Evidence law in Queensland [Eleventh edition.] 9780455238296, 0455238294

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Evidence Law in Queensland

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Evidence Law in Queensland

J R S FORBES BA, LLM (Hons) (Syd), LLM, PhD (Qld)

Barrister-at-Law (New South Wales and Queensland) Sometime Reader in Law, University of Queensland

ELEVENTH EDITION

LAWBOOK CO. 2016

Published in Sydney by Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited ABN 64 058 914 668 19 Harris Street, Pyrmont, NSW National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Forbes, J. R. S. Evidence Law in Queensland / J. R. S. Forbes 11th ed. 9780455238289 (pbk.) Includes index Evidence (Law) – Queensland. 347.94306 © 2016 Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited This publication is copyright. Other than for the purposes of and subject to the conditions under the Copyright Act, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Inquiries should be addressed to the publishers. All legislative material herein is reproduced by permission but does not purport to be the official or authorised version. It is subject to Commonwealth of Australia copyright. The Copyright Act 1968 permits certain reproduction and publication of Commonwealth legislation. In particular, s 182A of the Act enables a complete copy to be made by or on behalf of a particular person. For reproduction or publication beyond that permitted by the Act, permission should be sought in writing. Requests should be submited online at www.ag.gov.au/cca, faxed to (02) 6250 5989 or mailed to Commonwealth Copyright Administration, Attorney-General’s Department, Robert Garran Offices, National Circuit, Barton ACT 2600. This edition is up to date as of 5 May 2016. Editor: Nick Jewlachow Product Developer: Paul Gye Printed by Ligare Pty Ltd, Riverwood, NSW

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PREFACE This work was first published in 1986, a decade before the Commonwealth’s Evidence Act 1995 appeared. Marital privilege still applied in Queensland, DNA evidence was unknown, corporations might claim privilege against selfincrimination, and the prosecution’s duty of pre-trial disclosure lacked the force of s 590AB of the Criminal Code. Legislative modification of the Evidence Act since our 2014 edition has been mainly technical and minor. However, the Criminal Law (Domestic Violence) Amendment Act 2015 added to the class of “special witnesses” (as defined in s 21A) alleged victims of domestic violence, when they testify against the alleged offender. Consequently such witnesses may be relieved from giving evidence in the usual way, by one or more of several special orders. These include: obscuring the accused from the witness in court, excluding the accused or other persons from the courtroom while the witness testifies, allowing the evidence to be given in a separate room, or videotaping it for presentation at a later time. Nevertheless, as this text emphasises – in [A.9], [A.39], and [10.1] – the Act is by no means a code, and the law of evidence in Queensland remains, in large part, a common law subject. Recent developments are mainly judicial in character, and that evolutionary process is embodied in numerous additional authorities and comments in this edition. Not all the evolution is inconspicuous. The admissibility of admissions and confessions obtained by “under cover” police officers is considered in [130.56]ff, [Q.58], [Q.62] and [Q.71]. The centrality of the question: “Was the accused aware that he or she was addressing a ‘person in authority’?” was confirmed by the High Court’s refusal, on 11 March 2016, of special leave to appeal in the Daniel Morcombe case: R v Cowan; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2015] QCA 87. The High Court’s response to the Crown’s challenge to R v Baden-Clay [2015] QCA 265 is now awaited. It may determine whether a judicial creation of the mid-20th century (see [9D.3]), the “unsafe and unsatisfactory” verdict enables a court of appeal to reduce a conviction of murder to manslaughter when the accused simply denies responsibility for the death at the trial. The “unsafe and unsatisfactory” mantra is now a routine residuary clause in many criminal appeals. The proposed reopening of the “Bowraville murders” in New South Wales promises to revise the law of double jeopardy, and may even challenge the unrealities, not to say absurdities, of extreme applications of the rule against similar facts. Merilyn Shields, the able editor of every edition of this text since 2004 was, on this occasion, available as a consultant only. However, in her stead, I have

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benefited from the considerable skill and care, first, of Belinda Drake, and then, principally, of Nick Jewlachow. I am indebted to them both, and record my sincere thanks. Once again I acknowledge the encouragement and professional assistance of Anne, my dear wife. J R FORBES Brisbane, 31 May 2016

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface ....................................................................................................... v Table of Cases .......................................................................................... ix Table of Statutes ................................................................................... cxxv History and Common Law Foundations ................................................... 1 Evidence Act 1977–2016 ...................................................................... 168 Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection ................................................................................. 196 Taking Evidence Outside the Court: Evidence on Commission and Kindred Procedures ........................................... 344 Facilitating the Proof of Legislative and Official Documents ............. 381 Proof of Certain Miscellaneous Documents ......................................... 404 Proof of Interstate and Overseas Laws and Records and Convictions in Civil Cases ............................................................ 416 Documentary Hearsay ........................................................................... 431 Machine Copies Treated as Originals ................................................... 500 Simplifying Proof, Discretionary Exclusion of Admissible Evidence, Sentencing, Similar Facts ............................................. 518 Other Queensland Legislation ............................................................... 569 Commonwealth Evidence Law ............................................................. 625 Index ....................................................................................................... 659

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TABLE OF CASES A A v Hayden (No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 532 .............................................................. Q.2, Q.3 A (Minors), Re [1991] 2 Fam LR (Eng) 473 ............................................................. A.185 A Child v Western Australia (2005) 153 A Crim R 406; [2005] WASCA 91 ............................................................................................................................. A.105 A Debtor, Re [1927] 1 Ch 97 ....................................................................................... 83.13 A Petition by Fritz Van Beelen, Re (1974) 9 SASR 163 ............................................ 92.18 A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (2004) 216 CLR 253 .................................................................................................................. Q.109 A Solicitor, In re; Ex parte the Prothonotary (1939) 56 WN (NSW) 53 ........... A.113, 3.7 A and A, In the Marriage of [1985] FLC 91-613 ....................................... 6.8, 21A.3, Q.5 A and B, In the Marriage of (1989) 13 Fam LR 798 ................................................ A.173 A and B, Legal Practitioners v Disciplinary Tribunal (2001) 10 Tas R 152; [2001] TASSC 55 .................................................................................................... A.173 A3 v Australian Crime Commission [2006] FCA 894 ............................................... A.160 ACCC v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (No 3) [2002] ATPR 41-901 ............... A.203 AH Prentice Ltd, Re [1930] QWN 11 ................................................................... A.65, 6.8 AJ v The Queen (2011) 32 VR 614; [2011] VSCA 215 .............................................. Q.11 AM v Gill [2015] NSWSC 586 ..................................................................................... Q.12 AM v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 558; [2006] NTCCA 1 ............................... 21.18 AM v Western Australia (2008) 188 A Crim R 457; [2008] WASCA 196 ............... A.154 AMI Australia Holdings Pty Ltd v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (2009) 74 NSWLR 612; [2009] NSWSC 863 ....................................................... A.159 AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd v CGU Insurance Ltd (2005) 146 FCR 447; 13 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-658; [2005] FCAFC 185 ................................. A.219 ANZ Banking Group Ltd v Griffiths (1988) 49 SASR 385 .......................................... 95.5 AT & T Istel Ltd v Tully (No 1) [1993] AC 45 .......................................................... 10.21 AWA Ltd v Daniels (t/a Deloitte Haskins & Sells) (1992) 7 ACSR 463 .................. A.198 AWA Ltd v Daniels (t/a Deloitte Haskins and Sells) (1992) 9 ACSR 383 .............. A.197, A.198 AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382; [2006] FCA 571 ............................. A.163, A.187 AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30; [2006] FCA 1234 .... A.163, A.167, A.168, A.175, A.176, A.181, A.182 Aavelaid v Dental Board (NSW) [1998] ACL Rep 190 NSW 5 ............................... A.211 Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167; [1990] HCA 47 ....................................................................................................................... A.7 Abigroup Ltd v Atkins (1997) 42 NSWLR 623 ......................................................... A.176 Abrahamson v The Queen (1994) 63 SASR 139 ....................................................... A.143 Abram v Bank of New Zealand [1996] ATPR 41–507; [1996] FCA 1650 .................... 8.6 Abrath v North Eastern Railway Co (1883) 11 QBD 440 ......................................... A.102 Accident Insurance Mutual Holdings Ltd v McFadden (1993) 31 NSWLR 412 ................................................................................................................. 10.20, 10.22 Accom Finance Pty Ltd v Mars Pty Ltd (2007) 13 BPR 24,729; [2007] NSWSC 726 ................................................................................................ A.211, A.213 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Accurate Financial Consultants Pty Ltd v Koko Black Pty Ltd (2008) 66 ACSR 325; [2008] VSCA 86 ..................................................................... A.219, A.220 Ace Insurance Ltd v Trifunovski (2011) 200 FCR 532; [2011] FCA 1204 .............. A.219 Ackroyd v Minister for Tourism (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Dowsett J, 24 January 1986) ............................................................................................................. 84.5 Action Waste Collections Pty Ltd (In liq), Re; Crawford v O’Brien [1981] VR 691 ..................................................................................................................... 83.15 Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96 ..................................................................... 101.5 Adami v The Queen (1959) 108 CLR 605 ...................................... 59.4, 59.8, 59.9, 59.11 Adamopoulos v Olympic Airways SA (1991) 25 NSWLR 75 ........................ 131A.1, Q.6 Adams v Canon (1621) Ley 68; 73 ER 117 ................................................................. A.19 Adams v Lloyd (1858) 3 H & N 351; 157 ER 506 ........................................... 10.19, 14.3 Adamson v Queensland Law Society Inc [1990] 1 Qd R 498 ................ A.113, 3.7, 10.12 Adel Muhammed el Dabbah v Attorney-General for Palestine [1944] AC 156 .............................................................................................................................. 6.14 Adelaide Chemical and Fertiliser Co Ltd v Carlyle (1940) 64 CLR 514 ................. A.145 Adelaide Steamship Pty Ltd v Spalvins (1998) 81 FCR 360 ....................................... F.58 Adler v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) (2003) 179 FLR 1; 46 ACSR 504 ........................................................................................ A.70 Adler v Gardiner (2002) 43 ACSR 24 .......................................................................... Q.12 Administration of Papua and New Guinea v Daera Guba (1973) 130 CLR 353 ............................................................................................................... A.211, A.213 Administrator of Estate of Harold Beaver (Dec) v Macgregor [2001] WASC 222 ................................................................................................................. 74.6 Adsteam Building Industries Pty Ltd v Queensland Cement and Lime Co Ltd (No 4) [1985] 1 Qd R 127 ....................................... A.67, 10.11, 10.16, 68.4, 68.5 Adsteam Building Industries Pty Ltd v Queensland Cement and Lime Co Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 1 ............................................................................................... A.159 Adsteam Building Industries Pty Ltd v Queensland Cement and Lime Company Ltd (No 2) [1984] 2 Qd R 366 .................................................................. 2.2 Advertiser Newspapers v V (2000) 117 A Crim R 141 ................................................. Q.3 Aeberhard, Re [1952] QWN 42 ..................................................................................... 61.3 Aegis Blaze, The [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 203 .............................................................. A.195 Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552 ............................................................................. A.114 Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87 .................................. A.106, A.143, 101.2, Q.43 Ahmedi v Ahmedi (1991) 23 NSWLR 288 .................................................................. A.58 Ainsley Dunn & Co and Imported Brands Inc v Stewart & Son of Dundee [1969] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 49 .................................................................... 22.6, 22.12, 22.17 Ainsworth v Hanrahan (1991) 25 NSWLR 155 ........................................................... Q.10 Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade (No 2) [1983] 2 AC 394 ........................ A.159 Ajodha v The State [1981] 3 WLR 1 ............................................................................ Q.72 Akins v Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 539 ................................................. F.58, A.176 Akins v National Australia Bank (1994) 34 NSWLR 155 ............................................. A.4 Akot Pty Ltd v Rathmines Investments Pty Ltd [1984] 1 Qd R 302 .......................... A.56 Al-Hashemi v The Queen (2004) 208 ALR 491; 145 A Crim R 186; [2004] WASCA 61 ............................................................................. A.78, A.79, A.138 Al Shakarji v Mulhern [2010] QDC 476 ............................... A.62, 3.18, 49.1, 65.1, 101.2 Albarran v Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board (2007) 231 CLR 350 ............................................................................................... 10.12 Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542 ....... A.67, 83.12, 92.3, 92.15, 93A.17, 96.1, 98.4, 98.5 Alchin v Commissioner for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 ........... 17.15, 18.2, 19.6, 19.10, 19.17, 19.19, 101.5 [All references are to paragraph numbers] x

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Alessi v SE (2008) 187 A Crim R 427; [2008] NSWSC 909 ..................................... Q.24 Alexander v Manley (2004) 29 WAR 194; [2004] WASCA 140 ........ A.87, A.155, 19.12, 19.16, 101.10 Alexander v The Queen (1981) 145 CLR 395; 35 ALR 289 ......... A.1, A.77, A.78, A.79, 130.11 Alford v Magee (1952) 85 CLR 437 .......................................................................... A.134 Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners (No 2) [1972] 2 QB 102 .............................................................. A.163 Alishah v Gunns Ltd [2010] TASFC 6 ................................................................. 10.2, 24.1 Alister v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 404 ......................... A.91, A.160, 2.2, 10.19, 19.10 Allen v Allen [1894] P 248 .................................................................................. 20.2, A.88 Allen v Roughley (1995) 94 CLR 98 ........................................................................... Q.43 Allen, Re [1988] 1 Qd R 1 .................................................................................. 3.14, A.57 Allen, Allen & Hemsley v DCT (1989) 20 FCR 576; 89 ATC 4294 ........................ A.169 Allied Express Transport Pty Ltd v Michelle Anderson [1997] FCA 1161 ............ 129A.1 Allied Interstate (Qld) Pty Ltd v Barnes (1968) 118 CLR 581 ................................... A.86 Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [1983] 1 NSWLR 1 .................................................................................................................. A.94 Allitt v Sullivan [1988] VR 621 .................................................................................... Q.20 Allstate Life Insurance Co v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (No 33) (1996) 64 FCR 73; 136 ALR 627 ................................................................. A.66, 9C.2, 68.4, F.48 Alphafarm Pty Ltd v Eli Lilly Australia Pty Ltd (1996) 69 FCR 149 ...................... A.174 Aluminium Louvres & Ceilings Pty Ltd v Xue Qin Zheng (2006) 4 DDCR 358; [2006] NSWCA 34 ............................................................................... A.89 Alyssa Treasury Services Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 56 AAR 144; [2011] AATA 578 ............................................................................... Q.87 Amalgamated Television Services v Marsden [2002] NSWCA 419 ............................ A.78 Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden [1999] NSWCA 97 ..... A.175, F.58 Ambridge Investments Pty Ltd v Baker [2010] VSC 59 ............................... A.220, A.221 Amcor Ltd v Barnes [2011] VSC 341 ........................................................................ A.181 Amman v Wegener (1971) 129 CLR 415 ........................................................................ 3.9 Amman Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1988) 19 FCR 223; 81 ALR 710 .............................................................................................................................. 47.2 Ammar v Ammar [1954] P 468 .................................................................................... 22.10 Amoe v Director of Public Prosecutions (Nauru) (1991) 57 A Crim R 244; 103 ALR 595 ................................................................................................... 15.59 Ampolex Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Company (Canberra) Ltd (1996) 40 NSWLR 12 ................................................................................................................. F.58 Ampthill Peerage, The [1977] AC 547 ....................................................................... A.197 Anandagoda v The Queen [1962] 1 WLR 817 .................................................. Q.50, Q.53 Anchor Products Ltd v Hedges (1996) 115 CLR 493 .................................................. A.63 Andersen v Harper; Ex parte Andersen [1982] Qd R 105 .......................................... 10.24 Anderson v Bigmore (2006) 202 FLR 468; [2006] ACTSC 85 ........................ A.94, A.95 Anderson v Eric Anderson Radio & TV Pty Ltd (1965) 114 CLR 20 ............... 42.5, 68.1 Anderson v The Queen (1993) 177 CLR 520 ........................................................... 132C.3 Anderson v Weston (1840) 9 LJCP 194; 133 ER 117 .................................................. 62.1 Andrews v Cordiner [1947] 1 KB 655 ........................................................................ 102.2 Angaston & District Hospital v Thamm (1987) 47 SASR 177 .......................... A.58, F.30 Angel v Hawkesbury City Council [2008] Aust Torts Reports 81-955; [2008] NSWCA 130 ................................................................................................. A.76 Angell v Angell (1822) 1 Sim & St 83; 57 ER 33 ....................................................... 22.3 Anglim v Thomas [1974] VR 363 ..................................................................... 19.19, Q.43 Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 ................... 21F.3 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Annesley v Anglesea (1743) 17 St Tr 1139 ................................................................ A.181 Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] 1 Ch 55 .............................. Q.11 Antoun v The Queen [2006] HCA 2 ........................................................................... A.102 Anwaryar v Amanudin [2015] NSWSC 1763 ............................................................. A.219 Apand Pty Ltd v Kettle Chip Co Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 474; [1994] ATPR 41-353 ........................................................................................................... A.123 Apothecaries’ Company v Bentley (1824) 1 Car & P 538; 171 ER 1307 .................. Q.33 Application for Inquiry, Election of Officers, Transport Workers’ Union of Australia (WA Branch), Re (1989) 35 IR 223; 89 ALR 575 ......................... 2.2, 10.22 Application of Cannar v Eubanks [2003] NSWSC 802 ............................................. A.173 Application of Monier Inc, Re (2009) 76 NSWLR 158; [2009] NSWSC 986 .............................................................................................................................. 37.3 Appo v Stanley [2010] QSC 383 .................................................................................. A.75 Aqua-Marine Marketing Pty Ltd v Pacific Reef Fisheries (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 4) (2011) 194 FCR 479; [2011] FCA 578 ........................................ 83.6, 85.2 Aquila Coal Pty Ltd v Bowen Central Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 82 ................................ A.163 Aravena v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 288 ................................................................ F.51 Archer v Neuendorf [2014] QDC 91 ............................................................................... 8.6 Arcus Shopfitters Pty Ltd v Planning Commission (WA) (2002) 125 LGERA 180 ............................................................................................................... A.74 Areva NC (Aust) Ltd v Summit Resources (Aust) Pty Ltd [2007] WASC 276 ........................................................................................................................... A.175 Arian v Nguyen (2001) 33 MVR 37 ............................................................................. A.75 Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Global Gaming Supplies Pty Ltd (2013) 87 ALJR 668; [2013] HCA 21 ............................................................ A.130 Armat v Little [1909] St R Qd 83 ................................................................................. A.75 Armour v Walker (1884) LR 25 Ch D 673 ................................................................... 22.7 Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd v Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd (2012) 295 ALR 348; [2012] NSWCA 430 .............................................................................................................. F.56 Arno v Forsyth (1986) 9 FCR 576; 65 ALR 125 .............. A.194, Q.13, Q.14, Q.19, Q.20 Arnold v Westminster Bank Plc [1990] Ch 573 ......................................................... A.212 Arnott v Hayes (1887) LR 36 Ch D 731 ....................................................................... 84.7 Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313; [1990] ATPR 41-061 ............................................................................ A.67, A.148, 9C.5, 59.6, Artistic Builders Pty Ltd v Nash [2009] NSWSC 102 ............................................... A.186 Asahi Holdings (Australia) Pty Ltd v Pacific Equity Partners Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] FCA 481 .......................................................................................... A.179 Asahi Holdings (Australia) Pty Ltd v Pacific Equity Partners Pty Ltd (No 4) [2014] FCA 796 .......................................................................................... A.163 Asbury v Hicklin (1904) 81 SW 390 .............................................................................. A.6 Asciak v The Queen [1990] WAR 120 ............................................................................ 8.4 Ashby v Slipper [2014] FCAFC 15 ..................................................................... A.114, F.4 Asia Pacific Telecommunications Ltd v Optus Networks Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 550 ....................................................................................... A.166, A.173, Q.3 Assafiri v Shell Company (Australia) Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1058 ................................ A.68 Associated Dominions Assurance Society Pty Ltd v John Fairfax and Sons Ltd (1952) 72 WN (NSW) 250 ................................................................................. 88.3 Astway Pty Ltd v Gold Coast City Council (2008) 159 LGERA 335; [2008] QCA 73 ....................................................................................................... A.132 Atkinson, In the Marriage of [1997] FLC 92-728 ....................................................... 10.26 Atra v Farmers & Graziers Co-op Co Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 281 .................... 83.11, 98.3 Attorney-General v Bowman (1791) 2 B & P 532n; 126 ER 1423 .......................... A.135 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xii

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Attorney-General v British Broadcasting Corporation [1978] 1 WLR 477 .................... 3.4 Attorney-General v Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch 91; 154 ER 38 ................ A.124, 94.4, F.31 Attorney-General v Horner (No 2) [1913] 2 Ch 140 .................................................... 65.1 Attorney-General v Ireland [1995] QCA 75 .................................................................. 83.5 Attorney-General v Kitchen (1989) 51 SASR 54 ......................................................... A.61 Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440 .......................................... Q.3 Attorney-General v Radloff (1854) 10 Ex 84; 156 ER 366 ............................................ 3.7 Attorney-General v Railways Commissioners (1923) 23 SR (NSW) 265 ................... 51.5 Attorney-General (Cth), Ex parte; Re a Barrister and Solicitor (1972) 20 FLR 234 ................................................................................................................... 10.12 Attorney-General (NSW), Re [2015] NSWSC 1149 ..................................................... 22.2 Attorney-General (NSW), Re [2015] NSWSC 1683 ..................................................... 22.5 Attorney-General (NSW) v Findlay (1976) 50 ALJR 637 .......................................... 19.13 Attorney-General (NSW) v Martin (1909) 9 CLR 713 ........................... Q.43, Q.45, Q.50 Attorney-General (NSW) v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCCA 307 ........................................................................................................................... A.159 Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 ................................................. A.222 Attorney-General (NSW) v Stuart (1994) 75 A Crim R 8 ......................................... A.159 Attorney-General (NSW) v Time Inc Magazine Company Ltd [1994] NSWJB 94 ................................................................................................................. A.78 Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500 ......................... A.181, 2.2, Q.14 Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475 ........................................... A.175 Attorney-General (Qld) v Black [2015] QSC 302 .................................................... 39PB.2 Attorney-General (Qld) v Colin Lovitt QC [2003] QSC 279 ..................................... 101.2 Attorney-General (Qld) v Harvey (2012) 263 FLR 433; [2012] QSC 173 ............... 92.41, 93A.17, 98.4, 98.5 Attorney-General (Qld) v Marama [2015] QSC 8 ............................................. 92.5, 92.27 Attorney-General (SA) v Kowalski [2014] SASC 1 .................................................. A.213 Attorney-General (SA) v Kowalski [2015] SASC 123 .............................................. A.213 Attorney-General of Botswana v Aussie Diamond Products Pty Ltd (No 3) [2010] WASC 141 ................................................................................................... A.221 Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Humphreys Estate (Queens Gardens) Ltd [1987] 1 AC 114 .............................................................................................. A.220 Attorney-General’s Reference No 1 of 1983 [1983] 2 VR 410 .................. 21A.5, 93A.20 Attorney-General’s Reference No 2 of 1993 (1994) 4 Tas R 26; 73 A Crim R 567 .................................................................................................................. 9.1 Attwood v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 353 ............................ 15.29, 15.35, 15.36, A.135 Austic v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 110 ........................................................ A.106 Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582 .................. A.220 Australand Corporation (Qld) Pty Ltd v Johnson [2006] QSC 418 .......................... A.178 Australasian Brokerage Ltd v Australian & New Zealand Banking Corp Ltd (1934) 52 CLR 430 ............................................................................................ Q.43 Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Alirezai [2002] Q Conv R 54-574 .................................................................................................................. A.215 Australian & Overseas Telecommunications Corporation Ltd v McAuslan (1993) 47 FCR 492 ................................................................................................... A.62 Australian Alliance Insurance Co Ltd v Goodwyn [1916] St R Qd 225 ..................... 56.1 Australian Associated Motor Insurers Ltd v NRMA Insurance Ltd (2002) 124 FCR 518 ........................................................................................................... A.214 Australian Broadcasting Corporation and Masters v Cloran (1984) 4 FCR 151; 57 ALR 742 ............................................................................................ Q.18, Q.21 Australian Broadcasting Tribunal, Re; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13 ......................................................................................................................... 3.5 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Australian Co-operative Foods Ltd v Norco Co-operative Ltd (1999) 46 NSWLR 267 ................................................................................................. A.54, A.216 Australian Commercial Research and Development Ltd v Hampson [1991] 1 Qd R 508 .................................................................................................... 6.15, A.173 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1950) 83 CLR 1 ..................... A.62, 51.8 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v 4WD Systems Pty Ltd (2003) 200 ALR 491; [2003] FCA 850 ............................................................. F.51 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Advanced Medical Institute Pty Ltd (2005) 147 FCR 235; [2005] FCA 1357 ...................................... F.46 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (1998) 81 FCR 526; 153 ALR 393 ............................................... A.167 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd (1999) 92 FCR 375; 165 ALR 468 .................................................................. F.51, F.52 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Mayo International Pty Ltd (1998) 85 FCR 327 ............................................................................ F.49, Q.43 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Pratt (No 3) (2009) 175 FCR 558; [2009] ATPR 42-287; [2009] FCA 407 ............................................ F.38 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TF Woollam & Son Pty Ltd (No 2) (2011) 278 ALR 618; [2011] FCA 1216 ...................................... A.112 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Visy Industries Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 239 ALR 762; [2007] ATPR 42-157; [2007] FCA 444 ...................................................................................................... A.187 Australian Consolidated Investments Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1991) 5 ACSR 233 ................................................................................................ Q.110 Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan (1965) 112 CLR 483 ................... 3.8, A.111 Australian Crime Commission v Gray [2003] NSWCA 318 ..................................... A.219 Australian Crime Commission v Stoddart (2011) 244 CLR 554; [2011] HCA 47 ........................................................................................................... 8.2, 130.35 Australian Energy Ltd v Lennard Oil NL (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, 6 February 1985) .......................................................................................................... Q.52 Australian Federal Police, Commissioner of v McMillan (1987) 13 FCR 7; 70 ALR 203 ........................................................................................................... F.78 Australian Federal Police, Commissioner of v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 ........................................................................ A.88, A.174, A.182 Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc v Tobacco Institute of Australia (1990) 95 ALR 444 .................................................................... 22.6, 22.10 Australian Football League v Carlton Football Club Ltd [1998] 2 VR 546 ............. Q.109 Australian Granites Ltd v Eisenwerk Hensel Bayreuth Dipl-ing Burkhardt GmbH [2001] 1 Qd R 461 ....................................................................................... A.62 Australian Hospital Care (Pindara) Pty Ltd v Duggan (No 2) [1999] VSC 131 ........................................................................................................................... A.163 Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Re; Ex parte Australian Transport Officers Federation (1990) 171 CLR 216 .............................................. 83.13 Australian Medic-Care Company Ltd v Hamilton Pharmaceutical Pty Ltd (2008) 170 FCR 9; [2008] FCA 1038 ...................................................................... F.46 Australian Medical Association (NSW Branch) v Minister for Health and Community Services (1992) 26 NSWLR 114 .......................................................... 47.2 Australian National Airlines Commission v Commonwealth of Australia (1975) 131 CLR 582 .................................................................................................. 3.11 Australian Postal Commission v Dao (No 2) (1986) 69 ALR 125 ................................. 3.5 Australian Rugby Union Ltd v Hospitality Group Pty Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 253 ............................................................................................... A.163, F.47, F.56 Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479 ........................ A.137 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xiv

Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Cases

Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Adler (No 1) (2001) 20 ACLC 222 ............................................................................................................ A.70 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Cycclone Magnetic Engines Inc (2009) 224 FLR 50; [2009] QSC 58 .................................................... 73.1 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Healey (2011) 278 ALR 618; [2011] FCA 717 ..................................................................................... A.112 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Hobbs [2012] NSWSC 1276 ......................................................................................................................... A.120 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Lindberg (2009) 25 VR 398; [2009] VSCA 234 .................................................................................... A.195 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Managed Investments Pty Ltd (No 6) [2013] QSC 355 ............................................................................. 10.22 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Managed Investments Pty Ltd (No 7) [2014] QSC 72 .................................................................... 98.5, 130.35 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Managed Investments Pty Ltd (No 8) [2014] QSC 204 ............................................................................. 101.1 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Mercorella (No 3) (2006) 58 ACSR 40; [2006] FCA 772 ................................................................... A.181 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Michalik [2004] NSWSC 966 ................................................................................................................ Q.2 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2004) 49 ACSR 578; 22 ACLC 1125; [2004] NSWSC 467 ............................................ 15.9, 22.4, F.85 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich [2004] NSWSC 1089 ......................................................................................................................... A.163 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 188 FLR 416; 220 ALR 324; 52 ACSR 374; [2005] NSWSC 62 ............................... Q.12; Q.13 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 190 FLR 242; 23 ACLC 430; [2005] NSWSC 149 .............. A.67, A.68, A.73, A.74, A.97, 59.6 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 216 ALR 320; 191 FLR 385; 53 ACSR 752; [2005] NSWSC 417 ............ 3.15, 44.1, 62.1, 83.2, 83.14, 84.7, 85.1, 85.2, 92.15, 92.23, 96.1, Q.100 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 54 ACSR 28; [2005] NSWSC 471 .......................................................................... 83.1, 83.5, 84.7 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 54 ACSR 326; [2005] NSWCA 152 .............................................................................. 130.4, A.75 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229 .................................................................... 84.7, A.114, A.119 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich [2015] NSWSC 586 ............................................................................................................................. Q.12 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Sigalla (No 4) [2011] NSWSC 62 .............................................................................................................. A.111 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Vines (2003) 48 ACSR 291; [2003] NSWSC 1095 .................................................................. A.67, F.48 Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees Ltd (1995) 62 FCR 504; 133 ALR 1 ........................................................................................................... F.6 Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485 ............................................................................................................... F.6 Australian Statistician v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd [2008] WASCA 34 .............. A.159 Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2004] WASCA 229 ..................... A.75 Aveson v Lord Kinnaird (1805) 6 East 188; 102 ER 1258 ....................................... A.148 Avis v Mark Bain Constructions Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 80 ......................................... A.141 Aydin v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd [1984] 3 NSWLR 684 .............................. A.188 Aytugrul v The Queen [2012] HCA 15 ......................................................................... A.69 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Aztech Science Pty Ltd v Atlanta Aerospace (Woy Woy) Pty Ltd (2005) 55 ACSR 1; [2005] NSWCA 319 .............................................................................. A.4 Aztech Science Pty Ltd v Atlanta Aerospace (Woy Woy) Pty Ltd (2008) 187 A Crim R 245; [2008] NSWSC 908 ............................................................... A.111 Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50; [2001] HCA 25 .............. A.20, A.122, 10.8

B B v Dentists’ Disciplinary Tribunal [1994] 1 NZLR 95 ............................................... 22.4 B v Gould (1993) 67 A Crim R 297 ........................................................................ 21AG.1 B v Medical Superintendent of Macquarie Hospital (1987) 10 NSWLR 440 ............................................................................................................................... Q.2 B v Protective Commissioner [2000] NSWSC 718 ...................................................... A.75 B v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 599 ......................................................................... A.136 BBH v The Queen (2012) 245 CLR 499; [2012] HCA 9 .......................................... A.136 BCM v The Queen (2013) 303 ALR 387; 88 ALJR 101; [2013] HCA 48 ................ 9D.3, 21AM.1 BHP Billiton v Harwood (2011) 9 DDCR 73; [2011] NSWSC 680 ......................... Q.110 BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz (2004) 221 CLR 400 ...................................................... Q.110 BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v National Competition Council [2007] ATPR 42-141; [2006] FCA 1764 ............................................................................ A.57 BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v National Competition Council (2007) 162 FCR 234; [2007] FCAFC 157 .......................................................................... A.57 BHP Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union [2000] FCA 1613 ........................................................................................... Q.43 BI (Contracting) Pty Ltd v AW Baulderstone Holdings Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 173 ............................................................................................................. Q.96 BLM v RWS [2006] QSC 139 ....................................................................................... 59.9 BP Australia Pty Ltd v Nyran Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1302 .......................................... A.175 BPA Industries Ltd v Black (1987) 11 NSWLR 609 .................................................. 10.14 BT Australasia Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 7) [1998] FCA 294 ......................... F.58 BT Australasia Pty Ltd v New South Wales (unreported, Fed Ct Aust, Sackville J, 1 April 1998) ....................................................................................... A.180 BTR Engineering (Aust) (formerly Borg-Warner Australia Ltd) v Patterson (1990) 20 NSWLR 724 ........................................................................................... 10.22 Badraie v Commonwealth (2005) 195 FLR 119; [2005] NSWSC 1195 ................... A.211 Bahr v Nicolay (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 604; [1988] HCA 16 ................................... A.56 Baiada v Waste Recycling & Processing Service (NSW) (1999) 130 LGERA 52; [1999] NSWCA 139 .................................................................. A.63, Q.33 Bailey v City Smash Repairs (Vic) Pty Ltd (1998) 27 MVR 545 ............................... A.62 Bailey v Department of Land and Water Conservation (2009) 74 NSWLR 333; [2009] NSWCA 100 ............................................................... A.162, A.163, A.182 Bailey v Nominal Defendant [2004] QCA 344 ............................................................. 43.1 Baines v State Bank of New South Wales (1985) 2 NSWLR 729 ............................ A.213 Baker v Affoo [2014] QSC 46 ......................................................................... A.148, 92.15 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 ............... A.8, A.16, A.162, A.163, A.164, A.166, A.171, A.192, A.194, 3.5, 10.6, 10.10, 10.37, Q.12, Q.14, Q.109 Baker v Evans (1987) 77 ALR 565 ................................................................. 10.17, A.195 Baker Johnson v Jorgenson [2002] QDC 205 ................................................................. 7.3 Bakopoulos v General Motors Holden Pty Ltd [1973] VR 190 .................................. A.96 Balabel v Air India [1988] Ch 317; 2 All ER 246 ............................... A.16, A.165, A.168 Bale v Mills (2011) 282 ALR 336; [2011] NSWCA 226 ................................ A.94, A.114 Balnaves v Smith [2008] 2 Qd R 413; [2008] QSC 215 ........................................... A.175 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xvi

Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Cases

Balog v Independent Commission Against Corruption (1990) 169 CLR 625 ............................................................................................................................ 10.33 Bamfield v Massey (1808) 1 Camp 460; 170 ER 1021 ................................................ 92.8 Bandiera v Adamedes [1963] SASR 103 ..................................................................... 22.21 Bangkok Bank Ltd v Swatow Lace Co Ltd [1963] NSWR 488 ................................ 22.15 Bank of Australasia v Palmer [1897] AC 540 ..................................................... 3.14, A.54 Bank of India v Wilson (1877) LR 3 Exch D 108 ...................................................... 83.13 Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 ................................ 83.13 Bank of New South Wales v Withers (1981) 35 ALR 21 ................................... 28.1, A.65 Bank of New Zealand v Simpson [1900] AC 182 ....................................................... A.56 Bank of Valletta PLC v National Crime Authority (1999) 164 ALR 45 ...................... 68.4 Bankinvest AG v Seabrook (1988) 14 NSWLR 711 .................................................. Q.110 Banksia Mortgages Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 535 .................................. A.163, A.175 Bankstown Football Club Ltd v CIC Insurance Ltd (1998) 10 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-406 .......................................................................................... A.213 Bannister v The Queen (1993) 10 WAR 484 .............................................................. 21.15 Bannon v The Queen (1995) 185 CLR 1 ......................................................... A.142, Q.43 Banque Comerciale SA, en Liquidation v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279 .................................................................................................................. A.197 Baptist Union of Queensland – Carinity v Roberts [2015] FCA 1068 ...................... A.166 Barber v Rowe [1948] 2 All ER 1050 ........................................................................ Q.103 Barclay, Ex parte (1924) 24 SR (NSW) 416 ................................................................. 53.8 Barden v Barden (1921) 21 SR (NSW) 588 ............................................................... A.198 Barker v Linklater [2007] QSC 125 ............................................................................. 92.29 Barker v The Queen (1993) 153 CLR 338 .................................................................... 99.2 Barker v The Queen (1994) 78 A Crim R 1; 127 ALR 280 ..................................... 130.49 Barkway v South Wales Transport Co Ltd [1949] 1 KB 54 ....................................... 92.38 Barnes v Allied Interstate (Qld) Pty Ltd; Ex parte Barnes [1969] Qd R 244 ............................................................................................................................ 19.23 Barnes, Re [1968] 1 NSWR 697 .................................................................................... 28.1 Baron of Say and Sele (1848) 1 HLC 507 .................................................................... 58.1 Barrett Property Group Pty Ltd v Dennis Family Homes Pty Ltd (No 2) (2011) 193 FCR 479; [2011] FCA 276 .................................................................. A.205 Barrier Wharfs Ltd v W Scott Fell & Co Ltd (1908) 5 CLR 647 ............................. A.197 Barristers Board of Western Australia v Tranter Corporation Pty Ltd [1976] WAR 65 ................................................................................................. A.6, A.48 Barry v Police (2009) 197 A Crim R 445; [2009] SASC 295 ..................................... Q.45 Bartlett v Higgins [1901] 2 KB 230 ............................................................................ 22.31 Bartlett v Lewis (1862) 12 CBNS 249; 171 ER 1139 ................................................ 10.26 Barton v Lake Macquarie City Council [2014] FCA 1103 ....................... A.67, A.75, F.48 Barton v North Staffordshire Railway Co (1887) 35 WR 536 ................................... 22.23 Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75 ........................................................................ 3.9 Bartucciotto v Euro Printing Pty Ltd [1999] WASCA 1011 ...................................... A.211 Basser v Medical Board of Victoria [1981] VR 953 ........................................... A.211, 3.7 Bassett v Ferguson [1952] VLR 481 .............................................................................. 17.9 Basto v The Queen (1954) 91 CLR 628 ......................................................... 130.34, Q.79 Bates v Nelson (1973) 6 SASR 149 ................................................................... 83.8, 83.12 Batey v Potts (2004) 61 NSWLR 274; [2004] NSWSC 606 ........................................ 79.7 Batista v Citra Constructions Pty Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 351 ................................... A.148 Batlow Packing House and Cool Stores Rural Co-op Society Ltd v Commonwealth & Dominion Line Ltd (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 314 ................ 51.5, 66.1 Bauer Equipment Australia Pty Ltd v ACN 153 866 114 Pty Ltd [2016] QSC 76 .................................................................................................................... Q.110 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Bauhaus Pyrmont Pty Ltd (In liq), Re [2006] NSWSC 543 ...................................... A.178 Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137; [1987] HCA 59 ............................ A.7 Bax Global (Aust) Pty Ltd v Evans (1999) 47 NSWLR 538 ....................................... F.61 Bayliss v Cassidy (No 2) [2000] 1 Qd R 464 ............................................................ A.175 Bayly v Vaughan [1989] VR 364 .................................................................. 130.19, 130.21 Baynes v Osborne (1873) 4 QSCR 1 .................................................... 22.19, 22.20, 22.30 Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (1991) 105 ALR 456 .................................................. A.3 Beamish v The Queen [1962] WAR 85 ........................................................... 130.46, Q.55 Beamish v The Queen [2005] WASCA 62 ........................................................... 92.9, 96.1 Beaton v McDivitt (1985) 13 NSWLR 134 ................................................................... 3.12 Beattie v Ball [1999] 3 VR 1 .............................................................................. A.94, A.95 Beavan Investments Ltd v Blackall and Struthers (No 2) [1978] 2 NZLR 97 ............................................................................................................................. A.148 Beazley v Steinhardt (1999) 106 A Crim R 21 .......................................................... A.181 Bechara v Jawhar [2007] NSWCA 25 .......................................................................... A.62 Beck v Weinstock (2012) 8 BFRA 279; [2012] NSWCA 289 ................................... A.211 Beckett v Nurse [1948] 1 KB 535 ................................................................................ Q.98 Beecham Pty Ltd v Periera (2001) 22 NSWCCR 507; [2001] NSWCA 278 ........................................................................................................................... A.211 Belan v Casey [2002] NSWSC 58 .............................................................................. A.173 Belhaven and Stenton Peerage [1875] 1 AC 278 ....................................................... A.106 Bell v Clarke (1884) 10 VLR (E) 283 ......................................................................... 22.20 Bell v FS & U Industrial Benefit Society Ltd (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, McLelland J, 9 September 1987) noted in (1992) 66 ALJ ............................ A.74, 59.6 Bell, In the Marriage of (1993) FLC 92-347 ............................................................... 92.30 Bell, Re [1969] VR 597 ................................................................................................. A.57 Bell v Western Australia (No 2) [2014] WASC 260 ................................................. 130.11 Bell Goup Ltd (In liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 70 ACSR 1; [2008] WASC 239 .......... A.95, A.119, A.104, A.217, A.218, A.219, A.220, A.221 Bell Group (In liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (2004) 189 FLR 360; 208 ALR 491; [2004] WASC 162 .......................................................... 22.1, 22.4, F.85 Bell Telephone Company of Canada, Re (1947) 89 CCC 196 .................................... Q.17 Bellevue Crescent Pty Ltd v Marland Holdings Pty Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 364 ............................................................................................................... F.47 Bellini v ANZ Banking Group [1998] ACL Rep 195 ................................ A.2, 84.7, 106.3 Bellino v Clair [1993] 2 Qd R 236 ............................................................................... A.35 Bellis v United States 417 US 85 (1974) .................................................................... 10.16 Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd v Gorczynski (No 3) [2016] NSWSC 55 .............. A.208 Benecke v National Australia Bank (1993) 35 NSWLR 110 ........................ A.175, A.186 Beneficial Finance Co Ltd v Conway [1970] VR 321 .................................................. 3.11 Beneficial Finance Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (1991) 31 FCR 523; 58 A Crim R 1 ............................................................ Q.18 Beneficial Finance Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (1991) 21 ATR 1584; 52 A Crim R 423 ....................................................... Q.18 Bennett v Chief Executive Officer, Australian Customs Service (2004) 140 FCR 101; [2004] FCAFC 237 ................................................................................ A.175 Bennett v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 70 ........................................................... 79.7 Bennett, Ex parte; Re Cunningham (1967) 86 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 323 ...................... 101.9 Benstead v Edwards (2003) 138 A Crim R 552; [2003] QCA 154 ............................. Q.18 Bentley v Cooke (1784) 3 Doug 442; 99 ER 729 ........................................................... 7.4 Bentley v Nelson [1963] WAR 89 .............................................................................. A.203 Bercove v Hermes [No 3] (1983) 67 FLR 186; 49 ALR 156 .................................... 10.31 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xviii

Evidence Law in Queensland

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Berdan v Greenwood (1880) 20 Ch D 764 ................................................................. 22.15 Beresford v Attorney-General [1918] P 33 .................................................................... 22.3 Berg v Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) [2009] QCA 213 .................................. Q.10 Berger v Raymond Sun Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 625 ........................................................ A.134 Berjak (Victoria) Pty Ltd v Peerless Processing Co Pty Ltd [1963] VR 515 .............................................................................................................................. 92.4 Berkeley Peerage case (1811) 4 Camp 401; 171 ER 128 ............................................ A.20 Berrell v Gill (1993) 113 FLR 333 ............................................................................. A.120 Berry v Wong [2000] NSWSC 1002 ........................................................................... A.216 Best v The Queen [2012] VSCA 277 .......................................................................... A.120 Betfair Pty Ltd v Racing New South Wales (No 12) [2009] FCA 1519 ................... A.166 Bevan v Western Australia (2012) 43 WAR 233; 224 A Crim R 227; [2012] WASCA 153 .................................................................................................. A.63 Bhagat v Global Custodians Ltd [2002] NSWCA 160 ............................................... A.202 Bickle v Attorney-General (Qld) [2015] QCA 263 ..................................................... 10.32 Bierkowski v Pearson (1971) 18 FLR 110 ................................................................. A.105 Binqld Finances Pty Ltd, Re; Ex parte Sheahan and Lock (2015) 107 ACSR 163; [2015] FCA 718 .................................................................................. A.178 Birchall v Bullough [1896] 1 QB 325 ......................................................................... 19.16 Bird v Adams [1972] Crim LR 174 .............................................................................. Q.43 Bird v Keep [1918] 2 KB 692 ....................................................................................... 74.4 Birla Nifty Pty Ltd v International Mining Industry Underwriters Ltd (2014) 47 WAR 522; [2014] WASCA 180 ................................................ A.217, A.221 Birmingham and Midland Motor Omnibus Co Ltd v London and North Western Railway Co [1913] 3 KB 850 ..................................................................... 20.2 Birrell v Australian National Airlines Commission (1984) 1 FCR 526; 55 ALR 211 ................................................................................................................... 10.23 Birrell v Dryer (1884) 9 AC 345 ................................................................................... 65.1 Bishop of Lincoln, Re [1892] AC 644 ........................................................................... 51.8 Black Uhlans Inc v Crime Commission (NSW) (2002) 12 BPR 22,421; [2002] NSWSC 1060 ................................................................................................. 16.3 Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 .................................................... A.211, A.212, A.213 Blake v Summersby [1889] WN 39 ............................................................................... 3.26 Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowper 63; 98 ER 969 ...................................................... A.114 Blayney v Barron and Stobart (unreported, Vic Sup Ct, Nathan J, 10 September 1987) .................................................................................................... 130.61 Bleasby v Romney (1898) 24 VLR 201 ........................................................................ 22.7 Blewitt v The Queen (1988) 62 ALJR 503 ........................................... 17.16, 101.5, 101.6 Blue Pines, Re [1988] 1 Qd R 13 .................................................................................. 20.2 Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd [1942] 2 KB 253 .............................. 10.2, 10.20, 13.1, 14.2 Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421 ................................................................................. 15.20 Bocquee v Allen (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Master Weld, 2 September 1985) ........................................................................................................................... 14.4 Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84; [2008] FCAFC 63 ................................ A.75, F.35 Bohdahl v The Queen (1987) 24 A Crim R 318 ................................................. 15.33, A.4 Bolkiah v KPMG (a firm) [1999] 2 WLR 215 ........................................................... A.173 Bollen v Hickson [1981] Qd R 249 ....................................................... A.211, A.212, 53.3 Bolton v Kienzle (1926) 43 WN (NSW) 30 .................................................... 22.10, 22.18 Bomford v Western Australia [2014] WASCA 43 ...................................................... A.137 Bond v Cerruto [2003] QCA 219 .............................................................. 79.6, 79.7, 101.2 Bond v Tuohy (1995) 56 FCR 92; 128 ALR 595 ........................................... A.194, 10.37 Bond Air Services v Hill [1955] 2 QB 417 ......................................................... A.103, 3.6 Bond Media Ltd v John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd (1988) 16 NSWLR 82 .......... 19.19, Q.43 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Bonett v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 234 ................................................................... A.4 Bonfoal Pty Ltd v Botany Bay City Council (1999) 105 LGERA 190; [1998] NSWLEC 282 ............................................................................................... A.60 Bonhote v Henderson [1895] 1 Ch 742 ....................................................................... 22.17 Boonudnoon v The Queen (2002) 172 FLR 111 .......................................................... Q.45 Boorer v HLB Mann Judd (NSW) Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1499 .............................. A.68 Booth v Bosworth (2001) 114 FCR 39; 117 LGERA 168 .............................................. F.6 Boral Resources Pty Ltd v Donnelly [1988] 1 Qd R 506 ............................................ A.57 Boranga v Flintoff (1997) 19 WAR 1 ........................................................................... A.57 Borg v Northern Rivers Finance Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 112 ........................................ A.141 Borowski v Quayle [1966] VR 382 .................................................................... 9C.5, A.75 Bowden Bros & Co v Imperial Marine and Transport Insurance Co (1905) 5 SR (NSW) 614 ..................................................................................... 68.5, 69.2, 73.1 Bowen, Re [1996] 2 Qd R 8 ........................................................................................ 10.12 Bowen-James v Walton (unreported, NSWCA, 5 August 1991) .................................. 10.2 Boyle v Wiseman (1855) 10 Ex 647; 156 ER 598 ................................. 6.15, 10.18, 10.26 Boyse, Re (1882) 20 Ch D 760 .......................................................................... 22.7, 22.11 Bradken Consolidated Ltd v Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd (1979) 145 CLR 107 ............................................................................................................... 2.1 Bradrose Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Police; Ex parte Bradrose [1989] 2 Qd R 304 ................................................................................................................... Q.18 Brady v Thornton (1948) 75 CLR 140 ...................................................... F.73, Q.27, Q.28 Brady Street Developments Pty Ltd v ME Asset Investments Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1755 .............................................................................................. A.219 Brain v The Queen [2010] VSCA 172 .......................................................................... Q.53 Brandi v Mingot (1976) 12 ALR 551 ............................................................. A.118, A.119 Brauer v DPP (Cth) (1989) 45 A Crim R 109; 91 ALR 491 ........................................ F.75 Brebner v Bruce (1950) 82 CLR 161 ............................................................................ 43.2 Brebner v Perry [1961] SASR 177 ............................................ 10.19, 10.21, 10.22, 10.27 Breunis v Penthouse Publications Ltd (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Levine J, 20 August 1993) ....................................................................................................... 10.20 Brewer v Brewer (1953) 83 CLR 1 ............................................................................ A.213 Brewer v Castles (No 3) (1984) 52 ALR 581 .............................................................. Q.14 Brewster v Milne (1993) 18 MVR 83 ......................................................................... A.213 Brewster v Sewell (1820) 3 B & Ad 296; 106 ER 172 .............................................. 106.3 Brickworks Ltd v Shire of Warringah (1963) 108 CLR 568 ....................................... A.63 Briese v Turner (1989) 10 QL Reps 75 ....................................................................... 10.36 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 .... 3.7, 13.1, 59.11, 132C.2, A.113, A.114, F.4 Brimblecombe v Duncan; Ex parte Duncan [1958] Qd R 8 ............................ A.103, Q.35 Brisbane City Council v Attorney-General for Queensland [1978] 3 WLR 299 ........................................................................................................................... A.214 Brisbane City Council v Group Projects Pty Ltd (1979) 145 CLR 143 ........................ 2.1 Brisbane City Council v Woodhall Ltd [1983] 1 Qd R 563 ...................................... A.211 Brisbane City Council and White, Re (1972) 50 LGRA 225 .................................... A.202 Brisbane Unit Development Corporation Pty Ltd v Robertson [1983] 2 Qd R 105 ............................................................................................................. A.54, A.216 Briscoe v Briscoe [1968] P 501 ..................................................................................... 6.13 Bristol Corporation v Cox (1884) 26 Ch D 678 ......................................................... A.187 British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Eubanks (2004) 60 NSWLR 483; [2004] NSWCA 158 ........................................................................... 22.2 British Coal Corporation v Dennis Rye (No 2) [1988] 1 WLR 1113 ........................ A.179 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xx

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Table of Cases

British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd [1981] AC 1096; 1 All ER 417 ..................................................................................................................... A.196 Britt, Ex parte [1987] 1 Qd R 221 ................................................................................ A.48 Britton v Commissioner for Road Transport (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 249 .................... 101.7 Broadbent v Medical Board of Queensland [2010] QCA 352 ................................... A.207 Broadhurst v The Queen [1964] AC 441 ...................................................................... Q.54 Brodie v Streeter (2003) 180 FLR 176; [2003] ACTSC 88 ....................................... 21A.3 Bromley v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 315 ................................................... 130.4, Q.107 Brooks v Ticor Chemical Company Pty Ltd [2003] 2 Qd R 117 .............................. A.194 Brotheron v The Queen (1992) 29 NSWLR 95 ............................................................ A.67 Brounsell, Ex parte (1778) 2 Cowp 829; 98 ER 1385 ................................................ 10.12 Brouwer v Titan Corporation Ltd (1997) 73 FCR 241 ................................................ A.48 Brown v Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 46 ATR 393 .......................................... A.200 Brown v Mahony [1967] Qd R 592 ................................................................ A.143, A.148 Brown v Mt Isa Mines Ltd (unreported, Qld Sup Ct FC, 16 December 1988) ......................................................................................................................... 92.42 Brown v The King (1913) 17 CLR 570 ......................................................... A.105, A.145 Brown v The Queen [1980] Tas SR 61 ......................................................................... A.95 Brown v Western Australia [2011] WASCA 111 ......................................................... 19.17 Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 97 ..................................................................................... A.94 Browning v Beston (1555) 1 Plowd 131; 75 ER 202 .................................................. A.14 Bruce v Ligar (1869) 6 WW & a’B (E) 240 ................................................................. 22.7 Brumar (Vic) Pty Ltd v Norris (2010) 28 VR 665; [2010] VSCA 206 ..................... A.211 Brunsgard v Jennings [1974] WAR 35 ............................................................................ 9.1 Brunswick Hill Apartments Pty Ld v CGU Insurance Ltd [2010] VSC 532 ............ A.187 Bruton v United States 391 US 123 ............................................................................. 15.69 Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1994) 51 FCR 529; 123 ALR 642 ........................................................................................................................... A.214 Bryce v Chief Executive Officer of Customs (No 2) (2010) 199 A Crim R 542; [2010] QSC 125 ................................................................................................ 92.5 Brydon v Australian Rail Track Corporation Ltd [2015] NSWSC 722 ..................... Q.110 Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1989] 3 WLR 152 ............................... A.202 Buckley v Thomas (1554) 1 Plowd 118; 75 ER 182 .................................................... 68.5 Bufalo Corporation Pty Ltd v Lendlease Primelife Ltd [2010] VSC 672 ................... A.64 Bugg v Day (1949) 79 CLR 442 ............................. 15.35, 16.1, 16.3, 16.7, A.134, A.135 Bulejcik v The Queen (1996) 185 CLR 375 ....................................................... 3.21, A.77 Bulk Materials (Coal Handling) Services Pty Ltd v Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 689 .............................................. A.163, A.178 Bull v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 443 ..................................... 21.5, 21.10, 21.12, A.145 Bull, Re [1998] 2 Qd R 224 ............................................................................. 10.18, 10.32 Bullard v The Queen [1957] AC 635 ............................................................................ Q.35 Bullivant v Attorney-General (Victoria) [1901] AC 196 .................................. A.182, Q.14 Bullivant’s Natural Health Products Pty Ltd v CF Planners Pty Ltd [1999] QSC 35 ....................................................................................................................... 14.4 Bundamurra v Western Australia [2008] WASC 106 ...................................... 130.34, Q.61 Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54 ............ 10.23, 10.28, 15.60, 130.3, 130.40, 130.41, 130.42, 130.44, 130.48, A.198, F.4, F.6, F.66, Q.108 Burden v Ainsworth (2004) 59 NSWLR 506; [2004] NSWCA 3 ............................. A.213 Burgess v Cox [1951] Ch 383 ............................................................................. Q.98, Q.99 Burke v Custom Credit Corporation Ltd (1971) 65 QJPR 5 ....................................... Q.38 Burnell v British Transport Commission [1956] 1 QB 187 .............................. A.175, F.58 Burnett and South Burnett Primary Producers’ Co-operative Association Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1939] QWN 17 ...................................... 66.1 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Burns v The Queen (1975) 132 CLR 258 ................................................ Q.50, Q.55, Q.79 Burnside v Melbourne Fire Office Ltd (No 2) [1918] VLR 639 ................................ 22.16 Burridge v Tonkin [2007] VSC 230 ............................................................................ A.103 Burrows v The King (1937) 58 CLR 249 ................................................................... A.137 Bursill v Tanner (1885) 16 QBD 1 ............................................................................. A.170 Burwood Municipal Council v Harvey (1995) 86 LGERA 389 ..................................... 8.6 Bushby v Dixon Holmes du Pont Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 234 ................................ A.217 Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 ..... A.70, 3.11, 3.13, 3.15, 3.19, 3.21, 6.10, 19.5, 19.10, 20.2, 99.1, 104.2 Butler v Board of Trade [1971] 1 Ch 680 .................................................................. A.182 Buttes Gas & Oil Co v Hammer (No 3) [1981] QB 223 .................. A.175, A.178, A.192 Button v Evans [1984] 2 NSWLR 607 ............................................................................ 3.8 Buttsworth v The Queen (2004) 29 WAR 1; [2004] WASCA 69 ................. A.105, A.136 Byrne v Byrne (2003) 172 FLR 81; [2003] FLC 93-125 ............................................. F.82 Byrne v Petrie [1994] QSR 41 .................................................................................... A.197 Byron Shire Council v Vaughan [2002] NSWCA 158 ............................................... A.217 Bzikadze v Fielders Australia Pty Ltd [2011] SASC 88 ............................................ A.211

C C v C and C [1972] 1 WLR 1335 ................................................................................. 3.20 C v National Crime Authority (1987) 78 ALR 338 .................................................... 10.18 CDJ v VAJ (No 2) (1998) 197 CLR 172; [1998] HCA 47 ....................................... 130.35 CG Maloney Pty Ltd v Noon [2011] NSWSC 242 .................................................... A.214 CGL v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (2010) 24 VR 486; [2010] VSCA 26 ........................................................................................................ A.138, F.51 CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2007) 81 ALJR 1551; [2007] HCA 36 ............................................................................................. A.221 CJ v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 258 ........................................................................ A.72 CSR Ltd v Della Maddalena (2006) 80 ALJR 458 ...................................................... A.58 CTM v The Queen (2008) 236 CLR 440 ....................................................................... A.4 CW v CW [1998] FLC 92-802 .......................................................................... A.185, F.79 CW v The Queen [2010] VSCA 288 .......................................................................... A.126 Cachia v Haynes (1994) 179 CLR 403 ............................................................................ 8.6 Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Amcor Ltd [2008] FCA 88 ....................................... A.159 Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd [2006] ATPR 42-112; [2006] FCA 363 ....................................................... A.67, A.148 Cadwallader v Bajco Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 328 .................................................... A.118 Cain v Glass (1985) 3 NSWLR 39 ............................................................................. A.184 Cain v Glass (No 2) (1985) 3 NSWLR 230 ....................................................... A.159, Q.3 Cain v MBP Industries Pty Ltd (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Ryan J, 21 August 1992) .............................................................................................................. 92.2 Calcraft v Guest [1898] 1 QB 759 .............................................................................. A.195 Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam 93 .......................................................... A.203, F.63 Callanan v B (2004) 151 A Crim 287; [2004] QCA 478 ................................... A.158, 8.2 Callander v The Queen (2004) 144 NTR 1; [2004] NTCCA 5 ....................... A.118, Q.54 Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge “Willemstad” (1976) 136 CLR 529 ............................................................................................................. 6.13, A.4 Cameron v The Queen [1990] 2 WAR 1 ...................................................................... A.71 Campbell v Burrows Engineering (2002) 82 SASR 75 .............................................. 101.7 Campbell v Crane (2013) 17 BPR 32,483; [2013] NSWCA 43 ..................................... 3.6 Campbell v Earl of Dalhousie (1869) LR 1 Sc & Div 462 .......................................... 22.3 Campbell v Railway Commissioner (1902) BCR 21 ................................................... A.99 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xxii

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Campbell Painting Corporation v Reid 392 US 286 (1968) ....................................... 10.16 Canberra Residential Developments Pty Ltd v Brendas (2010) 188 FCR 140; [2010] FCAFC 125 ........................................................................................... A.93 Cantrick v Thompson [2004] ANZ Conv R 531; [2004] Q Conv R 54-607; [2004] QSC 341 ........................................................................................... 59.9 Capar v Commissioner of Police (1994) 34 NSWLR 715 ......................................... A.190 Carbone v National Crime Authority (1994) 52 FCR 516; 126 ALR 79 ..................... F.71 Carbury v Measures (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 569 ................................................... 17.12, 18.5 Cardile v Nominal Defendant (Qld) [1978] Qd R 132 ........................................ A.2, Q.24 Carey v Korda (2012) 45 WAR 181; [2012] WASCA 228 ........................................ A.169 Carian v Elton [2006] NSWCA 168 ........................................................................... A.132 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 ...................... A.213 Carlton and United Breweries Ltd v Cassin [1956] VLR 186 .......... 51.1, 51.2, 74.3, 74.4 Carlyon v Town and Country Pubs No 2 Pty Ltd t/a Queens Hotel Gladstone [2015] QSC 13 ......................................................................................... 92.8 Carolan v Cohen [2011] QDC 103 ................................................................................ 95.4 Carpenter v Wall (1840) 11 Ad & E 803; 113 ER 619 ................................................. 18.4 Carr v The Queen (1973) 127 CLR 662 .................................................................... 130.55 Carr v Western Australia (2006) 166 A Crim R 1; [2006] WASCA 125 ................. 130.77 Carrick v J [1989] Tas R 24; (1989) 39 A Crim R 235 ................................................. A.2 Carroll v The Queen [1956] Tas SR 91 ....................................................................... 15.54 Carroll, Ex parte (1905) 22 WN (NSW) 55 .................................................................. 53.8 Carruthers v Connolly [1998] 1 Qd R 339 ................................................................. A.131 Carter v Managing Partner, Northmore Hale Davy & Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121 ....................................................................................................... A.184, 10.37 Cartwright v Richardson & Co [1955] 1 WLR 340 .................................................... 92.26 Carusi v Housing Commission [1973] VR 215 ........................................................... 92.13 Carusi v Housing Commission [1975] VR 139 ............................................................. 95.3 Casley-Smith v F S Evans and Sons Pty Ltd (No 1) (1988) 49 SASR 314 ..... A.70, 9C.3 Cassatone Nominees Pty Ltd v Queenslandwide House & Building Reports Pty Ltd [2008] QCA 102 ............................................................................ Q.52 Cassidy v Engwirda Constructions Company [1967] QWN 16 .................................... 3.11 Castelli v Groom (1852) 18 QB 490; 118 ER 185 ....................................................... 22.6 Castle v Cross [1984] 1 WLR 1372 ............................................................................... 95.6 Castlemaine Perkins Ltd v Queen Street Hotels Pty Ltd (No 2) [1969] Qd R 397 ............................................................................................................. 10.23, 10.25 Caterpillar Inc v John Deere Ltd (No 2) (2000) 181 ALR 108 ............. 92.32, 92.35, F.41 Cavanett v Chambers [1968] SASR 97 ......................................................................... A.62 Central Queensland Speleological Society Inc v Central Queensland Cement Pty Ltd (No 2) [1989] 2 Qd R 537 ................................................... 10.6, Q.16 Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 164 CLR 502 ........ A.211, 53.3 Chamberlain v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 521 ..................... A.78, A.105, 9D.3, 93A.20 Chambers v Bernasconi (1834) 149 ER 1114 ............................................................. A.151 Champerslife Pty Ltd v Manojlovski (2010) 75 NSWLR 245; [2010] NSWCA 33 ................................................................................................. A.213, A.215 Chan v Louey [2007] NSWSC 272 ............................................................................... Q.10 Chapman v Allan (1999) 74 SASR 274 ......................................................... A.197, A.204 Chapman v Cole (2006) 15 VR 150; [2006] VSCA 70 ............................................. A.114 Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (2000) 100 FCR 229 ........................................................ Q.2 Chapman v Rogers; Ex parte Chapman [1984] 1 Qd R 542 .............................. A.64, 93.9 Chapman v Walton (1833) 10 Bing 57; 131 ER 826 ................................................. A.132 Chappell v National Car Parks , The Times Law Reports, 22 May 1987 ................. A.103 Charlick v Foley Bros Ltd (1916) 21 CLR 249 ......................................................... Q.105 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Charm Maritime Inc v Kyriakou [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 433; 1 FTLR 265 ....... 53.3, 69.3 Chedzey v The Queen (1987) 30 A Crim R 451 ........................................................... 95.4 Chel v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 1535 .................. A.70 Chen v City Convenience Leasing Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 297 .............................. A.175 Cheney v Spooner (1929) 41 CLR 532 ......................................................................... 3.26 Cheney v The Queen (1991) 28 FCR 103; 99 ALR 360 ............................................ 18.11 Cheung v The Queen (2001) 209 CLR 1 .................................................................. 132C.7 Chic Fashions (West Wales) v Jones [1968] 2 QB 299 ..................................... Q.12, Q.17 Chidiac v The Queen (1991) 171 CLR 432 ................................................... A.116, Q.107 Chief Executive, Queensland Health v Jattan [2010] QCA 359 ........................ 3.26, 10.12 Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Labrador Liquor Wholesale Pty Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 161 ......................................................................... A.105, A.112, 92.5 Chipchase v Chipchase [1939] P 391 ............................................................................ A.63 Chivers v Gold Coast City Council [2010] QSC 98 ................................................... 92.38 Chong v CC Containers Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 137 ................................................... 10.26 Choo Cheng Kui v Quinn (1986) 11 FCR 217; 21 A Crim R 447 ........................... A.163 Choudhary v The Queen [2013] VSCA 325 ................................................................. Q.53 Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 ....................................................................... 130.51 Christie v The Queen [2005] WASCA 55 ...................................................... 95A.1, A.106 Chugg v Pacific Dunlop Ltd (1990) 170 CLR 249 ...................................................... Q.35 Chuprinoff v Chuprinoff (unreported, Vic Sup Ct FC, 23 November 1987) ................ 21.3 Church of Scientology of California v Department of Health and Social Security [1979] 1 WLR 723 ................................................................................... A.166 Church of Scientology of California v Johnson-Smith [1972] 1 QB 522 .................... 47.2 Cicolini v Spencer [2005] QSC 338 ........................................................................... A.163 Cioban v The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 265; [2003] NSWCCA 304 .................. 93B.5 Circuit Finance Australia v Sobbi [2010] NSWSC 912 ............................................. A.111 Citibank Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 19 ATR 1479 ...... 10.37, A.194 City and Westminster Properties (1934) Ltd v Mudd [1959] Ch 129 ......................... A.54 Clare v Peach [1995] 2 Cr App R 333 ......................................................................... A.67 Claremont Petroleum NL v Cummings (1992) 110 ALR 239 ................................... A.119 Claremont 24-7 Pty Ltd v Invox Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] WASC 220 ......................... 92.38 Clark v CA Kruger & Sons Pty Ltd [1946] QSR 206 ........................................ 18.7, Q.43 Clark v Hall [2006] QCA 274 ........................................................................................ 79.7 Clark v NZI Life Ltd [1991] 2 Qd R 11 .......................................................... A.103, Q.37 Clark v NZI Life Ltd QLR 15 December 1990 .......................................................... A.115 Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 .......................................................... 9C.3, A.67, Q.84 Clark Equipment Co v Registrar of Trade Marks (1964) 111 CLR 511 ..................... Q.42 Clarke v Banfield [1999] QDC 271 ............................................................................... 18.4 Clarke v Great Southern Finance Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 260 ...................................... A.195 Clarke v Japan Machines (Australia) Pty Ltd [1984] 1 Qd R 404 ................................ A.4 Clee v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 18 ......................................................................... A.4 Cleland v Boynes (1978) 19 SASR 464 ............................................................... A.2, Q.93 Cleland v The Queen (1982) 151 CLR 1 .......... A.17, 10.1, 10.8, 130.41, 130.48, 130.51, Q.60, Q.77 Clements, Dunne & Bell Pty Ltd v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (2001) 48 ATR 650; [2002] ATC 4072 ............................................. A.181, F.58 Clifford v Clifford [1961] 1 WLR 1274; 3 All ER 231 .......................... 15.63, 16.4, 19.11 Close v Mirror Newspapers Ltd (1961) 80 WN (NSW) 200 ........................................ 43.3 Clough v Leahy (1904) 2 CLR 139 ................................................................................. 3.7 Clout v Klein [2001] QSC 401 .................................................................................... A.211 Clune v Collins Angus and Robertson Publishers Pty Ltd (1992) 25 IPR 246 ........................................................................................................................... A.116 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xxiv

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Clutterbuck Brothers v Ringwood [1906] SALR 186 ................................................. 22.18 Clyne v Bowman (1987) 11 NSWLR 341; 18 ATR 385 ................................. 130.50, F.82 Clyne v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 57 FLR 198; 82 ATC 4001 ............................................................................................................................ 68.5 Clyne v NSW Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186 .............................. A.92, 10.12, 21.3 Co-operative Development Funds of Australia Ltd (No 2), Re (1977) 19 SASR 105 ..................................................................................................... 22.15, 22.16 Cobbett v Kilminster (1865) 4 F & F 490; 176 ER 659 ............................................ 59.10 Cobiac v Liddy (1969) 119 CLR 257 ................................................................... 53.5, 54.1 Cockerill v Collins [1999] 2 Qd R 26 .............................................................. A.194, Q.92 Coco v Newnham (unreported, Qld Sup Ct (FC), McPherson SPJ, 10 May 1991) ............................................................................................................................. 3.9 Coco v Shaw [1994] 1 Qd R 469 .................................................................................... 3.9 Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427 ........................................................... Q.89, Q.90 Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337 .......................................................................................................... A.55, A.56 Coelli v Western Underwriters Pty Ltd (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Master Weld, 29 February 1988) ........................................................................................... 14.4 Coghill v McDermott [1983] 1 VR 751 ....................................................................... Q.18 Cohen v Roche [1927] 1 KB 169 ............................................................................... Q.100 Cokely v Cokely 469 So 2d 635 .................................................................................. 10.26 Cole v Sth Tweed Heads Rugby Club (2004) 217 CLR 469 ..................................... A.114 Coleman v Heywood; Ex parte Coleman [1978] Qd R 411 ........................................ Q.34 Coleman v Hindle (No 2) [2009] FamCA 987 .............................................................. F.81 Coles v Coles and Brown (1866) LR 1 P & D 70 ........................................................ 17.9 Collard v The Queen [2000] WASCA 417 ................................................................... A.79 Collard v Western Australia [No 2] [2013] WASC 55 ................................................... Q.2 Collier v Hicks (1830) 2 B & Ad 663; 109 ER 1020 ................................................... 20.1 Collins v London General Omnibus Company (1893) 68 LT 831 ............................ A.187 Collins v The Queen (1980) 31 ALR 257 .......................................................... Q.61, Q.70 Commercial Union Assurance Co of Australia Ltd v Ferrcom Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 389; 6 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-042 .................................... A.118 Commission from the High Court of Justice, England, Re (1886) 2 QLJR 137 .............................................................................................................................. 22.1 Commissioner for Government Transport v Adamcik (1961) 106 CLR 292 .............. A.67 Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564 ................................. Q.10 Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Gao [2016] FCAFC 62 ....................... A.159, F.6, F.62 Commissioner of Water Resources, Re [1991] 1 Qd R 549 ........................................... 2.2 Commonwealth v Clark [1994] 2 VR 333 .................................................................. A.217 Commonwealth v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union (2000) 98 FCR 31; 171 ALR 379 ...................................................................................... A.159 Commonwealth v McLean (1996) 41 NSWLR 389 ...................................................... F.41 Commonwealth v Northern Land Council (1993) 176 CLR 604; [1993] HCA 24 ................................................................................................................... A.160 Commonwealth v Pilt (1973) 3 ALR 236 ..................................................................... Q.29 Commonwealth v Riley (1984) 5 FCR 8 ...................................................................... A.66 Commonwealth v Sciacca (1988) 17 FCR 476; 78 ALR 279; note (1988) 62 ALJ 500 .............................................................................................................. A.211 Commonwealth v Temwood Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 107 ........................... A.175 Commonwealth v Vance (2005) 158 ACTR 47; [2005] ACTCA 35 ......................... A.163 Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 ............................ A.217, A.219, A.221 Commonwealth v Wallace (1862) 4 All Mass 306 ....................................................... Q.54 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Boothby [2015] QCA 204 ................................ 92.17 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Cooke [2001] 1 Qd R 7; [1999] QSC 13 ................................................................................................................... A.177, Q.10 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Duckworth [2012] WASC 476 .......................... A.68 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Perrin [2011] Q Conv R 54-765; [2011] QSC 274 ......................................................................................................... 59.5 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Xiong [2010] NSWSC 1518 ............................. A.61 Commonwealth Oil Refineries Ltd v Hollins [1956] VLR 169 ................................. A.204 Community Association DP No 270180 v Arrow Asset Management Pty Ltd [2007] NSW Titles Cases 80-118; [2007] NSWSC 527 ................................ A.216 Compafina Bank v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [1982] 1 NSWLR 409 ..... 83.7, 83.14, 98.5 Compagnie Generale Maritime v Diakan Spirit SA (“The Ymnos”) [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 550 ............................................................................................ 3.6, 92.42 Compton v Wilson (2007) 4 DCLR (NSW) 244; [2007] NSWDC 67 ...................... A.175 Comptroller-General of Customs v Bridal Fashions Pty Ltd (1995) 13 WAR 254 .................................................................................................................. 10.16 Computer Accounting and Tax Pty Ltd v Professional Services of Australia Pty Ltd (No 4) [2011] WASC 284 ............................................................. A.4 Con-Stan Industries of Australia Pty Ltd v Norwich Winterthur Insurance (Australia) Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 226 ..................................................................... A.219 Condos v Clycut Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 200 .......................................................... A.118 Connections Total Fitness for the Family Pty Ltd v Selkirk Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 184 .................................................................................... A.54 Connell v The Queen (No 6) (1994) 12 WAR 133 ............................... 15.14, 19.18, Q.43 Connolly v Meagher (1906) 3 CLR 682 ...................................................................... 39P.1 Considine v Lemmer [1971] SASR 39 ............................................................... Q.28, Q.30 Consolidated Press Holdings Ltd v Wheeler (1992) 84 NTR 42 .............................. Q.109 Consolidated Press Ltd v McRae (1955) 93 CLR 325 ........................................ 3.8, A.111 Constantine deceased, Re [1960] SASR 19 ................................................................. 92.31 Constantinou v Ansett Australia Ltd [2004] QSC 419 ................................................ 92.28 Constantinou v The Queen [2015] VSCA 177 .............................................................. F.44 Controlled Consultants Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (1985) 156 CLR 385; 57 ALR 751 ............................................ 10.2, 10.6, 10.35, Q.16 Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910 ............................................................ 2.2, A.159, Q.94 Cook v Leonard [1954] VLR 591 ............................................................................... A.170 Cook v The Queen (2000) 22 WAR 67; 110 A Crim R 117 ..................................... A.145 Cooke v Midland Great Western Railway of Ireland [1909] AC 229 ......................... A.62 Cook’s Constructions Pty Ltd v Stork Food Systems Aust Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 179 ........................................................................................................ A.95, A.123 Cooksley & Associates, Re [1998] QSC 72 ............................................................... A.163 Cooper v Bech (No 2) (1975) 12 SASR 151 ............................................................... A.67 Coopers Brewery Ltd v Panfida Foods Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 738 .......................... A.61 Copley v Queensland Newspapers Ltd (unreported, Sup Ct Qld, Dowsett J, 30 July 1992) ......................................................................................................... 3.21 Copmanhurst Shire Council v Watt (2005) 140 LGERA 333; [2005] NSWCA 245 ............................................................................................................. A.94 Cordes v Dr Peter Ironside Pty Ltd (2009) 231 FLR 32; [2009] QSC 89 (aff’d [2009] QCA 302) .......................................................................................... A.213 Cordova v Philips Roxane Laboratories Inc [1984] 2 NSWLR 327 .......................... 22.25 Cornelius v Global Medical Solutions Australia Pty Ltd (2014) 98 ACSR 301; [2014] NSWCA 65 ......................................................................................... A.104 Cornelius v The King (1936) 55 CLR 235 .......................... Q.60, Q.62, Q.74, Q.77, Q.82 Cornwall v Rowan (2004) 90 SASR 269; [2004] SASC 384 ............ A.118, A.119, A.159 Cornwell v The Queen (2006) 160 A Crim R 243; [2006] NSWCCA 116 ................. F.61 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xxvi

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Cornwell v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 260; [2007] HCA 12 ................ A.4, A.213, F.61 Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319 ......................... 10.37 Corporations & Securities Panel v Bristile Investments Pty Ltd (1999) 32 ACSR 677 ................................................................................................................ 10.37 Correll v Attorney-General (NSW) (2007) 180 A Crim R 212; [2007] NSWSC 1385 ........................................................................................................... 10.18 Corruption and Crime Commission, Re; Ex parte West Australian Newspapers Ltd (2007) 98 ALD 89; [2007] WASC 201 .......................................... Q.2 Corry v Dorron; Ex parte Corry [1985] 1 Qd R 31 ......................................... A.109, Q.35 Cosgrove v Johns [2002] 1 Qd R 57; [2000] QCA 157 ................................................ A.4 Coshott v Barry [2007] NSWSC 1094 ........................................................................ A.219 Coshott v Barry [2009] NSWCA 34 ........................................................................... A.218 Cotton v Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways (1942) 43 SR (NSW) 66 .............................................................................................. 17.12, 18.4, 18.6 Council of the Bar Association (NSW) v Archer (2008) 72 NSWLR 236; [2008] NSWCA 164 ............................................................................................... A.163 Council of the NSW Bar Association v Power (2008) 71 NSWLR 451; [2008] NSWCA 135 .................................................................................................. 10.2 Cousens, Ex parte; Re Blacket (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 145 ............................................. 3.9 Coward v The Queen (1985) 16 A Crim R 257 ........................................... 130.59, 130.61 Cox v Cox (1893) 10 WN (NSW) 37 ............................................................................ 22.7 Cox v New South Wales (2007) 71 NSWLR 225; [2007] Aust Torts Reports 81-888; [2007] NSWSC 471 ......................................................... 93A.12, F.40 Coxan v Mazey [1981] Tas R 209 ............................................................................. 130.55 Crabbe v The Queen (1984) 11 FCR 1; 56 ALR 733 ................................................. 15.29 Craig v The King (1933) 49 CLR 429 ....................................................... 18.6, 59.3, A.77 Craig d Annesley v Anglesea (1743) 17 How St Tr 1160 ........................................... A.20 Crampton v The Queen (2000) 206 CLR 161; [2000] HCA 60 ................................ A.154 Crampton, Ex parte (1906) 6 SR (NSW) 236 ............................................................... 53.8 Crawford v Turner [1984] Tas R 96 ............................................................................ A.213 Crawford Earthmovers Pty Ltd v Fitzsimmons (1972) 4 SASR 226; 20 FLR 123 ..................................................................................................................... 70.1 Cream v Bushcolt Pty Ltd [2004] ATPR 42-004; [2004] WASCA 82 ...................... A.222 Creevy v Salesian Society (Vic) Inc (unreported) .......................................................... Q.3 Crescent Farm (Sidcup) Sports Ltd v Sterling Offices Ltd [1972] Ch 553; [1971] 3 All ER 1192 ............................................................................................. A.181 Creswick v Creswick [2010] QSC 339 ............................................................ 17.10, A.114 Criminal Justice Commission v Collins (1994) 74 A Crim R 63 .............................. A.159 Criminal Justice Commission v Connolly [1997] 2 Qd R 586 .................................. A.174 Crisafio v The Queen (2003) 27 WAR 169 ..................................................... 21.20, A.105 Crockett v Roberts [2001] TASSC 95 ......................................................................... A.196 Crofts v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 427; [1996] HCA 22 ............................. A.154, F.67 Crompton v Commissioner of Highways (1973) 5 SASR 301 ........................ A.75, A.191 Croucher v Cachia [2015] NSWCA 365 ........................................................................ F.51 Crowley v Murphy (1981) 52 FLR 123; 34 ALR 496 ............................ Q.12, Q.17, Q.18 Crowley v Page (1837) 7 C & P 789; 173 ER 344 ...................................................... 18.1 Crown Estate Commissioners v Dorset County Council [1990] Ch 297; 1 All ER 19 ................................................................................................................ A.211 Cudgen Rutile (No 2) Pty Ltd v Chalk [1975] AC 520 ................................................ 56.1 Cullis v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd [1970] WAR 170 ................... 22.16, 22.17, 92.30, 92.35 Cummeragunga Pty Ltd (In liq) v Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (2004) 139 FCR 73; 210 ALR 612; [2004] FCA 1098 ................... A.219 Cunningham’s Trusts, Re (1899) 9 QLJR 87 ................................................................ 64.2 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Cuno, Re (1889) 43 Ch D 12 ....................................................................................... 10.33 Curlex Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Carlingford Australia General Insurance Ltd [1987] 2 Qd R 335 ........................................................................................... A.163 Curley v Duff (1985) 2 NSWLR 716 ......................................................... 6.11, 92.9, A.49 Currie v Dempsey (1967) 69 SR (NSW) 116 ............................................................. A.102 Curwen v Vanbreck Pty Ltd (2009) 26 VR 335; [2009] VSCA 284 ........................... A.94 Curwood v The King (1944) 69 CLR 561 ............................................ 15.52, 15.54, 15.56 Cushing v The Queen [1977] WAR 7 .......................................................................... 15.53 Customglass Boats Pty Ltd v Salthouse Brothers Ltd [1976] 1 NZLR 36 ............... A.148 Customs and Excise, Commissioners of v Harz [1967] 1 AC 760; (1967) 51 Cr App R 123 ........................................................................................... 10.27, Q.58 Cutts v Head [1984] Ch 290 ....................................................................................... A.197 Cyclone Scaffolding Pty Ltd v State of Queensland and Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1982) 12 ATR 777 ................................................................. Q.13, Q.22

D D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1978] AC 171 ........................................................................................ A.16, A.142, A.164, A.165 D & J Constructions Pty Ltd v Head (1987) 9 NSWLR 118 .................................... A.173 DC Payments Australasia v Vic Hotel Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 535 .............................. A.175 DCT v Ahern (No 2) [1988] 2 Qd R 158 ........................................................... A.4, Q.108 DFC of T v Capron (1993) 93 ATC 4144 ................................................... 83.6, 95.6, 95.8 DJT v The Queen (1999) 73 ALJR 460 .......................................................................... A.4 DJV v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 272 ................................................................... A.136 DPP v Alderman (1998) 45 NSWLR 526 ......................................................... 10.31, Q.66 DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421 ........... A.20, A.117, A.134, A.135, A.139, 15.19, 99.1, 130.4, 132A.1, F.6 DPP v Garrett (A Pseudonym) [2016] VSCA 31 .......................................................... F.20 DPP v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 ................................................................................ A.116 DPP v P [1991] 2 AC 447 ................................................. A.40, A.136, A.137, A.140, F.6 DPP v Ping Lin [1976] AC 574 .......................................................................... Q.61, Q.77 DPP v Walsh [1990] WAR 25 ..................................................................................... A.197 DPP v Weiss [2002] VSC 17 ...................................................................................... 130.12 DPP (Cth) v Bayly (No 3) (1996) 89 A Crim R 542 .................................... 130.4, 130.12 DPP (Cth) v Galloway (a pseudonym) [2014] VSCA 272 ......................................... A.184 DPP (Cth) v Kane (1997) 140 FLR 468 ............................................................ A.180, F.58 DPP (Cth) v Smiles (1993) 30 NSWLR 248 .......................................................... 8.2, F.11 DPP (Cth) v United Telecasters Sydney Ltd (1990) 168 CLR 594 ...... A.103, Q.27, Q.33 DPP (NSW) v Fordham (2010) 202 A Crim R 254; [2010] NSWSC 795 .................. Q.87 DPP (NSW) v Leonard (2001) 53 NSWLR 227; [2001] NSWSC 797 ...................... 10.24 DPP Reference No 2 of 1997 [1997] VICSC 48 ....................................................... 130.67 DPW v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 583; [2006] NSWCCA 295 ......... A.78, A.154, 130.67, Q.56 DRE v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 400; [2006] NSWCCA 280 ........... A.78, A.154 DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc (2003) 135 FCR 151 ................................... A.168 Daines, In the Marriage of [1986] FLC 91-705 ............................................................. Q.5 Dainford Ltd v Yulara [1984] 1 NSWLR 546 ................................................................ A.4 Daintrey, Re; Ex parte Holt [1893] 2 QB 136 ............................................................ A.202 Dairy Farmers Co-operative Milk Co Ltd v Acquilina (1963) 109 CLR 458 ................................................................................. 19.23, 92.26, 101.10, A.86, Q.6 Dale v Barry; Ex parte Barry (unreported, Qld Sup Ct FC, 19 January 1982) ........................................................................................................................... 17.7 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xxviii

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Dale v Scott; Ex parte Dale [1985] 1 Qd R 406 ................................................. 9.2, A.147 Dale v Western Australia (2009) 261 ALR 21; [2009] FCA 1201 ............................ A.213 Daley v The Queen [1979] Tas SR 75 ................................................................ 59.9, 59.11 Dalleagles Pty Ltd v Australian Securities Commission (1991) 4 WAR 325 ........................................................................................................................... A.168 Dallison v Caffery [1965] 1 QB 348 ............................................................................. 6.14 Damon v The Queen [1985] Tas R 25 ............................................................................. 6.2 Daniel v Western Australia (2001) 186 ALR 369 ........................................................ Q.43 Daniel v Wilkin (1852) 7 Exch 429; 155 ER 1016 ....................................................... 51.5 Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v ACCC (2002) 213 CLR 543 .............. A.194, 10.12, 10.16, 10.33, 10.35, 10.37, A.164, A.194 Dansie v Kelly; Ex parte Dansie [1981] Qd R 1 ...................................................... 130.21 Darby v Ouseley (1856) 1 H & N 1; 156 ER 1093 ........................................ 19.10, 19.19 Darkan v The Queen (2006) CLR 373; [2006] HCA 34 ............................................ A.105 Darling Casino Ltd v NSW Casino Control Authority (1997) 191 CLR 602 ............................................................................................................................ 21F.3 Darston v Earl of Oxford (1701) 1 Eq Cas Abr 10; 21 ER 834 .................................. 83.3 Dart Industries Pty Ltd v Decor Corporation [1989] AIPC 90-569 ............................. A.58 Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21 ........ A.6, A.62, A.68, A.74, A.75 Dass v Masih [1968] 1 WLR 756; 2 All ER 226 ....................................................... 92.15 Dat Quoc Ho v The Queen (2002) 130 A Crim R 545 ................................................ Q.54 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharamceuticals (1993) 509 US 579 ..................................... A.67 Daulia Ltd v Four Millbank Nominees Ltd [1978] Ch 231 ......................................... Q.97 Daventry Holdings Pty Ltd v Bacalakis Hotels Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 406 ................................................................................................................. A.103, Q.41 David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265 .................................................................................................................. 21H.1 David Lee & Co Ltd v Coward Chance (a firm) [1990] 3 WLR 1278 ..................... A.173 David Syme & Co Ltd v General Motors-Holden’s Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 294 ............................................................................................................................... Q.2 David Syme & Co Ltd v Mather [1977] VR 516 ..................................................... 130.35 Davidson v The Queen (2009) 75 NSWLR 150; 195 A Crim R 406; [2009] NSWCCA 150 ............................................................................................. A.106 Davie v Edinburgh Corp (No 2) (1953) SC 34 ......... A.67, A.72, A.74, A.75, 9C.2, 9C.5, 59.6 Davies v Fortior Ltd [1952] 1 All ER 1359 ............................................................... A.145 Davies v Nyland (1974) 10 SASR 76 ............................................................... A.202, Q.52 Davies and Cody v The King (1937) 57 CLR 170 ...................................................... A.79 Davis v Davis; Wissing (Party Cited) (1963) 5 FLR 398 ..................................... 98.4, A.3 Davis v Lawrence; Ex parte Lawrence [1910] QSR 98 ............................................... Q.46 Dawdy and Hartcup, Re (1885) 15 QB 426 ........................................................ 3.6, Q.109 Dawson v The Queen (1961) 106 CLR 1 ........................................... 15.52, A.105, A.134 Dawson v The Queen (1990) 2 WAR 458; 47 A Crim R 458 .................................. 130.11 Dawson v Zammit; Ex parte Zammit [1936] St R Qd 322 ................................. 6.19, 6.22 Day v Dalton [1981] WAR 316 ........................................................................ A.181, Q.14 Daya v CX Reinsurance Company Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1622 .................................... A.67 De Beaujeu’s Application, In re [1949] Ch 230 ............................................................. Q.2 De Bray v Cohen [2008] QDC 275 ............................................................................... 43.1 De Garis Kendenup (WA) Development Co Ltd v Courtis (1925) 28 WALR 54 ................................................................................................................. 22.18 De Gioia v Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd (1941) 42 SR (NSW) 1 ............................................................................................................ A.102 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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De Gruchy v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 85 ............................................................ A.134 De Jesus v The Queen (1986) 22 A Crim R 375; 62 ALJR 1 .................................... 15.65 De Lassalle v Guildford [1901] 2 KB 215 ................................................................... A.56 De Rose v South Australia (No 4) [2001] FCA 1616 ................................................... F.41 De Saxe v Schlesinger (1881) 7 VLR (L) 127 .............................................................. 22.6 De Simone v Legal Services Board [2015] VSC 9 .................................................... A.191 Degman Pty Ltd (In liq) v Wright (No 2) [1983] 2 NSWLR 354 ............................... 90.1 Delaforce v Simpson-Cook (2010) 78 NSWLR 483; [2010] NSWCA 84 ................ A.217 Delhi International Oil Corporation v Olive [1973] WAR 52 ..................................... 21F.3 Dellow’s Will Trusts, Re [1964] 1 WLR 451 ............................................................. A.114 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 40 ATR 435; 98 ATC 5192 .......................................................................................... A.170 Demirok v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 20 ................................................ 6.5, 9A.4, Q.72 Dental Council of New Zealand; Ex parte Gibson (2010) 19 PRNZ 900; [2010] NZHC 912 ................................................................................................... A.211 Deokinanan v The Queen [1969] 1 AC 20 ................................................................... Q.59 Department of Education v Azmitia [2015] WASCA 246 ............................................ A.75 Deppro Pty Ltd v Hannah (2008) 79 IPR 114; [2008] QSC 193 .............................. A.181 Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No 10) [1991] 1 WLR 660; 2 All ER 908 ................... A.175 Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No 9) [1991] 1 WLR 652 ....................................... 3.20, 3.11 Desilla v Fells & Co (1879) 40 LT 423 ........................................................... 22.19, 22.25 Determination Pursuant to a Reference of 27 February 1986 by the High Court (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, 16 November 1990) ................................................ Q.6 Devers v Kindlian Society (2010) 269 ALR 404; [2010] FCAFC 72 ......................... A.58 Devitt v Owners of Steamship Bainbridge [1909] 2 KB 802 ...................................... Q.46 Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472 .............. A.58 Dhanhoa v The Queen (2003) 217 CLR 1 .................................................................... Q.54 Di Leone v Turco [1982] Qd R 224 ............................................................... A.219, A.221 Di Pietrantanio v Austin Hospital Heidelberg [1958] VLR 325 ................................ A.188 Di Rosso v Weary (1986) 4 MVR 141 ........................................................................ 19.13 Dib v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 15 ........................................................................ 9D.3 Dick Smith Electronics Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation [2002] FCA 1040 ................................................................................................................ A.163 Dickman v The Queen [2015] VSCA 311 .................................................................... A.67 Diehm v Director of Public Prosecutions (Nauru) (2013) 303 ALR 42; [2013] HCA 42 .............................................................................................. A.120, 6.24 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 ............................................. A.112, 3.8, 21P.1 Dillon v Crawley (1701) Holt KB 299; 88 ER 1475 .................................................... 19.6 Dimkovski v Ken’s Painting and Decorating Services Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 50 ................................................................................................................. F.56 Dingle v Commonwealth Development Bank (1989) 23 FCR 63; 91 ALR 239 ............................................................................................................... A.162, A.192 Dingwall v Commonwealth (1992) 39 FCR 521 ........................................................ A.177 Dinsdale v Morse [2003] QDC 338 ............................................................................... 79.8 Director General of Community Services; Re Sophie [2008] NSWCA 250 ............. A.114 Director of Public Prosecutions v Losurdo (1998) 103 A Crim R 189 .................. 21AG.1 Director of Public Prosecutions v Nair (2009) 170 ATR 15; [2009] ACTCA 17 ........................................................................................................ F.19, F.20 Director of Public Prosecutions v Nicholls [2010] VSC 397 ....................................... F.40 Director of Public Prosecutions v Tamcelik (2012) 224 A Crim R 350; [2012] NSWSC 1008 ................................................................................................... F.4 Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Xu (2005) 154 A Crim R 173; [2005] NSWSC 191 ................................................................................................. 10.36 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xxx

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Director of Public Prosecutions (SA) v District Court (SA) (2005) 92 SASR 94; [2005] SASC 260 .................................................................................... A.61 Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas) v Cook (2006) 166 A Crim R 234; [2006] TASSC 75 .................................................................................................. 130.31 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Farquharson (No 9) [2007] VSC 463 ............................................................................................................................. Q.45 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Ghiller (2003) 151 A Crim R 148; [2003] VSC 350 ..................................................................................................... 130.56 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Moore (2003) 6 VR 430; [2003] VSCA 90 ................................................................................................................ 130.44 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Selway (No 2) (2007) 172 A Crim R 359; [2007] VSC 244 ........................................................................................ 130.50 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v T (2006) 163 A Crim R 192; [2006] VSC 256 ......................................................................... Q.61, Q.67, Q.69, Q.71 Director of Public Prosecutions Reference (No 1 of 1984) [1984] VR 727 ............ 130.48 Discount & Finance Ltd v Gehrig’s NSW Wines Ltd (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 598 .............................................................................................................. A.216 Dixon v LeKich (2010) 56 MVR 70; [2010] QCA 213 .................................... A.63, Q.26 Dixon v McCarthy [1975] 1 NSWLR 617 ................................................................... Q.76 Dobbs v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1935) 53 CLR 643 ..... A.2, A.216, 3.6, Q.41 Dobbs v Ward [2003] 1 Qd R 158 ................................................................................ Q.18 Dobree v Hoffman (1995) 14 WAR 408 ..................................................................... A.213 Dodd v Tamigi (2007) 47 MVR 117; [2007] WASC 42 .............................................. A.75 Dodds v Marshall (1988) 10 QL Reps 101 ........................................................ A.70, A.76 Doe v Andrews (1850) 15 QB 756 ................................................................................ 51.4 Doe d France v Andrews (1850) 15 QB 756 ................................................................. 51.4 Doe d Mudd v Suckermore (1837) 5 Ad & E 703; 11 ER 1331 ............... 59.2, 59.3, 59.8 Doe d Oldhan v Woolley (1828) 8 B & C 22; 108 ER 951 ......................................... 62.1 Doe d Shrewsbury v Keeling (1848) 11 QB 884; 116 ER 704 .................................... 62.1 Doggett v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 343 ................................................... A.136, A.154 Doker v Hasler (1824) Ry & Moo 198; 171 ER 992 ..................................................... 7.4 Dolan v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (1993) 42 FCR 206; 114 ALR 231 ..................................................................................... 10.26 Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555 .................................. A.1, A.5, A.78, 130.11 Don Hodge Motors Pty Ltd v Lecos Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, 22 October 1990) .................................................................................................... A.116 Donald v Rail Corporation of NSW (No 4) [2015] NSWSC 1681 ............................. A.75 Donald v Rail Corporation of NSW (No 5) [2015] NSWSC 1750 .............................. F.40 Donaldson v Suffolk Investments Pty Ltd [2011] WASC 481 ................................... A.211 Donaldson v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 216 .................................................. 15.36 Donellan v Watson (1990) 21 NSWLR 335 ............................................................... A.175 Doney v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207 ....................................................... 9D.3, A.116 Donnini v The Queen (1972) 128 CLR 114 .............................. 15.44, 15.66, 15.68, 101.2 Donoghue v Terry [1939] VLR 165 .............................................................................. Q.35 Donovan v TIC Realty Pty Ltd [2011] QCA 90 .............................................. 104.1, 116.1 Dorotea Pty Ltd v Christos Doufas Nominees Pty Ltd [1986] 2 Qd R 91 ..... A.54, A.216 Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins (2003) 215 CLR 317 .......................................................... Q.46 Dowe v The Queen (2009) 193 A Crim R 220; [2009] NSWCCA 23 .................... 130.43 Dowling v Bowie (1952) 86 CLR 136 ......................................................................... Q.35 Dowling v Dowling [2015] VSC 412 ......................................................................... A.186 Dowling v Ultraceuticals Pty Ltd [216] NSWSC 386 ............................................... A.197 Downes v Maxwell Richard Rhys & Co Pty Ltd (2014) 313 ALR 383; [2014] VSCA 193 ........................................................................................................ 8.6 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Downs Distributing Co Pty Ltd v Associated Blue Star Stores Pty Ltd (In liq) (1948) 76 CLR 463 ............................................................................................. 83.7 Downs Irrigation v National Bank Ltd [1983] 1 Qd R 130 ....................................... A.103 Downs Irrigation Co-operative Association Ltd v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (No 2) [1983] 1 Qd R 475 ................................................. 92.28, 92.43 Downward Bricklaying Pty Ltd v Goulburn-Murray Rural Water Authority (2003) 8 VR 61; [2003] VSC 171 ............................................................. A.218, A.220 Doyle v Saunders [1904] QWN 73 ................................................................................ 75.3 Drabsch v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd [1999] NSWSC 765 ................... A.100 Drabsch v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd [1999] NSWSC 975 ................... A.177 Draper v The Queen [2000] WASCA 160 .................................................................... A.79 Driscoll v Minister for Education (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Ambrose J, 17 October 1986) ............................................................................................................ 92.2 Driscoll v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 517 ...... 17.15, 99.1, 130.11, 130.33, 130.34, F.49 Druett v The Queen (1994) 123 FLR 249 ................................................................. 130.31 Du Bost v Beresford (1810) 2 Camp 511; 170 ER 1235 ........................................... A.143 Dubai Bank Ltd v Galadari [1990] Ch 98; [1989] 3 WLR 1044 .................. A.163, A.192 Dubbo Base Hospital v Jones [1979] 1 NSWLR 225 .................................................... A.6 Dudgeon v Chie (1955) 55 SR (NSW) 450 ................................................................ Q.101 Duffus v Collins [1966] 1 NSWR 464 ............................................................. A.63, A.132 Dugan v Mirror Newspapers Ltd (1979) 142 CLR 583 ................................................ 6.28 Duhs v Pettett (No 3) [2010] QSC 55 ....................................................................... 132C.2 Duke v Duke (1975) 12 SASR 106 ............................................................................... 59.3 Duke Group Ltd (In liq) v Arthur Young (1990) 54 SASR 498; 3 ACSR 147 ............................................................................................................................ 92.38 Duke Group Ltd (In liq) v Arthur Young (1990) 55 SASR 11; 3 ASCR 420 ............................................................................................................................ 83.14 Duke Group Ltd (In liq) v Pilmer (1994) 63 SASR 364 ................................... 84.3, 130.3 Duke of Norfolk v Germaine (1692) 12 How St Tr 927 ............................................. A.19 Duncan, In re; Garfield v Fay [1968] P 306 ............................................................... A.187 Duncan Davis Pty Ltd v Hurstbridge Abattoirs (Aust) Pty Ltd [1995] 1 VR 279 ............................................................................................................ 83.5, 83.15 Dunlop Holding Ltd’s Application [1979] RPC 523 .................................................. A.114 Dupas v The Queen (2012) 218 A Crim R 507; [2012] VSCA 328 ........................... A.71 Durrant v Von Schultz [2002] 2 Qd R 241; [2001] QCA 345 ..................................... Q.39 Dwyer v Bridges; Ex parte Bridges [1951] QSR 90 .................................................... Q.54 Dwyer v Collins (1852) 7 Ex 639; 155 ER 1104 ........................................................ 104.7 Dyers v The Queen (2002) 210 CLR 285 .................................. 6.15, 15.10, A.121, A.122

E E v Australian Red Cross Society (1991) 31 FCR 299; 105 ALR 53 ......................... A.73 EMI Australia Ltd v Bes [1970] 2 NSWLR 238 .......................................................... A.67 Eade v The King (1924) 34 CLR 154 ......................................................................... A.116 Eagar v Field (1820) ....................................................................................................... 6.28 Eagar v de Mestre (1820) ............................................................................................... 6.28 Eagles v Orth [1976] Qd R 313 .................................................................................... A.67 Eagleton and Coventry v Kingston (1803) 8 Ves Jun 438; 32 ER 425 ........................ 59.2 Earle v Castlemaine District Community Hospital [1974] VR 722 ........ 6.15, A.1, A.118, A.119 Easterday v The Queen (2003) 143 A Crim R 154; [2003] WASCA 69 ...................... A.4 Eastman v Australian Capital Territory (2014) ACTLR 119; 285 FLR 325; [2014] ACTSC 105 ................................................................................................. A.211 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xxxii

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Eastman v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 9 ........... A.136, A.159, Q.3, Q.5, F.26, F.27, F.43, F.54 Eastwood v Bullock (1864) 1 WW and a’B(L) ............................................................. 53.6 Eaton v Nominal Defendant (Qld) (1995) 21 MVR 357 .................... A.101, A.145, 101.7 Eaton v Yanner; Ex parte Eaton [1998] QCA 20 ................................................. 43.1, 48.1 Ebber v Isager [1995] 1 Qd R 150 .............................................................................. A.211 Eccles & Co v Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co [1912] 1 KB 135 ...................... 22.19 Echegaray v Government Insurance Office of NSW (Unreported, NSW Sup Ct CA, 4 December 1990) ................................................................................ A.95 Eckersley v Medical Board of Queensland [1998] 2 Qd R 453 ................................ A.113 Edelsten v Investigating Committee of New South Wales (1986) 7 NSWLR 222 ................................................................................................. 130.49, F.82 Eden Productions Pty Ltd v Southern Star Group Ltd [2002] NSWSC 1166 ......................................................................................................................... A.175 Edgar v Ron Kingham Real Estate Pty Ltd [1997] QCA 242 ...................................... 59.1 Edmeades v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1969] 2 QB 67 ...................................... 37.2, Q.23 Edmonds v Edmonds [1947] P 67 ................................................................................ 92.31 Edmondson v Amery, The Times Law Reports 28, 31 January 1911 .......................... 65.1 Edwards v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (1987) 163 CLR 558 ..................... 9D.5 Edwards v Nominal Defendant [2006] QCA 475 ........................................................ 102.1 Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; [1993] HCA 63 ............. A.5, A.106, A.116, Q.45, Q.54 Edwather Grazing Pty Ltd v Pincevic Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) NSW Conv R 55-980 .......................................................................................................... A.15 Effem Foods Pty Ltd v Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd (In liq) (1993) 43 FCR 510; 115 ALR 377 ........................................................................ A.213 Egart v Deal [1994] 2 Qd R 117 ................................................................................... Q.56 Egglishaw v Australian Crime Commission (2007) 164 FCR 224; [2007] FCAFC 183 ............................................................................................................. A.215 Egri v DRG Australia Ltd (1988) 19 NSWLR 600 .................................................... A.212 Ehrmann v Ehrmann [1896] 2 Ch 611 ......................................................................... 22.12 Eichsteadt v Lahrs (1960) Qd R 487 ..................................................... A.140, A.141, F.52 Eichsteadt v Lahrs [1961] Qd R 457 .......................................................................... A.141 Eizenberg v Eizenberg [2008] VSC 322 ........................................................... 10.10, 10.23 El-Zarw v Nikola; Ex parte El-Zarw [1992] 1 Qd R 145 ............................................ Q.18 Elders Finance Ltd v Invaway Pty Ltd [1991] 2 Qd R 398 ...................................... A.213 Elecon Australia Pty Ltd v Brevini Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 263 ALR 1; [2009] FCA 1327 ....................................................................................................... 68.4 Electronic Rentals Pty Ltd v Anderson (1971) 124 CLR 27 ........................................ 53.7 Eli Lilly & Co v Pfizer Ireland Pharmaceuticals (No 2) (2004) 137 FCR 573; [2004] AIPC 92-010; FCA 850 ...................................................................... A.196 Elias & Elias Pty Ltd v Chidiac [2010] NSWSC 1364 .............................................. Q.110 Elliott v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2004) 48 ACSR 621; 205 ALR 594; [2004] VSCA 54 ................................................. A.112, 3.8 Ellis v Deheer [1922] 2 KB 113 ................................................................................... 9D.3 Elsey v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1969) 121 CLR 99 ................................ A.42 Emanuel Management Pty Ltd & Ors v Fosters Brewing Group Ltd (2003) 178 FLR 1; [2003] QSC 205 ...................................................................... 92.27 English Exporters v Eldonwall Ltd [1973] Ch 415 ............................................ A.75, 9C.5 Enoch and Zaretsky Bock & Co’s Arbitration, Re [1910] 1 KB 327 ................... 3.6, 6.18 Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477 .................................................. 10.3, 10.5, 10.6, 10.8, 10.12, 10.16, F.61 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Environment Protection Authority v Shell Co of Australia Ltd (No 4) [1999] NSWLEC 289 ......................................................................... 10.27, 10.31, Q.66 Epperson v Dampney [1976] FLC 90-561 .................................................................... 9C.7 Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd [2006] QCA 194 ........ A.54, A.219 Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallen Investments Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 365 ..................... Q.43 Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Wilmoth Field Warne (a firm) (2007) 18 VR 250; [2007] VSCA 280 ................................................................................................... A.219 Erasito v Shiphard [1999] WASCA 132 .................................................................... 130.34 Esanda v Conti [1995] QSC 342 .................................................................................... 61.2 Esanda Ltd v Burgess [1984] 2 NSWLR 139 .............................................................. A.55 Eslick, Ex parte (1905) 5 SR (NSW) 470 ..................................................................... 53.8 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 150 ALR 117; 37 ATR 470 ..................................................................................... F.56, F.59 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 83 FCR 511; 40 ATR 512 ........................................................................................................ F.59 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 ................................................... A.162, A.163, A.167, A.187, 6.13, F.56, F.59 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10 ..................................... Q.2 Estate of Slavinskyj (1988) 53 SASR 221 ..................................................................... 3.15 Estex Clothing Manufacturers Pty Ltd v Ellis & Goldstein Ltd (1967) 116 CLR 254 ........................................................................................................... 6.11, A.49 European Central Railway Co, Re; Ex parte Oriental Financial Corporation (1876) 4 Ch D 33 ............................................................................... A.211 Evans v Davies [1991] 2 Qd R 498 .............................................................................. 9D.3 Evans v Evans [2011] NSWCA 92 ............................................................................. A.219 Evans v Hoare [1892] 1 QB 593 ................................................................................. Q.100 Evans v Powell [2012] NSWSC 1384 ............................................................................ A.7 Evans v Staunton [1958] Qd R 96 ................................................. 10.1, 10.5, 10.19, 10.20 Evans v The Queen (2007) 235 CLR 521; [2007] HCA 59 ................................. A.60, F.6 Evans Deakin Pty Ltd v Sebel Furniture Ltd [2003] FCA 171 ................................. A.220 Everard v Opperman [1958] VR 389 .................................................................. Q.33, Q.35 Everingham v Municipality of Penrith (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 238 ............................... 51.5 Evon and Evon v Noble [1949] 1 KB 222 .................................................................... 92.1 Ewer v Ambrose (1825) 3 B & C 746; 107 ER 910 .................................................... 17.3 Ewing International LP v Ausbulk Ltd [2009] SASC 381 ............................... A.218, 84.3 Exagym Pty Ltd v Professional Gymnasium Equipment Company Pty Ltd (No 2) [1994] 2 Qd R 129 ..................................................................................... A.194 Expectation Pty Ltd v PRD Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 140 FCR 17; 209 ALR 568 ..................................................................................................................... A.7, A.58 Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 303 ALR 199; 88 ALJR 76; [2013] HCA 46 ............................................................................ A.175, A.180, F.56

F F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189 ........................................................................................... A.71 FDP v The Queen (2008) 74 NSWLR 645; [2008] NSWCCA 317 .............................. A.4 FGT Custodians Pty Ltd v Fagenblat [2003] VSCA 33 .......................... A.68, A.72, A.97 FJL v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 8 ................................................................ A.154 Fabre v Arenales (1992) 27 NSWLR 437 ....................................................... 10.26, A.119 Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd, Re [2011] NSWSC 223 ............................................. 37.3 Falland v Symbion Health Ltd [2010] SASC 119 ...................................................... A.198 Fallshaw Bros v Ryan (1902) 28 VLR 279 ................................................................... 45.3 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xxxiv

Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Cases

Farah v Australian Postal Corporation (1994) 35 ALD 349 ........................................ A.58 Fardon v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland (2004) 223 CLR 575; [2004] HCA 46 ................................................................................................ 10.12 Farnaby v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (2007) 47 AAR 11; [2007] AATA 1792 ..................................................................... A.163, F.6 Farnell v Penhalluriack (No 2) [2008] VSC 214 .......................................................... A.69 Farnham v Pruden [2016] QCA 18 ............................................................................... A.67 Farquharson v The Queen (2012) 36 VR 538; [2012] VSCA 296 ...... 9D.3, A.106, A.132 Farr Smith & Co v Messers Ltd [1928] 1 KB 397 .................................................... Q.101 Farrell v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 286 ................................................................... A.71 Farrelly v Hircock (No 1) [1971] Qd R 341 ....................................................... 18.7, Q.43 Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd v Webb (1996) 39 NSWLR 601 ........... A.163, A.178 Fastlink Calling Pty Ltd v Macquarie Telecom Pty Ltd (2008) 217 FLR 366; [2008] NSWSC 299 ....................................................................................... A.146 Faulkner v Brine (1858) 1 F & F 254; 175 ER 715 ................................................... 17.12 Fawcett v Nimmo (2005) 156 A Crim R 431; [2005] NSWSC 1047 ......................... Q.24 Fawkes v Schadwell; Ex Parte Schadwell [1966] Qd R 20 ....................................... A.102 Fay v Miller, Wilkins & Co [1941] Ch 360 ................................................................. Q.99 Federal Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Currie (1903) 20 WN (NSW) 217 .................... 22.31 Fenech v Sterling (1983) 79 FLR 244 ........................................................................... 79.9 Ferella v Otvosi (2006) 197 FLR 451; [2006] FMCA 334 .......................................... A.67 Ferguson, Ex parte; Re Alexander (1944) 45 SR (NSW) 64 ..................................... A.102 Fernandez v Tubemakers of Australia Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 190 ............................ A.114 Ferreira v Zebra Stoneworks Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 405 ....................................... A.212 Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; [2001] HCA 72 ....... A.78, A.79, A.130, 130.4, A.67 Fick v Groves [2010] QSC 89 ..................................................................................... 92.29 Fidelitas Shipping Co Ltd v V/O Exportchleb [1966] 1 QB 630 ................................... 3.6 Field v Commissioner for Railways (1957) 99 CLR 285 .................. A.197, A.198, A.203 Fifteenth Eestin Nominees Pty Ltd v Rosenberg (2009) 24 VR 155; [2009] VSCA 112 ................................................................................................... A.221 Filios v Morland (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 331 ..................................................... 131A.1, Q.6 Finance and Guarantee Company Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1970) 1 ATR 766; 44 ALJR 368 ......................................................................................... Q.43 Finborough Investments Pty Ltd v Airlie Beach Pty Ltd [1995] 1 Qd R 12 ............ A.103 Finch v Grieve (1991) 22 NSWLR 578 ...................................................................... A.159 Finn v Lemmer (1991) 55 SASR 455 ......................................................................... A.213 Fischer v Douglas; Ex parte Fischer [1978] Qd R 27 ............................................... 130.34 Fisher v Brown [1968] SASR 65 ........................................................................ 9C.3, A.67 Fisher v CHT Ltd [1965] 1 WLR 1093 ....................................................................... 22.22 Fisher v Fisher (1877) 3 VLR (I P & M) 64 ................................................................. 22.9 Fisher v Hahn (1863) 13 CBNS 659; 143 ER 261 ....................................................... 22.9 Fitzgerald v Hill (2008) 51 MVR 55; [2008] QCA 283 .............................................. A.61 Fitzgerald v The Queen (2014) 88 ALJR 779; 311 ALR 158; [2014] HCA 28 ............................................................................................................................... A.69 Fitzwood Pty Ltd v Unique Goal Pty Ltd (In liq) (2001) 188 ALR 566 .................. A.217 Flanagan v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (1996) 60 FCR 149 .................. F.83 Flannery v Cohuna Sewerage Authority (1976) 51 ALJR 135 .................................... A.58 Flavel v South Australia (2007) 96 SASR 505; [2007] SASC 50 ..................... A.68, A.97 Flavel v South Australia (2008) 102 SASR 404; [2008] SASC 333 ........................... A.75 Fleet v District Court of NSW [1999] NSWCA 363 .................................................... F.26 Fleming v Advertiser-News Weekend Publishing Co Pty Ltd [2016] SASC 26 .................................................................................................................................. 3.7 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Fletcher v Fortress Credit Corporation (Australia) II Pty Ltd [2014] QSC 303 ........................................................................................................................... A.182 Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v MPN Group Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW SC, Rolfe J, 14 July 1997) ................................................................... Q.109, 3.6 Flinn v Flinn [1999] 3 VR 712; [1999] VSCA 109 ................................................... A.217 Flore v NSW Department of Education and Training [2006] NSWSC 1227 .......................................................................................................................... 22.11 Flori v Commissioner of Police [2015] 2 Qd R 497; [2014] QSC 284 ...................... Q.13 Flower and Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134 .................................................................................................................... A.95, F.26 Flowers v The Queen (2005) 153 A Crim R 110; [2005] NTCCA 5 ................ Q.43, Q.50 Foggo, Re [1989] 2 Qd R 49 ........................................................................... 101.10, A.87 Folkes v Chadd (1782) 3 Doug KB 157; 99 ER 589 ................................................... 9C.2 Forbes v The Queen (2009) 167 ACTR 1; [2009] ACTCA 10 .................................... A.69 Forbes Engineering (Asia) Pte Ltd v Forbes (No 4) [2009] FCA 675 ....................... 92.15 Foreign Media Pty Ltd v Konstantinidis [2003] NSWCA 161 ..................................... 3.21 Forrest v Cosmetic Co Pty Ltd (2008) 218 FLR 109; [2008] SASC 152 ..... 92.38, Q.100 Forrest v Eisert (1881) 2 ALJ 136 ............................................................................... 22.31 Forster v Hunter New England Area Health Service (2010) 77 NSWLR 495; [2010] NSWCA 106 ......................................................................................... A.67 Fortson Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2008) 100 SASR 162; [2008] SASC 49 ............................................................................................... A.68 Foster v The Queen (1993) 66 A Crim R 112; 67 ALJR 550 .......... 130.3, 130.46, 130.53 400 George Street (Qld) Pty Ltd v BG International Ltd [2010] Q Conv R 54-731; [2010] QSC 66 (aff’d [2010] Q Conv R 54-743; [2010] QCA 245) .......................................................................................................................... A.219 Fox v General Medical Council [1960] 1 WLR 1017; 3 All ER 225 ........................ 100.1 Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; 77 ALJR 989 ........................................................ A.58 Fractionated Cane Technology Ltd v Ruiz-Avila [1988] 1 Qd R 51 ............. 21A.4, 133.2 Fragomeni v Western Australia [2011] WASCA 67 ..................................................... Q.54 Francombe v Holloway [1957] VR 139 .......................................................... 101.7, A.101 Frank v Police (2007) 98 SASR 547; [2007] SASC 288 ......................................... 131A.1 Frank Truman Export Ltd v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1977] QB 952 ............................................................................................................................. Q.17 Franklin v Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Ltd (1935) 36 SR (NSW) 76 .............. A.217 Frankos v Hocking [2000] SASC 128 ...................................................................... 129A.1 Franks v Equitiloan Securities Pty Ltd (2008) 2 BFRA 484; [2008] NSWSC 33; (2009) 258 ALR 388; [2009] NSWCA 128 ..................................... A.220 Fraser-Kirk v David Jones Ltd (2010) 190 FCR 325; [2010] FCA 1060 ..................... Q.2 Fraser Henleins Pty Ltd v Cody (1945) 70 CLR 100 .................................................. Q.43 Freeleagus v Nominal Defendant (2007) 47 MVR 491; [2007] QCA 116 ................ 92.32 Freeman v Health Insurance Commission (1997) 78 FCR 91 ................................... A.181 French v Triple M (Melbourne) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] VSC 548 ............................ A.103 Freshmark Ltd v Mercantile Mutual Insurance (Australia) Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 390 ................................................................................................................. A.221 Friend v Wallmann [1946] KB 493 .............................................................................. 92.43 Fritz, Re [1995] 2 Qd R 580 ........................................................................... A.182, A.184 Fruehauf Finance Corp Pty Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 359 ......................................................................... A.49, A.88, A.162, 20.2 Fulcher v Hilt (1985) 79 FLR 353 ................................................................................. 24.1 Fuld Deceased, In the Estate of [1965] 1 WLR 1336; 2 All ER 653 ........................... Q.6 Fullmer v Cape York Cattle Co [1987] 1 Qd R 6 ............ 2.1,22.2, 22.5, 22.24, 36.1, 69.2 Furesh v Schor [2013] WASCA 231 ............................................................................. Q.23 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xxxvi

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Furlong v Staniforth (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 364 ......................................... 18.4, 18.6, 18.8

G G v H (1994) 181 CLR 387 ............................................................................ A.114, A.141 G (An Infant) v Colthart [1967] 1 QB 432 ................................................................. 15.16 GAR v The Queen (No 1) [2010] NSWCCA 163 .......................................................... A.4 GBT v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 19 ............................................................... A.78 GH Photography Pty Ltd v McGarrigle [1974] 2 NSWLR 635 .................................. Q.21 GJ Coles & Co Ltd v McDonald [1998] 2 VR 218 ................................................... A.101 GK Sanford Pty Ltd v Jansen (1992) 36 FCR 83 ...................................................... A.213 GMCG, LLC v Agenix Ltd [2007] QSC 309 ............................................................. A.175 GPC (WA) Pty Ltd v Investec Bank (Australia) Ltd [2010] WASC 171 .................. A.146 GPI Leisure Corporation Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15 ........................................................................... 20.2, A.81, A.93 GS Technology Pty Ltd v Elster Metering Pty Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 444; 75 IPR 80; [2008] FCA 17 ..................................................................................... A.213 GSA Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd v Constable [2002] 2 Qd R 146; [2001] QSC 180 ...................................................................................................... A.163, A.167 Gabriel v Ah Mook (1924) 34 CLR 591 ...................................................................... Q.30 Gabriel v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 279 ................................... 15.37, 15.38, 15.59, F.54 Gad v Health Care Complaints Commission [2002] NSWCA 111 ............................ A.113 Gaetani v Trustees of the Christian Brothers [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-156 ...................................................................................................................... A.114 Gaggin v Moss [1984] 2 Qd R 513 ...................................................................... 51.3, 53.7 Gaio v The Queen (1960) 104 CLR 419 ..................................................... F.33, Q.6, Q.50 Galafassi v Kelly (2014) 87 NSWLR 119; [2014] NSWCA 190 ...... A.197, A.200, A.205 Galea v Bagtrans Pty Ltd [2011] Aust Torts Reports 82-078; [2010] NSWCA 350 ............................................................................................................ A.119 Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263 .......................................................................... 6.17 Galler v Galler [1955] 1 WLR 400 .............................................................................. 92.31 Galvin v The Queen (2006) 161 A Crim R 449; [2006] NSWCCA 66 .................. 93A.12 Gannon v Gannon (1971) 125 CLR 629 ....................................................................... A.61 Garcin v Amerindo Investment Advisers Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 1140 .................... 22.1, 22.4 Gardiner v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 233; [2006] NSWCCA 190 ....... A.65, A.78 Gardner v Duve (1978) 19 ALR 695 .................................................................. Q.46, Q.57 Gardner, Re (1967) 13 FLR 345 .................................................................................... 93.8 Garrett v Nicholson (1999) 21 WAR 226 ..................................................................... A.94 Garrett v The Queen (1977) 139 CLR 437 ......................................... 15.16, A.138, A.211 Gaskell v Denkas Building Services Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 35 ............................. A.118 Gatellaro v Westpac Banking Corporation (2004) 78 ALJR 394 ................................... F.6 Gately v The Queen (2007) 241 ALR 1; 82 ALJR 149; [2007] HCA 55 ................ 21A.7, 93A.12 Gates v CML Insurance Society Ltd (1982) 68 FLR 74; 43 ALR 313 ............ A.3, A.141 Gattellaro v Westpac Banking Corporation (2004) 78 ALJR 394 ............................... A.62 Gatward v Kleem (1955) 72 WN (NSW) 354 .............................................................. A.56 Gaynor v Chief of the Defence Force (No 2) [2015] FCA 817 ................................ A.163 Geddes v Blacktown Municipal Council [1977] 1 NSWLR 683 ............................... 83.13 Gedeon v The Queen (2013) 280 FLR 275; [2013] NSWCCA 257 ............................ F.61 Gell v Gell [2005] NSWSC 566 ................................................................................... A.63 General Credits Ltd v Ebsworth [1986] 2 Qd R 162 ................................................. A.201 Genese, Re; Ex parte Gilbert (1886) 3 Morr 223 ........................................................ 10.21 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Geoffrey W Hill & Associates (Insurance Brokers) Pty Ltd v Squash Centre (Allawah North) Pty Ltd (1990) 6 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-012 ............... 83.9 George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104 ............................................................. Q.18, Q.20 George Doland Ltd v Blackburn Robson Coates & Co (a firm) [1972] 1 WLR 1388; 3 All ER 959 ...................................................................................... A.176 Gerard & Co Pty Ltd, Ex parte; Re Craig (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 370 .............. Q.27, Q.43 Getty v Getty (1907) 76 LJP 158 ................................................................................ A.166 Ghani v Jones [1970] 1 QB 693 ................................................................................... Q.21 Ghazal v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1992) 29 NSWLR 336 ........ 18.1, A.119 Giannarelli v Wraith [No 2] (1991) 171 CLR 592 .............................. 10.10, 10.26, A.193 Gianoutsos v Glykis (2006) 65 NSWLR 539; [2006] NSWCCA 137 ...................... A.114 Giasoumi v Hutton [1977] VR 294 ............................................................................. Q.103 Gibbs v Kinna [1999] 2 VR 19 ................................................................................... A.215 Gilbey v Great Western Railway (1910) 102 LT 202 ................................................ A.148 Gilchrist v Pine Grove Memorial Park Ltd [1968] SR (NSW) 270 ........................... 92.15 Gill v Director of Public Prosecutions (1992) 64 A Crim R 378 .............................. A.214 Gill v Walton (1991) 25 NSWLR 190 ........................................................................ A.214 Gillard v The Queen (2003) 219 CLR 1 ..................................................................... A.126 Gillespie v Steer (1973) 5 SASR 200 ........................................................................... A.85 Gillett v Murphy [2001] NSWCA 199 ................................................................. F.29, F.30 Gilsan (International) Ltd v Optus Networks Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1077 ........................................................................................................................... Q.52 Ginesi v Ginesi [1948] P 179 ......................................................................................... 13.1 Giourtalis v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 216 ............................................................. F.53 Gipp v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 106 .................................................................... A.136 Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101; 73 ALJR 547; [1999] HCA 10 ............. A.217 Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd v Anderson [2002] 1 Qd R 233; (2001) 47 ATR 11 ................................................................................................... A.163, A.203 Glennon v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 1 .................................................................... Q.52 Global Funds Management (NSW) Ltd v Rooney (1994) 36 NSWLR 122 ............. A.163 Glynn v Houston (1831) 2 Man & Gr 337; 133 ER 775 ........................................... A.100 Goddard v Nationwide Building Society [1987] QB 670 .......................................... A.173 Godfrey v New South Wales (No 1) (2003) 25 NSWCCR 291 .................................. A.70 Gold Coast City Council v Hall [2000] QCA 92 ....................................................... A.118 Goldberg v Ng (1995) 185 CLR 83 ................................................................... A.175, F.58 Goldberg v Shell Oil Co Ltd (1990) 95 ALR 711 ........................................... A.103, Q.37 Goldman v The Ferry “Kameruka” [1971] 1 NSWLR 393 .......................................... 51.1 Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 76 ALJR 1024 .................................................. A.96, A.99 Goncalves v The Queen (1997) 99 A Crim R 193 ............................................ 17.3, A.105 Goninan & Co Pty Ltd v Direct Engineering Services Pty Ltd (2007) 33 WAR 182; [2007] WASCA 10 ................................................................................... A.4 Gonzales v Claridades (2003) NSWLR 211; [2003] NSWCCA 227 ........................... 78.1 Goodchild v Goodchild [1919] VLR 13 ........................................................................ 22.9 Goodman v J Eban Ltd [1954] 1 QB 550 .............................................. 92.4, 92.38, Q.100 Goodrich Aerospace Pty Ltd v Arsic (2006) 66 NSWLR 186; [2006] NSWCA 187 ............................................................................................................. A.58 Goody v Odhams Press [1967] 1 QB 333 ..................................................................... 80.1 Goold v Evans & Co [1951] 2 TLR 1189 .................................................................... A.60 Gordon v Carroll (1975) 27 FLR 129 ........................................................................... A.81 Gordon v Ross [2006] NSWCA 157 .............................................................................. 93.8 Gordon M Jenkins & Associates Pty Ltd v Coleman (1989) 23 FCR 38; 87 ALR 477 ............................................................................................................... A.62 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xxxviii

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Gordon Martin Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW) (2009) 53 MVR 474; [2009] NSWCA 287 ......................................................................................... A.94 Gorman v Newton; Ex parte Newton (1958) Qd R 169 ....................... 19.22, 101.9, A.84 Gough v Braden [1993] 1 Qd R 100 ............................................................................ Q.35 Gould v State Bank of NSW (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Bryson J, 28 February 1996) ........................................................................................................... 22.1 Government Employees’ Superannuation Board v Martin (1997) 19 WAR 224 ................................................................................................................... 19.21, F.24 Government Insurance Office v Bailey (1992) 27 NSWLR 304 ................................. A.58 Government Insurance Office of New South Wales v Glassock (unreported, NSW CA, 19 February 1991) .............................................................. 6.17 Gradidge v Grace Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 93 FLR 414 .......................... 130.34, 131A.1, Q.6 Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606 ......................................................... F.44, F.45 Grainger & Son v Gough [1896] AC 325 ................................................................... 83.13 Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 .............. 10.15, A.16, A.162, A.164, A.167, A.182, A.192 Grant v South Western and County Properties Ltd [1975] Ch 185 .............................. 3.11 Grassby v The Queen (1988) 168 CLR 1 ........................................................................ 3.9 Gray v Hart [2012] NSWSC 1435 ................................................................................ A.67 Gray t/as Clarence Valley Plumbing Services v Ware Building Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCA 271 ................................................................................................... A.4 Graycorp Pty Ltd v Maharaj International Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 387 .......................... Q.38 Grayden v The Queen .......................................................................................................... Grayden v The Queen [1989] WAR 208; (1988) 36 A Crim R 163 ......... 19.5, 59.3, 59.8, 59.10, 59.11 Graymarshall Pty Ltd v Director-General of the Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water [2010] NSWLEC 54 ............................ 10.16 Grdic v The Queen [1985] 1 SCR (Canada) 810 ....................................................... A.211 Great Atlantic Insurance Co v Home Insurance Co [1981] 1 WLR 529; 2 All ER 485 .............................................................................................................. A.175 Greek Orthodox Community of South Australia Inc v Pashalis [2015] SASC 122 ................................................................................................................ A.143 Green v Pearson [2014] QCA 110 ................................................................................ A.61 Green v The King (1939) 61 CLR 167 ..................................................................... 130.12 Green v The Queen (1971) 126 CLR 28 .................................................................... A.105 Green v The Queen (1995) 124 FLR 423; 135 ALR 181 ............................................. F.82 Greenhill Nominees Pty Ltd v Aircraft Technicians of Australia Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 7 .............................................................................................. A.175, A.176 Greenough v Eccles (1859) 5 CBNS 786 ...................................................................... 17.3 Greenwood v Martin’s Bank [1933] AC 51 ............................................................... A.219 Gregory v Philip Morris Ltd (1988) 24 IR 397; 80 ALR 455 ................................... A.202 Gregory v Taverner (1833) 6 C & P 280; 172 ER 797 ............................................... A.87 Gregory v The Queen (1983) 151 CLR 566 ................................................................ 21.13 Gregory, Re [1934] QWN 36 .......................................................... 3.15, 63.2, 126.1, Q.96 Gregrhon Investments Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1986) 48 FLR 41 .............................................................................................................. 6.10, 20.2 Grey v City of Marion (2006) 159 A Crim R 357; [2006] SASC 3 .................... 8.6, Q.72 Grey v The Queen (2001) 75 ALJR 1708; [2001] HCA 65 ........................... 130.12, Q.11 Griffin v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2010] SASC 286 ..................................... Q.110 Griffin v Pantzer (2004) 137 FCR 209; 1 ABC (NS) 625; [2004] FCAFC 113 ............................................................................................................................ 10.30 Griffith v The King (1937) 58 CLR 185 ..................................................................... A.138 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Griffiths v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1990) 53 SASR 256 ......................................................................................................... 83.6, 95.8 Griffiths v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 293 .................................................................. 54.1 Griffiths v The Queen (1994) 76 A Crim R 164 .......................................................... Q.45 Grinham, Ex parte; Re Sneddon (1961) 61 SR (NSW) 862 ....................................... 10.33 Grivas v Brooks (1997) 69 SASR 532 ....................................................................... A.141 Grofam Pty Ltd v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 408; 116 ALR 535 .................................................................................................................. A.163 Grollo v Macauley (1993) 45 FCR 336 ........................................................................ Q.13 Grollo v Macauley (1995) 56 FCR 533 ........................................................................ Q.18 Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348 ........................................................................... F.83 Gross v Weston (2007) 69 NSWLR 279 .................................................................... A.148 Grosser v South Australian Police (1994) 63 SASR 243 ............................................. A.60 Grosvenor v The Queen [2014] NTCCA 5 ................................................................... Q.46 Groves v Groves [2013] QSC 277 ....................................................................... 3.7, A.118 Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 641 ........................... A.217 Grygiel v Baine [2005] NSWCA 218 ........................................................................... A.56 Guarnaccia v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd [1976] VR 302 .................................... 18.7, Q.43 Guest v Nominal Defendant [2006] NSWCA 77 ......................................................... Q.54 Guide Dog Owners’ & Friends’ Association Inc v Guide Dog Association (NSW & ACT) (1998) 154 ALR 527 ....................................................................... F.47 Guinness Peat Properties Ltd v Fitzroy Robinson Partnership [1987] 1 WLR 1027 ................................................................................................... 10.23, A.167 Gumurdul v Reinke (2006) A Crim R 87; [2006] NTSC 27 ........................................ 85.1 Gunner v Payne [1910] VLR 45 .................................................................................. 15.37 Gurfinkel v Bentley Pty Ltd (1966) 116 CLR 98 ......................................................... A.55 Guthrie v Guthrie [1943] QWN 28 .............................................................................. 22.17 Gyngell, Re; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 54 ALJR 314 .............................................. Q.109

H H v Schering Chemicals Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 143 ............................................ 83.14, 92.11 H v The Queen (1994) 69 ALJR 22; [1994] HCA 59 .................................................... A.4 HAR v Western Australia (No 2) [2015] WASCA 249 ................................................. 20.1 HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414 .................................................... 21.11, A.74, F.47 HM & O Investments Pty Ltd v Ingram (No 1) [2011] NSWSC 550 ...................... A.168 HM Advocate v Cairns [1967] SLT 165 ..................................................................... A.211 HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 ........ A.4, A.63, A.124, A.134, A.136, A.140 Hadid v Redpath (2001) 35 MVR 152; [2002] NSWCA 16 ....................................... A.58 Hales v Kerr [1908] 2 KB 601 ....................................................................... A.129, A.134 Hall v Alice Springs Veterinary Clinic Pty Ltd (1982) 17 NTR 13 ............................. 87.1 Hally v Starkey; Ex parte Hally (1962) Qd R 474 .................................... 6.10, 20.2, A.89 Hamberger v Williamson (2000) 102 IR 297 ............................................................ 130.44 Hamdan v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 211 ALR 642; [2004] FCA 1267 ............................................................... A.170 Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Metal and Engineering Workers’ Union of WA [1998] WASC 289 ................................................................................................... A.180 Hamilton v New South Wales (No 10) [2015] NSWSC 114 ........................................ F.16 Hamilton v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 487 ...................................................................... 10.33 Hamilton, Ex parte; Re Fagan [1966] 2 NSWR 732 .................................................... Q.76 Hamilton, Re (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 277 ......................................................................... Q.2 Hamilton-Smith v George [2006] HCA 1551 ............................................................... A.83 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xl

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Hammer v Hoffnung & Co Ltd (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 280 ................... 18.3, 19.17, 101.5 Hammond v Scheinberg (2001) 52 NSWLR 49 ............................................................. Q.2 Hamod v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2006] NSWCA 243 ................................. A.67 Hampton Court Limited v Crooks (1957) 97 CLR 367 ............................................. A.114 Hancock v East Coast Timber Products Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 11 ..... A.67, A.74, A.75 Hancock v Rinehart [2016] NSWSC 12 ......................................................... A.163, A.182 Hancock Bros Pty Ltd v Preservatrice Insurance Australia Ltd (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, 11 November 1985) ....................................................... 22.18 Handley v Baddock [1987] WAR 98 .......................................................................... A.162 Hansen v Millars’ Karri and Jarrah Co (1905) 7 WALR 266 ...................................... 55.1 Hansen Beverage Co v Bickfords (Australia) Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 406 ...................... 83.8 Haoui v The Queen (2008) 188 A Crim R 331; [2008] NSWCCA 209 ..................... A.72 Hardcastle v Commissioner of Police (1986) 53 ALR 593 ........................................ 10.12 Hardie Rubber Co Ltd v General Tire & Rubber Co (1973) 129 CLR 521 ...... 22.1, 22.5, 22.6, 22.7, 22.11, 22.10 Hardwick v Western Australia (2011) 211 A Crim R 349; [2011] WASCA 164 ............................................................................................................................. A.64 Hare v Gladwin (1988) 82 ALR 307 ........................................................................... 10.35 Hargrave v Hargrave (1848) 2 Car & K 701; 175 ER 293 ......................................... Q.54 Hargraves v The Queen (2011) 85 ALJR 1254; [2011] HCA 44 .............................. A.105 Harman v Western Australia (2004) 29 WAR 380; [2004] WASCA 230 .......... 17.3, Q.52 Harmony Shipping Co SA v Davis [1979] 1 WLR 1380; 3 All ER 177; [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 377 ................................................................ A.65, A.191, A.198 Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590 ....... 21.13, 92.42, 130.4, A.19, A.136, F.51 Harrington v Lowe (1996) 190 CLR 311 ................................................................... A.197 Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 2) (2003) 130 FCR 424 ............................. A.6 Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v Western Australia (No 8) (2004) 207 ALR 483; [2004] FCA 338 ................................... 3.30, 83.12, F.40 Harris v Burrows (1945) 7 ATD 518 ............................................................................ Q.30 Harris v DPP [1952] AC 694 ..................................................... 15.23, 130.4, 130.8, 130.9 Harris v The Queen (1988) 37 A Crim R 29 ............................................................... 15.60 Harris v Tippett (1811) 2 Camp 637 ............................................................................. A.96 Harrison v Harrison [2011] VSC 459 ......................................................................... A.221 Harrison v Harrison [2013] VSCA 170 ....................................................................... A.221 Harrison v The Queen (1987) 29 A Crim R 213 .......................................................... A.78 Harry Parker Ltd v Mason [1940] 2 KB 590 ................................................................ 3.11 Hartogen Energy Ltd v Australian Gas Light Co (1992) 36 FCR 557 ........................ A.88 Harvey v Smith Wood [1964] 2 QB 171 .......................................................... 17.17, 92.26 Harwood v Priestley (1997) 6 Tas R 383 .................................................................... 22.10 Hasson v Police Department of Western Australia [2006] WASC 207 ..................... A.106 Hatziparadissis v GFC (Manufacturing) Pty Ltd [1978] VR 181 ............................. 101.10 Hawes v Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre (1997) 94 A Crim R 554 ............................................................................................................................. Q.24 Hawick Jersey International Ltd v Caplan, The Times (London) 11 March 1988 ......................................................................................................................... A.201 Hawira v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd (2007) 47 MVR 530; [2007] QSC 158 .................................................................................................................. A.212 Hawkins v Pender Bros Pty Ltd [1990] 1 Qd R 135 ..................................................... A.4 Hawkins v Price [1947] Ch 645 .................................................................................... Q.98 Hawkins (JA) v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 440 .......................................... 130.57, Q.35 Hawksford v Hawksford [2008] NSWSC 31 .............................................................. A.163 Hayes v Bondaletoff [1986] 1 Qd R 455 ............................................................. 3.8, 10.12 He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523 ....................................................... A.103 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Health Insurance Commissioner v Freeman (1998) 88 FCR 544 .............................. A.163 Healy, Ex parte (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 14 ....................................................................... Q.29 Heanes v Herangi (2007) 175 A Crim R 175; [2007] WASC 175 .................... A.83, A.85 Heart Research Institute Ltd v Psiron Ltd [2002] NSWSC 646 ......................... 3.6, Q.109 Heatherington v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 370 ....................................................... Q.56 Hedgeland v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 97 ......................................... A.106, Q.54 Hedges v Grundmann; Ex parte Grundmann [1985] 2 Qd R 263 ............................... Q.19 Heedes v Western Australia (No 2) [2008] WASCA 142 ............................................... A.4 Heery v Criminal Justice Commission [2001] 2 Qd R 610; (2000) 110 A Crim R 465 ..................................................................................................... Q.87, Q.89 Heggies Bulkhaul Ltd v Global Minerals Australia Pty Ltd (2003) 59 NSWLR 312; [2003] NSWSC 851 ............................................................ A.217, A.221 Heid v Connell Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 629 ................................... A.212 Heilbut Symons & Co v Buckleton [1913] AC 30 ....................................................... A.56 Helco Pty Ltd v O’Haire (1990) 28 FCR 230; [1991] ATPR 41-099 ........................ 83.13 Helibut Symons & Co v Buckleton [1913] AC 30 ....................................................... A.56 Helliwell v Piggott-Sims [1980] FSR 356 ................................................................. 130.35 Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691 ................................................ 3.7, 80.1, A.115, A.211 Hemmings v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2010] QDC 305 ............................. 134A.1 Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100; 67 ER 313 ........................................... A.214 Henderson v Low [2000] QSC 417 ................................................................ A.175, A.177 Henderson v Primmer (1986) 68 ACTR 9 ..................................................................... 22.1 Hennesseys Self-Service Stores Pty Ltd (In liq), Re [1965] Qd R 576 ........... 22.16, 92.9, 92.26, 92.38 Hennessy v Wright (No 2) (1882) 24 QBD 445 ........................................................... 88.3 Henry Bath and Son Ltd v Birgby Products [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 389 ........................ 3.6 Henry Coxon, The (1878) LR 3 PD 156 .................................................................... A.151 Hercules Motors Pty Ltd v Schubert (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 301 ..................... A.56, A.201 Hermanus (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2015] VSCA 2 ............................................. A.64 Herriott Services Pty Ltd v Creevey [2009] QSC 419 ........................................ 59.5, 59.9 Herron v McGregor (1986) 6 NSWLR 246 .................................................. 130.41, A.214 Hesse Blind Roller Company Pty Ltd v Hamitovski [2006] VSCA 121 ................... A.118 Hetherington v Brooks [1963] SASR 321 ....................... 19.22, 101.9, 130.33, A.85, F.14 Hevi Lift (PNG) Ltd v Etherington [2005] NSWCA 42 .............................................. A.74 Hewitt v Lenthall [1931] SASR 314 ............................................................................ 15.53 Hewitt v West Australian Newspapers (1976) 17 ACTR 15; 27 FLR 222 ............... A.196 Hewitt, Re (1885) 15 QBD 159 ..................................................................................... 22.5 Hewson v Burke (2000) 32 MVR 392 ........................................................................ A.219 Heyne v Fischel & Co (1913) 30 TLR 190 ......................................................... 51.3, 75.1 Hickey v The Queen (2002) 136 A Crim R 150 ...................................................... 132A.1 Hickman v Peacey [1945] AC 304 .............................................................................. A.114 Higgins v Donnelly and Dorries (1965) Qd R 389 ..................................................... 101.7 Higham v Ridgway (1808) 10 East 109; 103 ER 717 ............................... 74.7, 83.3, A.20 Highgrade Traders Ltd, Re [1984] BCLC 151 ........................................................... A.162 Highup Pty Ltd v Gubas (2014) 226 FCR 541; 102 ACSR 467; [2014] FCA 1170 ............................................................................................................... A.123 Hill v Minister for Community Services and Health (1991) 30 FCR 272; 102 ALR 661 ........................................................................................................... A.196 Hill End Gold Ltd v First Tiffany Resource Corporation (2010) 4 ARLR 389; [2010] NSWSC 375 ........................................................................................ A.211 Hillier v Lucas (2000) 81 SASR 451 ................................................................ 92.24, A.74 Hillier v The Queen [2008] ACTCA 3 ......................................................................... A.95 Hillman v Hillman [1977] 2 NSWLR 739 .................................................................. A.211 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xlii

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Hilton v Lancashire Dynamo Nevelin Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 952 .................................. 92.26 Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57 .............................................................. 130.49, 130.69 Hinch v Attorney-General for Victoria (1987) 164 CLR 15 ...................................... A.111 Hindson v Monahan [1970] VR 84 .............................................................................. 104.7 Hirst v Sydney South West Area Health Service [2011] NSWSC 664 ....................... A.67 Hoad v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1998) 19 WAR 468 ............................................ A.175 Hoban’s Glynde Pty Ltd v Firle Hotel Pty Ltd (1973) 4 SASR 503 ........................ A.148 Hobbs v CT Tinling & Co [1929] 2 KB 1 ................................................................... Q.54 Hobbs v Davies; Ex parte Davies [1943] QSR 131 ................................................... A.117 Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292 .......... 15.65, 132A.1, 132A.2, A.8, A.19, A.41, A.117, A.137, A.139 Hocken v Morris [2011] QDC 115 ................................................................................ 80.1 Hockey v Yelland (1984) 157 CLR 124 ...................................................................... 21F.3 Hocking v Ahlquist Bros Ltd [1944] 1 KB 120 ........................................................... A.59 Hodgson v Amcor Ltd (No 6) [2011] VSC 294 ........................................................... A.93 Hodgson, In re (1885) 31 Ch D 177 ................................................... A.114, A.116, A.211 Hoffmann v Challis [2016] NSWSC 268 ...................................................................... A.68 Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651; [2010] HCA 21 ....................................................................................... A.166, A.182, Q.2, Q.3 Hogan v Gill (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Shepherdson J, 25 June 1992) ...................... 79.7 Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506 .............................................................................. Q.2 Holborow v Western Australia [2009] FCA 1200 ...................................................... A.213 Holden v Trustees of Sisters of Mercy (North Sydney) Property Trust [2015] NSWSC 1359 ............................................................................................. 130.41 Holdway v Arcuri Lawyers [2009] 2 Qd R 18; [2008] QCA 218 ............................... A.61 Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149 ............................................. 41.2, 123.1, A.62, Q.42 Holland v The Queen (2005) 154 A Crim R 376; [2005] WASCA 140 ....................... A.4 Hollingham v Head (1858) 4 CB (NS) 388; 140 ER 1135 ........................................ A.114 Hollingsworth v Hopkins (1967) Qd R 168 ....................................................... 9C.2, A.72 Hollington v Hewthorn & Co Ltd [1943] KB 587 ............................................ 79.1, A.211 Holloway, In re; Young v Holloway (1887) 12 PD 167 ............................................ A.190 Holman v Deol; Macquarie v Higgins [1979] 1 NSWLR 640 ................................... 83.13 Holman v Holman (1964) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 374 .................................................. A.88 Holmes v Jones (1907) 4 CLR 1692 ............................................................................. 18.9 Holtman v Sampson [1985] 2 Qd R 472 .............................. 9C.5, 59.6, A.67, A.72, A.74 Home Office v Harman [1982] 2 WLR 338 ................................................................... Q.2 Home Office v Harman [1983] 1 AC 280 ..................................................................... Q.10 Homes v Newman [1931] 2 Ch 112 ........................................................................... A.126 Homestyle Pty Ltd v Perozzi (2007) 33 WAR 209; [2007] WASCA 16 ..................... 49.1 Homeward Bound GM Co v McPherson (1896) 17 NSWLR (Eq) 281 ...................... 68.6 Hondema v Carroll (2008) 50 MVR 401; [2008] WASC 155 ..................................... Q.46 Honeywood v Munnings (2006) 67 NSWLR 466; [2006] NSWCA 215 .................. A.211 Hoogwerf v The Queen (1992) 63 A Crim R 302 .......................................................... 6.5 Hooker Corporation Ltd v Darling Harbour Authority (1987) 9 NSWLR 538 ........................................................................................... 10.17, 10.23, A.180, F.58 Horan v Ferguson [1995] 2 Qd R 490 ........................................................................ 93A.4 Hornberg v Horrobin [1997] QSC 207 ........................................................................ 101.2 Horne v Comino; Ex parte Comino (1966) Qd R 20 ................................................... A.86 Horrell v The Queen (1997) 6 NTLR 125; 138 FLR 222 ............................... A.106, Q.54 Houghton Tractor and Machinery Sales Pty Ltd v Muffett Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 209 .............................................................................................................. A.75 Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 378 ................................................................................................ A.3 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Howson v The Queen (2007) 170 A Crim R 401; [2007] WASCA 83 ....................... Q.54 Hoy v The Queen (2002) 136 A Crim R 65; [2002] WASCA 275 ................ 130.34, Q.56 Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 933 ............... A.167, A.175 Hoystead v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155 ............................................. A.214 Hoyt’s Pty Ltd v Spencer (1919) 27 CLR 133 ............................................................. A.56 Hubbards Pty Ltd v Simpson Ltd (1982) 60 FLR 430; 1 TPR 354 ............................. 79.9 Huddart Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Morehead (1909) 8 CLR 330; [1908] HCA 36 ...................................................................................................................... 10.4 Hudson Crushed Metals Pty Ltd v Henry [1985] 1 Qd R 202 .................................. A.129 Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning and Consultancy Services Pty Ltd [2014] VSCA 3 ..................................................................................................................... A.68 Huges (a Pseudonym) v The Queen (2013) 238 A Crim R 345; [2013] VSCA 338 ................................................................................................................ 15.38 Hughes v Hi-way Ads Pty Ltd; Ex parte Hughes [1963] Qd R 328 ............................ 48.2 Hughes v National Trustees Executors & Agency Co of Australasia Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 134; 23 ALR 321 .................................................... A.4, A.148, 92.15 Hughes v Phillips (1948) 75 CLR 436 .......................................................................... F.73 Hughes v Rogers (1841) 8 M & W 123; 151 ER 975 .................................................. 59.8 Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Air Services Australia (1997) 80 FCR 276; [1998] ATPR 41-612 ................................................................................ F.66 Hui Chi-Ming v The Queen [1992] 1 AC 34; (1992) 94 Cr App R 236 ..................... 79.1 Hull v Thompson [2001] NSWCA 35 ........................................................................... A.94 Hume v Council of the Kings School [2010] NSWSC 186 ........................................... Q.3 Hunt v Wark (1986) 40 SASR 489 ............................................................................ 130.58 Hunt v Western Australia (No 2) (2008) 37 WAR 530; [2008] WASCA 210 ........................................................................................................................... A.154 Hutchings v Clarke (1993) 112 FLR 450; [1993] FLC 79,871 ................................. A.201 Hutchins v Cap Coast Telecoms Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 945 ........................................ A.163 Huxley v West London Extension Railway (1889) 17 QBD 373 ................................. 90.1 Hyde v Sullivan (1956) 56 SR (NSW) 113 ................................................................. 83.13 Hyslop v Australian Paper Manufacturers Ltd (No 2) [1987] VR 309 ..... 3.11, 3.21, 22.4, 22.14, 22.15, 22.18, 22.28

I I v Western Australia (2006) 165 A Crim R 420; [2006] WASCA 204 .................... A.101 IMM v The Queen (2016) 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14 ........................................... F.51 IOOF Building Society Pty Ltd v Foxeden Pty Ltd (2009) 23 VR 536; [2009] VSCA 138 ................................................................................................... A.221 ISPT Nominees Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2003) 53 ATR 527; [2003] NSWSC 697 ......................................................................... A.222 ITC Film Distributors Ltd v Video Exchange Ltd [1982] Ch 431 ................. A.173, 10.28 IVI Pty Ltd v Baycrown Pty Ltd [2007] 1 Qd R 428; [2006] QCA 461 ...................... A.4 IVI Pty Ltd v Baycrown Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 2 ........................................................ A.212 Ibrahim v Police [2012] SASC 231 ............................................................................ A.114 Ibrahim v The King [1914] AC 599 ................................................................ 130.35, Q.61 Ideas Plus Investments Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2002] WASC 167 ........................................................................................................................... A.175 Idoport Pty Ltd, Re [2012] NSWSC 524 ........................................................... A.201, F.39 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank [2000] NSWSC 63 ................................. A.166 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 50 NSWLR 640 ............. A.67, F.6 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 123 ........................... F.47 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 222 ........................ A.181 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xliv

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Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 529 ........................... F.47 Ifka v Shahin Enterprises Pty Ltd [2014] VSCA 8 .............................................. A.7, A.58 Ilvariy Pty Ltd t/as Craftsman Homes Northern Rivers v Ross [2008] NSWSC 718 ............................................................................................................ A.215 Immigration & Multicultural Affairs & Indigenous Affairs, Minister for v Hamdan (2005) 143 FCR 398; [2005] FCAFC 113 .............................................. A.182 Imnetu v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 203 ................................................... 15.35, A.135 Imobridge Pty Ltd (In Liq), Re [1999] 1 Qd R 38; [1998] QSC 109 ................. A.65, 6.8 Impagnatiello v Campbell (2003) 6 VR 416; [2003] VSCA 154 .............................. A.114 In the Goods of Blewitt (1879) 5 PD 116 .................................................................. Q.100 In the Goods of Christopher Davison [1947] St R Qd 36 ............................................ 61.3 In the Goods of Crake [1959] QWN 33 ........................................................................ 43.3 Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cornwall (1993) 38 NSWLR 207 ............................................................................................................ A.196 Indochina Medical Co Pty Ltd v Nicolai [2013] NSWCA 436 .................................... 22.7 Infields Ltd v P Rosen and Sons [1938] 3 All ER 591 .............................................. A.175 Infields Ltd v Rosen [1939] 1 All ER 121 .................................................................... 98.3 Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (2006) 67 NSWLR 91; [2006] NSWSC 530 .................................................. A.187 Ingram v Ingram [1956] P 390 ............................................................................. 79.7, 82.1 Insbury Pty Ltd v Craig [1990] 1 Qd R 309 .............................................................. A.207 Insurance Commissioner v Joyce (1948) 77 CLR 39 ................................................... 6.15 Interchase Corporation Ltd v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Ltd [1999] 1 Qd R 141 ............................................................................................................... A.176, A.191 Interchase Corporation Ltd (In liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Queensland) Pty Ltd (No 2) [1999] 1 Qd R 163 .......................................................................... 10.23, A.162 Interlego AG and Lego Australia Pty Ltd v Croner Trading Pty Ltd [1991] ATPR 41-124 ........................................................................................................... A.148 International Cat Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Rodrick [2010] QSC 30 ........................... 84.7 International Entertainment (Aust) Pty Ltd v Churchill [2003] QSC 247 ................. A.146 Irani v The Queen (2008) 188 A Crim R 125; [2008] NSWCCA 217 ........................ A.70 Irish Society v Bishop of Derry (1846) 12 C & F 641; 8 ER 1561 ................... 51.1, 51.3 Irvin v Whitrod [1978] Qd R 137 .................................................................................... 2.2 Irving v Heferen [1995] 1 Qd R 255 ......................................................................... 130.46 Irwin v Queensland [2011] VSC 291 .......................................................................... Q.110 Isaac & Sons v Salbstein [1916] 2 KB 139 ................................................................ A.211 Isaacs v Cachia [1981] 2 NSWLR 92 ......................................................................... A.211 Island Way Pty Ltd v Redmond [1990] 1 Qd R 431 ................................................... Q.21 Ivanovski v McConnell (2009) 14 BPR 27,687; [2009] NSWSC 1036 .................... A.114

J J v The Queen [1989] Tas R 116 .................................................. 8.3, 10.21, 15.16, A.136 JP v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2015] NSWSC 1669 ........................... A.69 J-Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers (WA Branch) (No 2) (1992) 38 FCR 458; 111 ALR 377 ...................... A.102 J-Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federation (1992) 38 FCR 452; 110 ALR 510 .................................................................................................. A.192 J Boag & Son Brewing Ltd v Bridon Investments Pty Ltd (2001) 10 Tas R 26 ................................................................................................................ 19.11, A.86 JA McBeath Nominees Pty Ltd v Jenkins Development Corporation Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 121 .............................................................................. A.201, A.205 JFL v TP (1999) 155 FLR 370; [1999] FLC 92-870 ................................................. A.211 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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JJB v The Queen (2006) 161 A Crim R 187; [2006] NSWCCA 126 ...... 21.9, A.4, A.154 JJU v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 264 ............................................................. 21.10 Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51; [2000] FCA 1886 ....................................................................................................... A.141, F.51 Jack v Smail (1905) 2 CLR 684 .......................................................................... 6.14, Q.45 Jackson v Arawak Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] QSC 57 ................................................... 59.1 Jackson v Gamble [1983] 1 VR 552 ............................... 10.11, 10.19, 10.21, 10.23, 10.31 Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446 ......................................................... 79.1, A.213 Jackson v Johnson [2010] SASC 133 ............................................................................. Q.2 Jackson v The Queen (1962) 108 CLR 591 ................................................................. Q.61 Jacobsen v Suncorp Insurance and Finance [1991] 2 Qd R 46 .................................. 17.11 Jacobsen v Suncorp Insurance and Finance (No 2) [1992] 1 Qd R 385 ........... 53.5, 79.7, 79.8 Jacobson v Rogers (1995) 182 CLR 572 .................................................................... A.159 Jacombe v Jacombe (1960) 105 CLR 355; [1969] VR 214 ............................... A.63, 74.7 Jadu Raj v Bhubotaran Nandy (1889) 17 ILR (Calcutta) 173 ....................................... A.6 Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549 ......................................................................... A.62 Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23 ........................................ 130.41, A.214 James v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2011] NSWSC 331 ....................... A.159 James v Cowan (1929) 42 CLR 305 .............................................................................. 28.1 James v Keogh [2008] SASC 156 ................................................................................. A.68 James Hardie & Coy Pty Ltd v Barry (2000) 50 NSWLR 357 ................................. Q.110 James Hardie Industries NV v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2010) 274 ALR 85; 81 ASCR 1; [2010] NSWCA 332 ...... A.114, A.148 Jameson v Smith (1989) 11 QL Reps 47 .................................................................... A.155 Jango v Northern Territory of Australia [2003] FCA 1230 ............................................ Q.2 Jango v Northern Territory of Australia (No 2) [2004] FCA 1004 ............................... F.47 Jarman v Lambert and Cooke Contractors [1951] 2 KB 937 .................. 92.2, 92.15, 98.4 Jarvie v Magistrates Court (Vic) [1995] 1 VR 84 .......................................................... Q.3 Jattan v Chief Executive, Queensland Health (2010) 237 FLR 360; [2010] QSC 92 ..................................................................................................................... 10.12 Jauncey, Re [1980] Qd R 335 ..................................................................................... A.222 Jayasena v The Queen [1970] AC 618 ........................................................................ A.102 Jazabas Pty Ltd v Haddad (2007) 65 ACSR 276; [2007] NSWCA 291 .................. 130.64 Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia (1980) 26 SASR 101 .......................................... A.221 Jeans v Cleary [2006] NSWSC 647 ............................................................................ A.114 Jefferies v Sturcke [1992] 2 Qd R 392 ...................................................................... 130.59 Jeffrey v The Queen [1991] Tas R 336; (1991) 60 A Crim R 38 ................................ A.75 Jemena Ltd v Mine Subsidence Board (2012) 193 LGERA 303; [2012] NSWSC 1509 ............................................................................................................ A.63 Jenkins v Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] NSWCA 406 .................................. 54.1 Jenkins v Wynen [1992] 1 Qd R 40 .............................................................................. 20.5 Jeppe v The Queen [1987] WAR 124; (1987) 61 ALR 383 ...................................... A.134 Jermyn v Spargos Mining NL [2001] WASCA 149 ................................................... A.205 Jessop v Jessop (1931) 48 WN (NSW) 78 .................................................................... 74.5 Jobst v Inglis (1986) 41 SASR 399 ..................................................................... A.58, F.30 John Briscoe Discount Store Pty Ltd v Securecam Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 794 ............................................................................................................ A.119 John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Cojuangco (1988) 165 CLR 346; [1988] HCA 54 ............................................................................................................................. A.196 John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Police Tribunal of New South Wales (1986) 5 NSWLR 465 ................................................................................................................ Q.3 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xlvi

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John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd v Local Court of New South Wales (1991) 26 NSWLR 131 ................................................................................................................ Q.3 John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court (NSW) (2004) 61 NSWLR 344; 148 A Crim R 522; [2004] NSWCA 324 .................................. Q.2, Q.3 John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Rivkin (2003) 201 ALR 77; 77 ALJR 1657 ........................................................................................................................... 9D.3 John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Ryde Local Court (2005) 62 NSWLR 512; [2005] NSWCA 101 ........................................................................................... Q.2 John Fairfax and Sons Ltd v Police Tribunal of New South Wales (1986) 5 NSWLR 465 ........................................................................................................ 21A.4 John Nominees Pty Ltd v Dixon [2003] WASCA 51 .......................................... 51.5, 66.1 John Robertson & Co Ltd (In Liq) v Ferguson Transformers Pty Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 65 ................................................................................................... A.42 John Tanner Holdings Pty Ltd v Mortgage Management Ltd (2001) 182 ALR 201 .................................................................................................................. A.179 Johns Perry Industries v International Rigging (Aust) Pty Ltd [1988] 2 Qd R 556 .............................................................................................................. A.203, F.63 Johnson v Colangelo [2010] SASC 187 ....................................................................... A.62 Johnson v James (unreported, WA Sup Ct, Walsh J, 1 November 1995) .................. A.219 Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 ....................................................................... 20.2 Johnson v Kershaw (1847) 1 De G & S 260; 63 ER 1059 .......................................... 3.19 Johnson v Poppeliers (2008) 20 VR 92; 51 MVR 44; [2008] VSC 461 .................... A.65 Johnson v Savage [2003] NSWCA 244 ...................................................................... A.132 Johnson v Triple C Furniture & Electrical Pty Ltd (2010) 243 FLR 336; [2010] QCA 282 ..................................................................................................... A.104 Johnson, In the Marriage of (1997) 139 FLR 384; [1997] FLC 92-764 ........................ 8.6 Johnson Matthey (Aust) Pty Ltd v Dascorp Pty Ltd (2003) 9 VR 171; [2003] VSC 291 ............................................................................................ A.94, A.219 Johnson Matthey Ltd v AC Rochester Overseas Corporation (1990) 23 NSWLR 190 ..................................................................................... A.54, A.216, A.219 Johnston v Arnaboldi [1990] 2 Qd R 138 ..................................................................... A.54 Johnston v Brightstars Holding Company Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 150 .................. A.219 Johnston v Cameron [2002] FCA 948 ............................................................................. Q.3 Johnston v Jackson (1880) 6 VLR 1 ........................................................................... A.204 Johnston v McGrath (2005) 195 FLR 101; [2005] NSWSC 1183 ............................ A.175 Johnston v O’Neill [1911] AC 552 ................................................................................ 62.2 Johnstone v New South Wales (2010) 202 A Crim R 422; [2010] NSWCA 70 ............................................................................................................................ 130.51 Johnstone Shire Council v Jessie Tam Sie [1939] QSR 74 ............................... 9C.5, A.75 Jokic v Hayes (1990) 53 SASR 530 .............................................................................. 6.25 Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635 .................................................................. 15.12, 15.23, 15.44 Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 ...................... A.1, A.114, A.118, 6.15, 10.26, Q.32 Jones v Foxall (1852) 15 Beav 388; 51 ER 588 ........................................................ A.197 Jones v G D Searle & Co Ltd [1978] 3 All ER 654 .................................................. A.175 Jones v Harris [1946] SASR 98 .................................................................................. A.138 Jones v Hyde (1989) 63 ALJR 349 ............................................................................... A.58 Jones v National Coal Board [1957] 2 QB 55; 2 All ER 155 ............................. 6.10, 6.17 Jones v Phillips [1969] Qd R 548 ................................................................................. A.56 Jones v Sutherland Shire Council [1979] 2 NSWLR 206 .............................................. A.4 Jones v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 439 .......................................................... A.154, F.67 Jones v The Queen (2009) 83 ALJR 671; [2009] HCA 17 .............................. A.91, 93B.8 Jong Song v Joy Hoy (1897) 8 QLJR 109 ...................................................................... 8.5 Jonkers v Police (1996) 67 SASR 401 ....................................................................... A.154 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Joseph Constantine SS Co v Imperial Smelting Corporation [1942] AC 154 ............................................................................................................... A.102, A.103 Joseph Crosfield & Sons Ltd v Techno-Chemical Laboratories Ltd (1913) 29 TLR 378 ..................................................................................................... A.68, 9C.2 Jovista Pty Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd [1998] WASC 298 ....................... A.199 Joyce v Sunland Waterfront (BVI) Ltd (2011) 195 FCR 213; [2011] FCAFC 95 ................................................................................................................ 22.11 Jung v Son [1998] NSWSC 698 .................................................................................... F.49 Junge v Junge [2013] NSWSC 1842 ........................................................................... A.219 Jupiters Ltd v UAERJ Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1469 .................................................. A.61 Juson Pty Ltd, Re (1992) 8 WAR 13 ................................................................. A.146, 6.11

K K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501 .................... Q.109 K & K Real Estate Pty Ltd v Adellos Pty Ltd (2010) 15 BPR 28,679; [2010] NSWCA 302 ................................................................................... A.218, A.219 K & S Corp Ltd v Number 1 Betting Shop Ltd [2005] SASC 228 .............................. Q.2 K and K, In the Marriage of [1981] FLC 91-009 ............................................... A.159, 2.2 KGK Constructions Pty Ltd v East Coast Earthmoving Pty Ltd [1985] 2 Qd R 13 ................................................................................................................... A.213 KH v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 294 ....................................................................... F.64 KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221 ............................................ A.136, 101.2, 130.4 Kajala v Noble (1982) 75 Cr App R 149 .................................................................... 104.2 Kalenik v Apostolidis [2009] VSC 208 ........................................................................ A.67 Kamleh v The Queen (2005) 79 ALJR 541; [2005] HCA 2 ............. A.143, A.144, A.148 Kappos v State Transit Authority (1995) 11 NSWCCR 386 ........................................ A.58 Karina Fisheries Pty Ltd v Mitson (1990) 26 FCR 473; 96 ALR 629 ........................ Q.18 Kaye v Woods (No 2) [2016] 87 ACTSC 87 ............................................................. A.181 Keefe v The King (1919) 21 WALR 88 ............................................................ 130.7, Q.71 Keeley v Brooking (1979) 143 CLR 162 ............................................................ A.111, 3.8 Keen Mar Corporation v Labrador Shopping Centre [1989] ATPR 46,068 .............. A.222 Kehoe v Dacol Motors Pty Ltd; Ex parte Dacol Motors Pty Ltd [1972] Qd R 59 ................................................................................................................... A.103 Keller v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 204 ......................................................... A.75, F.48 Kelly v Kelly [1917] 1 IR 51 ......................................................................................... 22.3 Kelly v The Queen (2002) 129 A Crim R 363 ............................................................. A.79 Kelly v The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 216; 78 ALJR 538; [2004] HCA 12 ............. 130.31, 130.77, F.49 Kemp v The King (1951) 83 CLR 341 ..................................................... 8.3, 10.21, 15.16 Kempley v The King [1944] ALR 249 ........................................................................ 10.20 Kennedy v Baker (No 2) (2004) 138 FCR 414; [2004] FCA 809 .................. A.194, Q.14 Kennedy v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 134 .................................. A.175 Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 136 FCR 114; [2004] FCA 636 ........................................ A.65 Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 142 FCR 185; 213 ALR 108; [2004] FCAFC 337 ............................................................................................................... A.163, A.181 Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 208 ALR 424; [2004] FCA 332 ..................................... A.163 Kenny v Hornberg (1963) 57 QJPR 139 .......................................................... A.117, Q.45 Kenny v Nominal Defendant [2007] QCA 185 ........................................................... 92.37 Kenny v Ritter (2009) 52 MVR 360; [2009] SASC 139 ................................................ 8.6 Kerr v Nominal Defendant (Queensland) (1987) 5 MVR 175 ..................................... 79.8 Key International Drilling Company Ltd v TNT Bulkships Operations Pty Ltd [1989] WAR 280 .............................................................................................. A.180 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xlviii

Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Cases

Keys v Salway [2015] NSWSC 613 ......................................................... 83.5, 84.4, 92.14 Kilby v The Queen (1973) 129 CLR 460 ....................................................... A.154, 101.2 Killick v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 565 ...................................................... A.103, 15.23 King v Bryant (No 2) [1956] QSR 570 ........................................................................ A.86 King v Nolan [1992] 2 Qd R 498 ......................................................................... 3.12, 6.13 King v Owners Corporation Strata Plan 2311 (2006) 3 DCLR (NSW) 271; [2006] NSWDC 44 ......................................................................................... A.118 King v The Queen (1986) 15 FCR 427; 22 A Crim R 153 .................................. A.4, 10.3 Kingston v Reid & Co Ltd [1902] QWN 36 ................................................................. 22.7 Kirby v Prisoners Review Board (No 2) [2010] WASC 280 ..................................... A.159 Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531; [2010] HCA 1 ........................................................................... A.64, 8.3, F.9 Kirkby v Coote [2005] QSC 197 ................................................................................. 102.1 Kit Digital Australia Pty Ltd, Re [2014] NSWSC 1547 ............................................ A.118 Kleimeyer v Clay [1965] QWN 26 ...................................................................... A.159, 2.2 Klein v SBD Services Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 134 ........................................................ A.119 Knapp v Metropolitan Permanent Building Association (1888) 9 LR (NSW) 486 .............................................................................................................. A.206 Knight v Australian Capital Territory [2016] ACTCA 3 .............................................. A.48 Knight v Commissioner of Police [2011] WASC 93 .................................................. A.212 Knight v Jones; Ex parte Jones [1981] Qd R 98 .......................................... A.141, 130.43 Knight v Porter [1945] VLR 208 .......................................................................... 16.6, 53.5 Knight v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 495 ................................................................. A.105 Knowles, Re [1984] VR 751 ........................................................................................... A.4 Koch v The Queen [2011] VSCA 435 ........................................................................ A.117 Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] AC 993 ................. A.213, A.222 Kong v Kang [2014] VSC 28 ................................................................ A.197, A.204, F.63 Konig v Casino Canberra Ltd [2000] ACTSC 67 ...................................................... A.166 Kooee Communications Pty Ltd v Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 119 ................................................................................................. A.215 Korean Air Lines v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (No 3) (2008) 247 ALR 781; [2008] FCA 701 ............................. A.187, A.197, A.200 Korgbara v The Queen (2007) 71 NSWLR 187; [2007] NSWCCA 84 ...................... A.77 Korp v Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board [1964] VR 563 ..................................... 10.21 Kosanovic v Sarapuu [1962] VR 321 ......................................................................... A.211 Koscot Interplanetary (UK) Ltd, Re [1972] 3 All ER 829 ........................................... 85.1 Kostopoulos v GE Commercial Finance Australia Pty Ltd [2005] Q Conv R 54-634; [2005] QCA 311 .................................................................................... A.220 Kotku Bread Pty Ltd v Vero Insurance Ltd (2012) 17 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-930; [2012] QSC 109 ............................................................................... A.68 Koushappis v Western Australia (2007) 168 A Crim R 51; [2007] WASCA 26 ............................................................................................................................. 95A.3 Kovan Engineering (Australia) Pty Ltd v Gold Peg International Pty Ltd (2006) 70 IPR 1; [2006] FCAFC 117 ...................................................................... A.58 Koven v Hail Creek Coal Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 51 ....................................................... 83.5 Kowalski v Trustee, Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd Staff Superannuation Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 18 ...................................................................................... A.211 Kozul v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 221 ......................................................... A.60, 133.3 Kristeff v The Queen (1968) 42 ALJR 233 ....................................... A.4, A.60, 59.9, F.29 Kruger v The Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1 ...................................................... 10.12 Krulewitch v United States (1949) 336 US 440 ............................................................. A.6 Krycki v Nominal Defendant [1962] NSWR 235 ....................................................... 19.16 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361; [2011] HCA 11 ........................................................................................................ A.118 Kukurs v Hodgson (2012) 61 MVR 96; 223 A Crim R 155; [2012] WASC 181 ................................................................................................................................ 5.2 Kuligowski v Metrobus (2004) 220 CLR 363; [2004] HCA 34; (2002) 26 WAR 137 ..................................................................................................... A.211, A.213 Kunnath v Mauritius [1993] 1 WLR 1315; 4 All ER 30 ............................................... Q.6 Kupang Resources Ltd v International Litigation Partners Pte Ltd [2015] WASCA 89 .................................................................................................................. A.4 Kurgiel v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (1990) 54 SASR 125 ............................... A.96 Kurth v Paff; Ex parte Paff [1968] QWN 21 ................................................................ Q.53 Kuruma v The Queen [1955] AC 197 ....................................................................... 130.42 Kurzbock v Hallett (2001) 126 A Crim R 125 ........................................................... A.103

L L (An Infant), Re [1968] P 119 ..................................................................................... Q.23 L Schuler AG v Wickham Machine Tool Sales Ltd [1974] AC 235 ........................... A.56 LAL v The Queen [2011] VSCA 111 ............................................................................ 21.9 LC v TC [1998] FLC 92-803 ........................................................................................ A.95 LE Walwin and Partners Ltd v West Sussex County Council [1975] 3 All ER 604 ..................................................................................................................... A.214 LG Thorne Pty Ltd v Thomas Borthwick & Sons (Australasia) Ltd (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 81 ................................................................................... A.54, A.56, 3.14 LJAW Enterprises Pty Ltd v RJK Enterprises Pty Ltd [2004] QSC 134 .................. A.146 LMI (A’sia) Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 31 ................................................................................................................ A.66 LT & KT Conlon v Lensworth Interstate (Vic) Pty Ltd [1970] VR 293 ................... A.181 La Fontaine v The Queen (1976) 136 CLR 62 .......................................................... A.105 La Trobe Capital & Mortgage Corporation Ltd v Hay Property Consultants Pty Ltd (2011) 273 ALR 774; [2011] FCAFC 4 ................................. A.66 Labocus Precious Metals Pty Ltd v Thomas [2007] FCA 1072 .................................. A.67 Labracon Pty Ltd v Cuturich (2013) 17 BPR 32,497; [2013] NSWSC 97 ............... A.216 Lade and Co Pty Ltd v Finlay [2010] QSC 382 .................................................. 43.1, 46.1 Lakeman v Finlay (1959) 59 SR (NSW) 5 .................................................................... 83.3 Lal Chand Marwari v Mahant Ramrup Gir (1925) 42 TLR 159 .................................. 74.8 Lamb v Munster (1882) 10 QBD 110 ....................................................... 10.1, 10.20, 14.2 Lambidis v Commissioner of Police (1995) 37 NSWLR 320 ................................... A.211 Lander v Mitson (1988) 83 ALR 466 ........................................................................... Q.14 Landmark Underwriting Agency Pty Ltd v Kilborn [2006] NSWSC 1108 .............. A.175 Lane v Jurd (No 2) (1995) 40 NSWLR 708 .................................................................. F.40 Lane v The Queen (1996) 66 FCR 144 ......................................................................... F.67 Langbein v The Queen (2008) 181 A Crim R 378 ........................................................ F.41 Langen v Tate (1883) 24 Ch D 522 ............................................................................... 22.7 Langford v Langford [1932] QWN 39 ......................................................................... 22.17 Langridge v The Queen (1996) 17 WAR 346 ........................................................... 132C.3 Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 ......................................................................... 90.1 Lattouf v Sassen [1968] 3 NSWR 577 .......................................................................... 59.7 Laurendi v Boral Contracting Pty Ltd [2002] WASCA 297 ........................................ A.95 Law Institute of Victoria Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2009] VSC 179 ...................................................................................................... A.159 Lawler v Johnson & DPP (2002) 56 NSWLR 1 ..................................................... 21AG.1 Lawler v Leeder (1981) 1 SR (WA) 389 ............................................................ 9C.3, A.70 [All references are to paragraph numbers] l

Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Cases

Lawless v The Queen (1979) 142 CLR 659 .......................................................... 6.14, A.4 Lawrence v Australian War Memorial [2014] NSWSC 757 ......................................... 3.11 Lawrence v Campbell (1859) 4 Drew 485; 62 ER 186 ............................................... A.16 Lawrence v Oil Drilling & Exploration (Qld) Pty Ltd [1967] QWN 4 ...................... Q.24 Lawrie v Hwang [2012] QSC 422 ............................................................................ 129A.5 Lawrie v Muir [1950] SLT 37; SC (J) 19 ....................................................... 130.42, Q.13 Lawson v Vacuum Brake Co (1884) 27 Ch D 137 .............................. 22.14, 22.15, 92.28 Lawton v Price (1968) 16 WR 666 .................................................................................. 6.8 Laythoarp v Bryant (1836) 2 Bing NC 725; 132 ER 283 ........................................... Q.98 Le Cerf v Commissioner of Police [2011] QDC 235 ................................................... Q.87 Leader Westernport v IPD Instant Duplicating (1988) 5 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-856 ........................................................................................................... A.192 Lear v Wills (unreported, Fed Ct of Aust, Hill J, 21 September 1992) .................... A.192 Lebon v Lake Placid Resort Pty Ltd [1995] 1 Qd R 24 ............................ 134A.1, 134A.7 Lee v Chai [2013] QSC 136 ......................................................... 19.5, 19.11, 19.12, 19.24 Lee v Commissioner of Police [2012] QCA 185 ..................................................... 131A.2 Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 302 ALR 363; [2013] HCA 39 ............................................................................................... A.194, 10.1, 10.29 Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594 ............................................. 6.10, F.34, F.35, F.36 Lee-Wright v Police (2010) 109 SASR 96; [2010] SASC 353 ................... 130.18, 130.26 Leeks v XY (2008) 21 VR 118; [2008] VSCA 21 ...................................................... 101.7 Lees v Smith (1918) 35 WN (NSW) 53 ........................................................................ 22.9 Legal Services Commisioner v Hansen [2008] QLPT 7 ............................................ A.113 Legal Services Commissioner v Dempsey [2010] QCA 197 ........................... A.136, Q.54 Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406 .................................. A.15, A.217, A.219, A.221 Lego Australia Pty Ltd v Paraggio (1994) 52 FCR 542; 124 ALR 225 ..................... Q.12 Leigh v Cole (1853) 6 Cox CC 329 ............................................................................. Q.24 Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Western Metals Resources Ltd [2001] 1 Qd R 261 ................................................................................................. A.65, 6.8, Q.10 Lemari v Lemari [1988] 1 Qd R 144 .......................................................................... A.213 Lenehan v Queensland Trustees Ltd [1965] Qd R 559 .... 51.3, 92.14, 92.15, 92.42, 98.4, 98.5, 103.1, A.151 Lennon v South Australia [2010] SASC 272 .............................................................. A.123 Leonard v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 374; [2006] NSWCCA 267 ................ A.136 Leto v Coffey Projects (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 1896 ............................. A.215 Levene v Roxhan [1970] 1 WLR 1322; 3 All ER 683 ................................................. 80.1 Levinge v Director of Custodial Services (1987) 9 NSWLR 546 ............................... A.94 Lewis v Combell Constructions Pty Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 528 ............................. A.207 Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (In liq); Lamru Pty Ltd v Kation Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 335 ............................................................................................................. 17.10 Lewis v Strickland [2003] QSC 395 ............................................................................ 92.32 Lewis v The Queen (1987) 88 FLR 104 ....................................................................... A.67 Lewis v Theodoropoulos (1987) 5 MVR 115 ............................................................. A.175 Leybourne v Permanent Custodians Ltd [2010] NSWCA 78 ......................................... 8.6 Li v The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 281; [2003] NSWCCA 290 ............................ A.77 Li Shu-Ling v The Queen [1988] 3 WLR 671 ................................................ 130.33, A.60 Liaweena (NSW) Pty Ltd v McWilliams Wines Pty Ltd [1991] ASC 56-038 ...................................................................................................................... A.123 Liberato v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 507 .............................................................. A.105 Liberty Funding Pty Ltd v Phoenix Capital Ltd (2005) 218 ALR 283; [2005] FCAFC 3 ......................................................................................... A.175, A.176 Libke v The Queen (2007) 230 CLR 559; 81 ALJR 1309; 235 ALR 517; [2007] HCA 30 .......................................................................................................... 21.2 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

Liesfeld v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 348 ....................................... A.146, A.167 Lilley v Pettit [1946] KB 401 ............................................................................... 51.3, 51.7 Lillicrap v Nalder & Son [1993] 1 WLR 94 .............................................................. A.186 Lindsay v Health Care Complaints Commission [2010] NSWCA 194 ....................... A.58 Lindsay v Smith (2001) 11 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-498 ........................................ A.219 Lindsay-Owen v Lake [2000] NSWSC 1046 ................................................................ F.16 Lindwall v Lindwall [1967] 1 WLR 143 ...................................................................... A.48 Linfox Transport (Aust) Pty Ltd v Arthur Yates & Co Ltd (2003) 47 ACSR 261; [2003] NSWSC 876 ............................................................................... 83.5 Ling v Commonwealth (1996) 68 FCR 180; 139 ALR 159 ...................................... A.215 Linprint Pty Ltd v Hexham Textiles Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 509 ...................... A.211 Linsley v Petrie (1996) 9 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-349 ........................................... A.212 Lipke v Goombungee Co-operative Dairy Co Ltd [1908] QSR 103 ............................ 55.1 Liquorland (Aust) Pty Ltd v Anghie (2003) 7 VR 27; [2003] VSC 73 .................... A.175 Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352; [2011] HCA 36 ................... 92.13 Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206 ........................................................................ 10.35 Livingspring Pty Ltd v Kliger Partners (2008) 66 ACSR 455; [2008] VSCA 93 ........................................................................................................... 84.7, 88.4 Llewellyn v Police (2005) 91 SASR 418; [2005] SASC 160 .................................... A.145 Lloyd v Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co Ltd [1914] AC 733 .................................... A.151 Lock v Lock [1966] SASR 246 ................................................................................... A.171 Lockheed-Arabia Corporation v Owen [1993] QB 806 ..................................... 59.3, 59.10 Loges v Martin (1991) 13 MVR 405 ........................................................................... 10.36 Lombe v Pollak [2004] FCA 593 ................................................................................ A.175 Lonergan v The Queen [1963] Tas SR 158 ................................................................ A.116 Longhurst v Hunt (2004) 42 MVR 267; [2004] NSWCA 91 ............................ 92.32, F.41 Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79 .............. A.5, A.154, A.214, 8.4, 130.4, F.67 Lopes v Taylor (1970) 44 ALJR 412 .................................................................. Q.46, Q.57 Lorca v Holt’s Corrosion Control Pty Ltd [1981] Qd R 261 .......................... A.103, Q.37 Lord Abinger v Ashton (1873) LR 17 Eq 358 ............................................................. A.68 Lord Ashburton v Pape [1913] 2 Ch 469 .................................................................... 10.28 Loumbos v McCoy (Unreported, NSW Sup Ct CA, 15 August 1996) ....................... Q.54 Loveday v Ayre [1955] St R Qd 264 ................................................................ A.103, Q.33 Loveday v Renton and Wellcome Foundation Ltd (1990) 1 Med LR 117 .................. A.72 Loveden v Loveden (1810) 2 Hag Con 1; 161 ER 648 ................................... A.130, 13.1 Lowe v Joliffe (1762) 1 W Bl 366; 96 ER 204 ............................................................ A.13 Lowery v The Queen [1974] AC 85 ....................................................... 9C.4, 15.27, 15.28 Lowry, Re (1892) 4 QLJR 131 ...................................................................................... 22.1 Lucas v Dixon (1889) 22 QBD 357 ............................................................................ Q.101 Lucas v Smith [1948] Tas SR 111 ............................................................................... 83.13 Lucas v Williams & Sons [1892] 2 QB 113 .................................................................. 59.3 Luck v Civil Mining and Construction Pty Ltd [2009] QSC 413 .............................. 92.33 Lui Mei Lin v The Queen [1989] 2 WLR 175 ................................................. 15.74, Q.80 Lukies v Ripley (No 2) (1994) 35 NSWLR 283 ............................................ A.198, A.200 Lumley v Gye (1854) 3 E & B 114; 118 ER 1083 ..................................................... 22.20 Lustre Hosiery Ltd v York (1936) 54 CLR 134 ................................................ 19.19, Q.43 Luxton v Vines (1952) 85 CLR 352 ........................................................................... A.114 Lyell v Kennedy (1889) 14 AC 437; (1888) 50 LT 730 ........................... 3.20, 51.2, Q.57 Lynch v Lynch (1966) 8 FLR 433 ...................................................................... A.67, 9C.4

M M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; [1994] HCA 63 ..................................... 9D.3, 18.5 [All references are to paragraph numbers] lii

Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Cases

MAM Mortgages Ltd (In liq) v Cameron Brothers (No 2) [2001] 1 Qd R 46 ............................................................................................................................. A.175 MBS v DPP (Qld) [2012] QCA 326 ........................................................................ 21AK.3 M’Cormick v Garnett (1854) 23 LJ Ch 777 .................................................................. 68.4 MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606 ...................................................................... 9D.3 MGICA (1992) Ltd v Kenny & Good Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 61 FCR 236; 135 ALR 743 ................................................................................................. A.175, F.58 MJH v Western Australia (2006) 33 WAR 9; 166 A Crim R 152; [2006] WASCA 167 ............................................................................................................... 18.8 MJW v The Queen (2005) 80 ALJR 329; 222 ALR 436; [2005] HCA 74 ................. A.95 ML Ubase Holdings Co Ltd v Trigem Computer Inc (2007) 69 NSWLR 577; [2007] NSWSC 859 ....................................................................................... A.175 MLB v The Queen (2010) 27 NTLR 198; [2010] NTCCA 11 .................................. A.154 MM v Australian Crime Commission (2007) 69 ATR 223; [2007] FCA 2026 ......................................................................................................................... A.194 MM v The Queen [2012] ACTCA 44 ......................................................................... A.136 MM Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Port Stephens Council (2012) 191 LGERA 292; [2012] NSWCA 417 ........................................................................... A.58 MPL v JP [2011] QCA 220 ........................................................................................... A.89 MSPR Pty Ltd v Advanced Braking Technology Ltd [2013] NSWCA 416 ............. A.118 MWJ v The Queen (2005) 80 ALJR 329; 222 ALR 436; [2005] HCA 74 ................. A.95 MWR v The Queen [2003] WASCA 236 ................................................................... A.154 Mabbot v The Queen [1990] WAR 323 ........................................................................ Q.43 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 ............................................................. Q.6 MacDonnell v Evans (1852) 11 CB 930 ...................................................................... 104.2 MacMillan v Pharmaceutical Council of WA [1983] WAR 166 ................................ 10.12 MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512; [1981] HCA 46 ........... 8.6, 15.7, 15.39, Q.59, Q.61, Q.72, Q.73, Q.76 Macaulay v Glass (1902) 47 So Jo 71 ......................................................................... 22.16 Macchia v Nilant [2006] FCA 213 .............................................................................. A.214 Macedonia Pty Ltd v FCT (1987) 18 ATR 929; 87 ATC 4565 ................................. A.196 Macferson v Thoytes (1790) Peake 29; 170 ER 67 ...................................................... 59.8 Mack v Lenton (1993) 32 NSWLR 259 ............................................................ 3.15, Q.103 Mackay v Mackay [1910] VLR 50 ................................................................................ 22.5 Mackay v Pearce [2007] QSC 195 ............................................................................... 102.1 Mackay Sugar Ltd v Quadrio [2015] QCA 41 ............................................................. Q.99 Mackenzie v The Queen (2004) 150 A Crim R 451; [2004] WASCA 146 ............. 130.43, 130.44, 130.45 Maclean v Workers’ Union [1929] 1 Ch 602 ............................................................. Q.109 Macquarie Bank Ltd v Westgarth Middletons (1995) 8 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-261 ........................................................................................................... A.214 Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney Local Health District [2014] NSWSC 1105 ................................................................................. A75.5 Madafferi v Age Company Ltd [2015] VSC 687 .......................................................... F.60 Maddern v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd [2002] QSC 275 ............................................. 92.33 Maddison v Alderson (1883) 8 App Cas 467 ............................................................. Q.104 Maddison v Goldrick [1976] 1 NSWLR 651 ................................... A.184, 3.9, 18.1, 19.1 Magellan Petroleum Australia Limited v Sagasco Amadeus Pty Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 37 ....................................................................................................... A.166, Q.3 Magill v The Queen [2013] VSCA 259 ........................................................................ Q.53 Magnusson v ACT Health Community Care Service [2001] ACTSC 3 ............ 22.20, Q.2 Maguire v Beaton (2005) 162 A Crim R 21; [2005] NSWSC 1241 ........................... Q.24 Mahadervan v Mahadervan [1964] P 233 ...................................................................... 68.4 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Mahantheran v Western Australia [2014] WASCA 232 ..................................... A.78, A.79 Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 241 ALR 606; 82 ALJR 372; [2008] HCA 1 ........................................................................................................... Q.46 Mahoney v Fielding; Ex parte Fielding [1959] Qd R 479 ............................. A.79, 130.74 Mainchime Pty Ltd (t/a Inala Plaza News) v Inala Plaza Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 250 .................................................................................................................. A.197 Maitland-Smith v Path Transit Pty Ltd (2009) 52 MVR 185; [2009] WASCA 46 .............................................................................................................. A.114 Makhoul v Barnes (1995) 60 FCR 572 ....................................................................... A.211 Makin v Attorney-General for NSW (1893) 14 NSWLR (L) 1; [1894] AC 57 ..... A.19, A.33, A.134, A.136, A.137, A.138, A.139, 15.12, 15.19, 92.13, F.6, F.51 Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305 ......................................................................................... A.67, A.74, A.75 Malaysian Airlines System v Wood [1988] WAR 294 ........................................ A.62, 41.2 Malcolmson v O’Dea (1863) 10 HLC 593; 11 ER 1155 .............................................. 62.1 Malindi v The Queen [1967] 1 AC 439 ....................................................................... 15.29 Mallard v The Queen (2003) 28 WAR 1; [2003] WASCA 296 ......................... A.71, Q.43 Mallesons Stephen Jacques v KPMG Peat Marwick & Carter (1990) 4 WAR 357 ......................................................................................................... A.173, Q.2 Maloney v New South Wales National Coursing Association Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 161 ..................................................................................................... 6.10, 20.2 Malouf v Malouf (2006) 65 NSWLR 449; [2006] NSWCA 83 .................................... A.4 Malubel Pty Ltd v Elder (1999) 73 ALJR 269 ................................................... Q.13, Q.18 Malyon v Lawrence Messer & Co [1968] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 539 ........................... 68.5, 68.6 Manchester Brewery Co Ltd v Coombs (1900) 82 LT 347 ....................................... A.143 Mandzij v The Queen (1983) 11 A Crim R 209 ......................................................... 15.54 Manenti v Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board [1954] VLR 115 ...... A.3, 16.7, 130.35 Mango Boulevard Pty Ltd v Spencer [2008] QCA 274 ............................................. A.213 Mango Boulevard Pty Ltd v Spencer [2010] QCA 207 ............................................. A.212 Manley v Alexander (2005) 80 ALJR 413; [2005] HCA 79 ...................................... A.114 Manly v Public Trustee of Queensland [2007] QSC 388 ........................................... 92.14 Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 ......................................................... A.175, A.179, F.6 Mannah v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 19 ........................................................... A.4 Manning Motel Pty Ltd v DH MB Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1582 ............................. A.56 Manno v Manno [2016] NSWSC 493 ............................................................ A.220, A.221 Manson v Ponninghaus [1911] VLR 239 ...................................................................... A.48 Mansour v Standard Telephones and Cables Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 205 ............................................................................................................................ 92.15 Manton v Commonwealth (1981) 34 ALR 342 ...................................... 85.1, 92.28, 92.36 Mapp v Ohio 367 US 643 (1961) .............................................................................. 130.42 Marcel v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1991] 2 WLR 1118; 1 All ER 845 .............................................................................................................. 10.6 March Cabaret Club and Casino Ltd v London Assurance [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 169 ........................................................................................................ 10.1 Marek v Australasian Conference Association Pty Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 521 ............. A.197 Marelic v Comcare (1993) 47 FCR 437; 121 ALR 114 .............................................. A.58 Marginson v Blackburn Borough Council [1939] 2 KB 426 ............................ A.213, 79.1 Marine Midland Bank v John E Russo Produce Co Inc 427 NYS 2d 961 (1980) ....................................................................................................................... 10.26 Maritime Union of Australia v Geraldton Port Authority (1999) 93 FCR 34; 88 IR 351 .............................................................................................. A.159, A.160 Markby v The Queen (1978) 140 CLR 108 ............................ 15.12, 15.19, A.134, A.137 [All references are to paragraph numbers] liv

Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Cases

Markovina v The Queen (1996) 16 WAR 354 ..................................................... 83.6, 95.7 Markovina v The Queen (No 2) (1997) 19 WAR 119 ................................................. A.85 Marks v Beyfus (1890) 25 QBD 494 ............................................................................... F.6 Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1996) 63 FCR 304; [1996] ATPR 41-471 ................................................................................................................... F.4, F.6 Marks v National & General Insurance Co Ltd (1993) 114 FLR 416 ...................... A.211 Marra Developments Ltd, Re [1979] 2 NSWLR 193 ............................. 83.10, 92.42, 98.5 Marriott v The Queen (1995) 126 FLR 119 .............................................................. 130.45 Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1099 ............................................................................................................................. Q.3 Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1254 ............................................................................................................................ 3.11 Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 87 .................. F.29 Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Levine J, 2 November 1998) ........................................................................ Q.3 Marshall v Averay [2006] QDC 356 .............................................................................. 43.1 Marshall v Western Australia [2008] WASC 99 ........................................................ 130.21 Martelli v Police (2007) 46 MVR 568; [2007] SASC 21 .......................................... A.102 Martin v Kennedy [1992] 2 Qd R 109 ................................................................. 3.12, 6.13 Martin v Medical Complaints Tribunal (2006) 15 Tas R 413; [2006] TASSC 73 .............................................................................................................. 130.78 Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 .... A.1, A.62, A.127, A.130, A.140, A.141, 21.13, 92.18, F.52 Martin v Rowling [2005] QCA 128 .............................................................................. A.95 Martin v White [1910] 1 KB 665 ......................................................................... 16.6, 53.5 Mash v Darley [1914] 3 KB 1226 ........................................................................ 16.6, 53.5 Mason v Tritton (1993) 70 A Crim R 28 ...................................................................... Q.33 Mason & Cox Pty Ltd v KPMG Peat Marwick (1999) 74 SASR 171 ..................... A.175 Masterton Homes Pty Ltd v Palm Assets Pty Ltd (2009) 261 ALR 382; [2009] NSWCA 234 ................................................................................................. A.54 Mather and Deegan v Morgan [1971] Tas SR 192 .................................. A.86, 3.30, 83.12 Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 7) [2013] VSC 553 .................................... A.174 Matthews v The Queen [1973] WAR 110 ................................................................... 15.61 Matthews, Re [1919] VLR 733 .................................................... 22.6, 22.15, 22.16, 22.18 Matton Developments Pty Ltd v CGU Insurance Ltd [2015] QSC 72 ............ A.60, 102.1 Matusevich v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 633 .......................................................... 15.33 Maurice Blackburn Cashman v Brown (2011) 242 CLR 647; [2011] HCA 22 ............................................................................................................................. A.211 Mawaz Khan v The Queen [1967] 1 AC 454 ............................... A.143, 83.1, Q.45, Q.54 Max Cooper & Sons Pty Ltd v Sydney City Council (1980) 54 ALJR 234; 29 ALR 77 ........................................................................................................ A.70 Maxwell v DPP [1935] AC 309 ...................................... A.27, A.211, 15.16, 15.30, 15.60 Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261 ......................................................................... A.2 May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654 ....................................................................... A.102 Maybury v Atlantic Union Oil Co Ltd (1953) 89 CLR 507 ............................... A.56, 3.14 Mayor of Brighton v Selpam Pty Ltd [1987] VR 54 .................................................... 6.10 Mazinski v Bakka (1979) 20 SASR 350 ...................................................... 130.41, 130.62 McAdam v Chylos Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 161 ........................................................... 88.4 McBride v ASK Funding Ltd [2013] QCA 130 ............................................................ 59.9 McCarthy v O’Flynn [1979] IR 127 .............................................................................. 3.17 McCauley v McCauley (1910) 10 CLR 434 ............................................. 3.15, 63.2, 126.1 McCawley, Re [1918] QSR 62 ....................................................................................... 41.1 McColl v Lehmann [1987] VR 503 .............................................................................. Q.10 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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McCollom v Kovarik [2013] QDC 111 ......................................................................... 42.2 McCraith v Fraser (1991) 104 FLR 227; 6 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-061 ............... A.219 McDermott v The King (1948) 76 CLR 501 ................. 130.14, 130.28, Q.59, Q.61, Q.71 McDonald v Page [1923] SASR 167 ............................................................................. 22.3 McDonald v Sydney South West Area Health Service [2005] NSWSC 924 ............ A.213 McDonald (t/as BE McDonald Transport) v Girkaid Pty Ltd [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-768; [2004] NSWCA 297 ...................................... A.67, A.72, A.114 McDonalds Australia Ltd v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd [2013] V ConvR 54-843; [2013] VSC 639 ........................................................................... A.219 McDonald’s System of Australia Pty Ltd v McWilliam’s Wines Pty Ltd (1979) 41 FLR 436; 28 ALR 236 .......................................................................... A.148 McDonnell v Evans (1852) 11 CB 930; 138 ER 742 .......................................... 19.5, 19.8 McFadden v Snow (1951) 69 WN (NSW) 8 .............................................................. A.205 McGahan v Driver [1936] QWN 45 ......................................................... 17.12, 18.4, 18.8 McGrath as Liquidators of HIH Insurance Ltd [2008] NSWSC 780 ........................... 22.1 McGregor v Stokes [1952] VLR 347 .......................................................................... A.143 McGregor-Lowndes v Collector of Customs (Qld) (1968) 11 FLR 349 ....................... A.4 McGuinness v Attorney-General (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73 ........................................ A.196 McGuirk v University of New South Wales [2010] NSWSC 448 ............................. A.111 McIlwraith McEacharn Operations Ltd v CE Heath Underwriting and Insurance (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) [1995] 1 Qd R 363 .................................... A.192 McIntyre v Sing (1979) 43 FLR 89; 30 ALR 299 ........................................................ F.70 McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads [2009] WASC 353 ....................................... A.67 McKay v Hutchins [1990] 1 Qd R 533 .............................. 92.2, 92.13, 92.38, 93.10, 96.1 McKay v The King (1935) 54 CLR 1 ................................................................ Q.50, Q.55 McKinney v The Queen (1991) 171 CLR 468 ........... A.39, 130.11, 130.31, 130.77, Q.56 McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; [2006] HCA 45 ....................................................................................................... A.125 McLachlan v Australian Stock Exchange (1998) 30 ACSR 139 ................................... Q.3 McLaren v Norton [2006] WASC 305 ........................................................................... 6.11 McLean v Cahill [1932] SASR 359 ............................................................................... 59.8 McLean v Kalanda Constructions Pty Ltd [1995] QCA 280 ............................. A.94, A.95 McLellan v Bowyer (1961) 106 CLR 95 ....................................... 17.7, 17.9, 17.11, 17.13 McLellan v Queensland Rail [2001] QDC 58 ............................................................. 92.32 McLeod v Greer [2003] WASCA 199 ......................................................................... A.106 McMahon v Cooper [1989] 2 Qd R 418 ............................................................... 6.8, A.65 McMahon v Evans (1892) 8 WN (NSW) 94 ................................................................. 22.7 McMahon v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (No 4) [2012] NSWSC 216 .............................................................................................................................. 83.8 McMinn v Daire (1982) 5 A Crim R 307 .................................................................... 15.53 McNair v Press Offshore Ltd (1997) 17 WAR 191 .................................................... A.211 McNamara v Cameron (1890) 16 VLR 108 .................................................................. 22.5 McNamara v Edwards; Ex parte Edwards [1907] QSR 9 ............................................ Q.69 McNee v Kay [1953] VLR 520 ..................................................................................... Q.35 McNeil v Commissioner of Taxation (2003) 202 ALR 35; [2003] FCA 958 ............................................................................................................................. A.75 McPherson v McPherson [1936] AC 177 ....................................................................... Q.2 McQueen v Hawi [2008] NSWSC 136 ......................................................................... Q.21 McShane v Higgins [1997] 2 Qd R 373 .......................................................................... 6.2 McTaggart v McTaggart [1949] P 94 .............................................................. A.200, A.204 McWilliam’s Wines Pty Ltd v McDonald’s System of Australia Pty Ltd (1980) 49 FLR 455; 33 ALR 394 ............................................................................. 59.9 Mead v Mead (2007) 81 ALJR 1185; 235 ALR 197; [2007] HCA 25 ......... A.118, A.163 [All references are to paragraph numbers] lvi

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Meadow Springs Fairway Resort Ltd (In liq) v Balanced Securities Ltd (No 2) (2008) 245 ALR 726; [2008] FCA 471 ..................................................... A.219 Meath v Winchester (1836) 10 Bli 330; 6 ER 125 ....................................................... 62.1 Mechanical and General Inventions Co Ltd v Austin [1935] AC 346 ......................... 20.2 Medical Council of Tasmania v Lad (2007) 16 Tas R 260; [2007] TASSC 43 ................................................................................................................................. A.4 Medina v Copenhagen Handelsbank International SA [1989] FCA 52 ............ 10.23, 68.7 Medina v The Queen (1990) 3 WAR 21; 46 A Crim R 132 ................... A.168, 59.3, 59.6 Medina v The Queen (1995) 84 A Crim R 316 ............................................................ F.82 Meek v Guardian Assurance Co Ltd (1963) 80 WN (NSW) 940; [1963] NSWR 1308 ............................................................................................................... 53.7 Mees v Main Roads Corporation (2003) 128 FCR 418; [2003] FCA 306 ................ A.159 Mega-top Cargo Pty Ltd v Moneytech Services Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 3 ............ A.203 Mehesz v Redman (No 2) (1980) 26 SASR 244 ........................................................... 95.7 Meiers v Button (unreported, Qld CCA, 15 March 1988) ................................. 17.7, 101.5 Meissner v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 132 ............................................................... A.61 Melbourne v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 1 ......................................... 15.35, 15.36, 15.67 Melhuish v Collier (1850) 15 QB 878; 117 ER 690; 19 LJQB 493 ......... 17.3, 17.5, 17.9 Meltend Pty Ltd v Restoration Clinics of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 511; 145 ALR 391 ..................................................................... A.180, 10.23, F.58 Mendola v Warren [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-240 ................................................ 92.23 Menkens v Wintour [2009] QSC 206 ........................................................................... Q.38 Mercantile Mutual Custodians Pty Ltd v Village/Nine Network Restaurants & Bars Pty Ltd [2001] 1 Qd R 276; [1999] QCA 276 ........ A.197, A.198, A.206, A.208 Mercantile Mutual Insurance (NSW Workers Compensation) Ltd v Murray (2004) 13 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-612; [2004] NSWCA 151 ........................... A.192 Mercer v Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways (NSW) (1936) 56 CLR 580 ............................................................................................................... A.71 Mercer v Pharmacy Board of Victoria [1968] VR 72 ......................................... A.113, 3.7 Meredith v Innes (1931) 31 SR (NSW) 104 ......................................... 19.11, 19.15, 19.18 Mericka v Mericka [1954] SASR 74 ........................................................................... 92.31 Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2009) 263 ALR 556; [2009] NSWCA 434 ........................................................... A.215 Merivale Motel Investments Pty Ltd v Brisbane Exposition & Southbank Redevelopment Authority [1988] 2 Qd R 562 ...................................................... A.125 Merwin Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Moolpa Pastoral Pty Ltd (1933) 48 CLR 565 .............................................................................................................................. 68.1 Metrolink Victoria Pty Ltd v Auspro Logistics Pty Ltd (2008) 49 MVR 350; [2008] VSC 23 ............................................................................................... A.102 Metropolitan Bank Ltd v Pooley (1885) 10 App Cas 210 ........................................ 130.41 Micalizzi v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 96 ........................................................ 10.3 Micar Group Pty Ltd v Insul-Trade LLC (2010) 244 FLR 403; [2010] NSWSC 1391 .......................................................................................................... A.146 Miccon Hire Pty Ltd (in liq) v Birla Mt Gordon Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 139 .............. 102.1 Michael v Oldfield (1887) 8 ALT 164 ........................................................................... 22.9 Michael, Re; Ex parte Epic Energy (WA) Pty Ltd Nominees Pty Ltd (2002) 25 WAR 511 .................................................................................................. A.57 Mickelberg v Director of Perth Mint [1986] WAR 365 ................................................ 79.8 Mickelberg v The Queen [1978] WAR 191 .................................................................. Q.54 Mickelberg v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 259 .............................................................. A.4 Mickelberg v The Queen (2004) 29 WAR 13; [2004] WASCA 145 ............................. A.4 Middleton v Freier [1958] Qd R 351 ......................................................... A.60, 59.9, F.29 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Miladinovic v The Queen (1993) 47 FCR 190 ........................................................... A.156 Miles v The Queen [1999] NTCCA 105 ......................................................... 130.77, Q.56 Milicevic v Campbell (1975) 132 CLR 307 .................................................................. F.74 Miller v Cameron (1936) 54 CLR 572 ........................................................................... A.4 Miller v Livingstone Shire Council [2003] QCA 29 .................................................. A.114 Miller v Miller (1978) 141 CLR 269 ............ A.198, 10.23, 10.28, 130.3, 130.36, 130.37, 130.49, 130.62 Miller v TCN Channel 9 (1988) 36 A Crim R 92 ........................................................ Q.87 Miller v The Queen (1995) 13 WAR 504 ................................................................... A.154 Miller v University of New South Wales (2003) 132 FCR 147; 200 ALR 565; [2003] FCAFC 180 ............................................................................ A.211, A.213 Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd v Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 948 .......................................................................................................... A.68 Mills v Western Australia (2008) 189 A Crim R 411; [2008] WASCA 219 ............... A.78 Milner v Anderson (1982) 42 ACTR 23 ........................................................ A.141, 130.43 Milojevic v ROH Industries Pty Ltd (1991) 56 SASR 78 ......................................... A.211 Minagall v Ayres [1966] SASR 151 .............................................................................. A.58 Minassian v Minassian [2010] NSWSC 708 ..................................................... 3.15, Q.103 Mine & Quarry Equipment International Pty Ltd (In liq), Re (2004) 51 ACSR 339; [2004] QSC 402 .................................................................................. A.215 Minet v Morgan (1873) LR 8 Ch App 361 .................................................................. A.16 Minhaj v The Queen [2000] WASCA 52 ..................................................... 130.11, 130.12 Mining Homes of Australia Ltd, Re (1981) 6 ACLR 226 .......................................... 10.18 Minister for Home and Territories v Teesdale Smith (1924) 35 CLR 120 ............... A.213 Minniti v The Queen (2006) 159 A Crim R 394; 196 FLR 431; [2006] NSWCCA 30 ................................................................................................. A.106, Q.54 Minogue v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1999) 84 FCR 438; 166 ALR 129; [1999] FCA 85 ................................................................... 8.6 Minter v Priest [1929] 1 KB 655; [1930] AC 558 .................. A.163, A.181, A.182, Q.73 Mister Figgins Pty Ltd v Centrepoint Freeholds Pty Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 23 ............................................................................................................................. A.141 Mitchell v Nelson (1900) 17 WN (NSW) 16 .............................................................. 22.31 Mitic v OZ Minerals Ltd [2015] FCA 1152 ............................................................... A.168 Mitton v Curl [1922] SASR 282 ........................................................... 10.19, 10.21, 10.23 Mkari v Meza [2005] NSWCA 136 .............................................................................. A.94 Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Guina Developments Pty Ltd [1996] 2 VR 34 ....... A.166, Q.3 Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Lyndel Nominees Pty Ltd (1998) 153 ALR 198 ............. A.219 Mobil Oil Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks [1984] VR 25; (1983) 51 ALR 735 ............................................................................................................. A.148 Modern Merchandising Pty Ltd v Brown [1998] QSC 69 .......................................... 92.35 Moggridge v Hall (1879) 13 Ch D 380 ......................................................................... 22.3 Mok v NSW Crime Commission [2002] NSWCA 53 ............................................... A.159 Mokbel v The Queen [2013] VSCA 118 ....................................................................... 68.4 Moller v Bruce-Sanders [1962] QWN 12 ................................................................... A.114 Monie v Commonwealth (2005) 63 NSWLR 729; [2005] NSWCA 25 ...................... A.58 Monroe v Twistleton (1802) Peake Add Cas 219; 170 ER 250 ..................................... 7.4 Monroe Australia Pty Ltd v Campbell (1995) 65 SASR 16 .............................. A.67, A.72 Montecatini’s Patent, Re (1973) 47 ALJR 161 .................................................... 83.5, 84.3 Mood Music Publishing Co Ltd v De Wolfe Ltd [1976] Ch 119 .............................. A.141 Mooney v James [1949] VLR 22 ......................................................................... A.89, 17.8 Moore v Giofrelle [1952] ALR (CN) 1049 ........................................... A.138, A.211, 79.7 Moore v Lambeth County Court Registrar [1969] 1 All ER 782 ................................ A.68 Moore v Skinner (1990) 101 FLR 152; 49 A Crim R 1 .............................................. A.85 [All references are to paragraph numbers] lviii

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Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v Twitchings [1977] AC 890; [1976] QB 225; [1975] 3 All ER 314 .......................................................................... A.211, A.219 Moratic Pty Ltd v Gordon (2007) 13 BPR 24,713; [2007] NSWSC 5 ..................... A.218 Moreay Nominees Pty Ltd v McCarthy (1994) 10 WAR 293 ................................... A.186 Morgan v Babcock & Wilcox Ltd (1929) 43 CLR 163 ........................... 3.15, 19.5, 104.2 Morgan v Mallard [2000] SASC 445 .......................................................................... A.215 Morgan v The Queen (2011) 215 A Crim R 33; [2011] NSWCCA 257 ..................... A.67 Morier v Liem [2016] NSWSC 582 ................................................................................. 8.6 Morley v National Insurance Co [1967] VR 566 ........................................................ 92.15 Morony v Reschke [2011] NSWSC 1139 ................................................................... Q.110 Morony v Reschke [2014] NSWSC 359 ..................................................................... A.176 Morris v Barron [1918] AC 359 .................................................................................... A.55 Morris v FAI General Insurance Company Ltd [1996] 1 Qd R 495 ......................... A.219 Morris v Riverwild Management Pty Ltd (2011) 284 ALR 413; [2011] VSCA 283 ............................................................................................................... A.211 Morris v The Queen (1987) 163 CLR 454 .................................................................. 101.5 Morris v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 152 ......................................... A.103, 15.23, 18.11 Morrison v Bennett [2010] QDC 488 ............................................................................ 44.2 Morrison v Jenkins (1949) 80 CLR 626 ..................................................................... A.106 Mortgage Acceptance Nominees Ltd v Australian Thoroughbred Finance Ltd (1996) 69 SASR 302 ........................................................................... A.217, A.221 Mortimer v M’Callan (1840) 6 M & W 58; 151 ER 320 .......................... 51.2, 59.3, 84.7 Morton, Re; Ex parte Mitchell Products Pty Ltd (1996) 21 ACSR 497 ................... A.211 Motor Transport, Commissioner for v Collier-Moat Ltd (1960) 60 SR (NSW) 238; 77 WN (NSW) 12 .............................................................. 51.3, 51.7, 89.1 Moussa v Westray Engineering Pty Ltd (1994) 10 NSWCCR 723 ........................... A.213 Mowday v Western Australia (2007) 176 A Crim R 85; [2007] WASCA 165 ...................................................................................................................... A.63, 5.2 Moy v Warringah Council (2004) 142 A Crim R 577; [2004] NSWCA 77 .............. A.211 “Mr C”, Re (1993) 67 A Crim R 562 ............................................................................. Q.3 Muller v Western Australia [2014] WASCA 81 .............................................................. A.4 Mulley v Manifold (1959) 103 CLR 341 ..................................................................... A.49 Mulligan, Re; Ex parte Isidoro [1979] WAR 198 ..................................... 8.3, 10.21, 15.16 Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v Bligh Lobb Pink Pty Ltd (2002) 18 BCL 376; [2002] VSC 337 ..................................................................................... A.201 Munce v Vinidex Tubemakers Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 235 ..................... A.102, A.104 Mundey v Askin [1982] 2 NSWLR 369 ........................................ A.159, 10.3, 47.2, Q.52 Mundy v Bridge Motors Pty Ltd (1987) 45 SASR 125 ..................................... 53.7, A.61 Munmurrie v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 184 ................................................ A.106 Munro Machinery Pty Ltd v Scrap Metal Co of Australia Ltd (1969) 89 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 399 ............................................................................................ 92.40 Murdoch v Taylor [1965] AC 574 .................................................................... 15.72, 15.73 Murdoch v The Queen (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; [2007] NTCCA 1 .... A.67, A.79, Q.54 Murphy v Abu-Saab (1995) 37 NSWLR 280 ............................................................. A.213 Murphy v Lew [1998] 3 VR 791 ............................................................... 3.21, 83.6, 83.9, Murphy v Overton Investments Pty Ltd (2001) 182 ALR 138; [2001] FCA 1725 .................................................................................................... A.212, A.217 Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94 ...... A.71, A.73, A.75, 9C.4, 9C.7, F.48, Q.61, Q.84 Murphy v The Queen (1994) 62 SASR 121 ................................................................. A.67 Murphy v Victoria (No 2) (2014) 289 FLR 245; [2014] VSC 404 .......................... 83.13 Murray v Schreuder (2009) 1 ASTLR 340; [2009] WASC 51 .................................. A.163 Murray v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 193; 189 ALR 40 ............................. A.105, A.134 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Murray, Re; Permanent Trustee of NSW v Salwey [1965] NSWR 121 ...................... A.62 Mutemeri v Cheesman [1998] 4 VR 484; (1998) 100 A Crim R 397 ................ A.62, Q.3 Mutual Life Insurance Co of New York v Moss (1906) 4 CLR 311; [1906] HCA 70 ....................................................................................................... A.130 Myers v DPP [1965] AC 1001 ............................................. 51.1, 93.1, 93.8, 130.5, A.142 Myers v Medical Practitioners’ Board of Victoria (2007) 18 VR 48; [2007] VSCA 163 ................................................................................................. 129A.1

N N (on behalf of her son) v Queensland (acting through the Dept of Education and the Arts) [2007] QSC 208 ................................................................. 44.2 NAD v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 2 .................................................... A.106, Q.54 NAFQ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 473 ...................................................................................................... A.159 NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 7) (1999) 161 ALR 576 ....................... F.47 NSI Group Pty Ltd v Mokas [2006] NSWSC 1077 ................................................... A.206 NSW Bar Association v Evatt (1968) 117 CLR 177 ...................................... A.113, 10.12 NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority [2000] ATPR 41-746; [1999] FCA 1549 ........................................................................... A.160, 83.14 Nagan v Holloway [1996] 1 Qd R 607 ....................................................................... A.162 Nagle v Rottnest Island Authority (1993) 177 CLR 423 ........................................... A.114 Naidoo v Naidoo [2005) 38 SR (WA) 352; [2005] WADC 41 .................................... A.96 Namol Pty Ltd v A W Baulderstone Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 89; [1992] AIPC 90-886 ........................................................................................................... A.214 Nanaseni v The Queen [1971] NZLR 269 .................................................................... Q.70 Naomi Marble and Granite Pty Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (No 1) [1999] 1 Qd R 507 ................................................................................................ 10.1 Narkle v The Queen (2001) 23 WAR 468; 117 A Crim R 583 .................................... 18.8 Narne v Brisbane Tramways Co Ltd [1914] QWN 6 ..................................................... 6.4 Nash v United States 54 F 2d 1006 (1932) ................................................................. 15.69 National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu (1999) 47 NSWLR 309 ...................... 8.6, 85.1, F.27 National Australia Bank Ltd v Troiani [2002] QCA 196 ..................................... A.4, A.75 National Companies and Securities Commission v Sim (No 2) (1987) 5 ACLC 500 ................................................................................................................ 10.16 National Crime Authority v Gould (1989) 23 FCR 191; 90 ALR 489 ..................... A.159 National Employers’ Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd v Waind (1979) 141 CLR 648 ..................................................................................... 14.4, A.192 National Foods Milk Ltd v McMahon Milk Pty Ltd [2008] VSC 208 ....................... A.56 National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v The Sentry Corporation (1989) 22 FCR 209 ..................................................................................................................... 68.4 National Mutual Life Association of Australia Ltd v Australian Widow’s Fund Life Insurance Society Ltd [1910] VLR 411 ....................................... 6.10, 22.18 National Safety Council of Australia Victorian Division (In liq), Re; Re Friedrich (1989) 1 ACSR 293; 8 ACLC 277 ................................................ 21A.4, Q.2 National Trustees Executors & Agency Co of A/asia Ltd v Attorney-General (Vic) [1973] VR 610 ................................................................... A.62 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v District Court of New South Wales (1996) 40 NSWLR 486 ................................................................................................................ Q.2 Natta v Canham (1991) 32 FCR 282; 104 ALR 143 .................... A.99, A.141, 16.5, 94.4 Naumovski v Ugrinovski [2015] VSC 49 ..................................................................... A.65 Naxakis v Western General Hospital (1999) 197 CLR 269 ....................................... A.102 Nayeiob Queensland Pty Ltd v Soric [1974] Qd R 161 .............................................. A.49 [All references are to paragraph numbers] lx

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Neal v The Queen [2005] TASSC 70 ........................................................................ 130.11 Neal, Re; Ex parte Neal v Duncan Properties Pty Ltd (1994) 123 ALR 614 ........................................................................................................................... A.214 Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 67 ALJR 170 ............... A.114 Neill v NSW Fresh Food and Ice Pty Ltd (1963) 108 CLR 362 ................................. 41.2 Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd (2005) 223 CLR 331 .............................................................................................................................. 68.4 Nelson v Whittall (1817) 1 B & Ad 19; 106 ER 8 ....................................................... 61.1 Neowarra v Western Australia (2003) 205 ALR 145; [2003] FCA 1402 ..................... F.35 Nesterczuk v Mortimore (1965) 115 CLR 140 ........................................................... A.114 Nestorov v The Queen [1999] WASCA 303 ................................................................. Q.54 Nestorov v The Queen (2002) 137 A Crim R 310; [2002] WASCA 356 .................... Q.54 Netanya Noosa Pty Ltd v Evans Harch Constructions Pty Ltd [1995] 1 Qd R 650 ............................................................................................................................ 3.6 Network Ten Pty Ltd v Capital Television Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 275 ................... A.179 Neville v The Queen (2004) A Crim R 108; [2004] WASCA 62 ................................ A.77 New Brunswick Railway Company v British and French Trust Corporation [1939] AC 1 ........................................................................................ A.213 New Cap Reinsurance Corporation Ltd v AE Grant, Lloyd’s Syndicate No 991 (2009) 257 ALR 740; [2009] NSWSC 662 ....................................................... 22.1 New South Wales v Corbett (2007) 230 CLR 606; [2007] HCA 32 ........................... Q.18 New South Wales v Hunt (2014) 86 NSWLR 226; [2014] NSWCA 47 ..................... A.58 New South Wales v Jackson [2007] NSWCA 279 ..................................................... A.182 New South Wales v UXC Ltd [2011] NSWSC 530 ........................................................ 3.6 New South Wales Bar Association v Meakes [2006] NSWCA 340 ............................. 10.2 New South Wales Bar Association v Muirhead (1988) 14 NSWLR 173 ....................... 3.5 New South Wales Commissioner of Police v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2008) 70 NSWLR 643; [2007] NSWCA 366 .......................................................... Q.2 New South Wales Country Press Co-operative Co Ltd v Stewart (1911) 12 CLR 481 .................................................................................................................... Q.43 New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Agency Co Ltd v Taylor [1955] QWN 68 ................................................................................................................................ 20.2 New Zealand Pelt Export Co Ltd v Trade Indemnity New Zealand Ltd (2004) 13 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-626; [2004] VSCA 163 ................... A.217, A.219 Newbold v The Queen [1983] 2 AC 705; Crim LR 676 .............................................. 51.6 Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd v Court of Coal Mines Regulation (1997) 42 NSWLR 351 .......................................................................................... A.177 Newhill v Western Australia (No 2) [2015] WASCA 121 ........................................... Q.54 Newman v Phillips Fox (1999) 21 WAR 309 ............................................................. A.173 Newton v Pieper (1968) 86 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 404; [1968] 1 NSWR 42 ........ 92.4, 92.38 Ng v Chong (2005) ANZ Conv R 360; [2005] NSWSC 270 .................................... A.219 Nguyen v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (2014) 292 FLR 10; [2014] QCA 293 ........................................................................................................ 10.1 Nguyen v Cosmopolitan Homes [2008] NSWCA 246 ............................................... A.114 Nguyen v QBE Insurance Ltd (2007) 99 SASR 443; [2007] SASC 320 ................. A.221 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173 ............................................................. 130.58 Nicholas v Western Australia [1972] WAR 168 ............................................................ 56.1 Nicholls v The Queen (2005) 219 CLR 196; 79 ALJR 468; [2005] HCA 1 ............. A.97, A.99, 18.10, 130.77 Nichols v Police (2005) 91 SASR 232; [2005] SASC 106 ............................................ 9.1 Nicholson v O’Flaherty; Ex parte Nicholson [1985] 2 Qd R 499 ................................. Q.8 Nicholson v Southern Star Fire Insurance Co Ltd (1927) 28 SR (NSW) 124 ........................................................................................................................... A.202 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Nicholson v Superior Home Improvements Pty Ltd [1987] 2 Qd R 201 ................. A.102 Nicolia v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1971) 45 ALJR 465 ........................... 74.5 Nicopoulos v Commissioner for Corrective Services (2004) 148 A Crim R 74; [2004] NSWSC 562 ............................................................................. A.159, A.160 Niesmann v Collingridge (1921) 29 CLR 177 ............................................................. Q.98 Nika Management Services Pty Ltd (In liq), Re (1996) 14 ACLC 326 .................... A.178 Nikoloski v Ridge Consolidated Pty Ltd (1994) 116 FLR 192 ................................. A.103 Nine Films & Television Pty Ltd v Ninox Television Ltd (2005) 65 IPR 442; [2005] FCA 356 .............................................................................................. A.175 Niven v The Queen (1968) 113 CLR 513 ................................................................... 18.11 Nolan v Nolan (2003) 10 VR 626; [2003] VSC 121 .................................................... 62.1 Nolan v Nolan [2013] QSC 140 .................................................................................. A.168 Nominal Defendant v Chaffey (2011) 58 MVR 1; [2011] QSC 88 ................ 92.37, 102.1 Nominal Defendant v Clements (1960) 104 CLR 476 ................................... A.101, 101.7 Nominal Defendant v Hook (1962) 113 CLR 641 ....................................................... Q.43 Nominal Defendant v Owens (1978) 45 FLR 430; 22 ALR 128 ..................... 9C.5, 92.26 Nominal Defendant (NSW) v Cotrip Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 10 MVR 511 ........................................................................................................................... A.118 Noor Mohammed v The King [1949] AC 182 ................................................. 130.8, 130.9 Norman v O’Mahony [2006] FCA 1169 ..................................................................... A.175 Norman v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 230 ............................................................. A.136 Norman and Mulgrave Shire Council, Re (unreported, Decision No 94013, Queensland Information Commissioner, 28 June 1994) ........................... A.195 Normandale v Rankine (1972) 4 SASR 205 ................................................................. A.85 North Australian Aboriginal Legal Service Inc v Liddle (1994) 118 FLR 109; [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-300 ................................................................. A.211 North Australian Territory Co v Goldsborough Mort & Co [1893] 2 Ch 381 .......................................................................................... 17.15, 19.11, 19.17, 19.20 Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553 ......................... A.176, A.185, F.6, F.79 Northey v Juul [2008] NSWSC 275 ........................................................................... A.213 Norton v The Queen (2001) 24 WAR 488 ................................................... 130.15, 130.53 Noto v Western Australia (2006) 168 A Crim R 457; [2006] WASCA 278 ............. A.136 Noza Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 273 ALR 621; [2010] FCA 990 ................................................................................................ A.75 Nunn v Wily (2001) 10 BPR 18,983 .................................................................. A.54, A.55 Nygh, Re; Ex parte Bar-Mordecai (1983) 50 ALR 175 ................................................ F.81

O O’Brien v Gillespie (1997) 41 NSWLR 549 ......................................................... A.67, F.6 O’Brien v Tanning Research Laboratories Inc (1988) 14 NSWLR 601 .................... A.215 O’Connor v Blacktown District Hospital [1971] 1 NSWLR 713 ..................... A.141, F.52 O’Donnell v Dakin [1966] Tas SR 87 ................................................................ 83.12, 98.5 O’Donoghue v Kordick; Ex parte O’Donoghue [1995] 1 Qd R 278 ................ Q.13, Q.18 O’Kelly Holdings Pty Ltd v Dalrymple Holdings Pty Ltd (1993) 45 FCR 145 ............................................................................................................................. A.72 O’Leary v The King (1946) 73 CLR 566 ................................ A.126, A.127, 15.21, 21.13 O’Mara v Litfin [1972] QWN 32 ................................................................................ A.212 O’Meara v Dominican Fathers (2003) 153 ACTR 1; [2003] ACTCA 24 ................. A.118 O’Meara v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 228 ......................................... A.103, 18.11 O’Neil v Wratten (1986) 11 FCR 404; 65 ALR 451 ................................................ 130.62 O’Neil, Re [1972] VR 327 .......................................................................... A.49, 6.11, 74.7 O’Neill v Martini [2012] QSC 198 ............................................................................. A.205 [All references are to paragraph numbers] lxii

Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Cases

O’Neon v The Queen (1991) 52 A Crim R 144 ........................................................... Q.72 O’Rourke v Darbishire [1920] AC 581 ....................................................................... A.182 O’Rourke v Miller (1985) 156 CLR 342 ............................................................. 6.10, 20.2 O’Shane v Burwood Local Court (2007) 178 A Crim R 392; [2007] NSWSC 1300 .............................................................................................................. Q.3 Oakes v Gaudron (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Walsh J, 23 May 1963) ...................... 19.16 Oakley v Insurance Manufacturers of Australia Pty Ltd [2008] VSC 68 .................. A.102 Obach Pty Ltd, Re (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Thomas J, 4 June 1985) ...................... 10.23 Obeid v The Queen (No 2) [2016] HCA 10 ................................................................... Q.2 Ocean Industries (Overseas) Pty Ltd, Re [1991] 2 Qd R 409 ............................... Q.1, Q.7 Ocean Marine Insurance Association (Europe) OV v Jetopay Pty Ltd (2000) 120 FCR 146 ....................................................................................... A.67, F.47 Official Solicitor v K [1965] AC 201 .............................................. A.147, 9.2, Q.2, Q.108 Ohlsen v Terrero (1874) LR 10 Ch App 127 .............................................................. 22.20 Okafor v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 147 ............................................................... A.106 Oke v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (2007) 168 A Crim R 503; [2007] FCA 27 .................................................................................................. Q.18 Old Papa’s Franchise Systems Pty Ltd v Camisa Nominees Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 11 .............................................................................................................. A.197 Oldfield v Keogh (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 206 .............................................................. A.114 Olga Investments Pty Ltd v CitiPower Ltd [1998] 3 VR 485 .......................... A.141, F.52 Olin Corporation v Castells 428 A 2d 319 (1980) ...................................................... 10.26 Ollis v Melissari [2005] NSWSC 1016 .......................................................................... F.61 Omychund v Barker (1745) 1 Atk 21; 26 ER 15 ............................................................ 6.2 On v On [2002] NTSC 18 ........................................................................................... A.221 Onerati v Phillips Constructions Pty Ltd (In liq) (1989) 16 NSWLR 730 ............... A.214 Optical Prescriptions Spectacle Makers Pty Ltd v Withers (1987) 13 FCR 594; 71 ALR 269 ...................................................................................................... Q.18 Optus Networks Pty Ltd v Gilsan (International) Ltd [2006] NSWCA 171 ...... A.67, 68.4 Orchard v Orchard (1972) 3 SASR 89 ........................................................................... A.4 Orchard v Spooner (1992) 28 NSWLR 114 .................................................................. F.15 Ordukaya v Hicks [2000] NSWCA 180 ............................................................... 98.4, F.39 Origliasso v Vitale [1952] St R Qd 211 ......................................................................... 79.1 Orleans Investments Pty Ltd v Mindshare Communications Ltd (2009) 254 ALR 81; [2009] NSWCA 40 ............................................................................. A.48 Orr v Holmes (1948) 76 CLR 632 .................................................................................. A.4 Orr v University of Tasmania (unreported, Tas Sup Ct, Green J, 19 November 1956) p 20 (appeal dismissed (1957) 100 CLR 526) .......................... 92.26 Osborne v Landpower Developments Pty Ltd (In liq) [2003] WASCA 117 ................. A.4 Osborne Park Co-operative Society Ltd v Wilden Pty Ltd (1989) 2 WAR 77 ............................................................................................................................. A.221 Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice (2008) 234 CLR 275; [2008] HCA 37 ................................................................................................................... A.175 Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316 ................................................................. 15.51 Ousley v The Queen (1997) 192 CLR 69 ..................................................................... Q.88 Ovens v Laneyrie (1987) 11 NSWLR 207 ................................................................... A.58 Owen v Menzies [2013] 2 Qd R 327; [2012] QCA 170 ............................................ A.211 Owners of the SS “Kalibia” v Wilson (1910) 11 CLR 689 .......................................... 22.5 Owston Nominees No 2 Pty Ltd v Clambake Pty Ltd (2011) 248 FLR 193; [2011] WASCA 76 ............................................................................. A.212, A.214 Oxfordshire County Council v M [1994] 2 WLR 393; 2 All ER 269 ...................... A.185 Oztech Pty Ltd v Public Trustee of Queensland (No 5) [2016] FCA 333 ................ A.163 Ozzard-Low v Ozzard-Low and Wonham [1953] P 272 ...................... 22.17, 92.31, 102.2 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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P P v D1 [No 3] (2010) 202 A Crim R 40; [2010] NSWSC 644 ................................. A.159 P v The Queen (1993) 61 SASR 75 ................................................................. 15.60, 15.64 P (Tax Evasion), In the Marriage of (1985) FLC 91-605 ................................ 10.23, 133.1 P and V Industries Pty Ltd v Porto (No 3) [2007] VSC 113 ..................................... A.181 PGM v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 426 ............................................................ 15.37 PNJ v Director of Public Prosecutions (2010) 27 VR 146; [2010] VSCA 88 ................................................................................................................................ F.51 PPP v The Queen (2010) 200 A Crim R 533; [2010] VSCA 110 ............................. A.136 PS Chelleram & Co Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Co Ltd [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 493 ......................................................................................... A.219, A.220 Packer v DCT [1985] 1 Qd R 275 .............................................................................. A.169 Paddock v Forrester (1842) 133 ER 1404 .................................................................. A.200 Pagett v Hales [2000] NTSC 35 ....................................................................... A.94, A.145 Pakuza, Re [1975] Qd R 141 ................................................................................ 68.7, 70.2 Palace Gallery Pty Ltd, The v Police (2008) 258 LSJS 420; [2008] SASC 305 ........................................................................................................................... A.166 Palagiano v Mankarios [2011] NSWSC 61 ................................................................ A.221 Palios Meegan & Nicholson Holdings Pty Ltd v Shore (2010) 108 SASR 31; [2010] SASCFC 21 ..................................................................... A.114, A.141, F.52 Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 2) [1976] VR 363 ............................. A.153, 53.7, 92.41 Palm Gardens Consolidated Pty Ltd v PG Properties Pty Ltd (2009) 1 LT(A)R 281; [2009] SASC 311 ............................................................................. A.219 Palmbay Nominees Pty Ltd v Fowler [2003] WASCA 217 ....................................... A.213 Palmer v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 1 ....................................................................... A.66 Pamamull v Albrizzi (Sales) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] VSCA 260 .................................... 8.6 Pamplin v Express Newspapers Ltd [1985] 2 All ER 185 ......................................... A.193 Pankelis v Francombe (1988) 14 Tas R 174 ...................................................... A.67, A.73 Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297 ........... A.154, 93A.23, 98.4, 130.4, F.37, F.45, F.66 Pappas v New World Oil Developments Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 594; 117 ALR 304 ................................................................................................................... 10.26 Paradis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board (2007) 33 WAR 361; [2007] WASCA 97 ................................................................................................... 10.12 Paragon Finance Plc v Freshfields [1999] 1 WLR 1183 ............................................ A.186 Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 844; 62 ALR 85; [1984] 2 NSWLR 505 .................................................................... A.75, A.94 Parisian, The (1874) LR 18 Eq 524 ............................................................................... 6.11 Park v Citibank Savings Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 219 ................................................. 22.15 Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191 ............................................................................................................................. A.58 Parker v Churchill (1985) 9 FCR 316; 63 ALR 326 ...................................... 130.52, Q.18 Parker v Churchill (1986) 9 FCR 334; 65 ALR 107 .................................................... Q.18 Parker v Green (1862) 2 B & s 299; 121 ER 1084 ........................................................ 3.7 Parker v The King (1912) 14 CLR 681 .................................................... A.69, A.77, 54.1 Parker, Re [1995] Qd R 617 .......................................................................................... A.63 Parker and Williams [1993] FLC 92-394 ....................................................................... F.82 Parkes v The Queen [1976] 1 WLR 1251; (1977) 64 Cr App R 25 .................. 10.3, Q.52 Parmar v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 122 ALD 103; [2011] FCA 760 ........................................................................................................ A.62 Parr v Bavarian Steak House Pty Ltd [2001] 2 Qd R 196 .......................................... Q.93 Parsons, Re [1984] FCA 246 ...................................................................................... 130.42 [All references are to paragraph numbers] lxiv

Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Cases

Patel v Controller of Customs [1966] AC 356 ........................................................... A.142 Paterson v Paterson (1953) 89 CLR 212 ........................... A.7, 19.10, 19.19, 19.21, 19.24 Paterson v The Queen (2004) 28 WAR 233; [2004] WASCA 63 ................................ A.94 Pathways Employment Services Pty Ltd v West (2004) 186 FLR 330; 212 ALR 140; [2004] NSWSC 903 ............................................................................... 10.14 Patmoy, Ex parte; Re Jack (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 351 ................................................. Q.33 Paton v The Queen [2011] VSCA 72 .......................................................................... A.136 Patrick v Capital Finance Corp (A’sia) Pty Ltd (2004) 211 ALR 272; [2004] FCA 1249 .................................................................................................... A.163 Patrick v Capital Finance Corporation (A’sia) Pty Ltd (2004) 211 ALR 272; [2004] FCA 1249 ............................................................................................ A.186 Patten v Justice of the Peace, Redfern Court (1986) 22 A Crim R 94 ........................ Q.20 Patterson v The Queen [2001] NSWCCA 316 .............................................................. 23.1 Patterson v Veitch (1956) 58 SR (NSW) 287 ............................................................. A.214 Pavitt v The Queen (2007) 169 A Crim R 452; [2007] NSWCCA 88 ..................... 130.59 Payless Superbarn (NSW) Pty Ltd v O’Gara (1990) 19 NSWLR 551 ............. A.94, A.95 Payne v Ibbotson (1858) 27 LJ Ex 341 ........................................................... A.87, 101.10 Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191 ........................................................................ A.118 Pearce v Button (1985) 8 FCR 388; 60 ALR 537 ..................................................... 130.35 Pearce v Pearce (1932) 49 WN (NSW) 177 ................................................................ 22.22 Pearce v Western Australia [2014] WASCA 156 .......................... A.4, 130.34, Q.11, Q.72 Pearse v Pearse (1846) 1 DeG & Sm 12; 63 ER 950 .................................................. A.16 Pearson, S v Dublin Distillery [1907] AC 351 ................................................. A.54, A.216 Peatling (decd), Re [1969] VR 214 ............................................................................... A.63 Peck v De-Saint-Aromain [1972] VR 230 .................................................................... Q.33 Pelka v Sunquist [2005] WASC 52 ............................................................................ 130.43 Penny v Hanson (1887) 18 QBD 478 ........................................................................... A.62 Penrith Whitewater Stadium Ltd v Lesvos Pty Ltd [2007] NSW Conv R 56-189; [2007] NSWCA 176 .................................................................................... Q.97 People v Aranda 407 P 2d 265 ..................................................................................... 15.69 People v Buckowski 233 P 2d 912 (1951) ..................................................... A.136, A.138 People v Nye 234 P 2d 172 (1951) ............................................................................. A.136 Peppe v Jydonnet Pty Ltd [2007] NSW Conv R 56-183 ............................................. Q.98 Perich v The Queen (unreported, WA CCA, Malcolm CJ, Pidgeon, Murray JJ, 3 September 1996) ............................................................................... A.136 Permanent Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd v Finlayson (1968) 122 CLR 338 ................... 42.5 Permanent Trustee Co of NSW v Fels [1918] AC 879 ...................................... 69.2, 120.1 Permanent Trustee Company Ltd v Gulf Import and Export Company (2007) 17 VR 592; [2007] VSC 267 ...................................................................... 19.16 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v George (unreported, NSW Cup Ct, Einstein J, 1 December 1997); [1998] ACL Rep 195 NSW 1 ................................................... F.47 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 ...................... A.2, A.216, 3.6 Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v Menzies (2012) 7 BFRA 733; [2012] NSWSC 1066 .......................................................................................................... A.222 Perron Investments Pty v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 25 FCR 187; 20 ATR 1299 ............................................................................................. F.71 Perry v Lean (1985) 39 SASR 515 ................................................................................ 24.1 Perry v The Queen (1982) 150 CLR 580 ............................................ A.134, A.140, 15.19 Pertl v Kahl (1976) 13 SASR 433 ................................................................................ A.63 Pertsinidis v Australian Central Credit Union Ltd (2001) 80 SASR 76 .................... A.215 Petelin v Cullen (1975) 132 CLR 355 ........................................................................... 3.14 Peter Williamson Pty Ltd v Capitol Motors Ltd (1982) 61 FLR 257; 41 ALR 613 .......................................................................................................... A.112, 3.8 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Petera Pty Ltd v EAJ Pty Ltd (1985) 7 FCR 375; [1985] ATPR 40-605 .................. 10.23 Peters v The Queen (1987) 23 A Crim R 451 ........................................................... 130.34 Peterson (A Pseudonym) v The Queen [2014] VSCA 111 ........................................... A.79 Petition by Van Beelen, Re (1974) 9 SASR 163 ...................................... 6.14, 19.17, 20.4 Pettitt v Dunkley [1971] 1 NSWLR 376 ............................................................... A.3, 98.4 Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95 .............................................................. 10.3, Q.52 Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461 ................ A.19, A.136, A.137, A.138, A.139, A.140, A.211, 15.12, 79.7, 132A.2, 132B.1, F.6, F.51 Phelps v Gothachalkenin [1996] 1 Qd R 503 .............................................................. 10.24 Phillips v Arnold (2009) 53 MVR 33; [2009] TASSC 43 ................................... A.7, A.58 Phillips v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 45 ......... 15.57, 15.59, 15.60, 15.61, 15.63, 15.66, 15.68, 16.3, 101.2 Phillips v The Queen (2006) 225 CLR 303; [2006] HCA 4 ............ A.134, A.136, A.137, A.140 Phillipson v Robertson [1905] QWN 38 ...................................................................... 22.18 Phoenix Commercial Enterprises Pty Ltd v Canada Bay City Council [2010] NSWCA 64 ..................................................................................................... A.4 Photo Art & Sound (Cremorne) Pty Ltd v Cremorne Centre Pty Ltd (1987) 4 BPR 9436; [1987] ANZ Conv R 347 ..................................................... A.219 Pickard v Sears (1837) 6 Ad & E 469; 112 ER 179 .................................................... A.15 Pickering v Edmunds (1994) 63 SASR 357 ...................................................... A.175, F.58 Pickersgill v Tsoukalas [2009] SASC 357 .................................................................... A.55 Piddington v Bennett and Wood Pty Ltd (1940) 63 CLR 533 ....... A.96, 6.26, 6.27, 16.5, 94.4 Pihiga Pty Ltd v Roche (2011) 278 ALR 209; [2011] FCA 240 ............................... A.205 Pikos v Bezuidenhout (2004) 145 A Crim R 544; [2004] QCA 178 .................. 43.1, 48.1 Pikoulas v Canterbury City Council [2007] NSWLEC 798 ........................................... 6.8 Pinehurst Nominees Pty Ltd v Coeur De Lion Investments Pty Ltd [2012] QSC 314 .................................................................................................................... A.61 Pioneer Concrete (NSW) Pty Ltd v Webb (1985) 18 ACSR 418 .................. A.163, A.178 Piras v Thaisawat [1993] FLC 92-417 ........................................................................ A.159 Pitkin v The Queen (1995) 80 A Crim R 302; 69 ALJR 612; [1995] HCA 30 ............................................................................................................................... A.79 Pitts v Adney (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 886 ................................................................... A.205 Plant v Bourne [1897] 2 Ch 281 ................................................................................... Q.98 Playroom Pty Ltd v Hibbard (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Senior Master Lee, 18 August 1987) ......................................................................................................... 83.5 Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635 ........................................................................... Q.12 Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234 .......... A.106, A.130, A.136, 8.2, 132B.2, Q.54 Plumb v Monck (1974) 4 ALR 405 ............................................................................ A.182 Plumley v Moroney [2014] QSC 3 ....................................................................... 92.4, 92.6 Plunkett v Bull (1915) 19 CLR 544 ................................................................ A.114, A.116 Police v A, MR (2008) 101 SASR 557; [2008] SASC 255 ....................................... A.138 Police v Dodd (2004) 88 SASR 130 ............................................................................. Q.38 Police v Dunstall (2015) 89 ALJR 677; 322 ALR 440 ............................................... 130.4 Police v Kyriacou (2009) 103 SASR 243; [2009] SASC 66 ................. A.4, A.118, A.120 Police v Pakrou (2008) 102 SASR 207 .......................................................................... A.4 Police, Commissioner of v Hughes [2009] NSWCA 306 ............................................ A.65 Police, Commissioner of v Nirta [2002] 1 Qd R 364 ................................................ A.179 Police (SA) v Butcher (2014) 119 SASR 509; 67 MVR 128; [2014] SASC 85 ...................................................................................................... Q.102, 130.4 Police (SA) v Modra (2000) 31 MVR 243 ................................................................ 130.43 Police Service Board v Morris (1985) 156 CLR 397 ............................. 10.2, 10.12, 10.34 [All references are to paragraph numbers] lxvi

Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Cases

Police of the Metropolis, Commissioner of v Hills [1980] AC 26 ................. 15.26, 15.72 Polivitte Ltd v Commercial Union Assurance Co plc [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 379 ..................................................................................................................... A.68 Pollard v RRR Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 110 ........................................... A.58 Pollard v The Queen (1992) 176 CLR 177 .............. A.110, 130.40, 130.41, 130.48, Q.56 Pollard v The Queen (2011) 31 VR 416; 207 A Crim R 124 ...................................... Q.54 Pollitt v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 558 ........ A.2, A.128, A.143, A.144, A.145, A.156, Q.56, Q.107 Pollock v The Queen (2010) 240 CLR 233; [2010] HCA 35 .................................... A.134 Pollock v Wellington (1996) 15 WAR 1 ....................................................................... A.75 Polycarpou v Australian Wire Industries Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 49 ...... 16.7, 130.35, F.66 Pomeroy v Rural Hotels Pty Ltd (1973) 5 SASR 191 ................................................. Q.43 Poniris v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 100 ................................................................... A.4 Ponzio v Multiplex Ltd (2005) 145 IR 431; [2005] FCA 1410 ................................... Q.87 Popiw v Popiw [1959] VR 197 .................................................. 53.7, 101.2, Q.101, Q.102 Pople v Evans [1969] 2 Ch 255 .................................................................................. A.213 Poricanin v Australian Consolidated Industries Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 419 ..... A.94, A.95 Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589 ......... A.197, A.214 Portland Downs Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Great Northern Developments Pty Ltd [2012] QCA 18 ................................................................................................. A.218 Poteri v Clarke (1998) 19 QL Reps 108 ........................................................................ 3.11 Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277 ........................................................................... 10.33 Potts v Miller (1940) 64 CLR 282 ....................................................................... 83.5, 84.3 Powe, Re [1956] P 110 ................................................................................................... 92.4 Powell v Smith and Blacker (unreported, Qld CA, 14 November 1995) ..................... 15.5 Powell v Streatham Manor Nursing Home [1935] AC 243 ................................. A.7, A.58 Powercell Pty Ltd v Cuzeno Pty Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 21,385; [2003] NSWSC 600 ................................................................................................ A.213, A.214 Powercell Pty Ltd v Cuzeno Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 51 ............................. A.214, A.217 Pownall v Conlan Management Pty Ltd (1995) 12 WAR 370 .................................... A.75 Poyser v Minors (1881) 7 QBD 329 ............................................................................... A.2 Poyser and Mills’ Arbitration, Re [1964] 2 QB 467 ...................................................... A.3 Practice Direction (No 1 of 2000) (Supreme Court) [2000] 1 Qd R 618 ........ 22.4, 39B.1 Practice Direction No 10 of 2011 (Supreme Court) ..................................................... 3.11 Practice Direction No 8 of 2014 (Supreme Court) ....................................................... Q.8 Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357; 207 ALR 217 .................................................................................. A.163, A.191, A.192 Precision Plastics Pty Ltd v Demir (1975) 132 CLR 362 ............................................ A.95 Preece v HM Advocate [1981] Crim LR 783 ........................................... A.67, A.74, 59.6 Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381; 3 All ER 237 ..................................... A.57, 3.14 Prepaid Services Pty Ltd v Atradius Credit Insurance NV (2013) 302 ALR 732; [2013] NSWCA 252 ......................................................................................... A.94 Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust v Scots Church Development Ltd (2007) 64 ACSR 31; [2007] NSWSC 676 ...................................................... A.219 Prescott v Bulldog Tools [1981] 3 All ER 869 ............................................................. 37.2 Prestage v The Queen [1976] Tas SR 16 ...................................................................... A.85 Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81 ............................................................ 17.8, 17.11, 17.13 Price v McCabe; Ex parte Price [1985] 2 Qd R 510; (1984) 55 ALR 319 .... 10.20, 10.35 Price v Price [1962] QWN 25 ........................................................................................ 28.1 Priestley v Harwood (unreported, Tas Sup Ct, Zeehan J, 14 November 1996) ......................................................................................................................... 22.15 Prince v Samo (1838) 7 Ad & E 627; 112 ER 606 ......................................... A.100, Q.57 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Principal Registrar of Supreme Court of NSW v Drollett [2002] NSWSC 490 ............................................................................................................................. A.65 Proctor v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2005) 59 ATR 1064 .......................... A.213 Proctor v Jetway Aviation [1982] 2 NSWLR 264 ...................................................... 21H.1 Proctor v Lainson (1836) 7 C & P 631; 173 ER 276 ................................................. 22.22 Professional Services of Australia Pty Ltd v Computer Accounting & Tax Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) 261 ALR 179; [2009] WASCA 183 ................................... A.75 Progressive Recycling Pty Ltd v Eversham (2003) 40 MVR 141; [2003] NSWCA 268 ............................................................................................................ A.114 Protean (Holdings) Ltd v American Home Assurance Co [1985] VR 187 ............... A.102 Prothonotary of Supreme Court (NSW) v Rakete (2010) 202 A Crim R 117; [2010] NSWSC 665 ............................................................................................ Q.2 Proudfoot v Drake (1882) 3 NSWLR 381 ..................................................................... 68.5 Province of Bombay v Municipal Corporation of Bombay [1947] AC 58 .................... 2.1 Pryor v City Offices Co (1883) 10 QBD 504 ................................................................ 3.26 Public Prosecutor v Yuvaroj [1970] AC 913 ................................................................ Q.35 Public Transport Authority (WA) v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (2007) 34 WAR 279; [2007] WASCA 151 ............................................................ A.162, A.198 Public Transport Ticketing Corporation v Integrated Transit Solutions Ltd [2011] NSWSC 453 ................................................................................................ A.168 Public Trustee of New South Wales v Fitter [2005] NSWSC 1188 .......................... A.115 Punch v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (unreported, ACT Sup Ct, McGregor J, No 814 of 1976) ........................................................................................................ 95.5 Purex Corporation Ltd v Vanguard Trading Co (1965) 112 CLR 532 ......................... 55.1 Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164 ................................................................. A.104 Purnell v Medical Board of Queensland [1999] 1 Qd R 362 ......................... A.211, 39P.1 Purnell Brothers v Transport Engineers Pty Ltd (1984) 73 FLR 160 ............. A.159, Q.94 Purton, In re [1943] QWN 33 ....................................................................................... A.63 Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328 ..... 10.12, 10.13, 10.16, 14.2

Q Q v Australian Red Cross Society [1992] 1 VR 19 ................................ A.75, 9C.5, 101.2 Qantas Airways Ltd, Ex parte; Re Horsington (1969) 71 SR (NSW) 291 .... 130.55, Q.20 Quad Consulting Pty Ltd v David R Bleakley and Associates Pty Ltd (1990) 27 FCR 86; [1991] ATPR 52,013 .................................................. A.201, A.204 Qualtieri v The Queen (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 95 ................. A.136 Quarmby v Qasair Investments Pty Ltd [2014] TASFC 11 ....................................... A.212 Quartz Hill Co, Re (1882) 21 Ch D 642 ....................................................................... 20.2 Queen’s Case (1820) 2 B & B 284; 129 ER 976 ......... A.8, A.14, A.25, 3.15, 19.5, 19.6, 104.2 Queensland v Brooks [2008] 1 Qd R 484; (2006) 180 A Crim R 1; [2006] QCA 431 .................................................................................................................. 92.41 Queensland v Byers [2006] QSC 334 ............................................................................ 79.6 Queensland v Nuttall [2007] QSC 79 ............................................................................. Q.3 Queensland v O’Brien [2015] QSC 136 ....................................................................... Q.43 Queensland v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd [1999] ATPR 41-691 ............................ A.3 Queensland v Ward [2004] 1 Qd R 429; [2003] QCA 366 ........................................ A.112 Queensland Alumina Ltd v Alinta DQP Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 387 ........................... A.219 Queensland Bacon Pty Ltd v Rees (1966) 115 CLR 266 ............................................ Q.18 Queensland Community Correction Board, Re; Ex parte Smith QLR 13 April 1991 ............................................................................................................... A.159 [All references are to paragraph numbers] lxviii

Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Cases

Queensland Harness Racing Ltd v Racing Queensland Ltd [2013] 2 Qd R 372; [2012] QSC 34 ............................................................................................... A.159 Queensland Independent Wholesalers Ltd v Coutts Townsville Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 40 ................................................................................................... A.219, A.220 Queensland Law Society Inc v Albeitz [2000] 1 Qd R 621 ............................. A.175, F.58 Queensland Law Society Inc, Ex parte [1984] 1 Qd R 166 .......................................... Q.3 Queensland Mining Corporation Ltd v Renshaw (2014) 98 ACSR 559; [2014] FCA 365 ...................................................................................................... A.222 Queensland Trustees Ltd v Thomas [1932] QSR 57 ..................................................... 51.2 Question of Law Reserved (No 1 of 1998) (1998) 70 SASR 281 ............................ A.179 Questions of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 2 of 1993) (1993) 61 SASR 1 ............................................................................................................................... A.102 Quick v Stoland (1998) 87 FCR 371; 157 ALR 615 ........................................... F.35, F.47 Quin v Attorney-General (NSW) (1988) 28 IR 244 ................................................... A.211 Quinlan v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 106; [2006] NSWCCA 284 .................. Q.54 Quinn v Bloom [1962] 2 QB 245 ................................................................................. A.60

R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R

v AAR [2014] QCA 20 ......................................................................................... 21AW.2 v AJS (2005) 159 A Crim R 327; [2005] VSCA 288 ............................................ A.100 v A2 (No 21) [2016] NSWSC 24 ............................................................................... F.18 v Abela (2007) 170 A Crim R 244; [2007] VSCA 22 ............................... A.136, A.154 v Abou-Chabake (2004) 149 A Crim R 417; [2004] NSWCCA 356 ........................ A.4 v Aboud [2003] QCA 499 ....................................................................................... A.106 v Accused [1989] 1 NZLR 714 ....................................................................... A.67, A.68 v Adam (1999) 47 NSWLR 267; 106 A Crim R 510; [1999] NSWCCA 189 ......................................................................... A.127, 17.18, 101.5, F.19, F.20, F.31 v Adamiczka (1993) 33 NSWLR 68 .......................................................................... 23.4 v Adams [1965] VR 563 ............................................................................................. 10.5 v Adams [1996] Crim LR 898 ................................................................................... A.69 v Addabbo (1982) 33 SASR 84 ............................................................................. 130.45 v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171 .................................................................................. A.136 v Ahmed [2001] NSWCCA 450 ....................................................................... 59.3, 59.9 v Aird [1949] VLR 1 ................................................................................................. Q.60 v Akbulat (1993) 69 A Crim R 75 ............................................................................ Q.54 v Al Jenabi [2004] NTSC 44 ..................................................................................... A.79 v Alchin (2006) 200 FLR 204; [2006] ACTSC 53 .................................................... F.42 v Aldrey (1852) 2 Den 430; 169 ER 568 ................................................................. Q.67 v Aldridge (1990) 20 NSWLR 737 ..................................... A.76, A.97, 16.1, 16.3, 20.2 v Alexander [1973] Qd R 494 ................................................................... 130.16, 130.20 v Alexander [1975] VR 741 ..................................................... A.62, A.86, 19.22, 126.1 v Alexander [1979] VR 615 ...................................................................................... A.60 v Alexander [1994] 2 VR 249 ................................................................................... Q.52 v Alexander (2002) 6 VR 53; [2002] VSCA 183 ................................................... A.138 v Algar [1954] 1 QB 279 ............................................................................................. 8.2 v Ali [2001] QCA 331 ............................................................................................... Q.54 v Ali (2002) 135 A Crim R 426 ................................................................................ Q.54 v Ali (No 2) (2005) 13 VR 257; 158 A Crim R 469; [2005] VSCA 302 ............. Q.107 v Ali Elhusseini (1988) 33 A Crim R 155 ............................................................... 83.13 v Allingham QLR (16 February 1991) ..................................................................... 21.18 v Aloia [1983] WAR 133 ......................................................................................... A.107 v Aloisio (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 111 ................................................. 21.10, 21.11 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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v Alt [2013] QCA 343 ........................................................................................... 132C.2 v Amad [1962] VR 545 ....................................... 15.11, 130.18, 130.22, 130.26, 130.28 v Amber [2013] QCA 360 .................................................................................... 21AW.2 v Ambrosoli (2002) 55 NSWLR 603 ...................................................................... 93B.3 v Ames [1964-5] NSWR 1489 ............................................................................... 130.11 v Anderson (1929) 21 Cr App R 178 ............................................................ 19.12, Q.72 v Anderson (1991) 1 NTLR 149; 57 A Crim R 143 ................................ 130.18, 130.57 v Anderson (1992) 64 A Crim R 312 ............................................................. A.70, A.75 v Anderson [1998] ACL Rep 130 Qld 232 ............................................................. Q.107 v Anderson (2000) 1 VR 1; 111 A Crim R 19 ............................................. A.67, A.136 v Anderson (2005) 44 MVR 434; [2005] QCA 304 ............................ A.63, Q.24, Q.40 v Andrews [1987] 1 Qd R 21 ................................................................ 17.4, 17.7, 101.5 v Andrews (No 3) (2005) 92 SASR 442; [2005] SASC 298 .................................... F.12 v Angeli [1979] 1 WLR 26 ....................................................................................... 59.11 v Anh Tuan Le (2002) 130 A Crim R 256 ............................................................... A.79 v Annakin (1988) 17 NSWLR 202; 37 A Crim R 131 .......................................... A.134 v Anthony David Holmes [1996] TASSC 163 ............................................. 10.18, 10.27 v Anunga (1976) 11 ALR 412 ...................................................................... 130.34, Q.61 v Aoukar [2011] SASCFC 96 .................................................................................. A.122 v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 ........................................ A.1, 6.14, 6.18, 6.19, 6.24 v Apps (unreported, Vic Sup Ct, 26 May 1998) ..................................................... A.116 v Aristidis [1999] 2 Qd R 629 .................................................................................... F.67 v Armstrong (1990) 48 A Crim R 382 .................................................................... A.138 v Armstrong (1998) 148 FLR 230; [1998] VSCA 126 ............................................. 6.19 v Armstrong [2015] QCA 189 ................................................................................. 21N.1 v Arnott (1992) 79 A Crim R 275 ........................................................................... A.151 v Ashby [2010] VSC 14 ............................................................................................... 6.6 v Ashcroft [1965] Qd R 81 .............................................................................. 9C.6, Q.84 v Ashton (1999) 108 A Crim R 200 ........................................................................... 17.9 v Ashton (2003) 143 A Crim R 354; [2003] TASSC 140 ......................................... F.19 v Associated Northern Collieries (1910) 11 CLR 738 ................................... 10.1, 10.33 v Aston (No 1) [1991] 1 Qd R 363 ............................................................................. A.4 v Ataou [1988] QB 798; 2 All ER 321 ....................................................... 10.37, A.184 v Auld [1997] QCA 202 ........................................................................................... 15.18 v Austin (No 2) [2010] ACTSC 136 ......................................................................... Q.12 v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13 ..................................................................................................................... 10.24 v Avo Kushkarian (1984) 16 A Crim R 416 .......................................................... 130.45 v Azar (1991) 56 A Crim R 414 .............................. 10.27, 10.31, 130.18, 130.21, Q.66 v B [1979] 1 WLR 1185 ........................................................................................... 15.34 v B [1987] 1 NZLR 362 ............................................................................................ A.67 v B [2003] QCA 465 ................................................................................................ 15.12 v BAH (2002) 135 A Crim R 150 ............................................................................. 99.1 v BAR (2005) 152 A Crim R 428; [2005] QCA 80 ................................... A.137, A.140 v BBA [2006] QCA 234 ............................................................................................ A.78 v BBP [2009] QCA 114 ........................................................................................ 21AW.2 v BBR (2009) 195 A Crim R 330; [2009] QCA 178 ............................................... 9B.4 v BCA [2011] QCA 278 .......................................................................... 132C.1, 132C.2 v BCM [2015] QSC 43 ............................................................................................ 93A.1 v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 ........................................................................... F.6, F.37 v BDX (2009) 24 VR 288; 194 A Crim R 57; [2009] VSCA 28 ................... A.71,A.96 v BJC (2005) 154 A Crim R 109; [2005] VSCA 154 ............................................ A.136 v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241 ............................................... A.154, 8.4, 9D.2, 130.67 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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v Babsek [1998] QCA 116 ....................................................................... 132B.1, 132B.3 v Baden-Clay [2014] QSC 156 ................................................................................ 92.43 v Baden-Clay [2016] QCA 265 ................................................................................. 9D.3 v Baffigo [1957] VR 303 ................................................................................ A.85, 101.9 v Bailey [1958] SASR 301 ........................................................................................ Q.50 v Baines [1909] 1 KB 258 ........................................................................................... 6.8 v Baira [2009] QCA 332 .......................................................................................... 17.16 v Bajic (2005) 154 A Crim R 96; [2005] VSCA 158 ................................... A.66, 21.20 v Baker (1912) 7 Cr App R 252 .............................................................................. 15.37 v Baker (2000) 78 SASR 103; 118 A Crim R 150 ................................................ A.121 v Baker [2014] QCA 5 ............................................................................................. 18.10 v Baldry (1852) 2 Den 430; 169 ER 568 ................................................................. Q.44 v Baldwin [2009] QCA 337 ..................................................................................... 21.20 v Balfour; Ex parte Parkes Rural Distributions Pty Ltd (1987) 17 FCR 26; 76 ALR 256 ...................................................................................................... A.211 v Ball [1911] AC 47 ................................................................................................ A.136 v Banhelyi (2012) 62 MVR 373; [2012] QCA 357 ................................................. A.67 v Banks (1916) 12 Cr App R 74 ................................................................... 19.10, 19.19 v Barker (1829) 3 C & P 589 ................................................................................... 21.11 v Barker [1941] 2 KB 381 ......................................................................................... Q.81 v Barker [1976] Tas SR 52 ............................................................................. 83.8, 92.13 v Barker [1993] 2 Qd R 673 ..................................................................................... A.35 v Barrow [2001] 2 Qd R 525 .................................................................................. A.116 v Barry [1984] 1 Qd R 74 ..................................................................... 9C.5, A.71, Q.85 v Bartels (1986) 44 SASR 260 .................................................................................. A.78 v Bartle (2003) 181 FLR 1; [2003] NSWCCA 329 ......... 15.37, 15.38, 93A.25, 130.45 v Barton [1981] 2 NSWLR 414 ................................................................................ A.65 v Bartzis [2012] QCA 225 ....................................................................................... 21O.1 v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658 ........................................................................ 8.4, A.116 v Beales [1991] Crim LR 118 ................................................................................ 130.44 v Beames (1979) 1 A Crim R 239 .................................................................... 3.21, F.27 v Beardsall (1859) 1 F & F 529; 175 ER 839 ......................................................... Q.52 v Beattie (1989) 89 Cr App R 302 ........................................................................... 19.25 v Beble [1979] Qd R 278 ..................................................... A.78, 130.27, 130.28, Q.67 v Beck [1990] 1 Qd R 30 ............................................... 93A.5, Q.46, Q.50, Q.57, Q.88 v Beckett [1966] Qd R 170 ........................................................................................ 20.2 v Beckett [2011] 1 Qd R 259; [2009] QCA 196 ......................................... A.135, 15.28 v Bedington [1970] Qd R 353 .................................................. 19.11, 19.21, 19.24, F.24 v Beere [1965] Qd R 370 .......................................................................................... Q.68 v Belford and Bound [2011] QCA 43 ..................................................................... 93B.1 v Beljajev [1984] VR 657 ......................................................................................... Q.52 v Bell [2014] QSC 203 ................................................................................. 130.11, Q.63 v Bell; Ex parte Lees (1980) 146 CLR 141 ........................................................... A.181 v Benecke (1999) 106 A Crim R 282 ...................................................................... 130.4 v Benjamin (1913) 8 Cr App R 146 ........................................................................ 101.7 v Bennett (1903) 6 WALR 60 ................................................................................... Q.69 v Benson [1985] 2 Qd R 117 ....................................................................... A.136, 15.12 v Bentley [1963] QWN 10 ........................................................................................ Q.67 v Benz (1989) 168 CLR 110 ......................................................................... A.77, A.144 v Bernadotti (1869) 11 Cox CC 316 ....................................................................... A.151 v Berrill [1982] Qd R 508 ....................................................................................... A.117 v Berry (2007) 17 VR 153; 176 A Crim R 195; [2007] VSCA 202 ....................... A.69 v Bertrand (2008) 20 VR 222; [2008] VSCA 182 ................................................... Q.54 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 ................................................ A.136, A.148, 130.11 v Bickley (1909) 2 Cr App R 53 ........................................................................... 130.59 v Bigeni (1990) 47 A Crim R 363 ................................................................. A.1, 130.11 v Biggin [1920] 1 KB 213 ............................................................................ 15.51, 130.5 v Bijkerk (2000) 111 A Crim R 443 ...................................................................... 130.58 v Billings [1961] VR 127 .............................................................................. 15.51, 15.53 v Billings [1966] VR 396 ......................................................................................... 15.64 v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 ................................................................................ A.95 v Bisht [2013] QCA 238 .......................................................................................... 21A.2 v Bitossi [1984] 2 Qd R 51 ....................................................................................... Q.54 v Bjelke-Petersen; Ex parte Plunkett [1978] Qd R 305 .............................................. 3.9 v Bjordal (2005) 93 SASR 237; [2005] SASC 422 ................................................. A.67 v Blackledge [1965] VR 397 .......................................................... A.137, A.139, A.140 v Blanch (unreported, Qld CCA, Kelly, Ryan, Mackenzie JJ, 30 October 1989) ............................................................................................... 9D.4, 21A.5 v Blastland [1986] AC 41 ............................................ 19.17, 93B.8, 101.6, 130.5, Q.43 v Blayney (2003) 87 SASR 354; [2003] SASC 405 .............................................. A.117 v Blick (2000) 111 A Crim R 326 ............................................................................. A.79 v Bloomfield [2003] NTSC 9 ................................................................................. 130.11 v Boal [1965] 1 QB 402 ............................................................................................... 8.3 v Board of Visitors of Hull Prison; Ex parte St Germain (No 2) [1979] 1 WLR 1401 ................................................................................................................ 3.5 v Bodsworth (1968) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 290; [1968] 2 NSWR 132 ..... 130.46, Q.67 v Bohdahl (1987) 24 A Crim R 318 ........................................................................... A.4 v Boland [1974] VR 849 ......................................................................................... A.101 v Bouquet (1961) 62 SR (NSW) 563 ......................................................................... 10.3 v Bowering [1942] SASR 145 ................................................................................. 15.16 v Bowman [2001] QCA 500 .................................................................................... A.136 v Boxshall [1956] QWN 45 ....................................................................................... A.60 v Boyes (1861) 1 B & S 311; 121 ER 730 ............................. 10.1, 10.19, 10.20, 10.21 v Bracewell (1979) 68 Cr App R 44 ........................................................................ 15.34 v Bradshaw (1978) 18 SASR 83 ..................................................................... 99.1, 133.3 v Brady (2005) 92 SASR 135; [2005] SASC 277 ................................................. A.102 v Bransden (1981) 27 SASR 474 ............................................................................. 15.55 v Brasier (1779) 1 Leach 199; 168 ER 202 ................................................................ 9.1 v Brauer [1937] QWN 18 ........................................................................... 130.8, 130.27 v Brauer [1990] 1 Qd R 332 ................................................................ 9D.3, 101.5, Q.36 v Brennan (1998) 101 A Crim R 214 ........................................................... A.121, Q.45 v Brennan [1999] 2 Qd R 529 ................................................................................... Q.54 v Brennan and Pearce (unreported, Qld CCA, 3 January 1990) ............................. 15.12 v Bridgland [2013] SASC 203 .................................................................................. A.78 v Bridgwater [1905] 1 KB 131 ................................................................................ 15.61 v Briggs (1930) 22 Cr App R 68 .............................................................................. A.68 v Britzmann (1983) 76 Cr App R 134 ..................................................................... 15.53 v Brixton Prison Governor; Ex parte Ahsan [1969] 2 QB 222 ..................... Q.35, Q.54 v Broadwater (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Dowsett J, 31 August 1989); aff’d [1996] QCA 450 .................................................................. 93A.3, 93A.4, 93A.21 v Brookes [1992] QCA 103 ....................................................................................... A.79 v Brooks (1998) 44 NSWLR 121 ...................................................................... 9B.4, F.8 v Brooks (2007) 96 SASR 478; [2007] SASC 234 ................................................ A.151 v Brophy [1982] AC 476; [1981] 2 All ER 705 ........................................... 15.10, Q.75 v Brown (1960) 44 Cr App R 181 ........................................................................... 15.55 v Brown [1960] VR 382 ............................................................................... 15.53, 15.60 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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Brown [1977] Qd R 220 .................................................................................... 6.4, 9.1 Brown [1985] 2 Qd R 126 ...................................................................................... 14.2 Brown [2006] QCA 136 ...................................................................................... 130.77 Browne-Kerr [1990] VR 78 ................................................................................... 59.11 Browning (1991) 103 FLR 425 ................................................................. 59.4, 130.56 Brownlee (1999) 105 A Crim R 214 ..................................................................... Q.43 Brownlee [2001] QCA 134 ..................................................................................... 59.2 Brownlow (2003) 86 SASR 114 ........................................................................... 15.59 Brownlowe (1986) 7 NSWLR 461 ........................................................................ A.77 Bruce (1986) 23 A Crim R 123 .............................................................................. 10.3 Bryce [1994] 1 Qd R 77 ....................................................................................... A.116 Buchan [1964] 1 WLR 365 ................................................................................. 130.53 Buchanan [1966] VR 9 ........................................................................................ 130.34 Buchanan (2004) 152 A Crim R 302; [2004] NSWSC 816 ................................. A.79 Buck [1983] WAR 372; (1982) 8 A Crim R 208 ................................................ A.116 Buckland [1977] 2 NSWLR 452 .......................................................................... A.120 Buckland (1983) 9 A Crim R 132 .......................................................................... Q.72 Buckley (2004) 149 A Crim R 122; [2004] VSCA 185 ....................................... A.66 Bunting (2004) 92 SASR 146; [2004] SASC 235 .............................................. A.134 Bunting (No 4) (2003) 231 LSJS 1; [2003] SASC 252 ........................................ Q.88 Burke (1858) 8 Cox CC 44 ............................................................................ A.96, Q.6 Burns [1975] VR 241 ............................................................................................. Q.44 Burns [1999] SASC 493 ............................................................... 130.34, A.145, Q.62 Burns (2009) 103 SASR 514; [2009] SASC 105 ................................................ A.106 Burt [2000] 1 Qd R 28 ........................................................................................... Q.71 Busby (1982) 75 Cr App R 79 ..................................................................... A.96, A.97 Bush [1975] 1 NSWLR 298 .................................................................................... F.75 Busson (2007) 248 LSIS 444; [2007] SASC 179 .................................................. 6.14 Butler (1897) 18 NSWLR (L) 146 ......................................................................... 68.2 Butler (1953) 70 WN (NSW) 222 .......................................................................... 6.17 Butler [2000] TASSC 129 ....................................................................................... 23.1 Butler (No 1) (1991) 57 A Crim R 451 ................................................................. Q.56 Butler (No 2) (1991) 1 NTLR 166; 57 A Crim R 460 ......................................... Q.56 Butterwasser [1948] 1 KB 4 ............................................................. 15.2, 15.36, 15.37 Button [1992] 1 Qd R 552 ........................................................................................ 8.4 Button [2001] QCA 133 ......................................................................................... A.69 Buzzacott (2010) 107 SASR 564; [2010] SASC 234 ........ A.110, A.151, 59.11, 93.4, 130.63, Q.77 Byrne [1972] 1 NSWLR 264 .............................................................................. 130.29 Byrnes and Hopwood (1966) 20 ACSR 260 ....................................................... A.127 C [1976] Qd R 341 ................................................................................................. Q.61 C (1991) 59 A Crim R 46 ..................................................................................... 21.11 C (1993) 60 SASR 467 .......................................................................................... A.67 C [1995] QCA 327 ............................................................................................... 93A.3 C [1997] 2 Qd R 465 ................................................................................ 130.76, Q.56 C [2000] 2 Qd R 54 ........................................................................................... 93A.25 C (2006) 244 LSJS 212; [2006] SASC 158 ........................................................ A.160 CAH (2008) 186 A Crim R 288; [2008] QCA 333 ................................... A.136, 53.1 CBK [2014] QCA 35 ............................................................................................ A.105 CBL; R v BCT [2014] QCA 93 ............................................................................ 130.4 CDR [1996] 1 Qd R 183 ...................................................................................... A.103 CHS (2006) 159 A Crim R 560; [2006] VSCA 19 ................................... A.134, Q.54 CX [2006] QCA 409 ............................................................................................... 59.2 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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v Cahill (No 2) [1999] 2 VR 387 ........................................................................... A.140 v Cahill; Ex parte McGregor (1985) 61 ACTR 7 ................................................... A.184 v Cakovski (2004) 149 A Crim R 21; [2004] NSWCCA 280 ................... A.138, A.141 v Calabria (1982) 31 SASR 423 .............................................................................. 92.38 v Callaghan [1994] 2 Qd R 300 ...................................................................... A.80, Q.45 v Camelleri [1922] 2 KB 122 .................................................................................. A.154 v Camilleri (2000) 127 A Crim R 290 ................................................................... 130.11 v Campbell (2007) 175 A Crim R 79; [2007] VSCA 189 ....................................... A.79 v Canning (1754) 19 How St Tr 383 ........................................................................ A.20 v Cannon [2007] QCA 205 ........................................................................................ Q.43 v Cannon [2013] QCA 191 ........................................................................................ Q.11 v Cardamone (2007) 171 A Crim R 207; [2007] VSCA 77 .................................... Q.54 v Cargill (1913) 8 Cr App R 224 ............................................................................. 130.7 v Caric [2009] QCA 319 .......................................................................................... 17.16 v Carr [1972] 1 NSWLR 608 .................................................................................... A.69 v Carr (2000) 117 A Crim R 272 .............................................................................. A.78 v Carr-Briant [1943] KB 607 .................................................................................... Q.35 v Carroll (2002) 213 CLR 635; 136 A Crim R 167; 194 ALR 1; [2002] HCA 55 ........................................................................................................ A.211, 39P.1 v Carter, The Times Law Report (London, 14 November 1996) ........................... 15.14 v Carter [2003] 2 Qd R 402 ...................................................................................... Q.79 v Carter (2014) 241 A Crim R 522; [2014] QCA 120 ........................................... 21A.2 v Carter; Ex parte Attorney-General [1990] 2 Qd R 371 ............. 53.1, 53.5, 79.7, Q.43 v Caruso [2006] ACTSC 45 ...................................................................................... Q.18 v Cassidy [2016] NTSC 1 ......................................................................................... A.69 v Castillo [1996] Crim LR 193 .................................................................................. 93.3 v Castleton (1909) 3 Cr App R 74 ............................................................................. 54.1 v Central Criminal Court; Ex parte Francis & Francis (a firm) (1989) 88 Cr App R 213 .................................................................................................... A.181 v Challita (1988) 37 A Crim R 175 .......................................................................... Q.54 v Chambers (1848) 3 Cox CC 92 ........................................................................... A.100 v Chami [2004] NSWCCA 36 ................................................................................... A.79 v Chandler (1956) 56 SR (NSW) 335 ..................................................................... A.138 v Chang (2003) 7 VR 236; [2003] VSCA 149 ......................................................... Q.54 v Charles [1994] 1 Qd R 597 .................................................................................... 9D.3 v Charlie Deen (1913) 7 QJPR 25 ............................................................................. 23.3 v Chatzidimitriou (2000) 112 A Crim R 95; [2000] 1 VR 493; [2000] VSCA 91 ................................................................................................................. A.105 v Checconi (1988) 34 A Crim R 160 ...................................................................... A.134 v Chen [1993] 2 VR 139 ............................................................................................ 3.21 v Chevathen (2001) 122 A Crim R 441; [2001] QCA 337 ...................................... Q.54 v Childs (1923) 24 SR (NSW) 57 ............................................................................. Q.69 v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 .................................................... A.90, 15.23, 18.11, 19.16 v Chinmaya [1995] 1 Qd R 547; [1994] QCA 281 ................................................. 15.63 v Christensen (2005) 156 A Crim R 397; [2005] QSC 279 ..................................... Q.18 v Christensen (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Moynihan J, 26 March 1986) ................ 130.60 v Christie [1914] AC 545 ............ A.79, A.142, 15.27, 15.72, 130.3, 130.4, 130.7, F.66 v Christou [1992] 1 QB 979 ................................................................................... 130.60 v Ciantar (2006) 167 A Crim R 504; 16 VR 26; [2006] VSCA 263 ...................... Q.54 v Cittadini (2008) 189 A Crim R 492 ........................................................................ F.51 v City of Calgary; Ex parte Sanderson (1965) 53 DLR 2nd 477 ............................. 6.10 v Clark [1955] 2 QB 469 ......................................................................................... 15.54 v Clark (1962) 46 Cr App R 113 ................................................................................. 6.5 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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Clark (1984) 11 A Crim R 257 ............................................................................. 59.11 Clark (1996) 91 A Crim R 46 ................................................................................ A.79 Clark (unreported, Qld CA, 4 August 1995) ......................................... 93A.3, 93A.13 Clarke (1930) 22 Cr App R 58 ................................................................... A.98, 19.13 Clarke [1964] QWN 8 ......................................................................................... 130.33 Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414 ......................................................................... 130.18 Clarke (2005) 159 A Crim R 281; [2005] QCA 483 .............................. A.134, 15A.1 Clauss [1994] 1 Qd R 427 ..................................................................................... Q.24 Cleghorn [1967] 2 QB 584 ............................................................................ 6.21, 6.22 Climas (1999) 74 SASR 411 .................................................................................... A.2 Clinton [1993] 1 WLR 1181 .................................................................................... A.4 Clout (1995) 41 NSWLR 312 ................................................................................ A.77 Clune [1982] VR 1 ................................................................................................. A.78 Clyne (1985) 2 NSWLR 740 ................................................................................ 10.31 Cobden (1862) 3 F & F 833; 176 ER 381 .......................................................... A.126 Cockburn (1857) 26 LJMC 136 .............................................................................. 23.1 Cocks (2011) 109 SASR 456; [2011] SASC 61 ................................................... Q.71 Cokar [1960] 2 QB 207; (1960) 44 Cr App R 165 .................................. 15.16, 15.20 Cole (1792) 12 How St Tr 883 .............................................................................. A.20 Colgan (1959) 59 SR (NSW) 96 .................................................................. A.58, 9C.2 Colless (1964) 84 WN (NSW) (Pt 1) 55 ............................................................. A.116 Collie (2005) 91 SASR 339; [2005] SASC 148 ................................................. A.136 Collins (1986) 44 SASR 214 .................................................................................. 3.19 Coltress (1979) 68 Cr App R 193 ......................................................................... 15.45 Condren (1987) 28 A Crim R 261 ......................................................................... Q.84 Condren; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 574 ................ A.4, 19.17, 101.6 Congressi (1974) 9 SASR 257 .............................................................................. 15.73 Connell (1895) 6 QLJR 209 .................................................................................... 55.1 Connell (No 4) (1992) 9 WAR 567 ..................................................................... A.160 Connolly [1991] 2 Qd R 171 ............................................................ A.80, A.134, 20.3 Cook [1959] 2 QB 340 ................................. 15.39, 15.53, 15.54, 15.56, 15.60, 15.66 Cook (1980) 71 Cr App R 205 ............................................................................. 83.11 Cook [1987] QB 417 .............................................................................................. A.59 Coombs (1960) 45 Cr App R 36 ........................................................................... 15.23 Coote (1873) LR 4 PC 599 ................................................................................... 10.23 Corak and Palmer (1982) 30 SASR 404 .............................................................. 15.74 Corke (1989) 41 A Crim R 292 ............................................................................. A.77 Coroner; Ex parte Alexander [1982] VR 731 ....................................................... 10.18 Corrigan (1998) 74 SASR 454 ........................................................... A.41, 8.4, Q.107 Coss [2015] QCA 33 ........................................................................... 21AV.1, 21AW.2 Coulstock (1998) 99 A Crim R 143 ................................................................ F.4, F.66 Court [2003] WASCA 308 ...................................................................................... 9C.3 Courtney-Smith (No 2) (1990) 48 A Crim R 49 ...................................... A.135, 15.35 Coventry (1997) 7 Tas R 199 ............................................................... 17.2, 17.4, 17.7 Cowan; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2015] QCA 87 ...................... 130.61, Q.71 Cowie; Ex parte Attorney-General [1994] 1 Qd R 326 .......... 93A.3, 93A.13, 93A.17 Cowpe and Richardson (1892) 13 LR (NSW) 265 ................................................ 83.3 Cox [1972] Qd R 366 ......................................................................... 18.1, 19.2, 101.1 Cox [1986] 2 Qd R 55 ............................................................................... 93A.5, Q.57 Cox (No 3) [2006] VSC 58 .................................................................................. A.160 Cox and Railton (1884-85) LR 14 QBD 153 .............................. A.181, A.183, 10.19 Coyne [1996] 1 Qd R 512 ...................................................................................... Q.52 Craig [1975] 1 NZLR 597 .................................................................................... A.172 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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Crawford [1977] 1 WLR 1329 .............................................................................. 15.73 Crawford [1985] 2 Qd R 22 ................................................................................ 130.34 Crawford [1998] 1 Cr App R 338 ......................................................................... 15.73 Creagh (unreported, Qld CA, 29 May 1995) ............................................ 15.37, 15.65 Creamer (1989) 43 A Crim R 92 ........................................................................ 130.11 Crickner (1889) 16 Cox CC 701 ............................................................. A.136, A.138 Crippen [1911] 1 KB 149 ........................................................................................ 6.19 Crisologo (1998) 99 A Crim R 178 ............................................................... F.37, F.44 Crooks (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 390 .......................................................................... 9D.3 Crooks [2001] 2 Qd R 541 ....................................................................... 130.18, Q.62 Crosby [2002] QCA 213 ....................................................................................... 21A.2 Crothers [2010] QCA 334 ...................................................................................... Q.72 Crouch (1850) 4 Cox CC 163 ................................................................................. 59.4 Crowe (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Vasta J, 23 November 1984) ............................ 9A.2 Crump [2004] QCA 176 ........................................................................... 93B.1, 93B.3 Cuenco (2007) 16 VR 118; [2007] VSCA 31 ....................................................... Q.54 Cullen (1989) 52 CCC 3d 459 ............................................................................. A.211 Cumberbatch (No 5) (2002) 130 A Crim R 599 ....................................... 15.35, 15.67 Cummings [1978] Qd R 49 ................................................................................... 15.50 Cummins (2004) 147 A Crim R 585; [2004] VSCA 164 .................................. 130.11 Cumner [1994] QCA 270 ..................................................................... 93A.17, 93A.22 Cunningham [1959] 1 QB 288 .............................................................................. 15.55 Curran [1983] 2 VR 133 ............................................................................ 130.50, F.82 Curtis [1957] VR 306 ............................................................................................. A.85 Czerwinski [1954] VLR 483 .................................................................................. Q.77 D [1992] QCA 141 ............................................................................................... A.116 D (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 ..................................................................................... F.45 D (2003) 141 A Crim R 471; [2003] QCA 151 ...................................... 9C.9, 93A.14 D (2008) 220 FLR 169; [2008] ACTSC 82 .......................................................... A.79 DAH (2004) 150 A Crim R 14; [2004] QCA 419 .............................................. A.122 DAX [2010] QCA 221 ................................................................................... 9E.1, 17.3 D’Arrigo (1991) 58 A Crim R 71; [1994] 1 Qd R 603 ........................ 130.12, 130.61 DBI [2015] QCA 83 ................................................................................................. A.4 DCC (2004) 151 A Crim R 403; [2004] VSCA 230 .................. A.103, A.134, A.136 DJT [1998] VSC 320 ............................................................................................. 101.7 DM [2006] QCA 79 ........................................................................................... 21AW.2 D’Orta-Ekanaike (1998) 2 VR 140 ........................................................................ Q.46 DP (2007) 176 A Crim R 382; [2007] VSCA 219 ................................................ 9A.2 DWB (2006) 163 A Crim R 71; [2006] VSCA 137 ........................................... A.136 DWB (2008) 20 VR 112; [2008] VSCA 223 ............................................ A.136, Q.54 Da Silva [1990] 1 WLR 31 ......................................................................... A.84, 19.22 Dainer; Ex parte Pullen (1988) 78 ACTR 25 ...................................................... A.163 Dales [2011] QCA 315 ............................................................................................ 17.3 Daley [2001] NSWSC 279 ..................................................................................... A.77 Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750 ................................................................................. 6.23 Danine (2004) 145 A Crim R 278; [2004] QCA 102 .......................................... 21.17 Daren [1971] 2 NSWLR 423 .............................................................. 18.1, 18.11, 19.1 Dargin [2013] QCA 20 ......................................................................................... 21A.1 Darmody (2010) 25 VR 209; [2010] VSCA 41 ..................................................... F.42 David James N (1992) 95 Cr App R 256 ................................................................. 9.1 Davidson (1996) 92 A Crim R 1 ......................................................................... 130.60 Davidson [2000] NSWSC 197 .............................................................................. 15.42 Davidson [2014] QCA 348 .................................................................................... 15.52 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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R v Davidson and Moyle; Ex parte Attorney-General [1996] 2 Qd R 505 ............ 130.59, 130.60 R v Davies (1974) 7 SASR 375 ....................................................................................... 6.6 R v Davies (2005) 153 A Crim R 217; [2005] VSCA 90 .................................. A.79, 99.1 R v Davis [1975] 1 All ER 233 ................................................................................... 15.73 R v Davis (1995) 57 FCR 512 ........................................................................................ Q.2 R v Davison (1808) 31 How St Tr 99 ......................................................................... 10.23 R v Dawes [1992] 2 Qd R 435 ................................................................................... A.103 R v Dawson (1962) 106 CLR 1 ................................................................................. 130.11 R v Day (1852) 6 Cox CC 55 ........................................................................................ 23.3 R v Day (2000) 115 A Crim R 80; [2000] QCA 313 ...................................... 15.40, 15.64 R v Daye [1908] 2 KB 333 .................................................................................. A.65, 3.17 R v Daylight (1989) 41 A Crim R 354 ....................................................................... 93B.8 R v De-Cressac (1985) 1 NSWLR 381 ......................................................................... A.79 R v De Angelis (1979) 20 SASR 288 .......................................... 6.26, 21.10, 21.14, 21.19 R v De Voss [1995] QCA 518 ....................................................................................... A.72 R v Deering (1986) 43 SASR 252 ................................................................................ A.79 R v Delgado-Guerra [2002] 2 Qd R 384; [2001] QCA 266 ................................ Q.8, Q.43 R v Delon (1992) 29 NSWLR 29 ................................................................................. A.60 R v Demeter [1995] 2 Qd R 626 ................................................................................ A.121 R v Demir [1990] 2 Qd R 433 .......................................................................... A.159, Q.94 R v Deng [2001] NSWCCA 153 ................................................................................ 130.18 R v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation; Ex parte Briggs (1987) 13 FCR 389; 18 ATR 469 ............................................................................................. 10.6, Q.16 R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner; Ex parte Moore [1965] 1 QB 456 ...................................................................................................................... A.20 R v Derby Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte B [1996] 1 AC 487 .................................... A.184 R v Devenish [1969] VR 737 ................................................................ 59.3, 59.10, 130.11 R v Devine (1985) 18 A Crim R 185 ........................................................................ 130.11 R v Dewhirst (2001) 122 A Crim R 403 ................................................................... 130.34 R v Dhanhoa [2001] NSWCCA 293 ............................................................................. Q.54 R v Dick (1947) 2 CR 417 ......................................................................................... 130.57 R v Dick [1966] Qd R 301 ............................................................................................ 9C.2 R v Dillon [1983] 2 Qd R 627 ........................................................................... 19.19, Q.43 R v Dimian (1995) 83 A Crim R 358 .......................................................................... 21.19 R v Dixon (1992) 28 NSWLR 215 ..................................................................... Q.67, Q.71 R v Dobos (1984) 58 ACTR 10 ....................................................................................... 6.6 R v Dodd [1985] 2 Qd R 277 .......................................................... A.1, A.62, 41.2, 123.1 R v Doheny [1997] 1 Cr App R 369 ............................................................................ A.69 R v Doherty (1874) 13 Cox CC 23 .................................................................... Q.59, Q.68 R v Dolan (1992) 58 SASR 501 ................................................................................ 130.23 R v Domican (No 3) (1990) 46 A Crim R 428 ........................................................... 15.52 R v Domokos (2005) 92 SASR 258; [2005] SASC 266 ............................................ A.140 R v Donaldson (1976) 64 Cr App R 59 ............................................................. Q.48, Q.57 R v Doney (2001) 126 A Crim R 271 ........................................................................... 59.9 R v Donnelly (1997) 96 A Crim R 432 ......................................................................... F.49 R v Donohoe (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 38 ........................................................... 59.11, A.151 R v Doolan [1962] Qd R 449 ................................................................................ 8.6, Q.53 R v Dora Harris [1927] 2 KB 587 ................................................................................. 6.21 R v Douglas [2012] QCA 352 ..................................................................................... A.136 R v Douglass [2003] VSC 474 ................................................................................... 130.17 R v Dowding [1999] VSC 497 ...................................................................................... A.75 R v Doyle [1967] VR 698 ............................................................................................. A.79 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

R v Doyle; Ex parte Attorney-General [1987] 2 Qd R 732 ......... Q.43, Q.45, Q.50, Q.59, Q.61, Q.67 R v Drake [2013] QCA 222 ..................................................................................... 21AW.2 R v Drollett [2005] NSWCCA 356 ............................................................................... A.79 R v Drover (unreported, Qld Dist Ct, Morley DCJ, 14 May 1990) ............................ 9A.3 R v Drury [1984] 1 Qd R 356 ....................................................................................... A.42 R v Duffy [1999] QB 919 ......................................................................... 3.11, 3.21, 93B.3 R v Dugan [1984] 2 NSWLR 554 ............................................................................. 130.59 R v Dunbar and Logan (1983) 138 DLR (3d) 221 .................................................... A.186 R v Dunkley [1927] 1 KB 323 ..................................................................................... 15.29 R v Dunn (1958) 75 WN (NSW) 423 ......................................................................... 15.54 R v Dunn [2007] SASC 132 ...................................................................................... 130.16 R v Dunne (1928) 21 Cr App R 176 ............................................................................... 6.5 R v Dunne [2003] VSCA 150 ..................................................................................... A.136 R v Dunning; Ex parte Attorney-General [2007] QCA 176 ......................................... Q.74 R v Dunwoody (2004) 212 ALR 103; [2004] QCA 413 ............................... A.181, A.186 R v Duong [2002] 1 Qd R 502 ..................................................................................... Q.56 R v Dupas [2000] VSC 372 .......................................................................................... Q.56 R v Dupas (2004) 148 A Crim R 185; [2004] VSC 253 ........................................... A.138 R v Dupas (No 2) (2005) 154 A Crim R 566; [2005] VSCA 212 ............................ A.138 R v Dyer and Siepen (unreported, Qld Dist Ct, 21 November 1994) ........................ 10.21 R v Dykstra [2011] QCA 175 ........................................................................................ Q.54 R v E (1996) 39 NSWLR 450 ..................................................................................... A.103 R v EF (2008) 189 A Crim R 463; [2008] VSCA 213 .............................................. A.136 R v Eade (1984) 14 A Crim R 186 .............................................................................. 93.10 R v Eberle [1999] QCA 58 .......................................................................................... A.136 R v Economou (1989) 51 SASR 421 .......................................................................... A.102 R v Edelsten (1989) 18 NSWLR 213; (1990) 21 NSWLR 542 ............................... 130.45 R v Edmunds (1909) 2 Cr App R 257 ........................................................................... 23.2 R v Edwards [1975] QB 27 ........................................................................................... Q.33 R v Edwards [2005] EWCA 3244 ............................................................................... A.137 R v Egan (1985) 15 A Crim R 20 ................................................................................. Q.54 R v Ella (1990) 100 FLR 442 ..................................... A.110, 130.4, 130.15, 130.63, Q.77 R v Elliott (unreported, Vic Sup Ct, Vincent J, 28 February 1996) .......................... A.182 R v Ellis [1910] 2 KB 746 ........................................................................................... 15.38 R v Ellis (2001) 125 A Crim R 419 ............................................................. 130.45, 130.59 R v Ellis (2003) 58 NSWLR 700; (2003) 144 A Crim R 1; [2003] NSWCCA 319 ........................................................................................ A.136, F.6, F.51 R v Ellul (2008) 185 A Crim R 311; [2008] VSCA 106 ........................................... A.136 R v Elms (2004) 61 NSWLR 703; [2004] NSWCCA 467 ........................................... F.43 R v Em [2003] NSWCCA 374 ................................................................................... 130.18 R v Erasmus [2006] QCA 245 ................................................................... A.4, 6.14, 93B.1 R v Ernst [1984] VR 593 ............................................................................................. 92.17 R v Esho [2001] NSWCCA 415 .................................................................................... F.49 R v Esposito (1998) 105 A Crim R 27 .......................................................................... F.49 R v Etherington (1982) 32 SASR 230 ........................................................................ A.126 R v Evan (2006) 175 A Crim R 1; [2006] QCA 527 ................................................... A.77 R v Evans (1985) 38 SASR 344 ................................................................................... Q.54 R v Evans; R v Pearce [2011] 2 Qd R 571; [2011] QCA 135 ................................ 132C.6 R v Ewens [1967] 1 QB 323 ......................................................................................... Q.33 R v Ewing [1983] QB 1039; 2 All ER 645 .......................... 59.11, 83.6, 92.25, 95.6, 95.8 R v Exail (1866) 4 F & F 922 .................................................................................... A.106 R v Eyres (1977) 16 SASR 226 ................................................................................. 130.51 [All references are to paragraph numbers] lxxviii

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Table of Cases

R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R

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F (1995) 83 A Crim R 502 ..................................................................................... A.67 F; Ex parte Attorney-General [1999] 2 Qd R 157 ................................................ 9D.5 FAD [2013] QCA 334 ....................................................................................... 21AW.2 FAE [2014] QCA 69 ................................................................................. 93A.19, 99.1 FAR [1996] 2 Qd R 49; [1995] QCA 330 .......................... 93A.17, 98.1, 98.4, Q.107 FJB (1999) 105 A Crim R 567 ............................................................................. A.136 FTG (2007) 15 VR 685; 172 A Crim R 340 ......................................................... A.99 Faint [2011] QDC 45 .......................................................................................... 132C.2 Fairbairn (2011) 250 FLR 277; 212 A Crim R 32; [2011] ACTSC 78 ................... F.6 Falzon [1990] 2 Qd R 430 .................................................................................. 130.12 Falzon (No 2) [1993] 1 Qd R 618 ...................................................................... 130.12 Farquharson (2009) 26 VR 410; [2009] VSCA 307 ....................... A.67, A.106, Q.54 Farr (2001) 118 A Crim R 399 ........................................................................... 130.77 Farrell (1831) 1 Legge 5; 599 ................................................................................. 6.26 Faulkner [1987] 2 Qd R 263 .................................................................................. A.67 Favata [2004] VSC 7 ........................................................................................... 130.56 Fazio (1997) 69 SASR 54 ............................................................................ A.70, 9C.3 Feiloakitau (unreported, Qld CA, 14 December 1993) ......................................... A.78 Fellowes and Jackson [1987] 2 Qd R 606 ........................................................... 15.60 Ferguson (1909) 2 Cr App R 250 ......................................................................... 15.37 Ferguson (2009) 24 VR 531; [2009] VSCA 198 ...................................... A.67, A.116 Ferguson; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 35 .................................... A.102 Fernandes (1996) 133 FLR 477 ............................................................................ 15.33 Festa (2000) 111 A Crim R 60 ............................................................................... A.79 Fieldhouse (1977) 17 SASR 92 .......................................................................... 130.57 Fielding [1993] 1 Qd R 192 ................................................................................... 9D.3 Files [1983] 2 Qd R 153 ............................................................................ A.103, Q.35 Filippa [2008] QSC 39 ....................................................................................... 132C.2 Fisher [2001] NSWCCA 380 ................................................................................. A.79 Fitzherbert [2000] QCA 255 ................................................................................... A.69 Fizzell (1987) 31 A Crim R 213 ............................................................................ 9C.5 Fletcher (1913) 9 Cr App R 53 ............................................................................. 130.7 Fletcher [1998] 2 Qd R 437 ................................................................................... A.69 Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308; [2005] NSWCCA 338 .................................. F.51 Flynn [1963] 1 QB 729 ......................................................................................... 15.60 Flynn [1972] Crim LR 428 ..................................................................................... 21.4 Flynn [2010] QCA 254 .......................................................................................... 102.1 Folbigg (2005) 152 A Crim R 35; [2005] NSWCCA 23 ..................... A.67, F.6, F.51 Foley [2000] 1 Qd R 290; (1998) 105 A Crim R 1; [1998] QCA 225 ..... A.66, A.90, A.95 Folland [2004] QCA 209 ....................................................................................... 17.10 Fong [1981] Qd R 90 ................................................................................... A.73, 9C.6 Foord (1985) 20 A Crim R 267 ............................................................................ 15.36 Forbes [1992] 2 Cr App R 501 ............................................................................. 15.32 Ford (1851) 5 Cox CC 184 ................................................................................... 19.18 Ford (2009) 273 ALR 286; [2009] NSWCCA 306 ................................................ F.51 Forrest (2004) 236 LSJS 265; [2004] SASC 333 ............................................... A.105 Forsyth (1990) 20 ATR 1818 ............................................................................... A.102 Foster (1834) 6 Car & P 325; 172 ER 1261 ....................................................... A.145 Fotheringham (1975) 88 Cr App R 206 ....................................................... A.84, F.14 Fouyaxis (2007) 99 SASR 233; [2007] SASC 335 ............................................. A.105 Fowkes (1856) The Times Law Report, 8 March 1856 ....................................... 101.7 Fowler (1985) 39 SASR 440 .................................................................................. A.75 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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Fowler [2000] NSWCCA 142 ................................................................................. F.20 Fowler (2003) 151 A Crim R 166; [2003] NSWCCA 321 ................................. A.106 Fox [2000] 1 Qd R 640; [1999] QCA 140 ............................................................ A.78 Fox [2000] 2 Qd R 334 ......................................................................................... 15.24 France [1978] Crim LR 48 ........................................................................ 15.23, 15.65 Francis (1874) LR 2 CCR 128 ............................................................................... A.59 Francis [1993] 2 Qd R 300 .................................................................................. Q.107 Francis (2004) 145 A Crim R 233; [2004] NSWCCA 85 ........................................ F.6 Franco (2009) 105 SASR 446; [2009] SASC 370 .............................................. A.116 Franicevic [2010] QCA 36 ........................................................................... 17.4, 17.11 Franklin (2001) 119 A Crim R 223 ........................................................................ Q.54 Fraser [1989] Qd R 182 ......................................................................................... Q.52 Fraser (1995) 65 SASR 260; 85 A Crim R 385 ......................................... A.80, 18.10 Freer and Weekes [2004] QCA 97 ....................................................................... 93B.8 Fricker (1986) 42 SASR 436 ................................................................................ 15.44 Frolchenko [1998] QCA 43 ......................................................................... 3.11, Q.100 Fuller [2009] QCA 195 ........................................................................................... 59.9 Fuzil Deen (1895) 6 QLJR 302 ................................................................................ 8.2 G [1994] 1 Qd R 540 ........................................................................ 9D.1, 9D.2, 21.20 G (2007) 4 DCLR (NSW) 328 ............................................................................. 21A.1 GAE (2000) 1 VR 198; 109 A Crim R 419 ............................... A.136, A.154, 130.11 GEC [2001] 3 VR 334 .......................................................................................... A.118 GG (2004) 151 A Crim R 92; [2004] VSCA 238 ............................................... A.154 GH (2000) 105 FCR 419 ........................................................................................ Q.43 GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317; (2001) 125 A Crim R 315 ................... A.69, A.75, F.48 GR (2005) 153 A Crim R 94; [2005] QCA 146 ................................ 21AD.1, 93A.12 GT [2005] QCA 478 ....................................................... A.2, 21AM.2, 93A.1, 93A.19 GVV (2008) 184 A Crim R 242; [2008] VSCA 170 .................... A.136, A.154, Q.54 GW [2016] HCA 6 .......................................................................................... 9A.3, F.8 Gallagher (1986) 41 SASR 73 ............................................................................. A.117 Gallagher [1998] 2 VR 671 .................................................................................... Q.52 Gallagher [2001] NSWSC 462 ............................................................................... A.69 Gallagher [2013] NSWSC 1102 .......................................................................... 130.20 Galli (2001) 127 A Crim R 493 ............................................................................. A.69 Gao [2012] QCA 54 .................................................................................. 93A.19, 99.1 Garbett (1847) 2 Car & K 474; 175 ER 196 ....................................................... 10.27 Gardiner [1981] Qd R 394 ................................................................ A.109, Q.35, F.75 Gardner [1980] Qd R 531 ...................................................................................... A.70 Gardner and Coates (No 1) [2003] VSC 152 ........................................................ A.79 Garofalo [1999] 2 VR 625 ..................................................................................... Q.11 Garth (1994) 73 A Crim R 215 ................................................................. 130.34, Q.63 Garvey [1987] 2 Qd R 623 ................................................................... 6.5, 9A.2, 9A.4 Gatty [2001] TASSC 9 ........................................................................................... A.79 Gaudion [1979] VR 57 .......................................................................... 3.11, 3.21, F.27 Gbojueh (2009) 103 SASR 545; [2009] SASC 104 ............................................... A.4 Gebert (1992) 60 SASR 110 ................................................................................ A.105 Geering (1849) 18 LJMC 215 ............................................................................... 15.20 Geesing (1985) 38 SASR 226 ................................................................................ Q.60 Genrich [2001] QCA 466 ...................................................................................... 15.12 George Joseph Smith (1915) 11 Cr App R 229 .......................... A.137, A.139, A.140 Georgiadis (No 4) [2001] TASSC 54 ..................................................................... 93.8 Georgiev (2001) 119 A Crim R 363 .......................................................... A.136, Q.45 Georgiou (2005) 153 A Crim R 288; [2005] NSWCCA 189 ............................... Q.54 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Cases

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Georgiou [2005] NSWCCA 237 ............................................................................. 3.21 Gesa [2001] 2 Qd R 72 ........................................................................................ A.102 Ghion [1982] Qd R 781 .................................................................. 17.16, 18.11, 101.5 Giaccio (1997) 68 SASR 484 ................................................................ 130.59, 130.60 Gibb [1983] 2 VR 155 .......................................................................................... 15.28 Gibson (1999) 110 A Crim R 180; [1999] NSWCCA 370 .................................. 130.4 Gidley [1984] 3 NSWLR 168 ......................................................................... 8.6, Q.72 Gilbert (1977) 66 Cr App R 237 ............................................................................. 10.3 Gilfoyle [1996] 3 All ER 883 .............................................................................. A.148 Gilfoyle [2001] 2 Cr App R 57 .............................................................................. A.74 Gill (1963) 47 Cr App R 166 ................................................................................. Q.35 Gill [2003] VSC 321 ........................................................................................... 130.12 Gillard (1999) 105 A Crim R 479 ........................................................................... F.45 Gillard (2000) 78 SASR 279 ................................................................................ A.126 Gillespie (1967) 51 Cr App R 172 ....................................................................... 19.20 Gillis [1957] VR 91 ................................................................................... 15.51, 130.5 Gilmore (1977) 2 NSWLR 935 .............................................................................. A.67 Gilvarry [1991] 2 Qd R 431 ..................................................................................... A.4 Gionfriddo (1990) 50 A Crim R 327 ........................................................... Q.45, Q.54 Glastonbury (2012) 115 SASR 37; [2012] SASCFC 141 ................................... Q.107 Glastonbury [2014] SASCFC 44 ............................................................ 93A.19, 133.1 Glaves [1993] Crim LR 685 ............................................................................... 130.44 Glennon (No 3) (2005) 158 A Crim R 74; [2005] VSCA 262 ............................ 15.16 Glover [2002] NSWCCA 376 .............................................................................. A.106 Goddard (1882) 15 Cox CC 7 .............................................................................. A.151 Gojanovic (No 1) (2002) 130 A Crim R 167 ........................................................ Q.56 Golder, Jones and Porritt [1960] 1 WLR 1169; 3 All ER 457 ............................ 101.1 Golightly (1997) 17 WAR 401 ............................................................................. A.151 Gordon; Ex parte Attorney-General [1975] Qd R 301 ......................................... 39P.1 Governor of Brixton Prison; Ex parte Levin [1997] AC 741 ................................ 3.13 Governor of Metropolitan Gaol; Ex parte Di Nardo [1963] VR 61 ......... 10.27, F.76, Q.26 v Governor of Pentonville Prison; Ex parte Osman [1990] 1 WLR 277; (1990) 90 Cr App R 149; [1989] 3 All ER 701 .......................................... A.11, A.182 v Governor of Pentonville Prison; Ex parte Schneider (1981) 73 Cr App R 200 ............................................................................................................................ 3.9 v Gow (2006) DCLR (NSW) 211 .......................................................................... 130.77 v Gramanatz [1962] QWN 41 ....................................................................... 15.60, 15.61 v Grassby (1988) 15 NSWLR 109 ............................................................. 10.21, 130.10 v Gray [1965] Qd R 373 ........................................................................ 10.23, 15.7, 15.8 v Gray (1977) 17 SASR 534 ............................................................. 21.16, 21.17, 21.18 v Green (unreported, Qld Sup Ct CA, 14 December 1994) ................................... A.117 v Gregory (No 2) [2009] VSC 509 ......................................................................... A.134 v Griffin (1997) 94 A Crim R 26; [1998] 1 Qd R 659; [1997] QCA 115 ............ 92.37, 92.39, 93A.4 v Griffis (1996) 67 SASR 170 .................................................................................... 6.25 v Griffith [1997] 2 Qd R 524 .................................................................................... A.79 v Griffith [2000] QSC 9 ................................................................................. 130.3, Q.74 v Grimes [2013] 1 Qd R 351; [2012] QSC 229 .................................................... 130.74 v Gudgeon (1995) 83 A Crim R 228; 133 ALR 379 ................................................ 15.5 v Gun; Ex parte Stephenson (1977) 17 SASR 165 ............................ 21.9, 21.10, 21.18 v Gunewardene [1951] 2 KB 600 ............................................................................. A.96 v H [1995] 2 AC 596; 2 All ER 865 .................................. A.41, A.134, A.137, 132A.2 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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Table of Cases

R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R

v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v

R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R

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H [1999] 2 Qd R 283 .................................................................. 93A.19, 93A.25, 99.1 HBJ [2014] QCA 2 ............................................................................................ 21AW.3 HRA (2008) 183 A Crim R 91; [2008] VSCA 56 .............................................. A.154 Haddad (1988) 33 A Crim R 400 ............................................................................. 8.4 Hadlow [1992] 2 Qd R 440 .................................. 17.2, 17.3, 17.7, 17.8, 17.11, 17.13 Hagan [1966] Qd R 219 ............................................................................. A.110, Q.77 Hagarty (2004) 145 A Crim R 138; [2004] NSWCCA 89 ................................. A.136 Haidley [1984] VR 229 ............................................................................. 130.11, A.79 Hall (1970) 55 Cr App R 108 ................................................................................ Q.52 Hall [1973] QB 496 ................................................................................................. 23.2 Hall [1986] 1 Qd R 462 ....... 15.69, 17.11, 98.5, 101.1, 101.2, 101.5, 130.15, 130.63 Hall [1987] 1 NZLR 616 .......................................................................................... A.4 Hall [2011] QCA 26 ............................................................................................. 21A.2 Hallam (1985) 42 SASR 126; 18 A Crim R 221 .................................. 130.11, 130.53 Hally [1962] Qd R 214 ........................................................................................... A.75 Halpin [1975] QB 907 ............................................................................................. 51.4 Halse (1980) 25 SASR 510 ................................................................................. 130.54 Hamilton [1979] Crim LR 486 ............................................................................. 15.38 Hamitov (1979) 21 SASR 596 .............................................................................. 133.3 Hamood (1987) 45 SASR 90 ................................................................................. A.79 Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359 ................................................................................... F.32 Harbach (1973) 6 SASR 427 .............................................................................. 130.12 Harding [1956] QWN 32 ......................................................................................... 17.9 Harding [1989] 2 Qd R 373 ....................................................... 6.5, 9A.2, 9A.4, Q.72 Harding (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Moynihan J, 13 October 1988) ...................... 9A.2 Hardy (unreported, Qld Dist Ct, 26 February 1990) .......... 9.1, 93A.3, 9A.4, 93A.12, 93A.19, 99.1 Hargraves (2008) 73 ATR 775; [2008] QSC 267 .................................................. Q.11 Hargraves and Stoten (2010) 79 ATR 406; [2010] QSC 188 ........................... 132C.2 Harringworth (Inhabitants) (1815) 4 M & S 350; 105 ER 863 ............................. 60.1 Harris [1927] 2 KB 576 .......................................................................................... 6.18 Harris (1997) 7 NTLR 1 ......................................................................................... A.70 Harris (No 3) [1990] VR 310 .............................................................................. 130.11 Harrison (1692) 12 How St Tr 834 .................................................. A.19, A.105, 16.1 Harrison [1966] VR 72 ............................................................................. A.87, 101.10 Hart (1958) 42 Cr App R 47 ................................................................................. 17.12 Hart [1979] Qd R 8 ........................................................... 130.27, 130.34, Q.53, Q.72 Hartwick (2005) 159 A Crim R 1; [2005] VSCA 264 ............................... 15.12, Q.54 Hartwick (No 3) [2002] VSC 480 ........................................................................ 19.18 Hartwick (No 4) [2002] VSC 481 ..................................................................... 21AZ.1 Harvey (1869) 11 Cox CC 546 ............................................................................... 59.4 Hasler; Ex parte Attorney-General [1987] 1 Qd R 239 ..... 130.4, 130.64, Q.50, Q.55 Hassan [2004] VSC 85 ........................................................................................ 130.11 Hastings (2003) 85 SASR 256 ............................................................................... Q.56 Hatchard [1997] ACL Rep 130 SA 121 ............................................................... A.138 Hatton (1976) 64 Cr App R 88 ............................................................................. 15.73 Haughbro (1997) 135 ACTR 15 ......................................................................... 130.59 Hawes (1994) 35 NSWLR 294 .................................................................... 19.17, F.24 Hawkins (1669) 6 How St Tr 921 ......................................................................... A.19 Haycock [1989] 2 Qd R 56 .................................................................................. A.121 Hayden [1959] VR 102 ........................................................................................... 17.9 Haydon (No 2) [2005] SASC 16 ......................................................................... A.160 Hayes [1977] 1 WLR 234; 2 All ER 288 ................................................................. 9.1 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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Haynes (1859) 1 F & F 666; 175 ER 898 ............................................................. 6.20 Haywood (1994) 73 A Crim R 41 ......................................................................... A.64 Heaney [1992] 2 VR 531 .................................................................................... 130.52 Heaney (2009) 22 VR 164; [2009] VSCA 74 ....................................................... A.95 Heenan [2002] QCA 292 ......................................................................................... 20.1 Hegarty (unreported, ref’d (1977) 17 SASR 524) ................................................ 21.16 Heginbotham [2008] QCA 47 ................................................................................ 9A.2 Hein (2013) 117 SASR 444; [2013] SASCFC 97 .............................................. 130.34 Heiss (1990) 101 FLR 433 ....................................................................... 130.52, Q.62 Hellemons (unreported, Qld CA, 1 July 1997) ............................ 93A.3, 93A.18, 98.1 Hellwig [2007] 1 Qd R 17; [2006] QCA 179 ................................... 21AW.1, 21AW.2 Helmhout (2001) 125 A Crim R 257 .................................................................. 130.46 Henderson [2014] QCA 12 ................................................................................... 21A.1 Hennig [2010] QCA 244 ........................................................................................ Q.54 Henriques (unreported) ........................................................................................... A.58 Hentschel [1988] VR 362 .................................................... A.8, A.79, 130.41, 130.67 Hepworth [1955] 2 QB 600 ................................................................................. A.105 Herbert [1998] QCA 418 ........................................................................................ Q.72 Hettiarachchi [2009] VSCA 270 ........................................................................... 15.34 Heuston (1995) 81 A Crim R 387 .......................................................................... A.78 Heyde (1990) 20 NSWLR 234 ............................................................................... Q.54 Heyward & Minter [2010] SASCFC 38 ................................................................ Q.59 Hibbins [1999] 2 Qd R 54 ................................................................................. 93A.25 Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 ................................... 21F.3 Higgins (1994) 71 A Crim R 429 .......................................................................... A.89 Hill (1777) 20 How St Tr 1317 ............................................................................. A.20 Hill (1851) 5 Jurist 470 .......................................................................................... A.64 Hillier (2007) 172 A Crim R 73; [2007] HCA 13 ............................................... A.106 Hilton [1972] 1 QB 421 .......................................................................................... 15.4 Hinch [2013] VSC 520 ......................................................................................... A.111 Hogan [2001] NSWCCA 292 ........................................................................ F.19, F.20 Hollis (1905) 5 SR (NSW) 283 ............................................................................ 19.10 Holman [1997] 1 Qd R 373 ................................................................................. A.105 Holmes (1871) 12 Cox CC 137 ............................................................................ 21.11 Holt (1793) 2 Leach 593; 168 ER 399 ................................................................... 45.2 Holt [1983] 2 Qd R 462 ........................................................................................ 21.18 Hood [1997] ACL Rep 195 NSW 8 ..................................................................... 10.27 Hooper (1999) 108 A Crim R 108; [1999] QCA 310 .......................................... 130.4 Hopwood [2001] QCA 565 .................................................................................. 93A.3 Hore [2005] NSWCCA 3 ...................................................................................... 10.26 Horne (1903) 6 WALR 9 ....................................................................................... 15.15 Horry [1949] NZLR 791 ...................................................................................... A.124 Horsfall (1989) 51 SASR 489 ................................................................... A.64, 130.11 Horsham Justices; Ex parte Bukhari (1982) 74 Cr App R 291 ......................... 130.10 Horvath [1972] VR 533 ............................................................................. A.63, A.132 Hosking (unreported, Qld CCA, 31 January 1990) .................................. 101.5, 102.1 Houston (1982) 8 A Crim R 392 .......................................................................... 17.10 Howarth [1973] Qd R 431 ........................................................... 130.27, 130.30, Q.67 Howe [1958] SASR 95 .......................................................................................... 15.51 Hsing (1991) 25 NSWLR 685 ............................................................... 130.59, 130.61 Hudson [1912] 2 KB 464 ........................................................................... 15.55, 15.56 Huebner and Maher [2004] QCA 98 ................................................................... A.136 Hugh Lunny (1854) 6 Cox CC 477 ..................................................................... A.151 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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v Hulet (1660) 5 How St Tr 1185 ............................................................................ 131.1 v Hunt [2002] SASC 195 ........................................................................................ A.116 v Hunter [1956] VLR 31 .......................................... A.89, A.97, 17.3, 17.7, 17.8, 17.13 v Hunter [2014] QCA 59 ........................................................................................... A.69 v Hunter (No 11) [2014] NSWSC 1154 .................................................................... F.61 v Hurst [1958] VR 396 .............................................................................................. Q.67 v Huseyin (unreported, Vic Cty Ct, O’Shea J, 16 February 1990) ....................... 130.11 v Hush; Ex parte Devanny (1933) 48 CLR 487 ............................................. Q.27, Q.29 v Hutchinson (1990) 53 SASR 587 ........................................................................... 17.9 v Hutchinson [2010] QCA 22 .................................................................................... A.61 v Hutton (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 282 ........................................................................... 23.2 v Hutton (1994) 3 Tas R 225 ................................................................................... A.211 v Ibrahim (2003) 7 VR 141; [2003] VSCA 180 ....................................................... Q.54 v Inamata (2003) 137 A Crim R 510; [2003] NSWCCA 19 ................................... A.78 v Ince [1999] VSC 418 ........................................................................................... 130.59 v Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commissioner [2016] HCA 8 ..................................................................................................................... 10.33, 10.35 v Inhabitants of Eriswell (1790) 3 Term Rep 707; 100 ER 815 ........ A.10, A.13, 130.7 v Inland Revenue Commissioners; Ex parte Rossminster [1980] AC 952 .............. Q.18 v Inner London Crown Court; Ex parte Baines and Baines (a Firm) [1988] QB 579; [1987] 3 All ER 1025 .................................................................. A.166 v Inston (2009) 103 SASR 265; [2009] SASC 89 ..................................... A.136, A.154 v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321 .... 10.3, 130.3, 130.34, 130.38, 130.44, 130.55, 130.61, Q.108 v Ireland (No 1) [1970] SASR 416 ............................................................................ 3.19 v Ireland; Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95 .................................................... 10.3 v Irlam; Ex parte Attorney-General [2002] QCA 235 ............................................ A.105 v Irvine [2009] VSCA 239 ....................................................................................... A.116 v Isaacs (1996) 41 NSWLR 374 ........................................................................... 132C.3 v Isequilla [1975] 1 WLR 716; 1 All ER 77 ............................................................ Q.70 v Ives [1973] Qd R 128 ........................................................................................... A.154 v J (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 ..................................................................................... A.67 v J (No 2) [1998] 3 VR 602 .................................................................................... A.154 v JCM [2007] QDC 211 .............................................................................. A.102, A.117 v JF (2009) 237 FLR 142; [2009] ACTSC 104 ....................................................... Q.60 v JG (2009) 199 A Crim R 299; [2009] NSWSC 1053 ........................................... A.64 v JK [2005] QCA 307 ............................................................................................... 21.11 v Jack (1894) 15 LR (NSW) 196 ............................................................................. 19.16 v Jackson (1987) 11 NSWLR 318 ............................................................................ Q.43 v Jackson (1987) 8 NSWLR 116 ............................................................................... 47.2 v Jamieson and Elliott (1992) 60 A Crim R 68 ..................................................... 130.12 v Jarc [2000] NTSC 80 ............................................................................................ A.127 v Jarrett [2012] NSWCCA 81 ......................................................... 130.20, 130.63, Q.71 v Jeffrey (1991) 60 A Crim R 384 ............................................................................ Q.54 v Jeffries (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 384 ....................................................................... 130.21 v Jell; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 48 ............................................. A.102 v Jenkins (1869) LR 1 CCR 187 ............................................................................. A.151 v Jenkins [1970] Tas SR 13 ........................................................................................ 93.8 v Jenkins; Ex parte Morrison [1949] VLR 277 ........................................................ A.74 v Jenkyns (1993) 32 NSWLR 712 .................................................................. A.64, A.71 v Jensen [2009] VSCA 266 ..................................................................................... A.120 v Jerome [1964] Qd R 595 ......................................................................................... 54.1 v Jeynes [1927] QSR 27 .............................................................................. 9D.3, 93A.20 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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v Jobling [2011] QCA 31 ................................................................... 101.2, 101.3, 102.1 v Jobson [1989] 2 Qd R 464 ..................................................................... A.107, 132C.3 v John [2014] QCA 86 ........................................................................................... 132C.2 v Johnson (1987) 25 A Crim R 433 ............................................................................ Q.6 v Johnson [2004] NSWCCA 121 ................................................................................ A.4 v Jones (1986) 19 A Crim R 236 ........................................................................... 130.44 v Jones [1993] 1 Qd R 676 ..................................................................................... A.106 v Jones (1998) 72 SASR 281 ...................................................................................... Q.5 v Jones [2001] TASSC 121 .................................................................................... 130.59 v Jones (2006) 161 A Crim R 511; [2006] SASC 189 ......... A.143, A.148, A.156, 17.2 v Jones [2015] QSC 161 ............................................................................................ A.67 v Jones (Benjamin) [1978] 1 WLR 195 ................................................................... 83.14 v Jones (No 2) (2007) 173 A Crim R 309; [2007] NSWSC 770 ......................... 130.26 v Jovanovic [2014] ACTSC 98 ................................................................................... Q.2 v Joyce [1958] 1 WLR 140; [1957] 3 All ER 623 ................................................ 130.22 v Joyce (2002) 173 FLR 322 ....................................................................... A.69, 130.11 v Joyce (2005) 153 A Crim R 241; [2005] NTSC 21 .............................................. A.71 v Jung [2006] NSWSC 658 ................................................................... A.67, A.75, 3.20 v Juric (2002) 4 VR 411; 129 A Crim R 408 ................................................. A.69, Q.54 v K (1984) 14 A Crim R 226 .................................................................................... Q.68 v K; Ex parte Attorney-General (2002) 132 A Crim R 108; [2002] QCA 260 ............................................................................................................................. Q.43 v KAH [2012] QCA 154 ............................................................................................ 99.1 v KAN [2016] QCA 108 ......................................................................................... A.136 v KP; Ex parte Attorney-General [2006] QCA 301 ............................................. 132A.2 v Kadibil [1999] WASC 67 ..................................................................................... A.151 v Kalajdic (2005) 157 A Crim R 300; [2005] VSCA 160 ....................................... Q.54 v Kalajzich (1989) 39 A Crim R 415 ...................................................................... A.116 v Kalia (1974) 60 Cr App R 200 ............................................................................... 20.2 v Kallis [1994] 2 Qd R 88 ........................................................................... 130.28, Q.56 v Kamleh (No 2) (2003) 226 LSJS 4; [2003] SASC 35 ......................... 130.17, 130.19 v Kanaan (2005) 157 A Crim R 238; [2005] NSWCCA 385 ...................... A.105, Q.54 v Kanaris [1999] NTSC 94 ..................................................................................... 130.77 v Kaplan (2005) 14 VR 673; [2005] VSCA 316 ........................................... 83.14, 93.8 v Karam (1995) 83 A Crim R 416 ......................................................................... 130.46 v Karger (2001) 83 SASR 1; [2001] SASC 64 ........................................................ 9C.5 v Karger (2002) 83 SASR 135 .......................................................... A.69, 130.77, Q.56 v Kashani-Malaki [2010] QCA 222 ........................................................................ A.159 v Kays (1979) 25 ALR 174 ....................................................................................... Q.35 v Kearley [1992] 2 WLR 656 ................................................................................. A.144 v Keeley [1980] VR 571 ........................................................................................... A.79 v Keen [2015] QSC 7 ............................................................................................... 92.43 v Kehagias [1985] VR 107 ........................................................................... 19.16, 101.4 v Kelcey [1985] VR 765 ........................................................................................ 130.45 v Kelly (1907) 7 SR (NSW) 518 ............................................................................ A.100 v Kelly (1975) 12 SASR 441 .................................................................................... A.63 v Kelly [1984] 1 Qd R 474 ............................................................... A.40, A.136, A.137 v Kelly (1988) 78 ACTR 14 ..................................................................... 130.46, 130.52 v Kelly (2005) 152 A Crim R 428; [2005] QCA 80 .............................................. A.137 v Kelly [2006] QCA 467 .......................................................................................... 15.53 v Kelly [2006] VSCA 221 ....................................................................................... A.105 v Kelly; Ex parte Hoang van Duong (1981) 28 SASR 271 ..................................... A.89 v Kemp (No 2) [1998] 2 Qd R 510 ........................................................................ A.129 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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v Kempley (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 416 ..................................................................... 10.31 v Kendrick [1997] 2 VR 699 ................................................................................... A.101 v Kennedy (1979) 37 FLR 356; 25 ALR 367 ........................................................ A.143 v Kennedy (1997) 94 A Crim R 341 .................................................................... 21AG.1 v Kerbatieh (2005) 155 A Crim R 367; [2005] VSCA 194 ...... A.134, 8.6, 21P.1, Q.72 v Kerim [1988] 1 Qd R 426 ................................................................. A.116, 8.4, 21.12 v Kerin [2014] SASC 19 ............................................................................................ 83.2 v Kern [1986] 2 Qd R 209 .................................................................. 18.5, 18.11, 101.6 v Ketchup [1982] Qd R 732 ........................................................................ A.105, A.106 v Khalil (1987) 44 SASR 23 ........................................................................ 130.16, Q.71 v Khammash (2004) 89 SASR 488; [2004] SASC 289 ........................................ 130.31 v Khan (unreported, NSW SC, Hidden J, 22 November 1995) ................................ F.11 v Kidner [2001] QCA 79 ........................................................................................... Q.54 v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 ............................................................................. A.130, 8.4 v Killick (1979) 21 SASR 321 ................................................................. 130.34, 130.51 v King (1983) 77 Cr App R 1 ................................................................................. A.163 v King [2002] NSWCCA 365 ............................................................... A.58, A.78, A.79 v King [2002] SASC 140 ........................................................................................ A.181 v Kingston [1986] 2 Qd R 114 ......................................... A.86, A.184, 2.2, 6.14, 19.13 v Kingston [2008] QCA 193 .................................................................................. 132B.3 v Kirkby [2000] 2 Qd R 57 ........................................................................................ 79.1 v Kirkby [2001] 1 Qd R 267; [1999] QCA 445 ........................................... A.213, 53.5 v Kirkman (2000) 155 FLR 9 ................................................................................. A.154 v Klamo (2008) 18 VR 644; [2008] VSCA 75 ........................................................ 9D.3 v Kneebone (1999) 47 NSWLR 450 .......................................................................... F.20 v Knight (1905) 20 Cox CC 711 ................................................... 130.7, 130.14, 130.16 v Knight (2001) 160 FLR 465; 120 A Crim R 381; [2001] NSWCCA 344 .......................................................................................................... A.77, 10.7, 59.4 v Knight [2010] QCA 372 ........................................................................... 93B.1, 93B.3 v Knight (2012) 227 A Crim R 339; [2012] QSC 397 ............................................ A.60 v Knight (aka Black) (2001) 120 A Crim R 381; [2001] NSWCCA 114 ........... 130.56 v Kochnieff (1987) 33 A Crim R 1 ........................................................................... Q.45 v Kong [2009] QCA 34 .............................................................................................. 17.2 v Konstandopoulos (1997) 99 A Crim R 36 ............................................................. Q.54 v Kostaras (2002) 131 A Crim R 563 ..................................................................... A.136 v Kostaras (2002) 133 A Crim R 399 ...................................................................... 15.59 v Kostic Stefanopoulos (2004) 151 A Crim R 10; [2004] SASC 406 .......... A.78, A.79 v Kovacs [2009] 2 Qd R 51; [2008] QCA 417 ...................................................... 21A.2 v Krasniqi (1993) 61 SASR 366 ............................................................................. A.105 v Krausch (1913) 32 NZLR 1229 ............................................................................. A.69 v Krausz (1973) 57 Cr App R 466 ........................................................................... 21.14 v Kumar (2006) 165 A Crim R 48; [2006] VSCA 182 ............................................ Q.54 v Kuster (2008) 21 VR 407; 191 A Crim R 449; [2008] VSCA 261 .................... A.116 v Kwok (2005) 158 A Crim R 160; [2005] NSWCCA 245 ....................................... Q.2 v Kyriakou (1987) 29 A Crim R 50 ............................................................. 130.64, Q.78 v Kyu Hyuk Kim (1998) 104 A Crim R2 33 ............................................................ 22.4 v LLH (2002) 132 A Crim R 498 ................................................................ 130.46, Q.56 v LM [2004] QCA 192 .............................................................................................. A.73 v LR (2005) 156 A Crim R 354; [2005] QCA 368 ..................................... 130.34, Q.63 v LSS [2000] 1 Qd R 546 ............................................................................. A.96, A.136 v Lace [2001] QCA 255 ........................................................................................... 18.11 v Lacey and Lacey [2010] QDC 344 .................................................................... 132C.2 v Laing [2008] QCA 317 ............................................................................................ 93.9 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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v Lam (No 11) [2005] VSC 285 .............................................................................. 101.5 v Lambert (2000) 111 A Crim R 564; [2000] QCA 141 ............................ A.128, A.145 v Lane [No 13] [2010] NSWSC 1540 ...................................................................... Q.54 v Langford [1974] Qd R 67 .......................................................................... 15.54, 15.61 v Langmead (1864) Le & Ca 427; 169 ER 1459 ..................................................... Q.33 v Laracy (2007) 180 A Crim R 19; [2007] VSC 19 ................................... 130.18, Q.56 v Larkins (1911) 6 Cr App R 194 .............................................................................. 54.1 v Larson [1984] VR 559 ........................................................................... 130.28, 130.34 v Lau (1991) 58 A Crim R 390 ................................................................................. 9A.2 v Laurie [1987] 2 Qd R 762 ...................................................................................... Q.85 v Lawless [1974] VR 398 ........................................................... A.60, A.94, 17.9, 17.11 v Lawrence [2002] 2 Qd R 400; [2001] QCA 441 ........................................ A.96, A.99 v Lawrence (2003) 190 FLR 1; [2003] NSWSC 656 .............................................. Q.12 v Lawrie [1986] 2 Qd R 502 ............................................................... 17.3, 17.13, 101.5 v Lawson [1996] 2 Qd R 587 ................................................................................... Q.56 v Le (2002) 54 NSWLR 474; (2002) 130 A Crim R 44; [2002] NSWCCA 186 .................................................................................................. F.19, F.20 v Le (2007) 173 A Crim R 450; [2007] QCA 259 .................................................... 99.1 v Le [2009] QCA 343 ............................................................................................... 17.10 v Leak [1969] SASR 172 .......................................................................................... A.66 v Leatham (1861) 8 Cox CC 498 ........................................................................... 130.42 v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133; [1950] HCA 25 .... A.6, 15.18, 130.3, 130.4, 130.9, 130.14, 130.15, 130.21, 130.26, 130.59, 130.63, 130.66, F.66 v Lee (2005) 12 VR 249; [2005] VSC 167 .............................................................. Q.54 v Lee Kun [1916] 1 KB 337 ....................................................................................... Q.6 v Lemmens [2010] QSC 271 ..................................................................................... A.65 v Leroy [1984] 2 NSWLR 441 .......................................... A.63, 59.2, 59.5, 59.9, 59.11 v Leroy [1984] 2 NSWLR 441; (1984) 55 ALR 338 ............................................... 59.9 v Lesley Kowitz (unreported, Qld Dist Ct, 4 August 1987) .................................. A.141 v Leslie Robert Brown (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Shanahan AJ, 17 November 1992) .................................................................................................... 130.12 v Lester [2004] QCA 34 .................................................................................... 23.1, 23.4 v Lester (2007) 176 A Crim R 152; [2007] QSC 229 .......... A.136, 23.4, 93B.1, 93B.3 v Lester (2008) 190 A Crim R 468; [2008] QCA 354 ........................................... 93B.3 v Lester [2010] QCA 152 .......................................................................................... Q.53 v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405 .............................................. A.67, A.70, A.79, A.121 v Lewis [2003] NSWCCA 180 ................................................................................ A.136 v Lewis (unreported, Qld CA, Macrossan CJ, Pincus JA, Mackenzie J, 22 November 1996) .................................................................................................. Q.63 v Lewis; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 2 Qd R 294 ........................................ 130.4 v Li (2003) 140 A Crim R 288; [2003] NSWCCA 386 ............................................ 23.1 v Li [2003] NSWCCA 407 ...................................................................................... A.136 v Liddy (No 2) (2001) 79 SASR 401; 160 FLR 342 ........................................ 8.1, F.79 v Lieske (2006) 166 A Crim R 213; 204 FLR 1; [2006] ACTSC 97 ........ 130.59, Q.52 v Lindsay [1963] Qd R 386 ....................................................................................... Q.43 v Lipton (2011) 82 NSWLR 123 ..................................................................... A.159, F.6 v Liristis (2004) 146 A Crim R 547; [2004] NSWCCA 287 ...................................... 6.6 v Litzow [2011] QCA 366 ....................................................................................... A.154 v Liu [2006] QDC 247 .............................................................................................. A.70 v Livingstone (1915) 9 QJPR 67 .................................................................. 130.7, 130.8 v Livingstone [1987] 1 Qd R 38 ......................................... A.80, A.96, 20.3, 92.8, 94.4 v Livingstone (2004) 150 A Crim R 117; [2004] NSWCCA 407 ............................ 6.14 v Lo Presti [1992] 1 VR 696 ................................................................................... 130.4 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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v Loader (2005) 89 SASR 204 .................................................................................. Q.54 v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24; 112 A Crim R 357 ............................................... 130.39 v Loc Huu Phan [2003] NSWCCA 205 ................................................................. 130.45 v Lockyer (1996) 89 A Crim R 457 ........................................................ F.51, F.52, F.66 v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 250; [2006] NSWSC 587 .............................. 39A.1, Q.2, Q.3 v Long (2002) 137 A Crim R 263; [2002] SASC 426 ........................................... A.136 v Long; Ex parte Attorney-General (2003) 138 A Crim R 103; [2003] QCA 77 ................................................................................................................... A.151 v Longford (1970) 17 FLR 37 ........................................................................ A.61, Q.43 v Lord Mohun (1692) 12 How St Tr 949 ................................................................. A.22 v Lorenzo [2001] NSWCCA 389 ................................................................................ A.4 v Lovet [1986] 1 Qd R 52 ........................................................................................... A.4 v Lowe [1997] 2 VR 465 .......................................................................... 130.38, 130.56 v Lowe (1997) 98 A Crim R 300 ............................................................................... F.68 v Lowery (No 1) [1972] VR 554 ........................................................................... 130.18 v Lowery (No 3) [1972] VR 939 ............................................................................. 15.27 v Lozano [1997] ACL Rep 130 NSW 169 ................................................................ F.20 v Lucas [1973] VR 693 .................................................................................... 6.14, Q.11 v Lucas [1981] QB 720 ............................................................................................. Q.54 v Luck [2000] QCA 74 ................................................................................... 15.14, 19.3 v Lumsden [2003] NSWCCA 83 ............................................................................... A.78 v Lynch (1858) 2 Legge (NSW) 1120 ..................................................................... 17.15 v Lynch & Watson [1978] Tas SR 190 ...................................................................... 23.1 v M [1976] Qd R 344 ........................................................... 130.34, 130.53, Q.61, Q.69 v M [1980] 2 NSWLR 195 ............................................................................... 17.2, 17.3 v M [1991] 2 Qd R 68 ...................................................................................... A.4, Q.11 v M (1993) 67 A Crim R 549 .................................................................................. 21.11 v M (1994) 72 A Crim R 269 .................................................................................. 15.35 v M (2000) 109 A Crim R 530; [2000] QCA 20 ................................................... A.154 v M [2004] QCA 184 ............................................................................................... A.134 v M, BJ (2011) 102 SASR 1; [2011] SASCFC 50 ......... A.134, 101.2, 132A.1, 132A.2 v M, RB (2007) 172 A Crim R 73; [2007] SASC 207 .............................. A.106, A.136 v MAP [2006] QCA 220 ......................................................................................... A.140 v MBE (2008) 191 A Crim R 264; [2008] QCA 381 ......................................... 21AW.2 v MBO [2011] QCA 280 ....................................................................................... 132B.1 v MBT [2012] QCA 343 ............................................................................................ 9B.2 v MBV (2013) 227 A Crim R 49; [2013] QCA 17 ................................................... 98.4 v MBX [2013] QCA 214 ............................................................................. A.116, A.154 v MJJ; R v CJN (2013) 117 SASR 81; [2013] SASCFC 51 ............................... 132A.1 v MM [2014] NSWCCA 144 .................................................................................. A.136 v MSK (2004) 61 NSWLR 204; [2004] NSWCCA 308 ........................................ 21N.2 v MWL (2002) 137 A Crim R 282; [2002] VSCA 221 ......................................... A.154 v Macdonald (2002) 168 FLR 232 ......................................................................... 130.11 v Mackie (unreported, Qld Dist Ct, Helman DCJ, 22 March 1990) ............... 9.1, 9A.3, 21A.5, 93A.14 v Macleod [1991] Tas R 144; (1991) 61 A Crim R 465 ............................ 130.55, Q.20 v Mahoney-Smith (1967) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 249; [1967] 2 NSWR 154 ......................................................................................................... Q.72, Q.77, Q.82 v Maiden (1988) 35 A Crim R 346 ......................................................................... A.100 v Major [1998] 1 Qd R 317 .................................................................................... A.117 v Makismas (unreported, Qld Dist Ct, Hanger DCJ, 6 February 1985) ................... 59.7 v Mallah (2005) 154 A Crim R 150; [2005] NSWSC 358 ................................... 130.46 v Mallory (1884) 13 QBD 33 ................................................................................. 130.11 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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v Manchester Crown Court; Ex parte R [1999] 2 Cr App R 267 ............. A.163, A.170 v Manning (1968) 11 So Jo 745 ................................................................................ 17.2 v Manning (2014) 239 A Crim R 348; [2014] QCA 49 ......................................... A.136 v Manunta (1990) 54 SASR 17 ................................................................................. A.95 v Maqsud Ali [1966] 1 QB 688 ................................................. 3.11, 3.20, 3.21, 130.60 v Marijancevic (1991) 54 A Crim R 431 .................................................................. Q.54 v Mark & Elmazovski [2006] VSCA 251 ................................................................. 17.3 v Marks (2004) 150 A Crim R 212; [2004] VSC 476 ................................ 130.56, Q.58 v Marks [2006] VSCA 42 ....................................................................................... 130.56 v Marsh [1994] Crim LR 52 .................................................................................... 15.14 v Marsh [2005] NSWCCA 331 ................................................................................. A.79 v Marsham; Ex parte Pethick Lawrence [1912] 2 KB 362 ......................................... 6.2 v Martin [1981] 2 NSWLR 640 .............................................................................. A.107 v Martin, Klinge and Sambo (2002) 134 A Crim R 568; [2002] QCA 443 ................................................................................................................. 93B.8, Q.43 v Martindale [2009] QCA 24 ..................................................................................... Q.54 v Mason [1988] 1 WLR 139; [1987] 3 All ER 481 .............................................. 130.56 v Mason [2000] NSWCCA 82 ................................................................................... A.62 v Mason (2003) 140 A Crim R 274; [2003] NSWCCA 331 ................................. A.138 v Mason [2006] QCA 125 ........................................................................... A.134, A.154 v Massey [1997] 1 Qd R 404 .................................................................................. A.116 v Masters [1987] 2 Qd R 272 ....................................................................... 15.51, 130.5 v Masters (1992) 26 NSWLR 450 ............................................................................ Q.43 v May [1962] Qd R 456 ............................................................................................ Q.54 v Maynard (1979) 69 Cr App R 309 ......................................................................... 20.2 v Maynard (1993) 70 A Crim R 133; 126 ALR 150 ................................................. 95.6 v Maywhort [1955] 1 WLR 848 .............................................................................. 10.27 v Mazzolini [1999] 3 VR 113 ................................................................................. A.154 v Mazzone (1985) 21 A Crim R 32; (1985) 43 SASR 330 ......... 59.1, 59.6, 59.8, 59.9, 59.11 v McCallum [1918] QSR 124 .................................................................................... 23.1 v McCarthy (1993) 71 A Crim R 395 ....................................................................... A.79 v McCartney and Hansen (1928) 20 Cr App R 179 ..................................... A.168, 59.4 v McCready [1967] VR 325 ..................................................................................... 21.10 v McDermott (1990) 49 A Crim R 105 ..................................................................... 16.8 v McDermott (No 1) (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 379 ........................................................ A.4 v McDonald (1985) 3 MVR 182 ............................................................................ 130.52 v McDonnell; Ex parte Attorney-General [1988] 2 Qd R 189 ........ 10.10, 10.29, 10.31, Q.91 v McEndoo (1980) 5 A Crim R 52 ................................................................. A.71, 9C.6 v McGarvey (1987) 10 NSWLR 632 ....................................................................... 21.19 v McGee (2008) 102 SASR 318; [2008] SASC 328 ............................................. A.212 v McGrane [2002] QCA 173 ............................................................... A.4, A.138, 93B.3 v McGrath and Casey (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 460 .............................................. 132C.3 v McGregor (1967) 51 Cr App R 338 ...................................................................... Q.48 v McGregor [1984] 1 Qd R 256 ........................................... A.87, 19.12, 101.9, 101.10 v McHardie and Danielson [1983] 2 NSWLR 733 ......................................... A.67, 95.7 v McIntosh [1968] Qd R 570 .................................................................................. A.145 v McIntyre [2002] NSWCCA 29 ............................................................................. 93B.3 v McK [1986] 1 Qd R 476 .................................................................. A.116, Q.45, Q.54 v McKay [1965] Qd R 240 ....................................... 15.60, 130.14, 130.67, Q.50, Q.60 v McKay [1967] NZLR 139 ...................................................................................... Q.84 v McKenzie-McHarg (2008) 189 A Crim R 291; [2008] VSCA 206 .................... A.136 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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v McKeown [1923] VLR 577 .................................................................. 53.3, 68.1, 68.4 v McKimmie [1957] VR 93 ...................................................................................... A.76 v McL [1999] 1 VR 746 .......................................................................................... A.136 v McLachlan [1999] 2 VR 553 ............................................................................... A.116 v McLean; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 231 ......... 130.4, 130.12, 130.64 v McLennan [1999] 2 Qd R 297 ........................................................................... 93A.13 v McLeod (1890) 11 NSWLR 218 ............................................................................ 69.3 v McLeod [1964] NZLR 545 ................................................................................... 15.53 v McLeod (1995) 1 Cr App R 591 .......................................................................... 15.60 v McLeod (2007) 47 MVR 294; [2007] QCA 45 ................................................. 132C.7 v McLoughlin; Ex parte DPP [1988] 1 Qd R 464 ................................................. A.213 v McMahon (2004) 8 VR 101; [2004] VSCA 64 ..................................................... Q.54 v McMillan (1984) 13 A Crim R 234 ....................................................................... Q.64 v McMillan (2010) 204 A Crim R 98; [2010] QSC 309 .......................................... 93.3 v McNamara [1987] VR 855 ..................................................................................... Q.52 v McNamara (1994) 73 A Crim R 539 ..................................................................... Q.87 v McQuire (2000) 110 A Crim R 348 ....................................................................... A.61 v McStay (1945) 7 ATD 527 ..................................................................................... Q.27 v Maybir (No 7) [2015] NSWSC 1742 ...................................................................... F.51 v Meade (Ruling No 1) [2013] VSC 250 .............................................................. 130.37 v Medical Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Gilmore [1957] 1 QB 574 ........................... 21F.3 v Meizer [2001] QCA 231 ....................................................................................... A.138 v Melrose [1989] 1 Qd R 572 ....................................................................... A.117, Q.54 v Mendham (1993) 71 A Crim R 382 .............................................................. 22.9, 23.1 v Mendoza (2007) 173 A Crim R 157; [2007] VSCA 120 ...................................... A.78 v Merritt (1985) 19 A Crim R 360 ................................................. 130.45, 130.48, Q.65 v Merritt [1999] NSWCCA 29 ................................................................................ A.106 v Metal Trade Employers’ Association; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union, Australian Section (1951) 82 CLR 208 ......................... A.111, 3.8 v Michael (2008) 181 A Crim R 490; [2008] QCA 33 .......................................... 21A.2 v Michaux [1984] 2 Qd R 159 ............................................................... 3.11, 3.21, Q.35 v Middleton [1975] QB 191 ...................................................................................... Q.67 v Migliorini [1981] Tas R 80; (1981) 38 ALR 356 ......................................... 3.21, F.82 v Milat (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Hunt CJ at CL, 12 April 1996) ....................... A.60 v Milenkovic (2005) 158 A Crim R 4 ........................................................................ F.51 v Miles (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 198 ........................................................................... 15.16 v Millar [2000] 1 Qd R 437 ............................................... 15A.1, 16.2, 16.3, 16.8, 21.3 v Miller (1901) 65 JP 313 ........................................................................................ 130.7 v Miller [1952] 2 All ER 667 ................................................................................... 15.27 v Miller [1990] 2 Qd R 566 ...................................................................................... A.61 v Miller [2004] 1 Qd R 548; [2003] QCA 404 .................................................... 132C.7 v Miller (2007) 177 A Crim R 528; [2007] QCA 373 ............................................ 21.11 v Miller (2008) 103 SASR 174; [2008] SASC 331 ............................................... A.136 v Mills [1986] 1 Qd R 77 .... A.136, 10.3, 15.12, 15.18, 130.7, 132B.2, Q.52, F.6, F.49 v Mills [1986] VR 617 .............................................................................................. Q.48 v Milnes and Green (1983) 33 SASR 211 ................................................................ Q.69 v Milos [2014] QCA 314 ....................................................................................... 132C.2 v Milton [2004] NSWCCA 195 ............................................................................... 130.4 v Minarowska (1995) 83 A Crim R 78 ..................................................................... 9D.3 v Minh Quoc Le (2005) 151 A Crim R 564; [2005] NSWCCA 40 ........................ Q.12 v Minors [1989] 1 WLR 441 ..................................................................................... Q.77 v Mitchell [1971] VR 46 ................................................................................. 83.15, 93.8 v Mitchell (2007) 174 A Crim R 52; [2007] QCA 267 ........................................... Q.54 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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v Moghal (1977) 65 Cr App R 56 ........................................................................... 19.17 v Mokbel [2005] VSC 410 ....................................................................................... 15.62 v Mondon [2003] 1 Qd R 200; [2002] QCA 89 ......................................................... Q.1 v Moore (1852) 2 Den 522; 169 ER 608 ................................................................. Q.71 v Moore [1945] QWN 13 ........................................................................................... 23.4 v Moore (1972) 56 Cr App R 373 ............................................................................ Q.71 v Moore (1987) 25 A Crim R 302 ............................................................................ Q.43 v Morgan (1993) 30 NSWLR 543 ................................................................ 21.13, 21.15 v Morgan [2009] VSCA 225 ................................................................................. 93A.25 v Morgan; Ex parte Attorney-General [1987] 2 Qd R 627 ...................................... Q.35 v Morris (1959) 43 Cr App R 206 ........................................................................... 15.39 v Morris [1987] 1 Qd R 370 .................................................................................... 101.3 v Morris [1996] 2 Qd R 68 ............. 93A.1, 93A.13, 93A.17, 93A.18, 98.1, 98.4, 130.4 v Morris (1997) 98 A Crim R 408 .......................................................................... A.102 v Morrison [1999] 1 Qd R 397 ................................................................. A.107, 132C.3 v Morton (2008) 191 A Crim R 333; [2008] NSWCCA 196 .................................... Q.6 v Moxham (2000) 112 A Crim R 142 ....................................................................... A.61 v Mullins [2001] QCA 440 ....................................................................................... 17.11 v Munday (2003) 7 VR 423; [2003] VSCA 189 .................................................... A.154 v Muratovic [1967] Qd R 15 ................................................................................... A.103 v Murcott (2005) 156 A Crim R 163; [2005] WASC 30 ...................................... 130.77 v Murdoch (1987) 37 A Crim R 118 ........................................................................ A.59 v Murdoch (No 3) (2005) 195 FLR 400; [2005] NTSC 77 ........................ 10.7, 130.74 v Murphy (1900) 16 WN (NSW) 239 ....................................................................... Q.67 v Murphy (1985) 158 CLR 596 ................................................................................... 3.9 v Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42; 63 ALR 53 .......................................................... 15.35 v Murphy (1994) 62 SASR 121 ................................................................................ A.79 v Murphy [1996] 2 Qd R 523; (1995) 85 A Crim R 286 ........................................ A.79 v Murray (1981) 7 A Crim R 48 ............................................................................... Q.84 v Murray (unreported, Qld Dist Ct, 4 June 1990) .................................... 93A.3, 93A.10 v Mursic [1980] Qd R 482 ............................................................................ 18.11, 101.5 v Mustafa (2005) 91 SASR 62; [2005] SASC 66 ................................................. 130.11 v Myles [1997] 1 Qd R 199 ...................................................................................... 9D.3 v N [2001] QCA 70 ................................................................................................. A.136 v N (No 3) [2010] SASC 7 ...................................................................................... 15.34 v N [2015] QSC 91 ........................................................................... 130.3, 130.45, Q.12 v ND [2004] 2 Qd R 307; [2003] QCA 505 .............................................................. A.4 v NG [2007] 1 Qd R 37; [2006] QCA 218 .................................................. 10.12, 39P.1 v NRC (No 2) (2001) 124 A Crim R 580 ............................................................... 101.7 v NZ (2005) 63 NSWLR 628; [2005] NSWCCA 278 ................................ 93A.19, 99.1 v Nagawalli [2009] NTSC 25 ................................................................................. 130.34 v Nanette [1982] VR 81 ........................................................................................... A.117 v Nardozzi [1995] 2 Qd R 87 ................................................................... A.107, 132C.3 v Narula (1986) 22 A Crim R 409 .................................................................... Q.6, Q.61 v Nash [2014] QSC 139 ......................................................................................... 130.34 v Navarolli [2010] 1 Qd R 27; [2009] QCA 49 .......................................... A.121, 116.1 v Naylor; Ex parte Attorney-General [2013] 1 Qd R 368; [2012] QCA 116 ................................................................................................................... Q.67, Q.71 v Neale (1977) 65 Cr App R 304 ............................................................................. 15.27 v Neish [2013] ACTSC 23 ......................................................................................... F.31 v Nelson (1979) 68 Cr App R 12 ............................................................................. 15.53 v Nelson [1982] Qd R 636 .................................................................... A.71, 9C.6, Q.84 v Nelson (2004) MVR 10; [2004] NSWCCA 231 ................................................ 130.17 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v

Neville [1985] 2 Qd R 398 ...................................... 15.16, 17.16, 18.11, 101.5, 101.6 Newsome (1980) 71 Cr App R 325 ....................................................................... Q.45 Ng (2002) 136 A Crim R 299; 5 VR 257 ................................................ 130.46, Q.18 Ngo (2001) 122 A Crim R 467 ............................................................................ A.106 Ngo (No 2) (2001) 124 A Crim R 151 .................................................... 21B.1, 39Q.1 Nguyen [1989] 2 Qd R 72 .................................................................................... 101.5 Nguyen (1992) 60 A Crim R 196 .......................................................................... Q.54 Nguyen (1995) 78 A Crim R 582 ....................................................................... 130.18 Nguyen [2000] 1 Qd R 559 ............................................................... 3.10, 15.12, Q.74 Nguyen [2000] NSWCCA 285 ............................................................................... A.78 Nicholas (2000) 111 A Crim R 490 .................................................................... 130.58 Nichols [1958] Qd R 200 .................................................................................... 130.14 Nichols [1965] QWN 10 ....................................................................................... 15.13 Nielson [1930] QWN 15 .......................................................................... 130.8, 130.34 Noakes (1986) 42 SASR 489 ...................................................... 130.57, 130.65, Q.69 Noble [2002] 1 Qd R 432 ............................................................................ A.66, A.83 Noll [1999] 3 VR 704 .................................................................................. A.69, A.75 Nona [1997] 2 Qd R 438 .............................................................................. 6.14, A.35 Nona [2015] ACTSC 175 .............................................................................. A.58, F.42 Noud; Ex parte McNamara [1991] 2 Qd R 86 ...... 16.8, 20.1, 21.3, 92.43, Q.3, Q.74 Noyes [2005] 1 Qd R 169; [2003] QCA 564 ...................................................... A.154 O [1996] 3 NZLR 295 ............................................................................................. 99.1 O’Callaghan [1976] VR 676 .................................................................................. A.69 OGD [No 2] (2000) 50 NSWLR 433 ................................................................ 132A.1 O’Keefe (1893) 14 LR (NSW) 345 ....................................................................... Q.69 O’Keefe [1999] 1 Qd R 564 ............................................... A.138, A.140, A.211, 79.7 O’Leary [1946] SASR 175 .................................................................................. 130.12 O’Malley [1964] Qd R 226 ........................................................... A.126, 15.21, 21.13 O’Meally [1952] VLR 499 ...................................................................................... F.42 O’Neale [1988] RTR 124 ..................................................................................... A.130 O’Neill (1950) 34 Cr App R 108 ........................................................................... A.92 O’Neill [1969] Crim LR 260 ....................................................................... 17.12, 18.4 O’Neill (1988) 48 SASR 51 ................................................................................ 130.28 O’Neill [1996] 2 Qd R 326; (1995) 81 A Crim R 458 .......... 130.16, 130.18, 130.20, 130.57, 130.59, Q.87 O’Neill [2001] VSCA 227 ....................................................................................... 3.11 O’Neill (2003) 7 VR 408; [2003] VSCA 204 ........................................... 21.17, 21.18 O’Sullivan [1995] QCA 312 ................................................................................... A.67 O’Sullivan; Ex parte Attorney-General [1988] 1 Qd R 672 .................................... 6.2 Obeid (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, 6 September 1990) .............................................. 6.17 Oliver (1984) 57 ALR 543 ...................................................................................... F.82 Ong (2007) 176 A Crim R 366; [2007] VSCA 206 .............................................. A.77 Orton [1922] VLR 469 .......................................................................................... 19.20 Orton (unreported, 1874) ......................................................................................... 65.1 Osborne (2003) 11 Tas R 295; [2003] TASSC 17 .......................................... F.4, F.66 Osbourne [1973] QB 678 ....................................................................................... A.79 Ostojic (1978) 18 SASR 188 ................................................................................. Q.63 Oulds [2014] QCA 223 ................................................................................. A.35, 6.14 Ovenell [1969] 1 QB 17 ........................................................................ 130.14, 130.16 Owen [1951] VLR 393 .................................................................... 10.27, 10.31, Q.66 Owen (1991) 56 SASR 397 ...................................................................................... 8.6 Owen (1993) 68 A Crim R 247 ............................................................... A.212, A.213 P (2001) 53 NSWLR 664 ........................................................................................ F.47 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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PAB (2006) 162 A Crim R 449; [2006] QCA 212 ............................................ 132B.2 PWD (2010) 205 A Crim R 75; [2010] NSWCCA 209 ........................................ F.51 PZG (2007) 171 A Crim R 62; [2007] VSCA 54 ............................................... A.136 Pachonick [1973] 2 NSWLR 86 ................................................................. A.86, 19.22 Paddon [1999] 2 Qd R 387; [1998] QCA 248 .................................................... A.163 Padman [1979] Tas R 37; (1979) 25 ALR 36 ......................... 130.42, 130.47, 130.49 Palaga (2001) 80 SASR 19 .................................................................................. A.136 Panetta (1997) 26 MVR 332 ................................................................................... F.47 Pangilinan [2001] 1 Qd R 56 ................................................................................. Q.33 Panozzo [2007] VSCA 245 .................................................................................... Q.54 Pantoja (1996) 88 A Crim R 554 ................................................................. A.67, A.69 Pantoja [1998] NSWSC 565 .................................................................................... F.19 Papamitrou [2004] VSCA 12 ............................................................................... A.138 Papoulias [1988] VR 858 ....................................................................... 130.58, 130.59 Park [1999] NSWSC 921 ............................................................................ 22.4, 39X.1 Parker (1783) 3 Doug 242; 99 ER 364 ................................................................ 100.1 Parker (1990) 19 NSWLR 177 .................................................................... Q.61, Q.63 Parker [2006] QSC 109 .......................................................................................... A.70 Parker [2011] QCA 198 ...................................................................................... 132C.1 Parkes (2003) 147 A Crim R 450; [2003] NSWCCA 12 ........................... 101.5, F.19 Parkinson [1965] QWN 31 .................................................................................. 130.57 Parkinson [1990] 1 Qd R 382 ............................................................................... 101.5 Parsons [1998] 1 VR 471 ...................................................................................... 21.18 Patel (No 5) [2013] QSC 63 ................................................................................... 6.25 Patel (No 6) [2013] QSC 64 ................................................................................... 9C.5 Patterson [1962] 2 QB 429; 1 All ER 340 ............................................................ Q.35 Pattison and Exley [1996] 1 Cr App R 51 ............................................................ A.78 Paul [1920] 2 KB 183 ............................................................................................. 15.3 Peacock (1870) 12 Cox CC 21 ............................................................................... 23.4 Pearce (1979) 69 Cr App R 365 ............................................................................ Q.45 Pearce [1992] QCA 168 ......................................................................................... A.79 Pearcey (1985) 63 ACTR 12 .................................................... 130.45, 130.48, 130.51 Pearson [1964] Qd R 471 .......................................................................... 19.17, 101.1 Pearson [2015] QCA 157 .................................................................................... 132B.3 Peirce [1992] 1 VR 273 ........................................................................... 130.4, 130.12 Penney [1944] 3 DLR 453 .................................................................................... 15.23 Percerep (1993) 65 A Crim R 419; [1993] 2 VR 109 .......................................... A.69 Perera [1986] 1 Qd R 211 ...................................................................................... Q.79 Perera [1986] 2 Qd R 431 .............................................................. 101.2, 101.3, 102.1 Perks [1973] Crim LR 388 ...................................................................................... 6.19 Perrier, Pop & Tilley [2008] VSCA 97 .................................................................. Q.43 Perrier (No 1) [1991] 1 VR 697 ................................................................ 15.37, 15.59 Perry (1982) 150 CLR 580 ...................................................................................... F.51 Perry (No 2) (1981) 28 SASR 95 ........................................................................ A.148 Perry (No 3) (1981) 28 SASR 112 ......................................................................... 93.9 Petroulias (No 8) (2007) 175 A Crim R 417; [2007] NSWSC 82 .................... 130.46 Pettigrew (1980) 71 Cr App R 39 ............................................................... 92.25, 95.6 Pfennig (1995) 182 CLR 461 ............................................................................... A.138 Pfennig (No 1) (1992) 57 SASR 507 ....................................................... 130.56, A.70 Phair [1986] 1 Qd R 136 .............................................................................. A.4, 19.15 Phillips [1997] ACL Rep 130 Qld 285 .......................................... 15.37, 15.60, 15.64 Phillips (unreported, Qld CA, 21 July 1997) ............................................ 15.60, 15.65 Phuong Canh Ngo (2001) 122 A Crim R 467 ........................................................ F.42 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v

Pilley (1922) 16 Cr App R 138 ........................................................................... 130.29 Playford [2013] 2 Qd R 567; [2013] QCA 109 ................................................... 130.3 Plevac (1995) 84 A Crim R 570 ............................................................................ Q.53 Plotzki [1972] Qd R 379 ...................................................... 130.57, Q.59, Q.68, Q.69 Polkinghorne (1999) 108 A Crim R 189 .................................................... 93B.3, F.42 Post [1982] Qd R 495 ............................................................................................. 15.7 Powell [2014] SASCFC 48 .................................................................................. A.101 Power (1996) 87 A Crim R 407 ........................................................................... A.117 Powers (2000) 113 A Crim R 51 ........................................................................... A.78 Prager [1972] 1 WLR 260 ...................................................................................... Q.60 Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161 .............................................................................. 93A.20 Pratt (1965) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 358 ................................................................. Q.82 Preston [1909] 1 KB 568 .................................................................. 15.1, 15.42, 15.54 Preston (2013) 116 SASR 522; [2013] SASCFC 69 ............................................ A.79 Pretorius [2009] QCA 58 ...................................................................................... A.136 Previte [2005] QCA 95 .................................................................................. 59.1, 59.5 Price (unreported, Qld CCA, 19 April 1984) ..................................................... 130.60 Priest (2011) 246 FLR 341; [2011] ACTSC 18 ................................................. 130.59 Priestley (1967) 51 Cr App R 1 .......................................................................... 130.67 Pritchard [1991] 1 VR 84 .................................................................................... 130.28 Pryor [2007] QCA 232 ....................................................................................... 132B.3 Pryor; Ex parte Attorney-General [2001] QCA 241 ............................................ A.140 Punj (2002) A Crim R 595 ................................................................................... A.105 Q [2003] QCA 421 ................................................................................................. Q.77 QVT (2002) 131 A Crim R 264 ................................................................... A.69, A.79 Quaile [1988] 2 Qd R 103 ................................................................................... A.129 R (1993) 32 NSWLR 447 ..................................................................................... 15.14 R [1996] 2 Qd R 49 ........................................................................................... 93A.18 R [2003] 2 Qd R 544 ................................................................................... A.69, Q.24 RAI [2011] QCA 64 ............................................................................................. 21A.2 RH [2005] 1 Qd R 180; [2004] QCA 225 ........................................................... A.154 RW (2008) 18 VR 666; [2008] VSCA 79 ........................................................... A.154 Raabe [1985] 1 Qd R 115 ...................................................................................... A.61 Radbourne (1787) 1 Leach 457 ............................................................................... 23.2 Rae [2006] QCA 207 ........................................................................................... 130.12 Rae (2008) 191 A Crim R 279; [2008] QCA 385 ............................................... A.136 Ragen (1964) 81 WN Pt 1 (NSW) 572 .............................................................. 130.32 Rajakaruna (2004) 146 A Crim R 238; [2004] VSCA 114 ................................. A.138 Ransom (1979) 22 SASR 283 ............................................................................... 15.72 Rawton (1865) Le & Ca 520; 169 ER 1497 ....................................................... A.134 Ray (2003) 57 NSWLR 616; [2003] NSWCCA 227 ............................................ Q.54 Raye (2003) 138 A Crim R 355; [2003] QCA 98 ............................................... A.136 Razzak [2004] NSWCCA 62 .................................................................................. A.79 Reading (1679) 7 How St Tr 259 .......................................................................... A.17 Redd [1923] 1 KB 104 .......................................................................................... 15.38 Reed [2014] QCA 207 ........................................................................................ 132B.1 Reeves (1992) 29 NSWLR 109 ........................................................................... A.105 Regazzoli [1995] 2 Qd R 422 ................................................................................ Q.88 Reid [1989] Crim LR 719 ..................................................................................... 15.74 Reid [1999] 2 VR 605; (1999) 15 FLR 26; [1999] VSCA 98 ..................... 22.4, F.85 Reiken [2006] QCA 178 ......................................................................................... A.79 Reno (1987) 9 QL Reps 1 ....................................................................................... 21.3 Reynolds [1950] 1 KB 606 ............................................................................. 6.5, 9C.6 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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v Rhodes (1999) 104 A Crim R 572; [1999] QCA 55 ........................................... Q.107 v Rice [1963] 1 QB 857 .................................................................................. 15.23, 93.8 v Rice [1996] 2 VR 406 ............................................................................................ Q.54 v Richards [1943] QWN 47 ....................................................................................... 23.4 v Richardson [1969] 1 QB 299 ................................................................................. A.96 v Richardson [1971] 2 QB 484 ........................................................... A.84, 19.22, 101.9 v Richardson [1989] 1 Qd R 583 ............................................................................. 21.15 v Richens (1994) 98 Cr App R 43 ............................................................................ Q.54 v Rickard (1918) 13 Cr App R 140 ........................................................................... 59.3 v Rigney (1988) 48 SASR 72 ..................................................................................... Q.5 v Rigney-Hopkins (2005) 154 A Crim R 433; [2005] QCA 275 .................. Q.17, Q.18 v Riley (1887) 18 QBD 481 ..................................................................................... 21.10 v Riley [1908] QSR 141 ................................................................. 130.14, 130.27, Q.70 v Rima (2003) 145 A Crim R 27; [2003] NSWCCA 405 .......................... A.79, 130.64 v Roach (2009) 213 A Crim R 485; [2009] QCA 360 ........................................... A.136 v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161 .............................................................................. A.67 v Roberts [1942] 1 All ER 187 .......................................... A.80, 20.3, 92.8, 94.4, 100.1 v Roberts (2004) 9 VR 295; [2004] VSCA 1 .................................... 10.19, 10.26, Q.56 v Robertson (1978) 17 SASR 479 ........................................................................... 21.13 v Robertson [2015] QCA 11 ........................................................................ 93B.1, 93B.3 v Robertson; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 262 ................................ A.154 v Robinson [1977] Qd R 387 ........................................................................... 21.3, A.92 v Robinson (1994) 98 Cr App R 370 ........................................................................ 9C.6 v Robinson (1995) 80 A Crim R 358 .................................................................... 93A.18 v Robinson (1996) 129 FLR 409; 89 A Crim R 42 .............................................. 130.18 v Robinson (1998) 102 A Crim R 89; [1998] QCA 50 .................................. 8.4, Q.107 v Robinson (1999) 197 CLR 162 ............................................................................ Q.107 v Robinson (2000) 111 A Crim R 388 ..................................................................... 15.59 v Robinson [2001] Crim LR 478 ............................................................................. 15.38 v Robinson [2003] NSWCCA 188 ......................................................................... 130.12 v Robinson (2009) 233 FLR 443; [2009] QCA 250 ............................................... 15.12 v Robson [1972] 1 WLR 651 ............................................................................ 3.11, 3.21 v Rogaloff (unreported, Qld Dist Ct, McLauchlan DCJ, 21 January 1990) ...................................................................................................................... 93A.10 v Rogan and Elliott (1846) 1 Cox CC 291 .............................................................. 15.34 v Rogers [1995] 1 Cr App R 374 ............................................................................ A.151 v Roissetter [1984] 1 Qd R 477 .............................................................................. A.117 v Rolton (1910) 29 NZLR 272 ................................................................................... 18.9 v Ronan (No 1) (2004) 211 FLR 258; [2004] NSWSC 1283 ................................ 10.16 v Ronan (No 4) (2004) 211 FLR 297; [2004] NSWSC 1290 ................................... F.61 v Ronen [2004] NSWSC 1298 ................................................................................... F.19 v Rooke [1997] ACL Rep 130 NSW 281 .................................................................. F.49 v Rose [1977] Qd R 280 ............................................................................... 19.17, 101.5 v Rose (2002) 55 NSWLR 701 ................................................................................. Q.52 v Ross [2007] QCA 244 ........................................................................................ 132A.2 v Ross [2013] QCA 87 .......................................................................................... 132A.1 v Rosser (1836) 7 C & P 648 .................................................................................... A.20 v Rothery (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 451 ......................................................... A.102, 130.34 v Rothman [1981] 1 RCS 640 ................................................................................ 130.56 v Roughan [2009] QCA 21 ........................................................................................ Q.46 v Roughan and Jones (2007) 179 A Crim R 389; [2007] QCA 443 ...................... 130.4 v Rouse [1904] 1 KB 184 ........................................................................................ 15.53 v Rowe (1998) 71 SASR 389 ................................................................................. 130.60 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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v Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520; 169 ER 1497 ...................... 15.29, 15.34, 15.35, 15.36 v Rudd (2009) 23 VR 444; [2009] VSCA 213 .................................. A.143, Q.45, Q.54 v Runjanjic and Kontinnen (1991) 56 SASR 114; 53 A Crim R 362 ........... A.67, 9C.4 v Russell (No 2) [1965] Qd R 334 .......................................................................... 15.26 v Rutledge; Ex parte Laidlaw [1923] QSR 284 ...................................................... 10.18 v Ryan [2002] VSCA 176 .......................................................................................... A.69 v S (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 460 ................................................................................... Q.71 v S [1995] 1 Qd R 558 ................................................................................................. 8.6 v S (2000) 113 A Crim R 429; [2000] QCA 256 ............................. 15.14, 15.16, 15.47 v S (2000) 78 SASR 33 ........................................................................................... 21A.1 v SAP; Ex parte Attorney-General (2005) 155 A Crim R 291; [2005] QCA 284 ................................................................................................................. A.103 v SAW [2006] QCA 378 ...................................................................................... 21AW.2 v SCB [2013] QCA 276 ....................................................................................... 21AW.2 v SCD [2013] QCA 352 .................................................................................. A.80, Q.45 v SCJ; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2015] QCA 123 .............. 9A.1, 93A.1, 93B.3 v SWC (2007) 175 A Crim R 71; [2007] VSCA 201 .................................... A.66, A.95 v Saad (2005) 156 A Crim R 533; [2005] VSCA 249 ........................................... A.106 v Sadler (2008) 20 VR 69; [2008] VSCA 198 ....................................................... A.106 v Sailor [1994] 2 Qd R 342 ..................................................................................... A.154 v Sainsbury [1993] 1 Qd R 305 ................................................................................ A.78 v Sakail [1993] 1 Qd R 312 .......................................................... A.116, A.136, 132B.2 v Salameh (1985) 4 NSWLR 369 .............................................................................. F.33 v Salem (1997) 96 A Crim R 421 ....................................................................... F.4, F.66 v Salmon [2003] QCA 17 ............................................................................. 15.74, 15A.1 v Sams (1990) 46 A Crim R 468 .................................................................. 19.17, 130.4 v Samuel (1956) 40 Cr App R 8 ................................................................... 15.37, 15.69 v Sang [1980] AC 402 ............................................................................... 130.42, 130.58 v Sanghera [1983] 2 VR 130 ....................................................................................... 3.9 v Saraya (1993) 70 A Crim R 515 .............................................................................. Q.6 v Sarbandi (2012) 229 A Crim R 39; [2012] ACTSC 180 ....................................... F.42 v Saric [1982] Qd R 360 ............................................................................... 15.17, 15.72 v Saub [2007] QCA 194 ........................................................................................... 15.12 v Saunders [1965] Qd R 409 ................................................................................... A.154 v Saunders [1983] 2 Qd R 270 ............................................................................... A.102 v Savage [1970] Tas SR 137 ................................................................................... A.151 v Saxon [1998] 1 VR 503 ......................................................................................... A.79 v Schafferius [1977] Qd R 213 .................................................................................. 9C.5 v Schlaefer (1992) 57 SASR 423; (1992) 61 A Crim R 1 ................. 6.2, 6.4, 9.1, 9A.4 v Schneider [2001] 1 Qd R 546; [1998] QCA 303 ...................................... A.96, A.154 v Schuller [1972] QWN 41 ............................................................................. 15.4, 15.25 v Schultz (unreported, Qld CCA, 19 April 1991) ........................................ 17.16, 101.3 v Schuurs [1990] QSC 176 ......................................................................................... 23.1 v Scott [1989] 1 Qd R 347 ........................................................................................ 9D.3 v Scott (2000) 112 A Crim R 543 ........................................................................... A.121 v Scott; Ex parte Attorney-General [1993] 1 Qd R 537 ............................. 130.34, Q.81 v Scouller (1995) 119 FLR 310; 76 A Crim R 487 ................................................. Q.90 v Seham Yousry (1914) 11 Cr App R 13 ................................................................. 19.20 v Seifert (1955) 73 WN (NSW) 358 .......................................................................... 84.3 v Self [2001] QCA 338 ............................................................................................ A.136 v Semyraha [2001] 2 Qd R 208; [2000] QCA 303 ............................... 15.7, 15.9, Q.77 v Sergi [1998] 1 Qd R 536 ........................................................................................ A.65 v Serratore (1999) 48 NSWLR 101 ......................................................................... 93B.3 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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v Shannon (1987) 47 SASR 347; 29 A Crim R 434 ................................... A.79, 130.74 v Sharkey [2013] QCA 259 ......................................................................................... A.4 v Shaw [1996] 1 Qd R 641; [1995] QCA 45 ................................................. A.81, Q.52 v Shea (1978) 18 SASR 591 .................................................................................... 19.22 v Sheehy [2003] 1 Qd R 418; [2003] QCA 420 ........................................ 129A.1, Q.78 v Shepherd (1980) 71 Cr App R 120 ............................................. A.138, A.211, 15.23, v Shepherd [2001] 1 NZLR 161 ............................................................................... A.92 v Sheppard [2010] QCA 342 ..................................................................................... Q.54 v Shield (1866) 5 SCR (NSW) 213 ........................................................................... 84.5 v Shiers (2003) 7 VR 174; [2003] VSCA 179 ......................................................... Q.54 v Shoesmith [2011] QCA 352 ................................................................................ 132B.1 v Shum (1968) 62 QJPR 35 ..................................................................................... 101.7 v Sieben (1987) 56 CR (3d) 225 .............................................................. 130.41, 130.52 v Siedofsky [1989] 1 Qd R 655 ............................................... 17.7, 17.10, 101.5, 102.1 v Silverlock [1894] 2 QB 766 .......................................................................... 9C.3, 59.5 v Simmonds (1967) 51 Cr App R 316 ...................................................................... A.84 v Simmons [2015] QCA 194 ................................................................................... A.127 v Simpson [2008] QCA 77 ...................................................................................... Q.107 v Sinanovic (1992) 67 A Crim R 230 ........................................................................ 23.1 v Sing; Ex parte Harrison (1979) 36 FLR 322 ......................................................... Q.20 v Singh (1977) 15 SASR 591 ............................................................... A.84, 101.9, F.14 v Singh-Bal (1997) 92 A Crim R 397 ........................................................................ F.34 v Singleton [1986] 2 Qd R 535 ....................................................................... A.4, A.100 v Sitek [1988] 2 Qd R 284 ................................................... 3.11, 3.12, 3.21, 93.3, Q.55 v Skaf (2004) 60 NSWLR 86; [2004] NSWCCA 37 ........................... A.60, A.79, 9D.3 v Skaf [2004] NSWCCA 74 ..................................................................................... 15.37 v Slack (2003) 139 A Crim R 314; [2003] NSWCCA 93 ........................................ 15.5 v Small Claims Tribunal; Ex parte Gibson [1973] Qd R 490 ................................ 83.13 v Smart [1983] 1 VR 265 ............................................................................... 83.15, 93.8 v Smellie (1919) 14 Cr App R 128 ......................................................................... 21A.3 v Smith [1908] St R Qd 83 .......................................................................................... 6.6 v Smith (1915) 11 Cr App R 229 ............................................................................ 15.20 v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35; (1959) 43 Cr App R 121 ....................................... Q.58, Q.59 v Smith [1984] 1 NSWLR 462 ................................................................................. A.77 v Smith [1984] 2 Qd R 69 ......................................................................................... Q.79 v Smith [1987] VR 907 ................................................................................... A.67, 9C.4 v Smith (1992) 58 SASR 491 ................................................................................... Q.63 v Smith (1994) 63 SASR 123; 75 A Crim R 327 ................................................. 130.18 v Smith (2003) 138 A Crim R 172; [2003] QCA 76 ............................................... Q.56 v Smith (2008) 190 A Crim R 8; [2008] NSWCCA 247 ....................................... A.137 v Smith [2015] 2 Qd R 452; [2014] QCA 277 ......................................................... 99.1 v Smith [2016] QCA 9 ........................................................................................... 132C.4 v Smith (Robert William), The Times (London) 20 May 1985 ................................ 10.6 v Smith and Hollis (1776) 20 How St Tr 1225 ........................................................ A.20 v Socialist Worker Printers and Publishers Ltd; Ex parte Attorney General [1975] QB 637 .............................................................................................. Q.3 v Soffy [2008] QCA 129 ........................................................................................ 132C.2 v Soloman [2006] QCA 244 ............................................................... 15.35, 15.67, Q.54 v Solomon (2005) 92 SASR 331; [2005] SASC 265 ............................................... A.77 v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299 ........................................................................ 17.16, 18.11 v Sood [2007] NSWCCA 214 .................................................................................. 130.4 v Sopher (1992) 74 A Crim R 21 .............................................................................. A.69 v Sotheren (2001) 122 A Crim R 301 ..................................................................... A.126 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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v Souleyman (1996) 40 NSWLR 712 ........................................................................ F.19 v South London Coroner; Ex parte Thompson (1982) 126 SJ 625 ............................ 3.5 v Sparkes (1996) 6 Tas R 178 ................................................................................ 130.11 v Spero (2006) 161 A Crim R 13; [2006] VSCA 58 ............................................... A.78 v Spiteri (2004) 61 NSWLR 369; [2004] NSWCCA 321 ......................... A.103, A.136 v Spizzirri (2000) 117 A Crim R 101 ............................................................ A.65, 15.62 v Spooner [1957] VR 540 ......................................................................................... A.76 v Stafford (1976) 13 SASR 392 ....................................................... A.110, 130.51, Q.77 v Stalder [1981] 2 NSWLR 9 ................................................................................... 15.68 v Stannard (1837) 7 C & P 673; 173 ER 295 ......................................................... 15.35 v Stannard [1965] 2 QB 1 ........................................................................................ 15.73 v Starecki [1960] VR 141 ....................................................................................... 130.34 v Starkey [1988] 2 Qd R 294 ............................................................ 21.10, 21.14, 21.17 v Stead (1992) 62 A Crim R 40 .................................................. 130.12, 130.41, 130.45 v Steffan (1993) 30 NSWLR 633 ........................................................................... 130.58 v Stephens [1999] 3 NZLR 81 ................................................................................... 59.2 v Stephenson (1862) Le & Ca 165; 169 ER 1347 ........................................... 22.9, 23.4 v Stephenson [1976] VR 376 .............................................................. A.130, 92.18, F.31 v Stephenson (1978) 18 SASR 381 ................................................................ 99.1, 133.3 v Stevenson (2000) 23 WAR 92; 118 A Crim R 20 ................................................. 9A.2 v Stewart; Ex parte Attorney General [1989] 1 Qd R 590 ............... A.102, 9D.3, 101.5 v Stewart [2014] QCA 244 ........................................................................................ A.71 v Stipendiary Magistrate at Southport; Ex parte Gibson [1993] 2 Qd R 687 ......................................................................................................... 21B.1, Q.3, Q.94 v Stockdale (2004) 142 A Crim R 448; [2004] NSWCCA 1 ............................... 130.61 v Stojovic [2004] VSCA 84 ..................................................................................... A.130 v Stone (2005) 157 A Crim R 41; [2005] NSWCCA 344 ..................................... A.211 v Storey (1968) 52 Cr App R 334 ............................................................................. Q.45 v Storey (1978) 140 CLR 364 ..................................................................... A.212, 15.16 v Storey [1998] 1 VR 359 ..................................................................................... 132C.3 v Story (2004) 144 A Crim R 370; [2004] SASC 32 ............................................... A.79 v Stott (2000) 116 A Crim R 15 ................................................................................ A.79 v Stoupas (1997) 94 A Crim R 525 ........................................................................ A.154 v Straffen [1952] 2 QB 911 .......................................................................... 15.20, 130.8 v Strawhorn [2004] VSC 415 .................................................................................. 21B.1 v Stretton and McCallion (1988) 86 Cr App R 7 ................................................. 93A.13 v Stuart [1974] Qd R 297 ............................................................................................ Q.5 v Su (2003) 7 VR 13; [2003] VSC 305 ................................................................. 130.34 v Sullivan [1923] 1 KB 47 ......................................................................................... 6.19 v Sullivan [1970] Tas SR 284 .................................................................................. 59.10 v Sullivan and Robertson [1939] QSR 285 ............................................................. 130.7 v Summers (1986) 2 A Crim R 47 ............................................................................ A.91 v Summers [1990] 1 Qd R 92 ................................................................................. A.105 v Susec [2013] QCA 77 ......................................................................................... 132B.3 v Suteski (2002) 56 NSWLR 182 ................................................................. A.42, 93B.3 v Sutton [1986] 2 Qd R 72 ............................................................. 9D.3, 21A.5, 93A.20 v Sutton (1986) 5 NSWLR 697 ................................................................................. Q.54 v Sutton (No 2) [2015] QSC 289 ................................................................................ Q.2 v Swaffield; Pavic v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 159 ............... 130.3, 130.14, 130.57, 130.59, 130.60, Q.59 v Sweet-Escott (1971) 55 Cr App R 316 ......................................................... 16.3, 20.5 v Swift (1999) 105 A Crim R 279 ......................................................................... 130.59 v Symonds [2002] 2 Qd R 70; [2001] QCA 199 ......................................... 15.52, 15.60 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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v v v v v v v v v v v

Szach (1980) 23 SASR 504 ................................................................................. A.100 T [1993] 1 Qd R 454 ............................................................................. 93A.3, 93A.13 T (1998) 71 SASR 265 ............................................................................................. 6.2 T (1999) 74 SASR 486 ......................................................................................... A.154 T (unreported, Qld CA, 1 August 1997) ............................................................. 130.59 T, WA (2014) 118 SASR 382; [2014] SASCFC 3 ................................... 19.21, 19.22 T; Ex parte Attorney-General [1999] 2 Qd R 424 ................................ 130.34, 130.59 TAB [2002] NSWCCA 274 ...................................................................... A.136, 101.7 TAC [2013] QCA 283 ....................................................................................... 21AW.2 TJW [1989] 1 Qd R 108 ................................................................................ 74.5, 93.9 TN (2005) 153 A Crim R 129; [2005] QCA 160 ............ A.41, A.106, A.134, A.136, A.154 v TQ (2007) 173 A Crim R 385; [2007] QCA 255 ................................................ 21A.5 v TR (2004) 180 FLR 424; [2004] ACTSC 10 ..................................................... 130.10 v Tait [1991] 2 NZLR 667 ........................................................................................ A.68 v Tamme [2005] VSC 103 ......................................................................................... Q.46 v Tang (1997) 96 A Crim R 550; 141 FLR 338 .......................................... 130.77, F.72 v Tang [2003] NSWCCA 357 .................................................................................. A.120 v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; 161 A Crim R 377; [2006] NSWCCA 167 ......................................................................................................... A.67, A.69, A.79 v Taouk (2005) 154 A Crim R 69; [2005] NSWCCA 155 .......................... A.105, Q.56 v Tarantino (1993) 67 A Crim R 31 .......................................................................... Q.56 v Tawill [1974] VR 84 ................................................................................................ F.75 v Taylor (1892) 18 VLR 497 ...................................................................................... 20.5 v Taylor [1996] QCA 117 .......................................................................... 93A.2, 93A.13 v Taylor [2001] 2 Qd R 23; [2000] QCA 96 .............................................. A.105, 21.20 v Taylor [2003] NSWCCA 194 .................................................................................. F.19 v Taylor (2004) 8 VR 213; [2004] VSCA 98 ............................................. A.117, A.136 v Taylor (Gary) [1994] TLR 484 ................................................................................. Q.3 v Telfer (2004) 142 A Crim R 132; [2004] NSWCCA 27 .......................... A.135, 15.35 v Terry (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Connolly J, 9 January 1984) ..................... 9A.2, 93.9 v The Inhabitants of All Saints Worcester (1817) 7 M & S 194; 105 ER 1215 .......................................................................................................................... 10.15 v Theophanous (2003) 141 A Crim R 216; [2003] VSCA 78 .................... 130.45, Q.18 v Thomas (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 77 .......................................................................... 15.2 v Thomas [1970] VR 674 ................................................................................. 10.3, Q.52 v Thomas (1988) 40 A Crim R 89 ............................................................................... 8.4 v Thomas (1992) 9 CRNZ 113 .................................................................... 93A.25, 99.1 v Thomas (2006) 14 VR 475; [2006] VSCA 165 .............................. 15.42, 15.52, Q.71 v Thomas [2006] VSCA 167 .................................................................................... 15.59 v Thomas (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Connolly J, 9 October 1989) .......... 93A.3, 93A.18 v Thompson [1893] 2 QB 12 ................................................................ Q.55, Q.58, Q.71 v Thompson (1966) 50 Cr App R 91 ....................................................................... 15.38 v Thompson [1966] QWN 47 ................................................................................... 15.35 v Thompson (1992) 58 A Crim R 451 ................................................................... 130.61 v Thompson [1995] 3 NZLR 423 ........................................................ 18.5, 19.11, 19.18 v Thompson (2008) 21 VR 135; [2008] VSCA 144 ................................................ A.94 v Thomson [1912] 3 KB 19 ...................................................................................... A.91 v Thornley [1998] VR 888 ....................................................................................... 101.2 v Thrower [1934] VLR 292 ........................................................................................ 23.2 v Thurlow [2015] QCA 89 ......................................................................................... 10.3 v Thynne [1977] VR 98 .................................................................................. 17.8, 17.15 v Tichowitsch [2007] 2 Qd R 262 ............................................................................. 99.1 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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Tilev (1983) 33 SASR 344 .................................................................................. 130.53 Tillett; Ex parte Newton (1969) 14 FLR 101 .............................................. Q.18, Q.20 Tilley (1961) 45 Cr App R 360 ............................................................................... 59.3 Tilley [1985] VR 505 ............................................................................................. Q.84 Tirado (1974) 59 Cr App R 80 ............................................................................. 83.14 To (2006) 96 SASR 1; [2006] SASC 126 .......................................................... 130.17 Tofilau (2003) 149 A Crim R 446; [2003] VSC 188 ........... 130.60, Q.62, Q.67, Q.71 Tofilau (No 2) (2006) 160 A Crim R 549; [2006] VSCA 40 .................. 130.60, Q.71 Tolson (1864) 176 ER 488 ...................................................................................... 3.20 Tomes [1917] VLR 78 ............................................................................................. 74.6 Tompkins (1977) 67 Cr App R 181 ..................................................................... A.180 Toner [1966] QWN 44 ................................................................................. 10.23, 15.7 Topalidis [1999] QCA 376 ........................................................................ A.105, 21.20 Tracey (No 5) (2005) 93 SASR 101; [2005] SASC 359 ................................... 130.18 Tran [2000] 2 Qd R 430 ......................................................................................... A.78 Treacy (1944) 30 Cr App R 93 .............................................................................. Q.80 Tribe [2001] QCA 206 ............................................................................................. 21.5 Trimboli (1979) 21 SASR 577 .................................................................. A.135, 15.67 Tripodi [1961] VR 186 ........................................................................................... Q.54 Truong (1999) 105 A Crim R 345 ........................................................................... A.2 Truong [2007] NTSC 20 ......................................................................................... A.70 Turnbull [1958] Tas SR 80 ................................................................................... A.159 Turnbull [1977] QB 224 ......................................................................................... A.78 Turnbull (1985) 17 A Crim R 370 ........................................................................ 15.44 Turner (1816) 5 M & S 206; 105 ER 1026 ........................................................... Q.33 Turner [1944] KB 463 ........................................................................................... 15.56 Turner (1975) 61 Cr App R 67 ............................................................................. 130.5 Turner [1975] QB 834 .......................................... A.67, A.74, 9C.4, 9C.6, 92.8, Q.84 Tyler [1994] 1 Qd R 675 ................................................................................ A.79, 8.4 UA [2007] QCA 41 ........................................................................................... 21AK.3 UB (2007) 178 A Crim R 450; [2007] QCA 374 ............................................... A.136 Ugolini (1989) 51 SASR 303 ............................................................................... A.119 Uittenbosch [2013] QCA 96 ................................................................................. 93B.3 Ul-Haque [2007] NSWSC 1251 ............................................................................. Q.58 Umanski [1961] VR 242 .................................................. A.96, A.97, 6.26, 17.9, 94.5 Ung (2000) 112 A Crim R 344 ............................................................................ A.145 United Kingdom Electric Telegraph Company (1862) 176 ER 33 ........................ 3.20 Upchurch (1836) 1 Mood CC 465; 168 ER 1346 ................................................. Q.71 Upton (2007) 209 FLR 487; [2007] ACTSC 21 ................................................ 130.59 V (1998) 100 A Crim R 488 ...................................................................... A.99, A.103 Van Beelen (1972) 4 SASR 353 .................................................................... 59.5, 59.6 Van Beelen (1972) 6 SASR 534 ........................................................................... 101.9 Van Dyk [2000] NSWCCA 67 ................................................................................ F.47 Varley [1982] 2 All ER 519 ....................................................................... 15.72, 15.73 Vaughan (1997) 98 A Crim R 239 .......................................................................... F.13 Vaughan [2011] QCA 224 ......................................................................................... 5.2 Vella (2006) 167 A Crim R 66; [2006] VSCA 248 ............................................ 101.10 Veneman [1970] SASR 506 ...................................................... 130.58, 130.60, 130.61 Venn-Brown [1991] 1 Qd R 458 .............................................. 130.46, 130.58, 130.61 Verma (1987) 30 A Crim R 441 ............................................................................... A.4 Versac (2013) 227 A Crim R 569; [2013] QSC 46 ............................................ 130.46 Vickery [1996] 1 Qd R 334 .................................................................................... Q.88 Vidic (1986) 43 SASR 176 .................................................................................. A.127 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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v Viers [1983] 2 Qd R 1 ............................................................................ A.214, 130.41 v Vincent (2002) 133 A Crim R 206 ............................................................. 93B.3, Q.54 v Vinh Chi Pham [2000] QSC 274 ........................................................................ 130.76 v Viola [1982] 1 WLR 1138 ......................................................................... 21.13, 21.18 v Virgo (1978) 67 Cr App R 323 .............................................................................. A.86 v Voisin [1918] 1 KB 531 .......................................................................................... 59.4 v Von Einem (No 2) (1991) 52 A Crim R 402 ....................................................... A.140 v Vonarx (unreported, Vic Sup Ct CA, 15 November 1995) ................................. A.136 v Vuckov (1986) 40 SASR 498 ................................................................ 130.41, 130.59 v W [1988] 2 Qd R 308 .................................................................. 130.34, 130.48, Q.61 v W (John) [1998] 2 Cr App R 289 ........................................................................ A.137 v WAH [2009] QCA 263 ....................................................................................... 21AJ.2 v WAT [2013] QCA 251 ....................................................................................... 21AW.2 v WAU [2013] QCA 265 ........................................................................................... 9B.2 v WB (2009) 23 VR 319; [2009] VSCA 173 .............................................. A.64, 130.11 v WJT [2001] NSWCCA 405 .................................................................................. A.136 v WR [2010] ACTSC 89 ........................................................................................... A.96 v WRC (2002) 130 A Crim R 89 .................................................... A.117, A.139, A.154 v Wackerow [1998] 1 Qd R 197 ............................................................................. A.136 v Wadey (1935) 25 Cr App R 104 ................................................................ 15.14, 15.47 v Wait [2011] SASCFC 91 ...................................................................................... A.102 v Wakeley [1994] 2 Qd R 196 ............................................................. 101.6, Q.56, Q.83 v Walbank [1996] 1 Qd R 78; (1995) 79 A Crim R 180 ......................................... Q.72 v Waldman (1934) 24 Cr App R 204 ....................................................................... 15.34 v Walker (1993) 61 SASR 260 ....................................................................... 19.4, 19.11 v Walton and Harman [2001] QCA 309 ................................................................... Q.54 v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228 ................................................................................................... A.3, 3.5, 130.4 v Warasta (1991) 54 A Crim R 351 ......................................................................... 15.35 v Ward [1963] Qd R 56 ............................................................ A.97, A.136, 6.26, 15.12 v Ward (1981) 3 A Crim R 171 .................................................................... A.65, A.191 v Ward (1984) 15 A Crim R 275 ............................................................................... 18.5 v Wardle [2011] QCA 339 ........................................................................................ 101.2 v Waring (No 2) [1972] Qd R 263 .............................................................................. A.4 v Warman (2006) 94 SASR 521; [2006] SASC 151 .............................................. A.154 v Warner (1988) 48 SASR 79 ................................................................................... Q.59 v Warner [1996] 1 Qd R 573 .................................................................................. A.154 v Warradoo [2014] QCA 299 ..................................................................... 93C.1, 132B.1 v Warrell [1993] 1 VR 671 ....................................................................................... 21.15 v Warren [1971] SASR 316 ...................................................................................... 15.53 v Warren [1982] 2 NSWLR 360 .............................................................................. A.110 v Warsap (2010) 106 SASR 264; [2010] SASC 40 ............................................... Q.107 v Warwickshall (1783) 1 Leach 298; 168 ER 234 ................................................... Q.81 v Waters (2002) 129 A Crim R 115 ....................................................................... 130.24 v Watkins (2005) 153 A Crim R 434; [2005] NSWCCA 164 ............................... A.140 v Watson (1817) 2 Stark 116; 171 ER 591 ........................................... 10.26, 16.1, 16.6 v Watson [1987] 1 Qd R 440 .......................................................................... A.67, 9C.3 v Watson [2002] QCA 145 ...................................................................................... 21A.2 v Watts (1863) Le & Ca 339; 169 ER 1422 .............................................................. 23.3 v Watts [1983] 3 All ER 101 ............................................................. 15.65, 15.66, 15.68 v Watts [1992] 1 Qd R 214 ........................................................................................ 3.21 v Weatherall (1981) 27 SASR 238 ............................................................................. 95.7 v Weatherstone (1968) 12 FLR 14 .......................................................................... A.155 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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Table of Cases

R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R

v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v

Webb (1992) 59 SASR 563 ................................................................................... 15.27 Webster [1996] QCA 246 ............................................................ 93A.3, 93A.23, 102.1 Weeder (1980) 71 Cr App R 228 ........................................................................... A.78 Wehlow (2001) 122 A Crim R 63 .......................................................................... Q.45 Weininger (2000) 159 FLR 238 ............................................................... A.105, A.107 Weir [1973] Qd R 496 ......................................................................................... 130.54 Weir [2006] 1 Cr App R 19 ................................................................................. A.137 Weiss (2004) 8 VR 388; [2004] VSCA 73 ......................................................... 130.56 Weisz (2008) 189 A Crim R 93; [2008] QCA 313 .............................................. 17.11 Welden (1977) 16 SASR 421 ........................................................................ A.82, 17.3 Wellings (1878) 3 QBD 426 .......................................................................... 22.9, 23.1 Wells [2013] QCA 289 ...................................................................................... 21AW.2 Welsh [1983] 1 Qd R 592 .................................................................................. 132C.3 Welsh (1996) 90 A Crim R 364 .............................................................................. F.35 Werry [2009] VSCA 94 ........................................................................................ A.136 West (1863) 2 SCR (NSW) (L) 69 ......................................................................... 53.8 West [1964] 1 QB 15 ................................................................................................ 6.2 West [1973] Qd R 338 ......................................................................................... 130.11 West [1992] 1 Qd R 227 ...................................................................................... 21A.2 Western Australia [2006] WASCA 101 .................................................................... A.4 Westfall (1912) 7 Cr App R 176 ........................................................................... 15.61 Westwell [1976] 2 All ER 812 ............................................................................... A.86 Wetherall [1938] QWN 13 .................................................................................... 10.31 Whalley [1985] 1 Qd R 547 ..................................................................................... Q.9 Whiley (1804) 2 Leach 983; 168 ER 589 ............................................................ 15.20 Whitby (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 441 ........................................................................ A.76 White [1969] VR 203 ............................................................................................ 15.60 White (1987) 49 SASR 154 ......................................................................... A.58, 9C.2 White [2005] NSWSC 60 .................................................................................... 130.74 White and Piggin (2003) 7 VR 442 ................................................................ 8.6, Q.72 White; Ex parte Byrnes (1963) 109 CLR 665 .................................. A.113, 3.7, 10.12 Whitehouse (1900) 9 QLJR 325 ............................................................................... 6.2 Whittingham (1988) 49 SASR 67 ........................................................................ A.105 Whyte; Ex parte Byrnes (1963) 109 CLR 665 ..................................................... 39P.1 Wickham (1971) 55 Cr App R 199 .......................................................... A.122, 15.75 Wickson [2007] QCA 104 .................................................................................. 132A.2 Wildy (2011) 111 SASR 189; [2011] SASCFC 131 ............................................. Q.52 Wiles [1982] Crim LR 669 .......................................................................... 92.25, 95.6 Wilkie (2005) 193 FLR 291; [2005] NSWSC 794 ........................ 39A.1, 39Q.1, F.85 Wilkie (2005) 64 NSWLR 125; [2005] NSWCCA 311 ...................................... 39A.1 Wilkinson (No 4) (2009) 195 A Crim R 20; [2009] NSWSC 323 ....................... A.61 Williams (1976) 14 SASR 1 ............................................................................... 130.18 Williams [1983] 2 VR 579; (1983) 9 A Crim R 99 ............................................ A.134 Williams [1987] 2 Qd R 777 ....................................................................... Q.53, Q.54 Williams [1989] 1 Qd R 601 ....................................................................... 9A.2, 9A.4 Williams (1995) 84 A Crim R 370 ........................................................................... Q.8 Williams [1999] QSC 185 .................................................................................... A.163 Williams [2001] 1 Qd R 212 .......................................................... 130.77, Q.45, Q.54 Williams [2001] 2 Qd R 442 ............................................................ 18.5, 101.3, 101.5 Williams [2007] VSC 139 ........................................................................................ Q.2 Williams (2008) 192 A Crim R 218; [2008] QCA 411 ....................................... A.117 Williams (unreported, Qld CCA, 26 April 1991) .................................................. 9A.2 Williamson [1972] 2 NSWLR 281 ............................................................ 93A.5, Q.57 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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Evidence Law in Queensland

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v Willie [1960] Qd R 525 ................................................................................ 9C.8, Q.79 v Willmot; Ex parte Attorney-General [1987] 1 Qd R 53 ................................. Q.1, Q.8 v Wilson [1967] 2 QB 406 ........................................................................................ Q.71 v Wilson [1988] VR 673 .......................................................................................... 83.15 v Wilson [1997] 2 NZLR 161 ................................................................................. A.138 v Wilson [1998] 2 Qd R 599 ................................................................. A.71, 6.25, Q.72 v Wilson (2005) 62 NSWLR 346; [2005] NSWCCA 20 ....................................... A.122 v Wilton [1946] QWN 19 ........................................................................................... 23.4 v Wilton (2013) 116 SASR 392; [2013] SASCFC 60 .............................................. 9D.3 v Winfield (1939) 27 Cr App R 139 ........................................................................ 15.64 v Witham [1962] Qd R 49 ........................................................................................ 130.4 v Witt [2016] VSC 19 .............................................................................................. A.181 v Wogandt (1983) 33 A Crim R 31 .................................................... A.103, Q.35, Q.57 v Woitowicz (2005) 156 A Crim R 237; [2005] NTSC 53 .................................... A.154 v Wong Chi Po [1985] 2 Qd R 285 ........................................................................... F.75 v Wood [1974] VR 117 ............................................................................................ A.102 v Wood (1982) 76 Cr App R 23 ............................................................ 92.25, 95.6, 95.7 v Woodall [1967] QWN 48 .................................................................................... 130.57 v Woodcock (1789) 1 Leach 500; 168 ER 352 ...................................................... A.151 v Woodcock [1963] Crim LR 273 ............................................................................. A.84 v Woods (2008) 102 SASR 422; [2008] SASC 66 ................................................ A.105 v Woolcott Forbes (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 333 ........................................................... 69.3 v Workman (2004) 60 NSWLR 471; [2004] NSWCCA 213 ..................... 130.37, Q.87 v Wright (1985) 19 A Crim R 17 .............................................................................. A.66 v Wright (1990) 49 A Crim R 462 ............................................................... A.154, 18.11 v Wright (1991) 60 A Crim R 215 ............................................................................ A.79 v Wright (2004) 186 FLR 76; [2004] ACTSC 83 ..................................................... F.11 v Wyatt [1990] Crim LR 343 ................................................................................ 93A.13 v X, R v Y and R v Z , The Times (Law Report) 3 November 1989 .................. 21A.2 v Xu (2005) 152 A Crim R 17; [2005] NSWSC 73 ................................................... Q.3 v Y, DB (2006) 94 SASR 489; [2006] SASC 141 ................................................... Q.54 v YL (2004) 187 FLR 84; [2004] ACTSC 115 ....................................... F.11, F.40, F.42 v Yacoob [1981] 72 Cr App R 313 ........................................................... A.4, 8.2, 59.11 v Yanner [1998] 2 Qd R 208 ...................................................................................... 43.1 v York (1748) Fost 70; 168 ER 35 ............................................................................ 10.9 v York [2001] QCA 408 ........................................................................................... 15.14 v Young [1969] Qd R 417 ....................................................................................... A.121 v Zaidi (1991) 57 A Crim R 189 .................................................................. 15.35, 15.38 v Zammit (1999) 107 A Crim R 489 ..................................................................... 130.11 v Zaphir [1978] Qd R 151 ................................................................................ 3.11, 3.21 v Zaveckas (1970) 54 Cr App R 202 ........................................................................ Q.67 v Zerafa [1935] QSR 227 ................................................................................ 9C.8, Q.79 v Zhang (2005) 158 A Crim R 504; [2005] NSWCCA 437 ..................................... F.51 v Zion [1986] VR 609 ......................................................................... 10.27, 10.31, Q.66 v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91 .................................................................................... 8.6 v Zullo [1993] 2 Qd R 572; [1993] QCA 208 ....................................... A.1, A.78, Q.43 v de Angelis (1979) 20 SASR 288 ............................................................................ A.97 (Coke-Wallis) v Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales [2011] 2 AC 146; [2011] UKSC 1 .............................................................. A.211 R (a Solicitor) v Lewis [1987] 2 Qd R 710 ................................ A.194, 10.37, Q.89, Q.92 R W Miller & Co Pty Ltd v Krupp (Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 32 NSWLR 152 .............................................................................................................. Q.43 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

RCI Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 76 ATR 591; [2009] FCA 910 ........................................................................................................ A.88 RH v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 71 .......................................................................... F.51 RMC v Western Australia [2015] WASCA 33 ............................................................ A.154 RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620 ........................................................... A.122, 6.15 RW Miller & Co Pty Ltd v Krupp (Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 32 NSWLR 152 ............................................................................................................................ 19.19 Rabin v Mendoza & Co [1954] 1 WLR 271; 1 All ER 247 ......................... A.197, A.199 Radio Corporation of America v Rauland Corporation [1956] 1 QB 618 ................. 22.13 Radio Ten Pty Ltd v Brisbane TV Ltd [1984] 1 Qd R 113 .......................................... 3.11 Radnedge v Government Insurance Office of NSW (1987) 9 NSWLR 235 ................. A.4 Raftland Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 238 CLR 516 ............................................................................................................................. A.55 Railways, Commissioner for v Murphy (1967) 41 ALJR 77 ....................................... A.60 Railways, Commissioner for v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564 ............. A.65, 10.5, 28.1 Railways (NSW), Commissioner for v Young (1962) 106 CLR 535 ...... 3.12, 19.5, 104.2 Raines, Re (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Shepherdson J, 22 June 1995) ............................ Q.8 Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642 .................................................... A.75, 9C.5, F.35 Randwick City Council v Fuller (1996) 90 LGERA 380 ............................................... 8.6 Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information Centre [1982] AC 380 .......... 10.1, 10.6, 10.14, 10.23, 10.32 Raphael, Re [1973] 1 WLR 998 .................................................................................... 78.1 Rasmussen v Sutton [2003] 1 Qd R 538; [2002] QSC 157 .......................................... 53.1 Ratten v The Queen [1972] AC 378 ......................................... A.76, A.143, A.145, 93B.3 Rawcliffe v The Queen (2001) 22 WAR 490; 115 A Crim R 509 ............................... 17.7 Raybos Australia Pty Ltd v Jones (1985) 2 NSWLR 47 ............................................... Q.2 Re Carus v Wilson and Greene (1887) 18 QBD 7 ............................................. 3.6, Q.109 Re Cochran Consulting Inc v Uwatec USA Inc [1998] 2 Qd R 137 ..... A.22, 22.4, 22.24, 36.1 Redevelopments Pty Ltd v Enima Pty Ltd (2010) 174 ACTR 1; [2010] ACTCA 13 ................................................................................................................ A.56 Redfern v Redfern [1891] P 139 ......................................................................... 10.1, 10.20 Redowood Pty Ltd v Link Market Services Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 286 .............. A.214, A.215 Redwood Pty Ltd v Mongoose Pty Ltd (2004) 48 ACSR 172; [2004] NSWSC 101 ............................................................................................................ A.220 Reed v Columbia Fur Dressers and Dyers [1965] 1 WLR 13 .................................... 92.33 Reed v Sheehan (1982) 56 FLR 206; [1982] FCA 1 ................................................. A.221 Rees v Kratzmann (1965) 114 CLR 63 ......................................................................... 10.1 Reeves v The Queen [2013] VSCA 311 ........................................................... A.66, A.117 Reg Russell & Sons Pty Ltd v Buxton Meats Pty Ltd [1996] ATPR 41-476 ...................................................................................................................... A.221 Registrar of the Workers’ Compensation Commission (NSW) v FAI Insurances Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 362 ................................................................... A.162 Reid v Howard (1993) 31 NSWLR 298 ...................................................................... 10.21 Reid v Howard (1995) 184 CLR 1 ..................................... 10.1, 10.21, 10.32, 10.35, F.61 Reid v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367 ......................................................................... A.94, 6.10 Reisner v Bratt [2004] NSWCA 22 ................................................................................. 8.6 Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517 ..................................................................... A.114 Remely v Vandenberg [2010] QCA 214 .............................................................. A.65, 28.1 Repatriation Commission v Law (1981) 147 CLR 635; [1981] HCA 57 .................... F.75 Repatriation Commission v Reid (1984) 54 ALR 157 ................................................. A.88 Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd v Kok [2016] WASC 96 ......................................... 22.1 [All references are to paragraph numbers] civ

Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Cases

Restifio v Bernstein (1996) 23 MVR 347 ..................................................................... A.70 Reynolds, Ex parte; Re Reynolds (1882) 20 Ch D 294 .............................................. 10.19 Rhyse Holdings Pty Ltd v Stanton Hillier Parker (Qld) Pty Ltd [2002] QCA 122 ................................................................................................................. A.186 Rice v Howard (1886) 16 QBD 681 .............................................................................. 17.7 Rich v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2005) 54 ACSR 365; [2005] NSWCA 233 .......................................................................................... 84.7 Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2004) 220 CLR 129; [2004] HCA 42 ....................................................................................... 10.12 Rich v Pierpont (1862) 176 ER 24 ...................................................................... A.75, F.48 Rich v The Queen [2014] VSCA 126 ................................................................... A.4, Q.43 Richards v Dare [2001] VSC 365 ................................................................................. A.67 Richards v Gellatly (1872) LR 7 CP 127 ............................................................ 10.3, Q.52 Richards v Jager [1909] VLR 140 ................................................................................ A.88 Richards v Kadian (2005) 64 NSWLR 204; [2005] NSWCA 328 ..... A.65, A.166, A.175 Richards v Sandy Cape Deep Sea Fishing Club Inc [2003] QCA 30 ........................ 92.32 Richardson v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 116 ................................. 6.14, 6.19, 6.23, 6.24 Rickard v Sutherland (1907) 24 WN (NSW) 153 .............................................. 22.6, 22.18 Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19 ..................... 130.46, 130.58, 130.60, 130.61 Riggs v Registrar of Births Deaths and Marriages [2010] QSC 481 .......................... A.63 Riggs, Re; Ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (WA) (1986) 9 FCR 149; 17 ATR 366 ................................................................................... 3.30, 83.12 Riley v Western Australia (2005) 30 WAR 525; [2005] WASCA 190 .............. A.62, A.69 Riley, Re [1996] 1 Qd R 209 .............................................................................. Q.23, Q.24 Riley [1908] St R Qd 141 ............................................................................................ 130.7 Rilstone v BP Australia Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1557 ........................................ A.163, A.167 Rinehart v Welker [2011] NSWCA 425 .......................................................................... Q.3 Ringstaad v Butler [1978] 1 NSWLR 754 .................................................................... A.62 Rio Tinto Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2005) 60 ATR 339; 224 ALR 299; [2005] FCA 1336 ............................................................................................ A.175 Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v Westinghouse Electric Corporation [1978] AC 547 ........................................ 10.11, 10.12, 10.16, 10.22, 22.2, 22.19, 22.24, 22.25 Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 158 .................... A.4, A.148 Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (Nos 13, 18 and 19) (1988) 14 NSWLR 116 ............................................................................................................. 83.10 Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (Nos 15 and 16) (1988) 14 NSWLR 107 ..................................................................... 51.8, 92.9, 92.14, 92.38, 96.2 Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (No 21) (1988) 14 NSWLR 128 ............... 104.2 Rivers v Fuller; Ex parte Rivers [1977] Qd R 97 ........................................... 92.38, Q.100 Rizhao Steel Holding Group Co Ltd v Koolan Iron Ore Pty Ltd (2012) 43 WAR 91; [2012] WASCA 50 ................................................................................. A.213 Roach v Page (No 11) [2003] NSWSC 907 .................................................................. F.35 Roach v Page (No 27) [2003] NSWSC 1046 ................................................................ 83.8 Roach v The Queen (2011) 242 CLR 610; [2011] HCA 12 ......... A.136, 132A.1, 132B.1, 132B.3 Roads and Maritime Services v Addario (2012) 82 NSWLR 474; [2012] NSWCA 412 ............................................................................................................. A.72 Robert Bax & Associates v Cavenham Pty Ltd [2013] 1 Qd R 476; [2012] QCA 177 ..................................................................................................................... A.4 Roberts v ANZ Banking Group [2006] 1 Qd R 482; [2005] QCA 470 .................... A.222 Roberts v Allat (1828) M & M 193; 173 ER 1128 ..................................................... 10.21 Roberts v Burns Philp Trustee Co Ltd (1985) 5 NSWLR 72 .................................... A.151 Roberts v Hay [1982] Qd R 688; (1982) 13 ATR 619 .................................... 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Roberts v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2014] QCAT 253 ................................................................................................................. A.72 Robertson v Grigg (1932) 47 CLR 257 ......................................................................... 83.7 Robinson v Laws [2003] 1 Qd R 81 ........................................................................... 15A.1 Robinson v Studorp Ltd (2013) 279 FLR 329; [2013] QSC 238 ................................. 68.3 Robinson v The Queen (1991) 180 CLR 531 ................................................... 15.2, Q.107 Robinson v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 162 ..................... A.41, A.116, A.154, 8.4, 9D.2 Robinson v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 88; [2006] NSWCCA 192 ................... F.67 Robinson v The Queen (No 2) (1991) 180 CLR 531; [1991] HCA 38 ........................ A.4 Robinson v Woolworths Ltd (2005) 158 A Crim R 546; [2005] NSWCCA 426 ........................................................................................................... 130.61, F.4, F.6 Robinson v Zhang (2005) 158 A Crim R 575; [2005] NSWCA 439 ............. A.58, 130.60 Robinson & Co v Davies & Co (1879) 5 QBD 26 ......................................... 22.19, 22.20 Robson v Robson [2010] QSC 378 ................................................................................ 3.11 Roche Mining Pty Ltd v Jeffs [2011] NSWCA 184 ..................................................... A.71 Rochfort v Trade Practices Commission (1982) 153 CLR 134 .................................... 10.5 Rockcote Enterprises Pty Ltd v FS Architects Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 39 ............... A.61 Rockett v Smith; Ex parte Smith [1992] 1 Qd R 660 .................................................... Q.3 Rodd v The Queen [2000] WASCA 329 ..................................................................... A.105 Rodden v The Queen (2008) 182 A Crim R 227; [2008] NSWCCA 53 ................... A.136 Rodgers v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2009] QSC 86 ............. 92.38 Rodgers v Rodgers (1964) 114 CLR 608 ....................................................... A.197, A.200 Rodriguez v Telstra Corporation Ltd (2002) 66 ALD 579; [2002] FCA 30 ............. Q.109 Rodway v The Queen (1990) 169 CLR 515 ................................................................... A.2 Rogers v Home Secretary [1973] AC 388 .................................................................. A.159 Rogers v Legal Services Commission (SA) (1995) 64 SASR 572 ............................ A.213 Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251 ...................................................... A.212, Q.66 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 ...................................................................... A.71 Rogerson v Law Society (NT) (1993) 88 NTR 1 ....................................................... A.186 Rolfe v The Queen (2007) 173 A Crim R 168; [2007] NSWCCA 155 ...................... A.78 Rolls v Bateman [1946] QSR 34 ................................................................................... 43.1 Rolls v Miller (1884) 27 Ch D 71 ............................................................................... 83.13 Roma Electric Light & Power Co Ltd v Hair [1955] St R Qd 311 .......................... A.222 Romeo v The Queen (1988) 36 A Crim R 212 ............................................................ Q.54 Ron Medich Properties Pty Ltd v Bentley-Smythe Pty Ltd (No 6) (2010) 191 FCR 145; [2010] FCA 1460 ............................................................................ Q.110 Ronchi v Portland Smelter Services Ltd [2005] VSCA 83 .............................. A.72, A.123 Roof and Ceiling Construction Co v Wigan [1972] QWN 14 ....................................... A.4 Rook v Maynard (1993) 116 FLR 234; 2 Tas R 97 ...................................................... 95.6 Rook v Maynard (No 2) (1994) 3 Tas R 325; 123 ALR 677 ....................................... F.75 Rosebanner Pty Ltd v Energy Australia (2009) 223 FLR 406; [2009] NSWSC 43 ................................................................................................................ A.63 Rosenthal v Phillips (1985) 84 FLR 93; [1985] VR 409 ............................................. Q.21 Roser v The Queen (2001) 24 WAR 254 ...................................................................... A.79 Ross v Hamilton [1997] QSC 170 .............................................................................. A.145 Ross v NRMA Life Ltd (1993) 7 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-170 ................................ A.63 Ross v The King (1922) 30 CLR 246 ............................................................ 9D.3, 93A.20 Ross v Woodford [1894] 1 Ch 38 ................................................................................ 22.14 Ross McConnell Kitchen & Co Pty Ltd (In liq) v Ross (No 1) [1985] 1 NSWLR 233 ............................................................................................................. 83.14 Rosser v Austral Wine and Spirit Co Pty Ltd [1980] VR 313 ........................... A.49, 20.2 Rossi Pty Ltd v Ballymore Tower Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 167 ................................... 87.1 Rossiter v Miller (1878) 3 App Cas 1124 ..................................................................... Q.98 [All references are to paragraph numbers] cvi

Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Cases

Roughley v The Queen (1995) 78 A Crim R 160; 5 Tas SR 8; [1995] TASSC 14 .................................................................................................... A.64, 130.11 Roupell v Haws (1863) 3 F & F 784; 176 ER 359 ...................................................... 59.5 Rousseaux, Ex parte [1983] 1 Qd R 391 ....................................................................... 88.2 Rowlands v New South Wales (2009) 74 NSWLR 715; [2009] NSWCA 136 .............................................................................................. 10.1, 10.6, 10.20, 10.23 Rowlings, Re; Fraser v Thom [2010] VSC 626 ........................................................... A.63 Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society Ltd v Parkinson [1892] 1 QB 431 .......................................................................................................... 3.4 Royal Commission, Re; A Brisbane Hotel [1964] QWN 29 .......................... 10.10, Q.109 Royal Women’s Hospital v Medical Practitioners’ Board (Vic) (2006) 15 VR 22; [2006] VSCA 85 ........................................................................................ A.159 Royal Women’s Hospital v Medical Practitioners’ Board of Victoria [2005] VSC 225 ...................................................................................................... A.159 Royds v Norcross Press Pty Ltd [2000] 1 Qd R 681 .................................................... 18.1 Rozenes v Belajev [1995] 1 VR 583; (1994) 126 ALR 481 ...................................... 130.4 Ruffin v Western Australia [2015] WASCA 127 ......................................................... Q.107 Running Pigmy Productions Pty Ltd v AMP General Insurance Co Ltd [2001] NSWSC 431 ................................................................................................ A.215 Rush & Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council [1989] AC 1280 ............. A.198, A.206 Russell v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 74 ATR 466; [2009] FCA 1224 ............................................................................................................................ 59.2 Russell v Craddock [1985] 1 Qd R 377 ............................................ 16.6, 53.5, 79.4, 79.6 Russell v Dalton (1883) 4 LR (NSW) 261 ........................................... 17.10, 17.11, 17.12 Russell v Jackson (1851) 9 Hare 387; 168 ER 558 ................................................... A.163 Russell v Russell (1875) 4 QSCR 103 ........................................................................... 3.20 Russell v Russell [1924] AC 687 ................................................................................... 12.1 Russell v Russell (1976) 134 CLR 495 .......................................................................... Q.2 Russo v Russo [2010] VSC 98 ........................................................................................ Q.2 Ruthol Pty Ltd v Mills (2003) 11 BPR 20,793 .......................................................... A.118 Ryan v Electricity Trust (SA) (No 2) (1987) 47 SASR 239 ............................. 83.14, 98.5 Ryan, Ex parte; Re Johnson (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 12 ....................................... Q.29, Q.32 Ryan v Victoria [2015] VSCA 353 ..................................................................... A.159, Q.3 Ryledar Pty Ltd v Euphoric Pty Ltd (2007) 69 NSWLR 603; [2007] NSWCA 65 ............................................................................................................. A.219

S S v R (1999) 149 FLR 149 .............................................................................................. F.6 S, In the Marriage of (1990) 101 FLR 89; 14 Fam LR 251 .......................................... 9.2 S, Re [1948] VLR 11 ........................................................................................... 10.11, 22.6 S (An Infant) v S [1972] AC 24 .................................................................................... 37.2 SD v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 84 NSWLR 456; 232 A Crim R 285; [2013] NSWCA 48 ....................................................................... A.170 SGIC v Paneros (1988) 48 SASR 349; 5 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-857 .................. A.173 SGIO v Saarinen [1967] QWN 23 ................................................................................ Q.46 SJX v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 243 .............................................................. A.81 SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400; [2011] HCA 13 .......................................... 9D.3 SLS v The Queen (2014) 42 VR 64; [2014] VSCA 31 ...................................... A.67, F.51 SS & M Ceramics v Kin [1995] QCA 437 ................................................................... A.57 STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd v Bowen Basin Coal Group Pty Ltd (2010) 188 FCR 528; [2010] FCA 1002 ........................................................................................ 6.2 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

SVI Systems Pty Ltd v Best & Less Pty Ltd (2001) 187 ALR 302; [2001] FCA 279 .................................................................................................................... A.56 SWV Pty Ltd v Spiroc Pty Ltd (2006) 201 FLR 238; [2006] NSWSC 668 ............ A.206 SZDCF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 1391 ................ A.211 SZHWY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 159 FCR 1; [2007] FCAFC 64 ............................................................................... A.8, A.162, 10.10 Saeedi v Patterson [1998] ACL Rep 195 Qld 3 ........................................................... A.61 Safco v BHP [1998] QSC 64 ....................................................................................... 102.1 Saffron v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1992) 109 ALR 695 .............................. 10.21 Sahin v National Australia Bank Ltd [2012] VSCA 317 ........................................... A.214 St George Bank Ltd v Irani [2006] VSC 217 ............................................................. A.215 St George Club Ltd v Hines (1961) 35 ALJR 106 ..................................................... A.114 Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453; [2010] NSWCA 274 .............................. A.54 Salemi v MacKellar (No 2) (1977) 137 CLR 396 ...................................................... 92.39 Samadi v The Queen (2008) 192 A Crim R 251; [2008] NSWCCA 330 .... A.126, A.140, F.51 Sambasivam v Public Prosecutor Federation of Malaya [1950] AC 458 .................. A.211 Sampson, Ex parte; Re Governor of HM Penitentiary at Malabar (1966) 66 SR (NSW) 501 ....................................................................... 54.1, 59.3, 59.10, 68.4 Sanchez v The Queen (2009) 196 A Crim R 472; [2009] NSWCCA 171 ................... 10.3 Sangha v Baxter (2009) 52 MVR 492; [2009] NSWCA 78 ................................ A.7, A.58 Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 ...................... A.159, A.160, 2.2, 10.19, 47.2, Q.94 Sanpine v Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council [2005] NSWSC 365 ................................................................................................... A.102, A.220, A.222 Santamaria v Administrative Appeals Tribunal; Department of Administrative Services [1998] VSC 107 ................................................................... 8.6 Santos v Delhi Petroleum Pty Ltd (2002) 225 LSJS 1; [2002] SASC 272 ............... A.213 Santos v The Queen (1987) 29 A Crim R 122; 61 ALJR 668 .................................... 15.68 Saoud v The Queen (2014) 87 NSWLR 481; [2014] NSWCCA 136 .......................... F.51 Sarah C Getty Trust, Re [1985] QB 956 .................................................................... A.163 Saunders v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (1998) 160 ALR 469 ............ A.179, Q.14 Saunders v Public Trustee [2015] WASCA 203 ........................................................... A.67 Saunders v The Queen (1985) 15 A Crim R 115 ......................................................... A.81 Saunders v The Queen (2004) 149 A Crim R 174; [2004] TASSC 5 ........................... A.4 Savanoff v Re-Car Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 219 ...................................... 18.4, 19.15, 19.18 Saw Wah v The Queen [2014] VSCA 7 ..................................................................... A.135 Saxby v Fulton [1909] 2 KB 208 ................................................................................... 68.4 Sayer v Glossop (1848) 2 Ex 409; 154 ER 552 ............................................................ 59.3 Sayers v Perrin (No 1) [1965] Qd R 221 ............................................................ A.159, 2.2 Scalise v Bezzina [2003] NSWCA 362 ......................................................................... A.95 Scanlan v Swan; Ex parte Swan [1984] 1 Qd R 21 ................................................... Q.109 Scharer v New South Wales (2003) 125 LGERA 104 ............................................... A.221 Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 121; [2000] HCA 18 ......................................................................................................... A.63, A.118 Schiffmann v Whitton (1916) 22 CLR 142 .................................................................. Q.27 Schmidt v Schmidt [1969] QWN 3 ...................................................................... 3.12, 3.20 Schmidt v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd [2009] QSC 106 .............................................. 92.32 Schneider v Leigh [1955] 2 QB 195 ............................................................... A.172, A.195 Schulman v Abbott Tout Lawyers (A Firm) t/a Abbott Tout Solicitors [2010] FCA 308 ...................................................................................................... A.186 Schultz v The Queen [1982] WAR 171 ........................................................................ A.73 Schweppes Ltd v O’Connor [1913] QSR 289 ............................................................... 90.1 [All references are to paragraph numbers] cviii

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Scott v Numurkah Corporation (1954) 91 CLR 300 ......................... A.1, A.60, 59.9, F.29 Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 ........................................................................................... Q.2 Scott MacRae Investments Pty Ltd v Baylily Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 82 ................. 96.1 Scott Paper Co v Drayton Paper Works Ltd (1927) 44 RPC 151 ............................. A.197 Scruples Imports Pty Ltd v Crabtree & Evelyn Pty Ltd (1983) 1 IPR 315 ................. 68.4 Sebba, Re [1959] Ch 166 ............................................................................................... 68.4 Secretary Department of Family & Community Services v K [2014] NSWSC 1065 ............................................................................................................. F.50 Seeley International Pty Ltd v Jeffrey [2013] VSCA 288 .......................................... A.106 Seeter Pty Ltd (t/a Great Barrier Reef Tuna) v Commonwealth (2004) 210 ALR 437; [2004] FCA 1104 .................................................................................... Q.18 Seiler v Nan [2000] QCA 362 ..................................................................................... A.219 Sell v The Queen (1995) 15 WAR 240 ......................................................................... Q.56 Selman v Minogue (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 280 ........................................................... A.132 Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262; [2000] NSWCA 29 ............................................................................................................................... A.67 Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 ...... 15.17, 15.29, 15.31, 15.36, 15.39, 15.42, 15.44, 15.53, 15.54, 15.55, 15.56, 15.60, 15.61, 130.4, 130.9 Semple v Noble (1988) 49 SASR 356 ......................................................................... 104.2 Senat v Senat [1965] P 172 ................................................................................ A.87, 19.12 Senior v Holdsworth; Ex parte Independent Television News [1976] QB 23 .................................................................................................... 3.11, 3.20, 3.21, 87.1 Sent v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2002] VSC 429 ....................................... A.173 Sepulveda v The Queen (2006) 167 A Crim R 108; [2006] NSWCCA 379 ............. A.78, A.154 Seven-Up Bottlers Perth Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 62 FCR 289 ....................................................................................................................... F.6 Seven Bishops’ Trial, The (1688) 12 State Trials 183 ............................................... A.105 Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2005] FCA 142 ..................................................... A.167 Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance [2003] FCA 1366 ...................................................................................................... A.70 789TEN Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation [2004] NSWSC 594 ...... A.197, A.198, A.208 789TEN Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation Ltd (2005) 215 ALR 131; [2005] NSWSC 123 ....................................................................................... A.163 Sevic v Roarty (1998) 44 NSWLR 287 ...................................................................... A.176 Seyfang v GD Searle & Co [1973] QB 148 ............................................... 6.8, A.65, Q.10 Seymour v Attorney-General (1984) 1 FCR 416; 53 ALR 513 ................................ 130.10 Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977) 19 NSWLR 219 ....... A.94, A.95 Seymour v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2006) 234 ALR 350; 95 ALD 301; [2006] FCA 965 ............................................................................... A.111 Seymour CBD Pty Ltd v Noosa Shire Council (2002) 123 LGERA 113 ................. A.222 Sharif v Azad [1967] 1 QB 605 ..................................................................................... 68.5 Sharp v Australian Builders Labourers’ Federated Union of Workers (WA Branch) [1989] WAR 138 ........................................................................................ 10.11 Sharpe, In the Marriage of (1990) 100 FLR 115; [1990] FLC 78,142 ....................... A.65 Sharples v Northern Territory (1988) 55 NTR 3591 FLR 11 .................................... Q.108 Sharrock v Lillie (1888) 4 TLR 355 .............................................................................. 28.1 Shaw v Gadens Lawyers [2014] VSCA 74 ................................................................. A.211 Shaw v Harris (No 1) (1992) 3 Tas R 153 ................................................................. A.180 Shaw v The Queen (1952) 85 CLR 365 ...................................... A.103, 6.23, 15.34, Q.35 Shea v Green (1886) 2 TLR 533 .................................................................................... 6.11 Sheahan v Woulfe [1927] QSR 128 .............................................................................. A.88 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Sheehan v The Queen (2006) 163 A Crim R 397; [2006] NSWCCA 233 ................ A.154 Sheldon v Sun Alliance Ltd (1988) 50 SASR 236 ........... A.3, A.103, A.141, 22.15, Q.37 Sheldon v Sun Alliance Ltd (1989) 53 SASR 97 ............ A.3, A.103, A.115, A.141, Q.43 Shenton v Tyler [1939] Ch 620 ........................................................................................ 7.2 Shephard v Chiquita Brands (South Pacific) Ltd [2002] FCA 466 ........................... A.213 Shephard v Pike (1954) 72 WN (NSW) 85 .................................................................. A.67 Shepherd v McGivern (1966) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 387; [1966] 1 NSWR 55 ............................................................................................................ A.58, 9C.2, 59.9 Shepherd v Queensland Police Service [2011] QDC 303 ........................................ 132C.1 Shepherd v Shepherd [1954] VLR 514; Argus LR 899 .............................................. 92.26 Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; [1990] HCA 56 ..................... A.106, A.130 Sherman v Commissioner of Patents (2008) 77 IPR 297; [2008] FCA 1026 .............................................................................................................................. F.6 Sherman v United States 356 US 369 (1958) .............................................. 130.58, 130.61 Shimokawa v Lewis [2009] NSWCA 266 .................................................................... A.58 Shorey v PT Ltd (2003) 77 ALJR 1104; 197 ALR 410 ............................................... A.72 Shrivastava v Western Australia (No 2) [2011] WASCA 8 .......................................... 9D.3 Shu Uan Eao v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 50 AAR 183; [2009] FCA 992 .......................................................................................................... Q.6 Shum Yip Properties Development Pty Ltd v Chatswood Investment and Development Co Pty Ltd (2002) 40 ACSR 619 .................................................... A.119 Sidey v Schull; Ex parte Sidey [1978] Qd R 290 .......................................... A.143, A.144 Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 88 ALJR 640; [2014] HCA 19 ......................................... A.220 Sidmouth v Sidmouth (1840) 2 Beav 447; 48 ER 1254 ............................................ A.148 Silovi Pty Ltd v Barbaro (1988) 13 NSWLR 466 ...................................................... A.217 Silver Fox Co Pty Ltd v Lenards Pty Ltd (No 3) (2004) 214 ALR 621; [2004] FCA 1570 .................................................................................................... A.186 Simic v The Queen (1980) 144 CLR 319 ................................................................... 15.35 Simmons v Venning (1969) 1 SASR 403 ...................................................................... F.73 Simon-Beecroft v Proprietors “Top of the Mark” BUP [1997] 2 Qd R 635; [1996] QCA 239 ................................................................................... 17.15, 101.3 Simonfi v Dowden (1999) 140 ACTR 1 ............................................................ 22.4, 39C.3 Simpson v Brett and Suncorp General Insurance Ltd (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Rockhampton, McMeekin J, 8 December 2008) ............................................... A.68 Simpson v Fraser (1894) 5 QLJ 89 ............................................................................... A.62 Simpson v Hodges [2007] NSWSC 1230 .................................................................... 10.23 Sims v Bakke [1967] QWN 46 .................................................................................... 133.1 Sims v Celcast Pty Ltd (1998) 71 SASR 142 ............................................................ A.118 Simsek v Macphee (1982) 148 CLR 636 ...................................................................... Q.11 Sinclair v The King (1946) 73 CLR 316 ............................................................ Q.63, Q.73 Singh v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (2007) 46 AAR 447; [2007] FCAFC 174 .............................................................. A.215 Singh v The Queen [2011] VSCA 263 .......................................................................... F.42 Singh (Heer) v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 15 FCR 4 ............................................................................................... 130.34, 131A.1, Q.6 Singleton v John Fairfax and Sons Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 38 ..................................... A.61 Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Weston (2011) 81 NSWLR 526; [2011] NSWSC 1083 ......................................................................................................................... A.182 Skaramuca v Craft (2005) 154 A Crim R 254; [2005] ACTSC 61 .................... 15.12, A.6 Skinner v Beaumont [1974] 2 NSWLR 106 ................................................................ 10.12 Skinner v Frappell [2008] NSWCA 296 ....................................................................... A.58 Skinner (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2015] VSCA 26 ............................................... A.66 Skywest Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1995) 126 FLR 61 ............................. 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Sladden v Sergeant (1858) 1 F & F 322; 175 ER 746 ............................................... 19.11 Slater v Nye [1998] VSC 100 ..................................................................................... A.214 Slatterie v Pooley (1840) 6 M & W 664; 151 ER 579 ...................................... Q.44, Q.50 Slaveski v Victoria [2010] VSC 441 ............................................................................. Q.17 Smale v Sprott [2004] 1 Qd R 290; [2003] QSC 254 ................................................ 10.37 Smeaton v Pattison [2003] QCA 341 ............................................................................. 6.26 Smit v Chan [2003] 2 Qd R 431 ................................................................................... A.25 Smith v ACN090444518 Pty Ltd (2007) 208 FLR 455; [2007] FMCA 263 ............. 10.16 Smith v Advanced Electrics Pty Ltd [2005] 1 Qd R 65; [2003] QCA 432 ................ A.95 Smith v Anderson (1880) 15 Ch D 247 ....................................................................... 83.13 Smith v Bagias (1978) 21 ALR 435 ............................................................................... A.4 Smith v Capewell (1979) 142 CLR 509 ...................................................................... 83.13 Smith v Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 552 ............................................................................................................................ 101.7 Smith v Harris [1996] VR 335 ........................................................................................ Q.2 Smith v Joyce (1954) 89 CLR 529 ............................................................ 18.7, Q.43, Q.86 Smith v MacGowan (1938) 159 LT 278 ....................................................................... Q.98 Smith v McLaughlin (1999) 103 A Crim R 285 ....................................................... 130.42 Smith v New South Wales Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256 .............................. Q.54 Smith v Read (1737) 1 Atk 526; 26 ER 332 ................................................................. 10.5 Smith v Samuels (1976) 12 SASR 573 ....................................................................... A.119 Smith v The Queen (1970) 121 CLR 572 ..................................................................... 3.19 Smith v The Queen (1990) 64 ALJR 588; 50 A Crim R 434 ................... A.71, 3.11, 3.21 Smith v The Queen (1993) 9 WAR 99 ......................................................................... A.97 Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650 .................................................................. A.124 Smith v Western Australia (2014) 305 ALR 338; [2014] HCA 3 ................................ 9D.3 Smith, Re [1991] 2 Qd R 467 ...................................................................................... 21F.3 Smith-Bird v Blower [1939] 2 All ER 406 ................................................................. A.168 Smith and Fawcett, Re [1942] Ch 304 ........................................................................ 22.17 Smithers v Andrews; Ex parte Andrews [1978] Qd R 64 ............................................ Q.75 Smorgon v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1976) 134 CLR 475 ...................................... A.196 Société d’Alliance Commerciales (Société Anonyme Egyptienne) v Merchants’ Marine Insurance Co [1924] 20 Lloyd’s L Rep 140 ............................ A.58 Sogelease Australia Ltd v Griffin [2003] NSWSC 178 ............................................... 10.18 Solak v Registrar of Titles (2011) 33 VR 40; [2011] VSCA 279 .............................. A.215 Somodaj v Australian Iron and Steel Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 285 ................................ A.213 Song v Ying (2010) 273 ALR 213; [2010] NSWCA 237 ............................................. F.61 Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 .... A.8, 10.1, 10.4, 10.6, 10.8, 10.9, 10.10, 10.19, 10.20, 10.22, 10.29, 10.31, 10.33 Sorenson, In the Marriage of (unreported, Fam Ct of Aust FC) .................................. 98.5 Sorrenson v McNamara [2004] 1 Qd R 82; [2003] QCA 149 .......................... A.85, A.86 Soteriadis v Nillumbik Shire Council [2015] VSC 363 ................................................ 21.3 Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 ............................... A.3 South American and Mexican Co, Re; Ex parte Bank of England [1895] 1 Ch 37 ....................................................................................................................... A.211 South Coast Oils (Qld & NSW) Pty Ltd v Look Enterprises Pty Ltd [1988] 1 Qd R 680 ..................................................................................... Q.101, Q.104 South Shropshire DC v Amos [1986] 1 WLR 1271; [1987] 1 All ER 340 .............. A.197 South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd v News Ltd (No 4) [2000] FCA 1211 .................................................................................................. Q.43 Southern Cross Commodities Pty Ltd (In liq) v Crinis [1984] VR 697 .................... A.170 Southern Equities Corporation Ltd v Bond (No 2) (2001) 78 SASR 554 ................. 92.38 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Southern Equities Corporation Ltd v Bond Petrochemicals (No 1) Pty Ltd (unreported, WA Sup Ct FC, 16 June 1993) ......................................................... A.162 Southern Equities Corporation Ltd (In liq) v Arthur Anderson (No 10) (2002) 82 SASR 53 ................................................................................................. 83.14 Southern Equities Corporation Ltd (In liq) v Bond (No 2) (2001) 78 SASR 554 ............................................................................................................... 130.35 Southern Pacific Hotel Services Inc v Southern Pacific Hotel Corporation Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 710 ............................................................................. A.65, Q.10 Sovereign v Bevillesta [2000] NSWSC 521 ............................................................... A.180 Soward v Leggatt (1836) 7 C & P 613 ....................................................................... A.103 Spargos Mining NL v Standard Chartered Australia Ltd (No 1) (1989) 1 ACSR 311; 8 ACLC 87 .......................................................................................... A.159 Sparks v The Queen [1964] AC 964 ................................................................... 9C.8, Q.79 Sparnon v Apand Pty Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 322; 138 ALR 735 .............................. F.6, F.59 Spassked Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 67 ATR 900; [2007] FCAFC 205 ................................................................................................. A.214 Spassked Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (No 4) (2002) 50 ATR 70 .............. A.174 Spedley Securities Ltd (In Liq) v Bank of New Zealand (1991) 26 NSWLR 711; 10 ACLC 77 .................................................................................... A.179 Spence v Demasi (1988) 48 SASR 536 .............................................................. Q.46, Q.57 Spence v Jacob [1982] Qd R 748 ................................................................................ 10.23 Spencer v Commonwealth (2012) 206 FCR 309; [2012] FCAFC 169 ..................... A.160 Spencer Motors Pty Ltd v LNC Industries Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 921 ............ A.65, Q.10 Spincode Pty Ltd v Look Software Pty Ltd (2001) 4 VR 501; [2001] VSCA 248 ............................................................................................................... A.173 Spokes v Grosvenor Hotel Co Ltd [1897] 2 QB 124 ........................................ 10.5, 10.23 Spotless Group Ltd v Premier Building and Consulting Group Pty Ltd (2006) 16 VR 1; [2006] VSCA 201 .......................................................... A.169, A.179 Sprayworx Pty Ltd v Homag Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 51 ........................... A.75 Springer v The Queen (2007) 177 A Crim R 13; [2007] NSWCCA 289 ..................... A.4 Squires Transport Pty Ltd v Turnor [2004] WASCA 245 .......................................... A.211 Stack v Western Australia (2004) 29 WAR 526; [2004] WASCA 300 ........................ A.89 Stage Club Ltd v Millers Hotels Pty Ltd (1981) 150 CLR 535 ................................ Q.106 Stambolziovski v Nestorovic [2015] NSWCCA 332 ....................................................... F.4 Standard Chartered Bank of Aust v Antico (1993) 36 NSWLR 87 ........................... A.175 Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd v Antico (1993) 35 NSWLR 588 ............................................................................................................................ 83.14 Stanfield v Rosin [1966] Qd R 10 ........................................................................ 92.4, 96.2 Stapleton v The Queen (1952) 86 CLR 358 .............................................................. 130.34 Stapleton v The Queen (2002) 136 A Crim R 65 ......................................................... Q.56 Stapylton v Clough (1853) 23 LJQB 5 .......................................................................... 94.2 State Bank of New South Wales v Lo [2000] NSWSC 1191 ...................................... A.49 State Bank of South Australia v Heinrich (1989) 52 SASR 596 .................................. 3.11 State Government Insurance Commission v Paneros (1988) 48 SASR 349; 5 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-857 ............................................................................. A.178 State Government Insurance Corporation v Government Insurance Office of NSW (1991) 28 FCR 511; 101 ALR 259 ......................................................... A.148 State of Norway’s Application (No 2), Re [1988] 3 WLR 603 ................................. A.213 State Rail Authority (NSW) v Brown (2006) 66 NSWLR 540; [2006] NSWCA 220 ................................................................................................... A.90, A.95 State Rail Authority of NSW v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) (1999) 73 ALJR 306; 160 ALR 588 ........................................................................ A.58 [All references are to paragraph numbers] cxii

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State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170 ............................................................................................ A.217, A.219 Statue of Liberty, The [1968] 2 All ER 195 .................................................................. 95.6 Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141 .................... 6.17 Steele v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 348 ........................................... A.123 Steer v The Queen (2008) 191 A Crim R 435; [2008] NSWCCA 295 ....................... Q.54 Steffen v Ruban (1966) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 264; [1966] 2 NSWR 622 ....... 9C.5, A.75 Stellard Pty Ltd v North Queensland Fuel Pty Ltd [2015] QSC 119 ......................... 92.38 Stenger v Mathias (No 2) [1903] QWN 46 ................................................................... 22.9 Stephens v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 664 ............................................................. 130.11 Stergis v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 20 ATR 591; 89 ATC 4442; [1989] FCA 120 ...................................................................... 10.10, 10.35, 10.37 Stern v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 121 ALR 192; [2000] FCA 294 ............................................................................................................................. A.95 Stevens v Standard Chartered Bank Australia Ltd (1988) 53 SASR 323 ................. A.219 Stewart v Fehlberg [2008] QSC 203 ............................................................................. A.68 Stewart v The King (1921) 29 CLR 234 .................................................. 15.35, 53.7, Q.48 Stirland v DPP [1944] AC 315 ...................................................... A.4, 15.14, 15.40, 15.47 Stoddart v Boulton (2009) 260 ALR 268; [2009] FCA 1108; (2010) 271 ALR 53; [2010] FCAFC 89 ............................................................................ A.158, 8.2 Stohl Aviation v Electrum Finance Pty Ltd (1984) 5 FCR 187; 56 ALR 716 .............................................................................................................................. 51.3 Stokes v McCourt [2013] NSWSC 1014 .................................................................... A.215 Stokes v Whicher [1920] 1 Ch 411 ............................................................................... Q.99 Stolfa v Owners Strata Plan 4366 (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 531 ................................... A.68 Stollery, Re [1926] Ch 284 .......................................................................... 51.2, 74.3, 74.4 Stone v Glendyc Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 80 ................................................... A.218, A.221 Stone, Re [1989] 1 Qd R 351 .......................................................................................... 3.7 Stonehouse v Strickland [1981] Tas R 359 .................................................................... 88.4 Stoney v A & S Boesley Pty Ltd [2014] VSCA 237 ..................................................... A.4 Stora Enso Australia Pty Ltd v CPI Group Ltd [2007] ATPR (Digest) 46-270; [2006] FCA 1685 ...................................................................................... A.119 Strachan, Re [1895] 1 Ch 439 ..................................................................................... A.192 Street v Luna Park Sydney Pty Ltd [2007] NSWC 1529 ............................................ A.67 Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461 ............................ 39F.1, 83.13 Strodder v Minh Ngoi Le [2000] QSC 239 ................................................................. 92.15 Stroud v Stroud [1963] 1 WLR 1080 ......................................................................... A.155 Stu Mitchell Enterprises Pty Ltd v Hughes [1993] QCA 327 ...................................... 79.7 Stuart v Sanderson (2000) 100 FCR 150 .................................................................... A.215 Stubley v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 36 ................................ A.106, A.127, A.136 Studds v Watson (1884) 28 Ch D 305 .......................................................................... Q.99 Stupple v Royal Insurance Co Ltd [1971] 1 QB 50 ..................................................... 79.8 Sturla v Freccia (1880) LR 5 App Cas 623 ....................................... 51.1, 51.3, 51.5, 74.7 Styles v O’Brien (2007) 16 Tas R 268; [2007] TASSC 67 ........................................ A.173 Subbotovsky v Waung (1968) 72 SR (NSW) 242 ......................................................... 68.3 Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965 ........................... 83.1, A.143, F.34 Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462 .................................................................................. Q.109 Sugden v Lord St Leonards (1876) LR 1 PD 154 ..................................... 3.15, 63.2, Q.96 Sugden v Sugden (2007) 70 NSWLR 301; [2007] NSWCA 312 .............................. A.163 Sullivan v Sullivan (2006) 13 BPR 24,755; [2006] ANZ Conv R 54; [2006] NSWCA 312 ............................................................................................... A.221 Sullivan v Gordon (1999) 47 NSWLR 319 .................................................................. A.62 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Summer Hill Business Estate Pty Ltd v Equititrust Ltd [2011] NSWCA 149 ........................................................................................................................... A.220 Sumner v Booth [1974] 2 NSWLR 174 ........................................................................ 59.7 Sunland Waterfront (BVI) Ltd v Prudentia Investments Pty Ltd (No 4) [2010] FCA 863 ......................................................................................................... 10.2 Supetina Pty Ltd v Lombok Pty Ltd (1984) 5 FCR 439; 59 ALR 581 ....................... 98.4 Suresh v The Queen (1998) 102 A Crim R 18; 72 ALJR 769 ............... A.4, A.154, 18.10 Surr v Walmsley (1866) LR 2 Eq 439 ......................................................................... 22.20 Sussex Peerage Case (1844) 11 Cl & F 85; 8 ER 1034 ............................................ A.151 Sut v Nominal Defendant (1968) 70 SR (NSW) 212; [1968] 2 NSWR 78 .............. A.181 Sutton v The Queen [1978] WAR 94 ............................................................................ A.78 Sutton v The Queen (1984) 152 CLR 528 ....... A.138, A.139, A.140, 15.12, 15.19, 15.20 Sweeney v Boulton (1984) 2 MVR 124 ....................................................................... A.70 Swindells v Hosking [2012] QDC 6 .............................................................................. 83.5 Swiss Aluminium Australia Ltd, Ex parte (1987) 68 ALR 587 ................................... A.65 Sydney Council, City of v Waldorf Apartments Hotel Sydney Pty Ltd (2008) 158 LGERA 67; [2008] NSWLEC 97 ....................................................... A.222 Sydney Electricity Authority v Giles [1993] NWCCR 700 ....................................... A.145 Sydney Ferries Ltd v SS Tahiti (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 307 .......................................... 22.7 Sydney South West Area Health Service v Stamoulis [2009] NSWCA 153 ..... A.67, A.68 Sykes v Richardson (2007) 70 NSWLR 66; [2007] NSWSC 418 ...................... 22.2, 24.1 Symonds v Raphael (1998) 148 FLR 171; 24 Fam LR 20 ........................................ A.214 Symons v Schiffmann (1915) 20 CLR 277 .................................................................... F.73

T T v P [2000] FLC 93-049 ............................................................................................ A.115 T v Waye (1983) 35 SASR 247 ................................................................................. 130.34 T (A Solicitor), Re (1899) 9 QLJ (NC) 95 .................................................................... 75.3 T (a child) v The Queen (1998) 20 WAR 130; [1998] WASCA 209 ............. 130.77, Q.56 T and T, In the Marriage of [1984] FLC 91-588 ........................................................ 10.23 TA Miller Ltd v Minister for Housing and Local Government [1968] 1 WLR 992 ................................................................................................................. Q.109 TJ v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 257 ...................................................................... A.154 TKWJ v The Queen (2002) 212 CLR 124; [2002] HCA 46 .................................... 130.10 TM Burke Estates Pty Ltd v Noosa Shire Council (2001) 113 LGERA 368 ........................................................................................................................... A.214 TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 53 ALJR 267; 23 ALR 345 ................ A.106 TS v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 174 ....................................................................... A.64 TTS Pty Ltd v Griffiths (1991) 105 FLR 255 .............................................................. A.70 Taber v The Queen (2007) 170 A Crim R 427; [2007] NSWCCA 116 ....................... F.43 Taleb v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 105 .................................................................. 21.15 Tallott v City of Stirling (No 2) [2015] WASC 483 .................................................. A.214 Tan v The Queen (2008) 192 A Crim R 310; [2008] NSWCCA 332 .......................... F.42 Tapiolas v Tapiolas [1985] 2 Qd R 310 ...................................................................... Q.106 Tarong Energy Corporation Ltd v South Burnett Regional Council [2010] 1 Qd R 575; [2009] QCA 265 ............................................................................... A.179 Tasmania v Challender (2007) 16 Tas R 339; [2007] TASSC 58 ............... 130.31, 130.34 Tasmania v Crane (2004) 148 A Crim R 346; [2004] TASSC 80 ............................ 130.45 Tasmania v Farmer (2004) 148 A Crim R 99; [2004] TASSC 104 ........................... A.117 Tasmania v Salter [2007] TASSC 33 ......................................................................... 130.45 Tasmania v Seabourne [2010] TASSC 35 ...................................................................... F.66 [All references are to paragraph numbers] cxiv

Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Cases

Tasmanian Seafoods Pty Ltd v MacQueen (2004) 12 Tas R 436; [2004] TASSC 39 ............................................................................................................... A.175 Tasovac v Western Australia [2015] WASCA 24 ............................................................ A.4 Tate & Lyle International Ltd v Government Trading Corporation (1984) The Times (London) Law Report No 582 ............................................................. A.175 Taxation, Commissioner of v Citibank Ltd (1989) 20 FCR 403; 85 ALR 588 ............................................................................................. A.175, Q.14, Q.19, F.71 Taxation, Commissioner of v Coombes (1999) 92 FCR 240; 164 ALR 341; [1999] FCA 842 ................................................................................. A.166, A.170 Taxation, Deputy Commissioner of v Ahern (No 2) [1988] 2 Qd R 158 ....... A.146, 6.11, Q.108 Taxation, Deputy Commissioner of v De Vonk (1995) 61 FCR 564 ......................... 10.35 Taxation, Deputy Commissioner of v Law Institute of Victoria (2010) 267 ALR 127; [2010] VSCA 73 ................................................................................... A.159 Taxation, Deputy Commissioner of v Richard Walter Pty Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 168 ................................................................................................................... 21F.3 Taxation, Deputy Commissioner of v Shears [2014] NSWSC 1653 ......................... A.214 Taxation, Deputy Commissioner of v Woodhams (1999) 10 Leg Rep SL1a .... 85.1, 92.28 Taxation, Federal Commissioner of v McDonald (1987) 78 ALR 588 ...................... 83.13 Taxation, Federal Commissioner of v Munro (1926) 38 CLR 153 ......................... 3.5, 3.7 Taxation, Federal Commissioner of v Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd (2003) 51 ATR 593; 195 ALR 717 ......................................................................................... A.196 Taxation, Federal Commissioner of v Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd (2005) 60 ATR 466; [2005] FCA 1247 ....................................................................... A.163, A.167 Taxation, Federal Commissioner of v Rio Tinto Ltd (2006) 151 FCR 141; [2006] FCAFC 86 ................................................................................................... A.175 Taxation (Qld), Deputy Commissioner of v Citibank Ltd [1989] 1 Qd R 516; (1988) 88 ATC 4941 ....................................................................................... A.163 Taylor v Carmichael [1984] 1 NSWLR 421 ................................................................ 10.12 Taylor v Chief Constable of Cheshire (1987) 84 Cr App R 191 ................................. A.59 Taylor v Commissioner for Railways [1974] Qd R 131 ............................................ A.192 Taylor v Harvey [1986] 2 Qd R 137 ................................................ A.3, A.6, A.73, A.137 Taylor v Hayes (1990) 53 SASR 282 ......................................................................... A.120 Taylor v L; Ex parte L [1988] 1 Qd R 706 ....................................... 3.7, 9.2, 9C.4, Q.108 Taylor v Taylor [1970] 1 WLR 1148 ....................................................... 79.8, 92.17, 92.41 Taylor v The King (1918) 25 CLR 573 ................................................ 17.15, 19.17, 101.5 Taylor v The Queen (1978) 45 FLR 343; 22 ALR 599 ............................................... 9C.2 Taylor v White (1964) 110 CLR 129 ............................................................................. 83.7 Taylor v Witham (1876) 3 Ch D 605 ................................................................ 83.3, A.151 Taylor, Re [1961] 1 WLR 9 ........................................................................................... 74.7 Technilock (Australia) Pty Ltd v Mondami Pty Ltd [1999] SASC 320 ....................... 83.2 Teelow v Commissioner of Police [2009] 2 Qd R 489; [2009] QCA 84 ...................... Q.8 Telstra Corporation v Australis Media Holdings (No 1) (1997) 41 NSWLR 277 ..................................................................................................... F.56, F.59 Telstra Corporation Ltd v BT Australasia Pty Ltd (1998) 85 FCR 152; 156 ALR 634 ........................................................................................................... A.175 Telstra Corporation Ltd v Mahon (2004) 39 AAR 484; [2004] FCA 1404 ............. A.218, A.221 Telstra Corporation Ltd v Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (No 2) [2007] FCA 1445 .............................................. A.163 Temmerman-Dunn v Maroochy Shire Council [2003] 1 Qd R 449 ................ A.219, Q.46 Temperley v Scott (1832) 5 C & P 341; 172 ER 1002 ............................................... 22.22 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Temwood Holdings Pty Ltd v West Australian Planning Commission [2003] WASCA 112 ................................................................................................ A.175 Teper v The Queen [1952] AC 480 ............................................................................. A.142 Thatcher v Charles (1961) 104 CLR 57 .............................................. 10.3, Q.52, F.6, F.49 The Estate of Whiteley (decd), Re (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Powell J, 13 May 1993) ............................................................................................................. 63.2 The Police Service, Commissioner of v Nirta [2002] 1 Qd R 364 ........................... A.179 The Recyclers (NSW) Pty Ltd v Ayoub [2016] NSWSC 144 ........................... 9A.3, 9A.4 Theden v Nominal Defendant [2004] QSC 310 ......................................................... A.114 Theo v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1996) 70 FCR 317 ...................................... A.213 Thevenaz, In the Marriage of (1986) 84 FLR 10; 11 Fam LR 95 ............................ A.173 Thiess v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [1994] 1 Qd R 156 ......................................... A.115 Thiess v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 4) [1992] 2 Qd R 549 .............................. 19.18 Thiess Properties Pty Ltd v Ipswich Hospitals Board [1985] 2 Qd R 318 ..... 92.15, 92.26 Thirteenth Corporation Pty Ltd v State (2006) 232 ALR 491; [2006] FCA 979 ........................................................................................................................... A.215 Thoday v Thoday [1964] P 181 ...................................................................... A.211, A.212 Thomas v Commissioner of Police [1997] 2 WLR 593 ............................................. 15A.1 Thomas v David (1836) 7 C & P 350; 173 ER 156 ........................ A.97, 6.26, 17.9, 94.5 Thomas v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 584 ......................................... A.105, A.109, Q.35 Thomas v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 22 ............................................................ A.4 Thomason v Council of the Municipality of Campbelltown (1939) 39 SR (NSW) 347 .............................................................................................................. A.179 Thompson v Bella-Lewis [1997] 1 Qd R 429 .................................................... 10.26, 98.5 Thompson v British Medical Association (NSW Branch) [1924] AC 764 ................ 10.12 Thompson v Kovacs [1959] VR 229 ............................................................................ A.63 Thompson v Palmer (1933) 49 CLR 507 ................................................................... A.217 Thompson v The Queen (1968) 117 CLR 313 ............................................... A.127, A.134 Thompson v The Queen (1989) 169 CLR 1 ................................................... A.108, 15.20 Thomson, Re [2015] QSC 29 ...................................................................................... A.114 Thomson v Martin; Ex parte Thomson [1986] 2 Qd R 483 ........................................ Q.34 Thorpe v Charles Sturt City Corporation (1999) 103 LGERA 395; [1999] SASC 10 .................................................................................................................. A.211 Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [2005] 1 AC 610 ........................ A.168 396 Bay Street Port Melbourne, Re [1969] VR 293 ..................................................... 82.1 Tickel v Short (1750) 2 Ves Sen 239; 28 ER 154 ........................................................ Q.52 Tickell v Trifleska Pty Ltd (1990) 24 NSWLR 548 ....................................... A.166, A.168 Tillmanns Butcheries Pty Ltd v A/asian Meat Industry Employees’ Union (1979) 42 FLR 331 .................................................................................................. 10.20 Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd (2009) 258 ALR 598; [2009] NSWSC 769 ................................................................................................... F.40 Timbs v Shoalhaven City Council [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-738; (2004) 132 LGERA 397; [2004] NSWCA 81 ....................................................... A.118 Timms v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2003] NSWSC 576 ............................. 83.14 Tirango Nominees Pty Ltd v Dairy Vale Foods Pty Ltd (No 2) (1998) 83 FCR 397; 156 ALR 364 ......................................................................................... A.191 Titheradge v The King (1917) 24 CLR 107 ............................................... 6.22, 6.23, 6.24 Tiufino v Warland (2000) 50 NSWLR 104; [2000] NSWCA 110 ................. A.211, A.212 Tobias v Allen (No 2) [1957] VR 221 ......................................................................... 92.14 Tofilau v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 396; 238 ALR 650; [2007] HCA 39 .......... 130.56, 130.60, Q.71 Tomasevic v Travaglini (2007) 17 VR 100; [2007] VSC 337 .............................. 8.6, Q.72 Tomic v Limro Pty Ltd (1993) 47 FCR 414 ................................................................ A.61 [All references are to paragraph numbers] cxvi

Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Cases

Tomko v Tomko [2007] NSWSC 1486 ......................................................................... A.68 Tomlin v Standard Telephones and Cables Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1378 ........... A.197, A.206 Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd (2015) 323 ALR 1; 89 ALJR 750; [2015] HCA 28 ........................................................................ A.209, A.213 Toohey v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] AC 595 ...... A.64, A.71, A.96, Q.85 Tool Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungston Electric Co Ltd [1955] 1 WLR 761; 2 All ER 657 ........................................................................................ A.221 Topp v Lawnton Sawmill [1968] QWN 34 .................................................................. Q.93 Tousek v Bernat (1959) 61 SR (NSW) 203 ................................................................... 6.17 Towercom Pty Ltd v Fahour [2011] VSC 455 ........................................................... A.175 Towney v Minister for Land and Water Conservation [1997] ACL Rep 195 FC 9 .................................................................................................................... F.58 Townsend v BBC Hardware [2003] Aust Torts Reports 81-690; [2003] QSC 15 ....................................................................................................................... 48.1 Townsend v Townsend [2001] NSWCA 136 ................................................................. F.51 Townsville City Council v Department of Main Roads [2006] 1 Qd R 77; [2005] QCA 226 ....................................................................................................... A.94 Trade Practices Commission v Abbco Ice Works Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 96; 123 ALR 503 ............................................................................................ 10.16, F.61 Trade Practices Commission v Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd (No 3) (1981) 55 FLR 174 ................................................................................................... Q.43 Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Ltd [1990] ATPR 41-010 ............................... A.74 Trade Practices Commission v George Weston Foods Ltd (No 2) (1980) 43 FLR 55 ............................................................................................................... A.102 Trade Practices Commission v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd (1984) 3 FCR 168; 55 ALR 527 ...................................................................................................... A.95 Trade Practices Commission v Port Adelaide Wool Co Pty Ltd (1995) 60 FCR 366; 132 ALR 645 ............................................................................................ F.56 Trade Practices Commission v Sterling (1979) 36 FLR 244 ............. A.162, A.163, A.191 Trade Practices Commission v TNT Australia Pty Ltd [1995] ATPR 41-375 ...................................................................................................................... A.197 Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647; [1984] ATPR 40-483 ........ 10.12, 10.16, 19.20, 51.4, 83.14, 92.13, 92.15, A.175, F.58 Traderight (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland Ltd (No 14) [2013] NSWSC 211 ............................................................................................................ A.177 Transpacific Cleanaway Pty v Wilson [2009] WASC 306 .......................................... 10.23 Transport & General Insurance Co Ltd v Edmondson (1961) 106 CLR 23 .............. 101.7 Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (trading as Uncle Bens of Australia) (1992) 27 NSWLR 326 .................................................. A.58 Treacey v Edwards (2000) 49 NSWLR 739 ........................................................ 3.11, Q.96 Tregenza v Bryson (1989) 8 MVR 529 ..................................................................... 130.43 Trepca Mines Ltd, Re [1960] 1 WLR 24; [1959] 3 All ER 798 ................................... Q.6 Trevorrow v South Australia (No 3) (2005) 94 SASR 44; [2005] SASC 471 ........................................................................................................................... A.159 Trevorrow v South Australia (No 4) (2006) 94 SASR 64; [2006] SASC 42 ............................................................................................................................. A.180 Trevorrow v South Australia (No 5) (2007) 98 SASR 136; [2007] SASC 285 ............................................................................................................................. A.67 Tri-Star Petroleum v Tipperary Oil & Gas (Australia) Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 198 ............................................................................................. 22.4, 22.24, 35A.2, 36.1 Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd v Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 395 ...................................................................... 10.5, 10.14, 10.16, 10.19, 10.21 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Tripodi v The Queen (1961) 104 CLR 1 ...................................................................... Q.43 Troubadour Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 110 FLR 123 ....................................... Q.12 Truica v The Queen [2001] WASCA 221 ..................................................................... Q.56 Trustee of the Property of Paul Jason Uhrhane (a bankrupt) v Gunn [2012] QCA 75 ......................................................................................................... A.61 Trustees of the Property of Cummins (a Bankrupt) v Cummins (2006) 227 CLR 278; [2006] HCA 6 .......................................................................................... A.62 Tryon v Clutterbuck (No 2) (2009) 42 Fam LR 118; [2009] FLC 93-142; [2009] FamCAFC 176 ............................................................................................... F.79 Tsallis v Schofield [2012] WASC 231 ........................................................................ A.201 Tsang Chi Ming v Uvanna Pty Ltd (t/as North West Immigration Services) (1996) 140 ALR 273 ......................................................................... Q.6, F.33 Tsang Chi Ming v Uvanna Pty Ltd (trading as North West Immigration Services) (1996) 140 ALR 273 ........................................................................................ Tubby Trout Pty Ltd v Sailbay Pty Ltd (1992) 42 FCR 595; 113 ALR 748 ............... 96.1 Tubman, Ex parte; Re Lucas (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 520 .............................................. Q.2 Tucker v Oldbury UDC [1912] 2 KB 317 .................................................................. A.151 Tuckiar v The King (1934) 52 CLR 335 .................................................................... A.183 Tudor Developments Pty Ltd v Makeig [2007] NSWSC 1116 .................................. A.222 Tudor Developments Pty Ltd v Makeig (2008) 72 NSWLR 624; [2008] NSWCA 263 ........................................................................................................... A.222 Tully v The Queen (2006) 230 CLR 234; [2006] HCA 56 .... A.41, A.116, A.134, A.154, 15.18, 130.11 Turf Enterprises Pty Ltd, Re [1975] Qd R 266 .......................................................... A.204 Turnbull, Re (1886) 2 QLJR 131 ................................................................................... 22.1 Turner v Gorkowski (2014) 289 FLR 98; [2014] VSCA 248 .................................. Q.110 Turner v Hatton [1952] 1 TLR 1184 ............................................................................. Q.98 Turner v Nominal Defendant [2008] QSC 138 ......................................................... A.114 Tweddell v Henderson [1975] 1 WLR 1496 ................................................................. Q.98 Tweedie v The Queen [2003] WASCA 282 ................................................................ A.140 Tynan v Jones [1975] RTR 465 ..................................................................................... Q.33

U Ucar v Nylex Industrial Products Pty Ltd (2007) 2 AWR 3,572; [2007] VSCA 181 ................................................................................................................. A.58 Ugle v The Queen (1989) 43 A Crim R 446 .............................................................. A.154 Ukley v Ukley [1977] VR 121 ..................................................................................... 22.24 Ulgera Gap Nominees Pty Ltd v Elders Ltd (1996) 188 LSJS 374 .......................... A.179 Unilever Australia Ltd v Karounos [2001] FCA 1717 ............................................... A.118 Unilever Plc v Procter & Gamble Co [2000] 1 WLR 2436 ...................................... A.198 Union Bank of Australia Ltd, The v Puddy [1949] VLR 242 ................................... A.102 Union Bank of London v Lenanton (1878) 3 CPD 243 ............................................... 52.2 United Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Lopmand [2002] NSWSC 1142 ........................ A.175 United States v Lizarraga-Tirado F 3d WL 3772772 (2015) ........................................ 3.18 United States Surgical Corporation v Hospital Products International Pty Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 766 ........................................................................................ 68.4 University of Western Australia v Gray (No 14) [2007] FCA 410 ............................ A.175 Unsted v Unsted (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 495 ............................................................... A.360 Unsworth v The Queen [1986] Tas R 173 ................................................................... 15.28 Unsworth v Tristar Steering and Suspension Australia Ltd [2007] FCA 1081 ......................................................................................................................... A.180 Urban Transport Authority (NSW) v Nweiser (1992) 28 NSWLR 471 ...................... A.99 [All references are to paragraph numbers] cxviii

Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Cases

Urbano v The Queen (1983) 9 A Crim R 170 ............................................................. 101.2 Utans v Consolidated Insurances Ltd (unreported, SA Sup Ct, noted in the Australian Law Report (17 November 1986)) ....................................................... A.211 Uzabeaga v Town of Cottesloe [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-739; [2004] WASCA 57 .............................................................................................................. A.118 Uzun v The Queen [2015] VSCA 292 ........................................................................... F.51

V Vacuum Oil Co Pty Ltd v Commonwealth and Dominion Line Ltd [1922] VLR 693 ..................................................................................................................... 49.1 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2002) 129 LGERA 10; [2002] NSWSC 881 .............................................................................................................................. F.30 Valetta PLC v National Crime Authority (1999) 165 ALR 60 .................................... A.66 Valoutin Pty Ltd v Furst (1998) 154 ALR 119 .............................................................. F.46 Van Beelen, Re (1974) 9 SASR 163 .............. A.1, A.4, A.62, A.130, A.143, 93B.8, Q.43 Van Den Hoek v The Queen (1985) 17 A Crim R 191 .............................................. A.145 Van Dyke v Sidhu (2013) 301 ALR 769; [2013] NSWCA 198 .................... A.220, A.221 Van Leeuwen v The Queen (1981) 55 ALJR 726 ...................................................... A.105 Van Reesema v Flavel (1992) 57 SASR 590 .............................................................. A.107 Van den Heuvel v Tucker (2003) 85 SASR 512; [2003] SASC 110 ........................... A.72 Van den Hoorn v Ellis [2010] QDC 451 ............................................................ 95.4, 116.1 Van der Meer v The Queen (1988) 35 A Crim R 232; 62 ALJR 656 ......... 130.4, 130.14, 130.48 Varawa v Howard Smith & Co Ltd (1910) 10 CLR 382 ................................. A.181, Q.14 Varma v Varma [2010] NSWSC 786 .......................................................................... A.220 Vassallo v Haddad Import & Export Pty Ltd (2004) 2 DCLR (NSW) 123 .............. A.213 Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR 402; 187 ALR 233 .............................. A.69, 9C.2 Velissaris v Fitzgerald [2014] VSCA 139 ................................................................... A.215 Velkoski v The Queen (2014) 242 A Crim R 242; [2014] VSCA 121 ................ A.4, F.51 Vella v The Queen (1990) 2 WAR 537; 47 A Crim R 119 ........................................... 20.5 Venkataya, Re (1995) 80 A Crim R 574 ........................................................................ 24.1 Ventouris v Mountain [1991] 1 WLR 607 ...................................................... A.192, A.197 Vernazza v Barburriza & Co Ltd [1937] 4 All ER 364 ................................................. Q.2 Versace v Monte [2001] FCA 1572 ................................................................................ F.61 Vexatious Actions Act, Re; Re Boaler [1915] 1 KB 21 ................................................ 3.26 Vic Hotel Pty Ltd v DC Payments Australasia Pty Ltd (2015) 321 ALR 191; [2015] VSCA 101 ........................................................................................... A.175 Vickers v The Queen (2006) 160 A Crim R 195; [2006] NSWCCA 60 ...................... F.43 Victoria v Australian Building Construction Employees’ and Builders Labourers’ Federation (1982) 152 CLR 25 ................................................................ 3.7 Victoria v Seal Rocks Victoria (Aust) Pty Ltd (2001) 3 VR 1; [2001] VSCA 94 ................................................................................................................. A.159 Victorian Professional Group Management Pty Ltd v The Proprietors “Surfers Aquarius” Building Units Plan No 3881 [1991] 1 Qd R 487 ................ A.211 Victorian Women Lawyers Association Inc v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 170 FCR 318; [2008] FCA 983 .................................................... A.62 Vilaisonah v Hilton [2009] NTSC 28 ........................................................................... A.62 Vines v Djordjevitch (1955) 91 CLR 512 ........................................................ A.103, Q.35 Vinidex Tubemakers Pty Ltd v Marshall (1981) 5 P Sess Rev 2414 ........................... 98.4 Vink v Tuckwell (No 3) (2008) 67 ACSR 547; [2008] VSC 316 ................................ 90.1 Violi v Berridale Orchards Ltd (2000) 93 FCR 580; 173 ALR 518 .............. 10.23, 10.28, 130.3, 130.36, 130.37, 130.62, F.82 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Vitali v Stachnik [2001] NSWSC 303 ................................................................ 92.10, 98.4 Vivash v Vivash [1955] QWN 37 ................................................................................ 22.17 Vocisano v Vocisano (1974) 130 CLR 267 .......................... A.145, 17.2, 17.6, 92.38, F.21 Volksbank Schwabisch Gmund v Werner [1999] QCA 375 ......................................... 22.6 Volksbank Schwabisch Gmund EG v Werner [1998] ACL Rep 195 ................ 22.4, 22.11 Volmer v Northern Territory Electricity Commission (1984) 30 NTR 21 ................... Q.24 Von Snarski v Criminal Justice Commission [1998] 1 Qd R 562 ............................. A.159 Voss v Suncorp-Metway Ltd (No 1) [2004] 1 Qd R 212; [2003] QCA 252 ............ A.219

W W v Bugden (2005) 155 A Crim R 416; [2005] NSWSC 898 .................................... Q.24 W v Edgell noted in (1989) 63 ALJ 215 .................................................................... A.196 W v The Queen (2001) 115 FCR 41; 124 A Crim R 545 ............................................ F.51 WB Hunter Pty Ltd v Forshaw (1971) 129 CLR 409 ................................................... 55.1 Wade v Lempriere [1903] QWN 55 ............................................................................. 22.26 Wagner, a bankrupt, Re [1964] ALR 657 ................................................................... A.186 Wai Fun Chan, Deceased, Re Estate of [2015] NSWSC 1107 .................................... Q.96 Waipara Pty Ltd v Police Association [1998] V Conv R 54-583 .............................. A.220 Wakeford v Bishop of Lincoln (1921) 90 LJPC 174 ........................................... 59.2, 59.6 Wakeley v The Queen (1990) 64 ALJR 321 ............................................... 20.1, 20.2, 20.4 Walden v Black [2006] NSWCA 170 ........................................................................... A.58 Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630 ........................................ A.86, A.155, 19.12, 19.22 Walker v Wilsher (1889) 23 QBD 335 ....................................................................... A.206 Wall v Halford (No 2) [1960] QWN 51 ............................................................ 53.3, A.211 Wall v The King; Ex parte King Won (1927) 39 CLR 266; [1927] HCA 16 ............................................................................................................................. A.211 Walsh v The Queen (1996) 6 Tas R 70 ..................................................................... 130.57 Walsh v Wilcox [1976] WAR 62 ................................................................. 3.11, 3.21, F.27 Walt Disney Productions v H John Edwards Publishing Co Pty Ltd (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 281 .................................................................................................. 22.16 Walter Mining Pty Ltd v Coroner Hennessey [2010] 1 Qd R 593; [2009] QSC 102 .................................................................................................................. Q.109 Walters v The Queen [1969] 2 AC 26 ........................................................................ A.105 Walton v Butler (2004) 150 A Crim R 341; [2004] QCA 456 .................. 132C.1, 132C.8 Walton v Gill (1993) 177 CLR 378 ............................................................................ A.214 Walton v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 283 ....... A.143, A.144, A.145, A.148, 93B.3, F.42 Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387; [1988] HCA 7 ................................................................................... A.15, A.217, A.219, A.221 Wantagong Farm Pty Ltd v Bulle [2015] NSWSC 1603 ........................................... A.220 Ward v Interag Pty Ltd [1985] 2 Qd R 552 ......................................................... 6.7, 22.10 Ward v Sinfield (1880) 49 LJQB 696; 43 LT 253 ............................................. 16.4, 19.11 Wardrope v Dunne [1996] 1 Qd R 224 ...................................................................... A.175 Ware v Amaral Pastoral Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] NSWSC 1550 ..................................... A.1 Warner v Mosses (1880) 16 Ch D 100 .......................................................................... 22.5 Warner v The Women’s Hospital [1954] VLR 410 ......................................... A.187, 92.15 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701 .............................................................................................................................. F.29 Warren v Coombes [1976] ACLD 214 ........................................................................ A.145 Washer v Western Australia (2007) 234 CLR 492; [2007] HCA 48 ................... 15.16, F.6 Watcham v Attorney-General of East Africa Protectorate [1919] AC 533 .................. A.57 Waterford v Commonwealth of Australia (1987) 163 CLR 54 ............. A.163, A.184, 2.2, 10.17 [All references are to paragraph numbers] cxx

Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Cases

Waterman v Gerling Australia Insurance Co Pty Ltd (2005) 13 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-664; [2005] NSWSC 1066 ............................ A.218, A.219, A.220 Watkins v Queensland [2008] 1 Qd R 564; [2007] QCA 430 ....................... A.175, A.194 Watson v Foxman (1995) 49 NSWLR 315 ....................................................... A.114, 92.1 Watson v McLernon [2000] NSWSC 114 ................................................................... A.180 Watson v The Queen (2010) 204 A Crim R 30; [2010] VSCA 189 .......................... A.154 Watts v Rake (1960) 108 CLR 158 ............................................................................. A.103 Wauchope v Mordecai [1970] 1 WLR 317; 1 All ER 417 ........................................... 79.8 Waugh v British Railways Board [1980] AC 521 ...................................................... A.167 Waugh Asset Management v Merrill Lynch [2010] NSWSC 197 ............................. A.176 Waverley Council v Tovir Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) [2013] NSWLEC 35 ............................................................................................................................. A.111 Wayne Lawrence Pty Ltd v Hunt [1999] NSWSC 1044 ............................................ A.176 Weal v Bottom (1966) 40 ALJR 436 .................................................................. A.70, 9C.3 Weaver v Law Society of NSW (1979) 142 CLR 201; [1979] HCA 35 .................. A.212 Weber v Weber [1976] Qd R 337 .................................................... 22.2, 22.5, 22.25, 24.1 Weeding v Weeding (1887) 8 ALT 142 ......................................................................... 22.9 Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217 ........................................... A.121, 6.16 Welfare v Nominal Defendant (Queensland) (1988) 7 MVR 28 ............................... A.114 Weller v Phipps [2010] NSWCA 323 ......................................................................... A.215 Wendo v The Queen (1963) 109 CLR 559 ..... A.110, 15.18, 59.11, 93.4, 130.15, 130.63, Q.77 Wendt v Lind; Ex parte Lind [1913] QSR 240 ............................................................. 59.9 Wentworth v Lloyd (1864) 10 HLC 589; 11 ER 1154 ............................................... 10.26 Wentworth v Rogers (No 10) (1987) 8 NSWLR 398 ............... 17.10, 19.11, 19.18, 101.7 West v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1981) 148 CLR 62 ........................... A.118 West v Lord Sackville [1903] 2 Ch 378 ........................................................................ 22.3 Western Australia v Coates [2007] WASC 307 .......................................................... A.116 Western Australia v Liyanage (No 2) [2016] WASC 18 ........................................... 130.11 Western Australia v Mandolini (2006) 44 SR (WA) 290; [2006] WADC 133 .......................................................................................................................... 130.34 Western Australia v Montani [2006] WASC 190 ................. A.145, A.151, 130.18, 130.21 Western Australia v Montani (2007) 182 A Crim R 155; [2007] WASCA 259 ........................................................................................................................... A.102 Western Australia v Tierney (2005) 39 SR (WA) 296; [2005] WADC 110 ............... 21.12 Western Australia v Watson [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-226 ................................... A.96 Western Australia v Willis on behalf of the Pilki People [2015] FCAFC 186 .............................................................................................................................. F.48 Western Australia v Wood [2008] WASCA 81 ............................................................. A.79 Westgate Wool Co Pty Ltd (in liq) (2006) 206 FLR 190; 60 ACSR 570; [2006] SASC 372 .................................................................................................... A.186 Weston v Registrar-General (NSW) [2002] NSWSC 173 .......................................... A.163 Westpac Banking Corporation v Barnes [1983] 1 NSWLR 342 .................................. Q.20 Westpac Banking Corporation v Hilliard (No 3) [2007] VSC 58 .............................. A.146 Westpac General Insurance Ltd v Cooper [2006] ACTSC 91 ................................... A.103 Wheeler v Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675 ............................................................ A.192 Whiffen v Hartwright (1848) 11 Beav 111; 50 ER 759 ............................................. A.197 Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 77 ALJR 1598; 200 ALR 447 .............................. A.75 White v Hoddle (1880) 6 VLR (E) 82 ......................................................................... 22.20 White v Logen Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 159 ............................................................... A.67 White v Taylor (No 2) (1969) 1 Ch 150; [1967] 3 All ER 349 ................................... 51.3 White v The Queen [2006] WASCA 62 ................................................ A.78, 130.67, Q.56 White v Venus [1968] SASR 83 .................................................................................. 92.13 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

White v Verkouille [1990] 2 Qd R 191 ......................................................................... 68.3 Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657 ........................ 6.14, 6.19, 6.23, 6.24, 9D.3 Whitehouse v BHP Steel Ltd [2004] NSWCA 428 .................................................... A.219 Whitelock, Ex parte; Re Mackenzie [1971] 2 NSWLR 534 ..................... A.6, Q.73, Q.82 Whitlam v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (1992) 27 NSWLR 437 ............................................................................................................ A.118 Whittle v Parnell Mogas Pty Ltd (2006) 94 SASR 421; [2006] SASC 129 ............... Q.43 Whyman v Garth (1853) 8 Ex 803; 155 ER 1578 ............................................... 60.1, 60.2 Wiedemann v Walpole [1891] 2 QB 534 ...................................................................... Q.52 Wiki v Atlantis Relocations (NSW) Pty Ltd (2004) 60 NSWLR 127 ......................... A.72 Willcox v Sing [1985] 2 Qd R 66 ............................................................................... A.114 Williams v Jordan (1877) 6 Ch D 517 .......................................................................... Q.98 Williams v Keelty (2001) 111 FCR 175 ....................................................................... Q.18 Williams v Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 677; 21 WN (NSW) 249 ................................................................... 22.10, 22.5 Williams v Nicoski [2003] WASC 131 ....................................................................... A.198 Williams v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1994) 122 ALR 585 .................................. A.4 Williams v Public Trustee of New South Wales [2007] NSWSC 921 ........................ A.72 Williams v Quebrada Railway, Land and Copper Co [1895] 2 Ch 751 .................... A.181 Williams v Russell (1933) 149 LT 190 ......................................................................... Q.33 Williams v The Queen [1982] Tas R 266 .................................................................. 130.50 Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278 ............................................................ 130.51 Williams v The Queen (2000) 119 A Crim R 490 ............................................ 93B.3, F.42 Williams v Usher (1955) 94 CLR 450 ........................................................................... 68.4 Williams Will Trusts, In re [1953] Ch 138 .................................................................. 83.13 Williamson v Ah On (1926) 39 CLR 95 ....................................................................... F.74 Williamson v Schmidt [1998] 2 Qd R 317 ..................................................... A.198, A.208 Williamson v Trainor [1992] 2 Qd R 572 ................................................................. 130.41 Willis v Little (1861) 11 CB (NS) 369 ......................................................................... A.55 Willis v Trequair (1906) 3 CLR 912 ....................................................... 22.7, 22.10, 22.14 Willoughby v Clayton Utz (No 2) (2009) 40 WAR 98; [2009] WASCA 29 ............ A.213 Wilson v Deputy State Coroner (1995) 124 FLR 388 ................................................ 10.27 Wilson v Kingsgate Mining Industries Pty Ltd [1973] 2 NSWLR 713 .................... A.202 Wilson v Lowery (1993) 4 NTLR 79; 110 FLR 142 ................................................. A.213 Wilson v Mitchell [2014] VSC 280 ................................................................................ Q.2 Wilson v Mitchell (No 2) [2014] VSC 332 ........................................................ 92.35, F.41 Wilson v Nilepac Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 63 .............................................................. A.68 Wilson v The Queen (1970) 123 CLR 334 ................................................... A.136, 132B.2 Wilson v Union Insurance Co Ltd (1992) 112 FLR 166 ........................................... A.213 Wily v Lo Presti (1997) 16 ACLC 82 ......................................................................... 92.41 Wingecarribee Shire Council v Concrete Quarries Pty Ltd (2001) 114 LGERA 82 ............................................................................................................... A.219 Wingecarribee Shire Council v Minister for Local Government [1975] 2 NSWLR 779 ............................................................................................................. 21F.3 Winks v W H Heck & Sons Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 226 ............................................. 6.15 Winmar v The Queen [2001] WASCA 239 .................................................................. Q.54 Winsor v The Queen (1866) LR 1 QB 390 ..................................................................... 8.3 Wipperman, Re [1955] P 59 .............................................................................. 22.15, 22.20 Wirth v Tuckey [1949] QWN 42 ................................................................................ A.134 Wisden v Wisden (1849) 6 Hare 549; 67 ER 1281 ...................................................... A.65 Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 .......................................................... A.111, 3.8 Witham v Witham [2000] WASC 236 ......................................................................... A.221 [All references are to paragraph numbers] cxxii

Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Cases

Withyman v New South Wales [2013] Aust Torts Reports 82-124; [2013] NSWCA 10 ............................................................................................................. A.213 Witness D v Crime and Misconduct Commission [2008] QSC 155 .................. A.158, 8.2 Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1967] VR 263 ....................................... 101.7 Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1969] VR 323 ....................................... 19.15 Wolverson v Todman [2015] QCA 74 ........................................................................... 74.5 Wombat Nominees Pty Ltd v De Tullio (1990) 98 ALR 307 ..................................... 92.30 Wong v Jani-King Franchising Inc [2014] QCA 76 ....................................................... A.4 Wong v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 146 FCR 10; 204 ALR 722; [2004] FCA 51 ................................ A.212, A.215 Wong Kam-Ming v The Queen [1980] AC 247 ............................................................ 15.7 Wood v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1996) 67 IR 46 .................................... A.196 Wood v Desmond (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 65 .............................................................. 19.18 Wood v The Queen (2012) 84 NSWLR 581; [2012] NSWCCA 21 ............................ 9D.3 Woodcock v Nichol (1976) 13 ALR 411 ..................................................................... 101.9 Woodhouse v Hall (1980) 72 Cr App R 39 ................................................................ A.144 Woodroffe v National Crime Authority (1999) 168 ALR 585 (aff’d (1999) 107 A Crim R 384) ................................................................................................. A.159 Woods v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (2008) 38 WAR 217; [2008] WASCA 188 .................................................................................................. A.67 Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460 ................................... A.114 Woods v Rogers; Ex parte Woods [1983] 2 Qd R 212 ..................................... 10.23, Q.75 Woods v The Queen (2008) 184 A Crim R 108; [2008] NSWCA 83 ......................... A.61 Woollahra Municipal Council v Westpac Banking Corporation (1994) 33 NSWLR 529 ............................................................................................... A.162, A.182 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 .......................................................................... A.105 Woolworths Ltd v Department of Health (2005) 2 DCLR (NSW) 76 ..................... 130.61 Woon v The Queen (1964) 109 CLR 529 ........................................................... 10.3, Q.53 Workers Compensation (Dust Diseases) Board of NSW v Smith [2010] NSWCA 19 ................................................................................................................. A.3 Wort v Whitsunday Shire Council (2001) 116 LGERA 179 .......................... A.220, A.222 Wotton v Queensland (No 3) [2015] FCA 1074 ............................................................. Q.3 Wran v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1984] 3 NSWLR 241 ....................... 105.3 Wran v The Queen (1968) 117 CLR 313 ................................................................... A.134 Wren v Mahoney (1972) 126 CLR 212 ...................................................................... A.211 Wright v Cobb (1885) 1 TLR 555 ................................................................................. 59.3 Wright v Doe d Tatham (1837) 7 Ad & E 128; 112 ER 488 .......................... A.20, A.144 Wright v Hamilton Island Enterprises Ltd [2003] Q Conv R 54-588; [2003] QCA 36 ................................................................................. A.54, A.219, A.221 Wright v KB Nut Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] QDC 91 ................................................. A.134 Wright v Madden [1992] 1 Qd R 343 .............................................................. Q.97, Q.104 Wright v Mooney [1966] VR 225 ................................................................................ 39P.1 Wright v The Queen (1977) 15 ALR 305 ..................................................................... Q.55 Wright v The Queen [2015] QSC 178 ...................................................................... 132C.2 Wright Heaton & Co v Barrett (1892) 13 NSWLR 206 ............................................... 68.5 Wu v Statewide Developments Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 587 ...................................... A.68 Wulff v Honan (1989) 11 QL Reps 72 ........................................................................ 15.39 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40 ..................................................... A.114

X X v X [2000] FLC 93-017 ............................................................................................. A.62 X v Y [2000] NSWSC 951 .............................................................................................. Q.2 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

cxxiii

Table of Cases

X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92 ............................... 10.33, 10.35

Y Yarrabee Coal Co Pty Ltd v Lujans (2007) 49 MVR 178; [2007] NSWCA 342 ............................................................................................................................. A.58 Yassir v Bone [2010] QDC 11 ....................................................................................... 21.2 Yates v Municipal District of Dubbo (1882) 3 NSWLR (L) 315 ................................. 18.7 Yates Property Corporation Ltd v Darling Harbour Authority (1988) 64 LGRA 331 ............................................................................................................... A.189 Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd v Boland (2000) 179 ALR 664 ........................ A.211 Yoon Shin Lee v Bob Chae-Sang Cha [2008] NSWCA 13 ............................................ 8.6 Young v Cesta-Incani [2007] NSWCA 229 .................................................................. A.72 Young v Queensland Trustees Ltd (1956) 99 CLR 560 ............................................. A.103 Young v Quin (1985) 4 FCR 483; 59 ALR 225 ......................................................... A.159 Young v Tibbits (1912) 14 CLR 114 ............................................................................ Q.52 Young v Yorkston [2000] NSWSC 350 ......................................................................... 59.6 Youngberry v Heatherington; Ex parte Youngberry [1977] Qd R 15 .......................... Q.35 Yuill v Yuill [1945] P 15 ................................................................................................ 6.17

Z Z v New South Wales Crime Commission (2007) 231 CLR 75; [2007] HCA 7 ..................................................................................................................... A.170 Zahra v Brown (2006) 45 MVR 505; [2006] NSWCA 162 ........................................ A.72 Zaknic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corporation Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 171 ..................... F.51, F.52 Zanetti v Hill (1962) 108 CLR 433 ............................................................................ A.104 Zappia v Registrar of Supreme Court (SA) (2004) 90 SASR 193; [2004] SASC 375 ................................................................................................................. 10.19 Zavodnyik v Alex Constructions Pty Ltd (2005) 67 NSWLR 457; [2004] NSWCA 438 ............................................................................................................ A.211 Ziderman v General Dental Council [1976] 1 WLR 330 ............................................ 10.12 Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW (1957) 97 CLR 279 ........ 6.14, 7.3, 10.12, Q.109 Zomojo Pty Ltd v Hurd (No 5) [2014] FCA 537 ........................................................ 10.22 Zoneff v The Queen (2000) 200 CLR 234 ................................................................... Q.54

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Evidence Law in Queensland

TABLE OF STATUTES [Note: The Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) is not included in this table. References are to paragraph numbers, which follow the sections of the Evidence Act, except: A refers to Chapter 1; Q to Chapter 11; and F to Chapter 12.]

Commonwealth Acts Interpretation Act 1901: 10.35 s 15AB: 10.35 s 25A: 3.11

Australian Border Force Act 2015: s 26(8): 10.30

Australian Crime Commission Act 2002: A.194 s 30: 10.12 s 30(5): 10.31 s 30(5)(c): 10.13

Australian Federal Police Act 1979 s 40A: 10.30

Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 s s s s s s s s

22: 36: 55: 68: 69: 76: 77: 80:

F.84 F.71 F.84 F.78 F.58, F.80 93.11 93.11 86.2

Bankruptcy Act 1966: Q.66 s 81: 10.30 s 130: F.71

1101C: 111.2 1274(7A): 73.1 1292(2): 10.12 1300: 88.4 1305: 84.7, 88.4 1317E: 10.12 Crimes Act 1914: A.194, 39A.1, 130.70, 130.77 s 3E to 3S: F.70 s 3ZG: F.70 s 3ZX: F.58, F.80 s 15X: 130.58 s 23A(2): 130.70 s 23A(5): F.72 s 30R: F.75 s 70: Q.18 Pt 1C: 130.70 Pt 1AA: A.194 Pt IC: F.5, F.6, F.49, F.66, F.72 Criminal Code Act 1995: 130.3, 130.12, 132B.1, F.73, F.75 s 53: A.159 Sch 13.3(6): F.75 Sch 13.4: F.75 Sch 13.5: F.75 Sch 13.6: F.73

Criminal Law Amendment Act 1997 Chs 28 to 30: 132B.1

Civil Proceedings Act 2011 s 590AA: 130.3

Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950 s 14(1A): 10.29

Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act s 118: 68.1 ss 174 to 175: 68.4

Competition and Consumer Act 2010: A.58 s s s s

s s s s s s

83: 79.9 155: A.194 155(7): 10.14 159(1): 10.30

Corporations Act 2001: 55.1 s 597(4): Q.2 s 733: 10.37

Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sexual Assault Communications Privilege) Act 1999: F.1 Cross-Border Law Enforcement Legislation Amendment Act 2005: A.41 Customs Act 1901: 92.5 s 82V: F.71 s 133(7): 10.30 s 183UB: F.58, F.80 s 198: F.71 s 199: F.71 s 214AB(2): F.71 s 219B(5): Q.90 ss 228 to 230: 14.2 s 233: F.75 s 243F(3A): 10.32

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Table of Statutes Customs Act 1901 — cont s 243SC: F.78 s 255: F.73

Electronic Transactions Act 1999: 3.11, F.27, F.46 Evidence Act 1905: A.42 Evidence Act 1995: A.6, A.9, A.42, A.60, A.62, A.75, A.136, A.153, A.196, 3.15, 92.17, 93B.3, 98.5, 104.1, 122.1, Q.43, F.1, F.56 s 3.10: F.56 s 4: A.42, F.40 s 4(1): F.59 s 5: F.82 s 6(1): F.82 s 8: F.6 s 9: F.6 s 12: F.9 s 13: 9.5, F.7 s 13(1): F.8 s 13(2): F.8 s 13(3): F.7 s 13(8): F.7 s 15: F.9 s 16: F.9 s 17: F.9 s 18: 11.1, F.4 s 18(1): F.11 s 18(2): F.11 s 18(4): F.11 s 18(6): F.11 s 18(7): F.12 ss 18 to 19: 8.2 s 19: F.11 s 20: F.13 s 23C to 23E: F.72 s 23F: F.72 s 23G to 23M: F.72 s 23H to 23K: F.72 s 23N: F.72 s 23V(6): F.72 s 31(5): F.8 s 32(2)(b)(i): F.14 s 32(3): F.14 s 33: A.85, F.15 s 34: F.16 s 35: A.155, F.17 s 37: F.18 s 37(1)(a): F.18 s 38: 17.2, 17.18, F.19, F.20 s 38(1)(b): F.19 s 38(6): F.20 s 38(7): F.21 s 39: F.83 s 41: 21.2, F.22, F.36 s 43: F.22 s 43(1)(b): F.22

s s s s s s s s s s s s s

44(3): F.24 45: F.83 45(5): F.22 46: F.25, F.26 48: F.69 51: 3.15, F.27, F.28 54: A.60, F.29 55: F.4, F.31 56: F.4, F.31 56(1): F.31 59: A.144, F.32 59(2A): F.32 60: F.4, F.19, F.23, F.33, F.34, F.35, F.36, F.66 s 60(2): F.34 s 60(3): F.34 s 62: F.36 ss 62 to 68: A.28, F.38 s 63: F.40 s 64: F.41 s 64(2): A.148 s 64(3): F.41 s 65: 93B.1, F.43 s 65(2): F.42 s 65(3): F.42 s 65(4): F.42 s 65(5): F.42 s 65(7): F.42 s 65(9): F.43 s 66: A.154, F.37, F.44, F.45 s 66(2): F.44, F.45 s 66(2A): F.45 s 66(4): F.44 s 67: F.40, F.42, F.43 s 68: 43.3, F.41 s 69: 10.31, 83.4, F.46 s 69(2): 92.10, F.46 s 69(3): F.46 s 69V: F.79 s 70(2): F.5 s 72: F.38 s 76: F.47 s 77(1)(a): F.82 s 78: F.47 s 78A: F.47 s 79: F.47 s 79(2): F.47 s 80: A.67, A.73, F.48 s 80(a): A.75, F.48 s 80(b): F.48 s 81(1): F.38 ss 81 to 90: F.38, F.49 s 83: F.49 s 84: F.49 s 85: F.49 s 85(1): F.49 s 86: F.49 s 87: F.49

[All references are to paragraph numbers] cxxvi

Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Statutes Evidence Act 1995 — cont s 87(2): F.49 s 89: F.6, F.49 s 90: F.49, F.66 s 92(1)(a): F.40 s 92(2): F.50 s 93B: F.43 ss 94 to 101: F.4 s 97: A.136, F.6, F.51 s 97(1)(b): F.51 s 98: A.136, F.6, F.51 s 99: F.53 s 100: F.53 s 101: F.34, F.51 s 102: F.77 s 108(3)(b): F.45 ss 109 to 112: F.4 s 110: F.54 s 112: F.54 ss 113 to 116: F.55 s 114: F.55 s 114(2): F.55 s 115: F.55 s 116: F.55 s 117: A.136, F.56 s 118: A.163, 42.5, F.6, F.56 s 119: A.163, F.57 s 120: A.192, F.57 ss 121 to 126: F.4 s 122: F.6, F.56 s 122(2): F.58 s 122(2)(c): F.58 s 122(3)(b): F.58 s 122(4): F.58 s 122(6): F.58 s 123: A.184, F.58 s 124: A.163, F.58 s 125: F.58 s 126: F.58 s 126G: F.60 s 126H: F.60 s 126H(2): F.60 s 127: F.60 s 128: 10.21, 10.30, F.4, F.61 s 128(2): F.61 s 128(3): F.61 s 128(4): F.61 s 128(5): F.61 s 128(7): F.61 s 128A: F.61 s 130: F.62 s 130(5): F.62 s 131: F.63 s 131(2)(h): F.63 s 132: F.64 s 133: F.65 s 135: 130.4, F.31, F.47, F.48, F.49, F.66 ss 135 to 136: F.39

ss 135 to 137: F.45 s 136: F.35, F.45, F.66 s 137: F.4, F.39, F.49, F.66 s 138: F.4, F.49, F.66 s 138(1): 130.62 s 138(3)(f): F.66 s 139: F.66, F.72 s 139(3): 130.18 s 140: A.114, F.4 s 142(1): F.49 s 143: F.5 s 146: F.27, F.69 s 147: F.69 s 150: F.5 s 153: F.5 s 154: F.5 ss 154 to 158: F.69 s 155: F.5 s 157: 53.2, F.5 s 158: F.5 s 159: F.5 s 163: F.5 s 164: F.67, F.68 s 165: F.4, F.6, F.8, F.67, F.68 s 165(2)(a): F.35, F.39 s 165A: F.68 s 165B: F.68 s 167(c): F.28 s 169(1): F.28 s 169(3): F.28 ss 174 to 175: A.67 s 177: F.47 s 182: F.5 s 185: 42.5, 43.3, 45.3, 68.1, 70.1, F.5 s 186: F.5 s 187: F.61 s 190: A.2, A.62 s 192: F.18 s 632: 130.12 Pt 2: F.46 Pts 2 to 4: F.1 Pt 3: F.1 Pt 4: F.1 Evidence Amendment Act 2008: F.1, F.34, F.38, F.45, F.47, F.49, F.56, F.61, F.68 s 97(1): F.51

Evidence Amendment (Journalists’ Privilege) Act 2007: A.196 Evidence Amendment (Journalists’ Privilege) Act 2011: A.196 Evidence Regulations 1995 reg 5: F.40

Evidence and Procedure (New Zealand) Act 1994 s 14: 22.10

Excise Act 1901 s 82: F.58, F.80

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cxxvii

Table of Statutes Excise Act 1901 — cont

James Hardie (Investigations and Proceedings) Act 2004: A.194 Judiciary Act 1903

s 107AB: F.58, F.80 s 144: F.73

Extradition Act 1988: 24.1 Family Law Act 1975: A.185, F.6, F.79, F.81 s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

10D: F.79 48: 12.2 62G: A.68, F.77 69V: 12.3, 13.2 97: F.84 97(2): F.84 98: F.84 100: 7.5, 8.1 100A: A.147, F.6 100B: 6.1, 9.2, F.81 101: 13.3 102: 74.3 104(1): 67.1 120: 12.2 121: F.84

Family Law Rules 2004: F.56 r 1: 6.13 r 15.71: 6.18 r 15.74: F.81 Pt 11.1: A.208 Pt 12.2: A.208 Pt 15.1, r 15.04(c): F.77 Pt 15.2: 6.11 Pt 15.6: 6.18 O 10: 6.13 O 34B, r 32: A.68 O 46 r 6(2): Q.2 O 72, r 1: A.208 O 78, r 31: A.148

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 s 50: Q.3

Federal Magisrates Court Rules 2001 r 15.04: 6.18

Federal Magistrates Act 1999 s 63: 6.18

Foreign Evidence Act 1994: 22.1, 22.4, F.85 Freedom of Information Act 1982 s 42: A.194, F.58, F.80

Health Insurance Act 1973 s 128A: Q.18

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936: F.71 s s s s s

177: F.76 262A: 111.2 263: A.194, Q.19, F.71 264: 10.35, F.71 264(1): A.159

Inspector-General of Taxation Act 2003 s 18: F.58, F.80 s 27: F.58, F.80

Insurance Act 1973 s 38F: 10.30

s 79: A.42, F.2

Law and Justice Legislation Amendment Act 1999: F.1 Life Insurance Act 1995 s 156F: 10.30

Marriage Act 1961 s 88G: 74.2 s 89: 12.2 s 111A: 132.1

Migration Act 1958 s 271: F.76 s 306J: 10.30

Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 s 37(1): A.194

National Crime Authority Act 1984 s 22: F.71 s 30(4): 10.16

Patents Act 1990 s 200(2): A.196

Proceeds of Crime Act 2002: 14.2 s s s s s s

39: 10.36 48: F.75 225: F.71 264: F.58, F.80 317: 14.2 318: F.76

Service and Execution of Process Act 1992: 22.18, 88.2 s 15: 6.7

Shipping Registration Act 1981: 52.1 State and Territorial Laws and Records Recognition Act 1901: 42.5, 68.1 Taxation Administration Act 1953: 10.35 s 8ZL: F.73 s 82K, Sch 1, Div 355-75: A.159 Sched 1 Div 355-280: A.159

Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979: 130.49, F.82 s s s s s

5: F.83 9: F.83 10: F.83 77: 130.69 77(1): 130.49

Trade Practices Act 1974: A.201 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 r 222: A.175 r 395: A.153

Veterans’ Entitlement Act 1986 s 120: F.75

[All references are to paragraph numbers] cxxviii

Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Statutes

New South Wales

s 36: 53.9

Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1949: 1.1, A.36

Crimes Act 1900 s 410: 130.57

Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990

s 8: 74.5

s 13: A.194, 10.29 s 13A: A.194, 10.29

Child Care Act 2002

Criminal Law and Evidence Amendment Act 1891: A.27 Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sexual Offence Evidence) Act 2004: 21A.1 Evidence Act 1995: 132A.1, F.3, F.6 s s s s s

89A: A.39, Q.52 97: A.136 98: A.136 128: 10.26 135: 98.4

Justices Act 1902

s 138(2): 10.30

Child Protection Act 1999: 9.3, 21.21 s s s s s s s s s

8: F.81 99R: Q.92 105(1): 3.5, 9.3 112: 9.3, F.81 173: Q.88 182: 129A.4, Q.31, Q.38 189: Q.4 192: Q.4 193: Q.4

Children’s Court Rules

s 48E: 21AG.1

Listening Devices Act 1984: Q.87 s 5: 130.37

ss 7 to 9: 21A.1 s 16: 21A.1

Childrens Court Act 1992

Queensland Acquisition of Land Act 1967 s 39: Q.38

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 s s s s s s s s s s s

Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 2003: 74.1, Q.86

7: 67.2 7(1): 43.1 13: 2.1, 35A.1 14: 1.1 14B: 21AA.1 16: 43.4 32E: 3.11 34: 42.1 36: 3.11, 3.17, 9.3, 19.4, 45.1 39: Q.38 39A: Q.38

s 20: Q.4

Childrens Services Act 1965: 9.3 Civil Liability Act 2003: Q.46 Civil Proceedings Act 2011 s 92: 92.4 s 146: A.6, A.41, A.146, 59.12, 83.4, 92.4, 104.1, 129A.1, 129B.1

Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 s 74: A.197 s 83: A.197 s 164: A.211

Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction Reform and Modernisation Amendment Act 2010 s 66: 21AF.1

Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999

Adoption Act 2009

s 250: 129A.4, Q.38

s 223: Q.4 s 312(2): 42.3 s 313: 74.7

Commercial Arbitration Act 2013

Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 s 201: Q.92 s 208: Q.109

Associations Incorporation Act 1981: 55.1 s 64: Q.40 s 127: Q.95

Audio Visual and Audio Links Act 1999: 39A.1

Australian Consular Offıcers Notarial Powers and Evidence Act 1946: Q.1 Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2011 r 31: A.180

s s s s s

19: Q.109 19(1): 3.6 19(5): Q.7 27A: 2.2 27B(5): 10.1

Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950: Q.25 s s s s s s

5: 6.7 6: Q.7 9: Q.22 14(1A): Q.22, Q.25 16: Q.4 17: 3.5, Q.109

Community Services (Aborigines) Act 1984 s 81(a): Q.31

Bail Act 1980 s 12: Q.4

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Table of Statutes

Constitution Act 1867 s 30: 56.1 s 40: 56.1

Constitution of Queensland 2001 Sch 2: 41.3, 43A.1, 58.2, 58A.1

Coroners Act 2003 s s s s s s s

37: 3.5 37(4): Q.7 39: 10.32 40: 133.1 41: Q.4 43: Q.4 96: 10.32

Corrective Services Act 2000 s 10: 10.7 s 245: 132C.4

Crime and Corruption Act 2001: 21B.5 s 72: Q.22 ss 121 to 128: Q.87 s 146L: Q.108 s 146M: Q.40 s 185: Q.92 s 192: A.158, 8.2, Q.92 s 202: Q.4

Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1989: Q.8

Criminal Code: A.35, 1.1, 21AC.1, 21AD.2, 21M.2, 21M.3, 93A.27, Q.1 s 8: 39P.1, A.105 s 9: A.105 s 15(2)(c): Q.76 s 16: 39P.1 s 23: Q.35 s 24: Q.33, Q.35 s 26: Q.35 s 29: Q.39 s 29(2): 9D.5 s 75: 21M.3 s 93A: Q.11 s 95: 39M.1, Q.7 ss 95 to 96: 23.6, 24.3 s 122: 21M.3 s 123: 6.6, 39.1 s 125: A.35, Q.1, Q.8 s 126: 39.2, Q.1 s 127: 21M.3 s 129: Q.1 s 140: 39.2 s 195: Q.1 s 204: Q.1 s 206: 21M.3 s 208: 21M.2 s 209: 21M.2, 21M.4 s 210: 9.4, 21M.2 s 213: 21M.2 s 215: 9.4, 21M.2 s 216: 9.4, 21M.2

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

217: 9.4, 21M.2 218: 21M.2 219: 9.4, 21M.2 221: 21M.2 222: 21M.2 227: 21M.2 229B: 9.4, 21M.2 229N: Q.1 259: Q.24 269: Q.33 271: Q.33 272: Q.33 304: Q.33 306: 21M.2 308: 21M.3 309: 21M.3 313: 21M.2 315: 21M.2 317: 21M.2 319A: 21AC.2 320: 21M.2 320A: 21M.2 322: 21M.2 323: 21M.3 323A: 21M.2 323B: 21M.2 331: 21AC.2 332: 21AC.2 335: 21M.3 337: 9.4 338: 21M.4 338A: 21M.3 339: 21M.3 340: 21M.3 345: 53.9 346: 21M.3 347: 9.4 352: 21.6 354: 21M.3 354A: 21M.3 354A(5): 8.2 355: 21M.3 359: 21M.3 359E: 21M.2 363: 21M.2 363A: 9.4, 21M.2 364: 21M.2 373: 39L.1 408D: 95.6 409: 21M.2 412: 21M.2 413: 21M.3 414: 21M.3 415: 21M.3 416: 21M.4 417: 21M.4 417A: 21M.3 419: 21M.3

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Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Statutes Criminal Code — cont s 442K: 10.30, 10.32 s 442M(2): Q.1 s 539: 9.4 s 563: A.35 s 567: A.35 s 568: A.35 s 568(6): 15.26 s 568(7): 15.26 ss 590AAA to 590AW: 6.14 s 590AA: 15.12 s 590ABff: 6.13, Q.11 s 590A: 55.2 ss 590A to 590C: 6.14 s 590AA: A.102, 3.10, Q.74 s 590AA(2)(e): 92.43 s 590AB: A.98, 2.2, Q.11 s 590AD: Q.11 s 590AFA: Q.11 s 590AH: A.69 s 590AOA: 93A.27 s 590AQ: A.159 s 590AV: 6.14 s 592A: Q.74 s 594: 39B.1 s 594(4): 22.4 s 597B: A.35 s 616: 15.48, 21Q.2 s 617: Q.5 s 618A: A.33, 8.5, 15.43 s 619: A.35 s 623: A.35 s 632: A.41, A.116, A.154, 8.4, 9D.2, Q.1, Q.107, F.67 s 632(2): 8.4 s 632(3): 8.4 ss 634 to 644: Q.1 s 635: 53.9 s 636: 9.4 s 638: Q.31 s 639: Q.31 s 644: A.35, A.61, Q.46 s 695A: Q.4 s 702: 53.9 ss 705 to 706: 9D.1 Ch 16: 39.1 Chs 28 to 32: 93B.2 Ch 29: 93B.2 Ch 30: 93B.2 Ch 32: 21M.2

Criminal Code and Justices Act Amendment Act 1975 s 27: 15.5

Criminal Code and Other Acts Amendment Act 2008: , 21AC.2, 21M.4, 93A.26, 144.2, 146.1

Criminal Code, Evidence Act and Other Acts Amendment Act 1989: A.40, 9C.1, 93A.1 s 9: 9C.1 s 21A: 9C.1, 21A.1 s 30: 53.9 s 61: 9.4 s 93A: 9C.1

Criminal Justice Act 1988 s 32: 21A.1

Criminal Justice Act 1989 s 99: A.159

Criminal Law Amendment Act 1892: A.27, A.33, 15.1, 131.2 Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894: Q.67 s 10: A.33, 130.69, Q.59, Q.60

Criminal Law Amendment Act 1979 s 10: 95.1

Criminal Law Amendment Act 1997: 93A.1, 131A.1, 132A.1, 132B.1 s 84: 8.4

Criminal Law Amendment Act 2000: A.41, 21A.1, 93A.1, 93B.1, 98.6 s s s s s s s s s s

31: 38, 38, 38, 38, 38, 43: 44: 45: 47:

Q.107 r 1: 21.8 r 2: 21.8 r 4: 21.8 r 5: 21.8 r 6: 21.8 3.27 A.41, 6.1, 9.5, 9C.1 20.1, 21.1 21L.1

Criminal Law Amendment Act 2002 s 48: 95A.1 s 49: 133A.1

Criminal Law Amendment Act 2014 s 50: 39PB.1, 39PC.1 s 53: 55A.1 s 54: 95.1

Criminal Law Amendment Act (No 3) 1997: A.41, 92.43 s 113: A.41

Criminal Law (Child Exploitation and Dangerous Drugs) Amendment Act 2013 s 53: 54.1

Criminal Law (Criminal Organisations Disruption) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2013 s 73: 39B.1

Criminal Law (Domestic Violence) Amendment Act 2015: 21A.1 Criminal Law (False Evidence Before Parliament) Amendment Act 2012: A.159

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Table of Statutes

Criminal Law (Rehabilitation of Offenders) Act 1986: 15A.1, 21G.2 s 3(1): 15A.2, 15A.3, 15A.4 s 3(2)(b): 15A.4 s 4(2): 15A.4 s 4(3): 15A.6 s 5(3)(b): 15A.1 s 8: A.39, 15A.1 s 9A: 15A.7 s 11: 15A.5 s 14: A.39 ss 21L to 21S: 21L.1 Div 6, Pt 2: 21L.1

Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978: A.39, A.41, 13.3, 21.5, Q.1 s 3: 21.6 s 4: 21.8 s 4(2): A.154 s 4, r 1: 21.11, 21.16 s 4, r 2: 21.12 s 4, r 3: 21.12 s 4, r 4: 21.12 s 4, r 5: 21.12 s 4A: A.154, 21.5, 93A.11 s 5: 21.7, 21A.4, Q.4 s 5(1)(f): 21.7 s 5(1)(g): 21.7 s 6: 21.7, Q.4 s 7: Q.4 s 8: 21.7 r 4: 21.10, 21.13 r 5: 21.18 r 6: 21.19

Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995 s 5: 131A.2 s 14: 132C.6 Pt 2: 131A.2

Criminal Organisation Act 2009 s 153: 21A.1

Criminal Practice Rules 1999 r 5: 133.1 r 29: 6.7

Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002: A.194, 10.13, 10.29, 14.2, 92.41, Q.8, Q.108 s 8: 10.13 s 40: A.194, 10.29, Q.92 s 58: 10.13 s 94: 92.41 s 194: Q.108

Cross-Border Law Enforcement Legislation Amendment Act 2005: 21B.1 Disaster Management Act 2003 s 69: 55A.1

District Court of Queensland Act 1967 s 100: 39B.1 ss 110A to 110G: 22.4, 39PB.1, 39Z.1

s 131: 39Z.1

Drugs Misuse Act 1986: Q.88 s s s s s s

47: A.159 103(3): 10.30 104: Q.22 124: Q.33 129: Q.36 130: Q.40

Duties Act 2001 s 487: 3.16 Sch 1, s 551: 127.1

Electricity Act 1994 s 152E: Q.88

Electronic Transactions (Queensland) Act 2013 s 14: 92.38, Q.100

Environmental Protection Act 1994 s 490: Q.40

Evidence Act 1898: 71.1, A.34 Evidence Act Amendment Act 1981 s 2: 24.4

Evidence Amendment Act 2000: 132C.1, 136.1 s 132C: 132C.1 s 136C(4): 132C.1

Evidence Amendment Regulation (No 1) 1993 s 4: 134A.8

Evidence (Attestation of Documents) Act 1937: A.36, Q.1, Q.7 Evidence Further Amendment Act 1874-1962: A.32 s 3: 12.1 s 3A: 13.1

Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003: A.41, A.154, 15A.7 s 6: 136.1 s 8(3): A.41 s 9: A.41 ss 9A to 9D: 9.6 s 9E: A.41 s 11: A.41 s 15: 6.13, 6.14, Q.11 s 21A: A.41 ss 21AA to 21AZC: A.41 s 21AD: A.41 s 39B(4): 39C.6 s 40: 21.5 s 54: 3.1 s 55: 4.1 s 56: 8.2 s 57: 9.6, 9A.1, 9B.1, 9C.1, 9D.1, 9E.1 s 58: 11.1 s 59(5): 21A.1 s 60: 21AA.1

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Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Statutes Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003 — cont s s s s s s s

s 130(6): Q.92

Health Act 1937: 14.2 s 178(2): 42.3

61: 39C.2 63M: 93A.1 64: 93AA.1 65: 131.3 67: 137.1 93A(5): A.41 139: 138.2

Health Practitioners (Professional Standards) Act 1999 s 136(1)(c): 3.5 s 149: Q.109 s 179: Q.109

Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011

Evidence Regulation 2007: 107.2, 135.1 s 6: 134A.2, 134A.3, 135.1 s 7: 135.1

Evidence (Reproductions) Act 1970: 105.2, F.69 Pt 7: F.69

Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Amendment Act 2000: A.41, 21B.1, Q.4 s 4: A.41, 3.27 s 6: 21B.2 s 21F(3): 21B.2

s 142(1): 134A.6 s 143: 134A.6

Invasion of Privacy Act 1971: 130.75, Q.87, Q.89, Q.92 s s s s s s

43(2)(a): 130.37, Q.87 43(2)(c): Q.88 43(2)(d): Q.90 46Q.87 46: 130.69, Q.87 46(1): Q.87

Judicial Review Act 1991

Evidence and Discovery Act 1867: A.22, A.30, A.37, 1.1, 7.1, 23.1, 92.4, Q.1 s 16: 17.3 s 25A: 61.2 s 31: A.37, 1.1 s 37A: 1.1 s 37: 70.2, 1.1 s 38: A.37, 1.1 ss 42A to 42C: 92.3 s 43: A.37, 1.1 s 61: A.37, 1.1 s 67: 1.1, 22.4, A.37, 23.1, 93.11 s 79: A.37, 1.1

Evidence on Commission Act 1988: 22.4, Q.1 s 4: 22.4 s 5: 22.4

Sch 1, Pt 1: 21B.2

Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross Vesting) Act 1987 s 11(1)(c): Q.110

Jury Act 1995 s s s s

4: A.20 18: A.20 22: A.20 52: A.60

Justice Legislation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1996: 93A.1 Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2005: 93A.1, 144.1, 145.1 s 63(4): 93A.9

Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2013 s 80: 7.1

Explosives Act 1999 s 87: Q.88 s 100(3): 10.30

Fair Trading Act 1989: 49.2 s 112: Q.40 s 112(1): Q.38

Justice and Other Legislation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2000: 49.3, 92.33 s 1: A.41, 15.17 s 2: 15.17

Justices Act 1886: A.22, 21AF.3

Family Law Act 1975 ss 20 to 21: 13.3 s 146: 9.3

Fisheries Act 1994 s 49: Q.88

Food Act 2006 ss 42 to 47: Q.33 s 248: Q.40 s 250: Q.40

Freedom of Information Act 1992: 134A.5 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 s 108: Q.4 s 109(2): Q.4

s 18: 42.3 s 41: 2.2 ss 70 to 71: Q.4 s 76: Q.34 s 78: 6.7 s 104: 9D.1 s 104(3): Q.47 s 105: Q.47 s 110A: 21AB.2, 21AF.1, Q.9 s 110A(4): 93A.24 s 110A(9): 21AF.2, 21AF.3 s 111: 9D.1, 23.3, 23.4, 93.11 s 111(3)(b): 23.3

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Table of Statutes Justices Act 1886 — cont s 113: Q.47 s 134: 9D.1 s 178C: 39B.1

Ombudsman Act 2001 s 45: Q.92

Partnership Act 1891

Justices Act 1902

s 18: Q.86

s 21AW(2): 21AW.2

Penalties and Sentences Act 1992

Land Tax Act 2010 s 63: Q.40

Land Title Act 1994: 56.2, 57.1 ss 22 to 23: Q.22 s 36: 51.9, Q.95 s 47: 56.2 s 29: Q.92

Legal Profession Act 2004 8: 39F.2 9: 39F.2 475: 3.5 479: A.113

Legislative Standards Act 1992 s 4(2): 21B.1 s 4(3): Q.93

Limitation of Actions Act 1974: A.220 s 35: Q.106 s 36: Q.106

Liquor Act 1992 s 178(3): 10.30 s 233: Q.31

Local Government Act 2009 s 248: Q.40

Magistrates Court Act 1921 s 10(2): 3.5

Maintenance Act 1965 s 14: 53.10 s 16: 53.10

Mental Health Act 2000 s 458: Q.4

Mineral Resources Act 1989 s 129(3)(a): 129A.5 s 413(2): 129A.4, Q.38 s 413(4): Q.40

Misconduct Tribunals Act 1997 s 23(2): 3.5

Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 s s s s s

37(1): 10.37 46A: 37.1, Q.24 48: A.194 48(1): Q.92 48(2): Q.92

Mutual Recognition (Queensland) Act 1992 Pt 3: 39F.1

National Crime Authority Act 1984 s 96: 10.18

Oaths Act 1867: 21AF.3 s 5: 6.4

s 15: 132C.4 s 15A: 22.4, 39B.1

Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 s 20: A.194

Legal Aid Queensland Act 1997

s s s s

s 13: Q.7 ss 17 to 20: 6.4

Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000: A.41, 130.14, 130.16, F.72, Q.1, Q.12, Q.83 s 10: 130.14 s 29: 130.45, 130.73 s 37: 130.18 ss 124 to 127: 130.73 ss 137 to 140: 130.73 s 150(2): Q.12 s 150(3): Q.12 s 150(4): Q.12 s 150(5): Q.12 ss 150 to 162: 130.73 s 155: Q.12 s 156(1): Q.12 s 157: Q.12 s 158: Q.12 s 160: 130.45, 130.73, Q.17 s 196: 130.73 ss 328 to 335: 130.75 s 391: 130.51 s 397: 10.3 s 403: 130.34, 130.51 ss 403 to 410: Q.62 ss 403 to 411: 130.72 ss 405 to 406: 130.72 s 414: 130.31 s 416: Q.59 s 417: 130.26 s 418: 130.34, 130.76 s 419: Q.56 s 420: 130.34 ss 420 to 421: Q.56 ss 420 to 422: 130.74, 130.76 s 421: 130.34 s 423: 130.34 ss 431 to 435: 130.18 s 433: 130.18, 130.34, 131A.1 s 435: 130.18 ss 436 to 437: 130.63, 130.77, Q.56 ss 436 to 439: A.39, 130.31 s 438: 130.33 s 439(2): 130.15, 130.68, Q.56 s 443: 130.73 ss 443 to 444: Q.24 ss 445 to 466: 10.7, 37.1 ss 449 to 455: 130.74

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Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Statutes Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 — cont ss 458 to 465: 130.74 s 467: 10.7, 130.74, Q.24 ss 475 to 488: 10.7 ss 475 to 490: 130.74 s 482: Q.24 s 484: Q.24 s 485: Q.24 ss 502 to 503: Q.24 s 504: Q.24 ss 509 to 510: Q.24 s 540: Q.24 s 617: A.79, 130.74, Q.24 s 617(4): A.79, 130.74 Sch 10, s 33: 130.17

Police Powers and Responsibilities and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2014 s 44: 95A.1 s 45: 133A.1

Powers of Attorney Act 1998 s s s s

11: Q.96 14: Q.95 81(3)(b): Q.92 87: Q.38

s 72: 3.5

Rules of the Supreme Court O 40 r 3A: 134A.1

Small Claims Tribunal Act 1973: 3.5 Status of Children Act 1978: 74.9 s s s s s s s s s s

3: 12.2 5: 12.2 11: 37.1 11(1)(b): Q.24 11(7): 37.2, Q.24 11(10): Q.24 12: 10.1 18B: 74.9 18C: 53.10 25: Q.86

Sch 1, s 3: 25.1, 34.1

10: Q.97 11: Q.97 12: Q.97 56: 3.14, Q.97 57: Q.41 59: 3.14 249: 56.2 250: 56.2 347: Q.38

Statute of Frauds: Q.98, Q.100 Succession Act 1981 s 9: Q.96 s 10: 3.14, 61.3 s 40: 12.2

Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991

Public Records Act 2002 s 7: 129.2 s 10: 129.2 Sch 1, s 62: 129.1

s 80: 39B.1 ss 80 to 82: 22.4 s 114: A.197 s 114(1): A.208 ss 116A to 116G: 22.4, 39PB.1, 39Z.1 s 117: 39Z.1

Surrogacy Act 2010 s 95: 21AC.2

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 s 29: 3.26 s 98(1)(b): Q.7

Surveillance Devices Act 2004 s 38: Q.90

Taxation Administration Act 2001

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009 r 39: Q.38 r 86 : A.203

Racing Act 2002 s s s s

Q.8

Retail Shop Leases Act 1994

Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No 2) 1992: 134A.1

Property Law Act 1974: Q.97 s s s s s s s s s

Recording of Evidence (Amendment) Regulation (No 1) 1993: Q.8 Recording of Evidence Amendment Regulation (No 1) 2003: Q.8 Recording of Evidence Regulation 1992:

172(2): 3.5 330: 129A.4, Q.38 332: Q.40 333: Q.31

Recording of Evidence Act 1962: 23.3, Q.1, Q.8 s 10: Q.8 s 11: Q.8

s 87: Q.22, Q.92 s 124: 10.30

Telegraphic Messages Act 1872: 3.29, A.31 Traffıc Act 1949: Q.34 Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 s s s s s s s s

60: Q.40 80: 10.7, Q.24 80(15G): Q.40 80(15H): Q.40 80(16B): Q.24 80(16F): A.63 124(1)(r): Q.31 124(1)(u): Q.38

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cxxxv

Table of Statutes Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 — cont s 157A: Q.40

Treasury and Trade and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2013 s 109: 146.2

Trust Accounts Act 1973 s 26A: Q.22

Uniform Civil Procedure Amendment Rule (No 1) No 115 of 2004: A.68 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999: 39Q.1, A.176 r 4: 106.3 s 83: 129A.3 s 103: 129A.3 s 129A(1)(a)(ii): 129A.3 r 150(1)(e): A.218 r 150(4): Q.105 r 187: Q.46 r 188: A.61 r 212: Q.93 r 212(1): 10.1 r 212(2): Q.93 r 213: A.162 r 217(3)(a): 3.11 r 227: 19.12, 104.7, 119.1 r 320: A.208 rr 323 to 333: A.208 rr 360 to 361: A.203 r 371(1): A.146 r 390: 6.10 r 390(b): A.48 r 391: 6.18, Q.1 r 392 : A.41 r 392: 22.4, 22.10, 39B.1 r 394: 104.1, 129A.1, Q.108 r 396: 22.1, 22.27 rr 396 to 409: 22.4, 25.2, 34.1 rr 396 to 413: 27.1, 36.1 r 401: 22.25 r 402: 22.20, Q.8 r 403: 22.21 r 404: 22.20 r 405: 28.1 rr 410 to 413: 22.3 rr 414 to 422: 6.7, 6.8, Q.10 r 416: Q.10 r 422: A.65 r 423: A.68, 6.13 rr 423 to 429S: A.68 r 425: A.68 r 426: A.68 rr 426 to 429S: Q.1 r 427: A.68 r 428: A.68 r 429: A.68, Q.93 r 429B: A.68

r 429C: A.68 rr 429G to 429J: A.68 r 429H(6): A.68 r 429N: A.68 r 429N(2): A.68 r 429O: A.68 r 430: A.146 r 430(2): Q.108 r 436: A.146 r 439: A.49, 20.2, 22.17, 63.1 r 439(1): 6.11 r 439(3): A.49 r 439(5): 92.9 r 502(3): 3.6 r 514(1)(f): Q.4 r 547(3)(e): 6.13, Q.93 r 602: 63.1 r 604: 61.3, 63.1 r 604(2): 61.3 r 609: 63.1 r 689: 90.1 r 965: 75.3 r 975A: 3.11 Ch 7, Pt 1: 6.13, 115.1, 129A.3, 133.4, 134A.1, Q.11 Ch 7, Pt 2: 88.2 Ch 8, Pt 1: 133.4, Q.11 Ch 11: Q.1 Pt 5: 39PB.1

Weapons Act 1990 s 163(1)(c): Q.31 s 163(2): Q.40

Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 s s s s

282: 37.1, Q.24 284: A.194 421(13): 10.30 583: Q.31

Work Health and Safety Act 2011 s 230: Q.40

Youth Justice Act 1992 s s s s s s s

18: Q.6 29: 130.34, 130.76, Q.56, Q.61 72: Q.6 148: 15A.4 150: 132C.5 151: 132C.5 301: Q.4

South Australia Criminal Code: 132A.2 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 278(2a): 132A.2 s 597A(1AA): 132A.2

Criminal Law (Undercover Operations) Act 1995: 130.58

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Evidence Law in Queensland

Table of Statutes

Tasmania Evidence Act 2001 s 97: A.136 s 98: A.136

Victoria

United Kingdom Bankers Books Evidence Act 1879: A.22 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1836: 74.1 Chancery Procedure Act 1852: A.24 Civil Evidence Act 1938: A.28, A.30, A.36, 92.1

Civil Evidence Act 1968: A.38, 92.17

Crimes Act 1958

s 11: 79.3

s 398A: A.140

Crimes (Custody and Investigation) Act 1988: Q.83 Evidence Act 1958: 1.1 Evidence Act 2008: F.3

Western Australia Criminal Code

Civil Evidence Act 1972: A.28 Common Law Procedure Act 1854: A.25, A.29 s 1: A.25 s 20: A.22 s 22: A.25 s 25: 16.1, 19.9 s 26: A.14, 60.2 s 27: 59.1, 59.10

Criminal Procedure Act 1865

s 36BE: 8.4

s 6: 19.9

Evidence Act 1906 s 31A: A.136, A.137, A.140

Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 s 80: 39A.1

New Zealand Evidence Act 1908 s 13A: 21B.1

Evidence Amendment Act 1994 s 14: 22.10 ss 14-18: 6.7 s 18: 22.10 s 25 : 22.10

Court of Probate Act 1857 ss 64 to 65: 64.1

Criminal Evidence Act 1898: A.22, A.27, A.28, 15.1 Criminal Evidence Act 1965: A.28, 93.1 Criminal Justice Act 2003 s 99: A.137 s 101: A.137 s 103: A.137

Evidence and Procedure (New Zealand) Regulations 1995 r 9: 22.10

Imperial Evidence Act 1851

Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s 34: A.39, 130.18 s 35(3): A.122

Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885: A.27 Criminal Procedure Act 1865: A.25 s 6: 16.1 s 8: 59.1

Documentary Evidence Act 1868

s 11: 70.2

s 2: A.22

Extradition Act 1870: 22.24 Extradition Act 1988 s 5: 24.2

Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act 1856: A.22, 22.4, 22.24, 24.2, 25.1, 36.1

Documentary Evidence Act Amendment Act 1882: A.22 Evidence Act 1843 s 1: A.26

Evidence Act 1868 s 2: 71.1

s 1: 22.24

Merchant Shipping Act 1894: 52.1 Statute of Frauds: A.14 Statute of Wills; Wills Act 1837: A.14 Witnesses on Trial for Treason etc Act 1702: 131.1

Evidence Act 1938 s 3: 61.2

Evidence Amendment Act 1851: A.29 s 2: A.26

Evidence Amendment Act 1853: A.29 ss 1 to 2: A.26

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Table of Statutes

Evidence Further Amendment Act 1869: A.32

Evidence on Commission Act 1831: A.22, A.29

Oaths Act: A.22 Offences Against the Person Act 1861: A.27

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984:

Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act 1856: A.29

Indictable Offences Act 1848: A.22, A.29,

130.14 s 34: Q.83 s 78: 130.42

Summary Offences Act 1848

10.9

Indian Evidence Act 1872: A.30 Law of Evidence Act 1877: A.27

s 18: A.23

Witnesses Act 1806: 10.14

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Evidence Law in Queensland

HISTORY AND COMMON LAW FOUNDATIONS HISTORY Nature of evidence law [A.1] Courts of law are not so free to gather information as other decision-makers, although recent changes to civil procedure1 have, to a degree, freed them from former restraints.2 But generally they still depend on information collected and tendered by the parties. Often they must disregard relevant material in deference to technical rules of exclusion. The hearsay rule, for example, excludes much information that is relevant and sometimes highly reliable, while the rules of privilege protect State secrets, self-incriminating information and communications between lawyer and client. However, subject to these and other rules of exclusion, relevance is the fons et origo of evidence law. Evidence law concentrates on admissibility – that is, on whether information offered by a party may be received and considered by the court. The distinct and ultimately decisive question of whether it should be accepted and acted upon depends on its weight, as assessed by the judge of fact. Most of the rules of evidence deal with admissibility, but a few do relate to acceptability – for example, standards of proof, precautions with evidence of identity3 and the rule in Jones v Dunkel4 (failure to call a material witness). Proof of central events may be direct or indirect (circumstantial). Circumstantial proof depends on estimates of the “probabilities of human affairs”.5 More refined theories of probability belong to non-judicial writings.6 [A.2] Evidence is “adjectival”, as distinct from “substantive”, law;7 it deals with the process by which a legal right is enforced, as distinct from the law that enforces the right.8 But that distinction should not obscure the importance of this 1. See [6.17] – [6.18]. 2. Scott v Numurkah Corporation (1954) 91 CLR 300; R v Dodd [1985] 2 Qd R 277. Criminal courts have a reserve power to call witnesses: R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563. 3. Alexander v The Queen (1981) 145 CLR 395; R v Bigeni (1990) 47 A Crim R 363; Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555; R v Zullo [1993] 2 Qd R 572; [1993] QCA 208. 4. (1959) 101 CLR 298; Earle v Castlemaine District Community Hospital [1974] VR 722 is a good illustration. 5. Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 at 375; Re Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 193-194; Ware v Amaral Pastoral Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] NSWSC 1550 at [14]. 6. For example, Cohen, The Probable and the Proveable (Oxford University Press, 1977; published online, Oxford Scholarship online, 2011); Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability (2nd ed, 1983); Eggleston, “The Philosophy of Proof” (1991) 65 ALJ 130. 7. Cardile v Nominal Defendant (Qld) [1978] Qd R 132. 8. Poyser v Minors (1881) 7 QBD 329 at 333.

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subject. Success in a legal claim depends on presentation of sufficient admissible evidence to establish it in a court of law. The law of evidence, though adjectival, is the working tool which a trial judge must constantly keep at hand and the principles of the law of evidence are, so to speak, the ground on which the dynamics of a trial, especially a criminal trial, are played out.10

However, adjectival law may be varied by waiver or consent,11 as in the “evidence clauses” of many standard-form contracts. A certificate issued in accordance with a contract may determine both the existence and the quantum of a debt.12 One rationale for “without prejudice” privilege is that it arises from an agreement to vary the rules of evidence.13 Another difference between adjectival and substantive law is that legislation amending the law of evidence is presumed to be retrospective, as in Cardile v Nominal Defendant (Qld).14 Sections 136 and 138 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) imply that presumption. [A.3] The rules of evidence have been described as crystallisations of procedural fairness: [They] represent the attempt made, through many generations, to evolve a method of inquiry best calculated to prevent error and elicit truth. No tribunal can, without grave danger of injustice, set them on one side.15

But in an era when judicial discretion tends to be more fashionable than legal certainty, rules of evidence are sometimes conflated with arid points of practice in the past. “[T]echnical objections … will be received with less enthusiasm today”.16 The principle that courts should give reasons for their decisions17 does not generally apply to interlocutory rulings,18 so that many points of evidence are disposed of inarticulately,19 if not arbitrarily.20 9. Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261 at 267 per Dixon CJ. Subordinate legislation abrogating professional privilege is dubiously labelled “procedural” in Cleland v Boynes (1978) 19 SASR 464. 10. Pollitt v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 558 at 573 per Brennan J. 11. Dobbs v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1935) 53 CLR 643; Bellini v ANZ Banking Group [1998] ACL Rep 195 (Vic 4); Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 190. 12. Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [117]. 13. See [A.197]. 14. [1978] Qd R 132; see also Carrick v J [1989] Tas R 24; (1989) 39 A Crim R 235 (removal of corroboration requirement); Rodway v The Queen (1990) 169 CLR 515; R v Truong (1999) 105 A Crim R 345 (procedures for sentencing); R v Climas (1999) 74 SASR 411; R v GT [2005] QCA 478. 15. R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228 at 256 per Evatt J. 16. Queensland v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd [1999] ATPR 41-691 at 42,827; Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (1991) 105 ALR 456 at 466. 17. Davis v Davis; Wissing (Party Cited) (1963) 5 FLR 398 at 401; Re Poyser and Mills’ Arbitration [1964] 2 QB 467 at 478; Pettitt v Dunkley [1971] 1 NSWLR 376; Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 378 at 385; Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 at 278. 18. Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 at 279. 19. There was scant sympathy for a complaint that no explicit ruling was given in Workers Compensation (Dust Diseases) Board of NSW v Smith [2010] NSWCA 19.

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[A.4] No legal subject is less “academic” than Evidence. If a tender is not pressed, or an objection is not promptly made, the point is lost or, at least, very difficult to retrieve.21 It is not the judge’s task to rule on the admissibility of evidence to which a legally represented party does not object.22 Similarly, evidence abandoned at the first sound of an objection cannot be described as wrongly excluded.23 Generally, evidence must be adduced at first instance, or not at all. Stringent and cumulative24 tests are applied before a new trial is granted for “fresh evidence”,25 even in criminal matters.26 The adversary system generally requires a court to base its decision, as best it can, on the information the parties place before it.27 However, new (as distinct from fresh) evidence is sometimes so strong as to warrant its reception, despite the fact that it could have been led at the trial.28 20. There are, of course, noble exceptions, eg Manenti v Metropolitan Tramways Board [1954] VLR 155; Gates v CML Insurance Society Ltd (1982) 43 ALR 313; Taylor v Harvey [1986] 2 Qd R 137; Sheldon v Sun Alliance Ltd (1988) 50 SASR 236; aff’d (1989) 53 SASR 97. 21. Roof and Ceiling Construction Co v Wigan [1972] QWN 14; Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 158; Smith v Bagias (1978) 21 ALR 435 at 441-2; Robert Bax and Associates v Cavenham Pty Ltd [2013] 1 Qd R 476 at [35] – [36]. As to criminal appeals, see Stirland v DPP [1944] AC 315; Bohdahl v The Queen (1987) 24 A Crim R 318; Poniris v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 100 (objection based on relevance does not cover objection based on undue prejudice); Kupang Resources Ltd v International Litigation Partners Pte Ltd [2015] WASCA 89 at [146]. 22. FDP v The Queen (2008) 74 NSWLR 645; [2008] NSWCCA 317. Distinguish unrepresented accused: see [8.6]. 23. R v Phair [1986] 1 Qd R 136. 24. Bonett v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 234. 25. R v McDermott (No 1) (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 379; Re Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 182; Orchard v Orchard (1972) 3 SASR 89 at 98-99; Williams v Offıcial Trustee in Bankruptcy (1994) 122 ALR 585; Hawkins v Pender Bros Pty Ltd [1990] 1 Qd R 135; Radnedge v Government Insurance Offıce of NSW (1987) 9 NSWLR 235; Akins v National Australia Bank (1994) 34 NSWLR 155; Orr v Holmes (1948) 76 CLR 632 at 640-641; Mickelberg v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 259 at 273; Easterday v The Queen (2003) 143 A Crim R 154; [2003] WASCA 69; IVI Pty Ltd v Baycrown Pty Ltd [2007] 1 Qd R 428; [2006] QCA 461; Malouf v Malouf (2006) 65 NSWLR 449; [2006] NSWCA 83 (no acceptable explanation for omission from trial); Medical Council of Tasmania v Lad (2007) 16 Tas R 260; [2007] TASSC 43; GAR v The Queen (No 1) [2010] NSWCCA 163; Thomas v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 22 at [14]; Stoney v A & S Boesley Pty Ltd [2014] VSCA 237 (not available at hearing but could not have affected decision). There are guidelines for appeals based on fresh evidence in Goninan & Co Pty Ltd v Direct Engineering Services Pty Ltd (2007) 33 WAR 182; [2007] WASCA 10; Wong v Jani-King Franchising Inc [2014] QCA 76. 26. Holland v The Queen (2005) 154 A Crim R 376; [2005] WASCA 140; R v Erasmus [2006] QCA 245 (leave refused in each case); see, however, R v Abou-Chabake (2004) 149 A Crim R 417; [2004] NSWCCA 356 at [63] (latitude in judging “due diligence”). Distinguish permission to lead additional evidence at the trial itself, when leave is more readily granted: Osborne v Landpower Developments Pty Ltd (In liq) [2003] WASCA 117; Rich v The Queen [2014] VSCA 126 (evidence not credible). 27. Kristeff v The Queen (1968) 42 ALJR 233; Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge “Willemstad” (1976) 136 CLR 529 at 582-583; [1976] HCA 65; Police v Kyriacou (2009) 103 SASR 243; [2009] SASC 66 at [4]; Police v Pakrou (2008) 102 SASR 207; [2008] SASC 294; Ipp, “Reforms to the Adversarial Process in Civil Litigation” (1995) 69 ALJ 705 at 707. 28. R v Johnson [2004] NSWCCA 121; R v Condren; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 574 at 579; R v Sharkey [2013] QCA 259 at [9]; Aztech Science Pty Ltd v Atlanta Aerospace (Woy © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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“Fresh evidence” is evidence which either did not exist at the time of the trial,29 or which could not with reasonable diligence then be discovered.30 “Fresh evidence” was successfully claimed in R v Gilvarry31 and Mickelberg v The Queen.32 In Cosgrove v Johns33 the fresh evidence consisted of proof that a witness deliberately gave false testimony in the original trial. Fresh evidence going only to credit may be admitted, although in practice it will often fail to meet the appropriate tests.34 An application to introduce additional evidence while judgment is reserved may be entertained if the omission was not deliberate, and the additional material, if accepted, is likely to affect the result. In Mannah v Western Australia35 the evidence sought to be admitted was fresh, relevant, but not credible. If the evidence was reasonably available during the trial, this presents a serious obstacle, albeit not a fatal one.36 As to fresh evidence in a sentencing hearing, see R v Lorenzo.37 New evidence was admitted on a sentencing issue in Springer v The Queen38 in the “exceptional” circumstance that, although its existence was known at the time of trial, its full significance was not. When a question seems technically improper, or material tendered seems inadmissible, an immediate objection should be raised. Each party (particularly the objector)39 should then be prepared to make submissions, at least in outline, for or against its reception.40 In civil cases, inadmissible evidence not objected to is generally “in for what it is worth”,41 but in criminal proceedings the law is more circumspect. However, Woy) Pty Ltd (2005) 55 ACSR 1; [2005] NSWCA 319; Phoenix Commercial Enterprises Pty Ltd v Canada Bay City Council [2010] NSWCA 64 at [6] – [11], [79] – [80]; R v Gbojueh (2009) 103 SASR 545; [2009] SASC 104 (incompetence of counsel a possible ground). 29. See, eg, R v DBI [2015] QCA 83 (post-trial statement recanting evidence of complainant at trial). 30. R v Sharkey [2013] QCA 259 at [8]; Lawless v The Queen (1979) 142 CLR 659 at 674-676; Pearce v Western Australia [2014] WASCA 156 at [27] – [28]. 31. [1991] 2 Qd R 431. 32. (2004) 29 WAR 13; [2004] WASCA 145. 33. [2002] 1 Qd R 57; [2000] QCA 157. 34. Muller v Western Australia [2014] WASCA 81 at [63]. 35. [2016] WASCA 19. 36. Computer Accounting and Tax Pty Ltd v Professional Services of Australia Pty Ltd (No 4) [2011] WASC 284; Pearce v Western Australia [2014] WASCA 156 at [26] (“such a doubt that the court is satisfied the appellant should not have been convicted”). 37. [2001] NSWCCA 389. 38. (2007) 177 A Crim R 13; [2007] NSWCCA 289. 39. R v Yacoob [1981] 72 Cr App R 313. 40. R v Singleton [1986] 2 Qd R 535; Dainford Ltd v Yulara [1984] 1 NSWLR 546 at 553-554; Forbes, “Inadmissible Evidence: Objections Well Taken and Rulings Well Made” (1984) 13 UQLJ 197 at 199. 41. Miller v Cameron (1936) 54 CLR 572 at 577 and 382; Roof and Ceiling Construction Co v Wigan [1972] QWN 14; Jones v Sutherland Shire Council [1979] 2 NSWLR 206 at 212 and 214-215; Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 158; McGregor-Lowndes v Collector of Customs (Qld) (1968) 11 FLR 349; Hughes v National Trustees Executors & Agency Co Australasia Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 134 at 153; National Australia Bank Ltd v Troiani [2002] QCA 196 (non-expert opinion on value not objected to); Robert Bax & Associates v Cavenham

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CTM v The Queen shows that, even in criminal proceedings, a failure to take a point at the first opportunity may be fatal. Inadmissible evidence that endangers a fair trial may justify an appeal, despite a failure to object,43 provided that the omission was not a tactical manoeuvre by competent counsel.44 It is possible to secure a new trial without proving that defence counsel was “flagrantly” incompetent,45 but generally an accused is bound by counsel’s conduct of his or her case.46 On an issue of “flagrant incompetence”, the question is whether there could be a reasonable explanation for the course that was chosen.47 It is not enough that an appeal court considers that the impugned decision of the advocate, rational in itself, injured the appellant’s case.48 In the final analysis, an erroneous ruling on evidence is a good appeal point only if it is likely to have caused a miscarriage of justice.49 A court may act on inadmissible evidence adduced by the defence to which the prosecution does not object.50 An appellant who complains that the jury was misdirected should be prepared to show that an appropriate redirection was sought without success,51 although this is not an absolute rule.52 A ruling on evidence in an abortive trial need not be followed at a retrial.53

Pty Ltd [2013] 1 Qd R 476; [2012] QCA 177; Gray t/as Clarence Valley Plumbing Services v Ware Building Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCA 271 at [94]; Kupang Resources Ltd v International Litgation Partners Pte Ltd [2015] WASCA 89 at 146. 42. (2008) 236 CLR 440; see also FDP v The Queen (2008) 74 NSWLR 645; [2008] NSWCCA 317. 43. Young, “How Incompetent Must Your Lawyer Be to Get a New Trial?” (1993) 67 ALJ 796; R v Clinton [1993] 1 WLR 1181 at 1187. 44. Stirland v DPP [1944] AC 315; R v Bohdahl (1987) 24 A Crim R 318; R v Hall [1987] 1 NZLR 616; R v Waring (No 2) [1972] Qd R 263; R v M [1991] 2 Qd R 68; DJT v The Queen (1999) 73 ALJR 460; R v Aston (No 1) [1991] 1 Qd R 363; Suresh v The Queen (1998) 72 ALJR 769 at 774 and 781; there was such a decision in R v McGrane [2002] QCA 173; and in JJB v The Queen (2006) 161 A Crim R 187; [2006] NSWCCA 126; Velkoski v The Queen (2014) 242 A Crim R 222; [2014] VSCA 121. In HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16, there were no “exceptional” circumstances to warrant consideration of an objection not taken below. A failure by “experienced counsel” to object to plainly inadmissible material was not fatal in Heedes v Western Australia (No 2) [2008] WASCA 142. 45. R v ND [2004] 2 Qd R 307; [2003] QCA 505;. 46. Saunders v The Queen (2004) 149 A Crim R 174; [2004] TASSC 5. 47. Pearce v Western Australia [2014] WASCA 156 at [20] – [24]. 48. Clee v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 18. 49. Clarke v Japan Machines (Australia) Pty Ltd [1984] 1 Qd R 404; DCT v Ahern [1988] 2 Qd R 158 at 163-164; Mickelberg v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 259; Tasovac v Western Australia [2015] WASCA 24 at [41]. 50. Re Knowles [1984] VR 751. 51. R v Lovet [1986] 1 Qd R 52; R v Verma (1987) 30 A Crim R 441; H v The Queen (1994) 69 ALJR 22; [1994] HCA 59 at 24 (ALJR); R v Western Australia [2006] WASCA 101. 52. King v The Queen (1986) 15 FCR 427 at 439-440; 22 A Crim R 153; Robinson v The Queen (No 2) (1991) 180 CLR 531; [1991] HCA 38. 53. Cornwell v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 260. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Not for barristers only [A.5] Many rules of evidence, including the “character evidence” rule,54 are lawyers’ artefacts, seldom explained to citizens puzzled by the results of some criminal cases.55 Convoluted formulae clothe platitudes about eyewitness identification, defendants’ lies, or long delays in reporting offences, acquiring mystique from such labels as the “Domican”,56 “Edwards”57 or “Longman” direction.58 But even in a “divided” profession, the law of evidence should not be a barristers’ monopoly. Every lawyer engaged in litigation needs a welldeveloped sense of relevance and a basic understanding of the exclusionary rules. Information that is not promptly collected by a solicitor may be contaminated or irretrievable by the time a barrister is engaged. Moreover, as the practice of trials on affidavit59 becomes more pervasive, evidence in chief is effectively presented by solicitors who compose those more or less artificial documents. Every lawyer should know the law (and limits) of privilege, both for their clients’ sake and their own, and the rules governing “without prejudice” negotiations are everyday tools of solicitors and barristers alike. [A.6] Nevertheless, Evidence is less fashionable than it used to be. Even Rupert Cross, so it is said, looked forward to the abolition of “my subject”.60 The new s 129A of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld)61 answers his prayer in part. Some lawyers attribute the decline to a rapidly expanding profession, pullulating law schools fuelling “accreditation inflation”, the blurring of rules by vague legislation, expanding judicial discretions, a proliferating and perhaps more politicised judiciary, and “specialist” tribunals outside the legal mainstream. In some such cases a token gesture may pass muster: “I will admit it subject to objection. If later I decide the objection is well founded, I shall disregard it.”62 “Objections noted but not ruled upon will be taken into account as to weight.”63 “It may be admissible, but I’ll exclude it as a matter of discretion.”64 Another factor, no doubt, is the near-terminal decline of the civil jury, leading some judges to see Evidence as an unnecessary fetter upon their discretions. The criminal jury 54. See [A.134]. 55. However, lawyers’ complete control of character evidence was challenged in 2000 by the creation of a website known as “Crime Net”, recording criminal records. On 24 May 2000, Hampel J, a Victorian judge, discharged a criminal jury which, in his view, may have drawn some information from that source: “Crime Website Proving a Trial for Attorneys-General”, The Australian (26 May 2000), p 7. 56. Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555; [1992] HCA 13. 57. Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; [1993] HCA 63. 58. Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79; [1989] HCA 60. 59. See [A.24]. 60. Twining, Theories of Evidence: Bentham and Wigmore (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985), p 10. 61. Inserted by the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), s 146. 62. See, eg, the “reservation” of “similar fact” and discretionary points in Taylor v Harvey [1986] 2 Qd R 137. 63. Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 2) (2003) 130 FCR 424 (native title case – anthropologist’s report). 64. This refers mainly to prosecution evidence in criminal cases (see R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133; [1950] HCA 25), but this escape is sometimes available in civil proceedings as well: see Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 98.

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remains as a comfortable judicial insulation, although, while acquittals are infallible, judges have assumed the right to set aside verdicts of guilt.65 The orthodox view is that such assurances are not “unmitigated fictions”.66 In Skaramuca v Craft67 a magistrate who was improperly made aware of the defendant’s previous convictions was allowed to continue with the case, Higgins J observing: It is not infrequent that magistrates and, more recently, judges on trials by judge alone, are asked to admit evidence that, if admitted, would be unfairly prejudicial to an accused person. To determine that question it is frequently necessary (if not invariably so) for the judge or magistrate to be told what the proposed prejudicial evidence is. Of course, there will be cases where a judge or magistrate will conclude that the disclosed information so prejudices the fair trial (or the appearance of a fair trial) that he or she cannot do other than abort the hearing and direct its continuance before another judge or magistrate. However, that cannot be the inevitable result; it would make it too easy for one party or another to “forum shop” by raising, as on a voir dire, prejudicial matter.68

But the faith of litigants is sorely tried when questions of admissibility lie in limbo for weeks or months, pending a reserved judgment that eventually says precious little about them. The judgment of the High Court in Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar69 offers a long overdue remedy. While as a general rule, the judge should rule upon the objection as soon as possible, often the ruling can and should be given immediately after the objection has been made and argued. If, for some pressing reason, that cannot be done, the ruling should ordinarily be given before the party who tenders the disputed evidence closes its case. That party will then know whether it must try to mend its hand, and opponents will know the evidence they must answer. Another test of faith occurs when a trial on affidavits allows judges to read inadmissible material before any objection can be taken.70 [A.7] In civil cases there is often little discussion of points of evidence.71 In judge-only courts, valid objections may be abandoned as futile if the objectionable material is already disclosed. Absent an appeal (which many can ill afford) the facts and the law are what one person says they are. Assessments of

65. See [9D.3]. 66. Krulewitch v United States (1949) 336 US 440 at 453 per Jackson J; Asbury v Hicklin (1904) 81 SW 390 at 392; Jadu Raj v Bhubotaran Nandy (1889) 17 ILR (Calcutta) 173 at 188 and 195. For a defence of reserved decisions on evidence issues, see Dubbo Base Hospital v Jones [1979] 1 NSWLR 225 at 227; Ex parte Whitelock; Re Mackenzie [1971] 2 NSWLR 534 at 537. 67. (2005) 154 A Crim R 254; [2005] ACTSC 61. 68. (2005) 154 A Crim R 254; [2005] ACTSC 61 at [81]. 69. (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21 at [19] (rulings on objections to evidence should be given without delay so that parties know promptly where they stand). 70. In such circumstances the theory that an affidavit is not evidence until it is “read” at the hearing is not always reassuring: Barristers Board of Western Australia v Tranter Corporation Pty Ltd [1976] WAR 65 at 67. 71. A relatively rare case of insufficient reasons for rejecting evidence is Evans v Powell [2012] NSWSC 1384. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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witnesses’ credit, often asserted rather than explained, are notoriously difficult to dislodge, albeit less so today than in the past.73 In criminal proceedings, however, the rules are more closely monitored, as shown by the high proportion of criminal cases in texts of this kind. [A.8] However, while the discipline of Evidence may be less fashionable that in the past, advocates can hardly ignore it. There is, after all, a certain professional interest in an appearance of high technique and procedural complexity on which the mystique of Bench and Bar depends. Besides, some aspects of the subject are expanding. The law of privilege, for example, is increasingly sophisticated, and it is not confined to the courts.74 “Discretions” quarantining jurors from evidence they are not trusted to hear are constantly being refined.75

Codification [A.9] The Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) was the first attempt to codify evidence law in Australia. The Queensland Evidence Act 1977 and its counterparts in some other States76 are statutory fragments in a matrix of common law. Accordingly, an exposition of the Queensland Act requires discussion of many topics that it ignores, implies, or touches upon in a Delphic word or two. This text outlines the common law matrix, as well as judicial glosses on the legislation.

Evidence law: English history [A.10] Evidence law, as it now exists, is scarcely more than two centuries old. At the end of the 18th century Edmund Burke could say: “Evidence … [is] comprised in so small a compass that a parrot might get [it] by rote in one half-hour and repeat [it] in five minutes”.77 The subject occupied just ten pages in Blackstone’s “Commentaries” of 1765-1769 and 40 pages in Comyn’s eightvolume Digest of the Laws of England, published in 1822. But lawyers are prone to exaggerate the antiquity of cherished professional arrangements. So, for 72. In non-jury criminal cases, at least, decisions based on assessments of credit should be explained: Phillips v Arnold (2009) 53 MVR 33; [2009] TASSC 43. 73. Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167; [1990] HCA 47; Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137; [1987] HCA 59; Powell v Streatham Manor Nursing Home [1935] AC 243 at 266-268; Paterson v Paterson (1953) 89 CLR 212; [1953] HCA 74 at 219-224 (CLR). However, an appeal court may intervene if the judge’s findings are at odds with contemporary materials or uncontradicted evidence, or otherwise clearly wrong: Sangha v Baxter (2009) 52 MVR 492; [2009] NSWCA 78; so far as possible, findings based merely on the appearance of witnesses should be minimised: Expectation Pty Ltd v PRD Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 140 FCR 17; 209 ALR 568; [2004] FCAFC 189. However, the assessment of credit in Ifka v Shahin Enterprises Pty Ltd [2014] VSCA 8 was upheld by reference to inconsistent documents. As to a more critical approach to credit findings, see [A.58]. 74. Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281; Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52; SZHWY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 159 FCR 1; [2007] FCAFC 64. 75. Consider the gloss on the rules of similar fact evidence in Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292 (modified by s 132A of the present Act). See the comments of Brooking J on the pseudo-science of assessing identification evidence in R v Hentschel [1988] VR 362 at 369-370; see also the comparison of old and new texts in the Queen’s Case (1820) 2 B & B 284 at 289; 129 ER 976 at 978; and [130.37]. 76. But no longer in New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania, which have adopted the federal Act. 77. House of Lords’ Journal (25 February 1794).

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example, the protocols of the “divided” profession, still unsettled and vulnerable in the mid-1800s, were being presented by 1900 as “immemorial customs”.78 In 1790 Lord Kenyon claimed that the rules of evidence were “matured by the wisdom of the ages and … now revered from their antiquity”.79 But on closer inspection, his eulogy merely refers to the law of competency – a minor aspect of Evidence today.80 [A.11] A work often described as the first Evidence text was published by Gilbert Jeffrey, an Irish barrister, in 1754.81 It sought to reduce the subject to the “best evidence” principle. Other early writers were Henry Bathurst82 and Francis Buller.83 With due respect to these “rude beginnings”,84 the subject was just beginning to assume its modern form when W M Best’s Evidence appeared in 1849.85 Prior to 1800 there was a dearth of primary material; the first reports of rulings on evidence were compiled by Peake, Espinasse and Campbell between 1800 and 1830. Then Nature began to imitate art. Those reports led to “more rulings upon evidence than in the prior … two centuries” and Evidence began to emerge as a subject in its own right.86 By 1890 Best’s text had passed through several editions, followed by the works of Phipson87 and the Americans Thayer88 and Wigmore.89 They abandoned Jeffrey’s presentation of the “best evidence” rule90 as an all-embracing solution, and rebuilt the subject on the principle of relevance (“materiality”), as modified by technical rules of exclusion. The outstanding American contribution to this subject reflects the superiority of legal education in the United States at the time, catering for a decentralised profession without an exclusive caste of advocates.

78. Forbes, The Divided Legal Profession in Australia (Law Book Company, 1979), Ch 1. 79. R v Inhabitants of Eriswell (1790) 3 Term Rep 707; 100 ER 815 at 721 (TR), 823 (ER). 80. Twining, Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays (Oxford University Press, 1990), p 34. 81. Jeffrey, The Law of Evidence (1754). 82. Henry Bathurst, The Theory of Evidence (1761). 83. Francis Buller, An Introduction to the Law Relative to Trials at Nisi Prius (1772). 84. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at Common Law (Little Brown, 1898), Ch 11. 85. Some works of the 1800-1850 era are: Thomas Peake, A Compendium of the Law of Evidence (1801); Phillipps, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence (1814); Thomas Starkie, Law of Evidence and Digest of Proofs in Civil and Criminal Proceedings (Strahan, 1824); Wills, An Essay on the Rationale of Circumstantial Evidence (1838); Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence (1842-1853); Taylor, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence as Administered in England and Wales (1848), John Phillimore The History and Principles of the Law of Evidence as Illustrating Our Social Progress (Benning & Co, London, 1850). 86. Wigmore, Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Trials at Common Law (Little Brown, 1904-1905), Vol 1, p 238. 87. Phipson, The Law of Evidence (Sweet & Maxwell, 1892). 88. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at Common Law (Little Brown, 1898). 89. Wigmore, Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Trials at Common Law (Little Brown, 1904-1905). 90. The “best evidence” principle was mainly concerned with documentary evidence “in the days of parchment and quill pens”: R v Governor of Pentonville Prison; Ex parte Osman (1990) 90 Cr App R 149 at 152. As remarked in that case, it has largely gone by the board (see [104.1]; [Q.95]) and is abolished by the federal Act: [F.27]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[A.12] As the literature proliferated, Evidence lost some of its mystery and began to attract criticism. A leading sceptic was Jeremy Bentham, particularly in his Rationale of Judicial Evidence (1827). “Some of his books are like exploded shells, buried under the ruins they have made.”92 But his preference for commonsense rules of weight over technical rules of admissibility made slow progress in the heyday of black-letter law.93 As a barrister, Bentham could not simply be dismissed as an interfering ignoramus, but his robust criticisms of “Judge & Co’s” interest in arcane procedures can hardly have endeared him to the Inns of Court. Others, more revered in those venerable institutions, took credit for his ideas. They were freely borrowed by Brougham, Denman and others; plagiarism is not without honour in the law.

Early topics of importance: competence, documents [A.13] Before 1800, Evidence dealt mainly with matters now peripheral, such as the original document rule94 and competence to testify.95 Exquisite attention to competency96 may be traced to a Canon Law ban on oaths by children under 14 years of age,97 and to the view that it was immoral to tempt “interested” witnesses to commit perjury. About 1580, parties and their spouses became incompetent to testify.98 In the 1820s this rule was defended as a wise precaution against the “known infirmities of human nature”,99 but a few decades later these disqualifications began to fade. Today, rescripts of the remedial laws keep them in their graves.100 [A.14] The “original document” rule was another ancient principle.101 When literacy was uncommon, and copying techniques tedious, costly and prone to error, original records had an almost totemic significance. Special formalities were prescribed for wills in 1540102 and for other vital records in 1677.103 Rules for the proof of deeds were not liberalised until 1854.104 91. Twining, Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays (Oxford University Press, 1990), p 41. 92. Stephen, A Digest of the Law of Evidence (Macmillan, 1879), p xxii. 93. See Dixon, “The Law and the Constitution” in Woinarski (ed), Jesting Pilate and Other Papers and Addresses (Law Book Company, 1965), p 397. 94. See [19.5] and [104.2]. 95. Twining, “The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship” in Campbell and Waller (eds), Well and Truly Tried (Law Book Company, 1892), p 216. 96. As in Lowe v Joliffe (1762) 1 W Bl 366; 96 ER 204; R v Inhabitants of Eriswell (1790) 3 Term Rep 707; 100 ER 815. 97. (Or under 12 where a female was involved): Holdsworth, History of English Law (Methuen, 1922-1972), Vol 9, p 186. 98. Holdsworth, History of English Law (Methuen, 1922-1972), Vol 9, p 194. 99. Starkie, Law of Evidence and Digest of Proofs in Civil and Criminal Proceedings (Strahan, 1824), p 83. 100. See Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), ss 6 – 8 and 15. 101. Described as “ancient” in the Queen’s Case (1820) 2 B & B 284 at 289; 129 ER 976 at 978; see also Browning v Beston (1555) 1 Plowd 131; 75 ER 202. 102. Statute of Wills; Wills Act 1837 (Imp). 103. Statute of Frauds (Imp), 29 Car 2 c 3-4. 104. Common Law Procedure Act 1854 (Eng), s 26; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), ss 60 – 61.

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[A.18]

History

Estoppel by record [A.15] An early form of estoppel was the res judicata rule, prohibiting re-litigation of completed causes. The rationale was that a judgment amounted to a decree under the Royal Seal, and, as such, was beyond question. Estoppel by deed was recognised in the 14th century.105 Estoppel by representation was a product of Lord Mansfield’s blending of equity and common law in the late 1700s.106 It was still being refined in the 1830s.107 The doctrine of equitable or promissory estoppel was not finally established in Australia until 1983.108

Privilege Legal professional privilege [A.16] Lawyer-client privilege was designed to uphold the dignity of lawyers as confidential counsellors, but as democracy advanced it became more politic to explain it as a privilege of the client, to facilitate his or her access to legal advice.109 Originally it was limited to communications about current litigation. Later it was extended to communications about prospective actions. Only in the 19th century was it applied to all lawyer-client confidences, litigious or non-litigious,110 and in the 1980s it became clear that it is not confined to courts. Privilege against self-incrimination [A.17] Privilege against self-incrimination, based on the Canonist maxim “nemo tenetur prodere seipsum”,111 was the common lawyers’ response to the detested Court of Star Chamber. At first it was available only to defendants in criminal cases, but later it was extended to witnesses in any proceeding.112 This privilege, as well as professional privilege, is now available before any person or body with legal authority to demand information.113 Marital privilege [A.18] When a spouse was simply incompetent to testify in the other spouse’s cause, no question of marital privilege could arise. This rule was created when an older one was modified in 1853.114 Queensland abolished marital privilege in 2003: see [8.2]. 105. Holdsworth, History of English Law (Methuen, 1922-1972), Vol 9, pp 147 and 166. 106. Holdsworth, History of English Law (Methuen, 1922-1972), Vol 12, p 504. 107. Pickard v Sears (1837) 6 Ad & E 469; 112 ER 179. 108. Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406 at 434-445; Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387; [1988] HCA 7; Edwather Grazing Pty Ltd v Pincevic Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) NSW Conv R 55-980. 109. Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 127; Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 685; D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1978] AC 171 at 232. 110. Pearse v Pearse (1846) 1 DeG & Sm 12; 63 ER 950; Lawrence v Campbell (1859) 4 Drew 485; 62 ER 186; Minet v Morgan (1873) LR 8 Ch App 361; Balabel v Air India [1988] Ch 317 at 324; 2 All ER 246 at 249. 111. Cleland v The Queen (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 30. 112. R v Reading (1679) 7 How St Tr 259 at 296. 113. See [10.12]. 114. 16 and 17 Vic c 83 (UK). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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History and Common Law Foundations

[A.19]

HEARSAY AND CHARACTER EVIDENCE [A.19] Two distinctive rules of Anglo-Australian law exclude hearsay and evidence of character (or propensity).115 The hearsay rule was perfected more recently than many lawyers realise, and the “character evidence” rule is still being refined.116 The Court of Star Chamber, which fares so badly in history written by lawyers, had no rule against hearsay. In Adams v Canon117 a charge of fomenting litigation was proved by one witness who saw money changing hands, and by another who was equally sure of that fact “because his father said so”. But in that respect the Star Chamber was not alone. In 1669, when Sir Matthew Hale tried the Reverend Robert Hawkins for larceny, the prosecution was unfettered by rules against hearsay, character evidence or “impeachment”118 of one’s own witnesses. Summing up, Hale reminded the jury that they had heard evidence of “other acts of the like nature, as [when the Crown called] one Chilton to swear that the prisoner … did steal a pair of boots from him, and four or five persons [to] swear that they [heard] Chilton say he did”.119 In 1692, when the Duke of Norfolk accused his duchess of adultery with Mr Germaine,120 Holt LCJ and counsel (including the Attorney-General) were presumably on their best professional behaviour. Nevertheless, a good deal of hearsay went in without comment or objection.121 About the same time there was hearsay evidence of identity in a murder trial.122 The latter case also featured the blackguarding of one witness by another with little or no knowledge of the facts,123 as in this vignette: “Now … we shall show your Lordship somewhat in relation to the credit of those witnesses … As for Maccaffee, he keeps a very disorderly house, where ill people commonly resort.”124 Evidently there was still no rule against evidence in chief about the credit of another witness.125 [A.20] The existence of a hearsay rule was questioned in 1743.126 While hearsay was excluded in 1754,127 a witness in a bribery case 20 years later was allowed to recite what “all the people” had told him about the events in question.128 In 1777, in a trial for arson, a witness testified not only to admissions by the accused but also to discussions between himself and others about them, 115. Makin v Attorney-General for New South Wales [1894] AC 57. 116. See Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292; Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590; Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461. 117. (1621) Ley 68; 73 ER 117. 118. Compare s 17 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld). 119. R v Hawkins (1669) 6 How St Tr 921 at 949. 120. Duke of Norfolk v Germaine (1692) 12 How St Tr 927. 121. Duke of Norfolk v Germaine (1692) 12 How St Tr 927 at 931, 933, 934, 936, 937, 940 and 943. 122. R v Harrison (1692) 12 How St Tr 834 at 860. 123. See now the rule against evidence in chief that goes only to credit: see [A.80]. 124. R v Harrison (1692) 12 How St Tr 834 at 861; cf R v Hawkins (1669) 6 How St Tr 921. 125. See [A.80]. 126. Craig d Annesley v Anglesea (1743) 17 How St Tr 1160. 127. R v Canning (1754) 19 How St Tr 383 at 406. 128. R v Smith and Hollis (1776) 20 How St Tr 1225 at 1245, 1246 and 1248.

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Evidence Law in Queensland

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Hearsay and Character Evidence

despite a stern warning at the outset that “improper” testimony would be nipped in the bud.129 In the 1790s a hearsay account of a murder was allowed to go to the jury, although the judge did question its weight.130 Two decades later the rule was still a novelty,131 and in 1811132 Lord Mansfield noted that there was no such rule in Scotland.133 Evidently, then, it was rewriting history to claim that the rule was “fully established” by 1700134 and that there were only “occasional lapses” thereafter.135 Glib claims of antiquity were made for lawyers’ law when, in reality, it was decidedly a work in progress. The rules against hearsay and “character evidence” are “children of the jury system”136 that took centuries to mature. Their growth accompanied the 19th century “professionalisation” of the courts,137 which gave freer rein to lawyers’ pessimistic estimates of jury psychology,138 even as they continued to extol the institution. There was an increasingly formal relationship between judges and juries of the 19th century139 although the latter were more representative and astute, perhaps, than some contemporary panels, attenuated as they are by numerous statutory and discretionary exemptions from jury service.140

Benthamite reforms [A.21] Bentham’s influence, acknowledged and unacknowledged, has already been noted at [A.12]. [A.22] Procedural reform in 19th century England began with the Evidence on Commission Act 1831 and culminated in the Criminal Evidence Act 1898. In 129. R v Hill (1777) 20 How St Tr 1317 at 1334 and 1345. 130. R v Cole (1792) 12 How St Tr 883. 131. Higham v Ridgway (1808) 10 East 109; 103 ER 717; Berkeley Peerage case (1811) 4 Camp 401; 171 ER 128. 132. Berkeley Peerage case (1811) 4 Camp 401; 171 ER 128. 133. Berkeley Peerage case (1811) 4 Camp 401 at 415; 171 ER 128. 134. Holdsworth, History of English Law (Methuen, 1922-1972), Vol 9, p 214; see also Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50; [2001] HCA 25 at [144] (self-incrimination privilege more recent than supposed); and, generally, Stone and Wells, Evidence: Its History and Policies (Butterworths, 1991). 135. Craig d Annesley v Anglesea (1743) 17 How St Tr 1160. 136. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at Common Law (1898), p 226; Baker, The Hearsay Rule (Law Book Company, 1950), p 11; Sealy and Cornish, “Juries and the Rules of Evidence” (1973) 34 Crim LR 208. 137. Compare Best on Evidence (1849), para 38. 138. Berkeley Peerage case (1811) 4 Camp 401 at 415; 171 ER 128 at 135: “No man can tell what effect it might have upon their minds”; Wright v Doe d Tatham (1837) 7 Ad & E 313 at 389; R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner; Ex parte Moore [1965] 1 QB 456 at 488; DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421 at 456: “juries would … think it was more relevant than it [is]”. 139. R v Rosser (1836) 7 C & P 648 per Parke B dealing with the value of a stolen watch and the question of whether a juror who was a watchmaker could use his own knowledge: “If a gentleman is in the trade he must be sworn as a witness.” 140. Jury Act 1995, ss 4, 18 and 22. An attempt is being made to make Queensland juries more representative of the community, and less prone to exemptions from service: Queensland Law Reform Commission, Annual Report 2009, pp 14–15. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[A.23]

141

1833 conscientious objectors were allowed an alternative to the Christian oath. A general right to make a solemn affirmation in civil cases was recognised in 1854,142 and extended to criminal proceedings in 1861.143 From 1836144 persons facing criminal charges could engage counsel to question witnesses and comment on evidence; previously counsel were heard only on points of law.145 The same Act prohibited disclosure of a criminal record to the jury.146 In 1845 there was a modest relaxation of the “original document” rule; certified copies of statutes, court documents and company records became admissible to the same extent as the originals.147 Records of births, deaths and marriages were transferred from church to State registries: see [74.1]. The Evidence on Commission Act 1831 extended to all British dominions a process previously confined to India, and in 1856 British courts were authorised to make similar arrangements with foreign counterparts.148 Limited provision for admitting depositions of deceased or infirm witnesses in criminal cases was made in 1848.149 [A.23] At the same time, privilege against self-incrimination received better recognition. Magistrates conducting committal proceedings could no longer question unrepresented defendants without an appropriate caution.150 [A.24] Efforts were made to modernise evidence in the equity courts. Those bureaux were addicted to a highly artificial mode of trial now returning to vogue, namely trial on affidavit. It is a procedure attractive to minds more at home with papers than with people; it has the dubious merit of giving one side a preview of the other’s evidence and an opportunity to compose a response at leisure.151 In Holdsworth’s view, “[A] more futile system of getting at the facts … never existed in any mature legal system … productive [as it is] of the most 141. 3-4 Wm IV cc 49 and 82. 142. Common Law Procedure Act 1854 (UK), s 20. 143. By 24-25 Vic c 66, replaced by the Oaths Act (UK) in 1888. 144. 6-7 Wm IV c 114. The mordant wit of the Rev Sydney Smith (1771-1845) may have played a part: “Let two gentlemen from the Ministerial side of the House … commit some serious crimes, which will render their execution a matter of painful necessity. Let them feel … all the injustice and inconvenience of having neither a copy of the indictment, nor a list of witnesses, nor counsel to defend them. We will venture to say that the evidence of two such persons would … bring the question to an issue” (quoted by H Pearson, The Smith of Smiths (Penguin Books, 1948), p 84). 145. R v Lord Mohun (1692) 12 How St Tr 949. 146. As is still done in some European jurisdictions. See, however, s 15(2) of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld). 147. 8-9 Vic c 13; see also Documentary Evidence Act 1868 (UK), s 2 (Govt Gazette); Bankers Books Evidence Act 1879 (UK); Documentary Evidence Act Amendment Act 1882 (UK). The limitations of such a provision, so far as hearsay is concerned, are noted in [106.4]. 148. Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act 1856 (Imp). Although repealed in England, this Act may still operate in Queensland: Re Cochran Consulting Inc v Uwatec USA Inc [1998] 2 Qd R 137. But see [36.1]. 149. Indictable Offences Act 1848 (Jarvis’ Act); cf Evidence and Discovery Act 1867 (Qld); s 67; Justices Act 1886 (Qld); Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 23. 150. Summary Offences Act 1848 (UK) (11-12 Vic c 43), s 18. 151. Simultaneous exchange of affidavits might meet this objection.

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[A.27]

Hearsay and Character Evidence

unconvincing testimony at the greatest possible expense”.152 The Chancery Procedure Act 1852 gave litigants a right to present oral evidence, but the judges did not deign to hear it themselves; “examiners” recorded it for them, so that their Lordships still had copious paper between themselves and their supplicants. Jarndyce v Jarndyce153 was still part heard. [A.25] However, the English Common Law Procedure Act 1854 had profound effects on civil litigation in other courts. Section 1 began the decline of the civil jury by allowing a choice of trial by judge alone, and a party’s preference for a jury could be negatived if the judge saw too much “complexity” for the non-legal mind.154 Litigants were forbidden to “impeach” their own witnesses without special permission.155 Sections 23 and 24 made an exception to the rule in the Queen’s Case (the “original document” rule) to assist cross-examination on inconsistent statements.156 Section 25 confirmed that any witness (other than an accused) could be questioned about his or her criminal record.157 On a handwriting issue a court could now rely on its own comparison of the disputed document with a genuine specimen.158 Several of these reforms were reproduced in the Criminal Procedure Act 1865.159

Disqualifications removed [A.26] In 1843 England began to relax ancient rules disqualifying witnesses for “interest” or “taint of felony”.160 Parties to civil proceedings became competent and compellable in 1851,161 but people charged with crimes remained incompetent, and their spouses largely so.162 Spouses became competent witnesses in civil proceedings in 1853.163 [A.27] England made piecemeal exceptions to the incompetence of persons accused of crime between 1861 and 1885,164 before the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 simply made them competent witnesses for the defence. (Some Australian colonies made that signal change a little earlier.)165 By the same token a 152. Holdsworth, History of English Law (Methuen, 1922-1972), Vol 9, p 353. 153. See Dickens’ Bleak House, Ch 1. 154. Smit v Chan [2003] 2 Qd R 431. 155. Common Law Procedure Act 1854 (UK), s 22; see now Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 17. 156. Queen’s Case (1820) 2 B & B 286; 129 ER 976. See now Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 19. 157. See now Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 16. 158. See Common Law Procedure Act 1854 (UK); see now Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 59. 159. For example, ss 3 – 4 (hostile witnesses), s 5 (inconsistent statements), s 6 (cross-examination on criminal record) and s 8 (disputed handwriting). 160. Evidence Act 1843 (UK), s 1. 161. Evidence Amendment Act 1851 (UK), s 2. 162. Spouses could testify for the prosecution in cases of treason, forcible marriage and as victims of assault: Phipson on Evidence (12th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1976), para 1496. 163. Evidence Amendment Act 1853 (UK), ss 1 – 2. 164. Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (UK); Law of Evidence Act 1877 (UK); Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 (UK); Maxwell v DPP [1935] AC 309 at 317. 165. See Criminal Law and Evidence Amendment Act 1891 (NSW); Criminal Law Amendment Act 1892 (Qld); and now Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 8. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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History and Common Law Foundations

[A.28]

defendant who chose to testify became liable to cross-examination about the matter charged and, in some circumstances, about misconduct on other occasions.166

Twentieth century changes to the hearsay rule [A.28] The Criminal Evidence Act 1898 ended an era of procedural reform in England, and little more was done until 1938, when the Civil Evidence Act 1938 made exceptions to the hearsay rule in favour of documents in civil proceedings. The 1938 Act recognised that many records that are technically hearsay are more reliable than first-hand oral evidence, particularly in proceedings long after the event. But critics of the hearsay rule remained unsatisfied: Founded apparently on the proposition that all jurymen are deaf to reason, that all witnesses are presumptively liars and … all documents … forgeries, [the hearsay rule] has been added to, subtracted from and tinkered with for two centuries until it has become less of a structure than a pile of builders’ debris.167

A decade later, business records were made admissible in English criminal courts by the Criminal Evidence Act 1965,168 and the Civil Evidence Act 1972 (UK) made exceptions for first-hand oral hearsay.169

Evidence in Queensland: legislative history [A.29] Upon separation from New South Wales in December 1859, Queensland inherited the common law of evidence, some Imperial legislation170 and minor reforms already made in New South Wales.171 In 1867 a committee comprising Cockle CJ, Lutwyche J and Charles Lilley, “with clerical assistance rendered by Mr MacKenzie Shaw”,172 produced a local pastiche of recent English reforms with a two-page memorandum.173 Honourable members were assured that there was nothing radical in the Evidence and Discovery Bill 1867 (Qld), and that it merely followed “machinery” legislation “at Home”.174 [A.30] The Bill passed without debate and became law in December 1867, but the law of evidence remained largely a common law subject. In 1873 James Fitzjames Stephen, author of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 (Imp), produced an Evidence Code for England, but it was shelved after brief discussion in the House of Commons. The unrequited author was philosophical: “It would be as 166. See [15.12]. 167. Harvey, The Advocate’s Devil (Stevens, 1958), p 79. 168. See Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 93. 169. See now Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss 62 – 68; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 93B. 170. Such as the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act 1856. 171. Order In Council accompanying Letters Patent of 6 June 1859, declaring Queensland a separate colony. 172. (1867) 5 QPD 543 (Lilley A-G). 173. (1867) Votes & Proc (Qld), pp 809-810. 174. Chiefly the Evidence on Commission Act 1831 (UK), the Indictable Offences Act 1848 (UK), the Evidence Amendment Act 1851 (UK), the Evidence Amendment Act 1853 (UK) and the Common Law Procedure Act 1854 (UK).

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Evidence Law in Queensland

[A.34]

Hearsay and Character Evidence

impossible to get in Parliament a really satisfactory discussion of a Bill codifying the Law of Evidence as to get a Committee of the whole House to paint a picture.”175 In 1874 Queensland appointed a committee of its own to draft a code, but nothing came of it.176 The Evidence and Discovery Act 1867, with a few minor amendments, served Queensland for nigh on 100 years. In its original form it dealt mainly with competency, proof of public records and evidence on commission. The most significant amendments occurred in 1962, when a version of England’s Civil Evidence Act 1938 became ss 42A – 42C of the local Act, then 95 years of age.177 [A.31] Samuel Walker Griffith, barrister-at-law, entered the Queensland Legislative Assembly in 1872. An early and uncommonly modest mark of his ambition was a Bill to simplify proof of communications via the new electric telegraph. As the law then stood: [One had] to call the clerk who received it, the clerk to whom he gave it, and … the clerk who sent it on, to prove that he … sent it correctly. All that being done, it was necessary, then, at the other end [perhaps hundreds of miles away] to prove that [another clerk] received the telegram, and that he copied it correctly … and that [it was] duly delivered.178

This time it was not just a matter of copying precedents. Griffith proudly presented his Bill as “an advance upon the English law”.179 Arch-conservatives sensed “danger”,180 but the modest measure became the Telegraphic Messages Act 1872, enabling writs, orders and warrants of execution to be served by telegraphic means. Parts of it survive in ss 75 – 77 of the present Act. [A.32] English legislation requiring corroboration in breach of promise cases, and limiting questions about adultery, was adopted in 1874.181 [A.33] In 1892, six years before England adopted the reform, Queensland allowed an accused to testify for the defence.182 The 1892 Act stood until 1961, when it became s 618A of the Criminal Code, and subsequently s 8(1) of the Evidence Act 1977. Section 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894, still in force, prohibited the reception in evidence of confessions “induced” by “persons in authority”.183 [A.34] The Evidence Act 1898 made reciprocal arrangements for the proof of official records of other “Australasian colonies”. 175. Quoted in Twining, Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays (Oxford University Press, 1990), p 54. 176. McPherson, The Supreme Court of Queensland (Butterworths, 1989), p 163. 177. Compare the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 92. 178. (1872) 14 QPD 502 (Griffith). 179. (1872) 14 QPD 502 at 504. 180. (1872) 14 QPD 502 at 503 (Bramston AG). 181. Evidence Further Amendment Act 1874 (Qld), following the Evidence Further Amendment Act 1869 (UK). 182. Criminal Law Amendment Act 1892 (Qld) following a New South Wales Act of 1891; see also Makin v Attorney-General (NSW) (1893) 14 NSWLR (L) 1. 183. See [Q.59]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[A.35]

[A.35] The Criminal Code of 1899 included various rules of evidence and procedure, such as mandatory corroboration in cases of perjury,184 nolle prosequi protocols,185 joinder and severance of charges,186 addresses of counsel,187 views by juries188 and formal admissions.189 [A.36] Other reforms in Queensland, prior to 1977, were modest and infrequent. The Evidence (Attestation of Documents) Act 1937 recognised the signatures of justices of the peace in other British jurisdictions. The Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1949190 adopted a law enacted in England 70 years earlier. There was no immediate interest in England’s Civil Evidence Act 1938, but almost 25 years later it was adopted after a token parliamentary debate.191

Evidence Act 1977 Changes to the Evidence and Discovery Act 1867 [A.37] Queensland established a permanent Law Reform Commission in 1968. In 1973 it began a review of the venerable Evidence and Discovery Act 1867 and four years later its draft Bill became the Evidence Act 1977. There were brief submissions on minor points from the Bar Association and the draft of s 79 was altered, as suggested by this writer. The professional bodies raised no objection to the novel s 101 at the time, but see now [101.5] – [101.6]. The 1977 Act left ss 31, 38, 43, 61, 67 and 79 of the Evidence and Discovery Act 1867 intact.192 The Commission expected that they would soon be incorporated in a new “Procedure Act”,193 but they remain in place today. [A.38] Changes made in 1977194 included:195 (a) provision for unsworn evidence by children (s 9);196 184. Criminal Code (Qld), s 125. Corroboration is also required in trials under ss 52 (sedition), 57 (false evidence before parliament), 117 (false electoral claim), 193 and 194 (false declarations). 185. Criminal Code (Qld), s 563. 186. Criminal Code (Qld), ss 567, 568 and 597B (s 606 was renumbered by Act No 55 of 2003). On the relationship between ss 567 and 568, see R v Barker [1993] 2 Qd R 673. 187. Criminal Code (Qld), s 619, the application of which to an unrepresented defendant was considered in Bellino v Clair [1993] 2 Qd R 236. There is a discretion to allow the defence, if it so desires, to give an outline of its case immediately after the opening address for the prosecution: R v Nona [1997] 2 Qd R 438; R v Oulds [2014] QCA 223. 188. Criminal Code (Qld), s 623. 189. Criminal Code (Qld), s 644. 190. See now Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), ss 83, 84, 92, 93 and 95. 191. (1962) 233 QPD 1124 at 1135-1136. 192. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), Sch 1 Pt B. 193. Report on the Evidence Bill (QLRC 19, 14 November 1975). A Working paper of 13 June 1975 is cited as “QLRC 13”. 194. J R Forbes, “Evidence: Farewell to 1876” (1977) 4 QL 109. 195. Some significant additions and amendments between 1977 and 2003 are: (i) a general presumption of competency and general provisions for unsworn evidence; (ii) anonymity for endangered witnesses (ss 21B – 21K); (iii) special arrangements for taking the evidence of children and “vulnerable” witnesses (ss 21A, 21L – 21S, 21AA – 21AZC, 93A); (iv) abolition of matrimonial privilege (s 8(3)). 196. See now new ss 9, 9A, 21A, 21L – 21S, 21AA – 21AZC and 93A.

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Hearsay and Character Evidence

(b) modification of the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn (ss 79 – 80); (c) an exception to the hearsay rule for “books of account” (ss 83 – 91); (d) extension of the 1962 “business records” provisions to criminal proceedings (s 93); (e) provisions for information derived from computers (s 95); and (f) elevation of prior consistent and inconsistent statements from mere evidence of credit to proof of the facts asserted (s 101). The Commission decided not to adopt English provisions for oral hearsay in civil cases,197 fearing that they would excite controversy and delay the passage of its new Act.198 English proposals for oral hearsay in criminal cases199 received short shrift. (But see now s 93B, inserted in 2000.) The Commission’s aims were modest: Our main purpose has been to state in modern form so much of the law of evidence as may conveniently be set out … [W]e have not attempted to abolish the Common Law … Nor have we attempted to incorporate in the Bill all the rules of Evidence which have been expressed in statutory form.200

Limitations of the 1977 Act [A.39] Far from being a code, the Evidence Act 1977 has little or nothing to say about relevance, expert evidence, admissions, confessions, similar facts, estoppel, public interest privilege or legal professional privilege. In many places it is intelligible only in the light of common law.201 In the year of its enactment the Lucas Committee recommended abolition of the “right to silence” and electronic recording of police interviews.202 The latter proposal became law 20 years later203 after the High Court, in McKinney v The Queen,204 nudged legislatures in that direction. The right to silence remains a matter of debate.205

197. Civil Evidence Act 1968 (UK). 198. QLRC 13 at 2. 199. QLRC 13 at 2; see also Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee (UK) Cmd 4991 at 137. 200. QLRC 19 at 2. 201. For example, ss 8, 10, 15(2), 94, 101, 103 and 130. 202. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Enforcement of the Criminal Law in Queensland (Lucas Committee) (29 April 1977). 203. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, ss 436 – 439. 204. (1991) 171 CLR 468. 205. See [10.3], [Q.52]. In 1994 England adopted this solution: If an accused does not mention, before trial, a fact relied on in his or her defence at the trial, the jury may draw any inference from that silence “as appear[s] proper”: Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK), s 34. And see now Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 89A. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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History and Common Law Foundations

[A.40]

In 1978 Queensland joined other States in limiting cross-examination of complainants in trials for sexual offences.206 Cross-examination about prior convictions was curtailed in 1986.207 Further developments [A.40] In 1989208 the conditions for children’s evidence were liberalised and expert evidence about its reliability was permitted: s 9A. At the same time novel rules were made for receiving the evidence of children under 12 and handicapped people: s 21A. Certain pre-trial statements by children became admissible in “any proceeding”: s 93A. But radical changes to the law of similar facts in sexual cases were not adopted.209 (They would have allowed propensity evidence beyond the relationship of complainant and accused.)210 [A.41] Further changes were made by the Criminal Law Amendment Act (No 3) 1997. In response to the decision of the High Court in Hoch v The Queen,211 it was provided that similar fact evidence must not be excluded merely because of possible collusion.212 The admissibility of relationship evidence in “domestic” cases was confirmed in a new s 134B. The rule of practice requiring corroboration of certain classes of witnesses, such as children and complainants in cases of sexual assault, was abolished.213 The Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 requires electronic recording of confessions and admissions and deals with many other matters previously left to the Judges’ Rules.214 Section 132C of the Evidence Act 1977, inserted in 2000, resolves doubts about the standard of proof in sentencing hearings. Other changes in 2000 were as follows: • Part 3A allows reception of evidence by videolink or telephone. See also Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 392. 206. Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978. 207. Criminal Law (Rehabilitation of Offenders) Act 1986, ss 8 and 14; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 15A. 208. Criminal Code, Evidence Act and Other Acts Amendment Act 1989, amending the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), as indicated in this paragraph. 209. Compare the Criminal Code Amendment Bill as introduced in the Legislative Assembly on 21 April 1988, cl 63. 210. See Forbes, Similar Facts (Law Book Co, 1987), pp 223-226; and cf the highly refined approach in R v Kelly [1984] 1 Qd R 474 with the more robust view of the House of Lords in DPP v P [1991] 2 AC 447. 211. (1988) 165 CLR 292. 212. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 132A, reflecting the common law position in England: R v H [1995] 2 AC 596; 2 All ER 865. 213. Criminal Code, s 632, inserted by the Criminal Law Amendment Act (No 3) 1997, s 113. But s 632 does not prevent a judicial comment tailored to the case, to prevent a miscarriage of justice, provided that no generalisations about classes of complainants or other witnesses are made: R v Corrigan (1998) 74 SASR 454 (CCA); Robinson v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 162; R v TN (2005) 153 A Crim R 129; [2005] QCA 160 (aff’d Tully v The Queen (2006) 230 CLR 234; [2006] HCA 56). 214. See [130.34] and [130.70].

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[A.42]

Hearsay and Character Evidence

• Sections 9 and 9A, previously confined to children’s evidence, were extended215 to witnesses who do not understand an oath. • An earlier amendment to s 15(2) (cross-examination of accused) was reversed216 so that s 15(2)(a), (2)(b) and (2)(c) are all subject to leave. • Powers to curb unnecessary or undesirable cross-examination were rephrased217 and the policy of protecting vulnerable witnesses from unfair treatment was advanced by amendments to the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 and the addition to this Act of ss 21L – 21S (protected witnesses). The right of an unrepresented defendant to cross-examine such a witness was removed: s 21N. • Sections 21B – 21K218 allow endangered witnesses to use an assumed name. • Section 93B is a radical departure from the 1977 policy of confining Pt 6 of the Act almost entirely219 to documentary evidence. In trials for certain indictable offences, s 93B admits hearsay (including oral hearsay) if it is close in time to an event in issue, and contrary to the interests of the maker, or made in other circumstances indicating reliability. The Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003 made these changes: • Marital privilege was abolished by amending s 8(3) and repealing s 11. • A general presumption of competency was adopted: s 9. • The age limit for child witnesses for whom special arrangements may be made was raised from 12 to 16 years: ss 9E, 21A, 21AD and 93A(5). • Elaborate arrangements were made for the evidence of “affected children”: ss 21AA – 21AZC. • Section 129A, inserted by the Civil Proceedings Act 2011, s 146, enables a court to relax the rules relating to proof of handwriting, documents, identity of parties, authority, and the hearsay rule. Witness protection provisions inserted by the Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Amendment Act 2000 (ss 21B – 21KH) were amended by the Cross-Border Law Enforcement Legislation Amendment Act 2005.

1995: A new Commonwealth Act [A.42] For almost a century after federation, Commonwealth courts applied the evidence laws of the State in which they happened to be sitting.220 In July 1979 the Attorney-General directed the Australian Law Reform Commission to prepare 215. By s 44 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2000. 216. Justice and Other Legislation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2000, s 1. 217. Criminal Law Amendment Act 2000, replacing former ss 20 and 21. 218. Inserted by s 4 of the Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Amendment Act 2000. 219. But see ss 18 and 101, which can extend to prior statements made orally. 220. Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 79, subject to the Evidence Act 1905 (Cth) and any special provisions to the contrary: John Robertson & Co Ltd (In Liq) v Ferguson Transformers Pty Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 65 at 83; Elsey v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1969) 121 CLR 99 at 105. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[A.43]

a Code of Evidence for those courts. Sixteen years later the Commission’s Bill became the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). It applies to federal courts and the courts of the Australian Capital Territory, but not to State courts exercising federal jurisdiction.221 However, the Commonwealth model has been adopted in New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania. Major differences between the Commonwealth Act and Queensland law are noted in [F.1]ff.

General overview of evidence [A.43] As noted at [A.39], the Evidence Act 1977 does not purport to be a code; it is a series of amendments to, and glosses on, the common law. Before we examine it in detail, a general overview of Evidence is appropriate.

Contents and order of treatment [A.44] Topics covered in the rest of this chapter are: • Types of evidence: [A.45]. • Stages of testimony and related rules of procedure: [A.47]. • Documentary evidence and special rules therefor: [A.51]. • • • •

Onus and standard of proof: [A.102] and [A.105]. Rules about the weight of evidence: [A.116]. The principle of relevance: [A.124]. The “character evidence” rule and its limits: [A.134].

• Hearsay, “original evidence”, and exceptions to the hearsay rule: [A.142]. • The several kinds of privilege: [A.158]. • Estoppel: [A.209]. • Discretionary exclusion of admissible evidence: [A.223].

Types of evidence [A.45] The three main types of evidence are: • testimony: [A.47] and [A.64]; • documents: [A.51]; and • real evidence: [A.58]. [A.46] Substitutes for, or dispensations from, the normal presentation of evidence are: • formal admissions: [A.61]; • judicial notice: [A.62]; and • presumptions: [A.63]. 221. Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 4; R v Drury [1984] 1 Qd R 356. The point is academic in States that have adopted the Commonwealth Act.

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Evidence Law in Queensland

[A.49]

Hearsay and Character Evidence

Testimony [A.47] Testimony consists of a witness’s sworn222 assertions of fact or opinion:223 • to the court in person; or • on affidavit; or • in evidence on commission; or • in some other form allowed by legislation or special order. Testimony is considered at [A.64]. Affidavits [A.48] In some proceedings, usually civil, evidence in chief may be given on affidavit. Formerly affidavits were largely confined to interlocutory proceedings – that is, civil proceedings not designed to finalise an action224 (although they may in fact do so),225 such as applications for temporary injunctions, extensions of time, or further particulars. In civil proceedings commenced by application, evidence may only be given by affidavit, unless the court otherwise directs.226 Affidavits become evidence when they are “read” (that is, tendered and admitted).227 [A.49] But affidavits are not a complete substitute for viva voce evidence. Except in certain chamber matters,228 a party relying on an affidavit must produce the deponent for cross-examination229 on reasonable notice230 to do so. Non-appearance by the witness generally makes the document inadmissible. An 222. A solemn affirmation may be substituted for an oath, and in certain circumstances young children may give unsworn evidence: see [9A.1]ff. 223. See [A.67]. 224. Ex parte Britt [1987] 1 Qd R 221. 225. Sofronoff, “Interlocutory Injunctions Having Final Effect” (1987) 61 ALJ 341; Jameson, “Interlocutory Orders: Or Are They Final?” (1987) 17 QLSJ 39. It is a question of legal character rather than practical effect: Brouwer v Titan Corporation Ltd (1997) 73 FCR 241; Knight v Australian Capital Territory [2016] ACTCA 3 at [19]. 226. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 390(b). 227. Manson v Ponninghaus [1911] VLR 239; Lindwall v Lindwall [1967] 1 WLR 143; Barristers’ Board of Western Australia v Tranter Corporation Pty Ltd [1976] WAR 65 at 67; Orleans Investments Pty Ltd v Mindshare Communications Ltd (2009) 254 ALR 81; [2009] NSWCA 40. 228. For example, applications for summary judgment: Nayeiob Queensland Pty Ltd v Soric [1974] Qd R 161; Rosser v Austral Wine and Spirit Co Pty Ltd [1980] VR 313; affidavits of discovery: Mulley v Manifold (1959) 103 CLR 341; Fruehauf Finance Corp Pty Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 359. 229. See Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 439. Leave to tender an affidavit was refused in State Bank of New South Wales v Lo [2000] NSWSC 1191, despite extensive efforts to locate the deponent. The contents contradicted the plaintiff’s evidence and it would have been most unfair to the plaintiff to admit it without cross-examination. 230. See, however, Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 439(3): if an affidavit to be relied on at a hearing is served on a party less than two business days before the hearing, the person who made the affidavit must attend the court to be available for cross-examination unless the party otherwise agrees. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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History and Common Law Foundations

[A.50] 231

exception may be made if the deponent is dead, incapable of testifying, overseas, but then the weight of the evidence is likely to be reduced.232

or is

Evidence on commission [A.50]

Evidence on commission is examined at [22.1]ff.

Documents [A.51]

The term “document” covers any record of information, including:

• traditional paper writings; • microfilm; • audiotape; • videotape; and • data on a computer disc. See further on documents, [3.11]. [A.52] When a document is offered as proof of facts asserted in it (ie “testimonially”), the tender must be justified by reference to a recognised exception to the hearsay rule. The contents are subject to the other rules governing viva voce testimony233 and to special rules noted at [A.53] – [A.57]. [A.53] When a document in the form of a paper writing is tendered, it must generally be proved by producing the original:234 but see [4.1], [51.1], [86.1], [97.1], [104.1]ff and [F.27]. Transactions subject to the Statute of Frauds must normally be proved by a document that records their essential terms: see [Q.97]ff. [A.54] Another special doctrine is the parol evidence rule, which applies when a transaction is fully documented (in one or more instruments), either by choice of the parties or as required by statute. It forbids the use of material extrinsic to the document in question for the purpose of altering or contradicting its terms.235 Accordingly, in Australian Co-operative Foods Ltd v Norco Co-operative Ltd,236 pre-contractual negotiations could not affect the terms of a wholly written

231. Curley v Duff (1985) 2 NSWLR 716; Estex Clothing Manufacturers Pty Ltd v Ellis & Goldstein Ltd (1967) 116 CLR 254. 232. Re O’Neil [1972] VR 327. 233. See [A.52], [3.13], [51.1], [83.1] and [92.19]. 234. See [19.5]. 235. Bank of Australasia v Palmer [1897] AC 540; L G Thorne Pty Ltd v Thomas Borthwick & Sons (Australasia) Ltd (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 81; McNamara, “The Parol Evidence Rule and the Substantive Law of Contract” (1986) 2 Aust Bar Rev 137; Stewart, “Oral Promises, Ad Hoc Implications and the Sanctity of Written Agreements” (1987) 61 ALJ 119. 236. (1999) 46 NSWLR 267.

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Evidence Law in Queensland

[A.55]

Hearsay and Character Evidence

agreement. An explicit term excluding extrinsic material237 may raise an estoppel by deed or contract.238 A typical “entire agreement” rule reads as follows: This document contains the entire agreement between the parties with respect to its subject matter. It supersedes all prior agreements and understandings in that respect and may be varied only in writing signed by each party.

On the other hand, promissory or conventional estoppel may prevent reliance on terms of a wholly written agreement:239 see [A.219] and [A.220]. A party seeking to enforce a written transaction inequitably may be restrained from doing so.240 When the parol evidence rule is invoked, these preliminary issues may arise: Did the parties really agree to document the whole transaction?241 If so, did they actually implement that agreement?242 Until those two questions are answered affirmatively, the rule is immaterial. [A.55] However, inherent limitations of the rule significantly reduce its practical effect. It does not exclude evidence of a condition precedent,243 infancy, fraud, sham,244 undue influence or mistake affecting the transaction, or a subsequent oral agreement (of a kind not required to be in writing) rescinding or amending the original agreement.245 Presumably, the rationale for those qualifications is that they attack the legal status of the instrument, as distinct from what it says: “[T]he English rule forbidding recourse to extrinsic evidence is not so strict as some have thought”.246 Extrinsic evidence is admissible to show the true nature of the transaction – for example, that what appears to be a loan is really a sale.247

237. On the effect of “entire contract clauses”, see Pearson, S v Dublin Distillery [1907] AC 351; Brisbane Unit Development Corporation Pty Ltd v Robertson [1983] 2 Qd R 105; Dorotea Pty Ltd v Christos Doufas Nominees Pty Ltd [1986] 2 Qd R 91. 238. See Johnson Matthey Ltd v AC Rochester Overseas Corporation (1990) 23 NSWLR 190, where McLelland J held that the parol evidence rule excluded evidence of a convention said to arise from pre-contractual negotiations. 239. Wright v Hamilton Island Enterprises Ltd [2003] Q Conv R 54-588; [2003] QCA 36; Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallen Investments Pty Ltd [2006] QCA 194 at [118] – [119]; Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453; [2010] NSWCA 274. 240. City and Westminster Properties (1934) Ltd v Mudd [1959] Ch 129; Johnston v Arnaboldi [1990] 2 Qd R 138. 241. Determination of an issue of this kind are considered in Masterton Homes Pty Ltd v Palm Assets Pty Ltd (2009) 261 ALR 382; [2009] NSWCA 234; Connections Total Fitness for the Family Pty Ltd v Selkirk Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 184 at [125], [127]. 242. LG Thorne Pty Ltd v Thomas Borthwick & Sons (Australasia) Ltd (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 81; Nunn v Wily (2001) 10 BPR 18,983. 243. Willis v Little (1861) 11 CB (NS) 369. 244. Nunn v Wily (2001) 10 BPR 18,983; Pickersgill v Tsoukalas [2009] SASC 357; Esanda Ltd v Burgess [1984] 2 NSWLR 139; Raftland Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 238 CLR 516 at 561. 245. Morris v Barron [1918] AC 359. 246. Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337 at 348 per Mason J. 247. Gurfinkel v Bentley Pty Ltd (1966) 116 CLR 98. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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History and Common Law Foundations

[A.56]

[A.56] Extrinsic evidence is admissible to identify the subject matter of a written instrument, but less liberally to identify a party.248 Further, the parol evidence rule does not preclude attempts to prove collateral terms for which the main agreement serves as consideration,249 provided that notice is given in the pleadings,250 and provided that the terms alleged do not contradict the agreement with which they are said to co-exist.251 For example, if a wholly written lease states, without qualification, that the landlord may terminate the tenancy on four weeks’ notice, the tenant will not be heard to say that this right may be exercised only in particular circumstances.252 In De Lassalle v Guildford,253 on the other hand, a tenant was allowed to prove a collateral warranty that drains on the premises were in good order. It is said that claims of collateral terms will be treated suspiciously,254 but this has not prevented such evidence from being accepted on many occasions.255 A collateral contract cannot be formed after the main contract has come into existence, because in the event the main contract would be past consideration for the alleged new contract.256 [A.57] Extrinsic evidence is also admissible to explain or clarify257 words in a wholly written agreement or to show that they have a special meaning.258 The evidence of economists was admitted to explain terms of art in the pipeline legislation involved in Re Michael; Ex parte Epic Energy (WA) Pty Ltd Nominees Pty Ltd.259 But when the expression “production process” in a mining Act was used in the ordinary sense, expert evidence was inadmissible.260 248. Bank of New Zealand v Simpson [1900] AC 182; L Schuler AG v Wickham Machine Tool Sales Ltd [1974] AC 235 at 261; Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337 at 347-349; Akot Pty Ltd v Rathmines Investments Pty Ltd [1984] 1 Qd R 302. 249. Helibut Symons & Co v Buckleton [1913] AC 30 at 47; National Foods Milk Ltd v McMahon Milk Pty Ltd [2008] VSC 208 at [220]. 250. Jones v Phillips [1969] Qd R 548. 251. Maybury v Atlantic Union Oil Co Ltd (1953) 89 CLR 507; Gatward v Kleem (1955) 72 WN (NSW) 354; Redevelopments Pty Ltd v Enima Pty Ltd (2010) 174 ACTR 1; [2010] ACTCA 13 at [46]; Manning Motel Pty Ltd v DH MB Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1582. 252. Hoyt’s Pty Ltd v Spencer (1919) 27 CLR 133. 253. [1901] 2 KB 215; Bahr v Nicolay (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 604; [1988] HCA 16 at [10]. 254. Heilbut Symons & Co v Buckleton [1913] AC 30 at 47; National Foods Milk Ltd v McMahon Milk Pty Ltd [2008] VSC 208 at [224]. 255. LG Thorne Pty Ltd v Thomas Borthwick & Sons (Australasia) Ltd (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 81 at 91. 256. Hercules Motors Pty Ltd v Schubert (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 301; Grygiel v Baine [2005] NSWCA 218 at [66]; SVI Systems Pty Ltd v Best & Less Pty Ltd (2001) 189 ALR 302; [2001] FCA 279 at [115]. 257. Watcham v Attorney-General of East Africa Protectorate [1919] AC 533; SS & M Ceramics v Kin [1995] QCA 437. 258. Re Bell [1969] VR 597 at 600-601; Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381; 3 All ER 237; Re Allen [1988] 1 Qd R 1; Boral Resources Pty Ltd v Donnelly [1988] 1 Qd R 506; Boranga v Flintoff (1997) 19 WAR 1. 259. (2002) 25 WAR 511. 260. BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v National Competition Council [2007] ATPR 42-141; [2006] FCA 1764 (aff’d (2007) 162 FCR 234; [2007] FCAFC 157).

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Evidence Law in Queensland

[A.58]

Hearsay and Character Evidence

Real evidence [A.58] Real evidence261 usually consists of physical objects identified in oral evidence. Common examples are tools used to commit a crime, or the packaging of rival products in an action for a breach of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).262 Less obvious forms of real evidence are: • demonstrations in aid of testimony (see [A.60]); • the demeanour of a witness;263 • the physical appearance of a person seeking damages for personal injuries;264 • the appearance of a person as evidence of age;265 • the conduct of a person charged with contempt in the face of the court;266 and • on an identity issue, the appearance of an accused.267 Assessments of credit based on demeanour were traditionally difficult to challenge,268 but courts of appeal are now less reluctant to review them.269 “An ounce of intrinsic merit or demerit in the evidence, that is to say, the comparison of evidence with known facts, is worth pounds of demeanour.”270 An appeal may succeed if the trial judge failed to use the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses, or if the decision is inconsistent with facts incontrovertibly established 261. From the Latin, “res”, “a thing”. 262. Dart Industries Pty Ltd v Decor Corporation [1989] AIPC 90-569; Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191. 263. Jones v Hyde (1989) 63 ALJR 349 at 351. 264. Shepherd v McGivern (1966) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 387; [1966] 1 NSWR 55; see also Ovens v Laneyrie (1987) 11 NSWLR 207 (sale of liquor to a person under age); and R v Colgan (1959) 59 SR (NSW) 96 (mental deficiency). 265. Ovens v Laneyrie (1987) 11 NSWLR 207 (sale of liquor to a minor); Robinson v Zhang (2005) 158 A Crim R 575; [2005] NSWCA 439. 266. R v Henriques (unreported), referred to in Stone, Evidence, Its History and Politics (Butterworths, 1991), p 133. 267. R v King [2002] NSWCCA 365. 268. Flannery v Cohuna Sewerage Authority (1976) 51 ALJR 135 at 136; Powell v Streatham Manor Nursing Home [1935] AC 243 at 266-268; Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472; Kovan Engineering (Australia) Pty Ltd v Gold Peg International Pty Ltd (2006) 70 IPR 1; [2006] FCAFC 117 (probabilities as well as demeanour). 269. See Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at 128-129, 146-147 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ; Goodrich Aerospace Pty Ltd v Arsic (2006) 66 NSWLR 186; [2006] NSWCA 187 at [11] per Ipp JA; Skinner v Frappell [2008] NSWCA 296; Shimokawa v Lewis [2009] NSWCA 266; Phillips v Arnold (2009) 53 MVR 33; [2009] TASSC 43 (credit findings in non-jury criminal cases should be explained); Ahmedi v Ahmedi (1991) 23 NSWLR 288 at 291; Pollard v RRR Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 110 at [64] – [65]; Sangha v Baxter (2009) 52 MVR 492; [2009] NSWCA 78; R v Nona [2015] ACTSC 175 at [133]; see also Mason, “Unconscious Judicial Prejudice” (2001) 75 ALJ 676; Gleeson, “Judging the Judges” (1979) 53 ALJ 338 at 344. It is pertinent to ask how crucial the credit findings are to the decision: Devers v Kindlian Society (2010) 269 ALR 404; [2010] FCAFC 72. 270. Société d’Alliance Commerciales (Société Anonyme Egyptienne) v Merchants’ Marine Insurance Co (“The Palatina”) (1924) 20 Lloyd’s L Rep 140 at 152 per Lord Atkin; Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (t/as as Uncle Bens of Australia) (1992) 27 NSWLR 326 at 348. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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History and Common Law Foundations

[A.58]

271

by other evidence. In State Rail Authority of NSW v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq)272 a decision based on demeanour was set aside for giving too little weight to relevant documents. On the other hand, documentary evidence supported the trial judge’s view in Ifka v Shahin Enterprises Pty Ltd.273 “Ritual incantation about witness credibility” is no longer a reliable substitute for careful examination of the facts and law.274 In CSR Ltd v Della Maddalena275 Kirby J (Gleeson CJ concurring) observed that Fox v Percy “involved a shift to some degree from the more extreme judicial statements commanding deference to the findings of primary judges said to be based on credibility assessments”, and added: “It would be a misfortune for legal doctrine if, so soon after Fox v Percy corrected the ... excesses of earlier appellate deference to erroneous fact-finding by primary judges, the old approach was restored ... by reversion to the previous formulae about the ‘subtle influence of demeanour’ that could have affected the primary judge’s conclusion.” Before it is found that a witness is not merely unreliable, but has actually lied, that person must be given a fair opportunity to respond to the imputation.276 The judge may take a party’s demeanour outside the witness box into account, provided that due process is observed by alerting the party to the court’s provisional impressions.277 The same applies to other forms of real evidence of which the parties may not be aware,278 or do not seem to regard as relevant.279 A jury’s observations of a party’s or witness’s conduct, in or about the courtroom, may also be taken into account, provided that they are disclosed to the judge, and by the judge to counsel.280 If a reserved judgment is long delayed, the advantage of seeing the witnesses is diminished. Then bare assertions about demeanour are plainly insufficient, and specific reasons for credit assessments should be given.281 271. Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472 at 479; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; 77 ALJR 989; Yarrabee Coal Co Pty Ltd v Lujans (2007) 49 MVR 178; [2007] NSWCA 342 (reduction of speed referred to time well before collision). 272. (1999) 73 ALJR 306; 160 ALR 588. 273. [2014] VSCA 8. 274. Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at 128. 275. (2006) 80 ALJR 458 at 465. 276. New South Wales v Hunt (2014) 86 NSWLR 226; [2014] NSWCA 47. 277. Government Insurance Offıce v Bailey (1992) 27 NSWLR 304; Marelic v Comcare (1993) 47 FCR 437; 121 ALR 114; Kappos v State Transit Authority (1995) 11 NSWCCR 386; Farah v Australian Postal Corporation (1994) 35 ALD 349; Ucar v Nylex Industrial Products Pty Ltd (2007) 2 AWR 3,572; [2007] VSCA 181; Minagall v Ayres [1966] SASR 151 at 156; Lindsay v Health Care Complaints Commission [2010] NSWCA 194. 278. If counsel is aware, see Angaston and District Hospital v Thamm (1987) 47 SASR 177 at 178-179. 279. Jobst v Inglis (1986) 41 SASR 399 at 417; Angaston and District Hospital v Thamm (1987) 47 SASR 177. 280. R v White (1987) 49 SASR 154. 281. Monie v Commonwealth of Australia (2005) 63 NSWLR 729; [2005] NSWCA 25; Hadid v Redpath (2001) 35 MVR 152; [2002] NSWCA 16; Expectation Pty Ltd v PRD Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 140 FCR 17; 209 ALR 568; Walden v Black [2006] NSWCA 170; MM Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Port Stephens Council (2012) 191 LGERA 292; [2012] NSWCA 417.

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Evidence Law in Queensland

[A.60]

Hearsay and Character Evidence

[A.59] Real evidence is not affected by the “original document” rule.282 A photograph,283 physical replica or oral description284 is admissible instead of the object itself.285 In Taylor v Chief Constable of Cheshire,286 police witnesses identified a thief by watching a security videotape. When the recording was accidentally erased they were allowed to recall what they had observed. However, non-production of an original, when production is reasonably possible, may go to weight.287 [A.60] Real evidence, demonstrations and reconstructions288 by sworn witnesses, and evidence of competently conducted experiments289 are not to be confused with a “view” – that is, an inspection of places or things outside the court to assist the understanding of admissible evidence. The distinction between a demonstration and a view is explained in R v Alexander290 in a passage approved by Wilson J in Kozul v The Queen.291 If a court treats a view as evidence, it effectively acts on unsworn evidence, and risks a denial of natural justice.292 For the purposes of a view, the place or thing in question need not be in the same condition as at the relevant time, provided that changes are duly noted. Demonstrations with real evidence, in the course of testimony, are generally admissible, but an attempted reconstruction of a complex and disputed event, such as a noise nuisance, may be too prone to inaccuracy to be considered.293 In Scott v Numurkah Corporation294 the plaintiff, a cinema proprietor, complained of a noise nuisance created by an adjacent dance hall. It was held that the trial judge was entitled to use the experience of such an occasion to understand and apply the evidence, but not to treat it as evidence in itself, as there was no proof that the decibel level at demonstration time matched the times in question. At common law a “view” was an out of court examination of land, or of chattels too large to be taken into court and tendered as exhibits. The purpose of a view was to 282. See [A.59]. 283. R v Cook [1987] QB 417. 284. Hocking v Ahlquist Bros Ltd [1944] 1 KB 120 at 123-124. 285. R v Murdoch (1987) 37 A Crim R 118. 286. (1987) 84 Cr App R 191. 287. R v Francis (1874) LR 2 CCR 128 at 132. 288. Quinn v Bloom [1962] 2 QB 245 at 257. A demonstration given outside the proceedings may be proved by a witness who watched it or made a videotape of it: Li Shu-Ling v The Queen [1988] 3 WLR 671. 289. R v Alexander [1979] VR 615. 290. [1979] VR 615. 291. (1981) 147 CLR 221 at 242. 292. Commissioner for Railways v Murphy (1967) 41 ALJR 77; Middleton v Freier [1958] Qd R 351; Kristeff v The Queen (1968) 42 ALJR 233; Grosser v South Australian Police (1994) 63 SASR 243. But compare and contrast Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 54. 293. In Scott v Numurkah Corporation (1954) 91 CLR 300 the demonstration was too unreliable to be admissible. Other “demonstration” cases are R v Delon (1992) 29 NSWLR 29; Grosser v South Australian Police (1994) 63 SASR 243; Evans v The Queen (2007) 235 CLR 521 at 540. 294. (1954) 91 CLR 300. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[A.60]

assist the trier of fact, by enabling an examination of the dimensions, appearance and relative positions of the features of things viewed to understand and weigh the oral evidence. A “view” was distinguished from an out of court demonstration or reproduction of a past event … described in court. … [T]he court could not treat a demonstration or reproduction as in truth a demonstration or reproduction of what witnesses had described unless one of two conditions was satisfied. The first was that the parties specifically admit that the demonstration was, or [agree] that it should be treated as, a reproduction of what the witnesses had attempted to describe. The second was that it be proved by evidence … that the demonstration really did reproduce what the witnesses had attempted to describe.295

The holding of a view, particularly in a criminal case, is a matter for the judge’s discretion.296 It should normally take place in the presence of the parties,297 but there may be special circumstances.298 An appropriate direction to a jury would be: The view that you have had may be used to assist you to understand the evidence you have heard, but it is not itself evidence. The witnesses have described the relevant events to you, and photographs have been tendered. That is the evidence that you must act upon, and you should not substitute what you saw when you went to the scene.

However, the reality of this distinction is questionable, and an experienced judge believes that the distinction between views and demonstrations “will not stand a moment’s examination”.299 The Commonwealth Evidence Act 1995 agrees: see [F.29]. But r 478 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) is governed by the common law.300 The importance of warning juries not to conduct views of their own is illustrated and emphasised in R v Skaf.301

295. Evans v The Queen (2007) 235 CLR 521 at 573 per Heydon J, footnotes omitted; Unsted v Unsted (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 495 at 498. 296. Jury Act 1995, s 52; R v Boxshall [1956] QWN 45; R v Lawless [1974] VR 398; R v Delon (1992) 29 NSWLR 29 at 34. 297. Bonfoal Pty Ltd v Botany Bay City Council (1999) 105 LGERA 190; [1998] NSWLEC 282. 298. R v Milat (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Hunt CJ at CL, 12 April 1996). 299. Wells, Evidence and Advocacy (Butterworths, 1988), p 166. Denning LJ agreed: Goold v Evans & Co [1951] 2 TLR 1189: “I think that a view is part of the evidence just as much as an exhibit”. For detailed procedure for the conduct of a view, see Wells op cit pp 162-164. 300. Matton Developments Pty Ltd v CGU Insurance Ltd [2014] QSC 256 at [36]; Evans v The Queen (2007) 235 CLR 521 at 573. In Matton Developments the demonstration was videotaped for convenient reference, but subject to the Numurkah principle. 301. (2004) 60 NSWLR 86; [2004] NSWCCA 37; R v Knight (2012) 227 A Crim R 339; [2012] QSC 397.

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Dispensations from adducing evidence Formal admissions [A.61] A formal admission occurs when a party concedes a fact in issue in pre-trial pleadings,302 or in response to a notice to admit, or in open court.303 Thereafter, evidence of that fact is irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible.304 Leave is required to withdraw a formal admission.305 There may be an exception when evidence contradicting the admission is not objected to.306 A statement that a party “does not plead” to an allegation is a formal admission.307 A free and rational guilty plea is a formal admission of every element of the offence charged,308 whether it is true or not.309 An admission in answers to interrogatories is an informal admission.310 Judicial notice [A.62] A court may dispense with proof of a fact so well known that it would be a waste of time to insist on formal proof.311 For example: • the name of the current Minister for Defence;312 • that cancer is a major health problem;313 302. Fitzgerald v Hill (2008) 51 MVR 55; [2008] QCA 283. 303. In criminal proceedings formal admissions are made in court: Criminal Code, s 644. 304. R v Longford (1970) 17 FLR 37; R v Raabe [1985] 1 Qd R 115. But not in subsequent proceedings: Singleton v John Fairfax and Sons Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 38. 305. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 188; Trustee of the Property of Paul Jason Uhrhane (a bankrupt) v Gunn [2012] QCA 75; Coopers Brewery Ltd v Panfida Foods Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 738 (leave refused although admission made in error); Saeedi v Patterson [1998] ACL Rep 195 Qld 3; Jupiters Ltd v UAERJ Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1469, for the reasons given at [56] – [59]; Green v Pearson [2014] QCA 110. As to withdrawal of a guilty plea, see Attorney-General v Kitchen (1989) 51 SASR 54; R v Miller; Ex parte Attorney-General, QLR (20 October 1990); R v Moxham (2000) 112 A Crim R 142; Director of Public Prosecutions (SA) v District Court (SA) (2005) 92 SASR 94; [2005] SASC 260; R v Wilkinson (No 4) (2009) 195 A Crim R 20; [2009] NSWSC 323; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Xiong [2010] NSWSC 1518; Pinehurst Nominees Pty Ltd v Coeur De Lion Investments Pty Ltd [2012] QSC 314 at [38], [39]. 306. Holdway v Arcuri Lawyers [2009] 2 Qd R 18; [2008] QCA 218. 307. Rockcote Enterprises Pty Ltd v FS Architects Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 39 at [62] – [63]. 308. Meissner v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 132; R v McQuire (2000) 110 A Crim R 348. As to retraction of a plea of guilty, see R v Miller [1990] 2 Qd R 566; Woods v The Queen (2008) 184 A Crim R 108; [2008] NSWCA 83. 309. R v Hutchinson [2010] QCA 22 at [13]; Meissner v The Queen [1995] HCA 41; (1995) 184 CLR 132 at 141, 157. 310. Mundy v Bridge Motors Pty Ltd (1987) 45 SASR 125; Tomic v Limro Pty Ltd (1993) 47 FCR 414; Gannon v Gannon (1971) 125 CLR 629. 311. Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149 at 153. 312. Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149. 313. Re Murray; Permanent Trustee of NSW v Salwey [1965] NSWR 121. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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• that for decades there has been inflation of the currency; • that cannabis sativa is popularly known as “grass”;315 • that AIDS is a life-threatening disease;316

• that the income of a practising QC would be above the tax threshold;317 • that certain aspects of legal practice have not been attended to;318 • that female legal practitioners are disadvantaged;319 • that in Brisbane of the 1890s Lennons Hotel was near the Supreme Court;320 • that fortunes cannot be predicted by astrology;321 • that children are apt to be mischievous;322 • normal school hours in this State.323 Several other examples of judicial notice (“common knowledge”) appear in R v Alexander.324 The doctrine extends to standard works of reference, such as dictionaries, maps, reputable scientific texts325 or rules of a well-known international body326 when no serious dispute exists.327 As to maps, charts etc, see Evidence Act 1977, s 65. The status of Google Earth maps is discussed in Al Shakarji v Mulhern.328 As the foregoing examples suggest, this doctrine is used sparingly, and not when there is a reasonable dispute about the fact in question.329 Geographical facts that are notorious in a small town may not be matters for judicial notice in a larger 314. National Trustees Executors & Agency Co of A/asia Ltd v Attorney-General (Vic) [1973] VR 610. 315. Ringstaad v Butler [1978] 1 NSWLR 754. But not that the use of amphetamines can cause schizophrenia: R v Mason [2000] NSWCCA 82. 316. Mutemeri v Cheesman [1998] 4 VR 484; (1998) 100 A Crim R 397. 317. Trustees of the Property of Cummins (a Bankrupt) v Cummins (2006) 227 CLR 278; [2006] HCA 6. 318. Bechara v Jawhar [2007] NSWCA 25. 319. Victorian Women Lawyers Association Inc v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 170 FCR 318; [2008] FCA 983. 320. Simpson v Fraser (1894) 5 QLJ 89. 321. Penny v Hanson (1887) 18 QBD 478. 322. Cooke v Midland Great Western Railway of Ireland [1909] AC 229 at 237 323. Sullivan v Gordon (1999) 47 NSWLR 319 at [76]. 324. [1979] VR 615 at 629. 325. Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549 (medical journals on causes of psychological injury); Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1950) 83 CLR 1 (texts on basic principles of Communism). 326. Australian Granites Ltd v Eisenwerk Hensel Bayreuth Dipl-ing Burkhardt GmbH [2001] 1 Qd R 461 (Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce). 327. But not on disputed matters, eg to reject psychiatric evidence without notice to the parties: Australian & Overseas Telecommunications Corporation Ltd v McAuslan (1993) 47 FCR 492; see also Gordon M Jenkins & Associates Pty Ltd v Coleman (1989) 23 FCR 38; 87 ALR 477. 328. [2010] QDC 476 at [11] – [14]. 329. Riley v Western Australia (2005) 30 WAR 525; [2005] WASCA 190.

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centre or when the court is sitting away from home.330 In Malaysian Airlines System v Wood,331 the trial court exceeded the bounds of judicial notice in assumptions about “public relations” practised by international airlines. A Family Court judge went too far when he took judicial notice of the effects of a sexually transmitted disease.332 So did the magistrate who informed himself that Thailand is a haven for paedophiles, where sexual abuse is rampant.333 Information on a website about a language test for immigrants did not qualify for judicial notice in Parmar v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship.334 The limits of this source of evidence may apply to a tribunal that is not bound by the rules of evidence.335 On the other hand, it has been said that, where expert evidence of a certain kind is regularly given and usually accepted, the “tedious” process of strict proof may be discarded.336 There is a more significant, but seldom recognised, form of judicial notice, namely the “silent major premise” in “common course” reasoning337 about circumstantial evidence: see [A.130]. Apparently the doctrine of judicial notice is not recognised, as such, in the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).338 But in civil proceedings that may be academic, because s 190 of the federal Act allows the court to waive rules of evidence that would cause “unnecessary expense or delay”. Presumptions [A.63] A rebuttable presumption of law is a partial dispensation from circumstantial proof. Generally there is no legal right to require a court to draw a desired conclusion from circumstantial evidence,339 but the effect of a rebuttable presumption is that, once certain circumstances are established, the court must draw the conclusion, absent proof to the contrary.340 A presumption may assist the proof of a foreign marriage,341 or that a particular person is dead,342 or that

330. R v Dodd [1985] 2 Qd R 277; Bailey v City Smash Repairs (Vic) Pty Ltd (1998) 27 MVR 545. 331. [1988] WAR 294 at 303. In Cavanett v Chambers [1968] SASR 97 it was wrong to take judicial notice of the medical implications of a blood alcohol reading. 332. X v X [2000] FLC 93-017. 333. Vilaisonah v Hilton [2009] NTSC 28. 334. (2011) 122 ALD 103; [2011] FCA 760. 335. Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21. 336. Johnson v Colangelo [2010] SASC 187. 337. Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367; Re Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 193-194. 338. Gattellaro v Westpac Banking Corporation (2004) 78 ALJR 394. See, however, s 144 (“common knowledge”). 339. Distinguish so-called presumptions of fact, such as the presumption of regularity or continuance (Duffus v Collins [1966] 1 NSWR 464; R v Horvath [1972] VR 533) or a submission of res ipsa loquitur. The latter is merely an inferential reasoning process, not an independent rule of law: Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 121. 340. Re Peatling (decd) [1969] VR 214 (standard of proof in rebuttal is the “Briginshaw” standard). 341. Jacombe v Jacombe (1960) 105 CLR 355; [1969] VR 214 at 222. 342. Riggs v Registrar of Births Deaths and Marriages [2010] QSC 481. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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one victim of a double fatality died before or after the other, or that a confession was improperly induced,344 or that a letter was posted at the time and place stated in a postmark.345 Evidence necessary to raise a presumption of death is carefully analysed in Gell v Gell.346 That presumption proves the fact, but not the date of death.347 In some cases a finding of death has been made although seven years since the person’s disappearance have not elapsed. In Re Parker348 and In re Purton349 the evidence sufficed to rebut the presumption of life continuing. The so-called presumptions of continuance and regularity350 (for example, the accuracy of a “scientific instrument”,351 or an official record)352 or the “doctrine” of res ipsa loquitur in the law of negligence353 are merely arguable presumptions of fact, that is, commonsense inferences based on what usually happens, or is assumed to happen. Could there be a more engaging example than this: “Who is so lacking in common sense that he would be unaware of the usual consequences of night, wine, love and a boy and girl together?”354 There is no legal duty to draw the suggested inference. The presumption of regularity is not available when a convenient means of proof, provided by statute, is neglected.355 “Breathalyser” tests have the benefit of a statutory presumption of accuracy.356

343. Re Rowlings; Fraser v Thom [2010] VSC 626. 344. See [Q.59]. 345. R v Leroy [1984] 2 NSWLR 441; R v Kelly (1975) 12 SASR 441. 346. [2005] NSWSC 566. 347. Ross v NRMA Life Ltd (1993) 7 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-170; Chipchase v Chipchase [1939] P 391. 348. [1995] Qd R 617 (fisherman washed from rocks). 349. [1943] QWN 33 (plane disappeared, fleeing Japanese invasion). 350. Pertl v Kahl (1976) 13 SASR 433 (official delegation); Rosebanner Pty Ltd v Energy Australia (2009) 223 FLR 406; [2009] NSWSC 43 (Governor’s consent to electricity installation); Brickworks Ltd v Shire of Warringah (1963) 108 CLR 568; Jemena Ltd v Mine Subsidence Board (2012) 193 LGERA 303; [2012] NSWSC 1509. Application of the presumption of regularity to criminal proceedings is discussed in Mowday v Western Australia (2007) 176 A Crim R 85; [2007] WASCA 165. 351. Thompson v Kovacs [1959] VR 229 (speedometer). Expert evidence is needed when the instrument is not “notoriously” reliable: R v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26; [2006] VSCA 263; Bevan v Western Australia (2012) 43 WAR 233; 224 A Crim R 227; [2012] WASCA 153 at [144]. 352. Baiada v Waste Recycling & Processing Service (NSW) (1999) 130 LGERA 52; [1999] NSWCA 139. 353. Anchor Products Ltd v Hedges (1996) 115 CLR 493 at 500. 354. HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 per Heydon J at [272], quoting a Dutch writer. 355. Dixon v LeKich (2010) 56 MVR 70; [2010] QCA 213 (speed camera photograph). 356. Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995, s 80(16F); R v Anderson (2005) 44 MVR 434; [2005] QCA 304.

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Rules relating to testimony Competence to testify [A.64] Gradual liberalisation of the rules of competency is noted at [A.26] and [A.27] and in the commentary on ss 6 – 9D. A question of sanity is a matter for the judge to decide, in the light of expert evidence.357 It is uncertain whether recollections aided by hypnosis raise a question of admissibility for the judge, or a matter of weight for the jury.358 On the dangers associated with evidence produced by hypnotherapy, see R v Horsfall,359 Roughley v The Queen,360 R v WB361 and Hardwick v Western Australia.362 The evidence of a child aged 9, obtained in several sessions of hypnosis, was excluded as a matter of discretion in R v JG.363 “Recovered memory” is described by an expert as forensically unreliable in TS v The Queen,364 but there is no presumption that after a particular time memories are too unreliable for the purposes of a criminal trial.365 Subject to privilege, a party’s lawyer is competent to testify for or against the client, but if the evidence is controversial the lawyer should no longer act for the client in that matter.366 The rules of competence and compellability may not be waived.367 Compellability [A.65] Most competent witnesses are compellable to testify. The main exceptions are defendants in criminal proceedings and witnesses entitled to privilege (to the extent that questions objected to impinge on the privilege). A witness does not cease to be compellable because he or she has been interviewed by the other side.368 Failure to comply with a subpoena without lawful excuse is a contempt, and the judge may issue a bench warrant for the offender’s arrest.369 A person in the 357. R v Hill (1851) 5 Jurist 470; Toohey v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] AC 595. 358. R v Haywood (1994) 73 A Crim R 41; R v Jenkyns (1993) 32 NSWLR 712. 359. (1989) 51 SASR 489. 360. (1995) 5 Tas R 8; [1995] TASSC 14. 361. (2009) 23 VR 319; [2009] VSCA 173. 362. (2011) 211 A Crim R 349; [2011] WASCA 164. 363. (2009) 199 A Crim R 299; [2009] NSWSC 1053. 364. [2014] NSWCCA 174. 365. Hermanus (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2015] VSCA 2 at [41]. 366. Chapman v Rogers [1984] 1 Qd R 542; Bufalo Corporation Pty Ltd v Lendlease Primelife Ltd [2010] VSC 672. 367. Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531 at [51]. 368. R v Ward (1981) 3 A Crim R 171; Harmony Shipping Co SA v Davis [1979] 1 WLR 1380; [1981] Lloyd’s Rep 377; Richards v Kadian (2005) 64 NSWLR 204; [2005] NSWCA 328 (breaches of confidence excepted); Lewis, “Communication with Another Practitioner’s Client or Witness” (1987) 25 Law Soc J (NSW) 65. 369. R v Daye [1908] 2 KB 333; Bank of New South Wales v Withers (1981) 35 ALR 21; Remely v Vandenberg [2010] QCA 214; R v Lemmens [2010] QSC 271; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 422. The same applies if the witness appears but refuses to testify: R v Lemmens [2010] QSC 271; Principal Registrar of Supreme Court of NSW v Drollett [2002] NSWSC 490. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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precincts of the court may be called to testify without service of a subpoena.370 A subpoena that is irrelevant, “fishing”, oppressive, or is otherwise an abuse of process,371 may be set aside372 with costs to the person improperly served.373 There must be a real or reasonable374 possibility that the information sought will assist a party’s case.375 If the person subpoenaed denies that proposition, the person issuing the subpoena must demonstrate it to the judge’s satisfaction, but not necessarily on the balance of probabilities.376 If a subpoena is not accompanied by proper conduct money, it need not be obeyed,377 but if the recipient does attend court, he or she is compellable after all.378 The abuse of subpoenas is considered in Spencer Motors Pty Ltd v LNC Industries Ltd.379 It is not abusive to issue a subpoena to the Corrective Services Department in search of “credit” material.380 Testimony to be factual [A.66] As a general rule, testimony should consist of assertions of facts within the witness’s own knowledge. Opinions are judgments – “inferences from observed and communicable data”381 – and judgments are for the court. However, the distinction between evidence of fact and opinion is sometimes difficult to draw.382

370. Evidence Act 1977, s 129B; McMahon v Cooper [1989] 2 Qd R 418; Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure (4th ed, Law Book Co, 1996), p 534. 371. R v Sergi [1998] 1 Qd R 536; Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564 at 573; Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Western Metals Resources Ltd [2001] 1 Qd R 261 (attempt to use subpoena to discover material unconnected with the present case); R v Barton [1981] 2 NSWLR 414; Ex parte Swiss Aluminium Australia Ltd (1987) 68 ALR 587 (collateral purpose). 372. Seyfang v GD Searle & Co [1973] QB 148 (oppressive subpoena to expert not previously associated with the case); In the Marriage of Sharpe (1990) 100 FLR 115; [1990] FLC 78,142 (documents not relevant); R v Sergi [1998] 1 Qd R 536 (fishing); Spencer Motors Pty Ltd v LNC Industries Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 921 (fishing). 373. Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 136 FCR 114; [2004] FCA 636; Naumovski v Ugrinovski [2015] VSC 49. 374. Johnson v Poppeliers (2008) 20 VR 92; 51 MVR 44; [2008] VSC 461. 375. Gardiner v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 233; [2006] NSWCCA 190. 376. Commissioner of Police v Hughes [2009] NSWCA 306. 377. Re AH Prentice Ltd [1930] QWN 11; Re Imobridge Pty Ltd (In Liq) [1999] 1 Qd R 38; [1998] QSC 109. 378. Wisden v Wisden (1849) 6 Hare 549; 67 ER 1281; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 419. 379. [1982] 2 NSWLR 921; see also Southern Pacific Hotel Services Inc v Southern Pacific Hotel Corporation Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 710. 380. R v Spizzirri (2000) 117 A Crim R 101. 381. Allstate Life Insurance Co v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (No 5) (1996) 136 ALR 627; Valetta PLC v National Crime Authority (1999) 165 ALR 60 at [20]. 382. La Trobe Capital & Mortgage Corporation Ltd v Hay Property Consultants Pty Ltd (2011) 273 ALR 774; [2011] FCAFC 4 at [43]ff.

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It is customary to ask witnesses to give evidence of conversations in direct speech but there is no inflexible rule requiring the evidence to be given in that form.383 It is improper to ask a witness whether another witness has lied; that invites an opinion about the other’s state of mind that the present witness is not qualified to express, and usurps a function of the court.384 It is generally improper to ask an accused why a complainant would want to lie, unless the accused raises that issue,385 in which case the prosecution may try to discover whether there is any basis for the suggestion. Expert witnesses [A.67] In practice, the rule against opinion evidence is heavily qualified. Witnesses who possess special skills or knowledge are permitted to express opinions that are relevant and within their expertise386 and to select appropriate literature.387 It is for the judge to decide whether a professed expert is sufficiently versed in a special field of knowledge to be of assistance to the court.388 A finding that an opinion is based on expertise is a question of fact.389 The evidence, if admitted, should be demonstrative, not merely assertive.390 The expert’s opinion should be preceded by a statement of relevant facts and the principles applied, so that the court can form a conclusion of its own.391 The opponent is not to be left to discover the expert’s reasoning for the first time in cross-examination.392

383. LMI (A’sia) Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 31; Commonwealth of Australia v Riley (1984) 5 FCR 8; R v Wright (1985) 19 A Crim R 17; R v Noble [2002] 1 Qd R 432. 384. R v Foley [2000] 1 Qd R 290; (1998) 105 A Crim R 1; [1998] QCA 225; R v Buckley (2004) 149 A Crim R 122; [2004] VSCA 185; R v SWC (2007) 175 A Crim R 71; [2007] VSCA 201; R v Leak [1969] SASR 172; Reeves v The Queen [2013] VSCA 311. 385. Palmer v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 1; R v Bajic (2005) 154 A Crim R 96; [2005] VSCA 158; R v SWC (2007) 175 A Crim R 71; [2007] VSCA 201; Skinner (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2015] VSCA 26 at [8]. 386. Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 at 491; McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads [2009] WASC 353 [3] – [5]; Saunders v Public Trustee [2015] WASCA 203 at [144]; R v Jones [2015] QCA 161 at [16]; Glass, “Expert Evidence” (1987) 3 Aust Bar Rev 43; Von Doussa, “Difficulties of Assessing Expert Evidence” (1987) 61 ALJ 615. 387. Trevorrow v South Australia (No 5) (2007) 98 SASR 136; [2007] SASC 285. 388. Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 at 491; Fisher v Brown [1968] SASR 65; R v Watson [1987] 1 Qd R 440; Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305 at 743 (NSWLR). 389. R v Jung [2006] NSWSC 658 at [59]. 390. Ocean Marine Mutual Insurance Association (Europe) OV v Jetopay Pty Ltd (2000) 120 FCR 146 at 150; see, eg, Farnham v Pruden [2016] QCA 18. 391. Davie v Edinburgh Corp (No 2) (1953) SC 34 at 40; Preece v HM Advocate [1981] Crim LR 783; Holtman v Sampson [1985] 2 Qd R 472 at 474; Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission [1990] ATPR 41-061; Forster v Hunter New England Area Health Service (2010) 77 NSWLR 495; [2010] NSWCA 106; Commissioner for Government Transport v Adamcik (1961) 106 CLR 292 at 303; Monroe Australia Pty Ltd v Campbell (1995) 65 SASR 16 at 27. 392. Lewis v The Queen (1987) 88 FLR 104 at 124. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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The opinion of the most eminent and impartial expert is unacceptable if its factual foundation is not properly proved before, during or after the opinion is given: see [A.75]. If a witness’s status as an expert is disputed, the questions for the judge are these:393 (a) Does the asserted field of special knowledge exist?394 Disciplines such as accountancy, biology, pharmacology, land valuation and the various branches of medicine and engineering are routinely accepted as reliable areas of special knowledge. (The weight of a particular witness’s evidence may be contested, but that is another matter.) Of course the list of acceptable sciences is not closed;395 voice identification was treated as a science in R v McHardie and Danielson,396 but such evidence, whether given by an expert or a lay witness, should be treated with the caution appropriate to eyewitness identification.397 A “forensic anatomist” may give evidence of similarity, but not identity, based on “facial mapping”.398 A geriatrician was accepted as an expert where testamentary capacity was in issue.399 A retired Family Court judge may be an expert on likely results of false evidence in that jurisdiction.400 “Forensic accountancy” may help a court to assess the financial health of a company.401 In R v Folbigg,402 qualified pathologists testified that in their experience, and on a review of relevant

393. Criteria for deciding expertise for legal purposes are discussed in Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 at [85]; and R v Bjordal (2005) 93 SASR 237; [2005] SASC 422 and R v Ferguson (2009) 24 VR 531; [2009] VSCA 198. Evidence on this issue was well presented in R v Gilmore (1977) 2 NSWLR 935; and R v McHardie and Danielson [1983] 2 NSWLR 733 at 755-763. 394. Fisher v Brown [1968] SASR 65 at 72; Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 at 743; Hancock v East Coast Timber Products Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 11 at [67]; R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681 at 712. Robust views on the claims of “social sciences” appear in R v Turner [1975] QB 834 and Lynch v Lynch (1966) 8 FLR 433, but now tend to be more muted. “[A]s areas of human knowledge and understanding expand, there will … be the progression … from the expression of a novel theory … to the stage where a sufficient level of … research [has] been conducted to justify the receipt of expert opinion upon the subject matter”: R v Smith [1987] VR 907 at 909 per Vincent J. 395. Clare v Peach [1995] 2 Cr App R 333: “as technology develops, evidential practice will need to be evolved”. 396. [1983] 2 NSWLR 733; see also R v Gilmore [1977] 2 NSWLR 935; R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; Brotherton v The Queen (1992) 29 NSWLR 95; Dickman v The Queen [2015] VSCA 311 at [127]; Carracher, “Voice Identification Evidence” (1993) 10 Aust Bar Rev 75. It was received from a non-expert and from an expert using techniques approved only by a minority of his profession in R v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161. 397. R v O’Sullivan [1995] QCA 312. 398. R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; 161 A Crim R 377; [2006] NSWCCA 167 (comparison of photographs and video surveillance recording); R v Jung [2006] NSWSC 658 at [30]; Murdoch v The Queen (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; [2007] NTCCA 1 at [280]. 399. Gray v Hart [2012] NSWSC 1435. 400. Richards v Dare [2001] VSC 365. 401. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 23 ACLC 430; [2005] NSWSC 149. 402. (2005) 152 A Crim R 35; [2005] NSWCCA 23.

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literature, the sudden deaths of four healthy infants in the same family, due to natural causes, were unprecedented. Foreign law is a matter for expert evidence.403 Medical evidence of the “typical ambivalence of a sexually abused child” was excluded in the New Zealand cases of R v B404 and R v Accused.405 Evidence of a so-called “battered woman syndrome” was more sympathetically treated in R v Runjanjic and Kontinnen,406 but judicial views in Australia have varied.407 In a trade practices case it was held that a behavioural scientist is not an expert on likely consumer behaviour.408 An opinion as to solvency is not a matter for expert accountancy evidence.409 An expert in “facial mapping” may give circumstantial evidence of similarity, but not direct evidence of identity.410 Evidence of “body mapping”, as distinct from facial mapping, has been less well received.411 Doubts about the scientific status of an “ergonomics and safety management consultant” justified a decision to discount the weight of his evidence in White v Logen Pty Ltd.412 A clinical psychologist whose expertise on the “grooming” of children was based, retrospectively, on a study of known sex offenders was not permitted to give such evidence prospectively against a person charged, but not yet convicted.413 In deciding whether a professed expert should be accepted as such, the court may be referred to other decisions about his or her expertise.414

403. Adsteam Building Industries Pty Ltd v Queensland Cement & Lime Co Ltd (No 4) [1985] 1 Qd R 127. But see ss 174 – 175 of the Federal Act, considered in Optus Networks Pty Ltd v Gilsan (International) Ltd [2006] NSWCA 171. Under the Federal Act, if the effect of foreign law is an ultimate issue, any difficulty is overcome by s 80 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth): Barton v Lake Macquarie City Council [2014] FCA 1103 at [41]; Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 50 NSWLR 640. (This matter, funded by a litigation financier to the extent of about $7.5 million, consumed 223 hearing days and generated 75 separate judgments and several law reports before it succumbed to the burden of costs.) As to decline of the ultimate issue rule at common law, see [A.75]. But see ss 174 – 175 of the Federal Act, considered in Optus Networks Pty Ltd v Gilsan (International) Ltd [2006] NSWCA 171. 404. [1987] 1 NZLR 362. 405. [1989] 1 NZLR 714. 406. (1991) 56 SASR 114; 53 A Crim R 362: criticised by Odgers and Richardson in “Keeping Bad Science Out of the Courtroom – Changes in Expert Evidence” (1995) 18 UNSWLJ 109. But see Woods v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (2008) 38 WAR 217; [2008] WASCA 188. 407. Compare R v C (1993) 60 SASR 467; and R v J (1994) 75 A Crim R 522. See also Kalenik v Apostolidis [2009] VSC 208. 408. Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd [2006] ATPR 42-112; [2006] FCA 363. 409. Ferella v Otvosi (2006) 197 FLR 451; [2006] FMCA 334 (Federal Magistrates Ct). 410. R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681 at 703-704. On the distinction between evidence of similarity and identification, see Murphy v The Queen (1994) 62 SASR 121 at 123-124; Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593 at 598. 411. Rejected in R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; cf R v Jung [2006] NSWSC 658. 412. [2014] NSWCA 159. 413. SLS v The Queen (2004) 42 VR 64; [2014] VSCA 31 at [211]. 414. R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; R v Jung [2006] NSWSC 658; Morgan v The Queen (2011) 215 A Crim R 33; [2011] NSWCCA 257 at [139]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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A formally trained expert may express an opinion about practices followed by competent and careful practitioners in his or her field, without saying what he or she would have done in the particular case.415 Expert evidence as to “possible” causes, with other evidence,416 may satisfy the civil standard of proof.417 In the United States it is for the court, not the scientific community, to decide whether a self-proclaimed science really exists,418 but the position in Australia is less certain:419 [A] decision of a trial judge that a witness is qualified to give expert evidence is very much a question of fact … [T]he admission or exclusion of such testimony … will not be reviewed … except where [the trial judge’s] discretion has been abused, as where there is absolutely no evidence that the witness had the qualifications of an expert, or where … the trial court has proceeded upon erroneous legal standards.420

Courts have consistently refused to accept that there is a general science of the causation of accidents,421 but particular aspects, such as mechanical failure, or braking distances under specified conditions, are matters for expert opinion,422 although the application of “critical speed formulae” to tyre marks may not be a sufficiently organised body of special knowledge.423 Experts were allowed to reconstruct the circumstances of a fall from a staircase in Collaroy Services Beach Club Ltd v Haywood.424 In Eagles v Orth425 a full court accepted, with some hesitation, that “the study of seat belts” in motor cars is a recognised field of special knowledge. Research since 1976 would probably support a more confident ruling today. A computer simulation was admitted to prove the likely path of a vehicle in R v Farquharson.426 The interpretation of video-recordings of a collision is a matter for the judge of fact, not for an expert.427 415. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Vines (2003) 48 ACSR 291; [2003] NSWSC 1095; Labocus Precious Metals Pty Ltd v Thomas [2007] FCA 1072. 416. Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262; [2000] NSWCA 29 at [89], [94]-[96], [98]-[100], [102], [143], [144] and [153]. 417. McDonald (t/as BE McDonald Transport) v Girkaid Pty Ltd [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-768; [2004] NSWCA 297; EMI Australia Ltd v Bes [1970] 2 NSWLR 238; Hirst v Sydney South West Area Health Service [2011] NSWSC 664 at [123]; Sydney South West Area Health Service v Stamoulis [2009] NSWCA 153 at [138]. 418. Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharamceuticals (1993) 509 US 579. 419. See R v Pantoja (1996) 88 A Crim R 554 at 558, where Hunt J suggests that the Daubert test depends on US rules of procedure which have no exact counterpart here. Other cases implying that the court is the arbiter are: Eagles v Orth [1976] Qd R 313; and Lewis v The Queen (1987) 88 FLR 104 at 117. 420. Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 at 503 per Menzies J. 421. Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486; R v Faulkner [1987] 2 Qd R 263; Cooper v Bech (No 2) (1975) 12 SASR 151; Pankelis v Francombe (1988) 14 Tas R 174; Shephard v Pike (1954) 72 WN (NSW) 85. 422. Fisher v Brown [1968] SASR 65; Rechnitzer, Richardson and Grzebieta, “Expert Evidence in Crash Investigations” (2004) 15 Bar News 11. 423. R v Bjordal (2005) 93 SASR 237; [2005] SASC 422. 424. [2007] NSWCA 21. 425. [1976] Qd R 313. 426. (2009) 26 VR 410; [2009] VSCA 307. 427. R v Banhelyi (2012) 62 MVR 373; [2012] QCA 357.

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(b) If the answer to “(a)” is “yes”, is the witness suffıciently versed in the science?428 In highly developed sciences with specialist subdivisions, an expert in one area may not be expert in another.429 A paediatrician was not entitled to speak on the psychology of “abused children” in R v F.430 In O’Brien v Gillespie,431 a solicitor’s expertise did not extend to the type of practice in question. A person may be a trained automotive engineer without being an expert on motor car immobilisers.432 However, an expert is not disqualified merely because he or she has not seen or previously considered a particular situation; well-qualified experts are sometimes required to offer opinions on events or circumstances that, to the best of their knowledge, have not previously occurred.433 It has been suggested that a court may examine the academic rigour and integrity of a particular course of study before deciding a question of expertise.434 That would be a salutary response to accreditation inflation, but nowadays it would require signal courage in the face of academic ire. The expert as advocate [A.68] Bias in experts is a matter of perennial concern.435 Perhaps it explains the reluctance of New Zealand courts, in the 1990s, to admit psychologists’ evidence in child abuse cases.436 Some 30 years earlier an Australian judge referred, with a candour now uncommon, to the “unconscious bias which is a well-known characteristic of expert evidence”.437 The fact that a witness is aligned to one party goes to weight, but it does not render the witness’s evidence inadmissible.438 An instruction to an expert to change the assumed facts is not 428. Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542 at 562. 429. R v Anderson (2000) 1 VR 1; 111 A Crim R 19 (doctor with no training or experience in stab wounds); Daya v CX Reinsurance Company Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1622 at [7], citing R v Farquharson (2009) 26 VR 410; [2009] VSCA 307 at [79]. 430. R v F (1995) 83 A Crim R 502. 431. (1997) 41 NSWLR 549. 432. Hamod v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2006] NSWCA 243. 433. Street v Luna Park Sydney Pty Ltd [2007] NSWC 1529. 434. Fisher v Brown [1968] SASR 65. 435. Lord Abinger v Ashton (1873) LR 17 Eq 358 at 373 per Jessel MR; Joseph Crosfield & Sons Ltd v Techno-Chemical Laboratories Ltd (1913) 29 TLR 378 at 379; Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd v Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 948 at 963; Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588 at 610 per Heydon J. However, the practice is to allow experts who have not yet testified to remain in court while other evidence is given, unlike other witnesses (parties excepted): Moore v Lambeth County Court Registrar [1969] 1 All ER 782. A failure to comply with an “order for witnesses” is a contempt, but does not disqualify the offender from giving evidence: R v Briggs (1930) 22 Cr App R 68. However, there may be a discretion to exclude the offender’s evidence: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Duckworth [2012] WASC 476 at [31]. 436. R v Tait [1991] 2 NZLR 667; R v Accused [1989] 1 NZLR 714. 437. Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd v Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 948 at 963 per Walsh J. 438. FGT Custodians Pty Ltd v Fagenblat [2003] VSCA 33; Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 190 FLR 242; 23 ACLC 430; [2005] NSWSC 149; Flavel v South Australia (2007) 96 SASR 505; [2007] SASC 50; Fortson Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2008) 100 SASR 162 at [114]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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improper, provided that the change is disclosed in his or her report. However, any particular relationship should be disclosed.440 Modern practice rules provide for court-appointed experts,441 but parties usually retain the right to call experts of their own. Rules requiring experts’ reports to be exchanged before trial442 embody a hope that common ground will be discovered, thus shortening and simplifying the hearing. A non-adversarial process known as “concurrent evidence” (“hot tubbing”) encourages expert witnesses to identify and minimise points of difference.443 An example of an advocate-expert spurned may be seen in Assafiri v Shell Company (Aust) Ltd.444 However, the uncontradicted expert in Wilson v Nilepac Pty Ltd445 was given the benefit of the doubt, as his advocacy could be seen as the expression of strong opinions and frustration at the nature and length of his cross-examination. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules: experts New rules, designed to reduce the risk of partisan experts in civil cases, were promulgated in the Uniform Civil Procedure Amendment Rule (No 1) No 115 of 2004 (2 July 2004), inserting Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, rr 423 – 429S.446 A foreign lawyer was exempted from strict compliance with the code of conduct requirements in Hoffmann v Challis.447 An expert has a duty to assist the court, above and beyond any obligation to the person paying the witness’s fees or expenses: r 426.448 So far as practicable, and without compromising the interests of justice, evidence on a particular issue should be given by a single expert: rr 429H(6), 429N(2). These rules were strictly applied in Stewart v Fehlberg449 and Simpson v Brett and Suncorp General Insurance 439. Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning and Consultancy Services Pty Ltd [2014] VSCA 3. 440. Fortson Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2008) 100 SASR 162; [2008] SASC 49 (employer and employee). 441. See, eg, Federal Court Rules, O 34B r 32 (by consent); Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 62G; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 425. 442. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Qld), r 423. 443. See AAT Policy and Research Section, An Evaluation of the Concurrent Use in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (November 2005); Downes, “Concurrent Expert Evidence in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal: The New South Wales Experience” (Paper presented at the Australasian Conference of Planning and Environment Courts and Tribunals, Hobart, 27 February 2004); Freckelton, Reddy and Selby, Australian Judicial Perspectives on Expert Evidence: An Empirical Study (Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, 1999); Cooper, “Federal Court Expert Guidelines” (1998) 16(3) Aust Bar Rev 203. Practical suggestions for the effective use of this method are made by J Temple-Cole and S Farthing in “Some Like it Hot!” (2013) 59 Hearsay (Jnl Qld Bar Assn). It was used, for example, in Kotku Bread Pty Ltd v Vero Insurance Ltd (2012) 17 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-930; [2012] QSC 109 at [109] and Boorer v HLB Mann Judd (NSW) Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1499 at [105]. 444. [2010] NSWSC 1058 at [12] – [13]. 445. [2011] NSWCA 63 at [64]. 446. They are traceable to England’s Woolf Report of 1996: Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales (1996). 447. [2016] NSWSC 268. 448. Polivitte Ltd v Commercial Union Assurance Co plc [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 379 at 386; James v Keogh [2008] SASC 156. Rule 426 may be more demanding than the common law: Sydney South West Area Health Service v Stamoulis [2009] NSWCA 153 at [210]. 449. [2008] QSC 203.

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450

Ltd, although more lenient cases can be found.451 The expert may be appointed by agreement, or on the court’s own initiative, or on application for an appropriate order: rr 429G – 429J and 429N. An expert’s evidence in chief may take the form of a written report (r 427), to be disclosed 90 days before trial by a plaintiff, or 120 days before trial by a defendant: r 429. A report has the same privilege as oral evidence: r 429C. The expert’s document should be addressed to the court, setting out the writer’s qualifications and the facts, literature and any other materials relied on. If there is a range of competent opinions, it should say so, and give reasons for adopting one view rather than another. If there is any readily ascertainable (but presently unavailable) information that might produce a more reliable result, this should also be stated: r 428. The court may direct rival experts to try, without prejudice, to identify areas of agreement: r 429B. A person with useful information may be ordered to supply it to an expert for the purposes of the expert’s report: r 429O. Identification by expert evidence [A.69] Fingerprint identification evidence was accepted by the High Court as long ago as 1912.452 It may support a conviction although it is the only evidence of identity.453 The recent454 arrival of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid analysis) is a valuable addition to evidence of identity. It may convict or exonerate.455 It depends on a statistical improbability that a particular set of “genetic markers” would be found in a sample from someone else in the community.456 A technique known as “low

450. (Unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Rockhampton, McMeekin J, 8 December 2008). 451. Permission to tender a second report, following the production of one by a jointly appointed engineer’s report was refused in Stolfa v Owners Strata Plan 4366 (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 531. However, a second psychological report was admitted in Tomko v Tomko [2007] NSWSC 1486; and in Wu v Statewide Developments Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 587 (procedure rules “not the last word”). 452. Parker v The King (1912) 14 CLR 681. It appears that Queensland courts were using this form of evidence as early as 1905: The Queenslander (24 February 1905); Blanch, “First Dab Scores Fifteen Years Jail”, Sunday Mail (9 January 1994), p 88. A conclusive opinion is based on the cumulative effect of points of similarity: R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681. 453. R v Carr [1972] 1 NSWLR 608; R v O’Callaghan [1976] VR 676; JP v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2015] NSWSC 1669. 454. It is said that the first conviction based on DNA evidence was of one Applebee in the ACT in 1989: The Australian (Magazine) (8-9 April 2000), p 14. 455. It exonerated the accused in R v Button [2001] QCA 133. Unfortunate events in that case led to the insertion of s 590AH of the Criminal Code (Crown to disclose any forensic procedure, whether completed or not). 456. An accessible article is Freney and Ansford’s “DNA in Forensic Science” (1999) Proctor (Qld Law Society, Jan-Feb 1999) 16. See also Curran, “Expert Witnesses in DNA Cases” [2000] NZLJ 101; Alldridge, “Recognising Novel Scientific Techniques: DNA as a Test Case” [1992] Crim LR 687; Atchison, “DNA Statistics May Be Misleading” (2003) 41 Law Soc J (NSW) 68; Ayres, Chaseling and Balding, “Implications for DNA Identification Arising from an Analysis © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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457

copy number” increases the sensitivity of a test. In Forbes v The Queen458 it was held that DNA identification alone can support a conviction. However, that will not be so if “secondary transfer” of the specimen – that is, a possibility that it was deposited at some other, immaterial time – raises a reasonable doubt.459 The nature of DNA evidence is considered in Riley v Western Australia,460 where the trial judge’s reasons for accepting it were inadequate. Queensland decisions in point include R v Sopher461 and R v Fletcher.462 A high degree of expertise is expected in such cases.463 DNA evidence, like other scientific evidence, must be properly proved by admissible evidence. It is liable to be tested by the usual forensic means, such as cross-examination or contrary expert evidence. If defects are exposed in the testing process, the taking and examination of samples, or laboratory procedures this may discredit the expert’s conclusions.464 There may be “contamination” of samples, or other defects in the collection or processing of primary material.465 The prosecution must exclude the possibility of laboratory error beyond reasonable doubt,466 but there is no general duty to warn jurors that statistical evidence may be misused.467 DNA evidence was excluded as a matter of discretion in R v Joyce468 because the possibility of an innocent explanation of its presence could not be excluded. But in R v Berry469 the court was satisfied that a jury could cope with evidence that the accused’s DNA was found with that of three others.

of Australian Forensic Databases” (2002) 129 Forensic Science International 90; Evett, Foreman, Jackson and Lambert, “DNA Profiling: A Discussion of Issues Relating to the Reporting of Very Small Match Probabilities” (2000) Crim LR 341; Ligertwood, “Avoiding Bayes in DNA Cases” (2003) 77 ALJ 317. 457. R v Cassidy [2016] NTSC 1 at [20]. 458. (2009) 167 ACTR 1; [2009] ACTCA 10. On 18 May 2010, the High Court refused special leave to appeal. 459. As in Fitzgerald v The Queen (2014) 311 ALR 158; 88 ALJR 779; [2014] HCA 28. 460. (2005) 30 WAR 525; [2005] WASCA 190 at [79] per Roberts-Smith JA. See also R v Fitzherbert [2000] QCA 255; R v Noll [1999] 3 VR 704 at 711. 461. (1992) 74 A Crim R 21. 462. [1998] 2 Qd R 437 (chance of error said to be 1 in 6.4 billion). Other jurisdictions: R v Percerep (1993) 65 A Crim R 419; [1993] 2 VR 109; R v Adams [1996] Crim LR 898 (case and comment); R v Pantoja (1996) 88 A Crim R 554. 463. R v Gallagher [2001] NSWSC 462. 464. Farnell v Penhalluriack (No 2) [2008] VSC 214. 465. On the more robust and reviewable nature of fingerprint evidence, see Shadbolt, “Too Clever by Half” [2008] ALMD Advance No 6 (31 March 2008), p 2. 466. That was not done in R v Ryan [2002] VSCA 176 because the expert witness did not collect the sample, and there was no other evidence linking it to the accused. 467. R v Karger (2002) 83 SASR 135 (FC). 468. (2002) 173 FLR 322. 469. (2007) 17 VR 153; 176 A Crim R 195; [2007] VSCA 202.

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The statistical evidence must be considered with all the other evidence to decide whether the onus of proof has been discharged.470 Thirteen procedural steps for assessing DNA evidence for the prosecution are set out in R v Doheny:471 (i) The witness should give evidence of the DNA comparison between the “crime stain” and a sample from the defendant, and a calculation of the random occurrence ratio. (ii) The defence should be given pre-trial details of how the calculations were carried out. (iii) The Crown should make available to a defence expert, if requested, the database for the calculations. (iv) Any issue of admissibility should be identified and, if possible, resolved before the trial. (v) The expert should explain to the jury the nature of the matching DNA characteristics between the two specimens. (vi) On the basis of statistical data, the expert should give the jury a random occurrence ratio – that is, the frequency with which the matching DNA characteristics are likely to be found in the population at large.472 (vii) If the witness has the necessary data, it may be appropriate to state how many people with the matching characteristics are likely to be found in a specified class of people or area. (viii) It is then for the jury to decide, on all the evidence, whether they are sure that it was the defendant who created the crime stain or whether there is a reasonable possibility that it was made by someone else. (ix) The witness should not be asked about the likelihood that the stain was made by the defendant, or say anything to that effect. (x) The expert should not give a statistical evaluation of the likelihood that the defendant left the stain, as that is likely to be so complex as to confuse the jury. (xi) The summing up should include careful directions on any doubts cast on the DNA evidence, and help the jury to see where no real issue exists. (xii) The judge should explain to the jury the relevance of the random occurrence ratio and draw attention to any extraneous evidence that gives that ratio significance, and draw attention to any evidence indicating that the defendant is not the person who left the stain. (xiii) With respect to the random occurrence ratio, a direction along these lines, tailored to the facts, may be appropriate: If you accept the Crown’s scientific evidence, it indicates that there are probably only 4 or 5 white males in [the selected area] from whom that stain could have come. The defendant is one of them. If that is the position, the decision you have to reach, on all the evidence, is whether you are sure that 470. Riley v Western Australia (2005) 30 WAR 525; [2005] WASCA 190 at [30]; R v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317 at 323; R v Karger (2002) 83 SASR 135 at 139. 471. [1997] 1 Cr App R 369 (Court of Appeal England). See also R v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317 at 328-329. 472. A 1 in 6.4 billion match was noted in R v Fletcher [1998] 2 Qd R 437. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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it was the defendant who left that stain, or whether it is possible that it was one of that small group of men who share the same DNA characteristics.

See also R v Galli,473 commending an earlier, analogous direction on fingerprint evidence in the New Zealand case of R v Krausch.474 A recent case closely examining DNA evidence is R v Hunter.475 According to the High Court of Australia, juries are quite capable of resolving complex medical issues in criminal trials.476 Evidence that expresses results of DNA testing as an “exclusion percentage” is admissible when accompanied by an equivalent “frequency ratio” and an explanation of those terms. Evidence that one in 1,600 people in the general population would be expected to share the subject DNA profile is the “frequency ratio”, and evidence that 99.9 per cent of people would not be expected to share it is “the exclusion percentage”.477 In R v QVT,478 the judge ensured that DNA evidence was likely to be reliable before letting it to go to the jury. In R v Juric,479 on the other hand, the jury was insufficiently instructed. In R v GK,480 Mason P identified a “Prosecutor’s Fallacy” involving a “slide” from the proposition: “The chance of C’s father being a person selected at random rather than GK is 147,005:1 against” to the conclusion: “It is 147,005 times more likely than not that GK is C’s father.” The proper approach, his Honour explained, is to consider how many groups of 147,005 people there are in the relevant population. The number of such groups must be taken into account in order to reach a proper conclusion. A statutory power to take DNA specimens and place the results on a database was considered in R v R.481 Provision for “DNA evidentiary certificates” appears in s 95A. Non-certificated or “ad hoc”482 experts [A.70] Expertise can be acquired by practice without formal training or certification.483 All that is needed is that the witness has acquired some skill or knowledge beyond common experience.484 A firefighter may be competent to 473. (2001) 127 A Crim R 493 at 509. 474. (1913) 32 NZLR 1229 at 1230-1231. 475. [2014] QCA 59. 476. Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR 402; 187 ALR 233. 477. Aytugrul v The Queen [2012] HCA 15. 478. (2002) 131 A Crim R 264. 479. (2002) 4 VR 411; 129 A Crim R 408. Further proceedings: [2003] VSC 382. 480. (2001) 53 NSWLR 317 at [33] and [47]-[54]. 481. [2003] 2 Qd R 544. 482. Honeysett v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 135 at [40]. 483. Also described as “ad hoc experts”: Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 195; R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405 at [37] – [38]. See also Restifio v Bernstein (1996) 23 MVR 347 (approximate speed); Dodds v Marshall (1988) 10 QL Reps 101 (apparent influence of alcohol or drugs). 484. Weal v Bottom (1966) 40 ALJR 436; TTS Pty Ltd v Griffıths (1991) 105 FLR 255; Sweeney v Boulton (1984) 2 MVR 124; R v Fazio (1997) 69 SASR 54; Chel v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 1535 (meaning of “bikie gang”).

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give an expert opinion on the cause or progress of a bushfire,485 a dog trainer on the propensities of a particular breed,486 a member of a police drug squad on the distribution and value of a narcotic,487 a blacktracker on the identity of footprints,488 a senior police officer on precautions against escaping criminals,489 and an experienced company director on the “careful and diligent” handling of business affairs.490 An established member of a police Drug Squad, was allowed to testify that, in the “specialised language of the drug scene”, “Charlie” means cocaine.491 In Irani v The Queen492 the witness became an expert identifier of the defendant’s voice by repeatedly listening to records of it. In Max Cooper & Sons Pty Ltd v Sydney City Council,493 a person with 40 years’ experience in the building industry was permitted to interpret the expression “conditions of employment” in the subject agreement. A witness was accepted as a practical expert on hand movements of “card-sharps” in a case concerning a fraudulent gaming scheme.494 But a purported expert on “human reactions to public opinion polls” was not accepted in Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance.495 [A.71] An appropriate expert may express an opinion on an issue of intent496 or about the credit of a witness who is “clinically abnormal”497 and hence unreliable.498 But expert evidence on the reliability of a “normal” witness is generally inadmissible;499 it is a matter of ordinary experience for the tribunal of fact. However, evidence as to the competency of children and certain other witnesses is admissible under s 9C: see [9C.1]ff. In R v BDX500 evidence of a neuro-psychologist was admitted to prove it was improbable that a child could recall events that occurred when she was only three years old. In Dupas v The 485. Lawler v Leeder (1981) 1 SR (WA) 389; Casley-Smith v F S Evans and Sons Pty Ltd (No 1) (1988) 49 SASR 314. 486. R v Pfennig (No 1) (1992) 57 SASR 507. 487. R v Fazio (1997) 69 SASR 54; R v Anderson (1992) 64 A Crim R 312. But see also R v Gardner [1980] Qd R 531, where similar evidence of a police officer was excluded for non-compliance with the “basis rule”. 488. R v Harris (1997) 7 NTLR 1; see also R v Truong [2007] NTSC 20. 489. Godfrey v New South Wales (No 1) (2003) 25 NSWCCR 291. 490. Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler (No 1) (2001) 20 ACLC 222; Adler v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 179 FLR 1; 46 ACSR 504. 491. R v Parker [2006] QSC 109. 492. (2008) 188 A Crim R 125; [2008] NSWCCA 217; R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405. 493. (1980) 54 ALJR 234; 29 ALR 77. 494. R v Liu [2006] QDC 247. 495. [2003] FCA 1366. 496. Cameron v The Queen [1990] 2 WAR 1. 497. R v Wilson [1998] 2 Qd R 599; Toohey v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] AC 595; R v Barry [1984] 1 Qd R 74; Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94; Farrell v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 286. Contrast R v Nelson [1982] Qd R 636; R v McEndoo (1980) 5 A Crim R 52. See generally Magner, “Expert Evidence as to Credibility” (1989) 5 Aust Bar Rev 225. 498. R v Joyce (2005) 153 A Crim R 241; [2005] NTSC 21. 499. Smith v The Queen (1990) 64 ALJR 588; 50 A Crim R 434; R v Joyce (2005) 153 A Crim R 241; [2005] NTSC 21. 500. (2009) 24 VR 288; 194 A Crim R 57; [2009] VSCA 28. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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501

Queen a psychologist was allowed to give general opinion evidence about the limitations of eye-witness identification, but not about the reliability of particular witnesses. Australian authority does not approve evidence of polygraph (“lie detector”) tests,502 but evidence obtained by hypnosis may be allowed, subject to the conditions in R v Jenkyns.503 Experts are not the arbiters of what a duty of care requires; it may be reasonable to expect certain precautions to be taken, despite the fact that few people in the defendant’s position actually take them.504 An “accepted medical practice” may fall short of what the ever-expanding law of negligence requires.505 [A.72] Within the limits of rationality506 the weight of expert evidence is a matter for the judge of fact.507 A most helpful guide to resolving conflicts of expert evidence appears in Loveday v Renton and Wellcome Foundation Ltd.508 The report of that English decision is relatively inaccessible, but the relevant passage is conveniently summarised in a decision of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal.509 The guidelines, in summary, refer to the cogency of reasons, internal consistency, the degree of care apparently taken in preparing the opinion, precision of thought, willingness to concede valid points in crossexamination, and manifest independence. There may be a miscarriage of justice if the judge does not tell the jury that the value of an expert’s opinion essentially depends on acceptance of the facts and reasons on which it is based.510 An adjudicator should not so defer to an expert witness that the latter effectively assumes the judicial function.511 Credible, uncontradicted evidence may not be arbitrarily rejected,512 but direct evidence of an eyewitness may be preferred to 501. (2012) 218 A Crim R 507; [2012] VSCA 328. 502. Mallard v The Queen (2003) 28 WAR 1; [2003] WASCA 296; an offer not taken up in R v Stewart [2014] QCA 244; McMahon, “Polygraph Testing for Deception in Australia” (2003) 11 JLM 24. 503. (1993) 32 NSWLR 712 at 714. 504. Mercer v Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways (NSW) (1936) 56 CLR 580; Roche Mining Pty Ltd v Jeffs [2011] NSWCA 184. 505. F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189 at 193-194; Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. 506. Reasons should be given for choices between competing experts: Zahra v Brown (2006) 45 MVR 505; [2006] NSWCA 162; Wiki v Atlantis Relocations (NSW) Pty Ltd (2004) 60 NSWLR 127; Young v Cesta-Incani [2007] NSWCA 229. 507. Monroe Australia Pty Ltd v Campbell (1995) 65 SASR 16; Davie v Edinburgh Corporation (No 2) (1953) SC 34; O’Kelly Holdings Pty Ltd v Dalrymple Holdings Pty Ltd (1993) 45 FCR 145 at 155-156; Holtman v Sampson [1985] 2 Qd R 472 at 474; McDonald (t/as BE McDonald Transport) v Girkaid Pty Ltd [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-768; [2004] NSWCA 297; Haoui v The Queen (2008) 188 A Crim R 331; [2008] NSWCCA 209 at [127]. Insufficient reasons were given in CJ v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 258. 508. (1990) 1 Med LR 117. 509. Roberts v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2014] QCAT 253. 510. Ronchi v Portland Smelter Services Ltd [2005] VSCA 83; Williams v Public Trustee of New South Wales [2007] NSWSC 921. As to the “basis rule”, see [A.75]. 511. Van den Heuvel v Tucker (2003) 85 SASR 512; [2003] SASC 110. 512. R v De Voss [1995] QCA 518.

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an expert’s reconstruction.513 A biased expert’s evidence need not always be rejected. Bias goes to weight, not to admissibility.514 Cross-examiners frequently invite experts to agree that they could be wrong, or draw their attention to other possibilities not considered, but acceptance of such suggestions is not necessarily a withdrawal of the opinion; it may still be reasonable to accept it.515 [A.73] Advocates should not seek a forensic advantage by presenting commonsense inferences or arguments as expert evidence.516 A court does not need an expert to tell it that several witnesses to the same event are likely to give different estimates of time, or that a vehicle with one headlight is more difficult to see at night than one with two or more lights.517 A miscarriage of justice occurred when a psychiatrist was allowed to give evidence of a so-called “Munchausen’s Syndrome”, which was not a recognised psychiatric illness, but merely a type of behaviour that jurors could assess for themselves.518 Expertise is not normally needed to read a company’s financial statements.519 However, it is now recognised that there are “grey areas” in which experts can throw additional light on matters of common experience.520 In R v Baden-Clay521 experts were allowed to express the view that scratch marks on the face of the accused were caused by fingernails rather than a razor. An objection that the jury could decide that issue as a matter of common knowledge was rejected on the ground that laymen were unlikely to have examined the matter as closely as experts who assess such injuries in the course of their profession. Another consideration was that the evidence would not involve unduly impressive “scientific jargon”, and would therefore be open to critical evaluation by the jury. Presentation of expert evidence [A.74] As a matter of law and good advocacy, expert evidence should be presented demonstratively:522 first, the factual foundation,523 next, the scientific principles, explained as clearly as possible, and finally, the application of those 513. Hollingsworth v Hopkins (1967) Qd R 168; Roads and Maritime Services v Addario (2012) 82 NSWLR 474; [2012] NSWCA 412. 514. FGT Custodians Pty Ltd v Fagenblat [2003] VSCA 33. 515. Shorey v PT Ltd (2003) 77 ALJR 1104; 197 ALR 410. 516. Pankelis v Francombe (1988) 14 Tas R 174. 517. R v Fong [1981] Qd R 90; Taylor v Harvey [1986] 2 Qd R 137. 518. R v LM [2004] QCA 192. 519. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 190 FLR 242; 23 ACLC 430; [2005] NSWSC 149 (reversed on other grounds: (2005) 54 ACSR 326). 520. Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94; Schultz v The Queen [1982] WAR 171; E v Australian Red Cross Society (1991) 31 FCR 299; 105 ALR 53 (psychologist allowed to speak as expert on ambiguity of a document issued to blood donors); see also Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 80. 521. R v Baden-Clay [2014] QSC 156. 522. Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 at 743-744; [2001] NSWCA 305; Hevi Lift (PNG) Ltd v Etherington [2005] NSWCA 42 at [84]; Hancock v East Coast Timber Products Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 11 at [67]; Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21; Venus, “Preparing Better Expert Evidence” (2003) 41 Law Soc J (NSW) 62. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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principles to form the opinion. But it may be necessary to depart from this counsel of perfection when the basic information is complex or voluminous. For example, it would be too slow and difficult, if not impossible, for a financial expert who has reviewed masses of material to articulate every assumption, inference and reasoning process underpinning his or her conclusions.525 Objections as expert evidence proceeds: foundational facts [A.75] The fact that a witness is accepted as an expert does not prevent objections to his or her evidence on other grounds. An expert must stay within his or her field of special knowledge526 and, according to the common law’s “basis rule”, the factual foundation of any scientific opinion must be proved by admissible527 and acceptable528 evidence before, during529 or after he or she testifies.530 However, a less rigorous application of the basis rule may be appropriate in a tribunal not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.531 523. On the duty of an expert to state the factual foundation, see R v Turner [1975] QB 834 at 840; HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; Hillier v Lucas (2000) 81 SASR 451; Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 at 729; Arcus Shopfitters Pty Ltd v Planning Commission (WA) (2002) 125 LGERA 180. 524. R v Jenkins; Ex parte Morrison [1949] VLR 277; Davie v Edinburgh Corp (No 2) (1953) SC 34; R v Turner [1975] QB 834 at 840; Preece v HM Advocate [1981] Crim LR 783; Holtman v Sampson [1985] 2 Qd R 472; Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Ltd [1990] ATPR 41-010 at 51,213; Bell v FS & U Industrial Benefit Society Ltd (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, McLelland J, 9 September 1987) noted in (1992) 66 ALJ at 377; Hillier v Lucas (2000) 81 SASR 451; R v Gilfoyle [2001] 2 Cr App R 57; Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705. 525. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 190 FLR 242; 23 ACLC 430; [2005] NSWSC 149 (reversed on other grounds: (2005) 54 ACSR 326). 526. Armat v Little [1909] St R Qd 83; R v Hally [1962] Qd R 214; R v Dowding [1999] VSC 497. 527. Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642 at 649; Q v Australian Red Cross Society [1992] 1 VR 19; Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 844; 62 ALR 85 at 845-846 (ALJR), 87 (ALR); Steffen v Ruban (1966) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 264; [1966] 2 NSWR 622; Johnstone Shire Council v Jessie Tam Sie [1939] QSR 74; English Exporters v Eldonwall Ltd [1973] Ch 415; Crompton v Commissioner of Highways (1973) 5 SASR 301; Pownall v Conlan Management Pty Ltd (1995) 12 WAR 370 at 387 and 390; McNeil v Commissioner of Taxation (2003) 202 ALR 35 at 52; Pollock v Wellington (1996) 15 WAR 1 at 3; Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2004] WASCA 229; Hancock v East Coast Timber Products Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 11 at [75]; Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21 at [64]. Contrast Houghton Tractor and Machinery Sales Pty Ltd v Muffett Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 209, where the valuer relied on other sales personally conducted. However, assistance in dealing with this point (by reference to documents) may be gained from s 92. 528. If the witness on whose evidence the opinion depends is found to be unworthy of credit, the expert evidence may be discarded: Arian v Nguyen (2001) 33 MVR 37; Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 77 ALJR 1598; 200 ALR 447. 529. In Sprayworx Pty Ltd v Homag Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 51 the experts were also witnesses of facts on which they relied. 530. R v Fowler (1985) 39 SASR 440 at 442; Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 at 733-734; Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 54 ACSR 326; [2005] NSWCA 152; Flavel v South Australia (2008) 102 SASR 404; [2008] SASC 333 at [67]; Donald v Rail Corporation (NSW) (No 4) [2015] NSWSC 1681; Einstein, “Recent Developments in Opinion Evidence – Exposing the Factual Basis for an Expert’s Opinion” (2006) 7 JR 431. The Commonwealth Act does not incorporate the basis rule: Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84; [2008] FCAFC 63; but the common law was applied in Donald v Rail Corporation (NSW) (No 4) [2015] NSWSC 1681. 531. Department of Education v Azmitia [2015] WASCA 246.

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However, if no objection is taken to a breach of the basis rule, the evidence may be given such weight as it deserves.532 No doubt in many valuation cases the requirement of first-hand evidence is not pressed to an extreme … But basically the expert’s evidence on matters of fact is in the same position as the factual evidence of any other witness … [D]etails of comparable transactions upon which a valuer intends to rely … must … be proved by admissible evidence.533

While the facts of the instant case534 are subject to the hearsay rule, the expert’s professional literature and the corpus of his or her professional experience are not.535 An expert may draw general scientific information from the “books, lectures, discussions and … research”536 of fellow experts537 because “this is an area where the hearsay rule does not apply”.538 The reason is pragmatic: No one professional man can know from personal observation more than a minute fraction of the data which he must every day treat as working truths … [Any other view] … would be to … insist on … impossible standards.

The fact that an expert relies on facts proved by others may go to weight but not to admissibility.539 In Jeffrey v The Queen,540 an expert was allowed to give evidence of the proportions of various blood groupings in the Tasmanian population based on the writings of another researcher. It is tactful, albeit no longer necessary,541 to avoid “swearing the issue”,542 particularly before a jury. In some cases this will be objectionable on the

532. National Australia Bank Ltd v Troiani [2002] QCA 196. 533. English Exporters (London) Ltd v Eldonwall Ltd [1983] Ch 415 at 420 per Megarry J; Professional Services of Australia Pty Ltd v Computer Accounting and Tax Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] WASCA 183. 534. “All the facts which are peculiar to the plaintiff’s case alone, such as his age, his condition and degree of haemophilia”: Q v Australian Red Cross Society [1992] 1 VR 19 at 36. 535. Davie v Edinburgh Corp (No 2) (1953) SC 34 at 41; Borowski v Quayle [1966] VR 382. In R v Noll [1999] 3 VR 704, a biochemist was competent to give evidence about DNA tests based on “established” statistical principles, although he had no formal training in statistical analysis. 536. Borowski v Quayle [1966] VR 382 at 385. 537. Davie v Edinburgh Corp (No 2) (1953) SC 34 at 41; Q v Australian Red Cross Society [1992] 1 VR 19; R v Jung [2006] NSWSC 658 at [57]. 538. Borowski v Quayle [1966] VR 382 at 385; Professional Services of Australia Pty Ltd v Computer Accounting & Tax Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) 261 ALR 179; [2009] WASCA 183 at [82]; Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21 at [69]; Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney Local Health District [2014] NSWSC 1105 at [92]. 539. R v Anderson (1992) 64 A Crim R 312 (forensic scientist – evidence based on notes and photographs made by others). 540. [1991] Tas R 336; (1991) 60 A Crim R 384. 541. Murphy v The Queen (1989) 63 ALJR 422 at 430; Dodd v Tamigi (2007) 47 MVR 117; [2007] WASC 42; cf Rich v Pierpont (1862) 176 ER 24. See, however, criticism on this ground in McNeil v Commissioner of Taxation (2003) 202 ALR 35; [2003] FCA 958; R v GK (2001) 125 A Crim R 315 at 324; Keller v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 204; Appo v Stanley [2010] QSC 383 at [52]; and B v Protective Commissioner [2000] NSWSC 718 (evidence not to be directed at the legal standard, but as to what a competent and careful practitioner would do in the circumstances). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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alternative ground that the expert is straying outside his or her field. But increasingly it is recognised that legal and scientific issues may coincide, and in the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) the “ultimate issue” rule is formally abandoned.544 Opinion evidence by non-experts [A.76] There are many matters of common experience that are impossible or at least very difficult to relate without a substantial element of opinion – for example, weather conditions, a person’s apparent age, height, emotional condition or state of sobriety.545 Opinion evidence on such matters may be given by any observer. Cross-examination may test the factual basis of the opinion, if the witness can articulate it. Eyewitness identification [A.77] More remarkable than the examples in [A.76] is evidence identifying persons, handwriting546 or objects.547 It may be scientific evidence,548 but it is often the evidence of non-experts. “Identification occurs when one person recognises another by comparing his current observations of that person with his recollection of him.”549 That is largely opinion evidence, as Evatt and McTiernan JJ demonstrated in Craig v The King.550 Identification by the sound of a person’s voice is admissible if the witness is already familiar with it,551 or if the voice has some distinctive quality.552 Voice identification involving a foreign language does not necessarily require expert evidence.553 Appropriate warnings to a jury are set out in Bulejcik v The 542. That is, expressing an opinion in terms of the very issue the court has to decide. See Noza Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 273 ALR 621; [2010] FCA 990 (United States tax expert’s report). 543. As in Armat v Little [1909] St R Qd 83; and R v Hally [1962] Qd R 214. 544. Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 80(a); Barton v Lake Macquarie City Council [2014] FCA 1103 at [41]. 545. Ratten v The Queen [1972] AC 378; R v Whitby (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 441; R v Spooner [1957] VR 540; Dodds v Marshall (1988) 10 QL Reps 101; R v McKimmie [1957] VR 93; Angel v Hawkesbury City Council [2008] Aust Torts Reports 81-955; [2008] NSWCA 130 (shadow concealing defect in footpath). R v Whitby (state of sobriety), was followed in R v Aldridge (1990) 20 NSWLR 737. 546. R v Knight (2001) 160 FLR 465; 120 A Crim R 381; [2001] NSWCCA 344 (identification of accused by handwriting). 547. Identification of things: R v Clout (1995) 41 NSWLR 312. 548. The cogency of fingerprint evidence has been recognised for many years: Parker v The King (1912) 14 CLR 681: “an unforgeable signature” (Griffith CJ at 683). Consider also identification of dental peculiarities, blood or semen, and DNA evidence. 549. R v Benz (1989) 168 CLR 110 at 132 per Dawson J. 550. (1933) 49 CLR 429 at 446; cf Alexander v The Queen (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 426: “so many variables”. 551. See [A.77]. 552. R v Smith [1984] 1 NSWLR 462 at 477; R v Brownlowe (1986) 7 NSWLR 461; R v Corke (1989) 41 A Crim R 292. 553. Korgbara v The Queen (2007) 71 NSWLR 187; [2007] NSWCCA 84.

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Queen. In Korgbara v The Queen,555 the jury was allowed to compare one voice recording with another. In R v Daley,556 the court admitted voice identification evidence based on comparative recordings of 12 other persons reading words spoken by the accused. Voice identification by an expert was admitted in Li v The Queen,557 although a “cross-lingual comparison” was involved. [A.78] While the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence is undoubted, its notorious fallibility558 requires rules for “quality control”.559 [T]he seductive effect of identification evidence has so frequently led to proven miscarriages of justice that courts … have felt obliged to lay down special rules [for] directions judges must give in criminal trials where identification evidence is a significant issue.560 Such is the concern of courts about the risks involved in identification evidence that trial judges are bound by authority to give appropriate warnings … One of the particular problems ,,, is that the most honest of witnesses, completely confident in their own beliefs, can be mistaken. Another problem is that of suggestibility. People can honestly believe that they recognise somebody because of ideas that have been suggested to them, and human nature is such that it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, for people to distinguish … between the various sources from which their belief [is] made up.561

Many an honest but mistaken identification has been convincingly presented.562 It is the quality, not the quantity of evidence that matters: The identification can be poor even though given by a number of witnesses. They may all have had only the opportunity of a fleeting glance or a longer observation but made in difficult conditions … even a number of honest witnesses can all be mistaken.563

554. (1996) 185 CLR 375 at 384 and 397; R v Ong (2007) 176 A Crim R 366; [2007] VSCA 206; R v Evan (2006) 175 A Crim R 1; [2006] QCA 527. See also Ormerod, “Sounds Familiar? – Voice Identification Evidence” [2001] Crim LR 595. 555. (2007) 71 NSWLR 187; [2007] NSWCCA 84. 556. [2001] NSWSC 279. See also Neville v The Queen (2004) A Crim R 108; [2004] WASCA 62, where a police officer was allowed to identify a voice on the basis of hearing numerous telephone intercepts; and R v Solomon (2005) 92 SASR 331; [2005] SASC 265, where a jury was allowed to compare recordings. 557. (2003) 139 A Crim R 281; [2003] NSWCCA 290. 558. Loftus and Doyle, Eye Witness Testimony: Civil and Criminal (3rd ed, Butterworths, 1997). 559. Harrison v The Queen (1987) 29 A Crim R 213; R v Zullo [1993] 2 Qd R 572; [1993] QCA 208; Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555; R v Bartels (1986) 44 SASR 260; Shepherd, Identification Evidence – A Psychological Evaluation (Aberdeen UP, 1982); note: “Eye Witness Identification – Why So Many Mistakes?” (1984) 58 ALJ 509. 560. Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555 at 561. 561. Attorney-General (NSW) v Time Inc Magazine Company Ltd [1994] NSWJB 94 at 6 per Gleeson CJ; R v Bridgland [2013] SASC 203 at [115] and cases there cited. 562. R v Turnbull [1977] QB 224 (applied in Al-Hashimi v The Queen (2004) 208 ALR 491; [2004] WASCA 61); Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555; R v Sainsbury [1993] 1 Qd R 305 at 308; R v Heuston (1995) 81 A Crim R 387 at 399; R v Pattison and Exley [1996] 1 Cr App R 51 at 54-55. 563. R v Weeder (1980) 71 Cr App R 228 at 231. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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The evidence of strangers or casual acquaintances requires special care. Even relatives can make mistakes,565 particularly with photo-identification.566 If a suspect belongs to a different racial group, that may diminish eyewitness evidence.567 On the other hand, peculiar characteristics may enhance it,568 and if it is inconclusive, other evidence may support a conviction.569 The judge should tell the jury to consider carefully the conditions under which a visual identification was made.570 The greater a party’s dependence on such evidence, the stronger and more specific the warning should be.571 How long did the witness have the suspect under observation? At what distance? In what light? Was observation impeded in any way? Was the witness emotionally involved? What time elapsed between the original sighting and identification to the police? Had the witness ever seen the defendant before? If so, how often? Are there significant differences between the witness’s statement to the police and the evidence in court? But when the person identified was already well known to the witness, or when only a resemblance is claimed,572 a warning may be unnecessary.573 There is no set formula for warnings about visual identification. The words “danger” or “dangerous” – emotive expressions potentially prejudicial to the Crown – need not always be used.574 They may be taken as a hint to acquit.575 The essential point is to point out clearly any particular weaknesses in the evidence, short of suggesting that it has no probative value.576 There is a discretion to exclude weak evidence of identity.577

564. Sutton v The Queen [1978] WAR 94; R v BBA [2006] QCA 234 at [20]. 565. A modified Domican direction may be called for, even in cases of “recognition identification”: Mahantheran v Western Australia [2014] WASCA 232 at [34]; Mills v Western Australia (2008) 189 A Crim R 411; [2008] WASCA 219. 566. R v Carr (2000) 117 A Crim R 272. 567. R v Nguyen [2000] NSWCCA 285 at [25]. 568. R v Feiloakitau (unreported, Qld CA, 14 December 1993). 569. R v Beble [1979] Qd R 278 (approved, Chamberlain v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 521). 570. R v Mendoza (2007) 173 A Crim R 157; [2007] VSCA 120. 571. R v Clune [1982] VR 1. 572. Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; [2001] HCA 72. 573. R v Tran [2000] 2 Qd R 430; R v Lumsden [2003] NSWCCA 83 (identification of drug dealer by undercover agent). See also R v Spero (2006) 161 A Crim R 13; [2006] VSCA 58; Gardiner v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 233; [2006] NSWCCA 190. 574. R v Fox [2000] 1 Qd R 640; [1999] QCA 140; White v The Queen [2006] WASCA 62; GBT v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 19. It is undesirable to use these words when giving a Longman direction: DPW v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 583; [2006] NSWCCA 295; DRE v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 400; [2006] NSWCCA 280; Sepulveda v The Queen (2006) 167 A Crim R 108; [2006] NSWCCA 379. 575. Rolfe v The Queen (2007) 173 A Crim R 168; [2007] NSWCCA 155. 576. Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; [2001] HCA 72. 577. Alexander v The Queen (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 402-403. The Christie discretion is examined at [130.4]ff.

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The directions in R v Inamata578 were adequate, but not those in R v Kostic Stefanopoulos,579 where the witness was presented with an all-male line-up despite his suggesting that a female offender was involved. Directions were also insufficient in R v Powers,580 where the “check” identification occurred more than two years after the event. In R v King581 it was proper for the trial judge to invite the jury to compare the complainant’s description of the offender with their own observations of the defendant in court. The customary warnings about eyewitness identification may be appropriate in a civil case, provided that the criminal standard of proof is not applied.582 [A.79] In criminal cases, an identification in court583 should normally be preceded584 by a successful “check identification” at a properly conducted585 “parade”586 or inspection of a fair587 selection of photographs.588 Evidence of a successful “check identification” may be given at the trial, and may include any simple words of identification then uttered.589 A videotape of a checkidentification procedure is desirable.590 The jury may have unrestricted access to it.591

578. (2003) 137 A Crim R 510; [2003] NSWCCA 19 579. (2004) 151 A Crim R 10; [2004] SASC 406. 580. (2000) 113 A Crim R 51. 581. [2002] NSWCCA 365 (scar and tattoos). 582. Amalgamated Television Services v Marsden [2002] NSWCA 419 (allegation of criminal conduct raised in defamation proceedings). 583. Not essential when identity is really not in issue: Western Australia v Wood [2008] WASCA 81. 584. Except in the relatively rare case where the suspect was well known to the witness at the time in question: Davies and Cody v The King (1937) 57 CLR 170 at 182; Mahantheran v Western Australia [2014] WASCA 232. 585. The “parade” was not fairly conducted in R v Fisher [2001] NSWCCA 380, where the complainant had told police that the offender was of Aboriginal appearance and the appellant was the only person of that appearance in the line-up. 586. Alexander v The Queen (1981) 35 ALR 289 at 292; R v De-Cressac (1985) 1 NSWLR 381; R v Deering (1986) 43 SASR 252. In 1992 an experienced writer claimed that identification parades were then “rare” in “New South Wales: Purves (Crown Prosecutor)”, Bar News (NSW), Spring-Summer 1992, p 22. 587. Unfair: showing a collection of photos in which only one subject had a goatee beard (like the accused): R v Blick (2000) 111 A Crim R 326. Evidence based on “obvious police photographs or ‘mug shots’” was rejected for that reason (and others) in R v Gatty [2001] TASSC 9. 588. R v Murphy [1996] 2 Qd R 523; (1995) 85 A Crim R 286; R v Doyle [1967] VR 698; R v Stott (2000) 116 A Crim R 15. Appropriate directions in photo-identification cases are considered in R v Skaf (2004) 60 NSWLR 86; [2004] NSWCCA 37; and R v Campbell (2007) 175 A Crim R 79; [2007] VSCA 189. As to proper procedure with “identikits”, see R v Hentschel [1988] VR 362; R v Gardner and Coates (No 1) [2003] VSC 152. 589. R v Keeley [1980] VR 571; R v Hentschel [1988] VR 362; R v Christie [1914] AC 545 at 55; Roser v The Queen (2001) 24 WAR 254; R v Osbourne [1973] QB 678; Murdoch v The Queen (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; [2007] NTCCA 1. 590. As in R v Murphy [1996] 2 Qd R 523; (1995) 85 A Crim R 286. No such facility for the court to review the process was available in R v Gatty [2001] TASSC 9, where identification evidence based on photographs was rejected. 591. R v Davies (2005) 153 A Crim R 217; [2005] VSCA 90. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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A “dock identification” by a witness with no prior knowledge of the accused is usually of little value592 and may cause a mistrial.593 But it is different if the witness had a lengthy, unobstructed view of the accused at the time of the offence, or has seen the accused on several occasions before or since,594 or knew the person well beforehand.595 In such cases a distinction is drawn between identification evidence and “recognition evidence”.596 In R v Marsh597 the defendant’s sister saw his photograph in a newspaper, and recognising him, called the police. Her evidence was admitted. In the same case the jury was allowed to compare surveillance camera photographs with the appellant’s appearance in court. Identification from social media was received in Peterson (A Pseudonym) v The Queen.598 When the evidence of identity consists of a security camera recording, the jury may be as well placed to decide the identity issue as any witness.599 Identification evidence based on a parade is not normally admitted when the accused (or a photograph of the accused) has been presented to the witness as a suspect.600 If a witness has already seen a photograph of the accused, it may be reasonable to forego an identification parade.601 A refusal to participate in an identification parade does not justify an adverse inference.602 But if the accused refused to participate, the prosecution may lead evidence of the refusal in answer to any defence complaint about the absence of a parade.603 An identification parade must be fairly arranged and conducted. The collection must include photographs of persons sufficiently similar to the suspect; and there 592. But see Kelly v The Queen (2002) 129 A Crim R 363. 593. R v Tyler [1994] 1 Qd R 675; R v Saxon [1998] 1 VR 503 at 513; R v Anh Tuan Le (2002) 130 A Crim R 256 (but special circumstances existed in that case); cf R v King [2002] NSWCCA 365. Distinguish a dock identification after a successful “check”, when it is a proper confirmation that the person previously identified is the person before the court: Murdoch v The Queen (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; [2007] NTCCA 1. 594. Al-Hashemi v The Queen (2004) 145 A Crim R 186; [2004] WASCA 61; R v Preston (2013) 116 SASR 522; [2013] SASCFC 69; R v Clark (1996) 91 A Crim R 46. There was an over-cautious approach by the judge to identification evidence in R v Rima (2003) 145 A Crim R 27. 595. R v D (2008) 220 FLR 169; [2008] ACTSC 82 (witness knew accused as former classmate, and named him). 596. Davies v The King (1937) 57 CLR 170; Kelly v The Queen (2002) 129 A Crim R 363. 597. [2005] NSWCCA 331; see also Murdoch v The Queen (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; [2007] NTCCA 1. 598. [2014] VSCA 111. 599. R v Griffıth [1997] 2 Qd R 524. 600. Murdoch v The Queen (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; [2007] NTCCA 1. 601. Peterson (A Pseudonym) v The Queen [2014] VSCA 111 at [48]. 602. Mahoney v Fielding; Ex parte Fielding [1959] Qd R 479 at 484; R v Haidley [1984] VR 229; R v Shannon (1987) 47 SASR 347; 29 A Crim R 434; R v Campbell (2007) 175 A Crim R 79; [2007] VSCA 189. The right to refuse is recognised in s 617(4) of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld). However, evidence of the refusal may be admitted in answer to an allegation that police acted irregularly by not holding a “parade”: R v Hamood (1987) 45 SASR 90; R v McCarthy (1993) 71 A Crim R 395. 603. R v Davies (2005) 153 A Crim R 217; [2005] VSCA 90.

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must be nothing that draws attention to the suspect in particular.604 A collection of photographs is unlikely to be fair if one photograph, and one only, fits the description which has been given by the witness, at any rate if the differences in the other photographs relate to significant features of the person described.605 As noted at [A.78], a new trial was granted where a witness was shown an all-male line-up, despite his suggestion that the offender was a woman.606 But in R v QVT607 a Vietnamese defendant unsuccessfully claimed that the parade was unfair because all the other participants were Koreans. An alternative to an identification parade is a test based on a fair selection of photographs, as in R v Chami.608 The pictures used should be available for inspection by the court. A jury should generally be told that photographic identification is inferior to a positive result at an identification parade.609 In Pitkin v The Queen610 the High Court noted these risks in identification from “photoboards”: (a) the witness may assume that the collection includes at least one picture of the offender and pick one that resembles him or her;611 and (b) the fact that police have a photograph of the accused may suggest a prior police record.612 However, photo-identification of a person already well known to the witness (sometimes called “recognition evidence”) is factual rather than opinion evidence. It involves no more element of inference than recognising that person in the street.613 The judge’s warning was satisfactory in R v Razzak.614 [T]here are … peculiar difficulties, due to the various ways in which photographic representations differ from nature: their two dimensional and static quality, the fact that they are often in black and white, and the clear and well-lit picture of the subject they usually provide.615

604. R v Brookes [1992] QCA 103. 605. R v Pearce [1992] QCA 168. 606. R v Kostic Stefanopoulos (2004) 151 A Crim R 10; [2004] SASC 406. 607. (2002) 131 A Crim R 264; see also R v Buchanan (2004) 152 A Crim R 302; [2004] NSWSC 816 (photographs of Aboriginal persons prominently displayed). 608. [2004] NSWCCA 36. The quality of the photoboard was specifically approved in Murdoch v The Queen (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; [2007] NTCCA 1. Alternative methods of checking identification, including photoboards, are recognised in the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s 617. 609. Collard v The Queen [2000] WASCA 417; Draper v The Queen [2000] WASCA 160 (CCA); R v Al Jenabi [2004] NTSC 44. Sufficient directions (filling six transcript pages) were given in R v Festa (2000) 111 A Crim R 60 (voice identification also involved). 610. (1995) 80 A Crim R 302; 69 ALJR 612; [1995] HCA 30. 611. Does this not apply to parades also? 612. See also R v Reiken [2006] QCA 178. 613. R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; but not so if the quality of the photograph is poor: R v Drollett [2005] NSWCCA 356 at [41]-[44]. 614. [2004] NSWCCA 62. 615. Alexander v The Queen (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 409 per Stephen J. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[A.80]

Another acceptable process is to have the witness point the suspect out in a group – for example, among patrons in a hotel616 or witnesses at a committal hearing.617 The fact that a “check” took place when the accused was with police, shortly after the offence, did not lead to exclusion in R v Story.618 Evidence of similarity, as distinct from evidence of identification, may be admissible as part of a circumstantial case. It is sometimes referred to as “circumstantial identification evidence”.619

Rules for evidence in chief Must relate to issues of fact, not merely to credit [A.80] All evidence in chief must relate to the issues for trial,620 not merely to the credit of the present or another witness.621 In R v Roberts,622 a man charged with drug offences claimed that the drugs were “planted” on him, and sought to prove that certain prosecution witnesses had been charged with similar offences. That information was excluded as going only to the credit of those witnesses. Similarly, an accused has no right to tender, or to require the prosecution to tender, previous self-serving statements.623 Other applications of this rule are these: (i) witnesses may not refer in chief to a prior statement of theirs that is consistent with their testimony;624 and (ii) counsel may not ask questions in chief that merely tend to accredit their own witnesses,625 such as questions about exceptional powers of memory. Questions designed to “qualify” an expert witness are not improper accreditation. Evidence of “fresh complaint”626 (now “preliminary complaint”) is an exception to this rule: see [A.154]. Section 9C is another special case. “Leading” prohibited [A.81] It is assumed that parties will call only those witnesses whom they expect to assist their case, and therefore they are expected to take their evidence “as it comes”. Leading questions on matters in dispute are generally prohibited, 616. R v Shannon (1987) 29 A Crim R 434; R v Hamood (1987) 45 SASR 90; R v Wright (1991) 60 A Crim R 215. 617. R v Festa (2000) 111 A Crim R 60. 618. (2004) 144 A Crim R 370; [2004] SASC 32. 619. That is, evidence that the general appearance or some characteristic or propensity of the accused is similar to that of the person seen committing a crime: R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; R v Murphy (1994) 62 SASR 121 at 123-124; Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; [2001] HCA 72 at 611; Pitkin v The Queen (1995) 69 ALJR 612; [1995] HCA 30 at 614 and 615-616 (ALJR). 620. R v Connolly [1991] 2 Qd R 171; R v Fraser (1995) 65 SASR 260; 85 A Crim R 385 at 267 (SASR). 621. R v Livingstone [1987] 1 Qd R 38. Distinguish the special provision for reliability evidence in s 9C of this Act. 622. [1942] 1 All ER 187. 623. R v Callaghan [1994] 2 Qd R 300 at 303; R v SCD [2013] QCA 352. 624. R v Roberts [1942] 1 All ER 187 at 191; see also R v Connolly [1991] 2 Qd R 171. 625. R v Connolly [1991] 2 Qd R 171 at 173-174. 626. See [A.154].

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and cross-examination of one’s own witness – friendly or aggressive – is banned for the same reason. Questions in chief must not indicate too plainly the desired response,627 or assume disputed facts to which the witness has not yet testified. In a civil assault case, for example, it would be improper to ask the plaintiff, “What did you do after the defendant attacked you?” before the witness testifies that the defendant hit him. For a discussion of the expression “leading”, see SJX v Western Australia.628 Lawyers need sufficient imagination to alert inexperienced witnesses to these rules to ensure, so far as possible, that they are not confused by the artificiality of non-leading questions in court.629 However, it is not always feasible to approach a topic obliquely.630 In a sexual assault case the prosecutor may simply ask the complainant: “Did you consent to have intercourse with the accused?”631 Not to impeach own witness [A.82] If an honest witness fails to “come up to proof”, the party who called that person may not impugn his or her credit. Normally the most that can be done is to call, if possible, another witness to the same event, and invite the court to prefer the second version.632 However, the position is different when a witness is “adverse” or “hostile”: see [17.1]ff. Witnesses to speak from memory [A.83] Generally, a witness must testify from memory without reference to a document, even if it is a copy of his or her statement to a solicitor. This is another artificial rule that should be explained to inexperienced witnesses. Contrary to a common belief, there is no rule that a witness who forgets the exact terms of a conversation, but remembers its effect, must reconstruct it in the form of direct speech.633 There is no rule requiring the exclusion of statements produced by two or more witnesses in concert, provided that each testifies that the other’s recollection agrees with their own.634 627. On leading questions, see Gordon v Carroll (1975) 27 FLR 129 at 135; Saunders v The Queen (1985) 15 A Crim R 115. 628. [2010] WASCA 243 at [83] – [85]. 629. Byrne, “Litigation as Problem-Solving Device – Some Practical Considerations” (1991) 38 Queensland Bar News (December) 15 at 23; Legg, “Preparing Witnesses Effectively” (2003) 41 Law Soc J (NSW) 60. 630. Changes of subject may be indicated without breaking this rule: GPI Leisure Corporation Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15. 631. R v Shaw [1996] 1 Qd R 641. 632. R v Welden (1977) 16 SASR 421; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 17. 633. R v Noble [2002] 1 Qd R 432 (conversation 18 years earlier); Hamilton-Smith v George [2006] HCA 1551. 634. Heanes v Herangi (2007) 175 A Crim R 175; [2007] WASC 175. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[A.84]

Refreshing memory [A.84] The primary duty to speak from memory is relaxed if the witness has a note of a relevant event, made by or for the witness635 during or soon after it. The judge decides636 whether a note is sufficiently contemporaneous for this purpose.637 A delay of 22 days was accepted in R v Fotheringham,638 but in R v Woodcock639 a lapse of three months was too long. If a witness purports to give a verbatim account of a conversation, the note should be closely contemporaneous.640 See also [101.9]. [A.85] Strictly speaking, a witness may not consult a contemporary note until his or her memory of the event is exhausted641 and the note may not be read onto the record.642 But these rules are not rigidly enforced.643 Experts are usually allowed to read their reports as evidence in chief, and other witnesses are often permitted to use contemporary notes although they have no independent memory of the events recorded.644 In Sorrenson v McNamara645 an unrepresented defendant was allowed to use contemporary notes and to read a prepared statement. [A.86] At common law646 the note is not generally evidence for party “A”, who called the witness. (But see [A.87].) The opponent (“B”) is entitled to inspect it647 without having to tender it, but “B” may require “A” to do so.648 Often “B” does not do so because normally it would merely reinforce the evidence in chief. However, if the contents are misrepresented in chief, a different course may be taken.649 The opponent’s right to inspect a contemporary note is not to be confused with the rule in Walker v Walker:650 compare [A.155].651 635. Gorman v Newton; Ex parte Newton (1958) Qd R 169; R v Singh (1977) 15 SASR 591. 636. R v Simmonds (1967) 51 Cr App R 316 (notes made on return to office following interview). 637. R v Richardson [1971] 2 QB 484 at 490; R v Da Silva [1990] 1 WLR 31. 638. (1975) 88 Cr App R 206. 639. [1963] Crim LR 273. 640. R v Da Silva [1990] 1 WLR 31. 641. Hetherington v Brooks [1963] SASR 321; Prestage v The Queen [1976] Tas SR 16. 642. Moore v Skinner (1990) 101 FLR 152; 49 A Crim R 1. 643. R v Baffıgo [1957] VR 303 at 305; R v Curtis [1957] VR 306; Markovina v The Queen (No 2) (1997) 19 WAR 119. The position under the Commonwealth Act is noted in [F.15]. 644. Normandale v Rankine (1972) 4 SASR 205 at 207; Gillespie v Steer (1973) 5 SASR 200; cf Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 33. It is “naïve” to think that police and other witnesses do not compare notes: Heanes v Herangi (2007) 175 A Crim R 175; [2007] WASC 175. 645. [2004] 1 Qd R 82; [2003] QCA 149. 646. R v Virgo (1978) 67 Cr App R 323. See, however, Evidence Act 1977, ss 92 (civil cases) and 101. 647. J Boag & Son Brewing Ltd v Bridon Investments Pty Ltd (2001) 10 Tas R 26; Sorrenson v McNamara [2004] 1 Qd R 82; [2003] QCA 149. 648. R v Pachonick [1973] 2 NSWLR 86. 649. As in Dairy Farmers Co-operative Milk Co Ltd v Acquilina (1963) 109 CLR 458 or in Allied Interstate (Qld) Pty Ltd v Barnes (1968) 118 CLR 581. In the latter case there was a record of some useful self-serving statements by the defendant. 650. (1937) 57 CLR 630. 651. J Boag & Son Brewing Ltd v Bridon Investments Pty Ltd (2001) 10 Tas R 26.

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A note used to refresh memory out of court need not be contemporaneous,652 but it should be produced on demand.653 Failure to do so may affect the weight of evidence that is said to be based on it.654 [A.87] Exceptionally, a contemporary note may be tendered by the party who calls the witness if the opponent’s cross-examination goes beyond the parts used in chief.655 The contents are then admissible for all purposes.656 But if cross-examination is confined to material used in chief, no common law right to tender it arises.657

Rules for cross-examination General [A.88] With few exceptions,658 everyone who testifies – orally or on affidavit – is open to cross-examination.659 Unchallenged evidence must be accepted unless it is so patently absurd or unreliable that no reasonable person would accept it.660 [A.89] Cross-examination is a fundamental right in courts of law,661 subject to disallowance for irrelevance, unnecessary offensiveness, or pointless repetition.662 At this stage leading questions are routine,663 but the judge may direct a cross-examiner not to “lead” if a witness seems too willing to assist the latter’s

652. R v Westwell [1976] 2 All ER 812. 653. Mather and Deegan v Morgan [1971] Tas SR 192; R v Kingston [1986] 2 Qd R 114; Horne v Comino; Ex parte Comino (1966) Qd R 20; King v Bryant (No 2) [1956] QSR 570; R v Alexander [1975] VR 741. 654. King v Bryant (No 2) [1956] QSR 570 at 583-584. 655. Payne v Ibbotson (1858) 27 LJ Ex 341; R v Harrison [1966] VR 72; R v McGregor [1984] 1 Qd R 256; Re Foggo [1989] 2 Qd R 49. 656. Senat v Senat [1965] P 172 at 179; Alexander v Manley (2004) 29 WAR 194. 657. Gregory v Taverner (1833) 6 C & P 280; 172 ER 797; Alexander v Manley (2004) 29 WAR 194. 658. For example, affidavits of discovery: Fruehauf Finance Corporation Pty Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 359. However, some authorities hold that there is a discretion to allow cross-examination in such cases: Hartogen Energy Ltd (in liq) v Australian Gas Light Co (1992) 36 FCR 557 at 560-561; Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 at 574. 659. Allen v Allen [1894] P 248 at 252. An exception to that rule of practice was made in RCI Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 76 ATR 591; [2009] FCA 910. 660. Richards v Jager [1909] VLR 140 at 147; Holman v Holman (1964) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 374 at 378; Repatriation Commission v Reid (1984) 54 ALR 157 at 163; Sheahan v Woulfe [1927] St R Qd 128 at 131. 661. Hally v Starkey; Ex parte Hally (1962) Qd R 474; Jones v National Coal Board [1957] 2 All ER 155; Aluminium Louvres & Ceilings Pty Ltd v Xue Qin Zheng (2006) 4 DDCR 358; [2006] NSWCA 34; MPL v JP [2011] QCA 220 at [22]. But it is not a “human right”: see [93A.13]. 662. R v Higgins (1994) 71 A Crim R 429 at 442; Mooney v James [1949] VLR 22 at 28-29; R v Kelly; Ex parte Hoang van Duong (1981) 28 SASR 271 at 273. 663. R v Hunter [1956] VLR 31 at 36; see also [15.23]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[A.90]

664

cause. This discretion was wrongly exercised with respect to an obliging Aboriginal witness in Stack v Western Australia.665 [A.90] Cross-examination is not limited to topics canvassed in chief. The cross-examiner may explore any matter relevant to the issues for trial, or to the credit666 of the witness. Prior inconsistent statements are a cross-examiner’s stock-in-trade.667 There is no general rule against introducing evidence for the first time at this stage.668 But it is not permissible to ask questions about the credit of other witnesses;669 see [A.66]. [A.91]

Cross-examination is subject to the hearsay rule.670

[A.92] The judge may disallow questions that are needlessly offensive.671 Imputations unsupported by evidence may raise an adverse inference against the cross-examiner’s case and, in extreme cases, lead to disciplinary action.672 It is an important rule of practice that counsel must not communicate with his or her witness, currently under cross-examination. A breach of this rule may cause a mistrial.673 [A.93] Cross-examination of a particular witness by more than one counsel for the same party is generally not allowed,674 but an exception may be made where one advocate withdraws from a case leaving a cross-examination unfinished, or where responsibilities for parts of a heavy commercial case are divided between senior and junior counsel.675 Where two or more parties share a common interest, only one of them may be allowed to cross-examine.676

664. Mooney v James [1949] VLR 22 at 28. This is a variation on the theme of the hostile witness. The hostility emerges in cross-examination instead of evidence in chief. 665. (2004) 29 WAR 526; [2004] WASCA 300. 666. State Rail Authority (NSW) v Brown (2006) 66 NSWLR 540; [2006] NSWCA 220. 667. See [18.1] – [19.18]. 668. R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 681 and 691, but this is subject to a discretion to prevent improper “holding back” of a prosecution case; see also [15.23]. 669. R v Foley [2000] 1 Qd R 290; (1998) 105 A Crim R 1; [1998] QCA 225. 670. R v Thomson [1912] 3 KB 19; Alister v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 404 at 417; R v Summers (1986) 2 A Crim R 47; Jones v The Queen (2009) 83 ALJR 671; [2009] HCA 17. 671. See [20.1] – [21.4]. 672. R v Robinson [1977] Qd R 387; Clyne v NSW Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186; R v O’Neill (1950) 34 Cr App R 108 at 110; Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules 2015 (NSW), r 67. 673. R v Shepherd [2001] 1 NZLR 161 (but not fatal in that case); Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules 2015 (NSW), r 73. 674. GPI Leisure Corporation Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15; Hodgson v Amcor Ltd (No 6) [2011] VSC 294 at [15]. 675. Canberra Residential Developments Pty Ltd v Brendas (2010) 188 FCR 140; [2010] FCAFC 125. 676. Hodgson v Amcor Ltd (No 6) [2011] VSC 294.

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Hearsay and Character Evidence

The rule in Browne v Dunn [A.94] A fundamental rule of cross-examination is the rule in Browne v Dunn.677 If a witness is to be challenged, the witness and the court should be alerted to the fact,678 particularly when fraud is suggested.679 Credible evidence that is not challenged is normally taken to be accepted,680 and it will usually be unreasonable to reject it.681 It is wrong to ask a court to reject the evidence of a witness to whom the cross-examiner has put only a few general questions, while implicitly accepting the gist of what he or she has said.682 The rule in Browne v Dunn is meant to give the witness a fair chance683 to deal with contradiction, to assist the court to ascertain the truth684 and to warn the party calling the witness to call supporting evidence, if any.685 (An apparent absence of conflict may create a false sense of security.) There is an excellent review of the law in Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation.686 A clear breach of the rule occurred in Payless Superbarn (NSW) Pty Ltd v O’Gara.687 In an action against the defendant retailer, the plaintiff swore that she slipped on grapes lying on the shop floor. This story was not seriously challenged in cross-examination (counsel merely asking how many grapes there were), but later the defence contended that “there was nothing on the floor”. The jury was properly directed to ignore that version of the event. Another clear case is Reid v Kerr688 where the defence called expert evidence on a point which was not raised 677. (1893) 6 R 97. It is suggested that the rule has been less strictly applied in Queensland than in other Australian courts: McLean v Kalanda Constructions Pty Ltd [1995] QCA 280 at [6]. 678. Townsville City Council v Department of Main Roads [2006] 1 Qd R 77; [2005] QCA 226 at [60]; Gordon Martin Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW) (2009) 53 MVR 474; [2009] NSWCA 287 at [68]; Curwen v Vanbreck Pty Ltd (2009) 26 VR 335; [2009] VSCA 284. 679. Prepaid Services Pty Ltd v Atradius Credit Insurance NV (2013) 302 ALR 732; [2013] NSWCA 252. 680. Hull v Thompson [2001] NSWCA 35. But in a criminal case a plea of “not guilty” is a sufficient indication to the prosecution that evidence of the elements of the offence is not accepted: Garrett v Nicholson (1999) 21 WAR 226. 681. Poricanin v Australian Consolidated Industries Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 419 at 426-427; Paric v John Holland Constructions Pty Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 505 at 507; Levinge v Director of Custodial Services (1987) 9 NSWLR 546 at 560; R v Lawless [1974] VR 398; Allied Pastoral Co v Commissioner of Taxation [1983] 1 NSWLR 1. 682. Mkari v Meza [2005] NSWCA 136. 683. This is a matter of substance; it is not necessary that every detail of the cross-examiner’s instruction be put: Pagett v Hales [2000] NTSC 35; see also Copmanhurst Shire Council v Watt (2005) 140 LGERA 333; [2005] NSWCA 245. 684. Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977) 19 NSWLR 219 at 235-236; Johnson Matthey (Aust) Pty Ltd v Dascorp Pty Ltd (2003) 9 VR 171; [2003] VSC 291 at [100]. 685. Otherwise that party may dispense with supporting witnesses in the belief that the present witness’s version is accepted. 686. [1983] 1 NSWLR 1; Paterson v The Queen (2004) 28 WAR 233; [2004] WASCA 63 at [197]. As to the respective functions of judge and jury in a jury case, see Beattie v Ball [1999] 3 VR 1. 687. (1990) 19 NSWLR 551. 688. (1974) 9 SASR 367. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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in cross-examination of the prosecution’s expert. In Anderson v Bigmore, the defendant’s claim that she acted honestly was not challenged in crossexamination, but the prosecution later relied on evidence to the contrary. The conviction was set aside. It is unjust to make a finding of fraud against a party who has not had an opportunity to deal with that imputation under crossexamination.690 [A.95] Browne v Dunn is less important when pleadings or other pre-trial communications691 make it clear that particular evidence is in dispute. A failure to cross-examine may then be immaterial.692 (See, however, the caution in Curwen v Vanbreck Pty Ltd.693) In Echegaray v Government Insurance Offıce of NSW694 it was obvious from medical evidence disclosed before the hearing that the plaintiff would be accused of malingering. In those circumstances the court was entitled to reject the plaintiff’s story of persistent chest pains despite a lack of cross-examination on that point. “Previews” that dispense with Browne v Dunn are more likely to occur when evidence in chief is on affidavit.695 The rule does not apply if a witness has no recollection of a fact or event because then there is no prospect of contradiction so far as that witness is concerned.696 The severest sanction for a breach of Browne v Dunn is a refusal to admit evidence contradicting the witness who was not properly cross-examined:697 see [A.94]. But a court may take the milder course of hearing the contradictory evidence, and then allow the “wronged” witness to return and answer it.698 The alternative ways of dealing with breaches of Browne v Dunn are considered in Smith v Advanced Electrics Pty Ltd.699 As noted in [A.6], firm rules of practice are now less fashionable, and enthusiasm for Browne v Dunn seems to be waning. It is doubtful whether it is so strictly enforced in Queensland as in New South

689. (2006) 202 FLR 468; [2006] ACTSC 85; see also R v Thompson (2008) 21 VR 135; [2008] VSCA 144. 690. Bale v Mills (2011) 282 ALR 336; [2011] NSWCA 226; Prepaid Services Pty Ltd v Atradius Credit Insurance NV (2013) 302 ALR 732; [2013] NSWCA 252. 691. Flower and Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134. 692. Brown v The Queen [1980] Tas SR 61; Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977) 19 NSWLR 219; State Rail Authority (NSW) v Brown (2006) 66 NSWLR 540; [2006] NSWCA 220; Laurendi v Boral Contracting Pty Ltd [2002] WASCA 297; Flower and Hart v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134; Cook’s Constructions Pty Ltd v Stork Food Systems Aust Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 179 at [97]; Stern v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 121 ALR 192; [2000] FCA 294 at [44]; Martin v Rowling [2005] QCA 128. 693. (2009) 26 VR 335 at 349; [2009] VSCA 284 at [27]. 694. (Unreported, NSW Sup Ct CA, 14 December 1990). 695. LC v TC [1998] FLC 92-803. 696. Trade Practices Commission v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd (1984) 3 FCR 168; 55 ALR 527 at 181 (FCR), 540 (ALR). 697. Precision Plastics Pty Ltd v Demir (1975) 132 CLR 362 at 370-371; Payless Superbarn (NSW) Pty Ltd v O’Gara (1990) 19 NSWLR 551. 698. Payless Superbarn (NSW) Pty Ltd v O’Gara (1990) 19 NSWLR 551; Poricanin v Australian Consolidated Industries Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 419 at 426; MJW v The Queen (2005) 80 ALJR 329; 222 ALR 436; [2005] HCA 74 at [38] – [40]. 699. [2005] 1 Qd R 65; [2003] QCA 432.

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Hearsay and Character Evidence 700

Wales. The current orthodoxy is that it is a flexible rule of fairness and that the judge is free to devise a fair solution,701 particularly in marathon cases where the most competent counsel may occasionally overlook it.702 In criminal cases, Browne v Dunn may be applied to the prosecution,703 but only with considerable caution to the defence.704 The defence line was not properly put to a prosecution witness in R v Foley,705 but on appeal it was said that the judge could simply have told the jury that the omission denied them the opportunity of hearing what he had to say. According to MJW v The Queen,706 the difficulty can often be overcome, in criminal as well as civil proceedings, by recalling the witness to respond. In a jury trial, the judge explains the rule and how it may be applied. The jury then decides whether there has actually been a breach of the rule and, if so, whether it will discount the story that was not properly ventilated.707 Finality rule [A.96] As a time-saving measure, or traditional “case management device”,708 an answer to a collateral question (one going only to credit) may generally not be rebutted.709 For example, if a witness is asked whether he or she tried to talk another out of giving evidence, and denies it, that is the end of it.710 In R v Burke711 an Irish witness, claiming to know no English, gave evidence through an interpreter. In cross-examination it was put to him (and denied) that he spoke English to two people in the precincts of the court. That answer had to be taken as final because the witness’s ability to speak English was not a fact in issue. This is a rule which many clients, and even some lawyers, understandably find difficult to accept. 700. McLean v Kalanda Constructions Pty Ltd [1995] QCA 280 at [6]. 701. Scalise v Bezzina [2003] NSWCA 362. 702. Bell Group Ltd (In liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 70 ACSR 1; [2008] WASC 239 (hearing 404 days). 703. Anderson v Bigmore (2006) 202 FLR 468; [2006] ACTSC 85; Hillier v The Queen [2008] ACTCA 3. See also Papametheos, “Can an Inference Still be Drawn Against the Crown for Failure to Call a Material Witness” (2006) 30 Crim LJ 24. 704. R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677; R v Manunta (1990) 54 SASR 17; MWJ v The Queen (2005) 80 ALJR 329; 222 ALR 436; [2005] HCA 74; R v SWC (2007) 175 A Crim R 71; [2007] VSCA 201; R v Heaney (2009) 22 VR 164; [2009] VSCA 74. 705. [2000] 1 Qd R 290; (1998) 105 A Crim R 1; [1998] QCA 225. 706. (2005) 80 ALJR 329; 222 ALR 436; [2005] HCA 74. 707. Beattie v Ball [1999] 3 VR 1. 708. R v Lawrence [2002] 2 Qd R 400; [2001] QCA 441 at 416 per White J (Qd R). 709. Harris v Tippett (1811) 2 Camp 637; Piddington v Bennett & Wood Pty Ltd (1940) 63 CLR 533; R v Livingstone [1987] 1 Qd R 38 at 41; Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 76 ALJR 1024; Kurgiel v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (1990) 54 SASR 125 at 128. 710. Harris v Tippett (1811) 2 Camp 637; R v Livingstone [1987] 1 Qd R 38 at 41. But if the alleged “propositioner” were a party, an admission by conduct could be involved. The rule is concerned with evidence from a witness other than the one under cross-examination. It does not prevent counsel from pursuing the same matter with the present witness in search for a more satisfactory answer: Western Australia v Watson [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-226 at 68,323. 711. (1858) 8 Cox CC 44. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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But there are exceptions to the finality rule with respect to a witness’s: (a) reputation as a liar (a tactic now rarely used);712 (b) criminal record; (c) bias;713 for example, where a child is coached to give evidence against an accused,714 and bias is denied;715 (d) prior inconsistent statements;716 or (e) false complaints of sexual assaults against the accused or other persons.717 [A.97] Bias refers to a specific reason for refusing to acknowledge facts favourable to one party, or adverse to the other.718 It is an error of law to refuse cross-examination as to bias without good reason.719 Bias goes to weight, but does not render a witness incompetent720 or compel the court to reject the evidence. The law is considered at length in R v Umanski,721 although the actual decision in that case seems questionable. Other causes of bias may be fear or undue influence,722 or a desire to curry favour with police or other persons of influence.723 Evidence of bias was wrongly excluded in Smith v The Queen.724 [A.98] Prior inconsistent statements are traditionally listed as an exception to the finality rule because, at common law, they are hearsay and, as such, relevant only to credit. But see now [101.3]. Procedures for dealing with inconsistent statements are considered at [19.11]ff. In a criminal case the prosecution must inform the defence of prior inconsistent statements by any of its witnesses.725 [A.99] There are signs of a more flexible approach to the finality rule, although it was affirmed by the High Court in Goldsmith v Sandilands,726 and more 712. R v Gunewardene [1951] 2 KB 600 R v Richardson [1969] 1 QB 299 at 309; Toohey v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] AC 595 at 605-606. However, it is still part of the common law, and should be allowed when credit is a vital issue: R v BDX (2008) 24 VR 288; 194 A Crim R 57; [2009] VSCA 28. 713. R v Umanski [1961] VR 242 at 244; Bakopoulos v General Motors Holden Pty Ltd [1973] VR 190; R v Busby (1982) 75 Cr App R 79; R v LSS [2000] 1 Qd R 546. 714. R v Schneider [2001] 1 Qd R 546; [1998] QCA 303. 715. Naidoo v Naidoo [2005) 38 SR (WA) 352; [2005] WADC 41. 716. Strictly speaking, these are no longer material that goes only to credit: see s 101. 717. R v Lawrence [2002] 2 Qd R 400; [2001] QCA 441; R v WR [2010] ACTSC 89 at [16]. 718. R v Hunter [1956] VLR 31 at 36. 719. R v Aldridge (1990) 20 NSWLR 737 at 745-746. 720. FGT Custodians Pty Ltd v Fagenblat [2003] VSCA 33; Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 190 FLR 242; 23 ACLC 430; [2005] NSWSC 149 (reversed on other grounds: (2005) 54 ACSR 326); Flavel v South Australia (2007) 96 SASR 505; [2007] SASC 50. 721. [1961] VR 242; see also Thomas v David (1836) 7 C & P 350; 173 ER 156; R v Ward [1963] Qd R 56. 722. R v de Angelis (1979) 20 SASR 288; R v Busby (1982) 75 Cr App R 79 (fear of police threats). 723. Nicholls v The Queen (2005) 219 CLR 196; 79 ALJR 468; [2005] HCA 1. 724. (1993) 9 WAR 99. 725. R v Clarke (1930) 22 Cr App R 58. And see now Criminal Code, s 590AB. 726. (2002) 76 ALJR 1024.

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recently in Nicholls v The Queen.727 It was not enforced in Natta v Canham,728 where the plaintiff was involved in three earlier traffic incidents, one in 1975, when she received a large award, and others in 1984 and 1987, when the defendants claimed that she deliberately caused the collisions. In crossexamination she denied telling a friend that those incidents were “faked”. The court admitted evidence contradicting her denial, and gave judgment for the defendant. In dismissing her appeal, the Full Court observed:729 [We] cannot, of course, disregard … the decision of the High Court in Piddington. Nevertheless [we are] not bound to the view that the exclusionary rule is absolute or that the categories of exceptions to it are closed. It is a rule of practice related to the proper management of litigation. A trial judge should not be precluded from determining … that the matter … is [so] relevant to … credit … that such evidence may be admitted.

Natta v Canham was anticipated almost 90 years earlier in an obscure Queensland case, Campbell v Railway Commissioner.730 The plaintiff testified, dramatically, from a stretcher on the floor of the court. But, alas, there was evidence that he had fraudulently staged similar “accidents” in three other States. There was judgment for the defendant, followed by a conviction of the plaintiff for perjury. The line between evidence on the issues and collateral matters is sometimes difficult to discern. It has been held that, if a complainant swears the accused assaulted her in the presence of “B”, “B’s” evidence that he saw no such incident is not collateral because it tends to show the real relationship between complainant and accused.731 In a trial for sexual assault, issues of credit (such as a disposition of the complainant to make false allegations) may also relate to the question of whether the offence occurred.732 However, we were recently reminded that: The finality rule is important to the efficient conduct of litigation. Without it, the principal issues in trials would sometimes become overwhelmed by charge and counter-charge remote from the cause of action being litigated. In many cases, the finality rule also protects witnesses from having to defend themselves against discreditable allegations that are peripheral to the issues.733 727. (2005) 219 CLR 196; [2005] HCA 1 at [2]. 728. (1991) 32 FCR 282; 104 ALR 143. Other flexible cases are: Urban Transport Authority (NSW) v Nweiser (1992) 28 NSWLR 471; R v Lawrence [2002] 2 Qd R 400; R v FTG (2007) 15 VR 685; 172 A Crim R 340. See also Nicholls v The Queen (2005) 219 CLR 196; 79 ALJR 468; [2005] HCA 1 at [56] per McHugh J: “[E]vidence disproving a witness’s denials concerning matters of credibility should be regarded as generally admissible if the witness’s credit is inextricably involved with a fact in issue. Consistently with the case management rationale of the finality rule, however, a judge may still reject rebutting evidence where, although inextricably connected with a fact in issue, the time, convenience or expense of admitting the evidence would be unduly disproportionate to its probative force” (witness’s stated intention to give false evidence). 729. (1991) 104 ALR 143 at 161. 730. (1902) BCR 21 (August 1902). 731. R v V (1998) 100 A Crim R 488. 732. As Thomas J observed in R v Lawrence [2002] 2 Qd R 400 at 410. 733. Nicholls v The Queen (2005) 219 CLR 196; 79 ALJR 468; [2005] HCA 1 at [55] per McHugh J. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[A.100]

Rules for re-examination [A.100] The purpose of re-examination is to explain, repair or improve a witness’s evidence after cross-examination is concluded.734 All questions in re-examination must arise from the cross-examination. Collateral questions are permitted (contrast evidence in chief) and occasionally a cross-examination opens the way for accreditation that could not be raised earlier,735 such as a motive that enhances the evidence in chief:736 see [A.80]. For example, if a complainant admits to defence counsel that she detests the accused, she may be asked in re-examination why that is so, if the expected answer is likely to assist the prosecution. A legitimate re-examination may disclose another offence.737 Again, if a police witness is criticised for failing to pursue a theory of accidental death, that witness may say in re-examination that no such suggestion was ever made by the accused.738 If a witness admits changing the story, re-examination might reveal that this was done for fear of the accused or some other person.739 A conversation partly explored in cross-examination may be elicited as a whole,740 if it deals with the same subject.741 In R v Kelly742 a child’s mother was able to explain why she did not tell her husband immediately that the child was sexually assaulted. [A.101] If a cross-examiner’s attack on credit imputes “recent invention” (a change of story between the event and the trial), the re-examiner may lead evidence of a prior statement, consistent with the evidence in court.743 The “recent invention” concept is not limited to charges of deliberate lying,744 but it does not extend to any and every attack on credit.745 Cross-examination

734. For principles and examples, see R v Szach (1980) 23 SASR 504 at 511-519; R v AJS (2005) 159 A Crim R 327; [2005] VSCA 288; Young, “Practical Evidence: Re-Examination” (1991) 65 ALJ 282. 735. R v Maiden (1988) 35 A Crim R 346; R v Singleton [1986] 2 Qd R 535. 736. R v Kelly (1907) 7 SR (NSW) 518 (reason why mother of child, sexually assaulted, did not at once tell her husband). 737. R v Chambers (1848) 3 Cox CC 92 (earlier rape explaining absence of pain). 738. Compare R v Maiden (1988) 35 A Crim R 346. 739. R v Singleton [1986] 2 Qd R 525. 740. Glynn v Houston (1831) 2 Man & Gr 337; 133 ER 775. 741. Prince v Samo (1838-9) 7 Ad & E 627; 112 ER 606. 742. (1907) 7 SR (NSW) 518. Other cases involving relevant motives or states of mind are: Drabsch v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd [1999] NSWSC 765; and R v Szach (1980) 23 SASR 504 at 511. 743. R v Boland [1974] VR 849; Eaton v Nominal Defendant (Queensland) (1995) 21 MVR 357; Nominal Defendant v Clements (1960) 104 CLR 476; GJ Coles & Co Ltd v McDonald [1998] 2 VR 218; I v Western Australia (2006) 165 A Crim R 420; [2006] WASCA 204; R v Kendrick [1997] 2 VR 699 (statement erroneously admitted – attack on credit not specifically “recent invention”). 744. Francombe v Holloway [1957] VR 139; Nominal Defendant v Clements (1960) 104 CLR 476 at 479; and see [101.7]. 745. R v Kendrick [1997] 2 VR 699.

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Hearsay and Character Evidence

about an inconsistent statement does not necessarily enliven the rule.746 The facts in R v Powell747 did not warrant a suggestion of recent invention.

Onus (or burden) of proof [A.102] A useful rule of thumb is “He who asserts must prove”,748 but this simple test is not infallible. Normally the onus is on the party initiating the proceedings – prosecutor, plaintiff or applicant, as the case may be, but not always so: In my opinion [the legal burden] lies on a plaintiff, if the fact alleged (whether affirmative or negative in form) is an essential element in his cause of action, for example, if its existence is a condition precedent to his right to maintain the action. The onus is on the defendant, if the allegation is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the cause of action, but is one which, if established, will constitute a good defence, that is, an “avoidance” of the claim [to] which, prima facie, the plaintiff [is entitled].749

Sometimes there is an onus to prove a negative, but not in Sanpine v Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council.750 That was an action for wrongful termination of a joint venture. The defendant claimed that it was lawfully ended because of breaches by the plaintiff. The plaintiff denied that allegation. It was held that the defendant must prove the plaintiff’s default. It was not the plaintiff’s task to prove that he was not in breach. Until the initiating party presents a prima facie case on every element of the chosen cause of action, the defendant need not respond.751 A good prima facie case may eventually fail,752 but if none is made out, the defendant753 may submit, as a matter of law, that the proceedings should be dismissed at once.754 In deciding a “no case” application the judge should, in principle, consider the affirmative evidence in the most favourable light, on the assumption that it will

746. GJ Coles & Co Ltd v McDonald [1998] 2 VR 218. 747. [2014] SASCFC 48. 748. Ex parte Ferguson; Re Alexander (1944) 45 SR (NSW) 64; Joseph Constantine SS Co v Imperial Smelting Corporation [1942] AC 154 at 174; Abrath v North Eastern Railway Co (1883) 11 QBD 440 at 457. 749. Currie v Dempsey (1967) 69 SR (NSW) 116 at 125 per Walsh JA. 750. [2005] NSWSC 365. 751. Protean (Holdings) Ltd v American Home Assurance Co [1985] VR 187. 752. Jayasena v The Queen [1970] AC 618 at 624. 753. The same considerations apply, mutatis mutandis, when the legal onus is upon the plaintiff. In the absence of an application by a party, the judge should raise the question only rarely and with great caution: Western Australia v Montani (2007) 182 A Crim R 155; [2007] WASCA 259. 754. May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654; Munce v Vinidex Tubemakers Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 235; R v Stewart; Ex parte Attorney General [1989] 1 Qd R 590; Nicholson v Superior Home Improvements Pty Ltd [1987] 2 Qd R 201; De Gioia v Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd (1941) 42 SR (NSW) 1 at 3-5; Naxakis v Western General Hospital (1999) 197 CLR 269 at 296-297; R v Brady (2005) 92 SASR 135; [2005] SASC 277. See also Glass, “Insufficiency of Evidence to Raise a Case to Answer” (1981) 55 ALJ 842. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[A.102]

755

all be accepted. Where the prosecution case is circumstantial, the test is whether the evidence is capable of satisfying the criminal standard of proof, taking the primary facts at their strongest, and assuming that all the inferences relied on by the prosecution are reasonably open.756 But in a judge-only case the distinction between what could be found and what should be found is less clear cut, and in such a case it may be argued that, if the purely legal question is decided in the negative, the evidence so far adduced would not establish the claim on the balance of probabilities.757 Leave to reopen in response to a “no case” submission should rarely be granted.758 In a criminal case, an hypothesis consistent with innocence does not necessitate a “no case” ruling.759 The “reasonable doubt” issue may be left to the jury. However, the application suceeded in R v Forsyth.760 In that case the defendant barrister was charged with assisting a client to defraud the revenue, but the prosecution produced no evidence that he was aware of his client’s intentions. A pre-trial application under s 590AA of the Criminal Code may be used for this purpose if the facts are undisputed and the Crown concedes that they represent its case at its highest.761 Alternatively, the Crown may enter a nolle prosequi at any time before verdict, so that, in theory at least, the charge may be revived.762 A party whose “no case” application is rejected faces an invidious choice. In R v Wood763 the appellant complained that his submission was wrongly rejected, but he went into evidence, and he was convicted. An unsympathetic court of appeal told him that he should have “stuck to his guns and called no evidence”. An old practice of requiring a party to choose between abandoning a “no case” application, or calling no evidence if it failed, may now be obsolete.764 It was confined to civil cases heard by a judge alone.765 755. Questions of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 2 of 1993) (1993) 61 SASR 1; Jayasena v The Queen [1970] AC 618 at 624; R v Morris (1997) 98 A Crim R 408; R v Rothery (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 451 at 461; Western Australia v Montani (2007) 182 A Crim R 155; [2007] WASCA 259. 756. R v Wait [2011] SASCFC 91. 757. The Union Bank of Australia Ltd v Puddy [1949] VLR 242 at 244; Antoun v The Queen [2006] HCA 2 at [54]; Metrolink Victoria Pty Ltd v Auspro Logistics Pty Ltd (2008) 49 MVR 350; [2008] VSC 23 (evidence as to credit, already received may be considered). 758. Martelli v Police (2007) 46 MVR 568; [2007] SASC 21; Police (SA) v Butcher (2014) 119 SASR 509; 67 MVR 128; [2014] SASC 85 at [58]. 759. R v Brady (2005) 92 SASR 135; [2005] SASC 277. 760. R v Forsyth (1990) 20 ATR 1818. 761. R v Gesa [2001] 2 Qd R 72. 762. R v Economou (1989) 51 SASR 421; R v Ferguson; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 35. While a nolle prosequi leaves the charge “alive, the court may impose a stay of further proceedings to prevent abuse of process”: R v Saunders [1983] 2 Qd R 270; R v Jell; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 48; R v JCM [2007] QDC 211. 763. [1974] VR 117. 764. Trade Practices Commission v George Weston Foods Ltd (No 2) (1980) 43 FLR 55; J-Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers (WA Branch) (No 2) (1992) 38 FCR 458; 111 ALR 377; Oakley v Insurance Manufacturers of Australia Pty Ltd [2008] VSC 68. 765. Fawkes v Schadwell; Ex Parte Schadwell [1966] Qd R 20.

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Hearsay and Character Evidence

[A.103] As noted at [A.102], it is not always the plaintiff or prosecutor who “asserts” and thus assumes the duty to prove. A defendant who pleads insanity or diminished responsibility has the legal burden of establishing that defence.766 Where there is a proviso or condition precedent to a right of action, it is for the plaintiff to prove that it has been fulfilled.767 Similarly, the onus of proving contributory negligence, failure to mitigate damages768 or prior repayment of a debt769 is on the defendant. The same applies in contract cases where the defendant pleads infancy, fraud, mistake or breach of a condition.770 The onus is on a landlord to prove a breach of a lease, but if the tenant relies on an exception, the tenant must show that it applies.771 In a civil case the onus may be reversed by agreement:772 see [A.2]. Reversal of the onus of proof by statute is considered at [Q.33].773 Sometimes a seemingly negative assertion merely indicates that some element of the affirmative case is not admitted. In many criminal cases, “defences” of this kind – for example, self-defence774 and “honest and reasonable mistake of fact”775 – need only be raised by the accused.776 No “reverse onus” then arises, and the prosecution must close the suggested “escape route” beyond reasonable doubt.777 When it is uncertain who is making the positive assertion, the court may place the onus on the party who is likely to have less difficulty in proving (or disproving) the fact in question.778 When the defendant does bear the legal onus, the plaintiff or prosecution may reserve its case on that issue, await the defendant’s evidence upon it, and then

766. R v Files [1983] 2 Qd R 153; R v Wogandt (1983) 33 A Crim R 31. 767. Vines v Djordjevitch (1955) 91 CLR 512 at 518. 768. Lorca v Holt’s Corrosion Control [1981] Qd R 261; Goldburg v Shell Oil Co of Australia Ltd (1990) 95 ALR 711; Watts v Rake (1960) 108 CLR 158 at 159. 769. Young v Queensland Trustees Ltd (1956) 99 CLR 560. 770. Clark v NZI Life Ltd [1991] 2 Qd R 11; Sheldon v Sun Alliance Ltd (1988) 50 SASR 236; aff’d (1989) 53 SASR 97. 771. Westpac General Insurance Ltd v Cooper [2006] ACTSC 91. 772. Bond Air Services v Hill [1955] 2 QB 417; Daventry Holdings Pty Ltd v Bacalakis Hotels Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 406; Chappell v National Car Parks, The Times Law Reports, 22 May 1987. 773. See the discussion in DPP (Cth) v United Telecasters Sydney Ltd (1990) 168 CLR 594. 774. R v Muratovic [1967] Qd R 15 at 573. 775. Loveday v Ayre [1955] St R Qd 264 at 267 and 276; Kehoe v Dacol Motors Pty Ltd; Ex parte Dacol Motors Pty Ltd [1972] Qd R 59. 776. In which case it is improper for a prosecutor to argue: “Why else would she make these allegations? Why would she lie?”: R v E (1996) 39 NSWLR 450; but see to the contrary R v DCC (2004) 151 A Crim R 403; [2004] VSCA 230, where the defence alleged fabrication and collusion. It is quite permissible for police to put such a question to a suspect: R v SAP; Ex parte Attorney-General (2005) 155 A Crim R 291; [2005] QCA 284. 777. Brimblecombe v Duncan; Ex parte Duncan [1958] Qd R 8 at 13; He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523 at 573. 778. Soward v Leggatt (1836) 7 C & P 613; Joseph Constantine SS Co v Imperial Smelting Corporation [1942] AC 154. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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779

present a reply as a matter of right. This is an exception to the general rule that an affirmative case must not be “split” without leave of the court. If the defendant subsequently seeks leave to reopen, it is simply a question of what fairness requires.780 Leave to reopen a prosecution case is relatively rare,781 but it was granted in R v Dawes,782 R v CDR783 and R v Spiteri.784 In Spiteri the Crown was allowed to prove in reply that, shortly before the trial, the accused was seen performing vigorous physical exercises, despite his unexpected claim that a physical handicap made it impossible for him to commit the crime. But generally, in civil as well as criminal proceedings, one presentation of the affirmative case must suffice.785 [A.104] The party with the legal burden of proof has two tasks:786 (i) to show a prima facie case;787 and (ii) to establish it, on all the evidence, to the appropriate standard of proof. The first is called the “evidential burden” (“getting to the jury”) and the second, the “persuasive burden”.788 The persuasive or tactical burden may shift from time to time, in the sense that the party who last led evidence may win if no further evidence is given.789 But “[f]ew, if any, civil cases where both parties go into evidence will be determined by the application of the rules as to onus of proof. The totality of evidence, such as it is, will prove or disprove facts which one party or the other must establish to make out its case or defence.”790

779. Downs Irrigation v National Bank Ltd [1983] 1 Qd R 130; Finborough Investments Pty Ltd v Airlie Beach Pty Ltd [1995] 1 Qd R 12. The right is subject to a discretionary direction in the interests of justice. 780. For example, Nikoloski v Ridge Consolidated Pty Ltd (1994) 116 FLR 192 (leave granted; prejudice to plaintiff if vital evidence excluded clearly greater than additional cost and inconvenience to defendant); French v Triple M (Melbourne) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] VSC 548 (defamation, defendant pleading justification). 781. Shaw v The Queen (1952) 85 CLR 365 at 379; Killick v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 565 at 568; Morris v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 152 (“only if the circumstances are very special or exceptional”). It was incorrectly allowed in R v V (1998) 100 A Crim R 488. 782. [1992] 2 Qd R 435 (passing valueless cheques – accused’s evidence based his defence on notes on cheque butts; the Crown was allowed to reply with evidence that the butts were fabricated). 783. [1996] 1 Qd R 183; also in Kurzbock v Hallett (2001) 126 A Crim R 125. 784. (2004) 61 NSWLR 369; [2004] NSWCCA 321; see also Burridge v Tonkin [2007] VSC 230; O’Meara v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 228 (evidence going only to credit, not admissible in primary prosecution case). 785. Finborough Investments Pty Ltd v Airlie Beach Pty Ltd [1995] 1 Qd R 12. 786. Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164. 787. Munce v Vinidex Tubemakers Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 235; Zanetti v Hill (1962) 108 CLR 433 at 442; Glass, “The Insufficiency of Evidence to Raise a Case to Answer” (1981) 55 ALJ 842. 788. For a discussion of the legal and evidential burdens, and shifting of the burden see Bell Goup Ltd (In liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 70 ACSR 1; [2008] WASC 239. 789. Cornelius v Global Medical Solutions Australia Pty Ltd (2014) 98 ACSR 301; [2014] NSWCA 65 at [19]-[20]. 790. Johnson v Triple C Furniture & Electrical Pty Ltd (2010) 243 FLR 336; [2010] QCA 282 at [59] per Chesterman JA.

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Standards of proof Criminal cases – prosecution evidence [A.105] In criminal proceedings (other than on a voir dire)791 the prosecution must establish all points on which it bears the legal onus “beyond reasonable doubt”,792 even if, by statute, the prosecution is commenced by civil procedure.793 Thus, if the defence is alibi, the jury must be told that, if there is a reasonable possibility that the accused was elsewhere, they must acquit.794 The criminal standard applies to the proof of other crimes tendered as evidence on the issues795 or to discredit the defence.796 The present formula seems to have been established about 1800. Before that time judges commonly told juries that a “very great weight of evidence” was needed to prove a criminal charge.797 The expressions “fully proved” and “highest degree of probability” were still current in 1850.798 This mantra799 or “time-honoured formula” is said to require no explanation,800 and trial judges paraphrase it at their peril:801 791. See [A.110]. 792. See Hodgson, “The Scales of Justice: Probability and Proof in Legal Fact-Finding” (1995) 69 ALJ 731. See also Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462; Chamberlain v The Queen (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 599; R v Kelly [2006] VSCA 221 (several rational hypotheses not addressed by the Crown). 793. Chief Executive Offıcer of Customs v Labrador Liquor Wholesale Pty Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 161; [2003] HCA 49. 794. R v Kanaan (2005) 157 A Crim R 238; [2005] NSWCCA 385. 795. Section 15(2)(a) and [15.18]-[15.24]. 796. Under s 15(2)(c); see [15.29]ff, R v Weininger (2000) 159 FLR 238; Buttsworth v The Queen (2004) 29 WAR 1; [2004] WASCA 69. 797. Seven Bishops’ Trial (1688) 12 State Trials 183 at 305; Twining, Bentham and Wigmore (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985), p 95. 798. Address of Therry J at the first sittings of the NSW Supreme Court at Moreton Bay (13 May 1850) Sydney Morning Herald (21 May 1850). 799. As to earlier and less exacting tests, see The Seven Bishops’ Trial (1688) 12 State Trials 183 at 305 (a “very great weight of evidence”); R v Harrison (1692) 12 How State Trials 834 at 865 per Holt LCJ: “if you are satisfied … you ought to find him guilty”. 800. Dawson v The Queen (1961) 106 CLR 1 at 18 per Dixon CJ. 801. “[Jurors] often ask what is beyond reasonable doubt, which I can’t tell them. We can say reasonable doubt is what you believe a reasonable doubt to be. A lot of people thought it meant proof to a scientific certainty”: De Jersey CJ, extra-judicially Courier Mail (Brisbane, 13 May 2013), p 8; Brown v The King (1913) 17 CLR 570 at 584; Dawson v The Queen (1961) 106 CLR 1 at 18; Green v The Queen (1971) 126 CLR 28 at 31-32; R v Reeves (1992) 29 NSWLR 109; Van Leeuwen v The Queen (1981) 55 ALJR 726; R v Ketchup [1982] Qd R 732; R v Holman [1997] 1 Qd R 373; La Fontaine v The Queen (1976) 136 CLR 62; R v Punj (2002) A Crim R 595; R v Forrest (2004) 236 LSJS 265; [2004] SASC 333; R v Fouyaxis (2007) 99 SASR 233; [2007] SASC 335. The frequent, if not tedious repetition of it by judge and counsel may sound, to some jurors, as a broad hint to acquit. It is legally, if not morally inadvisable to tell a jury: “It’s not a doubt based on conjecture, guesswork or sympathy. It’s not something that you snatch out of thin air because you don’t like having to do an unpleasant duty”: Queensland Supreme and District Courts Benchbook 57.1. However, the traditional reverence for the “reasonable doubt” formula does not prevent a judge from explaining the expression “probable consequence” in ss 8 and 9 of the Criminal Code: Darkan v The Queen (2006) CLR 373; [2006] HCA 34. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[I]t is, I think, used by ordinary people and is understood well enough by the average man in the community. The attempts to substitute other expressions, of which there have been many examples not only here but in England, have never prospered. It is wise … to avoid such expressions.802

The following direction was disapproved in Thomas v The Queen,803 despite inclusion of the magic words: The onus is on the Crown to satisfy you that the accused is guilty, and the accused is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt … You consider it in an ordinary commonsense manner and in the way that you would consider the more serious matters which come up … in your lives … [I]f you come to a feeling of comfortable satisfaction that the accused is guilty, then you should find him … guilty.

An imaginative, but singularly unsuccessful, attempt to explain “reasonable doubt” by reference to cricket’s LBW law was made in R v CBK.804 It is permissible, if not very helpful, to say: “A reasonable doubt is a doubt which the particular jury entertains in the circumstances. Jurymen themselves set the standard of what is reasonable in the circumstances”,805 or “A reasonable doubt is one which [you], as reasonable persons, are prepared to entertain”.806 (In practice, an unreasonable doubt is equally beneficial to the defendant. Convictions are routinely appealed; acquittals are deemed infallible.) Another permissible explanation is as follows: “If there is any hypothesis consistent with innocence, then you must acquit this defendant.”807 Such timid exegesis scarcely encourages judges to assist puzzled jurors. Another permissible equivocation may be: A reasonable doubt is a doubt that you consider reasonable on a view of all the evidence. It is for you to say whether you have any doubt you consider reasonable. If, after due deliberation as reasonable people, you are in doubt about the guilt of the defendant, the charge has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.808

The beginners’ handbook (Benchbook) for Queensland judges – the existence of which is now officially, if somewhat coyly, acknowledged809 – offers this circumlocution: 802. Dawson v The Queen (1961) 106 CLR 1 at 18 per Dixon CJ. 803. (1960) 102 CLR 584 at 586; R v Woods (2008) 102 SASR 422; [2008] SASC 66 (otherwise orthodox direction ruined by asking whether defence evidence raised a real possibility of innocence). 804. [2014] QCA 35 at [9]. 805. Green v The Queen (1971) 126 CLR 28 at 32-33. 806. R v Gebert (1992) 60 SASR 110. 807. Knight v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 495 at 501-503; R v Taouk (2005) 154 A Crim R 69; [2005] NSWCCA 155. It seems likely that difficulties with “reasonable doubt” are responsible for a significant number of “hung juries”. According to the Justice Department, 17.8% of juries (23 out of 216) were unable to agree between July 2004 and February 2005; figures for 2003-2004 were 10.2% (22 out of 216) and for 2002-2003 12.1% (31 out of 257): Courier Mail (21-22 January 2006), p 25. 808. Compare R v Chatzidimitriou [2000] 1 VR 493 at 498, 503 and 509; R v Krasniqi (1993) 61 SASR 366. 809. R v Irlam; Ex parte Attorney-General [2002] QCA 235 at [55]. The existence of this manual suggests that, if a politician will confer the office, a mediocre recruit can perform it well enough to escape public attention.

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A reasonable doubt is such a doubt as you … consider to be reasonable on a consideration of the evidence. It is therefore for you, and each of you, to say whether you have a doubt which you consider reasonable. If, at the end of your deliberations, you, as reasonable persons, are in doubt about the guilt of the accused, the charge has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Mesmeric repetition of the mantra as judicial insurance against an appeal, or by a defender striving for any doubt, reasonable or unreasonable, may strike jurors unaccustomed or averse to responsibility as an invitation to acquit. It is then a short step to the comforting thought: “I have just been described as a reasonable person. I think I have a doubt. Therefore it is reasonable.”810 The Victorian Court of Appeal has held that a jury may consult a dictionary to interpret “beyond reasonable doubt”,811 and it seems safe to tell jurors that there is a difference between a fanciful doubt and a reasonable one.812 The Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal has allowed a judge to say that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessarily the same as scientific certainty,813 or as another court put it, without fatal consequences: “It’s not proof to the point of absolute certainty.”814 According to the Privy Council, a jury may be told that a reasonable doubt is the sort of doubt that might influence the mind of a person dealing with matters of importance in his or her own affairs,815 but that paraphrase may not be suitable for Australian conditions. It is an improper reversal of the onus of proof to tell jurors to ask themselves whether they “accept the defendant’s version”, or to consider who is to be believed.816 That ignores the fact that the prosecution case should not merely be more acceptable, but must be established beyond reasonable doubt.817 By the same token, a jury must not be given the impression that the defence must show that the complainant has a motive to lie.818 Remarkably, a jury must not be told to consider, in relation to an accused’s credibility, that he or she has a certain interest in avoiding a conviction.819

810. Compare the comment of Wells J on the attraction, for some judges, of the “fuzziness” of discretionary exclusion: [130.67]. 811. R v Chatzidimitriou (2000) 112 A Crim R 95; [2000] VSCA 91. 812. Bierkowski v Pearson (1971) 18 FLR 110 at 11; R v Whittingham (1988) 49 SASR 67. 813. R v Summers [1990] 1 Qd R 92. 814. Goncalves v The Queen (1997) 99 A Crim R 193. 815. Walters v The Queen [1969] 2 AC 26 at 30. The same comment applies to a direction that “you must feel sure”: R v Hepworth [1955] 2 QB 600 at 603 per Goddard LCJ. 816. Murray v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 193; 189 ALR 40; A Child v Western Australia (2005) 153 A Crim R 406; [2005] WASCA 91. 817. Liberato v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 507 at 515. 818. R v Topalidis [1999] QCA 376; R v Taylor [2001] 2 Qd R 23; [2001] QCA 96; Rodd v The Queen [2000] WASCA 329; Crisafio v The Queen (2003) 27 WAR 169. 819. Hargraves v The Queen (2011) 85 ALJR 1254; [2011] HCA 44 (criticism rejected in this case). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Circumstantial proof [A.106] A circumstantial case820 must be assessed as a whole, not piecemeal.821 “Sometimes it will be the united force of all the circumstances … that will be crucial”:822 My Lords, in dealing with circumstantial evidence, we have to consider the weight that is to be given to the united force of all the circumstances put together. You may have a ray of light so feeble that by itself it will do little to elucidate a dark corner. But on the other hand, you may have a number of rays, each of them insufficient, but all converging and brought to bear upon the same point, and, when united, producing a body of illumination which will clear away the darkness which you are endeavouring to dispel.823

In R v Aboud824 the jury was correctly told to treat evidence about the origin of phone calls to a murder victim as merely one element in a “circumstantial matrix”. Circumstantial cases have been described and distinguished as: (i) “strands in a rope”;825 and (ii) “links in a chain”.826 When the “rope” analogy applies, some circumstantial items may be rejected, while those remaining may still support a conviction. But when the “chain” analogy applies, a failure of one “link” is necessarily a failure of the “chain”, and a negative answer must follow.827 The link in question must be proved “beyond reasonable doubt”.828 Clearly an issue of identity is a vital link in a “chain”.829 When appropriate, the summing up must clearly identify the indispensable link or links.830 But it is unnecessary to regale a

820. Circumstantial relevance is examined in [A.130]ff. 821. Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; [1990] HCA 56 at 579 and 593 (CLR); Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234; R v Ketchup [1982] Qd R 732; R v Ngo (2001) 122 A Crim R 467; R v Glover [2002] NSWCCA 376; McLeod v Greer [2003] WASCA 199; R v Saad (2005) 156 A Crim R 533; [2005] VSCA 249; R v Hillier (2007) 172 A Crim R 73; [2007] HCA 13; R v Farquharson (2009) 26 VR 410; [2009] VSCA 307; Davidson v The Queen (2009) 75 NSWLR 150; 195 A Crim R 406; [2009] NSWCCA 150; Farquharson v The Queen (2012) 36 VR 538; [2012] VSCA 296. This applies to admissions by conduct: NAD v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 2. 822. Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87; [1988] HCA 39 at [94] per curiam; Seeley International Pty Ltd v Jeffrey [2013] VSCA 288 at [43]. 823. Belhaven and Stenton Peerage [1875] 1 AC 278 at 279 per Lord Cairns; cited with approval by Dawson J (with whom Toohey and Gaudron JJ agreed) in Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; [1990] HCA 56 at 580 (CLR). 824. [2003] QCA 499. 825. R v Exail (1866) 4 F & F 922 at 929 per Pollock CB; R v Fowler (2003) 151 A Crim R 166; [2003] NSWCCA 321. 826. R v Jones [1993] 1 Qd R 676. 827. Christie v The Queen [2005] WASCA 55; Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; [1990] HCA 56; R v Merritt [1999] NSWCCA 29; Davidson v The Queen (2009) 75 NSWLR 150; 195 A Crim R 406; [2009] NSWCCA 150. 828. R v Farquharson (2009) 26 VR 410; [2009] VSCA 307. 829. As in Hasson v Police Department of Western Australia [2006] WASC 207. 830. Minniti v The Queen (2006) 159 A Crim R 394; 196 FLR 431; [2006] NSWCCA 30.

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jury with the “chain theory” when the “rope” analogy applies,831 and in that event, a circumstantial fact need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt.832 Yet the “rope” theory is not without difficulties of its own. It has been pointed out that a collection of facts that are merely “probable” logically increases the risk of error: With any chain of circumstantial evidence the chances of error in the conclusion arise first from the chances of error in each fact … forming the steps and, second, from the chance of error in reasoning to the conclusion … The possibilities of error at all points must be combined and assessed together.833

However, the robust orthodoxy is that a circumstantial case should be assessed as a whole. There may be an exception in trials for sexual offences with respect to relationship evidence (“uncharged acts”).834 Facts relating to sentence [A.107] Questions of fact relating to sentence are decided by the judge alone. Formerly Queensland courts applied the civil standard,835 while other Australian jurisdictions preferred the criminal.836 Queensland adopted the criminal standard in 1999,837 but one year later the civil test was reinstated by s 132C, noted at [132C.2] – [132C.3]. (Distinguish prior offences tendered under s 15(2), to which the criminal standard applies.)838 Jurisdictional facts [A.108] If the prosecution has to prove that a crime was committed in a particular Australian State or Territory, the civil standard applies.839 831. Horrell v The Queen (1997) 138 FLR 222; R v TN (2005) 153 A Crim R 129; [2005] QCA 160; Okafor v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 147; Munmurrie v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 184; Stubley v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 36; Austic v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 110. However, see R v Sadler (2008) 20 VR 69; [2008] VSCA 198 (when used to show propensity); R v Burns (2009) 103 SASR 514; [2009] SASC 105 (evidence of flight); R v M, RB (2007) 172 A Crim R 73; [2007] SASC 207, where it is said that proof beyond reasonable doubt should be required where the evidence of the uncharged acts is “intertwined with the charged acts”. 832. Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; [1993] HCA 63 at 210 (CLR); Hedgeland v State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 97 at [80]. 833. Morrison v Jenkins (1949) 80 CLR 626 at 644 per Dixon CJ; TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 53 ALJR 267; 23 ALR 345 at 270-273 (ALJR), 350-356 (ALR); Eggleston, “The Philosophy of Truth” (1991) 65 ALJ 130; Eggleston, “Wigmore, Fact-Finding and Probability” (1990) 15 Mon LR 370; Tribe, “Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process” (1971) 84 Harv Law Rev 1810; Williams, “The Mathematics of Proof” [1979] Crim LR 297-308 and 340-54; Eggleston, “The Probability Debate” [1980] Crim LR 678. 834. See [A.136]. 835. R v Jobson [1989] 2 Qd R 464; R v Nardozzi [1995] 2 Qd R 87. 836. R v Martin [1981] 2 NSWLR 640; Van Reesema v Flavel (1992) 57 SASR 590; R v Aloia [1983] WAR 133. 837. R v Morrison [1999] 1 Qd R 397. 838. R v Weininger (2000) 159 FLR 238; see also [A.105]. 839. Thompson v The Queen (1989) 169 CLR 1. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Standard when onus on defence [A.109] When the legal onus is on the defence in a criminal case, the civil standard applies.840 Standard on voir dire [A.110] In any proceeding, civil or criminal, the standard of proof on a voir dire is the balance of probabilities.841 Contempt [A.111] The standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt,842 whether the contempt be classed as criminal or civil. In Waverley Council v Tovir Investments Pty Ltd (No 3)843 it was said that, apart from procedural differences, the distinction between civil and criminal contempt is largely illusory, considering that the standard of proof is the same in each case. In McGuirk v University of New South Wales,844 the criminal standard was applied to disobedience of an order of the court to refrain from communicating with persons named, although such conduct is sometimes described as a civil contempt.845

840. R v Carr-Briant [1943] KB 607; Thomas v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 584 at 602; R v Gardiner [1981] Qd R 394; Corry v Dorron; Ex parte Corry [1985] 1 Qd R 31. 841. Wendo v The Queen (1963) 109 CLR 559; R v Hagan [1966] Qd R 219; R v Stafford (1976) 13 SASR 392; R v Warren [1982] 2 NSWLR 360; R v Ella (1990) 100 FLR 442; Pollard v The Queen (1992) 176 CLR 177 at 196; R v Buzzacott (2010) 107 SASR 564; [2010] SASC 234. 842. Keeley v Brooking (1979) 143 CLR 162; Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525; R v Metal Trades Employers’ Association; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union, Australian Section (1951) 82 CLR 208 at 253-255; Consolidated Press Ltd v McRae (1955) 93 CLR 325; Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan (1965) 112 CLR 483 at 489; Hinch v Attorney-General for Victoria (1987) 164 CLR 15 at 49; McGuirk v University of New South Wales [2010] NSWSC 448 at [12]-[13]; Seymour v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2006) 234 ALR 350; 95 ALD 301; [2006] FCA 965; Aztech Science Pty Ltd v Atlanta Aerospace (Woy Woy) Pty Ltd (2008) 187 A Crim R 245; [2008] NSWSC 908; R v Hinch [2013] VSC 520. Is the application brought in the public interest for punishment, or is it remedial or coercive? See Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Sigalla (No 4) [2011] NSWSC 62. 843. [2013] NSWLEC 35. 844. [2010] NSWSC 448. 845. Circuit Finance Australia v Sobbi [2010] NSWSC 912.

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Civil penalties [A.112] Generally the civil standard applies.846 But there may be a question whether particular legislation requires the criminal standard of proof.847 The rule in Dietrich v The Queen848 does not apply to proceedings for a civil penalty.849 Proof in disciplinary tribunals [A.113] While disciplinary tribunals may impose sanctions more severe than many criminal penalties, the standard of proof is reasonable satisfaction, bearing in mind the gravity of the charge, the inherent probability or improbability of the accusation, and the likely consequences if it is established.850 Proof in civil proceedings [A.114] The standard of proof in civil proceedings is commonly expressed as “the balance of probabilities”. The same standard applies to the proof of circumstantial facts and inferences from them.851 “A [civil] court … is not engaged in ascertaining ultimate verities”:852 The difference between the criminal standard of proof … and the civil is that in the former the facts must be such as to exclude reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence, while in the latter you need only circumstances raising a more probable inference in favour of what is alleged … [I]t is enough that the circumstances appearing in the evidence give rise to a reasonable and definite inference … [In that event] though the conclusion may fall short of certainty, it is not to regarded as mere conjecture or surmise.853

846. Chief Executive Offıcer of Customs v Labrador Liquor Wholesale Pty Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 161 at [114], [135], [139]; Peter Williamson Pty Ltd v Capitol Motors Ltd (1982) 61 FLR 257 at 264; 41 ALR 613 at 620, but with due regard to the consequences of an adverse finding: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TF Woollam & Son Pty Ltd (No 2) (2011) 278 ALR 618; [2011] FCA 1216 at [6]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TF Woollam & Son Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 973 at [8]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey (2011) 278 ALR 618; [2011] FCA 717 at [101]. 847. Chief Executive Offıcer of Customs v Labrador Liquor Wholesale Pty Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 161; Queensland v Ward [2004] 1 Qd R 429; [2003] QCA 366 at [40], [44]. 848. (1992) 177 CLR 292; see [21P.1]. 849. Elliott v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2004) 48 ACSR 621; 205 ALR 594; [2004] VSCA 54. 850. Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361-362; In re a Solicitor; Ex parte the Prothonotary (1939) 56 WN (NSW) 53; R v White; Ex parte Byrnes (1963) 109 CLR 665; Mercer v Pharmacy Board of Victoria [1968] VR 72; NSW Bar Association v Evatt (1968) 117 CLR 177 at 183-184; Gad v Health Care Complaints Commission [2002] NSWCA 111; Adamson v Queensland Law Society Inc [1990] 1 Qd R 498; Eckersley v Medical Board of Queensland [1998] 2 Qd R 453 at 458; Legal Profession Act 2004, s 679; Legal Services Commisioner v Hansen [2008] QLPT 7. 851. Chapman v Cole (2006) 15 VR 150; [2006] VSCA 70. 852. Hickman v Peacey [1945] AC 304 at 318. The same may be said of criminal proceedings: see [A.4]. 853. Luxton v Vines (1952) 85 CLR 352 at 358; Hamer, “The Civil Standard of Proof: Uncertainty, Probability, Belief and Justice” (1994) 16 Syd LR 506. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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It is not necessary to exclude every reasonable hypothesis that suggests a different conclusion.854 But if the evidence is evenly balanced, the affirmative case fails.855 It is not merely a question of whose evidence is preferred; the proponent’s evidence must satisfy the onus and meet the appropriate standard of proof.856 The civil standard is not satisfied by a guess between two “possible explanations” for an accident, one favouring the plaintiff, and the other the defendant.857 However, a verdict based on an exquisite series of inferences was upheld in Progressive Recycling Pty Ltd v Eversham.858 “Reasonable satisfaction” may better describe the civil standard than “balance of probabilities”859 because, in practice, if not in theory, the civil standard varies according to the gravity of the allegation (particularly fraud860), its inherent probability (or improbability) and the consequences of an affirmative finding.861 The more improbable the event alleged, the stronger must be the evidence that it did in fact occur before the probability of its occurrence will be accepted.862 The trial judge in Palios Meegan & Nicholson Holdings Pty Ltd v Shore863 erred in failing to refer explicitly to Briginshaw v Briginshaw before finding that a solicitor who failed to provide necessary and basic advice covered up his error by persuading the respondent to sign false acknowledgments. Other pertinent questions may be: How easily can this kind of allegation be made? How difficult is it to rebut?864 For example, in a claim against a deceased estate, or against a Nominal Defendant,865 it may be significant that the plaintiff is the only surviving 854. Director General of Community Services; Re Sophie [2008] NSWCA 250 at [67]; Nguyen v Cosmopolitan Homes [2008] NSWCA 246. 855. Nesterczuk v Mortimore (1965) 115 CLR 140; Gaetani v Trustees of the Christian Brothers [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-156. 856. Ibrahim v Police [2012] SASC 231 at [59]. 857. Miller v Livingstone Shire Council [2003] QCA 29. 858. (2003) 40 MVR 141; [2003] NSWCA 268. 859. However, these expressions do not denote two different standards; there is no third standard of proof: G v H (1994) 181 CLR 387 at 380; 124 ALR 353 at 362; [1994] HCA 48; Gianoutsos v Glykis (2006) 65 NSWLR 539; [2006] NSWCCA 137. The Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 140 effectively adopts the Briginshaw test: Ashby v Slipper [2014] FCAFC 15 at [71]. 860. Oldfield v Keogh (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 206 at 211. 861. Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361-362; Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517 at 521-522; Willcox v Sing [1985] 2 Qd R 66; Luxton v Vines (1952) 85 CLR 352 at 358; Creswick v Creswick [2010] QSC 339 at [113]; Jeans v Cleary [2006] NSWSC 647 at [28] (forgery); Bale v Mills (2011) 282 ALR 336; [2011] NSWCA 226 at [23]; Hamer, “The Civil Standard of Proof – Uncertainty, Probability, Belief and Justice” (1994) 16 Syd LR 506; Hodgson, “The Scales of Justice: Probability and Proof in Legal Fact-finding” (1995) 69 ALJ 731. 862. Re Dellow’s Will Trusts [1964] 1 WLR 451 at 455. 863. (2010) 108 SASR 31; [2010] SASCFC 21. 864. Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowper 63; 98 ER 969 at 65 (Cowper); In re Hodgson (1885) 31 Ch D 177 at 183; Plunkett v Bull (1915) 19 CLR 544 at 548-549 per Isaacs J. The rationale in Blatch v Archer includes the rule in Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298, as well the application noted in this paragraph: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229. 865. Theden v Nominal Defendant [2004] QSC 310 at [34]; Turner v Nominal Defendant [2008] QSC 138 at [26].

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witness to a transaction which, if proved, benefits him or her considerably.866 In such cases the evidence “should be weighed according to the power of the party to produce it”.867 In the absence of some reliable contemporary record, or other corroborative material, a party relying on oral evidence to prove fraud or deliberate deception faces serious difficulties.868 Nevertheless evidence of fraud in a civil case need not attain the criminal standard.869 Cogent proofs are required in an action upon an alleged oral contract,870 or where oral misrepresentation is alleged.871 In a sucession case the evidence was insufficient to support an allegation of unlawful killing.872 But despite the emphasis on probabilities, civil courts may take into account possibilities recognised by medical and other expert witnesses.873 But permissive as the civil standard has become, particularly in negligence cases, “mere speculation” is illegitimate.874 In the eponymous case of Welfare v Nominal Defendant (Queensland)875 (rivalling the High Court’s egregious decision in Manley v Alexander)876 Mr Welfare was hit by an unidentified car as he slept in the middle of a dark country road, clad only in a football jersey. In keeping with the modern negligence industry, the trial judge found that the driver should have seen the “unsuntanned portions” of Mr Welfare’s anatomy in time to avoid the highway sleeper. The only obstacle to this view was a complete lack of evidence that there were such “portions” or that (if they existed) they were so positioned as to attract a driver’s attention. Accordingly, the Full Court reduced the award, but not to zero. Enough remained, one hopes, to reimburse Mr Welfare’s advisers. The Welfare spirit infuses Wyong Shire Council v Shirt,877 where we are told that the only risk not foreseeable is one that is “far-fetched or

866. Dunlop Holding Ltd’s Application [1979] RPC 523 at 544; Moller v Bruce-Sanders [1962] QWN 12. 867. Hampton Court Limited v Crooks (1957) 97 CLR 367 at 371 per Dixon CJ. 868. Watson v Foxman (1995) 49 NSWLR 315. 869. Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 67 ALJR 170 at 170-171; [1992] HCA 66; Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517 at 519-521; Jeans v Cleary [2006] NSWSC 647 (allegation of forgery). 870. Ivanovski v McConnell (2009) 14 BPR 27,687; [2009] NSWSC 1036. 871. James Hardie Industries NV v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2010) 274 ALR 85; 81 ASCR 1; [2010] NSWCA 332. 872. Re Thomson [2015] QSC 29. 873. St George Club Ltd v Hines (1961) 35 ALJR 106; Fernandez v Tubemakers of Australia Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 190; McDonald (t/as BE McDonald Transport) v Girkaid Pty Ltd [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-768; [2004] NSWCA 297. 874. Hollingham v Head (1858) 4 CB (NS) 388; 140 ER 1135 at 1136; Maitland-Smith v Path Transit Pty Ltd (2009) 52 MVR 185; [2009] WASCA 46. 875. (1988) 7 MVR 28; see also Impagnatiello v Campbell (2003) 6 VR 416; [2003] VSCA 154 (whether breath testing instrument an “authorised” type). 876. (2005) 80 ALJR 413; [2005] HCA 79. 877. (1980) 146 CLR 40 at 47 per Mason J. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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fanciful”. However, antidotes were applied, more or less successfully, in Agar v Hyde,879 Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd880 and Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby Club.881 Imputations of criminality in civil cases [A.115] The standard of proof remains the civil standard when it is alleged that: • “X” cannot inherit the estate of “Y” because “X” murdered “Y”;882 • an insurance policy is avoided by the insured’s arson883 or suicide;884 • defamatory statements were justified because the plaintiff repeatedly bribed a minister of the Crown;885 or • “child abuse” is an issue in custody proceedings.886

Weight of evidence: corroboration, Jones v Dunkel Corroboration [A.116] Corroboration is independent887 evidence supporting a material part of a witness’s testimony, and tending to identify (if need be) the actor in question.888 Corroborative evidence must be admissible in its own right,889 but it need not support the entire story,890 let alone establish a charge beyond reasonable doubt.891 In Chidiac v The Queen892 two out of three items of evidence were weak, but the third (correspondence of the accused’s phone number with a note 878. Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40 at [13] per Mason J. See also Nagle v Rottnest Island Authority (1993) 177 CLR 423 (people with a duty of care to “X” should be aware that he may not take proper care for his own safety). 879. (2000) 201 CLR 552. 880. (2002) 208 CLR 460. 881. (2004) 217 CLR 469. 882. Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691; Public Trustee of New South Wales v Fitter [2005] NSWSC 1188. 883. Sheldon v Sun Alliance Ltd (1989) 53 SASR 97. 884. Clark v NZI Life Ltd QLR 15 December 1990. 885. Thiess v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [1994] 1 Qd R 156. 886. T v P [2000] FLC 93-049. 887. Self-corroboration is a contradiction in terms: Lonergan v The Queen [1963] Tas SR 158 at 164; Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; [1993] HCA 63 at 198 (CLR). 888. R v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658; Doney v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207; R v Buck [1983] WAR 372; (1982) 8 A Crim R 208. 889. R v Buck [1983] WAR 372; (1982) 8 A Crim R 208. 890. R v Kalajzich (1989) 39 A Crim R 415; R v Sakail [1993] 1 Qd R 312 at 317; Doney v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207; Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; [1993] HCA 63 at 215 (CLR); Western Australia v Coates [2007] WASC 307; R v Kuster (2008) 21 VR 407; 191 A Crim R 449; [2008] VSCA 261. Indeed, it may be consistent with innocence, as well as with guilt: R v Barrow [2001] 2 Qd R 525. 891. R v Apps (unreported, Vic Sup Ct, 26 May 1998); R v Franco (2009) 105 SASR 446; [2009] SASC 370; R v Ferguson (2009) 24 VR 531; [2009] VSCA 198. 892. (1991) 171 CLR 432.

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he gave to an accomplice) was corroborative. In R v Massey893 the defendant was charged with sexual offences against his stepdaughter. It was enough that the complainant’s mother confirmed the fact of intercourse, without proving absence of consent. (Corroboration is no longer necessary in cases of that kind: see [A.41].) Corroborative evidence may be partly consistent with the other side’s version,894 but mere evidence of opportunity is not corroborative.895 It is for the judge to decide whether evidence is potentially corroborative. The jury must be clearly told that, if they accept it, it is independent evidence tending to show that the event did happen and that the defendant was its author.896 Acceptance or rejection is a matter for the jury.897 There is no set formula for instructions to the jury in such cases, and it is not essential that the word “corroboration” be used.898 Corroboration is desirable when it is much easier to present evidence on one side than on the other, as, for example, where a vital witness for the other side has died.899 Uncorroborated evidence against a deceased estate,900 or to prove an oral agreement,901 should be carefully scrutinised. There are now very few cases in which corroboration is mandatory, and old rules requiring corroboration “as a matter of practice”902 have been overtaken by s 632 of the Criminal Code.903 But independent support904 for keenly contested evidence retains its practical value, and while s 632 does away with “stereotypical assumptions”,905 it does not forbid judicial warnings tailored to the case in hand,906 such as long delay in reporting a sexual offence.907

893. [1997] 1 Qd R 404. 894. R v Kalajzich (1989) 39 A Crim R 415; R v Kerim [1988] 1 Qd R 426; R v McK [1986] 1 Qd R 476; R v Hunt [2002] SASC 195 (FC); R v Bryce [1994] 1 Qd R 77. 895. R v Colless (1964) 84 WN (NSW) (Pt 1) 55; Eade v The King (1924) 34 CLR 154. (Note, however, that there was additional evidence in each case.) 896. R v McLachlan [1999] 2 VR 553. 897. R v D [1992] QCA 141. 898. R v Ferguson (2009) 24 VR 531; [2009] VSCA 198. 899. Clune v Collins Angus and Robertson Publishers Pty Ltd (1992) 25 IPR 246. 900. In re Hodgson (1885) 31 Ch D 177 at 183; Plunkett v Bull (1915) 19 CLR 544 at 548-549. 901. Don Hodge Motors Pty Ltd v Lecos Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, 22 October 1990). 902. In such cases uncorroborated evidence could be accepted, but only after a warning that it might be dangerous to do so. 903. See [Q.107]. 904. R v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658; DPP v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729. 905. Robinson v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 162 at 168. 906. Tully v The Queen (2006) 230 CLR 234; [2006] HCA 56 at [43]. Although Tully’s appeal was dismissed by majority, the case provides examples of circumstances that may call for special and specific warnings: see Kirby J at [57]; eg, a potentially unreliable witness: R v Irvine [2009] VSCA 239. 907. R v MBX [2013] QCA 214. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[A.117] There is no a priori limit to the forms that corroboration may take. Admissions by words908 or conduct, such as flight,909 may be highly probative. Other examples are “guilty denial”,910 attempts to bribe, or to corrupt or intimidate witnesses.911 It may consist of real evidence, such as injuries consistent with an assault,912 or a complainant’s physical distress soon after an incident, absent any sign that it was feigned or caused by something irrelevant.913 Collusion aside, separate and highly similar experiences of several witnesses with the same person are mutually corroborative.914 Failure to call material witness: Jones v Dunkel [A.118] The weight of a party’s case may be enhanced if an opponent fails, without due explanation,915 to call a material916 witness who is more readily available to the opponent.917 There must be evidence which the opponent is required to explain or contradict.918 In O’Meara v Dominican Fathers919 the plaintiff was injured when he fell from a balustrade on the defendant’s premises. He testified that fellow-students often sat in the same position, and the defendant 908. Hobbs v Davies; Ex parte Davies [1943] QSR 131 (letters to complainant in affiliation case). 909. Evidence of flight after a charge is laid may be enough, although allowance must be made for any explanation that does not signify “consciousness of guilt”: R v Melrose [1989] 1 Qd R 572. See also R v Taylor (2004) 8 VR 213; [2004] VSCA 98 (frequent phone calls to complainant, and solo meetings). However, the mere co-existence of an innocent explanation does not make the evidence inadmissible: R v Power (1996) 87 A Crim R 407 at 409; Koch v The Queen [2011] VSCA 435 at [13]. 910. Kenny v Hornberg (1963) 57 QJPR 139. 911. R v Nanette [1982] VR 81. 912. R v Gallagher (1986) 41 SASR 73; R v Berrill [1982] Qd R 508. 913. R v Roissetter [1984] 1 Qd R 477; R v Major [1998] 1 Qd R 317; R v Green (unreported, Qld Sup Ct CA, 14 December 1994); R v Blayney (2003) 87 SASR 354; [2003] SASC 405. Distress was not corroborative in R v Williams (2008) 192 A Crim R 218; [2008] QCA 411 because of a considerable lapse of time. 914. DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421; R v WRC (2002) 130 A Crim R 89; Tasmania v Farmer (2004) 148 A Crim R 99; [2004] TASSC 104; R v JCM [2007] QDC 211; Reeves v The Queen [2013] VSCA 311. Collusion must be ruled out: Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292, which is, however, subject to s 132A. 915. The absence of the plaintiff was not explained by admissible evidence in Nominal Defendant (NSW) v Cotrip Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 10 MVR 511. Disproportionate costs of calling the absent witnesses may be a valid consideration: Re Kit Digital Australia Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1547 at [12]. 916. The Crown witnesses in question were not “material” in Callander v The Queen (2004) 144 NTR 1; [2004] NTCCA 5. 917. Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 312 (approved West v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1981) 148 CLR 62 at 69); Earle v Castlemaine District Community Hospital [1974] VR 722; Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191 at 201; West v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1981) 148 CLR 62 at 69; Sims v Celcast Pty Ltd (1998) 71 SASR 142; Gold Coast City Council v Hall [2000] QCA 92 at [9] – [10]; Ruthol Pty Ltd v Mills (2003) 11 BPR 20,793; Mead v Mead (2007) 81 ALJR 1185; 235 ALR 197; [2007] HCA 25; Cadwallader v Bajco Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 328; Mead v Mead (2007) 81 ALJR 1185; 235 ALR 197; [2007] HCA 25; Police v Kyriacou (2009) 103 SASR 243; [2009] SASC 66; Whitlam v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (1992) 27 NSWLR 437 at 448-450; Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361; [2011] HCA 11. 918. MSPR Pty Ltd v Advanced Braking Technology Ltd [2013] NSWCA 416. 919. (2003) 153 ACTR 1; [2003] ACTCA 24.

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called no evidence that it was unaware of the risky practice. Jones v Dunkel was applied. The same occurred in Timbs v Shoalhaven City Council,920 where the plaintiff was struck by a falling tree, and the defendant failed to call an inspector whom it employed to minimise dangers of that kind. In Groves v Groves921 two handwriting experts gave evidence for party “A”. Two similar experts had examined the document for party “B”, but he failed to call either of them. A failure to put certain questions to a witness who is called may have the same effect.922 But the failure is not a source of additional evidence923 – Jones v Dunkel cannot save a defective prima facie case.924 There are two rationales for Jones v Dunkel.925 One is that an unexplained failure to call a material witness warrants an inference that he or she would not have assisted the party concerned.926 A more robust, but less favoured, explanation is that the omission entitles a court to find, more confidently, that a disputed fact exists. The difference, if any, may elude a non-lawyer’s mind, but it is emphasised in Cornwall v Rowan.927 [A.119] A Jones v Dunkel submission may fail if the absent witness would probably be hostile towards the party in question,928 or is equally accessible to each party,929 or if the party against whom the argument is raised simply does not know what the witness will say. Jones v Dunkel does not oblige a party to call a witness “blind”.930 There was no advance knowledge to warrant an adverse inference in Cornwall v Rowan.931 On the other hand, the excuse that a party had insufficient funds to call a material witness in a personal injury case was rejected 920. [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-738; (2004) 132 LGERA 397; [2004] NSWCA 81. 921. [2013] QSC 277 at [115] – [120]. 922. Commercial Union Assurance Co of Australia Ltd v Ferrcom Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 389; 6 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-042 at 418 (NSWLR); R v GEC [2001] 3 VR 334. 923. Gaskell v Denkas Building Services Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 35. 924. Uzabeaga v Town of Cottesloe [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-739; [2004] WASCA 57; King v Owners Corporation Strata Plan 2311 (2006) 3 DCLR (NSW) 271; [2006] NSWDC 44; Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 308, 312, 320-321; Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 121; [2000] HCA 18 at [53]; Hesse Blind Roller Company Pty Ltd v Hamitovski [2006] VSCA 121 at [28]. 925. Unilever Australia Ltd v Karounos [2001] FCA 1717. 926. Brandi v Mingot (1976) 12 ALR 551 at 559; Condos v Clycut Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 200 at [84]; Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361; [2011] HCA 11 at [64]. 927. (2004) 90 SASR 269; [2004] SASC 384 at [414]. 928. Fabre v Arenales (1992) 27 NSWLR 437; R v Ugolini (1989) 51 SASR 303; Ghazal v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1992) 29 NSWLR 336. 929. Claremont Petroleum NL v Cummings (1992) 110 ALR 239; John Briscoe Discount Store Pty Ltd v Securecam Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 794; Smith v Samuels (1976) 12 SASR 573 at 581; Shum Yip Properties Development Pty Ltd v Chatswood Investment and Development Co Pty Ltd (2002) 40 ACSR 619 at [64]. That was not the case in Earle v Castlemaine District Community Hospital [1974] VR 722; Stora Enso Australia Pty Ltd v CPI Group Ltd [2007] ATPR (Digest) 46-270; [2006] FCA 1685. 930. Fabre v Arenales (1992) 27 NSWLR 437 at 449-450 per Mahoney JA; Bell Group Ltd (In liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 70 ACSR 1; [2008] WASC 239 at [1004]. 931. (2004) 90 SASR 269; [2004] SASC 384 at [432]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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on the basis that most personal injury plaintiffs are “carried” by their solicitors.932 In the “mega-litigation” of Bell Group Ltd (In liq) v Wespac Banking Corporation (No 9)933 Owen J declared that he would approach the rule in a “realistic way”, considering that a witness list cannot and should not be extended ad infinitum. An unexplained failure by both parties may give rise to competing inferences, to be assessed in the light of available evidence.934 The rule is applicable to multiple parties whose interests coincide,935 and is available in proceedings for a civil penalty.936 Jones v Dunkel – criminal cases [A.120] In principle, Jones v Dunkel is applicable to criminal proceedings.937 For example, it may be invoked against the prosecution if it fails to call a witness to an allegedly successful “identification parade”.938 An unexplained failure by the prosecution to call a material witness is apt to cause a miscarriage of justice.939 A Jones v Dunkel direction should have been given in R v Tang.940 The question whether a Jones v Dunkel inference should be drawn against the defendant in civil penalty proceedings was considered, but not decided, in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hobbs.941 [A.121] Considerable caution is required when the rule is invoked against an accused who does not offer evidence,942 lest the onus of proof be reversed.943 Indeed, there may be few cases in which the defence is better placed than the

932. Klein v SBD Services Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 134. 933. (2008) 70 ACSR 1; [2008] WASC 239 at [1001]. The trial lasted 404 days, with 290 witnesses and documents generated by over 3800 authors. 934. Brandi v Mingot (1976) 12 ALR 551 at 560. 935. Galea v Bagtrans Pty Ltd [2011] Aust Torts Reports 82-078; [2010] NSWCA 350. 936. Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229. 937. R v Buckland [1977] 2 NSWLR 452 at 458-459; Best v The Queen [2012] VSCA 277. 938. Berrell v Gill (1993) 113 FLR 333; see also Taylor v Hayes (1990) 53 SASR 282. 939. R v Jensen [2009] VSCA 266; but distinguish a case in which the prosecution genuinely regards a witness as dishonest or unreliable: Police v Kyriacou (2009) 103 SASR 243; [2009] SASC 66; Diehm v Director of Public Prosecutions (Nauru) (2013) 88 ALJR 34; 203 ALR 42; [2013] HCA 42 (corroborative witness omitted, but no substantial injustice). 940. [2003] NSWCCA 357. 941. [2012] NSWSC 1276. 942. It is rarely appropriate to give a Jones v Dunkel direction in relation to an omission by the defence to call witnesses: Dyers v The Queen (2002) 210 CLR 285 at 291; R v Navarolli [2010] 1 Qd R 27; [2009] QCA 49. 943. R v Scott (2000) 112 A Crim R 543; R v Baker (2000) 78 SASR 103; 118 A Crim R 150.

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Crown to call a particular witness.944 It is no longer the law that an accused’s failure to testify may fortify the prosecution case (the “Weissensteiner direction”).945 [A.122] A Weissensteiner direction should now seldom, if ever, be given, because it endangers the presumption of innocence and the right to silence.946 In Queensland, however, it is said that a direction that it is “less unsafe to infer guilt than it would otherwise have been” may still be permissible in a circumstantial case if a conviction could safely be entered.947 It must be stressed that an accused’s silence is no admission.948 An appropriate direction might be: The fact that the accused has not given evidence or called witnesses is no admission of guilt on his part. His silence cannot displace or alter the burden of proof on the Crown to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. There is no obligation on him to give evidence, and the fact that he has not done so must not be used by you to fill any gaps or remove any weaknesses in the prosecution’s case.

However, a co-accused retains the right to comment upon another accused’s failure to testify.949 As to an appropriate direction when the accused’s evidence at an earlier trial is tendered, see R v Aoukar.950 Use Jones v Dunkel in moderation [A.123] Warnings against the over-enthusiastic use of Jones v Dunkel appear in Steele v Mirror Newspapers Ltd951 and Liaweena (NSW) Pty Ltd v McWilliams Wines Pty Ltd.952 In Liaweena it was held that no adverse inference should be drawn from the omission to call a company secretary to describe negotiations for a contract. Although the secretary did have some knowledge of the matter, another employee who knew more was called, and that was sufficient. Kirby P observed:

944. The wife of the accused might be a special case, but only if it appears that she can assist the inquiry: R v Brennan (1998) 101 A Crim R 214. See also R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405 (direction given when no evidence denying voice identification). 945. R v Young [1969] Qd R 417; R v Haycock [1989] 2 Qd R 56; Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217; R v Demeter [1995] 2 Qd R 626. 946. RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620; Dyers v The Queen (2002) 210 CLR 285. Compare the position in England: “[T]he court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the offence charge, may draw such inferences as appear proper from the failure of the accused to give evidence” (Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK), s 35(3)). 947. R v DAH (2004) 150 A Crim R 14; [2004] QCA 419. 948. Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50 at 74; R v Wilson (2005) 62 NSWLR 346; [2005] NSWCCA 20. 949. R v Wickham (1971) 55 Cr App R 199. 950. [2011] SASCFC 96. 951. [1974] 2 NSWLR 348 at 377 per Samuels JA. 952. [1991] ASC 56-038 at 56,617; a similar case is Apand Pty Ltd v Kettle Chip Co Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 474; [1994] ATPR 41-353. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Care must be taken … lest an over-exuberant application of [Jones v Dunkel] … forces upon litigants … the tedious tender of innumerable witnesses … where one would suffice, out of fear of later facing arguments based upon … that case.

For example, if five people attend a relevant meeting, and only some of them are called, a Jones v Dunkel inference does not arise unless it appears that the evidence of those not called would add something of significance.953 Before the rule can properly be invoked there must be evidence that calls for an answer.954 Jones v Dunkel is not, per se, a source of evidence.955

Rules of admissibility The principle of relevance [A.124] “Relevance” denotes a sufficient956 rational connection, direct or indirect, between information and a fact in issue (“ultimate fact”). A fact in issue is an essential ingredient of a prima facie case.957 Facts in issue are identified by the law defining the offence or cause of action, minus any issues eliminated by the pleadings or admissions before or during the trial.958 The issue to which evidence is said to be relevant must still be “alive” at the time of the tender959 or the material will be irrelevant and inadmissible. [A.125] Everything relevant is admissible unless it is excluded by another rule, based on some legal policy overriding the “best evidence” principle,960 such as the hearsay rule or a rule of privilege. It is an error of law to act on irrelevant material, or to ignore information that is relevant and admissible.961 If a piece of information, or an opinion, or an argument, can have no rational bearing upon a question for decision, it is irrelevant, and must be left out of further consideration. Otherwise, being relevant, just decision-making requires that it be taken into account.962

Direct relevance and res gesta [A.126] Direct relevance is usually self-evident, but not always so. What is conveniently called a “fact” may really be a series of events. To draw an analogy 953. Lennon v South Australia [2010] SASC 272. 954. Ronchi v Portland Smelter Services Ltd [2005] VSCA 83 at [81]; Cook’s Constructions Pty Ltd v Stork Food Systems Aust Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 179 at [51]. 955. Highup Pty Ltd (in liq) v Gubas (2014) 226 FCR 541; 102 ACSR 467; [2014] FCA 1170 at [33]. 956. “If we lived for a thousand years instead of 60 or 70, and every case were of sufficient importance … [we might] raise every possible inquiry as to the truth of statements made. But … mankind finds it to be impossible”: Attorney-General v Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch 91 at 105 per Rolfe B. 957. Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650 at [6]. 958. HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 at [4]. 959. See [A.61]; see also R v Horry [1949] NZLR 791. 960. As to be “best evidence” principle, see [A.11]. 961. Merivale Motel Investments Pty Ltd v Brisbane Exposition & Southbank Redevelopment Authority [1988] 2 Qd R 562. 962. McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; [2006] HCA 45 at [11] per Gleeson CJ and Kirby J.

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from the cinema, there may be a question whether a fact in issue, such as an assault or negligent conduct, fills twenty “frames” of the metaphorical “film”, or just two. Does an assault include a prior exchange of insults, or the reactions of bystanders?963 Do four robberies by the same person within a few hours constitute one event, so that evidence of each offence is direct evidence of the others?964 The res gesta doctrine may be seen as a concept comprising all the facts surrounding or accompanying an event in issue, or of facts so connected with it as to introduce it, explain it, or form with it one continuous event. A ruling on where an event or “transaction” begins and ends is a decision about the extent of the res gesta (plural: res gestae).965 As such, it is a decision about the limits of direct relevance in the case at bar. Criticism of the Latin tag aside,966 a res gesta ruling may have great practical importance. Much of the evidence in O’Leary v The King,967 had it not been classified as part of the res gesta, would have been circumstantial evidence of the accused’s attitude towards people other than the victim. In that event, it would have fallen foul of the rule against character evidence: see [A.134]. But according to the High Court it was evidence, not of other events, but of the murder in question: From the time on Saturday … when the prisoner and the party with him came under the influence of drink, right up to the conclusion of the scene in the early hours of the following Sunday morning … a connected series of events occurred which should be considered as one transaction … Without [that evidence] … the transaction of which the alleged murder formed an integral part could not be truly understood and … could only be presented as an unreal and not very intelligible event.968

[A.127] The res gesta concept is a principle of completeness.969 If a fact in issue is too narrowly defined, the testimonial picture of it will be incomplete, unintelligible, and perhaps incredible. Therefore a fact in issue is taken to include “all facts … which form constituent parts or ingredients of the transaction itself, or explain or make intelligible the course of conduct pursued”.970

963. Evidence of G’s demeanour towards P during police interview admitted: R v Gillard (2000) 78 SASR 279; reversed on other grounds: Gillard v The Queen (2003) 219 CLR 1. 964. R v Cobden (1862) 3 F & F 833; 176 ER 381; R v Sotheren (2001) 122 A Crim R 301; see also Samadi v The Queen (2008) 192 A Crim R 251; [2008] NSWCCA 330 (series of “spiking” drinks and sexual assaults). In CW v The Queen [2010] VSCA 288 (three fires lit in one night) the evidence was held cross-admissible, although res gesta was not mentioned, and striking similarity was not required. 965. O’Leary v The King (1946) 73 CLR 566; R v O’Malley [1964] Qd R 226; R v Etherington (1982) 32 SASR 230 (sexual abuse of stepdaughter one protracted event). 966. It has been called “a legal cloak for a variety of cases to which no formula of precision can be applied”: Homes v Newman [1931] 2 Ch 112 at 120 per Lord Tomlin; Odgers, “Res Gestae Regurgitated” (1989) UNSWLJ 262. 967. (1946) 73 CLR 566. 968. O’Leary v The King (1946) 73 CLR 566 at 577 per Dixon J. 969. The phrase is used in R v Vidic (1986) 43 SASR 176. It is criticised in, eg, Thompson v The Queen (1968) 117 CLR 313 at 317; R v Adam (1999) 47 NSWLR 267; [1999] NSWCCA 189, but the writer uses it unrepentantly. 970. Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 at 375 per Dixon J (emphasis added); O’Leary v The King (1946) 73 CLR 566 at 575 per Latham CJ, 577 per Dixon J: “[Otherwise] the transaction © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Discreditable acts other than the one charged may form part of a res gesta.971 Immediately after the collision in R v Vidic,972 the defendant assaulted the driver of the other car. Adding insult to injury, the defendant then deliberately rammed the car. That act of aggression was treated as part and parcel of the assault. [A.128] The present discussion excludes statements that are part of a res gesta. In R v Lambert,973 for example, evidence that a bystander called the defendant by name as he committed an assault was admitted as proof of identity. Such statements, when used testimonially, are now treated as exceptions to the hearsay rule:974 see [A.145]. [A.129] The boundaries of a res gesta may be extended by the definition of the offence charged,975 the breadth of an allegation976 or the manner in which a claim or defence is pleaded.977 Indirect or circumstantial relevance [A.130] Evidence is circumstantially relevant when it asserts facts that alone, or in combination with others, have a rational tendency to resolve a fact in issue.978 “It tends to prove a fact from which the existence of a fact in issue may be inferred.”979 Commonly it is a process of “cumulative, geometric progression eliminating other possibilities”.980 An exchange of emails showing a disposition to disregard the law of copyright may warrant an inference that breach of copyright ensued.981 The thrust of circumstantial reasoning is that, in view of secondary facts proved, and a perceived “common course of events” – a generalisation that forms the “silent major premise” of a tacit syllogism982 – the fact in issue probably does (or does not) exist.983 of which the alleged murder formed an integral part could not be truly understood and, isolated from it, could only be presented as an unreal and not very intelligible event”. See also R v Byrnes and Hopwood (1966) 20 ACSR 260 (a course of dealings by a company); R v Simmons [2015] QCA 194 at [50]. 971. Stubley v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 36. 972. (1986) 43 SASR 176; R v Jarc [2000] NTSC 80. 973. (2000) 111 A Crim R 564; [2000] QCA 141. 974. Pollitt v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 558. 975. For example, “maintaining a sexual relationship with a child”: R v Kemp (No 2) [1998] 2 Qd R 510. 976. R v Quaile [1988] 2 Qd R 103 (“trafficking” in drugs). 977. Hudson Crushed Metals Pty Ltd v Henry [1985] 1 Qd R 202 (defence of repudiation consisting of numerous minor breaches); Hales v Kerr [1908] 2 KB 601 (negligent “practice” alleged). 978. Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; [1990] HCA 56. 979. Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; [2001] HCA 72 at 597 per Gleeson CJ. 980. R v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 at 758 per Lord Simon. 981. Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Global Gaming Supplies Pty Ltd (2013) 87 ALJR 668; [2013] HCA 21. 982. For example, “A man who has a mistress and ill-treats his wife is more likely to kill his wife than a man in a happy marriage – Plomp acted in that way – Therefore (in the light of the other circumstances) Plomp is likely to have killed his wife”: cf Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234. 983. Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 at 375 per Dixon J; Re Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 193-194.

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The circumstantial proofs of murder in Plomp v The Queen984 survived two appeals. In Mutual Life Insurance Co of New York v Moss985 the question was whether an insured committed suicide. It was found that indeed he had; the proofs included theft from his employer, possession of dynamite, purchase of explosives after his crime was discovered, retirement to a lonely place, and the finding of his shattered body. Another illustration of circumstantial proof is the eponymous Loveden v Loveden,986 a comedy of manners in Regency England. R v Stephenson,987 on the other hand, is an example of insufficient relevance. Stephenson was a case of “motor car manslaughter”. Defence counsel sought to distract the jury by questions about blood-alcohol tests on occupants of the “victim” car. The question was disallowed because, while some passengers in that car had “liquor taken”, it was virtually certain that the driver was sober. Similarly, evidence that a person charged with reckless driving has failed two driving tests, and was driving without supervision at the time of the offence, is admissible only if those facts caused or contributed to his erratic driving at the time in question.988 Psychiatric evidence was insufficiently relevant in R v Stojovic.989 The role of common sense as the “silent major premise” in circumstantial reasoning may be illustrated by reference to Plomp v The Queen. Soon after his wife’s death by drowning, Plomp and his mistress sought to marry in a Registry Office. When Plomp was told that the ceremony could not take place until his wife’s death certificate was available, he angrily and gratuitously denied responsibility for her death. The tacit syllogism may be expressed as follows: • Silent major premise. A man who denies murdering his wife when not accused of doing so has a guilty conscience. • Minor premise. Plomp behaved like that. • Conclusion. Therefore it is probable that he is responsible for his wife’s death. In practice, there will usually be several other mutually supportive syllogisms, as in Plomp itself. Some of the circumstantial reasoning in Loveden v Loveden took this course: • Silent major premise. A man who takes another’s wife into a room alone and locks the door is up to no good. • Minor premise. The co-respondent did that with Mrs Loveden, the petitioner’s wife. • Conclusion. On that basis (and given the other circumstances) they were up to no good. [A.131] It is a common fallacy to suppose that circumstantial evidence is intrinsically inferior to direct evidence. The popular misconception that “circumstantial” means “weak” or “doubtful” is one that some prosecutors could 984. (1963) 110 CLR 234. 985. (1906) 4 CLR 311; [1906] HCA 70. 986. Loveden v Loveden (1810) 2 Hag Con 1. 987. [1976] VR 376. 988. R v O’Neale [1988] RTR 124. 989. [2004] VSCA 84. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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well anticipate in plain and simple language. Eyewitness identification is direct evidence, but it is notoriously prone to error (see [A.78]) and direct evidence of many kinds may come from unreliable witnesses. On the other hand, fingerprint and DNA evidence is “only circumstantial”, but see [A.69]. If a child suspected of stealing chocolates is found with chocolate on his or her hands and chocolate wrappers elsewhere, but stoutly denies responsibility, the direct evidence points to innocence, while the evidence of guilt is “only” circumstantial. Which would the reader prefer? “[P]articular pieces of evidence, standing alone, may seem trivial, and sometimes neutral, but in combination they may overwhelmingly point in a particular direction.”990 [A.132] Circumstantial evidence may precede the fact in issue, in which case it is called “prospectant”991 – for example, evidence of motive. In Johnson v Savage992 a finding of negligence was based on reckless driving shortly before the collision in question. In Carian v Elton,993 the fact that “X” was driving, and “Y” was riding pillion when a fairly short journey began, led to an inference that they were in the same positions when their motorcycle came to grief. The disputed evidence in Farquharson v The Queen994 was both prospectant and retrospectant. The appellant’s prior hostility to the dead children’s mother was followed by his “strange behaviour” after he drowned the children by driving his car into a dam. Alternatively, probative “retrospectant”.996 [A.133]

circumstances

may

be

contemporaneous995

or

Assessment of a circumstantial case is considered at [A.106].

Rule against propensity or “character” evidence “Ordinary” character evidence [A.134]

Consider the following forms of reasoning:

(a) “This man’s record means that he is probably guilty. He has stolen things before; so he is more likely than someone without that record to have stolen on this occasion.” (b) “The accused has housebreaking tools. Although he didn’t use them to commit this crime, they show that he’s a professional thief.”997 990. Carruthers v Connolly [1998] 1 Qd R 339 at 358 per Thomas J. 991. Duffus v Collins [1966] 1 NSWR 464 (manner of driving before reaching accident scene); contrast R v Horvath [1972] VR 533 (45-minute gap too great). 992. Johnson v Savage [2003] NSWCA 244. 993. [2006] NSWCA 168. 994.

(2012) 36 VR 538; [2012] VSCA 296.

995. Chapman v Walton (1833) 10 Bing 57; 131 ER 826 (practice in comparable businesses at the material time). 996. Selman v Minogue (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 280 (takings of $1,000 in May, some evidence they were not $2,500 in the month immediately preceding); Astway Pty Ltd v Gold Coast City Council (2008) 159 LGERA 335; [2008] QCA 73 (Council’s state of mind when resuming land). 997. R v Connolly [1991] 2 Qd R 171; Wran v The Queen (1968) 117 CLR 313 at 316; R v Williams [1983] 2 VR 579; (1983) 9 A Crim R 99.

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(c) “She has several awards for safe driving, so she probably wasn’t negligent this time.”998 Circumstantial evidence of this kind is not necessarily irrelevant. Indeed, it often accords with the “common course of human affairs”: It is not that the law regards [character] evidence as inherently irrelevant, but … if it were generally admitted jurors … would think that it was more relevant than it [is].999 Evidence that an accused person has a propensity to commit crimes of the sort with which he is charged … would ordinarily be regarded as relevant to the question whether he did commit the offence in question. Such evidence is excluded, not because it is irrelevant, but because it is likely to be unfairly prejudicial …1000

Therefore: It is the thesis of English law that the ingredients of a crime [or tort or breach of contract] are to be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence of the … transaction amounting to the crime, and not inferred from the character and tendencies of the [defendant].1001

Accordingly, evidence with no higher relevance than the examples set out above is excluded by judicial policy.1002 Lawyers do not trust juries to treat it properly.1003 This is one of several rules indicating what lawyers really think of juries,1004 despite their ritual praise of the system.1005 Other reasons for the rule are that “character” evidence complicates and prolongs proceedings and oppresses parties by forcing them to fight on too wide a front.1006 However, in a joint trial of several charges against one or more defendants – a common event1007 – the jury almost inevitably hears evidence of repeated 998. Wirth v Tuckey [1949] QWN 42; Bugg v Day (1949) 79 CLR 442; Wright v KB Nut Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] QDC 91 at [34]. 999. DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421 at 456 per Lord Cross. 1000. Perry v The Queen (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 585 per Gibbs CJ. 1001. Dawson v The Queen (1961) 106 CLR 1 at 16 per Dixon CJ. 1002. Makin v Attorney-General for NSW [1894] AC 57 at 65; Markby v The Queen (1978) 140 CLR 108; Thompson and Wran v The Queen (1968) 117 CLR 313. But cf Jeppe v The Queen [1987] WAR 124; (1987) 61 ALR 383, where a majority of the WA Court of Criminal Appeal allowed evidence that a man charged with a drug offence had a book entitled Cocaine – Consumer’s Handbook at his residence. 1003. See [A.130]; DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421 at 456 per Lord Cross; R v Rawton (1865) Le & Ca 520; 169 ER 1497 at 537 (Le & Ca), 1505 (ER) per Martin B: “If I were investigating [for my own purposes] … my first inquiry would be, what was the prisoner’s character; and … that answer would influence me as much as anything else. But if a man [is] indicted in a court of law no one [can] give such evidence.” 1004. R v H [1995] 2 AC 596 at 613 per Lord Griffiths: “The judges did not trust the jury to evaluate all the relevant material.” 1005. Of course it does not follow that criminal juries are in any danger of abolition. Inter alia, they relieve judges of responsibility, and are often thought to improve defence lawyers’ prospects of raising a reasonable (or unreasonable) doubt. 1006. Berger v Raymond Sun Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 625; Hales v Kerr [1908] 2 KB 601 at 605: “he does not come to trial prepared to meet all the allegations of previous negligence”. 1007. However, severance may be granted: R v Gregory (No 2) [2009] VSC 509. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[A.134] 1008

misconduct by an accused, or of the dubious company he or she keeps. The official assurance is that jury prejudice is avoided by directions about evidence properly referable to the various charges,1009 and by warnings against “disposition reasoning”.1010 Indeed, some authorities say that a propensity warning is not essential, provided that the jury is told to consider every count separately, and only in the light of evidence that relates to it.1011 If one defendant is charged with sexual offences against several women: It [is] necessary for the jury to understand the purpose for which the evidence on counts relating to one complainant [is] relevant to counts relating to the others. In particular, it [is] necessary for them to understand that they could reason from the improbability of coincidence, if they were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was no collusion, but they were not to reason that, because the applicant was guilty in relation to one complainant, he was the kind of person who was likely to have abused the other complainants too.1012

But it is questionable whether such a direction as the following is so easy to understand and apply as lawyers assume: Each defendant is entitled to have his case decided on the evidence admissible against him, and on nothing else. Although the two defendants are being tried together, you must consider the cases for and against each of them separately. In relation to each charge, each defendant is entitled to have the case decided on the law and evidence [here specified] that applies to him, and as it relates to each separate charge. You must return separate verdicts on each defendant, and separate verdicts on each charge.1013

A few years ago, a lady just appointed to a Supreme Court told admirers at a celebratory dinner: For a number of members of the Court, the first summing up to a jury which they heard was their own, as a judge sitting in crime. The situation seems to be that one sums up first to the Court of Appeal, and then to the High Court, and finally, if they are still awake, to members of the jury.1014

1008. Forbes, Similar Facts (Law Book Co, 1987), [9.18] – [9.32]. A “propensity warning” eschews the idea that an offence at another time proves the offence now charged: Phillips v The Queen (2006) 225 CLR 303; [2006] HCA 4. 1009. R v Checconi (1988) 34 A Crim R 160; R v Annakin (1988) 17 NSWLR 202; 37 A Crim R 131 (evidence against numerous defendants); R v M, BJ (2011) 102 SASR 1; [2011] SASCFC 50 (directions re similar facts referable to some charges only). 1010. R v M [2004] QCA 184; R v Bunting (2004) 92 SASR 146; [2004] SASC 235. 1011. R v TN (2005) 153 A Crim R 129; [2005] QCA 160. 1012. R v DCC (2004) 151 A Crim R 403; [2004] VSCA 230 at [71] per Callaway JA; R v Kerbatieh (2005) 155 A Crim R 367; [2005] VSCA 194 at [100]. A propensity direction may not be necessary where there are several charges relating to a single complainant: R v CHS (2006) 159 A Crim R 560; [2006] VSCA 19. 1013. Queensland Supreme and District Courts Benchbook (2004), Direction No 35.1. 1014. The task is less daunting than those not called to judicial ermine may believe. In some jurisdictions a CD-ROM, alias “Bench Book”, supplies judicial neophytes with the most elaborate procedural directions, and safe, soporific and set-piece directions on a variety of evidentiary points. Any embarrassment at publicity for this basic recipe book seems to have abated; there are explicit references to it in R v Mason [2006] QCA 125 at [27]; and R v Clarke (2005) 159 A Crim R 281; [2005] QCA 483. Of course intelligent use of it cannot be guaranteed: see Tully v The Queen (2006) 230 CLR 234; [2006] HCA 56 at [26] on directions by Richards DCJ. A classic warning against stereotyped directions, insufficiently tailored to the

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Or, as Kirby J observed more than once: The analysis in these reasons adopts the assumption, inherent in much appellate examination of jury decision-making, that members of a jury reach their conclusions by a process of deliberation from evidence to verdict by way of an accurate application of judicial directions on the law. Such empirical evidence as there is casts serious doubts upon such assumptions.1015

Exceptions to the rule against character evidence, and evidence outside the rule [A.135] Some evidence indicating character is so relevant that it is admitted after all, lest the law becomes an “affront to common sense”:1016 see [A.136]. If the evidence has a higher and more specific probative value than “common” character evidence, it is not caught by the rule of exclusion. (Compare statements used as “original evidence”, which fall outside the hearsay rule, and thus need no exception to that rule to justify their reception: see [A.145].) There are also some true exceptions to the primary rule, where character evidence is admitted, simply as such. This paragraph deals with those exceptions. Sometimes character is a fact in issue, as in licensing cases or applications for admission to a profession, where the issue is whether someone is a “fit and proper person”. In such cases, evidence of character (or relevant aspects of it) cannot sensibly be excluded. Again, character may be relevant to the measure of damages in a defamation case, and aspects of character are often material in custody proceedings. Good character evidence for the defence Evidence of good character or disposition1017 is admissible, for what it is worth, to prove that an accused person is innocent1018 and (if he or she testifies) a witness of credit. Evidence of good character may carry more weight in the case of an elderly accused. A person who has lived for many years without blemish has demonstrated a capacity to avoid criminal activity which a 21-year-old cannot claim.1019 Appropriate directions about evidence of good-character are considered in Melbourne v The Queen.1020 No particular formula is prescribed.1021 But such evidence may be unable to rebut convincing proofs of guilt; people do commit facts of the instant case, appears in Alford v Magee (1952) 85 CLR 437 at 466. See also De Gruchy v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 85 at 96; Murray v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 193 at 205; Tully v The Queen (2006) 230 CLR 234; [2006] HCA 56 at [44]. The Bench Book was used slavishly rather than intelligently at the trial in Pollock v The Queen (2010) 240 CLR 233; [2010] HCA 35. 1015. HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16. 1016. DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421 at 456 per Lord Cross. 1017. Saw Wah v The Queen [2014] VSCA 7 at [42]. 1018. Attwood v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 353 at 359; R v Courtney-Smith (No 2) (1990) 48 A Crim R 49. There is no such rule in civil cases: Attorney-General v Bowman (1791) 2 B & P 532n; 126 ER 1423; Bugg v Day (1949) 79 CLR 442. 1019. Imnetu v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 203 at [43]. 1020. (1999) 198 CLR 1; [1999] HCA 32. 1021. R v Telfer (2004) 142 A Crim R 132; [2004] NSWCCA 27. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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crimes for the first time or, in less sensitive terms: “Everyone had a good character – once.”1022 On the other hand, misconduct on other occasions may be admitted on the more limited basis considered at [15.12]ff. Any witness (other than an accused) may be cross-examined about past convictions.1023 Special provisions for persons charged are contained in s 15(2) of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld). A prosecution witness may be cross-examined about propensity to show that he or she is the real offender.1024 As to the character of a complainant alleging a sexual assault, see [21.5]ff. Evidence outside the rule: similar occasions with higher probative value [A.136] We now turn to cases in which character evidence is tendered, not as an exception to the primary rule of exclusion, but on some basis beyond the reach of that rule. Evidence is not to be excluded because it tends to show the accused to be of bad disposition, but only if it shows nothing more.1025

In these cases evidence that incidentally shows character has more specific relevance and hence higher probative value.1026 The categories are not closed,1027 but the following (with some overlapping) can be distilled from the authorities: (a) evidence of motive, even when another offence is revealed.1028 However, the jury must solemnly be told not to use motive evidence as propensity evidence.1029 Apparently it is assumed (i) that a motive to offend does not imply any propensity to do so, and (ii) that the legal distinction between inclination and propensity is one that a jury will readily understand and accept. The existence of a motive to lie is not, per se, evidence of lying.1030 (b) evidence of a significant relationship1031 (such as hostility,1032 violence1033 or sexual attraction)1034 between the same persons1035 (usually accused and victim, but sometimes co-accused).1036 1022. R v Trimboli (1979) 21 SASR 577; Melbourne v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 1; [1999] HCA 32 at [188]. 1023. See [16.1]. 1024. R v Beckett [2011] 1 Qd R 259; [2009] QCA 196. 1025. Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 484 (emphasis added). 1026. Forbes, Similar Facts (Law Book Co, 1987), Ch 10. 1027. HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 at [7], [26], [158]. 1028. Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234; R v Benson [1985] 2 Qd R 117; R v Georgiev (2001) 119 A Crim R 363 (evidence of drug trafficking as motive for murder – subject to appropriate jury directions); R v Lester (2007) 176 A Crim R 152; [2007] QSC 229; Stubley v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 36. 1029. R v Lester (2007) 176 A Crim R 152; [2007] QSC 229; R v UB (2007) 178 A Crim R 450; [2007] QCA 374; R v GVV (2008) 184 A Crim R 242; [2008] VSCA 170; R v Miller (2008) 103 SASR 174; [2008] SASC 331; Paton v The Queen [2011] VSCA 72. 1030. Legal Services Commissioner v Dempsey [2010] QCA 197 at [33]. 1031. Wilson v The Queen (1970) 123 CLR 334 at 339 and 344; KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221 at 233; R v Anderson (2000) 1 VR 1; 111 A Crim R 19; R v CAH (2008) 186 A Crim R 288; [2008] QCA 333. Relationship evidence at common law and under the Evidence Act 1995

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“Relationship evidence” (or “context evidence”1037) is circumstantially relevant, and enhances the credibility and intelligibility of direct evidence.1038 Unlike other forms of circumstantial evidence it must be proved, in a criminal case, beyond reasonable doubt.1039 It is incidentally evidence of propensity, but it has other, sufficient probative value.1040 The rule does not extend to relations with other persons.1041

(Cth) is examined in Smith and Holdenson, “Comparative Evidence: Admission of Evidence of Relationship in Sexual Offence Prosecutions” (1999) 73 ALJ 432 and 494. It may sometimes be placed in the alternative category of res gesta and thus be directly relevant: Perich v The Queen (unreported, WA CCA, Malcolm CJ, Pidgeon, Murray JJ, 3 September 1996); Stubley v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 36. Evidence of this kind (“uncharged acts”) was received on a sentencing issue in R v Dunne [2003] VSCA 150. 1032. R v Lester (2007) 176 A Crim R 152; [2007] QSC 229. 1033. R v Mills [1986] 1 Qd R 77 at 84 per McPherson J: “[I]t does tend to show something more than that the accused was a person given to violent conduct, or even violent conduct towards children in general. What it tends to show is … the attitude of the accused towards the dead child in particular.” See also R v Roach (2009) 213 A Crim R 485; [2009] QCA 360; Eastman v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 9; R v Self [2001] QCA 338 at [31]; R v Raye (2003) 138 A Crim R 355; [2003] QCA 98; Wilson v The Queen (1970) 123 CLR 334 (victim’s statements that accused wanted to kill her); R v Collie (2005) 91 SASR 339; [2005] SASC 148 (homicide of drug dealers – history of violent quarrels). Relationship evidence may be relevant to intent, motive, provocation, or self defence: R v Collie (2005) 91 SASR 339; [2005] SASC 148; Leonard v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 374; [2006] NSWCCA 267. 1034. R v Sakail [1993] 1 Qd R 312; R v Wackerow [1998] 1 Qd R 197; R v Eberle [1999] QCA 58; R v GAE (2000) 1 VR 198; 109 A Crim R 419; R v LSS [2000] 1 Qd R 546; Gipp v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 106; R v WJT [2001] NSWCCA 405 (uncharged sexual offences against same child); R v TAB [2002] NSWCCA 274; Buttsworth v The Queen (2004) 29 WAR 1; [2004] WASCA 69; Rodden v The Queen (2008) 182 A Crim R 227; [2008] NSWCCA 53; R v Douglas [2012] QCA 352 at [127] (“grooming”); MM v The Queen [2012] ACTCA 44. The directions were insufficient in R v Kostaras (2002) 131 A Crim R 563. Relationship evidence in child abuse cases is less cogent (though still admissible) if it occurs after the event charged. Because of its lower probative value it may more readily be excluded as a matter of discretion: R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510. 1035. R v Kelly [1984] 1 Qd R 474; KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221; R v McL [1999] 1 VR 746 (charges of sexual offences against two stepdaughters; evidence of uncharged acts against A only is not admissible on charges relating to B). Contrast the more robust approach of the House of Lords in DPP v P [1991] 2 AC 447; R v Lewis [2003] NSWCCA 180 (evidence of assaults on complainant by mother of accused inadmissible). 1036. R v Ball [1911] AC 47; Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590 (issue: innocent relationship or joint dealers in illicit drugs?). A case similar to Harriman is R v Huebner and Maher [2004] QCA 98, but the evidence there failed the Pfennig test. 1037. R v MM [2014] NSWCCA 144. 1038. HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 at [6], [180], [431] and [513]. 1039. R v KAN [2016] QCA 108 at [39]; HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334 at 347. 1040. Roach v The Queen (2011) 242 CLR 610; [2011] HCA 12; but evidence of non-sexual violence is insufficiently relevant to prove a sexual interest: Norman v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 230 at [36]. 1041. J v The Queen [1989] Tas R 116; R v Kelly [1984] 1 Qd R 474; R v N [2001] QCA 70 (attitude of “loose sexual morality” in presence of complainant); R v Bowman [2001] QCA 500; Phillips v The Queen (2006) 225 CLR 303; [2006] HCA 4. But a high degree of similarity may make a difference: R v Inston (2009) 103 SASR 265; [2009] SASC 89 (evidence cross-admissible). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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1042

(c) “other occasion” evidence proving identity;

(d) “other occasion” evidence proving a disputed knowledge or ability;1043 (e) “other occasion” evidence rebutting a specific defence;1044 (f) “other occasions” “strikingly similar” to the case before the court.1045 Therefore, although the wider context of conduct in issue is artificially restricted, even when relevance is admitted, there comes a point where exclusion becomes intolerable as a matter of common sense. In that extremity, convoluted formulae are devised to explain why context is admitted after all. When character evidence with higher probative value is admitted, the jury must be carefully instructed about its permissible and impermissible uses. Where in a criminal case [the trial judge] admits evidence admissible for one purpose, but inadmissible for another … he should direct the jury that they must not use the evidence for the purpose for which it is inadmissible, particularly when the use of that evidence would be adverse to the accused.1046

The appropriate standard of proof of “uncharged acts” has been a matter of uncertainty, if not confusion. The question is whether a jury should be told that such acts must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, despite the fact that they are merely circumstantial evidence.1047 (Contrast the position where similar fact evidence is explicitly and lawfully tendered as evidence of propensity.)1048 In the High Court there are “sharp divisions”1049 on the point, up to and including HML v The Queen,1050 leaving State courts in a quandary. “None of this is terribly satisfactory. The law on uncharged acts is now in a state of considerable 1042. People v Nye 234 P 2d 172 (1951) (alibi rebutted by evidence of another offence about same time and place). 1043. R v Ward [1963] Qd R 56 (capacity of offender to drive car); R v Palaga (2001) 80 SASR 19 (FC) (knowledge needed to grow cannabis plants); R v FJB (1999) 105 A Crim R 567; R v Spiteri (2004) 61 NSWLR 369; [2004] NSWCCA 321 (accused claiming physical disability at trial recently seen doing “push-ups”). 1044. Makin v Attorney-General for NSW [1894] AC 57 at 65; R v Crickner (1889) 16 Cox CC 701; People v Buckowski 233 P 2d 912 (1951) (injury in later crime explaining lack of capacity to leave fingerprints); R v Abela (2007) 170 A Crim R 244; [2007] VSCA 22 (sexual assault of complainant’s daughter to rebut defence that complainant consented to intercourse one day later). 1045. See [A.137]. 1046. B v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 599 at 619; a warning may be unnecessary in a case like R v Pretorius [2009] QCA 58. 1047. R v TN (2005) 153 A Crim R 129; [2005] QCA 160; DJV v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 272; but see R v M, RB (2007) 172 A Crim R 73; [2007] SASC 207; R v Ellul (2008) 185 A Crim R 311; [2008] VSCA 106; BBH v The Queen (2012) 245 CLR 499; [2012] HCA 9. 1048. Noto v Western Australia (2006) 168 A Crim R 457; [2006] WASCA 278; PPP v The Queen (2010) 200 A Crim R 533; [2010] VSCA 110. 1049. HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 at [328] per Heydon J. 1050. (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16; cf [29] and [31] per Gleeson CJ, [477] per Crennan J and [328] per Heydon J with [61] per Kirby J and [217] per Hayne J. “Some significant divergence between the judgments” in HML v The Queen is noted in R v Rae (2008) 191 A Crim R 279; [2008] QCA 385 at [53]. The dissenting judgment of McHugh J in Pfennig is described as “compelling” by Spigelman CJ in R v Ellis [2003] NSWCCA 319 at [91].

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uncertainty.” In BBH v The Queen1052 another divided court held that the 1053 Pfennig principle applies to evidence of this kind. According to Kiefel and Crennan JJ: [W]hen determining whether the evidence of propensity is to be admitted before the jury, [the judge should] apply the standard which the jury must eventually apply. The judge must ask whether there is a rational view of the propensity evidence, seen in the setting of the prosecution case, which is consistent with the accused’s innocence. If the judge so concludes, the evidence ought not to be admitted.1054

When evidence of uncharged events is presented as relationship evidence in a sexual assault case, the jury should be told: [E]vidence of such conduct can be used by you only if you are satisfied1055 that it occurred, and only for the limited purpose of determining whether a sexual relationship existed between the complainant and the accused, thereby enabling the evidence relied on by the Crown … to be … evaluated within a realistic contextual setting. You should not reason that the accused is the kind of person likely to commit the offence charged.1056 To prove that a person did something many times does not compel a conclusion that he did it again. … People do not act in accordance with all their inclinations at every opportunity, but proof of a person’s inclinations may provide strong support for direct testimony as to that person’s conduct [on the occasion in question].1057

The reality or unreality of a distinction1058 between “a realistic contextual setting” and “disposition”1059 might be more closely scrutinised if debates about the admissibility of character evidence were not so monopolised by Bench and Bar. But judges continue to recognise its validity.1060 1051. R v DWB (2008) 20 VR 112; [2008] VSCA 223 at [74] per Vincent and Weinberg JJA, Mandie AJA; R v EF (2008) 189 A Crim R 463; [2008] VSCA 213; R v McKenzie-McHarg (2008) 189 A Crim R 291; [2008] VSCA 206. 1052. (2012) 245 CLR 499; [2012] HCA 9. 1053. See [A.140]. Pfennig is now legislatively avoided by the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss 97 and 98; the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), ss 97 and 98 (R v Ellis (2003) 58 NSWLR 700; [2003] NSWCCA 319); the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), ss 97 and 98; and the Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 31A. 1054. BBH v The Queen (2012) 245 CLR 499 at 541; R v Manning (2014) 239 A Crim R 348; [2014] QCA 49 at [24]. 1055. Beyond reasonable doubt: Buttsworth v The Queen (2004) 29 WAR 1; [2004] WASCA 69. 1056. Gipp v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 106 at 156 per Kirby J, approving R v Vonarx (unreported, Vic Sup Ct CA, 15 November 1995); R v Hagarty (2004) 145 A Crim R 138; [2004] NSWCCA 89; R v Taylor (2004) 8 VR 213; [2004] VSCA 98; R v DCC (2004) 151 A Crim R 403; [2004] VSCA 230; R v DWB (2006) 163 A Crim R 71; [2006] VSCA 137; R v PZG (2007) 171 A Crim R 62; [2007] VSCA 54; R v GVV (2008) 20 VR 395; (2008) 184 A Crim R 242; [2008] VSCA 170; R v Rae (2008) 191 A Crim R 279; [2008] QCA 385. The directions in R v Li [2003] NSWCCA 407 and in R v Long (2002) 137 A Crim R 263; [2002] SASC 426 were inadequate. 1057. HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 at [11] per Gleeson CJ. 1058. It is indeed “but a short step from a finding of guilt”: R v M, RB (2007) 172 A Crim R 73; [2007] SASC 207. 1059. Qualtieri v The Queen (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 95. 1060. R v Hagarty (2004) 145 A Crim R 138; [2004] NSWCCA 89; R v BJC (2005) 154 A Crim R 109; [2005] VSCA 154; R v Werry [2009] VSCA 94. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Occasionally, in relation to similar facts, identification, guilty denial and other vexed questions, courts of appeal observe a moratorium on complex recitations to juries: Directions are not ritualistic formularies. Their purpose is to assist the jury in the practical task of resolving fairly the issues, as they have been presented to them by the parties.1061 I believe that the supreme test that should be satisfied … is that [directions be] comprehensible to an ordinary member of the public who is called to sit on a jury and who has no prior particular acquaintance with the law. To make it obligatory on trial judges to give directions in law which are so elaborate that the ordinary member of the jury will have great difficulty in following them, and even greater difficulty [in applying them] … is no service to the cause of justice.1062

But it is not always safe for trial judges to accept such assurances at face value. “Striking similarity” [A.137] This is one of several kinds of character evidence with sufficient probative value to place it outside the exclusionary rule.1063 Unfortunately, the expression “similar facts” is often used loosely to refer to other forms of admissible character evidence, such as evidence of a relationship.1064 Like the other forms of admissible material listed in [A.136], highly (“strikingly”) similar facts pertain to the second “limb” of the Makin formula: On the other hand, the mere fact that evidence … tends to shew [bad character] does not render it inadmissible if it be relevant to an issue before the jury, and it may be so relevant if it bears upon the question whether the acts alleged … were designed or accidental, or to rebut a defence which would otherwise be open.1065

However, appeal courts have made trial judges excessively wary of similar facts evidence. When led by the Crown, it faces severer tests than other cogent character evidence, such as motive or “relationship” material. Many tenders of similar facts fail because judges correctly (or timorously) declare that the pattern is not sufficiently distinctive to justify its reception.1066 The approach of the High Court in Phillips v The Queen1067 is distinctly conservative. However, even in criminal cases, a cautious retreat from the 1061. Doggett v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 343 at 346 per Gleeson CJ. 1062. R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171 at 189 per Mackay LC. 1063. The origin of the label “striking similarity” may be found, not in a learned judgment, but in a letter from a Blackpool boarding house keeper, George Crossley, which alerted the police to the “brides in the bath” murders (R v George Joseph Smith (1915) Cr App R 229): “I have been very much struck by the enclosed [newspaper] account and its striking similarity to a case which happened just 12 months previously … I thought this might possibly be of some use …”. 1064. Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 464. 1065. Makin v Attorney General for NSW [1894] AC 57 at 65. 1066. See Burrows v The King (1937) 58 CLR 249; Markby v The Queen (1978) 140 CLR 108; R v Blackledge [1965] VR 397; Taylor v Harvey [1986] 2 Qd R 137. An over-cautious exclusion was set aside in R v Smith (2008) 190 A Crim R 8; [2008] NSWCCA 247. 1067. (2006) 225 CLR 303; [2006] HCA 4.

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traditional approach is discernible.1068 The House of Lords adopted a more robust approach in DPP v P.1069 The accused was convicted of incest with two daughters under the age of 13. He claimed that the trial judge should not have allowed a joint trial of the two complaints. In the leading judgment, Lord Mackay stated that striking similarity is not necessary in every such case, and that the complainants’ evidence was mutually supportive. He accepted that one should be more demanding when “other occasion” evidence is the only evidence on an identity issue, but even then, similarity need not be “striking” if it is supported by other evidence.1070 And when similar facts are tendered on other issues, the question is simply whether their probative value is high enough to justify their admission, despite prejudicial side-effects. In some jurisdictions the legislature has encouraged relaxation of the common law:1071 Why … should a jury be denied knowledge that an alleged rapist committed another rape six months earlier … or that an accused charged with fraud has a string of convictions for dishonesty? While I acknowledge the contrary position, many would argue common sense and general life experience would militate in favour of not keeping a jury in the dark about such matters.1072

There is some support for DPP v P, in dicta of the Queensland Court of Appeal in R v BAR,1073 although the “other occasion” evidence there was eventually excluded. In R v BAR the prosecution tendered evidence of the accused’s sexual offences against “K” as evidence of similar offences against “B”. “K” and “B” were stepchildren of the accused, and members of his household. (Compare R v Kelly.)1074 But the majority ruled the evidence was inadmissible, as it showed nothing more distinctive than the “depressingly familiar concomitants of dozens of cases of this kind”.1075 In the light of R v BAR, it appears that the result in R v Kelly would be the same today, as the disputed evidence would not be considered “strikingly similar”, or qualify as evidence of the same relationship. Nevertheless, the elaborate superstructure of Makin1076 may eventually be reduced to a simple question of “probative force”, just as the complexities of occupiers’ liability were eventually merged in the general law of negligence.1077 1068. An appeal against exclusion of similar fact evidence succeeded in R v Smith (2008) 190 A Crim R 8; [2008] NSWCCA 247. 1069. [1991] 2 AC 447. See further R v H [1995] 2 AC 596 at 613 per Lord Griffiths: “[Formerly] the judges fashion[ed] rules of evidence … [because] they did not trust the jury … Today … the value of those restrictive rules is being re-evaluated, and many are being discarded or modified.” 1070. R v W (John) [1998] 2 Cr App R 289. 1071. Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 31A; Bomford v Western Australia [2014] WASCA 43; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), ss 132A (overriding Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292) and 132B. 1072. De Jersey CJ (Qld), address to Law Symposium (16 March 2013): see Courier Mail (15 March 2013); see also “A Justice Issue Worth Debating”, The Australian (editorial, 20 March 2014), referring to comments by McMurdo J, President of the Judicial Conference of Australia. 1073. (2005) 152 A Crim R 428; [2005] QCA 80. 1074. [1984] 1 Qd R 474. 1075. (2005) 152 A Crim R 428; [2005] QCA 80 at [10] per McPherson JA. 1076. [1894] AC 57. 1077. Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Indeed, England has abolished the common law anti-propensity rules, subject, however, to open-ended discretions to prevent “injustice or unfairness”.1078 Propensity evidence need only be relevant to be admissible. The English courts appear to be respecting the spirit of the legislation.1079 [A.138] The proper focus is on the constituent details and circumstances1080 of the other, allegedly similar occasions compared with the event in question.1081 The greater the degree of specificity with which the claimed similarities can be identified, the greater the probative value.1082 If the similar facts1083 are deemed admissible, “[i]nstances are multiplied … then sooner or later the point is reached at which reason rejects the hypothesis of mere coincidence, and the inference of a causal connection becomes irresistible.”1084 The question is simply whether the significance of similar fact evidence is such that it should not be suppressed for fear of “jury prejudice”. That is essentially a matter of opinion, despite innumerable attempts to present the process as a technical exercise. The point is not that a defendant has committed other burglaries or has driven cars carefully1085 before or after a collision in question. The point is that there are distinct similarities in the manner and circumstances in which all such events occurred. The fact that every victim of a series of offences was a “street prostitute” was insufficient in R v Rajakaruna,1086 and the reference to “depressingly familiar” circumstances in R v BAR (see [A.137]) has been noted. In R v Armstrong,1087 where the issue was identity, there were five breaking and entering offences in the same area in a period of a few months, all in similar circumstances, including the use of a white car; evidence of the other occasions

1078. Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK), ss 99, 101, 103. 1079. R v Edwards [2005] EWCA 3244; R v Weir [2006] 1 Cr App R 19. 1080. R v Mason (2003) 140 A Crim R 274; [2003] NSWCCA 331; R v Alexander (2002) 6 VR 53; [2002] VSCA 183 (distinctive pattern of conduct preliminary to seduction); Al-Hashemi v The Queen (2004) 145 A Crim R 186; [2004] WASCA 61 (“striking similarity” in series of “people smuggling” (illegal immigration) offences). 1081. If the other events have led to a conviction, that fact is prejudicial and inadmissible: R v Shepherd (1980) 71 Cr App R 120; R v Hatchard [1997] ACL Rep 130 SA 121; R v Meizer [2001] QCA 231 (jury discharged when counsel for Crown opened a conviction as well as similar facts). But the position is different if the accused pleaded guilty on the other occasion. That plea is a virtual confession and the plea, as distinct from the conviction, may be relied on: Moore v Giofrelle [1952] ALR (CN) 1049; Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461; R v Pfennig (1995) 182 CLR 461. But if there was an acquittal in the other case, the similar facts thereof are deemed non-existent and cannot be proved: Garrett v The Queen (1977) 139 CLR 437; R v Wilson [1997] 2 NZLR 161. 1082. CGL v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (2010) 24 VR 486; [2010] VSCA 26. 1083. Makin v Attorney-General for NSW [1894] AC 57 at 65; R v Crickner (1889) 16 Cox CC 701; People v Buckowski 233 P 2d 912 (1951) (injury in later crime explaining lack of capacity to leave fingerprints). 1084. Jones v Harris [1946] SASR 98 at 104 per Napier CJ. 1085. In principle, the rule against character evidence applies to favourable, as well as unfavourable, references to other occasions. 1086. (2004) 146 A Crim R 238; [2004] VSCA 114. 1087. (1990) 48 A Crim R 382.

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was admitted. In R v McGrane1088 several separate incidents revealed a doctor’s propensity to use drugs and sexually assault female patients. Other cases in which the prosecution successfully tendered similar facts are Griffıth v The King,1089 R v Chandler,1090 Sutton v The Queen,1091 Pfennig v The Queen,1092 R v Dupas1093 and (although there was only one other occasion and a considerable lapse of time) R v O’Keefe.1094 Details of a subsequent murder were admitted to prove a highly similar mutilation technique in R v Dupas (No 2).1095 [A.139] The rationale is that the similar facts cannot reasonably be dismissed as mere coincidences.1096 If the issue is one of identity, and it is proved that the defendant has done very similar things at other more or less recent times, the argument will be that it is unlikely that someone else with the same “trade mark” turned up on this occasion.1097 If the issue is one of intent and the defendant was the actor on every other occasion, it will be submitted that no-one could do the same thing so often without knowing the nature and consequences of the act.1098 Where the unlawful act is flatly denied, but only the defendant had the opportunity to commit it, similar experiences of the complainant and other witnesses with the defendant may be evidence that the complainants’ stories are true.1099 The theory then will be – collusion aside – that several people could not have composed such remarkably similar “lies” but are telling the truth. In a few outstanding cases similar facts have proved identity, the act and the guilty mind.1100 The long-standing dogma1101 that similar facts are never admitted as evidence of propensity was abandoned in Pfennig v The Queen:

1088. [2002] QCA 173. 1089. (1937) 58 CLR 185. 1090. (1956) 56 SR (NSW) 335. 1091. (1984) 152 CLR 528 (joint trial of sexual offences where similar facts). See also R v Meizer [2001] QCA 231; R v Papamitrou [2004] VSCA 12; Police v A, MR (2008) 101 SASR 557; [2008] SASC 255. 1092.

(1995) 182 CLR 461.

1093. (2004) 148 A Crim R 185; [2004] VSC 253 (removal of breasts of murder victims). 1094. [1999] 1 Qd R 564; cf R v Cakovski (2004) 149 A Crim R 21. 1095. (2005) 154 A Crim R 566; [2005] VSCA 212. 1096. Various uses of similar facts are illustrated in Forbes, Similar Facts (Law Book Co, 1987), Ch 5. 1097. Sutton v The Queen (1984) 152 CLR 528; contrast the insufficient specificity in R v Blackledge [1965] VR 397. 1098. “To lose one parent, Mr Worthing, may be regarded as a misfortune. To lose both looks like carelessness”: Oscar Wilde, The Importance of Being Earnest per Lady Bracknell. 1099. DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421; Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292; R v WRC (2002) 130 A Crim R 89. 1100. Makin v Attorney-General for NSW (1893) 14 NSWLR (L) 1; [1894] AC 57 (murder by “baby farmers”, evidence of numerous other deaths in similar circumstances); R v George Joseph Smith (1915) 11 Cr App R 229 (the case of the “brides in the bath”). 1101. Criticised in Forbes, Similar Facts (Law Book Co, 1987), p 61ff. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[E]vidence which is received [although] it discloses the commission of offences other than those of which the accused is charged … is always propensity evidence … [whether it] falls within the category of similar fact evidence, relationship evidence, or identity evidence.1102

[A.140] In deciding whether “striking similarity” is present, it may be useful to ask one or more of the following questions: • How often was the pattern repeated? Comparatively humdrum events need to be repeated more often and more precisely to be regarded as distinctive.1103 • Is it clear that the defendant was the actor on the other occasion or occasions?1104 • How proximate in space and time is the event in question to the others? As time passes and places change the greater the possibility that someone else with a similar modus operandi will come upon the scene. In R v Watkins1105 the absence of striking similarity was more important than a lapse of 15 years. • Is the issue one of identity? If so, the probative force of the evidence needs to be particularly high.1106 But it does not follow that quite the same degree of similarity should be demanded on other issues.1107 • Are there dissimilarities as well as similarities? If so, are the dissimilarities really material? For example, on an issue of identity, where the prosecution relies on a highly distinctive pattern of luring victims to a secluded place, it may not matter that the offender was sometimes disturbed before committing the offence. In Tweedie v The Queen1108 it did not matter that another man also attacked women on a particular beach about the same time, because his appearance was markedly different from that of the accused. • Are the similar facts supported by other evidence?1109 • When similar facts are tendered by the prosecution, is there a rational hypothesis consistent with innocence? If so, the evidence should not go 1102. (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 464-465 per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ; see also at 517, 523 and 526; cf Forbes, Similar Facts (Law Book Co, 1987), pp 63-64, where the then orthodoxy is questioned. 1103. Contrast R v George Joseph Smith (1915) 11 Cr App R 229 and comparatively humdrum cases, such as Sutton v The Queen (1984) 152 CLR 528 and the civil negligence case of Eichsteadt v Lahrs (1960) Qd R 487. 1104. Not satisfied in Perry v The Queen (1982) 150 CLR 580. 1105. (2005) 153 A Crim R 434; [2005] NSWCCA 164. 1106. Sutton v The Queen (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 549 per Brennan J; Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 at 339-400; DPP v P [1991] 2 AC 447; R v Von Einem (No 2) (1991) 52 A Crim R 402 at 408-409, approving Forbes, Similar Facts (Law Book Co, 1987), [6.6]; R v Blackledge [1965] VR 397. 1107. Director of Public Prosecutions v P [1991] 2 AC 447 at 460 and 462 per Lord Mackay of Clashfern. 1108. [2003] WASCA 282; Samadi v The Queen (2008) 192 A Crim R 251; [2008] NSWCCA 330 (adequate similarity although some complainants’ property not stolen). 1109. R v Pryor; Ex parte Attorney-General [2001] QCA 241 (fingerprint evidence supporting similar features of two rape and burglary offences; “overwhelming case”).

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to the jury, according to some members of the court in Pfennig v The Queen.1110 This seems to suggest that the similar facts cannot go to the jury unless the judge thinks that the jury, actually rationally, must convict. McHugh J disagreed: The “no rational explanation” test … [would require] the trial judge … to perform the task of the jury and evaluate the strength of the evidence. I do not recollect any other area of the Australian law of evidence where the test that the judge applies to … admissibility … is the same test that the jury must apply … if the evidence is admitted.1111

In R v O’Keefe1112 the Court of Appeal interpreted Pfennig as requiring the trial judge to consider these two questions: (a) Is it the only reasonable view that the similar facts support an inference of guilt? (b) If the answer to (a) is “Yes”, is the evidence as a whole (including the similar facts) reasonably capable of excluding all hypotheses of innocence? Pfennig was similarly interpreted by the Victorian Court of Appeal in R v Cahill (No 2).1113 In R v BAR1114 Chesterman J observed that Thomas JA’s interpretation of Pfennig “has since been regarded as authoritative”. But the O’Keefe version of Pfennig was censoriously rejected by the High Court in Phillips v The Queen.1115 The court insisted that Pfennig does not require the judge to conclude that similar facts alone would demonstrate the guilt of the accused, but rather to exclude it if there is a reasonable view of it that is consistent with innocence. The subsequent decision in R v MAP1116 displays a more critical approach. In HML v The Queen,1117 Hayne J offered this interpretation, or reinterpretation, of Pfennig: [T]he trial judge is not called on to decide whether the evidence which the prosectuion intends to adduce does or does not establish the accused’s guilt … because [he] will usually be required to decide disputed questions of admissibility before any, or at least all, of the evidence to be called by the prosecution has been adduced … [I]t must be assumed that the similar fact evidence would be accepted as true and that the prosecution case (as revealed in evidence already given at trial or in the depositions of witnesses later to be called) may be accepted by the jury. Pfennig v The Queen does not

1110. (1995) 182 CLR 461. Compare the judicial “guided democracy” of the “unsafe” verdict at [9.17]. 1111. Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 517-518 per McHugh J. In some jurisdictions the Pfennig conundrum has been resolved by statute; see, eg, Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 398A; Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 31A. 1112. [1999] 1 Qd R 564. See also criticism of the more extreme view by McHugh J in Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 516-517. 1113. [1999] 2 VR 387. 1114. (2005) 152 A Crim R 428; [2005] QCA 80 at [93]. See now Phillips v The Queen (2006) 225 CLR 303; [2006] HCA 4. 1115. (2006) 225 CLR 303; [2006] HCA 4 at [63]. 1116. [2006] QCA 220. 1117. (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 at [118]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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require the judge to conclude that the similar fact evidence, standing alone, would demonstrate the guilt of the accused of the offence or offences with which he or she is charged.

Pfennig does not apply to every case in which prior misconduct is used to prove the present charge, but only when it is presented as belonging to a “pattern”, or as evidence of propensity.1118 As to “propensity warnings”, see [A.134]. Similar facts for the defence and in civil cases [A.141] The literature of similar fact evidence is preoccupied with prosecution evidence, but this should not obscure the fact that it can assist the defence in a criminal case, as well as parties to civil proceedings.1119 In the former case it need only raise a reasonable doubt. In a civil case the standard of proof is lower than the Crown’s, and no criminal stigma is involved.1120 The probative force of evidence rises as the standard of proof falls. In Knight v Jones; Ex parte Jones1121 prior misconduct by a police officer was admitted in answer to a charge of drink-driving. An unreported case of dangerous driving causing death was abandoned when 139 citizens, in response to a newspaper advertisement, stated that they had been confused by the same roadworks.1122 In R v Cakovski1123 the accused, charged with murder, pleaded self-defence. Evidence was admitted that 23 years earlier, the deceased killed three people, and that on the night of his own demise he threatened to kill a witness in the present case. Manifestly the deceased was more likely to attack people than most other members of the community, and so (it was submitted) the defence should be accepted. In Eichsteadt v Lahrs1124 similar fact evidence, or evidence of an established habit or practice,1125 rebutted an allegation that the plaintiff was riding his bicycle in a negligent manner when he was run down by the defendant’s car. In Sheldon 1118. R v Domokos (2005) 92 SASR 258; [2005] SASC 266. 1119. Borg v Northern Rivers Finance Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 112 at [84]; see also Gething, “Propensity Evidence in Civil Trials” (1993) 10 Aust Bar Rev 203. 1120. Eichsteadt v Lahrs (1960) Qd R 487; Gates v CML Insurance Society Ltd (1982) 68 FLR 74; 43 ALR 313; Sheldon v Sun Alliance Ltd (1988) 50 SASR 236; aff’d (1989) 53 SASR 97, noted (1989) 63 ALJ 55; Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51; [2000] FCA 1886 (representations re leases insufficiently similar); Mood Music Publishing Co Ltd v De Wolfe Ltd [1976] Ch 119; Mister Figgins Pty Ltd v Centrepoint Freeholds Pty Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 23; Avis v Mark Bain Constructions Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 80. 1121. [1981] Qd R 98. See also Milner v Anderson (1982) 42 ACTR 23. 1122. R v Lesley Kowitz (unreported, Qld Dist Ct, 4 August 1987); see also Courier Mail (Brisbane, 5 August 1987). 1123. (2004) 149 A Crim R 21; [2004] NSWCCA 280. 1124. [1960] Qd R 487 (aff’d Eichsteadt v Lahrs [1961] Qd R 457). 1125. On the admissibility of evidence of habit or practice to support an inference as to events at the time in issue, see Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 at 376, 386; O’Connor v Blacktown District Hospital [1971] 1 NSWLR 713 at 721; Olga Investments Pty Ltd v CitiPower Ltd [1998] 3 VR 485 at 486-487; G v H (1994) 181 CLR 387 at 390; [1994] HCA 48; Palios Meegan & Nicholson Holdings Pty Ltd v Shore (2010) 108 SASR 31; [2010] SASCFC 21 at [80] – [83] (regular practice of solicitor in workers’ compensation matters).

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v Sun Alliance Ltd it established the insurer’s defence of arson to a claim under a fire insurance policy. See also Natta v Canham,1127 outlined in [A.99].

The hearsay rule Overview [A.142] The rule against hearsay is based on a policy of excluding unreliable evidence1128 and preserving the value of cross-examination.1129 “Hearsay is no evidence of the thing heard.”1130 It forbids the repetition of a prior statement to assert as true the facts narrated therein.1131 Facts in dispute cannot generally be proved by witness “A’s” telling the court what “B” said about them. At common law a “country of origin” stamp on a consignment of goods is no evidence that they actually came from the country nominated.1132 As to public opinion surveys, see [A.148]. Prima facie, extra-curial statements in documents are in the same position, but there are wide statutory exceptions.1133 Prior statements as “original” evidence [A.143] Not every repetition of a prior statement offends the hearsay rule. The making of a statement is a fact like any other, and, true or untrue, it may be a relevant fact.1134 The hearsay rule forbids the repetition of a prior statement as a true narrative. But it does not prohibit evidence that a statement was made, when what was said – true or false – is relevant.1135 Prior statements tendered on that basis are described as “original evidence”.1136 Identical false alibis by two suspects are evidence of collusion and “consciousness of guilt”.1137 (Manifestly they are not tendered as true narratives.) Threatening statements are evidence of duress.1138 A greeting or some other non-narrative 1126. (1988) 50 SASR 236, followed in Grivas v Brooks (1997) 69 SASR 532 (FC). The test may be more stringent under the federal Act: Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51. 1127. (1991) 32 FCR 282. 1128. D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1978] AC 171 at 231; Teper v The Queen [1952] AC 480 at 486. There is no general discretion to admit “reliable” hearsay: Bannon v The Queen (1995) 185 CLR 1 at 7, 32 and 40-41. 1129. Teper v The Queen [1952] AC 480 at 486. 1130. R v Christie [1914] AC 545 at 548 in argument (Sir John Simon). 1131. Myers v DPP [1965] AC 1001. 1132. Patel v Controller of Customs [1966] AC 356. 1133. See [A.157]. 1134. Numerous examples are given in Re Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 200-201; see also Mr Justice Ferguson’s note in (1927) 1 Aust LJ 195, described as a “famous article” by Mr Justice Young in “Hearsay Evidence” (1992) 66 ALJ 37. 1135. Kamleh v The Queen (2005) 79 ALJR 541; [2005] HCA 2. 1136. As in Walton v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 283 at 289; Pollitt v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 558 at 571; Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87; [1988] HCA 39 at 94 (CLR), statements of deceased as evidence of relationship between deceased and accused: R v Warradoo [2014] QCA 299. 1137. Mawaz Khan v The Queen [1967] 1 AC 454; R v Rudd (2009) 23 VR 444 at [38]; [2009] VSCA 213. 1138. Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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utterance may be proof that the speaker was aware of the presence of another person, to whom a duty of care was owed. Words of command or request may be evidence that “A” put “B” in charge of a motor vehicle. An otherwise irrelevant conversation may show that two suspects knew each other at a time when they claim they were strangers.1139 A wife’s cry to “call the police” may discredit her husband’s claim that nothing was then amiss.1140 Utterances by passers-by or telephone callers may be evidence of unlawful gaming1141 or other illicit activities.1142 In an action for wrongful arrest a citizen’s report to the defendant policeman, correct or incorrect, is admissible evidence that the officer had reasonable cause to arrest the plaintiff.1143 Utterances by people viewing a picture may be evidence that it is the image of a particular person.1144 In Manchester Brewery Co Ltd v Coombs1145 verbal and other reactions of drinkers were evidence that a publican’s beer had been adulterated. In R v Jones1146 telephone calls by the accused were evidence that he lured the victim to the locus in quo. “Implied assertions” [A.144] But on closer inspection, some statements presented as original evidence may be hearsay after all.1147 In R v Kearley1148 the prosecution sought to prove that the defendant was a drug dealer by leading evidence that several unidentified people telephoned him, asking for narcotics. It was submitted that these calls were circumstantial facts from which the necessary conclusion should be drawn, but it was held (contrary to similar cases)1149 that they were hearsay. In Walton v The Queen1150 a murder victim’s stated intention to meet the accused was admissible evidence that the meeting took place. But when a child in the same case answered the telephone and exclaimed “It’s Daddy” (meaning the 1139. R v Kennedy (1979) 37 FLR 356; 25 ALR 367. 1140. Ratten v The Queen [1972] AC 378. 1141. McGregor v Stokes [1952] VLR 347; Sidey v Schull; Ex parte Sidey [1978] Qd R 290. 1142. Abrahamson v The Queen (1994) 63 SASR 139 (FC) (phone calls – trafficking in drugs). 1143. Compare Brown v Mahony [1967] Qd R 592. 1144. Du Bost v Beresford (1810) 2 Camp 511; 170 ER 1235; Greek Orthodox Community of South Australia Inc v Pashalis [2015] SASC 122 at [64]. 1145. (1900) 82 LT 347. 1146. (2006) 161 A Crim R 511; [2006] SASC 189. 1147. Wright v Doe d Tatham (1837) 7 A & E 313; R v Benz (1989) 168 CLR 110; Pollitt v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 558; Weinberg, “Implied Assertions and the Scope of the Hearsay Rule” (1973) 9 MULR 268; Williams, “Issues at the Penumbra of Hearsay” (1987) 11 Adel L Rev 113; McGinley and Waye, “Implied Assertions and the Hearsay Prohibition” (1993) 67 ALJ 657. For criticism of uncertainty arising from Benz and Pollitt, see Yee Fen Lim, “A Logical View of the Hearsay Rule” (1994) 68 ALJ 724. Restriction of the rule to consciously assertive statements (cf Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 59) is advocated in Rein, “The Scope of Hearsay” (1994) 110 LQR 431. 1148. [1992] 2 WLR 656. 1149. For example, Woodhouse v Hall (1980) 72 Cr App R 39 (calls seeking sexual services evidence of brothel-keeping); Sidey v Schull; Ex parte Sidey [1978] Qd R 290 (“betting noises” proof of unlawful bookmaking). 1150. (1989) 166 CLR 283; Walton was applied in Kamleh v The Queen (2005) 79 ALJR 541; [2005] HCA 2 (out-of-court statement as evidence of intention to commit murder).

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accused), that utterance was branded hearsay. In Pollitt v The Queen1151 the High Court avoided the embarrassment of a similar ruling by inventing a new exception to the hearsay rule – the “telephone exception”. In R v Benz1152 the High Court discovered a difficulty not raised in two courts below. Two women charged with murdering a man by drowning were seen on a bridge late at night. One of them told a considerate motorist who stopped and asked if they were in difficulty: “It’s all right, my mother’s just feeling a bit sick.” According to the High Court, that was not a verbal act indicating their relationship (or to get rid of a dangerous witness), but a subtle kind of hearsay. Effectively it was held that there was no difference between a verbal “brush-off” and a deliberately informative statement: “Good evening, I am ‘X’ and this is my mother ‘Y’.” The elusiveness of this esoteric law appears in the early case of Wright v Doe d Tatham,1153 where letters written to a testator were tendered not to prove the irrelevant facts asserted in them, but to show that the writers – his friends – saw him as a mentally competent person. That evidence was rejected as hearsay. But in the same case insulting catcalls by naughty children were admitted to prove that he was a “silly old man”! However, the complexities of “implied assertion” need not be exaggerated. In Walton v The Queen1154 it was said that the “betting shop” cases1155 were correctly decided and that, for most practical purposes, the distinction between hearsay and original evidence is valid. Anxiety to avoid an absurd extreme inspired a new exception to the hearsay rule in Pollitt, and the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 59 reduces the scope for pedantry by redefining hearsay as a statement intended to assert the facts expressed or implied: see [F.32].

Exceptions to the hearsay rule Res gesta utterances [A.145] Statements admitted as original evidence are not exceptions to the hearsay rule. They stand outside that rule because they lack an essential ingredient of hearsay: they are tendered as relevant facts, not as true narratives. There is a true exception to the rule when a prior statement is admitted to prove the facts it asserts despite the fact that it infringes the primary rule of exclusion. One such exception concerns utterances or statements that are part of a res gesta. Utterances that are effectively part and parcel of a central event may be admitted on the basis that their spontaneity enhances their reliability.1156 But according to Adelaide Chemical and Fertiliser Co Ltd v Carlyle,1157 this exception is limited 1151. (1992) 174 CLR 558. 1152. (1989) 168 CLR 110. 1153. (1837) 7 Ad & E 128; 112 ER 488. 1154. (1989) 166 CLR 283 at 293 and 302–303. 1155. For example, Sidey v Schull; Ex parte Sidey [1978] Qd R 290. 1156. Walton v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 283 at 304; Pollitt v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 558. 1157. (1940) 64 CLR 514; see also Brown v The King (1913) 17 CLR 570; Vocisano v Vocisano (1974) 130 CLR 267 at 270-271; Cook v The Queen (2000) 22 WAR 67; 110 A Crim R 117 © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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to statements closely contemporaneous with the event in issue. It is not enough to say that, despite some significant lapse of time, concoction was unlikely.1159 In Eaton v Nominal Defendant (Qld)1160 the statement was made about 10 minutes after the event, when the speaker was giving an argumentative account of the subject collision. A res gesta submission was rejected. But under the influence of more liberal English authorities,1161 the principle of Carlyle’s case may now be less rigorously applied. While the close time-test has not been formally abandoned, there appears to be more emphasis on spontaneity, or the absence of an opportunity for reflection. There are characteristically expansive dicta of Kirby P in Sydney Electricity Authority v Giles,1162 although the facts of that case suggest that very little time elapsed between the incident (the plaintiff’s head striking a switch box) and his telling a fellow worker: “I bumped my head.” In Ross v Hamilton1163 a statement by a semi-conscious plaintiff about seeing “a little green man” just before he was knocked down on a busy road was deemed part of the res gesta. (The “little green man” was not an extra-terrestrial visitor, but the “walk now” signal at a pedestrian crossing.) Muir J was satisfied that five minutes was “very much an outside estimate of the time which elapsed between the conversation and the accident”. In R v Lambert1164 the fact that a person addressed the accused by his Christian name at the time of an assault was admitted to prove identity. In R v Ung1165 a conversation between two men charged with importing drugs, while unloading them, was treated as part and parcel of the illicit operation. In Llewellyn v Police1166 the production of a driver’s licence bearing the defendant’s name was so proximate to a traffic offence as to be evidence of identity. See now s 93B of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), inserted in 2000, dealing with certain serious criminal charges. It allows the testimonial use of a third-party

(conversation on tape recording not proximate enough to alleged assault). The concepts of contemporaneity and spontaneity are closely associated: Western Australia v Montani [2006] WASC 190; Warren v Coombes [1976] ACLD 214 (NSW); Bull v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 443. For examples of sufficient contemporaneity, see R v McIntosh [1968] Qd R 570; Van Den Hoek v The Queen (1985) 17 A Crim R 191; Pagett v Hales [2000] NTSC 35. An early case consistent with the Adelaide Chemical Co case is R v Foster (1834) 6 Car & P 325; 172 ER 1261 (statement to bystander immediately after being run down by horse-drawn vehicle). Compare Davies v Fortior Ltd [1952] 1 All ER 1359, where a man’s statement after falling into a bath of acid was deemed part of the res gestae. (It may also have been an admission.) 1158. Brown v The King (1913) 17 CLR 570 (statement after walking 25 yards from main event not part of res gestae). But the “event [itself] may extend over a considerable period of time”: R v Burns [1999] SASC 493 (drug importation scheme – statements admitted). 1159. Eaton v Nominal Defendant (Qld) (1995) 21 MVR 357 (Qld Sup Ct CA). 1160. (1995) 21 MVR 357. 1161. Notably Ratten v The Queen [1972] AC 378 at 391, cited in Pollitt v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 558 at 580. 1162. [1993] NWCCR 700. 1163. [1997] QSC 170. 1164. (2000) 111 A Crim R 564. 1165. (2000) 112 A Crim R 344. 1166. (2005) 91 SASR 418; [2005] SASC 160.

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statement against interest, or one made “shortly after” the event, or in circumstances that make it “highly probable the representation is reliable”. There are notes on that provision in [93B.1]ff. Interlocutory proceedings [A.146] Hearsay is admissible in interlocutory proceedings provided that it (and its source) are clearly identified.1167 Section 129A(3)1168 opens the way for ad hoc exceptions to the hearsay rule in proceedings that are not merely interlocutory. But admissibility is not necessarily the same thing as adequacy. A source is not sufficiently identified by a reference to a company; the relevant individual should be specified. A fresh affidavit from a person with direct knowledge was ordered in International Entertainment (Aust) Pty Ltd v Churchill.1169 Material that is inadmissible opinion, or which offends a rule other than hearsay should not be included in an affidavit, even in interlocutory proceedings.1170 Extrinsic evidence may be given to prove that an affidavit was duly witnessed, although the witness did not in fact sign the document as prescribed.1171 Similarly, proof may be given that an affidavit was sworn, although the jurat clause is not completed.1172 Pursuant to rr 371(1) and 436 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (irregularity not a cause of nullity) an affidavit that is not signed on every page may be received in evidence.1173 Custody proceedings [A.147] Where the welfare of a young child is concerned, there is a common law discretion1174 to receive hearsay evidence.1175

1167. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Ahern (No 2) [1988] 2 Qd R 158; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 430. This rule was not observed in Westpac Banking Corporation v Hilliard (No 3) [2007] VSC 58. There is a discretion to waive the rule, eg in urgent cases: Liesfeld v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 348. 1168. Inserted by Civil Proceedings Act 2011, s 146. 1169. [2003] QSC 247. See also Westpac Banking Corporation v Hilliard (No 3) [2007] VSC 58. 1170. Re Juson Pty Ltd (1992) 8 WAR 13. 1171. Fastlink Calling Pty Ltd v Macquarie Telecom Pty Ltd (2008) 217 FLR 366; [2008] NSWSC 299. 1172. Micar Group Pty Ltd v Insul-Trade LLC (2010) 244 FLR 403; [2010] NSWSC 1391; GPC (WA) Pty Ltd v Investec Bank (Australia) Ltd [2010] WASC 171. 1173. LJAW Enterprises Pty Ltd v RJK Enterprises Pty Ltd [2004] QSC 134 at [18]. 1174. See now Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 100A. 1175. Offıcial Solicitor v K [1965] AC 201; Dale v Scott; Ex parte Dale [1985] 1 Qd R 406. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Contemporaneous statements re thoughts or feelings [A.148] When a person makes a statement about current thoughts or feelings, that statement is admissible to prove that he or she had those thoughts or feelings at the time when it was made.1176 (An alternative explanation treats it as “original evidence”.)1177 This exception may be used to prove: (a) pain and suffering in a personal injuries case; or (b) in an action for wrongful arrest, a police officer’s reasonable belief that there was good cause to arrest the plaintiff;1178 (c) that “A” intended to meet “B” (and inferentially did so);1179 (d) that a testator had certain things in mind when making a will.1180 In Walton v The Queen1181 a murder victim’s statement was evidence that she met the accused at the material time. In Sidmouth v Sidmouth1182 a parent’s instructions while making certain payments was evidence of a trust. This exception does not require that the statement-maker be dead or unavailable.1183 It is a moot point whether results of public opinion surveys are covered by this exception.1184 One view is that they are “double, perhaps even treble hearsay”,1185 admissible only if every interviewee is called.1186 Probably the 1176. Aveson v Lord Kinnaird (1805) 6 East 188; 102 ER 1258; R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510; Gross v Weston (2007) 69 NSWLR 279 at [32]. The rule includes inarticulate utterances, such as sounds of suffering: Gilbey v Great Western Railway (1910) 102 LT 202. 1177. Hughes v National Trustees Executors & Agency Co of Australasia Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 134; 23 ALR 321 at 149-150 (CLR), 334-335 (ALR); Walton v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 283 at 288. 1178. Brown v Mahony [1967] Qd R 592. 1179. Walton v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 283; Kamleh v The Queen (2005) 79 ALJR 541; [2005] HCA 2. See also R v Gilfoyle [1996] 3 All ER 883, where a woman’s statement that she had been asked to draft a suicide note for a project her husband was writing on suicide was admissible to negative a theory that her death was self-inflicted. 1180. Hughes v National Trustees Executors & Agency Co of Australasia Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 134. Section 92 takes this further: Baker v Affoo [2014] QSC 46 at [52]. 1181. (1989) 166 CLR 283; see also R v Jones (2006) 161 A Crim R 511; [2006] SASC 189. 1182. (1840) 2 Beav 447; 48 ER 1254. 1183. R v Perry (No 2) (1981) 28 SASR 95 at 97; and Batista v Citra Constructions Pty Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 351; Walton v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 283 at 288-289 per Mason CJ. 1184. Mulheron, “Survey Evidence in Passing-off and Trademark Litigation – Admissibility and Weight” (1996) 26 Q Law Soc J 449; Shafron, “Admissibility of Surveys in Evidence” (1989) 12 Syd LR 218. There is a good review of authorities in Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz (1988) 15 NSWLR 158 at 178. Such evidence has been “received coolly in recent years in the Federal Court”: James Hardie Industries NV v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2010) 274 ALR 85; 81 ASCR 1; [2010] NSWCA 332 at [94]. 1185. Hoban’s Glynde Pty Ltd v Firle Hotel Pty Ltd (1973) 4 SASR 503 at 506 per Bray CJ. See also McDonald’s System of Australia Pty Ltd v McWilliam’s Wines Pty Ltd (1979) 41 FLR 436; 28 ALR 236; Mobil Oil Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks [1984] VR 25; (1983) 51 ALR 735. 1186. Mobil Oil Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks [1984] VR 25; (1983) 51 ALR 735.

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better view is that, when the public’s thoughts or feelings are relevant – as in cases of passing-off or deceptive conduct – survey results are admissible,1187 although their reliability may be disputed.1188 Alternatively, the common law question can be bypassed by appealing to a statutory discretion1189 to allow hearsay when strict proof would be unduly burdensome.1190 Informal admissions [A.149] A prior statement by a party that is adverse to that party’s interests in current litigation is admissible under a major exception to the hearsay rule: see [Q.43]. Confessions [A.150] A confession is an informal admission of one or more of the ultimate facts in a criminal case: see [Q.49]. Certain statements by deceased witnesses [A.151] The following statements by deceased witnesses are admissible at common law: (i) Statements against interest (distinguish admissions by parties) The statement must be based on personal knowledge; it must appear that the maker knew he or she was speaking against an interest1191 pecuniary in character.1192 If these conditions are satisfied by any part of the statement a relevant portion is admissible.1193 (ii) Statements made as a legal duty The statement must be based on personal knowledge, with no apparent motive for distortion. The duty may be imposed by private or public law.1194 1187. Customglass Boats Pty Ltd v Salthouse Brothers Ltd [1976] 1 NZLR 36; Beavan Investments Ltd v Blackall and Struthers (No 2) [1978] 2 NZLR 97 at 124; Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313; [1990] ATPR 41–061; Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 158 at 178; Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] ATPR 42-112; [2006] FCA 364. 1188. In Interlego AG and Lego Australia Pty Ltd v Croner Trading Pty Ltd [1991] ATPR 41-124 there is a close analysis of defective methodology. 1189. Federal Court Rules, O 78 r 31. 1190. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 92(2)(f); Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 64(2); Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313; [1990] ATPR 41–061; State Government Insurance Corporation v Government Insurance Offıce of NSW (1991) 28 FCR 511; 101 ALR 259 (1,200 interviewees involved). 1191. Tucker v Oldbury UDC [1912] 2 KB 317; Roberts v Burns Philp Trustee Co Ltd (1985) 5 NSWLR 72 at 78. 1192. Sussex Peerage Case (1844) 11 Cl & F 85; 8 ER 1034; Lloyd v Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co Ltd [1914] AC 733 at 741; R v Rogers [1995] 1 Cr App R 374. 1193. Taylor v Witham (1876) 3 Ch D 605; Lenehan v Queensland Trustees Ltd [1965] Qd R 559 at 571-573; Roberts v Burns Philp Trustee Co Ltd (1985) 5 NSWLR 72 (statement against proprietary interest). 1194. Chambers v Bernasconi (1834) 149 ER 1114; The Henry Coxon (1878) LR 3 PD 156. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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The common law relating to statements against interest and statements made under a legal duty is largely overtaken by Pt 6 of the present Act, but it is preserved by s 103. (iii) Dying declarations This exception is confined to cases of homicide. A statement made when the victim has “a settled, hopeless expectation of death” is evidence of the identity of the assailant or of any other circumstance of the death.1195 The necessary elements need only be proved to the civil standard.1196 A confession by an arsonist immediately after he was shot by police was described as “similar to a dying declaration” in R v Long; Ex parte Attorney-General.1197 The statement need not be made immediately before death, provided that, when it was made, the speaker expected to die.1198 Sometimes when that expectation is not established,1199 the statement is admissible as part of the res gesta.1200 A statement made ten minutes after a fatal attack was clearly not part of the res gesta, but qualified as a dying declaration.1201 See now s 93B. Statements in public documents [A.152]

See [51.1].

Evidence in earlier proceedings [A.153] At common law this is a narrow exception. The parties must be the same, the issues substantially the same, the opponent must have had a fair opportunity to cross-examine on the previous occasion, and the absence of the former witness must be explained by death, serious illness, absence from the jurisdiction or unavailability after due search.1202 But see now s 92(4)(c) of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld)1203 (information recorded in the course of and ancillary to a legal proceeding) and the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, r 395.1204 1195. R v Woodcock (1789) 1 Leach 500; 168 ER 352; R v Hugh Lunny (1854) 6 Cox CC 477; R v Arnott (1992) 79 A Crim R 275; R v Brooks (2007) 96 SASR 478; [2007] SASC 234. The statement must relate to the cause of death: Western Australia v Montani [2006] WASC 190; R v Donohoe (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 38; R v Savage [1970] Tas SR 137. 1196. R v Buzzacott (2010) 107 SASR 564; [2010] SASC 234 (proof insufficient); Western Australia v Montani [2006] WASC 190. 1197. (2003) 138 A Crim R 103; [2003] QCA 77. 1198. R v Bernadotti (1869) 11 Cox CC 316. But in a case where the deceased said “I have no present hope of recovery”, the statement was excluded: R v Jenkins (1869) LR 1 CCR 187. The word “present” was crucial. 1199. A voir dire was held on this point in R v Arnott (1992) 79 A Crim R 275. 1200. R v Golightly (1997) 17 WAR 401; R v Kadibil [1999] WASC 67; see [A.145]. The statements in Western Australia v Montani [2006] WASC 190 were admissible on either basis. 1201. R v Goddard (1882) 15 Cox CC 7. 1202. Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 2) [1976] VR 363. 1203. “For the purposes of [Pt 6] a statement contained in a document is made by a person if … it was recorded in the course of, or ancillary to a proceeding.” 1204. The concept of “fresh complaint” is enlarged by the Evidence Act 1995, as noted at [F.45].

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Fresh complaint [A.154] On a charge of sexual assault, a spontaneous1205 statement by the complainant1206 about the offence, made at the first reasonable opportunity, was admissible at common law as “a buttress to credit”,1207 but not as evidence of the facts asserted.1208 It was usually proved by calling both the person who made it and the person who received it.1209 If the receiver were unavailable, the complainant could still give the evidence,1210 although its weight might then be diminished.1211 If there were a long delay between alleged assault and complaint, the jury1212 had to be warned about possible effects on the weight of the prosecution evidence (the “Longman direction”)1213 and, especially,1214 about consequent difficulties faced by the defence.1215 (Quaere whether it is proper to mention difficulties faced by the police.)1216 In Crampton v The Queen1217 Hayne J observed that a delay of 19 years “inevitably meant that the accused was put at a significant disadvantage, of a kind and to an extent which a jury might not appreciate without a proper direction”. Such a lapse of time between offence and prosecution “creates a circumstance palpable or obvious to a judge, but which a jury might fail to appreciate … [A]fter such a long period of time, an accused is forensically disadvantaged by losing a chance to test the complainant’s evidence or to 1205. R v Warman (2006) 94 SASR 521; [2006] SASC 151. 1206. Male or female: R v Camelleri [1922] 2 KB 122. 1207. R v Robertson; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 262. 1208. Kilby v The Queen (1973) 129 CLR 460; R v Stoupas (1997) 94 A Crim R 525; Suresh v The Queen (1998) 102 A Crim R 18; 72 ALJR 769; R v Schneider [2001] 1 Qd R 546; [1998] QCA 303 at [14]. It is wrong to tell a jury that they can use evidence of fresh complaint “to support” the complainant’s evidence. The right direction is that it is “exceptionally limited by the law” as showing only a consistency between her reaction at the time and her account of events in court: R v Stoupas (1997) 94 A Crim R 525. 1209. Ugle v The Queen (1989) 43 A Crim R 446 at 447. 1210. In R v GAE (2000) 1 VR 198; 109 A Crim R 419 the complainant told her mother the next day, but the mother died several years before the trial. 1211. R v J (No 2) [1998] 3 VR 602. 1212. In an appropriate case a judge sitting without a jury must give the Longman doctrine careful consideration: AM v Western Australia (2008) 188 A Crim R 457; [2008] WASCA 196. 1213. R v MBX [2013] QCA 214; Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79 (20 years’ delay); R v T (1999) 74 SASR 486; Doggett v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 343 (between nine and 12 years); Crampton v The Queen (2000) 206 CLR 161; [2000] HCA 60 (19 years); R v WRC (2002) 130 A Crim R 89; R v Mazzolini [1999] 3 VR 113; Jones v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 439; JJB v The Queen (2006) 161 A Crim R 187; [2006] NSWCCA 126 (between 12 and 17 years); Hunt v Western Australia (No 2) (2008) 37 WAR 530; [2008] WASCA 210; MLB v The Queen (2010) 27 NTLR 198; [2010] NTCCA 11. 1214. Sheehan v The Queen (2006) 163 A Crim R 397; [2006] NSWCCA 233. As to the appropriate emphasis in the warning see FJL v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 8. 1215. MWR v The Queen [2003] WASCA 236; TJ v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 257. The warning should be tailored to the facts of the case: DRE v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 400; [2006] NSWCCA 280; R v Inston (2009) 103 SASR 265; [2009] SASC 89. The warning should focus on the difficulties facing the defence, not the prosecution: R v GVV (2008) 184 A Crim R 242; [2008] VSCA 170. 1216. R v RW (2008) 18 VR 666; [2008] VSCA 79. 1217. (2000) 206 CLR 161; [2000] HCA 60 at [140]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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1218

adequately marshall a defence”. But there is no magic in the words “dangerous” or “warning”; it suffices to say that it may be “unsafe” to convict.1219 Abolition of the corroboration rule1220 does not eliminate the need for a “Longman direction” in an appropriate case.1221 In the event of a long delay (20 years in Longman itself), it is essential that this direction be given in specific and emphatic terms,1222 even when there is corroboration.1223 Contrast Tully v The Queen,1224 where the delay was less than three years, and the victim was 16 years of age at the time. Well before the 2003 amendment (Criminal Code, s 632), the “first reasonable opportunity” requirement became more sensitive to the complainant’s age, education, temperament and circumstances.1225 There could be a “complaint” (at least to a stranger) that did not specify sexual assault.1226 A complaint could be in the form of a question, rather than a narrative statement.1227 It was a “complaint” when the victim noted the assault in her diary, and later confirmed the note to her mother.1228 There is an analogy to “fresh complaint” when an accused alleges an assault by police before a confession was made. The absence of an early complaint to a superior officer may discredit such a claim.1229

1218. Tully v The Queen (2006) 230 CLR 234; [2006] HCA 56 at [177]-[178] per Crennan J. 1219. DRE v The Queen (2006) 163 A Crim R 400; [2006] NSWCCA 280; Sepulveda v The Queen (2006) 167 A Crim R 108; [2006] NSWCCA 379. 1220. Criminal Code, s 632. 1221. Robinson v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 162 at 169. However, the question of a Longman direction was a “red herring” in Tully v The Queen (2006) 230 CLR 234; [2006] HCA 56, where reasons other than delay arguably required specific warnings to the jury. 1222. R v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241; DPW v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 583; [2006] NSWCCA 295. For an example of a failure to do so, see R v MWL (2002) 137 A Crim R 282; [2002] VSCA 221. 1223. Doggett v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 343. But see now R v Mason [2006] QCA 125 at [24]: “A judge must not warn or suggest in any way to the jury that the law regards the complainant’s evidence to be more or less reliable only because of the length of time before the complainant made a complaint (s 4A(4)) [of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 (Qld)].” 1224. (2006) 230 CLR 234; [2006] HCA 56. 1225. Jonkers v Police (1996) 67 SASR 401; R v Sailor [1994] 2 Qd R 342; Miller v The Queen (1995) 13 WAR 504; R v M (2000) 109 A Crim R 530; [2000] QCA 20; R v GG (2004) 151 A Crim R 92; [2004] VSCA 238 (child 10 years, two weeks’ delay); R v HRA (2008) 183 A Crim R 91; [2008] VSCA 56. In R v Warner [1996] 1 Qd R 573 the Court of Appeal held that a complaint by a nine-year-old child, made one week after the event, could be treated as made at the first reasonable opportunity. 1226. R v Ives [1973] Qd R 128; but see also R v Saunders [1965] Qd R 409. Distinguish the prejudicial evidence of changes in a child’s demeanour in R v Litzow [2011] QCA 366. 1227. R v Abela (2007) 170 A Crim R 244; [2007] VSCA 22. 1228. R v Woitowicz (2005) 156 A Crim R 237; [2005] NTSC 53. 1229. R v Wright (1990) 49 A Crim R 462.

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Preliminary complaint (statutory) The common law has been overtaken by the concept of “preliminary complaint”, introduced by the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 (Qld) (CLSOA), s 4A, as amended by the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003 (Qld). A “preliminary complaint” is admissible whenever made,1230 and a judge must not suggest that delay in making it is in itself1231 a reason for treating it as unreliable. Nevertheless, delay remains a relevant consideration.1232 In R v Noyes,1233 a case of indecent dealing with a child under 14 years, a delay of more than 30 years did not invalidate the conviction. But other circumstances, including matters personal to the complainant, may require a Longman warning,1234 because neither s 4A of the CLSOA, nor s 632 of the Criminal Code affects the duty to ensure a fair trial.1235 At first sight it seems that the 2003 amendment eliminates the highly artificial distinction between evidence on the issues and evidence as to credit that governed “fresh complaints” at common law. That is the effect of similar Commonwealth legislation.1236 But in R v RH1237 it was held that the common law distinction remains. That conclusion was asserted rather than demonstrated. The judgments in R v RH do not consider the remedial nature of the legislation, the change embodied in the federal Act, or the fact that s 4(2) of the CLSOA, as amended, declares that preliminary complaints are “admissible in evidence” without mentioning the old refinement. The rule in Walker v Walker [A.155] When “A” calls for a document that “B” has in court, and “B” complies, “B” may then require “A” to tender it. The contents of the document are then evidence of any relevant fact recorded, the hearsay rule notwithstanding.1238 The rule only applies to a formal “call” for a document that 1230. R v Mason [2006] QCA 125. It is more likely that an allegation of rape is true when the complainant complains at the first reasonable opportunity: R v Munday (2003) 7 VR 423; [2003] VSCA 189. 1231. Tully v The Queen (2006) 230 CLR 234; [2006] HCA 56. However, other circumstances, in combination with delay, may make a significant difference. 1232. Watson v The Queen (2010) 204 A Crim R 30; [2010] VSCA 189; Crofts v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 427; [1996] HCA 22; RMC v Western Australia [2015] WASCA 33 at [20]. 1233. R v Noyes [2005] 1 Qd R 169; [2003] QCA 564. 1234. R v TN (2005) 153 A Crim R 129; [2005] QCA 160 (aff’d Tully v The Queen (2006) 230 CLR 234; [2006] HCA 56). 1235. Tully v The Queen (2006) 230 CLR 234; [2006] HCA 56 at [161] per Crennan J. 1236. Section 66 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) makes “fresh complaint” evidence on the issues: Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297; R v Kirkman (2000) 155 FLR 9. 1237. [2005] 1 Qd R 180; [2004] QCA 225; see also Jones v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 439; R v Mason [2006] QCA 125. 1238. Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630; Jameson v Smith (1989) 11 QL Reps 47. As to what amounts to “calling for” a document, see Alexander v Manley (2004) 29 WAR 194; [2004] WASCA 140. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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1239

the “caller” is otherwise not entitled to see. Walker v Walker does not apply to the inspection of a “contemporary note”: see [19.22]. It is uncertain whether this rule applies to criminal proceedings,1240 but that question may now be academic, in view of the prosecution’s statutory duty of disclosure: see [Q.11]. The rule is not available in cases governed by the Commonwealth Act.1241 The “telephone exception” [A.156] Statements made during or immediately after a telephone conversation are admissible to identify the other party to the conversation. This exception was invented by the High Court in 1992 to avoid a potentially embarrassing application of the “implied assertion” doctrine.1242 Statutory exceptions [A.157] The position in Queensland is considered at [74.1] and [83.1] – [103.1]. As to the position in federal courts, see [F.38].

Rules of privilege Marital privilege [A.158] Marital privilege was abolished in Queensland in 2003: see s 8(2) and (3) and s 138 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld). It remained available in the Crime and Misconduct Commission,1243 but see now s 192 of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld), as amended in 2008. Crown or public interest privilege [A.159] A court may prohibit or restrict access to information1244 if unrestricted access would unduly prejudice the public interest in: (a) national security; (b) the confidentiality of cabinet deliberations;1245 (c) international relations; 1239. Alexander v Manley (2004) 29 WAR 194; [2004] WASCA 140. 1240. Stroud v Stroud [1963] 1 WLR 1080; R v Weatherstone (1968) 12 FLR 14 (committal proceedings). 1241. Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 35. 1242. See [A.144]; Pollitt v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 558 (“Hello daddy”); Miladinovic v The Queen (1993) 47 FCR 190; R v Jones (2006) 161 A Crim R 511; [2006] SASC 189. 1243. Callanan v B (2004) 151 A Crim R 287; [2004] QCA 478; Witness D v Crime and Misconduct Commission [2008] QSC 155. As to the Australian Crime Commission, see Stoddart v Boulton (2009) 260 ALR 268; [2009] FCA 1108; (2010) 271 ALR 53; [2010] FCAFC 89. 1244. Relevant cases are Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1; Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910; Adsteam Building Industries Pty Ltd v Queensland Cement and Lime Co Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 1; Spargos Mining NL v Standard Chartered Australia Ltd (No 1) (1989) 1 ACSR 311; 8 ACLC 87; Maritime Union of Australia v Geraldton Port Authority (1999) 88 IR 351. 1245. Public interest privilege was extended to a letter from a Minister to the Prime Minister, requesting that certain matters be urgently discussed by Cabinet in Commonwealth v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union (2000) 98 FCR 31; 171 ALR 379.

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(d) the conduct of prosecutions or disciplinary proceedings;1246 (e) the efficient operation of government;1247 or (f) protection for police informants.1248 This privilege (or immunity) cannot be waived.1249 It is a substantive legal principle, not a mere rule of evidence.1250 The point may be raised by the court, a litigant, or a witness.1251 The rule is applicable to oral as well as documentary evidence.1252 Parliamentary privilege is a distinct species.1253 A party may tender a report of something said in Parliament (or to a select committee)1254 to prove the fact that it was said, but it may not be used as evidence of the truth of what was said,1255 or of the legislators’ motives.1256 Special provision for admissibility of evidence of parliamentary proceedings, for the purposes of the Criminal Law (False Evidence Before Parliament) Amendment Act 2012 is made in s 53 of the Criminal Code. It is not necessary that documents in which public interest privilege is claimed be property of the Crown or in the possession of a government agency.1257 While

1246. Finch v Grieve (1991) 22 NSWLR 578. 1247. For example, confidential information regarding security in a prison: Nicopoulos v Commissioner for Corrective Services (2004) 148 A Crim R 74; [2004] NSWSC 562; Ryan v Victoria [2015] VSCA 353 (police documents on operational matters). 1248. Rogers v Home Secretary [1973] AC 388; Cain v Glass (No 2) (1985) 3 NSWLR 230; Attorney-General (NSW) v Stuart (1994) 75 A Crim R 8; Eastman v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 9; Ryan v Victoria [2015] VSCA 353 at [56]. The common law protection of police informants is made absolute by s 47 of the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld): “A person who appears as witness shall not be compelled to disclose the name of an informer”; see also R v Demir [1990] 2 Qd R 433. 1249. Victoria v Seal Rocks Victoria (Aust) Pty Ltd (2001) 3 VR 1; [2001] VSCA 94; Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade (No 2) [1983] 2 AC 394 at 436. 1250. Jacobsen v Rogers (1995) 182 CLR 572 at 579; R v Lipton (2011) 82 NSWLR 123; Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Gao [2016] FCAFC 62. 1251. Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 44, 58-59. 1252. Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 38. 1253. According to parliamentary privilege, members of Parliament cannot, without the consent of Parliament, be compelled to testify about events in that place: Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 36. Nor can a court examine the truth of things said in Parliament or the motives of the speaker: R v Turnbull [1958] Tas SR 80; Mundey v Askin [1982] 2 NSWLR 369; see also Campbell, “Parliamentary Privilege and the Admissibility of Evidence” (1999) 27 FL Rev 367. 1254. Cornwall v Rowan (2004) 90 SASR 269; [2004] SASC 384. 1255. Mees v Main Roads Corporation (2003) 128 FCR 418; [2003] FCA 306; AMI Australia Holdings Pty Ltd v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (2009) 74 NSWLR 612; [2009] NSWSC 863. 1256. Queensland Harness Racing Ltd v Racing Queensland Ltd [2013] 2 Qd R 372; [2012] QSC 34. 1257. Sayers v Perrin (No 1) [1965] Qd R 221; Kleimeyer v Clay [1965] QWN 26; Royal Women’s Hospital v Medical Practitioners’ Board (Vic) (2006) 15 VR 22; [2006] VSCA 85; James v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2011] NSWSC 331. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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1258

confidentiality is a relevant consideration (as with other forms of privilege), it is not conclusive.1259 The public interest in professional discipline outweighed the confidentiality of a hospital’s gynaecological records in Royal Women’s Hospital v Medical Practitioners’ Board of Victoria.1260 A claim of public interest immunity was upheld in that case, although the information had already been given in open court.1261 The decision is one for the court, not the executive government.1262 The court is entitled to a clear statement on affidavit of the reasons for the claim,1263 but cross-examination of the claimant is not usually allowed.1264 In weighing the interest of the litigant against the public interest, a court should consider the relevance and importance of the material in the current litigation, whether it is already in the public domain, whether time has diminished the public interest in non-disclosure, and whether disclosure would deprive the government of important sources of information.1265 It must appear that disclosure would cause substantial detriment, or risk of detriment, to the public interest in good government.1266 That test was satisfied in Australian Statistician v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd1267 with respect to confidential interviews conducted for preparation of an official price index. Public interest privilege in confidential Law Society records prevailed over a demand for disclosure under s 264(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) in Law Institute of Victoria Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (No 2).1268 A prosecutor’s duty of disclosure to the defence may be limited by public interest considerations.1269

1258. Prior disclosure defeated a claim of public interest privilege in Trevorrow v South Australia (No 3) (2005) 94 SASR 44; [2005] SASC 471. The fact that confidentiality was not sought was fatal to the claim in Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Amcor Ltd [2008] FCA 88. 1259. In the Marriage of K and K [1981] FLC 91-009; Mok v NSW Crime Commission [2002] NSWCA 53 (access allowed to witness’s prison medical records). 1260. [2005] VSC 225; see also Royal Women’s Hospital v Medical Practitioners’ Board (Vic) (2006) 15 VR 22; [2006] VSCA 85. 1261. P v D1 [No 3] (2010) 202 A Crim R 40; [2010] NSWSC 644 (“material useful to criminals” on court file). 1262. The interest of liberty of the subject took precedence over secrecy of parole board papers in Re Queensland Community Correction Board; Ex parte Smith QLR 13 April 1991. The difficulties of balancing the public interest and the interests of the litigant are discussed in Criminal Justice Commission v Collins (1994) 74 A Crim R 63. 1263. Kirby v Prisoners Review Board (No 2) [2010] WASC 280. 1264. Young v Quin (1985) 4 FCR 483; 59 ALR 225; Woodroffe v National Crime Authority (1999) 168 ALR 585 (aff’d (1999) 107 A Crim R 384); NAFQ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 473 at [27]. 1265. Trevorrow v South Australia (No 3) (2005) 94 SASR 44; [2005] SASC 471. 1266. Attorney-General (NSW) v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCCA 307. “Class” claims, irrespective of contents, are particularly difficult to establish: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Law Institute of Victoria (2010) 267 ALR 127; [2010] VSCA 73. 1267. [2008] WASCA 34. 1268. [2009] VSC 179. 1269. Criminal Code, s 590AQ; R v Kashani-Malaki [2010] QCA 222 (record of lawful inception by Australian Crime Commission).

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Hearsay and Character Evidence

The judicial discretion may be removed by statute,1270 but not every secrecy provision has that effect. For example, if a statute prohibits disclosure “unless it is necessary”, a court may decide whether necessity exists.1271 When legislation prohibited disclosure to “any person”, it was adroitly decided that the word “person” did not include a court.1272 The special immunities of federal taxation officers1273 may be seen as a statutory version of public interest privilege. [A.160] There is no absolute rule that Cabinet papers are privileged; the immunity must be weighed against the public interest in the administration of justice.1274 But disclosure of recent material requires exceptional circumstances.1275 When conspiracy was alleged against a Minister of State, disclosure was ordered of Cabinet papers that were several years old.1276 Even “high policy” documents may lose their privileged character as time passes1277 or if they are needed for the defence of a serious criminal charge.1278 A decision upon a claim of public interest privilege is not necessarily “black or white”. It may be possible to strike a balance – for example, by ordering that sources of information be deleted before inspection is allowed. Disclosure of secret evidence before a Royal Commission was ordered in R v Connell (No 4)1279 on condition that counsel would not reveal the information to any other person without the court’s permission. In NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority1280 limited access was given to Cabinet papers concerning national competition policy, although the subject was still topical and controversial. In some circumstances material covered by public interest privilege may be taken into account by the court, without disclosing it to the parties, natural justice notwithstanding.1281

1270. See Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), Sch 1 Div 355-280; Purnell Brothers v Transport Engineers Pty Ltd (1984) 73 FLR 160; Roberts v Hay [1982] Qd R 688; (1982) 13 ATR 619. 1271. National Crime Authority v Gould (1989) 23 FCR 191; 90 ALR 489; see also Piras v Thaisawat [1993] FLC 92-417. 1272. Von Snarski v Criminal Justice Commission [1998] 1 Qd R 562, interpreting s 99 of the Criminal Justice Act 1989 (Qld). 1273. Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), s 82K; Sch 1 Div 355-75. “Confidential information” is defined in Div 355-50. 1274. Commonwealth v Northern Land Council (1993) 176 CLR 604 at 616; [1993] HCA 24; Spencer v Commonwealth (2012) 206 FCR 309; [2012] FCAFC 169. 1275. Commonwealth v Northern Land Council (1993) 176 CLR 604; [1993] HCA 24. 1276. Maritime Union of Australia v Geraldton Port Authority (1999) 93 FCR 34. 1277. Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1. 1278. Alister v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 404 (ASIO files); see also R v Haydon (No 2) [2005] SASC 16; R v Cox (No 3) [2006] VSC 58 (police intelligence report including names of informants). But morbidity records prepared under statute for a State Health Commission were privileged in R v C (2006) 244 LSJS 212; [2006] SASC 158. 1279. (1992) 9 WAR 567; see also A3 v Australian Crime Commission [2006] FCA 894. 1280. [2000] ATPR 41-746. 1281. Nicopoulos v Commissioner for Corrective Services (2004) 148 A Crim R 74; [2004] NSWSC 562. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[A.161]

Privilege against self-incrimination [A.161]

This topic is discussed at [10.1]ff.

LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE Overview [A.162]

Legal professional privilege is treated as follows:

(a) lawyer-client communications: see [A.163]; (b) circumstances preventing or terminating professional privilege: see [A.175]; (c) material prepared for litigation:1282 see [A.187]; and (d) “without prejudice” negotiations: see [A.197]. A claim of professional privilege may be made upon a pre-trial application, or in an affidavit of discovery in a civil case, or at the hearing. Cross-examination on an affidavit asserting privilege is generally not allowed,1283 but additional evidence may be ordered if the initial material is inadequate. The judge may examine disputed material before ruling on its admissibility,1284 and the result of the examination may be evidence on the voir dire.1285 An objection to disclosure should identify the document in question, in case production is ordered. But an opponent is not entitled to all the detail that the judge may need to decide a disputed claim.1286 Procedure for claiming privilege, when challenged, is prescribed in the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 213.

1282. A distinction between communications privilege and litigation privilege is recognised in Re Highgrade Traders Ltd [1984] BCLC 151; Handley v Baddock [1987] WAR 98; Dingle v Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia (1989) 23 FCR 63; and Nagan v Holloway [1996] 1 Qd R 607. The expression “litigation privilege” is used in Southern Equities Corporation Ltd v Bond Petrochemicals (No 1) Pty Ltd (unreported, WA Sup Ct FC, 16 June 1993). Quaere whether it has a rationale distinct from that of legal professional privilege: Public Transport Authority (WA) v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (2007) 34 WAR 279; [2007] WASCA 151. 1283. Fruehauf Finance Corporation Pty Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 359. Where cross-examination is exceptionally allowed, it must not impinge on the prerogative of the judge: Registrar of the Workers’ Compensation Commission (NSW) v FAI Insurances Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 362. 1284. Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 677, 688-689; Trade Practices Commission v Sterling (1979) 36 FLR 244 at 246-247; Woollahra Municipal Council v Westpac Banking Corporation (1994) 33 NSWLR 529 at 541-542; Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 at [52]. 1285. Bailey v Department of Land and Water Conservation [2009] NSWCA 100 at [57]. 1286. Interchase Corporation Ltd (In liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Queensland) Pty Ltd (No 2) [1999] 1 Qd R 163.

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[A.163]

Legal Professional Privilege

Legal professional privilege is not confined to the courts; it may be claimed in administrative tribunals, and before any person or body lawfully entitled to compel information to be given.1287

Lawyer-client communications General rule [A.163] A confidential communication between lawyer1288 and client, predominantly1289 for the purpose of getting or giving legal advice, need not be disclosed to a court or other authority1290 with compulsory powers of inquiry.1291 The primary onus of establishing privilege is upon the party claiming it,1292 and “focused and specific evidence is required in respect of each communication, rather than mere generalised assertion”.1293 The privilege extends to notes,1294 memoranda and other documents (including copies)1295 recording such communications, or containing information sought by the adviser to enable proper advice to be given.1296 “Dominant purpose” means the prevailing, paramount or most influential purpose1297 at the time the document or statement was made.1298 It is not essential that there be a contract of retainer between the lawyer and the client;1299 accordingly, privilege may exist between a legal aid agency and its 1287. Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52; SZHWY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 159 FCR 1; [2007] FCAFC 64; Mantziaris, “Client Legal Privilege in Administrative Proceedings: Killing Off the Adversarial/Inquisitorial Distinction” (2008) 82 ALJ 397. 1288. The lawyer must be acting as such: Weston v Registrar-General (NSW) [2002] NSWSC 173. “Lawyer” here includes the lawyer’s clerks, employees or an agent (Australian Rugby Union Ltd v Hospitality Group Pty Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 253; 789TEN Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation Ltd (2005) 215 ALR 131; [2005] NSWSC 123 (auditor not agent)) or interpreter assisting in the giving of instructions: Russell v Jackson (1851) 9 Hare 387; 168 ER 558; Waterford v Commonwealth of Australia (1987) 163 CLR 54; see also Gibbs, “Legal Interpreting” (1988) LSJ (NSW) 56 at 59. 1289. The former “sole purpose” test was abandoned in favour of “dominant purpose” in Esso Resources Australia Limited v FCT (1999) 201 CLR 49. The common law test is now the same as that in the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss 118 and 119. 1290. Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52; Farnaby v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (2007) 47 AAR 11; [2007] AATA 1792 (Cth AAT). 1291. There is a very detailed discussion of this privilege by Lockhart J in Trade Practices Commission v Sterling (1979) 36 FLR 244. Several ways of establishing a claim of privilege are described in AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382; [2006] FCA 571. 1292. No admissible evidence was adduced by the claimant in Hancock v Rinehart [2016] NSWSC 12. 1293. Asahi Holdings (Australia) Pty Ltd v Pacific Equity Partners Pty Ltd (No 4) [2014] FCA 796 at [28]ff. 1294. Choo Cheng Kui v Quinn (1986) 11 FCR 217; 21 A Crim R 447. 1295. Dubai Bank Ltd v Galadari [1990] Ch 98; [1989] 3 WLR 1044 at 104 (Ch). 1296. AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30; [2006] FCA 1234 at [146]. 1297. Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd (2005) 60 ATR 466; [2005] FCA 1247. 1298. AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382; [2006] FCA 571. 1299. Minter v Priest [1929] 1 KB 655 at 666; Health Insurance Commissioner v Freeman (1998) 88 FCR 544 at 566. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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1300

clients, and between a client and a lawyer who subsequently refuses the retainer.1301 It is enough that the client – or intending client – holds a reasonable and bona fide belief that there is a lawyer-client relationship.1302 It does not matter if the client is potentially an “opposite party”.1303 Communications between officers of a company or government organisation1304 and an in-house lawyer may be privileged,1305 provided that the lawyer is acting as such,1306 enjoys proper professional independence,1307 and holds a current practising certificate.1308 (It is suggested in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich1309 that privilege may arise if the client has a reasonable belief that the lawyer has a current certificate.) Communications with an accountant with a law degree, but without a current certificate, are not normally privileged.1310 There is no presumption of a lack of independence,1311 and the onus of proof is upon the party contesting that point.1312 The tenure of several non-legal positions did not deprive the in-house lawyer of his professional independence in Oztech Pty Ltd v Public Trustee of Queensland (No 5).1313 A communication between a lawyer and his “dating agency” was denied privilege in R v Williams.1314

1300. As implied in R v Paddon [1999] 2 Qd R 387; [1998] QCA 248 (client of Public Defender). 1301. Hawksford v Hawksford [2008] NSWSC 31. 1302. Global Funds Management (NSW) Ltd v Rooney (1994) 36 NSWLR 122 at 130. 1303. Sugden v Sugden (2007) 70 NSWLR 301; [2007] NSWCA 312. 1304. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich [2004] NSWSC 1089. 1305. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Qld) v Citibank Ltd [1989] 1 Qd R 516; (1988) 88 ATC 4941, but only if the communication with the lawyer is qua lawyer and not in some other executive capacity: Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners (No 2) [1972] 2 QB 102 at 129, 136 and 138. See also Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54 at 61; AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30; [2006] FCA 1234; Rilstone v BP Australia Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1557; Bailey v Department of Land and Water Conservation (2009) 74 NSWLR 333; [2009] NSWCA 100; GSA Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd v Constable [2002] 2 Qd R 146; [2001] QSC 180 at [14]; Gaynor v Chief of the Defence Force (No 2) [2015] FCA 817; Willcock, “Legal Professional Privilege and the In House Lawyer: Principles and Practice” (1999) 27 ABLR 364. 1306. GSA Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd v Constable [2002] 2 Qd R 146; [2001] QSC 180. An in-house lawyer may have the necessary independence even if the same person has some non-legal duties: Banksia Mortgages Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 535. 1307. Telstra Corporation Ltd v Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (No 2) [2007] FCA 1445 at [35] – [36] (if personal loyalties, duties and interests of the lawyer do not influence his professional advice). 1308. Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 213 ALR 108; [2004] FCAFC 337 (but dominant purpose test not satisfied). For a different view on the practising certificate point, see Commonwealth v Vance (2005) 158 ACTR 47; [2005] ACTCA 35 at [23]; AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30; [2006] FCA 1234. 1309. [2004] NSWSC 1089. 1310. Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd v Anderson [2002] 1 Qd R 233; (2001) 47 ATR 11. 1311. Aquila Coal Pty Ltd v Bowen Central Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 82 at [1]. 1312. Australian Hospital Care (Pindara) Pty Ltd v Duggan (No 2) [1999] VSC 131. 1313. [2016] FCA 333. 1314. [1999] QSC 185.

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Communications with foreign lawyers may be privileged if they otherwise meet the requirements of Australian law.1315 A foreign lawyer’s advice on Australian law may be privileged, provided that he or she is entitled to practise in the relevant foreign jurisdiction.1316 The position of an Australian lawyer who advises on foreign law remains unclear. Communications between a party and a third person may be privileged if their dominant purpose is to obtain material needed for legal advice, whether or not litigation is pending.1317 But the mere fact that a party’s lawyer listens to a conversation between a client and a third party does not make that conversation privileged.1318 Documents predating the lawyer-client relationship do not acquire privilege merely because they are briefed to a lawyer,1319 but communications about them may well be privileged.1320 It is possible for the contents of a document to be dissected into privileged and non-privileged portions,1321 but this approach is unlikely to be taken to oral communications that clearly have some privileged content.1322 An inference that a party must have been told something by their lawyer is not an intrusion upon a privileged communication.1323 Several persons, such as insurer and insured, or trustee and beneficiary1324 may share “common interest privilege”,1325 in circumstances where they share the 1315. Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 142 FCR 185; 213 ALR 108; [2004] FCAFC 337 (but dominant purpose test not satisfied). See also Kee and Feiglin, “Legal Professional Privilege and the Foreign Lawyer in Australia” (2006) 80 ALJ 131. 1316. Aquila Coal Pty Ltd v Bowen Central Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 82 at [1]. As to matters in federal courts, see Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss 117–118. 1317. Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 2004 ATC 4526; 207 ALR 217; [2004] FCAFC 122. 1318. Cicolini v Spencer [2005] QSC 338. 1319. R v King (1983) 77 Cr App R 1; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd (2005) 60 ATR 466; [2005] FCA 1247. 1320. In Re Cooksley & Associates [1998] QSC 72, documents given to a solicitor for the collection of moneys owed by a foreign government were not privileged as they were not generated by or within the professional relationship. 1321. Grofam Pty Ltd v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 408; 116 ALR 535; Curlex Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Carlingford Australia General Insurance Ltd [1987] 2 Qd R 335; R v Dainer; Ex parte Pullen (1988) 78 ACTR 25 (police brief); Dick Smith Electronics Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation [2002] FCA 1040; R v Manchester Crown Court; Ex parte R [1999] 2 Cr App R 267; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd (2005) 60 ATR 466; [2005] FCA 1247; Council of the Bar Association (NSW) v Archer (2008) 72 NSWLR 236; [2008] NSWCA 164. 1322. Minter v Priest [1929] 1 KB 655; Re Sarah C Getty Trust [1985] QB 956 at 964. However, see Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 208 ALR 424; [2004] FCA 332, where there was no clear separation of legal and non-legal advice received from a foreign lawyer, and privilege was not allowed. 1323. Mead v Mead (2007) 81 ALJR 1185; 235 ALR 197; [2007] HCA 25. 1324. Murray v Schreuder (2009) 1 ASTLR 340; [2009] WASC 51. 1325. Bulk Materials (Coal Handling) Services Pty Ltd v Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 689; Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Webb (1996) 39 NSWLR 601 at © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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same “ambit of confidence”. But that will not be so if their interests conflict in a civil action governed by the federal Act.1327 [A.164] The rationale of lawyer-client privilege is that, without it, citizens could not ascertain and protect their legal rights because lawyers would be unlikely to receive full and frank instructions.1328 [A.165] This privilege is not limited to cases in which litigation is current or anticipated.1329 Confidentiality [A.166] Privilege cannot be claimed for information disclosed, or intended for disclosure, outside the lawyer-client relationship.1330 Accordingly, privilege does not attach to documents such as wills or conveyancing documents that are destined for the public domain.1331 (Instructions and advice about such documents are in a different position.) A surveillance tape made in a casino, recording a contretemps between an employee and a patron, is not confidential, and therefore not privileged, because it records what any bystander could have seen or heard.1332 Commercially sensitive material, not strictly privileged,1333 may be protected by an order limiting disclosure to legal representatives or to others nominated by the court.1334 Before making such an order the court may, and indeed should,

608; Hutchins v Cap Coast Telecoms Pty Ltd (in liq) [2015] FCA 945 at [16]. There may be common interest privilege although only one of those entitled engages the lawyer: Pioneer Concrete (NSW) Pty Ltd v Webb (1985) 18 ACSR 418. See also Waye, “The Corporation and Legal Privilege” (1997) 8 AJCL 25. 1326. Hutchins v Cap Coast Telecoms Pty Ltd (in liq) [2015] FCA 945 at [16] – [17]. 1327. Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 124; Patrick v Capital Finance Corp (A’sia) Pty Ltd (2004) 211 ALR 272; [2004] FCA 1249. 1328. Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 126-127; Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 685; D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1978] AC 171 at 232; Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v ACCC (2002) 213 CLR 543. 1329. D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1978] AC 171 at 232; Balabel v Air India [1988] Ch 317; 2 All ER 246. 1330. Getty v Getty (1907) 76 LJP 158. 1331. Tickell v Trifleska Pty Ltd (1990) 24 NSWLR 548; R v Inner London Crown Court; Ex parte Baines and Baines (a Firm) [1988] QB 579; [1987] 3 All ER 1025; Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 123. Names and addresses of clients participating in a tax avoidance scheme were not privileged because the scheme could only operate through documents to be put on public record: Commissioner of Taxation v Coombes (1999) 92 FCR 240; 164 ALR 341; [1999] FCA 842. 1332. Konig v Casino Canberra Ltd [2000] ACTSC 67. An alternative or additional reason might be that legal advice was not the dominant purpose in producing it: The Palace Gallery Pty Ltd v Police (2008) 258 LSJS 420; [2008] SASC 305. 1333. Church of Scientology of California v Department of Health and Social Security [1979] 1 WLR 723; Baptist Union of Queensland – Carinity v Roberts [2015] FCA 1068. 1334. Magellan Petroleum Australia Limited v Sagasco Amadeus Pty Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 37 (material available to opponent’s lawyers on their written undertaking not to disclose the contents except to the extent specified); see also Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Guina Developments Pty Ltd

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[A.168]

Legal Professional Privilege

ascertain for itself whether the claim is warranted.1335 However, a private confidentiality agreement does not have the same status as privilege; it will not be allowed to interfere with the administration of justice, particularly if it affects a third party’s rights.1336 Dominant purpose [A.167] The getting or giving of legal advice1337 must be the dominant purpose of a lawyer-client communication.1338 “Dominant” means more than “substantial”; in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd1339 a claim of privilege failed because the request for legal advice was “no more dominant than the purpose of carrying on the investigatory functions” of the Commission. If reports are “produced automatically whenever a mishap occurs, whatever its nature, gravity or … triviality”, the dominant purpose test will be “difficult to satisfy”.1340 In cases of dispute it may be necessary to examine the intentions of the communicator. On the voir dire, cross-examination may be allowed.1341 When a retainer already exists, that is a prima facie reason for concluding that legal advice is the dominant purpose.1342 With respect to documents, the purpose at the time of creation is decisive.1343 When privilege is claimed by a company, it may be necessary to examine its agents’ purposes.1344 Getting or giving legal advice [A.168] “Legal advice is not confined to telling the client the law; it may include advice as to what should prudently and sensibly be done in the relevant [1996] 2 VR 34 at 38 and 40; Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank [2000] NSWSC 63; Asia Pacific Telecommunications Ltd v Optus Networks Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 550; Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651; [2010] HCA 21 at [38] – [39]. 1335. Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Guina Developments Pty Ltd [1996] 2 VR 34; Betfair Pty Ltd v Racing New South Wales (No 12) [2009] FCA 1519. 1336. Richards v Kadian (2005) 64 NSWLR 204; [2005] NSWCA 328. 1337. Or, in the case of litigation privilege, the conduct of legal proceedings begun or reasonably anticipated. 1338. Esso Resources Australia Ltd v FCT (1999) 201 CLR 49, replacing the “sole purpose” test in Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674. This is a question of fact – for what purpose was the communication made?: AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) (2005) 155 FCR 30; [2006] FCA 1234; Rilstone v BP Australia Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1557 (dominant purpose political and media interest). 1339. (1998) 81 FCR 526; 153 ALR 393 at 546-547 (FCR), 413 (ALR). 1340. Waugh v British Railways Board [1980] AC 521 at 544 per Lord Edmund Davies; see also Legg, “Legal Professional Privilege after Esso – Applying a Dominant Purpose Test” (2000) 20 Aust Bar Rev 40. 1341. Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2005] FCA 142 at [3]. 1342. Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 933. 1343. GSA Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd v Constable [2002] 2 Qd R 146; [2001] QSC 180; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd (2005) 60 ATR 466; [2005] FCA 1247; Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 933. 1344. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (1998) 81 FCR 526; 153 ALR 393 at 412; Guinness Peat Properties Ltd v Fitzroy Robinson Partnership [1987] 1 WLR 1027 at 1036; Liesfeld v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 348. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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1345

legal context”. While the concept of legal advice is fairly wide, it does not extend to guidance that is merely commercial or concerned with “public relations”.1346 Nor does it cover non-legal information, or a simple direction on the client’s part.1347 In Medina v The Queen1348 the prosecution claimed that the accused displayed consciousness of guilt by suddenly leaving the jurisdiction. In order to show why he departed, his solicitor was asked: “Did you telephone your client and tell him: ‘The police have taken out a warrant for your arrest’?” It was held that the question must be answered because the communication was neither instructions nor legal advice, but simply a statement of fact. The mere fact that legal advice was obtained does not mean that it is privileged.1349 Not all confidential documents are privileged [A.169] Documents prepared by a lawyer for professional purposes are covered by privilege only if they record instructions or advice. Trust account records do not generally meet that description.1350 Client’s identity – existence of retainer [A.170] A client’s name and address, albeit confidential, are not generally privileged.1351 But the position may be different if disclosure of a client’s name would tend to disclose the advice given – for instance where a list of clients’ names and addresses would ipso facto reveal privileged information1352 – or endanger the client’s safety.1353 A record of a client’s mobile phone number was privileged in the circumstances of Hamdan v Minister for Immigration, 1345. Balabel v Air India [1988] Ch 317; 2 All ER 246 at 330 (Ch), 254 (All ER); Public Transport Ticketing Corporation v Integrated Transit Solutions Ltd [2011] NSWSC 453. 1346. AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30; [2006] FCA 1234 at [44]; Dalleagles Pty Ltd v Australian Securities Commission (1991) 4 WAR 325 at 332-333; DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc (2003) 135 FCR 151 at 161-173; Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [2005] 1 AC 610 at [38]; Mitic v OZ Minerals Ltd [2015] FCA 1152 at [7]. 1347. Smith-Bird v Blower [1939] 2 All ER 406 (“Who is your estate agent?”); R v McCartney and Hansen (1928) 20 Cr App R 179 (“I would like an interview”); Tickell v Trifleska Pty Ltd (1990) 24 NSWLR 548 (“Put this in my will” – no advice sought). But see also Nolan v Nolan [2013] QSC 140. 1348. (1990) 3 WAR 21; 46 A Crim R 132. 1349. HM & O Investments Pty Ltd v Ingram (No 1) [2011] NSWSC 550. 1350. Packer v DCT [1985] 1 Qd R 275; Allen, Allen & Hemsley v DCT (1989) 20 FCR 576; 89 ATC 4294. The same applies to bills of costs: Spotless Group Pty Ltd v Premier Building and Consulting Group Pty Ltd (2006) 16 VR 1; [2006] VSCA 201 at [43]; Carey v Korda (2012) 45 WAR 181; [2012] WASCA 228 at [67] – [68]. 1351. Cook v Leonard [1954] VLR 591; Bursill v Tanner (1885) 16 QBD 1; Southern Cross Commodities Pty Ltd (In liq) v Crinis [1984] VR 697; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 40 ATR 435; 98 ATC 5192; Commissioner of Taxation v Coombes (1999) 92 FCR 240; 164 ALR 341; [1999] FCA 842; Z v New South Wales Crime Commission (2007) 231 CLR 75; [2007] HCA 7. 1352. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 40 ATR 435; 98 ATC 5192. 1353. Z v New South Wales Crime Commission (2007) 231 CLR 75; [2007] HCA 7 at [15]; SD v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 84 NSWLR 456; 232 A Crim R 285; [2013] NSWCA 48 at [71] .

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Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs.1354 But a mere record of dates and times of attendances is not a record of instructions or advice.1355 Real evidence and lawyer’s own perceptions [A.171] Physical objects or a lawyer’s own perceptions are not “communications” for which privilege may be claimed.1356 In a forgery case, for example, the defendant’s solicitor may be asked: “Did this document bear this mark when you first saw it?” Or (to relevance): “Did you see your client last week?” No privilege for witness [A.172] A person from whom a lawyer obtains information, but who is not a client at the time,1357 cannot invoke professional privilege.1358 However, if a statement is taken from such a person, predominantly for litigation, it is privileged in a client’s hands at common law, if not under rules of court: see [Q.93]. Protecting professional privilege [A.173] Privileged material that is unlawfully or deceptively1359 obtained, or “escapes” without the client’s consent, will be protected against disclosure if an appropriate application is made before it is given in evidence and enters the public domain.1360 A lawyer may be restrained from acting against a former client if there is a reasonable possibility1361 that the latter’s privilege will be compromised, albeit unintentionally.1362 Courts have seldom been impressed by a “megafirm’s” promise to erect a “Chinese wall” between persons who acted for the former client, and those now acting against him, because of the difficulty of 1354. (2004) 211 ALR 642; [2004] FCA 1267. 1355. R v Manchester Crown Court; Ex parte R [1999] 2 Cr App R 267. 1356. Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 122-123; Lock v Lock [1966] SASR 246. 1357. Privilege does not arise retrospectively if the former witness becomes a client: R v Craig [1975] 1 NZLR 597. 1358. Schneider v Leigh [1955] 2 QB 195. 1359. Application of Cannar v Eubanks [2003] NSWSC 802. 1360. ITC Film Distributors Ltd v Video Exchange Ltd [1982] Ch 431; Goddard v Nationwide Building Society [1987] QB 670. 1361. In Bolkiah v KPMG (a firm) [1999] 2 WLR 215 the court went so far as to say that there should be no risk of disclosure. 1362. SGIC v Paneros (1988) 48 SASR 349; 5 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-857; Australian Commercial Research and Development Ltd v Hampson [1991] 1 Qd R 508; Mallesons Stephen Jacques v KPMG Peat Marwick & Carter (1990) 4 WAR 357; In the Marriage of Thevenaz (1986) 84 FLR 10; 11 Fam LR 95; In the Marriage of A and B (1989) 13 Fam LR 798; D & J Constructions Pty Ltd v Head (1987) 9 NSWLR 118; Spincode Pty Ltd v Look Software Pty Ltd (2001) 4 VR 501; [2001] VSCA 248. See also Young, “Recent Cases: Solicitors Acting Against Former Clients” (1999) 73 ALJ 176; Connock, “Restraining Lawyers from Acting in the Face of a Conflict” (1995) 12 Aust Bar Rev 244; David Lee & Co Ltd v Coward Chance (a firm) [1990] 3 WLR 1278. But in D & J Constructions Pty Ltd v Head (1987) 9 NSWLR 118, where the first client’s records had been destroyed and the first case was six or seven years earlier, no restraint was applied. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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1363

enforcing such an arrangement. However, a more liberal view is taken in Asia Pacific Telecommunications Ltd v Optus Networks Pty Ltd1364 on the basis that the former client would have a remedy in contract if the “Chinese wall” collapsed. Is there a “duty of loyalty” to a former client, even if their privilege and confidences are not endangered? There is affirmative1365 as well as negative1366 authority on this point. Non-privileged material gaining privilege [A.174] In certain circumstances copies or collections of non-privileged material may acquire privilege – for example where the arrangement of it, or annotations on it tends to disclose legal advice.1367 That was the position in Spassked Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (No 4),1368 where previously non-privileged material was assembled to obtain an expert opinion.

Circumstances terminating or precluding professional privilege Waiver [A.175] Professional privilege may be waived1369 explicitly or implicitly.1370 Waiver involves action by the party claiming privilege, or an agent, that is inconsistent with confidentiality:1371 Waiver is an intentional act done with knowledge, whereby a person abandons a right (or privilege) by acting in a manner inconsistent with that right (or privilege). It may be express or implied. In most cases concerning waiver, the area of dispute is whether it is to be implied. In some cases waiver will be imputed by law,1372 with the consequence that the privilege is lost, even though that consequence was not intended ... The courts will impute an intention where the actions of a party are plainly inconsistent with the maintenance of the confidentiality which the privilege is intended to protect.1373 1363. Newman v Phillips Fox (1999) 21 WAR 309. 1364. [2005] NSWSC 550. 1365. Spincode Pty Ltd v Look Software Pty Ltd (2001) 4 VR 501; [2001] VSCA 248; Sent v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2002] VSC 429. 1366. Styles v O’Brien (2007) 16 Tas R 268; [2007] TASSC 67; Belan v Casey [2002] NSWSC 58 at [18], [21]; A and B, Legal Practitioners v Disciplinary Tribunal (2001) 10 Tas R 152; [2001] TASSC 55 at [45]. 1367. Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501; Criminal Justice Commission v Connolly [1997] 2 Qd R 586; Alphafarm Pty Ltd v Eli Lilly Australia Pty Ltd (1996) 69 FCR 149. 1368. (2002) 50 ATR 70; Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 7) [2013] VSC 553 at [2]. 1369. United Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Lopmand [2002] NSWSC 1142. 1370. Privilege lost when document given to police for inquiries: Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden [1999] NSWCA 97. 1371. Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 at 13; AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30; [2006] FCA 1234 at [162]. 1372. Goldberg v Ng (1995) 185 CLR 83 at 95-96. 1373. Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 303 ALR 199; 88 ALJR 76; [2013] HCA 46 at [29].

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In practice, decisions depend on matters of fact and degree.1374 An employee lacking authority for this particular purpose cannot waive the employer’s privilege,1375 whatever authority the employee has in other respects. A lawyer’s failure to assert a client’s privilege may amount to waiver,1376 leaving the client to a remedy in damages.1377 There is an implied (“imputed”) waiver if no objection is taken when a question seeking privileged information is answered without objection.1378 Waiver also occurs when a lawyer includes privileged material in an open letter, or in a pleading,1379 affidavit or other non-confidential document, or when it is partly disclosed in evidence.1380 Material in an affidavit loses any privileged character when the document is filed and served,1381 but a statement made for the purposes of preparing the affidavit (not mentioned therein) remains privileged.1382 A person cannot waive privilege over part of a document dealing with a single subject and retain privilege in the remainder,1383 although when it deals with several discrete matters the position may be different.1384 There is an implied or imputed1385 waiver when privileged material (other than a witness’s own proof of evidence)1386 is used to refresh memory,1387 or to 1374. Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice (2008) 234 CLR 275 at [49]. 1375. Eden Productions Pty Ltd v Southern Star Group Ltd [2002] NSWSC 1166. 1376. Commissioner of Taxation v Citibank Ltd (1989) 20 FCR 403; 85 ALR 588 at 415 (FCR), 596 (ALR). 1377. Donellan v Watson (1990) 21 NSWLR 335 at 344; Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475. 1378. Lombe v Pollak [2004] FCA 593 (privilege in solicitor’s letter of advice not claimed); Norman v O’Mahony [2006] FCA 1169 (party had been warned of possible privilege). 1379. An inferred or implied reference is insufficient: Balnaves v Smith [2008] 2 Qd R 413; [2008] QSC 215, applying Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 222. 1380. Lewis v Theodoropoulos (1987) 5 MVR 115; Standard Chartered Bank of Aust v Antico (1993) 36 NSWLR 87; Pickering v Edmunds (1994) 63 SASR 357; Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No 10) [1991] 1 WLR 660; 2 All ER 908 (substantial parts disclosed on application for a Mareva injunction); Bayliss v Cassidy (No 2) [2000] 1 Qd R 464; Watkins v Queensland [2008] 1 Qd R 564; [2007] QSC 57; Banksia Mortgages Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 535 (material used on summary judgment application). Distinguish GMCG, LLC v Agenix Ltd [2007] QSC 309, where the reference to legal advice was not made for any forensic purpose, but in a note to the company’s accounts. 1381. Liberty Funding Pty Ltd v Phoenix Capital Ltd (2005) 218 ALR 283; [2005] FCAFC 3. Quaere whether privilege is retained if the affidavit is not read: University of Western Australia v Gray (No 14) [2007] FCA 410. 1382. Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475 at 481, 493; Johnston v McGrath (2005) 195 FLR 101; [2005] NSWSC 1183. 1383. Great Atlantic Insurance Co v Home Insurance Co [1981] 1 WLR 529; 2 All ER 485. 1384. MAM Mortgages Ltd (In liq) v Cameron Brothers (No 2) [2001] 1 Qd R 46 (separate counsel’s opinion). 1385. Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 88 ALJR 76; 303 ALR 199; [2013] HCA 46 at [30]. 1386. Tasmanian Seafoods Pty Ltd v MacQueen (2004) 12 Tas R 436; [2004] TASSC 39. 1387. Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647; [1984] ATPR 40-483; MGICA (1992) Ltd v Kenny & Good Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 61 FCR 236; 135 ALR 743. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[A.175] 1389

cross-examine a witness. In such cases the rationale is simply fairness or “consistency”.1390 Would the party claiming privilege gain an unfair advantage by revealing parts that assist his or her case, while withholding parts that are less helpful?1391 Is it “unfair for a person both to parade the substance of a legal transaction, [while claiming a right] to prevent the other party from testing what was said”?1392 These considerations are more important than the motive for a partial disclosure.1393 A “reservation” of privilege in such cases is unlikely to be effective.1394 But in Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice1395 there was no perceived unfairness when an applicant for a pardon was told that three senior counsel recommended against it. There was a well-settled practice of giving no reasons, and privilege was not claimed to gain an advantage in litigation. There was an implied waiver when a lawyer disclosed privileged material in the defence of a disciplinary charge, and then claimed privilege in the same material when sued by a former client.1396 When defendants in a false imprisonment case indicated that legal advice provided reasonable grounds for the actions complained of, privilege in that advice was lost1397 because, having disclosed the lawyer’s conclusions, they could not fairly keep secret his reasons.1398 Bennett v Chief Executive Offıcer, Australian Customs Service1399 is a similar case. On the same principle, privilege cannot be retained by a party who puts a state of mind in issue, claiming that it was based on legal advice.1400

1388. Burnell v British Transport Commission [1956] 1 QB 187. 1389. Attorney-General v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475 at 481 and 487; Greenhill Nominees Pty Ltd v Aircraft Technicians of Australia Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 7; Liquorland (Aust) Pty Ltd v Anghie (2003) 7 VR 27; [2003] VSC 73; Richards v Kadian (2005) 64 NSWLR 204; [2005] NSWCA 328; Areva NC (Aust) Ltd v Summit Resources (Aust) Pty Ltd [2007] WASC 276. 1390. Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 at 13. 1391. Chen v City Convenience Leasing Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 297; Vic Hotel Pty Ltd v DC Payments Australasia Pty Ltd (2015) 321 ALR 191; [2015] VSCA 101 at [21]. 1392. Landmark Underwriting Agency Pty Ltd v Kilborn [2006] NSWSC 1108 at [116]. 1393. BP Australia Pty Ltd v Nyran Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1302. 1394. Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Rio Tinto Ltd (2006) 151 FCR 141; [2006] FCAFC 86. 1395. (2008) 234 CLR 275; [2008] HCA 37. 1396. Goldberg v Ng (1995) 185 CLR 83. A law society was held to have waived privilege in similar circumstances in Queensland Law Society Inc v Albeitz [2000] 1 Qd R 621. 1397. Bayliss v Cassidy (No 2) [2000] 1 Qd R 464. See also Hoad v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1998) 19 WAR 468; Pickering v Edmunds (1994) 63 SASR 357 (statement of claim alleged that deed entered into on legal advice that an earlier deed was void – advice no longer privileged); and Commonwealth v Temwood Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 107. Compare Mason & Cox Pty Ltd v KPMG Peat Marwick (1999) 74 SASR 171, where Perry J held that a mere statement that a party was advised that he had a “sustainable claim” did not amount to waiver. 1398. BP Australia Pty Ltd v Nyran Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1302; Telstra Corporation Ltd v BT Australasia Pty Ltd (1998) 85 FCR 152; 156 ALR 634; Bennett v Chief Executive Offıcer of Australian Customs Service (2004) 140 FCR 101; [2004] FCAFC 237. 1399. (2004) 210 ALR 220; [2004] FCAFC 237. 1400. Rio Tinto Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2005) 60 ATR 339; 224 ALR 299; [2005] FCA 1336; Corkhill and Selwyn, “Evolution of the Common Law Principle of ’Issue Waiver’” (2008) 82 ALJ 338.

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Privilege in medical reports was lost when a report was partially disclosed by one medical expert to another,1401 and when a party allowed the document in question to be seen by a solicitor who was not acting for him.1402 A person seeking extension of a limitation period on the ground that legal advice was only recently received may be asked whether it was favourable or unfavourable.1403 A party who claims that he or she settled an action in reasonable reliance on legal advice implicitly waives privilege in that advice.1404 Various cases in which issues raised may result in waiver are considered in Ideas Plus Investments Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd.1405 In Wardrope v Dunne1406 “A” alleged that “B” fraudulently induced him to settle a legal claim. “B” denied any wrongdoing and sought disclosure of legal advice to “A” in connection with the settlement. Access was granted on the basis that the advice was relevant to a crucial issue, namely “A’s” state of mind in accepting the settlement. In Benecke v National Australia Bank1407 the plaintiff waived privilege by pleading that her lawyer settled a claim without her consent. However, there is an important difference between a passing reference to receiving legal advice and disclosure of its substance.1408 A valuation figure based on an expert’s report may be disclosed without losing privilege in the report itself.1409 Privilege in associated documents may survive if a document that is disclosed can be understood without reference to them.1410 [A.176] Privilege in a lawyer-client conference may be waived without losing privilege in documents arising from that meeting.1411 Disclosure of a document

1401. Henderson v Low [2000] QSC 417. 1402. United Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Lopmand [2002] NSWSC 1142. 1403. Jones v G D Searle & Co Ltd [1978] 3 All ER 654. 1404. Compton v Wilson (2007) 4 DCLR (NSW) 244; [2007] NSWDC 67. 1405. [2002] WASC 167. 1406. [1996] 1 Qd R 224. 1407. (1993) 35 NSWLR 110. 1408. AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30; [2006] FCA 1234 at [138]; Temwood Holdings Pty Ltd v West Australian Planning Commission [2003] WASCA 112 at [20]; Bennett v Chief Executive Offıcer, Australian Customs Service (2004) 140 FCR 101; [2004] FCAFC 237; Infields Ltd v P Rosen and Sons [1938] 3 All ER 591 at 597; Tate & Lyle International Ltd v Government Trading Corporation (1984) The Times (London) Law Report No 582; Buttes Gas & Oil Co v Hammer (No 3) [1981] QB 223; Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No 10) [1991] 1 WLR 660; 2 All ER 908; Nine Films & Television Pty Ltd v Ninox Television Ltd (2005) 65 IPR 442; [2005] FCA 356; Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 933; Kennedy v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 134. 1409. Towercom Pty Ltd v Fahour [2011] VSC 455. 1410. ML Ubase Holdings Co Ltd v Trigem Computer Inc (2007) 69 NSWLR 577; [2007] NSWSC 859. 1411. George Doland Ltd v Blackburn Robson Coates & Co (a firm) [1972] 1 WLR 1388; 3 All ER 959. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[A.177]

under compulsion of law is not a waiver of privilege in associated documents1412 or in the document itself, if discovery is demanded in another case by a different opponent.1413 Privilege is not lost by producing documents in response to a subpoena, with a reservation as to privilege.1414 The law relating to evidence disclosed under legal compulsion is not affected by the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld).1415 [A.177] Material retains its privileged character when disclosed to an expert witness for the preparation of a confidential report.1416 Privilege in an affidavit or statement obtained from a witness is not waived by giving a copy to the witness for checking,1417 but it is prudent to attach an explicit reservation.1418 [A.178] There is no waiver when privileged information is shared by parties with a common or joint interest.1419 So, for example, the disclosure of a liquidator’s legal advice to the creditors of a company is not a waiver.1420 Any person entitled to common interest privilege may assert it against a third party, and waiver generally requires the consent of all,1421 even when their interests diverge.1422 There may be common interest privilege although one or more of the parties did not retain the adviser.1423 In Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd v Webb1424 directors sought advice for themselves as well as the company. They retained their privilege when a liquidator purported to waive it on behalf of the company. 1412. Interchase Corporation Ltd v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Ltd (No 1) [1999] 1 Qd R 141; AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30; [2006] FCA 1234 at [138]; Akins v Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 539 at 552; Sevic v Roarty (1998) 44 NSWLR 287 at 293. But see also Liberty Funding Pty Ltd v Phoenix Capital Ltd (2005) 218 ALR 283 at [24] – [27]. 1413. Abigroup Ltd v Akins (1997) 42 NSWLR 623; Waugh Asset Management v Merrill Lynch [2010] NSWSC 197; Morony v Reschke [2014] NSWSC 359 at [46]. 1414. Wayne Lawrence Pty Ltd v Hunt [1999] NSWSC 1044; Northern Territory v GPAO (1990) 196 CLR 553 at [72]. 1415. Greenhill Nominees Pty Ltd v Aircraft Technicians of Australia Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 7. 1416. Dingwall v Commonwealth (1992) 39 FCR 521; Traderight (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland Ltd (No 14) [2013] NSWSC 211. Distinguish Henderson v Low [2000] QSC 417, where one expert disclosed the material to another. 1417. Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Cooke [2000] 1 Qd R 7; Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd v Court of Coal Mines Regulation (1997) 42 NSWLR 351. 1418. Drabsch v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd [1999] NSWSC 975. 1419. Buttes Gas and Oil Co v Hammer [1981] QB 223 at 242-243; Bulk Materials (Coal Handling) Services Pty Ltd v Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 689 (insurer and insured); Re Binqld Finances Pty Ltd; Ex parte Sheahan and Lock [2015] FCA 718. See generally Waye, “The Corporation and Legal Privilege” (1997) 8 AJCL 25; Syver and Dharmanda, “Adjoining Walls: Legal Privilege in the Context of Joint Ventures” [1999] ICCLR 295. 1420. Re Bauhaus Pyrmont Pty Ltd (In liq) [2006] NSWSC 543 (except where the proposed defendant is one of the creditors). 1421. Re Nika Management Services Pty Ltd (In liq) (1996) 14 ACLC 326; Australand Corporation (Qld) Pty Ltd v Johnson [2006] QSC 418. But as to the Commonwealth Act, see [A.163]. 1422. State Government Insurance Commission v Paneros (1988) 48 SASR 349; 5 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-857. But as to the Commonwealth Act, see [A.163]. 1423. Pioneer Concrete (NSW) Pty Ltd v Webb (1985) 18 ACSR 418. 1424. (1996) 39 NSWLR 601.

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Legal Professional Privilege

Sheller JA drew a distinction between “joint privilege” and “common interest privilege” as follows: common interest privilege arises when one or more parties obtain legal advice and then disclose it to others who have “a shared or similar interest in the matter”. Joint privilege occurs when two or more persons consult the legal adviser together. His Honour suggested that in a case of common interest privilege it may not be essential that all concerned join in a waiver,1425 although it will often be fair to require the consent of all.1426 [A.179] Prima facie, waiver is final and irreversible,1427 but material may be disclosed on an expressly limited and confidential basis without loss of privilege.1428 When this point is relied on, it is pertinent to ask whether effective control over preservation of the confidence is assured.1429 In Ulgera Gap Nominees Pty Ltd v Elders Ltd1430 a bank’s clients retained privilege in documents shown to their banker to obtain a loan. The confidential nature of the disclosure should be made quite clear, as indicated in Spotless Group Ltd v Premier Building and Consulting Group Pty Ltd:1431 Ms Moon did not swear that the documents themselves were provided on a confidential basis but simply asserted the existence of a general confidential relationship between Premier and Royce. There was no evidence that the documents were provided to Royce on a confidential basis for a limited and specific purpose. They were not accompanied by a letter, fax or email requiring it to limit the dissemination of the documents provided to it, or to return copies when they were no longer needed, as was the case in Network Ten Pty Ltd v Capital Television Ltd.1432

There is no waiver when documents are seized under a search warrant before a person entitled to privilege has a reasonable opportunity to claim it.1433 A party without legal advice at the time of seizure may later assert privilege.1434 But a failure to allow time to claim privilege does not, in itself, make the seizure

1425. Note, however, that this dictum refers to the New South Wales version of the Commonwealth Act: see [A.163]. 1426. (1996) 39 NSWLR 601 at 608-609. 1427. Thomason v Council of the Municipality of Campbelltown (1939) 39 SR (NSW) 347; Spedley Securities Ltd (In Liq) v Bank of New Zealand (1991) 26 NSWLR 711; 10 ACLC 77. 1428. British Coal Corporation v Dennis Rye (No 2) [1988] 1 WLR 1113; Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 (confidential disclosure of government papers to a Member of Parliament inquiring into expenditures in course of duty); Network Ten Pty Ltd v Capital Television Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 275 at 286. 1429. Asahi Holdings (Australia) Pty Ltd v Pacific Equity Partners Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] FCA 481. 1430. (1996) 188 LSJS 374; John Tanner Holdings Pty Ltd v Mortgage Management Ltd (2001) 182 ALR 201; Tarong Energy Corporation Ltd v South Burnett Regional Council [2010] 1 Qd R 575; [2009] QCA 265 (counsel’s opinion shown to financial consultant). 1431. (2006) 16 VR 1; [2006] VSCA 201 at [87]. 1432. (1995) 36 NSWLR 275. 1433. Saunders v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (1998) 160 ALR 469; Commissioner of the Police Service v Nirta [2002] 1 Qd R 364. 1434. Commissioner of Police v Nirta [2002] 1 Qd R 364. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[A.180]

1435

unlawful. Consensual arrangements have been made between law societies and police for interim protection of allegedly privileged material held by solicitors on clients’ behalf.1436 Inadvertent disclosure [A.180] The courts have become more indulgent1437 towards parties who disclose privileged material through inadvertence1438 or error. “[I]n large commercial cases, mistakes are now more likely to occur.”1439 There is a discretion in such cases to treat the privilege as intact, provided that an application is made before the material goes into evidence. It is pertinent to ask whether the opponent should have known that a mistake was being made.1440 That was not so in Trevorrow v South Australia (No 4).1441 The position is now clarified and simplified by r 31 of the Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2011.1442

1435. Question of Law Reserved (No 1 of 1998) (1998) 70 SASR 281. 1436. (1997) 32 Australian Lawyer 29; Proctor (Queensland Law Society, October 1989). 1437. For an example of the bad, not-so-old days, see R v Tompkins (1977) 67 Cr App R 181 (note to defence counsel picked up by prosecutor). 1438. Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Metal and Engineering Workers’ Union of WA [1998] WASC 289; Shaw v Harris (No 1) (1992) 3 Tas R 153; Unsworth v Tristar Steering and Suspension Australia Ltd [2007] FCA 1081. Distinguish failure of communications between legal advisers: BT Australasia Pty Ltd v New South Wales (unreported, Fed Ct Aust, Sackville J, 1 April 1998). 1439. Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 303 ALR 199; 88 ALJR 76; [2013] HCA 46 at [48]. 1440. Hooker Corporation Ltd v Darling Harbour Authority (1987) 9 NSWLR 538; Key International Drilling Company Ltd v TNT Bulkships Operations Pty Ltd [1989] WAR 280; Meltend Pty Ltd v Restoration Clinics of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 511; 145 ALR 391; DPP (Cth) v Kane (1997) 140 FLR 468; Watson v McLernon [2000] NSWSC 114; Sovereign v Bevillesta [2000] NSWSC 521. 1441. (2006) 94 SASR 64; [2006] SASC 42. 1442. As confirmed in Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 303 ALR 199; 88 ALJR 76; [2013] HCA 46.

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Legal Professional Privilege

Furtherance of an unlawful purpose [A.181] Professional privilege cannot arise1443 when the client seeks advice in aid of an unlawful purpose.1444 For example, there is no privilege in false information given to a lawyer in order to persuade the Crown to abandon a prosecution1445 or in a solicitor’s letter encouraging a client to defy the authority of a court.1446 It is not necessary that the lawyer be aware of the client’s purpose.1447 The unlawful purpose may be that of a third party.1448 The word “unlawful” is not limited to criminal enterprises. It includes civil as well as criminal fraud1449 as well as deliberate attempts to defeat legislation.1450 Various expositions of “unlawful purpose” refer to “crime or fraud”, “criminal or unlawful proceeding”, “any unlawful or wicked act”1451 and “all forms of fraud or dishonesty such as a fraudulent breach of trust, fraudulent conspiracy, trickery and sham contrivances”.1452 But the concept does not extend to “every act or scheme which is unlawful in the sense of giving rise to a civil claim”,1453 such as an inadvertent misuse of statutory powers,1454 or a refusal to cooperate with authorities based on a valid claim of privilege.1455 “Pressure” on an opponent in litigation is not necessarily an unlawful purpose.1456 In Kaye v Woods (No 2)1457 a solicitor who gave an opponent misleading information thereby deprived his client of professional privilege. 1443. This rule is treated as an exception, rather than an absence of an essential element in AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30; [2006] FCA 1234. 1444. R v Cox and Railton (1884-85) LR 14 QBD 153; Minter v Priest [1929] 1 KB 655; Clements, Dunne & Bell Pty Ltd v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (2001) 48 ATR 650; Sut v Nominal Defendant (1968) 70 SR (NSW) 212; [1968] 2 NSWR 78; LT & KT Conlon v Lensworth Interstate (Vic) Pty Ltd [1970] VR 293; R v Central Criminal Court; Ex parte Francis & Francis (a firm) (1989) 88 Cr App R 213; R v Dunwoody (2004) 212 ALR 103; [2004] QCA 413; P and V Industries Pty Ltd v Porto (No 3) [2007] VSC 113; Deppro Pty Ltd v Hannah (2008) 79 IPR 114; [2008] QSC 193. 1445. R v King [2002] SASC 140. 1446. R v Witt [2016] VSC 19. 1447. R v Bell; Ex parte Lees (1980) 146 CLR 141 at 145; Varawa v Howard Smith & Co Ltd (1910) 10 CLR 382 at 390; Day v Dalton [1981] WAR 316. 1448. AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30; [2006] FCA 1234. 1449. Williams v Quebrada Railway, Land and Copper Co [1895] 2 Ch 751; Beazley v Steinhardt (1999) 106 A Crim R 21 (tax evasion); Amcor Ltd v Barnes [2011] VSC 341. 1450. Attorney-General v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500. 1451. Annesley v Anglesea (1743) 17 St Tr 1139 at 1229. 1452. Crescent Farm (Sidcup) Sports Ltd v Sterling Offıces Ltd [1972] Ch 553 at 565. 1453. Crescent Farm (Sidcup) Sports Ltd v Sterling Offıces Ltd [1972] Ch 553; [1971] 3 All ER 1192 at 1199-1200; Freeman v Health Insurance Commission (1997) 78 FCR 91 (not extended to inadvertent abuse of statutory powers). “Illegality” may be wider than crime and fraud: Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 142 FCR 185; 213 ALR 108; [2004] FCAFC 337. 1454. Freeman v Health Insurance Commission (1997) 78 FCR 91. 1455. Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 142 FCR 185; 213 ALR 108; [2004] FCAFC 337. 1456. Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 222; Clements, Dunne & Bell Pty Ltd v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (2001) 48 ATR 650. 1457. [2016] ACTSC 87. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Mercorella (No 3)1458 a fine distinction was drawn between an unlawful investment scheme and legal advice about security for money invested in the scheme. [A.182] When the existence of privilege is disputed, the person claiming it may be questioned on a voir dire and relevant documents may be examined by the judge:1459 The court has power to examine the documents for itself, a power which has perhaps been too sparingly exercised in the past, springing possibly from a misplaced reluctance to go behind the claim of privilege.1460

Judicial inspection may be preferred to ordering the party claiming privilege to specify the grounds.1461 In Fletcher v Fortress Credit Corporation (Australia) II Pty Ltd1462 the court declined to accept a solicitor’s affidavit as proof of privilege, and ordered that the subject documents be produced for inspection. The onus of establishing an unlawful purpose is on the party opposing the claim.1463 The alleged illegality must be particularised.1464 Mere suspicion is not enough,1465 but proof on the balance of probabilities is not essential.1466 It suffices that “there are reasonable grounds for believing” that there was an unlawful purpose, or that there is “something to give colour to the charge”.1467 [A.183] The word “furtherance” should be carefully noted. The present rule does not apply when legal advice is sought about a past illegality,1468 even if the client indicates that he or she is guilty.1469

1458. (2006) 58 ACSR 40; [2006] FCA 772. 1459. Minter v Priest [1929] 1 KB 655 at 668-689; R v Governor of Pentonville Prison; Ex parte Osman [1990] 1 WLR 277; [1989] 3 All ER 701 at 310 (WLR), 730 (All ER); Woollahra Municipal Council v Westpac Banking Corporation (1994) 33 NSWLR 529; Re Fritz [1995] 2 Qd R 580; New South Wales v Jackson [2007] NSWCA 279 at [24]; Bailey v Department of Land and Water Conservation (2009) 74 NSWLR 333; [2009] NSWCA 100. 1460. Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 688-689. 1461. Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Weston (2011) 81 NSWLR 526; [2011] NSWSC 1083. But not in Hancock v Rinehart [2016] NSWSC 12, where inspection was not allowed to be a substitute for admissible evidence. 1462. [2014] QSC 303. 1463. Plumb v Monck (1974) 4 ALR 405 at 409; AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30; [2006] FCA 1234. The alleged purpose was not proved in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs & Indigenous Affairs v Hamdan (2005) 143 FCR 398; [2005] FCAFC 113. 1464. Bullivant v Attorney-General (Victoria) [1901] AC 196 at 201; O’Rourke v Darbishire [1920] AC 581 at 604; Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651; [2010] HCA 21 (given on affidavit). 1465. R v Elliott (unreported, Vic Sup Ct, Vincent J, 28 February 1996). 1466. Butler v Board of Trade [1971] 1 Ch 680 at 689; Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 at 514, 521, 534, 546, 556, 592; AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30; [2006] FCA 1234. 1467. O’Rourke v Darbishire [1920] AC 581 at 604. 1468. R v Cox and Railton (1884-85) LR 14 QBD 153 at 175. 1469. Tuckiar v The King (1934) 52 CLR 335.

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Legal Professional Privilege

The needs of criminal justice [A.184] In principle, the Crown, like any other litigant, may claim professional privilege,1470 although it cannot be used to avoid proper disclosure of evidence relating to a criminal charge.1471 But at common law, a private citizen entitled to privilege cannot be compelled to waive it for the benefit of a stranger, even if the material is sought for the defence of a criminal charge.1472 Custody proceedings [A.185] There is English and Australian authority for the proposition that, in proceedings about the welfare of a child, a court may override professional privilege.1473 See, however, Northern Territory v GPAO1474 where a Northern Territory statute conferring immunity from production of certain documents was unaffected by the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). Litigation between client and lawyer and other exceptions [A.186] When a client brings disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer, or seeks damages for professional negligence, or disputes a bill of costs,1475 the client’s privilege is set aside so far as is necessary for the lawyer’s defence.1476 This may be explained as an application of natural justice, or an implied waiver. A defendant who compromises an action and then seeks recompense from a third party may be required to prove the appropriateness of the settlement by disclosing relevant advice.1477 Another possible exception concerns public safety. In a Canadian case1478 a psychiatrist retained for the accused, fearing that the accused would kill again, 1470. R v Cahill; Ex parte McGregor (1985) 61 ACTR 7; Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54; Re Fritz [1995] 2 Qd R 580; (1995) 75 A Crim R 64; Cain v Glass (1985) 3 NSWLR 39; Brown, “The Justification of Legal Professional Privilege when the Client is the State” (2010) 84 ALJ 624. 1471. Maddison v Goldrick [1976] 1 NSWLR 651; R v Kingston [1986] 2 Qd R 114. 1472. Cain v Glass (1985) 3 NSWLR 39; Carter v Managing Partner, Northmore Hale Davy & Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121; R v Ataou [1988] QB 798; 2 All ER 321 not followed. Ataou was overruled in R v Derby Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte B [1996] 1 AC 487 at 508-509. Carter is not displaced by the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 123; DPP (Cth) v Galloway (a pseudonym) [2014] VSCA 272 at [66]. 1473. Oxfordshire County Council v M [1994] 2 WLR 393; 2 All ER 269; Re A (Minors) [1991] 2 Fam LR (Eng) 473 at 477; CW v CW [1998] FLC 92-802. 1474. (1999) 196 CLR 553. 1475. Patrick v Capital Finance Corporation (A’sia) Pty Ltd (2004) 211 ALR 272; [2004] FCA 1249; Silver Fox Co Pty Ltd v Lenards Pty Ltd (No 3) (2004) 214 ALR 621; [2004] FCA 1570. 1476. R v Dunbar and Logan (1983) 138 DLR (3d) 221; Lillicrap v Nalder & Son [1993] 1 WLR 94; Moreay Nominees Pty Ltd v McCarthy (1994) 10 WAR 293; Benecke v National Australia Bank (1993) 35 NSWLR 110; Paragon Finance Plc v Freshfields [1999] 1 WLR 1183 at 1188; Artistic Builders Pty Ltd v Nash [2009] NSWSC 102; Schulman v Abbott Tout Lawyers (A Firm) t/a Abbott Tout Solicitors [2010] FCA 308 (no conduct inconsistent with privilege); Rogerson v Law Society (NT) (1993) 88 NTR 1 (disciplinary proceedings). But not in relation to other lawyers: Dowling v Dowling [2015] VSC 412. 1477. Rhyse Holdings Pty Ltd v Stanton Hillier Parker (Qld) Pty Ltd [2002] QCA 122. 1478. Note (1999) 73 ALJ 629 on the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in “Smith v Jones”, 25 March 1999. There was a statutory privilege for lawyer-client communications. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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sought a declaration allowing him to disclose that opinion. It was held that there is a “public risk” exception to professional privilege. Quaere whether bankruptcy divests a bankrupt of privilege and vests it in the trustee.1479

Material prepared for litigation Prerequisites [A.187] Lawyer-client communications aside, material is privileged at common law if it is prepared predominantly for pending or anticipated1480 litigation.1481 The rule extends to material prepared for litigation abroad.1482 But with respect to civil litigation since 1999, see [Q.93]. It may not apply to material prepared for use in an administrative tribunal.1483 Litigation is reasonably anticipated if it has been threatened or there is a “high probability” that it will occur.1484 There may be reasonable anticipation although the cause of action is incomplete,1485 but a mere “contingent possibility”1486 or “rumour” is insufficient.1487 [A.188] The purpose of the party is decisive. Although the person who actually collects the material has litigation mainly in mind, privilege does not arise if the person for whom it is collected has some other predominant purpose.1488 Conversely, if the party has the required purpose, the agent’s motive or intent is immaterial.1489 [A.189] The dominant purpose test can sometimes be satisfied when there is a statutory duty to collect the information.1490 The former “sole purpose” test could not be met in such a case. 1479. Re Wagner, a bankrupt [1964] ALR 657 at 660-661; R v Dunwoody (2004) 212 ALR 103; [2004] QCA 413 at [25]; Westgate Wool Co Pty Ltd (in liq) (2006) 206 FLR 190; 60 ACSR 570; [2006] SASC 372 at [58]. 1480. Korean Air Lines v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (No 3) (2008) 247 ALR 781; [2008] FCA 701. Where a corporation claims the privilege, the expectations of the senior officer are material: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Visy Industries Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 239 ALR 762; [2007] ATPR 42-157; [2007] FCA 444. 1481. Esso Resources Australia Ltd v FCT (1999) 201 CLR 49. This privilege is not available in commissions of inquiry: AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382; [2006] FCA 571. 1482. In re Duncan; Garfield v Fay [1968] P 306. 1483. Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (2006) 67 NSWLR 91; [2006] NSWSC 530. 1484. Collins v London General Omnibus Company (1893) 68 LT 831 at 833. 1485. Bristol Corporation v Cox (1884) 26 Ch D 678. 1486. Brunswick Hill Apartments Pty Ltd v CGU Insurance Ltd [2010] VSC 532 (insurance investigation). 1487. Warner v The Women’s Hospital [1954] VLR 410. 1488. Aydin v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd [1984] 3 NSWLR 684. 1489. Di Pietrantanio v Austin Hospital Heidelberg [1958] VLR 325. 1490. Contrast the position under the former “sole purpose” regime: Yates Property Corporation Ltd v Darling Harbour Authority (1988) 64 LGRA 331.

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Legal Professional Privilege

[A.190] It appears that unsolicited material cannot be the subject of “litigation privilege”, despite some old authority to the contrary.1491 [A.191] Confidential information and instructions given to a potential witness, particularly an expert, for the sole purpose of preparing a report or proof of evidence is privileged,1492 but apparently this does not extend to documents produced by an expert in the course of preparing a report.1493 Calling an expert witness does not ipso facto waive privilege in pre-trial instructions to the expert unless non-disclosure would result in evidence that is misleading.1494 The expert’s instructions may come direct from the party, provided that the latter’s predominant purpose is to obtain legal advice.1495 Litigants in person [A.192] At common law it is uncertain whether this privilege applies to litigants acting in person. Grant v Downs1496 is equivocal. In National Employers’ Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd v Waind1497 Mason J considered that the employment of a lawyer is essential, but that was an obiter view. It is not fully supported by the cases cited, and there is authority the other way.1498 The question is resolved in favour of litigants in person in s 120 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and it would hardly be politic for the common law to differ at this stage. When a party is legally represented the material need not be collected or generated by the lawyer in person; it may reach the lawyer from an independent consultant, such as an insurance loss assessor, provided that the dominant purpose test is satisfied.1499 1491. Capar v Commissioner of Police (1994) 34 NSWLR 715; contra In re Holloway; Young v Holloway (1887) 12 PD 167. 1492. Harmony Shipping Co SA v Davis [1979] 1 WLR 1380; 3 All ER 177; [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 377; Crompton v Commissioner for Highways (1973) 5 SASR 301; R v Ward (1981) 3 A Crim R 171; Trade Practices Commission v Sterling (1979) 36 FLR 244 at 246; Interchase Corporation Ltd (In liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Ltd (No 1) [1999] 1 Qd R 141 at 151, 160. 1493. Interchase Corporation Ltd v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Ltd [1999] 1 Qd R 141. 1494. Tirango Nominees Pty Ltd v Dairy Vale Foods Pty Ltd (No 2) (1998) 83 FCR 397; 156 ALR 364. 1495. Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357; 207 ALR 217; [2004] FCAFC 122 (accountant’s advice relating to proposed company restructure); De Simone v Legal Services Board [2015] VSC 9 at [100]. 1496. (1976) 135 CLR 674. 1497. (1979) 141 CLR 648 at 654; see also Lear v Wills (unreported, Fed Ct of Aust, Hill J, 21 September 1992). 1498. Re Strachan [1895] 1 Ch 439 at 445; Taylor v Commissioner for Railways [1974] Qd R 131 at 135-136; Buttes Gas & Oil Co v Hammer (No 3) [1981] QB 223 at 243-244; Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 109 per Brennan J (forcing disclosure of “material for the brief” is against public interest); Dubai Bank Ltd v Galadari [1990] Ch 98; [1989] 3 WLR 1044 at 1052 (WLR); Dingle v Commonwealth Development Bank (1989) 23 FCR 63; 91 ALR 239 at 66 (FCR), 242 (ALR); Ventouris v Mountain [1991] 1 WLR 607 at 611. 1499. Wheeler v Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675; Leader Westernport v IPD Instant Duplicating (1988) 5 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-856; McIlwraith McEacharn Operations Ltd v CE Heath Underwriting and Insurance (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) [1995] 1 Qd R 363; J-Corp Pty Ltd v © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[A.193]

Taxation of costs [A.193] A party claiming costs, and who seeks taxation of them, does not thereby waive privilege in source documents, but insisting on privilege may limit, to that party’s detriment, the taxing officer’s access to evidence of disputed items.1500 Statutory abrogation of professional privilege [A.194] Professional privilege is not constitutionally guaranteed; it may be removed or limited by ordinary legislation. Abrogation of litigation privilege is considered at [Q.93]. Professional privilege is not abrogated by (i) a search warrant under the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth),1501 or (ii) a notice under s 263 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth),1502 or (iii) the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002,1503 or (iv) an order to produce documents to the Receiver in Bankruptcy,1504 or (v) the law relating to investigation of companies.1505 Other examples of statutory abrogation appear in s 48 of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld), s 20 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld),1506 and (subject to qualifications) in s 284 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld). However, privilege is not affected by s 468 of the latter Act, which gives authorised persons access to material that may disclose an offence.1507 Privilege is not overridden by s 155 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), which requires information to be supplied by persons “capable of complying” with a notice to do so.1508 The Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 (Qld) abrogates this privilege as well as privilege against self-incrimination.1509 Similar legislation was upheld in Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission.1510 Australian Builders Labourers Federation (1992) 38 FCR 452; 110 ALR 510; Mercantile Mutual Insurance (NSW Workers Compensation) Ltd v Murray (2004) 13 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-612; [2004] NSWCA 151; Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357; 207 ALR 217. 1500. Pamplin v Express Newspapers Ltd [1985] 2 All ER 185; Giannarelli v Wraith [No 2] (1991) 171 CLR 592 at 602-605 per McHugh J. 1501. Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52; Arno v Forsyth (1986) 9 FCR 576; 65 ALR 125, or by Pt 1AA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth): Kennedy v Baker (No 2) (2004) 138 FCR 414; [2004] FCA 809. 1502. Citibank Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 19 ATR 1479. 1503. MM v Australian Crime Commission (2007) 69 ATR 223; [2007] FCA 2026. 1504. Bond v Tuohy (1995) 56 FCR 92; 128 ALR 595. 1505. Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543; [2002] HCA 49. 1506. Watkins v Queensland [2008] 1 Qd R 564; [2007] QCA 430. 1507. Brooks v Ticor Chemical Company Pty Ltd [2003] 2 Qd R 117. 1508. Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v ACCC (2002) 213 CLR 543. Bruce, “The Trade Practices Act 1974 and the Demise of Legal Professional Privilege” (2002) 30 NSWLJ 373. 1509. Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 (Qld), s 40, subject to restrictions on the use of answers in other proceedings. 1510. (2013) 302 ALR 363; 87 ALJR 1082; [2013] HCA 39; Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW), ss 13, 13A.

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[A.196]

Legal Professional Privilege

An extraordinary statute abrogating privilege is the James Hardie (Investigations and Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth). A claim of implied abrogation by electronic surveillance laws was firmly rejected in R (a Solicitor) v Lewis.1511 A general power in the District Court to “give such directions as the court or a judge thinks proper” does not authorise the setting aside of professional privilege.1512 The same applies to the Supreme Court’s power to interrogate a person charged with contempt.1513 Professional privilege is affirmed in s 42 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), and it is not abrogated by s 37(1) of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Cth), which requires a claimant to provide insurers with a sworn statement in accordance with the regulations.1514 Further examples of statutes preserving professional privilege appear at [F.80]. Duration of professional privilege [A.195] The professional privilege of a natural person lasts for life and even afterwards, if necessary, for the benefit of a privy in title, but not if the original or a copy is lawfully in the hands of another person1515 not under a duty of confidence.1516 The same applies to material prepared for litigation.1517 If the client is a corporation and there is no privy in title, privilege ends on dissolution, as distinct from liquidation.1518 Other professions [A.196] At common law the only professional relationship entitled to privilege is between lawyer and client. There is no privilege for communications with medical practitioners,1519 clergy, industrial advocates,1520 bankers,1521 1511. [1987] 2 Qd R 710. 1512. Cockerill v Collins [1999] 2 Qd R 26. 1513. Exagym Pty Ltd v Professional Gymnasium Equipment Company Pty Ltd (No 2) [1994] 2 Qd R129. 1514. Smale v Sprott, QLR (31 January 2004). 1515. Calcraft v Guest [1898] 1 QB 759; Clarke v Great Southern Finance Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 260; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Lindberg (2009) 25 VR 398; [2009] VSCA 234 at [43]. 1516. Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Lindberg (2009) 25 VR 398; [2009] VSCA 234 at [51]. 1517. The Aegis Blaze [1986] 1 Lloyds Rep 203; Schneider v Leigh [1955] 2 QB 195 at 203; Re Norman and Mulgrave Shire Council (unreported, Decision No 94013, Queensland Information Commissioner, 28 June 1994). 1518. Baker v Evans (1987) 77 ALR 565. 1519. Hill v Minister for Community Services and Health (1991) 30 FCR 272; 102 ALR 661; Crockett v Roberts [2001] TASSC 95; W v Edgell noted in (1989) 63 ALJ 215 (no privilege for prisoner in consultation with psychiatrist). A similar instance in Australia, in the course of a coronial inquiry, is outlined in “The Queen St Murders”, The Australian (12 July 1991), p 9. The assassin, Vitkovic, consulted a counsellor at Melbourne University, where he was a law student. The counsellor was compelled to testify that he had seen Vitkovic and found him to be “deeply disturbed”. 1520. Wood v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1996) 67 IR 46. 1521. Smorgon v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1976) 134 CLR 475. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[A.197]

1523

accountants or journalists. In a case concerning the editor of the late and unlamented Truth, Rich J was markedly unsympathetic: Divided duty has produced many martyrs. The appellant was called upon to choose between his duty under law to answer questions relevant to the inquiry … and what he conceives to be his duty as a pressman to his informant to maintain silence. He chose to observe the latter supposed duty … [However] the small fine imposed on him scarcely entitles him to a high place in the rank of martyrs to a cause.1524

Nevertheless, while there is no absolute protection for journalists’ sources, there is a discretionary rule of practice, recognising the the social value of a free press, that an order for disclosure may be refused at an interlocutory stage in defamation proceedings. It is commonly known as “the newspaper rule”.1525 In 1991 the Queensland Law Reform Commission advised that interstate legislation about religious confessions should not be adopted in Queensland1526 and no further action was taken. Communications between Australian1527 patent attorneys and their clients are protected by the Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 200(2). In proceedings governed by the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) limited protection is given to confidential sources of journalists by ss 126A – 126H, 131A and 131B of that Act.1528

“Without prejudice” negotiations Prerequisites [A.197] This doctrine1529 is distinct from professional privilege, although closely associated with it in practice.1530 Admissions by word or conduct1531 during a bona fide attempt to settle civil litigation,1532 current or reasonably 1522. Macedonia Pty Ltd v FCT (1987) 18 ATR 929; 87 ATC 4565; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd (2003) 51 ATR 593; 195 ALR 717. 1523. McGuinness v Attorney General (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73 at 102-103; British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd [1981] AC 1096; 1 All ER 417; Hewitt v West Australian Newspapers (1976) 17 ACTR 15; 27 FLR 222; Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cornwall (1993) 38 NSWLR 207. 1524. McGuinness v Attorney-General (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73. 1525. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Cojuangco (1988) 165 CLR 346; [1988] HCA 54 at [9], [10], [18]. 1526. “Priests Defy Evidence Law”, Courier Mail (27 August 1991), p 3. 1527. Eli Lilly & Co v Pfizer Ireland Pharmaceuticals (No 2) (2004) 137 FCR 573; [2004] AIPC 92-010; FCA 850. 1528. Inserted by the Evidence Amendment (Journalists’ Privilege) Act 2007 (Cth) and the Evidence Amendment (Journalists’ Privilege) Act 2011 (Cth). 1529. For a useful summary, see Old Papa’s Franchise Systems Pty Ltd v Camisa Nominees Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 11 at [91] – [95]. 1530. Chapman v Allan (1999) 74 SASR 274. 1531. Strictly speaking, the very attempt to compromise is privileged: Field v Commissioner for Railways (1957) 99 CLR 285 at 291. 1532. Or proceedings for a civil penalty: Trade Practices Commission v TNT Australia Pty Ltd [1995] ATPR 41-375. We are not concerned with the now quasi-official process of “plea bargaining” in criminal cases, although it was equated to attempts to compromise civil issues in DPP v Walsh [1990] WAR 25 at 33.

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Legal Professional Privilege 1533

anticipated, are inadmissible if negotiations fail and the action proceeds to trial.1534 This privilege covers an “opening shot” in negotiations, even if the initial approach is rejected.1535 But a relevant communication that occurs before a dispute arises is not privileged.1536 This doctrine is designed to conserve private and public resources.1537 “As a means of resolution of civil contention litigation is certainly preferable to personal violence. But it is not intrinsically a desirable activity.”1538 “Civil disputes [should] as far as possible [be] settled without recourse to judicial decision.”1539 An alternative explanation is that it arises from an express or implied agreement to vary the rules of evidence.1540 This privilege is available to litigants in person.1541 Statutory provisions akin to “without prejudice” privilege protect admissions at a mediation or in compulsory conferences.1542 A lawyer or other agent who is authorised to negotiate a settlement is not ipso facto authorised to conclude a contract of compromise if the negotiations succeed. “It is one thing … to settle what are to be the terms of an agreement, if it should be made, and quite another thing to make the agreement.”1543

1533. Korean Air Lines v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (No 3) (2008) 247 ALR 781; [2008] FCA 701; Dowling v Ultraceuticals Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 386 (litigation not contemplated). 1534. See generally, Aitken, “‘Without Prejudice’ Revisited” (2011) 34 Aust Bar Rev 296. 1535. Korean Air Lines v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (No 3) (2008) 247 ALR 781; [2008] FCA 701; Galafassi v Kelly (2014) 87 NSWLR 119; [2014] NSWCA 190. 1536. Kong v Kang [2014] VSC 28 at [68]. 1537. Field v Commissioner for Railways (1957) 99 CLR 285 at 291; Harrington v Lowe (1996) 190 CLR 311 at 323; Mercantile Mutual Custodians Pty Ltd v Village/Nine Network Restaurants & Bars Pty Ltd [2001] 1 Qd R 276; [1999] QCA 276 at [27]. 1538. The Ampthill Peerage [1977] AC 547 at 575 per Lord Simon. 1539. Ventouris v Mountain [1991] 1 WLR 607 at 611 per Bingham J. Other cases emphasising the public interest in minimising litigation: Banque Comerciale SA, en Liquidation v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279 at 284; Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589 at 609; Tomlin v Standard Telephones and Cables Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1378 at 1384; Jones v Foxall (1852) 15 Beav 388; 51 ER 588 at 396 (Beav), 591 (ER). 1540. South Shropshire DC v Amos [1986] 1 WLR 1271; [1987] 1 All ER 340 at 1276-1277 (WLR), 343 (All ER); Cutts v Head [1984] Ch 290 at 313-314; Whiffen v Hartwright (1848) 11 Beav 111; 50 ER 759; Rabin v Mendoza & Co [1954] 1 WLR 271; 1 All ER 247. 1541. Rodgers v Rodgers (1964) 114 CLR 608 at 614; Scott Paper Co v Drayton Paper Works Ltd (1927) 44 RPC 151 at 156; Byrne v Petrie [1994] QSR 41. 1542.

See, eg, Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009, ss 74, 83; Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991, s 114. In AWA Ltd v Daniels t/a Deloitte Haskins and Sells (1992) 9 ACSR 383 a similar provision did not prevent proof of events at a mediation aliunde. But a suitably drafted mediation agreement may remove this difficulty: 789TEN v Westpac Banking Corporation [2004] NSWSC 594.

1543. Barrier Wharfs Ltd v W Scott Fell & Co Ltd (1908) 5 CLR 647 at 650 per Higgins J, approved in Marek v Australasian Conference Association Pty Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 521, applied in Mainchime Pty Ltd (t/a Inala Plaza News) v Inala Plaza Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 250. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Are only admissions protected? [A.198] If real evidence is produced during negotiations, the other party’s perceptions are not subject to privilege.1544 Deeds produced during “without prejudice” discussions are admissible.1545 If a party names a potential witness during negotiations, it would seem to follow that the other party may interview and call that witness at the trial.1546 If only admissions relevant to the dispute under negotiation1547 are protected, it would seem to follow that matters admitted may subsequently be proved by other means,1548 and that, accordingly, parties attempting settlement must steer a difficult course between undue taciturnity and imprudent volubility. However, in Mercantile Mutual Custodians Pty Ltd v Village Nine Network Restaurants & Bars Pty Ltd1549 there are dicta suggesting, pace Field v Commissioner for Railways,1550 that the protection of “negotiations privilege” may not be confined to admissions: Compromise negotiations are typically conducted [in] … a shared expectation that communications incidental to the process will not be disclosed without consent. … If … the participants were left to anticipate that their negotiations might afterwards be used to their detriment, many would feel constrained to conduct [them] in a cautious, tight-lipped, non-committal manner more suitable to poker players … than adversaries attempting to arrive at a just resolution of a civil dispute. … The notion that the … privilege should be confined to … [admissions] has some attraction … But … access to information which did not amount to admissions could supply a preview of the adversary’s assessment of its case, or identify previously unknown potential witnesses, or expose adventitious lines of inquiry.1551

1544. Field v Commissioner for Railways (1957) 99 CLR 285 at 291. 1545. AWA Ltd v Daniels (t/a Deloitte Haskins & Sells) (1992) 7 ACSR 463. 1546. There is no property in witnesses, provided that they are not questioned about the content of their discussions with the legal representative of another party: Harmony Shipping Co SA v Davis [1979] 1 WLR 1380 at 1384; [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 377; Public Transport Authority (WA) v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (2007) 34 WAR 279; [2007] WASCA 151 at [31]. On 29 June 1981 the Queensland Bar Association adopted this rule of professional ethics: “When the existence of … a witness is divulged to one party to another in the course of a settlement discussion, it is improper for any representatives of the other party to approach that witness and question him concerning what has been divulged.” As to evidence improperly obtained, see Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54; and Miller v Miller (1978) 141 CLR 269. 1547. Barden v Barden (1921) 21 SR (NSW) 588 (admission not material to dispute “A”, then subject to negotiations, but material to dispute “B” (not under negotiation) admissible). 1548. Compare Williamson v Schmidt [1998] 2 Qd R 317; 789TEN Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation [2004] NSWSC 594 at [26]-[29] (mediation). It may be useful to stipulate that disclosures shall not be proveable, directly or indirectly, if the matter proceeds to trial. Compare the formulae or statutory abrogation of self-incrimination privilege, outlined in [10.32]. 1549. [2001] 1 Qd R 276; [1999] QCA 276; Falland v Symbion Health Ltd [2010] SASC 119 at [11]; see also Lukies v Ripley (No 2) (1994) 35 NSWLR 283 at 287 (“any communication”). 1550. (1957) 99 CLR 285at 291-292. The view in Field is followed in AWA Ltd v Daniels t/a Deloitte Haskins and Sells (1992) 9 ACSR 383 at [14]. 1551. [2001] 1 Qd 276 at 289 and 292; see also Pincus JA at 284-285. Special leave to appeal to the High Court was refused, but on quite different grounds.

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There is support for this view in the single-judge decision in Williams v Nicoski.1552 But if it is correct, what limits can be set to the guile of a negotiator who seeks to handicap an opponent by making sundry disclosures (short of admissions) during settlement discussions, and then claiming that none of them may be used, directly or indirectly, if the case proceeds to trial?1553 But be that as it may, the dicta in Mercantile Mutual Custodians draw attention to an uncertain and important point that has received surprisingly little attention. [A.199] The privilege extends to admissions in documents from third parties, such as experts, disclosed in the course of negotiations.1554 [A.200] It is desirable, but not essential, that the time-honoured words “without prejudice” be used. It is sufficient if the parties’ words and conduct show that “off-the-record” negotiations were intended,1555 particularly if legal representatives were present1556 or a party was responding to a “without prejudice” approach.1557 Bona fides [A.201] Negotiations must be bona fide, but an honest claim that is doubtful or even legally unsound1558 may be good consideration for a contract of compromise.1559 However, bona fides was conspicuously absent in Hawick Jersey International Ltd v Caplan,1560 where one party admitted that the claim under discussion was a mere sham to induce the other to settle an unrelated claim. In JA McBeath Nominees Pty Ltd v Jenkins Development Corporation Pty Ltd1561 a tenant sought the landlord’s assent to an assignment of its lease. The landlord refused, claiming that the newcomer was financially unsound. But later, in a “without prejudice” conversation, the landlord let slip its real motive by offering to approve the assignment if the newcomer paid a substantially higher rent. The tenant was allowed to give evidence of that statement in an application for dispensation from the landlord’s consent. On the other hand, an allegation that 1552. [2003] WASC 131; see also Falland v Symbion Health Ltd [2010] SASC 119 at [11], referring to Rush & Tompkins v Greater London Council Ltd [1989] AC 1280 at 1300 and Unilever Plc v Procter & Gamble Co [2000] 1 WLR 2436 at 2448-2449. 1553. See AWA Ltd v Daniels t/a Deloitte Haskins and Sells (1992) 9 ACSR 383, where the privilege is limited to admissions. 1554. Rabin v Mendoza & Co [1954] 1 WLR 271; 1 All ER 247; Jovista Pty Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd [1998] WASC 298 (report sent under cover of “without prejudice” letter). 1555. Rodgers v Rodgers (1964) 114 CLR 608 at 614; McTaggart v McTaggart [1949] P 94; Korean Air Lines v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (No 3) (2008) 247 ALR 781; [2008] FCA 701; Galafassi v Kelly (2014) 87 NSWLR 119; [2014] NSWCA 190. 1556. Lukies v Ripley (No 2) (1994) 35 NSWLR 283; Brown v Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 46 ATR 393 (voluntary attendance at tax office with lawyer and accountant). 1557. Paddock v Forrester (1842) 133 ER 1404. 1558. Hercules Motors Pty Ltd v Schubert (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 301. 1559. General Credits Ltd v Ebsworth [1986] 2 Qd R 162; Hawick Jersey International Limited v Caplan, The Times (London) 11 March 1988; Hutchings v Clarke (1993) 112 FLR 450; [1993] FLC 79,871. 1560. The Times (London) 11 March 1988. 1561. [1992] 2 Qd R 121; applied in Tsallis v Schofield [2012] WASC 231 and Re Idoport Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 524. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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there was no reasonable belief in the merits of a claim was rejected in Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v Bligh Lobb Pink Pty Ltd.1562 An initially valid privilege may not be used to mislead the court or to defraud the other party: see [A.205]. Misrepresentations contrary to the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) were not privileged in Quad Consulting Pty Ltd v David R Bleakley and Associates Pty Ltd.1563 See also [A.205]. When the conventional phrase is pointless [A.202] In the absence of an actual legal dispute, the “without prejudice” mantra serves no purpose. It is pointless when it accompanies a bare assertion of a right, or appears in a letter merely stating that a claim will be referred to legal advisers.1564 Sometimes it is worse than pointless. If the issue is whether an insurer flatly refused to honour a policy, a letter containing the refusal is admissible, regardless of the caption “without prejudice”.1565 A “without prejudice” letter that expressly or impliedly admits liability and merely requests time to pay is not privileged because the legal rights of the creditor are not contested.1566 If an employer writes to an ex-employee who is suing for wrongful dismissal, “without prejudice – if you join a trade union, you can have your job back” – the letter is admissible.1567 A letter containing demands and threats, dripping with prejudice, but without a suggestion of settlement, gained no protection from the “magic words” in Bhagat v Global Custodians Ltd.1568 Negotiating part of a dispute [A.203] When only part of a dispute is under negotiation, it is essential to distinguish issues that are under negotiation from those that are not. If only quantum is under discussion, admissions relating to liability will not be protected.1569 In other cases negotiations are limited to preservation of the status quo pending trial.1570 Often they are subject to a condition that, if the matter does go to trial and the “without prejudice” offer is not bettered, the offer will be evidence on the question of costs.1571 1562. (2002) 18 BCL 376; [2002] VSC 337. 1563. (1990) 27 FCR 86; [1991] ATPR 52,013. 1564. Re Brisbane City Council and White (1972) 50 LGRA 225 at 229; Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1989] 3 WLR 152; note the impatient comments of Wells J in Davies v Nyland (1974) 10 SASR 76 at 89. 1565. Nicholson v Southern Star Fire Insurance Co Ltd (1927) 28 SR (NSW) 124. 1566. Re Daintrey; Ex parte Holt [1893] 2 QB 136; Wilson v Kingsgate Mining Industries Pty Ltd [1973] 2 NSWLR 713 (re extra time to complete contract for sale of land). 1567. Gregory v Philip Morris Ltd (1988) 24 IR 397; 80 ALR 455. According to industrial law it was unlawful to compel, or to conspire to compel, a person to join a trade union. 1568. [2002] NSWCA 160. 1569. Field v Commissioner for Railways (1957) 99 CLR 285. 1570. Bentley v Nelson [1963] WAR 89. 1571. Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam 93; Johns Perry Industries v International Rigging (Aust) Pty Ltd [1988] 2 Qd R 556; ACCC v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (No 3) [2002]

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Admissions about extraneous issues between a taxpayer and the Taxation Office lacked privilege in Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd v Anderson.1572 Waiver [A.204] Waiver of “without prejudice” privilege requires the express or implied assent of all parties to the negotiations.1573 When waiver does occur, the whole of the “without prejudice” communications are normally open to disclosure1574 by either party,1575 but an exception may be made if some aspects of a compromise are severable.1576 Abuse of “without prejudice” privilege [A.205] “Without prejudice” privilege may not be used to oppress a party or to mislead a court.1577 Accordingly, the privilege may not be used to pretend that an admission was made by failing to answer business correspondence, when a reply was actually made in a “without prejudice” letter.1578 Nor may it be used to prevent a party from proving that a deed of settlement is based on misleading or deceptive information provided during settlement negotiations.1579 But it is not lost by hard bargaining within normal business limits.1580 Duration of “without prejudice” privilege [A.206] If a compromise is achieved but not honoured, evidence of the negotiations may be given to enforce the settlement.1581 In such a case the privilege has served its purpose and, as between the parties, it would be absurd to

ATPR 41-901; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, rr 360 – 361; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009, r 86. But the court retains a discretion to relax the rule: Mega-top Cargo Pty Ltd v Moneytech Services Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 3. 1572. [2002] 1 Qd R 233; (2001) 47 ATR 11. 1573. McTaggart v McTaggart [1949] P 94; Re Turf Enterprises Pty Ltd [1975] Qd R 266; Chapman v Allan (1999) 74 SASR 274; Kong v Kang [2014] VSC 28 at [64]. 1574. Quad Consulting Pty Ltd v David R Bleakley and Associates Pty Ltd (1990) 27 FCR 86; [1991] ATPR 52,013. 1575. Johnston v Jackson (1880) 6 VLR 1 (L). 1576. Commonwealth Oil Refineries Ltd v Hollins [1956] VLR 169. 1577. Barrett Property Group Pty Ltd v Dennis Family Homes Pty Ltd (No 2) (2011) 193 FCR 479; [2011] FCA 276; O’Neill v Martini [2012] QSC 198 at [45]; Galafassi v Kelly [2014] NSWCA 190. 1578. McFadden v Snow (1951) 69 WN (NSW) 8; see also Pitts v Adney (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 886; JA McBeath Nominees Pty Ltd v Jenkins Development Corporation Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 121. 1579. Pihiga Pty Ltd v Roche (2011) 278 ALR 209; [2011] FCA 240. 1580. Jermyn v Spargos Mining NL [2001] WASCA 149. 1581. Walker v Wilsher (1889) 23 QBD 335 at 337; Tomlin v Standard Telephones and Cables Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1378; Knapp v Metropolitan Permanent Building Association (1888) 9 LR (NSW) 486; NSI Group Pty Ltd v Mokas [2006] NSWSC 1077 (issue as to whether settlement had been abandoned); SWV Pty Ltd v Spiroc Pty Ltd (2006) 201 FLR 238; [2006] NSWSC 668. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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let it continue. But settlement or no settlement, it remains effective against others,1582 whether they are parties to the same action or not.1583 Unauthorised or unjust settlement [A.207] If a party’s lawyer compromises an action without actual1584 authority or if a reasonable opponent would realise that an agreement was made by mistake,1585 the court may decline to enforce it.1586 As to the difference between authority to negotiate terms, and authority to settle, see [A.197]. Court initiatives [A.208] Modern rules of court authorise judges to order parties to negotiate.1587 In Queensland courts, things said and done in the course of “alternative dispute resolution” are inadmissible without the consent of all concerned.1588 However, matters then referred to may be proved by other means.1589 In Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd v Gorczynski (No 3)1590 the court determined the existence and proper interpretation of a settlement agreement.

ESTOPPEL General [A.209] Estoppel, like privilege, is a collection of disparate rules with different policy foundations. But they have this in common: they exclude otherwise admissible evidence because of a particular relationship or course of dealing between the parties. That relationship may arise from previous litigation, or from a contract or non-contractual representation. For a discussion of the several species of estoppel, see Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd.1591 [A.210] Estoppel is treated here as follows: (a) res judicata or estoppel by record – complete and partial: [A.211]; 1582. Rush & Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council [1989] AC 1280; Mercantile Mutual Custodians Pty Ltd v Village/Nine Network Restaurants & Bars Pty Ltd [2001] 1 Qd R 276. 1583. Mercantile Mutual Custodians Pty Ltd v Village/Nine Network Restaurants & Bars Pty Ltd [2001] 1 Qd R 276; [1999] QCA 276 at [20]. 1584. But there may be apparent authority: Broadbent v Medical Board of Queensland [2010] QCA 352. 1585. Lewis v Combell Constructions Pty Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 528. 1586. Insbury Pty Ltd v Craig [1990] 1 Qd R 309; Broadbent v Medical Board of Queensland [2010] QCA 352. 1587. For example, Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth), Pts 11.1 and 12.2; Federal Court Rules (Cth), O 72 r 1; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, rr 320, 323-333. 1588. Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991, s 114(1); Mercantile Mutual Custodians Pty Ltd v Village Nine Network Restaurants & Bars Pty Ltd [2001] 1 Qd R 276. 1589. Williamson v Schmidt [1998] 2 Qd R 317 at 332-336. For a possible solution, see 789TEN v Westpac Banking Corporation [2004] NSWSC 594. 1590. [2016] NSWSC 55. 1591.

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(b) “Anshun” estoppel: [A.214]; (c) estoppel by deed or contract: [A.216]; and (d) estoppel by representation: [A.217].

Estoppel by record – cause of action estoppel [A.211] This doctrine is substantive rather than procedural,1592 but it is not a jurisdictional point that the court may raise if the parties fail to do so.1593 The principle is that a charge or cause of action decided1594 by a competent court cannot be re-litigated,1595 because it “merges” in the prior judgment.1596 Absence of legal representation at the first hearing does not negate an otherwise valid estoppel.1597 The two causes of action, and the parties1598 must be precisely the same.1599 That is not so when issues in case number 1 are combined with new issues raised in case number 2.1600 A judgment by consent or in default of pleading1601 suffices.1602 A default judgment in an action for damages estops the issue of liability, but not the quantum issue.1603 As to a dismissal for want of jurisdiction, see [A.213], The reasons for a decision do not create an estoppel, but they may be examined to see what issues were decided.1604 1592. Commonwealth of Australia v Sciacca (1988) 17 FCR 476; 78 ALR 279; note (1988) 62 ALJ 500; Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v Twitchings [1976] QB 225; [1975] 3 All ER 314 at 241-242 (QB), 323 (All ER). 1593. Thorpe v Charles Sturt City Corporation (1999) 103 LGERA 395; [1999] SASC 10 at [6]. 1594. There can be res judicata as between defendants, although it is usually between plaintiff and defendant: Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd v Boland (2000) 179 ALR 664. 1595. Any attempt to do so is an abuse of process: R v Balfour; Ex parte Parkes Rural Distributions Pty Ltd (1987) 17 FCR 26; 76 ALR 256; Donaldson v Suffolk Investments Pty Ltd [2015] WASC 481. 1596. Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 532; Wall v Halford (No 2) [1960] QWN 51; Re European Central Railway Co; Ex parte Oriental Financial Corporation (1876) 4 Ch D 33; In re Hodgson (1885) 31 Ch D 177 at 188; Isaac & Sons v Salbstein [1916] 2 KB 139; Thoday v Thoday [1964] P 181 at 197 (“cause of action estoppels”). Failure of a counterclaim resulted in res judicata in Linprint Pty Ltd v Hexham Textiles Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 509. 1597. SZDCF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 1391. 1598. Hill End Gold Ltd v First Tiffany Resource Corporation [2010] NSWSC 375 at [36] (a privy in title is the same party). 1599. Moy v Warringah Council (2004) 142 A Crim R 577; [2004] NSWCA 77; Zavodnyik v Alex Constructions Pty Ltd (2005) 67 NSWLR 457; [2004] NSWCA 438 (sufficient identity between action in contract and claims for restitution or quantum meruit)); Bzikadze v Fielders Australia Pty Ltd [2011] SASC 88. 1600. Eastman v Australian Capital Territory (2014) ACTLR 119; 285 FLR 325; [2014] ACTSC 105 at [63]. 1601. Re Morton; Ex parte Mitchell Products Pty Ltd (1996) 21 ACSR 497; Accom Finance Pty Ltd v Mars Pty Ltd (2007) 13 BPR 24,729; [2007] NSWSC 726. 1602. Marks v National & General Insurance Co Ltd (1993) 114 FLR 416; Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 164 CLR 502 at 508; Re South American and Mexican Co; Ex parte Bank of England [1895] 1 Ch 37 at 45; Makhoul v Barnes (1995) 60 FCR 572 at 582. 1603. North Australian Aboriginal Legal Service Inc v Liddle (1994) 118 FLR 109; [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-300. 1604. Wall v The King; Ex parte King Won (1927) 39 CLR 266; [1927] HCA 16. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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The res judicata principle cannot be avoided by “splitting” a single cause of action. Judgment for part of a debt or breach of contract bars a separate action for the balance.1605 The position of the first court in the judicial hierarchy does not matter; the judgment of a magistrates’ court may be pleaded in bar in a subsequent Supreme Court action.1606 An estoppel by record may be based on a decision of a State administrative tribunal1607 or commercial arbitrator.1608 “The doctrine of estoppel extends to the decision of any tribunal which has jurisdiction to decide finally a question arising between parties, even if it is not called a court, and its jurisdiction is derived from statute or from the submission of parties.”1609 (Quaere whether domestic tribunals are included.)1610 However, a decision of a Commonwealth tribunal cannot raise an issue estoppel because the judicial power of the Commonwealth

1605. Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 164 CLR 502; Ebber v Isager [1995] 1 Qd R 150 (building defects); Honeywood v Munnings (2006) 67 NSWLR 466; [2006] NSWCA 215. This principle did not apply in Clout v Klein [2001] QSC 401, where the only common element was the expenditure of money to the defendants’ benefit. 1606. Bollen v Hickson [1981] Qd R 249 (first court a Magistrates’ Court); Crown Estate Commissioners v Dorset County Council [1990] Ch 297; 1 All ER 19; Tiufino v Warland (2000) 50 NSWLR 104. 1607. Victorian Professional Group Management Pty Ltd v The Proprietors “Surfers Aquarius” Building Units Plan No 3881 [1991] 1 Qd R 487; McNair v Press Offshore Ltd (1997) 17 WAR 191; Basser v Medical Board of Victoria [1981] VR 953; Isaacs v Cachia [1981] 2 NSWLR 92; Aavelaid v Dental Board (NSW) [1998] ACL Rep 190 NSW 5; Bartucciotto v Euro Printing Pty Ltd [1999] WASCA 1011 (finding of industrial relations court that employee breached duty to employer; latter employee estopped from denying negligence in later action by employer); Milojevic v ROH Industries Pty Ltd (1991) 56 SASR 78 (decision of workers’ compensation tribunal – injury not received in employment – estoppel on that issue in action at common law). A similar case is Beecham Pty Ltd v Periera (2001) 22 NSWCCR 507; [2001] NSWCA 278; see also Kuligowski v Metrobus (2002) 26 WAR 137; (2004) 220 CLR 363; [2004] HCA 34 (claim failed, but judgments proceeded on basis that issue estoppel could arise); Squires Transport Pty Ltd v Turnor [2004] WASCA 245 (review officer); Tiufino v Warland (2000) 50 NSWLR 104; [2000] NSWCA 110 at [27]; Morris v Riverwild Management Pty Ltd (2011) 284 ALR 413; [2011] VSCA 283 at [86], and particularly if the tribunal is declared a court of record: Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 164; Owen v Menzies [2013] 2 Qd R 327; [2012] QCA 170. But no estoppel can be based on an administrative tribunal’s decision about a jurisdictional fact: Kowalski v Trustee, Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd Staff Superannuation Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 18. 1608. Brisbane City Council v Woodhall Ltd [1983] 1 Qd R 563. 1609. Administration of Papua and New Guinea v Daera Guba (1973) 130 CLR 353 at 453 per Gibbs J; Hill End Gold Ltd v First Tiffany Resource Corporation (2010) 4 ARLR 389; [2010] NSWSC 375 (Mining Warden’s Court); Lambidis v Commissioner of Police (1995) 37 NSWLR 320. But in Brumar (Vic) Pty Ltd v Norris (2010) 28 VR 665; [2010] VSCA 206 the particular statute strictly limited issue estoppel arising from the decision of a workers’ compensation tribunal. 1610. A positive answer was given in R (Coke-Wallis) v Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales [2011] 2 AC 146; [2011] UKSC 1. Note, however, that at least two of the authorities relied on, namely Basser v Medical Board (Vic) [1981] VR 953 and Dental Council of New Zealand; Ex parte Gibson (2010) 19 PRNZ 900; [2010] NZHC 912 involved statutory tribunals.

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may only be exercised by a court.1611 In Maurice Blackburn Cashman v Brown1612 the particular statute limited the finality of the tribunal’s decisions to cases arising under that Act. However, the judgment clearly implies that, in an appropriate case, an estoppel may arise from a decision of an administrative tribunal.1613 Apart from ss 79 and 80 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), a prior judgment is no evidence of its findings of fact1614 unless it is a conviction based on a plea of guilty, in which case the plea is evidence of the facts thereby admitted.1615 Res judicata does not arise from an agreement between the parties that is noted by the court. There must be a judicial order.1616 The criminal law versions of res judicata1617 are autrefois convict and autrefois acquit.1618 Acquittal on a murder charge bars a subsequent trial for perjury1619 if a conviction on the latter charge would be inconsistent with the acquittal.1620 But a person acquitted of burglary may be tried for receiving the same property, provided that the acquittal of burglary is not impugned.1621 An acquittal bars the proof of facts inconsistent with that verdict in later criminal proceedings,1622 but not in civil1623 or disciplinary cases.1624 (Distinguish a challenge to the verdict itself.) There are some special cases in which res judicata does not apply. A party to a declaratory order may return to the court if the original order proves inadequate or if new events occur.1625 In bankruptcy jurisdiction a debtor may challenge the validity of a judgment on which a creditor’s petition is based.1626 A judgment

1611. Badraie v Commonwealth (2005) 195 FLR 119; [2005] NSWSC 1195; Miller v University of New South Wales (2003) 132 FCR 147; 200 ALR 565; [2003] FCAFC 180 at [9], [48]ff. 1612. (2011) 242 CLR 647; [2011] HCA 22. 1613. As in Shaw v Gadens Lawyers [2014] VSCA 74. 1614. Hollington v Hewthorn & Co Ltd [1943] KB 587; R v Shepherd (1980) 71 Cr App R 120. 1615. Moore v Giofrelle [1952] ALR (CN) 1049; Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461; R v O’Keefe [1999] 1 Qd R 564. 1616. Beck v Weinstock (2012) 8 BFRA 279; [2012] NSWCA 289. 1617. Sambasivam v Public Prosecutor Federation of Malaya [1950] AC 458; Maxwell v DPP [1935] AC 309. 1618. As to the elements of a plea of autrefois convict, see R v Stone (2005) 157 A Crim R 41; [2005] NSWCCA 344. 1619. HM Advocate v Cairns [1967] SLT 165; Grdic v The Queen [1985] 1 SCR (Canada) 810. 1620. R v Carroll (2002) 213 CLR 635; 136 A Crim R 167; 194 ALR 1; [2002] HCA 55. 1621. R v Hutton (1994) 3 Tas R 225. 1622. Garrett v The Queen (1977) 139 CLR 437; R v Cullen (1989) 52 CCC 3d 459; Williams, “A Judgment of Innocence: The Effect of an Acquittal in Australian Law” (1987) 61 ALJ 134. 1623. Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691; Kosanovic v Sarapuu [1962] VR 321. In Utans v Consolidated Insurances Ltd (unreported, SA Sup Ct, noted in the Australian Law Report (17 November 1986); aff’d SA Sup Ct (FC) 17 February 1988), a civil action against an insurer, a man was found to have deliberately lit a fire after he was acquitted of arson and an associated murder. 1624. Purnell v Medical Board of Queensland [1999] 1 Qd R 362. 1625. Quin v Attorney-General (NSW) (1988) 28 IR 244 (CA). 1626. Wren v Mahoney (1972) 126 CLR 212. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[A.212]

obtained by fraud may be impeached by an original action in equity in lieu of an appeal.1627 Custody and access orders are always reviewable while the child is in the jurisdiction.1628

Issue estoppel (partial res judicata) [A.212] This is an extension of, or analogue to, res judicata.1629 An issue estoppel arises when an issue raised in Action No 2 was decided in Action No 1, although the second cause of action is not the same.1630 In [cause of action estoppel] the very right or cause of action claimed … has in the former proceedings passed into judgment, so that it has merged and has no longer an independent existence, while in [issue estoppel], for the purpose of some other claim … a state of fact or law is alleged or denied, the existence of which is a matter necessarily decided by the prior judgment, decree or order.1631

Issue estoppel is confined to civil proceedings.1632 When it is relied on it should be pleaded, although an omission to do so is not fatal.1633 An example may be seen in Bollen v Hickson,1634 where the liability issue in a personal injuries action was effectively withdrawn from the Supreme Court by the decision of a magistrates’ court in a property claim arising out of the same incident. Another example, involving an unsuccessful plea of fraud, is Heid v Connell Investments Pty Ltd.1635 Linsley v Petrie1636 differs from Bollen v Hickson in treating a duty with respect to property and a duty towards its owner in person as entirely separate matters.1637

1627. Hillman v Hillman [1977] 2 NSWLR 739. The time for appeal had long ago expired. 1628. JFL v TP (1999) 155 FLR 370; [1999] FLC 92-870. 1629. Thoday v Thoday [1964] P 181 at 197-198 per Lord Diplock. 1630. Quarmby v Qasair Investments Pty Ltd [2014] TASFC 11. For a general treatment of the elements of issue estoppel, see Murphy v Overton Investments Pty Ltd (2001) 182 ALR 138; [2001] FCA 1725. 1631. Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 532 per Dixon J. For a similar explanation, see Wong v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 204 ALR 722; [2004] FCA 51: see also Mango Boulevard Pty Ltd v Spencer [2010] QCA 207; Owston Nominees No 2 Pty Ltd v Clambake Pty Ltd (2011) 248 FLR 193; [2011] WASCA 76 at [124]. 1632. R v Storey (1978) 140 CLR 364; R v Owen (1993) 68 A Crim R 247; Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251, overruling O’Mara v Litfin [1972] QWN 32; R v McGee (2008) 102 SASR 318; [2008] SASC 328 (no application to sentencing proceedings). 1633. Ferreira v Zebra Stoneworks Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 405 at [56]. 1634. [1981] Qd R 249. In Bollen v Hickson, in one traffic incident the plaintiff’s car was damaged and the plaintiff was physically injured; thus, two distinct causes of action arose. In Action 1, in a magistrate’s court, liability was apportioned between the parties. In Action 2, in the Supreme Court, no evidence could be received on that issue, although the issue of quantum remained res integra. See also Egri v DRG Australia Ltd (1988) 19 NSWLR 600; IVI Pty Ltd v Baycrown Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 2 (declaration in prior case that a contract valid and binding). 1635. (1989) 16 NSWLR 629. 1636. (1996) 9 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-349. 1637. A case supporting the approach in Bollen v Hickson [1981] Qd R 249 is Tiufino v Warland (2000) 50 NSWLR 104 (motor car collision – property claim heard first – magistrate finds appellant wholly responsible – causes of action different, but duty of care the same).

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However, the approach in Bollen v Hickson was preferred in Hawira v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd.1638 Regardless of whether the first action failed or succeeded, issue estoppel will operate to prevent the same question of fact or law from being relitigated in proceedings on a different cause of action between the same parties or their privies.1639 However, issue estoppel is inherently less stable than cause of action estoppel. The issue may be reopened if there has been a change in the law or if the second court considers that the first decision is clearly wrong.1640 An issue estoppel cannot be based on a judgment obtained by perjury.1641 [A.213] In order to establish an issue estoppel, it must be shown1642 that in Action No 1: (a) the issue was exactly the same;1643 (b) there was a final1644 judgment on the merits;1645 1638. (2007) 47 MVR 530; [2007] QSC 158 (“prima facie there is a real risk of an issue estoppel arising”). 1639. Knight v Commissioner of Police [2011] WASC 93 at [49]. 1640. Arnold v Westminster Bank Plc [1990] Ch 573 (CA). 1641. Weaver v Law Society of NSW (1979) 142 CLR 201; [1979] HCA 35. 1642. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853; Cordes v Dr Peter Ironside Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 302; Kuligowski v Metrobus (2004) 220 CLR 363; [2004] HCA 34. 1643. As in Powercell Pty Ltd v Cuzeno Pty Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 21,385; [2003] NSWSC 600 (existence of oral agreement); appeal dismissed [2004] NSWCA 51. Not so in Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446 (car driver’s duty to motor cyclist not the same as duty to cyclist’s pillion passenger); or in McDonald v Sydney South West Area Health Service [2005] NSWSC 924 (separate duties to mother and father of unwanted child). Similar cases are Brewster v Milne (1993) 18 MVR 83; and Miller v University of NSW (2003) 132 FCR 147; 200 ALR 565; [2003] FCAFC 180 (finding of “harsh, unjust or unreasonable” dismissal by industrial court not an estoppel in common law action for wrongful dismissal); Kuligowski v Metrobus (2004) 220 CLR 363; [2004] HCA 34 (decision in workers’ compensation tribunal that serious injury not compensable was distinct from common law issue of negligence). 1644. A decision is “final” if it is “completely effective unless and until it should be rescinded, altered, or amended”, even if it not expressly declared to be final: Kuligowski v Metrobus (2004) 220 CLR 363; [2004] HCA 34 (appeal allowed on other grounds). A decision does not cease to be “final” merely because an appeal is available: Administration of Papua and New Guinea v Daera Guba (1973) 130 CLR 353 at 453. 1645. An interlocutory judgment cannot give rise to an issue estoppel: Wilson v Union Insurance Co Ltd (1992) 112 FLR 166; Santos v Delhi Petroleum Pty Ltd (2002) 225 LSJS 1; [2002] SASC 272; Withyman v New South Wales [2013] Aust Torts Reports 82-124; [2013] NSWCA 10; Attorney-General (SA) v Kowalski [2015] SASC 123 at [139]. There is no estoppel if the primary decision is set aside on appeal: Bankstown Football Club Ltd v CIC Insurance Ltd (1998) 10 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-406. Distinguish decisions based on withdrawal (R v McLoughlin; Ex parte DPP [1988] 1 Qd R 464), want of jurisdiction (Minister for Home and Territories v Teesdale Smith (1924) 35 CLR 120; Rizhao Steel Holding Group Co Ltd v Koolan Iron Ore Pty Ltd (2012) 43 WAR 91; [2012] WASCA 50 at [195]; Willoughby v Clayton Utz (No 2) (2009) 40 WAR 98; [2009] WASCA 29 at [30]; Phipson on Evidence (12th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1976) at [1306]; Spencer Bower et al, Res Judicata (Butterworths, 1996), p 37; J D Heydon (ed),Cross on Evidence (5th Aust ed, Butterworths, 1996) at [5025]), want of prosecution (Pople v Evans [1969] 2 Ch 255) or a decision to strike out a pleading as disclosing no cause of action: Rogers v Legal Services Commission (SA) (1995) 64 SASR 572. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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(c) the issue was ultimate, not merely evidential;

(d) the parties were the same or privies in interest1647 and sued in the same capacities;1648 and (e) the issue was necessarily decided,1649 as distinct from an obiter opinion.1650 The record of the first case may not enable the issue to be clearly identified, especially if it involved a jury verdict.1651 A judgment in default of appearance or defence is treated as a judgment on the merits,1652 but not a dismissal for failure

A magistrate’s direction that goods seized under a search warrant may be released to a certain person does not determine the title to the goods, and creates no estoppel on that issue: Vassallo v Haddad Import & Export Pty Ltd (2004) 2 DCLR (NSW) 123. 1646. Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 532; GK Sanford Pty Ltd v Jansen (1992) 36 FCR 83 at 98; and Burden v Ainsworth (2004) 59 NSWLR 506; [2004] NSWCA 3; Northey v Juul [2008] NSWSC 275; Brewer v Brewer (1953) 83 CLR 1 at 15-16; Holborow v Western Australia [2009] FCA 1200; Dale v Western Australia (2009) 261 ALR 21; [2009] FCA 1201. Findings as to credit of medical opinion were only evidential in Moussa v Westray Engineering Pty Ltd (1994) 10 NSWCCR 723. A ruling on evidence at a first trial is not binding upon a retrial: Cornwell v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 260; [2007] HCA 12. 1647. Palmbay Nominees Pty Ltd v Fowler [2003] WASCA 217; Proctor v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2005) 59 ATR 1064; Wilson v Lowery (1993) 4 NTLR 79; 110 FLR 142. The parties were not the same when one action concerning the same accident was brought against a car owner in person and the second action (as required by statute) against a party’s insurance company: Finn v Lemmer (1991) 55 SASR 455. Where an individual lays a complaint and then the Crown prosecutes, there are different parties: R v Owen (1993) 68 A Crim R 247. On the trial of “X” for procuring an offence by “Y”, evidence that “Y” was convicted is not admissible against “X”: R v Kirkby [2001] 1 Qd R 267; [1999] QCA 445; Champerslife Pty Ltd v Manojlovski (2010) 75 NSWLR 245; [2010] NSWCA 33; Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd (2015) 323 ALR 1; 89 ALJR 750; [2015] HCA 28 at [19]. 1648. Marginson v Blackburn Borough Council [1939] KB 246; Cordes v Dr Peter Ironside Pty Ltd (2009) 231 FLR 32; [2009] QSC 89 (aff’d [2009] QCA 302). 1649. Dobree v Hoffman (1995) 14 WAR 408 (issue not decided – solicitor acting for self given costs order in general terms – no estoppel before taxing master as to right to professional costs of lawyer acting in person); GS Technology Pty Ltd v Elster Metering Pty Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 444; 75 IPR 80; [2008] FCA 17 (necessarily decided). 1650. Re State of Norway’s Application (No 2) [1988] 3 WLR 603; Shephard v Chiquita Brands (South Pacific) Ltd [2002] FCA 466; Theo v Offıcial Trustee in Bankruptcy (1996) 70 FCR 317 (finding of intent to defraud creditors not necessary, so no issue estoppel on that point in later bankruptcy case). Test – could it be the subject of an appeal?: Murphy v Abu-Saab (1995) 37 NSWLR 280; Shephard v Chiquita Brands (South Pacific) Ltd [2002] FCA 466. 1651. Lemari v Lemari [1988] 1 Qd R 144. 1652. Crawford v Turner [1984] Tas R 96; Elders Finance Ltd v Invaway Pty Ltd [1991] 2 Qd R 398; Accom Finance Pty Ltd v Mars Pty Ltd (2007) 13 BPR 24,729; [2007] NSWSC 726 (default judgment for possession and sale); New Brunswick Railway Company v British and French Trust Corporation [1939] AC 1; Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] AC 993; KGK Constructions Pty Ltd v East Coast Earthmoving Pty Ltd [1985] 2 Qd R 13; Mango Boulevard Pty Ltd v Spencer [2008] QCA 274 (“guillotine” order); contra Palmbay Nominees Pty Ltd v Fowler [2003] WASCA 217.

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to disclose a cause of action. Companies and their directors are not privies, so a judgment against the company is not a judgment against the directors.1654 Issue estoppel is not available in a Commonwealth tribunal, for the constitutional reason stated in [A.211].

“Anshun” estoppel [A.214] Apart from res judicata in the strict sense,1655 a court may estop a person from pursuing, in a separate action, a claim that should have been ventilated in earlier proceedings1656 between the same parties.1657 This has been described as “res judicata in the wider sense”.1658 It is an application of the broad power to prevent abuse of process1659 by proliferating or prolonging litigation. The Anshun principle applies if the matter subsequently relied upon was so relevant to the subject matter of the determined action that it was unreasonable not to rely on it on that occasion. The purpose of the principle is to avoid the possibility of inconsistent decisions and to achieve efficient use of court resources and time.1660 A defendant entitled to contribution or indemnity from a third party should join that claim in the proceedings initiated by the plaintiff.1661 A landowner should not deny a right of way in Action No 1 and then dispute the extent of that right in Action No 2.1662 A defendant in Matter “A” should plead an agreement which may provide a defence in that case, instead of reserving it for Matter “B”, with 1653. It is not a judgment on the merits: Rogers v Legal Services Commission (SA) (1995) 64 SASR 572; Somodaj v Australian Iron and Steel Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 285 at 296-297; Baines v State Bank of New South Wales (1985) 2 NSWLR 729; Attorney-General v Kowalski (SA) [2014] SASC 1 at [188]. 1654. Effem Foods Pty Ltd v Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd (In liq) (1993) 43 FCR 510; 115 ALR 377. 1655. Because Action No 2 does not involve the same cause of action. 1656. Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589; Slater v Nye [1998] VSC 100; TM Burke Estates Pty Ltd v Noosa Shire Council (2001) 113 LGERA 368; Australian Associated Motor Insurers Ltd v NRMA Insurance Ltd (2002) 124 FCR 518; Powercell Pty Ltd v Cuzeno Pty Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 21,385; [2003] NSWSC 600; Macchia v Nilant [2006] FCA 213; Sahin v National Australia Bank Ltd [2012] VSCA 317. 1657. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Shears [2014] NSWSC 1653. 1658. Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100; 67 ER 313 at 115 (Hare), 319 (ER) per Wigram V-C: “The plea of res judicata applies … not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to … pronounce a judgment … but to every point which … the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.” This statement was approved in Hoystead v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155 at 170; see also Brisbane City Council v Attorney-General for Queensland [1978] 3 WLR 299 at 308. The distinction between this concept and cause of action estoppel strictu sensu is explained in Patterson v Veitch (1956) 58 SR (NSW) 287 at 289-290. 1659. Herron v McGregor (1986) 6 NSWLR 246 at 250; Redowood Pty Ltd v Link Market Services Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 286; Tallott v City of Stirling (No 2) [2015] WASC 483 (two actions significantly overlapping). 1660. Owston Nominees No 2 Pty Ltd v Clambake Pty Ltd (2011) 248 FLR 193; [2011] WASCA 76 at [125]. 1661. Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589. 1662. LE Walwin and Partners Ltd v West Sussex County Council [1975] 3 All ER 604; see also Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1994) 51 FCR 529; 123 ALR 642. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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1663

the original plaintiff as defendant. A party who agrees to treat Case No 1 as a “test case” governing Case No 2 may be prevented from litigating Case No 2 as if Case No 1 had never been decided.1664 When a firm of solicitors successfully defended an action for mishandling securities, a second action by the same client, alleging careless dealing with other securities, was permanently stayed.1665 The Anshun principle also supports stays in criminal and disciplinary cases.1666 [A.215] The principle is not inflexible.1667 It is a question of whether the separate actions should reasonably have been combined.1668 The possibility of bringing a cross-claim did not debar the plaintiff from pursuing a separate action in Leto v Coffey Projects (Australia) Pty Ltd.1669 There was an affirmative answer in Egglishaw v Australian Crime Commission,1670 where an application to set aside a search warrant was followed by an application for a copy of material seized. But it is not necessary that a claim for defective workmanship be made before a building contract is completed.1671 The test of reasonableness may be less strictly applied when the second action involves different parties.1672 In applying that test, the avoidance of added complexity may outweigh the 1663. Powercell Pty Ltd v Cuzeno Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 51. 1664. Spassked Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 67 ATR 900; [2007] FCAFC 205. However, no such agreement was established in this case. 1665. Macquarie Bank Ltd v Westgarth Middletons (1995) 8 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-261 . Other examples: Namol Pty Ltd v A W Baulderstone Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 89; [1992] AIPC 90-886; Onerati v Phillips Constructions Pty Ltd (In liq) (1989) 16 NSWLR 730; Symonds v Raphael (1998) 148 FLR 171; 24 Fam LR 20 (costs issues); Re Neal; Ex parte Neal v Duncan Properties Pty Ltd (1994) 123 ALR 614; Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1994) 51 FCR 529; 123 ALR 642 (cross-claim disallowed). For another successful plea, see CG Maloney Pty Ltd v Noon [2011] NSWSC 242. 1666. Herron v McGregor (1986) 6 NSWLR 246; Gill v Walton (1991) 25 NSWLR 190; Walton v Gill (1993) 177 CLR 378 (medical discipline); R v Viers [1983] 2 Qd R 1; Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23; Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79; Gill v Director of Public Prosecutions (1992) 64 A Crim R 378. 1667. There is a discretionary element in Anshun estoppel: Wong v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 204 ALR 722; [2004] FCA 51. 1668. O’Brien v Tanning Research Laboratories Inc (1988) 14 NSWLR 601 (reasonable to omit claim against party out of jurisdiction at time of first action); Ling v Commonwealth (1996) 68 FCR 180; 139 ALR 159; Gibbs v Kinna [1999] 2 VR 19; Morgan v Mallard [2000] SASC 445 (counter-claim could have been brought in first case but would have been handled separately); Pertsinidis v Australian Central Credit Union Ltd (2001) 80 SASR 76; Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Alirezai [2002] Q Conv R 54-574; Re Mine & Quarry Equipment International Pty Ltd (In liq) (2004) 51 ACSR 339; [2004] QSC 402 (sub nom Mine & Quarry Equipment International Ltd v McIntosh) (set off not able to be raised in earlier proceedings) (aff’d (2005) 54 ACSR 1; [2005] QCA 186); St George Bank Ltd v Irani [2006] VSC 217 (no reasonable explanation for failure to raise earlier); Egglishaw v Australian Crime Commission (2007) 164 FCR 224; [2007] FCAFC 183 (different facts, different types of proceedings); Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2009) 263 ALR 556; [2009] NSWCA 434; Champerslife Pty Ltd v Manojlovski [2010] NSWCA 33; Kooee Communications Pty Ltd v Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 119; Stokes v McCourt [2013] NSWSC 1014; Velissaris v Fitzgerald [2014] VSCA 139. 1669. [2015] NSWSC 1896. 1670. (2007) 164 FCR 224; [2007] FCAFC 183. 1671. Ilvariy Pty Ltd t/as Craftsman Homes Northern Rivers v Ross [2008] NSWSC 718. 1672. Redowood Pty Ltd v Link Market Services Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 286.

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desirability of avoiding two actions instead of one.1673 Further, the application of Anshun estoppel, unlike res judicata in the strict sense, is discretionary.1674 There is no room for the doctrine if the first case did not proceed to judgment.1675 There is a suggestion1676 that the benefit of Anshun estoppel may be denied to the Crown because it is not subject to the same “psychological burden” as other litigants. The principle may apply to judicial review of administrative decisions.1677 Failure to warn a client of a clear Anshun or issue estoppel may give rise to an action for professional negligence.1678

Estoppel by deed or contract [A.216] Parties to civil proceedings may vary the rules of evidence by waiver or agreement.1679 They can agree that whatever the reality may be, they will not contest certain points1680 – for example, that any unauthorised stoppage of work will cause the other party a loss of “X” thousand dollars per day, or that a certain amount is owing by one party to the other.1681 A clause in a wholly written agreement excluding any other term1682 may create an estoppel by contract.1683 Evidence contradicting such an agreement is normally inadmissible: see [A.54]. Estoppel by deed antedates estoppel by convention, but is now a subset of it.1684 Recitals to a deed may raise an estoppel.1685 A failure to plead an estoppel by agreement may be treated as a waiver.1686

1673. Solak v Registrar of Titles (2011) 33 VR 40; [2011] VSCA 279. 1674. Stuart v Sanderson (2000) 100 FCR 150. 1675. Running Pigmy Productions Pty Ltd v AMP General Insurance Co Ltd [2001] NSWSC 431; Thirteenth Corporation Pty Ltd v State (2006) 232 ALR 491; [2006] FCA 979. 1676. Wong v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 146 FCR 10; [2004] FCAFC 242. 1677. Singh v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (2007) 46 AAR 447; [2007] FCAFC 174. 1678. Weller v Phipps [2010] NSWCA 323. 1679. Dobbs v National Bank Ltd (1935) 53 CLR 643; cf [A.2]. 1680. Discount & Finance Ltd v Gehrig’s NSW Wines Ltd (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 598 at 602. 1681. An “evidence certificate” may prove both the existence and the quantum of a debt: Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [117]. 1682. On the effect of “entire contract clauses”, see Pearson, S v Dublin Distillery [1907] AC 351; Brisbane Unit Development Corporation Pty Ltd v Robertson [1983] 2 Qd R 105; Dorotea Pty Ltd v Christos Doufas Nominees Pty Ltd [1986] 2 Qd R 91. 1683. See Johnson Matthey Ltd v AC Rochester Overseas Corporation (1990) 23 NSWLR 190, where McLelland J held that the parol evidence rule excluded evidence of a convention said to arise from pre-contractual negotiations. In Australian Co-operative Foods Ltd v Norco Co-operative Ltd (1999) 46 NSWLR 267, thanks to a wholly written agreement, pre-contractual negotiations could not affect the terms thereof. 1684. Community Association DP No 270180 v Arrow Asset Management Pty Ltd [2007] NSW Titles Cases 80-118; [2007] NSWSC 527 at [189]. 1685. Berry v Wong [2000] NSWSC 1002; Discount & Finance Ltd v Gehrig’s NSW Wines Ltd (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 598; Labracon Pty Ltd v Cuturich (2013) 17 BPR 32,497; [2013] NSWSC 97. 1686. Berry v Wong [2000] NSWSC 1002. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Estoppel by representation of present fact or as to future conduct [A.217] If “A” reasonably relies on “B’s” representation of a present fact or “B’s” promise of future conduct (explicit or implicit),1687 and if “A” would suffer detriment if “B” were permitted to resile from that position, “A” may claim a common law or equitable estoppel, as the case may be. If the claim succeeds, “B” will not be allowed to tender against “A” any evidence to contradict “B’s” earlier representation: The object … is to prevent an unjust departure by one person from the assumption adopted by another as the basis of some act or omission which, unless the assumption be adhered to, would operate to that other’s detriment.1688

The confirmation of promissory estoppel in Australian law was long delayed,1689 but now the once-vital distinction1690 between factual representations and promises is less important.1691 There is no distinction between common law estoppel, estoppel by convention1692 and equitable estoppel so far as the requisite clarity of the representation is concerned.1693 It was previously thought that only an equitable estoppel could be tailored to the actual detriment involved, but apparently that is no longer so.1694 However, differences remain.1695 While promissory estoppel can be used as a “sword” – a virtual cause of action1696 – common law estoppel merely functions as a defensive “shield” to exclude the evidence in question.1697 Promissory estoppel1698 may benefit a third party.1699 It is not available when the transaction is wholly executory on the claimant’s side and, when allowed, the 1687. See “estoppel by convention”, below. 1688. Thompson v Palmer (1933) 49 CLR 507 at 547 per Dixon J; see also Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 641 at 674-675. 1689. Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406; New Zealand Pelt Export Co Ltd v Trade Indemnity New Zealand Ltd [2004] VSCA 163 (equitable estoppel against insurer). 1690. Franklin v Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Ltd (1935) 36 SR (NSW) 76. 1691. Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 at 410 per Mason CJ; State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170 at 189. 1692. Estoppel by convention is a common law estoppel: Birla Nifty Pty Ltd v International Mining Industry Underwriters Ltd (2014) 47 WAR 522; [2014] WASCA 180 at [110]. 1693. Bell Group Ltd (In liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 70 ACSR 1; [2008] WASC 239. 1694. Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101; 73 ALJR 547; [1999] HCA 10 at 549-550 (ALJR); Byron Shire Council v Vaughan [2002] NSWCA 158. 1695. The question whether there is a “single overarching doctrine” of estoppel by representation or conduct is not finally resolved: Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101 at 112. 1696. Powercell Pty Ltd v Cuzeno Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 51 (a “source of rights”); see, eg, Heggies Bulkhaul Ltd v Global Minerals Australia Pty Ltd (2003) 59 NSWLR 312; [2003] NSWSC 851 (successful action for renewal of lease – proprietary estoppel); Bushby v Dixon Holmes du Pont Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 234 at [18], [28]. 1697. Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 459. 1698. Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101; 73 ALJR 547; [1999] HCA 10; Flinn v Flinn [1999] 3 VR 712; [1999] VSCA 109. 1699. Silovi Pty Ltd v Barbaro (1988) 13 NSWLR 466.

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detriment and the remedy must not be disproportionate.1700 It is the character of the representation, the reasonableness of reliance, and the nature and extent of the resulting detriment that determine whether failure to keep a promise is unconscionable.1701 [A.218] The essentials of representational estoppel are:1702 (a) an express or implicit representation1703 of fact or as to future conduct: see [A.219]; (b) upon which the representor intends the representee to act;1704 (c) actual1705 and reasonable reliance1706 on same: see [A.220]; and (d) a potential detriment to the representee if the representor were allowed to resile: see [A.221]. The mode of pleading an estoppel is considered in Moratic Pty Ltd v Gordon1707 and Ewing International LP v Ausbulk Ltd (No 2).1708 See also Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 150(1)(e); Portland Downs Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Great Northern Developments Pty Ltd.1709

Representation of fact, or promise [A.219] As to the elements of estoppels by conduct, see McDonalds Australia Ltd v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd.1710 There must be a clear and unequivocal statement or promise.1711 The representor must know and intend that the party 1700. Fitzwood Pty Ltd v Unique Goal Pty Ltd (In liq) (2001) 188 ALR 566; Delaforce v Simpson-Cook (2010) 78 NSWLR 483; [2010] NSWCA 84 at [4]. 1701. Commonwealth v Clark [1994] 2 VR 333 at 367; Mortgage Acceptance Nominees Ltd v Australian Thoroughbred Finance Pty Ltd (1996) 69 SASR 302 at 317-318; Murphy v Overton Investments Pty Ltd (2001) 182 ALR 138 at 157; Handley J, “The Three High Court Decisions on Estoppel 1988-1990” (2006) 80 ALJ 724. 1702. Waterman v Gerling Australia Insurance Co Pty Ltd (2005) 13 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-664; [2005] NSWSC 1066. 1703. For example, the words and conduct of a purchaser indicating that they would not be completing as per contract: K & K Real Estate Pty Ltd v Adellos Pty Ltd (2010) 15 BPR 28,679; [2010] NSWCA 302. 1704. Bell Group Ltd (In liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 70 ACSR 1; [2008] WASC 239. 1705. Coshott v Barry [2009] NSWCA 34. 1706. Telstra Corporation Ltd v Mahon (2004) 39 AAR 484; [2004] FCA 1404. Not proved in Stone v Glendyc Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 80; or Downward Bricklaying Pty Ltd v Goulburn-Murray Rural Water Authority (2003) 8 VR 61; [2003] VSC 171; Bell Group Ltd (In liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 70 ACSR 1; [2008] WASC 239. 1707. (2007) 13 BPR 24,713; [2007] NSWSC 5. 1708. [2009] SASC 381. 1709. [2012] QCA 18 at [28]. 1710. [2013] V ConvR 54-843; [2013] VSC 639. 1711. PS Chelleram & Co Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Co Ltd [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 493; Johnson v James (unreported, WA Sup Ct, Walsh J, 1 November 1995) (no representation when a retiring solicitor simply assumed that his partners would make certain financial provisions for him); Queensland Independent Wholesalers Ltd v Coutts Townsville Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 40 (self-induced belief not enough); Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406 at 436-437; Wingecarribee Shire Council v Concrete Quarries Pty Ltd (2001) 114 LGERA 82 at 91; Mobil © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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who adopts it will act or abstain from acting in reliance on the assumption or expectation.1712 However, it need not have the precision of a contractual term.1713 Silence when a reasonable and responsible person would make his or her position known1714 may be tantamount to a waiver of a potential estoppel1715 in equity or at common law.1716 But estoppel by convention1717 – a “shared assumption”1718 – may arise when “A” makes an assumption about “A’s” legal relationship with “B”, “B” reasonably1719 adopts the same assumption, and they conduct their relationship accordingly.1720 The capacity of estoppel to erode certainty of

Oil Australia Ltd v Lyndel Nominees Pty Ltd (1998) 153 ALR 198 at 236-238; AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd v CGU Insurance Ltd (2005) 146 FCR 447; 13 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-658; [2005] FCAFC 185; Anwaryar v Amanudin [2015] NSWSC 1763. This requirement was satisfied in Australian Crime Commission v Gray [2003] NSWCA 318 (promise to pay income tax due from witness for payments under witness protection scheme). The evidence was too conflicting to warrant a finding that a representation was made in Cummeragunga Pty Ltd (In liq) v Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (2004) 139 FCR 73; 210 ALR 612; [2004] FCA 1098; Coshott v Barry [2007] NSWSC 1094 (solicitor gives “approximate” statement of costs – no estoppel); Evans v Evans [2011] NSWCA 92 (“I’ve bought you a house. This is your house”). On this point there is no distinction between estoppel by representation, estoppel by convention and equitable estoppel: Bell Group Ltd (In liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 70 ACSR 1; [2008] WASC 239. 1712. Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 423; Johnston v Brightstars Holding Company Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 150 at [93]. 1713. Accurate Financial Consultants Pty Ltd v Koko Black Pty Ltd (2008) 66 ACSR 325; [2008] VSCA 86 at [178]. 1714. Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v Twitchings [1977] AC 890 at 903; Johnson Matthey (Aust) Pty Ltd v Dascorp Pty Ltd (2003) 9 VR 171; [2003] VSC 291. Silence was not of that kind when a retiring member of a legal firm simply assumed that his partners would make certain financial arrangements in his favour: Johnson v James (unreported, WA Sup Ct, Walsh J, 1 November 1995). 1715. Greenwood v Martin’s Bank [1933] AC 51; cf “estoppel by convention”: Whitehouse v BHP Steel Ltd [2004] NSWCA 428; Meadow Springs Fairway Resort Ltd (In liq) v Balanced Securities Ltd (No 2) (2008) 245 ALR 726; [2008] FCA 471. The plea failed in Junge v Junge [2013] NSWSC 1842. Distinguish Voss v Suncorp-Metway Ltd (No 1) [2004] 1 Qd R 212; [2003] QCA 252, where a fraudulent accountant paid a cheque into his personal account. 1716. New Zealand Pelt Export Co Ltd v Trade Indemnity New Zealand Ltd (2004) 13 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-626; [2004] VSCA 163. 1717. Founded not on a representation but on the conduct of relations between the parties on the basis of an agreed or assumed state of facts: Con-Stan Industries of Australia Pty Ltd v Norwich Winterthur Insurance (Australia) Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 226 at 244. 1718. Meadow Springs Fairway Resort Ltd (In liq) v Balanced Securities Ltd (No 2) (2008) 245 ALR 726; 65 ACSR 563; [2008] FCA 471; Ace Insurance Ltd v Trifunovski (2011) 200 FCR 532; [2011] FCA 1204 at [134]: “[They] had for many years proceeded upon the understanding that the agents were independent contractors.” 1719. Brady Street Developments Pty Ltd v ME Asset Investments Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1755 (assumption not reasonable). 1720. Waterman v Gerling Australia Insurance Co Pty Ltd (2005) 13 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-664; [2005] NSWSC 1066; Ng v Chong (2005) ANZ Conv R 360; [2005] NSWSC 270 (elements analysed); Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust v Scots Church Development Ltd (2007) 64 ACSR 31; [2007] NSWSC 676; Bell Group Ltd (In liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 70 ACSR 1; [2008] WASC 239; Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Wilmoth Field Warne (a firm) (2007) 18 VR 250; [2007] VSCA 280; Queensland Alumina Ltd v Alinta DQP Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 387; Ryledar Pty Ltd v Euphoric Pty Ltd (2007) 69 NSWLR 603; [2007]

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contract causes some concern.

Some examples of material representations are as follows: • Creditor: “We will not make any more advances against your guarantee, although it is not limited to past advances.”1722 • Purchaser: “We will let you know soon if we have any amendments to the draft contract. Otherwise you can take it as settled” – followed by a lengthy silence.1723 • Purchaser to vendor of real estate: “Go ahead with the repairs, because our finance has been approved.”1724 • Insurance company to third party: “Don’t worry about the Limitation of Actions Act 1974. If we don’t settle your claim, we will not rely on it in court.”1725 • Insurance company to insured: “Don’t worry about the writ you have received. We will attend to it”, followed later by this advice: “We are not responsible for this claim because you didn’t comply with your policy.”1726 • Licensor to licensee: “We’ll extend your permit for as long as you require.”1727 A post-contractual representation that a contractual right will not be relied on may raise a promissory estoppel.1728 In Wright v Hamilton Island Enterprises Ltd1729 the court upheld a promissory estoppel, despite the existence of a subsequent and inconsistent written agreement. In Photo Art & Sound (Cremorne) Pty Ltd v Cremorne Centre Pty Ltd1730 a landlord was estopped from enforcing the strict terms of an option after telling the tenant that there would be NSWCA 65 at [200]. For implied intimation found in a conveyancing case, see: K & K Real Estate Pty Ld v Adellos Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 302; 400 George Street (Qld) Pty Ltd v BG International Ltd [2010] Q Conv R 54-731; [2010] QSC 66 (aff’d [2010] Q Conv R 54-743; [2010] QCA 245). 1721. State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170 at 177. 1722. Stevens v Standard Chartered Bank Australia Ltd (1988) 53 SASR 323. 1723. Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387; [1988] HCA 7. 1724. Di Leone v Turco [1982] Qd R 224. 1725. Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394; Morris v FAI General Insurance Company Ltd [1996] 1 Qd R 495; Seiler v Nan [2000] QCA 362; Hewson v Burke (2000) 32 MVR 392; Lindsay v Smith (2001) 11 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-498. Indeed, there may be contract in such a case, formed by an offer to pay damages in consideration of forbearance to sue: Lindsay v Smith (2001) 11 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-498. 1726. McCraith v Fraser (1991) 104 FLR 227; 6 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-061. 1727. Wright v Hamilton Island Enterprises Ltd [2003] Q Conv R 54-588; [2003] QCA 36. 1728. Waterman v Gerling Australia Insurance Co Pty Ltd (2005) 13 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-664; [2005] NSWSC 1066; Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd [2006] QCA 194 at [31]. 1729. [2003] Q Conv R 54-588; [2003] QCA 36. 1730. (1987) 4 BPR 9436; [1987] ANZ Conv R 347. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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plenty of time to complete formalities after the Christmas break. But it is difficult to establish a promissory or conventional estoppel in the face of an “entire agreement” clause.1731 A statement that liability will not be contested in a civil case is not an admission, but it may support an estoppel.1732

Reasonable reliance [A.220] The interpretation placed on a representation, and reliance on it, must be reasonable.1733 The onus of proving reliance and a resulting detriment is on the person claiming the estoppel, but the conduct relied on need not be the sole inducement.1734 There cannot be reasonable reliance on a patently incredible, ambiguous,1735 or facetious statement, or on a promise that the hearer knows, or should know, is untrue,1736 or cannot be fulfilled, or is susceptible to a change of mind, such as a promise of a testamentary benefit.1737 However, a conditional promise may give rise to a proprietary estoppel1738 or “estoppel by encouragement”.1739 A self-induced belief is immaterial.1740 As noted in [A.219], a representation that a contractual right will not be strictly enforced may raise a promissory estoppel,1741 but it is seldom reasonable for a large commercial enterprise to assume that others will not insist on their legal rights.1742 It was unreasonable for a solicitor to assume that an insurer was waiving the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 when it promised to “fully explore” the 1731. Johnson Matthey Ltd v AC Rochester Overseas Corporation (1990) 23 NSWLR 190 at 196; Skywest Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1995) 126 FLR 61 at 105; Palm Gardens Consolidated Pty Ltd v PG Properties Pty Ltd (2009) 1 LT(A)R 281; [2009] SASC 311. 1732. Temmerman-Dunn v Maroochy Shire Council [2003] 1 Qd R 449. 1733. Robertson, “How Critical is Reasonable Reliance in Claiming the Benefit of an Estoppel?” (2001) 39 Law Soc J 69. See also Sanpine v Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council [2005] NSWSC 365; Accurate Financial Consultants Pty Ltd v Koko Black Pty Ltd (2008) 66 ACSR 325; [2008] VSCA 86: Bell Group Ltd (In liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 70 ACSR 1; [2008] WASC 239; Ambridge Investments Pty Ltd v Baker [2010] VSC 59; Manno v Manno [2016] NSWSC 493. 1734. Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 88 ALJR 640; [2014] HCA 19. 1735. Summer Hill Business Estate Pty Ltd v Equititrust Ltd [2011] NSWCA 149. 1736. Bell Group Ltd (In liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 70 ACSR 1; [2008] WASC 239. 1737. Varma v Varma [2010] NSWSC 786 at [486]. 1738. Van Dyke v Sidhu (2013) 301 ALR 769; [2013] NSWCA 198. 1739. Wantagong Farms Pty Ltd v Bulle [2015] NSWSC 1603 at [60]. 1740. Queensland Independent Wholesalers Ltd v Coutts Townsville Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 40; Downward Bricklaying Pty Ltd v Goulburn-Murray Rural Water Authority (2003) 8 VR 61; [2003] VSC 171. 1741. Waterman v Gerling Australia Insurance Co Pty Ltd (2005) 13 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-664; [2005] NSWSC 1066. 1742. Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582 at 585; see also PS Chelleram & Co Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Co Ltd [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 493; Kostopoulos v GE Commercial Finance Australia Pty Ltd [2005] Q Conv R 54-634; [2005] QCA 311. See, however, Franks v Equitiloan Securities Pty Ltd (2008) 2 BFRA 484; [2008] NSWSC 33; (2009) 258 ALR 388; [2009] NSWCA 128.

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Estoppel 1743

possibilities of settlement. There was no sufficiently clear promise in Evans Deakin Pty Ltd v Sebel Furniture Ltd.1744 In Wort v Whitsunday Shire Council1745 a land developer was not entitled to rely on information from a local authority referring to “existing council policy”, issued nine years earlier. In Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Humpreys Estate (Queens Gardens) Ltd1746 reliance was ruled out by a letter that read in part: We must point out that the above basic terms may be varied or withdrawn prior to … execution … Furthermore, any agreement reached shall be subject to formal agreement by our client and until the [appropriate] document … is executed this letter should not be considered binding.

Detriment [A.221] A party pleading an estoppel by representation must prove1747 a causal connection between reliance upon it and detriment that will follow if the other party is allowed to resile.1748 The question is not simply whether there will be a detriment in fact, but whether it would be a result of reasonable reliance.1749 But the representation relied on need not be the sole cause of reliance and detriment.1750 If a person claiming an estoppel based on an erroneously high bank statement intended to incur a particular expense in any event, there is disappointment, but no relevant detriment.1751 The bank’s error did not cause the expenditure that is now regretted. If the evidence shows that the representee would have acted in the same way, irrespective of the representation, it cannot be said that he or she acted upon it.1752 Not every disappointed expectation constitutes detriment.1753

1743. PS Chelleram & Co Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Co Ltd [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 493. 1744. [2003] FCA 171; see also Waipara Pty Ltd v Police Association [1998] V Conv R 54-583; Redwood Pty Ltd v Mongoose Pty Ltd (2004) 48 ACSR 172; [2004] NSWSC 101. 1745. (2001) 116 LGERA 179. 1746. [1987] 1 AC 114. 1747. Reg Russell & Sons Pty Ltd v Buxton Meats Pty Ltd [1996] ATPR 41-476 (insufficient evidence of loss caused by delay in winding up insolvent company). 1748. Telstra Corporation Ltd v Mahon (2004) 39 AAR 484; [2004] FCA 1404; Sullivan v Sullivan [2006] ANZ Conv R 54; [2006] NSWCA 312 (breach of promise to allow occupation at reduced rent if appellant maintained property); Ambridge Investments Pty Ltd v Baker [2010] VSC 59; IOOF Building Society Pty Ltd v Foxeden Pty Ltd (2009) 23 VR 536; [2009] VSCA 138; Manno v Manno [2016] NSWSC 493 at [77]. 1749. Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia (1980) 26 SASR 101 at 106; Nguyen v QBE Insurance Ltd (2007) 99 SASR 443; [2007] SASC 320. 1750. Van Dyke v Sidhu (2013) 301 ALR 769; [2013] NSWCA 198. 1751. The representation must be the cause of the detrimental action or inaction: Reed v Sheehan (1982) 56 FLR 206; [1982] FCA 1; Witham v Witham [2000] WASC 236 at [93]. 1752. Osborne Park Co-operative Society Ltd v Wilden Pty Ltd (1989) 2 WAR 77; CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2007) 81 ALJR 1551; [2007] HCA 36 (settlement of claim for reasons other than alleged representation). See also Freshmark Ltd v Mercantile Mutual Insurance (Australia) Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 390. 1753. Fifteenth Eestin Nominees Pty Ltd v Rosenberg (2009) 24 VR 155; [2009] VSCA 112. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[A.222]

There is no detriment if a debtor company is given a “grace and favour” moratorium and then is sued when its financial condition improves.1754 A promissory estoppel may cease to apply if reasonable notice of withdrawal of an indulgence is given, provided that the representee is not materially disadvantaged by the change.1755 Nor is there detriment, for present purposes, if a person makes improvements to a property he or she expects to inherit.1756 On v On1757 is another case that failed the detriment test. If the loss of an opportunity is relied on, it must be shown that the representee would have pursued the opportunity, with a reasonable prospect of success.1758 A questionable case is Palagiano v Mankarios,1759 where children left school early to go to work, and for years handed most of their wages to their father in expectation of a future interest in his property. It was held that there was no reliance on a promise of such a benefit, and that they handed over their money simply because that was expected of them. On the other hand, detriment (or more precisely, potential detriment) was well proved in two cases where vendors of property were induced to spend money that they would not otherwise have spent.1760 Detriment was also established in Wright v Hamilton Island Enterprises Ltd,1761 where a licensee relocated its business at considerable expense on the faith of a promise that its licence would be extended “for so long as you require”. In Harrison v Harrison1762 an estoppel was based on a promise that induced a party not to pursue a family provision claim. Estoppel is concerned, not with the avoidance of benefit, but the prevention of detriment.1763

Statutes and public policy prevail [A.222] An otherwise perfect estoppel will fail if allowing it would defeat the policy of a statute,1764 or prevent the exercise of a statutory duty or 1754. Mortgage Acceptance Nominees Ltd v Australian Thoroughbred Finance Ltd (1996) 69 SASR 302; see also Reg Russell & Sons Pty Ltd v Buxton Meats Pty Ltd [1996] ATPR 41-476. 1755. Tool Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungston Electric Co Ltd [1955] 1 WLR 761; 2 All ER 657; Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406 at [11]; Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 at 442; Attorney-General of Botswana v Aussie Diamond Products Pty Ltd (No 3) [2010] WASC 141 at [238]. 1756. Stone v Glendyc Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 80. 1757. [2002] NTSC 18. 1758. Bell Group Ltd (In liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 70 ACSR 1; [2008] WASC 239. 1759. [2011] NSWSC 61. 1760. Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387; [1988] HCA 7; Di Leone v Turco [1982] Qd R 224; see also Harrison v Harrison [2013] VSCA 170 (children induced not to resort to family provision legislation). 1761. [2003] Q Conv R 54-588; see also Heggies Bulkhaul Ltd v Global Minerals Australia Pty Ltd (2003) 59 NSWLR 312; [2003] NSWSC 851; Scharer v New South Wales (2003) 125 LGERA 104; Sullivan v Sullivan (2006) 13 BPR 24,755; [2006] NSWCA 312. 1762. [2011] VSC 459. 1763. Birla Nifty Pty Ltd v International Mining Industry Underwriters Ltd (2014) 47 WAR 522; [2014] WASCA 180. 1764. Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 18; Roma Electric Light & Power Co Ltd v Hair [1955] St R Qd 311; Re Jauncey [1980] Qd R 335; Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] AC 993 at 1017; Seymour CBD Pty Ltd v Noosa Shire Council

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Discretionary Exclusion of Admissible Evidence 1765

discretion. So, for example, a real estate agent cannot rely on an estoppel to avoid a statutory requirement that his appointment must be evidenced in writing.1766 A taxpayer cannot construct an estoppel upon an erroneous assessment of stamp duty if collection of the full amount is mandatory.1767 Estoppel cannot override the common law policy against unreasonable restraint of trade,1768 or fraud.1769 But there can be a valid estoppel based on a promise that a discretion be exercised in one of two lawful ways.1770 It is a matter of statutory construction.1771

DISCRETIONARY EXCLUSION OF ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE [A.223]

This topic is considered at [130.1]ff.

(2002) 123 LGERA 113 (no power to grant building permit); Sanpine v Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council [2005] NSWSC 365; Tudor Developments Pty Ltd v Makeig [2007] NSWSC 1116; Roberts v ANZ Banking Group [2006] 1 Qd R 482; [2005] QCA 470 at [20]; Tudor Developments Pty Ltd v Makeig (2008) 72 NSWLR 624; [2008] NSWCA 263; Queensland Mining Corporation Ltd v Renshaw (2014) 98 ACSR 559; [2014] FCA 365 at [161]. 1765. City of Sydney Council v Waldorf Apartments Hotel Sydney Pty Ltd (2008) 158 LGERA 67; [2008] NSWLEC 97. 1766. Moneywood v Salamon Nominees, QLR (2 October 1999) (reversed on other grounds in (2001) 202 CLR 351). 1767. ISPT Nominees Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2003) 53 ATR 527; [2003] NSWSC 697. 1768. Cream v Bushcolt Pty Ltd [2004] ATPR 42-004; [2004] WASCA 82. 1769. Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v Menzies (2012) 7 BFRA 733; [2012] NSWSC 1066 (no duty upon victim of fraud to notify plaintiff). 1770. Keen Mar Corporation v Labrador Shopping Centre [1989] ATPR 46,068; Wort v Whitsunday Shire Council (2001) 116 LGERA 179. 1771. Tudor Developments Pty Ltd v Makeig (2008) 72 NSWLR 624; [2008] NSWCA 263. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

167

EVIDENCE ACT 1977–2016 An Act to consolidate, amend and reform the law of evidence and for related purposes

INTRODUCTION [1.1] The remainder of this text, in large part, is based on the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), as amended to 5 May 2016. Headings to Chapters, Parts, Divisions and Subdivisions are part of the Act, as are headings to sections amended or inserted after 30 June 1991, as well as notes in the text: s 2A. Footnotes and endnotes are not part of the Act.1 In its original form this Act included marginal notes of other Queensland or interstate Acts upon which some of its sections were based, for example the note to s 84 read “(Vic) s 58B; cf Qld BBE s 4”. These abbreviations referred to the Evidence Act 1958 (Vic) and the Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1949 (Qld). They no longer appear. Part 1 - Preliminary 1 2 2A 3 4 5

Short title............................................................................................................175 Act binds Crown................................................................................................ 176 Notes in text.......................................................................................................176 Definitions.......................................................................................................... 177 Meaning of copy of document etc..................................................................... 194 Meaning of document purporting to be of certain character etc....................... 195

Part 2 - Witnesses Division 1 - Who may testify 6 Witnesses interested or convicted of offence....................................................204 7 Parties, their wives and husbands as witnesses.............................................. 205 8 Witnesses in a criminal proceeding...................................................................206 Division 1A - Competency of witnesses and capacity to be sworn 9 Presumption as to competency......................................................................... 210 9A Competency to give evidence........................................................................... 212 9B Competency to give sworn evidence................................................................ 214 9C Expert evidence about witness’s ability to give evidence................................. 215 9D Evidence admitted under s 9A.......................................................................... 218 Division 1B - Special provisions for child witnesses 9E Principles for dealing with a child witness.........................................................221 Division 2 - Privileges and obligations of witnesses 10 Privilege against self-incrimination.................................................................... 221 11 Communications to husband or wife [Repealed].............................................. 238 12 Admissibility of evidence as to access by husband or wife.............................. 238

1. Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 14.

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Introduction 13 14

Compellability of parties and witnesses as to evidence of adultery................. 239 Abolition of certain privileges.............................................................................240

Division 3 - Examination and cross-examination of witnesses 15 Questioning a person charged in a criminal proceeding.................................. 241 15A Questioning of witness as to certain convictions.............................................. 263 16 Witness may be questioned as to previous conviction..................................... 264 17 How far a party may discredit the party’s own witness.................................... 267 18 Proof of previous inconsistent statement of witness......................................... 272 19 Witness may be cross-examined as to written statement without being shown it..............................................................................................................275 20 Cross-examination as to credit..........................................................................283 21 Improper questions............................................................................................ 285 Division 4 - Evidence of special witnesses 21A Evidence of special witnesses...........................................................................293 Division 4A - Evidence of affected children Subdivision 1 - Preliminary 21AA Purposes of div 4A............................................................................................ 301 21AB How purposes are to be achieved.................................................................... 301 21AC Definitions for div 4A......................................................................................... 302 21AD Meaning of child................................................................................................ 304 Subdivision 2 - Committal proceeding 21AE Application of sdiv 2.......................................................................................... 305 21AF Evidence-in-chief............................................................................................... 305 21AG Cross-examination............................................................................................. 307 21AH Limitation on cross-examination........................................................................ 309 Subdivision 3 - Prerecording of affected child’s evidence 21AI Application of sdiv 3.......................................................................................... 310 21AJ Presentation of indictment................................................................................. 311 21AK Video-taping of affected child’s evidence.......................................................... 311 21AL Court to give directions for taking an affected child’s evidence........................312 21AM Use of prerecorded evidence............................................................................ 313 21AN Giving of further evidence................................................................................. 314 21AO Court order that evidence not to be taken and recorded under this sdiv.....................................................................................................................314 Subdivision 4 - Taking of affected child’s evidence using audio visual link or screen 21AP Application of sdiv 4.......................................................................................... 314 21AQ Audio visual links or screening arrangements must be used........................... 315 21AR Court may order that s 21AQ does not apply................................................... 316 Subdivision 5 - General 21AS Prosecutor or applicant to advise that an affected child is to give evidence.............................................................................................................316 21AT Identification of persons or things by affected child.......................................... 316 21AU Exclusion of public.............................................................................................317 21AV Affected child entitled to support....................................................................... 317 21AW Instructions to be given to jury.......................................................................... 318 21AX Orders, directions and rulings concerning affected child witnesses................. 320 Division 4B - Dealing with a recording 21AY Definitions for div 4B......................................................................................... 320 21AZ Approval to edit or otherwise change a recording............................................ 321 21AZA Court to give directions about the use or safekeeping of a recording..............321 21AZB Unauthorised possession of, or dealing with, recording................................... 321 © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Publishing a recording prohibited...................................................................... 322

Division 5 - Witness identity protection Subdivision 1 - Preliminary 21B Purposes of div 5...............................................................................................322 21C Definitions for div 5............................................................................................324 21D Application of div 5 to lawyer of party to a proceeding.....................................325 Subdivision 2 - Witness identity protection certificates for operatives 21E Application of sdiv 2.......................................................................................... 326 21F Giving witness identity protection certificate..................................................... 326 21G Form of witness identity protection certificate................................................... 327 21H Filing and notification.........................................................................................329 21I Effect of witness identity protection certificate.................................................. 330 21J Orders to protect operative’s identity etc.......................................................... 331 21K Disclosure of operative’s identity etc. despite certificate.................................. 331 21KA Directions to jury................................................................................................333 21KB Witness identity protection certificate—cancellation......................................... 333 21KC Permission to give information disclosing operative’s identity etc.................... 333 21KD Disclosure offences............................................................................................334 21KE Review of giving of witness identity protection certificate by police service................................................................................................................335 21KF Giving information about witness identity protection certificates...................... 336 21KG Report about witness identity protection certificates......................................... 336 21KH Recognition of witness identity protection certificates under corresponding laws............................................................................................337 Subdivision 3 - General 21KI Delegation..........................................................................................................337 Division 6 - Cross-examination of protected witnesses 21L Application of division 6.....................................................................................337 21M Meaning of protected witness............................................................................338 21N No cross-examination of protected witness by person charged....................... 340 21O Procedure for cross-examination of protected witness if person charged has no legal representative................................................................. 341 21P Legal assistance for cross-examination of protected witness...........................342 21Q Satisfaction of Criminal Code, section 616....................................................... 342 21R Jury direction..................................................................................................... 343 21S Orders, directions and rulings concerning protected witnesses....................... 343

Part 3 - Means of obtaining evidence Division 1 - Commissions, requests and orders to examine witnesses 22 Commission, request or order to examine witnesses....................................... 353 23 Commission or order in criminal cases............................................................. 355 24 Power of person appointed by foreign authority to take evidence and administer oaths................................................................................................ 357 Division 2 - Summary procedure to obtain evidence for Queensland or other jurisdictions 25 Definitions for div 2............................................................................................358 26 Power of Queensland court to request corresponding court in a prescribed country to take evidence for use in Queensland court................... 359 27 Power to take evidence on request from corresponding court of a prescribed country............................................................................................. 360 28 Summons of witnesses......................................................................................360 29 Examination....................................................................................................... 360

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Introduction 30 31 32 33 34

Objections.......................................................................................................... 361 Depositions to be signed................................................................................... 361 Power of Queensland court to transmit requests to other places.................... 362 Saving as to personal attendance.....................................................................362 Regulations [Repealed]..................................................................................... 362

Division 3 - General procedure to obtain evidence for other jurisdictions 35 Definitions for div 3............................................................................................362 35A Application of division to Crown........................................................................ 363 36 Application to Supreme Court to obtain evidence for civil proceedings in another jurisdiction.............................................................................................363 37 Power of Supreme Court to give effect to application to obtain evidence.............................................................................................................364 38 Privilege of witnesses........................................................................................ 365 39 Judicial proceedings for the purposes of the Criminal Code............................ 366

Part 3A - Audio visual links and audio links Division 1 - Preliminary 39A Purposes of pt 3A..............................................................................................366 39B Application of pt 3A........................................................................................... 367 39C Definitions for pt 3A........................................................................................... 368 Division 2 - Use of interstate audio visual links or audio links in proceedings before Queensland courts 39D Application of div 2............................................................................................ 370 39E State courts may take evidence and submissions from outside State............. 370 39F Legal practitioners entitled to practise...............................................................371 Division 3 - Use of interstate audio visual links or audio links in proceedings in participating States 39G Application of div 3............................................................................................ 371 39H Recognised courts may take evidence or receive submissions from persons in Queensland......................................................................................372 39I Powers of recognised courts............................................................................. 372 39J Orders made by recognised court.....................................................................372 39K Enforcement of order.........................................................................................373 39L Privileges, protection and immunity of participants in proceedings before recognised court.....................................................................................373 39M Recognised court may administer oath in the State......................................... 373 39N Assistance to recognised court......................................................................... 374 39O Contempt of recognised court........................................................................... 374 39P Double jeopardy.................................................................................................375 Division 3A - Use of audio visual links or audio links for expert witnesses 39PA Application of div 3A..........................................................................................375 39PB Expert witnesses to give evidence by audio visual link or audio link............... 375 39PC Direction to jury if expert witness gives evidence by audio visual link or audio link............................................................................................................376 Division 4 - General provisions about the use of audio visual links or audio links 39Q Application of div 4............................................................................................ 377 39R Queensland courts may take evidence and submissions from external location...............................................................................................................377 39S Failure of the link............................................................................................... 378 39T Expenses........................................................................................................... 378 39U External location to be considered part of Queensland court location............. 378 39V Witness outside Queensland—when compellable............................................ 379 © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Administration of oaths and affirmations........................................................... 379 Testimony from outside Australia other than on oath........................................379 Putting documents to a person at an external location.................................... 380 Extension of rule-making power........................................................................ 380

Part 4 - Judicial notice of seals, signatures and legislative enactments 41 42 42A 43 43A

Public Seal of the State.....................................................................................381 Signatures of holders of public offices etc. to be judicially noticed.................. 381 Certain seals to be judicially noticed etc...........................................................383 Acts and statutory instruments to be judicially noticed..................................... 383 Administrative arrangements to be judicially noticed........................................ 384

Part 5 - Proof of documents and other matters Division 1 - Proof of official and judicial documents and matters 44 Proof by purported certificate, document etc.................................................... 384 45 Proof of gazette................................................................................................. 385 46 Proof regarding government printer, parliamentary counsel and Legislative Assembly......................................................................................... 386 46A Presumption of accuracy of official copy of Queensland legislation.................386 46B Court or tribunal may inform itself about Act or statutory instrument............... 387 47 Proof of Legislative Assembly’s proceedings or legislative material.................388 48 Proof of particular instruments.......................................................................... 389 49 Proof of standard rules, codes and specifications............................................ 390 50 Proof of act done by Governor or Minister........................................................391 51 Proof of public documents.................................................................................391 52 Proof of registers of British vessels etc.............................................................393 53 Proof of judicial proceedings............................................................................. 394 54 Proof of identity of a person convicted..............................................................397 55 Proof of incorporation or registration of company in Queensland.................... 399 55A Proof of disaster situation under Disaster Management Act 2003................... 401 56 Proof of unallocated State land grants..............................................................402 57 Proof of lease or licence....................................................................................402 58 Proof of letters patent........................................................................................ 403 58A Proof of document under Royal Sign Manual................................................... 403 Division 2 - Proof of certain miscellaneous documents and matters 59 Comparison of disputed writing......................................................................... 404 60 Proof of instrument to validity of which attestation is not necessary................ 410 61 Proof of instrument to validity of which attestation is necessary...................... 410 62 Presumption as to documents 20 years old...................................................... 411 63 Wills, deeds etc. may be verified by declaration...............................................412 64 Evidentiary effect of probate etc........................................................................413 65 Maps, charts etc................................................................................................ 413 66 Astronomical phenomena.................................................................................. 414 Division 3 - Proof of certain Australian and overseas documents and matters 67 Definitions for div 3............................................................................................416 68 Proof of certain Australian and overseas written laws etc................................ 416 69 Proof of judicial proceedings of an overseas country....................................... 419 70 Proof of certain documents admissible elsewhere in Australia.........................420 71 Royal proclamations, orders of the Privy Council etc....................................... 420 72 Proof of certain Australian and overseas public documents............................. 421 73 Proof of incorporation or registration of certain Australian and overseas companies..........................................................................................................421 74 Proof of birth, adoption, death or marriage....................................................... 422

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Introduction Division 4 - Proof of telegraphic messages 75 Notice of intention to adduce telegraphic message in evidence...................... 423 76 Proof of message.............................................................................................. 424 77 Proof of sending a message............................................................................. 425 Division 5 - Admissibility of convictions in civil proceedings 78 Definitions for div 5............................................................................................425 79 Convictions as evidence in civil proceedings.................................................... 425 80 Convictions as evidence in actions for defamation........................................... 429 81 Evidence identifying the particulars of a conviction.......................................... 429 82 Operation of other laws not affected................................................................. 429 Division 6 - Books of account 83 Definitions for div 6............................................................................................431 84 Entries in book of account to be evidence........................................................438 85 Proof that book is a book of account................................................................ 439 86 Verification of copy............................................................................................ 440 87 Matters which may be proved under this division ordinarily to be so proved................................................................................................................ 440 88 Court may order books of account or copies to be made available................. 441 89 Proof that a person has no account..................................................................442 90 Costs..................................................................................................................443 91 Application of ss 84–86 and 89.........................................................................443

Part 6 - Admissibility of statements and representations 92 93 93A 93AA 93B 93C 94 95 95A 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103

Admissibility of documentary evidence as to facts in issue.............................. 443 Admissibility of documentary evidence as to facts in issue in criminal proceedings....................................................................................................... 457 Statement made before proceeding by child or person with an impairment of the mind......................................................................................460 Unauthorised possession of, or dealing in, s 93A criminal statements............ 472 Admissibility of representation in prescribed criminal proceedings if person who made it is unavailable....................................................................475 Warning and information for jury about hearsay evidence............................... 478 Admissibility of evidence concerning credibility of persons responsible for statement......................................................................................................478 Admissibility of statements in documents or things produced by processes or devices.........................................................................................480 DNA evidentiary certificate................................................................................ 484 Inferences concerning admissibility...................................................................486 Authentication.................................................................................................... 487 Rejection of evidence........................................................................................ 487 Withholding statement from jury room.............................................................. 490 Corroboration..................................................................................................... 491 Witness’s previous statement, if proved, to be evidence of facts stated................................................................................................................. 491 Weight to be attached to evidence....................................................................498 Provisions of part are alternative.......................................................................499

Part 7 - Reproductions of documents Division 1 - Preliminary 104 Definitions for part............................................................................................. 500 Division 2 - Reproduction of official documents 105 Certified reproductions of certain official documents etc. to be admissible without further proof........................................................................ 502 © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Evidence Act 1977–2016 Division 3 - Reproduction of business documents 106 Admissibility of reproductions of business documents destroyed, lost or unavailable.........................................................................................................504 107 Use of photographing machines........................................................................505 108 Affidavit of maker of print from transparency to be evidence........................... 506 109 Proof where document processed by independent processor..........................507 110 Reproduction not to be admitted as evidence unless transparency in existence............................................................................................................507 111 Transparency etc. may be preserved in lieu of document................................508 112 Proof of destruction of documents etc.............................................................. 509 113 One affidavit sufficient in certain circumstances............................................... 509 114 Certification required when affidavit etc. not contained in length or series of film...................................................................................................... 510 115 Discovery, inspection and production where document destroyed or lost..................................................................................................................... 510 Division 4 - General 116 Copies to be evidence.......................................................................................512 117 Further reproduction may be ordered by court................................................. 512 118 Colours and tones of reproductions.................................................................. 513 119 Notice to produce not required..........................................................................513 120 Proof of comparisons not required.................................................................... 514 121 Presumptions as to ancient documents............................................................ 514 122 Reproductions made in other States.................................................................514 123 Judicial notice.................................................................................................... 515 124 A court may reject reproduction........................................................................ 515 125 Weight of evidence............................................................................................ 515 126 Provisions of part are alternative.......................................................................516 127 Stamp duty [Repealed]...................................................................................... 516 128 Regulation may exclude application of provisions............................................ 516 129 Public Records Act 2002 not affected............................................................... 516

Part 8 - Miscellaneous 129A 129B 130 131 131A 132 132A 132B 132C 133 133A 134 134A 134B 135

Order that evidence may be given in a different way....................................... 518 Person may be examined without subpoena or other process........................ 519 Rejection of evidence in criminal proceedings.................................................. 519 Witnesses for defence to be sworn...................................................................553 Court may order interpreter to be provided.......................................................553 Actions for breach of promise of marriage........................................................ 554 Admissibility of similar fact evidence.................................................................554 Evidence of domestic violence.......................................................................... 555 Fact finding on sentencing................................................................................ 556 Impounding documents..................................................................................... 558 DNA analysts..................................................................................................... 559 Power to appoint a government printer.............................................................560 Production of documents by agencies in relation to civil proceedings............. 560 Approval of forms.............................................................................................. 562 Regulation-making power.................................................................................. 563

Part 9 - Transitional and declaratory provisions Division 1 - Evidence Amendment Act 2000 136 Transitional—Evidence Amendment Act 2000.................................................. 563 Division 1A - Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2003 136A Declaratory provision for Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2003................................................................................................................... 564

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[1.1]

Part 1 – Preliminary

s1

Division 2 - Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003 137 Definitions for div 2............................................................................................564 138 Communications between a husband and wife................................................ 564 139 Evidence admitted under repealed s 9............................................................. 565 140 Committal proceeding........................................................................................565 141 Prerecording of evidence for a summary trial................................................... 565 142 Prerecording of evidence for a trial on indictment............................................ 565 Division 3 - Cross-Border Law Enforcement Legislation Amendment Act 2005 143 Witness anonymity certificates.......................................................................... 565 Division 4 - Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2005 144 Statement made before proceeding by child or person with an impairment of the mind......................................................................................566 145 Definition chief executive (surveys)....................................................................567 Division 5 - Criminal Code and Other Acts Amendment Act 2008 146 References to particular Criminal Code offences..............................................567 Division 6 - Right to Information Act 2009 [Repealed] 147 Effect of regulation amendment [Repealed]...................................................... 567

SCHEDULE 1 - EXAMPLES OF OFFICES OF A PUBLIC NATURE ESTABLISHED UNDER AN ACT SCHEDULE 2 - [REPEALED] SCHEDULE 3 - DICTIONARY

Part 1 – Preliminary 1

Short title This Act may be cited as the Evidence Act 1977.

[S 1 am Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

[1.1] This Act is by no means the only Queensland legislation about evidence. Parts of the Evidence and Discovery Act 1867 are still in force, and there are evidentiary provisions in the Criminal Code and numerous other statutes, many of them mentioned in later chapters, particularly Chapter 11. The surviving sections of the Evidence and Discovery Act 1867 are: • s 31 – Proof of orders etc of Supreme Court by certified copies; • s 37A – Affidavits etc for use in Queensland may be sworn before consular officers or consular employees abroad; • s 38 – Judicial notice of consular seals for the purposes of s 37A; • s 43 – Order of advocates’ speeches in civil proceedings; • s 61 – Affidavits and affirmations taken under [the 1867 Act] to be of the same force as those same taken before the court or by a person authorised by the court; • s 67 – Depositions of witness who dies before a criminal trial may be used by defence; • s 79 – Title and commencement. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[2.1]

The reasons for retaining these sections and two other Acts dealing with evidence in writing were explained by the Law Reform Commission in 1975.2 2

Act binds Crown This Act binds the Crown not only in right of the State of Queensland but also, so far as the legislative power of Parliament permits, the Crown in all its other capacities. [Former s 1(3) renum Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1; s 2 om Reprint 1A; am Act 17 of 1989, s 60]

[2.1] Section 2 was originally s 1(3). It is a settled rule of interpretation that legislation does not bind the Crown unless a particular Act so provides, expressly or by implication.3 That is the purpose of s 2. However, see s 35A which provides that nothing in Pt III Div 3 of this Act (evidence for other jurisdictions) empowers a court “to make an order that is binding on the Crown or on any person in his capacity as an officer or servant of the Crown”. In Fullmer v Cape York Cattle Company4 the order was directed to “residents” other than employees of the Land Administration Commission. [2.2] The Crown as litigant is generally bound by the rules of evidence, and the Commonwealth may be bound by procedural laws of a State.5 However, this Act does not affect Crown (public interest) privilege.6 The Crown is entitled to legal professional privilege on the same terms as other litigants,7 but in criminal proceedings the privilege is ordinarily set aside in fairness to the accused.8 2A Notes in text A note in the text of this Act is part of the Act. [S 2A insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 53]

2. QLRC (1975) at 3 and 5-6. 3. Province of Bombay v Municipal Corporation of Bombay [1947] AC 58; Bradken Consolidated Ltd v Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd (1979) 145 CLR 107 at 116; Brisbane City Council v Group Projects Pty Ltd (1979) 145 CLR 143 at 169; Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 13. 4. [1987] 1 Qd R 6. 5. For example, by s 27A of the Commercial Arbitration Act 2013 (Qld), which enables a court to issue subpoenas in aid of arbitration proceedings: Re Commissioner of Water Resources [1991] 1 Qd R 549; Re Application, Election of Offıcers, Transport Workers’ Union of Australia (WA Branch) (1989) 89 ALR 575. 6. As to which see Kleimeyer v Clay [1965] QWN 26; Sayers v Perrin (No 1) [1965] Qd R 221; Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910; Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1; Irvin v Whitrod [1978] Qd R 137; In the Marriage of K and K [1981] FLC 91-009; Alister v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 404; Adsteam Building Industries Pty Ltd v Queensland Cement and Lime Company Ltd (No 2) [1984] 2 Qd R 366. 7. Attorney-General for the Northern Territory v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500; Waterford v Commonwealth of Australia (1987) 163 CLR 54. 8. R v Kingston [1986] 2 Qd R 114. See now the declaration of the rights of the defence in ss 590ABff of the Criminal Code and s 41 of the Justices Act 1886.

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[3.1]

Schedule 3

[2A.1] For examples of “notes”, see ss 9B, 21AL, 21AT, 39B, 39C, 93A and 93AA. These appendages illustrate the movement in legislative drafting styles from the relatively sparse and imperative style that was still in use when the first version of this Act appeared. [2A.2] It follows that whatever the precise scope of an “annotated” section may be, it necessarily covers the situation described in a note which is part of the Act. [2A.3] Another helpful development is the provision of footnotes that direct the reader to related parts of this Act and other legislation. 3

Definitions The dictionary in schedule 3 defines particular words used in this Act.

[S 3 am Act 55 of 2003, s 54; former s 5(1) renum Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1; s 3 om Reprint 1A]

Overview [3.1] The present s 3 was originally s 5. The original s 3 (since omitted as obsolete) dealt with repeals and amendments effected in 1978. By s 54 of the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003 (Qld) the table of definitions was amended and transferred to a new Sch 3 (Dictionary). For convenience, the Dictionary is reproduced at this point in our text. Terms which can be briefly explained are treated in footnotes attached to them. Terms which require more comment are discussed in the body of the text.

SCHEDULE 3 – DICTIONARY affected child, for part 2, division 4A, see section 21AC.9 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

affidavit, for part 7, see section 104.10 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

approved form see section 134B.11 [Def reloc from s 3 Act 55 of 2003, s 54; insrt Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

assumed name, for part 2, division 5, see section 21C. [Def insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 53]

audio link, for part 3A, see section 39C.12 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

9. According to s 21AC, “affected child” means a child who is a witness (not a defendant) in a criminal proceeding involving sexual and certain violent offences or civil proceedings arising out of such a criminal case. As to “child”, see below. 10. Section 104 deals with verification of reproductions of documents. 11. See [3.2]. 12. Section 39C defines “audio link” as a telephone or similar device enabling reasonably contemporaneous and continuous audio communication. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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audio visual link means facilities, including closed-circuit television, that enable reasonably contemporaneous and continuous audio and visual communication between persons at different places. [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

before, for part 3A, see section 39C.13 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

book of account, for part 5, division 6, see section 83.14 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

business, for part 7, see section 104.15 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

CCC, for part 2, division 5, see section 21C. [Def insrt Act 21 of 2014, s 94(2) and Sch 2]

chief executive officer, for part 2, division 5, see section 21C. [Def insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 53]

chief executive (surveys) means the chief executive of the department in which the Surveyors Act 2003 is administered.16 [Def am Act 70 of 2003, s 206 and Sch 2; reloc from s 3 Act 55 of 2003, s 54; insrt Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

child, for part 2, division 4A, see section 21AD.17 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

civil proceedings, for part 3, division 3, see section 35.18 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

CMC [Repealed] [Def rep Act 21 of 2014, s 94(2) and Sch 2; insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 53]

conduct, for part 2, division 5, see section 21C. [Def insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 53]

controlled operation [Repealed] [Def rep Act 45 of 2005, s 53; insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

convicted, for part 2, division 5, see section 21C. [Def insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 53]

conviction, for part 5, division 5, see section 78.19 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

13. “Before a court” includes in a court: s 39C. 14. “Any document used in the ordinary course of any undertaking to record the financial transactions etc”: s 83. 15. In relation to reproductions of documents “business” includes any undertaking: s 104. 16. See [3.3]. 17. An individual under 16 years at the times set out in s 21AD. 18. In relation to evidence obtained for overseas jurisdictions this means any civil or commercial matter. 19. Section 78 deals with convictions as evidence in civil cases. The term does not include a conviction quashed, set aside or the subject of a pardon.

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Schedule 3

copy, of a document, see section 4.20 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

corresponding court, for part 3, division 2, see section 25.21 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

corresponding law, for part 2, division 5, see section 21C. [Def insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 53]

corresponding witness identity protection certificate, for part 2, division 5, see section 21C. [Def insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 53]

corruption, for part 2, division 5, see section 21C. [Def insrt Act 21 of 2014, s 94(2) and Sch 2]

counsel, for part 2, division 4A, see section 21AC.22 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

court23 (a) (b) (c)

— for part 5, division 5—see section 78; or for part 5, division 6—see section 83; or otherwise—means the court, tribunal, judge, justice, arbitrator, body or person before whom or which a proceeding is held or taken.

[Def subst in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

court location, for part 3A, see section 39C.24 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

court name, for part 2, division 5, see section 21C. [Def insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 53]

covert operative [Repealed] [Def rep Act 45 of 2005, s 53; insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

criminal activity, for part 2, division 5, see section 21C. [Def insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 53]

criminal proceeding includes a proceeding wherein a person is charged with a simple offence, and an examination of witnesses in relation to an indictable offence.25 [Def reloc from s 3 Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

20. According to s 4, “copy” includes a transcript of an electronic recording and “stills” from a film or video recording. 21. Section 25 deals with summary procedure to obtain evidence for Queensland or a court of a “prescribed country” including other Australian States and New Zealand. 22. For the purposes of taking evidence of “affected children”, “counsel” includes a solicitoradvocate: s 21AC. 23. See [3.4]ff. 24. For the purposes of Pt 3A (audio and audio-visual links), this means the courtroom, or other place, where the court is sitting: s 39C. 25. See [3.7]ff. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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defendant, for part 2, division 4A, see section 21AC.26 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

document27 includes, in addition to a document in writing— (a) any part of a document in writing or of any other document as defined herein; and (b) any book, map, plan, graph or drawing; and (c) any photograph; and (d) any label, marking or other writing which identifies or describes anything of which it forms part, or to which it is attached by any means whatever; and (e) any disc, tape, soundtrack or other device in which sounds or other data (not being visual images) are embodied so as to be capable (with or without the aid of some other equipment) of being reproduced therefrom; and (f) any film, negative, tape or other device in which 1 or more visual images are embodied so as to be capable (with or without the aid of some other equipment) of being reproduced therefrom; and (g) any other record of information whatever. [Def reloc from s 3 Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

examiner, for part 3, division 2, see section 25.28 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

external location, for part 3A, see section 39C.29 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

film includes a microfilm. [Def reloc from s 3 Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

gazette includes any gazette, or part of a gazette, published by the government printer. Example—Queensland Government Gazette30 [Def am Act 38 of 2009, s 28; reloc from s 3 Act 55 of 2003, s 54; insrt Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

intellectually impaired person31 [Repealed] [Def rep Act 55 of 2008, s 150 and Sch; insrt in s 3 Act 43 of 2000, s 43]

investigation, for part 2, division 5, see section 21C. [Def insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 53]

judge means the member or members of a court.32 [Def reloc from s 3 Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

26. A person charged with an offence or a person in civil proceedings whose act or omission is complained of: s 21AC (evidence of affected children). 27. See [3.11]ff. 28. A judge, magistrate, clerk of a Magistrates Court or any duly qualified legal practitioner: s 26 (taking evidence abroad for a Queensland court). 29. A place outside Queensland at which evidence is taken for a Queensland court: s 39C. 30. See [3.23]. 31. See [3.24]. 32. See [3.25].

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judicial officer means a judge, magistrate or justices. [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

law enforcement agency, for part 2, division 5, see section 21C. [Def am Act 45 of 2005, s 53; insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

lawfully edited copy, of a video-taped recording of evidence given by a special witness or an affected child, means a copy of the recording that has been edited or otherwise changed under an approval under section 21AZ.33 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

machine copy, for part 7, see section 104.34 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

misconduct [Repealed] [Def rep Act 21 of 2014, s 94(2) and Sch 2; insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 53]

offence involving violence, for part 2, division 4A, see section 21AC.35 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

offence of a sexual nature, for part 2, division 4A, see section 21AC.36 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

operative, for part 2, division 5, see section 21C.37 [Def insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 53]

original document, for part 7, see section 104.38 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

overseas country — (a) for part 3, division 3—see section 35;39or (b) for part 5, division 3—see section 67.40 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

participating State, for part 3A, see section 39C.41 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

33. [Footnote in Act] Section 21AZ (approval to edit or otherwise change a recording). 34. A machine producing a latent image or copy of a document with or without using photosensitive material: s 104 (reproductions of documents). 35. An offence against the Criminal Code, Ch 28 (homicide etc), Ch 29 (offences endangering life or health) (excluding ss 317A, 318, 319, 319A, 321, 321A, 327, 329, 330–334), ss 335, 339, 340, 354, 354A, 355, Ch 33A (unlawful stalking) and ss 363, 363A, 364. 36. An offence against Criminal Code, Ch 22 (offences against morality) (excluding ss 224 – 226) or Ch 32 (rape and sexual assaults). 37. Replaces deleted definition, “covert operative”. 38. For the purposes of Pt 7 (reproductions of documents), this means the document that would, apart from Pt 7, have to be produced in answer to court process, or as evidence in a proceeding: s 104; see also [A.14], [3.15], [19.5]ff, [104.2] and [F.27]. 39. A country or part of a country outside the Commonwealth of Australia: s 35. 40. A country or part of a country outside Australia and any international organisation of which Australia or an overseas country is a member: s 67 (proof of certain Australian and overseas documents and matters). 41. Another State with legislation substantially similar to the audio and audio visual evidence-taking provisions of Pt 3A of this Act. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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party, for part 2, division 5, see section 21C. [Def insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 53]

person with an impairment of the mind means a person with a disability that— (a) is attributable to an intellectual, psychiatric, cognitive or neurological impairment or a combination of these; and (b) results in— (i) a substantial reduction of the person’s capacity for communication, social interaction or learning; and (ii) the person needing support.42 [Def insrt Act 55 of 2008, s 150 and Sch]

police service means the Queensland Police Service. [Def insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 53]

preliminary hearing, for part 2, division 4A, see section 21AC.43 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

prescribed country, for part 3, division 2, see section 25.44 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

presiding judicial officer, for part 2, division 4B, see section 21AY.45 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

proceeding — (a) for part 2, division 4A—see section 21AC;46 or (b) otherwise—means any civil, criminal or other proceeding or inquiry, reference or examination in which by law or by consent of parties evidence is or may be given, and includes an arbitration.47 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

protected witness, for part 2, division 6, see section 21M. [Def subst Act 45 of 2005, s 53; subst in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54; insrt Act 43 of 2000, s 43]

Queensland court, for part 3A, see section 39C.48 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

42. Inserted by the Criminal Code and Other Acts Amendment Act 2008. 43. A preliminary hearing at which an affected child’s evidence is taken under s 21AK. 44. Any State or Territory of the Commonwealth, New Zealand and any other place declared by regulation to be a prescribed country for the purposes of summary procedure to obtain evidence for Queensland or other jurisdictions: s 25. 45. The judicial officer presiding at a proceeding at which a recording is made or received or at which a pre-trial hearing is held under s 590AA of the Criminal Code or s 83 of the Justices Act 1886: s 21AY. 46. Any civil or criminal proceeding, including a preliminary hearing concerned with the evidence of an “affected child”: s 21AC. 47. See [3.26]. 48. For the purposes of Pt 3A (evidence by audio or audio visual link) the Supreme Court, the District Court, the Coroner’s Court, another court established under an Act and a tribunal declared by regulation to be a Queensland Court: s 39C.

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Schedule 3

recognised court, for part 3A, see section 39C.49 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

recording, for part 2, division 4B, see section 21AY.50 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

relevant court, for part 2, division 5, see section 21C. [Def insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 53]

relevant entity [Repealed] [Def rep Act 45 of 2005, s 53; insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

relevant offence, for part 2, division 4A, see section 21AC.51 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

relevant proceeding, for part 2, division 4A, see section 21AC.52 [Def subst Act 45 of 2005, s 53; insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

reproduce, for part 7, see section 104.53 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

reproduction, for part 7, see section 104. [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

request, for part 3, division 3, see section 35.54 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

requesting court, for part 3, division 3, see section 36. [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

special witness see section 21A.55 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

statement includes any representation of fact, whether made in words or otherwise and whether made by a person, computer or otherwise.56 [Def reloc from s 3 Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

statute, for part 5, division 3, see section 67.57 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

49. A court of a participating State, within the meaning of Pt 3A (audio and audio visual links). 50. A videotaped recording of a special witness’s evidence under s 21A or of an affected child’s evidence made under 4A, or a copy thereof: s 21AY. 51. An offence of a sexual nature or an offence involving violence where there is a prescribed relationship between a child witness and a defendant in Pt 4A proceedings (evidence of affected children). 52. Certain criminal and civil proceedings involving the evidence of affected children: s 21AC. 53. A machine copy or a print from a transparency under Pt 7. 54. Any commission, order or other process issued by an interstate or overseas court under Pt 3 Div 3 (evidence for other jurisdictions). 55. A child under 16 years and certain disadvantaged witnesses: s 21A. 56. See [3.28]. 57. Includes any instrument of a legislative nature made, granted or issued under a statute: s 67 (proof of certain Australian and overseas documents and matters). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[3.2]

telegraph means a system of telecommunication operated under Commonwealth law.58 [Def reloc from s 3 Act 55 of 2003, s 54; subst in s 3 Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

telegraphic message means any message or other communication transmitted or intended for transmission or purporting to have been transmitted by telegraph. [Def reloc from s 3 Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

telegraph office means an office or place established or used for receiving or transmitting telegraphic messages. [Def reloc from s 3 Act 55 of 2003, s 54; subst in s 3 Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

transparency, for part 7, see section 104.59 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

tribunal, for part 3A, see section 39C.60 [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

undertaking includes public administration and any business, profession, occupation, calling, trade or undertaking whether engaged in or carried on— (a) by the Crown (in right of the State of Queensland or any other right), or by a statutory body, or by any other person; or (b) for profit or not; or (c) in Queensland or elsewhere.61 [Def reloc from s 3 Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

video-taped means recorded as a video-taped recording. [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

video-taped recording means a recording, including the accompanying sound track, on any medium from which a moving image may be produced by any means. [Def insrt in s 3 then reloc Act 55 of 2003, s 54]

witness identity protection certificate, for part 2, division 5, see section 21C. [Def insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 53] [Sch 3 am Act 21 of 2014; Act 38 of 2009; Act 45 of 2005; Act 70 of 2003; reinsrt Act 55 of 2003, s 68; rep Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

“Approved form” [3.2] This definition relates to s 134B, which empowers a chief executive to approve forms required or permitted by the Act, other than forms for court proceedings.

58. See [3.28]. 59. Photographic copies of original documents for use under Pt 7 (reproductions). 60. For the purposes of the audio and audio visual provisions (Pt 3A) a body or person that may take evidence on oath: s 39C. 61. See [3.30].

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“Chief executive (surveys)” [3.3] This definition relates to s 65(1) (verification of maps and charts).

“Court” [3.4] Prima facie this term goes well beyond courts in the accepted sense to include tribunals, arbitrators and others who conduct a “proceeding”. “Proceeding” is also widely defined: see [3.26]. The characteristics of a court have been described62 as: (a) a power to make decisions inter partes that (absent a successful appeal) are final and binding; (b) a duty to hear witnesses called by the parties; (c) a power to take evidence on oath; (d) “a fixed and defined course of procedure”;63 and (e) a presiding officer “selected as specially qualified for the purpose”.64 [3.5] These common law tests distinguish courts from administrative inquiries, but offer no clear distinction between courts and quasi-judicial tribunals. The present definition deems tribunals to be courts, but tribunals are not normally bound by the rules of evidence65 and it is submitted that this definition does not alter that rule. Non-determinative inquiries may also come within the present definition; it includes any body or person before whom a proceeding is held. “Proceeding”, in turn, includes “any reference or examination in which by law or by consent … evidence is … given”. This may include a commission of inquiry, which takes sworn evidence but does not determine legal rights. However, many, if not most, tribunals and inquiries are not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.66 There are some bodies formally described as “courts”, which do not determine rights but merely conduct inquiries, for example the Coroner’s Court,67 or a Magistrates Court conducting committal proceedings.68 “Some bodies are called 62. Attorney-General v British Broadcasting Corporation [1978] 1 WLR 477 at 481. 63. Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society Ltd v Parkinson [1892] 1 QB 431 at 447. 64. Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society Ltd v Parkinson [1892] 1 QB 431 at 447. 65. R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228 at 256; R v Board of Visitors of Hull Prison; Ex parte St Germain (No 2) [1979] 1 WLR 1401 at 1409; Re Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13; Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52; Forbes, Justice in Tribunals (2nd ed, Federation Press, 2006), [12.42]ff; see also [Q.109]. 66. See Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950, s 17; Coroners Act 2003, s 37; Misconduct Tribunals Act 1997, s 23(2); Magistrates Court Act 1921, s 10(2) (small debts); Racing Act 2002, s 172(2); Small Claims Tribunal Act 1973; Child Protection Act 1999, s 105(1) (Children’s Court); Health Practitioners (Professional Standards) Act 1999, s 136(1)(c); Retail Shop Leases Act 1994, s 72; Legal Profession Act 2004, s 475. 67. R v South London Coroner; Ex parte Thompson (1982) 126 SJ 625. 68. Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 1 at 11, 19. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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courts but are not truly of that character, and some are called tribunals or commissions which … are [really] courts.”69 An institution is a court, howsoever called, if it is authorised to try criminal cases or civil actions at common law.70 [3.6] The inclusion of commercial arbitrators does not bind them to observe the rules of evidence unless the parties agree that those rules shall apply.71 Formerly, the Supreme Court could not authorise a referee to depart from the rules of evidence,72 but see now Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 502(3). Parties to civil proceedings in the regular courts may vary the rules of evidence by waiver or agreement.73 A certificate issued in accordance with a contract may determine both the existence and the quantum of a debt.74 Distinguish valuers appointed by parties to an agreement; they are exempt not only from the rules of evidence, but also from audi alteram partem.75

“Criminal proceeding” [3.7] This definition follows the common law in treating summary, as well as indictable offences as crimes.76 It is clearly not apt to refer to an administrative tribunal.77 A civil claim that involves a criminal imputation does not attract the criminal standard of proof.78 A Royal Commission may investigate suspected criminal activity, but in so doing it remains an administrative inquiry.79

69. New South Wales Bar Association v Muirhead (1988) 14 NSWLR 173 at 207-208 per Mahoney JA. See also Australian Postal Commission v Dao (No 2) (1986) 69 ALR 125 at 144 per McHugh JA: “Function and purpose, not labels, should be our guides.” 70. Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro (1926) 38 CLR 153 at 175. 71. Commercial Arbitration Act 2013 (Qld), s 19(1), displacing the common law as declared in Re Enoch and Zaretsky Bock and Co’s Arbitration [1910] 1 KB 327; Henry Bath and Son Ltd v Birgby Products [1962] 1 Lloyds Rep 389 at 399; Fidelitas Shipping Co Ltd v V/O Exportchleb [1966] 1 QB 630; Compagnie Generale Maritime v Diakan Spirit SA [1981] 1 Lloyds Rep 550 (“The Ymnos”). 72. Netanya Noosa Pty Ltd v Evans Harch Constructions Pty Ltd [1995] 1 Qd R 650. 73. Dobbs v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1935) 53 CLR 643; Bond Air Services v Hill [1955] 2 QB 417; Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [117]; New South Wales v UXC Ltd [2011] NSWSC 530 at [37]. 74. Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [117]. 75. Campbell v Crane (2013) 17 BPR 32,483; [2013] NSWCA 43; Re Dawdy and Hartcup (1885) 15 QB 426 at 430; Re Carus v Wilson and Greene (1886) 18 QBD 7; Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v MPN Group Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Rolfe J, 14 July 1997) at [14]. Applied Heart Research Institute Ltd v Psiron Ltd [2002] NSWSC 646 at [19]. 76. Parker v Green (1862) 2 B & s 299; 121 ER 1084 at 311 (B & s), 1089 (ER), extending the definition in Attorney-General v Radloff (1854) 10 Ex 84; 156 ER 366 at 96 (Ex), 371 (ER). 77. Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro (1926) 38 CLR 153 at 175. 78. Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691; Re Stone [1989] 1 Qd R 351; Taylor v L; Ex parte L [1988] 1 Qd R 706; Groves v Groves [2013] QSC 277 at [122]; Fleming v Advertiser-News Weekend Publishing Co Pty Ltd [2016] SASC 26 at [179]. 79. Clough v Leahy (1904) 2 CLR 139; Victoria v Australian Building Construction Employees’ and Builders Labourers’ Federation (1982) 152 CLR 25.

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Disciplinary proceedings are not subject to the criminal standard of proof, however serious the consequences of an adverse finding may be.80 [3.8] Proceedings for a “civil penalty” are governed by the civil standard of proof.81 Proceedings for contempt (particularly a contempt in the face of the court)82 attract the criminal standard.83 The rule in Dietrich v The Queen84 (which mandates legal representation for persons charged with serious crimes) does not apply to a civil action to recover a penalty.85 [3.9] The definition of “criminal proceeding” includes a committal hearing before a magistrate, although it is really an administrative inquiry, not a determination of the charge.86 Committal proceedings have been described as sui generis, albeit closely connected with judicial duties.87 They are meant to ensure that a person is not sent to trial unnecessarily, to enable the defendant to preview the prosecution case and to collect evidence in written form.88 The rules of evidence do not strictly apply,89 but it is pointless to admit material that will probably be excluded at the trial.90 The rules regarding cross-examination on prior statements apply to committal proceedings.91 As to discretionary rejection of evidence at a committal hearing, see [130.10]. In Coco v Shaw92 McPherson SPJ stated: [I]t is not, and never has been, a function of examining justices to make refined rulings on objections with a view to excluding evidence of witnesses at committal proceedings … Of course it is self-evident that, if some control is not exercised, the examination will, to use Taylor’s description “be loaded with every idle word let fall by the persons under examination, though obviously having no reference to the charge against the accused” … [I]t is neither expected nor desirable that [the magistrate] should attempt to emulate the learning or acuity of a Wigmore or a Phipson.

In the same case Dowsett J observed: 80. In re a Solicitor; Ex parte the Prothonotary (1939) 56 WN (NSW) 53; R v White; Ex parte Byrnes (1963) 109 CLR 665; Mercer v Pharmacy Board of Victoria [1968] VR 72; Basser v Medical Board of Victoria [1981] VR 953; Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; Adamson v Queensland Law Society Inc [1990] 1 Qd R 498. 81. Peter Williamson Pty Ltd v Capitol Motors Ltd (1982) 61 FLR 257; 41 ALR 613 at 264 (FLR), 620 (ALR); Button v Evans [1984] 2 NSWLR 607; Hayes v Bondaletoff [1986] 1 Qd R 455. 82. R v Metal Trade Employers’ Association; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union, Australian Section (1951) 82 CLR 208 at 253-255; Consolidated Press Ltd v McRae (1955) 93 CLR 325; Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan (1965) 112 CLR 483 at 489. 83. Keeley v Brooking (1979) 143 CLR 162; Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525; see [A.111]. 84. (1992) 177 CLR 292; see [21P.1]. 85. Elliott v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2004) 185 FLR 245; 205 ALR 594; [2004] VSCA 54. 86. Amman v Wegener (1971) 129 CLR 415 at 435-436; R v Bjelke-Petersen; Ex parte Plunkett [1978] Qd R 305 at 309-310; Ex parte Cousens; Re Blacket (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 145 at 146. 87. R v Murphy (1985) 158 CLR 596 at 616. 88. Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 1; Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75. 89. R v Governor of Pentonville Prison; Ex parte Schneider (1981) 73 Cr App R 200 (extradition proceedings); R v Sanghera [1983] 2 VR 130 at 131 (bail application). 90. Coco v Newnham (unreported, Qld Sup Ct (FC), McPherson SPJ, 10 May 1991). 91. Maddison v Goldrick [1976] 1 NSWLR 651. 92. [1994] 1 Qd R 469 at 484. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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No point is served by a committing magistrate considering [points of admissibility] if they are dependent upon findings of fact or the exercise of a discretion. These are matters for determination at the trial … A magistrate should, however, uphold any objection to evidence which is clearly … inadmissible. To do so will often be the only way to prevent an abuse of process or a significant waste of time.93

[3.10] According to the Dictionary, “criminal proceeding” includes a proceeding where a person is charged with a simple offence, as well as an examination of witnesses in relation to an indictable offence. But in relation to s 15(2), it does not include a voir dire or a pre-trial hearing pursuant to s 590AA of the Criminal Code. For the purposes of s 15(2) a criminal proceeding is one directly concerned with the question of guilt or innocence.94

“Document” [3.11] According to its Latin root, a “document” is “that which teaches or instructs”.95 The meaning of this word governs many provisions in this Act, particularly Pt 5 Div 6 (books of account), Pt 6 (statements in documents) and Pt 7 (reproductions). Clauses (e) and (f) of this definition, and the concluding phrase “any other record of information whatever”, clearly embrace modern technology such as audio recordings, video recordings,96 microfiches,97 email and facsimile transmissions, as well as traditional paper writings. “These days most business documents begin their life in electronic form and some are then printed.”98 A question whether material comes within this definition, or whether it comes from a particular source, may be answered by examining its content, appearance or self-description:99 s 3(3); see also s 96(1). This definition is complemented, if necessary, by s 36 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), defining a “document” as “any disc, tape, or other article or any material from which sounds, images, writings, or messages are capable of being produced or reproduced (with or without the aid of another article or device)”. Computer databases are included.100 Electronic management of documents in civil cases is the subject of rr 975Aff of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 and Practice Direction No 10 of 2011.101 A duty to produce a document is satisfied by handing over a paper reproducing the information from a “mechanical, electronic or other device”: Acts 93. [1994] 1 Qd R 469 at 499-500. 94. R v Nguyen [2000] 1 Qd R 559. 95. Grant v South Western and County Properties Ltd [1975] Ch 185 at 190. 96. Radio Ten Pty Ltd v Brisbane TV Ltd [1984] 1 Qd R 113 at 123. 97. State Bank of South Australia v Heinrich (1989) 52 SASR 596. 98. Robson v Robson [2010] QSC 378 at [15]. Hence the enactment of the Electronic Transactions (Queensland) Act 2001 and the Electronic Conveyancing National Law (Queensland) Act 2013. 99. R v Frolchenko [1998] QCA 43. 100. Poteri v Clarke (1998) 19 QL Reps 108. Discovery of “electronic diaries” was ordered in Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1254. 101. Practice Direction No 10 of 2011; Naismith, “The Discovery of Electronic Documents” (2003) 12 JJA 180.

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Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 32E; cf Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 25A. An audiotape recording testamentary intentions and directions has been admitted to probate.102 Strictly speaking, the Dictionary’s definition of “document” applies only to this Act, but the common law meaning has also been progressively modernised. In 1940 an English court admitted a “gramophone record” as evidence in a case of malpractice at the races.103 MacKinnon LJ observed that “the machine, notwithstanding the strain of [the plaintiff’s] epithets, faithfully recorded every word they uttered and its record [a transcript] was put in evidence, with [those] epithets indicated by blanks in deference to forensic decorum”. Reports relating to electronic documents are legion.104 An order for discovery of a computer database and “backup” copies was made in Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon,105 when such media were still novel, and innumerable orders of that kind have since been made.106 The transcript of a tape recording is subordinate to the recording but may be used as a means of understanding or reviewing same.107 Section 4(a) of this Act treats a transcript of recorded sounds “or other data” as a document. [3.12] The Dictionary classifies photographs as documents. At common law they are often treated as copies of real evidence.108 The present definition includes labels, which the common law treated as part and parcel of the item of real evidence to which they were attached, thus freeing them from the original document rule.109 The distinction may be material when there is a question of complying with a rule requiring disclosure of documents. Various uses of documents: non-hearsay and hearsay [3.13] A document may be used as evidence in several ways: 102. Treacey v Edwards (2000) 49 NSWLR 739; an extempore judgment questioned in Lawrence v Australian War Memorial [2014] NSWSC 757 at [64]. 103. Harry Parker Ltd v Mason [1940] 2 KB 590. 104. R v Maqsud Ali [1966] 1 QB 688; Cassidy v Engwirda Constructions Company [1967] QWN 16; Beneficial Finance Co Ltd v Conway [1970] VR 321; R v Robson [1972] 1 WLR 651; Australian National Airlines Commission v Commonwealth of Australia (1975) 131 CLR 582; Grant v South Western and County Properties Ltd [1975] Ch 185; Senior v Holdsworth; Ex parte Independent Television News [1976] QB 23 (film and videotape); Walsh v Wilcox [1976] WAR 62; R v Zaphir [1978] Qd R 151; R v Gaudion [1979] VR 57; R v Michaux [1984] 2 Qd R 159 (videotape of offence against police agent); Hyslop v Australian Paper Manufacturers Ltd (No 2) [1987] VR 309 (videotape of examination de bene esse); Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Victoria) (1987) 164 CLR 180; R v Sitek [1988] 2 Qd R 284 (videotape made by security camera in a casino). See generally, Goldstein, “Photographic and Videotape Evidence in the Criminal Courts of England and Canada” [1987] Crim LR 384. 105. [1991] 1 WLR 652. 106. See, eg, Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 217(3)(a). 107. Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Victoria) (1987) 164 CLR 180; Smith v The Queen (1990) 50 A Crim R 434; R v O’Neill [2001] VSCA 227. A verified transcript of a tape made by a mentally handicapped person, unintelligible to ordinary listeners, was admissible in R v Duffy [1999] QB 919. 108. Schmidt v Schmidt [1969] QWN 3; Beaton v McDivitt (1985) 13 NSWLR 134; R v Sitek [1988] 2 Qd R 284 at 286 and 291. (This point was not explicitly considered in Martin v Kennedy [1992] 2 Qd R 109 at 111; and King v Nolan [1992] 2 Qd R 498 at 507.) 109. Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Young (1962) 106 CLR 535. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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(a) as real evidence – for example a cheque found in the possession of a person charged with stealing it;110 or (b) as a legal instrument (for example, a share certificate);111 or (c) “testimonially” – that is, as a factual narrative purporting to be true. When a document is used testimonially, it is within the ambit of the hearsay rule. To make it admissible, it must then be brought under a common law exception to that rule or a statutory provision, such as s 74, 84, 92, 93, 93A, 95 or 101. When documents are necessary [3.14] When a document is tendered as a legal instrument, it may be subject to rules that require the transaction to be wholly or partly in writing or authenticated in a particular manner.112 If a transaction is wholly documented, either by agreement or in accordance with some special law, the “parol evidence” rule applies.113 The ambit and limitations of that rule114 are summarised at [A.54]. “Original document” rule [3.15] When a document is relied on as a legal instrument or testimonially, the original should be produced and authenticated.115 But this rule applies only to documents in the traditional sense,116 and there are now many statutory exceptions to the “original document” rule, such as ss 55, 74, 77, 84(b), 97, 105, 106 and 116. As to authenticity, see the presumptions in ss 5 and 62. At common law, secondary evidence of a document is admissible, subject to proof of the original’s existence and a satisfactory explanation for its absence.117 In the absence of any physical copy secondary evidence may take the form of testimony by a person who has read the original118 and has a recollection of its contents that is not too faint or fragmentary.119 There is a colourful example of 110. Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Victoria) (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 194. 111. Such as a deed or a will or a document showing an automatic transfer of funds: R v Governor of Brixton Prison; Ex parte Levin [1997] AC 741. 112. See ss 60 – 63; Succession Act 1981, s 10; Property Law Act 1974, ss 56 and 59 113. Bank of Australasia v Palmer [1897] AC 540; LG Thorne and Co Pty Ltd v Thomas Borthwick and Sons (Australasia) Ltd (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 81. 114. Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381; 3 All ER 237; Re Allen [1988] 1 Qd R 1; Petelin v Cullen (1975) 132 CLR 355; Maybury v Atlantic Union Oil Co Ltd (1953) 89 CLR 507; see also [Q.99]. 115. Queen’s Case (1820) 2 B & B 284; 129 ER 976; Morgan v Babcock & Wilcox Ltd (1929) 43 CLR 163 at 172 and 179. Authentication merely proves that a document is what it purports to be; its weight is a separate question: Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 191 FLR 385; 53 ACSR 752; [2005] NSWSC 417. 116. Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Victoria) (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 186-187, 194-195 and 202-203. 117. In property disputes the evidence should be clear and convincing: Mack v Lenton (1993) 32 NSWLR 259 at 261; Minassian v Minassian [2010] NSWSC 708. 118. Sugden v Lord St Leonards (1876) LR 1 PD 154; McCauley v McCauley (1910) 10 CLR 434; Re Gregory [1934] QWN 36. 119. Mack v Lenton (1993) 32 NSWLR 259.

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120

secondary evidence in Estate of Slavinskyj, where a Ukrainian migrant pencilled his will on the wall of his house. A photograph of the wall was admitted to probate. The original document rule is abandoned in the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).121 [3.16] Documents liable to stamp duty are not admissible until the proper duty has been paid: Duties Act 2001 (Qld), s 487. Some terms in the definition of “document” [3.17] “In writing”: “writing” includes any mode of representing or reproducing words in a visible form: Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 36. Paper is not essential.122 [3.18] “Map”: there is special provision for maps and charts in s 65. The status of Google Earth maps is discussed in Al Shakarji v Mulhern.123 [3.19] “Plan, graph or drawing”: where the plan or graph is not merely a rough sketch by an inexpert witness, but purports to be accurate, evidence that it was prepared by an expert may be required.124 Charts may be used to summarise or to clarify evidence given by other means. In Smith v The Queen125 a chart was used to help a jury to understand “a series of highly complicated cheque transactions which [were] proved by other evidence”. The High Court126 approved this statement in the court below: “The use of such charts and other time-saving devices in complicated trials … is a usual and desirable procedure and is encouraged by the courts.” [3.20] “Any photograph”: at common law photographs are variously classified as documents127 or copies of real evidence.128 There are reports of photographic evidence as early as the 1860s129 and in a local divorce suit in 120. (1988) 53 SASR 221. 121. Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 51. 122. R v Daye [1908] 2 KB 333 at 340: “any written thing capable of being evidence”. An x-ray was deemed a document in McCarthy v O’Flynn [1979] IR 127. 123. [2010] QDC 476 at [11]. The US Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal admitted such evidence in a criminal matter in United States v Lizarraga-Tirado F 3d WL 3772772 (2015). 124. R v Ireland (No 1) [1970] SASR 416. 125. (1970) 121 CLR 572. See also R v Collins (1986) 44 SASR 214; Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 190; Johnson v Kershaw (1847) 1 De G & S 260; 63 ER 1059. 126. (1970) 121 CLR 572 at 577. 127. Lyell v Kennedy (1888) 50 LT 730 (photographs of houses – inheritance dispute); Senior v Holdsworth; Ex parte Independent Television News [1976] QB 23 (videotape of incident in question); Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No 9) [1991] 1 WLR 652; R v Maqsud Ali [1966] 1 QB 688 per Marshall J at 701: “For many years now [relevant and identified] photographs have been admissible in evidence on proof that … the prints are taken from negatives that are untouched.” That statement must now be reconsidered in the light of digital photography; proof that the original image is “untouched” may well require an expert’s evidence. 128. C v C and C [1972] 1 WLR 1335 (photographs of relatives in legitimacy proceedings). 129. R v United Kingdom Electric Telegraph Company (1862) 176 ER 33; R v Tolson (1864) 176 ER 488. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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130

131

1875. The identifying witness need not be the photographer, evidence132 may be required if distortion is suggested.

but expert

[3.21] “Any disc, tape …”: a tape recording may function as a narrative (testimonially) or as a copy of real evidence (when used to prove the fact that certain words were uttered, as in an action for defamation).133 In Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Victoria)134 Dawson J described a tape recording as “the auditory equivalent of a photograph”. Authenticating evidence, if required, should prove the circumstances in which the tape was made, the identity of the voices or sounds recorded, the reliability of the recording device, and preservation of the tape unaltered from the time of recording to its production in court.135 For convenience, and at the judge’s discretion, a verified transcript may be used after the tape has been proved and played in court, but what is seen or heard on the playing of the tape is the primary evidence.136 The transcript may be excluded if it gives an impression of certainty or clarity that the recording itself does not support. The dangers of allowing a jury to compare a genuine tape recording of a defendant’s voice with a disputed recording are considered in Bulejcik v The Queen.137 A transcript may be used when a tape is long or difficult to follow, or in a foreign language.138 But even in the latter case, the transcript is subordinate to the tape.139 The accuracy of a translation is a matter for expert evidence.140 130. Russell v Russell (1875) 4 QSCR 103. 131. R v Tolson (1864) 176 ER 488; Schmidt v Schmidt [1969] QWN 3. 132. R v Jung [2006] NSWSC 658. 133. In Copley v Queensland Newspapers Ltd (unreported, Sup Ct Qld, Dowsett J, 30 July 1992) a tape recording was admitted in evidence, not for what it said, but for the manner in which words were spoken. The plaintiff, a barrister, was reported in the defendant’s newspaper as “bullying” witnesses in a previous magistrates’ court proceeding. The tape recording was tendered simply to prove that the witnesses in question were not “bullied” by the plaintiff. 134. (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 192. A similar comparison was made in R v Maqsud Ali [1966] 1 QB 688 at 701 per Marshall J. 135. R v Robson [1972] 1 WLR 651 at 654; Walsh v Wilcox [1976] WAR 62; R v Zaphir [1978] Qd R 151 at 156157; R v Gaudion [1979] VR 57; Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Victoria) (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 184; R v Chen [1993] 2 VR 139 at 149-150; Senior v Holdsworth; Ex parte Independent Television News [1976] QB 23; R v Michaux [1984] 2 Qd R 159; Hyslop v Australian Paper Manufacturers Ltd (No 2) [1987] VR 309; R v Sitek [1988] 2 Qd R 284; Wilson and Garner, “Evidence of Tape Recordings” (1988) 4 QUTLJ 113. 136. R v Maqsud Ali [1966] 1 QB 688; Walsh v Wilcox [1976] WAR 62; R v Gaudion [1979] VR 57; R v Migliorini [1981] Tas R 80; R v Beames (1979) 1 A Crim R 239; R v Watts [1992] 1 Qd R 214. A transcript of a tape recording of a statement by a victim of cerebral palsy was verified by a social worker familiar with the witness in R v Duffy [1999] QB 919. 137. (1996) 185 CLR 375. 138. Butera v DPP (Victoria) (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 190-191, 195-197 and 211-212; Smith v The Queen (1990) 50 A Crim R 434; R v Watts [1992] 1 Qd R 214 (long and indistinct recording); Foreign Media Pty Ltd v Konstantinidis [2003] NSWCA 161 (transcript of radio item in Greek, in defamation case). 139. R v Georgiou [2005] NSWCCA 237. 140. Butera v DPP (Victoria) (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 198.

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A witness who personally saw or heard the events recorded may be allowed to use the recording to refresh memory.141 In Victoria a provision identical to paragraph “(e)” of this definition was held to cover data in a computer.142

“Film” [3.22]

No comment is required.

“Gazette” [3.23]

See ss 45, 48 and 50.

“Judge” [3.24]

Compare the extended meaning of “court” in this section and at [3.4].

“Person with an impairment of the mind” [3.25] This definition was inserted by the Criminal Code and Other Acts Amendment Act 2008: see ss 9, 9A, 21, 21A, 21M, 93A and 144.

“Proceeding” [3.26] Here, as at common law, civil and criminal actions are included.143 “Proceeding” denotes any step in a court action prior to judgment, including interlocutory applications.144 The word is commonly used to describe the process of any tribunal that determines legal rights.145 It was extended to administrative disciplinary action in Chief Executive, Queensland Health v Jattan: “As the word ‘proceeding’ is capable of such a wide variety of meanings its meaning in any particular case is to be derived from the statutory context and objects of the legislation in question.”146

“Protected witness” [3.27] This definition was inserted by s 43 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2000 (Qld). It governs the provisions of Pt 2 Div 6, inserted by s 4 of the Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Amendment Act 2000 (Qld).

“Statement” [3.28] A document functions as a statement when it is used testimonially – that is, to assert as true the facts it records. For the purposes of ss 92 and 93, “statement” extends to competent expressions of opinion: see [92.15] and [F.11]. 141. R v Sitek [1988] 2 Qd R 284. 142. Murphy v Lew [1998] 3 VR 791. 143. Re Vexatious Actions Act; Re Boaler [1915] 1 KB 21 at 37. 144. Pryor v City Offıces Co (1883) 10 QBD 504 at 507; Blake v Summersby [1889] WN 39; Cheney v Spooner (1929) 41 CLR 532 at 536-537. Compare Oxford English Dictionary Online, which defines “proceeding”, in a legal context, as “a legal action or process; any act done by authority of a court of law; a step taken by either party in a legal case”. 145. See, eg, Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009, s 29. 146. [2010] QCA 359 at [23] per Boddice JA. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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“Telegraph” [3.29] This definition enlarges the expression as it was understood when the Telegraphic Messages Act 1872 (Qld) was passed. See now ss 75 – 77.

“Undertaking” [3.30] This expression embraces a wide range of activities – private, governmental and semi-governmental. It has been held to cover a sporting body,147 the Australian Taxation Office,148 and a mission station for Aboriginal people.149 It governs the effect of ss 83 and 92: see [83.12] and [92.33]. 4

Meaning of copy of document etc. In this Act, any reference to a copy of a document includes— (a) in the case of a document falling within paragraph (e) but not paragraph (f) of the definition document in schedule 3—a transcript of the sounds or other data embodied therein; and

[Para (a) am Act 55 of 2003, s 55]

(b)

in the case of a document falling within paragraph (f) but not paragraph (e) of that definition—a reproduction or still reproduction of the image or images embodied therein, whether enlarged or not; and (c) in the case of a document falling within both those paragraphs—such a transcript together with such a reproduction or still reproduction; and (d) in the case of a document not falling within the said paragraph (f) of which a visual image is embodied in a document falling within that paragraph—a reproduction or still reproduction of that image, whether enlarged or not; and any reference to a copy of the material part of a document shall be construed accordingly. [S 4 am Act 55 of 2003; former s 5(2) renum Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1; s 4 om Reprint 1A]

[4.1] Section 4 was originally s 5(2). No change of wording has occurred, beyond the substitution in cl (a) of the words “schedule 3” for “section 3”: Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003 (Qld), s 55. This section is ancillary to the definition of “document” in the Dictionary (see [3.11]), particularly the parts referring to electronic and photographic documents. Sections 4(a) and (c) support and strengthen the authorities that permit the use of a transcript of an audio recording: see [3.21].

147. Mather and Deegan v Morgan [1971] Tas SR 192. 148. Re Riggs; Ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (WA) (1986) 9 FCR 149; 17 ATR 366. 149. Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v Western Australia (No 8) (2004) 207 ALR 483; [2004] FCA 338.

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[5.2]

Schedule 3 – Dictionary Part 1 – Preliminary

s5

5

Meaning of document purporting to be of certain character etc. For the purposes of this Act a document, including any instrument or part of an instrument, purports— (a) to be of a certain character; or (b) to have been produced or authenticated at a certain time, in a certain manner, by a certain person or body, or by a person having a certain qualification or occupying a certain office; or (c) any other matter whatever; if the document expressly or impliedly represents that matter or a court can assume that matter from the contents of the document or otherwise. [Former s 5(3) am and renum Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

[5.1] Section 5 was originally s 5(3). It encourages courts to apply the presumption of regularity to an apparently genuine document: see s 62. [5.2] Application of the presumption of regularity in criminal cases is considered in Mowday v Western Australia.150 It was applied by the Court of Appeal in R v Vaughan.151

150. (2007) 176 A Crim R 85; [2007] WASCA 165. Caution is advised in Kukurs v Hodgson (2012) 61 MVR 96; 223 A Crim R 155; [2012] WASC 181. 151. [2011] QCA 224 at [44]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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WITNESSES: COMPETENCE, COMPELLABILITY, CROSS-EXAMINATION AND PROTECTION INTRODUCTION Competence to testify [6.1] Everyone who understands the duty imposed by an oath or affirmation, or who is entitled to the benefit of s 9A, is competent to testify: see the presumption in s 9(1). The position of young children is considered at [9.1]ff. By s 44 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2000 (Qld), provisions originally designed for young children were extended to witnesses who “do not understand the nature of an oath”. Section 9A attributes competency to anyone who is “able to give an intelligible account of events which he or she has observed or experienced”. As to the capacity to give sworn evidence, see s 9B. There is a special rule in the Family Court of Australia that a “child” under the age of 18 years may not testify without leave of the court.1 [6.2] At common law evidence could be given only by a person who took an oath in the Christian manner.2 Testimony on any other basis required statutory authority.3 Gradual relaxation of the old rule is noted at [A.22]. Less emphasis is now placed upon the words of the oath,4 although the form of a statutory affirmation was strictly enforced in Damon v The Queen.5 In Queensland there is no rule that the deponent of an affidavit must touch the Bible when the document is sworn; it is sufficient if the oath is accepted as binding that person to tell the truth.6 In South Australia an oath has been administered in the traditional way to a non-Christian. A statement verified before notary public in South Korea was accepted as duly sworn, having been made in circumstances of gravity and recognition of the importance of truth.7 1. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 100B. 2. Omychund v Barker (1745) 1 Atk 21; 26 ER 15; R v Schlaefer (1992) 57 SASR 423; 61 A Crim R 1. 3. R v Marsham; Ex parte Pethick Lawrence [1912] 2 KB 362; R v West [1964] 1 QB 15 at 28-29. 4. R v Whitehouse (1900) 9 QLJR 325; R v O’Sullivan; Ex parte Attorney-General [1988] 1 Qd R 672. 5. [1985] Tas R 25. 6. McShane v Higgins [1997] 2 Qd R 373. 7. STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd v Bowen Basin Coal Group Pty Ltd (2010) 188 FCR 528; [2010] FCA 1002.

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Introduction

If an adult witness takes the oath without objection, a court is entitled to assume that he or she has the appropriate religious belief or is otherwise bound in conscience.8 [6.3] The common law of competency was ill suited to early Australian society. The disqualification of Aboriginal witnesses troubled Francis Forbes, first Chief Justice of New South Wales. It hampered prosecutions arising out of the “Myall Creek massacre” of June 1838. In 1839 Attorney-General Plunkett took a Bill to the New South Wales legislature to enable Aboriginal people to testify without proof of a belief in God or an afterlife. The Bill was passed as Act 3 Vic No 16 (NSW), but was vetoed by the Colonial Office as repugnant to English law.9 In 1844 the Imperial Parliament authorised the colony to revive the 1839 Act, but this time the Bill was defeated in the colonial legislature, W C Wentworth leading the opposition. The revered statesman observed: “It would be quite as defensible to receive as evidence … the chatterings of an orang-outang.”10 In 1849 Attorney-General Plunkett tried once more to enable the evidence of Aboriginal people to be taken on declaration, subject to corroboration, but in vain.11 Alternatives to the traditional oath were still several decades away. [6.4] Sections 17 – 20 of the Oaths Act 1867 (Qld) now cater for witnesses who profess a belief in God but have a conscientious objection to swearing an oath. Those who have no such belief, and who are therefore incompetent to take an oath,12 are permitted by s 5 of the Oaths Act 1867 to make a solemn affirmation.13 In R v Brown14 it was said that an intelligent child of 12 may well be able to affirm. But now s 9B, below, inserted in 2003, allows sworn evidence to be given by any person who appreciates that the giving of evidence is a serious matter that imposes “an obligation to tell the truth that is over and above the ordinary duty” to do so. [6.5] Questions of competency are decided by the judge on a voir dire.15 In England it has been held that such inquiries should be held in the presence of the jury,16 but not so in Australia,17 unless the parties agree.18

8. R v T (1998) 71 SASR 265. 9. Historical Records of Australia, 1st Series, Vol 20, p 368 (Gipps to Normanby, 14 October 1839). 10. Sydney Morning Herald (21 June 1844). Nine years earlier Wentworth, who began his political career as a strident libertarian, ensured that New South Wales, and hence Australia, would reflect the professional class structure of England’s divided legal profession: Forbes, The Divided Legal Profession in Australia (Law Book Co, 1979), pp 36-44. 11. Sydney Morning Herald (28 June 1849). 12. R v Schlaefer (1992) 57 SASR 423; 61 A Crim R 1. 13. Narne v Brisbane Tramways Co Ltd [1914] QWN 6. 14. [1977] Qd R 220. 15. Hoogwerf v The Queen (1992) 63 A Crim R 302 (intellectual handicap); R v Clark (1962) 46 Cr App R 113 (the judge was too reluctant to accept the witness’s profession of agnosticism). 16. R v Dunne (1928) 21 Cr App R 176; R v Reynolds [1950] 1 KB 606. 17. R v Reynolds [1950] 1 KB 606 is disapproved in Demirok v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 20 at 30-32. 18. R v Harding [1989] 2 Qd R 373, overruling on this point R v Garvey [1987] 2 Qd R 623. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[6.6]

[6.6] A witness who knowingly gives false and material evidence on oath or “under any other sanction authorised by law”19 commits the crime of perjury. On a trial for perjury the judge decides, as a matter of law, whether the falsehood was material.20 However, it is for the jury to decide whether the accused knew it was material.21 Perjury cannot occur before a tribunal acting without jurisdiction.22 [6.7] Generally those who are competent to testify are also compellable to do so if they are within the jurisdiction.23 Service of a subpoena outside the jurisdiction requires statutory authority.24 [6.8] Normally proper conduct money must accompany the service of a subpoena.25 If the money is not provided within a reasonable time before attendance is required, the summons need not be obeyed.26 However, a witness who actually comes to court cannot complain of invalid service.27 A person is not entitled to disregard a subpoena as mistaken, vexatious, oppressive or an abuse of process.28 Those are questions for the court to decide29 at the hearing, or on earlier application. In Seyfang v GD Searle & Co,30 for example, a subpoena made unreasonable demands upon an expert who had no prior connection with the case and whose research records could not easily be reconstructed. It is not necessarily oppressive to require a medical witness to give sensitive evidence in the presence of a patient.31 A person in court, or in the precincts of the court, may be required to testify without service of a subpoena.32 [6.9] An exemption from the duty to testify is provided by rules of privilege: see [A.159]ff. The exemption covers only those questions that impinge on the privilege claimed.

19. Criminal Code (Qld), s 123; see also s 9D(2). 20. R v Davies (1974) 7 SASR 375. 21. R v Liristis (2004) 146 A Crim R 547; [2004] NSWCCA 287 at [113] – [114]. 22. R v Smith [1908] St R Qd 83; R v Dobos (1984) 58 ACTR 10; R v Ashby [2010] VSC 14. 23. Ward v Interag Pty Ltd [1985] 2 Qd R 552. 24. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, rr 414 – 422; Criminal Practice Rules 1999, r 29; Justices Act 1886, s 78; Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950, s 5. Authority to serve Queensland subpoenas interstate is contained in the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth), s 15. As to New Zealand, see Evidence Amendment Act 1994 (NZ), ss 14-18. 25. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 419; see also Re AH Prentice Ltd [1930] QWN 11. 26. Re AH Prentice Ltd [1930] QWN 11; Pikoulas v Canterbury City Council [2007] NSWLEC 798 at [18]; Re Imobridge Pty Ltd [1999] 1 Qd R 38; [1998] QSC 109. 27. Lawton v Price (1968) 16 WR 666. 28. Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Western Metals Resources Ltd [2001] 1 Qd R 261 (attempt to use subpoena to obtain disclosure of material unconnected with a pending matter). 29. See, eg, R v Baines [1909] 1 KB 258. 30. [1973] QB 148. 31. In the Marriage of A and A [1985] FLC 91-613. 32. McMahon v Cooper [1989] 2 Qd R 418.

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Introduction

[6.10] Generally witnesses must testify in person,33 particularly in criminal proceedings. (See however, ss 21A, 21AA – 21AX and 93A.) Personal attendance is essential for cross-examination, which is a matter of natural justice in courts, if not in other tribunals.34 Viva voce procedure is vital when credit is an important issue.35 [6.11] Evidence taken on commission is taken orally and cross-examination is permitted: see [22.15] and [22.19], below. When evidence is given on affidavit, the deponent may be required to attend for cross-examination; otherwise the affidavit is generally inadmissible,36 although leave to read it may be given if the deponent has since died or become incompetent,37 or personal attendance is impracticable. The weight of the evidence may well suffer.38 Leave is unlikely to be given when credit is a major issue39 or when the deponent is a party to the proceedings.40 An affidavit used in interlocutory proceedings may contain hearsay, but the source of it must be clearly indicated.41 A source is not sufficiently identified by a reference to a company; the relevant individual should be specified.42 [6.12] The provisions of Pt 6 may dispense with the right to cross-examine. Section 94 is a compensatory measure.

Selection of evidence [6.13] Witnesses are normally located, selected and questioned by the parties,43 not by the court. Courts must often base their decisions on less than all the available evidence.44 33. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 390; National Mutual Life Association of Australia Ltd v Australian Widow’s Fund Life Insurance Society Ltd [1910] VLR 411. 34. Jones v National Coal Board [1957] 2 QB 55 at 65; Hally v Starkey; Ex parte Hally (1962) Qd R 474; R v City of Calgary; Ex parte Sanderson (1965) 53 DLR 2nd 477 at 478; Reid v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367 at 374. (With respect to other tribunals, see Maloney v New South Wales National Coursing Association Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 161; O’Rourke v Miller (1985) 156 CLR 342.) 35. Gregrhon Investments Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1986) 48 FLR 41; Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 189; Mayor of Brighton v Selpam Pty Ltd [1987] VR 54; Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594 at 602. But insistence on viva voce procedure is criticised in Re, “Oral v Written Evidence: The Myth of the Impressive Witness” (1983) 57 ALJ 679. 36. For example, Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 439(1); Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth), Pt 15.2. 37. Estex Clothing Manufacturers Pty Ltd v Ellis & Goldstein Ltd (1967) 116 CLR 254; Curley v Duff (1985) 2 NSWLR 716; McLaren v Norton [2006] WASC 305. 38. Re O’Neil [1972] VR 327; Curley v Duff (1985) 2 NSWLR 716. 39. Shea v Green (1886) 2 TLR 533. 40. The Parisian (1874) LR 18 Eq 524. 41. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Ahern [No 2] [1988] 2 Qd R 158. 42. Re Juson Pty Ltd (1992) 8 WAR 13. 43. The order of witnesses is a matter for the parties: Briscoe v Briscoe [1968] P 501. 44. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge “Willemstad” (1976) 136 CLR 529 at 582. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[6.14]

At common law, material prepared predominantly for litigation is privileged,45 but in recent years rules of court and practice directions have eroded that immunity.46 In civil proceedings, discovery and inspection47 may make “A” aware of evidence that “B” would prefer to ignore. Full and timely disclosure of prosecution evidence is now a statutory duty.48 [6.14] The right of witness selection extends to prosecutors in criminal cases, provided that they give the defence timely notice of material within their knowledge that they do not intend to adduce.49 The judge may not order a prosecutor to call a witness,50 but that officer is expected to act as a “minister of justice” who “ought not struggle for a conviction nor be betrayed by feelings of professional rivalry”.51 Courts may order pre-trial disclosure of prosecution evidence when necessary,52 but the defence may practise “trial by ambush”53 unless it relies on alibi,54 expert evidence, or a statement tendered under s 93B.55 The defence may elect to outline its case immediately after the prosecutor’s opening address.56 At that stage it is appropriate to inform the jury of matters in dispute, and matters, if any, that are uncontested. But an outline of defence evidence should be left until the opening of the defence case.57 The duty of the prosecution to make full and timely disclosure is now governed in detail by ss 590AAA – 590AW of the Criminal Code, inserted by the Evidence 45. Esso Resources Australia Ltd v FCT (1999) 201 CLR 49. 46. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, rr 423 and 547(3)(e); Federal Court Rules (Cth), O 10 r 1. A videotape of the plaintiff’s capacity for physical effort, made on behalf of the defendant’s insurers, is not “expert [or] economic evidence” within the meaning of the rule: Martin v Kennedy [1992] 2 Qd R 109; King v Nolan [1992] 2 Qd R 498. 47. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, Ch 7 Pt 1. 48. Criminal Code, ss 590ABff, inserted by s 15 of the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003. 49. Dallison v Caffery [1965] 1 QB 348; Re Petition by Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 248-249; Lawless v The Queen (1979) 142 CLR 659; Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 674; R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563; R v Busson (2007) 248 LSIS 444; [2007] SASC 179. 50. Adel Muhammed el Dabbah v Attorney-General for Palestine [1944] AC 156 at 168; Richardson v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 116 at 119; Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW (1957) 97 CLR 279 at 292 and 307-308. 51. R v Lucas [1973] VR 693 at 705; Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 674; [1983] HCA 42; R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563; [1984] HCA 38; Jack v Smail (1905) 2 CLR 684 at 695 (“fair play”). 52. R v Kingston [1986] 2 Qd R 114; Criminal Code, s 590AV. 53. This position is defended as a corollary to the “right to silence”. There is now a respectable school of thought, albeit a minority view, that accused persons should be required to plead specifically, and before trial: The Australian (24 March 1998), p 6. (Reporting comments of Olsson J of the SA Supreme Court at an Australian judicial conference. Economy of legal aid funds was the main reason given.) 54. In R v Erasmus [2006] QCA 245 leave was given to adduce evidence of alibi, despite failure to give notice, but in fairness to the prosecution, adverse comment was made. 55. Criminal Code, ss 590A – 590C. 56. R v Nona [1997] 2 Qd R 438. 57. R v Oulds [2014] QCA 223.

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[6.18]

Introduction

(Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003, s 15. Guidelines for deciding when non-disclosure involves a miscarriage of justice are set out in R v Livingstone.58

Failure to call a material witness [6.15] A check and balance in the adversary system is the “rule in Jones v Dunkel”:59 see [A.118]. The rule is not a source of evidence but merely a practical consideration when conflicting evidence is being assessed.60 It is not wholly confined to civil proceedings, but its application to defence evidence in crime is severely limited by the High Court’s decision in Dyers v The Queen.61 [6.16] The decision in Weissensteiner v The Queen,62 which permitted adverse comment on an accused’s failure to testify in some circumstances, was overruled in Dyers v The Queen: see [A.122].

Judge eliciting evidence – civil proceedings [6.17] It is an axiom of the adversary system that the court is a receiver and assessor of evidence, not a searcher for, or presenter of it.63 However, a judge may question any witness called by a party and may recall a witness,64 but without “descending into the arena” or unduly interfering with presentation of a party’s case.65 [6.18] The common law did not permit a judge to call a fresh witness in a civil case without the parties’ consent.66 But that rule is now heavily qualified by subordinate legislation, particularly r 391 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) and Pt 15.6 r 15.71 of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).67 Such 58. R v Livingstone (2004) 150 A Crim R 117; [2004] NSWCCA 407. 59. (1959) 101 CLR 298; Boyle v Wiseman (1855) 10 Ex 647; 156 ER 598; Insurance Commissioner v Joyce (1948) 77 CLR 39; Earle v Castlemaine District Community Hospital [1974] VR 722; Winks v W H Heck & Sons Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 226; RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620 at 633. 60. Australian Commercial Research and Development Ltd v Hampson [1991] 1 Qd R 508. 61. (2002) 210 CLR 285; see also [A.122]. 62. (1993) 178 CLR 217. 63. Contrast European “investigative” procedure: Langbein, “The German Advantage in Civil Procedure” (1985) 52 University of Chicago Law Review 823; Thwaite and Reuter, “Civil Litigation in the German Legal System” (1994) 12 Aust Bar Rev 41. 64. Yuill v Yuill [1945] P 15 at 20; Jones v National Coal Board [1957] 2 QB 55 at 63-65; Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141; R v Obeid (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, 6 September 1990) (jury discharged on defence application); Government Insurance Offıce of New South Wales v Glassock (unreported, NSW CA, 19 February 1991) (excessive intervention by the judge “deprived the defendant of both the substance and the appearance of a fair trial”). 65. R v Butler (1953) 70 WN (NSW) 222; Tousek v Bernat (1959) 61 SR (NSW) 203; Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263. 66. Re Enoch and Zaretsky Bock & Co’s Arbitration [1910] 1 KB 327; R v Harris [1927] 2 KB 576 at 594; R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 at 572. 67. See also Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth), s 63; Federal Magisrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r 15.04. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[6.19]

provisions, and the current emphasis on “case management”, are narrowing the gap between the adversary system of the common law and Europe’s “investigative” system.68

Judge eliciting evidence – criminal proceedings [6.19] The position in criminal cases is less clear than it might be. The judge may question or recall a party’s witness in the interests of justice69 but may not order a prosecutor to call a witness that he or she is unwilling to call.70 However, a prosecutor’s refusal to call a witness may result in a mistrial.71 [6.20] The more difficult question is whether the judge in a criminal court may call a witness on his or her own initiative. Such action was considered (but not taken) as long ago as 185972 in a case where argument for intervention was strong. A soldier was charged with the murder of an “unfortunate woman”. The defence was insanity, but neither party called a doctor who had examined the accused. After consulting one of his brethren, the trial judge decided that it would be better to “follow the general rule” and to refrain from calling the doctor himself. A conviction followed. [6.21] In R v Dora Harris73 the defendant was charged with stealing. After she gave her evidence, the Recorder called her accomplice, evidently thinking that this would assist the defence. Alas, the accomplice’s evidence reinforced the prosecution case and Harris was convicted. However, the conviction was quashed on the ground that she had no opportunity to rebut the accomplice’s story, and it was said obiter that “an additional witness [may] be called by the judge … [even] after the defence has been closed”.74 The court of appeal added: [It] appears to be clearly established that [the rule in civil cases] does not apply to a criminal trial, where the liberty of the subject is at stake and where the sole object … is to [do] justice … between the subject and the State.75

These dicta do not clearly limit the suggested power to cases where the “judge’s witness” is expected to aid the defence. [6.22] The High Court of Australia took a different view in 1917. In Titheradge v The King76 Isaacs and Rich JJ declared that a judge was no more entitled to call 68. Edwards, “The Power of the Judge to Call Witnesses” (1959) 33 ALJ 269; Sheppard, “Court Witnesses – A Desirable or Undesirable Encroachment on the Adversary System?” (1982) 56 ALJ 234. 69. R v Crippen [1911] 1 KB 149; R v Sullivan [1923] 1 KB 47; Dawson v Zammit; Ex parte Zammit [1936] St R Qd 322 at 330; R v Perks [1973] Crim LR 388. 70. Richardson v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 116 at 121-122; Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657; R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563. 71. R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 at 575–576; R v Armstrong (1998) 148 FLR 230; [1998] VSCA 126. 72. R v Haynes (1859) 1 F & F 666; 175 ER 898. 73. [1927] 2 KB 587. 74. [1927] 2 KB 587 at 596. 75. [1927] 2 KB 587 at 594; see also R v Cleghorn [1967] 2 QB 584. 76. (1917) 24 CLR 107.

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[6.25]

Introduction

a witness in a criminal case than in a civil trial.77 Barton J left some room for manoeuvre, if the parties consented.78 Titheradge was considered in Dawson v Zammit; Ex parte Zammit,79 where Blair CJ and Henchman J favoured a reserve power.80 The Chief Justice added that, if it were exercised after the defence case closed, it should be used only in aid of the defence.81 That leaves open the possibility of calling a witness favourable to the Crown at an earlier stage. [6.23] In Shaw v The Queen82 Dixon, McTiernan, Webb and Kitto JJ noted the negative view in Titheradge83 without dissent. But in Richardson v The Queen84 there are dicta favouring a reserve power. In Whitehorn v The Queen85 Dawson J reviewed the authorities and concluded that there was: a clear divergence … between England and this country. Since Titheradge v The King it has been established that the rule is the same in civil and criminal cases, and that a witness cannot be called by the judge save with the consent of both parties and then only in exceptional circumstances.

Gibbs CJ and Brennan J reserved their opinions, and Murphy and Deane JJ did not deal with the point. [6.24] In 1984 R v Apostilides86 moved away from Titheradge87 towards the view that there is a reserve power, albeit one to be used only in “most exceptional circumstances”88 (no example was given). But at the same time the court approved Dawson J’s warning89 against judicial activism in this area because (a) criminal as well as civil trials are adversary proceedings, not commissions of inquiry; (b) the judge will often be unable to predict the effect of an intervention;90 (c) an unreliable witness may receive undue credit as a “judge’s witness”; (d) the parties may not be prepared to test the “surprise” witness’s evidence properly; and (e) the appearance of the “judge’s witness” may provoke applications to reopen and call other witnesses, with a risk of the trial getting out of hand. [6.25] Nevertheless, a criminal court judge does have a reserve power to call witnesses in “exceptional circumstances”. These questions remain: Is it ever permissible to call a “court witness” who is likely to assist the Crown? If the 77. (1917) 24 CLR 107 at 118. 78. (1917) 24 CLR 107 at 116-117. 79. [1936] St R Qd 322. 80. [1936] St R Qd 322 at 329 and 331. 81. [1936] St R Qd 322 at 329; see also R v Cleghorn [1967] 2 QB 584. 82. (1952) 85 CLR 365 at 379. 83. Titheradge v The King (1917) 24 CLR 107. 84. (1974) 131 CLR 116 at 122 per Barwick CJ and McTiernan and Mason JJ; see also R v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750. 85. Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 681. 86. (1984) 154 CLR 563. 87. Titheradge v The King (1917) 24 CLR 107. 88. (1984) 154 CLR 563 at 575 and 576. 89. Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 682-683; see also Diehm v Director of Public Prosecutions (Nauru) (2013) 303 ALR 42; [2013] HCA 42. 90. See also Richardson v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 116 at 122. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[6.26]

power is used with a view to assisting the defence, what remedy, if any, does the defence have if the “judge’s witness” damages its case? Reports of actual exercises of the Apostilides discretion are difficult to find. In one cautionary tale a conviction entered by a magistrate was quashed after he called the victim of an assault, who proceeded to devastate the defence.91 Perhaps such hazards can be reduced, if not eliminated, by pre-auditioning a proposed “judge’s witness” on a voir dire.92

Part 2 – Witnesses DIVISION 1 – WHO MAY TESTIFY 6

Witnesses interested or convicted of offence No person shall be excluded from giving evidence in any proceeding on the ground— (a) that the person has or may have an interest in the matter in question, or in the result of the proceeding; or (b) that the person has previously been convicted of any offence. [6.26] Section 6 may appear to state the obvious, but should be seen in the light of history outlined at [A.13] and [A.26]. Sections 6 and 7 are designed to keep former rules of incompetence in their graves, although an old New South Wales case holds that the rule negated by s 6(b) was never inherited from England, because it was unworkable in a penal colony.93 Section 6 reduces the former rules of incompetence to matters of weight. A suggestion of “interest” normally raises no more than an issue of credit, so that a denial of the suggestion is not open to rebuttal94 unless the interest is sufficiently strong and specific to amount to bias.95 [6.27] A prior conviction is material for cross-examination as to credit,96 and an exception to the “finality rule” allows a false denial to be rebutted.97 But when the witness is on trial, the position is governed by s 15(2): see [15.12], below. [6.28] The old rules of incompetence could effectively destroy a civil cause of action.98 In 1823 those rules were quite unsuited to a colony of 7,500 emancipists and 1,500 free immigrants, so a pardon by the Governor of New South Wales was 91. Jokic v Hayes (1990) 53 SASR 530; see also R v Griffıs (1996) 67 SASR 170. Upon a request by the jury the judge put an eyewitness to an alleged rape in the box – conviction set aside. 92. R v Wilson [1998] 2 Qd R 599 at 658-659; see also R v Patel (No 5) [2013] QSC 63. 93. R v Farrell (1831) 1 Legge 5; 599 at 658-659; cf the difficulty noted at [6.3]. 94. Piddington v Bennett and Wood Pty Ltd (1940) 63 CLR 533; Smeaton v Pattison [2003] QCA 341. 95. Thomas v David (1836) 7 C & P 350; 173 ER 156 (witness in action for debt the mistress of the plaintiff); R v Umanski [1961] VR 242; R v Ward [1963] Qd R 56; R v De Angelis (1979) 20 SASR 288. 96. See s 16 as modified by s 15A. 97. See [A.96]; see also Piddington v Bennett and Wood Pty Ltd (1940) 63 CLR 533. 98. Eagar v Field (1820); Eagar v de Mestre (1820), noted in Clark, History of Australia (MUP, 1962), Vol 1, p 355.

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Division 1 – Who may testify

s7

99

made equivalent to one granted by the King. The prisoner’s incompetence in Dugan v Mirror Newspapers Ltd100 was due to the fact that Dugan had received a sentence of death (albeit commuted to life imprisonment). 7

Parties, their wives and husbands as witnesses

(1) Each of the parties to a proceeding (not being a criminal proceeding) and a person on whose behalf such a proceeding is brought or defended is competent and compellable to give evidence on behalf of either or any of the parties to the proceeding. (2) The husband or wife of a party to a proceeding (not being a criminal proceeding) and the husband or wife of a person on whose behalf such a proceeding is brought or defended is competent and compellable to give evidence on behalf of either or any of the parties to the proceeding. (3) To remove any doubt, it is declared for subsections (1) and (2) that a party to a proceeding includes a person who is the subject of an inquiry, reference or examination. [Subs (3) insrt Act 35 of 2013, s 80] [S 7 am Act 35 of 2013]

Overview [7.1] Subsection (3) was inserted by the Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2013, s 80. Section 7 applies only to civil proceedings. It reproduces a section of the Evidence and Discovery Act 1867 (Qld), which adopted changes to the law of competency in England: see [A.26].

Plaintiff or defendant may testify [7.2] In view of s 7, the failure of a party to civil proceedings to give evidence may give rise to a Jones v Dunkel inference: see [A.118] and [15.10]. The old law had advantages as well as disadvantages.101 [7.3] An incidental effect of s 7(1) is that “A” may call “B” as witness for “A” in a civil case, albeit as a last resort. But in that event “B” will generally not be cross-examinable by “A”: see [A.82].102 There is no presumption that one’s opponent is “adverse” within the meaning of s 17.

99. Act for the Administration of Justice in NSW and Van Diemen’s Land 4 Geo IV c 96 s 34 (1823). 100. (1979) 142 CLR 583. 101. Shenton v Tyler [1939] Ch 620 at 626. 102. As in Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW (1957) 97 CLR 279 at 285; Baker Johnson v Jorgenson [2002] QDC 205 at [10]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Spouses of parties as witnesses [7.4] Section 7(2) abolishes the rule of incompetency in Bentley v Cooke103 and imposes compellability.104 It does not explicitly deal with an ex-spouse,105 but as a remedial provision it should be liberally interpreted. As to the abolition of marital privilege, see s 8. [7.5] The compellability of a spouse in matrimonial proceedings is governed by s 100 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). 8

Witnesses in a criminal proceeding

(1) In a criminal proceeding, each person charged is competent to give evidence on behalf of the defence (whether that person is charged solely or jointly with any other person) but is not compellable to do so. (2) The husband or wife of an accused person in a criminal proceeding is competent and compellable to give evidence in the proceeding in any court, either for the prosecution or for the defence, and without the consent of the accused. [Subs (2) subst Act 55 of 2003, s 56]

(3) In a criminal proceeding, a husband or wife is competent and compellable to disclose communications made between the husband and the wife during the marriage. [Subs (3) subst Act 55 of 2003, s 56]

(4) [Repealed] [Subs (4) rep Act 55 of 2003, s 56]

(5) [Repealed] [Subs (5) rep Act 55 of 2003, s 56]

(6) [Repealed] [Subs (6) rep Act 55 of 2003, s 56]

(7) [Repealed] [Subs (7) rep Act 55 of 2003, s 56] [S 8 am Act 55 of 2003]

103. (1784) 3 Doug 442; 99 ER 729. 104. As to the meanings of “husband” and “wife”, see [8.2]. 105. Monroe v Twistleton (1802) Peake Add Cas 219; 170 ER 250; Doker v Hasler (1824) Ry & Moo 198; 171 ER 992.

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Overview [8.1] Section 8(1) is a rescript of English and local legislation of the 1890s, which abolished a common law rule of incompetency while preserving non-compellability.106 Competency of spouses in civil cases is governed by s 7. As to matrimonial proceedings, see s 100 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).107 [8.2] Section 8 was substantially amended in 2003.108 Former subsections (2) – (7) were repealed and new ss 8(2) and (3) were inserted. Marital privilege (or immunity) is no longer recognised in criminal proceedings, but in Witness D v Crime and Misconduct Commission109 it was held that it may still be claimed before the Crime and Misconduct Commission (now the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC)). Section 8(3) abolishes the “communications” privilege formerly recognised in the repealed s 11.110 Those reforms are retrospective: s 138. A consequential amendment repealed s 354A(5) of the Criminal Code. As to spouses and other relatives in federal courts, see Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss 18 – 19 and [F.11]. The words “husband” and “wife” in the former s 8 probably referred to lawful spouses only,111 although a different view was taken in New South Wales.112

Co-offender spouse as witness [8.3] An accused is incompetent to testify for the prosecution.113 But the expression “person charged” in s 8(1) means a person presently on trial. An alleged co-offender who has been acquitted or convicted, or who will be tried separately, is not a “person charged”, and so is compellable to testify at the trial of a suspected co-offender.114 However, an alleged co-offender may claim privilege with respect to any offence not yet established, and a previous acquittal cannot be questioned.115

106. For a learned survey of the history and various Australian versions of these provisions, see Katz, “The Marital Communications Privilege in New South Wales” (1991) 7 Aust Bar Rev 1. 107. Not applicable in criminal proceedings: R v Liddy (No 2) (2001) 79 SASR 401; 160 FLR 342. 108. Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003 (Qld), s 56. 109. [2008] QSC 155; see also Callanan v B (2004) 151 A Crim 287; [2004] QCA 478; Stoddart v Boulton (2009) 260 ALR 268; [2009] FCA 1108; [2010] FCAFC 89. But see now s 192 of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001, as amended in 2008. 110. As to the Australian Crime Commission, see Australian Crime Commission v Stoddart (2011) 244 CLR 554; [2011] HCA 47. 111. R v Fuzil Deen (1895) 6 QLJR 302; R v Algar [1954] 1 QB 279; R v Yacoob (1981) 72 Cr App R 313. Was Hendrikus Plomp’s great haste to marry his mistress intended to give her privilege under ss 8 and 11? (Compare Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234.) 112. DPP (Cth) v Smiles (1993) 30 NSWLR 248. 113. It would be a jurisdictional error to ignore this rule: Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531 at 585; [2010] HCA 1 at [115]. 114. Winsor v The Queen (1866) LR 1 QB 390; R v Boal [1965] 1 QB 402 at 414. 115. Kemp v The King (1951) 83 CLR 341; Re Mulligan; Ex parte Isidoro [1979] WAR 198; J v The Queen [1989] Tas R 116. See also Williams, “A Judgment of Innocence: The Effect of an Acquittal in Australian Law” (1987) 61 ALJ 134. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[8.4] Formerly, when an alleged co-offender gave evidence for the Crown, the judge had to caution the jury against acting on such evidence in the absence of corroboration,116 but ss 632(2) and (3) of the Criminal Code117 now provide: (2) On the trial of a person for an offence [unless this Code states otherwise], a judge is not required by any rule of law or practice to warn the jury that it is unsafe to convict the accused on the uncorroborated testimony of 1 witness. (3) Subsection … (2) does not prevent a judge from making [an appropriate] comment on the evidence. As indicated in s 632(3), a comment appropriate to the particular case may still be made, provided that there are no generalisations about “classes” of unreliable witnesses.118 A “Longman direction” must still be given if the prosecution is long delayed.119

Evidence for defence [8.5] Section 8(1) entitles an accused to testify “on behalf of the defence”. The former s 618A of the Criminal Code referred to evidence “on his or her own behalf”, but it was interpreted so as to allow one accused to testify for another.120 [8.6] The proliferation of litigants in person poses a dilemma for courts and tribunals.121 It is the overriding duty of the court to ensure a fair trial,122 and to give proper assistance to self-represented litigants.123 The proper scope and assistance depends on the particular litigant, the nature of the case, and the litigant’s intelligence and understanding of the case.124 The judge must inform an 116. R v Button [1992] 1 Qd R 552; R v Haddad (1988) 33 A Crim R 400. On the meaning of “accomplice”, see R v Thomas (1988) 40 A Crim R 89; Asciak v The Queen [1990] WAR 120. An undercover police officer is generally not an accomplice and hence no warning was needed: R v Tyler [1994] 1 Qd R 675. On the nature of corroboration, see R v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658; R v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729; R v Kerim [1988] 1 Qd R 426; see also [9.13]. 117. New s 632, inserted by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1997 (Qld), s 84. Compare s 36BE of the Criminal Code (WA), which provides that a judge shall not warn the jury against acting on an uncorroborated complaint of a sexual offence unless there are special reasons for doing so: cf Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79. 118. R v Corrigan (1998) 74 SASR 454; Robinson v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 162. In s 632 of the Criminal Code “complainants” was changed to “persons” to eliminate an anomaly noted in R v Robinson (1998) 102 A Crim R 89. 119. Robinson v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 162 at 169; R v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241, and see [A.154]. 120. Jong Song v Joy Hoy (1897) 8 QLJR 109. 121. Cachia v Haynes (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 415; Kenny v Ritter (2009) 52 MVR 360; [2009] SASC 139 at [14]. 122. Pamamull v Albrizzi (Sales) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] VSCA 260 (unreasonably short adjournment). 123. Tomasevic v Travaglini (2007) 17 VR 100; [2007] VSC 337 at [89]; Minogue v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission (1999) 84 FCR 438; 166 ALR 129; [1999] FCA 85 at [29]; Reisner v Bratt [2004] NSWCA 22 at [4] – [6]. A solicitor appearing in person is not an unrepresented party: Leybourne v Permanent Custodians Ltd [2010] NSWCA 78. 124. Abram v Bank of New Zealand [1996] ATPR 41–507; [1996] FCA 1650 at [31].

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accused of the right to testify and to call witnesses for the defence. An accused is not bound to testify merely because the defence case is “put” to witnesses for the Crown.126 In R v Doolan127 the judge erred in not asking an unrepresented accused whether he wished to call witnesses apart from himself. The assistance that should be given to such a party is described in MacPherson v The Queen:128 When one is dealing with an unrepresented party it is tragically easy to bring him [or her] to [their] knees by strictly applying the evidentiary rules.129

Unrepresented defendants should be advised of the right to challenge prospective jurors, to give evidence in person, and to demand a voir dire upon a disputed confession.130 They should be given timely advice on the difference between evidence and submissions.131 But the judge’s duty does not extend to advising the defendant on how to conduct a defence.132 The appearance and reality of impartiality must be maintained, and excessive intervention avoided.133 It has been held that, even in a criminal case, it is not a judicial duty to advise an unrepresented party not to tender prejudicial material.134 Telling a party the rules is one thing; explaining how to play the game is another.135 For example, a judge may explain the form in which questions should be asked, but should not frame particular questions for the litigant. However, the judge must: ensure that the accused is fully aware of the legal position in relation to the substantive and procedural aspects of the case without effectively advising … what course should be followed, or unduly interfering with the Crown’s case as if the judge were the accused’s counsel.136

125. R v S [1995] 1 Qd R 558. 126. R v S [1995] 1 Qd R 558. 127. [1962] Qd R 449. 128. (1981) 147 CLR 512; see also R v Owen (1991) 56 SASR 397 (failure to apprise accused of rights when evidence did not come up to the Crown’s opening address); Yoon Shin Lee v Bob Chae-Sang Cha [2008] NSWCA 13 (unrepresented party needing interpreter). 129. Judge M Bowering, “Evidence and the Sacred Cow”, commentary in Papers Presented at the Tenth Annual AIJA Conference Adelaide 1991, p 46. 130. MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 513-514 and 534. 131. Downes v Maxwell Richard Rhys & Co Pty Ltd (In liq) (2014) 313 ALR 383; [2014] VSCA 183 (failure to warn litigant that if he confined himself to submissions he risked a Jones v Dunkel inference). 132. R v Kerbatieh (2005) 155 A Crim R 367; [2005] VSCA 194; MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 546; R v Gidley [1984] 3 NSWLR 168 at 181. Discretionary relaxation of the rules of evidence may be appropriate: R v Kerbatieh (2005) 155 A Crim R 367; [2005] VSCA 194 at [52]. 133. Burwood Municipal Council v Harvey (1995) 86 LGERA 389 at [5]; Reisner v Bratt [2004] NSWCA 22. 134. R v Gidley [1984] 3 NSWLR 168 at 181. 135. MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 546. 136. R v White and Piggin (2003) 7 VR 442 at 454; Grey v City of Marion (2006) 159 A Crim R 357; [2006] SASC 3; Tomasevic v Travaglini (2007) 17 VR 100; [2007] VSC 337; R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91. Further advice for dealing with unrepresented litigants appears in In the Marriage of Johnson (1997) 139 FLR 384; [1997] FLC 92-764; Santamaria v Administrative Appeals Tribunal; Department of Administrative Services [1998] VSC 107; Minogue v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1999) 84 FCR 438; 166 ALR 129; [1999] FCA 85; Kenny v Ritter (2009) 52 MVR 360; [2009] SASC 139. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[8.7]

Appropriate assistance may extend to substantive as well as procedural law.137 Less assistance may be appropriate in civil proceedings.138 In Morier v Liem139 the court refused to allow a witness for the defendant to represent her. Assistance was inadequate in the minor criminal case of Archer v Neuendorf.140 The judge may object to inadmissible evidence tendered against an unrepresented defendant, instead of merely stating the right to object.141 However, an unrepresented defendant is not entitled to give evidence from the Bar table; the distinction between evidence and addresses must be observed.142 [8.7] As to comment on the failure of an accused to testify, see [A.118]ff and [6.16].

DIVISION 1A – COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES AND CAPACITY TO BE SWORN 9

Presumption as to competency (1) Every person, including a child, is presumed to be— (a) competent to give evidence in a proceeding; and (b) competent to give evidence in a proceeding on oath. (2) Subsection (1) is subject to this division.

[S 9 subst Act 55 of 2003, s 57; Act 43 of 2000, s 44; am Act 17 of 1989, s 61]

Overview [9.1] By 1900 provision had been made for testimony by adults who could not, or would not, take an oath: see [6.4]. But witnesses who did not understand the meaning of either an oath143 or an affirmation144 remained incompetent. Prior to 1977 there was no general provision for unsworn evidence from children or other witnesses. By 1977 this was a matter of public concern, particularly in cases of “child abuse”, although courts often accepted that a child of ordinary intelligence, aged between eight145 and 12146 years of age, could give sworn evidence. It

137. Tomasevic v Travaglini (2007) 17 VR 100; [2007] VSC 337. 138. Minogue v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1999) 166 ALR 129; [1999] FCA 85 at [27]. 139. [2016] NSWSC 582. 140. [2014] QDC 91. 141. National Bank of Australia v Rusu (1999) 47 NSWLR 309 at 311. 142. Randwick City Council v Fuller (1996) 90 LGERA 380. 143. R v Brasier (1779) 1 Leach 199; 168 ER 202. The judge in R v Schlaefer (1992) 57 SASR 423; 61 A Crim R 1 was held to be in error when he allowed children aged 11 and 10 respectively to take an oath without inquiring whether they had a belief in God and divine power to reward truth and punish perjury. 144. From now on “oath” refers to an oath or solemn affirmation, and “sworn” includes “affirmed”. 145. R v Hayes [1977] 1 WLR 234; 2 All ER 288 at 237 (WLR), at 291(ER). 146. Brunsgard v Jennings [1974] WAR 35; Nichols v Police (2005) 91 SASR 232; [2005] SASC 106 (11 years).

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147

depended on the judge’s assessment of the particular child. In 1990 a highly articulate girl of nine, with a clear appreciation of the meaning of an oath, was allowed to take an oath in the District Court.148 But in another case it was considered “pointless” to ask whether a child aged six could be sworn.149 However, a child a few years older, without religious belief, might be allowed to affirm.150 [9.2] In custody cases the difficulty was relieved by allowing adults to give hearsay evidence of statements by children, even with respect to criminal misconduct.151 This rule remains important in the Family Court, where children under 18 years are not normally allowed to testify.152

Developments 1977 – 1989 [9.3] Prior to 1977 the only provision for unsworn evidence by children was in s 146 of the Children’s Services Act 1965 (Qld) (repealed).153 It was confined to summary proceedings under that Act. A radical change was introduced by the original s 9 of the present Act, providing for unsworn evidence from children in “any proceeding”.154 No age limits were prescribed,155 but s 36 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) defines a “child” as a person under 18 years of age. [9.4] In 1989, s 9 was substantially amended156 by the insertion of ss 9A, 21A and 93A. Section 9A (now s 9C) allowed expert evidence about a child witness’s reliability. Section 21A created a class of “special witnesses” (including children under 12 – now 16) who could be allowed to give evidence in the courtroom under special conditions, or from a separate room. Section 93A created a new exception to the hearsay rule in favour of certain pre-trial statements by children under 12 (now 16) years.

Developments 2000 – 2003 [9.5] By force of s 44 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2000, the original s 9 gave way to a general provision for witnesses who did not understand the 147. In the absence of some special provision, see, eg, s 93A of this Act – there is no set age below which a child is deemed to be incapable of understanding an oath: R v David James N (1992) 95 Cr App R 256 at 260-262. 148. R v Hardy (unreported, Qld Dist Ct, Noud DCJ, 26 February 1990). 149. R v Mackie (unreported, Qld Dist Ct, Helman Ch DC, 22 March 1990). 150. R v Brown [1977] Qd R 220; Attorney-General’s Reference No 2 of 1993 (1994) 4 Tas R 26; 73 A Crim R 567. 151. Offıcial Solicitor v K [1965] AC 201; Dale v Scott; Ex parte Dale [1985] 1 Qd R 406; Taylor v L; Ex parte L [1988] 1 Qd R 706; In the Marriage of S (1990) 101 FLR 89; 14 Fam LR 251. 152. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 100B; see also Dickey, “Can the Welfare Principle … Be Used to Override Rules of Evidence?” (1993) 67 ALJ 614. 153. The Childrens Services Act 1965 was replaced by the Child Protection Act 1999, under which the rules of evidence and compellability do not apply: Child Protection Act 1999, ss 105(1), 112. 154. “Oath” includes an affirmation: Acts Interpretation Act 1954, s 36. 155. Contrast ss 21A and 93A, which impose a limit of 16 years. 156. By s 61 of the Criminal Code, Evidence Act and Other Acts Amendment Act 1989. (Corresponding amendments were made by the same Act to ss 210, 215, 216, 217, 219, 229B, 337, 347, 363A, 539 and 636 of the Criminal Code.) © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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157

meaning of an oath. The court had to explain the duty of telling the truth, but even if the witness did not understand that duty, the court was obliged to receive the evidence unless “the witness [did] not have sufficient intelligence to give reliable evidence”. [9.6] The present s 9 was inserted by s 57 of the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003. It creates a general presumption of competency, leaving any rebuttal of the presumption, and other relevant matters, to new ss 9A – 9D. The new policy is to determine, first, whether the witness is competent to give evidence at all and then, if the answer is “yes”, whether the evidence should be sworn or unsworn. 9A

Competency to give evidence

(1) This section applies if, in a particular case, an issue is raised, by a party to the proceeding or the court, about the competency of a person called as a witness in the proceeding to give evidence. (2) The person is competent to give evidence in the proceeding if, in the court’s opinion, the person is able to give an intelligible account of events which he or she has observed or experienced. (3) Subsection (2) applies even though the evidence is not given on oath. [S 9A subst Act 55 of 2003, s 57; Act 43 of 2000, s 44; insrt Act 17 of 1989, s 62]

Overview [9A.1] This section was inserted by s 57 of the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003: compare the former s 9(3). If a witness’s competence is challenged, it is enough that the judge believes that he or she “is able to give an intelligible account” of direct perceptions, in evidence sworn or unsworn. This replaces the test prescribed in 2000, namely “sufficient intelligence to give reliable evidence”. In making a decision under s 9A(2), the judge may be assisted by expert evidence admitted under s 9C. A finding that a child witness is not competent to give evidence precludes admission of an earlier statement made by the child under s 93A. But an informal out-of-court statement by the same child may be admissible under s 93B.158

Evidence of young children [9A.2] While s 9 is no longer limited to children, it remains useful to consider cases involving minors. Since 1977 the approach has generally been liberal. In R v Garvey159 the judge mentioned two serious criminal cases in which children aged respectively “4 or 5” and 8 gave unsworn evidence.160 In Garvey itself, and 157. Compare s 13 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). 158. R v SCJ; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2015] QCA 123. 159. [1987] 2 Qd R 623. Garvey was overruled in R v Harding [1989] 2 Qd R 373, but not on this point. 160. R v Terry (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Connolly J, 9 January 1984) (charge: incest) and R v Crowe (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Vasta J, 23 November 1984).

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in R v Stevenson, children aged 5 were allowed to do the same. In R v Harding,162 a trial for murder, Moynihan J received unsworn evidence from a boy aged 7, who was only 5 years old when he saw the crime committed. In another case a boy aged 10 who was almost illiterate, but who realised he would be “in trouble” if he did not tell the truth, was treated as a competent witness.163 In R v DP164 a child, aged three at the time of the offence, and whose evidence was recorded soon afterwards, was deemed a competent witness. But another, almost nine, was deemed incompetent when he could not recall his home address or his teacher’s name.165 R v Lau166 concerned a child witness afflicted by Down Syndrome. A drug-affected witness may be competent to give evidence under s 9A.167

Onus on defence to show incompetence [9A.3] The onus of satisfying the judge that a person cannot “give an intelligible account” is on the party who makes that assertion.168 When the test was an ability to give “reliable evidence”, proof of improper “coaching” could discharge that onus. In R v Drover169 Morley DCJ refused to admit the evidence of a child “who had all the qualities of a young actress, [telling] what she knew by recitation, not by recollection”. A similar conclusion was reached in R v Mackie,170 where Helman DCJ found that “the witness [had been] extensively coached by her mother, using a statement prepared by an investigating policeman”. The mother was overheard telling the child: “You have got to say that Uncle Richard did it. We have got to get him convicted.” His Honour concluded that “the witness’s power of recall … and probably also her powers of perception and expression, are defective to the point that … she does not have sufficient intelligence to give reliable evidence”. It remains to be seen whether those cases are pertinent to the new test of “intelligibility” in s 9A(2). The witness disqualified in Mackie (above) might fail the test for sworn evidence in the present s 9B(2).

161. (2000) 23 WAR 92; 118 A Crim R 20. 162. (Unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Moynihan J, 13 October 1988). 163. R v Williams [1989] 1 Qd R 601. 164. (2007) 176 A Crim R 382; [2007] VSCA 219. 165. R v Williams (unreported, Qld CCA, 26 April 1991). 166. (1991) 58 A Crim R 390. 167. R v Heginbotham [2008] QCA 47. 168. R v Drover (unreported, Qld Dist Ct, Morley DCJ, 14 May 1990); The Recyclers (NSW) Pty Ltd v Ayoub [2016] NSWSC 144 at [15]; R v GW [2016] HCA 6 at [14] (similar legislation), and see the presumption in the current s 9. 169. (Unreported, Qld Dist Ct, 14 May 1990). 170. (Unreported, Qld Dist Ct, 22 March 1990). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Voir dire as to incompetency [9A.4] A voir dire for the purposes of s 9A or s 9B must be held in the absence of the jury.171 Competence is not to be confused with recall; a person may be quite competent, while unable to answer a particular question because of ordinary lack of memory.172 Following a voir dire, portions of a s 93A statement were withheld from the jury in R v Hardy.173 The parts excised were self-serving material about the witness’s religious beliefs, unrelated to the issues for trial.174 [9A.5] If a person is competent to give evidence, but not competent to take an oath, the court must explain the duty to tell the truth: s 9B(3). Oddly enough, there is no express requirement to do so when s 9A is applied without reference to s 9B. 9B

Competency to give sworn evidence

(1) This section applies if, in a particular case, an issue is raised, by a party to the proceeding or the court, about the competency of a person called as a witness in the proceeding to give evidence on oath. (2) The person is competent to give evidence in the proceeding on oath if, in the court’s opinion, the person understands that— (a) the giving of evidence is a serious matter; and (b) in giving evidence, he or she has an obligation to tell the truth that is over and above the ordinary duty to tell the truth. (3) If the person is competent to give evidence in the proceeding but is not competent to give the evidence on oath, the court must explain to the person the duty of speaking the truth. Note: The Oaths Act 1867, section 17, makes provision for a person called as a witness to make his or her solemn affirmation instead of being sworn. [S 9B insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 57]

[9B.1] Section 9B was inserted by s 57 of the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003. It abandons any pretence of theological inquiry in favour of the criteria in s 9B(2). [9B.2] Inquiry need only occur if an issue is raised about the witness’s ability to give sworn evidence. The issue may be raised by the judge, if a party does not do so. Failure to consider this matter caused mistrials in R v MBT175 and R v WAU.176

171. R v Harding [1989] 2 Qd R 373, overruling R v Garvey [1987] 2 Qd R 623 and R v Williams [1989] 1 Qd R 601 on this point; Demirok v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 20 at 31; R v Schlaefer (1992) 57 SASR 423; 61 A Crim R 1. 172. The Recyclers (NSW) Pty Ltd v Ayoub [2016] NSWSC 144. 173. (Unreported, Qld Dist Ct, Noud DCJ, 26 February 1990). 174. Cross on Evidence (5th ed, Butterworths, 1996) at [19005]. 175. [2012] QCA 343. 176. [2013] QCA 265.

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s 9C

[9B.3] A witness who fails the s 9B(2) test may still be competent under s 9A. In that event the court must explain the duty of telling the truth. [9B.4] A failure to explain the duty to speak the truth, as required by s 9B(3), invalidates the witness’s evidence.177 9C

Expert evidence about witness’s ability to give evidence

(1) This section applies to a proceeding if— (a) under section 9A, the court is deciding whether a person is able to give an intelligible account of events which he or she has observed or experienced; or (b) under section 9B, the court is deciding whether a person understands the matters mentioned in section 9B(2)(a) and (b); or (c) the evidence of a child under 12 years is admitted. (2) Expert evidence is admissible in the proceeding about the person’s or child’s level of intelligence, including the person’s or child’s powers of perception, memory and expression, or another matter relevant to the person’s or child’s competence to give evidence, competence to give evidence on oath, or ability to give reliable evidence. [S 9C insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 57]

Overview [9C.1] This provision was inserted by s 57 of the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003 (Qld). Compare the former s 9A. It replaces a similar section inserted in aid of ss 9, 21A and 93A in 1989.178 That provision was extended to persons other than children by s 44 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2000 (Qld). It contemplates the use of expert evidence by either party: (a) on a voir dire, to assist the judge to decide whether a child or other person who does not understand the nature of an oath has sufficient intelligence to give reliable evidence; or (b) in the trial proper, to assist the jury to assess the credit of a witness whose evidence is received.

Expert evidence generally [9C.2] The inclination to defer to experts varies from court to court. Before an indolent or indecisive decision-maker, experts sometimes “shift responsibility from the bench or the jury to the witness box”.179 In principle, however, they are not adjudicators but merely witnesses to assist the court on matters of special knowledge.180 Within the limits of rationality,181 it is for the tribunal to decide 177. R v BBR (2009) 195 A Crim R 330; [2009] QCA 178; R v Brooks (1998) 44 NSWLR 121. 178. By the Criminal Code, Evidence Act and Other Acts Amendment Act 1989 (Qld). 179. Joseph Crosfield and Sons Ltd v Techno-chemical Laboratories Ltd (1913) 29 TLR 378 at 379. 180. Folkes v Chadd (1782) 3 Doug KB 157; 99 ER 589. 181. R v Dick [1966] Qd R 301 at 305-306; Taylor v The Queen (1978) 45 FLR 343; 22 ALR 599. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

215

s 9C

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection 182

[9C.3]

183

which of several different expert opinions is acceptable. The evidence of an eyewitness184 or the court’s observations of real evidence may be preferred to reconstruction by an expert.185 [9C.3] It is for the judge to decide whether a professed expert is sufficiently versed in a special field of knowledge or experience to be helpful.186 It is a question of fact, and a court of appeal will not readily depart from the primary decision.187 Expertise can be acquired (albeit in a narrow field) by practical experience without formal education or certification.188 [9C.4] Courts are now less sceptical (or less openly so) about the claims of “social sciences”.189 The culture of “family” law has enhanced the forensic status of psychologists, social workers and assorted “counsellors”.

Mode of presenting expert evidence [9C.5] Expert evidence should be presented demonstratively rather than assertively. The factual foundation, the scientific principles, the reasoning process and the conclusion should be clearly explained. in due order.190 The opinion of the most eminent and impartial expert is unhelpful if it is based on mistaken facts, or assumptions not properly proved.191

182. Opinion evidence means “an inference from observed and communicable data”: Allstate Life Insurance Co v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (No 32) (1996) 64 FCR 73; 136 ALR 627. 183. Davie v Edinburgh Corp (No 2) (1953) SC 34 at 40; Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR 402; 187 ALR 233. 184. Hollingsworth v Hopkins (1967) Qd R 168. 185. R v Colgan (1959) 59 SR (NSW) 96; Shepherd v McGivern (1966) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 387; [1966] 1 NSWR 55; R v White (1987) 49 SASR 154. 186. Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 at 491; Fisher v Brown [1968] SASR 65; R v Watson [1987] 1 Qd R 440; see also [A.67]. 187. R v Court [2003] WASCA 308 at [61]. 188. R v Silverlock [1894] 2 QB 766; Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486; Weal v Bottom (1966) 40 ALJR 436; Lawler v Leeder (1981) 1 SR (WA) 389; Casley-Smith v FS Evans & Sons Pty Ltd and District Council of Stirling (No 1) (1988) 49 SASR 314; R v Fazio (1997) 69 SASR 54 (FC) (experienced member of police drug squad). 189. Lowery v The Queen [1974] AC 85; R v Smith [1987] VR 907 at 909 (new disciplines constantly emerging); Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94; R v Runjanjic and Kontinnen (1991) 56 SASR 114; 53 A Crim R 362 (“battered woman syndrome”). Contrast earlier, trenchant views in Lynch v Lynch (1966) 8 FLR 433; R v Turner [1975] QB 834. “Psychiatry has not yet become a satisfactory substitute for the commonsense of jurors”; “In the lush pastures of the common law a number of sacred cows graze. … One answers to the name ‘expert evidence’ … Properly cared for it could provide good progeny, but some strains are not worth encouraging”: (1982) 14 Australian Journal of Forensic Science 40 quoting an unnamed English judge. A cautious balance is struck in Taylor v L; Ex parte L [1988] 1 Qd R 706. 190. Davie v Edinburgh Corp (No 2) (1953) SC 34 at 40; R v Barry [1984] 1 Qd R 74 at 85; Holtman v Sampson [1985] 2 Qd R 472 at 474; Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313; [1990] ATPR 41-061. 191. Steffen v Ruban (1966) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 264; [1966] 2 NSWR 622; R v Schafferius [1977] Qd R 213; Nominal Defendant v Owens (1978) 45 FLR 430; 22 ALR 128 at 447-448 (FLR), 144 (ALR).

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[9C.8]

Division 1A – Competency of witnesses and capacity to be sworn

s 9C

According to the “basis rule” an expert is no more entitled than any other witness to prove disputed facts by inadmissible hearsay.192 But data in professional literature, not being facts “peculiar to the particular case”,193 may be used to form or to support an expert’s opinion.194 The material referred to may be tendered.195

Expert evidence on credit [9C.6] Section 9C creates an exception to the common law rule that evidence is not admissible in chief if it relates only to credit: see [A.80]. In R v Reynolds196 it was said that “no member of the present court has ever known a case in which a witness has been called to inform the court whether a child is capable or not of giving evidence”. But that is precisely what s 9C allows.197 To that extent it departs from the tradition that credit is a matter of observation and impression for the judge of fact.198 [9C.7] It would be difficult for an expert to give evidence as to a “child’s ability to give reliable evidence” without “swearing the issue”. But that rule is in decline,199 despite occasional rumblings.200

Evidence under section 9C in main trial [9C.8] Section 9C(1)(c) predicates that the judge has admitted evidence by a witness whose competency was challenged. In that event either party may call expert evidence before the jury, about a witness’s ability to give an “intelligible account” (see s 9A(2)) or to satisfy the test in s 9B(2). That is not to question the judge’s ruling on the voir dire, but to assist the jury’s decision on the merits. Evidence already given on the voir dire may be re-presented.201

192. Johnstone Shire Council v Jessie Tam Sie [1939] QSR 74; Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642 at 648-649; English Exporters (London) Ltd v Eldonwall Ltd [1973] Ch 415; R v Schafferius [1977] Qd R 213 at 217; R v Fizzell (1987) 31 A Crim R 213; Q v Australian Red Cross Society [1992] 1 VR 19. 193. Q v Australian Red Cross Society [1992] 1 VR 19 at 36 per McGarvie J. 194. Davie v Edinburgh Corp (No 2) (1953) SC 34; Borowski v Quayle [1966] VR 382; Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney Local Health District [2014] NSWSC 1105 at [92]. The crucial distinction is between evidence of the foundational facts of the instant case (eg that the plaintiff’s leg was in fact broken) and empirical generalisations (eg that such fractures normally take eight weeks to heal or have a residual disability of, say, 20%). 195. R v Patel (No 6) [2013] QSC 64 at [10]; R v Karger (2001) 83 SASR 1; [2001] SASC 64. 196. [1950] 1 KB 606 at 610. 197. Contrast the position at common law: R v Robinson (1994) 98 Cr App R 370 (educational psychologist not allowed to express opinion as to reliability of “retarded” child aged 15). 198. R v Ashcroft [1965] Qd R 81; R v Turner [1975] QB 834; R v McEndoo (1980) 5 A Crim R 52; R v Nelson [1982] Qd R 636; R v Fong [1981] Qd R 90. 199. Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94 at 110-111. 200. Epperson v Dampney [1976] FLC 90-561. 201. Compare the approach to evidence tending to establish that a confession is involuntary (voir dire) or at least unreliable (before the jury): R v Zerafa [1935] QSR 227; R v Willie [1960] Qd R 525; Sparks v The Queen [1964] AC 964. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

217

s 9D

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[9C.9]

What the expert may consider [9C.9] Section 9C(2) indicates the matters that the expert’s evidence may address. This provision applies to all witnesses whose competency is questioned under s 9A or 9B. The matters listed resemble those canvassed by the Court of Appeal in R v D.202 9D

Evidence admitted under s 9A

(1) Evidence admitted under section 9A that is written down as a deposition is taken to be a deposition for all purposes. (2) If evidence is admitted under section 9A— (a) the probative value of the evidence is not decreased only because the evidence is not given on oath; and (b) a person charged with an offence may be convicted on the evidence; and (c) the person giving the evidence is liable to be convicted of perjury to the same extent as if the person had given the evidence on oath. [S 9D insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 57]

[9D.1] Section 9D was inserted by s 57 of the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003: compare the former s 9(5) and (6). With respect to s 9D(1), depositions are governed by ss 104, 111 and 134 of the Justices Act 1886. See also ss 705 – 706 of the Criminal Code.203 [9D.2] Section 9D(2)(b) implies that corroboration is not strictly necessary. A clause requiring corroboration of unsworn evidence was deleted from the former s 9(5) in 1989. See now s 632 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits any suggestion to a jury “that the law regards any class of persons as unreliable witnesses”. However, the same section allows a judge to make other “comment[s] … that … are appropriate” in the circumstances of a particular case. A Longman direction must still be given when the complaint is long delayed.204 A jury must not be told that a child is unlikely to lie about a sexual offence, because that tends to reverse the onus of proof.205 [9D.3] Liberal admission of unsworn evidence tends to increase appeals on the ground that convictions are “unsafe and unsatisfactory”.206 (It is doubtful whether the use of two adjectives rather than one enhances the meaning of the doctrine.) That “unsafe” mantra significantly extends the older concept of the “perverse” or 202. R v D (2003) 141 A Crim R 471; [2003] QCA 151. 203. Copies of depositions for persons committed for trial; inspection at trial: R v G [1994] 1 Qd R 540. 204. Robinson v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 162 at 169. See further [A.154]. 205. R v G [1994] 1 Qd R 540: R v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241. 206. An illustration of lawyers’ propensity to avoid using one word when two will do. Verdicts of acquittal are deemed infallible, while verdicts of guilty are open to wide-ranging review: R v Charles [1994] 1 Qd R 597; R v Sutton [1986] 2 Qd R 72; Doney v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207; R v Brauer [1990] 1 Qd R 332. Contrast earlier judicial restraint in dealing with jury findings: R v Jeynes [1927] St R Qd 27; Ross v The King (1922) 30 CLR 246 at 255-256; R v Crooks (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 390.

218

Evidence Law in Queensland

[9D.3]

Division 1A – Competency of witnesses and capacity to be sworn

s 9D

irrational verdict, and correspondingly diminishes the role of the jury. This self-conferred power of the judiciary received sustained public attention, possibly for the first time, when the Court of Appeal extraordinarily reduced a verdict of murder to manslaughter in R v Baden-Clay.207 The “unsafe verdict” is largely a post-1950 creation208 that enhances the power of judges to override a jury’s verdict of “guilty”, while acquittals remain infallible. It predicates that there was enough evidence to go to the jury,209 but the appeal court reviews the record to see whether, in its opinion, the verdict is correct. The decision is not one of law but of fact.210 The question is not the older and less interventionist one of whether the jury could lawfully convict, but whether the judges think that it should have done so.211 Must the jury, acting reasonably, have had a reasonable doubt?212 It is said that, in most cases, a doubt experienced by an appellate court will be a doubt which a jury ought also to have experienced.213 Even though the jury was entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence in this matter, my analysis of the evidence has led me to conclude that it was not open for the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant was the person who shot [AB] and the deceased. The evidence has left me with a reasonable doubt on that issue and that is a doubt which the jury should also have had.214

If the appeal is dismissed, the appellate court, in its reasons, must disclose its assessment of the evidence it deems capable of supporting the verdict:215 Where, notwithstanding that as a matter of law there is evidence to sustain a verdict, a court of criminal appeal is asked to conclude that the verdict is unsafe or unsatisfactory, the question which the court must ask itself is whether it thinks that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty.216

207. [2016] QCA 265. 208. There is not the slightest suggestion of it in such cases as Ross v The King (1922) 30 CLR 246 and R v Jeynes [1927] St R Qd 27. 209. A trial judge may not withdraw a case from the jury as “unsafe and unsatisfactory”; that question must be left to a court of appeal: R v Sutton [1986] 2 Qd R 72; Doney v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207. 210. Dib v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 15 at [120]. 211. Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657; Chamberlain v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 521; R v Scott [1989] 1 Qd R 347; R v Stewart; Ex parte Attorney General [1989] 1 Qd R 590; R v Brauer [1990] 1 Qd R 332; M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; [1994] HCA 63 at 493 (CLR); SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400; [2011] HCA. 212. Farquharson v The Queen (2012) 36 VR 538; [2012] VSCA 296 at [5]. 213. R v Klamo (2008) 18 VR 644; [2008] VSCA 75. 214. R v Klamo, at [189] per Hoeben CJ at CL. Remarkably, many people remain willing to serve on juries. 215. BCM v The Queen (2013) 303 ALR 387; [2013] HCA 48. 216. M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 493; see also MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

219

s 9D

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[9D.4]

Despite an official reluctance to admit that the appeal court “second guesses” the jury, that is what happens.217 This is the most remarkable of several rules indicating what lawyers really think of juries, pace their official praise of the system.218 However, some limits are still observed; evidence of a jury’s discussions will not be received for this purpose, or for some other purposes.219 It appears that the “unsafe and unsatisfactory” doctrine does not apply to civil juries.220 [9D.4] The “unsafe and unsatisfactory” doctrine is available in addition to an appeal against a trial judge’s decision to allow evidence to be given under s 9, 21A or 93A. In R v Blanch221 a conviction based on evidence videotaped pursuant to s 21A was set aside on that ground. Several other decisions concerning s 93A statements have dealt with submissions of the same kind: see [93A.20]. [9D.5] An unsworn witness is subject to the law of perjury (s 9D(2)(c)), but it is difficult to see how a prosecution could succeed against a person who has failed the test in s 9B(2). Generally, an unsworn statement cannot support a charge of perjury.222 A young child charged with perjury would have the benefit of s 29(2) of the Criminal Code.223

217. Wood v The Queen (2012) 84 NSWLR 581; [2012] NSWCCA 21 at [56] per McClellan CJ at CL: “I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the applicant’s guilt.” 218. See [15.64], [93A.19], [99.1], [130.4] and [130.11]. 219. Evans v Davies [1991] 2 Qd R 498; Ellis v Deheer [1922] 2 KB 113 at 121; R v Myles [1997] 1 Qd R 199. This rule cannot be evaded by giving hearsay evidence of a juryman’s statement: R v Minarowska (1995) 83 A Crim R 78 at [84] – [85]; Shrivastava v Western Australia (No 2) [2011] WASCA 8 at [34]. But jury misconduct is another matter: R v Myles; see also R v Fielding [1993] 1 Qd R 192 (improper social contact between police officer acting as bailiff and jury); R v Skaf (2004) 60 NSWLR 86; [2004] NSWCCA 37; R v Wilton (2013) 116 SASR 392; [2013] SASCFC 60 at [19]; Smith v Western Australia (2014) 305 ALR 338; [2014] HCA 3. 220. John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Rivkin (2003) 201 ALR 77; 77 ALJR 1657. 221. (Unreported, Qld CCA, Kelly, Ryan, Mackenzie JJ, 30 October 1989). 222. Edwards v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (1987) 163 CLR 558. 223. Which contains irrebuttable and rebuttable presumptions in favour of defendants of “immature age” – under 10 and under 14 respectively. The standard of proof in rebuttal is the criminal standard: R v F; Ex parte Attorney-General [1999] 2 Qd R 157.

220

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[10.1]

Division 2 – Privileges and obligations of witnesses

s 10

DIVISION 1B – SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR CHILD WITNESSES 9E

Principles for dealing with a child witness

(1) Because a child tends to be vulnerable in dealings with a person in authority, it is the Parliament’s intention that a child who is a witness in a proceeding should be given the benefit of special measures when giving the child’s evidence. (2) The following general principles apply when dealing with a child witness in a proceeding— (a) the child is to be treated with dignity, respect and compassion; (b) measures should be taken to limit, to the greatest practical extent, the distress or trauma suffered by the child when giving evidence; (c) the child should not be intimidated in cross-examination; (d) the proceeding should be resolved as quickly as possible. (3) In this section— child means a child under 16 years. [S 9E insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 57]

[9E.1] Section 9E was inserted by s 57 of the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003. It follows a recent fashion of treating worthy but vague pieties as suitable for legislation. It remains to be seen how the patois of social work is interpreted by the courts. The policy of s 9E(2)(b) was emphasised in R v DAX.224 [9E.2] There are special provisions for child witnesses and “affected children” in ss 21A – 21AZC and 93A.

DIVISION 2 – PRIVILEGES AND OBLIGATIONS OF WITNESSES 10

Privilege against self-incrimination

(1) Nothing in this Act shall render any person compellable to answer any question tending to criminate the person. (2) However, in a criminal proceeding where a person charged gives evidence, the person’s liability to answer any such question shall be governed by section 15.

Overview [10.1] Section 10 illustrates the point (see [A.39]) that this Act takes much common law for granted.225 It is a terse affirmation226 of the common law 224. [2010] QCA 221. 225. See the comment at [A.9]. 226. Other examples of statutory affirmation may be seen in ss 30 and 38 of this Act and in the Commercial Arbitration Act 2013 (Qld), s 27B(5); Status of Children Act 1978, s 12; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 212(1). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

221

s 10

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[10.2]

privilege against self-incrimination, often described as a “basic liberty of the subject”.227 It has been attributed to “a persistent memory in the common law of hatred of the Star Chamber and its works”.228 “[A] party cannot be compelled to discover that which, if answered, would tend to subject him to any punishment [or] penalty.”229 But note s 10(2), which cross-refers to an important exception contained in s 15(1). Section 10 is not a “free standing” protection of the right to silence. It may be overridden by clear State or Commonwealth230 legislation. Subject to s 15(1), this privilege may be claimed by a witness in any civil231 or criminal court, or before any other authority with power to compel disclosure of information. But it is no excuse for concealing information that is material to a policy of insurance.232 [10.2] A rule of privilege provides a lawful excuse for refusing to supply information, when a refusal would normally be a contempt of court. The lawful excuse is that the information demanded would tend to expose the witness to a criminal conviction or “civil penalty”.233 It is not available to a party sued for exemplary damages.234 (As to disclosures under protest, and subsequent disciplinary proceedings, see [10.12].) The privilege can protect a person not only against a requirement to produce documents, but also a demand to identify them, or reveal their whereabouts.235

The “right to silence” [10.3] Privilege against self-incrimination is akin to the “right to silence”,236 but they are distinguishable. The expression “right to silence” is appropriate when 227. Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information Centre [1982] AC 380 at 442; Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 302 ALR 363; [2013] HCA 39 at [1]. The history of this privilege is discussed in Cleland v The Queen (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 30 and by Brennan J in Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 318. 228. Rees v Kratzmann (1965) 114 CLR 63 at 80 per Windeyer J. 229. Redfern v Redfern [1891] P 139 at 147 per Bowen LJ; R v Associated Northern Collieries (1910) 11 CLR 738: Reid v Howard (1995) 184 CLR 1. The risk must not be “so improbable that no reasonable man would suppose it to influence his conduct”: R v Boyes (1861) 1 B & S 311; 121 ER 730 at 330 (B & S), 738 (ER). There must be a “real risk as opposed to a remote possibility”: Lamb v Munster (1882) 10 QBD 110; Evans v Staunton [1958] Qd R 96 at 110 (“real likelihood”). 230. Nguyen v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (2014) 292 FLR 10; [2014] QCA 293. 231. Rowlands v New South Wales (2009) 74 NSWLR 715; [2009] NSWCA 136 (privilege allowed in civil case – blood test entailed risk of discovery of drug use). 232. March Cabaret Club and Casino Ltd v London Assurance [1975] 1 Lloyds Rep 169 at 177; Naomi Marble and Granite Pty Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (No 1) [1999] 1 Qd R 507. 233. Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd [1942] 2 KB 253 at 257; Police Service Board v Morris (1985) 156 CLR 397. However, there are cases in which failure to give evidence to a disciplinary authority have led to an adverse inference: New South Wales Bar Association v Meakes [2006] NSWCA 340; Bowen-James v Walton (unreported, NSWCA, 5 August 1991); Council of the NSW Bar Association v Power (2008) 71 NSWLR 451; [2008] NSWCA 135. 234. Alishah v Gunns Ltd [2010] TASFC 6. 235. Controlled Consultants Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (1985) 156 CLR 385 at 393; [1985] HCA 6; Sunland Waterfront (BVI) Ltd v Prudentia Investments Pty Ltd (No 4) [2010] FCA 863 at [63]. 236. Ramifications of the right to silence are discussed in Sanchez v The Queen (2009) 196 A Crim R 472; [2009] NSWCCA 171.

222

Evidence Law in Queensland

[10.5]

Division 2 – Privileges and obligations of witnesses

s 10

the questioner has no lawful power to compel disclosure. In that situation there is no prima facie duty to disclose, and no privilege is needed to justify a refusal to answer. The “right to silence” is simply the general freedom to give or withhold information as one chooses.237 An important implication of the “right to silence” is that a refusal to answer questions put to a person in lawful custody is not assent to any imputation made,238 even if the suspect subsequently raises a defence that could have been mentioned at that time.239 An exercise of the right to silence is irrelevant, and therefore it is not proper information for a jury.240 Other implications of the right to silence are considered in [A.122]. It is affirmed in s 397 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000. However, a failure to respond to an adverse suggestion when accuser and accused are on equal terms may amount to an admission,241 although this rule is cautiously applied, even in civil cases:242 see [Q.52] – [Q.53]. The question whether the right to silence unduly hampers the administration of criminal law need not be canvassed here.243

Not a constitutional guarantee [10.4] The privilege against self-incrimination is not a constitutional guarantee244 and it has been progressively eroded by legislation: see [10.29]ff.

Not limited to questions [10.5] Section 10 speaks of a “question” without the references to “documents” and “things” that appear in s 15(1). However, the common law privilege covers self-incrimination in any form, including viva voce evidence, affidavits, evidence on commission and responses to subpoenas or applications for discovery and inspection.245 A similar Victorian provision was so interpreted.246 237. Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477 at 526-527; Micalizzi v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 96 at [26]. 238. R v Bouquet (1961) 62 SR (NSW) 563; Woon v The Queen (1964) 109 CLR 529 at 535; R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321 at 331; R v Gilbert (1977) 66 Cr App R 237; R v Bruce (1986) 23 A Crim R 123 at 131; King v The Queen (1986) 15 FCR 427; 22 A Crim R 153. 239. Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95. (A change of stories, however, is another matter: at 102.) 240. R v Ireland (1991) 173 CLR 95 at 99; R v Thurlow [2015] QCA 89. 241. R v Thomas [1970] VR 674; Parkes v The Queen [1976] 1 WLR 1251; (1977) 64 Cr App R 25; R v Mills [1986] 1 Qd R 77. 242. Thatcher v Charles (1961) 104 CLR 57; Richards v Gellatly (1872) LR 7 CP 127 at 131; Mundey v Askin [1982] 2 NSWLR 369. 243. Suggestions for change include those of Sir Harry Gibbs in Australian Law News (August 1987), p 11; Lucas Report (Qld) (1977), para 194; Odgers, “Police Interrogation and the Right to Silence” (1985) 59 ALJ 78. 244. Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 298 and 314; Huddart Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Morehead (1909) 8 CLR 330; [1908] HCA 36. 245. Smith v Read (1737) 1 Atk 526; 26 ER 332; Spokes v Grosvenor Hotel Co Ltd [1897] 2 QB 124; Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564 at 574; Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd v Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 395; Evans v Staunton [1958] Qd R 96; Rochfort v Trade Practices Commission (1982) 153 CLR 134 at 145; Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477 at 501-502. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

223

s 10

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[10.6]

Not applicable to real evidence [10.6] This privilege does not extend to a lawful demand for real evidence.247 Nor does it prevent the seizure of documents or other things by search warrant. It is a privilege against self-incrimination, not against incrimination simpliciter.248 In other words, it is only a protection against enforced “testimonial” disclosure. It “is designed not to provide a shield against conviction, but to provide a shield against conviction by testimony wrung out of the mouth of the offender”.249 A person served with a search warrant need not assist the searcher, but if incriminating material is found, s 10 does not prevent its use in evidence. However, a party to civil proceedings is not entitled to subpoena material obtained by search warrant, or to use it as evidence with the consent of police.250 [10.7] According to s 10 of the Corrective Services Act 2000, a person in lawful custody may be photographed and fingerprinted. Sections 467 and 445 – 466 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 authorise photographs (including video-photographs)251 and medical and dental tests of “suspects”, and ss 475 – 488 of that Act deal with samples of DNA. Breath and blood-alcohol tests may be administered under s 80 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995. A handwriting sample may be obtained from a suspect without administering a caution.252

History of this privilege [10.8] The history of privilege against self-incrimination is outlined by Brennan J in Sorby v Commonwealth.253 The idea that it is indecent to compel a person to confess was part of Canon Law. It is said to have entered the common law in the 17th century254 in answer to the oppressive practices of the Court of Star Chamber. It protects a natural person from the “‘cruel trilemma’ of 246. R v Adams [1965] VR 563. 247. Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information Centre [1982] AC 380 at 441; R v Smith (Robert William) The Times (London) 20 May 1985 (hair sample); Central Queensland Speleological Society Inc v Central Queensland Cement Pty Ltd (No 2) [1989] 2 Qd R 537. Quaere Rowlands v New South Wales (2009) 74 NSWLR 715; [2009] NSWCA 136, where it was held that a medical examination likely to reveal drug addiction would prima facie be an infringement of the privilege, but insistence on privilege that deprived the opponent of a fair opportunity to defend the claim might be a constructive waiver. 248. Sorby v The Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 291-292; R v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation; Ex parte Briggs (1987) 18 ATR 469; Controlled Consultants Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (1985) 156 CLR 385 at 393. (Contrast the position with search warrants and legal professional privilege: Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52.) 249. Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477 at 514 per Brennan J. 250. Marcel v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1991] 2 WLR 1118; 1 All ER 845. 251. R v Murdoch (No 3) (2005) 195 FLR 400; [2005] NTSC 77. 252. R v Knight (2001) 160 FLR 465; 120 A Crim R 381; [2001] NSWCCA 344. 253. (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 317-318; see also Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477. 254. But see Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50; [2001] HCA 25 at [144] (self-incrimination privilege more recent than supposed).

224

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[10.12]

Division 2 – Privileges and obligations of witnesses

s 10 255

punishment for refusing to testify, or for truthful testimony, or for perjury”. is akin to the law of involuntary confessions.256

It

[10.9] According to Sorby,257 judicial interrogation of prisoners ceased after the Revolution of 1688, but Holdsworth states that criminal trials remained inquisitorial after that time.258 In 1848 Parliament found it necessary to curb the zeal of magistrates who conducted committal proceedings without due regard to the right to silence.259

Not confined to court proceedings [10.10] Privilege against self-incrimination, like legal professional privilege,260 is available not only in courts but also (absent statutory abrogation)261 before any other agency empowered to demand information.262 [10.11] It may be invoked against questions tending to incriminate under foreign law.263

Self-incrimination and “civil penalties” [10.12] Despite its name, this privilege is not strictly limited to risks of criminal liability. It extends to information that may expose an individual to a “civil penalty”.264 It appears, then, that a radical revision of the long-standing distinction between disciplinary “sanctions” and “penalties” has significantly enlarged the meaning of the latter term: see Rich and Jattan. In principle, it is 255. Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477 at 498 per Mason CJ and Toohey J. 256. Cleland v The Queen (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 30; see also [Q.49]. 257. Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 317. 258. History of English Law (Methuen, 1922-1972), Vol 9, p 201. 259. Indictable Offences Act 1848 (Eng). Yet there is commendable concern for a young prisoner in R v York (1748) Fost 70; 168 ER 35. A boy aged 10 was charged with the murder of a girl aged five. When the lad blurted out a confession to the magistrate the latter adjourned “till [the lad] should have an opportunity of recollecting himself” and “admonished him not to wrong himself”. But evidently the confession was not withdrawn. Young York was convicted at the Bury Assizes and was spared execution on “entering immediately into sea-service”. 260. Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52; Giannarelli v Wraith [No 2] (1991) 171 CLR 592; SZHWY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 159 FCR 1; [2007] FCAFC 64. 261. Re Royal Commission; A Brisbane Hotel (No 2) [1964] QWN 29; Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281; R v McDonnell [1988] 2 Qd R 189; Stergis v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 89 ATC 4442; [1989] FCA 120 at 4443 (ATC), [89] (FCA). 262. Including a party executing an Anton Piller order: Eizenberg v Eizenberg [2008] VSC 322. 263. Re S [1948] VLR 11 (bigamy under Belgian law); Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v Westinghouse Electric Corporation [1978] AC 547 (breach of US anti-trust laws); Adsteam Building Industries Pty Ltd v Queensland Cement and Lime Company Ltd (No 4) [1985] 1 Qd R 127; see also ss 30 and 38(1). However, the common law position is questioned in Sharp v Australian Builders Labourers’ Federated Union of Workers (WA Branch) [1989] WAR 138 and Jackson v Gamble [1983] 1 VR 552. However, similar claims by corporations today would fail for the reason given in [10.16]. 264. Hayes v Bondaletoff [1986] 1 Qd R 455; Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v Westinghouse Electric Corporation [1978] AC 547 at 563-564; Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328; Taylor v Carmichael [1984] 1 NSWLR 421 at 426; Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647; [1984] ATPR 40-483; Rich v © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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available in disciplinary proceedings when information tending to reveal a criminal offence or liability to a civil penalty is sought.265 A difficult question arises when, under compulsion of law, an incriminating answer is given to a Royal Commission (or similar authority) upon condition that a truthful answer may not be used in proceedings for a “penalty”, and it is later sought to use that answer for disciplinary purposes. There is (or was) a long-established distinction between disciplinary “sanctions” (which are said to be protective, not penal) and criminal and civil penalties.266 But there are broad dicta to the contrary in Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission267 dealing with s 1317E of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which explicitly describes its consequences as a “penalty”. It is curious that Rich says little or nothing about numerous authorities, including decisions of the High Court itself, which affirm that disciplinary sanctions are not penalties. Also noteworthy is the fact that in R v NG,268 two years after Rich, the Queensland Court of Appeal reasserted the traditional distinction, and the High Court refused to reconsider that ruling. A similar decision in Western Australia269 was taken no further, but in Jattan v Chief Executive, Queensland Health270 the reasoning in Rich was applied to prevent the respondent CEO from acting upon information obtained by the Australian Crime Commission. In Jattan it was held that the removal of a pharmacist’s licence for breaches of drugs and poisons regulations was a “penalty” within the meaning of s 30 of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth), and that information given to the Commission under protest could not be used by the Health Department for disciplinary purposes. In one judicial breath we are told that it is the “nature” of the action taken, not its purpose, that determines whether a penalty has been applied, and that the traditional distinction between sanctions and penalties “still exists”.271 But the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2004) 220 CLR 129; [2004] HCA 42. The theory of privilege relating to civil penalties is considered by Brennan J in Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477 at 518-519. 265. Police Service Board v Morris (1985) 156 CLR 397 (but abrogated in that case). See also Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2004) 220 CLR 129; [2004] HCA 42. 266. Ex parte Brounsell (1778) 2 Cowp 829; 98 ER 1385; NSW Bar Association v Evatt (1968) 117 CLR 177 at 183-184; Skinner v Beaumont [1974] 2 NSWLR 106 at 109, 113; Ex parte Attorney-General (Cth); Re a Barrister and Solicitor (1972) 20 FLR 234 at 244; Thompson v British Medical Association (NSW Branch) [1924] AC 764 at 769; Clyne v NSW Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186 at 201-202; Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW (1957) 97 CLR 279 at 286; Ziderman v General Dental Council [1976] 1 WLR 330 at 333; MacMillan v Pharmaceutical Council of WA [1983] WAR 166 at 174; Hardcastle v Commissioner of Police (1986) 53 ALR 593 at 597; Adamson v Queensland Law Society Inc [1990] 1 Qd R 498 at 504; Re Bowen [1996] 2 Qd R 8; R v White; Ex parte Byrnes (1963) 109 CLR 665; Kruger v The Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1 at 162; Fardon v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland (2004) 223 CLR 575; [2004] HCA 46 at [71] (CLR), [71] (HCA); Paradis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board (2007) 33 WAR 361; [2007] WASCA 97 at [25]; R v NG [2007] 1 Qd R 37; [2006] QCA 218 at [71] (leave to appeal to HC refused). 267. (2004) 220 CLR 129; [2004] HCA 42 at [31] – [33]. 268. [2007] 1 Qd R 37; [2006] QCA 218. 269. Paradis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board (2007) 33 WAR 361; [2007] WASCA 97. 270. (2010) 237 FLR 360; [2010] QSC 92; appeal dismissed: Chief Executive, Queensland Health v Jattan [2010] QCA 359. 271. Chief Executive, Queensland Health v Jattan [2010] QCA 359 at [29], [32] – [33].

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judgment does not condescend to tell us how to distinguish disciplinary orders that are penalties from those that are not. This is hardly a satisfactory state in which to leave the law. Neither Rich nor Jattan discusses, or even refers to, the long line of authority, including decisions of the High Court, supporting a distinction between penalties and disciplinary sanctions, and neither case considers logical consequences of a judicial abolition of that distinction. One remarkable, if unintended consequence of Rich, taken literally, is a radical revision of the double jeopardy doctrine, as noted in R v NG272 by the same judge who decided Jattan. It remains to be seen whether the High Court adheres273 to its sweeping dicta in Rich, or recognises some classes of disciplinary action that are, after all, immune from that decision. It is a matter of persuading judges who have made an unnecessarily sweeping statement to beat a discreet retreat, and devising a plausible formula for the purpose. The relevance of Rich to domestic (private or consensual) tribunals is yet to be revealed. In consequence of Rich, even when a disciplinary or licensing authority relies on its own inquiries into suspected misconduct, it will now face more difficulties than in the past. Criminal and civil penalties aside, the risk of disciplinary action may itself give rise to claims of self-incrimination privilege, unless the privilege relating to penalties is confined to judicial proceedings.274 It may be found necessary to add abrogation sections275 to the charters of such authorities, allowing answers under protest to be used for disciplinary purposes, but not in criminal proceedings, or proceedings for another kind of penalty.

Forfeitures [10.13] In Queensland276 privilege is no longer available against questions tending to expose a person to a forfeiture: see s 14(1)(a). This state of affairs may deserve reconsideration in the light of more recent legislation, such as the Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002. Sections 8 and 58 of the latter Act enable forfeiture orders to be made on proof to the civil standard: s 8. However, s 30(5)(c) of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) enables an answer under protest to be used to effect a forfeiture. 272. [2007] 1 Qd R 37; [2006] QCA 218 at [49]: “If a medical practitioner committed rape upon a patient and had been convicted and sentenced, he could not, on the appellant’s approach, be disbarred from practice. Similarly, in the present case, had the appellant been convicted in the Childrens Court and punished by that court, on the appellant’s approach … the school could not then have excluded him – with potentially deleterious consequences to the good order of the school.” 273. Perhaps it has already reconsidered. See Albarran v Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board (2007) 231 CLR 350 at [8]: “[T]he Board does not adjudicate guilt or inflict punishment when acting under s 1292(2) [of the Corporations Act (Cth)]”. 274. See Daniels Corporation v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543 at [13] and [31]. But the question then arises: Why should privilege against admissions relating to penalties be confined to judicial proceedings when privilege against selfincrimination strictu sensu is not so confined? 275. See [10.29]ff. 276. Contrast the common law as noted in Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328 at 345. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Civil liability [10.14] Privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to questions tending to reveal civil liability. Doubts on this point were settled long ago by England’s Witnesses Act 1806. A curious result is that one may decline to answer questions that tend to reveal a minor offence, but be compelled to answer questions calculated to reveal liability to pay heavy damages. But the position is different if the disclosure of a civil wrong would reveal a criminal offence as well.277 In BPA Industries Ltd v Black278 the terms of an Anton Piller order exempted from seizure any items tending to incriminate the subject of the order.

Incrimination of spouse [10.15] An old case suggests that this privilege covers information tending to incriminate one’s spouse,279 but modern policy is against marital privilege:280 see s 8.

Corporations no longer entitled [10.16] The common law granted privilege against self-incrimination to corporations and natural persons alike,281 although some statutes provided otherwise.282 But in 1993 the High Court, in its legislative jurisdiction, restricted the privilege to natural persons.283 The same applies to questions tending to expose companies to civil penalties.284 A corporation cannot evade this rule by sheltering behind the personal privilege of an individual.285 277. Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd v Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 395; Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information Centre [1982] AC 380; Wood, “Collateral Advantages of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Cases” [1990] Commercial Law Quarterly (No 1) 21; Magner, “Dealing with Claims to the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Cases” (1988) 4 Aust Bar Rev 149; cf Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 155(7). 278. (1987) 11 NSWLR 609; see also Pathways Employment Services Pty Ltd v West (2004) 186 FLR 330; 212 ALR 140; [2004] NSWSC 903. 279. R v The Inhabitants of All Saints Worcester (1817) 7 M & S 194; 105 ER 1215. 280. Compare Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674, and s 7 of the present Act. 281. Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd v Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 395; Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v Westinghouse Electric Corporation [1978] AC 547 at 605; Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328 at 336; Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647; [1984] ATPR 40-483; Adsteam Building Industries Pty Ltd v Queensland Cement and Lime Company Ltd (No 4) [1985] 1 Qd R 127. (Contrast the United States: Campbell Painting Corporation v Reid 392 US 286 (1968); Bellis v United States 417 US 85 (1974).) 282. See, eg, National Companies and Securities Commission v Sim (No 2) (1987) 5 ACLC 500; National Crime Authority Act 1984 (Cth), s 30(4). 283. Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477. 284. Trade Practices Commission v Abbco Ice Works Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 96; 123 ALR 503; Comptroller-General of Customs v Bridal Fashions Pty Ltd (1995) 13 WAR 254; Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543; [2002] HCA 49 at [31]; Graymarshall Pty Ltd v Director-General of the Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water [2010] NSWLEC 54 at [47]-[54]. 285. R v Ronan (No 1) (2004) 211 FLR 258; [2004] NSWSC 1283; Smith v ACN090444518 Pty Ltd (2007) 208 FLR 455; [2007] FMCA 263.

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Corporations remain eligible for legal professional privilege.

No “blanket” immunity [10.18] Self-incrimination privilege applies only to questions with the relevant tendency; otherwise the witness must answer as required.287 A distinct objection should be taken to every question perceived to be incriminating. But occasionally it is apparent that every relevant question will tend to incriminate, and then a single “blanket” or “global” objection, albeit risky, may suffice.288 This is an important consideration when a statute provides that incriminating questions must be answered before an inquiry, but will not be admissible in other proceedings if answered under protest.289

Claim not conclusive [10.19] The privilege is not established by mere assertion.290 It is for the court to decide whether the apprehension is reasonable, and more may be required than the ipse dixit of the witness.291 Often the context of the question enables the court to decide. If not, there may be a voir dire to see whether the claim is well founded: “Where the question concerns conduct which is itself innocent … he must satisfy the court that … that the answer would, or might tend to incriminate him.”292 If the claim is upheld, the evidence on the voir dire is not evidence in the trial, and access to it should be restricted accordingly.293 Clearly the voir dire should be conducted in the absence of a jury.294 286. Hooker Corporation Ltd v Darling Harbour Authority (1987) 9 NSWLR 538; Baker v Evans (1987) 77 ALR 565; Waterford v Commonwealth of Australia (1987) 163 CLR 54. 287. Boyle v Wiseman (1855) 10 Ex 647; 156 ER 598; C v National Crime Authority (1987) 78 ALR 338. 288. R v Rutledge; Ex parte Laidlaw [1923] QSR 284 at 287; R v Coroner; Ex parte Alexander [1982] VR 731 at 733; Correll v Attorney-General (NSW) (2007) 180 A Crim R 212; [2007] NSWSC 1385 (inquest – “person of interest” – no potential question could be free from a tendency to incriminate). 289. Re Bull [1998] 2 Qd R 224, applying s 96 of the former Criminal Justice Act 1989. The sole purpose of the Criminal Justice Commission’s interrogation of Bull was to prove him guilty of official corruption. This exceptional type of case is recognised in Sogelease Australia Ltd v Griffın [2003] NSWSC 178, while accepting that objections to particular questions are normally required: Re Mining Homes of Australia Ltd (1981) 6 ACLR 226 at 227. However, the decision went the other way in R v Anthony David Holmes [1996] TASSC 163, dealing with securities industry legislation. 290. R v Boyes (1861) 1 B & S 311; 121 ER 730; Ex parte Reynolds; Re Reynolds (1882) 20 Ch D 294; Mitton v Curl [1922] SASR 282; Evans v Staunton [1958] Qd R 96; Jackson v Gamble [1983] 1 VR 552; Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 289; contra Adams v Lloyd (1858) 3 H & N 351; 157 ER 506 at 361-362 (H & N), 510 (ER). 291. Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd v Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 395 at 403-404; Brebner v Perry [1961] SASR 177; Zappia v Registrar of Supreme Court (SA) (2004) 90 SASR 193; [2004] SASC 375. 292. Brebner v Perry [1961] SASR 177 at 182. (Similarly, where there is a disputed claim of legal professional privilege: R v Cox and Railton (1884-85) LR 14 QBD 153 at 175.) 293. Compare Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 46; Alister v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 404 (documents covered by State privilege not shown to counsel). 294. R v Roberts (2004) 9 VR 295; [2004] VSCA 1. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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What degree of risk? [10.20] The risk of self-incrimination must be “real and appreciable”,295 not fanciful or “so improbable that no reasonable man would suppose it to influence his conduct”.296 But it is enough that self-incrimination is “likely”, even if it is not probable.297 A “real risk as opposed to a remote possibility”298 is all that is required.299 Fear that a medical examination, in a civil case, will reveal an addiction to prohibited drugs, is not a fanciful concern.300 [10.21] However, the claim in R v Boyes301 was “simply ridiculous”. The witness, who had the benefit of a Royal pardon, argued that he could still be impeached in the High Court of Parliament. Less imaginative claims have failed simply because the time limit for prosecution has expired.302 Indemnified witnesses were denied privilege in Saffron v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth),303 and in a similar English case.304 A prosecution for criminal libel may still be a real, albeit remote, possibility,305 but in Jackson v Gamble306 the witness failed to show that there was a risk of prosecution in another jurisdiction. Clearly there is no risk of self-incrimination when the witness has already been convicted (or acquitted) of the offence in question.307

295. Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd [1942] 2 KB 253 at 257. 296. R v Boyes (1861) 1 B & S 311; 121 ER 730 at 330 (B & S), 738 (ER); Accident Insurance Mutual Holdings Ltd v McFadden (1993) 31 NSWLR 412 (whether reasonable to claim privilege in face of earlier written statement). Breunis v Penthouse Publications Ltd (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Levine J, 20 August 1993) (whether dates of offences outside limitation period for prosecution). 297. Tillmanns Butcheries Pty Ltd v A/asian Meat Industry Employees’ Union (1979) 42 FLR 331 at 339-340 and 346-347. 298. Lamb v Munster (1882) 10 QBD 110. 299. Redfern v Redfern [1891] P 139 at 149; Kempley v The King [1944] ALR 249 at 253; Evans v Staunton [1958] Qd R 96 at 110; Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 289-290; Price v McCabe; Ex parte Price [1985] 2 Qd R 510; (1984) 55 ALR 319 at 515 (Qd R), 324 (ALR). 300. Rowlands v New South Wales (2009) 74 NSWLR 715; [2009] NSWCA 136. 301. (1861) 1 B & S 311; 121 ER 730. 302. Roberts v Allat (1828) M & M 193; 173 ER 1128; Mitton v Curl [1922] SASR 282; Brebner v Perry [1961] SASR 177; Korp v Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board [1964] VR 563. 303. (1992) 109 ALR 695. 304. AT & T Istel Ltd v Tully (No 1) [1993] AC 45. 305. Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd v Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 395. In 1989 proceedings for criminal libel were commenced in New South Wales against one Grassby, a former Commonwealth Minister and a conviction for an attempt was entered in August 1991, but quashed on appeal: earlier proceedings: R v Grassby (1988) 15 NSWLR 109. Convictions for criminal libel were entered in R v Dyer and Siepen (unreported, Qld Dist Ct, 21 November 1994) (noted Courier Mail, 22 November 1994, p 3). 306. [1983] 1 VR 552. 307. Re Genese; Ex parte Gilbert (1886) 3 Morr 223. An acquittal cannot be canvassed in subsequent proceedings: Kemp v The King (1951) 83 CLR 341; Re Mulligan; Ex parte Isidoro [1979] WAR 198; J v The Queen [1989] Tas R 116.

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At common law courts have no power to grant an indemnity in return for a truthful answer. In an action by beneficiaries against a trustee, the court ordered disclosure on that condition,308 but on appeal it was held that any such arrangement is a matter for the legislature, not the judiciary.309 [10.22] It is a moot point whether privilege is available when a selfincriminating statement has already been made.310 Arguably, the privilege survives where a truthful, sworn answer would be more prejudicial than an unsworn statement, written or oral.311 The decisive question is whether a truthful answer in court would significantly increase the risk of prosecution. An admission in an unsworn statement was not a waiver in Accident Insurance Mutual Holdings Ltd v McFadden,312 but in BTR Engineering (Aust) (formerly Borg-Warner Ltd) v Patterson,313 where it appeared in a statutory declaration, privilege was not allowed.

A right to be warned? [10.23] Failure to claim privilege is generally a waiver, so that the answer is admissible.314 The court may refer it to an appropriate law enforcement agency.315 Legal professional privilege may survive a disclosure due to ignorance or mistake,316 but there does not appear to be a similar rule regarding self-incrimination. Strictly speaking, it is immaterial that a witness who fails to claim privilege has never heard of it.317 In practice, the judge usually warns a

308. Reid v Howard (1993) 31 NSWLR 298. 309. Reid v Howard (1995) 184 CLR 1. See now Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 128 (noted at [F.61]). 310. Re Application for Inquiry, Election of Offıcers, Transport Workers’ Union of Australia (WA Branch) (1989) 35 IR 223; 89 ALR 575 at 226-227 (IR), 579 (ALR); Brebner v Perry [1961] SASR 177; BTR Engineering (Aust) (formerly Borg-Warner Australia Ltd) v Patterson (1990) 20 NSWLR 724. The ruling in Brebner v Perry was noted without comment by Gibbs CJ in Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 291 and accepted by Denning MR in Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v Westinghouse Electric Corporation [1978] AC 547 at 574. 311. Accident Insurance Mutual Holdings Ltd v McFadden (1993) 31 NSWLR 412 at 424, 433. 312. (1993) 31 NSWLR 412. 313. (1990) 20 NSWLR 724, see also Zomojo Pty Ltd v Hurd (No 5) [2014] FCA 537 (admissions in affidavit filed); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Managed Investments Pty Ltd (No 6) [2013] QSC 355. 314. Woods v Rogers; Ex parte Woods [1983] 2 Qd R 212; Eizenberg v Eizenberg [2008] VSC 322 (no objection raised when Anton Piller order executed). 315. In the Marriage of T and T [1984] FLC 91-588; In the Marriage of P (Tax Evasion) (1985) FLC 91-605; Petera Pty Ltd v EAJ Pty Ltd (1985) 7 FCR 375; [1985] ATPR 40-605; Re Obach Pty Ltd (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Thomas J, 4 June 1985); McGregor, “Protection Against Self-incrimination in the Family Court” (1999) 13 Australian Family Lawyer 14. Judicial activism of this kind is criticised in Sweeney, “The Courts as Guardians of the Revenue” (1986) 60 ALJ 104. 316. Guinness Peat Properties Ltd v Fitzroy Robinson Partnership [1987] 1 WLR 1027; Hooker Corporation Ltd v Darling Harbour Authority (1987) 9 NSWLR 538; Meltend Pty Ltd v Restoration Clinics of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 511; 145 ALR 391 – an extreme reaction, perhaps, from “trial by ambush” to “You are your opponent’s keeper”. 317. R v Coote (1873) LR 4 PC 599 at 607. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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witness who is about to enter the danger zone, but that cannot be done if the risk is not apparent319 or if the point is overlooked during pre-trial discovery.320 Lawyers must be alert to privilege during discovery, however routine that process seems to be.321 An implied waiver may occur when, in a civil action, a party claims privilege to avoid a medical inspection, but persists in a claim that the other party gravely injured him.322 When privilege arises during discovery it may be difficult to justify the claim without revealing the secret. With that in mind, it was deemed sufficient when a claimant merely stated: “If the defendant were to produce the said documents he would risk prosecution under the Money Lenders Act.”323 That is consistent with decisions allowing guarded responses by parties claiming legal professional privilege.324 Privileged information obtained illegally or improperly is subject to discretionary exclusion.325 [10.24] Generally no warning is required when the questioner is an officer without legal qualifications. In Andersen v Harper; Ex parte Andersen326 it was held that a policeman had no duty to inform a truck driver (not in custody)327 of his right to claim privilege under the former State Transport Act 1960. A private “security officer” is not bound to inform a suspect of the “right to silence”.328 But an administrative tribunal should give a warning when the need is apparent.329

318. R v Gray [1965] Qd R 373; R v Toner [1966] QWN 44; Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information Centre [1982] AC 380 at 416. Two centuries ago Ellenborough LCJ carefully warned a witness of approaching danger: R v Davison (1808) 31 How St Tr 99 at 133-134. 319. Compare Mitton v Curl [1922] SASR 282; Jackson v Gamble [1983] 1 VR 552. 320. As in the case of In the Marriage of P (Tax Evasion) [1985] FLC 91-605. There is a judicial duty to bring apparent offences to the attention of the authorities. No hearing is necessary before making such a decision: Simpson v Hodges [2007] NSWSC 1230. 321. The procedure for claiming privilege in interlocutory proceedings is considered in Spokes v Grosvenor Hotel Co Ltd [1897] 2 QB 124; Castlemaine Perkins Ltd v Queen Street Hotels Pty Ltd (No 2) [1969] Qd R 397; Birrell v Australian National Airlines Commission (1984) 1 FCR 526; 55 ALR 211; and Spence v Jacob [1982] Qd R 748. 322. Rowlands v New South Wales (2009) 74 NSWLR 715; [2009] NSWCA 136 (fear that use of drugs would be revealed). 323. Medina v Copenhagen Handelsbank International SA [1989] FCA 52 (10 March 1989); see also Transpacific Cleanaway Pty v Wilson [2009] WASC 306. 324. Interchase Corporation Ltd (In liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Queensland) Pty Ltd (No 2) [1999] 1 Qd R 163; see also [A.162]. 325. That is, as evidence unfairly or illegally obtained: Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54; Miller v Miller (1978) 141 CLR 269 at 277; Violi v Berridale Orchards Ltd (2000) 93 FCR 580; 173 ALR 518; see also s 130. 326. [1982] Qd R 105; DPP (NSW) v Leonard (2001) 53 NSWLR 227; [2001] NSWSC 797. 327. The position is of course different when a person is, or is about to be, taken into custody: [130.18]ff. 328. Phelps v Gothachalkenin [1996] 1 Qd R 503. 329. R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13 at 34.

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[10.25] A successful claim of privilege is not always a clear victory. There was a risk of collateral damage in Castlemaine Perkins Ltd v Queen Street Hotels Pty Ltd (No 2).330 The court allowed the defendant’s objection to giving further and better particulars of its defence, but warned that, in the absence of that potentially embarrassing information, its pleadings might be too vague to survive. [10.26] No adverse inference may be drawn from a claim of self-incrimination privilege in a criminal case.331 It is a moot point whether an adverse inference may be drawn332 when self-incrimination privilege is claimed in a civil case.333 It is submitted – and some American courts have held334 – that the answer should be “Yes”. A mere adverse inference in one court is no basis for a criminal conviction in another. Anglo-Australian authority is equivocal. In the early 19th century Bayley J declared: “If he refuse [to answer] … it is for the jury to draw what inferences they may.”335 But in 1855 Baron Parke declared: “The [privilege] would be of no avail if the refusal to answer was construed into evidence of guilt”,336 although he realised that it was “impossible to prevent the jury drawing their own conclusions”.337 A few years later Erle CJ saw no reason why an inference should not be drawn,338 but Baron Parke’s view has been adopted in several modern cases.339 In Thompson v Bella-Lewis340 Davies JA thought that an inference might be drawn, but McPherson JA disagreed and Fitzgerald P did not deal with the point. However, it was held there that a statement admitted under s 92 should be excluded when, by claiming privilege, its author avoids cross-examination. In R v Hore341 the Court of Criminal Appeal remarked that the object of a disallowed question as to credit was “sufficiently achieved” when the witness declined to answer. It has been held that a claim of professional privilege does not warrant an adverse inference in a civil case,342 but consciousness of guilt is not necessarily the reason for invoking that form of privilege. There may be reasons that are not discreditable, such as commercial confidence, an honest desire for privacy, or a legitimate forensic advantage, from which no adverse inference could properly 330. [1969] Qd R 397. 331. R v Roberts (2004) 9 VR 295 at 328. 332. On the principle of Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298. 333. A negative answer is given by Young J in a note in (1991) 65 ALJ 412. 334. Cokely v Cokely 469 So 2d 635 at 637 (1985); Olin Corporation v Castells 428 A 2d 319 at 322 (1980); Marine Midland Bank v John E Russo Produce Co Inc 427 NYS 2d 961 (1980). 335. R v Watson (1817) 2 Stark 116; 171 ER 591 at 152-153 (Stark), 605 (ER). 336. Boyle v Wiseman (1855) 10 Ex 647; 156 ER 598 at 651 (Ex). 337. See also Wentworth v Lloyd (1864) 10 HLC 589; 11 ER 1154 (editorial note). 338. Bartlett v Lewis (1862) 12 CBNS 249; 171 ER 1139. 339. Dolan v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (1993) 42 FCR 206; 114 ALR 231; Pappas v New World Oil Developments Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 594; 117 ALR 304; Fabre v Arenales (1992) 27 NSWLR 437 at 450 per Mahoney JA; In the Marriage of Atkinson [1997] FLC 92-728; Chong v CC Containers Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 137 at [215]ff. 340. [1997] 1 Qd R 429 at 434 and 454. 341. [2005] NSWCCA 3. Under s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) there is a discretion to disallow privilege, although it is validly claimed. 342. Giannarelli v Wraith [No 2] (1991) 171 CLR 592 at 605. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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arise. On the other hand, privilege against self-incrimination, properly and necessarily claimed, has but one purpose and effect – to protect the guilty.

Erroneous rejection of claim [10.27] If a claim of privilege is wrongly rejected, the response is made under unlawful compulsion, and is inadmissible in later proceedings.343 A court of appeal may expunge the answer that should never have been obtained.344

Improper invasion of privilege [10.28] If a person improperly gains access to material subject to professional privilege, equity will prevent disclosure.345 It is submitted that the same applies to self-incrimination. An alternative is discretionary rejection of evidence illegally or improperly obtained.346

Abrogation by statute [10.29] Privilege against self-incrimination does not have the constitutional status in Australia that it enjoys in the United States. It may be modified or abrogated (expressly or by “necessary” implication) in ordinary legislation of the Commonwealth or a State. For example, s 14(1A) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950 (Cth) provides that “a person attending before an inquiry is not entitled ... to remain silent ... or refuse or fail to produce ... any document ... on the ground that to do so would tend to incriminate the person”.347 See also the Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002, which abrogates this privilege as well as legal professional privilege.348 Similar provisions were upheld in Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission.349 [10.30] Equally explicit is s 159(1) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth): “A person … is not excused from answering a question … on the ground that the answer … may tend to incriminate the person or impose the person to a 343. R v Garbett (1847) 2 Car & K 474; 175 ER 196: R v Maywhort [1955] 1 WLR 848; Brebner v Perry [1961] SASR 177 at 181; Commissioners of Customs and Excise v Harz [1967] 1 AC 760; R v Governor of Metropolitan Gaol; Ex parte Di Nardo [1963] VR 61; R v Hood [1997] ACL Rep 195 NSW 8. Contrast lawful compulsion: R v Zion [1986] VR 609; R v Owen [1951] VLR 393 at 395; R v Azar (1991) 56 A Crim R 414 at 418; Environment Protection Authority v Shell Co of Australia Ltd (No 4) [1999] NSWLEC 289 at [10]; R v Anthony David Holmes [1996] TASSC 163 at [8]; Bissett v Deputy State Coroner [2011] NSWSC 1182 at [12]. 344. Wilson v Deputy State Coroner (1995) 124 FLR 388. 345. ITC Film Distributors Ltd v Video Exchange Ltd [1982] Ch 431, developing Lord Ashburton v Pape [1913] 2 Ch 469. 346. Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54. The principle applies to civil proceedings: Miller v Miller (1978) 141 CLR 269; Violi v Berridale Orchards Ltd (2000) 93 FCR 580; 173 ALR 518; see also [130.37]. 347. R v McDonnell; Ex parte Attorney-General [1988] 2 Qd R 189. A similar provision in a Commonwealth statute was applied in Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281. 348. Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002, s 40, subject to restrictions on the use of answers in other proceedings. 349. (2013) 302 ALR 363; [2013] HCA 39; Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW), ss 13, 13A.

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350

penalty.” . Section 81 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) imposes a duty to answer certain questions that is not affected by the rule of privilege in s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which applies only to proceedings in a court.351 Other examples are to be found in s 133(7) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) and the Australian Border Force Act 2015 (Cth), s 26(8).

Compromises [10.31] Prima facie, an incriminating answer made under lawful compulsion is admissible in any subsequent proceeding: “Statements made by an accused person under proper compulsion of law … are, though compulsory, nevertheless admissible.”352 But in practice, statutes that set this privilege aside almost invariably offer some variant of a compromise suggested by Henry Brougham353 long before abrogation was common: “If objection is duly taken, an answer may be required, but it is not admissible in evidence in any criminal proceedings other than proceedings for perjury in the present proceedings.”354 From the citizen’s viewpoint, however, several unwelcome possibilities remain: 1. According to the Brougham formula – the least favourable compromise, from the citizen’s viewpoint – protection is confined to criminal proceedings, regardless of risks of civil liability. But modern “protective provisos” usually go further.355 2. The authorities may be enabled to discover other evidence of guilt, without direct reference to the damaging answer. While the answer itself is “off limits”, information to which it leads may be admissible.356 A possible answer to this objection is to prohibit direct or indirect use of the answer, although, in practice, indirect use may be difficult to prove. 3. A compromising answer may receive publicity more damaging than any legal action. 4. It may be doubted whether State law can prevent the use of an incriminating answer in another jurisdiction.357 350. For similar examples in the federal sphere see Insurance Act 1973 (Cth), s 38F; Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 306J; Life Insurance Act 1995 (Cth), s 156F; Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth), s 40A. As to State legislation, see Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 442K; Child Care Act 2002 (Qld), s 138(2); Explosives Act 1999 (Qld), s 100(3); Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld), s 103(3); Liquor Act 1992 (Qld), s 178(3); Taxation Administration Act 2001 (Qld), s 124; Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld), s 421(13). 351. Griffın v Pantzer (2004) 137 FCR 209; 1 ABC (NS) 625; [2004] FCAFC 113. 352. R v Zion [1986] VR 609 at 613. See also R v Owen [1951] VLR 393; R v Azar (1991) 56 A Crim R 414 at 418; Environment Protection Authority v Shell Co of Australia Ltd (No 4) [1999] NSWLEC 289 at [10]. 353. (1852) 20 LT 239; DPP v Alderman (1998) 45 NSWLR 526. 354. No such compromise appeared in the (now repealed) s 69 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth); R v Kempley (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 416; R v Owen [1951] VLR 393; R v Zion [1986] VR 609. 355. See, eg, Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth), s 30(5). 356. Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 291-292. Admissions lawfully compelled are technically not involuntary: R v Wetherall [1938] QWN 13; R v McDonnell [1988] 2 Qd R 189 at 199; R v Clyne (1985) 2 NSWLR 740 at 747; R v Zion [1986] VR 609. 357. But see Jackson v Gamble [1983] 1 VR 552 at 559; R v McDonnell; Ex parte Attorney-General [1988] 2 Qd R 189 at 192, 196-198 and 199-201. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[10.32]

5. A rule that merely prohibits use of the answer in criminal proceedings does not render it inadmissible in a disciplinary tribunal358 where the consequences may be more onerous than any penalty a criminal court is likely to impose. However, if the distinction between disciplinary sanctions and penalties is no longer valid, this objection may no longer apply: see [10.12]. [10.32] A more generous compromise is contained in s 442K of the Criminal Code, dealing with secret commissions: “An answer to a question in any such proceeding shall not … be in any [other] proceeding, civil or criminal, admissible in evidence against the person so answering.” Other improvements on the Brougham formula provide that a disclosure under protest may not be used “directly or indirectly” in subsequent proceedings,359 or “in civil, criminal … or … disciplinary proceedings”.360 At common law, courts have no power to order disclosure in civil proceedings in return for an order, or undertaking by the Crown, that the answer will not be used in subsequent proceedings.361

Is “implied” abrogation overdone? [10.33] It is a principle of statutory interpretation362 that the abolition of a basic common law right requires legislation that so provides, expressly, or by necessary implication.363 Lip service to this principle, at least, is routine when a question of implied abrogation arises.364 [10.34] However, some judges have been disposed to find “implied” abrogation where there is no logical necessity to do so. In Police Service Board v Morris365 the question was whether police officers could claim privilege when questioned by a superior officer about a breach of discipline. The relevant legislation was silent on the point, but the judges rejected a submission that the legislators had never thought of it. Instead, they found implied abrogation in the “character and object” of the rules of a “hierarchical institution”.366 It was unthinkable that “the Police Regulations intend[ed] a police officer to be able to cloak with his silence 358. Bercove v Hermes [No 3] (1983) 67 FLR 186; 49 ALR 156. 359. See, eg, Customs Act 1901 (Cth), s 243F(3A); Coroners Act 2003 (Qld), s 39. 360. An application of s 96 of the former Criminal Justice Act 1989 (Qld) was upheld in Re Bull [1998] 2 Qd R 224. 361. Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information Centre [1982] AC 380 at 44; Reid v Howard (1995) 184 CLR 1; Bickle v Attorney-General (Qld) [2015] QCA 263 at [29]. 362. (Unreported, Vic Sup Ct, Nathan J, 24 January 1991). See Forbes, “Erosion of Privilege by Statutory Interpretation” (1991) 11 QL 186. 363. Re Cuno (1889) 43 Ch D 12 at 17; Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277 at 304 (“irresistible clearness”); R v Associated Northern Collieries (1910) 11 CLR 738 at 748; Ex parte Grinham; Re Sneddon (1961) 61 SR (NSW) 862 at 870-871, 874-875; Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 289-290 and 309; X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92 at 153. 364. Hamilton v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 487 at 495 (need for “a clear legislative intention”); Balog v Independent Commission Against Corruption (1990) 169 CLR 625 at 635-636. See the criticism of Pyneboard in Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v ACCC (2002) 213 CLR 543. 365. (1985) 156 CLR 397. 366. (1985) 156 CLR 397 at 405.

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s 10

367

activities … prejudicial” to good order and discipline. For the immediate purpose, what is eulogised as a vital “liberty of the subject”368 was pejoratively described as a “cloak”. [10.35] Although the High Court has said that exceptions to this privilege can only be created by statute,369 new exceptions arise from what judges are prepared to imply. In Price v McCabe; Ex parte Price370 an “implication” that privilege had been set aside was based on judicial disapproval of fraud rather than any logical imperative. The same may be said of Controlled Consultants Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs.371 Tortuous reasoning in Stergis v Federal Commissioner of Taxation372 produced the conclusion that self-incrimination privilege is not available before a public servant wielding s 264 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). Hill J, in the Federal Court, relied heavily on a memorandum provided to members of Parliament when amendments to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) were presented for their approval. That document was less coy about abrogation than the Bill itself, but s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)373 was used to reach a result that the legislature either did not intend, or was not prepared to express. Should judges rush in where politicians fear to tread? When s 15AB was quietly inserted into federal and State Interpretation Acts, few people saw it as a formidable addition to the powers of the executive and executive-minded judges. Lord Atkin’s purple passage in Liversidge v Anderson374 could profitably be read by some adjudicators today. However, there is an encouraging retreat from non-necessary “implications” in Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v ACCC.375 It is presumed that an abrogating law is not intended to extend to the examination of a person about an offence with which he or she is charged while a trial of that matter is pending.376 But this principle does not extend to persons not presently charged, and against whom no prosecution is pending.377 [10.36] An order to provide details of property dealings, under s 39 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth), impliedly overrides this privilege.378 In Loges 367. (1985) 156 CLR 397 at 412. 368. Compare [10.1]. 369. Reid v Howard (1995) 184 CLR 1. 370. [1985] 2 Qd R 510; (1984) 55 ALR 319. 371. (1985) 156 CLR 385; see also Hare v Gladwin (1988) 82 ALR 307 (implied abrogation in federal electoral law). 372. (1989) 20 ATR 591; 89 ATC 4442. A similar conclusion was reached in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v De Vonk (1995) 61 FCR 564. 373. This amendment and associated changes to the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 doubtless slipped through as “mere technicalities”. In fact, they greatly enhanced the position of the executive government, not to mention executive-minded judges. 374. [1942] AC 206 at 244 (the Humpty Dumpty speech). 375. (2002) 213 CLR 543. 376. X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92 at 153. 377. “R” v Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commissioner (2016) 90 ALJR 433; [2016] HCA 8 at [48]. 378. Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Xu (2005) 154 A Crim R 173; [2005] NSWSC 191. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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379

v Martin a statute provided that the owner of a motor vehicle must give a police officer “any information which … may lead to the identification of any person who was the driver of the vehicle on any occasion”. It was held that privilege against self-incrimination was no defence to a charge of failing to supply such information. But a different view was taken of similar legislation in Queensland.380 [10.37] So far, professional privilege has suffered less erosion than selfincrimination privilege – a tribute to lawyers’ ability to protect cherished items of lawyers’ law. Implied abrogation of professional privilege has not been discovered in the law of search warrants381 or in the “spirit and intent” of tax collectors’ inquisitions382 or the powers of trustees in bankruptcy.383 The High Court has refused to create a new exception to professional privilege384 and a Queensland court has held that it is not affected by authorised electronic surveillance.385 Professional privilege is not abrogated by s 37(1) of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld), which requires a claimant to give his insurer a sworn statement in accordance with the regulations.386 In Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill387 the High Court, by the narrowest margin, and by reasoning as tortuous as any in Stergis v Federal Commissioner of Taxation,388 overrode professional privilege, but Yuill is distinguished in Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v ACCC.389 11

Communications to husband or wife [Repealed]

[S 11 rep Act 55 of 2003, s 58]

[11.1] Privilege for communications between husband and wife was abolished by s 58 of the Evidence (Protection of Children) Act 2003 (Qld), with retrospective effect: see ss 8(3) and 138. Compare the discretionary immunity for spouses and others in s 18 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). 12

Admissibility of evidence as to access by husband or wife Notwithstanding anything contained in any Act or any rule of law, neither the evidence of any person nor any statement made out of court by any person shall be inadmissible in any proceeding whatever by reason of the fact that it is 379. (1991) 13 MVR 405. 380. Briese v Turner (1989) 10 QL Reps 75. 381. Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52. 382. Citibank Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 19 ATR 1479. 383. Bond v Tuohy (1995) 56 FCR 92; 128 ALR 595. 384. Carter v Managing Partner, Northmore Hale Davy & Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121. No exception for the “needs of criminal justice”. Contrast R v Ataou [1988] QB 798; 2 All ER 321. 385. R (a Solicitor) v Lewis [1987] 2 Qd R 710. 386. Smale v Sprott [2004] 1 Qd R 290; [2003] QSC 254. 387. (1991) 172 CLR 319. Professional privilege is abrogated by s 733 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations and Securities Panel inquiries): Corporations & Securities Panel v Bristile Investments Pty Ltd (1999) 32 ACSR 677. 388. (1989) 20 ATR 591; 89 ATC 4442; see also [10.35]. 389. (2002) 213 CLR 543.

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s 13

tendered with the object of proving, or that it proves or tends to prove, that marital intercourse did or did not take place at any time or during any period between that person and a person who is or was the person’s wife or husband or that any child is or was, or is not or was not, their legitimate child. [12.1] Section 12 reproduces legislation of 1962 abolishing the rule in Russell v Russell.390 The former rule deemed it improper to allow, let alone compel, spouses to give evidence of marital “non-access”, particularly when a child’s legitimacy was in question. [12.2] Changes in social sentiment that weakened and eventually led to the abolition of Russell v Russell reduced the importance of s 12. The matrimonial offence of adultery no longer exists.391 Illegitimacy is now less embarrassing, and less significant in the law of succession.392 [12.3]

There are similar provisions in federal matrimonial law.393

13 Compellability of parties and witnesses as to evidence of adultery Notwithstanding anything in any Act or any rule of law, in any proceeding whatever— (a) a party shall not be entitled to refuse to answer any interrogatory or to give discovery of documents; (b) a witness, whether a party or not, shall not be entitled to refuse to answer any question, whether relevant to any issue or relating to credit merely; on the ground solely that such answer or discovery would or might relate to, or would tend or might tend to establish, adultery by that party or that witness, or by any other person with that party or that witness, as the case may be. [13.1] A corollary to the privilege against self-incrimination was a privilege against questions tending to prove adultery.394 Adultery was then a grave matrimonial offence. It attracted the criminal standard of proof in England,395 although Australia applied the civil standard.396 This privilege was abolished in Queensland in 1962.397 [13.2] When the paternity of a child is in issue a court may now order a party or any other person to “give such evidence as is material to the question”.398

390. [1924] AC 687; see also Evidence Further Amendment Act 1874-1962 (Qld), s 3. 391. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss 48 and 120. 392. Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), s 89 (legitimation per subsequens matrimonium); Status of Children Act 1978, ss 3 and 5; Succession Act 1981, s 40 (definition of “dependant”). 393. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 69V. 394. Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd [1942] 2 KB 253. 395. Loveden v Loveden (1810) 2 Hag Con 1; 161 ER 648; Ginesi v Ginesi [1948] P 179. 396. Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336. 397. Evidence Further Amendment Act 1874-1962, s 3A. 398. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 69V. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[13.3]

[13.3] Section 13 recognises that adultery may be relevant to credit, subject to the discretion to disallow gratuitously offensive questions.399 Questioning of complainants about sexual offences is governed by the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 (Qld): see [21.5]. 14

Abolition of certain privileges

(1) The following rules of law are hereby abrogated except in relation to criminal proceedings, that is to say— (a) the rule whereby, in any proceeding, a person can not be compelled to answer any question or produce any document or thing if to do so would tend to expose the person to a forfeiture; (b) the rule whereby, in any proceeding, a person other than a party to the proceeding can not be compelled to produce any deed or other document relating to the person’s title to any land. (2) The rule of law whereby, in any civil proceeding, a party to the proceeding can not be compelled to produce any document relating solely to the party’s own case and in no way tending to impeach that case or support the case of any opposing party is hereby abrogated.

Overview [14.1] Section 14 abolishes common law privileges with respect to (a) forfeiture: see [14.2]; (b) production of title deeds: see [14.3]; and (c) discovery of material that supports one’s own case and lends no support to an opponent’s: see [14.4]. These changes apply to civil proceedings only.

Forfeiture [14.2] The right to withhold information exposing one to forfeiture was a corollary to privilege against self-incrimination.400 Treason and felony are no longer grounds for forfeiture, but it was formerly a sanction in the Health Act 1937 (Qld),401 and is still provided for in ss 228 – 230 of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth), the Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 (Qld) and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth).402 The standard of proof under the latter two Acts is the civil standard: Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth), s 317.

Title deeds [14.3] Privilege in title deeds reflected the sentiment that “an Englishman’s home is his castle”.403 Under the old system of title to land there was always a risk that close scrutiny of deeds would reveal some weakness in the “chain of title”. But under the modern regime of registered title, open to public scrutiny, the common law rule hardly matters. Nevertheless s 14 retains it in criminal cases. 399. See Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), ss 20 – 21; Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 101. 400. Lamb v Munster (1882) 10 QBD 110; Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd [1942] 2 KB 253 at 257; Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328 at 335. 401. R v Brown [1985] 2 Qd R 126. 402. See [10.13]. 403. Adams v Lloyd (1858) 3 H & N 351; 157 ER 506.

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s 15

Documents supporting own case [14.4] When the burgeoning rules of discovery and inspection began to erode the old idea that parties were entitled to keep evidence “up their sleeves” until trial, an exception was made for material that could not assist the other party’s case. It was essentially a rule for civil proceedings.404 Decisions of a Master of the Supreme Court in 1985405 and again in 1988406 suggest that some practitioners were slow to appreciate the effect of s 14(2) or simply failed to amend standard-form interrogatories drafted before 1977. It appears that this subsection applies only to documentary discovery, not to interrogatories.407

DIVISION 3 – EXAMINATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES 15

Questioning a person charged in a criminal proceeding

(1) Where in a criminal proceeding a person charged gives evidence, the person shall not be entitled to refuse to answer a question or produce a document or thing on the ground that to do so would tend to prove the commission by the person of the offence with which the person is there charged. (2) Where in a criminal proceeding a person charged gives evidence, the person shall not be asked, and if asked shall not be required to answer, any question tending to show that the person has committed or been convicted of or been charged with any offence other than that with which the person is there charged, or is of bad character, unless— (a) the question is directed to showing a matter of which the proof is admissible evidence to show that the person is guilty of the offence with which the person is there charged; (b) the question is directed to showing a matter of which the proof is admissible evidence to show that any other person charged in that criminal proceeding is not guilty of the offence with which that other person is there charged; (c) the person has personally or by counsel asked questions of any witness with a view to establishing the person’s own good character, or has given evidence of the person’s good character, or the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on the character of the prosecutor or of any witness for the prosecution or of any other person charged in that criminal proceeding; (d) the person has given evidence against any other person charged in that criminal proceeding. [Subs (2) am Act 58 of 2000, s 2 and Sch]

404. National Employers’ Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd v Waind (1979) 141 CLR 648 at 654. 405. Bocquee v Allen (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Master Weld, 2 September 1985). 406. Coelli v Western Underwriters Pty Ltd (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Master Weld, 29 February 1988). 407. Bullivant’s Natural Health Products Pty Ltd v CF Planners Pty Ltd [1999] QSC 35 at [29]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[15.1]

(3) A question of a kind mentioned in subsection (2)(a), (b) or (c) may be asked only with the court’s permission. [Subs (3) insrt Act 58 of 2000, s 2 and Sch]

(4) If the proceeding is a trial by jury, an application for the court’s permission under subsection (3) must be made in the absence of the jury. [Subs (4) insrt Act 58 of 2000, s 2 and Sch] [S 15 am Act 58 of 2000]

Overview [15.1] In 1898, following some piecemeal reforms in this area,408 England abolished the rule that an accused was incompetent to testify.409 The Queensland Parliament acted six years earlier.410 The following questions then arose: (i) What will a prosecutor’s right of cross-examination be worth if the accused cannot be questioned about the crime presently charged? (ii) If the accused claims good character will the prosecution have a right of rebuttal?411 (iii) If the defence defames prosecution witnesses will the jury have a chance to compare the character of the accused?412 The legislative answers to these questions are contained in this section. Section 15(1) excludes the privilege against self-incrimination, and s 15(2) deals with the vexed question of “character” evidence.

Depends on election to testify [15.2] Section 15 comes into effect only when the accused testifies.413 Otherwise, the common law applies, and the accused’s character is put in issue only by raising good character, not by impugning the character of others.414 There must be no suggestion to the jury that an accused’s evidence merits closer scrutiny than that of other witnesses. In Robinson v The Queen,415 the trial judge attempted to balance attacks on the complainant’s credit by saying: “you might think … that the accused had the greatest interest of all the witnesses … and that, therefore, you should scrutinize his evidence closely”, but the High Court disapproved. [15.3] A co-accused who testifies and admits guilt may be cross-examined to prove the guilt of a co-accused.416 408. See [A.27]. 409. Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (UK). 410. Criminal Law Amendment Act 1892 (Qld) following a New South Wales Act of 1891. 411. See generally Campbell, “Cross-Examination of the Prisoner in Queensland” (1952) 2 UQLJ 49. 412. Compare R v Preston [1909] 1 KB 568 at 575. 413. R v Butterwasser [1948] 1 KB 4; R v Thomas (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 77. 414. R v Butterwasser [1948] 1 KB 4. 415. (1991) 180 CLR 531. 416. R v Paul [1920] 2 KB 183.

242

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[15.9]

Division 3 – Examination and cross-examination of witnesses

s 15

[15.4] Subject to s 15(2), co-accused “A” may cross-examine co-accused “B”, whether or not “B’s” evidence is adverse to “A”.417 [15.5] Section 15(1) abrogates privilege against self-incrimination, so far as the present charge is concerned. Any admission under cross-examination is deemed voluntary, to prevent frustration of s 15(1).418 However, cross-examination under this subsection must not be allowed to degenerate into a general attack on character.419 It is uncertain whether the Crown may cross-examine about charges on which it offers no evidence.420 The right to make an unsworn statement from the dock was abolished in Queensland in 1975.421

Section 15(1) and evidence on voir dire [15.6] If an accused gives evidence on a voir dire, may he or she then be asked whether a disputed confession is true? According to the Dictionary, “proceeding” includes “any … criminal … proceeding or inquiry … in which … evidence is or may be given”. [15.7] Prima facie, this includes a voir dire and in R v Semyraha422 the Court of Appeal rejected the proposition that questions tending to show guilt are always irrelevant at that stage.423 The question in Semyraha was relevant to voluntariness because it “implicated him much more seriously” than any statement he made to the police.424 [15.8] It was suggested in R v Gray425 that if an accused tells one story about the making of a confession on the voir dire, and a different story in the trial, the inconsistency may be put before the jury. [15.9] But on the other hand, R v Silley426 held that nothing the accused says during a voir dire should go before the jury. R v Semyraha427 is to the same effect. There the court, after allowing an incriminating question on the voir dire, hastened to add: 417. R v Schuller [1972] QWN 41; R v Hilton [1972] 1 QB 421. 418. R v Gudgeon (1995) 83 A Crim R 228; 133 ALR 379 at 247 (A Crim R), 398 (ALR). 419. R v Slack (2003) 139 A Crim R 314; [2003] NSWCCA 93. 420. Powell v Smith and Blacker (unreported, Qld CA, 14 November 1995), Pincus JA expressing no concluded opinion. 421. Criminal Code and Justices Act Amendment Act 1975 (Qld), s 27. 422. [2001] 2 Qd R 208. 423. R v Semyraha [2001] 2 Qd R 208 at 211, overruling R v Toner [1966] QWN 44; R v Post [1982] Qd R 495; and presumably R v Gray [1965] Qd R 373; and not following Wong Kam-Ming v The Queen [1980] AC 247. But see MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512; [1981] HCA 46 at 524 (CLR). 424. [2001] 2 Qd R 208 at 210. The question was: “And you finally realised that the best thing to do was just to tell the truth?” 425. [1965] Qd R 373. 426. [1964] QWN 45. Contrast a civil non-jury case, where evidence on the voir dire (if relevant) is evidence on the issues for trial unless otherwise ordered: Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2004) 51 ACSR 363; [2004] NSWSC 1062. 427. [2001] 2 Qd R 208 at 211. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[T]he asking and answering of the [voir dire] question … could not prejudice an accused unless either his answer is [improperly] sought to be used against him in his trial, or it is taken into account by the trial judge impermissibly in admitting the confession.

[15.10] An admission made during a voir dire is inadmissible in the trial because: If such evidence … were admissible at the substantive trial, an accused person would not enjoy the complete freedom that he ought to have at the voir dire to contest the admissibility of his previous statements … [and] the result might be a significant impairment of his so-called “right to silence” … The right of the accused to give evidence at the voir dire without affecting his right to remain silent at the substantive trial is in my opinion absolute.428

This view accords with the High Court’s reasoning in Dyers v The Queen:429 see [A.121]. [15.11] In R v Amad430 discretionary exclusion was applied to a confession that the accused, on a voir dire, acknowledged to be true.

Accused’s misconduct on other occasions [15.12] The first paragraph of s 15(2) affirms the common law rule that a party’s misconduct on other occasions, albeit circumstantially relevant, is generally431 inadmissible.432 In R v Genrich433 the judge failed to apply that rule when the complainant was allowed to say that Genrich told her not to reveal what he had done, or he would “go away [to prison] again”. A similar error occurred in R v B.434 R v Hartwick435 deals with the discretion to discharge a jury when bad

428. R v Brophy [1982] AC 476 at 481 and 483 per Lord Fraser. 429. (2002) 210 CLR 285. 430. [1962] VR 545. 431. Evidence escapes the primary rule of exclusion if it possesses “better relevance”, eg as evidence of a relevant relationship between the offender and the victim (R v Mills [1986] 1 Qd R 77), of motive (R v Benson [1985] 2 Qd R 117), of a disputed ability (R v Ward [1963] Qd R 56) or where the details of several incidents are “strikingly similar”: Sutton v The Queen (1984) 152 CLR 528; Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461. The rule against propensity evidence does not apply to a co-accused who cross-examines a fellow accused: see [15.28]. 432. Makin v Attorney-General for NSW [1894] AC 57; Markby v The Queen (1978) 140 CLR 108; Sutton v The Queen (1984) 152 CLR 528; R v Robinson (2009) 233 FLR 443; [2009] QCA 250. The rule was broken in R v Brennan and Pearce (unreported, Qld CCA, 3 January 1990) when a witness for the prosecution, under cross-examination by defence counsel, twice mentioned that he had spoken to the accused in gaol. However, the error was not highlighted by judge or counsel and the convictions were allowed to stand: see [15.19] and [15.20]. 433. [2001] QCA 466. 434. [2003] QCA 465. 435. (2005) 159 A Crim R 1; [2005] VSCA 264. In Skaramuca v Craft (2005) 154 A Crim R 254; [2005] ACTSC 61 a magistrate successfully assured the parties that he would ignore an improper reference to a prior, similar offence.

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character is improperly disclosed. A direction to the jury may suffice. There is nothing to prevent the defence from introducing such evidence if it seems likely to assist its case.437 The prohibition at the beginning of s 15(2) is not absolute: see cll (a) – (d) of the subsection.438 It appears that the rule against character evidence does not apply to a pre-trial application under s 590AA of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) or a voir dire, because “criminal proceeding” in s 15 means a hearing directly concerned with the issue of guilt.439

Protection limited to own trial [15.13] If “A” and “B” are charged as co-offenders and “B” (granted a separate trial) testifies for the prosecution at the trial of “A”, “B” is open to cross-examination about prior misconduct, other than offences not yet adjudicated.440

Section 15(2) exceptions not limited to convictions [15.14] The exceptions listed in s 15(2) are not confined to convictions, but since convictions are relatively easy to prove, they are usually the prior misconduct in question. The potential width of s 15(2) is illustrated in R v Marsh,441 where a professional Rugby footballer charged with assaulting an opponent correctly claimed that he had no criminal convictions. But the claim exposed him to cross-examination about several suspensions for foul play. In R v S442 questions about charges resulting in acquittals, and others ending in “hung” juries were disallowed: see also [15.16]. Subject to the judge’s leave, cross-examination of an accused may raise (a) the commission443 of a crime; (b) a charge of any other offence; or (c) bad character. “Charged” means formally charged in court, not a mere accusation by police.444 “Bad character” bears its ordinary meaning.445 It includes a finding of dishonesty 436. R v Hartwick [2005] VSCA 264. 437. Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635; R v Saub [2007] QCA 194. 438. See further [15.9]. 439. R v Nguyen [2000] 1 Qd R 559. 440. R v Nichols [1965] QWN 10. 441. [1994] Crim LR 52. 442. (2000) 113 A Crim R 429; [2000] QCA 256; R v Luck [2000] QCA 74. 443. In R v R (1993) 32 NSWLR 447 the charge was sexual interference with three young girls who lived in the same premises as the accused. The defence called evidence to the effect that “R” was a very decent fellow, most unlikely to commit such offences. His character being in issue, the Crown called a witness to testify that in 1974 when she was 12 he exposed himself and interfered with her. Another woman testified that he did the same to her in 1984 and a third woman said that in 1983 “R” exposed himself to her. On appeal, it was held that this evidence was properly admitted. 444. R v Wadey (1935) 25 Cr App R 104; Stirland v DPP [1944] AC 315. 445. Connell v The Queen (No 6) (1994) 12 WAR 133. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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in a civil case. The discretion is to be used sparingly, and not when the prior misconduct has little effect on the accused’s credibility as a witness.447 [15.15] However, the fact that a proposed question tends to reveal a crime not confirmed by a conviction is relevant to exercise of the s 15(3) discretion.448

Charges ending in acquittal [15.16] A trial ending in acquittal is a “misfortune” rather than a mark of bad character449 and no doubt may be cast on a verdict of “not guilty”,450 although it is not, strictly speaking, a declaration of innocence.451 However, it may be possible to frame a question without impugning an acquittal.452 For example, a person charged with possession of stolen goods, who denies guilty knowledge, may be asked whether, on another occasion, goods that were in fact stolen were found in his possession.453 The point will be that, after such an experience, the accused should have made more careful inquiries before “buying” the goods in question. In Garrett v The Queen454 the appellant was convicted of rape. Previously the same complainant accused him of a similar offence, but he was acquitted. The defence in each case was consent. The fact that the complainant reported the first event to the police was admitted, under s 15(2)(a), as evidence of non-consent on the second occasion. An acquittal on a previous charge is no evidence for the defence on a later, similar charge.455

Leave under section 15(3) [15.17] Section 15(2)(c), as enacted in 1977, included these words:456 “Provided that the permission of the court to ask any such question … must first be obtained.” It was held in R v Saric457 that this proviso governed not only s 15(2)(c), but also s 15(2)(a) and (2)(b). It followed that leave was required to cross-examine an accused about “other occasions” even when they went beyond issues of credit, and were “admissible evidence to show that he [was] guilty of the offence … charged”: s 15(2)(a). In a 1992 reprint of this Act, contrary to Saric, the “leave” proviso was limited to s 15(2)(c). But by ss 1 and 2 of the 446. R v Carter, The Times Law Report (London, 14 November 1996). 447. R v York [2001] QCA 408. 448. R v Horne (1903) 6 WALR 9. 449. R v Cokar [1960] 2 QB 207; (1960) 44 Cr App R 165. 450. Maxwell v DPP [1935] AC 309 at 321; R v Bowering [1942] SASR 145; Kemp v The King (1951) 83 CLR 341; G (An Infant) v Colthart [1967] 1 QB 432; Re Mulligan; Ex parte Isidoro [1979] WAR 198; J v The Queen [1989] Tas R 116. 451. R v Glennon (No 3) (2005) 158 A Crim R 74; [2005] VSCA 262. 452. Maxwell v DPP [1935] AC 309 at 321; R v Storey (1978) 140 CLR 364 at 372; R v Neville [1985] 2 Qd R 398 at 408. 453. R v Miles (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 198. 454. (1977) 139 CLR 437; see also R v S (2000) 113 A Crim R 429; [2000] QCA 256 (two acquittals, three “hung” juries). 455. Washer v Western Australia (2007) 234 CLR 492; [2007] HCA 48. 456. In the corresponding English scheme this was a judicial gloss: Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304. 457. [1982] Qd R 360.

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Justice and Other Legislation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2000 (Qld), the proviso was inserted in the present s 15(3).

Other misconduct as proof of guilt [15.18] Section 15(2)(a) recognises that “other occasion” evidence may have higher probative value than general indications of character: see [A.135]ff. It may, for example, rebut a particular defence,458 or be evidence of motive, identity, relationship,459 knowledge460 or ability, or a distinctive modus operandi.461 But before such evidence is introduced in cross-examination, leave is required: s 15(3). Evidence on the issues is not normally subject to leave, but it appears that the policy of s 15(2)(a) is to prevent unfair surprise by raising matters not mentioned in the Crown case in chief:462 see [15.23]. Another reason is that the “other occasion” evidence may turn out to be inadmissible, causing a mistrial. There is also a discretion to exclude unduly prejudicial evidence.463

Character evidence with higher relevance [15.19] The general rule against “character” evidence is stated in Makin v Attorney-General for New South Wales: It is … not competent for the prosecution to adduce evidence tending to shew that the accused had been guilty of criminal acts other than those covered by the indictment, for the purpose of leading to the conclusion that [he] is a person likely to have committed the offence for which he is being tried.464

But this distinction follows: On the other hand, the mere fact that the evidence … tends to show the commission of other crimes [or other discreditable facts about the accused] does not render it inadmissible if it be relevant to an issue before the jury, and it may be so relevant if [for example] it bears upon the question whether the acts alleged to constitute the crime charged … were designed or accidental, or to rebut a defence which would otherwise be open to the accused.465

458. See Garrett v The Queen, noted in [15.16]. 459. R v Mills [1986] 1 Qd R 77. An “abusive relationship” case, culminating in a wounding, is R v Auld [1997] QCA 202. But see the reservations about “uncharged acts” as relationship evidence in Tully v The Queen (2006) 230 CLR 234; [2006] HCA 56. 460. See, eg, Garrett v The Queen (1977) 139 CLR 437, noted at [15.16]. 461. Forbes, Similar Facts (Law Book Co, 1987), Chs 3 and 10. 462. See [15.23] and [15.24]. 463. R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133; Wendo v The Queen (1963) 109 CLR 559. 464. Makin v Attorney-General for New South Wales [1894] AC 57 at 65 per Lord Herschell LC; DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421 at 450; Markby v The Queen (1978) 140 CLR 108 at 116-117; Perry v The Queen (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 585; Sutton v The Queen (1984) 152 CLR 528. 465. Makin v Attorney-General for New South Wales [1894] AC 57 at 65. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[15.20] Evidence that incidentally reveals character is admissible when it exhibits a pattern of “striking similarity” tending to prove a fact in issue.466 For example, once it is proved that a man committed a rape, other rapes committed about the same time, in the same distinctive manner, may be attributed to him.467 In R v Cokar468 similar fact evidence was admitted under a provision akin to s 15(2)(a). [15.21] Normally character evidence, when admissible, is a species of circumstantial evidence. But when it is part and parcel of a res gesta it is directly relevant, as when a series of robberies or assaults is treated as “one transaction”.469 [15.22] “Striking similarity” is just one of several types of character evidence with higher probative value. Other forms of admissible “character” evidence are noted at [15.18]. [15.23] It is a firm rule of practice that the prosecution case should be fully disclosed before the defence is invited to respond.470 Therefore, whenever possible, admissible “other occasion” evidence should be adduced at that stage.471 If not, the s 15(3) discretion is likely to be exercised in favour of the defence. But “other occasion” evidence admissible under s 15(2)(c) cannot be part of the Crown case in chief, because of the rule noted in [A.80]. [15.24]

Leave to cross-examine under s 15(2)(a) was refused in R v Fox.472

Exoneration of co-accused [15.25] With the judge’s permission, co-accused “A” may cross-examine co-accused “B” with a view to establishing “A’s” innocence, whether or not “B” testifies against “A”.473 [15.26] The phrase “any other person charged in that … proceeding” recognises that persons may be co-accused474 without being charged with the same offence.475 466. R v Whiley (1804) 2 Leach 983; 168 ER 589; R v Geering (1849) 18 LJMC 215; R v Smith (1915) 11 Cr App R 229; R v Straffen [1952] 2 QB 911; Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421; Sutton v The Queen (1984) 152 CLR 528; Thompson v The Queen (1989) 169 CLR 1. 467. Sutton v The Queen (1984) 152 CLR 528. 468. (1960) 44 Cr App R 165 at 168. 469. O’Leary v The King (1946) 73 CLR 566; R v O’Malley [1964] Qd R 226; see also Forbes, Similar Facts (Law Book Co, 1987), Ch 2. 470. R v Rice [1963] 1 QB 857 at 867; Killick v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 565; R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671; Morris v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 152 (“only if the circumstances are very special or exceptional”). 471. R v Penney [1944] 3 DLR 453; Harris v DPP [1952] AC 694 at 705-706; R v Coombs (1960) 45 Cr App R 36; Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635 at 668 and 685; R v France [1978] Crim LR 48; R v Shepherd (1980) 71 Cr App R 120. 472. [2000] 2 Qd R 334. 473. R v Schuller [1972] QWN 41. 474. It is otherwise in England: Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Hills [1980] AC 26. 475. Criminal Code, s 568(6) and (7); R v Russell (No 2) [1965] Qd R 334.

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[15.27] The discretion to exclude evidence that is substantially more prejudicial than probative476 does not apply to evidence tending to exculpate a co-accused.477 It is limited to prosecution evidence. In Lowery v The Queen478 two accused were jointly charged with the sadistic murder of a girl. The evidence suggested that either or both were responsible. Lowery’s co-accused was allowed to call a psychologist to say that Lowery was more likely to be the murderer because of his aggressive personality. But any character evidence that a co-accused offers must be relevant. That fundamental quality was missing in R v Neale,479 where two men were charged with arson and manslaughter. Defendant “A”, whose defence was alibi, sought to give evidence that defendant “B” had a history of lighting fires unlawfully. That evidence had nothing to do with “A’s” alibi defence, and so was excluded. [15.28] The rule against character or propensity evidence does not apply to a co-accused480 or to a prosecution witness who is alleged to be the real offender.481 But evidence of “B’s” character that is led to exculpate co-accused “A” must not be used against “B”.482 One sympathises with judges who have to explain this refinement to a jury, and with jurors who are expected to apply it.483

Section 15(2)(c): bad character as credit evidence [15.29] According to s 15(2)(c) and (3) an accused may, after all, be asked about misconduct on other occasions, despite the general rule confirmed in s 15(2). The word “character” generally refers to a person’s reputation in the community rather than a particular witness’s opinion,484 but here it includes “real disposition”.485 [15.30] The policy of s 15(2)(c) requires explanation. When persons accused became competent to testify in their defence, there arose the question whether they should run the gauntlet of cross-examination with no more protection than other witnesses. If the answer was to be “yes”, then logically they would be open to questions about prior convictions under s 16. However: When Parliament … made the prisoner in every case a competent witness … it pursued the familiar English system of a compromise. It was clear that if you allowed a prisoner to go into the witness box it was impossible to allow him to be treated as an ordinary witness. Had that been permitted … [he] could have been asked about any previous 476. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 130; R v Christie [1914] AC 545. 477. R v Miller [1952] 2 All ER 667; R v Lowery (No 3) [1972] VR 939 at 947; Lowery v The Queen [1974] AC 85 at 102-103; R v Neale (1977) 65 Cr App R 304 at 307; R v Webb (1992) 59 SASR 563. 478. [1974] AC 85. 479. (1977) 65 Cr App R 304. 480. Lowery v The Queen [1974] AC 85; R v Gibb [1983] 2 VR 155. 481. R v Beckett [2011] 1 Qd R 259; [2009] QCA 196. 482. Unsworth v The Queen [1986] Tas R 173. 483. The need to abolish such schizophrenic rules is recognised in s 101. 484. R v Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520; 169 ER 1497. 485. R v Dunkley [1927] 1 KB 323; Malindi v The Queen [1967] 1 AC 439 at 451; Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304; Attwood v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 353 at 359 (“no technical meaning”); Crabbe v The Queen (1984) 11 FCR 1; 56 ALR 733 at 15-18 (FCR), 747-752 (ALR). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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conviction, with the result that an old offender would seldom, if ever, have been acquitted … [So] a certain amount of protection was accorded … [Primarily] he should not be required to answer any question tending to show that he had … any [other] offence … or was a bad character. Apart, however, from this protection, he was placed in the position of an ordinary witness in an ordinary civil case.486

[15.31] Hence the compromise contained in s 15(2)(c) and (3). The “shield” in the opening words of s 15(2) may be thrown away by a defendant who puts his or her own character in issue. A judicial warning should be issued to one who enters the danger zone.487 [15.32]

Prospects of using s 15(2)(c) arise when:

(a) the accused employs a defence of good character;488 or (b) the “nature or conduct of the defence … involve[s] imputations on the character of the prosecutor or of any witness for the prosecution or of any other person charged in that … proceeding”. But the prosecution still requires leave.489 If an accused refuses to answer proper questions about prior convictions, that is tantamount to a denial.490 [15.33] The power to grant leave arises only when the defence takes one of the courses described in s 15(2)(c). Thus, an accused who swears he is an honest man may (by leave) be asked about lies he has told to creditors.491 But apart from s 15(2)(c), cross-examination as to character is improper, leave or no leave.492 The appeal in Bohdahl v The Queen493 was upheld despite the fact that “character” was introduced without any objection at the trial. When s 15(2)(c) is applied, the jury is at risk of legal schizophrenia: if the defence gives evidence of good character, it is evidence of innocence and credibility. But when the prosecution is allowed to raise bad character, it merely goes to credit and is no evidence of guilt.494 It is interesting that juries are expected to apply such artificial rules when other parts of Evidence, including the character evidence rule, imply such a modest estimate of their abilities. [15.34] It has been noted that s 15 is enlivened only when the accused testifies, but it does not follow that an accused with a bad record, and who stays out of the witness box, can raise good character with impunity. A witness to good character

486. Maxwell v DPP [1935] AC 309 at 317 per Viscount Sankey LC. 487. Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304. 488. A practice of placing an accused’s “record” before the jury as a matter of course was proscribed by the English Act 6-7 Wm IV c 111 in 1836, but the Act recognised an exception where good character was raised. 489. See s 15(3). 490. R v Forbes [1992] 2 Cr App R 501. 491. R v Fernandes (1996) 133 FLR 477. 492. Bohdahl v The Queen (1987) 24 A Crim R 318; Matusevich v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 633. 493. (1987) 24 A Crim R 318. 494. See [15.68].

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may be cross-examined about misconduct by the accused, and unsatisfactory answers may be rebutted,496 subject to judicial control of the undesirable proliferation of issues.497

Good character evidence [15.35] Persons accused of crime enjoy a special dispensation from the character evidence rule.498 (Defendants have no similar advantage in civil cases.)499 Evidence of good character may be given for the defence, and is admissible as proof of innocence as well as credit.500 The jury must be carefully instructed on this point.501 It is wrong to tell a jury to consider good character only if they are seriously contemplating a guilty verdict.502 But evidence that a defendant has no convictions, without more, is of little consequence:503 People who are mean, greedy, ruthlessly ambitious, devoid of sympathy for the weaknesses or needs of others, exploitative, ungenerous, and unkind, can go through life without any convictions for criminal offences. An absence of them says very little about character.504

Good-character evidence may have more weight in the case of an elderly accused; a person who has lived for many years without blemish has demonstrated a capacity to avoid criminal activity that a 20-year-old cannot claim.505 [15.36] On the strictest view, evidence of good character should be given in general terms, without supporting detail.506 The following evidence given by a Queen’s Counsel at the trial of a Sydney judge for perverting the course of justice is exemplary:

495. R v Waldman (1934) 24 Cr App R 204; R v Rogan and Elliott (1846) 1 Cox CC 291. 496. R v Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520; 169 ER 1497; R v B [1979] 1 WLR 1185; R v Bracewell (1979) 68 Cr App R 44; Shaw v The Queen (1952) 85 CLR 365 at 380; R v Hettiarachchi [2009] VSCA 270 at [44]. 497. R v N (No 3) [2010] SASC 7 at [13]. 498. Stewart v The King (1921) 29 CLR 234 at 241. 499. Bugg v Day (1949) 79 CLR 442. 500. R v Stannard (1837) 7 C & P 673; 173 ER 295 at 675 (C & P), 296 (ER); R v Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520; 169 ER 1497; Attwood v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 353 at 359; R v Thompson [1966] QWN 47; Simic v The Queen (1980) 144 CLR 319; R v Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42; 63 ALR 53; R v Courtney-Smith (No 2) (1990) 48 A Crim R 49; R v Telfer (2004) 142 A Crim R 132; [2004] NSWCCA 27. 501. R v Warasta (1991) 54 A Crim R 351; R v Zaidi (1991) 57 A Crim R 189. 502. R v M (1994) 72 A Crim R 269. 503. R v Cumberbatch (No 5) (2002) 130 A Crim R 599; Melbourne v The Queen 198 CLR 1; 164 ALR 465; see also Munday, “What Constitutes a Good Character?” [1997] Crim LR 247. 504. R v Solomon [2006] QCA 244 at [24] per Jerrard JA. See also [15.67]. 505. Imnetu v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 203 at [43]. 506. R v Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520; 169 ER 1497; R v Butterwasser [1948] 1 KB 4 at 6. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Mr John Lloyd-Jones … told the court that he had known Judge Foord since 1961 both as a barrister and a judge, and that he is a man with a very high reputation for personal integrity and professional integrity and as a person on whose word you can completely rely.507

But in practice good-character witnesses are often allowed to elaborate.508

“Raising” good character [15.37] The raising of good character requires a conscious decision on the part of the accused.509 For example, it is not raised when another witness volunteers the evidence, without any invitation by the accused or defence counsel.510 In R v Samuel511 the accused, charged with theft, put his character in issue by claiming that he had a history of returning lost property to its owners. A defendant charged under health regulations did the same by testifying that he “always [took] every precaution” to avoid contamination of food.512 Another did so by asserting that he had earned an honest living for years.513 A man charged with indecent dealing with children brought himself within s 15(2)(c) by declaring that “it is not the sort of thing I would ever do” and that he was brought up “never to tell lies”.514 A claim that “I have no major criminal history” is in the same category.515 It is possible to extol one’s own character and to attack another’s simultaneously, as when a defendant charged with child abuse claimed that he took special care of the child because its mother neglected its welfare.516 Good character can be raised without calling a defence witness for that purpose. As s 15(2)(c) indicates, it may be raised in cross-examination of a prosecution witness or a witness for a co-accused.517

507. R v Foord (1985) 20 A Crim R 267 (evidence as reported in The Sydney Morning Herald, 25 September 1985). 508. R v Butterwasser [1948] 1 KB 4 at 6; Attwood v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 353 at 359; Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 at 333; Melbourne v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 1; 164 ALR 465 at 27 (CLR); Donaldson v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 216. 509. Gabriel v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 279; R v Bartle (2003) 181 FLR 1; [2003] NSWCCA 329 at [129] – [136]. 510. PGM v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 426 at [35]. 511. (1956) 40 Cr App R 8. 512. Gunner v Payne [1910] VLR 45. 513. R v Baker (1912) 7 Cr App R 252. 514. R v Phillips [1997] ACL Rep 130 Qld 285. In R v Perrier (No 1) [1991] 1 VR 697 the defendant’s counsel read a letter asserting that the defendant (charged with importing heroin) held drug dealers in contempt. Cross-examination on his “record” was allowed. In R v Ferguson (1909) 2 Cr App R 250 the accused put character in issue by asserting that he was a good Catholic and a Mass attender for 36 years. 515. R v Skaf [2004] NSWCCA 74. 516. R v Creagh (unreported, Qld CA, 29 May 1995). 517. R v Butterwasser [1948] 1 KB 4 at 6.

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[15.38] But a mere assertion of innocence, or an “emphatic denial of guilt”,518 does not inevitably “raise good character” within the meaning of s 15(2). Character is not in issue when a defendant charged with false pretences claims that he had no intent to deceive,519 because that relates to an element of the charge, and no reference to “other occasions” is involved. Similarly, if a doctor who is prosecuted for improperly performing an operation swears that he performed it properly, he is simply addressing a fact in issue.520 Section 15(2)(c) is not enlivened when an accused says that he ran away from police because of fear,521 or when a witness called for some other purpose gratuitously gives evidence of good character.522 A “verbose and excitable” defendant does not raise good character by brandishing a Bible in the witness box,523 or when he takes the stand sporting a regimental blazer.524 A parent accused of sexually assaulting his daughter testified that he had never hit her, and that he had no interest in pornography; it was held that he had not asserted good character, but was merely denying particular allegations made against him.525

Unrepresented defendant to be warned [15.39] If a defendant, represented526 or unrepresented527 is in peril of s 15(2)(c), the judge should issue an appropriate warning in the absence of the jury.

Risk not limited to convictions [15.40] See [15.14], the first paragraph of s 15(2) and Stirland v DPP.528 But when leave under s 15(3) is confined to convictions, the cross-examiner must not exceed that licence. In R v Day529 the prosecutor went on to suggest, most improperly, that the accused was naturally a lying, conniving, deceitful person, a standover man, and a lout. [15.41]

Cross-examination on convictions is also subject to s 15A.

Imputations on witnesses [15.42] The second “limb” of s 15(2)(c) is litigated more often than the first. The reason: 518. Gabriel v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 279; R v Bartle (2003) 181 FLR 1; [2003] NSWCCA 329 (where judicial indulgence was stretched to a claim that “I have never been involved in any importation or selling of drugs”). 519. R v Ellis [1910] 2 KB 746. 520. R v Zaidi (1991) 57 A Crim R 189. 521. R v Thompson (1966) 50 Cr App R 91. 522. R v Redd [1923] 1 KB 104. 523. R v Robinson [2001] Crim LR 478. 524. R v Hamilton [1979] Crim LR 486. 525. Huges (a Pseudonym) v The Queen (2013) 238 A Crim R 345; [2013] VSCA 338. 526. Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 at 342. As to the limits of the judge’s duty, see [8.6]. 527. R v Cook [1959] 2 QB 340; R v Morris (1959) 43 Cr App R 206; Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304; Wulff v Honan (1989) 11 QL Reps 72; MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512; [1981] HCA 46. 528. [1944] AC 315. 529. (2000) 115 A Crim R 80; [2000] QCA 313. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[15.43]

is not far to seek. Most defences at criminal trials involve questions as to the credit and character of the prosecution witnesses; a great many accused persons have previous convictions, so a clash becomes inevitable.530

And in that event: If the defence is so conducted … as to involve the proposition that the jury ought not to believe the prosecutor or one of the witnesses … upon the ground that his conduct … makes him an unreliable witness, then the jury ought also to know the character of the prisoner who either gives that evidence or makes that charge.531

Sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, if the judge sees such a distribution as a matter of fairness to the prosecution.532 [15.43] Section 15(2)(c) refers to “imputations on the character of the prosecutor or of any witness for the prosecution, or of any other person charged in that criminal proceeding” (emphasis added). Its predecessor, the former s 618A of the Criminal Code, did not include the words italicised, which tend to strengthen the prosecution’s hand. An accused whose defence is attacked by a co-accused has a right to cross-examine the latter as to character, regardless of s 15(3): see s 15(2)(d).

Expressions used in section 15(2) “Question tending to show” [15.44] This means “tending to show for the first time”. The prohibition does not apply if the accused has already discredited himself by some such argument as: “It’s true that I have stolen things in the past, but this is a charge of armed robbery and I never carry a gun”.533 The prosecution may then explore the other occasions without leave. But the “Christie” discretion may come to the rescue of an unrepresented accused who lets slip some self-destructive remark.534 “Committed” [15.45]

This includes offences committed before or after the offence charged.535

“Convicted” [15.46]

According to s 15A, “expired” convictions are effectively non-existent.

530. Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 at 349 per Lord Guest. 531. R v Preston [1909] 1 KB 568 at 575 per Channell J. Prior convictions had “significant probative value” in R v Davidson [2000] NSWSC 197. 532. R v Thomas (2006) 14 VR 475; [2006] VSCA 165. 533. Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635 at 663; Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 at 342; Donnini v The Queen (1972) 128 CLR 114 at 148; R v Turnbull (1985) 17 A Crim R 370; R v Fricker (1986) 42 SASR 436. 534. On the Christie discretion generally, see [130.4]ff; R v Fricker (1986) 42 SASR 436 at 439. 535. R v Coltress (1979) 68 Cr App R 193.

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“Charged” [15.47] This means formally charged; it does not include informal accusations by police.536 Charges that ended in acquittal are inadmissible.537 “Counsel” [15.48] This term, which barristers reserve for themselves, includes here a solicitor-advocate.538 “Bad character” [15.49]

See [15.29].

“Conduct of the defence” [15.50] This includes cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and witnesses for any co-accused, as well as evidence and submissions for the defence. It is improper for defence counsel to use the final address to make attacks on witnesses which, if made earlier, would have entitled the prosecution to seek leave under s 15(3).539 “Prosecutor” [15.51] This means the complainant, not the lawyer representing the Crown.540 It does not include a deceased victim,541 and so the way is paved for “trial of victim” (less sensitively described as “finding an unlikeable corpse”) – a distraction often resorted to by counsel defending a charge of murder of a relative or intimate of the accused. In crime, as in tort, it can be cheaper to kill than to maim.542 “Trial of victim” may backfire if the prosecution has evidence to accredit the deceased.543 “Imputation” [15.52] Ordinarily the word “imputation”544 means any attribution of fault.545 But in keeping with the criminal law’s solicitude546 for defendants, it is more narrowly interpreted here: 536. R v Wadey (1935) 25 Cr App R 104; Stirland v Director of Public Prosecutions [1944] AC 315. 537. See [15.16]; and R v S (2000) 113 A Crim R 429; [2000] QCA 256. 538. Criminal Code, s 616. 539. R v Cummings [1978] Qd R 49. 540. R v Billings [1961] VR 127. 541. R v Biggin [1920] 1 KB 213; R v Gillis [1957] VR 91; R v Masters [1987] 2 Qd R 272. 542. Ill-treatment may not be a licence to kill (cf Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316 at 378-379 per Kirby J) but it seems that killing is a licence for an accused with a “record” to make any convenient allegation about the deceased. A variation on the theme when, as often happens, prosecution evidence is not available from veritable pillars of the community, is “trial” of witnesses for the Crown. 543. R v Howe [1958] SASR 95. 544. Snelling, “The Effect in Criminal Proceedings of Making Imputations Against the Character of Crown Witnesses” in Glass (ed), Seminars on Evidence (Law Book Co, 1970), p 194. 545. Concise Oxford Dictionary (6th ed), p 542. 546. Compare [15.28]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[15.53]

[I]t is not every assertion … reflecting on … witnesses that fulfils the condition giving rise to the trial judge’s discretion to allow cross-examination … concerning … character … [T]he injurious reflections must really form part of the nature or conduct of his defence.547 [It is] not a denial of the case for the Crown, nor a denial of the evidence by which it is supported, but the use of matter which will have a particular or specific tendency to destroy, impair, or reflect upon the character of the prosecutor or witnesses called for the prosecution, quite independently of the possibility that such matter, were it true, would in itself provide a defence.548

The question is whether the imputation is “a main plank” in the defence.549 Not every challenge, retort, denial or criticism fits that description. It must appear that the defence is seeking “to weaken confidence in the … witnesses by imputations affecting their character”,550 or is making “charges of misconduct which are relevant to the issues”.551 It is the effect of the attack that matters;552 there need not be an obvious motive for insulting or vilifying a witness. [15.53] A mere rejection of adverse evidence, however spirited, is not an imputation, although some rejoinders are close to the line.553 An angry, hasty claim that adverse evidence is “all lies” may be allowed to pass.554 So may a remark that police “have lost all credibility with me”, because of their apparent prejudgment of the case.555 Such outbursts may be “benevolently” regarded as merely “traversing … an issue raised by the prosecution”.556 And after all, allowances should be made for the strain of a criminal trial.557 There is no “imputation” in a simple contradiction558 or flat denial, even if innocent mistake on a contrary witness’s part is unlikely.559 A fortiori there is no imputation if a defendant, while contradicting a prosecution witness, accepts that the latter may be honestly mistaken.560

547. Curwood v The King (1944) 69 CLR 561 at 587 per Dixon J. 548. Dawson v The Queen (1961) 106 CLR 1 at 9-10 per Dixon CJ. 549. Dawson v The Queen (1961) 106 CLR 1; R v Thomas (2006) 14 VR 475; [2006] VSCA 165. 550. See, eg, R v Davidson [2014] QCA 348 at [49]. 551. Curwood v The King (1944) 69 CLR 561 at 586-587; R v Symonds [2002] 2 Qd R 70; [2001] QCA 70. 552. R v Domican (No 3) (1990) 46 A Crim R 428. 553. Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 at 344; R v Warren [1971] SASR 316 at 319. 554. R v Rouse [1904] 1 KB 184; Hewitt v Lenthall [1931] SASR 314; Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 at 334, 339 and 344; McMinn v Daire (1982) 5 A Crim R 307. 555. R v Kelly [2006] QCA 467 at [4]. 556. R v Cook [1959] 2 QB 340 at 345; Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 at 337; R v Nelson (1979) 68 Cr App R 12; Cushing v The Queen [1977] WAR 7. 557. R v Britzmann (1983) 76 Cr App R 134. 558. R v McLeod [1964] NZLR 545. 559. R v Billings [1961] VR 127. 560. R v Brown [1960] VR 382.

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s 15

[15.54] But persistent allegations that witnesses are lying, or that police have fabricated or extorted a confession, are clearly on the other side of the line.561 In R v Preston562 a claim that an identification parade was unfairly conducted was not treated as an “imputation”, but in Selvey v DPP,563 Preston is described as a “rather special case”. [15.55] Plainly, there is an “imputation” if the defence asserts that a person complaining of a sexual assault is a homosexual prostitute and a blackmailer.564 The same is true if the defendant in an assault case alleges that the complainant is the “real offender”,565 or accuses him of drink-driving or initiating a brawl.566

Mere traverse not an imputation [15.56] Consent is a very common defence to charges of rape. It may well be a serious reflection on the complainant’s moral character,567 but it is not an “imputation” in the present sense.568 In the past this was described as a special concession to defendants facing such charges569 but it is now more politic to say that a defence of consent is merely a “traverse” of the Crown’s necessary assertion that the complainant did not consent.570 [15.57] The position is different if the defence does not merely claim consent, but embellishes the claim by alleging that consent was signalled by the use of alcohol or drugs.571

Imputations on a co-accused [15.58] An imputation on a prosecution witness may also reflect upon a co-accused – for example, a claim that the co-accused was party to misconduct by police. Section 15(2)(d) would then apply.

561. Curwood v The King (1944) 69 CLR 561; R v Clark [1955] 2 QB 469; R v Dunn (1958) 75 WN (NSW) 423; R v Cook [1959] 2 QB 340; Mandzij v The Queen (1983) 11 A Crim R 209; Carroll v The Queen [1956] Tas SR 91; R v Langford [1974] Qd R 67. 562. [1909] 1 KB 568. 563. [1970] AC 304 at 349. 564. Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 at 349. 565. R v Hudson [1912] 2 KB 464; R v Cunningham [1959] 1 QB 288; Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 at 350; R v Bransden (1981) 27 SASR 474. 566. R v Brown (1960) 44 Cr App R 181. 567. R v Turner [1944] KB 463 at 488, unless the mores of that case are now completely out of fashion. 568. Curwood v The King (1944) 69 CLR 561 at 587; Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304. 569. Compare R v Cook [1959] 2 QB 340 at 347. 570. Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 at 339 per Lord Pearce. A possible weakness in this rationale is that s 15 is supposed to be kept free from technical refinements: Curwood v The King (1944) 69 CLR 561 at 587 per Dixon J, referring to R v Hudson [1912] 2 KB 464 and Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 at 350. 571. Phillips v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 45. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 15

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[15.59]

The section 15(3) discretion [15.59] No question may be put under s 15(2)(a), (2)(b) or (2)(c) until the judge gives leave to do so.572 It is most improper to raise an accused’s criminal record without leave, and in that event the jury must be discharged.573 This “reverse discretion” is a mirror image of the power to exclude “unfair” evidence. In other words, while s 130 contemplates exclusion of admissible evidence, s 15(3) allows a judge to admit evidence that is normally inadmissible. Similar considerations apply in each case.574 Would the proposed questions have a real bearing on the credit of the accused?575 Would the advantage to the prosecution, if allowed to raise bad character, be significantly greater than any advantage gained by the defence in raising good character, or in besmirching prosecution witnesses?576 In R v Thomas,577 any advantage gained by the defence tendering a “thank you” card from the complainant employer would clearly have been outweighed by revealing prior convictions. The prosecutor may be required to specify, in the absence of the jury, precisely what will be raised if leave is granted.578 [15.60] The traditional view is that judges “should be most cautious and sparing in the [affirmative] exercise of the s 15(2)(c) discretion”.579 But while the High Court recited this formula in Phillips v The Queen,580 the actual decision in that case is liberal to the Crown: see [15.63]. In the 1980s it was observed that the discretion to admit “bad character” was being used more freely than in the past.581 Perhaps it was beginning to be recognised that many procedural advantages accorded to defendants began as responses to harsher criminal regimes of the past, and that the balance should now be adjusted towards the interests of the community, victims of crime, and citizens with the unpleasant, tediously repetitive, and sometimes dangerous duty of testifying for the Crown.582 It may also be a reaction to the exponential growth of discretionary exclusion.583

572. R v Brownlow (2003) 86 SASR 114. However, failure to seek leave was treated as an irregularity that was not fatal to the conviction in R v Kostaras (2002) 133 A Crim R 399. 573. Gabriel v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 279. 574. Phillips v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 45 at 51. 575. Amoe v Director of Public Prosecutions (Nauru) (1991) 57 A Crim R 244; 103 ALR 595 (HC). 576. R v Perrier (No 1) [1991] 1 VR 697 at 705. 577. [2006] VSCA 167. 578. R v Robinson (2000) 111 A Crim R 388. 579. R v Brown [1960] VR 382 at 398; R v Cook [1959] 2 QB 340 at 345; R v Gramanatz [1962] QWN 41; R v Flynn [1963] 1 QB 729; R v Symonds [2002] 2 Qd R 70; [2001] QCA 199. 580. (1985) 159 CLR 45 at 57: “sparingly and cautiously”. 581. R v Fellowes and Jackson [1987] 2 Qd R 606 at 611 per McPherson J; Harris v The Queen (1988) 37 A Crim R 29. 582. Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 at 341, 345 and 365 (disapproving R v Flynn [1963] 1 QB 729 at 737; R v McKay [1965] Qd R 240; Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54 at 64). 583. Compare [130.6].

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Division 3 – Examination and cross-examination of witnesses

s 15

584

According to the High Court in Phillips v The Queen, decisions under s 15(3) should be free from presumptions one way or the other. But the court added (consistently?) that decisions in favour of the prosecution need careful consideration.585 There is a list of relevant considerations in R v McLeod.586 It is not enough to complain that the proposed questions would be “prejudicial”.587 A great deal of prosecution evidence answers that facile description. The question is whether they would be unfairly prejudicial.588 The answer depends on weighing the interests of the accused against possible “abuse of the immunity”.589 How relevant to the issues or to credit590 are the proposed questions, compared with likely collateral damage? Will an examination of the accused’s character really help “to elucidate the particular issue the jury is investigating, or … [tend] to show that [the accused] is not to be believed on his oath”?591 If the decision is in favour of the prosecution, the details of past offences should not be explored, unless they are admissible similar facts. It must always be remembered that evidence admitted under s 15(2)(c) goes to credit only – another rule of evidence that strains comprehension and credulity. Special caution is needed in child abuse cases before the jury is allowed to hear of other offences against minors. R v White592 is a case in which prejudice clearly outweighed relevance, but contrast P v The Queen,593 involving a sexual offence.

When the defence is “forced” to impugn witnesses [15.61] The discretion to allow questions under s 15(2)(c) remains alive when a defendant is virtually bound to attack Crown witnesses in order to have any real chance of acquittal. Formerly the discretion in such a case favoured the defence,594 but that view is not so strongly held today.595 Nevertheless, it is pertinent to ask whether the more or less unavoidable attacks were more frequent or forceful than necessary.596 [15.62] The defence may issue a subpoena to the Corrective Services Department or another entity for material relating to the credit of a complainant597 without providing a basis of a successful s 15(2)(c) application. 584. (1985) 159 CLR 45. 585. R v Symonds [2002] 2 Qd R 70; [2001] QCA 70. 586. (1995) 1 Cr App R 591. 587. R v Phillips [1997] ACL Rep 130 Qld 285 per Davies JA. 588. Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 at 348. 589. R v Phillips (unreported, Qld CA, 21 July 1997) per Davies JA. 590. R v Brown [1960] VR 382 at 398; Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 at 340. 591. Maxwell v DPP [1935] AC 309 at 321. 592. [1969] VR 203. 593. (1993) 61 SASR 75. 594. R v Bridgwater [1905] 1 KB 131 at 134; R v Westfall (1912) 7 Cr App R 176 at 179. 595. Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 at 337 and 344; R v Langford [1974] Qd R 67; Matthews v The Queen [1973] WAR 110; Phillips v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 45. 596. As recognised by Gibbs J in R v Gramanatz [1962] QWN 41. 597. R v Spizzirri (2000) 117 A Crim R 101; R v Mokbel [2005] VSC 410 at [74]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[15.63]

[15.63] It is not necessary that previous convictions be for offences similar to the one charged. In Phillips v The Queen598 questions about dishonesty were allowed in a trial for rape. Convictions that do not involve dishonesty may also be relevant to credit.599 [15.64] It is incorrect to say that “there is no such thing … as putting half a prisoner’s character in issue and leaving out the other half”.600 The discretion to apply s 15(2)(c) may be used selectively. The judge may “dissect” the record,601 and only part of it may be sufficiently relevant. Other parts may be so prejudicial (for example previous sexual offences in a rape case) that it would be unfair to let them in.602 In R v Day603 the judge allowed cross-examination about convictions for violence and dishonesty, but not about one for murder. Leave to raise a conviction may forbid counsel to dwell on the facts on which it was based. In R v Phillips,604 concerning indecent dealings with children, the trial judge admitted the fact of a prior conviction of that kind, but not similarities to the instant case. [15.65] It is an article of judicial faith that a record of sexual offences is uniquely prejudicial.605 In R v Watts,606 a case of indecent assault, leave to raise past sexual misconduct was refused. However, a less dogmatic approach was adopted in R v Phillips,607 above, and R v Creagh.608

Appeals from decisions giving leave [15.66] There is no presumption that a decision in favour of the prosecution is likely to be wrong.609 An appellant must show that there was an error of principle (such as a mistaken view that the defence put character in issue), or a failure to approach the question in a judicial manner,610 or simply a failure to exercise the discretion.611 The discretion clearly miscarries when questions allowed have no real bearing on credit.612

598. (1985) 159 CLR 45; R v Chinmaya [1995] 1 Qd R 547; [1994] QCA 281. 599. Clifford v Clifford [1961] 1 WLR 1274; 3 All ER 231 at 1276 (WLR), 232 (All ER); R v Chinmaya [1995] 1 Qd R 547. 600. R v Winfield (1939) 27 Cr App R 139 at 141. 601. P v The Queen (1993) 61 SASR 75 at 80. 602. R v Billings [1966] VR 396. 603. (2005) 115 A Crim R 80; [2000] QCA 313. 604. [1997] ACL Rep 130 Qld 285. 605. De Jesus v The Queen (1986) 22 A Crim R 375; 62 ALJR 1; Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292. 606. [1983] 3 All ER 101. 607. (Unreported, Qld Sup Ct CA, 21 July 1997). 608. (Unreported, Qld Sup Ct CA, 29 May 1995). Details of the prior, similar offence were not revealed. See also R v France [1978] Crim LR 48. 609. Phillips v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 45. 610. Donnini v The Queen (1972) 128 CLR 114 at 144. 611. R v Cook [1959] 2 QB 340 at 348. 612. R v Watts [1983] 3 All ER 101.

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[15.70]

Division 3 – Examination and cross-examination of witnesses

s 15

Proper use of section 15(2) material [15.67] Evidence of good character is evidence on the issues as well as evidence of credibility. In other words, the jury may treat it as proof that the accused should be acquitted,613 although cynics may say that everyone had a good character – once: see [A.135]. “[P]eople do commit crimes for the first time … evidence of previous good character cannot prevail over evidence of guilt which [a jury] finds convincing.”614 It is not always necessary for the judge to tell the jury that evidence of good character may be proof of innocence. That depends on how relevant it is to the nature of the charge.615 A number of people currently jailed, serving long sentences for serious and violent offences would be described by some others, both in the prison and outside it, as loyal, trusted friends.616

[15.68] However, evidence of bad character is relevant to credit only. The judge “should tell [the jury] quite plainly that the fact of a prior conviction can only be used as a means of discrediting the accused … [where there is] conflict in his evidence with witnesses for the Crown”.617 It is no additional evidence of guilt. In a joint trial of two or more accused the jury must be carefully warned against using the criminal record of “A” (if admitted) as evidence of any kind against “B”.618 [15.69] Is it reasonable to expect jurors to apply this esoteric distinction rigorously and consistently?619 Or is it one of the “intellectually disreputable” fictions of lawyers’ law,620 as suggested by Goddard LCJ: It is very difficult to see how … the jury is not in effect being asked to say: “The prisoner is just the sort of man who will commit these crimes and therefore it is highly probable that he did.” [But] in theory, at any rate, [all] the jury is being asked to do is to reject the prisoner’s evidence when he says: “I acted honestly in this case”.621

[15.70] The distinction between evidence on the issues and evidence merely “going to credit” is abandoned in s 101 of this Act, but not in s 15. 613. See [15.35]. The rule is an anomaly, but “too deeply rooted to be removed by judicial decision”: Melbourne v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 1; 164 ALR 465 at 14-15 (CLR), 473 (ALR) per McHugh J. 614. R v Trimboli (1979) 21 SASR 577 at 578. 615. Melbourne v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 1; 164 ALR 465; R v Cumberbatch (No 5) (2002) 130 A Crim R 599 at 602; R v Soloman [2006] QCA 244. 616. R v Soloman [2006] QCA 244 at [23] per Jerrard JA. 617. Donnini v The Queen (1972) 128 CLR 114 at 123 per Barwick CJ (inelegantly); R v Stalder [1981] 2 NSWLR 9 at 17; R v Watts [1983] 3 All ER 101; Phillips v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 45 at 57. 618. Santos v The Queen (1987) 29 A Crim R 122; 61 ALJR 668. 619. R v Hall [1986] 1 Qd R 462 at 464; People v Aranda 407 P 2d 265 at 272 (1965) (“intellectual boxes”); Nash v United States 54 F 2d 1006 at 1007 (1932) per Learned Hand J (“mental gymnastics”). 620. Cross, “Similar Facts” (1984) 16 Australian Journal of Forensic Science 143; Bruton v United States 391 US 123 at 129 (1968); Eggleston, Evidence Proof and Probability (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1978), p 57. 621. R v Samuel (1956) 40 Cr App R 8 at 12. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[15.71]

[15.71] A proposed cross-examination under s 15(2)(c) may be previewed on a voir dire.

Section 15(2)(d): cross-examination by accused of adverse co-accused [15.72] The object of s 15(2)(d) is to enable a party who is “attacked” by a co-accused to test the latter’s credit and/or to establish a defence.622 So when co-accused “A” testifies against “B”, the latter may cross-examine “A” as to character without the judge’s leave.623 The “Christie discretion”624 does not arise; it is designed to filter prosecution evidence only. [15.73] It is for the judge to decide whether one accused has “given evidence against” the other. The effect of the evidence is more important than its motive or intent: “Does the evidence in question tend to support the prosecution’s case … or to undermine his defence?”625 For an example of evidence supporting the Crown case, see R v Hatton.626 Clearly, “A” “gives evidence against” “B” if “A” asserts that “B” threatened to kill him if he did not assist “B” to commit a robbery.627 In R v Davis628 two men were charged with the theft of a gold chain in circumstances where it must have been taken by one of them. In chief, Davis was careful not to blame his co-accused, but in cross-examination he said that the co-accused must have taken the property because he (Davis) did not. Mere inconsistency between the two defences, or a denial by one accused of accusations made by the other, does not necessarily bring s 15(2)(d) into play.629 Nor does a simple denial of a common unlawful purpose.630 [15.74] When s 15(2)(d) applies, there is no discretion to restrict crossexamination,631 unless s 15A is involved.632 If cross-examination of a co-accused is relevant only to credit, the judge must caution the jury against convicting the latter on the basis of propensity reasoning.633 But evidence elicited under s 15(2)(d) may be evidence on the issues.634 For example, in Lui Mei Lin v The 622. Murdoch v Taylor [1965] AC 574 at 590. Clause (d) differs from the comparable English provision, which limits the right to a case where the two accused are “charged with the same offence”: Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Hills [1980] AC 26. 623. R v Ransom (1979) 22 SASR 283; R v Varley [1982] 2 All ER 519 at 522; R v Saric [1982] Qd R 360. 624. R v Christie [1914] AC 545. 625. R v Stannard [1965] 2 QB 1; Murdoch v Taylor [1965] AC 574. Did the evidence, if accepted, damage the co-defendant’s case significantly?: R v Crawford [1977] 1 WLR 1329 at 1333. 626. (1976) 64 Cr App R 88. 627. R v Varley [1982] 2 All ER 519. 628. [1975] 1 All ER 233. 629. R v Congressi (1974) 9 SASR 257; R v Crawford [1998] 1 Cr App R 338. 630. R v Varley [1982] 2 All ER 519 at 523. 631. R v Reid [1989] Crim LR 719. 632. R v Salmon [2003] QCA 17. 633. R v Corak and Palmer (1982) 30 SASR 404. 634. See [15.18].

262

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[15A.2]

Division 3 – Examination and cross-examination of witnesses

s 15A

635

Queen “A” sought to prove his innocence by cross-examining “B” about a confession by “B” that was inadmissible in the prosecution’s case. [15.75] An accused has an unfettered right to comment on the failure of a co-accused to testify.636 15A Questioning of witness as to certain convictions A witness in any criminal or civil proceeding shall not be asked and if asked shall not be required to answer any question tending to show that the witness has committed or been convicted of or been charged with any offence if, where the witness has been convicted of the offence— (a) the conviction is one in relation to which a rehabilitation period is capable of running pursuant to the Criminal Law (Rehabilitation of Offenders) Act 1986; and (b) in relation to the conviction the rehabilitation period within the meaning of that Act is not running at the time of the criminal or civil proceeding; unless the permission of the court to ask the question has first been obtained, such permission to be applied for in a trial by jury in the absence of the jury. [S 15A insrt Act 20 of 1986, s 14]

Overview [15A.1] Section 15A was inserted by the Criminal Law (Rehabilitation of Offenders) Act 1986 (Qld) (CLROA).637 The CLROA deems certain convictions to be non-existent for the purposes of cross-examination under ss 15 and 16.638 An “expired” conviction may be denied with impunity,639 unless the judge decides that it is relevant to an issue before the court.640 Leave has been granted under similar English legislation,641 but questions about “expired” matters were disallowed in R v Millar.642 However, “expired” convictions may be tendered by a defendant.643 [15A.2] “Conviction” means a conviction recorded in Queensland or elsewhere before or after 8 April 1986.644 As to proof of convictions, see ss 53, 54 and 69. 635. [1989] 2 WLR 175. 636. R v Wickham (1971) 55 Cr App R 199. 637. Wagner, “Burying the Past” (1993) 23 Q Law Soc J 359. The discretion to allow cross-examination on “spent” convictions is considered in R v Millar [2000] 1 Qd R 437. 638. A point overlooked in R v Salmon [2003] QCA 17. 639. CLROA, s 8. 640. CLROA, s 5(3)(b). A question whether leave should be given should be subjected to this test: Is the conviction in question now likely to weaken confidence in the present evidence of the witness? Leave refused in R v Millar [2000] 1 Qd R 437 (convictions for stealing not relevant to credit of complainant in indecent dealing case) and in R v Clarke (2005) 159 A Crim R 281; [2005] QCA 483. 641. Thomas v Commissioner of Police [1997] 2 WLR 593. 642. QLR (31 July 1999) (CA). 643. Robinson v Laws [2003] 1 Qd R 81. 644. CLROA, s 3(1). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[15A.3]

[15A.3] “Offence” means any act or omission rendering a person liable to punishment after a trial on indictment or summary proceedings.645

Less than 30 months [15A.4] The CLROA erases a conviction only if the sentence imposed did not exceed 30 months in custody.646 It is immaterial whether the sentence was actually served.647 A custodial sentence for non-payment of a fine is included. Erasure occurs at the end of the appropriate “rehabilitation period”. The normal periods are 10 years in the case of an adult offender, and five years in the case of a juvenile.648 [15A.5] A conviction revives (and the rehabilitation period recommences) on the commission of another offence (not being a simple or regulatory offence triable summarily).649 The “reviving” offence need not be one that attracts a custodial sentence. [15A.6] The CLROA does not prevent the use of previous convictions as evidence relevant to sentence in a later case.650 [15A.7] There are special cases, such as applications for admission to the legal profession, in which expired convictions must be disclosed. See CLROA, s 9A, as amended by the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003 (Qld). 16

Witness may be questioned as to previous conviction Subject to this Act, a witness may be questioned as to whether the witness has been convicted of any indictable or other offence and upon being so questioned, if the witness either denies the fact or refuses to answer, it shall be lawful for the party so questioning to prove such conviction.

645. CLROA, s 3(1). 646. CLROA, s 4(2). 647. CLROA, s 3(2)(b). 648. CLROA, s 3(1), definition of “rehabilitation period”. In any event, a finding of guilt against a juvenile is inadmissible if no conviction was entered: Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld), s 148. 649. CLROA, s 11. 650. CLROA, s 4(3).

264

Evidence Law in Queensland

[16.4]

Division 3 – Examination and cross-examination of witnesses

s 16

Overview [16.1] “For the purpose of ascertaining the credit due to a witness, the courts indulge free cross-examination.”651 That was said in 1817 and this section echoes that robust philosophy.652 This rule, which is confined to convictions, (contrast s 15(2)) survived far-reaching 19th century reforms.653 [16.2] Section 16 applies to a witness in any proceeding other than an accused, for whom there is special provision in s 15(2). The relationship between ss 16 and 20 (cross-examination as to credit) is considered in R v Millar.654 [16.3] Subject to relevance and to ss 15A, 20 and 21, a conviction of any kind may be raised; it need not involve dishonesty.655 But relevance is the touchstone of all evidence, including evidence as to credit, and this should not be forgotten when s 16 is invoked.656 “A conviction … [may] not be used for discrediting [a witness] if the offence was not of such a nature as to tend to weaken confidence in … his character or trustworthiness as a witness of truth.”657 In R v Sweet-Escott658 two convictions for traffic offences and three for petty theft 20 years earlier were ruled out: “How far back is it permissible to go … when cross-examining as to credit to delve into a man’s past and to drag up such dirt as they can find?”659 (See now s 15A.) On the other hand: Where the credit of a witness is very much in issue, it is an unwise approach … to exclude matters which are relevant to credit unless they are clearly of no material weight whatsoever upon that issue. That decision … should always be taken with great caution.660

There is life in the old rule yet. If a witness’s record is likely to affect credit, it may be prudent to reveal it in chief, instead of waiting for the opponent to approach it less tenderly later on. [16.4] There will be cases in which a conviction is less significant than the witness’s reaction to the question: “[T]he credit of the witness may be very much

651. R v Watson (1817) 2 Stark 116 at 151 per Ellenborough LCJ. 652. Forbes, Similar Facts (Law Book Co, 1987), pp 5-6; Bugg v Day (1949) 79 CLR 442 at 457-459, 471 and 474-475; R v Aldridge (1990) 20 NSWLR 737 at 741. In R v Harrison (1692) 12 How St Tr 834 at 862-863 a witness was called simply to say this about two other witnesses: “I dwell … over against Mr Maccaffee’s house; and he and she are very ill people, and keep a very evil and scandalous house; and such as are reputed to be housebreakers, pick pockets and lewd women do use and frequent [it].” 653. Common Law Procedure Act 1854 (UK), s 25; Criminal Law Procedure Act 1865 (UK), s 6; cf Bugg v Day (1949) 79 CLR 442 at 465 and 474-475. 654. [2000] 1 Qd R 437 at 440-441. 655. Compare Phillips v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 45, a decision with respect to s 15(2), noted at [15.63]. 656. R v Millar [2000] 1 Qd R 437; Black Uhlans Inc v Crime Commission (NSW) (2002) 12 BPR 22,421; [2002] NSWSC 1060; see also Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 20. 657. Bugg v Day (1949) 79 CLR 442 at 467 per Dixon J. 658. (1971) 55 Cr App R 316. 659. R v Sweet-Escott (1971) 55 Cr App R 316 at 320 per Lawton LJ. 660. R v Aldridge (1990) 20 NSWLR 737 at 742 per Hunt J. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[16.5]

661

shaken by the way in which such questions are dealt with.” A frank admission may see the matter dismissed as trifling; evasion may be damaging.

Proof if conviction denied [16.5] If a “non-expired” conviction is falsely denied, the denial may be rebutted. This is an exception to the rule662 that answers to collateral questions are final. [16.6] Convictions must be strictly proved, in accordance with ss 53 and 54.663 Police records are not admissible for this purpose, even in a civil case.664 Nor is the testimony of a person present when the conviction was entered.665 The witness under scrutiny must of course be identified with the record of conviction. Section 54 envisages fingerprint evidence, but that is an enabling provision, and other evidence is admissible when fingerprints are not available.666 [16.7] When questions under s 16 are asked in civil proceedings, they may elicit “other occasion” evidence that is not admissible on the issues, such as a bad driving record in a negligence case.667 But if it is relevant to credit, there is no discretion to exclude it.668 [16.8] So far as s 16 is concerned (distinguish s 15(2)), the fact that a person has been charged with an offence or committed for trial is not relevant to credit.669 But cross-examination may be allowed about other discreditable matters that have not resulted in a conviction.670

661. Clifford v Clifford [1961] 1 WLR 1274; 3 All ER 231 at 1276 (WLR), 232 (All ER) per Cairns J; Ward v Sinfield (1880) 49 LJQB 696; 43 LT 253. 662. Piddington v Bennett & Wood Pty Ltd (1940) 63 CLR 533. A more flexible approach is adopted to the “finality rule” in Natta v Canham (1991) 104 ALR 143 at 161 to enable an important credit issue to be properly tested. 663. R v Watson (1817) 2 Stark 116 at 151; Knight v Porter [1945] VLR 208 at 209. Overseas convictions may be proved in accordance with s 69. 664. Russell v Craddock [1985] 1 Qd R 377. 665. Mash v Darley [1914] 3 KB 1226. 666. Martin v White [1910] 1 KB 665 at 681. 667. Bugg v Day (1949) 79 CLR 442. 668. Manenti v Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board [1954] VLR 115; Forbes, “Judicial Discretion to Reject Prejudicial Evidence in Civil Cases” (1988) 62 ALJ 21 referred to with approval in Polycarpou v Australian Wire Industries Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 49. 669. R v McDermott (1990) 49 A Crim R 105. 670. R v Noud; Ex parte McNamara [1991] 2 Qd R 86; R v Millar [2000] 1 Qd R 437, where it was alleged that the complainant had recently sustained several convictions for theft, but no official record of convictions could be found.

266

Evidence Law in Queensland

[17.2]

17

Division 3 – Examination and cross-examination of witnesses

s 17

How far a party may discredit the party’s own witness

(1) A party producing a witness shall not be allowed to impeach the credit of the witness by general evidence of bad character but may contradict the witness by other evidence, or (in case the witness in the opinion of the court proves adverse) may by leave of the court prove that the witness has made at other times a statement inconsistent with the present testimony of the witness. (2) However, before such last mentioned proof can be given, the circumstances of the supposed statement sufficient to designate the particular occasion must be mentioned to the witness and the witness must be asked whether or not the witness has made such statement.

Overview [17.1] It is assumed that parties will call only witnesses likely to assist their cause. But this expectation is not always realised. When a witness is “disappointing”, it is only natural that the party concerned should wish to discredit him or (if the witness seems benign) to improve the evidence by friendly cross-examination. But that is generally forbidden.

“Disappointing” not synonymous with “hostile” [17.2] It is an axiom of the adversary system that a party “takes [his] witnesses as he finds them”.671 Generally you may not seek to discredit your own witness. An honest witness may fail to “come up to proof” for various reasons – nervousness, immaturity, limited intelligence, inadequate pre-trial preparation or confusion caused by court procedures that unimaginative lawyers have failed to explain beforehand. Not every “difficult” or “prickly” witness is hostile.672 A genuinely forgetful witness, or one who honestly recalls something previously forgotten, is not “adverse” within the meaning of s 17.673 It is necessary to show an unwillingness to tell the truth in response to non-leading questions.674 A witness may in good faith depart from an earlier statement made in or out of court:675 There is a clear distinction between a witness who is hostile and one who merely has made a previous inconsistent statement. The concept of “hostility” connotes an attitude of prevarication or mendaciousness based on an interest in, or a commitment to an opposing party, or unfriendliness or antagonism to the party calling him or her as a witness. It has long been recognised that inconsistency without more does not necessarily warrant the conclusion of hostility. Thus the prosecution … [is] required to establish a nexus between the interest and sympathy of the witness and the reason for the inconsistent testimony.676

Compare the wider concept of “unfavourable witness” in s 38 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth): see [F.19]. 671. R v M [1980] 2 NSWLR 195 at 209. 672. R v Kong [2009] QCA 34. 673. R v Manning (1968) 11 So Jo 745. 674. R v Hadlow [1992] 2 Qd R 440 at 448; R v Kong [2009] QCA 34. 675. Vocisano v Vocisano (1974) 130 CLR 267 at 274-275. 676. R v Coventry (1997) 7 Tas R 199; R v Jones (2006) 161 A Crim R 511; [2006] SASC 189. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[17.3]

[17.3] Usually the best response to an unfavourable witness is to call, if possible, another, more helpful witness on the same point and invite the court to prefer the latter, without criticising the former.677 That is not “impeachment”.678 This appears to have been the position at common law679 before the prototype of s 17680 appeared. In some cases the party calling the witness may take a more forceful line.681 [17.4] However, if “the witness in the opinion of the court proves adverse”, the party calling him may be allowed to “prove that the witness has made at other times a statement inconsistent with the present testimony”. This involves an attack on credit, which only an opponent is normally permitted to make. It is permissible but not obligatory to hold a voir dire for this purpose682 and, where necessary, independent evidence of inconsistency or hostility may be called.683 [17.5] The policy of what is now s 17 was explained by Erle J a few years before the original legislation in England: The evil to be provided for here is that of a treacherous witness. It is quite within experience of any person accustomed to courts of justice that a witness will make statements such as to induce one of the parties … to call him as a witness, and afterwards upon his examination will give his evidence in favour of the opposite party.684

[17.6] Only a party may use this section. In Vocisano v Vocisano685 plaintiff and defendant were brothers. The real defendant was a “third party” insurer. It became so obvious that the action was a very fraternal affair that the insurer (as intervener) sought to cross-examine the defendant brother. The application was refused on the ground that only parties may question witnesses.

677. Section 17(1): “but may contradict the witness by other evidence”; Goncalves v The Queen (1997) 99 A Crim R 193. 678. Ewer v Ambrose (1825) 3 B & C 746; 107 ER 910; Melhuish v Collier (1850) 15 QB 878; 117 ER 690; R v Welden (1977) 16 SASR 421 at 427, 435, 442; R v Lawrie [1986] 2 Qd R 502 at 509-511; R v M [1980] 2 NSWLR 195 at 210; Harman v Western Australia (2004) 29 WAR 380; [2004] WASCA 230. 679. R v Hunter [1956] VLR 31; R v Lawrie [1986] 2 Qd R 502 at 505; R v Hadlow [1992] 2 Qd R 440 at 448. Compare Greenough v Eccles (1859) 5 CBNS 786 at 806-807. 680. The antecedent to s 17 was s 16 of the Evidence and Discovery Act 1867 (Qld). 681. R v Mark & Elmazovski [2006] VSCA 251; R v DAX [2010] QCA 221 at [24]; R v Dales [2011] QCA 315 at [58]. 682. R v Franicevic [2010] QCA 36 at [8]. 683. R v Coventry (1997) 7 Tas R 199; R v Andrews [1987] 1 Qd R 21. 684. Melhuish v Collier (1850) 19 LJQB 493 at 496. 685. (1974) 130 CLR 267.

268

Evidence Law in Queensland

[17.9]

Division 3 – Examination and cross-examination of witnesses

s 17

A “judge question” [17.7] The judge decides whether a witness is hostile.686 Cross-examination on the voir dire must be confined to that issue.687 From the judge’s decision there is no appeal on the merits;688 any review is limited to legal error, such as applying a wrong test of “hostility” or acting on irrelevant considerations.689 A magistrate’s decision was reversed in Dale v Barry; Ex parte Barry,690 but a declaration was upheld in R v Siedofsky.691 In exceptional circumstances, such as extreme nervousness or obvious immaturity, the judge may give leave to cross-examine one’s own witness without a declaration of hostility.692 This concession tends to diminish the weight of the evidence. [17.8] Permission to cross-examine a hostile witness may be limited to parts of his or her testimony,693 but generally the party calling the witness may cross-examine on any matter relevant to the issues or to credit.694

Indicia of hostility [17.9] A witness is “hostile” when it appears that he or she is deliberately withholding evidence695 or is unwilling to tell the truth if it will assist one party or harm the other.696 Motive is relevant,697 but the effect of the evidence is of prime importance.698 “Treachery” was the potent epithet in Melhuish v Collier,699 but a witness may be hostile for reasons other than malice or material gain. Fear of reprisals, as in some “organised crime” cases, or peer group pressure in a rape case, may cause an originally honest and helpful witness to become adverse.

686. Rice v Howard (1886) 16 QBD 681; McLellan v Bowyer (1961) 106 CLR 95 at 102; R v Hadlow [1992] 2 Qd R 440. 687. R v Coventry (1997) 7 Tas R 199. 688. R v Andrews [1987] 1 Qd R 21; Meiers v Button (unreported, Qld CCA, 15 March 1988): magistrate’s declaration of hostility upheld. 689. R v Hunter [1956] VLR 31 at 32. 690. (Unreported, Qld Sup Ct FC, 19 January 1982). 691. R v Siedofsky [1989] 1 Qd R 655. 692. Rawcliffe v The Queen (2001) 22 WAR 490; 115 A Crim R 509. 693. R v Thynne [1977] VR 98; R v Hadlow [1992] 2 Qd R 440. Conversely, if a witness seems too anxious to assist the opponent in normal cross-examination, the cross-examiner may be limited to non-leading questions: Mooney v James [1949] VLR 22 at 28. 694. R v Hunter [1956] VLR 31 at 37; Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81 at 88. 695. McLellan v Bowyer (1961) 106 CLR 95 at 104. 696. Coles v Coles and Brown (1866) LR 1 P & D 70 at 71; Bassett v Ferguson [1952] VLR 481 at 483; R v Harding [1956] QWN 32; R v Hayden [1959] VR 102; R v Lawless [1974] VR 398 at 408. 697. R v Ashton (1999) 108 A Crim R 200. 698. R v Hutchinson (1990) 53 SASR 587. Likewise the legal notion of bias: Thomas v David (1836) 7 C & P 350; 173 ER 156; R v Umanski [1961] VR 242. 699. (1850) 19 LJQB 493 at 496. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

269

s 17

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[17.10]

[17.10] Unwillingness to tell the truth may be evidenced by a significant departure from an earlier statement700 or by pretending to forget701 what it records. In Russell v Dalton,702 an action for slander, a witness was called to prove the offending words. He recalled them quite clearly in a conference with the plaintiff’s solicitor, but at the trial he remembered nothing of the kind. A declaration of hostility was made. [17.11] A radically inconsistent statement is the commonest sign of hostility, but not the only one.703 While some of the most treacherous witnesses present a calm and seemingly candid demeanour,704 a display of intransigence or evasiveness may indicate hostility, without evidence of an inconsistent statement.705 In R v Hall706 it was observed that courts have tended to make declarations of hostility more readily since the High Court’s decision in McLellan v Bowyer.707 [17.12] The clearest proof of hostility is a radical change of story that cannot reasonably be regarded as a mere failure of memory or change of mind: The best evidence of a witness being hostile is that he deceives the attorney of the side which calls him, as to the evidence which he [will] give.708

The prior statement need not be on oath,709 but the inconsistency must be clear and substantial.710 Documentation is not essential – there may be proof of an earlier, oral statement.711

700. Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (In liq); Lamru Pty Ltd v Kation Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 335; R v Folland [2004] QCA 209; R v Le [2009] QCA 343; Creswick v Creswick [2010] QSC 339 at [203]. 701. As in R v Siedofsky [1989] 1 Qd R 655; see also R v Houston (1982) 8 A Crim R 392; Wentworth v Rogers (No 10) (1987) 8 NSWLR 398. 702. (1883) 4 LR (NSW) 261. 703. R v Hadlow [1992] 2 Qd R 440. On various indicia of hostility, see R v Mullins [2001] QCA 440. 704. Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81 at 95. 705. Russell v Dalton (1883) 4 LR (NSW) 261 at 266; McLellan v Bowyer (1961) 106 CLR 95 at 103; R v Lawless [1974] VR 398 at 409; Jacobsen v Suncorp Insurance and Finance [1991] 2 Qd R 46 (“evasiveness”); R v Hadlow [1992] 2 Qd R 440; R v Weisz (2008) 189 A Crim R 93; [2008] QCA 313; R v Franicevic [2010] QCA 36. 706. [1986] 1 Qd R 462 at 467. 707. (1961) 106 CLR 95 (demeanour not hostile, but inconsistent statement made). 708. Russell v Dalton (1883) 4 LR (NSW) 261 at 266 per Windeyer J; Faulkner v Brine (1858) 1 F & F 254; 175 ER 715. 709. R v Hart (1958) 42 Cr App R 47 at 50. 710. Carbury v Measures (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 569; Cotton v Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways (1942) 43 SR (NSW) 66 at 71. 711. McGahan v Driver [1936] QWN 45; Cotton v Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways (1942) 43 SR (NSW) 66; R v O’Neill [1969] Crim LR 260.

270

Evidence Law in Queensland

[17.17]

Division 3 – Examination and cross-examination of witnesses

s 17

712

[17.13] The prior statement may be proved on a voir dire. The opponent may request a voir dire to show that the prior statement is unreliable. If the attempt succeeds, no declaration should be made.713 [17.14] If the witness does not distinctly admit the prior statement, it may be proved in accordance with ss 18 or 19.

Prior statement now evidence of facts asserted [17.15] the facts make.714 draw the issues.

At common law the prior statement, being hearsay, was no evidence of asserted in it, unless it was an admission, which only a party can Otherwise it went to credit only715 and a jury would be instructed to elusive distinction between evidence as to credit and evidence on the

[17.16] But that refined distinction has been abandoned for present purposes. According to s 101, an inconsistent statement is evidence, in all proceedings, of the facts it records: see [101.5].716 However, it has been suggested that, if the witness admits the prior statement, it is not “proved by virtue of s 17, 18 or 19”,717 and the common law (see [17.15]) still applies.718 It was said in Blewitt v The Queen719 that it is improper for a prosecutor to call a witness known to be hostile “for the sole purpose of getting before the jury a prior inconsistent statement which [goes to credit only]”. But by virtue of s 101, the prior statement does not go to credit only. Some commentators have failed to recognise that Blewitt did not involve a provision of that kind: see [101.5]. [17.17] In a civil case there is another method of contradicting one’s own witness: see s 92.720

712. R v Hunter [1956] VLR 31; McLellan v Bowyer (1961) 106 CLR 95 at 103; Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81 at 87; R v Lawrie [1986] 2 Qd R 502 at 512; R v Hadlow [1992] 2 Qd R 440. 713. R v Hadlow [1992] 2 Qd R 440 at 449. 714. North Australian Territory Co v Goldsborough Mort & Co [1893] 2 Ch 381 at 385-386; Alchin v Commissioner for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 at 509; R v Thynne [1977] VR 98. An admission was proved through a witness (not the party concerned) in Simon-Beecroft v Proprietors “Top of the Mark” BUP [1997] 2 Qd R 635; [1996] QCA 239. The witness’s original statement was to the effect that the plaintiff had admitted to her that an accident was the plaintiff’s own fault. Her testimony was in clear conflict with that statement, which was then proved under s 18. 715. R v Lynch (1858) 2 Legge (NSW) 1120; Taylor v The King (1918) 25 CLR 573; Driscoll v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 517. 716. R v Ghion [1982] Qd R 781; R v Neville [1985] 2 Qd R 398; R v Baira [2009] QCA 332; R v Caric [2009] QCA 319; R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299 at 307. 717. As required by s 101(1)(a). 718. R v Schultz (unreported, Qld CCA, 19 April 1991) per Thomas J. 719. (1988) 62 ALJR 503 at 505. 720. Harvey v Smith Wood [1964] 2 QB 171. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

271

s 18

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[17.18]

Federal Act [17.18] Section 38 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) is more liberal than s 17:721 see [F.19]. 18

Proof of previous inconsistent statement of witness

(1) If a witness upon cross-examination as to a former statement made by the witness relative to the subject matter of the proceeding and inconsistent with the present testimony of the witness does not distinctly admit that the witness has made such statement, proof may be given that the witness did in fact make it. (2) However, before such proof can be given, the circumstances of the supposed statement sufficient to designate the particular occasion must be mentioned to the witness and the witness must be asked whether or not the witness has made such statement.

Overview [18.1] Section 18 restates the common law.722 It relates to criminal as well as civil cases.723 It will normally, though not necessarily,724 apply to the cross-examination of an opponent’s witness. Section 18(1) allows the proof of material that was hearsay at common law, and s 18(2) is concerned with fairness. An inconsistent statement may be used in cross-examination without notice, even to prove fraud.725 Three purposes of cross-examination on documents are: (i) to prove a document that the cross-examiner wishes to tender; (ii) to prove facts asserted in a document, without necessarily tendering the document; and (iii) to discredit the witness. Sections 18 and 19 focus on (iii). Distinguish admissions [18.2] It is unnecessary to rely on s 18 or s 19 if the witness is a party and the inconsistent statement amounts to an admission.726 It is then evidence on the issues at common law.727

721. R v Adam (1999) 47 NSWLR 267. 722. Crowley v Page (1837) 7 C & P 789; 173 ER 344. 723. R v Daren [1971] 2 NSWLR 423. And to committal proceedings: Maddison v Goldrick [1976] 1 NSWLR 651. 724. See [17.11] regarding hostile witnesses; R v Cox [1972] Qd R 366. 725. Royds v Norcross Press Pty Ltd [2000] 1 Qd R 681; Ghazal v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1992) 29 NSWLR 336. 726. Alchin v Commissioner for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 at 508. 727. See [Q.43].

272

Evidence Law in Queensland

[18.5]

Division 3 – Examination and cross-examination of witnesses

s 18

Effect of section 101 [18.3] Until 1977 s 18, like ss 17 and 19, merely related to credibility. The prior statement was no evidence of the facts asserted in it.728 But see [17.15] and [17.16]. Statement need not be in document [18.4] Section 18 is not confined to statements recorded in a document.729 Documents are governed by s 19.730 An inconsistent statement made orally may be proved by anyone who heard it made.731 “Inconsistent” [18.5] The possible significance (or insignificance) of inconsistency is considered in R v Ward.732 Committal proceedings are an opportunity to generate statements that may later be portrayed as inconsistent733 and to “rough up” witnesses without the risk of alienating a jury. Advocates tend to exaggerate any departure from a prior statement, but the correct approach is more discerning. “It is the everyday experience of the courts that honest witnesses are frequently in error about the details of events. The more accounts that they are asked to give, the greater is the chance that there will be discrepancies about details ...”.734 In judging inconsistency one should consider such matters as age, emotional condition at the time of the first statement, the circumstances of its making (casual or formal),735 the lapse of time since it was made and the importance (or triviality) of discrepancies. The essential question is this: Could a jury reasonably find that a witness who is telling the truth could not have made that statement?736 There is “inconsistency” if the witness simply denies the prior statement.737 As to the weight of an inconsistent statement, see [101.2]. 728. Hammer v S Hoffnung & Co Ltd (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 280. 729. Carpenter v Wall (1840) 11 Ad & E 803; 113 ER 619; McGahan v Driver [1936] QWN 45; Cotton v Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways (1942) 43 SR (NSW) 66 at 71; R v O’Neill [1969] Crim LR 260; Furlong v Staniforth (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 364. 730. Savanoff v Re-Car Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 219 at 229. 731. See, eg, McGahan v Driver [1936] QWN 45; Clarke v Banfield [1999] QDC 271. 732. (1984) 15 A Crim R 275 at 280. In Carbury v Measures (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 569 it was held that the prior statement must be clearly inconsistent on matters of substance, not merely one from which different inferences can be drawn. See also Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed, Little Brown, 1940) at [1040]. 733. A point made by Dowd, A-G for NSW (later Dowd J) in The Australian (16-17 June 1990). For a defence of committal proceedings, see O’Gorman, “The Future of Committals” (1990) 20 Q Law Soc J 297. The political difficulty of abolishing them is recognised in Aronson, Managing Complex Criminal Trials: Reform of the Rules of Evidence and Procedure (AIJA, 1992), p 49. 734. M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; [1994] HCA 63 at 534 (CLR) per McHugh J. 735. R v Kern [1986] 2 Qd R 209: appeal allowed when the trial judge allowed the Crown a case in reply to prove a “casual conversation”. 736. R v Thompson [1995] 3 NZLR 423. 737. R v Williams [2001] 2 Qd R 442. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

273

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Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[18.6]

“Statement” [18.6] The term “statement” includes the opinion of a duly qualified expert or of a non-expert on a matter of common experience.738 Cotton v Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways739 was an action by a young girl knocked down by a bus. After her mother testified that it was the driver’s fault, the defendant was allowed to ask her about a statement she made to the driver shortly after the incident: “You couldn’t help it … Pauline ran in front of [you].” Agent’s inconsistent statement [18.7] A statement by a party’s agent may be used for the purposes of s 18.740 However, the courts are not quick to find authority to make admissions on behalf of another person, even when the speaker is an agent for other purposes.741 “Relative to the subject matter” [18.8] The prior statement must relate to the “subject-matter of the proceeding”. “Relative” means “relevant”.742 In other words, the facts or opinions it asserts must be directly or circumstantially relevant to the issues for trial. A statement is not “inconsistent” if the conflict merely goes to credit.743 In Narkle v The Queen744 it was put to the complainant that she told a doctor the appellant tried to kiss her breasts. She denied that. The appellant was not charged with any indecent assault of that kind, so the alleged statement was not “relative to the subject matter”. On the other hand, when the plaintiff’s wife testified in McGahan v Driver:745 “[My husband] was not rushing to catch his train when the accident occurred”, the defendant was allowed to ask whether she told a bystander shortly after the accident: “He’s always in a hurry.” Sometimes the necessary relevance does not appear until the statement is compared with other evidence. In Furlong v Staniforth746 the question was whether the defendant failed to pay commission due to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was allowed to cross-examine a defence witness about his comment that the defendant “had not treated [the plaintiff] fairly”, although in isolation that comment had no clear connection with the issues.

738. Notwithstanding a primary rule against opinion evidence by non-expert witnesses, “lay” evidence frequently contains an opinionated element; identification evidence is a prime example: Craig v The King (1933) 49 CLR 429 at 446. 739. (1942) 43 SR (NSW) 66. See also Furlong v Staniforth (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 364. 740. Yates v Municipal District of Dubbo (1882) 3 NSWLR (L) 315. 741. See, eg, Clark v CA Kruger & Sons Pty Ltd [1946] QSR 206; Smith v Joyce (1954) 89 CLR 529; Farrelly v Hircock (No 1) [1971] Qd R 341; Guarnaccia v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd [1976] VR 302. 742. MJH v Western Australia (2006) 33 WAR 9; 166 A Crim R 152; [2006] WASCA 167. 743. MJH v Western Australia (2006) 33 WAR 9; 166 A Crim R 152; [2006] WASCA 167. 744. (2001) 23 WAR 468; 117 A Crim R 583. 745. [1936] QWN 45. 746. (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 364.

274

Evidence Law in Queensland

[18.11]

Division 3 – Examination and cross-examination of witnesses

s 19

“Present testimony” [18.9] This expression includes evidence in chief, answers under crossexamination and any evidence in reply.747 Rebuttal when statement not admitted [18.10] If the prior statement is admitted, further proof is unnecessary.748 Otherwise the first step is to show that the witness did in fact make it. In fairness, the witness must be given enough information to identify the occasion: s 18(2).749 If the prior statement is in writing, subsequent procedure is governed by s 19. [18.11] If the statement is denied it may be proved by other means.750 If the cross-examiner’s case has been closed, leave to reopen may751 be given for this purpose. Alternatively, the cross-examination may be suspended, the witness stood down, and rebuttal evidence interposed.752 But in criminal proceedings leave to reopen the Crown case, even for the purpose of tendering a prior inconsistent statement, is cautiously granted.753 19 Witness may be cross-examined as to written statement without being shown it (1) A witness may be cross-examined as to a previous statement made by the witness in writing or reduced into writing relative to the subject matter of the proceeding without such writing being shown to the witness. (1A) However, if it is intended to contradict the witness by the writing the attention of the witness must, before such contradictory proof can be given, be called to those parts of the writing which are to be used for the purpose of so contradicting the witness. (2) A court may at any time during the hearing of a proceeding direct that the writing containing a statement referred to in subsection (1) be produced to the court and the court may make such use in the proceeding of the writing as the court thinks fit.

747. Holmes v Jones (1907) 4 CLR 1692; R v Rolton (1910) 29 NZLR 272. 748. R v Fraser (1995) 65 SASR 260; 85 A Crim R 385 at 265 (SASR); Suresh v The Queen (1998) 72 ALJR 769 at 771-772 and 773; R v Baker [2014] QCA 5 at [16]. 749. Nicholls v The Queen (2005) 219 CLR 196. This proviso was originally part of s 18 without subsections. 750. As in R v Mursic [1980] Qd R 482; R v Lace [2001] QCA 255. 751. R v Ghion [1982] Qd R 781; Niven v The Queen (1968) 113 CLR 513; R v Daren [1971] 2 NSWLR 423; R v Neville [1985] 2 Qd R 398 at 404; R v Kern [1986] 2 Qd R 209 at 211 and 214 (prior statement merely a “casual conversation”); R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 676-677; R v Wright (1990) 49 A Crim R 462. 752. Cheney v The Queen (1991) 28 FCR 103; 99 ALR 360 at 122-126 (FCR), 379-383 (ALR). 753. R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299; R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 676; [1985] HCA 35; Morris v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 152 (“only if the circumstances are very special or exceptional”); O’Meara v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 228 (evidence as to credit not admissible in chief). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

275

s 19

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[19.1]

Overview [19.1] Section 7 reproduces a 19th century reform in aid of cross-examination: see [19.5]. It applies to committal proceedings as well as civil and criminal trials.754 The associated rules of practice are somewhat arcane.755 They were generated by tricks of advocacy when civil jury trials were much more common than they are today. [19.2] Section 19 applies to cross-examination of a hostile witness as well as to the normal questioning of an opponent’s witness.756 [19.3] The meanings of “inconsistent”, “statement” and “relative to the subject matter” are noted at [18.5], [18.6] and [18.8]. In a jury trial the jury decides whether there is material inconsistency and, if so, what effect it should have on credit.757 “In writing” [19.4] Section 19, unlike s 18, predicates a document written, signed or otherwise adopted by the witness.758 The word “writing” is not defined in this Act but, according to s 36 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), it refers to any mode of representing or reproducing words in visible form. (Compare the definition of “document” in the Dictionary, which does not require visible form.)759 It is submitted that a verified transcript of a tape-recording would be a “previous statement … reduced into writing”. Otherwise a tape-recorded statement could be dealt with under s 18. Section 19 and the Queen’s Case [19.5] At common law760 a witness could not be asked about the contents of a document until the original was produced, verified, and put into evidence. Section 19 creates an exception to that rule.761 [19.6] The rule in the Queen’s Case was an application of the “best evidence” principle.762 It frustrated effective cross-examination by eliminating, or greatly 754. Section 3 (“criminal proceeding”); R v Daren [1971] 2 NSWLR 423; Maddison v Goldrick [1976] 1 NSWLR 651. 755. Starke, “Cross-Examination Based on Documents” (1945) 19 ALJ 262. 756. R v Cox [1972] Qd R 366 at 374. 757. R v Luck [2000] QCA 74. 758. R v Walker (1993) 61 SASR 260 (transcript of evidence, not admissible). 759. Dictionary (“document”); see also [3.11]. 760. Queen’s Case (1820) 2 B & B 284; 129 ER 976; McDonnell v Evans (1852) 11 CB 930; 138 ER 742; Morgan v Babcock and Wilcox Ltd (1929) 43 CLR 163, 172 and 179; Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Young (1962) 106 CLR 535 at 556-557; Grayden v The Queen (1988) 36 A Crim R 163. Starke, “Cross-Examination Based on Documents” (1945) 19 ALJ 262. The distinction between originals and true copies applies only to documents in the traditional sense and not to electronic recordings: Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180. 761. Lee v Chai [2013] QSC 136 at [99]. 762. Dillon v Crawley (1701) Holt KB 299; 88 ER 1475. As to the “best evidence” principle, see [A.11].

276

Evidence Law in Queensland

[19.10]

Division 3 – Examination and cross-examination of witnesses

s 19

reducing, the element of surprise. If the document was admitted, it had to be read out in full, before cross-examination could proceed.763 [19.7] 1853:

The English Common Law Commission considered the problem in

The chief reason assigned for the [old] rule is, that the adoption of a contrary course would entitle the cross-examining counsel to put the court in possession of only a part of the contents of a paper, though a knowledge of the whole might be essential to a right judgment. The answer, however, is that on re-examination, the witness may be asked [about] any other parts of the writing, which may tend to qualify, contradict, or explain the passages referred to in cross-examination.

[19.8] The Commission enlisted the support of Henry Brougham, a parliamentary champion of law reform, and counsel in the Queen’s Case: If I wish to put a person’s memory to the test … I must put the document into his hands … though, by so doing, he at once becomes acquainted with the contents and so defeats the object of my inquiry … And yet, how can a better means be found of sifting a person’s credit, than examining him to the contents of a letter written by him, and which he believes to be lost?764

[19.9] Brougham was well placed to do something about it. The prototype of s 19 appeared as s 25 of the English Common Law Procedure Act 1854, and was extended to criminal cases in 1865.765 [19.10] While the Queen’s Case still applied to documents generally,766 it no longer hindered cross-examination. Unfortunately Brougham’s simple remedy became encrusted with exquisite points of procedure – relics of the days when jury trial was routine in civil as well as criminal cases.767 The combative Bar of New South Wales contributed generously to the confusion.

763. Queen’s Case (1820) 2 B & B 284 at 288-292; Alchin v Commissioner for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 at 509. 764. Quoted in the Second Report of the Common Law Commissioners (1853), as appended to McDonnell v Evans (1852) 11 CB 930; 138 ER 742 at 936n (CB), 749-750 (ER). 765. Criminal Procedure Act 1865 (ENG), s 6. 766. Darby v Ouseley (1856) 1 H & N 1; 156 ER 1093; R v Hollis (1905) 5 SR (NSW) 283; R v Banks (1916) 12 Cr App R 74; Paterson v Paterson (1953) 89 CLR 212; Alister v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 404 at 464; Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180. 767. There is guidance through the legal and tactical thickets in the judgment of Jordan CJ in Alchin v Commissioner for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 at 508-509 and in Starke, “Cross-Examination Based on Documents” (1945) 19 ALJ 262; McHugh, “Cross-Examination on Documents” (1985) 1 Aust Bar Rev 51; Malcolm, “Cross-Examination on Documents” (1986) 2 Aust Bar Rev 267; and MacMillan, “Cross-examination on Documents” (2005) 26 Aust Bar Rev 87. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

277

s 19

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[19.11]

Section 19 procedure [19.11] The first point to establish is that the witness actually made the prior statement.768 The simplest method is to obtain an admission to that effect. Otherwise, see [18.11]. Futile denials or prevarication may significantly affect credit.769 Once authorship is established, the cross-examiner may ask general questions about the document without showing it to the witness or to the opponent.770 However, if it is voluntarily shown to either of them, no duty to tender it arises771 unless the cross-examiner uses it as evidence on the issues.772 It may be tendered in re-examination.773 However, the right to tender is limited to the parts that were the subject of cross-examination.774 [19.12] The document must be available in court, or at least readily obtainable, in case the judge wishes to see it.775 If the original is with the opponent in a civil case, a copy may be used after service of a notice to produce.776 (If the original is simply “called for” in court it would ipso facto be evidence777 – a consequence the cross-examiner may be anxious to avoid.)778 [19.13] In criminal proceedings the defence is entitled to notice of any inconsistent statement by a witness of which the prosecution is aware.779 [19.14] If the witness admits making the statement (or if authorship is proved by other means), the cross-examiner may then “put” selected parts of it, probing inconsistencies between the present testimony and the contents of the document. 768. A transcript of the witness’s evidence in other proceedings is not a document “made” by the witness: R v Walker (1993) 61 SASR 260. The limited use which may be made of “third party statements” in cross-examination is discussed in R v Bedington [1970] Qd R 353. 769. Compare comments in relation to questions about prior convictions in Clifford v Clifford [1961] 1 WLR 1274; 3 All ER 231 at 1276 (WLR), 232 (All ER); and Ward v Sinfield (1880) 49 LJQB 696. 770. J Boag & Son Brewing Ltd v Bridon Investments Pty Ltd (2001) 10 Tas R 26; Lee v Chai [2013] QSC 136 at [99]. But if the opponent calls for the document, the opponent may be required to put it into evidence. 771. North Australian Territory Co v Goldsborough Mort & Co [1893] 2 Ch 381 at 386; Sladden v Sergeant (1858) 1 F & F 322; 175 ER 746; R v Thompson [1995] 3 NZLR 423. This statement in the text above is applied in Lee v Chai [2013] QSC 136 at [99]. 772. J Boag & Son Brewing Ltd v Bridon Investments Pty Ltd (2001) 10 Tas R 26. The document may be evidence of fact if it amounts to an admission or if it is tendered under s 101. 773. Lee v Chai [2013] QSC 136 at [99]. 774. Meredith v Innes (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 104 at 112-113; Wentworth v Rogers (No 10) (1987) 8 NSWLR 398 at 409. 775. R v Anderson (1929) 21 Cr App R 178; Alexander v Manley (2004) 29 WAR 194; [2004] WASCA 140. 776. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 227. 777. R v McGregor [1984] 1 Qd R 256; Lee v Chai [2013] QSC 136 at [99]. 778. Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630; Senat v Senat [1965] P 172. 779. R v Clarke (1930) 22 Cr App R 58. On orders for access to prima facie privileged material in the possession of the prosecution, including inconsistent statements, see R v Kingston [1986] 2 Qd R 114; Di Rosso v Weary (1986) 4 MVR 141; Attorney-General (NSW) v Findlay (1976) 50 ALJR 637. The matter is now covered by legislation: see [A.98] and [101.3].

278

Evidence Law in Queensland

[19.17]

Division 3 – Examination and cross-examination of witnesses

s 19

Attention should be drawn to inconsistencies by means of verbatim quotations.780 The witness is entitled to see the portions in question but not to read the document as a whole – that might destroy the effect of further cross-examination. Opposing counsel may inspect the document. [19.15] According to some authorities the cross-examiner should give the witness an opportunity to explain inconsistencies at once, but that is not the rule in Queensland.781 Re-examination may be used for that purpose,782 although an answer at that stage tends to be less convincing than an immediate reply. [19.16] Having seen the relevant statement, the witness may be asked whether he adheres to it on oath.783 If the answer is “yes”, the court may be invited to reject the present testimony. If the answer is “no”, the witness may be given an opportunity to affirm any parts of the statement that support the cross-examiner’s case. If the questions and answers are clear without reading the document itself, the cross-examiner need not tender it.784 But if it is tendered it may be used by either party to accredit or discredit the witness, as the case may be.785 It is not essential that the tender be made during cross-examination,786 but there is nothing to prevent a tender during the other party’s case.787 Statement now evidence of facts asserted [19.17] At common law a prior inconsistent statement was no evidence of facts asserted in it, unless they were admissions.788 Generally, as hearsay, it merely went to credit.789 However, following a recommendation of the Queensland Law Reform Commission, this distinction was abolished.790 By virtue of s 101(1)(a) an inconsistent statement introduced in accordance with s 17, 18 or 19 is 780. See s 19(1A). This proviso was originally part of s 19(1). Section 18(2) requires that “the circumstances of the supposed statement sufficient to designate the particular occasion … be mentioned to the witness”. This will often be appropriate when dealing with a written statement. 781. Savanoff v Re-Car Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 219. 782. Meredith v Innes (1931) 31 SR (NSW) 104 at 112; Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1969] VR 323 at 326; R v Phair [1986] 1 Qd R 136 at 137. 783. Birchall v Bullough [1896] 1 QB 325. 784. Oakes v Gaudron (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Walsh J, 23 May 1963); Permanent Trustee Company Ltd v Gulf Import and Export Company (2007) 17 VR 592; [2007] VSC 267. A contrary decision is R v Jack (1894) 15 LR (NSW) 196, but it seems to have been mistakenly based on The Queen’s Case, without regard to s 19: McHugh QC, “Cross-Examination on Documents” (1985) 1 Aust Bar Rev 51. 785. Krycki v Nominal Defendant [1962] NSWR 235; R v Kehagias [1985] VR 107. 786. Alexander v Manley (2004) 29 WAR 194; [2004] WASCA 140. 787. R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 681 and 689-691. 788. North Australian Territory Co v Goldsborough Mort & Co [1893] 2 Ch 381 at 385-386; Alchin v Commissioner for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 at 509; R v Moghal (1977) 65 Cr App R 56 at 63. 789. Taylor v The King (1918) 25 CLR 573; Hammer v S Hoffnung & Co Ltd (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 280; R v Pearson [1964] Qd R 471; R v Rose [1977] Qd R 280; R v Sams (1990) 46 A Crim R 468; R v Hawes (1994) 35 NSWLR 294. 790. Which survives for certain other purposes, eg in relation to bad-character evidence admitted under s 15(2)(c). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

279

s 19

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[19.18]

“admissible as evidence of any fact stated therein of which direct oral evidence791 would be admissible”. In R v Condren; Ex parte Attorney-General792 ss 19 and 101 combined to make admissible a “third party confession”, that was inadmissible at common law.793 (See now s 93B.) Re-examination [19.18] In re-examination the witness may be invited to explain any inconsistencies, and favourable parts of the statement may be referred to.794 The document may be tendered at this stage if that has not already been done.795 Because of this right of redress the discretion in s 19(2) is seldom used.796 However, it is available if evidence about a prior statement is left in an unsatisfactory state797 – for example, if answers given in cross-examination can only be understood by inspecting the document,798 or where, for any reason, it is fair to read the contents as a whole.799 Cross-examination on another person’s document [19.19] Generally witnesses may not be questioned about another person’s statement unless it is in evidence.800 In practice, many “third party statements” are inadmissible. Further, witnesses may generally not be asked about matters outside their own knowledge, although an admission may be based on hearsay.801 [19.20] However, if counsel has a hearsay statement in writing – perhaps a mere newspaper report – which contradicts a witness’s testimony, it may be handed to the witness during cross-examination, without identifying it, and the

791. Insofar as a prior statement asserts facts that are not within the personal knowledge of the statement-maker is still no evidence of those facts. 792. [1991] 1 Qd R 574. 793. Re Petition by Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163; R v Blastland [1986] AC 41; Brown v Western Australia [2011] WASCA 111. 794. Savanoff v Re-Car Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 219. 795. Meredith v Innes (1931) 31 SR (NSW) 104 at 112; Wood v Desmond (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 65; Wentworth v Rogers (No 10) (1987) 8 NSWLR 398. 796. In 1985 McHugh QC wrote that “in over 20 years of practice I have never seen any judge take advantage of that proviso”: (1985) 1 Aust Bar Rev 51. See to the same effect, Malcolm, “Cross-Examination on Documents” (1986) 2 Aust Bar Rev 267 at 272. No order to tender was made in Wood v Desmond (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 65; R v Hartwick (No 3) [2002] VSC 480 (application refused). 797. R v Ford (1851) 5 Cox CC 184; Thiess v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 4) [1992] 2 Qd R 549. 798. Thiess v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 4) [1992] 2 Qd R 549. 799. Connell v The Queen (No 6) (1994) 12 WAR 133; R v Thompson [1995] 3 NZLR 423. 800. Darby v Ouseley (1856) 1 H & N 1; 156 ER 1093; R v Banks (1916) 12 Cr App R 74; Paterson v Paterson (1953) 89 CLR 212. This may be so even when the witness is a party; Darby v Ousely, although there are dicta to the contrary in Alchin v Commissioner for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 at 508-509. 801. Lustre Hosiery Ltd v York (1936) 54 CLR 134 at 138; Anglim v Thomas [1974] VR 363; R v Dillon [1983] 2 Qd R 627; RW Miller & Co Pty Ltd v Krupp (Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 32 NSWLR 152; Bond Media Ltd v John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd (1988) 16 NSWLR 82 at 85-86.

280

Evidence Law in Queensland

[19.21]

Division 3 – Examination and cross-examination of witnesses

s 19 802

witness may be told: “Read this document, but don’t read it aloud.” Then, after a significant pause: “Now, having read that, do you still adhere to your evidence here?”803 The witness will often be unaware that a simple “yes, I do” would terminate this line of cross-examination. If the bluff works, and the witness says something like: “No, what I’ve said is not quite right”, he may be asked to make the appropriate corrections. Then, since the new version – as distinct from the mystery document – has become the witness’s own evidence, further questions can be asked about it. In so doing, the cross-examiner is not eliciting hearsay, but facts within the witness’s own knowledge.804 The third party document need not be tendered.805 [19.21] This stratagem was not well used in R v Bedington,806 where the charge was armed robbery and the main issue identity. The Crown case was that the accused, knowing the police had the registration number of his car, threw the stolen goods into the Brisbane River. The prosecutor handed him a newspaper cutting and said: “Having read that, you were aware, were you not, that the police knew not only the type of [your] car but also its [registration] number?” That question was objectionable because it conveyed the contents of the document to the jury: The limited use which can be made in cross-examination of documents of this kind is or should be well known. A document made by a person other than the witness … may, even if inadmissible in evidence, be put into a witness’s hands and that witness may be asked whether, having looked at the document he adheres to his previous testimony, but this is the extent to which the cross-examiner may go; he may not … indicate the nature … of the document.807

However, even when those rules are strictly observed, the result may be less than sensational. In Government Employees’ Superannuation Board v Martin808 “little confidence” was placed in evidence “hesitantly and reluctantly” changed after the witness read an unidentified document. Apparently the judge was no connoisseur of old tricks of advocacy. On the other hand, this strategem was recently described as “a cross-examination technique which is useful in many cases”.809 802. It is objectionable to introduce hearsay by asking a witness to read out the contents of a document that contains someone else’s knowledge. In R v Gillespie (1967) 51 Cr App R 172 – a false accounting case – the accused was improperly asked in cross-examination to read out the contents of sales dockets compiled by persons who were not called. 803. R v Seham Yousry (1914) 11 Cr App R 13 at 18; R v Orton [1922] VLR 469; R v Gillespie (1967) 51 Cr App R 172; North Australian Territory Co v Goldsborough Mort & Co [1893] 2 Ch 381 at 385 and 386. 804. An anecdote about devastating use of this bluff by Smyth QC, a former leader of the Sydney Bar, appears in McHugh QC, “Cross-Examination on Documents” (1985) 1 Aust Bar Rev 51. The fairness of the technique is open to debate; see comments on McHugh’s article in (1986) NZLJ 309 at 315. 805. Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647 at 682. 806. [1970] Qd R 353. 807. [1970] Qd R 353 at 359. Another case of error is Paterson v Paterson (1953) 89 CLR 212 where, on the hearing of a divorce, counsel was permitted to cross-examine the wife upon the contents of a letter sent to her by a stranger. 808. (1997) 19 WAR 224. 809. R v T, WA (2014) 118 SASR 382; [2014] SASCFC 3 at [77]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

281

s 19

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[19.22]

Other uses of prior statements Refreshing memory [19.22] Courts commonly allow witnesses to refer to notes made or verified during or soon after a relevant event.810 A copy may be used if absence of the original is satisfactorily explained.811 The opponent may inspect them without making them evidence for the party calling the witness.812 As a prior consistent statement, the notes are inadmissible at common law.813 But in civil proceedings, notes of personal knowledge may be tendered under s 92(1)(a), whether they are contemporaneous or not. Alternatively, if the notes satisfy the definition of “book of account” they may be tendered in any proceeding, under s 84. Notes used to “refresh” out of court must be produced in a criminal case,814 but in civil proceedings non-production goes to weight rather than admissibility of the associated testimony. On the other hand, this stratagem was recently described as “a cross-examination technique which is useful in many cases”.815 [19.23] The opponent may tender the notes, but this is unlikely if (as usual) they substantially support the witness’s testimony.816 [19.24] At common law the opponent may cross-examine the witness about evidence based on particular parts of the notes. Provided that questions are confined to parts used in chief, the cross-examiner retains the option817 of keeping the notes out of evidence. But if the questions go further, the cross-examiner may be required to tender them.818 These common law rules remain relevant in criminal proceedings, to which s 92 does not apply. Prior consistent statements [19.25] On the use of prior consistent statements, see [A.101] and [101.7]. Absent a suggestion of “recent invention”, an inconsistent statement tendered under s 19 cannot be countered, in criminal proceedings,819 by tendering another statement consistent with the testimony.820

810. Gorman v Newton; Ex parte Newton (1958) Qd R 169; Hetherington v Brooks [1963] SASR 321; R v Richardson [1971] 2 QB 484; R v Da Silva [1990] 1 WLR 31. 811. R v Shea (1978) 18 SASR 591. 812. Distinguish Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630 (hearsay document “called for”). 813. See, however, Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 92. 814. R v Pachonick [1973] 2 NSWLR 86; R v Alexander [1975] VR 741 at 749. 815. R v T, WA (2014) 118 SASR 382; [2014] SASCFC 3 at [77]. 816. For cases where opponents calculated that the notes would assist their causes, see Dairy Farmers Co-operative Milk Co Ltd v Acquilina (1963) 109 CLR 458; Barnes v Allied Interstate (Qld) Pty Ltd; Ex parte Barnes [1969] Qd R 244. 817. Lee v Chai [2013] QSC 136 at [100]. But in a civil case Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 92 may be used, and s 84, if applicable, may be used in any proceeding. 818. R v Bedington [1970] Qd R 353 at 359. Another case of error is Paterson v Paterson (1953) 89 CLR 212 where, on the hearing of a divorce, counsel was permitted to cross-examine the wife upon the contents of a letter sent to her by a stranger. 819. To which s 92 does not apply. 820. R v Beattie (1989) 89 Cr App R 302.

282

Evidence Law in Queensland

[20.2]

20

Division 3 – Examination and cross-examination of witnesses

s 20

Cross-examination as to credit

(1) The court may disallow a question as to credit put to a witness in cross-examination, or inform the witness the question need not be answered, if the court considers an admission of the question’s truth would not materially impair confidence in the reliability of the witness’s evidence. (2) In this section— question as to credit, for a witness, means a question that is not relevant to the proceeding except that an admission of the question’s truth may affect the witness’s credit by injuring the witness’s character. [S 20 subst Act 43 of 2000, s 45]

Overview [20.1] The present s 20 was substituted for the original version by s 45 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2000 (Qld). It probably adds nothing to a judge’s common law powers,821 but it may discourage judicial deference towards senior or aggressive advocates. Every court is in charge of its own procedure822 and disallowance of questions that “would not [even] affect the credibility of the witness”823 is unremarkable. Such questions merely cause “undue prolongation of the expensive procedure of hearing and determining a case”.824 Evidence relating to credit, like evidence on the issues, is subject to the over-arching principle of relevance. In HAR v Western Australia (No 2),825 concerning a witness 22 years of age, the judge was entitled to exclude evidence that the witness, at 14 years of age, made false allegations of sexual assault by someone other than the present accused. Section 20 applies to questioning under s 16.

Cross-examination not to be unduly restricted [20.2] Cross-examination is a vital part of the adversary system, especially when credit is in issue.826 In courts, if not other tribunals,827 cross-examination is a matter of natural justice,828 particularly in criminal cases.829 The rule against

821. Wakeley v The Queen (1990) 64 ALJR 321 at 325; R v Noud; Ex parte McNamara [1991] 2 Qd R 86. 822. Collier v Hicks (1830) 2 B & Ad 663; 109 ER 1020. 823. R v Heenan [2002] QCA 292. 824. Wakeley v The Queen (1990) 64 ALJR 321 at 325. 825. (2015) 49 WAR 266; [2015] WASCA 249. 826. Mechanical and General Inventions Co Ltd v Austin [1935] AC 346 at 359; Gregrhon Investments Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1986) 83 FLR 41; Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 189. But the capacity of judges to decide credit from “demeanour” is taken with more than a grain of salt by Kirby J in Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 at 505-506: “In earlier times great confidence was placed in the capacity of adjudicators to discern the truth on the basis of their impressions of witnesses. However, the trend of modern authority has cast doubts on that supposedly unique perceptiveness. That is why many adjudicators now rest their decisions, so far as they can, on indisputable facts, contemporary documents, and the logic of the circumstances rather than mere impressions. This is a desirable development.” © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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hearsay aims to protect this right. Accordingly, the power in s 20 is to be used with circumspection, and only when questions are clearly irrelevant.831 Cross-examination is a powerful and valuable weapon for the purpose of testing the veracity of a witness and the accuracy and completeness of his story. It is entrusted in the hands of counsel in the confidence that it will be used with discretion … not forgetting at the same time the burden that is imposed on the witness.832

Cross-examination by more than one counsel for a party, or by several parties with a common interest, may be restricted to prevent oppression and waste of time.833 If a party recalls a witness, the opponent has another opportunity (subject to the judge’s directions) to cross-examine at large.834 [20.3] Purely collateral questions may be, and commonly are, asked in cross-examination, but questions in chief must relate to the issues for trial.835 [20.4] The relevance of a cross-examiner’s question may not appear until several further questions are asked. In the meantime, counsel may be asked for an assurance that “this will become relevant”.836 In Wakeley v The Queen837 defence counsel attempted to ask a police witness whether he used illicit drugs. The question was preliminary to a suggestion that the officer was well placed to “plant” drugs on the accused, but was disallowed. In overruling that decision, the High Court observed that some very effective cross-examinations begin with seemingly irrelevant questions. [20.5] But control of cross-examination should be firm when questions unnecessarily “injur[e] the witness’s character”. (There are other and often more effective ways of testing credit, such as exploring the conditions under which an 827. Maloney v New South Wales National Coursing Association Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 161; O’Rourke v Miller (1985) 156 CLR 342; Forbes, Justice in Tribunals (Federation Press, 2002), para 12.76ff. 828. Hally v Starkey; Ex parte Hally [1962] Qd R 474; Wakeley v The Queen (1990) 64 ALJR 321. 829. R v Kalia (1974) 60 Cr App R 200; R v Maynard (1979) 69 Cr App R 309; Wakeley v The Queen (1990) 64 ALJR 321. 830. Allen v Allen [1894] P 248 at 252; Re Blue Pines [1988] 1 Qd R 13; Re Quartz Hill Co (1882) 21 Ch D 642; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 439. Minor exceptions relate to affidavits of documents (Birmingham and Midland Motor Omnibus Co Ltd v London and North Western Railway Co [1913] 3 KB 850; Fruehauf Finance Corporation Pty Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 359) and deponents opposing an application for summary judgment: New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Agency Co Ltd v Taylor [1955] QWN 68; Rosser v Austral Wine and Spirit Co Pty Ltd [1980] VR 313. 831. R v Aldridge (1990) 20 NSWLR 737. 832. Mechanical and General Inventions Co v Austin [1935] AC 346 at 349 per Viscount Sankey LC, approved in Wakeley v The Queen (1990) 64 ALJR 321 at 325. 833. GPI Leisure Corporation Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15. 834. R v Beckett [1966] Qd R 170. 835. Not so in examination in chief: R v Roberts [1942] 1 All ER 187 at 191; R v Livingstone [1987] 1 Qd R 38; R v Connolly [1991] 2 Qd R 171. 836. Re Petition by Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 193-194. 837. (1990) 64 ALJR 321.

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observation was made, without a reflection on the honesty of the witness.) Peccadilloes of long ago will often be irrelevant.838 The following passage in Stephen’s “History of the Common Law” was approved in R v Taylor:839 [T]here must be some discretion in the presiding judge as to the mode in which the examination shall be conducted in order best to answer the purposes of justice … No doubt cases may arise where the judge … would very properly interfere to protect the witness from unnecessary and unbecoming annoyance. Questions respecting alleged improprieties … which form no real ground for assuming that a witness … would not be a man of veracity might very fairly be checked … The judge has a right on all occasions to exercise the power of stopping examinations which are not necessary for any legitimate purpose.

There is an elegant and eminently sensible assessment of the parties’ credit in Jenkins v Wynen,840 where a constructive trust was in question. 21

Improper questions

(1) The court may disallow a question put to a witness in cross-examination or inform a witness a question need not be answered, if the court considers the question is an improper question. (2) In deciding whether a question is an improper question, the court must take into account— (a) any mental, intellectual or physical impairment the witness has or appears to have; and (b) any other matter about the witness the court considers relevant, including, for example, age, education, level of understanding, cultural background or relationship to any party to the proceeding. (3) Subsection (2) does not limit the matters the court may take into account in deciding whether a question is an improper question. (4) In this section— improper question means a question that uses inappropriate language or is misleading, confusing, annoying, harassing, intimidating, offensive, oppressive or repetitive. [S 21 subst Act 43 of 2000, s 45]

Overview [21.1] Section 21 was inserted by s 45 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2000 and the heading “Improper questions” then replaced “Scandalous and insulting questions”. A question may be “improper” within the meaning of s 21(4) although it bears some relevance to credit or even to an issue for trial. It may become “proper” if suitably rephrased. 838. R v Sweet-Escott (1971) 55 Cr App R 316. In Vella v The Queen (1990) 2 WAR 537; 47 A Crim R 119 the failure of the judge to control questions purporting to go to credit caused a mistrial. 839. (1892) 18 VLR 497. 840. [1992] 1 Qd R 40 at 41. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Questions about a witness’s criminal record may be relevant to credit (s 16) and sometimes to facts in issue.841 [21.2] Section 21 is not merely concerned with insults. It evinces the concern for vulnerable witnesses that is displayed in ss 21A, 21L – 21S, 21AA – 21AX and 93A. It refers specifically to age, intellectual disabilities, education and other subjective factors. The power conferred by s 21 may be used whether or not an objection is made.842 In Libke v The Queen843 the trial judge should have curtailed cross-examination and comment by the prosecutor that was “annoying, harassing, intimidating, offensive or oppressive”. It was improper for counsel to comment that he “did not buy” something said in evidence, or “we’ve heard about that one”. More detailed guidelines appear in s 41 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). [21.3] Sometimes it is in the interests of justice to raise a witness’s past misconduct.844 For example, if evidence of a confession is in issue it may be permissible to ask a purported witness to the confession whether he is an habitué of brothels and a taker of bribes.845 But it is improper to ask scandalous questions without evidence or apparently credible instructions to support them.846 A witness’s distress is not always a sufficient reason for stopping a cross-examination; an adjournment to regain composure may be the better course.847 [21.4] The names of persons not on trial should not be bandied about as if they are convicts or criminals.848

Cross-examining complainants in sexual-offence cases [21.5] The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 (Qld) (CLSOA) is an elaborate supplement to ss 20 and 21.849 It implies that some judges were previously too indulgent towards defence counsel at the expense of reputations or feelings of complainants. The history and policy of this legislation is discussed in Bull v The Queen.850 841. For example, when the conviction is admissible under s 79 or when the facts behind the conviction are admissible as evidence of motive, relationship or a distinctive modus operandi: see [15.18]-[15.21]. 842. For an example of application, see Yassir v Bone [2010] QDC 11. 843. (2007) 230 CLR 559; 81 ALJR 1309; 235 ALR 517; [2007] HCA 30 at [37], [124]. 844. R v Noud; Ex parte McNamara [1991] 2 Qd R 86; R v Millar [2000] 1 Qd R 437 at 441. 845. R v Reno (1987) 9 QL Reps 1. 846. Clyne v NSW Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186; R v Robinson [1977] Qd R 387 at 394. The allegation against the advocate was not established in Soteriadis v Nillumbik Shire Council [2015] VSC 363. 847. Chuprinoff v Chuprinoff (unreported, Vic Sup Ct FC, 23 November 1987); noted The Australian (21 December 1987). 848. R v Flynn [1972] Crim LR 428. 849. See generally, R v Tribe [2001] QCA 206. 850. (2000) 201 CLR 443 (McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). See also Kibble, “The Sexual History Provisions: Charting a Course between Inflexible Legislative Rules and Wholly Untrammelled Judicial Discretion?” [2000] Crim LR 274.

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Section 40 of the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003 inserted a new s 4A of the CLSOA: see [A.154]. [21.6] The term “sexual offence” includes rape, attempted rape, assault with intent to commit rape and indecent assault, as defined in s 352 of the Criminal Code.851 [21.7] Section 5 of the CLSOA authorises a court852 to exclude the public while a complainant testifies. A “person whose presence will provide emotional support” to the complainant may be allowed to remain or, in the case of a complainant under 17 years of age, a parent or guardian.853 Media reports must not identify the complainant.854 [21.8] Section 4 of the CLSOA provides that the following rules shall apply in relation to any examination of witnesses or trial in relation to a sexual offence whether or not the proceeding relates to another kind of offence: (1) The court shall not receive evidence of and shall disallow any question as to the general reputation of the complainant with respect to chastity. (2) Without leave of the court – (a) cross-examination of the complainant shall not be permitted as to the sexual activities of the complainant with any person; (b) evidence shall not be received as to the sexual activities of the complainant with any person. (3) The court shall not grant leave under Rule 2 unless it is satisfied that the evidence sought to be elicited855 or led has substantial relevance to the facts in issue or is proper matter for cross-examination as to credit. (4) Evidence relating to or tending to establish the fact that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity with a person or persons must not be regarded as having substantial relevance to the facts in issue only because of any inference it may raise about general disposition. Example of inference about general disposition – An inference that the complainant, because of having engaged in conduct of a sexual nature, is more likely to have consented to the conduct involved in the offence. Without prejudice to the substantial relevance of other evidence, evidence of an act or event that is substantially contemporaneous with any offence with which a defendant is charged in an examination of witnesses or a trial or that is part of a sequence of acts or events that explains the circumstances in which such an offence was committed shall be regarded as having substantial relevance to the facts in issue. (5) Evidence relating to or tending to establish the fact that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity with a person or persons is not proper matter for cross-examination as to credit unless, because of special circumstances, the court considers the evidence would be likely to materially impair confidence in the reliability of the complainant’s evidence. 851. CLSOA, s 3. 852. “Court” includes a magistrate conducting committal proceedings: s 3. 853. CLSOA, s 5(1)(f) and (1)(g). 854. CLSOA, ss 6 and 8. 855. That is, in cross-examination. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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The purpose of this rule is to ensure that a complainant is not regarded as less worthy of belief as a witness only because the complainant has engaged in sexual activity. (6) An application for leave under Rule 2 shall be made in the absence of the jury (if any)856 and, if the defendant so requests, in the absence of the complainant and shall be determined after the court has allowed such submissions or evidence (sworn or unsworn) as the court considers necessary for the determination of the application.

Rules 1, 2 and 4 were amended, r 5 was inserted and r 6 was renumbered by s 38 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2000 (Qld). [21.9] When the CLSOA first appeared it was criticised as unfair to defendants and over-indulgent towards complainants.857 There was some judicial support for that view: It seems to me, with all respect to those who think otherwise, that there were ample powers to protect prosecutrices [sic] against insulting and unwarranted questions relating to the sexual side of their lives without the enactment of the [CLSOA].858

But others did not agree.859 Another judge in the same case welcomed the legislation: Parliament is saying: “You in the courts have been so engrossed in seeing that justice was being done to the accused rapist that you have entirely overlooked that the girl who has been raped is entitled to justice … We are going to redress the balance.”… Parliament had to consider these problems: First, the courts [previously] tolerated almost unlimited ferreting into the girl’s past … [A]n active and vigilant use of [ss 20 and 21] … would have been quite sufficient to stop this pernicious process. However, it is equally-known to all of us who have practised in these courts that that did not happen. Secondly, admitted prior unchastity by the girl was frequently treated by juries as having a bearing on her veracity [or as showing] … that she could be treated as fair game by every lout … The third problem … is that quite a number of women jurors will not convict for rape … on the basis that if the woman puts so little value on her chastity why should we … cause a boy to be sent to gaol?860

And in the opinion of Spigelman CJ of New South Wales:

856. There is, of course, no jury in committal proceedings. 857. See a report of the 1988 International Criminal Law Congress in The Australian (21 June 1988): “Women Blamed for ‘Bizarre’ Rape Laws”. 858. R v Gun; Ex parte Stephenson (1977) 17 SASR 165 at 185 per Wells J. 859. See, eg, the comments of a Victorian practitioner under the heading, “Judges Must Be Forced to See Rape in New Light”, The Australian (4 May 1993), p 3: “If you are representing the defence you go in boots and all … because you know that if you can raise any kind of waywardness or antecedents on the part of the victim … then you can zero in on that.” In 1995 there were complaints, based on some empirical research in New South Wales and Victoria, to the effect that the legislation was often honoured in the breach: “Sexual experience was still raised in 40 per cent of cases, sometimes without explanation or challenge”, “Courts Face Scrutiny on Treatment of Sex Victims”, The Australian (9 May 1995), p 8. However, there may have been a misunderstanding of the application of parts of the CLSOA that still allow “other experiences” to be mentioned. 860. R v Gun; Ex parte Stephenson (1977) 17 SASR 165 at 173-174 per Zelling J. See to the same effect Bray CJ at 186.

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Legislative intervention was required to overcome the tendency of male judges to treat sexual assault complainants as prone to be unreliable.861

Upon the trial of an appellant for a sexual offence against a child under 16 years, it was not indicative of bias that the judge invited the complainant to nominate the times she wished the court to sit, apologised if she was kept waiting, inquired about her favourite subjects at school, whether she had a pet dog, what she did on her birthday, and assured her that she would try to make sure that the questions of counsel were not too hard for her. The judge, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal, quite properly sought to ensure that a young witness was not overawed or frightened by a strange, formal and potentially hostile environment in which the appellant was legally represented and the complainant was not.862 [21.10] The CLSOA governs evidence for the defence as well as crossexamination of complainants. It does not prohibit every reference to a complainant’s sexual conduct on other occasions. It strikes a balance that may disappoint its more zealous supporters. Evidence of previous sexual conduct with the accused remains relevant to an issue of consent,863 but since r 4 was amended in 2000 its introduction requires leave. In R v Starkey864 the defence sought to ask the complainant whether she had approached another man for intercourse shortly before the alleged rape, saying: “Starkey and I did it last night.” That was a proper question, relevant to consent. In Bull v The Queen865 it was held that the judge should have allowed defence evidence that, when the accused invited the complainant home he said to her: “We might be able to do one of your fantasies” (a mutually understood reference to “group sex”). Again, that was not an improper attack on her reputation, but evidence relevant to consent. It should be noted that Starkey and Bull were decided before the “leave” proviso was attached to CLSOA, r 4. [21.11] The only topic strictly taboo is “the general reputation of the complainant with respect to chastity”.866 Thus, s 4 r 1 of the CLSOA abolishes the practice of treating a complainant’s character in sexual matters as a regular topic for cross-examination as to credit.867 The ban is not limited to consensual activity.868 Cross-examination about experience of prior sexual assaults is not permissible869 and, according to R v M,870 the same applies to a lack of sexual 861. JJB v The Queen (2006) 161 A Crim R 187; [2006] NSWCCA 126 at [4]. 862. LAL v The Queen [2011] VSCA 111. 863. R v Riley (1887) 18 QBD 481; R v Aloisio (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 111; R v De Angelis (1979) 20 SASR 288 at 291; R v McCready [1967] VR 325; cf R v Gun; Ex parte Stephenson (1977) 17 SASR 165 at 169 per Bray CJ (“almost always” relevant). Mention of other relationships may be permitted under r 4; JJU v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 264. 864. [1988] 2 Qd R 294. 865. (2000) 201 CLR 443. 866. Including questions about lack of sexual experience: R v JK [2005] QCA 307 at [31]. 867. R v Holmes (1871) 12 Cox CC 137; R v Aloisio (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 111 at 114. Answers to this type of collateral question could only be rebutted if the complainant were a “common prostitute”: R v Barker (1829) 3 C & P 589. 868. HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; R v C (1991) 59 A Crim R 46. 869. R v C (1991) 59 A Crim R 46. 870. (1993) 67 A Crim R 549. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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experience. Section 4 does not prohibit questions designed to show that a complainant has previously made false complaints of sexual assault.871

Other occasions substantially relevant: CLSOA rule 4 [21.12] Prima facie questions about “sexual activities of the complainant with any person”, including the defendant, are prohibited.872 “[O]ne does not, in the ordinary case, [now] hear evidence of other sexual experience which a complainant may have had.”873 But the prohibition is not absolute. Such evidence may be allowed if it has “substantial relevance” to an issue of fact or credit.874 It is relevant to credit only where “because of special circumstances, the court considers the evidence would be likely to materially impair confidence in the reliability of the complainant’s evidence”.875 It is not relevant merely because it suggests promiscuity.876 [21.13]

According to CLSOA r 4 a court should allow:

evidence of an act or event that is substantially contemporaneous with any offence [or] that is part of a sequence of acts or events that explains the circumstances in which such an offence was committed.

This provision reflects the common law concept of res gesta.877 Events so closely connected with a fact in issue that they are really part of “the one transaction” are direct evidence thereof.878 Gregory v The Queen879 is a case in which the trial judge should have admitted evidence of the complainant’s intercourse not only with the three accused, but also with several others on the same occasion. The other acts were so closely related in place and time to the alleged rape as to be evidence of consent.880 The closing words of CLSOA r 4 provide that events may bear “substantial relevance to the facts in issue” without being “substantially contemporaneous”. In R v Viola881 the judge should have allowed cross-examination of the complainant to show that shortly before the alleged rape she made sexual overtures to two other men, and shortly afterwards had intercourse with her “boy friend”. [21.14] Consensual acts with other persons may be so similar to the act in question as to suggest that it, too, was consensual, or that the accused reasonably 871. R v Miller (2007) 177 A Crim R 528; [2007] QCA 373. 872. CLSOA, s 4 r 2. 873. R v Kerim [1988] 1 Qd R 426 at 448 per Macrossan J. 874. CLSOA, s 4 r 3 (emphasis added); Bull v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 443, outlined at [21.10]; see also Western Australia v Tierney (2005) 39 SR (WA) 296; [2005] WADC 110. 875. CLSOA, s 4 r 5. 876. CLSOA, s 4 r 4. 877. See [A.126]-[A.129]. 878. Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 at 375; O’Leary v The King (1946) 73 CLR 566; R v O’Malley [1964] Qd R 226; Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 633; Forbes, Similar Facts (Law Book Co, 1987), Ch 2. 879. (1983) 151 CLR 566; see also R v Robertson (1978) 17 SASR 479. 880. R v Morgan (1993) 30 NSWLR 543. 881. [1982] 1 WLR 1138.

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882

believed it to be so. In R v Starkey the defence should have been allowed to ask the complainant about consensual acts of “bondage” with another man, when she alleged that she was treated in that manner, against her will, on the occasion in question. In R v De Angelis883 the court allowed evidence of the complainant’s indulgence in “group sex”, because it supported the defence claim that she consented to “group sex” on the occasion charged.884 This has been described as “consent in special circumstances”,885 as distinct from general reputation. [21.15] In R v Richardson886 a man charged with rape told police that the complainant had boasted about sexual intercourse with other men on the same night. There was medical evidence to support this story. In those circumstances the defence should have been allowed to raise that matter, because it was substantially relevant to the issue of consent. (A fortiori if it is alleged that the complainant made sexual advances to the accused after the alleged assault.887) In R v Morgan888 the defence should have been allowed to cross-examine the complainant about consensual intercourse with a third person within one or two hours of the alleged rape. This evidence, if accepted, made her story of a recent sexual assault less credible. In a case where the complainant supported her denial of consent by claiming a fear of pregnancy, the defence was permitted to ask about her use of contraceptives.889 [21.16] A doubtful case is R v Hegarty (unreported), referred to in R v Gray.890 In Hegarty, Jacobs J allowed the defence to lead evidence that the complainant, aged 19, was notorious for her “ready availability” in the town of Port Lincoln at the time of the alleged offence, so that the accused reasonably believed she would give him a similar reception. Hegarty is difficult to reconcile with s 4 r 1 of the CLSOA.

Not “substantially relevant” [21.17] Other occasions are not substantially relevant if all they show is a promiscuous disposition.891 If a complainant says that she was a virgin before the alleged assault, it is not permissible to ask her about sexual conduct afterwards.892 There is no justification for asking a complainant aged 14 about prior sexual experience with a friend when the question is whether she consented to sexual activity with a group of four adults, all of them strangers to her.893 In R 882. [1988] 2 Qd R 294. 883. (1979) 20 SASR 288. 884. (1979) 20 SASR 288 at 292. 885. R v Krausz (1973) 57 Cr App R 466 at 475. 886. [1989] 1 Qd R 583. 887. Bannister v The Queen (1993) 10 WAR 484. 888. (1993) 30 NSWLR 543; Taleb v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 105. 889. R v Warrell [1993] 1 VR 671. 890. (1977) 17 SASR 534 at 544. 891. R v O’Neill (2003) 7 VR 408; [2003] VSCA 204 (conduct with another person four years after offences charged). 892. R v Danine (2004) 145 A Crim R 278; [2004] QCA 102. 893. R v Gray (1977) 17 SASR 534. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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894

v White the judge rightly refused leave to ask the complainant about a conversation in which she allegedly told the accused that a “boy friend” left her when he found her in bed with another man. This related only to her general reputation for chastity. A similar view was taken by the Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Starkey895 when the defence proposed to ask the complainant about the following conversation: Boy Friend: “You have already slept with two of my friends. How many more are you going to go through?” Complainant: “Probably all of them, if I can get round to it.”

Proper cross-examination as to credit: CLSOA rule 5 [21.18] Relevance to credit alone may suffice if the “other occasion” evidence is “likely to materially impair confidence in the reliability of the complainant’s evidence”: CLSOA, r 5. However, it is hard to find affirmative decisions based on this ground alone. It seems to have been one reason for giving leave in R v Viola,896 but not the only one. Again, in AM v The Queen,897 the complainant’s consent to being filmed during intercourse went to the issue of consent as well as to her credit. However, a case based squarely on r 5 is R v Holt.898 The complainant put her sexual character in issue by claiming “somewhat limited experience” with men. Kelly J allowed her to be questioned about her activities six weeks before the event, in premises charitably described as a “massage parlour”. Self-accreditation by a complainant is not prohibited by the CLSOA,899 but it invites cross-examination, as in Holt.900 But leave may be refused if the offence is so aggravated that no complainant, however “sophisticated”, could reasonably be regarded as consenting.901 Leave to cross-examine as to credit was refused in R v Parsons,902 where the defence proposed to ask the complainant about a denial of a sexual encounter six years earlier, when she was only 13 years of age. A similar case is R v O’Neill903 where the defence unsuccessfully applied to cross-examine a woman who was 16 years old at the time of the offence, about conduct with another man four years afterwards.

Procedure under the CLSOA [21.19] Rule 6 of the CLSOA states that a decision to allow or disallow a question shall be made “after the court has allowed such submissions or evidence 894. (1989) 18 NSWLR 332. 895. [1988] 2 Qd R 294. 896. [1982] 1 WLR 1138. 897. (2006) 164 A Crim R 558; [2006] NTCCA 1. 898. [1983] 2 Qd R 462. 899. R v Allingham QLR (16 February 1991) (leave to appeal to High Court refused). Claim by complainant that she was a virgin immediately before the offence. 900. See also R v Gun; Ex parte Stephenson (1977) 17 SASR 165 at 169. 901. R v Gray (1977) 17 SASR 534 at 541-542. 902. [1998] 1 VR 471. 903. (2003) 7 VR 408; [2003] VSCA 204.

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s 21A 904

(sworn or unsworn) as the court considers necessary”. In R v De Angelis the judge directed the accused to give evidence on the voir dire in support of the application, but on appeal it was said that assurances from the Bar table will normally suffice. The application must include any particulars required by the judge,905 but there is no need to recite verbatim the questions proposed to be asked.906 A memorandum of the proposed line of questioning is desirable, in case the application is refused and an appeal follows.907 [21.20] Notwithstanding the changes introduced by the CLSOA, it is an improper reversal of the onus of proof to tell a jury that a young complainant is unlikely to have concocted a story of sexual abuse.908 It is also erroneous for judge or prosecution to suggest that the defence has to prove that the complainant has a motive to lie.909 But if the defence suggests that the complainant is lying, the prosecution may ask whether there is any factual basis for the suggestion.910 [21.21] Cross-examination under the Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) requires leave, which is not to be granted unless the child is at least 12 years of age, has legal representation, and consents to testify: s 112. Cross-examination of a “protected witness” by an unrepresented defendant is prohibited: see ss 21M and 21N.

DIVISION 4 – EVIDENCE OF SPECIAL WITNESSES 21A

Evidence of special witnesses

(1) In this section— criminal organisation see the Criminal Code, section 1. [Def insrt Act 53 of 2009, s 153]

domestic violence see the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012, section 8. [Def insrt Act 17 of 2015, s 11(1)]

party includes a person who is present in court and is a member, a representative (other than a legal representative) or a nominee of an organisation that is a party to the proceeding. [Def insrt Act 53 of 2009, s 153]

prescribed proceeding means a proceeding for, or an appeal from an order made on, an application under the Criminal Organisation Act 2009. [Def insrt Act 53 of 2009, s 153]

904. (1979) 20 SASR 288. 905. R v McGarvey (1987) 10 NSWLR 632. 906. R v Dimian (1995) 83 A Crim R 358. 907. R v McGarvey (1987) 10 NSWLR 632. 908. R v G [1994] 1 Qd R 540; R v Baldwin [2009] QCA 337 at [38]; R v Parsons [2015] SASCFC 183. 909. R v Topalidis [1999] QCA 376; R v Taylor [2001] 2 Qd R 23; [2000] QCA 96; Crisafio v The Queen (2003) 27 WAR 169. 910. R v Bajic (2005) 154 A Crim R 96; [2005] VSCA 158. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

293

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relevant matter, for a person, means the person’s age, education, level of understanding, cultural background or relationship to any party to the proceeding, the nature of the subject matter of the evidence, or another matter the court considers relevant. [Def insrt Act 43 of 2000, s 46]

serious criminal offence see the Criminal Organisation Act 2009, section 7. [Def insrt Act 53 of 2009, s 153]

special witness means— (a) a child under 16 years; or (b) a person who, in the court’s opinion— (i) would, as a result of a mental, intellectual or physical impairment or a relevant matter, be likely to be disadvantaged as a witness; or (ii) would be likely to suffer severe emotional trauma; or (iii) would be likely to be so intimidated as to be disadvantaged as a witness; if required to give evidence in accordance with the usual rules and practice of the court; or (c) a person who is to give evidence about the commission of a serious criminal offence committed by a criminal organisation or a member of a criminal organisation. (d) a person— (i) against whom domestic violence has been or is alleged to have been committed by another person; and (ii) who is to give evidence about the commission of an offence by the other person. [Def am Act 17 of 2015, s 11(2); Act 53 of 2009, s 153; Act 55 of 2003, s 59]

(1A) This section does not apply to a child to the extent division 4A applies to the child. [Subs (1A) insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 59]

(1B) A party to a proceeding or, in a criminal proceeding, the person charged may be a special witness. [Former subs (1A) renum Act 55 of 2003, s 59]

(2) Where a special witness is to give or is giving evidence in any proceeding, the court may, of its own motion or upon application made by a party to the proceeding, make or give 1 or more of the following orders or directions— (a) in the case of a criminal or other prescribed proceeding—that the person charged or other party to the proceeding be excluded from the room in which the court is sitting or be obscured from the view of the special witness while the special witness is giving evidence or is required to appear in court for any other purpose; (b) that, while the special witness is giving evidence, all persons other than those specified by the court be excluded from the room in which it is sitting; 294

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s 21A

(c)

that the special witness give evidence in a room— (i) other than that in which the court is sitting; and (ii) from which all persons other than those specified by the court are excluded; (d) that a person approved by the court be present while the special witness is giving evidence or is required to appear in court for any other purpose in order to provide emotional support to the special witness; (e) that a video-taped recording of the evidence of the special witness or any portion of it be made under such conditions as are specified in the order and that the video-taped evidence be viewed and heard in the proceeding instead of the direct testimony of the special witness; (f) another order or direction the court considers appropriate about the giving of evidence by the special witness, including, for example, any of the following— (i) a direction about rest breaks for the special witness; (ii) a direction that questions for the special witness be kept simple; (iii) a direction that questions for the special witness be limited by time; (iv) a direction that the number of questions for a special witness on a particular issue be limited. [Subs (2) am Act 53 of 2009, s 153; Act 55 of 2003, s 59; Act 43 of 2000, s 46]

(3) [Repealed] [Subs (3) rep Act 55 of 2003, s 59]

(4) Subject to any order made pursuant to subsection (5), in any criminal proceeding an order shall not be made pursuant to subsection (2)(a), (b) or (c) excluding the person charged from the room in which a special witness is giving evidence unless provision is made, by means of an electronic device or otherwise, for that person to see and hear the special witness while the special witness is giving evidence. (5) Where the making of a video-taped recording of the evidence of a special witness is ordered pursuant to subsection (2)(e), the court may further order that all persons other than those specified by the court be excluded from the room in which the special witness is giving that evidence. [Subs (5) am Act 55 of 2003, s 59]

(5A) However, any person entitled in the proceeding to examine or cross-examine the special witness shall be given reasonable opportunity to view any portion of the video-taped recording of the evidence relevant to the conduct of that examination or cross-examination. [Subs (5A) am Act 55 of 2003, s 59]

(6) A video-taped recording under this section of evidence given by a special witness, or a lawfully edited copy of the recording— © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

295

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Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

(a)

(b)

[21A.1]

is as admissible as if the evidence were given orally in the proceeding in accordance with the usual rules and practice of the court; and is, unless the relevant court otherwise orders, admissible in— (i) any rehearing or retrial of, or appeal from, the proceeding; or (ii) in the case of evidence given for a criminal proceeding— (A) another proceeding in the same court for the relevant charge or for another charge arising out of the same, or the same set of, circumstances; or (B) a civil proceeding arising from the commission of the offence.

[Subs (6) subst Act 55 of 2003, s 59]

(7) The room in which a special witness gives evidence pursuant to an order made pursuant to subsection (2)(c) or (e) shall be deemed to be part of the court in which the proceeding is being held. [Subs (7) am Act 55 of 2003, s 59]

(8) If evidence is given, or to be given, in a proceeding on indictment under an order or direction mentioned in subsection (2)(a) to (e), the judge presiding at the proceeding must instruct the jury that— (a) they should not draw any inference as to the defendant’s guilt from the order or direction; and (b) the probative value of the evidence is not increased or decreased because of the order or direction; and (c) the evidence is not to be given any greater or lesser weight because of the order or direction. [Subs (8) reinsrt Act 55 of 2003, s 59; rep Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

(9) [Repealed] [Subs (9) rep Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1] [S 21A am Act 17 of 2015; Act 53 of 2009; Act 55 of 2003; Act 43 of 2000; Act 58 of 1995; insrt Act 17 of 1989, s 63]

Overview [21A.1] Section 21A was inserted by the Criminal Code, Evidence Act and Other Acts Amendment Act 1989 (Qld). It is based on s 32 of the English Criminal Justice Act 1988.911 Minor amendments were made by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2000, which inserted the definition of “relevant matter” into s 21A(1)(b). This section was used to avoid the risk of “intimidation” in R v Dargin.912 Section 21A(2)(f) encourages the court to order rest breaks for “special witnesses” and to ensure that questions are “kept simple”. Additional 911. On the subject of evidence of children, see Robertson, “Vulnerable Witnesses and the Criminal Justice System” (2000) 4 Queensland Bar News 13. The writer refers to ss 21A and 93A of this Act, casts doubt on the dogma that witnesses must always be compelled to confront the accused and argues for adoption of legislation in Western Australia where children’s evidence in sexual cases, at the committal stage, may be given in writing or by tape-recording, with cross-examination only by special leave. 912. [2013] QCA 20.

296

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[21A.2]

Division 4 – Evidence of special witnesses

s 21A

guidelines were added to that subsection by s 59(5) of the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003 (Qld).913 At the same time, s 21A(6) was extended to retrials,914 rehearings, appeals and related proceedings. Section 21A(8) was added, and the age limit for a “child” was raised from 12 to 16 years: s 21A(1)(a). Section 21A does not apply to an “affected child”, but may apply to an adult, such as one who is mentally ill.915 The definitions of “criminal organisation”, “party”, “prescribed proceedings” and “serious criminal offence”, and cl (c) of the definition of “special witness” were inserted by s 153 of the Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld), assented to on 15 April 2010. By the same Act consequential changes were made to s 21A(2)(a). This section was extended to alleged victims of domestic violence by the Criminal Law (Domestic Violence) Amendment Act 2015, ss 10–11. Section 21A is not limited to criminal proceedings.916 Section 21A(6)(b)(ii) specifically mentions civil proceedings “arising from the commission of the offence”, such as an application for criminal compensation, but in practice it is used mainly in relation to sexual offences against minors. Evidence of minors in the Children’s Court is normally received in the form of a report prepared by a psychologist or social worker.917 “Court” includes a magistrate conducting committal proceedings.918 In New South Wales similar provisions have been extended to all complainants in sexual assault cases.919 [21A.2] Section 21A caters not only for children, but also for persons who would be “disadvantaged”920 or “likely to suffer severe emotional trauma”, or be seriously “intimidated” if they were required to testify in the ordinary way: s 21A(1)(b). Presumably, a judge who feels unsure of the meaning of “severe emotional trauma” may receive expert evidence on a voir dire. In R v West921 a Full Court held that s 21A allows a screen to be placed between the accused and a “distressed and timid 19 year old female complainant”. The court approved922 the following direction by the trial judge:923 913. The legislation encourages liberal use of this power: R v S (2000) 78 SASR 33. 914. R v G (2007) 4 DCLR (NSW) 328 (record of complainant’s evidence admissible at sixth trial after five discontinued trials). 915. R v Henderson [2014] QCA 12 at [61]. 916. See s 21A(1B). 917. On affidavits in this jurisdiction, see Children’s Court Rules (Qld), ss 7 – 9 and 16. 918. Section 3 definitions of “court” and “proceeding”. 919. Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sexual Offence Evidence) Act 2004 (NSW). 920. For example, those who are intellectually impaired: R v RAI [2011] QCA 64. 921. [1992] 1 Qd R 227; R v Hall [2011] QCA 26. See also R v X, R v Y and R v Z, The Times (Law Report) 3 November 1989, where the accused were charged with indecent assaults upon two girls and two boys; R v Watson [2002] QCA 145; R v Crosby [2002] QCA 213. The judge must instruct the jury in terms of s 21A(8), or risk a mistrial: R v Kovacs [2009] 2 Qd R 51; [2008] QCA 417. 922. [1992] 1 Qd R 227 at 229-230. 923. Now embodied in s 21A(8), inserted in 2003. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

297

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[21A.3]

You will see that the accused is no longer in the dock. In fact, he is at the back of the court behind the screen. You will have seen that the witness has had some difficulties in giving her evidence. It will be for you to assess that … but it seems to me … that the trial might proceed more expeditiously and expediently in the overall interests of justice if the accused is not in the view of the witness. Now, I should hasten to add that … the accused has not in any way apparently attempted to influence or intimidate the witness … you must not draw any adverse inference against the accused by reason of the steps I’ve taken.

The substance of that warning is now a statutory requirement: s 21A(8). Failure to observe it will result in a mistrial.924 Clearly the judge in R v West suspected that the special arrangements might create difficulties for the defence, but acceptance of that risk is implicit in s 21A. Indeed, some juries might look askance at the complainant rather than the accused, as Thomas J925 suggested in that case: It may be important that an accused person have the opportunity of looking the complainant in the eye, especially if the complaint is false and he is appalled at the lies she is telling … [H]e may not wish the jury to think he is by apparent lack of interest accepting what she says. Within the limits of decorum which the Court can control, such reactions may be spontaneous and justifiable. A willingness to confront an accuser may be the mark of an honest defence. On other occasions, an aggressive glance may be … designed to intimidate. … In the context of a trial such as the present, there are two diametrically conflicting explanations why a complainant may not wish the accused person to be looking at her … One is that she is required to relate a very distressing incident in the presence of the very attacker for whom she feels disgust or … fear. The other is that she is not telling the truth, and the presence of the accused person is embarrassing to her. … If the defence counsel’s instructions are to the effect that she is not telling the truth, then he may properly put that to the witness, and may ultimately submit to the jury that she is adopting that pose for theatrical reasons, or that she finds it difficult to look the accused in the eye because she knows she is not telling the truth. This is the forensic counterbalance … [T]he subsection does not require the total elimination of all prejudice, and the scheme of s 21A is to entrust to the court a balancing exercise … This particular case concerns only a relatively minor adjustment to … traditional court procedure.

Possible applications of section 21A(2) [21A.3] The use of a screen is not the only special procedure. The accused may be excluded from the courtroom if compensating arrangements are made.926 Other alternatives are: (i) exclusion of specified persons from the courtroom; (ii) examination of the witness in another room; (iii) approval of a person to lend “emotional support”; (iv) use of a videotape instead of evidence viva voce;927 (v) closed circuit television. 924. R v Michael (2008) 181 A Crim R 490; [2008] QCA 33; R v Bisht [2013] QCA 238; R v Carter (2014) 241 A Crim R 522; [2014] QCA 120 at [64], [69]. 925. [1992] 1 Qd R 227 at 230-231. 926. See s 21A(4) (electronic or other means of enabling the defendant to see and hear the special witness) and s 21A(5A) (which gives other parties a right to preview any tape recording before examining or cross-examining). 927. As to the admissibility of a videotape, see s 21A(6), inserted in 2003.

298

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[21A.6]

Division 4 – Evidence of special witnesses

s 21A

Tension between the right of confrontation and the alternative methods of receiving evidence is considered in Brodie v Streeter.928 In an unnamed case in the District Court at Innisfail in February 2004 an application for a screen was refused, on the ground that the accused was already well hidden by a large, old-fashioned dock.929 Exclusion of a party, even in civil proceedings, is a radical step, which usually requires statutory authority.930 Nevertheless, in R v Smellie,931 absent such authority, the accused was ordered to sit on stairs to the dock, out of the complainant’s sight. Coleridge J stated: If the judge considers that the presence of the prisoner will intimidate the witness there is nothing to prevent him from securing the ends of justice by removing the former from the presence of the latter.932

[21A.4] Non-publication orders and the exclusion of persons who are not parties are less remarkable procedures.933

Video recordings: section 21A(2)(e) [21A.5] An early case on s 21A(2)(e) is R v Blanch.934 The conviction was later set aside as “unsafe”,935 but the orders for video recording were not criticised. The form of order used in Blanch was followed by Helman Ch DC in R v Mackie,936 where the evidence of a girl aged six was recorded in another building. The defendant is entitled to be present when videotaped evidence is played before the jury.937 [21A.6]

The Mackie order reads:

I direct that the videotaping take place in the room set up for that purpose in the office of the Director of Prosecutions and that the complainant’s mother and such Court reporters as may be necessary to record the proceedings by way of transcript may be present at all times during the videotaping. I direct that the evidence in chief of the complainant be given in the presence of the Crown Prosecutor and of the mother of the complainant and the court reporters, but 928. (2003) 180 FLR 176; [2003] ACTSC 88. There it was decided to hear evidence by an alternative means from an “uninhibited witness”, considering that facial expressions and “body language” would still be seen by the defence. 929. Courier Mail (17 February 2004), p 6. 930. In the Marriage of A and A (1985) FLC 91-613. 931. R v Smellie (1919) 14 Cr App R 128. 932. (1919) 14 Cr App R 128 at 130. 933. See, eg, Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 (Qld), s 5; see also Fractionated Cane Technology Ltd v Ruiz-Avila [1988] 1 Qd R 51 at 72 (protection of trade secrets); John Fairfax and Sons Ltd v Police Tribunal of New South Wales (1986) 5 NSWLR 465; Re National Safety Council of Australia Victorian Division (In liq) (1989) 8 ACLC 277. 934. (Unreported, Qld District Ct, Skoien DCJ, 14 August 1989). 935. R v Blanch (unreported, Qld CCA, Kelly, Ryan, Mackenzie JJ, 30 October 1989). It was not open to the trial judge to direct an acquittal on that ground: Attorney-General’s Reference No 1 of 1983 [1983] 2 VR 410; R v Sutton [1986] 2 Qd R 72. 936. (Unreported, Qld Dist Ct, 22 March 1990). 937. R v TQ (2007) 173 A Crim R 385; [2007] QCA 255. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

299

s 21A

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[21A.7]

that counsel for the accused and his instructing solicitor and their client be present in an observation room from which they can see and hear all that takes place. I direct that at the conclusion of the evidence in chief of the complainant [the Prosecutor] leave the room and that counsel for the accused may then enter the room alone and ask whatever questions he wishes to by way of cross-examination of the complainant. I direct that [the Prosecutor] and those instructing him be at liberty to observe the cross-examination from the observation room and that [Counsel’s] instructing solicitor and the accused be permitted to observe it also from a separate observation room. Re-examination, if any, shall be conducted in the same way as evidence in chief, subject to the ordinary rules relating to re-examination of a witness. I direct further that the Crown and the accused and his advisers have access to the videotape and the Court reporting Bureau provide a transcript for the purpose of taking instructions and preparing their cases. I direct that the videotape be transcribed, if necessary, on to a videotape capable of being played in the courtroom and that all necessary equipment be brought into the courtroom for that purpose. I further direct that should [defence counsel] not cross-examine the complainant in the videotaping room, that he then be at liberty to cross-examine the complainant in the courtroom after the videotape of her evidence in chief has been played [there].

[21A.7] The videotapes and transcripts in Blanch and Mackie were recorded subject to any objections raised in court. As a matter of fairness, the videotapes were played to the jury once only, bearing in mind there are no “replays” of normal testimony: compare [99.1]. That view is endorsed in Gately v The Queen,938 where a videotape of the complainant’s evidence was replayed to the jury in the absence of the judge and legal representatives, with the consent of counsel for the defence. The High Court decided that this procedure, albeit irregular, did not cause a mistrial because the complainant’s testimony was virtually the only evidence before the court. [21A.8] Before making the orders in Mackie, his Honour examined the child on a voir dire and concluded: “I couldn’t be satisfied that she doesn’t have sufficient intelligence to give reliable evidence, and it would seem to me that she was probably overawed by the courtroom.” The judge then explained to the child the duty to speak the truth, observing that it would be “pointless” to administer an oath to a six-year-old. [21A.9] The special arrangements permitted by s 21A depend on the capacity of judges and counsel to modify forms and mannerisms which normally (if unnecessarily) accompany a trial. Section 21A goes beyond the quaint notion that a child will soon be at home in a courtroom if judges and counsel just take off their wigs and even – in extremis – their gowns. Indeed, in Mackie a barrister confidently asserted: “There is nothing about the court that would intimidate [a child aged six]. I know of no field of study that would indicate that children have nightmares because they have seen the inside of a courtroom.”939 938. (2007) 241 ALR 1; 82 ALJR 149; [2007] HCA 55. 939. But the same gentleman was perturbed at the prospect of cross-examining a witness while she sat beside him, amid “toys and bean bags and things”. Let us hope that he was consoled by his Honour’s assurance: “I won’t make you sit on a bean bag, Mr X.” Relevant literature includes: Oates, “Children as Witnesses” (1990) 64 ALJ 129; Parkinson, “The Future of Competency

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[21AA.2]

Division 4A – Evidence of affected children

s 21AB

[21A.10] For insights into defence tactics with children, see O’Gorman, “Defence Strategies in Child Sexual Abuse Accusation Cases”.940 Some devices mentioned there may have to be modified in the light of Div 4A.

DIVISION 4A – EVIDENCE OF AFFECTED CHILDREN Subdivision 1 – Preliminary 21AA Purposes of div 4A The purposes of this division are— (a) to preserve, to the greatest extent practicable, the integrity of an affected child’s evidence; and (b) to require, wherever practicable, that an affected child’s evidence be taken in an environment that limits, to the greatest extent practicable, the distress and trauma that might otherwise be experienced by the child when giving evidence. [S 21AA insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

[21AA.1] Divisions 4A and 4B of Pt 2, comprising ss 21AA – 21AZC, were inserted by s 60 of the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003 (Qld).941 The Explanatory Notes942 to that Act observe: A great deal of reputable research has criticized the Queensland criminal justice system’s treatment of child witnesses, particularly victims of sexual assault … [2] This Bill is part of a comprehensive reform package directed at improving the way the criminal justice system treats child witnesses and ensuring that those who offend against children are detected and punished … The reforms aim to ensure that ordinarily a child should not have to give evidence more than once, alternative measures should be used where possible, and trials should be resolved as quickly as possible.

[21AA.2] “Supreme Court Practice Direction No 3 of 2004”, published in the Queensland Law Reporter (27 March 2004), deals with these matters arising under Div 4A: (i) preparation, safe keeping and copying of videotapes; (ii) the prerecording of evidence; (iii) the editing of prerecorded evidence; and (iv) orders for the supply of prerecorded evidence. There are similar rules for the “District Court in Practice Direction No 2 of 2004”, published in the Queensland Law Reporter (20 March 2004). 21AB

How purposes are to be achieved

To achieve the purposes of this division, the division prescribes the following measures for an affected child when giving evidence for a relevant proceeding— Testing for Child Witnesses” (1991) 15 Crim LJ 186; Cashmore and Cahill, “Closed Circuit Television and Child Witnesses: Is It Achieving Its Objective?” (1991) 29 Law Soc J (NSW) 57; Ambikapathy, “Judicial Discretion and Children’s Evidence” (1992) 66 Law Inst J (Vic) 147; Queensland Law Reform Commission: The Receipt of Evidence by Queensland Courts: The Evidence of Children, Working Paper No 53 (December 1998). 940. (1991) 21 Q Law Soc J 195. 941. Birch, “Children’s Evidence” [1992] Crim LR 262. 942. Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 14B(3)(e). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[21AB.1]

(a)

for a criminal proceeding— (i) the child’s evidence is to be prerecorded in the presence of a judicial officer, but in advance of the proceeding; (ii) if the measure in subparagraph (i) can not be given effect, the child’s evidence is to be given at the proceeding, but with the use of an audio visual link or with the benefit of a screen; (iii) for a committal proceeding, the child’s evidence-in chief is to be given only as a statement and, ordinarily, the child is not to be called as a witness for cross-examination; (b) for a civil proceeding, the child’s evidence is to be given at the proceeding with the use of an audio visual link or with the benefit of a screen. [S 21AB insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

[21AB.1] Presumably the provision for prerecording is meant to preserve the integrity of the child’s evidence by minimising the time-lapse between the event and the testimony: compare s 21AA(b). For notes on screens and audio-visual links, see [21A.1]ff. [21AB.2] Cross-examination of complainants in committal proceedings is subject to ss 21AG and 21AH. Normally, at that stage, the child’s evidence is contained in a statement prepared in accordance with s 110A of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld). [21AB.3] The expression “civil proceeding” in s 21AB(b) includes an application for criminal compensation as well as an action for damages against the offender. Quaere whether it would apply to (or be needed in) an action for negligence against a school or similar institution for failing to prevent “child abuse”.

21AC

Definitions for div 4A

In this division— affected child means a child who is a witness in a relevant proceeding and who is not a defendant in the proceeding. child see section 21AD. civil proceeding arising from the commission of a relevant offence does not include a proceeding for a domestic violence order under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012. [Def am Act 5 of 2012, s 220]

counsel includes solicitor. defendant means— (a) in a criminal proceeding—a person charged with an offence; or (b) in a civil proceeding arising from the commission of a relevant offence—a person whose act or omission is complained of. offence involving violence means an offence against any of the following provisions of the Criminal Code— 302

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s 21AC

• a provision of chapter 28943 or 28A944 • a provision of chapter 29945 other than section 317A, 318, 319, 321, 321A, 327, 329, 330, 333 or 334 • sections 335, 339, 340, 354, 354A and 355 • a provision of chapter 33A946 • sections 363, 363A and 364. [Def am Act 42 of 2014, s 26B; Act 55 of 2008, s 150 and Sch]

offence of a sexual nature means an offence against any of the following provisions of the Criminal Code— • a provision of chapter 22947 other than section 224, 225 or 226 • a provision of chapter 32.948 parentage order relationship means a relationship arising because of— (a) a parentage order under the Surrogacy Act 2010; or (b) an order of another Australian jurisdiction that corresponds to a parentage order made under that Act.949 [Def insrt Act 2 of 2010, s 95(1)]

preliminary hearing means a hearing under section 21AK.950 prescribed relationship, between a child who is a witness in a proceeding and a defendant in the proceeding, means any of the following— (a) a relationship, regardless of whether it is a half, adoptive, step or parentage order relationship, where the defendant is— (i) a parent of the child; or (ii) a grandparent of the child; or (iii) a brother or sister of the child; or (iv) an uncle, aunt, nephew, niece or cousin of the child; (b) a relationship arising because, at the time of the alleged offence with which the defendant is charged, the defendant lived in the same household as the child; (c) a relationship arising because the defendant had the care of, or exercised authority over, the child in a household on a regular basis. [Def am Act 2 of 2010, s 95(2)]

proceeding means any civil or criminal proceeding, including a preliminary hearing. relevant offence, in relation to a proceeding, means— (a) an offence of a sexual nature; or 943. Criminal Code, Ch 28 (Homicide – suicide – concealment of birth). 944. Criminal Code, Ch 28A (Unlawful striking causing death). 945. Criminal Code, Ch 29 (Offences endangering life or health). 946. Criminal Code, Ch 33A (Unlawful stalking). 947. Criminal Code, Ch 22 (Offences against morality). 948. Criminal Code, Ch 32 (Rape and sexual offences). 949. Definition inserted by s 95. 950. Section 21AK (Video-taping of affected child’s evidence). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

303

s 21AC

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[21AC.1]

(b)

an offence involving violence, if there is a prescribed relationship between a child who is a witness in the proceeding and a defendant in the proceeding. relevant proceeding means— (a) a criminal proceeding for a relevant offence, whether or not the proceeding also relates to other offences; or (b) a civil proceeding arising from the commission of a relevant offence. step relationship includes a relationship corresponding to a step relationship arising because of cohabitation in a de facto relationship or because of a foster relationship or a legal arrangement. [S 21AC am Act 42 of 2014; Act 5 of 2012; Act 2 of 2010; Act 55 of 2008; insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

[21AC.1] Cross-references to relevant Chapters of the Criminal Code appear in footnotes to this section. [21AC.2] Section 21AC was amended by the Criminal Code and Other Acts Amendment Act 2008, which deleted from the definition of “offence involving violence” the references to ss 319A, 331 and 332 of the Criminal Code. It was further amended by s 95 of the Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld), which inserted the definition of a “parentage order relationship” and substituted the words “step or parentage order relationship” for “step relationship” in subcl (a) of the definition of “prescribed relationship”. 21AD

Meaning of child

(1) For the purposes of a proceeding for this division, a child is— (a) if the proceeding is a criminal proceeding— (i) an individual who is under 16 years when the first of the following happens— (A) the defendant in the proceeding is arrested; (B) a complaint is made under the Justices Act 1886, section 42951 in relation to the defendant in the proceeding; (C) a notice to appear is served on the defendant in the proceeding under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, section 382;952 or (ii) an individual who is 16 or 17 years when the first of the matters mentioned in subparagraph (i) happens and who is a special witness; or (b) if the proceeding is a civil proceeding arising from the commission of a relevant offence— (i) an individual who is under 16 years when the proceeding starts; or 951. Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 42 (Commencement of proceedings). 952. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 382 (Notice to appear may be issued for offence.) Evidence Law in Queensland 304

[21AE.1]

Division 4A – Evidence of affected children

(ii)

s 21AF

an individual who is 16 or 17 years when the proceeding starts and who is a special witness.

(2) An individual remains a child for the purposes of giving evidence for a proceeding if the child gives evidence for the proceeding at any time before the child turns 18 years. [S 21AD am Act 5 of 2000, s 810 and Sch 4 (am Act 26 of 2006); insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

[21AD.1] “Child” means a person under 16 years, or (in the circumstances set out in s 21AD) a special witness who is 16 or 17 years of age.953 [21AD.2] Footnotes attached to this section explain references to the Criminal Code and other legislation.

Subdivision 2 – Committal proceeding 21AE Application of sdiv 2 This subdivision applies to the taking of an affected child’s evidence for a committal proceeding for a relevant offence, whether or not the committal proceeding also relates to other offences. [S 21AE insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

[21AE.1] The Explanatory Notes to the amending Act of 2003 state: New section 21AE to 21AH … restrict the right of a defendant to require a child witness to attend at and be cross-examined at committal. … A wealth of research shows that cross-examination by defence counsel at committal can be more stressful than at trial where there is the additional constraining influence of the jury. Techniques used by defence counsel at committals include: focussing on minor detail … and adopting confusing sentence structures and repetition (suggesting to a child that the first answer is incorrect). Defence counsel also employ aggressive and intimidatory mannerisms and tone of voice. … With the exception of Western Australia … all Australian jurisdictions retain the committal process. However, in most [of them] … oral evidence … is restricted. … Pre-recording of all the evidence of a child witness will enable the defence to cross-examine the child prior to the trial, which will facilitate pleas of guilty and no case submissions … The use of recorded statements under existing section 93A … gives the defence an opportunity to see and hear how the witness describes the event.

21AF

Evidence-in-chief

(1) The affected child’s evidence-in-chief must be given as a statement without the child being called as a witness. (2) For this section, the Justices Act 1886, section 110A applies with all necessary changes and as though a reference in that section to a written statement included a reference to a statement contained in a document as defined under schedule 3.

953. R v GR (2005) 153 A Crim R 94; [2005] QCA 146. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

305

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[21AF.1]

(3) Also, for the purposes of applying the Justices Act 1886, section 110A, that section is to be read with the following changes— (a) if the child’s statement is a written statement—subsections (4), (5), (6), (6B), (8) and (9) of that section were omitted; (b) if the child’s statement is not a written statement— (i) subsections (4), (5), (6), (6B), (6C), (8) and (9) of that section were omitted; and (ii) in subsection (13)— (A) the words “read as evidence” were omitted and the words “received as evidence” were inserted in their place; and (B) paragraph (a) were omitted. [Subs (3) am Act 26 of 2010, s 66]

(4) Further, for the purposes of applying the Justices Act 1886, section 111, that section applies with all necessary changes and is to be read as though, in subsections (1) and (2), the words “read as evidence” were omitted and the words “received as evidence” were inserted in their place. (5) In addition, for the purposes of applying the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1892, section 4, that section applies with all necessary changes and is to be read as though— (a) a reference to a deposition included a reference to a statement contained in a document; and (b) a reference to the reading of a deposition that is not a written statement included a reference to the showing of a statement contained in a document. (6) In this section— statement means— (a) a written statement; or (b) a statement contained in a document. [S 21AF am Act 26 of 2010; insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

[21AF.1] Section 21AF(2) indicates that s 110A of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) is to be read subject to the policy and terms of Div 4A (Evidence of affected children), which was inserted in 2003. Subsections (3)(a) and (3)(b)(ii) were amended by the Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction Reform and Modernisation Amendment Act 2010, s 66. [21AF.2] When the statement is in writing, s 21AF(3)(a) has the following effects: (i) the statement is admissible whether or not the defendant is legally represented; (ii) it is not necessary that the prosecution and the defence agree to its admission; (iii) a party against whom the statement is tendered is not entitled to object to its admission; (iv) the prosecution and defence may not agree that the statement-maker be available for cross-examination; and (v) the magistrate may not require the statement-maker to give evidence in person, pursuant to s 110A(9) of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld). (But see s 21AG.)

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[21AF.4]

Division 4A – Evidence of affected children

s 21AG

[21AF.3] When the statement is not in written form, s 21AF(3)(b) has the following effects: (i) the statement is admissible whether or not the defendant is legally represented; (ii) it is not necessary that the prosecution and the defence agree to its admission; (iii) the Justices Act 1886 requirement that copies be given to other parties does not apply; (iv) verification pursuant to the Oaths Act 1867 (Qld) is unnecessary; (v) a party against whom the statement is tendered is not entitled to object to its admission; (vi) the prosecution and defence may not agree that the statement-maker be available for cross-examination; and (vii) the magistrate may not require the statement-maker to give evidence in person, pursuant to s 110A(9) of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld). (But see s 21AG.) [21AF.4] The expression “statement” extends to audio and video recordings. See the definition of “document” in the Dictionary: see [3.1]. 21AG

Cross-examination

(1) The affected child may be cross-examined only if, under this section, a magistrate requires a party to call the child as a witness for that purpose. (2) The requirement may be made, on an application, by— (a) a magistrate at a direction hearing under the Justices Act 1886, section 83A;954 or (b) the magistrate presiding at the committal proceeding. (3) A magistrate at a direction hearing must not require the child to be called as a witness for cross-examination unless the magistrate is satisfied that— (a) the party seeking to cross-examine the child has— (i) identified an issue to which the proposed questioning relates; and (ii) provided a reason why the evidence of the child is relevant to the issue; and (iii) explained why the evidence disclosed by the prosecution does not address the issue; and (iv) identified to the magistrate the purpose and general nature of the questions to be put to the child to address the issue; and (b) the interests of justice can not adequately be satisfied by leaving cross-examination of the child about the issue to the trial. (4) The magistrate presiding at the committal proceeding must not require the child to be called as a witness for cross-examination unless the magistrate is satisfied that— (a) the evidence before the court at the committal has identified an issue to which the proposed questioning relates that could not reasonably have been anticipated before the committal; and (b) the party making the application has— (i) provided a reason why the evidence of the child is relevant to the issue; and

954. Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 83A (Direction hearing). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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(ii)

explained why the evidence before the court does not address the issue; and (iii) identified to the magistrate the purpose and general nature of the questions to be put to the child to address the issue; and (c) the interests of justice can not adequately be satisfied by leaving cross-examination of the child about the issue to the trial. (5) Without limiting the matters to which the magistrate may have regard for subsection (3)(b) or (4)(c), the magistrate— (a) must consider whether— (i) the prosecution case is adequately disclosed; and (ii) the charge is adequately particularised; and (b) must have regard to the vulnerability of children, the general principles stated in section 9E and the undesirability of calling a child as a witness for a committal proceeding. (6) The magistrate must give reasons for the magistrate’s decision on the application. (7) If, under this section, the magistrate requires a party to call the child as a witness for cross-examination— (a) the child’s evidence must be taken under subdivision 3 or 4;955 and (b) when the magistrate decides the application, the magistrate must decide whether the child’s evidence is to be taken under subdivision 3 or under subdivision 4, and how it is to be taken, and give a direction accordingly. (8) In deciding whether the child’s evidence is to be taken under subdivision 3 or 4, and how it is to be taken, the magistrate must have regard to the following— (a) the distress or trauma likely to be suffered by the child when giving evidence and the need to minimise the child’s distress or trauma; (b) whether a local court has an audio visual link and, if not, the availability of another appropriate place with appropriate equipment and facilities for taking or video-taping the child’s evidence under subdivision 3 or 4; (c) whether the parties would be substantially inconvenienced if the proceeding were to be adjourned to another place mentioned in paragraph (b) that is not within the same locality as the court; (d) the need for committal proceedings to be conducted expeditiously. (9) In this section— local court means— (a) in relation to a magistrate at a direction hearing—a court at which the committal proceeding would ordinarily be held; or (b) in relation to the magistrate presiding at the committal proceeding—the court in which the committal proceeding is being held or another court within the court precincts. 955. Subdivision 3 (Pre-recording of affected child’s evidence) or subdiv 4 (Taking of affected child’s evidence using audio visual link or screen). Evidence Law in Queensland 308

[21AG.2]

Division 4A – Evidence of affected children

s 21AH

magistrate, presiding at a committal proceeding, includes justices presiding at the proceeding. [S 21AG insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

[21AG.1] Similar legislation is considered in B v Gould,956 Lawler v Johnson,957 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Losurdo958 and R v Kennedy.959 According to Kennedy the essential question is whether crossexamination is needed to serve the purpose of committal proceedings, namely to ensure a fair trial: compare s 21AG(3)(b). In Lawler the magistrate erred in holding that a 20-year delay before reporting the alleged offence was not sufficiently “special” to warrant an order for the complainant and her mother to be cross-examined. Lawler and the other authorities listed in this paragraph emphasise that the discretion should not be fettered by fine points of interpretation. Interstate legislation on which this section is based960 contains less prescriptive detail. [21AG.2] The guidelines for the use of the magistrate’s discretion require reference to s 9E, particularly s 9E(2). If the application is granted, the cross-examination is to be conducted by audio visual link or with a screen, either before or during the trial.

21AH

Limitation on cross-examination

(1) If the affected child is to be cross-examined, the party calling the child may first ask the child questions for identifying the child and establishing that the child made the statement mentioned in section 21AF961 and the truthfulness of the statement. (2) The presiding magistrate or justices must not allow the child to be cross-examined about an issue other than the issue in relation to which the child was required to be called unless the magistrate or justices are satisfied as mentioned in section 21AG(3)(a) and (b) or section 21AG(4)(a) to (c), whichever is relevant, in relation to the issue. (3) Also, the presiding magistrate or justices— (a) must not allow cross-examination to continue to the extent it— (i) does not appear relevant to an issue for which it may be conducted; or

956. (1993) 67 A Crim R 297. 957. (2002) 56 NSWLR 1. 958. (1998) 103 A Crim R 189. 959. (1997) 94 A Crim R 341. 960. Justices Act 1902 (NSW), s 48E. 961. Section 21AF (Evidence-in-chief). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[21AH.1]

(ii)

consists of exploratory questions asked in the hope of receiving any answer of any assistance to the party conducting the cross-examination, commonly known as a “fishing expedition”; and (b) must disallow a question that may be disallowed under section 20 or 21.962 (4) The child may be re-examined by the party calling the child. [S 21AH insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

[21AH.1] If leave is given to cross-examine, the special controls in this section apply. The proposed questions must satisfy the tests in s 21AG(3) and (4). Accordingly, those “filters” can operate twice. [21AH.2] On the expression “fishing expedition” in s 21AH(3)(a)(ii), see [A.65], [22.13], and [88.3].

Subdivision 3 – Prerecording of affected child’s evidence 21AI

Application of sdiv 3

(1) This subdivision applies to taking an affected child’s evidence— (a) for a summary trial for a relevant offence; and (b) for a trial on indictment for a relevant offence; and (c) for a committal proceeding for a relevant offence, if a magistrate or justices give a direction as mentioned in section 21AG(7)(b)963 that the child’s evidence is to be taken under this subdivision. (2) However, this subdivision does not apply to an affected child who is a witness for the defence. (3) Subsection (1) applies to a proceeding whether or not the proceeding also relates to offences other than the relevant offence. [S 21AI insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

[21AI.1] Subdivisions 3 and 4 of Div 4A raise a presumption in favour of prerecording the evidence of an “affected child”, using an audio visual link if possible. According to the Explanatory Notes to the amending Act (p 5), the Queensland Law Reform Commission found that the use of closed-circuit television in other States had no significant effect on conviction rates. Sections 21AI – 21AO are designed to secure the earliest possible recording of the child’s evidence, which may then be used at the trial in lieu of another personal appearance. Statements covered by s 93A are not affected.

962. Section 20 (Cross-examination as to credit) or s 21 (Improper questions). 963. Section 21AG (Cross-examination).

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Evidence Law in Queensland

[21AJ.2]

Division 4A – Evidence of affected children

s 21AK

21AJ Presentation of indictment If the affected child’s evidence is to be taken for a trial on indictment, the indictment must be presented before the evidence can be taken under this subdivision. [S 21AJ insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

[21AJ.1] The object of s 21AJ is to ensure that the issues for trial are properly defined before the child’s evidence is taken. A foundation is thus laid for deciding questions of relevance when the recording is made. [21AJ.2] In R v WAH964 there were originally two indictments. A nolle prosequi was entered upon one, and the second was presented. This did not involve a significant breach of the “one indictment, one jury” rule. 21AK

Video-taping of affected child’s evidence

(1) The affected child’s evidence must be taken and video-taped at a hearing under this section (a preliminary hearing) presided over by a judicial officer. (2) The video-taped recording must be presented— (a) if taken for a committal proceeding—to the court at the committal proceeding; or (b) if taken for a trial—to the court at the trial. (3) To facilitate the operation of this section for the taking of the child’s evidence in a proceeding, the judicial officer may order that the preliminary hearing be conducted by audio visual link. (4) The provisions of part 3A965 relating to the use of an audio visual link in criminal proceedings apply for, and are not limited by, subsection (3). (5) To facilitate the operation of this section for a trial, the judicial officer must, if it is not practicable at the place of the trial to take and video-tape the child’s evidence— (a) adjourn the trial to an appropriately equipped place to allow the evidence to be taken and video-taped; or (b) make another order the judicial officer considers appropriate including, for example, an order that the preliminary hearing be conducted by audio visual link. (6) If the taking and video-taping of the child’s evidence is done at a place that is not a courtroom, the place is taken to be a courtroom for all purposes for the preliminary hearing. (7) It does not matter whether or not the judicial officer presiding and the counsel appearing at the preliminary hearing are the same judicial officer presiding and counsel appearing at an adjourned preliminary hearing or at the proceeding in which the video-taped recording is presented to the court. 964. [2009] QCA 263. 965. Part 3A (Audio visual links and audio links). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

311

s 21AK

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[21AK.1]

(8) Also, it does not matter if, while the preliminary hearing is conducted, the judicial officer, counsel, parties and witnesses are at different places. Example— To facilitate the taking and video-taping of the affected child’s evidence, the judicial officer directs that the child give the evidence by audio visual link. The preliminary hearing is conducted while the judicial officer, counsel and defendant are in a courtroom in a particular city and the child is in a room in another city connected to the courtroom through the audio visual link.

(9) In this section— appropriately equipped place, for the taking and video-taping of an affected child’s evidence, means a court, or another place that is not a court, that— (a) is equipped to take and video-tape the child’s evidence; and (b) allows the defendant to see and hear the child while the child is giving evidence, for example, through an audio visual link. evidence means evidence-in-chief or evidence given in cross-examination or re-examination. [S 21AK insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

[21AK.1] “Judicial officer” means a judge, magistrate or justices: see the Dictionary: [3.1]. Compare s 93A, which does not require judicial supervision. [21AK.2] However, by leave of the court and with the consent of the witness, a child’s evidence may be given in the ordinary way: see s 21AR. [21AK.3] Evidence recorded in accordance with this section, and admitted under s 93A, supported the conviction in R v UA.966 21AL Court to give directions for taking an affected child’s evidence (1) The judicial officer presiding at the preliminary hearing may make any order the judicial officer considers appropriate in relation to taking and video-taping the affected child’s evidence. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), the judicial officer may give directions, with or without conditions, as to the conduct of the preliminary hearing, including directions as to— (a) whether the child is to be in the courtroom or a separate room when the child’s evidence is being taken; and (b) the persons who may be present in the same room as the child when the child’s evidence is being taken. (3) Subsection (2)(b) is subject to section 21AU. Note: Section 21AU makes provision about the exclusion of persons while an affected child witness is giving evidence in relation to a relevant offence.

(4) At the preliminary hearing— (a) the defendant—

966. [2007] QCA 41; see also MBS v DPP (Qld) [2012] QCA 326 at [32].

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Evidence Law in Queensland

[21AM.2]

Division 4A – Evidence of affected children

s 21AM

(i)

must not be in the same room as the child when the child’s evidence is being taken; but (ii) must be capable of seeing and hearing the child while the child is giving evidence; and (b) subject to the judicial officer’s control, the child is to give his or her evidence-in-chief and be cross-examined and re-examined; and (c) except as provided by this subdivision, the usual rules of evidence apply. (5) The judicial officer may adjourn the hearing from time to time until the taking and video-taping of the child’s evidence is complete. [S 21AL insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

21AM

Use of prerecorded evidence

(1) The affected child’s evidence contained in a videotaped recording made under this subdivision for a proceeding, or in a lawfully edited copy of the recording— (a) is as admissible as if the evidence were given orally in the proceeding in accordance with the usual rules and practice of the court; and (b) is, unless the relevant court otherwise orders, admissible in— (i) any rehearing or retrial of, or appeal from, the proceeding; or (ii) another proceeding in the same court for the relevant charge or for another charge arising out of the same, or the same set of, circumstances; or (iii) a civil proceeding arising from the commission of the relevant offence.967 [Subs (1) am Act 42 of 2010, s 48(1)]

(2) The admissibility of the evidence for a proceeding is not affected only because the child turns 18 before the evidence is presented at the proceeding. [Subs (2) am Act 42 of 2010, s 48(2)] [S 21AM am Act 42 of 2010; insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

[21AM.1] Section 21AM is intended to minimise the need for a fresh statement if there are later proceedings about the same incident. Opportunities for the defence to generate prior inconsistent statements are reduced accordingly. This procedure was followed in BCM v The Queen.968 [21AM.2] There is no general rule that statements pre-recorded under this section should be withheld from the jury room. (Contrast s 93A material: [93A.19].) The reason for this difference is that s 21AM documents, unlike s 93A statements, record cross-examination as well as examination in chief.969

967. Section 702 of the Criminal Code states that a conviction is no bar to civil proceedings arising from the commission of an offence unless there is express legislation to that effect. 968. (2013) 88 ALJR 101 [2013] HCA 48. 969. R v GT [2005] QCA 478 at [18]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

313

s 21AN

21AN

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[21AM.2]

Giving of further evidence

(1) This section applies if the affected child has given evidence under this subdivision for a proceeding and has been excused from further attendance as a witness at the proceeding. (2) A party may apply to the court for an order that the child— (a) give further evidence under this subdivision at another preliminary hearing; or (b) attend at the proceeding to give further evidence. (3) The court must not make the order unless satisfied that— (a) if the child were giving evidence before a court in the ordinary way, the child could be recalled to give further evidence; and (b) it would be in the interests of justice to make the order. (4) The court must not make an order that the child attend at the proceeding to give further evidence unless satisfied it is not possible or not practical for the child to give the further evidence at another preliminary hearing. [S 21AN insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

21AO Court order that evidence not to be taken and recorded under this sdiv (1) This section applies if an affected child is to give evidence in a criminal proceeding, other than a committal proceeding, for a relevant offence. (2) A party may apply to the court for an order that the child’s evidence not be taken and video-taped under this subdivision. (3) The court may make the order for good reason, having regard to the child’s wishes and the purposes of this division. Example— If a courtroom or other place with facilities to take and video-tape the affected child’s evidence is not likely to be available within a reasonable time, the court may decide the child’s interests are better served by dealing with the proceeding quickly rather than waiting for a courtroom or other place with the necessary facilities to become available. [S 21AO insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

Subdivision 4 – Taking of affected child’s evidence using audio visual link or screen 21AP

Application of sdiv 4

(1) This subdivision applies to taking an affected child’s evidence— (a) for a summary trial for a relevant offence, if the evidence is not taken under subdivision 3; or (b) for a trial on indictment for a relevant offence, if the evidence is not taken under subdivision 3; or (c) for a committal proceeding for a relevant offence, if a magistrate or justices give a direction as mentioned in section 21AG(7)(b)970 that the child’s evidence is to be taken under this subdivision; or 970. Section 21AG (Cross-examination).

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[21AP.1]

Division 4A – Evidence of affected children

s 21AQ

(d)

for summary trial, trial on indictment or committal proceeding for a relevant offence, if the child is ordered under section 21AN to attend at the proceeding to give further evidence; or (e) for a civil proceeding arising from the commission of a relevant offence.

(2) Subsection (1) applies to a proceeding whether or not the proceeding also relates to offences other than the relevant offence. [S 21AP insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

[21AP.1] 21AQ used

The definition of “relevant offence” is in s 21AC. Audio visual links or screening arrangements must be

(1) This section— (a) applies subject to any order under section 21AR; and (b) has effect despite the Criminal Code, section 617.971 (2) If there is an audio visual link within the court precincts, the judicial officer presiding at the proceeding for the giving of evidence by the affected child must direct that— (a) the child give evidence outside the courtroom and the evidence be transmitted to the courtroom by means of the audio visual link; or (b) while the child is giving evidence, the defendant be held in a room apart from the courtroom and the evidence be transmitted to that room by means of the audio visual link. (3) It is not necessary that the place outside the courtroom at which the child gives evidence under subsection (2)(a) be within the court precincts. (4) If a direction is given under subsection (2)(a) or (b) and the audio visual link enables video-taping, the child’s evidence must be video-taped. (5) If a direction can not be given under subsection (2)(a) or (b), a screen, one-way glass or other thing must be so placed in relation to the child while he or she is giving evidence that the child can not see the defendant. (6) A video-taped recording of the child’s evidence made under this section, or a lawfully edited copy of the recording, is, unless the relevant court otherwise orders, admissible in— (a) any rehearing or retrial of, or appeal from, the proceeding; or (b) another proceeding in the same court for the relevant charge or for another charge arising out of the same, or the same set of, circumstances; or (c) a civil proceeding arising from the commission of the relevant offence. [S 21AQ insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

971. Criminal Code, s 617, (Presence of accused). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 21AR

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[21AQ.1]

[21AQ.1] The expression “civil proceeding” includes an application for criminal compensation as well as a common law action against the offender or another person civilly liable for the occurrence of the offence. 21AR

Court may order that s 21AQ does not apply

(1) This section applies if— (a) a relevant proceeding has been started in a court; and (b) an affected child is to give evidence in the proceeding. (2) The party who is to call the child as a witness may apply to the presiding judicial officer for an order that section 21AQ is not to apply to the child. (3) The judicial officer may grant the application only if the judicial officer is satisfied the child is able and wishes to give evidence in the defendant’s presence without using an audio visual link or a screen. [S 21AR insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

[21AR.1] Elaborate alternative arrangements notwithstanding, s 21AR leaves open the possibility that a child may give evidence in the traditional way.

Subdivision 5 – General 21AS Prosecutor or applicant to advise that an affected child is to give evidence (1) The prosecutor or applicant in a relevant proceeding must inform the court, before the proceeding starts, that an affected child may give evidence in the proceeding. (2) For a trial on indictment, the prosecutor must inform the court at the time the indictment is presented. (3) A failure to comply with subsection (1) or (2) does not prevent an affected child’s evidence being taken or video-taped under this division or affect the admissibility of the evidence. [S 21AS insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

21AT

Identification of persons or things by affected child

(1) This section applies if an affected child is required to identify a person, including the defendant, or thing when the child is giving evidence. (2) The court may make the orders it considers appropriate to ensure that the identification is carried out in a way that limits the distress or trauma that might be suffered by the child when making the identification. Note: See section 9E for the general principles to be applied when dealing with a child witness.

(3) The court must also decide at what point during the giving of the child’s evidence the identification is to be made.

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[21AU.1]

Division 4A – Evidence of affected children

s 21AV

(4) If an affected child is required to be in the defendant’s presence for the purposes of identification, the child should not be required to be in the defendant’s presence for the identification for any longer than is necessary. [S 21AT insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

[21AT.1] Section 21AT recognises that when a child is required to give evidence of identity, the shielding of the witness from the defendant may have to be suspended, albeit briefly. 21AU

Exclusion of public

(1) This section applies if an affected child is to give evidence in a relevant proceeding under this division. (2) If the child is to give evidence about an offence of a sexual nature, the court must exclude from the room in which it is sitting all persons other than essential persons while the child is giving the evidence. (3) If the child is to give evidence other than in relation to an offence of a sexual nature, the court must exclude from the room in which it is sitting all persons other than essential persons while the child is giving the evidence unless the court is satisfied that the interests of justice require the evidence to be heard in open court. (4) In this section— essential person, for a proceeding, means any of the following persons— (a) a party to the proceeding and the party’s counsel; (b) a Crown law officer or a person authorised by a Crown law officer; (c) the prosecutor; (d) a person whose presence is, in the court’s opinion, necessary or desirable for the proper conduct of the proceeding; (e) a support person for the child under section 21AV; (f) a person who applies to the court to be present and whose presence, in the court’s opinion— (i) would serve a proper interest of the person; and (ii) would not be prejudicial to the child’s interests. [S 21AU insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

[21AU.1] There are notes on exclusion of the public at [21.7] and [Q.3].

21AV

Affected child entitled to support

(1) An affected child, while he or she is giving evidence in a relevant proceeding, is entitled to have near to him or her a person who may provide the child with support (a support person). (2) A person may be the child’s support person only if the person is approved by the court on application by the party proposing to call the child.

© 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 21AV

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[21AV.1]

(3) The support person must be permitted to be in close proximity to the child, and within the child’s sight, while the child is giving evidence. (4) An affected child may, with the agreement of the court, waive the entitlement to a support person under subsection (1). (5) The court must not agree to the waiver if the court considers the waiver is not in the child’s best interests. [S 21AV insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

[21AV.1] Compare s 21A(2)(d). Approval was given with respect to four witnesses in R v Coss.972 21AW

Instructions to be given to jury

(1) This section applies to a proceeding on indictment if any of the following measures is taken— (a) an affected child’s evidence is taken in a way provided for under subdivision 3 or 4;973 (b) a person is excluded under section 21AU while an affected child gives evidence; (c) an affected child has a support person under section 21AV while the child gives evidence. (2) The judicial officer presiding at the proceeding must instruct the jury that— (a) the measure is a routine practice of the court and that they should not draw any inference as to the defendant’s guilt from it; and (b) the probative value of the evidence is not increased or decreased because of the measure; and (c) the evidence is not to be given any greater or lesser weight because of the measure. [S 21AW insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

[21AW.1] See the direction approved by a Full Court at [21A.2]. Compare s 21AW(2)(b) and (c) with s 9D(2). [E]xperience has shown that evidence is best tested, and a true verdict reached, when the evidence in support or defence of a case is put before a court, judge or jury, and is explored for signs of inconsistency or insincerity in the presence of the tribunal of fact. The process is assisted by the solemn requirement that a witness’ testimony be given on oath or affirmation and be open to public scrutiny. [However] Division 4A has provided, for reasons which Parliament deems sufficient, that a different procedure should be followed in cases involving a certain class of witness.974

972. [2015] QCA 33. 973. Subdivision 3 (Pre-recording of affected child’s evidence) or 4 (Taking of affected child’s evidence using audio-visual link or screen). 974. R v Hellwig [2007] 1 Qd R 17; [2006] QCA 179 at [21] – [22].

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Division 4A – Evidence of affected children

s 21AW 975

[21AW.2] The directions required by s 21AW(2) are mandatory. Failure to give the specific direction required by s 21AW caused mistrials in R v DM,976 R v Hellwig,977 R v SAW,978 R v MBE979 and R v Coss.980 “To attempt to paraphrase … is to flirt with invalidating error.”981 In R v MBE the trial judge, contrary to the intent of s 21AW(2), told the jury that evidence taken under s 93A should not be regarded as inferior, but failed to add that it should not be regarded as superior. The Court of Appeal explained the intent of the sub-section (particularly s 21AW(2)(b)): The [use of a s 93A statement instead of oral evidence] is likely to surprise jurors who have some knowledge, whether first or second hand, of ordinary court proceedings. Without the benefit of the instructions required by s 21AW(2) that surprise may well turn into conjecture adverse to an accused. The subsection is intended to dispel the surprise and to prevent the conjecture. That that occurs is clearly of the utmost importance to a fair trial. Parliament cannot have intended that the new procedures should prejudice the fair trial of an accused. It has enacted that, to ensure a fair trial, the jury must be instructed how to evaluate evidence led in this way.

Nevertheless, s 21AW continues to be a fertile field for appeals, successful or unsuccessful, as the case may be.982 Errors are sometimes redeemed by a finding that no substantial miscarriage of justice was involved. [21AW.3] In R v HBJ983 it was noted that the following direction was unchallenged: Before we play this [recording], the procedure, ladies and gentlemen what is adopted with children giving evidence in cases like this is that their evidence is recorded before the trial. So you won’t see [the complainant] come into the witness-box and give her evidence. The procedure that is adopted in all cases like this throughout Queensland, so it is standard procedure, is that the child comes into court, sits in a room, as it turns out in this court building for this trial, with a support person, that’s standard, and there is a closed-circuit TV link from the room, the secure room to the courtroom so the girl can see – you can see the cameras around – the girl can see the barristers and the barristers can see her and she would have given some brief evidence and then would have been cross-examined by [defence counsel], and it doesn’t have to have been me – I wasn’t the judge, there was another judge sitting here, it doesn’t have to be the same judge for these purposes. I am required by law to give you the following direction: this measure, the one that I have explained, is a routine practice of the court. You should not draw any inference as to the defendant’s guilt of it. The probative value of the evidence is not increased or decreased because of the measure and the evidence is not to be given any greater or lesser weight because of this measure. Probative means affording proof or evidence, so 975. R v AAR [2014] QCA 20 at [24]. 976. [2006] QCA 79. 977. [2007] 1 Qd R 17; [2006] QCA 179. 978. [2006] QCA 378. 979. (2008) 191 A Crim R 264; [2008] QCA 381 at [22]; R v BBP [2009] QCA 114 980. [2015] QCA 33. 981. R v BBP [2009] QCA 114 at [47]. 982. For example, R v AAR [2014] QCA 20; R v FAD [2013] QCA 334; R v Wells [2013] QCA 289; R v TAC [2013] QCA 283; R v SCB [2013] QCA 276; R v Drake [2013] QCA 222; R v Amber [2013] QCA 360; R v WAT [2013] QCA 251. 983. [2014] QCA 2 at [34]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[21AW.3]

say that the probative value of evidence is not increased or decreased because it is pre-recorded and played to you means it is not better evidence, or worse evidence than evidence given by a witness in the presence of the jury. So the long and short is, this is standard procedure in these types of cases. It is nothing to do with the defendant that’s in cases like this, this is how the evidence is given. You don’t draw any inference against [the defendant] because of this, and the probative value of the evidence is not increased or decreased because the evidence is pre-recorded this way. You don’t give it any greater or lesser weight, it is as if the girl was in the witness-box.

21AX Orders, directions and rulings concerning affected child witnesses (1) The court may make any orders or give any directions or rulings it considers appropriate for this division on the court’s own initiative or on an application made to the court by a party to the proceeding. (2) Subsection (1) does not limit the Criminal Code, section 590AA or the Justices Act 1886, section 83A.984 [S 21AX insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

DIVISION 4B – DEALING WITH A RECORDING 21AY Definitions for div 4B In this division— presiding judicial officer, in relation to a recording, means the judicial officer presiding at— (a) the proceeding in which the recording is made; or (b) the proceeding in which the recording is presented or to be presented; or (c) a hearing for giving a direction or ruling under the Criminal Code, section 590AA;985 or (d) a direction hearing under the Justices Act 1886, section 83A.986 recording means— (a) a video-taped recording of a special witness’s evidence made under section 21A;987 or (b) a video-taped recording of an affected child’s evidence made under division 4A, subdivision 3 or subdivision 4;section 21A988 or (c) a copy of a video-taped recording mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b). [S 21AY insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

984. Criminal Code, s 590AA (Pre-trial directions and rulings) or the Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 83A (Direction hearing). 985. Criminal Code, s 590AA (Pre-trial directions and rulings). 986. Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 83A (Directions hearing). 987. Section 21A (Evidence of special witnesses). 988. Div 4A (Evidence of affected children), subdiv 3 (Pre-recording of affected child’s evidence) or subdiv 4 (Taking of affected child’s evidence using audio-visual link or screen).

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[21AZ.1]

21AZ

Division 4B – Dealing with a recording

s 21AZB

Approval to edit or otherwise change a recording

(1) An original recording must not be edited or otherwise changed in any way. (2) The presiding judicial officer may, on application, give approval for a copy of an original recording to be edited or changed in a stated way. Example— The presiding judicial officer may give approval for a copy of an original recording to be edited to omit certain inadmissible material. [S 21AZ insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

[21AZ.1] When a pre-trial statement is edited, the revised version should not display gaps or other signs which may cause the jury to suspect that something suspicious has occurred. Where appropriate, paragraphs in a transcript should be renumbered.989

21AZA Court to give directions about the use or safekeeping of a recording (1) The presiding judicial officer may make any order the judicial officer considers appropriate about the use or safekeeping of a recording. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), the presiding judicial officer may give directions, with or without conditions, as to— (a) the persons, or classes of persons, who are authorised to have possession of a recording; and (b) the giving up of possession of a recording. (3) The presiding judicial officer must have regard to the following matters when deciding the persons, or classes of persons, who are authorised to have possession of a recording— (a) the need for counsel involved in the proceeding to have access to the recording; (b) the need to ensure that persons authorised to have possession of the recording are able to take appropriate measures to ensure there is no unauthorised access to the recording. (4) In this section— use, of a recording, includes copying of the recording. [S 21AZA insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

21AZB

Unauthorised possession of, or dealing with, recording

(1) A person commits an offence who, without authority— (a) has a recording in his or her possession; or (b) supplies, or offers to supply, a recording to any person; or

989. R v Hartwick (No 4) [2002] VSC 481. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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(c)

plays, copies or erases a recording or permits a person to play, copy or erase a recording. Maximum penalty— (a) for an individual—100 penalty units or 2 years imprisonment; or (b) for a corporation—1000 penalty units. (2) A person has authority for subsection (1) only if the person has the possession or does the thing mentioned in subsection (1)— (a) in the case of a public official—for a purpose connected with the proceeding for which the recording was made or any rehearing or retrial of, or appeal from, the proceeding, or civil proceeding in which the recording may be presented in evidence; or (b) in any case—as authorised by a judicial officer under section 21AZA. [S 21AZB insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

21AZC

Publishing a recording prohibited

(1) A person must not publish all or part of a recording other than with the approval of the relevant court and in accordance with any condition attached to the court’s approval. Maximum penalty— (a) for an individual—100 penalty units or 2 years imprisonment; or (b) for a corporation—1000 penalty units. (2) An approval under subsection (1) may be given only in exceptional circumstances. (3) In subsection (1)— publish means disseminate to the public by radio or television or otherwise by the transmission of light or sound. relevant court means the court presiding at the proceeding or preliminary hearing at which the recording is made or the court of trial or appeal at which the recording is presented. [S 21AZC insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 60]

DIVISION 5 – WITNESS IDENTITY PROTECTION Subdivision 1 – Preliminary 21B Purposes of div 5 The purposes of this division are— (a) to facilitate, for law enforcement purposes, investigations in relation to criminal activity, including investigations extending beyond Queensland, by— (i) providing for the protection of the identity of operatives; and (ii) facilitating the recognition of witness identity protection certificates under corresponding laws; and (b) to facilitate investigations by the CCC in relation to corruption by providing for the protection of the identity of operatives. [Para (b) am Act 21 of 2014, s 94(2) and Sch 2] [S 21B am Act 21 of 2014; subst Act 45 of 2005, s 51; am Act 69 of 2001, s 378 and Sch 1; insrt Act 57 of 2000, s 4]

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[21B.5]

Division 5 – Witness identity protection

s 21B

[21B.1] The philosophy of open “justice” is opposed to the idea of anonymous or pseudonymous witnesses,990 but it is necessary to adapt the common law to the modern realities of organised crime and undercover police operations. Accordingly, Div 5, based on s 13A of the Evidence Act 1908 (NZ) was inserted by the Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Amendment Act 2000 and extended by the Cross-Border Law Enforcement Legislation Amendment Act 2005. Under similar legislation, witnesses have been allowed to testify anonymously, by video link, because of a fear of reprisals, or threats to court security, if their evidence were given in the ordinary way.991 Division 5 modifies the common law “right of confrontation”992 and overcomes the decision in R v Stipendiary Magistrate at Southport; Ex parte Gibson993 that a magistrate conducting committal proceedings may not allow a witness to give evidence under an assumed name. Division 5 authorises the chairperson of the Crime and Corruption Commission, and the Commissioner of the Police Service, to issue “witness anonymity certificates” to an “operative” (as defined in s 21C) if the issuing officer is reasonably satisfied that disclosure of the operative’s identity or address is likely to endanger that person, or to prejudice an investigation. [21B.2] The decision to grant a certificate is one for a designated officer, not a court and may not be challenged by way of judicial review.994 However, it is subject to a form of administrative review under s 21KE. [21B.3] The effect of Div 5 is that a witness who receives a certificate may give evidence under an assumed name and no question may be asked which tends to reveal his or her true identity or place of residence. [21B.4] The prescribed form of a witness anonymity certificate appears in the Queensland Government Gazette (27 October 2006), p 935. [21B.5] These provisions, as amended in 2005, extend to criminal investigations beyond the State, and to suspected cases of misconduct, as defined in the Crime and Corruption Act 2001. “Corresponding” laws are declared by regulation: s 21C.

990. See [Q.3]. 991. R v Ngo (No 2) (2001) 124 A Crim R 151; R v Strawhorn [2004] VSC 415. 992. Pace s 4(2) of the Legislative Standards Act 1992, which requires sufficient regard to be paid to the rights and liberties of individuals. 993. [1993] 2 Qd R 687. 994. Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), Sch 1 Pt 1, as amended by s 6 of the Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2000 (Qld); see also Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 21F(3). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[21B.5]

21C Definitions for div 5 In this division— assumed name, of an operative, see section 21G(1)(a)(i).995 CCC means the Crime and Corruption Commission. [Def insrt Act 21 of 2014, s 94(2) and Sch 2]

chief executive officer, of a law enforcement agency, means— (a) for the CCC—the chairperson of the CCC; or (b) for the police service—the commissioner of the police service. [Def am Act 19 of 2016, s 46 and Sch 1]

CMC [Repealed] [Def am Act 21 of 2014, s 94(2) and Sch 2]

conduct includes any act or omission. convicted means found guilty, or having a plea of guilty accepted by a court, whether or not a conviction is recorded. corresponding law means a law of another jurisdiction that is declared under a regulation to correspond to this division.996 corresponding witness identity protection certificate means a certificate given under a corresponding law that corresponds to section 21F.997 corruption see the Crime and Corruption Act 2001, schedule 2. [Def insrt Act 21 of 2014, s 94(2) and Sch 2]

court name, for an operative in relation to a proceeding, means a name, other than the operative’s real name, or code used to identify the operative in the proceeding. criminal activity means conduct that involves the commission of an offence by 1 or more persons. investigation means an investigation in relation to— (a) criminal activity, including an investigation extending beyond Queensland; or (b) corruption. [Def am Act 21 of 2014, s 94(2) and Sch 2]

jurisdiction means the Commonwealth or a State of the Commonwealth. law enforcement agency means— (a) the CCC; or (b) the police service. [Def am Act 21 of 2014, s 94(2) and Sch 2]

misconduct [Repealed] [Def am Act 21 of 2014, s 94(2) and Sch 2]

operative means a person who is or was— 995. Section 21G (Form of witness identity protection certificate). 996. Section 3 of the Evidence Regulation 2007 declares the Evidence Act 1958 (Vic), Pt IIAA to be a corresponding law. 997. Section 21F (Giving witness identity protection certificate).

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Evidence Law in Queensland

[21D.2]

Division 5 – Witness identity protection

s 21D

(a) a covert operative under the Crime and Corruption Act 2001, chapter 3, part 6A;998 or (b) a participant in an authorised operation under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, chapter 11;999 or (c) an authorised person under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, chapter 12.1000 [Def am Act 21 of 2014, s 94(2) and Sch 2]

party, to a proceeding, means— (a) for a criminal proceeding—the prosecutor and each accused person; or (b) for a civil proceeding—each person who is a party to the proceeding; or (c) for another proceeding—each person who has been given leave to appear in the proceeding. relevant court, for a proceeding, means the entity before whom or which the proceeding is held or taken. witness identity protection certificate means a certificate given under section 21F. [S 21C am Act 19 of 2016; Act 21 of 2014; Act 5 of 2000, s 810 and Sch 4 (am Act 26 of 2006); subst Act 45 of 2005, s 51; insrt Act 57 of 2000, s 4]

[21C.1] The expressions “relevant proceeding”, “covert operative” and “controlled operation” are defined in s 21B. 21D Application of div 5 to lawyer of party to a proceeding For this division— (a) anything permitted to be done by a party to a proceeding may be done by the party’s lawyer; and (b) any requirement to give something to, or notify, a party to a proceeding is satisfied by giving the thing to, or notifying, the party’s lawyer. [S 21D subst Act 45 of 2005, s 51; am Act 69 of 2001, s 378 and Sch 1; insrt Act 57 of 2000, s 4]

[21D.1]

The expression “party” is defined in s 21C.

The expression “senior police officer” is defined in s 21D(7). [21D.2]

For a definition of “proceeding”, see Sch 3 (Definitions) and [3.26].

998. Chapter 3 deals with “powers”, and 6A with “controlled operations and controlled activities for misconduct offences”. 999. Controlled operations. 1000. Assumed identities. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 21E

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[21E.1]

Subdivision 2 – Witness identity protection certificates for operatives 21E

Application of sdiv 2

(1) This subdivision applies to a proceeding in which an operative is, or may be, required to give evidence obtained as an operative. (2) To remove any doubt, it is declared that this subdivision does not affect the operation of the common law in relation to the protection of the identity of a person who is not an operative who gives or intends to give evidence in a proceeding. [S 21E subst Act 45 of 2005, s 51; insrt Act 57 of 2000, s 4]

[21E.1] The common law on suppression of a witness’s identity is considered at [Q.3]. 21F

Giving witness identity protection certificate

(1) The chief executive officer of a law enforcement agency may give a witness identity protection certificate for an operative of the agency in relation to a proceeding if— (a) the operative is, or may be required, to give evidence in the proceeding; and (b) the chief executive officer is satisfied on reasonable grounds that the disclosure in the proceeding of the operative’s identity or where the operative lives is likely to— (i) endanger the safety of the operative or someone else; or (ii) prejudice an investigation. (2) The chief executive officer must make all reasonable enquiries to enable him or her to find out the information required to be included in the witness identity protection certificate under section 21G. (3) A decision to give a witness identity protection certificate— (a) is final; and (b) can not be impeached for informality or want of form; and (c) can not be appealed against, reviewed, called into question, quashed or invalidated in any court. (4) Subsection (3) does not prevent a decision to give a witness identity protection certificate being called into question during a proceeding of a disciplinary nature against the person who made the decision. [S 21F subst Act 45 of 2005, s 51; insrt Act 57 of 2000, s 4]

[21F.1] For definitions of “chief executive officer”, “law enforcement agency” and “operative”, see s 21C. [21F.2] Quaere whether the reasonableness of inquiries (s 21F(2)) is open to judicial review notwithstanding s 21F(3). It is open to reconsideration in

326

Evidence Law in Queensland

[21F.6]

Division 5 – Witness identity protection

s 21G

disciplinary proceedings against the person who granted a witness identity certificate: s 21F(3). Reasons for issuing certificates must appear, albeit belatedly, in the CMC’s annual report: s 21KG. [21F.3] The courts do not take privative clauses such as s 21F(3) quite literally. Executive action may still be impugned for jurisdictional error or bad faith.1001 A declaration may still be granted.1002 A provision that a decision shall be “final” merely means that there is no appeal on the merits.1003 Generally, the courts resist any suggestion that Parliament meant a tribunal or executive agency to be a law unto itself,1004 and this determination is unlikely to wane in an era when judges and lawyers are more astute than ever to annexing territory from legislators and executives. [21F.4] The power to cancel a certificate also resides in the designated chief executive officer: s 21KB. That officer may also vary the terms of a certificate in certain circumstances: s 21KC. [21F.5] As to the review of certificates issued by the police Commissioner, see s 21KE. [21F.6] The authority to issue certificates may be delegated in accordance with s 21KI. 21G

Form of witness identity protection certificate

(1) A witness identity protection certificate for an operative of a law enforcement agency in relation to a proceeding must be in the approved form and state all of the following— (a) if the operative— (i) is known to a party to the proceeding or a party’s lawyer by a name other than the operative’s real name—that name (the assumed name); or (ii) is not known to any party to the proceeding or any party’s lawyer by a name—the operative’s court name for the proceeding; (b) the period the operative was involved in the investigation to which the proceeding relates; (c) the name of the agency; (d) the date of the certificate; (e) a general description of the reasons for giving the certificate;

1001. R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598; Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Richard Walter Pty Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 168; Darling Casino Ltd v NSW Casino Control Authority (1997) 191 CLR 602. 1002. Wingecarribee Shire Council v Minister for Local Government [1975] 2 NSWLR 779 at 785; Delhi International Oil Corporation v Olive [1973] WAR 52 at 55; Re Smith [1991] 2 Qd R 467. 1003. Hockey v Yelland (1984) 157 CLR 124 at 130, 139 and 142. 1004. R v Medical Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Gilmore [1957] 1 QB 574. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

(f) (g) (h)

(i)

(j)

(k)

whether the operative has been convicted of an offence, in Queensland or elsewhere, and, if so, particulars of each offence; whether a charge against the operative for an offence is outstanding, in Queensland or elsewhere, and, if so, particulars of each charge; if the operative is, or was, a law enforcement officer— (i) whether the operative has been found guilty of professional misconduct and, if so, particulars of each finding; and (ii) whether any allegation of professional misconduct against the operative is outstanding and, if so, particulars of each allegation; whether, to the knowledge of the person giving the certificate, a court has made any adverse comment about the operative’s credibility and, if so, particulars of the comment; whether, to the knowledge of the person giving the certificate, the operative has made a false representation when the truth was required and, if so, particulars of the representation; if there is anything else known to the person giving the certificate that may be relevant to the operative’s credibility—particulars of the thing.

[Subs (1) am Act 26 of 2006, s 108]

(2) A witness identity protection certificate for an operative must not contain information that may allow the operative’s identity, or where the operative lives, to be revealed. (3) For this section— (a) a charge against a person for an offence is outstanding until the charge is finally dealt with in any of the following ways— (i) the charge is withdrawn; (ii) the charge is dismissed by a court; (iii) the person is discharged by a court; (iv) the person is acquitted or convicted of the offence by a court; and (b) an allegation of professional misconduct against a person is outstanding if the allegation has not been finally dealt with. (4) The Criminal Law (Rehabilitation of Offenders) Act 1986 does not apply to the disclosure of information under subsection (1)(f) or (g). (5) In this section— charge, for an offence, means a charge in any form, including, for example, the following— (a) a charge on an arrest; (b) a notice to appear served under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, section 382; (c) a complaint under the Justices Act 1886; 328

Evidence Law in Queensland

[21G.2]

Division 5 – Witness identity protection

s 21H

(d)

a charge by a court under the Justices Act 1886, section 42(1A),1005 or another provision of an Act; (e) an indictment. false representation does not include a representation made under— (a) an authority, or a corresponding authority, under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, chapter 111006 or 12;1007 or (b) an approval under the Crime and Corruption Act 2001, chapter 3, part 6A.1008 [Def am Act 21 of 2014, s 94(2) and Sch 2]

law enforcement officer means— (a) a commission officer under the Crime and Corruption Act 2001; or (b) a police officer. [Def am Act 21 of 2014, s 94(2) and Sch 2]

professional misconduct means— (a) corruption under the Crime and Corruption Act 2001; or (b) misconduct or a breach of discipline under— (i) the Police Service Administration Act 1990; or (ii) a law of another jurisdiction, or a foreign country, that corresponds to the Police Service Administration Act 1990. [Def am Act 21 of 2014, s 94(2) and Sch 2] [S 21G am Act 21 of 2014; Act 5 of 2000, s 810 and Sch 4 (am Act 26 of 2006); Act 26 of 2006; subst Act 45 of 2005, s 51; insrt Act 57 of 2000, s 4]

[21G.1] The prescribed form of witness anonymity certificate is published in the Queensland Government Gazette (27 October 2006), p 935. [21G.2] For notes on the Criminal Law (Rehabilitation of Offenders) Act 1986, see [15A.1]ff.

21H

Filing and notification

(1) If the chief executive officer of a law enforcement agency gives a witness identity protection certificate for an operative in relation to a proceeding, the agency must— (a) file the certificate with the relevant court for the proceeding before the operative gives evidence in the proceeding; and (b) if the agency is the police service—give to the chairperson of the CCC a copy of the certificate and notice of the date it was filed. [Subs (1) am Act 19 of 2016, s 46 and Sch 1]

1005. Which provides that, where a defendant is present and does not object, a further charge or amended charge may be made against him or her and proceeded with, although no complaint in writing has been made in respect thereof. 1006. Controlled operations. 1007. Assumed identities. 1008. Controlled operations and controlled activities for misconduct offences. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 21H

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[21H.1]

(2) Also, the law enforcement agency must give a copy of the witness identity protection certificate to each party to the proceeding at least 14 days, or the shorter period agreed to by a party, before the day the operative is to give evidence. (3) The relevant court may order the law enforcement agency to give a copy of the witness identity protection certificate to someone else stated in the order. [S 21H am Act 19 of 2016; Act 21 of 2014; subst Act 45 of 2005, s 51; insrt Act 57 of 2000, s 4]

[21H.1] The time for delivery of a copy of a certificate may be abbreviated by consent of the party concerned, but there is no other provision for abbreviation. Courts have no general power to vary time limits set by legislation.1009 21I

Effect of witness identity protection certificate

(1) This section applies if— (a) a witness identity protection certificate for an operative in relation to a proceeding is filed under section 21H(1)(a); and (b) either— (i) a copy of the certificate is given to each party under section 21H(2) and to each person, if any, stated in an order under section 21H(3) for the certificate; or (ii) the relevant court for the proceeding gives leave for this section to apply despite noncompliance with section 21H(2) or (3). (2) If this section applies— (a) the operative may give evidence in the proceeding under the assumed name, or court name, stated in the certificate; and (b) subject to section 21K— (i) a question must not be asked of a witness, including the operative, that may lead to the disclosure of the operative’s identity or where the operative lives; and (ii) a witness, including the operative, can not be required to, and must not, answer a question, give evidence or provide information that discloses, or may lead to the disclosure of, the operative’s identity or where the operative lives; and (iii) a person involved in the proceeding must not make a statement that discloses, or may lead to the disclosure of, the operative’s identity or where the operative lives. (3) For this section, a person involved in a proceeding includes the following— (a) the relevant court; (b) a party to the proceeding; (c) a person given leave to be heard or make submissions in the proceeding; 1009. Proctor v Jetway Aviation [1982] 2 NSWLR 264; David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265.

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s 21K

(d)

a lawyer representing a person mentioned in paragraph (b) or (c) or a lawyer assisting the court in the proceeding; (e) any other officer of the court or person assisting the court in the proceeding; (f) a person acting in the execution of any process or the enforcement of any order in the proceeding.

[S 21I subst Act 45 of 2005, s 51; insrt Act 57 of 2000, s 4]

21J

Orders to protect operative’s identity etc.

(1) The court with which a witness identity protection certificate is filed may make any order it considers necessary or desirable— (a) to protect the identity of the operative for whom the certificate is given; or (b) to prevent the disclosure of where the operative lives. Examples of orders— • an order prohibiting sketching of the operative • an order that the operative give evidence in the absence of the public [Subs (1) am Act 69 of 2001, s 378 and Sch 1]

(2) A person commits an offence if— (a) the person knows that, or is reckless as to whether, an order has been made under subsection (1); and (b) the person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly contravenes the order. Maximum penalty—2 years imprisonment. [Subs (2) subst Act 69 of 2001, s 378 and Sch 1]

(3) Subsection (2) does not limit the court’s power to punish for contempt. [S 21J subst Act 45 of 2005, s 51; am Act 69 of 2001; insrt Act 57 of 2000, s 4]

21K

Disclosure of operative’s identity etc. despite certificate

(1) This section applies if a witness identity protection certificate for an operative in relation to a proceeding is filed with a court. (2) A party to the proceeding, or a lawyer assisting the court in the proceeding, may apply to the court— (a) for leave— (i) to ask a question of a witness, including the operative, that may lead to the disclosure of the operative’s identity or where the operative lives; or (ii) for a person involved in the proceeding to make a statement that discloses, or may lead to the disclosure of, the operative’s identity or where the operative lives; or (b) for an order requiring a witness, including the operative, to answer a question, give evidence or provide information that discloses, or may lead to the disclosure of, the operative’s identity or where the operative lives. (3) The court may— © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

331

s 21K

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

(a) (b)

[21K.1]

give leave for the party or lawyer to do anything mentioned in subsection (2)(a); or make an order requiring a witness to do anything mentioned in subsection (2)(b).

(4) However, the court must not give leave or make an order unless satisfied about each of the following— (a) there is evidence that, if accepted, would substantially call into question the operative’s credibility; (b) it would be impractical to test properly the credibility of the operative without allowing the risk of disclosure of, or disclosing, the operative’s identity or where the operative lives; (c) it is in the interests of justice for the operative’s credibility to be able to be tested. (5) If there is a jury in the proceeding, the application must be heard in the absence of the jury. (6) Unless the court considers that the interests of justice require otherwise, the court must be closed when— (a) the application is made; and (b) if leave is given or an order is made—the question is asked and answered, the evidence is given, the information is provided or the statement is made. (7) The court must make an order suppressing the publication of anything said when— (a) the application is made; and (b) if leave is given or an order is made—the question is asked and answered, the evidence is given, the information is provided or the statement is made. (8) Nothing in subsection (7) prevents the taking of a transcript of court proceedings, but the court may make an order for how the transcript is to be dealt with, including an order suppressing its publication. (9) The court may make any other order it considers appropriate to protect the operative’s identity or to prevent the disclosure of where the operative lives. (10) A person commits an offence if— (a) the person knows that, or is reckless as to whether, an order has been made under subsection (7), (8) or (9); and (b) the person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly contravenes the order. Maximum penalty—2 years imprisonment. (11) Subsection (10) does not limit the court’s power to punish for contempt. [S 21K subst Act 45 of 2005, s 51; insrt Act 57 of 2000, s 4]

[21K.1] The protection afforded by a “witness anonymity certificate” is not absolute. Section 21K seeks to balance the interests of defendants and the safety of the protected witness. It enables the court to allow a party (as defined in s 21C) 332

Evidence Law in Queensland

[21K.3]

Division 5 – Witness identity protection

s 21KC

to ask questions that may identify the witness if credit is a serious issue, and cannot otherwise be properly tested. At the same time, the court may exclude the jury (if any) and members of the public, and may make a non-publication order that is sanctioned by a fine or imprisonment under s 21K(10) and by the law of contempt: s 21K(11). [21K.2] Accordingly, the removal of court control by s 21F is significantly restored by s 21K. [21K.3] Power to relax a witness identity protection certificate, otherwise than in a proceeding, resides in the chief executive officer who granted the certificate: s 21KC. 21KA

Directions to jury

(1) This section applies if— (a) a witness identity protection certificate for an operative in relation to a proceeding is filed with a court; and (b) there is a jury in the proceeding; and (c) the operative gives evidence. (2) The court must, unless it considers it inappropriate, direct the jury not to give the operative’s evidence any more or less weight, or draw any adverse inferences against the defendant or another party to the proceeding, because— (a) there is a witness identity protection certificate for the operative; or (b) the court has made an order under section 21J or section 21K(7), (8) or (9). [S 21KA insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 51]

21KB

Witness identity protection certificate—cancellation

(1) This section applies if the chief executive officer of a law enforcement agency gives a witness identity protection certificate for an operative of the agency in relation to a proceeding. (2) The chief executive officer must cancel the witness identity protection certificate if the chief executive officer considers that it is no longer necessary or appropriate to prevent the disclosure of the operative’s identity or where the operative lives. (3) If the chief executive officer cancels the certificate after it has been filed with a court, the chief executive officer must immediately give written notice of the cancellation to the court and each party to the proceeding. [S 21KB insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 51]

21KC Permission to give information disclosing operative’s identity etc. (1) This section applies if the chief executive officer of a law enforcement agency gives a witness identity protection certificate for an operative of the agency in relation to a proceeding. (2) The chief executive officer may, in writing, permit a person to give information, otherwise than in the proceeding, that discloses, or may lead to the © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

333

s 21KC

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[21KC.1]

disclosure of, the operative’s identity or where the operative lives if the chief executive officer considers it necessary or appropriate for the information to be given. (3) The (a) (b) (c)

permission must state— the name of the person who may give the information; and the name of the person to whom the information may be given; and the information that may be given.

(4) The permission also may state how the information may be given. [S 21KC insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 51]

[21KC.1] Power to relax a witness identity protection certificate in the course of a proceeding resides in the court concerned: s 21K.

21KD

Disclosure offences

(1) A person commits an offence if— (a) a witness identity protection certificate for an operative in relation to a proceeding has been given; and (b) the person knows that, or is reckless as to whether, the certificate has been given; and (c) the person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly does something (the disclosure action) that discloses, or is likely to lead to the disclosure of, the operative’s identity or where the operative lives; and (d) the person knows that, or is reckless as to whether, the certificate had not been cancelled under section 21KB before the person does the disclosure action; and (e) the person knows that, or is reckless as to whether, the disclosure action is not— (i) authorised by leave or an order under section 21K; or (ii) permitted under section 21KC. Maximum penalty—2 years imprisonment. (2) A person commits a crime if the person commits an offence against subsection (1) in circumstances in which the person— (a) intends to endanger the health or safety of any person or prejudice the effective conduct of an investigation; or (b) knows that, or is reckless as to whether, the disclosure action— (i) endangers or will endanger the health or safety of any person; or (ii) prejudices or will prejudice the effective conduct of an investigation. Maximum penalty—10 years imprisonment. [S 21KD insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 51]

334

Evidence Law in Queensland

[21KE.2]

Division 5 – Witness identity protection

s 21KE

21KE Review of giving of witness identity protection certificate by police service (1) This section applies to a witness identity protection certificate filed with a court by the police service. (2) As soon as practicable after the end of the proceeding in which the witness identity protection certificate is filed by the police service, the commissioner of the police service must give the chairperson of the CCC notice of the date the proceeding to which the certificate relates ended. [Subs (2) am Act 19 of 2016, s 46 and Sch 1]

(3) The chairperson of the CCC must— (a) review the giving of the witness identity protection certificate as soon as practicable after the end of the proceeding to which the certificate relates and, in any event, within 3 months after the end of the year in which the certificate is filed; and (b) consider whether, in the circumstances, it was appropriate to give the certificate; and (c) if the chairperson considers it was inappropriate to give the certificate, notify whichever of the following is relevant of that fact as soon as practicable— (i) each party to the proceeding; (ii) a lawyer assisting the court. [Subs (3) am Act 19 of 2016, s 46 and Sch 1; Act 26 of 2006, s 109]

(4) The commissioner of the police service, if asked by the chairperson of the CCC, must give the chairperson— (a) all the information the police service used for deciding to give the witness identity protection certificate; and (b) particulars relating to each person to whom a copy of the certificate was given under section 21H(2) or (3). [Subs (4) am Act 19 of 2016, s 46 and Sch 1]

(5) The chairperson of the CCC must give a copy of any report on the review to the commissioner of the police service as soon as practicable after the report is completed. [Subs (5) am Act 19 of 2016, s 46 and Sch 1] [S 21KE am Act 19 of 2016; Act 21 of 2014; Act 26 of 2006; insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 51]

[21KE.1] Compare s 21F(3), which significantly limits the power of the courts to review a grant of a witness identity protection certificate. [21KE.2] The CCC’s power of review is assisted by reports made under s 21KF. Details of reviews must appear in the CCC’s annual report: s 21KG.

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335

s 21KF

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[21KE.2]

21KF Giving information about witness identity protection certificates (1) As soon as practicable after the end of each financial year, the chief executive officer of a law enforcement agency, other than the CCC, must give to the chairperson of the CCC a written report containing all of the following information for the financial year— (a) the number of witness identity protection certificates given by the chief executive officer; (b) the basis on which the chief executive officer was satisfied about the matters mentioned in section 21F(1)(b) for each certificate; (c) if leave was given or an order made under section 21K in a proceeding in which a witness identity protection certificate for an operative of the agency was filed—details of the proceeding that relate to the leave or order; (d) if a witness identity protection certificate was cancelled under section 21KB—the reasons for the cancellation; (e) if a permission was given under section 21KC—the reasons for giving the permission; (f) any other information relating to witness identity protection certificates and the administration of this division that the chairperson of the CCC considers appropriate. [Subs (1) am Act 19 of 2016, s 46 and Sch 1]

(2) The report must not include information that discloses, or may lead to the disclosure of, an operative’s identity, or where the operative lives, unless the witness identity protection certificate for the operative has been cancelled. [S 21KF am Act 19 of 2016; Act 21 of 2014; insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 51]

21KG

Report about witness identity protection certificates

(1) The CCC must include in its annual report for a financial year the following information about witness identity protection certificates given under this division in the financial year— (a) the number of witness identity protection certificates given by each chief executive officer; (b) the basis on which the chief executive officer was satisfied about the matters mentioned in section 21F(1)(b) for each certificate; (c) if leave was given or an order made under section 21K in a proceeding in which a witness identity protection certificate was filed—details of the proceeding that relate to the leave or order; (d) if a witness identity protection certificate was cancelled under section 21KB—the reasons for the cancellation; (e) if a permission was given under section 21KC—the reasons for giving the permission; (f) any other information relating to witness identity protection certificates and the administration of this division that the chairperson of the CCC considers appropriate. [Subs (1) am Act 19 of 2016, s 46 and Sch 1]

336

Evidence Law in Queensland

[21L.1]

Division 6 – Cross-examination of protected witnesses

s 21L

(2) The annual report must not include information that discloses, or may lead to the disclosure of, an operative’s identity, or where the operative lives, unless the witness identity protection certificate for the operative has been cancelled. (3) In this section— annual report, of the CCC, means the report given by the CCC under the Financial Accountability Act 2009, section 63. [Def am Act 21 of 2014, s 94(2) and Sch 2; Act 9 of 2009, s 136 and Sch 1 item 1] [S 21KG am Act 19 of 2016; Act 21 of 2014; Act 9 of 2009; insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 51]

21KH Recognition of witness identity protection certificates under corresponding laws Sections 21H to 21KA and section 21KD apply, with any necessary changes, to a corresponding witness identity protection certificate as if it were a witness identity protection certificate given under section 21F. [S 21KH insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 51]

[21KH.1] The expression “corresponding law” is defined in s 21C.

Subdivision 3 – General 21KI

Delegation

(1) Other than as provided by this section, and despite any other Act or law to the contrary, the powers of a chief executive officer under this division may not be delegated to any other person. (2) A chief executive officer of a law enforcement agency may delegate any of the chief executive officer’s powers under this division, other than this power of delegation, to a senior officer of the agency. (3) In this section— senior officer, of a law enforcement agency, means— (a) for the police service—a deputy commissioner of the police service; or (b) for the CCC—a senior executive officer under the Crime and Corruption Act 2001. [Def am Act 21 of 2014, s 94(2) and Sch 2] [S 21KI am Act 21 of 2014; insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 51]

DIVISION 6 – CROSS-EXAMINATION OF PROTECTED WITNESSES 21L Application of division 6 This division applies only to criminal proceedings, other than summary proceedings under the Justices Act 1886. [S 21L insrt Act 43 of 2000, s 47]

[21L.1] Division 6 of Pt 2, comprising ss 21L – 21S, was inserted by s 47 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2000. Division 6 applies only to indictable © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

337

s 21M

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[21L.2]

offences, including committal proceedings in relation thereto. The definition of “criminal proceeding” in the Dictionary is modified for the purposes of this Division. [21L.2] Division 6 is a further response to public opinion that gave birth to s 21A (evidence of special witnesses). It arises from community concern about oppressive treatment of “protected witnesses” (particularly complainants) in certain criminal cases. It prevents an unrepresented accused from crossexamining children, persons with an intellectual disability, or alleged victims of sexual or violent crimes. If the accused accepts legal aid, for the purposes of such a cross-examination at least, the right of challenge is preserved; if the accused refuses legal aid, the right to cross-examine is abrogated. 21M

Meaning of protected witness

(1) For this division, each of the following persons is a protected witness — (a) a witness under 16 years; (b) a witness who is a person with an impairment of the mind; (c) for a proceeding for a prescribed special offence, an alleged victim of the offence; (d) for a proceeding for a prescribed offence, an alleged victim of the offence who the court considers would be likely to be disadvantaged as a witness, or to suffer severe emotional trauma, unless treated as a protected witness. [Subs (1) am Act 55 of 2008, s 150 and Sch]

(2) It does not matter whether the proceeding mentioned in subsection (1)(c) or (d) relates also to another offence that is not a prescribed special offence or a prescribed offence. (3) In this section— alleged victim of an offence means a person, other than the person charged, who is— (a) alleged to be a person in relation to whom the offence was committed; or (b) alleged to have been subject to violence in relation to the offence. prescribed offence means an offence defined in the Criminal Code, section 75, 122, 127, 206, 308, 309, 323, 335, 338A, 339, 340, 346, 354, 354A, 355, 359, 413, 414, 415, 417A or 419. [Def am Act 55 of 2008, s 150 and Sch]

prescribed special offence means an offence defined in the Criminal Code, section 208, 210, 213, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 221, 222, 227, 229B, 306, 313, 315, 316, 317, 320, 320A, 322, 323A, 323B, 359E, 363, 363A, 364, 409 or 412 or chapter 32. [Def am Act 55 of 2008, s 150 and Sch]

violence means— (a) an assault on, or injury to, a person; or 338

Evidence Law in Queensland

[21M.2]

Division 6 – Cross-examination of protected witnesses

(b)

s 21M

a threat of an assault on, or an injury to, a person.

[S 21M am Act 55 of 2008; insrt Act 43 of 2000, s 47]

[21M.1] Section 21M(1) defines the classes of witnesses entitled to the benefit of Div 6. Witnesses under 16 years of age and witnesses who are intellectually impaired are protected, whether or not they are alleged victims. An “alleged victim” is a person against whom the offence was committed or who was “subject to violence [or threat of violence] in relation to the offence”: s 21M(3)(b). Some alleged victims will qualify for protection under s 21M(3)(a) or (b), as well as under s 21M(3)(c) or (d). [21M.2]

Other alleged victims come within s 21M(1)(c) or (d).

The alleged victim of a “prescribed special offence” is ipso facto a protected witness. A prescribed special offence is one of the offences defined in these provisions of the Criminal Code: • s 208 – unlawful sodomy; • s 209 – attempted sodomy; • s 210 – indecent treatment of children under 16; • s 213 – owner etc permitting child abuse on premises; • s 215 – carnal knowledge with or of child under 16; • s 216 – abuse of intellectually impaired person; • s 217 – procuring young etc person for carnal knowledge; • s 218 – procuring sexual acts by coercion; • s 219 – taking child for immoral purposes; • s 221 – conspiracy to defile; • s 222 – incest; • s 227 – indecent acts; • s 229B – maintaining a sexual relationship with a child; • s 306 – attempt to murder; • s 313 – killing unborn child; • s 315 – disabling in order to commit indictable offence; • s 317 – acts intended to cause grievous bodily harm etc; • s 320 – grievous bodily harm; • s 320A – torture; • s 322 – maliciously administering poison; • s 323A – female genital mutilation; • s 323B – removal of child from the State for female genital mutilation; • s 359E – unlawful stalking; • s 363 – child stealing; • s 363A – abduction of child under 16; • s 364 – cruelty to child under 16; • s 409 – robbery; © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

339

s 21N

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[21M.3]

• s 412 – attempted robbery; and • Ch 32 – rape and sexual assaults. [21M.3] The alleged victim of a “prescribed offence” is a protected witness if the court considers that one or more of the conditions in s 21M(1)(d) is or are satisfied. A “prescribed offence” is one of the miscellany of offences defined in these sections of the Criminal Code: • s 75 – threatening violence; • • • • • • •

s s s s s s s

122 127 206 308 309 323 335

– – – – – – –

corrupting or threatening jurors; corruption of witnesses; offering violence to officiating ministers of religion; threat to murder in a document; conspiring to murder; wounding and similar acts; common assault;

• s 338A – assaults on member of crew on aircraft; • s 339 – assault occasioning bodily harm; • s 340 – serious assault; • s 346 – assault in interference with freedom of trade or work; • s 354 – kidnapping; • • • • • • • •

s s s s s s s s

354A – kidnapping for ransom; 355 – deprivation of liberty; 359 – threats; 413 – assault with intent to steal; 414 – demanding property with menaces with intent to steal; 415 – demanding property etc with threats; 417A – taking control of aircraft; and 419 – burglary.

[21M.4] Section 21M was amended by the Criminal Code and Other Acts Amendment Act 2008 as follows: (i) by substituting the words “a person with an impairment of the mind” for the words “an intellectually impaired person” in s 21M(1)(b); (ii) by omitting from the definition of “prescribed offence” in s 21M(3) references to ss 338, 416 and 417 of the Code; and (iii) by omitting from the definition of “prescribed special offence” in s 21M(3) a reference to s 209 of the Code. [21M.5]

As to the application of the definitions in s 21M see s 146, below.

21N No cross-examination of protected witness by person charged A person charged may not cross-examine a protected witness in person. [S 21N insrt Act 43 of 2000, s 47]

340

Evidence Law in Queensland

[21N.2]

Division 6 – Cross-examination of protected witnesses

s 21O

[21N.1] Under s 21N, an unrepresented defendant who is charged with one of the offences indicated in s 21M loses the fundamental right to cross-examine a “protected witness” unless he or she consents to legal representation according to ss 21O and 21P.1010 In recommending a similar reform, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission observed:1011 [T]he Commission takes the view that the nature of the questions that must be put to the complainant in sexual assault proceedings makes it inherently offensive to the proper administration of justice that those questions should be put personally by an alleged attacker (whether he or she is guilty or not), even where those questions are put with objective propriety. Those questions deal with matters of considerable intimacy, relating to sexual approach, sexual caresses, details of intercourse and the aftermath. This is certainly true of “consent cases”, that is, cases in which intercourse between the complainant and the accused is admitted but the accused alleges that the complainant consented, and where the focus of the trial is on the issue of consent. It is also true in most “denial cases”, that is, cases (often involving children) in which the accused denies that intercourse took place at all, and where the defence is aimed at suggesting that intercourse could not have physically occurred, or at questioning the veracity of the account of the incident given by the complainant in the witness box by pointing to the complainant’s different account of the incident on some other occasion.

[21N.2] In R v MSK1012 a challenge to the validity of a similar provision was rejected, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal holding that the legislature is free to vary the common law right of cross-examination in this way, and that there is no obstacle in federal constitutional law. 21O Procedure for cross-examination of protected witness if person charged has no legal representative (1) This section applies if— (a) a person charged does not have a legal representative for a proceeding; and (b) the court rules that a person is a protected witness for the proceeding. (2) The court must advise the person charged present before the court that— (a) the person charged may not cross-examine the protected witness in person; and (b) the court will arrange for the person charged to be given free legal assistance by Legal Aid for the cross-examination unless the person charged— (i) arranges for legal representation; or (ii) does not want the protected witness to be cross-examined. (3) The court must also require the person charged to advise the court by a particular date or time the court considers reasonable if the person charged— 1010. R v Armstrong [2015] QCA 189. 1011. NSWLRC, Questioning of complainants by unrepresented accused in sexual offence trials, Report No 101 (June 2003) at [3.67]. 1012. (2004) 61 NSWLR 204; [2004] NSWCCA 308 (application for special leave dismissed by the High Court on 4 February 2005). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

341

s 21O

Witnesses: Competence, Compellability, Cross-examination and Protection

[21O.1]

(a)

has arranged for a legal representative to act for the person charged for the proceeding; or (b) has arranged for a legal representative to act for the person charged for cross-examination of the protected witness; or (c) does not want the protected witness to be cross-examined. (4) If, by the particular date or time, the court has not received advice from the person charged under subsection (3) that the person charged has arranged for a legal representative or does not want the protected witness crossexamined, the court must make an order that the person charged be given free legal assistance by Legal Aid for the cross-examination of the protected witness by a lawyer. [S 21O insrt Act 43 of 2000, s 47]

[21O.1] Section 21O gives unrepresented defendants a chance to reconsider their position before they forfeit the right to cross-examine. If an accused is unwilling to be legally represented throughout a trial, a lawyer may be engaged at public or private expense for the limited purposes of cross-examining protected witnesses: s 21P; R v Bartzis.1013 [21O.2] If a private appointment is not made within a set time, the court must order that Legal Aid be provided for that purpose. The accused retains the right to refuse that assistance, at the expense of forfeiting cross-examination. 21P Legal assistance for cross-examination of protected witness If a person charged is given legal assistance by Legal Aid because of an order under section 21O(4), the lawyer who cross-examines the protected witness for the person charged is the person’s legal representative for the purposes only of the cross-examination. [S 21P insrt Act 43 of 2000, s 47]

[21P.1] If a lawyer is engaged at public expense under s 21O(2) or (4), the engagement is limited to the cross-examination of protected witnesses. A case in which an accused mischievously dismisses his counsel in the midst of a trial may be distinguishable.1014 On the general right to publicly funded legal representation in serious criminal matters, see Dietrich v The Queen.1015 21Q

Satisfaction of Criminal Code, section 616

(1) This section applies if a person charged who does not have a legal representative for the cross-examination of a protected witness refuses legal assistance, available because of an order under section 21O(4), to cross-examine the witness. 1013. [2012] QCA 225. 1014. R v Kerbatieh (2005) 155 A Crim R 367; [2005] VSCA 194. 1015. (1992) 177 CLR 292.

342

Evidence Law in Queensland

[21S.1]

Division 6 – Cross-examination of protected witnesses

s 21S

(2) The Criminal Code, section 616 is taken to have been satisfied for the person charged in relation to cross-examination of the witness despite the person charged being unable to cross-examine the witness because of section 21N. [S 21Q insrt Act 43 of 2000, s 47]

[21Q.1] Ultimately the accused retains the right to refuse legal representation even when an order is made under s 21O(4). But in that event, the right to cross-examine is abrogated by s 21N. [21Q.2] The object of s 21Q is to ensure that abrogation of the right of cross-examination under Div 5 is not open to challenge under s 616 of the Criminal Code, which states: “Every person charged with an offence is entitled to make the person’s defence at the … trial and to have the witnesses examined and cross-examined by … counsel.” 21R

Jury direction

(1) This section applies if there is a jury and a person charged— (a) does not have a legal representative other than for the crossexamination of a protected witness; or (b) does not have a legal representative for the cross-examination of a protected witness. (2) The court must give the jury any warning the court considers necessary to ensure the person charged is not prejudiced by any inference that might be drawn from the fact the person charged has been prevented from crossexamining the protected witness in person. [S 21R insrt Act 43 of 2000, s 47]

[21R.1] The judge has the difficult task of ensuring, so far as possible, that the jury does not draw an adverse inference from the fact that a protected witness is not cross-examined. But unchallenged evidence is generally impressive. Is the jury to apply some sort of arbitrary discount in favour of the accused? Guidance in dealing with this section is awaited from courts of criminal appeal. 21S Orders, directions and rulings concerning protected witnesses The court may make any orders or give any directions or rulings it considers appropriate for the purposes of this division on the court’s own initiative or on an application made to the court by a party to the proceeding. [S 21S insrt Act 43 of 2000, s 47]

[21S.1] Section 21S is characteristic of politicians who enact vague legislation and consign “unintended consequences” to judicial discretion.

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TAKING EVIDENCE OUTSIDE THE COURT: EVIDENCE ON COMMISSION AND KINDRED PROCEDURES INTRODUCTION [22.1] The common law’s preference for viva voce testimony is noted at [6.10]. But sometimes it is necessary to collect evidence before the trial or away from the court. This may be done by issuing a commission, appointing an examiner, or sending letters of request1 to a foreign court to hear and record evidence that cannot be taken in the usual way. (Here the term “evidence on commission” is a general reference to those processes.) Evidence may be obtained by one of those methods in Queensland, or in another Australian jurisdiction, or overseas. There is an abundance of rules for the purpose,2 but the traditional methods are rapidly being overtaken by modern facilities3 for immediate communication.4 The “home” court must be satisfied that the foreign court is likely to accept and act upon its request, if an order is made.5 [22.2] As a matter of reciprocity, Queensland courts assist interstate and overseas courts to collect evidence in this State: see [22.24]. The authority to do so is purely statutory,6 and the form of local legislation is such that some English authorities are still relevant.7 The Queensland provisions were closely examined 1. As a matter of comity, “letters of request” are addressed to authorities in other countries, as a foreign court can only be requested to co-operate: Re Turnbull (1886) 2 QLJR 131; Re Commission from the High Court of Justice, England (1886) 2 QLJR 137; Re Lowry (1892) 4 QLJR 131; Hardie Rubber Company Pty Ltd v General Tire & Rubber Co (1973) 129 CLR 521. The elaborate request to Japanese authorities in the latter case is set out at pp 522-525 of the report. Orders appointing examiners and letters of request are now more usual than commissions (Henderson v Primmer (1986) 68 ACTR 9) but for convenience the expression “evidence on commission” is used to refer to kindred processes here. The importance of observing and promoting international judicial comity is emphasised in Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd v Kok [2016] WASC 96. 2. See Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 396ff (Evidence out of court). 3. Garcin v Amerindo Investment Advisers Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 1140; Gould v State Bank of NSW (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Bryson J, 28 February 1996). 4. A video link may be ordered under the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth) although there is no specific provision for it therein: Bell Group Ltd (In liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (2004) 189 FLR 360; 208 ALR 491; [2004] WASC 162. 5. McGrath as Liquidators of HIH Insurance Ltd [2008] NSWSC 780 at [19]; New Cap Reinsurance Corporation Ltd v AE Grant, Lloyd’s Syndicate No 991 (2009) 257 ALR 740; [2009] NSWSC 662 at [108]. 6. Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v Westinghouse Electric Corporation [1978] AC 547 at 633. 7. British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Eubanks (2004) 60 NSWLR 483; [2004] NSWCA 158.

344

Evidence Law in Queensland

[22.4]

Introduction 8

in Weber v Weber and Fullmer v Cape York Cattle Co.9 In the interests of comity, requests from foreign courts, in civil proceedings, should be viewed “benevolently”.10 An order for production of bank and motor registration records was made in aid of civil proceedings in the Russian Federation in Re Attorney-General (NSW).11 [22.3] Evidence beyond the confines of a trial began as a process in the Chancery12 to “perpetuate” the evidence of elderly, infirm or peripatetic witnesses in case it was needed in future disputes about land or succession to property.13 That ancient process is preserved in rr 410 – 413 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (“future right or claim”). Unlike the other processes considered in this chapter, an application to perpetuate testimony predicates that litigation inter partes has not commenced.14 Evidence so obtained may be used if the witness is unavailable when a relevant dispute comes to trial.15 [22.4] More commonly, evidence on commission is taken for proceedings already commenced. Separate provisions for “evidence given out of court” exist in rr 396 – 409 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, ss 22 – 39 of the Evidence Act 1977, and the Evidence on Commission Act 1988. A remnant of the Evidence and Discovery Act 1967 (s 67) deals with depositions of a “prisoner’s witnesses dying before trial”. The Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth) enables evidence taken abroad to be used in Australian courts.16 The Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act 1856 (Imp) is no longer available in England, but on one view, a Queensland court may still use it in aid of a foreign court.17 According to s 4 of the Evidence on Commission Act 1988, an order may be made, or letters of request issued, for the examination of a witness abroad in any civil or criminal proceeding. On an application under that provision the court must consider whether (i) the witness can reasonably be expected to testify in the normal way; (ii) the expected evidence is material; and (iii) the interests of justice will be served by making the order sought.

8. [1976] Qd R 337. 9. [1987] 1 Qd R 6. 10. Sykes v Richardson (2007) 70 NSWLR 66; [2007] NSWSC 418 at [24]. 11. [2015] NSWSC 1149. 12. Holdsworth, History of English Law (Methuen, 1922-1972), Vol 9, p 356; see also McDonald v Page [1923] SASR 167 at 172-173. 13. Angell v Angell (1822) 1 Sim & St 83; 57 ER 33; Campbell v Earl of Dalhousie (1869) LR 1 Sc & Div 462; Moggridge v Hall (1879) 13 Ch D 380; Kelly v Kelly [1917] 1 IR 51; West v Lord Sackville [1903] 2 Ch 378. An order was refused in the latter case because a suitable cause of action already existed. 14. For a history of this process, see Kelly v Kelly [1917] 1 IR 51; West v Lord Sackville [1903] 2 Ch 378. 15. Beresford v Attorney-General [1918] P 33. 16. Re Cochran Consulting Inc v Uwatec USA Inc [1998] 2 Qd R 137; sed contra Tri-Star Petroleum v Tipperary Oil and Gas (Australia) Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 198; R v Reid (1999) 2 VR 605; 152 FLR 26; [1999] VSCA 98. 17. Re Cochran Consulting Inc v Uwatec USA Inc [1998] 2 Qd R 137; sed contra Tri-Star Petroleum v Tipperary Oil and Gas (Australia) Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 198. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[22.5]

Section 5 of the Evidence on Commission Act 1988 authorises similar action in aid of committal proceedings, or an inquiry about an indictable offence. The Act does not affect any other law for collecting evidence for Queensland courts: s 9. Video links and audio links, as modern alternatives to evidence on commission, now have statutory support.18 They tend to be less expensive than the traditional process, and are certainly more expeditious and lifelike.19 It may be suitable to use a video link for speed or economy, even if the old process might yield better results, and a fortiori if it would not.20 In Volksbank Schwabisch Gmund EG v Werner21 a video link to take “critical” evidence was preferred to letters of request because the foreign jurisdiction might not allow cross-examination if the older method was used. Evidence has been taken by video link in criminal proceedings,22 but an order for medical evidence by telephone from a jurisdiction without reciprocal arrangements was refused.23 In R v Park24 the court refused to admit evidence by video link from Korea because there was no effective sanction for perjury. A video link may be unsuitable if the evidence required is mainly documentary.25 Provisions for video links and audio links appear in ss 39A – 39Z of the Evidence Act 1977, as well as in ss 116A – 116G of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 and ss 110A – 110G of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967. Video recording was used in Hyslop v Australian Paper Manufacturers Ltd (No 2),26 where the plaintiff was gravely ill with lung cancer.

Orders in aid of Queensland litigation [22.5] A party may seek an order for evidence on commission at any time after proceedings begin.27 Normally the application should be on notice. If an order is made ex parte for some special reason,28 other parties should have an opportunity 18. Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991, ss 80 – 82; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 392; Practice Direction No 1 of 2000 (Supreme Court) [2000] 1 Qd R 618; Magistrates Court Practice Direction No 3 of 2000, QLR (10 June 2000); Penalties and Sentences Act 1992, s 15A; Criminal Code 1899, s 594(4) (arraignment); Evidence Act 1977, ss 39A – 39Z. A power to make a video-link order is implicit in the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth): Bell Group (In liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (2004) 189 FLR 360; 208 ALR 491; [2004] WASC 162. 19. See, eg, Garcin v Amerindo Investment Advisers Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 1140; and B v Dentists’ Disciplinary Tribunal [1994] 1 NZLR 95. There is a helpful note on this case in (1995) 69 ALJ at 100. 20. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2004) 49 ACSR 578; 22 ACLC 1125; [2004] NSWSC 467. 21. [1998] ACL Rep 195 (Qld 4). 22. R v Kyu Hyuk Kim (1998) 104 A Crim R2 33 (Vic Sup Ct, Coldrey J). 23. Simonfi v Dowden (1999) 140 ACTR 1. 24. [1999] NSWSC 921. 25. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2004) 49 ACSR 578; [2004] NSWSC 467 (order for evidence to be taken viva voce in London). 26. Hyslop v Australian Paper Manufacturers Ltd (No 2) [1987] VR 309. 27. Re Hewitt (1885) 15 QBD 159 at 163; Mackay v Mackay [1910] VLR 50. There is no power to make an order before proceedings begin: Re Hewitt. 28. Warner v Mosses (1880) 16 Ch D 100 at 103; Williams v Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 677; 21 WN (NSW) 249.

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Evidence Law in Queensland

[22.8]

Introduction

to be heard before it is put into effect.29 An order for a second examination of a particular witness was made in Re Attorney-General (NSW).30 [22.6] An order for evidence on commission is discretionary and will not be reviewed unless the decision to allow it is plainly wrong.31 The interests of all parties must be considered.32 How important is the evidence likely to be? What will be the cost of obtaining it in this manner? What inconvenience will be caused to parties or the court if the order is made, or is not, made?33 Is the proposed witness entitled to privilege and likely to claim it? If so, an order is likely to result in futile expense.34 [22.7] The applicant’s affidavits should show that: (i) the proposed witness is unable to attend the trial or cannot be compelled to do so;35 (ii) the witness can probably36 give material37 and admissible38 evidence; (iii) on the whole it is reasonable to take evidence out of court;39 (iv) there is no ulterior motive for the application, such as a desire to protect a witness from scrutiny in court;40 and (v) the proposed examination can be lawfully and efficiently conducted at the place proposed. On an application for a letter of request to a foreign authority, the court must be shown, in general terms at least, the evidence that is sought, that it is relevant to the issues in the proceedings before it, and that it is sought for the purposes of the trial. Only then can the court be satisfied that what is sought is indeed relevant material.41

Unable to attend or non-compellable Inability [22.8] The usual reasons for inability to attend are advanced age, serious illness or a disability that would make it oppressive to insist on personal attendance. 29. McNamara v Cameron (1890) 16 VLR 108; Owners of the SS “Kalibia” v Wilson (1910) 11 CLR 689; Weber v Weber [1976] Qd R 337 at 340; Hardie Rubber Co Pty Ltd v General Tire and Rubber Co (1973) 129 CLR 521; but cf Fullmer v Cape York Cattle Co [1987] 1 Qd R 6. 30. [2015] NSWSC 1683. 31. Re Matthews [1919] VLR 733; Hardie Rubber Company Pty Ltd v General Tire and Rubber Co (1973) 129 CLR 521. 32. Castelli v Groom (1852) 18 QB 490; 118 ER 185; De Saxe v Schlesinger (1881) 7 VLR (L) 127; Rickard v Sutherland (1907) 24 WN (NSW) 153; Re Matthews [1919] VLR 733; Re S [1948] VLR 11; Ainsley Dunn & Co and Imported Brands Inc v Stewart and Son of Dundee [1969] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 49. 33. Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc v Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd (1990) 95 ALR 444. 34. Volksbank Schwabisch Gmund v Werner [1999] QCA 375. 35. Willis v Trequair (1906) 3 CLR 912; Sydney Ferries Ltd v SS Tahiti (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 307. 36. Hardie Rubber Company Pty Ltd v General Tire and Rubber Co (1973) 129 CLR 521. 37. Cox v Cox (1893) 10 WN (NSW) 37; Kingston v Reid & Co Ltd [1902] QWN 36. 38. Langen v Tate (1883) 24 Ch D 522; Armour v Walker (1884) LR 25 Ch D 673; Bleasby v Romney (1898) 24 VLR 201. 39. McMahon v Evans (1892) 8 WN (NSW) 94. 40. Bruce v Ligar (1869) 6 WW & a’B (E) 240; Re Boyse (1882) 20 Ch D 760; Langen v Tate (1883) 24 Ch D 522. 41. Indochina Medical Co Pty Ltd v Nicolai [2013] NSWCA 436. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

347

Taking Evidence Outside the Court

[22.9]

[22.9] Inability to attend court might also be due to impending childbirth42 if the trial is likely to begin before confinement.43 But social attitudes to pregnant women in public have changed a great deal since the cases just mentioned were decided. Inability to attend may also be due to an imminent departure abroad, if there is no reason to suspect that the trip is designed to avoid a court appearance.44 It may be reasonable to require the witness to delay a journey, or it may appear that he or she will be back before the hearing.45 Fear of appearing in court is not a sufficient reason.46 Not compellable [22.10] An Australian court has no power to subpoena a witness overseas47 (other than one in New Zealand48), but special arrangements may be refused if he or she is willing to appear in person, and the costs entailed are proportionate to the importance of the case, and of the evidence concerned.49 The mere fact that a witness is overseas does not necessarily justify an order for evidence on commission, when modern travel facilities are taken into account.50 But an order need not be refused merely because the opponent would rather cross-examine the witness in court than before a commissioner. If that were an overriding objection, many more applications would fail.51 An order for evidence by video link or audio link reduces the force of such objections.52 [22.11] An order will not be made if the relevant foreign law would prevent an effective examination, or offend our notions of natural justice.53 Traditional evidence on commission was preferred to video links for “reasons of 42. R v Stephenson (1862) Le & Ca 165; 169 ER 1347; Weeding v Weeding (1887) 8 ALT 142; R v Wellings (1878) 3 QBD 426 (committal proceedings). 43. Fisher v Fisher (1877) 3 VLR (I P & M) 64. 44. Fisher v Hahn (1863) 13 CBNS 659; 143 ER 261; Stenger v Mathias (No 2) [1903] QWN 46; Lees v Smith (1918) 35 WN (NSW) 53; Goodchild v Goodchild [1919] VLR 13. 45. Michael v Oldfield (1887) 8 ALT 164. 46. Fisher v Fisher (1877) 3 VLR (I P & M) 64; R v Mendham (1993) 71 A Crim R 382, where an alleged “stress related illness” was not a sufficient excuse. 47. Willis v Trequair (1906) 3 CLR 912; Hardie Rubber Co Pty Ltd v General Tire & Rubber Co (1973) 129 CLR 521 (numerous witnesses in Japan); Ward v Interag Pty Ltd [1985] 2 Qd R 552. In Harwood v Priestley (1997) 6 Tas R 383 an order made without evidence that the witnesses were unable or unwilling to appear in person was allowed to stand. 48. A subpoena issued by an Australian court may now be served in New Zealand: Evidence Amendment Act 1994 (NZ), ss 14-18, 25; Evidence and Procedure (New Zealand) Regulations 1995 (NZ), r 9. However, it may be set aside under the Evidence and Procedure (New Zealand) Act 1994 (Cth), s 14. 49. Williams v Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 677; 21 WN (NSW) 249; Ammar v Ammar [1954] P 468. 50. Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc v Tobacco Institute of Australia (1990) 95 ALR 444. 51. Bolton v Kienzle (1926) 43 WN (NSW) 30. 52. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 392. The relatively inexpensive telephone link is usually adequate when credit is not a major issue, as with much expert evidence. 53. Re Boyse (1882) 20 Ch D 760; Hardie Rubber Co Ltd v General Tire & Rubber Co (1973) 129 CLR 521; Volksbank Schwabisch Gmund EG v Werner [1998] ACL Rep 195 (Qld 4).

348

Evidence Law in Queensland

[22.15]

Introduction

sovereignty” in Flore v NSW Department of Education and Training.54 But considerations of sovereignty and comity were disregarded in Joyce v Sunland Waterfront (BVI) Ltd,55 where a witness in the United Arab Emirates was unable to travel to Australia because of criminal proceedings in his own country. The law relating to video link evidence in the United Arab Emirates was unclear. How important is the evidence? [22.12] It must appear that the proposed witness will give evidence that is more than collateral or marginal.56 An order for examination of four witnesses in America was refused in Ainsley Dunn & Co and Imported Brands Inc v Stewart & Son of Dundee57 because none of them was present when the alleged agreement was made. Their knowledge was limited to post-contractual conversations. [22.13] It must be clear that the evidence exists, and that something better than a “fishing expedition” is proposed. In Radio Corporation of America v Rauland Corporation58 the court refused an order in aid of proceedings in the United States. The applicant wished to conduct a pre-trial, oral interrogation of the opponent – a common procedure in the United States, but unheard of in Australia. Out of court evidence by a party [22.14] In principle, even a party may be allowed to give evidence on commission, but a plaintiff needs exceptionally strong reasons to receive this concession.59 The onus was discharged in Hyslop v Australian Paper Manufacturers Ltd (No 2), where the plaintiff was in hospital, dying of lung cancer.60 A defendant has a somewhat better chance of securing an order, not being open to the objection: “Why did you begin this case if you cannot be present at the trial?”61 When credit is an important issue [22.15] An order may be refused if the credit of a witness is crucial, even if the case for an order is otherwise strong.62 It is a drawback of evidence on commission that the commissioner may not comment on credit.63 However, an audio link or, preferably, a video link, reduces this difficulty64 as the court can then observe demeanour. There was no such difficulty in Hyslop v Australian 54. [2006] NSWSC 1227. 55. (2011) 195 FCR 213; [2011] FCAFC 95. 56. Ehrmann v Ehrmann [1896] 2 Ch 611. 57. [1969] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 49. 58. [1956] 1 QB 618. 59. Lawson v Vacuum Brake Co (1884) 27 Ch D 137. 60. Hyslop v Australian Paper Manufacturers Ltd (No 2) [1987] VR 309: see [22.4]. 61. Ross v Woodford [1894] 1 Ch 38; Willis v Trequair (1906) 3 CLR 912. 62. Berdan v Greenwood (1880) 20 Ch D 764 at 766; Lawson v Vacuum Brake Co (1884) 27 Ch D 137 (fraudulent company promotion; witness in America); Bangkok Bank Ltd v Swatow Lace Co Ltd [1963] NSWR 488. 63. Re Wipperman [1955] P 59 at 67. 64. Park v Citibank Savings Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 219. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

349

Taking Evidence Outside the Court

[22.16]

65

Paper Manufacturers Ltd (No 2) because the plaintiff’s pre-recorded evidence was taken before the trial judge. Sometimes that is possible, even when the witness is overseas.66 There are cases in which a self-appointment of the trial judge as commissioner has provided agreeable travel and welcome relief from daily court routine.67 Costs of personal attendance [22.16] In Macaulay v Glass68 it was said that economy alone does not justify an order. But that was said in England, with European distances and relatively minor travel expenses in mind. The cost of bringing a witness to and from Australia, or (in a minor case) from a distant part of Australia, may be a different matter.69 However, evidence on commission itself, or by video link, is not an inexpensive process. Evidence on commission is taken viva voce with full rights of cross-examination. The fees of the commissioner, as well as lawyers and ancillary staff, must be taken into account. Other things being equal, the case for an order is stronger when the desired evidence is brief70 or cross-examination is not required.71 [22.17] The expense of evidence on commission is a reason for refusing an order when the case is relatively minor, or the evidence sought is not important.72 It may then be better to use an audio link, an affidavit, or even a statement admissible under s 92 of the Evidence Act 1977. In Cullis v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd73 the court rejected a submission that a witness should come from Denmark to Perth, or be examined on commission, and relied instead on a version of s 92. However, Cullis was decided before audio links were formally recognised, and when video links were unknown. The weight of a s 92 statement may be reduced considerably by lack of cross-examination,74 and evidence of that kind can

65. [1987] VR 309. 66. Re Matthews [1919] VLR 733. 67. Re Co-operative Development Funds of Australia Ltd (No 2) (1977) 19 SASR 105 (Adelaide to Tasmania); Priestley v Harwood [1996] TASSC 141 (Tasmania to California); Sheldon v Sun Alliance Ltd (1988) 50 SASR 236 (Adelaide to England). Sheldon involved allegations of arson with intent to defraud an insurance company. Cogent similar fact evidence was taken in the British Isles. 68. (1902) 47 So Jo 71. 69. Re Matthews [1919] VLR 733 at 735; Re Hennesseys Self Service Stores Pty Ltd (In liq) [1965] Qd R 576; Cullis v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd [1970] WAR 170; Re Co-operative Development Funds of Australia Ltd (No 2) (1977) 19 SASR 105. 70. Walt Disney Productions v H John Edwards Publishing Co Pty Ltd (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 281. 71. Burnside v Melbourne Fire Offıce Ltd (No 2) [1918] VLR 639. 72. Compare Ainsley Dunn & Co and Imported Brands Inc v Stewart & Son of Dundee [1969] 1 Lloyds Rep 49. 73. [1970] WAR 170. 74. Ozzard-Low v Ozzard-Low and Wonham [1953] P 272; see also Evidence Act 1977, ss 98 and 102.

350

Evidence Law in Queensland

[22.20]

Introduction 75

seldom resolve a credit issue. An affidavit is liable to be excluded if the deponent is not available for cross-examination.76 Witness in Australia [22.18] The need for evidence on commission within Australia is greatly reduced by the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth), enabling State subpoenas to be served throughout the Commonwealth.77 Generally a witness within Australia and in good health should testify in person.78 But age or serious infirmity is a valid ground wherever the witness may be,79 and an imminent overseas journey may support an order. In Re Matthews80 a witness about to leave Melbourne for Queensland was examined before the trial to minimise costs of administering a small estate. In the early 1900s an application was granted in Sydney with respect to a witness in Western Australia.81 The age of these cases calls for caution today, but expense in small cases, or where a party with a meritorious claim has few resources, is still a relevant consideration. Objections to evidence on commission [22.19] Evidence on commission is not exempt from the rules of evidence. The reference to “all just exceptions” in s 22(3) of the Evidence Act 1977 implies a right to object in court to inadmissible material in depositions.82 Objections based on privilege are recognised in s 38, which restates the common law.83 If no objection is taken before the examiner, the right to object may be lost,84 but not necessarily so.85 [22.20] So far as possible the examiner should follow the rules of evidence and procedure of the court that issued the commission,86 apart from the open-court 75. Bonhote v Henderson [1895] 1 Ch 742; Re Smith and Fawcett [1942] Ch 304. 76. See Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 439. During World War II, when soldiers on active service naturally received special consideration, evidence on affidavit was allowed in undefended divorce cases: Langford v Langford [1932] QWN 39; Guthrie v Guthrie [1943] QWN 28; Vivash v Vivash [1955] QWN 37 (admission of adultery to a solicitor’s clerk in England). 77. National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Australian Widows’ Fund Life Assurance Society Ltd [1910] VLR 411. 78. National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Australian Widows’ Fund Life Assurance Society Ltd [1910] VLR 411; Clutterbuck Brothers v Ringwood [1906] SALR 186. 79. Hancock Bros Pty Ltd v Preservatrice Insurance Australia Ltd (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, 11 November 1985) (witness ill in Cairns; not appropriate to transfer the trial from Brisbane to Cairns); Hyslop v Australian Paper Manufacturers Ltd (No 2) [1987] VR 309. 80. [1919] VLR 733. 81. Rickard v Sutherland (1907) 24 WN (NSW) 153. See also Phillipson v Robertson [1905] QWN 38; Clutterbuck Brothers v Ringwood [1906] SALR 186; De Garis Kendenup (WA) Development Co Ltd v Courtis (1925) 28 WALR 54; Bolton v Kienzle (1926) 43 WN (NSW) 30. 82. Baynes v Osborne (1873) 4 QSCR 1. 83. Desilla v Fells & Co (1879) 40 LT 423; Eccles & Co v Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co [1912] 1 KB 135; Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v Westinghouse Electric Corporation [1978] AC 547. 84. Robinson & Co v Davies & Co (1879) 5 QBD 26. 85. Baynes v Osborne (1873) 4 QSCR 1. 86. Bell v Clarke (1884) 10 VLR (E) 283. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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87

rule. Evidence objected to before the commissioner should be received, with a note of the objection,88 because the commission process is too expensive and time-consuming to risk exclusion of material that may be admissible and important after all. The commissioner’s view of an objection may be stated in the depositions or in an accompanying document,89 but the decision is one for the court.90 The court may overrule an objection not taken before the commissioner, or penalise the failure in costs, if the other party has to replace the evidence tardily challenged.91 A commissioner may declare a witness hostile,92 or record an opinion about competency93 or demeanour94 but not decide issues of credibility.95 [22.21] The depositions should be signed by the commissioner and the witness,96 although the presumption of regularity applies. How depositions become evidence [22.22] Depositions taken by a commissioner become evidence when they are tendered and admitted at the hearing.97 They may be tendered by either party, but the party who obtained them is not bound to use them.98 Unlike answers to interrogatories, depositions may not be selectively tendered.99 [22.23] At the time of tender the circumstances that existed when the commission was issued must still obtain.100 Orders in aid of foreign courts [22.24] Queensland courts may take evidence for other jurisdictions. The necessary authority101 is found in ss 24, 27 and 36 – 39 of the Evidence Act 1977, and possibly in the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act 1856 (Imp). Although the 1856 Act no longer operates in the United Kingdom,102 it has been held that it 87. Magnusson v ACT Health Community Care Service [2001] ACTSC 3. 88. Robinson & Co v Davies & Co (1879) 5 QBD 26; see also s 30. 89. Lumley v Gye (1854) 3 E & B 114; 118 ER 1083; Surr v Walmsley (1866) LR 2 Eq 439. But a commissioner should not comment on matters of credit: Re Wipperman [1955] P 59 at 67. 90. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 402. 91. Baynes v Osborn (1873) 4 QSCR 1 at 14. 92. Ohlsen v Terrero (1874) LR 10 Ch App 127. 93. White v Hoddle (1880) 6 VLR (E) 82. 94. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 404. 95. Re Wipperman [1955] P 59 at 67. 96. Bandiera v Adamedes [1963] SASR 103; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 403. 97. Proctor v Lainson (1836) 7 C & P 631; 173 ER 276; Fisher v CHT Ltd [1965] 1 WLR 1093. 98. Pearce v Pearce (1932) 49 WN (NSW) 177. 99. Temperley v Scott (1832) 5 C & P 341; 172 ER 1002 (examination in chief not severable from notes of cross-examination). 100. Barton v North Staffordshire Railway Co (1887) 35 WR 536; see also s 22(3). 101. Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v Westinghouse Electric Corporation [1978] AC 547 at 633. 102. It was replaced in the United Kingdom in 1975, following the Hague Convention.

352

Evidence Law in Queensland

[22.25]

Division 1 – Commissions, requests and orders to examine witnesses 103

s 22

104

still applies in Queensland, but this is doubtful. The same may be true of the Extradition Act 1870 (Imp), which extended the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act 1856 to criminal cases.105 [22.25] When evidence is taken for a foreign court, the rules of that jurisdiction should be followed so far as Queensland law allows.106 But claims of privilege depend on Queensland law.107

Part 3 – Means of obtaining evidence DIVISION 1 – COMMISSIONS, REQUESTS AND ORDERS TO EXAMINE WITNESSES 22

Commission, request or order to examine witnesses

(1) The Supreme Court or a judge thereof, on application made under the Rules of the Supreme Court, shall have the same powers to issue a commission, request or order to examine witnesses for the purpose of civil proceedings in any court other than the Supreme Court as it or the judge has for the purpose of civil proceedings in the Supreme Court. [Subs (1) am Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

(2) The Rules of the Supreme Court, with such adaptations as the circumstances may require, shall apply and extend to a commission, request or order to examine witnesses issued by authority of subsection (1) and to all proceedings taken thereunder as if the commission, request or order were issued by authority of those rules.

103. Ukley v Ukley [1977] VR 121 at 129; Fullmer v Cape York Cattle Co [1987] 1 Qd R 6; Re Cochran Consulting Inc v Uwatec USA Inc [1998] 2 Qd R 137. The latter case related to a patent infringement prosecution in the United States. While s 1 of the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act 1856 (Imp) refers to testimony, it also covers documents: Re Cochran (see above). In that case the letter of request was sent by the US Attorney-General to the Commonwealth A-G, who forwarded it to the A-G for Queensland. 104. See Tri-Star Petroleum v Tipperary Oil & Gas (Australia) Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 198 for a negative view. 105. But see [35A.2]. 106. Cordova v Philips Roxane Laboratories Inc [1984] 2 NSWLR 327 at 334. 107. Desilla v Fells & Co (1879) 40 LT 423; Weber v Weber [1976] Qd R 337; Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v Westinghouse Electric Corporation [1978] AC 547; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 401. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

353

s 22

Taking Evidence Outside the Court

[22.26]

(3) Subject to all just exceptions, the depositions taken upon the examination of a witness before an examiner by virtue of this section certified under the hand of the examiner are admissible in evidence, without proof of the signature to such certificate, unless it is proved that the witness is at the time of the hearing at which the depositions are offered in evidence within a convenient distance of the place of the hearing and able to attend. (4) The costs of proceedings taken by virtue of this section shall be costs in the cause, unless otherwise directed either by the judge issuing the commission, request or order or by the court for the purpose of whose proceedings the examination is conducted. [S 22 am Act 58 of 1995]

[22.26] Section 22 enables the Supreme Court to arrange for evidence to be taken on commission for inferior courts in Queensland. Section 22 implies the traditional view that evidence on commission is a prerogative of superior courts. In practice, a Supreme Court order may be more readily recognised abroad than an order from an inferior court. In Wade v Lempriere108 an order was made for the examination of witnesses in England in aid of District Court proceedings in north Queensland. [22.27] The rules referred to in s 22(2) are the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 396ff. [22.28] In s 22(3) the phrase “subject to all just exceptions” refers to objections based on the Queensland law of evidence.109 The subsection also confirms that the circumstances in which the order was made must still exist when the depositions are tendered. [22.29] In s 22(4) the phrase “costs in the cause” means that the costs of obtaining evidence on commission will ultimately fall upon the party liable for the costs of the action.110 [22.30] Failure to take a valid objection to evidence before the commissioner may be penalised in costs.111 [22.31] Clearly a party has a strong case for the costs of evidence on commission if the party who sought the order does not use the depositions on trial, and the applicant attended before the commissioner.112 However, special circumstances may be shown.113

108. [1903] QWN 55. 109. In Hyslop v Australian Paper Manufacturers Ltd (No 2) [1987] VR 309 Nicholson J dealt with objections to a videotaped examination of the plaintiff before the civil jury was selected. 110. Oliver, Law of Costs (Law Book Co, 1960), p 16ff. 111. Baynes v Osborne (1873) 4 QSCR 1 at 14; see also [22.20]. 112. Even if the first party is otherwise liable for the costs of the action. 113. Bartlett v Higgins [1901] 2 KB 230; Federal Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Currie (1903) 20 WN (NSW) 217. For other orders relevant to s 22, see Forrest v Eisert (1881) 2 ALJ 136; Mitchell v Nelson (1900) 17 WN (NSW) 16.

354

Evidence Law in Queensland

[23.1]

23

Division 1 – Commissions, requests and orders to examine witnesses

s 23

Commission or order in criminal cases

(1) In any criminal proceeding, if any witness is out of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or more than 400km from the intended place of trial or is from age or infirmity unable to attend the trial or if the testimony of any witness is in danger of being lost by reason of the age or infirmity of the witness or by reason of the witness being about to depart out of the jurisdiction or to some place beyond the said distance of 400km, the Supreme Court or a judge thereof may, on the application or with the consent of the Attorney-General or the Crown prosecutor as well as the person charged, but not otherwise, order— (a) that any such witness within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court be examined on oath, either viva voce or upon interrogatories or otherwise, before a specified officer of the court or other specified person; or (b) that a commission issue for the examination of such witness on oath, either viva voce or upon interrogatories or otherwise, at any place in or out of the jurisdiction. (2) The Supreme Court or a judge thereof may, at the same time or subsequently, give all such directions touching the time, place and manner of such examination, as well within the jurisdiction as without, and all other matters and circumstances connected with such examination as appear reasonable and just. (3) Subject to all just exceptions, the depositions taken upon the examination of a witness before an examiner by virtue of this section certified under the hand of the examiner are admissible in evidence, without proof of the signature to such certificate, unless it is proved that the witness is at the time of the hearing at which the depositions are offered in evidence within a convenient distance of the place of the hearing and able to attend. (4) Any person authorised by any order or commission under this section to take the examination of any witness shall take such examination upon the oath of such witness and may administer the necessary oaths to such witness. [23.1] Section 23 allows evidence to be taken on commission in a criminal case, but only by consent: s 23(1) and the surviving s 67 of the Evidence and Discovery Act 1867, dealing with the use of deposition of prisoners’ witnesses who die or fall gravely ill before trial, remains in force. Subject to those provisions, the deposition may be evidence on the present charge, or another charge based on the same facts.114 In provisions such as s 67 of the Evidence and Discovery Act 1867 “parliament has to some extent abrogated [the] common law principles” of confrontation and cross-examination at the trial.115 The same comment applies to more recent provisions, such as s 93 of the Evidence Act 1977.

114. R v McCallum [1918] St R Qd 124. 115. R v Lynch & Watson [1978] Tas SR 190. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

355

s 23

Taking Evidence Outside the Court

[23.2]

If a witness cannot attend court without a serious risk to health, there is physical incapacity to attend.116 The absence of a witness for the prosecution was satisfactorily explained in R v Cockburn117 (paralytic stroke) and in R v Wellings118 (advanced pregnancy). But in R v Mendham119 an excuse of “stress related illness” was rejected. The deposition of the absent witness, having been read to the jury, should not be made an exhibit120 because that would enable the jury to read it repeatedly and perhaps give it undue weight.121 A provision similar to s 67 of the Evidence and Discovery Act 1867 was considered in R v Butler,122 where Miller J admitted the deposition of the principal witness for the prosecution in an assault case. The witness had been cross-examined at length at the committal hearing. In R v Lester123 Mackenzie J admitted the deposition of the deceased wife of the accused as evidence for the prosecution. A discretion to reject such evidence was exercised in R v Schuurs.124 [23.2] Depositions of deceased or gravely ill witnesses were sometimes admitted in criminal proceedings at common law.125 The evidence of a witness who lost the power of speech after testifying at the committal hearing was received in R v Hutton.126 [23.3] Provision for disabled witnesses also exists in s 111 of the Justices Act 1886, which admits the deposition of a witness at the committal hearing who, at the time of trial, is dead, insane, gravely ill or “kept out of the way” by the defendant. The deposition may be in the form of a tape-recording made under the Recording of Evidence Act 1962. It is a condition of admissibility that “the accused or his solicitor or counsel had a full opportunity of cross-examining the witness”.127 The magistrate must inform an unrepresented defendant of this right.128 In R v Charlie Deen129 the accused was charged with murder. Evidence was taken from the victim in hospital, in the presence of the accused. A doctor urged the magistrate to “hurry up because he is sinking”. It was held that, although the magistrate did invite the defence to cross-examine, there was no “full opportunity” to do so, and the deposition was excluded. 116. R v Sinanovic (1992) 67 A Crim R 230. 117. (1857) 26 LJMC 136. 118. (1878) 3 QBD 426. However, with respect to pregnancy, consider the comments at [22.9]. 119. (1993) 71 A Crim R 382. 120. R v Mendham (1993) 71 A Crim R 382. 121. But see s 99 and [99.1]. 122. [2000] TASSC 129. 123. [2004] QCA 34. 124. [1999] QSC 176. 125. R v Radbourne (1787) 1 Leach 457; R v Edmunds (1909) 2 Cr App R 257; R v Thrower [1934] VLR 292; R v Hall [1973] QB 496 at 502. 126. (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 282. 127. Justices Act 1886, s 111(3)(b); R v Day (1852) 6 Cox CC 55. 128. R v Watts (1863) Le & Ca 339; 169 ER 1422. 129. (1913) 7 QJPR 25.

356

Evidence Law in Queensland

[23.6]

Division 1 – Commissions, requests and orders to examine witnesses

s 24

[23.4] When s 111 of the Justices Act 1886 is invoked, the judge must be satisfied that every requirement of the section is satisfied.130 A voir dire may be held for this purpose.131 Tenders were rejected in R v Moore132 and R v Richards,133 but no reasons are reported. The deposition of a child was excluded in R v Wilton134 because it was not clear that the magistrate had considered the question of competency. The tender was successful in R v Lester,135 but not in a subsequent case, where the committal was on a charge of attempted murder, subsequently upgraded to murder.136 [23.5]

The phrase “subject to all just exceptions” is considered at [22.19].

[23.6] Section 23(4) provides the necessary authority to administer oaths or affirmations before taking evidence for a foreign tribunal. It is an offence to administer an oath without lawful authority.137 24 Power of person appointed by foreign authority to take evidence and administer oaths (1) Subject to subsections (2) to (4), where an authority desires to take receive evidence in Queensland, that authority may appoint a person to take receive evidence in Queensland and a person so appointed has power to take receive evidence in Queensland for that authority and for that purpose administer an oath.

or or or to

[Subs (1) subst Act 3 of 1981, s 2]

(2) Where the authority is not a court or judge, a person so appointed has no power to take or receive evidence, or to administer an oath, in Queensland unless the person has first obtained the consent of the Attorney-General. (3) This section does not authorise the taking or receiving of evidence by a person so appointed in or for use in criminal proceedings. (4) In this section— authority means any court, judge, or person who, or body which, is authorised under the law of a place outside Queensland to take or receive evidence on oath or under any other sanction authorised by law in that place. [S 24 am Act 3 of 1981]

130. R v Adamiczka (1993) 33 NSWLR 68. 131. R v Stephenson (1862) Le & Ca 165; 169 ER 1347; R v Peacock (1870) 12 Cox CC 21. 132. [1945] QWN 13. 133. [1943] QWN 47. 134. [1946] QWN 19. 135. [2004] QCA 34. See [23.4] 136. R v Lester (2007) 176 A Crim R 152; [2007] QSC 229. 137. Criminal Code, ss 95 – 96. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

357

s 25

Taking Evidence Outside the Court

[24.1] 138

[24.1] The spirit of s 24 is reciprocity. As amended in 1981 it enables a non-Queensland “authority” to take evidence in this State for civil proceedings, without obtaining permission to do so. A claim for punitive damages is a civil claim.139 International co-operation in criminal matters is governed by the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth).140 [24.2] No provision for “just exceptions” appears in s 24: contrast ss 22(3), 23(3) and 38. A probable reason is that witnesses interviewed under s 24 are not compellable to testify. But domestic rules of evidence apply to depositions taken under the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act 1856 (Imp), s 5.141

Administering oaths [24.3] According to s 24(2), a foreign examiner may administer an oath in Queensland only if the appointing authority is a court or a judge. In other cases permission of the Attorney-General is required. The unauthorised administration of an oath is an offence.142

“Authority” [24.4] The term “authority” originally referred to an authorised person or body in “a foreign country”. The words “outside Queensland” were substituted by s 2 of the Evidence Act Amendment Act 1981.

DIVISION 2 – SUMMARY PROCEDURE TO OBTAIN EVIDENCE FOR QUEENSLAND OR OTHER JURISDICTIONS 25

Definitions for div 2 In this division— corresponding court — (a) in relation to a court or person acting judicially in a prescribed country—means the court or person acting judicially in Queensland declared by regulation to be the court or person in Queensland that corresponds to that court or person in the prescribed country; and

138. In 1976 it was necessary for an Austrian court to seek the permission of the Queensland Supreme Court to take evidence in Queensland: Weber v Weber [1976] Qd R 337. 139. Sykes v Richardson (2007) 70 NSWLR 66; [2007] NSWSC 418; Alishah v Gunns Ltd (2010) 20 Tas R 305; [2010] TASFC 6. 140. Considered in Fulcher v Hilt (1985) 79 FLR 353; Perry v Lean (1985) 39 SASR 515; Re Venkataya (1995) 80 A Crim R 574. 141. This Act may no longer be applicable: see [22.4]. 142. Criminal Code, ss 95 – 96.

358

Evidence Law in Queensland

[26.2] Division 2 – Summary procedure to obtain evidence for Queensland or other jurisdictionss 26

(b)

in relation to a court or person acting judicially in Queensland—means the court or person acting judicially in a prescribed country declared by regulation to be the court or person in a prescribed country that corresponds to that court or person in Queensland. examiner means a judge, magistrate, clerk of a Magistrates Court or any duly qualified legal practitioner. prescribed country means any State or Territory of the Commonwealth, New Zealand and any other State, Territory or country that is declared by regulation to be a prescribed country for the purposes of this division. [S 25 am Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

[25.1] Under the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act 1856 (Imp) requests from other jurisdictions had to be addressed to a superior court. Part 3 Div 2 enables inferior courts in Queensland and abroad to obtain evidence for each other without the intervention of a superior court. However, no regulation under s 25(a) has appeared. Section 34, which enabled regulations to be made for this Division, was repealed by s 3 Sch 1 of the Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No 2) 1992. [25.2]

See Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, rr 396 – 409.

26 Power of Queensland court to request corresponding court in a prescribed country to take evidence for use in Queensland court (1) Where a court or person acting judicially in Queensland is authorised by or under any Act or law to authorise or order evidence to be taken otherwise than at the hearing of the legal proceedings in respect of which the evidence is required, that court or person may on the application of a person who desires to lead evidence, if it or the person is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice, request a corresponding court to order the examination of a witness or the production of documents by a person or both such examination and production. (2) Any deposition received from a corresponding court which purports to have been signed by the deponent and the examiner or to have been certified as a correct record by the examiner may, subject to all just exceptions, be put in as evidence at the hearing of the legal proceedings and any documents received from a corresponding court may, subject to all just exceptions, be put in at the hearing as if produced at the hearing by the person who produced the documents pursuant to the order of the corresponding court. (3) A court or person acting judicially shall take judicial notice of the seal of a corresponding court and of the signature of any examiner appointed by a corresponding court. [26.1] Sections 26 and 27 predicate proceedings that are “judicial”. Compare s 24(4), which includes administrative inquiries. [26.2]

Section 26(2) recites settled law: see [22.19] – [22.21].

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359

s 27

Taking Evidence Outside the Court

[27.1]

27 Power to take evidence on request from corresponding court of a prescribed country (1) Where by or under any Act or law of a prescribed country provision is made for the evidence of any person that is required in connection with any legal proceedings to be taken otherwise than at the hearing of those proceedings by a court or person acting judicially, a court or person acting judicially in Queensland that is a corresponding court to a court or person acting judicially in the prescribed country before which or whom legal proceedings are being held may, upon receipt of a request in writing from that court or person in the prescribed country, make an order for the examination of a witness and the production of documents by a person or both for such examination or production before an examiner named in the order at a time and place specified in the order. (2) The order shall require reasonable notice to be given by post to each party to the legal proceedings at the party’s address as shown in the request of the time when and place where the examination is to take place or the documents are to be produced. [27.1] This provision for “corresponding courts” remains dormant in the absence of regulations.143 28

Summons of witnesses Upon service on a person of an order requiring the person to attend for examination or to produce documents, together with the payment or tender of a reasonable sum for expenses, the person shall attend at the time and place appointed and shall have and be subject to the same rights and liabilities as if the person were summoned before the court or person by which or whom the order was made. [28.1] See Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 405. Failure to comply with a summons, without just cause or excuse, is a contempt of court.144 Disobedience may be punished by attachment.145

29

Examination (1) Subject to any directions contained in the order for examination— (a) a person ordered to be examined before the examiner may be cross-examined and re-examined; and

143. See also Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, rr 396 – 413. 144. James v Cowan (1929) 42 CLR 305; Commissioner of Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564; Re Barnes [1968] 1 NSWR 697 at 700; Bank of New South Wales v Withers (1981) 35 ALR 21; Remely v Vandenberg [2010] QCA 214. 145. Sharrock v Lillie (1888) 4 TLR 355; Price v Price [1962] QWN 25.

360

Evidence Law in Queensland

[31.1] Division 2 – Summary procedure to obtain evidence for Queensland or other jurisdictionss 31

(b)

the examination, cross-examination and re-examination of persons before the examiner shall be conducted in like manner as they would have been conducted before the court or person acting judicially who made the order for the examination.

(2) The examiner may put any question to a person examined before the examiner as to the meaning of any answer made by that person or as to any matter arising in the course of the examination. (3) An examiner shall have and may exercise such of the powers of the court or person acting judicially by whom the examiner was appointed as are necessary for the proper exercise of the examiner’s functions under this division and may administer oaths and adjourn the examination from time to time as the examiner thinks fit. [29.1] Procedure at examinations on commission is noted at [22.19] – [22.21]. 30

Objections

(1) If a person being examined before an examiner objects to answering any question put to the person, or if objection is taken to any such question that question, the ground for the objection and the answer to any such question to which objection is taken shall be set out in the deposition of that person or any statement annexed thereto. (2) The validity of the ground for objecting to answer any such question or for objecting to such question shall not be determined by the examiner but by the corresponding court at whose request the examination is being conducted. [30.1] 31

The expression “subject to all just exceptions” is explained at [22.19].

Depositions to be signed (1) Where pursuant to an order for examination— (a) a witness has given evidence to the examiner, the depositions of the witness shall be signed by the witness and by the examiner or where the witness refuses to sign or requires alterations that the examiner considers to be unjustified the depositions shall be signed by the examiner who shall certify that the depositions are a correct record and the reasons for them not being signed by the witness; (b) documents have been produced to the examiner by a person not giving evidence, the examiner shall attach to such documents a certificate signed by the examiner stating the name of that person.

(2) All depositions and documents taken before or produced to the examiner pursuant to any such order shall be delivered by the examiner to the court or person by which or whom the order was made for transmission to the corresponding court. [31.1] See [22.21].

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361

s 32

Taking Evidence Outside the Court

[32.1]

32 Power of Queensland court to transmit requests to other places Where a court or person acting judicially in Queensland receives a request from a corresponding court for the examination of a witness or the production of documents by a person and it appears to the court or person acting judicially that the witness or person is not in Queensland and is not proceeding to Queensland but is in or proceeding to another country that is a prescribed country under the law of the country of the corresponding court the court— (a) may transmit the request to a corresponding court in that other prescribed country together with such information as it or the person possesses concerning the whereabouts and intended movements of the person; (b) shall give notice to the corresponding court from which it received the request that the documents have been so transmitted. [32.1] This provision is in keeping with the expeditious spirit of ss 25 – 32. There is no need to return a request to the requesting jurisdiction if the witness has left Queensland. The papers may be sent direct to the place where the witness is located. 33

Saving as to personal attendance

Nothing in this division limits or abridges the power of a court or a person acting judicially to require a witness to attend in person before the court or person. [33.1] Part 3 Div 2 notwithstanding, a Queensland court retains a discretion to grant or refuse an order for evidence on commission. 34

Regulations [Repealed]

[S 34 rep Act 76 of 1993, s 3 and Sch 1]

[34.1] Section 34 was repealed by s 3 Sch 1 of the Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No 2) 1992. Elaborate rules relating to evidence on commission now appear in the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, rr 396-409. DIVISION 3 – GENERAL PROCEDURE TO OBTAIN EVIDENCE FOR OTHER JURISDICTIONS 35

Definitions for div 3 In this division— civil proceedings, in relation to a requesting court, means proceedings in any civil or commercial matter. overseas country means a country, or part of a country, outside the Commonwealth. request includes any commission, order or other process issued by or on behalf of a requesting court.

362

Evidence Law in Queensland

[36.1]

Division 3 – General procedure to obtain evidence for other jurisdictions

s 36

requesting court has the meaning given to it in section 36. [S 35 am Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

[35.1] The definition of “overseas country” accommodates federal polities such as the United States of America, Canada and Germany. 35A Application of division to Crown Nothing in this division shall be construed as enabling any court to make an order that is binding on the Crown or on any person in the person’s capacity as an officer or servant of the Crown. [Former s 35(2) renum Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

[35A.1] Acts do not bind the Crown unless that is expressly stated.146 Section 2 of the Evidence Act 1977 expresses a general intention to bind the Crown. It was therefore necessary to insert s 35A to prevent the nomination of officers or servants of the Crown as agents for other jurisdictions. [35A.2] This section was invoked by the Crown in Tri-Star Petroleum v Tipperary Oil & Gas (Australia) Pty Ltd.147 36 Application to Supreme Court to obtain evidence for civil proceedings in another jurisdiction Where an application by way of originating summons is made to the Supreme Court or a judge thereof for an order for evidence to be obtained in the State, and the court or judge is satisfied— (a) that the application is made in pursuance of a request issued by or on behalf of a court or tribunal (the requesting court) exercising jurisdiction in a State or Territory of the Commonwealth other than Queensland or in an overseas country; and (b) that the evidence to which the application relates is to be obtained for the purposes of civil proceedings which either have been instituted before the requesting court or whose institution before that court is contemplated; the court or judge shall have the powers conferred by the following provisions of this division. [36.1] See Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, rr 396 – 413. Proof of the request and of the foreign proceedings may be given under s 69.148 Section 36 has been treated as an alternative to the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act 1856 (Imp)149 but, on another view, that Act was impliedly repealed by this Act.150 146. Acts Interpretation Act 1954, s 13. 147. [2003] QSC 198. 148. Fullmer v Cape York Cattle Co [1987] 1 Qd R 6. 149. Re Cochran Consulting Inc v Uwatec USA Inc [1998] 2 Qd R 137. 150. Tri-Star Petroleum v Tipperary Oil & Gas (Australia) Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 198. If this is correct, s 35A presents a serious difficulty for litigants seeking evidence on commission from officers or servants of the Crown. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

363

s 37

Taking Evidence Outside the Court

[37.1]

This section applies to Australian States and Territories as well as to courts overseas: s 36(a). 37 Power of Supreme Court to give effect to application to obtain evidence (1) The Supreme Court or a judge thereof on an application under section 36 shall have power by order to make such provision for obtaining evidence in the State as may appear to be appropriate for the purpose of giving effect to the request in pursuance of which the application is made, and any such order may require a person specified therein to take such steps as the court or judge may consider appropriate for that purpose. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), an order under this section may make provision— (a) for the examination of witnesses, either orally or in writing; and (b) for the production of documents; and (c) for the inspection, photographing, preservation, custody or detention of any property; and (d) for the taking of samples of any property and the carrying out of any experiments on or with any property; and (e) for the medical examination of any person. (3) An order under this section shall not require any particular steps to be taken unless they are steps which can be required to be taken by way of obtaining evidence for the purposes of civil proceedings in the Supreme Court (whether or not proceedings of the same description as those to which the application for the order relates), but this subsection shall not preclude the making of an order requiring a person to give testimony (either orally or in writing) otherwise than on oath where this is asked for by the requesting court. (4) An order under this section shall not require a person— (a) to state what documents relevant to the proceedings to which the application for the order relates are or have been in the person’s possession or power; or (b) to produce any documents other than particular documents specified in the order as being documents appearing to the court making the order to be, or to be likely to be, in the person’s possession or power. (5) A person who, by virtue of an order under this section, is required to attend at any place shall be entitled to the like conduct money and payment for expenses and loss of time as on attendance as a witness in civil proceedings before the Supreme Court. (6) An order under this section may be enforced in the same manner as if it were an order made by the Supreme Court or a judge thereof in proceedings pending in the Supreme Court or before the judge. [37.1] Apart from s 37(2)(e) there are statutory powers to order a medical examination in the Status of Children Act 1978, s 11; the Workers’ Compensation 364

Evidence Law in Queensland

[38.2]

Division 3 – General procedure to obtain evidence for other jurisdictions

s 38

and Rehabilitation Act 2003, s 282; the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994, s 46A; and the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, ss 445 – 466. [37.2] A superior court has inherent power to stay proceedings until a party undergoes a reasonable and relevant examination.151 [37.3] An order in the nature of discovery may not be made, but production of specific documents may be required: s 37(4). Individual documents should be separately described, but an insufficiently specific request may be appropriately reworded.152 38

Privilege of witnesses

(1) A person shall not be compelled by virtue of an order under section 37 to give any evidence which the person could not be compelled to give— (a) in civil proceedings in the State; or (b) subject to subsection (2), in civil proceedings in the State or Territory of the Commonwealth or the overseas country in which the requesting court exercises jurisdiction. (2) Subsection (1)(b) shall not apply unless the claim of the person in question to be exempt from giving the evidence is either— (a) supported by a statement contained in the request (whether it is so supported unconditionally or subject to conditions that are fulfilled); or (b) conceded by the applicant for the order; and where such a claim made by any person is not supported or conceded as aforesaid the person may (subject to the other provisions of this section) be required to give the evidence to which the claim relates but that evidence shall not be transmitted to the requesting court if that court, on the matter being referred to it, upholds the claim. (3) In this section, references to giving evidence include references to answering any question and to producing any document and the reference in subsection (2) to the transmission of evidence given by a person shall be construed accordingly. [38.1] For these purposes both the law of Queensland and the law of the “requesting” jurisdiction may be considered. But only privileges that are available in civil proceedings may be claimed. [38.2] If a rule of privilege of another jurisdiction is relied on, it must be proved in accordance with s 38(2).

151. Edmeades v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1969] 2 QB 67; Prescott v Bulldog Tools [1981] 3 All ER 869; S (An Infant) v S [1972] AC 24; see also Status of Children Act 1978, s 11(7). 152. Re Application of Monier Inc (2009) 76 NSWLR 158; [2009] NSWSC 986; Re Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd [2011] NSWSC 223. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

365

s 39

Taking Evidence Outside the Court

[39.1]

39

Judicial proceedings for the purposes of the Criminal Code Proceedings wherein a person gives or is required to give any testimony (either orally or in writing) pursuant to an order under section 37 shall be a judicial proceeding for the purposes of the Criminal Code, chapter 16 whether or not the testimony is given or required to be given on oath or under any other sanction authorised by law. [39.1] Chapter 16 of the Criminal Code deals with offences relating to the administration of justice, namely perjury (Criminal Code, s 123), fabricating evidence (s 126) and perverting the course of justice (s 140). [39.2] An offence against s 126 or s 140 of the Criminal Code may be committed whether or not the evidence is on oath.

Part 3A – Audio visual links and audio links DIVISION 1 – PRELIMINARY 39A

Purposes of pt 3A

The purposes of this part are— (a) to provide for Queensland to participate in a substantially uniform interstate scheme for the taking or receiving of evidence, and the making or receiving of submissions, from or in participating States; and (b) to facilitate the giving and receiving of evidence, and the making and receiving of submissions, in Queensland court proceedings, by audio visual link or audio link. [S 39A insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39A.1] It has been noted153 that the traditional process of evidence on commission is giving way to modern and more immediate means of communication. Part 3A was inserted by the Audio Visual and Audio Links Act 1999 to replace earlier rules of practice in this area. It implements an agreement of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General to enable evidence to be received by video link or telephone throughout Australia. In framing the Queensland version it was decided not to insert an explicit statement that these provisions are subject to the “interests of justice” because that would be superfluous.154 Sections 39A – 39Z enable Queensland to participate in an interstate scheme to use modern technology to save time, expense and inconvenience to parties and witnesses. Provision is also made for the reception of evidence from other countries: s 39X. On a charge of terrorism under the Commonwealth Crimes Act 1914, pre-trial applications were conducted by audio

153. See [22.1], [22.4], [22.10], [22.15] and [22.16]. 154. Queensland, Parliamentary Debates (13 April 1999), p 960 (Second Reading Speech).

366

Evidence Law in Queensland

[39B.1]

Division 1 – Preliminary

s 39B

visual means; a question of conducting the trial in the same way was deferred.155 Audio visual evidence from England and Hong Kong was admitted by the New South Wales court in R v Wilkie.156 The taking of evidence by means of an audio visual link from a witness overseas does not contravene the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK), s 80, which provides that every “trial on indictment” for an offence against the law of the Commonwealth shall be held “in the State” where the offence was committed.157 39B

Application of pt 3A

(1) This part applies to a proceeding whether commenced before or after the commencement of this part. (2) This part does not limit any law of the State that makes provision for— (a) the use of audio visual links or audio links; or (b) the taking of evidence, or the making of submissions, in or outside the State for the purpose of a proceeding in the State. (3) In particular, this part does not affect a prohibition under another Act on the making of an order about the use of an audio visual link or audio link without the consent of all parties to a proceeding. (4) This part does not authorise a defendant in a criminal proceeding before a Queensland court to appear before, or give evidence or make a submission to the court by audio visual link or audio link unless expressly authorised by any of the following— (a) the Criminal Code, section 597C(4); (b) the District Court of Queensland Act 1967, section 110C; (c) the Justices Act 1886, section 178C; (d) the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992, section 15A; (e) the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991, section 80; (f) the Youth Justice Act 1992, section 53 or 159.158 [Subs (4) am Act 34 of 2009, s 45 and Sch item 17; Act 44 of 1992, s 341 and Sch 3 (am Act 39 of 2002); Act 39 of 2002, s 152] [S 39B am Act 34 of 2009; Act 44 of 1992 (am Act 39 of 2002); Act 39 of 2002; insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39B.1] The provisions of Pt 3A are retrospective, according to the usual presumption regarding procedural legislation.159

155. R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 250; [2006] NSWSC 587. 156. (2005) 193 FLR 291; [2005] NSWSC 794. 157. R v Wilkie (2005) 64 NSWLR 125; [2005] NSWCCA 311. 158. , section 53 (granting bail by audio- or video-link); s 159 (sentencing by the same means). 159. See [A.2]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

367

s 39C

Taking Evidence Outside the Court

[39B.1]

Part 3A acts in addition to, and does not detract from, any other Act or rule of court permitting evidence by video link or telephone.160 If another rule requires consent of the parties, that requirement is not affected by this Part. The reservation in s 39B(4), as amended by the Criminal Law (Criminal Organisations Disruption) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2013, s 73, refers to the following provisions: (a) s 594 of the Criminal Code (arraignment by video or audio link if parties agree); (b) s 100 of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (use of video link facilities in proceedings); (c) s 178C of the Justices Act 1886 (use of video link facilities or audio link facilities in proceedings); (d) s 15A of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (audio visual link or audio link may be used to sentence); (e) s 80 of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (use of video link facilities in proceedings); and (f) s 53 or s 159 of the Youth Justice Act 1992 (granting of bail by audio visual link or audio link); (audio visual link or audio link may be used to sentence).

39C

Definitions for pt 3A

In this part— audio link means facilities, including telephone, that enable reasonably contemporaneous and continuous audio communication between persons at different places. audio visual link [Repealed] [Def rep Act 55 of 2003, s 61]

before, a court, includes in a court. court location means the courtroom, or other place, where the court is sitting. external location, for a court, means the location, external to the court location— (a) in or outside Queensland or Australia from which evidence or a submission is being, is to be, or has been taken or made by audio visual link or audio link under this part; or (b) for the application of this part under the Criminal Code, section 597C—at which an accused person is being, is to be, or has been arraigned; or

160. See [22.4]; see also Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 392; Practice Direction No 1 of 2000.

368

Evidence Law in Queensland

[39C.4]

Division 1 – Preliminary

s 39C

(c) for the application of this part under the Youth Justice Act 1992, section 159 or the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992, section 15A—at which an offender or a child is being, is to be, or has been sentenced. [Def am Act 34 of 2009, s 45 and Sch item 17; Act 44 of 1992, s 341 and Sch 3 (am Act 39 of 2002)]

participating State means another State in which provisions of an Act of that State in terms that substantially correspond to divisions 2 and 3 are in force. Queensland court means— (a) the Supreme Court, the District Court or a Magistrates Court; or (b) the Coroners Court; or (c) another court established under an Act; or (d) another tribunal declared under a regulation to be a court for this part. [Def am Act 13 of 2003, s 106 and Sch 1]

recognised court means a court or tribunal of a participating State that is authorised by the provisions of an Act of that State in terms substantially corresponding to divisions 2 and 3 to direct that evidence be taken or submissions be made by audio visual link or audio link from Queensland. tribunal means a body or person that may take evidence on oath. [S 39C am Act 34 of 2009; Act 55 of 2003; Act 13 of 2003; Act 44 of 1992 (am Act 39 of 2002); insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

“Audio link” [39C.1] This definition is capable of including mobile phones and other radio transmitters.

“Audio visual link” [39C.2] This definition was deleted by s 61 of the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003.

“Participating State” [39C.3] An order was refused with respect to a non-participating jurisdiction in Simonfi v Dowden,161 but this difficulty is unlikely to occur again. There are provisions for taking evidence from overseas: s 39X.

“Queensland court” [39C.4] A coroner conducting what is really an administrative inquiry is a court for the purposes of Pt 3A. A tribunal not described as a court may be brought within Pt 3A by regulation. That has been done with respect to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal.162 Compare the extended definition of “court” in the Dictionary and noted at [3.4] – [3.6]. 161. Simonfi v Dowden (1999) 140 ACTR 1. 162. Evidence Regulation 2007, s 4. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

369

s 39D

Taking Evidence Outside the Court

[39C.5]

“Recognised court” [39C.5] This means a court in another State or Territory for which arrangements similar to those in Pt 3A have been made. For this purpose, “court” may have the extended meaning that it bears in the definition of “Queensland court”.

“External location” [39C.6]

The effects of the provisions listed in s 39B(4) are set out in [39B.1].

“Tribunal” [39C.7] For present purposes it is not necessary to consider attempts to distinguish “courts” and “tribunals” at common law. Here a “tribunal” is a person or body authorised to take evidence on oath, and not covered by the definition of “Queensland court”.

DIVISION 2 – USE OF INTERSTATE AUDIO VISUAL LINKS OR AUDIO LINKS IN PROCEEDINGS BEFORE QUEENSLAND COURTS 39D Application of div 2 This division applies to any proceeding, including a criminal proceeding, before a Queensland court. [S 39D insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39D.1] Part 3A Div 2 deals with the use of video and audio links to receive material in Queensland courts from “participating States”. It is not limited to civil proceedings. 39E State courts may take evidence and submissions from outside State (1) The court may, on the court’s own initiative or on the application of a party to a proceeding before the court, direct that evidence be taken or submissions be made by audio visual link or audio link from a participating State. Note: See division 3A in relation to expert witnesses giving evidence by audio visual link or audio link. [Subs (1) am Act 39 of 2014, s 49; Act 13 of 2003, s 106 and Sch 1]

(2) The court may exercise in the participating State, in connection with taking evidence or receiving submissions by audio visual link or audio link, any of its powers that the court may be permitted, under the law of the participating State, to exercise in the participating State. [S 39E am Act 39 of 2014; Act 13 of 2003; insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39E.1] It is submitted that the discretion to make orders under s 39E will be influenced by the considerations outlined at [22.7] – [22.19]. However, Pt 3A may encourage a more liberal approach, particularly in civil cases.

370

Evidence Law in Queensland

[39G.1] Division 3 – Use of interstate audio visual links or audio links in proceedings in participating States s 39G

[39E.2] Section 39E(2) recognises that the powers of a Queensland court in a reciprocating State depend upon the legislature of that other jurisdiction. 39F Legal practitioners entitled to practise A person who is entitled to practise as a legal practitioner in a participating State is entitled to practise as a barrister or solicitor or both in relation to the following— (a) the examination-in-chief, cross-examination or re-examination of a witness in the participating State whose evidence is being given by audio visual link or audio link in a proceeding before the court; (b) making of submissions by audio visual link or audio link from the participating State in a proceeding before the court. [S 39F insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39F.1] Section 39F assumes an absence of nationwide qualifications to practise in State courts. Generally the requirement for professional admission on a State-by-State basis has been eased, but not abolished, by a decision of the High Court163 and by “mutual recognition” Acts.164 However, for the purposes of taking evidence and submissions by interstate video and audio links, “admission” in a participating State, without more, is deemed to be “admission” in Queensland. [39F.2] On 8 March 2002 the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General accepted the principle of national recognition of legal practitioners, instead of the State-based system that existed since colonial times. See the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), ss 8 and 9 (definitions of “barrister” and “solicitor”).

DIVISION 3 – USE OF INTERSTATE AUDIO VISUAL LINKS OR AUDIO LINKS IN PROCEEDINGS IN PARTICIPATING STATES 39G

Application of div 3

This division applies to any proceeding, including a criminal proceeding, before a recognised court. [S 39G insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39G.1] Section 39G introduces provisions dealing with the powers of interstate courts in Queensland. Reciprocal provisions in other States offer similar assistance to Queensland courts.

163. Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461 (residence requirements for admission of interstate practitioners invalidated). 164. See, eg, Mutual Recognition (Queensland) Act 1992, Pt 3. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

371

s 39H

Taking Evidence Outside the Court

[39H.1]

39H Recognised courts may take evidence or receive submissions from persons in Queensland The court may, for a proceeding before it, take evidence or receive submissions, by audio visual link or audio link, from a person in Queensland. [S 39H insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39H.1] Section 39H1 enables interstate courts to take evidence from witnesses in Queensland. 39I

Powers of recognised courts

(1) The court may, for the proceeding, exercise in Queensland, in connection with taking evidence or receiving submissions by audio visual link or audio link, any of its powers other than its powers— (a) to punish for contempt; and (b) to enforce or execute its judgments or process. (2) The laws of the participating State, including rules of court, that apply to the proceeding in that State also apply to the practice and procedure of the court in taking evidence or receiving submissions by audio visual link or audio link from a person in Queensland. (3) For the purposes of the court exercising its powers in Queensland, the external location in Queensland is taken to be part of the court location. [S 39I insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39I.1] For the purposes of s 39H, the powers and procedures of the interstate court apply in Queensland. However, proceedings to enforce an order made under s 39J, or to punish any contempt of the interstate court, are matters for the Queensland courts: ss 39K and 39O. 39J Orders made by recognised court Without limiting section 39I, the court may, by order— (a) direct that the proceeding, or a part of the proceeding, be conducted in private at the external location in Queensland; and (b) require a person to leave the external location in Queensland; and (c) prohibit or restrict the publication of evidence given in the proceeding or the name of a party to, or a witness in, the proceeding. [S 39J insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39J.1] An interstate court has the same powers of excluding the public, removing persons from the place where evidence is being taken, or prohibiting the publication of evidence as it would have if the evidence were taken before that court in the ordinary way: see [Q.3] – [Q.5].

372

Evidence Law in Queensland

[39L.1] Division 3 – Use of interstate audio visual links or audio links in proceedings in participating States s 39M

39K

Enforcement of order

(1) An order under section 39J must be complied with. (2) Subject to rules of court made under the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991, the order may be enforced by the Supreme Court as if the order were an order of that court. (3) Without limiting subsection (2), a person who contravenes the order— (a) is taken to be in contempt of the Supreme Court; and (b) is punishable accordingly; unless the person establishes that the contravention should be excused. [S 39K insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39K.1] A person who, without sufficient excuse, disobeys an order of an interstate court made under s 39J is in contempt of the Supreme Court of Queensland, and may be punished accordingly. 39L Privileges, protection and immunity of participants in proceedings before recognised court (1) A judge or other person presiding at or otherwise taking part in a judicial capacity in the proceeding before the court has, in connection with evidence being taken or submissions being received by audio visual link or audio link from the external location in Queensland, the same privileges, protection and immunity as a Supreme Court judge. (2) A person appearing as a legal practitioner in the proceeding before the court has, in connection with evidence being taken or submissions being received by audio visual link or audio link from the external location in Queensland, the same protection and immunity as a barrister appearing before the Supreme Court. (3) A person at the external location in Queensland appearing as a witness in the proceeding before the court by audio visual link or audio link has the same protection and immunity as a witness in a proceeding before the Supreme Court. [S 39L insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39L.1] Section 39L ensures that judges, practitioners and witnesses officiating or testifying during an interstate “link” enjoy the same immunity from actions for defamation165 that obtains in the reciprocating jurisdiction.

39M

Recognised court may administer oath in the State

(1) The court may administer an oath or affirmation in accordance with its practice and procedure for the purpose of obtaining the testimony of a person in Queensland by audio visual link or audio link in the proceeding.

165. See, eg, Criminal Code, s 373. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

373

s 39M

Taking Evidence Outside the Court

[39M.1]

(2) Evidence given on the oath or affirmation is taken to be given in a Queensland judicial proceeding for the purposes of Queensland law. [S 39M insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39M.1] Section 39M satisfies, for present purposes, s 95 of the Criminal Code: see [Q.7]. Alternatively, an oath or affirmation may be administered by an officer of a Queensland court: s 39N. 39N Assistance to recognised court An officer of a Queensland court may, if asked by the recognised court, do any of the following things for the proceeding— (a) attend at the external location in Queensland; (b) take the action the recognised court directs to facilitate the proceeding; (c) administer an oath or affirmation. [S 39N insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39N.1] Section 39N promotes the policy of co-operation and comity by enabling Queensland court officials to attend and assist participating courts. 39O Contempt of recognised court A person must not, in connection with evidence or a submission that is to be, is being, or has been given or made at the external location in Queensland in the proceeding before the court, do any of the following things— (a) assault, in Queensland— (i) a witness in the proceeding; or (ii) a person appearing in the proceeding as a legal practitioner; or (iii) an officer of a Queensland court giving assistance under section 39N; (b) deliberately interrupt or obstruct the court; (c) create or continue, or join in creating or continuing, a disturbance at the external location in Queensland; (d) attempt to influence improperly anyone in connection with the proceeding; (e) deliberately and without lawful excuse, disobey an order or direction given by the court to regulate conduct happening while evidence is being given or a submission is being made by audio visual link or audio link; (f) do anything in connection with the proceeding that would be a contempt of court if the thing done were done in, or in relation to, a Queensland judicial proceeding. Maximum penalty—imprisonment for 3 months. [S 39O insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39O.1] Contempt of a participating court is an offence against the law of Queensland, punishable in a Queensland court. 374

Evidence Law in Queensland

[39P.1]

39P

Division 3A – Use of audio visial links or audio links for expert witnesses

s 39PB

Double jeopardy

(1) This section applies to a person who does an act or makes an omission that is an offence both— (a) under this part; and (b) under a law of a participating State. (2) The person must not be prosecuted or punished under this part for the offence if the person has been prosecuted or punished under the law of the participating State for the offence. [S 39P insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39P.1] The rule against double jeopardy is deeply embedded in our criminal law.166 The crucial question is whether the act in question is the same as the act or omission already penalised, or has the same central theme or focal point.167 Until recently, at least,168 it was not a case of double jeopardy when a person is prosecuted for an offence already dealt with in disciplinary proceedings,169 or vice versa.170 Section 39P extends the frame of reference interstate, so that prosecution or punishment in another jurisdiction is deemed to be prosecution or punishment for an offence in Queensland.

DIVISION 3A – USE OF AUDIO VISIAL LINKS OR AUDIO LINKS FOR EXPERT WITNESSES 39PA Application of div 3A This division applies to any proceeding, including a criminal proceeding, before a Queensland court. [S 39PA insrt Act 39 of 2014, s 50]

39PB Expert witnesses to give evidence by audio visual link or audio link (1) This section applies if a person is called to give evidence as an expert witness in the proceeding. (2) Subject to subsection (3) and any rules of the court, the person is to give the evidence to the court by audio visual link or audio link. (3) The court may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party to the proceeding, direct that the person is to give oral evidence to the court other

166. Criminal Code Act 1899, ss 8 and 16. 167. R v Gordon; Ex parte Attorney-General [1975] Qd R 301; Connolly v Meagher (1906) 3 CLR 682; R v Carroll (2002) 213 CLR 635; 136 A Crim R 167;[2002] HCA 55. 168. But see [10.12]. 169. R v Whyte; Ex parte Byrnes (1963) 109 CLR 665; Wright v Mooney [1966] VR 225; R v NG [2007] 1 Qd R 37; [2006] QCA 218. 170. Purnell v Medical Board of Queensland [1999] 1 Qd R 362. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

375

s 39PB

Taking Evidence Outside the Court

[39PB.1]

than by audio visual link or audio link if the court is satisfied it is in the interests of justice to give the direction. (4) In deciding whether it is in the interests of justice to give a direction under subsection (3), the court may have regard to the following matters— (a) the nature and scope of the evidence the person is to give in the proceedings; (b) whether the use of audio link or audio visual link is likely to affect the court’s or a jury’s ability to assess the credibility or reliability of the person or the person’s evidence; (c) the availability of appropriate audio or audio visual facilities in the court to which the person is to give evidence; (d) any submission made to the court by the person or any party to the proceedings about the way in which the person should give evidence. (5) Subsection (4) does not limit the matters the court may have regard to in deciding whether it is in the interests of justice to make a direction under subsection (3). (6) The court may, at any time, vary or revoke a direction made under this section on its own initiative or on the application of a party to the proceeding. (7) The court must not give the person’s evidence any more or less weight, or draw any adverse inferences against a party to the proceeding, only because the person gave the evidence by audio visual link or audio link. [S 39PB insrt Act 39 of 2014, s 50]

[39PB.1] This section was inserted by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2014, s 50. It regulates a procedure already well established. See [22.4], ss 39A – 39Z of this Act, ss 116A – 116G of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) and ss 110A – 110G of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld). Expert evidence is governed by Pt 5 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, and relevant common law principles are considered in [A.67]ff. [39PB.2] The court retains a discretion to decide that personal attendance by the witness is necessary: s 39PB(3); Attorney-General (Qld) v Black.171

39PC Direction to jury if expert witness gives evidence by audio visual link or audio link (1) This section applies if— (a) a person gives evidence in the proceeding as an expert witness; and (b) the evidence is given by audio visual link or audio link under section 39PB; and (c) there is a jury in the proceeding.

171. [2015] QSC 302.

376

Evidence Law in Queensland

[39R.1] Division 4 – General provisions about the use of audio visual links or audio links

s 39R

(2) The court must direct the jury not to give the person’s evidence any more or less weight, or draw any adverse inferences against a party to the proceeding, only because the person gave the evidence by audio visual link or audio link. [S 39PC insrt Act 39 of 2014, s 50]

[39PC.1] This section was inserted by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2014, s 50. The prescribed direction will seldom be necessary in civil proceedings, where juries are now seldom seen.

DIVISION 4 – GENERAL PROVISIONS ABOUT THE USE OF AUDIO VISUAL LINKS OR AUDIO LINKS 39Q

Application of div 4

(1) This division applies to any proceeding, including a criminal proceeding, before a Queensland court. (2) This division does not limit, and is not limited by, division 2, 3 or 3A. [Subs (2) am Act 39 of 2014, s 51] [S 39Q am Act 39 of 2014; insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39Q.1] The inclusion of criminal proceedings172 before Queensland courts, and the absence of a requirement for consent, takes ss 39R – 39Z beyond the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 and other provisions noted in s 39B. 39R Queensland courts may take evidence and submissions from external location (1) Subject to any rules of the court, the court may, on the application of a party to the proceeding before the court, direct that a person appear before, or give evidence or make a submission to, the court by audio visual link or audio link from a location inside or outside Queensland, including a location outside Australia. [Subs (1) am Act 39 of 2014, s 52]

(2) The court may, at any time, vary or revoke a direction made under this section on its own initiative or on the application of a party to the proceeding. Note: See division 3A in relation to expert witnesses giving evidence by audio visual link or audio link. [S 39R am Act 39 of 2014; insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39R.1] The provisions of ss 39Rff are not confined to Australian jurisdictions, but compellability of witnesses is subject to s 39V.

172. Witnesses in a murder trial were allowed to give evidence by video link in view of well-held fears about their safety: R v Ngo (2001) 124 A Crim R 151. In R v Wilkie (2005) 193 FLR 291; [2005] NSWSC 794 evidence was taken by audio link from the United Kingdom and Hong Kong. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

377

s 39S

Taking Evidence Outside the Court

[39R.2]

[39R.2] Any sanction for disobedience of a direction to a person outside the State would depend on the law of the reciprocating jurisdiction. 39S Failure of the link If an audio visual link or audio link fails in the proceeding, the court may adjourn the proceeding, or make another appropriate order, as if a person present at the external location were at the court location. [S 39S insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39S.1] 39T

Section 39S evinces a healthy scepticism about the latest technology.

Expenses

The court may make the orders it considers just for payment of expenses incurred in connection with taking evidence or making submissions by audio visual link or audio link. [S 39T insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39T.1] Section 39T confirms that the courts’ long-standing powers to order one party to pay another’s costs in civil proceedings extend to these procedures. In principle, this section is not confined to civil cases: s 39Q. 39U External location to be considered part of Queensland court location (1) An external location in the proceeding before the court is taken to be part of the court location in the proceeding for all purposes relating to a Queensland law for the administration of justice. (2) In this section— a law for the administration of justice includes a law about any of the following— (a) compulsory attendance at court; (b) punishment for failing to attend at court; (c) the presence of a person at court; (d) evidence, including compellability to give evidence; (e) perjury, contempt, procedure, privileges, protection or immunities. law includes any written or unwritten law, and a rule, practice or procedure of the court. [S 39U insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39U.1] Section 39U cannot disguise the fact that persons outside Queensland, and especially witnesses outside Australia, are usually beyond the reach of Queensland courts.

378

Evidence Law in Queensland

[39X.1] Division 4 – General provisions about the use of audio visual links or audio links

s 39X

39V Witness outside Queensland—when compellable If the external location from which a witness giving evidence by audio visual link or audio link in the proceeding is outside Queensland, the witness is compellable to give evidence only to the extent the witness— (a) would be compellable to give the evidence if present in Queensland; and (b) would be compellable to give the evidence in court proceedings under the law of the place from which the evidence is given. [S 39V insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39V.1] Even if a witness is compellable according to the law of the place where he or she resides, Queensland courts will need the co-operation of the courts of that place to make s 39V effective. [39V.2] On compellability generally, see [A.65], [A.162], [6.7], [8.1], [10.1] and [11.1]. 39W Administration of oaths and affirmations An oath or affirmation may be sworn for giving testimony by audio visual link or audio link— (a) over the link in a way that is as near as practicable to the way the witness could be sworn at the court location; or (b) by a person at the external location in accordance with the court’s direction. [S 39W insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39W.1] If the “external location” is outside Queensland, the administration of an oath “over the link” may require the authority of the jurisdiction in which the witness is situated. But any difficulty in that regard can be overcome by resort to s 39W(b). 39X

Testimony from outside Australia other than on oath

(1) This section applies if the external location is in a country other than Australia and an oath is not allowed under the law of the country. (2) The evidence may be given otherwise than on oath under a caution or admonition that would be accepted by a court in that country for the purpose of giving evidence in the court. (3) The probative value of the evidence given under subsection (2) is not diminished merely because the evidence is not given on oath. (4) A person giving the evidence under subsection (2) is liable to be convicted of perjury as if the evidence were given on oath. [S 39X insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39X.1] The inability of the domestic court to administer an oath, or to have an oath administered where the witness is situated, may be a reason for refusing an © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

379

s 39Y

Taking Evidence Outside the Court

[39Y.1]

application to take evidence under Pt 3A. The same consideration applies if, in the circumstances, s 39X(4) would be unlikely to have any practical effect.173 39Y

Putting documents to a person at an external location

(1) If in the course of examination of a person by audio visual link or audio link it is necessary to put a document to the person, the court may permit the document to be put to the person— (a) if the document is at the court location—by sending a copy of it to the external location in any way and the copy then put to the person; or (b) if the document is at the external location—by putting it to the person and then sending it to the court location in any way. (2) A document put to a person under subsection (1) is admissible as evidence without proof that the transmitted copy is a true copy of the relevant document. [S 39Y insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39Y.1] Section 39Y is a specific exemption from the original document rule: compare [19.5], [104.2] and [Q.95]. 39Z Extension of rule-making power If there is a power under another Act to make rules for the court, the power includes a power to make rules, not inconsistent with this part, that are necessary or convenient for carrying out or giving effect to this part. [S 39Z insrt Act 65 of 1999, s 4]

[39Z.1] Relevant powers exist in s 117 of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 and s 131 of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967. Electronic links are also provided for in ss 116A – 116G of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 and ss 110A – 110G of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967. 40

[Repealed]

[40.1] Section 40 was repealed by Act No 58 of 1995, s 4. Its substance now appears in s 135(2)(b).

173. R v Park [1999] NSWSC 921.

380

Evidence Law in Queensland

FACILITATING THE PROOF OF LEGISLATIVE AND OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS Part 4 – Judicial notice of seals, signatures and legislative enactments 41

Public Seal of the State All courts shall take judicial notice of the impression of the Public Seal of the State without evidence of such seal having been impressed or any other evidence relating thereto. [S 41 am Act 80 of 2001, s 94 and Sch 2]

[41.1] Sections 41 – 82 facilitate proof of documents that would be tedious or impossible to prove in strict accordance with the common law, or would be caught by the hearsay rule if such proof were required. A seal purporting to be the State seal “proves itself” on production, but this does not bar a claim that a transaction under the State seal is ultra vires. For example, an instrument appointing a judge of the Supreme Court might be challenged on the ground that the nominee is not qualified for the office.1 [41.2] The “judicial notice” to which ss 41 – 43 refer is not the common law doctrine.2 Here there is no discretion; the court must dispense a party from further proof when these provisions apply. [41.3] The heading “Seal of Queensland” was substituted by the Constitution of Queensland 2001, Sch 2. 42 Signatures of holders of public offices etc. to be judicially noticed (1) Judicial notice must be taken of— (a) the signature of a person who is or has been the holder of a public office; and (b) the fact that the person holds or has held the office. (2) For subsection (1), the following offices are public offices— (a) the office of Governor; 1. Re McCawley [1918] QSR 62. 2. See [A.62]; see also Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149; Neill v NSW Fresh Food and Ice Pty Ltd (1963) 108 CLR 362; R v Dodd [1985] 2 Qd R 277; Malaysian Airlines System v Wood [1988] WAR 294.

© 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

381

s 42

Facilitating the Proof of Legislative and Official Documents

(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)

[42.1]

the office of a Minister; the office of a judge, magistrate or warden; the office of an official of a court; the office of a justice of the peace or commissioner for declarations; another office of a public nature established under an Act; an office prescribed under an Act for this section.

(3) Schedule 1 provides examples of offices of a public nature established under an Act. (4) This section is in addition to, and does not limit, the common law, another provision of this Act or a provision of another Act. [S 42 subst Act 51 of 1995, s 4 and Sch; am Act 76 of 1993, s 3 and Sch 1]

[42.1] Section 42 requires courts to accept without proof: (a) the authenticity of the apparent signature of a public officer; and (b) the fact that the person who appears to have signed the document occupies, or has occupied, one of the offices listed in s 42(2). As to the signatures of deputies, see s 34 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954. [42.2] Examples of “offices of a public nature established under an Act” (s 42(2)(g)) are given in Sch 1 as follows:3 • Auditor-General; • Chairperson of the CCC; • Chief executive of a department; • Chief executive officer of a local government; • Clerk of the Parliament; • Commissioner of the Police Service; • Director of Public Prosecutions; • Electoral commissioner; • Information commissioner; • Mayor of a local government; • Parliamentary counsel; • Public trustee; • Ombudsman; • Registrar-General; • Registrar of titles; and • Solicitor-General. [42.3] With respect to s 42(4), see s 312(2) of the Adoption Act 2009, s 178(2) of the Health Act 1937, and s 18 of the Justices Act 1886. [42.4] Section 123 requires judicial notice to be taken of reproductions of seals and signatures whenever the originals are entitled to judicial notice. 3. As to a justice of the peace see McCollom v Kovarik [2013] QDC 111.

382

Evidence Law in Queensland

[42A.1]

Part 4 – Judicial notice of seals, signatures and legislative enactments

s 43

[42.5] Section 185 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (replacing the State and Territorial Laws and Records Recognition Act 1901 (Cth)) implements s 118 of the Federal Constitution. It requires State courts to take judicial notice of interstate legislation, official records and judicial proceedings. This does not give State laws any extraterritorial operation that they do not already possess.4 42A

Certain seals to be judicially noticed etc.

(1) Judicial notice must be taken of the imprint of any seal of an office or entity established under an Act, and a document on which the imprint appears must be presumed to have been properly sealed unless the contrary is established. (2) This section is in addition to, and does not limit, the common law, another provision of this Act or a provision of another Act. [S 42A insrt Act 51 of 1995, s 4 and Sch]

[42A.1] Section 42A was inserted by Act No 51 of 1995. Seals of this kind proliferate as former governmental functions are hived off to quasi-commercial corporations. 43

Acts and statutory instruments to be judicially noticed Judicial (a) (b) (c)

notice must be taken of the following— every Act; every statutory instrument; the time when every Act or statutory instrument commenced, and every provision of every Act or statutory instrument commenced. (d) when every Act was assented to;

[Para (d) insrt Act 39 of 2013, s 58]

(e)

when and by whom every item of subordinate legislation was made, approved, confirmed or otherwise consented to;

[Para (e) insrt Act 39 of 2013, s 58]

(f)

when and how every item of subordinate legislation was notified;

[Para (f) insrt Act 39 of 2013, s 58]

(g)

when every item of subordinate legislation was laid before the Legislative Assembly;

[Para (g) insrt Act 39 of 2013, s 58]

(h)

every official copy of Queensland legislation.

[Para (h) insrt Act 39 of 2013, s 58] [S 43 am Act 39 of 2013; subst Act 51 of 1995, s 4 and Sch; Act 76 of 1993, s 3 and Sch 1]

4. Anderson v Eric Anderson Radio and TV Pty Ltd (1965) 114 CLR 20; Permanent Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd v Finlayson (1968) 122 CLR 338. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

383

s 43A

Facilitating the Proof of Legislative and Official Documents

[43.1]

5

[43.1] Queensland legislation “proves itself”. According to s 7(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954, a reference to an Act includes a reference to statutory instruments made under that Act. Section 43(b) was applied in De Bray v Cohen6 and extended to a local law in Marshall v Averay.7 [43.2] However, the handing-up of a current copy of the Act is a standard courtesy to the court, particularly when the Act is one seldom referred to.8 [43.3] As to proof of interstate legislation, see ss 68 and 185 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). Recognition of the common law in other States is considered in Close v Mirror Newspapers Ltd9 and In the Goods of Crake.10 [43.4] A copy of an Act on which the government printer has printed the date of assent is evidence of that date.11 43A Administrative arrangements to be judicially noticed Judicial notice must be taken of the administrative arrangements set out in an order published in the gazette and purportedly made under the Constitution of Queensland 2001, section 44. [S 43A insrt Act 80 of 2001, s 94 and Sch 2]

[43A.1] Sch 2.

Section 43A was inserted by the Constitution of Queensland 2001,

Part 5 – Proof of documents and other matters DIVISION 1 – PROOF OF OFFICIAL AND JUDICIAL DOCUMENTS AND MATTERS 44

Proof by purported certificate, document etc. Where (a) (b) (c)

by a law in force in Queensland— a certificate; or an official or public document; or a document of a corporation; or

5. Rolls v Bateman [1946] QSR 34; R v Yanner [1998] 2 Qd R 208; Lade and Co Pty Ltd v Finlay [2010] QSC 382; Bailey v Nominal Defendant [2004] QCA 344; Pikos v Bezuidenhout (2004) 145 A Crim R 544; [2004] QCA 178 (Industrial Gazette); Eaton v Yanner; Ex parte Eaton [1998] QCA 20. 6. [2008] QDC 275. 7. [2006] QDC 356. 8. Brebner v Bruce (1950) 82 CLR 161 at 167-169. 9. (1961) 80 WN (NSW) 200. 10. [1959] QWN 33. 11. Acts Interpretation Act 1954, s 16.

384

Evidence Law in Queensland

[45.3]

Division 1 – Proof of official and judicial documents and matters

s 45

(d) a copy of, or extract from, a document; is admissible in evidence for any purpose, a document purporting to be the certificate, document, copy or extract shall, unless the contrary intention appears, be admissible in evidence to the same extent and for the same purpose provided that it purports to be authenticated in the manner (if any) directed by that law. [44.1] Section 44 predicates another enactment enabling proof by a certificate or similar document. When such a document is produced and appears to be regular, this section dispenses with proof that it is what it purports to be. Similar provisions appear in many other Acts. The result is a double dispensation from ordinary proof, in that (a) the document is presumed to be authentic;12 and (b) it proves the facts that it records. [44.2] This section was used to admit a transcript of evidence before an Anti-Discrimination tribunal in N (on behalf of her son) v Queensland (acting through the Dept of Education and the Arts).13 See also Morrison v Bennett.14 45

Proof of gazette The production of a document purporting to be the gazette shall be evidence that the document is the gazette and was published on the day on which it bears date. [45.1] “The Gazette” means the Queensland Government Gazette: Acts Interpretation Act 1954, s 36. [45.2] “The Gazette” is an authoritative means of proving all acts relating to the Crown and the State.15 Section 45 enables a copy of the Gazette, upon production, to “prove itself” as the authentic Gazette for the date it bears. Many official Acts and regulations, including those mentioned in ss 43 and 48, are perfected by notice in the Gazette. [45.3] Section 185 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) is to the same effect.16 Proof of Government Gazettes from other Australian States is provided for in ss 68, 70 and 72.

12. Authentication is proof that a document is what it purports to be; its weight is a separate question: Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 191 FLR 385; 53 ACSR 752; [2005] NSWSC 417. 13. [2007] QSC 208. 14. [2010] QDC 488. 15. R v Holt (1793) 2 Leach 593; 168 ER 399. 16. Fallshaw Bros v Ryan (1902) 28 VLR 279. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

385

s 46

Facilitating the Proof of Legislative and Official Documents

[46.1]

46 Proof regarding government printer, parliamentary counsel and Legislative Assembly (1) The production of a document purporting to be printed by the government printer or by the authority of the Government of the State is evidence the document was printed by the government printer or by that authority. [Subs (1) am Act 39 of 2013, s 59(2)]

(2) The production of a document purporting to be authorised by the parliamentary counsel is evidence that the document was authorised by the parliamentary counsel. (3) The production of a document purporting to be published under the authority of the Legislative Assembly is evidence the document was published under that authority. [Subs (3) insrt Act 39 of 2013, s 59(3)] [S 46 am Act 39 of 2013, s 59(1); Act 51 of 1995, s 4 and Sch]

[46.1] According to s 43, Queensland Acts and subordinate legislation are to be judicially noticed.17 If there is a question as to precisely what is to be noticed, this section identifies the accurate and up-to-date version. Power to appoint a Government Printer is conferred by s 134. 46A Presumption of accuracy of official copy of Queensland legislation (1) An official copy of Queensland legislation is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, taken to correctly show— (a) for Queensland legislation other than a reprint—the legislation as at the relevant date; or (b) for a reprint—the law in force included in the reprint as at the relevant date. (2) The date of assent appearing in an official copy of an Act or a reprint of an Act is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, evidence of the date of assent. (3) A statement of any of the following matters appearing in an official copy of subordinate legislation or a reprint of subordinate legislation is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, evidence of the matter— (a) when and by whom the subordinate legislation was made; (b) when and how the subordinate legislation was notified; (c) when the subordinate legislation was laid before the Legislative Assembly; (d) that the subordinate legislation was disallowed and the date of the disallowance.

17. Lade and Co Pty Ltd v Finlay [2010] QSC 382.

386

Evidence Law in Queensland

[46A.2]

Division 1 – Proof of official and judicial documents and matters

s 46B

(4) A document purporting to be a copy of, or extract from, an official copy of Queensland legislation is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, taken to be a correct copy of, or extract from, the official copy. (5) For an official copy of a reprint authorised under the Legislative Standards Act 1992, section 10A, extract from the copy, for subsection (4), includes a document containing— (a) 1 or more pages of the copy; and (b) a page of the copy containing the note mentioned in section 10A(2) of that Act. (6) In this section— made, for subordinate legislation, means made, approved, confirmed or otherwise consented to. relevant date, for an official copy of Queensland legislation, means— (a) for an Act as passed, or an agreement or other instrument in or attached to the Act—the day the Act was assented to; or (b) for subordinate legislation as made, or an agreement or other instrument in or attached to the subordinate legislation—the day the subordinate legislation was made; or (c) for an agreement or other instrument not mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) that has not been amended—the day the agreement or other instrument came into the same force of law as an Act or subordinate legislation; or (d) for a reprint—the day or days, however described or identified in the official copy, for which the law included in the copy is or was the law in force. [S 46A subst Act 39 of 2013, s 60; am Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1; former s 46(2)–(3) renum Act 51 of 1995, s 4 and Sch]

[46A.1] Consistent with this amendment, reprints of principal and subordinate legislation bear the date of reprinting and list amendments that have been incorporated – for example, “Reprinted as in force on 9 December 1997 (includes amendments up to Act No 82 of 1997)”. [46A.2]

As to copies obtained via the internet, see s 46B(1).

46B Court or tribunal may inform itself about Act or statutory instrument (1) A court or tribunal may inform itself about an Act or statutory instrument in any way it considers appropriate. Examples of ways that may be appropriate— 1 2

using an electronic version of an Act as available on the internet or on a CD-ROM other than a reprint of the Act authorised under the Legislative Standards Act 1992, section 10A using a printed copy of an Act in a publication other than a reprint of the Act authorised under the Legislative Standards Act 1992, section 10A

[Subs (1) am Act 39 of 2013, s 61]

(2) However, the court or tribunal must consider whether the document or source it intends to consult appears to be a reliable source of information. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

387

s 46B

Facilitating the Proof of Legislative and Official Documents

[46B.1]

(3) Subsection (1) does not limit any law providing for a way in which a court or tribunal may be informed about an Act or statutory instrument, including any other provision of this Act or the Reprints Act 1992. [S 46B am Act 39 of 2013; insrt Act 58 of 2000, s 2 and Sch]

[46B.1] Section 46B provides for simpler proof of Queensland statutes and regulations. It expressly states that information obtained from the internet may be used. 47 Proof of Legislative Assembly’s proceedings or legislative material (1) A document purporting to be a copy of an official record of proceedings in the Legislative Assembly printed by the government printer or published under the authority of the Legislative Assembly is, on its production, evidence of the record. Note: See also the Parliament of Queensland Act 2001, section 57. [Subs (1) subst Act 39 of 2013, s 62(1); am Act 51 of 1995, s 4 and Sch]

(2) A document purporting to be a copy of legislative material printed by the government printer, authorised by the parliamentary counsel or published under the authority of the Legislative Assembly is, on its production, evidence of the legislative material. [Former subs (1A) renum Act 39 of 2013, s 62(3); insrt Act 39 of 2013, s 62(1)]

(3) In this section— legislative material includes— (a) a Bill, an amendment of a Bill or an explanatory note for a Bill, introduced into, moved in, tabled in, or circulated to members of, the Legislative Assembly; or (b) an explanatory note or regulatory impact statement for subordinate legislation. [Def insrt Act 51 of 1995, s 4 and Sch]

regulatory impact statement means a regulatory impact statement prepared under— (a) the Statutory Instruments Act 1992, part 5 as in force from time to time before its repeal by the Fiscal Repair Amendment Act 2012; or (b) guidelines, for a regulatory impact statement system, approved by the Treasurer. [Def insrt Act 25 of 2012, s 195 and Sch item 1]

Votes and Proceedings [Repealed] [Def rep Act 39 of 2013, s 62(2)] [Former subs (2) renum Act 39 of 2013, s 62(3)] [S 47 am Act 39 of 2013, s 62(1); Act 25 of 2012; Act 51 of 1995, s 4 and Sch]

[47.1] Copies that purport to be official publications are to be accepted as such and as evidence of the parliamentary events they record. 388

Evidence Law in Queensland

[47.2]

Division 1 – Proof of official and judicial documents and matters

s 48

The “Votes and Proceedings” are day-to-day records of business transacted in the Legislative Assembly. They include minutes of proceedings, registers of Bills presented and debated, records of divisions in the House, addresses presented to Parliament, notice of questions and motions and orders of the day. [47.2] Hansard may be used to prove that a member was present at a certain time, that relevant documents were tabled or that a particular member made a certain statement,18 subject to parliamentary privilege.19 Hansard may not be used to inquire into a member’s motives or to impugn his or her conduct outside Parliament.20 Leave of Parliament is needed before a subpoena may be issued for the production of documents tabled therein.21 48

Proof of particular instruments (1) This section applies to an instrument made— (a) by the Governor or Governor in Council; or (b) by or under the authority of a Minister or of a public entity.

(2) Evidence of the instrument may be given by producing any of the following documents— (a) the gazette purporting to contain it; (b) a document purporting to be a copy of it and purporting to be printed by or under the authority of the government printer; (c) for an instrument made by the Governor or Governor in Council—a copy or extract purporting to be certified as a true copy or extract by the clerk of the Executive Council; (d) for an instrument made by or under the authority of a Minister—a copy or extract purporting to be certified as a true copy or extract by a Minister. (3) If the document states any of the following matters about the instrument, the document is evidence of the matter— (a) who made it, or under whose authority it was made; (b) when it was made; (c) how it, or notice of its making, was published, and when; (d) when it was tabled in the Legislative Assembly.

18. Mundey v Askin [1982] 2 NSWLR 369. 19. Australian Medical Association (NSW Branch) v Minister for Health and Community Services (1992) 26 NSWLR 114. 20. R v Jackson (1987) 8 NSWLR 116; Church of Scientology of California v Johnson-Smith [1972] 1 QB 522; Amman Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1988) 19 FCR 223; 81 ALR 710. 21. Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

389

s 48

Facilitating the Proof of Legislative and Official Documents

[48.1]

(4) In this section— made means made, approved, confirmed or otherwise consented to. public entity means an agency, authority, commission, corporation, instrumentality, office, or other entity, established under an Act or under State authorisation for a public or State purpose. [S 48 subst Act 39 of 2013, s 63; am Act 51 of 1995, s 4 and Sch]

[48.1] Evidence of proclamations, regulations and Orders in Council may be given in any one of five ways specified in s 48(d) – (h). The simplest methods are production of the relevant copy of the Gazette,22 or a copy of the document, printed by authority. However, this section is facultative and other methods may be used.23 [48.2] A copy issued by the Government Printer is presumed to be correct as at the date of issue (s 46A), but there is no presumption that the law is unaltered since that time.24 [48.3] 49

As to copies obtained from the internet, see [46.2].

Proof of standard rules, codes and specifications

If an Act or statutory instrument adopts by way of reference, wholly or in part, any of the standard rules, codes or specifications of the bodies known as the Standards Association of Australia, Standards Australia, the British Standards Institution or other body expressly or impliedly identified in the Act, evidence of any such standard rule, code or specification may be given— (a) by the production of a document purporting to be a copy of it and purporting to be published by or on behalf of the Standards Association of Australia, Standards Australia, the British Standards Institution or other body concerned; or (b) by the production of a document purporting to be a copy of it and purporting to be printed by the government printer or by the authority of the Government of the State. [S 49 am Act 58 of 2000, s 2 and Sch; Act 51 of 1995, s 4 and Sch]

[49.1] Section 49 may be relevant to legislation on such matters as product standards, factory or building regulations. The rule or standard in question must be specifically adopted by principal or subordinate legislation. Standards other than those of the two named organisations may be adopted. The details of the adopted standard may be proved by production of a copy purporting to be published by the organisation concerned or by an official copy. This provision is

22. As to the Queensland Industrial Gazette, see Pikos v Bezuidenhout (2004) 145 A Crim R 544; [2004] QCA 178; and Townsend v BBC Hardware [2003] Aust Torts Reports 81-690; [2003] QSC 15. 23. Eaton v Yanner; Ex parte Eaton [1998] QCA 20. 24. Hughes v Hi-way Ads Pty Ltd; Ex parte Hughes [1963] Qd R 328 (the copy of local authority by-laws produced in that case was about 12 years old).

390

Evidence Law in Queensland

[51.1]

Division 1 – Proof of official and judicial documents and matters

s 51

useful in an action for negligence, for example, to prove that at the material time a defendant employer was (or was not) observing safety practices prescribed for the activity in question.25 [49.2] For the purposes of a prosecution under the Fair Trading Act 1989, a document that purports to be a standard rule, code or specification of an association or body referred to in the regulations, and to have been published by or for that association or body, is evidence of that standard rule, code or specification. [49.3] The words “Standards Australia” were inserted by the Justice and Other Legislation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2000. 50

Proof of act done by Governor or Minister Where by any law at any time in force the Governor or the Governor in Council or a Minister is authorised or empowered to do any act, production of the gazette purporting to contain a copy or notification of any such act shall be evidence of such act having been duly done. [50.1]

Many such acts also come within the terms of s 48.

51

Proof of public documents Where a document is of such a public nature as to be admissible in evidence on its mere production from proper custody, a copy of or extract from the document shall be admissible in evidence if— (a) it is proved to be an examined copy or extract; or (b) it purports to be certified as a true copy or extract under the hand of a person described in the certificate as the person to whose custody the original is entrusted. [51.1] The Act now moves from legislative and executive instruments to public documents. Generally, the hearsay rule excludes documents used “testimonially” – that is, to prove facts in issue.26 But information in public documents has the benefit of a long-standing exception to the hearsay rule,27 and is evidence of any relevant fact28 recorded. In the interests of accessibility and preservation of public records, s 51 ensures that a verified copy is admissible in lieu of the original. As to interstate and overseas documents of this kind, see s 72.

25. Vacuum Oil Co Pty Ltd v Commonwealth and Dominion Line Ltd [1922] VLR 693; Homestyle Pty Ltd v Perozzi (2007) 33 WAR 209; [2007] WASCA 16 (glass in building – Australian Standard not observed); Al Shakarji v Mulhern [2010] QDC 476. 26. Myers v DPP [1965] AC 1001. 27. Irish Society v Bishop of Derry (1846) 12 C & F 641; Sturla v Freccia (1880) LR 5 App Cas 623; Carlton and United Breweries Ltd v Cassin [1956] VLR 186. 28. But not of matters of comment or opinion: Goldman v The Ferry “Kameruka” [1971] 1 NSWLR 393. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

391

s 51

Facilitating the Proof of Legislative and Official Documents

[51.2]

[51.2] However, verified copies of public documents appear to have been admissible at common law.29 [51.3] A public document is one made by a public officer pursuant to a duty to inquire and to record facts for a public purpose. It is not necessary that the recorder be a full-time employee of the Crown,30 but the record must be reasonably available for inspection by members of the public.31 The optimistic assumption that errors will be corrected by the public provides the “guarantee” of reliability for exemption from the hearsay rule. Another requirement is that the record be kept indefinitely.32 [51.4] Despite some old authority to the contrary,33 it is not necessary that the recorder have personal knowledge of the matters noted, but the law expects him or her to ensure, so far as possible, that the information recorded is correct.34 In practice many public documents are compiled from information received.35 The skill and diligence of individual officers is immaterial; a public document is not to be excluded because the person who compiled it could have done so in a more “businesslike way”.36 [51.5] The essential element of public duty was absent in Sturla v Freccia,37 where the record was made by agents of a foreign government. Private records do not become “public” merely because they are located in a public office.38 In Everingham v Municipality of Penrith39 a privately prepared plan of subdivision in the Registrar-General’s office was not a “public document”. But when government meteorologists have a duty to observe and record weather phenomena, their permanent files of data, if available to the public, are public

29. Mortimer v M’Callan (1840) 6 M & W 58; 151 ER 320; Lyell v Kennedy (1889) 14 AC 437; Re Stollery [1926] Ch 284; Queensland Trustees Ltd v Thomas [1932] QSR 57 at 63; Carlton & United Breweries Ltd v Cassin [1956] VLR 186 at 188. 30. Irish Society v Bishop of Derry (1846) 12 C & F 641; 8 ER 1561. 31. Irish Society v Bishop of Derry (1846) 12 C & F 641; 8 ER 1561 at 668-669 (C & F), 1573 (ER); Sturla v Freccia (1880) LR 5 App Cas 623 at 643; Lilley v Pettit [1946] KB 401 at 407-408; Commissioner for Motor Transport v Collier-Moat Ltd (1960) 77 WN (NSW) 12 at 15, 17; Lenehan v Queensland Trustees Ltd [1965] Qd R 559 at 575; Gaggin v Moss [1984] 2 Qd R 513; Stohl Aviation v Electrum Finance Pty Ltd (1984) 5 FCR 187; 56 ALR 716. 32. Sturla v Freccia (1880) LR 5 App Cas 623 at 643; White v Taylor (No 2) (1969) 1 Ch 150; [1967] 3 All ER 349 at 155 (Ch), 351 (All ER). This condition was not satisfied in Heyne v Fischel & Co (1913) 30 TLR 190 (temporary Post Office records of telegrams). 33. Doe d France v Andrews (1850) 15 QB 756 at 759. 34. R v Halpin [1975] QB 907 at 912; Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647 at 666. 35. Compare ss 92(1)(b) and 93(1)(a). 36. Doe v Andrews (1850) 15 QB 756 at 759. 37. (1880) LR 5 App Cas 623; John Nominees Pty Ltd v Dixon [2003] WASCA 51 at [92] – [93]. There were several grounds of exclusion in Sturla v Freccia. 38. Daniel v Wilkin (1852) 7 Exch 429; 155 ER 1016. 39. (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 238; see also Attorney-General v Railways Commissioners (1923) 23 SR (NSW) 265.

392

Evidence Law in Queensland

[51.9]

Division 1 – Proof of official and judicial documents and matters

s 52

documents, although there is no express requirement to keep those records.40 (Maps and astronomical data are treated in ss 65 and 66.) [51.6] If the duty to record only arises when a specific direction is given, a document made without such a direction is not a public record.41 [51.7] The terms “public document” and “official document” are by no means synonymous. Many documents made by public servants are not open to public inspection.42 However, they may be admissible under other statutory provisions, such as ss 84, 92 and 93 of the Evidence Act 1977 or the “evidence clauses” of other statutes: see [51.9]. [51.8] Historical works are not public documents, regardless of their age or how widely they are read.43 However, reputable history texts may be used as works of reference to support judicial notice of ancient facts of a public character.44 [51.9] Apart from the common law and s 51, there are now many statutes that dispense official records from the original document rule or the hearsay rule, or both, whether they are public documents or not – for example, the Land Title Act 1994, s 36, and ss 52 and 74 of the Evidence Act 1977. 52

Proof of registers of British vessels etc.

(1) Every register of a vessel kept under any of the Acts relating to the registry of British vessels may be proved by the production of— (a) the original; or (b) an examined copy of the original; or (c) a copy purporting to be certified as a true copy under the hand of the person having the charge of the original. (2) A person having the charge of the original of such register is required to furnish such certified copy to any person applying at a reasonable time for the same upon payment of such fee (if any) as is prescribed by law. (3) Every— (a) such register or such copy of a register; and

40. Batlow Packing House and Cool Stores Rural Co-op Society Ltd v Commonwealth & Dominion Line Ltd (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 314. 41. Newbold v The Queen [1983] 2 AC 705; Crim LR 676. 42. Commissioner for Motor Transport v Collier-Moat Ltd (1960) 77 WN (NSW) 12 at 15 and 17 (files on licensed truck operators); Lilley v Pettit [1946] KB 401 (army records). 43. Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (Nos 15 & 16) (1987) 14 NSWLR 107. 44. Re Bishop of Lincoln [1892] AC 644 at 653; Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth of Australia (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 196. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

393

s 52

Facilitating the Proof of Legislative and Official Documents

[52.1]

(b)

certificate of registry granted under any of the said Acts relating to the registry of British vessels and purporting to be signed as required by law; shall be admissible in evidence of— (c) all the matters contained or recited in such register when the register or such copy of the register is produced; and (d) all the matters contained recited in or endorsed on such certificate of registry when the said certificate is produced. [52.1] Section 52 is a relic of the days when the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp) covered ships registered in Australian ports. Australian ships are now registered under the Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Cth). [52.2] The registered title may be subject to equitable interests.45 53

Proof of judicial proceedings

(1) Where it is sought to prove any of the following matters— (a) a judgment, decree, rule, conviction, acquittal, sentence or other order, process, act or decision of any court; (b) an affidavit, pleading, will, codicil, indictment or other legal document filed, deposited or presented in any court; (c) the pendency or existence at any time before any court of any proceeding; evidence of such matter and, as the case may be, of any particulars relating thereto may be given by the production of— (d) the original of the order, process, act, decision or document; or (e) a document proved to be an examined copy of the order, process, act, decision or document; or (f) a document purporting to be a copy of the order, process, act, decision or document and to be sealed with the seal of the court; or (g) a certificate showing such matter and such particulars and purporting to be under the hand of— (i) a registrar of the court; or (ii) a person having the custody of the records or documents of the court; or (iii) any other proper officer of the court; or (iv) a deputy of such registrar, person or officer. (2) In this section— court means any court of Queensland, of the Commonwealth or of any other State or Territory.

45. Union Bank of London v Lenanton (1878) 3 CPD 243 at 250.

394

Evidence Law in Queensland

[53.6]

Division 1 – Proof of official and judicial documents and matters

s 53

[53.1] Section 53 facilitates proof in Queensland courts of judicial proceedings46 in a federal court, a court of another State47 or Territory, or a court in Queensland.48 [53.2] There is reciprocal provision for recognition of State and Territory proceedings in s 157 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). Records of federal courts may be proved under s 182 of that Act. [53.3] A judgment in another jurisdiction may be proved under s 53(1)(a) in support of a plea of res judicata,49 autrefois convict or autrefois acquit. The same provision may be used to prove facts relevant to sentence or to rebut a false answer given to a question under s 16. It may be necessary to analyse an interstate conviction to determine its significance in Queensland law.50 [53.4] Judicial proceedings in an overseas country may be proved under s 69. However, that section does not contain the reference to “any particulars relating thereto” that appears in s 53(1)(c). [53.5] A document tendered under s 53 to prove a judgment or conviction merely shows that a person with the name shown in the document obtained (or suffered) the order stated. In the absence of a suitable admission, the party before the court must be identified as that person.51 Where a conviction is involved, this may be done according to s 54. A conviction may not be proved by the oral evidence of a person who was present at the time52 or by police records tendered under s 92,53 even in civil proceedings. A certificate of the conviction of a principal offender is admissible on the trial of an accessory,54 but the Court of Appeal has refused to extend that principle to the trial of a co-offender.55 A “conviction” is distinguishable from a “sentence”. The latter is “the judgment of the court, which follows the conviction”.56 [53.6] Section 53 is not limited to proof of judgments and orders. It may also be used to prove an affidavit, pleading, will, indictment or “other legal document 46. As described in s 53(1)(a) – (c). 47. R v CAH (2008) 186 A Crim R 288; [2008] QCA 333 at [25] (convictions in Victoria). 48. Rasmussen v Sutton [2003] 1 Qd R 538; [2002] QSC 157 at [23]. In R v Carter; Ex parte Attorney-General [1990] 2 Qd R 371 it was used to prove the conviction of the principal offender when an accessory was tried in later, separate proceedings. 49. Charm Maritime Inc v Kyriakou [1987] 1 Lloyds Rep 433; 1 FTLR 265 (Ct of App, England). On res judicata and estoppel by record generally, see Wall v Halford (No 2) [1960] QWN 51; Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 164 CLR 502; Bollen v Hickson [1981] Qd R 249 (issue estoppel). 50. R v McKeown [1923] VLR 577. 51. Martin v White [1910] 1 KB 665 at 681. 52. Mash v Darley [1914] 3 KB 1226; Knight v Porter [1945] VLR 208; Russell v Craddock [1985] 1 Qd R 377 at 385. 53. Russell v Craddock [1985] 1 Qd R 377. 54. R v Carter; Ex parte Attorney-General [1990] 2 Qd R 371. 55. R v Kirkby [2001] 1 Qd R 267; [1999] QCA 445. 56. Cobiac v Liddy (1969) 119 CLR 257 at 271-273; Jacobsen v Suncorp Insurance and Finance (No 2) [1992] 1 Qd R 385 at 389. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

395

s 53

Facilitating the Proof of Legislative and Official Documents

[53.7]

filed … in any court”, or to establish that certain proceedings occurred in an Australian court: s 53(1)(b) and (c). Section 53 could be used to prove an earlier indictment for the purposes of s 15(2). The expression “legal document” has no precise meaning. Depositions taken in committal proceedings have been treated as such.57 Arguably, the phrase includes transcripts of evidence and exhibits admitted during viva voce evidence or as annexures to affidavits read in the other court. [53.7] Material tendered under s 53 is not exempt from the rules of evidence and s 53 is not a broad exception to the hearsay rule. Documents tendered under s 53 merely establish the fact that a particular order was made or that a witness made an assertion which may or may not be true. In Meek v Guardian Assurance Co Ltd58 depositions taken by a marine board of inquiry in New Guinea (then an Australian Territory) were not evidence of the facts asserted therein. At common law59 the same applies to depositions taken at committal proceedings60 as well as evidence in previous proceedings, save in narrowly defined circumstances.61 However, if earlier testimony contains an admission, it has the benefit of an exception to the hearsay rule.62 [53.8] A certificate issued under s 53(1)(g) need not be verified on oath,63 but should state the order made, when and where it was made, and the name of the presiding judge.64 However, if necessary, the details of time and place may be proved by other means.65 In R v West66 it was held that the status of the person issuing the certificate may be proved by extrinsic evidence, but according to this section it must appear on the face of the certificate: s 53(1)(g). [53.9] Other provisions for the proof of convictions and orders are the Bail Act 1980, s 36 and the Criminal Code, s 635. The former s 345 of the Code, which made a certificate of conviction or acquittal a defence in certain cases, was repealed by s 30 of the Criminal Code, Evidence Act and Other Acts Amendment Act 1989. Section 702 of the Code states that a conviction is not a bar to civil proceedings, absent express provision to that effect. [53.10] According to s 18C of the Status of Children Act 1978 an order under s 14 or s 16 of the Maintenance Act 1965 is evidence (and, in the absence of

57. Eastwood v Bullock (1864) 1 WW and a’B(L). 58. (1963) 80 WN (NSW) 940; [1963] NSWR 1308. 59. But with respect to subsequent civil proceedings, see now s 92(1)(a) and (4)(c). 60. Electronic Rentals Pty Ltd v Anderson (1971) 124 CLR 27. See, however, [23.1]. 61. Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 2) [1976] VR 363; Gaggin v Moss [1984] 2 Qd R 513. See, however, s 92(1)(a) and (4)(c). 62. Stewart v The King (1921) 29 CLR 234; Popiw v Popiw [1959] VR 197. But distinguish unsworn pleadings: Mundy v Bridge Motors Pty Ltd (1987) 45 SASR 125. 63. Ex parte Crampton (1906) 6 SR (NSW) 236. 64. Ex parte Eslick (1905) 5 SR (NSW) 470; Ex parte Carroll (1905) 22 WN (NSW) 55. 65. Ex parte Barclay (1924) 24 SR (NSW) 416. 66. (1863) 2 SCR (NSW) (L) 69.

396

Evidence Law in Queensland

[53.10]

Division 1 – Proof of official and judicial documents and matters

s 54

contradiction, conclusive evidence) that the person against whom the order was made is the natural father of a particular child, except in criminal proceedings for carnal knowledge of the mother. 54

Proof of identity of a person convicted

(1) If a person (the alleged offender) is alleged to have been convicted in Queensland, the Commonwealth or another State or Territory of an offence, an affidavit that complies with subsection (2) is proof, unless the contrary is proved, the alleged offender— (a) has been convicted of an offence stated in the affidavit under subsection (2)(c)(iii); and (b) is the person who is referred to as having been convicted in a certificate of conviction exhibited to the affidavit under subsection (2)(b). (2) The affidavit must— (a) purport to be made by an expert; and (b) exhibit a certificate of conviction for the offence the alleged offender is alleged to have been convicted of; and (c) state the following— (i) the expert’s field of expertise; (ii) the process and evidence used by the expert to determine the identity of the alleged offender based on available identifying records; (iii) any offence that, based on the results of the expert’s determination mentioned in subparagraph (ii), a police record states the alleged offender has been convicted of; (iv) that, based on the results of the expert’s determination mentioned in subparagraph (ii), and the police record mentioned in subparagraph (iii), the expert believes that the alleged offender is the person who is referred to as having been convicted in the certificate of conviction exhibited to the affidavit under subsection (2)(b). (3) If a party to a proceeding intends to rely on the affidavit (the relying party), the party must give a copy of the affidavit to each other party to the proceeding— (a) at least 10 business days before the hearing day; or (b) if, in the particular circumstances, the court considers it just to shorten the period mentioned in paragraph (a)—by a later date allowed by the court. (4) If a party to the proceeding, other than the relying party, intends to challenge a matter stated in the affidavit, the party must give the relying party notice in writing of the matter to be challenged— (a) at least 3 business days before the hearing day; or (b) if subsection (3)(b) applies and, in the particular circumstances, the court considers it just to shorten the period mentioned in paragraph (a)—by a later date allowed by the court. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

397

s 54

Facilitating the Proof of Legislative and Official Documents

[54.1]

(5) If a party to the proceeding (the notifying party) gives the relying party a notice under subsection (4), then, unless the notifying party otherwise agrees, the relying party must ensure that the expert is available at the hearing of the proceeding for cross-examination on the affidavit. (6) In this section— certificate of conviction, for an offence, means a document purporting to be the certificate of conviction, or a certified copy of the certificate of conviction, for the offence. corresponding law, in relation to a provision of a Queensland law, means a law of the Commonwealth or another State or Territory corresponding, or substantially corresponding, to the provision. DNA sample see the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, schedule 6. expert means a person who is qualified to give opinion evidence as an expert witness in relation to the identity of a person based on the type of identifying records used by the expert to determine the identity of the alleged offender under subsection (2)(c)(ii). hearing day means the day fixed for the start of the hearing of the proceeding. identifying particulars see the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, schedule 6. identifying records, of a person, means— (a) any identifying particulars of the person taken under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, chapter 17, part 4 or a corresponding law; or (b) the results of a DNA analysis performed, under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, chapter 17, part 5 or a corresponding law, on a DNA sample taken from the person under that part or a corresponding law; or (c) a DNA sample taken from the person under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, chapter 17, part 5 or a corresponding law. party, to a proceeding, means— (a) for a criminal proceeding—the prosecutor and each accused person; or (b) for a civil proceeding—each person who is a party to the proceeding; or (c) for another proceeding—each person who has been given leave to appear in the proceeding. [S 54 subst Act 14 of 2013, s 53; am Act 26 of 2006; Act 58 of 1995]

[54.1] The present s 54 was substituted by the Criminal Law (Child Exploitation and Dangerous Drugs) Amendment Act 2013, s 53. It is clearly more explicit and prescriptive than its predecessor.

398

Evidence Law in Queensland

[54.2]

Division 1 – Proof of official and judicial documents and matters

s 55

As to the meaning of “conviction”, see s 79(1) (“convicted”), Griffıths v The Queen67 and Cobiac v Liddy.68 It does not include a finding that a person is unfit to plead.69 A plea of “guilty” is not a conviction per se; there must also be a formal order of the court.70 A jury’s guilty verdict is such an order.71 The reliability of expert fingerprint evidence has been accepted for almost 100 years.72 As to DNA evidence, see [A.69], [95A.1], [133A.1] and [Q.24]. [54.2] A certificate of the relevant conviction is also required: s 53. 55 Proof of incorporation or registration of company in Queensland (1) Evidence of the incorporation or registration of a company within the meaning of the Corporations Act that is taken to be registered in Queensland may be given by the production of— (a) a certificate of the incorporation or registration of the company that purports to be given by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (the commission), the commission’s delegate or a commission officer; or (b) an affidavit or statutory declaration of an officer of the company (company verification) made under the Oaths Act 1867. [Subs (1) am Act 45 of 2001, s 29 and Sch 3; subst Act 9 of 1997, s 33]

(2) The date of incorporation or registration mentioned in the certificate or company verification is evidence of the date on which the company was incorporated or registered. [Subs (2) am Act 9 of 1997, s 33]

(2A) Evidence that a company is not incorporated or registered, or no longer incorporated or registered, may be given by the production of a certificate that purports to be given by the commission, the commission’s delegate or a commission officer. [Subs (2A) rep Act 45 of 2001, s 29 and Sch 3; insrt Act 9 of 1997, s 33]

(2B) The date a company ceased being incorporated or registered mentioned in the certificate is evidence of the date on which the company ceased being incorporated or registered. [Subs (2B) rep Act 45 of 2001, s 29 and Sch 3; insrt Act 9 of 1997, s 33]

(3) A document that purports to be— (a) a copy of, or extract from, a document kept and registered in the office of the commission; and

67. (1977) 137 CLR 293. 68. (1969) 119 CLR 257 at 271-273. 69. R v Larkins (1911) 6 Cr App R 194. 70. R v Jerome [1964] Qd R 595; Griffıths v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 293. 71. Jenkins v Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] NSWCA 406. 72. R v Castleton (1909) 3 Cr App R 74; Parker v The King (1912) 14 CLR 681; Ex parte Sampson; Re Governor of Her Majesty’s Penitentiary at Malabar (1966) 66 SR (NSW) 501 at 514. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

399

s 55

Facilitating the Proof of Legislative and Official Documents

[55.1]

(b)

certified by the commission or the delegate or an officer of the commission; is admissible in evidence in all cases in which the original document is admissible and for the same purposes and to the same extent. [Subs (3) am Act 45 of 2001, s 29 and Sch 3]

(4) If the prosecution in a criminal proceeding intends to rely on a company verification, the prosecutor must serve a copy of it on the defendant or the defendant’s legal representative— (a) for a summary trial or committal proceeding— (i) when the summons is served on the defendant; or (ii) not later than 14 days after the defendant first appears in court for the alleged offence; or (b) for a trial on indictment—not later than 14 days after the indictment against the defendant is presented. [Subs (4) insrt Act 9 of 1997, s 33]

(5) A defendant who is served with a copy of a company verification under subsection (4) must give the prosecution a written notice stating whether the defendant intends to contest a following matter about the company’s incorporation or registration mentioned in the company verification— (a) the fact of its incorporation or registration; (b) the date of its incorporation or registration; (c) the date on which it ceased being incorporated or registered. [Subs (5) insrt Act 9 of 1997, s 33]

(6) The defendant must give the notice by not later than— (a) 10 days before the day the trial of the proceedings to which the notice relates starts; or (b) the end of a later period allowed by the court, if the court considers it just to extend the period in the particular circumstances. [Subs (6) insrt Act 9 of 1997, s 33]

(7) If, in a proceeding before it, a court considers the defendant or the defendant’s lawyer has unnecessarily caused the prosecution to prove the incorporation or registration of a company, the court may order the defendant to pay the prosecution’s costs of proving the incorporation or registration. [Subs (7) insrt Act 9 of 1997, s 33]

(8) For this section, a defendant is taken to be served with a copy of a company verification if the copy is served on the defendant’s lawyer. [Subs (8) insrt Act 9 of 1997, s 33] [S 55 am Act 45 of 2001; Act 9 of 1997; subst Act 68 of 1993, s 5]

[55.1] Section 55 was amended in 1997 and again in 2001 to comply with the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the establishment of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. As to the incorporation of companies in other jurisdictions, see s 73. Incorporation of non-profit organisations is governed by the Associations

400

Evidence Law in Queensland

[55A.2]

Division 1 – Proof of official and judicial documents and matters

s 55A

Incorporation Act 1981. In proceedings by or against a company, incorporation is a material fact which, if not admitted, must be formally proved,73 though not necessarily by virtue of this section.74 [55.2] Section 55(4), (5) and (6) apply to criminal proceedings in which incorporation is an issue. The obligation imposed on a defendant by s 55(5) is a rare exception to the atavistic right of persons charged with an offence to practise “trial by ambush” by disclosing nothing until the trial. There is another example in s 590A of the Criminal Code (notice of alibi). 55A Proof of disaster situation under Disaster Management Act 2003 (1) Any of the following is evidence of the declaration of a disaster situation— (a) a copy of a declaration (a relevant declaration) for the disaster situation made under the Disaster Management Act 2003, section 64(1) or 69; (b) the gazette purporting to contain notice of the relevant declaration; (c) for an oral declaration—a statement from the responsible person for the oral declaration that the oral declaration was made under the Disaster Management Act 2003. (2) In this section— disaster situation means a disaster situation within the meaning of the Disaster Management Act 2003. oral declaration means a declaration of a disaster situation made orally under the Disaster Management Act 2003, section 65(5) or 70(5), that, at the time of the hearing, has not been recorded under the Disaster Management Act 2003, section 65(7) or 70(7). responsible person, for an oral declaration, means the person who made the oral declaration under the Disaster Management Act 2003, section 65(5) or 70(5). [S 55A insrt Act 39 of 2014, s 53]

[55A.1] This section was inserted by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2014, s 53. As to the meaning of “disaster situation”, see s 69 of the Disaster Management Act 2003. [55A.2] The expression “responsible person” refers to the Premier or responsible Minister.

73. Hansen v Millars’ Karri and Jarrah Co (1905) 7 WALR 266; WB Hunter Pty Ltd v Forshaw (1971) 129 CLR 409. 74. R v Connell (1895) 6 QLJR 209 (recognition in a statute); Lipke v Goombungee Co-operative Dairy Co Ltd [1908] QSR 103; Purex Corporation Ltd v Vanguard Trading Co (1965) 112 CLR 532 at 534. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

401

s 56

Facilitating the Proof of Legislative and Official Documents

[56.1]

56

Proof of unallocated State land grants Upon its production in any proceeding wherein it is sought to prove any grant from the Crown of land within the State a document that purports— (a) to be a copy of the instrument of grant or of an entry of such instrument; and (b) to be certified under the hand of the registrar of titles; [Para (b) am Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

shall be evidence and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, conclusive evidence of the matters contained therein. [S 56 am Act 58 of 1995]

[56.1] The Crown may not divest itself of land or other property without statutory authority,75 and mandatory procedures in the enabling law must be strictly observed.76 [56.2] All lands alienated in Queensland since 1 January 1862 are subject to the Land Title Act 1994.77 With respect to earlier grants, see s 249 of the Property Law Act 1974. 57

Proof of lease or licence

(1) This section applies to an instrument of lease or licence issued or continued in force and held under any of the following Acts— • Housing Act 2003 • Land Act 1994 • Mineral Resources Act 1989. [Subs (1) subst Act 52 of 2003, s 153 and Sch 2; am Act 39 of 1999, s 299 and Sch 1; Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

(2) An instrument may be proved by the production of a document purporting to be a copy of the instrument certified by the chief executive of the issuing department. (3) In this section— issuing department, for an instrument of a lease or licence, means the department dealing with matters about the provisions of the Act under which the lease or licence was issued or continued in force and held. [S 57 am Act 52 of 2003; Act 39 of 1999; Act 58 of 1995; subst Act 76 of 1993, s 3 and Sch 1; am Act 80 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1]

[57.1] A new s 57 was inserted by Act No 76 of 1993 and amended by Act No 58 of 1995. It enables the specified Crown leases and licences to be proved in the same way as titles registered under the Land Title Act 1994: see ss 36 and 46 thereof. 75. Constitution Act 1867, ss 30 and 40; see also Australian Alliance Insurance Co Ltd v Goodwyn [1916] St R Qd 225. 76. Nicholas v Western Australia [1972] WAR 168; Cudgen Rutile (No 2) Pty Ltd v Chalk [1975] AC 520. 77. Land Title Act 1994, s 47; see also Property Law Act 1974, s 250.

402

Evidence Law in Queensland

[58A.1]

58

Division 1 – Proof of official and judicial documents and matters

s 58A

Proof of letters patent

(1) The chief executive (premiers) may certify a copy of any letters patent issued by the Crown in relation to the State, or in relation to any matter that concerns the State, to be a true copy of the letters patent. (2) The chief executive (premiers) may delegate the power under subsection (1) to an officer of that chief executive’s department. (3) The copy of the letters patent certified by the chief executive (premiers) is, on production in any proceeding in which it is sought to prove the letters patent, evidence of the matters contained in the copy. (4) In this section— chief executive (premiers) means the chief executive of the department dealing with matters under the Constitution of Queensland 2001. [S 58 subst Act 77 of 2003, s 74; am Act 80 of 2001, s 94 and Sch 2; Act 76 of 1993, s 3 and Sch 1; am Act 80 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1]

[58.1] Letters patent are documents bearing the State Seal (see s 41) and conferring some special and official status or privilege. For example, letters patent evidence the appointment of justices of the Supreme Court, Royal Commissioners and Queen’s Counsel. Original letters patent are public documents admissible at common law, which allowed copies to be tendered in some cases.78 This section enables proof by a certified copy. [58.2] In s 58(b) the words “Constitution of Queensland 2001” were inserted in lieu of “Constitution Act 1867” by Sch 2 of the Constitution of Queensland 2001. 58A Proof of document under Royal Sign Manual Evidence of a document under the signature or royal hand of the Sovereign in relation to the State or in relation to any matter concerning the State (the Royal Sign Manual document) may be given by the production of a document purporting to be a copy of the Royal Sign Manual document certified by the chief executive of the department dealing with matters under the Constitution of Queensland 2001. [S 58A insrt Act 80 of 2001, s 94 and Sch 2]

[58A.1] 2001.

Section 58A was inserted by Sch 2 of the Constitution of Queensland

78. Baron of Say and Sele (1848) 1 HLC 507. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

403

PROOF OF CERTAIN MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS DIVISION 2 – PROOF OF CERTAIN MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS AND MATTERS 59

Comparison of disputed writing

(1) Comparison of a disputed writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the judge to be genuine shall be permitted to be made by witnesses and such writings and the evidence of witnesses respecting the same may be submitted as evidence of the genuineness or otherwise of the writing in dispute. (2) A court may compare a disputed writing with any writing that is genuine and act upon its own conclusions in relation thereto.

History and purpose [59.1] Section 59 is based on s 27 of the English Common Law Procedure Act 1854 and s 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1865 (“Lord Denman’s Act”). It is an enabling provision that does not affect other forms of proof described below.1 An application of this section was approved by the Court of Appeal in Edgar v Ron Kingham Real Estate Pty Ltd.2 In an action for improper dealings with trust property there was an issue of the authenticity of a letter containing an admission. The letter was attached to a file of otherwise admissible documents obtained from the Australian Securities & Investments Commission. The judge verified the letter by comparing it with admitted signatures of the defendant on other documents on the file.3 [59.2] Handwriting issues came before the courts long before experts in the field were recognised. “Questions depending on handwriting [were] in many cases doubtful and [a] … cause for great anxiety”, but courts had to decide them to the best of their ability.4 By 1700 it was permissible to identify handwriting without the evidence of the author or of a witness to the making of the document in question,5 provided that the identifying witness had seen the alleged author

1. R v Mazzone (1985) 43 SASR 330 at 339. 2. [1997] QCA 242; [1999] 2 Qd R 439. Also applied in R v Previte [2005] QCA 95. 3. See also Jackson v Arawak Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] QSC 57 at [78]. 4. Wakeford v Bishop of Lincoln (1921) LJPC 174 at 179. 5. Wigmore on Evidence (Little Brown, 1904-1905), Vol III, para 2648.

404

Evidence Law in Queensland

[59.3]

Division 2 – Proof of certain miscellaneous documents and matters

s 59

6

writing at other times. Later that rule was relaxed to admit the evidence of a witness who had become familiar with disputed writing by seeing specimens of it. Lord Denman CJ, the original sponsor of this section, argued that: The servant who has habitually carried letters addressed by me to others has the opportunity of obtaining knowledge of my writing though he never saw me write or received a letter from me.7

That refers to s 59(1). Subsection (2) goes further, but it is prudent to treat it as a last resort. It is desirable, especially in criminal proceedings,8 to produce an identifying witness familiar with the putative author’s handwriting, or an expert witness to compare the writing in dispute with a genuine specimen.9 However, if a handwriting expert is unable to conclude that writing belongs to a particular person, it is open to the jury to make a comparison itself and make use of other admissible evidence to decide the issue.10

Witness need not be expert [59.3] Non-expert evidence identifying persons, objects or handwriting is one of the more remarkable forms of “lay opinion evidence”.11 The authenticity of a signature or handwriting is essentially a matter of opinion – the witness is comparing either a genuine specimen or a mental picture12 of the party’s writing with the document in question.13 Provided that the witness has some significant14 experience of the alleged author’s writing, his or her opinion is admissible. The extent of that experience may affect the weight of the evidence. It is desirable that a genuine specimen be placed before the court but, if that is not possible, the witness may be allowed to base an opinion on examples previously

6. “Trial of the Seven Bishops” (1688) 12 How St Tr 183 at 305; Eagleton and Coventry v Kingston (1803) 8 Ves Jun 438; 32 ER 425 at 474 (Ves Jun), 438 (ER). 7. In Doe d Mudd v Suckermore (1837) 5 Ad & E 703; 111 ER 1331 at 740 (Ad & E), 1345 (ER). 8. R v Stephens [1999] 3 NZLR 81. 9. Juries were permitted to make their own comparisons in R v Brownlee [2001] QCA 134 and R v CX [2006] QCA 409 at [77]. See also the opinion of the judge in Russell v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 74 ATR 466; [2009] FCA 1224 at [86]. 10. R v Leroy [1984] 2 NSWLR 441 at 446. 11. Lucas v Williams & Sons [1892] 2 QB 113 at 116; Ex parte Sampson; Re Governor of HM Penitentiary at Malabar (1966) 66 SR (NSW) 501 at 514; Craig v The King (1933) 49 CLR 429 at 446; see also [A.77]. 12. A witness who knows the writing but did not see the particular specimen being made may be called, even if a witness with direct knowledge is available: Wright v Cobb (1885) 1 TLR 555. 13. Craig v The King (1933) 49 CLR 429 at 446; “Trial of the Seven Bishops” (1688) 12 How St Tr 183 at 297; Doe d Mudd v Suckermore (1837) 5 Ad & E 703; 11 ER 1331 at 705 and 729 (Ad & E), 1333 and 1342 (ER). 14. There is a point at which the experience is so slight that the evidence will be excluded: Duke v Duke (1975) 12 SASR 106 at 108. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

405

s 59

Part 5 Division 2 – Proof of Certain Miscellaneous Documents 15

[59.4]

16

seen, whether they still exist or not. In Mortimer v M’Callan Abinger CB posed the colourful hypothesis of a libel written on a prison wall, seen by the witness, but erased before the trial. An opinion based on a copy of a genuine specimen may be allowed, in a civil case at least, if nothing better is available.17 In Lockheed-Arabia v Owen18 a handwriting expert was permitted to base his opinion on a facsimile copy of a genuine specimen. But that was not permitted in R v Devenish,19 where the prosecution had lost the original and relied on enlarged photographs. In Grayden v The Queen20 an appeal against conviction was upheld although the defence did not object to comparison photocopies at the trial. It has been said that a conviction based on s 59 alone would necessarily be unsafe,21 but that may be going too far. It was held in Medina v The Queen22 and R v Ahmed23 that it is not mandatory to warn a jury of the danger of convicting without expert evidence. [59.4] In a criminal case24 the identifying witness should not be a person who saw a genuine specimen for the first time after the charge was laid.25 However, this does not apply if the specimen was made in the presence of a police officer who merely testifies to seeing it made, leaving the process of comparison to others.26 A court may decline to use a genuine specimen that was improperly obtained.27

Expert evidence [59.5] In practice the opinions of lay witnesses are often supported by the evidence of a handwriting expert. The science of handwriting identification is not new; experts as well as lay witnesses gave evidence about a forged will in 1863.28 But while the existence of expertise in this field is undoubted,29 an expert necessarily relies on a comparison of the disputed writing with a specimen 15. Mortimer v M’Callan (1840) 6 M & W 58; 151 ER 320; Sayer v Glossop (1848) 2 Ex 409; 154 ER 552. In each case a satisfactory reason for non-production was given. 16. (1840) 6 M & W 58; 151 ER 320. 17. Ex parte Sampson (1966) 66 SR (NSW) 501 at 511 (extradition application; opinion based on comparing photocopies of cheques). 18. [1993] QB 806. 19. [1969] VR 737. 20. (1988) 36 A Crim R 163. 21. R v Rickard (1918) 13 Cr App R 140; R v Tilley (1961) 45 Cr App R 360. 22. (1990) 46 A Crim R 132 at 144. 23. [2001] NSWCCA 450. 24. See R v Knight (2001) 160 FLR 465; 120 A Crim R 381; [2001] NSWCCA 344. 25. R v Crouch (1850) 4 Cox CC 163; R v Harvey (1869) 11 Cox CC 546; contra R v McCartney and Hansen (1928) 20 Cr App R 179. 26. R v Voisin [1918] 1 KB 531; Adami v The Queen (1959) 108 CLR 605. 27. As in R v Browning (1991) 103 FLR 425. 28. Roupell v Haws (1863) 3 F & F 784; 176 ER 359. 29. R v Silverlock [1894] 2 QB 766; R v Van Beelen (1972) 4 SASR 353 at 385; R v Leroy [1984] 2 NSWLR 441.

406

Evidence Law in Queensland

[59.7]

Division 2 – Proof of certain miscellaneous documents and matters

s 59

proved genuine by other means. A judge of fact is not bound to accept an expert’s opinion, but may independently compare the genuine and disputed specimens.30 Nevertheless, expert evidence, if available, should not be lightly disregarded.31 In Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Perrin32 the judge himself made a minute examination of the specimens and disputed signatures. [59.6] The evidence should be demonstrative rather than merely assertive. The expert’s opinion should be preceded by a statement of relevant facts and the principles applied, so that the court can come to a conclusion of its own.33 A handwriting expert should not simply say: “This is the signature of X.” That is a question for the court to decide, although the expert may express an opinion to that effect.34 The expert’s approach in Wakeford v Bishop of Lincoln was approved by the Privy Council: The expert … gave his evidence with great candour. “It is not possible”, he says, “to say definitely that anybody wrote a particular thing. All you can do is to point out the similarities and draw conclusions from them.” This is the manner in which expert evidence on matters of this kind ought to be presented.35

A relatively recent case on handwriting evidence is Bell v FS & U Industrial Benefit Society Ltd:36 As a general rule it is highly desirable … that there should be put before the court, so far as practicable,37 evidence of the facts on the basis of which the opinion has been formed38 … In the particular case of document examination where reliance is placed upon particular physical features of handwriting or typing, … first, that the relevant specific features be identified … and second, … actual observation or existence of those features [as by] … enlarged photographs.

Occasionally expertise of another kind is useful. In Young v Yorkston39 evidence was received from a psychiatrist about the effects of Parkinson’s disease on handwriting.

Questions of weight [59.7] There are useful observations in Sumner v Booth.40 How many genuine specimens of the alleged author’s writing has the witness seen? How long ago? If 30. R v Previte [2005] QCA 95 at [83]. 31. Herriott Services Pty Ltd v Creevey [2009] QSC 419. 32. [2011] Q Conv R 54-765; [2011] QSC 274 at [78]ff. 33. Davie v Edinburgh Corp (No 2) (1953) SC 34 at 40; Preece v HM Advocate [1981] Crim LR 783; Holtman v Sampson [1985] 2 Qd R 472 at 474; Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission [1990] ATPR 41-061. However, there are pragmatic limits to these counsels of perfection where masses of material form the bases of an expert’s opinion: see [A.74]. 34. R v Van Beelen (1972) 4 SASR 353 at 385; R v Mazzone (1985) 21 A Crim R 32. 35. Wakeford v Bishop of Lincoln (1921) 90 LJPC 174 at 179. 36. (Unreported, NSW Sup Ct, McLelland J), noted in (1992) 66 ALJ at 377. 37. The counsel of perfection may have to be modified when the basic information is voluminous: Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 190 FLR 242; 23 ACLC 430; [2005] NSWSC 149 (reversed on other grounds: (2005) 54 ACSR 326). 38. The more proved specimens for comparison, the better: Medina v The Queen (1990) 3 WAR 21. 39. [2000] NSWSC 350. 40. [1974] 2 NSWLR 174. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

407

s 59

Part 5 Division 2 – Proof of Certain Miscellaneous Documents

[59.8]

one specimen differs from another, is the difference due to old age, illness or some other cause consistent with genuineness, or do they indicate a forgery? Perhaps one specimen was written at leisure, comfortably seated at a desk, and the other in haste, or in some position awkward for writing. The court was not overly cautious in Lattouf v Sassen,41 which may well have been one of the last actions in Australia for breach of promise of marriage. The judge allowed a handwriting expert to identify letters written in Arabic, professing undying love. The expert had no knowledge of Arabic, and had never examined Arabic writing before. But it was enough that the judge, in admitting his evidence, warned the jury to treat it with care. On the other hand, a Queensland court excluded the evidence of a skilled teacher of handwriting with little or no experience in examining documents for forensic purposes.42

Changes made by section 59 [59.8] Section 59 made three significant changes to the law. First, it enables a genuine specimen of a person’s handwriting to be used as a “standard of comparison”43 whether or not it is relevant to the issues for trial.44 That was not permissible at common law.45 Comparison of documents was out of the question when jurors, the usual judges of fact, were often illiterate.46 [59.9] Second, a court may act upon its own comparison of genuine and disputed specimens, with or without other identifying evidence.47 This is not the only case in which “the eye is [ultimately] the test”,48 but it is a significant departure from the common law tradition that courts do not gather evidence for themselves.49 But due deference should be paid to expert evidence, when

41. [1968] 3 NSWR 577. 42. R v Makismas (unreported, Qld Dist Ct, Hanger DCJ, 6 February 1985). 43. Adami v The Queen (1959) 108 CLR 605 at 616. 44. Adami v The Queen (1959) 108 CLR 605; McLean v Cahill [1932] SASR 359 (authorship of illegal betting sheets proved by writing on bail papers signed by defendant after arrest for “SP” bookmaking); R v Mazzone (1985) 21 A Crim R 32 at 41-42; Grayden v The Queen [1989] WAR 208 at 217. 45. Adami v The Queen (1959) 108 CLR 605 at 616; Doe d Mudd v Suckermore (1837) 5 Ad & E 703; 11 ER 1331; Hughes v Rogers (1841) 8 M & W 123; 151 ER 975. 46. Macferson v Thoytes (1790) Peake 29; 170 ER 67. 47. Wendt v Lind; Ex parte Lind [1913] QSR 240 at 245; Adami v The Queen (1959) 108 CLR 605 at 618; Daley v The Queen [1979] Tas SR 75 at 82; R v Leroy [1984] 2 NSWLR 441; (1984) 55 ALR 338 (expert evidence equivocal); R v Mazzone (1985) 21 A Crim R 32 at 41; Herriott Services Pty Ltd v Creevey [2009] QSC 419; R v Doney (2001) 126 A Crim R 271 at 280; Cantrick v Thompson [2004] ANZ Conv R 531; [2004] Q Conv R 54-607; [2004] QSC 341; BLM v RWS [2006] QSC 139 at [35]; McBride v ASK Funding Ltd [2013] QCA 130 at [39]. 48. Scott v Numurkah Corporation (1954) 91 CLR 300 at 313; Shepherd v McGivern (1966) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 387; [1966] 1 NSWR 55 (physical appearance); McWilliam’s Wines Pty Ltd v McDonald’s System of Australia Pty Ltd (1980) 49 FLR 455; 33 ALR 394 at 461 and 471 (FLR), 399 and 408 (ALR) (packaging – passing off). 49. Scott v Numurkah Corporation (1954) 91 CLR 300; Middleton v Freier [1958] Qd R 351; Kristeff v The Queen (1968) 42 ALJR 233.

408

Evidence Law in Queensland

[59.11]

Division 2 – Proof of certain miscellaneous documents and matters

s 59

50

available. While the determination of authorship is solely a question for the judge of fact, a jury may be given a warning in the absence of expert testimony.51 [59.10] The third change effected by s 59 is that the comparative specimen may be obtained during cross-examination,52 subject to a valid claim of privilege against self-incrimination. The section allows “any genuine writing” to be used and clearly a specimen created in the course of a trial is in that category, as the judge accepted in Cobbett v Kilminster53 after counsel tactfully reminded him that s 27 of the Common Law Procedure Act 1854 (Imp) was already more than ten years old. It is uncertain whether a photocopy may be used for this purpose.54

“Satisfaction of the judge”: section 59(1) [59.11] The judge alone decides whether a comparative specimen is admissible55 and the jury (if any) then decides whether that specimen and the disputed writing were produced by the same person.56 But first it is for the judge to be “satisfied” that the comparative specimen is genuine. In a criminal case must that “satisfaction” be established beyond reasonable doubt? The answer in R v Ewing57 and R v Mazzone58 is “Yes”. But R v Angeli,59 on the other hand, treats it as a voir dire question and prefers the civil standard. In Adami v The Queen60 the High Court did not have to decide this point, but it did observe61 that the trial judge had a sufficient “prima facie reason” for letting the “genuine” specimen go to the jury. After all, the phrase “to the satisfaction of the judge” resembles the expression “reasonable satisfaction”, which normally denotes the civil standard of proof.62 The difference between English and Australian authorities on this point may be due to the fact that in England a prosecutor faces the criminal standard of proof on a voir dire,63 while the civil standard applies to every voir dire in Australia.64 50. R v Fuller [2009] QCA 195 at [83]. 51. R v Ahmed [2001] NSWCCA 450; R v Leroy [1984] 2 NSWLR 441 at 446. 52. R v Sullivan [1970] Tas SR 284 (NC 5); Grayden v The Queen [1989] WAR 208 at 217. 53. (1865) 4 F & F 490; 176 ER 659. 54. Re Sampson and the Fugitive Offenders Act (1966) 66 SR (NSW) 501 at 513, 517; Grayden v The Queen [1989] WAR 208 at 211-213, 217-218; R v Devenish [1969] VR 737 at 740; Lockheed-Arabia Corporation v Owen [1993] QB 806. 55. Adami v The Queen (1959) 108 CLR 605; Grayden v The Queen [1989] WAR 208; R v Browne-Kerr [1990] VR 78. 56. Adami v The Queen (1959) 108 CLR 605 at 618; Daley v The Queen [1979] Tas SR 75 at 82-83; R v Leroy [1984] 2 NSWLR 441 at 446; Grayden v The Queen [1989] WAR 208 at 218. 57. [1983] QB 1039; 2 All ER 645 at 1046-1047 (QB), 652-653 (All ER). 58. (1985) 21 A Crim R 32 at 45. 59. [1979] 1 WLR 26. 60. (1959) 108 CLR 605. 61. Adami v The Queen (1959) 108 CLR 605 at 618. 62. Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361-362. 63. R v Yacoob (1981) 72 Cr App R 313 at 317 (competence to testify); R v Ewing [1983] QB 1039; 2 All ER 645 at 1044 (QB), 650 (All ER) (admissibility of confession). 64. R v Donohoe (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 38; Wendo v The Queen (1963) 109 CLR 559; R v Clark (1984) 11 A Crim R 257; R v Buzzacott (2010) 107 SASR 564; [2010] SASC 234. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

409

s 60

Part 5 Division 2 – Proof of Certain Miscellaneous Documents

[59.12]

[59.12] There is now a wide discretion, in civil cases, to allow proof of handwriting, “in any way the court directs”.65 60 Proof of instrument to validity of which attestation is not necessary It shall not be necessary to prove by the attesting witness any instrument to the validity of which attestation is not requisite, and such instrument may be proved by admission or otherwise as if there had been no attesting witness thereto. [60.1] A person “attests” a document by signing it to indicate that he or she saw the author sign it. In practice many documents are attested unnecessarily. In the past this could create difficulties because all documents that were in fact attested had to be proved in the same strict manner as those required to be attested. At least one attesting witness had to be called unless all the attesting witnesses were dead or unavailable. Otherwise alternative evidence of authenticity, however cogent, was inadmissible.66 [60.2] That burdensome rule arose from an old practice of appointing an attesting witness to the jury in the days when jurors acted on their own knowledge. Later it was rationalised as compliance with the intentions of the author.67 By the time of Bentham it was ripe for reform. Section 60 reproduces s 26 of the English Common Law Procedure Act 1854, which abolished the Harringworth rule. [60.3] When the age of a document makes proof by normal means difficult or impossible, the presumption raised by s 62 is helpful: see [62.1]. 61 Proof of instrument to validity of which attestation is necessary (1) Any instrument to the validity of which attestation is requisite may, instead of being proved by an attesting witness, be proved in the manner in which it might be proved if no attesting witness were alive. (2) Nothing in this section shall apply to the proof of wills or other testamentary documents. [61.1] In England until 1938 (and until 1962 in Queensland) the law on this point stood still. Generally, at least one witness to a document required to be witnessed had to be called to prove it. However, if this were impossible, another person could be called to identify the signature of at least one attesting witness. Oddly enough, if this could be done, it was not necessary to prove the author’s signature!68 There was another expedient: if it were impossible to call either an 65. See s 129A, below, inserted by the Civil Proceedings Act 2011, s 146. 66. Whyman v Garth (1853) 8 Ex 803; 155 ER 1578; R v Harringworth (Inhabitants) (1815) 4 M & S 350; 105 ER 863. 67. Whyman v Garth (1853) 8 Ex 803; 155 ER 1578. 68. Nelson v Whittall (1817) 1 B & Ad 19; 106 ER 8.

410

Evidence Law in Queensland

[62.1]

Division 2 – Proof of certain miscellaneous documents and matters

s 62

attesting witness or someone who could identify an attesting witness’s signature, it was permissible to lead other (and quite possibly better) evidence of authenticity. [61.2] England altered the common law by s 3 of the Evidence Act 1938 (UK). In 1962 that provision was adopted in Queensland as s 25A of the Evidence and Discovery Act 1867, reproduced in this section.69 [61.3] Section 61 does not apply to testamentary instruments. They are governed by the Succession Act 1981, s 10 (mode of execution and attestation) and s 11 (competence of attesting witnesses). A witness to a will may give evidence by statutory declaration if not required for cross-examination: s 63. If a will has a proper attestation clause, duly signed, that clause is prima facie proof of a valid will: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 604. In the absence of a proper attestation clause, the evidence of at least one witness, or some other person who was present when the document was made, should be obtained.70 62

Presumption as to documents 20 years old Where any document is proved or purports to be not less than 20 years old, there shall be made any presumption which immediately before the date of the passing of the Evidence Acts Amendment Act 1962 would have been made in the case of a document of like character proved or purporting to be not less than 30 years old. [62.1] “Authentication” is proof that a document is what it purports to be; its weight (if used testimonially) is a separate matter.71 The common law recognised that, as time goes by, it becomes increasingly difficult to produce a witness who actually saw a document being made. So there was a rebuttable presumption that, if a document at least 40 years old was produced from “proper custody” – that is, from a place where one would normally expect to find it72 – no further authentication would be required. Inferences of occupation or possession of realty could be based on it.73 “Ancient” documents also enjoy a presumption that the date of execution that they bear is the true date74 and their antiquity is calculated from that date.75 This doctrine was recently considered in Nolan v Nolan.76

69. Esanda v Conti [1995] QSC 342. 70. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 604(2); see also In the Goods of Christopher Davison [1947] St R Qd 36; Re Aeberhard [1952] QWN 42. 71. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 191 FLR 385; 53 ACSR 752; [2005] NSWSC 417. 72. Meath v Winchester (1836) 10 Bli 330; 6 ER 125. When an “ancient” document is produced from an official registry, no further proof of “proper custody” is required: Doe d Shrewsbury v Keeling (1848) 11 QB 884; 116 ER 704. 73. Malcolmson v O’Dea (1863) 10 HLC 593; 11 ER 1155. 74. Anderson v Weston (1840) 9 LJCP 194; 133 ER 117. 75. Doe d Oldhan v Woolley (1828) 8 B & C 22; 108 ER 951. 76. (2003) 10 VR 626; [2003] VSC 121. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

411

s 63

Part 5 Division 2 – Proof of Certain Miscellaneous Documents

[62.2]

[62.2] In modern times social mobility and shorter “local memories” warrant a reduction in the qualifying period. Section 62 reproduces local legislation of 1962, abbreviating the qualifying period from 40 to 20 years. Nevertheless, it is prudent to support the statutory presumption by affirmative evidence in a disputed case, or when considerable property is involved.77 [62.3] Reproductions made in accordance with Pt 7 of this Act may have the status of ancient documents: see s 121. 63

Wills, deeds etc. may be verified by declaration

(1) Any attesting witness to the execution of any will or codicil, deed, or instrument in writing, and any other competent person, may verify and prove the signing, sealing, publication, or delivery of any such will, codicil, deed or instrument in writing by declaration in writing made under the Oaths Act 1867. (2) A party who intends to adduce in evidence as proof of the execution of a will, codicil, deed or instrument in writing a declaration made in accordance with subsection (1) shall give such notice of the party’s intention to do so as may be required by rules of court. (3) The method of proof prescribed by this section shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other method of proving the due execution of a will or codicil prescribed by rules of court. [63.1] A statutory declaration, as distinct from an affidavit, is not a common form of evidence in the courts; see, however, s 85(2). In common-form probate practice, the evidence is usually given by affidavit pursuant to rr 602, 604 and 609 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999. They co-exist with this section: s 63(3). That subsection may be used in a precautionary manner at the time of execution of the instrument. Notice must be given of an intention to rely upon this section: s 63(2). Quaere whether the deponent of a statutory declaration is liable to cross-examination: compare Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 439, which applies to affidavits. [63.2] Section 63 leaves intact the common law relating to secondary evidence.78 Such evidence must include proof that the missing original was executed in any special manner required by law. In 1993 there was colourful litigation in Sydney about the estate of the artist Brett Whiteley.79 The absence of the document was one of several difficulties that Powell J, in his last trial before retirement, was persuaded to overlook. His Honour accepted oral evidence of a will that allegedly revoked an earlier will, the original of which was produced. According to the deceased’s engaging daughter, Arkie, and a gentleman described as her boyfriend, Whiteley duly executed the later will in their favour, and then put it in a drawer where, unfortunately, it could no longer be found.

77. Johnston v O’Neill [1911] AC 552. 78. Sugden v Lord St Leonards (1876) LR 1 PD 154; McCauley v McCauley (1910) 10 CLR 434; Re Gregory [1934] QWN 36; see also [3.15]. 79. Re the Estate of Whiteley (decd) (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Powell J, 13 May 1993) (noted in Butt, “The Dispensing Power and Missing Wills” (1993) 67 ALJ 859).

412

Evidence Law in Queensland

[64.2]

64

Division 2 – Proof of certain miscellaneous documents and matters

s 65

Evidentiary effect of probate etc.

(1) The probate of a will or letters of administration with a will annexed are evidence of the due execution of the will. (2) The copy of a will annexed to a probate or to letters of administration is evidence of the contents of the will. (3) The probate of a will is evidence of the death of the testator and, if the probate states the date of death of the testator, of the date of the testator’s death. (4) Letters of administration of the estate of a deceased person are evidence of the death of the person and, if the letters of administration state the date of death of the person, of the date of the person’s death. (5) In this section— (a) a reference to probate shall be read as a reference to probate, and to an exemplification of probate, whether granted within or outside the State; and (b) a reference to letters of administration shall be read as a reference to letters of administration, to an exemplification of letters of administration, whether granted within or outside the State and to an order to administer the estate of a deceased person granted to the public trustee. [64.1] Section 64 is derived from ss 64 – 65 of the English Court of Probate Act 1857. It does not confer authority to administer an estate. Its purpose is to facilitate proof of (i) due execution of a will; (ii) the contents of a will; and (iii) the fact and date of death, whether the deceased died testate or intestate. [64.2] Section 64 applies to grants of probate or letters of administration in Queensland and other jurisdictions: s 64(5). It disposes of the decision in Re Cunningham’s Trusts,80 where a verified copy of probate granted in New South Wales was held to be insufficient proof of a beneficiary’s title to land in Queensland. General provisions for proof of the orders of interstate and overseas courts appear in ss 53 and 69. 65

Maps, charts etc.

(1) Where in a proceeding there is a question as to the territorial limits or situation of an area or place, or the distance between 2 places, a court may admit in evidence— (a) a published book, map, chart or document that appears to the court to be a reliable source of information in relation to the question; or (b) a certificate purporting to be given by the chief executive (surveys), or the holder of another office that, in the court’s opinion, qualifies the person to express an opinion about the question. [Subs (1) am Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

80. (1899) 9 QLJR 87. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

413

s 65

Part 5 Division 2 – Proof of Certain Miscellaneous Documents

[65.1]

(2) In any proceeding a map, chart or plan purporting to be issued or published by any department of the Government of the State or of the Commonwealth or by an officer thereof in discharge of the officer’s functions shall, upon its production, be sufficient evidence of the matters stated or delineated thereon until the contrary is proved. [S 65 am Act 58 of 1995]

[65.1] Maps are included in the definition of “document” in the Dictionary: see [3.1]. A chart may also be a record of a business or undertaking within the meaning of s 92(1)(b) or s 93(1), or a learned work, judicial notice of which may be taken at common law.81 An official map may qualify for admission as a public document: see [51.1]. The status of maps as ancient documents is considered in Attorney-General v Horner (No 2).82 Judicial notice may be taken of information in standard maps and street directories.83 The status of Google Earth maps is discussed in Al Shakarji v Mulhern.84 [65.2] The rules outlined at [65.1] are complemented by s 65. Note that this section is not confined to official publications, although they are treated preferentially in s 65(2). It extends to unofficial publications that the court considers to be reliable. 66

Astronomical phenomena

(1) Where in a proceeding there is a question as to the time or duration of any astronomical phenomenon that has occurred or shall occur in relation to a place, a court may admit in evidence a certificate about the question given by the chief executive (surveys). [Subs (1) am Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

(2) The certificate may include an explanation of the terms used therein, a statement of their recognised practical application, and the basis for calculating the time or duration of the astronomical phenomenon. (3) In this section— astronomical phenomenon includes the rising or setting of the sun or moon, the position of the sun or moon, the phase of the moon and the degree of twilight. [S 66 am Act 58 of 1995]

[66.1] The term “astronomical phenomena” is defined in s 66(3). There is nothing to prevent these matters, insofar as they are within common experience,

81. R v Orton (unreported, 1874), cited in Phipson on Evidence (13th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1982), para 26.03 (places in Australia where pretender to English aristocracy lived); Birrell v Dryer (1884) 9 AC 345; Edmondson v Amery, The Times Law Reports 28, 31 January 1911 (South African locations). 82. [1913] 2 Ch 140. 83. See [A.62]. 84. [2010] QDC 476 at [11].

414

Evidence Law in Queensland

[66.1]

Division 2 – Proof of certain miscellaneous documents and matters

s 66

85

from being proved by an ordinary witness. Weather conditions may be proved in the same way or by reference to public documents.86

85. See [A.76]. 86. Batlow Packing House and Cool Stores Rural Co-operative Society Ltd v Commonwealth and Dominion Line Ltd (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 314; Burnett and South Burnett Primary Producers’ Co-operative Association Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1939] QWN 17; John Nominees Pty Ltd v Dixon [2003] WASCA 51. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

415

PROOF OF INTERSTATE AND OVERSEAS LAWS AND RECORDS AND CONVICTIONS IN CIVIL CASES DIVISION 3 – PROOF OF CERTAIN AUSTRALIAN AND OVERSEAS DOCUMENTS AND MATTERS 67

Definitions for div 3 In this division— overseas country means a country or part of a country outside the Commonwealth and includes any international organisation of which the Commonwealth or an overseas country is a member. statute includes any instrument of a legislative nature made, granted or issued under a statute.

[S 67 am Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

[67.1] The extended definition of “overseas country” includes a state or province within a federal entity, such as the United States, Canada and Germany: compare Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 104(1). [67.2] “Statute” includes subordinate legislation. This is consistent with s 7 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954.

68

Proof of certain Australian and overseas written laws etc.

Evidence of— (a) a statute, proclamation or act of state of a State or Territory other than Queensland; or (b) a statute, proclamation, treaty or act of state of an overseas country; may be given by the production of— (c) a copy proved to be an examined copy thereof; or (d) a copy purporting to be sealed with the seal of that State, Territory or country; or (e) a book or pamphlet purporting to be published by the authority of the government of that State, Territory or country or by the government or official printer of that State, Territory or country containing the statute, proclamation, treaty or act of state; or (f) a book or publication that appears to the court to be a reliable source of information containing the statute, proclamation, treaty or act of state; or

416

Evidence Law in Queensland

[68.4]

Division 3 – Proof of certain Australian and overseas documents and matters

(g)

s 68

a book or pamphlet that is proved to the satisfaction of the court to be admissible in the courts in that State, Territory or country as evidence of the statutes, proclamations, treaties or acts of state of that State, Territory or country contained in that book or pamphlet.

[68.1] In its reference to the laws of other Australian States and Territories s 68 is superfluous, in view of s 185 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which replaced the State and Territorial Laws and Records Recognition Act 1901 (Cth). Section 118 of the Constitution accords full faith and credit to the laws and judicial proceedings of every State.1 An interstate law was interpreted by the “home” court in R v McKeown.2 Proof of judicial proceedings in other parts of Australia is governed by s 53. Section 69 provides for proof of judicial proceedings in other countries. [68.2] An extradition treaty was treated as an “act of State” in R v Butler,3 but there is explicit provision for treaties in the present s 68(b). Section 68(f) may help to avoid the cost and delay involved in obtaining an official copy of a foreign law. [68.3] Section 68 is merely enabling.4 In White v Verkouille5 it was unnecessary to tender a copy of the legislation of Nevada because an extract of the relevant sections was set out in an affidavit of an expert, a lawyer practising in Nevada. This section does not admit texts expounding judge-made law and practice in other jurisdictions:6 see [68.6]. [68.4] Generally, foreign law is a matter of fact for expert evidence rather than judicial notice,7 but in the absence ofsatisfactory expert evidence, the court may interpret the law itself.8 In the absence of any evidence of difference, domestic and foreign law are presumed to be the same.9 An exception to the requirement of expert evidence may be made when the law in question is frequently referred to in our courts, or is internationally notorious.10 Foreign law may not be proved by 1. Merwin Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Moolpa Pastoral Pty Ltd (1933) 48 CLR 565; Anderson v Eric Anderson Radio & TV Pty Ltd (1965) 114 CLR 20. 2. [1923] VLR 577. 3. (1897) 18 NSWLR (L) 146. 4. Subbotovsky v Waung (1968) 72 SR (NSW) 242; White v Verkouille [1990] 2 Qd R 191. 5. [1990] 2 Qd R 191. 6. Robinson v Studorp Ltd (2013) 279 FLR 329; [2013] QSC 238 at [37]. 7. Scruples Imports Pty Ltd v Crabtree & Evelyn Pty Ltd (1983) 1 IPR 315; Ex parte Sampson; Re Governor of HM Penitentiary at Malabar (1966) 66 SR (NSW) 501 at 514; National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v The Sentry Corporation (1989) 22 FCR 209. In Adsteam Building Industries Pty Ltd v Queensland Cement and Lime Co Ltd (No 4) [1985] 1 Qd R 127, it was suggested that cross-examination of experts on foreign law is not normally allowed. Compare ss 174 – 175 of the Federal Act, considered in Optus Networks Pty Ltd v Gilsan (International) Ltd [2006] NSWCA 171. 8. Williams v Usher (1955) 94 CLR 450 at 454; Scruples Imports Pty Ltd v Crabtree & Evelyn Pty Ltd (1983) 1 IPR 315 at 325; Bank of Valletta PLC v National Crime Authority (1999) 164 ALR 45 at [74]; affd (1999) 90 FCR 565. 9. Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd (2005) 223 CLR 331 at [125]. 10. Saxby v Fulton [1909] 2 KB 208 (gambling lawful in the principality of Monaco); Mokbel v The Queen [2013] VSCA 118 at [26]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

417

s 68

Proof of Interstate and Overseas Laws

[68.5]

11

reference to findings in another case. The application of foreign law to particular facts is a matter for the court.12 Australian courts may interpret statutes of a present or past British possession.13 Parties to civil cases may vary these rules by consent.14 [68.5] There is a rule that the burden of proof is on a party who claims that foreign or interstate law is different from comparable law in Queensland.15 It is probably limited to proof of the laws of other common law jurisdictions.16 [68.6] It is doubtful whether a foreign legal text may be tendered as evidence of the way in which a foreign statute is applied.17 In Malyon v Lawrence Messer & Co18 the plaintiff was injured in a road accident in Germany. On his return to England he instructed the defendant firm of solicitors to file a claim for damages in a German court. That action was commenced, but later, due to the defendants’ inefficiency, was struck out for want of prosecution. In an action against the English lawyers for negligence, two German lawyers gave evidence of the likely result of the action in their jurisdiction, if it had been properly conducted. [68.7] While foreign law is a matter of evidence, the weight of that evidence is for the judge alone, even in a jury trial. If there is a conflict of evidence on a point of foreign law, the judge decides which version is to be preferred.19 Obviously it is desirable to call a highly qualified expert but, when a small or remote regime is involved, that may not be possible. In Re Pakuza20 a consular representative without formal legal qualifications gave evidence on a point of legal practice in the USSR.21

11. M’Cormick v Garnett (1854) 23 LJ Ch 777. 12. Allstate Life Insurance Co v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (No 33) (1996) 64 FCR 73; 136 ALR 627; Elecon Australia Pty Ltd v Brevini Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 263 ALR 1; [2009] FCA 1327. 13. R v McKeown [1923] VLR 577; Re Sebba [1959] Ch 166; Mahadervan v Mahadervan [1964] P 233 at 240. 14. United States Surgical Corporation v Hospital Products International Pty Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 766 at 801. 15. Proudfoot v Drake (1882) 3 NSWLR 381; Wright Heaton & Co v Barrett (1892) 13 NSWLR 206. 16. Bowden Bros v Imperial Marine and Transport Co (1905) 5 SR (NSW) 614. Generally on the proof of foreign law, see Buckley v Thomas (1554) 1 Plowd 118; 75 ER 182 at 124 (Plowd), 192 (ER); Sharif v Azad [1967] 1 QB 605 at 616; Malyon v Lawrence Messer & Co [1968] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 539; Clyne v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 57 FLR 198; 82 ATC 4001; Adsteam Building Industries Pty Ltd v Queensland Cement and Lime Co Ltd (No 4) [1985] 1 Qd R 127. 17. See s 68(e) and (f); see also Homeward Bound GM Co v McPherson (1896) 17 NSWLR (Eq) 281 at 288-289. 18. [1968] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 539. 19. Medina v Copenhagen Handelsbank International SA [1989] FCA 52. 20. [1975] Qd R 141. 21. For a note on pleading foreign law, see (1986) 60 ALJ 304.

418

Evidence Law in Queensland

[69.4]

Division 3 – Proof of certain Australian and overseas documents and matters

s 69

69

Proof of judicial proceedings of an overseas country Evidence of— (a) a judgment, decree, rule, conviction, acquittal, sentence or other order, process, act or decision of any court in an overseas country; or (b) an affidavit, pleading, will, codicil, indictment or other legal document filed, deposited or presented in any such court; may be given by the production of a copy thereof— (c) proved to be an examined copy thereof; or (d) purporting— (i) to be sealed with the seal of such court; or (ii) to be signed by a judge of such court with a statement in writing attached by the judge to the judge’s signature that such court has no seal and without proof of the judge’s judicial character or of the truth of such statement. [69.1] Compare s 53, which deals with proof of judicial proceedings elsewhere in Australia. [69.2] In Permanent Trustee Co of New South Wales v Fels22 a marriage settlement prepared by a notary in Poland was admitted under a provision similar to s 69. A certificate of incorporation of a foreign company bearing the seal of the country of origin was admitted as a “judicial proceeding” in Bowden Bros & Co v Imperial Marine and Transport Insurance Co.23 In Fullmer v Cape York Cattle Company24 letters of request from a foreign court were accepted as evidence of proceedings in that court. [69.3] A foreign judgment is evidence that a corresponding order was made in that jurisdiction.25 It may support a plea of res judicata here.26 But subsidiary findings of fact are not made evidence by s 69.27 [69.4] As to committal proceedings in a foreign country, see [53.4] and [53.6]. On the relationship between s 69 and the rule against hearsay, see [53.7].

22. [1918] AC 879. 23. (1905) 5 SR (NSW) 614. 24. [1987] 1 Qd R 6. 25. R v Woolcott Forbes (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 333. 26. Charm Maritime Inc v Kyriakou [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 433; 1 FTLR 265. 27. R v McLeod (1890) 11 NSWLR 218 (statement in Mexican divorce decree that party had resided there for six months). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

419

s 70

Proof of Interstate and Overseas Laws

[70.1]

70

Proof of certain documents admissible elsewhere in Australia Any document which by a law at any time in force in a State or Territory other than Queensland is admissible in evidence for any purpose in a court of that State or Territory without proof of— (a) the seal or stamp or signature authenticating the same; or (b) the judicial or official character of the person appearing to have signed the same, shall be admissible in evidence to the same extent and for the same purpose in all courts in Queensland without such proof. [70.1] Section 70 predicates interstate legislation similar to ss 53, 55, 56 and 57 of the Evidence Act 1977. It overlaps s 185 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), a predecessor of which was applied in Crawford Earthmovers Pty Ltd v Fitzsimmons.28 However, the former legislation dealt only with public acts, records and judicial proceedings, while the present section covers private documents, subject to the interstate law. [70.2] The Evidence Act 1977 does not reproduce s 37 of the Evidence and Discovery Act 1867, which provided that documents admissible without proof of seal or signature in the United Kingdom were admissible to the same extent in Queensland.29 However, it is submitted that such a document is still admissible here under s 11 of the Evidence Act 1851 (Imp). 71

Royal proclamations, orders of the Privy Council etc.

(1) Evidence of any royal proclamation, order of Her Majesty’s Privy Council, order, regulation, dispatch, or any other instrument made or issued by Her Majesty or by Her Majesty’s Privy Council, or by or under the authority of any of Her Majesty’s Secretaries of State, or of any department of Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, may be given— (a) by the production of a document purporting to be a copy of the London gazette or of the government gazette purporting to contain a reprint of such proclamation, order of the Privy Council, order, regulation, dispatch or other instrument; or (b) by the production in the case of any such proclamation of a copy purporting to be printed by the government printer. (2) In this section (but without affecting the generality of the expression when used elsewhere)— Her Majesty includes any predecessors of Her Majesty. [71.1] Presumably these provisions of the Evidence Act 1898 (Qld) and s 2 of the Evidence Act 1868 (UK) were reproduced in case they are required by continuing (albeit attenuated) legal relations between the United Kingdom and its former colony of Queensland.

28. (1972) 4 SASR 226; 20 FLR 123. 29. Re Pakuza [1975] Qd R 141.

420

Evidence Law in Queensland

[73.1]

Division 3 – Proof of certain Australian and overseas documents and matters

s 73

72

Proof of certain Australian and overseas public documents Where a document of a State or Territory of the Commonwealth other than Queensland or of an overseas country is of such a public nature that it would if it were a Queensland document be admissible in evidence in Queensland on its mere production from proper custody, a copy of or extract from the document shall be admissible in evidence if— (a) it is proved to be an examined copy or extract; or (b) it purports to be certified as a true copy or extract under the hand of a person described in the certificate as the person to whose custody the original is entrusted. [72.1] While s 51 enables a public document to be proved by means of an authenticated copy, s 72 extends the benefit to a document which, had it been made in Queensland for the information of the public of that State, would be a public document irrespective of its status in the other jurisdiction. 73 Proof of incorporation or registration of certain Australian and overseas companies Evidence of the incorporation or registration of a company within the meaning of the Corporations Act that is taken to be registered in a State or Territory of the Commonwealth other than Queensland or in an overseas country may be given by the production of a certificate of the incorporation or registration of that company which purports to be signed or issued by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission or the proper officer or body in that country, and the date of incorporation or registration mentioned in such certificate shall be evidence of the date on which the company was incorporated or registered. [S 73 am Act 45 of 2001, s 29 and Sch 3]

[73.1] The incorporation of a litigant company is a material fact to be pleaded and, if not admitted, must be proved: see [55.1]. Companies registered in Queensland are provided for in s 55 of this Act, but see now s 1274(7A) of the Corporations Act 2001, which makes a certificate of registration issued by ASIC conclusive evidence that all registration requirements have been satisfied, and that the company is duly registered as at the date of the certificate.30 The possibility of proof by other means is noted at [55.2]. In Bowden Bros & Co v Imperial Marine and Transport Insurance Co31 a certificate of incorporation sealed by a foreign court was admitted under a provision similar to s 69: see also s 72.

30. Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cycclone Magnetic Engines Inc (2009) 224 FLR 50; [2009] QSC 58 at [194]. 31. (1905) 5 SR (NSW) 614. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

421

s 74

Proof of Interstate and Overseas Laws

[74.1]

74

Proof of birth, adoption, death or marriage A document purporting to be either the original or a certified copy of a certificate, entry or record of a birth, adoption, death or marriage alleged to have taken place whether in Australia or elsewhere is evidence in a proceeding of the matters contained therein. [74.1] Government registers of this kind were established in the 19th century following Bentham’s criticism of the local and fragmentary character of church records.32 Although marriage and matrimonial causes are now federal matters, the registration of marriages remains a State responsibility: Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 2003. [74.2] Section 74 extends to interstate and overseas records. (With respect to overseas countries, see also s 72 of this Act and s 88G of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth).) It suffices that the document purports to be a certified copy. [74.3] Section 74 modifies two common law rules. First, it dispenses a party from the original evidence rule. Second, it creates a significant exception to the hearsay rule, in that the certificate is “evidence … of the matters contained therein”.33 It is therefore unnecessary to consider whether the certificate is a public document within the meaning of ss 51 and 72.34 The tender of “X’s” birth certificate to prove “X’s” age overcomes the technical objection that his oral evidence on that point would be hearsay.35 [74.4] According to s 74, the record or certificate is evidence not only of the date of the event, but also of all other facts that are required to be recorded in the jurisdiction concerned.36 Thus, names and ages of the parents of a child and their occupations at that time may be proved under this section if the local law demands these details.37 In Bird v Keep,38 the cause of death was surplus to local requirements, so the certificate was no evidence on that point. [74.5] The evidence is not liable to exclusion as a prior consistent statement if the person who supplied the information now relies on the contents of the certificate – for example, where a woman seeking child maintenance tenders a birth certificate naming the respondent as father and herself as the informant.39 32. Births and Deaths Registration Act 1836 (UK). 33. Compare Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 102. 34. A birth certificate was treated as a public document in Re Stollery [1926] Ch 284. 35. Carlton and United Breweries Ltd v Cassin [1956] VLR 186. 36. Carlton and United Breweries Ltd v Cassin [1956] VLR 186 (age of husband proved by reference to marriage certificate). 37. Re Stollery [1926] Ch 284 at 328. 38. [1918] 2 KB 692. The position may be different in Queensland. The cause of death portion of a death certificate is probably relied on less often than the fact and date of death (except by historians) but, according to Professor J M Hilton of Sydney University’s Department of Pathology, the “causes” stated in such certificates are wrong in 15-33% of cases: letter to The Australian (7 February 2000), p 12. 39. Jessop v Jessop (1931) 48 WN (NSW) 78. Unilateral registration is prima facie prevented by s 8 of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 2003, but the registrar has a discretion: s 8(2).

422

Evidence Law in Queensland

[74.9]

Division 4 – Proof of telegraphic messages

s 75

But the certificate is not conclusive – it is always possible that incorrect information was given to the registrar,40 as in R v TJW.41 [74.6] The certificate itself cannot identify a party to the proceedings as the person named therein. If necessary that link must be established by other means: compare [53.5]. In matrimonial proceedings this evidence is readily available from one or other of the parties, but other cases may be more difficult. In R v Tomes42 a child’s evidence as to the date on which she regularly celebrated her birthday was accepted as proof that she was the child named in a birth certificate. [74.7] Section 74 is merely an enabling provision. A birth, death or marriage may also be proved by the evidence of a person who was present at the time or by means of the common law exceptions to the hearsay rule regarding statements of deceased persons against interest43 or as to pedigree.44 Evidence of a purported marriage ceremony raises a rebuttable presumption of a lawful marriage. The presumption is enhanced if children have been born to the parties.45 For an alternative means of proving a death, see s 64. Another method of proving an adoption is provided in the Adoption Act 2009, s 313. [74.8] The presumption of death arising from unexplained absence for at least seven years may establish the fact of death, but not the precise date on which it occurred.46 [74.9] When parentage is an issue in proceedings under the Status of Children Act 1978, a record of paternity in a Queensland birth certificate raises a presumption to that effect.47

DIVISION 4 – PROOF OF TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGES 75

Notice of intention to adduce telegraphic message in evidence

(1) In any proceeding (not being a criminal proceeding), any party may at any time after the commencement thereof give notice to any other party that the party proposes to adduce in evidence at the trial or hearing any telegraphic message that has been sent by telegraph from any place in the Commonwealth to any other place in the Commonwealth.

40. Nicolia v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1971) 45 ALJR 465 (death certificate signed by doctor without examining the deceased); Wolverson v Todman [2015] QCA 74 at [49]. 41. [1989] 1 Qd R 108. 42. [1917] VLR 78; Administrator of Estate of Harold Beaver (Dec) v Macgregor [2001] WASC 222 at [8]. 43. Higham v Ridgway (1808) 10 East 109; 103 ER 717. 44. Sturla v Freccia (1880) 5 App Cas 623 at 641; Re O’Neil [1972] VR 327. 45. Jacombe v Jacombe (1960) 105 CLR 355; Re Taylor [1961] 1 WLR 9. 46. Lal Chand Marwari v Mahant Ramrup Gir (1925) 42 TLR 159. 47. Status of Children Act 1978, s 18B. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

423

s 75

Proof of Interstate and Overseas Laws

[75.1]

(1A) However— (a) the time between the giving of such notice and the day on which such evidence shall be tendered shall not in any case be less than 2 days; and (b) every such notice shall specify the names of the sender and receiver of the message, the subject matter thereof, and the date as nearly as may be. (2) Any such notice may be served and the service thereof proved in the same manner as notices to produce may now be served and proved. [75.1] The history of these provisions is outlined at [A.31]. In civil cases they enable the fact of a message to be proved without production of the original and without proof of accurate transmission. They do not create an exception to the hearsay rule, but are useful when a message is to be used non-testimonially – for example, to prove an oral agreement. The documents referred to are neither permanent enough,48 nor sufficiently open to inspection, to qualify as public documents (see [51.3]), but they may be admissible under s 84 or s 92. [75.2] See the Dictionary for definitions of “telegraph”, “telegraphic message” and “telegraph office”. [75.3] Although these provisions were originally designed for 19th century technology, they have been adapted to modern conditions. For example, references to “telegraphic stations within the Colony” have given way to the rule that a message be sent between any two “places” linked by a “system of telecommunication operated by an authority of the Commonwealth”. The current practice of allowing facsimile affidavits49 to be read (subject to filing the original when received) disposes of old cases questioning the admissibility of affidavits sent by telegraph.50 76

Proof of message Where a notice under section 75 has been given, the production of a telegraphic message described in the notice and purporting to have been sent by any person, together with evidence that the same was duly received from a telegraph office, shall be evidence that such message was sent by the person so purporting to be the sender thereof to the person to whom the same is addressed. [76.1] The heading to s 76 is unhelpful. In fact, the section facilitates proof that a particular person sent the message in question.

48. Heyne v Fischel & Co (1913) 30 TLR 190. 49. See Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 965. 50. Re T (A Solicitor) (1899) 9 QLJ (NC) 95; Doyle v Saunders [1904] QWN 73.

424

Evidence Law in Queensland

[78.2]

Division 5 – Admissibility of convictions in civil proceedings

s 79

77

Proof of sending a message Where a notice under section 75 has been given, the production of a telegraphic message, or a copy thereof verified on oath, together with evidence that such message was sent to or delivered at a telegraph office and that the fees (if any) for the transmission thereof were duly paid shall be evidence that such message was duly delivered to the person named therein as the person to whom the same was to be transmitted. [77.1] Section 77 serves to complete what would otherwise be a tedious process of proof (see [A.31]) by providing evidence of due delivery.

DIVISION 5 – ADMISSIBILITY OF CONVICTIONS IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS 78

Definitions for div 5 In this division— conviction does not include— (a) a conviction that has been set aside or quashed; or (b) where the person convicted of an offence has been granted a pardon in respect of that offence, such a conviction; and the term convicted has a corresponding meaning. court means any court of Queensland, of the Commonwealth or of any other State or Territory but does not include a court martial.

[S 78 am Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

“Conviction” [78.1] This term includes a conviction that is under appeal. However, if the evidence were pressed in such a case, the court would probably adjourn the matter before it until the appeal was decided.51 The conviction should be proved in accordance with s 53 or s 69. There are notes on proof of convictions at [53.3] and [54.1].

“Court” [78.2] 79

Only convictions in Australian courts are admissible under ss 79 and 80.

Convictions as evidence in civil proceedings (1) In this section— civil proceeding does not include an action for defamation. convicted means a finding of guilt for an offence, on a plea of guilty or otherwise, and whether or not a conviction was recorded.

[Def insrt Act 59 of 2008, s 49]

51. Re Raphael [1973] 1 WLR 998; Gonzales v Claridades (2003) 58 NSWLR 211; [2003] NSWCA 227. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

425

s 79

Proof of Interstate and Overseas Laws

[79.1]

(2) In any civil proceeding the fact that a person has been convicted by a court of an offence is admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving, where to do so is relevant to any issue in that proceeding, that the person committed that offence. (3) In any civil proceeding in which by virtue of this section a person is proved to have been convicted by a court of an offence the person shall, unless the contrary is proved, be taken to have committed the acts and to have possessed the state of mind (if any) which at law constitute that offence. (4) This section applies— (a) whether or not a person was convicted upon a plea of guilty; and (b) whether or not the person convicted is a party to the civil proceeding. [S 79 am Act 59 of 2008]

Background [79.1] Section 79 follows English legislation that was passed to modify (but not to abolish)52 the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn & Co Ltd.53 Section 79 makes no difference to the law applicable to successive criminal cases. The first verdict is no evidence in the second case. In a trial for procuring an offence, the conviction of the principal offender is no evidence that the principal offence was committed.54 In Hollington v Hewthorn an injured passenger sued the drivers of two cars involved in a collision. Before the civil case was heard, one defendant was convicted of careless driving causing that collision. Later, in the civil case, it was held that the conviction raised no estoppel by record because the parties were not the same.55 Furthermore, it was merely an inadmissible opinion. On the same principle, a conviction for assault was inadmissible in Origliasso v Vitale.56 [79.2]

The English Law [Reform] Commission condemned the rule:

Rationalise it how one will, the decision in this case offends one’s sense of justice. The defendant driver had been found guilty of careless driving by a court of competent jurisdiction. The onus of proof … in criminal cases is higher than in civil; the degree of carelessness required to sustain a conviction for careless driving is, if anything, greater than that required to sustain a civil … action in negligence. Yet the fact that the defendant driver had been convicted of careless driving at the time and place of the accident was held not to amount even to prima facie evidence of his negligent driving at that time and place.57

52. This legislation applies only in a civil case after criminal proceedings involving the same subject matter. 53. [1943] KB 587, applied in Hui Chi-Ming v The Queen [1992] 1 AC 34; (1992) 94 Cr App R 236. 54. R v Kirkby [2000] 2 Qd R 57. 55. See also Marginson v Blackburn Borough Council [1939] 2 KB 426; Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446. 56. [1952] St R Qd 211. 57. Fifteenth Report Cmd 3391 (1967), para 3.

426

Evidence Law in Queensland

[79.7]

Division 5 – Admissibility of convictions in civil proceedings

s 79

[79.3] The English Parliament responded with s 11 of the Civil Evidence Act 1968, which is the basis of the present section.

Civil action may arise from different incident [79.4] Usually the conviction will concern the same incident that gives rise to the civil action, as in Hollington v Hewthorn, where a conviction for careless driving preceded an action for personal injuries. But sometimes a conviction based on a separate incident is relevant – for example, to prove that drug addiction and not a motor vehicle accident explains a plaintiff’s lack of paid employment.58

Section 79(1): defamation [79.5] The use of convictions in defamation proceedings is governed by s 80. That section is designed to prevent the abuse of a civil action to re-litigate the decision of a criminal court.

Section 79(2): previous conviction [79.6] The words “convicted” and “court” are defined in s 78: see [78.1] – [78.2]. In a subsequent civil case to which s 79 applies, the conviction is evidence that the person convicted did commit the offence specified, if that is relevant.59 In Russell v Craddock60 the plaintiff’s convictions for vagrancy and other offences had no bearing on his future earning capacity. We are not concerned here with evidence as to credit; that is dealt with in s 16.

Section 79(3): previous conviction – state of mind [79.7] Here the wording of the Queensland provision differs from the English precedent, following a suggestion of the writer to the Queensland Law Reform Commission in 1976. The explicit statement that the conviction is prima facie evidence not only of the offence, but also of the acts and state of mind that constitute the offence, is a precaution against narrower interpretation. The different terms of the Queensland section are noted by McPherson SPJ in Jacobsen v Suncorp Insurance and Finance (No 2).61 For example, a conviction for negligent driving causing death may be evidence in civil proceedings that the defendant did in fact drive on the incorrect side of the road, as alleged in the criminal case. In Hogan v Gill62 the plaintiff was a four-year-old, injured by an air rifle fired by a child aged six. In an action against the latter’s parent, negligence was proved by means of his conviction for failing to keep the weapon in a secure place. In Batey 58. Compare Russell v Craddock [1985] 1 Qd R 377, noted at [79.6]. 59. Queensland v Byers [2006] QSC 334; Bond v Cerruto [2003] QCA 219. 60. [1985] 1 Qd R 377. 61. [1992] 1 Qd R 385 at 388. “[I]n England the presumption is only that the person convicted committed the offence.” See also Stu Mitchell Enterprises Pty Ltd v Hughes [1993] QCA 327. 62. (Unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Shepherdson J, 25 June 1992). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

427

s 79

Proof of Interstate and Overseas Laws

[79.8]

63

v Potts a certificate of conviction for manslaughter proved that the person convicted was not entitled to inherit the property of the deceased. When the mere fact of a conviction is relevant the assistance of s 79 is not required. When a wife sought a divorce on the ground of cruelty,64 alleging that the respondent husband exposed her to ostracism as the wife of a traitor, the fact of the husband’s conviction for espionage was evidence in its own right.65 When a conviction is based on a guilty plea, the plea, as distinct from the conviction, is a formal admission that may be evidence in a later case.66 A conviction is evidence of the matters stated in s 79(3), whether the plea was “guilty” or “not guilty”.67 Section 79 does not affect the use of convictions for other purposes.68 See [82.1].

Not conclusive evidence [79.8] Although a conviction is necessarily based on proof beyond reasonable doubt, the facts behind it are open to rebuttal under s 79: contrast s 80. Difficult as it may be,69 the person convicted may seek to prove that he or she did not do the acts, or possess the state of mind indicated by the conviction.70 Evidence of bloodstains was insufficient to rebut a presumption that “X” was driving a car at the material time in Jacobsen v Suncorp Insurance and Finance (No 2).71 The trial judge was too easily satisfied by the rebuttal evidence in Taylor v Taylor.72 On the other hand, in Kerr v Nominal Defendant (Queensland)73 a person convicted of driving without due care and attention claimed in a subsequent civil case that the plaintiff passenger caused the collision by grabbing the steering wheel. Admitting that evidence, Connolly J observed: Section 79(3), in this case, does no more than establish that [the defendant] was in some respect driving without due care and attention. There is therefore no basis on which the conviction can be regarded as establishing prima facie the whole of the plaintiff’s cause of action.74

63. (2004) 61 NSWLR 274; [2004] NSWSC 606; see also Bond v Cerruto [2003] QCA 219; Clark v Hall [2006] QCA 274. 64. Assuming, for the purposes of this illustration, that such a ground still exists. 65. Ingram v Ingram [1956] P 390. 66. Moore v Giofrelle [1952] ALR (CN) 1049; cf s 79(4)(a). In Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461 this was assumed; see also R v O’Keefe [1999] 1 Qd R 564; Bennett v Western Australia (2012) 223 A Crim R 419; [2012] WASCA 70 at [49]. 67. Jacobsen v Suncorp Insurance and Finance (No 2) [1992] 1 Qd R 385 at 389. 68. R v Carter; Ex parte Attorney-General [1990] 2 Qd R 371 (in which s 53 was used as part of the case against an accomplice). 69. Stupple v Royal Insurance Co Ltd [1971] 1 QB 50; Mickelberg v Director of Perth Mint [1986] WAR 365; Dinsdale v Morse [2003] QDC 338. 70. Wauchope v Mordecai [1970] 1 WLR 317; 1 All ER 417. 71. [1992] 1 Qd R 385. 72. [1970] 1 WLR 1148. 73. (1987) 5 MVR 175. 74. (1987) 5 MVR 175 at 176.

428

Evidence Law in Queensland

[81.2]

Division 5 – Admissibility of convictions in civil proceedings

s 82

[79.9] Compare s 83 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), which declares that findings in proceedings under certain sections of the Act are evidence in actions for damages under s 82 thereof.75 80

Convictions as evidence in actions for defamation In an action for defamation in which the question whether a person did or did not commit a criminal offence is relevant to an issue arising in the action, proof that at the time when the issue falls to be determined that person stands convicted by a court of that offence is conclusive evidence that the person committed that offence. [80.1] At common law, if “A” published a statement that “B” was a convict, implying that the conviction was correct, “B” could re-litigate that issue in a civil action for defamation.76 The policy of s 80 is that actions of that kind should no longer be possible. Accordingly, in an action for defamation a conviction is conclusively presumed to be correct, and a plea contrary to s 80 may be struck out as an abuse of process.77 This section was applied in Hocken v Morris.78 81

Evidence identifying the particulars of a conviction Without prejudice to the reception of any other evidence for the purpose of identifying the particulars of a conviction— (a) the contents of any document which is admissible as evidence of the conviction; and (b) the contents of any document which is admissible as evidence of the complaint, information, indictment or charge on which the person in question was convicted; shall be admissible for that purpose where by virtue of section 79 or 80 evidence of the conviction may be given. [81.1] Section 81 facilitates the proof of convictions, and the facts on which they were based, for the purposes of ss 79 and 80. The evidence may consist of a certificate of conviction or related document, such as an information or indictment. The identification of convicted persons is considered at [54.1]. [81.2] On the proof of convictions entered in Australia and overseas, see ss 53 and 69. 82

Operation of other laws not affected Nothing in this division derogates from the operation of any other law under which a conviction or finding of fact in a criminal proceeding is, for the 75. Hubbards Pty Ltd v Simpson Ltd (1982) 60 FLR 430; 1 TPR 354; Fenech v Sterling (1983) 79 FLR 244 at 256. 76. Goody v Odhams Press [1967] 1 QB 333. Note, however, that the standard of proof of the offence would be the civil standard. A man acquitted of murder was found “guilty” in a subsequent probate action in Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691. 77. Levene v Roxhan [1970] 1 WLR 1322; 3 All ER 683. 78. [2011] QDC 115. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

429

s 82

Proof of Interstate and Overseas Laws

[82.1]

purposes of any proceeding, made evidence or conclusive evidence of any fact. [82.1] The substantive provisions of “this Division” are ss 79, 80 and 81. They are additional to any other statutory or common law rule that treats a conviction as evidence in a subsequent case.79 In Re 396 Bay Street Port Melbourne80 a conviction was used to prove that action by the police against the owner of a “sly grog” shop was based on a reasonable suspicion, as the relevant statute required.

79. See again Ingram v Ingram [1956] P 390; and [79.7]. 80. [1969] VR 293.

430

Evidence Law in Queensland

DOCUMENTARY HEARSAY DIVISION 6 – BOOKS OF ACCOUNT 83

Definitions for div 6 In this division— book of account includes any document used in the ordinary course of any undertaking to record the financial transactions of the undertaking or to record anything acquired or otherwise dealt with by, produced in, held for or on behalf of, or taken or lost from the undertaking and any particulars relating to any such thing. court means— (a) in relation to any proceeding in the Supreme Court—the Supreme Court or a judge thereof; and (b) in relation to any proceeding in the District Court—the District Court or a judge thereof; and (c) in relation to any proceeding in a Magistrates Court or before justices—the Magistrates Court, a magistrate or a justice; and (d) in relation to any other proceeding—the Supreme Court or a judge thereof.

[Def am Act 55 of 2003, s 62; Act 19 of 1999, s 3 and Sch] [S 83 am Act 55 of 2003; Act 19 of 1999; Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

INTRODUCTION [83.1] When a document is used testimonially – that is, as proof of the facts asserted in it – it is prima facie inadmissible hearsay. But that is not so if the document is used “non-testimonially” – as real evidence, or as a legal instrument such as a will or title deed, or if the information recorded is “original evidence” (see [A.143]), for example to reveal a “cover up”1 or as evidence of duress.2 A business record was original evidence in Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich.3 [83.2] Sections 83 – 103 assume that the document is being used testimonially. On that basis they proceed to make exceptions to the hearsay rule in favour of

1. Mawaz Khan v The Queen [1967] 1 AC 454. The position would have been the same if the accused’s statements to police were originally in written form. 2. As the oral statements were in Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965. 3. (2005) 54 ACSR 28; [2005] NSWSC 471.

© 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

431

s 83

Documentary Hearsay

[83.3]

4

certain private and business records. In that respect they go beyond other parts of this Act, such as s 41, which merely raises a presumption of authenticity,5 or s 106(1), which avoids the “original document” rule6 by making a copy “admissible … to the extent to which the contents of the original document … would have been admissible”.7 [83.3] Some statements covered by these sections are also admissible according to common law exceptions to the hearsay rule – for example public documents,8 documents containing admissions9 and statements by deceased witnesses against pecuniary interest.10 At common law the state of a bank account could be proved by reference to the bank’s records,11 but other businesses were not treated so favourably.12 A tradesman was entitled to refresh his memory by referring to his books of account, but it was only after his death that they could be used as evidence.13 These common law exceptions are still available: s 103. [83.4] In some Australian jurisdictions there is a single set of “business record” rules for criminal and civil proceedings,14 but the documentary hearsay provisions of this Act are more complex. They may be summarised as follows: (a) “books of account”: s 84 complemented by ss 83 and 85 – 91; (b) documents used testimonially in civil cases: ss 92 and 93A and ancillary sections in Pt 6; (c) documents used testimonially in criminal cases: ss 93 and 93A and incidental provisions; (d) material admissible under s 94; (e) information from a “device or process”: s 95; and (f) prior consistent and inconsistent statements covered by s 101. In practice these categories may overlap. (See also s 129A.) All “books of account” are “business records”, but not all business records are books of account. Many computer records are both “books of account” and business 4. On the whittling away of the hearsay rule, see Aronson, “Hello Relevance – Goodbye Hearsay” (1991) 65 ALJ 596. For a European lawyer’s perspective on this distinctive rule of the common law, see Reiter, “Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Process in Germany and Austria” (1984) 10 Mon LR 51. 5. Authentication is proof that a document is what it purports to be; its weight is a separate matter: Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 191 FLR 385; 53 ACSR 752; [2005] NSWSC 417. 6. See [3.15]. 7. R v Kerin [2014] SASC 19 at [184]; Technilock (Australia) Pty Ltd v Mondami Pty Ltd [1999] SASC 320 at [109] – [110]. 8. See [51.3]. 9. See [Q.43]. 10. Higham v Ridgway (1808) 10 East 109; 103 ER 717; Taylor v Witham (1876) 3 Ch D 605. 11. R v Cowpe and Richardson (1892) 13 LR (NSW) 265. 12. Lakeman v Finlay (1959) 59 SR (NSW) 5. 13. Blackstone, Laws of England (1765) Vol III, pp 368-369; Darston v Earl of Oxford (1701) 1 Eq Cas Abr 10; 21 ER 834. 14. See, eg, Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 69.

432

Evidence Law in Queensland

[83.5]

Introduction

s 83

records. A private record admissible under s 92(1)(a) is sometimes a business record admissible under s 92(1)(b) or s 93 as well. There is now a wide discretion, in civil cases, to allow any document to be proved, if it be a fact in issue, “in any way the court directs”.15

“Book of account” [83.5] This definition includes “any document” ordinarily used to record “financial transactions”, whether or not it is a book in the ordinary sense, and whether or not an accountant would regard it as a financial record. “A book of account is not limited to something that looks like a large bound ledger.”16 The definition extends to “any document … [recording] anything acquired or otherwise dealt with … or taken or lost”.17 On the trial of a railway employee for fraud, travel claim forms were admitted as books of account.18 A company director’s business diary may be a book of account.19 In Swindells v Hosking20 medical records were treated as a book of account, with no mention of s 92, presumably on the basis that they recorded matters “dealt with” or “produced” in the professional business. Monthly memoranda containing “raw figures” were deemed part of a company’s financial records in Linfox Transport (Aust) Pty Ltd v Arthur Yates & Co Ltd,21 and in Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich,22 two financial reports and an email communication were similarly treated. It is immaterial that a diary recording financial details also records matters of a non-business nature.23 A summary of financial records prepared by an appropriate expert is admissible, provided that the primary records are available to the court and other parties.24 The “book” need not be made or kept in Queensland: see s 91.

15. See s 129A inserted by the Civil Proceedings Act 2011, s 146. 16. Playroom Pty Ltd v Hibbard (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Senior Master Lee, 18 August 1987). 17. The extent to which incidental material is covered was briefly considered, but left undecided, in Koven v Hail Creek Coal Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 51 at [43(b)] (fn). 18. Attorney-General v Ireland [1995] QCA 75. 19. Duncan Davis Pty Ltd v Hurstbridge Abattoirs (Aust) Pty Ltd [1995] 1 VR 279. 20. [2012] QDC 6 at [43]. 21. (2003) 47 ACSR 261; [2003] NSWSC 876; Keys v Salway [2015] NSWSC 613 at [212]. 22. (2005) 54 ACSR 28; [2005] NSWSC 471. 23. Duncan Davis Pty Ltd v Hurstbridge Abattoirs (Aust) Pty Ltd [1995] 1 VR 279. 24. Potts v Miller (1940) 64 CLR 282 at 303; Re Montecatini’s Patent (1973) 47 ALJR 161 at 169; Playroom Pty Ltd v Hibbard (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Senior Master Lee, 18 August 1987): “[Otherwise] trials such as this would come to a standstill.” © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

433

s 83

Documentary Hearsay

[83.6]

“Document” [83.6] See the notes at [3.11] – [3.23]. Many “books of account” are now computerised25 and may be admissible under s 84 even if they do not meet the requirements of s 95.26 An email may be a business document.27

“In the ordinary course” [83.7] This “guarantee” of reliability is fundamental to s 84 and to ss 92, 93 and 95.28 “Ordinariness” depends on the practice of the “undertaking” in question, not on generalisations about businesses of that kind.29 After an initial reference to “any undertaking” this section focuses on “the undertaking” in question, as does s 85(1). The “business by business” approach is maintained in ss 92(1)(b) and 93(1)(a), which respectively speak of “that undertaking” and “that trade or business”. [83.8] Practices that are “ordinary” in one business may not be ordinary in another, albeit similar, business. For example, a firm of solicitors specialising in taxation law may have certain systems or provide services not offered by firms specialising in conveyancing or personal injury cases. It may be an ordinary practice in a probate firm to make notes about testators’ physical or mental health, but most unusual for it to send reports about such matters to the police.30 A hospital may ordinarily compile psychiatric reports for its own use, but not for legal advisers.31 It may be ordinary for one supplier of electrical goods to keep records of names and addresses of its customers for the purpose of sending them advertisements, but unusual for another such firm to do so. Marketing documents and business journals are not “ordinary” business records.32 [83.9] A document may be made in the ordinary course of business although it was compiled with litigation in mind – for example, an insurance company’s file of correspondence with a policy-holder who is pressing a claim despite initial

25. R v Ewing [1983] QB 1039; 2 All ER 645; Griffıths v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1990) 53 SASR 256. 26. Markovina v The Queen (1996) 16 WAR 354; Griffıths v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1988) 49 SASR 385; DFC of T v Capron (1993) 93 ATC 4144; Murphy v Lew [1998] 3 VR 791. 27. Aqua-Marine Marketing Pty Ltd v Pacific Reef Fisheries (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 4) (2011) 194 FCR 479; [2011] FCA 578. 28. In s 95 the equivalent expression is “regular use”. 29. Compafina Bank v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [1982] 1 NSWLR 409. Contrast the meaning given to the ordinary course of business in the law of bankruptcy, where the question is treated generally: Robertson v Grigg (1932) 47 CLR 257; Downs Distributing Co Pty Ltd v Associated Blue Star Stores Pty Ltd (In liq) (1948) 76 CLR 463; Taylor v White (1964) 110 CLR 129 at 136. 30. R v Barker [1976] Tas SR 52. 31. Bates v Nelson (1973) 6 SASR 149 at 155. 32. Roach v Page (No 27) [2003] NSWSC 1046; Hansen Beverage Co v Bickfords (Australia) Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 406 at [133]; McMahon v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (No 4) [2012] NSWSC 216 at [18] – [33].

434

Evidence Law in Queensland

[83.13]

Introduction

s 83

33

rejection of it. An entry in a book of account is made in the “ordinary course” when those running the business need the entry for their work, whatever it may be.34 [83.10] A company’s annual report to shareholders is an ordinary record. It is in part a book of account, and in part a business record within the meaning of s 92(1)(b).35 Reports to directors and inter-office memoranda were deemed “ordinary” records in Re Marra Developments Ltd.36 [83.11] A document may be a party’s ordinary record although it was compiled by someone else, such as an independent accountant who keeps the books of a small firm.37 A date stamp placed on a shipping document by the customs office has been treated as an ordinary record of the importer: There is nothing … which provides that the entry should have been made by the person or firm … of which the document is a record … [It suffices that] the entry … relates to the trade or business and is made in the course of that business.38

“Undertaking” [83.12] See [3.30]. Clearly this term is wider than the expression “banker” in the former Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1949, which dealt with a particular class of records now admissible under ss 84, 92, 93 and 95 of this Act. Accounting materials from many other businesses and public authorities are now exempt from the hearsay rule. Not all undertakings are “businesses” in the ordinary sense of that word, but numerous non-business entities are “undertakings” for the purposes of s 84 and Pt 6. Thus, public as well as private hospitals are “undertakings”,39 as is the Australian Taxation Office.40 A sports organisation was classified as a business (and “undertaking”) in Mather and Deegan v Morgan.41 A mission station for Aboriginals was treated as both in Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v Western Australia (No 8).42 It is submitted that any entity that is a “trade or business” within the meaning of s 93 is an “undertaking” in the present sense.43 [83.13] The existence of a “business” is a question of fact and degree. “Of all words, the word ‘business’ is notorious for taking its colour and its content from 33. Geoffrey W Hill & Associates (Insurance Brokers) Pty Ltd v Squash Centre (Allawah North) Pty Ltd (1990) 6 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-012. 34. Murphy v Lew [1998] 3 VR 791. 35. Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (Nos 13, 18 and 19) (1988) 14 NSWLR 116. 36. [1979] 2 NSWLR 193. 37. Atra v Farmers & Graziers Co-op Co Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 281 at 288. 38. R v Cook (1980) 71 Cr App R 205 at 212. 39. O’Donnell v Dakin [1966] Tas SR 87; Bates v Nelson (1973) 6 SASR 149; Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542. 40. Re Riggs; Ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (WA) (1986) 9 FCR 149; 17 ATR 366. 41. [1971] Tas SR 192. 42. (2004) 207 ALR 483; [2004] FCA 338. 43. See [93.7]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

435

s 83

Documentary Hearsay

[83.14]

44

its surroundings.” The word usually signifies continuous activity for some commercial purpose, profitable or not.45 However, it is possible for a single transaction to amount to carrying on a business.46 On one view, “trade” and “business” are synonyms,47 but “business” may be a wider concept.48 It includes professional work (when judges are not asked to describe the Bar as such).49 A business was described as “almost anything which is an occupation as distinct from a pleasure” by Lindley LJ,50 who seems to have despaired of translating common parlance into terms of legal art.

“Record” [83.14] The word “record” suggests a degree of permanence, as in tidy files of letters sent and received.51 Collections of incoming and outgoing correspondence are typical “ordinary records”.52 But while a note made for some temporary purpose may not qualify as a record, there are no set standards of permanence.53 It is ultimately a question of practical business requirements.54 An employee’s personal diary, in so far as it dealt with his employer’s business, was a record of the undertaking in Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd v Antico.55 In Ryan v Electricity Trust (SA) (No 2)56 the court demanded no more than “some apparent degree of permanence” in office memoranda. It is relevant to ask whether a purported “record” was made for the use of other people in the organisation.57 In R v Tirado58 it was suggested that an isolated letter to or from 44. Re Australian Industrial Relations Commission; Ex parte Australian Transport Offıcers Federation (1990) 171 CLR 216 at 226 per Mason CJ, Gaudron and McHugh JJ. 45. Re a Debtor [1927] 1 Ch 97; Geddes v Blacktown Municipal Council [1977] 1 NSWLR 683; Lucas v Smith [1948] Tas SR 111 at 113; R v Ali Elhusseini (1988) 33 A Crim R 155 at 159; Hyde v Sullivan (1956) 56 SR (NSW) 113 at 119; Smith v Capewell (1979) 142 CLR 509 at 515; Murphy v Victoria (No 2) (2014) 289 FLR 245; [2014] VSC 404 at [40] –- [41]. 46. Federal Commissioner of Taxation v McDonald (1987) 78 ALR 588; Smith v Anderson (1880) 15 Ch D 247 at 277-278 (“single adventure”). 47. Grainger & Son v Gough [1896] AC 325 at 343. 48. Re a Debtor [1927] 1 Ch 97. 49. Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461 at 538-539; see also Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 381-382 per Dixon J; In re Williams Will Trusts [1953] Ch 138; R v Small Claims Tribunal; Ex parte Gibson [1973] Qd R 490 (dentist not “trader”); Helco Pty Ltd v O’Haire (1990) 28 FCR 230; [1991] ATPR 41-099 at 236 (FCR); 52,576 (ATPR). Contra: Bank of India v Wilson (1877) LR 3 Exch D 108 at 120; Holman v Deol; Macquarie v Higgins [1979] 1 NSWLR 640 at 646. 50. Rolls v Miller (1884) 27 Ch D 71 at 88. 51. Compafina Bank v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [1982] 1 NSWLR 409. 52. Duke Group Ltd (In liq) v Arthur Young (1990) 55 SASR 11; 3 ASCR 420. 53. A document may be a business record, although it is a preparatory draft: Timms v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2003] NSWSC 576; NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority [1999] FCA 1549; Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 216 ALR 320; 191 FLR 385; [2005] NSWSC 417 at [190]. 54. R v Jones (Benjamin) [1978] 1 WLR 195. 55. (1993) 35 NSWLR 588; see also R v Kaplan (2005) 14 VR 673; [2005] VSCA 316 (personal interest irrelevant). 56. (1987) 47 SASR 239 at 246. 57. Ryan v Electricity Trust (SA) (No 2) (1987) 47 SASR 239.

436

Evidence Law in Queensland

[83.16]

Introduction

s 83 59

a third party cannot be a record, but that view is probably too dogmatic. It is possible for a business record to be a record of two different businesses.60 The records of a liquidator are records of the company in liquidation.61 But the mere fact that a document is found in a company’s files does not necessarily mean that it is a record of that company.62

“To record the financial transactions … or … any thing” [83.15] The term “book of account” is not limited to records such as ledger cards,63 receipt books, profit and loss accounts or balance sheets. A company’s documents may be books of account, provided they have some financial character, although company laws do not require them to be kept.64 A bank officer’s diary notes of non-financial matters (covered by the former Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1949 (Imp)) should be tendered under s 92 or s 93 of the Evidence Act 1977, not under s 84.65 But any ordinary record of outgoing or ingoing stock or capital66 comes within the phrase “acquired or otherwise dealt with”, and that phrase is followed by the even wider words: “… any particulars relating to any such thing”.67 A similar “dragnet clause” was held to include a diary kept by a company officer in which he recorded orders placed by the company, the names of suppliers, prices paid and alternative quotations received.68 It is a moot point whether particulars of property “lost” by a business could be evidence against a person accused of stealing it. (Section 84 applies to “all proceedings”.) No doubt the submission would have a difficult passage, if only because his Honour has not previously thought of it.

“Court” [83.16] Section 84 is available in all Queensland courts. Pursuant to ss 83(d) and 88, parties to commercial arbitration may apply to the Supreme Court for access to books of account.

58. (1974) 59 Cr App R 80 at 90. 59. R v Jones (Benjamin) [1978] 1 WLR 195 (bill of lading and cargo manifest); H v Schering Chemicals Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 143 at 146. A file copy of an isolated letter to a particular person was admitted as a company record in Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647; [1984] ATPR 40-483. 60. Southern Equities Corporation Ltd (In liq) v Arthur Anderson (No 10) (2002) 82 SASR 53. 61. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 191 FLR 385; 53 ACSR 752; [2005] NSWSC 417. 62. Ross McConnell Kitchen & Co Pty Ltd (In liq) v Ross (No 1) [1985] 1 NSWLR 233 at 235. 63. R v Mitchell [1971] VR 46. 64. R v Mitchell [1971] VR 46. 65. Distinguish R v Smart [1983] 1 VR 265, which is based on a differently worded definition of “books of account” in the Victorian Act. 66. R v Wilson [1988] VR 673. 67. See the miscellany of records admitted in Re Action Waste Collections Pty Ltd (In liq); Crawford v O’Brien [1981] VR 691. 68. Duncan Davis Pty Ltd v Hurstbridge Abattoirs (Aust) Pty Ltd [1995] 1 VR 279. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

437

s 84

84

Documentary Hearsay

[84.1]

Entries in book of account to be evidence Subject to this division, in all proceedings— (a) an entry in a book of account shall be evidence of the matters, transactions and accounts therein recorded; and (b) a copy of an entry in a book of account shall be evidence of the entry and of the matters, transactions and accounts therein recorded.

[84.1] Section 84 is the operative provision in Pt 5 Div 6, but it depends for its meaning on s 83. [84.2] Section 84 applies to criminal, as well as civil, proceedings. [84.3] Section 84 contains a typical formula for a statutory exception to the hearsay rule: “[It] shall be evidence69 of the matters … therein recorded”. But if s 84 changed the law, it may not have made much difference to everyday practice. In reality, books of account were often admitted at common law.70 [84.4] It is submitted that the expression “matters” in s 84(1) includes an opinion that is part of a book of account, provided that it would be admissible if the author were giving oral evidence.71 [84.5] Section 84 may be used to prove a negative (s 89) and it appears that s 92 may serve the same purpose.72 The common law also allowed evidence of the absence of a record without requiring production of every file in which, if it did exist, it might be found.73 [84.6] In the absence of the record-maker, material admitted under s 84 may be rebutted in accordance with s 94. But the exclusionary discretion in s 98 applies only to material admitted under Pt 6. [84.7] In many cases production of the original document in court would cause inconvenience, which owners (especially non-parties) should be spared whenever possible.74 To that end, s 84(2) gives a verified copy of a book of account the same evidentiary status as the original. Copies of public documents are admitted for the same reason: see [51.2]. Verification of copies is governed by s 86. Section 84 is merely facultative, so that proof of a copy in accordance with the common law is acceptable.75 As to the admissibility of entries in company

69. But not necessarily conclusive evidence: Duke Group Ltd (In liq) v Pilmer (1994) 63 SASR 364 at 380; Ewing International LP v Ausbulk Ltd [2009] SASC 381. 70. Potts v Miller (1940) 64 CLR 282 at 303 per Dixon J; R v Seifert (1955) 73 WN (NSW) 358; Re Montecatini’s Patent (1973) 47 ALJR 161 at 169. 71. See [92.15]; Keys v Salway [2015] NSWSC 613 at [173] – [174]. 72. Ackroyd v Minister for Tourism (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Dowsett J, 24 January 1986). 73. R v Shield (1866) 5 SCR (NSW) 213. 74. Mortimer v M’Callan (1840) 6 M & W 58; 151 ER 320 (Bank of England books not removable); Arnott v Hayes (1887) LR 36 Ch D 731 at 739; see also ss 87 and 90. 75. Bellini v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [1998] ACL Rep 195 (Vic 4).

438

Evidence Law in Queensland

[85.2]

Introduction

s 85 76

records, see s 1305 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). That provision makes them prima facie evidence of their contents, but does not raise a presumption that they are correct.77 85

Proof that book is a book of account

(1) An entry or a copy of an entry in a book of account shall not be admissible in evidence under this division unless it is first proved that the book was at the time of the making of the entry 1 of the ordinary books of account of the undertaking to which it purports to relate and that the entry was made in the usual and ordinary course of that undertaking. (2) Such proof may be given by a responsible person familiar with the books of account of the undertaking and may be given orally or by an affidavit sworn or by a declaration made before a commissioner or person authorised to take affidavits or statutory declarations. [85.1] Books of account do not “prove themselves” simply by production to the court:78 contrast ss 47, 49 and 62. When a tender is made under s 84 or Pt 6, the party concerned should be prepared to show that the material complies with the section relied on.79 The Act provides some assistance in this regard (see s 96), but statements from the Bar table are not evidence.80 [85.2] A book of account may be authenticated by the viva voce evidence of a “responsible person”, by affidavit, or by statutory declaration: s 85(2). If a copy is used, s 86 must also be observed. “It is important not to set the bar too high for the authentication of documents, because if too much is demanded, the authentication requirement will conflict with the liberal policy of the business

76. Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 191 FLR 385; 53 ACSR 752; [2005] NSWSC 417; Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 54 ACSR 28; [2005] NSWSC 471. Section 1305 is an alternative to the business records provisions of the State and Commonwealth Evidence Acts: Rich v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2005) 54 ACSR 365; [2005] NSWCA 233; International Cat Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Rodrick [2010] QSC 30 at [15]. 77. Livingspring Pty Ltd v Kliger Partners (2008) 66 ACSR 455; [2008] VSCA 93; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229. 78. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 191 FLR 385; 53 ACSR 752; [2005] NSWSC 417; National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu (1999) 47 NSWLR 309. 79. Re Koscot Interplanetary (UK) Ltd [1972] 3 All ER 829. 80. Manton v Commonwealth of Australia (1981) 34 ALR 342. A note in (1999) 73 ALJ 724 refers to comments of McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ in a special leave application of Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Woodhams (1999) 10 Leg Rep SL1a: “We wish to make it clear that if a party for special leave wishes to rely on facts to show the importance of consequences of the case beyond what is plain from the record, those facts must be proved by affidavit evidence.” It is otherwise in hearings on sentence, particularly with respect to the accused’s background; facts that are credible and undisputed may be established by statements of counsel: Gumurdul v Reinke (2006) 161 A Crim R 87; [2006] NTSC 27. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

439

s 86

Documentary Hearsay

[86.1]

81

records provisions.” Authentication of a document has nothing to do with weight; it is merely proof that the document is what it purports to be.82 The policy of avoiding unnecessary interference with originals and unnecessary appearances at court is noted at [51.2], [84.7] and [87.1]. A party tendering a book of account has no prima facie duty to call the witness; contrast the position when s 92 is used. However, ss 85(2), 86(2), 87 and 90 are not intended to exempt a witness from attending for cross-examination when that is reasonably required. 86

Verification of copy

(1) A copy of an entry in a book of account shall not be admissible in evidence under this division unless it is further proved that the copy has been examined with the original entry and is correct. (2) Such proof may be given by some person who has examined the copy with the original entry and may be given either orally or by an affidavit sworn or by a declaration made before a commissioner or person authorised to take affidavits or statutory declarations. [86.1] These requirements are additional to those in s 85. Once again, in the absence of a reasonable demand for personal attendance, the evidence required may be given on affidavit or by statutory declaration. [86.2] Similar provisions for the proof of company books appear in s 80 of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth). 87 Matters which may be proved under this division ordinarily to be so proved A person engaged in any undertaking or an employee of that person shall not in any proceeding to which the person is not a party be compellable to produce any book of account the contents of which can be proved under this division or to appear as a witness to prove the matters, transactions and accounts therein recorded unless by order of a court. [87.1] The object of this section is to minimise inconvenience to owners or custodians of books of account who have no personal interest in the proceedings for which their documents are required. The onus is on a party who insists on bringing such a person to court to explain the failure to use ss 85 and 86. In a civil case there may be a penalty in costs: see s 90. Unreasonable burdens of time, expense or invasion of privacy must not be imposed in the course of “non-party” discovery83 and demands made on

81. Aqua-Marine Marketing Pty Ltd v Pacific Reef Fisheries (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 4) (2011) 194 FCR 479; [2011] FCA 578 at [14]. 82. Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 191 FLR 385; 53 ACSR 752; [2005] NSWSC 417. 83. Senior v Holdsworth; Ex parte Independent Television News [1976] QB 23.

440

Evidence Law in Queensland

[88.2]

Introduction

s 88 84

non-parties should be as specific as possible. However, at the trial stage, oral evidence is usually needed, as the documents seldom speak for themselves. 88 Court may order books of account or copies to be made available (1) On the application of any party to a proceeding, a court may order that such party be at liberty to inspect and take copies of or extracts from any entries in a book of account of any undertaking for any of the purposes of such proceeding. (2) An order under this section may be made either with or without summoning the person engaged in the undertaking or any other party and shall be served on the person engaged in the undertaking 3 clear days before the same is to be obeyed unless the court otherwise directs. (3) An order under this section may direct that the person engaged in the undertaking shall, on payment of such fee as is specified in the order, prepare and deliver to the party who obtained that order a duly verified copy of such entries as may be required for evidence in the proceeding. (4) For the purposes of subsection (2), Saturday, Sunday, and any day which is a public holiday throughout the State or in that part of the State in which the order is to be obeyed shall be excluded from the computation of time. (5) Where a person engaged in any undertaking is a party to a proceeding, the other party or parties thereto shall be at liberty to inspect and make copies of or extracts from the original entries and the accounts of which such entries form a part and the documents in respect of which such entries were made as though this division had not been enacted. [88.1] This is a special provision for “non-party discovery” of books of account in civil or criminal proceedings. It recognises that access by means of a subpoena may be too late for proper preparation of a case. When the custodian of the books is a party to the proceedings, inspection is available as of right: s 88(5). When the custodian is not a party, an order may be obtained either ex parte or on notice. An order for payment of expenses may be made: s 88(3). [88.2] In civil proceedings85 there are alternative remedies in Ch 7 Pt 2 of the Uniform Rules of Civil Procedure 1999, and s 134A, gives access to documents held by government and semi-governmental “agencies” without application to a court. Section 88 does not apply to persons outside the State (s 91), but orders may be enforced elsewhere in Australia by means of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth). Section 90 enables an order for costs to be made against a non-party whose conduct is unreasonable.

84. Hall v Alice Springs Veterinary Clinic Pty Ltd (1982) 17 NTR 13; Rossi Pty Ltd v Ballymore Tower Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 167. 85. Ex parte Rousseaux [1983] 1 Qd R 391. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

441

s 89

Documentary Hearsay

[88.3] 86

[88.3] Section 88 is subject to the law against “fishing” – that is, rummaging through another person’s records in the random hope of finding a cause of action or a defence for which there is, so far, no supporting evidence. Or in more colourful terms: “A person who has no evidence that fish of a particular kind are in a pool is desirous to be at liberty to drag it for the purpose of finding out whether there are any there or not.”87 [88.4] Books of account and other records of companies may be inspected under s 1300 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Entries in such documents are admissible in any proceeding as prima facie evidence of the matters recorded88 and may satisfy the criminal standard of proof.89 89

Proof that a person has no account

(1) Where it is sought to prove for the purposes of a proceeding that a person did not at a given time have an account with an undertaking or with any branch thereof, evidence of the fact may be given by a responsible person familiar with the books of account of the undertaking or, as the case may be, of the branch thereof. (2) Such evidence may be given by such person orally or by an affidavit sworn or by a declaration made before a commissioner or person authorised to take affidavits or statutory declarations. [89.1] Generally silence is no proof one way or the other,90 but s 89 enables a book of account to “prove a negative”. For example, s 89 might be used to prove that a defendant had no honest and reasonable belief that there were funds available to meet a cheque, or that a suspected thief, who claims to have purchased the stolen property from “X”, had no dealing with “X” at any material time.

86. Hennessy v Wright (No 2) (1882) 24 QBD 445 at 448. 87. Associated Dominions Assurance Society Pty Ltd v John Fairfax and Sons Ltd (1952) 72 WN (NSW) 250 per Owen J. 88. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 1305; Livingspring Pty Ltd v Kliger Partners (2008) 66 ACSR 455; [2008] VSCA 93; McAdam v Chylos Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 161 at [17] (“matters” not “transactions”). 89. Stonehouse v Strickland [1981] Tas R 359. 90. Commissioner for Motor Transport v Collier-Moat Ltd (1960) 60 SR (NSW) 238 at 243. But see also [84.5].

442

Evidence Law in Queensland

[91.1]

90

Part 6 – Admissibility of statements and representations

s 92

Costs

(1) The costs of any application to a court under or for the purposes of this division and the costs of anything done or to be done under an order of a court made under or for the purposes of this division shall be in the discretion of the court, who may order the same or any part thereof to be paid to any party by the person engaged in the undertaking concerned where the same have been occasioned by any default or delay on the part of that person. (2) Any such order against a person engaged in an undertaking may be enforced as if the person were a party to the proceeding. [90.1] Orders for costs are normally confined to civil proceedings, but with respect to criminal charges tried summarily, see Latoudis v Casey.91 Costs in civil proceedings are at the discretion of the court, but normally follow the event.92 Special costs orders may be made to reflect the court’s disapproval of dishonest, obstructive or wasteful tactics.93 [90.2] 91

Section 90(2) appears to authorise a “lifting of the corporate veil”.

Application of ss 84–86 and 89

Sections 84 to 86 and 89 shall apply to and in relation to books of account and persons engaged in undertakings in any State or Territory. [91.1] Material generated or held outside Queensland is admissible provided that it conforms to the law of evidence in that jurisdiction. By implication, however, ss 87, 88 and 90 do not apply to parties or other persons outside Queensland.

Part 6 – Admissibility of statements and representations 92

Admissibility of documentary evidence as to facts in issue

(1) In any proceeding (not being a criminal proceeding) where direct oral evidence of a fact would be admissible, any statement contained in a document and tending to establish that fact shall, subject to this part, be admissible as evidence of that fact if— (a) the maker of the statement had personal knowledge of the matters dealt with by the statement, and is called as a witness in the proceeding; or

91. (1990) 170 CLR 534. 92. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 689. 93. Huxley v West London Extension Railway (1889) 17 QBD 373; Schweppes Ltd v O’Connor [1913] QSR 289; Degman Pty Ltd (In liq) v Wright (No 2) [1983] 2 NSWLR 354; Vink v Tuckwell (No 3) (2008) 67 ACSR 547; [2008] VSC 316; see also s 87. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

443

s 92

Documentary Hearsay

(b)

[92.1]

the document is or forms part of a record relating to any undertaking and made in the course of that undertaking from information supplied (whether directly or indirectly) by persons who had, or may reasonably be supposed to have had, personal knowledge of the matters dealt with in the information they supplied, and the person who supplied the information recorded in the statement in question is called as a witness in the proceeding.

(2) The condition in subsection (1) that the maker of the statement or the person who supplied the information, as the case may be, be called as a witness need not be satisfied where— (a) the maker or supplier is dead, or unfit by reason of bodily or mental condition to attend as a witness; or (b) the maker or supplier is out of the State and it is not reasonably practicable to secure the attendance of the maker or supplier; or (c) the maker or supplier can not with reasonable diligence be found or identified; or (d) it can not reasonably be supposed (having regard to the time which has elapsed since the maker or supplier made the statement, or supplied the information, and to all the circumstances) that the maker or supplier would have any recollection of the matters dealt with by the statement the maker made or in the information the supplier supplied; or (e) no party to the proceeding who would have the right to cross-examine the maker or supplier requires the maker or supplier being called as a witness; or (f) at any stage of the proceeding it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, undue delay or expense would be caused by calling the maker or supplier as a witness. [Subs (2) am Act 58 of 2000, s 2 and Sch]

(3) The court may act on hearsay evidence for the purpose of deciding any of the matters mentioned in subsection (2)(a), (b), (c), (d) or (f). (4) For the purposes of this part, a statement contained in a document is made by a person if— (a) it was written, made, dictated or otherwise produced by the person; or (b) it was recorded with the person’s knowledge; or (c) it was recorded in the course of and ancillary to a proceeding; or (d) it was recognised by the person as the person’s statement by signing, initialling or otherwise in writing. [S 92 am Act 58 of 2000]

Introduction [92.1] What we perceive, if not recorded, can only be retrieved by memory – a notoriously fallible process. [H]uman memory of what was said in a conversation is fallible for a variety of reasons, and ordinarily the degree of fallibility increases with the passage of time, particularly 444

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where disputes or litigation intervene, and the processes of memory are overlaid, often subconsciously, by perceptions or self-interest as well as conscious consideration of what should have been said or could have been said. All too often what is actually remembered is little more than an impression from which plausible details are then, again often subconsciously, constructed. All this is a matter of ordinary human experience.94

On the other hand, what we write down or otherwise record may be considered, reconsidered and recalled in its original form. There is tension between the hearsay rule and practical reasons for creating exceptions to it.95 The common law applied the hearsay rule to all extra-curial statements, oral or documentary, with relatively few (and usually narrow) exceptions. A witness could always be asked for his recollection of an event years ago, although he made no note of it at the time and was asked to recall it just a few days ago. But he could not tender a note made five minutes after the event, although it would almost certainly be more reliable than memory. Part 6 of this Act acknowledges that argument. The forerunner to s 92 was England’s Evidence Act 1938, based on the 1931 report of the Maugham Committee.96 It took seven years to become law in England and another 24 years to arrive in Queensland. The English Act was criticised as a timid, “nibbling” attempt at reform,97 but any bolder measure, and the consequent restriction of cross-examination – “one of the great virtues of our legal system”98 – may well have been defeated by lawyers in Parliament. [92.2] The Maugham Committee was influenced by difficulties created by the hearsay rule in commercial causes with international ramifications. But s 92 often serves more mundane purposes, as when a vital witness is unavailable in a personal injury case.99 [92.3] In 1962 the substance of the 1938 English Act became ss 42A – 42C of the Evidence and Discovery Act 1867. Modest as the changes were, it was considered politic to include the placebos that are reproduced in ss 98, 99 and 102. Occasionally, an atavistic judge has to be reminded that s 98 is not a licence for judicial repeal of Pt 6.100

Improvements since 1962 [92.4] The 1962 amendments to the Evidence and Discovery Act 1867 catered for civil cases only. There was no counterpart of s 93 and, naturally, nothing 94. Watson v Foxman (1995) 49 NSWLR 315 at 319 per McLelland CJ in Eq. 95. Tapper, “Hearsay in Criminal Cases: An Overview of Law Commission Report No 245” [1997] Crim LR 771 at 772. 96. For comments by Lord Maugham LC on his reform, see (1939) 17 Can Bar Rev at 481. 97. Wright, “The Law of Evidence: Present and Future” (1942) 20 Can Bar Rev 714 at 718. 98. Evon and Evon v Noble [1949] 1 KB 222 at 225 per Birkett J. 99. Jarman v Lambert and Cooke Contractors [1951] 2 KB 937 at 947 per Denning J; McKay v Hutchins [1990] 1 Qd R 533. Two cases in which leave to proceed was given on the ground that s 92 would prevent any prejudice resulting from delay are: Cain v MBP Industries Pty Ltd (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Ryan J, 21 August 1992); and Driscoll v Minister for Education (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Ambrose J, 17 October 1986). 100. Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542 at 571. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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about computers. The ancillary provisions were less elaborate than the present ss 94 and 96 – 102. Instead of explicit “business records” provisions, the former Act spoke of records made “in the performance of a duty to record information”, and they had to be a “continuous record”.101 Further, a document was not “made” by a person unless it was “written … with his own hand, or … signed or initialled by him or otherwise recognised by him in writing”.102 Courts chafing at these restrictions produced some highly artificial case law.103 The definition of the “maker” of a statement is now more liberal: see [92.37]. Section 92B is a significant departure not only from the common law but also from the original Pt 6, which dealt almost exclusively with documentary hearsay.104 There is now a wide discretion, in civil cases, to allow any document to be proved, if it be a fact in issue, “in any way the court directs”.105 In Plumley v Moroney106 consideration was given to adducing the plaintiff’s evidence in chief in a s 92 document.

Two kinds of statement: section 92 [92.5] Section 92 admits two distinct kinds of records in civil107 proceedings: (i) statements conveying first-hand knowledge of the maker, whether they are business records or not; and (ii) statements recorded in the ordinary course of an “undertaking”. Some documents satisfy both tests: a business record setting out the personal experience of the statement-maker is admissible under s 92(1)(a) and (b). Proceedings under the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offences) Act 2003 are civil proceedings for present purposes.108 [92.6] In each case there is a prima facie duty to make the “source” available for cross-examination:109 see [92.34]. [92.7] The party tendering the document bears the onus of proving its authenticity and compliance with the legislation that is said to exempt it from the hearsay rule: see [85.1].

101. Berjak (Victoria) Pty Ltd v Peerless Processing Co Pty Ltd [1963] VR 515; Newton v Pieper (1968) 86 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 404; [1968] 1 NSWR 42. (“Ordinariness” was not necessarily sufficient.) 102. Evidence and Discovery Act 1867, s 42B(3) (repealed). 103. Goodman v J Eban Ltd [1954] 1 QB 550; Re Powe [1956] P 110; Stanfield v Rosin [1966] Qd R 10. 104. Minor exceptions to this generalisation were allowed by ss 94 and 101. 105. See s 129A, inserted by the Civil Proceedings Act 2011, s 146. 106. [2014] QSC 3. 107. Section 92 applies to prosecutions under the Customs Act 1901 as civil procedure is used in such cases: Chief Executive Offıcer of Customs v Labrador Liquor Wholesale Pty Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 161; [2003] HCA 49; Bryce v Chief Executive Offıcer of Customs (No 2) (2010) 199 A Crim R 542; [2010] QSC 125 at [29]. 108. Attorney-General (Qld) v Marama [2015] QSC 8. 109. Plumley v Moroney [2014] QSC 3 at [47].

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Section 92(1)(a): a document with first-hand hearsay [92.8] Generally “first-hand hearsay” is no better than second- or third-hand material.110 But where oral evidence of a fact would be admissible, a statement in a document asserting that fact as personal knowledge of the statement-maker is admissible to prove the fact. At common law such a document was generally inadmissible, even if the “source” were called to verify it, because a prior consistent statement could not be adduced in chief.111 In Carlyon v Town and Country Pubs No 2 Pty Ltd t/a Queens Hotel Gladstone112 a witness watched a video recording and immediately made notes of its contents. At the time of trial the video was unavailable; the notes were admitted under s 92(1)(a). [92.9] In deciding whether the statement-maker is a person with direct knowledge of the facts recorded, due attention should be paid to the wide definition of “maker” in s 92(4): see [92.37]. Courts generally tried to apply the 1962 provisions liberally, but if Re Hennesseys Self-Service Stores Pty Ltd (In liq)113 had been decided under the present Act, it would have been much easier for Gibbs J to conclude that the maker of stocktaking records was recording personal knowledge. It would also have been simpler, in Curley v Duff,114 to admit the affidavit of a witness who died before the hearing.115 Usually the form and contents of the document, and the circumstances in which it was made enable an inference of personal knowledge to be drawn.116

Section 92(1)(b): business records in civil cases [92.10] Where direct oral evidence of a fact would be admissible, the fact may be proved by tendering an ordinary record of an undertaking in which it is asserted. It is not essential that the compiler of the record have personal knowledge of the fact; it suffices that the information was supplied (directly or indirectly) by someone reasonably supposed to have personal knowledge of it. The information might have been third-hand by the time it is recorded and, in practice, the “source” is often unavailable or unidentifiable by the time the statement is tendered. The original witness need not be connected with the business in question.117 [92.11] The implications of s 92(1)(b) are considered in H v Schering Chemicals Ltd.118 110. Phipson on Evidence (13th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1982), p 329; Cross on Evidence (4th Aust ed, Butterworths, 1991), p 800 (departing from the 2nd ed at p 456). 111. Bamfield v Massey (1808) 1 Camp 460; 170 ER 1021 at 461 (Camp); R v Turner [1975] QB 834 at 842; R v Roberts [1942] 1 All ER 187 at 191; R v Livingstone [1987] 1 Qd R 38. 112. [2015] QSC 13. 113. [1965] Qd R 576. 114. [1985] 2 NSWLR 716. 115. See s 92(1)(a); and cf Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 439(5). 116. McKay v Hutchins and Fire and All Risks Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 1 Qd R 533; Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (Nos 15 and 16) (1988) 14 NSWLR 107; Beamish v The Queen [2005] WASCA 62 at [178]. 117. The same applies to s 69(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth): Vitali v Stachnik [2001] NSWSC 303 at [8]. 118. [1983] 1 WLR 143 at 146. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[92.12]

Terms used in section 92(1) “Where direct oral evidence … would be admissible” [92.12] In the terminology of evidence, “direct” has two different meanings. In a discussion of relevance, it refers to immediate evidence of a fact in issue, as distinct from circumstantial material. But in the present sense it means evidence that is based on personal experience, as distinct from hearsay. The relevance of the information recorded may be either direct or circumstantial, provided that the original observer, if present in court, would be recalling his or her own experience. [92.13] The point of the opening words of s 92 is that it is only a dispensation from the hearsay rule, not an exemption from any other rule of evidence that may be pertinent.119 It does not enable evidence to be adduced in spite of privilege,120 or contrary to the “character” evidence rule,121 or about some matter of opinion (such as a legal proposition)122 that the “source” would not be qualified to express in person.123 Information need not be in narrative form [92.14] Witnesses testifying in person must normally give evidence in what grammarians call the “indicative” or narrative mood, not in the form of questions or commands. On the strictest interpretation of the phrase “where direct oral evidence would be admissible”, it might be held that “Part 6 hearsay” must also be in narrative form.124 But the proper approach is less pedantic. If relevant information can be gleaned from a document, its grammatical form is immaterial.125 In Lenehan v Queensland Trustees Ltd126 the ownership of certain cattle was in issue. A letter written by the deceased – the alleged owner – included this imperative: “Take those cattle to town and sell them.” Hart J treated this as equivalent to a narrative statement: “Those cattle are mine.” A statement in a will was accepted as proof of the facts there asserted in Manly v Public Trustee of Queensland.127

119. Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352; [2011] HCA 36 (provision allowing documentary hearsay not an exemption from a separate and special rule requiring personal knowledge). 120. White v Venus [1968] SASR 83; Carusi v Housing Commission [1973] VR 215. 121. Makin v Attorney-General for New South Wales [1894] AC 57 at 65; see also [A.134]. 122. Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647; [1984] ATPR 40-483. 123. R v Barker [1976] Tas SR 52 (lawyer’s opinion as to client’s psychiatric condition). A portion of the statement in McKay v Hutchins [1990] 1 Qd R 533 was excluded for this reason. 124. Tobias v Allen (No 2) [1957] VR 221. 125. Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (Nos 15 and 16) (1988) 14 NSWLR 107 at 114. 126. [1965] Qd R 559; Keys v Salway [2015] NSWSC 613 at [173] – [174]. 127. [2007] QSC 388.

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s 92

“Fact” includes certain opinions [92.15] Section 92 is a remedial provision, and remedial legislation should be liberally interpreted.128 Accordingly, it has been held that “evidence of a fact” includes the expression of an opinion, provided that is it one that the witness would be qualified to express in person, for example the medical opinion of a qualified physician,129 or a financial assessment by a company liquidator.130 Also admissible is an opinion to which a non-expert may testify, such as evidence of identity or personal ownership.131 In Baker v Affoo132 a declaration by a testator, which would merely have been “state of mind” evidence at common law,133 became evidence of fact by virtue of s 92. But the word “fact” does not include a legal opinion134 or a conclusion from facts not disclosed.135 [92.16] Rules governing expert evidence, including the “basis rule”, are noted at [A.67]. An opinion in a document may be inadmissible if the “maker” had no personal knowledge of the facts on which it is based. This difficulty may be overcome by calling a witness with personal knowledge of those facts, or tendering another (admissible) document recording them. “In a document” [92.17] For the meaning of “document”, see [3.11] and [83.6]. It need not be a document made in Queensland.136 Taylor v Taylor137 dealt with a transcript of evidence admissible under a provision similar to s 92. Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Boothby138 concerned a mortgage. While it is generally correct to describe Pt 6 as a set of rules for documents, it does make some oral hearsay evidence admissible: see [93B.1], [94.6] and [101.13]. Queensland has not yet adopted the wider provisions for oral hearsay in England’s Civil Evidence Act 1968 and the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth),139 but see s 129A. 128. Jarman v Lambert and Cooke Contractors [1951] 2 KB 937; Lenehan v Queensland Trustees Ltd [1965] Qd R 559; Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542. 129. Warner v The Women’s Hospital [1954] VLR 410; Dass v Masih [1968] 1 WLR 756; 2 All ER 226 (expert opinion on handwriting); Mansour v Standard Telephones and Cables Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 205; Thiess Properties Pty Ltd v Ipswich Hospitals Board [1985] 2 Qd R 318; Strodder v Minh Ngoi Le [2000] QSC 239 at [6]. 130. Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 191 FLR 385; 53 ACSR 752; [2005] NSWSC 417; Forbes Engineering (Asia) Pte Ltd v Forbes (No 4) [2009] FCA 675 (auditor’s report). 131. Lenehan v Queensland Trustees Ltd [1965] Qd R 559 (identification of deceased person’s property). Lenehan was followed on this point in Morley v National Insurance Co [1967] VR 566. See generally [A.77]. 132. [2014] QSC 46 at [52]. 133. Hughes v National Trustees, Executors & Agency Co of A/asia Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 134 at 152. 134. Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647; [1984] ATPR 40-483 at 650 (ALR). 135. Gilchrist v Pine Grove Memorial Park Ltd [1968] SR (NSW) 270 at 284. 136. Section 91; see also R v Ernst [1984] VR 593. 137. [1970] 1 WLR 1148. 138. [2015] QCA 204. 139. The Commonwealth provisions are considered at [F.38]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[92.18]

“Tending to establish” a fact [92.18] The phrase “tending to establish” indicates that circumstantial, as well as directly relevant evidence may be admissible. Evidence is circumstantially relevant if, on its own, or in combination with other facts proved or to be proved,140 and considered in the light of “the common course of human affairs”, it tends to resolve an ultimate issue.141 “Shall … be admissible as evidence of that fact” [92.19] These are the operative words making hearsay of the specified kinds admissible as evidence of the facts asserted. If a statement in a document is tendered as original evidence or for another purpose, there is no need to rely on Pt 6 or any common law exception to the hearsay rule: see [A.143] and [83.2]. “Maker of the statement” [92.20] [92.37].

This expression governs s 92 and other substantive sections in Pt 6: see

“If … [it] is, or forms part of a record” [92.21] This phrase introduces s 92(1)(b). The expression “record” is considered in [83.14]. “Undertaking” [92.22]

See [3.30] and [83.12].

“In the course of that undertaking” [92.23] Once again, “ordinariness” is the touchstone of reliability, and the rationale for these exceptions to the hearsay rule: see [83.7] – [83.11]. The expression “that undertaking” makes it clear that “ordinariness” depends on the practices of the undertaking in question, not on generalisations about organisations of that type. The records of a company liquidator relating to X Ltd (in liq) are records of that company.142 Nice questions may be raised about the “ordinariness” of hospital records containing information more pertinent to legal liability than to medical diagnosis or treatment, such as a detailed description of a traffic accident. However, the connection between evidence of contributory negligence and medical data was sufficient for admission of the hospital record in Mendola v Warren.143 If a record tendered in a civil case is not “ordinary”, it may be possible to show that it was dictated by an eyewitness or that the witness was aware that his or her statement was being recorded, thus making it admissible by virtue of s 92(1)(a) and (4): see [92.38]. 140. A point on which the court may provisionally accept counsel’s assurance. 141. Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 at 375; Re a Petition by Fritz Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 194. For an example of circumstantial facts not sufficiently relevant, see R v Stephenson [1976] VR 376. 142. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 191 FLR 385; 53 ACSR 752; [2005] NSWSC 417. 143. [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-240 (“involved in motor vehicle accident tonight after drinking (approx) 15 cans of beer”).

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“The person who supplied the information … is called” [92.24] There is a prima facie duty144 to call the original witness, namely the prime source of information contained in a s 92 document. When the document is a business record, that person will often not be the one who physically compiled it. [92.25] Information recorded automatically by a petrol pump and later printed out by a service station employee did not emanate from a “person”, according to two English decisions,145 but it is doubtful whether they are applicable to the present Act:146 see also [95.6].

Section 92 and prior consistent statements [92.26] Generally a witness may not accredit himself by testifying in chief that he has told the same story before,147 but s 92 enables a witness who has personal knowledge of facts recorded in a document made by him, and who is available to give oral evidence of them, to bypass that rule.148 Thus, a possibly unintended consequence of s 92 creates an exception not only to hearsay, but also to the rule against self-accreditation.149 (No such result flows from s 93: see [93.3].) The prior statement may be relied on if the witness does appear, but fails to “come up to proof”.150

Section 92(2): excuses for absence of the “source” [92.27] Both s 92(1)(a) and (b) impose a prima facie duty to present the “source” for cross-examination. No satisfactory explanation for the witness’s absence was given in Emanuel Management Pty Ltd v Fosters Brewing Group Ltd.151 But in many cases, especially those governed by s 92(1)(b), presentation of the source is impossible, as the legislation recognises. Nevertheless, the absence of cross-examination may reduce the weight of the evidence: Attorney-General (Qld) v Marama.152 Valid excuses for the absence of witnesses in civil cases are set out in s 92(2)(a) – (f). Hearsay evidence may be used to establish them: s 92(3). Section 93 has its own list of excuses. 144. Not discharged or properly excused in Hillier v Lucas (2000) 81 SASR 451. 145. R v Wiles [1982] Crim LR 669; see also R v Pettigrew (1980) 71 Cr App R 39 (automatic bank teller). 146. R v Wood (1982) 76 Cr App R 23 at 28; R v Ewing [1983] QB 1039; 2 All ER 645. 147. This rule does not prevent a witness from using notes to “refresh memory”: Dairy Farmers Co-operative Milk Co Ltd v Acquilina (1963) 109 CLR 458. 148. Shepherd v Shepherd [1954] VLR 514; Argus LR 899 at 903 per Scholl J; Orr v University of Tasmania (unreported, Tas Sup Ct, Green J, 19 November 1956) p 20 (appeal dismissed (1957) 100 CLR 526); Cartwright v Richardson & Co [1955] 1 WLR 340; Hilton v Lancashire Dynamo Nevelin Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 952; Re Hennesseys Self-Service Stores Pty Ltd (In liq) [1965] Qd R 576; Thiess Properties Pty Ltd v Ipswich Hospitals Board [1985] 2 Qd R 318 (expert opinion). 149. But subject to s 100. 150. Harvey v Smith Wood [1964] 2 QB 171; Nominal Defendant v Owens (1978) 45 FLR 430; 22 ALR 128. 151. (2003) 178 FLR 1; [2003] QSC 205. 152. [2015] QSC 8. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Witness dead or seriously ill [92.28] Evidence of illness153 may be in the form of a document purporting to be a medical certificate: s 96(2). It need not be verified on oath, but if a dispute is likely, that would be a prudent step to take. In deciding whether the witness is absent for a sufficient reason, the court may act on hearsay (see s 92(3)), but not on unilateral statements from the Bar table.154 The more important a matter sought to be proved by documentary hearsay, the more important it is to offer cogent evidence that the “source” is absent for a reason recognised in s 92(2),155 particularly when credit is in issue.156 A “staged” approach was adopted in Plumley v Moroney.157 Although the witness suffered from a degree of psychiatric illness, it was decided to identify topics on which she might give evidence on affidavit, and those on which her oral evidence would be required. [92.29] If a witness dies before the hearing, a pre-trial statement may be admissible at common law as a statement against interest, a statement made under a legal duty, a statement as to public or general rights, a declaration as to pedigree, or a statement by a deceased testator about the contents of a will: see [83.3] and [103.1], as well as s 92(2)(a).158 Witness outside the State and impractical to call [92.30] Mere absence from the State does not establish this excuse, although in some cases it may be relevant to s 92(2)(c) or (f). A party relying on this excuse must also show that it is not reasonably practicable to call the witness. “Practicability” relates to the difficulty of locating the witness, the importance of the evidence, the cost and inconvenience of personal attendance and any undue delay in bringing the matter to trial: s 92(2)(f). Cost and inconvenience were not given due weight in In the Marriage of Bell.159 But in Cullis v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd160 the court rejected a suggestion that a party to a personal injury case should bring a witness from Denmark to Perth instead of using a provision similar to s 92. (Audio and video links were not available at that time.) More colourful in fact as well as name is Wombat 153. Constantinou v Ansett Australia Ltd [2004] QSC 419 (medical report). 154. Manton v Commonwealth of Australia (1981) 34 ALR 342. See Note in (1999) 73 ALJ 724: refers to comments of McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ in a special leave application of Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Woodhams (1999) 10 Leg Rep SL1a: “We wish to make it clear that if a party for special leave wishes to rely on facts to show the importance of consequences of the case beyond what is plain from the record, those facts must be proved by affidavit evidence.” 155. Downs Irrigation Co-operative Association Ltd v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (No 2) [1983] 1 Qd R 475 at 481-482. 156. As when an order for evidence on commission is sought: Lawson v Vacuum Brake Co (1884) 27 Ch D 137; see also [22.15]. 157. [2014] QSC 3. 158. Applied in Fick v Groves [2010] QSC 89; Barker v Linklater [2007] QSC 125. 159. [1993] FLC 92-347. 160. [1970] WAR 170.

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161

Nominees Pty Ltd v De Tullio, where it was “impracticable” to call a witness who breached the conditions of his parole and fled to Italy. The Wombat court observed that s 92(2) is for the benefit of parties; if it also suits the witness, that is incidental. [92.31] Statements by witnesses residing overseas were admitted in Mericka v Mericka,162 Galler v Galler163 and Re Constantine deceased164 (evidence of foreign law). It appears that in Galler and in Edmonds v Edmonds165 the statements were prepared especially for the case in hand. But when the evidence of an absent witness is vital, and credit is a major issue, failure to obtain the evidence on commission, or by audio or video link, may greatly reduce its weight.166 Witness unable to be contacted or identified [92.32] “Reasonable diligence”, like “illness” and “practicability”, is a matter of degree and proportion, having regard to the importance of the evidence, the amount at stake, and other relevant circumstances. Hearsay evidence of inquiries is admissible: s 92(3). This excuse will often be appropriate when material is tendered under s 92(1)(b), particularly when the source of the information is unidentified, or the record was made long ago.167 But in Longhurst v Hunt168 there was no evidence that every reasonable effort to find the witness had been made. A better effort to contact an expert witness was expected in Caterpillar Inc v John Deere Ltd (No 2).169 Section 92 may be applied when the witness successfully evades service of a subpoena.170 Cannot be supposed to remember [92.33] This excuse will often apply to witnesses such as doctors,171 police officers or government inspectors who compile many reports in the course of their duties.172 The absence of an available witness may be excused on this ground. The Justice and Other Legislation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2000 amended s 92(2)(d) by altering the words “by the statement the maker or supplier made or 161. (1990) 98 ALR 307. 162. [1954] SASR 74. 163. [1955] 1 WLR 400. 164. [1960] SASR 19. 165. [1947] P 67. 166. Ozzard-Low v Ozzard-Low and Wonham [1953] P 272. 167. Lewis v Strickland [2003] QSC 395; Richards v Sandy Cape Deep Sea Fishing Club Inc [2003] QCA 30; Schmidt v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd [2009] QSC 106. 168. (2004) 42 MVR 267; [2004] NSWCA 91; contrast Freeleagus v Nominal Defendant (2007) 47 MVR 491; [2007] QCA 116 at [7]. 169. (2000) 181 ALR 108. 170. McLellan v Queensland Rail [2001] QDC 58. 171. Luck v Civil Mining and Construction Pty Ltd [2009] QSC 413 at [30]. 172. See, eg, Reed v Columbia Fur Dressers and Dyers [1965] 1 WLR 13; Maddern v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd [2002] QSC 275. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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in the information the maker or supplier supplied” to read “by the statement the maker made or in the information the supplier supplied”. Not wanted for cross-examination [92.34] Inevitably Pt 6 impinges on the cherished right of cross-examination. Section 92(2) seeks to minimise this result, but if cross-examination is not required, the problem does not arise. Therefore, s 92(2)(e) is not so much a ground of exemption as an instance of evidence tendered by consent. Undue delay or expense [92.35] The decision in Cullis v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd173 is explicable on this ground. The apparent intention is to prevent the phrase “not reasonably practicable”, in s 92(2)(b), from being given too strict a meaning. This ground overlaps excuses (b) and (c): see [92.30] – [92.32]. It is not available in criminal proceedings: compare s 93(1)(b). In Modern Merchandising Pty Ltd v Brown174 a party who originally raised no objection to a document tendered under s 92 later demanded that the witness be called. Noting that the statement was supported by other evidence, White J applied the “delay and expense” clause and rejected the demand. Submissions of undue expense invite a comparison of the cost of producing the witness with the value of what is at stake, and the importance of the evidence the witness appears able to give.175

Section 92(3): hearsay in aid of section 92 [92.36] Documentary hearsay may be made admissible by other hearsay – oral or documentary – tendered on a voir dire. This does not include hearsay from the Bar table176 but it may include hearsay in a solicitor’s affidavit claiming “impracticability” within the meaning of s 92(2)(b), “reasonable diligence” under s 92(2)(c) or “undue expense” under s 92(2)(f). See also s 96(2) with respect to medical certificates. It applies to criminal and civil proceedings, but the concession in s 92(3) applies only to a tender made under s 92.

Section 92(4): “makers” of statements [92.37] It is important to note that s 92(4) is not limited to s 92. It serves all “the purposes of this Part”, and would, therefore, be better placed in a separate section. For the purposes of s 92(1)(a), the “maker” is the person with first-hand knowledge of the facts recorded, not necessarily the maker of the physical record.177 The statement of a client may be found in a solicitor’s conference 173. [1970] WAR 170; cf [92.30]. 174. [1998] QSC 69. 175. Wilson v Mitchell (No 2) [2014] VSC 332 at [19]; Caterpillar Inc v John Deere Ltd (No 2) (2000) 181 ALR 108; [2000] FCA 1903 at [25]. 176. Manton v Commonwealth (1981) 34 ALR 342. 177. R v Griffın [1998] 1 Qd R 659; [1997] QCA 115; Kenny v Nominal Defendant [2007] QCA 185 (statement dictated to police).

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notes. For the purposes of s 92(1)(b), a statement-maker is a person who records his or her own knowledge (as in a family business) or who supplies personal knowledge directly or indirectly to another person, who then records it in the ordinary course of an “undertaking”. [92.38] The provisions of s 92(4) are a considerable improvement upon the previous legislation: see [92.4]. Adoption of a statement in writing is now merely one way of “making” it.179 When “writing” or signing is relied upon, a facsimile stamp suffices.180 Prima facie a person who signs a statement is taken to have read it and accepted the contents as correct.181 In the absence of non est factum, mistake, misrepresentation or duress, evidence of subjective intention is neither necessary nor admissible before a document signed by a party takes effect.182 One can also make a statement by dictating it to a shorthand writer or amanuensis, or into a tape recorder. It is possible to “make” a statement without dictating it verbatim, provided that it is recorded with the speaker’s knowledge – for example when a doctor notes a patient’s “history”, or a police officer interviews a witness to an accident183 or a solicitor takes a client’s instructions.184 In an egregious case, facts narrated in a “ghost written” biography were admitted under a provision similar to s 92(1)(a), upon proof that years earlier the author had signed a preface attached to the original manuscript.185 In Duke Group Ltd (In liq) v Arthur Young186 a transcript of an examination of a company officer was admitted as a record made “by or at the direction of the witness”. It is submitted that under the present Act such a document would be one dictated by the witness, or at least “recorded with [the witness’s] knowledge”, within the meaning of s 92(4). Evidence of a deceased witness, recorded in earlier proceedings, was admitted in Rodgers v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd.187 The wording of s 92(4) is calculated to overcome such decisions as Barkway v South Wales Transport Co Ltd188 (where a statement was held to be made to the

178. Nominal Defendant v Chaffey (2011) 58 MVR 1; [2011] QSC 88. 179. In this respect the legislation applied by Gibbs J in Re Hennesseys Self-Service Stores Pty Ltd (In liq) [1965] Qd R 576 at 580 was much narrower. 180. Goodman v J Eban Ltd [1954] 1 QB 550; Rivers v Fuller; Ex parte Rivers [1977] Qd R 97. A requirement for a signature may be satisfied by virtue of the Electronic Transactions (Queensland) Act 2001; Stellard Pty Ltd v North Queensland Fuel Pty Ltd [2015] QSC 119; Claremont 24-7 Pty Ltd v Invox Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] WASC 220. 181. Vocisano v Vocisano (1974) 130 CLR 267. 182. Forrest v Cosmetic Co Pty Ltd (2008) 218 FLR 109; [2008] SASC 152. 183. McKay v Hutchins [1990] 1 Qd R 533. 184. R v Calabria (1982) 31 SASR 423. 185. Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (Nos 15 and 16) (1988) 14 NSWLR 107. 186. (1990) 54 SASR 498; 3 ACSR 147; Southern Equities Corporation Ltd v Bond (No 2) (2001) 78 SASR 554. 187. [2009] QSC 86; see also Chivers v Gold Coast City Council [2010] QSC 98 at [37]. 188. [1949] 1 KB 54. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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court, not to the shorthand writer) and Newton v Pieper, which failed a “continuous record” test then contained in the Queensland and New South Wales legislation. [92.39] As indicated at [92.38], a statement tendered under s 92(1)(a) may be “made” by one person although it is physically produced by another.190 This point could be useful in a case where, if the actual writer was regarded as the “maker”, the statement would be neither first-hand hearsay nor a business record. Take, for example, the case where a hospital doctor includes in his or her clinical notes a detailed account of how an accident occurred, and this part of the document is not an ordinary record of the hospital. If it is shown that the material was dictated to the doctor by an eyewitness (or that the latter knew that the doctor was writing it down), the statement would be admissible under s 92(1)(a), which has no “ordinary course” requirement.191

Belief required [92.40] The maker of a s 92(1)(b) statement must believe that the information received is true. In Munro Machinery Pty Ltd v Scrap Metal Co of Australia Ltd192 a police officer recorded a witness’s statement with the reservation that it might well be incorrect.

Statements in “proceedings” [92.41] The reference in s 92(4) to a statement made “in the course of … a proceeding” embodies judicial decisions on an earlier version of this legislation.193 The transcript of a party’s examination under the Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 became evidence under s 94 in Queensland v Brooks.194 The corresponding common law rule is relatively narrow and technical.195 For a discussion of when it is fair to receive evidence of this kind, see Wily v Lo Presti.196

Inadmissible parts [92.42] When part of a statement is admissible under s 92 it does not necessarily follow that everything in the document is admissible, even if it is relevant. Inadmissible portions should be disregarded197 and withheld from a 189. (1968) 86 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 404; [1968] 1 NSWR 42. 190. R v Griffın (1997) 94 A Crim R 26; [1998] 1 Qd R 659. 191. This proposition is subject to any special rule requiring a document to be authenticated “under hand”: Salemi v MacKellar (No 2) (1977) 137 CLR 396 at 413. 192. (1969) 89 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 399. 193. Taylor v Taylor [1970] 1 WLR 1148. 194. [2008] 1 Qd R 484; (2006) 180 A Crim R 1; [2006] QCA 431. See also Attorney-General (Qld) v Harvey (2012) 263 FLR 433; [2012] QSC 173 at [36]. 195. Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 2) [1976] VR 363; see also [A.153]. 196. (1997) 16 ACLC 82. 197. Lenehan v Queensland Trustees Ltd [1965] Qd R 559.

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198

s 93

199

jury. The same applies to material tendered under s 93. In Brown v Mt Isa Mines Ltd200 an appeal based on fresh evidence was rejected because at all material times, the appellant had access to a statement admissible under s 92, from which “extraneous material” could easily have been excised.

Pre-trial decisions about Part 6 issues [92.43] Pre-trial rulings on evidence require statutory authority.201 A question arising under s 92 may be determined before trial upon a summons for directions.202 In criminal cases this may now be done under s 590AA(2)(e) of the Criminal Code.203 The standard of proof is the civil standard.204 An elaborate decision under the latter section appears in R v Baden-Clay.205 93 Admissibility of documentary evidence as to facts in issue in criminal proceedings (1) In any criminal proceeding where direct oral evidence of a fact would be admissible, any statement contained in a document and tending to establish that fact shall, subject to this part, be admissible as evidence of that fact if— (a) the document is or forms part of a record relating to any trade or business and made in the course of that trade or business from information supplied (whether directly or indirectly) by persons who had, or may reasonably be supposed to have had, personal knowledge of the matters dealt with in the information they supplied; and (b) the person who supplied the information recorded in the statement in question— (i) is dead, or unfit by reason of the person’s bodily or mental condition to attend as a witness; or

198. Lenehan v Queensland Trustees Ltd [1965] Qd R 559; Re Marra Developments Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 193; Compagnie Generale Maritime v Diakan Spirit SA (“The Ymnos”) [1981] 1 Lloyds Rep 550. 199. Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 603-604. 200. (Unreported, Qld Sup Ct FC, 16 December 1988). 201. R v Noud; Ex parte McNamara [1991] 2 Qd R 86. 202. Friend v Wallmann [1946] KB 493; Downs Irrigation Co-operative Association Ltd v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (No 2) [1983] 1 Qd R 475. 203. Section headed “Pre-trial directions and rulings”, inserted by the Criminal Law Amendment Act (No 3) 1997 . 204. R v Keen [2015] QSC 7. 205. [2014] QSC 156. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[93.1]

(ii)

is out of the State and it is not reasonably practicable to secure the person’s attendance; or (iii) can not with reasonable diligence be found or identified; or (iv) can not reasonably be supposed (having regard to the time which has lapsed since the person supplied the information and to all the circumstances) to have any recollection of the matters dealt with in the information the person supplied. (2) In this section— business includes any public transport, public utility or similar undertaking carried on in Queensland or elsewhere by the Crown (in right of the State of Queensland or any other right) or a statutory body.

Overview [93.1] Section 93 is based on the English Criminal Evidence Act 1965, a response to Myers v DPP.206 Myers was charged with receiving stolen cars. As evidence of identity the prosecution tendered records of engine numbers from the Austin factory. A majority of the House of Lords ruled that they were inadmissible being mere hearsay statements by unidentified employees about numbers they saw on engine blocks.207 Exercising judicial restraint not always displayed by the High Court of Australia, their Lordships held that it was too late in legal history for judges to invent new exceptions to the hearsay rule. The disputed records in Myers v DPP would now be records of a “trade or business” within the meaning of s 93(1)(a). [93.2] Section 93 uses language resembling that of s 92: see [92.12]–[92.33]. But, consistent with the higher standard of proof in criminal matters, this gateway is narrower than s 92. [93.3] Section 93 contains no equivalent of s 92(1)(a). Only business records are admissible here, and there is no question of tendering the document and calling the witness:208 compare [92.26]. (Distinguish R v Sitek,209 where the casino security videotape was real evidence of the defendant’s activities, so that both the tape and the testimony of an employee who was watching the television monitor at the time were admissible.) A statement is admissible only if the “supplier” of the information210 is absent for one of the reasons listed in s 93(1)(b). The liberal provisions of s 92(2)(e) and (f) do not reappear, although considerations of delay and expense may be implicit in s 93(1)(b)(ii) (“not reasonably practicable”). While expense deters the Crown less

206. [1965] AC 1001. 207. Myers v DPP [1965] AC 1001 at 1022 per Lord Reid. 208. R v McMillan (2010) 204 A Crim R 98; [2010] QSC 309 at [34]. 209. [1988] 2 Qd R 284. 210. The references to “maker” or “supplier” in the opening words of s 92(2) do not reappear in s 93(1)(b), where the focus is on the “person who supplied the information recorded”.

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than many other litigants, it is unreasonable to expect it to bring a witness from a distant place to give evidence that cannot seriously be challenged.211 [93.4] For notes on s 93(1)(b), see [92.38] – [92.43]. A prosecutor may find it more difficult to satisfy these tests than a party to a civil case, although the standard of proof on a voir dire remains the civil standard.212 Apart from s 96(2), there is no provision for hearsay evidence to establish that a document satisfies the requirements of s 93. Section 92(3) is confined to civil proceedings. [93.5] The definition of the “maker” of a statement in s 92(4) applies to s 93.

“Made in the course of …” [93.6]

See [83.7] – [83.11].

Record of a “trade or business” [93.7] A difference between ss 93 and 92 is the use of the phrase “trade or business” instead of “undertaking” in s 93(1)(a). The difference is narrowed by s 93(2), which defines “business” as including “any public transport, public utility or similar undertaking” carried on by the Crown or by a statutory body “in Queensland or elsewhere” (emphasis added). But it is submitted that “undertaking” in s 93(2) is limited by the sui generis rule to governmental and quasigovernmental entities, such as public transport and public utilities, while in s 92 the word “undertaking” has the meaning given to it in the Dictionary, namely public administration and any business (etc) carried on by the Crown or any other person. [93.8] Bank records were admitted under a similar provision in R v Jenkins213 and R v Mitchell.214 In Queensland s 84 would provide another basis for those decisions. A bank manager’s official diary notes were admitted in R v Smart.215 If Smart were decided in Queensland, s 93 would be the applicable provision, not s 84, because the notes in Smart were not financial in character.216 It is submitted that airline passenger records would be admissible to prove opportunity to commit an offence, subject to identification of the accused as the person named therein. The decision in R v Rice217 to admit a copy of an airline ticket has been criticised as contrary to Myers v DPP,218 but Myers has been overtaken by s 93. The report of Re Gardner219 (a bankruptcy case) does not reveal why Gibbs J rejected airline records tendered to prove that the bankrupt 211. R v Castillo [1996] Crim LR 193 (proposal to bring travel agent from South America to England to verify travel bookings in prosecution for drug offence). 212. Wendo v The Queen (1963) 109 CLR 559; R v Buzzacott (2010) 107 SASR 564; [2010] SASC 234. 213. [1970] Tas SR 13. 214. [1971] VR 46. 215. [1983] 1 VR 265. 216. Compare [83.15]. 217. [1963] 1 QB 857. 218. [1965] AC 1001. 219. (1967) 13 FLR 345. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[93.9]

tried to avoid his creditors. A possible explanation is that the statute in that case required a record to be “continuous”, or perhaps the document did not justify an inference that the debtor actually took the flight in question. In any event, Gardner pre-dates s 93. There is no prescribed method of making a business record. In R v Kaplan220 a diary note later transferred to a spreadsheet was admitted to prove theft by an employee. Invoice books were admitted to prove a conspiracy to engage in unlicensed fishing in R v Georgiadis (No 4).221 [93.9] Public and private hospitals are “businesses” within the meaning of s 93.222 In R v Terry223 the attendance records of a State school were admitted to prove that the accused had an opportunity to molest the complainant child. Apparently the school roll, showing that the child was not at school on the day in question, was treated as a record of a “public utility” within the meaning of s 93(2). [93.10] However, it is unlikely that police records would be admitted under s 93. For that purpose they would have to be treated as records of a “public utility or similar undertaking”, and judges would hardly be anxious to find that all manner of police reports, including unsigned records of interview, are entitled to the benefit of s 93. This point was noted in the South Australian case of R v Eade,224 although the material there was admitted under a provision that does not apply in Queensland. Ordinary police records are admissible in civil proceedings.225

Provisions akin to section 93 [93.11] Other enactments permitting the use of documents to prove facts in criminal proceedings are s 23 of the Evidence Act 1977, s 67 of the Evidence and Discovery Act 1867, s 111 of the Justices Act 1886 (depositions of dead or infirm witnesses) and ss 76 and 77 of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (evidence on examination before the Commission). 93A Statement made before proceeding by child or person with an impairment of the mind (1) In any proceeding where direct oral evidence of a fact would be admissible, any statement tending to establish that fact, contained in a document, shall, subject to this part, be admissible as evidence of that fact if—

220. (2005) 14 VR 673; [2005] VSCA 316; Gordon v Ross [2006] NSWCA 157 (manager’s daily notes of dealings with defendant). 221. [2001] TASSC 54. 222. R v Perry (No 3) (1981) 28 SASR 112; Chapman v Rogers; Ex parte Chapman [1984] 1 Qd R 542 at 550 (blood/alcohol test records); R v Ware, QLR (23 April 1988); R v TJW [1989] 1 Qd R 108. Hospital records need not be identified by the treating doctor: R v Laing [2008] QCA 317. 223. (Unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Connolly J, 9 January 1984). 224. (1984) 14 A Crim R 186 at 189. 225. McKay v Hutchins [1990] 1 Qd R 533.

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(a)

(b)

s 93A

the maker of the statement was a child or a person with an impairment of the mind at the time of making the statement and had personal knowledge of the matters dealt with by the statement; and the maker of the statement is available to give evidence in the proceeding.

[Subs (1) am Act 55 of 2008, s 150 and Sch; Act 70 of 2005, s 93; Act 55 of 2003, s 63; Act 3 of 1997, s 122 and Sch 2; Act 79 of 1996, s 42]

(2) If a statement mentioned in subsection (1) (the main statement) is admissible, a related statement is also admissible as evidence if the maker of the related statement is available to give evidence in the proceeding. [Subs (2) subst Act 70 of 2005, s 93; am Act 3 of 1997, s 122 and Sch 2]

(2A) A related statement is a statement— (a) made by someone to the maker of the main statement, in response to which the main statement was made; and (b) contained in the document containing the main statement. [Subs (2A) insrt Act 70 of 2005, s 93]

(2B) Subsection (2) is subject to this part. [Subs (2B) insrt Act 70 of 2005, s 93]

(3) Where the statement of a person is admitted as evidence in any proceeding pursuant to subsection (1) or (2), the party tendering the statement shall, if required to do so by any other party to the proceeding, call as a witness the person whose statement is so admitted and the person who recorded the statement. (3A) For a committal proceeding for a relevant offence, subsections (1)(b) and (3) do not apply to the person who made the statement if the person is an affected child. Note: For the taking of an affected child’s evidence for a committal proceeding for a relevant offence, see part 2, division 4A, subdivision 2. [Subs (3A) insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 63]

(4) In the application of subsection (3) to a criminal proceeding— party means the prosecution or the person charged in the proceeding. (5) In this section— affected child see section 21AC. child, in relation to a person who made a statement under subsection (1), means— (a) a person who was under 16 years when the statement was made, whether or not the person is under 16 years at the time of the proceeding; or (b) a person who was 16 or 17 years when the statement was made and who, at the time of the proceeding, is a special witness. [Def subst Act 70 of 2005, s 93]

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[93A.1]

relevant offence see section 21AC. [Subs (5) insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 63; rep s 122 and Sch 2]

Act 43 of 2000, s 49; insrt

Act 3 of 1997,

[S 93A am Act 55 of 2008; Act 70 of 2005; Act 55 of 2003, s 63; Act 43 of 2000; Act 3 of 1997, s 122 and Sch 2; Act 79 of 1996; insrt Act 17 of 1989, s 64]

Overview [93A.1] Section 93A was inserted by the Criminal Code, Evidence Act and Other Acts Amendment Act 1989. It was amended in 1996226 to make statements by children more readily admissible227 and in 1997228 to apply to “intellectually impaired persons”. It was further amended by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2000, which transferred the definition of “intellectually impaired person” (now described as a “person with an impairment of the mind”) from s 93A(5) to the Dictionary, and by s 63M of the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003, which raised the age limit of a “child” from 12 to 16 years. It was further amended by the Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2005, which substituted new subsections (2), (2A) and (2B). Section 93A is intended “to avoid the difficulties inherent in extracting cogent evidence from young witnesses in court”.229 Section 93A statements are “sensitive evidence”, protected by a duty of “limited disclosure”: see [Q.11]. This section complements amendments made in 1997 to ss 9, 9A and 21A. The retrospective effect of the 2005 amendments is considered in R v GT.230 Section 93A, like s 21A, applies to “any proceeding”, but is mainly used in trials for sexual offences against children and the intellectually handicapped. It has attracted a remarkable amount of judicial interpretation and some judicial controversy. The section was applied in a judge-only trial in R v BCM.231 If a child witness is not competent to give evidence an earlier statement by the same witness, made under s 93A, is inadmissible. But an earlier out-of-court statement by the same child may be admissible under s 93B.232

Policy [93A.2]

In R v Taylor233 Pincus JA (with whom de Jersey J agreed) observed:

The legislature has established a special method by which evidence may be given in certain cases. As I understand the policy, that is partly because it had been found that some young children were unable to give a proper account of offences against them, speaking in the formal setting of a courtroom. … It is not astonishing that in some instances … a child will give a much fuller and more confident account when 226. By the Justice Legislation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1996. 227. See [93A.11]. 228. By the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1997. 229. R v Morris [1996] 2 Qd R 68 at 74 per Dowsett J. 230. [2005] QCA 478. 231. [2015] QSC 43. 232. R v SCJ; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2015] QCA 123. 233. [1996] QCA 117.

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interviewed in the way in which this complainant was interviewed, shortly after the commission of the alleged offence, than she is able to give some considerable time later, in the atmosphere of a court. This does not necessarily … produce an unfair trial.

However, there is a sharply different opinion in the dissenting judgment of Fitzgerald P. He regretted that crucial evidence was now being taken in police stations instead of courts: If different rules are to be applied in relation to those accused of sexual abuse of children I consider that the law should be changed, in unambiguous terms, by Parliament, after community debate … While a child’s age and other circumstances might help to explain deficiencies in the child’s evidence, and some latitude might be justified … [t]he prosecution case against a person accused of child molestation must still be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and the problems experienced by children in giving evidence do not justify the conviction of a person accused of such an offence if the quality of the prosecution evidence makes the conviction unsafe and unsatisfactory.

Successful tenders [93A.3] The long list of cases in which s 93A has been successfully invoked includes R v T,234 R v Cowie; Ex parte Attorney-General,235 and R v Broadwater.236 In R v Hopwood237 the court dismissed an appeal from a conviction for sexual assault based largely on the pre-trial statement of a child aged five, who, at the trial, could not recall the incident, or the interview at which the pre-trial statement was recorded. However, there was cogent medical evidence, and the appellant had told lies indicating consciousness of guilt.

“Any statement … in a document” [93A.4] The word “document” is examined at [3.11]. Section 93A statements are usually recorded electronically. There are guidelines for the conduct of interviews in the judgment of Demack J in Horan v Ferguson.238 While electronic recordings are preferred,239 statements in writing are admissible. In R v Griffın,240 after an interview was tape-recorded, the child made a further statement, and a police officer recorded it in his notebook. The written statement 234. [1993] 1 Qd R 454 (statements by two children). 235. [1994] 1 Qd R 326. 236. (Unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Dowsett J, 31 August 1989) (girl aged four years; written statement in typical question and answer form made at police interview) (aff’d [1996] QCA 450). Other cases are R v Thomas (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Connolly J, 9 October 1989) (girl aged 11); R v Hardy (unreported, Qld Dist Ct, 26 February 1990); R v Murray (unreported, Qld Dist Ct, 4 June 1990); R v Clark (unreported, Qld CA, 4 August 1995); R v Hellemons (unreported, Qld CA, 1 July 1997); R v Taylor (unreported, Qld CA, 1 November 1996); R v Webster [1996] QCA 246; R v C [1995] QCA 327. 237. [2001] QCA 565. 238. [1995] 2 Qd R 490 at 496-497; see also Cashmore, “The Use of Video Technology for Child Witnesses” (1990) 16 Monash LR 228; Queensland Law Reform Commission, The Receipt of Evidence by Queensland Courts: The Evidence of Children, Discussion Paper WP No 53 (December 1998). 239. R v Griffın [1998] 1 Qd R 659. 240. [1998] 1 Qd R 659. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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was admitted, although failure to restart the recorder was criticised. In R v Broadwater241 the statement was a traditional record of interview in questionand-answer form. [93A.5] Fairness may require scrutiny of the interviewer’s contribution by way of questions, promptings or observations,242 as the meaning or credibility of the story may be affected by such interventions. Things said to the complainant are admissible if the interviewer is available to testify: s 93A(2).

“Child” [93A.6] For present purposes this means a person who was under the age of 16 years when the pre-trial statement was made: s 93A(1)(a).243

“Intellectually impaired” [93A.7] Expert evidence as to impairment and its likely effect on reliability may be received under s 9C.

Conditions of admissibility Age and knowledge [93A.8] In the case of a child complainant, the maker of the statement must be under 16 years of age when the statement is made and must have personal knowledge of the facts asserted: s 93A(1)(a). Timing [93A.9] Formerly the statement had to be made soon after the event, or to “a person investigating the matter”: s 93A(1)(b). That requirement was repealed by s 63(4) of the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003. [93A.10] Presumably the former s 93A(1)(b) – or at least the first part of it – was meant as some assurance that the statement was sufficiently reliable to be exempted from the hearsay rule.244 In R v Murray245 Kimmins DCJ rejected a statement video taped just two days after the offence was reported to police, although the report itself was made on the day of the assault. In R v Rogaloff246 a delay of five days was deemed too long. [93A.11] Apart from s 93A, evidence of a “complaint” may be admissible under s 4A of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978: see [A.154]. 241. (Unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Dowsett J, 31 August 1989) (aff’d [1996] QCA 450). 242. Compare the principle of completeness and full context which applies to admissions: R v Cox [1986] 2 Qd R 55; R v Williamson [1972] 2 NSWLR 281; R v Beck [1990] 1 Qd R 30. 243. The same definition applies in s 21A; contrast the open-ended character of s 9. 244. Compare the “ordinary course” test in ss 83, 92 and 93. 245. (Unreported, Qld Dist Ct, 4 June 1990). 246. (Unreported, Qld Dist Ct, McLauchlan DCJ, 21 January 1990).

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Available to give evidence [93A.12] The complainant must be available for cross-examination: s 93A(1)(b) and (3). An order may then be made under s 21A. In R v Hardy247 a girl aged nine gave evidence on oath. Permission to use a s 93A statement was refused in Galvin v The Queen,248 where the complainant suicided before the trial. A witness who is physically present, but unable to recall the relevant events because of a psychiatric injury is not an “available” witness.249 A written statement may be tendered under s 93A in addition to a video recording made under Pt 2 Div 4A subdiv 3.250 The word “child” in s 93A(1)(b) does not apply to a witness who is no longer a child at the time of the hearing. The provisions of s 93A are not intended to apply to witnesses who are no longer children (or intellectually impaired) at the time of the hearing because they no longer need the special protection of this section.251 [93A.13] While the witness must be available, it is not essential that he or she be able to recall everything recorded in the pre-trial statement.252 Nor is it essential that the testimony be wholly consistent with that statement, even if the witness is over 16 by the time of the hearing.253 These things go to weight, and may lead to discretionary exclusion. In R v Taylor254 Pincus JA observed that the child “performed badly” when asked to estimate periods of time or to put events in order, but otherwise showed the ability to recall unpleasant events that one would expect of a ten-year-old. Noting that the trial judge had reminded the jury of the discrepancies, his Honour referred to English cases255 in which convictions were allowed to stand although illness or emotional distress of a complainant, or sheer refusal to answer some questions, hampered cross-examination. His Honour concluded that “there is [no] absolute rule that an accused, deprived by circumstances of a full right of cross-examination, cannot be convicted”. At a time when so many demands are presented as “human rights”, cross-examination is not yet in that category, even in criminal proceedings.256

247. (Unreported, Qld Dist Ct, 26 February 1990). 248. (2006) 161 A Crim R 449; [2006] NSWCCA 66. 249. Cox v New South Wales [2007] Aust Torts Reports 81-888; [2007] NSWSC 471. 250. Gately v The Queen (2007) 82 ALJR 149; [2007] HCA 55. 251. R v GR (2005) 153 A Crim R 94; [2005] QCA 146. 252. R v Cowie; Ex parte Attorney-General [1994] 1 Qd R 326; R v T [1993] 1 Qd R 454; R v Clark (unreported, Qld CA, 4 August 1995). 253. R v Morris [1996] 2 Qd R 68. 254. [1996] QCA 117. 255. R v Stretton and McCallion (1988) 86 Cr App R 7; R v Wyatt [1990] Crim LR 343. 256. R v McLennan [1999] 2 Qd R 297. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[93A.14] If a complainant is incompetent to give evidence (sworn or unsworn), s 93A is not available.257 Evidence for or against competency may be received under s 9C.258 [93A.15] It is an open question whether the defence may use s 94 to attack the credit of a s 93A statement when the complainant is available to testify, but is not required to do so. Section 94 applies if the maker of a statement admitted under s 93A “is not called”, but it is doubtful whether s 94 envisages that a defendant who is responsible for that situation should have the benefit of that provision. If s 94 is available in such a case, it might be a less risky method of attacking a child witness than viva voce questioning.

Discretionary exclusion [93A.16] A statement admissible under s 93A may be excluded under s 130. The vague and potent discretion259 to exclude admissible prosecution evidence is a welcome port of call for defence counsel, and s 93A evidence is not immune. [93A.17] However, appeals to that discretion have been less successful than usual here.260 When s 98 was used by some judges to curb the “novelty” of earlier inclusions in Pt 6, they had to be reminded that remedial legislation is not to be narrowly interpreted.261 There has been less interest in “clipping the wings” of s 93A. While the Court of Appeal accepts that the credit of a complainant may be so poor that it would be unfair to let the section operate, it has emphasised that ss 98 and 130 should not be allowed to defeat the reform.262 In R v FAR Pincus JA stated: I am inclined to the view that … s 93A constituted a sensible and useful reform; but courts, whether or not in agreement with the policy of the section, should in my opinion exercise the discretion to admit or exclude statements taken under it without any preconception that admission of such statements is unfair.263

And there are reservations about the more cautious approaches of Fitzgerald P and Demack J in R v Cumner.264 [93A.18] A decision to exclude a s 93A statement will “almost always” turn on an impression of unreliability, particularly if it is not possible to crossexamine.265 But in R v Thomas266 Connolly J refused to exclude the statement of 257. R v Mackie (unreported, Qld Dist Ct, Helman DCJ, 22 March 1990) (not of sufficient intelligence: cf s 9). 258. R v D (2003) 141 A Crim R 471; [2003] QCA 151. 259. See commentary on s 130. 260. Attorney-General (Qld) v Harvey (2012) 263 FLR 433; [2012] QSC 173 at [38]: “[I]t would be a rare case”. 261. See, eg, Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542 at 571. 262. See, eg, R v Morris [1996] 2 Qd R 68, referring to R v Cowie; Ex parte Attorney-General [1994] 1 Qd R 326. 263. R v FAR [1996] 2 Qd R 49; [1995] QCA 330 at 61 (Qd R). 264. [1994] QCA 270. 265. R v R [1996] 2 Qd R 49; R v Morris [1996] 2 Qd R 68. There is a general consideration of the reliability of children’s evidence in R v Robinson (1995) 80 A Crim R 358. 266. (Unreported, Qld Sup Ct, 9 October 1989).

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a girl aged 11. The defence argued that it was highly suspect because the child moved back and forth between sophisticated and unsophisticated anatomical terms, but in his Honour’s view the child probably “learned a few words she mightn’t have known before” during police inquiries. In R v Hellemons267 the Court of Appeal upheld a decision to admit two pre-trial statements by a boy aged 11, despite a claim that his family had “pressured” him to make them. The child made a complaint consistent with his testimony before any parental pressure could have been applied. [93A.19] In s 99 there is a discretion to withhold evidence from a jury during its deliberations, lest they give it “undue weight” – another example of procedural law based on mistrust of juries: see [99.1]. The s 99 discretion was used to withhold a s 93A statement from the jury room in R v Hardy.268 It contained self-accrediting references to the child’s religious education and the remark: “I don’t like [the accused] because he does bad things.” It is now settled law that s 93A statements should not be made exhibits,269 or go to the jury room270 because, unlike records made under s 21AM, they contain only evidence in chief.271 However, there is a discretion to depart from the general rule, provided that the jury is warned not to give the recorded statement additional weight merely because they hear it twice. In R v FAE272 the trial miscarried for want of any such warning; the error was exacerbated by the fact that a considerable time had elapsed since the defence case was closed.

“Unsafe and unsatisfactory” [93A.20] On appeal it may be argued that, even if the statement was properly admitted, the conviction is “unsafe and unsatisfactory”. (In a fine example of curial diseconomy, that mantra may only be intoned on appeal, not before the trial judge.)273 The “unsafe” ground is a fairly recent addition to judicial power,274 enabling judges to “second guess”275 guilty verdicts, while acquittals remain infallible: see [9D.3]. [93A.21] The “unsafe and unsatisfactory” formula, like discretionary exclusion, has returned many a burglar (and other suspects) to their friends and relations.276 But there seems to be a judicial perception that frequent resort to it in this area 267. (Unreported, Qld CA, 1 July 1997). 268. (Unreported, Qld Dist Ct, Noud DCJ, 26 February 1990). 269. R v Glastonbury [2014] SASCFC 44 at [34]. 270. R v H [1999] 2 Qd R 283 at 290; R v Gao [2012] QCA 54. 271. R v GT [2005] QCA 478 at [18]; cf R v NZ (2005) 63 NSWLR 628; [2005] NSWCCA 278. 272. [2014] QCA 69. 273. R v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161; Attorney-General’s Reference No 1 of 1983 [1983] 2 VR 410 at 415; R v Sutton [1986] 2 Qd R 72 at 74-75; Chamberlain v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 608. 274. Contrast the former refusal to interfere with verdicts which were not “perverse”: R v Jeynes [1927] QSR 27; Ross v The King (1922) 30 CLR 246. 275. The simple notion behind the technical facade is that, while the jury could lawfully convict, it should not have done so. 276. For commentary on this doctrine, see [9D.3], above. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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could appear subversive of s 93A. Inconsistencies between a s 93A statement and the complainant’s testimony in R v Broadwater277 were said to be “unsafe”, but the Court of Appeal did not agree: [T]he point is taken that the complainant did not in all respects when examined at the trial support what she had said at an interview shortly after the incident. This is, as it seems to us, a very common phenomenon in relation to young children who are sexually assaulted, and illustrates one of the advantages of the system based on s 93A … common experience of which suggests that it has worked remarkably well since its inception in 1989.

[93A.22] R v Cumner,278 however, was a weak case. The only evidence against the accused was a statement videotaped nine months after the event. There were earlier inconsistent statements and the child’s mother had repeatedly questioned her about the matter, urging her to condemn the accused. The conviction was set aside. [93A.23] In R v Webster,279 on the other hand, an appeal based on inconsistencies between the s 93A statement, evidence at committal, and evidence in the trial was dismissed. The complainant was 12 years of age at the time of the trial, and was “experiencing learning difficulties”. Some of the events in question occurred four years earlier. Pincus JA observed: I have heard the audiotape of the complainant’s explanations to the police of what was alleged to have been done to her, and seeing and hearing the video record of the appellant’s interview with the police. There are some quite substantial inconsistencies … such as to require close consideration … [Nevertheless] … [n]one of the authorities cited deals with an argument that a conviction should not be based on a statement taken under s 93A unless the person against whom the allegations is made is present … The reason such an argument has not been advanced is that it would be hopeless, being merely an invitation to amend the section judicially.280

Invitations to legislate judicially are not always “hopeless”, particularly in federal courts. But in Webster the court accepted that interviews with the child were fairly conducted, without leading questions, and that cross-examination was unrestricted. It referred to a “line of cases in this Court” to the effect that a s 93A statement can support a conviction “irrespective of the quality of the complainant’s testimony at the trial … notwithstanding that the [accused] … [was] not present when the [original] allegations were made … and even, on one view, if effective cross-examination … is impossible”.

Committal proceedings: unrepresented defendants [93A.24] It was a moot question whether s 93A was compatible with s 110A(4) of the Justices Act 1886, which previously forbade the use of “hand up briefs” when defendants were not legally represented. The issue has been resolved by amendment of that legislation to allow “hand up” material under certain conditions. 277. (Unreported, Qld CA, 19 November 1996) (aff’d [1996] QCA 450). 278. [1994] QCA 270. 279. [1996] QCA 246. 280. For a firm warning against using judicial discretion to “subvert the policy of … legislation”, see Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297 per Gleeson CJ and Hayne J at [40].

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Sections 93A and 99 [93A.25] Normally a s 93A statement should not be among the exhibits taken to the jury room because of the risk that the jury may read and re-read it while other evidence is but a memory.281 If a tape-recorded statement is replayed in court, the jury should usually be reminded of what the witness said in cross-examination.282 [93A.26] In 2008 s 93 was amended by the Criminal Code and Other Acts Amendment Act 2008 by substituting the words “person with an impairment of the mind” for the words “intellectually impaired person” in the heading to this section, and in s 93A(10)(a).

The Criminal Code and section 93A [93A.27] Code:

In 2008 (Act No 55 s 113) the following was inserted in the Criminal

590AOA Evidence Act section 93A device statement (1) The prosecution is not, for a relevant proceeding, required under this chapter division to give the accused person a copy of an Evidence Act section 93A device statement (the statement) other than as required under this section. (2) If – (a) apart from this section, the prosecution would have to give the accused person a copy of the statement; and (b) the prosecution does not give the accused person a copy of the statement; then the prosecution must give the accused person a written notice – (c) describing the statement; and (d) stating that the prosecution – (i) considers the statement to be an Evidence Act section 93A device statement; and (ii) is not required to give the accused person a copy of the statement other than as required under this section; and (e) stating the matters mentioned in subsection (3) or (6), whichever is applicable. (3) If the accused person has a lawyer acting for him or her, the notice must state that the prosecution will give a lawyer acting for the accused person a copy of the statement (the copy) on the following conditions – (a) that the lawyer must not give the copy to the accused person or anyone else other than the following – 281. See [93A.19] and [99.1]; R v Hibbins [1999] 2 Qd R 54; and R v Thomas (1992) 9 CRNZ 113. Traditionally juries are not trusted with a copy of the transcript, although judge and counsel would soon be lost without it. The unconvincing rationale is that the evidence is in the jury’s memory, not in the transcript: R v Morgan [2009] VSCA 225. However, in R v Bartle (2003) 181 FLR 1; [2003] NSWCCA 329 the jury, in a complex trial, should have been allowed to read a transcript of counsel’s closing addresses: “A trial is not a memory test for the jury”. Where a statement tendered under s 93A is replayed to the jury at its request, it is not necessary in every case that the judge should remind them of the cross-examination and re-examination of the witness, although in many cases this will be desirable: R v C [2000] 2 Qd R 54, differing from R v H [1999] 2 Qd R 283 at 295. 282. R v C [2000] 2 Qd R 54. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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(i) a lawyer acting for the accused person or to whom the copy is referred for particular advice; (ii) a person, other than a lawyer, to whom the copy is referred for particular expert advice; (iii) an associate of the lawyer to the extent necessary for work to be done for the lawyer in relation to the relevant proceeding or a proceeding for a relevant charge in the ordinary practice of the law; (b) that any lawyer acting for the accused person, other than the lawyer to whom the prosecution gives the copy, must not give the copy to the accused person or anyone else other than the persons mentioned in paragraph (a)(ii) or (a)(iii); (c) that a person who is given the copy under paragraph (a) or (b), other than a lawyer mentioned in the paragraph, must not give the copy to the accused person or anyone else who is not a lawyer acting for the accused person; (d) that the copy held by the lawyer to whom it was given by the prosecution, or held by anyone else to whom the copy has been given under this section – (i) must not be copied; and (ii) must be returned to the prosecution within 14 days after – (A) the lawyer or other person stops being someone who may be given the copy under this section; or Example – A lawyer may stop acting for the accused person. (B) the end of the proceedings for the relevant charge; (e) that the copy may only be given to another person in accordance with the conditions mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (d) for a legitimate purpose connected with the relevant proceeding or a proceeding for a relevant charge. (4) If the original statement is a visual image device and the copy to be given by the prosecution under the notice is only a sound device, the court may direct the prosecution to give a copy that is a visual image device. (5) The court may make a direction under subsection (4) only if it is satisfied the terms of the direction can ensure – (a) the copy will only be viewed for a legitimate purpose connected with the relevant proceeding; and (b) there is no unauthorised copying or circulation of the copy. (6) If the accused person does not have a lawyer acting for him or her, the notice must state that – (a) the prosecution will not give the statement (whether the original or copy) to the accused person; and (b) the prosecution will, on request, allow an appropriate person to view the statement, either the original or a copy as stated in the notice for the purposes of the relevant proceeding at a stated place. 470

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(7) If the prosecution refuses to accept a person, nominated by the accused person under paragraph (c) of the definition appropriate person, as an appropriate person for subsection (6)(b), the court may direct the prosecution to accept the person as an appropriate person for subsection (6)(b), subject to the conditions the court considers appropriate. (8) The court may make the direction under subsection (7) only if the court is satisfied the terms of the direction can ensure – (a) the statement will only be viewed for a legitimate purpose connected with the relevant proceeding; and (b) there is no unauthorised copying or circulation of the statement; and (c) if the original statement is to be viewed – the integrity of the statement is protected. (9) A person who does an act mentioned in the Evidence Act 1977, section 93AA(1)(a) to (c) in contravention of a condition imposed by a notice under subsection (3) or a direction under subsection (5) or (7) – (a) does the act without authority; and (b) commits an offence against that section. (10) For subsection (3)(d)(i) or (8)(b), it is declared that the making of a transcript of the contents of the statement is not the making of a copy of the statement to which the Evidence Act 1977, section 93AA(1)(c) applies. (11) In this section – appropriate person means – (a) the accused person; or (b) a lawyer mentioned in the Evidence Act 1977 section 21O(4); or (c) another person engaged by the accused person if the prosecution or court considers it is appropriate for the other person to view the thing. (Examples of persons prosecution may consider appropriate – interpreter, expert) associate of a lawyer means an associate of the law practice, of the lawyer, as defined under the Legal Profession Act 2007 section 7(1)(a) or (c). copy of the statement, in subsections (3) and (6) means a copy of the original statement in the form of – (a) a device of similar function to the original device containing a copy of the statement; or (b) if the original statement is in the form of a visual image device – any sound device capable of reproducing a soundtrack of the visual image device; and includes any additional copy provided by the prosecution for convenience. end of proceedings, in relation to a relevant charge, means the latest of the following – (a) if a trial is not conducted that disposes of the charge – the discharge, striking out, withdrawal, entry of nolle prosequi, quashing, staying or other event by which the proceedings end; (b) if a trial is conducted that disposes of the charge – (i) if the trial ends without a finding of guilt – the end of the trial; or (ii) if the trial ends with a finding of guilt – the end of any period allowed for appeal against the finding of guilt; or (iii) if an appeal is started against the finding of guilt – the end of the appeal and the end of any further proceedings. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Note – This definition covers circumstances where a copy of a statement is held beyond committal to the resulting trial and beyond any mistrial or appeal to later trial. relevant charge means the charge against the accused in the relevant proceeding, and includes any replacement or further charge arising out of the proceeding or the same, or same set of, circumstances. sound device means a device mentioned in section 590AFA(b)(i). visual image device means a device mentioned in section 590AFA(b)(ii).

93AA Unauthorised possession of, or dealing in, s 93A criminal statements (1) A person commits an offence who, without authority— (a) has a section 93A criminal statement in the person’s possession; or (b) supplies, or offers to supply, a section 93A criminal statement to any person; or (c) copies, or permits a person to copy, a section 93A criminal statement. Maximum penalty— (a) for an individual—100 penalty units or 2 years imprisonment; or (b) for a corporation—1000 penalty units. (2) A person has authority for subsection (1) if the person has the possession or does the thing mentioned in subsection (1) for a legitimate purpose connected with the proceeding for which the section 93A statement was made or another proceeding. [Subs (2) am Act 5 of 2010, s 203]

(2A) Also, the commissioner of the police service or the director of public prosecutions has authority for subsection (1) if the commissioner or director has the possession or does the thing mentioned in the subsection for the purpose of— (a) preparing a transcript of a section 93A criminal statement so that it can be given to the chief executive (employment screening) as mentioned in paragraph (b); or (b) giving, under the Working with Children Act, a section 93A transcript, or a summary of a section 93A transcript, to the chief executive (employment screening). [Subs (2A) am Act 28 of 2014, s 105 and Sch 1; insrt Act 5 of 2010, s 203]

(2B) A person does not commit an offence against subsection (1)(a) by possessing a section 93A transcript, or a summary of a section 93A transcript, if the transcript or summary— (a) was, under the Working with Children Act, given to the former CCYPCG commissioner or the chief executive (employment screening) by the commissioner of the police service or the director of public prosecutions; and 472

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is in the person’s possession, at the relevant time, for the purpose of making an employment-screening decision.

[Subs (2B) am Act 28 of 2014, s 105 and Sch 1; insrt Act 5 of 2010, s 203]

(2C) A person does not commit an offence against subsection (1)(b) if the person supplies, or offers to supply, a written summary of a section 93A transcript that is in the person’s possession under subsection (2B)— (a) to a WWC applicant; and (b) for a legitimate purpose directly related to the making of an employment-screening decision. [Subs (2C) am Act 28 of 2014, s 105 and Sch 1; insrt Act 5 of 2010, s 203]

(2D) A person does not commit an offence against subsection (1)(c) if— (a) the person copies, or permits a person to copy, a section 93A transcript, or a summary of a section 93A transcript, that is in the person’s possession under subsection (2B); and (b) the copying is done for the purpose of making an employmentscreening decision. [Subs (2D) am Act 28 of 2014, s 105 and Sch 1; insrt Act 5 of 2010, s 203]

(2E) A WWC applicant— (a) does not commit an offence against subsection (1)(a) by possessing a written summary of a section 93A transcript, if the summary— (i) was given to the applicant under subsection (2C); and (ii) is in the applicant’s possession, at the relevant time, for a legitimate purpose directly related to the making of an employment-screening decision; and (b) does not commit an offence against subsection (1)(b) if the applicant supplies, or offers to supply, a written summary of a section 93A transcript that is in the applicant’s possession under paragraph (a), or a copy of the summary— (i) to an Australian lawyer; and (ii) for the purpose of obtaining legal advice directly related to the making of an employment-screening decision; and (c) does not commit an offence against subsection (1)(c) if— (i) the applicant copies, or permits a person to copy, a written summary of a section 93A transcript that is in the applicant’s possession under paragraph (a); and (ii) the copying is done so that a copy of the summary can be given to an Australian lawyer for the purpose of obtaining legal advice directly related to the making of an employmentscreening decision. [Subs (2E) am Act 28 of 2014, s 105 and Sch 1; insrt Act 5 of 2010, s 203]

(2F) An Australian lawyer does not commit an offence against subsection (1)(a) by possessing a written summary of a section 93A transcript, or a copy of a written summary of a section 93A transcript, if the summary or copy— © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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(a) (b)

was given to the lawyer under subsection (2E) by a WWC applicant; and is in the lawyer’s possession, at the relevant time, for the purpose of providing legal advice directly related to the making of an employment-screening decision about the applicant.

[Subs (2F) am Act 28 of 2014, s 105 and Sch 1; insrt Act 5 of 2010, s 203]

(3) In this section— Australian lawyer has the meaning given by the Legal Profession Act 2007. [Def insrt Act 5 of 2010, s 203]

CCYPCG Act [Repealed] [Def rep Act 28 of 2014, s 105 and Sch 1; insrt Act 5 of 2010, s 203]

CCYPCG commissioner [Repealed] [Def rep Act 28 of 2014, s 105 and Sch 1; insrt Act 5 of 2010, s 203]

CCYPCG employment-screening decision [Repealed] [Def rep Act 28 of 2014, s 105 and Sch 1; insrt Act 5 of 2010, s 203]

chief executive (employment screening) means the chief executive of the department in which the Working with Children Act is administered. [Def insrt Act 28 of 2014, s 105 and Sch 1]

employment-screening decision means an employment-screening decision under the Working with Children Act. [Def insrt Act 28 of 2014, s 105 and Sch 1]

former CCYPCG commissioner means the Commissioner for Children and Young People and Child Guardian before the commencement of this definition. [Def insrt Act 28 of 2014, s 105 and Sch 1]

relevant CCYPCG applicant [Repealed] [Def rep Act 28 of 2014, s 105 and Sch 1; insrt Act 5 of 2010, s 203]

section 93A criminal statement means a statement— (a) made to a person investigating an alleged offence; and (b) given in, or in anticipation of, a criminal proceeding about the alleged offence; and (c) that is potentially admissible under section 93A. section 93A transcript means a transcript of a section 93A criminal statement. [Def insrt Act 5 of 2010, s 203]

Working with Children Act means the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000. [Def insrt Act 28 of 2014, s 105 and Sch 1]

WWC applicant, for a section 93A transcript, means a person— (a) who allegedly committed the alleged offence to which the transcript relates; and

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about whom the former CCYPCG commissioner or the chief executive (employment screening) has made, or the chief executive (employment screening) is about to make, an employmentscreening decision.

[Def insrt Act 28 of 2014, s 105 and Sch 1] [S 93AA am Act 28 of 2014; Act 5 of 2010; insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 64]

[93AA.1] Section 93AA was inserted by s 64 of the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003. 93B Admissibility of representation in prescribed criminal proceedings if person who made it is unavailable (1) This section applies in a prescribed criminal proceeding if a person with personal knowledge of an asserted fact— (a) made a representation about the asserted fact; and (b) is unavailable to give evidence about the asserted fact because the person is dead or mentally or physically incapable of giving the evidence. (2) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of the representation given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation, if the representation was— (a) made when or shortly after the asserted fact happened and in circumstances making it unlikely the representation is a fabrication; or (b) made in circumstances making it highly probable the representation is reliable; or (c) at the time it was made, against the interests of the person who made it. (3) If evidence given by a person of a representation about a matter has been adduced by a party and has been admitted under subsection (2), the hearsay rule does not apply to the following evidence adduced by another party to the proceeding— (a) evidence of the representation given by another person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation; (b) evidence of another representation about the matter given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the other representation. (4) To avoid any doubt, it is declared that subsections (2) and (3) only provide exceptions to the hearsay rule for particular evidence and do not otherwise affect the admissibility of the evidence. (5) In this section— prescribed criminal proceeding means a criminal proceeding against a person for an offence defined in the Criminal Code, chapters 28 to 32. representation includes— (a) an express or implied representation, whether oral or written; and © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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(b) a representation to be inferred from conduct; and (c) a representation not intended by the person making it to be communicated to or seen by another person; and (d) a representation that for any reason is not communicated. [S 93B insrt Act 43 of 2000, s 50]

[93B.1] Section 92B, inserted by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2000, is a significant departure from the original policy of this Act,283 which eschewed oral hearsay, even in civil cases: see [A.38]. According to the Explanatory Notes to the amending Act, s 93B is based “to an extent” on s 65 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), but “with a more restricted operation”. It was applied, for example, in R v Lester,284 R v Erasmus,285 R v Knight286 and R v Robertson.287 Although it was enacted after s 98, it is subject to that provision.288 [93B.2] Section 92B applies only “prescribed criminal proceedings” – that is, proceedings under Chs 28 – 32 of the Criminal Code. Chapter 28 deals with homicide, suicide and concealment of birth. Chapter 29 covers offences endangering life or health. Chapter 30 relates to assaults, and Chapter 32 deals with rape and sexual assaults. [93B.3] Section 93B makes admissible an oral or documented statement about a fact in issue by a person who has died,289 or who is mentally or physically incapable of testifying, provided that the witness who recites the statement in court actually heard it made, so that it is “first hand hearsay”. The statement must be one that asserts facts within the personal knowledge of the statement-maker and must have been made in the circumstances described in s 93B(2)(a)290 – (c). Earlier or later statements by the person making the representation may be relevant to credit.291 An expression of a state of mind is a statement of fact.292 Section 93B(2)(a) and (b)293 adopt suggestions in Ratten v The Queen294 and Walton v The Queen295 that the strict test of contemporaneity with respect to res

283. Discussed in R v Crump [2004] QCA 176. 284. (2007) 176 A Crim R 152; [2007] QSC 229. 285. [2006] QCA 245. 286. [2010] QCA 372. 287. [2015] QCA 11. 288. R v Belford and Bound [2011] QCA 43. 289. R v Uittenbosch [2013] QCA 96. 290. Section 93B(2)(a) – fabrication – is considered in R v Knight [2010] QCA 372 (deceased prisoner’s expression of fear). 291. R v Lester (2007) 176 A Crim R 152; [2007] QSC 229. 292. R v Lester (2008) 190 A Crim R 468; [2008] QCA 354. 293. “Shortly after” – it would be an unusual case in which this would cover a statement made five days after the event: Williams v The Queen (2000) 119 A Crim R 490. 294. [1972] AC 378. 295. (1989) 166 CLR 283.

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gesta statements should be relaxed: compare [A.145]. However, the emphasis is upon the factual setting in which the statement was made, rather than on separate, preceding or subsequent events.296 The section may incidentally liberalise the common law test of a “dying declaration”.297 It was applied in R v McGrane298 to admit evidence of a phone call by the deceased complaining of ill treatment by the accused. The statement in R v Vincent299 was admissible as “against interest”. But in R v Crump300 the condition in s 93B(2)(b) was not satisfied; the statement alleged a violent assault, but did not mention any facts consistent with that assertion. In relation to s 93B(2)(c) there is a question whether the maker of the representation must be aware that it is against his or her interest. A similar provision in the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) was considered in R v Polkinghorne.301 A transcript of a tape-recording made by a witness suffering from cerebral palsy, and incapable of testifying in person, was received under a similar English provision in R v Duffy.302 If a child witness is not competent to give evidence an earlier statement by the same witness, made under s 93A, is inadmissible. But an earlier out-of-court statement by the same child may be admissible under s 93B.303 [93B.4] A reference in the definition of “representation” in s 93B(5)(c) to a statement “that for any reason is not communicated” could cover an entry in a private diary previously unknown to anyone but the writer. [93B.5] The jury is to be given a specific warning304 about the weaknesses of hearsay evidence. The discretionary power in s 98 has been amended to cover evidence of “representations” as well as “statements”. [93B.6] When a statement is admitted under s 93B, evidence of other versions by the same person, and versions by other observers, is also admissible: s 93B(3). [93B.7]

Section 93B is available to both the prosecution and the defence.

[93B.8] Section 93B seems capable of dealing with the vexed question of “third party confessions”,305 but only in a “prescribed criminal proceeding”, and only when the absence of the third party is due to the reasons recognised in 296. R v Robertson [2015] QCA 11; R v Ambrosoli (2002) 55 NSWLR 603. 297. R v Polkinghorne (1999) 108 A Crim R 189. 298. [2002] QCA 173; see also R v Serratore (1999) 48 NSWLR 101; and R v McIntyre [2002] NSWCCA 29. 299. (2002) 133 A Crim R 206; see also R v Suteski (2002) 56 NSWLR 182. 300. [2004] QCA 176. 301. (1999) 108 A Crim R 189. 302. [1999] QB 919. 303. R v SCJ; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2015] QCA 123. 304. The warning was adequate in Cioban v The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 265; [2003] NSWCCA 304. 305. Described as an open question in Jones v The Queen (2009) 83 ALJR 671; [2009] HCA 17; Re Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 202-211; R v Blastland [1986] AC 41; R v Daylight (1989) 41 A Crim R 354; see also [Q.43] (footnote). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

477

s 93C

Documentary Hearsay

[93C.1] 306

s 93B(1)(b). Curiously, s 93B is not mentioned in R v Martin or R v Freer,307 in which third party admissions were admitted under common law. 93C

Warning and information for jury about hearsay evidence

(1) This section applies if evidence is admitted under section 93B (hearsay evidence) and there is a jury. (2) On request by a party, the court must, unless there are good reasons for not doing so— (a) warn the jury the hearsay evidence may be unreliable; and (b) inform the jury of matters that may cause the hearsay evidence to be unreliable; and (c) warn the jury of the need for caution in deciding whether to accept the hearsay evidence and the weight to be given to it. (3) It is not necessary for a particular form of words to be used in giving the warning or information. (4) This section does not affect another power of the court to give a warning to, or to inform, the jury. [S 93C insrt Act 43 of 2000, s 50]

[93C.1] This “warning” proviso is an attempt to moderate the further erosion of the hearsay rule by s 93B. Section 93C(2)(b) calls for a warning tailored to the circumstances of the case. Section 93C(3) should serve to discourage appeals based on fine semantic points. No request for a direction was made in R v Warradoo,308 and no miscarriage of justice was found.

94 Admissibility of evidence concerning credibility of persons responsible for statement (1) Where in any proceeding a statement is given in evidence by virtue of section 84, 92, 93 or 93A and a person who made the statement or supplied the information recorded in it is not called as a witness in the proceeding— (a) any evidence which, if that person had been so called, would be admissible for the purpose of destroying or supporting the person’s credibility as a witness shall be admissible for that purpose in that proceeding; (b) any evidence tending to prove that, whether before or after the person made that statement or supplied that information, the person made another statement or supplied other information (whether orally or in a document or otherwise) inconsistent therewith shall be admissible for the purpose of showing that the person has

306. (2002) 134 A Crim R 568; [2002] QCA 443. 307. [2004] QCA 97. 308. [2014] QCA 299.

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Evidence Law in Queensland

[94.3]

Part 6 – Admissibility of statements and representations

s 94

contradicted himself or herself; but nothing in paragraph (a) or (b) shall enable evidence to be given of any matter of which, if the person in question had been called as a witness and had denied that matter in cross-examination, evidence could not have been adduced by the cross-examining party. [Subs (1) am Act 37 of 2007, s 162 and Sch; Act 17 of 1989, s 65]

(2) Where in any proceeding a statement is given in evidence by virtue of section 84, 92, 93 or 93A and a person who made the statement or supplied the information recorded in it is not called as a witness in the proceeding any evidence proving that that person has been guilty of any indictable or other offence shall, with the leave of the court, be admissible in the proceeding to the same extent as if that person had been so called and on being questioned as to whether the person had been convicted of an indictable or other offence had denied the fact or refused to answer the question. [Subs (2) am Act 17 of 1989, s 65] [S 94 am Act 37 of 2007; Act 17 of 1989]

[94.1] Section 94 applies to evidence admitted under s 84, s 92, s 93 or s 93A when the maker of the document or the supplier of the information does not appear in court. It may extend to a s 93A statement because, while the party tendering such material must have the child available to testify, the child may not in fact be called: see [93A.15]. Section 93B has a similar provision.309 While other ancillary provisions in Pt 6 are limited to that Part, s 94 reaches back to s 84, in Pt 5. [94.2] The object of this turgid section is to compensate parties who are confronted by material admitted under s 84, s 92, s 93 or s 93A, and are unable to question the “source”. It caters for material, not otherwise admissible, indicating that the absent witness is biased, or has criminal convictions, or has made inconsistent statements orally, or in documents not otherwise admissible under Pt 6 – for example a business record that is not “ordinary” or (in a criminal case) hearsay that is not a record of a “trade or business”. A party against whom a deceased’s statement is admitted at common law has no such right.310 [94.3] If the absent witness made a contradictory statement that is admissible under s 84, s 92, s 93 or s 93A, the present section will not be needed.

309. See s 93B(3). 310. See [A.151]. In relation to those exceptions, it was observed that even if such a witness “babbled for the rest of his life” in contradiction of the written statement put in evidence, those oral contradictions would not be admissible: Stapylton v Clough (1853) 23 LJQB 5 per Campbell LCJ. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

479

s 95

Documentary Hearsay

[94.4]

[94.4] To avoid interminable trials the common law generally forbids rebuttal of answers to collateral questions.311 Section 94 impliedly refers to that rule as follows: [B]ut nothing … shall enable evidence to be given of any matter of which, if the person in question had been called … and had denied that matter … evidence could not have been adduced by the cross-examining party.

The intention is that a party who uses s 94 to attack a statement admitted under Pt 6 shall have no more or less room to adduce collateral material than if the absent witness testified in person and gave unhelpful answers to questions relevant only to credit. [94.5] Section 94 then makes room for three common law exceptions to the “finality rule”: (i) bias that is not admitted;312 (ii) convictions313 that are not admitted; and (iii) statements (oral or documentary) that are inconsistent with material already admitted under s 84, s 92, s 93 or s 93A. Accordingly a party relying on s 94 may canvass collateral issues, but only to the extent that would be allowed if the statement-maker appeared in person. [94.6] An inconsistent statement must be one that is “relative to the subject matter of the [present] proceeding”: s 18. For the purposes of ss 18 and 94, it may be oral or documentary: see the words bracketed in s 94(1)(b). [94.7] Material admitted under s 94 is evidence on the issues by virtue of s 101(2). 95 Admissibility of statements in documents or things produced by processes or devices (1) In a proceeding where direct oral evidence of a fact would be admissible, a statement contained in a document or thing produced wholly or partly by a device or process and tending to establish that fact is, subject to this part, admissible as evidence of that fact. (2) A court may presume the process or device produced the document or thing containing the statement if the court considers an inference can reasonably be made that the process or device, if properly used, produces a document or thing of that kind. (3) In a proceeding, a certificate purporting to be signed by a responsible person for the process or device and stating any of the following matters is evidence of the matter for the purpose of subsection (2)— (a) that the document or thing was produced wholly or partly by the process or device; 311. Attorney-General v Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch 91 at 99; Piddington v Bennett and Wood Pty Ltd (1940) 63 CLR 533. Piddington is an application of a wider rule that evidence in chief must be relevant to the issues and not go merely to the credit of the present witness or another witness: R v Roberts [1942] 1 All ER 187 at 191; R v Livingstone [1987] 1 Qd R 38. However, the exceptions to the finality rule may not be closed: see Natta v Canham (1991) 32 FCR 282; 104 ALR 143 at 298-299 (FCR); 161 (ALR). 312. Thomas v David (1836) 7 C & P 350; 173 ER 156; R v Umanski [1961] VR 242. 313. See [16.3].

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[95.2]

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s 95

(b)

that the document or thing was produced wholly or partly in a particular way by the process or device; (c) that, if properly used, the process or device produces documents or things of a particular kind; (d) any particulars relevant to a matter mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c). (4) A person who signs a certificate mentioned in subsection (3) commits an offence if— (a) a matter is stated in the certificate that the person knows is false or ought reasonably to know is false; and (b) the statement of the matter is material in the proceeding. Maximum penalty—20 penalty units or 1 year’s imprisonment. (5) If a party (the relying party) to a proceeding intends to rely on the certificate, the party must give a copy of the certificate to each other party to the proceeding— (a) at least 10 business days before the hearing day; or (b) if, in the particular circumstances, the court considers it just to shorten the period mentioned in paragraph (a)—by a later date allowed by the court. (6) If a party to the proceeding, other than the relying party, intends to challenge a matter stated in the certificate, the party must give the relying party notice in writing of the matter to be challenged— (a) at least 3 business days before the hearing day; or (b) if, in the particular circumstances, the court considers it just to shorten the period mentioned in paragraph (a)—by a later date allowed by the court. (7) In this section— hearing day means the day fixed for the start of the hearing of the proceeding. responsible person, for a process or device that produced a document or thing, means a person responsible, at or about the time the process or device produced the document or thing, for— (a) the operation of the process or device; or (b) the management of activities for which the document or thing was produced by the process or device. [S 95 subst Act 39 of 2014, s 54; am Act 58 of 1995; Act 88 of 1988; Act 2 of 1979]

Overview [95.1] Orignally, s 95 applied to civil proceedings only, but was extended to criminal cases by s 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1979. The present section was substituted for the (amended) 1977 version by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2014, s 54. [95.2] Earlier editions of this text described its definition of “computer” as unsophisticated. Possibly in response to that criticism, the draftsman has now © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

481

s 95

Documentary Hearsay

[95.3]

substituted the even vaguer phrase “device or process” for the word “computer”. The meaning of the new terminology could hardly be wider. It is not defined in the present section, or elsewhere in the amending Act. Nor is enlightenment to be found in any amendment to the Dictionary to the Evidence Act 1977. It appears that a workable definition must await judicial guidance.

Conditions of admissibility [95.3] The wording of s 95(1) resembles the preambles to ss 92 and 93. The following phrases are examined in other paragraphs, as follows: (i) “where direct or oral evidence would be admissible”:314 [92.12]; (ii) “a fact”: [92.15]; (iii) “in a document”: [92.17]; (iv) “tending to establish”: [92.18]; and (v) “shall be admissible as evidence of that fact”: [92.19]. The relevant “document or thing” has the benefit of the presumption in s 95(2), assisted by reference to a certificate described in s 95(3). [95.4] Notice in accordance with s 95(5) is required before reliance can be placed on a “document or thing” adduced under s 95(1). Notice is to consist of a copy of a certificate complying with s 95(3). The recipient of a s 95(5) notice may challenge a matter stated in the certificate at least three days before the hearing, or such shorter time as the court may allow: s 95(6). Certificates issued under the former s 95 were admitted to prove service of traffic offence notices in Carolan v Cohen315 and Van den Hoorn v Ellis.316 The reliability of a computer-generated “telephone trace” is considered in Chedzey v The Queen.317 [95.5] Many documents tendered under s 95 will be records of a business or “undertaking”,318 but this is not essential. A list of members of a political party was admitted under a similar provision in the Australian Capital Territory.319

Automatic data collection [95.6] Computer records may be generated by human activity or automatically. Section 95(2)(d) does not require the basic information to be supplied by a person: contrast ss 92(1)(b) and 93(1)(a). Accordingly, s 95 can admit information obtained from a device which records data automatically, such as a surveillance camera or breathalyser.320 In the Dictionary to this Act (Sch 3), “statement” is defined as including any representation of fact, whether made in words or otherwise and whether made by a person, computer or otherwise. Indeed, information supplied by a machine is 314. If the material fed in is itself second-hand or third-hand information (eg X tells Y that Z has ordered goods and Y enters this on the computer), it would not be admissible under s 95: Carusi v Housing Commission [1975] VR 139. (But consider ss 84, 92(1)(b) and 93.) 315. [2011] QDC 103. 316. [2010] QDC 451. 317. (1987) 30 A Crim R 451; Crowley-Smith, “The Evidence Act 1995: Should Computer Data Be Presumed Accurate?” (1996) 22 Mon LR 166. 318. ANZ Banking Group Ltd v Griffıths (1988) 49 SASR 385. 319. Punch v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (unreported, ACT Sup Ct, McGregor J, No 814 of 1976). 320. Castle v Cross [1984] 1 WLR 1372.

482

Evidence Law in Queensland

[95.8]

Part 6 – Admissibility of statements and representations

s 95

321

not really hearsay. The reason for rejecting data from a petrol pump in R v Wiles322 – that no person had first-hand knowledge of the data – does not apply to s 95.323 Microfiche records of computer-generated tax office data were admitted in DFC of T v Capron.324 In Rook v Maynard325 the defendant was charged with unauthorised access to a computer of the Department of Social Security. The court admitted printouts of computer-produced records showing the defendant’s password and the times when a person with that password examined the material in question. Computer “hacking” and misuse are now criminal offences.326

When admissible at common law [95.7] Section 95 is an enabling provision, not a code. At common law information from a computer can be made admissible by giving ordinary evidence of data fed into the device by a person using it as calculator, compiler or classifier, supported by expert evidence that it was working properly at the material time.327 In such cases the computer functions (so to speak) as a sophisticated version of a pencil and a slide rule. In R v Wood328 an expert used a computer to classify the results of metallurgical analyses in order to identify stolen property. Mehesz v Redman (No 2)329 involved blood-alcohol tests, and R v McHardie and Danielson330 concerned voiceanalysis tests to identify a blackmailer. Data on a computer constituted admissions in Markovina v The Queen,331 a drug-dealing case. Provided that the computer is properly programmed, the insertion of raw data and collection of the results need not be done by an expert.332

Other grounds of admissibility [95.8] Section 95 and the common law aside, information from a computer is often admissible as a book of account or ordinary business record under s 84, 321. R v Maynard (1993) 70 A Crim R 133; 126 ALR 150; The Statue of Liberty [1968] 2 All ER 195 (automatic recording from radar apparatus). 322. [1982] Crim LR 669. The decision in Wiles was described as “very technical” in R v Ewing [1983] QB 1039; 2 All ER 645, and was doubted in R v Wood (1982) 76 Cr App R 23 at 28-29. 323. The same comment applies to R v Pettigrew (1980) 71 Cr App R 39, which applied the English legislation to a computer printout of the numbers of stolen banknotes. 324. (1993) 93 ATC 4144. 325. (1993) 116 FLR 234; 2 Tas R 97. 326. Criminal Code, s 408D. 327. Mehesz v Redman (No 2) (1980) 26 SASR 244; R v Weatherall (1981) 27 SASR 238 at 247; R v Wood (1982) 76 Cr App R 23; R v McHardie and Danielson [1983] 2 NSWLR 733. 328. (1982) 76 Cr App R 23. 329. (1980) 26 SASR 244. 330. [1983] 2 NSWLR 733. 331. (1996) 16 WAR 354. 332. R v McHardie and Danielson [1983] 2 NSWLR 733. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

483

s 95A

Documentary Hearsay

[95.8]

333

s 92 or s 93. This may explain the dearth of Australian cases clearly based on s 95 (or similar provisions) alone.334 If a statement from a computer satisfies the requirements of another section, it need not satisfy s 95 as well.335 The computer printout in R v Ewing336 could have been tendered under s 84 or s 93 instead of s 95. 95A

DNA evidentiary certificate

(1) This section applies to a criminal proceeding. (2) A certificate, in the approved form, purporting to be signed by a DNA analyst and stating any of the following matters is evidence of the matter— (a) that a stated thing was received at a stated laboratory on a stated day; (b) that the thing was tested at the laboratory on a stated day or between stated days; (c) that a stated DNA profile has been obtained from the thing; (d) that the DNA analyst— (i) examined the laboratory’s records relating to the receipt, storage and testing of the thing, including any test process that was done by someone other than the DNA analyst; and (ii) confirms that the records indicate that all quality assurance procedures for the receipt, storage and testing of the thing that were in place in the laboratory at the time of the test were complied with. (3) If a party intends to rely on the certificate, the party must— (a) at least 10 business days before the hearing day, give a copy of the certificate to each other party; and (b) at the hearing, call the DNA analyst to give evidence. (4) If the responsible person for the laboratory receives a written request from a party for a copy of the laboratory’s records relating to the receipt,

333. R v Ewing [1983] QB 1039; 2 All ER 645; Griffıths v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1990) 53 SASR 256. 334. This profoundly disappoints a leading authority on documentary hearsay, who writes: “It is apparent from the paucity of case law surrounding computer-specific legislation in Australia … [and] the negative reaction of the courts … in the rare cases … that such statutes have been a marked failure … [This] arises first from the unrealistic complexity of … legislation, secondly, from the relative ease with which the common law can be used … and thirdly, from the clear unwillingness of counsel to come to grips with the legislation and argue its application” (Brown, Documentary Evidence in Australia (2nd ed, Law Book Co, 1996), p 366). 335. DFC of T v Capron (1993) 93 ATC 4144. Some relevant articles are: Tapper, “Evidence from Computers” (1974) 8 Georgia L Rev 562; Smith, “The Admissibility of Statements by Computer” [1982] Crim LR 387; Pengilley, “Machine Information: Is It Hearsay?” (1982) 13 MULR 617; Brown, “Computer-produced Evidence in Australia” (1984) 8 U Tas LR 46; Crowley-Smith, “The Evidence Act 1995: Should Computer Data Be Presumed Accurate?” (1996) 22 Mon LR 166; and Davidson, “Retaining Electronic Mail for Evidentiary Purposes” (1999) 19(6) Proctor 29. 336. [1983] QB 1039; 2 All ER 645: records of payments into account.

484

Evidence Law in Queensland

[95A.1]

Part 6 – Admissibility of statements and representations

s 95A

storage and testing of the thing, the responsible person must give the party a copy of the records within 7 business days after receiving the request. [Subs (4) am Act 1 of 2014, s 44(1) and (2)]

(5) If a party intends to challenge a matter stated in the certificate, the party must, at least 3 business days before the hearing day, give the responsible person and each other party notice, in the approved form, of the matter to be challenged. [Subs (5) am Act 1 of 2014, s 44(3)]

(6) A party challenging a matter stated in the certificate may, with the leave of the court, require the party relying on the certificate to call any person involved in the receipt, storage or testing of the thing to give evidence at the hearing. (7) The court may give leave only if the court is satisfied that— (a) an irregularity may exist in relation to the receipt, storage or testing of the thing about which the person to be called is able to give evidence; or (b) it is in the interests of justice that the person be called to give evidence. (8) Any equipment used in testing the thing at the laboratory is to be taken to have given accurate results in the absence of evidence to the contrary. (9) In this section— chief executive [Repealed] [Def rep Act 1 of 2014, s 44(4); subst Act 32 of 2011, s 332 and Sch 1 item 1 (subst Act 9 of 2012); am Act 48 of 2005, s 492 and Sch 1]

DNA analyst means a person who holds an appointment as a DNA analyst under section 133A. DNA profile means the result from DNA analysis. hearing day means the day fixed for the start of the hearing of the proceeding. party means the prosecution or a person charged in the proceeding. responsible person, for a laboratory, means— (a) if the commissioner of the police service has entered into a DNA arrangement with the laboratory under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, section 488B(1)—the chief executive officer, however described, of the laboratory; or (b) otherwise—the chief executive of the department within which the Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011 is administered. [Def insrt Act 1 of 2014, s 44(5)] [S 95A am Act 1 of 2014; Act 32 of 2011; Act 48 of 2005; insrt Act 23 of 2002, s 48]

[95A.1] This section was inserted by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2002, s 48 and amended by the Police Powers and Responsibilities and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2014, s 44. See also s 133A. Directions in relation to

© 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

485

s 96

Documentary Hearsay

[95A.2] 337

DNA evidence are discussed in Christie v The Queen. For other references to DNA, see [A.69], [A.75]n, [130.11]n, [130.74]n and [Q.24]. [95A.2] The prescribed forms of DNA certificate and Notice of Challenge appear in the Queensland Government Gazette (2 February 2007), pp 528, 532. [95A.3] It is not necessary to show that the witness conducted the testing in person.338 96

Inferences concerning admissibility

(1) For the purpose of deciding whether or not a statement is admissible in evidence by virtue of this part, the court may draw any reasonable inference from the form or contents of the document in which the statement is contained, or from any other circumstances. (2) For the purpose of deciding whether or not a statement is admissible in evidence by virtue of section 92 or 93, the court may, in deciding whether or not a person is fit to attend as a witness, act on a certificate purporting to be a certificate of a legally qualified medical practitioner.

Appearance of the document etc [96.1] See also s 5. Business documents do not “prove themselves” merely on production, and if there is a likelihood that their admissibility will be disputed, evidence of authenticity should be available.339 However, a question whether a document is admissible under Pt 6, or is authentic, may be answered by an inspection of the document340 and a consideration of relevant circumstances. The fact that a document is written on the letterhead of an established business may be enough to prove that it is a record of that business. The fact that the letter is one of a series found in an orderly filing system may indicate that it was made in the ordinary course of business. With the assistance of this section, a statement in police files was tendered in a civil case although neither the statement-maker nor the recording officer was available to identify it.341 The form and contents of a medical “consultation sheet” were allowed to speak for themselves in Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital.342

337. [2005] WASCA 55. 338. Compare Koushappis v Western Australia (2007) 168 A Crim R 51; [2007] WASCA 26. 339. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 191 FLR 385; 53 ACSR 752; [2005] NSWSC 417; Scott MacRae Investments Pty Ltd v Baylily Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 82 at [101]. 340. Beamish v The Queen [2005] WASCA 62 at [178]. Compare Tubby Trout Pty Ltd v Sailbay Pty Ltd (1992) 42 FCR 595; 113 ALR 748. 341. McKay v Hutchins [1990] 1 Qd R 533. 342. [1980] 2 NSWLR 542.

486

Evidence Law in Queensland

[97.1]

Part 6 – Admissibility of statements and representations

s 98

[96.2] A more egregious case is Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (Nos 15 and 16).343 A printed signature to the preface of a “ghost written” book was accepted as proof that the nominal author read and verified the long-lost manuscript. In Stanfield v Rosin,344 an earlier version of Pt 6 was satisfied by assuming that a cheque was attached to the corresponding butt (on which the relevant information was noted) at the time when it was signed.

Medical evidence re absent witness [96.3] A document purporting to be a medical certificate is prima facie evidence that the maker of a statement tendered under s 92 or s 93 is too ill to appear in person. In effect, hearsay may be used to show that other hearsay is admissible. An affidavit is not strictly necessary, but it does not follow that the certificate alone will always be sufficient proof of disability. [96.4] There is a general provision for hearsay in aid of admissibility of s 92 material in s 92(3). A foundation for tendering a “book of account” may be laid by using the procedures in ss 85 and 86. 97

Authentication

Where in any proceeding a statement contained in a document is proposed to be given in evidence by virtue of this part, it may be proved by the production of that document or (whether or not that document is still in existence) by the production of a copy of that document, or the material part thereof, authenticated in such manner as the court may approve. [97.1] The heading to s 97 is inept. In fact, it provides that a statement tendered under Pt 6 may be proved by producing either the original or a verified copy. If a copy is used, it is not necessary to show that the original no longer exists. In other words, the “original document” rule does not apply. Copies of books of account may be proved in accordance with s 86. 98

Rejection of evidence

(1) The court may in its discretion reject any statement or representation notwithstanding that the requirements of this part are satisfied with respect thereto, if for any reason it appears to it to be inexpedient in the interests of justice that the statement should be admitted. [Subs (1) am Act 43 of 2000, s 51]

(2) This section does not affect the admissibility of any evidence otherwise than by virtue of this part. [S 98 am Act 43 of 2000]

343. (1988) 14 NSWLR 107. 344. [1966] Qd R 10. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 98

Documentary Hearsay

[98.1]

[98.1] Broader discretions to exclude admissible evidence are considered in the notes to s 130. Section 98 is limited to evidence tendered under Pt 6. It does not apply to “books of account” because those provisions are in Pt 5, but s 130 is applicable to books of account as well as Pt 6 material. Section 98 may have been a placebo for lawyers to whom the Pt 6 reforms seemed too radical in 1938 and 1962.345 Discussion of s 98 was revived when s 93A arrived in 1989.346 [98.2] When material is admissible at common law and under Pt 6 (for example, a public document or a statement against interest by a person deceased) and the tender is made under the common law, s 98 is inapplicable. This point may occasionally be useful in civil proceedings, to which the broad “Christie discretion” does not apply.347 [98.3] No guidelines are prescribed for s 98, but the “more prejudicial than probative” mantra that governs the Christie discretion is probably suitable.348 Section 98 might also be used when it is so difficult or impossible for an opponent to test the material in question that it would be “oppressive” to let it in. Again, the judge may think that the evidence could and should have been obtained in a form open to cross-examination, such as evidence on commission349 or audio- or video-link. Section 98 might also be used to exclude material of little weight, which has been specifically prepared for the current proceedings. In some jurisdictions such material is simply inadmissible.350 [98.4] But once again it must be stressed that Pt 6 is remedial legislation,351 and that judges who think it is too liberal should not try to “repeal” it by over-zealous use of s 98.352 The High Court has condemned the use of judicial discretion to “subvert the policy of … legislation”.353 If a court does apply s 98, it should articulate the reasons for doing so.354 It is scarcely a sufficient reason that “no testimony is be considered as [sic] against the interests of a party unless that party has had an opportunity of … cross-examination” or that the evidence

345. See [92.3]. “1938” refers to the English Act, and “1962” to its adoption in Queensland. 346. R v Morris [1996] 2 Qd R 68; R v FAR [1996] 2 Qd R 49; [1995] QCA 330; R v Hellemons (unreported, Qld CA, 1 July 1997); see also [101.5]. 347. See [130.35]. 348. For a refinement of this shorthand phrase, see [130.4]. 349. Infields Ltd v Rosen [1939] 1 All ER 121. 350. See, eg, Atra v Farmers’ and Graziers’ Co-op Co Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 281; see also [F.46]. 351. Jarman v Lambert and Cooke Contractors [1951] 2 KB 937; Lenehan v Queensland Trustees Ltd [1965] Qd R 559. 352. Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542 at 571. 353. Papakosmos v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297 per Gleeson CJ and Hayne J at [40]; see also Ordukaya v Hicks [2000] NSWCA 180; and Vitali v Stachnik [2001] NSWSC 303 at [22] (decisions on the discretion to exclude “unfair” evidence under s 135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)). 354. On the discipline of reasoned adjudication, see, eg, Vinidex Tubemakers Pty Ltd v Marshall (1981) 5 P Sess Rev 2414; Davis v Davis; Wissing (Party Cited) (1963) 5 FLR 398 at 401; Pettitt v Dunkley [1971] 1 NSWLR 376.

488

Evidence Law in Queensland

[98.5]

Part 6 – Admissibility of statements and representations

s 98

355

relates to a “central issue”. If that were the case, how many Pt 6 documents would escape exclusion? The Queensland Court of Appeal has eschewed frequent reliance on s 98 where s 93A statements are concerned.356 As Pincus JA said in R v FAR:357 [C]ourts, whether or not in agreement with the policy of [s 93A], should in my opinion exercise the discretion to admit or exclude statements taken under it without any preconception that admission of such statements is unfair.

[98.5] Applications for rejection under s 98 were refused in O’Donnell v Dakin;358 Re Marra Developments Ltd;359 Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital;360 Compafina Bank v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group;361 Attorney-General (Qld) v Harvey362 and R v Hall363 (where s 101 was used in a criminal case). Material of slight value and prejudicial tendency was excluded in Ryan v Electricity Trust (SA) (No 2).364 A case in which s 98 should have been used is Thompson v Bella-Lewis.365 The trial judge, purporting to apply s 92, admitted an affidavit to prove that a will was duly executed, although the witness escaped cross-examination by claiming privilege against self-incrimination. This criticism has support in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Managed Investments Pty Ltd (No 7).366 A deceased valuer’s report, prima facie admissible under s 92(1)(a),367 was excluded in a Family Court case for lack of weight, because there were more recent reports by valuers who were available for cross-examination.368 The presence of a civil jury was the reason given for excluding material revealing hostility between the deceased and the plaintiff in Lenehan v Queensland Trustees Ltd.369 355. Supetina Pty Ltd v Lombok Pty Ltd (1984) 5 FCR 439; 59 ALR 581 at 446 (FCR); 587-588 (ALR). After all, Pt 6 evinces a clear legislative intention to receive certain evidence, although cross-examination is desired but is clearly impossible. However, it should be noted that there were other reasons given for exclusion in this case. 356. Inconsistencies in a child’s evidence are by no means always a justification for using s 98: R v Morris [1996] 2 Qd R 68. Section 98 exclusions of material admissible under s 93A should be “rare”, Attorney-General (Qld) v Harvey (2012) 263 FLR 433; [2012] QSC 173 at [18]. 357. R v FAR [1996] 2 Qd R 49 at 61; R v MBV (2013) 227 A Crim R 49; [2013] QCA 17. 358. [1966] Tas SR 87. 359. [1979] 2 NSWLR 193. 360. [1980] 2 NSWLR 542. 361. [1982] 1 NSWLR 409. 362. (2012) 263 FLR 433; [2012] QSC 173 at [44]: “high barrier”. 363. [1986] 1 Qd R 462. 364. (1987) 47 SASR 239. 365. [1997] 1 Qd R 429. 366. [2015] 2 Qd R 32; [2014] QSC 72 at [28]. 367. Prior to the enactment of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). 368. In the Marriage of Sorenson (unreported, Fam Ct of Aust FC), noted in Australian Family Lawyer, Vol 7 No 3, p 46. 369. [1965] Qd R 559 at 568. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

489

s 99

Documentary Hearsay

[98.6]

[98.6] The words “or representation” were inserted after “statement” in s 98(1) by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2000. This amendment followed the insertion of s 93B. 99

Withholding statement from jury room Where in a proceeding there is a jury, and a statement in a document is admitted in evidence under this part, and it appears to the court that if the jury were to have the document with them during their deliberations they might give the statement undue weight, the court may direct that the document be withheld from the jury during their deliberations. [99.1] Here a compromise is struck between technical admissibility and limited access to evidence by the jury. Section 99 embodies a lawyer’s belief that juries are prone to give documentary evidence undue weight.370 “If the general body of the evidence is given orally, a written transcript of part [of it] … in the jury room tends to give [it] an emphasis and perhaps an undue air of credibility.”371 Jurors are allowed to hear the evidence in court, but not to have the document before them while considering their verdict. Section 99 was applied to s 93A statements in R v Hardy372 and R v H.373 See also [23.1] concerning pre-trial depositions. Generally jurors are not allowed to retire with a videotape of testimony, lest they play it repeatedly and to the detriment of their memory of other evidence, particularly cross-examination.374 See also [133.3]. If permission to have the material in the jury room is given,375 the jury must be warned against giving the recorded material disproportionate weight.376 Compare the treatment of evidence on commission: see [23.2]. But this restriction does not apply to a videotape of an identification parade, or of an offence actually being committed.377 In R v Le378 there was no mistrial when the jury was allowed to take to their room a transcript of a police interview with the defendant, as distinct from a record of the complainant’s evidence. [99.2] The presence of unauthorised material in a jury room may lead to an order for a new trial.379 370. See DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421 at 456; Driscoll v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 517. Cases dealing specifically with the s 99 discretion are: R v Bradshaw (1978) 18 SASR 83; R v Stephenson (1978) 18 SASR 381; R v Thomas (1992) 9 CRNZ 113. 371. Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 189 per Mason CJ, Brennan and Deane JJ; R v Gao [2012] QCA 54. 372. (Unreported, Qld Dist Ct, Noud DCJ, 26 February 1990). 373. [1999] 2 Qd R 283; see also R v BAH (2002) 135 A Crim R 150. 374. R v O [1996] 3 NZLR 295; R v NZ (2005) 63 NSWLR 628; [2005] NSWCCA 278 (5 member court); R v Tichowitsch [2007] 2 Qd R 262 at 269. 375. As to the discretion to allow pre-recorded statements to go to the jury room, see [93A.19]; R v Smith [2015] 2 Qd R 452; [2014] QCA 277. 376. R v KAH [2012] QCA 154; R v FAE [2014] QCA 69. 377. R v Davies (2005) 153 A Crim R 217; [2005] VSCA 90. 378. (2007) 173 A Crim R 450; [2007] QCA 259; R v Smith [2015] 2 Qd R 452; [2014] QCA 277 (DVD of interview relevant to credit). 379. Barker v The Queen (1983) 153 CLR 338.

490

Evidence Law in Queensland

[100.2]

Part 6 – Admissibility of statements and representations

s 101

100 Corroboration For the purpose of any rule of law or practice requiring evidence to be corroborated or regulating the manner in which uncorroborated evidence is to be treated, a statement rendered admissible as evidence by this part shall not be treated as corroboration of evidence given by the maker of the statement or the person who supplied the information from which the record containing the statement was made. [100.1] A witness is not usually allowed to give evidence in chief of an earlier statement consistent with his or her testimony; it is regarded as an unreliable and time-wasting form of self-accreditation.380 Exceptions to this rule are created by ss 92 and 93A.381 [100.2] Section 100 applies only where corroboration is required as a matter of law or practice. Such requirements are now rare, even in criminal proceedings: see [9D.2]. 101 Witness’s previous statement, if proved, to be evidence of facts stated (1) Where in any proceeding— (a) a previous inconsistent or contradictory statement made by a person called as a witness in that proceeding is proved by virtue of section 17, 18 or 19; or (b) a previous statement made by a person called as aforesaid is proved for the purpose of rebutting a suggestion that the person’s evidence has been fabricated; that statement shall be admissible as evidence of any fact stated therein of which direct oral evidence by the person would be admissible. (2) Subsection (1) shall apply to any statement or information proved by virtue of section 94(1)(b) as it applies to a previous inconsistent or contradictory statement made by a person called as a witness which is proved as mentioned in subsection (1)(a). (3) Nothing in this part shall affect any of the rules of law relating to the circumstances in which, where a person called as a witness in any proceeding is cross-examined on a document used by the person to refresh the person’s memory, that document may be made evidence in that proceeding, and where a document or any part of a document is received in evidence in any such proceeding by virtue of any such rule of law, any statement made in that document or part by the person using the document to refresh the person’s memory shall by virtue of this subsection be admissible as evidence of any fact stated therein of which direct oral evidence by the person would be admissible.

380. R v Parker (1783) 3 Doug 242; 99 ER 364; R v Roberts [1942] 1 All ER 187; Fox v General Medical Council [1960] 1 WLR 1017; 3 All ER 225 at 1024-1025 (WLR); 230 (ER). 381. See [92.26]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

491

s 101

Documentary Hearsay

[101.1]

A fiction abandoned [101.1] Section 101 makes several kinds of pre-trial statements evidence on the issues, although they merely went to credit at common law.382 Formerly, if the testimony of a witness was rejected because of an inconsistent statement, and there was no other (non-hearsay) evidence in point, there was no evidence one way or the other. It may be doubted whether this highly artificial doctrine was consistently applied by jurors or by lawyers. Whether juries were able to appreciate, and in practice observe the distinction between evidence going only to credit and evidence going to the issues may be doubted. [In 1977] the legislature was evidently not confident that they did.383

It was condemned by the Australian Law Reform Commission as a “pious fraud” and a “mere verbal ritual … not easily appreciated by a jury”384 and by an experienced criminal court judge as “gobbledegook”.385 Almost 40 years ago its abolition was advocated by W B Campbell QC, later Chief Justice of Queensland, without success.386 [101.2] Prior consistent and inconsistent statements, statements admitted under s 94 and (in certain circumstances) notes used to “refresh memory”,387 are now evidence of what they assert.388 Section 101 makes this unsworn389 material admissible evidence of facts in issue. The prior statement must first be made admissible according to other parts of this Act (for example s 17, s 19, s 92 or s 93) or the common law.390 Its weight is then a matter for the judge of fact.391 Was it made on oath? How soon after the event was it made? If it is an inconsistent statement, what explanation has been given for the change of story?

382. R v Golder, Jones and Porritt [1960] 1 WLR 1169; 3 All ER 457 at 1172 (WLR); 459 (ER); R v Pearson [1964] Qd R 471; R v Cox [1972] Qd R 366; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Managed Investments Pty Ltd (No 8) [2014] QSC 204. 383. R v Hall [1986] 1 Qd R 462 at 464 per McPherson J. 384. ALRC, Interim Report No 26, 1985, para 334. 385. Roden (later Roden J), “Criminal Evidence – The Law and Gobbledegook”, Proceedings of the Institute of Criminology No 48, Criminal Evidence Law Reform (Univ of Syd, 1981), p 24. There is a telling criticism in a “Letter to the Editor” in (1992) 66 ALJ 318. For critical comment by a trial judge of demands by appeal courts on juries, see the Note in (1991) 65 ALJ 698. 386. “Recent and Suggested Reform in the Law of Evidence” (1967-1968) 8 WA Law Rev 61 at 75. 387. Attorney-General (Qld) v Colin Lovitt QC [2003] QSC 279 at [37]. 388. R v Hall [1986] 1 Qd R 462 at 469; Bond v Cerruto [2003] QCA 219; Hornberg v Horrobin [1997] QSC 207; R v Jobling (2011) 220 A Crim R 74; [2011] QCA 31 at [23]; R v Wardle [2011] QCA 339 at [49]. (In a civil case s 92 may have the same effect: Q v Australian Red Cross Society [1992] 1 VR 19.) 389. Occasionally the prior statement will be one made on oath: Popiw v Popiw [1959] VR 197. 390. A point overlooked by the court below in Al Shakarji v Mulhern [2010] QDC 476. 391. Urbano v The Queen (1983) 9 A Crim R 170; R v Jobling (2011) 220 A Crim R 74; [2011] QCA 31 at [23]; R v Perera [1986] 2 Qd R 431 at 437 per Williams J: “It should be noted that s 102 … implies that in many (perhaps even in most) situations evidence of the type in question may be regarded as having lesser weight or significance than other evidence.”

492

Evidence Law in Queensland

[101.3]

Part 6 – Admissibility of statements and representations

s 101

Unfortunately, the “gobbledegook” that formerly bedevilled the law of inconsistent statements survives in other areas. Evidence of prior convictions, admitted under s 15(2)(c), is supposed to go to credit, but not to guilt,392 and the same dichotomy governs evidence of a “preliminary complaint”.393 Evidence of motive, we are told, is not evidence of propensity.394 Evidence in joint trials must often be kept in separate compartments. A jury may be expected to apply similar fact evidence to some charges, but not to others.395 On one hand, juries are expected to perform these mental gymnastics while, on the other, they are patronised by the character evidence rule and the process of discretionary exclusion. Summings-up devoted to fine distinctions may be more for the benefit of the trial judge in a court of appeal than for the citizens in the jury room.396 A High Court judge observed: The presumption that jurors understand, and act upon judicial directions about the law is deeply entrenched in the law. It is based on pragmatic considerations rather than psychological truth.397

However, complicated directions to juries serve as “insurance” against an appeal to a High Court that increasingly intervenes in State criminal matters. Presumably the irony of these High Court dicta is unconscious: Nothing is more likely to discredit and undermine the institution of trial by jury than a requirement that a trial judge explain to the jury matters of law in terms which are unlikely to be understood or retained by them.398

While rules of evidence imply an unflattering estimate of jurors,399 those worthies, however perplexed and quarantined from relevant information, offer judges relief from responsibility in the more “exposed” areas of judicial activity.

Inconsistent statements [101.3] Inconsistent statements receive the benefit of s 101 when they are admitted under s 17,400 s 18 or s 19. The judge of fact then decides whether to prefer the version contained in the prior statement or the evidence given in court.401 However, if a witness admits making an inconsistent statement, it is not

392. Donnini v The Queen (1972) 128 CLR 114; Phillips v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 45 at 57. 393. Kilby v The Queen (1973) 129 CLR 460; see also [A.154]. 394. See [A.136]. 395. R v M, BJ (2011) 110 SASR 1; [2011] SASCFC 50. 396. A new and refreshingly candid Supreme Court Judge admitted extrajudicially in 1992: “For a number of members of the court the first summing-up to a jury which they heard was their own as a judge sitting in crime. The situation seems to be that one sums up first to the Court of Appeal, then to the High Court, and finally, if they are still awake, to the members of the jury.” 397. KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221 per Kirby J, in relation to separate consideration of each charge in a joint trial of multiple charges. 398. Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87 at 103 per curiam. In R v Thornley [1998] VR 888, eg, the jury was seriously expected to compartmentalise evidence on ten counts of indecency from nine complainants! 399. See “What the [R v Lewis] Jury Didn’t Hear”, Courier Mail (7 August 1991), p 3. 400. R v Jobling (2011) 220 A Crim R 74; [2011] QCA 31 at [23]. 401. R v Perera [1986] 2 Qd R 431. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

493

s 101

Documentary Hearsay

[101.4]

402

one proved “by virtue of section 17, 18 or 19” and s 101 may not apply.403 There is no rule that a jury must be instructed that a witness who has made conflicting statements is unreliable.404 In Simon-Beecroft v Proprietors Top of the Mark BUP405 s 101(1)(a) served to prove an admission. A witness for the defendant, in an earlier statement, claimed to have heard an admission by the plaintiff, but professed “no recollection” of it at the trial. (There is “inconsistency” when a witness simply denies, or claims to have forgotten, the substance of a prior statement.)406 Judging the prior statement more likely to be the truth, the court found that the plaintiff’s accident did not occur as alleged, and gave judgment for the defendant. [101.4] On the other hand, if the judge of fact prefers the present testimony, and parts of an inconsistent statement support it, the latter may be treated as corroborative.407

Section 101 in criminal proceedings [101.5] Section 101 applies to “any proceeding”, and in a criminal trial a prior statement by a prosecution witness who is declared hostile may tend to prove the charge.408 This was a significant change,409 but for more than a decade it excited little comment.410 The legal culture-lag ended in the mid-1980s when there was a sudden flurry of cases critical of s 101 and its implications regarding hostile Crown witnesses, and seeking the second-guessing of related convictions as “unsafe and unsatisfactory”. The complaint was that prosecutors should not be able to call witnesses known or suspected to be hostile so as to tender their earlier, more helpful statements under s 101. In R v Hall,411 and again in R v Andrews,412 the Court of Criminal Appeal declined to lay down a general rule that the Crown should not call such 402. As required by s 101(1)(a). 403. R v Schultz (unreported, Qld CCA, 19 April 1991) per Thomas J, obiter. 404. R v Morris [1987] 1 Qd R 370. 405. [1997] 2 Qd R 635; [1996] QCA 239. 406. R v Williams [2001] 2 Qd R 442. 407. R v Kehagias [1985] VR 107. 408. R v Lawrie [1986] 2 Qd R 502 at 505; Meiers v Button (unreported, Qld CCA, 15 March 1988) (no error by magistrate in convicting upon s 101 material). 409. R v Mursic [1980] Qd R 482 at 485; R v Hall [1986] 1 Qd R 462 at 464 and 467; cf Taylor v The King (1918) 25 CLR 573; Hammer v Hoffnung & Co Ltd (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 280; Alchin v Commissioner for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 at 509; R v Rose [1977] Qd R 280. The interim report No 26 of the Australian Law Reform Commission on the Evidence Bill (at p 171) quotes Sir Stanley Burbury, former Chief Justice of Tasmania, to the Law Reform Committee of that State: “I have often been impatient of the rule that a prior inconsistent statement goes only to credit … A judge may be convinced that the witness was telling the truth before the magistrate and has been ‘got at’ since.” 410. R v Mursic [1980] Qd R 482; R v Ghion [1982] Qd R 781; R v Neville [1985] 2 Qd R 398; R v Lawrie [1986] 2 Qd R 502; R v Siedofsky [1989] 1 Qd R 655. 411. [1986] 1 Qd R 462. 412. [1987] 1 Qd R 21.

494

Evidence Law in Queensland

[101.6]

Part 6 – Admissibility of statements and representations

s 101

413

witnesses. In R v Siedofsky there was enough supporting evidence to render a conviction for indecent dealing safe and satisfactory. But in R v Nguyen,414 encouraged by dicta in Blewitt v The Queen,415 there were renewed efforts to have s 101 limited to civil proceedings. In Nguyen the appeal was allowed because the only evidence of guilt consisted of prior statements by two witnesses aged 17. Attempts at judicial amendment of s 101 continued in R v Parkinson,416 where it was said that a conviction based wholly or largely upon s 101 material would “almost inevitably” be “unsafe”,417 and that judges should advise prosecutors to withdraw cases of that kind. But eventually it was realised that Blewitt came from a jurisdiction in which the prior statement was only evidence as to credit – as the High Court acknowledged in Adam v The Queen.418 It was held in R v Williams419 that it is not improper for the Crown to call a hostile witness with an eye on s 101. That is the position under the Commonwealth Act.420 Inconsistent statements admitted under s 93A have been more gently treated: see [93A.17]. [101.6] The defence interest represented in R v Nguyen421 is balanced by the public interest in curbing criminal activity and the perception that pressures on Crown witnesses to change or “forget” statements to police have increased in recent years, particularly in cases of drug-related422 crime. After all, one kind of “hostile” witness is a fearful witness. Sections 98 and 130 confer ample power to curb unfair prosecution tactics, without curtailing s 101 in the manner suggested.423 It may well be in the interests of justice to make a jury aware of a statement that was made before a prosecution witness experienced peer group pressure or fear of reprisals, or simply became fed up with long-delayed, repetitive hearings and multiple cross-examinations.424 413. [1989] 1 Qd R 655. A similar case is R v Hosking (unreported, Qld CCA, 31 January 1990) (appeal dismissed). 414. [1989] 2 Qd R 72. 415. (1988) 62 ALJR 503. 416. [1990] 1 Qd R 382. 417. On “unsafe and unsatisfactory” verdicts generally, see Morris v The Queen (1987) 163 CLR 454; R v Stewart; Ex parte Attorney General [1989] 1 Qd R 590; R v Brauer [1990] 1 Qd R 332. 418. (2001) 207 CLR 96. 419. [2001] 2 Qd R 442; R v Lam (No 11) [2005] VSC 285 at [31]. 420. R v Adam (1999) 47 NSWLR 267, referring to the combined effect of ss 38 and 60 of the Commonwealth legislation; see also R v Parkes (2003) 147 A Crim R 450; [2003] NSWCCA 12. 421. [1989] 2 Qd R 72: see [101.5]. 422. For example, R v Wakeley [1994] 2 Qd R 196, although in that particular case the witness’s reasons for changing his story (in two pre-trial statements) were said to be “plausible”. 423. R v Neville [1985] 2 Qd R 398; R v Kern [1986] 2 Qd R 209 at 214; Blewitt v The Queen (1988) 62 ALJR 503 at 505. 424. By letter dated 4 April 1990 the then Attorney-General and Minister for Justice acknowledged receipt of a submission by the present writer and informed him that proposals to restrict s 101 to civil cases had been rejected. The following newspaper report, which accompanied the submission to leave s 101 intact, may have been persuasive: “Murder Trial Witnesses in Kidnap”, Courier Mail (12 March 1990). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

495

s 101

Documentary Hearsay

[101.7]

Section 101 assisted the defence in R v Condren; Ex parte Attorney-General,425 where it made a “third party confession”426 admissible.

Prior consistent statements [101.7] At common law a prior consistent statement may enhance or reinstate credit, but it is not evidence of the facts asserted427 unless it is so closely associated with the event in question as to be part of the res gesta.428 Section 101(1)(b) abolishes that distinction. The subsection predicates that an earlier statement, consistent with the witness’s testimony, has been admitted at common law to rebut a suggestion of “recent429 fabrication” – that is, an accusation or insinuation that the witness has consciously or subconsciously changed his or her story because of some motive arising between the subject event and the trial. In such a case, the making of a prior consistent statement may be proved by the witness who made it, with or without supporting evidence on that point.430 In Campbell v Burrows Engineering,431 in response to a suggestion of recent invention, the plaintiff workman was allowed to tender his pre-trial complaint about the provision of unsafe equipment. In R v TAB432 the complainant was allowed to give evidence of a prior statement about the sexual assault in question. In R v NRC (No 2)433 a prior statement by a young child was admitted to rebut the suggestion that she was “coached” to accuse the defendant of sexual assault. But by no means is every attack on credit a charge of recent invention.434 It is for the judge to decide whether that has been suggested, considering the tone as well as the content of the cross-examination.435 Before admitting a prior consistent statement, the judge should consider its proximity to the events in issue and whether the suggested motive to distort existed before it was made.436

425. [1991] 1 Qd R 574 at 585. 426. Not normally admissible at common law: R v Blastland [1986] AC 41. 427. Transport & General Insurance Co Ltd v Edmondson (1961) 106 CLR 23. 428. R v Fowkes (1856) The Times Law Report, 8 March 1856. 429. “Recent” is a misnomer. The rule covers any fabrication between the time of the event and the hearing: Wentworth v Rogers (No 10) (1987) 8 NSWLR 398 at 401. 430. Nominal Defendant v Clements (1960) 104 CLR 476 at 476-489; Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1967] VR 263 at 274; R v Shum (1968) 62 QJPR 35; R v DJT [1998] VSC 320. 431. (2002) 82 SASR 75. 432. [2002] NSWCCA 274. 433. (2001) 124 A Crim R 580. 434. Smith v Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 552; Eaton v Nominal Defendant (Qld) (1995) 21 MVR 357. 435. Transport & General Insurance Co Ltd v Edmondson (1961) 106 CLR 23 at 29. 436. R v Benjamin (1913) 8 Cr App R 146; Britton v Commissioner for Road Transport (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 249 at 251; Francombe v Holloway [1957] VR 139; Higgins v Donnelly and Dorries (1965) Qd R 389; Nominal Defendant v Clements (1960) 104 CLR 476; Leeks v XY (2008) 21 VR 118; [2008] VSCA 21.

496

Evidence Law in Queensland

[101.12]

Part 6 – Admissibility of statements and representations

s 101

Section 94 material [101.8] Section 94(1)(b) admits inconsistent statements (oral or documentary) to test the credit of statements admitted under s 84, s 92, s 93 or s 93A. By virtue of s 101(2), a statement admitted under s 94 is evidence of facts within the maker’s own knowledge. However, if it complies with s 84, s 92, s 93 or s 93A, it does not need the assistance of s 101.

Notes to refresh memory [101.9] Section 103(3) predicates the common law on “contemporary notes”: see [A.84]. Generally a witness must not mention a prior consistent statement in chief, but an exception is made for aides-memoire in the form of notes made by or on behalf of the witness during or soon after the events in question.437 Strictly speaking, the note should not be read onto the record,438 but in practice this rule is often relaxed, particularly for expert witnesses.439 [101.10] The opponent may require the note to be put in evidence, but as it usually supports the witness, that is seldom done unless the witness significantly departs from it, or misrepresents its contents.440 If the opponent’s crossexamination goes beyond the parts used in chief, the party who called the witness may then require the opponent to tender the note, if that seems advantageous.441 A Victorian case holds that this right must be exercised before the crossexamination ends,442 but that is not the practice in Queensland.443 [101.11] The effect of s 101(3) is that if a “note to refresh” goes into evidence in one of the ways described in [101.10], it is evidence of facts within the note-maker’s personal knowledge.

Section 101 and oral hearsay [101.12] Prior consistent and inconsistent statements that are not documented may be used to test credit at common law444 and may become evidence on the issues by virtue of s 101.

437. Gorman v Newton; Ex parte Newton (1958) Qd R 169; R v Richardson [1971] 2 QB 484; R v Van Beelen (1972) 6 SASR 534 at 537; Woodcock v Nichol (1976) 13 ALR 411; R v Singh (1977) 15 SASR 591; R v McGregor [1984] 1 Qd R 256. 438. Hetherington v Brooks [1963] SASR 321. Note, however, that in a civil case a “note to refresh” may be admissible in chief by virtue of s 84 or 92. 439. R v Baffıgo [1957] VR 303; Ex parte Bennett; Re Cunningham (1967) 86 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 323 at 333. 440. Dairy Farmers Co-operative Milk Co Ltd v Acquilina (1963) 109 CLR 458. 441. Payne v Ibbotson (1858) 27 LJ Ex 341; R v Harrison [1966] VR 72; R v McGregor [1984] 1 Qd R 256. 442. Hatziparadissis v GFC (Manufacturing) Pty Ltd [1978] VR 181; criticised in R v Vella (2006) 167 A Crim R 66; [2006] VSCA 248. 443. R v McGregor [1984] 1 Qd R 256; Re Foggo [1989] 2 Qd R 49; Alexander v Manley (2004) 29 WAR 194; [2004] WASCA 140 at [10]. 444. See ss 18 and 94(1)(b). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

497

s 102

Documentary Hearsay

[102.1]

102 Weight to be attached to evidence In estimating the weight (if any) to be attached to a statement rendered admissible as evidence by this part, regard shall be had to all the circumstances from which an inference can reasonably be drawn as to the accuracy or otherwise of the statement, including— (a) the question whether or not the statement was made, or the information recorded in it was supplied, contemporaneously with the occurrence or existence of the facts to which the statement or information relates; and (b) the question whether or not the maker of the statement, or the supplier of the information recorded in it, had any incentive to conceal or misrepresent the facts. [102.1] It is doubtful whether s 102 adds anything to a fact-finder’s powers at common law,445 but it serves as a reminder that statutes rendering hearsay admissible do not necessarily make it acceptable. This provision should not be a covert method of ignoring authorities that disapprove excessive use of s 98. Section 102 has been invoked in several cases in which it was argued that convictions based on statements admitted under Pt 6 were “unsafe and unsatisfactory”.446 In Nominal Defendant v Chaffey447 a statement admitted under s 92 was not contemporaneous with the events in question and reflected a version of events which benefited the fourth defendant by not exposing her to liability. Section 102 was applied. In Mackay v Pearce448 evidence was discounted because of the absence of cross-examination and the presence of a motive to lie. (It is submitted that the first reason, if generally applied, would unduly weaken the effect of s 92.) In Miccon Hire Pty Ltd (in liq) v Birla Mt Gordon Pty Ltd449 the statement maker “could have given evidence at least by telephone, [and then] his version could have been tested by cross-examination”. In Kirkby v Coote450 the absent builder made his statement when he was aware that he might be held responsible for the subsidence in question. Contemporaneity was a favourable element in Safco v BHP.451 Another positive application may be seen in Matton Developments Pty Ltd v CGU Insurance Ltd.452 A s 92 statement was preferred to oral evidence in Edwards v Nominal Defendant.453

445. Compare R v Flynn [2010] QCA 254 at [56]. 446. Including R v Perera [1986] 2 Qd R 431 (direction under s 101 should also conform to s 102); R v Siedofsky [1989] 1 Qd R 655 (ample directions under s 102, appeal dismissed); R v Hosking (unreported, Qld CCA, 31 January 1990) (ample directions under s 102, appeal dismissed); R v Webster [1996] QCA 246. 447. (2011) 58 MVR 1; [2011] QSC 88. 448. [2007] QSC 195. 449. [2013] QSC 139. 450. [2005] QSC 197. 451. [1998] QSC 64. 452. [2015] QSC 72 at [65], [69]. 453. [2006] QCA 475.

498

Evidence Law in Queensland

[103.1]

Part 6 – Admissibility of statements and representations

s 103

Section 102 applies to statements admitted under s 93A, although the latter section was enacted later than s 102.454 In a jury trial it is for the jury, properly instructed, to decide the weight of the evidence.455 [102.2] A relevant consideration is whether the evidence, albeit admissible, should have been given in some other and better form.456 [102.3] Unfortunately, the power to determine “weight” can be used as a covert alternative to s 98 or 130. Lawyers may be induced to abandon good points of evidence by a judge who senses that an appeal is unlikely. There is a certain tension between maintaining good relations with the Bench and acting in the interests of a client who may never be seen again. The following anecdote in a barristers’ newsletter has a certain point: Smart of Counsel: Your Honour, I tender the signed statement under s 92 of the Evidence Act. Bullingham J: Do you mean to tell me that you can tender an unsworn document instead of calling the witness? Smart: Yes, if the conditions of s 92 are satisfied, as here – in my submission – they clearly are. Bullingham J (muttering darkly to self): Well it may be admissible, as you say, but it has no value. You had better tender a paperweight as well.

103 Provisions of part are alternative Sections 92 to 95 and 101 shall be construed as in aid of and as alternative to one another, any other provision in any other part, and any other law practice or usage with respect to the admissibility in evidence of statements. [S 103 am Act 17 of 1989, s 66]

[103.1] Part 6 is remedial. It does not affect any other rule of admissibility. So, for example, a document of an “undertaking” may be admissible not only under Pt 6 but also as a public document, and a deceased witness’s statement admissible under s 92 may also be admissible at common law.457 If there is a choice between a common law rule and Pt 6, and the common law is chosen, s 98 does not apply.458 But considering the scope for judicial autocracy in non-jury trials, this may be of academic interest only.

454. R v Flynn [2010] QCA 254. 455. R v Jobling (2011) 220 A Crim R 74; [2011] QCA 31. 456. Andrews v Cordiner [1947] 1 KB 655; Ozzard-Low v Ozzard-Low and Wonham [1953] P 272. 457. Lenehan v Queensland Trustees Ltd [1965] Qd R 559. 458. See [130.35]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

499

MACHINE COPIES TREATED AS ORIGINALS Part 7 – Reproductions of Documents DIVISION 1 – PRELIMINARY 104 Definitions for part In this part— affidavit includes statutory declarations. business includes any undertaking. machine copy, in relation to a document, means a copy of the document made by a machine performing a process— (a) involving the production of a latent image of the document (not being a latent image on photosensitive material on a transparent base) and the development of that image by chemical means or otherwise; or (b) that, without the use of photosensitive material, produces a copy of the document simultaneously with the making of the document. minister [Repealed] [Def rep Act 76 of 1993, s 3 and Sch 1; subst Act 80 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1]

original document means— (a) when referred to in connection with the production of a document in answer to legal process issued by a court, the document that would, if this part had not been enacted, be required to be produced in answer to that process; or (b) when referred to in connection with the admissibility of a document in evidence in a proceeding— (i) a document that would, if this part had not been enacted, be admissible in evidence in that proceeding in lieu of another document where a party to the proceeding failed to produce that other document in response to notice to do so given to the party by another such party; or (ii) any other document that would, if this part had not been enacted, be admissible in evidence in that proceeding. reproduction in relation to a document means a machine copy of the document or a print made from a transparency of the document and reproduce and any derivatives thereof have a corresponding meaning. transparency, in relation to a document, means— (a) a developed negative or positive photograph of that document (an original photograph) made on a transparent base by means of light reflected from, or transmitted through, the document; or

500

Evidence Law in Queensland

[104.5]

Division 1 – Preliminary

s 104

(b)

a copy of an original photograph made by the use of photosensitive material (being photosensitive material on a transparent base) placed in surface contact with the original photograph; or (c) any 1 of a series of copies of an original photograph, the first of the series being made by the use of photosensitive material (being photosensitive material on a transparent base) placed in surface contact with a copy referred to in paragraph (b) of this definition, and each succeeding copy in the series being made, in the same manner, from any preceding copy in the series.

[S 104 am Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1; Act 76 of 1993; Act 80 of 1990]

Overview [104.1] Part 7 replaces the repealed Evidence (Reproductions) Act 1970. It is complicated by the fact that the present Act, unlike the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), retains the original document rule, although the old fear of erroneous hand-copying has little point in this age of photocopiers and similar means of reproduction. However, there is now a wide discretion, in civil cases, to allow any document to be proved, if it be a fact in issue, “in any way the court directs”.1 Indeed, it is said that, in civil cases at least, the best evidence rule has been consigned to the history books.2 [104.2] The object of Pt 7 is to adapt the rules of documentary evidence to modern methods of preserving documents in space-saving forms, such as microfilm or microfiche. The common law rule here modified is not the rule against hearsay (contrast Pt 6), but the “best evidence” rule,3 now confined to traditional paper writings.4

“Affidavit” [104.3] This definition enlarges the usual meaning of the word. Compare the assimilation of statutory declarations to affidavits in ss 85(2) and 86(2).

“Business” [104.4] For the meaning of “undertaking”, see the Dictionary. Here “business” includes an “undertaking”, and so has a wider meaning than in s 93.

“Machine-copy” [104.5] This term includes photographs, micro-photographs and photostat copies, whether or not a negative image intervenes between the original and the copy. 1. See s 129A, inserted by the Civil Proceedings Act 2011, s 146. 2. Donovan v TIC Realty Pty Ltd [2011] QCA 90 at [28]; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 394. 3. The Queen’s Case (1820) 2 B & B 284; 129 ER 976; MacDonnell v Evans (1852) 11 CB 930; Morgan v Babcock & Wilcox Ltd (1929) 43 CLR 163 at 172 and 179; Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Young (1962) 106 CLR 535 at 556-557; Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (No 21) (1988) 14 NSWLR 128; Semple v Noble (1988) 49 SASR 356; and see [A.11]. 4. Kajala v Noble (1982) 75 Cr App R 149; Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

501

s 105

Machine copies treated as originals

[104.6]

“Original document” [104.6] By virtue of s 104(b) this phrase includes many documents that are not originals in the ordinary sense. It accommodates secondary evidence at common law: see [3.15]. In view of this definition, the phrase “copy of an original document” in s 106(1) includes a copy of a copy, provided that the first copy is admissible otherwise than by virtue of Pt 7. Absent Pt 7, there would still be many copies “admissible in evidence”: see, for example, ss 48, 51, 53, 55, 68, 69, 74, 84(b) and 97. [104.7] Section 104(b)(i) of this definition refers to the rule of civil procedure allowing proof by means of a copy if the opponent fails to produce the original in response to a notice to produce.5 This procedure is unnecessary when a Pt 7 document is relied on: see s 116(b).

“Reproduction” [104.8] See the definition of “machine-copy”. It is not essential that the reproduction be taken direct from the original.

“Transparency” [104.9] This may be a negative, or a direct copy of a negative or a copy of a print made from a negative: see cll (b) and (c) in the above definition; and [104.6]. DIVISION 2 – REPRODUCTION OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 105 Certified reproductions of certain official documents etc. to be admissible without further proof (1) In this section— approved person means— (a) a person the Minister declares by gazette notice to be an approved person; or (b) where an original document to which this section relates is a document filed in a court or the official record of a proceeding, the registrar or other proper officer of the court in which the document was filed or before which the proceeding took place. [Def am Act 82 of 1997, s 36; Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1; Act 71 of 1984, s 2]

(2) A person shall not fail or cease to be an approved person by reason only of a misdescription or an abbreviated description of a designated office by virtue of which the person would, but for the misdescription or abbreviated description, be an approved person, where the misdescription or abbreviation does not materially affect identification of that person. [Former subs (3) renum Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1; subs (2) rep Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

(3) A document that purports to be a copy of an original document shall, without further proof, be admissible in evidence in a proceeding as if it were the 5. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 227; Dwyer v Collins (1852) 7 Ex 639; 155 ER 1104; Hindson v Monahan [1970] VR 84.

502

Evidence Law in Queensland

[105.2]

Division 2 – Reproduction of official documents

s 105

original document of which it purports to be a copy, if it bears or is accompanied by a certificate, purporting to have been signed by an approved person, that it is a reproduction of a document that was in the custody or control of that person in the person’s official capacity— (a) where the reproduction is a machine copy, at the time the machine copy was made; or (b) where the reproduction is a print made from a transparency, at the time when the transparency was made. [Former subs (5) renum Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

(4) Where an approved person is served with legal process to produce a document to a court it shall be a sufficient answer to such process if the person to whom the process is addressed sends by post, or causes to be delivered, to the registrar or proper officer of the court requiring the production of the document a reproduction, certified as provided by this section, of the document and, where more than 1 document is specified howsoever in the legal process, further certifies, that, to the best of the person’s knowledge and belief, the reproductions so sent or caused to be delivered are reproductions of the whole of the documents in question. [Former subs (6) renum Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1; subs (4) rep Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

(5) For the purposes of this section and without prejudice to any form of custody or control, an approved person shall be deemed to have custody or control of a document at the time the transparency of the document was made if— (a) the person has custody or control of the transparency; and (b) the transparency— (i) incorporates a transparency of a certificate purporting to have been signed by an approved person to the effect that the transparency was made as a permanent record of a document in the custody or under the control of the person who signed the certificate; or (ii) is 1 of a series of transparencies that incorporates, as part of the series, a transparency of such a certificate relating to the transparencies in the series. [Former subs (7) renum Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

(6) Division 3 of this part shall not apply to or in respect of a reproduction of a document referred to in this division. [Former subs (8) renum Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1] [S 105 am Act 82 of 1997; Act 58 of 1995; Act 71 of 1984]

[105.1] Section 105 enables “approved persons” (as gazetted from time to time) and court registrars to issue prints of microfilm records or photostat copies instead of labour-intensive examined copies. The copy is “admissible … as if it were the original document”: s 105(3). Certification is still required: s 105(3) and (5). Further provision for photocopies is made in s 116. [105.2] The original s 4 of the present Act, which preserved approvals granted under the Evidence (Reproductions) Act 1970, has been repealed. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

503

s 106

Machine copies treated as originals

[105.3]

[105.3] In New South Wales a similar provision has been used to prove material held in State archives.6

DIVISION 3 – REPRODUCTION OF BUSINESS DOCUMENTS 106 Admissibility of reproductions of business documents destroyed, lost or unavailable (1) Subject to this part, a document that purports to be a copy of an original document made or used in the course of a business shall, upon proof that it is a reproduction made in good faith and that the original document has been destroyed or lost, whether wholly or in part, or that it is not reasonably practicable to produce the original document or to secure its production, be admissible in evidence in any proceeding to the extent to which the contents of the original document of which it purports to be a copy would have been admissible and it shall, subject to proof of the same matters, be a sufficient answer to legal process issued by a court, requiring production of a document to the court, for the person required by that process to produce the document to produce such a reproduction of the document. (2) Without prejudice to any other mode of proof an affidavit purporting to have been made by a person at or about the time the person made a machine copy of or photographed a document— (a) stating the person’s full name, address and occupation; and (b) identifying or describing the document and indicating whether the document is itself a reproduction; and (c) stating the day upon which the person made the machine copy or photograph, the condition of the document at that time with respect to legibility and the extent of any damage thereto; and (d) describing the machine or process by which the person made the machine copy or photograph; and (e) stating that the making of the machine copy or photograph was properly carried out by the use of apparatus or materials in good working condition with the object of making a machine copy or, as the case may be, a transparency of the document; and (f) stating that the machine copy or photograph is a machine copy or photograph made in good faith; shall be evidence, whether or not such person is available to be called as a witness, that the machine copy or, as the case may be, a transparency of the document referred to in the affidavit is a machine copy or transparency made in good faith and, in the case of a machine copy is, or in the case of a transparency can be used to produce, a reproduction of the document. [106.1]

The meaning of “business” in this Part is noted at [104.4].

6. Wran v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1984] 3 NSWLR 241 at 261.

504

Evidence Law in Queensland

[106.4]

Division 3 – Reproduction of business documents

s 107

[106.2] Sections 106 – 115 admit reproductions of “original documents” used in the course of a business when the originals have been destroyed or are unavailable. (See notes on the phrase “in the course of a business” at [83.7] – [83.11] and [92.23].) The position of electronic copies, such as CD-ROMs, is not quite clear. They were not in contemplation when these provisions were drafted in 1975-1977. However, assistance may be gained from s 116 or s 126, which leave room for other laws, practices or usages. [106.3] In accordance with the rules relating to secondary evidence at common law, a failure to produce the original must be explained if the court or an opponent so requires.7 But the explanation need not be given by a witness in person. It may be contained in an affidavit, as described in s 106(2). Presumably, the deponent, if still available,8 may be called for cross-examination, but an assertion of good faith is prima facie evidence thereof.9 The need for verification every time a reproduction is used may be avoided by following the procedures in s 113(3) or s 114. [106.4] Section 106(1) states that an approved reproduction “shall … be admissible in any proceeding to the extent to which the contents of the original document … would have been admissible”. Thus, s 106 offers relief from the “original document” rule, but not from other rules of evidence. The extent to which the original “would have been admissible” depends on the general law. Section 106 does not affect the rule against hearsay. It lacks the significant words “shall be admissible as evidence of that fact”, which appear, for example, in s 92(1). Therefore, if a reproduction is used testimonially, it must appear that its original was exempt from the hearsay rule at common law or by virtue of provisions such as s 84 or s 92.

107

Use of photographing machines

(1) For this part, a regulation may declare a machine to be an approved machine. [Subs (1) subst Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

(2) Subject to this part, but in addition to and without derogating from the provisions of section 106(1), a print made from a transparency of an original document (being a document made or used in the course of business) shall be admissible in evidence in a proceeding to the extent to which the contents of the original document would have been admissible, whether the document is still in existence or not, upon proof that the transparency was made in good faith by using a machine that, at the time the transparency was made, was an approved machine and that the print is a print of the image on the transparency. [Former subs (3) renum Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1; subs (2) rep Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

7. See s 106(1); Brewster v Sewell (1820) 3 B & Ad 296; 106 ER 172. 8. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 439. 9. Bellini v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [1998] ACL Rep 195 (Vic 4). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

505

s 107

Machine copies treated as originals

[107.1]

(3) Without prejudice to any other mode of proof an affidavit purporting to have been made by a person at or about the time the person photographed a document by means of an approved machine— (a) stating the person’s full name, address and occupation and the person’s functions or duties (if any) in relation to copying documents; and (b) identifying or describing the document and indicating whether the document is itself a reproduction; and (c) stating the day upon which the document was photographed, the condition of the document at that time with respect to legibility and the extent of any damage to the document; and (d) stating the person from whose custody or control the document was produced for photographing or on whose behalf or in the course of whose business the document was photographed; and (e) identifying the approved machine and stating that the photographing was properly carried out in the ordinary course of business by the use of apparatus and materials in good working order and condition and in accordance with the conditions (if any) attaching to the approval of such machine as so notified; and (f) stating that the document was photographed in good faith; shall be evidence, whether such person is available to be called as a witness or not, that a transparency of the document referred to in the affidavit was made in good faith by using an approved machine and bears an image of the document. [Former subs (4) am and renum Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1] [S 107 am Act 16 of 1999, s 2 and Sch; Act 58 of 1995]

[107.1] Section 107 deals with three matters: (i) approval of machines; (ii) prints from transparencies; and (iii) verification of transparencies. Section 107(3) enables the transparency10 (that is, the master copy) to be retained while a print made from it is used in court.11 The transparency requires verification by affidavit or otherwise: s 107(3). By virtue of s 113 or s 114 the same affidavit may be used and reused. [107.2] For a list of approved machines, see the Schedule to the Evidence Regulation 2007. 108 Affidavit of maker of print from transparency to be evidence Without prejudice to any other mode of proof an affidavit purporting to have been made by a person at or about the time the person made a print from a transparency of a document— (a) stating the person’s full name, address and occupation; and (b) identifying the transparency; and (c) stating the day upon which the print was made, the condition of the transparency and the extent of any damage thereto; and 10. This term is defined in s 104. 11. Note also s 110.

506

Evidence Law in Queensland

[109.1]

Division 3 – Reproduction of business documents

s 110

(d) describing the process by which the person made the print; and (e) stating that the printing was properly carried out by the use of apparatus and materials in good working order and condition with the object of reproducing the whole of the image on the transparency; and (f) stating that the print was made in good faith; shall be evidence, whether such person is available to be called as a witness or not, that the print was made in good faith and reproduces the whole of the image on the transparency. [108.1] The transparency requires verification under s 107(3). The print is admissible under s 107(2). Section 108 makes an affidavit containing the prescribed information evidence of good faith and of the accuracy of the print although the deponent is no longer available to testify in person. 109 Proof where document processed by independent processor Where a person having the custody or control of a document— (a) delivers the document, or causes it to be delivered to another person (the processor) whose business is or includes the reproduction or photographing of documents for other persons; and (b) receives from the processor— (i) a machine copy or transparency of a document; and (ii) an affidavit by the processor under section 106 or 107; an affidavit made by the person at or about that time giving particulars of the person’s custody or control of the document, its delivery to the processor and the person’s receipt from the processor, of the document and the machine copy or transparency shall, whether the person who had the custody or control of the document is available to be called as a witness or not, be admissible in a proceeding as evidence of the facts stated therein. [109.1] Section 109 enables reproductions not made “in house” to be verified by an affidavit made at or about the time of the contracting-out of that task, and preserved with the reproduction for use as and when required.

110 Reproduction not to be admitted as evidence unless transparency in existence (1) Save as provided in subsection (2) a reproduction made from a transparency shall not be admitted as evidence pursuant to this division in any proceeding unless the court is satisfied— (a) that the transparency is in existence at the time of the proceeding; and (b) that the document reproduced was— (i) in existence for a period of at least 12 months after the document was made; or (ii) delivered or sent by the party tendering the reproduction to the other party or 1 of the other parties to the proceeding. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

507

s 110

Machine copies treated as originals

[110.1]

(2) The provisions of subsection (1)(b) do not apply with respect to a print made from a transparency made by using an approved machine where, at the time the print was made, the transparency was in the custody or control of— (a) a Minister of the Crown in right of the Commonwealth or of the State of Queensland or of any other State or any officer in any government department under the direct control of any such Minister; or (b) any council, board, commission, trust or other body established or constituted by or under the law of the Commonwealth or of the State of Queensland or of any other State or Territory for any public purpose; or (c) a financial institution; or (d) any corporation that is registered under the Life Insurance Act 1995(Cth) where the document reproduced relates to the life insurance business of that corporation. [Subs (2) am Act 77 of 2003, s 75; Act 17 of 1997, s 74 and Sch; Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1] [S 110 am Act 77 of 2003; Act 17 of 1997; Act 58 of 1995]

[110.1] A copy of a copy (that is, a print from a transparency) is made admissible by s 107(3). But subject to s 110(2), the transparency, as the master copy, must be in existence when the print is tendered. It must also appear that the original from which the transparency was made was kept for at least 12 months after the original itself was made or that it was delivered, within that period, to another party to the proceedings. [110.2] The “preservation proviso” does not apply to the entities listed in s 110(2). The list of exemptions includes federal and State departments, government boards, financial institutions and registered life insurance companies. The expression “financial institution” is not defined in the Dictionary or in s 104. 111 Transparency etc. may be preserved in lieu of document Where any Act passed before or after the commencement of this Act requires a document to which this division applies to be preserved for any purpose for a longer period of time than 3 years it shall be a sufficient compliance with such a requirement to preserve, in lieu of any such document more than 3 years old, a transparency thereof made by using an approved machine together with an affidavit relating to the transparency being a transparency and an affidavit to which section 115 applies. [111.1] Section 111 modifies Queensland laws enacted before the Evidence Act 1977 which required original documents to be preserved for more than three years. If the original is kept for three years, it may then be discarded, provided that a verified transparency is kept for the balance of the period prescribed. [111.2] With respect to tax records, see s 262A of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). Preservation of company documents is governed by s 1101C of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Those provisions are not affected by this section.

508

Evidence Law in Queensland

[112.1]

Division 3 – Reproduction of business documents

s 113

112 Proof of destruction of documents etc. A statement by any person in an affidavit made for the purposes of this division— (a) that the person destroyed or caused the destruction of a document; or (b) that after due search and inquiry a document can not be found; or (c) that, for the reasons specified therein, it is not reasonably practicable to produce a document or secure its production; or (d) that a transparency of a document is in the custody or control of a person, corporation or body referred to in section 110(2); or (e) that a document was made or was used in the course of the person’s or the person’s employer’s business; or (f) that the person has made transparencies of a series of documents including the affidavit by photographing them in their proper order; shall be evidence of the fact or facts stated, whether that person is available to be called as a witness or not. [112.1] Section 112 is ancillary to ss 106(1), 107(2), 109 and 110(1). 113

One affidavit sufficient in certain circumstances

(1) This section applies to and in respect of transparencies, made by using an approved machine, of a series of documents that— (a) bear or have been given serial numbers in arithmetical order; or (b) bear or have been marked with the same distinctive identification mark; or (c) purport from their contents to relate to the same subject matter, to the same person or persons or to a matter between persons; where the documents are photographed in their proper order on a continuous length of film or, where the documents are marked in accordance with paragraph (a) or (b), on separate films. (2) An affidavit made pursuant to this division shall be deemed to be an affidavit in respect of all or any of the transparencies of a series of documents to which this section applies if it is photographed as part of the series and in lieu of identifying or describing each individual document photographed, it states the general nature of the documents in the series and— (a) the serial numbers of the first and last document in the series; or (b) the distinctive identification mark; or (c) the person or persons, or the matter between persons, to which the documents refer; as the case may require. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this division, a print that purports to be made from a transparency of an affidavit referred to in subsection (2) shall be admissible in evidence in a proceeding as if it were the affidavit from which the transparency was made, if— (a) it is produced or tendered with a print made from a transparency of a document in the series to which the affidavit relates; and © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

509

s 113

Machine copies treated as originals

(b)

[113.1]

an affidavit under section 108 relating to both prints is also produced or tendered.

[113.1] One affidavit may verify numerous documents, serially numbered, if a photograph of the affidavit itself is made part of a series of micro-photographs. Thereafter, a print copy of the affidavit may be tendered with a print copy of the relevant document and an affidavit under s 108. Other verifying affidavits may be preserved in the records of the business and put into evidence as a copy verified under s 114. 114 Certification required when affidavit etc. not contained in length or series of film Where any affidavit relating to the reproduction of a document is not an affidavit referred to in section 113(2), a copy thereof duly certified to be a true copy— (a) in the case of an affidavit in the custody of a body corporate—by the chairperson, secretary or by a director or manager thereof; or (b) in any other case—by a justice of the peace; shall, unless the court otherwise orders, be admissible in evidence in a proceeding as if it were the affidavit of which it is certified to be a true copy. [114.1] Section 114 enables an affidavit made under s 108, s 109 or s 112, and not photographed as described in s 113(2), to be used repeatedly while the original is retained by the organisation concerned. 115 Discovery, inspection and production where document destroyed or lost (1) In this section— affidavit includes— (a) a transparency, made as provided in section 113, of an affidavit; and (b) a copy, certified as provided in section 114, of an affidavit. (2) This section applies to— (a) a transparency of a destroyed or lost document, where a print made from the transparency would, subject to compliance with the conditions prescribed by this part for the purpose, be admissible in evidence in a proceeding; and (b) an affidavit that would be evidence or, where the affidavit is itself in the form of a transparency, that could be the means of providing evidence, pursuant to this part, of compliance with those conditions in so far as they relate to the making of the transparency and the destruction or loss of the document. (3) Where any person has the custody or control of a transparency and an affidavit to which this section applies and, but for the destruction or loss of the document from which the transparency was made would be required by any law, order of court, practice or usage— 510

Evidence Law in Queensland

[115.2]

Division 3 – Reproduction of business documents

s 115

(a) to give discovery of the document; or (b) to produce the document for inspection; or (c) to permit the making of a copy of the document or the taking of extracts therefrom; or (d) to supply a copy of the document; the law, order, practice or usage shall, subject to this section, be deemed to extend to the transparency and affidavit. (4) For the purposes of this section— (a) the obligation imposed by this section in respect of a requirement referred to in subsection (3)(b) shall be deemed to include an obligation— (i) to provide proper facilities for reading the image on the transparency and, where the affidavit is itself in the form of a transparency, the image on the transparency of the affidavit; or (ii) to produce for inspection a print made from the transparency and, where the affidavit is itself in the form of a transparency, a print made from the transparency of the affidavit, together in each case, with an affidavit that would under section 108, be evidence that the print was made in good faith and reproduces the image on the transparency; and (b) the obligation imposed by this section in respect of a requirement referred to in subsection (3)(d) shall be deemed not to include an obligation to supply a copy of any transparency but to include, in lieu thereof, an obligation to supply the print and affidavit or, as the case may require, the prints and affidavits, referred to in paragraph (a)(ii). (5) Where any person has the custody or control of a transparency and an affidavit to which this section applies and is required by legal process issued by a court to produce to the court the document from which the transparency was made, that legal process shall be deemed to require the production by the person of— (a) a print, made in good faith, that reproduces the image on the transparency; and (b) the affidavit or, where the affidavit is itself in the form of a transparency, a print, made in good faith, that reproduces the image on the transparency of the affidavit. [115.1] References to original documents in Ch 7 Pt 1 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 are to be read subject to this Part. Appropriate “reading” facilities and prints are to be supplied: s 115(4). An affidavit sanctioned by Ch 7 of the Uniform Rules serves as an affidavit of documents. [115.2] Delivery of a reproduction in response to a subpoena duces tecum is governed by s 106(1).

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s 116

Machine copies treated as originals

[116.1]

DIVISION 4 – GENERAL 116 Copies to be evidence Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, where a document has been copied by means of a photographic or other machine which produces a facsimile copy of the document, the copy is, upon proof to the satisfaction of the court that the copy was taken or made from the original document by means of the machine, admissible in evidence to the same extent as the original document would be admissible in evidence without— (a) proof that the copy was compared with the original document; and (b) notice to produce the original document having been given. [116.1] The common law rules of secondary evidence were devised when copies were handmade. It was then appropriate to require evidence that the copy had been compared with the original and found correct. Clause (a) recognises that it would be pointless to treat modern facsimiles in the same manner. As to s 116(b), see [104.7]. This section was applied in R v Navarolli12 and Van den Hoorn v Ellis.13 [116.2] 117

The phrase “admissible … to the same extent” is discussed at [106.4].

Further reproduction may be ordered by court

(1) Subject to this section, where a print made from a transparency is, in a proceeding, tendered in evidence pursuant to the provisions of this part and— (a) the court is not satisfied that the print is a legible copy of the original document; or (b) a party to the proceeding questions the authenticity of the print and applies for an order under this section; the court may reject the print tendered and order that a further print be made from a transparency of the original document. (2) A further print made in compliance with an order made under this section shall be made— (a) where the order is made under subsection (1)(a), at the cost of the party who tendered the rejected print; or (b) where the order is made under subsection (1)(b), in the presence of a person appointed by the court for the purpose and at the cost of the party who applied for the order. (3) Where a print to which division 2 of this part relates is rejected under this section, a print made in compliance with an order under this section shall be made in the same premises as the rejected print or, where this is not practicable, in accordance with directions given by the court.

12. R v Navarolli [2010] 1 Qd R 27; [2009] QCA 49; see also Donovan v TIC Realty Pty Ltd [2011] QCA 90. 13. [2010] QDC 451.

512

Evidence Law in Queensland

[119.1]

Division 4 – General

s 119

[117.1] Section 117 confirms the court’s power to insist on reproductions of good quality. The court may take the initiative in ordering another print. [117.2] If the court rejects the first print tendered, the cost of another is to fall upon the party who tendered the substandard copy. When the rejection is the result of a complaint by a party, the new print is to be made under court supervision and at the cost of the objector. High finance is not likely to be involved. [117.3] 118

Section 117(3) refers to reproductions of official documents.

Colours and tones of reproductions

(1) For the purposes of this part, the production of a reproduction of a document to a court in answer to a legal process, or the admission of such a reproduction in evidence in a proceeding, shall not be precluded on the ground that it is not a copy of an original document or, where the reproduction is a print made from a transparency, on the ground that the transparency does not bear an image of an original document, if the reproduction is not such a copy, or the transparency does not bear such an image, by reason only of the fact— (a) that, in the process by which the reproduction or transparency was made, the colours or tones appearing in the original document were altered or reversed in the reproduction or transparency; or (b) that any number or mark of identification added for the purposes of section 113 appears in the reproduction or transparency. (2) A document may be certified under division 2 of this part to be a reproduction of an original document notwithstanding that— (a) any writing or representation describing or identifying colours in the original document appears in the reproduction; or (b) any colours appearing in the reproduction were added after it was made and before certification. [118.1] If a reproduction reduces colours to monochrome, or changes colours, it is still admissible. The addition of identifying numbers to originals (compare s 113) does not affect the admissibility of reproductions. [118.2] A copy of an official document is not invalidated by the addition of words describing colours or by colours added after the reproduction was made and before certification. 119 Notice to produce not required Where a reproduction of a document is admissible in evidence pursuant to this part, it shall be so admissible whether or not notice to produce the document of which it is a reproduction has been given. [119.1] Where the “original document” rule applies, a notice to produce may be given to the other party if the original is in that party’s possession. Then, if the original is not produced on demand, secondary evidence may be used: Uniform

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513

s 120

Machine copies treated as originals

[120.1]

Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 227. It would be pointless to insist on this procedure when the original document rule does not apply.14 120 Proof of comparisons not required Where a reproduction of a document is tendered as evidence pursuant to this part, no proof shall be required that the reproduction was compared with the original document. [120.1] See also s 116(a). The common law rule was that a copy could only be used if it were proved to be a true copy of the original, either by the person who did the copying or by some other person who had compared the copy with the original and found the copy to be correct.15 121 Presumptions as to ancient documents Any presumption that may be made in respect of a document over 20 years old may be made with respect to any reproduction of that document admitted in evidence under this part in all respects as if the reproduction were the document. [121.1] Section 121 extends the presumption of authenticity in s 62 to reproductions of “ancient documents” made in accordance with Pt 7. 122 Reproductions made in other States Where a reproduction is made of a document in another State or in a Territory and would be admissible in evidence in a proceeding in that State or Territory under a law of that State or Territory corresponding with this part, or a law of that State or Territory that a regulation declares to correspond with this part, the reproduction shall be admissible in evidence in a proceeding in Queensland in the same circumstances, to the same extent and for the like purpose as it would be admissible in evidence in a proceeding in that State or Territory under the law of that State or Territory. [S 122 am Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

[122.1] No regulation is needed when a Queensland court is satisfied that the law of the State or Territory in which the reproduction was made corresponds with Pt 7 of this Act. Now that New South Wales, Tasmania, Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory are governed by the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) or rescripts thereof, there are no corresponding provisions in those jurisdictions. They have abandoned the “original document” rule and no longer need “reproduction” rules of this kind.

14. See the definition of “original document” in s 104(b)(i). 15. Permanent Trustee Co of NSW v Fels [1918] AC 879.

514

Evidence Law in Queensland

[124.1]

Division 4 – General

s 125

123 Judicial notice Where any Act or law requires a court to take judicial notice of the seal or signature of any court, person or body corporate appearing on a document and a reproduction of that document is, pursuant to this part, admitted in evidence in a proceeding, the court shall take judicial notice of the image of the seal or signature on the reproduction to the same extent as it would be required to take judicial notice of the seal or signature on the document. [123.1] At common law “judicial notice” refers to a discretion to dispense with evidence of a fact that is so notorious, at least locally, that strict proof would be a waste of time.16 Statutory judicial notice, of which s 123 is an example, is a rule that requires the court to assume the authenticity of a seal, signature or other documentary feature. Examples of originals that must be “judicially noticed” appear in ss 42, 42A and 43. [123.2] The effect of s 123 is that a reproduction of any seal or signature entitled to judicial notice is itself entitled to judicial notice. 124 A court may reject reproduction Notwithstanding anything contained in this part, a court may refuse to admit in evidence a reproduction tendered pursuant to this part if it considers it inexpedient in the interests of justice to do so as a result of any reasonable inference drawn by the court from the nature of the reproduction, the machine or process by which it or, in the case of a print from a transparency, by which the transparency was made, and any other circumstances. [124.1] Part 7 does not oblige a court to receive a reproduction or print in evidence. In relation to s 117, courts may demand reproductions of fair quality. Presumably the power of outright rejection would be used only in exceptional circumstances, as when a reproduction has been tampered with or is obviously incomplete or has deteriorated. This section can hardly be intended to undermine the reforms introduced by Pt 7.17 125

Weight of evidence

In estimating the weight to be attached to a reproduction of a document admitted in evidence pursuant to this part, regard shall be had to the fact that, if the person making an affidavit pursuant to this part is not called as a witness, there has been no opportunity to cross-examine the person, and to all the circumstances from which any inference may reasonably be drawn as to— (a) the necessity for making the reproduction or, in the case of a print from a transparency, the transparency or for destroying or parting with the document reproduced; or

16. Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149; R v Dodd [1985] 2 Qd R 277; see also [A.62]. 17. See the comments on s 98. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 125

Machine copies treated as originals

[125.1]

(b) the accuracy or otherwise of the reproduction; or (c) any incentive to tamper with the document or to misrepresent the reproduction. [125.1] It is axiomatic that admissibility is a matter of law and that “weight” is a matter of practical judgment. Part 7 does not affect the courts’ control of questions of weight. However, s 125 suggests some guidelines for assessing material received under that Part.18 126 Provisions of part are alternative The provisions of this part shall be construed as in aid of and as alternative to any provision of any other part, any other law or any practice or usage with respect to the production to a court or the admissibility in evidence in a proceeding of reproductions of documents. [126.1] Compare s 103. Part 7 leaves intact the common law rules of secondary evidence. At common law an original document need not be produced if the other party does not require its production.19 In the absence of an agreement to accept a copy, secondary evidence will be allowed if the absence of the original is satisfactorily explained. If nothing better is available, oral evidence of the contents, for what it is worth, may be given by a witness who has read the original.20 127

Stamp duty [Repealed]

[S 127 rep Act 71 of 2001, s 551 and Sch 1]

[127.1] Section 127 was repealed by s 551 Sch 1 of the Duties Act 2001. Section 487 of the latter Act recognises the traditional discretion to admit an unstamped document, subject to an order for payment of duties owing. 128 Regulation may exclude application of provisions A regulation may declare that this part, or a provision of this part, does not apply to a document. [S 128 subst Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

[128.1]

No relevant regulation is in force.

129 Public Records Act 2002 not affected This part does not affect the Public Records Act 2002. [S 129 subst Act 11 of 2002, s 62 and Sch 1; Act 76 of 1993, s 3 and Sch 1]

[129.1] 2002.

Section 129 was amended by Sch 1 s 62 of the Public Records Act

18. Compare s 102. 19. R v Alexander [1975] VR 741. 20. McCauley v McCauley (1910) 10 CLR 434; Re Gregory [1934] QWN 36.

516

Evidence Law in Queensland

[129.2]

Division 4 – General

s 129

[129.2] A public authority must make and keep full and accurate records of its activities, observing any relevant policies or guidelines issued by the State archivist.21 A public authority holding records more than 25 years old must transfer them to the archives if so directed, unless immediate access to them is still required.22 Section 12 provides special protection to records that are 30 or more years old. A person who unlawfully damages such records is liable to a maximum fine of 100 penalty units.

21. Public Records Act 2002, s 7. 22. Public Records Act 2002, s 10. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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SIMPLIFYING PROOF, DISCRETIONARY EXCLUSION OF ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE, SENTENCING, SIMILAR FACTS Part 8 – Miscellaneous 129A

Order that evidence may be given in a different way

(1) This section applies in a proceeding that is not a criminal proceeding if either— (a) the fact in issue is any of the following— (i) the proof of handwriting; (ii) the proof of documents; (iii) the proof of the identity of parties; (iv) the proof of authority; or (b) a court considers— (i) a fact in issue is not seriously in dispute; or (ii) strict proof of a fact in issue might cause unnecessary or unreasonable expense, delay or inconvenience in a proceeding. (2) The court may order that evidence of the fact may be given at the trial, or any other stage of the proceeding, in any way the court directs. (3) Without limiting subsection (2), the court may order that evidence of a fact be given by— (a) a statement on oath of information and belief; or (b) the production of documents or entries in records; or (c) the production of copies of documents or copies of entries in records. (4) The court may at any time vary or revoke an order made under this section. [S 129A insrt Act 45 of 2011, s 146]

[129A.1] Section 129A was inserted by the Civil Proceedings Act 2011, s 146. There is a similar provision in r 394 of the Uniform Civil Proceedings Rules 1999. The discretions conferred are wide, and appeals against discretionary decisions, particularly on points of practice, are not encouraged.1

1. R v Sheehy [2003] 1 Qd R 418; [2003] QCA 420; Myers v Medical Practitioners’ Board of Victoria (2007) 18 VR 48; [2007] VSCA 163; Frankos v Hocking [2000] SASC 128; Allied Express Transport Pty Ltd v Michelle Anderson [1997] FCA 1161.

518

Evidence Law in Queensland

[130.1]

[129A.2] [59.11].

Part 8 – Miscellaneous

s 130

As to the proof of handwriting apart from this section, see [59.1] –

[129A.3] Section 129A(1)(a)(ii) is not confined to the classes of documents more particularly dealt with in ss 83-103, Pt 7 and elsewhere in this and other Acts. [129A.4] Provisions to simplify proof of authority appear in many Acts: see, for example, Racing Act 2002, s 330; Child Protection Act 1999, s 182; Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999, s 250; Mineral Resources Act 1989, s 413(2). [129A.5] Section 129(3)(a) opens the way for additional and ad hoc exceptions to the hearsay rule. Hearsay was admitted under this section, without objection, in Lawrie v Hwang.2 129B Person may be examined without subpoena or other process (1) A court may order a person who is present at the hearing of a proceeding and compellable to give evidence in the proceeding to give evidence or to produce a document or thing even if a subpoena or other process requiring the person to attend for that purpose has not been duly served on the person. (2) If ordered to give evidence or to produce a document or thing, the person is subject to the same penalties and liabilities as if the person had been duly served with a subpoena or other process. [S 129B insrt Act 45 of 2011, s 146]

[129B.1] Section 129B was inserted by the Civil Proceedings Act 2011, s 146. It confirms the common law, as stated in [A.65], above. Unlike s 129A, it is not explicitly confined to civil proceedings. 130 Rejection of evidence in criminal proceedings Nothing in this Act derogates from the power of the court in a criminal proceeding to exclude evidence if the court is satisfied that it would be unfair to the person charged to admit that evidence. [130.1] In one respect s 130 resembles s 10: behind a brief and cryptic provision lies a wealth of common law. The discretion to exclude admissible evidence for “unfairness” or misconduct is a considerable power to withhold relevant information from jurors who, at other times, are expected to understand and apply some highly refined legal distinctions.3

2. [2012] QSC 422. 3. See [101.2]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 130

Simplifying Proof, Discretionary Exclusion, Sentencing, Similar Facts

[130.2]

[130.2] In a broad sense “discretion” means that because of an imprecise rule, or disputed facts, a decision is largely a matter of personal judgment. But here it bears the more specific meaning of a power to override the normal rules of admissibility.4 [130.3] Section 130 itself speaks only of “unfair[ness] to the person charged”. That phrase is apt to refer to the discretion recognised in England’s R v Christie5 and Australia’s R v Lee6 (“the Christie discretion”). It is less apt to refer to the power to exclude admissible evidence illegally or improperly obtained (“the Ireland discretion”),7 which applies to civil as well as criminal proceedings.8 However, if s 130 does not include Ireland, the common law supplies the defect. In theory, Christie and Ireland are clearly distinguishable, but in practice they often overlap;9 the way in which evidence is obtained from a suspect (Ireland) may also affect its weight, so that it becomes substantially “more prejudicial than probative” (Christie).10 Pre-trial applications for discretionary exclusion may now be made under s 590AA of the Criminal Code.11 In R v N12 an applicant indicted for drug trafficking successfully applied under s 590AA for the exclusion of a mobile phone and data unlawfully seized by police.

THE CHRISTIE DISCRETION Overview [130.4] In a criminal trial the judge may exclude admissible evidence tendered by the prosecution on the ground that it would create a risk of jury prejudice disproportionate to its rational probative value.13 The existence of a residual common law discretion to exclude, on grounds of fairness, evidence lawfully obtained, probative, non-confessional and unaffected by impropriety or risk of prejudicial misuse is considered in Police v Dunstall.14 In other words, jurors 4. See generally, Pattenden, Judicial Discretion and Criminal Litigation (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 1990). 5. [1914] AC 545. 6. (1950) 82 CLR 133; [1950] HCA 25. 7. R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321; Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54; see also [130.37]. 8. Miller v Miller (1978) 141 CLR 269; Violi v Berridale Orchards Ltd (2000) 93 FCR 580; 173 ALR 518; Duke Group Ltd (In liq) v Pilmer (1994) 63 SASR 364. 9. R v Swaffıeld; Pavic v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 159; Foster v The Queen (1993) 66 A Crim R 112; 67 ALJR 550 at 117 (Crim R), 554 (ALJR); R v Playford [2013] 2 Qd R 567; [2013] QCA 109. 10. Weinberg, “The Judicial Discretion to Exclude Relevant Evidence” (1975) 21 McGill LJ 1. 11. R v Griffıth [2000] QSC 9 (application re evidence of indemnified witness refused). 12. [2015] QSC 91. 13. R v Christie [1914] AC 545; R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133; [1950] HCA 25; Harris v DPP [1952] AC 694 at 707; Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304; Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 619. Evidence of behaviour of a tracker dog was excluded as prejudicial and of little probative value in R v Benecke (1999) 106 A Crim R 282. 14. (2015) 243 A Crim R 573; 89 ALJR 677; [2015] HCA 26.

520

Evidence Law in Queensland

[130.4]

The Christie Discretion

s 130 15

would “think that is it more relevant than it [is]”. It is doubtful whether evidence that is unreliable, but not unduly prejudicial, is liable to discretionary exclusion,16 but the jury should receive an appropriate warning.17 “Prejudicial” does not simply mean “damaging to the defence”: There is a common misunderstanding of the term “prejudicial effect” in this context. Inculpatory evidence is always prejudicial to an accused person’s case, using the word “prejudicial” in a broad sense to mean “damaging” … It is not damage to the defence case which is relevant, but damage to the prospects of a fair trial.18

When a defendant invokes Christie, the judge considers whether the evidence is so deficient in probative value that it would be dangerous for the jury to hear it.19 The focus is on a fair trial; the manner in which the evidence was obtained is a secondary consideration.20 The shorthand phrase “more prejudicial than probative” is apt to mislead: [It] is not a simple balancing function in which the judge decides whether the overall effect of the evidence is more prejudicial to the accused than it is beneficial to the Crown case. … Exclusion should only occur when the evidence in question is of relatively slight probative value and the prejudicial effect of its admission would be substantial.21 … In performing the balancing exercise, the only evidence that should be thrown into the “prejudice” scale is that which shows discreditable conduct other than those facts which directly tend to prove the offence itself. The “prejudice” cannot refer to the damage to the accused’s case through direct proof of the offence. To speak of a “balancing” of prejudicial effect against probative value of such evidence is absurd, because the weight of each will be exactly the same. If prejudice arising from strict proof of the case were to go into the “prejudice” scale, then the additional prejudicial effect would always tip the scales and the evidence would never be admissible.22

The “proof versus prejudice” calculation depends on the opinion of the judge,23 who should not focus on the prejudicial character of the evidence without paying 15. DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421 at 456 per Lord Cross; Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593. 16. Rozenes v Belajev [1995] 1 VR 583; (1994) 126 ALR 481; DPP (Cth) v Bayly (No 3) (1996) 89 A Crim R 542; R v Peirce [1992] 1 VR 273. But consider weak identification evidence: [A.78], [130.11] 17. Bromley v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 315 at 319; Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79 at 86. 18. R v Morris [1996] 2 Qd R 68 at 72 per Dowsett J, with whom Macrossan CJ and Pincus JA agreed; Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297 at 325 per McHugh J: “Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial merely because it makes it more likely that the defendant will be convicted.” See also, R v CBL; R v BCT [2014] QCA 93 at [53], approving dicta of Thomas J in R v Hasler; Ex parte Attorney-General [1987] 1 Qd R 239 at 251. 19. R v Ella (1990) 100 FLR 442. 20. Van der Meer v The Queen (1988) 35 A Crim R 232; 62 ALJR 656 at 248 (Crim R), 666 (ALJR). 21. Compare Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 135: “The court may refuse to admit evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that [it] might … be unfairly prejudicial …” (emphasis added). 22. R v Hasler; Ex parte Attorney-General [1987] 1 Qd R 239 at 251 per Thomas J, approved in R v Roughan and Jones (2007) 179 A Crim R 389; [2007] QCA 443; and in R v CBL (2014) 240 A Crim R 492; [2014] QCA 93 at [53]. 23. R v Lewis; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 2 Qd R 294. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 130

Simplifying Proof, Discretionary Exclusion, Sentencing, Similar Facts

[130.4]

24

commensurate attention to its probative value. Christie “does not confer upon the court a discretion to exclude evidence according to any general conception on the part of the judge as to whether it is unfair”.25 Before admissible Crown evidence is censored, the integrity of the rest of the prosecution case should be considered.26 This point was overlooked in R v Hasler; Ex parte AttorneyGeneral,27 when the judge edited-out information which gave reality and credibility to a child’s evidence that Hasler confessed to her. Another rare, albeit Pyrrhic, victory occurred in R v Sood28 where the trial judge excluded cogent evidence as unfair because it incidentally revealed a tax offence. There remains, however, an essentially political question on which reasonable minds may differ:29 admit the prejudicial evidence and risk a mistrial, or exclude it, and compromise the public interest by setting a malefactor free? The Christie rationale is that the “essentials of justice [are] above the technical rule[s]”.30 However, the judge need not raise a point of discretionary exclusion if the defence does not do so.31 We are told that those “technical” rules are the ripe fruit of wise adjudication,32 but when it comes to the point an additional filter is applied.33 The realpolitik of lawyers’ law is sometimes at odds with the praise that lawyers publicly bestow on the jury system. The exponential growth of discretionary exclusion, and extremes of the character evidence rule, may be seen as “what lawyers really think of juries”.34 Section 130 can be a refuge for judicial mediocrity or timidity: see [130.67]. A person convicted of a serious offence is likely to appeal, but the Crown’s rights of appeal are much more limited. A judge risks the ire of the criminal Bar by refusing to apply discretionary exclusion as freely as it wishes.

24. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 54 ACSR 326; [2005] NSWCA 152. 25. Police v Butcher (2014) 119 SASR 509; 67 MVR 128; [2014] SASC 85; Police v Dunstall (2015) 89 ALJR 677; 322 ALR 440. 26. R v McLean; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 231. 27. [1987] 1 Qd R 239. 28. [2007] NSWCCA 214. “Pyrrhic” because the acquittal stands, officially, infallible. 29. R v Hooper (1999) 108 A Crim R 108; [1999] QCA 310 at [11] per de Jersey CJ; R v Milton [2004] NSWCCA 195 at [33] per Hidden J. 30. Harris v DPP [1952] AC 694 at 707 per Viscount Simon; see also R v Witham [1962] Qd R 49 at 58. 31. R v Gibson (1999) 110 A Crim R 180; [1999] NSWCCA 370 (weak voice-identification evidence). 32. R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228 at 256. 33. DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421 at 453. 34. See the comments of Kirby J on the fictitious aspect of “instructions” to juries in KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221, quoted at [101.2]. Questions by a jury confident enough to ask them are tightly controlled. A juror who wishes to ask a witness a question should first ask the judge, who, if he or she approves, will then pose the question from the Bench: R v Sams (1990) 46 A Crim R 468. Generally (it is said), juries should not be told of their right to question witnesses, lest inadmissible evidence slips out: R v Lo Presti [1992] 1 VR 696.

522

Evidence Law in Queensland

[130.7]

The Christie Discretion

s 130

[130.5] Christie is for the benefit of defendants only. The prosecution has no corresponding advantage.35 In other words, there is no general discretion to admit evidence that is technically inadmissible, however cogent it may be.36

History [130.6] The Christie discretion is a child of stratagems to ameliorate the old criminal law, such as under-valuing stolen property to avert the risk of capital punishment.37 The criminal justice system is now much less draconian, and nominal sentences are rarely served in full, but the rule of discretion grows apace. Discussion of Christie occupied just one paragraph in the first edition of Cross on Evidence in 1958; by the seventh edition (1990) it filled 13 pages, and 25 pages were devoted to it in the Australian edition of 1996. Legal digests now cultivate a wilderness of single instances under the rubric “Criminal law – discretion to exclude evidence”. [130.7] In 1790 it was said that “rules of evidence should [never] depend upon the discretion of the judges”,38 because certainty is vital to the rule of law. A century later, discretionary exclusion was still absent from recognised Evidence texts.39 A hint of it appears in R v Miller40 (1901), a case of child neglect. Excluding “other occasion” evidence that was probably fit for mandatory exclusion,41 Phillimore J remarked: “I think it would be a little hard … It had better not be given.” But in 1913, one year before Christie, Channell J would not “allow it to be supposed that a judge has a discretion to relax [the law of evidence] if he thinks [it] will work an injustice”.42 But things were still in a state of flux; eight years earlier the same judge,43 in a more expansive mood, excluded a voluntary confession obtained by cross-examining an accused in custody.44 By 191345 other judges were putting pressure on counsel to omit “unfair” evidence, although the modern power to exclude it had not yet been proclaimed. In Christie (1914) such pressure was described as a “constant practice”, which “usually” had the desired result.46 When lawyers wish to consolidate a practice, they often exaggerate its prevalence and antiquity. Christie was not an appeal to a settled rule; it was an appeal to make a rule. 35. R v Biggin [1920] 1 KB 213; R v Gillis [1957] VR 91; R v Masters [1987] 2 Qd R 272 and refer to comments on “trial of victim” at [15.51]. 36. Myers v DPP [1965] AC 1001; R v Blastland [1986] AC 41 (third party confessions); R v Turner (1975) 61 Cr App R 67. 37. Stratagems of those days are well described in Oldham, Britain’s Convicts to the Colonies (Library of Australian History, Sydney, 1990), pp 11-14. 38. R v Inhabitants of Eriswell (1790) 3 Term Rep 707; 100 ER 815 at 714 (Term Rep), 819 (ER). 39. Best on Evidence (12th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1920), p 100. 40. (1901) 65 JP 313. 41. Questionable “relationship” evidence: cf R v Mills [1986] 1 Qd R 77; see also [A.136]. 42. R v Cargill (1913) 8 Cr App R 224 at 229. 43. Compare R v Cargill (1913) 8 Cr App R 224 at 229. 44. R v Knight (1905) 20 Cox CC 711 at 713. 45. See, eg, R v Fletcher (1913) 9 Cr App R 53. 46. R v Christie [1914] AC 545 at 564-565 per Lord Reading. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Simplifying Proof, Discretionary Exclusion, Sentencing, Similar Facts

[130.8] 47

There is no reference to discretion in the Queensland case of Riley in 1908, when a complaint about cross-examination in custody was rejected, or in Keefe v The King48 11 years later. In 1939 a Queensland court admitted evidence with “only a grain of weight”49 that would almost certainly be excluded today. The Christie discretion is absent from the seventh edition of Phipson (1930) and the 12th edition of Stephen (1948), although with regard to police inquiries, in particular, it is foreshadowed in the Judges’ Rules of 1912, and in the Queensland case of R v Livingstone,50 in 1915. [130.8] For some years after Christie – in England at least – it was not a matter of a judicial ruling, but rather of an “intimation” to counsel that certain evidence should “not be pressed”. Presumably the more senior or courageous counsel could still insist on tendering it. The discreet diction of “intimation” was still extant in England in 1952,51 but by that time there were overt assertions of judicial power in such cases as Noor Mohammed v The King52 and R v Straffen.53 The colonials were more assertive. “Intimation” was bolstered by a judicial threat in R v Livingstone54 (1915) and in R v Nielson55 (1930) Macrossan SPJ bluntly told the Crown “not [to] press its case”. [130.9] Christie was eventually reinforced in Noor Mohammed v The King56 and Harris v DPP,57 and in 1950 the High Court of Australia cautiously endorsed it in R v Lee.58 By 1970 it was “too late in the day … to consider the argument that a judge has no such discretion”.59 [130.10] However, discretionary exclusion should not be applied in committal proceedings60 because rulings at that stage do not bind the trial court. It is better, at the committal stage, to err on the side of inclusion.

Not limited to confessions [130.11] Christie is not limited to confessions. While many discretionary exclusions do involve confessions, the power may be used to exclude any 47. [1908] St R Qd 141. 48. (1919) 21 WALR 88. 49. R v Sullivan and Robertson [1939] QSR 285 at 296. 50. (1915) 9 QJPR 67; see also [130.8]. 51. Harris v DPP [1952] AC 694 at 707. 52. [1949] AC 182 at 192. 53. [1952] 2 QB 911 at 917. 54. (1915) 9 QJPR 67 at 70 by Lukin J (verbal confession – no police notes of same and little other evidence). 55. [1930] QWN 15 (confession by “overawed” lad of 17); see also R v Brauer [1937] QWN 18. 56. [1949] AC 182. 57. [1952] AC 694. 58. (1950) 82 CLR 133; [1950] HCA 25. 59. Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 at 341 per Viscount Dilhorne. 60. Seymour v Attorney-General (1984) 1 FCR 416; 53 ALR 513 at 441 (FCR), 540 (ALR); R v Grassby (1988) 15 NSWLR 109 at 119; R v Horsham Justices; Ex parte Bukhari (1982) 74 Cr App R 291; TKWJ v The Queen (2002) 212 CLR 124; [2002] HCA 46; R v TR (2004) 180 FLR 424; [2004] ACTSC 10.

524

Evidence Law in Queensland

[130.11]

The Christie Discretion

s 130

prosecution evidence that the judge considers substantially more prejudicial than probative, such as weak identification,61 evidence obtained by hypnosis,62 “relationship” evidence63 that is too prejudicial64 or equivocal,65 evidence from mentally unstable witnesses,66 or photographs so graphic that they may “inflame” the jury.67 (Such evidence may justify an order for trial by judge alone.68) In R v Horsfall69 the “contaminated memory” of a witness led to discretionary rejection. Admissions made during a psychiatric assessment of fitness to stand trial were excluded in R v Hassan.70 In R v Mustafa,71 the appeal court held that the judge should not have let the jury hear that a complaint was delayed because the accused assaulted the complainant shortly after the alleged rape. In R v Cummins72 the suggested motive for a robbery – drug addiction – was ruled unfit for the jury’s ears. But in Neal v The Queen,73 evidence of the accused’s unhappy and sexless marriage was sufficiently relevant to a charge of indecent dealing to outweigh its prejudicial side-effects. The Christie discretion is routinely used to exclude unsigned records of interview which defendants – according to police – have acknowledged as the truth.74 In such cases the proof versus prejudice calculation is clear:

61. Alexander v The Queen (1981) 145 CLR 395; R v Hallam (1985) 42 SASR 126; 18 A Crim R 221; R v Bigeni (1990) 47 A Crim R 363; R v Macdonald (2002) 168 FLR 232; Dawson v The Queen (1990) 2 WAR 458; 47 A Crim R 458 (“dock” identification); R v Harris (No 3) [1990] VR 310; and R v Camilleri (2000) 127 A Crim R 290 (unimpressive voice identification); R v Devenish [1969] VR 737 (handwriting); R v Bloomfield [2003] NTSC 9 (unfavourable conditions for identification). The assessment of evidence of identity in criminal proceedings is considered at length by the High Court in Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555. In R v Haidley [1984] VR 229 at 253-254, Brooking J strongly criticised the over-liberal application of Christie to identification evidence in cases where the suspect refuses to join in an identity parade. 62. Roughley v The Queen (1995) 78 A Crim R 160; 5 Tas SR 8; R v Sparkes (1996) 6 Tas R 178; R v WB (2009) 23 VR 319; [2009] VSCA 173 (evidence of things recalled for the first time during or after hypnosis inadmissible). 63. See [A.136]; R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510. 64. R v GAE (2000) 1 VR 198; 109 A Crim R 419 (uncharged acts showing “guilty passion”); Tully v The Queen (2006) 230 CLR 234; [2006] HCA 56. 65. R v Joyce (2002) 173 FLR 322 (innocent explanation of DNA evidence not excluded). 66. R v Horsfall (1989) 51 SASR 489. 67. R v Huseyin (unreported, Vic Cty Ct, O’Shea J, 16 February 1990) (photographs of burns caused by kidnapper throwing petrol over children excluded); R v Ames [1964-5] NSWR 1489 (photographs not excluded as injuries illustrated needed to assess a particular defence); other non-exclusionary cases are R v Zammit (1999) 107 A Crim R 489 (“The sensitivity of jurors … can too easily be overstated”); Minhaj v The Queen [2000] WASCA 52; Western Australia v Liyanage (No 2) [2016] WASC 18. 68. Bell v Western Australia (No 2) [2014] WASC 260. 69. (1989) 51 SASR 489. 70. [2004] VSC 85. 71. (2005) 91 SASR 62; [2005] SASC 66. 72. (2004) 147 A Crim R 585; [2004] VSCA 164. 73. [2005] TASSC 70. 74. R v Mallory (1884) 13 QBD 33; R v Dawson (1962) 106 CLR 1 at 13; R v West [1973] Qd R 338. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

525

s 130

Simplifying Proof, Discretionary Exclusion, Sentencing, Similar Facts

[130.12]

The mere existence of the record is no safeguard against perjury. If the police officers are prepared to give false testimony as to what the accused said, it may [be] expected they will not shrink from compiling a false document as well.75

An exceptional case is R v Devine,76 where an unsigned record of interview was admitted by consent. The results of a “field interview” were admitted in R v Bell.77 [130.12] In R v Leslie Robert Brown78 the accused was charged with murdering his wife. He admitted inflicting at least 40 stab wounds in what the judge described as a “ferocious, dreadful attack”. However, his Honour’s discretion excluded photographs and video recordings of the scene, and a verdict of manslaughter, not murder, resulted. On the other hand, disturbing photographs were deemed essential to the Crown case in R v Jamieson and Elliott79 because they showed that the victim had been “trussed up” before being killed – something that just one offender could hardly have done alone. Discretionary exclusion of photographs seems anachronistic when spectacles as alarming, or worse, are presented as public entertainment. Applications to exclude “prejudicial” photographs failed in Green v The King;80 R v O’Leary;81 R v Harbach;82 and Minhaj v The Queen.83 There have been efforts to extend Christie to the evidence of indemnified witnesses.84 A judicial comment is an alternative.85 According to R v McLean; Ex parte Attorney-General86 the mere fact of an indemnity is not a reason for Christie censorship. The evidence of an invalidly indemnified witness was admitted in R v Stead.87 But in Grey v The Queen88 the prosecution’s failure to disclose an indemnity caused a mistrial.

75. Driscoll v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 517 at 541-542 per Gibbs J; Stephens v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 664; R v Creamer (1989) 43 A Crim R 92; Wolchover, “The Myth of the Unsigned Confession” (1986) 136 NLJ 1007. As to confessions in custody without documentation, see now McKinney v The Queen (1991) 171 CLR 468. 76. (1985) 18 A Crim R 185. 77. [2014] QSC 203. 78. (Unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Shanahan AJ, 17 November 1992), noted Courier Mail (Brisbane, 18 November 1992), p 2. 79. (1992) 60 A Crim R 68; see also DPP v Weiss [2002] VSC 17 (photos relevant to show severity of blows to head); and R v Rae [2006] QCA 207 (“ghastly” pictures admitted to show intent to maim). 80. (1939) 61 CLR 167. 81. [1946] SASR 175. 82. (1973) 6 SASR 427. 83. [2000] WASCA 52. Alarming photographs of burns were admitted on a charge of grievous bodily harm. They were deemed more probative than prejudicial, in that they enabled the jury to see the extent and pattern of the injuries suffered by the complainant. 84. R v Falzon [1990] 2 Qd R 430; R v D’Arrigo (1991) 58 A Crim R 71; [1994] 1 Qd R 603. 85. R v Falzon (No 2) [1993] 1 Qd R 618. 86. [1991] 1 Qd R 231. 87. (1992) 62 A Crim R 40. In this case the appeal to discretion was made under the Ireland doctrine. 88. (2001) 75 ALJR 1708.

526

Evidence Law in Queensland

[130.14]

The Judges’ Rules and the Police Powers etc Act

s 130 89

Christie and the evidence of an accomplice are considered in R v Peirce. The evidence of an indemnified accomplice90 should be followed by a strong warning to the jury,91 subject to s 632 of the Criminal Code.92 R v Robinson93 involved the evidence of a prison informer. [130.13] It is difficult to see a role for Christie where admissible similar facts are involved, as the law on that subject embodies a stricter test of proof versus prejudice than Christie itself.94

THE JUDGES’ RULES AND THE POLICE POWERS ETC ACT Overview [130.14] In Queensland the police practice guidelines, known as the Judges’ Rules, have been largely overtaken by the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, outlined at [130.70]ff. But that Act does not affect Christie,95 and pre-2000 cases may still suggest arguments for discretionary exclusion. The Judges’ Rules were foreshadowed in England and Australia a few years before they were formalised.96 They did not deal with discretionary exclusion in general, but with powers of arrest and interrogation in particular. The Judges’ Rules were never law in England97 or Australia,98 and they were not a code of criminal investigation,99 but from 1912 they helped judges to decide whether confessional evidence should fairly be excluded.100 They were replaced in England by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

89. [1992] 1 VR 273. 90. As to the meaning of “accomplice”, see R v Gill [2003] VSC 321. 91. DPP (Cth) v Bayly (No 3) (1996) 89 A Crim R 542. 92. As to criticism of “suspect” classes of witnesses, see [Q.107]. 93. [2003] NSWCCA 188. 94. Forbes, Similar Facts (Law Book Co, 1987), pp 162-168. 95. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 10. 96. R v Knight (1905) 20 Cox CC 711; R v Riley [1908] QSR 141 (cross-examination in custody). 97. R v Ovenell [1969] 1 QB 17 at 26. 98. R v Swaffıeld; Pavic v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 159 at 190, where they are described by Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ as “a yardstick against which issues of unfairness (and impropriety) may be measured”. 99. McDermott v The King (1948) 76 CLR 501 at 513; R v Swaffıeld; Pavic v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 159 at 171-172. 100. R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133; [1950] HCA 25; R v Nichols [1958] Qd R 200; R v McKay [1965] Qd R 240 at 248; Van der Meer v The Queen (1988) 35 A Crim R 232; 62 ALJR 656. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

527

s 130

Simplifying Proof, Discretionary Exclusion, Sentencing, Similar Facts

[130.15]

[130.15] A breach of the Judges’ Rules did not necessarily lead to exclusion.101 It was for the defence102 to persuade the judge, according to the civil standard, that the discretion should be exercised in its favour.103 [130.16] While the Rules were primarily addressed to police, they could be applied to other official investigators, as in R v Knight,104 concerning a Post Office investigator. The Judges’ Rules are summarised below, with comparative references to the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (the PPRA).

Judges’ Rules and PPRA compared Preliminary inquiries [130.17] A police officer investigating an offence may question anyone who seems likely to have useful information. There is no need for a caution at this stage. The accused in R v Douglass,105 for example, was not a suspect when first questioned. Now, before questioning a person not under arrest, or in lawful custody, an officer must assure the interviewee that he or she is free to leave at any time.106 Time for caution [130.18] When a police officer decides to charge a suspect,107 the “right to silence” requires a caution before further questioning.108 The same applies if a suspect is asked to accompany police to a crime scene, or to take part in a demonstration.109 The duty may arise earlier, if police are “open to [a] person’s involvement in the crime”.110 A “stale” caution is insufficient, particularly if it relates to a different line of inquiry.111 101. A similar view was taken of “Police Guidelines” in Norton v The Queen (2001) 24 WAR 488. 102. But according to s 439(2) of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 the onus is on the prosecution to satisfy the judge that there are “special circumstances” warranting reception of the evidence, despite non-compliance with s 263 or s 264; see also [130.77]. 103. R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133; [1950] HCA 25 at 154 (CLR); Wendo v The Queen (1963) 109 CLR 559; R v Hall [1986] 1 Qd R 462; R v Ella (1990) 100 FLR 442. 104. (1905) 20 Cox CC 711; see also R v Ovenell [1969] 1 QB 17; R v Dunn [2007] SASC 132 at [7] – [8]; R v Khalil (1987) 44 SASR 23 (prison warder). But distinguish persons who are not official investigators: R v Alexander [1973] Qd R 494 (admissions volunteered to medical officer); R v O’Neill [1996] 2 Qd R 326; (1995) 81 A Crim R 458 (admissions made to friend, tape-recorded for police). 105. [2003] VSC 474; R v Nelson (2004) MVR 10; [2004] NSWCCA 231; R v Kamleh (No 2) (2003) 226 LSJS 4; [2003] SASC 35; R v To (2006) 96 SASR 1; [2006] SASC 126. 106. Police Powers and Responsibilities Regulation 2000, Sch 10 s 33. 107. Admissions secretly but lawfully recorded at a time when no decision to arrest had been made were admitted in R v Em [2003] NSWCCA 374. 108. R v Amad [1962] VR 545; R v Williams (1976) 14 SASR 1. 109. R v Lowery (No 1) [1972] VR 554; R v Smith (1994) 63 SASR 123; 75 A Crim R 327. 110. R v Tracey (No 5) (2005) 93 SASR 101; [2005] SASC 359. 111. R v Anderson (1991) 1 NTLR 149; 57 A Crim R 143 (caution one month earlier).

528

Evidence Law in Queensland

[130.19]

The Judges’ Rules and the Police Powers etc Act

s 130

Where some questions must, by law, be answered, a caution should be given before moving to questions that are not in that category.112 The traditional form of caution was: Do you wish to say anything in answer to these questions? You are not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so but whatever you do say will be taken down in writing [or otherwise recorded] and may be given in evidence.

Cautions are now governed by ss 431 – 435 of the PPRA.113 Section 37 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Regulation 2000 requires the warning to be “substantially” in these terms: Before I ask you any questions, I must tell you that you have the right to remain silent. This means you do not have to say anything, answer any question, or make any statement unless you wish to do so. However, if you do say something, or make any statement it may later be used as evidence. Do you understand?

The form of caution in England is now significantly different.114 If possible, the caution, and any response, should be electronically recorded.115 It should be clear that a person unfamiliar with English understood the caution and its significance.116 The most important part of the caution is its reference to the right to silence. Yet in Western Australia v Montani,117 a case of wilful murder, omission to warn that any statement would be recorded did not result in exclusion. The primary consideration is not instruction in the law, but freedom of the decision to speak.118 There is no cause for discretionary exclusion if, after a proper caution, an initial refusal to answer questions is followed by a voluntary change of mind.119 No caution is required when police record a conversation between a suspect and another civilian.120 [130.19] The time when it was decided to charge the accused may be inferred from the circumstances, including the officer’s knowledge and belief at that 112. Lee-Wright v Police (2010) 109 SASR 96; [2010] SASC 353. 113. “A police officer must, before a relevant person is questioned, caution the person in the way required under the responsibilities code.” 114. It is based on s 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK), which provides that if an accused does not mention, pre-trial, a fact relied on in his defence, the jury may draw such inferences from his silence “as may appear proper”. 115. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 435. In R v Laracy (2007) 180 A Crim R 19; [2007] VSC 19, discretionary exclusion was applied when the appropriate caution was not recorded. 116. R v Nguyen (1995) 78 A Crim R 582. See now Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 433; Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 139(3). A videotape of the interview showed the accused answering questions in English. As he was reasonably fluent in English a caution in English sufficed: R v Deng [2001] NSWCCA 153. 117. [2006] WASC 190. 118. R v Azar (1991) 56 A Crim R 414. 119. R v Crooks [2001] 2 Qd R 541; R v Robinson (1996) 129 FLR 409; 89 A Crim R 42 at 418 (FLR), 52 (Crim R); R v Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414. 120. R v O’Neill [1996] 2 Qd R 326; (1995) 81 A Crim R 458. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Simplifying Proof, Discretionary Exclusion, Sentencing, Similar Facts

[130.20]

121

stage whether or not the accused was aware of that decision. The Judges’ Rules did not oblige the officer to use the expressions “right to silence” or “privilege against self-incrimination”.122 But see now the statutory formula in [130.18]. [130.20] The duty to administer a caution does not apply to a medical officer examining a mentally normal123 person in custody,124 or to a friend or acquaintance secretly recording admissions.125 [130.21] A failure to administer a proper caution invites discretionary exclusion. But evidence obtained without a caution was admitted in Dansie v Kelly; Ex parte Dansie,126 where clear, voluntary admissions were made on two separate occasions. In the special circumstances of Marshall v Western Australia127 a confession was admitted despite a “reckless breach” of a statutory duty to caution. In R v Lee128 where the High Court overruled a discretionary exclusion, it noted that the accused was not caught off guard, and knew that she was not bound to say anything. The court approved129 a statement by Street CJ in R v Jeffries:130 “It is a question of degree in each case, and it is for the presiding Judge to determine, in the light of all the circumstances, whether the statements or admissions of the accused have been extracted from him under conditions which render it unjust to allow his own words to be given in evidence against him.” As Gleeson CJ observed in R v Azar;131 “There are numerous statements in the law reports to the effect that a confessional statement to a police officer is not inadmissible merely because no caution has been administered.” Indeed, it has been said that, while a formal caution may hamper inquiries, it may, on the other hand, cause a suspect to act contrary to his own interests.132 In Western Australia v Montani,133 a record of interview was admitted although part of the prescribed formula was omitted. Questioning persons in custody [130.22]

A person is deemed to be in custody:

… not only after formal arrest, but also where he is in, say, a police vehicle, or on police premises, and the police by their words and conduct [have given] him reasonable grounds for believing … that he would not be allowed to go should he try to do so.134 121. R v Kamleh (No 2) (2003) 226 LSJS 4; [2003] SASC 35. 122. Bayly v Vaughan [1989] VR 364. 123. R v Gallagher [2013] NSWSC 1102. 124. R v Alexander [1973] Qd R 494; R v Jarrett [2012] NSWCCA 81. 125. R v O’Neill [1996] 2 Qd R 326 at 429. 126. [1981] Qd R 1. 127. [2008] WASC 99 (record verified on oath). 128. (1950) 82 CLR 133; [1950] HCA 25 at 158 (CLR). 129. (1950) 82 CLR 133; [1950] HCA 25 at 154 (CLR). 130. (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 384. 131. (1991) 56 A Crim R 414 at 420. 132. Bayly v Vaughan [1989] VR 364 at 368-369. 133. [2006] WASC 190. 134. R v Amad [1962] VR 545 at 546-547; R v Joyce [1958] 1 WLR 140; [1957] 3 All ER 623.

530

Evidence Law in Queensland

[130.28]

The Judges’ Rules and the Police Powers etc Act

s 130

[130.23] Persons already in custody should be cautioned before being further questioned. In that situation a caution is “virtually [an] indispensable condition” of admissibility.135 [130.24] If there are several interviews, there should be a fresh caution on every occasion.136 [130.25] If a suspect begins to make a statement before there is time to administer a caution, the officer should intervene and administer a caution before allowing him or her to continue. No cross-examination [130.26] A person in custody who makes a voluntary statement should not be cross-examined about it, or asked leading or argumentative questions by official investigators.137 Any further questions should be confined to clearing up ambiguities (for example, “To whom does ‘she’ refer?”) or simply to inviting comment on evidence not previously drawn to the suspect’s attention.138 [130.27] Disputed questions were deemed proper attempts at clarification in R v Riley;139 R v Howarth;140 R v Beble;141 and R v Hart.142 But the questioning went beyond permissible limits in R v Brauer.143 [130.28] In R v Amad144 admissions obtained by police cross-examination were excluded, although on a voir dire the accused not only admitted that he made them, but also that they were true. The difference between legitimate clarification and improper cross-examination is discussed in R v Larson145 and R v O’Neill,146 but a clear distinction is difficult to discern. On one hand, it is said that persistent questioning may lead to discretionary exclusion147 and, on the other, that police need not accept the first answer given, but may confront the suspect with evidence contradicting his story.148 Since the advent of electronic

135. R v Dolan (1992) 58 SASR 501. 136. R v Waters (2002) 129 A Crim R 115. 137. R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133; [1950] HCA 25 at 155 (CLR); R v Amad [1962] VR 545. However, this prohibition does not apply to questioners who are not “official”, such as a relative or friend: R v Jones (No 2) (2007) 173 A Crim R 309; [2007] NSWSC 770; Lee-Wright v Police (2010) 109 SASR 96; [2010] SASC 353. 138. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 417. 139. [1908] QSR 141. 140. [1973] Qd R 431. 141. [1979] Qd R 278. 142. [1979] Qd R 8. 143. [1937] QWN 18. 144. [1962] VR 545. 145. [1984] VR 559. 146. (1988) 48 SASR 51. 147. McDermott v The King (1948) 76 CLR 501 at 515; R v Beble [1979] Qd R 278 at 285-287; R v Kallis [1994] 2 Qd R 88. 148. R v Pritchard [1991] 1 VR 84 at 91. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[130.29]

recording, the judicial approach to police questioning has become more flexible, provided that the record does not convey disbelief or ridicule that could jeopardise a fair trial.149 Informing one suspect of another’s statement [130.29] When two or more persons are charged with the same offence, police should not read the statement of one suspect to the other. Each is to be given a copy of the other’s statement, without being questioned about it or invited to comment on it.150 If a response is volunteered, a caution is required. If a caution has already been given, it should be repeated. [130.30] In R v Howarth151 a police officer erred by handing a copy of one suspect’s statement to the other and saying: “We do not believe your story so far.” Statement to be recorded [130.31] The Judges’ Rules required a written record of police interviews. According to McKinney v The Queen,152 a jury must be warned that it is dangerous to accept a disputed confession, unless the fact of its making is reliably corroborated. This applies even if there is other evidence of guilt because it is always possible that the jury will reject that evidence.153 However, a McKinney direction is unnecessary when admissions are made before the accused becomes a suspect.154 The “recording” provisions of the PPRA ss 436 – 439 apply whenever a person is “in the company of a police officer for the purpose of being questioned as a suspect”155 about an indictable offence.156 The phrase “course of official questioning” is interpreted in Kelly v The Queen.157 It does not include any and every interaction between police and a suspect,158 but admissions obtained in a conversation before the formal interview began were excluded in Tasmania v Challender.159 [130.32] When admissions are made in response to an official investigator, the record, if written, should be in verbatim question-and-answer form.160 It should be read back to the suspect forthwith, so that any desired corrections may be made. 149. R v Pritchard [1991] 1 VR 84 at 92-93. 150. R v Pilley (1922) 16 Cr App R 138; R v Byrne [1972] 1 NSWLR 264. 151. [1973] Qd R 431. 152. (1991) 171 CLR 468. 153. Druett v The Queen (1994) 123 FLR 249 (direction to be conditional upon rejection of that evidence). 154. R v Khammash (2004) 89 SASR 488; [2004] SASC 289. 155. The accused had not yet become a “suspect” when the crucial conversation took place in R v Khammash (2004) 89 SASR 488; [2004] SASC 289. 156. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 414. 157. (2004) 218 CLR 216; 78 ALJR 538; [2004] HCA 12. 158. Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas) v Cook (2006) 166 A Crim R 234; [2006] TASSC 75. 159. (2007) 16 Tas R 339; [2007] TASSC 58. 160. R v Ragen (1964) 81 WN Pt 1 (NSW) 572 at 580.

532

Evidence Law in Queensland

[130.34]

The Judges’ Rules and the Police Powers etc Act

s 130

[130.33] A written record that is not signed by the accused will invariably be excluded, as in R v Clarke161 and Driscoll v The Queen:162 see [130.11]. If a police witness uses an unsigned record as a note to “refresh memory”, its contents must not be read onto the record.163 Of course these difficulties do not arise when electronic recording is used. The record should be played back to the interviewee as soon as possible so that any comments or corrections can be made.164 The interviewee is entitled to a duplicate recording in accordance with s 438 of the PPRA.

Other discretionary considerations [130.34] The Judges’ Rules were not an exhaustive list of irregularities that might lead to discretionary165 exclusion. The following are other irregularities that may have that result. Several are now covered by the PPRA, as indicated below: 1. Non-compliance with a reasonable request for legal assistance at an interview,166 made before or after167 official questioning begins. A delay of two hours before allowing access to a lawyer led to the exclusion of a voluntary statement in R v Su.168 The position may be different if the material, being real evidence, is not affected by an absence of legal advice.169 2. Deceptive tactics170 inducing a confession, as in R v Scott; Ex parte Attorney-General,171 where the Christie discretion172 was applied to a confession made after lies by police gave the accused a false sense of security. Police officers interviewing a suspect must not mislead him or her, particularly in relation to a statement by another suspect. If it appears that a suspect has misunderstood something put to them, they should be alerted to the mistake.173 By the same token, pressure by

161. [1964] QWN 8. 162. (1977) 137 CLR 517. 163. Hetherington v Brooks [1963] SASR 321. 164. Li Shu-Ling v The Queen [1988] 3 WLR 671. 165. Stapleton v The Queen (1952) 86 CLR 358 at 375. 166. Driscoll v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 517 at 540; R v Hart [1979] Qd R 8; R v Killick (1979) 21 SASR 321; Erasito v Shiphard [1999] WASCA 132; see also Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 418; and R v LR (2005) 156 A Crim R 354; [2005] QCA 368. 167. Tasmania v Challender (2007) 16 Tas R 339; [2007] TASSC 58. 168. (2003) 7 VR 13; [2003] VSC 305. 169. Fischer v Douglas; Ex parte Fischer [1978] Qd R 27 (results of breathalyser test). 170. Generally a confession obtained by deliberate police trickery will be excluded: R v Burns [1999] SASC 493; R v Dewhirst (2001) 122 A Crim R 403 (undercover policeman posing as fellow prisoner). But in Burns, where the use of a listening device under permit was attacked as a means of getting around the right to silence, the evidence was not excluded. 171. [1993] 1 Qd R 537. 172. The exclusion could have been attributed to Ireland. 173. R v Hein (2013) 117 SASR 444; [2013] SASCFC 97. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

533

s 130

Simplifying Proof, Discretionary Exclusion, Sentencing, Similar Facts

[130.35]

falsehood, such as the warning that “two people saw you do it”, when the police know that there is only one witness, may lead to exclusion.174 3. Obtaining admissions from a person who is exhausted by long questioning175 or who is so intoxicated,176 immature177 or unintelligent to cope with interrogation without the support of a parent, welfare officer or friend.178 There are similar cases based on language or cultural differences.179 Naturally, the position is different if the suspect declines an invitation to have a lawyer or “next friend” at an interview.180 The existence of a handicap warranting exclusion is a matter of degree. In R v Garth181 admissions by a moderately intoxicated person were admitted when a videotape showed that he “fully appreciated his situation”, and confessions by persons injured or drugged are sometimes admitted.182 4. Refusing a reasonable request for an interpreter.183

Christie in civil cases [130.35] The Christie discretion was designed for prosecution evidence. It is not a power to reject “prejudicial” evidence in civil cases. That was clearly stated in Christie itself and it is supported by later authority.184 In Pearce v Button,185 174. R v Rothery (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 451. 175. R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321; Western Australia v Mandolini (2006) 44 SR (WA) 290; [2006] WADC 133; as to current time limits, see Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 403ff. 176. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 423; R v LR (2005) 156 A Crim R 354; [2005] QCA 368 (officer could not have been reasonably satisfied alcohol not affecting accused’s ability to understand his rights); Hoy v The Queen [2002] WASCA 275; R v Nash (2014) 240 A Crim R 589; [2014] QSC 139. As to intoxication at the time of the offence as distinct from the time of interrogation, see Pearce v Western Australia [2014] WASCA 156 at [64] – [65]. 177. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 421; Youth Justice Act 1992, s 29. In the latter provision, the expression “police officer” does not include a person acting under the direction of a police officer – here a friend of the defendant juveniles who, at the request of police, tape-recorded admissions made by them away from police premises: R v T; Ex parte Attorney-General [1999] 2 Qd R 424. 178. R v Nielson [1930] QWN 15 (incest, youth 17 years, no caution until implicated self, “overawed”); R v M [1976] Qd R 344 (young suspect); T v Waye (1983) 35 SASR 247 (14 years of age – no excuse for not having parent present); R v Larson [1984] VR 559 (age, intellectual limitations and police attitude); R v Nagawalli [2009] NTSC 25 (Aboriginal, injured and speech-impaired). 179. R v Anunga (1976) 11 ALR 412; R v W [1988] 2 Qd R 308; Bundamurra v Western Australia [2008] WASC 106; Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 420 (Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders). 180. R v Crawford [1985] 2 Qd R 22 (16 years of age); Peters v The Queen (1987) 23 A Crim R 451 (15 years, 8 months). 181. (1994) 73 A Crim R 215. 182. Basto v The Queen (1954) 91 CLR 628; R v Starecki [1960] VR 141; R v Buchanan [1966] VR 9. 183. Compare Singh (Heer) v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 15 FCR 4; Gradidge v Grace Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 93 FLR 414; Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 433; and Evidence Act 1977, s 131A. 184. Forbes, “Extent of the Judicial Discretion to Reject Prejudicial Evidence in Civil Cases” (1988) 62 ALJ 211 – referred to with approval in Polycarpou v Australian Wire Industries Pty Ltd

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where a different view was expressed, the proceedings concerned a customs offence, and the ground of exclusion was more akin to Ireland (see [130.37]) than to Christie. [130.36] Ireland, on the other hand, is applicable to civil as well as criminal proceedings.186

THE IRELAND (OR BUNNING) DISCRETION Overview [130.37] A court may reject evidence in any proceeding187 if it was obtained illegally or by some means that the law should not countenance. But evidence lawfully collected in one Australian State is not subject to discretionary exclusion merely because its mode of collection would be unlawful in the State where the hearing takes place.188 [130.38] In R v Ireland189 the question was whether to exclude medical evidence of injuries to the accused, as well as photographs and clinical notes on which that evidence was based. The photographs were taken against the will of the accused, and without statutory authority, and the medical examination was unlawful because the accused was not allowed to have his own doctor present. There was no confession. All the disputed evidence was excluded, including the real evidence, although its weight could not have been affected by the way in which it was obtained: Evidence of relevant facts or things ascertained or procured by means of unlawful or unfair acts is not, for that reason alone, inadmissible … [but] the judge has a discretion to reject the evidence … In the exercise of [that discretion] the competing public requirements must be considered and weighed against each other … Convictions obtained by the aid of unlawful or unfair acts may be obtained at too high a price.190 (1995) 36 NSWLR 49; Ibrahim v The King [1914] AC 599 at 610 (three members of that court sat in Christie); Manenti v Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board [1954] VLR 115; David Syme & Co Ltd v Mather [1977] VR 516; Helliwell v Piggott-Sims [1980] FSR 356 at 357; Southern Equities Corporation Ltd (In liq) v Bond (No 2) (2001) 78 SASR 554; CDJ v VAJ (No 2) (1998) 197 CLR 172; [1998] HCA 47 at [142]; Australian Crime Commission v Stoddart (2011) 244 CLR 554 at 577 per Heydon J (“highly doubtful”); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Managed Investments Pty Ltd (No 7) [2014] QSC 72 at [21] – [23]. 185. (1985) 8 FCR 388; 60 ALR 537. 186. Miller v Miller (1978) 141 CLR 269; Violi v Berridale Orchards Ltd (2000) 93 FCR 580; 173 ALR 518. 187. Miller v Miller (1978) 141 CLR 269; Violi v Berridale Orchards Ltd (2000) 93 FCR 580; 173 ALR 518. 188. R v Workman (2004) 60 NSWLR 471; [2004] NSWCCA 213 (evidence secured in Queensland as permitted by s 43(2)(a) of the Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld), tendered in NSW where its collection would have infringed s 5 of the Listening Devices Act 1984 (NSW)); R v Meade (Ruling No 1) [2013] VSC 250. 189. (1970) 126 CLR 321. 190. R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321 at 334-335 per Barwick CJ. But unfairness on the part of someone who is not part of the machinery of prosecution seems to be regarded less seriously, as in R v Lowe [1997] 2 VR 465, where the court refused to exclude evidence revealed by a psychotherapist. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[130.39]

191

[130.39] Ireland concentrates on events before the trial. It need not be shown that the method of obtaining the evidence has reduced its weight. So far as Ireland is concerned, evidence may be more probative than prejudicial, yet still be excluded. [130.40] Ireland was elaborated in Bunning v Cross,192 where it was described as “settled law in this country”.193 The disputed evidence in Bunning was real evidence, namely the result of a “breathalyser” test. It was common ground that the test was not conducted in strict compliance with law. While the Bunning evidence was not excluded, a flurry of reports in the early 1980s suggests that Bunning, rather than Ireland, alerted defence counsel to a new opportunity for discretionary exclusion.

Ireland and abuse of process [130.41] Bunning made explicit the distinction between Christie’s concern for the individual, and Ireland’s focus on the public interest: It is not fair play … but rather society’s right to insist that those who enforce the law themselves respect it.194

In other words, Bunning is: concerned with broader questions of high public policy, unfairness to the accused being only one of the factors which, if present, will play its part in the whole process of consideration.195

And accordingly: [T]he principal considerations … which favour exclusion of evidence produced by unlawful conduct … transcend any question of unfairness to the particular accused. In their forefront is the threat which calculated disregard of the law by those empowered to enforce it represents to the legal structure of our society and the dignity of the administration of criminal justice.196

This is a significant departure from Christie.197 The limitations of juries, as perceived by lawyers, are not in question here. The point of Ireland and Bunning is that it would be bad for the executive arm of justice, and undignified for the judicial branch, to turn a blind eye to the collection of evidence by unlawful or disreputable means.198

191. Distinguish events after the evidence is obtained: R v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24; 112 A Crim R 357. 192. (1978) 141 CLR 54. 193. (1978) 141 CLR 54 at 69; Pollard v The Queen (1992) 176 CLR 177 at 201. 194. Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54 at 75. 195. (1978) 141 CLR 54 at 74; R v Stead (1992) 62 A Crim R 40 (special leave to appeal to High Court refused). 196. Pollard v The Queen (1992) 176 CLR 177 at 202 per Deane J. 197. Cleland v The Queen (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 31. 198. Cleland v The Queen (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 20; Hunter, “‘Tainted’ Proceedings: Censuring Police Illegalities” (1985) 59 ALJ 709.

536

Evidence Law in Queensland

[130.43]

The Ireland (or Bunning) Discretion

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199

Ireland, in common with identification evidence, has developed an elaborate jurisprudence of its own. In essence, it is an application of “abuse of process”,200 a concept with a long history in the civil courts201 and a later addition202 to criminal practice.203 [130.42] In its evolution of the Ireland discretion, Australia was ahead of English law. In 1861 an English judge roundly declared that “[i]f you steal [evidence] even, it would be admissible”,204 and that view persisted for many years. Confessional evidence and the Judges’ Rules aside, England did not recognise a discretion to exclude improperly obtained evidence205 until legislation in 1984.206 Scotland anticipated the Australian view207 and, in the United States, the principle has constitutional status.208 There is no exhaustive list of relevant considerations,209 but the following guidelines may be extrapolated from Bunning v Cross.210

Guidelines for Ireland If illegal, was it deliberate? [130.43] If the evidence was obtained by a breach of law, it is pertinent to ask whether the illegality was deliberate, or merely inadvertent211 (as in Bunning). In practice, it is likely that the only direct evidence on this point will come from police witnesses, but on a voir dire and rebuttal, the defence may lead evidence of similar misconduct by the same officers at other times.212 A case similar to Bunning is Tregenza v Bryson,213 but an exceptionally high blood-alcohol reading in that case outweighed the inadvertent breach of law 199. R v Hentschel [1988] VR 362 at 369. 200. Mazinski v Bakka (1979) 20 SASR 350 at 361; R v Vuckov (1986) 40 SASR 498; R v Sieben (1987) 56 CR (3d) 225; Holden v Trustees of Sisters of Mercy (North Sydney) Property Trust [2015] NSWSC 1359 (unduly burdensome request for particulars). 201. Metropolitan Bank Ltd v Pooley (1885) 10 App Cas 210 at 220. 202. R v Vuckov (1986) 40 SASR 498 at 515. 203. See, eg, R v Viers [1983] 2 Qd R 1; Herron v McGregor (1986) 6 NSWLR 246 (disciplinary proceedings); Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23; Williamson v Trainor [1992] 2 Qd R 572. 204. R v Leatham (1861) 8 Cox CC 498 at 501. 205. Kuruma v The Queen [1955] AC 197; R v Sang [1980] AC 402. 206. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Eng), s 78. 207. Lawrie v Muir [1950] SC (J) 19 at 26. 208. Mapp v Ohio 367 US 643 (1961). 209. R v Padman [1979] Tas R 37; (1979) 25 ALR 36; Re Parsons [1984] FCA 246 at [71]. The factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion are also considered in Smith v McLaughlin (1999) 103 A Crim R 285. 210. (1978) 141 CLR 54, especially at 78-80. 211. Mackenzie v The Queen (2004) 150 A Crim R 451; [2004] WASCA 146; Pelka v Sunquist [2005] WASC 52 (minor offence); Dowe v The Queen (2009) 193 A Crim R 220; [2009] NSWCCA 23 (bona fide belief that operation duly authorised). 212. Milner v Anderson (1982) 42 ACTR 23; Knight v Jones; Ex parte Jones [1981] Qd R 98. 213. (1989) 8 MVR 529. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[130.44]

214

relied on for exclusion. In Police (SA) v Modra a magistrate’s exclusion of breathalyser evidence was set aside. Again, there was no deliberate illegality. Do the inquiry methods affect the quality of the evidence? [130.44] Oppressive interrogation215 or “entrapment” may well affect the weight of admissions. In Hamberger v Williamson216 a tape-recorded confession was excluded because it was obtained by deliberate provocation and lies. But in Mackenzie v The Queen217 the fact that a confession was recorded during unlawful detention did not affect its reliability. The probative value of real evidence, such as blood samples,218 breathalyser results219 or DNA specimens is unlikely to be affected by improper procedures. Fingerprint evidence is unlikely to be caught by Christie, although it could fall foul of Ireland.220 How serious is the charge? [130.45] The more serious the charge, the more likely it is that the public interest in suppressing crime will overshadow the ideal of immaculate methods of investigation.221 Armed robbery was the charge in R v Avo Kushkarian222 and R v Merritt.223 Each accused was detained for questioning longer than the law allowed, but their admissions were not excluded. An “Ireland application” also failed in R v Kelcey,224 involving rape and armed robbery. Marriott v The Queen225 concerned serious drug offences and, once again, evidence improperly obtained was received. A charge of hiring a “hit man” to assault a former patient warranted the admission of an unlawful tape-recording in R v Edelsten.226 In R v

214. (2000) 31 MVR 243. 215. In R v Beales [1991] Crim LR 118 the accused was “hectored and bullied from first to last”. In R v Glaves [1993] Crim LR 685 a suspect aged 16 was subjected to an overbearing interview with no “next friend” present. 216. (2000) 102 IR 297. 217. (2004) 150 A Crim R 451; [2004] WASCA 146. 218. R v Jones (1986) 19 A Crim R 236. 219. Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54; Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Moore (2003) 6 VR 430; [2003] VSCA 90. 220. R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321 at 75. 221. R v Addabbo (1982) 33 SASR 84 at 98 (murder – illegal arrest and detention – breach not deliberate although law could easily have been complied with – evidence admitted); see also R v Stead (1992) 62 A Crim R 40, in which 30 offences were involved; and R v Loc Huu Phan [2003] NSWCCA 205 (illegal entry to apprehend drug dealers, but entry in “good faith”); Mackenzie v The Queen (2004) 150 A Crim R 451; [2004] WASCA 146 (murder and other charges). 222. (1984) 16 A Crim R 416. 223. (1985) 19 A Crim R 360. 224. [1985] VR 765. 225. (1995) 126 FLR 119; see also R v Ellis (2001) 125 A Crim R 419 (illegal purchase of drugs by police); R v Pearcey (1985) 63 ACTR 12; and Tasmania v Salter [2007] TASSC 33 (interception of mail). 226. (1989) 18 NSWLR 213; (1990) 21 NSWLR 542.

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227

Theophanous the fact that a Crown witness bribed the accused did not result in exclusion. In Tasmania v Crane228 evidence of large-scale cultivation of cannabis was allowed, although it was obtained by entry without a warrant, and then by a warrant improperly obtained.229 How serious is the investigator’s misconduct? [130.46] The more serious the illegality or impropriety, the greater the public interest in discouraging it.230 Do the methods that were used to obtain the evidence fall below the minimum standard that society expects from those entrusted with law enforcement powers?231 There was serious and reckless disregard of the defendant’s rights in Foster v The Queen.232 Having insufficient evidence to support a charge,233 the police arrested Foster to get some evidence by interrogation. The principal prosecution witness in R v Venn-Brown234 was a persistent agent provocateur who persuaded an ailing drug addict to commit an offence that she might otherwise not have committed. In Ridgeway v The Queen235 the activities of undercover police amounted to participation in illegal importation of drugs, and the High Court held that their evidence should have been excluded. Admissions were excluded in R v LLH236 because of a deliberate omission to explain the role of a “next friend” at a police interview. On the other hand, the irregularities in Bunning v Cross and in R v Kelly237 were minor and inadvertent. In Kelly the police were just 30 minutes late in taking the accused before a magistrate. In Irving v Heferen238 the trial judge was entitled to admit evidence of a drug offence obtained by a motel manager searching the accused’s room without his permission. The reason for the search was not “amateur policing” or idle curiosity, but a reasonable fear that the accused was leaving without paying his account. A confession of murder by a “nonvulnerable” Aboriginal, recorded without prior reference to Aboriginal Legal Aid, but without deliberate disregard of the law, was admitted in R v Helmhout.239 227. (2003) 141 A Crim R 216; [2003] VSCA 78; R v Bartle (2003) 181 FLR 1; [2003] NSWCCA 329 (serious narcotics offence – statement of accused admitted despite police failure to observe proper procedure). 228. (2004) 148 A Crim R 346; [2004] TASSC 80. 229. In certain cases, searches and seizures without warrant are lawful in Queensland: Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2002, ss 29 and 160. However, those provisions are subject to discretionary exclusion, as in R v N [2015] QSC 91. 230. R v Karam (1995) 83 A Crim R 416 (sale of drugs procured by illegal action by police). 231. R v Petroulias (No 8) (2007) 175 A Crim R 417; [2007] NSWSC 82. 232. (1993) 66 A Crim R 112; 67 ALJR 550; see also R v Versac (2013) 227 A Crim R 569; [2013] QSC 46. 233. A person lawfully in custody may be questioned about another offence: Beamish v The Queen [1962] WAR 85 at 87; R v Bodsworth (1968) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 290; [1968] 2 NSWR 132. 234. [1991] 1 Qd R 458; see also R v Mallah (2005) 154 A Crim R 150; [2005] NSWSC 358. 235. (1995) 184 CLR 19. However, this decision was set aside by statute: see [130.58]. 236. (2002) 132 A Crim R 498. 237. (1988) 78 ACTR 14; see also R v Ng (2002) 136 A Crim R 299; 5 VR 257. 238. [1995] 1 Qd R 255. 239. (2001) 125 A Crim R 257. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[130.47]

A law for police or for all? [130.47] When evidence is obtained by a breach of statute, it is relevant to ask whether the law applies to police in particular, or to the public in general. In R v Padman240 the evidence was obtained by illegal phone-tapping, and a point in favour of admitting it was that the Act was directed to all and sundry, not merely to investigators. [130.48] Ireland can be applied to a voluntary confession,241 but confessions improperly obtained are usually dealt with by way of either mandatory exclusion or the Christie discretion.242 One voir dire can deal with both discretions.243 If Christie is used, the question is whether admitting the evidence would be unfair to the accused, not whether it would harm the public interest.244 In Pollard v The Queen245 unlawful detention for ten hours made the confession unreliable, so that Ireland as well as Christie was involved.

Applications of Ireland Telephone tapping [130.49] Before the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) was amended in 1987246 the exclusion of unauthorised “phone taps”247 was discretionary.248 While that is no longer the case, reasons in pre-1987 cases of that kind may be relevant to applications on other grounds. Breaches of the law were tolerated in R v Padman,249 a drug dealing case, on the ground that it would have been very difficult to obtain the evidence by lawful means. In Barker v The Queen250 the Federal Court refused to exclude a “phone tap” unlawfully made in England because no Australian police officer was involved. [130.50] An unauthorised interception was admitted in R v Curran,251 where a prosecution witness making an innocent call encountered a “crossed line”, heard 240. [1979] Tas R 37; (1979) 25 ALR 36. 241. Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54 at 78-80; Cleland v The Queen (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 23; R v W [1988] 2 Qd R 308; Pollard v The Queen (1992) 176 CLR 177 at 179. According to the majority in Cleland, a confession that is not caught by Christie should only be kept out on the Ireland principle in exceptional circumstances. See also Director of Public Prosecutions Reference (No 1 of 1984) [1984] VR 727 at 731; R v Merritt (1985) 19 A Crim R 360; R v Pearcey (1985) 63 ACTR 12. 242. Compare Cleland v The Queen (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 23. 243. Cleland v The Queen (1983) 151 CLR 1 at 24. 244. Van der Meer v The Queen (1988) 35 A Crim R 232; 62 ALJR 656. 245. (1992) 176 CLR 177. 246. Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), s 77(1). Evidence obtained in breach of the Act is now generally inadmissible. 247. In 2001-2002 the courts and the AAT approved 2,157 telephone “taps”, compared with 675 four years earlier. Only seven out of 2,164 applications were refused in 2001-2002. By 2002 the AAT was issuing 94% of the warrants: The Australian (16 September 2002), p 1. 248. Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57; Edelsten v Investigating Committee of New South Wales (1986) 7 NSWLR 222; Miller v Miller (1978) 141 CLR 269. 249. [1979] Tas R 37; (1979) 25 ALR 36. 250. (1994) 78 A Crim R 1; 127 ALR 280. 251. [1983] 2 VR 133.

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an incriminating conversation, and astutely recorded it. In another case, an unlawful “phone tap” was admitted to prove that the caller was attempting blackmail.252 Clyne v Bowman253 is a case that fell (and falls) outside the “phone tapping” ban. Clyne was charged with inciting people to flout the income tax laws. The prosecution tendered a recording of a “talkback” radio program in which the offending phone call was broadcast. The transmission was subject to a “time delay” – a normal precaution against obscene, defamatory, or other “inappropriate” material. It was held that no “interception” had occurred, and therefore no question of illegality arose, because the message was out of the telecommunications system before the recording was made. A face-to-face conversation is not “over” the telecommunications system, even if a third party hears it by telephone.254 Unlawful arrest or detention [130.51] There is an important public interest in discouraging unlawful arrest.255 A police officer who arrests a person, whether or not under a warrant, must, as soon as is reasonably practicable after the arrest, inform the person that he or she is under arrest and of the nature of the offence in question.256 A detention that was originally lawful becomes unlawful if the suspect is not taken before a magistrate as soon as possible, or released before a statutory time limit expires.257 The confession in Cleland v The Queen258 was excluded because the accused was detained for ten hours longer than allowed. But even in cases of that kind the public interest in suppressing serious crime may tip the balance against exclusion. In R v Pearcey259 the accused was charged with possession of heroin for sale. Admissions obtained during illegal detention were admitted. [130.52] Exclusion is unlikely when the interference with liberty is slight and inadvertent.260 An absence of wilful delay was decisive in R v Heaney.261 A statement obtained after an unauthorised but non-violent entry was admitted in R 252. Williams v The Queen [1982] Tas R 266. 253. (1987) 18 ATR 385. 254. Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Selway (No 2) (2007) 172 A Crim R 359; [2007] VSC 244. 255. Maxwell, “The Admissibility of Confessions Obtained During Unlawful Detention” (1986) 24 Law Soc J (NSW) 34; see now Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 403ff. 256. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 391. This reflects the common law: Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573; Johnstone v New South Wales (2010) 202 A Crim R 422; [2010] NSWCA 70. 257. Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278 at 303. 258. (1982) 151 CLR 1; see also R v Stafford (1976) 13 SASR 392; R v Eyres (1977) 16 SASR 226 (held 26 hours before taken before a magistrate); R v Killick (1979) 21 SASR 321 (two statements excluded for unlawful arrest and denial of access to legal advice). 259. (1985) 63 ACTR 12. 260. R v Sieben (1987) 56 CR (3d) 225 (Canada) (wrong form of warrant used in error); Parker v Churchill (1985) 9 FCR 316; 63 ALR 326 (honest mistake in execution of warrant); R v Kelly (1988) 78 ACTR 14 (30 minutes delay in approaching a magistrate “trivial”). 261. [1992] 2 VR 531. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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262

v McDonald, where the plea for discretionary exclusion was dismissed as a “classic case of a disappointed defendant searching around for a ground of appeal”.263 The unlawful but bona fide detention of a murder suspect did not lead to exclusion in R v Heiss.264 [130.53] In R v M265 Lucas J suggested that an officer who “invites” a person to a police station need not add: “Of course, you do not have to come.” But the position may be different if acceptance of the invitation is due to confusion caused or contributed to by police,266 or if the suspect is led to believe that there is no real choice.267 An arrest on a “holding charge” attracts the Ireland discretion if the charge is not bona fide.268 In R v Hallam269 the accused were arrested for indecent language, but the real purpose was to interrogate them about a robbery. Their admissions were excluded. But if there is a bona fide arrest on one charge, the suspect, after a caution, may be questioned about other offences.270 Interviews or tests without authority [130.54] Oral admissions following a breach of prison regulations were excluded in R v Weir,271 but in the same case a handwritten confession was admitted. In R v Halse272 a man was unlawfully taken from prison to be questioned about an armed robbery, but as the breach of regulations was inadvertent, his confession was admitted. [130.55] Ireland273 itself involved unlawful physical tests. (The facts are outlined at [130.38].) In Coxan v Mazey274 fingerprint evidence taken with the consent of the accused, but without statutory authority, was admitted. There is a discretion to exclude evidence seized under a warrant issued by a justice acting as a mere “rubber stamp”.275 Deceptive conduct by investigators [130.56] In R v Mason276 a confession was excluded because police falsely told the accused that his fingerprints were found at the crime scene. A 262. (1985) 3 MVR 182. 263. R v McDonald (1985) 3 MVR 182 at 183 per de Jersey J. 264. (1990) 101 FLR 433. 265. [1976] Qd R 344. 266. R v Tilev (1983) 33 SASR 344. 267. Norton v The Queen (2001) 24 WAR 488. 268. Foster v The Queen (1993) 66 A Crim R 112; 67 ALJR 550. 269. (1985) 42 SASR 126; 18 A Crim R 221. 270. R v Buchan [1964] 1 WLR 365. 271. [1973] Qd R 496. 272. (1980) 25 SASR 510. 273. R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321. 274. [1981] Tas R 209; see also Carr v The Queen (1973) 127 CLR 662 at 663 per Menzies J. 275. R v Macleod [1991] Tas R 144; (1991) 61 A Crim R 465; Ex parte Qantas Airways Ltd; Re Horsington (1969) 71 SR (NSW) 291. On search warrants generally, see [Q.12]ff. 276. [1988] 1 WLR 139; [1987] 3 All ER 481.

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handwriting specimen obtained by trickery was excluded in R v Browning. But an innocent misrepresentation influencing an admission may be treated differently.278 A confession made to a fellow prisoner may be excluded if police “recruited” the witness to obtain it,279 but exclusion is less likely if the accused initiated the conversation.280 Generally, the “bringing about [sic] a guilty suspect to admit guilt … is not in itself an improper activity. It is only to be repressed if it is done in a way that offends our basic values”.281 A confession made to an undercover policeman, without any suggestion of duress or pressure, was admitted in R v Favata.282 Police are entitled to use undercover methods to investigate serious crime, and the fact that a suspect is misled in the process does not necessitate exclusion.283 [130.57] If the victim of an assault dies as a result of the attack, it is permissible (on one view) for police to let the accused believe that he or she is still alive, to improve the chance of admissions to support a murder charge.284 But a different view was taken in R v Woodall285 and R v Tucker.286 In R v Noakes287 a confession was made after police said that the conversation was “off the record”. But since the confession was involuntary, and hence subject to mandatory exclusion, no Christie or Ireland ruling was required. If a suspect refuses to be interviewed by police identified as such, and later an undercover officer secures admissions, the evidence may be excluded.288

277. (1991) 103 FLR 425. Distinguish R v Knight (aka Black) (2001) 120 A Crim R 381; [2001] NSWCCA 114, based on police instructions different from those in Browning. 278. R v Weiss (2004) 8 VR 388; [2004] VSCA 73. 279. R v Pfennig (No 1) (1992) 57 SASR 507. 280. R v Lowe [1997] 2 VR 465. 281. R v Rothman [1981] 1 RCS 640 per Lamer J. 282. [2004] VSC 7; Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Ghiller (2003) 151 A Crim R 148; [2003] VSC 350. 283. R v Marks (2004) 150 A Crim R 212; [2004] VSC 476 (aff’d R v Marks [2006] VSCA 42); Tofilau v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 396; [2007] HCA 39. 284. R v Parkinson [1965] QWN 31 (admissions excluded despite a caution); R v Fieldhouse (1977) 17 SASR 92; R v Dick (1947) 2 CR 417 (Ontario); R v Anderson (1991) 1 NTLR 149; 57 A Crim R 143 (suspect falsely told bloodstains were certainly his when this was a mere possibility). Compare Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 410, which expressly makes inadmissible a confession induced by “an untrue representation” by a “person in authority”: Hawkins (JA) v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 440. 285. [1967] QWN 48. 286. R v Woodall [1967] QWN 48 (editorial note). 287. (1986) 42 SASR 489; R v Plotzki [1972] Qd R 379; Walsh v The Queen (1996) 6 Tas R 70. 288. R v Swaffıeld; Pavic v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 159; contra R v O’Neill [1996] 2 Qd R 326; (1995) 81 A Crim R 458. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[130.58]

“Entrapment” [130.58] The constitutional associations of “entrapment”289 in the United States290 must not be uncritically transferred to Australia. Entrapment is not a ground of mandatory exclusion in this country,291 even when the emotive word is apposite.292 Cases loosely so described display wide differences of degree and opinion,293 but clear cases of incitement to crime fall foul of Christie or Ireland.294 In Ridgeway v The Queen295 the High Court drew an elusive distinction between (a) cases “where illegal police conduct is itself the principal offence to which the charged offence is ancillary, or … constitutes an essential ingredient of the charged offence”; and (b) cases where the public interest in criminal law enforcement is likely to prevail, although “the police conduct has induced an accused person to commit the offence”. In Ridgeway the High Court classified the police agents as principal offenders296 and held that their evidence should be excluded. But in R v Bijkerk,297 the offence was complete before the police were involved. [130.59] It is certainly not “entrapment” to lie in wait for a potential offender in response to an alert.298 There was no exclusion in R v Hsing,299 where a drug dealer sold heroin to an undercover agent without any pressure to do so. There is a difference between conduct inciting crime, and merely providing an opportunity to offend.300 It is not always enough to show that the officer is technically an accessory. In dealing with organised crime, that may be an acceptable price to pay.301 In R v Bickley302 a woman pretended to be pregnant in order to obtain evidence against 289. For a general discussion of this concept, see R v Steffan (1993) 30 NSWLR 633. 290. Sherman v United States 356 US 369 (1958). 291. R v Sang [1980] AC 402; Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19; R v Venn-Brown [1991] 1 Qd R 458. 292. R v Veneman [1970] SASR 506; R v Papoulias [1988] VR 858; R v Venn-Brown [1991] 1 Qd R 458; Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19. 293. Roser, “Entrapment: Have the Courts Found a Solution to This Fundamental Dilemma to the Criminal Justice System?” (1993) 67 ALJ 722. 294. Hunt v Wark (1986) 40 SASR 489. 295. (1995) 184 CLR 19 at 39. 296. The law was then amended to prevent discretionary exclusion of such evidence, and a challenge to the validity of the amendment was rejected by the High Court in Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173. See s 15X of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) as applied in R v Nicholas (2000) 111 A Crim R 490. An alternative method is to enact that, under certain circumstances, undercover police officers commit no offence: Criminal Law (Undercover Operations) Act 1995 (SA). 297. (2000) 111 A Crim R 443. 298. R v Dugan [1984] 2 NSWLR 554; Coward v The Queen (1985) 16 A Crim R 257. 299. (1991) 25 NSWLR 685; see also R v Ellis (2001) 125 A Crim R 419. 300. R v Upton (2007) 209 FLR 487; [2007] ACTSC 21; R v Priest (2011) 246 FLR 341; [2011] ACTSC 18. 301. As observed by Miles CJ in R v Haughbro (1997) 135 ACTR 15. 302. (1909) 2 Cr App R 53.

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an abortionist; her evidence was admitted. The influence of an agent provocateur in Jefferies v Sturcke303 did not result in discretionary exclusion, although it was relevant to sentence. Evidence obtained by a police agent who bought drugs while “wired for sound” was admitted in R v Vuckov.304 In R v Papoulias305 it did not matter that the evidence was obtained only after the agent paid several visits to the defendant heroin dealer. Police do not have to be completely candid in investigating major crime, and subterfuges such as persuading a friend of the accused to make a secret tape-recording is not usually a good reason for exclusion.306 Evidence of that kind was admitted in R v O’Neill307 and may be allowed even when the suspect is a juvenile.308 In R v Swift309 public policy favoured the reception of evidence against a policeman charged with corruption, although it was secured by an unlawful offer from the Criminal Justice Commission. In R v Giaccio310 evidence of solicitation to murder was obtained by sending a witness to tell the accused that another man (an undercover policeman) was prepared to be the “hit man”. The court saw nothing in those tactics “to shock the public conscience”. But in R v Jones311 admissions recorded by a fellow prisoner were excluded as the unguarded312 statements of a person in custody, and in R v Lieske313 admissions made to the complainant in a “pretext phone call” were withheld from the jury. [130.60] In R v Price314 the Court of Criminal Appeal did not accept that the evidence of a paid informer should be excluded. Demack J observed: It may well be that the use of a paid informer is not a pretty business. However, until all persons accused of criminal activity display appealing frankness and candour … it is likely that paid informers will remain part of the armamentorium of the police force.

Another Queensland judge put it this way: Of course it is not the law that deception … on the part of the police can never … be improper; but … merely to say that the police have used deceptive tactics, to identify an offender or to obtain evidence, is not to say that they have done anything of which the law disapproves.315

303. [1992] 2 Qd R 392. 304. (1986) 40 SASR 498. 305. [1988] VR 858. 306. R v Davidson and Moyle; Ex parte Attorney-General [1996] 2 Qd R 505; R v Swaffıeld; Pavic v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 159; R v T (unreported, Qld CA, 1 August 1997). 307. [1996] 2 Qd R 326. Likewise in R v Ince [1999] VSC 418. 308. R v T; Ex parte Attorney-General [1999] 2 Qd R 424. 309. (1999) 105 A Crim R 279 (Qld Sup Ct) (not a case of entrapment of the unwary). 310. (1997) 68 SASR 484. 311. [2001] TASSC 121. 312. Compare R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133; [1950] HCA 25 at 154 (CLR), as noted in [130.21]. 313. (2006) 166 A Crim R 213; 204 FLR 1; [2006] ACTSC 97; cf Pavitt v The Queen (2007) 169 A Crim R 452; [2007] NSWCCA 88. 314. (Unreported, Qld CCA, 19 April 1984). 315. R v Davidson (1996) 92 A Crim R 1 at 19 per Pincus JA. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[130.60]

316

Bray CJ was of the same opinion in dismissing a procurer’s appeal:

[Such evidence] has been admitted in the criminal courts for centuries. It is commonplace for evidence to be given by a police officer that a licensee, at his request, has sold him liquor after hours.

According to Kirby J: Subterfuge, ruses and tricks may be lawfully employed by police, acting in the public interest. There is nothing improper in these tactics where they are lawfully deployed in the endeavour to investigate crime so as to bring the guilty to justice. Nor is there anything inherently wrong in the use of technology, such as telephonic interception and listening devices, although this will commonly require statutory authority.317

And an English judge cut to the chase: The criminal does not act according to Queensberry Rules. The method of the informer and the eavesdropper is commonly used in the detection of crime.318

There was no exclusion when an undercover officer bought firearms and drugs from a defendant who was “more than willing to do business”.319 In R v Christensen320 the accused faced 17 counts of housebreaking. The court approved the efforts of an undercover policeman who, pretending to be an accomplice, used an unmarked police car to help the accused remove the stolen goods. A secretly taped conversation between an informant and the accused was admitted in R v Davidson and Moyle; Ex parte Attorney-General.321 Admissions of murder to undercover police posing as members of a criminal gang was received in R v Tofilau322 and R v Cowan; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld).323 Evidence of illegal sales of cigarettes to minors, obtained by two 15-year-old decoys, was allowed in Robinson v Zhang.324

316. R v Veneman [1970] SASR 506 at 508. 317. R v Swaffıeld; Pavic v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 159 at 220 per Kirby J; see also Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19 at 37; R v Christou [1992] 1 QB 979 at 989. 318. R v Maqsud Ali [1966] 1 QB 688 at 701-702 per Marshall J. 319. R v Rowe (1998) 71 SASR 389. 320. (Unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Moynihan J, 26 March 1986); appeal to CCA dismissed (28 July 1986). 321. [1996] 2 Qd R 505. A similar case is R v Giaccio (1997) 68 SASR 484: the appellant solicited a man to commit murder. The latter told police, who sent him back with a concealed tape-recorder to record another, similar offer. Not a case for exclusion. 322. (2003) 149 A Crim R 446; [2003] VSC 188; R v Tofilau (No 2) (2006) 160 A Crim R 549; [2006] VSCA 40 (aff’d Tofilau v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 396; [2007] HCA 39). 323. [2015] QCA 87; leave to appeal to High Court refused, 11 March 2016. 324. (2005) 158 A Crim R 575; [2005] NSWCA 439.

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s 130

325

[130.61] In R v Price Demack J observed that “entrapment” is a matter of circumstances, opinion and degree. While the authorities do not draw a clear line, there is a point, inevitably uncertain, where over-zealous, “creative activity”326 warrants discretionary intervention.327 It was said in R v Hsing328 that there is no entrapment unless the accused is induced to commit a crime that probably would not have occurred without the agent’s intervention or instigation. The line was crossed in Woolworths Ltd v Department of Health329 where the department engaged two minors to buy cigarettes from a store selected at random, which had no history of relevant offences. But not every degree of influence is decisive: see [130.60]. A mere request for drugs is not the cause of an unlawful sale.330 The case for exclusion was strong in R v Venn-Brown331 where the agent, knowing that a woman, depressed and ill, was trying to overcome a “drug problem”, repeatedly urged her to use drugs he supplied. While the accused was not innocent, she was induced to “travel beyond the bounds of her criminal disposition”.332 R v D’Arrigo333 was an even stronger case. The appellant was convicted of receiving a stolen car on the evidence of an informer who was indemnified against prosecution for future and past offences. In the opinion of Dowsett J, those responsible for the subject offence included the AttorneyGeneral who granted such an extraordinary indemnity: In some cases the extent of police involvement in illegal activities will so taint the evidence obtained as to lead to its discretionary exclusion … Exercise of the discretion will often depend upon the extent of the illegality and the relationship between the illegality and the evidence obtained. … It is clearly unacceptable in the administration of the law for the Attorney-General to indemnify a suspected offender against unspecified future criminal conduct simply in the hope that this will lead to the identification of receivers of stolen vehicles. This is particularly so when, as a result of such indemnity, the agent engages in conduct resulting in numerous innocent persons being deprived of their property.334

And Macrossan CJ added: [The agent’s] role was to take part with the thieves in the selection of vehicles, their asportation to the secret location where the work to disguise their identity was undertaken … The objective of the apprehension and conviction of offenders can in the

325. See [130.60]. 326. Sherman v United States 356 US 369 (1958); Coward v The Queen (1985) 16 A Crim R 257 at 260. 327. R v Veneman [1970] SASR 506 at 508; Blayney v Barron and Stobart (unreported, Vic Sup Ct, Nathan J, 10 September 1987), noted in The Australian (28 September 1987), p 5; Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19. 328. (1991) 25 NSWLR 685; see also R v Stockdale (2004) 142 A Crim R 448; [2004] NSWCCA 1. 329. (2005) 2 DCLR (NSW) 76. But for a contrary view, see Robinson v Woolworths Ltd (2005) 158 A Crim R 546; [2005] NSWCCA 426. 330. R v Thompson (1992) 58 A Crim R 451. 331. [1991] 1 Qd R 458. 332. Compare R v Hsing (1991) 25 NSWLR 685 at 697 per Samuels JA. 333. (1991) 58 A Crim R 71; [1994] 1 Qd R 603. 334. (1991) 58 A Crim R 71; [1994] 1 Qd R 603 at 78 (Crim R), 611 (Qd R). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[130.62]

335

words of Barwick CJ be bought at too high a price by society. It cannot be accepted that the end will necessarily justify the means.336

Ireland in civil cases [130.62] While Christie was specifically designed for prosecution evidence, Ireland, as an offshoot of abuse of process,337 applies to civil as well as criminal proceedings.338 In federal courts evidence obtained “improperly or in contravention of Australian law” is not to be admitted unless the party tendering it satisfies the court that “the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighs the undesirability” of doing so.339 Thus, the common law onus is reversed.

Onus of proof [130.63] At common law it is for the party relying on Ireland to persuade the judge that that exclusion should occur.340 The civil standard of proof applies.341 But as to breaches of ss 436 – 437 of the PPRA see [130.77].

Appeals from discretionary rulings [130.64] A decision about discretionary exclusion will not be set aside unless it is plainly wrong, or contrary to legal principle.342 An appeal by the Crown cannot affect an acquittal, but on that limited basis appeals were upheld in R v McLean; Ex parte Attorney-General343 and R v Hasler; Ex parte Attorney-General.344 In Hasler the exclusion deprived confessional evidence of vital context and credibility. [130.65] A defendant appealing from a refusal of discretionary exclusion may present an argument for mandatory exclusion that was not advanced at the trial.345 335. R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321 at 335. 336. (1991) 58 A Crim R 71; [1994] 1 Qd R 603 at 72-73 (A Crim R), 605 (Qd R). 337. See [130.41]. 338. Miller v Miller (1978) 141 CLR 269 at 277; see also Mazinski v Bakka (1979) 20 SASR 350 at 361; Violi v Berridale Orchards Ltd (2000) 93 FCR 580; 173 ALR 518; O’Neil v Wratten (1986) 11 FCR 404; 65 ALR 451 (noted but not applied). 339. Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 138(1). 340. R v Jarrett [2012] NSWCCA 81. 341. R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133; [1950] HCA 25; Wendo v The Queen (1963) 109 CLR 559; R v Hall [1986] 1 Qd R 462; R v Ella (1990) 100 FLR 442; R v Buzzacott (2010) 107 SASR 564; [2010] SASC 234. 342. R v Kyriakou (1987) 29 A Crim R 50; R v Rima (2003) 145 A Crim R 27; [2003] NSWCCA 405 (appeal against exclusion of identity evidence allowed); Jazabas Pty Ltd v Haddad (2007) 65 ACSR 276; [2007] NSWCA 291. 343. [1991] 1 Qd R 231. 344. [1987] 1 Qd R 239. 345. R v Noakes (1986) 42 SASR 489.

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s 130

Discretion versus legal certainty [130.66] In 1950 a prescient High Court observed346 that the law relating to confessions was already so favourable to an accused that: [T]he introduction of a discretionary rule may be considered … unnecessary … [I]t is only reasonable to require that some substantial reason should be shown to justify a discretionary rejection of a voluntary admission.

[130.67] Reasonable certainty is vital to justice according to law; the more discretion, the greater the power of individual judges, and the less predictable litigation becomes. But as an experienced South Australian judge observed, some of his brethren prefer the “fuzziness” of discretionary rulings: [They] may serve to encourage the doubters of bench or bar to take refuge in “discretion” whenever a daunting task of analysis, [or] a hard decision … presents itself.347

The mantle of tribunus populi is agreeable to defence counsel, and a judge wins no popularity among them by stressing that the community, too, is entitled to a fair trial.348 If there were such a thing as judicial corruption in this country, it might shelter behind the expanding and almost inscrutable discretions that can decide criminal proceedings. On the other hand, directions to jurors routinely refer emotively to “dangerous” lines of thought,349 while oft-repeated incantations of “beyond reasonable doubt” may seem a broad hint to acquit.350 In 1970 the first Australian edition of Cross on Evidence remarked that discretionary exclusion “has been very valuable in assisting accused persons, but the time must be fast approaching for a general review”. Any such review is probably well below the horizon. In a Queensland case in 2010 the accused was charged with the murder of one parent, and attempted murder of the other. As a matter of discretion, the jury was not allowed to hear that she copied from the internet an article headed: “How to Kill Your Parents – a Complete Guide”.351 Discretionary exclusion in excelsis terminated the 1996 trial of a business magnate after investigations by the National Crime Authority (NCA). The case came before a judge who, both before and after his elevation to the Bench, was a 346. In R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133; [1950] HCA 25 at 154 (CLR). 347. Wells QC (formerly Wells J of the SA Supreme Court), “A Critique of the Australian Law Reform Commission Draft Evidence Bill” (1992) 9 Aust Bar Rev 185 at 197; Gagliardi, “What the Jury Did Not Hear”, Courier Mail (Brisbane, 7 August 1991), p 3, referring to the trial of former Police Commissioner, Terence Lewis. Such reports, if made regularly, might do more to reform the law of evidence than the deliberations of law reform commissions. Compare R v Hentschel [1988] VR 362 at 370. 348. R v McKay [1965] Qd R 240 at 246; R v Priestley (1967) 51 Cr App R 1 at 2 per Sachs LJ. A barrister who dares to suggest that the law has become excessively complex and too favourable to defendants may prejudice his professional promotion: see “Judges Blackballed Prosecutor for Silk”, The Australian (5 October 2006), p 6; Merritt, “Revenge of the Pygmies”, The Australian (6 October 2006), p 21; Cuneen M (Deputy Crown Prosecutor NSW), “When the Guilty Walk Free the Criminal Law Has Failed”, The Australian (6 October 2006), p 21. 349. It is not strictly necessary to include the word “dangerous” in a corroboration warning: White v The Queen [2006] WASCA 62. It should not be used in a Longman direction: DPW v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 583; [2006] NSWCCA 295. 350. As Wood J observed in R v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241 at 251. 351. Courier Mail (Brisbane, 18 February 2010), p 1. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[130.68]

prominent critic of the NCA. The matter never reached a jury or, as the Court of Appeal put it: “[T]hat foundation of the system [was] never anywhere to be seen.” The trial ended in a judge-only acquittal, after a marathon voir dire, extending from January to August 1996. Brooking JA remarked: “This case reinforces my view that criminal proceedings in this State are in some respects out of control.” A unanimous Court of Appeal found that the discretion had miscarried,352 but after the technically infallible acquittal, no more could be done.

Special discretions [130.68] There is a discretion to exclude “Part 6” evidence in civil as well as criminal cases: see [98.1]ff. Section 15(2) of the Evidence Act 1977 and s 439(2) of the PPRA contain “reverse” (inclusionary) discretions with respect to character evidence and unrecorded interviews.

Mandatory exclusion of evidence illegally obtained [130.69] Some statutes do not leave the treatment of illegally-obtained evidence to discretion.353 See, for example, s 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894 (“induced” confessions), s 46 of the Invasion of Privacy Act 1971, and s 77 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth).

Police Powers and Responsibilities Act [130.70] The common law of discretions must now be read in conjunction with the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000.354 Comparable provisions of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) are summarised at [F.72]. The Commonwealth provisions apply in State courts dealing with federal offences.355 Discretions preserved [130.71] The PPRA does not affect common law discretions to exclude admissible evidence. Generally breaches of that Act do not entail mandatory exclusion: s 10. Also unaffected is the “right to silence”: s 397. Detention for questioning [130.72] Sections 403 – 411 of the PPRA set limits to periods of detention. The initial period is a reasonable time, not exceeding eight hours, unless the suspect is charged with an indictable offence or is already in lawful custody. Only four of the eight hours may be spent in questioning. A justice or magistrate may extend the period of detention by up to eight hours: ss 405 – 406. [130.73] Searches for and seizures of property from persons in custody are governed by PPRA, ss 124 – 127 (motor vehicles), ss 137 – 140 (animals), ss 150 – 162 (warrants etc), s 196 (evidence generally) and s 443 (person in custody). Searches and seizures without warrant are permitted by ss 29 and 160. 352. DPP Reference No 2 of 1997 [1997] VICSC 48. 353. As to interpretation on this point, see Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57. 354. There are precedents for some of its provisions in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), Pt 1C. 355. Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 23A(2).

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[130.77]

The Ireland (or Bunning) Discretion

s 130

Identification, photographs [130.74] When an indictable offence is charged, there is a power to take fingerprints and photographs:356 PPRA, s 467. Section 617 of the PPRA refers to identification parades, “photo boards”, videotapes and computer-generated images. The right to refuse to take part in an identification parade357 is recognised in s 617(4). In the absence of consent by a detainee (ss 449 – 455), medical and dental procedures require the permission of a magistrate: ss 458 – 465.358 The presence of an “independent person” may be required: s 504. Procedures for taking DNA material are prescribed in ss 475 – 490. “Support persons” may be required for Aboriginals, children and impaired persons: ss 420 – 422. As to unfair selections of photographs, see [A.79]. It has been doubted whether there is a discretion to exclude such material for unfairness, as distinct from low probative value.359 Surveillance [130.75] Upon reasonable suspicion of an indictable offence, a police officer may obtain a surveillance warrant and an exemption from the Invasion of Privacy Act 1971: PPRA, ss 328 – 335. Interrogation [130.76] Before a police officer questions a person about an indictable offence, the officer must advise the suspect of the right to have a friend, relative or lawyer present: PPRA, s 418. A caution in terms of the “responsibilities code” must be administered: s 431. There are additional requirements where children,360 “persons with impaired capacity” or Aboriginal persons are involved: ss 420 – 422. After proceedings commence, police may ask questions to resolve any ambiguity in a prior statement and, if new information is received, the suspect may be invited to comment: s 417. Recording interviews [130.77] Sections 436 – 437 of the PPRA promote the “anti-verballing” policy of McKinney v The Queen.361 The questioning of a person suspected of an indictable offence362 “must, if practicable, be electronically recorded”. A copy of an audiotape must be given to the interviewee within seven days, and a videotape 356. Including video-recorded pictures: R v Murdoch (No 3) (2005) 195 FLR 400; [2005] NTSC 77. 357. Mahoney v Fielding; Ex parte Fielding [1959] Qd R 479 at 484; R v Shannon (1987) 47 SASR 347; 29 A Crim R 434. 358. However, this does not apply to a discarded cigarette butt used for DNA testing: R v White [2005] NSWSC 60. 359. R v Grimes [2013] 1 Qd R 351; [2012] QSC 229 at [133]. 360. See also Youth Justice Act 1992, s 29. Discretionary exclusion was applied in a case in which a Justice of the Peace was present during questioning of a minor, but was nervous or annoyed and of no likely assistance to the accused: R v C [1997] 2 Qd R 465. In R v Vinh Chi Pham [2000] QSC 274 (Mackenzie J) (questioning of juvenile – whether independent person performed role adequately) the evidence was admitted. 361. McKinney v The Queen (1991) 171 CLR 468. 362. Distinguish summary offences: R v Farr (2001) 118 A Crim R 399. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[130.77]

within 14 days: s 438. If a traditional statement in writing is taken, it must conform to s 437. The term “police interview” bears a wide meaning, and may include an informal conversation initiated by the accused.363 In R v Karger364 a police officer briefly asked the defendant about numbers registered on his mobile phone: this was deemed an “interview”. The Act could easily be defeated if police merely had to assert that they did not initiate a conversation in which alleged admissions were made. On the limits of the phrase “the course of official questioning”, see Kelly v The Queen.365 In that case, during a recorded interview, the accused was referred to an earlier admission, and claimed that it was made under duress. Later he volunteered that there was, after all, no duress. Both admissions were received. Prima facie the recording rules are mandatory, but s 436 is qualified by “practicability”366 and s 439(2) provides that a court may admit evidence of a confession or admission if: having regard to the nature of, and the reasons for non-compliance and any other relevant matters, the court is satisfied, in the special circumstances of the case [that] admission of the evidence would be in the interests of justice.

The burden of showing “special circumstances” is on the prosecution.367 Dispensations were granted: (a) when a confession was made while police were busy searching for prohibited drugs;368 (b) when an officer made a bona fide inquiry about a suspect’s health and was told that he was suffering the effects of using heroin earlier that day;369 and (c) when a confessional statement was obtained, in a murder case, without strict compliance with rules made for the benefit of Aboriginal persons.370 On the other hand, leave was refused when police interviewed a suspect in prison, knowing that there were no video recording facilities there, and without any effort to make alternative arrangements.371 Forgetting to take a tape recorder to an official interview is no excuse.372 The confession in Nicholls v The Queen373 should have been excluded because the police made no attempt to have it repeated for recording purposes, and made no note of it in writing. 363. Carr v Western Australia (2006) 166 A Crim R 1; [2006] WASCA 125. 364. (2002) 83 SASR 135. 365. (2004) 218 CLR 216; 78 ALJR 538; [2004] HCA 12. 366. Notes to s 436 give examples of situations in which recording may not be practicable. Electronic recording was impracticable in T (a child) v The Queen (1998) 20 WAR 130; [1998] WASCA 209. See, however, R v Williams [2001] 1 Qd R 212 (criticism of failure of police to use inexpensive recorders when interviewing suspects in the field – a “well-known problem area”). 367. Compare [130.63]. A decision upon a similar provision in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) is R v Tang (1997) 96 A Crim R 550; 141 FLR 338. 368. Miles v The Queen [1999] NTCCA 105. 369. R v Kanaris [1999] NTSC 94. 370. R v Brown [2006] QCA 136. 371. R v Murcott (2005) 156 A Crim R 163; [2005] WASC 30. 372. R v Gow (2006) DCLR (NSW) 211. 373. Nicholls v The Queen (2005) 219 CLR 196; 79 ALJR 468; [2005] HCA 1.

552

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[131A.1]

The Ireland (or Bunning) Discretion

s 131A

[130.78] Tribunals not bound by the rules of evidence need not follow Bunning v Cross.374 131

Witnesses for defence to be sworn

(1) In a criminal proceeding, any person who gives evidence on behalf of the defence shall first take an oath in such manner as the person would by law be obliged to do if the person were a witness for the prosecution. (2) Subsection (1) is subject to part 2, division 1A. [Subs (2) insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 65] [S 131 am Act 55 of 2003]

[131.1] At common law an accused could neither call witnesses nor testify in person. That rule was relaxed in 1589 and in 1606 for witnesses other than the accused, but they were not to be sworn.375 The right and duty of defence witnesses to take an oath, a duty that was introduced by the Witnesses on Trial for Treason etc Act 1702 (Imp), is reproduced in this section. [131.2] An accused gained the right to testify in England in 1898, and six years earlier in Queensland: Criminal Law Amendment Act 1892, s 3. [131.3] Subsection (2) was inserted by the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003, s 65. Part 2, division 1A, entitled “Competency of Witnesses and Capacity to be Sworn”, comprises ss 9 – 9D. 131A

Court may order interpreter to be provided

(1) In a criminal proceeding, a court may order the State to provide an interpreter for a complainant, defendant or witness, if the court is satisfied that the interests of justice so require. (2) [Repealed] [Subs (2) rep Act 35 of 2009, s 205] [S 131A am Act 35 of 2009; insrt Act 3 of 1997, s 122 and Sch 2]

[131A.1] Section 131A was inserted by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1997. The importance of interpreters to the administration of justice in “multicultural” Australia is clear.376 There is now a statutory obligation to provide an interpreter before questioning a suspect with an inadequate grasp of English377 and the present section fortifies the common law378 with respect to trials. See also [Q.6]. 374. Martin v Medical Complaints Tribunal (2006) 15 Tas R 413; [2006] TASSC 73. 375. R v Hulet (1660) 5 How St Tr 1185 at 1191-1192. 376. Singh (Heer) v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 15 FCR 4; Gradidge v Grace Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 93 FLR 414; Frank v Police (2007) 98 SASR 547; [2007] SASC 288 (psychiatric examination of defendant wrongly conducted without interpreter). 377. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 433. 378. Filios v Morland (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 331; Adamopoulos v Olympic Airways SA (1991) 25 NSWLR 75; Laster and Taylor, Interpreters and the Legal System (Federation Press, 1994), esp Ch 4. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 132

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[131A.2]

[131A.2] Part 2 of the Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995 features a sententious legislative style fashionable in recent years. The stated intention is that (presumed) “victims”379 who need an interpreter shall receive “fair and dignified treatment”, “access to justice”, privacy, a minimum of inconvenience, protection from violence or intimidation by or on behalf of the accused and information about the progress of proceedings. The “victim” is to be given information about the trial process and the experience of being a witness380 and told about the availability of criminal compensation. An appointment of an interpreter was refused in Lee v Commissioner of Police,381 where the appeal had no reasonable prospect of success. 132 Actions for breach of promise of marriage The plaintiff in an action for breach of promise of marriage shall not recover a verdict unless the plaintiff’s testimony is corroborated by some other material evidence in support of such promise. [132.1] It is odd that none of the amending Acts passed since 1977 has abolished this provision. The action was abolished in 1976 by s 111A of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth). It is now confined to Gilbert and Sullivan’s operetta Trial by Jury. 132A Admissibility of similar fact evidence In a criminal proceeding, similar fact evidence, the probative value of which outweighs its potentially prejudicial effect, must not be ruled inadmissible on the ground that it may be the result of collusion or suggestion, and the weight of that evidence is a question for the jury, if any. [S 132A insrt Act 3 of 1997, s 122 and Sch 2]

[132A.1] Section 132A was inserted by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1997. It abolishes a rule created by the High Court in Hoch v The Queen382 for a species of similar fact evidence, namely evidence of highly similar experiences of several witnesses with the same defendant.383

379. As defined in s 5 of the Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995. 380. This is information which should be given to every witness by the lawyers who call that witness; when witnesses are “disappointing” this is sometimes due to the fact that unimaginative or inconsiderate lawyers fail to explain arcana such as the ban on leading questions in chief, and the general rule against using documents (including a copy of the witness’s statement) in the witness box. 381. [2012] QCA 185. 382. (1988) 165 CLR 292, as recognised in Roach v The Queen (2011) 242 CLR 610; [2011] HCA 12 at [19]. The rule in Hoch also applies under the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW): R v OGD [No 2] (2000) 50 NSWLR 433. In some jurisdictions Hoch still applies: Hickey v The Queen (2002) 136 A Crim R 150. But it does not apply in South Australia: R v M, BJ (2011) 102 SASR 1; [2011] SASCFC 50; R v MJJ; R v CJN (2013) 117 SASR 81; [2013] SASCFC 51. South Australia has also departed legislatively from Pfennig v The Queen. 383. DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421; R v Ross [2013] QCA 87.

554

Evidence Law in Queensland

[132B.1]

The Ireland (or Bunning) Discretion

s 132B

[132A.2] In Hoch it was held that if there is any reasonable possibility that the witnesses have “put their heads together”, the evidence is inadmissible.384 The English courts rejected this approach as a judicial usurpation of the jury’s role.385 Section 132A accepts the latter view, and ensures that if the evidence is clearly more probative than prejudicial, any question of collusion is for the jury to decide.386 Section 597A(1AA) of the Criminal Code applies the same principle to applications for separate trials.387 However, in some cases it may still be desirable to warn the jury about a risk of collusion.388 [132A.3] Hoch’s High Court success may not have achieved a great deal. Some ten years later the Queensland Court of Appeal confirmed a conviction of one Jonathan Neil Hoch for possession of pornographic books, photographs and a computer game featuring young children.389 132B

Evidence of domestic violence

(1) This section applies to a criminal proceeding against a person for an offence defined in the Criminal Code, chapters 28 to 30. (2) Relevant evidence of the history of the domestic relationship between the defendant and the person against whom the offence was committed is admissible in evidence in the proceeding. (3) In this section— domestic relationship means a relevant relationship under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012, section 13. Note: Under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012, section 13, a relevant relationship means an intimate personal relationship, a family relationship or an informal care relationship, as defined under that Act. [Subs (3) insrt Act 5 of 2012, s 221] [S 132B am Act 5 of 2012; insrt Act 3 of 1997, s 122 and Sch 2]

[132B.1] Section 132B was inserted by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1997.390 Chapters 28 – 30 of the Criminal Code deal with homicide, offences endangering life or health and assaults. The word “domestic” is not defined, and

384. Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 297 and 305. A more recent High Court essay in excessive insulation of the jury is the similar fact case of Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461; see also [A.140]. 385. R v H [1995] 2 AC 596; 2 All ER 865; the decision in Hoch is criticised in Odgers, “Proof and Probability” (1989) 5 Aust Bar Rev 137. 386. See also Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s 278(2a); R v M, BJ (2011) 102 SASR 1; [2011] SASCFC 50. 387. R v KP; Ex parte Attorney-General [2006] QCA 301. 388. R v Wickson [2007] QCA 104 at [12]; R v Ross [2007] QCA 244. 389. Courier Mail (Brisbane, 30 October 1999), p 2. Hoch v The Queen itself was an appeal from a conviction in Queensland for indecent dealing with children in an orphanage. 390. Applied: R v Babsek [1998] QCA 116; R v Reed [2014] QCA 207; R v Warradoo [2014] QCA 299. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

555

s 132C

Simplifying Proof, Discretionary Exclusion, Sentencing, Similar Facts

[132B.2]

so bears its ordinary meaning. The governing test is relevance; the test in Pfennig v The Queen391 does not limit this provision,392 but the s 130 discretion may apply.393 [132B.2] It is doubtful whether s 132B adds much to the common law, which already recognised that evidence of a relevant and specific “relationship” between an alleged offender and a complainant transcends the rule against character evidence.394 However, this section also refers to the victim’s conduct towards the accused. The reference to “relevant” evidence in s 132B is superfluous. Irrelevant material is never admissible. [132B.3] Section 132B was applied in R v Babsek395 and R v Susec396 without discussion of common law alternatives. The jury was properly instructed about application of this section in R v Pearson.397 132C

Fact finding on sentencing

(1) This section applies to any sentencing procedure in a criminal proceeding. (2) The sentencing judge or magistrate may act on an allegation of fact that is admitted or not challenged. (3) If an allegation of fact is not admitted or is challenged, the sentencing judge or magistrate may act on the allegation if the judge or magistrate is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the allegation is true. (4) For subsection (3), the degree of satisfaction required varies according to the consequences, adverse to the person being sentenced, of finding the allegation to be true. (5) In this section— allegation of fact includes the following—

391. (1995) 182 CLR 461. 392. R v Shoesmith [2011] QCA 352 at [60]. 393. Roach v The Queen (2011) 242 CLR 610; [2011] HCA 12 at [31], [32], [37]; R v MBO [2011] QCA 280. 394. Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234; Wilson v The Queen (1970) 123 CLR 334 at 344; R v Mills [1986] 1 Qd R 77; R v Sakail [1993] 1 Qd R 312 at 316. This comment was approved in R v PAB (2006) 162 A Crim R 449; [2006] QCA 212. 395. [1998] QCA 116. 396. [2013] QCA 77; see also R v Pryor [2007] QCA 232; Roach v The Queen (2011) 242 CLR 610; [2011] HCA 12; R v Kingston [2008] QCA 193. 397. [2015] QCA 157.

556

Evidence Law in Queensland

[132C.3]

The Ireland (or Bunning) Discretion

s 132C

(a) information under the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992, section 15 or evidence given at a hearing in relation to an order under part 3A of that Act; (b) information under the Youth Justice Act 1992, section 150(3) or in a pre-sentence report under section 151 of that Act; (c) information given to the court under the Victims of Crime Assistance Act 2009, section 15; (d) other information or evidence. [Def am Act 35 of 2009, s 206; Act 34 of 2009, s 45 and Sch item 17; Act 94 of 2001, s 8; Act 44 of 1992, s 341 and Sch 3 (am Act 39 of 2002)] [S 132C am Act 35 of 2009; Act 34 of 2009; Act 44 of 1992 (am Act 39 of 2002); Act 94 of 2001; insrt Act 41 of 2000, s 4]

[132C.1] Sections 132C398 and 136 (concerning the retrospective effect of s 132C) were inserted by the Evidence Amendment Act 2000. Section 132C, particularly s 136C(4), was considered in R v BCA.399 The operation of this section should be explained to an unrepresented party.400 [132C.2] Section 132C(3) affirms that in Queensland the standard of proof of disputed facts relating to sentence is the civil standard, provided that the finding is not inconsistent with the jury’s verdict.401 Section 132C(4) recognises that the civil standard varies according to the Briginshaw test.402 On that basis a finding of dishonesty was made in R v Hargraves and Stoten.403 High standards of “satisfaction” were applied in R v Faint404 and R v Lacey and Lacey.405 Distinguish the standard of proof of prior convictions in relation to guilt, noted at [16.6]. [132C.3] Section 132C resolved significant differences of judicial opinion. In England and in other Australian States the criminal standard was preferred,406 while Queensland applied the civil standard407 until the criminal standard was decreed by a divided court of five judges in R v Morrison.408 This section reverses that decision. 398. Discussed in Walton v Butler (2004) 150 A Crim R 341; [2004] QCA 456. 399. [2011] QCA 278 at [35]; see also R v Parker [2011] QCA 198. 400. Shepherd v Queensland Police Service [2011] QDC 303. 401. Duhs v Pettett (No 3) [2010] QSC 55 at [8]; R v Alt [2013] QCA 343 at [70]; R v Milos [2014] QCA 314 at [163]; Wright v The Queen [2015] QSC 178. 402. R v Soffy [2008] QCA 129 at [2]; R v Filippa [2008] QSC 39; R v BCA [2011] QCA 278; Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; see also [A.114]. 403. (2010) 79 ATR 406; [2010] QSC 188 at [17]. For another application, see R v John [2014] QCA 86. 404. [2011] QDC 45. 405. [2010] QDC 344. 406. R v McGrath and Casey (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 460 at 463; R v Isaacs (1996) 41 NSWLR 374; Anderson v The Queen (1993) 177 CLR 520; R v Storey [1998] 1 VR 359; Langridge v The Queen (1996) 17 WAR 346. 407. R v Welsh [1983] 1 Qd R 592; R v Jobson [1989] 2 Qd R 464; R v Nardozzi [1995] 2 Qd R 87. 408. [1999] 1 Qd R 397. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

557

s 133

Simplifying Proof, Discretionary Exclusion, Sentencing, Similar Facts

[132C.4]

[132C.4] Section 15 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 provides that, in considering a sentence, a court may receive any information, including a report under s 245 of the Corrective Services Act 2000, to enable it to impose “the proper sentence”.409 [132C.5] Section 150(3) of the Youth Justice Act 1992 makes similar provision for young offenders and s 151 of that Act enables the court to order a pre-sentence report. [132C.6] Section 14 of the Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995 states that the prosecutor, at the sentencing stage, and with the consent of the victim, should “inform the sentencing court of appropriate details of the harm caused to [that person] by the crime”. The court may accept uncontradicted allegations in “victim impact statements”.410 [132C.7] Following a “guilty” verdict, the judge may review the evidence and make findings (not inconsistent with the verdict)411 that were not clearly made by the jury.412 If the accused did not testify, the judge may more confidently draw relevant inferences from uncontradicted prosecution evidence. The Weissensteiner principle413 is still applicable at the sentencing stage because the presumption of innocence no longer applies.414 [132C.8] In the event of forfeiture proceedings, an agreed statement of facts tendered at the sentencing hearing raises no estoppel.415 133 Impounding documents Where a document has been tendered or produced before a court, the court may, whether or not the document is admitted in evidence, direct that the document shall be impounded and kept in the custody of an officer of the court or of another person for such period and subject to such conditions as the court thinks fit. [133.1] A document is “impounded” when it is lawfully confiscated or taken into lawful custody.416 For the purposes of s 133 it is not necessary that the document be an exhibit; it suffices that it has been “produced” or “tendered” (whether admitted or not). Accordingly, s 133 would be available where a document discloses a fraud on the revenue that the judge decides to report to the authorities.417

409. R v Smith [2016] QCA 9. 410. R v Evans; R v Pearce [2011] 2 Qd R 571; [2011] QCA 135 at [7]. 411. R v McLeod (2007) 47 MVR 294; [2007] QCA 45. 412. Cheung v The Queen (2001) 209 CLR 1. 413. See [A.122]. 414. R v Miller [2004] 1 Qd R 548; [2003] QCA 404. 415. Walton v Butler (2004) 150 A Crim R 341; [2004] QCA 456. 416. See also Criminal Practice Rules 1999, r 5; Coroners Act 2003, s 40. 417. In the Marriage of P (Tax Evasion) [1985] FLC 91-605; see also [10.23].

558

Evidence Law in Queensland

[133.4]

The Ireland (or Bunning) Discretion

s 133A

A document “marked for identification” but not subsequently tendered is not part of the evidence.418 [133.2] Documents produced in answer to a subpoena duces tecum, or admitted as exhibits, remain in the custody of the court until further order. This is one reason for “convenience” provisions such as ss 51 and 84(b). At the time of judgment an order may be obtained that exhibits be released when the time for appeal expires. It is doubtful whether a court has a general power to order that exhibits or transcripts of evidence be closed to public inspection.419 [133.3] When a jury retires to consider its verdict it generally takes with it all exhibits in the case,420 subject to s 99 and to considerations of safety, size or inconvenience. The proper limits of a jury’s use of exhibits are considered in Kozul v The Queen421 and R v Hamitov.422 See also [99.1] and [130.11]. [133.4] Access to documents and real evidence before trial is a separate question: see, for example, s 88 of the Evidence Act 1977 and Ch 7 Pt 1 and Ch 8 Pt 1 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999.423

133A

DNA analysts

(1) The chief executive of the department within which the Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011 is administered, if satisfied the officer has the necessary qualifications and experience to be a DNA analyst, may appoint as a DNA analyst— (a) a public service officer employed in the department; or (b) a health service employee employed in the department under the Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011. [Subs (1) subst Act 32 of 2011, s 332 and Sch 1 item 2 (subst Act 9 of 2012); am Act 48 of 2005, s 492 and Sch 1]

(2) The appointment takes effect on the day it is notified in the gazette. (3) Subsection (4) applies if the commissioner of the police service has entered into a DNA arrangement with a laboratory under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, section 488B(1). [Subs (3) insrt Act 1 of 2014, s 45]

418. Sims v Bakke [1967] QWN 46; R v Glastonbury [2014] SASCFC 44 at [34]. 419. Fractionated Cane Technology Ltd v Ruiz-Avila [1988] 1 Qd R 51. 420. R v Bradshaw (1978) 18 SASR 83; Kozul v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 221; R v Stephenson (1978) 18 SASR 381. 421. (1981) 147 CLR 221. 422. (1979) 21 SASR 596 at 598. 423. See also Campbell, “Access to Exhibits in Criminal Trials” (1986) 8 QL 177. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

559

s 133A

Simplifying Proof, Discretionary Exclusion, Sentencing, Similar Facts

[133A.1]

(4) The chief executive officer, however described, of the laboratory may, by written notice, appoint an employee of the laboratory as a DNA analyst if satisfied the employee has the necessary qualifications and experience to be a DNA analyst. [Subs (4) insrt Act 1 of 2014, s 45]

(5) The appointment takes effect— (a) on the day the notice is given to the employee; or (b) if a later day is stated in the notice, the later day. [Subs (5) insrt Act 1 of 2014, s 45] [S 133A am Act 1 of 2014; Act 32 of 2011; Act 48 of 2005; insrt Act 23 of 2002, s 49]

[133A.1] This section was inserted by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2002, s 49, and amended by the Police Powers and Responsibilities and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2014, s 45. See also s 95A. On the topic of DNA evidence, see [A.69], [A.75]n, [95A.1], [130.11]n, [130.74]n and [Q.24]. 134

Power to appoint a government printer

The Governor in Council may appoint a government printer for the State. [134.1]

This provision relates to ss 46, 48 and 68.

134A Production of documents by agencies in relation to civil proceedings (1) A person who is a party to a civil proceeding may make written application to the principal officer of an agency to produce for inspection a document that— (a) is in the possession of, or under the power of, the agency; and (b) is relevant to an issue in the proceeding; if the agency, the principal officer, or a member, officer or employee of the agency, could be ordered, on the application of the person, to produce the document in the proceeding. (2) The principal officer may permit the person, on payment of the prescribed fee, to inspect the document, and take a copy of, or an extract from, the document, at a time and place nominated by the principal officer. (3) If the principal officer permits the person to inspect and take a copy of, or an extract from, the document, the principal officer, and all persons acting on behalf of the principal officer, are entitled to the same protection as they would have had if the acts concerned had been carried out in obedience to a process of the Supreme Court. (4) The proceeding (a) (b) 560

principal officer is not required to notify another party to the of— the making of the application; or any action taken in relation to the application. Evidence Law in Queensland

The Ireland (or Bunning) Discretion

s 134A

(4A) The principal officer may delegate his or her powers under this section to an officer or employee of the principal officer’s agency. [Subs (4A) insrt Act 24 of 1994, s 3 and Sch]

(4B) Also, the principal officer of a public safety entity under the Public Safety Business Agency Act 2014 may delegate the officer’s powers under this section to an appropriately qualified person in the Public Safety Business Agency. [Subs (4B) insrt Act 17 of 2014, s 57]

(5) Subject to subsection (6), this section does not affect— (a) the operation of any law relating to the disclosure or nondisclosure of information; or (b) the operation of another law that authorises the inspection or copying of a document otherwise than as provided in this section; or (c) the power of a court to order the inspection or production of a document. (6) If a document mentioned in subsection (1) is a document that contains information to which the Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011, section 142(1) applies, the document is, for the purposes of section 143 of that Act, information that is required or permitted to be given under this Act. [Subs (6) subst Act 32 of 2011, s 332 and Sch 1 item 3 (subst Act 9 of 2012); am Act 70 of 2005, s 94; Act 46 of 2000, s 3 and Sch]

(7) In this section— agency means— (a) a department; or (b) a public authority, other than a prescribed entity, within the meaning of the Right to Information Act 2009, section 16; or (c) a person or body declared by regulation to be an agency; but does not include a person or body declared by regulation424 not to be an agency. [Def am Act 13 of 2009, s 213 and Sch 5 item 1]

principal officer means— (a) in relation to a department—the chief executive of the department; or (b) in relation to an agency for which a regulation declares an officer to be the principal officer—the holder of the office; or (c) in relation to another agency— (i) if it is an incorporated body that has no members—the person who manages the body’s affairs; or (ii) if it is a body (whether or not incorporated) that is constituted by 1 person—the person; or

424. See Evidence Regulation 2007, s 6 (person or body not an agency because FOI provisions do not apply to the person or body). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

561

s 134A

Simplifying Proof, Discretionary Exclusion, Sentencing, Similar Facts

(iii)

[134A.1]

if it is a body (whether or not incorporated) that is constituted by 2 or more persons—the person who is entitled to preside at a meeting of the body at which the person is present.

[S 134A am Act 17 of 2014; Act 32 of 2011; Act 13 of 2009; Act 70 of 2005; Act 46 of 2000; Act 24 of 1994; insrt Act 68 of 1992, s 3 and Sch 1]

[134A.1] Section 134A was inserted by the Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No 2) 1992 to provide a relatively cheap and speedy alternative to applications for “non party discovery” under the former O 40 r 3A of the Rules of the Supreme Court. (See now Ch 7 Pt 1 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999.) This innovation is discussed in Lebon v Lake Placid Resort Pty Ltd425 and Hemmings v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd.426 [134A.2] This procedure does not apply to non-parties in general, but only to an “agency” as defined in s 134A(7). A list of persons and bodies that are not “agencies” appears in s 6 of the Evidence Regulation 2007. [134A.3] Fees payable under s 134A(2) are prescribed in s 6 of the Evidence Regulation 2007. [134A.4]

Protection against actions for defamation is provided by s 134A(3).

[134A.5] Section 134A does not affect the laws of privilege, the Freedom of Information Act 1992 or any other law with respect to discovery or inspection: s 134A(5). [134A.6] Section 134A(6) cross-refers to s 142(1) (confidentiality) and s 143 (disclosure required or permitted by law) of the Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011. [134A.7] It is recognised that there are contentious cases427 in which it will be necessary to revert to court-administered procedures. For example, a “principal officer” may not be satisfied that a document is one which the agency “could be ordered … to produce … in the proceeding”: compare s 134A(1). [134A.8] The director of a Regional Health Authority is a principal officer for the purposes of s 134A(7)(b): Evidence Amendment Regulation (No 1) 1993, s 4. 134B

Approval of forms

(1) The chief executive may approve forms for— (a) anything for which this Act requires or permits an approved form to be used; or (b) another use under this Act. (2) Subsection (1)(b) does not apply to forms for court proceedings. [S 134B insrt Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

425. [1995] 1 Qd R 24. 426. [2010] QDC 305. 427. Lebon v Lake Placid Resort Pty Ltd [1995] 1 Qd R 24 at 30.

562

Evidence Law in Queensland

[136.2]

Division 1 – Evidence Amendment Act 2000

s 136

[134B.1] A form for proof of identity of a person convicted was published in the Queensland Government Gazette (10 May 1996), p 528, and a form of witness anonymity certificate was published in the Queensland Government Gazette (5 January 2001), p 48. 135

Regulation-making power

(1) The Governor in Council may make regulations under this Act. (2) A regulation may be made about— (a) fees to be charged under this Act; or (b) the payment of fees and expenses for, or incurred in, taking evidence under part 3, division 2. [S 135 subst Act 76 of 1993, s 3 and Sch 1]

[135.1] The Evidence Regulation 2007, as amended by SL No 64 of 1998, deals with (i) fees for inspecting a document under s 134A: s 6; (ii) persons and bodies declared not to be an “agency” for the purposes of s 134A: s 7; and (iii) machines approved under s 107 for making reproductions pursuant to Pt 7: Schedule.

Part 9 – Transitional and declaratory provisions DIVISION 1 – EVIDENCE AMENDMENT ACT 2000 136

Transitional—Evidence Amendment Act 2000

(1) Section 132C applies to a sentencing procedure regardless of whether the offence or the conviction for the offence giving rise to the sentencing procedure happened before or after the commencement of this section. (2) In this section— conviction means a finding of guilt, or the acceptance of a plea of guilty, by a court. sentencing procedure means a sentencing procedure started after the commencement of this section. [S 136 reinsrt Act 41 of 2000, s 5; exp Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1, with effect from 28 May 1996; insrt Act 58 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1]

[136.1] The heading to Div 1 was inserted by s 6 of the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003 and s 136 was inserted by the Evidence Amendment Act 2000 as a provision ancillary to s 132C. [136.2] In accordance with the common law428 the amendment effected by s 132C, being beneficial to accused persons, is retrospective.

428. See [A.2]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

563

s 136A

Simplifying Proof, Discretionary Exclusion, Sentencing, Similar Facts

[137.1]

DIVISION 1A – JUSTICE AND OTHER LEGISLATION AMENDMENT ACT 2003 136A Declaratory provision for Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2003 To remove any doubt, it is declared that the chief executive (premiers) has always had the powers mentioned in section 58(1) and (2).429 [Former s 137 renum Act 43 of 2004, s 3 and Sch; insrt Act 77 of 2003, s 77]

DIVISION 2 – EVIDENCE (PROTECTION OF CHILDREN) AMENDMENT ACT 2003 137 Definitions for div 2 In this division— amending Act means the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003. commencement day means— (a) for section 138—the day the amending Act, section 56 commences; or (b) for section 139—the day the amending Act, section 57 commences; or (c) for sections 140, 141 and 142—the day the amending Act, section 60 commences. originating step, for a proceeding, means— (a) the arrest of the defendant in the proceeding; or (b) the making of a complaint under the Justices Act 1886, section 42430 in relation to the defendant in the proceeding; or (c) the serving of a notice to appear on the defendant in the proceeding under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, section 382.431 [Def am Act 5 of 2000, s 810 and Sch 4 (am Act 26 of 2006)] [S 137 am Act 5 of 2000 (am Act 26 of 2006); insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 67]

[137.1] These transitional provisions (ss 137 – 142) were inserted by s 67 of the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003. 138 Communications between a husband and wife Section 8(3) applies to communications whether made before or after the commencement day. [S 138 insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 67]

429. Certification of letters patent. 430. Justices Act 1886, s 42 (Commencement of proceedings). 431. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 382 (Notice to appear may be issued for offence).

564

Evidence Law in Queensland

[139.1]

Division 3 – Cross-Border Law Enforcement Legislation Amendment Act 2005

s 143

[138.1] Section 8(3), as amended by Act No 55 of 2003, abolishes privilege for matrimonial communications. The former s 11 was repealed by the same enactment. [138.2] On the retrospective effect of statutes amending procedural laws, see [A.2]. See also s 139. 139

Evidence admitted under repealed s 9

(1) Section 9D applies to evidence admitted before the commencement day under repealed section 9 as if the evidence had been admitted under section 9A. (2) In this section— repealed section 9 means section 9 as in force before the commencement day. [S 139 insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 67]

[139.1] Section 9D deems evidence admitted under s 9A, and written down, to be a deposition for all purposes. It also deals with the probative value of s 9A evidence, and applies the law of perjury to such evidence. 140

Committal proceeding

Part 2, division 4A, subdivision 2432 applies to a committal proceeding only if an originating step for the proceeding is taken on or after the commencement day. [S 140 insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 67]

141 Prerecording of evidence for a summary trial Part 2, division 4A, subdivision 3433 applies to a summary trial for a relevant offence only if an originating step for the proceeding is taken on or after the commencement day. [S 141 insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 67]

142 Prerecording of evidence for a trial on indictment Part 2, division 4A, subdivision 3 applies to a trial on indictment for a relevant offence only if the indictment is presented on or after the commencement day. [S 142 insrt Act 55 of 2003, s 67]

DIVISION 3 – CROSS-BORDER LAW ENFORCEMENT LEGISLATION AMENDMENT ACT 2005 143

Witness anonymity certificates

(1) This section applies to a witness anonymity certificate given under section 21D of the pre-amended Act.

432. Part 2 (Witnesses), Div 4A (Evidence of affected children), subdiv 2 (committal proceedings). 433. Part 2 (Witnesses), Div 4A (Evidence of affected children), subdiv 3 (Pre-recording of affected child’s evidence). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

565

s 143

Simplifying Proof, Discretionary Exclusion, Sentencing, Similar Facts

[143.1]

(2) The prescribed sections continue to apply in relation to the witness anonymity certificate as if the Cross-Border Law Enforcement Legislation Amendment Act 2005, part 3 had not commenced.434 (3) In this section— pre-amended Act means this Act as in force before the commencement of the Cross-Border Law Enforcement Legislation Amendment Act 2005, part 3. prescribed sections means sections 21B to 21J of the pre-amended Act. [S 143 insrt Act 45 of 2005, s 52]

[143.1] The prescribed form of witness anonymity certificate is published in the Government Gazette (27 October 2006), p 935.

DIVISION 4 – JUSTICE AND OTHER LEGISLATION AMENDMENT ACT 2005 144 Statement made before proceeding by child or person with an impairment of the mind (1) To remove any doubt, it is declared that amended section 93A applies to a proceeding that starts after the commencement of this section, regardless of when the conduct giving rise to the proceeding happened. (2) A statement admitted into evidence in a proceeding before the commencement of this section that would be admissible under the amended section 93A if tendered in a proceeding after the commencement is taken to have always been admissible under section 93A. (3) In this section— amended section 93A means section 93A as amended by the Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2005. proceeding includes a committal, a preliminary hearing, a trial and any rehearing or retrial arising out of, or any appeal from, an earlier proceeding. [S 144 am Act 55 of 2008, s 150 and Sch; insrt Act 70 of 2005, s 95]

[144.1] This declaratory and precautionary section was inserted by the Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2005, Act No 70 of 2005, s 95. It commenced on 8 December 2005. [144.2] The heading to s 144 was amended by the Criminal Code and Other Acts Amendment Act 2008 by substituting the words “person with an impairment of the mind” for the phrase “intellectually impaired person”.

434. Cross-Border Law Enforcement Legislation Amendment Act 2005, Pt 3 (Amendment of Evidence Act 1977). At the time of writing the Cross-Border Law Enforcement Legislation Amendment Act 2005 did not appear on the Parliamentary Counsel’s list of Queensland Acts in force.

566

Evidence Law in Queensland

[146.2]

Division 6 – Right to Information Act 2009 [Repealed]

s 147

145 Definition chief executive (surveys) It is declared that the amendment of the definition chief executive (surveys) by the Surveyors Act 2003 is, and has always been, as effective as it would have been if the definition had been located in schedule 3 rather than section 3 when the amendment commenced. [S 145 insrt Act 70 of 2005, s 95]

[145.1] This section was inserted by the Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2005, Act No 70 of 2005, s 95.

DIVISION 5 – CRIMINAL CODE AND OTHER ACTS AMENDMENT ACT 2008 146

References to particular Criminal Code offences

(1) The definition offence involving violence in section 21AC applies as if it included a reference to the Criminal Code, sections 319A, 331 and 332 as in force at any time before their repeal by the amending Act. (2) The definition prescribed offence in section 21M(3) applies as if it included a reference to the Criminal Code, section 338 as in force at any time before its repeal by the amending Act. (3) The definition prescribed offence in section 21M(3) applies as if the reference to the Criminal Code, section 415 included a reference to the Criminal Code, sections 415, 416 and 417 as in force at any time before their repeal by the amending Act. (4) The definition prescribed special offence in section 21M(3) applies as if the reference to the Criminal Code, section 208 included a reference to the Criminal Code, section 209 as in force at any time before its repeal by the amending Act. (5) In this section— amending Act means the Criminal Code and Other Acts Amendment Act 2008. [S 146 insrt Act 55 of 2008, s 150 and Sch]

[146.1] Section 146 was inserted by the Criminal Code and Other Acts Amendment Act 2008, and the former Sch 2 to the Evidence Act 1977 was deleted. [146.2] Part 9 Div 6 omitted by the Treasury and Trade and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2013, s 109, Sch 2.

DIVISION 6 – RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT 2009 [REPEALED] 147

Effect of regulation amendment [Repealed]

[S 147 rep Act 39 of 2013, s 109 and Sch 2; insrt Act 13 of 2009, s 213 and Sch 5 item 2]

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567

s 147

Simplifying Proof, Discretionary Exclusion, Sentencing, Similar Facts

[146.2]

SCHEDULE 1: Examples of offices of a public nature established under an Act: see [42.2]. SCHEDULE 2: Deleted by the Criminal Code and Other Acts Amendment Act 2008. SCHEDULE 3: Dictionary: see [3.1].

568

Evidence Law in Queensland

OTHER QUEENSLAND LEGISLATION OVERVIEW [Q.1] This chapter does not attempt to collect the plethora of evidential provisions in Queensland statutes apart from the Evidence Act 1977. It is a select list of examples. Other Queensland Acts dealing specifically with evidence are the Evidence and Discovery Act 1867; the Evidence (Attestation of Documents) Act 1937;1 the Australian Consular Offıcers Notarial Powers and Evidence Act 1946; the Recording of Evidence Act 1962; the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978; and the Evidence on Commission Act 1988. They are mentioned elsewhere in this text. Chapter 11 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 deals with the reception of evidence in and out2 of court, subpoenas, expert evidence and affidavits, and differs from the common law in several respects.3 Rules relating to evidence appear in the Criminal Code, for example: (i) s 125 (corroboration mandatory in perjury cases);4 (ii) s 126 (fabricating evidence); (iii) s 129 (destroying evidence); (iv) s 195 (corroboration mandatory, false declarations);5 (v) s 204 (general offence of disobeying statute law; the onus of proving lawful excuse is on the defendant); (vi) s 229N (evidence that a place is used for prostitution). Section 442M(2) of the Criminal Code places the onus of proving noninvolvement on a principal whose agent receives a secret commission. Section 632 abolishes any rule requiring corroboration unless the Code specifically states otherwise, and forbids any suggestion that particular classes of persons are unreliable witnesses. Sections 634 – 644 deal with evidence in trials for perjury, evidence of previous convictions and evidence of blood relationship, gambling, possession of lawful authority, certain types of stealing, intention to injure or defraud and admissions. Evidential aspects of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 are summarised at [130.34], [130.70] and [Q.56].

1. An affidavit was not valid in this Act when it was witnessed in New South Wales by a solicitor because the New South Wales legislation enabled a solicitor to witness affidavits only for use in New South Wales: Re Ocean Industries (Overseas) Pty Ltd [1991] 2 Qd R 409. 2. Compare Evidence Act 1977, Pt 3, ss 22–39. 3. Particularly r 391 (court may call evidence) and rr 426–429S (court control and appointment of experts). 4. R v Willmot; Ex parte Attorney-General [1987] 1 Qd R 53. 5. R v Mondon [2003] 1 Qd R 200; [2002] QCA 89.

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Other Queensland Legislation

[Q.2]

OPEN COURT, NON-PUBLICATION ORDERS, ANONYMITY Open court – common law position [Q.2] It is a fundamental principle that court proceedings are open to press and the public, as a protection against judicial partiality,6 and in the interests of education and investigation.7 Proceedings in Chambers are an exception,8 but orders made in Chambers9 may be published unless otherwise stated.10 A superior court11 may be closed to the public if the interests of justice so require, but the power is sparingly used.12 An unauthorised order to vacate a court may amount to contempt.13 The open court principle does not extend to photographing or videotaping proceedings without special permission.14 Evidence was taken in camera to protect professional privilege in Mallesons Stephen Jacques v KPMG Peat Marwick,15 where a client sought to restrain his former solicitors from acting against him. Other examples involve litigation about secret processes,16 proceedings relating to minors,17 matters of national security,18 and witnesses participating in witness protection programs.19 The High 6. Russell v Russell (1976) 134 CLR 495 at 520; Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506. 7. Re Hamilton (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 277; Russell v Russell (1976) 134 CLR 495 at 520; Raybos Australia Pty Ltd v Jones (1985) 2 NSWLR 47; John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court (NSW) (2004) 61 NSWLR 344; 148 A Crim R 522 at [18]; Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651; [2010] HCA 21 at [29] – [31]; Fraser-Kirk v David Jones Ltd (2010) 190 FCR 325; [2010] FCA 1060; R v Davis (1995) 57 FCR 512 at 514; Young, “Open Courts” (2006) 80 ALJ 83. 8. Vernazza v Barburriza & Co Ltd [1937] 4 All ER 364; In re de Beaujeu’s Application [1949] Ch 230; Cumbrae-Stewart, “Reports of Proceedings at Judges’ Chambers” (1947) 20 ALJ 370. 9. Now referred to as “proceedings commenced by application”: Supreme Court Practice Direction No 14 of 1999. 10. In re de Beaujeu’s Application [1949] Ch 230; see also Note in (1947) 20 ALJ 370. 11. New South Wales Commissioner of Police v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2008) 70 NSWLR 643; [2007] NSWCA 366; Distinguish inferior courts: John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court (NSW) (2004) 61 NSWLR 344; 148 A Crim R 522; [2004] NSWCA 324; but for a different view, see R v Kwok (2005) 158 A Crim R 160; [2005] NSWCCA 245 (District Court). 12. Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 at 445; McPherson v McPherson [1936] AC 177; Offıcial Solicitor v K [1965] AC 201; Home Offıce v Harman [1982] 2 WLR 338 at 345; Grassby v The Queen (1989) 161 CLR 1 at 16-17; R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 250; [2006] NSWSC 587 (security – trial for terrorism). 13. Ex parte Tubman; Re Lucas (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 520; see also Note in (1989) 63 ALJ 155 recording the objection of Deane J to security checks upon members of the public attending Sittings of the High Court. 14. R v Williams [2007] VSC 139; Prothonotary of Supreme Court (NSW) v Rakete (2010) 202 A Crim R 117; [2010] NSWSC 665; see the reasons for refusal in Collard v Western Australia (No 2) [2013] WASC 55. 15. (1990) 4 WAR 357. 16. Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417; David Syme & Co Ltd v General Motors-Holden’s Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 294. 17. B v Medical Superintendent of Macquarie Hospital (1987) 10 NSWLR 440. 18. A v Hayden (No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 532.

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Evidence Law in Queensland

[Q.2]

Open Court, Non-publication Orders, Anonymity

Court granted non-publication orders in Obeid v The Queen (No 2).20 But despite a statutory discretion to sit in private, the corporate affairs inquiry in Re National Safety Council of Australia Victorian Division (In liq); Re Friedrich21 declined to do so. The rights of news media in relation to closed courts and non-publication orders are considered in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v District Court of New South Wales,22 Re Corruption and Crime Commission; Ex parte West Australian Newspapers Ltd23 and John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Ryde Local Court.24 In the Fairfax case it was held that there is no common law right of access to documents filed but not used in the hearing.25 At common law, exhibits are normally in the public domain,26 and there is express provision for public access to pleadings and certain other filed documents in the Federal Court.27 Access to an exhibit (a CCTV recording) in proceedings that the prosecution discontinued was refused in R v Sutton (No 2).28 Elaborate arrangements for receiving evidence of “secret business” of Aboriginal people are sui generis.29 Publication of the results of proceedings held in camera will not be prohibited.30 Commercial arbitrations and hearings of evidence on commission are closed to the media and the public,31 although it has been suggested that arbitrators should sit in public when important public interests are involved.32

19. X v Y [2000] NSWSC 951. 20. [2016] HCA 10. 21. (1989) 1 ACSR 293; 8 ACLC 277, applying a section similar to s 597(4) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 22. (1996) 40 NSWLR 486; Hammond v Scheinberg (2001) 52 NSWLR 49 (media access to affidavits). 23. (2007) 98 ALD 89; [2007] WASC 201. 24. (2005) 62 NSWLR 512; [2005] NSWCA 101. 25. See also Smith v Harris [1996] VR 335 at 341; Russo v Russo [2010] VSC 98; however, special leave was given to the media in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Michalik [2004] NSWSC 966. 26. K & S Corp Ltd v Number 1 Betting Shop Ltd [2005] SASC 228; Jackson v Johnson [2010] SASC 133 (media access, statement of claim); R v Jovanovic [2014] ACTSC 98 (media access to CCTV recording). 27. Federal Court Rules (Cth), O 46 r 6(2); Fraser-Kirk v David Jones Ltd (2010) 190 FCR 325; [2010] FCA 1060; cf Wilson v Mitchell [2014] VSC 280. 28. [2015] QSC 289. 29. See, eg, Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (2000) 100 FCR 229, where such evidence was heard in camera, the parties represented only by female practitioners, on condition that there be no disclosure of the evidence without the court’s permission. Another case on the precious topic of “gender restricted evidence” is Jango v Northern Territory of Australia [2003] FCA 1230. 30. John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court (NSW) (2004) 61 NSWLR 344; 148 A Crim R 522; [2004] NSWCA 324 at [59] – [63]. 31. Magnusson v ACT Health Community Care Service [2001] ACTSC 3. 32. Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Other Queensland Legislation

[Q.3]

Alternatives – anonymity, non-publication [Q.3] An alternative to closure is an order suppressing the identity of a witness33 or permitting the use of a pseudonym.34 Protection of this kind may be afforded to police informers,35 victims of extortion,36 or national security agents.37 If an “anonymity” order is made, there must be a confidential disclosure to the court and to the defence in a criminal case, if that is likely to assist it.38 In the absence of statutory authority an anonymity order may not be made in committal proceedings.39 Special provisions for anonymity appear in s 21Bff of the Evidence Act 1977. Another alternative is to order that evidence not be published.40 In R v Xu41 a non-publication order was based on psychiatric evidence about the accused’s recovery and rehabilitation, and a view that the compromise of open justice was “minimal”. A District Court exceeded its statutory powers, when it ordered that a conviction not be published.42 Decisions about these lesser forms of suppression are governed by the same principle as decisions to sit in camera. The question is whether the court can function properly in public, not whether a witness prefers to avoid publicity: [A]n order of a court prohibiting the publication of evidence is only valid if it is really necessary to secure the proper administration of justice in proceedings before it. Moreover, an order prohibiting publication of evidence must be clear in its terms and do no more than is necessary to achieve the due administration of justice … [T]here must be some material before the court upon which it can reasonably reach the conclusion that it is necessary to make an order prohibiting publication. Mere belief that the order is necessary is insufficient.43

An unsuccessful application for suppression of the plaintiffs’ names was made in 33. R v Noud; Ex parte McNamara [1991] 2 Qd R 86; R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 250; [2006] NSWSC 587. 34. John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd v Local Court of New South Wales (1991) 26 NSWLR 131; Rockett v Smith; Ex parte Smith [1992] 1 Qd R 660; R v Taylor (Gary) [1994] TLR 484. 35. Cain v Glass (No 2) (1985) 3 NSWLR 230; Eastman v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 9; Ryan v Victoria [2015] VSCA 353 at [56]. 36. John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd v Local Court of New South Wales (1991) 26 NSWLR 131; R v Socialist Worker Printers and Publishers Ltd; Ex parte Attorney General [1975] QB 637. 37. A v Hayden (No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 532. 38. Jarvie v Magistrates Court (Vic) [1995] 1 VR 84. 39. R v Stipendiary Magistrate at Southport; Ex parte Gibson [1993] 2 Qd R 687. 40. Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440; Ex parte Queensland Law Society Inc [1984] 1 Qd R 166; John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Police Tribunal of New South Wales (1986) 5 NSWLR 465. As to non-publication orders in the Federal Court, see Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 50; Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651; [2010] HCA 21. 41. (2005) 152 A Crim R 17; [2005] NSWSC 73. 42. John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court (NSW) (2004) 61 NSWLR 344; 148 A Crim R 522; [2004] NSWCA 324. 43. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Police Tribunal of New South Wales (1986) 5 NSWLR 465 at 477 per McHugh JA.

572

Evidence Law in Queensland

[Q.3]

Open Court, Non-publication Orders, Anonymity

Creevy v Salesian Society (Vic) Inc,44 a civil action for “child abuse”. Nathan J declared that open justice cannot be abandoned because a litigant fears embarrassment or ridicule. However, in Hume v Council of the Kings School45 the applicant, who was accused, in a civil action, of serious gross sexual assaults on a former fellow-pupil, was granted a temporary anonymity order for reasons of shame and potential economic harm. In Advertiser Newspapers v V46 a suppression order in favour of a person who escaped convictions for sacrilege and damage to church property on the ground of mental incapacity was set aside on appeal. In J v L & A Services Pty Ltd (No 2)47 the Queensland Court of Appeal allowed publication of the names of plaintiffs who were suing medical practitioners who allegedly infected them with AIDS. The majority saw no difference between them and many other litigants who would prefer to give evidence in private. In McLachlan v Australian Stock Exchange48 an anonymity order in relation to an adverse financial report was refused, although the application was unopposed. Lander J stated that the extraordinary power to sit in private is not designed to allow important people to “litigate out of the public eye”.49 An application to suppress the names of witnesses in a defamation case involving paedophilia was initially allowed,50 but subsequently dismissed, despite the fact that “the open conduct of the courts can cause great pain and loss”.51 An application to suppress evidence of sexual misconduct by a senior trade unionist was rejected in Johnston v Cameron.52 A similar application was successful in Re “Mr C”.53 As to evidence by video link for reasons of security, see [21B.1] Commercially sensitive material may be protected by orders limiting disclosure of it to persons nominated by the court,54 or by omitting it from the reasons for judgment.55

44. (Unreported, Vic Sup Ct, Nathan J, 24 August 1993); see also Queensland v Nuttall [2007] QSC 79. 45. [2010] NSWSC 186. The order (at [34]) was open to review as the action proceeded. 46. (2000) 117 A Crim R 141. 47. [1995] 2 Qd R 10; see also Mutemeri v Cheesman (1998) 100 A Crim R 397, where an order suppressing names was refused to persons suffering HIV, possibly through the criminal conduct of another. See also Wotton v Queensland (No 3) [2015] FCA 1074. 48. (1998) 30 ACSR 139; see also O’Shane v Burwood Local Court (2007) 178 A Crim R 392; [2007] NSWSC 1300. 49. Rinehart v Welker [2011] NSWCA 425 at [19] (leave to appeal to High Court refused). 50. Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Levine J, 2 November 1998); Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1099. 51. John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd v Local Court of New South Wales (1991) 26 NSWLR 131 per Mahoney JA. 52.

[2002] FCA 948.

53. (1993) 67 A Crim R 562. 54. Magellan Petroleum Australia Ltd v Sagasco Amadeus Pty Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 37; Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Guina Developments Pty Ltd [1996] 2 VR 34. 55. Asia Pacific Telecommunications Ltd v Optus Networks Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 550. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

573

Other Queensland Legislation

[Q.4]

STATUTORY MODIFICATION OF OPEN COURT POLICY [Q.4] Complainants in sexual offence cases are not to be identified, and the accused must not be publicly named before committal for trial or sentence. The public may be excluded while the complainant testifies.56 A person under 17 years of age who is charged with a criminal offence must not be identified at any stage.57 See also [21AU.1]. There are other examples of statutory authority to sit in private or to restrict publication in the Adoption Act 2009, s 223; the Bail Act 1980, s 12; the Coroners Act 2003, ss 41 and 43; the Childrens Court Act 1992, s 20; the Child Protection Act 1999, ss 189, 192 and 193; Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950, s 16; the Crime and Corruption Act 2001, s 202; the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000, ss 108, 109(2); the Mental Health Act 2000, s 458; the Justices Act 1886, ss 70 – 71; the Evidence Act 1977, s 21Bff; the Criminal Code, s 695A (protection of victims of violence); and r 514(1)(f) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (minor claims in Magistrates’ Courts). Certificates entitling a “protected witness” to give evidence under an assumed name may be issued under s 21F of the Evidence Act 1977.58

EXCLUSION OF A PARTY [Q.5] In the absence of statutory authority59 or extreme circumstances, such as disorderly contempt of court, a party is entitled to be present throughout a hearing.60 However, a criminal trial may proceed in the absence of an accused who repeatedly disrupts proceedings or deliberately makes his personal attendance impossible.61 In Eastman v The Queen62 the accused, who became obstructive and abusive, was taken to a separate room to watch proceedings on closed circuit television. An application by a psychiatrist that her evidence be taken in a party’s absence was refused in the case of In the Marriage of A and A.63

56. Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978, ss 5, 6 and 7. 57. Youth Justice Act 1992, s 301. 58. As amended by the Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Amendment Act 2000. 59. See s 21A(4). 60. In the Marriage of Daines [1986] FLC 91-705. 61. Criminal Code, s 617; R v Stuart [1974] Qd R 297 (self-inflicted injury); R v Rigney (1988) 48 SASR 72; R v Jones (1998) 72 SASR 281. 62. (1997) 76 FCR 9. 63. [1985] FLC 91-613.

574

Evidence Law in Queensland

[Q.6]

Interpreters

INTERPRETERS [Q.6] The proceedings of Australian courts must be conducted in English.64 If an accused cannot understand English and is unrepresented, the proceedings must be translated.65 A party who is legally represented may waive that right.66 It is for the court to decide whether a party or a witness is so deficient in English as to be allowed to testify through an interpreter.67 (With respect to criminal proceedings, see Evidence Act 1977, s 131A.) In making that decision there is no a priori rule in favour of any ethnic group.68 It is a denial of natural justice to proceed without an interpreter when one is genuinely needed.69 If an interpreter is incompetent, there is no reasonable opportunity to present the party’s case.70 Evidence does not become hearsay because it passes through an interpreter.71 On the advantages and disadvantages of evidence through an interpreter, see Filios v Morland.72 A witness with a fair grasp of English, unnecessarily using an interpreter, may deliberately slow down cross-examination, or gain extra time to answer questions, or even receive advice from the person who purports to be a mere translator.73

64. Re Trepca Mines Ltd [1960] 1 WLR 24; [1959] 3 All ER 798; In the Estate of Fuld Deceased [1965] 1 WLR 1336; 2 All ER 653. 65. Kunnath v Mauritius [1993] 1 WLR 1315; 4 All ER 30 (PC). 66. R v Lee Kun [1916] 1 KB 337. 67. Filios v Morland (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 331; Dairy Farmers’ Co-operative Milk Co Ltd v Acquilina (1963) 109 CLR 458 at 464; R v Johnson (1987) 25 A Crim R 433 (interpreter refused); Adamopoulos v Olympic Airways SA (1991) 25 NSWLR 75; see also Evidence Act 1977, s 131A. 68. R v Narula (1986) 22 A Crim R 409. 69. Singh (Heer) v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 15 FCR 4; Gradidge v Grace Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 93 FLR 414; R v Saraya (1993) 70 A Crim R 515; Youth Justice Act 1992, ss 18, 72, 158. 70. Shu Uan Eao v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 50 AAR 183; [2009] FCA 992. 71. Gaio v The Queen (1960) 104 CLR 419; Tsang Chi Ming v Uvanna Pty Ltd (trading as North West Immigration Services) (1996) 140 ALR 273; R v Morton (2008) 191 A Crim R 333; [2008] NSWCCA 196. 72. (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 331 at 332-333; see also Laster and Taylor, Interpreters and the Legal System (Federation Press, Sydney, 1994), esp Ch 4. 73. As Moynihan J recognised in his findings made on reference from the High Court in Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, “On a number of occasions I soon gained the impression that the witness both understood and could speak English but desired to collaborate with the interpreter as a form of social support. The arrangement also gave the opportunity to … hear the question twice and give time for the witness to collect his or her thoughts and to collaborate with the interpreter on an answer”: Determination Pursuant to a Reference of 27 February 1986 by the High Court (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, 16 November 1990), transcript p 66. See also R v Burke (1858) 8 Cox CC 44 at 47; Wrottesley, Letters to a Young Barrister (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1930), p 75: “Most of us have had the experience of the foreign witness who, while quite familiar with the English tongue, has asked for and obtained the intervention of an interpreter, and so gained time to reflect carefully before every answer.” © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

575

Other Queensland Legislation

[Q.7]

ADMINISTRATION OF OATHS [Q.7] It is an offence for anyone but a superior court judge to administer an oath without statutory authority.74 For examples of authorising Acts, see the Oaths Act 1867, s 13; the Commercial Arbitration Act 2013, s 19(5); the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950, s 6; the Coroners Act 2003, s 37(4); the Evidence Act 1977, s 29(3) and the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009, s 98(1)(b). The Evidence (Attestation of Documents) Act 1937 does not enable a person to take depositions for use in Queensland courts if the legislation of the “home” State limits the authority to that State.75

RECORDING EVIDENCE [Q.8] Affidavits and evidence on commission are considered at [6.10], [6.11] and [22.1]. Testimony in the Supreme and District Courts was for many years noted in shorthand and converted to typescript,76 but electronic recording is now the rule. In Magistrates’ Courts it is no longer necessary for two-finger typists, alias clerks of court, to toil at a typewriter while counsel fret, and witnesses have far too much time to frame answers in cross-examination. Testimony before magistrates is taken under the Recording of Evidence Act 1962.77 Every such record, duly certified, is prima facie evidence of the proceedings, and witnesses’ signatures are not required.78 But if the record is tendered in other proceedings as evidence of the facts asserted, its admissibility depends on exceptions to the hearsay rule recognised by statute79 or at common law – for example, admissions or prior inconsistent statements.80 Unofficial recording of evidence is generally prohibited,81 subject to an exception for approved news agencies.82 A transcript recording an admission of perjury was admitted as corroboration in R v Willmot; Ex parte Attorney-General.83 In Re Raines84 a transcript provided evidence for the purposes of the Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1989 (see now Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002). In R v Williams85 the trial judge’s notes of his summing-up were preferred to the official record. 74. Criminal Code, s 95. 75. Re Ocean Industries (Overseas) Pty Ltd [1991] 2 Qd R 409. 76. See the former RSC (Q), O 40 r 2 and now Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 402. 77. As to fees and other matters, see Recording of Evidence Regulation 1992; Recording of Evidence (Amendment) Regulation (No 1) 1993; Recording of Evidence Amendment Regulation (No 1) 2003. 78. Recording of Evidence Act 1962, ss 10 and 11; R v Delgado-Guerra [2002] 2 Qd R 384; [2001] QCA 266; Teelow v Commissioner of Police [2009] 2 Qd R 489; [2009] QCA 84 at [24]. 79. See s 92(4)(c). 80. Nicholson v O’Flaherty; Ex parte Nicholson [1985] 2 Qd R 499. 81. Supreme Court Practice Direction No 4 of 2004; District Court Practice Direction No 3 of 2004; Supreme Court Practice Direction No 1 of 2006 (recording devices in courtrooms); QLR (27 March 2004). 82. Supreme Court Practice Direction No 8 of 2014, rr 12 – 15; District Court Practice Direction 1 of 2009, r 10; Magistrates Courts Practice Direction 1 of 2014, rr 12 – 15. 83. [1987] 1 Qd R 53; cf Criminal Code, s 125. 84. (Unreported, Qld Sup Ct, Shepherdson J, 22 June 1995). 85. (1995) 84 A Crim R 370.

576

Evidence Law in Queensland

[Q.11]

Procedures to Obtain Evidence

[Q.9] In committal proceedings and on the summary trial of an indictable offence86 evidence may be given in writing with the consent of a legally represented defendant.87

PROCEDURES TO OBTAIN EVIDENCE Subpoenas, discovery [Q.10] A party to a civil or criminal proceeding may secure the attendance of witnesses or production of documents by subpoena ad testificandum (now “subpoena to give evidence”) or subpoena duces tecum (now “subpoena for production”), as the case may be.88 But these processes are blunt instruments, compared with discovery and inspection, because they confer no right to interview the witness or to inspect the documents before their production in court.89 A subpoena may be set aside for imprecision,90 irrelevance,91 “fishing”,92 vexation, or oppression, as when unreasonable demands are made on an expert witness.93 It is an abuse of process to use a subpoena in search of information unconnected with the proceedings in which it is issued.94 [Q.11] Parties to civil proceedings may gain pre-trial access to evidence by discovery of documents, interrogatories or inspection of property.95 If destruction or concealment of evidence is likely to occur, a party may apply ex parte for an “Anton Piller” order, a kind of civil search warrant.96 An accused’s right of access to the prosecution’s material was never properly defined at common law,97 but it is now detailed in s 590ABff of the Criminal Code, inserted by s 15 of the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003. Section 590AB: 86. R v Whalley [1985] 1 Qd R 547. 87. Justices Act 1886, s 110A. 88. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, rr 414 – 422. (A subpoena may combine both commands.) 89. Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Cooke [2001] 1 Qd R 7; [1999] QSC 13 at [27]; Berg v Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) [2009] QCA 213. 90. McColl v Lehmann [1987] VR 503 (claim rejected). 91. For example, nominated documents non-existent: Chan v Louey [2007] NSWSC 272. 92. Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564 at 575; Spencer Motors v LNC Industries [1982] 2 NSWLR 921; Southern Pacific Hotel Services Inc v Southern Pacific Hotel Corp Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 710. 93. Seyfang v GD Searle & Co [1973] QB 148. See also Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 416. 94. Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Western Metals Resources Ltd [2001] 1 Qd R 261; QLR (12 August 2000); Home Offıce v Harman [1983] 1 AC 280; Ainsworth v Hanrahan (1991) 25 NSWLR 155. 95. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, Ch 7 Pt 1; Ch 8 Pt 1; Simpson, Bailey and Evans, Discovery and Interrogatories (2nd ed, Butterworths, 1990). 96. Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] 1 Ch 55; Simsek v Macphee (1982) 148 CLR 636 at 641. See generally, Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure (6th ed, Law Book Co, 2005), pp 338-339. 97. See, eg, R v Lucas [1973] VR 693 at 706; R v M [1991] 2 Qd R 68 at 80; Grey v The Queen (2001) 75 ALJR 1708; [2001] HCA 65. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Other Queensland Legislation

[Q.12]

acknowledges that it is a fundamental obligation of the prosecution to ensure criminal proceedings are conducted fairly with the single aim of determining and establishing truth … [T]he obligation includes an ongoing obligation for the prosecution to give an accused person full and early disclosure of (a) all evidence the prosecution proposes to rely on … and (b) all things in the possession of the prosecution,98 other than things the disclosure of which would be unlawful or contrary to public interest, that would tend to help the case for the accused person.

“All evidence” includes copies of witness statements, audio recordings and relevant material in the possession of an independent investigative body.99 This duty extends to committal proceedings and “prescribed summary trials”.100 The duty of disclosure may involve the making of appropriate inquiries.101 However, it does not follow that a prosecutor must call witnesses whose evidence is not essential to exposition of the Crown’s case.102 There is provision for limited disclosure of “sensitive evidence”, including statements tendered in criminal proceedings under s 93A.103 An accused’s limited duties of disclosure are noted at [6.14].

SEARCH WARRANTS [Q.12] Search warrants are a potent weapon in criminal investigations: see the judgment of Mason J in Baker v Campbell.104 At common law the right of police to enter private premises without the occupier’s consent was limited to searches for stolen goods;105 if found, they could not be taken from an innocent possessor.106 Entry without consent, and even by force, may now be lawful if there is a reasonable belief that evidence may otherwise be destroyed.107 A warrant108 issued under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 authorises nominated persons to exercise all or any of the powers described in s 157. In R v N109 evidence obtained by means of a “warrantless” search was excluded, ss 29 and 160 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 notwithstanding. A warrant may be obtained on proof of reasonable suspicion that an “arrest offence” has been, or is about to be, committed. The amount of force “necessary” 98. This phrase is examined in R v Hargraves (2008) 73 ATR 775; [2008] QSC 267. 99. R v Cannon [2013] QCA 191. 100. See definition of “relevant proceeding” in the Criminal Code, s 590AD. 101. AJ v The Queen (2011) 32 VR 614; [2011] VSCA 215 at [22]; R v Garofalo [1999] 2 VR 625 at 637. 102. Pearce v Western Australia [2014] WASCA 156 at [169]. 103. Criminal Code, ss 590AD, 590AFA. 104. (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 81-82. 105. Crowley v Murphy (1981) 52 FLR 123; 34 ALR 496 at 141 (FLR); 513 (ALR). 106. Chic Fashions (West Wales) v Jones [1968] 2 QB 299 at 321. 107. R v Austin (No 2) [2010] ACTSC 136. 108. See generally, Lichtenberger, “The Issue and Execution of Search Warrants” (1987) 11 Crim LJ 268. 109. [2015] QSC 91.

578

Evidence Law in Queensland

[Q.13]

Search Warrants

is to be judged in a practical way, not hypercritically.110 Suspicion may be based on hearsay or other inadmissible material, provided that it has some probative value.111 Lawfulness of a seizure depends on a reasonable belief, at the time, that the material taken may throw light on the matter under investigation. It is not necessary that the material seized be admissible in evidence.112 An application for a search warrant is commonly made to a Justice of the Peace,113 but in certain cases it must be made to a magistrate114 and, if structural damage is likely to occur, to a Supreme Court judge.115 The application must be verified on oath, and set out the grounds relied on.116 The person issuing the warrant need not administer the oath.117 Failure to submit adequate information may vitiate a warrant.118 The warrant must contain short particulars of the alleged offence and of items to be taken.119 It is valid for seven days from the date of issue, but in some cases for 72 hours only.120 The occupier of premises searched is entitled to a copy.121 As to “seizure” of electronic data, see Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich.122 [Q.13] Search warrants are notoriously open to abuse, and the divergence between legal theory and practice in this area may be wide. Relatively few warrants are tested in the courts. On an application to quash a warrant, the court seeks to balance the public interest in suppressing crime, on one hand, and protection of citizens against arbitrary, embarrassing or burdensome interference, on the other.123 A warrant that is excessively wide may be suitably amended.124

110. Troubadour Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 110 FLR 123. Distinguish a “non coercive” summons; entry upon premises without permission to serve process of this kind is a trespass: Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635. 111. R v Minh Quoc Le (2005) 151 A Crim R 564; [2005] NSWCCA 40. 112. Adler v Gardiner (2002) 43 ACSR 24. 113. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 150(2). 114. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 150(3). 115. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 150(4). 116. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 150(5). 117. R v Lawrence (2003) 190 FLR 1; [2003] NSWSC 656. 118. Lego Australia Pty Ltd v Paraggio (1994) 52 FCR 542; 124 ALR 225; AM v Gill [2015] NSWSC 586 at [24]. 119. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 156(1). 120. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 155. 121. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 158. 122. (2005) 188 FLR 416; 52 ACSR 374; [2005] NSWSC 62. 123. Lawrie v Muir [1950] SLT 37 at 39-40; Cyclone Scaffolding Pty Ltd v State of Queensland and Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1982) 12 ATR 777; Arno v Forsyth (1986) 9 FCR 576; 65 ALR 125. 124. Malubel Pty Ltd v Elder (1999) 73 ALJR 269; O’Donoghue v Kordick; Ex parte O’Donoghue [1995] 1 Qd R 278. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Other Queensland Legislation

[Q.14]

In civil proceedings, it is improper to use material obtained by a search warrant in lieu of the normal process of discovery. Use of the material so obtained is limited to the purpose for which the warrant was issued.125 [Q.14] Warrants are subject to legal professional privilege.126 A warrant to search for “opinions of counsel” is bad on its face.127 When privilege is claimed, a reasonable opportunity to seek legal advice should be allowed.128 It is incorrect to say that privilege must be claimed at the time of seizure or not at all; in an emergency, a failure to make an immediate claim is not a waiver.129 Nor is it a waiver if the legal adviser of a person entitled to privilege remains passive while a search is conducted.130 But professional privilege does not cover legal advice sought in aid of an illegal purpose.131 [Q.15] Guidelines for the execution of search warrants in lawyers’ premises were agreed between the Australian Federal Police and the Law Council of Australia in 1986132 and a similar “accord” exists between the Queensland Police Service and the Queensland Law Society.133 [Q.16] A person claiming privilege against self-incrimination is not obliged to help police find adverse material, or to answer questions about it,134 but this privilege confers only immunity against self-incrimination, not incrimination by other means.135 Privilege against self-incrimination is no bar to inspection of property in civil proceedings.136 [Q.17] A search warrant must be executed in good faith and in a reasonable manner and not for an ulterior purpose such as harassing a person who is out of favour with authority: 125. Grollo v Macauley (1993) 45 FCR 336; Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 188 FLR 416; 52 ACSR 374; [2005] NSWSC 62; Flori v Commissioner of Police [2015] 2 Qd R 497; [2014] QSC 284. 126. Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52. 127. Brewer v Castles (No 3) (1984) 52 ALR 581. 128. Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Citibank Ltd (1989) 20 FCR 403; 85 ALR 588; Kennedy v Baker (No 2) (2004) 138 FCR 414; [2004] FCA 809. 129. Saunders v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (1998) 160 ALR 469. 130. Lander v Mitson (1988) 83 ALR 466. 131. Bullivant v Attorney-General (Victoria) [1901] AC 196; Varawa v Howard Smith & Co Ltd (1910) 10 CLR 382 at 390; Day v Dalton [1981] WAR 316; Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500; Arno v Forsyth (1986) 9 FCR 576; 65 ALR 125 at 581 (FCR); 129 (ALR). 132. Supplement to Australian Law News (Law Council of Australia, December 1986). For an updated version, see (1997) 32(4) Australian Lawyer; ALRC, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigative Bodies (4 June 2007). 133. Supplement to Proctor (Qld Law Society, October 1989). 134. R v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation; Ex parte Briggs (1987) 13 FCR 389; 18 ATR 469; 71 ALR 86 at 89; Controlled Consultants Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (1985) 156 CLR 385 at 393. 135. Controlled Consultants Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (1985) 156 CLR 385 at 393. 136. Central Queensland Speleological Society Inc v Central Queensland Cement Pty Ltd (No 2) [1989] 2 Qd R 537.

580

Evidence Law in Queensland

[Q.18]

Search Warrants

The overriding obligation of the searcher is to do no more than is reasonably necessary to satisfy himself by search that in all the circumstances of the particular case he has whatever documents [or things] are necessary to answer the terms of the warrant.137

Police should observe high standards of fairness when executing search warrants against innocent parties.138 There is no “carte blanche to search at will”.139 “Negative searches” (searches of every nook and cranny to see if anything incriminating turns up) are improper when dealing with innocent parties but may be justified where suspects are concerned.140 Material in the possession of a suspect which points to offences not specified in the warrant may be seized.141 [Q.18] Rules for issuing search warrants are to be strictly construed.142 The onus is on the applicant to satisfy the justice, magistrate or judge that “there are reasonable grounds for suspecting” premises contain (or soon will contain) evidence of an offence. That requires prima facie evidence of “facts that are sufficient to induce that [suspicion] in a reasonable person”.143 The standard of proof is the civil standard.144 “Suspicion” is a state of “conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking”.145 But it is more than “a mere idle wondering … it is a positive feeling of actual apprehension or mistrust”.146 It is not every difference of opinion about the existence of reasonable grounds that calls for judicial intervention.147 The justice need not personally entertain the suspicion, provided that the applicant shows reasonable grounds for doing so.148 Police need not reveal their sources, but the justice should not accept a bald assertion of suspicion.149 The warrant must specify an offence to which the search relates.150 The description of the suspected offence must set reasonable limits to the ambit of the

137. Crowley v Murphy (1981) 52 FLR 123; 34 ALR 496 at 149-150 (FLR); 521 (ALR) per Lockhart J. 138. Crowley v Murphy (1981) 52 FLR 123; 34 ALR 496 at 152 (FLR); 523 (ALR); Re Bell Telephone Company of Canada (1947) 89 CCC 196. 139. Crowley v Murphy (1981) 52 FLR 123; 34 ALR 496 at 153 (FLR); 524 (ALR); Slaveski v Victoria [2010] VSC 441. 140. Frank Truman Export Ltd v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1977] QB 952 at 965. 141. Chic Fashions (West Wales) v Jones [1968] 2 QB 299; R v Rigney-Hopkins (2005) 154 A Crim R 433; [2005] QCA 275; Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 160. 142. R v Inland Revenue Commissioners; Ex parte Rossminster [1980] AC 952 at 1017; Dobbs v Ward [2003] 1 Qd R 158. 143. George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104 at 112. 144. Beneficial Finance Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Federal Police (1991) 31 FCR 523; 58 A Crim R 1. 145. George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104 at 115. 146. Queensland Bacon Pty Ltd v Rees (1966) 115 CLR 266 at 303 per Kitto J. 147. Williams v Keelty (2001) 111 FCR 175 at 213. 148. Grollo v Macauley (1995) 56 FCR 533. 149. Coghill v McDermott [1983] 1 VR 751. 150. R v Tillett; Ex parte Newton (1969) 14 FLR 101 at 112-113; Crowley v Murphy (1981) 52 FLR 123; 34 ALR 496 at 143 (FLR); 515 (ALR): Parker v Churchill (1985) 9 FCR 316; 63 ALR 326. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Other Queensland Legislation

[Q.18]

search, although particulars need not attain the standard expected in an indictment.151 The evidence placed before the justice should be factual, free from opinions or argumentative material.152 On judicial review a court may confirm, amend153 or set aside a warrant.154 It may examine the information on which the grant was based,155 but the review is limited to the information that was before the justice,156 who may not be questioned about the reasons for the grant.157 Many applications for review are based on a claim that the offences suspected or the items sought are not adequately particularised.158 Such cases turn on their own facts, or on the disposition of the judge to be more or less critical of executive government. An “overly technical” approach was criticised in Beneficial Finance Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police.159 A warrant can hardly be condemned for imprecision when the law under which it was issued is similarly vague.160 In Crowley v Murphy161 a warrant authorising police to search for and seize “any books, records, cheque butts, deposit slips or other documents in relation to … offences against s 67 of the Companies Ordinance” passed muster. But one merely referring to “false documentation”, without specifying s 128A of the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth), was set aside.162 In another case, the warrant referred to s 70 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), but failed to indicate any suspected offence.163 An incorrect section number may be a fatal flaw,164 but the defect in R v Ng165 was

151. Coghill v McDermott [1983] 1 VR 751; Beneficial Finance Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (1991) 31 FCR 523; 58 A Crim R 1; New South Wales v Corbett (2007) 230 CLR 606; [2007] HCA 32. 152. El-Zarw v Nikola; Ex parte El-Zarw [1992] 1 Qd R 145. 153. Malubel Pty Ltd v Elder (1999) 73 ALJR 269. 154. O’Donoghue v Kordick; Ex parte O’Donoghue [1995] 1 Qd R 278. 155. Karina Fisheries Pty Ltd v Mitson (1990) 26 FCR 473; 96 ALR 629. 156. El-Zarw v Nikola; Ex parte El-Zarw [1992] 1 Qd R 145. 157. Seeter Pty Ltd (t/a Great Barrier Reef Tuna) v Commonwealth (2004) 210 ALR 437; [2004] FCA 1104. 158. R v Christensen (2005) 156 A Crim R 397; [2005] QSC 279 (vague reference to “Brisbane”, no suspect named, no offence specified); R v Caruso [2006] ACTSC 45 (purported authority to search “for anything else the informant believes on reasonable grounds to be connected with an offence”; the word “place” used when vehicle and suspect’s person intended). 159. (1991) 21 ATR 1584; 52 A Crim R 423. 160. Seeter Pty Ltd (t/a Great Barrier Reef Tuna) v Commonwealth (2004) 210 ALR 437; [2004] FCA 1104. 161. (1981) 52 FLR 123; 34 ALR 496. 162. Optical Prescriptions Spectacle Makers Pty Ltd v Withers (1987) 13 FCR 594; 71 ALR 269. 163. Australian Broadcasting Corporation and Masters v Cloran (1984) 4 FCR 151; 57 ALR 742. 164. Parker v Churchill (1986) 9 FCR 334; 65 ALR 107 (partial invalidity). See also Bradrose Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Police; Ex parte Bradrose [1989] 2 Qd R 304. 165. (2002) 136 A Crim R 299; 5 VR 257. See also Benstead v Edwards (2003) 138 A Crim R 552; [2003] QCA 154; R v Theophanous (2003) 141 A Crim R 216; [2003] VSCA 78 (name of informant inserted instead of name of suspect).

582

Evidence Law in Queensland

[Q.20]

Search Warrants

immaterial. In Seeter Pty Ltd (t/a Great Barrier Reef Tuna) v Commonwealth166 it did not matter that the justice’s name was missing from the body of the warrant because it ended with his signature and registration number. A failure to strike out an inapplicable clause in a standard form warrant was overlooked in R v Rigney-Hopkins.167 [Q.19] In Arno v Forsyth168 it was too vague to say that the search was for “things in relation to” tax offences, although specific sections of the Act were nominated. In Hedges v Grundmann; Ex parte Grundmann,169 the warrant was bad in two respects: it did not specify the alleged offence, and it lacked an adequate description of the objects of the search. Less seems to be demanded of de facto search warrants issued under s 263 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth).170 [Q.20] There is a discretion to exclude evidence seized under the warrant of a justice who merely acts as a “rubber stamp”.171 Granting a search warrant is not an administrative formality, but a judicial act172 to be based on independent judgment. Is this precept more honoured in the breach than the observance? Relatively few search warrants come under judicial review and counsels of perfection mean little unless the powers to issue and obtain them are closely and regularly controlled. Independence was lacking in Ex parte Qantas Airways Ltd; Re Horsington,173 where the justice was employed in the same office as the complainant. In R v Sing; Ex parte Harrison174 the warrant was bad because the justice gave no serious consideration to the evidence, waving it aside as a “load of garbage I don’t have to read”. In R v Tillett; Ex parte Newton175 the warrant failed to recite that the justice was satisfied of “reasonable grounds for suspicion”. In Allitt v Sullivan176 it was held that the justice need not consider possible claims of privilege, but according to Arno v Forsyth,177 a warrant should state that it does not authorise the seizure of privileged material.

166. (2004) 210 ALR 437; [2004] FCA 1104; see also Oke v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (2007) 168 A Crim R 503; [2007] FCA 27. 167. (2005) 154 A Crim R 433; [2005] QCA 275. 168. (1986) 9 FCR 576; 65 ALR 125. 169.

[1985] 2 Qd R 263.

170. See Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Citibank Ltd (1989) 20 FCR 403; 85 ALR 588 (need not specify premises or items sought). 171. R v Macleod [1991] Tas R 144; (1991) 61 A Crim R 465. 172. Not of course in the sense of a final determination: Westpac Banking Corporation v Barnes [1983] 1 NSWLR 342. 173. (1969) 71 SR (NSW) 291. See also Patten v Justice of the Peace, Redfern Court (1986) 22 A Crim R 94; George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104. 174. (1979) 36 FLR 322. 175. (1969) 14 FLR 101. 176. [1988] VR 621. 177. (1986) 9 FCR 576; 65 ALR 125. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

583

Other Queensland Legislation

[Q.21]

[Q.21] An invalid warrant may be quashed although it has already been executed.178 Property seized under an invalid warrant may be recovered in a civil action.179 A State court may entertain such an action even if it has no jurisdiction to review the warrant.180 Evidence seized under an invalid warrant is liable to discretionary rejection.181

OTHER POWERS TO COMPEL DISCLOSURE [Q.22] Examples of other powers to compel the supply of information to officers of the executive may be seen in the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950, ss 9 and 14(1A); the Drugs Misuse Act 1986, s 104; the Land Title Act 1994, ss 22 – 23; the Taxation Administration Act 2001, s 87;182 the Trust Accounts Act 1973, s 26A (appointment and powers of inspector); and the Crime and Corruption Act 2001, s 72.

MEDICAL INSPECTIONS [Q.23] A superior court has inherent jurisdiction to direct a reasonable medical test to be taken and to draw an adverse inference from non-compliance.183 But in the absence of statutory authority such orders are rare. There is no inherent power to order a person to provide bodily samples for analysis,184 or to make an order interfering with the right of control and self-determination with respect to one’s own body.185 [Q.24] Section 259 of the Criminal Code and ss 443 – 444, 467 and 617 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 deal with searches and identification of persons in custody. They also provide for medical examinations by consent, or by order of a magistrate,186 if there are reasonable grounds for suspicion.187 The examinee may have an observer present: s 504. A medical or other “forensic procedure” may be performed upon a suspect in custody: ss 502 – 503, 509 – 510.188

178. Australian Broadcasting Corporation and Masters v Cloran (1984) 4 FCR 151; 57 ALR 742. 179. Ghani v Jones [1970] 1 QB 693; GH Photography Pty Ltd v McGarrigle [1974] 2 NSWLR 635; Island Way Pty Ltd v Redmond [1990] 1 Qd R 431; McQueen v Hawi [2008] NSWSC 136. 180. Rosenthal v Phillips (1985) 84 FLR 93; [1985] VR 409. 181. See [130.37]. 182. Cyclone Scaffolding Pty Ltd v State of Queensland and Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1982) 12 ATR 777. 183. Re L (An Infant) [1968] P 119; Edmeades v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1969] 2 QB 67; Forbes and Forbes, “Medical Issues, Audi Alteram Partem and Family Law” (1983) 13 Q Law Soc J 177. 184. Re Riley [1996] 1 Qd R 209. 185. Furesh v Schor [2013] WASCA 231. 186. As to the position at common law, see Leigh v Cole (1853) 6 Cox CC 329. 187. Maguire v Beaton (2005) 162 A Crim R 21; [2005] NSWSC 1241; Alessi v SE (2008) 187 A Crim R 427; [2008] NSWSC 909. 188. Hawes v Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre (1997) 94 A Crim R 554.

584

Evidence Law in Queensland

[Q.25]

Commissions of Inquiry

Police may take a DNA sample, on notice, from a person charged with an indictable offence.189 The same may be done to an adult by order of a court: s 484, or to a person found guilty of an indictable offence: s 485. A statutory power to take DNA specimens and to place the results on a database was considered in R v R.190 A magistrate may authorise the taking of blood and urine specimens from a person suspected of a sexual or other serious assault.191 Medical examinations may be required in personal injury cases192 under s 46A of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 or s 282 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003. The examinee may be accompanied by a lawyer.193 In an affiliation case the Supreme Court may direct the putative father to take medical tests relevant to paternity.194 Usually a blood test is involved, but there is also a reference to the “taking of tissue”.195 The sanction for non-compliance is an adverse inference.196 Under s 80 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 the driver of a motor vehicle may be required to submit to a breathalyser or blood test. The result is admissible in proceedings at common law,197 but not as conclusive evidence.198 An analyst’s certificate issued under s 80(16B) of the same Act is admissible without proof that a blood sample was produced in strict accordance with the Act.199

COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY [Q.25] An extraordinary method of obtaining information for government is a Royal Commission or commission of inquiry.200 Privilege against selfincrimination is restricted by s 14(1A) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950. The abrogation of privilege is further considered at [10.29].

189. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 482. Decisions to permit DNA tests were set aside for want of sufficient evidence in W v Bugden (2005) 155 A Crim R 416; [2005] NSWSC 898; and in Fawcett v Nimmo (2005) 156 A Crim R 431; [2005] NSWSC 1047. 190. [2003] 2 Qd R 544. 191. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 540. 192. Refusal to submit to a medical examination was reasonable in Volmer v Northern Territory Electricity Commission (1984) 30 NTR 21 (plaintiff resident in Tasmania refusing to attend medical examination in Sydney). 193. Lawrence v Oil Drilling & Exploration (Qld) Pty Ltd [1967] QWN 4. 194. Status of Children Act 1978, s 11(1)(b); see also Re Riley [1996] 1 Qd R 209. 195. Status of Children Act 1978, s 11(10). 196. Status of Children Act 1978, s 11(7). 197. Cardile v Nominal Defendant (Queensland) [1978] Qd R 132. 198. R v Anderson [2005] QCA 304. 199. R v Clauss [1994] 1 Qd R 427. 200. Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950. See generally Hallett, Royal Commissions and Boards of Inquiry (Law Book Co, Sydney, 1982). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

585

Other Queensland Legislation

[Q.26]

EVIDENTIARY SHORTCUTS: AVERMENTS ETC [Q.26] Many Acts defining offences have provisions facilitating proof by reversing, more or less, the burden of proof.201 For example: (i) “averments” that are equivalent to evidence (see [Q.27]); (ii) overt reversal of the onus of proof (see [Q.33]); (iii) statutory presumptions (see [Q.38]); (iv) certificates as evidence (see [Q.40]); and (v) mandatory judicial notice (see [Q.42]). The presumption of regularity is not available when a convenient method of proof provided by statute is neglected.202

Averments [Q.27] In the language of pleading, an “averment” is an allegation of fact or law.203 Normally, an allegation of fact must be proved by admissible evidence,204 but legislation may provide that, if not rebutted, it is prima facie (or conclusive) proof of what is asserted.205 An averment of fact must not be mixed with one of law,206 unless the statute otherwise provides. An irrelevant averment is no more admissible than any other irrelevancy.207 Averments as substitutes for evidence are not a recent invention,208 but they gained ground when successive World Wars intensified State control.209 In 1933 the High Court described a charge with no fewer than 60 averments “an amazing document, well calculated to embarrass [a] proper trial”.210 In 1944 a New South Wales judge wondered whether averments signified “a regression to the past when governments found it too tedious to procure evidence of the guilt of persons charged”.211 Are these mere echoes from the past? [Q.28] A prosecutor may use an averment to avoid calling a witness who is hard to find, or whose viva voce evidence might be unimpressive. A statutory averment may satisfy the criminal standard of proof.212 201. Compare R v Governor of Metropolitan Gaol; Ex parte Di Nardo [1963] VR 61. 202. Dixon v LeKich (2010) 56 MVR 70; [2010] QCA 213 (speed camera photograph). 203. Brady v Thornton (1947) 75 CLR 140 at 146. 204. Schiffmann v Whitton (1916) 22 CLR 142. 205. For example, in s 103A(3) of the former Mining Act 1968, which stated that in any proceedings with respect to an offence, certificates by mining registrars and other officials “shall, upon its production, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary [be] conclusive evidence of the matters contained therein”. 206. In Brady v Thornton (1948) 75 CLR 140 an averment that a document was “false in a material particular” passed the test of “pure fact”. 207. R v McStay (1945) 7 ATD 527. 208. Mitchell, “A Note on Averments” (1945) 19 ALJ 179. 209. Paul, “The ‘Averment of the Prosecutor’ in Criminal Charges” (1940) 14 ALJ 102; Anderson, “Averments” (1945) 19 ALJ 102. For discussion of reverse onus statutes, see DPP (Cth) v United Telecasters Sydney Ltd (1990) 168 CLR 594. 210. R v Hush; Ex parte Devanny (1933) 48 CLR 487 at 500. 211. Ex parte Gerard & Co Pty Ltd, Re Craig (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 370 at 380-381 per Davidson J. 212. Considine v Lemmer [1971] SASR 39. The entire case for the prosecution was made by averment in Brady v Thornton (1948) 75 CLR 140.

586

Evidence Law in Queensland

[Q.33]

Evidentiary Shortcuts: Averments etc

[Q.29] Technically, an averment does not reverse the onus of proof and it may be insufficient, in itself, to establish a prima facie case.213 But its effect on the practical burden may be quite another matter. [Q.30] A statutory averment does not lose its force if evidence is led to support it.214 On the other hand, the weight of defence evidence is not reduced merely because the prosecution has the benefit of an averment.215 [Q.31] For examples of legislation allowing proof by averment, see the Criminal Code, ss 638 and 639; the Liquor Act 1992, s 233; the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995, s 124(1)(r); the Child Protection Act 1999, s 182; the Weapons Act 1990, s 163(1)(c); the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, s 583; and the Racing Act 2002, s 333. Sometimes the statute merely enables proof of some mundane fact – for example, that a certain place is not an approved rifle range216 – but in other cases it enables a prosecutor to prove (or to avoid proving) something quite debatable.217 [Q.32] Courts do what they can to prevent the unfair use of averments. It is deemed an abuse of process to pack information with allegations that do not really come within an averment provision.218 If an averment is used instead of calling a material and reasonably available witness, an adverse inference may be drawn.219

Reversal of the onus of proof [Q.33] Legislation may enable the prosecution to reverse the onus of proof by asserting a negative proposition that the defence must then displace. The common law allows “negative averments” when the facts are likely to be better known to the defendant than anyone else:220 I have always understood it to be a general rule that if a negative averment be made by one party, which is peculiarly within the knowledge of the other, the party … who asserts the affirmative is to prove it and not he who avers the negative.221

Thus, a possessor of stolen goods must show innocent possession.222 A person accused of trading without a licence must prove that he or she held an appropriate 213. R v Hush; Ex parte Devanny (1933) 48 CLR 487 (financing an unlawful association – payment to the specific association not shown); Ex parte Healy (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 14; Ex parte Ryan; Re Johnson (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 12; Commonwealth v Pilt (1973) 3 ALR 236 (expression not definite enough). 214. Gabriel v Ah Mook (1924) 34 CLR 591 at 595; Considine v Lemmer [1971] SASR 39. 215. Harris v Burrows (1945) 7 ATD 518 at 523. 216. Weapons Act 1990, s 163(1)(c). 217. Community Services (Aborigines) Act 1984, s 81(a) (“usages” of a “community”). 218. Ex parte Ryan; Re Johnson (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 12 at 17. 219. According to the principle in Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298. 220. R v Edwards [1975] QB 27; Baiada v Waste Recycling & Processing Service (NSW) (1999) 130 LGERA 52; [1999] NSWCA 139. 221. R v Turner (1816) 5 M & S 206; 105 ER 1026 at 211 (M & S); 1028 (ER) per Bayly J; Ex parte Patmoy; Re Jack (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 351 at 356; Mason v Tritton (1993) 70 A Crim R 28 at 42. 222. R v Langmead (1864) Le & Ca 427; 169 ER 1459. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Other Queensland Legislation

[Q.34]

223

licence at the material time. A person in possession of a prohibited drug, who claims it was obtained on prescription, must establish that defence.224 In this sense the “right to silence” is not absolute. See also the defences available under ss 42 – 47 of the Food Act 2006. However, many so-called “defences” to charges under the Criminal Code do not place a legal onus on the defence.225 For example, the accused has no legal obligation to prove self-defence under s 271 of the Code. It is only necessary to point to some evidence that raises that issue,226 and the prosecution must then eliminate it beyond reasonable doubt. In DPP (Cth)v United Telecasters Sydney Ltd227 the High Court observed: When a statute imposes an obligation which is the subject of a qualification, exception or proviso, the burden of proof concerning that qualification, exception or proviso turns on whether it is part of the total statement of the obligation. If it is, the onus in respect of the qualification, exception or proviso is on the party asserting a breach of the obligation. If it is not, the party relying on the qualification, exception or proviso must prove that he or she has complied with its terms.

[Q.34] The common law rule about licences, exemptions, etc is adopted in s 76 of the Justices Act 1886: If the complaint in any case … negatives any exemption, exception, proviso, or condition, contained in the Act on which the same is framed, it shall not be necessary for the complainant to prove such negative, but the defendant shall be called upon to prove the affirmative thereof in the defendant’s defence.228

[Q.35] But when the absence of certain facts or circumstances is an essential element of an offence, or is a condition precedent to a cause of action,229 the prosecutor or plaintiff must negative those matters to the criminal or civil standard, as the case may be.230 For example, if a penal statute requires an employer to provide a safe system of work “so far as is practicable”, the onus of showing that a practicable precaution was not taken is on the prosecution.231 If a person charged with using a motor vehicle without the owner’s permission claims permission to use it, the prosecution must negative that claim232 because the absence of permission is an element of the offence. The same applies to the 223. Apothecaries’ Company v Bentley (1824) 1 Car & P 538; 171 ER 1307; R v Ewens [1967] 1 QB 323; R v Edwards [1975] QB 27 (liquor); Williams v Russell (1933) 149 LT 190; Everard v Opperman [1958] VR 389; Tynan v Jones [1975] RTR 465; Peck v De-Saint-Aromain [1972] VR 230 (motor vehicle). 224. Drugs Misuse Act 1986, s 124. 225. These are more appropriately called excuses (Loveday v Ayre [1955] St R Qd 264, 267) – eg mistake of fact (s 24), provocation (ss 269 and 304) and self-defence (ss 271 and 272). 226. R v Pangilinan [2001] 1 Qd R 56. 227. (1990) 168 CLR 594 at 611. 228. Coleman v Heywood; Ex parte Coleman [1978] Qd R 411 (procession without a Traffıc Act 1949 permit); Thomson v Martin; Ex parte Thomson [1986] 2 Qd R 483. 229. Vines v Djordjevitch (1955) 91 CLR 512 at 521. 230. Dowling v Bowie (1952) 86 CLR 136; McNee v Kay [1953] VLR 520 at 540-542; Youngberry v Heatherington; Ex parte Youngberry [1977] Qd R 15. 231. Chugg v Pacific Dunlop Ltd (1990) 170 CLR 249. 232. Donoghue v Terry [1939] VLR 165.

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[Q.38]

Evidentiary Shortcuts: Averments etc 233

“defence” of honest and reasonable mistake of fact234 in s 24 of the Criminal Code, and to s 23 regarding acts “independent of the will”.235 On an application for habeas corpus, the onus is on the person imposing the restraint to prove its legality beyond reasonable doubt.236 On the other hand, s 26 of the Criminal Code raises a presumption of sanity. It follows that there is a legal onus to prove a defence of insanity or diminished responsibility, as the case may be.237 On a charge of possessing stolen property, it is for the defence to provide a satisfactory explanation.238 Other examples are the defences of provocation and duress.239 When the defence bears the legal onus in a criminal case, the standard of proof is the civil standard.240 [Q.36] There is a statutory reversal of the onus of proof in s 129 of the Drugs Misuse Act 1986, which requires a defendant to prove that drugs found on his premises were there without his knowledge.241 [Q.37] In civil proceedings a “reverse onus” applies to an allegation of failure to mitigate damages242 and to a defence of “breach of policy” by an insurer sued for indemnity.243

Statutory presumptions [Q.38] There is little real difference between a law that plainly reverses the onus of proof and one which provides that fact “X” shall be presumed to exist until the contrary is proved: for examples, see s 112(1) of the Fair Trading Act 1989, s 124(1)(u) of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (presumption that a breathalyser is in good order) and s 95A(8) of the Evidence Act 1977. Presumptions of due service of documents and presumptions of 233. The quotation marks indicate the looser sense of this word; in fact, many criminal “defences” leave the onus of proof on the prosecution. 234. Brimblecombe v Duncan; Ex parte Duncan [1958] Qd R 8. 235. R v Wogandt (1983) 33 A Crim R 31. 236. R v Brixton Prison Governor; Ex parte Ahsan [1969] 2 QB 222. 237. Shaw v The Queen (1952) 85 CLR 365 at 379; Thomas v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 584 at 602; R v Files [1983] 2 Qd R 153; R v Michaux [1984] 2 Qd R 159; R v Morgan; Ex parte Attorney-General [1987] 2 Qd R 627 at 629. Alternatively, the defence may choose not to use these defences and instead call expert evidence that the relevant intent could not have been present due to some temporary state of mind, thus avoiding the onus of proof and relying simply on a reasonable doubt: Hawkins (JA) v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 440. 238. Gough v Braden [1993] 1 Qd R 100. 239. R v Gill (1963) 47 Cr App R 166; Bullard v The Queen [1957] AC 635. 240. R v Carr-Briant [1943] KB 607; Everard v Opperman [1958] VR 389 at 391; Thomas v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 584 at 602; R v Patterson [1962] 2 QB 429; 1 All ER 340; Public Prosecutor v Yuvaroj [1970] AC 913; R v Kays (1979) 25 ALR 174; R v Gardiner [1981] Qd R 394; Corry v Dorron; Ex parte Corry [1985] 1 Qd R 31. 241. R v Brauer [1990] 1 Qd R 332. 242. Lorca v Holt’s Corrosion Control Pty Ltd [1981] Qd R 261; Goldberg v Shell Oil Co Ltd (1990) 95 ALR 711. 243. Clark v NZI Life Ltd [1991] 2 Qd R 11; Sheldon v Sun Alliance Ltd (1989) 53 SASR 97. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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244

authority are common. A notice posted under s 347 of the Property Law Act 1974245 is “deemed to have been served, unless the contrary is shown, at the time when by the ordinary course of post [it] would be delivered”.246 Rebuttal of such a presumption is considered in Burke v Custom Credit Corporation Ltd.247 A transaction between a principal and the holder of an enduring power of attorney raises a presumption of undue influence in favour of the principal.248 A statutory presumption may be raised for the first time on appeal.249 [Q.39] Statutory presumptions are usually rebuttable. If not, they are really substantive laws. See, for example, the unqualified part of s 29 of the Criminal Code, dealing with “immature age” and criminal responsibility.250

Certificates as evidence [Q.40] Official certificates may be given the status of viva voce evidence.251 Usually a seal or signature on the certificate is entitled to judicial notice and, in the absence of rebuttal, the certificate may be declared “conclusive” or “sufficient” evidence.252 Sometimes a right of cross-examination is expressed.253 Section 413(4) of the Mineral Resources Act 1989 enables applications and grants of titles to be proved by certificates. A certificate of the results of a breathalyser test is conclusive proof254 of a person’s blood alcohol concentration at the time of issue, but not of the extent to which he was adversely affected.255 For other examples of “evidentiary aids”, allowing prima facie evidence of facts or circumstances that might otherwise be difficult to prove, see Crime and Corruption Act 2001, s 146M (chairman’s certificate); Drugs Misuse Act 1986, s 130 (labels etc as evidence of contents a controlled substance); Environmental Protection Act 1994, s 490 (certificate of authorised person as evidence of numerous matters, and presumption of accuracy of instruments and analyses); Fair Trading Act 1989, s 112 (presumptions as to publication, falsifying odometers etc); Food Act 2006, ss 248, 250 (presumption of due appointment, certificates as to various facts, including results of analyses); Local Government 244. See, eg, Acts Interpretation Act 1954, ss 39, 39A; Racing Act 2002, s 330; Child Protection Act 1999, s 182; Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999, s 250; Mineral Resources Act 1989, s 413(2) (presumption rebuttable only if reasonable notice of challenge given); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009, r 39. 245. See also Acquisition of Land Act 1967, s 39. 246. Menkens v Wintour [2009] QSC 206; Graycorp Pty Ltd v Maharaj International Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 387. 247. Burke v Custom Credit Corporation Ltd (1971) 65 QJPR 5. 248. Powers of Attorney Act 1998, s 87. 249. Police v Dodd (2004) 88 SASR 130. 250. Rebuttal may not be limited to the means prescribed by the statute in question: Durrant v Von Schultz [2002] 2 Qd R 241; [2001] QCA 345. 251. See, eg, Land Tax Act 2010, s 63. 252. Associations Incorporation Act 1981, s 64; Weapons Act 1990, s 163(2). 253. Weapons Act 1990, s 163(2). 254. Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995, s 80(15G) and (15H); see also Racing Act 2002, s 332. 255. R v Anderson (2005) 44 MVR 434; [2005] QCA 304.

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Admissions and Confessions

Act 2009, s 248 (evidence of local laws and council resolutions); Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995, ss 60, 157A (certificates as evidence of more than 30 matters; document of chief executive “evidence of matters stated in it”); Work Health and Safety Act 2011, s 230(2) (presumption of authority). [Q.41] The burden of proof may be reversed by contract.256 Parties to a contract may agree that proof of a certain state of affairs, such as the balance of an account, may be proved by production of one party’s certificate.257 Such documents are now prima facie evidence only.258

Mandatory judicial notice [Q.42] At common law, judicial notice may be taken of a fact so notorious that it would be pointless to require formal proof.259 The court decides whether the dispensation from proof should be granted. But there are statutory provisions for “judicial notice” that require certain facts to be found – see, for example, ss 41 and 42 of the Evidence Act 1977. In such cases the court has no discretion.

ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS [Q.43] Informal admissions260 are a leading exception to the hearsay rule. All confessions are admissions, but many admissions are not confessions. A confession is either a direct admission of guilt, or of a fact or facts that tend to prove a criminal charge.261 Generally the law of admissions in Queensland is common law, but there are important statutory modifications in criminal cases. An admission is a statement by a party that is adverse262 to that party’s interest263 in current proceedings. It 256. Daventry Holdings Pty Ltd v Bacalakis Hotels Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 406. 257. Dobbs v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1935) 53 CLR 643. The certificate in that case was conclusive. 258. Property Law Act 1974, s 57; a note critical of the more radical position taken in Dobbs appears in (1992) 66 ALJ 309. 259. Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149 at 153; Clark Equipment Co v Registrar of Trade Marks (1964) 111 CLR 511 at 516; see also [A.62]. 260. As distinct from formal admissions: see [Q.46]. 261. Attorney-General for NSW v Martin (1909) 9 CLR 713 at 732; R v Lindsay [1963] Qd R 386 at 393; R v Doyle; Ex parte Attorney-General [1987] 2 Qd R 732 at 742-743. 262. Distinguish exculpatory statements, both at common law and under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth): R v GH (2000) 105 FCR 419; Flowers v The Queen (2005) 153 A Crim R 110; [2005] NTCCA 5. 263. Strictly speaking, a third party cannot make an admission or confession in the legal sense of those words and “third party confessions” are inadmissible at common law: Re Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 205; R v Blastland [1986] AC 41; Bannon v The Queen (1995) 185 CLR 1 at 9 and 22; but see R v Zullo [1993] 2 Qd R 572; [1993] QCA 208 at 574 (Qd R); R v K; Ex parte Attorney-General (2002) 132 A Crim R 108; [2002] QCA 260; R v Martin, Klinge and Sambo (2002) 134 A Crim R 568; [2002] QCA 443. However, if the third party appears as a witness, the prior statement may go to credit and to the issues (Evidence Act 1977, s 101) as a prior inconsistent statement. (And see now s 93B, inserted in 2000, which allows oral hearsay in certain criminal cases.) When an accessory to a crime is being tried separately, after the main offender is convicted, an extra-judicial confession of the crime by the main offender is no evidence that the crime occurred: R v Carter; Ex parte Attorney-General [1990] 2 Qd R 371. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[Q.43]

must be made to a third person; a statement by one officer of a company to another is not an admission by the company.264 An admission may be based on reliable hearsay.265 It may be expressed in the third person – for example, as a “theory” about the circumstances of a crime.266 A party may make a “vicarious admission” by an agent who is expressly or impliedly authorised to speak on the party’s behalf,267 such as counsel for the defence in criminal proceedings,268 or a co-conspirator.269 The admissibility of statements by co-conspirators in “proceeds of crime” proceedings is considered in Queensland v O’Brien.270 Obviously, any admission by a corporation must be vicarious, but it does not follow that whenever an employee purports to speak for a company, an admission by the company follows. On the contrary, people who are agents for other purposes, such as selling or driving motor vehicles, are often incapable of making admissions on their principals’ behalf. Express authority for this purpose is often difficult to prove. When implied authority is alleged, it is pertinent to ask: “Was the speaker someone who would reasonably be expected to answer inquiries about this matter for the party in question?”271 The scope of an agent’s authority depends on the duties entrusted to him or her.272 A hotel manager was an agent for this purpose in Pomeroy v Rural Hotels Pty Ltd,273 but generally claims of vicarious admissions are treated cautiously.274 An internal memorandum sent from one section of a company to another does not constitute an admission by the 264. Whittle v Parnell Mogas Pty Ltd (2006) 94 SASR 421; [2006] SASC 129. 265. Lustre Hosiery Ltd v York (1936) 54 CLR 134; R W Miller & Co Pty Ltd v Krupp (Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 32 NSWLR 152; Anglim v Thomas [1974] VR 363; Allen v Roughley (1995) 94 CLR 98; Bird v Adams [1972] Crim LR 174; Mabbot v The Queen [1990] WAR 323; R v Longford (1970) 17 FLR 37; R v Dillon [1983] 2 Qd R 627. 266. Mallard v The Queen (2003) 28 WAR 1; [2003] WASCA 296. 267. Fraser Henleins Pty Ltd v Cody (1945) 70 CLR 100; Trade Practices Commission v Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd (No 3) (1981) 55 FLR 174; Pomeroy v Rural Hotels Pty Ltd (1973) 5 SASR 191; Daniel v Western Australia (2001) 186 ALR 369 (anthropologist had no authority to speak for Aboriginal group); Ex parte Gerard & Co Pty Ltd; Re Craig (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 370 (no authority). 268. R v Delgado-Guerra [2002] 2 Qd R 384; [2001] QCA 266. 269. Tripodi v The Queen (1961) 104 CLR 1; Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87; R v Moore (1987) 25 A Crim R 302; R v Jackson (1987) 11 NSWLR 318; R v Masters (1992) 26 NSWLR 450 at 464-466; Connell v The Queen (No 6) (1994) 12 WAR 133; R v Cannon [2007] QCA 205; Rich v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 558; 286 FLR 251; [2014] VSCA 126. But a statement by an alleged co-offender about a past event is an admission only against the person who made it: R v Brownlee (1999) 105 A Crim R 214; R v Perrier, Pop & Tilley [2008] VSCA 97 (statements before Tilley joined conspiracy). The conspiracy principle applies to civil cases also: Sheldon v Sun Alliance Ltd (1988) 50 SASR 236. 270. [2015] QSC 136. 271. Fraser Henleins Pty Ltd v Cody (1945) 70 CLR 100. 272. Australasian Brokerage Ltd v Australian & New Zealand Banking Corp Ltd (1934) 52 CLR 430. 273. (1973) 5 SASR 191. 274. Smith v Joyce (1954) 89 CLR 529 (admission by one partner did not bind others); Clark v CA Kruger & Sons Pty Ltd [1946] QSR 206; Guarnaccia v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd [1976] VR 302. But in Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Mayo International Pty Ltd (1998) 85 FCR 327 a sales representative had sufficient authority to discuss changes in terms of trading to make admissions by the company charged. When the speaker is a director, the occasion on which he or she speaks may make all the difference. For example, it has been said

592

Evidence Law in Queensland

[Q.45]

Admissions and Confessions

company unless the writer is authorised to speak to outsiders on the company’s behalf.275 A statement by a company director to a shareholders’ meeting may be an admission, while a statement by the same person, on a less formal occasion, may not have the same significance.276 The authority to make vicarious admissions can be terminated at any time – even in the course of testimony.277 A statement by a joint tenant that the property is subject to a contract of sale is no evidence against a co-owner in an action to enforce a sale.278 Membership of a group that is a party to proceedings does not in itself confer authority upon one member to make statements for the group.279 An uninsured driver’s admissions are not evidence against the Nominal Defendant.280 In BHP Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union281 an admission by the secretary of a trade union was no evidence against the union. One should not hastily conclude that a servant or agent can make admissions that bind an employer. It can be decidedly more difficult to prove a vicarious admission than vicarious liability for negligence. [Q.44] Common explanations for exempting admissions from the hearsay rule are these: “What a party says against himself is likely to be true”,282 and “a confession … well proved … is the best evidence that can be produced”.283 But a statement made inadvertently may be an admission, and a statement that is an admission in 2006 may have been self-serving in 2004. Suppose that a man accused of a crime in Sydney assures police, in 2004, that he was in Brisbane at the time. The statement is then self-serving. But if, in 2006, he is charged with a crime in Brisbane at that time, and he swears he was in Sydney, his statement in 2004 becomes an admission. All that is necessary is that the statement be against the maker’s interest at the time when it is tendered. [Q.45] A self-serving statement is generally no evidence of the facts asserted,284 except in response to an imputation of “recent invention”.285 A in the High Court that a statement by a chairman of directors at a meeting of shareholders probably would bind the company: Finance and Guarantee Company Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1970) 1 ATR 766; 44 ALJR 368 per Owen J. 275. Guarnaccia v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd [1976] VR 302. There is some criticism of this case in Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallen Investments Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 365. 276. New South Wales Country Press Co-operative Co Ltd v Stewart (1911) 12 CLR 481; Finance and Guarantee Company Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1970) 1 ATR 766; 44 ALJR 368. 277. Bond Media Ltd v John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd (1988) 16 NSWLR 82. 278. Farrelly v Hircock (No 1) [1971] Qd R 341. 279. South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd v News Ltd (No 4) [2000] FCA 1211 at [10] – [11]; Daniel v Western Australia (2001) 186 ALR 369 at [9]. 280. Nominal Defendant v Hook (1962) 113 CLR 641. 281. [2000] FCA 1613. 282. Slatterie v Pooley (1840) 6 M & W 664; 151 ER 579 at 669 (M & W); 581 (ER) per Parke B; R v Burns [1975] VR 241 at 250. 283. R v Baldry (1852) 2 Den 430; 169 ER 568 at 446 (Den); 574 (ER) per Erle J. 284. Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Farquharson (No 9) [2007] VSC 463. 285. Attorney-General for New South Wales v Martin (1909) 9 CLR 713; R v Pearce (1979) 69 Cr App R 365 at 369; R v Doyle; Ex parte Attorney-General [1987] 2 Qd R 732; R v Callaghan [1994] 2 Qd R 300 at 303-304; but see s 92. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[Q.46] 286

“stage-managed” declaration of innocence is of little or no consequence. But an early denial of guilt may be relevant to show that innocence has been consistently asserted,287 whereas self-serving lies about material facts288 – “guilty denial” or “consciousness of guilt” – may be tantamount to an admission.289 If a confession contains both damaging and self-serving statements the prosecution must tender the whole,290 and the exculpatory parts are evidence for the defence.291 But purely exculpatory statements are inadmissible hearsay.292 [Q.46] Evidence of an admission may be given by any witness who heard it made or who can verify a document in which it is recorded. Evidence of informal admissions may be rebutted or explained, unlike formal admissions,293 which may not be withdrawn without leave of the court. In civil cases, formal admissions may be made in the pleadings or in response to a Notice to Admit.294 In criminal proceedings they can be made only at the trial,295 summary or on indictment, as the case may be.296 A plea of guilty is a formal admission of every element of the offence charged.297 A pre-trial statement of intention to plead guilty may indicate consciousness of guilt, but other explanations are possible, and evidence of that kind was excluded in R v Rose.298 A statement that liability will be admitted in a civil case is not an admission, but may raise an estoppel.299 The effect of an apology to purchasers of unmerchantable goods is considered in Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins.300 In cases governed by the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) an expression of regret is no admission.

286. R v Newsome (1980) 71 Cr App R 325 (prior statement written on legal advice). 287. R v Storey (1968) 52 Cr App R 334. 288. R v Georgiev (2001) 119 A Crim R 363. 289. Mawaz Khan v The Queen [1967] 1 AC 454; R v McK [1986] 1 Qd R 476 at 482; Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; R v Gionfriddo (1990) 50 A Crim R 327 (Vic FC); Kenny v Hornberg (1963) 57 QJPR 139; Boonudnoon v The Queen (2002) 172 FLR 111; R v Wehlow (2001) 122 A Crim R 63; R v Brennan (1998) 101 A Crim R 214; R v Williams [2001] 1 Qd R 212. See [Q.54]. 290. R v Kochnieff (1987) 33 A Crim R 1. 291. Barry v Police (2009) 197 A Crim R 445; [2009] SASC 295; Jack v Smail (1905) 2 CLR 684 at 695; Griffıths v The Queen (1994) 76 A Crim R 164 at 169; R v Rudd (2009) 23 VR 444; [2009] VSCA 213 at [43]. 292. R v SCD [2013] QCA 352. 293. As to which, see [A.61]. 294. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 187. 295. Criminal Code, s 644. 296. Devitt v Owners of Steamship Bainbridge [1909] 2 KB 802; Davis v Lawrence; Ex parte Lawrence [1910] QSR 98. 297. R v Tamme [2005] VSC 103; R v D’Orta-Ekanaike (1998) 2 VR 140; but not per se a conviction: Hondema v Carroll (2008) 50 MVR 401; [2008] WASC 155. 298. QLR (3 March 1979); Grosvenor v The Queen [2014] NTCCA 5 (not a guilty plea). 299. Temmerman-Dunn v Maroochy Shire Council [2003] 1 Qd R 449. 300.

594

(2003) 215 CLR 317. Evidence Law in Queensland

[Q.50]

Admissions and Confessions

A party against whom an admission is tendered is entitled to have the whole context in evidence, including any self-serving material.301 But of course the judge of fact may give less weight to self-serving parts, accepting what is damaging and rejecting the excuses.302 [Q.47] If a defendant testifies at a committal hearing, any admission will be recorded in the depositions and sent to the court above. The depositions are sufficient proof that the statement was made.303 [Q.48] Informal admissions made by an accused at an abortive trial may be tendered at a retrial, whether or not the accused testifies on the second occasion.304

Confessions [Q.49] This section is concerned with admissibility in the strict sense. Discretionary exclusion of admissible evidence is considered at [130.4]ff. If an argument for mandatory exclusion is rejected, the discretion may then be invoked; in practice one voir dire may serve both purposes. [Q.50] Evidence of an out-of-court confession is technically hearsay,305 but confessions have always been admissible on the basis that self-condemnation is likely to be true.306 However, that dictum must not be recited to a jury.307 Many admissions are not confessions. Admissions are evidence in civil or criminal proceedings, but the term “confession” pertains to criminal practice. A confession is either a direct admission of guilt, or an admission of some fact or facts tending to establish guilt.308 Confessions range from “the most solemn, spontaneous, express and detailed acknowledgments of the facts constituting a crime to casual admissions of some only of the specific facts involving guilt”.309 Sometimes the prosecution tenders self-serving statements by an accused, but it cannot be compelled to do so.310 301. Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 241 ALR 606; 82 ALJR 372; [2008] HCA 1 (video of “walk through” re-enactment, said to contain admission, played only in part); R v Roughan [2009] QCA 21. 302. SGIO v Saarinen [1967] QWN 23; Lopes v Taylor (1970) 44 ALJR 412 at 417; Gardner v Duve (1978) 19 ALR 695; Spence v Demasi (1988) 48 SASR 536; R v Beck [1990] 1 Qd R 30. 303. Justices Act 1886, ss 104(3) and 105. Procedure when a plea of “guilty” is made at a committal hearing is prescribed by s 113 of the same Act. 304. Stewart v The King (1921) 29 CLR 234; R v McGregor (1967) 51 Cr App R 338; R v Donaldson (1976) 64 Cr App R 59 at 63; R v Mills [1986] VR 617. 305. Gaio v The Queen (1960) 104 CLR 419 at 426. 306. Slatterie v Pooley (1840) 6 M & W 664; 151 ER 579 at 669 (M & W); 581 (ER). 307. Burns v The Queen (1975) 132 CLR 258 at 262. 308. Attorney-General for NSW v Martin (1909) 9 CLR 713 at 734; McKay v The King (1935) 54 CLR 1 at 8; Anandagoda v The Queen [1962] 1 WLR 817. For a detailed demonstration of admissions amounting to a confession, and mere admissions, see R v Doyle; Ex parte Attorney-General [1987] 2 Qd R 732. 309. McKay v The King (1935) 54 CLR 1 at 8 per Dixon J. 310. R v Beck [1990] 1 Qd R 30; Flowers v The Queen (2005) 153 A Crim R 110; [2005] NTCCA 5. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[Q.51]

An admission of a circumstantial fact, or a false denial suggesting consciousness of guilt,311 is not a confession. If “X” is charged with murder by gunshot, the statement “Yes, I shot him” is clearly a confession, as it concedes the physical (though not the mental) element of the crime. But if “X” merely says, “Yes, the gun that was used is mine”, that is an admission, not a confession. In R v Doyle; Ex parte Attorney General312 one statement was a confession, a second was an admission, and a third was just a self-serving assertion. There is no rule that a confession must be excluded if it reveals offences not presently charged,313 but there may be discretionary exclusion of prejudicial and non-essential material. [Q.51] Confessions are subject to the special rules of voluntariness considered at [Q.58]. A mere admission is not open to mandatory exclusion unless it is involuntary in the ordinary sense – that is, made when the will of the speaker is overborne. But in the case of a confession, actual duress aside, a statutory presumption of involuntariness arises if it follows an “inducement” by a “person in authority”. [Q.52] Generally, silence in the face of damaging imputations is no admission,314 especially where police or other official investigators are concerned: A person who believes on reasonable grounds that he … is suspected of having been a party to an offence is entitled to remain silent when questioned or asked to supply information by any person in authority … That is a fundamental rule of the common law which … is applied in the administration of the criminal law in this country. An incident of that right is that no adverse inference can be drawn against an accused … by reason of his … failure to answer such questions or to provide such information. To draw such an inference would be to erode the right of silence or to render it valueless … [I]n a criminal trial it should not be suggested, either by evidence led by the Crown or by questions asked or comments made by the trial judge or the Crown Prosecutor, that an accused’s exercise of the right of silence may provide a basis for inferring a consciousness of guilt. Thus, to take an example, the Crown should not lead evidence that when charged the accused made no reply. Nor should it be suggested that previous silence … [means] that the defence is a new invention315 or is rendered suspect or unacceptable.316

311. R v McKay [1965] Qd R 240. 312. [1987] 2 Qd R 732. 313. R v Hasler; Ex parte Attorney-General [1987] 1 Qd R 239 at 243; R v Bailey [1958] SASR 301. 314. Thatcher v Charles (1961) 104 CLR 57; R v Hall (1970) 55 Cr App R 108; R v Beljajev [1984] VR 657; R v McNamara [1987] VR 855; Glennon v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 1; R v Coyne [1996] 1 Qd R 512; cf R v Shaw [1996] 1 Qd R 641; [1995] QCA 45 at 646 (Qd R) (silence no consent to assault). In Richards v Gellatly (1872) LR 7 CP 127 at 131 Willes J said that it was absurd to suggest that every person against whom an accusation is made is under a duty to enter a denial. Compare the position in England since 1994: see [A.39]n. 315. Here Petty overrules authorities such as R v McNamara [1987] VR 855 and R v Fraser [1989] Qd R 182. 316. Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95 at 99 per Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and McHugh JJ.

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[Q.52]

Admissions and Confessions

Silence is not evidence of an admission, unless there are circumstances which render it more reasonably probable that a man would answer the charge made against him than that he would not.317

But when questioner and accused are on equal terms,318 it may be unreasonable not to respond, and then silence may be tantamount to assent.319 In Parkes v The Queen320 the mother of a murder victim was allowed to testify that she twice asked the accused “Why did you stab her?” without receiving a reply. In R v Mills321 a relative of a child allegedly killed by the defendant accused him of regularly injuring the deceased, and in reply he simply changed the subject. In R v Alexander322 a failure to claim innocence in a conversation with two friends was treated as an admission. Remarkably, admissions made to a complainant during a “pretext phone call” were excluded as a breach of the right to silence in R v Lieske.323 Critics of the “right to silence” contend that it should be abolished in favour of a general rule that a failure to answer adverse suggestions be given such weight as it deserves.324 This argument has prevailed in New South Wales.325 If a suspect does not remain silent, but tells one story to the police and another at the trial, the right to silence is not in question, and the change of story is admissible.326 In civil proceedings, an admission may be found in a failure to respond to business correspondence327 or statements of account.328 But here, too, the law is 317. Wiedemann v Walpole [1891] 2 QB 534 at 539, approved in Young v Tibbits (1912) 14 CLR 114 at 121 per Griffith CJ. 318. It would not be reasonable to expect a reply after a caution has been administered: R v Rose (2002) 55 NSWLR 701 at [260] – [261]. 319. R v Thomas [1970] VR 674; Parkes v The Queen [1976] 1 WLR 1251; R v Mills [1986] 1 Qd R 77; R v Wildy (2011) 111 SASR 189; [2011] SASCFC 131 at [121]; Heydon, “Silence as Evidence” (1974) 1 Mon LR 53. 320. [1976] 1 WLR 1251. 321. [1986] 1 Qd R 77; see also R v Gallagher [1998] 2 VR 671 (de facto wife told accused that if he did not leave her alone she would report him for armed robbery; silence, and he did stay away); R v Alexander [1994] 2 VR 249 (non-response to adverse suggestions in conversation with friends). 322. [1994] 2 VR 249. 323. (2006) 166 A Crim R 213; 204 FLR 1; [2006] ACTSC 97. 324. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Enforcement of the Criminal Law in Queensland (Lucas Report) (1977), para 194; Gibbs, Australian Law News (August 1987), p 11; Costigan, The Australian (22 March 1989); Aronson, Managing Complex Criminal Trials: Reform of the Rules of Evidence and Procedure (AIJA, 1992), Ch 2; Greer, “The Right to Silence: A Review of the Current Debate” (1990) 53 Mod LR 709; Thomas, “The So-Called Right to Silence” (1991) 1 NZULR 299; Galligan, “The Right to Silence Reconsidered” [1988] Current Legal Problems 69. 325. Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 89A. 326. Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95 at 102; Harman v Western Australia (2004) 29 WAR 380; [2004] WASCA 230. 327. Davies v Nyland (1974) 10 SASR 76 at 88; Australian Energy Ltd v Lennard Oil NL (unreported, Qld Sup Ct, 6 February 1985); R v Beardsall (1859) 1 F & F 529; 175 ER 839. 328. Tickel v Short (1750) 2 Ves Sen 239; 28 ER 154. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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cautious. There is certainly no rule, even in civil cases, that every person before whom an adverse claim or accusation is made is bound to respond, at the risk of an adverse inference.330 A failure to challenge a statement in an email message was not an admission that an agreement was varied “peripherally” in Gilsan (International) Ltd v Optus Networks Pty Ltd.331 It seems to have been at one time thought that a duty was cast upon the recipient of a letter to answer it, and that his omission to do so amounted to evidence of an admission of the truth of the statements contained in it. But that notion has been long since exploded, and the absurdity of acting upon it demonstrated. It may be otherwise where the relation between the parties is such that a reply might be properly expected.332

No admission arises from a failure to reply to a letter stating that a decision is final, and that further discussion is pointless.333 In Mundey v Askin334 the failure of the defendant politician to issue a public denial of defamatory remarks attributed to him was not an admission that he made them. As a public figure, he could not be expected to read and correct every report of his activities. [Q.53] When an admission is allegedly made in response to interrogation, accusation or suggestion, there may be a question whether an oblique or equivocal response can reasonably be seen as assent. That is a “judge question”; if the judge answers it in the affirmative, it is for the jury, carefully instructed,335 to decide whether assent was actually given.336 In R v Lester337 the jury was allowed to consider this exchange between the accused, charged with murder, and a friend. Friend: “Did you do it?” Accused: “Mind your own [expletive] business.” “No comment” replies are usually excluded as irrelevant, but if their omission would produce a disjointed account of an interview, they may be included, subject to an instruction that they are not evidence of guilt.338

329. Thatcher v Charles (1961) 104 CLR 57. 330. Richards v Gellatly (1872) LR 7 CP 127 at 131. 331.

[2004] NSWSC 1077.

332. Richards v Gellatly (1872) LR 7 CP 127 at 131 per Willes J. 333. Cassatone Nominees Pty Ltd v Queenslandwide House & Building Reports Pty Ltd [2008] QCA 102. 334. [1982] 2 NSWLR 369. 335. R v Plevac (1995) 84 A Crim R 570 at 579-580; Magill v The Queen [2013] VSCA 259 (equivocal email message). 336. Anandagoda v The Queen [1962] 1 WLR 817; R v Doolan [1962] Qd R 449; Woon v The Queen (1964) 109 CLR 529 (equivocation and “fencing” with interrogator – effectively an admission by conduct: R v Williams [1987] 2 Qd R 777 at 786-787); Kurth v Paff; Ex parte Paff [1968] QWN 21; R v Hart [1979] Qd R 8; Choudhary v The Queen [2013] VSCA 325 (nodding and looking at the ground). 337. [2010] QCA 152. 338. Brain v The Queen [2010] VSCA 172.

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Evidence Law in Queensland

[Q.54]

Lies as Evidence

LIES AS EVIDENCE [Q.54] Generally, a lie is no evidence of the contrary proposition,339 but merely goes to credit.340 But a plethora of subtle jurisprudence surrounds a distinction341 between lies that go only to credit and those that are evidence of guilt. The mere existence of a motive to lie is not evidence of lying.342 It is highly unlikely that a lie alone could support a conviction;343 in order to do that, a lie usually needs a good deal of supporting evidence.344 Independent evidence is necessary.345 But with such support, a lie on a material point, before or during a trial,346 may enhance the prosecution case,347 particularly when it is carefully composed.348 A deliberately false alibi may be evidence of intent, and of the act in question.349 If a joint armed robbery is in question, and one defendant falsely denies any knowledge of his or her co-accused, that denial may be considered, with other evidence, in deciding whether that defendant is guilty.350 When two co-accused, on a retrial, give evidence inconsistent with their stories at the first trial, and admit that their original story was a lie, that may be seen as “consciousness of guilt”.351 A false accusation against another person may have the same effect.352 In order to be treated as a form of admission, a lie must be on a “material” point. In the opinion of the majority in Edwards v The Queen353 the accused’s lie was not material because it concerned relations between the complainant and third parties, not between the complainant and the accused. 339. Hobbs v CT Tinling & Co [1929] 2 KB 1 at 21; R v Brixton Prison Governor; Ex parte Ahsan [1969] 2 QB 222 at 230; Romeo v The Queen (1988) 36 A Crim R 212; Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193 at 208; Smith v New South Wales Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256. 340. Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193 at 208. 341. On the distinction between lies as admissions and lies going to credit, see R v Richens (1994) 98 Cr App R 43 at 51; and R v Chevathen (2001) 122 A Crim R 441; [2001] QCA 337 at [30] – [31]. 342. Legal Services Commissioner v Dempsey [2010] QCA 197 at [33]. 343. Mickelberg v The Queen [1978] WAR 191 at 198; Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193 at 201 and 202; R v Ciantar (2006) 167 A Crim R 504; [2006] VSCA 263. 344. R v Williams [1987] 2 Qd R 777; R v Nguyen (1992) 60 A Crim R 196; Zoneff v The Queen (2000) 200 CLR 234 at 259. 345. R v Lane (No 13) [2010] NSWSC 1540. 346. R v Tripodi [1961] VR 186 at 193; R v Heyde (1990) 20 NSWLR 234 at 245. 347. R v May [1962] Qd R 456; R v Egan (1985) 15 A Crim R 20; R v Akbulat (1993) 69 A Crim R 75; Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193 at 202, 205 and 210; R v Bertrand (2008) 20 VR 222; [2008] VSCA 182. 348. For example, false and identical alibis of joint suspects: Mawaz Khan v The Queen [1967] 1 AC 454. 349. R v Mitchell (2007) 174 A Crim R 52; [2007] QCA 267; Mawaz Khan v The Queen [1967] 1 AC 454; R v Juric (2002) 4 VR 411; 129 A Crim R 408; R v Rice [1996] 2 VR 406 (accused concealed body of deceased and told lies about his and the victim’s movements prior to death); R v Gionfriddo (1990) 50 A Crim R 327; R v Martindale [2009] QCA 24 at [47]. 350. R v Gionfriddo (1990) 50 A Crim R 327. 351. R v Georgiou (2005) 153 A Crim R 288; [2005] NSWCCA 189. 352. R v Hartwick (2005) 159 A Crim R 1; [2005] VSCA 264. 353. (1993) 178 CLR 193. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[Q.54]

It is very important that a jury should be carefully directed upon the effect of a conclusion … that the accused is lying. There is a natural tendency for a jury to think that, if an accused is lying, it must be because he is guilty, and accordingly to convict him, without more ado. It is the duty of the judge to make it clear to them that this is not [necessarily] so.354

Jurors should be warned against thinking “that just because a person … told a lie about something, that is evidence of guilt”.355 A lie shows “consciousness of guilt” only if it indicates knowledge of the offence, is apparently told because the accused knows that the truth would condemn him or her,356 and cannot be explained away.357 There can be reasons for lying that are consistent with innocence,358 such as the shock of being arrested, or embarrassment at revealing some conduct that is shameful but not criminal. If any such interpretation is open on the evidence, the jury must be reminded of it.359 An innocent explanation was accepted in R v Lee.360 But when an accused offers no innocent explanation, the jury need not be invited to speculate.361 An Edwards direction, when required, must clearly identify the false statement,362 the count to which it relates,363 and any innocent interpretation reasonably open.364 Whenever an admission is not a fair inference from a lie, the jury must be told that it only goes to credit.365 The directions were adequate in Nestorov v The Queen,366 but not in R v Vincent367 or R v Sheppard.368 They were correctly given in R v Shiers,369 and the direction in Murdoch v The 354. Broadhurst v The Queen [1964] AC 441 at 457 per Lord Devlin. 355. Zoneff v The Queen (2000) 200 CLR 234; R v Hennig [2010] QCA 244 at [40]. 356. R v Konstandopoulos (1997) 99 A Crim R 36; R v Brennan [1999] 2 Qd R 529; Hedgeland v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 97 at [83]. 357. Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193 at 199 and 209. 358. But it may be dangerous to give too many examples, for the reason stated in R v Jeffrey (1991) 60 A Crim R 384. 359. Nestorov v The Queen [1999] WASCA 303; R v Brennan [1999] 2 Qd R 529; R v Lucas [1981] QB 720; Dwyer v Bridges; Ex parte Bridges [1951] QSR 90; R v Challita (1988) 37 A Crim R 175; R v Melrose [1989] 1 Qd R 572; R v Sutton (1986) 5 NSWLR 697; R v Evans (1985) 38 SASR 344 at 347; Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193 at 211; Winmar v The Queen [2001] WASCA 239; R v McK [1986] 1 Qd R 476 at 482; R v Ali [2001] QCA 331; R v Kanaan (2005) 157 A Crim R 238; [2005] NSWCCA 385. 360. (2005) 12 VR 249; [2005] VSC 167 (changed cars after accident for fear of a mechanical defect). 361. Horrell v The Queen (1997) 6 NTLR 125. 362. R v Ray (2003) 57 NSWLR 616; [2003] NSWCCA 227; R v Hartwick (2005) 159 A Crim R 1; [2005] VSCA 264; R v Ciantar (2006) 167 A Crim R 504; [2006] VSCA 263; Newhill v Western Australia (No 2) [2015] WASCA 121 at [70]. 363. R v Kalajdic (2005) 157 A Crim R 300; [2005] VSCA 160; R v Georgiou (2005) 153 A Crim R 288; [2005] NSWCCA 189. 364. Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; R v Ali (2002) 135 A Crim R 426. 365. R v Williams [2001] 1 Qd R 212. 366. (2002) 137 A Crim R 310; [2002] WASCA 356; likewise in R v Panozzo [2007] VSCA 245. 367. (2002) 133 A Crim R 206. 368. [2010] QCA 342. 369. (2003) 7 VR 174; [2003] VSCA 179.

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Evidence Law in Queensland

[Q.54]

Lies as Evidence 370

Queen was “beyond reproach”. However, as with other exquisite distinctions, such as that between “credit” and “proof of facts”, these directions may be more helpful to a judge whose summing-up is appealed than to jurors. There is no need for an Edwards direction when the prosecution uses a lie as evidence of credit only,371 or when it is treated as just one item of circumstantial evidence, with no reference to consciousness of guilt.372 Indeed, an inappropriate reference to Edwards may cause a miscarriage of justice.373 It is not necessary for a trial judge to give a direction, either of the kind referred to in Edwards, or … Zoneff, every time it is suggested … that something an accused person has said, either in court or out of court, is untrue or otherwise reflects on his or her reliability. Where the prosecution does not contend that a lie is evidence of guilt, then, unless the judge apprehends that there is a real danger that the jury may apply such a process of reasoning, as a general rule it is unnecessary and inappropriate to give an Edwards direction.374

Nor is there a need for an Edwards direction when the prosecutor refers to “a work of fiction”, or an “elaborate concoction” and the defence does not ask for a direction.375 But the mere fact that a prosecutor avoids the precise phrase “consciousness of guilt” does not make an Edwards direction superfluous.376 If any doubt remains, the judge should seek clarification of the prosecution case377 and, if there remains any risk that the jury may not appreciate the subtle difference between evidence of credit and evidence of fact, an Edwards direction should be given.378 Proper directions about lies and “consciousness of guilt”379 are “convoluted and difficult for a judge to give, and for a jury to understand”,380 and call for special 370. (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; [2007] NTCCA 1. 371. Dhanhoa v The Queen (2003) 217 CLR 1; R v Ibrahim (2003) 7 VR 141; [2003] VSCA 180; R v CHS (2006) 159 A Crim R 560; [2006] VSCA 19. It is for the judge to decide whether an Edwards direction is required, or whether the milder Zoneff direction suffices: R v Cuenco (2007) 16 VR 118; [2007] VSCA 31. 372. R v Loader (2005) 89 SASR 204; R v CHS (2006) 159 A Crim R 560; [2006] VSCA 19. 373. R v GVV (2008) 184 A Crim R 242; [2008] VSCA 170; Fragomeni v Western Australia [2011] WASCA 67; R v Dykstra [2011] QCA 175. 374. Dhanhoa v The Queen (2003) 217 CLR 1. But on appeal “Unless the judge apprehends” may easily become “unless the judge should have apprehended”. Zoneff v The Queen (2000) 200 CLR 234 was such a case. 375. R v Shiers (2003) 7 VR 174. 376. R v Kumar (2006) 165 A Crim R 48; [2006] VSCA 182. 377. Callander v The Queen (2004) 144 NTR 1; [2004] NTCCA 5. 378. R v Cardamone (2007) 171 A Crim R 207; [2007] VSCA 77; Howson v The Queen (2007) 170 A Crim R 401; [2007] WASCA 83. 379. When a lie is relied on as an admission (R v Chevathen (2001) 122 A Crim R 441), the direction in Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193 must be given. See also Zoneff v The Queen (2000) 200 CLR 234; R v Franklin (2001) 119 A Crim R 223; R v Williams [2001] 1 Qd R 212; Zoneff v The Queen (2000) 200 CLR 234; R v Chang (2003) 7 VR 236; [2003] VSCA 149. The Edwards direction is unnecessary when the prosecution places no reliance on lies in its closing address: R v Dhanhoa [2001] NSWCCA 293. 380. R v Brennan [1999] 2 Qd R 529 at 530 per McPherson JA; see also R v Chang (2003) 7 VR 236; R v Hartwick [2005] VSCA 264. However, the trial judge emerged unscathed in R v McMahon (2004) 8 VR 101; [2004] VSCA 64. By 2007, according to former Victorian © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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care. Subtle semantic variations between one appellate court and another have made Edwards a fertile field for appeals. The main difficulty is the elusive, and perhaps illusory, distinction between “probative lies” (implicit admissions) and mere “credibility lies”. [T]he complexity of a conventional Edwards direction … has frightened trial judges and lawyers … into re-characterising [as mere credit material] evidence which would otherwise be treated as evidence of consciousness of guilt.382

As with the law of uncharged acts, “[n]one of this is terribly satisfactory. The law ... is now in a state of considerable uncertainty”.383 Could it not simply be said: “A lie is an admission if he fears that the truth may well convict him”? Trial judges and juries deserve some relief from High Court arcana. Civil cases. A lie may be an admission in a civil case too. Loumbos v McCoy384 involved damages for assault. The plaintiff said that he was punched and knocked down by the defendant. Soon after the event he identified the defendant as his assailant, whereupon the defendant protested: “I have never seen this man in my life, and I have witnesses to say that I did not leave my office all day.” Those claims were proved false. “A more damning admission by way of consciousness of guilt”, observed McHugh JA, “is difficult to imagine”. Other conduct. Other forms of conduct that may amount to an admission are flight,385 tampering with evidence,386 fabricating387 or concealing it,388 displaying shock when misconduct is revealed,389 failing to stop after an accident,390 expressing regret to the victim of one’s crime,391 or failing to make an early

Supreme Court judge, Murray Kellam, the “standard direction on lies” had blown out to seven pages. He added that “jurors’ eyes glaze over as they are captive to [the intolerable burden of] a long and complex charge”: The Australian, Legal Affairs section (1 February 2008), p 31. 381. R v Walton and Harman [2001] QCA 309 at [61]. 382. R v Chang (2003) 7 VR 236 at 238. 383. R v DWB (2008) 20 VR 112; [2008] VSCA 223 at [74] per Vincent and Weinberg JJA, Mandie AJA. 384. (Unreported, NSW Sup Ct CA, 15 August 1986), noted in The Australian, Law Report (25 August 1986). 385. R v Melrose [1989] 1 Qd R 572; R v Kidner [2001] QCA 79; Dat Quoc Ho v The Queen (2002) 130 A Crim R 545; Quinlan v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 106; [2006] NSWCCA 284; Steer v The Queen (2008) 191 A Crim R 435; [2008] NSWCCA 295. In a circumstantial case the fact of flight need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt: Minniti v The Queen (2006) 159 A Crim R 394; 196 FLR 431; [2006] NSWCCA 30. 386. Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234. 387. R v Rudd (2009) 23 VR 444; [2009] VSCA 213. 388. Hargrave v Hargrave (1848) 2 Car & K 701; 175 ER 293 (issue of illegitimacy); R v Farquharson (2009) 26 VR 410; [2009] VSCA 307 (attempt to suppress conversation implicating accused); NAD v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 2; Pollard v The Queen (2011) 31 VR 416; 207 A Crim R 124 (hiding mobile phone). 389. R v Y, DB (2006) 94 SASR 489; [2006] SASC 141 (charge of indecent dealing; shocked reaction by accused when complainant’s father mentioned that the complainant had “shared a secret with the family”). 390. Guest v Nominal Defendant [2006] NSWCA 77. 391. R v Soloman [2006] QCA 244.

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Evidence Law in Queensland

[Q.56]

Documentation of Confessions

complaint about alleged ill-treatment by police.392 There was an admission in a Queensland case when the suspect, knowing police were looking for him, suddenly deserted his favourite hotel.393 R v Chang394 displays several forms of consciousness of guilt of murder. Few admissions can be more comical than the conduct of an American fraudster, desperately masticating forged banknotes as the police arrived.395

DOCUMENTATION OF CONFESSIONS [Q.55] It is not always necessary that a confession be documented or corroborated, however serious the charge may be.396 A reliable confession may be made orally, not to police, but to an ordinary citizen.397 But of course corroboration is always desirable. Evidence of a confession gains considerable weight if, after it is made, investigators find (or the suspect shows them) evidence that would not otherwise have been found.398 However, oral confessions allegedly made to police have faced judicial scepticism for a long time: For my part I always suspect these confessions which are supposed to be the offspring of penitence and remorse and which are nevertheless repudiated by the prisoner at the trial. It is remarkable that it is a very rare occurrence for evidence of a confession to be given when the proof of the prisoner’s guilt is otherwise clear … but when it is not … the prisoner is not infrequently alleged to have been seized with a desire born of penitence and remorse to supplement it with a confession – a desire which vanishes as soon as he appears in a court of justice.399

Rules to eliminate the “verballing” of suspects are noted at [Q.56]. The treatment of a written but unsigned record of interview is noted at [130.11]. [Q.56] In 1991 it became a rule of practice to warn juries that it is dangerous to convict on the basis of an uncorroborated oral confession allegedly made by a person in custody: McKinney v The Queen.400 It is the making of the statement, as distinct from the truth of its contents, that needs independent support.401 The emotive word “dangerous” may sound like a direction to acquit,402 but it can be tempered by using some less tendentious expression403 or by adding: “However, I 392. R v Marijancevic (1991) 54 A Crim R 431. 393. R v Bitossi [1984] 2 Qd R 51. 394. (2003) 7 VR 236; [2003] VSCA 149. 395. Commonwealth v Wallace (1862) 4 All Mass 306. 396. McKay v The King (1935) 54 CLR 1; Beamish v The Queen [1962] WAR 85; Wright v The Queen (1977) 15 ALR 305; R v Sitek [1988] 2 Qd R 284. 397. See, eg, R v Hasler; Ex parte Attorney-General [1987] 1 Qd R 239. 398. Burns v The Queen (1975) 132 CLR 258 at 263. 399. R v Thompson [1893] 2 QB 12 at 18 per Cave J. 400. (1991) 171 CLR 468. Also when a person is merely “detained”: Egart v Deal [1994] 2 Qd R 117. 401. R v Wakeley [1994] 2 Qd R 196 at 200; R v Lawson [1996] 2 Qd R 587; Pollitt v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 558 at 601 and 606. 402. The word should not be used in giving a Longman direction: DPW v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 583; [2006] NSWCCA 295. 403. White v The Queen [2006] WASCA 62. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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404

have not formed any view about that evidence.” The judge should not suggest that the evidence of police is inherently suspect, or seek to redress the balance by saying that people who make true confessions sometimes deny them later on.405 A McKinney direction was refused in R v Butler (No 2)406 because there was no suggestion of fabrication, and a friend of the accused was present at the interview. Where only part of an interview is electronically recorded, but it includes the admissions, McKinney does not apply.407 In addition to McKinney, there is now a statutory requirement408 that police interviews409 with suspects in custody be electronically recorded whenever possible. There is a discretion to admit statements not so recorded410 – for example, where the recording apparatus fails to work,411 or when a spontaneous statement is made before recording equipment can be turned on.412 An unrecorded statement may be admitted when the suspect preferred to speak “off the record”,413 or when it was made before he became a suspect.414 There was no acceptable excuse for failing to record the interview in R v Smith,415 but in R v Roberts416 the unrecorded session was merely preliminary, and a failure to record it did not affect the admissibility of a second interview in which admissions were made. Argumentative, critical or derisory observations by police officers should be edited out before the recording is played to the jury.417 There is a right to have a friend, relative or lawyer418 at the interview. The person selected for that purpose should have a proper understanding of a “next friend’s” role419 – a question examined in R v Butler (No 1).420 There are special 404. Sell v The Queen (1995) 15 WAR 240. 405. R v Tarantino (1993) 67 A Crim R 31. 406.

(1991) 1 NTLR 166; 57 A Crim R 460; see also R v Duong [2002] 1 Qd R 502.

407. Pollard v The Queen (1992) 176 CLR 177; Heatherington v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 370. In T (a child) v The Queen (1998) 20 WAR 130 an unrecorded statement was admitted when there was no claim that the evidence of it was false. 408. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, ss 436 – 437 but subject to s 439(2). 409. “Interview” has been interpreted as including a brief question about numbers recorded on a telephone: R v Karger (2002) 83 SASR 135. 410. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 439(2); see Miles v The Queen [1999] NTCCA 105 (confession admitted though not recorded – made while police conducting search for drugs). 411. R v Dupas [2000] VSC 372. 412. Truica v The Queen [2001] WASCA 221; brief discussion merely to arrange interview, substantive interview properly recorded – statement admitted: R v Hastings (2003) 85 SASR 256; R v Gojanovic (No 1) (2002) 130 A Crim R 167. 413. Stapleton v The Queen (2002) 136 A Crim R 65; Hoy v The Queen (2002) 136 A Crim R 65. 414. R v Taouk (2005) 154 A Crim R 69; [2005] NSWCCA 155. 415. (2003) 138 A Crim R 172; [2003] QCA 76. 416. (2004) 9 VR 295; [2004] VSCA 1. 417. R v Kallis [1994] 2 Qd R 88. 418. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s 419. 419. R v LLH (2002) 132 A Crim R 498.

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Evidence Law in Queensland

[Q.59]

Special Test of Voluntariness

procedures for police when an Aboriginal or minor is involved.421 In R v Laracy422 a statement by an intellectually handicapped person was excluded because no independent person was present when it was made. [Q.57] The whole interview should go into evidence, and may be treated as proof of any facts asserted, be they incriminating or self-serving: “When an admission is read everything ought to be read which is fairly connected with it.”423 But less weight may be given to self-serving portions.424

SPECIAL TEST OF VOLUNTARINESS [Q.58] Confessions are subject to tests of voluntariness more favourable to the accused than those governing mere admissions. The vigilance of the courts extends to relatively “gentle threats” and “slight inducements”, considering the unequal position of a person in custody.425 A confession is not involuntary because it was made to an undercover officer426 but the confession in R v Ul-Haque427 was objectionable on several grounds – oppression, intimidation and the absence of a proper caution. A threat may amount to an inducement if it is made to a third person, in an expectation (later fulfilled) that it will be related to the suspect.428 [Q.59]

In McDermott v The King429 Dixon J summarised the law as follows:

At common law a confessional statement made out of court … may not be admitted … unless it is shown to have been voluntarily made. This means substantially that it has been made in the exercise of his free choice. If he speaks because he is overborne, his confessional statement cannot be received in evidence and it does not matter by what means he has been overborne. If his statement is the result of duress, intimidation, persistent importunity, or sustained or undue insistence or pressure it cannot be voluntary. But it is also a definite rule of the common law that a confessional statement cannot be voluntary if it is preceded by an inducement held out by a person in authority and the inducement has not been removed before the statement is made … The expression “person in authority” includes officers of police and the like, the prosecutor, 420. (1991) 57 A Crim R 451; see also R v C [1997] 2 Qd R 465 (JP attending unwillingly; conviction set aside). 421. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, ss 420 – 421; Youth Justice Act 1992, s 29; see also R v C [1997] 2 Qd R 465. 422. (2007) 180 A Crim R 19; [2007] VSC 19. 423. Lyell v Kennedy (1888) 50 LT 730 at 734 per Cotton LJ; see also Prince v Samo (1838) 7 Ad & E 627; 112 ER 606; R v Donaldson (1976) 64 Cr App R 59; R v Wogandt (1983) 33 A Crim R 31; R v Cox [1986] 2 Qd R 55 at 63-65. 424. Lopes v Taylor (1970) 44 ALJR 412 at 417; R v Williamson [1972] 2 NSWLR 281 at 289; Gardner v Duve (1978) 19 ALR 695; Spence v Demasi (1988) 48 SASR 536; R v Beck [1990] 1 Qd R 30. 425. Commissioners of Customs and Excise v Harz [1967] 1 AC 760; (1967) 51 Cr App R 123 at 820-821 (AC); 158 (Cr App) per Lord Reid; R v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35; (1959) 43 Cr App R 121. 426. R v Marks (2004) 150 A Crim R 212; [2004] VSC 476. 427. [2007] NSWSC 1251. 428. R v Thompson [1893] 2 QB 12. 429. (1948) 76 CLR 501 at 511. This passage has been endorsed many times, eg in MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512 and R v Swaffıeld; Pavic v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 159 at 188. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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and others concerned in preferring the charge. An inducement may take the form of some fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised or held out by the person in authority.

In Queensland inducements are the subject of s 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894: No confession which is tendered in evidence on any criminal proceeding shall be received which has been induced by any threat or promise by some person in authority, and every confession made after any such threat or promise shall be deemed to have been induced thereby unless the contrary be shown.

For notes on that section, see [Q.67] – [Q.71]. When an “inducement” is offered by a “person in authority”, the accused has the benefit of a rebuttable presumption. The inducement is taken to have overborne the suspect’s will, unless the prosecution proves otherwise.430 It is immaterial if the confession begins with the formula: “No threat, promise or inducement was held out to me to make this statement.”431 If there is a significant interval between an inducement and the making of a confession, the prosecution may be able to rebut the presumption of involuntariness,432 but the onus is a heavy one. Time-lapses of 10 hours433 and 20 hours434 have not been sufficient to neutralise the effect of inducements. Apart from s 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894, s 416 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (limited to indictable offences) provides that a police officer “must not obtain a confession by a threat or promise”. When an inducement is offered by someone not “in authority”, the accused must satisfy the judge that his or her will was overborne.435 [Q.60] Section 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894 is not limited to trials on indictment. Nor is it concerned with the cruder pressures of physical violence, oppression436 or duress; they are left to the common law.437 Of course a confession resulting from actual duress must be excluded, whether the pressure was applied by a “person in authority” or by someone else, such as a fellow prisoner.438

430. R v Heyward & Minter [2010] SASCFC 38. 431. R v Plotzki [1972] Qd R 379 at 382. 432. R v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35; R v Warner (1988) 48 SASR 79; R v Doyle; Ex parte Attorney-General [1987] 2 Qd R 732 at 749. 433. R v Doherty (1874) 13 Cox CC 23. 434. R v Plotzki [1972] Qd R 379. 435. Deokinanan v The Queen [1969] 1 AC 20 (inducement offered by a “trusted friend”). 436. R v Prager [1972] 1 WLR 260. 437. R v Aird [1949] VLR 1; R v McKay [1965] Qd R 240; Cleland v The Queen (1982) 151 CLR 1; Cornelius v The King (1936) 55 CLR 235 at 246-247. 438. R v Geesing (1985) 38 SASR 226; R v JF (2009) 237 FLR 142; [2009] ACTSC 104.

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[Q.61] The principle that a confession must be voluntary to be admissible is recited in countless authorities.439 The capacity of a person to resist improper pressure depends on all the relevant circumstances, including the suspect’s intelligence, psychological and physical health,440 sobriety, maturity and self-sufficiency.441 Youth442 and other handicaps led to exclusion in R v W.443 A suspect’s vocabulary and level of intelligence may assist a court to decide whether a confession was in fact made and, if so, whether it was voluntary.444 [Q.62] However, “voluntary” does not necessarily mean “volunteered” or “spontaneous”.445 Many confessions admitted in evidence are products of lawful interrogation, often prolonged. (But as to time limits, see ss 403 – 410 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000.) The crucial question is whether the accused’s will was overborne.446 In R v Heiss447 a confession was admitted despite the accused’s “occasional statements of intention not to answer questions”. A confession is not involuntary because it was made to a trusted friend of the accused,448 or to an undercover officer.449 There is no rule that, if a suspect initially declines to answer, any subsequent admission must be excluded.450 [Q.63] Intoxication does not necessarily make a confession inadmissible,451 unless it is so marked as to deprive the suspect of free will,452 or to suggest such a degree of unreliability that discretionary exclusion is appropriate.453 In R v

439. Including Ibrahim v The King [1914] AC 599; McDermott v The King (1948) 76 CLR 501 at 511; DPP v Ping Lin [1976] AC 574; MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 519-520; and R v Doyle; Ex parte Attorney-General [1987] 2 Qd R 732. 440. Unsoundness of mind or psychiatric disorder at the time of making a confession do not make the confession inadmissible, but may gravely affect its weight: Jackson v The Queen (1962) 108 CLR 591; R v Parker (1990) 19 NSWLR 177 at 183. It may also raise a question of fairness in taking the confessional statement. 441. Collins v The Queen (1980) 31 ALR 257 at 307-309 per Brennan J. 442. See Youth Justice Act 1992, s 29. In Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v T (2006) 163 A Crim R 192; [2006] VSC 256 it was an inducement to tell a boy aged 16 that it would be in his best interests to speak to the police. 443. [1988] 2 Qd R 308; see also R v C [1976] Qd R 341; R v M [1976] Qd R 344; R v Anunga (1976) 11 ALR 412; Bundamurra v Western Australia [2008] WASC 106. The latter two cases refer to tribal Aboriginals in particular, but their principles are of wider application: R v Narula (1986) 22 A Crim R 409. 444. Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94. 445. Cornelius v The King (1936) 55 CLR 235. 446. R v Tofilau (2003) 149 A Crim R 446; [2003] VSC 188. 447. (1990) 101 FLR 433. 448. R v Burns [1999] SASC 493. 449. R v Tofilau (2003) 149 A Crim R 446; [2003] VSC 188. 450. R v Crooks [2001] 2 Qd R 541. 451. R v Ostojic (1978) 18 SASR 188. 452. As in R v Lewis (unreported, Qld CA, Macrossan CJ, Pincus JA, Mackenzie J, 22 November 1996), where the accused was affected by drugs recently taken, and received no caution. 453. R v Smith (1992) 58 SASR 491; R v LR (2005) 156 A Crim R 354; [2005] QCA 368 (also denied legal assistance). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Garth admissions by an intoxicated man were admitted because a videotape of the interview showed that he “fully appreciated his situation”. But in R v LR455 the police could not have reasonably believed that the accused was sufficiently sober to understand his rights. Minor forms of mental disability or abnormality may be compatible with a voluntary confession.456 In R v Bell457 admissions made during a “field interview” were received in evidence, although the accused was somewhat intoxicated at the time. [Q.64] A confession is not involuntary because it relates to a charge other than one under investigation when the admissions are made. In R v McMillan458 a confession was admitted to prove an offence against Australian law, although it was made in Belgium, when the accused was charged with a breach of the immigration laws of that country. [Q.65] Involuntariness cannot be manufactured in advance by leaving a letter with a solicitor stating that, if the author ever makes a confession, it will be made under duress. Any subsequent claim of duress will be assessed in the circumstances of its making.459 [Q.66] Admissions obtained under lawful compulsion of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) were admitted in R v Zion,460 but most laws of that kind limit or prohibit the subsequent use of disclosures made under protest.461 It is an abuse of process to tender a confession that was excluded in proceedings for other offences.462

TERMS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT 1894 “Induced” [Q.67] The expression “induced” was re-examined in R v Doyle; Ex parte Attorney-General.463 An inducement is a threat of detriment if no confession is made, or a promise of material benefit if one is made, offered by a “person in authority”.464 The threat need not come direct from the person in authority, provided that the recipient understands that such a person is its author.465 The 454. (1994) 73 A Crim R 215. 455. (2005) 156 A Crim R 354; [2005] QCA 368. 456. Sinclair v The King (1946) 73 CLR 316; R v Parker (1990) 19 NSWLR 177. 457. [2014] QSC 203. 458. (1984) 13 A Crim R 234. 459. R v Merritt (1985) 19 A Crim R 360. 460. [1986] VR 609. See also R v Owen [1951] VLR 393; R v Azar (1991) 56 A Crim R 414 at 418; DPP v Alderman (1998) 45 NSWLR 526; Environment Protection Authority v Shell Co of Australia Ltd (No 4) [1999] NSWLEC 289 at [10]. 461. See [10.31]. 462. Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251. 463. [1987] 2 Qd R 732. 464. The undercover officer in R v Tofilau (2003) 149 A Crim R 446; [2003] VSC 188 was not “in authority”. 465. R v Naylor; Ex parte Attorney-General [2013] 1 Qd R 368; [2012] QCA 116.

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Terms in the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894

inducement need not directly affect the accused – it may concern a relative or close friend.466 An inducement may occur if a prospect of advantage is raised by the accused, and then encouraged by a person in authority.467 A bare caution to tell the truth is not an inducement.468 But when an “independent person” told a boy aged 16 that it would be in his best interests to talk to the police, the confession was excluded.469 It is not an inducement to give correct information, without comment, in response to a question by the accused.470 Police may show a suspect a statement implicating him or her and ask “are you prepared to tell us the truth now?” without necessarily falling foul of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894.471 Inconsistencies or ambiguities in a prior statement by the accused may be pointed out calmly and factually without making a confession inadmissible.472 [Q.68] But any statement to the effect that “you had better …” is very likely to be an “inducement”.473 The essential question is how the accused might reasonably have interpreted what was said.474 A confession by an Aboriginal person was excluded because it was made after police told him: “There is guilt written all over your face.”475 [Q.69] Inducements occurred when persons in authority variously said: (a) “You had better make a clean breast of it”;476 (b) “Any statement made would be for your benefit”;477 (c) “I may not arrest you if you give a satisfactory explanation of how the property was in your possession”;478 (d) “Doing something wrong is bad, and lying about it can be worse” (to a child aged 12);479 (e) “There will be a pardon or indemnity for assistance”;480 (f) “Whatever you say is ‘off the record’”;481 466. R v Hurst [1958] VR 396 (action against wife threatened); R v Middleton [1975] QB 191. 467. R v Zaveckas (1970) 54 Cr App R 202 (“If I make a statement will I get bail?”). 468. R v Aldrey (1852) 2 Den 430; 169 ER 568; R v Bentley [1963] QWN 10; R v Dixon (1992) 28 NSWLR 215 at 225. 469. Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v T (2006) 163 A Crim R 192; [2006] VSC 256. 470. R v Murphy (1900) 16 WN (NSW) 239 (“If you killed him in self-defence they will not hang you”). 471. R v Bodsworth (1968) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 290; [1968] 2 NSWR 132; but see also R v Howarth [1973] Qd R 431. 472. R v Beble [1979] Qd R 278. 473. R v Doherty (1874) 13 Cox CC 23; R v Beere [1965] Qd R 370. 474. R v Plotzki [1972] Qd R 379. 475. R v K (1984) 14 A Crim R 226. 476. R v O’Keefe (1893) 14 LR (NSW) 345. 477. McNamara v Edwards; Ex parte Edwards [1907] QSR 9. 478. R v Bennett (1903) 6 WALR 60. 479. R v M [1976] Qd R 344. 480. R v Milnes and Green (1983) 33 SASR 211. 481. R v Noakes (1986) 42 SASR 489. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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(g) “If you tell us who delivered [the stolen vehicles] to you, the worst that will happen is that you will have to pay for repainting them in the original colours”;482 (h) “It would be in your best interests to speak to the police” (to a youth aged 16);483 (i) “You had better split and not suffer for all of them.”484 [Q.70] However, a statement motivated by hope or fear not engendered by a person in authority,485 but due to a propensity to confess,486 or a troubled conscience,487 or fatigue to which police did not contribute,488 is not “induced” in the present sense.

“Person in authority” [Q.71] This expression includes anyone reasonably489 seen by the accused as able to influence the result of a prosecution.490 There may be inducement when a threat or promise by a person in authority is conveyed to the accused via a third person, such as his solicitor.491 It is the defendant’s impression that matters,492 provided that it is reasonable. Usually the “authority” is a police officer, but it may be an aggrieved employer,493 a customs officer or a tax inspector, as Dixon J indicated in McDermott v The King.494 In Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v T495 an “independent person” who was with a youth of 16 at a police interview was treated as a “person in authority”. However, Tofilau v The Queen496 describes a person in authority, more narrowly, as one reasonably seen as possessing lawful authority to investigate the offence. An inducement offered by a foreign authority, or by Australian police in a foreign country, may render a confession inadmissible.497 A prison officer was a “person in authority” in R v Khalil,498 an 482. R v Plotzki [1972] Qd R 379. 483. R v Beere [1965] Qd R 370; Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v T (2006) 163 A Crim R 192; [2006] VSC 256. 484. R v Childs (1923) 24 SR (NSW) 57. 485. R v Isequilla [1975] 1 WLR 716; 1 All ER 77. 486. Collins v The Queen (1980) 31 ALR 257 at 307. 487. R v Riley [1908] QSR 141. 488. Nanaseni v The Queen [1971] NZLR 269. 489. R v Wilson [1967] 2 QB 406. 490. R v Dixon (1992) 28 NSWLR 215. 491. R v Naylor; Ex parte Attorney General [2013] 1 Qd R 368; [2012] QCA 116; R v Thompson [1893] 2 QB 12. 492. R v Burt [2000] 1 Qd R 28. 493. As in R v Thompson [1893] 2 QB 12 (chairman of company from which the prisoner was alleged to have stolen money). 494. (1948) 76 CLR 501 at 519-520 (“officers of police and the like”). 495. (2006) 163 A Crim R 192; [2006] VSC 256. 496. (2007) 231 CLR 396; 238 ALR 650; [2007] HCA 39. 497. R v Thomas (2006) 14 VR 475; [2006] VSCA 165. 498. (1987) 44 SASR 23.

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Disputed Confessions: Procedure

Aboriginal liaison officer in R v Dixon,499 and a complainant’s wife in R v Upchurch.500 But that was not the case in R v Burt501 because the accused “had no inkling or apprehension that [the complainant] ... might put the ‘wheels of prosecution in motion’”. Psychiatrists assessing the mental health of a murder suspect were not deemed persons in authority in R v Cocks.502 A confession made to a police officer posing as a criminal is not made to a person in authority.503 Confessions to undercover police officers have been admitted on the basis that the accused could not have known or believed that they were speaking to a person connected with “authority”.504 A fellow employee is not “in authority” merely because he or she is the accused’s superior in the ordinary course of business.505 More surprisingly, a Royal Commissioner was not a person in authority in R v S.506 However, an inducement by someone not “in authority” enlivens the 1894 Act if it is endorsed by a person in authority.507

DISPUTED CONFESSIONS: PROCEDURE [Q.72] The questions (a) whether a confession was made, and (b) if made, whether it is reliable, are for the jury. But an issue of voluntariness is a question of admissibility for the judge to decide in the absence of the jury,508 unless the defence wishes the jury to remain.509 There is no presumption that a confession is involuntary, and if a legally represented party does not suggest that it is, the judge need not enquire. However, the judge should advise an unrepresented accused of the right to a voir dire if there is any reason to believe that confessional evidence or alleged admissions are objectionable.510 If the defence does not contest admissibility, but simply says that no confession was made, or that, if made, it is too unreliable to be accepted, the judge should be 499. R v Dixon (1992) 28 NSWLR 215. 500. (1836) 1 Mood CC 465; 168 ER 1346; see also R v Wilson [1967] 2 QB 406. 501. [2000] 1 Qd R 28. 502. (2011) 109 SASR 456; [2011] SASC 61; cf R v Jarrett [2012] NSWCCA 81 (hospital staff). 503. R v Tofilau (2006) 160 A Crim R 549; [2006] VSCA 40; R v Cowan; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2015] QCA 87; leave to appeal to High Court refused 11 March 2016. 504. R v Tofilau (2003) 149 A Crim R 446; [2003] VSC 188. 505. R v Moore (1852) 2 Den 522; 169 ER 608; Keefe v The King (1919) 21 WALR 88. 506. (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 460. 507. R v Moore (1972) 56 Cr App R 373 (father to son at police station: “You had better make a statement and then we can go home”). 508. Demirok v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 20 at 31; R v Harding [1989] 2 Qd R 373. 509. R v Anderson (1929) 21 Cr App R 178. 510. MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512; R v Buckland (1983) 9 A Crim R 132; R v Gidley [1984] 3 NSWLR 168; R v Herbert [1998] QCA 418; see also the several cautions in R v Crothers [2010] QCA 334. The image of the unrepresented, helpless and overawed accused is not always accurate. See the feisty exchange between judge and accused in R v Wilson [1998] 2 Qd R 599 at 613-616, including: “His Honour: ‘Playing up doesn’t really get you anywhere.’ Wilson: ‘No, but it might get the truth out.’” As to the limits of a judge’s duty to an unrepresented defendant, see R v White and Piggin (2003) 7 VR 442 at 454; Grey v City of Marion (2006) 159 A Crim R 357; [2006] SASC 3; R v Kerbatieh (2005) 155 A Crim R 367; [2005] VSCA 194; Tomasevic v Travaglini [2007] VSC 337; see also [8.6]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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511

so informed. If the defence later changes tack and raises an admissibility issue, the late objection512 should still be entertained.513 Alternatively, the defence can “have it both ways”. It may deny that a confession was made, or deny that it is true, and still have a voir dire to decide whether it is admissible.514 Tactics for dealing with confessions are discussed by O’Brien J in R v Mahoney-Smith.515 [Q.73] The nature and purposes of a voir dire are explained in Sinclair v The King.516 It is a “trial within the trial”, by judge alone, to decide questions of fact on which the admissibility of evidence depends. It has not escaped the High Court that defence lawyers sometimes use a voir dire to assess how witnesses will perform in the presence of the jury.517 [Q.74] If a voir dire is required, it may take place immediately after the jury is selected.518 If the confession is excluded, a nolle prosequi may follow, depending on the strength of the rest of the prosecution’s case. There is now a convenient procedure in s 590AA of the Criminal Code for pre-trial rulings on “questions of … admissibility”.519 It is surprising that legislation was needed before this simple and sensible economy became possible.520 A pre-trial hearing under s 592A is not a “criminal proceeding” within the meaning of s 15(2), above.521 It may be reopened for “special reasons”.522 [Q.75] A voir dire about a confession may be held in a non-jury court523 despite the air of unreality noted at [A.6]. In such cases it is not necessary to repeat voir dire evidence that is relevant in the trial itself.524 [Q.76] A voir dire is subject to the normal rules of evidence. Evidence in support of admissibility is first led by the prosecution. The defence may 511. O’Neon v The Queen (1991) 52 A Crim R 144. 512. R v Mahoney-Smith (1967) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 249; [1967] 2 NSWR 154 at 256-257 (WN); 159-160 (NSWR); Ajodha v The State [1981] 3 WLR 1 at 13. 513. R v Walbank [1996] 1 Qd R 78; (1995) 79 A Crim R 180. 514. R v Hart [1979] Qd R 8; MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512; Sinclair v The King (1946) 73 CLR 316 at 326; Pearce v Western Australia [2014] WASCA 156 at [41]. 515. (1967) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 249; [1967] 2 NSWR 154 at 256-257 (WN); 159-160 (NSWR). 516. (1946) 73 CLR 316 at 325-326; see also Minter v Priest [1930] AC 558 at 581; Ex parte Whitelock; Re Mackenzie [1971] 2 NSWLR 534 at 537. 517. MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 523 per Gibbs CJ and Wilson J. 518. A different view seems to have been taken at the time of Cornelius v The King (1936) 55 CLR 235 at 249. 519. A s 592A application for discretionary exclusion of evidence of indemnified witnesses (one a prisoner) was dismissed in R v Griffıth [2000] QSC 9. 520. R v Noud; Ex parte McNamara [1991] 2 Qd R 86. 521. R v Nguyen [2000] 1 Qd R 559. 522. R v Dunning; Ex parte Attorney-General [2007] QCA 176. 523. Smithers v Andrews; Ex parte Andrews [1978] Qd R 64; Woods v Rogers; Ex parte Woods [1983] 2 Qd R 212. 524. R v Brophy [1982] AC 476; [1981] 2 All ER 705.

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[Q.80]

Disputed Confessions: Procedure

cross-examine on any matter relevant to admissibility525 and call evidence in reply.526 If the accused gives evidence on the voir dire and attacks the character of witnesses for the prosecution, he or she may be cross-examined as to credit under s 15(2)(c) of the Act before the judge alone, but not before the jury.527 The application of s 15(2)(c) depends on evidence before the jury. [Q.77] The onus of proving that a confession is voluntary is on the prosecution,528 but the standard of proof is the civil standard.529 The question on the voir dire is not whether the statement should be accepted, but merely whether it is admissible.530 The onus and standard of proof on applications for discretionary rejection are noted at [130.63]. [Q.78] Only in exceptional circumstances will a court of appeal disturb findings of fact made on a voir dire.531 An attempt to reopen a ruling in favour of admissibility was rejected in R v Sheehy.532 [Q.79] If the judge decides that a confession is admissible, the defence is free to argue before the jury any point raised on the voir dire that also relates to its reliability.533 That is not a challenge to the judge’s authority because the questions are not the same. In the main trial the prosecution must establish the truth of the confession beyond reasonable doubt,534 On the voir dire the judge merely decides admissibility on the balance of probabilities: [T]he prisoner is entitled both to a ruling on admissibility from the judge and also to hear the verdict of the jury on the weight and value of a confession.535

[Q.80] When a confession is ruled inadmissible, the prosecution must not make any reference to it before the jury – for example, by putting it to the accused that he made an earlier statement inconsistent with his present claim of innocence.536 But counsel for a co-accused may refer to the confession, in which case the judge

525. Dixon v McCarthy [1975] 1 NSWLR 617. 526. Ex parte Hamilton; Re Fagan [1966] 2 NSWR 732; MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 520, 524 and 532. 527. See [15.9] and [15.10]. 528. R v Q [2003] QCA 421. 529. Wendo v The Queen (1963) 109 CLR 559; R v Hagan [1966] Qd R 219; R v Mahoney-Smith (1967) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 249; [1967] 2 NSWR 154; R v Stafford (1976) 13 SASR 392; Cleland v The Queen (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 19; R v Ella (1990) 100 FLR 442; R v Buzzacott (2010) 107 SASR 564; [2010] SASC 234. 530. Cornelius v The King (1936) 55 CLR 235 at 246 and 248; R v Czerwinski [1954] VLR 483. (A different view is taken in England: DPP v Ping Lin [1976] AC 574; R v Minors [1989] 1 WLR 441.) As to questioning on the voir dire about the voluntariness of a confession and the credit of the accused, see R v Semyraha [2001] 2 Qd R 208; [2000] QCA 303. 531. R v Kyriakou (1987) 29 A Crim R 50. 532. R v Sheehy [2003] 1 Qd R 418; [2003] QCA 420. 533. R v Zerafa [1935] QSR 227; Basto v The Queen (1954) 91 CLR 628; R v Willie [1960] Qd R 525; R v Smith [1984] 2 Qd R 69; R v Carter [2003] 2 Qd R 402 at [51]. 534. Burns v The Queen (1975) 132 CLR 258. 535. Sparks v The Queen [1964] AC 964; R v Perera [1986] 1 Qd R 211. 536. R v Treacy (1944) 30 Cr App R 93. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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must solemnly tell the jury that the inadmissible confession they have just been told about is no evidence of its author’s guilt.537 [Q.81] A moot point is whether evidence discovered by means of an inadmissible confession is itself admissible. Old authorities suggest that the answer is “No”.538 In R v Scott; Ex parte Attorney-General,539 it was held that the Ireland discretion may be used in such a case.540 [Q.82] No decision on admissibility is final until the trial is concluded. Until then, it may be decided that information ruled inadmissible is admissible after all (or vice versa), and this applies to confessions.541 But if a confession is admitted and later excluded, it would be impossible to continue with that jury without the accused’s consent. [Q.83] We have noted provisions of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 dealing with the questioning of suspects and permissible length of interviews.542 Precedents for those provisions existed in the Crimes (Custody and Investigation) Act 1988 (Vic) and in s 34 of England’s Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Pointed comments of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Wakeley543 may have been the catalyst for their adoption in Queensland.

EXPERT EVIDENCE ON RELIABILITY OF A CONFESSION [Q.84] Reliability of evidence is generally a matter for the common sense of the judge of fact, and there is no recognised science of credibility.544 In relation to a witness who is “clinically normal”, it is not permissible for a psychologist or other expert to testify that a disputed confession is “out of character”, or one that the accused “could not have made”.545 Testimony purporting to be expert evidence of Aboriginal speech patterns and personality traits was rejected in R v Condren,546 although that decision may be doubted in the light of Murphy v The Queen.547 Evidence that the accused passed a “lie detector” test was excluded in R v Murray.548 Evidence by a psychiatrist of statements made by an accused while under the influence of a “truth drug” was excluded in New Zealand’s Court 537. Lui Mei Lin v The Queen [1989] 2 WLR 175. 538. R v Warwickshall (1783) 1 Leach 298; 168 ER 234; R v Barker [1941] 2 KB 381 at 384. 539. [1993] 1 Qd R 537. 540. See [130.37]; and R v Scott; Ex parte Attorney-General [1993] 1 Qd R 537. 541. Cornelius v The King (1936) 55 CLR 235 at 249; R v Pratt (1965) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 358; R v Mahoney-Smith (1967) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 249; [1967] 2 NSWR 154 at 256-257 (WN); 159 (NSWR); Ex parte Whitelock; Re Mackenzie [1971] 2 NSWLR 534 at 537. 542. See [130.15], [130.51], [130.72], [130.76], [Q.24] and [Q.56]. 543. R v Wakeley [1994] 2 Qd R 196 at 200. 544. Compare Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486. 545. R v Ashcroft [1965] Qd R 81; R v Turner [1975] QB 834; R v Nelson [1982] Qd R 636. 546. (1987) 28 A Crim R 261. 547. (1989) 167 CLR 94. 548. (1981) 7 A Crim R 48.

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Admissions Obtained in Breach of Privacy Laws 549

of Appeal. An expert in “stylometry” (if there be such a science) may not express an opinion about the authenticity of an oral confession.550 [Q.85] However, if a defendant exhibits some “clinical abnormality”, the position is different,551 and then evidence as to reliability may also be evidence on the issues. Could the accused have formed the necessary intention? Could a person of abnormally low intelligence use the relatively sophisticated expressions in the statement? But a problem in such cases is that the expert may self-levitate by declaring the defendant “abnormal”.

Other statutes relating to admissions [Q.86] Section 18 of the Partnership Act 1891 provides that an admission by a partner about ordinary partnership affairs is evidence against the firm. The admission in Smith v Joyce552 did not satisfy that test and was evidence against one partner only. Section 25 of the Status of Children Act 1978 provides that a person’s name in a record of birth made under the Births Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 2003 is evidence of parentage.

ADMISSIONS OBTAINED IN BREACH OF PRIVACY LAWS [Q.87] Section 46(1) of the Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 declares that evidence of a private conversation recorded, monitored or overheard by means of a “listening device”553 is not admissible in any proceeding.554 (Quaere whether a video camera is a “listening device” for present purposes. In R v McNamara,555 based on similar Victorian legislation, the answer was “No”.) However, the prohibition in s 46 is less stringent than may appear at first sight, because a conversation is not “private” unless it is conducted “in circumstances that indicate that [all parties to it] desire the words to be heard … only by themselves”, and then only if they have a reasonable expectation that they will not be overheard by anyone without their consent. Recording is not prohibited if the person using the device is party to the conversation: s 43(2)(a).556 In other words, one party to a conversation by any number of people may secretly 549. R v McKay [1967] NZLR 139. 550. R v Tilley [1985] VR 505. 551. See R v Laurie [1987] 2 Qd R 762; R v Barry [1984] 1 Qd R 74 (“borderline mental defective”); Toohey v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] AC 595; and Murphy v The Queen (1989 167 CLR 94. 552. (1954) 89 CLR 529. 553. See generally Carter, “Evidence Obtained by Use of a Covert Listening Device” (1997) 113 LQR 468. 554. Order for delivery-up of evidence acquired in breach of Invasion of Privacy Act 1971: Heery v Criminal Justice Commission [2001] 2 Qd R 610; (2000) 110 A Crim R 465. 555. [1995] 1 VR 263; (1994) 73 A Crim R 539. 556. Alyssa Treasury Services Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 56 AAR 144; [2011] AATA 578 at [14]; Le Cerf v Commissioner of Police [2011] QDC 235 at [4]; R v Workman (2004) 60 NSWLR 471; [2004] NSWCCA 213 at [7]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[Q.88]

557

tape-record it without contravening the Act. But there is a qualified prohibition upon publication of lawfully recorded private conversation in s 45. Publication is lawful only if (i) all parties consent, or (ii) if it is made in legal proceedings, or to the extent that it is reasonably necessary in the public interest, or the performance of a duty, or for the protection of the lawful interests of the publisher, (iii) or if it is limited to a person reasonably believed to have such an interest in the conversation as to warrant the publication, (iv) or to certain authorised Commonwealth or State officers. The use of listening devices by the Crime and Corruption Commission is regulated by ss 121 – 128 of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001.558 [Q.88] An executive officer, acting under s 43(2)(c) of the Invasion of Privacy Act,559 may approve the use of a listening device to record private conversations. That was done in the case of two accused in custody for abducting and murdering a young woman.560 One permit may cover the installation of several devices on the same premises.561 The terms of an authority must be strictly observed, and there must be no unauthorised delegation.562 Provisions for special warrants also appear in the Child Protection Act 1999, s 173; the Fisheries Act 1994, s 49; and the Electricity Act 1994, s 152E.563 In relation to the Drugs Misuse Act, it has been held that an authorised police officer may delegate necessary technical work to subordinates.564 [Q.89] An eavesdropping authority granted under the Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 does not override legal professional privilege,565 nor does it authorise a trespass in order to install a device.566 In Heery v Criminal Justice Commission567 an order was made for surrender of unlawfully made recordings of conversations between the plaintiff and his solicitor. [Q.90] The expression “member of the police force” in s 43(2)(d) of the Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 refers primarily to Queensland police. Federal 557. R v O’Neill [1996] 2 Qd R 326; (1995) 81 A Crim R 458. Ponzio v Multiplex Ltd (2005) 145 IR 431; [2005] FCA 1410 deals with similar Victorian legislation. Compare the Listening Devices Act 1984 (NSW) under which it is an offence for a journalist to tape a conversation to which he or she is a party: Miller v TCN Channel 9 (1988) 36 A Crim R 92; DPP (NSW) v Fordham (2010) 202 A Crim R 254; [2010] NSWSC 795. 558. Heery v Criminal Justice Commission (2000) 110 A Crim R 465. 559. The validity of the order may be reviewed in subsequent proceedings, even in an inferior court: Ousley v The Queen (1997) 192 CLR 69. The conferment of this executive function upon the judiciary has been criticised as inappropriate and inadequately documented: Courier Mail (Brisbane, 13 January 1994), p 1, reporting an application to Dowsett J by the Criminal Justice Commission to curb press reports of the Commission’s activities. 560. R v Beck [1990] 1 Qd R 30. 561. R v Regazzoli [1995] 2 Qd R 422. 562. R v Bunting (No 4) (2003) 231 LSJS 1; [2003] SASC 252. 563. See also Explosives Act 1999, s 87. 564. R v Vickery [1996] 1 Qd R 334. 565. R (a Solicitor) v Lewis [1987] 2 Qd R 710. 566. Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427. 567. (2000) 110 A Crim R 465.

616

Evidence Law in Queensland

[Q.93]

Statutes Affecting Privilege

police are not automatically entitled568 to do things for which State police require special authority,569 but if they hold a Commonwealth permit570 to install a listening device, they need no permit under State law.571

STATUTES AFFECTING PRIVILEGE [Q.91] Abrogation of privilege against self-incrimination is considered at [10.30]. State legislation may have that effect, but it is doubtful whether a “saving” clause572 is effective in a federal court, or a court of another State.573 [Q.92] It appears that legal professional privilege was displaced by s 29 of the former Stamp Act 1894, which required “any person” to provide information relevant to an assessment of duties. But generally there has been no enthusiasm to find implied abrogation of professional privilege in State legislation: see [A.194] and [10.37]. The effect of s 87 of the present Taxation Administration Act 2001 is less clear; it is subject to s 124, which abrogates privilege against selfincrimination, but the Act says nothing about professional privilege. As noted above, an exemption from the Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 does not affect professional privilege.574 A rule of court conferring power to “give such directions as the court or a judge thinks proper” does not imply that the privilege may be set aside.575 However, the legislature is not so circumspect as in the past. Professional privilege is set aside by the Legal Aid Queensland Act 1997, s 29; the Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002, s 40; the Powers of Attorney Act 1998, s 81(3)(b); and the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000, s 130(6). On the other hand, it is protected by the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, s 201; the Ombudsman Act 2001, s 45; the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (compare s 48(1) and (2)), and the Crime and Corruption Act 2001, ss 185 and 192. The Child Protection Act 1999, s 99R confers privilege on communications between a “separate representative” and a child whom he or she is appointed to assist. [Q.93] Rules of court for inspection of property do not override privilege.576 But privilege in material prepared for litigation is now severely limited. Rule 429 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules provides that a party who intends to call an expert witness must disclose the report within 90 or 120 days after the close of pleading.577 There is a similar provision in personal injury cases,578 where the rules extend to plaintiffs’ statements to their lawyers, in so far as they relate to 568. See, eg, Surveillance Devices Act 2004, s 38. 569. Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427. 570. Such as s 219B(5) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth). 571. R v Scouller (1995) 119 FLR 310; 76 A Crim R 487. 572. See [10.31]. 573. R v McDonnell [1988] 2 Qd R 189. 574. R (a Solicitor) v Lewis [1987] 2 Qd R 710. 575. Cockerill v Collins [1999] 2 Qd R 26. 576. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 212; Topp v Lawnton Sawmill [1968] QWN 34. 577. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 212(2) states: “A document consisting of a statement or report of an expert is not privileged from disclosure.” © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

617

Other Queensland Legislation

[Q.94]

579

damages. One may question the abrogation of privilege by subordinate legislation,580 but in one appeal from Caesar to Caesar the judges looked upon their rules, and behold, they found them very good.581 Can lawyers who prune privilege really complain when politicians do the same? [Q.94] The common law rules of Crown (or public interest) privilege allow courts to balance the interests of the public against those of particular litigants.582 But some statutes make the privilege absolute:583 see, for example, Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), Sch 1, s 355-280.584

RELIEF FROM THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RULE [Q.95] The primary rule is noted at [19.5] and [104.2]. There are now many statutes that allow proof of documents by production of verified copies. Examples appear in ss 51 – 53, 55 – 58, 72 – 74, 84(b) and 97, and Pt 7 of the Evidence Act 1977. Other examples abound.585

STATUTES REQUIRING DOCUMENTATION [Q.96] The law does not generally require evidence to be in documentary form. But if a document is used, the original must be produced, or a satisfactory reason for its absence given. That done, secondary evidence (written or oral) may be allowed.586 However, there are special cases where documentation is essential. A last will and testament must be wholly written, executed and witnessed as prescribed.587 Transactions governed by s 34 of the Credit Act 1987 and powers of attorney588 must also be fully recorded. Nevertheless, secondary evidence is admissible if inability to produce the original is adequately explained. Even wills may be

578. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 547(3)(e). 579. Parr v Bavarian Steak House Pty Ltd [2001] 2 Qd R 196. 580. It seems reasonable to expect this to be done by principal legislation, even if it is technically valid to do so by mere rules of court. It is now accepted by the legislature that some things which may lawfully be done by subordinate legislation should not be done in that way: Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld), s 4(3). 581. Cleland v Boynes (1978) 19 SASR 464. 582. Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1; Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910. 583. Roberts v Hay [1982] Qd R 688; (1982) 13 ATR 619; R v Demir [1990] 2 Qd R 433; R v Stipendiary Magistrate at Southport; Ex parte Gibson [1993] 2 Qd R 687. 584. Purnell Brothers v Transport Engineers Pty Ltd (1984) 73 FLR 160. 585. For example, Land Title Act 1994, s 36; Associations Incorporation Act 1981, s 127; Powers of Attorney Act 1998, s 14. 586. Sugden v Lord St Leonards (1876) LR 1 PD 154; Re Gregory [1934] QWN 36; BI (Contracting) Pty Ltd v AW Baulderstone Holdings Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 173 (building contract – indemnity clause). 587. Succession Act 1981, s 9. 588. Powers of Attorney Act 1998, s 11.

618

Evidence Law in Queensland

[Q.99]

Statute of Frauds

proved by oral secondary evidence: see Re Gregory589 and [63.2]. An audio-recording of testamentary intentions was admitted to probate in Treacey v Edwards.590

STATUTE OF FRAUDS [Q.97] A modified version of this ancient legislation appears in the Property Law Act 1974.591 The relevant transactions require proof in writing, but need not be fully documented. A memorandum signed by the “party charged” suffices to prove such important dealings as assignments of land,592 declarations of trust over land (other than resulting, implied or constructive trusts) and guarantees. Sales of land by auction are included.593 Guarantees to credit providers are governed by s 133 of the Credit Act 1987. [Q.98] A memorandum complies with the Statute of Frauds if it records the essential terms of the transaction.594 A definitive list of the “essentials” depends on the nature and circumstances of the case,595 but some items are indispensable. Obviously, the parties must be identified,596 though not necessarily by their proper names.597 Other “standard essentials” are a sufficient description of the subject property, a statement of the price and the terms of payment.598 An imperfect description of the subject matter may be clarified by extrinsic evidence.599 If separate prices are payable for discrete parcels of land, or if payment is to be by instalments, those points must also be documented.600 But if an essential term is omitted from a memorandum of agreement between “A” and “B” and that term is severable and solely for the benefit of “A”, “A” may waive it and enforce the rest.601 [Q.99] The necessary memorandum may be assembled from several documents, such as letters referring to each other, provided that one of them bears the

589. [1934] QWN 36. 590. (2000) 49 NSWLR 739; Re Estate of Wai Fun Chan [2015] NSWSC 1107 (video recording). 591. Property Law Act 1974, ss 10, 11, 12 and 56. 592. Including a contract to grant a lease of land not yet acquired: Penrith Whitewater Stadium Ltd v Lesvos Pty Ltd [2007] NSW Conv R 56-189; [2007] NSWCA 176. 593. Wright v Madden [1992] 1 Qd R 343; Daulia Ltd v Four Millbank Nominees Ltd [1978] Ch 231. 594. Hawkins v Price [1947] Ch 645 at 657. 595. Hawkins v Price [1947] Ch 645; Burgess v Cox [1951] Ch 383. 596. Williams v Jordan (1877) 6 Ch D 517. 597. Rossiter v Miller (1878) 3 App Cas 1124. 598. Laythoarp v Bryant (1836) 2 Bing NC 725; 132 ER 283; Burgess v Cox [1951] Ch 383; Niesmann v Collingridge (1921) 29 CLR 177; Peppe v Jydonnet Pty Ltd [2007] NSW Conv R 56-183. 599. Plant v Bourne [1897] 2 Ch 281 (“24 acres at X” sufficient when it was proved that the vendor owned no other land at X). 600. Smith v MacGowan (1938) 159 LT 278; Tweddell v Henderson [1975] 1 WLR 1496. 601. Beckett v Nurse [1948] 1 KB 535; Turner v Hatton [1952] 1 TLR 1184. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

619

Other Queensland Legislation

[Q.100]

602

necessary signature. A letter merely headed “Dear Sir” may be linked to writing on an envelope bearing the name of the addressee.603 [Q.100] There are other ways in which the courts have liberalised the Statute of Frauds. A signature need not be in the conventional position at the end of the memorandum, so long as it appears that one placed elsewhere was meant to authenticate the whole.604 Initials are equivalent to a signature.605 A printed heading on an invoice has been accepted as a “signature”606 and a rubber-stamp probably suffices.607 Absent a claim of non est factum, mistake, misrepresentation or duress, evidence of subjective intention is neither necessary nor admissible before a document signed by a party is enforced.608 [Q.101] The memorandum need not come into existence at the time of the transaction, provided that it exists by the time the action is commenced.609 [Q.102] It is not necessary that the document be deliberately produced as evidence of the transaction. In Popiw v Popiw610 the requisite memorandum was unwittingly and incidentally made in an affidavit for matrimonial proceedings. [Q.103] If the absence of an original memorandum is satisfactorily explained, secondary evidence may be given in the usual way.611 [Q.104] If a sufficient memorandum cannot be produced, relief may be found in the equitable doctrine of part performance.612 But the difficulty cannot be overcome by pleading a collateral agreement to make a memorandum.613 [Q.105] It is for the “party charged” (the defendant) to plead the Statute.614 A defence of this kind is often unmeritorious, and in the long run may do a party 602. Studds v Watson (1884) 28 Ch D 305; Fay v Miller, Wilkins & Co [1941] Ch 360; Burgess v Cox [1951] Ch 383. 603. Stokes v Whicher [1920] 1 Ch 411 at 418; Mackay Sugar Ltd v Quadrio [2015] QCA 41 at [29]. 604. Evans v Hoare [1892] 1 QB 593; Cohen v Roche [1927] 1 KB 169. Authentication merely proves that a document is what it purports to be; its weight is a separate question: Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 53 ACSR 752; [2005] NSWSC 417. 605. In the Goods of Blewitt (1879) 5 PD 116. 606. Cohen v Roche [1927] 1 KB 169. 607. Goodman v J Eban Ltd [1954] 1 QB 550; Rivers v Fuller; Ex parte Rivers [1977] Qd R 97. In R v Frolchenko [1998] QCA 43 McPherson JA suggested that a typed signature may suffice. See now the Electronic Transactions (Queensland) Act 2001, s 14. 608. Forrest v Cosmetic Co Pty Ltd (2008) 218 FLR 109; [2008] SASC 152. 609. Lucas v Dixon (1889) 22 QBD 357; Farr Smith & Co v Messers Ltd [1928] 1 KB 397; Dudgeon v Chie (1955) 55 SR (NSW) 450; Popiw v Popiw [1959] VR 197; South Coast Oils (Qld & NSW) Pty Ltd v Look Enterprises Pty Ltd [1988] 1 Qd R 680 (affidavit in present proceedings insufficient). 610. [1959] VR 197. 611. Barber v Rowe [1948] 2 All ER 1050; Giasoumi v Hutton [1977] VR 294; see also [Q.96]. In property disputes the evidence should be clear and convincing: Mack v Lenton (1993) 32 NSWLR 259 at 261; Minassian v Minassian [2010] NSWSC 708. 612. Maddison v Alderson (1883) 8 App Cas 467; South Coast Oils (Qld & NSW) Pty Ltd v Look Enterprises Pty Ltd [1988] 1 Qd R 680. 613. Wright v Madden [1992] 1 Qd R 343. 614. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 150(4).

620

Evidence Law in Queensland

[Q.107]

Corroboration Rules Reformed

more harm than good, especially in a business environment. Therefore a legal adviser should obtain a client’s informed consent before pleading that time has expired.615 [Q.106] Writings that revive a stale cause of action are governed by ss 35 and 36 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974.616

CORROBORATION RULES REFORMED [Q.107] Corroboration was formerly required “as a matter of practice” for several classes of witnesses in criminal cases, including accomplices,617 fellow prisoners,618 young children,619 and persons complaining of sexual assaults620 (but not for the evidence of one accused of such an assault).621 Section 632 of the Criminal Code now provides622 (subject to five exceptions) that a person may be convicted of an offence on the uncorroborated evidence of one witness. The judge may make any “comment on the evidence … that it is appropriate … in the interests of justice”, but must not “suggest in any way … that the law regards any class of persons623 as unreliable witnesses”. A suitably phrased warning about uncorroborated evidence is still desirable in a case like R v Robinson,624 where the history and rationale of the new s 632 of the Code were examined in the court below.625 With respect to an accomplice, the judge may draw “attention to a tendency … to do whatever might be best suited to minimising his own role or exculpating himself”.626 Accomplices cannot corroborate each other.627 A jury should be warned to examine the evidence of a prisoner witness with particular care.628 As to intellectually handicapped witnesses, see Bromley v The Queen629 and R v Warsap.630 615. Charlick v Foley Bros Ltd (1916) 21 CLR 249. 616. Stage Club Ltd v Millers Hotels Pty Ltd (1981) 150 CLR 535; Tapiolas v Tapiolas [1985] 2 Qd R 310. 617. Chidiac v The Queen (1991) 171 CLR 432. 618. Pollitt v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 558. 619. Bromley v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 315. 620. R v Francis [1993] 2 Qd R 300. 621. Robinson v The Queen (1991) 180 CLR 531. The consequent wisdom is (or then was) that the evidence of a person complaining of rape was “suspect” while the self-serving evidence of the accused was not. 622. In a reform suggested in R v FAR [1996] 2 Qd R 49; [1995] QCA 330 at 61 (Qd R). 623. Emphasis added. In s 632 the word “complainant” was changed to “persons” by s 31 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2000, to remove an anomaly noted in R v Robinson (1998) 102 A Crim R 89; [1998] QCA 50. 624. (1999) 197 CLR 162; R v Corrigan (1998) 74 SASR 454. 625. (1998) 102 A Crim R 89; [1998] QCA 50. 626. R v Rhodes (1999) 104 A Crim R 572; [1999] QCA 55 per McMurdo P, referring to R v Anderson [1998] ACL Rep 130 Qld 232; R v Simpson [2008] QCA 77; Ruffın v Western Australia [2015] WASCA 127 at [60] – [61]. 627. R v Glastonbury (2012) 115 SASR 37; [2012] SASCFC 141. 628. R v Ali (No 2) (2005) 13 VR 257; 158 A Crim R 469; [2005] VSCA 302. 629. (1986) 161 CLR 315. 630. (2010) 106 SASR 264; [2010] SASC 40. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

621

Other Queensland Legislation

[Q.108]

DISPENSATION FROM RULES OF EVIDENCE [Q.108] On a summons for directions a judge may order that evidence in a civil action be given without strict compliance with the rules of evidence.631 This power does not depend on the parties’ consent. Section 129A, above, inserted in 2011, confers a wide discretion to relax rules of evidence in civil proceedings. No dispensation is needed when hearsay is tendered in child custody cases.632 Hearsay evidence is admissible in civil pre-trial proceedings, although its weight may be insufficient.633 A court hearing an application under the Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 may admit a “prescribed officer’s” opinion as to the market value of a dangerous drug or controlled substance: s 194. The discretion to exclude evidence illegally obtained634 is suspended if the discovery was made in the course of a “controlled operation”.635

EVIDENCE IN TRIBUNALS [Q.109] Quasi-judicial and investigative tribunals are generally not bound by the rules of evidence, other than relevance and privilege.636 Such a dispensation is not necessarily inconsistent with the exercise of judicial power.637 However, it does not dispose of natural justice,638 or the duty to act rationally.639 In keeping with a general release from the rules of evidence, some tribunals are expressly permitted to act on evidence received by another tribunal or a court, or to adopt relevant findings and reasons of any such authority.640 This is a rescript

631. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 394. 632. Offıcial Solicitor v K [1965] AC 201; Taylor v L; Ex parte L [1988] 1 Qd R 706. 633. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 430(2); Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Ahern [No 2] [1988] 2 Qd R 158; Sharples v Northern Territory (1988) 55 NTR 3591 FLR 11. 634. Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54; R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321. 635. Crime and Corruption Act 2001, s 146L. 636. Re Royal Commission; A Brisbane Hotel [1964] QWN 29; Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52; Walter Mining Pty Ltd v Coroner Hennessey [2010] 1 Qd R 593; [2009] QSC 102; Scanlan v Swan; Ex parte Swan [1984] 1 Qd R 21; Maclean v Workers’ Union [1929] 1 Ch 602 at 621; TA Miller Ltd v Minister for Housing and Local Government [1968] 1 WLR 992 at 995; Re Gyngell; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 54 ALJR 314; Australian Football League v Carlton Football Club Ltd [1998] 2 VR 546. For examples of legislation confirming this principle, see Health Practitioners (Professional Standards) Act 1999, s 179; Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950, s 17. 637. K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501 at [125]; Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462 at [42]. 638. Consolidated Press Holdings Ltd v Wheeler (1992) 84 NTR 42. 639. Rodriguez v Telstra Corporation Ltd (2002) 66 ALD 579; [2002] FCA 30. 640. See, eg, Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, s 208; Health Practitioners (Professional Standards) Act 1999, s 149.

622

Evidence Law in Queensland

[Q.110]

Evidence in Cross-vested Matters

of the common law, which recognises that the issues or evidence before the second tribunal may be different, and insists that the latter make a decision of its own.641 Commercial arbitrators are not bound by the rules of evidence unless the parties stipulate that those rules shall apply: Commercial Arbitration Act 2013, s 19. Valuers, as distinct from arbitrators, are not bound by the rules of evidence or audi alteram partem.642

EVIDENCE IN CROSS-VESTED MATTERS [Q.110] A Queensland court or a federal court sitting in Queensland may be required to apply another jurisdiction’s rules of evidence by s 11(1)(c) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross Vesting) Act 1987 (Qld) and s 11(1)(c) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth). The objects of that legislation, and guidelines for its application, are considered in Bankinvest AG v Seabrook643 and Brydon v Australian Rail Track Corporation Ltd.644 It is not necessary to show that the court of origin is clearly inappropriate; it suffices that, in the interests of justice, the second court is more appropriate.645 It is relevant to consider the hardship to the respective parties if a transfer is, or is not ordered.646 In Bauer Equipment Australia Pty Ltd v ACN 153 866 114 Pty Ltd647 every aspect of the case demanded a transfer from Queensland to New South Wales: the parties carried on business in New South Wales, and their principal offices were in that State; all witnesses were in New South Wales, and the subject equipment could only be used there. A matter in the Federal Court was transferred to a State court to avoid prejudicing a criminal trial in the latter jurisdiction.648 A transfer was refused by the South Australian court in Griffın v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd649 because a change of venue to New South Wales would have relegated the matter to a tribunal, to the exclusion of the Supreme Court. In Irwin v Queensland650 an application to transfer a personal injuries case from Victoria to Queensland was dismissed: a 641. Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (1957) 97 CLR 279; A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (2004) 216 CLR 253; [2004] HCA 1. 642. Re Dawdy and Hartcup (1885) 15 QBD 426 at 430; Re Carus v Wilson and Greene (1887) 18 QBD 7; Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v MPN Group Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW SC, Rolfe J, 14 July 1997) at [14] (applied Heart Research Institute Ltd v Psiron Ltd [2002] NSWSC 646 at [19]). 643. (1988) 14 NSWLR 711; see also James Hardie & Coy Pty Ltd v Barry (2000) 50 NSWLR 357; BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz (2004) 221 CLR 400; Australian Consolidated Investments Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1991) 5 ACSR 233. 644. [2015] NSWSC 722. 645. BHP Billiton v Schultz (2004) 221 CLR 400 at [14]. 646. Morony v Reschke [2011] NSWSC 1139. 647. [2016] QSC 76. 648. Ron Medich Properties Pty Ltd v Bentley-Smythe Pty Ltd (No 6) (2010) 191 FCR 145; [2010] FCA 1460. 649. [2010] SASC 286. The application was also refused in Elias & Elias Pty Ltd v Chidiac [2010] NSWSC 1364. 650. [2011] VSC 291. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

623

Other Queensland Legislation

[Q.110]

change would have imposed a heavy financial and physical burden upon the plaintiff, while the defendant had the resources of a State behind it. The application to transfer from New South Wales to South Australia succeeded in BHP Billiton v Harwood,651 where the tort occurred in the latter State, and the law of South Australia offered certain procedural advantages not available in New South Wales. A bankruptcy matter was transferred from the Supreme Court of Victoria to the Federal Court in Turner v Gorkowski.652

651. (2011) 9 DDCR 73; [2011] NSWSC 680. 652. (2014) 289 FLR 98; [2014] VSCA 248.

624

Evidence Law in Queensland

COMMONWEALTH EVIDENCE LAW OVERVIEW [F.1] All statutory references in this chapter are to the Evidence Act 1995 (“the Commonwealth Act”), unless otherwise stated. This chapter deals mainly, but not exclusively, with significant differences between the law of evidence in Queensland and the Commonwealth Act.1 Some differences have been noted in earlier chapters. The Act is in five Parts, principally Pts 2 – 4. Part 2 deals with competence, compellability, examination of witnesses, and documents. Part 3, the bulk of the Act, contains sub-parts on relevance, hearsay and its exceptions, opinion evidence, admissions, tendency and coincidence, credibility, character of accused, identification, privileges, and discretionary exclusion. Admissions are treated in a discrete section, rather than as a major exception to the hearsay rule. Part 4 deals with standard of proof, judicial notice, public records, corroboration, proof of convictions etc, affidavits and the voir dire. [F.2] When the Act came into operation in April 1995 Commonwealth courts ceased to rely upon the law of evidence of the State in which they were sitting.2

THE STATES AND THE COMMONWEALTH ACT [F.3] The Commonwealth Act was the result of 16 years’ work by the Australian Law Reform Commission, led by Mr Timothy Smith, subsequently Smith J of the Supreme Court of Victoria.3 The sponsors of the project hoped that it would soon be adopted in every State, but to date only New South Wales,4 Tasmania and Victoria5 have complied. Most of the early exegesis of the “uniform” Act comes from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

1. As amended by the Law and Justice Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (Cth), the Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sexual Assault Communications Privilege) Act 1999 (Cth) and the Evidence Amendment Act 2008 (Cth). For another comparison of the Commonwealth Act and Queensland law, see Queensland Law Reform Commission (QLRC), A Review of the Uniform Evidence Acts, Report No 60 (September 2005). 2. Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 79. 3. Smith, “The More Things Change the More They Stay the Same? The Evidence Acts 1995 – An Overview” (1995) 18 UNSWLJ 1; Wells, “A Critique of the Australian Law Reform Commission Draft Evidence Bill” (1992) 9 Aust Bar Rev 185; Dennis, “Codification and Reform of Evidence Law in Australia” [1996] Crim LR 477. 4. Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). 5. Evidence Act 2008 (Vic).

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625

Commonwealth Evidence Law

[F.4]

EFFECT OF THE COMMONWEALTH ACT [F.4] It is sometimes uncertain whether the Commonwealth Act intends to change the common law or merely to restate it,6 and if to restate it, whether the language chosen actually achieves that result. There are numerous departures from traditional terminology. For example, statements used as original evidence are described as “evidence relevant for a non-hearsay purpose” (s 60),7 character evidence possessing higher relevance8 is distributed between a “tendency rule” and a “coincidence rule” (ss 94 – 101 and 109 – 112) and legal professional privilege is described, more aptly than at common law, as “client legal privilege” (ss 121 – 126). The Commonwealth Act is replete with discretions to override its own rules of admissibility: see [F.66]. The Christie discretion9 reappears in s 137 and in s 138 the Ireland discretion10 is extended to evidence obtained “in consequence of an impropriety”. Section 138 varies the law as stated in Bunning v Cross11 by placing an onus on the party tendering evidence illegally or improperly obtained to show that it should not be excluded.12 It is really a discretion to include evidence13 and, as such, replaces the common law rule.14 Section 140 effectively adopts the “reasonable satisfaction” test15 in Briginshaw v Briginshaw.16 Evidence that the judge considers “unreliable” may be withheld from a jury, according to s 165. There are discretions to disallow marital privilege and privilege against self-incrimination (ss 18 and 128): When the [NSW rescript of] the Evidence Act went to Cabinet ... the financial implications for the State of the proposed legislation were stated to be “nil”. Since that time, tens of thousands of judicial hours have been devoted to the exploration and explanation of the changes brought about by that legislation which, together with hundreds of others for new trials ... make the original estimate of “nil” cost look distinctly low.17

6. As in ss 55 and 56, which restate the common law regarding parol evidence: Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1996) 63 FCR 304; [1996] ATPR 41-471. 7. Stambolziovski v Nestorovic [2015] NSWCA 332. 8. Compare [A.136] – [A.137]. 9. See [130.4]ff. 10. See [130.37]ff. 11. (1978) 141 CLR 54. 12. R v Osborne (2003) 11 Tas R 295. 13. R v Coulstock (1998) 99 A Crim R 143; R v Salem (1997) 96 A Crim R 421 14. Robinson v Woolworths Ltd (2005) 64 NSWLR 612; [2005] NSWCCA 426; Director of Public Prosecutions v Tamcelik (2012) 224 A Crim R 350; [2012] NSWSC 1008 at [96]. 15. Ashby v Slipper (2014) 219 FCR 322; [2014] FCAFC 15 at [71]. 16. (1938) 60 CLR 336. 17. Spigelman CJ (NSW), speaking at the opening of the Law Term dinner (Sydney, 2003).

626

Evidence Law in Queensland

[F.6]

Not a Code

APPLICATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH ACT [F.5] The Commonwealth Act applies to proceedings in courts of the Commonwealth and the Australian Capital Territory, but generally not in State courts exercising federal jurisdiction.18 However, there are some provisions applicable in all Australian courts, namely: • s 70(2) – tags and labels in customs and excise prosecutions; • s 143 – matters of law – judicial notice; • s 150 – seals and signatures; • s 153 – gazettes and other official publications; • s 154 – documents published by authority of Parliaments etc; • s 155 – official records; • s 157 – court documents; • s 158 – certain other public documents; • s 159 – official statistics; • s 163 – proof of sending letters by Commonwealth agencies; • s 182 – Commonwealth records; • s 185 – faith and credit to public acts etc; • s 186 – swearing of affidavits. Most of these provisions replace parts of the former State and Territorial Laws Recognition Act 1901 (Cth).

NOT A CODE [F.6] While the Commonwealth Act is the first comprehensive evidence legislation enacted in Australia, it is not strictly a Code.19 Generally, it does not affect evidentiary provisions in other Commonwealth Acts20 and it is “subject to the Corporations Law and the ASIC law”.21 It leaves Pt IC of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) intact and does not affect parts of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) dealing with the competency of children22 and hearsay in custody cases.23 It does not deal with the burden of proof, estoppel, presumptions or inferences from circumstantial facts. Whether it disposes of the common law doctrine of res gesta is a moot point.24 It says nothing about Jones v Dunkel,25 leaving the common 18. Except s 186 (swearing of affidavits). As to Pt IC of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), see [F.72]. 19. Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 50 NSWLR 640 at 651; Seven-Up Bottlers Perth Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 62 FCR 289 at 301. 20. Sherman v Commissioner of Patents (2008) 77 IPR 297; [2008] FCA 1026. 21. Section 8; see also s 9, regarding common law and statute law in areas such as applications for bail, presumptions, interlocutory proceedings etc. 22. See [F.81]. 23. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 100A; see also S v R (1999) 149 FLR 149; Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553 at 649-650. 24. R v Fairbairn (2011) 250 FLR 277; 212 A Crim R 32; [2011] ACTSC 78 at [99]. 25. See [A.118]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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26

law rule intact. It does not define the duties of a person subpoenaed to produce documents.27 Pre-trial questions of privilege and claims of privilege before federal administrative tribunals28 still depend on the common law, not on ss 118 and 122.29 “Admissions by silence”30 (official questioning aside) and demonstrations in court31 are also left to the common law. In the absence of any definition of evidence improperly obtained, Bunning v Cross32 applies.33 The doctrine of judicial notice is not mentioned.34 The parol evidence rule is not affected:35 [The Act] does not and cannot represent a complete codification of the law of evidence to the exclusion of … the body of principles referred to in the cases decided prior to its enactment.36

Section 130 does not replace the rule that public interest privilege is a substantive principle of the common law, not a mere rule of evidence.37 Given these lacunae it seems unduly cautious to say: “whether the Evidence Act 1995 constitutes a codification of the laws of evidence … remains a question of debate”.38 The New South Wales39 and Tasmanian40 versions of the Commonwealth Act explicitly state: This Act does not affect the operation of a principle or rule of common law or equity in relation to evidence in a proceeding to which this Act applies, except so far as this Act provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment.

Thus room is created, not only for reversion to the common law in the process of interpretation, but also for occasional arguments that it does not provide “expressly or by necessary intendment” for the case in hand. In R v Folbigg41 the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, applying ss 97 and 98 of its Act (tendency and coincidence), referred to several common law authorities on 26. Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees Ltd (1995) 62 FCR 504; 133 ALR 1; Booth v Bosworth (2001) 114 FCR 39; 117 LGERA 168 at [89]. 27. Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553 at 649; R v Francis (2004) 145 A Crim R 233; [2004] NSWCCA 85 (public interest privilege). 28. Farnaby v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (2007) 47 AAR 11; [2007] AATA 1792. 29. Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1; Sparnon v Apand Pty Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 322; 138 ALR 735. 30. Section 89; cf Thatcher v Charles (1961) 104 CLR 57; R v Mills [1986] 1 Qd R 77. 31. Evans v The Queen (2007) 235 CLR 521; [2007] HCA 59 at [53], [63]. 32. (1978) 141 CLR 54. 33. Robinson v Woolworths Ltd (2005) 158 A Crim R 546; [2005] NSWCCA 426. 34. Gatellaro v Westpac Banking Corporation (2004) 78 ALJR 394. 35. Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1996) 63 FCR 304; [1996] ATPR 41-471. 36. O’Brien v Gillespie (1997) 41 NSWLR 549 at 557 per Levine J. Section 165 explicitly “does not affect any other power of the judge to give a warning to, or to inform, the jury”. 37. Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Gao [2016] FCAFC 62; Marks v Beyfus (1890) 25 QBD 494 at 498; R v Lipton (2011) 82 NSWLR 123 at [85]. 38. Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Gao [2016] FCAFC 62 at [15] per Collier J. 39. Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 9. 40. Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), s 9. 41. (2005) 152 A Crim R 35; [2005] NSWCCA 23

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[F.8]

Competency 42

43

similar facts. But R v Ellis decides that the common law of similar facts is replaced by the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). The words of the statute must not be subordinated to common law concepts, but the common law may still be useful where the Act adopts traditional terminology.44 In Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd45 it was stated that an intermediate appellate court should not depart from an interpretation placed upon uniform national legislation by another Australian intermediate appellate court unless convinced that the interpretation in question is plainly wrong.

COMPETENCY [F.7] Testimony may be sworn or unsworn. The capacity to give sworn evidence depends on a “capacity to understand that, in giving evidence, [the person concerned] is under an obligation to give truthful evidence”: s 13(3). For the purpose of deciding a question under s 13, the court may inform itself as it thinks fit, and may obtain information from an appropriate expert: s 13(8). [F.8] The possibility of giving unsworn evidence is not limited to children. There is a general rule that persons who are incompetent to take an oath may give unsworn evidence if the judge tells them: (i) that it is important to tell the truth; (ii) that they may be asked questions that they do not know, or cannot remember the answer to, and that they should tell the court if this occurs; and (iii) that they may be asked questions that suggest certain statements are true or untrue, and that they should agree with the statements they believe are true, but feel no pressure to agree with those they believe to be untrue: ss 13(2) and 31(5). On the recommendation of the Australian Law Reform Commission, s 13 was amended in 2008 by removing requirements that a witness giving unsworn evidence understand the difference between the truth and a lie and the requirement that the person indicate that he or she will not tell lies.46 The difference between “understanding that, in giving evidence, he or she is under an obligation to give truthful evidence” (in which case an oath may be taken) and an appreciation of “the difference between the truth and a lie” is not obvious. Perhaps it is open to a court to attach more weight to sworn evidence than unsworn evidence, but there is no direction on that point.47 Unsworn evidence is not listed as “unreliable evidence” in s 165, and s 165A precludes warning the jury or suggesting to it that children as a class are unreliable witnesses, or that the evidence of children as a class is inherently less credible or reliable or requires more careful scrutiny than the evidence of adults, or giving a warning about the unreliability of a particular child’s evidence solely on account 42. DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421; Makin v Attorney-General for NSW [1894] AC 57; Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461; DPP v P [1991] 2 AC 447. 43. (2003) 58 NSWLR 700; 144 A Crim R 1; [2003] NSWCCA 319. The same applies to discretionary exclusion (s 138): Robinson v Woolworths Ltd (2005) 62 NSWLR 612; [2005] NSWCCA 426. 44. R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131; Washer v Western Australia (2007) 234 CLR 492 at [5]. 45. (1993) 177 CLR 485 at 492; [1993] HCA 15. 46. R v GW (2016) 90 ALJR 407; [2016] HCA 6 at [11]. 47. Compare Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 9D(2). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Commonwealth Evidence Law

[F.9]

48

of the child’s age. Before allowing unsworn evidence to be given, the court must be satisfied that s 13(1) is fully observed.49

COMPELLABILITY [F.9] Section 12 is a general declaration of competence and compellability. The traditional exceptions for the sovereign, judges and jurors are preserved: ss 15 and 16. In criminal proceedings an “associated defendant” may not give evidence against another defendant unless there are separate trials: s 17. The rules of competence and compellability cannot be waived.50

SPOUSES AND RELATIVES [F.10] The non-compellability of family members is not confined to spouses,51 but the court may set aside the immunity in certain circumstances: see [F.11]. [F.11] In criminal proceedings a defendant’s spouse, de facto spouse,52 parent or child may object to giving evidence for the Crown, either generally or with respect to a communication between the witness and the defendant: s 18(1) and (2).53 The judge must inform the witness of his or her rights: s 18(4). But if privilege is properly claimed, that may not be the end of the matter. The judge may then consider whether the “desirability of having the evidence given” (s 18(6)) outweighs the likelihood of harm to the witness or to the relationship between witness and defendant. If the answer is “No”, the witness must testify as directed. There are special cases in which a spouse or relative is simply compellable: s 19. [F.12] In deciding whether to remove the immunity, the judge must consider the matters listed in s 18(7), including the gravity of the charge, the importance of the evidence the witness can give, the nature of the relationship between witness and defendant54 and the possibility of obtaining similar evidence from another witness available to the prosecution. The complexity of these provisions contrasts with the simple abolition of spousal immunity in Queensland.

FAILURE OF AN ACCUSED TO TESTIFY [F.13] The judge and the defence (but not the prosecutor) may comment on the failure of an accused or a member of the accused’s family to testify, but not so as to suggest that it is due to consciousness of guilt: s 20. The Commonwealth Act does not attempt to define circumstances in which such a comment would be 48. R v GW (2016) 90 ALJR 407; [2016] HCA 6 at [35]. 49. R v Brooks (1998) 44 NSWLR 121; R v GW (2016) 90 ALJR 407; [2016] HCA 6 at [28]. 50. Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531; [2010] HCA 1 at [51], [76], [115]. 51. Compare [8.2]. 52. The status of spouse or de facto must exist at the time the person is required to give evidence: DPP (Cth) v Smiles (1993) 30 NSWLR 248. 53. R v Khan (unreported, NSW SC, Hidden J, 22 November 1995). In R v YL (2004) 187 FLR 84; [2004] ACTSC 115, a child aged 6 years was not required to testify; see also R v Wright (2004) 186 FLR 76; [2004] ACTSC 83. 54. R v Andrews (No 3) (2005) 92 SASR 442; [2005] SASC 298.

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Evidence Law in Queensland

[F.18]

Examination in Chief

unfair. In a case where possession of drugs was the only issue, a comment was held to be proper.55 The common law differs: see [A.122].

REFRESHING MEMORY [F.14] The Commonwealth Act ratifies some departures from the common law that have crept into practice56 and resolves certain questions about refreshing memory out of court. The concept of a contemporaneous note gives way to a requirement that the note be made when “the events recorded in it were fresh in memory” (s 32(2)(b)(i)) but this may be a distinction without a difference.57 By leave of the judge, the witness may read on to the record so much of the document as is used to revive memory: s 32(3). Leave will not usually be given if the first request to use the note is made during cross-examination.58 [F.15] In a criminal proceeding a police officer may give evidence for the prosecution by “reading or being led through a written statement made and signed at the time of, or soon after”,59 the events described, provided that a copy of the statement is given to the defence a reasonable time before the trial: s 33. [F.16] When a witness uses a document as an aide-memoire before testifying (for example in preparing an affidavit),60 the court may order its production. If it is not produced the evidence may be excluded: s 34. As at common law, use of a hitherto privileged document to “refresh” results in loss of the privilege.61

RULE IN WALKER V WALKER ABOLISHED [F.17] Section 35 abolishes the rule in Walker v Walker, noted at [A.155].

EXAMINATION IN CHIEF Leading questions [F.18] There is a discretion to allow leading questions: s 37(1)(a). The dictionary defines that expression. Guidelines for granting leave appear in s 192. In R v A2 (No 21),62 leave was given to ask a child, who was nine years of age at a pre-trial interview, one significant leading question. The rule against “leading” does not apply in a civil case when a witness is asked about “an investigation, inspection or report” made in the course of “public or official duties”: s 37. Section 42 enables the court to restrict leading questions in cross-examination, for example, where a witness gives evidence in chief that is damaging to the party who called that witness. 55. R v Vaughan (1997) 98 A Crim R 239. 56. Compare [A.85] and the strict view in Hetherington v Brooks [1963] SASR 321. 57. R v Fotheringham (1975) 88 Cr App R 206; R v Singh (1977) 15 SASR 591 at 593 (flexibility of “contemporaneity” at common law). 58. Hadid v Australis Media Ltd (unreported, NSW SC, Sperling J, 11 November 1996). 59. This probably means days rather than weeks: Orchard v Spooner (1992) 28 NSWLR 114 at 119, dealing with a similar provision. 60. Lindsay-Owen v Lake [2000] NSWSC 1046. 61. Hamilton v New South Wales (No 10) [2015] NSWSC 114. 62.

[2016] NSWSC 24.

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Commonwealth Evidence Law

[F.19]

“Unfavourable” witnesses [F.19] The rule against “impeaching” one’s own witness and the hostile witness exception are considered at [17.1]ff. At common law it is by no means every unfavourable witness who is “hostile” and thus open, by leave, to crossexamination by the party who called her or him. But the concept of “unfavourable witnesses” in s 38 of the Commonwealth Act is distinctly wider,63 and intentionally so.64 All “hostile” witnesses are “unfavourable”, but many unfavourable ones are not “hostile”: s 38(1)(b). The Commonwealth provision extends to witnesses who: (i) simply give evidence unfavourable to the party making the application to cross-examine;65 or (ii) have made a prior inconsistent statement. As to the limits of cross-examination under s 38, see R v Hogan,66 R v Le.67 The combined effect of ss 38 and 60 is that it is permissible to call a witness known to be unfavourable in order to use an inconsistent statement to prove facts in issue.68 Possible abuses of s 38 are considered in R v Parkes.69 [F.20] Cross-examination of an unfavourable witness is subject to the judge’s leave, subject to s 38(6). It is not necessary that there be evidence of a motive to give untruthful evidence.70 Conceivably, the discretion to refuse or to qualify leave could narrow the difference between a hostile witness (as understood in Queensland) and witnesses liable to cross-examination under s 38. The precise scope of s 38 remains uncertain71 but in R v Le72 it was interpreted so as to allow the Crown to cross-examine one of its witnesses who suggested in regular cross-examination that a third party was the real offender. Leave to cross-examine may be given whether inconsistency is deliberate or not. In R v Lozano73 a witness attributed his inconsistencies to drug addiction, but that did not prevent an exercise of the s 38 discretion. The power to grant leave is not confined to cases where the unfavourable evidence comes as a surprise, but in criminal cases it should be used cautiously.74 63. See Smith and Holdenson, “Comparative Evidence: The Unhelpful Witness” (1998) 72 ALJ 720; see also R v Pantoja [1998] NSWSC 565. 64. Director of Public Prosecutions v Nair (2009) 170 ATR 15; [2009] ACTCA 17. 65. “Unfavourable” simply means “not favourable”: R v Taylor [2003] NSWCCA 194; R v Ashton (2003) 143 A Crim R 354; [2003] TASSC 140; R v Souleyman (1996) 40 NSWLR 712 at 715; R v Ronen [2004] NSWSC 1298 at 186. 66. [2001] NSWCCA 292. 67. (2002) 130 A Crim R 44; [2002] NSWCCA 186. 68. R v Adam (1999) 47 NSWLR 267; see also [17.18] and [101.5] on the combined effect of ss 17 and 101 of the Queensland Act. 69. (2003) 147 A Crim R 450; [2003] NSWCCA 12. 70. Director of Public Prosecutions v Nair (2009) 170 ATR 15; [2009] ACTCA 17. 71. R v Kneebone (1999) 47 NSWLR 450. See discussion of s 38 in DPP (Vic) v Garrett (a Pseudonym) [2016] VSCA 31. 72. (2002) 54 NSWLR 474; [2002] NSWCCA 186. But see also R v Hogan [2001] NSWCCA 292. 73. [1997] ACL Rep 130 NSW 169. 74. R v Adam (1999) 47 NSWLR 267; R v Fowler [2000] NSWCCA 142.

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Evidence Law in Queensland

[F.26]

Aspects of Cross-examination

Insurers’ rights [F.21] Section 38(7) states that leave to cross-examine a party may be given to an insurer who is conducting proceedings in the name of that party. This overcomes the decision in Vocisano v Vocisano.75

ASPECTS OF CROSS-EXAMINATION Prior inconsistent statements [F.22] Section 43 substantially reproduces ss 18 and 19 of the Queensland Act, which modify the rule in the Queen’s Case.76 However, the Commonwealth Act does not require the statement to be “relative” to the issues. A document containing the statement need not be shown to the witness: ss 43(1)(b) and 45(5). If it is, the cross-examiner is not bound to tender it: s 45(5). As to improper questions, see s 41. [F.23] Evidence of a prior inconsistent statement is evidence on the issues as well as material relevant to credit: s 60. In 1995 this was already the position in Queensland,77 but not in some other Australian jurisdictions.

Cross-examination on a third party statement [F.24] Section 44(3) retains the rule in R v Bedington,78 despite some judicial criticism of that tactic.79 It is interesting that this trick of advocacy survives, while the rule in Walker v Walker, another old trap for the unwary, is discarded.80

Browne v Dunn modified [F.25] At common law a cross-examiner must give a witness a fair opportunity to deal with any version, contrary to the witness’s own, that the court will be asked to prefer, but the sanction for a breach of this rule may be less severe than it used to be.81 The Commonwealth Act does not expressly require the alternative story to be “put”. It merely provides that if “A” leads evidence contradicting “B’s” witness without cross-examining the witness on that point, the court may allow that witness to be recalled: s 46. [F.26] However, in view of the fact that this procedure, if commonly used, is apt to be time-consuming, costly or inconvenient, it seems reasonable to expect that s 46 will not effect a virtual abolition of Browne v Dunn. Indeed, Browne v Dunn lives on in the federal regime,82 even in its most stringent form, namely 75. (1974) 130 CLR 267; see also [17.6]. 76. See [19.5] – [19.10]. 77. Evidence Act 1977, s 101. 78. [1970] Qd R 353; see also [19.20]. 79. For example, in R v Hawes (1994) 35 NSWLR 294 in which Hunt J declared that he had “never been convinced of its validity”; Government Employees’ Superannuation Board v Martin (1997) 19 WAR 224. 80. See [F.17]. 81. See [A.94] – [A.95]. 82. Heaton v Luczka (unreported, NSW CA, 3 March 1998); Flower and Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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[F.27]

disallowance of evidence to contradict the witness not properly questioned, particularly if he or she cannot be recalled.83

Original document rule abolished [F.27] In Queensland the rule in the Queen’s Case survives, albeit riddled with common law and statutory exceptions.84 Section 51 of the Commonwealth Act simply abolishes the enfeebled rule. The contents of a document may be proved by tendering the original, or a machine copy,85 tape-recording, computer print-out, extract from a business record, or an official copy of a public document, or even by oral evidence. In the case of a tape-recording, the question whether a transcript is original or secondary evidence86 is academic.87 Naturally, it is still necessary to prove that a document (or copy of same) is what it purports to be.88 Transactions effected by electronic communication are governed by the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth). [F.28] A party against whom a copy document is tendered is not entirely at the mercy of s 51. According to s 167(c), a request may be made to determine “the authenticity, or identity or admissibility of a document or thing”. A failure to comply may lead to exclusion of the copy: s 169(1) and (3).

Views as evidence [F.29] Section 54 deals with demonstrations and experiments as well as views. At common law, “views” of relevant places or objects are supposed to be mere aids to understanding sworn evidence.89 But the Commonwealth Act declares that a judge of fact “may draw any reasonable inference” from what is seen, heard or noticed “during a demonstration, experiment or inspection”.90 Evidently this accepts the view that the common law on views is unrealistic. However, a court is not bound to treat a view as evidence and, if it does not do so, no record of it need be made.91 The New South Wales version of the Commonwealth Act provides: “The Court (including if there is a jury, the jury) may draw any reasonable inference from what it sees, hears or otherwise notices during a demonstration, experiment or inspection.”92 83. Eastman v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 101-103; Fleet v District Court of NSW [1999] NSWCA 363. 84. See [19.5]. 85. There is a presumption in favour of machine copies in s 146. 86. R v Gaudion [1979] VR 57; R v Beames (1979) 1 A Crim R 239; contrast Walsh v Wilcox [1976] WAR 62. 87. Eastman v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 9. 88. National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu (1999) 47 NSWLR 309. 89. Scott v Numurkah Corporation (1954) 91 CLR 300; Middleton v Freier [1958] Qd R 351; Kristeff v The Queen (1968) 42 ALJR 233; see also [A.60]. 90. Section 54. 91. Gillett v Murphy [2001] NSWCA 199 at [55]; Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701. 92. Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 87 at [30]; Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 54.

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Evidence Law in Queensland

[F.32]

Aspects of Cross-examination

[F.30] It is submitted that, before a view is treated as evidence, natural justice requires the court to convey its provisional impressions to the parties and invite their responses,93 as implied in Gillett v Murphy.94 In Vairy v Wyong Shire Council95 the judge recorded his observations in an exhibit.

The principle of relevance [F.31] Section 55 embodies the concepts of direct and indirect relevance, and adds that evidence is not to be regarded as irrelevant because it concerns only (a) credit; (b) admissibility of other evidence (voir dire relevance); or (c) a failure to adduce evidence (a Jones v Dunkel consideration). Section 56 states that “except as otherwise provided in this Act, evidence that is relevant … is admissible …”, and adds, a trifle unnecessarily: “Evidence that is not relevant … is not admissible.” At first sight it may seem that s 56(1) disregards the common sense view of the common law, that in practice material that is logically relevant may have too little probative value to be considered.96 But the absence of such “light and shade” in s 56 is remedied by s 135, which confers a discretion to exclude evidence that would cause “undue waste of time”. It is submitted that s 55 embodies the res gesta doctrine, as understood at common law,97 but see [F.6].

The hearsay rule [F.32] The Commonwealth Act redefines hearsay98 so that it occurs only when the maker of the extra-curial statement “intend[s] to assert” its factual content: s 59. The apparent purpose is to avoid or minimise99 the arcane law of “implied assertions”:100 see [A.144]. Section 59 is a brave attempt to define a vexed question away, but there is still room for argument about the intentions of a statement-maker, which, in turn, raises the difficulties of an inquiry into a state of mind. When intention is in issue, the task of overcoming those difficulties will rest upon the party tendering the evidence. The Law Reform Commission argued that the possibility of an intention to mislead can be discounted when an implied assertion is unintended.101 However, if an unintentional error occurs, an opponent may be hard put to expose the error. 93. Compare Jobst v Inglis (1986) 41 SASR 399 at 417; Angaston & District Hospital v Thamm (1987) 47 SASR 177. 94. [2001] NSWCA 199. 95. (2002) 129 LGERA 10; [2002] NSWSC 881. 96. R v Stephenson [1976] VR 376; life is too short: Attorney-General v Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch 91; 154 ER 38 at (Exch) 105, (ER) 44. 97. R v Adam (1999) 106 A Crim R 510; [1999] NSWCCA 189 at [26]; R v Neish [2013] ACTSC 23. 98. On hearsay and the Commonwealth Act, see the views of the chief architect of the Act and another writer in Smith and Holdenson, “Comparative Evidence – The Uniform Evidence Acts and the Common Law” (1998) 72 ALJ 363. 99. In R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359 at [359], Spigelman CJ observed that, if “intended” meant “specific conscious advertence” there might be little room left for implied assertions. But see now s 59(2A): “For the purpose of determining under subsection (1) whether it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert a particular fact … the court may have regard to the circumstances in which the representation was made.” 100. ALRC, Evidence, Report No 26, Interim (1985), Vol 1, para 684. 101. ALRC, Evidence, Report No 26, Interim (1985), Vol 1, para 684. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Commonwealth Evidence Law

[F.33] 102

[F.33] The distinction between hearsay and “original evidence” is maintained. The hearsay rule does not apply to a prior statement tendered “for a purpose other than proof of the fact intended to be asserted [therein]”: s 60. However, s 60 has another, more remarkable and perhaps unintended effect, which is considered in [F.35]. Evidence is not hearsay merely because an interpreter is used.103

Original evidence may be used testimonially [F.34] According to s 60, the hearsay rule does not apply to a prior statement admitted for a non-hearsay purpose.104 In other words, once a statement is admitted as original evidence, or as evidence of credit, it may also be used to prove the facts it asserts. The section applies whether or not the maker of the statement had personal knowledge of the facts asserted, but not to evidence of an admission in criminal proceedings.105 A salutary effect of s 60 is to make a prior consistent106 or inconsistent107 statement (relevant to credit only at common law) evidence of the facts asserted. Queensland abandoned the schizoid distinction108 between “evidence as to credit” and “evidence on the issues” in those cases in 1977.109 [F.35] While s 60 has the virtue of avoiding some old and highly artificial distinctions, it has some presumably unintended consequences that need to be controlled. One concerns expert evidence. At common law, hearsay supplied to an expert is admissible to explain how the expert’s opinion was formed,110 but usually111 not as evidence of the facts asserted: see [A.75]. Now, according to s 60, statements made by an expert to elucidate his or her opinion are evidence of the facts asserted, whether or not the expert (or even the expert’s informant) has personal knowledge of them.112 Another side-effect, presumably unintended, is that things said in the process of making an oral agreement, repeated in court to prove the contractual terms, are also evidence of any relevant facts asserted.113 102. On utterances as original evidence, see [A.143]. 103. Tsang Chi Ming v Uvanna Pty Ltd (t/as North West Immigration Services) (1996) 140 ALR 273; Gaio v The Queen (1960) 104 CLR 419 at 421; R v Salameh (1985) 4 NSWLR 369. 104. For example, evidence of a statement to prove an oral agreement, a defamatory statement, or a threat: Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965. 105. Section 60(2) and (3), inserted by the Evidence Amendment Act 2008. 106. R v Singh-Bal (1997) 92 A Crim R 397. 107. Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594 at 601. 108. Compare ALRC, Evidence, Report No 26, Interim (1985), Vol 1, para 334. 109. By virtue of s 101 of the Evidence Act 1977. 110. Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642 at 648-649. 111. There is an exception when present symptoms, stated to a medical practitioner, are contemporaneous expressions of thoughts or feelings: see [A.148]. 112. R v Welsh (1996) 90 A Crim R 364; Quick v Stoland (1998) 87 FCR 371; 157 ALR 615; Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594 at 604; Neowarra v Western Australia (2003) 205 ALR 145; [2003] FCA 1402 (anthropologist’s evidence based on hearsay in native title cases); Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84; [2008] FCAFC 63. 113. R v Macraild (unreported, NSW CCA, 18 December 1997).

636

Evidence Law in Queensland

[F.38]

Exceptions for “First Hand” Hearsay (Oral or Documentary)

However, one of the Act’s plethora of discretions may come to the rescue here. It is recognised in Quick v Stoland114 that “the extraordinary effect of s 60 [may] be unfair” and, if so, a section 136 order should be made, limiting the use of the evidence. In this roundabout and more or less unpredictable way, the common law position can be restored. The judge, if requested, must generally warn a jury that hearsay tends to be unreliable (s 165(2)(a)), but this, too, is a matter of discretion. [F.36] At all events, the High Court has held that s 60 does not admit second-hand hearsay.115 Note that the Law Reform Commission, in framing ss 62ff (exceptions to the hearsay rule) limited them to first-hand hearsay,116 except in the case of business records. In Lee v The Queen117 a prosecution witness told police that the accused had confessed to the robbery in question, but disavowed that statement at the trial. It was held that the pre-trial statement was merely evidence that the accused said that he had committed the robbery, not evidence that he committed it.118 As to improper questions, see s 41.

Fresh complaint [F.37] Section 66 (hearsay in criminal proceedings if maker available) covers evidence of “fresh complaint”, as the common law called it: see [A.154]. But s 66 is not limited to complaints by alleged victims of sexual offences. Nor is it limited to complaint. In R v Crisologo119 an exculpatory statement made by the defendant to his mother and his wife soon after the assault was admitted as evidence of his innocence. At common law, and under the Queensland provisions regarding “preliminary complaints”, the prior statement merely goes to credit.120 Under the Commonwealth Act it is evidence on the issues.121

EXCEPTIONS FOR “FIRST HAND” HEARSAY (ORAL OR DOCUMENTARY) Overview [F.38] Sections 62 – 68 of the Commonwealth Act differ significantly from Queensland law. When Pt 6 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) was framed, it dealt almost exclusively with documentary hearsay.122 There has been some relaxation 114. Quick v Stoland (1998) 87 FCR 371; 157 ALR 615; Roach v Page (No 11) [2003] NSWSC 907. 115. Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594. 116. ALRC, Evidence, Report No 26, Interim (1985), Vol 1, para 678. 117. (1998) 195 CLR 594. 118. Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594 at 601 per curiam. 119. (1998) 99 A Crim R 178. 120. See [A.154]. 121. R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131; Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297. 122. Section s 101 of the Queensland Act admits some oral hearsay (see [101.12]), but its effect is much narrower than that of the Commonwealth provisions considered here. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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123

of that policy, but the Commonwealth Act still contains wider exceptions for first-hand oral hearsay than the comparable Queensland legislation. As an indulgence to “native title”, the hearsay rule does not apply to “evidence of a representation about the existence or non-existence, or the content, of the traditional laws and customs of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander group.”124 Admissions are treated separately in ss 81 – 90. Pleadings in previous proceedings may be admissions within the meaning of s 81(1).125

Discretionary counterweights [F.39] While the Commonwealth Act’s exceptions to hearsay are wide, there are exclusionary discretions in ss 135 – 136 (unfairness, confusion, waste of time) and in s 137 (prejudicial evidence in criminal cases). There is also a power to warn a jury that hearsay evidence may be unreliable.126 But loss of the right to cross-examine cannot override the policy of the Act.127

Civil proceedings: maker of statement unavailable [F.40] “Unavailability” is defined in s 4 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary in terms similar to s 92(2) of the Queensland Act.128 The mere fact that a witness is overseas does not prove unavailability.129 A witness who is physically present is “unavailable” if he has no recollection of the event in question, and therefore cannot speak rationally about it,130 or simply refuses to answer questions about it.131 The first-hand perceptions of an absent witness may be proved by the testimony of a person to whom they were narrated, or by tendering a document containing them.132 Notice in writing of an intention to use this provision must be given,133 but a failure to give notice was excused in Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v Western Australia (No 8).134

123. See now s 93B of the Queensland Act (admissibility of representation in prescribed criminal proceedings). 124. Section 72, inserted by the Evidence Amendment Act 2008. 125. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Pratt (No 3) (2009) 175 FCR 558; [2009] ATPR 42-287; [2009] FCA 407. 126. Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 165(2)(a). 127. See the discussion of the hearsay exceptions and exclusionary discretions in Ordukaya v Hicks [2000] NSWCA 180; applied Re Idoport Pty Ltd (In liq) [2012] NSWSC 524 at [61]. 128. A statement by a witness who died before the hearing was admitted under s 63 in Lane v Jurd (No 2) (1995) 40 NSWLR 708. 129. Donald v Rail Corporation of NSW (No 5) [2015] NSWSC 1750. 130. Cox v New South Wales (2007) 71 NSWLR 225; [2007] Aust Torts Reports 81-888; [2007] NSWSC 471; Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd (2009) 258 ALR 598; [2009] NSWSC 769 (Japanese citizen refusing to cooperate). 131. Director of Public Prosecutions v Nicholls [2010] VSC 397 at [18]. 132. Compare Evidence Act 1977, s 92(1)(a). 133. Section 67 and Evidence Regulations 1995 (Cth), reg 5. 134. (2004) 207 ALR 483; [2004] FCA 338; see also R v YL (2004) 187 FLR 84; [2004] ACTSC 115.

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Exceptions for “First Hand” Hearsay (Oral or Documentary)

Civil proceedings: maker of statement available [F.41] First-hand oral or documentary hearsay is admissible without calling an “available” witness, if personal attendance would cause undue delay or expense135 or is not “reasonably practicable”: s 64. If the witness does attend, he or she may refer to the prior statement and so may anyone else who heard it made, provided that it was made when “the asserted fact was fresh in the memory” of the statement-maker: s 64(3).136 Once again, notice is required, and if the opponent objects to the evidence in hearsay form,137 the question of applying s 64 is to be decided at or before the hearing: s 68. The New South Wales Court of Appeal provided guidelines for applying the section in Commonwealth v McLean.138

Criminal proceedings: maker of statement unavailable [F.42] First-hand hearsay, oral or documentary, is admissible if the statement was made: (a) under a duty;139 or (b) at the time of the event or “shortly after[wards]”,140 in circumstances in which fabrication is unlikely;141 or (c) in other circumstances “that make it highly probable” that the statement is reliable;142 or (d) against the interests143 of the maker at the time when it was made: s 65(2);144 or (e) in a previous proceeding in which the person against whom it is tendered had a fair opportunity to cross-examine: s 65(3), (4) and (5).145 Notice provisions apply: s 67. A failure to give notice led to rejection of the tender in R v YL.146 135. De Rose v South Australia (No 4) [2001] FCA 1616; Caterpillar Inc v John Deere Ltd (No 2) (2000) 181 ALR 108 (amount at stake, cost of securing attendance, importance of the evidence). 136. Langbein v The Queen (2008) 181 A Crim R 378 at [82]-[84]. 137. As the respondent was entitled to do in Longhurst v Hunt (2004) 42 MVR 267; [2004] NSWCA 91 where the appellant produced no evidence of attempting to secure the attendance of the witnesses. 138. (1996) 41 NSWLR 389; Wilson v Mitchell (No 2) [2014] VSC 332 at [19]. 139. It need not be a legal duty: contrast R v O’Meally [1952] VLR 499. 140. Williams v The Queen (2000) 119 A Crim R 490 emphasises spontaneity. 141. R v Polkinghorne (1999) 108 A Crim R 189 (“Mum, Vin stabbed me,” said by the deceased soon after the event). Compare res gesta statements at common law: see [A.145]. 142. Compare Walton v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 283 at 293 per Mason CJ. For criticism of this provision, see Molomby and Clark, “Let’s Not Hear It for Hearsay” (2001) 75 ALJ 133. 143. That is, damages reputation, reveals a conviction, or indicates a liability to damages: s 65(7). It is not clear whether the statement-maker must be aware of speaking against interest. 144. R v Mrish (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Hidden J, 4 October 1996). 145. See also R v Phuong Canh Ngo (2001) 122 A Crim R 467. 146. (2004) 187 FLR 84; [2004] ACTSC 115. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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An unsworn record of interview may be admitted under this section if it is clear that the witness is unwilling, for any reason, to testify in person.147 A witness who could not remember making a complaint of rape was deemed to be “unavailable” in Singh v The Queen.148 A witness is unavailable if he or she refuses to submit to cross-examination,149 or remains mute for fear of reprisals.150 A witness in Saudi Arabia was not “unavailable” – that is, all reasonable steps to obtain his evidence had not been taken – when he was offered no expenses, and no consideration was given to arranging a telephone or videolink.151

Criminal proceedings: statement-maker unavailable – defence evidence [F.43] Pursuant to s 65 an accused may adduce evidence of any relevant first-hand hearsay (oral or documentary).152 Criteria for deciding admissibility are examined in Vickers v The Queen.153 The limitations noted at [F.42] do not apply, but notice must be given (s 67) and the prosecution may respond by tendering hearsay on similar terms.154 Section 65 is capable of admitting a “third party confession”.155 Queensland’s s 93B is a more limited version of s 65. Hearsay evidence of a co-accused in an earlier trial was successfully tendered by the prosecution, under s 65, in Taber v The Queen.156

Criminal proceedings: statement-maker available [F.44] A witness may repeat a prior statement of direct knowledge as evidence on the issues if the perception was “fresh in [the witness’s] memory” when the statement was first made.157 The same applies to anyone else who heard it made: s 66(2).158 (Contrast “fresh complaint” at common law, which is limited to sexual assaults and goes only to credit.)159 An exculpatory statement was admitted in R v Crisologo.160 A statement that is contained in a document should be tendered at the conclusion of evidence in chief: s 66(4). 147. R v Alchin (2006) 200 FLR 204; [2006] ACTSC 53. 148. [2011] VSCA 263. 149. Tan v The Queen (2008) 192 A Crim R 310; [2008] NSWCCA 332. 150. R v Darmody (2010) 25 VR 209; [2010] VSCA 41. 151. R v Sarbandi [2012] ACTSC 180. Another case in which evidence of unavailability was insufficient is Donald v Rail Corporation of NSW (No 5) [2015] NSWSC 1750. 152. R v Elms (2004) 61 NSWLR 703; [2004] NSWCCA 467. 153. (2006) 160 A Crim R 195; [2006] NSWCCA 60. 154. Section 65(9), which admits hearsay material to explain or contradict defence evidence: R v Mrish (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Hidden J, 4 October 1996); Eastman v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 80. 155. Contrast the common law position at [Q.43]. 156. (2007) 170 A Crim R 427; [2007] NSWCCA 116. 157. As to a complaint made six years after the event, see Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606. 158. Constantinou v The Queen [2015] VSCA 177 at [185]. 159. See [A.154]. 160. (1998) 99 A Crim R 178.

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Evidence Law in Queensland

[F.47]

Exceptions for “First Hand” Hearsay (Oral or Documentary)

The notice provisions do not apply to statements tendered under s 66. [F.45] The phrase “fresh in memory” means that the events mentioned in the prior statement must be recent, with delay in making the statement normally limited to a few days.161 But a statement that is not so fresh may be admitted if recent fabrication is suggested.162 A fresh complaint (in the common law sense) was admitted under s 66 in Papakosmas v The Queen.163 There is a discretion to limit evidence of that kind to issues of credit: s 136.164 However, the discretions in ss 135 – 137 must not be allowed to defeat the policy of the Act.165

Business records [F.46] The Commonwealth business records provisions are less complex than Queensland’s. They are in a single section applicable to all proceedings: s 69. The information need not be first-hand hearsay, provided that it was supplied by a person reasonably supposed to have had personal knowledge of it: s 69(2). The record must not be one prepared for litigation: s 69(3).166 That proviso is explained in Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Advanced Medical Institute Pty Ltd.167 “Business” is widely defined in Pt 2 of the Dictionary and includes government agencies, Parliament and non-profit organisations. The Queensland test of reliability, namely that the record be made “in the ordinary course of business” is not explicitly stated. Section 69 was considered in Valoutin Pty Ltd v Furst.168 The validity of transactions by electronic communication is recognised in the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth).

Opinion evidence [F.47] After a general rule of exclusion (s 76) the Commonwealth Act makes exceptions for certain “lay”169 and expert170 opinions. It accommodates experts without formal qualifications.171 “To avoid doubt”, it declares that expert evidence includes “specialised knowledge of child development and child 161. Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606 at 608 and 614-615. After a lapse of months s 66(2) does not apply, but the prior statement might be admissible under s 108(3)(b) if the defence suggested fabrication: R v Gillard (1999) 105 A Crim R 479. In response to the decision in Graham v The Queen, s 66(2A) was inserted by the Evidence Amendment Act 2008. 162. R v Gillard (1999) 105 A Crim R 479. 163. (1999) 196 CLR 297. 164. See also R v D (1997) 94 A Crim R 131. 165. Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [40] per Gleeson CJ and Hayne J. 166. Australian Medic-Care Company Ltd v Hamilton Pharmaceutical Pty Ltd (2008) 170 FCR 9; [2008] FCA 1038. 167. (2005) 147 FCR 235; [2005] FCA 1357. The question is whether the person who prepared or obtained the document did so with likely or reasonably probable litigation in mind. 168. Valoutin Pty Ltd v Furst (1998) 154 ALR 119. 169. Section 78; see also R v Van Dyk [2000] NSWCCA 67 and the prerequisites for admissible expert evidence described in Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 529. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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behaviour (including specialised knowledge of the impact of sexual abuse on children and their development and behaviour during and following the abuse)”.172 The Act does not deal explicitly with proof of facts on which the opinion is based,173 nor does it require that an expert opinion be drawn from a recognised field of special knowledge. Apart from an egregious exception for lay opinion evidence in “native title” cases,174 there do not appear to be significant departures from the common law.175 The requirement that expert evidence be given demonstratively still applies.176 Expert witnesses must distinguish facts, or assumed facts, from their opinions.177 A dearth of primary facts will detract from the rationality and weight of an opinion.178 Mere assumptions are not to be treated as facts.179 But as to the basis rule, see [F.35]. There is a discretion to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by likely prejudice, confusion or waste of time: s 135.180 In R v Panetta181 an estimate of speed, based on a fleeting glimpse in a rear vision mirror, was rejected as worthless. In Bellevue Crescent Pty Ltd v Marland Holdings Pty Ltd.182 the evidence of a “local historian” was not admitted to prove why certain events happened and how people behaved at the time in question. An opinion may be based upon other specialised knowledge, as when a radiologist “reads” an X-ray or where an accountant expresses an opinion about the solvency of a company, based on its financial records.183

170. Section 79. Expert evidence may be given by certificate served 21 days before the hearing: s 177. 171. NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 7) (1999) 161 ALR 576; cf [A.70]. 172. Section 79(2), inserted by the Evidence Amendment Act 2008. 173. R v P (2001) 53 NSWLR 664 at [55]; cf [A.75]. 174. Section 78A, inserted by the Evidence Amendment Act 2008. 175. A mere heading on a report reading “Consulting Marine Surveyors and Engineers” is not a proper basis for admitting the opinions following as expert evidence: Ocean Marine Insurance Association (Europe) OV v Jetopay Pty Ltd (2000) 120 FCR 146. 176. See [A.74] and [59.6]; Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 123. 177. HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414 178. Guide Dog Owners’ & Friends’ Association Inc v Guide Dog Association (NSW & ACT) (1998) 154 ALR 527; Australian Rugby Union Ltd v Hospitality Group Pty Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 253. In Jango v Northern Territory of Australia (No 2) [2004] FCA 1004 part of the evidence of an anthropologist was excluded because the source material was not identified, and it was difficult to decide whether certain opinions were based on specialised knowledge. 179. Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v George (unreported, NSW Cup Ct, Einstein J, 1 December 1997); [1998] ACL Rep 195 NSW 1. 180. See also ALRC, Evidence, Report No 26 Interim (1985), Vol 1, para 750. 181. (1997) 26 MVR 332. 182. (1998) 43 NSWLR 364. 183. Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371; 157 ALR 615.

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Evidence Law in Queensland

[F.49]

Exceptions for “First Hand” Hearsay (Oral or Documentary)

Ultimate issue rule and common knowledge rules abolished [F.48] Section 80(b) abolishes the rule that an expert may not express an opinion on matters of ordinary experience.184 It is accepted that even when science shades into common sense, an expert’s opinion may be useful. The rule against “swearing the issue”185 (the ultimate issue rule) was in decline before the Commonwealth Act was passed,186 and was sometimes a mere semantic exercise.187 It became less workable as more legal issues coincided with scientific questions. Recognising this reality, s 80(a) provides that evidence of an opinion is not to be excluded only because188 it is about a fact in issue,189 or expresses a legal standard.190 However, there is still some reluctance to receive the opinions of experts on ultimate issues.191 Section 80 is subject to a discretion to exclude evidence that is unfairly prejudicial, confusing, or a waste of time: s 135.

Admissions [F.49] Admissions are treated in ss 81 – 90, which generally follow the common law. A lie may constitute an admission.192 There is no explicit reference to admissions based on hearsay: compare [Q.43]. Sections 81 – 90 are complemented by Pt IC of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), summarised at [F.72]. Section 83 ensures that admissions made by one party are not admissible against another unless the latter adopts them. Admissions extracted by violence, threats and other forms of oppression are inadmissible in any proceeding: s 84.193 Proof of voluntariness is governed by the civil standard: s 142(1). Section 85194 deals with official “inducements” and directs the court to take account of the age, physical condition and personal characteristics of the person who allegedly made the admission. In response to the decision in Kelly v The Queen195 a new s 85(1) was inserted by the Evidence Amendment Act 2008. 184. Compare [A.73]. 185. Compare [A.75]. 186. Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94; Walton v Corporate Venture Pty Ltd (unreported, ACT Sup Ct, Miles CJ, 6 June 1996): “The old rule that an expert may not express an opinion on the ultimate issue that a court has to decide died long ago and was buried by s 80 of the Evidence Act 1995.” 187. See the suggested rewording in Rich v Pierpont (1862) 176 ER 24. 188. Emphasis added. 189. Barton v Lake Macquarie City Council [2014] FCA 1103 at [41]. 190. Allstate Life Insurance Co v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (No 33) (1996) 64 FCR 73; 136 ALR 627. 191. R v GK (2001) 125 A Crim R 315 at 324; Keller v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 204; Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Vines (2003) 48 ACSR 291; [2003] NSWSC 1095. Section 80 does not entitle the witness to usurp the role of the court: Western Australia v Willis on behalf of the Pilki People [2015] FCAFC 186 at [32]. 192. R v Esposito (1998) 105 A Crim R 27 at 42; R v Esho [2001] NSWCCA 415; and see [Q.54]. 193. Jung v Son [1998] NSWSC 698. 194. Considered in R v Rooke [1997] ACL Rep 130 NSW 281. 195. (2004) 218 CLR 216. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Section 85 now extends to admissions made “to or in the presence of, an investigating official who at that time was performing functions in connection with the investigation of the commission, or possible commission, of an offence”. There can be no “admission by silence” in the course of official questioning: s 89.196 Otherwise the question of admissions by silence is left to the common law.197 Written records of interview are inadmissible unless they are signed by the accused: s 86.198 Section 87 recognises “vicarious admissions”199 and admits hearsay evidence to determine whether authority to make them exists: s 87(2). Section 90 confers a discretion, in addition to those in ss 135, 137 and 138, to exclude unfair evidence of admissions in criminal cases. It is for the defence to show that the evidence should be excluded.200

Hollington v Hewthorn modified [F.50] Section 92(2) enables a criminal conviction to be used as evidence in a civil proceeding:201 compare s 79 of the Queensland Act.

Tendency and coincidence [F.51] Sections 97 (the tendency rule)202 and 98 (the coincidence rule)203 deal with “other occasion” evidence that is admissible at common law,204 according to the second “limb” of Makin’s Case.205 Tendency evidence is admissible to prove, inferentially, that, because on a particular occasion or occasions a person acted in a certain way, he or she acted in a similar way on an occasion in question.206 This reasoning process involves judgments upon which reasonable minds may differ.207 The greater the degree of specificity with which the similarities can be 196. Compare [Q.52]. 197. Thatcher v Charles (1961) 104 CLR 57; R v Mills [1986] 1 Qd R 77. 198. Driscoll v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 517. 199. See [Q.43]; see also Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Mayo International Pty Ltd (1998) 85 FCR 327. 200. R v Donnelly (1997) 96 A Crim R 432. 201. Secretary, Department of Family & Community Services v K [2014] NSWSC 1065 at [24]. 202. A new subsection, s 97(1), was inserted by the Evidence Amendment Act 2008. 203. Each of these terms is defined in the Dictionary to the Commonwealth Act. See McNicol, “Credit, Credibility and Character under the Evidence Acts 1995 (NSW) and (Cth)” (1999) 23 Crim LJ 339. 204. The meaning of this phrase is considered in Townsend v Townsend [2001] NSWCA 136. 205. Makin v Attorney General for NSW [1894] AC 57 at 65: “[T]he mere fact that evidence … tends to shew … other crimes does not render it inadmissible if it be relevant to an issue before the jury, [for example if] it bears upon the question whether the acts alleged … were designed or accidental, or to rebut a defence that would otherwise be open to the accused.” See [A.134]; see also McNicol, “Credit, Credibility and Character under the Evidence Acts 1995 (NSW) and (Cth)” (1999) 23 Crim LJ 339. As to differences between the common law and the present Act on this topic, see R v Ellis (2003) 58 NSWLR 700; [2003] NSWCCA 319. 206. R v Cittadini (2008) 189 A Crim R 492 at [23]; R v Maybir (No 7) [2015] NSWSC 1742 (tendency to assault). 207. Samadi v The Queen (2008) 192 A Crim R 251; [2008] NSWCCA 330 at [68], [172] – [173].

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Evidence Law in Queensland

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Exceptions for “First Hand” Hearsay (Oral or Documentary)

identified, the greater the probative value.208 When such evidence is led by the prosecution, its probative force must substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect: s 101.209 Section 97 reflects the common law’s reservations about similar facts, but in s 97(1)(b) “significant probative value” may be capable of including material that has somewhat less force than “substantial” probative value.210 While s 97 is apt to deal with evidence of motive or relationship,211 s 98 focuses on “similar facts”.212 The presence of a separate “coincidence rule” may reflect the long-held dogma213 that evidence of propensity is never admissible as such. It was suggested that s 98, in its original form, served no useful purpose.214 The following direction with respect to the “coincidence rule” was approved in R v Folbigg:215 The law is that sometimes there may be such a striking similarity between different events that a jury may safely conclude that they did not all happen by coincidence. Putting it another way, the circumstances of the events are so remarkably similar that it would be an affront to common sense to conclude that they all happened naturally and coincidentally.

And in the same case216 no fault was found in the following exposition of the “tendency rule”: Inherent in the Crown submission is the proposition that if a person behaves in a particular way in a given set of circumstances on one occasion the person will tend to behave in the same way if similar circumstances exist on another occasion … You need to be satisfied that on such an occasion, there is a similarity of circumstances, a similarity of pattern of behaviour … When considering this kind of evidence you are entitled to give consideration to the extent, if any, to which the relevant conduct may have been unusual or unique … the frequency of its repetition and the extent of its similarity to or dissimilarity … from the facts with which you are comparing it.

208. CGL v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (2010) 24 VR 486; [2010] VSCA 26. 209. Zaknic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corporation Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 171; R v Lockyer (1996) 89 A Crim R 457. 210. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd (1999) 92 FCR 375; 165 ALR 468. But the evidence in R v Milenkovic (2005) 158 A Crim R 4 failed the “significant” test. A single prior instance was admissible evidence of tendency in Aravena v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 288. 211. See [A.136]. 212. See [A.137]; Croucher v Cachia [2015] NSWCA 365 at [10] (“toxic” relationship). 213. Forbes, Similar Facts (Law Book Co, 1987), paras [3.73]-[3.96] – now abandoned: see R v Perry (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 592-593; Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 599; Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 483 and 517. 214. Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law (7th ed, Lawbook Co., 2006), p 383. 215. (2005) 152 A Crim R 35; [2005] NSWCCA 23. The correct approach to a s 97 submission is discussed in R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308; [2005] NSWCCA 338. 216. (2005) 152 A Crim R 35; [2005] NSWCCA 23 at [105]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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217

However, according to R v PWD, the tendency rule, unlike the coincidence rule,218 does not require remarkable similarity. Substantial similarity suffices.219 However, tendency evidence is inadmissible when there is a real or reasonable possibility of concoction, collusion, collaboration or contamination.220 The phrase “significant probative value” in s 97(1)(b) is the subject of close examination in IMM v The Queen.221 There the High Court explained, at inordinate length, that evidence, albeit relevant,222 does not possess significant probative value if it is not credible. For other expositions of s 98, see R v Zhang;223 Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd;224 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v 4WD Systems Pty Ltd;225 R v Ford;226 and R v Ellis.227 A new s 98, inserted by the 2008 amendments, eases the test of admissibility. The earlier provision required the other events and the circumstances in which they occurred to be substantially and relevantly similar. Now, the court is directed to have regard to “any similarities in the other events or the circumstances in which they occurred, or any similarities in both the events and the circumstances in which they occurred” (emphases added). In W v The Queen228 Madgwick J observed (at [101]): The Evidence Act in these areas deliberately eschewed the particular, mandatory or near-mandatory rules for the admission or rejection of tendency or coincidence evidence developed by the Australian common law. It would be wrong for the courts, as it were, to seek to re-establish those rules under cover of attempting to develop general guidelines to assist trial judges in the near discretionary judgments called for by ss 97, 98 and 101. It is, however, another and an unwarranted thing to say that trial judges cannot usefully recall the experience and need for caution that gave rise to those now-discarded rules of the common law.

[F.52] Tendency and coincidence evidence is admissible in civil as well criminal proceedings if it is strongly probative of a fact in issue.229 Some judicial timidity in that respect suggests insufficient attention to the absence of criminal jeopardy and a lower standard of proof.230 The phrase “significant probative 217. (2010) 205 A Crim R 75; [2010] NSWCCA 209. See also RH v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 71 at [142]; Velkoski v The Queen (2014) 242 A Crim R 222; [2014] VSCA 121; Uzun v The Queen [2015] VSCA 292 at [26]. 218. PNJ v Director of Public Prosecutions (2010) 27 VR 146; [2010] VSCA 88; RH v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 71 at [142]. 219. Saoud v The Queen (2014) 87 NSWLR 481; [2014] NSWCCA 136. 220. SLS v The Queen (2014) 42 VR 64; [2014] VSCA 31. 221. (2016) 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14. 222. (2016) 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14 at [61]. 223. (2005) 158 A Crim R 504; [2005] NSWCCA 437. 224. (2000) 106 FCR 51; [2000] FCA 1886. 225. (2003) 200 ALR 491; [2003] FCA 850 at [49] – [50]. 226. (2009) 273 ALR 286; [2009] NSWCCA 306. 227. (2003) 58 NSWLR 700; [2003] NSWCCA 319. 228. (2001) 115 FCR 41; 124 A Crim R 545 at [101]. 229. Zaknic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corporation Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 171. 230. Forbes, Similar Facts (Law Book Co, 1987), Ch 8.

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Privileges

value” in s 97(1)(b) is capable of including material less compelling than “substantial” probative value.231 A type of similar facts is evidence of habit or established practice, indicating a probability that what is usually done was in fact done on the occasion in question.232 It may be tendered by the defence in a criminal case.233 [F.53] Evidence of this kind is generally not admissible unless pre-trial notice has been given: ss 99 and 100.234 [F.54] Evidence of good character may be given on behalf of an accused person, subject to the prosecution’s right of rebuttal: ss 110 and 112.235 The discretion to allow cross-examination of a defendant as to character was properly exercised in Eastman v The Queen.236 The mere denial of allegations raised in cross-examination does not put character in issue.237

Identification evidence [F.55] Sections 113 – 116, which apply to criminal cases, are an attempt to collect the voluminous common law in statutory form.238 Section 114 deals with “visual identification evidence” and s 115 with “picture identification evidence”. There is a prima facie obligation to conduct an identification parade: s 114(2). The traditional warnings to the jury are required by s 116.239

PRIVILEGES “Client legal privilege” [F.56] The common law on this subject is summarised at [A.162] – [A.196].240 The traditional expression “legal professional privilege” is here replaced by “client legal privilege”. That concept is similar, but not identical to, the common

231. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd (1999) 92 FCR 375; 165 ALR 468. 232. Eichsteadt v Lahrs (1960) Qd R 487; Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 at 376, 386; O’Connor v Blacktown District Hospital [1971] 1 NSWLR 713 at 721; Olga Investments Pty Ltd v CitiPower Ltd [1998] 3 VR 485 at 486-487; Palios Meegan & Nicholson Holdings Pty Ltd v Shore [2010] SASCFC 21 at [80] – [83]. 233. R v Lockyer (1996) 89 A Crim R 457 (propensity of accused’s de facto wife to kill the child in question). 234. See, eg, Giourtalis v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 216. 235. See also [A.135]. 236. (1997) 76 FCR 9. 237. Gabriel v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 279. 238. Compare [A.77] – [A.79]. 239. R v Clarke (unreported, NSW CCA, 31 October 1997). 240. Legal professional privilege at common law and under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) is considered in Roberts, “Client Legal Privilege: Some Practical Considerations” (1996) 70(6) Law Inst J 54. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

647

Commonwealth Evidence Law 241

[F.57] 242

law. There are definitions of “confidential communication”, “client” and “lawyer” in s 117. This Act adopts the “dominant purpose” test to which Australian common law reverted in Esso Resources Australia Ltd v FCT.243 That test applies to pre-trial proceedings244 as well as trials,245 but pre-trial issues are governed by the common law.246 Material subpoenaed is covered by ss 117 and 118.247 Loss of privilege is treated in s 122, as replaced by the Evidence Amendment Act 2008. Interaction between Pt 3.10 of the Commonwealth Act and the Federal Court Rules (Cth) is considered in Trade Practices Commission v Port Adelaide Wool Co Pty Ltd.248 [F.57] The privilege for material prepared for litigation (s 119) is available to a party who is not legally represented: s 120. The common law on this point is equivocal.249 [F.58] Client legal privilege may be lost by consent, waiver250 (express or implied),251 substantial disclosure252 or “misconduct”.253 Documents closely connected with material already disclosed are governed by s 126.254 Privileged

241. Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd v Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd (2012) 295 ALR 348; [2012] NSWCA 430 at [69]; reversed on other grounds in Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 303 ALR 199; 88 ALJR 76; [2013] HCA 46. But the doctrine of waiver remains the same: Expense Reduction at [32]. 242. Dimkovski v Ken’s Painting and Decorating Services Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 50. 243. (1999) 201 CLR 49. 244. The pre-trial stage is governed by the common law and the trial stage by the “dominant purpose” test in the Act itself. 245. Prior to the High Court’s decision in the Esso case, it had been held that the “dominant purpose test” governed the proceedings at trial, while discovery was subject to the then common law test, “sole purpose”: Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 37 ATR 470; 150 ALR 117; Australian Rugby Union Ltd v Hospitality Group Pty Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 253. 246. See [F.6]. 247. Telstra Corporation v Australis Media Holdings Ltd (No 1) (1997) 41 NSWLR 277. 248. (1995) 60 FCR 366; 132 ALR 645. 249. See [A.192]. 250. A document given to the police for investigation is no longer privileged: Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden [1999] NSWCA 97; Goldberg v Ng (1995) 185 CLR 83; Queensland Law Society Inc v Albeitz [2000] 1 Qd R 621; Pickering v Edmunds (1994) 63 SASR 357. 251. Section 122(3)(b); see also Adelaide Steamship Pty Ltd v Spalvins (1998) 81 FCR 360 at 370. 252. Section 122(2) and (4); see also Ampolex Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Company (Canberra) Ltd (1996) 40 NSWLR 12. 253. Section 125, where “misconduct” means fraud, a criminal offence, an act attracting a civil penalty or a deliberate abuse of a power; cf “furtherance of an unlawful purpose” at common law; and see Clements, Dunne & Bell Pty Ltd v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (2001) 48 ATR 650; [2002] ATC 4072. 254. Towney v Minister for Land and Water Conservation [1997] ACL Rep 195 FC 9. Compare [A.176].

648

Evidence Law in Queensland

[F.59]

Privileges

material disclosed under a rule or order of court is disclosed under compulsion of law, and remains privileged for other purposes: s 122(2)(c).255 Section 122(6) negates privilege where a hitherto privileged document is used to “refresh memory”.256 The common law agrees.257 The Act does not specifically deal with cases in which a privileged document is used for cross-examination – an implied waiver at common law.258 In a civil case any party to common interest privilege may use the material in evidence, provided that it existed before the current action was commenced: s 124. Privilege may be suspended in aid of a criminal defence: s 123.259 Common law decisions preserving privilege in material disclosed by mistake260 have been applied in courts governed by the Commonwealth Act.261 Commonwealth legislation confirming legal professional privilege includes the Excise Act 1901 (Cth), ss 82 and 107AB; the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 3ZX; the Customs Act 1901 (Cth), s 183UB; the Inspector-General of Taxation Act 2003 (Cth), ss 18 and 27; the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 42; the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth), s 264; and (to a limited extent) the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s 69. [F.59] As noted at [F.56], the question whether pre-trial discovery was governed by the “dominant purpose” test or the “sole purpose test”262 was resolved by the High Court’s decision in Esso Resources Australia Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation.263 Federal tribunals, such as the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and commissions of inquiry, not generally bound by the rules of evidence, must apply the common law of legal professional privilege: s 4(1).264

255. Akins v Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 539. 256. The common law phrase, “refreshing memory”, means the same as “try[ing] to revive the witness’s memory” in s 122(6): MGICA (1992) Ltd v Kenny & Good Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 61 FCR 236; 135 ALR 743. 257. Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647; [1984] ATPR 40-483. 258. Burnell v British Transport Commission [1956] 1 QB 187 at 190. 259. Contrast the position at common law: [A.184]. 260. For example, Hooker Corporation Ltd v Darling Harbour Authority (1987) 9 NSWLR 538. 261. Meltend Pty Ltd v Restoration Clinics of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 511; 145 ALR 391; DPP (Cth) v Kane (1997) 140 FLR 468; but see also BT Australasia Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 7) [1998] FCA 294 (“failure of communications” between solicitors – privilege lost). 262. “Dominant purpose”: Telstra Corporation v Australis Media Holdings (No 1) (1997) 41 NSWLR 277; Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 83 FCR 511; 40 ATR 512. “Sole purpose”: Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 150 ALR 117; Sparnon v Apand Pty Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 322; 138 ALR 735. 263. (1999) 201 CLR 49. 264. See also Dictionary, definition of “federal court”; Telstra Corporation v Australis Media Holdings (No 1) (1997) 41 NSWLR 277. As to ancillary court proceedings, see Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; 74 ALJR 339. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

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Commonwealth Evidence Law

[F.60]

Other professions [F.60] Clergy of any religion or religious denomination may refuse to disclose the fact that a religious confession was made, or the contents of same, unless it was made for a criminal purpose: s 127. There is no such privilege at common law and at present there is no similar statutory rule in Queensland. Limited protection for confidences received by journalists is conferred by the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss 126G and 126H. However, as a matter of discretion, a court may order disclosure if such an order outweighs any likely adverse consequences, and the public interest in the communication of facts and opinion to the public by the news media: s 126H(2). Relevant considerations before declaring a journalist compellable to disclose confidential sources are discussed in Madafferi v Age Company Ltd,265 where the application for such an order was refused.

Privilege against self-incrimination [F.61] See generally [10.1]ff. A new s 128 was inserted by the Evidence Amendment Act 2008. If there are “reasonable grounds” for objecting, the court may excuse a witness from giving the evidence in question, or offer the witness a protective certificate if it is given: s 128(2) and (3).266 The fact that a certificate was granted was communicated to the jury in R v Hunter (No 11).267 Alternatively, the witness may be directed to testify in the interests of justice268 provided that a protective certificate is issued: s 128(4) and (5). That cannot be done at common law.269 If the witness objects to a disclosure order the procedure in s 128A must be followed. The statutory protection in s 128(7) is deemed sufficient unless there are circumstances not adequately addressed by the statute.270

265. [2015] VSC 687. 266. The relevant powers of a court are discussed in Ollis v Melissari [2005] NSWSC 1016 and Cornwell v The Queen (2006) 160 A Crim R 243; [2006] NSWCCA 116; Cornwell v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 260; [2007] HCA 12. (The certificate should specify the questions and answers concerned.) At a committal hearing of a charge against broadcaster John Laws for contempt of court, the defendant’s former secretary was given a certificate protecting her against prosecution when she was asked about her participation in the alleged offence and claimed privilege: “Laws Secretary Testifies Against Her Boss”, The Australian (23 November 1999), p 3. A certificate is not available to protect a witness against self-incriminating evidence in chief, for then there is no compulsion: Song v Ying (2010) 273 ALR 213; [2010] NSWCA 237. 267. [2014] NSWSC 1154. 268. R v Ronan (No 4) (2004) 211 FLR 297; [2004] NSWSC 1290; Gedeon v The Queen (2013) 280 FLR 275; [2013] NSWCCA 257. This proviso was not satisfied in the circumstances of Versace v Monte [2001] FCA 1572; it might be appropriate to use it to prevent disposal of proceeds of crime: HPM Industries Pty Ltd v Graham (unreported, NSW SC, Young J, 17 July 1996). 269. Reid v Howard (1995) 184 CLR 1. 270. Bax Global (Aust) Pty Ltd v Evans (1999) 47 NSWLR 538.

650

Evidence Law in Queensland

[F.65]

Privileges

Abolition of privilege against self-incrimination for corporations (s 187) accords with the decision of the High Court in Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd.271 The abolition extends to proceedings for a civil penalty.272 As to abrogation of privilege against self-incrimination, see [10.29] and [F.78].

Public interest privilege [F.62] Section 130 restates the common law of Crown privilege.273 The Law Reform Commission did not find “any serious inadequacies in the common law approach” and decided to “interfere as little as possible”.274 As a substantive principle of law, not merely a rule of evidence, public interest privilege applies in federal tribunals, as well as the courts.275 The court must balance the public interest in having the best available evidence against the interest in “preserving secrecy or confidentiality in relation to the information or document” in question. There are six guidelines for the balancing process in s 130(5).

Settlement negotiations [F.63] The Law Reform Commission was generally satisfied with the common law relating to “without prejudice” negotiations,276 and s 131 follows that law.277 The privilege does not apply “if the communication or document is relevant to determining liability for costs”: s 131(2)(h). (See also [A.203].) Apparently an explicit “subject to costs” reservation is not necessary when the Commonwealth Act applies.278

Witnesses to be advised of privilege [F.64] Section 132 requires a court to ensure, so far as possible, that a person who may have grounds for claiming a privilege or immunity is aware of his or her rights.279

Inspection of documents to decide privilege [F.65] May the court examine the secret to see whether it should be kept? After much hesitation the common law resolved this question in the affirmative.280 Section 133 removes any doubt. 271. (1993) 178 CLR 477. 272. Trade Practices Commission v Abbco Ice Works (1994) 52 FCR 96. 273. See [A.159]. 274. ALRC, Report No 26, Vol 1, para 864. 275. Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Gao [2016] FCAFC 62. 276. See [A.197] – [A.207]. 277. For example, by requiring proof of a dispute existing at the time of the communication in question: Kong v Kang [2014] VSC 28. 278. Contrast the common law: Johns Perry Industries v International Rigging (Aust) Pty Ltd [1988] 2 Qd R 556; Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam 93. 279. KH v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 294 at [35]. 280. Compare [A.182]. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

651

Commonwealth Evidence Law

[F.66]

Discretions to exclude or limit admissible evidence [F.66] Discretions to exclude admissible evidence are contained in s 90 (admissions) and in ss 135, 136, 137 and 138.281 They have the capacity to reverse relaxations of the common law in other parts of the Act.282 Section 135 confers a “general discretion” to exclude evidence when its probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfairness,283 confusion284 or waste of time. This power is not limited to criminal proceedings285 or to prosecution evidence.286 Section 136 enables a court to “limit” the use of evidence in the interests of fairness or to avoid confusion. Compare [F.35]. Section 137 states that a court must exclude prosecution evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to an accused, making mandatory what the common law287 leaves to discretion. Section 138 deals with evidence improperly or illegally obtained. It appears to vary the law as stated in Bunning v Cross288 by placing a legal onus on the party tendering the evidence to show that it should not be excluded if the defence proves illegality or impropriety.289 It is really a discretion to include evidence.290 A failure to administer a caution before official questioning is “misconduct” for the purposes of s 138: s 139. A novel, broad-spectrum ground of discretionary exclusion is that “the impropriety … was contrary to or inconsistent with a right of a person recognised by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”: s 138(3)(f).

Corroboration rules abolished [F.67] Section 164 abolishes rules of law and practice that required corroboration in a wide variety of cases. In particular, it removes the taint of 281. See also the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), Pt IC. 282. For example, the potentially radical effect of s 60, curbed by s 136: see [F.35]; self-corroborative material was excluded under s 135 in Joyrao Pty Ltd v Marule Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, McLelland J, 28 September 1995); as to evidence of fresh complaint, see [F.45]. 283. Evidence is not “unfair” merely because it damages a party’s case: Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297. 284. Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Air Services Australia (1997) 80 FCR 276; [1998] ATPR 41-612. 285. Compare the limits of the “Christie discretion” at common law: Forbes, “Judicial Discretion to Reject Prejudicial Evidence in Civil Cases” (1988) 62 ALJ 211, approved in Polycarpou v Australian Wire Industries Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 49. 286. Section 135 could be used to ensure fairness to the prosecution: R v Lockyer (1996) 89 A Crim R 457. 287. R v Christie [1914] AC 545; R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133; [1950] HCA 25; see also Evidence Act 1977, s 130. 288. (1978) 141 CLR 54. 289. R v Osborne (2003) 11 Tas R 295; [2003] TASSC 17. 290. R v Coulstock (1998) 99 A Crim R 143 (undercover police activity, evidence admitted); R v Salem (1997) 96 A Crim R 421; Tasmania v Seabourne [2010] TASSC 35 at [27] – [28].

652

Evidence Law in Queensland

[F.70]

Other Commonwealth enactments

suspicion from the evidence of complainants in sexual cases,291 although the circumstances of a particular case may still warrant a warning to the jury.292 Similar changes were effected by the new s 632 of the Criminal Code.293

Warnings to juries [F.68] Section 165 entitles a party to have a jury warned about potentially unreliable testimony, such as evidence of identity, evidence of an accomplice or prison informer, and evidence against deceased estates.294 Conceivably s 165 could be used to negate s 164. Warnings about children’s evidence and delayed prosecutions are the subjects of ss 165A and 165B, inserted by the Evidence Amendment Act 2008.

Machine-made documents [F.69] See ss 146 and 147. In the 1970s, legislation about “reproductions”, such as microfilms, microfiches and photocopies, was introduced in most States.295 The complexity of that legislation was formidable, and elaborate systems were needed to ensure compliance. There are also many separate provisions granting exemptions from the “original document” rule in favour of public documents and official records.296 According to the Australian Law Reform Commission, most users of such laws would fail the statutory tests if they were strictly enforced. Section 48 enables the contents of any paper document to be proved by tendering a “machine copy”.

OTHER COMMONWEALTH ENACTMENTS Crimes Act 1914 Search warrants [F.70]

See generally [Q.12]ff.

The principal authority for federal search warrants is contained in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), ss 3E – 3S. Every justice of the peace has federal powers for this purpose.297 The interaction of search warrants and privilege against self-incrimination is considered at [10.6]. Guidelines for “The Execution of Search Warrants on 291. Lane v The Queen (1996) 66 FCR 144. 292. Crofts v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 427 at 446; Jones v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 439 at 464; Robinson v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 88; [2006] NSWCCA 192. See also s 165. 293. See [Q.107]; see also Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79 at 91-92 per Deane J, where the traditional view is described as “the experience of judges of earlier times … which sounds strangely in modern ears”; see also R v Aristidis [1999] 2 Qd R 629. 294. Considered by the NSW Court of Appeal in R v Lowe (1997) 98 A Crim R 300. 295. Evidence (Reproductions) Act 1970; see now Evidence Act 1977, Pt 7. 296. As to public and official records, see ss 154 – 158. The common law concept of a “public document” (as to which, see [51.3]) is greatly enlarged by the definition of that term in the Dictionary to the Commonwealth Act. 297. McIntyre v Sing (1979) 43 FLR 89; 30 ALR 299. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

653

Commonwealth Evidence Law

[F.71]

Lawyers’ Premises” were agreed between the Australian Federal Police and the Law Council of Australia in 1986,298 and replaced as from 3 March 1997. According to s 3ZG of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), a police officer at premises where an arrest is made may seize property that is in plain view and is reasonably believed to be evidence of an offence. [F.71] There are similar heads of power in the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 130ff; the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth), s 225; the Customs Act 1901 (Cth), ss 198, 199 and 214AB(2) (“monitoring powers”); the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s 36; and the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). By virtue of ss 263 and 264 of the latter Act, the Commissioner may effectively grant search warrants to himself. The Commissioner may also conduct viva voce interrogations, whether or not a relevant court action has commenced. These powers are subject to legal professional privilege,299 but this need not be advertised in the “warrant”.300 A notice issued under s 263 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) need not specify the premises to be searched or the documents sought.301 Warrants issued under s 22 of the former National Crime Authority Act 1984 (Cth) are considered in Carbone v National Crime Authority.302 See now the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth). Crimes Act, Part IC: Investigation of Commonwealth offences [F.72] Part IC of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) applies to proceedings in State Courts exercising federal jurisdiction.303 Periods of detention are controlled by ss 23C – 23E. A caution is to be administered to persons under arrest and to “protected suspects”: s 23F.304 There is a right to contact a lawyer or friend: ss 23G – 23M. There are special provisions for the benefit of Aboriginal suspects and minors: ss 23H – 23K. An interpreter is to be provided where necessary: s 23N. A confession or admission that is not recorded electronically or in writing is prima facie inadmissible, but there is a discretion to admit it in the interests of justice: s 23V(6). The onus is on the prosecution to show that Pt IC has been complied with, or to persuade the judge to admit non-compliant evidence.305 298. “Supplement to the Australian Law News” (December 1986) (revised version (1997) 32 Australian Lawyer 29); for a similar State “accord”, see supplement to Proctor (Qld Law Society, October 1989). 299. Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Citibank Ltd (1989) 20 FCR 403; 20 ATR 292. 300. Perron Investments Pty v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 25 FCR 187; 20 ATR 1299. 301. Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Citibank Ltd (1989) 20 FCR 403; 20 ATR 292. 302. (1994) 52 FCR 516; 126 ALR 79. 303. Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 23A(5) 304. See also Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 139. 305. Contrast the position at common law: see [130.63]. The discretion to admit was exercised in favour of the prosecution in R v Tang (1997) 141 FLR 338.

654

Evidence Law in Queensland

[F.75]

Evidentiary Short Cuts

Similar safeguards appear in the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld).306

EVIDENTIARY SHORT CUTS Statutory averments [F.73] See [Q.27]. In tax prosecutions every averment contained in an information, summons etc is prima facie evidence of the facts asserted (other than intent),307 except in cases where imprisonment may follow.308 This provision was used in Brady v Thornton309 and in Hughes v Phillips.310 Another example appears in the Excise Act 1901 (Cth), s 144. In a prosecution for a customs offence, an averment is prima facie evidence of any fact other than intent, or the commission of an indictable offence: Customs Act 1901 (Cth), s 255.311 Matters of “mixed fact and law” may be averred.312 According to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), any law allowing the prosecution to aver is inoperative (a) to prove any fault element in an offence; and (b) in a prosecution for an offence directly punishable by imprisonment.313

Reverse-onus provisions [F.74] See [Q.33]. In 1983 a Select Committee of the Senate compiled a long list of such provisions in Commonwealth legislation then in force.314 The list may not be shorter today. Such provisions face no constitutional bar.315 [F.75] The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) provides316 that a legal burden falls on a defendant only if the Commonwealth law in question: (i) specifies that a burden on the defence is of that kind; (ii) requires the defendant to prove a specified fact; or (iii) creates a presumption that a fact exists until the contrary is proved. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.317 Otherwise the defendant has only an “evidential burden” to adduce, or point to, evidence “that suggests a reasonable possibility that the matter exists or does not exist”.318 306. See [130.70]ff. 307. Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), s 8ZL, but subject to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Sch 13.6 (intent and indictable offences). 308. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Sch 13.6. 309. (1948) 75 CLR 140. 310. (1948) 75 CLR 436. 311. Simmons v Venning (1969) 1 SASR 403. 312. Compare Symons v Schiffmann (1915) 20 CLR 277, which held that averments must be purely factual. 313. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Sch 13.6. 314. See (1983) 57 ALJ 132 (Note). 315. Williamson v Ah On (1926) 39 CLR 95; Milicevic v Campbell (1975) 132 CLR 307. 316. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Sch 13.4. 317. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Sch 13.5. 318. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Sch 13.3(6). © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

655

Commonwealth Evidence Law

[F.76]

For examples of “reverse onus” provisions in Commonwealth legislation, see the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth), s 48;319 the Customs Act 1901 (Cth), s 233; the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 6.1 (prohibited imports);320 the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 30R (publication by associations of books or papers); and Rook v Maynard (No 2).321 For a rare provision operating against the Commonwealth, see Repatriation Commission v Law.322

Certificates as evidence [F.76] Section 177 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) declares that a notice of assessment is conclusive evidence of the facts asserted, except in an appeal against the assessment. Facts relating to a deportation order may be proved by a certificate under s 271 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).323 See also the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth), s 318, according to which an official certificate is evidence of relevant convictions, and of facts asserted in prior criminal proceedings and recorded in transcripts of evidence. [F.77] Section 62G of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) allows the court to receive an unsworn report of a “family consultant”. Cross-examination of such witnesses is not a matter of right: Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth), Pt 15.1 r 15.04(c). Section 102 of the same Act makes a certified copy of an Australian or overseas record of birth, death or marriage evidence of the facts stated therein: compare s 74 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld).

Abrogation of privilege [F.78] See generally [10.29]. Examples in Commonwealth legislation, with respect to self-incrimination, appear in the Customs Act 1901 (Cth), s 243SC,324 the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s 68; and in other examples listed in notes to [10.30]. [F.79] The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) abolishes the common law privileges regarding marital “access” and matrimonial communications: s 69V.325 A declaration under that section does not determine the issue of parentage for the purposes of any other Commonwealth law.326 In proceedings about the welfare of 319. Brauer v DPP (Cth) (1989) 45 A Crim R 109; 91 ALR 491. 320. R v Bush [1975] 1 NSWLR 298; R v Tawill [1974] VR 84 (claim of duress); R v Gardiner [1981] Qd R 394; R v Wong Chi Po [1985] 2 Qd R 285. 321. (1994) 3 Tas R 325; 123 ALR 677. 322. (1981) 147 CLR 635; [1981] HCA 57; see now Veterans’ Entitlement Act 1986 (Cth), s 120. 323. R v Governor of Metropolitan Gaol; Ex parte Di Nardo [1963] VR 61. 324. Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v McMillan (1987) 13 FCR 7; 70 ALR 203. 325. Compare Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), ss 11 – 13. 326. Tryon v Clutterbuck (No 2) (2009) 42 Fam LR 118; [2009] FLC 93-142; [2009] FamCAFC 176 at [28].

656

Evidence Law in Queensland

[F.82]

Evidentiary Short Cuts

a child, the Family Court may override legal professional privilege;327 however, see Northern Territory v GPAO.328 Communications with counsellors and mediators are inadmissible.329 [F.80] Commonwealth legislation in which legal professional privilege is protected includes the Excise Act 1901 (Cth), ss 82 and 107AB; the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 3ZX; the Customs Act 1901 (Cth), s 183UB; the Inspector-General of Taxation Act 2003 (Cth), ss 18 and 27; the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 42; the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth), s 264; and (to a limited extent) the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s 69.

Special rule of incompetency [F.81] In proceedings under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), a child under 18 years of age may not give evidence without the leave of the court.330 This ultra-protective rule is not confined to custody proceedings, or to a child of the marriage in question. So while a child under 10 years of age may be allowed to testify at a criminal trial, a youth of 16 or 17 may not testify as a matter of course in the Family Court. Leave is given sparingly, particularly in custody cases.331 The rule necessitates reliance on hearsay in many such cases.332

Exclusion of evidence illegally obtained [F.82] In 1987 the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) was amended to provide for mandatory exclusion of evidence obtained by unlawful interception.333 “Interception” means listening to or recording a communication passing through a public telephone system without the knowledge of the persons communicating: s 6(1). Mobile phones are included.334 It is a breach of the Act to listen by attaching a device to a telephone receiver335 or to monitor a conversation if a “crossed line” accidentally occurs.336 The rule of exclusion applies to hearings in federal, State and Territory courts, and before a tribunal or any other authority authorised to receive evidence: s 5 (“proceeding”). It is not unlawful to listen-in on a fixed extension (“second phone”)337 or to record messages after they emerge from the system.338 327. CW v CW [1998] FLC 92-802. 328. (1999) 196 CLR 553. 329. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 10D. However, that section does not apply to criminal proceedings: R v Liddy (No 2) (2001) 79 SASR 401; 160 FLR 342. 330. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 100B; Coleman v Hindle (No 2) [2009] FamCA 987 at [17]; there is an exception where the child is seeking to become a party; cf Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld), ss 8 and 112. 331. A blatant contravention of this rule produced a judicial explosion in Re Nygh; Ex parte Bar-Mordecai (1983) 50 ALR 175. 332. Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth), r 15.74. 333. Section 77(1)(a); see also Medina v The Queen (1995) 84 A Crim R 316. 334. Edelsten v Investigating Committee of New South Wales (1986) 7 NSWLR 222; Byrne v Byrne (2003) 172 FLR 81; [2003] FLC 93-125. 335. R v Migliorini [1981] Tas R 80; (1981) 38 ALR 356. 336. R v Curran [1983] 2 VR 133. 337. Parker and Williams [1993] FLC 92-394. © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

657

Commonwealth Evidence Law

[F.83]

[F.83] Authority may be given for interceptions to detect “serious offences”.339 Interception warrants may be issued by the Commonwealth Attorney-General or Director-General of Security under ss 9 and 10 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), and by “eligible” judges to government agencies: s 39. The grantor must be satisfied that the material is likely to assist an inquiry and that it cannot appropriately be obtained by other means: s 45.340 A constitutional challenge to the use of federal judges for this administrative purpose failed.341 Evidence obtained by undercover agents in drug-importation cases is protected by a statutory amendment noted at [130.58].

Closed courts and non-publication orders [F.84] A general rule requiring the Family Court to sit in closed court was repealed in 1983: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 97. Power to exclude the public or selected individuals (including parties) remains: ss 97(2) and 98. Publication of proceedings is severely restricted: s 121. Proceedings of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission may be conducted in private342 and publication may be restricted.343

Evidence on commission [F.85] Evidence for Australian courts (including criminal courts) may be obtained under the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth).344 The Act implies a power to receive evidence by video link.345

338. Violi v Berridale Orchards Ltd (2000) 93 FCR 580; 173 ALR 518; R v Oliver (1984) 57 ALR 543; Clyne v Bowman (1987) 11 NSWLR 341 (radio “talkback” program); Green v The Queen (1995) 124 FLR 423; 135 ALR 181; see also [Q.87]. 339. As defined in s 5 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) – Class 1 and Class 2 offences. Class 1 includes murder, narcotics offences and terrorism. 340. The sufficiency of material placed before a judge for this purpose is considered in Flanagan v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (1996) 60 FCR 149. 341. Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348. 342. Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s 22. 343. Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s 55. 344. R v Reid [1999] 2 VR 605; (1999) 15 FLR 26; [1999] VSCA 98; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2004) 49 ACSR 578; 22 ACLC 1125; [2004] NSWSC 467. 345. Bell Group Ltd (In liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (2004) 189 FLR 360; 208 ALR 491; [2004] WASC 162; R v Wilkie (2005) 193 FLR 291; [2005] NSWSC 794.

658

Evidence Law in Queensland

INDEX A Aboriginal persons incompetence to testify, ....................... [6.3] questioning of, ..... [130.76], [Q.56], [Q.68], [F.72] Abuse of process Anshun estoppel as, ........................ [A.214] averments, excessive, ........................ [Q.32] Bunning v Cross, and .... [130.41], [130.62] committal proceedings, in, ................... [3.9] delay, ................................................ [A.214] discretionary rejection, .................. [130.41], [130.62] generally, ................. [A.102], [3.9], [22.13], [130.3], [130.36] stay of proceedings, ........................ [A.214] subpoena as, ............................ [6.8], [Q.10] Access marital, ................................................ [12.1] Accomplice called by judge, .................................. [6.21] corroboration of, ............. [130.12], [Q.107], [F.68] discretionary rejection of evidence, ............................................. [130.12] meaning, ....................................... [130.12]n police simulating, ........................... [130.60] suspect witness, ............................... [Q.107] Accrediting own witness, ...................... [A.80] Accused — see Character evidence — see Cross-examination absent, trial of, .................................... [Q.5] attacking co-accused, ...................... [15.58], [15.72]–[15.74] attacking witnesses, ............ [15.42]–[15.65] character, ........................................ [15.12]ff clinical abnormality, .......................... [Q.85] compellable, not, .................................. [8.4] competency, ..... [A.27], [A.33], [8.3], [8.5], [8.6], [15.1], [15.30] confessions — see Confessions

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convictions, credit evidence only, ............................................... [15.68] co-offender, witness for, ....................... [8.5] cross-examination of, .... [15.4], [15.28], [15.72] counsel, right to, ................................ [A.22] cross-examination, character, ....... [15.19]ff, [15.29], [Q.76] convictions, not limited to, ....... [15.14], [15.40] credit evidence only, .................. [15.68] cross-examining co-accused, ...... [15.4], [15.25] disciplinary record, professional sport, ............................................... [15.14] “imputations”, ............................. [15.42] leave for, ........ [15.17], [15.25], [15.32], [15.59]–[15.66] propensity, revealing, ................ [15.60], [15.65] rationale, ..................................... [15.30] unrepresented party, warning, .... [15.39] voir dire as to proposed questions, ............................................... [15.71] Crown material, access to, ............. [A.155], [A.184], [6.14], [19.13], [133.5], [Q.11] deception of, ................................... [130.56] disclosure, duty of, ............. [A.155], [6.16], [Q.11] election to testify, ................... [15.2], [15.3] failure to testify, ................. [A.121], [6.16], [15.34], [15.75], [F.13]ff Federal Act, rights, ............................. [F.72] formal admissions, ............................ [Q.46] good character, raising, ................... [15.22], [15.32]–[15.38] imputations co-accused, on, ........................... [15.58] witnesses, on, ................ [15.42]–[15.57] lies by, ............................................... [Q.54] onus on, when, ................................ [A.103] Police Powers etc Act, rights — see Discretionary exclusion — see Police Powers etc Act questioning of, ................................ [130.32] record inadmissible, ......................... [15.12] right to counsel, ................................. [A.22]

659

Index Accused — cont right to silence ................... [10.3], [130.18], [130.19], [130.34]n, [130.59], [130.71], [Q.33], [Q.52] right to testify, advice of, ..................... [8.6] right to testify, Queensland, ............. [A.33], [8.3], [8.5], [8.6], [15.1], [15.30] similar facts, cross-examination on, ................................. [15.12], [15.17] spouse, competence, .......................... [A.27] stale convictions, .............................. [15.41] suspect, evidence not, ..................... [Q.107] unrepresented, judge’s role, ................ [8.6], [15.39], [Q.72] unsworn dock statement abolished, ................................................. [15.5] voir dire, cross-examination on, .................................... [15.6]–[15.11] warning, when raises character, ....... [15.39] witness, former incompetence, ........ [A.27], [A.33] witnesses for, to be sworn, .............. [131.1] witnesses for Crown, notice of, ......... [6.14] Acquittal appeal not available, ...... [130.64], [130.67] canvassing forbidden, .... [A.138]n, [A.211], [15.14], [15.16], [15.47], [93A.20] certificate of, ....................................... [53.9] civil proceedings after, ........... [53.9], [80.1] cross-examination as to character forbidden, ............................................... [15.16] deemed infallible, .......... [9D.3]n, [93A.20], [130.64] effect of, .............................. [10.21], [15.16] estoppel, ........... [A.138]n, [A.211], [10.21], [15.14], [15.16], [15.47], [93A.20] foreign jurisdiction, ............................ [53.3] judicial invitation, ............. [130.67], [Q.56] not “person charged”, .......................... [8.3] perjury charge after, ........................ [A.211] reasonable doubt, ............................. [A.105] self-incrimination and, ..................... [10.21] Addresses by counsel, .............. [A.22], [A.35] defence, improper use, ..................... [15.50] opening by defence, ........................... [6.14] transcript for jury, ........................ [93A.25]n Adjectival law evidence law as, .................................. [A.2] waiver, ......................... [A.4], [A.124], [3.6] Admissibility acceptability distinguished, ................. [A.1] Bar table statements, ............ [85.1], [92.28] sentence hearing, ........................ [85.1]n committal proceedings, ........................ [3.9]

660

company records, ............................... [84.7] competency evidence, ....................... [A.64] delayed decisions, ............................... [A.6] discretion, and, ................................. [130.2] hearsay, relevant to, ........................... [96.4] identification, ..................................... [A.78] pre-trial rulings, ..................... [92.3], [Q.74] prior proceedings, evidence in, ....... [A.153] question for judge, ............................ [Q.72] relationship evidence, ........ [A.41], [A.106], [A.136] reopening question, ........................... [Q.82] reproductions, ................................... [118.1] rules of, ......................................... [A.124]ff similar facts, ................... [A.136], [132A.1] standard of proof for, ...... [A.105], [A.110], [Q.79] videotape, ....................................... [21A.3]n voir dire, ............................................ [Q.73] weight distinguished, ............. [A.1], [A.74], [19.22], [59.3], [68.7] Admissions abortive trial, at, ................................ [Q.48] admissibility, rationale, ..................... [Q.44] affiliation cases, ..................... [74.5], [Q.86] apology not admission, ..................... [Q.46] breach of privacy, ................. [Q.87]–[Q.90] caution, ........................................... [130.21] civil cases, ......................................... [Q.52] committal hearing, ............................. [Q.47] computer on, ....................................... [95.7] conduct, by, ......................... [A.168], [Q.54] Edwards direction, and, .............. [Q.54] confessions — see Confessions confessions distinguished, .... [Q.43], [Q.50] conspirators, ....................................... [Q.43] corporations, ...................................... [Q.43] corroboration, as, .................. [A.117], [Q.8] cross-examination by police, ......... [130.28] deception by police, ...... [130.34], [130.44], [130.57] defence counsel, addressing, ............. [Q.43] detention illegal, ............. [130.45], [130.51] document, ........................................... [83.3] earlier trial, at, ................................... [Q.48] Evidence Act silent, ........................... [A.39] evidence of, ........................... [Q.46]–[Q.48] exhausted interviewee, .................. [130.34], [130.45] flight as admission. ...... [A.106]n, [A.118]n, [Q.54] formal, ...... [A.35], [A.46], [A.61], [A.124], [Q.46] informal distinguished, ................ [A.61] full context rule, .............. [93A.5]n, [Q.46], [Q.57] generally, ......................... [A.39], [A.149]ff, [Q.43]–[Q.48], [F.49]ff Evidence Law in Queensland

Index Admissions — cont guilty denial, ...................................... [Q.45] guilty plea as, ........... [A.61], [79.7], [Q.46] hearsay, based on, ............... [19.19], [Q.43] hearsay, major exception, ..... [Q.43], [Q.44] improperly obtained, ..... [130.46], [130.51], [130.53], [130.54], [130.59], [Q.87], [F.49] inadvertent, ........................................ [Q.44] inconsistent statements distinguished, ................................................. [18.2] informal, ................. [A.149], [Q.43]–[Q.48] innocent misrepresentation inducing, ............................................. [130.56] Invasion of Privacy Act, .................... [Q.87] interrogatories, answers to, ............... [A.61] intoxicated person, .......... [10.36], [130.34], [Q.63] joint tenant, by, .................................. [Q.43] Judges’ Rules and, ......................... [130.14] legal compulsion, ................ [10.30], [Q.66] legal proposition, of, ......................... [Q.46] liability will be admitted, .................. [Q.46] lies as, ....................... [Q.45], [Q.54], [F.49] civil case, ..................................... [Q.54] Edwards direction, ....................... [Q.54] meaning, ............................................ [Q.43] miscellaneous statutes re, .................. [Q.86] partners, by, ....................................... [Q.86] pleadings as, ...................................... [A.61] police recording of, ....... [130.31], [130.77], [Q.56], [F.72] proof of, ............................................. [Q.46] psychiatric assessment, during, ...... [130.11] rationale of admissibility, .................. [Q.44] recording of, ..... [A.41], [130.20], [130.32], [130.33], [130.77], [Q.56], [F.72] regret, expression of, ......................... [Q.46] related statutes, .................................. [Q.86] right to silence, .................. [10.3], [130.18], [130.19], [130.34n], [130.59], [130.71], [Q.33], [Q.52] s 101, ................................................ [101.3] self-serving portions, ......................... [Q.46] self-serving statements, ........ [Q.45], [Q.51] silence, as, ........ [10.3], [Q.52], [F.6], [F.49] statutory provisions, .......................... [Q.86] vicarious, .................... [18.7], [Q.43], [F.49] voir dire, on, ..................................... [15.10] without prejudice privilege, ................................ [A.197]–[A.203] Adoption proof of, .............................................. [74.1] Adultery, ................................................. [A.32] abolition of offence, ........................... [12.2] credit, as to, ........................................ [13.3] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

evidence of, ............................ [13.1]–[13.3] corroboration, .............................. [A.32] privilege, ....................................... [13.1] Adversary system case management, .............................. [6.18] choice of evidence, ............... [A.81], [6.13] cross-examination and, ....................... [20.2] hostile witnesses, ................................ [17.2] Jones v Dunkel and, ........................... [6.15] judge calling witness, ........................ [6.18], [6.19]–[6.25] judge questioning witness, ................. [6.17] natural justice, and, ........................... [A.60] parties’ control, .......... [A.4], [A.60], [6.13], [6.17] Affected child additional evidence, ......................... [21AN] arrangements for, ............................. [21AQ] support person, ........................... [21AV] civil proceedings, ........... [21AB.3], [21AC] committal proceeding, .................. [21AE.1] cross-examination at, ............. [21AG.1], [21AH.1] cross-examination, ......... [21AG], [21AH.1] directions by judge, ........... [21AL], [21AX] jury, instructions to, ........................ [21AW] meaning, ............................................... [3.1] Dictionary, ............. [21AC.1], [21AD.1] notice by prosecutor, ........................ [21AS] policy of legislation, ..................... [21AA.1] public, exclusion of, ........................ [21AU] pre-recording of evidence, .......... [21AB.1], [21AI.1], [21AK], [21AP], [21AY]–[21AZC], [93A.1]ff admissibility of recording, ........ [21AM] editing of, ................................... [21AZ] offences with respect to, ........ [21AZB], [21AZC] unauthorised dealing, ............. [93AA.1] unsafe verdicts and, ................. [93A.20] use of, ..................................... [21AM.1] transitional arrangements, ........ [139]–[142] Affidavits artificiality, ......................................... [A.24] Chancery practice, ............................. [A.24] child, Family Court, ................. [6.8], [F.81] conviction, verifying, ......................... [54.1] cross-examination on, ........... [A.49], [6.11], [22.17] defects, ............ [A.5], [A.6], [A.24], [A.48] deponent deceased, ............................. [92.9] documents, affidavit of, .................... [10.23] facsimile, ............................................ [75.3] fingerprints, verifying, ........................ [54.2] generally, ............................... [A.48]–[A.49]

661

Index Affidavits — cont interlocutory proceedings, not confined to, ................................................ [A.48] lawyers composing, ................ [A.5], [A.24] order to provide, ................................ [A.25] other proceedings, from, .................... [53.6] “reading” of, ...................................... [A.49] reproductions, verifying, ................. [104.3], [107.1], [113.1] swearing, ............................................... [6.2] transparency, verifying, .................... [113.1] trial on, ....................... [A.5], [A.24], [A.48] Affirmation child, by, ............................................... [9.1] competence and, ......................... [6.1], [9.1] evidence for foreign court, ............... [23.6], [39M.1] form of, ................................................. [6.2] “oath” includes, .................................. [9.3]n provision for, .................. [A.22], [6.4]–[6.5] Agent provocateur discretion to reject evidence, ........ [130.46], [130.59] Alibi directions to jury, ............................ [A.105] false, evidence of guilt, ...... [A.143], [Q.54] notice of, ................................. [6.14], [55.2] failure to give, .............................. [55.2] Ancient document meaning, ................................ [A.14], [62.1] proof of, .................................. [62.1]–[62.4] proper custody, ................................... [62.1] reproductions of, .................. [62.4], [121.1] Anonymous witnesses non-statutory orders, ........................... [Q.3] statutory provision for, .................. [21B.1]ff Anshun estoppel, ................ [A.210], [A.214]ff judicial review, ................................ [A.215] reasonableness test, ......................... [A.215] Anton Piller order meaning, ............................................ [Q.11] search warrant compared, ................. [Q.11] self-incrimination excepted, ............. [10.14] Appeals closed court order, ............................... [Q.3] discretionary rulings, ....... [15.66], [130.52], [130.64] equity action instead, ....................... [A.211] evidence, rulings on, ........................... [A.7]

662

fresh evidence, ...................... [A.4], [A.103] hostile witness ruling, ........................ [17.7] incompetence of counsel, .................... [A.4] suppression order, ................................ [Q.3] tax assessment, ................................... [F.76] unsafe verdict, ................................... [9D.3] voir dire ruling, ................................. [Q.78] Arrest, reason for, .............................. [130.51] Astronomical phenomena proof of, .............................................. [66.1] Attested document — see also Wills history, ............................................... [A.14] proof liberalised, .... [60.1]ff, [61.1]ff, [63.1] wills distinguished, ............................. [61.3] Audio-link compellability, .................................. [39V.1] criminal cases, .................. [39B.1], [39Q.1] definitions, ......................... [39C.1], [39C.7] double jeopardy, ............................... [39P.1] disciplinary proceedings, and, .... [39P.1] evidence ex Queensland, ................ [39E.1], [39R.1] evidence on commission alternative, ............................................... [39C.1] expenses, .......................................... [39T.1] generally, ....................................... [39C.1]ff legal practice rights, ......................... [39F.1] link failure, ....................................... [39S.1] oaths, ................................ [39W.1], [39X.1] participating State, ........... [39G.1], [39H.1], [39I.1], [39J.1], [39K.1] assistance to, .............................. [39N.1] contempt, ................................... [39O.1] powers, ............................................ [39M.1] provisions for, ......................... [22.1], [22.4] putting documents, ........................... [39Y.1] Queensland law applies, ................. [39U.1] rules for, ........................................... [39Z.1] witness immunity, ............................ [39L.1] Audio visual links — see also Video link — see also Evidence on commission compellability, .................................. [39V.1] criminal cases, .................. [39B.1], [39Q.1] definitions, ......................... [39C.1], [39C.7] double jeopardy, ............................... [39P.1] evidence ex Queensland, ................ [39E.1], [39R.1] evidence on commission alternative, ............................................... [39C.1] expenses, .......................................... [39T.1] expert witnesses, ..... [39PB.1], [39PC.1] generally, ....................................... [39C.1]ff legal practice rights, ......................... [39F.1] Evidence Law in Queensland

Index Audio visual links — cont link failure, ....................................... [39S.1] meaning, Dictionary, ............................ [3.1] oaths, ................................ [39W.1], [39X.1] participating State, ........... [39G.1], [39H.1], [39I.1], [39J.1], [39K.1] assistance to, .............................. [39N.1] contempt, ................................... [39O.1] powers, ............................................ [39M.1] putting documents, ........................... [39Y.1] Queensland law applies, ................. [39U.1] rules for, ........................................... [39Z.1] witness immunity, ............................ [39L.1] Australian Law Reform Commission federal evidence reform, ...................... [F.3] Authentication, ............ [85.2]n, [5.15], [44.1], [62.1], [Q.100]

Births, deaths and marriages alternative proof, ................................ [74.7] certificate, effect of, ........................... [74.4] dual effect, s 74, ................................. [74.3] enabling provision, ............................. [74.7] hearsay exception, .................. [74.3], [F.77] history of records, ................. [A.22], [74.1] identification of person named, ......... [74.6] original document rule, and, .............. [74.3] overseas records, ................................ [74.2] paternity issue, ........... [74.5], [74.9], [Q.86] prior consistent statement rule, and, ................................................. [74.3] proof of, ........................................... [74.1]ff public document, ................................ [74.3] registration becomes State matter, .... [A.22] self-corroboration, .............................. [74.5] Status of Children Act, ....................... [74.9] Black tracker expert witness, ................................... [A.70]

Autrefois acquit, ...................... [A.211], [53.3] Autrefois convict, ..................... [A.211], [53.3] Averments — see Statutory averments

B

Bankers’ Books early legislation, ................................ [A.36] Queensland Act, .................. [A.36], [83.15] Bar table evidence from, ........................ [85.1], [92.8] Bench book, ........................................ [A.134]n Bentham, Jeremy evidence reform, influence, .............. [A.12], [A.21], [60.2], [74.1] plagiarised, ......................................... [A.21] Best evidence principle, ........................ [A.11] Bias, witness competency not affected, .................. [A.97] corrption of witness, ......................... [A.97] documentary evidence, ........... [94.3], [94.5] expert, ...................... [A.67], [A.72], [A.97] fear, caused by, .................................. [A.97] finality rule, exception, ........ [A.96], [6.26], [94.3], [94.5] indicia, ................................................ [17.9] meaning, ................................ [A.97], [6.26] proof when denied, .... [6.27], [94.3], [94.5] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

Blood test common law power lacking, ............. [Q.23] discretionary exclusion, ................. [130.44] Police Powers etc Act, ...................... [Q.24] Status of Children Act, ...................... [Q.24] Traffıc Act, .... [10.7], [Q.24], [Q.38], [Q.40] Books of account — see also Business records — see also Computer (device or process) records access to, ................................. [88.1]–[88.4] authentication, .................................... [85.2] copy, ............................................. [86.1] bankers’ books distinguished, ......... [83.12], [83.15] business, meaning, ........................... [83.13] computerised, ..................................... [83.4] copy admissible, ..................... [84.7], [85.2] costs of access, ................................... [90.1] credit, testing, .................................. [94.1]ff definition wide, ..................... [83.5], [83.15] discovery of, ........................... [88.1]–[88.4] evidence of facts recorded, ................ [84.3] “fishing” prohibited, ........... [A.65], [22.13], [88.3] “financial transactions”, ................... [83.15] liberal interpretation, .......................... [98.4] meaning, ................................ [83.5]–[83.15] no account, proof of, .............. [84.5], [89.1] order to make available, .................... [88.1] ordinary course of business, .................................... [83.7]–[83.11] third party compiler, ................... [83.11] other jurisdictions, from, .................... [91.1] record, meaning, ............................... [83.14] summaries of, ..................................... [83.5] third parties’ convenience, ................. [87.1]

663

Index Books of account — cont “undertaking”, .................................. [83.12] verification, ................. [85.1], [85.2], [86.1] witness, avoid calling, ........................ [87.1] Breach of promise history, evidence rules, ...................... [A.32] law reform, ....................................... [132.1] British vessels, ......................................... [52.1] Browne v Dunn, rule in — see Cross-examination Burden of proof — see Onus of proof Business records — see also Books of account — see also Computer (device or process) records — see also Private records admissibility in general, ......... [83.1]–[95.8] annual report, company, ................... [83.10] authentication, .................................... [96.1] automatic recording, ......................... [92.25] bank records (criminal case), ............. [93.8] books of account, when also, ............ [83.4] business, meaning, ........................... [83.13] profession, whether business, .......... [83.13] sporting body as, ........................ [83.12] civil cases, .......................................... [92.1] common law position, .......... [83.3], [103.1] computer records — see Computer (device or process) records contract of sale, as, ............................ [83.8] copy admissible, ................................. [97.1] corroboration, as, ............................. [92.26], [100.1]–[100.2] credit, testing, .................................. [94.1]ff criminal cases, in, ................. [93.1]–[93.10] “business records”, ...................... [93.3], [93.7]–[93.10] history of s 93, ............................. [93.1] kindred provisions, ..................... [93.11] terms similar to s 92, ................... [93.2] witness must be absent, .............. [93.3], [93.4] medical evidence re absence, ........................................... [96.3] cross-examination right, and, ............. [6.12] discretionary exclusion, ................... [98.1]ff examples, pro and con, ................ [98.5] document, meaning, ........... [3.11]ff, [92.17] expense, avoiding, ............................ [92.35] facsimile signature, .......................... [92.38] first-hand hearsay need not be for business, ................................................. [92.5] prior consistent statements in, ............................................... [92.26]

664

generally, ............................. [92.10]–[92.23] hearsay as to admissibility, .............. [96.1]ff history of reforms, ................. [A.28], [92.1] Queensland, in, ...................... [A.37], [92.3] hospital records, ................ [83.12], [92.16], [92.23], [93.9] non-medical data, ....................... [92.23] improvements, 1977, ............ [92.4], [92.38] inadmissible portions, ...................... [92.42] indirect information, ......................... [92.10] insurance company files, .................... [83.9] internal memoranda, ........... [83.10], [83.14] isolated letter, ................................... [83.14] jury, withholding from, ...................... [99.1] liberal interpretation, .......................... [98.4] limits of legislation, ......................... [92.13] liquidator’s records, ......................... [83.14] machine-supplied information, ....... [92.25], [95.6], [95.9] “maker” of statement, ....................... [92.9], [92.37]–[92.39] belief in truth, ............................. [92.40] mode of expression, ......................... [92.14] non-business records, ............ [83.2], [83.4], [92.5], [92.8] onus of proof, ..................................... [92.7] hearsay in aid of, ....................... [92.36] opinions, ............................... [92.15] “ordinary course”, ................ [83.7]–[83.11], [92.23] original evidence, as, ......................... [83.1] overseas witness, .............................. [92.31] pattern of Queensland law, ................ [83.4] police records (criminal proceedings), ............................................... [93.10] previous proceedings, evidence in, ............................................... [92.41] pre-trial rulings, ................................ [92.43] privileged material, .......................... [92.13] provisions alternative to common law, ............................................... [103.1] psychiatric report, ............................... [83.8] “record”, meaning, ........................... [83.14] reform in 20th century, ..................... [A.28] reproductions — see Reproductions of documents “running down” cases, ....................... [92.2] s 92 terms explained, ......... [92.12]–[92.25] school records (criminal proceedings), ................................................. [93.9] self-corroboration, .............. [92.26], [100.1] “source” to be called, .......... [92.6], [92.24], [92.27]ff excuses for not calling, .................................. [92.27]–[92.35] cross-examination waived, ......................................... [92.34] dead or ill, ............................ [92.28] out of State etc, .................... [92.30] Evidence Law in Queensland

Index Business records — cont undue delay, ......................... [92.35] unlikely to recall, ................. [92.43] unidentified, .......................... [92.32] tax department records, .................... [83.12] temporary notes, ............................... [83.14] terms in s 92, ................................. [92.12]ff “direct oral evidence … when”, .................................. [92.12]–[92.13] “fact”, ........................... [92.15], [92.16] “maker” of statement, ................. [92.9], [92.37]–[92.39] belief in truth, ....................... [92.40] “ordinary course”, .......... [83.7]–[83.11], [92.23] “record”, meaning, ..................... [83.14] “tending to establish”, ................ [92.18] “undertaking”, ................ [3.28], [83.12] terms in s 93 “trade or business”, ........ [93.7]–[93.10] testimonial effect, ................. [83.2], [92.19] testing credit, ................................... [94.1]ff third party, made by, ........................ [83.11] “trade or business” in s 93, ............... [93.7] unavailability or expense, assessing, ................................... [92.35], [F.41] “undertaking”, ...................... [3.28], [83.12] voir dire, hearsay on, ...................... [92.36], [96.1]–[96.4] weight of Pt 6 evidence, .... [102.1]–[102.3]

C Calling for document, .......... [A.155], [19.12], [F.17] Case in reply Crown, criminal case, .......... [15.24], [16.5] leave for, .......................................... [A.103] right to, when, ................................. [A.103] Cautioning suspect — see also Discretionary exclusion — see also Judges’ Rules Certificates as evidence astronomical data, .............................. [66.1] births etc, ......................................... [74.1]ff blood specimen, ................................. [Q.24] Commonwealth Act, ............... [F.76]–[F.77] computer evidence, re, ....................... [95.4] conviction, ...... [53.5], [53.9], [54.3], [81.1] DNA evidence, ................................ [95A.1] expert evidence, ................................ [F.47]n general provisions, .... [44.1], [Q.40], [F.76] incorporation, ............. [55.1], [69.2], [73.1] maps and surveys, .............................. [65.1] medical, .................. [92.28], [92.36], [96.3] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

reproduction of document, ............... [105.1] self-incrimination, protection, ............ [F.61] weather conditions, ............................ [66.1] witness anonymity, ............ [21F.1]–[21F.5], [Q.4] authority to grant, ......... [21F.1]–[21F.5] prescribed form, ........................ [21G.1] review of certificate, ................. [21F.3], [21KE.1] witness, illness of, ............. [92.28], [92.36], [96.3] Chancery affidavit evidence in, ......................... [A.24] evidence on commission, ................... [22.3] Character evidence, rule against accused, cross-examination, .............. [15.1], [15.3]–[15.5], [15.7], [15.14], [15.25], [15.29]ff admissible, when, ............................ [A.135] better relevance, possessing, ........ [A.136]ff, [15.18] anticipatory rebuttal, ................. [A.136] capacity, evidence of, ................ [A.136] identity evidence, ...................... [A.136] motive, ....................................... [A.136] relationship, ............................... [A.136] strikingly similar facts, ............. [A.137] guidelines, ............................ [A.140] child of jury, ...................................... [A.20] civil cases, ............... [A.134], [16.7], [16.9] co-accused, right to use, ................. [15.27], [15.28], [15.72]ff Commonwealth Act, ........................... [F.51] complainants, of, sexual offences, ............................................... [21.5]ff convictions cross-examination of accused on, ................. [A.135], [15.4]ff, [15.72], [15A.1]ff, [16.1]ff discretion to allow, ............................ [15.59]–[15.65] cross-examination of other witnesses, ............................................... [16.1]ff credit of accused, as to, ................. [15.29]ff convictions, not limited to, ........ [15.40] grounds for allowing, ................. [15.32] imputations on witnesses, when made, ...... [15.42]–[15.43], [15.52]–[15.55] unrepresented accused, ............... [15.39] criminal record, when inadmissible, .................................. [A.22], [15.12] discreditable conduct, cross-examined, ................................... [16.9], [20.1]ff examples, ......................................... [A.134] exceptions to rule of exclusion, ...... [A.135] exclusion, reasons for, ..................... [A.134]

665

Index Character evidence, rule against — cont “only if shows nothing more”, .............................................. [A.136] fact in issue, when, ......................... [A.135] generally, ............................ [A.134], [15.12] good character in crime, ................ [A.135], [15.35]–[15.38], [15.67] higher relevance, .............. [A.134], [A.136] directions when admitted for, .............................................. [A.136] history, ...................... [A.17]–[A.18], [A.22] identity, proof of, ............................. [A.136] joint trials, and, ............................... [A.134] jury not trusted, ............................... [A.134] knowledge or ability, evidence of, .............................................. [A.136] licensing cases, ................................ [A.135] motive, proof of, ............................. [A.136] particular defence, rebuttal of, ........ [A.136] past convictions, witness, ................ [A.135] propensity reasoning, directions re, .............................................. [A.134] pre-trial hearing on admissibility of evidence, ............................... [15.12] relationship, evidence of, ................ [A.136] relevance of, .................................... [A.134] several charges, when, .................... [A.134] directions, reality of, ................. [A.134] similar facts and, ............... [A.137], [15.21] “striking similarity”, ........................ [A.137] constituent facts, focus on, ....... [A.138] guidelines, .................................. [A.140] rationale, .................................... [A.139] voir dire and s 15, ............................ [15.12] Charts document, as, ................ [3.3], [3.18], [65.1] evidentiary aid, ................................... [3.19] Child abuse — see also Child, evidence of “child”, meaning of, ...................... [93A.12] child’s evidence, ....... [9.3]–[9.5], [21A.1]ff, [93.1]ff expert evidence, ................................. [A.67] proof of, ........................................... [A.114] public concern, ..................................... [9.1] relationship evidence, .................... [A.136]n school records, ................................... [93.9] similar facts, ..................................... [15.60] Child, evidence of “affected child,” ........................... [21AA.1]ff defined, ....................................... [21AC] affirmation by, ............................ [6.4], [9.1] changes 1989, ............... [A.40], [9.3], [9.4], [9A.3] Child Protection Act 1999, ...... [9.3], [9.24] competence, judge question, ............. [9A.4]

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corroboration, .................................... [9D.2] cross-examination, .............................. [9.24] custody cases, ............................. [6.1], [9.2] defence tactics, .............................. [21A.11] definition, .............................................. [9.3] deposition, .......................................... [9.23] expert evidence, re, .... [A.40], [9.5], [9C.1] Family Court, ............................. [6.1], [9.2] history, .................................................. [9.1] incompetence, ........... [9.2], [9A.3], [21A.8] intelligence, sufficient, ....................... [9A.3] liberal approach, ................................ [9A.2] literature regarding, ....................... [21A.10] minimum age, no, ......... [9.3], [9.6], [9A.2] oath, when competent, ......................... [9.1] perjury, ................................................ [9.22] pre-trial statement, ............ [93A.1]–[93A.9] discretion to exclude, ............. [93A.13], [93A.16]–[93A.19], [98.1] protected witness — see Protected witness reliability, ................. [9.5], [9A.3], [9C.1]ff, [21A.8] special witness, ............................. [21A.1]ff transitional provision, ....................... [144.1] unsafe verdict, ................................... [9D.3] unsworn evidence, .... [9.1]ff, [9A.5], [9B.3] video taped evidence, ......... [9.18], [21A.3], [21A.5]–[21A.7], [93A.4], [93A.10], [93A.22] weight, ................................................ [9.20] Circumstantial evidence — see also Relevance assessment of, .................................. [A.106] “chain” theory, ................................. [A.106] character evidence, ............ [A.134], [15.12] direct evidence not always superior, .............................................. [A.131] generally, ......................................... [A.130] fingerprints, ...................................... [A.131] not inferior, ...................................... [A.131] practice or habit, ............................. [A.141] prospectant and retrospectant, ......... [A.132] rationale of, .............. [A.1], [A.62], [A.130] relationship evidence, ...................... [A.106] “rope” analogy, ................................ [A.106] s 92 and, ............................. [92.12], [92.18] standard of proof, crime, ................ [A.106] Civil Evidence Act 1938 (UK) punitive or protective?, .................... [10.12] Civil penalty, .................. [A.112], [3.8], [10.2] Christie discretion — see Discretionary exclusion Closed circuit television, ..................... [21A.3] Closed court Australian Securities Commission, .... [F.84] Evidence Law in Queensland

Index Closed court — cont commercially sensitive material, .................................... [A.166], [Q.3] exclusion of non-parties, .... [21.7], [21A.4], [Q.3] exclusion of parties, ............. [21A.3], [Q.5] Family Court, ..................................... [F.84] protected witness, ............................. [21F.2] “secret women’s business”, ................ [Q.3] sexual offence, trial of, ...................... [21.7] special witness, ................. [21A.3], [21A.4] Collateral contract parol evidence rule, ........................... [A.56] Collateral evidence cross-examination, in, .......... [20.3], [21.11] evidence in chief, prohibited in, ....... [A.80] definition difficult, ....................... [A.99] formerly allowed, .............................. [A.18] rebuttal not allowed, ............ [A.96], [A.99], [16.5], [94.4] exceptions, ............ [6.26], [94.3], [94.5] rule relaxed, ....................................... [A.99] Commercial arbitration closed hearing, ..................................... [Q.3] distinguish valuers, ................ [3.6], [Q.109] estoppel, ........................................... [A.211] evidence rules, and, ............... [3.6], [Q.109] res judicata, ...................................... [A.211] Commissions of inquiry, ...... [2.25], [Q.25] — see also Royal Commission Committal proceedings, ......................... [18.5] administrative character, ............ [3.5], [3.9] admissions at, .................................... [Q.47] commission, evidence on, ...... [22.4], [23.2] “criminal proceeding”, ......................... [3.9] cross-examination, ................................ [3.9] deceased and ill witneses, ...... [23.1], [23.2] depositions, whether evidence, ......... [23.1], [53.6], [53.7] disclosure by prosecution, ................. [Q.11] discretionary exclusion, ....... [3.9], [130.10] evidence on commission, ................... [22.4] evidence rules in, ....... [A.23], [3.9], [19.1], [130.10], [Q.9] foreign, ................................... [53.6], [69.4] hearsay, and, ....................................... [53.7] hostile witness, ................................... [18.1] identification at, ................................. [A.79] inconsistent statement at, ...... [18.5], [19.1], [93A.23] protected witness, ............................ [21L.1] purposes of, ........................ [3.9], [21AG.1] recording evidence, ............................. [Q.8] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

reform, ................................... [A.23], [10.9] self-incrimination, ................. [A.23], [10.9] suppression of identity, ....................... [Q.8] transitional provision, .......................... [140] Walker v Walker, ............................. [A.155] written evidence, ................ [93A.24], [Q.9] unrepresented defendant, ......... [93A.24] Common Law Procedure Act 1854 reforms, .............................................. [A.25] Commonwealth Evidence Act — see Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) Companies documents admissible, ......... [A.22], [84.7], [86.2] incorporation, proof of, .......... [55.1], [69.2] interstate and overseas, ................ [73.1] liquidator’s records, ........... [83.14], [92.23] preservation of records, .................... [111.2] report an ordinary record, ................ [83.10] self-incrimination, ................ [10.16], [F.61] Compellability — see Accused — see Witness adultery, admissions, .............. [13.1]–[13.3] credit, as to, sexual offences, ............. [13.3] exceptions, ......................................... [A.65] exemption, ............................................ [6.9] expert, ................................................... [6.9] generally, ........................................... [A.65] privilege and, ........................................ [6.9] sanity and, ......................................... [A.65] subpoena, effect of, ........................... [A.65] witness in or near court, ...................... [6.8] Competency — see also Child, evidence of — see also Oaths Aboriginals, former position, ............... [6.3] accused, of, ...... [A.27], [A.33], [8.3], [8.5], [8.6], [15.1], [15.30] ancient rule, ............. [A.10], [A.13], [A.26] Canon Law, ........................................ [A.13] child, .................. [9.1]ff, [21A.8], [21A.10], [93A.14] co-offender, ................................. [8.3], [8.4] Commonwealth Act, ............................. [F.7] conscientious objectors to oath, ........... [6.4] convict, ................................ [A.26], [6.26]ff disqualifications removed, ................. [A.27] expert evidence re, .......................... [9C.1]ff relevant topics, ............................. [9C.9] Family Court, child, ....... [6.1], [9.2], [F.81] generally, .................. [A.64], [6.1]ff, [9B.1] general rule of competency, .............. [9.4]ff history, ........ [A.10], [A.13], [A.26], [A.33], [6.2]–[6.3], [6.26], [6.28], [7.1], [7.4], [8.1], [9.1]

667

Index Competency — cont judge question, ......................... [6.5], [9.11] liberalised, ....................... [6.26], [9.1]–[9.5] matrimonial cases, ...................... [6.1], [7.5] oath, formerly essential, ....................... [6.2] opponent as witness, ............................ [7.3] party, ........................... [A.13], [A.26], [7.2] party’s lawyer, ................................... [A.64] presumption of, .................................... [9.6] challenge, onus of proof, ............ [9A.3] reform, .......... [A.26]–[A.27], [A.64], [6.26] spouses, ........... [A.26], [7.4], [8.1]ff, [11.1] sworn evidence, competency to give, .................................... [9B.1]–[9B.2] test of, ................................... [9A.1]–[9A.5] voir dire to decide, .................. [6.5], [9A.4] unsworn evidence, competency, ....... [9A.5] perjury, ......................................... [9D.6] weight not diminished, ................ [9D.1] Complainant character, subpoena to Corrective Services, ............................................... [15.62] emotional support for, ........................ [21.7] general reputation, sexual offence, ................................... [21.8], [21.11] identity not to be disclosed, ............... [21.7] meaning in s 15(2)(c), ..................... [15.51] sexual offence, questioning of, ........ [21.5]ff sexual offence, other conduct relevant, ............................................... [21.13] special witness, as, .......................... [21A.2] video-recorded evidence, ................ [21A.6] Compromise contract — see also Without prejudice (privilege) authority to make, ........................... [A.197] Computer (device or process) records — see also Books of account — see also Business records admissible by statute, conditions, ..... [95.2], [95.3] articles on, .......................................... [95.8] automatic data collection, .................. [95.6] books of account, ......... [8.4], [83.4], [95.8] business records and, ............ [83.4], [83.6], [95.8] calculator, as, ...................................... [95.7] certificates of reliability, ........ [95.3], [95.4] common law, admissibility, ............... [95.7] conditions of admissibility, .... [95.3], [95.5] credit, .................................................. [94.1] “device or process”, term substituted, ................................................. [95.2] discovery, ............................................ [3.11] discretionary exclusion, ................... [98.1]ff

668

document, as, ......... [A.51], [3.11], [95.1]ff, [F.27] generally, .......................................... [95.1]ff meaning, ................................ [A.51], [95.2] notice of tender, ..................... [95.5], [95.6] reform, ................................... [A.38], [92.4] statement produced by, ........... [95.1]–[95.6] Computer simulation proof of vehicle’s path, ..................... [A.67] Concurrent evidence, ............................ [A.67] Confessions — see also Admissions Aboriginals, ......... [130.46], [Q.56], [Q.68], [Q.84] abuse of process, where previously excluded, ................................ [Q.66] admissibility, reconsideration, ........... [Q.82] admissions distinguished, ..... [Q.43], [Q.50] context to be complete, ....... [130.7], [Q.57] corroboration, .................................... [Q.56] Criminal Law Amendment Act, ......... [Q.59] cross-examination, obtained by, ...... [130.7], [130.28] deception inducing, ....... [130.34], [130.56], [130.57] detention unlawful, ........ [130.48], [130.51], [Q.62] different charge, in response to, ....... [Q.64] discretionary exclusion, .................. [130.4], [130.11], [130.14], [130.34], [130.42], [130.48], [130.51], [130.52], [130.56], [130.66], [130.70], [Q.49], [Q.61] disputed, procedure when, ................ [Q.72] documentation, ........ [Q.55]–[Q.57], [Q.82], [F.72] equivocal responses, .......................... [Q.53] evidence via inadmissible confession, ...................... [15.74], [Q.80]–[Q.81] expert evidence on, ............... [Q.84]–[Q.85] generally, ............................... [Q.49]–[Q.85] guilty plea, ............. [A.61], [A.211], [Q.46] hearsay, exception to, ........................ [Q.50] history, ............... [A.33], [130.14], [130.42] improperly obtained, .................... [130.37]ff inadmissible, evidence found by, ...... [Q.81] inducement, ............. [A.33], [A.63], [Q.58], [Q.67]–[Q.70] intoxicated person, ............ [130.34], [Q.63] Ireland discretion and, ................... [130.48] language difficulty, ......................... [130.34] late objection, .................................... [Q.72] legal compulsion, .............................. [Q.66] lies as evidence, ................................ [Q.54] mandatory exclusion, ...... [130.69], [Q.49]ff meaning, ................. [A.150], [Q.43], [Q.50] McKinney direction, ......................... [Q.56] Evidence Law in Queensland

Index Confessions — cont not applicable to co-accused, ........... [15.27] offences not charged, ........................ [Q.50] person in authority, ............................ [Q.71] undercover agent, ........................ [Q.71] Police Powers etc Act, .................. [130.15], [130.51], [130.72], [130.76], [Q.24], [Q.56], [Q.83] pre-trial ruling, .................................. [Q.74] principle of completeness, ................ [Q.57] procedure when disputed, ..... [Q.72]–[Q.76] provisional ruling, ............................. [Q.82] recording of, ..... [A.41], [130.20], [130.31], [130.32], [130.33], [130.77], [Q.55], [Q.56], [F.72] religious, .............................. [A.196], [F.60] silence as, .......................................... [Q.52] third party confession, ...... [19.17], [93B.8], [101.6], [Q.43]n, [F.43] undercover agent, to, ........ [130.56], [Q.62], [Q.71] unrepresented defendant, ..................... [8.6] voir dire, at, ..................................... [15.6]ff voir dire, re, .......................... [Q.72]–[Q.78] evidence on, in trial, ................... [Q.79] “voluntary”, .............. [Q.51], [Q.58]–[Q.68] fear self-induced, ......................... [Q.70] inducement, .................. [Q.58], [Q.68]ff examples, ............................... [Q.69] friend, by, .................. [Q.58], [Q.71] intoxication, ................. [130.34], [Q.62] jury issue also, ............................. [Q.79] onus of proof, ................. [Q.59], [Q.77] person in authority, ......... [Q.59], [Q.67] pressure, capacity to resist, ......... [Q.61] presumption, ................................ [Q.51] rebuttable presumption, ............... [A.63] standard of proof, ........................ [Q.77] undercover agent, ........ [130.56], [Q.58] Consistent statement (prior) evidence on issues, ........................... [101.7] res gestae, part of, ............................ [101.7] Conspirators admissions by, ................................... [Q.43] Contemporary note — see Refreshing memory Contempt of court standard of proof, ............................ [A.111] Convictions accused, prior, ................................ [10.29]ff credit evidence only, .................. [15.67] alternative proof, ................................ [82.1] circumstantial evidence, .................. [A.106] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

civil proceedings bar to, as a, ................................... [53.9] evidence in, ........... [79.1]–[79.8], [F.50] identifying particulars, ........... [81.1] rebuttable, ............................... [79.8] state of mind, ............................... [79.7] not a bar, ....................................... [53.9] common law, evidence at, ................. [82.1] competence to testify, ............. [6.26]–[6.28] Corrective Services Dept, subpoena to, ................................................. [20.3] cross-examination about, .... [A.135], [6.27], [16.1]ff, [15.14], [15.40], [16.1]–[16.9], [94.3] curtailed, ....... [A.39], [15.46], [15A.1]ff inflammatory, .............................. [15.40] defamation proceedings, evidence in, ................................................. [80.1] defined, ............................................... [78.1] evidence of, ........................................ [81.1] expired, .............................. [15A.1]–[15A.7] foreign court, ...................................... [69.3] identification of convicted person, ..................................... [54.1], [81.2] certificate, form of, ...................... [54.2] interstate, ............................................ [53.3] price too high, ................ [130.39], [130.61] proof of, ......... [16.5]–[16.6], [53.3]–[53.4], [Q.2] identity form, of, ......... [54.2], [134B.1] propensity and s 15(2)(c), ................ [15.65] rebuttal of denial, ............................... [16.5] stale, .............................................. [15A.1]ff unsafe, ................. [9D.3], [21A.5], [93A.2], [93A.11], [93A.13], [93A.20], [101.5], [102.1] witnesses, cross-examination on, ...................................... [16.1]–[16.9] Coronial inquiry self-incrimination, ........................ [110.32]n Corporations — see Companies Corroboration abolition of requirement, .................. [A.41], [A.154], [8.4], [9D.2], [Q.2], [Q.107], [F.67] limits of abolition, ..................... [A.116] Aboriginals, .......................................... [6.3] accomplice, ........................................... [8.4] admissible, to be, ............................. [A.116] breach of promise, ............... [A.32], [132.1] child witness, ..................................... [9D.2] Commonwealth Act, ........................... [F.67] complete, need not be, .................... [A.116] confessions, ....................................... [Q.55] Criminal Code provisions, ............... [A.35], [A.41], [Q.2], [Q.107]

669

Index Corroboration — cont confession, making of, ..... [130.31], [Q.55], [Q.56] deceased estate, claims against, ...... [A.116] examples, ........................ [A.117], [132A.1] forms of, .......................................... [A.117] generally, ....................................... [A.116]ff jury warnings, .................................. [A.116] Longman direction, ......................... [A.154] McKinney rule, ................................. [Q.56] mandatory rules, abolition, .... [8.4], [9D.2], [Q.107] meaning, .......................................... [A.116] opportunity, evidence of, ................. [A.116] Pt 6 documents, by, ........... [92.26], [100.1], [100.2] perjury, ......................... [A.35], [Q.2], [Q.8] practice rule, ................ [A.41], [8.4], [Q.2], [Q.107], [F.67] prisoner witness, .............................. [Q.107] roles, judge and jury, ....................... [A.116] rules reformed, ................................ [Q.107] sexual offences, ......................... [8.4], [Q.2] similar facts, ..................................... [132.1] Counsel allowed 1836, .................................... [A.22] cross-examination, by one only, ........ [20.2] incompetence, appeal ground, ............ [A.4] right to address, ................................. [A.35] right to counsel, history, ................... [A.22] solicitor included, ............................. [15.48] Court — see also Open court comparison of writing, .................... [59.1]ff evidence rules confined to, .................. [3.5] informing itself of legislation, ........ [46B.1] meaning, ....... [3.1], Dictionary, [3.4]–[3.6], [78.2], [83.16] records, proof, .................................. [53.1]ff Court papers access to, ............................................. [Q.3] Credit demeanour, decisions on, appeals, .... [A.58] evidence in chief, and, ...................... [A.80] evidence on commission, ................. [22.15] expert on, .............................. [A.71], [9C.6] judgment delayed, ............................. [A.58] prior consistent statement, ................ [A.80] statements tendered under Pts 5, 6, ............................................... [94.1]ff witness commenting on another’s, ....................... [A.66], [A.76], [A.90]

670

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), .......................... investigating offences, ........................ search warrants, .................................. similar provisions, .............. [130.70],

[F.70] [F.72] [F.70] [F.71]

Criminal Code corroboration law changed, .... [A.41], [8.4], [9D.2], [Q.2], [Q.107] evidence provisions in, ...... [A.35], [A.116], [Q.2] physical tests, ..................................... [10.8] provisions re s 93A, ...................... [93A.27] Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978, ............................................... [21.5]ff cross-examination as to credit, ........ [21.18] exclusion of public, ............................ [21.7] general disposition, ............................ [21.8] other occasions substantially relevant, ............................................... [21.12] procedure, ........................................... [21.9] rules contained in, .............................. [21.8] Criminal lawyers, influence, ................. [A.2], [15.51], [130.67] Criminal proceeding committal proceeding as, ..................... [3.9] deceased witness, deposition of, ........ [23.1] hearsay evidence in, .............. [23.1], [84.2], [93.1]ff, [93A.1], [95.1], [101.5] meaning, ..................................... [3.7], [3.9] Criminal record cross-examination on, ...... [A.25], [15.12]ff, [15A.1]ff, [16.1]ff Cross-examination accused, of, ...................................... [15.3]ff acquittal in previous case, ......... [15.16] imputations by, ........................... [15.42] leave, when required, ................ [15.14], [15.17], [15.22]–[15.24], [15.27], [15.32], [15.33], [15.59]–[15.66] guidelines for leave, ................... [15.60] rationale, ..................................... [15.30] adjournment, communication with witness during, .................................... [A.92] affidavits, on, ......................... [A.49], [6.11] bias, as to, .......................................... [A.97] Browne v Dunn, rule in, ....... [A.94], [F.25] breach of, ..................................... [A.95] criminal cases, ............................. [A.94] inappropriate comment, ............... [A.95] limits of, ...................................... [A.95] no recollection by first witness, ................................................ [A.94] child under 12, ................................. [21.20] Evidence Law in Queensland

Index Cross-examination — cont co-accused, by, ................................. [15.25] co-offender, of, ..................... [15.3], [15.13] collateral issues, ..................... [6.10], [20.3] finality rule, ................................. [A.96] rebuttal on — see finality rule scandalous questions, ................. [21.1]ff vexatious questions, ................... [21.1]ff complainants, sexual offences, .......... [13.3], [21.5]ff, [21N.1] ff — see also Sexual offences conditions improved for, ................... [A.25] controlling questions on, ...... [20.1]–[21.19] credit, as to, ............................ [20.1]–[20.5] criminal record, on, .............. [A.25], [6.27], [15.12]ff, [15A.1]ff, [16.1]ff prosecutor foreshadowing questions, ............................................... [15.59] curbing, requires caution, ...... [20.2], [20.4] documentary hearsay, and, .... [6.12], [92.6], [92.27], [92.31], [92.34], [93A.13], [93A.18], [93A.23], [94.2], [98.4], [98.5] evidence in chief, not limited to, ...... [A.90] finality rule, .............. [A.96], [16.5], [94.4], [94.5] fundamental right, ............................. [A.89] generally, ........................................... [A.88] hearsay rule applies, .......................... [A.91] improper questions, ................ [21.1]–[21.4] inconsistent statement, ..................... [A.98], [18.1]–[19.16] authorship, proof of, ................... [19.11] evidence on issues, ..................... [19.17] identification of inconsistent parts, ............................................... [19.14] prosecution to disclose, .............. [19.13] witness need not be shown, ....... [19.11] introducing evidence in, .................... [A.90] leading questions, .............................. [A.89] discretion to prohibit, .................. [A.89] liability to, ......................................... [A.88] limitation, affected child, ............. [21AH.1] motive to lie, questions re, .............. [A.90], [21.20] note to “refresh”, on, ....................... [19.24] offensive, ............................... [A.89], [A.92] one counsel per side, ......................... [A.93] own witness, .......................... [7.3], [17.1]ff Pt 6 overrides, .................................... [6.12] privileged document use for, .......... [A.175] protected witness, ............. [21.20], [21M.1] Queen’s Case modified, ...... [A.25], [19.6]ff recalled witness, of, ........................... [20.2] repetitive, ........................................... [A.89] right forfeited, ................................. [21O.1] rules governing, .............................. [A.88]ff scope of, ............................................ [A.90] speaking to witness while under, ...... [A.93] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

third party’s document, on, ........... [19.19]ff tribunals, in, ........................................ [6.10] vexatious questions, ............ [A.92], [20.1]ff viva voce evidence, importance, ....... [6.10] warning, unrepresented defendant, ............................................... [15.39] witness favouring cross-examiner, .... [A.89] witness, on convictions, .... [15A.1], [16.1]ff proof where denied, ................... [16.5]ff Cross vesting effect on evidence rules, ................. [Q.110] Crown, evidence rules bind, .......... [2.1]–[2.2] Crown grants lease or licence, .................................. [57.1] proof of, .................................. [56.1]–[57.2] Crown privilege — see Public interest (Crown) privilege Custody cases hearsay in, .............. [A.147], [9.2], [Q.108], [F.81] privilege, .......................................... [A.185]

D

Dangerous, use of word, .......... [A.78], [Q.56] Death — see Births, deaths and marriages presumption of, ................................. [A.63] Deceased witness deposition of, criminal case, .............. [23.1] Deed estoppel by, ............ [A.15], [A.54], [A.216] proof by declaration, .......................... [63.1] Defamation conviction as evidence, ...................... [80.1] Defendant, unrepresented judge’s duty to, ....................... [8.6], [Q.72] Definitions, ................................................. [3.1] Delay sexual offence complaints, .............. [A.154] Demeanour evidence on commission, ................. [22.15] hostile witness, ................................. [17.11]

671

Index Demeanour — cont real evidence, ..................................... [A.58] Demonstrations generally, ........................................... [A.60] views distinguished, .......................... [A.60] Design standards proof of, .................................. [49.1]–[49.2] Dietrich v The Queen rule, ............... [A.112], [21P.1] Directions to jury, ......... [A.5], [A.60], [A.69], [A.78], [A.122], [A.134], [A.135], [A.136], [A.154], [20.2], [s 21AL], [s 21AX], [s 21AZA], [s 21KA], [s 21S], [95A.1], [101.2], [102.1]n, [130.67] Disaster situation, proof, .................... [55A.1] Disciplinary proceedings counsel, against, ................................ [A.92] privilege, ................ [10.2], [10.12], [10.31], [10.32], [10.34] Discovery Anton Piller order, ............................. [Q.11] books of account, ................... [88.1]–[88.4] computer files, ........................ [3.11], [95.9] criminal proceedings, ...... [A.155], [A.184], [6.13], [6.14], [19.13], [130.12], [Q.11] electronic documents, ......................... [3.11] Commonwealth Act, ........................... [F.59] generally, ........ [3.11], [6.13], [10.2], [10.5], [134A.1], [134A.5], [Q.11], [Q.13], [F.59] government agencies, by, ............................ [134A.1]–[134A.7] inspection, .......................................... [Q.11] non-party, ........................... [87.1], [134A.1] “own case” material, .............. [14.1], [14.4] privilege and, ........................ [10.23], [F.59] reproductions, ................................... [115.1] Discretionary exclusion abuse of process, as (Ireland), ....... [130.41] agent provocateur, ......... [130.46], [130.59], [130.61] appeals from rulings, ..................... [130.64] arrest powers abused, ..... [130.51]–[130.53] balancing process (Ireland), .............................. [130.43]–[130.47] child, s 93A statement, ................. [93A.11], [93A.13], [93A.16], [93A.19], [98.1]

672

Christie discretion, ............ [130.4]–[130.36] Australia, adoption in, ................ [130.9] civil cases, ................................ [130.35] committal proceedings, ............ [130.10] confessions, not limited to, .............................. [130.11]–[130.13] defendant’s benefit only, ............ [130.5] expansion, ..................... [130.4], [130.7] history, ........................ [130.6]–[130.10] identity, evidence, ..................... [130.11] indemnified witness, ................. [130.12] Ireland distinguished, ............... [130.41] Judges’ Rules, ........... [130.15]–[130.33] cautions, .............. [130.18]–[130.25] part caution omitted, [130.18] time to administer, [130.18], [130.19] cross-examining, ........................ [130.26]–[130.28] confessions, recording, ........................ [130.31]–[130.33] non-suspect, questioning, ....................................... [130.17] official investigators generally, ....................................... [130.16] Police Powers etc Act overtakes, ....................................... [130.14] jury, implicit estimate of, ........... [130.4] overlapping, .............. [130.31], [130.34] photographs, ............................. [130.12] “prejudicial”, meaning, .............. [130.4] prosecution case, confined to, .... [15.27] similar fact evidence, ............... [130.13] unsigned records of interview, ............................................. [130.11] committal proceedings, .................. [130.10] Commonwealth offences, investigation, ................................. [130.68], [F.72] confessional evidence, not confined to, ............................................. [130.11] controlled operation, discretion not available, .............................. [Q.108] Corporations Act, s 1305, ................ [84.7]n criticism of, .......... [A.6], [130.66]–[130.67] deceptive tactics, ............................ [130.34] disadvantaged witnesses, ............... [130.34] discretion, meaning, ......................... [130.2] discretion versus certainty, ............. [130.66] DNA evidence, ............................... [130.11] generally, ........................... [130.1]–[130.77] handicapped persons, ..................... [130.34] hypnosis, ......................................... [130.11] identification evidence, weak, .......... [A.78], [130.11] indemnified witness, ....................... [130.12] intoxication, ....................... [130.34], [Q.63] Ireland (Bunning) discretion abuse of process, and, .............. [130.41] applications, ........................... [130.49]ff Evidence Law in Queensland

Index Discretionary exclusion — cont civil cases, ................................ [130.62] confessions, .............................. [130.48] deceptive conduct, .... [130.56], [130.57] detention unlawful, ................... [130.51] English law, ahead of, .............. [130.42] entrapment, ............... [130.58]–[130.61] special dispensation, .......... [130.58], [F.83] extra-curial unfairness, ............. [130.39] generally, ................... [130.37]–[130.62] guidelines, ................. [130.43]–[130.47] illegality and cogency, ............. [130.44] illegality in another State, ....................................... [130.37] illegality trivial, ........................ [130.52] informer, ................................... [130.60] interpreter, refused, .................. [130.34] interview unauthorised, ............ [130.54] legal advice, prevented, ........... [130.34] nature of, .................................. [130.41] official misconduct, gravity, ..... [130.46] onus of proof, ........................... [130.63] proper interpretation of Christie, ............................................... [130.4] real evidence, .......... [130.34], [130.38], [130.40], [130.59] seriousness of charge, .............. [130.45] undercover agent, ..... [130.59], [130.60] Judges’ Rules — see Judges’ Rules language, cultural differences, ....... [130.34] legal certainty, and, ........................ [130.66] mandatory exclusion distinguished, ............................................. [130.69] mental instability, ........................... [130.12] onus of proof, ................................. [130.63] over-used, ............. [A.6], [130.66]–[130.67] Pt 6 material, .......................... [98.1]–[98.5] photographs, “inflammatory”, ....... [130.11], [130.12] Police Powers etc Act, .................. [130.14], [130.18], [130.33], [130.70] detention for questioning, .............. [130.72] discretions preserved, ..... [130.71], [130.77] fingerprints, photos, ........................ [130.74] identification parades, .................... [130.74] interrogation, .................................. [130.76] lawyer or friend may be present, ............................. [130.74], [130.76] medical procedures, ....................... [130.74] interviews, ......... [130.33], [130.77], [Q.56] exemption from, ............................. [130.77] reverse onus when breach, ............. [130.77] surveillance, .................................... [130.75] prison informers, ............................ [130.12] reproductions, ................................... [124.1] reverse discretion ................ [15.27], [Q.56] “rubber stamp”, justice acting as, ............................................. [130.55] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

s 93A statements, .......... [93A.16]–[93A.19] jury room, withholding from, ............................................ [93A.19] special powers, ............................... [130.68] standard of proof, ........................... [130.63] statement to be recorded, ............... [130.31] telephone tapping, ......................... [130.47], [130.49]–[130.50] tape-recording, phone, .................. [F.82] telephone extension, ..................... [F.82] tracker dog’s behaviour, ................. [130.4]n tribunals not to apply, .................... [130.78] unreliable evidence, ......................... [130.4] unsigned confession, ...................... [130.11] various grounds, ............................. [130.34] young suspect, ............... [130.34], [130.74], [130.76] Divided legal profession antiquity exaggerated, ....................... [A.10] evidence as mystery in, ....................... [A.8] DNA evidence, ........................................ [A.69] analysts, ......................................... [133A.1] certificate, ........................................ [95A.1] cigarette butt, ................................ [130.74]n database, ............................................ [A.69] DNA analysts, appointment, ......... [133A.1] directions to jury, ............................ [95A.1] fingerprint evidence compared, ......... [A.69] generally, ........ [A.75]n, [95A.1], [130.11]n, [130.74]n, [Q.24] juries and, .......................................... [A.69] laboratory error, ................................. [A.69] procedures for assessing, .................. [A.69] “Prosecutor’s fallacy”, ...................... [A.69] specimens, ......................................... [Q.24] Dock statement abolished, ....... [8.6], [130.67] Document — see also Tape-recordings Acts Interpretation Act definition, ..... [3.11] admissible elsewhere, proof of, ........ [70.1], [72.1] ancient, proof of, ................................ [62.1] attestation not necessary, proof of, .... [60.1]–[60.3] necessary, proof of, .......... [61.1]–[61.3] calling for document, ....... [A.155], [19.12], [F.17] child, pre-trial statement, .............. [93A.1]ff copy of, meaning, ................................ [4.1] electronic recordings, as, ....... [3.11], [3.21], [4.1], [F.46] “fax” as, .............................................. [3.11] handwriting, ..................................... [59.1]ff hearsay, when admissible, ................ [A.52], [A.152], [51.1], [74.3], [83.1]–[103.1]

673

Index Document — cont impounding, ...................................... [133.1] jury’s use of, .................................... [133.3] label as, ............................................... [3.12] map, .................................................... [3.18] marked for identification, ................. [133.1] meaning, .................................. [A.51], [3.1] Dictionary, ...................... [3.11], [3.17]ff common law meaning, ................. [3.11] microfiche as, ..................................... [3.11] necessary, when, ..... [3.14], [Q.96]–[Q.105] original document rule, ........ [A.14], [3.15], [19.5]ff, [104.2], [F.27] parol evidence — see Parol evidence rule photograph as, ........................ [3.12], [3.20] production of, civil proceedings, ........ [134A.1] — see Production of documents public — see Public documents regularity, presumption of, ...... [A.63], [5.1] reproductions, ................................. [104.1]ff secondary evidence, .............. [3.15], [63.2], [97.1], [Q.96], [Q.103] signature to, evidence as to intent, ................................ [92.38], [Q.100] special rules, ........................ [A.53], [60.1]ff parol evidence rule, ........ [A.54]–[A.57] stamp duty, ......................................... [3.16] Statute of Frauds, ............... [Q.97]–[Q.106] statutes requiring, ................ [Q.96]–[Q.106] tape recording as, ................... [3.11], [3.21] transcript of, .... [3.11], [3.21], [3.22], [4.1], [19.4], [21.6], [F.27] testamentary, .......................... [61.3], [Q.96] testimonial use of, ............................. [A.52] uses of, various, in evidence, ............ [3.13] video-recording as, ............................. [3.11] wills, proof by declaration, ................ [63.1] withholding from jury, ...... [93A.19], [99.1] “writing”, ............................................ [3.17] Documentary hearsay — see also Books of account — see also Business records — see also Computer (device or process) records — see also Private records admissibility, common law, ............... [83.3] credibility, evidence concerning, ...................................... [94.1]–[94.7] hearsay rule, and, .............................. [A.52] inferences re admissibility, .... [96.1], [96.2] history, .......... [A.28], [A.37], [83.3], [92.1] narrative form not essential, ............ [92.14] Queensland provisions analysed, ....... [83.4] overlapping, .................................. [83.4] reforms, history, ...................... [92.1]–[92.4] s 92 terms explained, ......... [92.12]–[92.25] two distinct classes, s 92, .................. [92.5] weight of evidence, .......................... [102.1]

674

Domestic violence, ............................. [132B.1] Dominant purpose test, ........ [A.163], [A.167] Commonwealth Act, pre-trial discovery, ................................................. [F.39] Commonwealth Act, trials, ................ [F.56] consultant’s advice, ......................... [A.192] party third person, ............................... [A.164] instructing expert, ...................... [A.191] statutory duty to collect data, ......... [A.189] Double jeopardy, ................................... [39P.1] Dying declaration, ............................... [A.151]

E Electronic documents, ............................ [3.11] English language courts, to be used in, ........................... [Q.6] Entrapment, ........................ [130.58]–[130.61] Estoppel — see Res judicata acquittal, .......................................... [A.211] admission of liability as, .... [A.219], [Q.46] Anshun estoppel, ............................. [A.214] flexibility of, .............................. [A.214] meaning, .................................... [A.214] res judicata distinguished, ......... [A.214] autrefois acquit or convict, ............. [A.211] deed or contract, by, ........................ [A.216] recitals, deed, ............................. [A.216] waiver, ....................................... [A.216] equitable — see promissory estoppel by convention, ................ [A.219]n generally, ....................................... [A.209]ff history, ................................... [A.15], [53.3] issue estoppel, ................... [A.212]–[A.213] civil cases only, ......................... [A.212] elements of, ............................... [A.213] fraud, judgment obtained by, .... [A.212] nature of, ......................................... [A.209] parol evidence rule, and, ................... [A.55] pleading of, ...................................... [A.218] promissory, ........................................ [A.15] contractual right overriding, ...... [A.55], [A.220] source of rights, ......................... [A.217] public policy overrides, ................... [A.222] record, by, ............ [A.211]–[A.213], [53.3], [69.3] administrative tribunal, .............. [A.211] commercial arbitration, ............. [A.211] consent order, ............................ [A.211] Evidence Law in Queensland

Index Estoppel — cont history, ......................................... [A.15] not applicable, when, ................ [A.211] representation, by, ............. [A.217]–[A.221] detriment, ................................... [A.221] elements of, ............................. [A.218]ff equitable estoppel, ..................... [A.217] examples, ................................... [A.219] post-contractual, .................. [A.219] reasonable reliance, ................... [A.220] statute prevails, .......................... [A.222] res judicata, .......... [A.15], [A.211]–[A.213] perjury and, ................................ [A.211] when not applicable, ................. [A.212] splitting cause of action, ................. [A.211] types of, ........................................... [A.210] various bases, .................................. [A.209] Evidence — see also Business records — see also Hearsay rule — see also Privilege acceptability and admissibility distinguished, .................................................. [A.1] adjectival law, ...................................... [A.2] waiver of, ....................................... [A.2] affidavits, ............................................ [A.48] cross-examination on, ................. [A.49] trials on, ....................................... [A.48] antiquity exaggerated, ......... [A.10], [A.19], [10.8]n appeals from rulings, ........... [A.7], [130.64] arguing points of, ................................ [A.4] barristers, not only for, ........................ [A.5] Bentham, and, .................................... [A.12] certificates as, ........................ [Q.40], [F.76] changes to, retrospective, .... [A.2], [39B.1], [93A.1] charts as, ............................................. [3.19] committal proceeding, rules in, ....... [A.23], [3.9], [130.10] conversations, evidence of, ............... [A.66] criminal lawyers’ influence, ............... [A.2], [15.51], [130.67] cross-vesting laws, and, .................. [Q.110] decline of, ............................................ [A.6] delayed rulings, ................................... [A.6] despair of Rupert Cross, ..................... [A.6] discretion avoids rules, ....................... [A.6] dispensations from, ............. [A.46], [Q.108] DNA evidence, ...... [A.69], [54.1], [95A.1], [Q.24] early texts, ......................................... [A.11] expert — see Expert witnesses factual, to be, ..................................... [A.66] fairness, rules of as, ............................ [A.3] federal jurisdiction, in, ....................... [F.1]ff federal charges, State courts, ....... [F.72] “fresh”, ................................................. [A.4] historical development, ................... [A.10]ff © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

England, .................................... [A.10]ff Queensland, ............................... [A.29]ff hypnotherapy and, ............................. [A.64] illegally obtained, ......... [130.3], [130.37]ff, [F.82] inadmissible, not objected to, ............. [A.4] judge alone, artificiality, .......................... [A.7] eliciting, ............................ [6.17]–[6.25] judicial appointments, and, ................. [A.8] jury, effect on, ..................................... [A.7] lies as, ................................................ [Q.54] medical inspections, .............. [Q.23]–[Q.24] mystique, ................................. [A.8], [A.12] natural justice, as, ................................ [A.3] nature, .................................................. [A.1] adjectival law, ................................ [A.2] 19th century growth, ......................... [A.11] objections to — see Objections to evidence oral, primary rule, .... [A.49], [6.10], [22.1], [22.16] parties select, .............. [6.13], [6.14], [6.17] photograph as, ........................ [3.12], [3.20] practical importance, ........................... [A.4] pre-trial procedures, ........................... [Q.11] reasons for rulings, .............................. [A.3] recording of, ........................................ [Q.8] prohibition, .................................... [Q.8] reform of, ........................................ [A.25]ff relaxation, power of, ........... [8.6]n, [Q.108] relevance minus exclusions, as, .......... [A.1] rulings abortive trial, ................................. [A.4] first trial, on retrial, ................... [A.213] postponed, criticised, ..................... [A.6] reasons for, .................................... [A.4] sentences, rules not applicable, ...... [A.107] shortcuts, ......................................... [Q.26]ff solicitors’ role, ..................................... [A.5] statutory changes retrospective, .......... [A.2] telephone, ............................. [22.4], [22.10] testimony, ........................................ [A.47]ff textbooks, early, ................................. [A.11] tribunals, in, ..................................... [Q.109] types of, ............................................. [A.45] unreality of some rules, .... [A.60], [A.134], [A.136], [A.154], [15.69], [101.2], [Q.54]n variation of rules by consent, ............ [A.2], [3.6] by order of court, ................... [A.129A] various statutes on, .............................. [Q.2] viva voce, importance, ........... [6.11], [22.1] Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) amendments to, ..................... [A.39]–[A.41] children’s evidence, re, ............... [A.40] complainants, questioning, .......... [A.40] similar facts, re, ........................... [A.40]

675

Index Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) — cont telephone, video evidence, .......... [A.40] business records — see Business records changes made by (1977), .................. [A.38] changes, subsequent, ............. [A.40]–[A.41] code, not a, .............. [A.39], [A.43], [10.1], [103.1] other State legislation, ................ [Q.1]ff topics omitted, ............................. [A.43] common law foundations, .................... [A.9], [A.43]ff preserved, ...... [A.43]ff, [103.1], [126.1] Criminal Code, evidence provisions, .................................................. [Q.2] Crown bound, ....................................... [2.1] definitions, Dictionary, ....................... [3.1]ff footnotes, status of, .............................. [1.1] forms, approval of, ........................ [134B.1] history, ................................... [A.29]–[A.36] improvements made by, .................... [A.38] other evidence legislation, ..... [Q.1]ff, [Q.2] policy of, ........................................... [A.38] preparation of Bill for, ...................... [A.37] privileges abolished, ........................... [14.1] regulations, power to make, ............ [135.1] table of provisions, ............................... [1.1] textual notes, ......................... [2A.1]–[2A.3] Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) accused, failure to testify, .................. [F.13] admissions, ......................................... [F.49] adverse witness, ............................... [17.18] application, .............................. [A.42], [F.5] Australian Law Reform Commission, ................................................... [F.3] Browne v Dunn, rule in, .................... [F.25] business records, ................................ [F.46] character — see coincidence, tendency good character (accused), ............ [F.54] children as witnesses, ........................... [F.8] client legal privilege, .......................... [F.56] documents, court inspection, ....... [F.65] dominant purpose test, ................. [F.59] loss of, .......................................... [F.58] pre-trial processes, ........................ [F.59] unrepresented party, ..................... [F.57] code, not a, ........................................... [F.6] admissions by silence, .................... [F.6] burden of proof, ............................. [F.6] circumstantial relevance omitted, ................................................... [F.6] discovery and common law, ......... [A.6] estoppel not treated, ....................... [F.6] Jones v Dunkel omitted, ................ [F.6] judicial notice, ................................ [F.6] presumptions not treated, ............... [F.6] pre-trial privilege, ............... [F.6], [F.59] statutes preserved, .......................... [F.6] without prejudice, ......................... [F.63]

676

coincidence rule (character evidence), ................................................. [F.51] commencement, .................................... [F.2] common law, and, ................................ [F.4] compellability, witnesses, ......... [F.9]–[F.12] relatives, ........................................ [F.10] spouses, ......................................... [F.10] competency, .............................. [F.7], [F.81] unsworn evidence, .......................... [F.8] corroboration, not necessary, ............. [F.67] Crimes Act, Pt 1C, ............................. [F.72] cross-examination, .................. [F.22]–[F.26] Browne v Dunn, ............... [F.25], [F.26] inconsistent statements, ................ [F.22] insurers’ right, .............................. [F.21] third party statement, on, ............. [F.24] discretions exclusion, ...................................... [F.66] limiting use of evidence, .............. [F.66] documents machine produced, ....................... [F.69] originals, rule abolished, ............. [F.27], [F.28] evidence in chief, ............................... [F.18] leading questions, ......................... [F.18] exceptions to, .......................... [F.34]–[F.46] exclude, discretions to, ....................... [F.66] expert witness basis rule, ...................................... [F.35] ultimate issue rule, abolished, ..... [F.48] family members, witnesses, ............... [F.10] privilege disallowance, ................. [F.11] first hand, ................................ [F.38]–[F.45] balancing discretions, ................... [F.39] civil case, maker absent, .............. [F.40] civil case, maker present, ............. [F.41] crime, defendant’s tender, ............ [F.43] crime, maker absent, ........ [F.42], [F.43] crime, maker present, ................... [F.44] third party confession, .................. [F.43] fresh complaint, ....... [A.154], [F.37], [F.45] hearsay admissible on another basis, ................................................. [F.35] limiting use of, ............................. [F.45] Longman direction, ................... [A.154] full faith and credit rules, .................... [F.5] hearsay rule, ..................................... [F.32]ff admissions, ................................... [F.49] special discretion, ................... [F.49] business records, .......................... [F.46] exceptions to, ............................. [F.38]ff expert, from, ................................. [F.35] first-hand hearsay, ...................... [F.38]ff civil proceedings, ........ [F.40]–[F.41] criminal proceedings, ................................ [F.42]–[F.45] interpreter, and, ............................. [F.33] original evidence, ......................... [F.33] testimonial use of, ...... [F.34]–[F.35] Evidence Law in Queensland

Index Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) — cont prior statement, ............................. [F.34] redefined, ...................................... [F.32] history, ..................................... [A.42], [F.3] Hollington v Hewthorn modified, ...... [F.50] identification evidence, ...................... [F.55] illegally obtained evidence, ............... [F.82] inconsistent statements, ...................... [F.22] evidence on issues, as, ................. [F.23] third party statement, ................... [F.24] inspection of documents, ................... [F.65] insurers, right to cross-examine, ........ [F.21] jury, warnings to, ............................... [F.68] leading questions, ............................... [F.18] legal professional privilege, ...................................... [F.56]–[F.59] limiting use of evidence, .................... [F.66] litigation privilege, ............................. [F.57] machine-made documents, ................. [F.69] matrimonial privileges abolished, ...... [F.79] matters of state, .................................. [F.62] NSW adopts, ......................................... [F.3] opinion evidence, ............................... [F.47] original document rule abolished, ..... [F.27] authenticity check, ........................ [F.28] preparation of Act, ............................... [F.3] prior statement, evidence as, ............. [F.34] Queensland law compared, .......... [F.34] privilege, religious confessions, ......... [F.60] privilege, self-incrimination, .............. [F.61] directions to answer, .................... [F.61] public interest privilege, .................... [F.62] refreshing memory, ................. [F.14]–[F.16] out of court, .................................. [F.16] police officer, ................................ [F.15] relevance, ............................................ [F.31] religious confessions, privilege, ......... [F.60] scheme of Act, ...................................... [F.1] self-incrimination, privilege, .............. [F.61] warning to witness, ...................... [F.64] settlement negotiations, ...................... [F.63] similar facts — see coincidence rule, tendency rule spouse witness, ................................... [F.10] privilege disallowance, ................. [F.11] swearing issue, ................................... [F.48] Tasmania adopts, .................................. [F.3] tendency rule (character evidence), ...................................... [F.51]–[F.54] terminology, new, ................................. [F.4] ultimate issue rule abolished, ............ [F.48] unfavourable witness, ............. [F.19], [F.20] hostile witness compared, ............ [F.19] unsworn evidence, ................................ [F.8] views and demonstrations, ..... [F.29], [F.30] natural justice and, ....................... [F.30] Walker v Walker, abolition, .............. [F.17], [F.24] warning parties re privilege, .............. [F.64] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

“without prejudice” privilege, ............ [F.63] witnesses, leading questions, ............. [F.18] Evidence and Discovery Act 1867 history, .................................. [A.29], [A.30] surviving parts, ........... [A.37], [1.3], [23.1], [61.2], [93.11], [Q.2] Evidence illegally obtained discretionary exclusion — see Discretionary exclusion mandatory exclusion, ..................... [130.69] Evidence in chief affidavit, by, ............... [A.5], [A.24], [A.48] certificate as, ...................................... [Q.40] credit, not only to go to, ...... [A.80], [92.8], [100.1], [101.9] exceptions to rule, ....................... [A.80] qualifying expert, ........................ [A.80] generally, ......................................... [A.80]ff impeaching witness, ............ [A.82], [17.1]ff leading questions, .................. [A.81], [F.18] refreshing memory, ............ [A.84], [101.10] note as evidence, ......... [A.86], [101.10] special order, ................................... [21A.6] Evidence on commission application evidence supporting, .................... [22.7] time for, ........................................ [22.5] assistance to foreign courts, ............ [22.24], [32.1] discretion in local court, .............. [33.1] orders by Queensland court, ........ [37.1] perjury laws apply, ....................... [39.1] audio visual links, ........................... [39A.1] interstate links, .......................... [39D.1] authority for, ....................................... [22.4] basis for use of, .................................. [23.1] depositions not to be exhibit, ...... [23.1] civil cases, .......................................... [36.1] Commonwealth law, ........................... [F.85] cost considerations, ............ [22.16]–[22.17] costs of commission, .......... [22.29], [22.31] credit comments on, ............................. [22.15] when vital, .................................. [22.15] criminal cases, ........................ [23.1]–[23.4] common law, ................................ [23.2] consent needed (Evidence Act), ................................................. [23.1] Evidence and Discovery Act provisions, ................................................. [23.1] Justices Act provisions, ................ [23.4] cross-examination, .... [6.11], [22.16], [23.3] Crown not bound by Pt 3 Div 2, .............................................. [35A.1] depositions

677

Index Evidence on commission — cont authentication, ................ [22.21], [31.1] tendering, ...................... [22.22], [22.23] discretion to order, ............................. [22.6] evidence rules apply, .......... [22.19]–[22.20] generally, ...... [22.1], [22.4]–[22.6], [22.10], [22.14]–[22.19], [22.26], [22.29], [22.31], [33.1], [39A.1] grounds, .... [22.7], [22.12], [22.14]–[22.18] non-compellable witness, ........... [22.10] party’s evidence, ........................ [22.14] unable to attend trial, ....... [22.8]–[22.9] witness in Australia, ................... [22.18] Evidence and Discovery Act provisions, ................................................. [23.1] foreign country, oath not allowed, .............................................. [39X.1] foreign courts evidence for, .... [22.24], [24.1]ff, [36.1], [37.1] may take evidence here, .............. [24.1] oaths, administration of, ........ [24.3] summons to witness, .............. [28.1] foreign law incompatible, ................ [22.11] Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act 1854, application, ............................. [36.1] generally, ....... [22.1]–[22.25], [26.1], [27.1] history, ................................... [A.22], [22.3] importance of evidence, ..... [22.12], [22.13] inability to attend court, ......... [22.8]–[22.9] inferior courts, reciprocity, ................. [25.1] Justices Act provisions, ...................... [23.3] cross-examination essential, ......... [23.4] defendant to be told rights, .......... [23.3] legal practice rights, ......................... [39F.1] lower courts (Queensland), orders for, ............................................... [22.26] medical examination, ......................... [37.1] modern alternatives to, ........ [22.4], [39A.1] nature of, ............................................ [22.1] numerous provisions, ......................... [22.4] oath, authority for, ..... [23.6], [24.3], [39.1], [39.2], [39M.1] objections to evidence, ...... [22.19]–[22.20], [22.28], [22.30], [30.1] oral procedure, ...................... [6.11], [22.16] other legislation for this purpose, ...... [21.4] party’s evidence, .............................. [22.14] perjury, ................................................ [39.1] police inquiries, evidence for, ............ [22.4] pre-trial procedure, ............................. [22.3] privilege, ................... [38.1]–[38.3], [39L.1] procedure, .............. [22.19]–[22.21], [29.1], [35.1], [36.1], [37.1]–[37.3] reciprocal arrangements absent, ......... [22.4] “recognised courts”, ......................... [39J.1] assistance to, .............................. [39N.1] contempt, ................................... [39O.1] rule-making power, .......................... [39Z.1]

678

summary procedure, ........................ [25.1]ff summons to witness, .......................... [28.1] telephone alternative, ........... [22.4], [22.10] tendering the depositions, ................ [22.22] time for application, ........................... [22.5] transfer of request, ............................. [32.1] video, audio link alternatives, ........... [22.4], [22.8], [22.10], [22.15], [22.16], [22.31], [39A.1] criminal proceedings, in, .............. [22.4] definitions for Pt 3A, ................. [39C.1] documents, putting to witness, ............................................... [39Y.1] evidence from other States, ....... [39E.1] expenses of audio, video link procedure, ............................................... [39T.1] failure of link, ............................ [39S.1] other States taking evidence here, .............................................. [39H.1] assistance by Queensland officers, ........................................ [39N.1] contempt of recognised court, ........................................ [39O.1] double jeopardy, ................... [39P.1] oaths, administering, ........... [39W.1] powers of participating courts, .............. [39I.1], [39J.1], [39K.1] testimony not on oath, ........ [39X.1] order to give evidence, external location, ................ [39R.1], [39U.1], [39V.1], [39W.1], [39Y.1] retrospective provisions, ............ [39B.1] rights of practice, ....................... [39F.1] witness in Australia, ......................... [22.18] witness outside Queensland, ...... [39V.1] witness not compellable, .................. [22.10] Evidence Regulation 2007 fees for inspection of documents of agencies, ............................ [134A.3] person or body when not agency, ............................................. [134A]n reproductions, approved machines, ............................................... [107.2] witness identity protection corresponding law, ...................... [21C]n Executive officers privilege before, ..... [10.10], [Q.16], [Q.25] Exhibits access to, .......................................... [133.4] impounding, ...................................... [133.1] “marked for identification”, ............. [133.1] withholding from jury room, ............ [99.1], [133.3] Evidence Law in Queensland

Index Expert witnesses accidents, causation of, ..................... [A.67] basis rule, .............................. [A.75], [9C.5] “battered woman syndrome”, ........... [A.67] bias no disqualification, .................... [A.72] black tracker, ..................................... [A.70] categories not closed, ........................ [A.67] child abuse, ........................................ [A.67] child, re, ........ [9.5], [9C.1]–[9C.9], [93A.7] clinical abnormality, .......................... [Q.85] commonsense matters, ...................... [A.73] compellability, ......................... [A.65], [6.9] concurrent evidence, ......................... [A.68] confession, re, ....................... [Q.84]–[Q.85] court-appointed, ................................. [A.67] courts’ authority over, .......... [A.72], [9C.2] credit, evidence on, .......................... [A.71], [9C.6]–[9C.9] credit evidence hypnosis, ...................................... [A.71] polygraph, .................................... [A.71] Daubert test, ...................................... [A.67] demonstrative presentation by, ......... [A.74], [59.6] direct evidence, versus, ..................... [A.72] DNA evidence, .................................. [A.69] dog trainer, ......................................... [A.70] drug identification, ............................ [A.70] duty of care, not arbiter of, .............. [A.71] examples, ........................................... [A.67] facial mapping, .................................. [A.67] fingerprint evidence, .......................... [A.68] fire fighter, ......................................... [A.70] foreign law, .... [A.68], [68.4], [68.6], [68.8] Commonwealth Act, .................. [A.68]n foundational facts, proof of, ............. [A.75] conclave report distinguished, .... [A.67] forensic accountants, ......................... [A.67] generally, ........................... [A.64], [A.66]ff, [9A.2]–[9A.5], [9C.2]–[9C.5], [54.2], [59.2], [59.5], [83.5], [92.15], [92.16], [93A.7], [95.7] handwriting, ................ [59.2], [59.5]–[59.6] hearsay evidence from, ....... [A.75], [9A.5], [92.16], [96.3], [F.35] professional literature, .... [A.75], [9A.5] identification evidence, ..................... [A.69] identification with party, ................... [A.67] instructions to, privileged, .............. [A.177] intent, evidence as to, ....................... [A.71] juries and conflicts of, ....................... [A.72] misuse of, .......................................... [A.73] multiple expert witnesses, restrictions, ................................................ [A.67] non-certificated, .................... [A.70], [9C.3] examples, ..................................... [A.70] non-expert opinions, .......................... [A.76] examples, ..................................... [A.76] objections to, ..................................... [A.75] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

other decisions about, ....................... [A.67] outside field, ...................................... [A.75] possibilities, evidence of, ................. [A.67], [A.124] practical training as, .......................... [A.70] presentation of, ........ [A.74], [9A.5], [9C.5] professional literature, use of, ......... [A.75], [9A.5] qualifying, .... [A.67], [9A.3]–[9A.4], [9C.3] quality of course, querying, .............. [A.67] reliability of witness, re, ................... [A.71] remaining in court, ............................ [A.68] reports, exchange of, ......................... [A.67] UCPR requirements, ................... [A.68] road accident causes, ......................... [A.67] sexually abused child, traits, ............. [A.67] specialties within professions, .......... [A.67] subpoena, oppressive, ............. [A.65], [6.9], [Q.10] “swearing the issue”, ........... [A.75], [9A.7], [F.48] competency, evidence of, ............ [9C.7] texts, use of, ...................................... [A.75] uncontradicted, .................................. [A.72] United States approach, .................... [A.67] video – audio-link alternatives, ............. [39A.1]–[39PB.1], [39PC.1] voice identification, ........................... [A.67] witness, not member of court, .......... [A.67]

F

Family Court adultery, evidence of, ......................... [13.2] birth etc records, ................................ [F.77] child under 18 incompetent, .... [6.1], [F.81] closed court abolished, ....................... [F.84] counsellors’ evidence, ........................ [F.77] cross-examination, .............................. [6.11] hearsay, ..................................... [9.2], [F.81] judge calling witness, ...................... [6.17]ff marital access, ........................ [12.3], [F.79] matrimonial communications, ............ [F.79] privilege overriding, ............ [A.185], [F.78] Finality rule, ..... [A.96], [A.99], [6.27], [16.5], [94.4], [94.5] approach liberalised, ......................... [A.99] Fingerprints — see also Police Powers etc Act circumstantial evidence, .................. [A.131] cogency, ................ [A.69], [54.1], [130.44], [130.55] consent, taken by, ........................... [130.55] convicted person, identifying, ........... [16.6], [53.5], [54.2]

679

Index Fingerprints — cont expert evidence, ........................... [A.69] DNA compared, ................................. [A.69] power to take, ..................... [10.7], [130.74] Fire fighter expert witness, as, ............................. [A.70] Foreign law expert evidence, ................................. [68.4] Federal Act, ..................................... [A.68]n legal text, ............................................ [68.6] pleading same, .................................... [68.8] question of fact, ................................. [68.3] proof of, ............... [A.68], [A.163], [10.11], [68.1]–[68.7], [92.31] self-incrimination and, ....................... [68.2] Forfeiture privilege abolished, ......................... [10.13], [14.1]–[14.2] Formal admissions civil cases, ............................ [A.61], [Q.46] Criminal Code provision, ................. [A.35] guilty plea as, .................................... [A.61] withdrawing plea, ........................ [A.61] hearsay based on, .............................. [Q.46] informal admission distinguished, .................................. [A.149], [Q.46] interrogatories, answers to, ............... [A.61] leave to withdraw, ............................. [A.61] nature of, ........................................... [A.61] relevance, effect on, ........................ [A.124] substitute for evidence, ..................... [A.46] Forms approval of, .................................... [134B.1] conviction, proof of, .......................... [54.2]

G

Good character evidence Bible, brandishing, ........................... [15.38] criminal record, letting in, ............... [15.38] directions by judge, ............ [15.35], [15.67] evidence on issues (crime), ............ [15.35], [15.67] how raised, ......................... [15.37], [15.38] innocence, evidence of, ..... [15.33], [15.67], [F.54] general terms, to be in, .................... [15.36] “raising” character issue, .... [15.37]–[15.38] rebuttal of, .............. [15.1], [15.32], [15.34] warning unrepresented defendant, ............................................... [15.39] Government Gazette definition, ................................ [3.23], [45.1] DNA analysts, ............................... [133A.1] executive acts, .................................... [50.1] Federal Act, proof under, ..................... [F.5] interstate Gazettes, ............................. [45.3] judicial notice, ................................. [43A.1] matters proved by, .............................. [45.2] proof of, .............................................. [45.1] regulations etc, ................................... [48.1] reproduction of documents, approved persons, ................................. [105.1] Royal Proclamations, ......................... [71.1] Government Printer, ............................ [134.1] power to appoint, ............................. [134.1] proof of printing, ................................ [46.1]

H

Habeas corpus, ....................................... [Q.35] Habit or practice, ................................ [A.141]

Fresh complaint, ....... [A.154], [101.1], [F.37], [F.45] corroboration, and, .......................... [A.154] delay, ................................................ [A.154] document under s 93A, ................. [93A.10] law reformed, ...................... [A.154], [21.5] Longman direction, ......................... [A.154] meaning, .......................................... [A.154] police assault, of, ............................ [A.154] “preliminary complaint” distinguished, .............................................. [A.154] Fresh evidence, ........................................ [A.4] reopening evidence distinguished, ...... [A.4]

680

Handwriting, ........................................... [10.7] changes by s 59, ................................. [59.8] comparative specimen, production, ................................................. [59.3] comparison, proof by, ......... [A.25], [59.1]ff satisfaction of judge, .................. [59.11] standard of proof, ....................... [59.11] Evidence Act reforms, ....... [59A.3]–[59A.4] expert evidence, ...... [59.5]–[59.6], [92.15]n identification of, ...................... [59.3]–[59.6] lay opinion evidence, ............ [A.77], [59.2] photostat specimen, ............................ [59.3] trick, sample obtained by, .............. [130.56] weight, ............................................. [59A.2] Evidence Law in Queensland

Index Hearsay rule — see also Admissions — see also Books of account — see also Business records — see also Computer (device or process) records — see also Confessions — see also Private records antiquity exaggerated, ....................... [A.19] birth certificate, ....................... [74.3]–[74.5] child of jury, ...................................... [A.20] child, pre-trial statement, .............. [93A.1]ff limited disclosure of, ................... [Q.11] criminal cases, hearsay in, .... [23.1], [84.2], [93.1]ff, [93A.1], [93B.1]ff, [95.1], [101.5] cross-examination, ............................. [A.91] rule protects right of, ................... [20.2] documentary, ......................... [3.13], [41.1], [83.1]–[83.3] exceptions to, ................................ [A.145]ff admissions, ..... [A.149], [Q.43]ff — see also Admissions affected child, pre-recording, ............................. [21AM], [93A.1]ff birth etc certificates, ................... [74.43] business records — see Business records child welfare, ............ [A.147], [9.2], [Q.108], [F.6], [F.81] Commonwealth Act 1995, ...................................... [F.34]–[F.46] computer, statement from, ...................................... [95.1]–[95.6] confessions, ....... [A.150], [Q.50] — see also Admissions consistent statements, .............. [101.1]ff contemporaneous thoughts etc, .............................................. [A.148] credit of statement-makers, .......... [94.1] criminal proceedings, for defence, ................................ [93B.1]–[93B.8] warning re, ........................... [93C.1] custody cases, ...... [A.147], [9.2], [F.81] deceased witnesses’ statements, .............................................. [A.151] dying declarations, .............. [A.151] interest, against, ................... [A.151] legal duty, under, ................. [A.151] documents, ....... [A.52], [51.1], [74.1]ff, [83.1]–[103.1] admissibility, inferences as to, ........................................... [96.1] credit of, testing, .................. [94.1]ff evidence, earlier case, ............... [A.153] fresh complaint, ......................... [A.154] assault by police alleged, .... [A.154] changes to law, .................... [A.154] Longman direction, ............. [A.154] preliminary complaint distinguished, ........................................ [A.154] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

inconsistent statements, ............. [17.15], [18.1], [19.17] informal admissions, ................ [A.149], [Q.43]–[Q.48] interlocutory proceedings, ........ [A.146], [6.11], [Q.108] historical works, ........................... [51.9] judicial proceedings, .................... [53.7] miscellaneous statutes, ................. [51.9] original document rule, relief from, distinguished, ........................ [106.4] “prescribed criminal proceedings”, ............................................ [93B.1]ff pre-trial statement (child etc), .............................. [93A.1]ff, [144.1] “child”, ................................. [93A.6] conditions to admit, ........................ [93A.8]–[93A.14] Criminal Code, related provision, ...................................... [93A.27] cross-examination right, .... [93A.12] discretionary exclusion, ...................... [93A.16]–[93A.19] “intellectually impaired”, .... [93A.6] investigator, made to, ........ [93A.11] jury, limited access, ........... [93A.25] purpose of s 93A, ............... [93A.1], [93A.2] retrospective effect, s 93A, ......................................... [144.1] s 94, relation to, ................ [93A.15] “soon after”, ...................... [93A.10] timing, .................................. [93A.9] unauthorised dealing, ....... [93AA.1] unsafe verdicts, ...................... [93A.20]–[93A.23] videotaping, ......................... [93A.4] withholding from jury, ........... [99.1] written statement, ................ [93A.5] previous case, evidence in, ...... [A.153], [92.41], [Q.8] public documents, ......... [A.152], [51.1] public opinion surveys, ............. [A.148] refreshing memory, note used for, ............................................... [101.9] representation, criminal proceedings, .............................. [93B.1]ff, [101.5] first-hand only, ..................... [93B.3] inserted 2000, ...................... [93B.1] oral hearsay admissible, ...... [93B.3] “prescribed criminal proceedings”, limited to, ....................... [93B.2] rebuttal of, ........................... [93B.6] warning to jury, ................... [93C.1] ss 92 and 93, hearsay in aid, .... [92.36], [96.3], [96.4] third party confessions, ............. [93B.8] res gestae statements, ............... [A.128], [A.145]

681

Index Hearsay rule — cont statutory exceptions, ...... [A.157] — see also Books of account — see also Business records — see also Computer (device or process) records — see also Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) — see also Private records inferences re admissibility of Pt 6 statements, .............................. [96.1] telephone exception, .................. [A.156] “unavailable” witness, ............ [93A.12], [F.40] Walker v Walker, rule in, .......... [A.155] expert witnesses giving, ...... [A.75], [9C.5], [92.16], [96.3], [F.35] Commonwealth Act differs, ......... [F.35] forbidden, what is, .......................... [A.143] generally, ......................... [A.142]ff, [F.32]ff history of rule, ......... [A.17]–[A.20], [A.28] hostile witness, prior statement, ...... [17.15] implied assertions, ........................... [A.144] indictable offences, ............. [A.41], [93B.1] intellectually handicapped witness, ............................................ [93A.1]ff interpreters, and, ...................... [Q.6], [F.33] meaning, .......................................... [A.142] oral, .......... [A.28], [A.38], [A.41], [93B.3], [101.12], [F.40], [F.41], [F.43], [F.44] original evidence distinguished, .... [A.143], [A.144], [A.145], [Q.4], [F.33] examples, ................................... [A.143] public opinion surveys, ................... [A.148] redefined, Commonwealth Act, ........ [F.32], [F.34] reform of, ........ [A.28], [9.3], [92.1]–[92.4], [93A.1]–[93A.2], [F.32] relevant information, may exclude, .... [A.1] res gesta statements, ......... [A.128], [A.145] reproductions, and, ........................... [106.4] s 101 — see Section 101 third party confession, ..................... [93B.7] 20th century reforms, ........................ [A.28] unreliable evidence exlcuded, ......... [A.142] History of evidence antiquity of rules exaggerated, ........ [A.10], [A.19], [10.8]n Commonwealth courts, ............ [A.42], [F.2] competence of witnesses, .................. [A.13] England, .......................................... [A.10]ff jury influence, .................................... [A.20] privilege, ............................................ [A.16] Queensland, in, ............................... [A.29]ff Griffith’s influence, ...................... [A.31] res judicata, ....................................... [A.15] textbooks, early, .............................. [A.11]ff

682

Hollington v Hewthorn, rule in criticised, ............................................ [79.2] defamation cases, ............................... [80.1] effect, .................................................. [79.1] modified by Act, ........ [A.38], [79.1]–[80.1] Queensland wording differs, ........ [79.7] Hospital records business records, as, ........................... [93.9] civil cases, ........................................ [92.23] ordinary records, ................ [92.23], [92.39] undertaking, records of, ................... [83.12] Hostile witness — see also Inconsistent statement co-accused as, ..................... [15.72]–[15.75] Commonwealth Act, wider rule, ..... [17.18], [F.19] cross-examination, limits, .................. [17.8] criminal case, as evidence, .............. [101.5] demeanour of witness, ..................... [17.11] evidence on commission, ................. [22.20] history, .................................... [17.4]–[17.5] impeachment rule exception, ............ [A.82] inconsistent statement as proof, ....... [17.11] evidence on issues, ...... [17.15]–[17.16], [101.5] “inconsistent”, meaning, .............. [18.5] proof of hostility, ............ [17.9]–[17.12] proof of prior statement, .............. [18.1] test of inconsistency, .................... [19.2] indicia, ................................................ [17.9] Jones v Dunkel inapplicable, .......... [A.119] judge question, ................................... [17.7] limited order, ...................................... [17.8] meaning, ........ [17.2]–[17.3], [17.9]–[17.13] opponent, not presumed hostile, .......... [7.3] policy of law, ...................................... [17.5] procedure to identify, ........... [17.1]ff, [19.2] prosecution calling, ............ [17.16], [101.5] unfavourable witness distinguished, ......................... [A.82], [17.3], [F.19] Hypnosis, ................................ [A.64], [130.11] evidence under, .................................. [A.71] Husband and wife — see Spouse, immunity or privilege Hypnotherapy evidence obtained by, ........................ [A.64]

I

Identification evidence “affected child”, ............................. [21AT.1] caution required, ................ [A.78], [130.11] Evidence Law in Queensland

Index Identification evidence — cont check identification, ........... [A.79], [A.120] computer-generated images, .......... [130.74] convicted person, ................... [54.1], [81.1] direct evidence, as ........................... [A.131] discretionary exclusion, ..... [A.78], [130.11] dock identification, .......... [A.79], [130.11]n driver of vehicle, .............................. [10.36] expert evidence, ...... [A.67], [A.71], [A.77], [59.1]ff eyewitness identification, ................ [A.77]ff fallibility, ................................ [A.78], [F.68] Federal Act, ........................................ [F.55] handwriting, by, ....... [A.77]n, [59.3]–[59.6] jurors’ observations, by, .................... [A.77] lay opinions, ............. [A.77]–[A.79], [18.6], [59.2] opinion evidence, as, ......................... [A.77] parade, ................. [A.79], [15.54], [130.74] person well known, ........................... [A.78] photographs, ...................... [A.79], [130.74] platitudinous directions, ...................... [A.5] Police Powers etc Act, ...... [130.74], [Q.24] pre-trial checks, ................................. [A.79] real evidence, ..................................... [A.58] s 92 and identification, ..................... [92.15] similar facts to identify, ................. [A.136], [A.138], [A.140], [15.20] similarity, evidence of, ...................... [A.79] surveillance camera pictures, ........... [A.79], [A.166] videotapes, ...................................... [130.74] voice identification, ............. [A.67], [A.77], [130.11] warning to jury, ..................... [A.78], [F.68] civil case, ..................................... [A.78] Identity protection — see Witness identity protection Illegally obtained evidence, .............. [130.69], [Q.87]–[Q.89], [F.82]–[F.83] — see also Discretionary exclusion Impaired person abuse of, .......................................... [21M.2] expert evidence re capacity, ............ [93A.7] meaning, ................................... [3.1], [3.25] Dictionary, .................................... [3.25] pre-trial statement by, ........ [93A.1], [144.1] protected witness ............................ [21M.1] special witness, ................................ [21A.2] Inconsistent statement — see also Hostile witness accused on voir dire, .......................... [15.7] admission, when it is, ........................ [18.2] agent, by, ............................................ [18.7] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

criminal case, evidence in, .............. [101.5] cross-examination on, ..... [18.1]–[19.17] — see also Cross-examination document not necessary, .................... [18.4] evidence on issues, .............. [17.16], [18.3], [19.17], [94.7], [101.3]–[101.6], [F.23] finality rule and, ................................ [A.98] history of present law, ..................... [19.5]ff hostile witness, indication, ............... [17.11] jury’s function, ................................... [19.3] meaning of “inconsistent”, ................. [18.5] opinion, expression of, ....................... [18.6] oral, ......................... [18.4], [94.6], [101.12] procedure for cross-examination, ............................................. [19.11]ff proof if denied, ......... [18.11], [94.5]–[94.6] prosecutor, disclosure by, .................. [A.98] rebutting denial, .................. [18.10]–[18.11] re-examination, re, ........................... [19.18] relevant to issues, must be, ................ [18.8] s 92, proof under, ............... [17.17], [92.26] s 94, proof under, ............................... [94.3] “statement”, meaning, ........................ [18.6] third party statement, .......... [19.19]–[19.21] tender, when required, ...................... [19.18] weight, .............................................. [101.2] written, meaning, ................................ [19.4] Incorporation — see Companies Interlocutory proceedings affidavit evidence, .............................. [A.48] Commonwealth Act, ............................. [F.6] hearsay evidence, ................. [A.146], [6.11] privilege, claiming, ........................ [10.23]n “proceeding”, as, ................................ [3.26] reasons for rulings, .............................. [A.3] Interpreters, ...... [130.34], [131A.1]–[131A.2], [Q.6], [F.72] advantages and disadvantages, ........... [A.6] duty to provide, ............ [130.34], [131A.1], [131A.2], [Q.6], [F.72] expert witness, assisting, ............... [131A.1] hearsay rule, and, ............................... [F.33] refusing request for, ............ [130.34], [Q.6] Police Powers etc Act, ................... [130.34] professional privilege when using, ............................................ [A.163]n testifying through, ............................... [Q.6] Interstate law interpretation of, ................................. [68.1] Interstate records, ........ [A.34], [42.5], [43.3], [51.1], [53.3], [64.2], [68.1]ff, [70.1] Interview meaning, ......................................... [130.77]

683

Index Ireland discretion — see Discretionary exclusion Issue estoppel civil proceedings, confined to, ........ [A.212] elements of, ..................................... [A.213] foreign judgment, ............................... [53.3] generally, ....................................... [A.212]ff meaning, .......................................... [A.212] separate duties, ................................ [A.212] tribunal in, ......................... [A.211], [A.213] federal tribunal, ........... [A.211], [A.213]

J Joint trials, ........................................... [A.134] propensity warning, ......................... [A.134] Jones v Dunkel, rule in alternative versions, ......................... [A.118] averment, re ..................................... [Q.32]n both parties failing to call, .............. [A.119] civil penalty, .................................... [A.122] criminal cases, ..... [A.120], [A.122], [6.15], [6.16], [15.34] Commonwealth Act silent, ................... [F.6] evidence, does not supply, ............. [A.118], [6.15] generally, ............................ [A.1], [A.118]ff hostile witness, not applicable, ....... [A.119] inapplicable, when, .......................... [A.119] limits of rule, ................................... [A.123] meaning, .................... [A.1], [A.118], [6.15] party, absence of, ................................. [7.2] questions omitted, ............................ [A.118] rationales, ......................................... [A.118] weight, rule as to, ..... [A.1], [A.118], [6.15] Weissensteiner direction abolished, ................................ [A.121]–[A.122] Journalists Commonwealth law, limited protection, ................................... [A.196], [F.60] newspaper rule, ............................... [A.196] privilege unavailable at common law, .............................................. [A.196] Judge autocracy, fact-finding, ........................ [A.7] calling witnesses, ..... [6.17]–[6.25], [21A.3] criminal cases, .................. [6.19]–[6.25] UCP Rules (Q), ............................ [6.18] child witness, jury warning, .............. [9D.2] competence, decides, ......................... [9A.4] confession, decides whether evidence of, ................................................ [Q.53] “dangerous”, use of word, ................ [Q.56]

684

directions to jury, adequacy, ......... [A.134]n eliciting evidence, ................... [6.19]–[6.25] examining document, privilege issue, .............................................. [A.162] executive-minded, ............................ [10.35] expert, qualifications of, .................... [9A.3] hostile witness, decides, ..................... [17.7] intervention, ........................................ [6.17] leave to cross-examine, ................... [15.17], [15.22]–[15.33], [15.52], [15.59] perjury case, role, ................................. [6.6] questioning witness, ............... [6.17], [6.19] sanity of witness, ............................... [A.64] self-incrimination, warning, ............ [10.23], [F.64] sitting alone, power, ................ [A.6], [A.7], [102.2] spouse witness, warning, ................... [F.64] unrepresented accused, duty, .............. [8.6], [15.39], [Q.72] warning, character “raised”, ............ [15.39] Judges’ Rules — see also Confessions — see also Discretionary exclusion caution, time for, ........... [130.18], [130.22], [130.24], [130.29], [130.57], [130.76], [F.72] form of caution, ....................... [130.25] medical officer, need not, ......... [130.20] other officers, ............................ [130.16] preliminary inquiries, ............... [130.17] clarification permissible, ................ [130.26] co-suspects, and, ............................ [130.29] cross-examining suspect, ............... [130.26] discretionary exclusion, ................ [130.15], [130.34] generally, ...................................... [130.14]ff guidelines only, .............. [130.14], [130.21] list not exhaustive, ......................... [130.34] officers other than police, .............. [130.16] Police Powers etc Act, and rules, ............................................. [130.14] questioning persons in custody, ........................................... [130.22]ff recording interviews, ........ [130.31], [Q.56], [F.72] interview, meaning, .................. [130.77] statement by co-offender, use of, ............................................. [130.29] summary, ...................................... [130.17]ff unsigned statement, ........ [130.11], [130.33] Judicial notice administrative arrangements, .......... [43A.1] ancient facts, ....................................... [51.8] certificates, official, ........................... [Q.40] circumstantial reasoning, in, ............. [A.61] common law, ..................................... [A.62] Commonwealth Act, ................ [A.62], [F.6] Evidence Law in Queensland

Index Judicial notice — cont Commonwealth, official acts, ............ [42.5], [F.5] corresponding court’s seal, ................ [26.1] evidentiary shortcut, .......................... [Q.26] examples, ........................................... [A.62] foreign law, ......................................... [68.4] generally, ........................................... [A.62] Government Gazette, .............. [45.1]–[45.3] interstate legislation, .................................... [42.5] official acts, .................................. [42.5] learned works, .................................... [65.1] legislation, .......................................... [43.1] mandatory, ......................................... [Q.42] matters of law (Commonwealth Act), ................................................... [F.5] official signatures, .................. [42.1], [42.2] examples, ...................................... [42.2] official seals, .................................. [42A.1]ff mandatory, ............................... [Q.42], [F.5] maps, ................................................... [65.1] meaning, ............................................ [A.62] maps, charts, ....................................... [65.1] official certificates etc, ....................... [44.1] official signatures, .............................. [42.1] Queensland statutory instruments, ..... [43.1] reproductions, ................................... [123.1] Seal of Queensland, .............. [A.15], [41.1] Judicial proceedings affidavits etc, proof of, ....................... [53.6] Australian, proof of, ........................... [53.1] certificate verifying, ........................... [53.8] circumstantial facts and, ................... [A.62] convicted person, proving identity, ................................................. [54.1] evidence rules apply, .......................... [53.7] examples of, ...................................... [A.62] foreign judgment as evidence, ........... [69.3] full faith and credit, ........................... [68.1] generally, ........................................... [A.62] hearsay rule applies, ........................... [53.7] identification, ...................................... [53.5] interstate, .......................................... [53.1]ff judicial notice, .................................... [42.5] matters provable, ................................ [53.3] other provisions, ................... [53.9], [53.10] overseas, ...................... [53.4], [69.1]–[69.4] paternity, proof, ................................ [53.10] proof of, ........................................... [53.1]ff Queensland, ...................................... [53.2]ff reciprocal provisions, ......................... [53.2] Jurisdictional facts proof of, ........................................... [A.108] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

Jury access to tape recordings, .................. [99.1] affected child, directions, ............ [21AW.1], [21AZ.1], [21R.1] assistance by judge, ......................... [A.137] Browne v Dunn, and, ........................ [A.95] character evidence, directions, ........ [A.136] charts to assist, ................................... [3.19] circumstantial case, directions, ....... [A.106] civil, decline, .......................... [A.6], [A.25] confession, directions, ...... [130.31], [Q.50], [Q.53], [Q.56], [Q.72] constitutional role diminished, ......... [9D.3], [132A.2] corroboration, functions, ................ [A.116], [Q.107] credit, matter for jury, ....................... [Q.84] criminal standard of proof, directions, .............................................. [A.105] dictionary, use of, ............................ [A.105] directions to, adequacy, ......... [A.5], [A.60], [A.69], [A.77], [A.78], [A.122], [A.134]n, [A.135], [A.136], [A.154], [20.2], [95A.1], [101.2], [102.1]n, [130.67] discussions inadmissible, .................. [9D.3] DNA evidence, directions, ................ [A.69] evidence effect on, ........................... [A.6], [A.20] discussions, of, ............................ [9D.3] misconduct, of, ............................ [9D.3] exemptions from service, .................. [A.20] exhibits, use of, .................... [99.1], [133.3] “gobbledegook” directions, ............. [15.28], [15.33], [17.15], [101.1], [101.2], [Q.80] intolerable burden, directions re lies, .............................................. [Q.54]n handwriting comparison by, .............. [59.9], [59.11] identification, directions, ..... [A.78], [A.79], [F.55] inconsistent statement, jury task, ...... [18.5], [19.2], [101.3] issue estoppel, jury verdicts, ........... [A.213] judge setting aside verdict, right to, ................................................ [A.25] lies, directions re, .............................. [Q.54] mistrust of, ........... [A.20], [A.134], [15.64], [93A.19], [99.1], [130.4], [130.11], [F.4] observations by, ................................. [A.58] Pt 6 material, withholding, ................ [99.1] propensity evidence, directions, ..... [A.134], [15.74] quarantined, ........................... [A.8], [130.4] second guessing jury, ...... [9D.3], [93A.20], [101.5] s 93A statement, directions, .......... [93A.13]

685

Index Jury — cont s 93B evidence, directions, ............. [93B.5] tape recordings, use of, ...... [3.21], [21A.7], [99.1] transcript, access to, .................... [93A.25]n unreal demands on, ........... [15.28], [15.60], [15.69], [15.70], [101.1], [Q.54]n “unsafe verdict”, second guessing, ................................ [9D.3], [93A.21] view by, ..................... [A.35], [A.60], [F.29] voice identification by, ...................... [A.77] voir dire, and, ............. [6.5], [9.11], [9A.4], [9C.8], [11.9], [Q.72], [Q.73] withholding documents from, ...... [93A.19], [99.1]

L

Label Commonwealth Act, ............................. [F.5] document, as, .................. [3.1], [3.12], [F.5] Land grants lease or licence, proof of, .................. [57.1] unallocated, proof of, ......................... [56.1] Laws (other jurisdictions) Australian States and Territories, .... [68.1]ff other countries, ................................ [68.3]ff expert evidence, ........................... [68.4] judicial proceedings, .................. [69.1]ff Leading questions cross-examination, in, discretion to prohibit, ................................................ [A.89] examination in chief, ......................... [A.81] person in custody, .......................... [130.26] Legal professional privilege abrogation, ........... [A.194], [10.37], [Q.92], [F.78] Act silent, .......................................... [A.39] address of client, ............................. [A.170] adverse inference from claim, ......... [10.26] agreements with police, .................. [A.179] bankruptcy, whether lost by, ........... [A.186] “Chinese wall”, ............................... [A.173] claiming it, ....................................... [A.162] client identity, address, ........................ [A.170] suing lawyer, ............................. [A.195] closed court, ........................................ [Q.3] commercially sensitive material, .................................... [A.166], [Q.3] common interest, .............. [A.163], [A.178] Commonwealth Act, ........................... [F.56]

686

confidential, to be, ........................... [A.166] confidentiality necessary, not sufficient, .............................................. [A.169] confirmation of, ..................... [Q.92], [F.80] copy statement to witness, .............. [A.177] corporations may claim, ................... [10.17] costs dispute, ................................... [A.186] courts, not confined to, ....... [A.8], [A.162], [10.10] criminal justice, needs of, ............... [A.184] Crown entitled, .......... [A.184], [2.2], [6.14] custody case, overrides, ...... [A.185], [F.79] development of doctrine, .................. [A.16] disclosure, inadvertent, .................... [A.180] discovery cross-examination limited, ........ [A.162] sufficient details, ........................ [A.162] dissection of legal and non-legal material, .............................................. [A.163] dominant purpose test, ..... [A.163], [A.167] statutory duty to collect, and, .............................................. [A.189] duration of, ...................................... [A.195] essentials, ......................................... [A.163] examination of disputed material, by court, .............................................. [A.182] expert, disclosure to, ....................... [A.177] factual information only, ................. [A.168] FOI legislation, ................................... [F.80] foreign lawyer, ................................. [A.163] generally, ....................................... [A.162]ff getting or giving advice, ................. [A.168] history, ............................................... [A.16] identity of client, ............................. [A.170] improper access, ............................... [10.28] inadvertent disclosure, ..................... [A.180] in-house lawyer, .............................. [A.163] interpreter, ........................................ [A.163] Invasion of Privacy Act, .................... [Q.89] judge examining document, ............ [A.162] lawyer-client litigation, ................... [A.186] “leaks”, .............................. [A.180], [10.28] legal aid client, ................................ [A.163] legal compulsion, disclosure, .......... [A.176] litigation, material for, .................... [A.187] administrative tribunal, ............. [A.187] Commonwealth Act, under, ...... [A.192] litigant in person, ...................... [A.192] not collected by lawyer, ............ [A.192] purpose of party decisive, ......... [A.188] reasonable anticipation of action, .............................................. [A.187] unsolicited material, .................. [A.190] loss assessor, .................................... [A.192] material obtained by party for advice, ................................ [A.163], [A.191] mistaken disclosure, .......... [A.180], [10.23] non-litigious matters, .......... [A.16], [A.165] Evidence Law in Queensland

Index Legal professional privilege — cont non-privileged material gaining privilege, .............................................. [A.174] objection, making of, ...................... [A.162] other professions, ............................ [A.196] pre-existing documents, .................. [A.163] protection of, .......... [A.173], [10.28], [Q.3] evidence in camera, ....................... [Q.3] public safety, .................................... [A.186] quasi privilege, ................................ [A.166] rationale, .......................................... [A.164] real evidence not covered, .............. [A.171] retainer not essential, ...................... [A.163] rules of court and, ............................. [Q.93] search warrants and, .......... [A.179], [Q.14], [F.71] Stamp Act and, .................................. [Q.92] statutory abrogation, .......... [A.194], [Q.92], [Q.93] taxation of costs, exception, ........... [A.193] termination of, ............................... [A.175]ff trade secrets and, ............................. [A.166] tribunals, in, ............ [A.8], [A.162], [10.10] trust account records, ...................... [A.169] unlawful purpose, ................ [A.181], [F.58] “furthering” same, ..................... [A.183] meaning, .................................... [A.181] voir dire, ............................ [A.182]–[A.183] waiver, ............. [A.175]ff, [A.179], [10.29], [F.58] common interest privilege, ....... [A.178] cross-examining with privileged document, ............................ [A.175] expert, disclosure to, ........... [A.177] implied, ................................ [A.175] inadvertent disclosure, ............... [A.180] limitation period, extension of, .............................................. [A.175] limited disclosure, ..................... [A.179] partial disclosure of privileged matter, .............................................. [A.175] outside legal proceedings, company accounts, ........................ [A.175] refreshing memory, .................... [A.175] from own statement, ........... [A.175] rules of court, disclosure under, .............................................. [A.176] search warrant, seizure, ............. [A.179] subpoena, production in response to, .............................................. [A.176] suing one’s lawyer, ................... [A.186] taxation of costs, ....................... [A.193] witness, copy statement supplied to, .............................................. [A.177] witness not entitled, ........................ [A.172] Legislation, proof of Commonwealth, ................................. [A.62] court informing itself, ..................... [46B.1] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

internet copies, ................................ [46A.2] interstate and overseas, ............ [68.1], [F.5] official copies, .................................... [46.1] overseas, ............................................. [68.1] parliamentary proceedings, ................ [47.1] presumption of accuracy, ................ [46A.1] proof of, .............................................. [47.1] Queensland, ...................................... [43.1]ff regulations, .............................. [48.1]–[48.3] Letters patent proof of, .............................................. [58.1] Lies admission, as, ....................... [Q.45], [Q.54] credit evidence only, when ............... [Q.54] directions, difficult, ............................ [Q.54] Listening device authorisation for, ......... [130.34]n, [130.60], [130.75], [Q.88], [Q.90] evidence inadmissible, ...................... [Q.87] Longman direction, ...... [A.154], [8.4], [9D.2] judge sitting alone, ........................ [A.154]n platitudinous, ....................................... [A.5]

M

Map ancient document, .............................. [65.1] document, as, ................ [3.1], [3.18], [65.1] evidence, as, ....................................... [65.1] judicial notice of, .............................. [A.62] verification, ........................................... [3.3] Marital privilege, ................................. [A.158] abolished, ..................... [A.16], [8.2], [11.1] access, evidence of, ................ [12.1]–[12.3] Commonwealth Act, ........................ [F.10]ff transitional provisions, ..................... [138.1] Marriage certificate — see Births, deaths and marriages Material for litigation, privilege abrogation of privilege, ..................... [Q.93] commission of inquiry, not available in, ............................................ [A.187]n Commonwealth Act, ........................... [F.59] dominant purpose, ........................... [A.187] duration, ........................................... [A.195] litigant in person, ............................ [A.192] privileged, ............................ [A.187], [6.13] rules of court erode privilege, .......... [6.13], [Q.93]

687

Index Material for litigation, privilege — cont witness checking material, .............. [A.177] Medical examinations blood tests, ................ [10.7], [Q.24], [Q.38] breathalyser tests, ................. [A.63], [10.7], [130.34]n, [130.40], [130.43], [130.44], [Q.24], [Q.38], [Q.40] inherent power, .................................. [Q.23] personal injury cases, ........................ [Q.24] Police Powers etc Act, ...................... [Q.24] statutory powers, various, .................. [37.1] unlawful, ......................................... [130.38] Ministerial act proof of, .............................................. [50.1] Motive ....... [A.136], [A.151], [15.18], [15.52], [17.9], [101.7], [F.51] character evidence, and, ................. [A.136], [A.137], [15.18] circumstantial evidence, .................. [A.132] Commonwealth Act, ........................... [F.51] cross-examination re, ......................... [17.9] parliamentary speech, ......................... [47.2] revealing another offence, ............... [A.136]

N

Negative proof of, .............................................. [84.5] No case to answer, ............................... [A.102] circumstantial case, ......................... [A.102] election re calling evidence, ........... [A.102] judge taking initiative, ................. [A.102]fn Nolle prosequi, ........................ [A.102], [Q.74] Non-publication order, ............................ [Q.3]

O

Oaths Aboriginals, formerly, .......................... [6.3] administration of, ................................ [Q.7] alternatives, .......... [A.22], [6.2], [6.4], [9.1] audio visual evidence, ..... [39W.1], [39X.1] Australia, common law varied, ............ [6.3] authority to administer, ........... [3.4], [24.1], [24.3], [39.2], [Q.7] capacity to take, ........... [6.1], [9.5], [9A.1], [9C.1], [21A.8], [93A.12], [F.8] child, ............................... [21A.8], [93A.12]

688

essential, ............................................... [6.2] evidence on commission, ...... [23.6], [24.3], [39.1], [39.2], [39M.1], [39W.1], [39X.1] form of, ................................................. [6.2] history, ............. [A.13], [A.22], [6.2], [6.3], [9.1], [131.1] offence to administer, when, .... [Q.7], [Q.8] perjury, .................................................. [6.6] Queensland reforms, ............................ [6.4] s 92, illness of witness, .................... [92.28] solemn affirmation, ............................... [6.4] unlawful administration, ......... [23.6], [Q.7] Objections to evidence abandoned, ................................ [A.4], [A.7] committal proceedings, ........................ [3.9] confession, late objection, ................. [Q.72] criminal case, not made, ..... [A.4], [130.65] civil cases, not made, .......................... [A.4] evidence on commission, ..... [22.19]–[22.20], [22.28], [22.30], [30.1] expert evidence, ................................. [A.75] incriminating questions, ................... [10.18] judge, by, .............................................. [8.6] judge sitting alone, .............................. [A.7] oath, to taking, ..................................... [6.4] omission to make, ............................... [A.4] privileged material, ......................... [A.162] promptly taken, ................................... [A.4] technical, .............................................. [A.3] waiver, ............................................. [A.175] Official documents interstate seals and signatures, ........... [70.1] Privy Council orders, ......................... [71.1] proof on production, .......................... [44.1] Royal Proclamations, ......................... [71.1] State seals and signatures, .... [41.1], [42.1], [50.1] Onus of proof confession, ............................ [Q.59], [Q.77] defences, onus remaining on Crown, .............................................. [A.103] defences reversing onus, ................. [A.103] discretionary exclusion, ................. [130.63] Commonwealth Act, ..................... [F.66] documentary hearsay, ......................... [92.7] evidential, ........................................ [A.104] generally, ......................................... [A.102] improper reversal, ............. [A.105], [21.20] legal and persuasive, ....................... [A.104] negative, proof of, ............ [A.102], [A.103] “no case to answer”, ....................... [A.102] election rule, .............................. [A.102] persuasive, ....................................... [A.104] prima facie case, ............................. [A.102] Evidence Law in Queensland

Index Onus of proof — cont reversal of, ....................................... [A.103] improper reversal, ....... [A.103], [A.105] search warrant, .................................. [Q.18] Onus of proof, reverse agreement, ....................................... [A.103] averments, .......................................... [Q.29] case in reply, when, ......................... [A.103] civil cases, .......................... [A.103], [Q.36] common law, ..... [A.63], [A.103], [130.68], [130.77], [Q.33], [Q.37], [F.74], [F.75] common law reversal, ....................... [Q.33] Commonwealth law, ............... [F.74], [F.75] confession not recorded, ................ [130.77] Criminal Code “defences”, ............... [Q.33] diminished responsibility, ............... [A.103] discretionary exclusion, ................ [130.15], [130.63], [F.49] evidence on commission, ................. [22.14] examples, ................ [A.103], [Q.36], [F.75] erroneous reversal, ............ [A.105], [21.20] generally, ........................................... [Q.33] habeas corpus, ................................... [Q.35] illegally obtained evidence, .......... [130.77], [F.66], [F.72] improper reversal, ............. [A.105], [21.20] insanity, ............................................ [A.103] Jones v Dunkel and, ........................ [A.121] leave to cross-examine accused, ...... [15.59] “no case” applications, .................... [A.102] Pt 6 material, .......................... [83.1], [92.7] presumption, by, ................................ [A.63] presumptions, statutory, compared, ................................................ [Q.38] reversal, ........................................... [Q.33]ff statutory, examples, ........ [9D.2], [Q.36] standard of proof, ............... [A.109], [Q.35] Open court anonymous witnesses, .......... [21B.1], [Q.3] chambers, proceedings in, ................... [Q.3] closed court, .............. [21.7], [21F.2], [Q.2] alternative arrangements, .............. [Q.3] embarrassment no ground, ............ [Q.3] security, videolink, ........................ [Q.3] commercial arbitrations, ...................... [Q.3] commercial secrets, ............................. [Q.3] privilege, protection of, ................. [Q.3] Commonwealth Act, ........................... [F.84] contempt, ............................................. [Q.3] exhibits, access, ................................... [Q.3] filming, ................................................. [Q.3] legislation apart from Evidence Act, .................................................. [Q.2] non-publication orders, ........... [21.7], [Q.3] normal requirement, ...... [Q.3]–[Q.5], [F.84] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

party, exclusion of, .............................. [Q.5] sexual charge, defendant’s name, ....... [Q.4] statutory changes, ................................ [Q.4] Opinion evidence — see also Expert witnesses credit of other witnesses, .................. identification evidence, ..................... non-experts, ....................................... examples, ..................................... voice identification, .............. [A.67],

[A.90] [A.77] [A.76] [A.76] [A.77]

Orders in council proof of, .............................................. [48.1] Original document rule — see also Queen’s Case, rule abolished, ................................ [3.15], [F.24] ancient rule, ....................................... [A.14] effect, ..................................... [A.53], [19.5] exemptions, numerous, ...................... [51.9] history, ......... [A.13], [A.14], [A.22], [A.25] labels, .................................................. [3.12] machine-made documents, .............. [104.1], [F.69] meaning, ................... [3.15], [19.5], [104.2] paper writings only, ............ [19.5]n, [104.2] Pt 6 documents, ...................... [83.2], [97.1] real evidence unaffected, ................... [A.59] relief from, ......................................... [Q.95] reproductions, ................................... [104.1] Original evidence — see Hearsay rule Other occasion evidence — see Character evidence, rule against

P

Parliamentary papers Votes and Proceedings, proof, ........... [47.1] Parliamentary privilege, ......... [A.159], [47.2] meaning, ........................................ [A.159]n Parol evidence rule collateral terms, ................................. [A.56] estoppel, pre-contractual negotiations, ................................................ [A.55] fraud, .................................................. [A.55] generally, ............................. [A.54]ff, [3.14] glosses, qualifications, ....................... [A.55] infancy, .............................................. [A.55] limits of rule, ........................ [A.55]–[A.56] meaning of words, and, .................... [A.57] mistake, .............................................. [A.55]

689

Index Parol evidence rule — cont rule stated, ......................................... [A.54] special meanings, .............................. [A.57] written instrument, subject matter, ................................................ [A.56] Paternity birth certificate, .................................. [74.9] proof of, .............................................. [74.9] Perjury child witness, ..................................... [9D.5] corroboration, ............... [A.35], [Q.2], [Q.8] double jeopardy, and ....................... [A.211] evidence on commission, ....... [22.4], [39.1] judge role, ............................................. [6.6] jurisdiction absent, ............................... [6.6] meaning, ............................................... [6.6] s 9A statement, ................................. [139.1] unsworn evidence, ............................. [9D.6] Photograph discretionary exclusion, ................. [130.11], [130.12] document, as, .......................... [3.12], [3.20] document, of, ..................... [104.5]ff, [F.69] identification, ........................ [A.78], [A.79] “machine copy”, ............................... [104.5] original document rule, and, ............. [A.59] Police Powers etc Act, ....... [10.7], [130.74] power to take, ..................... [10.7], [130.74] real evidence, ......................... [A.59], [3.20] statutory provisions, ....................... [130.74] unlawfully taken, ............................ [130.38] Physical tests, ............ [10.7], [130.54], [Q.24], [Q.38]

Police Powers etc Act, ....... [130.14], [130.18], [130.33] Aboriginals, ....................... [130.76], [Q.56] cautioning suspects, ....... [130.18], [130.76] children, ............................................. [Q.56] confessions, and, ............... [130.77], [Q.83] “controlled operation”, .................... [21B.1] Crimes Act (Cth), Pt 1C, .................... [F.72] detention, ........................................ [130.72] discretionary exclusion, and, ........ [130.34], [130.70], [130.71], [130.77]ff fingerprints, ......................... [10.7], [130.74] identification procedures, .............. [130.74], [Q.24] independent person present, .......... [130.74], [130.76], [Q.56] interpreter, right to, ........................ [130.34] interviews, ......................... [130.77], [Q.83] legal advice, access to, ...... [130.34], [Q.56] medical examinations, ........... [10.7], [Q.24] photographs, ....................... [10.7], [130.74] questioning and detention, ............ [130.72], [130.76] new evidence, questions on, .... [130.26] recording interviews, ........ [A.41], [130.23], [130.33], [130.76], [Q.56] replace Judges’ Rules, .................. [130.14], [130.34] right to silence, ................... [10.3], [130.71] searches and seizures, ...... [130.73], [Q.12], [Q.24], [Q.88] self-incrimination privilege, .............. [Q.59] silence, right to, .................. [10.3], [130.71] surveillance, .................................... [130.75] tape recording, copy for suspect, ............................................. [130.33] warrants, search, ................................ [Q.12] Polygraph test, ....................................... [A.71]

Pleading admission, as ..................................... [A.61]

Possibilities, evidence of, ...................... [A.67]

Police informants, ..................... [A.159], [Q.3]

Practice or habit, evidence of, ........... [A.141]

Police interviews — see also Confessions Aboriginals, .................................... [130.76] demeanour at, ................................ [A.126]n electronic recordings, .... [130.31], [130.77], [Q.56], [F.72] expression interpreted liberally, ..... [130.77] Judges’ Rules, and, .......... [130.7], [130.31] Lucas Committee recommendations, ................................................ [A.39] next friend’s role, .............. [130.46], [Q.56] recording, .......... [A.41], [130.23], [130.33], [130.76], [Q.56] right to silence, ................... [10.3], [130.71] time limits, ............................ [Q.62], [Q.83]

Preliminary complaint — see Fresh complaint

690

Presumptions accuracy of copy legislation, .......... [46A.1] “affected child”, ............................. [21AI.1] ancient document, .... [60.3], [62.1], [121.1] authenticity, ........................................ [83.2] authority, of, ...................................... [Q.38] Commonwealth Act silent, ................... [F.6] competence to testify, .... [6.1], [9.6], [A.41] confession, inducement, .................... [A.63] continuance, of, ................................. [A.63] death, of, ................................ [A.63], [74.8] Evidence Law in Queensland

Index Presumptions — cont evidence changes retrospective, ..... [39B.1], [A.2] generally, ........................................... [A.63] innocence, ....................... [A.122], [132C.7] involuntariness, confession, ............. [Q.51], [Q.59], [Q.72] marriage of, ........................... [A.63], [74.7] meaning, ............................................ [A.63] rebuttable, .......................................... [A.63] regularity and continuity, ................. [A.63], [A.132], [5.1], [22.21], [22.28], [95.4] sanity, ................................................. [Q.35] scientific instrument, ......................... [A.63] service of document, ......................... [Q.38] statutory, ....... [3.15], [62.2], [Q.26], [Q.38], [Q.39] undue influence, ................................ [Q.38] Pre-trial rulings, ................................... [92.43] Pre-trial statement — see Hearsay, pre-trial statement (child etc) Prior consistent statements birth certificate, .................................. [74.5] documentary hearsay, and, ............... [92.26] evidence on issues, ............... [A.38], [83.4], [101.2], [101.7], [F.34] generally not admissible, .... [19.22], [92.9], [92.26], [101.7], [101.9] oral, ................................................. [101.12] refreshing memory, .......................... [19.22] s 92, and, ............................................ [92.6] when admissible, .................. [19.25], [92.8] Prison informer treatment of evidence, .................... [130.12] Privacy laws authorised departures, ....................... [Q.88] trespass, and, ............................... [Q.88] Commonwealth law, relation to, ....... [Q.87] evidence in breach of, ........... [Q.87], [F.82] Private records admissibility, ....................................... [92.8] corroboration, as, ................ [100.1]–[100.2] credit, testing, .................................. [94.1]ff discretionary exclusion, ..................... [98.1] federal courts, .................................. [F.38]ff first hand hearsay, .................. [92.8], [92.9] inadmissible portions, ...................... [92.42] “maker” of statement, .................... [92.37]ff opinions in, ......................... [92.15]–[92.16] prior consistent statement, ............... [92.26] running down cases, ........................... [92.2] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

self-corroboration, .............. [92.26], [100.1] source to be called, ............................ [92.6] excuses for not calling, ...... [92.27]–[92.35] two classes, s 92, ............................... [92.5] weight, ................................ [102.1]–[102.2] withholding from jury, ....................... [99.1] witness to be called, ........ [92.24], [92.27]ff Privative clauses courts’ attitude to, ............................ [21F.3] Privilege — see also Journalists — see also Legal professional privilege — see also Public interest (Crown) privilege — see also Self-incrimination (privilege) — see also Spouse, immunity or privilege — see also Without prejudice abrogation, ............. [A.194], [6.13], [Q.92], [Q.93] adultery questions, ............................. [13.1] common features, ............................... [10.2] courts, not confined to, ....................... [A.8] documents, supporting own case, ...... [14.3] forfeiture, ................................ [14.1]–[14.2] history, ............................................... [A.16] journalists, ............................ [A.196], [F.60] legal professional, ................ [A.16], [A.39], [A.162]ff marital, abolished, .................... [8.2], [11.1] material for litigation — see Legal professional privilege parliamentary, ...................... [A.159], [47.2] public interest (Crown, State), ........ [A.159] self-incrimination, .......................... [A.161], [10.1]–[10.37] title deeds, .......................................... [14.3] Privy Council orders proof of, .............................................. [71.1] Probability, circumstantial reasoning, .................................... [A.1], [A.130] article, .......................................... [132A.2]n Probate, evidentiary effect, ....... [64.1], [64.2] Proceeding meaning, .............................................. [3.1], Dictionary, .................................... [3.26] Proceedings of courts, proof Australian courts, .................. [53.1]–[53.10] overseas courts, ...................... [69.1]–[69.4]

691

Index Proclamations proof of, .................................. [48.1], [68.1] Royal, ................................................. [71.1] Production of documents, civil proceedings “agency”, confined to, ................... [134A.2] aide memoire, ....................... [19.22], [F.16] demand to be specific, .................... [A.162] evidence on commission, ................... [37.1] government agencies, by ............... [134A.1] Government Gazette, .......................... [45.2] legislative material etc, ...................... [47.1] parliamentary document, .................... [47.2] real evidence, ..................................... [A.59] regulations, etc, .................................. [48.1] standard codes, ................................... [49.1] State seal, ........................................... [41.1] subpoena, ............................ [A.176], [Q.10] tape recording, .................................... [3.21] third party discovery, alternative, ............................................ [134A.1] title deeds, .............................. [14.1], [14.3] Propensity evidence — see Character evidence, rule against Prosecutor averments, .......................................... [Q.31] comment on accused not testifying, ................................................. [F.13] cross-examining accused on record, ................................. [15.59], [15.64] DNA evidence, .................................. [A.69] duty of disclosure, ........... [A.155], [A.184], [6.13], [6.14], [19.13], [130.12], [Q.11] hearsay evidence, ............................... [F.43] hostile witness, calling, .... [17.16], [93B.7], [101.5] improper comment, ........................... [A.95] improperly obtained evidence, .... [130.41]ff inconsistent statement, duty, ............ [A.98], [19.13] independence of judge, ...................... [6.14] nolle prosequi, ................................. [A.102] onus of proof, ....... [A.105], [Q.33], [Q.35], [Q.59], [Q.77], [Q.79], [F.75] prejudicial evidence, ..... [93A.16], [130.11], [130.35], [F.66] “prosecutor” in s 15(2), ................... [15.51] reopening case, .... [A.103], [15.23], [18.11] standard of proof, ............................ [A.105] victim impact data, ........................ [132C.6] witness selection, ................... [6.14], [6.19] Protected witness — see also Witness identity protection additional orders, ............... [21H.1], [21S.1]

692

cross-examination, ........... [21L.2], [21N.1], [21O.1], [21P.1], [21Q.1], [21Q.2] accused not to cross-examine, .............................................. [21N.1] Criminal Code, exemption from, .............................................. [21Q.2] jury direction, ............................ [21R.1] representation for cross-examination, .............................................. [21O.1] direction to jury, .............................. [21R.1] generally, ........................................ [21L.1]ff meaning (Pt 2 Div 6), .................... [21M.1] “prescribed offence”, ................ [21M.3] “prescribed special offence”, .... [21M.2] Public documents alternative provisions, ........................ [51.9] another State, in, ................................ [72.1] birth certificate, ................................ [74.3]n Commonwealth Act, ..... [F.5], [F.27], [F.69] copy of, ............................................... [84.7] duty to record, .................................... [51.5] government documents, ...... [A.152], [51.6] hearsay, exception to, ............. [51.1], [83.3] rationale, ....................................... [51.3] historical works, ................................. [51.8] interstate, ............................................ [72.1] judicial proceedings — see Judicial proceedings letters patent, ...................................... [58.1] map, .................................................... [65.1] meaning, ............................................. [51.3] official documents distinguished, ....... [51.7] other statutes, ..................................... [51.9] overseas, ............................................. [72.1] personal knowledge unnecessary, ...... [51.4] proof of, ........................................... [51.1]ff Public interest (Crown) privilege balancing process, ............ [A.159], [A.160] Cabinet papers, ................................ [A.160] criminal trial, disclosure, .......... [A.160] compromise orders, ......................... [A.160] Crown property, need not be, ......... [A.159] generally, ......................................... [A.159] oral evidence, .................................. [A.159] parliamentary privilege, ...... [A.159], [47.2] police informants, ................. [A.159], [Q.3] reasons to be given, ........................ [A.159] statute, imposed by, ............ [A.159], [Q.94] substantive rule of law, ........ [A.159], [F.6], [F.62] waiver not possible, ........................ [A.159] Public opinion surveys, ....................... [A.148] expert on, rejected, ............................ [A.70] Public policy estoppel, prevails over, .................... [A.222] Evidence Law in Queensland

Index

Q Queen’s Case, rule — see also Original document rule abolished, ............................................ [F.24] amended, ............................. [A.22], [19.6]ff effect, .................................................. [19.5] inconsistent statements and, ............. [A.25], [19.5] reproductions, and, ........................... [104.2] Queensland accused made competent witness, .... [A.33] first Evidence Act, ............................. [A.29] Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Part 3A applied to, .......................... [39C.4]

R

Real evidence, ............................ [A.58], [9C.2] access, pre-trial, ................................ [133.4] confession, found after, .................. [130.34] demeanour, physical appearance as, .................................. [A.58], [22.15] demonstrations with, ......................... [A.60] document as, ....................................... [3.13] generally, ............................... [A.58]–[A.59] injuries, ............................................ [A.117] meaning, ............................................ [A.58] non-production of, ............................. [A.59] original document rule, and, ............. [A.59] personal appearance, ......................... [A.58] photograph of, ........................ [3.12], [3.20] privilege, not applicable, ................ [A.171], [A.198], [10.6], [130.34] tape recording as, ................... [3.21], [93.3] unlawfully obtained, ...... [130.38], [130.40], [130.44] Recent invention (fabrication), ......... [A.101], [19.25], [101.7], [Q.45] meaning, ........................................... [101.7] self-serving statement, and, .............. [Q.45] Recording of admissions, .................. [130.33], [130.77], [Q.56] Recording of evidence, ............................ [Q.8] Re-direction not sought, ........................................... [A.4] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

Re-examination affected child, ............................... [21AH.1] credit, questions as to, .................... [A.100] cross-examination, must arise from, .............................................. [A.100] generally, ............................ [A.100], [19.18] inconsistent statement, ......... [19.7], [19.15] objects of, ........................................ [A.100] recent invention, when suggested, ................................ [A.101], [101.7] Refreshing memory collaborative statement, ..................... [A.83] “contemporary note”, meaning, ........ [A.84] Commonwealth Act, ............... [F.14]–[F.16] cross-examining on notes, ............... [19.24] evidence, when not, ......... [A.86], [19.22], [19.23] when notes are, ............ [A.87], [19.23], [19.24], [101.2], [101.9]–[101.11] exhaust memory first, ........................ [A.85] generally, ............ [A.84]ff, [19.22]–[19.25], [83.3], [F.58]n inspection by opponent, .................... [A.86] out of court, ....................................... [A.86] privileged document used for, ........ [A.175] production of note, ............... [A.86], [A.87] unsigned confession, ...................... [130.33] waiver of privilege in, ....... [A.175], [10.23] Walker v Walker rule distinguished, ................................................ [A.86] Regret expression of, .................................... [Q.46] Regulation-making power, ................... [135.1] — see Evidence Regulation 2007 Relationship evidence, ........... [A.99], [A.136], [A.137], [15.18], [130.11], [132B.2], [F.51] domestic cases, ................. [A.41], [132B.2] Pfennig test, ..................................... [A.136] sentence, relevant to, ....................... [A.136] sexual offence, ................................. [A.136] Relevance Act silent, .......................................... [A.39] character evidence, ........... [A.136], [15.19], [F.4] circumstantial, .................... [A.62], [A.106], [A.130]–[A.133], [92.12] how determined, ........................ [A.130] not inherently inferior, .............. [A.131] prospectant, ................................ [A.132] retrospectant, ............................. [A.132] completeness, principle of, ............. [A.127]

693

Index Relevance — cont credit, to, ............... [15.62], [15A.1], [16.3], [16.8], [20.1], [20.5], [21.1], [21.8], [21.12] cross-examination, .... [20.4], [21.8], [21.13] sexual offence, ................ [21.8], [21.13] direct, ............................................... [A.126] res gesta, and, ............................ [A.126] fundamental importance, ...... [A.1], [A.125] generally, ............... [A.124]–[A.133], [F.31] how determined, .............................. [A.124] insufficient, ...................................... [A.134] meaning, .......................................... [A.124] policies override, ................................. [A.1] prior convictions, ............... [15.63], [15.64] principle, ................... [A.1], [A.11], [92.13] res gestae and direct relevance, ................................ [A.126]–[A.129] tribunals, .......................................... [Q.109] Reopening case, ................................... [A.103] Reproductions of documents admissibility, ....................... [106.1], [116.1] hearsay distinguished, ................ [106.4] affidavit verifying, .............. [113.1], [114.1] ancient documents rule, ................... [121.1] business documents, ........... [106.1]–[114.1] colour changes, ................................. [118.1] common law preserved, ................... [126.1] company records, .............................. [111.2] comparison not required, ................. [120.1] definitions, .......................... [104.3]–[104.9] discovery law modified, ..... [115.1], [116.1] discretion to reject, ........................... [124.1] evidence, copies to be, ..................... [116.1] exhaustive, provisions not, .............. [126.1] further reproduction, order for, ........ [117.1] generally, ............................. [104.1]–[128.1] hearsay rule not affected, ................. [106.4] independent processing, ................... [109.1] interstate reproductions, ................... [122.1] judicial notice of seals etc, .............. [123.1] Libraries etc Act, .............................. [129.1] machines approved, .......................... [107.2] notice to produce unnecessary, ........ [119.1] officers approved, ............................. [105.1] official documents, ........................... [105.1] original document rule, .................... [104.2] other rules preserved, ....................... [126.1] photographing machines, use of, ..... [107.1] prints, verifying, ............................... [108.1] proof of destruction, ......................... [112.1] Public Records Act not affected, ..... [129.2] record-keeping laws and, ................ [111.1], [129.2] rejection, ........................................... [124.1] sub-contracted copies, ...................... [109.1]

694

subpoena, compliance, ..................... [115.2] sub-standard prints, .......................... [117.1] tax records, ....................................... [111.2] transparency required, ........ [110.1], [110.2] replaces original, ........................ [111.1] Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, ...... [115.1] verification, microfilm etc, .............. [113.1], [114.1] weight of evidence, .......................... [125.1] Res gesta (gestae) boundaries extended, ....................... [A.129] character evidence, ........................... [15.21] CLSO Act and, ................................. [21.13] Commonwealth Act compared, .......... [F.42] completeness, principle of, ............. [A.127] direct relevance and, ......... [A.126], [15.21] dying declaration, ............................ [A.151] events and statements distinguished, ................................ [A.128], [A.145] examples, ......................................... [A.127] extension of, .................................... [A.129] meaning, .......................................... [A.126] other discreditable acts, ................... [A.127] statements as part of, ...................... [A.145] relaxation of tests, ..................... [A.145] verbal events distinguished, ........... [A.128], [A.145] Res judicata (estoppel by record), ..... [A.15], [A.211]–[A.215] administrative tribunal, .................... [A.211] Commonwealth tribunal, ........... [A.211] domestic tribunal, ...................... [A.211] criminal law versions, ..................... [A.211] default judgment, ............................. [A.211] foreign judgment, ................... [53.3], [69.3] hierarchy of courts distinguished, ............................................... [A.211] history, ............................................... [A.15] issue estoppel — see Issue estoppel splitting cause of action, ................. [A.211] Retrospectivity circumstantial evidence, .................. [A.132] evidence law changes, ......... [A.2], [39B.1], [136.2], [138.2] marital privilege abolition, ...... [8.2], [11.1], [138.1] privilege, .......................................... [A.172] Right to silence, ..... [10.3], [130.18], [130.19], [130.34n], [130.59], [130.71], [Q.33], [Q.52] abolition, ............................... [A.39], [Q.52] admission, is not, .............................. [Q.52] “ambush” defence, ............. [6.14], [10.23]n Evidence Law in Queensland

Index Right to silence, — cont cautioning suspect, .......... [10.24], [130.18], [130.19], [130.22], [130.24], [130.25], [130.29], [130.76] change of story, ................................. [Q.52] Commonwealth Act, ........................... [F.49] criticised, ................... [A.39], [10.3], [Q.52] disciplinary matters, ......................... [10.34] discretionary exclusion and, ......... [130.59], [Q.52] English law differs, ........... [A.39], [A.122], [130.18] generally, .............................. [A.121], [10.3] meaning, ............................................. [10.3] Police Powers etc Act, ................... [130.71] privilege distinguished, ...................... [10.3] representation, as, ............................ [A.219] story, change of, ................................. [10.3] voir dire, admissions during, ........... [15.10] warning about, .................. [10.24], [130.18] Road accidents causes of, expert evidence, ............... [A.67] Royal Commission appointment, ....................................... [58.1] criminal questions, ............................... [3.7] privilege, ............. [A.160], [10.29], [10.30], [Q.25], [Q.71], [Q.91] Royal Proclamation, ............................... [71.1] Royal sign manual document, ........... [58A.1] Rules, codes, specifications proof of, .............................................. [49.1]

generally, ............................... [Q.12]–[Q.21] innocent parties, ................................ [Q.17] invalid, quashing, .............................. [Q.21] judicial review, ..................... [Q.13], [Q.18] justice, cross-examination of, ........... [Q.18] justice issuing, duties, ....................... [Q.20] lawyer/police guidelines, ....... [Q.15], [F.70] mode of execution, ............................ [Q.17] nature of, ........................................... [Q.12] negative searches, .............................. [Q.17] offence to be specified, ..................... [Q.18] other offences detected, ..................... [Q.17] particulars, ............................. [Q.18]–[Q.19] Police Powers etc Act, ...................... [Q.12] professional privilege, .......... [Q.14], [Q.15] police, “accords” with, ................ [Q.15] reasonable suspicion, proof, .............. [Q.20] review by court, ................................ [Q.18] “rubber stamp”, justice acting as, ................................ [130.55], [Q.20] self-incrimination, ............... [10.6], [10.16], [Q.16] severance, ............................. [Q.13], [Q.18] similar powers, ...................... [Q.22], [F.71] suspicion, meaning, ........................... [Q.18] tax powers compared, ........................ [F.71] technicalities, ..................................... [Q.18] unduly wide, ...................................... [Q.13] Secondary evidence — see also Document Commonwealth Act, ........................... [F.27] generally, ....... [3.15], [63.2], [84.5], [97.1], [104.6], [Q.96], [Q.103] will, of, ............................................... [63.2] Section 92 — see Business records Section 93 — see Business records

S Section 93A — see Hearsay rule – pre-trial statement (child etc) Scientific instrument, ............................ [A.63] Seal of Queensland judicial notice, .................................... [41.1] Search warrants abuse of, ............................................ [Q.13] amendment by court, ......................... [Q.13] Anton Piller order compared, ........... [Q.11] application for, ...................... [Q.18], [Q.19] civil proceedings, not to be used for, ................................................ [Q.13] Commonwealth law, ............... [F.70], [F.71] comparable powers, ........................... [Q.22] electronic material, seizure, .............. [Q.12] evidence to obtain, ............................ [Q.18] execution, lawful, .............................. [Q.17] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

Section 101 abolishes credit/facts distinction, ..... [101.1] consistent statements, ....................... [101.7] criminal proceedings, in, .................. [101.5] inconsistent statements, .................... [101.3] notes to refresh memory, ................. [101.9] oral hearsay, effect on, ................... [101.12] s 94 statements, ................................ [101.8] statements affected, .......................... [101.2] Self-incrimination (privilege) abrogation, .......................... [A.194], [10.4], [10.29]–[10.30], [10.33]–[10.36], [F.78] compromises, ............... [10.31]–[10.32], [Q.91]

695

Index Self-incrimination (privilege) — cont implied abrogation criticised, .................................. [10.34]–[10.37] accused who testifies, ......................... [15.5] admission already made, .................. [10.22] adultery, privilege abolished, ............. [13.1] adverse inference when claimed?, ............................................... [10.26] Anton Piller orders, .......................... [10.14] “blanket” claim, ............................... [10.18] blood test, ........................................... [10.1] breath, blood tests, ............................. [10.7] civil liability, .................................... [10.14] civil penalties, .................................. [10.12] claim not conclusive, .......... [10.19]–[10.21] co-offender, ............................. [8.3], [15.13] commission of inquiry, ..................... [Q.25] committal proceedings, ..................... [A.23] Commonwealth law, ............... [F.61], [F.78] compulsion of law, ......................... [10.27]n constitutional right, not a, .... [10.4], [10.29] coronial inquiry, ............................. [10.32]n corporations not entitled, ................. [10.16] court may examine claim, ............... [10.19] courts, not limited to, ............ [A.8], [10.10] cross-examination of accused, .......... [15.1], [15.5] disallowance, ........................................ [F.4] disciplinary offences, ........................ [10.12] disclosure, previous, ......................... [10.22] discovery available on, ................................. [10.5] precautions, ................................. [10.24] documents, production, ...................... [10.5] erroneous rejection, .......................... [10.27] extensions of, ................................... [10.12] fingerprints and photographs, ............ [10.7] foreign law offence, ......................... [10.11] forfeitures, ............................ [10.13], [14.2] generally, .......................................... [10.1]ff history, ..................... [A.16], [A.23], [A.27], [10.8]–[10.9] improper access, ............................... [10.28] incrimination distinguished, .............. [10.6], [Q.16] insurer, disclosure to, ......................... [10.1] jury, exclusion from voir dire, ......... [10.19] lawful excuse for non-disclosure, ...... [10.2] meaning, ............................................. [10.1] medical tests, ...................................... [10.7] physical examinations, ....................... [10.7] proceeds of crime legislation, .......... [10.36] real evidence, not applicable to, ........ [10.6] recognition improved, ....................... [A.23] “right to silence” compared, .............. [10.3] risk, degree of, .................... [10.20]–[10.22] Royal Commission — see Royal Commission search warrants, ......... [10.6], [F.70], [Q.16]

696

solicitors beware, ............................. [10.23] spouse, incrimination of, .................. [10.15] State protection in federal court?, .................................. [10.31], [Q.91] statutory abrogation, ........... [10.29]–[10.37] “tendency” to incriminate, .................................. [10.20]–[10.21] voir dire and the accused, .... [15.6]–[15.11] warning, right to, ............... [10.23]–[10.24], [130.19], [F.64] writing specimen, ............................. [59.10] Sentencing agreed facts, no estoppels, ............ [132C.8] evidence rules not applicable, ......... [A.107] facts, proof of, ................................ [A.107], [132C.1]–[132C.4] “stale” convictions, ......................... [15A.6] standard of proof, ........... [A.107], [132C.3] transitional provision, ....................... [136.2] Sexual offences accused’s identity suppressed, ............ [Q.4] complainant’s identity, ........................ [Q.4] complaints long delayed, ................ [A.154] convictions for, admissibility, ......... [15.64], [15.65] corroboration rule changed, ........... [Q.107], [F.67] cross-examination, complainant, ...... [A.39], [13.3], [21.5]ff, [Q.2] CLSO Act rules, ........................... [21.8] conduct with accused, ................ [21.10] credit, cross-examination as to, ............................................... [21.18] general reputation, ...................... [21.11] limitation, ........... [A.39], [A.41], [21.5], [21.8] other occasions substantially relevant, .................................. [21.12]–[21.16] policy of CLSOA, ........................ [21.9] rules for, under CLSOA, .................................. [21.19]–[21.21] unrepresented defendant, sexual offence, ............................................ [21N.1]ff fresh complaint — see Fresh complaint imputation of, ................................... [15.55] meaning, ............................................. [21.6] “preliminary complaint”, ................ [A.154], [93A.11] previous offences, ............................. [15.64] relationship evidence, ...................... [A.136] s 21A, and, ...................................... [21A.1] s 93A, and, ..................... [93A.1], [93A.21] Ships proof of title, ...................................... [52.1] Evidence Law in Queensland

Index Signature electronic, ......................................... [92.38] stamp, ............................................... [92.38] Similar facts Act silent, .......................................... [A.39] admissibility of (collusion), .......... [132A.2] civil cases, ....................................... [A.141] Commonwealth Act stricter?, ............................................ [A.141]n collusion and, .................................... [A.41] s 132A, .................... [132A.1]–[132A.3] coincidence excluded, ..................... [A.139] Commonwealth Act, ............... [F.51]–[F.54] constituent facts, focus on, ............. [A.138] cross-examining accused, ................. [15.18] defence, for (crime), ........................ [A.141] discretionary rejection, ................... [130.13] domestic violence, ......................... [132B.1] generally, .............. [A.137], [15.19]–[15.21] guidelines, ........................................ [A.140] judges wary of, ................................ [A.137] origin of phrase, ............................ [A.137]n practice or habit, ............................. [A.141] propensity evidence, ........................ [A.139] rationale, ........................... [A.138], [A.139] reforms rejected, ................................ [A.40] res gesta, ........................................... [15.21] s 15(2), and, ..................................... [15.20] standard of proof, ........... [A.105], [A.136]n Solicitors affidavits, drafting, .................. [A.5], [A.24] authority to conclude settlement agreement, .............................................. [A.197] expert witness, ................................... [A.67] factual information and privilege, .............................................. [A.168] own perception not privileged, ....... [A.171] role, evidence rules, ............................ [A.5] self-incrimination, risk, .................... [10.23] waiver by, ........................................ [A.175] Special witness accused, interests of, ....................... [21A.2] “affected child” — see Affected child arrangements for, ............................. [21A.3] videotapes, procedure, ................................ [21A.6]–[21A.7] balancing exercise, .......................... [21A.2] child under 16, ................................ [21A.1] child witnesses articles on, ............................... [21A.10] tactics with, .............................. [21A.11] civil proceedings, ............................ [21A.1] disadvantaged person, ..................... [21A.2] domestic violence, ........................... [21A.1] editing tapes, ................................... [21A.7] exclusion of parties etc, .................. [21A.3] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

law reform, ...................................... [21A.1] meaning, .......................................... [21A.2] order, form of, .................. [21A.2], [21A.6] protected witness — see Protected witness reliability, ......................................... [21A.8] videotaping evidence, ...................... [21A.5] Splitting case, ....................................... [A.103] Spouse, immunity or privilege abolition of privilege, ............... [8.2], [11.1] access, evidence of, ............................ [12.1] adultery, .................................. [13.1]–[13.3] co-accused, when, ...................... [8.3], [8.4] Commonwealth Act, ............... [F.10]–[F.12] communications, ................................. [11.1] compellable, ............................... [7.4], [7.5] competence, .......................................... [8.1] Crime and Corruption Commission, in, ................................................... [8.2] family members, other, ...................... [F.10] incompetent, ............. [A.13], [A.16], [A.26] incrimination of, ............................... [10.15] marital access, former privilege, ...... [12.1], [F.79] meaning, ............................................... [8.2] “Stale” convictions revival of, ........................................ [15A.5] sentence, evidence on, .................... [15A.6] Stamp duty admissibility of documents, ............... [3.16] assessment, estoppel, ....................... [A.222] privilege, and, .................................... [Q.92] Standard rules, codes etc proof of, .............................................. [49.1] Standards of proof averments, statutory, .......................... [Q.28] beyond reasonable doubt, ............... [A.105] explaining this phrase, .............. [A.105] book of account, criminal case, ......... [88.4] circumstantial case (crime), ............ [A.106] “chain”, ...................................... [A.106] “rope”, ....................................... [A.106] civil penalty, ............ [A.112], [3.8], [10.12] civil proceedings, ..... [A.114], [3.7], [59.11] criminal imputations in, ........... [A.114], [A.115], [3.7], [80.1]n deceased estate, claim against, ............................................... [A.114] possibilities, ............................... [A.114] “reasonable satisfaction”, .......... [A.114] speculation, ................................ [A.114] confession, voluntariness, ................. [Q.77] confiscation of property, .................. [10.13]

697

Index Standards of proof — cont contempt of court, ........................... [A.111] criminal proceedings, ......... [A.105], [88.4], [93.2] defence, when onus on, ................. [A.109], [130.63], [Q.35] disciplinary tribunal, .............. [A.113], [3.7] discretionary rejection (crime), ..... [130.63], [Q.77] forfeiture, .......................................... [10.13] generally, ....................................... [A.105]ff habeas corpus, ................................... [Q.35] handwriting comparisons, ................ [59.11] jurisdictional facts, .......................... [A.108] LBW rule and criminal standard, .............................................. [A.105] prior convictions re guilt, .............. [A.105], [A.107], [15.34], [132C.2] quasi-criminal issue, .............. [A.115], [3.7] rebuttal, when impossible, .............. [A.114] “reasonable doubt”, ......................... [A.105] “reasonable satisfaction”, ................. [59.11] reverse onus, ....... [A.109], [130.63], [Q.35] search warrant, .................................. [Q.18] s 93, and, ............................................ [93.2] sentencing, ....... [A.41], [A.107], [132C.1]ff similar facts, civil case, .................. [A.141] speculation, ...................................... [A.114] unlawful purpose, ............................ [A.183] voir dire, on, ...... [A.110], [A.114], [59.11], [93.4], [Q.77], [Q.79], [F.49] voluntariness, confession, ................. [Q.77] Star Chamber, ............... [A.16], [A.17], [10.8] Statement — see also Business records document functioning as, ................... [3.28] maker of, ........................................ [92.37]ff meaning, ............................................. [3.28] opinion as, ............................ [3.26], [92.15] self-serving, ....................................... [Q.45] State seal ancient doctrine, ................................ [A.15] judicial notice, .................................... [41.1] proof of, .............................................. [41.1] reproductions, ................................... [123.1] Status of Children Act medical examination, ......................... [37.1] proof of paternity, ............... [53.10], [74.9], [Q.24], [Q.86] self-incrimination, ............................ [10.1]n succession law, ................................. [12.2]n Statute of Frauds ambit of, ............................................ [Q.97] auction sale of land, .......................... [Q.97]

698

created after agreement, .................. [Q.101] deeds, proof of, ............................... [A.14]n document needed, .............................. [A.53] essential contents, .............................. [Q.98] generally, ......................................... [A.97]ff intent not necessary, ........................ [Q.102] liberalisation, ................................... [Q.100] memorandum contents, ..................... [Q.98] origin, .................................... [A.14], [Q.53] part performance, ............................ [Q.104] plea, instructions to use, ................. [Q.105] printed signature, ............................. [Q.100] secondary evidence, ........................ [Q.103] several documents, ............................ [Q.99] signature, position of, ........................ [Q.99] evidence as to intent, ................ [92.38], [Q.100] Statutory averments abuse of, ............................................ [Q.32] allegations as evidence, ....... [Q.26]–[Q.32], [F.73] Commonwealth laws, ......................... [F.73] conclusive, ......................................... [Q.28] criminal standard, and, ...................... [Q.28] criticism of, ....................................... [Q.27] defective averments, .......................... [Q.29] examples, ..................................... [Q.31] examples of legislation, .................... [Q.31] generally, ............................... [Q.27]–[Q.32] mixed fact and law, ........................... [Q.28] normal evidence against, ................... [Q.30] onus of proof, and, ............................ [Q.29] sufficient proof, .................................. [Q.28] supporting evidence, ......................... [Q.30] Statutory certificates, ................ [Q.40], [F.26] Statutory declaration “affidavit” includes, .......................... [104.3] book of account, proof of, ..... [85.2], [86.1] will, proof of, ........... [61.3], [85.2], [104.3] Stay of proceedings, ............................ [A.214] criminal case, ................................... [A.214] Subpoena abuse of, ............................... [A.65], [Q.10] arbitration proceedings, ........................ [2.2] Australia, service within, ..................... [6.7] calling witness without, .................... [A.65] collateral use, ..................................... [Q.10] conduct money, .................................... [6.8] contempt of court, ............................. [A.65] custody of documents, ..................... [133.2] discovery compared, ......................... [Q.10] expert witness, ......................... [A.65], [6.9] failure to comply with, ..................... [A.65] Evidence Law in Queensland

Index Subpoena — cont fishing, ............................................... [A.65] material as to credit (crime), ........... [15.62] oppressive, .................. [A.65], [6.8], [Q.10] parliamentary privilege, ..................... [47.2] person at court, not needed, ................ [6.8] privilege, and, ........................... [6.9], [F.56] reproduction of document, ............... [115.2] self-incrimination, and, ...................... [10.5] service outside Queensland, ................ [6.7], [22.10] statement, need not give, .................. [Q.10] vexatious, ........................................... [Q.10] witness already at court, not needed, ................................................... [6.8] Swearing the issue (ultimate issue rule) abolition, ............................................. [F.48] decline of rule, ................................... [F.48] expert, ................................... [A.75], [9C.7]

T

Tape recordings audiotape as will, ................... [3.11], [Q.96] child’s evidence, .............. [21A.3], [21A.5], [21A.6], [93A.1]ff deposition in, ...................................... [23.3] document, as, .......... [A.51], [3.11], [93A.4] document, copy of, ............................. [F.27] history, ................................................ [3.11] jury’s access to, .................................. [99.1] narrative, as, ....................................... [3.21] playback to interviewee, ................ [130.33] proof of, .................................. [3.11], [3.21] real evidence, as, .................. [3.21], [3.21]n refreshing memory, ............................ [3.23] replaying, when irregular, ............... [21A.7] required, when, .............. [130.31], [130.77], [Q.55] secretly made, ................................. [130.59] s 92 statement, ................................. [92.38] special witness, .............................. [21A.3]n transcript of, .... [3.11], [3.21], [3.22], [4.1], [19.4], [21.6], [F.27] unfairly obtained, exclusion of, ..... [130.44] verification, ......................................... [3.21] video recording, ...... [3.11], [3.21], [21A.3], [21A.5], [21A.6], [22.4], [22.8], [22.10], [22.15], [22.16], [93.3], [93A.4], [93A.10], [95.6], [98.3], [Q.56], [Q.87] voice identification, ............... [A.70], [3.21] will recorded on, ................... [3.11], [Q.96] witness ill, .......................................... [22.8] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

Telegraphic messages delivery, proof of, ............................... [77.1] history, ............................................... [A.31] message, proof of, .............................. [76.1] modernisation of law, ......................... [75.3] notice of tender, ................................. [75.1] proof of, .................................. [75.1]–[77.1] “telegraph”, meaning, ........................ [3.27] Telephone, evidence by, ........... [22.4], [22.10] Telephone tapping, ............ [130.49], [130.50], [F.82] Testimony, ............................................ [A.47]ff factual, to be, ..................................... [A.66] nature of, ........................................... [A.47] Third party confession, ........ [19.17], [93B.8], [130.5]n, [Q.43], [F.43] Title deeds privilege abolished, ............................ [14.3] Transcript jury, access to, ............................. [93A.25]n not evidence, ............................... [93A.25]n Transitional provision Evidence Act Amendment Act 2000, ............................................... [136.1] Transparency original, replaces, ............................. [111.1] preservation of original, ................... [110.1] Trial on affidavit, ........... [A.5], [A.24], [A.28] Tribunals deemed to be court, ......................... [39C.4] definition, ............................... [3.1], [39C.7] estoppel by record, ........... [A.211], [A.213] evidence rules in, ..... [A.8], [10.2], [10.10], [10.31], [Q.109], [F.59] exclusion of phone taps, .................... [F.82] growth of, ............................................ [A.6] self-incrimination, to warn about, ............................................... [10.24] standard of proof, ............................ [A.113]

U Ultimate issue rule — see Swearing the issue Undercover agent, .... [130.56], [Q.58], [Q.62], [Q.71] not person in authority, ..................... [Q.71]

699

Index “Undertaking”, ......................................... [3.1] course of, in the, .............................. [92.23] diary as record of, ............................ [83.14] hospital as, ........................................ [83.12] meaning, ................. [3.30], [83.12], [104.4] particular organisation, ordinary course, ................................................. [83.7] sporting body as, .............................. [83.12] trade or business compared, .............. [93.7] Unfavourable witness Commonwealth Act, ........................... [F.19] “hostile” witness compared, .............. [17.2] Unreliable evidence, .... [A.88], [A.142], [8.4], [9D.2], [15.42], [100.1], [101.3], [130.14], [130.48], [Q.72], [Q.107], [F.4], [F.8], [F.35], [F.39] Unrepresented defendant, ....................... [8.6] Unsafe and unsatisfactory conviction appeal court, question for, ............ [93A.20] judicial power, ................................... [9D.3] recent development, ...................... [93A.20] second guessing, ................................ [9D.3] s 93A statement, ........... [93A.2], [93A.20]ff s 101 material, .................................. [101.5] s 102, ................................................ [102.1]

V Veracity — see also Credit evidence as to, ................................... [A.96] Video-link, ...... [21B.1], [22.4], [22.8], [22.16], [39PB.1], [39PC.1], [Q.3] — see also Audio visual link — see also Evidence on commission — see also Tape recording Video recording document, as, ...................................... [3.11] evidence outside court, ...................... [22.8] meaning, ............................ [3.1], Dictionary police interviews, .... [130.31], [130.77], [Q.56], [F.72] repeated playing, ............................. [21A.7] s 21A statement, ............................ [21A.5]ff order for, .................................... [21A.5] View, ............................... [A.35], [A.60], [F.29] Commonwealth Act, under, ............... [F.29] demonstrations distinguished, ........... [A.60] jury, by, .............................................. [A.35] presence of parties, ........................... [A.60]

700

unreality of common law rule, ........ [A.60], [F.29] Voice identification, .................. [A.67], [A.77] article, .............................................. [A.67]n direction by judge, .......................... [A.121] expert, ................................................ [A.77] weak, ............................................. [130.11]n Voir dire admissions during, crime, ..... [15.6]–[15.11] appeal from fact finding, ................... [Q.78] attacking Crown witness, .................. [Q.76] bad character questions on, ............. [15.12] canvassing issues before jury, ........... [Q.79] civil non-jury case, in, ..................... [15.9]n character evidence, ........................... [15.12] competency issues, .................. [6.5], [9C.8] child etc, of, .... [9A.4], [9A.5], [21A.8], [93A.3] confession, ............................ [Q.72]–[Q.76] “criminal proceeding”, not a, ...... [3.10] cross-examination, ............................. [Q.76] of accused, ...... [15.6]–[15.11], [130.28] preview of, ................................. [15.71] delayed, .............................................. [Q.72] documents, admissibility, ................. [92.36] dual purpose, ..................................... [Q.49] deceased or ill witness’s statement, ................................................. [23.4] document, s 92, ................................ [92.36] dying declaration, .......................... [A.151]n evidence, repeated on trial, .............. [9A.9], [Q.75], [Q.79] expert witness, .................... [9A.3], [21A.2] hostile witness, ..................... [17.7], [17.13] judge calling witness, ......................... [6.25] nature and purpose, ............... [3.10], [15.6], [Q.73] non-jury court, ................................... [Q.75] oath, capacity to take, .......................... [6.5] privilege, challenged, ....... [A.182], [10.19], [11.9] procedure, ..... [9A.4], [11.9], [17.7], [21.9], [21A.2], [59.11], [92.36], [130.48], [Q.49], [Q.72], [Q.74]–[Q.76] rebuttal, .............................................. [Q.76] rules of evidence apply, .................... [Q.76] s 15(1), and, ..................................... [15.6]ff s 15(2) preview, ................................ [15.71] sexual offences, ................................ [21.19] similar facts, on, ............................. [130.43] standard of proof, ............. [A.110], [59.11], [93.4], [130.63], [Q.77] testing witnesses, ............................... [Q.73] unrepresented defendant, ......... [8.6], [Q.72] Evidence Law in Queensland

Index Voluntariness — see Confessions Votes and proceedings proof of, .............................................. [47.1]

W Waiver adjectival law, evidence rules, ........... [A.2], [A.124], [3.6] affected child, waiver of support, ............................................. [21AV.1] authority, lack of, ............................ [A.179] common interest privilege, ............. [A.178] disclosure of legal advice, .............. [A.175] emergency, failure to claim, ............. [Q.14] estoppel not pleaded, ....................... [A.216] evidence rules of, .................. [3.6], [A.216] limited, .............................. [A.176], [A.179] privilege, of, ...... [A.175]–[A.178], [A.186], [A.204], [10.23], [Q.14], [F.58] legal professional privilege, .... [A.175]ff self-incrimination, ........ [10.22], [10.23] “without prejudice” material, ............................................ [A.204]ff rules of evidence, .................. [A.216], [3.6] search warrant, ................... [A.179], [Q.14] Walker v Walker, rule in, ................... [A.155] abolished, ................................ [F.17], [F.24] inspection distinguished, ..... [A.86], [19.22] meaning and effect, ......................... [A.155] Weight of evidence absent witness, ..................... [92.31], [98.5] authentication distinguished, ........... [85.2]n, [5.15], [44.1], [62.1], [Q.100] averment, ........................................... [Q.30] child, .............................................. [93A.13] corroboration, ...................... [A.116], [Q.55] covert exclusion, .............................. [102.2] difficulty in getting, weight, ............ [A.116] discretionary exclusion, .................. [130.7], [130.48] evidence rules, substitute for, ........... [A.12] generally, ....................................... [A.116]ff identification evidence, ...... [59.3], [59A.2], [130.11] inconsistent statement, ..................... [101.2] Jones v Dunkel, ..... [A.1], [A.118]ff, [6.15], [7.2], [10.26], [Q.32], [F.6], [F.13] judicial power, .................... [102.2], [103.1] opinion evidence, ............................... [F.47] Pt 6 material, ......... [92.31], [99.1], [101.2], [102.1]ff parental influence, ............................. [9A.3] reproductions, ................................... [125.1] © 2016 THOMSON REUTERS

rules regarding, ................... [A.1], [A.116]ff self-serving material, ......................... [Q.57] unsafe verdicts, .................................. [9D.3] Wentworth, William Charles evidence reform opposes, .................... [6.3] fusion of profession opposes, .............. [6.3] Wills audiotape recording as will, .............. [3.11], [Q.96] declaration, proof by, ......................... [63.1] evidentiary effect, ............................... [64.1] history of rules, ................................. [A.14] probate, effect of, .................... [64.1]–[64.2] proof of, .................................. [63.1]–[63.2] Without prejudice (privilege) abuse of, .......................................... [A.205] admissions only?, ............................ [A.198] proof by other means, .............. [A.198], [A.208] authority to conclude compromise agreement, ........................... [A.197] bona fides, ....................................... [A.201] costs issue, ....................................... [A.203] court ordering negotiations, ............ [A.208] deeds produced, ............................... [A.198] duration, ........................................... [A.206] experts’ conference, .......................... [A.67] generally, ........................... [A.197]ff, [F.63] liability admission, .......................... [A.202] litigants in person, ........................... [A.200] “magic words”, use of, ................... [A.200] misuse of term, ................................ [A.202] negotiations essential, ..................... [A.202] part of dispute, negotiating, ............ [A.203] policy of, ......................................... [A.197] real evidence and, ........................... [A.198] rights, no dispute, ............................ [A.202] unauthorised settlements, ................ [A.207] waiver of, ......................................... [A.204] witness statements, .......................... [A.199] words not essential, ......................... [A.200] Witness — see also Child, evidence of — see also Spouse, immunity or privilege accrediting own witness, ................... [A.80] accused as, .................... [8.5]–[8.7], [15.1]ff adverse — see hostile anonymous — see Witness identity protection before testifying, excluded from courtroom, ................................................ [A.68] bias, ............................ [A.97], [6.26], [94.5] closed circuit television, ................. [21A.3] compellable, ..................... [6.7], [7.5], [8.4] competency — see Competency conversation, evidence of, ................ [A.83]

701

Index Witness — cont convicted person, ............................... [6.26] convictions, cross-examination, ...... [16.1]ff, [15A.1]ff proof of, .................................. [16.5]–[16.6] co-offender as, ...................................... [8.3] corruption of, ..................................... [A.97] credit assessment, .................................... [A.7] commenting on, ............... [A.66], [A.7], [A.90] defence, for, to be sworn, ................ [131.1] failing to call, ......... [A.118]ff, [6.15], [7.2], [10.26], [Q.32], [F.6], [F.13] — see also Jones v Dunkel “got at”, ............................................ [101.5] hostile, ............. [A.82], [17.1]ff — see also Hostile witness identity, suppression of, ...................... [Q.4] impeaching own, ..... [A.82], [17.1]ff, [F.19] interest no disqualification, ................ [6.26] interpreter, right to, ....................... [131A.1] judge calling, .......................... [6.17]–[6.25] leading, rule against, ......................... [A.81] memory, to speak from, .................... [A.83] no property in witness, ................. [A.198]n opinion on another’s credit, .............. [A.66] opponent as own witness, .................... [7.3] parties as, .................................... [7.2]–[7.3] parties choose, ...................... [6.13], [6.17]ff personal appearance required, ........... [6.10] precincts of court, in, ........................... [6.8] privilege, warning to, ......................... [F.64] privilege abolished, .............................. [8.2] prosecution, disclosure of, ................. [6.14] pseudonym — see Witness identity protection refreshing memory, .............. [A.83], [101.9] relative, criminal case, ....................... [F.10] reliability, expert evidence on, .......... [A.72] selection of, ............................ [6.13]–[6.15] special, ........................................... [21A.1]ff spouses, ......... [7.1], [7.4], [7.5], [8.2], [8.3] unavailable, psychiatric injury, ..... [93A.12] video link, evidence by, security reasons, .................................... [21B.1], [Q.3] Witness identity protection certificate cancellation, ............................... [21KB] corresponding laws, recognition, ............................................... [21KH] definitions, ......................... [21C], [21G] disclosure of identity, ............... [21K.1], [21KC], [21KD], [21KF] effect of, ................................... [21I] filing and notification, ............ [21H] form of, ................. [21B.4], [21G.1] giving of, ................. [21F.1], [21KI]

702

jury directions, ..................... [21KA] offences, ............................... [21KD] protective orders, ..................... [21J] reports on, ............................ [21KG] review of, ............ [21F.3], [21KE.1] generally, ................................. [21B.1]ff Words and phrases adjectival law, ...................................... [A.2] adverse witness, ...................... [17.2]–[17.3] affected child, ................................... [21AC] agent provocateur, .......................... [130.61] ancient document, ................ [62.1], [122.1] approved forms, ................................... [3.2] astronomical phenomena, ................... [66.1] attested, ............................................... [60.1] available (witness), ........................ [93A.12] averment, ............................. [Q.27]ff, [F.73] bad character, ................................... [15.49] basis rule (expert), ............................. [A.75] book of account, ................................. [83.5] builder’s debris, ................................. [A.28] business, ........................................... [83.13] case management, .............................. [6.18] character, ........................................... [15.29] chatterings of orang outang, ................ [6.3] chief executive, .................................... [3.3] child of jury system, ......................... [A.20] Chinese wall, ................................... [A.173] civil penalty, ..................................... [10.12] committed, ........................................ [15.45] compulsion of law, ......................... [10.27]n computer, ............................................ [95.2] conduct of the defence, .................... [15.50] confession, ......................................... [Q.50] controlled operation, ........................ [21B.1] conviction, ............ [15.46], [15A.2], [53.5], [54.1], [78.1] costs in the cause, ............................ [22.29] counsel, ............................................. [15.48] course of official questioning, ....... [130.31], [130.77] court, ................. [3.4], [3.6], [78.2], [83.16] covert operative, .............................. [21B.1] criminal proceeding, ............................. [3.7] “dangerous”, ...................................... [A.78] device or process, ............................... [95.2] document, ............................. [3.11], [3.17]ff dying declarations, .......................... [A.151] entrapment, ..................................... [130.58] evidential burden, ............................ [A.104] fishing, ..................... [A.65], [22.13], [88.3] fresh complaint, ............................... [A.154] futile system (affidavits), ................... [A.24] gobbledegook, .................... [101.1], [101.2] guilty denial, ...................................... [Q.45] hostile witness, ................................... [17.9] hot tubbing, ....................................... [A.67] husband, .................................... [8.2], [11.2] Evidence Law in Queensland

Index Words and phrases — cont impeaching witness, ............ [A.17], [A.25], [17.1] implied assertions, ........................... [A.144] imputation, ............ [15.32], [15.42], [15.52] inducement, ....................................... [Q.59] infirmities of human nature, ............. [A.13] judge, .................................................. [3.24] judicial notice, ................................... [A.62] law enforcement agency, ................. [21B.1] marked for identification, ................. [133.4] mere traverse, ................................... [15.56] minor premise, ................................. [A.130] negligence industry, ......................... [A.114] next friend, ........................ [130.46], [Q.56] nolle prosequi, .................... [Q.74], [A.102] ordinary course (business), ................ [83.7] “other occasion” evidence, .............. [15.18] overseas country, ................................ [67.1] person in authority, ............................ [Q.71] persuasive burden, ........................... [A.104] preliminary complaint, .................... [A.154] prescribed offence, .......................... [21M.3] prescribed special offence, ............. [21M.2] presumption of continuance, ........... [A.132] probabilities of human affairs, ............ [A.1] proceeding, ......................................... [3.26] prosecutor, ........................................ [15.51] “Prosecutor’s Fallacy”, ..................... [A.69] protected witness, ................. [3.27], [21F.1] public document, ................................ [51.3] quasi privilege, ................................ [A.166] record (accused), .............................. [15.40] refreshing memory, ............................ [A.84] reverse discretion, ............... [15.27], [Q.56] senior police officer, ........................ [21D.1] sentence, ............................................. [53.5] sexual offence, .................................... [21.6] silent major premise, ....................... [A.130]

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splitting case, ................................... [A.103] statement, ............................................ [3.26] suspect evidence, ............................. [Q.107] telegraph, ............................................ [3.27] telephone exception, ........................ [A.156] tending to establish, ........... [15.44], [92.18] testimonially, ...................................... [83.1] trade or business, ................. [83.13], [93.7] trial by ambush, ................................. [6.14] trial of victim, .................................. [15.51] “unavailable” (witness), .... [93A.12], [F.40] undercover agent, ............. [130.56], [Q.58], [Q.62], [Q.71] undertaking, .......................... [3.28], [83.12] unmitigated fiction, ............................. [A.6] unreasonable doubt, ......................... [A.105] unsafe and unsatisfactory verdict, ................... [9D.3]–[9D.4], [93A.20] videolink, .............................................. [2.8] voluntary, ........................................... [Q.59] without prejudice, ............................ [A.197] witness identity protection, ............. [21B.1] writing, ............................................... [3.17] Writing cause of action, reviving, ................ [Q.106] committal, evidence at, ....................... [Q.9] comparison of, ................................. [59.1]ff confession, .......................... [130.31], [F.72] defined, ............................................... [3.17] inconsistent statement, ..................... [19.4]ff judge’s satisfaction, .......................... [59.11] expert evidence, ......... [59.2], [59.5], [59.6] non-expert evidence, .......................... [59.3] s 93A, .............................................. [93A.4] specimen during cross-examination, ............................................ [59A.42] Statute of Frauds, .............................. [Q.97] will, required for, .............................. [Q.96] written transaction, alteration, ........... [3.14]

703