Everyday Europe: Social Transnationalism in an Unsettled Continent 9781447334217

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EVERYDAY EUROPE SOCIAL TRANSNATIONALISM IN AN UNSETTLED CONTINENT ETTORE RECCHI, ADRIAN FAVELL, FULYA APAYDIN, ROXANA BARBULESCU, MICHAEL BRAUN, ` MEDRANO, IRINA CIORNEI, NIALL CUNNINGHAM, JUAN DIEZ DENIZ N.DURU, LAURIE HANQUINET, STEFFEN PÖTZSCHKE, ` MIKE SAVAGE, DAVID REIMER, JUSTYNA SALAMONSKA, JANNE SOLGAARD JENSEN, ALBERT VARELA

EVERYDAY EUROPE Social transnationalism in an unsettled continent Ettore Recchi, Adrian Favell, Fulya Apaydin, Roxana Barbulescu, Michael Braun, Irina Ciornei, Niall Cunningham, Juan Díez Medrano, Deniz N. Duru, Laurie Hanquinet, Steffen Pötzschke, David Reimer, Justyna Salamońska, Mike Savage, Janne Solgaard Jensen, Albert Varela

First published in Great Britain in 2019 by Policy Press North America office: University of Bristol Policy Press 1-9 Old Park Hill c/o The University of Chicago Press Bristol 1427 East 60th Street BS2 8BB Chicago, IL 60637, USA UK t: +1 773 702 7700 t: +44 (0)117 954 5940 f: +1 773-702-9756 [email protected] [email protected] www.policypress.co.uk www.press.uchicago.edu © Policy Press 2019 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested 978-1-4473-3420-0 hardback 978-1-4473-3421-7 ePdf 978-1-4473-3423-1 ePub 978-1-4473-3424-8 Mobi The rights of Ettore Recchi, Adrian Favell, Fulya Apaydin, Roxana Barbulescu, Michael Braun, Irina Ciornei, Niall Cunningham, Juan Díez Medrano, Deniz N. Duru, Laurie Hanquinet, Steffen Pötzschke, David Reimer, Justyna Salamońska, Mike Savage, Janne Solgaard Jensen and Albert Varela to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Policy Press. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the authors and not of the University of Bristol or Policy Press. The University of Bristol and Policy Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Policy Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design by Robin Hawes Front cover image: iStock Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Policy Press uses environmentally responsible print partners

Contents List of tables and figures vii Notes on contributors xi Acknowledgements xv Introduction: Social transnationalism in an unsettled continent 1 Adrian Favell and Ettore Recchi Social transnationalism amidst the Eurogloom 1 Towards the study of social transnationalism in Europe 8 Overview of chapters 18 The future of social transnationalism in Europe 22 one

Cartographies of social transnationalism 35 Mike Savage, Niall Cunningham, David Reimer and Adrian Favell Introduction 35 The European geography of social transnationalism 38 The geography of ‘close connections’ beyond Europe 40 The internal geography of European connections 43 The stratification of close connections abroad 50 Conclusion 55

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The social structure of transnational practices 61 Justyna Salamońska and Ettore Recchi Introduction 61 Types of cross-border practices 62 Data and indicators 67 The size and scope of cross-border practices in six 68 European countries The social determinants of cross-border practices 71 Configurations of cross-border practices: results 75 from MCA Conclusion 81

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Cultural boundaries and transnational consumption 87 patterns Laurie Hanquinet and Mike Savage Introduction 87 Musical taste in Europe 91 Culinary taste 95 Synthesising cultural consumption divisions in Europe 98 Data and variables 99 Main cultural dimensions in the European space 101 of tastes Exploration of the cultural space 106 Conclusion 110

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Social transnationalism and supranational identifications 115 Steffen Pötzschke and Michael Braun Introduction 115 Transnationalism and identifications: research 117 questions Data and methods 121 Results: Unpacking the impact of transnational 124 practices Conclusion 132

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Explaining supranational solidarity 137 Juan Díez Medrano, Irina Ciornei and Fulya Apaydin Introduction 137 Understanding solidarity: existing approaches 138 Solidarity in the European Union 143 Conclusion 161 Appendix: independent variables included in 164 statistical analysis

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Narratives and varieties of everyday transnationalism 171 Adrian Favell, Janne Solgaard Jensen and David Reimer Introduction 171 Studying narratives 176 The Danes 176 The Spanish 180 The Italians 183 The Germans 187 The British 189 Conclusion 190

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Understanding Romanians’ cross-border mobility 195 in Europe: movers, stayers and returnees Roxana Barbulescu, Irina Ciornei and Albert Varela Mobility practices of Romanian stayers, movers 195 and returnees Transnationalism from below and cross-border 197 mobility Space-sets as markers of cross-border mobility 198 Cross-border mobility and social status in the EU 200 Data and methodology 203 Profiling the space-sets of cross-border mobility 204 of Romanian stayers, movers and returnees in Europe Determinants of Romanians’ mobility in Europe 209 Most memorable cross-border trips: the salience 212 dimension of space-sets Conclusion 218

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Transnational Turkey: the everyday transnationalism 225 and diversity of Turkish populations in Europe Deniz Neriman Duru, Adrian Favell and Albert Varela Introduction 225 Transnational Turkey in Europe 227 Portrait of a diverse population: Turks in the 230 EUCROSS survey Social transnationalism: the everyday Europe of 235 Turkish populations Political transnationalism: Gezi Park and beyond 243 Conclusion 250

Epilogue:

Is social transnationalism fusing European societies 255 into one? Ettore Recchi Introduction: one Europe for whom? 255 Unpacking ‘society’: four critical dimensions 257 Specifying ‘social change’: three ongoing processes 259 Supranational and national borders: not a 263 zero-sum game Convergence of social structures? A possible reversal 267 Harmonisation of social norms and practices? 271 Secularisation and not much else ‘Feeling European’: shared identification or persistent 276 cleavage? Conclusion: a three-quarters empty glass? 280 v

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Methodological appendix 291 Steffen Pötzschke, Michael Braun, Irina Ciornei and Fulya Apaydin The EUCROSS survey 291 The qualitative EUMEAN study 296 Index

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List of tables and figures Tables 1.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1 3.2

3.3

3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.1

4.2

4.3

5.1

Feeling European and/or feeling like a citizen of the world 56 by country Classification of individual cross-border practices 63 Cross-border practices by nationality of respondents 69 Logistic regression models predicting cross-border 72 practices among national citizens Logistic regression models predicting cross-border 74 practices among Romanian and Turkish migrants Tastes in music by country 92 Tastes for classical music, jazz, traditional music from 93 country of residence and from another European country, pop, rock and hip hop by level of education Tastes for classical music, traditional music from country 95 of residence and from another European country, metal music, pop, rock and hip hop by age band Tastes for foreign food by country 96 Tastes for French, Italian, Asian cuisine and no taste 97 for foreign cuisine by level of education Tastes for French, Italian, Mexican, Asian cuisine and 98 no taste for foreign cuisine by age bands Active variables and modalities in the MCA 100 Supplementary variables and categories 101 Eigenvalues and modified rates of the most important axes 102 Local, regional, CoO, CoR and European identification and 125 cosmopolitan attitudes among national populations and migrants Regression of European identification and the difference 127 between European identification and cosmopolitanism for the national samples (unstandardised regression coefficients) Regression of European identification and the difference 130 between European identification and cosmopolitanism of Turkish and Romanian migrants (unstandardised regression coefficients) Average levels of individual solidarity for working and 146 total samples

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5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6

6.1 6.2 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 9.1 10.1 10.2 10.3

Transnational background, experience, skills, and practices and individual solidarity (OLS multiple regression) European identification and individual solidarity (OLS multiple regression) Cosmopolitan mindset and individual solidarity (OLS multiple regression) Political self-placement and individual solidarity (OLS multiple regression) Country of residence, European identification, cosmopolitan mindset, political orientation and individual solidarity (OLS multiple regression) Average score on transnationalism index (range 0–18) across five EUCROSS countries Cosmopolitan attitudes (% of ‘yes’ responses) and additive index across five EU countries Reasons for cross-border mobility in last 24 months (multiple answers allowed, in %) Sociodemographic profiles of Romanian stayers, returnees and movers Size and range of short-term mobility over past 24 months by type of respondent Regression models for intensity and size of short-term mobility space‑sets Demographics of Turkish samples Reasons for migration of Turks in five European countries Political positioning of Turks in five European countries Cross-border destinations of Turks in the last two years Reasons for travel abroad of Turks living in five European countries Contact with family members abroad and social media use among Turks living in five European countries Expected impact of processes of sociopolitical change on constituting dimensions of a unified European society Realised EUCROSS samples EUMEAN sampling frame for the national samples Number of EUMEAN respondents by country of residence and origin

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149 153 154 155 162

172 174 206 207 209 211 231 231 232 233 234 235 263 296 297 298

Contents

Figures 0.1 0.2 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 7.1 9.1 9.2 9.3

The expansion of international travel worldwide and 15 within the EU (1995–2016) Stocks of intra-EU migrants in receiving countries, 17 1990–2016 (in thousands) Familiarity with foreign countries by country of respondents 39 Europe or beyond? Proportion of respondents mentioning 40 having familiarity with non-European countries Global familiarity patterns amongst the six European case 41 study countries (deviations from the uniform distribution) Cartographies of familiarity with other European 44–49 countries by country of residence Map of ‘close connections’ for respondents on top and at 51 the bottom of self-reported SES scale (six country sample) Map of ‘close connections’ for respondents of high and 53 low education levels (six country sample) The stratification of ‘familiarity with foreign countries’ by 54 educational levels MCA two-dimensional representation of cross-border 77 practices (sample of nationals) MCA two-dimensional representation of cross-border 79 practices (sample of migrants) Modalities contributing to 35% of the variance on axis 1 103 Modalities contributing to 35% of the variance on axis 2 104 Modalities contributing to 35% of the variance on the plan formed by axes 3 and 4 106 Age, gender and education in plane 1–2 (cloud of modalities) 107 Subjective income and socioeconomic status in plane 1–2 107 (cloud of modalities) Countries in the space 1–2 (cloud of modalities) 109 Physical and virtual mobility practices 110 Destinations for cross-border mobility of Romanian 205 nationals in Europe (% visiting each destination) Convergence or divergence? Income disparity and income 268 inequality in the EU28 (2005–2016) Convergence or divergence? State expenditures for social 269 welfare and poverty levels in the EU28 (2005–2015) Harmonisation of social norms? Disparities in country-level 273 acceptance of homosexuality and tax civicness in the EU (1990–2010)

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9.4

9.5

Harmonisation of social practices? Disparities in 275 country-level volunteer activities and attendance of religious services in the EU (1990–2010) Evolution of European identification (% of population 278 feeling European according to weak, strong and exclusive definitions) and disparity of levels of European identification among member states (1994–2017)

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Notes on contributors Ettore Recchi is Professor of Sociology at Sciences Po Paris, where he is a member of the Observatoire Sociologique du Changement (OSC) and directs the Master and PhD programmes in Sociology. He is also a part-time professor at the Migration Policy Centre (MPC) of the European University Institute in Florence, where he coordinates the Global Mobilities Project. His main research foci are mobility (in its different forms), social stratification and European integration. A methodologically versatile sociologist especially committed to comparative research, Ettore’s last monograph was Mobile Europe (Palgrave, 2015). www.ettorerecchi.eu. Adrian Favell is Chair in Sociology and Social Theory at the University of Leeds. He is the author of various works on migration, multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism and cities, including Philosophies of Integration (1998), The Human Face of Global Mobility (with Michael Peter Smith, 2006) and Eurostars and Eurocities (2008). A collection of his essays, Immigration, Integration and Mobility: New Agendas in Migration Studies, including more recent work on East–West migration and anti‑EU politics in Britain, was published by ECPR Press (2015). www.adrianfavell.com. Fulya Apaydin is Assistant Professor at Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI). Previously, Fulya was AXA Research Fund Postdoctoral Fellow at IBEI and a visiting postdoctoral research associate in Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies (PIIRS) at Princeton University. Her current work explores the rise of Islamic finance in non-Western settings and the use of mixed-methods in social sciences. Roxana Barbulescu is Academic University Fellow in New Migrations in UK and Europe in the School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Leeds. Roxana is a comparative political sociologist with an interest in the tensions that emerge between mobility on the one hand and rights and citizenship on the other. She is the author of the research monograph Migrant Integration in a Changing Europe: Immigrants, EU Citizens and Co-ethnics in Italy and Spain (University of Notre Dame Press, 2018). Her work has also been

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published in Migration Studies, Mediterranean Politics, Politique européenne and Perspectives on European Society and Politics. Michael Braun is Senior Project Consultant at the Department of Survey Design and Methodology (SDM) at GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences and Adjunct Professor at the University of Mannheim. He has specialised in cross-cultural survey methodology and analysis. He is an expert in both the design and the analysis of large-scale comparative surveys using state-of-the-art statistical methods. He has worked substantively on international comparisons in the fields of migration and the family. Irina Ciornei is Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Bern. Her main research interests are related to cross-border mobility and the transnationalisation of political practices and institutions. Irina’s most recent work focuses on transnational solidarity, emigrant politics and morality policy issues and has been published in Journal of Common Market Studies, Party Politics and West European Politics. Niall Cunningham is Lecturer in Human Geography at Durham University. His work lies at the intersections of history, geography and sociology and he has interests in issues of social class, inequality and conflict, particularly in urban settings. He is co-author of Troubled Geographies: A Spatial History of Religion and Society in Ireland (Indiana UP, 2013) and Social Class in the 21st Century (Penguin, 2015). Juan Díez Medrano is Professor of Sociology at the Universidad Carlos  III de Madrid. He is also a senior research fellow at the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. His main research foci are European integration, collective identities and political sociology. He is the author of Divided Nations (Cornell University Press, 1995) and Framing Europe (Princeton University Press, 2003). His latest publications are ‘Multilingualism and European Identification’, Sociological Inquiry (2017) and ‘Globalization, Transnational Human Capital, and Employment in the European Union’, International Journal of Comparative Sociology (2017). Deniz Neriman Duru is Assistant Professor (tenure track) at the Department of Communication and Media at Lund University. She holds a DPhil/PhD degree in Anthropology from the University of Sussex and has worked in the Sociology Department at the University of York and in the Media, Cognition and Communication Department

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at the University of Copenhagen. She has taken part in various comparative EU projects. Her research interests include conviviality, multiculturalism, diversity, social media, media anthropology, anthropology of Turkey and migrants and refugees in Europe. She has published book chapters and journal articles in South European Society and Politics, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies and Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. Laurie Hanquinet is Senior Lecturer in Social Sciences at the University of York, UK. She is a sociologist, focusing on cultural participation, cultural capital and inequalities, and cultural diversity and tolerance. She is the author of Du musée aux pratiques culturelles. Enquête sur les publics de musée d’art moderne et contemporain (Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2014) and the editor of The Routledge International Handbook of the Sociology of Culture and Art (2016) with Mike Savage. Steffen Pötzschke is a Postdoctoral Researcher in the Department Survey Design and Methodology (SDM) at GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences in Mannheim and a Corresponding Member of the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies at the University of Osnabrück. His research interests include international migration, transnational studies and methods of migration research. Steffen has published bock chapters and articles in Migration Letters and Social Science Computer Review. David Reimer is Professor in Educational Sociology at Aarhus University. His research focuses on inequality in the domain of education and the transition from education to work. He is particularly interested in how social class, gender or ethnic inequalities are affected and moderated by different institutional arrangements across Europe and beyond. He has published articles in various journals such as European Sociological Review, Sociology and Social Science Research. Justyna Salamońska is Assistant Professor and Deputy Director of the Centre of Migration Research at the University of Warsaw. She previously carried out research and taught at Trinity College Dublin, the University of Chieti and the European University Institute. Her research and teaching interests include contemporary migrations in Europe, migrant labour market integration, cross-border mobilities, quantitative and qualitative research methods.

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Mike Savage is Martin White Professor of Sociology at the London School of Economics, where he also is Director of the International Inequalities Institute. His main interests are in stratification, and urban and historical sociology. He is the lead author of Globalization and Belonging (Sage, 2005), a key reference in the study of social transnationalism, as well as numerous other works. His work with the BBC’s Great British Class Survey attracted major public interest and was published in the co-authored Social Class in the 21st Century (Penguin, 2015). Janne Solgaard Jensen holds a PhD in European Studies from Aarhus University, with a scholarly focus on the sociology and anthropology of Europe. Her primary research focuses on processes of Europeanisation and globalisation, and how we might better understand the everyday effects of such processes with new qualitative methods and operationalisations. She has also worked on cosmopolitanism, mobility and education in relation to Europe and the EU. Albert Varela is Lecturer in Quantitative Methods at the University of Leeds, where he is also a member of the Q-Step Centre leading a step-change in the organisation and delivery of quantitative methods training in the social sciences. He has previously taught Social Statistics at the Cathie Marsh Institute for Social Research (Manchester) and Social Policy at the Department of Sociological Studies (Sheffield). His main research interests are the analysis of inequalities in relation to labour markets and welfare states.

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Acknowledgements This book is an outcome of the EUCROSS project, which was funded by the European Commission as part of its 7th Framework Programme of Research (FP7-SSH-2010-2; project number 266767; project’s full title: ‘The Europeanisation of Everyday Life: Cross-Border Practices and Transnational Identities among EU and Third-Country Citizens’). The field activities of the project were carried out between 2010 and 2014 by a consortium of six research units: the University of Chieti-Pescara (which served as project coordinator) in Italy; Aarhus University in Denmark; GESIS in Mannheim, Germany; Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals in Spain; the University of York in the United Kingdom; the University of Bucharest in Romania. In each of these institutions our study was supported by a larger team of people than the authors of this volume. At the University of Chieti-Pescara, the project’s development was greatly facilitated by the EUCROSS manager, Matteo Abbate, and the local administrator, Maria Antonietta Morale. They took good care of the myriad tasks associated with the management of a quite complex project design that had to fit in with tight national and EU requirements. The local researchers’ team also included Theresa Kuhn (for a brief but fruitful spell), Thea Rossi and Lorenzo Grifone Baglioni, to whom goes our thankfulness. At Aarhus University, the project was very ably administered by staff in the Institut for Kultur og Samfund, in particular, by Henriette Jaquet and Dorotea Smesnjak. Our thanks for support to Jan Ifversen, and to research assistants, Peter Sejr Kruse and Rolf Lyneborg Lund. At GESIS in Mannheim, Dr Dorothée Behr provided valuable input in many situations. We are especially thankful to her for sharing her expertise in questionnaire translation and for helping us to coordinate the respective joint efforts of the whole consortium. We could not have realised the project without the help of our student assistants, Valerie Steeb and Jessica Daikeler. Hande Erdem and Joachim Piepenburg contributed as interns to the success of our research. Finally, we would like to thank the administrative staff of our institute for their support regarding the project management. At the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI), Irina Ciornei, Fulya Apaydin, and Juan Díez Medrano were fortunate to receive prompt and efficient administrative and technical help from Carlos Sánchez. We are extremely thankful to him, to the general staff

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at IBEI, and to the institute’s Director, Jacint Jordana, for creating a highly supportive environment for carrying out our research. At the University of York, Laurie Hanquinet and Mike Savage received help from two fantastic departmental research administrators, Josine Opmeer and Ed Kirby. Our thanks also go to Chris Barber from the European Research and Development Team. We are grateful to anyone who assisted in the data collection and processing. Last but not least, Nazli Sila Cesur has been a most wonderful addition to our research team. At the University of Bucharest, the research team was led by Dumitru Sandu and included Monica Serban, Elena Tudor and Alin Croitoru. Thanks to all of them for their participation at different research stages. Part of the precious work carried out by these project members is not represented in this volume but is showcased on the project website: www.eucross.eu. In the European Commission, we interacted with several research officers in charge of the project. While everyone was helpful and cooperative, we are particularly grateful to Yuri Borgmann-Prebil, who went the extra mile to ensure that our scientific objectives were fulfilled in spite of the unavoidable predicaments and delays of field research. A first version of the manuscript was discussed in a one-day workshop held at the Observatoire Sociologique du Changement (OSC) of Sciences Po in December 2016. We would like to thank Marie Ferrazzini and Sylvie Lesur, who organized the workshop, and Mirna Safi, who discussed the papers one by one in detail. Thanks also to Steffen Mau, who debated with us some findings of the EUCROSS project at its final conference in Brussels in June 2014, and Owen Parker for his comments on chapter drafts at an editorial meeting in Leeds in June 2016. Policy Press was extraordinarily open-minded in welcoming a sixteen author volume. In the role of editors, Ettore Recchi and Adrian Favell have been responsible for the preparation of the final manuscript. At PP, we relied on the editorial guidance of Victoria Pittman, Shannon Kneis and Ruth Wallace. We are also grateful to two anonymous reviewers. In a brief acknowledgement we are unable to mention all the people with whom we have discussed work in the making of this project. Overall, the volume was an almost decade long (transnational) research journey. It started from a chat in a Parisian street between two of the authors, Ettore Recchi and Adrian Favell, that took place after they

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presented their previously edited book Pioneers of European Integration in 2009 at Sciences Po. Incidentally, in the following years both Adrian and Ettore joined Sciences Po – which subsequently became a hotbed for thinking about social transnationalism through seminars and discussions with Patrick Le Galès, Virginie Guiraudon, Tommaso Vitale, Renaud Dehousse, Marco Oberti, Edmond Preteceille, Alain Chenu, Hugues Lagrange, Carlo Barone, Emanuele Ferragina and many others, including numerous students.

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INTRODUCTION

Social transnationalism in an unsettled continent Adrian Favell and Ettore Recchi

Social transnationalism amidst the Eurogloom After more than fifty years of ‘ever closer union’, and thirty years on from the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Europe has become a continent of gloom. With the European Union and European political systems in crisis, the idea of further integration seems indefinitely stalled. The dissensual politics and populism that has gripped many core members of the European Union, and even threatens democracy itself in some, is said to be largely driven by repugnance to transformative ideas at the heart of the EU project: the notion of a borderless, convergent and united continent that has long been the vision of European political elites (Manow et al 2018; de Vries 2018). This Europe, built on the notion of macro-regional economic integration and the four freedoms of movement – of capital, goods, services and persons – is widely claimed to be at the root of social and spatial inequalities gnawing at the cohesion of European societies (Beckfield 2006; Fligstein 2008; Kriesi et al 2008; Fourcade et al 2013). And, accordingly, national populations appear to have a receding taste for the idealist political constructions of the politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals who projected European society beyond the nation state (Goodhart 2017). Since the global financial crisis of 2008, most popular commentary and scholarly analysis of the European project has come to echo this diagnosis. Its pessimism has appeared something that is seemingly unavoidable from any diagnosis which focuses on political dynamics or institutional and legal contexts. The dominant line of argument has been to emphasise the end of the ‘permissive consensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009): the quiet mode of European integration in which national populations allowed technocratic elites to build a supranational economic and political system as long as it satisfied the continent’s need for peace and sustained economic growth. With the demise of the EU Constitution (2005), the Eurozone crisis over the economies

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of Southern Europe (from 2009) and then the British vote for ‘Brexit’ (2016), ‘Europe’ as a political construction has also been seen to be reversible. Much of the political and legal analysis has evoked a need for more grounded sociological approaches to address the missing ‘social base’ of the European project (Milward 1997): whether characterised in terms of the ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009), the failure of ‘European identity’ (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009), the ‘Euroclash’ of elites and masses (Fligstein 2008), or the ‘democratic deficit’ (Follesdal and Hix 2006). The disconnect between European society and European politics is clear. But another view can be taken of this opposition. Politics may fail, but social behaviour itself may not be so reversible; change is always happening amidst political reaction and rollback. Underneath the stalled politics, faltering economy and stagnant legal development lies another Europe – what others have also referred to as ‘everyday Europe’ (Delhey et al 2014; McNamara 2015) – in which many of the social consequences of an integrating continent may in fact be irrevocable. As we document in this book, European integration has set in motion patterns of changed behaviours and practices, driven by widening and deepening cross-border connections at all levels of society and in all corners of Europe, that have their own evolution at least partly decoupled from politics. These may have been aspects of wider global forces – transformations that have always been discussed in terms of ‘globalisation’ (Held et  al 1999) – but at the macroregional scale in post-war Europe they have been shaped substantially by the EU’s particular form of highly regulated regional integration. Europeanisation indeed is nested in globalisation as a feature of this worldwide macro-regional integration (Cowles et al 2001; Fligstein and Merand 2002; Katzenstein 2005). What these macroeconomic changes mean sociologically, geographically and anthropologically is that populations everywhere in Europe have been exposed to products, images, ideas and imaginations, shortening distances and thickening interactions across often increasingly translucent and sometimes fictional cultural borders. Technological change and possibility has qualitatively facilitated and expanded information, media exchange and communication between national units. ‘Democratic’ populations may see themselves as proudly distinctive ‘peoples’ exercising ‘border control’ over elements of the international environment, but these assertions of territorial uniqueness have an increasingly ersatz feel. They are dependent on an ever more strident ‘re-enchantment of culture’ to help bind the nation together (Breidenbach and Nyiri 2009,

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39, alluding to the anthropologist Aihwa Ong 1999), even as it is untied by the proliferation of everyday cross-border practices. A good example of such ‘banal transnationalism’ (Aksoy and Robins 2003) are the lowered telephone and WiFi costs amidst a Europe now heavily regulating roaming charges, making nationalised price discriminations illegal. Low-cost airlines, which connect the continent in a dense web thanks to EU regulation, are another example.1 On an average EasyJet or Wizz Air flight, it is hardly just business elites and frequent flying conference academics (to evoke the famous stereotype propagated by Calhoun 2002): it is also courting couples, teenagers, students, cross-national families, budget business travellers, stag parties, commuting construction and care workers, and even sometimes ‘immigrants’ – a broad range of ‘middling’, anonymous European society routinely traversing international borders (Conradson and Latham 2010). From ever growing intra-EU tourism, cross-continental transportation of goods and SME business trade, to the diversifying consumption of international music and food – to take specific dimensions evoked in this volume – what we call after Mau (2010) ‘social transnationalism’ within and across Europe is a fact of everyday life. As we will show in the many dimensions of ‘social transnationalism’ documented in the EUCROSS survey, such indicators of international integration at a European scale are not evenly distributed socially, and there are very particular geographical patterns. Yet they have expanded exponentially. For sure, the political crisis has clearly demonstrated that liberal economic assumptions about linear progress towards a more cosmopolitan democratic post-national society – as was famously promoted in the Europhile social theory of Jürgen Habermas (1998), for example – need questioning, in terms of the classically modernist march forward of globalism. More generally, it is not surprising that the arbiters of public opinion have rather changed their tune (compare Inglehart 1997 to Inglehart and Norris 2016). But there is clearly a need to separate out the empirical study and understanding of the changing forms and consequences of everyday Europe in the daily life of populations, from both the politics and policies pursued by political elites, as well as from the verdicts on the EU delivered by unsettled voters in public opinion surveys, referenda and elections.

  Ironically, the deregulation of European telephone and transportation systems were, respectively, the main legacy of the work at the European institutions of two of the most widely reviled ‘losers’ of British EU politics: Nick Clegg and Neil Kinnock. 1

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Why the social and political dimensions of Europe have drifted so apart is of course an important question. But everyday Europe has been generally ignored as a topic by mainstream EU studies, which only became interested in grounded ‘sociological’ explanations of the EU as their top-down theories of developmental European integration ceased to work and the EU appeared to be disintegrating – a classic case of the Owl of Minerva taking flight (Favell 2017). Nevertheless, for several decades now there has been a viable sociology of the European Union, based on historical and empirical works, that moved from studies on the convergence of forms of life and social organisation across the continent (Kaelble 1987; Therborn 1995; Mendras 1997; Crouch 1999) to the identification and measurement of patterns of everyday social transnationalism underpinning regional societal integration (for surveys: Favell et  al 2011; Recchi 2016; Barwick 2017). We review the sources which most inspired our work in the literature review section below, and specify our own ways of operationalising these questions in the subsequent section. As in the key work of Mau (2010) and Savage and colleagues (2005), our study is an empirical variant on the study of globalisation at an at once macro-regional, national and sometimes locally specified scale. In the fading light of the Eurogloom, perhaps, nothing feels more dated than the global social theory of the optimistic 1990s, after the Berlin Wall came tumbling down – those grand, sweeping, largely unsubstantiated visions of the likes of Anthony Giddens (1990), Manuel Castells (1996), Ulrich Beck (2000) and John Urry (2000), mapping out the contours of late modernity in advanced Western society. But operationalising the conceptual language of their 1990s globalism – notably, transnationalism, mobilities and cosmopolitanism – in fact remains key to grasping the changes afoot. And if we do an empirical sociology of transnationalism, mobilities and cosmopolitanism in everyday life across Europe, comparing, say, 1970 and 2020, the world of the present is hardly likely to be a less transnational or mobile one (although cosmopolitan values may have become more shaky). Thought about at a European scale, whether as work, study and retirement abroad, employment of foreigners, friends’ networks, travel, tourism, knowledge of diversity, media use, the consumption of foreign food, music, films … Would we expect any European member state to be less Europeanised in a sociological sense on these measures – even (perhaps especially even) the one that has now voted itself out of the EU, the United Kingdom? This point raises the question of how and why social transnationalism might differ across Europe. Our contextual approach to these questions

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enables us to tackle such questions comparatively, in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Accordingly, much of our focus indeed is on understanding and explaining the varieties of social transnationalism in Europe: at once in terms of its volume in different locations and among different populations; its geographical variation in terms of spatial networks between countries and locations; and its anthropological diversity in terms of the meanings it is accorded as a set of practices by different people. We cover Europe by focusing equally on the South (Italy, Romania, Spain) and the North (Germany, Denmark, the UK). As well as this classical cleavage – which corresponds roughly to archetypal groupings of national culture and/or models of economy and society running through the continent – our selection of country cases also spans ‘core’ original EU member states (Italy, Germany), ‘peripheral’ member states (non-original members, Denmark and the UK, which of course has now voted to leave), and ‘new’ member states (states which joined through an ‘enlargement’ process: Spain, Romania). Most saliently, these countries are often rated quite differently in terms of their degree of globalisation, again spanning a variety of European positionalities. A number of established multidimensional indices of globalisation exist already (Raab et  al 2008; Kearney 2009). In terms of the KOF ‘social globalisation’ index, for instance, Denmark and the UK sit at the top, Germany and Spain are found around the EU average, and Italy and Romania are at the bottom end in the EU.2 In addition, as well as the fact that Denmark and the UK have been less embedded in the European project in terms of Euroscepticism and being outside the Eurozone (as is Romania), the UK, Denmark and Spain also have significant imperial/colonial relations around the globe which relate in complex ways to their geographical location in Europe. The angles provided by these groupings, juxtapositions, similarities and differences across contexts animate the analysis in several chapters in the book. Across all the cases, two concerns, of course, remain uppermost. One is the oft repeated point about the stratification of global mobilities (Bauman 1998). In other words, that these various forms of social transnationalism are distributed unequally, and indeed may even constitute modes of distinction reinforcing and extending social privilege, barriers and domination. The European integration that sustained these lifestyles was, allegedly, part of the elite payoff (Fligstein   In our original choice of national cases as part of the EUCROSS project we drew on the KOF index ranking for 2009: www.kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/ indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html. 2

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Everyday Europe

2008; Haller 2008); indeed, some have argued it was part of some late modern, colonial reassertion of Eurocentrism (Nikolaidis et al 2014). The other concern is that such social transnationalism may not translate directly or comfortably into identifications and attachments – to either the specified ‘identity’ of Europeanism and support for the EU project, or a more abstract, territorially unbounded cosmopolitanism (Kuhn 2015). In other words, that there is a disconnect between the normative values expressed by the EU (Manners 2002) and the behaviour of Europeans – when it comes to translating their mobility experiences and actions into the expressive values of conscious social engagement (Recchi 2015, ch 5). We do have to take seriously the notion that the governance framework of European social transnationalism may merely be a self-serving elite construction – a dream of a ‘nowhere’ abstraction of European society – adrift from its base firmly anchored in historically tried and tested national (welfare) states. On this point the damning critiques of conservative nationalists (Goodhart 2017) converge with those of the radical left ready to dismiss the construction of a European economy as nothing but a ‘neoliberal’ conspiracy to destroy ‘true’ socialistic European community and democracy (Anderson 2011; Streeck 2014). Yet we do insist that this is a contingent political question; tracing the democratic dissensus or Euroscepticism and its effects in political analysis should not be conflated with the enquiry into more fundamental everyday social and economic practices. At base, how increasingly de facto transnationalised practices translate into political values is a normative issue about the legitimacy of a governance unit: as much about deciding who is a member of that unit (in classical terms, a citizen) and where its borders lie for political purposes (the scale of the politically constituted population: the ‘people’), as what these ‘people’ happen to believe in (measuring public opinion, analysing elections). In this sense, comparative political science – even behind the positivist pose of cross-national public opinion and political values analysis – is always a normative business. Viewed normatively from this angle, the European Union’s greatest weakness perhaps was its attempt to largely do without the Hobbesian concentration of territorial power and population that is necessarily at the heart of the national sovereign unit. The EU sought to build its legitimacy through the values of individualisation and differentiation (Trenz 2009) and the concentric logic of progressive enlargements (Favell 2014), as well as (weaker) appeals to coalitions of public and private interests upholding an ‘output’ legitimacy (that is, delivering the economic goods in a technocratic sense: see Scharpf 1999; Majone 1998).

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Social transnationalism in an unsettled continent

Most research on the issue of European legitimacy has treated it as a question of ‘European identity’ to be measured in public opinion terms (Gabel 1998; Bruter 2005; McLaren 2005). Such research now typically concludes that the EU thereby failed (Polyakova and Fligstein 2016) — even if in the wider world of international relations and international political economy it had in fact helped rescue the ‘natural’ unit of society (the nation state) it was allegedly meant to replace (Milward 1992). The reliance on Eurobarometer and European Social Surveys – on which most research in the field still unimaginatively bases its analysis – helps reproduce the distorting focus on the inadequacy of the European Union in normative terms (Favell 2005). Our work on the whole represents a definitive shift towards practices as being more fundamental. However, in these pages we also do pay attention to the mainstream questions of European identification and political viability (expressed through the notion of identification with Europe or solidarity). And the more zero-sum-like opposition between the projection of a European society and the default of the nation state comes up again in the epilogue, which runs through all the best such evidence available for why Europe could never replace the nation in that way. Empirical answers to these questions in the current political climate are not surprisingly likely to be gloomy. We do stress elsewhere in the volume that the political expression of a European project or idealised notions of expansive cosmopolitanism might be a quite separate issue to the ongoing social transformations at a European scale. This tension between the political view of European society and the focus on the everyday accordingly runs through this introduction and many of the chapters; but in reasserting the need for a genuinely grounded sociology of the European Union, we feel such tension is a creative one. In the remainder of this introduction, after a more detailed assessment of the existing literature and a short introduction to our project and its various empirical dimensions, we also offer – as a deliberate counterpoint to the pessimistic assessment of the epilogue – a rather more optimistic vision of the ongoing transformation of Europe. How might things look, given the evidence, if we were to view this social transnationalism in Europe from a different perspective? That is, not from the present-day perspective of European politics and the EU in gloom? We should take care that our view of Europe today does not simply echo that generation or two of now despairing postnational visionaries who lived through the 1990s and 2000s – in the words of one of the pioneers (Kaelble 1987), ‘auf dem Weg zu einer Europaïschen Gesellschaft’ (on the path to a European society) – only to see everything dashed on the (de)fault lines of (re)nationalised politics.

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Everyday Europe

Towards the study of social transnationalism in Europe Everyday Europe is based on a unique research project – the EUCROSS study – whose survey and follow-up interviews generated rich data and narratives on an array of cross-border practices in Europe, offering the possibility of an empirically based view on these interconnections that goes well beyond existing studies. The EUCROSS project (for a full description, see the ‘Overview of chapters’ section below) looks at the ways in which EU residents in six different EU member states have been getting closer across national frontiers: in their everyday experiences of foreign countries – work, travel, personal networks – but also their knowledge, consumption of foreign products and attitudes towards foreign culture. It also considers how two groups of migrants in Europe – one intra-EU, one from an external third country – are also a part of this growing social transnationalism. In this section, we review the wide and diverse range of existing studies on the subject on which we have also drawn, covering the two principal critical dimensions which can be found to different degrees in the substantive chapters of the books: social transnationalism in relation to inequalities, and in relation to (fragile) cosmopolitan identifications or attachments. Given the lack of serious operationalisation to be found in the famous globalist social theories of the 1990s, the most important innovation of the empirical literature in a European context on social transnationalism – and the associated concepts of mobilities and cosmopolitanism – has been to devise ways of systematically studying them. Particularly pertinent has been how to set up comparative empirical research independent of pre-existing social surveys and their patent limitations (Duchesne 2010; Díez Medrano 2010; White 2010). One strategy among comparativists was to focus on mid-sized N, interviews-based studies of urban populations, whose networked and mobile lives might have both local and transnational dimensions. Savage and colleagues (2005), Favell (2008) and Andreotti and colleagues (2015) are ground-breaking examples: phenomenologies of globalisation, belonging, mobilities and social class in highly diverse, globalising European cities. An emergent research programme on ‘horizontal Europeanisation’ in Germany, meanwhile, has also thrown up methodological innovations: notably in projects led by Mau (2010), Gerhards and colleagues’ studies of European solidarity, languages and values (Gerhards 2007; Gerhards and Lengfeld 2015; Gerhards et al 2017), and Delhey et al’s (eg Delhey and Deutschmann 2016) huge-scale macro-sociology of European and global networks.

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Social transnationalism in an unsettled continent

Nevertheless, among these authors and others, there has often been a fall-back to reliance on the thin measures of European Social Survey (ESS) and Eurobarometer (eg Mau and Mewes 2012; Delhey et al 2014; Kuhn 2015). We go into certain details of some of these contributions below and throughout the book. Although there are always dangers of methodological nationalism in highlighting how national contexts and populations differ, we generally follow Savage and colleagues (2005) and Mau (2010) in their historically and spatially specific comparativist interest in varieties of national and social class patterns of transnationalism, rather than the ‘flat’ study of global and regional networks (a globe of bright lights and lines, with darkness in between) which perhaps may better represent a borderless world.3 As this book documents, geographies vary across Europe – for example, how Romanians and Turks may experience Europe in positionally different ways to West Europeans – thereby revealing enduring and significant historically rooted differences. Such nuances may easily get lost in massive scale global Macrosoziologie based on conveniently pre-packaged secondary datasets. Relying on an original, representative survey of the German population, Mau (2010) first drew a nuanced ‘cartography of transnational social relations’, which showed that in the early 2000s almost one out of two persons in Germany maintained personal ties with at least a friend or a relative living abroad, and that six out of ten respondents’ holidays were spent in a different country. On a broader scale, less precise cross-national indicators of social transnationalism were subsequently made available by Eurobarometer in 2006 and 2010 (Mau and Mewes 2012; Baglioni and Recchi 2013; Delhey et al 2014; Kuhn 2015). The EUCROSS survey expands the range of indicators of transnationalism to include ‘virtual’ transnational practices as well, including internet-based contacts, forms of international consumption, and ‘imaginative’ mobilities to distant places. The range of empirical analyses mentioned above, based on different sources, converge at least on highlighting recurrent macro- and microfoundations of social transnationalism. At the macro-level, country differences are significant, even when accounting for economic and social factors that enhance the likelihood of transnationalisation (such as: GDP per capita, economic globalisation, general level of  An example is the famous ‘World According to GAWC’ map, created in the Geography Department of Loughborough University, which reduces the planet to a series of interconnected world city blobs, with everything else erased: see www.lboro. ac.uk/gawc/visual/globalcities2010.pdf. 3

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human development, diversity of national population). With some country nuances, residents of North-Western Europe – including the UK – tend to live more transnational lives than their counterparts in Southern and Central-Eastern Europe (CEE). At the micro-level, transnationalism – in all its manifestations – is more widespread among younger cohorts, the more educated and those in more privileged social classes. Better-off Europeans are significantly more likely to have lived, studied and spent holidays abroad; they also typically have more foreign friends and partners, as well as family living abroad. On all forms of transnationalism, echoing the famous view of global elite privilege cemented by the work of economist Thomas Piketty (2013; Savage and Nichols 2018), Eurobarometer data indicate that the difference between the upper social class and the middle nonmanual class is larger than that between the latter and the working class (Baglioni and Recchi 2013; see, for example, Savage 2015 on the UK). Further analysis shows that social class gradients in the frequency of transnational behaviour are steeper in more affluent countries (Delhey et al 2015). In a Bourdieusian perspective, these findings could suggest that mechanisms of distinction and class delimitation in the upper part of the social hierarchy may leverage transnational practices more than traditional symbols and behaviours (as suggested in the large literature on cultural consumption: see, for example, Chan 2010; Coulangeon 2011; and Hanquinet and Savage in Chapter Three). From a political sociology perspective, the mounting transnationalisation of life raises a major question. Does individual involvement in transnational activities foster an identification or attachment to supranational political units of governance – the European Union, the United Nations, or other institutions of this kind? This can be conceived of in terms of cosmopolitanism – which may have a distinct variant in terms of a regional project such as the EU (what we refer to as ‘Europeanism’). In the context of early EU studies of European integration, the idea that cross-border practices could have a politically significant impact in this sense was formulated in Karl Deutsch’s transactionalist theory (Deutsch et al 1957). The theory itself was devised having in mind the then embryonic European construction – in fact, an integrated North Atlantic alliance – as a ‘security community’. In Deutsch’s view, the institutionalisation of such a ‘community’ depended on the scope and strength of a wide palette of cross-border exchanges – such as international trade, labour and capital mobility, scientific cooperation, cultural activities, the use of nonnational media and intermarriages – of the kind that were becoming routine between North America and Europe, as well as between

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Social transnationalism in an unsettled continent

West European societies (Deutsch 1969, 102). Broadly speaking, any transaction across borders is expected to promote a learning process sustaining trust in the emerging supranational polity and a virtuous circle of additional consensus for further integration (Adler and Barnett 1998). As a pointer to his empirical foresight, Deutsch (1953), for example, mentioned the ratio between domestic and international mail as a possible indicator of cross-border integration. This operational cue is even more suggestive in a time of generalised use of emails and social network posts. Delhey and colleagues (2014) took up this insight, computing indexes of ‘relative Europeanisation’ that consider not so much the amount of transnational practices and attitudes, but rather their weight over nation-based ones. More or less consciously following Deutsch’s lead, the relation between individuals’ transnational activities and political attitudes began to be explored empirically in the late 2000s. Focusing on Europe, several pieces of research found that cross-border mobility and practices go hand in hand with cosmopolitan (Mau et al 2008) and European (Recchi 2015, 140–142; Kuhn 2015; Teney et al 2016) identifications. Van Mol (2014, 98 ff) showed that the association between European identification and mobility experiences may hold in case of relatively short settlements, such as Erasmus grants which last no more than 12 months. A German study claimed that the transnationalism–cosmopolitanism association is stronger among ordinary citizens than it is in the elite (Helbling and Teney 2015). This probably reflects a ceiling effect, as members of the elite are all very likely to be highly transnational. Both among the general public and elites, cosmopolitanism does not come at the expense of local identities, however. Being ‘cosmopolitan’ does not entail a straightforward ‘denationalisation’ (Roudometof 2005; Gustafson 2009). Local and global identifications are not incompatible and can be nested (Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Risse 2010). Qualitative studies of European upper-middle classes confirm their ability to combine high levels of international travel, experiences of migration and foreign friendships with a persistent ‘rootedness’ in the local issues and identities related to their place of residence (Andreotti et al 2015). What happens when social transnationalism is related not to a broader sense of collective belonging (feeling ‘a world citizen’, a ‘European’) but rather to a more explicit political support for a specific governance unit, such as the EU? The issue was examined in detail by Kuhn (2015), who offers the most sophisticated test of Deutsch’s theory applied to the EU case using available secondary datasets. Her point of departure is an apparent inconsistency: at the

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Everyday Europe

aggregate level, transnational contacts have proliferated in Europe since the 1970s, while support for European institutions has stagnated, with some trendless fluctuations. In fact, the transnationalism– Europeanism association is incontrovertible at the individual level, but it does not show up in aggregate terms because it is so strongly stratified. In other words, the rise in the volume of transnational activities is disproportionately due to being part of a privileged social strata, a group that also expresses strong support for the EU (again, reconfirming Fligstein 2008). Kuhn’s analysis also showed that: (1) transnational practices (hinged on cross-border mobility) sustain the legitimacy of the EU more than a transnational background and transnational human capital; (2) cross-border sociability impacts EU legitimacy more than cross-border activities of an instrumental nature (such as business activities), possibly indicating the deeper influence of socio-psychological mechanisms over utilitarian considerations in the causal mechanism linking transnationalism and legitimisation; (3) in all EU national societies, transnationalism correlates more strongly with European identification than with EU support, which also may attest to the higher relevance of socio-psychological over utilitarian aspects of transnationalism; (4)  intra-EU transnational practices affect pro-EU attitudes more than experiences of transnationalism that are geographically anchored outside the European space; (5) the transnationalism–EU legitimacy association is accentuated in the most globalised European countries, where highly transnational individuals are more Europhile, whereas those measured as ‘non-transnationals’ are more vigorously Eurosceptic, possibly feeling marginalised and threatened by European integration. Kuhn’s findings are broadly convergent with the dominant trope laid out by Fligstein (2008) and Kriesi and colleagues (2008), which reads the dismal path of European integration as the regional playing out of a story of the ‘winners and losers’ of globalisation, that has led inexorably, via the ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU and the end of the ‘permissive consensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009), to its present legitimacy crisis. This question is reprised in the Epilogue of this volume. What might be added here on this point is that most social transnationalism does not have great emotional import. Spending a weekend on the Costa Brava or occasionally chatting with a glamourous Instagram contact abroad is likely to have less impact than relocation to another country. Cross-border activities have thus perhaps not delivered those legitimacy dividends for European integration that were expected according to the Deutsch transactionalist thesis. As Ciornei and Recchi (2017) have shown, the overall volume of social transnational experiences feeds

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Social transnationalism in an unsettled continent

into EU-wide solidarity only among people who are ideologically predisposed to it – in a nutshell, individuals who are more sensitive to egalitarian views. What else might be said about the transformations of Europe in a broader global context? Since the 1980s, two major social trends are changing the world: rising inequality and ongoing globalisation. Both have been affecting Europe in distinct ways. Let us start with inequality, in the light of debates centred on the work of Piketty (2013) and Milanovic (2011), which have focused on the upsurge in inequality globally since the Thatcher–Reagan era. Piketty and his associates argue that continental European countries are an island of exception (as well as Japan) in a world that in the last four decades has veered towards markedly more unequal societies (Alvaredo et al 2017) – boosted by what is generally referred to as ‘neoliberalism’ and its ‘winner takes all’ dynamics. The resilience of welfare states and progressive taxation are to a large extent the causes of European exceptionalism. Top economic elites – the 0.1% of the population – may have gained further ground in Europe as elsewhere (Piketty and Saez 2006; Godechot 2016), but, on the whole, within-country inequality has only modestly changed in the last quarter of a century, and in some instances it has even declined (Atkinson and Morelli 2014). In the whole EU, there has even been some convergence in national Gini indexes of income distributions in the face of the Eurocrisis of the late 2000s and early 2010s (see again the Epilogue in this volume). There is another side of inequality, though – inequality between countries. We owe to Milanovic’s (2011) work the evidence about how salient between-country inequality has become worldwide over the last century and a half. In today’s world, the amount of resources you are likely to access depends much more on where you were born than on your social class position (Milanovic 2015). The lottery of birth (Shachar 2009) counts more than status attainment trajectories over the life course. This is not a new story – the planet has long had a North/South divide, and if being rich may be not that different in developed and developing countries, the level and experience of poverty vary enormously by regions of the globe. Milanovic in fact presents evidence to show substantial ‘catch up’ among some rapidly developing ‘middling’ nations in the world – notably China and other emerging large economies (the BRICs: Brazil, Russia, India, China). What is interesting for us, though, is how this way of looking affects Europe. The European story, in this regard, is not dissimilar from the global picture. Although not extreme, divergences of prosperity

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and incomes across EU member states are far from negligible. While within-country inequality in the Union fits a relatively common pattern, between-country inequalities remain more significant. Salaries are more than ten times larger, for example, in Denmark than they are in Bulgaria.4 If we were to take a full-blown ‘United States of Europe’ conception and make such a comparison, in comparative perspective, between-country inequality in Europe would be notably higher than among US states or Canadian provinces. The critical thing, however, is not so much the static but the dynamic image of such inequality. Already huge, the income gaps between European national societies have been widening since the Eurozone crisis. This is not a good omen for European integration, for sure. The EU’s single market was made for further convergence, not divergence. The economic development of the continent may thus not be delivering the conditions under which the political acceptance of unity and therefore genuine equality between member states can become a matter of fact. Such equality follows from conception of EU citizenship and the full implementation by all of the EU legal acquis – something which European populations are now actively resisting in the name of national privilege. Regarding globalisation, we focus on measuring individual transnational practices – adopting, as stated, Mau’s notion of ‘social transnationalism’ (Mau 2010). We review two of the more obvious dimensions in more detail here: travelling and migration. By all possible indicators, the European space has become more and more interconnected and travel-friendly in the last century and a half. In 1881, when Francis Galton – better known for his major contributions to social statistics – invented ‘isochronic maps’, it took about ten days to travel from London to the furthest peripheries of the European continent (Recchi 2016). After World War I, travel time in Europe was cut by half: the same journeys to the limits of the continent would last no longer than five days. After World War II, while railway networks were rebuilt and expanded, politics played a part in possibly slowing down (when not hindering) travel time: the Iron Curtain meant that East–West trips, if authorised, would have to incorporate lengthy border checks. However, by the end of the century, European integration and the demise of the socialist bloc paved the way to tighter and faster links across Europe. Much of Europe can now be covered in three hours by boarding a plane.   According to the Eurostat database, in 2014 the mean hourly earning in industry, construction and services was €2.24 in Bulgaria and €27.61 in Denmark (http:// ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/earn_ses_hourly). 4

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Social transnationalism in an unsettled continent

Rail transportation meanwhile has interlinked and mapped out the continent with high-speed connections. The EU has been pivotal in this development, through its structural funds to build highways and railways as well as legislation to open up sky and land transportation to non-national competing companies, epitomised first by low-cost air carriers, and later also by the coach industry. Backed by the EU’s intervention, the European space has been shrinking for goods and persons aiming to exit national borders (Axhausen 2007; Williams and Baláž 2009; for a critical view, Jensen and Richardson 2004). People have followed suit. Research in progress (Recchi 2017a; see also Deutschmann 2016) indicates that no continent is so tightly interconnected in terms of human mobility as Europe. The volume of cross-border travels within the EU has now soared almost uninterruptedly for over three decades (Figure 0.1), standing well above the levels for any other world region. Worldwide, in 1995 there were 76 cross-border trips per 1,000 individuals; in 2016, there were 168. In the EU28 (including countries that in 1995 were not yet part of the Union), the two respective levels were 579 and 1281 per 1000 individuals – almost eight times more than worldwide. Of course, this is partly amplified by the small-state nature of neighbouring countries – in many instances in Europe national borders are around the corner. But what is more relevant, again, is the growth rate. In the last 20 years, flows more than doubled both

1,400 1,200 Within the EU 1,000 800 600 400 200 Worldwide

0

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Travels per 1,000 inhabitants of a region

Figure 0.1: The expansion of international travel worldwide and within the EU (1995–2016)

Source: Global Mobilities Project, MPC/EUI, on the basis of UNWTO data (2018). Unpublished analysis, courtesy of the MPC.

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globally and in the EU. As a result, in recent years there have been more yearly intra-EU travels than residents – as if, on average, each individual in the EU went abroad more than once every 12 months. Evidence in this book will show, in fact, that the distribution is skewed and the average is a poor descriptor of Europeans’ travel habits. Yet, in general, we do see measures of individualised social transnationalism as more practical than other modes of capturing these trends. For example, another way of looking at social transnationalism in a macroperspective is through globalisation indexes. Among these, the already mentioned KOF social globalisation index (Dreher et al 2008; Gygli et al 2018) is often taken as most accurate (for instance, by Kuhn 2015). However, it adopts a broader and more debatable view of transnational phenomena, weighting in congeries of indicators that refer to ‘crossborder contacts’, but also to the spread of global consumption patterns indicated by the number of, for example, IKEA and McDonald’s shops. At any rate, the KOF index of social globalisation shows a similar higher and growing volume of transnational links across borders in Europe relative to other continents from the 1970s onwards (Recchi 2015, 10). Finally, a key component of European mobilities is the most obvious: intra-EU migration. If we look at the stocks of EU citizens who have relocated to another EU member state under the umbrella of the free movement of persons – however imperfect it is – the trend is similarly increasing since the turn of the century (Figure 0.2). As is well known, intra-EU migration picked up at the eve of the big enlargement of 2004, only to grow further with the 2007 second enlargement (Glorius et al 2014; Recchi 2015; Castro-Martin and Cortina 2015; Engbersen et al 2017). East–West flows have continued to feed it in the following decade, and were also complemented by the rise of South–North flows during the Eurocrisis (Lafleur and Stanek 2016). In the first two decades of the twenty-first century, intra-EU migration has begun to match immigration from outside the EU (leaving aside the explosion in refugee migration in 2015), now accounting for up to almost a half of all immigrants legally residing in the Union. Although unequally distributed, as they are mostly resident in the West of the continent (three-quarters in five countries only, as Figure 0.2 shows), intra-EU migrants have become an even more visible part of the population, having also established some persistent routes of migration (for example, Poles to the UK and Ireland, Romanians to Italy and Spain, Portuguese to France). The political question, of course, is how these two main phenomena – economic inequality between countries and human

16

Social transnationalism in an unsettled continent Figure 0.2: Stocks of intra-EU migrants in receiving countries, 1990–2016 (in thousands) 18,000 16,000 14,000 Rest of the EU

12,000 10,000

Spain Italy

8,000 6,000 4,000

UK France

2,000 0 1990 1993

Germany 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011

2014 2015 2016

Source: Eurostat online database, various years (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database)

interconnectedness across borders – relate to one another in the European context. Prima facie, it is as much as an economic theory of migration would predict: a widening gulf in levels of prosperity across countries elicits migration from poorer to richer areas. Such a predictable outcome is even boosted by EU citizenship, a legal advantage that exempts intra-EU migrants from the visa requirements, border controls and state authorisations that make life routinely much harder for non-EU migrants. However, this connectedness, as we have seen, has not yielded a more equal continent. Economists differ on the estimation of the punctual impact of intra-EU mobilities on the convergence of economic performances across areas (Baas and Brücker 2011; Kahanec and Zimmermann 2016), but at very least it is clear that they have not buffered uneven development as economic theory would predict (Díez Medrano 2017). It might be argued that economic divergence between countries is likely to mirror political-economic arrangements more than workers’ flows. As the better performing CEE non-eurozone countries are in fact converging with core EU economies (in particular, Germany), while Southern European member states in the Eurozone are not, it is more the faulty architecture of the Eurozone that attracts blame (Baldwin and Giavazzi 2016). In the enthusiasm of the post-Maastricht era, the limits to or even backlash against open borders, free movement and cross-

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border connections in Europe were downplayed. As we have argued throughout, though, it would be misleading to exaggerate such reactions now, and be blind to the persisting effects of social transnationalism – in the more meaningful everyday manifestations that we trace in this volume – on regional integration. And some of these may still have significant weight in public opinion and politics (Favell 2014). In particular, all existing evidence, from different sources, shows that intra-EU migration – not tourism – makes people feel more European and more convinced supporters of European integration (Recchi 2017b). At the same time, it is still significant that the European population at large still continues to see free movement rights as the most meaningful policy of the EU according to Eurobarometer (Recchi 2015, 159). Perhaps these facts may prove to be the last bulwark in public opinion which has generally turned against open borders, free movement and intra-EU migration when it is negatively framed in terms of ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘immigration’ (Favell and Barbulescu 2018).

Overview of chapters EUCROSS (‘The Europeanisation of Everyday Life: Cross-Border Practices and Transnational Identities among EU and Third-Country Citizens’) was an EC Seventh Framework Programme project involving partners from the UK, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Spain and Romania (EUCROSS 2016, or Recchi et al 2016).5 It put into operation a unique cross-national telephone survey of 1,000 resident nationals in each of these partner countries, together with a further survey of 250 Romanian and Turkish migrants resident in each (excepting Turkish in Spain). In addition, sub-sampling from the main survey, it conducted 160 in-depth interviews with a carefully stratified group of respondents, again, including resident nationals and migrants (what we refer to as the EUMEAN survey). A Methodological Appendix by Steffen Pötzschke, Michael Braun, Irina Ciornei and Fulya Apaydin at the conclusion of this volume details this unique study and the challenges it faced. In particular, it offers an unusually transparent and full account of our research protocols and data gathering strategies.   The EUCROSS research project was funded as part of the European Commission’s 7th Framework Programme (‘Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities’, activity 8.5: ‘The Citizen in the European Union’; call identifier: FP7-SSH-2010-2; Funding scheme: collaborative project – small and medium-scale focused research projects; grant agreement: 266767). For details and deliverables of the project, see www.eucross.eu. 5

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Everyday Europe, the multi-authored volume that has resulted from the research, documents the social practices that have emerged at a European scale and beyond, in terms of transnational behaviours (migration, travel, tourism, cross-border networks) and transnational consumption (both commercial and cultural). Moreover, it explores the impact of these practices on ‘subjectivities’ and the way this developing European context of everyday life has changed ordinary lives on three dimensions: in terms of support and sympathy for international cooperative politics (‘identifications’), of ideas and conceptions of community and shared destiny (‘solidarities’), and of personal views of how individuals see themselves in the world (‘narratives’). The last two chapters focus on populations with a less privileged relationship to intra-EU mobility: Romanians – who have become European citizens most recently, and are studied here as both national and intra-EU mobile citizens – and mobile Turkish – whose extensively Europeanised patterns have emerged despite being locked out of EU membership. In this way, we delve into not only traditional migrants’ transnationalism between country of origin and country of residence, but also transnationalism across Europe via contacts in other member states. An Epilogue follows. Chapter One, a joint piece by Mike Savage, Niall Cunningham, David Reimer and Adrian Favell, takes up the challenge of a ‘cartography of social transnationalism’ first proposed by Mau (2010) in his study of German nationals in the post-war period. It emphasises, as he did, the need to find modes of operationalising the grand, abstract social theory of globalisation at a regional European scale. Using EUCROSS data on Europeans’ familiarity with other countries, the chapter maps variations in global connections across the countries and then goes on to map for each of the six countries the particular cartography of their citizens’ social relations within Europe. It also visualises the kind of stratification apparently inherent in access to these transnational lifestyles. A crucial point the chapter makes is how some European nations still have quite specific, historically rooted ‘imperial’ relations with the rest of the world, something which anchors their overall ‘geopolitics’. Chapter Two, by Justyna Salamońska and Ettore Recchi, expands on this first chapter by analysing the social structure of the different forms of transnational practices identified by the project. Reflecting the core analytical framework at the heart of EUCROSS, it distinguishes between physical and virtual mobilities. Using both regression models and multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), the chapter links such movements in physical and virtual spaces to the social categories of

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European populations: in order to see how they are structured in terms of existing inequalities at micro- and macro-levels and also whether certain kinds of cross-border practices are associated with particular kinds of social actors and lifestyles. A distinct angle on the dataset is then provided in Chapter Three by Laurie Hanquinet and Mike Savage, in a contribution to cultural sociology. This picks up from the strong development of Bourdieusian theory in comparative European sociology in recent years. How do Europeans draw cultural boundaries between each other in terms of their cross-border practices, differentiating their tastes and consumption preferences in transnational terms? The chapter moves away from fallacies of methodological nationalism, which portray each nation as having its own specific cultural hierarchies and boundaries (as Bourdieu [1979] famously did with France). Rather, it explores the complex interplay between national, social and cultural boundaries in terms of shifting ‘highbrow’ and ‘lowbrow’ tastes in music and food across various countries, and when pooled together in terms of their general structure as looked at with MCA. Connecting with the mainstream literature on ‘European identity’, Steffen Pötzschke and Michael Braun in Chapter Four tackle the issue of the association between transnational practices and what they carefully delimit as European ‘identifications’ – for both resident nationals and migrants in Europe. Differently from the existing literature, they disentangle the impact of distinct and fine-grained types of practice – for example, between having lived in EU or non-EU countries, with travelling in these places, or having family and friends there. The chapter challenges a simple transactionalist view by which all forms of cross-border practices would bring about supranational identification. It instead offers nuance as to how certain practices matter more than others, as well as the limitations of their effects on identification. During the Eurozone crisis, scholars of the EU shifted their decadeslong attention to the issue of European identity and measures of identification to the question of solidarity among member states and, more relevantly for sociologists, ordinary EU citizens. Chapter Five by Juan Díez Medrano, Irina Ciornei and Fulya Apaydin approaches this debate using the unique indicators on solidarity provided by the EUCROSS survey. Their conclusion is that transnational practices per se do not translate into solidarity, unless they are marked by some persistence or highly personal content. In fact, some transnational experiences – such as episodic touristic consumption or the memory of unpleasant events while abroad – may actually reinforce existing

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prejudices. However, the survey results also show that Europeans of both North and South still share a fair degree of solidarity, which is mainly rooted in national self-interest, but does have some degree of European identification and cosmopolitan values connected to it. Chapter Six, by Adrian Favell, Janne Solgaard Jensen and David Reimer, delves into the rich, cross-national comparative material offered by the qualitative interviews conducted in the EUMEAN survey. Building on Díez Medrano’s well-known study (2003) of how Europe is framed differently by Germans, Spanish and British, the chapter focuses on the discussions about mobility and crossborder experiences of residents of the five West European countries in the study. Taking the confident identities of Danes in Europe as its reference point, it contrasts the less experienced but sometimes more idealist points of view of Spaniards and Italians, with the more doubting voices of Germans and British. Tensions in their cross-border relations also surface, particularly between the privileged North-West of the continent and the South. We then move to the specific study of Romanians in the project. In Chapter Seven, using an exemplary combination of quantitative and qualitative data, Roxana Barbulescu, Irina Ciornei and Albert Varela highlight the social differentiation that is produced by social transnationalism – in particular, mobility practices – among Romanian citizens. Romanians are the only nationality in our overall sample for which we use data about both national residents at home and intra-EU migrants abroad. Building on the concept of ‘space-set’ (Recchi 2015), the chapter reveals how current and former migration experiences and the temporalities of migration form significant cleavages within this population. These insights counter stereotypes of Romanians, and also question what the authors call the ‘migratisation of mobilities’ where all forms of mobility are assimilated to a migration paradigm. Chapter Eight turns to the hugely diverse Turkish populations to be found in the member states under study. Deniz Neriman Duru, Adrian Favell and Albert Varela provide a portrait of a nationality which displays the most extensive forms of everyday social transnationalism in the continent, despite not enjoying the privilege of EU citizenship. Their accent, however, is on internal heterogeneity: Turkish nationals in different locations need to be carefully distinguished in terms of ethnicity – notably our samples of ethnic Turks and Kurds – socioeconomic status, religion and politics. Older stereotypes based on low-end ‘guest worker migration’ and linear models of immigration and integration no longer apply easily to the Turkish in Europe. Combining quantitative and qualitative data, the chapter surveys the

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social transnationalism which anchors Turkey in Europe, and then goes on to explore the political transnationalism of Turks revealed by their varying stances towards the Gezi Park protests of 2013, which took place as our fieldwork was being conducted. Finally, Ettore Recchi completes the volume by stepping beyond the bounds of the project and the data it provides, and asking what may now be said about a question raised in earlier rounds of the sociology of the EU. Is the emerging social transnationalism outlined in the present book leading to something like a ‘European society’, and are we thus heading towards a fusion or a fission of national societies in Europe? The chapter unpacks and explores four critical societal dimensions of this question: borders, inequality patterns, social norms and practices, and sense of belonging. It offers a sober empirical assessment, stressing again ongoing and emergent borderings, persistent and growing inequalities, and significant differences among Europeans’ norms and identifications. The nation state continues to put a brake on the effects of convergence and transnationalism in the EU. Having resisted the tide of globalisation and Europeanisation, it may even be successfully reinforcing its own legitimacy and powers.

The future of social transnationalism in Europe We will leave it to the Epilogue to summarise and assess the extant evidence on the degree to which we may speak of the fusion of European societies into one. Its view echoes the pessimistic assessment being offered by most of the leading analysts of EU and European politics today. The dilemma faced by all such empirical reasoning based on existing accepted categories of social or political ‘reality’ is whether it may capture the transformations afoot or whether a new theoretical language is required to make observations of other possibilities visible. The misleading focus on ‘democratic deficit’ in mainstream EU studies, it can be argued, is one such problem (Zimmermann and Favell 2011). Further, as we suggested above, EU scholars have to face their own disappointment about the empirical models and normative theories which once shaped all discussion in the field, as the object of study itself perhaps disappears. The present crisis of the West is not shared by other parts of the planet. Faced with the apparent resurgence of fascist-like nationalism in Europe, it is little wonder that Europeans might question the past confidence they had with the relentless historical progress of liberal democracy and liberalised economy. Globally, too, it might not be that economic growth in emergent economies, and the dramatic processes

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of heavily globalised urban agglomeration driving it, automatically translate into recognisable ‘Western’ political forms, particularly not the ‘normative power’ model of European welfare capitalism (Ong and Roy 2011). The heady, clearly naive post-1989 years now seem very distant. And reactions of Europeans to their own decline, amidst panic unleashed by the economic and social effects of global transformations in recent years, does seem to be the playing out of an older template of predictable cycles of Eurocrisis, Eurosclerosis and Euroconflict. The social transnationalism that we chart in this volume perhaps suggests other more positive undercurrents to the gloom of contemporary national party politics in Europe, and the ensuing demise of the EU project, on which blame can be heaped by all sides. These transformations are but a part of the way similar forms of economic and cultural integration, and shared forms of technological possibility and consumption, are happening all over the fast-moving, urbanising planet. This qualitative transformation is palpable worldwide in the last two decades, not least in countries of Asia and Latin America, whose position in the world order is drastically changing (Evans and Sewell 2014). Moreover, there is still much to be said for the almost ubiquitous models of world development identified by global institutionalists in an earlier phase of the transformations (Meyer et al 1997). While the emphasis on institutional forms takes us back to the crisis of global governance, and the dilemmas of finding suitable political modes of organisation to effectively build international society, the more microlevel focus of some institutionalists in this school suggests another way of looking (Meyer 2010). Without doubt, the qualitative shift here with regional and global integration is still strikingly balanced towards further individualisation, differentiation and diversification of populations, as they come to practise as citizens, consumers, audiences and self-fashioning persons their own trajectories and modes of transnationalisation (Soysal 2015), or what might be better referred to as ‘planetary’ consciousness (Elias and Moraru 2015). The practices anchored in transnational global models of education, professional science and the creative arts, most notably, have long since transcended and rendered obsolete strictly nationalised notions of the ‘good’ or ‘successful’ citizen, with the making of the global mind or subjectivity (Schissler and Soysal 2005; Soysal and Wong 2015). Gender, sexual preference, disability, anti-racist and minority self-expression continues to expand and extend around the planet, for all the forces of reaction, and even when laws and formal institutions do not keep up. For sure, the suspicion is there that this could all ultimately be driven by ‘neoliberal’ capitalism, or worse a ‘neo-fascist’ governmentality

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being organised by a competitive nation state (Mitchell 2003). The perception of the sources of these standardised global scripts is often still heavily nationalised, viewed through a self-congratulatory national prism. Yet these are changes – the unfolding of ongoing modernisation – evolving with their own dynamics, little touched by the melodrama of national politics, and the importance attached to political engagement and the capture of public opinion. This ongoing globalisation of ordinary individual lives, and the patterns and new forms traced by the everyday worlds they constitute, is quite separate to the highly contingent, short-term ‘political’ coalescence of mobilisation and voter engagement, being mostly contained and channelled through highly restrictive national political systems and their increasingly unstable electoral cycles. We have every reason to believe that global transformations of the everyday are happening for ever larger numbers of the population in ever expanding parts of the world. As in China, in South Africa, in Turkey, or in Brazil, so in the EU – for all the sometimes dismal and dissonant outcome of national politics. As transnational social practices and mobilities have routinised, and as these societies have experienced new and fast moving modes of individualisation, differentiation and diversification from the global environment around them, it is doubtful that anyone has been untouched (hence ‘left behind’ absolutely); the changes may go all the way down, quite separately from political reactions, just as there is no longer any tribe or village left in the world that has not been affected in some way by globalisation. A generational shift would make this all the clearer. Younger generations in Europe (Millennials and after) have been hardest hit by the economic and political crisis. But just as they may have only dim consciousness if at all of the utopian post-1989 world – the world of the 1990s idealised by global social theorists – and despite the fact they have most likely had their adult conceptions of how the world works formed by 9/11, other terrorist attacks or the 2008 economic collapse – they are not necessarily gloomy. Young Europeans have routinely grown up and into the Europe around them as an unquestioned backdrop; yet they have much less of the ideological preconceptions about self-conscious ‘Europeanism’ overlaid by previous generations (van der Velde 2008; Cicchelli 2012). In a PhD connected to EUCROSS, Jensen’s research (2015) on young Danes, like these other studies, underlines their adoption of a pragmatic, combined European/global attitude that finds little or no clash with the national/local levels of their lives. They could easily appear as very ‘Danish’ still, yet this is no traditional nationalism. Europe,

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rather, is a taken-for-granted, secure environment: their ‘playground’ in which to feel both Danish and global. Internet and social media play a role here in creating a different kind of imagination, in which physical mobility and denationalised socialisation is not necessarily key. Urbanised lives in Europe are often in any case intensely diversified, and home to multiple global identities. Their social networks appear insular – but the fundamental attitudes of the Millennial generation are global and outward looking, particularly in terms of a consciousness of finitude (environmental damage, military threats, smallness of the planet, depletion of resources), of respect for others and difference, and of mutual help and DIY collectivism amidst the lack of economic opportunity (as identified in Japan by Furuichi 2017). This may be the future of social transnationalism. Certainly there might be a different kind of transnationalism, mobility and cosmopolitanism at work here, less connected to individual selfexploration and physical travel and movement, than amongst the ‘pioneers’ imagined as the avatars of European integration in a previous generation (Recchi and Favell 2009). There may still only be weak support for the EU project as imagined by its founding figures and contemporary leaders, but the effects of more and ever shifting forms of social transnationalism projecting itself out into the world – something found in Europe more intensely than anywhere else – may be rather more enduring in its ultimately planetary effects. References Adler, E., and Barnett, M. (1998) ‘A framework for the study of security communities’. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 62(1): 29–66. Aksoy, A., and Robins, K. (2003) ‘Banal transnationalism: the difference that television makes’, in K. H. Karim (ed) The Media of Diaspora. London: Routledge, 89–104. Alvaredo, F., Chancel, L., Piketty, T., Saez, E., and Zucman, G. (2017) ‘World Inequality Report 2018’. The World Inequality Lab. http:// wir2018.wid.world. Anderson, P. (2011) The New Old World. London: Verso. Andreotti, A., Le Galès, P., and Moreno-Fuentes, F. J. (2015) Globalised Minds, Roots in the City: Urban Upper-Middle Classes in Europe. Oxford: Wiley. Atkinson, A. B., and Morelli, S. (2014) Chartbook of Economic Inequality. ECINEQ WP 2014 – 324. Milan: Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.

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Recchi, E. (2016) Space, Mobility and Legitimacy, in W. R. Thompson (ed) Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://politics.oxfordre.com/. Recchi, E. (2017a) ‘Towards a global mobilities database: rationale and challenges. Explanatory note’. Global Mobilities Project. Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute. www. migrationpolicycentre.eu/globalmobilities. Recchi, E. (2017b) ‘The engine of “Europeanness”? Free movement, social transnationalism and European identification’, in D. Thym (ed) Questioning EU Citizenship: Judges and the Limits of Free Movement and Solidarity in the EU. London: Hart, 135–148. Recchi, E., and Favell, A. (eds) (2009) Pioneers of European Integration: Mobility and Citizenship in the EU. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Recchi, E., Braun, M., Favell, A., Diez Medrano, J., Savage, M., Hanquinet, L., and Sandu, D. (EUCROSS) (2016) The Europeanisation of Everyday Life: Cross-Border Practices and Transnational Identities among EU and Third-Country Citizens (EUCROSS). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5911 Data file Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12381. Risse, T. (2010) A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Roudometof, V. (2005) ‘Transnationalism, cosmopolitanism and glocalization’. Current Sociology 53(1): 113–135. Savage, M. (2015) Social Class in the 21st Century. London: Penguin. Savage, M. and Nichols, (2018) ‘Theorizing elites in unequal times: class, constellation and accumulation’, in O. Korsnes, J. Heilbron, J. Hjellbrekke, F. Bühlmann, and M. Savage (eds) New Directions in Elite Studies. Abingdon: Routledge, 297–314. Savage, M., Bagnall, G., and Longhurst, B. J. (2005) Globalization and Belonging. London: Sage. Scharpf, F.  W. (1999) Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schissler. H. and Soysal, Y. N. (eds) (2005) The Nation, Europe and the World: Textbooks and Curricula in Transition. New York: Berghahn. Shachar, A. (2009) The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Soysal, Y.N. (2015) ‘Mapping the terrain of transnationalization: nation, citizenship, and region’, in Y. N. Soysal (ed) Transnational Trajectories in East Asia: Nation, Citizenship and Region. New York: Routledge, 1–16. Soysal, Y. N., and Wong, S. Y. (2015) ‘Citizenship as a national and transnational enterprise: how education shapes regional and global relevance’, in Y. N. Soysal (ed) Transnational Trajectories in East Asia: Nation, Citizenship and Region. New York: Routledge, 19–45.

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Streeck, W. (2014) Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism. London: Verso. Teney, C., Hanquinet, L. and Bürkin, K. (2016) ‘Feeling European: an exploration of ethnic disparities among immigrants’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 42(13): 2182–2204. Therborn, G. (1995) European Modernity and Beyond: The Trajectory of European Societies, 1945–2000. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Trenz, H. J. (2009) ‘Social theory and European integration’, in A. Favell and V. Guiraudon (eds) Sociology of the European Union. London: Palgrave, 193–213. Urry, J. (2000) Sociology Beyond Societies: Mobilities for the Twenty First Century. London: Routledge. Van de Velde, C. (2008) Devenir adulte: sociologie comparée de la jeunesse en Europe. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. Van Mol, C. (2014) Intra-European Student Mobility in International Higher Education Circuits: Europe on the Move. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. White, J. (2010) ‘Europe in the political imagination’. Journal of Common Market Studies 48(4): 1015–1038. Williams, A. M., and Baláž, V. (2009) ‘Low cost carriers, economies of flows and regional externalities’. Regional Studies 43(5): 677–691. Zimmermann, A., and Favell, A. (2011) ‘Governmentality, political field or public sphere? Theoretical alternatives in the political sociology of the EU’. European Journal of Social Theory 14(4): 489–515.

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ONE

Cartographies of social transnationalism Mike Savage, Niall Cunningham, David Reimer and Adrian Favell

Introduction Early globalisation theorists (Harvey 1989; Giddens 1991; Beck 2000) emphasised the significance of ‘time–space compression’ – the extent to which greater and easier mobility reduced the significance of local face-to-face ties. Others articulated a new social and spatial division between global elites and local masses (Castells 2000; Bauman 1998), a theme which rehearsed and gave new bite to the familiar distinction between sedentary ‘locals’ and mobile ‘cosmopolitans’, which had long been observed in the sociology and anthropology of community (Merton 1957; Watson 1964). These trends were also seen by sociologists embracing the mobilities turn (Urry 2000), as articulating the declining significance of borders, and fuelled the critique of ‘methodological nationalism’ which has gathered pace over the past two decades (Beck and Sznaider 2006). This chapter recognises the power of these trends, and the extent and significance of mundane, or what we call ‘everyday’ mobilities, of people, objects and information in the contemporary world. At the same time, it seeks to direct these observations onto a more balanced terrain in which we can see how such forms of mobility allow the consolidation of distinctive territorial and social identities. This recognition also has a long history, dating back to arguments according to which globalisation led not to the eradication of the local, but to ‘glocalisation’, as global processes acted to construct new kinds of local entities (Robertson 1995). These were similar to anthropological views which claimed that globalisation allowed the proliferation of different ‘scapes’ permitting intense, particularistic identities to develop (Appadurai 1996). It is this more nuanced and critical perspective which has come to the fore since the start of the new century, as it has become clearer

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that transnational practices can actually facilitate the generation of nationally specific identifications and behaviours, and even new forms of nationalism. We need to go beyond simplistic contrasts between ‘cosmopolitans’ and ‘locals’: in this case, between those who are confined to a national scale of everyday life versus those who are more international or global, in order to demonstrate the importance of a more granular geography of worldly connections. We build here on research by Mau (2010), who coined the term ‘social transnationalism’ to describe the concrete ways by which ordinary Germans engage in practices and connections which extend beyond national borders. Mau’s studies (see also Mau et al 2008; Mau and Verwiebe 2010; Mau and Mewes 2012) have done much to show the significance of social transnationalism in Germany. Mau has emphasised, in accordance with the arguments of Castells, Bauman and Urry, that the nation state cannot be readily construed as a container, but rather as a multiply linked entity through a range of transnational processes. He points out the significance of ‘transnationalism from below’, as a mundane process consisting of everyday transactions which cross borders, here picking up on themes from Karl Deutsch’s influential transactionalist view. He insists on the ‘cartographic’ aspects of this transnationalism from below, recognising that it is the specific and particular links Germans have with other people and things in other nations which is significant. ‘Crossborder relationships are a widespread phenomenon’ (Mau 2010, 52), as nearly half of Germans have regular contact with at least one person abroad. Mau also explicates the specific nations to which Germans have affiliations, where the United States scores highest, followed by France, the UK and Spain. What is striking is that when controlling for population size, it is exclusively European nations which are most likely to have the highest odds of having transnational contacts with Germany (Switzerland has the highest, followed by Austria, Sweden, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Denmark, Belgium, Poland, Hungary and the UK). As Mau reports, ‘although transnational social networks are pervasive, they are not likely to be global in nature, but are rather geographically confined in ways that are largely dependent on national characteristics’ (Mau 2010, 55). It is thus those nations which are German speaking, and/or closest to Germany, which score highest. A similar argument is exemplified in the British context by Savage and colleagues’ (2005) analysis of local attachments amongst residents of Manchester in the North of England, as well as Bennett and colleagues’ (2009) studies of cultural capital and identity in Britain. Savage and colleagues show how middle class residents of Manchester articulate a form of cosmopolitanism which embraces cultural references from the

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white Anglophone disapora – especially the US, Australia and Canada – but are largely impervious to black cultural references, and those from South America, Africa and Asia. It is precisely this more granular approach to understanding the specific geography of transnational ties which allows us to see how different cartographical patterns can form, and how these may embody exclusions as well as inclusions. Moreover, in breaking down and identifying the geographical range and distance, this kind of work responds to the call by Delhey and colleagues (2014) for transactionalist work on transnational patterns able to distinguish between European and global scales. This line of thinking has led to a powerful recognition that classbased and other inequalities within nations are closely associated with the extent and nature of transnational ties (Delhey et al 2015). This has been emphasised in accounts of an emerging ‘European field’ in which mobile professionals and managers forged ties and connections across Europe, whilst working class and rural populations were much more likely to be confined to their national boundaries (Fligstein 2008). This theme of the strong class basis of social transnationalism has been elaborated extensively in recent decades. Kuhn (2015, 812) has also used this argument to qualify Deutsch’s transactionism by showing that transnational interaction is highly stratifed across society. She also shows that this division has a powerful impact on the likelihood of Europeans feeling identification with the European project. This is also an issue which Prieur and Savage (2011; 2013) highlight in their studies of cultural divisions in several European nations. These attest to the powerful divide between those with cultural capital who usually embrace cosmopolitan attitudes or identifications and those with low levels of capital who are more nationally oriented. While Fligstein, Kuhn and others stress the general pattern of class differences in social transnationalism across Europe, there may also be significant national variations across member states. These have become particularly salient because of the emergence in many countries of a significant populist anti-EU vote, said to be driven in large part by these inequalities reflecting the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalisation or regional economic integration (Beckfield 2006; Kriesi et al 2008; de Vries 2018). When spatial and social polarisation within a country aligns with an apparent division in the degree of transnational integration found in different regions of the member state, this can lead to parts of a country voting to leave the EU (periphery regions of the UK), while another part wishes to stay in (London). In the context of these debates, EUCROSS data allows us to explore in detail the specific cartography of transnational practices in

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six different European nations. The varieties that this reveals enable us to go well beyond existing studies, allowing the themes elaborated by Mau in Germany and Savage and colleagues in the UK to be considered systematically across different European nations, as well as offering a more detailed assessment of the stratification of social transnationalism within a country which may be related to degrees and effects of Euroscepticism in its national politics. In the next three parts of this chapter, then, we set out various ways of visualising cartographically the national varieties of social transnationalism in Europe; in a fifth part, we explore what we might learn from our reading of the data about the stratification of social transnationalism across Europe.

The European geography of social transnationalism As noted, our starting point is to recognise that it is far too limiting to see any kind of extranational tie as a sign of cosmopolitanism or global attachment and that the exact nature of the tie needs clarification. Some extranational ties can represent very specific and personal connections, for instance based on migration chains; another possibility is that they might exemplify imperial or colonial connections rather than more liberal cosmopolitan or globalist ones. Before EUCROSS, we had only a limited understanding of the geography of transnational ties. One feature that its remarkably granular data offers is to ask respondents with which specific nations they have different kinds of connections. Here, we will use the resources of GIS (Geographical Information Systems) to provide accessible maps of contacts, using the national data samples only, with the size of nations proportional to the significance of different nations. We begin with Figure 1.1 which shows whether EUCROSS respondents indicated if there are parts of the world they feel ‘very familiar with, other than the country in which they currently reside’. It demonstrates a general contrast between Southern European nations (Spain, Romania, Italy) where a majority of individuals in the sample do not have another nation with which they are familiar, and the Northern European countries where a clear majority of people do report this ‘general familiarity’. Interestingly, this distinction groups the UK alongside Germany and Denmark. Despite its supposedly insular Brexit leanings, Britain generally shares with these other relatively affluent societies a higher familiarity with the international environment. Respondents who indicated that they are familiar with at least one other country were subsequently asked to identify which specific

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Cartographies of social transnationalism Figure 1.1: Familiarity with foreign countries by country of respondents Italy (national sample) Romania (national sample) Spain (national sample) Denmark (national sample) United Kingdom (national sample) Germany (national sample)

% 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 (3) No

(1) Yes, one

(2) Yes, two or more

Note: N = 970 (IT), 957 (RO), 986 (ES), 986 (DK), 951 (UK) 974 (DE). Weighted, aged

18–74 only.

Source: EUCROSS (2016)

countries/regions they were thinking of. Drawing on this information, Figure 1.2 demonstrates the striking dominance of familiarity with other European nations, and the very limited exposure of familiarity to the rest of the world. Across the EUCROSS sample as a whole, 23% of nations identified as familiar are from outside Europe. Figure 1.3 demonstrates some marked differences amongst our nations: in Romania, only 3% of familiar countries are outside Europe, compared with 30% in the UK, underscoring that nation’s wider imperial connections. The variability in exposure to extra-European nations is telling. We can conclude, therefore, that a sizeable proportion of Europeans, indeed a clear majority in affluent countries, feel familiar with other European nations first of all. A degree of what we might term ‘Europeanness’, therefore, has been achieved in a mundane way. However, we need to go beyond this broad point to unpick the more particular geographies at work.

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Everyday Europe Figure 1.2: Europe or beyond? Proportion of respondents mentioning having familiarity with non-European countries Europe

% 100

Rest of the world

90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Romania

Italy

Germany

Spain

Denmark

UK

Notes: From those respondents who expressed close familiarity with at least one other country (see Figure 1.1), this graph shows the relative share of connections within or outside Europe. N = 5,484 (weighted, aged 18–74 only). Source: EUCROSS (2016)

The geography of ‘close connections’ beyond Europe We gain further insight as to the different national geographies in Figure 1.3, which reports respondents’ ‘close connections’ with other countries. Although the ‘close connections’ could mean different things, they are nonetheless highly suggestive. We will start by looking at the extra-European connections because these are very telling about the power of historical diasporic connections today and in shedding light on the relative isolation of some European countries, whilst also highlighting the remarkable variation in extra-European familiarity that exists within the continent. Figure 1.3 measures the difference in the extent to which people from the six countries are very familiar with these various world regions (compared to what we would expect were such patterns to be uniform across all EUCROSS countries). Taking each country in turn reveals some fascinating patterns. Denmark first reveals lower levels of familiarity with all areas of the world with the exception of the category labelled ‘Other’. This

40

41

–150

–100

–50

0

50

100

150

200

Denmark

Europe

Germany

Asian country Other

Italy

Romania

Spain

Australia/New Zealand Canada Central American/Caribbean Other Africa South Africa South America Turkey

UK

USA

Notes: This figure shows the distribution of familiarity patterns with different parts of the world amongst the six national samples and how they differ from what we would have expected to see were distributions to be uniform across the board. N = 5,484 (weighted, aged 18–74 only). Source: EUCROSS (2016)

% difference in observed v. expected values

Figure 1.3: Global familiarity patterns amongst the six European case study countries (deviations from the uniform distribution)

Cartographies of social transnationalism

Everyday Europe

ambigous moniker refers largely to a miscellany of islands across the world’s major oceans. In the case of Denmark it also includes the Faroe Islands and Greenland: it is the strong historical and colonial ties between these places and Denmark which underpin the overrepresentation in this category. Cultural and colonial ties also come through when assessing the patterns for Spain, which demonstrate disproportionate familiarity with Central and South America. Otherwise, Spain has relatively high levels of social isolation from the rest of the world, patterns which are even more pronounced in the analysis of Italy and Romania. The linguistic singularity of these countries may be one reason. In the case of Romania, it is likely also that we also have to understand these trends potentially in terms of the economic and cultural legacy of the enforced seclusion behind the ‘Iron Curtain’. Italy’s relative lack of connection is perhaps more surprising, given its strong diasporas and African connections. Germany’s pattern is more diverse, with modest levels of overrepresentation and underrepresentation across the world, including other parts of Europe itself. It is the only one of the six nations which has an overrepresentation of familiarity with other European nations. This speaks very much to Germany’s heartland role and location at the very centre of the European project. This is also consistent with the findings of Mau (2010). At the same time, the distinct patterns for the USA and Turkey speak to both Germany’s past role as a source of immigrants for the New World and more recently as a long-established place of settlement for Turkish incomers. The most remarkable pattern, though, is that for the UK, which overall displays the relatively highest levels of close familiarity with a diverse range of far-flung locations across the globe. Clearly, we can see the enduring significance of the British empire, since many of the areas with which Britons are familiar have been former British colonies: especially where white Britons have settled: Australia/New Zealand, Canada, the USA and South Africa. The clear and interrelated ease of communication linked to a lingua franca also has a role to play here. Conversely, lower levels of close familiarity can be found with South and Central America and, perhaps more tellingly, across the rest of Europe. This is highly consistent with Savage and colleagues’ (2005; 2010) arguments about the way that British ‘cosmopolitanism’ extolls a version of post-imperial whiteness. However, we need to note that this relative European isolation is evidenced across all of the other European states with the exception of Germany. What we see, therefore, is how the residue of empire and migration diasporas remains fundamental in every case to the geography of

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connection of Europeans today. Transnationalism and globalisation has not created a level playing field of global communications, but has in fact allowed the proliferation of particular patterns of contact, following routes and corridors laid down by European imperialism. We have also seen how, for all nations other than Romania, settler colonies have played a special and significant role. Eventually these geographies help to explicate a complex pattern of identifications, as we will show at the end of the chapter.

The internal geography of European connections So far, we have shown the powerful fracturing between different European nations according to the geography of their extra-European connections. We can now turn to consider how internal European contacts are organised to consider their possible significance in structuring the identifications of different European nations. The maps show considerable complexity and variety, but also an overlying theme: whereas we detected a differential geography of extra-European connections according to imperial and diasporic history, within European nations a broad gravity model in which contacts are strongest with neighbouring nations can be observed. There are some crucial exceptions which we will discuss presently, but it is helpful to establish this point to suggest that this may be some kind of evidence for the existence of a ‘European field’ of the kind that Fligstein (2008) suggests: in which the dismantling of internal European borders and the creation of a European labour market has allowed significant numbers of people to gain familiarity with European nations not according to specific historical connections, but because of everyday personal or professional connections linked to a kind of sociological Europeanisation (Favell and Guiraudon 2011). Let us work through our six different nations to exemplify, but also qualify, this point. If we turn first to the map of those European nations where respondents show close connections, the Danes exemplify the gravity model very strongly. Their strong connections are to neighbouring nations: Norway, Sweden, Germany, Netherlands and the UK, along with Italy, France, Austria and Spain at the next remove. Clearly, the ties to Norway and Sweden represent Scandinavian ties (though the lack of connection found here to Finland is striking), but this is of course underscored by the proximity of these nations to Denmark; indeed, a bridge and a joint airport link Denmark and Sweden. What is also striking is the absence of connections to Eastern Europe, other than Lithuania.

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Germans also demonstrate the gravity effect, though what is also striking is how their connections range across European space much more than any other nations. The role of Germany at the heart of Europe is again vividly underscored. After its unusually close ties to Austria and Switzerland based on linguistic ties, it then has nearly 10% of its residents reporting close ties to France, Italy and Spain. Around Figure 1.4: Cartographies of familiarity with other European countries by country of residence: Denmark

Note: N = 940 (weighted, aged 18–74). Source: EUCROSS (2016)

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3–5% of its respondents report close connections with the Netherlands, the UK, Greece, Denmark and Poland. The close connections of Germans thus demonstrate its central role within Europe at large, though even here its apparent lack of reach into the Balkans and Eastern Europe (except Poland) is noteworthy.

Figure 1.4: (continued) Cartographies of familiarity with other European countries by country of residence: Germany

Note: N = 927 (weighted, aged 18–74). Source: EUCROSS (2016)

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The map of Italian close connections also shows the gravity effect, though once more with some striking twists. Its prime connections are with its neighbours or near-neighbours France, Spain and Germany, followed at some distance by Switzerland and Greece. However, unlike the previous nations, its connections fade rapidly. Italians report few

Figure 1.4: (continued) Cartographies of familiarity with other European countries by country of residence: Italy

Note: N = 960 (weighted, aged 18–74). Source: EUCROSS (2016)

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or no ties to the rest of Northern Europe (apart from Ireland and the Netherlands), or Eastern Europe (apart from Poland). The Romanians’ map is very different. Compared to their small range of extra-European connections, the extent and breadth of European connections are striking. They have very large contacts with Italy Spain and Germany. These connections also eclipse the gravity process, given the smaller but significant prominence of the Figure 1.4: (continued) Cartographies of familiarity with other European countries by country of residence: Romania

Note: N = 960 (weighted, aged 18–74). Source: EUCROSS (2016)

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UK, France, Belgium and Sweden, and the relative lack of contact with its Balkan neighbours or with Eastern European nations. We can surmise the power of labour migration chains as the driving force of these contacts. Spanish respondents clearly exemplify the gravity model, with the closeness of their ties to Western European neighbours very manifest, Figure 1.4: (continued) Cartographies of familiarity with other European countries by country of residence: Spain

Note: N = 931 (weighted, aged 18–74). Source: EUCROSS (2016)

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and only some connections with Austria and Sweden among more farflung European nations. The case of the UK also largely conforms to the gravity process, though we can also note the strength of Southern European ties (to Spain, Italy, Greece and Cyprus). Indeed, we observe that all the nations where British report close connections are maritime countries (there is a striking absence of Central and Eastern European connections), so underscoring again the imperial legacy. Figure 1.4: (continued) Cartographies of familiarity with other European countries by country of residence: United Kingdom

Note: N = 854 (weighted, aged 18–74). Source: EUCROSS (2016)

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We can pull together the threads of these maps as follows. Firstly, there clearly is an uneven internal geography of European contacts. For any one of our six European nations, there are some other European nations which are largely ‘terra incognita’. Close contacts are therefore uneven. Secondly, however, amidst this heterogeneity there is a neatly discernible gravity effect in Northern and in Western Europe, whereby it is mainly neighbouring nations which are most salient. This is, however, also powerfully overlain by labour migration channels, most evident in the Romanian case. Thirdly, we can see the centrality of Germany within this European map: not only are the contacts of its residents unusually far-reaching, it is also the only nation which figures in a significant way amongst the close contacts of all the other European nations which we studied.

The stratification of close connections abroad We now turn to consider the arguments of Fligstein, Kuhn and others regarding the fundamental stratification of social transnationalism between more and less advantaged populations within Europe. This theme animates much analysis on populism, so our data might help to clarify these political trends within Europe, notably the UK in the case of Brexit. The answer would lie in knowing to what extent those who do not exhibit transnational ties are predisposed towards supporting nationalist political positions. The EUCROSS data does not include information on family income, but we do have a question on how financially comfortable respondents feel, which we use as a proxy for respondents’ socioeconomic position. We have thereby visualised the cartographies of the two opposing positions: respondents who declare they ‘live very comfortably on the money we have’ and those at the opposite end of the scale, stating that they ‘find it very difficult’. We pooled the six national samples to pull out the differences across the entire European sample rather than looking at the patterns for individual states. The disparities become clear when we consider the relative exposure of the two groups to different parts of the world. This is shown in Figure 1.5 in terms of the shading from dark (comparatively low levels of global ties) to light (comparatively high levels of global ties). Using the same ‘observed versus expected’ methodology as deployed earlier in the chapter – that is, measuring how they differ from what we would have expected to see were distributions to be uniform across the board – we see that global ties for the ‘financially very comfortable’ group are disproportionately common (lighter shading), whilst for those

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Figure 1.5: Map of ‘close connections’ for respondents on top and at the bottom of self-reported SES scale (six country sample)

Note: The subjective SES scale has five positions: 1. We are living very comfortably on the money we have; 2. We are living comfortably on the money we have; 3. We make ends meet; 4. We find it difficult; 5. We find it very difficult. This figure reports values for the two polar groups of respondents (position 1. Very comfortable and 5. Very difficult). N = 5,484 (weighted, aged 18–74 only). Source: EUCROSS (2016)

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Everyday Europe

whose finances are ‘very difficult’, the precise opposite is true (darker shading). For the ‘financially very comfortable’, large swathes of the world are shaded light to indicate disproportionate levels of familiarity over what would be predicted were these distributions not skewed by socioeconomic levels. By contrast, nearly the entire global map of those in financial difficulties is shaded dark, showing that compared to the sample as a whole, they are far less likely to have familiarity with other nations (though see Yearwood et al 2015 for an interesting counterargument using Facebook data). Our map is a stark representation showing how socioeconomic conditions can be associated with having familiarity with other nations; it offers support to Fligstein’s and Kuhn’s general argument about the stratification of transnationalism in Europe. This argument receives further endorsement in Figure 1.6, which shows the disparities in the global geography of familiarity, this time expressed by education. For the highly educated, levels of familiarity are far higher than would be expected across North America and Europe, and broadly in line with what would be expected across the rest of the globe. In contrast, for those with a low level of education, the probability of familiarity is much less than would be expected across most of the world, with only marginally higher levels of familiarity (but still below the average) with the poorer continents of the Global South. These analyses underline powerfully the inequalities which exist in terms of how different groups can experience the wider world, as well as a comment on how globalisation presents different levels of opportunity for different groups in society. We can go further in terms of identifying national variation in degrees of familiarity with foreign countries by level of education in another way. In Figure 1.7, we compare the odds of being very familiar with any country apart from the country of residence for respondents with a tertiary degree compared to those with lower levels of education by computing odds-ratios across countries.1 In line with the previous figures, we see here that across all countries there is substantial inequality in familiarity with another country. Leaving aside the UK, which has a distinctive pattern, respondents with higher education are between 1.7 (Denmark) and 2.5 (Romania) times more likely to be familiar with another country compared to respondents with lower levels of education (the dark line). More highly educated Danes have a much stronger connection to English  We treat these findings with an appropriate degree of caution when interpreting differences in odds-ratios across different samples or countries (Breen et al 2014). 1

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Figure 1.6: Map of ‘close connections’ for respondents of high and low education levels (six country sample)

Note: N = 5,484 (weighted, aged 18–74 only). Source: EUCROSS (2016)

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Everyday Europe Figure 1.7: The stratification of ‘familiarity with foreign countries’ by educational levels Familiarity (any country) Familiarity with EU country only Familiarity with English speaking country only 3

2

1

0 DK

DE

IT

RO

ES

UK

Notes: This figure contrasts the odd ratios (vertical axis) of ‘being familiar with some foreign country’ among respondents with higher education degrees as opposed to respondents with lower level degrees in the six national samples (horizontal axis). N = 5,484 (weighted, aged 18–74 only). Source: EUCROSS (2016)

speaking countries than the less well educated, whereas in Spain education matters less in this. If familiarity with another EU country only is considered compared to familiarity to any country, the odds ratios generally do not look much different. Apart from this, overall, the education gradient is quite similar across the five continental EUCROSS countries even if disparities are to some degree more pronounced in the Southern countries, particularly Romania and Italy. Respondents in the UK with higher education, however, are, across the board, only slightly more likely to be familiar with countries abroad than their less well educated counterparts. Putting these findings together with other analyses made elsewhere with the EUCROSS data (Favell and Reimer 2013), we get a further sense of how deeply embedded some European societies are in Europe. A consistent finding of the EUCROSS project – which we echoed above – has been that citizens of the more affluent North-West EU member states, Denmark, Germany and the UK, have a significantly

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higher familiarity with other countries internationally. This also holds if we look not at ‘familiarity’ but at a broad range of forms of social transnationalism. For Britain, it is a question of overall volume of both familiarity with other countries, especially beyond Europe, and transnational practices. While there is a distinctive geography to the relations of the British to the world, the volume of their relations ensures that they are not less connected to Europe than, say, the Italians or Spanish, or that being part of Europe has inhibited their participation in everyday forms of wider social transnationalism. As we showed above, 70% of British overseas familiarity is with other European countries. As citizens of the EU, the British population had both global and European options in terms of mundane mobilities. In this sense, there is a certain degree of self-harm in the political decision to remove legal access to some of these ‘bottom up’ forms of Europeanisation – what Favell and Reimer (forthcoming) refer to as ‘irrational nationalism’.

Conclusion In this chapter we have shown that the geographical spread of transnational ties should be considered more important than their simple existence. This perspective is premised on the recognition that global ties are ubiquitous, across numerous domains of social life, and that what matters is the nationally specific crystallisations which such ties articulate. Among other things, this recognition is a vital one if we are to understand the gravity of current political challenges. The Brexit vote in the British EU referendum in 2016, for example, might be read simply as a ‘nationalist’ backlash against European integration, endorsing the idea of a divide between ‘cosmopolitans’ who value and even celebrate transnational ties, versus nationalist ‘nativists’ who resist them (for example, Fligstein 2009). However, in the context of our analyses, we find that the British are not so different from other European nations in the extent of their transnational ties – indeed they are highly international – but their ties are marked out by a distinct geography. National specificities – more or less self-consciously – define these differences. It can thus be argued that the Brexit vote is an attempt to politically redefine the nation’s position in the world, and resuscitate a British imperial identity based on endorsing ties between the old Commonwealth nations. While the UK is embedded in Europe transnationally, it also has a distinctive global geography that sets it apart in some ways. Brexit voters can be seen to have made a choice to emphasise this facet of Britain’s internationalisation; their

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option was not merely a case of shrinking into a closed nativism. In politically cutting themselves out of Europe, however, some of the country’s wide range of transnationalisms will undoubtedly be diminished. Furthermore, as discussed by Savage and colleagues (2005; 2010), Britain’s broader global associations can also be identified as a kind of ‘imperial British whiteness’, in which it is those nations with a large white settler population – such as South Africa, Australia and Canada – which are especially close. Such colonialism is a long way from the normative ideals of cosmopolitanism extolled by Ulrich Beck (Beck and Grande 2007), which are sometimes celebrated as a hallmark of the EU’s core values (Manners 2002). As a parting shot, we can see some support for this by exploiting the EUCROSS question regarding the nature of local, national, European and global identification. Table 1.1 reports the cross-tabulation of these European and world identifications, broken down by the six national samples. It shows a perceptible variation in how different national populations associate with European countries versus the world more generally. A sizeable proportion of respondents, and indeed an absolute majority in Spain, Romania and Italy, see themselves as both Europeans and ‘citizens of the world’. We might take this as an endorsement of cosmopolitan identifications. However, a substantial proportion (27.2% in each case) of Danes and Germans see themselves as Europeans but not citizens of the world. And in Britain, 23.4% of people see themselves as ‘citizens of the world’ – perhaps evoking old colonial ties – but not European. More generally, Table 1.1 therefore indicates that although 46% of our six country respondents have both European and globally minded identities, there is a sizeable group Table 1.1: Feeling European and/or feeling like a citizen of the world by country (in %) Denmark Germany Italy Romania Spain UK Total Feeling neither European nor citizen of the world

26.1

23.4

21.0

20.8

11.8 39.7 23.7

Feeling citizen of the world but not European

 6.1

 7.0

13.8

18.9

14.2 23.4 13.8

Feeling European but not citizen of the world

27.2

27.2

14.3

 9.3

 8.2 10.4 16.2

Feeling European and citizen of the world

40.7

42.4

50.8

51.0

65.8 26.4 46.3

Note: N = 939 (DK), 906 (DE), 923 (IT), 952 (RO), 930 (ES), 831 (UK). Weighted, aged 18–74 years only. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

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Cartographies of social transnationalism

(almost one out of three respondents) who say they have one, but not the other, supernational identity. In short, this chapter has shown that the specific geographies of social transnationalism offer a powerful way to understand collective attachment. We have also been able to unravel the specific complexity of the division between intra-European and extra-European networks, which do not straightforwardly go together. At the starkest extremes, Germany has dense intra-European networks, which underscore its centrality, indeed dominance, within the European project; whereas the UK’s networks, while still substantially Europeanised, are proportionately more likely to be extra-European, and more specifically targeted to its former colonies. Thus, the patterns which we have unpicked here can help to make sense of the complex geopolitics of contemporary nationalism in a way which goes beyond simple oppositions of nation-oriented and cosmopolitan-oriented populations. References Appadurai, A. (1996) Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Bauman, Z. (1998) Globalization: The Human Consequences. Cambridge: Polity Press. Beck, U. (2000) What is Globalization? Oxford: Polity. Beck, U., and Grande, E. (2007) ‘Cosmopolitanism: Europe’s way out of crisis’. European Journal of Social Theory 10(1): 67–85. Beck, U., and Sznaider, N. (2006) ‘Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: a research agenda’. British Journal of Sociology 57(1): 1–23. Beckfield, J. (2006) ‘European integration and income inequality’. American Sociological Review 71(6): 964–985. Bennett, T., Savage, M., Silva. E., Warde, A., Gayo-Cal, M., and Wright, D. (2009) Culture, Class, Distinction. London: Routledge. Breen, R., Holm, A., and Karlson, K. (2014) ‘Correlations and nonlinear probability models’, Sociological Methods and Research 43(4): 571–605. Castells, M. (2000) The Rise of the Network Society. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell. Delhey, J., Deutschmann, E. Graf, T., and Richter, K. (2014) ‘Measuring the Europeanization of everyday life: three new indices and an empirical application’. European Societies 163(3): 355–377.

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Delhey, J., Deutschmann, E., and Cirlanaru, K. (2015) ‘Between “class project” and individualization: the stratification of Europeans’ transnational activities’. International Sociology 30(3): 269–293. De Vries, C. (2018) Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Favell, A., and Guiraudon, V. (eds) (2011) Sociology of the European Union. London: Palgrave. Favell, A., and Reimer, D. (2013) ‘Winners and losers? Citizens and sceptics: European integration and the spread of cosmopolitanism’. EUCROSS Policy Brief. Chieti: University of Chieti-Pescara. Favell, A., and Reimer, D. (forthcoming) ‘Irrational nationalism: Euroscepticism and Europeanisation in Britain and Denmark’. Fligstein, N. (2008) Euroclash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fligstein, N. (2009) ‘Who are the Europeans and how does it matter for politics?’, in J. Checkel and P. Katzenstein (eds) European Identity. Cambridge University Press, 132–166. Giddens, A. (1991) The Consequences of Modernity. Oxford: Polity. Harvey, D. (1989) The Condition of Postmodernity. Oxford: WileyBlackwell. Kriesi H.-P. Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., and Frey, T. (2008) West European Politics in the Age of Globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kuhn, T. (2015) Experiencing European Integration: Transnational Lives and European Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Manners, I. (2002) ‘Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’ Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2): 235–258. Mau, S. (2010) Social Transnationalism: Lifeworlds beyond the Nation-state. London: Routledge. Mau, S., and Mewes, J. (2012) ‘Horizontal Europeanisation in contextual perspective: what drives cross-border activities within the European Union?’ European Societies 14(1): 7–34. Mau, S., and Verwiebe, R. (2010) European Societies. Mapping Structure and Change. Bristol: Policy Press. Mau, S., Mewes, J., and Zimmermann, A. (2008) ‘Cosmopolitan Attitudes through transnational social practices?’ Global Networks 8(1): 1–24. Merton, R. (1957) Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: The Free Press. Prieur, A., and Savage, M. (2011) ‘Updating cultural capital theory: a discussion based on studies in Denmark and in Britain’. Poetics 39: 566–580.

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Prieur, A., and Savage, M. (2013) ‘Emerging forms of cultural capital’. European Societies 15(2): 246–267. Recchi, E., Braun, M., Favell, A., Díez Medrano, J., Savage, M., Hanquinet, L., and Sandu, D. (EUCROSS) (2016) The Europeanisation of Everyday Life: Cross-Border Practices and Transnational Identities among EU and Third-Country Citizens (EUCROSS). Köln: GESIS Data Archive. ZA5911 Data file Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12381. Robertson, R. (1995) ‘Glocalisation: time-space and homogeneity– heterogeneity’, in M. Featherstone, S. Lash, and R. Robertson (eds) Global Modernities. London: Sage, 25–44. Savage, M., Bagnall, G., and Longhurst, B. (2005) Globalization and Belonging. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Savage, M., Wright, D., and Gayo-Cal, M. (2010) ‘Cosmopolitan nationalism and the cultural reach of the white British’. Nations and Nationalism 16(4): 598–615. Urry, J. (2000) Sociology Beyond Societies: Mobilities for the Twenty-first Century. London: Routledge. Watson, W. (1964) ‘Social mobility and social class in industrial communities’, in M. Gluckman (ed) Closed Systems and Open Minds: The Limits of Naivety in Social Anthropology. London: Routledge. Yearwood, H. M., Cuddy, A., Lamba, N., Youyou, W., van der Lowe, I., Piff, P. K., Gronin, C., Fleming, P., Simon-Thomas, E., Keltner, D., and Spectre, A. (2015) ‘On wealth and the diversity of friendships: high social class people around the world have fewer international friends’. Personality and Individual Differences 87: 224–229.

59

TWO

The social structure of transnational practices Justyna Salamon´ska and Ettore Recchi

Introduction Globalisation entails the expansion and diversification of the forms of mobility of humans. Worldwide, technological progress in the fields of communication and transportation has facilitated the development and intensification of new and diverse movements. In Europe, supranational political integration has created a particularly favourable environment for cross-state movements. Since the beginning of the century, social theory has taken into account such major changes with a ‘mobility turn’ (Urry 2000; 2007; Sheller 2016). Empirical research has thus paid renewed and multidisciplinary attention to a large canvas of forms of international mobility centred on Europe: migrations (eg Recchi and Favell 2009; Krings et al 2013; Wiesböck et al 2016); tourism (eg Urry 1990); shopping online (Perea y Monsuwé et al 2004); home ownership and lifestyles abroad (eg Aspden 2005; Wickham 2007; Benson and O’Reilly 2009); and virtual interactions (eg Mau 2010; Larsen et al 2006). In line with a theoretical insight dating back to Karl Deutsch, revived by Jan Delhey (2004) and Neil Fligstein (2008), the scale and intersection of these mobilities across the continent have been studied as the key to ‘horizontal Europeanization’ (Mau and Mewes 2012) and, eventually, to the bottom-up drivers of European integration tout court (Favell and Guiraudon 2009; Kuhn 2015; Recchi 2015). Short of that, mapping individual mobilities is in any case a revealing way of looking at European societies and their hybridisation via social practices. We operationalise international mobilities as cross-border practices, or ‘behaviours that are performed by any possible individual agent in any aspect of everyday life’ across state frontiers (Favell et al 2011, 19). This chapter will delve into some typical instances of such practices normally studied separately in an integrated way. We start with an a priori classification that guides our selection of relevant indicators

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of physical and virtual mobilities. We then review existing literature on these forms of mobilities, with a special emphasis on research focused on Europe. In the second part of the chapter, drawing on the EUCROSS dataset, we use survey data on national residents and selected nationalities of migrants (Romanians and Turks) in Denmark, Germany, Italy, Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom, in order to assess the spread of international mobilities in everyday life. Our analysis links movements in physical and virtual spaces to social categories and explores the way such movements are socially structured. This goal is pursued by using regression models and multiple correspondence analysis (MCA). Our aim is twofold. On the one hand, we seek to describe the spread in the population of each type of practice and how they are socially structured. Are they an upshot of existing inequalities at the micro and macro levels? Do they reflect pre-existing structures or cut across societies in a significant way? On the other hand, we intend to explore the interrelationships of these mobilities. Are some cross-border practices associated with certain types of social actors? Can they be said to be inscribed into different lifestyles among different categories of individuals?

Types of cross-border practices To what extent do Europeans live their lives beyond nation state borders? How is transnationalism enacted in everyday activities? In a working taxonomy proposed by Urry (2000), physical movements of people and objects are taken as the most basic form of mobility. But Urry’s classification also emphasises two other important ways in which people move: virtually, in particular via internet-based interactive applications; and imaginatively, via passively consumed media, mainly television and radio, but now also the internet. Our attempt to measure cross-border practices in Europe is intended to furnish empirical evidence to the scale and scope of European mobilities across all these categories. To do so, we build on an earlier classification (Recchi 2014). In the first place we draw a distinction between physical and virtualimaginative mobilities. Further distinctions are then made between two dimensions: physical mobilities can be seen ranging along a continuum from ‘short‘ to ‘long’ in permanence, while virtualimaginative mobilities vary in terms of their more ‘personal’ or ‘impersonal’ nature (see Table 2.1). Using this classification we aim to outline in more detail physical and non-physical mobility practices, and their possible intersections.

62

The social structure of transnational practices Table 2.1: Classification of individual cross-border practices Physical border crossing? Yes → Physical mobility

No → Virtualimaginative mobility

Dimensions Indicator High permanence Long-term stay abroad (>3 years) Medium-term stay abroad (3 months–3 years) Short-term stay abroad (3 weeks–3 months) Low permanence Holidaying, short trips abroad Personal Having a foreign spouse or family member Having family/relatives in a different country Planning relocation in a foreign country Having foreign friends/neighbours Having friends abroad Sending children study abroad Having foreign business partners, clients, colleagues Adhering to international associations Interacting with foreigners through social networks Making foreign investments (house, bank account) Impersonal Buying foreign products online

Source: Recchi (2014: 128)

Physical cross-border practices Our overview of the landscape of European mobilities starts here with an analysis of international movements, of both longer and shorter duration. To start with, international migration is the most researched form of long-term physical mobility across borders. Traditionally, migration is framed as a move from a place of origin to a destination of (more or less) permanent character. Migration statistics reflect this approach, as they define migrants as persons who are resident in a country other than their country of origin (CoO) for at least one year (following a UN-established convention). Yet a plethora of international moves do not necessarily last one year or more; add to this that migration horizons are increasingly broader and go beyond the origin and destination dichotomy, entailing step-wise subsequent resettlements from one country to another (Salamońska 2017). This flexibility is a particular feature of intra-European mobility, due to the ease of settlement and back-and-forth movement granted by European citizenship rights (Recchi 2015). Studies of intra-European migration in the EU15 focus on diverse motivations of people moving for work, for better quality of life, for studies, for family, or simply because they fall in love with somebody residing in another country (eg King 2002;

63

Everyday Europe

King and Ruiz-Gelices 2003; Hadler 2006; Santacreu et  al 2009; Benson 2010). In the aftermath of the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007, population flows from East to West in Europe grew substantially. Although these new migrations are still largely regarded as labour migration, the literature points to non-economic factors involved, including lifestyle issues, social networks, quality of life and life course related rationales (eg Cook et al 2011; Eade et al 2006; Grabowska 2003; Koryś 2003; Wickham et al 2009; Recchi and Triandafyllidou 2010; Krings et al 2013). Equally, the EU free movement regime facilitates short-term mobility of a more tourist-like character. In the simplest sense, the Schengen area passport-free facility and the Eurozone single currency make travel projects particularly smooth. Relative ease of travelling and historically decreasing costs of transportation – boosted in Europe by the EU air liberalisation policies and incentives to strengthen transnational infrastructure corridors – have resulted in tourism as leading to new social encounters and interactions (Hall 2005). Szerszynski and Urry (2006) notice how in the Western world travel has become a ‘way of life’: a claim corroborated by the numbers of people on the move, unprecedented in history (Koslowski 2011; Deutschmann 2016). Tourists may travel for diverse reasons. The World Tourism Organization defines them as individuals ‘travelling to and staying in places outside their usual environment for not more than one consecutive year for leisure, business and other purposes’ (UNWTO 1994). Tourist journeys are possibly the most common form of shortterm physical movements, but short trips for work trigger mobility as well. Another important aspect of short-term mobility is related to significant others: people travel to meet them in specific places or they travel with them in search of ‘intimate proximities’ (Larsen et al 2006). Overall, however, existing evidence points to a social stratification of international travel and, to a lesser extent, of other forms of mobility (Delhey et al 2015; Kuhn 2015). Although travel has become ever more accessible with diminishing costs of connections offered by carriers (especially in Europe), the extent of physical mobility may still depend on the material resources that people possess. In contrast, demographic evidence on the prevalence of East–West movements in intra-EU migration since 2004 (eg  Recchi 2015; Recchi and Salamońska 2015) suggests that the comparatively less affluent have a higher likelihood of migrating within the continent.

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The social structure of transnational practices

Virtual and imaginative cross-border practices Virtual mobility generates a particular type of mobile experience, which can be described as mediated, artificial or imaginative, but not as unreal, at least for its implications at the individual and collective level. While virtual relationships and communications are subject to limitations imposed by the media that make them possible (phone, computer), these same limitations may also elicit an aspiration for physical mobility. Woolgar (2002) points out that, much like with physical mobility, focusing on the macro-level does not say much about the day-to-day utilisation and experience of new technologies. This is why there is a need to understand technology in a contextualised perspective, taking into account the social environment in which it is used. Furthermore, the virtual is interrelated with the real, but this interrelation can be either a replacement or reinforcement. Often virtual contacts trigger real actions. And, finally, the perceptions of what technology is and what it can bring about are not the same for different social categories. The study of transnational social networks was initially the domain of migration studies in which the question of how mobile people kept in touch with significant others back home was studied (Glick Schiller et al 1992; Portes et al 1999; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Waldinger 2015). These studies illustrated ‘travelling-in-dwelling’ practices of communication by email or phone as they were becoming cheaper and more easily accessible (very much like travel) especially when compared with previous generations (eg Clarke 2005). Vertovec (2004) highlighted the potentially transformative power of such transnationalism for migrants, as well as sending and receiving societies. However, migrants’ practices are an extreme illustration of information and communication technologies’ use linked to physical mobility, and more generally characterising contemporary societies (Castells 1996). Eurostat data (2012) shows that connecting to the internet has become a daily practice for the large majority of European citizens at the time the EUCROSS survey was carried out. The bulk of Europeans use the internet to send and receive emails, over a third share their profiles and their ideas on general social media (like Facebook or Twitter). Mau’s (2010) work on social transnationalism demonstrates that in the mid-2000s almost half of German residents had social contacts spanning across national borders, although the geography of these international social networks was not random, but embedded in specific geographical, cultural and historical patterns.

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Everyday Europe

When the means and use of virtual communications were still in their infancy, Boden and Molotch (1994) highlighted a persisting compulsion for traditional face-to-face contacts, as a biographically and historically primary mode of communication. Proximity allows communicating with words, but also with eye contact, body language and touch, all ingredients of more dense and rewarding interactions. This is particularly important in the case of personal relations, but also business transactions whenever more complex understandings are sought. Their claim is that virtual and real contacts feed each other. If this is still true, we should find that people more inclined to travel are also more involved in cross-border communications via the internet and social media. In Urry’s (2007) typology, non-physical mobility can become an imaginative movement when the travel takes place using a TV set, radio or internet-based devices. Traditional and web-based social media allow journeys to distant places while staying physically put (eg  Tussyadiah and Fesenmaier 2009). Cross-border consumption practices involving media such as television have so far been examined largely within the migration literature (for a particularly illuminating study, see Aksoy and Robins 2003). We include them in our analysis as these practices imply that people cross national boundaries with their imagination in a symbolically meaningful way (Hanquinet and Savage 2013; also Chapter Three). Objects and things travel as well, and they do it in between real and virtual spaces. Migration scholars in particular have been interested in global flows of economic remittances (eg Mansoor and Quillin 2006; De Haas 2009), in terms of their directions, sizes and use. However, sending and receiving money is not limited to migrants and their households back home. Internet banking and other virtual payment systems have made cash flows across borders easier, cheaper and faster than ever before. What is more, purchases across borders have been constantly growing in importance. While for affluent classes this may mean buying property abroad (Aspden 2005), practices of online shopping have become more widespread all across the board. Indeed, online shopping is one of the most popular ways in which the internet is used. The added value of online shopping, compared to more traditional store retailing, consists in time saving and providing easily accessible information. However, online shopping activities may be more popular among those who are competent users of new technologies. And again the EU facilitates it, having removed custom duties charges and controls that apply when shopping takes place outside the Union’s borders. As a matter of fact, most primary shopping

66

The social structure of transnational practices

outlets have implemented EU-wide web search as a customary tool if surfing from a EU-based IP address. In conclusion, we expect access to virtual mobility to depend more on cognitive skills and generational cultures, as younger cohorts in particular are both more accustomed and more competent in making use of information and communication technologies (Duggan and Brenner 2013) than on socioeconomic status. Virtual mobility is definitely cheaper and less engaging (for instance, in terms of time needed) than physical mobility. This is not to say, however, that everybody can afford virtual–imaginative movements. In particular, we expect them to be easier for individuals endowed with a ‘transnational background’ (that is, holding a nationality other than the one of the country of residence (CoR) and/or being a descendants of nonnationals), as Kuhn (2015) found.

Data and indicators We analyse separately a set of mobility practices as reported on the one hand by the sample of national citizens of the six European countries of the EUCROSS survey (Denmark, Germany, Italy, Romania, Spain and the UK), and on the other hand by the sample of Romanian and Turkish migrants in these same countries (with the exception of Romanian migrants in Romania and Turks in Spain) (see Methodological appendix). Our regression analyses focus on seven indicators – some of which are constructed by assembling two different questionnaire items – of (mostly) intra-EU cross-border practices that tap physical (the first two) and virtual–imaginative mobilities (the other five):1 1. Migration experiences: ‘Have you ever lived in another EU country for three or more consecutive months before you turned 18?’; ‘Have you lived in another EU country for three or more consecutive months since you turned 18?’ 2. Recent tourist experiences: ‘Please think of trips abroad within the EU which included at least one overnight stay. How many of these trips have you had in the past 24 months?’

  As regards the sample of migrants, we examine their transnationalism net of their constitutive relationship with the country they come from (that is, Romania or Turkey). Therefore, for indicators 1, 2, 6 and 7 we did not consider travel and practices related to their country of origin as being a form of mobility. 1

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Everyday Europe

3. Communication with family/friends abroad via phone/computer and via mail/email: ‘Please think about the last 12 months: How frequently did you talk to family members, in-laws and friends abroad by phone or using your computer?’; ‘How frequently did you communicate with family/friends abroad by mail or email?’ 4. Communication with family/friends abroad via web-based social networks: ‘And how frequently did you communicate with family/ friends abroad via social networks? (eg Facebook, Hi5, Google+ etc)?’ 5. International money transfers: ‘Do you ever send money abroad for reasons other than purchasing goods or services?’; ‘In the last 12 months, have you received money from someone who is living in another country?’ 6. Shopping abroad: ‘Thinking about the last 12 months, have you purchased any goods or services from sellers or providers who were located abroad within the EU? That is, for example, via websites, mail, phone, etc?’ 7. Following TV in foreign language: ‘The following question is about TV content (eg movies, sitcoms, news broadcasts etc) in other languages than [official CoR language and respondent’s native language]: How often do you watch TV content which is in another language and has not been dubbed, either directly on TV or via the internet?’ The next section will delve into these indicators one by one, while the following section will turn to MCA for a more comprehensive take on the interrelationships between different forms of mobilities.

The size and scope of cross-border practices in six European countries A first look at cross-border practices as registered by the EUCROSS dataset shows that resident populations in the six European countries are astonishingly mobile. Table 2.2 gives an overview of the full range of practices on which we focus, reporting the breakdown of each mobility indicator by nationality of respondents. All the indicators were dichotomised, with code 1 assigned to individuals who reported that they engaged in a given cross-border activity within the period of reference. Among the national residents of our six-country sample, 11% have lived in another EU member state in the past. This is comparable with estimates from Eurobarometer 73.3 of 2010, in which 10.4%

68

The social structure of transnational practices Table 2.2: Cross-border practices by nationality of respondents (%)

United Kingdom

Romanian migrants

Turkish migrants

10.6

14.3

15.6

10.3

Visited at least one EU country in the last 24 months (excluding CoO and CoR for migrants)

72.9

61.7 38.0 26.8

37.5

55.9

53.8

38.6

Communicates by phone/ computer/mail/e-mail with family, friends abroad

40.7

44.0 45.2 68.1

52.3

58.4

81.9

86.9

Communicates via web-based social networks with family, friends abroad

25.0

19.0 26.1 32.7

29.3

34.2

61.2

59.6

Sent or received money from abroad

16.9

12.3 13.4 27.6

12.0

14.1

48.6

42.9

Purchased goods or services from sellers or providers who were located in another EU country in the last 12 months

31.5

19.7 11.1  7.0

11.9

11.2

21.6

 8.5

Watches TV in another language

86.2

51.7 35.9 51.5

34.4

40.1

50.1

53.6

Italy

 9.1  8.4 15.6

Germany

11.6

Indicators Lived in another EU country for three or more months (excluding CoO for migrants)

Denmark

Spain

Migrants

Romania

Nationals

Note: Nationals: N = 5,484 (weighted, aged 18–74 only); Migrants: N = 2,419. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

of respondents declared they have lived abroad for three months or more.2 The number of EU movers – that is, EU citizens living in a member state different from the one of which they are a national citizen – hovers around 3% of the EU population (17 million at the end of 2017). According to our estimates, then, the number of former EU movers is almost four times larger – still remaining, however,   However, 12.7% and 7.6% respectively declared they had ’worked’ or ‘studied’ abroad (not only in the EU) (Salamońska et al 2013, 38). Overall, one of the three modalities was selected by 17.2% of EB respondents (Recchi 2013). This proportion included also non-national residents, which are in fact excluded from our sample of reference here. 2

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Everyday Europe

a minority phenomenon. This data attests to the circulatory nature of intra-EU migration itself, which was hitherto only anecdotally reported. Not surprisingly, given the importance of migration in the country, Romanians (both living in Romania and abroad) are more likely than the other nationalities to have a past migration experience in their background. But the proportion of British who have done the same is almost the same (14.3%), revealing the scope of underlying links between a demographically robust part of British society and the continent. Tourism-like mobility across Europe (which may encompass more than just leisure-based activities) is quite divergent by nationality. Spending some short period in another EU member state is normal among the majority of British, Germans and especially Danes (72.9%). It remains, in fact, a minority practice in Southern and Eastern Europe, with a notable exception: Romanian migrants. Even excluding their return trips to the home country, 53.8% of them have visited a EU member state in the last two years (see also Chapter Seven). Perhaps this attests – together with information on virtual mobilities – the spread of the Romanian diaspora over the continent, which feeds a texture of geographical mobilities paralleling the migration experience. And indeed, no other nationality compares to Romanian migrants in terms of how much they talk with friends and family abroad via phone, mail, email (overall, 81.9% do so at least once a month) or via social media (61.2%). These proportions are twice as large as those of Danes who use the phone or mail/email to interact with people abroad, and three times larger those of Germans entertaining social relations internationally through Facebook-like websites. Virtual mobilities are also extremely common among Turkish migrants (for phone/mail/email contacts, even more than among Romanians). Less surprising is the prevalence of international money transfers among migrants: this is a practice of almost one out of two of Romanians living abroad (consider also that some of those who said ‘No’ may also rely on the remittances being provided by other family members); this contrasts to only about one in ten German and Spanish nationals. Habits of international money transfer do not overlap with buying goods (mostly online) abroad. This practice is substantially more common in Central-Northern Europe (and especially in Denmark) than it is in the Southern and Eastern European countries. However, the proportion of Romanian migrants that is used to it is an exception, being two and half times higher than among Turkish migrants and three times higher than among Romanian national residents. There

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The social structure of transnational practices

is no gap between Romanians at home and abroad when it comes to watching television in another language. The proportion of Germans and Turkish migrants doing this is close to that of Romanians, showing the confidence of these populations with foreign languages. This is only surpassed in Denmark, where 86.2% watch foreign language television – which is also due to the lack of a tradition of dubbing. At the opposite end, the majority of British, Italian and Spanish national residents never watch TV content in languages other than their mother tongue.

The social determinants of cross-border practices From the sociological point of view it matters how each form of crossborder mobility is socially structured: that is how different resources shape access to different mobilities. In order to examine the social structure of this range of practices among EU nationals and our sample of migrants, we turn first to logit regression modelling. On the basis of the literature, our bottom line hypothesis is that mobilities are a component of social stratification in the age of globalisation. Therefore, we surmise that education levels, employment status and household economic status can significantly affect the propensity to move, especially in geographical terms. The models also include country dummies, which in turn incorporate macro-differences in standards of living. We also hypothesise that ‘transnational background’ (language knowledge, one or two parents of different nationality) should matter for cross-border practices (Kuhn 2011; 2012). Lastly, we control for age and gender. As anticipated, we expect younger generations to be more internet-savvy and thus virtually connected transnationally; at the same time, we do not rule out that traditional gender roles may constrain women’s relative capacity for travelling. Both analyses (Table 2.3 for nationals and Table 2.4 for migrants) show that gender is, indeed, an important factor structuring mobilities between nationals as well as migrants. Echoing geographers’ claim that space is differently appropriated along gender lines (Massey 1994), we find that the cross-national activities of men and women differ. Transnational geographical spaces are gendered (Spain 1993; Mahler and Pessar 2001). Men are more likely to be mobile in terms of international trips, shopping horizons and use of foreign languages for leisure (for example, watching TV). Among nationals, women are in fact more likely to cross borders through virtual communications. In a sense, there seems to be a gendered division of spatial domains, with women occupying the least time-consuming and costly ones.

71

0.010*

0.542***

Tertiary (Isced 5-up)

–0.005

0.236

0.082

Unemployed

Retired

Doing other

0.243

0.178

0.262

0.277

0.154

0.160

0.005

0.116

SE

–0.280

–0.259*

–0.528**

0.149

1.183***

0.609***

0.001

0.296***

Coeff

SE

0.168

0.125

0.163

0.199

0.107

0.101

0.003

0.079

Visited EU

–0.222

–0.073

–0.221

–0.086

0.682***

0.283**

–0.007*

–0.164*

Coeff

72

–0.315

–0.326

0.325

1.727***

Living comfortably

Making ends meet

At least one parent of a different nationality

Has a good knowledge of foreign language

0.253

1.115***

0.473**

1.087***

–3.900

Italy

Romania

Spain

UK

Constant

0.333

0.181

0.175

0.170

0.176

0.167

0.124

0.187

0.191

0.186

0.222

–1.320

0.011

–0.573***

–1.009***

–0.407**

0.384**

0.867***

–0.285

0.334**

0.928***

1.379***

0.241

0.120

0.119

0.126

0.118

0.126

0.096

0.148

0.131

0.128

0.174

0.047

–0.463

0.725***

0.633***

1.326***

0.385**

–0.215*

0.694***

1.011***

–0.048

–0.033

0.222

0.117

0.153

0.124

0.111

0.109

0.092

0.153

0.115

0.118

0.157

0.077

1.028***

0.879***

0.904***

0.739***

0.426**

0.576***

0.853***

–0.064

–0.088

–0.235

–0.290

–0.384*

–0.270

–0.158

0.423**

0.252*

–0.043***

–0.238**

Coeff

0.257

0.142

0.133

0.134

0.135

0.135

0.098

0.148

0.131

0.134

0.188

0.174

0.159

0.164

0.202

0.122

0.116

0.004

0.087

SE

Communicated via social media

–3.397

0.290

0.296

1.456***

0.463**

0.375*

0.571***

1.095***

–0.192

–0.152

0.023

–0.243

–0.094

–0.001

0.252

0.511***

0.383**

0.014**

0.120

Coeff

0.304

0.160

0.162

0.153

0.160

0.151

0.113

0.151

0.155

0.156

0.208

0.200

0.159

0.197

0.242

0.145

0.139

0.002

0.099

SE

Transferred money abroad

Notes: N = 5,392 (all models). Sample weighted, respondents aged 18–74 only. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

0.007

Denmark

Country (reference: Germany)

–0.093

Living very comfortably

0.150

0.116

0.144

0.198

0.103

0.095

0.003

0.075

SE

Communicated via phone/email

Household economic status (reference: find it difficult/very difficult to live monthly)

–0.250

In education

Employment status (reference: at work)

0.255

Secondary (Isced 3–4)

Education (reference: Isced 0–2)

0.122

Age 

Coeff

Male

Gender (reference: female)

Lived in EU

Table 2.3: Logistic regression models predicting cross-border practices among national citizens

–2.559

–0.414**

–0.324*

–0.971***

–0.352*

0.628***

0.778***

–0.286

–0.005

0.136

0.201

–0.015

–0.307

–0.601*

–0.414

1.292***

0.795***

–0.010*

0.841***

Coeff

0.326

0.160

0.149

0.178

0.157

0.130

0.112

0.191

0.191

0.182

0.217

0.230

0.182

0.245

0.235

0.172

0.176

0.005

0.107

SE

Purchased online abroad

–0.098

–0.256*

–0.592***

0.316**

–0.384**

1.836***

1.412***

0.270

–0.013

0.100

0.056

0.189

–0.071

–0.158

0.588**

0.915***

0.300**

–0.021***

0.362***

Coeff

0.236

0.121

0.119

0.125

0.121

0.152

0.095

0.141

0.124

0.124

0.173

0.161

0.126

0.154

0.226

0.110

0.104

0.003

0.080

SE

Watched TV in foreign language

Everyday Europe

The social structure of transnational practices

Focusing on nationals (Table 2.3), we find that younger and more educated persons are also more likely to be mobile both physically and virtually. There is no form of mobility in which the probability of tertiary educated respondents does not exceed that of the least educated very significantly. Equally, and quite plausibly, a good knowledge of a foreign language is a passepartout of transnationalism (although we cannot rule out endogeneity as regards this variable). This is not so much the case for people with a non-national parent. Mixed parenthood feeds virtual contacts across borders, but not travel and migration. In contrast with mainstream economic wisdom maintaining that spatial mobility accommodates employment gaps across regions, being unemployed increases the probabilities of ‘living a local life’ – a finding that reminds classic sociological research (Jahoda et  al 2002 [1933]) and previous econometric studies conducted in Europe (Puhani 2001). Clearly, access to physical mobility on an international scale is largely premised on economic resources – among both national and non-national residents – even when barriers to movements are legally removed as is the case in the EU. On balance, both cultural and economic capital predict mobilities, but affluence is more important as a condition for international travel, while education plays a larger part as a predictor of virtual and imaginative connections across borders (with the exception of shopping online, which is predicated on economic resources). There are also marked differences by countries, with Danes travelling significantly more than all other nationalities, and Romanians standing out as being the most connected virtually. For Danes, physical mobility reflects the combination of economic well-being and the geographical proximity of borders. For Romanians, virtual mobilities are most likely triggered by a diaspora effect. In fact, it is clear that nationals in Romania conform to a more traditional migration pattern (having lived in other EU countries in the past) than to a lifestyle of mobility (being less likely to visit abroad). Interestingly, although to a lesser extent, this same dualism can also be found among Spanish and British citizens who include, evidently, a significant proportion of returnees from past episodes of migration (short periods of three months are included in our indicator). Germans, comparatively, are more into travelling and shopping abroad than into virtual and imaginative mobilities, as already sketched out in Mau’s (2010) pioneering study. The overall picture is quite similar in our sample of Romanians and Turks settled abroad (Table  2.4). We do therefore limit our comments to signalling the deviations from what has been discussed above. Differently than among nationals, there is no gender difference

73

0.016

–0.449*

Tertiary (Isced 5-up)

74

–0.307

–0.503

0.482*

Unemployed

Retired

Doing other

0.244

0.459

0.321

0.413

0.214

0.189

0.008

0.169

SE

–0.481**

–0.773**

–0.839***

0.323

0.926***

0.505***

0.005

0.359**

Coeff

SE

0.172

0.258

0.215

0.297

0.156

0.137

0.005

0.113

Visited EU

–0.008

–0.451

–0.508*

0.510

0.519**

0.161

–0.020**

0.309*

Coeff

–0.095

0.634

0.921***

Living comfortably

Making ends meet

At least one parent of a different nationality

Has a good knowledge of foreign language

–1.137***

–2.734

Cati interview

Constant

0.587

0.251

0.190

0.177

0.431

0.276

0.278

0.361

–1.572

–0.099

–0.093

0.206

–0.159

0.513*

0.905***

0.858**

0.401

0.181

0.129

0.134

0.346

0.215

0.216

0.272

1.554

–0.332

0.363*

0.006

0.050

0.233

0.400

0.193

0.471

0.238

0.176

0.176

0.407

0.231

0.236

0.314

1.269

–0.237

0.179

0.078

0.157

0.398*

0.368

0.558*

–0.199

–0.612*

–0.472*

–0.146

0.750***

0.396**

–0.050***

–0.024

Coeff

0.382

0.180

0.134

0.140

0.360

0.195

0.197

0.256

0.162

0.287

0.200

0.327

0.157

0.130

0.005

0.116

SE

Communicated via social media

Notes: N = 1,839, 1,836, 1,834, 1,835, 1,825, 1,828, 1,841. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

–0.389*

Turkey

Country (reference: Romania)

0.030

–0.025

Living very comfortably

0.202

0.271

0.231

0.543

0.205

0.165

0.007

0.144

SE

Communicated via phone/email

Household economic status (reference: find it difficult/very difficult to live monthly)

–0.237

In education

Employment status (reference: at work)

–0.325

Secondary (Isced 3–4)

Education (reference: Isced 0–2)

0.453**

Age 

Coeff

Male

Gender (reference: female)

Lived in EU

0.105

–1.174***

–0.354**

0.185

–0.209

0.410*

0.375

0.773**

–0.423**

–0.602*

0.081

–0.401

0.155

0.208

–0.012*

–0.022

Coeff

0.375

0.178

0.128

0.130

0.339

0.193

0.195

0.246

0.160

0.266

0.192

0.267

0.146

0.126

0.005

0.108

SE

Transferred money abroad

Table 2.4: Logistic regression models predicting cross-border practices among Romanian and Turkish migrants

–2.608

–0.151

–0.851***

0.665***

0.251

0.840

0.907*

1.290**

–0.446

0.289

–0.162

–0.713

0.928***

0.380

–0.039***

0.591**

Coeff

0.731

0.306

0.211

0.181

0.544

0.452

0.451

0.505

0.329

0.473

0.330

0.376

0.248

0.239

0.009

0.172

SE

Purchased online abroad

–0.704

–0.229

0.159

1.142***

0.721*

0.077

–0.068

0.053

0.010

–0.256

–0.153

0.413

0.784***

0.525***

–0.013*

0.212

Coeff

0.382

0.177

0.131

0.137

0.343

0.194

0.196

0.252

0.163

0.261

0.202

0.320

0.153

0.132

0.006

0.113

SE

Watched TV in foreign language

Everyday Europe

The social structure of transnational practices

in the extent of phone, mail and social media transnationalism of migrants, while men tend to prevail in their relatively firmer grasp on all other cross-border practices. The effect of education is also milder, and even reversed when it comes to past migration experiences to other EU countries: that is, the least educated are more likely to have lived in a different European society in the past. Re-migration may perhaps indicate poor adaptation to the host country, and therefore be negatively correlated to formal qualifications. Socioeconomic status has a more encompassing effect on migrants’ transnationalism than on nationals’. It helps predict significantly not only their trips abroad, but also their social media usage, their money transfers and cross-border purchases – which is not the case among nationals. The latter activity also benefits from respondents’ command of a third language (beyond the CoO and CoR languages), which is obviously a means to browse the internet comfortably as well as enjoy a larger palette of TV content. All in all, Romanians tend to be slightly more involved in cross-border practices, and particularly in past experiences of intra-European migration, but not in phone and mail connections with friends and relatives in third countries, which may be a result of the longer history and larger spread of the Turkish diaspora.

Configurations of cross-border practices: results from MCA Arguably, people differ not only in how frequently they cross the borders, but in the combination of ways by which they do so. In the literature, the focus on the overall volume of social transnationalism (Mau 2010; Mau and Mewes 2012; Kuhn 2015) has somewhat obscured the attention to the configuration of mobilities. In this section, we address this issue relying on Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA: for an alternative approach, see Salamońska and Recchi 2016; Recchi et al 2017). The advantages of this technique are well-known and becoming widely used in sociological research (Le Roux and Rouanet 2004; see also Chapter Three). In our case, we capitalise on: (a) its capacity to show the level of association between the several dependent variables (our indicators of cross-border practices) analysed one by one in the previous section, and (b) illustrate the (supposedly underlying) external factors that mould these configurations. MCA allows us to go for these two objectives simultaneously. Moreover, in this section we expand our take on indicators of international mobilities, looking at a wider number of practices and without an exclusively EU spatial limit. We include the same mobility indicators described above, but, differently from the regression

75

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models, we will consider ‘past migration experiences’ and ‘short-term international travels’ over the last two years not only within the EU but worldwide (the latter on a six-point scale), and ‘phone’ and ‘mail’ interactions with foreign contacts not together but as separate variables. We add to the analysis the following variables: 1. Lived abroad in childhood/adolescence: ‘Apart from your country of birth and [CoR], have you ever lived in another country for three or more consecutive months before you turned 18?’ 2. Work-related interactions with people located abroad: ‘In your work, how often did you interact with people (eg business partners, clients, colleagues) who are located in another country than [CoR] during the last 12 months?’ 3. Familiarity with countries other than CoR (and CoO for migrants): ‘Apart from [CoR (and CoO for migrants)], are there one or more other countries that you are very familiar with – that is, that you know well enough to feel comfortable in?’ Let us first focus on national respondents (Figure 2.1). In the MCA two-dimensional space, the horizontal axis (which accounts for 19.9% of the variance) appears to outline differences in cultural capital: the education variable spans from left to right. The vertical axis (which accounts for 14% of the variance), in fact, reflects variations in economic capital, as the six countries of residence are sorted from bottom to top in terms of their GDP per capita. The household economic status is equally ordered along the vertical dimension, although not fully orthogonal to the horizontal dimension, but rather slightly inclined along the southwest–northeast diagonal – which is meaningful, as long as education and income are typically highly correlated. Now, all indicators of cross-border practices are consistently split between the right-hand and the left-hand side, mostly along the horizontal axis. This means that they are mainly aligned in terms of cultural capital. However, there is a slightly larger incidence of economic capital for the frequency of international travels in the last two years (this variable stretches in parallel with household economic standing, except for the highest category) and, to a lesser extent, ‘purchases across borders’ (buy) and ‘familiarity with two or more foreign countries’ (familiar 2+). Clearly, the first two variables have much to do with a more affluent lifestyle. More noticeably, a set of virtual transnational practices (phone, mail/email and social media relations) also deviate from the dominant pattern. These transnational activities are clustered in the bottom right-hand side of the graph. That

76

77

–2

Verypoor

Lowed

Poor

Notrip

Nonfamiliar

–1

IT

Noworkstranger

Nonetwork

>55 Trip2

Comfort

DE

UK

DK

Endsmeet

ES

RO

0

18–24

Male Nomoney Noabroadyoung Noabroad Familiar 1 Mided 25–54 Female Nobuy Trip1

Nomail

Nophone

Note: N = 5,419. MCA method: symmetric standardisation. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

–4 –3

–3

–2

–1

0

1

2

3 Trip6/10

1

Phone

2

Network

Buy Familiar 2+ Highed Abroad Money Workstranger

Trip3/5

Rich

Figure 2.1: MCA two-dimensional representation of cross-border practices (sample of nationals)

Mail

3

Abroadyoung

Trip10+

4

The social structure of transnational practices

Everyday Europe

is, they are more common among respondents with higher educational qualifications, but especially so among those who are less well-off (both at the household and the country level). In a sense, virtual mobilities are ‘ersatz’ forms of mobilities for the highly educated who cannot afford ‘the real thing’ of physical mobility. The MCA for migrants is less easy to read (Figure 2.2). Here the horizontal axis (which accounts for 14.7% of the variance) mostly reflects generational and integration differences: on the right-hand side are found respondents who were schooled in CoR, with a higher level of education and younger, on the left those schooled in CoO, less well educated and older. The vertical axis (10.9% of the variance) is marked by the Turks (in the bottom) vs Romanians (in the top) distinction. Socioeconomic status is seemingly orthogonal to both axis, much like in the nationals’ graph but in a less linear way, possibly defining a third dimension in between. Like among nationals, cross-border practices tend to be mostly shaped by the horizontal axis, being overall equally likely for Romanians and Turks. However, there are two transnational indicators that vary significantly between the two nationalities. The first one is ‘work interactions with people in another country (different from CoR)’ (workstranger), which is more likely for Turks, possibly signalling their higher involvement in transnational ethnic businesses. The second outlier is the experience of travel abroad during childhood or adolescence: this seems to be more likely a prerogative of highly educated and young Turks. In a nutshell, among immigrants cross-border mobilities appear to correlate especially with socioeconomic incorporation in the host country. It is not the older immigrants who turn to transnationalism to feed their nostalgia and misadaptation, but rather the younger and more highly educated. This is not entirely surprising, but still a finding that counters the idea of a trajectory of immigrant incorporation that entails an assimilative abandonment of transnational ties (for a similar finding in a specific setting, see Dubucs et  al 2017).3 One possible interpretation of such finding is that cross-border mobilities are factored in by migrants not to distance themselves from their host societies, but in fact to carve out their own space within them. Ease with foreign countries and cultures is a resource in a globalised world, and one that migrants can master as much if not better than average educated natives.   In the MCA, given our general scope, we did not distinguish cross-border practices involving the home country from those geared to third countries. This is a limitation to be addressed in further analyses. 3

78

79

Lowed

>55

RO

–2

–1

TK

0

Noncati

Workstranger

1

Female Noworkstranger Nomail Comfort Nonfamiliar EduCOO Money Nonetwork Nobuy Phone Noabroadyoung Notrip Rich Trip2 Noabroad 25–54 Endsmeet Trip1 Nomoney Network Male V/Poor Familiar 1 Nophone

Cati

Mided

Note: N = 2,498. MCA method: symmetric standardisation. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

4 –3

3

2

1

0

–1

–2

–3

2

Abroadyoung

EduCOR

Highed

Trip3/5

Mail Abroad

Familiar 2+

18–24

Figure 2.2: MCA two-dimensional representation of cross-border practices (sample of migrants)

Buy

3

Trip6/10

4

Trip10+

5

The social structure of transnational practices

= mid-level education (ISCED 3–4)

= higher education (ISCED 5–up)

= man

= woman

= finds it (very) difficult to live with monthly household income

Mided

Highed

Male

Female

V/poor

= Danish national

= German national

= UK national

= Italian national

= Spanish national

= Romanian national

= Turkish national

= received school qualification in CoR

= received school qualification in CoO

= computer-assisted phone interview

= face-to-face interview (among migrants only)

DE

UK

IT

ES

RO

TK

EduCoR

EduCoO

Cati

Nocati

= aged 25–54 years old on

25–54

DK

= aged up to 24 years old

18–24

= aged 55 or more

= lives very comfortably with monthly household income

Rich

>55

Trip10+

= lives comfortably with monthly household income

Comfort = lived abroad before age 18

= travelled to another country in the last 24 months (over 10 times)

= travelled to another country in the last 24 months (6–10 times)

= travelled to another country in the last 24 months (3–5 times)

= travelled to another country in the last 24 months (twice)

= travelled to another country in the last 24 months (once)

= not travelled to another country in the last 24 months

= never lived as an adult three/more consecutive months in another country

= interacts with people abroad for work

80

= does not exchange mail/email with people in other countries at least once a month = uses social network media (eg, Facebook) with people abroad at least once a month = does not use social network media (eg, Facebook) with people abroad at least once a month

Network Nonetwork

= exchanges mail/email with people in other countries at least once a month

= does not phone to relatives/friends in other countries at least once a month

= phones to relatives/friends in other countries at least once a month

= does not send/receive money to/from other countries

= sends/receives money to/from other countries

= does not purchase in other countries

= does purchase in other countries

= familiar with no other countries (beyond CoR and CoO)

= familiar with another country (beyond CoR and CoO)

= familiar with two or more other countries (beyond CoR and CoO)

Nomail

Mail

Nophone

Phone

Nomoney

Money

Nobuy

Buy

Nofamiliar

Familiar 1

Familiar2+

Noworkstranger = does not interact with people abroad for work

Workstranger

Noabroadyoung = not lived abroad before age 18

Abroadyoung

Trip 6/10

Endsmeet = make ends meet with monthly household income

Trip3/5

Trip2

Trip1

Notrip

= lived as an adult three/more consecutive months in another country

Abroad

= low education (ISCED 0–2)

Lowed Noabroad

Cross-border practices

Sociodemographic variables

Notes to the MCA graphs:

Everyday Europe

The social structure of transnational practices

Conclusion In this chapter we have shown that international mobilities, in their diverse manifestations (physical and virtual–imaginative), enter the everyday lives of Europeans on a much larger scale than has been hitherto recognised. Our general claim is that, as long as they entail the crossing of geographic or symbolic borders, these mobilities contribute to erode the ‘container’ nature of nation-state societies. Expanding on previous research on intra-EU migration, we contend that the process of European integration – in spite of even serious crises and setbacks – goes hand in hand with globalisation and leads to enhanced relations among individuals that blur national boundaries. While we cannot track the evolution of such cross-border activities over time, which may be a crucial test of the presumed growing interpenetration of European societies, we can however document the current spread and scope of human mobility patterns. Our evidence shows that country- and individual-level factors do structure cross-border practices. On average, residents of richer and more globalised societies enjoy a greater facility to ‘exit’ partially these same societies (Andreotti et al 2015) – by visiting friends and family in foreign countries, by buying products and services abroad, or by forming online personal communities (Wellman 2001) that span beyond their localities. At the macro-level, in our range of countries, Denmark lies at one end and Romania at the other of a spectrum of nations that are more or less likely to be involved in episodes of cross-border mobilities. However, among Romanians, members of the diaspora are distinct from their compatriots back home: not only did they already move to settle in another EU member state, but they also have a high level of additional and diverse experiences of mobilities. At the micro-level, mobilities are markedly correlated with socioeconomic status. The better-off and especially the highly educated turn to cross-border practices significantly more. On balance, education makes a real difference: among those examined here, there is no form of cross-border mobility where the more educated do not have an edge over the less well educated. If virtual practices like phoning, skyping, emailing, interacting via Facebook are cheap and on paper offer opportunities for a transnational life to the worse-off as well, only the more highly educated in the lower classes are found to be generally ready to seize such opportunities. Some gender effects emerge, especially in access to international travel, while age differences – quite surprisingly – have a lesser impact on the propensity to move across borders among Europeans, if not virtually via internet-controlled devices.

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At the end of the day, physical and virtual forms of mobility obey the same ‘Matthew effect’ kind of logic. What remains to be seen, and be adjudicated with more sophisticated panel-like data, is to what extent international mobilities are an upshot of cultural (especially) and economic capital that bring about the conversion of such capital into additional life chances. In this sense, international mobilities add up to the resources of the better-off on a supranational scale. But this is not by itself proof of the actual usage of mobilities to reinforce existing social divisions. While we suspect that cross-border practices are not a simple enhancement of social life, our evidence here – for all its novelty – does not permit us to assess to what extent they propel access to further life chances. This is arguably the next research boundary to cross in this research field. References Aksoy, A., and Robins, K. (2003) ‘Banal transnationalism: the difference that television makes’, in K. H. Karim (ed) The Media of Diaspora. London: Routledge, 89–104. Andreotti, A., Le Galès, P., and Moreno Fuentes, F. J. (2015) Globalised Minds, Roots in the city: Urban Upper-Middle Classes in Europe. New York: Wiley. Aspden, D. (2005) ‘Methodological improvements to UK foreign property statistics’. Economic Trends 619: 54–60. Benson, M.  C. (2010) ‘The context and trajectory of lifestyle migration’. European Societies 12(1): 45–64. Benson, M., and O’Reilly, J. (eds) (2009) Lifestyle Migration: Expectations, Aspirations and Experiences. Aldershot: Ashgate. Boden, D., and Molotch, H. L. (1994) ‘The compulsion of proximity’, in R. Friedland and D. Boden (eds) NowHere: Space, Time and Modernity. Berkeley: University of California Press, 257–286. Castells, M. (1996) The Rise of the Network Society (Vol. 1). Malden, MA: Blackwell. Clarke, N. (2005) ‘Detailing transnational lives of the middle: British working holiday makers in Australia’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31(2): 307–322. Cook, J., Dwyer, P., and Waite, L. (2011) ‘The experiences of accession 8 migrants in England: motivations, work and agency’. International Migration 49(2): 54–79. De Haas, H. (2009) ‘Remittances and social development’, in K. Hujo and S. McClanahan (eds) Financing Social Policy. Social Policy in a Development Context. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 293–318.

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Jahoda, M., Lazarsfeld, F., and Zeisel, H. (2002 [1933]) Marienthal: The Sociography of an Unemployed Community. London: Routledge. King, R. (2002) ‘Towards a new map of European migration’. International Journal of Population Geography 8(2): 89–106. King, R., and Ruiz-Gelices, E. (2003) ‘International student migration and the European “year abroad”: effects on European identity and subsequent migration behaviour’. International Journal of Population Geography 9(3): 229–252. Koryś, I. (2003) Migration Trends in Selected EU Applicant Countries: Poland. CEFMR Working Paper No. 5/2003. Warsaw: CEFMR. Koslowski, R. (ed) (2011) Global Mobility Regimes. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Krings, T., Moriarty, E., Wickham, J., Bobek, A., and Salamońska, J. (2013) Polish Migration to Ireland Post 2004: New Mobilities in the New Europe. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Kuhn, T. (2011) ‘Individual transnationalism, globalisation and euroscepticism: an empirical test of Deutsch’s transactionalist theory’. European Journal of Political Research 50(6): 811–837. Kuhn, T. (2012) ‘Europa ante Portas: border residence, transnational interaction and Euroscepticism in Germany and France’. European Union Politics 13(1): 94–117. Kuhn, T. (2015) Experiencing European Integration: Transnational Lives and European Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Larsen, J., Urry, J., and Axhausen, K. W. (2006) Mobilities, Networks, Geographies. Aldershot: Ashgate. Le Roux, B., and Rouanet, H. (2004) Geometric Data Analysis. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Levitt, P., and Glick Schiller, N. (2004) ‘Conceptualizing simultaneity: a transnational social field perspective on society’. International Migration Review 38(3): 1002–1039. Mahler, S. J. and Pessar, P. R. (2001) ‘Gendered geographies of power: analyzing gender across transnational spaces’, Identities 7(4): 441–459. Mansoor, A. M., and Quillin, B. (eds) (2006) Migration and Remittances: Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: World Bank. Massey, D. (1994) Space, Place and Gender. Oxford: Polity. Mau, S. (2010) Social Transnationalism. Lifeworlds Beyond the NationState. London: Routledge. Mau, S., and Mewes, J. (2012) ‘Horizontal Europeanisation in contextual perspective’. European Societies 14(1): 7–34. Perea y Monsuwé, T., Dellaert, B. G., and De Ruyter, K. (2004) ‘What drives consumers to shop online? A literature review’. International Journal of Service Industry Management 15(1): 102–121.

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Portes, A., Guarnizo, L.  E., and Landolt, P. (1999) ‘The study of transnationalism: pitfalls and promise of an emergent research field’. Ethnic and Racial Studies 22(2): 217–237. Puhani, P. A. (2001) ‘Labour mobility: an adjustment mechanism in Euroland? Empirical evidence for Western Germany, France and Italy’. German Economic Review 2(2): 127–140. Recchi, E. (2013) ‘La libera circolazione e i suoi nemici’. Neodemos. www.neodemos.it/index.php?file=onenews&form_id_notizia=703. Recchi, E. (2014) ‘Pathways to European identity formation: a tale of two models’. Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research 27(2): 119–133. Recchi, E. (2015) Mobile Europe: The Theory and Practice of Free Movement in the EU. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Recchi, E., and Favell, A. (eds) (2009) Pioneers of European Integration. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Recchi, E., and Salamońska, J. (2015) ‘Bad times, good times to move? The changing landscape of intra-EU migration’, in C. Ruzza, V. Guiraudon, and H. J. Trenz, (eds) Europe’s Prolonged Crisis. The Making or the Unmaking of a Political Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 124–147. Recchi, E., and Triandafyllidou, A. (2010) ‘Crossing over, heading west and south: mobility, citizenship and employment in the enlarged Europe’, in G. Menz and A. Caviedes (eds) Labour Migration in Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 127–149. Recchi, E., Baglioni, L. G., Salamonska, J., and Rossi, T. (2017) ‘Cittadini in movimento. Una tipologia induttiva della mobilità transnazionale in Europa’, Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia, 58(1): 63–98. Salamońska, J. (2017) Multiple Migration – Researching the Multiple Temporalities and Spatialities of Migration. CMR Working Paper 102/160. Warsaw: CMR. Salamońska, J., and Recchi, E. (2016) Europe between Mobility and Sedentarism: Patterns of Cross-Border Practices and their Consequences for European Identification. Working Paper 50/2016. Fiesole: Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), EUI. Salamońska, J., Baglioni, L.  G., and Recchi, E. (2013) Navigating the European space: physical and virtual forms of cross-border mobility among EU citizens. EUCROSS Working Paper # 5. Chieti: University of Chieti-Pescara. Santacreu, O., Baldoni, E., and Albert, M. C. (2009). ‘Deciding to move: migration projects in an integrating Europe’, in E. Recchi and A. Favell (eds) Pioneers of European integration. Citizenship and mobility in the EU. Cheltenham: Elgar, 52–71.

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Sheller, M. (ed) (2016) ‘E-Special Issue: John Urry’. Theory, Culture and Society 33(7–8). Spain, D. (1993) ‘Gendered spaces and women’s status’, Sociological Theory 11(2): 137–151. Szerszynski, B., and Urry, J. (2006) ‘Visuality, mobility and the cosmopolitan: inhabiting the world from afar’. The British Journal of Sociology 57(1): 113–131. Tussyadiah, I.  P., and Fesenmaier, D.  R. (2009) ‘Mediating tourist experiences: access to places via shared videos’. Annals of Tourism Research 36(1): 24–40. United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) (1994) ‘Recommendations on tourism statistics’. Statistical Papers Series M No. 83. Madrid: UNWTO. Urry, J. (1990) The Tourist Gaze: Leisure and Travel in Contemporary Society. London: Sage. Urry, J. (2000) Sociology BEYOND Societies: Mobilities for the Twenty-first Century. London: Routledge. Urry, J. (2007) Mobilities. Cambridge: Polity Press. Vertovec, S. (2004) ‘Migrant transnationalism and modes of transformation’. International Migration Review 38(3): 970–1001. Waldinger, R. (2015) The Cross-Border Connection: Immigrants, Emigrants, And Their Homelands. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wellman, B. (2001) ‘Physical Place and cyberplace: the rise of personalized networking’. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25(2): 227–252. Wickham, J., Moriarty, E., Bobek, A., and Salamońska, J. (2009) ‘Working in the gold rush: Polish migrants’ careers and the Irish hospitality sector’, in S.  C. Bolton and M. Houlihan (eds) Work Matters: Critical Reflections on Contemporary Work. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 81–96. Wickham, J. (2007) ‘Irish mobilities’, in S. O’Sullivan (ed) Contemporary Ireland: A Sociological Map. Dublin: UCD Press, 48–64. Wiesböck, L., Verwiebe, R., Reinprecht, C., and Haindorfer, R. (2016) ‘The economic crisis as a driver of cross-border labour mobility? A multi-method perspective on the case of the Central European Region’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 42(10): 1711–1727. Woolgar, S. (2002) ‘Five rules of virtuality’, in S. Woolgar (ed) Virtual Society? Technology, Cyberbole, Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–22.

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THREE

Cultural boundaries and transnational consumption patterns Laurie Hanquinet and Mike Savage

Introduction Although a great deal is known about the significance of national, ethnic, religious and social identifications within and between European nations, we know very little about the wider drawing of cultural boundaries. This is a surprise given the sociological interest in cultural divisions, their relationship with consumption practices and lifestyles and their intersections with other aspects of inequality (see Bennett et al 2009; Prieur and Savage 2011). The EUCROSS project represents a unique opportunity to understand how Europeans differentiate between each other in terms of their cultural tastes and practices and how this is linked to their mobility practices and different sub- or-supranational identities. Our starting point is the familiar idea, often associated with the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu but by no means only him, that modern societies are characterised by a fundamental opposition between highbrow and popular culture. The former is associated with the capacity to decipher complex cultural genres, so permitting the ability to abstract and develop high levels of expertise. The latter is much more immediate and bound up with the routines of everyday life and does not lend itself to a ‘scholastic orientation’. For Bourdieu, this distinction has wider implications, since those with highbrow cultural capital will be more likely to achieve higher levels of educational attainment and will be more privileged than those without. Bourdieu’s original study, Distinction (1979), was based on French society in the 1960s and 1970s, and was largely unreflective about the assumption that France was a nationally bounded society. In the period since he wrote, scholars informed by post-colonialist thinking have been critical of the Eurocentric notion of ‘high culture’ which Bourdieu deploys – with the assumption that the European classical canon was the necessary benchmark of cultural capital (see eg Bennett

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et al 2009; Savage et al 2010; Meulemann and Savage 2013). This criticism links with the argument of numerous scholars that, although Bourdieu’s theory is still very relevant to understand the mechanisms that tie culture and social divisions together, his specific arguments about the relationship between cultural hierarchy and taste need to be updated (Prior 2005; Hanquinet et al 2014; Savage et al 2015; Hanquinet and Savage 2016). A widely discussed critique of Bourdieu is that the opposition between highbrow and popular culture has been replaced by that between ‘omnivores’ and ‘univores’ (Peterson and Kern 1996; Peterson 2005). According to this argument, the upper classes – labelled as ‘omnivores’ – appreciate prestigious art forms but are also increasingly attracted by popular culture, so implying a breakdown of the highbrow–lowbrow opposition. More recently, the notion of omnivorousness is often seen to lack clarity, as it has been spliced with many different theorisations and meanings (see Atkinson 2011; Lizardo and Skiles 2013; Gayo 2016; Karademir Hazır and Warde 2016). It can, for instance, be interpreted as a sign of a progressive decline of sociocultural hierarchies (eg Michaud 1997), although empirical studies tend to suggest that the capacity to appreciate different genres can also be conceived as a new form of sociocultural distinction (Bryson 1996; Coulangeon and Lemel 2007; Savage et al 2015). Warde and his colleagues (2007) show that omnivorousness can be consistent with very different worldviews and orientations. The ‘omnivore’ debate is relevant to our concerns because it touches on the idea that omnivores might be predisposed to cosmopolitanism, and hence ‘open to diversity’ – to paraphrase Ollivier (Ollivier 2008; Bellavance 2008, a definition which is close to that of Hannerz [1990]). Could cultural omnivorousness be a specific manifestation of a wider phenomenon such as cosmopolitanism, including an openness to cultural references from across national borders? Fridman and Ollivier (2004, 105) even speak of ‘an ostentatious openness to diversity’, arguing that tolerance is a part of the character of those with a breadth of social, economic and cultural resources. Although these issues have attracted much interest, there has only been limited research examining how changing forms of cultural capital may also be associated with the reworking of national boundaries. Prieur and Savage (2011; 2013), drawing predominantly on British and Danish research, argue that older highbrow cultural capital, associated with traditional ‘national’ frames of reference, is giving way amongst younger generations to ‘emerging cultural capital’, which is more likely to value ‘cosmopolitan’ connections and certain kinds of

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transnational ties. However, they also point out that British respondents with emerging cultural capital are more likely to value Anglophone cultural producers from the USA, Australia and Canada, rather than from mainland Europe, which are instead seen as ‘old fashioned’ (see also Savage et al 2010). Similarly, there is also evidence, though largely anecdotal, that there are important differences in the cultural values associated with different parts of Europe: thus ‘Nordic noir’ appears to be a hip cultural phenomenon in the UK, but British people show little interest in cultural production from Eastern or Southern Europe. The intersection with racial cultural hierarchies is also clear through the assumptions about ‘whiteness’ which this affiliation indicates. European culture is itself being reconfigured, with the supremacy of French cultural forms being challenged by the enlargement of the European Union. After the enactment of the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), cultural cooperation and preservation among EU member states became a recognised aim of the EU, and Fligstein (2008) shows that this has led to the (partial) formation of a European ‘field’ dominated by professionals and managers who have greater ease in moving between different national contexts. With these developments and the increasing inclusion of Eastern and Southern European nations in the EU, the meaning and definition of European culture might be changing. This process is also related to the challenge of cosmopolitan culture from other continents than Europe and North America. The intense postcolonial critique of cultural Eurocentrism over recent decades has led to a growing interest in the championing of cultural forms from other parts of the globe, ranging from world music through to new literary forms (see eg Chakrabarty 2008). However, alongside these shifts, we also need to be attentive to the reconstitution of national forms of cultural appreciation. The political resurgence of nationalism, manifest in the electoral success of the ‘Brexit’ campaign in the UK (2016) and the election of Donald Trump as President of the USA, testifies to the renewed power of national frames of reference. There is plenty of evidence that European nations retain cultural particularities, which indeed might even be increasing. Schmutz (2009), for instance, shows that the German media continue to focus their interest on classical music, whereas the Dutch now focus on popular music. Tensions between people with national orientations and cosmopolitan orientations have deepened (Norris and Inglehart 2009). Berkers (2009) shows that Dutch and German literary journals continue to marginalise ethnic minorities (a notable contrast to the American situation), suggesting that even despite cultural hybridisation, there is no simple broadening of the cultural canon of elite culture.

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There is evidence in some European nations that specifically national forms of cultural appreciation are becoming increasingly important. There is an upward trend in the popularity of domestic music artists since the late 1980s in many Western countries, regardless of increasing economic interdependencies and growing flows of foreign imports, which provide alternatives to domestically produced goods and culture (Frith 2004; Achterberg et al 2011). In the UK, Savage, Wright and Gayo-Cal (2010) show that well-educated professionals have a greater knowledge and appreciation of British authors, musicians and painters than less well-educated social groups. And in the Netherlands, Dutch music has become increasingly popular between 1990 and 2005 and has even replaced Anglo-American (pop) music to some extent (Hitters and van de Kamp 2010). The Dutch House of Representatives voted in favour of a 35% quota for Dutch-language music on public radio broadcasts (30 June 2011, voting results House of Representatives), an initiative from the Dutch radical right-wing Party for Freedom. And Dutch music is increasingly sung in the native tongue (Achterberg et al 2011). We thus need to recognise that there is no simple trend towards a globalisation or cosmopolitanisation of cultural taste. We have argued that we need to move away from the methodologically nationalist fallacy that each nation has its own cultural hierarchies and boundaries and explore the complex interplay between national, social and cultural boundaries. Hitherto, it has not been possible to do this within Europe because comparable European surveys (such as the European Social Survey) do not have an extensive range of questions on cultural taste and participation. National-level surveys which do focus on cultural consumption (such as Bennett et al 2009 in the UK), however, are not directly comparable in the questions they ask (see, in general terms, Purhonen and Wright 2013). The EUCROSS project, therefore, breaks new ground. It provides data that enables researchers to study key aspects of the European cultural field, and more especially the role of tastes in music and food, and how they reflect cultural but also symbolic boundaries that straddle European social space. We therefore have the opportunity to provide an unparalleled comparative study of this crucial issue. We begin by describing the variations of taste for music and food across our dataset, an exercise which reveals considerable national differences in patterns of appreciation and shows the extent to which national frames of reference dominate. We then use a multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) to group these two fields together to discern more broadly the general structure of relationships in the European field of cultural taste.

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Musical taste in Europe The EUCROSS questions are especially detailed with respect to taste for music and for food, both of which have been shown to be especially important arenas for cultural differentiation and tension. All studies of cultural taste from Bourdieu (1979) through to Bennett and colleagues (2009) concur that musical tastes generate strong oppositional feelings, juxtaposing fans and critics, and hence are an especially important barometer of cultural hierarchies. Table 3.1 shows the percentages of respondents’ preferences for nine different musical genres. The figures for classical music – traditionally the crucial hallmark of ‘highbrow’ cultural capital – are revealing. Perhaps befitting a genre which has high levels of legitimacy across the globe, it has rather similar levels of support across Europe ranging from 39% in Italy to 28% in Denmark. A rather similar pattern is found for the other two genres which are associated with ‘highbrow’ taste, jazz (ranging from 37% in Italy to 24% in Denmark) and ‘world’ music (32% in Spain to 22% in the UK). This lack of variation is not surprising in view of the argument that legitimacy comes precisely from the power of straddling and hence universalising across geographical boundaries (Bourdieu 2005). There is an interesting parallel here with ‘Metal’, which is universally shunned across Europe. By contrast, there are very striking variations in taste for traditional national musical forms (70% of Romanians like ‘their’ traditional music, compared to only 14% of Germans), for Rock music (54% of Germans like it, only 23% of Romanians), ‘pop’ (51% of Spanish, 32% of Romanians) and other traditional European music (31% of Romanians like it, only 11% of British). Danes are characterised by an overrepresentation of those who like pop and rock music and of those who do not like hip hop. Germans and Italians appreciate classical music to a greater extent, compared to, among other nations, Danes. Germans also are more likely than other nationalities to express a preference for metal, pop and rock and a dislike of the traditional German and European music. In comparison, preferences for traditional music from the country of residence and from Europe are overrepresented among Italians, Romanians and Spaniards. These three countries also appreciate world music to a greater extent. Spain also likes metal, pop, rock music more than most of the other countries compared to hip hop. Britons, who are comparatively more educated, have a stronger tendency to dislike music genres, except metal and hip hop.

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World music (n = 5,803)

Traditional from CoR (n = 5,927) Traditional from Europe (n = 5,731)

Total

Rock (n = 5,898)

United Kingdom (national sample)

Pop (n = 5,886)

Spain (national sample)

Hip Hop (n = 5,793)

Romania (national sample)

Metal music (n = 5,765)

Italy (national sample)

Jazz (n = 5,889)

36.7

38.1

43.5

38.8

42.6

39.4

24.2

22.6

24.3

24.5

21.7

23.4

39.1

39.3

32.3

36.7

35.7

37.2

40.6

40.7

49.3

48.4

46.9

44.3

28.2

22.1

22.9

22.9

23.5

24.3

24.0

31.1

37.2

27.8

27.8

29.6

31.3

Metal–

80.2

70.1

83.2

81.3

76.5

75.6

76.3

Metal=

 9.1

13.6

 7.4

10.3

10.2

11.1

10.9

Metal+

10.7

16.3

 9.0

 8.4

13.4

13.3

12.8

HipHop–

61.9

54.7

59.9

54.2

66.5

51.5

57.1

HipHop=

22.6

22.9

17.4

16.6

16.6

21.3

19.8

HipHop+

15.5

22.4

22.7

29.3

16.9

27.2

23.1

Pop–

16.0

21.8

35.7

43.1

25.4

29.1

28.7

Pop=

29.2

28.1

21.4

24.7

23.6

28.1

25.6

Pop+

54.7

50.1

43.0

32.3

51.0

42.8

45.7

Rock–

26.9

21.9

31.7

60.7

31.2

30.7

30.9

Rock=

22.1

23.9

19.9

16.7

20.5

25.3

22.1

Rock+

50.9

54.2

48.4

22.6

48.4

44.0

47.0

World–

43.9

32.9

43.7

39.1

33.3

47.6

39.3

World=

32.1

40.1

26.8

30.9

35.0

30.7

33.3

World+

23.9

27.0

29.5

30.1

31.8

21.7

27.4

TradCoR-

49.0

68.9

23.5

18.3

28.5

56.6

44.9

TradCoR=

25.7

17.0

19.1

11.5

21.8

22.1

19.1

TradCoR+

25.3

14.1

57.3

70.2

49.7

21.3

36.0

TradEU-

58.0

61.1

43.7

46.1

49.7

70.6

56.4

TradEU=

21.6

24.8

26.7

22.6

24.4

18.0

23.3

TradEU+

20.5

14.1

29.6

31.3

25.9

11.4

20.2

Denmark (national sample) Classical music (n = 5,919)

Germany (national sample)

Table 3.1: Tastes in music by country (% within country)

Classical–

47.4

Classical=

24.9

Classical+

27.7

Jazz–

52.4

Jazz=

23.6

Jazz+

Notes: Exact question: On a scale from one to five, where one means “Not at all” and five means “Very much”, how much do you like the following kinds of music? The results are weighted. All the tables have a significant Cramer’s V (p < 0.001), indicating a significant relationship between countries and music tastes. The sign “–” means a dislike of, “=” an indifference to, and “+” an appreciation of the genre. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

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These patterns, simple though they are, indicate clear differences between the more powerful and prosperous Northern European nations whose taste is more universalised, and those from Southern Europe where national musical traditions appear much more popular. Table 3.21 considers how these musical genres map onto educational qualifications in each nation in order to consider in more detail how they might be associated with cultural capital and forms of advantage. Table 3.2 shows that music tastes tend not to have a ‘linear’ relationship Table 3.2: Tastes for classical music, jazz, traditional music from country of residence and from another European country, pop, rock and hip hop by level of education (% within educational level) In Higher between secondary Lower lower and education secondary higher (university education secondary entrance Tertiary or less education requirement) education Classical– 46.5 42.3 41.6 25.7 Classical music Classical= 20.9 24.8 23.1 25.6 (n = 5,747) Classical+ 32.5 32.9 35.3 48.7 Jazz– 51.1 45.7 42.9 36.0 Jazz Jazz= 21.8 24.9 25.4 26.2 (n = 5,825) Jazz+ 27.1 29.4 31.8 37.9 29.4 56.6 45.9 54.4 Traditional TradCoRfrom CoR TradCoR= 16.7 19.9 18.2 22.4 (n = 5,865) TradCoR+ 53.9 23.6 35.8 23.2 52.6 61.0 55.4 58.4 Traditional TradEUfrom Europe TradEU= 22.3 23.7 23.6 24.1 (n = 5,674) TradEU+ 25.1 15.3 21.0 17.5 Pop– 35.5 22.9 28.3 25.1 Pop Pop= 22.0 27.2 24.1 30.6 (n = 5,826) Pop+ 42.5 49.9 47.7 44.3 Rock– 38.4 26.4 31.1 24.7 Rock Rock= 20.0 22.1 21.4 25.7 (n = 5,836) Rock+ 41.6 51.5 47.5 49.6 HipHop– 61.7 54.2 49.1 61.9 Hip hop HipHop= 16.1 22.8 21.4 20.4 (n = 5,736) HipHop+ 22.1 22.9 29.5 17.8

Total 39.4 23.4 37.2 44.3 24.3 31.3 44.9 19.1 36.0 56.4 23.3 20.2 28.7 25.6 45.7 30.9 22.1 47.0 59.3 18.9 21.7

Note: Results are weighted. All the tables have a significant Cramer’s V (p < 0.001). The sign “-” means a dislike of, “=” an indifference to, and “+” an appreciation of the genre. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

  Tables 3.2 and 3.3 do not show all the musical genres we asked about, but select only those for which the relationship with the other variable is most significant. 1

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with education. It is not the case that the more educated people are, the more they like or dislike a specific music genre. Take pop music, for instance, which those with intermediate qualifications are more likely to appreciate than those having no qualifications or having university degrees. However, a few interesting findings emerge. Classical music is indeed preferred by graduates much more than those who did not attend university, and the same is true to a lesser degree for jazz. This suggests that ‘highbrow’ affiliations can still be detected. Traditional music, whether it comes from the country of residence or another European country, is clearly preferred by those who have the lowest educational qualifications, thus confirming the argument that cosmopolitanism – at least with respect to cultural consumption – is associated with those with cultural capital. The gap between those with degrees who like traditional music, and those with the lowest qualifications is marked – and we should bear in mind that it is reinforced by the fact that those nations with greater liking for national music (notably Romania) also tend to have lower educational attainment in general. By contrast, in line with other findings showing the ‘gentrification’ of what used to be seen as popular culture (Bennett et al 2009), rock music is clearly preferred by those who have greater educational resources compared to those with the lowest ones. Hip hop is particularly liked by those with intermediate levels of education. The patterns are quite different for the links between music tastes and age. As Table 3.3 shows, the relationships tend to be more linear – though there are exceptions. The older people are, the more likely they are to like traditional and classical music and to dislike metal, pop, rock and hip hop. This conforms to the dominant view in cultural sociology which emphasises the significance of the age divide in musical taste (Bennett et al 2009; Prieur and Savage 2013). These differences can be very marked: young people are over four times as likely to like hip hop as older people, whilst older people are over twice as likely to enjoy classical music as younger ones. The interesting exception to this clear age gradient comes for rock and pop music, where it is the middle aged who have the highest proportion of aficionados. There are, then, some very clear patterns linking tastes for specific musical genres with national differences, forms of cosmopolitanism, educational attainment and age. Those with highest educational attainment are drawn to musical forms which are less specifically national. We can also detect a clear cultural differentiation between the Northern European nations on the one hand, and Southern and Eastern European nations on the other, with the latter group

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Cultural boundaries and transnational consumption patterns Table 3.3: Tastes for classical music, traditional music from country of residence and from another European country, metal music, pop, rock and hip hop by age band (% within age bands)

Classical music (n = 5,919) Traditional from CoR (n = 5,925) Traditional from Europe (n = 5,731) Metal music (n = 5,767) Pop (n = 5,886) Rock (n = 5,897) Hip hop (n = 5,795)

Classical– Classical= Classical+ TradCoRTradCoR= TradCoR+ TradEUTradEU= TradEU+ Metal– Metal= Metal+ Pop– Pop= Pop+ Rock– Rock= Rock+ HipHop– HipHop= HipHop+

34 and under 54.9 21.8 23.3 54.2 18.1 27.7 62.7 22.5 14.8 71.9 12.0 16.1 23.4 25.5 51.1 30.7 21.3 48.0 34.5 20.9 44.6

35–54 39.3 25.6 35.1 48.6 19.1 32.3 56.3 23.2 20.5 72.3 12.4 15.3 20.2 26.6 53.2 24.5 22.4 53.1 55.9 23.0 21.1

55 and over 28.4 21.4 50.2 33.0 19.8 47.3 51.9 24.2 23.9 85.7  7.7  6.6 44.8 24.3 30.9 40.2 22.4 37.4 76.1 14.4  9.5

Total 39.4 23.4 37.2 44.9 19.1 36.0 56.4 23.3 20.2 76.3 10.9 12.8 28.7 25.6 45.7 30.9 22.1 47.0 57.1 19.8 23.1

Note: Results are weighted. All the tables have a significant Cramer’s V (p < 0.001). The sign “-” means a dislike of, “=” an indifference to, and “+” an appreciation of the genre. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

preferring more specifically national forms of music. These two processes can reinforce each other. Cultural nationalism, it would appear, is associated with those with less education. There is some evidence here in support of Fligstein’s (2008) arguments that those more confined to national fields are less advantaged than those who are better able to straddle national musical tastes.

Culinary taste Bourdieu famously argued that there are likely to be homologies across different cultural arenas. If there is a general principle of cultural capital in operation, we would expect to see it operating across different domains of cultural life. In fact, as Table 3.4 shows, food taste has some differences, though also some similarities to music. Whereas we saw

95

Everyday Europe Table 3.4: Tastes for foreign food by country (n = 5,658 except Italian and Spanish cuisines)

French cuisine

DK DE IT RO SP UK Total 19.8 14.8 16.9  7.2 19.9 14.4 15.6

Italian cuisine (n = 4,692)

44.5 64.3 NA 50.6 46.0 42.6 52.3

Spanish cuisine (including cuisine from Malta) (n = 4,675)

11.5 12.7 21.3  8.3

NA

10.2 13.9

Cuisine from Northern and Central Europe (Austria, Belgium, Czech, Germany,  7.0  7.7 10.9  8.5  6.1  2.0  6.9 Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Swiss) Cuisine from the South of Europe (Bulgaria, 11.1 21.5  6.4  5.8  3.5  5.0 10.1 Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Albania) Cuisine from Baltic and Nordic countries (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, Iceland, Norway)

 2.9  0.6  0.9  0.6  0.2  0.1  0.5

Mexican cuisine

 6.0  2.7  5.0  1.4  9.7  4.2  4.7

Turkish cuisine

 4.3  4.9  2.1 11.8  2.1  2.4  3.7

Asian cuisine

27.8 36.3 19.8  8.6 26.1 65.2 35.4

Anglo-Saxon

 2.9  2.1  1.6  2.4  1.9  0.6  1.7

South-American and Caribbean

 0.6  2.2  5.1  0.7  6.3  4.4  3.9

African cuisine

 0.9  2.7  3.3  0.3  4.0  3.4  3.0

No foreign cuisine

 5.8  1.8 32.5 16.5 21.4  3.6 13.3

Note: Percentage of food preferences by country. Exact question: Please think about foreign cuisine, i.e., all which is originally from outside [CoR]. Which national cuisines do you like best? Multiple answers possible (up to 3 answers). The results are weighted. All the tables have a significant Cramer’s V (p < 0.001). Source: EUCROSS (2016)

that classical music, a highbrow cultural form, was fairly uniformly liked across Europe, French cuisine, which also has highbrow connotations, is more variable in its reception. French cuisine is unevenly popular across countries and is comparatively less liked by Romanians and British. Spaniards and Danes appreciate it to a greater extent. There are some distinctive patterns which appear to be underpinned by historical affiliations, imperial links and migration flows. Spanish cuisine is much more appreciated by Italians than by those in other nations. Italians also like cuisine from Northern and Central Europe more than people of the other nationalities. Cuisine from the South of Europe is particularly appreciated by Danes and Germans. Mexican cuisine is more often mentioned by Spanish respondents (presumably because of the historical associations). Turkish cuisine is appreciated by

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Cultural boundaries and transnational consumption patterns

Romanians to a greater extent, possibly because of a shared Ottoman background. The British are utterly distinctive from the other European nations. They largely shun European food, except maybe Italian cooking, but are highly predisposed to Asian cuisine (with a remarkably high proportion of 65% of Britons liking it), due to their historical colonial links to India and South-East Asia more generally. A taste for South American and Caribbean cuisine is also overrepresented among the British. The Italians are also the most nationally oriented of any of these six nations: almost a third of Italians do not like foreign cuisine whereas only 2% of Germans and 4% of Britons share the same opinion. Indeed, the culinary dominance of Italy within Europe is striking: it is easily the most popular taste genre, and is the most preferred form of cooking by every nationality, except the British where Asian food narrowly edges it out. Food tastes go along with significant differences between the levels of education (except Northern and Central European cuisine). Just as we saw with musical tastes, the least educated tend to like foreign cuisine less compared to the more highly educated. Table 3.5 shows the relationships between French, Italian and Asian cuisine and level of education, as they are the strongest. French cuisine is enjoyed much more by people with tertiary degree than people with fewer educational resources. Asian cuisine follows the same pattern but Italian cuisine is most appreciated by those with intermediate levels of education. Table 3.5 also indicates that less than a third of those with at maximum lower secondary education do not enjoy foreign food. Table 3.6 shows that age affects food tastes. A preference for French cuisine is overrepresented among people aged at least 55. On the other Table 3.5: Tastes for French, Italian, Asian cuisine and no taste for foreign cuisine by level of education (n = 5,596, except Italian cuisine)

French cuisine Italian cuisine (n = 4,635) Asian cuisine No foreign cuisine

Lower secondary education or less 10.9

Higher In between secondary lower and education higher (university secondary entrance education requirement) 13.0 16.4

Tertiary education 22.7

15.6

41.9

58.6

51.9

57.0

52.3

27.9 27.4

39.7  3.5

35.6 12.0

41.1  4.8

35.4 13.3

Note: Results are weighted. All the tables have a significant Cramer’s V (p < 0.001).

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Everyday Europe Table 3.6: Tastes for French, Italian, Mexican, Asian cuisine and no taste for foreign cuisine by age bands (n = 5,658 except Italian cuisine)

French cuisine Italian cuisine (n = 4,694) Mexican cuisine Asian cuisine No foreign cuisine

34 and less  8.5 49.9  6.1 42.9  7.9

35–54 14.7 55.7  5.8 37.4 11.8

55 and more 22.0 49.4  2.0 27.0 19.6

15.6 52.3  4.7 35.4 13.3

Note: Results are weighted. All the tables have a significant Cramer’s V (p < 0.001). Source: EUCROSS (2016)

hand, the younger generations are characterised by a taste for Asian cooking. Italian and Mexican foods tend to be appreciated to a lesser extent by the older generations but are not most popular among the youngest. Some dislike for foreign cuisine characterises 20% of those who are over 54 years. It appears that the younger generations are characterised by more global and non-European tastes, and that French cuisine – previously a hallmark of highbrow culture – is falling from grace.

Synthesising cultural consumption divisions in Europe We will now build on these findings to consider how far musical and culinary taste are associated and hence what the implications are for understanding the overarching cultural divisions in Europe. Here we use multiple correspondence analysis, which offers a powerful way of unravelling the structure of cultural tastes. This method, which is the same as employed in Bourdieu’s Distinction (1979), has recently been used by Bennett and colleagues (2009) to examine cultural tastes in the UK. To our knowledge, this chapter is the first to conduct an MCA of cultural consumption across different European nations.2   Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) can be conceived as the equivalent of principal component analysis for categorical data, eg with a finite number of categories or modalities (Le Roux and Rouanet 2004). This method is a geometric approach that conceptualises multivariate data sets as clouds of points in a Euclidean space. The analysis is performed by investigating two clouds, the cloud of modalities and the cloud of individuals. MCA thus allows an emphasis on individuals as well as variables. Compared to Factor Analysis, which mainly focuses on the clustering of variables, it is possible to interpret people’s distribution in the cloud according to their tastes and practices because one is not limited to the study of underlying structures. Next to the active variables (those that construct the space), MCA allows us to superimpose supplementary variables in the constructed space that help us understand it further. MCA does not then reify variables as agents instead of individuals, which is, according to Manzo (2005), one of the main problems of quantitative empirical sociology. 2

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Cultural boundaries and transnational consumption patterns

Recent use of MCA in various European nations (eg Prieur et al 2008; Bennett et al 2009; Prieur and Savage 2011; 2013) have argued that the prime cultural divide is now between the culturally ‘engaged’ and ‘disengaged’. This somewhat echoes Bourdieu’s original finding from France that the main opposition is organised along the ‘volume of capital’ in which those with more economic and cultural capital are more present amongst those who are culturally engaged. However, recent European research suggests that, on the second axis, the older highbrow–lowbrow distinction is giving way to a contrast between those with a taste for contemporary culture against those attracted to older, more classical forms of culture.

Data and variables The analysis includes 20 active variables (musical and culinary tastes) and 50 active modalities (categories of variables). ‘Active’ means that they contribute to the construction of the space of tastes. Other modalities are left ‘passive’; this means that they are not used to construct the MCA space but can be superimposed onto the active space.3 Sociodemographic items are usually used as supplementary variables to understand, for instance, how age can be related to an opposition between offline and online cultural participation. The position in the clouds indicates the cultural practices and tastes with which age can be associated. These supplementary variables are often used as ‘structuring factors’: they structure the cloud of individuals not only by the mean points of their modalities but also by sub-clouds (showing their dispersion). Table 3.7 recapitulates the active variables setting up the space. The variables already mentioned in this chapter are used in addition to a variable measuring whether people follow sport in the media. A total 5723 individuals constitute the sample. Individuals who did not give an answer to the questions with regard to music and food tastes have been excluded. The data have been weighted. Table 3.8 shows the supplementary variables and their associated frequencies for the active sample used in the MCA.

  When this happens, a specific MCA is undertaken. Typical passive modalities are missing answers, refusals to answer, ‘other’, and so on. These should not be confused with the supplementary variables/modalities, which are variables that are inserted inside the cloud of modalities once MCA has been built so as to better understand the distribution of modalities and individuals. 3

99

Everyday Europe Table 3.7: Active variables and modalities in the MCA Music tastes ‘On a scale from one to five, where one means “Not at all” and five means “Very much”, how much do you like the following kinds of music?’ • World music • Classical music • Jazz and Blues • Traditional and folk music from country of residence • Traditional and folk music from other European countries • Metal • Pop • Rock • Hip-Hop and R’n’B 1 don’t like (–) 2 Indifferent (=) 3 Like (+)

Food tastes ‘Please think about foreign cuisine, i.e., all which is originally from outside [CoR]. Which national cuisines do you like best? Multiple answers possible’ • French cuisine • Italian cuisine • Spanish cuisine (+ Malta) • South European • Baltic and Nordic cuisine + North and Central European cuisine • Turkish cuisine • Anglo-Saxon cuisine (only 2% but results do not change with or without) • South American and Caribbean cuisine + African cuisine (including South Africa) • Asian cuisine • Mexican cuisine 1 yes 2 no

Follow sports in the media Based on the two following questions: ‘Do you, in general, follow sports in the media?’ No Yes, at least once a week Yes, less regularly

‘And do you follow sports on an international level or in another country (e.g. watching matches of the German Bundesliga or the Formula-One world championship)?’ No (I don’t follow sport on an international level) Yes, at least once a week Yes, less regularly Note. The question was only asked to those who watch sports in the media 1 No sport TV 2 No sport International but sport 3 Sport international and more local

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Cultural boundaries and transnational consumption patterns Table 3.8: Supplementary variables and categories Age bands

Gender Sociooccupational status

Education

Subjective income

Physical and virtual mobility

24 and less 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65 and more Men Women In full-time paid work (or away temporarily) In part-time paid work (or away temporarily) In education (even if on vacation) Unemployed Retired Doing housework, looking after children or other persons Other (eg permanently sick or disabled) Lower secondary education or less In between lower and higher secondary education Higher secondary education Tertiary We are living very comfortably on the money we have We are living comfortably on the money we have We make ends meet We find it difficult We find it very difficult • Lived in another country for three or more months before turning 18 • Number of visited countries in the last 24 months (no trip to 10 and more trips) • Communicated by phone/computer/mail/email with family, friends abroad over the last 12 months (communication/no communication) • Communicated via social networks with family, friends abroad over the last 12 months (social network/no social network)

Main cultural dimensions in the European space of tastes The first step in a specific MCA consists in choosing the number of axes that properly define the space of cultural profiles. The modified rates (Table 3.9) indicate that one axis is not sufficient (25%), whereas taking the five first axes brings explained variance up to 67%.4 We will here only consider the first four most powerful axes which reflect the main cultural dimensions in the European space of tastes. In interpreting these axes, two tools can be useful. First, we can   These rates give a better assessment of the importance of axes (Le Roux and Rouanet 2004, 200–201). 4

101

Everyday Europe Table 3.9: Eigenvalues and modified rates of the most important axes Number 1 2 3 4 5

Eigenvalue 0.1033 0.0978 0.0733 0.0632 0.0617

Percentage 6.86 6.49 4.86 4.19 4.10

Modified rates (%) 25.8 22.1  9.0  5.3  4.8

Cumulated modified rates (%) 25.8 47.8 56.8 62.0 66.8

identify the modalities that contribute more than average to an axis: this guides us in interpreting and labelling the axes. Each modality having a contribution equal to or higher than 2% (100/50, 50 being the number of active modalities) contributes significantly to the axis and gives us some information about its meaning. Second, twodimensional figures can also be used to assess the location of these most contributing modalities and their relations with other relevant modalities. These graphs illustrate the relations between relevant modalities in a more understandable way than graphs representing a larger number of dimensions. Axis 1: musical openness versus musical narrow repertoire (see Figure 3.1) We start by interpreting axis 1, where there are 14 modalities from 6 variables that contribute more than average to the orientation of the first axis, accounting for 87.8% of the variance in that axis. Figure 3.1 shows modalities contributing to 35% of the variance on axis 1 in the two-dimensional space created by this axis and axis 2.5 When two modalities from different variables are close to each other, it means that people who chose one tended to choose the other. When two modalities from the same variable are located near each other, this means that respondents who selected one of the categories tend to have the same patterns of choice (as defined by the plane 1–2) than those who selected the other. Axis 1 illustrates a tension between a taste for diverse music genres, and especially metal, rock and hip hop, which are located on the left of Figure 3.1, and a dislike of most genres (located on the right of axis 1).   Note that we have chosen here to represent spaces created by axes which succeed one another in terms of the importance of their eigenvalues. For instance, axis 1 is represented in its relation with axis 2. However, it is possible to illustrate the interactions between axes 1 and 3, for instance. 5

102

Cultural boundaries and transnational consumption patterns Figure 3.1: Modalities contributing to 35% of the variance on axis 1 Axe 2

Classical– TradEU– 0.4

Jazz–

HipHop= Pop+

HipHop+ Metal+

World–

Asian cuisine

Metal=

Italian cuisine

Rock+

0

Sport Inter

–0.4

No Sport Inter No Sport TV Metal– No Italian cuisine HipHop–

Pop–

TradEU=

World+

Rock–

Jazz+

–0.8

TradEU+ –0.8

–0.4

0

0.4

0.8

Axe 1

Source: EUCROSS (2016)

Axis 1 is in part a differentiation on the lines of volume as has been found in other studies, with a greater number of positive likes (for metal, hip hop, rock, pop and world music on the left-hand side, and corresponding dislikes on the right-hand side). However, this is not a simple volume distinction since not all musical genres contribute to this axis. It is especially worth noting that classical music has a very limited contribution to axis 1, and hence more highbrow tastes are not very well represented on this axis. Axis 1 therefore refers more to the width of the musical repertoire people listen to than to the highbrow nature of their tastes. Interestingly, most of the musical tastes on the left-hand side of axis 1 are contemporary and dominated by American or Anglophone standards (in Europe at least), indicating a taste away from specifically European or national musical forms. Axis 2: Traditional highbrow Europe-oriented profile and rejection of traditional European outlook (see Figure 3.2) Let us now consider the second axis. We should note that this second axis is powerful, with modified rates only slightly less than the first axis, and hence almost comparable in importance. (This relatively even balance between first and second axes is unusual; it is much more common for the first axis to dominate). Here there are 13 modalities

103

Everyday Europe Figure 3.2: Modalities contributing to 35% of the variance on axis 2 Axe 2

Classical–

TradCoR–

TradEU–

World–

Asian cuisine

0.4

HipHop= Pop+ Rock+

Jazz–

Classical=

No French cuisine No North&Central/Baltic

0

No Asian cuisine HipHop– –0.4

Rock– Pop–

TradEU= French cuisine World+

Jazz+ Classical+

North&Central/Baltic TradCoR+

–0.8

TradEU+ –0.8

–0.4

0

0.4

0.8

Axe 1

Source: EUCROSS (2016)

from 8 variables that contribute more than average to the orientation of the second axis, accounting for 85.7% of the variance. Most of the variables contributing more than average are also related to music preferences; however, enjoying Asian (at the top) or French (on the bottom) cuisine does significantly contribute to axis 2. As previously, axis 2 shows the distribution of most relevant modalities to axis 2 but does not limit itself to the ones whose contribution is above average. Figure 3.2 shows the same space as Figure 3.1 but focuses on axis 2 this time. At the top can be found a rejection of classical music, of traditional music both from country of residence and another European country, of world music and of jazz but a preference for Asian food. At the bottom, the opposite profile can be found. A taste for traditional music from another European country turns out to be very important, alongside enjoying classical and world music, traditional from one’s own country of residence and jazz. A dislike of pop music also characterises the bottom of axis 2. In terms of food, French cuisine is appreciated (alongside Northern and Central European and Baltic cuisines but not in a very significant way). This therefore reveals an opposition between a traditional highbrow Europe-oriented profile amongst those at the bottom and a dislike of traditional European culture at the top and a preference for more American-oriented music (rock and pop). There

104

Cultural boundaries and transnational consumption patterns

are echoes here of Fligstein’s (2008) arguments that there is a strong differentiation between those who inhabit a more ‘European’ field and those associated with their national frame of reference This is also a different finding from that evident in other similar European research, where one usually sees a differentiation on the basis of age between older, more highbrow cultural forms, and more youthful contemporary culture on this second axis. We find that the bottom of axis 2 brings together a liking for older highbrow culture (classical, traditional European) and more contemporary (world music, jazz), as well as traditional music from one’s own country. Our second axis thus demonstrates the power of European-wide forces in differentiating cultural space. Axes 3 and 4: European music versus European food taste and European cuisine versus non-European cuisine (Figure 3.3) Let us now turn to the two less important, but still pertinent, third and fourth axes in our MCA, so that we can unravel further aspects of the differentiation of cultural consumption in Europe. Axis  3’s most significant categories are (1), on the left, a taste for traditional European music genres (including one’s own national music) that goes with an appreciation of lowbrow genres such hip hop, pop and metal and a dislike of jazz and classical music and (2), on the right, an appreciation of French and Italian cuisine and an indifference to the music tastes that are significant on the other side of the axis. This would appear to indicate a kind of highbrow opposition, in which lowbrow tastes are represented both by popular American-oriented music and by traditional music from one’s own country, and highbrow is represented by French culinary tastes and musical indifference. Axis 4 presents an opposition between a taste for Southern European, Italian, French, Spanish, Northern and Central European and Baltic cuisine at the top of the axis and a taste for Asian, Mexican, South American and African cuisine, so directly identifies a tension between European-oriented and world culinary tastes. In summary, we have shown very important ways in which forms of attachment to territorially based musical genres and culinary tastes intersect with more familiar forms of cultural distinction. The three main oppositions we have identified relate to the level of engagement (differentiating those who like and dislike different kinds of music (axis 1), highbrow or lowbrow tastes (axis 2 and 3), and its European or non-European character (axis 4). It is also interesting to note that traditional music and food genres can be associated in

105

Everyday Europe Figure 3.3: Modalities contributing to 35% of the variance on the plan formed by axes 3 and 4 Axe 4

South EU Italian cuisine 0.5

HipHop+ 0

TradEU+

Pop+ Jazz– Classical–

French cuisine

No Asian cuisine Sport Inter No Sth American/Afr No Mexican cuisine

TradCoR+

No South EU

TradCoR=

No French cuisine TradEU– No Italian cuisine

No sport TV

Pop= Rock=

–0.5

Asian cuisine –1.0

Mexican cuisine –1.5

Sth American/Africa –0.4

0

0.4

Axe 3

Source: EUCROSS (2016)

various ways with highbrow and lowbrow patterns of tastes. Yet the most important axis (axis 1) relies on music genres that are arguably globalised and standardised across the world. This indicates that the main important tension in Europe may relate to the extent to which people engage with common globalised pop culture. In the next part of the chapter, we will consider how this tension intersects with social and demographic divisions.

Exploration of the cultural space We now go a step further and investigate the differences between the kinds of Europeans who are located on these two axes. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the location of the variables of gender, age, education, sociooccupational status and subjective income in the plane formed by the axes 1 and 2. Gender, being located near the intersection between the two axes, has almost no effect on both axes.

106

Cultural boundaries and transnational consumption patterns Figure 3.4: Age, gender and education in plane 1–2 (cloud of modalities) Axe 2

24 and less 0.4

25–34 35–44 In-between lower and higher secondary ed Men Higher secondary edu Lower secondary educ Women

45–54

0

Tertiary education

55–64 –0.4

65 and more

–0.8

–0.8

–0.4

0

0.4

0.8

Axe 1

Source: EUCROSS (2016)

Figure 3.5: Subjective income and socioeconomic status in plane 1–2 (cloud of modalities) Axe 2

In education 0.4

Part time Full time Unemployed

0

Living very comfortably Living comfortably Making ends meet Doing housework Finding it very difficult

Finding it difficult

–0.4

Retired

–0.8

–0.8

–0.4

0

Source: EUCROSS (2016)

107

0.4

0.8

Axe 1

Everyday Europe

In comparison age seems more relevant to understanding the distribution of respondents in the cloud. The strongest opposition on axis 1 is between the categories ‘25–34’ and ‘35–44’ on the left and the age band ‘65 and over’ on the right. More generally, people from 18 to 54 years old are located closer to musical openness and people aged at least 55 to musical disengagement. On the second axis, there is an even clearer link with age, with the younger respondents situated at the top of plane 1–2 and the older at the bottom. The greatest gap is between the youngest category and the oldest one. This means that young people tend to reject a traditional European outlook while older people are more inclined to have highbrow Europe-oriented tastes. Socio-occupational status echoes some of the results associated with age. On axis 1 those in education (negative coordinates) are opposed to the retired (positive coordinates). However, there is also a fairly strong gap between those who have a full-time job compared to the retired and also the person in charge of the housework. This shows that the positioning of individuals in the space might not only be linked to age and life cycles but also to some kind of opposition between more domestic and more public roles. Axis 2 is more explicitly associated with age, by distinguishing people in education and retired. This is in line with what we have just seen about the effect of age. To recap, in the upper quadrant on the left of Figure 3.4 can be found people whose musical openness is more oriented towards lowbrow genres. They tend to be young and in education, likely to obtain more cultural resources in the near future. In the lower quadrant on the left are located educated middle-aged and economically active respondents who enjoy a more highbrow profile in their openness (visible in their preference for French cuisine). A profile drawing on more traditional and local cultural genres can be associated with older people with a lower level of education and with a smaller subjective income in the lower quadrant on the right. These figures show that a taste for specific cuisine goes along with cultural and economic capital. It should also be noted that the level of education and subjective income can partly explain this tension between quadrants, with more educated and wealthier people being more interested in classically highbrow European cuisine. Figure 3.6 shows the distribution of nationalities in the space 1–2. There is a very clear Northern–Southern European split (especially on axis 2). Germany, the UK and Denmark (to a lesser extent) are overrepresented in the upper quadrants compared to other nationalities, that is, among those who are less affiliated to traditional highbrow

108

Cultural boundaries and transnational consumption patterns Figure 3.6: Countries in the space 1–2 (cloud of modalities) Axe 2

0.4

Germany

UK Denmark

0

Spain Romania Italy

–0.4

–0.8

–0.8

–0.4

0

0.4

0.8

Axe 1

Source: EUCROSS (2016)

cultural forms. Romanians and Italians are more likely to have the opposite configuration, being more European-oriented, and more highbrow. Finally, Figure  3.7 includes modalities related to physical and virtual mobility practices: whether the respondents had lived abroad before they turned 18, whether they had some trips abroad over the 24 months preceding the survey and whether they communicated with friends or family abroad by mail or phone (or using their computer, through emails or Skype and Google talk, including video chat), or via social networks. Figure 3.7 needs to be interpreted with caution since the distances between the modalities are rather modest; yet it shows a clear pattern on axis 1 with the most mobile both virtually and physically being on the left and the least mobile on the right. The number of recent trips abroad seems to be the most ‘significant’ variable on axis 1. This is an indication that mobility practices are important in structuring cultural tastes, and hence that they are bound up with the reworking of cultural capital which has been observed in contemporary Europe and the tendency to embrace a wider range of tastes for more contemporary musical genres.

109

Everyday Europe Figure 3.7: Physical and virtual mobility practices Axe 2 0.30

6–10 trips 0.15 social network 0

3–5 trips 2 trips no communication Never lived abroad 18–

10+ trips

1 trip

no social network

Lived abroad 18– communication

No trip

–0.15

–0.30

–0.45 –0.4

0

0.4

Axe 1

0.8

Source: EUCROSS (2016)

Conclusion This chapter offers new insights in the making of cultural tastes from an original and systematic cultural survey spanning several European nations. Compared to most nationally oriented research in cultural sociology, EUCROSS provides us with exceptional data to evaluate the nature of cross-border cultural practices, their intersection with different kinds of mobility and social dynamics. We are thus able to show that there are systematic cultural oppositions differentiating those with more nationally oriented and more cosmopolitan tastes, and that these intersect with educational attainment, age and cross-border practices. We also see significant differences between the six nations studied, demonstrating that there is no uniform process at work across Europe. In general, we therefore endorse the views of writers such as Fligstein (2008), Savage and colleagues (2005; 2011) and Prieur and Savage (2013) who see the association between cultural consumption practices, spatial orientations and forms of privilege as a marked feature of contemporary social dynamics. Although our MCA analysis was limited to two areas of tastes (music and food), we are still able to show different patterns to previous similar research focusing on only one country or region (eg Bennett et al 2009). The first axis reflects an

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opposition between cultural engagement versus disengagement (as is typically found in national studies). However, whereas most national studies show that a liking for ‘highbrow’ genres such as classical music is included amongst those who are engaged, this is missing from our analysis: rather it is American or Anglophone musical genres which characterise engagement. It appears that those who are more engaged are also more global in orientation. Similarly, highbrow mechanisms of distinction have different implications whether one is more a food or a music lover. We have also seen that countries have to some extent different cultural profiles according to their past interactions with other cultural groups and spatial reference points (for instance to Asia in the case of the UK, to South America in the case of Spain). Mobility practices can also be related to tastes, with the more mobile having more cultural resources to acquire a diversity of tastes. Our results underline again the link between education and more ‘open’ forms of consumption, while both also seem to be associated with mobility practices. This tends to be in line with an idea of highly mobile cultural elites, opposed to more locally anchored and less culturally and economically rich groups. In conclusion, our research adds further evidence that highbrow culture is itself fragmenting into different forms and modes. We can detect the continuation of more Eurocentric forms of highbrow culture (at the bottom of axis 2), alongside more culinary and anti-popular highbrow culture (on the right of axis 3). Taking mobility into account therefore leads us to present a more complex analysis of highbrow culture than is found if one simply uses nationally based studies. Older models of ‘highbrow’ cultural capital, which are premised on the quasiautonomy of ‘national’ cultural boundaries, need to be widened out to recognise fluidity across nations. Once we take this step, we can see how those who are more likely to embrace cultural tastes from beyond their nations are also more likely to be privileged, but also how there is a highbrow current which resists a certain standardisation or even ‘Americanisation’. This helps us recognise the way that the politics of contemporary nationalism is bound up with patterns of cultural consumption in which those embracing national culture are also reacting against elites with more transnational tastes. References Achterberg, P., Heilbron, J., Houtman, D., and Aupers, S. (2011) ‘A cultural globalization of popular music? American, Dutch, French, and German popular music charts (1965 to 2006)’. American Behavioral Scientist 55(5): 589–608.

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Atkinson, W. (2011) ‘The context and genesis of musical tastes: omnivorousness debunked, Bourdieu buttressed’. Poetics 39(3): 169–186. Bellavance, G. (2008) ‘Where’s high? Who’s low? What’s new? Classification and stratification inside cultural “Repertoires”’. Poetics 36(2–3): 189–216. Bennett, T., Savage, M., Silva, E., Warde, A., Gayo-Cal, M., and Wright, D. (2009) Culture, Class, Distinction. London: Routledge. Berkers, P. (2009) ‘Ethnic boundaries in national literary histories: classification of ethnic minority fiction authors in American, Dutch and German anthologies and literary history books, 1978–2006’. Poetics 37(5): 419–438. Bourdieu, P. (1979) La distinction. Paris: Editions de Minuit. Bourdieu, P. (2005) The Social Structures of the Economy. Cambridge: Polity. Bryson, B. (1996) ‘“Anything but heavy metal”: symbolic exclusion and musical dislikes’. American Sociological Review 61(5): 884–899. Chakrabarty, D. (2008) Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Coulangeon, P., and Lemel, Y. (2007) ‘Is “distinction” really outdated? Questioning the meaning of the omnivorization of musical taste in contemporary France’. Poetics 35(2–3): 93–111. Fligstein, N. (2008) Euroclash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fridman, V., and Ollivier, M. (2004) ‘Ouverture ostentatoire à la diversité et cosmopolitisme’. Sociologie et Sociétés 36(1): 105–126. Frith, S. (2004) ‘Does British music still matter? A reflection on the changing status of British popular music in the global music market’. European Journal of Cultural Studies 7: 43–58. Gayo, M. (2016) ‘A critique of the omnivore: from the origin of the idea of omnivorousness to the Latin American experience’, in L. Hanquinet and M. Savage (eds) Routledge International Handbook of the Sociology of Art and Culture. Abingdon: Routledge, 104–115. Hannerz, U. (1990) ‘Cosmopolitans and locals in world culture’. Theory, Culture and Society 7(2): 237–251. Hanquinet, L., Roose, H., and Savage, M. (2014) ‘The eyes of the beholder: aesthetic preferences and the remaking of cultural capital’. Sociology 48(1): 111–132. Hanquinet, L., and Savage, M. (eds) (2016) Routledge International Handbook of the Sociology of Art and Culture. London: Routledge.

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Karademir Hazır, I., and Warde, A. (2016) ‘The cultural omnivore debate: methodological aspects of its progress’, in L. Hanquinet and M. Savage (eds) Routledge International Handbook of Sociology of Arts and Culture. London: Routledge, 77–89. Hitters, E., and van de Kamp, M. (2010) ‘Tune in, fade out: music companies and the classification of domestic music products in the Netherlands’. Poetics 38(5): 461–480. Le Roux, B., and Rouanet, H. (2004) Geometric Data Analysis. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Lizardo, O., and Skiles, S. (2013) ‘Reconceptualizing and theorizing “omnivorousness”: genetic and relational mechanisms’. Sociological Theory 30(4): 263–282. Manzo, G. (2005) ‘Variables, mécanismes et simulations : une synthèse des trois méthodes est-elle possible?’ Revue Française de Sociologie 46(1): 37–74. Meuleman, R., and Savage, M. (2013) ‘A field analysis of cosmopolitan taste: Lessons from the Netherlands’. Cultural Sociology 7(2): 230–256. Michaud, Y. (1997) La crise de l’Art contemporain. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Norris, P., and Inglehart, R. (2009) Cosmopolitan Communications: Cultural Diversity in a Globalized World. New York: Cambridge University Press. Ollivier, M. (2008) ‘Modes of openness to cultural diversity: humanist, populist, practical, and indifferent’. Poetics 36(2–3): 120–147. Peterson, R. (2005) ‘Problems in comparative research: the example of omnivorousness’. Poetics 33(5–6): 257–282. Peterson, R., and Kern, R. (1996) ‘Changing highbrow taste: from snob to omnivore’. American Sociological Review 61(5): 900–907. Prieur, A., Rosenlund, L., and Skjott-Larson, J. (2008) ‘Cultural capital today. A case study from Denmark’. Poetics 36(1): 45–71. Prieur, A., and Savage, M. (2011) ‘Updating cultural capital theory: a discussion based on studies in Denmark and in Britain’. Poetics 39(6): 566–580. Prieur, A., and Savage, M. (2013) ‘Emerging forms of cultural capital’. European Societies 15(2): 246–267. Prior, N. (2005) ‘A question of perception: Bourdieu, art and the postmodern’. The British Journal of Sociology 56(1): 123–139. Purhonen, S., and Wright, D. (2013) ‘Methodological issues in national-comparative research on cultural tastes: the case of cultural capital in the UK and Finland’. Cultural Sociology 7(2): 257–273.

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Savage, M., Cunningham, N., Devine, F., Friedman, S., Laurison, D., Mckenzie, L., Miles, A., Snee, H., and Wakeling, P. (2015) Social Class in the 21st Century. London: Penguin. Savage, M., Gayo-Cal, M., Warde, A., and Tampubolon, G. (2005) ‘Cultural capital in the UK: a preliminary report using correspondence analysis’. CRESC working paper 4. Manchester: University of Manchester. Savage, M., Wright, D., and Gayo-Cal, M. (2010) ‘Cosmopolitan nationalism and the cultural reach of the white British’. Nations and Nationalism 16(4): 598–615. Schmutz, V. (2009) ‘Social and symbolic boundaries in newspaper coverage of music, 1955–2005: gender and genre in the US, France, Germany, and the Netherlands’. Poetics 37(4): 298–314. Warde, A., Wright, D., and Gayo-Cal, M. (2007) ‘Understanding cultural omnivorousness: or, the myth of the cultural omnivore’. Cultural sociology 1(2): 143–164.

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Social transnationalism and supranational identifications Steffen Pötzschke and Michael Braun

Introduction The analysis of national and supranational identification of native populations offers an important research agenda. This is not the least since the concerns and interests of citizens, or their lack of interest in certain topics and concepts, are legitimate factors in the decision making of democracies. In this sense, questions of identification are relevant for the positioning of countries towards each other and, in particular, for their cooperation in the framework of supranational entities, such as the European Union, or even on a global scale. Contrary to opinions often expressed by different national actors in public debates, most studies have come to the conclusion that there is no incompatibility between national and European identifications but rather that they are complementary (Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Citrin and Sides 2004; Duchesne and Frognier 2002; 2008; Bruter 2005). As hypothesised in Deutsch’s transactionalist theory (Deutsch et al 1957), transnational relations of national populations, such as frequent foreign travel, knowledge of foreign languages and foreign friends, have been demonstrated to increase identification with larger regional entities (Kuhn 2011; 2015). However, transnational interactions are highly stratified across society and the younger and more highly educated are much more frequently involved in these interactions than the elderly and the less educated. As a consequence, the level of identification with Europe does not necessarily rise in tandem with an increase in these interactions. Instead, stratification with regard to interactions could be reflected by stratification with regard to identification. Using quantitative data gathered in 2012 and 2013 as part of the EUCROSS study, this chapter examines the identification at various different scales (city, region, country, Europe and the world) of nationals of Denmark, Germany, Italy, Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom, as well as Romanian and Turkish migrants to these

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countries.1 However, the focus is on identification with Europe and the difference between identification with Europe and the world as a whole. By doing so we are investigating the conscious selfidentification of individuals. It is not our aim to go beyond this and speculate on the existence of a ‘European identity’. In drawing this distinction we follow Brubaker and Cooper (2000), who argue that ‘identity’, due to its nature as a social construct, is not suitable as an analytical category. According to Mau and collaborators (2008), social transnationalism can be understood as involvement in cross-border interactions and mobility. Kuhn (2011) subdivides this transnationalism into three dimensions: transnational background, transnational practices and transnational human capital. Transnational background includes migration experiences; transnational practices involve interaction with non-national actors and sojourns abroad; and transnational human capital includes foreign language proficiency and general education. Though this book concentrates mainly on the general population in the various countries, a comparison with the two migrant groups in the survey is also enlightening. The study of migrants’ social transnationalism introduces an important additional aspect; the mere fact of having migrated should immediately be conducive to transnationalism. Depending on the age at migration, migrants have also been socialised in one or more countries and many of them are fluent in more than one language. In addition, migrants can relate not only to one country and to supranational entities, but to two different countries in a much more encompassing sense than non-migratory members of the general population who may have transnational contacts for other reasons. Studies of migration have focused mostly on the relationship of migrants to both their country of origin (CoO) and country of residence (CoR) (Brubaker 1989). While many pioneering studies on ‘transnational social spaces’ (Pries 2008) were conducted by researchers of this field, they usually did not take the migrants’ stance with regard to more encompassing entities, such as the European Union, into consideration. The majority of early transnationalism studies focused mainly on migration between the Americas (Glick Schiller et al 1995; Guarnizo 1998; Smith 1998; Itzigsohn et al 1999; Portes 1999).   Throughout the chapter we employ terms like ‘Danes’, ‘Italians’, ‘Turkish migrants’, ‘Turks’, ‘Romanians’, and so on to refer to individuals who are citizens of the respective countries. This means that we use these terms to refer to nationality in a legal sense and not to ethnicity. 1

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Transnationalism and identifications: research questions In this chapter, we pursue a number of related research questions: 1. Does transnationalism affect identifications among the general population? And which aspects of transnationalism are important in this context? 2. Do the variables measuring transnational background and behaviour work in a similar way for migrants as well as the general population? Or is the experience of migration so influential that additional transnational background and behaviour have a much lower importance for migrants? With respect to the European populations, Fligstein (2008) argued using Eurobarometer data that travel to other EU countries would strengthen identification with the European Union. While having migrated is the major distinction between migrants and the national populations in the receiving countries, there are other aspects of physical mobility to take into account. In this regard it seems useful to differentiate between experiences in other EU countries and nonEU countries. The latter should clearly be less relevant for European identification but could nevertheless have an effect by leading to greater open-mindedness, or what might be termed a ‘cosmopolitan’ orientation in general. Braun and Müller (2012) did not find any effect of a previous sojourn in the CoR on the identifications of intra-European migrants. However, the European Union lies at the root of the opportunities some migrants have to move freely between European countries. This benefit is particularly visible for migrants who have experienced multiple moves. Braun and Müller thus also argued that a previous sojourn in a third EU member state should strengthen identification with the European Union. This was indeed what they found. Similarly, Teney and colleagues (2016) found a positive effect of a previous sojourn (without differentiating between countries) for migrants in Germany. Regarding general populations, existing research which explicitly considers the effect of previous prolonged stays abroad on identification towards Europe or other entities is mainly limited to student mobility (Fuss et  al 2004; Sigalas 2010; Kuhn 2012). Nevertheless, we expect that sojourns in another EU country should strengthen European identification of the general population as well. However, sojourns in non-EU countries might show a weaker effect as they could instead rather strengthen a more general cosmopolitanism.

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Similar effects are expected for recent trips to other EU and non-EU countries, trips to the CoO of migrants as well as the number of recent trips abroad in general, which we will consider in addition. Some earlier studies found that participation in exchange programmes (eg Erasmus) do not have a significant impact on the identification of the general population with Europe. Kuhn (2012) argued that this is mainly due to the fact that individuals who are taking part in such programmes usually already have a very positive stance towards Europe. Since nationals of all the countries surveyed in EUCROSS as well as Turkish citizens can participate in EU-funded exchange programmes, the influence of such experiences will also be tested. However, in accordance with the abovementioned argument, we also do not expect that participation in Erasmus or other EU exchange programmes will significantly influence the identifications of the respondents analysed here. Having a partner from another EU country should be particularly beneficial for European identification. While Braun and Müller (2012) did not find a corresponding effect for intra-European migrants, their explanation for this is telling and warrants the inclusion of the variable here: in the bivariate case, they found an effect on identification with the European Union when the person has a partner from a third country, something which vanished upon inclusion of the characteristics of the friendship network in the multivariate regression. This means that the effect of the ethnic origin of the partner is mediated by the friendship network. However, this does not exclude the possibility that the former might be still relevant in a different sample and, more generally, in the case of non-migrant respondents. Mau (2010) argues that binational marriages and civil unions foster the transnationalisation of individuals’ daily lives as they potentially become part of social circles in more than one country (see also De Valk and Díez Medrano 2014). In this sense being in a relationship with a foreign EU citizen might also strengthen identification with Europe, as the legal framework created by the European Union facilitates the formation of such relations. Freedom of mobility and granting of social rights and benefits to EU citizens are only two aspects which might be mentioned in this regard. Furthermore, Europe might be conceived as a common cultural heritage and background by such couples. Having a partner from a non-EU country could on the contrary be more conducive to a generally cosmopolitan stance. Friends and family living in other countries should have a positive effect on supranational identification for both the general population and the migrants under investigation here. The same should hold true

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for having friends of third-country origin in the CoR. This is also what Braun and Müller (2012) found in their study of intra-European migrants. Analysing data on the citizens of EU member states, Gerhards (2012) demonstrated that there is a positive correlation between knowledge of languages and attachment to Europe. We would expect to see similar results, since language knowledge facilitates access to foreign country media and allows respondents to interact more closely with citizens of other EU countries. With the latter assumption we are following Fligstein (2008), who considers direct contact with Europeans abroad a main driving force of European identification. With respect to migrants, Braun and Müller (2012) showed a similar effect for proficiency in the CoR language. The use of foreign-language TV should work in a similar way as knowledge of additional languages. In addition, it is to be expected that it widens the horizon beyond the CoO and the CoR. For migrants, additional variables are also considered. Transnational ties to the country of origin could prevent a complete reorientation towards the CoR. If this holds, frequent contacts with family members and friends in the CoO should have positive effects on CoO identification and also on identification with the European Union, while they should not be conducive to CoR identification. However, and contrary to the expectations of Braun and Müller (2012), the impact on identification with the European Union of frequent contacts with family members and friends in the CoO, did not in fact turn out to be significant for intra-European migrants. This is not too surprising, as the compatibility of simultaneous identifications with different geographical entities has been demonstrated in the literature. In addition, Braun and Müller (2012) expected that experiences of discrimination in the CoR should not only negatively affect identification of migrants with the CoR but by means of generalisation should also affect identification with the European Union. However, they could not find such an effect. Nevertheless, we postulate that with the Romanian and Turkish migrant samples we have here this might be different. Each are more outsiders to the EU, albeit to different degrees, than the migrant groups in the PIONEUR study (see the Introduction to this volume). Furthermore, we should consider that the influence of discrimination on identification might also depend on specific circumstances. Hence, in contrast to Braun and Müller (2012), Teney and colleagues (2016) found at least an effect of high levels of perceived discrimination in the context of hiring processes.

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While Braun and Müller (2012) postulated identification differences depending on the migration motives, they did not find any. Consequently, we will refrain from formulating a hypothesis in this regard. As controls we consider the following variables: From the literature on European identification among general populations of EU member states (Citrin and Sides 2004; Dubé and Magni-Berton 2009; Kuhn 2015), one can conclude that higher education should lead to a stronger identification with the European Union. Braun and Müller (2012) also found strong educational effects for intra-EU migrants, in particular when they have a university degree. We also postulate that the worse the subjective economic household situation was at the age of 14, the stronger should be European identification at the time of the interview. The subjective economic situation at the age of 14 is likely to serve as a comparison standard against which the current situation is evaluated. With respect to national populations, Fligstein (2009) and Kuhn (2015) show that the subjective economic situation at the time of the interview, however, has a positive effect on identification with Europe. We expect to find the same effect both for nationals and migrants. In the existing literature, the effect of gender is not really clear. Among researchers who have used Eurobarometer data (from different waves) there seems to be consensus that, in the general population, women have a lower identification with the European Union than men (Citrin and Sides 2004; Risse 2010; Kuhn 2015). With respect to research relying on other data, the results are not that homogenous. There are examples which observe the same tendency as the aforementioned research (Schmidt et  al 2003), and others which, on the contrary, find a more pro-European stance of women (Jamieson and European Commission 2005; Quintelier et al 2014). The data on intra-European movers gathered and analysed as part of the PIONEUR project was in line with the Eurobarometer data: that is, men identified more with Europe than did women (Braun and Müller 2012). Using data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) Migration Sample, Teney and colleagues (2016) did not find any gender effect regarding the European identification of immigrants in Germany. Therefore, we refrain from formulating any hypothesis regarding the direction of a possible effect, since the processes behind these different results are not entirely clear. Because older people have generally been socialised in much more nationalised contexts and their experiences with globalisation are biographically more recent, identification with supranational entities

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should be lower for them than for younger people; this is what was found on the basis of Eurobarometer data (Citrin and Sides 2004; Kuhn 2015). However, for intra-European migrants a weak effect could be found in the opposite direction, in the sense that the identification of older migrants is higher than that of younger migrants (Braun and Müller 2012). For migrants only, we also consider duration of the stay as a control variable. We expect it to increase identification with the European Union, but possibly not much above the level reached by the general population of the CoR. This effect can be conceived as mainly mediated by opportunities in that a longer stay increases the exposure of migrants to new environments. While this corresponds to the results of Teney and colleagues (2016), Braun and Müller (2012) only found a significant effect of duration of the stay on the identification with the CoR but not on EU identification.

Data and methods Dependent variables Identification with different geographic entities was measured by the following instrument: On a scale from one to five, where one means ‘strongly disagree’ and five means ‘strongly agree’, please tell me how much you agree with the following statements. (a) I feel like a citizen of the town where I live, (b) I feel like a citizen of the region where I live, (c) I feel [CoR national], (d) [migrants only:] I feel [CoO national], (e) I feel European, (f) I feel like a citizen of the world. The chapter presents two related sets of regressions. The first set concentrates on identification with Europe. The second set of regressions uses the difference between identification with Europe and a more general cosmopolitan stance as the dependent variable. To this end a variable was created by subtracting the numeric value of the answer given to item (f) above (‘I feel like a citizen of the world’) from item (e) (‘I feel European’). This variable therefore could theoretically take values from –4 to 4, where positive values mean that identification with Europe is higher than identification as a citizen of the world.

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Independent variables Information on previous sojourns of three months or more in countries other than the CoO and the CoR were collected by the use of two items. The first one asked for stays which took place before the age of 18, and the second one for stays made later in life. Since the respondents were asked to specify the country in which they stayed, a differentiation following geographical criteria is possible. The answers to both items were combined and entered as dummy variables for previous sojourn in another EU country and in any other country (that is, which does not belong to the European Union). The response of ‘never have stayed elsewhere for at least three months’ serves as the baseline. A number of variables are introduced for the measurement of recent mobility. Trips to other countries within the last 24  months that included at least one overnight stay are entered as two dummy variables for stays in another EU country and stays in any other country. For migrants these dummies do not include the respective CoO, as they are meant to measure mobility between the CoR and third countries. As in the case of the abovementioned previous sojourns, these variables are dichotomous and indicate only whether or not the respondents visited the respective group of countries within the specified time frame. No stays in a country other than the CoR or CoO serve as the baseline. Furthermore, the total number of these trips and, for the migrant samples, the number of visits to the CoO are included in the analysis by means of two separate quantitative variables, asking how many of these trips the respondent made in the last 24 months. Participation in exchange programmes is measured by the dichotomous item: ‘Have you ever (eg  as a student or during your professional career) participated in an international exchange programme that has been funded or co-funded by the European Union?’ The origin of the partner is entered as dummy variables for partner from the CoR, partner from another EU country and partner from a third non-EU country. Those who do not have a partner or whose partner is from the CoO (migrant samples only) serve as the baseline. For the migrant samples we include measurements of integration into different social circles in the CoR. Therefore, the existence of family members, in-laws and friends in the CoR who come from the CoO, the CoR and a third country were measured by the items: ‘Please think about all family members, in-laws and friends you have who live in [CoR]. I would like to know: How many are

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originally from [CoO]? And how many are from [CoR]? And how many are originally from other countries?’ Answer categories were ‘none’, ‘a few’ and ‘several’. These variables are treated as quantitative variables, although they were measured on an ordinal scale only. The measurement of contacts abroad followed the same principles. Besides the existence of a transnational network the data also allow an assessment of the frequency with which different forms of communication are used. To this end three items were included asking how often the respondents communicated during the last 12 months with friends and family abroad via phone or software such as Skype, via mail or email and via social networking sites (such as Facebook). The answer categories were ‘every day’, ‘at least once a week’, ‘at least once a month’, ‘less often’ and ‘never’. These categories are reverse-coded. Knowledge of a third language (other than the CoR and CoO language) is included as a dichotomous item with no additional language proficiencies as reference. In order to allow for the measurement of foreign media consumption this item was included: ‘The following question is about TV content (eg movies, sitcoms, news broadcasts, etc) in other languages than [official CoR language] [and your native language]. How often do you watch TV content which is in another language and has not been dubbed, either directly on TV or via the internet?’ The response categories were ‘every day’, ‘at least once a week’, ‘at least once a month’, ‘less often’ and ‘never’. This question is reverse-coded. For migrants only, the experience of discrimination was measured by the question: ‘Have you ever felt discriminated against in [CoR] because you were born in another country?’ Response categories were ‘no, never’, ‘yes, sometimes’ and ‘yes, frequently’. This variable is treated as a cardinal variable, although it was measured on an ordinal scale only. The migration motives of Romanian and Turkish migrants were measured by an open question. Three dummy variables are used for education, quality-of-life and family/love motives. The baseline is constituted by work motives. Education is entered as three dummy variables for intermediary and upper secondary as well as university education (with those having a lower secondary education or less constituting the baseline). The subjective economic situation at the age of 14 and at the time of the interview were measured by the questions: ‘Which of the following descriptions comes closest to your feelings about how well off the household you were living in was when you were 14 years old?’ and ‘Which of the following descriptions comes closest to how

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you feel about how well off your household is today?’ The response categories were: ‘We are/were living very comfortably on the money we have/had’, ‘we are/were living comfortably on the money we have/had’, ‘we make/made ends meet’, ‘we find/found it difficult’ and ‘we find/found it very difficult’. Gender is a dummy variable with men as the baseline category: that is, the effects presented pertain to women. Age and, for migrants, duration of the stay in the CoR are included as quantitative variables.

Results: Unpacking the impact of transnational practices Analytical procedure First, the means for identification with the different geographical entities are presented. Then, regressions of European identification and the difference between identification with Europe and the world are estimated. Here we will look at the national samples first and then turn to the Turkish and Romanian migrants. Identification with different geographical entities Table 4.1 presents the group averages for local, regional, CoO, CoR and European identification as well as the more general cosmopolitan attitudes. Danes show the strongest identification with both their city and their region. At the bottom we find the Italians and the British. With the exception of Romanians in Italy, migrant populations show lower local and regional identifications than the corresponding national populations. Romanians score slightly higher than Turks but not in all countries. With regard to CoO identification, the migrant groups do not differ very much from each other and from the national populations’ orientation towards the countries they live in. Identification with the CoR is again highest for the Danes, followed by the Romanians. With the exception of Spain, it is higher than local and regional identifications. Regarding the migrant samples it is important to remember that they include only individuals who were neither born nor naturalised in the CoR. Therefore, it is not that much of a surprise that their identification with the CoR is much lower than in the case of the national populations. Romanian migrants identify more with their CoR than Turkish migrants do, with the only exception of the United Kingdom where it is the other way around.

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Social transnationalism and supranational identifications Table 4.1: Local, regional, CoO, CoR and European identification and cosmopolitan attitudes among national populations and migrants

Danes Germans Italians Romanians Spanish British Turks in… Denmark Germany Italy Romania United Kingdom Romanians in… Denmark Germany Italy Spain United Kingdom

City 4.4 4.0 3.9 4.3 4.2 3.9

Region 4.5 3.9 3.9 4.3 4.2 3.8

CoO – – – – – –

CoR 4.8 4.3 4.3 4.6 4.2 4.3

Europe 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.8 4.2 2.9

World 3.4 3.4 3.8 4.0 4.3 3.4

3.4 3.4 3.1 4.8 3.4

3.3 3.3 3.0 4.7 3.2

4.5 4.7 4.4 4.8 4.3

1.7 1.3 2.0 1.0 2.8

2.7 2.9 3.0 4.7 3.0

4.1 3.8 4.0 4.9 4.1

3.4 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.4

3.5 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.3

4.3 4.3 4.5 4.7 4.3

2.2 2.9 2.4 2.2 2.4

4.5 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.1

4.5 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.0

Notes: Nationals: N = 5,356 (weighted data). Turks: N = 1,209; Romanians: N = 1,200. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

An interesting picture emerges for identification with Europe. With the exception of the United Kingdom, where identification with Europe is rather weak, all other national populations are on a comparable level. However, European identification among nationals is in most cases markedly below their identification with the CoR, in particular in Denmark, Romania and the United Kingdom. Romanian migrants score higher than the national populations and dramatically higher than the Turks, with the exception of Turkish respondents in Romania who identify more with Europe than any other group. It is also noteworthy that identification with Europe is, by a wide margin, higher than identification with the CoR for almost all migrant groups. Only for Turkish migrants in the United Kingdom are both values nearly at the same level. A general cosmopolitan attitude is slightly higher than European identification in some but lower in other countries. In Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom, nationals feel less like citizens of the world than in Italy, Romania and Spain. The difference between the Romanian and Turkish migrants is rather small and most

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pronounced in Germany. Especially high cosmopolitanism is obvious with Turks in Romania. The members of this group are indeed exceptional in their high local and regional as well as supranational identifications, combined with a complete lack of identification with Romania as a country. When comparing European identification and cosmopolitanism among migrants, it becomes obvious that for the Turks cosmopolitanism is much higher than identification with Europe, while for the Romanians there is virtually no difference between them. Multivariate analysis of the national samples Table 4.2 shows two regression models for the national populations. European identification is used as the dependent variable in the lefthand panel and the difference between European identification and cosmopolitanism in the right-hand panel. Only a few forms of transnational behaviour have a significant effect. A previous sojourn in a non-EU country contributes to European identification, but a sojourn in an EU country does not. However, recent trips to EU countries have the expected effect. Frequent communication abroad via telephone or computer and the consumption of TV content in a foreign language also contribute to European identification by the nationals. Amongst the demographic variables, the current economic situation of the household has a positive impact on feeling European. Women identify more with Europe than men. The same holds true for older compared to younger people, contrary to our expectation regarding the national population as well as to earlier Eurobarometer-based analyses. When controlled for variables specified above, the German, Italian and Spanish respondents show a higher degree of European identification than the Danes (which are used as the baseline), whilst the Romanians are on the same level, and the British remain the group which identifies least with Europe. While all explanatory variables taken together – that is, those measuring transnationalism and the demographic variables (including the country dummies) – explain 15.2% of the variance of European identification, the specific contribution of the transnationalism variables is not very pronounced. These variables explain only 1.6% of the variance of European identification (in addition to what can be explained by the demographic variables alone). When looking at the six countries individually, the demographic variables and those measuring transnationalism explain between 4.1% (in Romania)

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Social transnationalism and supranational identifications Table 4.2: Regression of European identification and the difference between European identification and cosmopolitanism for the national samples (unstandardised regression coefficients)

Previous sojourn in an EU country Previous sojourn in a non-EU country Recent trip/s to other EU country/ies Recent trip/s to non-EU country/ies Number of recent trips abroad Participation in an EU exchange programme Partner (baseline: no partner or partner from CoR) Partner from another EU country Partner from non-EU country Family members, in-laws and friends abroad from CoR from third country Frequency of communication abroad via Telephone or computer (Skype etc) Mail or email Social networking sites Knowledge of foreign language/s Consumption of TV content in a foreign language Education (baseline: lower secondary or less) Intermediary secondary Higher secondary University Economic household situation (age 14) Economic household situation (currently) Female Age Nationality (baseline: Danes) Germans Italians Romanians Spaniards British Constant N R²

Difference European European identification – identification cosmopolitanism 0.089 0.044 0.172* –0.116 0.141* 0.170* –0.068 –0.133 –0.005 –0.046 0.121 0.020 0.195 –0.066

0.599** –0.263

–0.047 0.010

–0.134** –0.080

0.070* 0.017 –0.012 0.126 0.057**

0.066* –0.010 –0.023 0.124 –0.010

0.010 –0.069 0.030 –0.038 0.089** 0.126** 0.010***

–0.128 –0.071 0.008 –0.020 0.049 0.017 0.005*

0.148* 0.168* 0.054 0.431*** –0.863*** 2.664*** 5,282 0.152

0.012 –0.552*** –0.751*** –0.698*** –1.001*** 0.297 5,224 0.096

Notes: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Weighted data. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

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and 13.8% of the variance of European identification (in the United Kingdom). However, the specific impact of the variables measuring transnationalism is relatively low again: 1.5% in Romania and Spain and between 2.3% and 2.9% in Denmark, Germany and Italy. An exception is the value of 8.7% found in the United Kingdom. This means that transnationalism means most in the United Kingdom, the place where the general level of European identification is by far the lowest. Now we will explore the difference between European identification and cosmopolitanism as the dependent variable. Higher values mean that identification with Europe is stronger than identification as a citizen of the world. Recent trips to other EU countries are unsurprisingly related to a more European identification than a cosmopolitan stance. The same applies to having a partner from another EU country. Though respondents whose partner comes from a third country tend to be more inclined towards a more universal cosmopolitan stance, the corresponding effect is not significant. Interestingly, social contacts with people abroad show only significance when they consist of conationals and in this case they are favouring rather a cosmopolitan than a European identification. However, this might well be related to the question of whether these contacts themselves live within the confines of the European Union or not, which is a fact that was not controlled for. Another aspect related to a comparatively stronger identification with Europe is frequent communication abroad by telephone or computer and knowledge of a foreign language. The higher the age of the respondent, the more European identification there is versus a general cosmopolitanism. When controlling for demographic and behavioural variables, in comparison to Danes and Germans, the other populations tend more towards cosmopolitanism rather than European identification. When looking at the difference between European identification and cosmopolitanism, all explanatory variables taken together explain clearly less than in the case of European identification as the dependent variable: 9.6% in the pooled sample (where country dummies are included), and between 2.4% in Denmark and 4.9% in the United Kingdom. The specific impact of the variables measuring transnationalism is relatively low again: 1.2% in the pooled sample, 0.4% in Denmark, 1.3% in Spain, 2.3% in Italy, 2.8% in Romania, 3.1% in the United Kingdom and 4.6% in Germany. Moreover, none of the transnationalism variables is significant in Denmark and the United Kingdom (education is the only significant variable in the

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former and gender in the latter). In Spain and Italy, only one of the transnationalism variables is significant (partner from another EU country in the Spanish case, and social contacts from the CoR in a third country in the Italian case). This means that transnationalism contributes most to differentiate European identification from a general cosmopolitanism in Germany, but has practically no impact in Denmark. Multivariate analysis of the migrant samples In the following, we will analyse Romanian and Turkish migrants separately. While the regression models for Romanian and Turkish migrants (Table 4.3) resemble those for the general populations, it should be noted that migrant-specific variables are added. For migrants from both countries, social integration in the CoR, measured here by the number of family members, relatives and friends who are natives, has a strong positive impact on European identification. Interestingly, it seems that for this effect to occur, a higher number of close contacts with people of CoR origin is needed. On the contrary, having a CoR partner alone does not have a significant effect. This means that a higher degree of social connections on a national level – in an EU member state – is for migrants also related to a stronger identification on the European level. Only for the Romanian migrants – and not the Turkish – do we find that having lived in a country outside of the European Union for more than three months has a negative effect on identification with Europe. The same holds true for the subjective feeling of being discriminated against: that is, the feeling of being treated unfairly by institutions or fellow EU citizens. As was the case with the nationals, older Romanian migrants identify more with Europe than younger ones. Surprisingly, those who have stayed longer in their CoR show weaker identification than those who have stayed only for a short time. The Romanian samples hardly differ amongst each other, with the only exception of the Romanians in Germany, who show less European identification than the other groups. Only for the Turks does the frequency of contacts with family members, relatives and friends abroad via social networks also have a positive impact on European identification. Unsurprisingly, additional language knowledge has a positive effect on European identification, as does the consumption of foreign-language TV. Contrary to the case of Romanian migrants, discrimination experiences do not have a significant effect. This suggests that the feeling of being discriminated in an EU

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Everyday Europe Table 4.3: Regression of European identification and the difference between European identification and cosmopolitanism of Turkish and Romanian migrants (unstandardised regression coefficients) European identification Romanian Turkish migrants migrants 0.089 –0.043

Previous sojourn in a EU country Previous sojourn in a non-EU –0.275* –0.134 country Recent trip/s to other EU 0.118 –0.173 country/ies Recent trip/s to non-EU 0.044 0.049 country/ies Number of recent trips abroad 0.000 0.095 (except CoO) Number of recent trips to CoO 0.000 0.040 Participation in a EU exchange 0.066 0.153 programme Partner (baseline: none/partner from CoO) from CoR 0.056 –0.112 from another EU country –0.130 0.350 from non-EU country –0.041 0.313 Family members, in-laws and friends in the CoR from CoO –0.005 –0.059 from CoR 0.113* 0.216** from third countries –0.031 –0.031 Family members, in-laws and friends abroad from CoO and living there –0.070 0.124 from CoO living neither there –0.057 –0.053 nor in CoR from third country and living 0.058 0.013 outside CoR Frequency of communication abroad via Telephone or computer (Skype –0.014 –0.078 etc) Mail or e-mail 0.012 0.012 Social networking sites 0.036 0.071* Knowledge of additional 0.146 0.278** language/s Consumption of TV content in a –0.028 0.096** third language Discrimination experience –0.156** –0.077

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European identification – cosmopolitanism Romanian Turkish migrants migrants 0.032 –0.115 –0.233

–0.102

–0.025

–0.253

–0.029

–0.161

0.033

0.146*

–0.008

0.050

0.130

0.133

0.068 –0.416 0.024

–0.028 0.091 0.782

–0.001 0.104 0.049

–0.081 0.118 –0.156

–0.031

0.004

–0.093

–0.060

–0.058

0.167

0.001

–0.014

–0.042 –0.027

–0.030 0.085*

–0.097

0.169

–0.010

0.046

–0.131*

–0.108 (continued)

Social transnationalism and supranational identifications Table 4.3: Regression of European identification and the difference between European identification and cosmopolitanism of Turkish and Romanian migrants (unstandardised regression coefficients) (continued) European identification Romanian Turkish migrants migrants Migration motives (baseline: work) Education –0.002 0.128 Quality of life –0.016 0.134 Family/love –0.008 0.090 Education (baseline: lower education or less) Intermediary secondary 0.044 0.038 Higher secondary 0.136 0.038 University 0.085 0.168 Economic household situation 0.014 –0.137** (age 14) Economic household situation –0.024 0.118* (currently) Female –0.004 0.220* Age 0.008* 0.004 Duration of stay in CoR –0.013* 0.015* CoR (baseline: living in Denmark) Germany –0.247* 0.432** Italy –0.078 0.124 Romania – 1.723*** Spain –0.106 – United Kingdom –0.126 0.232 Constant 4.697*** 0.984* N 1,110 1,117 Adj. R² 0.033 0.255

European identification – cosmopolitanism Romanian Turkish migrants migrants 0.221 –0.019 0.048

0.113 –0.313 –0.168

–0.308 –0.222 –0.108

–0.041 –0.140 0.077

–0.014

–0.081

–0.067

0.004

–0.049 0.008 –0.011

0.332** 0.005 0.017*

0.032 0.241 – 0.119 0.085 0.414 1,098 0.013

0.500** 0.225 1.048*** – 0.220 –2.140*** 1,112 0.091

Notes: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

country might be more consequential for European identification of EU citizens than for those who do not hold EU citizenship. Identification with Europe is higher for those respondents who subjectively judge that they achieved a substantial improvement of their economic situation since their late childhood. It seems safe to assume that they attribute this improvement to a large extent to the realisation of their migratory project and the opportunities it provided them with. Contrary to Eurobarometer results on general populations but also in contrast to

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findings regarding those moving from EU-15 countries, for Turkish migrants it is actually women who are more likely to identify with Europe. Contrary to what we observed for the Romanians, for the Turkish migrants a longer duration of stay in the CoR has a positive effect. The Turks in Germany, but particularly in Romania, have a higher level of European identification than those in the other countries. Turning to the difference between European identification and cosmopolitanism, for Romanian migrants the only significant effect is discrimination experience. The more discrimination is felt, the weaker European identification becomes relative to general cosmopolitanism. There are no differences in this regard between the different migrant groups. For Turkish migrants, the number of recent trips abroad and the frequency of using social networking sites to communicate with friends and family in their countries all strengthen European versus cosmopolitan orientation. However, in contrast to the Romanians, experience of discrimination has no effect in their case. Turkish women tend more towards European identification than towards cosmopolitanism compared to men. The length of the stay in the CoR works in the same direction. European identification is also stronger than general cosmopolitanism for Turkish migrants in Germany and particularly in Romania compared with the other groups. Romanian attitudes, in contrast to Turkish attitudes, are only to a small degree accounted for by demographic and behavioural variables, as Romanian migrants show high identification with Europe, largely independent of their transnational background and their transnational behaviour. A significant effect of discrimination is only visible for Romanian migrants and indicates that the respective individuals tend to identify less with Europe. This supports the abovementioned interpretation that the negative relation between perceived discrimination within an EU country and European identification is more immediate in the case of EU citizens than for non-EU migrants.

Conclusion For European identification, the demographic and behavioural variables work in partly different ways in the different populations under investigation. The most important transnationalism variables that explain European identification of the national populations as a whole are: a previous sojourn in a non-EU country, recent trips to other EU countries, frequency of communication abroad via telephone or computer, and the consumption of TV content in a foreign language.

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Other significant variables are the current economic situation of the household, gender and age. However, when the national populations are broken down by the individual countries, few of the transnationalism variables remain significant in more than one country, and when they are significant, they have effects in opposite directions. The total explanatory power of the transnational variables can thus be regarded as rather low. Therefore we may conclude that while transnationalism makes a difference, it is a comparatively small one. The United Kingdom is perhaps the only exception in this regard. Significantly, in the country where attachment to Europe is the lowest, transnationalism does indeed make a considerable difference. While the level of European identification of the Romanian migrants is so high that there is only little room for the working of transnational background, behaviour and experiences, this explanation can barely be applied to the other populations. It is also noteworthy that there is no principal divide between nationals and migrants regarding the explanatory power of transnational background, behaviour and experiences. It could have been expected that these variables have a stronger effect for nationals than for migrants, as for the latter they might be less relevant compared to their broader migration experience. We also analysed the balance between European identification and cosmopolitanism, that is, whether respondents identify more with Europe than with the entire world. In the general populations taken together, European identification is boosted over cosmopolitanism by recent trips to other EU countries, by having a partner from another EU country, by having frequent communication abroad by telephone and by the age of the respondent being higher. On the other hand, a general cosmopolitanism becomes stronger than European identification when the respondent has CoR contacts abroad. Again, though, the specific contribution of these variables to the explained variance is low. Moreover, when the analysis is broken down to the six countries individually, none of the transnationalism variables is significant in Denmark and the United Kingdom (education is the only significant variable in the former and gender in the latter). It is in Germany that transnationalism most explains the difference between European identification and a general cosmopolitan stance. While for Romanian migrants only discrimination experience matters, for Turkish migrants the number of recent trips abroad, the frequency of using social networking sites, the length of the stay in the CoR and being a woman all strengthen European over cosmopolitan orientation.

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We may therefore conclude that identification with Europe is not just a variant of a general cosmopolitan attitude, but is in fact partly determined by different variables. At the same time we can conclude that this differentiation between European identification and a general cosmopolitanism is not particularly driven by practices of social transnationalism. References Braun, M., and Müller, W. (2012) ‘National and transnational identities of intra-European migrants’, in F. Höllinger and M. Hadler (eds) Crossing Borders, Shifting Boundaries. National and Transnational Identities in Europe and Beyond. Frankfurt am Main/New York: Campus, 263–287. Brubaker, R. (ed) (1989) Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America. Lanham/Washington, DC: University Press of America/German Marshall Fund of the United States. Brubaker, R., and Cooper, F. (2000) ‘Beyond “identity”’. Theory and Society 29(1): 1–47. Bruter, M. (2005) Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Citrin, J., and Sides, J. (2004) ‘More than nationals: how identity choice matters in the new Europe’, in R. K. Herrmann, T. Risse and M. B. Brewer (eds) Transnational Identities. Becoming European in the EU. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 161–185. De Valk, H. A. G., and Díez Medrano, J. (2014) ‘Guest editorial on meeting and mating across borders: union formation in the European Union single market’. Population, Space and Place 20(2): 103–109. Deutsch, K. W., Burrell, S. A., Kann, R. A., Lee, M. Jr., Lichtermann, M. Lindgren, R. E., Loewenheim, F. L., and van Wagenen, R. W. (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Díez Medrano, J., and Gutiérrez, P. (2001) ‘Nested identities. National and European identity in Spain’. Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies 24(5): 753–778. Dubé, S., and Magni-Berton, R. (2009) ‘How does income influence national and European Identity?’, in D. Fuchs, R. Magni-Berton and A. Rogers (eds) Euroscepticism Images of Europe among Mass Publics and Political Elites. Opladen: Budrich, 73–90. Duchesne, S., and Frognier, A.-P. (2002) ‘Sur les dynamiques sociologiques et politiques de l’identification de l’Europe’. Revue Française de Science Politique 52(4): 355–373.

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Duchesne, S., and Frognier, A.-P. (2008) ‘National and European identifications: a dual relationship’. Comparative European Politics 6(2): 143–168. Fligstein, N. (2008) Euroclash. The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fligstein, N. (2009) ‘Who are the Europeans and how does this matter for politics?’, in J. T. Checkel and P. J. Katzenstein (eds) European Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 136–166. Fuss, D., García Albacete, G. M., and Rodriguez Monter, M. (2004) ‘The role of language skills and foreign country experiences in the development of European identity’. Sociológia 36(3): 273–285. Gerhards, J. (2012) From Babel to Brussels: European Integration and the Importance of Transnational Linguistic Capital. Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin. Glick Schiller, N., Basch, L., and Szanton Blanc, C. (1995) ‘From immigrant to transmigrant: theorizing transnational migration’. Anthropological Quarterly 68(1): 48–63. Guarnizo, L. E. (1998) ‘The rise of transnational social formations: Mexican and Dominican state responses to transnational migration’. Political Power and Social Theory 12(1): 45–94. Itzigsohn, J., Dore Cabral, C., Hernandez Medina, E., and Vazquez, O. (1999) ‘Mapping Dominican transnationalism: narrow and broad transnational practices’. Ethnic and Racial Studies 22(2): 316–339. Jamieson, L., and European Commission (eds) (2005) Orientations of Young Men and Women to Citizenship and European Identity. Youth and European Identity Final Report. https://cordis.europa.eu/docs/ publications/1001/100123871-6_en.pdf. Kuhn, T. (2011) ‘Individual transnationalism, globalisation and Euroscepticism: an empirical test of Deutsch’s transactionalist theory’. European Journal of Political Research 50(6): 811–837. Kuhn, T. (2012) ‘Why educational exchange programmes miss their mark: cross-border mobility, education and European identity’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 50(6): 994–1010. Kuhn, T. (2015) Experiencing European Integration: Transnational Lives and European Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mau, S. (2010) Social Transnationalism: Lifeworlds Beyond the Nation-State. London and New York: Routledge. Mau, S., Mewes, J., and Zimmermann, A. (2008) ‘Cosmopolitan attitudes through transnational social practices?’ Global Networks 8(1): 1–24.

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Portes, A. (1999) ‘Conclusion: towards a new world: the origins and effects of transnational activities’. Ethnic and Racial Studies 22(2): 463–477. Pries, L. (2008) Die Transnationalisierung der Sozialen Welt: Sozialräume jenseits von Nationalgesellschaften. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Quintelier, E., Verhaegen, S., and Hooghe, M. (2014) ‘The intergenerational transmission of European identity: the role of gender and discussion within families’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 52(5): 1103–1119. Risse, T. (2010) ‘A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Sphere. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Schmidt, S., Tenscher, J., and Weber, A. (2003) ‘Mit Herz und Verstand? Zur Akzeptanz des europäischen Integrationsprozesses in der Südpfalz’, in F. Brettschneider, J. van Deth and E. Roller (eds) Europäische Integration in der öffentlichen Meinung. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 83–114. Sigalas, E. (2010) ‘Cross-border mobility and European identity: the effectiveness of intergroup contact during the ERASMUS year abroad’. European Union Politics 11(2): 241–265. Smith, R. C. (1998) ‘Transnational localities. Community, technology and the politics of membership within the context of Mexico and U.S. migration’, in M. P. Smith and L. E. Guarnizo (eds) Transnationalism from Below. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 196–240. Teney, C., Hanquinet, L., and Bürkin, K. (2016) ‘Feeling European: an exploration of ethnic disparities among immigrants’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 42(13): 2182–2204.

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FIVE

Explaining supranational solidarity Juan Díez Medrano, Irina Ciornei and Fulya Apaydin

Introduction The 2008 financial crisis highlighted the European Union’s enormous regional and national economic inequalities. It also revealed significant social distance between the citizens of different European Union member states and the persistence of national stereotypes. This prompted a shift from exclusive attention to European identification to a new focus on European solidarity. This chapter is motivated by that interest. Pan-European solidarity guided integration efforts since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 (Sangiovanni 2013). More recently, the Treaty of Maastricht and the Lisbon Treaty situated solidarity as one of the European Union’s central objectives. The latter, in particular, includes a solidarity clause (article 222), according to which ‘The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster’. The practical instantiation of this solidarity clause, the EU Solidarity Fund, is just one of several institutions, including the structural and cohesion funds, through which the European Union has pursued this objective over the years. Intergovernmental conflict and the mobilisation of nationalist sentiment that has followed the fiscal and debt crisis of several EU member states can in fact be traced to legal and policy debate on how to render these principles, institutions and policies compatible with the strict fiscal requirements of the monetary union’s Stability Pact and article 125 of the Lisbon Treaty (the so-called no bailout clause) according to which: The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to

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mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. We explore the extent to which the European citizens’ attitudes to solidarity mirror the institutional and policy framework and the individual variables that lead to more solidarity among some citizens than among others. As in the rest of the book, we pay special attention to the potential role of transnational background, experience, skills and practices in explaining the degree of solidarity that EU citizens exhibit.

Understanding solidarity: existing approaches In his seminal work, The Division of Labour in Society, Durkheim (2014) treats solidarity as a collective property: the capacity that a group displays to achieve things. Solidarity can stem from sharing values and worldviews (mechanical solidarity) or from interdependence (organic solidarity). While Durkheim emphasises the role of structures and institutions in creating and sustaining solidarity, authors who have translated the concept to the individual level have emphasised socio-psychological factors or else borrowed from ordinary language to emphasise behavioural traits that are only loosely connected to Durkheim’s original conceptualisation. Those who emphasise sociopsychological factors equate solidarity with positive affect, as expressed in sympathy, trust, a feeling of closeness and of direct connection, and mutual commitment (Wheeless 1978; Houtepen and Meulen 2000; Calhoun 2002; Molm et al 2007; Kuwabara and Sheldon 2012). Those who emphasise behaviour equate solidarity to treating others as part of the group, to cooperation, to concern for the wellbeing of others (Van Oorshot 2006) and to the act of assisting others (Fernández-Alonso and Jaime-Castillo 2016). This accent on assistance and sometimes redistributive behaviour characterises the European Union’s dominant use of the term and our own definition in this chapter (for an even more complex definition, see Bayertz 1999). One can speculate that emphasis on helping behaviour is rooted in subtle semantic differences in the definition of solidarity across languages. We have checked for the meaning of the term solidarity as defined in major language dictionaries in the countries that participate

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in EUCROSS. Whereas in English, Turkish, German and Danish the primary connotation of solidarity is that of a feeling of unity, of community, of connection to others, of cooperation and unconditional staying with other group members, in Latin languages the concept’s primary connotation – when used as an individual personality trait – is that of assisting others, mainly group members (as in French and Italian), but also people who do not belong to the group (as in Spanish). These subtle linguistic differences in the relative emphasis placed on closeness and helping behaviour in Anglo-Saxon and nonAnglo-Saxon countries has been overlooked and much of the scientific literature concerned with individual variation in levels of solidarity focuses mainly on the first understanding – solidarity as closeness. The two strands of scholarship on solidarity described above are relevant to this article because the explanation of group attachment and of what holds a group together (first understanding of solidarity) goes a long way toward predicting helping behaviour (second understanding of solidarity). There is indeed ample evidence showing that people subjectively privilege members of their group over out-group members (eg Tajfel and Turner 1979; Bohnet and Frey 1999; Goette et al 2006; Chen and Li 2009). National identification, in particular, creates sympathy and trust toward co-nationals and is especially relevant to the explanation of support for redistributive policies when the redistributive goal conflicts with self-interest (Miller 1995; 2006). Johnston and co-authors (2010), for instance, show that the strength of a person’s national identification is positively related to support for redistribution among high-income earners. We build on this literature to check the validity of the expectation that European identification is positively associated with the importance that individuals assign to European Union solidarity and to their predisposition to help other European Union countries and their populations. Closely connected to this is the expectation that the stronger the commitment to European Union values (that is, commitment to the EU’s political constitution [Calhoun 2002]), the stronger the bonds to other European Union member states and citizens, and the greater people’s predisposition to help one another. While solidarity usually refers to a group or to behaviour toward one’s group members, we call attention again to the fact that in some languages (such as Spanish) solidarity implies helping people who are not necessarily considered as in-group members. To behave in this fashion requires some degree of universalism from individuals, predicated on a belief in the equal worth of all human beings and an appreciation of human diversity. The term ‘cosmopolitanism’

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encapsulates these beliefs and attitudes (for general overviews, see Vertovec and Cohen 2003; Delanty 2012). The attribute of cosmopolitan has been used to describe individuals (eg Szerszynski and Urry 2002), places (eg Rumford 2014) and political projects (eg Beck 2006), drawing indistinctly from definitions and uses found among the Greek classics and the Enlightenment philosophers. The most demanding definitions include solidarity (eg Calhoun 2002) and an aspiration to cosmopolitan forms of government (Held 1995; Kaldor 1999) to the range of attributes describing cosmopolitanism. Our analysis below is thus built on the expectation that people with a cosmopolitan outlook attach more importance to European solidarity and express more solidarity with foreign European member states and citizens than people lacking a cosmopolitan outlook. A proper understanding of solidarity – defined as people’s willingness to help others – requires a careful consideration of its manifestation in political discourse and alignments. Solidarity, especially collective solidarity (welfare institutions instead of individual charity), has historically been linked to political programmes of the Left dating back to the French Revolution and to the Jacobins’ emphasis on fraternité. The achievement of international class solidarity, understood as group feeling, transnational cooperation and mutual assistance between workers, was also a driving force behind the founding of the International Workingmen’s Associations in 1864. Because of this, one would expect people with leftist political orientations to express stronger solidarity than do people with more conservative political views. In fact, studies find a consistent and stable relationship between leftist attitudes, such as supporting a strong role for the state in social and economic matters or adherence to the value of equality, and support for redistributive policies (Shaw and Shapiro 2005; Van Oorschot 2006; Mau and Veghte 2007; Shapiro 2009; Kulin and Svallfors 2013). Scholars have also highlighted the role of interpersonal and intergroup exchange in fostering solidarity. Some emphasise that interpersonal and intergroup exchanges increase group cohesion and solidarity (Kuwabara and Sheldon 2012; Leider et al 2012; BrañasGarza et  al 2010; Goeree et  al 2010; Apicella et  al 2012). Others emphasise the contribution of interpersonal and intergroup exchange to the development of trust and expectations of reciprocity, which in turn lead to greater cooperation within groups (Baldassarri and Abascal 2015). For instance, Goerres and Tepe (2010) find that older people’s support for public childcare programmes, which do not benefit them directly, increases with the frequency and intensity with which they

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interact with younger members in their family. By extrapolating these authors’ findings, one can draw the expectation that those who have interacted frequently with people from other European countries and whose states have benefited from European Union structural funds are readier to support other European countries and populations in case of need. Although the EUCROSS survey compiled extensive and unique information on transnational activities and experience, it did not ask respondents about the nature and extent of their transnational interpersonal exchanges or about reciprocal helping behaviour. The statistical analysis below thus provides information on the net associations between transnational background, experience, skills and practices in all their diversity and individual solidarity, where trustgenerating, reciprocity-enhancing activity and transnational helping behaviour coexist with superficial forms of interaction between people from different countries that should not have a significant impact on individual attitudes of solidarity toward other European countries and their populations. The impact of the variables discussed above can be evaluated against that of self-interest. A large majority of the models of attitudes and behaviour in economics and political science rests on the assumption of self-interested individuals. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Iversen and Soskice (2001) find that self-interest is an important predictor of support of welfare provision and redistributive policies in general. When people experience some economic setback (such as losing a job) they become more supportive of welfare policies that might benefit them (Margalit 2013; Nauman et al 2016), whether they live under a liberal (for example, US) or a universalistic (for example, Netherlands) welfare state regime. The permanence of these attitudinal shifts as individuals recover economically remains disputed, however. Whereas Margalit found that they are transitory, Nauman and colleagues showed that they are permanent within the duration of their research project. Other studies in this tradition have focused on attitudes to intergenerational transfers through welfare state institutions. This research reveals that old people or people who perceive that their standard of living may suffer when they retire are more supportive of generous pension schemes (Prinzen 2015). While state-of-the art panel studies (eg Margalit 2013; Nauman et al 2016) provide conclusive evidence for the impact of self-interest in short-term changes in attitudes to welfare policy, panel studies are more the exception than the rule. Cross-sectional studies, which suffer from problems of internal validity, and experiments, which suffer from problems of external validity, are far from being conclusive as to

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the role of self-interest in explaining normal or long-term levels of support for welfare policy and long-term levels of individual solidarity (eg Taylor-Gooby 2001; Lynch and Myrskyla 2009). This becomes evident in research on the role of ethnic heterogeneity in explaining support for welfare state expenditures and policies. Based on the assumptions of in-group favouritism and collective self-interest, the literature has assumed that increasing ethnic heterogeneity should lead to a decrease in welfare state support (eg Luttmer 2001; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Collier 2013). The most ambitious test of this hypothesis to date, however, based on comparing more than 90 societies through two major cross-sectional surveys, fails to empirically support this assumption (Steele 2016; see also Brady and Finnigan 2014; Gisselquist 2014). In fact, recent studies suggest that ethnic diversity does not always lead to poor or ineffective redistributive regimes (Singh and vom Hau 2016). Other research findings, although generally consistent with the expectations of a self-interest approach, are also amenable to alternative explanations. The study of the relationship between social class and preferences for redistribution or welfare state policies is a case in point. A self-interest perspective leads to the expectation that the lower classes are more supportive of redistributive schemes and welfare state policies than are other social groups, especially with respect to those that benefit the lower classes exclusively. Small group research on donating behaviour and other experimental studies suggest, however, that it is not self-interest but more compassionate predispositions and greater altruism that leads underprivileged groups in society to display more solidarity attitudes (eg Piff et al 2010; Nan et al 2014). In a recent study, Singh (2016) reaches a similar conclusion. Based on a subnational comparison of Indian states, he finds that communal cohesion and shared affective bonds – rather than calculated selfinterest of individuals – is at the root of inclusive and progressive welfare regimes. The literature discussed above mainly concerns theories that simply stress the individual propensities or characteristics of those susceptible of being solidary. However, a small number of publications focus on the role of the potential recipients’ characteristics and on the role of frames. León (2013), for instance, aligns with supporters of a theoretical alternative to the self-interest approach to behaviour that emphasises reciprocity motivations to stress instead that helping behaviour is more likely when the recipient is deemed ‘deserving’. A homo reciprocans approach to individual solidarity thus sees potential donors evaluating the potential recipients’ previous contributions and socially valued work as well as their degree of responsibility for their

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needy situation (León 2013, 200). These perceptions are of course associated with self-interest, to the extent that they rationalise the implications for objective or perceived group membership (Bowles and Gintis 2000) and to political orientations (Fong 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). They deserve to be treated as a separate influence on individual solidarity, however, not the least because of the role that media and other public institutions can play in framing the other as more or less deserving. As we show below, the media in different European countries have framed the debt crisis in dramatically different ways, thus potentially contributing to national differences in average levels of individual solidarity. In the sections that follow we use original data from the EUCROSS survey to examine levels of individual European solidarity in the six countries. Our analysis evaluates the different contributions of European identification, cosmopolitan values, transnational background, experience, skills and practices, political orientations and self-interest to the explanation of variation in individual solidarity.

Solidarity in the European Union The EUCROSS dataset (Recchi et al 2016) includes three measures that help gauge the extent of solidarity toward other countries and their populations. One can best capture solidarity in action by examining a community’s capacity to set goals for itself and to pursue these goals effectively, and by analysing the community’s and the citizens’ level of attention to its members’ needs. It would be wrong to portray the European Union as lacking solidarity. EU institutions, the member states and the latter’s taxpayers have in fact displayed an enormous and historically unique level of solidarity toward its weakest member states and regions, in the form of structural and cohesion funds. Spaniards, the greatest beneficiaries by far, have been quite aware of and grateful for this assistance (Díez Medrano 2003). Some may look elsewhere for signs of lack of solidarity, however. They may, on the one hand, point out the cacophony that nowadays paralyses the European Union’s leading institutions at both the planning and execution levels. They can also attribute the redistributive policies’ long-term failure to reduce regional inequalities to insufficient generosity on the part of the European Union’s member states. Finally, they may point out, as they have done recently, that when the European Union was really put to a test, as since the 2008 financial and economic crisis, its more economically developed member states and its citizens emerged as merciless, dogmatic and nationalist. Those criticised may in turn react by accusing debtor

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nations of deceit and irresponsibility, of sacrificing the European Union’s collective wellbeing through selfish economic policies. The examples above for the most part measure solidarity in the aggregate. In democratic regimes, however, aggregate solidarity reflects in part the citizens’ attitudes and behaviour. Thus, the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 partly owed to the mobilisation of thousands of citizens shocked by the destruction caused by two world wars. Similarly, rapid progress toward integration between 1957 and 1992 owed largely to what has been labelled the ‘permissive consensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009) – the citizens’ tacit support for what the European Community’s leaders undertook during this period. Finally, one cannot fully understand the current European Union crisis without invoking the European Union citizens’ rejection of recent plans for more integration, their reluctance to bail out countries in economic need, or even, as in Brexit, their willingness to leave the European Union. The interpretation of citizens’ behaviour in the instances just mentioned, however, is not straightforward. While it surely reflects lack of solidarity, it also reflects the influence of other factors, such as dissatisfaction with national policies, frustration with economic conditions, or complex notions of justice (as in the German citizens’ positions on the bailout of the Southern crisis states). For a better understanding of European solidarity at the individual level we need measures specifically developed to gauge them. This, of course, raises new challenges, both conceptual and methodological (Gerhards et al 2018; Genschel and Hemerijck 2018). The main new challenge is to adequately infer actual solidarity from attitudinal and intentional indicators. The positive normative connotation of the term means that the results presented below very likely exaggerate the citizens’ actual level of solidarity. At the same time, however, the systematic analysis of survey answers to questions that bear directly on solidarity allows for unveiling group differences and causal factors underlying these differences. In particular, it helps determine the impact of transnational experience and activities on solidarity. The EUCROSS survey measures solidarity through three indicators that tap the dimension of solidarity that has attracted greatest attention in the context of the 2008 financial and economic crisis: citizens’ willingness to help people from EU member states other than their own. The questions on which these indicators are based confront respondents with both hypothetical and concrete dilemmas, all of them in connection to the EU’s actual goals. The first question is worded as follows: ‘The European Union has various aims. On a scale from one to five, where one means “not at all important” and five means “very

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Explaining supranational solidarity

important”, please tell me for each of them how important they are from your point of view.’ Heading the list is the sentence ‘Solidarity between the peoples in the EU’. The second solidarity question describes a hypothetical situation that could affect either a region in the respondents’ own country or another European Union member state. It reads as follows: Imagine that another [country’s relevant administrative district or region] was struck by a natural disaster. Who do you think should make financial contributions to its reconstruction? Now please imagine that another member state of the European Union was struck by a natural disaster. Who do you think should make financial contributions to its reconstruction? In both cases, the answer options are ‘Only the respective [country’s relevant administrative district or region][country]’, ‘[Country of Residence][All member states of the European Union]’ and ‘Don’t know’. The third question directly refers to the European Union’s financial crisis. It reads as follows: ‘The EU member states are currently pooling national state funds to help EU countries having difficulties in paying their debts. On a scale from one to five, where one means “strongly disagree” and five means “strongly agree”: Please tell me how much you agree with this measure.’ As expected, respondents in the six countries express a moderately high degree of individual solidarity towards EU member states other than their own, whether we examine results based on the whole sample or we focus on the chapter’s working sample with valid cases for all variables. The average level in all countries but the United Kingdom stands at four or above, which means that, on average, respondents think that it is important or very important for the EU to aim at achieving solidarity between the peoples of the European Union. Even in the United Kingdom, the average value for answers to this question is high, at 3.77 in the total sample and 3.81 in the working sample. Standard statistical measures of dispersion also show that there is a relatively high consensus around this question in all countries. The answers to the hypothetical natural disaster scenario are consistent with the view conveyed by those to the first solidarity question. In all countries more than 80% of the respondents consider that it would be up to member states of the European Union to

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Everyday Europe Table 5.1: Average levels of individual solidarity for working and total samples Denmark

Germany

Italy

Romania

Spain

United Kingdom

4.01 (0.04)

4.41 (0.03)

4.61 (0.04)

4.36 (0.06)

4.59 (0.04)

3.81 (0.06)

Solidarity_debt

3.20 (0.05)

3.05 (0.05)

4.08 (0.05)

3.52 (0.07)

4.18 (0.05)

3.18 (0.06)

Solidarity_disaster

0.90 (0.01)

0.87 (0.01)

0.95 (0.01)

0.92 (0.01)

0.93 (0.01)

0.81 (0.02)

713

641

723

635

707

528

4.04 (0.04)

4.35 (0.03)

4.61 (0.03)

4.39 (0.05)

4.57 (0.03)

3.77 (0.05)

Solidarity_debt

3.19 (0.05)

2.95 (0.04)

4.04 (0.05)

3.59 (0.06)

4.16 (0.04)

3.12 (0.06)

Solidarity_disaster

0.80 (0.01)

0.85 (0.01)

0.94 (0.01)

0.92 (0.01)

0.93 (0.01)

0.81 (0.02)

852

867

891

885

873

765

Working sample: Solidarity_aim

N = 3,947 Total sample: Solidarity_aim

N = 5,133

Notes: As in all other models, we use weights to obtain the estimates. Working sample: Sample that only includes cases with valid answers for all items included in the statistical analyses performed for the chapter (see Tables 5.1 to 5.6). Total sample: Sample that includes cases with valid answers for all three solidarity items only. See text for definitions of the three solidarity indicators. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

financially contribute to the reconstruction of a country hit by a natural disaster. When confronted with the more realistic dilemma concerning how to address the debt problems of some of the European Union member states, respondents express less solidarity. Average values reflect the debtor or creditor status of their respective countries. In creditor countries, or at least in the four countries not affected by the exorbitant debt and related financial problems, respondents appear – on average – undecided on whether to pool national state funds to help countries that have run into difficulties. This is especially the case in Germany – of the six countries, the one most invested in lending to Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy. Spain and Italy are the only two countries where, on average, respondents agree or strongly agree that the EU member states should pool national state funds to help those countries in need.

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Explaining supranational solidarity

The analysis above offers contradictory information regarding the prevalence of solidarity in the countries that feature in this book. Respondents appear to have more solidarity when asked about their EU policy views or about what they think one should do if a European Union member state were to face a natural disaster than when asked about what to do about the countries most affected by the 2008 financial and economic crisis. Agreement between the respondents of different countries is also greater with respect to the first two questions than with respect to the last one. Finally, the answers to the three questions convey contradictory images as to the prevalence of attitudes to solidarity in the six different countries under study. Whereas the answers to the first two questions suggest that European solidarity is less prevalent in the United Kingdom than in the rest of the countries, the answers to the last one suggest that it is in Germany that citizens express less solidarity. Contradictory results such as those described are common in survey research. They reflect that the indicators used are not perfectly valid measures of the concepts being analysed or that they measure different dimensions of these constructs. In addition to this, answers to attitudinal questions, even when carefully worded and pre-tested, are likely to contain some random measurement error: respondents are often unprepared to give a well-thought-out answer on the spot, may be distracted at the moment the question is asked, or may find it difficult to rate their views along the proposed range of answers. This measurement error can compromise conclusions regarding the prevalence of particular views in the population and group comparisons. In some cases, complex statistical methods allow us to address these problems so as to strengthen descriptive and analytical conclusions. These methods generally build on careful definitions of the concept being analysed and on the observed correlations between items that presumably measure the same or different dimensions of the same concept (that is, confirmatory factor analysis). We applied these methods to the solidarity items above, but the correlation between them is not strong enough to warrant treating them as measures of one single concept. An even bigger source of concern is that although the questions are generally well understood, confirmatory factor analysis suggests that they are not interpreted in exactly the same way in the six different countries under study. There is no good reason, however, to privilege one or another question as a measure of individual solidarity. All three tap into solidarity but answers may also be influenced by other factors. At the same time, as discussed above, it is probably illusory to treat solidarity as a rigid value or personal trait, unaffected

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by the special circumstances that elicit it. Because of this, the rest of the analysis, which focuses on intergroup comparisons and on the role of different factors in explaining individual variation in solidarity attitudes, treats each of the solidarity questions separately. We proceed in this way, fully aware that the results are only provisional and contain some contradictions. Transnational background, experiences, practices and individual solidarity This book discusses the transformative power of transnational background, experiences and practices, including mobility across European countries. Transnational lives are only modestly associated with greater solidarity, however. We have reached this conclusion after fitting statistical models that control for sociodemographic variables and replicated models for each country in the study and for each solidarity variable separately. Taking advantage of the survey questionnaire’s rich and detailed content, we have distinguished transnational background, experiences and practices that are European from non-European ones (respondents’ birth place, parents’ birth place, transnational education, familiarity with other countries, residence abroad, trips abroad, transnational networks, transnational communication, foreign language skills, participation in transnational organisations, transnational viewing habits, property in other countries). In most cases, the associations we observe between transnational variables and solidarity are weak and likely to be due to chance alone. When statistically significant, the sign of the observed associations sometimes contradicts theoretical expectations. Generally speaking, the transnational dimension adds little to an explanation of individual solidarity. For illustrative purposes, we report models for each indicator of solidarity, using stepwise regression methods while controlling for the respondents’ sociodemographic background. Having foreign parents, having foreign contacts abroad and watching international sports programmes are the only relevant variables and then only when connected to the importance given to the EU goal of solidarity. Table 5.2 shows that the importance respondents assign to the EU for promoting solidarity among the peoples of Europe is greater for those who have a foreign-born parent. It is also greater when the frequency of foreign contacts is high and among people who like to watch international sports programmes. When one compares the percentage of variance explained by models that include only the country of residence and sociodemographic

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Explaining supranational solidarity Table 5.2: Transnational background, experience, skills, and practices and individual solidarity (OLS multiple regression) Financial solidarity

Solidarity aim

Solidarity in case of disaster

Gender (female) 0.117** Age 0.003* R’s education 0.029* Wellbeing growing up 0.029 Father’s education –0.007 Mother’s education 0.014 Current wellbeing 0.025 Has a foreign parent 0.158*

(0.041) –0.034 (0.002) 0.001 (0.014) 0.076*** (0.023) 0.011 (0.020) –0.005 (0.023) 0.019 (0.019) 0.038 (0.080) 0.069

(0.051) 0.006 (0.002) 0.003*** (0.019) 0.002 (0.029) 0.002 (0.024) 0.016** (0.027) –0.002 (0.023) 0.000 (0.097) –0.011

(0.013) (0.001) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.029)

Is familiar with one of the three crisis countries

0.008

(0.054)

0.035

(0.071) –0.010

(0.019)

Number of countries where R has foreign contacts

0.059*

(0.026)

0.019

(0.035)

0.008

(0.010)

Frequency of mail correspondence with people in foreign countries

0.007

(0.020)

0.014

(0.027) –0.000

(0.008)

Frequency of watching international sports on TV

0.039*

(0.016) –0.001

(0.020)

(0.005)

0.008

Frequency watching –0.009 (0.015) –0.023 (0.021) –0.008 (0.005) film in OV Nationality (baseline: Danes) Germans 0.377*** (0.060) –0.101 (0.080) –0.016 (0.021) Italians 0.603*** (0.065) 0.978*** (0.085) 0.076*** (0.020) Romanians 0.355*** (0.076) 0.415*** (0.095) 0.050* (0.021) Spaniards 0.578*** (0.066) 1.085*** (0.083) 0.060** (0.021) British –0.265** (0.081) –0.009 (0.093) –0.070** (0.026) Constant 3.466*** (0.158) 2.717*** (0.196) 0.710*** (0.057) N 3,947 3,947 3,947 R2 0.107 0.151 0.045 Notes: See text for definitions of the three solidarity indicators. See Appendix for the definition of the different independent variables. * Significant at the 0.05 level, two-tailed; ** Significant at the 0.01 level, two-tailed; *** Significant at the 0.001 level, two-tailed. Percentage of variance explained by models with only country of residence and sociodemographic variables: Aim: 9.7%; Debt: 14.9%; Disaster: 4.2%. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

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variables (Aim: 9.5%; Debt: 14.4%; Disaster: 4.4%) with that for the models that add the transnational ones (Aim: 10.2%; Debt: 14.8%; Disaster: 4.7%), one sees that transnational variables hardly increase the explanatory power of the models. While more precise measures of transnational interaction, including information on the quality of interpersonal exchanges and the frequency and intensity of transnational reciprocal interpersonal assistance might show stronger effects, the findings above suggest that transnational background, experiences and practices are not broadly relevant to the explanation of individual solidarity. These results can be compared to those obtained by Ciornei and Recchi (2017) based on Eurobarometer data for 2007 and a different set of measures for both transnational practices and solidarity. Their multilevel analysis reveals that transnational practices do not display the expected association with the importance that people attach to EU programmes to help the poor and socially excluded but that people with deep transnational experiences are more likely to support Eurobonds, especially if they hold egalitarian values. Lack of consistency in the results, across both datasets and indicators, invites more effort to measure EU solidarity, including qualitative testing of the meaning that different indicators have for respondents. It also suggests that current measures of transnational practices do not fully capture the complexity of these practices and of their meaning to those who engage in them. European identification, progressive attitudes, tolerance and selfinterest The EUCROSS survey data reveal that individual solidarity attitudes are strongly associated to feeling of membership in a group, progressive views, a cosmopolitan outlook reflected in tolerance and self-interest. What follows examines the associations between each of these factors and individual solidarity sequentially. Needless to say, the crosssectional character of the dataset makes it very difficult to unpack the complex causal structure underlying these relationships. The results must thus be read only as being consistent or not with the theoretical arguments outlined above. European identification Both national definitions of solidarity and the academic literature tend to treat solidarity as a group property. This follows logically from conceptualisations of solidarity that make it almost synonymous with

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Explaining supranational solidarity

cohesion or with a group’s capacity to set and carry out collective goals. As discussed above, implicit in all definitions of the word ‘solidarity’ is the assumption that in-group members deserve more or are more likely to receive help than are out-group members. Whether people show solidarity with others will thus depend in part on whether these ‘others’ are seen as part of one’s group. And this in turn depends on one’s group identification. If I define myself as European, then I will see people from European states other than mine as part of my group, whereas if I define myself only as French, I will see people from European states other than France as not part of my group, and I will therefore be less likely to contribute to their welfare. The reasoning above leads to the expectation that people who identify themselves as European display more solidarity with other Europeans than people who do not identify themselves as European. The EUCROSS survey questionnaire asked respondents different questions related to their geopolitical identification. One battery of questions asked them to indicate on a scale from 1 to 5 how strongly they agreed with statements of the form ‘I feel  …’, referring to the respondents’ city of residence, region of residence, country of residence, Europe and the world (that is, citizen of the world), in that order. Another series of questions asked respondents to compare their level of identification as citizens of their region, country of residence and country of birth with their level of identification as Europeans. Closely related to European identification is the concept of identification with the European Union, that is, support for the European Union and the values and goals the European Union pursues. Cram and Bruter call this form of identification ‘Identification with’ and ‘Civic identification’, respectively, which they differentiate from ‘Identification as’ and ‘Cultural identification’, as captured by the questions in the previous paragraph (Bruter 2004; Cram 2012). Just as we expect people who identify as ‘European’ to exhibit more solidarity with citizens from EU member states than do those who do not identify as European, we also expect that people who identify with ‘the European Union’ and the values and aims it represents to exhibit more solidarity with citizens from EU member states than those who do not identify with the European Union’s values and aims. The EUCROSS data consistently show an association between European identification and attitudes of solidarity, both across items and across countries. It is in fact the most important predictor of individual solidarity. As Table 5.3 shows, the higher respondents score on the various indicators of European identification (identification as European; identification with different EU aims; and identification

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with the EU) the greater the importance they assign to the goal of solidarity among the peoples of Europe, the more they agree that the EU as a whole should help in a country’s reconstruction efforts after a natural catastrophe, and the more they agree that European member states should pool national resources to help the countries affected by the debt crisis. Cosmopolitan mindset Our findings so far demonstrate that individual solidarity is unrelated to gross measures of transnational background and practices and is, in fact, related to European identification. The EUCROSS questionnaire also includes several questions touching upon what one would define as a cosmopolitan outlook: on people’s musical and food tastes, on their identification as citizens of the world, and on their tolerance to culturally different groups. All of them relate in consistent ways to the three indicators of individual solidarity, although only the coefficients for identification as citizen of the world and for tolerance of diversity are statistically significant for all three indicators of solidarity (Table 5.4). Progressive attitudes The EUCROSS questionnaire includes a left–right self-placement scale with which one can test this hypothesis. The statistical results presented in Table 5.5 are generally consistent with expectations. The more to the right people define themselves as being, the less solidarity they feel. The coefficient for the indicator of left–right self-placement fails to reach statistical significance only with respect to the importance attached to the aim of EU solidarity. Self-interest As discussed above, research in economics and political science places self-interest at the centre of explanations of individual behaviour. This study includes six different countries, with different levels of economic development, and therefore with varying capacity to confront economic challenges. In the face of a crisis in another European Union member state, wealthier countries command greater resources to help those in need than do poorer ones. When asked whether efforts should be made to increase pan-European solidarity, or whether countries affected by a natural disaster or a major financial crisis should be left

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Explaining supranational solidarity Table 5.3: European identification and individual solidarity (OLS multiple regression) Solidarity aim Gender (female)

Financial solidarity

Solidarity in case of disaster

0.063

(0.033) –0.014

(0.046)

0.004

Age

–0.000

(0.001) –0.004

(0.002)

0.002*** (0.001)

R’s education

–0.005

(0.013)

0.042*

(0.018) –0.004

(0.005)

0.014

(0.020)

0.004

(0.026)

0.002

(0.007)

(0.017) –0.013

(0.021)

0.015**

(0.006)

Wellbeing growing up

(0.013)

Father’s education

–0.019

Mother’s education

0.009

(0.019)

0.008

(0.024) –0.004

(0.007)

Current wellbeing

0.013

(0.016)

0.019

(0.022) –0.002

(0.006)

Feels European

0.085*** (0.017)

0.056*

(0.022)

0.001

(0.006)

Agrees with democracy aim

0.387*** (0.039)

0.084

(0.046)

0.026

(0.013)

Agrees with economic stability aim

0.161*** (0.030)

0.049

(0.034) –0.003

(0.009)

Agrees with right to work aim

0.121*** (0.030)

0.063

(0.032)

0.018

(0.010)

Agrees with common currency

0.063*** (0.017)

0.136*** (0.023)

0.015*

(0.006)

Relief if EU dissolved –0.086** (1–3) Nationality (baseline: Danes)

(0.032) –0.414*** (0.044) –0.068*** (0.014)

Germans

0.140**

Italians

0.223*** (0.063)

Romanians

0.120

Spaniards

0.258*** (0.062)

British Constant N R2

(0.053) –0.444*** (0.072) –0.071** 0.495*** (0.085) –0.002

(0.067) –0.015

–0.051 (0.064) 0.655** (0.224) 3,947 0.372

(0.022) (0.023)

(0.094) –0.010

(0.024)

0.613*** (0.081) –0.011

(0.023)

0.135 (0.076) –0.061** (0.023) 2.387*** (0.280) 0.654*** (0.085) 3,947 3,947 0.268 0.089

Notes: See text for definitions of the three solidarity indicators. See Appendix for the definition of the different independent variables. * Statistically significant at 0.05 level, two-tailed; ** Significant at the 0.01 level, twotailed; *** Significant at the 0.001 level, two-tailed. Percentage of variance explained by models with only country of residence and sociodemographic variables: Aim: 9.7%; Debt: 14.9%; Disaster: 4.2%. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

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Everyday Europe

Table 5.4: Cosmopolitan mindset and individual solidarity (OLS multiple regression) Financial solidarity

Solidarity aim

Solidarity in case of disaster

Gender (female)

0.067

(0.037) –0.063

(0.048) –0.004

Age

0.004*

(0.001)

0.001

(0.002)

–0.005

(0.014)

0.049**

(0.019) –0.004

(0.005)

0.019

(0.023)

0.007

(0.028)

0.001

(0.007)

0.017**

(0.006)

R’s education Wellbeing growing up

(0.013)

0.003*** (0.001)

Father’s education

–0.006

(0.019) –0.001

(0.023)

Mother’s education

0.012

(0.022)

0.013

(0.026) –0.003

(0.007)

Current wellbeing

0.020

(0.018)

0.035

(0.023) –0.000

(0.006)

Degree of identification as world citizen

0.069*** (0.016)

0.102*** (0.020)

0.016**

(0.005)

Number of music genres liked

0.026*

(0.012)

0.016

(0.015)

0.006

(0.004)

Number of national cuisines liked

0.051**

(0.020) –0.048

(0.027)

0.007

(0.007)

Ethnic variety a good thing

0.201*** (0.020)

0.194*** (0.025)

Does not deplore invasion by foreign 0.040* (0.017) 0.056** products Nationality (baseline: Danes) Germans 0.252*** (0.057) –0.218**

(0.022)

0.032*** (0.007)

0.009

(0.072) –0.046*

(0.005)

(0.020)

Italians

0.442*** (0.061)

0.739*** (0.076)

0.038*

(0.019)

Romanians

0.308*** (0.074)

0.295**

(0.090)

0.038

(0.020)

Spaniards

0.405*** (0.062)

0.842*** (0.077)

0.019

(0.020)

British Constant N R2

–0.408*** (0.074) –0.178* (0.081) –0.109*** (0.024) 2.348*** (0.185) 1.516*** (0.228) 0.479*** (0.068) 3,947 3,947 3,947 0.177 0.198 0.067

Notes: See text for definitions of the three solidarity indicators. See Appendix for the definition of the different independent variables. * Significant at 0.05 level; ** Significant at the 0.01 level, two-tailed; *** Significant at the 0.001 level, two-tailed. Percentage of variance explained by models with only country of residence and sociodemographic variables: Aim: 9.7%; Debt: 14.9%; Disaster: 4.2%. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

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Explaining supranational solidarity Table 5.5: Political self-placement and individual solidarity (OLS multiple regression) Solidarity aim Gender (female) 0.088* (0.039) Age 0.002 (0.002) R’s education 0.030* (0.015) Wellbeing growing up 0.031 (0.024) Father’s education –0.004 (0.020) Mother’s education 0.018 (0.023) Current wellbeing 0.017 (0.019) Centre left 0.065 (0.057) Centre –0.086 (0.064) Centre right –0.102 (0.066) Right –0.128 (0.086) L–R does not exist –0.053 (0.085) DK ideology –0.001 (0.079) Nationality (baseline: Danes) Germans 0.367*** (0.059) Italians 0.579*** (0.062) Romanians 0.354*** (0.076) Spaniards 0.579*** (0.062) British –0.250** (0.076) Constant 3.619*** (0.161) N 3,947 R2 0.102

Financial solidarity –0.041 (0.049) –0.000 (0.002) 0.068*** (0.019) 0.013 (0.029) 0.002 (0.024) 0.017 (0.027) 0.028 (0.023) –0.044 (0.079) –0.218** (0.084) –0.330*** (0.088) –0.487*** (0.117) –0.415*** (0.115) –0.168 (0.107)

Solidarity in case of disaster 0.002 (0.013) 0.002*** (0.001) –0.001 (0.005) 0.004 (0.007) 0.018** (0.006) –0.003 (0.008) –0.003 (0.006) 0.026 (0.016) –0.045* (0.021) –0.058** (0.022) –0.118*** (0.031) –0.061* (0.028) –0.053* (0.027)

–0.178* (0.076) –0.041* (0.020) 0.926*** (0.078) 0.058** (0.019) 0.390*** (0.095) 0.056** (0.021) 1.015*** (0.077) 0.042* (0.020) –0.045 (0.086) –0.088*** (0.024) 3.010*** (0.200) 0.774*** (0.056) 3,947 3,947 0.163 0.058

Notes: See text for definitions of the three solidarity indicators. See Appendix for the definition of the different independent variables. * Statistically significant at 0.05 level; ** Significant at the 0.01 level, two-tailed; *** Significant at the 0.001 level, two-tailed. Percentage of variance explained by models with only country of residence and sociodemographic variables: Aim: 9.7%; Debt: 14.9%; Disaster: 4.2%. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

to confront the challenge on their own or should be assisted by other EU member states, we expect individuals in economically vulnerable countries to be more supportive of pan-European solutions. Our intuition behind this is motivated by an imagined affinity among these individuals: people living in unstable economic environments may be more likely to put themselves in the position of the population of a country that has suffered a major economic setback. As discussed, earlier studies on the relationship between self-interest and attitude towards welfare also reveal less privileged groups to be more compassionate than more privileged groups. This observation

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leads us to expect that the respondents from the poorest countries in our sample will express more individual solidarity than the respondents in wealthier countries. The use of three separate measures of individual solidarity provides us with an opportunity, however, to indirectly test for the relative strength of self-interest and compassion motives. Whereas the compassion argument implies that three less wealthy countries – Spain, Italy and Romania – should express more solidarity on all three items, the self-interest argument implies that this would apply more to the general items on the EU’s solidarity aim and assistance in case of a natural disaster than to the item on financial help for the countries affected by the debt crisis. This is because the debt crisis has not spread to Romania to the extent that it has influenced Italy and Spain. Another important factor that affects people’s readiness to help other European countries is how they conceive of the potential beneficiaries of assistance. The literature stresses that people are more willing to help others when they see them as deserving. Both secondary sources and information drawn from in-depth interviews with selected participants in the EUCROSS study throw light on this matter. We start this analysis of frames by looking at the media (in the lineage of Díez Medrano 2003). Analysts have noted that the media in creditor countries has blamed Southern European countries, accusing them of irresponsible behaviour in the years preceding the financial crisis. Kontochristou (2014), for instance, argues that the exercise of solidarity during that phase was framed in a narrative of denial, moral hazard, self-responsibility and discipline, as well as threat. The ‘moral hazard’ argument, in particular, was deployed to justify not giving a blank cheque to the profligate South (Papadimitriou and Zartaloudis 2014; see also Fernándes and Rubio 2012). Nowhere was this discourse more prevalent than in Germany, where ‘the story … was all about the profligate Greeks versus the “good Germans” who save’ and where political elites emphasised their opposition to a ‘transfer union’ (Schmidt 2014, 192). Needless to say, political and media discourse in Southern European countries affected by the crisis was radically different. Here, both political elites and the media deflected accusations of profligacy, stressing the irresponsible behaviour of Northern European lenders, highlighting the greed of German banking institutions, and accusing Germany of arrogance and of imperialist ambitions reminiscent of Nazi Germany. Comparing the German, British, Spanish and Italian media content on the crisis – as in a study funded by the Reuters Foundation (Picard 2015) – the German press appears to have highlighted the role

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of national fiscal and social policy in the debtor countries at the onset of the crisis and the need for strict supervision of the loans given to these countries more than any other national press. The information contained in the qualitative interviews that EUCROSS conducted in the six participating countries provides us with another vantage point on how the crisis was framed across the European Union. The answers that respondents gave to openended questions reflect contrasts in how strongly different countries were touched by the crisis. We thus see that whereas respondents in Germany, Spain and, to a lesser extent, Italy had a lot to say about the crisis, the conversation was not as focused and remained superficial in Romania, in Denmark and in the United Kingdom. Romanians, for instance, emphasised their country’s economic underdevelopment and did not clearly differentiate between the ‘bail-outs’ and the European Union’s structural funds. Danes contemplated the crisis debate more as curious spectators than engaged participants. Finally, the British tended to reflect on the crisis in terms of Britain’s economic difficulties and referred to it as something that each country should deal with on its own. To illustrate contrasts in how respondents in different countries framed the crisis, we provide a synopsis of the German and Spanish views, as their opinions represent polar opposites. Compared to German politicians and the media, ordinary German citizens appraise the crisis and how it has been handled in less histrionic terms. For example, they generally take the redistribution measures for granted and suggest that helping countries in distress is the moral thing to do. They are in favour of the European Union and therefore view such assistance as part of the contract. One respondent remarked: “We are all members of an elected consortium [aimed at integration]; this is what our EU is after all, and in such cases you should assist each other.” At the same time, however, they are reluctant to support the countries in crisis. This reluctance may be said to stem from three sources. Firstly, there is a lack of trust towards those managing the resources offered to them. Again the same respondent mentioned: “What we know from hearsay is, or what is apparent is that there is a lot of corruption and quite a sum of money in the wrong hands, at the wrong places.” Secondly, there is a perception that there is a lot of corruption in these countries, Another respondent argued: ‘There is for example an island in Greece, where blind people receive a pension. On that island everybody gets a pension, every inhabitant receives a pension and on that

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island, blind people’s pension, and on that island there is a cab driver. How can a blind cab driver, a blind person, drive a cab?’ Thirdly, respondents articulated that there was a priority assigned to helping Germans who have also suffered in the crisis. A third respondent said: ‘At the same time I think that there are enough holes in our country where you could put in a large amount of money. Of course, you need to help, but I don’t know, maybe you should mind your own business first and check out first, before pouring billions into other countries, whether something could actually be done here.’ Spaniards differ significantly from Germans in how they frame the crisis. Underlying the respondents’ views is some cynicism concerning the European Union, conceived as a polity born out of and justified exclusively by national interests and where virtue and altruism play no role. As one Spanish respondent said: I think that countries like France, Germany, England, Spain or Italy, which have been involved in some war conflict or another since they were created and have strong national identities  … will always prioritise what is in their own interest  … It’s like that Galactic Senate from Star Wars where they always end up saying, “I’ll look after my own business”, you know. Is Mrs Merkel going to start worrying about Spaniards being evicted from their homes? Of course not! What she wants is to win the elections. Spanish respondents are ready to concede that the Spanish culture is partly to blame for the crisis. They depict the population as unproductive, lazy and prone to live above their means. As a second respondent said: ‘Well, look, I’ve lived in, I’ve seen Germany … the fact is that they’re not spendthrifts like us; they don’t spend like us. Here, they live hand to mouth and in Germany they don’t live hand to mouth. From what I’ve seen, people are very used to saving for old age.’

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Spaniards still feel entitled to solidarity from their richer neighbours. Instead of disputing the moral frame, however, which would place them in a weak position (on frames and counter-frames, see Steinberg 1999), they spread blame for the crisis and invoke the European Union’s contractual terms and the unequal distribution of profit in the European Union. They blame capitalism, the banks, corrupt politicians and other European countries and then justify European Union solidarity by emphasising that it was always understood that wealthier states would help poorer ones in exchange for the greater benefits that they would obtain from the single market. In another interview, it was expressed thus: ‘There’s been solidarity out of obligation, not out of generosity. Countries have supported each other simply because of what the law says. When the Community was created, funds were put in place and they said “you bring that much, you bring that much, and you bring that much, and we’ll give that much to Spain to build motorways, to build the AVE [high speed train]” and so on. They have given what they bargained for, because they are required to, not because that’s what they wanted to do. It is like a neighbourhood association: nobody likes to pay the neighbours’ repairs.’ Because of how they frame the EU’s explicit and implicit contract, Spanish respondents express a great deal of irritation with the German government’s policies toward Southern Europe as well as with German Chancellor Merkel’s ‘Lutheran’, authoritarian approach to the crisis. For example: ‘It’s not right for you to come here and make us all become your slaves, no way!’ ‘They want to drown us completely; they want to kill us. It’s going to get to a point where there’s going to be a civil war or something, which will destroy the government.’ Some Spanish respondents nonetheless concede that there must be a limit to the North’s generosity. They agree that Southern European countries bear some responsibility for their own problems and that they have tested Northern Europe’s patience. Thus, while they want solidarity, they do not judge the limits of this solidarity too severely.

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What they criticise most is the imposition of German austerity policies on the South, which they see as selfish and unacceptable. No respondent in the EUCROSS study linked their support for helping Southern European countries to their trips to or networks in those countries. Although the association between transnational lives and individual solidarity does not need to express itself at the conscious level, the absence of such linkage is telling of the relatively small role that transnational experiences play on the whole. Instead, the synthesis of German and Spanish frames above suggests that self-interest and moral frames concerning the crisis and the debtor countries, as well as country-specific frames about the European Union, informed the respondents’ answers to questions of solidarity. This is most visible especially in opinions on pooling resources to rescue the countries most affected by the 2008 crisis. One would expect German respondents to express less solidarity and Spanish (perhaps also Italian) respondents to express more solidarity on this item than do respondents from other countries in our sample. Although the role of self-interest in the explanation of individual solidarity leads to clear expectations regarding contrasts between respondents based on their country of residence, country of residence stands for many other variables that can potentially impact on solidarity. Because of this, it is important to analyse the effect of country of residence on individual solidarity while controlling for as many variables as possible. Table 5.6 does this. We estimated the impact of country of residence after controlling for the four sets of variables examined above: transnational background, experiences and practices, European identification, cosmopolitan outlook, and left–right ideological selfplacement. The statistical results provide consistent, albeit indirect, evidence in support of the hypothesis that self-interest guides the respondents’ answers to the solidarity questions. They show that after controlling for other variables, Romanians, Italians and Spaniards rate the EU’s aim of solidarity between the peoples as more important than do Germans, Danes and Britons. Although the effect of residence in Romania is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level, its magnitude is almost the same as that for residence in Spain or Italy. These same populations and Danes agree more than do Germans and Britons with the idea that in the event of a natural disaster the EU as a whole should be responsible for helping in the reconstruction of the country impacted by such a catastrophe. When asked about the pooling of national resources to rescue the countries most affected by the debt crisis, however, it is Italians and Spaniards, but not Romanians, that agree most with the proposal and it is the Germans that disagree the

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most with it (see Table 5.6). The contrast between average values in Romania and those in Italy and Spain again suggests that national contrasts reflect self-interest on the part of respondents in countries that have been heavily affected by the financial crisis and not greater compassion rooted in lower levels of economic development.

Conclusion The statistical results in Tables 5.2 to 5.5 are consistent with the hypothesis that individual solidarity varies depending on self-interest, European identification, cosmopolitanism and progressive attitudes. They do not show more than a weak association between transnational background, experiences and practices and individual solidarity. The inclusion of all sets of variables in one single model provides a fuller view of the relative strength of these associations. The estimated coefficients in Table 5.6 show that the conclusions reached above hold. We have commented already on the effect of country of residence, which is consistent with the role of self-interest in the explanation of solidarity. Table 5.6 also shows that the role of European identification is most consistently captured by its civic dimension, identification with the European Union and by its core values and achievements, especially the common currency. Meanwhile, the role of a cosmopolitan outlook is most consistently captured by people’s belief that ethnic diversity is a good thing. Finally, the left–right self-placement scale generally correlates in expected ways with people’s individual solidarity. Transnational background, experience and practices are only weakly related to individual solidarity and certainly less so than the other factors (for example, interest, identification, cosmopolitanism, political ideology) that this chapter has explored. In fact, none of the coefficients for the variables included in Table 5.2 are statistically significant and are therefore not reported in Table 5.6. As already discussed above, this does not necessarily mean that transnational background, experience and practices play no role in the development of horizontal individual solidarity across Europe. It means that, if anything, they matter only under very specific scope conditions that only complex research designs and measures would be able to capture. Just buying things abroad, going on trips abroad or even living abroad is not going to change people’s feelings toward the wellbeing of citizens from other European Union member states. For transnational lives to translate into solidarity, the quality and content of transnational exchanges may be more relevant. In fact, some transnational experiences and practices – such as exclusive touristic consumption or the memory of

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Everyday Europe Table 5.6: Country of residence, European identification, cosmopolitan mindset, political orientation and individual solidarity (OLS multiple regression) Financial solidarity

Solidarity aim Gender (female) Age R’s education Wellbeing growing up

Solidarity in case of disaster

0.057

(0.034) –0.044

(0.047)

0.006

(0.013)

0.001

0.002*** (0.001)

(0.001) –0.003

(0.002)

–0.019

(0.013)

0.027

(0.018) –0.009

(0.005)

0.010

(0.020)

0.006

(0.026)

0.001

(0.007)

(0.017) –0.006

(0.021)

0.016**

(0.006)

Father’s education

–0.018

Mother’s education

0.006

(0.019)

0.006

(0.023) –0.005

(0.007)

Current wellbeing

0.016

(0.016)

0.016

(0.021) –0.003

(0.006)

Feels European

0.073*** (0.018)

0.028

(0.025) –0.006

(0.006)

Agrees with democracy aim

0.369*** (0.038)

0.062

(0.045)

0.018

(0.013)

Agrees with economic stability aim

0.162*** (0.029)

0.060

(0.033) –0.001

(0.009)

Agrees with right to work aim

0.099**

0.035

(0.032)

0.016

(0.010)

Agrees with common currency

0.060*** (0.016)

0.014*

(0.006)

(0.030)

Relief if EU dissolved (1–3)

–0.061

Number of national cuisines liked

0.025

Ethnic variety a good thing

0.104*** (0.018)

Does not deplore Invasion by foreign products

0.030*

0.131*** (0.023)

(0.032) –0.384*** (0.044) –0.058*** (0.014) (0.017) –0.053*

(0.015)

(0.026)

0.005

(0.007)

0.106*** (0.025)

0.017**

(0.007)

0.035

(0.020)

0.005

(0.005)

Centre-left

–0.008

(0.048) –0.102

(0.074)

0.020

(0.016)

Centre

–0.035

(0.054) –0.149

(0.078) –0.031

(0.020)

Centre-right

–0.061

(0.055) –0.243**

(0.081) –0.044*

(0.021)

Right

0.045

(0.077) –0.304**

(0.111) –0.084**

(0.029)

L–R does not exist

0.051

(0.067) –0.214*

(0.105) –0.031

(0.028)

(0.070) –0.121

(0.100) –0.036

(0.027)

DK ideology 0.004 Nationality (baseline: Danes) Germans 0.078 Italians 0.152*

(0.059) –0.479*** (0.080) –0.086*** (0.024) (0.068) 0.403*** (0.089) –0.016 (0.025) (continued)

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Explaining supranational solidarity Table 5.6: Country of residence, European identification, cosmopolitan mindset, political orientations, and individual solidarity (OLS multiple regression) (continued) Financial solidarity

Solidarity aim Romanians Spanish British Constant N R2

Solidarity in case of disaster

0.114 (0.072) –0.023 (0.098) –0.008 (0.025) 0.187** (0.068) 0.537*** (0.087) –0.033 (0.025) –0.190** (0.070) 0.011 (0.089) –0.083** (0.026) 0.154 (0.244) 2.183*** (0.306) 0.617*** (0.092) 3,947 3,947 3,947 0.392 0.286 0.107

Notes: See text for definitions of the three solidarity indicators. See Appendix for the definition of the different independent variables. * Significant at 0.05 level, two-tailed; ** Significant at the 0.01 level, two-tailed; *** Significant at the 0.001 level, two-tailed. Note: Only variables for which a statistically significant effect exists are included in the table. The estimated models, however, also include all other variables included in Tables 5.2 to 5.5. Percentage of variance explained by models with only country of residence and sociodemographic variables: Aim: 9.7%; Debt: 14.9%; Disaster: 4.2%. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

unpleasant exchanges or events while abroad – may actually contribute to reproduce existing prejudices. During the decade following the 2008 global financial meltdown, the European Union confronted an unprecedented economic crisis. Economic interpenetration resulting from the European single market, combined with economic liberalisation and the speed of financialisation, exacerbated the effect of this event, causing it to linger for years after its onset. During this process, European solidarity was put to the test more than ever before. While evaluating how much solidarity the EU has displayed is a complex matter, the challenge has surely strained relations between many European Union member states. This chapter has shown that, at least at the level of individual attitudes, Europeans North and South still exhibit a fair degree of European solidarity. These results are congruent with results obtained in recent similar projects that have explored this issue (Gerhards et al 2018; Genschel and Hemerijck 2018). Within the limits of cross-sectional research design, which preclude any causal claim when interpreting the statistical results, both the qualitative and statistical findings also suggest that this moderate level of solidarity rests on perceptions of national interest, as well as on widespread, albeit diffuse, European identification, including shared political values, cosmopolitan views and political self-placement.

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Appendix: independent variables included in statistical analysis Gender: Gender of respondent (1 = Female) Age: Respondent’s age R’s education: Respondent’s educational attainment (1–6; 6 = Postgraduate education) Father’s education: Father’s educational attainment (1–6; 6 = Postgraduate education) Mother’s education: Mother’s educational attainment (1–6; 6 = Postgraduate education) Wellbeing growing up: Subjective assessment of how well-off household was when respondent was 14 (1 = We found it very difficult; 5 = We were living very comfortably on the money we had) Current wellbeing: Subjective assessment of how well-off household is today (1 = We find it very difficult; 5 = We are living very comfortably on the money we have) Has a foreign parent: (1 = Yes) Is familiar with one of the three crisis countries: is familiar with Greece, Portugal or Spain (1 = Yes) Number of countries where R has foreign contacts (0–15) Frequency of mail correspondence with people in foreign countries (0 = Never; 4 = Every day) Frequency of watching international sports on TV (0 = Never; 3 = Yes, at least once a week) Frequency watching film in OV (0 = Never; 4 = Every day) Feels European: agreement with statement (1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree) Degree of identification as world citizen: agreement with statement ‘I feel like a world citizen’ (1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree) Agrees with democracy aim: importance attached to the European Union’s aim to further democracy and human rights in the individual EU countries (1 = Not at all important; 5 = Very important)

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Agrees with economic stability aim: importance attached to the European Union’s aim to pursue economic stability in the individual EU countries (1 = Not at all important; 5 = Very important) Agrees with right to work aim: importance attached to the European Union’s aim to guarantee the right to work in any country of the EU (1 = Not at all important; 5 = Very important) Agrees with common currency: importance attached to the European Union’s aim to have its own currency (1 = Not at all important; 5 = Very important) Relief if EU dissolved: how would respondent feel if the EU was dissolved (1 = Very sorry; 3 = Relieved) Number of music genres liked: the genres are world music, classical music, jazz and blues, traditional and folk music from country of residence, metal, pop, rock, hip-hop and R&B (0–9) Number of national cuisines liked: from a list of 42 countries (0–42) Ethnic variety a good thing: agreement with statement ‘It is a good thing for a society to be made up of people from different ethnic groups, religions and cultures’ (1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree) Does not deplore invasion by foreign products: agreement with statement ‘Increased exposure to foreign films, music, and books is damaging national and local cultures’ (1 = Strongly agree; 5 = Strongly disagree) Political ideology: political self-placement, from Left to Right, operationalised as dichotomous variables (0–1); ‘Left’ is the omitted category; other dichotomous variables are DK ideology (Does not know) and L–R does not exist (Does not believe there is a Right or a Left in politics). References Alesina, A., and Glaeser, E. (2004) Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference. New York: Oxford University Press. Alesina, A., and La Ferrara, E. (2005) ‘Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities’. Journal of Public Economics 89(5–6): 897–931. Apicella, C., Marlowe, F., Fowler, J., and Christakis, N. (2012) ‘Social networks and cooperation in hunter-gatherers’. Nature 481: 497–501.

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Johnston, R., Banting, K., Kymlicka, W., and Soroka, S. (2010) ‘National identity and support for the welfare state’. Canadian Journal of Political Science 43(2): 349–377. Kaldor, M. (1999) ‘Transnational civil society’, in T. Dunne, N. Wheeler, and J. Nicholas (eds) Human Rights in Global Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 195–213. Kontochristou, M. (2014) ‘Expressions of solidarity in the European Union: the case of Greece’. Journal of Regional Socio-Economic Issues 4(3): 79–93. Kulin, J., and Svallfors, S. (2013) ‘Class, values, and attitudes towards redistribution: a European comparison’. European Sociological Review 29(2): 155–167. Kuwabara, K., and Sheldon, O. (2012) ‘Temporal dynamics of social exchange and the development of solidarity: “testing the waters” versus “taking a leap of faith”’. Social Forces 91(1): 253–273. Leider, S., Móbius, M., Rosenblat, T., and Do, Q. A. (2009) ‘Directed altruism and enforced reciprocity in social networks’. Quarterly Journal of Economics 124: 1815–1851. León, F. J. (2013) ‘Reciprocity and public support for the redistributive role of the state.’ Journal of European Social Policy 22(2): 198–215. Luttmer, E. (2001) ‘Group loyalty and the taste for redistribution’. Journal of Political Economy 109(3): 500–528. Lynch, J., and Myrskyla, M. (2009) ‘Always the third rail? Pension income and policy preferences in European democracies’. Comparative Political Studies 42(8): 1068–1097. Margalit, Y. (2013) ‘Explaining social policy preferences: evidence from the Great Recession’. American Political Science Review 107(1): 80–103. Mau, S., and Veghte, B. (2007) Social Justice, Legitimacy and the Welfare State. Aldershot: Ashgate. Miller, D. (1995) On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Miller, D. (2006) ‘Multiculturalism and the welfare state: theoretical reflections’, in K. Banting and W. Kymlicka (eds) Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Molm, L., Schaefer, D., and Collett, J. (2007) ‘The value of reciprocity’. Social Psychology Quarterly 70: 199–217. Nan, Y., Teng, L., Yu, Y., and Wang, Y. (2014) ‘“What’s in it for me?” The effect of donation outcomes on donation behavior’. Journal of Business Research 68(3): 480–486. Naumann, E., Buss, C., and Bähr, J. (2016) ‘How unemployment experience affects support for the welfare state: a real panel approach’. European Sociological Review 32(1): 81–92.

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Papadimitriou, D., and Zartaloudis, S. (2014) European Discourses on Managing the Greek Crisis: Denial, Distancing and Blaming. Paper prepared for the Annual PSA Conference Manchester, 14–16 April 2014. www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/2014/ Papadimitriou%20and%20Zartaloudis_psa_2014.pdf. Picard, R. (2015) The Eurocrisis in the Media: Journalistic Coverage of Economic Crisis and European Institutions. Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Piff, P., Kraus, M., Côté M., Hayden-Cheng, B., and Keltner, D. (2010) ‘The influence of social class on prosocial behavior.’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 99(5): 771–784. Prinzen, K. (2015) ‘Attitudes toward intergenerational redistribution in the welfare state’. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie 67(3): 349–370. Recchi, E., Braun, M., Favell, A., Díez Medrano, J., Savage, M., Hanquinet, L., and Sandu, D. (EUCROSS) (2016) The Europeanisation of Everyday Life: Cross-Border Practices and Transnational Identities among EU and Third-Country Citizens (EUCROSS). Köln: GESIS Data Archive. ZA5911 Data file Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12381. Rumford, C. (2014) Cosmopolitan Borders. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Sangiovanni, A. (2013) ‘Solidarity in the European Union’. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33(2): 213–241. Shapiro, R. (2009) ‘From economic depression to depression? Seventyfive years of public opinion toward welfare’. Paper presented at the Annual Fall Research Conference of the Association of Public Policy Analysis and Management, Washington, DC, 5–7 November. Shaw, G., and Shapiro, R. (2005) ‘Welfare’, in S. Best and B. Radcliff (eds) Polling America: An Encyclopedia of Public Opinion. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 880–892. Schmidt, V. (2014) ‘Speaking to the markets or to the people? A discursive institutionalist analysis of the EU’s sovereign debt crisis’. British Journal of Politics and International Relations 16(2): 188–209. Singh, P. (2016) How Solidarity works for Welfare: Subnationalism and Social Development in India. New York: Cambridge University Press. Singh, P., and vom Hau, M. (2016) ‘Ethnicity in time: politics, history, and the relationship between ethnic diversity and public goods provision’. Comparative Political Studies 49(10): 1303–1340. Steele, L. (2016) ‘Ethnic diversity and support for redistributive social policies’. Social Forces 4(1): 1–43. Steinberg, M. (1999) ‘The talk and back talk of collective action: A dialogic analysis of repertoires of discourse among nineteenth-century English cotton spinners’. American Journal of Sociology 105(3): 736–780.

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Szerszynski, B., and Urry, J. (2002) ‘Visuality, mobility and the cosmopolitan: inhabiting the world from afar’. The British Journal of Sociology 57(1): 113–131. Tajfel, H., and Turner, J. (1979) ‘An integrative theory of intergroup conflict’, in W. G. Austin and S. Worchel (eds) The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks-Cole, 33–47. Taylor-Gooby, P. (2001) ‘Welfare reform in the UK’, in P. TaylorGooby (ed) Welfare States Under Pressure. London: Sage, 168–197. Van Oorschot, W. (2006) ‘Making the difference in social Europe: deservingness perceptions among citizens of European welfare states’. Journal of European Social Policy 16(1): 23–42. Vertovec, S., and Cohen, R. (2003) (eds) Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context and Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wheeless, L. (1978) ‘A Follow-up study of the relationships among trust, disclosure, and interpersonal solidarity’. Human Communications Research 4(2): 143–157.

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SIX

Narratives and varieties of everyday transnationalism Adrian Favell, Janne Solgaard Jensen and David Reimer

Introduction In this chapter, we will take another look at the data our study provides on what might be conceived as ‘everyday transnationalism’ among ordinary European populations. European integration has provided for an extraordinary range of rights enabling European citizens to benefit from participation in a wide and open European space, whether for economic and business reasons, leisure, tourism and consumption, or in terms of wider knowledge and interest in countries around the region. Transnationalism has become a commonplace possibility of everyday life for ordinary citizens across the continent. In academic analyses of Europe, however, it has become routine to argue that European integration most benefits elites and upper classes – the people most likely to have international connections – while being of much less benefit to lower classes (Fligstein 2008). This may fuel a certain resentment towards those seen to be better able to take up the opportunities of a more mobile world (Kuhn 2015). In turn, this is linked to the widespread mistrust and (sometimes) hostility among ordinary citizens to the European project in political and identification terms (de Vries 2018). Sociologists (Beckfield 2006), meanwhile, have presented evidence that European integration is causing more inequality in the context of global economic change. So how has the possibility of mobility been understood and experienced by ordinary Europeans? Freedom of movement, after all, is routinely cited by the EU itself as its most popular achievement (Recchi 2015). Previous chapters have provided a quantitative overview of the cross-border mobility practices of residents living in the six EUCROSS countries. Chapter Two in particular showed significant variation between countries in terms of average levels of mobility, as well as its fundamental social stratification. Including intra-EU migrants and residents of a new member state (Romania)

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introduces further varieties into the aggregate mix, as well as a certain degree of noise, given the quite different migration and mobility scenarios faced by Turkish or Romanian citizens. Our goal in this chapter is disaggregation, and a focus on understanding qualitatively the positional variation of Europeans in a mobile Europe. For all its complexity in measuring mobilities, the aggregate survey can only tell us so much about how Europeans experience travel, long-distance contacts, experiences and ideas of other places, and so on. We wish to focus more on the ‘middling’ experiences of transnationalism (Conradson and Latham 2005), and thus limit the analysis to ordinary citizen residents of the five West European states in EUCROSS (extending thereby the study by Mau 2010 on Germany), leaving aside the particularities of the Romanian case, which is dealt with in Chapter Seven. We expect of course that national positionalities will affect their narratives (Díez Medrano 2003): the interesting part is to know what difference Europe is making to their lives and perceptions. Let us first remind ourselves of the basic varieties. The EUCROSS survey provides data on around 1000 nationals of the five chosen states: Denmark (our base reference), Spain, Italy, Germany and the UK. As part of the derivation of a small (n = 10) sample of interviewees for follow-up in-depth interviews in each country, a transnational index of selected cross-border practices (physical and virtual mobilities) was constructed from nine measurements, scored on a range of 0–18. This enables the estimate of an average level of transnationalism for each national sample. On average, the Danes emerge as the most transnational population, closely followed by the British and the Germans. The Southern European countries seem clearly less transnational. The strong suspicion – confirmed in Kuhn’s study (2015) – is that wealthier Table 6.1: Average score on transnationalism index (range 0–18) across five EUCROSS countries Denmark 6.03

UK 5.94

Germany 5.75

Italy 3.72

Spain 3.40

Notes: Weighted estimates. N = 4,456. The nine items used to compute the index are: residence in another country before the age of 18; frequency of trips abroad before the age of 18; residence in another country after the age of 18; frequency of trips abroad after the age of 18; number of friends living abroad; frequency of internet use; frequency of online purchase from another country; having property abroad; and frequency of contact with colleagues or business partners in other countries. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

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countries are more transnational, and more embedded in this sense in a transnational environment. From this index, it was then possible to select a number of highly transnational residents in each case (an average over six, as explained in the Appendix). These varied approximately half and half by high and low education and by gender, as well as covering an age span from 18 to retirement age. Interviews then took place in the respondents’ own language according to a semi-structured question schedule. They lasted, on average, 80  minutes across all countries. The in-depth interviews were conducted by members of the respective EUCROSS research team from each country. Questioning in both the quantitative and qualitative study focused on transnational practices, and on cosmopolitan attitudes. On cosmopolitanism, we follow Mau and colleagues’ (2008, 4–5) insistence that cosmopolitan values or attitudes should not be conflated with transnational practices, for which they criticise Beck (2000). They argue that there is a danger of tautology if the values expressed by mobile individuals are not separated from their practices (what Beck confusingly refers to as ‘cosmopolitanisation’). Mau and colleagues (2008) propose a narrow, more operational three-way breakdown of cosmopolitanism in terms of attitudes, along the lines of definition established by Held (2002). We largely shadow their suggestion of a three-sided distinction between dimensions of cosmopolitanism with a similar schedule of our own. Firstly, we identify (1) whether respondents feel themselves to be citizens of the world; (2)  their attitudes towards diversity; and (3)  their attitudes towards foreign products in the media and daily consumption. Two further questions are then added, looking at how supranational responsibility is attributed: (4) whether in the case of disaster respondents feel nations should step in to help other member states, and (5)  whether the EU should be stepping in to solve the economic crisis of Southern Europe. All of these questions are available in EUCROSS and have been analysed in other chapters. However, it is useful here to offer a brief overview of the main variations of the data on cosmopolitanism in the EUCROSS survey, since these questions have structured some of the key themes running through the interview discussions and our subsequent analysis. What is immediately interesting here is that overall scores suggest that the Italians and the Spanish – the least transnational in practice – appear to be the most cosmopolitan in their declaration of selfconception and values. Perhaps not surprisingly, they are strikingly more supportive of the EU helping member states in trouble. This,

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Everyday Europe Table 6.2: Cosmopolitan attitudes (% of ‘yes’ responses) and additive index across five EU countries

Denmark UK Germany Italy Spain

Feel citizen of the world 47 48 48 63 79

Exposure Help Different to foreign for EU ethnic/ film/ country cultural/ music/ struck by relations books disaster good for good for by all EU society culture* countries 51 70 90 78 71 82 69 71 85 74 67 94 68 69 93

Pooling of state funds to help EU member state in crisis** 42 40 32 70 76

Additive index (0–5) 3.00 3.18 3.04 3.68 3.85

Notes: Weighted estimates. N = 4,287. *In the original question the formulation ‘damaging for culture’ was used. The item was reversed so that it fits the direction of the other items. **The original item was dichotomised so that the values 4 and 5 on a scale from 1 to 5 (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) represent agreement with the statement. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

along with their aspiration to be good global citizens, drives the distinction and index. Among the highly transnational, rich Northern states, the supposedly Eurosceptic Danes and British score close to the ostensibly more ‘post-national’ and ‘core’ Europe Germans. And while the Danes are quite hostile to diversity, the British embrace it in a way that would exemplify some of the aspirations of what is known as the EU’s ‘normative power’ agenda (Manners 2002). Both are happy with international solidarity, but they baulk at cosmopolitanism when it is overtly framed in terms of EU governance (‘pooling funds’) (see also Favell and Reimer 2013). Some of the aggregates may still be puzzling; our qualitative interviews will help us understand more. Aggregate interpretations of EUCROSS have other limitations. One reading of the survey would be to stress the varieties as persistent national differences, and read this as a kind of overdetermination of society in Europe by the stubborn ‘reality’ of the nation-state society. Clearly we would expect these aggregate variations also to be reflected in the kinds of discursive narratives provided by respondents to account for their survey answers. On another reading, such positionality is of course a natural feature of the social world, permeated as it is by power configurations that shape people’s perceptions. What is perhaps more interesting, then, than seeing European transnationalism versus European nationalism as a zero-sum game on which we are

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supposed to adjudicate, is to look at all the ways that Europe, the EU, other European countries and the wider world or global reference points are cognitively understood and used by respondents. In this way, the transnational can be seen to be thoroughly embedded in everyone’s everyday lives, even when (perhaps especially when) they draw conventionally nationalist political or ethical conclusions and judgements (see also Jensen 2015). Whatever the reading, it is clear that a fuller understanding of the survey results – indeed the whole range of macro-conclusions reached by previous studies such as Fligstein (2008) and Kuhn (2015) – requires being complemented and nuanced by an in-depth look at the qualitative variation and the way people talk about Europe (for similar work on this line, see Díez Medrano 2003; Favell 2008; White 2010; Duchesne et al 2013). This is indeed one of the key original contributions of the EUCROSS project as a whole. Part of this is the effort to develop new qualitative methods and instruments for this kind of work, after Díez Medrano’s first pioneering intervention (Duchesne 2010). More generally, we see the work as contributing to studies about the human dimension of international mobilities and globalisation in everyday life (Savage et  al 2005; Mau 2010). The chapter also forms part of the effort in the recent sociological and geographical literature (Andreotti et al 2015) to shift discussions on mobility away from the limited numbers of obvious movers in Europe to more settled, mass populations. We thus connect the general investigation of the book to the relation of transnational practices to cosmopolitan attitudes on the one hand, and to perceptions of space, place and belonging on the other. For example, this may imply that investigating the experience and choice of place of residence as a collected space is negotiated and constructed in a changing global context in the lives of these ordinary citizens, as well as in the light of a seemingly large range of differentiated transnational practices such as leisure travel, workrelated mobility and/or experiences of the effects of globalisation (for example, immigration, new technological possibilities and/or increased personal international connections). From such narratives, we further show how and when different scales, such as the city, the national, the European and the global are invoked to make sense of the transnational world in which they live.

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Studying narratives Díez Medrano (2010) argues that Eurobarometer type surveys rarely help us to understand the dynamics of European integration at the national level, because there are marked qualitative differences in the way the European project is perceived and understood in different member states. He speaks of this in terms of the way Europe is ‘framed’ differently in different places. This could be related to the historical specificities and trajectories of different member states, as much as their geographical location. In his work, he considers the fairly obvious contrasts in this respect of Spain, Germany and the UK, also delving into internal regional differences within these countries (Díez Medrano 2003). To these we add Denmark and Italy. The logic of the qualitative analysis is as follows. We start with the ‘most’ transnational EUCROSS country, which is also noted for its prevarication when asked ‘politically’ about cosmopolitanism and support for EU membership. We seek to understand how in fact Danes live and experience the transnationalism afforded them by EU membership. Switching then to the South of Europe, we contrast the two member states where transnationalism has been less a part of everyday life, but self-styled cosmopolitanism and adherence to the EU has been higher. We get a sense of how positionality in Europe and the world affects these points of view. This then positions us to better defuse the often overdrawn contrast between the ‘postnational’ ‘core’ European Germany, and the ‘nationalist’, ‘peripheral’ (now ‘Brexiting’) UK – which share so closely their measures of transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. The Danes With Díez Medrano (2003) as an inspiration, we begin our analysis of the EUMEAN data with the Danish case. Prominent among the Nordic states, Denmark reveals itself as an ideal testing ground for exploring the paradoxes of nationalism, Europeanisation and globalisation in Europe today. Long known for its affluence, its high ratings in terms of levels of globalisation, and for being allegedly the happiest people on Earth, Denmark is an archetypal small nation that has known well how to position itself for success in the currents of international politics and economy. Yet in recent years its golden image has become tarnished by both a fairly intransigent attitude towards European cooperation – a version of Euroscepticism – as well as a quite harsh anti-immigrant politics grounded in a kind of ‘common

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sense’ populist xenophobia (Hedetoft 2015). ISSP (International Social Survey Programme) data from 2004 on national identity shows that Danes, comparatively more than their fellow Scandinavians in Norway and Sweden, want to live in Denmark rather than any other country (81%). This clarifies the importance of the national scale in the Danish case. We are interested in how these issues show up in the everyday lives of ordinary Danes. A major part of the small sample centred on Copenhagen was rated as ‘high transnationalism’ in the original survey, but the interviews in Denmark as a whole were deliberately conducted in a wide spread of locations, some very far out in the regions away from the metropolitan centre. Counter to their politically expressed Euroscepticism and nationalism, ordinary Danes of a variety of backgrounds engage in a large range of European, global and cosmopolitan practices in everyday life, which nuance their obviously expressed range of ‘banal Danishisms’ (Billig 1995; Jenkins 2011). In the Danish context, the city of Copenhagen has a special role as a spatial reference in strategies of ‘elective belonging’ (Savage et al 2005) and a sense of self, in contrast to living in Jutland (the mainland), where choices concerning residency are mainly linked to family questions. Variations in transnational practices and cosmopolitan attitudes may be linked with these belonging strategies, but crucially we find that the geographical periphery is no less transnational than Copenhagen, only sometimes differently transnational; social class too – frequently cited as the main factor in explaining opportunities for transnationalism or cosmopolitanism – does not seem to determine the kinds of cosmopolitanism expressed by Danes, and it only affects certain transnational practices. Most Danes are in many ways comfortably transnational and cosmopolitan in banal ways that would satisfy anyone looking for proof of Europe’s cosmopolitan ‘normative power’ agenda (Manners 2002; Beck and Grande 2007). However, when questions are linked with immigration or the European economic crisis (and especially issues of the common currency or identification with the EU), the national scale is immediately reinvoked and defended, particularly with reference to the superior democratic capacity of the Danish state, as well as its fragility as a small nation likely to be swamped by European or global problems. Our findings thus suggest some interesting particularities of the everyday effects of Europeanisation and globalisation in Denmark, and how various types of mobilities expressed and embodied by Danes in their everyday practices are quite separate from their political opinions and values.

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Our data portrays Danes as a peculiar mix of politically and culturally engaged citizens at local, national, European and global scales alike. Yet the fluidity of different scales in everyday life is highly contrasted among the group of interviewees, also in different contexts. Denmark is a nation with what seems to be a generally well-travelled population, and consequently the effect of class as well as the centre/ periphery hypothesis do not seem to hold as much as they might do in other countries, at least not when it comes to the intensity of transnational practices or cosmopolitan attitudes. Dependent on the context, choice of lifestyle and self-perception seem to be the most decisive factors in determining the most significant difference among this group of interviewees when negotiating transnational practices in everyday life. While the periphery is no less transnational than people living in Copenhagen, this data indicates differences in the form of integration of these practices and as well as the reason for crossing borders or buying products online. For example, one respondent living in the north-east of Jutland and classified on the side of ‘low transnational’ was in fact highly aware about the benefits of global flows and how she benefited from the EU. Her use of the internet, for instance, is a good indication of how the EU has certainly made it easier to live in a small town and she spoke a lot about the use of (particularly) Amazon in Germany which consequently created a very pragmatic and economic relationship to crossing borders, as the following quote indicates. ‘We feel that [closeness] even more with Hamburg though. We go there a lot. And that’s simply what we pick, and we pick that over Copenhagen actually […]. We do actually [like it better than going to Copenhagen]. From here and then on the high way, it takes no time […]. In the beginning when we talked about it, it was like: “But that’s another country, that’s Germany”. But there isn’t anyone at the border anymore, you don’t even notice passing it.’1 This was mainly part of their belonging strategies driving their choice of place to live as well as their motivation for travelling. Place and perceptions of place in a variety of ways seem to depict a certain cultural status and profile – as we saw in the perceptions of a travel hierarchy that existed among some of the interviewees, where Europe  The Danish government subsequently introduced selective border patrols as a concession to the Danske Folkeparti. 1

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is simply the most ‘ordinary’ travel destination in some cases, so ordinary that going there seems less a ‘serious’ trip than if you cross the Atlantic to the west or the Ural Mountains to the east. Hence, this is witness to the fact that the banal integration of transnational practices might very well be established in the European space. The data also show that the national scale is in fact intertwined with many other experiences of being European and using Europe as well as the world; that is, in the context of travel and other practices as part of social distinction, individuality, residence and general ‘free living’. At the same time, identification with Europe and the EU is also affected by the experience of being clearly part of a national community which currently seems to be invoked mostly due to the economic crisis or when talking about immigration. Such stories indicated that the wish to uphold the reference to the national was mostly in a political context; on these issues, there is a decrease in EU-specific European attachments – an attachment which had been so vividly expressed as almost a second home earlier, when travelling had been the focus. Thus what this chapter also clarifies is the importance of untangling experiential frames of at once the local and the city, the national, the European and the global scales, which show not only what the European or the national might be, but more significantly when the different scales are invoked and thus when they become meaningful (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008). In this case we can therefore assign the European space much more credit than might be the case if we only measured the political convictions about the EU that would be expressed in a quantitative survey. The transnational and cosmopolitan Dane is more visible when they are not talking about politics. Denmark is a good place to start as a case in Europe, because it is ideal-typical of a highly globalised, highly affluent, yet highly cohesive and relatively homogenous society. It is routinely rated as one of the most globalised societies on Earth (Dreher et al 2008). However, it combines high levels of social transnationalism with high levels of national loyalty: mobilities are not an ‘exit’ issue in terms of brain drain or the flight of capital, and Danes are very rarely driven to move themselves or their activities outside of the country for reasons of pure economic disadvantage. It is, in other words, the epitome of the privileged and economically successful North-West of Europe, which has combined growth and affluence with a strong welfare and social protection, and in which mobilities are more a matter of choice, consumption and lifestyle, and are widely diffused across society. We see European transnationalism under ideal conditions, yet we also

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see through our analysis that high levels of practical Europeanised behaviour are not necessarily accompanied by high levels of support for the European project. The Spanish How do things look in the South of Europe, the least transnational countries according to the index reported in Table 6.1? In contrast to Denmark, the Spanish history of travelling abroad does not date back as far as the 1950s, at least not for the majority of the population. As one respondent says: ‘I don’t know how young people have it these days because maybe things are not better or worse, they are just different, but I don’t think that there is so much difference from my time. Bear in mind that when I went abroad I was 17, it was in 1963, and Spanish were not used to travelling abroad during summer. But there were some who did it, anyway, it was not very common.’ As in the other Mediterranean countries the sun shines in their own country and summer holidays are therefore also likely to be on their own coast and without crossing any borders. This would partly explain the low Spanish figures on mobility and trips in the past 24 months, which show up in our measures of transnational practices. This is obviously a different story than among the Northern Europeans who line up every year on the German highways to go south. Some of the older interviewees in Spain tell stories about how few travelled around Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, but also how as tourists they were blacklisted due to the international view of Franco-ruled Spain. However, having experienced the change from when Franco was still alive, this seems to have had an effect on how the Spanish people today enjoy their new freedom to speak and travel, which can be seen in terms of certain ‘international choices’ and general reflections that still seem to be enhanced in light of the Spanish past. Advancing in language proficiency is especially something that the older population is very focused on in relation to the new global opportunities. From such discussions it also became clear that what we could refer to as Spanish cosmopolitanism is based on more virtual mobilities than the Danish hard-core commitment to physical mobilities. Also the Spanish seem more pragmatic in their openness to learning languages, in terms of travelling to new places, but also

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increasing opportunities to be involved in new work relations and other social relations at home with foreign countries. There is a clear difference between the Danes and the Spanish in terms of physical mobility, especially when it comes to ‘leisure movement’ or moving ‘without a reason’, and there is a tendency among the Spanish to go to countries close to their own. Though there certainly are interviewees from Spain who are extremely well travelled, what travelling means to them appears to be more modest, and to what extent this is relevant to their self-perception is also less evident than in the Danish cases. Lack of language proficiency might be one explanation as this was not even a topic in the Danish interviews: there was much frustration among Southern European populations at how bad they were at making themselves understood in other languages. Hence, in this respect, the Spanish seem to perceive themselves as somewhat more limited in the places they are able to travel to because of language. The Danes also appear less restricted in speaking about being mobile. It is no longer questioned, whereas a large part of the Spanish population still remembers the past and did not ‘grow up’ with travelling. The economic crisis since 2008 has also changed the character of mobility as people have been leaving Spain in significant numbers to find work (Lafleur and Stanek 2016), which is mentioned in the interviews and inevitably gives mobility a more pragmatic character. Whereas freedom to move is mainly only seen in Denmark as a personal asset (not in terms of migration), Spanish are forced to think of the necessity to move because their country has been through a deep crisis. Mobility is thus in general much more politicised than it is in Denmark. Mobility and politics go together in Denmark only when talking about immigration; otherwise mobility is associated with dreams, opportunities and self-development. In Spain, the historical path of the country has left mobility and therefore also the Spanish cosmopolitan outlook with a very different character. In part this is a question of self-interest (as Kuhn 2015 suggests). In Spain, mobility is today, as it has been in the past, as much about politics as it is about leisure, except for a narrow group of those who can easily afford it and prioritise it. The Spanish clearly position themselves geographically in a different way, confirming the more general insights of Chapter One. Latin America, unsurprisingly, is close. The same goes for places like Morocco, France, Italy and Portugal (even to some extent Switzerland), countries which are often talked about as self-evident travel destinations. This is different from Denmark, Germany and Britain; and colonialism certainly plays a role in these differences.

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Something in the Spanish interviews suggests that they are quite used to people coming from Morocco as immigrants and the distance is small: ‘Sure. It is obvious that I have more things in common with a Spanish person or a European (than a Japanese person) because we are nearer, we have more contact, we share the currency … But anyway, I have less in common with a Pole than with a Moroccan because we are neighbours, even though they are not European.’ The European crisis and a growing hostility to ‘the South’ is acknowledged by these respondents. Europe, in this light, lost some of its ‘goodness’ and sense of solidarity. One interviewee was now very hesitant to draw any points of identification with Northern European populations and he was extremely reluctant to think of the EU as anything other than German dominated, though the EU was still good in terms of facilitating mobility. ‘If Spain wasn’t in the EU it could have done things like depreciating the currency and other similar things. And maybe these would have improved our situation. But we cannot do anything because we are inside and, ok, it is true, when things go well it is great but when things go wrong … We cannot take the risk of letting this happen, what is going on now, it is not worth it. The crisis started when I was about 17 and so I wasn’t thinking about economic problems too much. I did not care. I was not thinking about Europe as something economic. I perceived it rather as something more cultural. I enjoyed it, such as the possibility to travel to all these countries. And all these scholarship agreements to study wherever you like. I liked all these things very much and I still like them. But this thing about economic union, I don’t see it very clearly.’ The Spanish in many cases are openly critical of their home environment, but many have only travelled in a more virtual sense, compared with Danes. It is almost the opposite case with Danes, where everybody travels, but where many are also more protective of their home sphere. Although place matters in Spain according to this small number of interviews, it seems there are different varieties of this, where the choice of place (or belonging to a place)

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is pragmatic, forced or based on a feeling about the environment, such as climate. At least for some the crisis has given the free choice of whom they should identify with, as well as posing the question of international mobility. The willingness to move to a different country is therefore also rather high. This forces some Spaniards to be more pragmatic in their mobility, for example expanding their own global and cosmopolitan opportunities by learning a new language, taking Erasmus scholarships, or leaving to work in Germany (to which more than one referred). The relation of place, belonging and Europe/the EU is invoked in many interviews. In the Danish interviews, place and city residence in many cases had a lot to do with self-perception, lifestyle and even their approach to globalisation, with differences between the peripheries and urban centre. In contrast, place, belonging and self-perception seem to be explicitly politicised in Spain: everyone is suffering the crisis, and the struggle often translates into regional concerns. Thoughts of mobility are immediately related to the country’s political situation. This might also have something to do with the eyes looking at them from the outside. The Spanish seem extremely aware of the world and Europe in the sense that they are aware of what others think about them and their politicians; in their discourse, there are a lot of ‘cross-border references’, whereas Danes are more living in their own bubble and more relaxed and confident in their nationality. This is for instance evident when the Spanish talk about reading foreign media; they are sceptical about only reading one type of national media about the crisis and therefore also read foreign media to get more or new perspectives on the matter – a further interesting effect of globalisation and regional integration. In sum, at an economic and political level the EU seems to cause a significant divide among the people. They are ambivalent in their idea of how Europe is today split between North and South, with Germany placed in the middle as a sometimes too strong or dominant political neighbour. Yet sometimes Europe is their way out of the crisis, perhaps through using mobility and exit options themselves. The Italians In aggregate terms, the Italians generally share transnational characteristics with the Spanish, yet there are some differences in their stories on space, place and belonging, and essentially how they construct their ideas of self in the light of their transnational experiences in Europe and beyond.

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The interviewees were much less well travelled than the Danes and the Germans (despite being among the most transnational in the national sample), yet there was no indication this made them any less interested in the world, as the cosmopolitan index supports. Unlike the Spanish, there was less of a collective narrative about their relative lack of shorter term travel and holidays. Those that did travel a lot did it for mainly business reasons. However, there was a unanimous view that all people should learn from diversity, travelling and cultural opposites. An older male, who was a teacher before his retirement, explained what travelling could mean for one’s way of thinking about being an Italian: ‘I wanted my students to be less backward. I mean, Milan is a big city but you still have a limited, partial vision of what life is. Aside from the fact that even just ordering coffee or buying a paper at the newsstand or taking the underground can be interesting. But being able to compare lifestyles, behaviours, and even different degrees of civilization, of getting an idea of others. Also because in some way we would like to, we should be citizens of Europe, so it seemed to me that the same everyday, banal gesture, that you did in an Italian city acquires a new meaning, a different signification, a greater depth when done in a different country.’ This interview from Milan was quite typical of other interviews from this most worldly of Italian cities, in which the questioning seems to elicit a critique of the place one comes from, in terms of its limitations or provinciality. An interviewee from Naples echoed this when comparing their home city unfavourably as similar to their experience of violence and insecurity when travelling (in this case) in Angola. Where the narrative of experiences also differs from the far more polished transnationalism of the Danes is in the less conscious experience of how transnationalism is used in order to construct a ‘modern’ cosmopolitan self. The Danes are also heavily committed to family holidays, which in a sense train their children in banal transnationalism, and an ability to process foreign cultures. In contrast, the Italians almost seem naive enthusiasts of the cosmopolitan. Those that have acquired transnational competences often did so by an ‘accidental’ enthusiasm for exotic foreign languages or religions. One-time extraordinary experiences stood out in their narratives, as

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revelations that had helped them understand their Italianness. The ‘first trip’ abroad was strongly emphasised by several respondents. They could look back on a transnational experience that had altered their lives, while contenting themselves with not planning future travel, or collecting further experiences. This stood in great contrast to the Northern Europeans, who always seemed anxious to go off on their next foreign holiday, to get away from normal life and collect some new experiences and materials. Here, an interviewee who had just lived for a few months in Denmark explains how it gave him a key insight before returning home: ‘Like a good Italian, as soon as I found a patch of land, I planted zucchini, tomatoes, and so on. The Danes didn’t even dream of doing this. From their point of view if one has to do something besides one’s work, it must be for pleasure, a hobby, not to get something back, the fruit of the land. I was a little ashamed of having planted zucchini and tomatoes in my little vegetable garden [laughs]. I mean, their mentality is that you can do something but only as an end in itself, for pleasure … Perhaps also because there fruit and vegetables are very controlled, much safer than in Italy, I mean.’ At the time of the interviews at least, none of the interviewees expressed strongly politicised views on immigration or diversity. Rather, they were positive within a general discourse of enthusiasm for what immigrant diversity may bring, and how immigrants often bring positive elements of diversity to a society. Opinions on immigration have notably hardened since 2012, so it is not possible to know whether these Italians, as did the Danes, would articulate their views more specifically against negative views propagated by populist political parties. Regarding the deficiency or limitations in transnational experiences that was also clear among the Spanish, the Italians on the whole were very conscious of what it might mean for them to engage in longer term travel and migrant experiences. Unlike Danes, so confident in collecting transnational knowledge from travel, visits and other experiences – before returning home – the Italians expressed an idea that a long-term stay in another country was perhaps the only way of being able to say anything about others. ‘I know many Italians who live abroad, but I’ve never lived abroad enough time to establish this knowledge about

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others. It was a month at the most. Unfortunately, I never did the Erasmus, I rushed through university and I never had time to … but I would like my daughters to have a long experience abroad.’ Italians abroad, and the historical image of diaspora, was often an idealisation of Italianness. One respondent ‘celebrated’ how the Italian minority in Belgium would support and help one another. These Italians discovered their love for Italy through being abroad, even though they had left because of political persecution or a hostile economic environment. Perhaps unsurprisingly, though, this enthusiasm for being Italian, and the strength of this culture internationally, did not extend to political pride or positivity about the nation. Repeatedly there was the story of how the Italian government has created a country that does not respect its people and the people’s wish to live and function as a society. The narrative about a dysfunctional country was thus the most significant collective narrative among the Italian interviewees. Essentially all the informants seem to contrast their travelling experiences and ideas of the world to how the Italian government has led the country into the worst possible situation. Many of the interviewees used their ideas or experiences of Germany to describe the Italian failings – a typical example being the Italian streets versus the German organisation, functionality and teamwork. The negativity stretches to despair about the nation, and why children should leave. Europe still plays the key role in offering an alternative. ‘I think Italy will hit rock bottom and we’ll have to do something. I really think we’re at a political and cultural low point … So, speaking of identity, I don’t identify at all, I don’t identify at all with the people who administrate us … Look, I almost puked at the last elections. It’s something on which unfortunately I give up, because I have only one instrument, and that is my vote … So, these young people are in a really sad situation. I hope that by travelling away from here and seeing a different world they’ll be able to lead a different life. The only thing I tell my kids is to leave. I hope they find a country that is not too hostile, that does not mark them as coming from Italy, because it wouldn’t be fair, so I hope they are open.’

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Interestingly, a certain idealism for Europe is retained, despite quite vocal criticism of the EU’s political handling of the economic crisis. The Italians were nowhere near as hesitant to talk about Europe as the British and the Danes. Questions were not met with the scepticism that elsewhere would often greet a political framing of the question about Europe. Perhaps Italian politicians have been much less effective than elsewhere in framing their own national failings in terms of the EU system. Though the Italians, as all other informants, are critical towards the state that Europe finds itself in, there seem to be solid feelings of being and feeling European. It does not seem to stand in contradiction to their Italianness and they even find themselves at home in many places. It was evident in the interviews that the Italians are able to express a ‘we’ in relation to a certain idea of sharing, which is also visible in the quantitative findings on international solidarity among Italians. The Germans Regarding Germany, we focused on adding nuances to the extensive picture that Mau and his colleagues have provided on horizontal Europeanisation and transnational practices (Mau 2010; Mau and Mewes 2012). The issue of being pro- or anti-EU is much less salient in Germany. However the former East/West divide has a significant effect on citizens’ perceptions of European freedom and German identity, as Díez Medrano (2003) also found. Germans, like the Spanish, evoke the political crisis when thinking about the EU: it is as much a political space as it is an experiential and cultural space. Unlike for the Danes, politics is part of living in everyday Europe and is much more prominent in their thoughts. This qualitative dataset does not reproduce the negative prejudices between the two parts of Germany; if anything some of the interviewees found it absurd that some Eastern and Western German citizens are still living with this mental divide even though they were not even born then. However, there are also several references to the divide when we talk about freedom to move and a general globalisation that demands a cosmopolitan outlook. A mother with children living abroad and who resides in the old Western Germany reflected on how Germans should celebrate more the ‘wonderful’ fact of free movement now, and also get over their prejudices towards the Turkish population. She is proud her children are ‘cosmopolitan’: ‘We are getting more open. Let us be happy that the wall is gone.’

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The possibility of being cosmopolitan citizens is something to be thankful for, and not least because of Germany’s own national history – that is the message here. It is not something that can be taken for granted, and in this sense the freedom to move is rather more linked to national history, over and above European free movement policies. Moreover, the quote shows a similar ‘good quality’ of cosmopolitan outlook to what we also find in the Danish interviews, where being global and cosmopolitan is a personal lifestyle and asset; something you characterise yourself and others with – that is, as a form of distinction. This is in contrast to Spain, where it appeared as a more pragmatic approach to make use of the world’s resources of work and a way to upgrade one’s ability to be part of the world economy. Another interesting aspect is how being ‘European’ can also be a positive reference point in the sense that ‘Germanness’ does not seem to have a clarified meaning – and again, the old divide shows its face, as in this quote from a former East German, when asked if he felt European: ‘Well, definitely, more as European than, what do I know, German, I dare to say. Well this is probably because I have lived in different countries and perhaps have not gained ground back here again. As far as the mentality is concerned and so on.’ For Germans, there seems to be a fine line between a cultural Europe and a political Europe, which may have been caused by the role that Germany has been given as a consequence of the recent economic crisis. Moreover, Germans also seem to have a geopolitical location that provides different and multiple types of transnational networks, both in a political and personal sense. There are many more and more varied references to nations, for example to the Balkans and other East European countries, than in Denmark or Spain. The centrality of Germany found in the cartographies of Chapter One is certainly substantiated. Germanness on the whole is difficult to grasp from the dataset. The feeling may not be so strong, or it may be hidden in the minds of Germans because of their problematic history with nationalism. There is also little reference to other parts of Germany. People seem to be rather local or regional, and intranational movement is not something that shows up in their talk about neighbourhood or residence. In Germany, Berlin is not the obvious big, global city to which all the people from small villages flee to evade narrow-minded citizens; at

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least not as obviously as it is for the Danes with Copenhagen. Instead, every region in Germany seems to have its own big city that contrasts with local village life. Country size and the network of mid-sized cities in Germany surely matters in this respect. On the other hand, the cosmopolitanism of certain Germans seems itself to be dependent on quite typical German traits: for example, a distrust of newspapers and the media, which pushes them to check and compare how the media might be covering it in another country such as the UK. The British The UK, like Denmark, has a specific national state of mind when it comes to Europe, as well as when it comes to travelling. On this front, the Danes, the Germans and the British exemplify their privileged position, mobility being a more routine or banal factor of everyday life, and enjoying the advantages of globalisation in a different way, say, to the Spanish in the South. Travelling represents a certain lifestyle, and is also about being categorised as such in terms of social distinction. It is not only about working or holidaying, but is also a life lesson in seeing the world or seeking authenticity. The interviewees were primarily happy about living in Europe, though they were also very open to other parts of the world. They would think about how such experiences are also sometimes the route to expressing oneself in a less self-flattering and exclusive way; that is, about what Europe seemed to be or not, or where certain European trademarks would be portrayed as ‘the good way’ to do things. ‘I think that when something daft like the Eurovision song comes to have Israelis in it, that’s ridiculous: they’re Middle Eastern. I am [also] not so sure I class Turkey as Europe. I know that Turkey wants to be part of the European Union but I don’t class it as Europe.’ This clear distinction has been found in more formal studies of European values. In these, Britain in fact sits at right in the middle of the distribution on many core European values (Gerhards 2007) – including, in this case, the same Eurocentric attitudes. At the same time (and not without self-contradiction), there is of course a distance from Europe expressed among the British interviewees. Negative comments about European ‘immigrants’ (that is, European citizens freely living and working in the UK) are now commonplace. “Because we are an island, aren’t we? There is going to be a saturation point at some point.”

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A typical reflection on European identity goes as follows: ‘Britain or the United Kingdom is not particularly European really. Everyone in Britain pretty much hates Europe and blames Europe for any problems. I suppose with Western Europe it is quite a similar culture, but with Europe it is a vastly different culture … I don’t think most people in the North of England will consider themselves European.’ The question opens up the way to embracing English nationalism; only to then admit that Britain is not America: “The fact that I really do not associate with Britain lessens the tie with Europe, so I do not consider myself European. But again if I was in America, then again I would be European.” Internal distinctions in the UK do matter, such as its own North/ South divide. Non-Londoners identify London – which is also seen as the main city of UK’s fabled multiculturalism and diversity, as is Copenhagen – with being unfriendly, depressing, lonely. A true Briton can even feel a ‘foreigner’ in London, hearing nothing but foreign languages on the tube. Others meanwhile strongly identify with London. The British, similar to Danes, are in general satisfied with life in Britain and most people prefer to stay in Britain. There is a sense that people are more flexible with their country of residence in Germany or Spain. To some extent, as also in Denmark, residence is evaluated from a social and family perspective and it therefore becomes a hindrance to moving away. Language (as for the Spanish) is also a major hindrance. We therefore see a similar type of satisfaction with the UK among the British as we find among Danes with Denmark. Many of the interviewees also express this through taking a stand on their neighbourhood and their city, contrasting it with other cities, then identifying with their country as especially a place where they like to live. Pure Danishness is stronger than being British because the greater category of nationhood is now in conflict with a resurgent Englishness. There is growing differentiation within the UK, which is mixed up with people’s thoughts about the EU, the European region and the UK’s place in the globe: a contradictory mix.

Conclusion In this chapter, we have offered a qualitative analysis of the relation of transnational practices to cosmopolitan attitudes through the EUMEAN

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dataset, investigating how they vary by social position and by national context across Europe. Transnationalism and cosmopolitanism can be found to be very similar in scale and intensity in Denmark, Germany and Britain, which belies the Danish and British Euroscepticism often expressed in these countries, in so far as many of these practices are concretely linked to European integration. Taking Denmark as the ideal-typical successful European society, we see how transnationalism and Europeanisation have become banal, while negating neither strong national affiliation nor defensiveness towards Danish homogeneity. In other respects, the Danes are exemplary cosmopolitans, with Europe a zone of lifestyle choices and easy mobility, but there is a mismatch with their opinions about the EU. Germany and the UK offer views on mobility and identity that might be expected: heavily determined by geographical position and national history. They share similar degrees of cosmopolitanism and transnationalism, but give it very different meanings in relation to national particularities. Italians come across as much more idealistic about transnationalism and cosmopolitanism in Europe, referring to the foreign as a mode of self-understanding and self-critique. Meanwhile, it is only the Spanish in our analysis of these five worlds of European transnationalism who are conscious of the primary economic justifications for European mobility rights. Yet they are markedly less experienced and more rooted in their everyday lives. References Andreotti, A., Le Galès, P., and Moreno Fuentes, F. J. (2015) Globalised Minds, Roots in the City: Urban Upper-Middle Classes in Europe. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Beck, U. (2000) ‘The cosmopolitan perspective: sociology of the second age of modernity’. British Journal of Sociology 51(1): 79–105. Beck, U., and Grande, E. (2007) Cosmopolitan Europe. Cambridge: Polity. Beckfield, J. (2006) ‘European integration and income inequality’. American Sociological Review 71(6): 964–985. Billig, M. (1995) Banal Nationalism. London: Sage. Conradson, D., and Latham, A. (2005) ‘Transnational urbanism: attending to everyday practices and mobilities’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31(2): 227–234. De Vries, C. (2018) Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Díez Medrano, J. (2003) Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain, and the Britain. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Díez Medrano, J. (2010) ‘Unpacking European identity’. Politique Européenne 30(1): 45–66. Dreher, A., Gaston, N., and Martens, P. (2008) Measuring Globalisation – Gauging Its Consequences. New York: Springer. Duchesne, S. (2010) ‘L’identité européenne: entre science sociale et science fiction. Introduction’. Politique Européenne 30(1): 7–16. Duchesne, S., Frazer, E., Haegel, F., and van Ingelgom, V. (2013) Citizens’ Reactions to European Integration Compared: Overlooking Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Favell, A. (2008) Eurostars and Eurocities: Free Movement and Mobility in an Integrating Europe. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Favell, A., and Reimer, D. (2013) ‘Winners and losers? Citizens and sceptics? European integration and the spread of cosmopolitanism’. EUCROSS Policy Brief # 1. Chieti: University of Chieti-Pescara; Fligstein, N. (2008) Euroclash: The EU, European identity, and the Future of Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fox, J., and Miller-Idriss, C. (2008) ‘Everyday nationhood’. Ethnicities 8(4): 536–563. Gerhards, J. (2007) Cultural Overstretch? Differences between the Old and New Member States of the EU and Turkey. London: Routledge. Hedetoft, U. (2015) ‘How Denmark faces immigration’. Open Democracy, 30 September. www.opendemocracy.net/ulf-hedetoft/ how-denmark-faces-immigration. Held, D. (2002) ‘Culture and political community: national, global, and cosmopolitan’, in S. Vertovec and R. Cohen (eds) Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, and Practice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 48–58. Jenkins, R. (2011) Being Danish: Paradoxes of Identity in Everyday Life. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press. Jensen, J. S. (2015) Making Cosmopolitans: Europe between the Local, the National and the Global in Young Danes’ Everyday Worldviews. PhD dissertation. Aarhus: Aarhus University. Kuhn, T. (2015) Experiencing European Integration: Transnational Lives and European Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lafleur, J.-M., and Stanek, M. (eds) (2016) South–North Migration of EU Citizens in Times of Crisis. Amsterdam: Springer. Manners, I. (2002) ‘Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms’. Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2): 235–258.

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Mau, S. (2010) Social Transnationalism. Lifeworlds Beyond the Nation-State. London and New York: Routledge. Mau, S., Mewes, J., and Zimmermann, A. (2008) ‘Cosmopolitan attitudes through transnational social practices?’ Global Networks 8(1): 1–24. Mau, S., and Mewes, J. (2012) ‘Horizontal Europeanisation in contextual perspective’. European Societies 14(1): 7–34. Recchi, E. (2015) Mobile Europe: The Theory and Practice of Free Movement in the EU. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Savage, M., Bagnall, G., and Longhurst, B. (2005) Globalization and Belonging. London: Sage. White, J. (2010) ‘Europe in the political imagination’. Journal of Common Market Studies 48(4): 1015–1038.

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Understanding Romanians’ cross-border mobility in Europe: movers, stayers and returnees Roxana Barbulescu, Irina Ciornei and Albert Varela

Mobility practices of Romanian stayers, movers and returnees Decades of prohibition to leave the country during the communist era and a defective double transition to democracy and the free market have turned Romanians into one of the most mobile populations in Europe. For Romanians as well as for Central Europeans who faced the same transitions, the ability to travel as well as to settle abroad is a newfound freedom. While all Romanians have gained more mobility, many move to another European country for longer periods. There are estimates of almost 7 million Central and Eastern Europeans registered as living in another EU country (Black et al 2010; Glorious et al 2013; Barbulescu et al 2015), who have followed in the footsteps of the intra-EU mobile citizens of Western Europe (Favell 2008a; Recchi and Favell 2009). Almost half of these 7 million are Romanian citizens, who constitute the largest nationality among intra-EU migrants. The great majority of them have moved abroad over the last two decades, once they gained the freedom to travel. In particular, outward mobility accelerated after 2007 when Romania joined the EU and many constraints to travel were removed. The migration of literally millions of Romanians has been generally perceived as labour migration. Not surprisingly, studies of this topic amount today to a small library (Barbulescu 2009; Boswell and Ciobanu 2009; Anghel 2013; Morseanu 2013a and 2013b; Ciornei 2014 and 2015; Croitoru et al 2014; Moreh 2014; McMahon 2015; Ciobanu 2015; Nedelcu and Wyss 2016). However, the focus on flows of migrants shadows the mobility of Romanians who do not move abroad or the mobility of Romanians who return but who nonetheless move freely, often and widely across borders in Europe. Some

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efforts have indeed been made to recalibrate ‘Romanian migration’ to include other forms of mobility including return or seasonal mobility. For example, Engbersen and colleagues (2010; 2014) argue that the mobility of Central and Eastern Europeans more generally is bidirectional, unstable or footloose and can be referred to as ‘liquid migration’. Others, such as Favell (2008b), have urged a rethink of conceptions of migration in order to integrate the newer East–West European mobilities to the theory of migration and mobility. What we call the migratisation of mobility in the sociological literature is not a phenomenon restricted to Romanians (see also Dahinden’s [2016] plea to ‘de-migranticize’ migration research). Conventionally, transnational mobility has been theorised almost exclusively as a practice of migrants, as a trait of migrant populations (see, for example, two classic discussions of transnationalism: Portes 2000; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). Glick Schiller and colleagues (1995) take the argument further and propose calling migrants ‘transmigrants’ in order to better describe their typically entangled transnational lives. Indeed, migrants stand out as the segment of the population that moves physically across borders to make their lives elsewhere. But while commuting trips back and forth between origin and destination have been diligently documented under the rubric of ‘seasonal’ or ‘circular’ migration, the everyday transnational mobility of such ‘migrants’ have received considerably less attention. Furthermore, the mobilities of settled population as well as former migrants needs to be explored systematically and integrated into a more inclusive and more realistic theory of cross-border mobility. This chapter investigates the transnational mobility of Romanians by focusing on short-term cross-border trips. To understand the full spectrum of mobility, we distinguish between three different groups of Romanian citizens who have different mobility statuses: stayers – individuals who have remained in the country (mobile non-migrants); movers – Romanians who reside abroad (mobile migrants), and a third category, returnees – Romanians who have lived abroad long term but who have returned to Romania (returned migrants). To put it differently, we seek to study the relation of different mobile individuals with transnational mobility in Europe. In particular, we analyse how socioeconomic characteristics such as gender, age, education, education of parents, occupation, employment and welfare influence the mobility patterns we observe for the three groups. Analytically, we build on the scholarship on the various forms and practices of ‘transnationalism from below’ (Smith and Guarnizo 1998), and particularly on the everyday practice of short-term cross-border

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mobility, in an effort to contribute to the emerging literature on space-sets (Recchi and Kuhn 2013; Recchi 2015; for early proposals, see also Pries 2005). By this term we refer to a geographical social space with which people interact in a direct way, having been there physically and having experienced it in an unmediated manner. The space-set perspective is valuable here because it allows us to encompass different dimensions of transnational mobility. We use a mixedmethods approach to analyse the quantitative and qualitative data in the EUCROSS dataset, which has the unique advantage of highquality data on short-term cross-border mobility (Favell et al 2011). Furthermore, EUCROSS allows us to study Romanian movers, stayers and returnees. Our findings show that, indeed, Romanians’ long-term mobility, motivated especially by work-related reasons, is matched by an increasing short-term mobility in the form of holidays, professional and educational trips or visits to friends and families who live abroad.

Transnationalism from below and cross-border mobility Artisans of new social relations across borders, mobile individuals are fundamental to what Smith and Guarnizo (1998) call ‘transnationalism from below’. This approach zooms in on the individuals and enquires about how they experience transnationalism and what impact it has on their lives. Seen through the lens of micro-processes, cross-border mobility is ultimately an individual experience. As opposed to large systemic transfers of capital, services or goods in an increasing globalised world, cross-border mobilities rely on the capacity, motivation and resources of the individual to cross the border and move from one society to the other. Travelling allows individuals to overcome spatial determination: that is, the limits imposed by birth and the location in which one lives. Simmel ([1908] 1950) argued that mobility and in particular the mobility of the stranger is a hallmark of relations between humans in general: If wandering is the liberation from every given point in space, and thus the conceptual opposite of fixation at such a point, the sociological form of the ‘stranger’ presents the unity, as it were, of these two characteristics. This phenomenon too, however, reveals that spatial relations are only the condition, on the one hand, and the symbol, on the other, of human relations. (Simmel [1908] 1950, 402)

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Mobile individuals are also artisans of personal and social change. Mobility leads to not only encounters and exchanges but also to lasting transformations in ideas, values and even identities. Fligstein (2008), Kuhn (2015) and Recchi (2015) show how intra-European cross-border mobility shifts the identities of European nationals to become more Europhile (for those who experience mobility) or more Eurosceptic for those who do not move. Transnational practices do not occur in a void; they are situated cultural practices (Ong 1999, 17). In our case, cross-border mobility unequivocally exposes individuals to other cultures and makes them less anxious regarding the unknown. Contact with unfamiliar societies, even the superficial contact of short stays such holidays or ‘bubble’ and ‘expat’ experiences, has a distinctive transformative impact. Commenting on German holidaymakers who go to Turkey for holidays with all-inclusive packages and limited contact with everyday life in Turkey, Mau (2010, 31) notes that ‘[E]ven package tourists go astray, get curious, expand their perimeter beyond the hotel facility, go in search of the authentic experience, just as the migrant is confronted with the host society, be it with administrations, at work, or in the neighbourhood’. In what follows we discuss how this cross-border mobility can be explored through the lens of spacesets.

Space-sets as markers of cross-border mobility While geographers have long highlighted the role of space in structuring individual and social existence (Hägerstrand 1975), sociology has been relatively silent on the spatial dimension of individual existence, with a few notable exceptions (Simmel [1908] 1950; Gouldner 1957; Lefebvre 1974; Urry 2000). The pre-eminence of national states in defining identities, rights and duties has always entailed a focus on borders and barriers rather than on spaces and mobility. This does not mean that a world of nation states presupposes immobility and sedentariness. On the contrary, internal mobility between villages, cities and regions (most often with distinct traditions, populations and languages) has been one of the main tools of nation state formation and a fundamental means for the consolidation of national identities. As Gellner (2008) notes, the nation state model is constructed upon an internally fluid but externally bounded space, characterised by free geographic and social mobility. However, with few exceptions, scholars have not approached internal mobility as an individual experience, but rather as a collective mechanism to create political allegiances (Baines 2002). Mobility within nation states has, in consequence, been understood as

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normal and desirable since it contributes to the functioning of labour markets and cultural homogenisation, while mobility between nation states has been seen as anomalous (Torpey 2000; Brubaker 2015: 132). Empowered by transportation and information technologies, globalisation processes intensified the physical and virtual mobility of people across national borders. The EU free movement regime, more than any other international political arrangement, bestows a large array of socioeconomic and political rights upon EU citizens who move to another member state, delinking the enjoyment of rights from residence in the country of nationality. Understanding the spatial dimension of individual mobility therefore becomes an intellectual endeavour important for giving an account of other processes such as supranational identity formation, cultural preferences, political attitudes or social mobility (Recchi and Kuhn 2013). At the same time, cross-border mobility needs to be placed in relation to other markers of differentiation such as education, occupation or social class so as to unveil the factors that render crossborder mobility unequal. Recchi (2015; 2016) coined the term spacesets to refer to ‘the complex of geographical sites where individuals spend their social existence … Space-sets constitute the spatial contexts that are not occupied at the moment and are not immediately accessible due to travel constraints, but which are unified by remembering one’s presence in a geographical space’ (Recchi 2015, 152). Various dimensions are constitutive of individual space-sets. Size refers to the number of places where individuals have physically been. Range refers to the furthest distance ever travelled. Size and range are not necessarily related since people can mention a large number of geographically close locations (within a country for example) or a small number of very distant places (transatlantic migrants for example). The salience of spaces is subjectively defined and depends on individuals’ emotional ties with them. We add another dimension – intensity – that captures the time spent in a location. Given the data structure, we focus in the following on the size, range, intensity and salience of Romanians’ transnational mobility. While range captures the geographical breadth, typically the distance between its constitutive spaces, intensity measures the time spent in the new locations. Short-term trips including single overnight stays can be eye-opening and life-changing. Indeed, by the nature of the experience, exceptional encounters with a new social place with a different language, mores and social organisation can leave a profound effect. Transnational experiences and practices temper a mobile individual’s understanding of both their own community and the one

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visited as it recalibrates both spaces: if an individual has a positive experience, they may be encouraged to travel more, while a negative experience abroad may lead to re-evaluation of the place of origin.

Cross-border mobility and social status in the EU The right to free movement of European citizens removes some of the most obstinate barriers to mobility existent elsewhere, such as national citizenship or preferential migratory regimes (open usually for the highly skilled or the rich). But the de jure equality of mobility rights is not necessarily connected to how cross-border mobility is and can be practised in reality. As Anderson and colleagues (2016) argue, ‘mobility and access to rights of residence for European Union citizens and non-European Union citizens is controlled in relation to work and self-sufficiency’. Although European freedom of movement is the most developed regional form of cross-border mobility in the world (see Barbulescu 2017), their status – as stated in Citizens’ Rights Directive 2004/38/EC – is contingent on their having ‘sufficient resources for themselves not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member state’, and thus mostly on work. European citizenship also protects those who practise mobility from being subject to integration agendas; yet, in fact, Romanians together with other ‘new Europeans’ have been targeted by such government strategies (Barbulescu 2018). The sociodemographic profile of European movers, at least until the Eastern enlargement, is in line with the provisions of the Citizen Rights’ Directive and subscribes to the self-sufficiency condition: the intra-EU migration of Western Europeans has been shown to have a clear component of mobility for non-economic reasons such as love, self-fulfilment, study and lifestyle retirement (Recchi and Favell 2009). Moreover, the EU15 movers who migrate to another member state for work-related reasons are likely to occupy high positions in the occupational pyramid, such as managers and professionals. The incremental visa liberalisation regime of the early 2000s and the 2004 and 2007 enlargements permitted an increasing number of Eastern Europeans to move for economic reasons to another member state. In consequence, work, low skilled in particular, is the main entrance gateway for Eastern European migrants. In an estimate by the European Commission from 2011, 40% of Romanian and Bulgarian movers in the EU undertake elementary occupations, as opposed to only 10% of EU15 migrants. When comparing the two largest groups of East European movers, Poles and Romanians, Recchi (2015,

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74) observes that while a large proportion of both are in elementary occupations at the onset of their migratory projects, Poles become upwardly mobile in subsequent years, decreasing their presence in manual jobs. Romanians, on the contrary, remain largely confined to blue-collar jobs, despite their over-qualification for these positions (European Commission 2016, 184). While these findings suggest that a low socioeconomic background is not a barrier to Romanians’ medium- and long-term migration in Europe, less is known about their short-term international journeys. However, we know from the mobility-related literature that socioeconomic inequalities most often translate into mobility inequality. The less educated, those with fewer socioeconomic resources, women and older people are on the immobile side of the spectrum (Recchi 2008; Ohnmacht et  al 2009; Mau 2010; Favell and Recchi 2011; Recchi 2016). This is true for both shortterm and long-term cross-border mobility, albeit that international tourism is ‘the most common and geographically widespread form of transnationalisation from below’ (Mau 2010, 78). We anticipate that movers have overall higher educational attainment than stayers, despite the mismatch between their qualifications and occupational status in countries of destination. As Mau (2010, 131) argues, education confers sociocultural competences that are needed in order to ‘understand other codes, conventions, attitudes and modes of behaviour across cultural boundaries’. A similar argument can be made in relation to age. Young people tend to be better equipped to work or travel in another country. Several factors can explain this trend. First, the jobs available in better performing economies tend to favour younger candidates. Secondly, personal circumstances such as fewer care responsibilities constitute an important lack of impediment that is more difficult to avoid at an older age. Thirdly, socialisation into transnational and cross-border practices, even if only virtual and remote, is much more common among younger generations. On the other hand, war and the memory of it constituted the main experience through which Western Europeans became aware of each other during the 1950s and 1960s, a fact that fundamentally changed after the development of IT and transport technologies over the past decades (Mau 2010). As regards gender, recent data shows that almost half of all international migrants are women (OECD 2016). However, while the feminisation of migration occurred in most economic sectors, gender inequality is occupation specific, with the overrepresentation of migrant women in the care and domestic work sector and their still limited presence among managers and professionals (Kofman

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and Raghuram 2010; Piperno 2012). Yet the presence of Romanian movers among the top sectors of the occupational pyramid needs further assessment. Recent studies argue that work-related crossborder mobility can actually become a powerful resource for women coming from patriarchal home contexts. Education, age and gender not only shape migratory projects that have a medium- or long-term perspective (Cass et al 2005), but they also generate unequal access to other forms of spatial mobility such as short trips and stays in other countries. Education and age confer skills for navigating through different cultures and places and embarking on the visual consumption of places (Urry and Larsen 2011). The sociocultural competences gained through education and by being younger imply that those with tertiary education and the youth are more likely to be found among Romanian movers. The same characteristics affect the range of trips and stays abroad by cultivating curiosity and interest in other places. As Kaufmann and Montulet (2008) argue, gender does not necessarily have an empowering effect in the case of short-term mobility. The mobility of one, even short-term, is related to the immobility of the other, drawing special attention to the fact that the professional success achieved by one partner through cross-border mobility (usually the husband) is frequently possible due to the stay-at-home role of the wife. In a similar vein, we expect that care responsibilities are more likely to prevent Romanian women than men making short trips abroad, especially in the case of work-related mobility. Building on this idea, we expect that occupational status is important for the size and range of individual space-sets. While the intra-EU migratory regime lowers the barriers for skilled and unskilled workers alike, short-term spatial mobility is more likely to be afforded by managers, professionals and students than by unskilled workers. The ‘mobility ethos’ of the upper part of the occupational pyramid, as well as the financial resources related to these professions, constitute the most plausible explanation. While social status structures mobility experiences both in their long and short temporal span, mobility in general might have an additive effect. Thus, Romanian movers are likely to have a larger and broader extent of cross-border mobility than their co-nationals residing at home and who share a similar social status. Short- and long-term cross-border mobility constitutes a capital that invites the further consumption of places and cultures. Interestingly, a low occupational profile can also be used for mobility capital, especially under the free movement regime. Precarious and short-term work contracts for

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low-skilled Eastern European migrants led to the ‘hyper-flexibility’ of jobs and tasks (Recchi 2015, 73). This may actually push Romanian migrants to change not only the workplace but also to search for better opportunities in other countries where personal networks can be of help (Elrick and Ciobanu 2009).

Data and methodology We examine the space-sets of short-term physical mobility for different types of Romanian citizens according to their experience of long-term mobility. This analysis exploits a key strength of the EUCROSS dataset (Favell et al 2011), namely the availability of a sample of Romanian nationals living in Romania and a sample of Romanian nationals living in the five other EU countries that make up the study – Denmark, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. Specifically, we use the EUCROSS dataset to compare the size (frequency) and range (number of countries) of cross-national short-term visits – that is, which include at least an overnight stay – between Romanians who have never left their country of origin for a period longer than three months (stayers), Romanians who have left and returned (returnees) and Romanians who are currently living abroad (movers). To conduct these analyses we rely on both descriptive statistics and visualisation techniques, including choropleth maps to visualise the geographical distribution of mobility, and regression models for ordinal and cardinal data (Scott Long and Freese 2006), to evaluate the differences in space-sets between mobility types controlling for key demographic and socioeconomic covariates. Although other aspects of the survey and the dataset are discussed in the Methodological Appendix, it is appropriate here to note that unlike the EUCROSS national samples, the Romanian migrant sample dataset does not have survey weights available. This means that descriptive statistics for the sample of movers, unlike those of stayers and returnees, are not adjusted for unequal selection probability and should be interpreted with caution.1 The size of space-sets is measured as the number of cross-border trips in the past 24 months recoded from the original categories in the questionnaire and has three categories: no transnational mobility   However, this becomes less of an issue with the regression models, as the unweighted estimates of the association between the target variable and the main predictors need not be biased when those factors that would typically account for unequal selection (eg age, gender and educational achievement) are adjusted for in the models (Winship and Radbill 1994). 1

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(0 trips), up to two trips, and three or more trips.2 The range of spacesets is measured as the number of different countries in Europe that the respondent has visited. In terms of the third indicator of space-sets, intensity, our analysis refers only to short stays abroad. Because there are great distributional differences, with the majority of Romanians not travelling abroad, we specify an ordered logistic regression for the size outcome and a negative binomial regression for the range outcome.3 To explore the salience dimension of space-sets, we turn to the qualitative sample in the EUCROSS survey. The sample contains 10 qualitative interviews with stayers who have participated in the quantitative survey and agreed to be contacted for a second face-toface interview (compare also Favell and Nebe 2009). The interviews took place in Romanian urban areas in April–August 2013. To measure salience, respondents were asked to identify the ‘most memorable’ thing about their trip abroad and explain why the trip they have made is particularly significant for them.

Profiling the space-sets of cross-border mobility of Romanian stayers, movers and returnees in Europe In Figure  7.1, we observe an overwhelming preference for similar destinations for all Romanians. What do these places have to offer? Measured against any yardstick, travelling abroad is expensive in terms of financial costs and time. This is even more the case for Romanians who are at the bottom of the EU in terms of earnings. Unlike Northern Europeans, who might travel for holidays in destinations where they can feel the light and warmth of the summer sun, Romanians have this at home. If we look at the map of destinations, it seems overwhelmingly dominated   Different categorisations for the size variable, even a binary ‘no trips abroad’ vs ‘one or more trips’, produced broadly similar results in sign and statistical significance of coefficients, indicating that the main differences are to be found between mobile and immobile respondents. Note also that our ‘range’ indicator is somewhat different from Recchi’s (2015) original proposal. 3   The Spread outcome is a count variable that is heavily right-skewed and features a large number of zeros – ie respondents who have not visited any countries. Therefore, OLS regression is inadequate even with transformations. Instead, we used count data regression models such as Poisson, Negative Binomial (NB) and their zero-inflated (ZI) extensions (where ‘0’ responses are modelled separately). Overall, the NB and ZINB provided similar model fit and robust results, thus favouring the simpler NB specification. Model comparisons were conducted with Stata command countfit from the SPOST13 package developed by Scott Long and Freese (2006). 2

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Notes: Stayers’ and returnees’ estimates are weighted, while movers’ estimates are unweighted. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

Figure 7.1: Destinations for cross-border mobility of Romanian nationals in Europe (% visiting each destination) Understanding Romanians’ cross-border mobility in Europe

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by emblematic cities and countries. Europe’s Germany–France axis is well represented. One can barely count any visitors to Lithuania or Poland. Instead, Europe’s old metropolitan hubs, with their statues, museums and towers that routinely feature in films and documentaries on the screens of Romanians, are the preferred destinations. Following the map of fridge magnets gives travellers the advantage of seeing in person the places that occupy their imaginary of the abroad. From the easternmost EU border, the imaginary of where to visit, experience and do business is firmly bounded to old Europe. Movers and returnees differ largely from stayers with regard to all indicators of transnational mobility analysed. As regards the reasons for cross-border mobility, stayers, returnees and movers primarily move to spend vacations. Movers lead this trend with a share of 78.9% of individuals who engage in short-term mobility practices for ‘holidays’. The second most important driver for mobility differs, however, from one group to the other: ‘visiting friends and family’ for stayers, and ‘professional reasons’ for returnees (Table 7.1). This latter indicates an ongoing professional link with people and companies abroad after their return. Cross-border mobility varies considerably according to the sociodemographic characteristics of the individuals. Table  7.2 summarises the descriptive analysis of the three groups of Romanian citizens and provides a comprehensive picture of their profiles. Stayers and returnees have similar age profiles, at 43 and 41 years old respectively. However, movers’ age varies widely depending on the country of residence, ranging from 32 in Denmark to 47 in Germany. Concerning gender distribution, stayers are balanced as they represent the overall population of Romania and the sample has been randomly drawn. Thus, there is a figure of 49% of males and 51% of females. Table 7.1: Reasons for cross-border mobility in last 24 months (multiple answers allowed, in %)

Vacation Visit friends/relatives Other private reasons Professional reasons Education Volunteering Other

Stayers 64.2 8.7 4.4 19.3 0 0 0 n = 359

Source: EUCROSS (2016)

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Returnees 55.1 31.9 8.3 38.0 0 1.4 1.4 n = 173

Movers 78.9 24.7 3.5 13.3 1.6 0 0.8 n = 705

Understanding Romanians’ cross-border mobility in Europe Table 7.2: Sociodemographic profiles of Romanian stayers, returnees and movers (%)

Age: mean (SD)

Movers Movers Movers Movers Movers Stayers Returnees DK DE IT ES UK 43.2 41.3 32.8 47.6 42.2 36.7 33.2 (14.9) (12.8) (10.5) (12.0) (10.7) (8.4) (9.0)

Gender Male 46.7 Female 53.3 Employment status Full-time 47.0 Part-time 3.8 In education 4.3 Unemployed 6.9 Retired 21.5 Care 14.8 Other 1.7 Education Lower secondary 31.4 or less Intermediate 15.0 secondary Higher secondary 40.5 Tertiary 13.1 Household economic status Very comfortable 3.8 Comfortable 22.8 Make ends meet 43.1 Difficult 16.8 Very difficult 13.5 Average N* 780

61.2 38.8

58.8 41.2

43.2 56.8

39.6 60.4

41.6 58.4

51.2 48.8

54.1 4.4 1.0 11.9 15.1 12.8 0.7

60.6 8.0 16.1 7.6 4.0 3.6 0.0

58.1 11.0 2.9 5.3 15.0 7.3 0.4

55.4 14.9 6.4 5.6 3.6 12.9 1.2

56.4 13.2 0.8 9.2 1.6 17.2 1.6

66.9 12.1 10.1 2.8 1.2 6.1 0.8

22.7

2.8

3.7

2.0

6.4

6.1

15.2

9.3

11.1

8.9

23.6

5.2

48.4 13.7

28.2 59.7

42.2 43.0

60.3 28.7

53.4 16.5

33.9 54.8

6.6 26.2 44.8 14.8 7.6 173

15.3 56.1 26.2 2.0 0.4 249

11.0 56.5 29.3 2.8 0.4 244

3.2 49.6 36.3 9.3 1.6 246

8.4 46.6 39.4 4.8 0.8 249

8.9 45.1 35.9 7.3 2.8 247

Note: *The maximum variation in the sample size across all categories is 14. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

However, women are slightly overrepresented (53%) across the four countries in our dataset. Interestingly, returnees show a markedly gendered profile, with 61.2% males. If we look at the gender profile of movers across the four countries in our dataset we find that women are overrepresented in Germany, Italy and Spain, whereas men are the largest group of Romanian movers in Denmark and the UK, even though in this latter country only slightly. With regard to economic status, Romanian stayers are predominantly in full-time employment followed by retirees, those with care duties, the unemployed, part-time workers and those still in education.

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Returnees, on the other hand, are most represented amongst fulltime workers and retirees. As expected, Romanian movers overall are much more concentrated than stayers in active employment either as full-timers or part-timers. The share of movers with care duties almost matches the figure for stayers in Spain and Italy and is much lower in Denmark and the UK. These findings are not surprising if we examine the reasons movers give for settling in the new country of residence. Looking for a job or taking up employment account for to two-thirds of all motives for movers. Love, family ties or lifestyle reasons are secondary to workrelated motivations, a fact which further reinforces the idea that Eastern European migration in general, and Romanian migration in particular, is quite distinct from the predominant lifestyle mobility of EU15 movers (Benson and O’Reilly 2009; Recchi and Favell 2009). These overall patterns for the economic status of Romanian movers are replicated in the four countries analysed. Yet there are some countryspecific differences in the extent of full-time and part-time employment of movers that are likely to be explained by the availability of these types of employment as well as the length of residence of Romanian movers in those countries. For instance, we find that the largest share of movers in full-time employment is found in the UK, followed by Denmark, Germany, Spain and Italy. Part-time employment is more frequent for movers in Italy and Spain, followed by those in the UK, Germany and Denmark, with an average of part-time employment below overall employment. Interestingly, in Denmark and the UK the share of movers in education is well above the average, also compared to that of stayers. In Germany and Spain the share of movers in education is far below the averages in the other countries. With regard to unemployment, movers are less likely to be unemployed than stayers who, in turn, are less likely to be unemployed than returnees. The only outlier to this pattern is Spain, where the share of Romanian movers in unemployment is slightly above that found for stayers, which suggests again country-specific reasons for this figure related to the extent of unemployment in the Spanish labour market. The share of retirees is always very low as compared to Romanian stayers and returnees. The proportion of movers with higher secondary education is higher than that of stayers in Spain and Italy and lower in Denmark and the UK. For tertiary education, the share of movers with university qualifications is always larger in the four countries analysed than that found for stayers. Yet the two countries with the lowest shares of movers with tertiary education are Italy and Spain.

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Concerning the self-reported level of satisfaction with their current household income, movers appear to be overall better off than stayers as well as returnees, albeit important differences among countries of residence can be observed. This is most likely related to specific characteristics of the labour markets of these countries in terms of pay and rewards. While almost two-thirds of the sample says that they live comfortably in Denmark, only half of the Italian sample declares this. For returnees and stayers, the share of those who find it difficult and very difficult is much higher, reaching close to a third of all their counterparts.

Determinants of Romanians’ mobility in Europe This section presents the findings of the regression models for each of the outcomes of interest, namely the size and range of space-sets. We aim to investigate whether these differences in transnational mobility patterns can be accounted for by key differences in the sociodemographic characteristics of movers, stayers and returnees. A simple description of the dependent variables (size and range) points to the large differences in short-term mobility practices between stayers, movers and returnees. Table 7.3 shows that the proportion of Table 7.3: Size and range of short-term mobility over past 24 months by type of respondent (%) Stayer Visits No visits 76.6 Up to two 15.7 Three or more  7.7 Number of countries 0 77.1 1 13.6 2  4.4 3  3.0 4  0.8 5  0.6 6  0.4 >7  0.1 Average N* 780

Returnees

Mover Mover Mover Mover Mover DK DE IT ES UK

50.8 27.7 21.5

30.2 27.4 42.3

37.2 28.0 34.8

42.9 35.6 21.5

66.0 22.4 11.6

39.9 28.2 31.9

51.6 23.5  9.1  5.8  3.4  2.9  2.7  1.0 172

32.0 16.0 16.8 16.0 9.2 4.8 3.2 2.0 249

39.6 21.2 14.4 12.8 4.8 3.2 1.6 2.4 244

45.2 28.0 14.0 8.8 2.0 0.4 0.4 1.2 249

68.8 13.6 10.0 2.0 2.8 0.8 1.2 0.8 250

42.3 19.0 14.5 9.7 5.2 4.4 0.8 4.0 248

Note: *The maximum variation in the sample size across all categories is 14. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

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immobiles among stayers represents two-thirds of the sample, while the number of those who did not make any cross-border trip in the last two years decreases to half and one-third for returnees and movers respectively. The bottom half of the table also indicates that the range of countries visited varies widely amongst respondents according to their experience of long-term mobility. Movers and returnees are more likely than stayers to report having visited one or more countries, but there is considerable heterogeneity amongst movers. The high number of Romanian stayers that did not make any international trip in the past two years suggests that, despite the increase in cross-border tourism and business and the growing professional and educational links across borders, there is a very large share of the population that is not ‘on the move’, not even for very short and episodic trips. Movers and returnees, in contrast, are much more integrated in the crossborder flows of tourists, professionals, students and the nomadic. Table 7.4 reports the results of the regression models for short-term physical mobility, defined here as visits abroad that included overnight stays and lasted no longer than three months in the last 24 months. Except for the movers residing in Spain, the mover–stayer divide is evident for both the number of trips as well as the number of countries visited. Movers and returnees have positive and significant coefficients indicating more frequent and wider transnational short-term mobility than stayers. As noted, however, the extent of mobility varies by country of residence. Thus, Romanians residing in Denmark and Germany seem to be much more mobile – compared to Romanian stayers – than those residing in the UK or Italy. Crucially, Romanians living in Spain appear not to differ from Romanian stayers on the size or range of their space-sets. These differences are net of other prima facie key determinants of mobility such as age, respondent and parental education, economic status of the household, occupation, employment status or gender, for which the model also estimates coefficients. Thus, we observe clear occupational differences whereby all the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) classes, except plant and machine operators with a negative but insignificant coefficient, report lower mobility than managers. Routine, agricultural and low-skilled services workers are the least mobile. Meanwhile, not surprisingly, individuals who live in households experiencing difficulties in making ends meet are less likely to travel to other countries. There is also evidence of a strong educational effect on mobility, where respondents with tertiary education (and/or those with parents with higher education) are much more likely to travel abroad more frequently and widely.

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Understanding Romanians’ cross-border mobility in Europe Table 7.4: Regression models for intensity and size of short-term mobility space‑sets Intensity (frequency of visits) (Ord. Logit)

Predictors (ref. category) Status (reference: stayers) Returnees 1.036*** Movers DK 1.078*** Movers DE 1.274*** Movers IT 1.007*** Movers ES 0.255 Movers UK 0.619*** HH economic status (reference: very comfortable) Comfortable –0.260 Make ends meet –0.673** Difficult –1.209*** Very difficult –1.308** Occupation (reference: manager) Professionals –0.501* Technicians –0.813** Clerical support –0.583* Services/sales –0.891*** Skilled agric. –1.212* Craft and related –0.781** Plant and machine –0.293 Elementary –1.240*** Education (reference: lower secondary or less) Intermediate secondary 0.425 Higher secondary 0.501 Tertiary 1.287*** Gender Female –0.366** Employment (reference: paid work) Not in paid work –0.211 Retired –0.072 Age (reference: 18–29) 30–44 –0.034 45–59 –0.223 >60 –0.636* Father’s education (reference: lower secondary or less) Intermediate secondary 0.196 Higher secondary 0.137 Tertiary 0.753***

Size (number of countries visited) (Neg. Bin.) 0.684*** 0.780*** 0.669*** 0.580*** 0.248 0.495*** 0.052 –0.253 –0.715*** –0.644* –0.400** –0.616*** –0.515** –0.579*** –0.835* –0.595*** –0.151 –0.856*** 0.543 0.547* 1.157*** –0.142 –0.064 –0.269 –0.028 –0.084 –0.194 0.157 0.065 0.408*** (continued)

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Predictors (ref. category) Cut 1 (constant) Cut 2 (constant) Constant Ln(alpha) N

Intensity (frequency of visits) (Ord. Logit) –0.349 1.093*

1,399

Size (number of countries visited) (Neg. Bin.)

–0.440 –0.308** 1,405

Note: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

These differences are less obvious between those with different levels of secondary education, even though there seems to be a significant positive gap in the number of countries visited. Women engage in transnational trips less frequently but do not differ significantly in the range of countries visited. Finally, age does not seem to make much of a difference in either size or range, with only a marginally significant negative coefficient for those over 60 on frequency of visits.

Most memorable cross-border trips: the salience dimension of space-sets Turning to the question of saliency and the qualitative interviews, we see that for the participants who are frequent travellers, it is difficult to limit themselves to one single ‘most memorable trip’. They indicate several memorable trips that made a strong impression on them for different reasons. The first trip abroad is likely to be the most salient as it is experienced more intensely than others (Croitoru 2014). In particular, what left a vivid impression was the first trip abroad for those who had the opportunity to travel before the collapse of Ceausescu’s dictatorship or immediately after while the country was still closed to outside influences. Marian travelled for the first time in 1990 when he was 34 years old, because, as he emphasises, “before 1990 you couldn’t leave except in organized trips, but since my wife and I were engineers we did not have the financial possibilities … There were other priorities for us then”. As soon as it was safe to travel, he booked a hotel for two weeks in Istanbul for himself and his wife and they got on a train. The decision to go to Istanbul as opposed to other destinations has to do with the fact that his wife,

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who is of Turkish Tatar origin, had a friend who was also from the same minority living in Turkey. Existing networks therefore channel the mobility not only for Romanian migrants (Elrick and Ciobanu 2009) but also for Romanian visitors. Marian recalls the experience as a great joy: Interviewer: ‘Was it a positive experience or quite the contrary?’ Marian: ‘Positive, yeah. And great happiness at the thought of going abroad.’ Interviewer: ‘Why do you say that?’ Marian: ‘Great joy because of leaving, because of having the opportunity to go, to see how a shop looks like after staring at our empty stores. And next to the hotel there was this store that sold watches. At closing time, they’d take all the watches and put them back the next day. Every morning the watches were in their place and I was fascinated about that.’ Far beyond discovering the city of Istanbul or Turkish society, Marian was experiencing the sharper edges of decades in which the economies of the two countries walked on divergent paths. The trip was extraordinary for the irreplicable conditions under which it took place. Marian now works for a German company as the manager of its branch in Romania; he has travelled extensively in Europe and outside and the country itself has changed, aligning its economy along free market principles. He was another man then and Romania was another country. ‘It’s very hard to say now about what I thought then because everything was completely different, it was something else. Now they cannot give me the same impression, like it was then, coming from a communist country with … in the province there weren’t even places where you could eat, but in Turkey there were shops at every corner where you could eat well.’ Yet on a personal level, Marian remembers clearly the trip he took again with his wife to London. They had decided to go to London as his wife had taken English language lessons. “She knew it [London] almost perfectly from her discussions with the teacher and all the books she got from her, this being before 1990.” In London, they

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booked a hotel close to Hyde Park, a Victorian building, and spent a week visiting the places marked on his wife’s mental map. They were restless during those few days, hurrying from one place to another but expressed with pride that they “managed to see almost all that was worth seeing”. Violeta, who is considerably younger, also travels greatly but her experiences abroad are rather more nuanced than those of Marian. For her, the ability to travel abroad came naturally and started early. At 15, Violeta went on a school trip to a beach resort in Bulgaria and has never stopped since: Paris, London, Amsterdam, Corsica, Spain, Germany, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Monaco, Greece and Hungary. Her most memorable trip was a holiday in Corsica. She was there with a friend who lives in France who acted as a cultural intermediary decoder and explained the common practices, thus lifting the weight of dealing with the unknown – even in the lessened version of a holiday resort in a country whose language she speaks and that she visits often. Violeta is part of a new generation of Romanian youth who is knowledgeable about the places she visits, looks for the ‘essence’ of a place and travels comfortably (economically and culturally) in search of new experiences across the continent. While Martin is keen on visiting the emblematic places in a city, Violeta visits them too but dislikes them and quickly goes off the tourist map. “I didn’t like Notre Dame at all, it seemed as if it was exactly like the Inquisition period, it was like everybody is looking and … so that’s why it seemed like a sensation.” In turn, Paris for her is to be found not on the streets of Paris but in certain rituals that she labels as ‘Paris’. ‘I mean, Paris! Paris is Paris. Uuh, that morning sensation, of coffee in the morning, always  … relax, of croissant, of staying on the patio and watching the morning with disengagement. It’s a thing of Paris that I don’t think you can describe unless you’ve slept there. So that sensation of morning coffee and croissant. It seems like a thing I’ve never encountered before.’ Yet not everybody appreciates their stays abroad in the same way. Bogdana’s case could not be more different. Bogdana experienced places abroad as a labourer, a waged domestic worker in private households. She only crossed the border to take work. Despite her recurrent returns, Bogdana continued to work abroad at the time the interview was conducted. Tatiana has a child and left Romania first when she was 34, relatively later than the average European

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mover (Recchi and Favell 2009). She has worked as an elderly care assistant (badante) in Italy, first in Sicily with one family, then in Parma with another, and later in a village near Salzburg, in Austria, with yet another family. She returned to Romania after each job, having secured enough money to meet the mortgage bill and provide for her child. As someone who has lived abroad for significant periods of time and has taken a key role in local families in two countries, she had a more complex understanding of these places. They have affected her in a profoundly different manner. For Bogdana, across the border there are “hospitable, warm” people as well as “mean, malicious” people. If one comes to have as employers one of the latter category, then she is “unlucky”. She has been unlucky in Italy but felt compelled to cross the border again to Austria. In Salzburg, she found another family for whom she works on a cyclical basis with two continuous months living there and two months in Romania, where she keeps a local job. In this way, Bogdana adheres to the liquid migration trends that Engbersen and colleagues (2010; 2013) describe. She was “lucky” in Salzburg, where she has found an employer who treats her well, and this experience alone makes Austria her most memorable experience abroad. “God loves me very much”, she says, because she has found this new employer. When she is asked about what she does not like in Austria she answers “nothing, absolutely nothing” and hurries to list all its positive aspects: ‘[T]heir beautiful culture, the people … maybe that’s how the people I met were, friendly, including in this village, everybody knew me and everybody said hello. I was also honest myself, I never mocked anybody, not even in Italy you know, this is how I am, but I saw that people are mean.’ For other Romanians, however, the experience abroad reconfirms their attachment to their own country and people. Morosanu (2013b) also finds similar practices amongst long-term Romanian migrants who sustain cross-border friendships and favour frequent and intense contact with Romanians at home who are their ‘soul friends’. Tatiana, who had moved to Bucharest to study at the university but soon dropped out and took a job, has travelled abroad to Budapest and Greece. She leaves no doubt about the fact that she did not enjoy Budapest or Hungary. Greece she appreciated; she liked the sea on the island of Thassos, and went twice in the same year for holidays there. However, the trips abroad reaffirmed her positive outlook on Romania and Romanian people, who are “friendlier, warmer”. The hardening

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of previous perceptions comes as a response to the threatening culture abroad and a sense of risk of being discriminated against, something that is documented in a number of studies (Fox et al 2012; 2015). Toma is a youngster who lives in a town near the border with Bulgaria and has only travelled to Bulgaria. Crossing the river Danube, which forms a natural border with Bulgaria in Romania’s southern region, Toma always stopped in the first city across the border, Silistra. He travelled there for various reasons, and, equally important, he travelled each time in different company: once with his parents before 1990 to visit relatives who live in Silistra, once with a friend to buy a secondhand car and the third time with his wife for their honeymoon. The most memorable was the trip with his wife, a trip in which the newlyweds had more time and money to explore the city. Rita has had a similar cross-border experience to a neighbouring country. Rita and her friends decided to spend New Year’s Eve abroad and went by car from their village to Serbia. While brief, their adventure cost Rita and her friends dearly: “Not having a job yet, we borrowed money to be able to go, which we returned in a period of two years [laughs], I think.” While some Romanians travel abroad to visit places, to spend holidays in the sun or, as in Bogdana’s case, to work, others take short trips with professional groups for competitions or school exchanges. Daniel is one of these. Although he had previously travelled with his parents on holidays as well, his most memorable trip abroad was to Spain when he participated in a school exchange programme. It was his first trip abroad on his own; Daniel was housed by a local family and he joined the local school for a period of two weeks. In his class, there were students from eight other countries and he made friends with whom he keeps in contact via social media. With the host family, he felt well cared for and this experience contributed to a lasting impression: “it was very beautiful, I felt like their second child. Very caring, very chatty…” Similarly, Ruxandra crossed the border as part of an ensemble for folkloric music. While it is unusual for someone of her generation to take an interest in this type of music, Roxana admits that she joined the ensemble because she had heard that the group travels abroad often. Her first experience abroad was when she was 16 years old and went to Budapest to do a show with the group. ‘I thought it was extraordinary, especially since it was a very big difference, I don’t know when was this, in 1990 something … ’98, ’98–’99, something like that and it was still, I mean, it was big difference between Romania, and

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especially from Piteşti, where, I don’t think I even went to Bucharest before, once or twice like, visiting and cities like Paris, Vienna, Nice, Krakow, Warsaw … I liked a lot … Budapest, every one of them.’ Her most memorable trip, however, remains the one to Paris when she had more time for sightseeing and went to Disneyland. Matei also travels frequently as part of a professional association. A martial arts practitioner, he often goes abroad to take part in international competition accompanied by his colleagues and coach. Most trips are low-budget short-stays as competitions of this sort tend to take place over the weekend so people can return to their day jobs. While he has travelled extensively, Matei most enjoyed a trip to Sicily in Italy. Interestingly he does not recall the exact name of the place but remembers the fact that it was a beach resort and the competition was part of a series of events taking place in the evenings in the resort. ‘It was a very beautiful area, right next to the beach. We did go to the beach. The sand was quite hot, you could not stand on it. Clean. […] We stayed for a number of days. The competition was the same: strong, but more relaxed. Plus the experiences I had there with walking around, with going out, with their festival area.’ The majority of the respondents had their most memorable experiences in the EU or Turkey, which is not surprising as the data presented in previous sections indicate these are the most visited destination. For Mihnea, however, a trip to India was his memorable one. When asked why, he answers that “[I]t was memorable because you encounter the limits of human existence”. Mihnea is an ethnic German who went to a German school and whose parents emigrated to Germany in 1988 following a specific flow of migration studied by Anghel (2013; see also Fassmann and Munz 1994). Mihnea therefore has a significant and constant exchange with Germany and German society, which he knows well. For him, cross-border experiences in Europe are mundane. Mihnea is part of what Verwiebe (2008) calls an emerging middle class of EU citizens. For Mihnea the trip to India was transformative. As his children play tennis and they received an invitation to join a tournament in India, Mihnea decided to seize the opportunity and take the whole family for a trip. The competition took place over three cities and he could observe the differences within India.

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‘India appeared in a bad light to me. Children were abandoned on the streets, some sort of boulevards, naked children, imagine. And just near them, that’s the problem, they don’t have neighbourhoods, near these promiscuous places you could see big villas, wrought iron fences, expensive cars, Bentley, bodyguards. The Bentley was passing right amidst those naked children  …. [By comparison], I was not impressed the first time I went to Germany.’ Perhaps not surprisingly, none of the interviewees in our sample had the most memorable cross-border experience in the same destination. Their perceptions are formed by the people with whom they travelled, the circumstances of the travel and the time and capital they had available. It is noteworthy that language was not mentioned by any of them as a major barrier, most mastering some level of English, using sign language or, as one of the respondents put it, speaking with “cash”. Interestingly, all participants had vivid sensory memories of the places they have visited and are prompted by aesthetic social experiences. For Marian, Turkey had a particular ‘scent’; Mihnea brought home cooking spices from India which he still keeps “in a jar at home, I was this impressed”; Violeta, in turn, saw France as perfume and compared Paris with a “perfume shop”. It is “nice”, “pleasant”; the “infrastructure is good, it is tidier, cleaner – even the sea is cleaner in Greece than Romania’s Black Sea”. The constant comparisons which Romanians make with experiences abroad leads to frustration with how some things are done in Romania. For most Romanians, travel abroad tends towards sites of prosperity but also history and capital.

Conclusion As one of the Romanian interviewees astutely reflects, back in 1989 Romanians were different and Romania was another country. Crossing the border was almost as unimaginable as economic wealth. Romanians’ cross-border mobility, or rather the lack of it, took a dramatic turn after a series of political changes that started with visa liberalisation and culminated with the country’s accession to the EU. This chapter has delved into this historical reality and analysed how previously nationally constructed space-sets and points of reference became Europeanised through the removal of barriers to mobility.

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Our findings show that, indeed, Romanians’ long-term mobility, motivated especially by work-related reasons, is matched by an increasing short-term mobility in the form of holidays, professional and educational trips or visits to friends and family who live abroad. However, this broader picture conceals the differences in the resources available to undertake international journeys and to relate to other countries and cultures. Despite the increase in international mobility, two-thirds of Romanian stayers had not crossed the border in the past two years. The proportion of non-mobile people among movers and returnees is smaller, with large variations across countries of residence. This finding suggests that long-term mobility has a ‘sticky’ nature and predicts short-term mobility practices irrespective of individual socioeconomic resources. As Kaufmann (2002) argues, mobility is a form of capital that can be ‘cashed in’ through skills and resources to navigate distinct places beyond the borders of one’s country. Socioeconomic resources also play a relevant role in the construction of Europeanised space-sets. In line with previous literature (Kaufmann 2002; Mau 2010; Recchi and Favell 2009; Recchi 2016), our analysis shows that education, occupation, income and gender define how much and how often people can travel. In this case, while the migration of Romanian workers to Western Europe largely fills in the bottom of the occupational pyramid, holidays abroad, professional and educational trips, touristic curiosities and the maintenance of social ties across borders are mostly confined to the most educated and the better off. Moreover, Romanians’ space-sets remain gendered despite the increase in women’s short-term and long-term mobilities. Men travel more often and become acquainted with a larger number of countries, reinforcing the idea that the mobility of one partner, usually the man, is supported by the immobility of the other, usually the woman. While the size and range of individual space-sets is mostly determined by individual resources, their salience escapes socioeconomic differences. What makes a place memorable is subjectively and contextually defined and mostly depends on the specific circumstances of one’s trip and company. Places stick to one’s memory through smell, visual impact and people. The perfume of croissant or coffee mingles with the image of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ people and sketches a stylised memory of a place that becomes memorable. This suggests an astonishment rather than an aesthetic experience. In such a complex interplay of familiarity and dépaysement lies a mystery of human attachment to places that certainly deserves further micro-sociological research.

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EIGHT

Transnational Turkey: the everyday transnationalism and diversity of Turkish populations in Europe Deniz Neriman Duru, Adrian Favell and Albert Varela

Introduction Turkish-origin populations are recognised as the largest non-national group resident across Europe (EUROSTAT 2015), and their highly transnational profile is well known (Küçükcan and Güngör 2009; Abadan-Unat 2011). The transnationalism of Turkish, Kurdish and other Turkish-origin migrants living in Europe has mostly been explored through their sense of belonging: for example, in studies of locality, town, country of residence and/or origin, and its relation to ideas of Europe, homeland or world citizenship; or in terms of daily interactions with the locals/natives, and the multiple, sometimes contradictory, identifications to which this leads – Turco-German, cosmopolitan, European, Turkish nationalist, Alevi, Kurdish exile, and so on (see Geaves 2003; Kaya 2007; Mandel 2008; Toktas 2012; Fokkema et al 2017; Cesur et al 2018). Yet, despite an ever growing literature, there is little work detailing their physical and virtual transnationalism on a broader and comparative scale, as has been possible using data from the EUCROSS survey (see Pötzschke et al 2014; Pötzschke 2015). With the dataset available to us, this chapter focuses on the transnational practices of Turkish and Kurdish migrants living in Denmark, Germany, Italy, Romania and the UK, adopting a mixedmethods research design, enabled by a combination of work completed (a quantitative survey of 250  Turkish nationals and 10 in-depth interviews in each of the five countries, leaving aside Spain which only has a very small Turkish-origin population).1 Our goal is initially   A Turkish government source estimated (2011) the following populations of Turkish in our countries of interest: Germany (2,502,000); UK (79,000); Denmark (55,000); 1

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descriptive and cartographic, in line with other chapters: to offer a broad and detailed view of the population which captures the variety and internal cleavages within this particular case of European social transnationalism. In turn, though, such a view provides insight into the intimacy and difficulty with which Turkey is socially and politically integrated into Europe, as well as its broader geopolitical positioning. After a literature review on the study of Turkey in Europe and a discussion of the wider research questions raised by the case of Turkish transnationalism, we organise our analysis in three main sections. In a first section, we document the demographics of the Turkish sample across the five nations in Europe, and the basic crossborder mobilities of this population in terms of their physical and virtual mobility. The emphasis here is on the sheer varieties of social transnationalism found amongst the Turkish in Europe. By ‘Turkish’ as a whole we mean strictly in terms of formal nationality: that is, those who hold Turkish citizenship. The sample does not include Turkishorigin populations who have naturalised – a substantially growing and significant population in sociological terms (see Crul et al 2012) – but it does include persons of various ethnic origins in Turkey, including majority Turkish ethnic, Kurdish, Zaza, Alevi, Sunni Muslim, secular and so on (we also exclude from our study those with a TurkishCypriot passport). It is also distinctly diverse in socioeconomic terms. Secondly, having also looked at these questions in the survey data, we explore the qualitative interviews on the migrants’ use of internet and social networks, and particularly the ways in which they communicate with family and friends living abroad and follow/consume Turkish and foreign news media. Thirdly, using a dimension of the survey not so present in other parts of this volume, we explore the migrant sample’s transnational political engagement through the use of social media. A key part of this question is the relation to ongoing political developments in Turkey and the Middle Eastern region, which are every bit as divisive among the transnational population as they are at home. Notably, the qualitative interviews were conducted prior to and during the Gezi Park protests (April–August 2013). Italy (25,000). See www.ytb.gov.tr/uploads/resimler/kitaplar_pdf/Avrupada_yasayan_ turkleranketi.pdf. These figures may include naturalised citizens. The population of Turks in Romania is estimated at 80,000 (Constantin et al 2010). EUROSTAT puts the figure at more than 1.6 million across 20 EU member states. https://ec.europa. eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/docs/infographics/immigration/ migration-in-eu-infographic_en.pdf. This count of course does not include all residents of Turkish descent, and is notably crude regarding the heterogeneity of Turkish nationals, something we underline in this chapter.

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As a means of capturing the heterogeneity of this population, we therefore look at the broader question of political transnationalism through an investigation of the use of social media in the political engagement during the Gezi Park protests, notably the change in and variety of interpretations based on the timing of the interview and how the protests evolved. We explore how the diversity of ethnic, religious and political views of the informants and their country of residence has an impact on the ways in which they express their support, their criticism or indifference towards the protests and the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Transnational Turkey in Europe The image of the Turkish population in Europe has mostly been cemented by the original, longstanding labour migration of Turks in the post-World War II era. Amongst our countries of study, this conception mostly applies to the populations in Germany and Denmark, and to a lesser extent the UK. These three countries essentially received Turkish migrants in three waves. The first wave comprised labour migration in the 1960s, when certain receiving countries signed a worker agreement with Turkey. Turks from rural parts of Anatolia especially migrated to Germany and Denmark: the well-known ‘guest worker’ population (Cağlar 1995; Icduygu et al 2002; Mandel 2008; Liversage 2009; Liversage and Mizrahi Mirdal 2017). In the early 1970s the UK also received male workers, who then brought their families (King et al 2008; Sirkeci et al 2016). The second wave comprised migration for political reasons, such as refugees and asylum seekers moving following the 1980s coup in Turkey and due to the ongoing Kurdish resistance (King et al 2008; Toktas 2012). The third wave is made up of a growing number of skilled and highly educated migrants from Turkey in the last two decades (Yanasmayan 2016). While Turks have been able to benefit from easier travel to Europe via agreements with the EU, all recent migrants have been affected by restrictions in migration policy and regulations in receiving countries, mostly targeted at low-skilled migrants and blocking family reunification (Liversage 2012). Especially in the post-2008 financial crisis period, European countries started to reduce numbers of work permits for the high skilled and educated in order to better accommodate intra-EU migrants (Duru and Trenz 2017). Despite this already apparent heterogeneity, Turkish migration was for many years mostly discussed as a classic ‘immigrant’ migration – usually with Germany in mind, and with a view to illustrating

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the difficult path from guest worker to naturalisation, and aspects of integration, segregation and racism (Brubaker 1992; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2011). In fact, though, Turks’ position in Europe has substantially improved due to increasing Turkish economic embeddedness in Europe, its growing geopolitical and economic weight in the region, its geographical gateway and crossroads function, and progressive (albeit sometimes stalled) agreements with the EU. These factors have in fact helped transform Turks in Europe into the most highly transnational migrant population (as already perceived by Soysal 1994; Faist 2000). The heartland of comparative Turkish migration studies charting this evolution has been Germany, along with the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden (a sample of works: Phalet and Swyngedouw 2003; Ehrkamp 2005; Crul et al 2012; Fleischmann and Phalet 2012; Crul 2015). To summarise the diverse patterns and heterogeneity stressed by this literature, the sheer diversity of the population, in ethnic, socioeconomic, religious and political terms, must first be noted. The Kurdish question notably runs through the population, and can significantly affect the nature of the society in given locations (for example, the clear divisions within the notionally ‘Turkish’ population in Brussels: see Bousetta et al 2017). There is also a large presence of Alevi populations in Scandinavia and the UK – mainly because of political asylum migration. In many locations there is a large migrant middle class, and also substantial student migration. Leaving aside secular groups, and notwithstanding the ‘guest worker’ image, integration issues for Turks in Europe are not necessarily the same as for other Islamic populations, although the Turkish do sometimes get swept up into Islamophobia and the perception of Muslim immigrants (Yurdakul 2009). The community may be divided but on the whole they are not as disadvantaged or racialised as other ‘immigrants’, and in some locations they have also been strikingly effective politically, both in secular and religious wings (as in the Netherlands, Fennema and Tillie 2001). The study of the Turks in Europe thus raises similar issues to Chapter Seven on Romanians. We need to ‘demigranticise’ the Turkish population (Dahinden 2016) – or ‘demigratise’ their mobilities, as argued in Chapter Seven – if we are to properly understand their subordinate but ambiguous and intermediate relationship with/ in Europe. Unlike Romania, Turkey is also substantially a country of immigration, playing a key role in the refugee crisis, more akin to Greece and Italy. And during the ‘glasnost’-like period of recent Turkish economic and political development – when a spectacular

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global neoliberalism in Istanbul and elsewhere, combined with growing political assertiveness and the rise of a distinctive form of Islamicism with the AKP – the ‘new Turkey’ became a site of substantial return migration from Germany, as well as the base for intensive business transnationalism and foreign direct investment from Europe, and a robust growth in tourism. This era has now ended, marked not least by the repression of the Gezi Park protests in 2013. Ongoing political developments and an apparent slide towards authoritarianism will of course have further effects on Turkish-origin diasporas in Europe. Our goal here is to consider how these developments can be traced in terms of the everyday social transnationalism of Turks across Europe: they may indeed in this sense be the most ‘European’ of all our mobile groups. Given this general backdrop, the following questions arise as central. What is the variety in ethnic, sociodemographic and political terms of the Turkish population across the five countries of study? How is it distributed and are there self-selection effects or particular patterns we might find in different countries of residence (CoRs)? What is the volume and variety of social transnationalism across the five countries and across sociodemographic or other variables? What is the specific cartography of this social transnationalism, both virtually and physically? And what kind of narratives may fill out the distinctiveness of Turkish social transnationalism in Europe, notably since this is a case of social transnationalism without the privilege of intra-EU freedom of movement? On these questions, we align the Turkish case with the studies found in other chapters. However, Turkey also represents a crucial case in terms of geopolitics, and the relationship of these populations to ongoing political change in the country. This external political dimension may indeed be another crucial aspect of everyday social transnationalism. The EUCROSS survey and follow-up interviews in fact allow the possibility of gauging a variety of political relationships to the ‘homeland’, and whether or not this is connected to other everyday practices of transnationalism. The bonus offered by the fieldwork was that it took place mostly during the Gezi Park protests in 2013, so we can also examine views on these events and how they shifted, thus getting a clear sense of the degree of de-territorialised nationalism versus de-nationalised transnationalism to be found among Turkish mobile and migrant populations across Europe.

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Portrait of a diverse population: Turks in the EUCROSS survey First, some basic analysis of the data is in order. The demographics of the Turkish sample (n = 1,250; 250 Turkish migrants in Denmark, Germany, Italy, Romania and the UK) strongly depend on the time of and reasons for settlement in the CoR as well as whether the CoR allows dual citizenship or not. We can thus divide the sample into three groups based on their similarity in socioeconomic background and historical settlement, largely according to the country of residence: (1) those living in Germany or Denmark; (2) those living in Italy or the UK; and (3) those living in Romania (Table 8.1). In the first group, Germany/Denmark, the majority of the Turkish migrants entered the country due to family reunion, as spouses or children of labour migrants (Table 8.2). These migrants comprise the women who joined their husbands who had migrated as labourers, as well as ‘imported’ brides and grooms – that is, someone born and raised in Turkey but who meets a Turkish migrant (usually second generation) already living in Europe, gets married and moves to the CoR as a spouse (Liversage 2009; Huschek et al 2012). We can also see that they come from relatively poor families with a low level of education (Table 8.1). In our qualitative interviews, we confirmed that the majority of the migrants in Denmark came as imported brides and grooms, who have had a higher level of education in Turkey, while those who migrated to Germany mostly came as spouses or children of guest workers, and had a lower level of education. While the migrants in Germany complained of not being encouraged by their families or by the German state to undertake higher education, those in Denmark mentioned being obliged to go to school, as well as learning in an environment which provides different types of education (computer use, digital ID in e-government tasks). We see that the sample in Germany has a lower level of education compared to those in Denmark: 17.6% of the sample in Denmark in contrast to 6% in Germany are of Kurdish background, due to a stronger influence of asylum migration. In Denmark, we see a wide spread of political views, with a slight tendency towards leftist political views, while in Germany those supporting the centre form a relatively bigger group (Table 8.3). At the time of the survey, Germany and Denmark did not allow dual citizenship, whilst it was permitted in the UK. This implied that there was an older migrant pool in Germany and Denmark compared to in the UK. In the UK sample, as we excluded those Turkish migrants

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Transnational Turkey Table 8.1: Demographics of Turkish samples

Age Gender Employment

Language Education

Father’s education

Mother’s education

Economic status

Mean Std. dev. Male Female In paid work Not in paid work Retired Kurdish Lower secondary or less Intermediate secondary Higher secondary Tertiary Lower secondary or less Intermediate secondary Higher secondary Tertiary Lower secondary or less Intermediate secondary Higher secondary Tertiary Very comfortable Comfortable Make ends meet Difficult Very difficult

DK 41.1 10.0 52.4 47.6 55.5 33.9 10.6 17.6 42.6 5.1 31.1 21.3 86.3 0.8 10.0 2.9 96.7 0.0 2.9 0.4 13.8 38.9 38.1 7.7 1.6

DE 46.2 11.4 43.7 56.4 55.8 32.5 11.7 6.0 50.4 11.5 28.7 9.4 86.7 2.1 8.7 2.5 96.7 0.0 2.9 0.4 8.9 32.7 46.0 10.9 1.6

ITA 33.9 9.9 56.4 43.6 61.5 37.7 0.8 12.4 34.6 3.7 19.9 41.9 63.3 1.2 12.2 23.3 69.8 0.4 14.7 15.1 6.5 38.9 44.5 9.3 0.8

RO 40.7 12.5 68.8 31.2 73.6 24.7 1.7 10.8 47.8 7.7 29.2 15.4 89.2 1.2 4.8 4.8 88.0 2.8 7.2 2.0 17.0 40.4 33.0 9.2 0.5

UK 38.5 12.2 56.9 43.2 70.9 22.7 6.5 10.5 21.7 2.1 19.6 56.7 54.6 3.3 23.1 19.0 66.7 3.3 20.8 9.2 7.4 35.1 49.4 7.4 0.8

Note: Danes: N = 247; Germans: N = 246; Italians: N = 249; Romanians: N = 250; British: N = 244. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

Table 8.2: Reasons for migration of Turks in five European countries (%)

Work Education Quality of life Family/love

DK 27.2  0.8  6.0 69.6

DE 20.6  2.8  2.8 72.6

Note: N = 1,250. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

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ITA 45.6 25.2  7.2 25.2

RO 67.6  4.4  4.4 21.2

UK 28.2 33.9 19.8 32.3

Everyday Europe Table 8.3: Political positioning of Turks in five European countries (%)

Left Centre-left Centre Centre-right Right Left and right no longer exist

DK 21.0 15.4 15.4 15.4 14.3 18.5

DE 20.1  9.5 27.4 17.9 14.0 11.1

ITA 31.1 20.2 14.0  5.7  9.8 19.2

RO  8.1  3.6  5.3 71.3 10.9  0.8

UK 36.5 21.0 19.5  6.0  8.0  9.0

Note: N = 1,250. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

with dual citizenship (that is, those who have been living there longer), we ended up with younger migrants. As seen in Table 8.2, they had come for education or skilled work, had migrated within the last decade, and had not yet applied for UK citizenship. In the second group bracketing migrants in the UK and Italy, we thus see more recent migration, where the main motives are work and education, with a younger and better educated sample. Of the migrants, 12.4% in Italy and 10.5% in the UK are from Kurdish backgrounds. The second group consists of more highly educated individuals. The Turkish migrants moved to Italy and the United Kingdom for educational purposes (to undertake Master’s degrees and PhD studies) and/or for occupations which require specific and/or high-level skills (to work as economists, bankers, architects, artists, designers, academics, and so on) (see Cesur et al 2018). Some of the Turkish migrants who came to the UK on a student visa in order to learn or improve their English also stayed as they got married, decided to undertake further higher education or found stable employment. Almost half of them support left or centre-left political views; overall they have a different profile than in Denmark, Germany or Romania, influenced by self-selection. The sample in Romania is different to the other two groupings. While most of them migrated to work in Romania, they are not labourers as in Germany and Denmark, but rather are much more likely to have their own business, usually a family-based operation. Their migration is recent, as in the UK and Italy, but they have lower levels of education. Most of them moved to Romania for reasons of work and the sample is dominated by males; 10.8% of them are Kurdish; 72.4% of them migrated between 1995 (when Romania officially applied for EU membership) and 2007 (when Romania entered the EU). Our interviewees pointed out that the EU accession period and the labour agreements between Turkey and Romania encouraged

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people to move to work in Romania. The majority of them, around 70%, have centre-right political views. They are distinctly businessminded and travel for professional reasons. Some informants continue businesses that their fathers started in Romania in the 1990s, in the post-communist era. We must emphasise that being business-minded and/or running a family business does not mean that the individual belongs to the middle class or has a high level of education. Unlike those who migrated to the UK and to Italy for skilled work as highly educated migrants, the Romanian sample’s educational level in fact is quite low. This can be attributed to the importance of working in the family business without the need for higher education. As we can see from Table 8.4, most of the Turkish migrants have visited Turkey in the last two years. One of the reasons why the Turkish migrants travel less than European citizens is visa restrictions. As the United Kingdom and Romania are not members of the Schengen agreement, Turkish migrants in these countries need a visa each time they travel. This hindrance is most visible among the Turkish sample in Romania, where only 9.2% of them have travelled to other European countries. The Turkish sample in Italy is the most mobile one; they gave vacations and leisure as their main reasons for travel, but also mentioned professional trips. In relation to the significance of work for the Turkish migrants in Romania, they stated professional trips as the main reason for travel (Table 8.5). From the qualitative interviews, it became evident that vacations included visits to friends and relatives in Turkey and also to other European countries. In these testimonies we could not find differences in travel patterns between different ethnic and or religious groups (Alevis, Kurds and ethnic Turkish). Nonetheless, devout Muslims mentioned visiting Mecca as one of the main non-European destinations, to perform their religious duties. Socioeconomic background plays a role in the choice of countries visited and the means of transport. Many Turkish migrants in Germany and Denmark, especially those with a lower socioeconomic background, visit their Table 8.4: Cross-border destinations of Turks in the last two years (%) Visits Turkey EU countries Non-EU countries

DK 88.0 48.8 12.8

DE 82.5 28.2  9.1

Note: N = 1,250. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

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ITA 76.0 61.6 22.8

RO 89.2  9.2 17.6

UK 87.1 44.4 14.1

Everyday Europe

Table 8.5: Reasons for travel abroad of Turks living in five European countries (%)

Vacation Visit friends/relatives Other private reasons Professional reasons Education Volunteering Other

DK 59.7 62.8 2.3 9.3 0.8 0.8 3.1

DE 68.8 35.0 3.8 3.8 0.0 0.0 8.8

ITA 70.1 34.7 6.0 21.0 4.2 0.0 2.4

RO 9.7 8.1 1.6 67.7 8.1 0.0 27.4

UK 63.3 30.8 6.7 15.8 3.3 0.0 6.7

Note: N = 1,250. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

relatives in the neighbouring (and nearer) countries such as in Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands and France, travelling by car. Our informants in Germany and Denmark in particular mentioned their car journeys to Turkey as driven by economic reasons, recalling the various countries they stopped in – which they had not counted as countries visited during the quantitative survey. Qualitative investigation also revealed that the wealthier the informant, the higher the social and cultural capital they have (generally with a well-paid, stable job, in their 30s and 40s), and the more likely they are to have travelled long distances such as to the USA, Latin America or China. Finally, we can also extract data on transnational communications. Apart from the sample in Romania, the frequency of talking with relatives abroad is quite similar across the CoRs. Turkish migrants in Romania seem to be the least connected with their relatives living outside of Romania. A general pattern among the migrants in other countries is that around 20% of them call their families every day, around 40–45% of them call at least once a week, around 20% call at least once a month and around 10% call less often. This shows us that Turkish migrants are in general well connected with their families and maintain intense transnational communication links (Table 8.6). When it comes to the use of social media, we see that those in Germany use it the least, at under 10% on a daily basis, while 30–35% of those living in the UK and Italy use it every day. We see a strong correlation between those with higher education using it more often than those with a lower level of education. As the UK and the Italian sample are the most well educated, this is confirmed by the samples in these two countries being the most virtually mobile and using social media the most. In Germany, as fixed phone rates are quite cheap, telephone calls are more common than using social media to talk with

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Transnational Turkey Table 8.6: Contact with family members abroad and social media use among Turks living in five European countries (%)

Phone/VoIP

Email

Social media

Every day At least once a week At least once a month Less often Never Every day At least once a week At least once a month Less often Never Every day At least once a week At least once a month Less often Never

DK 17.4 43.3 25.5 11.6 2.2 4.9 14.3 11.2 17.9 51.8 20.6 26.9 8.1 8.1 36.3

DE 23.3 44.4 18.3 12.8 1.1 5.0 13.8 9.9 12.7 58.6 9.4 18.8 3.3 9.4 59.1

ITA 20.7 46.0 19.8 11.7 1.8 12.1 26.9 13.5 11.2 36.3 35.1 27.6 8.9 5.8 22.7

RO 2.0 8.1 69.6 19.8 0.4 0.0 18.2 13.8 29.2 38.9 16.2 17.8 19.4 17.4 29.2

UK 24.4 41.9 19.4 12.0 2.3 11.5 26.3 15.2 17.5 29.5 30.4 28.6 12.0 7.4 21.7

Note: N = 1,250. Source: EUCROSS (2016)

relatives in Turkey and abroad. This perhaps explains why almost 60% of the Turks in Germany never use social media.

Social transnationalism: the everyday Europe of Turkish populations The transnationalism of Turkish migrants in Europe has hitherto mostly been explored by charting their relations with Turkey and the country of residence (see Cağlar 1995; Geaves 2003; Mandel 2008; Cesur et al 2018). Here, instead of limiting possible forms of transnational mobility to a conventional definition of migration – which highlights the ‘big journey’ of leaving one country of origin, moving to another one and then shuttling back and forth between the two (as in Portes 2000; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004) – we seek to ‘demigratise’ Turkish mobilities, as was suggested in Chapter Seven on Romanian migrants in Europe. By focusing on other cross-border mobilities and trips abroad more generally, we thus bring in other spaces (in Europe and outside of Europe) where (some) Turkish migrants feel familiarity and connections. Despite the obvious legal/political restrictions they face, they may also conceive of Europe as a comfortable space of

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transnationalism, analogous in a sense to the transnational Danes at home in their ‘European playground’, as detailed in Chapter Six. EUCROSS allows us to see the social links in terms of both crossborder mobility and virtual mobility. In this section, we mainly focus on travel abroad, and use of internet and social media to communicate with relatives and friends abroad. Visiting friends and relatives in European countries may not be cosmopolitan transnationalism as such, in that the story here is of Turkish migrants maintaining connections with other Turkish people. Nonetheless, when migrants visit their relatives or friends for a short period of time, for instance travelling by car to neighbouring countries, this gives them the opportunity to observe how people live in other places, as well as to familiarise themselves with different European countries. Building further on Mau’s (2010) cartographic aspects of social transnationalism, we observe that Turkish migrants in Europe are generally well connected with their Turkish relatives and friends spread around different parts of Europe. They combine their visits to their relatives with visiting touristic locations. A male migrant from Germany with a low level of education stated: ‘We went to Strasbourg in France. The reason we especially wanted to go to Strasbourg is that there is a European Union building there, we saw its environs. Near that place, we first visited out relatives, we said “as we are 30–40 km close to Strasbourg, take us around”. Thankfully, they showed us Strasbourg, the European Union building. There was a street there, where rich Jewish people go around and live, we went around there. Well, if you look at that, really, there are only them, well the Europe that does not tolerate the ways in which the Muslims dress in some places, on that street, they [Jewish people] were going around with their hats on … I really liked that, in a free way, everyone should live the way they want. Sure, in Europe we always have problems, of clothing, especially with women wearing headscarf, they cannot get access everywhere, this is why it is restrictive.’ During these short trips they reflect on themselves and their problems: for instance, how it is to live as a Muslim religious minority in a Christian country; in this case, comparing it to how other religious minorities are treated elsewhere in Europe. In many interviews they also compare the people in their country of residence with those in

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the country of travel. Car trips to relatives give those Turkish migrants with a lower socioeconomic background the chance to experience European cities. In that sense, in contrast to the arguments put forward by Fligstein (2008) and Kuhn (2015), who have argued repeatedly that the ‘European field’ and social transnationalism exclude disadvantaged people, these car trips provide an opportunity for Turkish migrants with modest socioeconomic status and a low level of education to physically experience places – famous European tourist destinations, architecture, food, and so on, as well as how people live there. A female migrant with a low level of education, currently living in York in the UK, and who had previously lived in Germany, reflected thus on her car trip to France and Belgium: ‘First of all, they all belong to different cultures; in addition to this, their houses had different designs, they had peculiar differences  … that Eiffel Tower, those big structures, peculiar structures, there was very nice wood carving inside those shops. You can’t even believe it, instead of buying things from the shop, you start looking at the shop itself. I don’t know, it was so different for me, for example, houses in Belgium were very interesting […] Their garden arrangements, houses’ designs, I really like them.’ Travelling by car from Denmark or Germany and passing through several countries, these ordinary Turks can sometimes get out of being stuck in ‘Turkishness’, or indeed their ‘Germanness’ or ‘Danishness’, and even sometimes their ‘Muslimness’. These pre-existing attributes are seen with fresh eyes: how others are doing things, what the buildings are like, or how space is used. The travelling migrants thus have a certain parity with other Europeans taken out of their country of origin and put in a different context, where they also get to see how cities or people in other countries are different or similar. Travelling brings out people’s character, encouraging their self-confidence and curiosity about differences and diversity. For example, as in the example above, one would not expect a devout Muslim housewife, with four children, who lives in York and who cannot speak English well, to leave her children and husband at home, and drive with a female friend, from Germany to France, Belgium, Holland and then back to Germany, just for leisure. She says how great it was for her to travel and drive in these countries. The migrants with higher socioeconomic and educational status travel widely in Europe but also to distant places; this gives them a

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more cosmopolitan view. For instance, most of those living in the UK and Italy were well travelled, had lived in the US during high school, university or during their PhD studies and had visited Canada and Latin American countries. They would go back there as tourists or for work reasons. Their cartography of social transnationalism goes beyond European borders. Nonetheless, similar to our informants with a lower socioeconomic background, the highly educated and wealthier ones also compare what is similar and different, realising what is lacking in their lives and commenting on the natural beauty of the places. For instance, one highly educated female banker living in the UK travelled to Argentina, Uruguay and Chile and tells how surprised she was by the relaxed mentality of the Chileans. She recalls: ‘As it was a very long country, it consisted of many things, we went to the north and the south, we visited different places. Its nature, people were relaxed, reckless, not reckless but there weren’t social limitations; people seriously didn’t care why you were wearing or what you were doing. They didn’t care. OK, they are not Londoners, it is not England, they are not relaxed that much, but their mentality is relaxed actually, you can feel it, because everyone was relaxed. When you are in Turkey you are faced with limitations like, “Why did you wear this? Why did you do this? You did this? Is this appropriate or not?” In this sense, they are very relaxed.’ These physical cross-border practices were also enhanced by the use of social networks, which has made it possible to reconnect with people from their past as well as their relatives who live in Europe and Turkey. This prompted many of them to engage in cross-border communication and plan trips. In that sense, virtual mobility helped the social transnationalism of Turkish migrants in Europe. In the following, we turn our attention to contacts with family members abroad and the use of social media. The social media literature on migrants demonstrates that migrants use social media to communicate with relatives and friends who remain in the country of origin (Madianou and Miller 2011; Dekker and Engbersen 2014), as well as making new connections with the people living in the country of residence (Duru and Trenz 2016). This was also the case for our informants. When they returned to their hometown, it was easier to meet their friends or organise birthday celebrations and so on. For some, Facebook also made it easier to

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organise events in the city where they currently live and hence helped them make new friends, enter new networks and meet these new people face to face. Work on the digital media use of Turkish migrants points out that this transnational communication intensifies ties with the country of origin and makes it a part of everyday lives (Bozdağ 2014). Similarly, the majority of our informants have used different social media platforms in order to sustain relationships with Turks in Turkey and abroad, as well as with new friends and acquaintances. Mobile phone applications with video or voice calls such as WhatsApp, Viber, Tango and Skype were used more to talk with people with stronger bonds, such as family and close friends. On the other hand, Facebook was also used with people with weaker ties (elementary school friends found through the app, or extended family). Facebook helped them reconnect with their friends from the past and keep up to date with their daily lives. When they found these friends from elementary school, or from their village and talked about their memories, they longed for a Turkey and relationships that no longer exist. This is similar to what Aksoy and Robins (2000) argued regarding media in the form of satellite television and cable services consumed by Turkish migrants in Europe: that it connects the Turkish migrant with an imagined Turkey. Nonetheless, this is an awkward relationship, because what they see on Turkish television does not correspond with the ideal Turkey that they long for, with ‘its nature, childhood memories and the “old times”’ (Aksoy and Robins 2000, 359). However, Facebook not only makes them nostalgic about a past that no longer exists, but it enables these migrants to follow the lives of these people who they left behind; it makes them feel emotionally connected. A Kurdish female migrant in Denmark with a low level of education says: ‘For example, people in my village got older, they got married, had children. You see all of these on Facebook, and you are shocked. It is nice that you recall old days, you send greetings to each other, and you get sentimental.’ Nonetheless, some of them also pointed out that Facebook made them understand who their real friends are, by separating those genuine friends from the fake ones. In the case of migrants, Facebook connections that bridge distance and provide the everyday presence of friends may give the impression to the migrant that nothing has changed in terms of the friendship; however, the intensity and importance of friendship might not be as significant for those back in

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the homeland. Their mediated digital friendship did not match the actual relationship when they went to Turkey and tried to meet these friends. They were critical of the fact that Facebook makes it very easy for people to write messages, comments and be digitally active, while they are passive when it comes to face-to-face relations, not making an effort to meet offline. One highly educated Turkish female informant living in the UK related how her childhood friends wrote to her that they would like to come to her wedding, insisting that the invitation letter be posted to them (it is traditionally very important to send wedding invitations by post), and that she organise a wedding in the bride’s hometown. In the end, only one friend attended the wedding there. This life event made her realise that the visibility of her friends on Facebook and the ease of digital communication had created an imagined friendship that, for her, was genuine and ongoing even though these friends were geographically distant. However, this was not true for her friends who had stayed in Turkey and had moved on in their lives without her; this digital friendship did not mean as much to them as it did to her. From our quantitative data, it is remarkable to see that almost 60% of the German sample does not use any type of social media. Fixed phone rates to call Turkey are still relatively cheap and commonly used. As in Germany and the other countries, the type of social media depends on what relatives or friends in Turkey use. Those migrants whose families and friends in Turkey or abroad are not using Facebook or mobile phones do not use other digital communication very much. Among those who use the internet, most of the migrants with a lower socioeconomic and educational status mentioned that they very much like using the ‘Google function’. They were impressed by the fact that they can write any question in the Google tool and they will get an answer. They also enjoyed using Facebook, because they can see photos of their relatives and friends and send messages and chat. Viber, Skype and Tango were seen as very convenient for talking as if they are on the ‘real phone’. Most of them used the internet to book their tickets to Turkey and to other countries. They mentioned that all of this was possible at low cost. A 69-year-old Turkish man in Germany (who migrated as a Turkish language teacher and married a German woman) saw the internet as a globalising tool, which has the potential of creating global villages. Nonetheless, he argued that people can keep up with the technology and can still preserve their cultural values. His point echoes the glocalisation argument (Robertson 1995) – that is, globalisation does not erase local cultures, but leads to the contruction of new cultural forms.

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‘Well, you know, our age is technology age. That is to say the world is becoming smaller, well, there is globalisation, there is a lot of communication and transportation. It is difficult not to change in such a lifestyle in such an environment. Both from technological aspects and social aspects. For sure, you should also keep pace with what the new age brings. That is the truth and we do not have anything to say against that. That is the situation in the world today. But I personally want that you try to adapt to the requirements of this age, to modernism, to technological advancements, to globalisation, to all kinds of things and reach the same level. I do not have anything to say against that. I even find it right. But from another perspective, I find it right to continue your culture, language, religion, customs etc without erasing, destroying and by preserving and continuing with both (old and new).’ Despite the similarity in socioeconomic status and education level of the migrants in Denmark and Germany, the Turks and Kurds in Denmark are more virtually mobile and digitally competent. This is also true for those with a very low level of education. One of the reasons is that the communication of the Danish state with its residents is done digitally. Everybody needs to have a digital ID in order to have a bank account, to receive salary pay slips, benefits, health appointments, or send their CVs for job applications. Residents thus use the internet and social media very actively. For example, a Kurdish migrant with poor writing skills explains how she uses the internet in official communications. ‘Of course, it [internet] is important, I receive emails. […] For example, I am a member of a [trade] union as we pay money to them. For example, I had an incident at work, I am having a court case. Now, I, the court, my work place, and the union are working together [for my case]. Email arrives at my E-box [a Danish digital emailing system], there is a key there when I tick that key I can see new emails. I use it a lot. I receive something new every day like, “we received your details”. For example, an email was sent today, it says to fill the form if I want to close the case. Therefore, I use it a lot. If I apply for jobs, I can immediately send my CV to the webpage of that company. If they receive my details, if they want to talk to me, they can then call

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me. For example, they reply to my email. Therefore, I use internet a lot.’ In Romania, the majority of the informants were male, almost half of them with a low level of education and they moved to Romania for work. Most of them stated that they use the internet mostly for their work and that it is crucial. In their personal life they use the internet for banking, for buying tickets for flights or for concerts and so on, but most of them try to avoid social media such as Facebook because, as some commented, they think it is “a waste of time”. It is also remarkable that only 2% of the Turkish sample in Romania call their relatives abroad every day, 8% call at least once a week and almost 70% only call them once a month. This shows that the sample in Romania is the least connected and the least socially transnational in terms of virtual mobility. While their use of social media is similar to the Turks in other countries, they do not use it as much to communicate with relatives as in the other countries. We should also underline again that Romania is not in the Schengen area, and this also restricts the migrants’ visits to other European countries. It also explains why only 8% of Turkish migrants in Romania visit their relatives abroad, and 70% of their trips are for professional reasons. Their use of the internet is mainly for work reasons, while the migrants in other countries state that they use it to communicate with friends and relatives abroad. Most of those who use Facebook, Skype and WhatsApp do so to keep in touch with friends and family. In our sample there is a mix of linguistic abilities: while some learnt Romanian and can follow Romanian media, some of them did not learn the language of their CoR; some speak English and some do not. They all follow Turkish news and some follow world and Romanian news. The female informants (only 3 out of 10 in the EUMEAN sample) use the internet more for social purposes such as keeping in touch with family and friends. They also read Turkish and American news. To sum up, the analysis of social media use provides insights on crossborder social interactions and how migrants keep their ties with family and friends abroad. After having explored the social transnationalism of Turkish migrants, by investigating their cross-border trips and virtual mobility, in the next section we turn our attention to their political transnationalism. Our main reason for this is to further differentiate the Turkish migrants, as political activity highlights their ethnic, political and socioeconomic diversity in relation to the homeland. Furthermore, the time of the interviews coincided with the Gezi Park protests, which enabled us to observe the politicisation of the

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social media platforms, especially Facebook. During the interviews, we asked our informants to reflect on the importance of the internet and social media in their lives. In response to this question, many of our informants talked about relying on Facebook to get news on what was happening, as mainstream media did not report the events, and they expressed their political views through the narratives of Gezi Park.

Political transnationalism: Gezi Park and beyond There is a wide range of literature that explores political mobilisation through the use of social media in different contexts: Northern Africa (the so-called Arab Spring), Southern Europe (Indignados – the outraged), the American continent (the Occupy movement) and China (see Johnson et al 2013; Breuer and Groshek 2014; Sloam 2014; Velasquez and LaRose 2015; Nez et al 2016). Our main focus in this section is to see how the use of social media may reveal the political diversity of the Turkish and Kurdish diaspora, via how social media use has reactivated social and political ties with Turks and Kurds in Turkey and abroad. The use of the internet and social media, especially Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, due to their low cost, has not only increased political participation, making it easy to organise protests and reach large numbers of people (Sloam 2014), but has also made it possible for the Turkish and Kurdish diasporas to follow the Gezi movement, increasing ties and communication (Baser 2015; Imani Giglou et al 2017). For instance, people who have not communicated for years started following each other, or commenting on shared posts. This political communication enhanced by social media platforms created a new political cartography, where dormant social ties revived, recreating bonds between people with similar political views as well as uniting those with some opposing views (Kemalists and Kurdish activists), as it formed political clusters of people in a binary format: pro-AKP/ anti-Gezi versus anti-AKP/pro-Gezi. Thus, political transnationalism may generate its own cartography of social transnationalism. While Bozdağ (2014) argues, in line with Aksoy and Robins (2000), that digital media increases banal transnationalism, we contend that the use of digital media mirrors the political views of the migrant, mostly intensifying political connections and engagement with people who hold the same political views, yet giving room to reach, engage and communicate with people who hold political views different to their own. Similar to the literature on political transnationalism where migrants participate in the politics of the country of origin (Al-Ali et al 2001; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a and 2003b; Levitt and

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Jaworsky 2007), we see a variety of degrees of political transnationalism ranging from a passive following of the news, to commenting and sharing news, to political activism. A few of our informants actively participated in protests in their European city and some of them acted as ‘international mediators’ who posted in English, in the language of the country of residence as well as in Turkish, in order to communicate with their international friends about what had been happening (see Imani Giglou et al 2017). Many of them followed the events through social media, especially Facebook and Twitter. Via our interviews, we focus on Facebook as the main social media outlet used by the Turkish and Kurdish migrants in Denmark, Italy and the UK. On the one hand, Facebook users live in their own social media bubble, have friends and connections mostly with people who share similar socioeconomic and political views. During the Gezi Park protests they had been sharing, posting and commenting posts, articles and various media content that supported and even intensified their views. Many of our highly educated informants mentioned that social media gained significance with the Gezi Park protests and made them more politically engaged. In order to follow the news, they intensified their internet searches and Facebook, Twitter and YouTube use. Bearing in mind that the interviews in Germany were conducted in April–May 2013, before the Gezi Park protests, use of the internet and social media was not as politicised in this case. Nonetheless, an Alevi migrant (who moved to Germany as an imported groom to marry his cousin) described very well the pre-Gezi tension in Germany and in Turkey. He talked about an Alevi demonstration in his town and said: ‘In Germany, there are protests. In Turkey you are beaten if you protest. I went to Bochum to attend a rally for protesting [against] the Turkish Prime Minister due to [the] Sivas suspects [a hotel fire and suspected state sponsored massacre in 1993 in which 35 people, mostly Alevi intellectuals, were killed]. He was going to be there to collect an award. We were there; Kurds and Armenians were also rallying. Around 30,000 people gathered in the stadium. There were still people outside. For two hours, there were speeches, songs etc. Then we started to rally. However, they put our association at the end of the rally. Then we thought that if we walked on pavement we could be quicker. Police warned us not to walk on pavement. We said OK. Then police said thank you. Police show tolerance towards protestors. It is not like that in Turkey. If you talk

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against the government they arrest you. People are scared. They even chase you on internet. In here, you are more free to express your thoughts.’ From this description, we can clearly see that he is closely following the political scene in Turkey; it is clear that the Gezi Park protests did not erupt suddenly but the tension, oppression, control, censorship, arrests and the lack of freedom of speech had been gradually building up. As the interviewee noted, the brutality of the police towards the protesters, arrests and being persecuted online were already present before the Gezi Park protests and became much more visible during and in the aftermath of the protests. Our informant highlighted the rise of an autocratic and despotic attitude in Erdoğan’s politics. When the interviewee talked about his views on diversity, he criticised the lack of freedom of speech and the increasing suppression of secular and non-Muslim minorities by the political Islamism of Erdoğan. In contrast, he drew attention to the fact that while in Germany it is possible to build places of worship (mosques), this would not be the case for Christians in Turkey. He mentioned that, while in Germany Sunnis and Alevis respect each other, that is not the case in Turkey. Our interviews with Turkish and Kurdish migrants in Denmark, Italy and the UK, which took place during the first months of the Gezi protests, illustrated how the Gezi movement changed the ways in which Facebook was used. Before the protests, the users posted photos from their daily lives, such as drinking coffee, meeting friends, travelling. During the protests, Facebook became a news source. One highly educated female in Italy said that she realised the importance of Facebook in terms of getting news, especially as mainstream Turkish media did not report the protests: ‘[On Facebook] … people were preoccupied with other people’s private lives, who gave birth, who went where, who took photo where. Then [Gezi] changed these people into a new way of seeing things, such as “come to this street”, “avoid that street”.’ She talked about how people communicated to gather in specific streets to protest as well as telling other people to avoid some streets where there was police brutality. She then continued: ‘I liked it because otherwise [without Facebook] we would not know what has been happening. If I did not live abroad

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and lived in Turkey, I would not have thought of following CNN international or Repubblica, I would have followed the mainstream, such as reading Hurriyet, Vatan newspapers. If I were in Turkey I would have done the same and watched NTV news. We think we watch the news!’ Those who were using Facebook in the ‘old way’ were accused of being disrespectful. One highly educated female informant living in Denmark said that she was told off for posting photos of herself at a night club while there were protests going on in Turkey. Informants with both high and low levels of education mentioned that Facebook gained importance during and after the protests, while their protester friends gave current updates from wherever they were protesting, sharing news articles in Huffington Post or other foreign media sources such as the BBC, Al-Jazeera and CNN International. We thus see an expansion of the political cartography of social transnationalism within and outside of Europe. The informants said that their news consumption was based on trust: they read the news shared by friends whose opinion they trusted. For example, a highly educated Turkish man in the UK reflected: ‘It is important when all media was muted, people can share and convey notifications from people they trust. There are too many columnists both in Turkey and abroad. It is like supply–demand in an economist’s point of view again because people don’t want to do things like “analyse, think, I have to find answers to that, how did it happen”, but they tend to get news from people they find ideologically close to themselves. So it is important to read a guy that you say “oh yes I know this guy and value his mind-set”. That goes for me as well as other people. I don’t have time to read 3–4 newspapers a day but if a friend of mine shared or commented something, I would read it because now that it is filtered. If a guy I trusted shared it, so I deem it worthy to read and spend time over it.’ This notion of trust nonetheless started to create clusters and boundaries between people who held different political views. On the one hand, Facebook created a political polarisation, as Facebook users started deleting people with different political views. For instance, those who supported the Gezi Park protests deleted their friends/ acquaintances who supported the AKP government’s attitude towards

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the protesters. It was not uncommon to see people write ‘those who condemn Gezi protesters, delete me as your friend’; or ‘I am deleting those people on my list who support Erdoğan’s views on the Gezi protesters’. On the other hand, media censorship pushed them to look for alternative media sources, such as Halk TV (online), Huffington Post, YouTube videos, or online streaming and sharing the news on their Facebook accounts. This also broke their ‘clusters’ to a limited extent, as underlined by a highly educated female living in the UK, forcing them to understand people from different socioeconomic backgrounds and political views. She explained that the generation that had grown up apolitical (those in their 20s and 30s) – especially those who live in big cities in Turkey, living a comfortable life and belonging mostly to the middle classes – came out of their bubble. She used the English word ‘cluster’ to describe their social life. ‘They came out of the “cluster” because they were always with the people like themselves, same place, and same environment. However, with the Gezi, they started to hang out with different people, they met different people, they learnt talking with them, understanding them, as they understood them they realised that they were wrong as they didn’t understand them before, they tried to keep up with them, I saw those.’ She explained further how being exposed to police brutality, being teargassed, helped these people (living in their clusters) to understand the pain of the Kurds – seeing what the state can do (in terms of violence) to its citizens; they even realised that they were enacting a similar type of oppression on women with headscarves, by criticising them for wearing them. ‘Empathy, exactly. The Kurd who was next to you was teargassed like you, the girl wearing a headscarf who was next to you, was teargassed, the things that you demanded were also similar, more democracy, more freedom. Their perception of freedom might be different than yours, however we understood that their origins are the same (they want the same thing). I mean, people understood that wearing a headscarf is also a freedom, why a girl wearing a headscarf can’t go to school? A man with a beard can go, why can’t a girl do so? People started to question like

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this, people who say “I hate girls with headscarves, they are like insects”, came to this point. In this sense, I think it is very important.’ This kind of thinking can also be seen as planting the seeds of support for the HDP (the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party). As well as Kurds who supported HDP, those young, secular, educated Turks and migrants embraced the HDP’s call for a politics more inclusive of ethnic and religious minorities and women. The HDP’s opposition to Erdoğan also won the approval of some secular Turks, who have equally felt oppressed by Erdoğan. Furthermore, many educated informants wrote posts in English and the language of their country of residence in order to reach out to a more international audience, to communicate what is happening in Turkey. They have acted as ‘the journalists’, the international communicators, who felt the need to reflect and explain what is going on as a response to the media censorship in Turkey. In Denmark, reactions towards the protests were quite diverse. The interviews in Denmark were conducted in June 2013, the first month of the protests. As the AKP had previously had good relations with the Kurds, promising them peace in South-Eastern Turkey, Kurds were not present at the beginning of the protests. This was also the reaction for most of the Kurdish informants, who were happy with what the AKP had done for the Kurds in Turkey. The highly educated female respondents were anti-AKP; one was overtly and strongly against Erdoğan and pro-Gezi, while the other was reluctant to reveal opposition but was still opposed to Erdogan’s attitude. One highly educated male was a mild political Islamist, on the one hand criticising the harsh tone and attitude of Erdoğan but also reproducing his rhetoric that “these are marginal groups” who are protesting (see White 2014). He was supportive of the Green movement of Occupy Gezi, which is how the protests started, but was against the fact that the protests escalated in such a way that some protesters burnt a car. He was probably a supporter of the Gulen movement, a competing political Islamic movement to AKP, which has strong roots in parts of the West European Turkish diaspora, particularly in Denmark. At the beginning of the Gezi protests, most of the Kurdish informants were sceptical about the Gezi movement, because at that point the AKP had been seen to bring peace to the region, and it could have been risky for them to support such a movement. The Kurdish male informants, both highly educated and less educated, had mixed reactions. One was hopeful that some communication had started between the protesters

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of different political views, giving the example of a nationalist party supporter, a Kurdish and a Kemalist who were shown together in the same photo protesting in Taksim. However, he was also disappointed that it had taken so long for the Turks to understand the suffering of the Kurds, and that Turks did not show any empathy when Kurds were dying during the counterinsurgency in South-Eastern Turkey. On the other hand, another highly educated Kurdish male and a less educated Turkish female expressed pro-AKP sentiments, stating that the AKP was the best political party at that time. In Italy, the interviews were conducted in August, during which the collective Gezi spirit coexisted in separate groups with different identity politics trying to express their voices. For example, the LGBT community, Kurds, Alevis, anti-capitalist Muslims, women and youth started to express their views and presence during the protests through the flags, banners and posters they held. The Turks interviewed in Italy comprised the most educated informants, most of them holding a Bachelor’s degree, Masters or even PhD. These had a more secular Kemalist view and were supportive of the Gezi movement. They followed Italian, Turkish and English language news. However, some of them were critical of the Gezi spirit moving from a collective protest to separate groups expressing identity politics, especially after they had seen posters of Öcalan in Gezi Park. A highly educated Turkish woman in Italy said: ‘Not ethnic separation but we should not approach that issue politically, we should be non-political, and there is no longer leftist or rightist in that incident. Is everyone against that man? Yes they are, and then we should do something together but without being unfair to anyone. That is to say, the event goes out of its intended direction … You give the Kurdish people something, something to that, it’s ok to recognise that, but then you lose your direction.’ She was arguing that the Gezi movement should be apolitical, that identity politics should be left out of the protest. According to her, people should forget about what they could get out of the movement as a collective group (for example, Kurds or leftists), but should rather unite against the autocracy of one man. Having followed Italian media, some informants also said that the Gezi protests were reported positively in the news and shown as an example to the Italians, who should also protest and take a stand against their problems. As a final point, in Romania, apart from one, who

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briefly mentioned that he followed the Gezi Park protests through social media, the Turkish migrants did not express any interest in or engagement with the movement. From the quantitative and qualitative data, we think it probable that this group was focused on running their family businesses and spent little time on social media. Most of them followed mainstream Turkish media. Thus, they were isolated from what was happening with the political movement.

Conclusion This chapter has emphasised the diversity of Turkish, Kurdish and other migrants of Turkish origin in Europe, using the EUCROSS data to explore their heterogeneity across five of the member states studied. Evidence of their extensively Europeanised social transnationalism underlines the extent to which Turkey is de facto integrated into Europe. The political transnationalism emphasised by the use of social media during the Gezi park protests, meanwhile, underlines another key dimension of the unsettled social transnationalism in Europe, as well as its wider geopolitics. What is of course crucially different for the Turkish population in Europe is that they do not enjoy the intraEU freedom of movement rights of other Europeans. In this sense, our study points to how the transnationalism of this population is only likely to continue and extend in the future, regardless of what happens to EU citizenship. The authoritarian slide of the homeland will have its effects as well. There is likely to be significant further flight of the young, secular and educated in future years: somewhat parallel to recent South–North migrations within Europe (Lafleur and Stanek 2016), only more dramatic and politically charged. At the same time, the social transnationalism of Turkish diasporas also facilitates the further extension of Islamic Turkish and Kurdish populations, finding their own place and connections in Europe. References Abadan-Unat, N. (2011) Turks in Europe: From Guest Worker to Transnational Citizen. New York: Berghahn. Aksoy, A., and Robins, K. (2000) ‘Thinking across spaces: transnational television from Turkey’. European Journal of Cultural Studies 3: 343–365. Al-Ali, N., Black, R., and Koser, K. (2001) ‘Refugees and transnationalism: the experience of Bosnians and Eritreans in Europe’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 27(4): 615–634.

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Baser, B. (2015) ‘Gezi spirit in the diaspora diffusion of Turkish politics to Europe’, in I. David and K. Toktamış (eds) Everywhere Taksim: Sowing the Seeds for a New Turkey at Gezi. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 251–266. Bozdağ, Ç. (2014) ‘The digital bridge between Turkey and Germany: transnational use of digital media in the Turkish diaspora’, in K. Kamp, A. Kaya, F. Keyman, and O. Onursal Besgul (eds) Contemporary Turkey at a Glance. Amsterdam: Springer, 157–172. Bousetta, H., Favell, A., and Martiniello, M. (2017) ‘Governing multicultural Brussels: paradoxes of a multi-level, multi-cultural, multi-national urban anomaly’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 44(12): 2017–2085. Breuer, A., and Groshek, J. (2014) ‘Online media and offline empowerment in post-rebellion Tunisia: an analysis of internet use during democratic transition’. Journal of Information Technology and Politics 11(1): 25–44. Brubaker, R. (1992) Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Cağlar, A. S. (1995) ‘German Turks in Berlin: social exclusion and strategies for social mobility’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 21(3): 309–323. Constantin, D.  L., Goschin, Z., and Dragusin, M. (2010) ‘Ethnic entrepreneurship as an integrating factor in civil society and a gate to religious tolerance: a spotlight on Turkish entrepreneurs in Romania’. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 7(20): 49–79. Crul, M., Schneider, J., and Lelie, F. (2012) The European Second Generation: Does the Integration Context Matter? Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Crul, M. (2015) ‘Is education the pathway to success? A comparison of second generation Turkish professionals in Sweden, France, Germany and the Netherlands’. European Journal of Education 50(3): 329–339. Cesur, N. S., Hanquinet, L., and Duru, D. N. (2018) ‘The “European Turks”: identities of high-skilled Turkish migrants in Europe’. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 18(1): 127–144. Dahinden, J. (2016) ‘A plea for the “de-migranticization” of research on migration and integration’. Ethnic and Racial Studies 39(13): 2207–2225. Dekker, R., and Engbersen, G. (2014) ‘How social media transform migrant networks and facilitate migration’. Global Networks 14(4): 401–418.

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Østergaard-Nielsen, E. (2003a) Transnational Politics: the case of Turks and Kurds in Germany. London: Routledge. Østergaard-Nielsen, E. (2003) ‘The politics of migrants’ transnational political practices’. International Migration Review 37(3): 760–786. Phalet, K. and Swyngedouw, M. (2003) ‘Measuring immigrant integration: the case of Belgium’. Studi Emigrazione/Migration Studies 40(152): 773–803. Portes, A. (2000) ‘Globalization from below: the rise of transnational communities’, in D. Kalb, M. dan der Land, R. Staring, B. van Steenbergen, and N. Wilterdink (eds) The Ends of Globalization: Bringing Society Back In. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 253–270. Pötzschke, S. (2015) ‘Migrant mobilities in Europe: comparing Turkish to Romanian migrants’. Migration Letters 12(3): 315–326. Pötzschke, S., Duru, D., Cesur, N. S., and Braun, M. (2014) CrossBorder Activities and Transnational Identification of Turkish Migrants in Europe. EUCROSS Working Paper 7. www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/ document/39537. Robertson, R. (1995) ‘Glocalization: time-space and homogeneity– heterogeneity’. Global Modernities 2: 25–45. Sirkeci, I., Bilecen, T., Costu, Y., Dedeoglu, S., Kesici, M. R., Seker, B. D., Tilbe, F., and Unutulmaz, K. O. (2016) Little Turkey in Britain. London: Transnational Press. Soysal, Y.  N. (1994) Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sloam, J. (2014) ‘“The outraged young”: young Europeans, civic engagement and the new media in a time of crisis’. Information, Communication and Society 17(2): 217–231. Toktas, S. (2012) ‘Introduction: 50 years of emigration from Turkey to Germany. A success story?’ Perceptions 17(2): 5–9. Velasquez, A., and LaRose, R. (2015) ‘Youth collective activism through social media: the role of collective efficacy’. New Media and Society 17(6): 899–918. Waldinger, R., and Fitzgerald, D. (2004) ‘Transnationalism in question’. American Journal of Sociology 109(5): 1177–1195. White, J. B. (2014) Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Yanasmayan, Z. (2016) ‘Does education “trump” nationality? Boundary drawing practices among highly educated migrants from Turkey’. Ethnic and Racial Studies 39(11): 2041–2059. Yurdakul, G. (2009) From Guest Workers into Muslims: Turkish Immigrant Associations in Germany. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press.

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EPILOGUE

Is social transnationalism fusing European societies into one? Ettore Recchi

Introduction: one Europe for whom? ‘Europe’ – as such – is the main intercontinental travel destination of Chinese tourists. In 2016, 12 million visited from Mainland China, six times their number in 2000 (Artl 2016). The rise continues, as 2018 was announced by the EU and the Chinese government as the ‘EU– China Year of Tourism’ (whatever this may mean). More sophisticated and diversified than in the early 2000s, still the majority of Chinese tourists set foot on the Old Continent as part of an organised group package trip. On average they stay between one and three nights per country – overall visiting between five and ten different nations (Croce 2016). The Schengen visa (which costs €60) favours such cross-border travel, as it allows access to more than 20 countries with a single authorisation, and removes the perception of frontiers. On their way from one destination to the other, typically under strict timelines, Chinese tourists hardly have the impression of crossing national borders. In their eyes, Europe is one. Contrast this with the experience of European movers. Their perceptions along with their hosts’ resonate with persisting cultural differences, language barriers, diverse cuisines, bureaucratic rules, sexual and family mores. It is true that passport controls have been removed since the 1990s (but have been reinstated more or less systematically since the Islamist attacks in France and Belgium in 2015) and most benefits of European citizenship have resisted the anti-EU wave that culminated in the Brexit referendum of 2016 (although not entirely: Carmel and Paul 2013; Heindlmaier and Blauberger 2017), but still EU citizens moving across member states can hardly overlook national borders. At the very least, they must not forget to bring medical insurance (or the European Health Insurance Card)

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and plug adapters with them, as well as subscribing to roaming plans for their smartphones and laptops in order to be able to connect to the internet.1 In short, other member states are still ‘abroad’ for the average European. Experientially, Europe continues to be made up of separate national societies, rather than being a ‘society’ in its own right. Things have even worsened, compared to the first decade of the twenty-first century, when it comes to the rights of intra-EU migrants. Most obviously, while one small country (Croatia) joined the EU club, the single most important recipient of migration flows originating from within the EU – the UK – opted out of it. The full effects of Brexit on free movement rights and practices – as well as on many other issues – remain the subject of intergovernmental negotiations. However, preliminary evidence of the post-Brexit referendum shows a 25% decline in net migration from the Continent to the UK between March 2016 and March 2017, particularly fed by mounting numbers of migrant returns (ONS 2017). Additional red tape for European free movers in Britain was introduced in the aftermath of the referendum, when episodes of hostility against European residents also escalated. But even in earlier years a number of member states adopted laws that discriminated subtly against EU workers, transposing Directive 2004/38/EC on free movement rights in a piecemeal and politically opportunistic fashion (Shaw 2015). As a result, the social rights of EU movers with different combinations of origin and destination member states end up being quite significantly diverse (Bruzelius et al 2017; 2018). For instance, the UK started to require EU citizens to have comprehensive sickness insurance to qualify for permanent residency, while Denmark is reluctant to grant them a personal identification number (cpr nummer), which is the key to access many public services (Jacqueson 2016). At the same time, the European Court of Justice adopted a somewhat narrower interpretation of free movement rights, opposing unconditional access to national social benefits (Blauberger and Schmidt 2014) and, overall, making it harder for national administrations to stick to unequivocal standards (Blauberger and Schmidt 2017; Thym 2017).

  In June 2017, after a decade of negotiations, the European Commission achieved its ‘Roam like at Home’ plan, which allows holders of a mobile telephone contract to access telecom networks in other EU member states at the same cost as in their country of residence. The actual enactment of this policy in all member states and circumstances is to be assessed though. In particular, as we write (early 2018) phone calls to mobile lines still seem to suffer from national limitations. 1

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Is social transnationalism fusing European societies into one?

Demographics tell us that the stock of Europeans on the move – either ephemerally, as tourists or visitors, or more stably, as foreign residents – from one EU member state to another has been growing uninterruptedly since the mid-1990s, having accelerated after the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2008 (Recchi 2015). However, the paths of everyday cross-border living in Europe have become bumpier in the second decade of the 2000s. As the European Commission admits (2017, 33), ‘there has been a clear increase since 2012 in the number of Europeans who say they have experienced some form of [nationality-based] discrimination’. But is this a contingency or a trend reversal, after half a century of incremental advancements in European integration? To address the issue, I take back a key question of the sociology of European integration (Kaelble 1987; Therborn 1995; Mendras 1997; Boje et al 1999, 2013; Bettin Lattes and Recchi 2005; Diez Medrano 2008; Outhwaite 2008; Favell and Guiraudon 2011): Are we heading towards a fusion or a fission of European societies? In search of an answer, I will examine four distinct dimensions that define the contours of established societies, bringing them more or less close to one another (and which could eventually lead to them fusing into a single one). I will then delve into empirical evidence accounting for the directions of change in each of these dimensions.

Unpacking ‘society’: four critical dimensions If we are to assess the chances of the formation of a unified, single European society, we need first to define the basic concept we are dealing with – ‘society’. What makes a collective of human beings sharing a given territory one or more ‘societies’? This question can open a Pandora’s box of handbook-like definitions stemming from the classics of sociology (and particularly drawing on Talcott Parsons [1951]). Let us limit ourselves to highlighting two main defining criteria: boundaries (the external criterion) and functioning (the internal criterion). On the one hand, societies are (perceived to be, and thus are) finite realities; their politically constructed borders contain the bulk of social relations and are relatively uncontroversial.2 Politics, at least in the modern world, is what cuts human groupings into pieces called ‘societies’. On the other hand, not all territorially distinct pieces can claim to function as ‘societies’. Some degree of  Exceptions (that is, contested and fought-over borders) only demonstrate the constitutive aspect of borders for human society in the modern age. 2

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organisation is needed. First of all, any society is endowed with levels of capabilities (wealth, income, institutional support) that are distributed hierarchically among individuals and groups in a relatively stable pattern – what is sometime referred as the social structure. This reflects a society-specific management of social inequality. Alongside, there are typical norms and practices that form rather unique mixes that distinguish one society from another – for instance, nutrition, sexuality, family arrangements, intergenerational relations, religion, collective behaviours, leisure. In turn, these norms and practices, especially when persisting over time and generations, contribute to shape a sense of belonging and shared destiny – the we-ness or identification that, again, draws the line from one society to another. To sum up, a society responds to the following constitutive conditions: 1. A politico-territorial condition: finite territorial borders. 2. A sociostructural condition: established patterns of resource allocation (that is, social inequality). 3. A sociocultural condition: typical norms and practices. 4. An identitarian condition: shared sense of belonging. These broad conditions stand out as blueprints of human societies. At the end of the day, in the modern era they largely equate with the public notion of ‘nation’ stripped of its ideological features. ‘Society’ is indeed the underlying, organised, everyday manifestation of an ‘imagined community’ of people, to use Benedict Anderson’s (1983) famous formula. The four conditions apply straightforwardly to single out, for instance, US society. Everybody knows where the borders of the United States lie, and that the borders between federal states are less salient than the borders with Mexico and Canada; the distribution of wealth, income and public benefits in the US population is quite specific – almost unique; there are rituals, lifestyle habits, celebrations that are recognised as all-American; people call themselves ‘Americans’. Briefly, these four features are sufficient to identify the conception of a given society that implicitly or explicitly is held by most ordinary people of our times.3 Correspondingly, one single European society would emerge if, and only if, we could detect:   I am aware that this picture is at odds with a normative reject of methodological nationalism, which I endorse; however, I surmise that it is a faithful descriptive account of the way almost every human being of the early twenty-first century perceives a ‘society’ to be. 3

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a. EU borders as uncontroversial and symbolically more important than member state borders. b. A common, EU-wide template of social inequality. c. A set of standard social practices and norms that are present everywhere. d. ‘Europe’ as a widespread object of self-identification. Arguably, none of these conditions holds as I write – as they did not about a decade ago when Díez Medrano (2008) discussed a similar set of criteria.4 These elements are not ‘black and white’, though. They are also problematic to measure, potentially including an array of aspects of social life – in particular as regards practices and norms. Before engaging in this exercise, in the next section I will outline the three sociopolitical processes that are likely to advance or push back the potential advent of one European society at some point in the future on these four crucial fronts of societal organisation and recognition.

Specifying ‘social change’: three ongoing processes Social change is a large – maybe too large – umbrella concept that captures all trends affecting social organisation and relations. Many such trends are discernible in the contemporary world, or in some areas of it. I concentrate here on three general processes that are arguably at work across the European space. The first one – centralisation – has to do with the distribution of political power in the EU. European integration has articulated the pre-existing picture, which hinged on the state, creating a multi-layered governance with a nested power structure from local government to supranational institutions – namely, the European Union (Bartolini 2005). To complicate things further, the latter is a bundle of organisms, some of which are not even formally enshrined in a constitutionally clear form of government – think in particular of the European Central Bank, which is nonetheless key to monetary policy all over the euro area.   While my approach builds explicitly on Díez Medrano (2008), I introduce a more dynamic view of societies, taking into account major processes of social change. I also slightly deviate from Díez Medrano’s requirement of a (European) society as entailing identification and territory-wide specific social groups, and particularly social classes. I assume that the regularities and specificities of any given society imply structured patterns of allocation of resources, thus including a hierarchical component, but not necessarily in the form of social class relations. Therefore, in a following section, I capture such a dimension through measures of inequality that do not focus on social class. 4

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In its earliest incarnation, the Coal and Steel Community of 1951, European integration was all about pooling resources and steering their access and use centrally. It was a top-down project, with a firm monitoring of economic activities and a clear political intent – controlling any temptation to funnel raw materials to nationalistic (if not military) use. Such a blueprint has never since disappeared from the history of European integration. Note that centralisation of power in Europe is only apparently at odds with the aim of ‘rescuing nation states’ (Milward et al 2000). The very existence of a coordinating super partes polity legitimates the persistence of otherwise more conflict-prone and thus vulnerable political orders – that is, European nation states. Brussels absorbs, buffers, serves as a scapegoat for unpopular policies. Whether to relieve national legislatures from painful and divisive decision-making issues, sustain market integration, or improve member states’ coordination games, the corpus of EU legislation has expanded and incorporated policy areas traditionally in the grasp of the national state. Even domains formally left to member states have been touched by the sweeping force of a top-down reformatting according to a common template. A good example is the Bologna Process: technically not a EU policy, but a coordinated EU-wide effort to align higher education’s organisational rules. As a by-product, national legislations have harmonised over time. This is ‘Europeanisation’, in the ‘vertical’ notion that is dear to political scientists (Radaelli 2003), rather than the ‘horizontal’ one on which sociologists have sought to focus (Favell and Guiraudon 2011; Mau and Mewes 2012; see also Trenz 2016). But such harmonisation is premised logically on a transfer of power to a pivotal authority – the EU. Europeanisation entails centralisation, at least in terms of coordination if not transfer of authority. Attempts to measure and track ‘Europeanisation’ over time are prevailingly country-based and, in a nutshell, conceptually and methodologically controversial (Müller et  al 2010; Töller 2010; Brouard et al 2011). Without entering into the details, however, the prevailing message of these studies point to a growing capacity of the EU to set and steer the agenda for national legislation. According to König and Ohr (2013), for instance, member states’ ‘institutional conformity’ to EU law (measured mostly on the basis of infringement procedures) has slightly increased in the EU15 between 1999 and 2010. In the long term, it is hard to deny that there has been a process of centralisation of policy making in Europe, although not in all realms or with uniform speed (Bickerton 2012). On paper, I expect the centralisation of political power in Europe to enhance the salience of EU borders, as legal differences between

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member states get smoothed out; to promote norms, and consequently social practices, that are shared throughout the EU; to nurture a sense of common destiny among individuals living far apart but abiding by the same legislation. In fact, vertical Europeanisation is not necessarily an instrument of equalisation of living standards across the continent (as argued by Beckfield 2006). The second major process of social change – imitation – takes place in part independently from political phenomena (and not only in Europe). This notion, as is well known, was first introduced into the sociological vocabulary by Gabriel Tarde (1890). In contemporary sociology, it undergirds the idea of isomorphism as a pervasive vehicle of social functioning and diffusion (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Strang and Meyer 1993). Both in Tarde’s original formulation and in more recent literature on isomorphism, imitation can work either top-down or bottom-up – if driven by elites or the wider public. Analytically, imitation encapsulates two different but overlapping processes. On the one hand, it entails isomorphism in beliefs and behaviours: people living in distinct societies show a tendency to adopt – even without direct contact – the same ways of thinking and living. Media and advertising promote such uniformity, exposing people to the same messages and pressures in different societies. On the other hand, imitation pertains to the sharing of common frames of reference: people look at the same benchmarks to evaluate what they deem viable and fair. Thus, in the European context, as Heidenreich and colleagues (2015, 7) note, ‘the nation-state is no longer [taken as] the exclusive frame of reference for the evaluation of living conditions. The economic and monetary integration of the EU has opened up previously closed national spaces of solidarity and equality standards’ (see also Whelan and Maître 2009; Gerhards and Lengfeld 2015). On a larger scale, globalisation may also foster imitation (although this has long been debated: see Ritzer 1993; Featherstone et al 1995). Through several (and increasingly transnational, with the spread of the internet) means of communication, and through converging media effects, ways of living and thinking diffuse across borders, swiftly becoming known and popular. (Why some do and others do not is puzzling, but not of direct interest here.) Imitation, whenever it happens, has an obvious effect on the standardisation of social practices and norms. It can also trigger a higher sensitivity to fairness in comparison with other societies, thus boosting some convergence in social structures. Less clear is the relation of supranational imitation to the perception of borders and sense of belonging; imitation (think of everyday practices, like food) is often predicated on overemphasised

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national or local identities (however widespread their consumption, paella remains associated with Spain and pizza with Italy) without any further cognitive and behavioural implication of sense of belonging and perception of societal borders. The third process has to do with the spatial ‘fixing’ of individuals into national societies. This process was crucial in nation building (Torpey 2000; see also Recchi 2016) and was part and parcel of the territorial closure that accompanied the rise of the welfare state (Ferrera 2005). Its reverse – that is, social transnationalism, in both physical and virtual terms – shakes the foundations of the nation-based organisation of social life. For sure, globalisation detaches individuals from the nation state. Moreover, the EU free movement regime and single market arrangements have institutionalised these possibilities. Cross-border physical and virtual mobility is a bottom-up worldwide trend that has blossomed nowhere as it has in Europe. At the world regional level, intense cross-national mobility may contribute to erode national borders and strengthen supranational ones (Deutsch et al 1957). We can also speculate that social practices and identifications may also blur and become less nation-specific – that is, hybridise – but not necessarily conform to the same standards. A superdiverse society (sensu Vertovec 2007) is not a homogenous society, in which people follow widespread mores. Less clear is the effect on the standardisation of social structures. In traditional neoclassical economic theory, the mobility of labour (like all factors of production) leads ultimately to market equalisation, levelling salaries and labour demands. But this outcome does not occur straightforwardly, and existing research shows that the mobility of workers from A to B does not bring the two economies A and B any closer – at least in the short and medium term (Faini 1996; Petrakos et al 2005; Huber and Tondl 2012). Lastly, in tune with the longstanding ‘transactionalist thesis’ (Deutsch et al 1957; Kuhn 2015), we can expect that collective identification among individuals who lead a cross-border life will upgrade to a supranational level – that is, feeling more European in the EU context. Table 9.1 summarises my expectations in terms of the effects of the three processes of social change on the four constituting dimensions of a potentially unified European society. Needless to say, the expectations are conditional on the direction and strength of the process itself. In the following section, I will examine empirical indicators about the changes of these dimensions and the likely influence of these three processes in Europe since the beginning of the twenty-first century.

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Is social transnationalism fusing European societies into one? Table 9.1: Expected impact of processes of sociopolitical change on constituting dimensions of a unified European society

Supranational borders Convergent social structure Common practices and norms Shared identification

Centralisation + +/– + +

Imitation +/– + + +/–

Transnationalism + +/– +/– +

Supranational and national borders: not a zero-sum game The whole process of European integration implies a spectacular process of ‘debordering and rebordering’ on a continental scale (Nelles and Walther 2011). ‘Debordering’ is a consequence of mechanisms and rules (the Single Market, free movement, Schengen) aiming at and leading to increased cross-state exchanges. ‘Rebordering’ refers to all activities geared to securitise external frontiers and the surveillance of entitlements to mobility within the EU itself. These two dynamics have possibly accelerated since the early 2000s. In particular, the enlargements of 2004, 2007 and 2013 have considerably changed the territory of the EU. The sheer length of the EU’s external borders rose from 7169 km in 2003 to 10,306 in 2008 (Hobbing 2005, 7). The question is: has this objective expansion been mirrored in a shift of salience from nation state to supranational borders? As a stream of literature on ‘Fortress Europe’ points out, external borders have become highly topical in the EU (Geddes and Scholten 2016). The EU has established a principle of solidarity and burden sharing among member states in external border control which was first expressed concretely in offering €963 million to new member states to set up infrastructure, personnel recruitment, training and technologies to cater for border management (Hobbing 2005, 8). The overlap of EU enlargements and the post-9/11 sensitivity to terrorism and security translated into an institutional impetus to articulate border controls. The Schengen convention of 1990 (and the Common Manual defining the ‘how to’ of harmonised frontier policing), which is still the cornerstone of border controls within the EU and at external borders, has been supplemented by a plethora of additional legal-technical instruments and operational bodies.

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The most important of these bodies is Frontex, whose history marks the recognition of the supranational nature of EU borders.5 Frontex was created immediately after the enlargement of 2004 with the mission of coordinating and supporting – not replacing – national border police activities (Ekelund 2014). Its headquarters opened in October 2005 in Warsaw – the timing and the place attesting the attention of the EU to the issue in relation to enlargement to the East. However, its full name reasserted the persisting respect for member states’ sovereignty in controlling access to their own national territory (Carrera 2007, 9): officially, Frontex was ‘the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union’ (italics added). The EU borders were, formally, first of all national borders. Nonetheless, Frontex has progressively accentuated its independence and strength, especially through its mandate to act in case of emergency with Rapid Border Intervention Teams in 2007. This trend was reaffirmed in 2011, when the agency was permitted to own and lease equipment, develop and use systems to exchange information with other agencies, member states and the European Commission (Mungianu 2013). The refugee crisis of 2015 marked a high point for emergencies at the external borders of the EU and put Frontex in the eye of the storm, well beyond its original ‘behind the scenes’ intelligence and risk assessment role. Eventually, in October 2016, after a new ad hoc EU Regulation, the agency changed its name to become the ‘European Border and Coast Guard Agency’. At its launch, the European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, declared: ‘From now onwards, the external EU border of one Member State is the external border of

  Another key, although less visible, actor is EU-LISA: that is, the ‘European Agency for the Operational Management of Large-scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’. The Agency manages EURODAC, the Visa Information System (VIS) and second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II). Even more than Frontex, which operates on spatial frontiers, EU-LISA reveals the multiplicity and deterritorialisation of borders denounced by critical border studies (Walters 2016). Bigo (2014) gives a comprehensive picture of what the EU has come to call ‘Integrated border management’ which corresponds to socially and symbolically stratified practices: a first layer is formed by national border guards with a police-like disposition, a second one by Frontex officials with an intelligence and risk assessment habitus, a third one by IT specialists at EU-LISA dealing with databases and biometrics who have a completely dehumanised view of securitisation practices. 5

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all Member States – both legally and operationally’.6 EU-led border controls sidelines the earlier principle by which borders in the Union were exclusively a matter of national sovereignty. This achievement crowns the impressive growth in size and scope of Frontex. Initially endowed with 43 officials, these rose to 138 in 2008 and up to 365 in 2016. Its 2005 budget was €6,157,000; it quadrupled already in its first two years of existence; and skyrocketed after the refugee crisis, up to €302,000,000 in 2017 (Neal 2009; Pollak and Slominski 2009; Mathiason et al 2015; Frontex website, consulted on November 22, 2017). What about intra-EU borders? Did they lose significance in parallel to the rising emphasis placed on external borders? In spite of the slow, uneven but overall expanding Europeanisation of border control policies, immigration stokes preoccupations and fears that are prevailingly framed in national terms. Anti-immigration parties are also nationalist parties that place an emphasis on the protection of nationbased – not EU-based – rights.7 What they advocate is not Fortress Europe, but Fortress Britain, Fortress Denmark, Fortress France, and so on. Such an approach turned into policies on the occasion of the 2015–2016 refugee crisis. Hungary built fences to prevent asylumseekers entering the country, and used water cannons and tear gas to deter them from crossing its borders.8 Bulgaria did the same along its frontiers with Turkey and Greece. In the latter instance, barbed wire separated the two EU member states, with the explicit aim of barring free movement across the EU territory. Slovenia followed suit at its borders with Croatia. After the refugee crisis Europe had more fences and walls than during the Cold War. Similarly, although visually less dramatically, most EU member states on the South and Eastern European borders (but also Denmark, Sweden and Norway) called for a suspension of the Schengen agreement and reintroduced traditional police controls at their frontiers. France suspended Schengen as well, but justified it on the grounds of potential terrorist attacks. As a result, at some point between 2015 and 2017 the Schengen system looked close to total collapse. Its suspension, far from being episodic and   As reported on Frontex webpage: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/videos/ official-launch-of-the-european-border-and-coast-guard-knOt9g. 7   A partial, but only nominal, exception is the Pegida movement in Germany, which claims to uphold the interests of ‘Europeans’. 8  Much earlier, in the 1990s, frontier walls were erected by Spain in Ceuta and Melilla. Periodically, they are assaulted and trigger deadly incidents between migrants and Spanish police. 6

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exceptional, became the norm. After all, this is entirely plausible under the Schengen agreement. As the European Commission reminds us, The reintroduction of border control is a prerogative of the Member States. The Commission may issue an opinion with regard to the necessity of the measure and its proportionality but cannot veto such a decision if it is taken by a Member State.9 Such a condition exposes the reversibility of Schengen. Freezing if not reversing the intra-EU free movement logic that inspired European integration in the previous decades, the defence of national borders – even when neighbours are other EU member states – has become a prominent issue in most government agendas (King et al 2017). Last but not least, the salience of national borders is also magnified by their contestation from within some EU member states. Scotland, Corsica, Lombardy and Veneto, the Basque country and, most vehemently, Catalonia challenge existing national borders and wave the flag of secession. Their ultimate goal is to redesign the political map of Europe and set up new frontier lines within the continent. In conclusion, there are few doubts that the external borders of the EU have progressively gained significance from the mid-2000s on. A logic of centralisation has clearly driven the process, with member states negotiating to transfer part of migration issues to EU actors. However, internal borders – that is, between EU member states – have not disappeared or have simply downgraded to ‘interfaces’ between constituting units of a single system. Under pressing terrorist threats, internal border controls have been reinstated, and member states have imitated each other in doing so. Perhaps only existing intra-EU mobility flows have inhibited the breakdown of the free movement regime altogether. After all, the number of intra-EU movers has been rising constantly, year after year, since the late 1990s, having reached 17  million people in 2017. Equally, intra-EU tourism continues to expand: Europeans made over 600 million cross-border trips to other EU countries in 2016 (see Figure 0.1, in this volume). The sheer meaning of space among Europeans has possibly changed as a consequence of their intra-EU mobility experiences (Scheibelhofer 2016). The ending of free movement, however, keeps on being aired   From the website of the DG Migration and Home Affairs: https://ec.europa.eu/ home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroductionborder-control_en. 9

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as a priority by mounting neo-nationalist parties. With the notable exception of the UK, where Brexit was spurred by a widespread rejection of immigration from the rest of the EU, free movement remains in place on the continent, but in a context of reinforced controls of internal frontiers.

Convergence of social structures? A possible reversal In purely monetary terms, the richest nation on earth is in Europe: GDP per capita is nowhere higher than in Luxembourg. Indeed all Western European countries lie at the top of the world rankings. While they have risen considerably since accession to the EU (more than tripling in Latvia between 2005 and 2016), incomes remain substantially lower in Eastern Europe. The median income of Romanian residents is still about or less than one-tenth that of residents in Luxembourg, Denmark, Austria, Sweden and Finland. As a result, income divergence between member states in the EU is greater than between federal states in the US. In sharp contrast, the intranational distance between the rich and the poor is lower in Europe than elsewhere on the planet. In the 2005–2016 period, the EU-wide average Gini index of within-country income inequality remained rather constant (in the 29.6–30.4 range) and at a comparably low level. Lower, in any case, than in most developing countries and well below the 0.60–0.70 Gini estimated by Branko Milanovic (2011) for the entire globe on the basis of denationalised householdlevel data. Europe can still boast a rather egalitarian distribution of its prosperity. Given our interest in social dynamics, the key issue at stake is whether the allocation of resources between and within European countries has been changing over time, and in which direction. Two dimensions are at play. The first one has to do with countryto-country differences: are residents in poorer European societies catching up with their counterparts in richer nations? In other words, is there ‘income convergence’ between countries? Earlier research has shown that this was actually the case in the two decades between 1980 and the end of the century, albeit at the price of increasing withincountry inequalities.10 Apparently, though, such convergence ended or even reverted in the new century (Mau and Verwiebe 2010, 193 ff).   Beckfield’s (2006) interpretation was that single market politics smoothed national differences at the same time as amplifying the distance between winners and losers of Europeanisation and globalisation in each country. 10

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9,000

4

8,500

3

8,000

2

1

Divergence Income disparity Inequality disparity

7,500

7,000 Convergence

0

6,500 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Note: Income disparity (between countries) is calculated as the standard deviation of median equivalised income by country (left-hand scale, grey line). Inequality disparity (within countries) is calculated as the standard deviation of income Gini indexes by country (right-hand scale, black line). For both indexes, a declining curve indicates convergence, a rising one divergence. Source: Elaboration from Eurostat online database (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database)

Figure 9.1 depicts the trend since 2005 – that is, immediately after the major enlargement of the EU in 2004. The grey line represents the standard deviation of median equivalised incomes in the EU28 (including Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia, which joined the EU later) in the following years. It shows an indisputably growing divergence between societies. From the mid-2000s, before the Eurocrisis hit, the pace of income growth was irregular. While some of the poorer countries headed towards prosperity at a fast pace (the Baltic states almost tripled their average income in the following decade, while Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria more than doubled theirs), others lagged behind or even faced shrinking household incomes (in Greece, incomes in 2016 were 20% lower than in 2005). How unequal is the distribution of economic resources? Although not perfect, the Gini coefficient is the most commonly used measure to summarise income inequalities at the national level. As anticipated, income Ginis are quite stable over time across European societies (see also Atkinson and Morelli 2014). In the 2005–2016 period they slightly converged towards the continent’s average, which in turn declined moderately. This trend may well mask extreme differences (like the

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mounting gap between the less privileged and the top 1% of incomes), but overall goes against the received wisdom that decries the Eurocrisis as a source of further social divisions within national societies. In brief, there seems to be a European model of income distribution (sketchily epitomised by a Gini of approximately 0.30) towards which EU societies seem to converge, in spite of their increasingly distant levels of prosperity. How do social welfare systems enter this equation? According to a famous classification, welfare states in Europe are clustered around three to five ideal models: the conservative, the liberal and the social democratic type (Esping-Andersen 1990), to which others add the Southern European and the post-socialist types (Ferrera 1996; Fenger 2007). Are these models withering away towards a common template? Or do they keep some differences but end up delivering increasingly similar outputs to buffer social risks (Ferragina and Seeleb-Kaiser 2011)? Figure  9.2 first shows the level of convergence in the social expenditures per inhabitant (in PPS: Purchasing Power Standard) by country. In 2016, the EU average was €6,841, ranging from €15,013 in Luxembourg to €2,350 in Romania. While amounts have increased Figure 9.2: Convergence or divergence? State expenditures for social welfare and poverty levels in the EU28 (2005–2015) 4,000

14 12

3,000

10 8 6 4

Social expenditures disparity

Divergence

Poverty level disparity

2,000

1,000

2 Convergence 0

0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Note: Social expenditure disparity is calculated as the standard deviation of total social expenditures per inhabitant by country in PPS (right-hand scale, black line). Poverty level disparity is calculated as the standard deviation of the proportion of resident population suffering severe material deprivation in each EU member state (left-hand scale, grey line). For both indexes, a declining curve indicates convergence, a rising one divergence. Source: Elaboration from Eurostat online database (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database)

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almost everywhere since 2005 by an average 35%, the gap between more and less generous welfare states has widened. The almost entire amount of this divergence has arisen since 2010, possibly as an effect of the differential capacity of member states to funnel resources into curbing the social effects of the recession. This parallels the growing divergence in average country incomes documented in Figure 9.1. What is striking, however, is that the proportion of extremely poor residents has in fact converged across countries. I take, in particular, the share of national residents in ‘severe material deprivation’ (that is, lacking four or more of nine basic capabilities: decent meals, money to pay mortgage, rent and utility bills, one week’s annual holiday, a telephone, a TV, a washing machine, a car, heating at home). In the developed world, the mere existence of people suffering such deprivation indicates a blatant form of unequal allocation of resources. In this regard, the distance from one country to another is huge: only 0.8% of Swedish residents as opposed to 31.9% of Bulgarian residents are in a state of deprivation in 2016. Nonetheless, the unweighted country-based average share of the severely deprived has declined noticeably since a decade earlier: from 11% to 8.8%. Correspondingly, the overall distance (again captured by the standard deviation) across countries has decreased by almost one-third. The progress has been spectacular particularly in some Eastern European countries: in Poland, the proportion dropped from 33.8% to 6.7%. On the other hand, unsurprisingly, it has risen in Greece from 12.8% to 22.4%, as well as in the rest of Southern Europe. The overall result is that there is convergence in poverty levels across the EU. The type of inequality management that underlies the size of the very poor population has become progressively more similar across European societies. Overall, from the mid-2000s to the mid-2010s in the EU there has been growing divergence in between-country economic inequality but convergence in within-country levels of inequality. European societies are distancing themselves in their economic standing, or even following a path of ‘economic dualisation’ of the continent (Palier et al 2017), but tend to conform somewhat more in the way resources are distributed among their members nationwide. Are these trends in inequality promoted, or at least sustained, by any of the three sweeping processes of change outlined earlier? In this realm, centralisation equates to a large extent to the adoption of a common currency (not shared by all EU member states) and the EU ‘fiscal compact’ imposing constraints on member states’ deficits. Economists debate fiercely about the macroeconomic effects of the

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euro (eg, Bellofiore et al 2015). Do fixed exchange rates jeopardise the capacity of less productive economies to compete on global markets, thus giving an extra edge to more capital-intensive national economies? Basically, is the euro behind the rising asymmetry in economic growth rates of Central and Northern European economies and Southern European ones (Höpner and Lutter 2014; Johnson and Regan 2016)? Other even more critical voices argue that ‘fiscal compact’ rules place an additional burden on crisis-ridden countries (again, in Southern Europe), hampering their rebooting of economic growth via public investments (Varoufakis 2016). In contrast, imitation is plausibly one of the drivers of convergence in within-country patterns of inequality. Welfare systems are overall subject to similar pressures and respond with similar solutions, which diffuse from one country to another. In particular, since the fall of socialist regimes, Eastern European countries have progressively borrowed welfare practices from their Western counterparts. Both policy makers and public opinions contribute to such convergence, keeping an eye on neighbouring societies and smoothing idiosyncratic inequalities. Finally, it is hard to assess the effects of workers’ cross-national mobility on inequality patterns in Europe. Sizeable flows especially from East to West may have contributed, via returns and remittances, to boost the quite spectacular macroeconomic performance of Poland and the Baltic States (but less to Romania’s). However, there could also have been a ‘brain drain’ effect on the sending countries. These two contrasting outcomes are extremely difficult to disentangle and economic research on the issue is inconclusive.

Harmonisation of social norms and practices? Secularisation and not much else Any society has myriad social norms and practices, more or less widespread and salient. In the impossibility of drawing an exhaustive list, and given the space limits of this overview, I focus here on two encompassing norms and practices. As for norms, I monitor the acceptance of homosexuality and tax civicness – that is, two norms having to do with the organisation of respectively private and public life. Tolerance of homosexuality is an indicator of the freedom for individual sexual expression, and ultimately of societal freedom, while the obligation to pay taxes is a key principle of the social contract, which also evokes the foundations of representative democracy. Both

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norms echo EU-bolstered basic values.11 As for practices, I look at regular attendance of religious services and volunteering in associations. These two practices are forms of sociality that speak respectively about transcendence (mostly a private concern) and civic commitment (mostly a public concern). Indicators about these norms and practices come from the European Values Study that has tracked them since the 1980s (EVS 2015).12 Tolerance of homosexuality is still a controversial issue in global public opinion, although it has overall increased since the 1980s (Hadler 2012; Smith et  al 2014). Worldwide, Europe is at the forefront of acceptance of homosexual relations; the first state ever to recognise same-sex marriage legally was the Netherlands in 2000. In every Western European country for which data are available (with the exception of Ireland and Portugal), the openly homophobic public considering homosexuality ‘never justifiable’ was already in the minority in the early 1990s. It has been shrinking during the following two decades, now generally being nowhere higher than one-third of the population (34% in Great Britain, where the decline has been less marked than in most countries; Malta, with 40%, is also exceptional). This trend of diminishing intolerance is visible in Eastern Europe as well, but at a slower pace and starting from a stronger base of hostility to homosexuality. As a result, in all Central and Eastern European societies (with the exception of the Czech Republic and Slovakia) a majority of European Values Study (EVS) respondents do still declare that ‘homosexuality is never justifiable’ in the 2008–2010 wave of the survey. In sum, large differences persist among European societies on this key aspect of individual freedom.13   The EU website has a ‘EU in brief ’ section that opens up with reference to ‘goals and values’. Among these, prominence is given to ‘respect for private life’ and ‘representative democracy’. See https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en. 12   The questionnaire items considered are the following: - Homosexuality: scores 2–10 on a 1–10 scale where 1 is ‘never justifiable’ and 10 is ‘always justifiable’; - Tax civicness: score 1 on a 1–10 scale where 1 is ‘cheating on taxes is never justifiable’ and 10 means ‘cheating on taxes is always justifiable’; - Religiosity: respondents declare they attend religious services once a month or more; - Volunteering: respondents declare they do non-paid work in a NGO, a community organisation, a trade union, a party, a charity, or any other non-profit body. 13   Consequently, as of 2017, same-sex marriages have entered the legislation of no more than 13 EU member states, while eight other member states recognise different forms of same-sex unions. 11

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Is social transnationalism fusing European societies into one? Figure 9.3: Harmonisation of social norms? Disparities in country-level acceptance of homosexuality and tax civicness in the EU (1990–2010) 12 10 8

Divergence

6 4

Convergence Disparity in tax civicness Disparity in acceptance of homosexuality

2 0 1990–1993

1999–2001

2008–2010

Notes: Disparity in sexual freedom is calculated as the standard deviation of the proportion of resident population considering homosexuality justifiable in each EU member state. Disparity in tax civicness is calculated as the standard deviation of the proportion of resident population considering it is never justifiable to cheat on taxes in each EU member state. A declining curve indicates cross-national convergence, a rising one divergence. Countries included in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Great Britain. N = 154,033 (homosexuality); 161,175 (tax civicness). Source: Elaboration from European Values Study longitudinal file (country-weighted) (EVS 2015)

Figure 9.3 shows that the disparity of views on homosexuality across EU countries even increased in the 1990s, as a result of the different speed at which tolerance of homosexual behaviour spread in different societies; however, it declined in the late 2000s, returning to the levels of the early 1990s. Cross-national divergence on the issue is now back to where it was 20 years earlier. Tax civicness – that is, intolerance of tax cheating – is a more stable norm. In the most recent wave of EVS, in the bulk of EU member states a majority of people states that this behaviour is never justifiable. The geography of tax civicness is also fragmented. In Eastern Europe, in particular, there is high variability: Hungary is the EU member state with the largest proportion of the population that abhors tax cheating (78.3%), while Lithuania has the lowest proportion of people who share such a view (37.3%). Such cross-national variations are not easy to account for. Enforcement policies and the economic conjuncture

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may have country-specific effects. Some case studies indicate that tax compliance stems from the legitimacy of state institutions, but its micro- and macro-level antecedents remain quite obscure (Torgler and Schneider 2007). Equally, in a diachronic perspective, changes within and across countries do not follow a clear-cut trend. In the two decades under observation, tax civicness has become more widespread in 11 countries and less in 12. The distance across EU countries – the key issue at stake here – has slightly diminished in the 1990s and slightly increased in the 2000s. At the end of the day, no sign of convergence appears on this front. A huge literature has magnified the role of social capital as the cornerstone of well-functioning societies or, at least, as a marker of societal identities. While the contours of the concept itself are not strictly determined, the extent to which people engage in voluntary work and associational life is certainly a core component of social capital. Here I operationalise this information as the proportion of respondents to EVS claiming to do some non-paid volunteering in each country in the usual two-decade time span – approximately 1990 to 2010. Variability is huge: these proportions range from 11.8% in Hungary to 85.9% in the Netherlands. No regional homogeneity shows up: for instance, in Southern Europe there is a contrast between 59.6% of volunteers in Italy and 13.2% in Spain. No surprise then that attempts to cluster European countries in terms of social capital characteristics have resulted in rather inconsistent classifications (Pichler and Wallace 2007, for instance, code Hungary and Estonia as part of the ‘Southern European cluster’). Over time, this picture has become all the more disparate, as the rise of the standard deviation in our indicator – from 7.7 in the early 1990s to 19.7 in 2008–2010 – indicates (Figure 9.4). As long as individuals’ engagement in voluntary work is a salient social practice, European societies have grown more not less different in these two decades. Participation in religious services is another meaningful social activity which – in secular and individualised contexts like Europe – reflects a more private counterpart to volunteering. Decreasing church attendance is a well-documented phenomenon Europewide (De Hart et al 2013; Halman and Van Ingen 2015; Cipriani and Garelli 2016). Of the 20 countries for which data are available for the three EVS waves under consideration, in only four has there been some rise in the proportion of respondents attending religious services since the late 1980s. However, these are all Eastern European societies (Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia) where the demise of socialist regimes boosted a return of religion, showing that the

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Is social transnationalism fusing European societies into one? Figure 9.4: Harmonisation of social practices? Disparities in country-level volunteer activities and attendance of religious services in the EU (1990–2010) Disparity in volunteering Disparity in attendance of religious services

30 25 20

Divergence

15 10

Convergence 5 0

1990–1993

1999–2001

2008–2010

Notes: Disparity in volunteering is calculated as the standard deviation of the proportion of resident population doing non-paid activities for some collective body in each EU member state. Disparity in religiosity is calculated as the standard deviation of the proportion of resident population attending religious services at least once a month in each EU member state. A declining curve indicates cross-national convergence, a rising one divergence. Countries included in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Great Britain. N = 155,976 (volunteering); 160,879 (religiosity). Source: Elaboration from European Values Study longitudinal file (country-weighted) (EVS 2015)

overarching trend of secularisation intermingles with specific societal trajectories (Dargent 2014). Moreover, the rhythm of secularisation is also different. Former very religious countries like Ireland and Spain have seen the proportion of the population going regularly to church almost halved in two decades, whereas equally Catholic countries like Italy and Portugal have experienced a definitely more tenuous decline (from 52.7% to 49% and from 41.3% to 36.3%, respectively). The end points of such trajectories are distinct: compare the 69.8% of Poles who go to mass monthly or more often to the 10.1% of Finns who do likewise. Immigration possibly plays a part as well, due to the different participation in religious activities of newcomers (which is unfortunately not documented in a systematic and comparative way). All in all, the distance between country levels of religiosity is contracting (SD: from 25 in 1990 to 22 in 2000 to 20 in 2010) (Figure 9.4). Broadly speaking, secularisation is a force sweeping the entire continent and potentially making European

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societies more similar in terms of levels of religious practice. In this regard, Therborn’s (1995, 353) earlier intuition that there is a typically ‘European scepticism with regard to God’ is corroborated a quarter of a century later. The four norms and practices examined in this section are a rather small sample of all norms and practices that regulate societies. Nonetheless, they are quite strategic and significant. Some of them resonate particularly with key principles of the EU, making a case for ‘centralisation’ effects. On homosexuality, the European Court of Human Rights has intervened repeatedly to support the legal status of same-sex couples. In particular, the Court has provided an interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights as requiring member states to provide legal recognition, which may or may not take the form of marriage. The EU is less vocal on taxes, as they remains a preserve of member state authority. Volunteering and grassroots activism mirror the EU concern with subsidiarity – self-help and collective action should be as close as possible to citizens. In its Citizenship Report of 2017, the European Commission states explicitly that ‘volunteering is another way of putting EU values into practice’ (European Commission 2017, 13), promoting European Solidarity Corps and the European Voluntary Service for young people. In spite of this, no common thrust to more civic participation can be found in the different corners of the continent. Finally, as for religiosity, the EU – not without controversy – has refrained on several occasions (especially the drafting of the Treaty of Amsterdam and the then aborted Constitutional Treaty) to mention the role of churches and religion, eventually adopting a secularity standpoint (Bontempi 2005). I suspect that this posture has not been particularly influential in shaping the growing secularisation of the continent, which may rather reflect wider processes of individualisation (the empowerment of the self) and demographic change (longer life expectancy meaning that fear of death is emotionally less compelling). Imitation is arguably a mechanism of diffusion of this deep-seated trend to individualisation and thus secularisation. Migration and social transnationalism, in turn, may mix the cards, as they enhance religious diversity, possibly curbing secularisation when newcomers originate from milieus that are more traditional.

‘Feeling European’: shared identification or persistent cleavage? Formulated about a century ago, William I. Thomas’ theorem of ‘definition of the situation’ holds that ‘If men [sic] define situations as

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real, they are real in their consequences’ (quoted in Merton 1995, 380). One of its basic implications is that people’s self-proclaimed sense of belonging to society X is constitutive of that same society. Is this the case for European society? Do Europeans define themselves as being part of it? Research on identification with Europe is now abundant (and controversial: Favell 2005), exploring the meanings (eg  Díez Medrano 2003), the antecedents (eg Bruter 2005), the mechanisms (eg Recchi 2014), or the salience (eg Duchesne et al 2013) of the feelings that individuals associate with ‘Europe’. Different research methods have been employed, from in-depth interviews to focus groups. The most widely used source, however, is Eurobarometer, which tracks the attitudes of residents of EU (and formerly EC) member states since the 1970s. Among the different questions tapping respondents’ sense of belonging, one of the most effective is the socalled Moreno question (named after the scholar who popularised it):14 Do you in the near future see yourself as: • Nationality (for example, French) only, • Nationality (for example, French) and European, • European and nationality (for example, French), • European only? This question was introduced into Eurobarometer in 1992 and asked regularly thereafter. Hence, which part of the population can be deemed to feel ‘European’? Much depends on the interpretation of the answer items – in other words, where we draw the line. We can opt for an ‘exclusive’ (European only), a ‘strong’ (European only and European and national), a ‘weak’ (European only, European and national and national and European) definition of people expressing a sense of belonging to Europe. Obviously, the last definition is more inclusive than the former ones. In contrast, respondents who see themselves as ‘nationals only’ reject all possible attachment to a Europe-wide society. Figure 9.5 shows the evolution of the size of the population that fits into an exclusive, a strong and a weak definition of Europeanness. It also shows the share of EU residents who do not consider themselves European at all. Finally, it tracks the disparity in the proportion of

 Apparently, Luis Moreno did not invent it, as an earlier version of the same question had been used in a study by Gunther and colleagues (1986), who in turn attributed it to Juan Linz (for a scrupulous history of the question’s travels and usages, see Deschouwer et al 2015). 14

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Everyday Europe Figure 9.5: Evolution of European identification (% of population feeling European according to weak, strong and exclusive definitions) and disparity of levels of European identification among member states (1994–2017) 70 Weak

60 50 Not European 40 30 20

Strong

10 0

Disparity among countries Exclusive 1994

2002

2010

2017

Notes: People who feel themselves to be European can be restricted to those who express an exclusive belonging (European only), who mention Europe as their first centre of identification (European only + European and national), or include anybody who feels some sense of Europeanness (European only + European and national + national and European). I call these exclusive, strong and weak conceptions of European identification. Disparity in European identification is calculated as the standard deviation of the proportion of resident population that fits into the weak definition in each EU member state (dotted line). Data refer to EU13 in 1994, EU15 in 2002, EU27 in 2010, and EU28 member states in 2017. N = 14,006 (1994), 15,588 (2002), 26,405 (2010), 26,643 (2017). Source: Elaboration from Eurobarometers 42, 57.1, 73.4 and 87.3 (weighted) (http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index#p=1& instruments=STANDARD)

self-defined Europeans across member states (dotted line) between 1994 and 2017. A first message of this analysis is that European identification has not superseded national identification in the EU. Our starting date is 1994, which coincides with the introduction of European citizenship. From this high point of symbolic recognition of a politically backed commonality, the number of ‘European nationalists’, so to speak, who claim an exclusive identification as ‘Europeans only’ has continued to shrink: from an already meagre 7.2% in 1994 to 1.7% in 2017. If this trend does not stop, there will hardly be any ‘Europeans at heart’ on the continent in the coming decades. ‘Thick’ Europeanism (Buhari-Gulmez and Rumford 2016) is mostly an intellectual exercise. The 12-starred blue and yellow flag of the EU hardly ever replaces national ones. A less ambitious notion,

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treating European identity as the dominant part of a multiple sense of belonging, gives a similar picture of demise: in 1994, 10.7% of respondents felt ‘European and national’; this had declined to 7% in 2017. In fact, Europe rather accommodates the we-feeling of Europeans as a secondary identity accompanying a persistently dominant national identity. This form of identification has become even more popular (from 48.1% in 1994 to 55.3% in 2017). ‘Loosely European’ is the main formula by which Europeans frame themselves. After a moment of decline, coinciding with the Eurocrisis, the number of people who in some way acknowledge Europe as part of their collective identification is approximately at the level of two and a half decades earlier (63.9% in 2017, 66% in 1994). Incapable of winning the hearts and minds of Europeans, Europe is consolidating itself as a persistent accessory to national identities. Cohort analysis indicates that younger generations are the engine behind this form of multiple identification (Striessnig and Lutz 2016). Accordingly, the disparity of views across countries (measured as the standard deviation of the weak notion of Europeanness) is somewhat declining.15 There is another side of the story, though: the number of ‘pure nationalists’ has not declined in this quarter of a century. They were 34.1% in 1994, increased to 47.1% in 2010, only to drop to 33.5% in 2017. While the rise in nationalism was a by-product of the financial crisis (Polyakova and Fligstein 2016; see also Recchi and Salamońska 2015), its fall at the end of the recession brought it back to the levels of almost a quarter of a century earlier. Today, as then, one-third of Europeans refuse to see themselves as European. More than a unifying umbrella, ‘Europe’ has grown into a divisive concept that fails to denote a shared commonality. Another strand of research, albeit sceptical of Eurobarometer measures, reaches consistent conclusions. With some nuances, using mostly focus groups and in-depth interviews, Duchesne and colleagues (2013), Gaxie and colleagues (2011) and Van Ingelgom (2014) show that the leading sentiment towards Europe – and particularly its political incarnation, the EU – among Europeans is ‘indifference’. ‘Europe’ is something out there, something not for them or which they do not feel part of. As always, the effects of the processes of change mentioned at the beginning of the chapter – centralisation of EU power, imitation and   This figure refers to a different number of cases over time (as the number of member states has more than doubled from 1994), which may alter the outcome. However, the analysis repeated only on the EU13 countries gives similar results (SD: 10.2; 11.6; 11.5; 8.8 at the four time points). 15

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transnationalism – are very hard to disentangle. Certainly the EU has been active in promoting – directly and indirectly – European identification, with countless campaigns and devices to raise a sense of commonality (European years of culture, European days, the European anthem, the common currency itself, among others) as well as to show off its impact on and authority over citizens’ lives (McNamara 2015). We do not have counterfactual tests – what if these efforts had not been made? – but on balance the data just reviewed do not seem to indicate that attachment to Europe can be effectively disseminated top-down. Or at least not as powerfully as when nation states inculcate(d) nationalist values. Although cultural diffusion is an interdisciplinary research topic, there is a dearth of studies exploring whether supranational identification spreads spatially through social learning and media pressure. This type of question entered the agenda of international relations at some point (Checkel 1999; Börzel and Risse 2009) but without a real follow-up of field-based analyses showing to what extent socialisation or peer contacts matter in raising (or rather, not) a sense of we-feeling among Europeans. Finally, transnationalism: all existing survey-based studies, relying on either Eurobarometer (Kuhn 2015) or original surveys (Rother and Nebe 2009; Mau 2010; Recchi 2015; Teney et al 2016; Pötzschke and Braun, this volume), attest to a correlation between social transnationalism (in particular, mobility) and European identification. Yet they also reveal that the number of Europeans who experience objectively relevant and subjectively meaningful movements across countries remain a small minority of the entire population, thus hardly boosting the overall level of shared identification.

Conclusion: a three-quarters empty glass? Are national societies in Europe transforming themselves in a converging way? In this chapter I have tried to answer by focusing on four constitutive dimensions of societies: borders, inequality patterns, norms and practices of private and public life, and collective identifications. Since the 1990s, when Schengen entered into force, abolishing intraEU border controls and creating a common EU border, the salience of the external frontiers of the Union has certainly increased. However, this has occurred alongside an augmented emphasis on national borders. In other words, the importance of external and internal EU borders is not a zero-sum game that leads to a commonly shared space. National societies maintain finite and clearly demarcated territories.

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Such difference is most clearly visible when it comes to the economy. Levels of prosperity vary dramatically across European societies, and this variance has increased rather than diminished from the mid2000s on. So has the degree of social protection granted by national welfares. By amount of expenditures, welfare systems are increasingly disparate in Europe. If anything, such a trend is not paralleled by a differentiation in income inequality and spread of poverty by country: both phenomena (but especially the latter) have in fact grown more similar across EU member states. Although on diverging economic trajectories, European societies seem to approximate a shared standard of within-country equality and solidarity. This does not mirror an underlying commonality in social norms and practices, though. The few indicators examined here, for reasons of space, resonate with the conclusions of broader comparative survey analyses (Brechon and Gonthier 2014): national differences in key societal values are quite persistent over time. And while there is convergence on a common path to secularisation (though at distinct stages), European societies have grown more not less diverse in the spread of social participation and civic life, reflecting long-term national specificities. Equally pathdependent are collective self-identifications. It is on this aspect that the prospects of a long-term fusion of European societies appear to be particularly improbable. The proportion of Europeans refusing to call themselves ‘European’ has not shrunk in the last quarter of a century, remaining at about one-third of the total population. Among those people who combine a multiple national cum European identification, only a tiny minority define themselves firstly as ‘European’. The split is clear: on one side convinced ‘non-Europeans’, on the other prevailingly ‘lukewarm Europeans’. This is not a good omen for the prospect of societal fusion, in spite of the somewhat greater inclination of younger cohorts to think of themselves as European. In sum: the glass is not half full, but rather three-quarters empty. Why? What has been preventing a more radical coming together of European societies? At the political level, centralisation of power in the EU has proceeded but with interruptions and backlashes and, most importantly, failing to transfer to the Union key prerogatives of the nation state. The nation state, in turn, has managed to refuel itself since the 1990s through a number of strategic transformations in the face of globalisation and Europeanisation (King and Le Galès 2017). Most notably, EU member states still jealously control the main sources of physical and material security: the army, police, risk management, health systems, retirement pensions, unemployment benefits, and the entire canvas of welfare allowances. The EU has

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very little say when it comes to managing legitimate violence and citizens’ care. Díez Medrano’s (2008) point that people identify the most with those organisations on which they rely for their security – as originally argued by Lawler (1992) – still holds. Moreover, nation states continue to play a dominant role in the main socialisation agencies – compulsory schools and the media. In the early twenty-first century, the architecture of European societies retains its political foundations in the nation state, which has resisted the tide of globalisation and Europeanisation, and even used these trends in a scaremongering game to reinforce its own legitimacy. The signs of convergence among EU societies – in having a legally common external border or showing statistically similar levels of internal inequality and relative poverty – touch upon objective factors that are not matched by subjective homogeneity in the realm of social norms and collective identifications, if not for a timidly growing sense of a secondary affiliation to ‘Europe’. Sizeable divergences arise, at the same time, especially in average economic conditions at the country level – some societies get richer, others get poorer. To buffer them, Europe would need a strong sense of we-ness; which is exactly the subjective facet of commonality that remains particularly weak. And here lies perhaps the real conundrum that looms large in the future of the EU: increasing structural inequality between societies distances their nationals’ interests, which in turn discourages mutual trust and solidarity, and thereby damages integration. Social transnationalism is hardly a remedy for such disruptive forces. Cross-border contacts can make people physically and virtually closer, but it does not necessarily make them more equal. References Anderson, B. (1983) Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Artl, W. G. (2016) ‘The evolution of Chinese visitors’. Paper presented at the conference 2018 EU–China Tourism Year. London: Barbican Centre. Atkinson, A. B., and Morelli, S. (2014) Chartbook of Economic Inequality. ECINEQ Working Paper 324. Milan: ECINEQ. Bartolini, S. (2005) Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building, and Political Structuring between the Nation State and the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Beckfield, J. (2006) ‘European integration and income inequality’. American Sociological Review 71(6): 964–985.

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Halman, L., and van Ingen, E. (2015) ‘Secularization and changing moral views: European trends in church attendance and views on homosexuality, divorce, abortion, and euthanasia’. European Sociological Review 31(5): 616–627. Heidenreich, M., Rice, D., and Zimmermann, K. (2015) The Europeanisation of Social Integration in the Eurozone Crisis: A Conceptual Framework. Oldenburger Studien zur Europäisierung und zur transnationalen Regulierung Nr. 24/2015. Oldenburg: University of Oldenburg. Heindlmaier, A., and Blauberger, M. (2017) ‘Enter at your own risk: free movement of EU citizens in practice’. West European Politics 40(6): 1198–1217. Hobbing, P. (2005) Integrated Border Management at the EU Level. CEPS Working Documents No. 227. Brussels: CEPS. Höpner, M., and Lutter, M. (2014) One Currency and Many Modes of Wage Formation. Why the Eurozone Is Too Heterogeneous for the Euro. MPIfG Discussion Paper 14/14. Berlin: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. Huber, P., and Tondl, G. (2012) ‘Migration and regional convergence in the European Union’. Empirica 39(4): 439–460. Jacqueson, C. (2016) ‘From negligence to resistance: Danish welfare in the light of free-movement law’. European Journal of Social Security 18(2): 183–206. Johnston, A. and Regan, A. (2016) ‘European monetary integration and the incompatibility of national varieties of capitalism’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 54(2): 318–336. Kaelble, H. (1987) Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Gesellschaft: eine Sozialgeschichte Westeuropas, 1880–1980. München: CH Beck. King, D., and Le Galès, P. (eds) (2017) Reconfiguring European States in Crisis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. King, D. Le Galès, P., and Vitale, T. (2017). ‘Assimilation, security, and borders in the member states’, in D. King and P. Le Galès (eds) Reconfiguring European States in Crisis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 428–450. König, J., and Ohr, R. (2013) ‘Different efforts in European economic integration: implications of the EU index’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 51(6): 1074–1090. Kuhn, T. (2015) Experiencing European Integration: Transnational Lives and European Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lawler, E. J. (1992) ‘Affective attachments to nested groups: a choiceprocess theory’. American Sociological Review 57(3): 327–339.

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Mathiason, N., Parsons, V., and Jeori, T. (2015) ‘Frontex: EU Border Agency to get huge budget hike as boss warns of failings with migrant fingerprint checks’. www.thebureauinvestigates.com/ stories/2015-09-18/frontex-eu-border-agency-to-get-huge-budgethike-as-boss-warns-of-failings-with-migrant-fingerprint-checks. Mau, S. (2010). Social Transnationalism: Lifeworlds beyond the NationState. London: Routledge. Mau, S., and Mewes, J. (2012) ‘Horizontal Europeanisation in contextual perspective: what drives cross-border activities within the European Union?’. European Societies 14(1): 7–34. Mau, S., and Verwiebe, R. (2010) European Societies: Mapping Structure and Change. Bristol: Policy Press. McNamara, K. R. (2015) The Politics of Everyday Europe: Constructing Authority in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mendras, H. (1997) L’Europe des Européens: sociologie de l’Europe occidentale. Paris: Gallimard. Merton, R.  K. (1995) ‘The Thomas Theorem and the Matthews Effect’. Social Forces 74(2): 379–425. Milanovic, B. (2011) Worlds Apart: Measuring International and Global Inequality. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Milward, A. S., Brennan, G., and Romero, F. (2000) The European Rescue of the Nation-State. London: Psychology Press. Müller, W. C., Bovens, M., Christensen, J. G., Jenny, M., and Yesilkagit, K. (2010) ‘Legal Europeanization: comparative perspectives’. Public Administration 88(1): 75–87. Mungianu, R. (2013) ‘Frontex: Towards a common policy on external border control’. European Journal of Migration and Law 15(4): 359–385. Nelles, J. and Walther, O. (2011) ‘Changing European borders: from separation to interface? An introduction’. Articulo: Journal of Urban Research, 6, online (https://journals.openedition.org/ articulo/1658#entries). ONS (2017) Migration Statistics Quarterly Report: August 2017. www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/population andmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatistics quarterlyreport/august2017. Outhwaite, W. (2008) European Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Palier, B., Rovny, A. E., and Rovny, J. (2017) European Disunion? Social and Economic Divergence in Europe, and their Political Consequences. LIEPP Working Paper 71, 11–30. Paris: Sciences Po. Parsons, T. (1951) The Social System. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

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Petrakos, G., Rodríguez-Pose, A., and Rovolis, A. (2005) ‘Growth, integration, and regional disparities in the European Union’. Environment and planning A 37(10): 1837–1855. Pichler, F. and Wallace, C. (2007) ‘Patterns of formal and informal social capital in Europe’. European Sociological Review 23(4): 423–435. Polyakova, A., and Fligstein, N. (2016) ‘Is European integration causing Europe to become more nationalist? Evidence from the 2007–9 financial crisis’. Journal of European Public Policy 23(1): 60–83. Radaelli, C. M. (2003) The Politics of Europeanization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Recchi, E. (2014) ‘Pathways to European identity formation: a tale of two models’. Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research 27(2): 119–133. Recchi, E. (2015) Mobile Europe: The Theory and Practice of Free Movement in the EU. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Recchi, E. (2016) ‘Space, mobility and legitimacy’, in W. R. Thompson (ed) Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://politics.oxfordre.com. Recchi, E., and Favell, A. (eds) (2009) Pioneers of European Integration: Mobility and Citizenship in the EU. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Recchi, E., and Salamońska, J. (2014) ‘Keeping the European faith. Collective identity before and after the Euro-crisis’. Partecipazione e Conflitto 7(3): 509–531. Ritzer, G. (1993) The McDonaldization of Society. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Rother, N., and Nebe, T. (2009) ‘More mobile, more European? Free movement and EU identity’, in E. Recchi and A. Favell (eds) Pioneers of European integration: Citizenship and mobility in the EU. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 120–155. Scheibelhofer, E. (2016) ‘Reflecting on spatiality in European migration research: from methodological nationalism to spacesensitive observations of social transformations’, in A. Amelina, K. Horvath, and B. Meeus (eds) An Anthology of Migration and Social Transformation. Berlin: Springer, 73–86. Shaw, J. (2015) ‘Between law and political truth? Member state preferences, EU free movement rules and national immigration law’. Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 17(1): 247–286. Smith, T.  W., Son, J., and Kim, J. (2014) Public Attitudes toward Homosexuality and Gay Rights across Time and Countries. Chicago: NORC/University of Chicago. Strang, D., and Meyer, J.  W. (1993) ‘Institutional conditions for diffusion’. Theory and Society 22(4): 487–511.

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Striessnig, E., and Lutz, W. (2016) ‘Demographic strengthening of European identity’. Population and Development Review 42(2): 305–311. Tarde, G. (1890) Les lois de l’imitation: étude sociologique. Paris: Félix Alcan. Teney, C., Hanquinet, L., and Bürkin, K. (2016) ‘Feeling European: an exploration of ethnic disparities among immigrants’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 42(13): 2182–2204. Therborn, G. (1995) European Modernity and Beyond: The Trajectory of European Societies, 1945–2000. New York: Sage. Thym, D. (ed) (2017) Questioning EU Citizenship: Judges and the Limits of Free Movement and Solidarity in the EU. London: Hart. Töller, A. E. (2010) ‘Measuring and comparing the Europeanization of national legislation: a research note’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 48(2): 417–444. Torgler, B., and Schneider, F. (2007) ‘What shapes attitudes toward paying taxes? Evidence from multicultural European countries’. Social Science Quarterly 88(2): 443–470. Torpey, J. (2000) The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Trenz, H. J. (2016) Narrating European Society: Toward a Sociology of European Integration. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Van Ingelgom, V. (2014) Integrating Indifference: A Comparative, Qualitative and Quantitative Approach to the Legitimacy of European Integration. Colchester: ECPR Press. Varoufakis, Y. (2016) And the Weak Suffer What They Must? Europe, Austerity and the Threat to Global Stability. New York: Random House. Vertovec, S. (2007) ‘Super-diversity and its implications’. Ethnic and Racial Studies 30(6): 1024–1054. Walters, W. (2016) ‘Border/control’, in A. Amelina, K. Horvath, and B. Meeus (eds) An Anthology of Migration and Social Transformation. Berlin: Springer, 151–165. Whelan, C. T., and Maître, B. (2009) ‘Europeanization of inequality and European reference groups’. Journal of European Social Policy 19(2): 117–130.

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Methodological appendix Steffen Pötzschke, Michael Braun, Irina Ciornei and Fulya Apaydin

EUCROSS was designed as a mixed-methods research project consisting of a representative survey and qualitative interviews. Computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI) were conducted in Denmark, Germany, Italy, Spain, Romania and the United Kingdom. The target populations consisted of: (a)  1,000 ‘nationals’ of the country (defined below), and (b) 250 Romanian and 250 Turkish foreign residents in the country, whom we consider ‘migrants’ (also defined below). However, due to the low number of Turkish foreign residents in Spain, only Romanians were included in the survey there. Hence, the envisioned total sample sizes were 6,000 EU member state nationals currently living in their country of origin, 1250 intra-EU migrants (Romanian citizens) and 1250 migrants from a third non-EU country (Turkish citizens). For the qualitative part of the project (EUMEAN), semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted with 10 selected participants per country from each sample of the survey (nationals, Romanian and Turkish migrants).

The EUCROSS survey Definition of the sample The goal of the EUCROSS project was to collect data on transnational behaviours and orientations of different groups of EU country residents. To be included in one of the three abovementioned broadly defined samples (nationals, Romanian migrants, Turkish migrants) respondents had to be at least 18 years old at the time of the interview. Taking into consideration the empirical reality of European countries, our definition of the ‘national’ samples is not based on any assumption of ethnic homogeneity. Hence, the essential criterion for inclusion in one of the six national samples was citizenship in its strictly legal sense. In using this formal aspect as a sampling criterion, EUCROSS sets itself apart from other approaches which might limit the definition of the reference national population to those who have been born there

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(that is, in the country of residence [CoR]), or even to those whose families have lived there for a given number of generations (excluding individuals with a migration background, defined by a family origin traceable within that range of generations to a different country [CoO]). A consequence of the provisions made in EUCROSS is that naturalised ‘immigrants’ (including, for example, persons originally from Romania or Turkey) may also be part of the national population samples. Hence, their migration (and naturalisation) experience can be considered only one sociodemographic aspect among others, such as diverse levels of formal education and income. Nevertheless, language served as an additional indirect filter since interviews with the national populations were conducted in the predominantly used official languages only. Citizenship is also central to the definition of the EUCROSS migrant samples. All respondents of these samples had to be respectively Romanian or Turkish nationals living in one of the surveyed countries but not also holding their country of residence’s citizenship. In addition to the citizenship requirements, samples of non-national migrants excluded those born in the country of residence: they had to have been born in Romania or Turkey respectively. Questionnaire development, translation, pre-test The first step in the development of the EUCROSS questionnaire consisted of a thorough literature review, focused on previously used instruments to measure cross-border activities and (trans)national identification (Favell et al 2011). The direct outcome of this work was an operationalisation document which summarised current best practice examples and proposed new instruments to operationalise the respective concepts, and to measure independent variables (Hanquinet and Savage 2011). Subsequently, we conducted a second review process which concentrated on the identification of tested questionnaire items. A wide range of questionnaires were included in this process. Important sources were general surveys of the European population (Eurobarometer, European Social Survey), studies which specifically investigated identification with the European Union (for example, Bruter 2005), studies which focused on transnational activities and networks (for example, Mau 2010) and migrant surveys (for example, Recchi and Favell 2009; INE 2009). The main questionnaire, which was designed in English, built substantially on these preliminary efforts. Consequently it incorporated a number of previously used items in their original form. Furthermore,

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a large number of items in the questionnaire were inspired by other studies, but considerably modified in their wording or with respect to categories and scales of answers. Finally, a significant number of innovative items were developed specifically for EUCROSS. The questionnaire itself consists of four parts, starting with an introductory screening section and ending with the collection of sociodemographic data (such as age, gender and education). The two main parts investigated cross-border practices, and European identification and cosmopolitan values, respectively. In order to assure a high level of comparability of the data gathered on nationals and migrants, the questionnaire for all samples mainly consists of the same items. This means it includes only a limited number of questions which are tailored specifically for migrants (for example, their year of settlement in the CoR). Instead of using alternative items, in most cases additional answer categories were added in order to adapt the questionnaire to the social realities of all samples. Using different filter questions, migration-specific data were not only collected on the ‘official’ migrant samples, but also on nationals with migration experience. The only non-standardised variable was the highest education achieved by respondents. This was collected using country-specific batteries (for example, consisting of Danish educational titles in the Danish survey). After the field period, the items of these batteries were coded into a variable consisting of four categories (lower secondary education or less; in between lower and higher secondary education; higher secondary education (university entrance requirement); tertiary education) to allow for the comparison of results. Data on the occupation of respondents, their partners and parents were collected in open questions and coded into the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO)-08.1 The translations of the English master questionnaire into Danish, German, Italian, Romanian, Spanish and Turkish followed the team translation approach (Behr 2009). In compliance with this strategy each translation was prepared in two stages. First, two separate translations of the questionnaire were made. At least one of them was done by a professional translator, the other either by another translator or by a member of the research team in the respective country. In a second step, these individual translations were merged into a final translation. This was done at a work meeting in which both translators and members of   Detailed information on the coding schemes of educational achievements, occupations and open questions are provided in Pötzschke (2015). 1

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the respective country teams compared the two translations, discussed differences, pending issues or unfamiliar formulations, and decided on the final wording of each item. This strategy combined the professional knowledge and experience of translators and social scientists in the development of a high-quality cross-cultural survey instrument. Several pre-tests of the questionnaire were carried out at different points during its development. Where necessary, adaptions were made before the fielding of the study.2 Sampling method, fieldwork and realised sample sizes The quantitative EUCROSS survey was carried out by Sozialwissenschaftliches Umfragezentrum GmbH (SUZ). The computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI) were generally conducted by native speakers of the respective language who called the respondents from Duisburg, Germany, where SUZ is located. Only the interviews with Danish nationals had to be conducted by a field institute in Denmark, due to the small number of qualified Danishspeaking interviewers available to SUZ. Interviews with respective groups of migrants were also conducted by Romanian and Turkish native language speakers in Duisburg. All interviewers received proper training and were familiarised with the scientific goals of the project. For economic reasons the survey of each sample could only be conducted in one language. For the national samples this was the respective countries’ most widely used official language. Romanian and Turkish were used for the surveyed migrant populations. Therefore, especially in the case of Turkish migrants, members of certain ethnic minorities might be underrepresented in the samples. Random digit dialling (RDD) was used to sample national populations. The sampling of migrants was realised via linguistic screening of names in telephone directories (the so-called ‘onomastic procedure’, Humpert and Schneiderheinze 2000). Only persons who were at least 18  years old and fulfilled the abovementioned additional sampling criteria could participate in the study. By default the interviews were conducted with the person in a given household whose birthday was the most recent and who fulfilled all sampling criteria of the respective sub-study. The EUCROSS field period started in June 2012 and concluded in April 2013. There are two main reasons for this somewhat large   More detailed information on the translation and pre-tests of the survey instrument are provided in Pötzschke (2015). 2

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time frame. Firstly, work on the survey had to be suspended for two months during the summer due to the holiday season and the resulting low participation rates. Other delays resulted from specific problems encountered during the interviews. Willingness to take part in the survey was very low, particularly in the UK. The sub-study of UK nationals was among the last EUCROSS national studies to be completed, even though it was the first begun. Data collection for all nationals was however finished by the second week of January 2013. The cooperation rate of CATI interviews for nationals in fact varied between 9% in the United Kingdom and 38% in Romania.3 For some migrant samples (Turkish migrants in Italy and Romania, as well as Turkish and Romanian migrants in the UK) the total of telephone numbers which could be generated through the onomastic procedure was too low. To counteract these problems different strategies were applied (refusal conversion, snowball sampling, online questionnaires, and face-to-face interviews).4 Table  10.1 gives an overview of the realised samples and the mode in which the interviews were conducted. The duration of the CATI interviews was approximately 25 minutes for nationals and 28 minutes for migrants. Weighting To improve the quality of estimates, we carried out a post-stratification of three key variables: education levels, sex and age groups by country. Each of these variables was treated separately, given the relatively limited size of our national samples. Individual weights have been attributed in order to reproduce the distribution of these variables in national censuses exactly. We have compared the results obtained with different weighting methods as proposed in the SAS macro CALMAR2.5 Eventually, for each national sample the ‘hyperbolic sinus’ method (alpha = 6) was found to provide the best solution in terms of a weak dispersion and relatively small range and values of upper and lower limits of multiplicative coefficients of individual weights. The whole procedure was designed and guided by Yannick

  For the calculation of each sample’s cooperation rate the ‘number of completed interviews’ was divided by the sum of ‘number of completed interviews’ and ‘refusals’. 4   More detailed information on the fieldwork for the migrant samples are provided in Pötzschke (2015). 5   For a detailed description, see https://github.com/tdelc/sas-cal/tree/master/ Calmar2. 3

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Sample Nationals Denmark 1,014 Germany 1,001 Italy 1,000 Romania 1,000 Spain 1,000 United Kingdom 1,001 Romanian migrants in … Denmark 250 Germany 250 Italy 250 Spain 250 United Kingdom 40 Turkish migrants in … Denmark 250 Germany 252 Italy 44 Romania 17 United Kingdom 126

– – – – – –

– – – – – –

– – – – – –

– – – – – –

1,014 1,001 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,001

– – – – 2

– – – – –

– – – – 208

– – – – –

250 250 250 250 250

– – 5 – 9

– – – – 3

– – 179 186 112

– – 22 47 –

250 250 250 250 250

Savina (Sciences Po, Observatoire Sociologique du Changement), whom we thank sincerely.

The qualitative EUMEAN study Sampling The sampling of interviewees for the EUMEAN study, the qualitative part of the EUCROSS project, was connected to the quantitative survey carried out before. The respondents of the EUMEAN study were selected from among those EUCROSS survey respondents with higher levels of physical and virtual mobility experiences. We constructed an additive transnationalism index by summing up the scores related to the following variables from the EUCROSS survey: familiarity with one or more other countries; residence in another country before the age of 18, number of countries visited before the age of 18; residence in another country after the age of 18; number of trips abroad in the last 24 months; frequency of communication

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across borders; level of knowledge of a foreign language; percentage of messages received from abroad; active membership in an organisation which is oriented towards another country; sending or receiving money to/from abroad; purchase of goods from another country (without being physically mobile); frequency of watching TV content in another language; frequency of contact with colleagues or business partners in other countries. The transnationalism index ranged from 0 to 18, with 17 being the highest score achieved by respondents. However, very few respondents had scores above 10. The category of what we considered ‘highly transnational’ respondents consists of those in the upper 40% of respondents on the transnationalism index in each sample. Individuals within the highest 25% were contacted as a priority. In each country, the sample included a balanced selection of respondents in terms of education, gender and age. Educational levels were divided into the binary categories ‘low’ and ‘high’. The classification was grounded upon the distribution of educational titles in each sample, with approximately 50% of each sample labelled as ‘low education’ and vice versa. The selection of EUMEAN interviewees also aimed to have approximately equal numbers of female and male respondents (see Table 10.2). Although an equal distribution of age groups across transnationalism, education and gender categories was difficult to achieve, the EUMEAN sample in each country comprises at least one young adult (18–25 years old) and one senior respondent (older than 65), respectively. Taken together, a total of 60 nationals (10 in each surveyed country) were interviewed based on these criteria. In addition to these 60 open-ended interviews, a total of 50 Turkish migrants (based in Denmark, Germany, Italy, Romania and the UK) and 50 Romanian migrants (based in Denmark, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) were interviewed (see Table 10.3). Here we also used the transnationalism index described above. In a limited number of cases (Turks in Romania), it was not possible to draw respondents from the EUCROSS sample and a new sample was drawn. Table 10.3 summarises the distribution of participants from each country. The interviews were completed between 1 April and 1 October 2013. Table 10.2: EUMEAN sampling frame for the national samples High transnationalism Male Female 2–3 2–3 2–3 2–3

Low level of education High level of education

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Nationals Turkish immigrants Romanian immigrants

Denmark 10 10 10

Germany 10 10 10

Italy 10 10 10

Romania 10 10 –

Spain 10 – 10

UK 10 10 10

Guideline construction The construction of the EUMEAN guideline was connected to the broad topics covered by the quantitative survey.6 Nonetheless, it aimed at exploring in more detail respondents’ narratives, emotions and their reasons and intentions when engaging in cross-border activities. In this way, the information of the quantitative survey is contextualised and complemented by a deeper understanding of respondents’ positioning regarding the topics involved. For this reason the questionnaire guideline consisted of a semi-structured list of points to be explored by the interviewer rather than very specific questions. The geographical distribution of interview locations varied by country. In Spain, the respondents with higher transnationalism scores were mostly concentrated in Barcelona and Madrid. In Denmark, the respondents came from urban areas such as Aarhus and Copenhagen as well as from less cosmopolitan areas such as North Jutland. In Germany, the participants were mostly based in urban locations such as Berlin, Dresden, Karlsruhe and Leipzig, though some were located in smaller cities. Likewise, in Romania, most of the respondents with higher transnational scores were based in Bucharest, though others from Campina, Buzau, Timisoara, Brasov and Calarasi were also interviewed. In Italy, the geographic location of the respondents was quite dispersed, including participants from several smaller cities as well as bigger and more cosmopolitan places like Milan and Rome. To help respondents and encourage the use of visual memory, two maps were used: a 2013 world map with national borders and a 2013 map of Europe with national borders. The maps were printed on A3 size paper, and presented to the interviewee during the conversation. Average duration of the interviews was about 1 hour and 20 minutes, the shortest lasting about 30 minutes and the longest about 2 hours and 40 minutes.

  The EUMEAN interview guideline is provided in Pötzschke et al (2014, 222–237).

6

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All nationals of the respective countries were interviewed by native or near-native speakers who were members of the EUCROSS team. The Turkish and Romanian migrants were interviewed by native speakers who travelled to the relevant countries to conduct face-toface interviews with the participants. All nationals of respective EU member countries were interviewed in the official language of the country where they resided. Turkish migrants were interviewed in Turkish and Romanian migrants were interviewed in Romanian. The transcription of the interviews was done either by members of the EUCROSS team or by native speakers of the language who were hired for this task. On most occasions, the translations were completed by the interviewers themselves and by bilingual translators where necessary. When the latter was the case, translated texts were double-checked by the respective EUCROSS team, verifying the accuracy of the English text with the original interview transcript. Availability of data and documentation The EUCROSS questionnaire and the quantitative data (separate files for nationals, Romanian migrants and Turkish migrants) are available through the GESIS Data Archive (Recchi et al 2016) at the following location: https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/sdesc2.asp?no= 5911&db=e&doi=10.4232/1.12381. Download is possible for free after registration. References Behr, D. (2009) Translationswissenschaft und international Vergleichende Umfrageforschung: Qualitätssicherung bei Fragebogenübersetzungen als Gegenstand einer Prozessanalyse. Bonn: GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bruter, M. (2005) Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Favell, A., Recchi, E., Kuhn T., Jensen, J. S., and Klein, J. (2011) The Europeanisation of Everyday Life: Cross-Border Practices and Transnational Identifications Among EU and Third-Country Citizens. EUCROSS Working Paper # 1. Chieti: University of Chieti-Pescara. www. eucross.eu/eucross/images/docs/eucross_d2_2_state_of_the_art.pdf.

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Hanquinet, L., and Savage, M. (2011) Operationalisation of European Identity, Cosmopolitanism and Cross-Border Practices. EUCROSS Working Paper # 2. Chieti: University of Chieti-Pescara. www. eucross.eu/cms/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_ download&gid=57&Itemid=157. Humpert, A., and Schneiderheinze, K. (2000) ’Stichprobenziehung für telefonische Zuwandererumfragen: Einsatzmöglichkeiten der Namensforschung’. ZUMA Nachrichten 24(47): 36–63. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística) (2009) Encuesta nacional de inmigrantes 2007. Una monografía. Madrid: INE. Mau, S. (2010) Social Transnationalism: Lifeworlds Beyond the Nation-State. London and New York: Routledge. Pötzschke, S. (2015) Technical Report of the Quantitative EUCROSS Survey. EUCROSS Working Paper #9. Chieti: University of Chieti-Pescara. https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/download. asp?db=E&id=58584. Pötzschke, S, Ciornei, I., and Apaydin, F. (2014) ’Methodological report’, in E. Recchi (ed) The Europeanisation of Everyday Life: Cross-Border Practices and Transnational Identifications among EU and Third-Country Citizens. Final Report, 169–237. nbn-resolving.de/ urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-395269. Recchi, E., and Favell, A. (2009) Pioneers of European Integration: Citizenship and Mobility in the EU. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Recchi, E., Braun, M., Favell, A., Díez Medrano, J., Savage, M., Hanquinet, L., and Sandu, D. (EUCROSS) (2016) The Europeanisation of Everyday Life: Cross-Border Practices and Transnational Identities among EU and Third-Country Citizens (EUCROSS). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5911 Data file Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12381.

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Index References to tables and figures are in italics

A

C

African cuisine 96, 106 age and cross-border practices 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, 81, 202, 206, 207, 211 and culture 94, 95, 97–8, 98, 107, 108 and migration 201, 211, 212, 231 and solidarity 149, 153–5, 162 and supranational identifications 120– 1, 126, 127, 128, 131, 133 Aksoy, A. 3, 239 Alesina, A. 141 Alevis 228, 244–5 Anderson, B. 200, 258 Andreotti, A. 8 Anglo-Saxon cuisine 96 anti-EU vote 37 Asian cuisine 96–8, 97, 103–4, 104–6, 106 Austria, travel to 215 Avramopoulos, Dimitris 264–5

cartographies of social transnationalism 35–57 beyond Europe 40–3, 40–1 effect of education 52–4, 53–4 effect of socioeconomic status 50–2, 51 European geography of 38–40 global identities 56–7, 56 gravity model 43–50 internal geography 43–50 stratification 50–5 Castells, M. 4, 36 centralisation (of power) 259–61, 263, 270–1, 281–2 Chile 238 Chinese tourists 255 church attendance 272, 274–6, 275 Ciornei, I. 12–13 class 10, 11, 37, 140, 142 classical music 91, 92–3, 94, 95, 104–6, 104, 106 colonialism 42–3, 56 communication with family/friends abroad and migrants/migration 234–5, 235, 238–43 social structure of 69, 70, 72, 74, 77 and solidarity 149, 161 and supranational identifications 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 133 Cooper, F. 116 Copenhagen 177, 178 cosmopolitanism 10–11, 36–7, 56, 128 concept of 139–40 and culture 88–90, 94 of migrants 116, 117–26, 125, 129–33, 130–1, 237–8 and solidarity 139–40, 152, 154 and young people 24–5 see also cartographies of social transnationalism; narratives of everyday transnationalism; supranational identifications; and see also individual countries Cram, L. 151 culinary tastes see food tastes cultural boundaries 87–111 data and variables 99–101, 100–1 and different parts of Europe 89

B Baltic and Nordic cuisine 96, 104, 104–5 Bauman, Z. 36 Beck, U. 4, 56, 173 Beckfield, J. 171 Bennett, T. 36, 91, 98 Berkers, P. 89 binational relationships 118, 127, 128, 130, 133 Boden, D. 66 Bologna Process 260 borders and concept of society 257–9, 263, 280 control of 263–7 intra-EU 265–6 supranational 263–5 Bourdieu, P. 87–8, 91, 95, 99 Bozdağ, Ç. 243 Breidenbach, J, 2 Brexit 55–6, 256 Britain see United Kingdom British Empire 42 Brubaker, R. 116 Bruter, M. 151 Bulgaria 216, 265

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Everyday Europe exploration of cultural space 106–10 food tastes 95–8, 96–8 highbrow vs popular culture 87–8, 105–6, 108–9, 111 main cultural dimensions 101–6, 102–4, 106 multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) 98–110 musical tastes 91–5, 92–3, 95 and nationalism 89–90 omnivores and univores 88 and physical and virtual mobility 109, 110, 111 reconfiguration of European culture 89 synthesising cultural consumption divisions 98–9 cultural capital 37, 73, 76, 82 see also cultural boundaries

D debordering 263 Delhey, J. 8, 11, 37, 61 Denmark characteristics of 179 cosmopolitanism 24–5, 56, 56, 124, 125, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 133, 174, 174, 179 cross-border practices 69, 71, 72, 73, 77, 81, 176–80 culture 91, 92, 96, 96, 108, 109 European identification 24–5, 179 familiarity with foreign countries 39–41, 40, 42, 43, 44, 52, 54, 54 food tastes 96, 96 migrants in 125, 131, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 227, 230, 231–5, 233–4, 239, 241–2, 246, 248–9 musical tastes 91, 92 narratives of everyday transnationalism 176–80 national identification 24–5, 177 solidarity 146, 149, 153–5, 157, 160, 162 supranational identifications 124, 125, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 133 transnationalism index 172 young people 24–5 deprivation 270 Deutsch, K. 10–11, 37, 61, 115 Díez Medrano, J. 175, 176, 187, 259, 282 discrimination, of migrants 119, 123, 129, 130, 132, 133 Division of Labour in Society, The (Durkheim) 138 dual citizenship 230, 232 Duchesne, S. 279

Durkheim, E. 138

E education and cross-border practices 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 202, 207, 210, 211, 219, 237–8 and culture 93–4, 93, 97, 97, 107, 111 impact on social transnationalism 52–4, 53–4 and migration 201, 208, 211, 230, 231, 232, 233, 237–8 and solidarity 149, 153–5, 162 and supranational identifications 120, 127, 131, 133 elite 11, 13 employment and cross-border practices 72, 73, 74, 207 and culture 107, 108 and migration/migrants 200–3, 208, 210, 211, 213, 214–15, 227, 231, 232–3 work interactions with people abroad 76, 77, 78, 79 Engbersen, G. 196 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip 245, 247, 248 ethnic heterogenity 142 EU-LISA 264n5 EU Solidarity Fund 137 EUCROSS survey 9 definition of the sample 291–2 methodology of 18, 291–9 qualitative EUMEAN study 296–9, 297–8 questionnaire development 292–4 sampling method and fieldwork 294–5, 296 weighting 295–6 EUMEAN study 296–9, 297–8 see also narratives of everyday transnationalism Eurobarometer 7, 9, 10, 117, 120, 150, 176, 277 European Border and Coast Guard Agency (formerly Frontex) 264–5 European Court of Human Rights 276 European identification 7, 11–12 and a European society 258, 259, 263, 276–80, 278, 281 and solidarity 150–2, 153, 161, 162 see also cartographies of social transnationalism; solidarity; supranational identifications European society 255–82 barriers to 281–2 and borders 257–9, 263–7, 263, 280

302

Index and centralisation of power 259–61, 263, 270–1, 281–2 concept of society 257–9, 263 convergence of social structures 258, 263, 267–71, 281 European identification 258, 259, 263, 276–80, 278, 281 harmonisation of social norms and practices 258, 259, 263, 271–6, 273, 275, 281 and imitation 261–2, 263, 271 and social change 259–63, 263, 270–1 and spatial fixing of individuals 262, 263 everyday transnationalism see narratives of everyday transnationalism exchange programmes 118, 122, 127, 130, 216

Schengen agreement 64, 233, 242, 255, 263, 265–7 French cuisine 96, 96–8, 97, 104–6, 104, 106 Fridman, V. 88 Frontex (now European Border and Coast Guard Agency) 264–5

G

F Facebook 239–40, 243, 244, 245–7 Favell, A. 61, 196 financial crisis and blame 156–7, 159 and media narrative 156–7 narratives of everyday transnationalism 182–3 no bailout clause 137–8 and solidarity 143–7, 146, 149, 150, 153–5, 156–61, 162–3, 163 Fligstein, N. 12, 37, 43, 52, 61, 89, 95, 105, 110, 117, 119, 120, 198, 237 food tastes and age 97–8, 98 by country 95–7, 96 and education 97, 97 and musical taste 103–6, 104, 106 and solidarity 154, 162 variables and modalities 100 foreign films 149, 174 foreign language skills and cross-border practices 72, 73, 74, 75 and migrants 74, 75 narratives of everyday transnationalism 180, 181 and supranational identifications 119, 127, 128, 129, 130 France cuisine of 96, 96–8, 97, 104–6, 104, 106 migrants in 17 travel to 214, 217, 236, 237 free movement of people 16–18, 64 narrowing of 256–7 refugees 265

Gaxie, D. 279 Gayo-Cal, M. 90 Gellner, E. 198 gender and cross-border practices 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 79, 81, 202, 206, 207, 207, 211, 212, 219 and culture 106, 107 and migration 201–2, 231 and solidarity 149, 153–5, 162 and supranational identifications 120, 126, 127, 131, 132, 133 Gerhards, J. 8, 119 Germany attitude to EU 187 cosmopolitanism 56, 56, 125, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 133, 174, 187–9 cross-border practices 69, 72, 73, 77, 187–9, 198 culture 89, 91, 92, 96, 96, 97, 108, 109 East/West divide 187, 188 familiarity with foreign countries 39–41, 42, 44–5, 45, 54, 57 and financial crisis 156, 157–8 food tastes 96, 96, 97 Germanness 188–9 migrants in 17, 125, 126, 129, 131, 132, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 227, 230, 231–5, 233–5, 236, 240–1, 244–5 musical tastes 91, 92 narratives of everyday transnationalism 187–9 social transnationalism 8, 9, 36 solidarity 146, 146, 147, 149, 153–5, 156, 157, 160–1, 162 and Spanish attitude to financial crisis 158–60 supranational identifications 125, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 133 transnationalism index 172 Gezi Park, Turkey 243–50 Giddens, A. 4 Glick Schiller, N. 196 globalisation 22–5 and imitation 261 indexes 5, 16

303

Everyday Europe and migration 16–18, 17 and travel 14–16, 15 see also cosmopolitanism Goerres, A. 140–1 Guarnizo, L.E. 197

H Habermas, J. 3 Heidenreich, M. 261 Held, D. 173 hip hop music 92–3, 94, 95, 102–6, 103–4, 106 homosexuality, tolerance of 271, 272–3, 273, 276 horizontal Europeanization 8, 61, 187

musical tastes 91, 92 narratives of everyday transnationalism 183–7 and solidarity 146, 146, 149, 153–5, 157, 160–1, 162 supranational identifications 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129 transnationalism index 172 Iversen, T. 141

J jazz music 91, 92–3, 94, 102–6, 103–4, 106 Jensen, J.S. 24 Johnston, R. 139

I

K

imitation 261–2, 263, 271, 276 immigration attitudes to 176–7, 185, 189, 228, 265 see also migration/migrants income distribution 267–9, 268, 281 India 216–17 inequality and common currency 270–1 between countries 13–14, 17, 270 income distribution 267–9, 268, 281 increasing 282 poverty and deprivation 270 and social change 270–1 welfare systems 269–70, 269, 271 within countries 13, 14, 270 irrational nationalism 55 Islamophobia 228 isomorphism 261 ISSP (International Social Survey Programme) 177 Italian cuisine 96–8, 97, 103, 105–6, 106 Italy attitude to EU 187 cosmopolitanism 56, 56, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 173, 174, 184–5 cross-border practices 69, 72, 77, 184–6 cuisine from 96–8, 97, 103, 105–6, 106 culture 91, 92, 96, 96, 97, 109, 109 diaspora 185–6 familiarity with foreign countries 39–41, 42, 46, 46–7, 54 food tastes 96, 96, 97 lack of political pride 186 migrants in 17, 125, 131, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 231–5, 232–4, 238, 245–6, 249

Kaelble, H. 7 Kaufmann, V. 202, 219 KOF social globalisation index 5, 16 König, J. 260 Kontochristou, M. 156 Kriesi, H. 12 Kuhn, T. 11–12, 37, 52, 67, 116, 118, 120, 198, 237 Kurds 228, 231, 232, 239, 241–2, 243, 247–9

L La Ferrara, E. 141 labour migration 48, 50, 64, 262 and inequality 271 Romanian migrants 195, 200–1 Turkish migrants 227, 232–3 see also migration/migrants language skills see foreign language skills Lawler, E.J. 282 legitimacy of EU 6–7, 12 León, F.J. 142 liquid migration 196, 215 living abroad 68–70, 69, 72, 76, 77, 79 see also migration/migrants

M macro-level social transnationalism 9–10 Manchester 36–7 Margalit, Y. 141 Mau, S. 3, 4, 8, 9, 36, 61, 65, 116, 118, 173, 198, 201, 236 media, framing of debt crisis 143, 156–7 metal music 92, 95, 102–3, 103 Mewes, J. 61 Mexican cuisine 96, 96, 98, 105–6, 106 micro-level social transnationalism 10

304

Index migration/migrants cross-border practices 69, 70, 74, 75, 78, 79, 81 definition of 63 discrimination 119, 123, 129, 130, 132, 133 and economic remittances 66 flexibility of 63 and gender 201–2, 231 liquid migration 196, 215 motivations for 63–4, 131 and social networks 65 and social status 200–3 space-sets 197–219 supranational identifications 116, 117–26, 125, 129–33, 130–1, 237–8 transformative effect of 198, 199– 200, 202 trends 16–18, 17 see also Romanian migrants; Turkish migrants migratisation of mobility 196 Milanovic, B. 13, 267 Millennials 24–5 mixed parentage 72, 73, 74 mobility practices see travel Molotch, H.L. 66 money transfer (from migrants abroad) 66, 69, 70, 72, 74, 75, 77, 79 Montulet, B. 202 Moreno question 277 Morocco 181–2 Moroşanu, L. 215 Müller, W. 117, 118, 119, 120, 121 multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) 75–80, 98–110 music tastes and age 94–5, 95 by country 91–2, 92 and culinary taste 103–6, 104, 106 cultural engagement vs disengagement 110–11 and education 93, 93–4 Netherlands 90 openness vs narrow repertoire 102–3, 103, 108 and solidarity 154 variables and modalities 100

N narratives of everyday transnationalism 171–91 British 189–90 Danes 176–80 Germans 187–9 Italians 183–7 and qualitative analysis 175, 176 research methodology 172–3

Spaniards 180–3 studying narratives 176–90 nation state 7, 36, 198–9 see also European society Nauman, E. 141 Netherlands 89, 90 no bailout clause 137–8 norms and practices 258, 259, 263, 271–6, 273, 275, 281 Northern and Central European cuisine 96, 96, 104, 104–5 Nyiri, P. 2

O occupational status see employment Ohr, R. 260 Ollivier, M. 88 omnivores and univores 88 online shopping 66–7, 69, 72, 74, 75, 76, 79

P physical cross-border mobilities see travel Piketty, T. 10, 13 PIONEUR project 120 political orientation and solidarity 140, 152, 155, 162 of Turkish migrants 230, 232, 243–50 pop music 91, 92, 93, 95, 102–6, 103–4, 106 poverty and deprivation 270 Prieur, A. 37, 88, 110

R Rapid Border Intervention Teams 264 rebordering 263 Recchi, E. 150, 198, 199 redistributive policies 139, 141–2 refugees 265 religious service attendance 272, 274–6, 275 Robins, K. 3, 239 rock music 91, 92–3, 94, 95, 102–6, 103–4, 106 Romania cosmopolitanism 56, 56 cross-border practices 69, 72, 73, 77, 81, 204, 205, 206, 207, 209, 210, 211, 212–18, 219 culture 91, 92, 96, 96–7, 109, 109 familiarity with foreign countries 39, 39–41, 42, 47–8, 47, 54 food tastes 96, 96–7 migrants in 125, 126, 131, 132, 231–5, 232–4, 242, 249–50 most memorable trips 212–18, 219

305

Everyday Europe musical tastes 91, 92 reasons for cross-border mobility 206, 206 returnees 211 solidarity 146, 149, 153–5, 157, 160–1, 163 supranational identifications 124, 125, 125, 126, 127, 128 see also Romanian migrants Romanian migrants characteristics of 201–2, 206 cross-border practices 69, 70, 74, 78, 79, 81, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 data and methods 203–4 in Denmark 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 determinants of mobility 209–12 in Germany 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 in Italy 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 most memorable trips 214–16, 219 numbers of 195 occupational status of 200–1, 202–3, 208–9, 210 reasons for cross-border mobility 206, 208 recalibration of 195–6 returnees 205–7, 206, 207–8, 209, 210 satisfaction levels of 209 in Spain 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 and supranational identifications 124, 125–6, 125, 129–32, 130–1, 133 in United Kingdom 207, 208, 209, 210 see also Romania

S Savage, M. 4, 8, 9 Schengen agreement 64, 233, 242, 255, 263, 265–7 Schmutz, V. 89 secularisation 274–6 self-interest 141–3, 152–61 Simmel, G. 197 Singh, P. 142 single European society see European society Smith, M.P. 197 social capital 274 social class 10, 11, 37, 140, 142 social media 65, 66, 70, 72, 74, 75, 77, 79 and migrants 70, 74, 234–5, 235, 238–43 and political mobilisation 243–50 social norms and practices 258, 259, 263, 271–6, 273, 275, 281

social structures of transnational practices 61–82 configuration of mobilities 75–80 convergence of social structures 258, 267–71, 281 data and indicators 67–8 physical cross-border practices 63, 63–4, 71–80, 72, 74, 77, 79 size and scope of cross-border practices 68–71 social determinants of 71–5, 72, 74 types of cross-border practices 62–7, 63 virtual cross-border practices 62, 63, 65–7, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75–6, 77, 78, 79, 81 social transnationalism concept of 3 elite construction 6 emotional importance 12 future of 22–5 relation with political attitudes 11 and support for the EU 11–12 unequal distribution of 5–6 varieties across Europe 4–5 society, concept of 257–9 society, European see European society Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) Migration Sample 120 socioeconomic status and cross-border practices 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 207, 207, 211, 219, 237–8 and culture 107, 108 impact on social transnationalism 50–2, 51 and migration/migrants 211, 231, 237–8 and supranational identifications 120, 126, 127, 131, 131, 133 solidarity 137–65 and contradictory research results 147–8 and cosmopolitanism 139–40, 152, 154, 161 definition of 138–40 in different languages 138–9 as EU aim 137, 144–5, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 153–5, 160, 162–3 and European identification 150–2, 153, 161, 162 existing approaches to 138–43 and financial crisis 143–7, 146, 149, 150, 153–5, 156–61, 162–3, 163 indicators to measure 144–5 and interpersonal and intergroup exchange 140–1 levels of in Europe 143–61

306

Index and natural disasters 145–7, 146, 149, 150, 153–5, 160, 162–3 and political orientation 140, 152, 155, 162 and recipients’ characteristics 142–3 and self-interest 152–61 and transnationalism 141, 148–50, 149, 160, 161, 163 variables used 164–5 Soskice, D. 141 South America, travel to 238 South American and Caribbean cuisine 96, 97, 105–6, 106 Southern European cuisine 96, 96, 105–6, 106 Sozialwissenschaftliches Umfragezentrum GmbH (SUZ) 294 space-sets 197–219 Spain attitude to EU 182–3 cosmopolitanism 56, 56, 125, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 173, 174, 180–1, 183 cross-border practices 69, 72, 73, 77, 180–1 cuisine from 96, 96 culture 91, 92, 96, 96, 109 familiarity with foreign countries 39–41, 42, 48–9, 48, 54, 54 and financial crisis 158–60, 182–3 food tastes 96, 96 migrants in 17, 125, 131, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 musical tastes 91, 92 narratives of everyday transnationalism 180–3 solidarity 146, 146, 149, 153–5, 157–61, 163 supranational identifications 125, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129 transnationalism index 172 Spanish cuisine 96, 96 sports (following in the media) 100, 103, 106, 149 stratification of transnationalism 50–5 supranational borders 263–5 supranational identifications 115–34 and age 120–1, 126, 127, 128, 131, 133 data and methods 121–4 and education 120, 127, 131, 133 and gender 120, 126, 127, 131, 132, 133 identification with geographical entities 124–9, 125, 127 and migrants 116, 117–26, 125, 129–33, 130–1, 237–8

research questions 117–21 research results 124–32 research variables 121–4 socioeconomic status 120, 126, 127, 131, 131, 133 supranational political units 10–11 Szerszynski, B. 64

T Tarde, G. 261 tax civicness 271, 273, 273–4, 276 television (foreign language) and cross border practices 69, 71, 72, 74, 75 and supranational identifications 119, 126, 127, 129, 130, 132 Teney, C. 117, 119, 120, 121 Tepe, M. 140–1 Therborn, G. 276 Thomas, W.I. 276–7 tourism see travel traditional national music 91, 92–3, 94–5, 95, 102–6, 103–4, 106 transactionalist theory 10–11, 36, 115 transnational background 116 transnational human capital 116 transnational practices 116 transnationalism from below 36, 197–8 travel and age 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, 81, 202, 206, 207, 211 and culture 109, 110, 111 Denmark 69, 71, 72, 73, 77, 81, 176–80 and education 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 202, 207, 210, 211, 219, 237–8 and employment status 72, 73, 74, 207 expansion of 14–16, 15, 64 and foreign language skills 72, 73, 74, 75 and gender 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 79, 81, 202, 206, 207, 207, 211, 212, 219 Germany 69, 72, 73, 77, 187–9, 198 Italy 69, 72, 77, 184–6 migrants 69, 70, 74, 75, 78, 79, 81, 130, 132, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 233–5, 233–43 most memorable trips 212–18, 219 narratives of everyday transnationalism 178–9, 180–2, 184–6, 189 overview of 63–4, 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75–9, 79 Romania 69, 72, 73, 77, 81, 204, 205, 206, 207, 209, 210, 211, 212–18, 219

307

Everyday Europe social stratification of 64 and socio-economic status 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 207, 207, 211, 219, 237–8 Spain 69, 72, 73, 77, 180–1 and supranational identifications 126, 127, 128, 130, 132, 133 United Kingdom 69, 72, 73, 77, 189 Turkey cuisine of 96–7, 96 immigration into 228–9 travel to 212–13 see also Turkish migrants Turkish migrants 225–50 communication with family/friends abroad 234–5, 235, 238–43 cross-border practices 69, 70, 74, 78, 79, 233–43, 233–5 demographics of 227–9 in Denmark 227, 230, 231–5, 233–4, 239, 241–2, 246, 248–9 framing of 227–8 in Germany 227, 230, 231–5, 233–5, 236, 240–1, 244–5 in Italy 231–5, 232, 233, 234, 238, 245–6, 249 political orientation 243–50 portrait of 230–5, 231–5 reasons for migration 227, 230, 231, 232 in Romania 231–5, 232–3, 234, 242, 249–50 and social media 238–43 supranational identifications 124, 125, 125–6, 129–32, 130–1, 133 in United Kingdom 227, 230, 231–5, 232, 233, 234, 237, 238, 240, 246, 247–8 see also Turkey

U unemployment 72, 73, 74, 207, 208 United Kingdom cultural capital 88–9 Brexit 55–6, 256 cosmopolitanism 36–7, 56, 56, 88–9, 124, 125, 125, 126, 127, 128, 133, 174, 174, 189–90 cross-border practices 69, 72, 73, 77, 189 culture 90, 91, 92, 96, 96, 97, 108, 109 European identification 133,189–90 familiarity with foreign countries 38, 39– 41, 42, 49, 49, 54, 54, 55, 57 food tastes 96, 96, 97 internal distinctions 190

migrants in 17, 125, 131, 207, 208, 209, 210, 227, 230, 231, 232, 232, 233, 233–5, 234, 237, 238, 240, 246, 247–8 musical tastes 91, 92 narratives of everyday transnationalism 189–90 nationalism 190 satisfaction of residents 190 solidarity 145, 146, 147, 149, 153–5, 157, 160, 163 supranational identifications 124, 125, 125, 126, 127, 128, 133 transnationalism index 172 travel to 213–14 upbringing and migration 231 and solidarity 149, 153, 154, 155, 162 Urry, J. 4, 36, 62, 64, 66

V Van Ingelgom, V. 279 Van Mol, C. 11 Vertovec, S. 65 Verwiebe, R. 217 virtual mobility cross-border practices 65–7, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75–6, 77, 78, 79, 81 and culture 109, 110, 111 indicators of 63 see also communication with family/ friends abroad volunteering as reason for cross-border mobility 206, 234 as social practice 272, 274, 275, 276

W Warde, A. 88 welfare policies, support for 141–2 welfare systems 269, 269–70, 271, 281 wellbeing, and solidarity 149, 153–5, 162 women see gender Woolgar, S. 65 work interactions with people abroad 76, 77, 78, 79 world music 91, 92, 102–5, 103–4 World Tourism Organization 64 Wright, D. 90

308

Drawing on unique research and rich data on cross-border practices, this book offers an empirically-based view on Europeans’ interconnections in everyday life. It looks at the ways in which EU residents have been getting closer across national frontiers: in their everyday experiences of foreign countries – work, travel, personal networks – but also their knowledge, consumption of foreign products, and attitudes towards foreign culture.

Ettore Recchi is a Professor of Sociology at Sciences Po (Paris) and part-time Professor at the Migration Policy Centre of the EUI (Florence).

Laurie Hanquinet is Senior Lecturer and Deputy Head of the Department of Sociology at the University of York.

Adrian Favell is Chair in Sociology and Social Theory at the University of Leeds.

Steffen Pötzschke is a Postdoctoral Researcher at GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences in Mannheim and a Corresponding Member of the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies at the University of Osnabrück.

Fulya Apaydin is an Assistant Professor at Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI). Roxana Barbulescu is Academic Fellow in New Migrations in UK and Europe at the School of Sociology and Social Policy of the University of Leeds. Michael Braun is a Project Consultant at GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences and Adjunct Professor at the University of Mannheim. Irina Ciornei is an Assistant Professor in the Institute of Sociology at the University of Bern. Niall Cunningham is an Assistant Professor in the Geography Department at Durham University. Juan Díez Medrano is a Professor of Sociology at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Deniz N. Duru is a Postdoc and Assistant Professor at the Media, Cognition and Communication Department at the University of Copenhagen.

David Reimer is Professor in Educational Sociology at Aarhus University. Justyna Salamońska is Assistant Professor and Deputy Director of the Centre of Migration Research at the University of Warsaw. Mike Savage is Professor of Sociology at the London School of Economics. Janne Solgaard Jensen is head of section at the Independent Research Fund Denmark. Albert Varela is a Lecturer in Quantitative Methods in the School of Sociology and Social Policy and the Q-Step Centre at the University of Leeds.

ISBN 978-1-4473-3420-0

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Recchi, Favell, Apaydin, Barbulescu, Braun, Ciornei, Cunningham, Díez Medrano, Duru, Hanquinet, Pötzschke, Reimer, Salamońska, Savage, Solgaard Jensen, Varela

These evolving European dimensions have been enabled by the EU-backed legal opening to transnational economic and cultural transactions, while also differing according to national contexts. The book considers how people reconcile their increasing cross-border interconnections and a politically separating Europe of nation states and national interests.

Everyday Europe

“An excellent example of systematic sociological enquiry of Europeanisation. The book makes a significant contribution to the study of European identities and to the geography of transnational ties in Europe.” Gerard Delanty, University of Sussex

EVERYDAY EUROPE SOCIAL TRANSNATIONALISM IN AN UNSETTLED CONTINENT

ETTORE RECCHI, ADRIAN FAVELL, FULYA APAYDIN, ROXANA BARBULESCU, MICHAEL BRAUN, ` MEDRANO, IRINA CIORNEI, NIALL CUNNINGHAM, JUAN DIEZ DENIZ N.DURU, LAURIE HANQUINET, STEFFEN PÖTZSCHKE, ` MIKE SAVAGE, DAVID REIMER, JUSTYNA SALAMONSKA, JANNE SOLGAARD JENSEN, ALBERT VARELA