Europe's Hybrid Threats : What Kinds of Power Does the EU Need in the 21st Century? [1 ed.] 9781443891844, 9781443881791

Citation preview

Europe’s Hybrid Threats

Europe’s Hybrid Threats: What Kinds of Power Does the EU Need in the 21st Century? Edited by

Giray Sadık

Europe’s Hybrid Threats: st What Kinds of Power Does the EU Need in the 21 Century? Edited by Giray Sadık This book first published 2017 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2017 by Giray Sadık and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-8179-1 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-8179-1

This project has been funded with support from the European Commission. This publication reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

This book is dedicated to all the cherished lives lost as a result of enduring hybrid threats, which we strive to improve our understanding via this edited volume.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements .................................................................................... ix Chapter I ...................................................................................................... 1 Introduction: Hybrid Threats and European Security Giray Sadık Chapter II ....................................................................................................11 War in Ukraine and European Security: Reset, Reverse or Revoke? Maria Raquel Freire Chapter III ................................................................................................. 29 Hybrid Threats and Justice and Home Affairs: The Case of Migration Policy Zeynep Arkan-Tuncel Chapter IV ................................................................................................. 51 The Visible and Invisible Story of the European Migrant Crisis Hélène Cristini and Claudio Lanza Chapter V................................................................................................... 77 The Strategic Consequences of Brexit: The Challenges of the Common European Security and Defence Policy in the Post-Brexit Era Filiz Çoban Chapter VI ................................................................................................. 93 Turkey and the EU: The Challenges of the Middle Eastern Crises Kıvanç Ulusoy Chapter VII ...............................................................................................117 Conclusion: In Search of Hybrid Policy Implications Giray Sadık Editor and Contributor Biographies......................................................... 121

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book is one of the major research outputs of our project funded by the European Union: Erasmus+ Jean Monnet Project: “Building Bridges with Europe and with the World”. I would like to thank our Jean Monnet Chair, Prof Angelo Santagostino, for his support and leadership in this project. I am also very grateful to have worked with the distinguished authors of this edited volume. In addition to their expertise, they have also been great colleagues and friends, always a great pleasure to have on board! It would not have been possible to complete this book without the dedicated, timely, and always kind support of my Author Liaison at Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Victoria Carruthers. Moreover, I would like to thank my best friend and dear colleague Dr Selim F. Adalı for his careful review and useful feedback on my chapters. Likewise, my special thanks go to Sue Morecroft for her thorough proofreading of the entire volume. For their steady support from the beginning to the end of this book marathon, I would like to thank to academic and administrative personnel of Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University. I cannot thank enough my beloved wife Demet Sadık and son Ege for their sacrifice of precious family time, as well as their endless support and understanding. As editor I bear sole responsibility for any possible errors of fact or judgement regarding my chapters. The authors have always been encouraged to remain free in their analyses, so the views expressed in the chapters should be considered as the perspectives of their respective authors only.

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION GIRAY SADIK1

Hybrid Threats and European Security The European Union (hereafter EU) has been witnessing various crises: from intergovernmental squabbles over the EU constitution to economic hardships, from refugees on its borders to rising concerns over emboldening Russian manoeuvres in Ukraine and Syria, and nowadays the strategic consequences of Brexit for Euro-Atlantic relations. Evidently, these interrelated challenges are of a transnational and hybrid nature involving state and non-state actors alike. As these challenges have been affecting the European sphere inside and out, the EU needs to timely devise political strategies to deal with them. As its title suggests, this book is dedicated to addressing contemporary hybrid threats to the European Union. To this end, this book aims to open up a debate on these interrelated questions on the nature of European power, and on what kind of Common European Security and Defence Policy (hereafter CESDP) is necessary to address the on-going hybrid threats to the EU. In light of these challenging developments, the need for comprehensive analyses and timely solutions has raised research interest in hybrid threats on the part of practitioners and scholars alike. For instance, the book edited by Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present (Cambridge University Press 2012), can be given as a flagship example of recent studies on hybrid warfare, providing historical background with the aim of tracing continuity and change in devising hybrid strategies. However, as Bernhard Hoffmann notes in his recent review of the book, perhaps in part due to the 1

Associate Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Political Science, Ankara Yldrm Beyazt University, Turkey. Correspondence: [email protected] ; [email protected].

2

Chapter I

military background of the editors, “a traditional focus on the battlefield makes me wonder whether the editors were thinking hybrid enough” (Hoffmann 2016). Considering the fact that while both editors, Mansoor and Murray have a background in military history and strategic studies, which can be an advantage for detailed battleground analysis it can also hamper a comprehensive outlook necessary to grasp the nature of contemporary hybrid threats. More recent books such as Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents Volume 141: Hybrid Warfare and the Gray Zone (Lovelace, ed. 2016), and Hybrid Wars: The Indirect Adaptive Approach to Regime Change (Korybko 2015) tend to overemphasize a single dimension of hybrid warfare above all other factors such as terrorism and regime change. Evidently, these studies also risk not being comprehensive enough to grasp the true complexity of contemporary hybrid strategies. We present in this book an edited volume of essays exploring previously understudied dimensions of hybrid threats. Given the relative paucity of comprehensive studies on such a highly complex topic, this edited volume will break new ground by opening the debate on the promise and pitfalls of the EU as a global power in light of on-going hybrid challenges. Under these circumstances, it is timely and necessary to seek multifaceted answers to the question of what kind of power does the EU really need. As can be observed from the majority of edited books in the field, this is not a single-person task. This edited volume aims to present different perspectives as to the nature of the EU’s real and potential power in relation to on-going transnational challenges. A variety of authors with diverse backgrounds ranging from history and sociology to political science and international relations will seek to analyse the multifaceted nature of hybrid threats under-represented in previous studies. Such variety remains essential for a comprehensive analysis of contemporary hybrid challenges. Accordingly, in line with this framework and the authors’ expertise, the book’s chapters will address the following substantive issues (please refer to the Table of Contents for a list of complete chapter titles): European Security, Hybrid Threats and CESDP; Mass Migration to Europe and the Role of the EU; Refugees and European Borders, and the Future of the Schengen Area; Putin-style Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine and EU-NATO Cooperation; Relations between the EU and Russia; What kinds of EU policies are needed toward Turkey in light of enduring MENA-crises and the growing threats from refugees and terrorism?

Introduction

3

Brexit, EU, Transatlantic Alliance and Hybrid Threats; Hybrid Conclusions and Policy Implications. Hybrid threats posed by various combinations of state and non-state actors have mounted transnational challenges (e.g. mass migration, terrorism) to EU-member NATO allies such as for Eastern European EU-members expanding Russian manoeuvres in Ukraine, and for non-EU NATO allies such as Turkey its long border with Syria. Meanwhile, the last decade has witnessed terrorist attacks of unprecedented magnitude in the NATO ally heartlands of Paris, Ankara, Brussels, and Istanbul. The on-going rise of hybrid threats to the allies, ranging from political instability in Eastern Europe and the Middle East to the mass refugee influx and terrorism in their neighbourhood, put forward the need to timely discuss important questions about hybrid threats and the venues for effective Euro-Atlantic cooperation as a method to counter these threats. In order to address these interrelated questions of what kind of European power is necessary and achievable, this section begins by delineating the concepts of “hybrid war” and “hybrid threat” with reference to on-going European challenges, and then it proceeds with a road map for the book by presenting the chapter briefs in the order of the table of contents.

Hybrid Threat or Hybrid War? As hybrid threats to international security have been evolving, their use in scholarly and policy debates has become a source of on-going confusion. In many instances, it can be noticed that the concepts such as “hybrid threat” and “hybrid war” are used randomly, without even providing a working definition for the terms. This has led to the further confusion of the policy-makers instead of much needed conceptual clarification. For that reason, this section will define each concept, delineate their similarities and differences, and explain why this book will proceed with “hybrid threats”. In addition to conceptual clarification, this section aims to put these terms into context. To this end, this paper refers to NATO and EU definitions from official reports as primary sources, which indicate a level consensus among member states about their understanding of these key terms. As NATO and the EU are the two core institutions to organise Euro-Atlantic cooperation against hybrid threats, their definitions present a meaningful starting point for this book. In a 2011 report, NATO describes hybrid threats as:

4

Chapter I Hybrid threat is an umbrella term, encompassing a wide variety of existing adverse circumstances and actions, such as terrorism, migration, piracy, corruption, ethnic conflict... What is new, however, is the possibility of NATO facing the adaptive and systematic use of such means singularly and in combination by adversaries in pursuit of long-term political objectives, as opposed to their more random occurrence, driven by coincidental factors. [Emphasis Added] (Quoted by Bachmann and Gunneriusson 2015)

This comprehensive definition of hybrid threats enables researchers to grasp the term’s multi-faceted nature. This definition also presents examples of hybrid threats such as terrorism and migration. This paper therefore uses the term “hybrid threat” with the connotations and examples set out by the above NATO definition. The same report underlines that hybrid threats are not exclusively a tool of asymmetric or non-state actors, but can be applied by state and non-state actors alike. Their principal attraction from the point of view of a state actor is that they can be largely non-attributable, and therefore applied in situations where more overt action is ruled out for any number of reasons. [Emphasis Added] (Quoted by Bachmann and Gunneriusson 2015)

This point in the report is of particular importance for this research, as it highlights the fact that hybrid does not necessarily mean non-state! In this regard, this “hybrid threat” conceptualization also opens door for the consideration of “hybrid war” in the formulation and development of hybrid threats. Accordingly, Hybrid war encompasses a set of hostile actions whereby, instead of a classical large-scale military invasion, an attacking power seeks to undermine its opponent through a variety of acts including subversive intelligence operations, sabotage, hacking, and the empowering of proxy insurgent groups. It may also spread disinformation (in target and third countries), exert economic pressure and threaten energy supplies. [Emphasis Added] (Popoescu 2015)

In view of the above definition, hybrid war necessitates an orchestrating state actor, which can weave state capabilities such as military and intelligence operations in support of proxy insurgent groups. The most recent examples of such operations can be observed in Russian manoeuvres in Ukraine and Syria, involving both conventional military assets such as fighter jets and air defences along with local insurgent groups acting as proxy land-forces.

Introduction

5

Although important, hybrid war is only part of the story when the Allies are faced with ever-growing hybrid threats ranging from refugees to terrorism. NATO’s Bi-Strategic Command Capstone Concept describes these hybrid threats as “those posed by conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives”. The same concept also includes, “low intensity asymmetric conflict scenarios, global terrorism, piracy, transnational organized crime, demographic challenges, resources security, which have also been identified by NATO as so-called hybrid threats” [Emphasis Added]. Similar to the earlier hybrid threat definition, this one also includes terrorism and demographic challenges, growing out of a combination of state and non-state actors via conventional and non-conventional means. This constitutes another reason for the editor’s choice of the term “hybrid threat’ to capture the complexity of the threat environment in which NATO and the EU need to operate. Under these circumstances, it can be observed that Euro-Atlantic relations have been on a constant trial period, in which even their rare successes are bound to be repeatedly tested. Still, “European countries are vulnerable to threats from war and political instability in Syria and Iraq. Terrorist groups exploit fragile environment for unleashing violence and attacks in European countries” [Emphasis Added] (Upadhyay 2016). For this reason, effective Euro-Atlantic cooperation against hybrid threats has become more a question of “how” rather than “if”. Among the sheer variety of these hybrid threats, this book mainly concentrates on analysing the ones related with the recent resurgence of an assertive Russia in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, which have triggered the largest refugee wave in Europe since World War Two. Evidently, these hybrid threats and demographic challenges are multi-causal, and therefore the book presents in-depth analyses provided by experts with various backgrounds ranging from geopolitics to migration issues.

In Search of Hybrid Order: The Road Map of the Book Writing on hybrid threats entails complex challenges. This has required a particular approach when editing this volume of experts’ essays. To this end, I coined this term Hybrid Order to describe the order for this book’s flow. This order is not meant to be hierarchical. The chapters are neither ordered based on the importance of their subject nor on the seniority of their authors. As a rule of thumb, the flow of the book is from general to specific and from most recent to the others, aiming to establish this hybrid order for the road map of this book.

6

Chapter I

In their chapters, the authors have liberally applied the framework of analysis established by the book editor. This is based on the overarching definition of “hybrid threat” presented in this introduction. Nevertheless, the authors’ interpretation of such an evolving concept is yet to be seen in their chapters, in which they can only speak for themselves, and not necessarily for the editor. As with any edited volume, the readers may feel certain discrepancies, or even disagreements among the authors. Considering that one of the core aims of this book is to open a debate on the nature of European power, different perspectives are more than welcome. As the editor of this book, I have set the stage for this road map; now I will introduce each chapter in the order of the table of contents, and based on summaries provided by the authors in their own words. War in Ukraine and European Security: Reset, Reverse or Revoke? by Professor Maria Raquel Freire looks into Russian politics towards Ukraine, and how the use of soft and hard power has prompted serious challenges to European security. The annexation of Crimea and the lingering instability in Eastern Ukraine put pressure on EU-Russia relations, as well as on the European security regime. The violation of the border regime with its normative implications is an object of analysis. By looking into politics and procedures, including Russian foreign and security policy principles as well as instruments to pursue them, the chapter analyses Russian actions in Ukraine, unpacking the hybrid nature of these decisions and actions, and discussing the implications of these for European security. Refugees, Borders and Practices of Othering in the European Union’s Migration Policy by Dr. Zeynep Arkan-Tuncel. In the words of this chapter’s author, the EU has been going through a rough period in terms of the domestic and external challenges directed against its politico-social order and security. By focusing on this increasingly closer connection between the EU’s domestic order and foreign policy as well as internal and external security, this chapter analyses how the EU perceived and responded to hybrid challenges in the broad field of justice and home affairs, with a specific focus on the Union’s migration policy. The aim of the chapter is to explore how the EU viewed migration, especially irregular migration, and formulated its response to this highly securitised phenomenon from the perspective of hybrid threats. It is argued that the response which the EU sought to develop to the threat of migration is based on a comprehensive approach that relied on solutions that intend to prevent migration by targeting its root causes through a combination of different policy tools and incentives, and to control and ultimately restrict migration through various surveillance mechanisms, stricter border controls and return agreements. Consequently, the EU’s policy reaction to migration,

Introduction

7

particularly irregular migration, by contradicting the very norms and values that symbolise the European order and the identity of the EU, is deemed to jeopardise the effectiveness and coherence of the Union’s foreign policy, and diminish its credibility as an actor. The Visible and Invisible Story of the European Migrant Crisis by Dr. Hélène Cristini and Claudio Lanza. The chapter’s authors state the following: the rise of brutal violence and civil wars across the MENA countries and in Africa has triggered the largest migration flow in contemporary history. Migrants, mostly Muslims fleeing the multiple on-going conflicts and wars in the MENA region, are still expected to reach EU coasts, and they come by the millions instead of the few thousands of the past. Faced with this situation, European countries, as a whole, have found themselves much unprepared strategically, politically, and economically to handle this crisis. In addition, EU member states’ responses have lacked any kind of coordination so far. More specifically, when looking at the EU members’ reactions through René Girard’s theoretical lenses, it seems that they focus on two apparently polar opposite arguments: the economic or the security argument fomented by Islamophobia. In fact, both arguments are identical insofar as they treat migrants as scapegoats hampering their integration policies and, thus, worsening the social discord between the autochthones’ community and the minority groups. In particular, when security reasons are argued, migrants are suspected of being potential infiltrators, while when economic reasons prevail, migrants are de-humanised and objectified. Either kind of policy addresses the migrant issue as a threat arising from a (constructed) homogeneous group, leaving out any attempt of sustainable integration. These approaches act as divisive tools likely to engender social discord within national communities, fomented by xenophobic narratives. Yet, conversely, the over-optimistic stand that pretends that the migrant flow in Europe will work as an economic bonus for the overaged European population equally fails to successfully address the problem of integration. This paper explores how both responses of EU states are a failure because they do not solve the root problem of the migrant crisis, which is the unresolved conflict between two mimetic extremisms: modernity perceived by some, as secular fundamentalism and Islamic fundamentalism both epitomised by nihilism and endogamy. As light is shed on the visible and the invisible migrant conflict resolution side, we analyse how this issue may turn out to be the catalyst to help the European states and the Muslim communities reform their “model of politics”. Should both parties fail to take steps in this direction, the chances are that a cycle of clashes will progressively escalate the conflicts between these extremes, on the one side

8

Chapter I

over utilitarian, rational and technocratic regimes, and on the other fundamentalist and radicalised states or organisations that are their mimetic doubles. This paper discusses the possibility of a new path to break the mimetic chain that is based on resentment and responsible for entrapping the conflict in the dialectic of a fake clash of civilization. The Strategic Consequences of Brexit: The Challenges of the Common European Security and Defence Policy in the Post-Brexit Era by Dr. Filiz Coban. In her own words: this study argues that keeping the unity of the European Union is the biggest challenge for the future of European integration and the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). Surely, Britain’s In/Out referendum by the end of 2017 qualifies as a decisive moment for Europe. An impressive number of thorough reports have analysed the process and consequences of Britain seceding from the EU over the past few years. Most analyses have focused on the economic, financial and trade costs and benefits regarding Britain’s membership of the EU. The debates of Brexit have already cast doubts on the development of the EU’s new Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy. However, its strategic effects still require a scholarly analysis. In this context, with Britain’s departure from its role in European security and defence, this research sheds a light on how Brexit might impact upon European security and defence and the transatlantic alliance, with a specific emphasis on its “special relationship” with the United States. Turkey and the EU: The Challenges of the Middle Eastern Crises by Prof. Kvanç Ulusoy. In his own words: since their beginning in the late 1950s until recent times the relations between Turkey and the European Union (EU) have been regarded as a question of foreign policy or as a matter of economic development. The official application of Turkey in 1987 slightly changed this perspective to be mainly technical and economic in essence. The EU’s Helsinki Summit in 1999, granting Turkey official candidate status, radically changed this. The EU’s impact on Turkey’s politics and political structures gained legitimate ground with the start of the accession negotiations in 2005. However, the relations made an unexpected turn in the radical political changes in the common neighbourhood. The Arab Spring and the civil war in Syria brought the geopolitical calculations and humanitarian crisis caused by the refugee crisis as the central questions that are parallel to accession negotiations. This article, in light of the recent changes in the Middle East, aims to discuss the relations between Turkey and the EU.

Introduction

9

Bibliography Bachmann, Sascha-Dominik and Hakan Gunneriusson. 2015. “Hybrid Wars: The 21st Century’s New Threats to Global Peace and Security,” Scientia Militia, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol. 43, No.1. Korybko, Andrew. 2015. Hybrid Wars: The Indirect Adaptive Approach to Regime Change, Project of the Institute for Strategic Studies and Predictions. Moscow: PFUR. Lovelace, Douglas, ed. 2016. Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents Volume 141: Hybrid Warfare and the Gray Zone Threat. Oxford University Press. NATO. 2010. “Bi-strategic Command Capstone Concept, Hybrid Threats Description” in 1500/CPPCAM/FCR/10-270038 and 5000 FXX/0100/TT-0651/SER: NU 0040, 25 August 2010. Popescu, Nicu. 2015. “Hybrid Tactics: Neither New nor Only Russian”, European Union Institute for Security Studies, EU-ISS-ALERT, January 2015. Upadhyay, Dinoj. 2016. “NATO Warsaw Summit: Outcomes and Implications”, Issue Brief of Indian Council of World Affairs, August 2. Accessed September 22, 2016. http://www.icwa.in/pdfs/IB/2014/NATOWarsawSummitIB02082016.p df. Williamson, Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, eds. 2012. Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present. Cambridge University Press.

CHAPTER II WAR IN UKRAINE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY: RESET, REVERSE OR REVOKE? MARIA RAQUEL FREIRE1

Introduction This chapter looks into Russian politics towards Ukraine, and how the use of soft and hard power has prompted serious challenges to European security. The mix in strategies and political moves shows how hybrid threats have become a new element, despite not being so new, of the so-called new wars (Kaldor 2007). This terminology points to a different approach to war from conventional ones, where there is a mix of war, organised crime, massive violations of human rights, involving global and local actors both public and private, and informal criminalised economic networks, thus constituting both a military challenge and a political one, with the centrality of the state being questioned many times. In this way, Kaldor highlights how the new wars end up becoming more of a political challenge, about breaches of legitimacy and the need for distinct political responses, eventually more cosmopolitan in their nature and reach. The war in Ukraine, with all the ingredients that ended up being made part of the complex recipe developing on the ground, points to a mix of “old” and “new” war features, where the hybrid nature of threats and responses to these seems to have gained a relevant place in the unfolding of events.

1

The author acknowledges funding for research from the Marie Skáodowska-Curie Innovative Training Networks (ITN-ETN) of the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, under grant agreement “CASPIAN––Around the Caspian: Doctoral Training for Future Experts in Development and Cooperation with a Focus on the Caspian Region” (642709–CASPIAN–H2020-MSCA-ITN-2014).

12

Chapter II

The annexation of Crimea and the lingering instability in Eastern Ukraine put pressure on EU-Russia relations, as well as on the European security regime. The violation of international law and the border regime with its normative implications are objects of analysis. By looking into politics and procedures, including Russian foreign and security policy principles as well as instruments to pursue them, the chapter analyses Russian actions in Ukraine, unpacking the hybrid nature of the means and actions, and discussing the implications of these for European security. In fact, the neighbouring area to both the EU and Russia which became smaller with successive EU enlargements became a space of attrition between these two giants. Looking at this area differently but very similarly also, as a space of influence, both the EU and Russia have been developing policies towards these countries that seek to bring them closer to their own spheres of action. These contradictory projects have clashed and Ukraine became the prime example of this clash in many different ways that this chapter seeks to analyse. The EU approach to Russian actions in Ukraine was slow to take shape and when sanctions were agreed among member states many criticised the EU for the lack of a strong common will and capacity to face the Russian muscled positioning in its vicinity. Besides, in many instances facing cumbersome decision-making processes in the face of divergence among its member states, the EU is not totally blocked by the disagreement of its members and might through different strategic approaches put forward alternative ways to approach new challenges, as well as take advantage of opportunities arising. The focus on preventive means and early warning is here a fundamental strategy in which the EU has been investing time and resources. Preventive diplomacy, by promoting anticipated action towards what might be identified as a focus of tension or friction, requiring the involvement of different human and material means, constitutes an area where the EU might play an advantageous role with positive results. In this way, this chapter looks at the concept of hybrid threat and war and how new applications of old procedures have been challenging the European security regime. The implications for EU-Russia relations, as well as relations of Russia with the west, are immediate and the way the EU might reply to the new context might be framed in innovative contours. The chapter starts by looking into hybridity in this context and at what European security means, particularly for Russia and the EU. It then proceeds with Russian foreign policy towards Ukraine and what the decisions made and actions taken mean for European security. The case of Ukraine illustrates the hybridity of challenges faced by Russia and the EU,

War in Ukraine and European Security: Reset, Reverse or Revoke?

13

and provides room for thinking ahead about a more proactive EU approach to hybrid challenges, through a tighter preventive approach.

Hybrid Threats: “Old Wine in New Bottles”? The concept of hybrid threats and hybrid wars has been gaining attention in the literature as it points to a mix in procedures at both the decision-making/strategic and operational levels. This is not a new concept as such, as the term hybridity has been used to mean a combination of civilian and military means, or of global and local levels of analysis, or even of conventional or traditional means with more post-modern tools. Hybrid threats range from transnational terrorism to corruption, from inter-institutional cooperation among governmental and non-governmental agencies with the military to the combination of public and private spheres in operations, with governments, transnational actors and civilian populations deeply involved in the processes. The term was first worked out by two American military personnel, General James Mattis and retired Marine officer Frank Hoffman in 2005, who referred to the use of “irregular methods” to gain tactical advantage, such as “terrorism, insurgency and narco-crime”. In these officers’ words, Irregular challengers seek to exploit tactical advantages at a time and place of their own choosing, rather than playing by our rules. They seek to accumulate a series of small tactical effects, magnify them through the media and by information warfare, to weaken US resolve.

This “merger of different modes and means of war”, they called “Hybrid Warfare” (IISS 2014). In this way, hybridity points to a complex mix of means spanning decision-making processes to implementation dynamics, and differentiated actors, such as governments or irregular groups. But the novelty of this concept lies not so much in the possible combinations that it implies, but more in the new contexts where this hybridity has been applied. [H]ybrid warfare (…) has emerged as one of the most innovative and popular instruments in contemporary international politics (…). Hybrid warfare is now used in a systematic, subtle, and refined way, backed by an official state discourse that denies it and supports it at the same time and to which the international community seems unable to respond. (Polese et al. 2016, 365)

14

Chapter II

This complexity inherent to hybrid threats and wars renders clear the need for more complex responses and draws attention to the need for innovative tasks. If the phenomenon is not new, as propaganda, mis(dis)information and subversion are tactics that have long been applied, the contexts have changed. In fact, a highly technological environment, more advanced instruments in the digital and conventional dimensions, such as regarding social media, and the spaces for intervention, both territorially and transnationally defined, confer on these threats the need for new thinking. The challenges associated with how hybrid threats are conceptualised in this encompassing manner, have a clear imprint on how security is understood and put to practice. The concept of security has been deepening and widening, particularly since the end of the Cold War, adjusting to a new context. More than just military security with a much territorialised dimension, human, societal, environmental and energy security became “new labels” for old concerns (Buzan et al. 1997). This meant that these different dimensions of security became part of the political agendas, in face of a more complex international system where different actors coexist, with different natures. The individual dimension of security gained relevance, with considerations about individuals and communities becoming fundamental, and the responsibility and in some cases ability of states to assure their rights being questioned. In fact, the discussion about a state’s fragility or its incapacity to guarantee the security of its populations was discussed widely. The responsibility to protect agreements at the United Nations expressed concern over major violations of human rights and the incapacity, inability or unwillingness of national governments to prevent these. Other dimensions of security gained increased relevance, such as energy security with national, international and transnational dimensions, involving states, but also private companies, making the dealings to ensure energy production, transit and supply a dynamic chain with many challenges. Spoilers have interrupted supplies, with consequences for specific countries and populations in terms of resources available and in this way are being used as a security threat to a country’s stability. Instead, in reverse, a reduction in supply demand can put pressure on the producer country, as a way to achieve lower prices, for example, but with consequences at the upper level of the chain production. These are just brief examples to demonstrate how security has widened and deepened, and how the challenges to security became so diverse. Security from what, and for whom, has become a recurrent question. And this demonstrates the ambiguities that have been characterising different understandings and interpretations of the concept. The territorialised nature of security is still relevant, but space was opened

War in Ukraine and European Security: Reset, Reverse or Revoke?

15

for non-territorialised challenges to security, both regarding the sectorial dimensions as identified above, and the nature of the actors involved–– state actors, non-state actors, intra-state actors and transnational actors. The complexity arising out of this new mix feeds into the discussion about hybrid threats and how we might face and respond to them to enhance security.

(In)security Readings in EU-Russia Relations The understanding of security in the EU and Russia has been distinct. These are two very different actors––one is a unitary state and the other an international organisation with 28 member states; one has a centralised decision-making process, and the other follows inter-governmental methods in matters of foreign, security and defence policies. The distinct nature of the actors defines their very own distinct understanding of security. The European Security Strategy (ESS) approved in 2003 sought to identify the main threats to the Union and define the main strategic goals to achieve more security. The document goes through different threats to security, including terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime. It defines as an assumption that the transnational and complex character of these threats impedes countries on their own from addressing them, requiring therefore a concerted effort. Towards this goal, the development of better means for preventing violence was agreed, and it was understood that threats outside, and even far from EU borders, could have a fundamental impact on the EU’s security. In fact, this idea became a core principle of the Neighbourhood Policy (Prague Summit 2009) when the EU defined security at its borders and in its vicinity as importing security towards the Union. The “ring of well governed states” in the EU’s neighbourhood would contribute to sustaining this approach to security in the wider Europe. It also implied, even if in a timid way, the EU’s affirmation as a global player, including in security matters. As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player. (ESS 2003, 1) This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In

16

Chapter II doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world. (ESS 2003, 14)

This vision of the EU as a global player has consolidated with time, and becomes more evident in the new Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (Global Strategy 2016). This document, approved in June 2016 acknowledges the changed international and internal context for the EU, and how new threats from energy, migration and climate change to hybrid warfare, need to be dealt with. The EU takes responsibility for its member states’ security in a volatile international context, as well as for its neighbouring areas. The so-called “Arab Spring” to the South unleashed movements of resistance and opposition triggering violence that spread out and became persistent in countries such as Iraq and Syria, and the conflict in Ukraine to the East brought hybrid warfare to the EU borders. Once more the document underlines the need to combine resources and efforts as tackling these threats and addressing these conflicts cannot be a one-state job. The Union assumes itself to be a big player with the responsibility to promote security internally for its citizens, but also externally, in its vicinity and further afield. This Strategy is underpinned by the vision of and ambition for a stronger Union, willing and able to make a positive difference in the world. Our citizens deserve a true Union, which promotes our shared interests by engaging responsibly and in partnership with others. It is now up to us to translate this into action. (Global Strategy 2016, 11) We will take responsibility foremost in Europe and its surrounding regions, while pursuing targeted engagement further afield. We will act globally to address the root causes of conflict and poverty, and to champion the indivisibility and universality of human rights. (Global Strategy 2016, 17)

The wording of the new document points to an encompassing understanding of security, based on the need for a coherent, comprehensive and co-jointly-owned approach to address threats and respond to the ongoing crisis. The identification of hybrid threats that do not know borders (Global Strategy 2016, 50) points also to this complexity of actors, instruments and contexts that defy the international order. The EU’s approach to security has been informed by its very own constitution as a union of 28 states where the finding of common ground is not always easy. Security and defence are one such area where much progress has been achieved, as evident in the number of CSDP missions agreed and deployed, but where consensus is still lacking in many issues. However, it should be underlined how “terrorism, hybrid threats and organised crime

War in Ukraine and European Security: Reset, Reverse or Revoke?

17

(…) call for tighter institutional links between [the EU’s] external action and the internal area of freedom, security and justice” driving efforts and interests together. The coexistence of different visions on security and the broadly sketched strategy to address well identified threats, including those of a hybrid nature, attest to the balances the EU continuously seeks within and among its member states. In Russia, the various National Security Concepts make clear the direction of security understandings, starting from those that are understood as national priorities, and projecting these into the overall policies related to security. In the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020, it is clearly stated that: The main directions of the national security policy of the Russian Federation are the [so-called] strategic national priorities, in the form of important social, political and economic transformations intended to create secure conditions for the realisation of Russian citizens’ constitutional rights and freedoms, the stable development of the country, and the preservation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state. (NSS2020 2009)

The issue of national sovereignty and respect for the territorial integrity of states are a fundamental part of the security equation. Russia has affirmed itself as a sovereignist power, meaning that the sovereignty rule has been a pillar of its foreign policy, as evidenced at the United Nations Security Council, for example, where it has been aligning with China on matters infringing the sovereignty of countries; as well as regarding its domestic politics, where Russia wants to avoid any kind of external interference. Indeed, Moscow became a fierce critic of the “colour revolutions” in the post-Soviet space understanding these as promoted and financed by western interests, attempting to destabilise relations between Russia and these republics, by promoting a western-oriented change in these governments’ politics. Thus, security in Russia is very much interconnected with the preservation of sovereignty and non-interference in its internal affairs. The issue of Chechnya became the best example of how this principle should apply to Russian matters, in the sense that it was always carefully labelled as an internal issue, and that all measures taken to respond to it were the sole responsibility of the central government. This was an issue clearly framed within the domestic sphere, and as a matter of national security to avoid any attempts at secession from any part(s) of the territory within the Federation. The overall security approach fits the foreign policy priorities of the Russian Federation and how the goal of regaining the status of a great power, including through international recognition by its peers, became so

18

Chapter II

central to the Russian agenda (Freire 2011). Briefly put, the concentric circles of foreign policy are geographically organised (Freire 2012), identifying the post-Soviet space as the primary area of interest for Russia, and where it even attributes itself a droit de regard, followed by relations both with the west––meaning the EU, the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), etc.,––and towards the east including China and India, for example. The Middle East has been increasingly regaining a central place in Russian politics, with the Syrian war making it even more central. And Africa and Latin America have also been playing a bigger role in Russian politics, particularly in an unfavourable context regarding west-Russia relations, and the realignment of foreign policy through more attention to club diplomacy, for example, with the BRICS2 becoming a relevant forum for Russian politics. In this foreign policy concentric geographic approach, the former Soviet space is an area of utmost primacy for Moscow which helps explain the approach followed regarding Ukraine. Moscow wants to have a say on Ukrainian politics, and in particular its eventual integration into western institutions. These two approaches to security point to a sharing of the identification of threats, though not really a sharing of the perception of threats. This means that if the issue is terrorism, for example, both the EU and Russia share this as a security threat, sharing also the understanding that certain measures are needed to contain it. However, this does not mean that the perception of terrorism and how to fight it is always shared, in the sense, for example, that some actors have been differently understood as promoters/fighters of terrorism, contributing to mismatches in policies and reducing the possibilities for cooperation. A simple illustration of distinct interpretations that might hamper closer collaboration is EU-Russia cooperation on security matters which has been framed by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (signed 1994, ratified 1997), which states the commitment of the Parties to promote international peace and security as well as the peaceful settlement of disputes and to cooperate to this end in the framework of the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and other fora.

Thus, since the formalisation of the relationship security has been a topic in the bilateral agenda, at the time broadly formulated. The Four Common Spaces agreement of 2004 further conferred on security a new place in the bilateral agenda, becoming more specific in its formulation 2

The acronym BRICS stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

War in Ukraine and European Security: Reset, Reverse or Revoke?

19

and including the problems lingering in the post-Soviet space, such as the protracted conflicts, which constitute focuses of insecurity. The wording of the document is clear and already includes hybrid threats in its listing, despite not explicitly using the terminology: The aim of work on this space is to intensify co-operation on security issues and crisis management, to address new threats such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts and state failure and to reinforce cooperation in responding to natural disasters. This cooperation will be based on the common values which underpin the external policies of both sides, as set out in the PCA. (EU-Russia Four Common Spaces 2004, 2)

However, and despite framing agreements, EU-Russia relations have been through many ups-and-downs due to misunderstandings in goals and procedures, as well as due to broader contextual factors. Sour relations between NATO and Russia, for example, have contributed to hampering EU-Russia relations. The same might be argued about the plan for a US missile defence shield involving some individual EU member states, which also did not contribute to a positive atmosphere in relations. EU enlargement, but clearly NATO enlargement––identified in Russia’s military doctrine as the main external threat to the Russian Federation (Military Doctrine 2014)––has been high on the agenda of discord. Adding to these differences, the readings about the neighbourhood that both the EU and Russia “share”, and that is shared and the focus of contention by Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine, have fostered distancing. As much as the EU project includes a stable and prosperous neighbourhood where security dynamics will positively impact the Union’s security, Russia also sees security and friendship at its borders as promoting its own security. The clashing projects of the EU and Russia towards this area of common interest, but where the projection of distinct interests is clear, led to a fundamental division. On the one hand, the EU vision is based on democracy building and liberal market principles, based on a normative appeal seeking to attract these states into its orbit. On the other hand, Russia, promoting more centralised governing procedures and its own market arrangements, is also seeking to bring these states into its sphere of influence. In the end, the initial rationale for the approximation and development of close ties with these countries is not very different, but looking closely at the developed objectives, instruments and politics, the difference is considerable and the proposals put forward are irreconcilable. The wider Europe project put forward by the EU clearly clashed with the greater Europe project advanced by Russia (see Averre 2016, 3; Sakwa

20

Chapter II

2012, 315-316). It is at this intersection of the EU and Russia’s competing goals over their close neighbours that the crisis in Ukraine escalated into violence, leading to a situation of high instability and high insecurity that does not contribute to the reinforcement of EU security. Indeed, the lingering violence in Eastern Ukraine has been understood by some as maintaining instability at the EU doors and in this way weakening its position before Russia. The next section deals with the case of Ukraine in more detail, looking at how these distinct projects clashed and the implications that the violence has had in Russia-west relations, and more broadly for European security.

Hybrid Threats and War: Which (re)actions in the Case of Ukraine? The developments in Ukraine, from the proposals to develop further economic integration to armed violence, demonstrate how quickly tensions and misunderstandings might escalate into armed conflict. The EU’s proposal for the signature of the Association Agreement and the counter-proposal of Russia for Ukraine to join the Customs Union ended up being more than technically non-reconcilable proposals. Having to make a choice between further integration with the EU or the Eurasian Union––which was the basic question then––pushed Ukraine into a choice it has always avoided. The multivectorial nature of Ukrainian foreign policy since 1991 had tried to play to the fullest on its geographical location in-between Russia and the EU, seeking to bargain and balance benefits and concessions, in such a way as to allow manageable relations with both big neighbours. This need to choose between one and the other economic project pushed Ukraine into a difficult situation where balancing no longer became a possible option. This points to the fact that the discussion on the signature of further cooperation with Russia or with the EU has to be framed in the ample context of relations between Russia and the EU, or more broadly, the west. In fact, in particular since 2008, when the war in Georgia seemed to be the culmination of a period of high tension between Russia and the west, cooperation between the EU and Russia has been haunted by misperceptions and misunderstandings. Furthermore, the issue of NATO which has always been a difficult one in the agenda only contributed to further sour relations. The demonization of the “other” has become the daily recipe for differences. Although Ukraine was always cautious with regard to NATO’s integration prospects, the discussion about offering a NATO Membership Action Plan

War in Ukraine and European Security: Reset, Reverse or Revoke?

21

back in 2008 at the time of the Bucharest Summit of the Alliance (see Bucharest Summit 2008), created fears in Russia that this proposal could lead to a non-welcomed development by the Kremlin, meaning the “intrusion” of NATO in the post-Soviet space, besides the Baltic states. This has been underlined several times in Russian discourse as a development that is not welcomed or supported, as it is understood as a direct threat to Russian interests, and even more, Russian security. From the moment these combined issues became part of a security agenda their treatment gained a differentiated dimension. This was very clear in Ukraine with the escalation of tension and the Russian direct intervention. Moscow made it clear that Ukraine is too much of a fundamental piece in the European security puzzle for it to let it go. The EU, differently, through the imposition of sanctions, ended up demonstrating the same approach in terms of how central Ukraine is on the European map. The escalation of tension in Ukraine leading to unrest in the Eastern part of the country which persists in time and has resulted in more than 9,500 casualties by 15 September 2016 (since the outbreak of armed violence in mid-April 2014) (UN Ukraine 2016), and the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation demonstrate the volatility of the situation which remains insecure both within Ukraine and with an impact on adjacent countries, as well as broadly with regard to European security. According to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, in a statement in mid-September 2016, The escalation of hostilities along the contact line over the summer was a sharp reminder that the situation in eastern Ukraine deserves much more attention. Additional efforts are needed to find a lasting solution to this crisis and put an end to the suffering of the civilian population. Human rights and justice are what people need, not further deaths and more intense hatred and destruction. (UN Ukraine 2016)

The dimension of the problem reports both the techniques and instruments at play since the armed hostilities began, as well as to the need for a comprehensive peacebuilding response. When looking at violence in Ukraine, experts concur with the view that Russia has been combining traditional operation methods with other means, including propaganda and economic pressure, but also resorting to local armed groups, mercenaries, and proxy forces. In this way, Russia understands the threats in Ukraine to be hybrid, and has been responding to these also with hybrid means. Ukraine has become a case of traditional war between two states, namely Ukraine and Russia, with asymmetrical contours, and where hybrid elements have been interplaying. This means

22

Chapter II

that the context in which these hybrid methods are being employed makes it very complex in terms of responses, making this conflict a test case for the EU’s ability to promote security through diverse means. Nevertheless, this is not really new in terms of threats or war conduct, but more regarding the context. These mixed methods are in this case being used by the strongest side to make the most of all opportunities at hand, be they material or non-material. As Mark Galeotti puts it, “[t]he outcome is a form of ‘guerrilla geopolitics’, a would-be great power, aware that its ambitions outstrip its military resources, seeks to leverage the methodologies of an insurgent to maximize its capabilities” (Galeotti 2016, 283). The objective is to seize favourable circumstances to increase power and gain advantage. As Galeotti (2016, 288) adds, the fact that the west has been showing reluctance to directly getting involved in hostilities provides more space for Moscow’s manoeuvring. Thus, “Russia’s ‘new way of war’ can be considered simply a recognition of the primacy of the political over the kinetic––and that if one side can disrupt the others’ will and ability to resist, then the actual strength of their military forces becomes irrelevant” (Galeotti 2016, 288). From the perspective of a western military official, this Russian hybrid approach is clear in the theatre of operations and demands innovative thinking from the west as to how to counter this combined and more robust approach. Traditional hybrid threats focus on the blending of various capabilities at the tactical and operational levels of warfare. Russia, however, is now employing not only the military Instrument of Power (IOP) of the modern state, but also the economic, informational, and diplomatic IOPs in its hybrid threat construct to exacerbate an already complex problem for NATO. (…) Russia is employing irregular forces and tactics with advanced conventional weapons and elite regular military special operations forces (Spetsnaz) synergistically for a common goal. Throughout contested areas in Ukraine, there are consistent reports of ‘little green men’ along with Russian volunteers moving around the battlefield without Russian military insignia or affiliation. These fighters are linking up with, and then augmenting, local pro-Russian irregular units and criminal gangs to boost their numbers and capabilities. With increased capability, Spetsnaz can organize these soldiers to execute guerilla type operations. (Davis Jr. 2015)

Additionally, the role of propaganda and disinformation became clear in the information war that has been fought in the media, with contradictory reports, unverified facts, and the use of a war-oriented language that labels players and contexts, and exacerbates stereotypes and pre-constructed images of the “other”. This “othering” exercise, which has

War in Ukraine and European Security: Reset, Reverse or Revoke?

23

erected more walls in creating real and imaginary divides between the parties, has fueled contradictions and extreme violence on the ground. Calling demonstrators “civilians” and “people in the streets” through to “extremists”, “terrorists” or “fascists” gives note to important twists in the background of reporting with an obvious distinct impact on the overall content of the information that is disseminated. Despite no central issue in this chapter, the power of language and narratives cannot be detached from the overall construct of the hybrid threat, as mentioned, as this is a component with heavy weight in the overall definition and composition of these hybrid constructs. This means that in addressing these complex hybrid threats, responses need to be proactive and attentive to the different dimensions of this hybridity, which might vary according to context. When looking at the EU’s role in Ukraine several questions arise as to the extent of its responses to the unfolding of events. The slow response of the Union has been a focus of criticism, but the options were not many. The agreement reached among the 28 member states on the imposition of sanctions on Russia and its renovation ended up signalling the EU’s rejection and disapproval of Russian actions in Ukraine, in particular the annexation of Crimea understood as an illegal act according to international law. This has been a contested issue, as Russia justified the “reintegration” of Crimea, as it was called, on the basis of historical arguments and the conduct of a referendum locally on March 16, 2014, when the majority of the population voted in favour of “secession” (The Guardian 2014). This clash in understandings does not preclude the questioning of Russian actions as violating one of the fundamental principles of the European security regime––the integrity of borders, and respect for the sovereignty of states. In fact, despite Russian historical claims, the juridical background points to a violation of fundamental principles of international law. This points to the ambiguity in Russian discourse and actions pertaining to the sovereignist approach Russia has been pursuing in its foreign and domestic politics, as previously analysed, and the breaching of this principle in the case of Ukraine, a case at its borders and defined by its very own policy formulation as a strategic country sitting in its area of influence. The questioning of the border regime resulted from the violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, signalling contestation to the prevailing regime within ambiguity. On the one hand, contestation of political change Western interference in the post-Soviet space, aggressive behaviour in Ukraine; on the other approach revealed contradictions in Russia’s

in Ukraine as well as of as drivers for Russian hand, this contestation own terms, as it has

24

Chapter II traditionally been a sovereignist power, opposing foreign interventions as interference in internal affairs. The border regime was part of Russia’s socialised practices in its relations with the West, regarding which Moscow became a norm-diffuser. Crimea’s annexation reversed the process and made of Russia a norm-contester of one of the dimensions it most valued regarding European security––respect for the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. But the ambivalence extends further, as it seems simultaneously Russia is accepting the sovereignty norm, as it always did, but also resisting this when it understands its interests are at stake, particularly in the post-Soviet space. What this means for European security is that the security regime is under pressure––the annexation of Crimea and lingering instability in Eastern Ukraine have added to existing distrust between Russia and the West. (Freire, forthcoming)

The implications of this eventually “exceptional” behaviour from Russia are not simple or light. The events in Ukraine carved out a huge rift between Russia and the west that led to the suspension of cooperation and dialogue at different levels and in different formats, including the stalling of negotiations on a new agreement to replace the PCA with the EU, or activities of the NATO-Russia Council. Moreover, the consequences are not just for relations with the west, but also to a great extent for the implications of these moves for Russia in terms of its positioning. Internally, Russia strengthened popular support towards what was understood as a show of force and power, and how Russia has been regaining a powerful status in the international polycentric system, as Moscow describes it. Externally, the divisions, misunderstandings and lack of trust were only reinforced. The perverse effect this might have for Russia is exactly the one that Moscow has been seeking to avoid––becoming isolated. In fact, a weak Russia may be looking to use such methods to leverage its own strengths, and above all Western weaknesses, but this is by no means a ‘magic bullet’. As of this writing, Moscow is bogged down in the Donbass, politically isolated, economically sanctioned, and with few options to improve its lot. Alarmist rhetoric aside, the ‘new way of war’ may well prove to be more of a threat to Russia than to the West. (Galeotti 2016, 298)

Facing economic recession at home, the war effort which is particularly high in material terms with Syria on the agenda, has been putting pressure on Russia’s finances, pointing to the limited reach that Russia’s options might lead to, with a high political cost.

War in Ukraine and European Security: Reset, Reverse or Revoke?

25

Concluding Thoughts European security has been injured at its very core, with the war in Ukraine representing the most visible example of the inability of preventive mechanisms to recognise and address signs of tension. This recognition might be a first step for the further development of EU proactive responses, instead of maintaining a very reactive attitude towards crises. The Global Strategy points to the need for a coherent and cohesive response from the EU, building on partnerships and projecting the Union’s power globally. The limited resources at the EU’s disposal and the delicate nature of defence matters within the Union press for the further development of preventive measures as a way of addressing tensions before they escalate, or eventually preventing them from effectively escalating. The challenges are many, but the lessons from Ukraine show how relevant are proactive measures to avoid massive violence which is destructive physically and psychologically, having implications which cross borders. The divisions in Russia-EU/west relations are extreme and the war in Ukraine keeps feeding distance. The lack of agreement regarding the stabilisation of the situation in eastern Ukraine and a political rewind in terms of how far the Donbass area has gone from the central authorities in Kiev, keep the situation in a protracted mood regarding attempts at signing and implementing a political deal. The hybrid nature of threats and war in the country only contributes to further complexity in terms of who is involved, who is responsible, and who is effectively capable of pushing forward towards a political settlement. In this context, what does Ukraine mean for European security, and for relations between the west and Russia? The extreme option of revoking agreements and the whole panoply of different instruments that have been institutionalised and that frame relations between the west and Russia seem not to be an option. Despite differences, the density of interdependence is huge and provides a window for new possibilities in terms of trying to advance beyond the current non-state of affairs. The EU and Russia are too close to afford to live too distantly. The option to revert to the status quo ante seems also not possible. The violation of the border regime in Europe, with the annexation of Crimea and the continuous support Russia has provided to Eastern Ukraine, point to illegal actions that cannot simply be erased from the map of relations and forgotten. In fact, the EU-Russia PCA seems to be dead. The option for a reset is not a new one, but might be the only feasible one if the goal is to find a basis for common understanding between Russia and the west. This will require a deep revision of the

26

Chapter II

basics underlining bilateral and multilateral relations, and clearly assuming differences as well as points of convergence. Reset means much more than getting back to business as usual, as the persistent lack of trust and understanding between Russia and the west needs to be fully addressed. Cooperation in difference is possible. Assuming this cooperation within the many existing differences is imperative if a new basis for relations is to be drawn up and implemented.

Bibliography Averre, Derek. 2016. “The EU and Russia: Managing the New Security Environment in The Wider Europe,” European Policy Analysis, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, April 2016, accessed on October 27, 2016, http://www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/2016_5_epa_eng_0.pdf. Bucharest Summit. 2008. “Bucharest Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008”. Press Release 049, 3 April 2008, accessed October 27, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm. Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. 1997. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Davis Jr., John. 2015. “Continued Evolution of Hybrid Threats. The Russian Hybrid Threat Construct and the Need for Innovation,” The Three Swords Magazine, 28 May 2015, accessed on October 27, 2016, http://www.jwc.nato.int/images/stories/threeswords/JWC_Magazine_ May2015_web_low.pdf. ESS. 2003. “A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy,” Brussels, 12 December 2003, accessed October 27, 2016, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. EU-Russia Four Common Spaces. 2004. MEMO/04/268 Brussels, 23 November 2004. Freire, Maria Raquel. 2011. “USSR/Russian Federation Major Power Status Inconsistencies.” In Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics: Global and Regional Perspectives, edited by Thomas Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith Grant and Ryan Baird. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. —. 2012. “Russian Foreign Policy in the Making: The Linkage between Internal Dynamics and the External Context,” International Politics 49, 4: 466-481.

War in Ukraine and European Security: Reset, Reverse or Revoke?

27

—. Forthcoming. “Ukraine and the Re-structuring of East-west Relations.” In The Russian Challenge to the European Security Environment. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. Galeotti, Mark. 2016. “Hybrid, Ambiguous, and Non-linear? How Roger Kanet is Russia’s ‘new way of war’?” Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, 2: 282-301. IISS. 2014. “Countering Hybrid Threats: Challenges for the West,” IISS Strategic Comments 20, 8, accessed October 27, 2016, www.iiss.org/stratcom. Kaldor, Mary. 2007. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. 2nd ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Military Doctrine. 2014. “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”, approved by the President of the Russian Federation on December 25, 2014, No. Pr.-2976, accessed on October 27, 2016, http://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029. NSS2020. 2009. “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020” by decree of the President of the Russian Federation N.537, 12 May 2009. PCA. 1997. Agreement on partnership and cooperation establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part–– Protocol 1 on the establishment of a coal and steel contact group–– Protocol 2 on mutual administrative assistance for the correct application of customs legislation––Final Act––Exchanges of letters–– Minutes of signing Official Journal L 327, 28/11/1997 P. 0003–0069. 21997A1128(01) (1997), accessed October 27, 2016, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc_114138.p df. Polese, Abel, Rob Kevlihan, and Donnacha Ó Beacháin. 2016. “Introduction: Hybrid Warfare in Post-Soviet Spaces, is there a Logic Behind?” Small Wars and Insurgencies 27, 3: 361-366. Prague Summit. 2009. “Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, Prague, 7 May 2009”. Brussels, Council of the European Union, 7 May 2009, 8435/09 (Presse 78), accessed on October 27, 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-09-78_en.htm. Sakwa, Richard. 2012. “Looking For a Greater Europe: From Mutual Dependence to an International Regime,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 45: 315-325. The Guardian. 2014. “Crimea Votes to Secede from Ukraine in ‘Illegal’ Poll,” 16 March 2014, accessed on October 27, 2016,

28

Chapter II

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/16/ukraine-russia-trucecrimea-referendum. UN Ukraine. 2016. “Situation in Eastern Ukraine Worsening, says UN report,” Geneva, Kyiv, United Nations, 15 September 2016, accessed October 27, 2016, http://un.org.ua/en/information-centre/news/3948-situation-in-easternukraine-worsening-says-un-repor.

CHAPTER III HYBRID THREATS AND JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS: THE CASE OF MIGRATION POLICY ZEYNEP ARKAN TUNCEL1

Introduction The European Union (EU) has been going through a rough decade. From the disruptive effects of the financial crisis to current “Brexit” talks, the EU is witnessing an unprecedented series of challenges directed at its historic achievements and existing politico-social order on the domestic front. At the same time, in its external realm, the EU seems to be battling with a series of threats that simultaneously risk its domestic order of peace and prosperity as well as security. These “new” threats directed against the EU reflect the changing nature and definition of security from a traditional one centred on the military security of the state to a non-traditional one according to which threats are unconventional and hybrid in terms of their origins, nature and targets. Such compound threats call for non-military as well as military responses and co-ordinated action by the EU and its member states. To this end, European leaders have been discussing possible EU-level responses, which, at the very least, necessitate strengthening the links between different dimensions of security as well as collaboration in “priority horizontal issues” (Council of the European Union 2015) such as organised crime, terrorism, human trafficking, and irregular migration.2 Currently, the European Commission and its Vice 1

Lecturer in International Relations at Hacettepe University, Department of International Relations, Ankara. Correspondence: [email protected]; [email protected]. 2 The use of the terms “irregular migration” and “illegal migration” will reflect the way in which the EU employed them in its official discourse over time. As a brief

30

Chapter III

President—the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy—are guiding the process of developing an EU-level response to these so-called “hybrid threats” on the basis of a “comprehensive approach”. According to them, the EU response requires “a holistic approach that will enable the EU, in coordination with Member States, to specifically counter threats of a hybrid nature by creating synergies between all relevant instruments and fostering close cooperation between all relevant actors” (European Commission 2016, 3). In other words, the EU’s comprehensive approach should be based on multilevel co-operation that encompasses the Union’s domestic and external spheres and policies, and should aim to provide an “added value” to the activities of its member states. It is common knowledge that the Union’s policy instruments and capabilities are quite limited in comparison to its member states’ in certain policy areas that fall within the scope of hybrid threats, particularly (external) security and defence. Yet, insofar as the threats are transnational or cross-border and common to all or many of its constituent units, the EU provides an optimal forum for developing an apt response, as it is deemed to have the capacity and vision to plan and co-ordinate actions required at the European level. This is mainly due to the Union’s unique institutional structure and the multilevel networks that have been created with respect to a wide spectrum of issues. On the basis of these, it is possible to say that the EU is more than a mere sum of its parts in terms of the response it is capable of offering to these new forms of threats. After almost seven decades of integration, today, the EU is a formidable actor in its region and the wider world. As a unique merger of states and peoples, the Union has evolved into an influential political and economic global power and undoubtedly is the most prominent player in its immediate neighbourhood. The achievements of the Union as a regional and global actor are only partly based on its efforts to forge an amalgamated and effective foreign and security policy. The EU’s success and influence owe more to the level of integration achieved in economic and financial matters as well as creating a new order in its neighbourhood. In fact, while developing a truly common foreign policy has proven difficult for the Union, it is a dynamic economic and political power in its external relations. In this respect, the EU’s foreign policy portfolio is quite note, the use of the term “illegal migration” precedes the use of “irregular migration” in the EU’s official discourse and was only replaced by the latter after 2010. In all other instances, the author will use “irregular migration” to refer to the broader phenomena of migration movements “outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries” (International Organisation for Migration 2016).

Hybrid Threats and Justice and Home Affairs

31

wide and covers policy areas that would not be included in the traditional definition of the term: “the foreign policy of the EU is not limited to its CFSP/CSDP [common foreign and security policy/common security and defence policy] and external action such as trade, development or enlargement policy” (Keukelerie and Delreux 2014, 222). EU foreign policy, in the broad sense of the term, also includes internal policy areas that have an external dimension and impact in which the Union has been granted certain external competences. In this respect, it is possible to categorise certain domestic policies under EU foreign policy since “[t]he external projection of internal policies constitutes a new kind of foreign policy, which is usually referred to as the ‘external dimension’ of a policy field” (Lavenex and Wichmann 2009, 84). Policy areas with an external dimension include transport, environment, energy and competition, and justice and home affairs (JHA). 3 Although outside the traditional definition of foreign policy, these policy areas are important sites in the EU’s interaction with third actors in its external realm and signify the blurring line between domestic and foreign policy—the inside and the outside. This blurring line is also apparent in the connected field of security: the changing conception of threats from traditional to transboundary and hybrid ones such as irregular migration, organised crime and terrorism has compelled the EU to develop a more consistent and all-encompassing approach that has brought together different dimensions of security “by establishing closer coordination and cooperation between the institutions and actors chiefly concerned with internal security and those dealing with external security” (Trauner 2011, 7; see also Mogherini 2015). This implies that the EU’s foreign and security policy directed towards external actors and threats is inextricably tied to the maintenance of its domestic order and security, particularly in policy areas like JHA, whose external dimension is motivated by “the transnational character of associated threats” (Lavenex and Wichmann 2009, 84). In this respect, it would not be wrong to conclude that the internal security of the Union is inherently linked to its external relations and thus has an external face: As the traditional divide between internal and external security dissolves, the EU must protect its own space from a variety of challenges that include organized crime, illegal migration and terrorism. These challenges have 3

Thierry Balzacq offers a rather different way of categorising JHA. He argues that rather than “an instrument of EU foreign policy,” the external dimension of JHA should be treated “as a distinctive policy, with its own raison d’être” (Balzacq 2009, 1).

32

Chapter III become de-territorialized, originating increasingly from actors that operate outside the Union’s external borders. (Rees 2008, 97-98)

In today’s security environment, these new threats and challenges faced by the Union, which have both national and transnational implications, mainly stem from its own neighbourhood and demand external action (European Commission 2010). In order to develop a suitable response to these, the EU needs to combine a variety of actions in the spheres of domestic and external security since “the comprehensive approach, insofar as it is mainly about the EU’s external action, would need to be broadened so as to include elements of internal security” (Andersson and Tardy 2015, 2). By focusing on this increasingly closer connection between the EU’s domestic order and foreign policy as well as internal and external security, this chapter analyses how the Union viewed and responded to the so-called hybrid challenges in the broad field of JHA, with a specific focus on the Union’s migration policy. The aim of the chapter is to explore how the EU approached the phenomenon of migration and formulated its response to this highly securitised issue from the perspective of hybrid threats. To this aim, the chapter will first trace the evolution of JHA as a policy area and the associated narrative on hybrid threats with a specific emphasis on the increasingly apparent connection between the Union’s internal and external security. It will then focus on the transformation of specific forms of migration into hybrid threats and the policy responses to these threats developed by the Union. It will be argued that these policy responses, by contradicting the very norms and values that symbolise the European order and the identity of the EU, jeopardise the effectiveness and coherence of the Union’s foreign policy, and diminish its credibility as an actor.

Internal Security with an External Face: JHA and its Evolution Security—or the legitimate and essential duty to provide security—is a matter that lies at the heart of statehood (Biersteker 2002): all governments are expected to protect the security of the state and their peoples against external threats through diplomacy, and political, economic or military supremacy or prowess. As an unusual benefactor, the EU has been involved in issues related to internal security since the early days of the process of integration. The European Economic Community’s ultimate goal of establishing an internal market within which people (among other things) move freely, and the eventual removal of border checks and

Hybrid Threats and Justice and Home Affairs

33

passport controls required a number of supporting mechanisms “to deal with unwanted consequences of the free movement of people” (Buonanno and Nugent 2013, 227) such as irregular migration, human or drug trafficking and the increased threat of terrorism. These “unwanted consequences” of the common market led the EU to develop European-level initiatives with varying levels of support from its member states in a number of connected fields. The most pertinent among these are the EU’s initiatives directed towards domestic security carried out under the framework of JHA. Jörg Monar (2001, 748) argued in 2001 that the origins of JHA date back to three preceding “‘laboratories’ which have helped to pave the way for the extraordinary development during the last decade and the ‘driving’ factors which have been triggering developments and further expansion of EU action.” The first and earliest among these laboratories is the Council of Europe and its activities which have laid the foundations of “a pan-European legal and judicial space” (Monar 2001, 749) through a range of conventions that have become part of the EU’s acquis communautaire, particularly with regard to judicial co-operation in criminal matters. While the work carried out under the framework of the Council of Europe was structurally limited to intergovernmental and lowest common denominator initiatives, it did lead to the gradual emergence of a European approach on matters related to co-operation in justice and home affairs. A more limited laboratory, both in terms of its scope and geographical coverage, was provided by the European Communities. In 1975, the common threat of terrorism led member states to establish a limited and intergovernmental procedure of co-operation—TREVI (which, some argue, is short for Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence Internationale)—to address issues of internal security in the form of six-monthly ministerial meetings. While the TREVI group’s work, conducted in the form of policy co-ordination and information exchanges, initially focused on counter-terrorism, over time, its mandate was broadened to cover organised crime, drug-trafficking and police co-operation. It was TREVI and the associated development of habits of co-operation between the ministers of member states that paved the way for more structured forms of collaboration to follow in the 1990s. The discussions on creating a passport-free travel zone in Europe which led to the signing of the 1985 Schengen Agreement added a new dimension to the work of the TREVI group as the third laboratory of JHA. The Schengen area, which consists of a number of non-EU states as well as most EU member states, operates on the basis of strengthened security controls at external borders and the dismantling of internal border controls.

34

Chapter III

It was the elimination of internal border controls that caused concerns over securing the domestic territories of the Schengen countries and spurred “closer cooperation on questions relating to cross-border phenomena such as immigration, organized crime, and drug trafficking” (Lavenex 2010, 459). In this respect, the Schengen experience served as a microcosm of the effective implementation of the principle of free movement of people as well as an intergovernmental forum that laid the foundations of a culture of cross-border co-operation in police and judicial matters (Monar 2001). Building on the experiences gained through these three policy laboratories, a number of domestic and external factors prompted the eventual creation of JHA as a separate pillar within the EU. In the domestic sphere, the completion of the single market, together with its associated freedoms, and the elimination of internal border controls resulted in an increased need for co-operation between the member states in the prevention of cross-border criminal activities as well as irregular immigration which were perceived as key threats that Europe was facing. In Monar’s words (2001, 755), member state leaders “realized that, as a result of the rapid progress of economic integration, they were, for better or for worse, increasingly sitting in the ‘same boat’.” At the systemic level, following the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Iron Curtain, the new security environment in Europe led to a redefinition of the very concept of security and the associated discourses on threats and challenges directed against the Union. The move from narrow military and state-centric notions of security to wider non-military and differentiated conceptions led to a growing concern with new and hybrid threats. These threats, which reflected the changing nature and scope of security, took different forms and challenged operational as well as bureaucratic and legal boundaries in Europe, and required a collective response that brought together military and civilian measures (Andersson and Tardy 2015, 4). Parallel to the rise of these new threats directed against both external and internal security and order in Europe, many seemingly domestic policy areas including home affairs policies were “securitised” (Bache, George and Bulmer 2015, 455). This process of securitisation led to the creation of certain “existential threats,” including the so-called hybrid threats, that the EU is faced with, to which member states needed to respond collectively. The construction of these threats and the formulation of the necessary responses to these in turn helped to solidify the European order, and the ideational as well as physical borders that separate “us” from “them,” and from who belongs in the EU and who should remain on the outside.

Hybrid Threats and Justice and Home Affairs

35

This rationale led to the creation of a separate and mostly intergovernmental JHA pillar in the Maastricht Treaty, whose initial work focused on judicial co-operation in civil and criminal matters, asylum and migration, and police and customs co-operation. The JHA pillar integrated a number of previously set-up initiatives and staff in the field of JHA co-operation [including an Ad Hoc Immigration Group (AHI) set up by the member states in 1986], at the top of which sat the JHA Council supported by COREPER. The institutional and structural arrangement of the JHA, just like some of the threats it was directed against, was a hybrid one that combined intergovernmental co-operation and EU involvement, “reflecting continuing ambivalence about the appropriate degree of international control over internal security matters” (Walker and Newman 1998, 234). While the decision making process associated with such a hybrid form of co-operation was slow and cumbersome, JHA developed into “the most active field for meetings convened under the Council of Ministers in the late 1990s” (Lavenex 2010, 460). In fact, it is argued that in this period, one of the main successes of JHA was that [t]he frequency and intensity of interaction… induced a transformation of the working practices of interior ministers and of police forces, which had remained among the least internationally minded within national governments, and led to the emergence of an intensive transgovernmental network. (Lavenex 2010, 460)

In the years that followed, the intricate structure created under the Maastricht Treaty whose output was mostly limited to non-binding intergovernmental measures, was reformed, streamlined, and gradually consolidated at the supranational level through the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice. The first steps in this process were the reformulation of JHA on the basis of the overarching aim of creating an area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) to provide the citizens of the Union with a high degree of safety under the Treaty of Amsterdam, and the incorporation of the Schengen system into the EU. In the face of widespread dissatisfaction regarding the intergovernmental and unanimity-based functioning of JHA, the Treaty of Amsterdam communitarised parts of the overall policy, including migration, and granted EU institutions increased competences with respect to making and implementing policy, a trend that was followed in the Treaty of Nice, albeit on a smaller scale. This led to an institutional reorganisation within the EU institutions such as the European Commission and the European Parliament with the aim of creating relevant directorate general or committee structures, and the prioritisation of the now citizen-centred AFSJ in the European Council meetings. In

36

Chapter III

fact, the Tampere Summit of the European Council set in action the practice of preparing five-year programmes to provide a general framework for the co-operation efforts between the EU and its member states, and to improve common capabilities in the materialisation of the AFSJ. The Treaty of Lisbon contained provisions that significantly upgraded the policy commitments of the EU in relation to the AFSJ. The EU was now assigned the broad objective of offering its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime. (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 3)

The Lisbon Treaty also completed the communitarisation process of JHA and, with the exception of a number of areas and opt-outs, subjected the policy area to the Union method of decision making. Yet, despite these developments, it would be wrong to categorise this policy area as a purely supranational one due to certain intergovernmental tendencies that still persist,4 and the existing patchwork of supranational, transnational, and national autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies which deal with matters related to JHA. On the whole, JHA has displayed certain structural tendencies that have led it to be labelled as a case of “communitarisation with hesitation” (Lavenex 2010, 460) throughout its evolution process. As a policy area that touches upon issues that lie at the heart of state sovereignty, integration in the field of JHA has been a rocky process that has been dominated by a very hesitant approach to common supranational legislation on the one hand—manifest in delays in the decision-making process, extensive discretion in adopted texts, and gaps in implementation—and more dynamic operational and practical integration, as well as cooperation with third countries on the other hand. (Lavenex 2015, 379)

The deeper level of integration achieved in operational rather than legislative matters, the EU-level agencies established such as Europol, Eurojust and Frontex, and the wider external scope of the EU’s activities have surely put the Union in an important position in matters related to 4

A good example of this would be the 2005 Prüm Convention between Germany, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria and Spain that focuses on terrorism, cross-border crimes and illegal migration.

Hybrid Threats and Justice and Home Affairs

37

JHA, but the fact remained: the EU is only an important secondary actor and has not in any way replaced “the member states as primary providers of internal security and justice” (Monar 2012, 613).

A Critical Look at the EU’s Migration Policy and the Case of Irregular Migration In its various different forms (regular, irregular, etc.), migration is a complex phenomenon that is shaped by the political, economic, social and cultural realities of the sending as well as receiving countries. Europe has been an attractive destination for migrants and asylum seekers since the second half of the twentieth century. The increasing number of people arriving at its borders and shores particularly from North Africa and the Middle East has placed the management of population movements and border controls high on the European agenda. The initial reaction to these population movements came from the states as Western European governments launched “a range of measures to limit or manage immigration and refugee flows” (Boswell 2003, 619) from the 1970s, albeit with limited outcomes. When individual or bilateral solutions failed to manage the “problem”, Western European states decided to come together and gradually lay the foundations of a regional migration regime, building on the early success of the Schengen project, particularly in terms of the creation of common external borders.5 It was initially through the efforts of the European Commission and the European Parliament, who argued in favour of developing a general framework in co-operation with third countries to tackle the root causes of involuntary migration, that migration and asylum issues arrived on the European agenda in the late 1980s. The early initiatives highlighted the need to develop an overarching framework for the EU’s activities in this field to deal with various different forms of migration “and the full course from motives to move through ultimate ‘solutions’ (integration, return or for some refugees, resettlement) would be connected” (van Selm 2002, 144). The backbone of the EU’s policies in the field of migration has been provided by a number of key documents and three five-year programmes, 5

It is a knee jerk reaction of the European states to initially turn to domestic solutions for complex issues such as migration: “Unilateral policy-making and problem-solving efforts are almost always the first preference of national governments because they are associated with lower transaction costs and they are comparatively easier to negotiate, implement, and monitor than are multilateral arrangements” (Uçarer 2002, 18).

38

Chapter III

a great majority of which focused on fighting irregular migration as a potential security threat. Clues to the path that migration policy would follow over the years were initially provided in the Presidency Conclusions of the 1992 Edinburgh Summit. In the annex to the conclusions entitled Declaration of Principles Governing External Aspects of Migration Policy, member state leaders acknowledged the EU’s commitment to create an order that welcomed outsiders, but at the same time noted the dangers and destabilising effects of uncontrolled migration. The policy choices identified by the European leaders in the declaration pointed to the two lines of action that would dominate EU-level activities in the management of migration in the years to come. The first line of action was preventative and devised to tackle what are called the “push factors” in the countries of origin to reduce the flow of migrants through co-ordinated action in foreign, development, economic, and migration and asylum policies, based on the norms and values that represent the very foundations of the EU: a number of different factors were important for the reduction of migratory movements into the Member States: the preservation of peace and the termination of armed conflicts; full respect for human rights; the creation of democratic societies and adequate social conditions; a liberal trade policy, which should improve economic conditions in the countries of emigration. (European Council 1992, 46)

The second line of action concerned controlling the flow of migrants through bilateral or multilateral readmission agreements with countries of origin or transit, to facilitate the return of “illegal immigrants”. These two lines of action were echoed in different forms in EU texts, and steered the activities of the Union towards restricting and externalising the control of migration in the years that followed. Externalisation often went hand in hand with the conception of migration, particularly irregular migration, as a security threat, reflecting the “growing tendency to channel diffuse socioeconomic and cultural concerns into the migration ‘problem’” (Boswell 2003, 623) and led to arrangements for the return of migrants and asylum seekers to sending or transit countries, and the exportation of migration control instruments such as border controls and capacity-building initiatives to countries of origin or transit. The year 1999 witnessed a key step forward in the field of migration and asylum as, following a Dutch proposal, the High-Level Group on Asylum and Migration (HLWG) was founded to prepare cross-pillar action plans in co-operation with selected sending or transit countries “to address root causes of migration and flight as well as consequences”

Hybrid Threats and Justice and Home Affairs

39

(High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration 1999, 6). Composed of officials from member states and the European Commission, the HLWG’s work laid the foundations of the comprehensive and cross-policy approach of the EU to prevent migration flows while simultaneously contributing to the further externalisation of the control of migration and asylum. Following this lead, a key text that specifically focused on the external dimension of JHA and the need for an EU-level migration and asylum policy was adopted in the Presidency Conclusions of the 1999 Tampere Summit. Calling for the development of a common policy for migration and asylum, the comprehensive Tampere Programme highlighted the need to produce a comprehensive approach that required greater coherence between internal and external policies of the EU in the field of migration and asylum to manage migration flows at all stages, in co-operation with sending and transit countries. The five-year programme reiterated the previous themes of controlling and preventing migration flows in co-operation with third countries, and noted that [t]he European Union has already put in place for its citizens the major ingredients of a shared area of prosperity and peace: a single market, economic and monetary union, and the capacity to take on global political and economic challenges. The challenge of the Amsterdam Treaty is now to ensure that freedom, which includes the right to move freely throughout the Union, can be enjoyed in conditions of security and justice accessible to all […] This freedom should not, however, be regarded as the exclusive preserve of the Union’s own citizens […] It would be in contradiction with Europe’s traditions to deny such freedom to those whose circumstances lead them justifiably to seek access to our territory. This in turn requires the Union to develop common policies on asylum and immigration, while taking into account the need for a consistent control of external borders to stop illegal immigration and to combat those who organise it and commit related international crimes. (European Council 1999)

In relation to illegal migration, the EU leaders reiterated their determination to tackle the problem at its source, focusing particularly on those who exploit and traffic migrants. The follow-up to these proposals came in the form of the five-year The Hague Programme of 2004 that aimed to further develop the AFSJ. The Hague Programme, like its predecessor, called for a comprehensive approach to the issue “involving all stages of migration, with respect to the root causes of migration, entry and admission policies and integration and return policies” (European Council 2005, 3). The high point of the programme was its strong emphasis on (the fight against) illegal migration:

40

Chapter III

in a tone that echoed the Seville Presidency Conclusions of 2002 (European Council 2002)6 the programme stressed the importance of the collective and gradual creation of an “integrated management system for external borders and the strengthening of controls at and surveillance of the external borders of the Union” with a view to dealing with “exceptional migratory pressure” (European Council 2005, 6) and the increased threat of illegal migration. Securitised references to illegal migration7 and the need for stronger external borders and surveillance mechanisms were also present in the 2005 Global Approach to Migration: Priority Actions Focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean adopted by the European Council as the overarching framework. The final document, which was based on a communication by the European Commission and various discussions in the Council, affirmed the EU leaders’ commitment “to initiate priority actions with a focus on Africa and the Mediterranean countries” in order “to reduce illegal migration flows and the loss of lives, ensure safe return of illegal migrants, strengthen durable solutions for refugees, and build capacity to better manage migration” (Council of the European Union 2005) in co-operation with third countries. The very broad provisions agreed on in the document paved the way for the much more detailed and comprehensive Communication from the European Commission entitled The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), as the first step towards an even more linked and integrated [approach] with the EU’s external policies. The Global Approach is to be defined in the widest possible context as the overarching framework of EU external migration policy, complementary to other, broader, objectives that are served by EU foreign policy and development cooperation. (European Commission 2011, 4)

To this aim, the GAMM was founded upon a set of priority actions under four pillars. The first pillar was organising and facilitating legal migration and mobility. Acknowledging the vital contribution that migration and mobility of third country nationals could make to the vitality and competitiveness of the Union, particularly in relation to Europe’s ageing 6

In this period, European Council Conclusions reflected a growing interest in measures to combat (the highly securitised) illegal migration and the integrated management of external borders. 7 A reference to illegal migration was also present in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS). The ESS noted that illegal migration in connection to organised crime was one of the internal threats with an external dimension directed against the EU (ESS, 2003).

Hybrid Threats and Justice and Home Affairs

41

population and the effects of the economic crisis, the European Commission stated that the GAMM should be migrant-centred, “designed to respond to the aspirations and the problems of the people concerned,” (European Commission 2011, 6) and protect the human rights of the migrants. The second pillar of the GAMM was preventing and reducing irregular migration (which replaced the term “illegal migration”) and trafficking in human beings. Despite the change in vocabulary, the securitised conception of the referred phenomenon remained unchanged: “A broad understanding of security means that irregular migration also needs to be considered in connection with organised crime and lack of rule of law and justice, feeding on corruption and inadequate regulation” (European Commission 2011, 15). The necessary measures to prevent irregular migration, the European Commission argued, need to be taken at both the intra-EU level and through partnerships with non-EU states. The third pillar of the GAMM was promoting international protection and enhancing the external dimension of asylum policy in co-operation with non-EU countries, to offer higher standards of protection to asylum seekers and displaced people. The fourth and final pillar was maximising the development impact of migration and mobility. The GAMM was endorsed by the Council of the European Union in 2012, which noted that it “should take adequately into account the migrant’s perspective” yet bear “in mind that Member States’ interests are a fundamental element in any EU policy framework vis-à-vis third countries” (Council of the European Union 2012, 4). Various reports on the implementation of the GAMM and the European Council conclusions that followed also highlighted the familiar themes of maximising the opportunities that legal migration provided on the one hand, and preventing and limiting irregular migration in co-operation with sending and transit countries through capacity building efforts on the other. The Stockholm Programme on the development of AFSJ was adopted in 2010 and covered the period between 2010 and 2014. Like its predecessor The Hague Programme, the Stockholm Programme stressed the importance of the integrated management of external borders through various mechanisms of surveillance that would facilitate legal migration while simultaneously preventing illegal migration and cross-border crimes.8 It also called for measures to combat illegal migration and to facilitate return in co-operation with third countries within the framework 8

The issue of strengthening (internal) security through better border management and mechanisms such as EUROSUR and various information systems is often expressed in texts adopted on the EU’s Internal Security Strategy and the European Agenda on Security.

42

Chapter III

of the GAMM. At the same time, the text also reflected the theme of contributing to the vitality and competitiveness of the EU through the opportunities provided by the legal migration and mobility of third country nationals: in the context of the important demographic challenges that will face the Union in the future with an increased demand for labour, flexible migration policies will make an important contribution to the Union’s economic development and performance in the longer term. (European Council 2010, 27)

The 2015 document entitled A European Agenda on Migration (European Commission 2015) was in many ways a response to the human tragedies unfolding in the Mediterranean and called for swift and decisive action to put an end to the ongoing and potential future crises. It explained that the ongoing crisis has simultaneously unearthed the structural limitations of the EU’s migration policy and provided an opportunity for the better and collective management of migration. In addition to offering a number of measures to tackle the current crisis ranging from relocation to resettlement, it offered a new four-pillared structure “to manage migration better” in line with the proposals of the Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker (European Commission 2015, 6; Juncker 2014). These four pillars were: reducing the incentives for irregular migration through addressing the root causes in co-operation with third countries; border management to save lives and secure external borders; a strong common asylum policy; and a new policy on legal migration to make Europe economically more competitive. On the whole, policy proposals put forward in the field of migration point towards a strongly securitised view of migration—particularly the irregular type—in which the phenomenon of migration has been framed as a security question and an “existential threat” that puts at risk not only the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the EU and its member states, but also the very fabric and prosperity of their societies (Cottey 2013). In this respect, the situation in the EU is no exception to the global tendency to treat migration as a potential security threat and to attempt to tackle it through increasingly restrictive measures (Emmers 2010; Bigo 2000). Just like the global discourse, the current European discourse on migration is characterised by “the need for national governments to control influxes, placate media pressures and comfort public opinion against the fear of being “swamped” by foreigners” (Buonfino 2004, 24). In the case of the EU, it is argued that the compound threat of migration directed against the Union’s internal and external security

Hybrid Threats and Justice and Home Affairs

43

necessitates a “comprehensive response” that brings together different policy areas and institutions of the EU as well as a complex network of bodies that deal with migration and asylum issues. In this context, EU-level policies that have been developed to manage migration contain two distinct lines of action: first, by targeting the root causes of migration through a combination of different policy tools and incentives, they intend to prevent migration, and then, through various surveillance mechanisms, tougher border controls and return agreements, to control and ultimately restrict it. This two-fold strategy to regulate migration has led to the development of policy initiatives and frameworks that increasingly go against the self-declared goal of the Union to formulate a migrant-centred policy that is founded upon the very norms and values that are supposed to symbolise the EU. In fact, the repressive elements that are present in the EU’s policy initiatives reflect a tendency to view the migrants as an unwelcome burden on the states and societies of Europe: if migrants are not qualified and thus cannot contribute to the economic competitiveness and vitality of the Union, they should remain on the outside. In this respect, the policy practices of the EU in the field of migration contradict the identity that the EU has assigned to itself which is “founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities” that “are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail” (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 2). This contradiction between the normative dimension of the EU’s identity and its policy practices is most obvious in the case of irregular migrants, who often flee their countries of origin due to the failure of the international community to address ongoing conflicts, violence or human rights violations. The preventative and restrictive policies that the EU employs regarding irregular migrants do not help remedy the deteriorating situation and reverse the underlying causes of their plight. In recent times, the fortification of external borders and, in some cases, the reinstitution of internal border controls have made the situation even worse and exposed to the world once again that the EU has failed to materialise the comprehensive, migrant-based approach that it aimed to develop since the 1990s: “[th]e lack of EU solidarity and absence of a collective response to the humanitarian and political challenges imposed by the influx laid bare the limitations of common border control and migration and refugee burden-sharing systems” (Greenhill 2016, 317). While it is true that human trafficking and the facilitation of irregular migration have developed into a major market in the territories of the EU,

44

Chapter III

this should not lead to a perspective that criminalises all migrants and turns the Union into a “fortress Europe”. In this vein, the challenge remains for the Union to find a balanced response in order not to build “the regulatory equivalent of the Berlin Wall” (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014, 235) in its migration and asylum policy. Embracing the assumption that there is nothing inevitable or necessary about the securitisation of migration, one might ask: why do the concepts of security and migration always seem to go hand in hand, particularly in the case of a hybrid polity like the EU? (Walters 2010). This can best be explained through the meanings attached to the notions of migration and the migrant in the European and global context. Migration is a powerful concept that exemplifies the margins of what it means to belong in a political community. As such, it “has a capacity to call into being or at least to support a struggle about responsibility and the nature of the political community in which this responsibility is institutionalised and enacted” (Huysmans 2000, 149). In this respect, migrants simultaneously represent what it means to belong and not belong in a political community: they flee the communities to which they belong only to arrive at the borders of another in which they are not fully welcomed or accepted. For receiving countries, the notion of the migrant serves as a challenge to the preservation of the society as “anchoring points for political (self-) identification” (Huysmans 2000, 150)—the “self” that is defined on the basis of its differences from the “other”. This situation is even more difficult in a polity such as the EU in which the ideational as well as material borders that separate the inside from the outside are not as clear as in the case of a more historic and sedimented nation state. This partly explains the rationale behind policy proposals put forward in this highly securitised field, particularly regarding the externalised solutions to the problems associated with migrants. These solutions that seek to stop or limit the phenomena of migratory flows outside the borders of the EU—what Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux referred to as “remote-control” policies—aim “to prevent migrants reaching the EU in the first place” (2014, 234) by transferring the mechanisms of control to third countries, before the migrants get the chance to test the limits of Europe’s political community and self-identification.

Conclusion Migration has become one of the main security concerns of the 21st century. Within the EU context, migration and asylum issues are dealt with under the framework of an increasingly securitised and communitarised

Hybrid Threats and Justice and Home Affairs

45

JHA. Traditionally categorised as one of the domestic policies of the EU, JHA has come to take on an external dimension as a response to the changing way in which the security of the Union and the threats to its domestic and international environments are conceptualised. In the framework of JHA, the current discourse on hybrid threats inextricably ties the maintenance of the domestic order of the Union to its security, and compels the EU to develop an external aspect to its policy initiatives. As part of this, the EU’s migration policy has come to acquire a strong external dimension, as it is mainly through the reliance of the Union on co-operation with third countries that it seeks to “remedy” the manifold problems associated with different forms of migration. In this respect, as Jan Joel Andersson and Thierry Tardy (2015, 2) claim, the concept of “hybrid threats” is neither new, nor original in terms of their substance or reliance on compound and multifaceted solutions involving conventional and unconventional methods. Yet, they argue, “what is certain is that the European Union now considers itself a potential target of such threats and feels ill-prepared to respond” (Andersson and Tardy 2015, 2). The response that the EU sought to develop as a reaction to the compound threat of migration was based on a comprehensive approach developed by the European Commission and the High Representative, and relied mainly on solutions that intend to prevent migration by targeting its root causes through a combination of policy tools and incentives, and to control and ultimately restrict migration through various surveillance mechanisms, stricter border controls and return agreements. Yet, as the Union’s record in the ongoing crisis demonstrates—particularly in relation to the experiences of mass detentions, deportations and reinstituted internal borders—the comprehensive framework developed and initiatives put into action at the EU level failed to achieve the intended outcome of effectively managing the flow of migrants in a humane and migrant-centred manner. At the same time, these instances showed once again “the potential power of unregulated migration to make people and governments feel insecure and under threat” (Greenhill 2016, 318) as can be clearly seen in the exclusionary discourses that emerged in relation to the ongoing crisis. The EU failed to calibrate the necessary and satisfactory European response to the human tragedies that have been unfolding on its borders and through its securitised, restrictive and repressive policies, failed to fulfil the role that was expected of it. Consequently, by contradicting the very norms and values that symbolise the European order and the identity of the EU, including respect for human rights and democracy, the EU has risked its credibility as a global actor in its migration policy.

46

Chapter III

Bibliography 2003. “A Secure Europe in a Better World––European Security Strategy.” Brussels, 12 December 2003. Andersson, Jan Joel, and Thierry Tardy. 2015. “Hybrid: What’s in a Name?” Brief Issue 32. Paris: EUISS. Bache, Ian, Stephen George and Simon Bulmer. 2015. Politics in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Balzacq, Thierry. 2009. “The Frontiers of Governance: Understanding the External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs.” In The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs, edited by Thierry Balzacq, 1-32. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Biersteker, Thomas J. 2002. “State, Sovereignty and Territory.” In SAGE Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, 157-176. London: SAGE. Bigo, Didier. 2000. “When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitisations in Europe.” In International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration, edited by Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams, 171-204. London: Routledge. Boswell, Christina. 2003. “The ‘External Dimension’ of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy,” International Affairs Vol. 79, No. 3: 619-638. Buonanno, Laurie, and Neil Nugent. 2013. Policies and Policy Processes of the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Buonfino, Alessandra. 2004. “Between Unity and Plurality: The Politicization and Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe,” New Political Science Vol. 26, No. 1 March: 23-49. Cottey, Andrew. 2013. Security in 21st Century Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Council of the European Union. 2005. “Global Approach to Migration: Priority Actions Focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean.” 15744/05. Brussels, 13 December 2005. —. 2012. “Council Conclusions on the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility.” 9417/12. Brussels, 3 May 2012. —. 2015. “Council Conclusions on CSDP.” 8971/15. Brussels, 18 May 2015. Emmers, Ralf. 2010. “Securitisation.” In Contemporary Security Studies, edited by Alan Collins, 131-144. Oxford: Oxford University Press. European Commission. 2011. “The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility.” COM (2011) 743 Final. Brussels, 18 December 2011. —. 2015. “A European Agenda on Migration.” COM (2015) 240 final. Brussels, 13 May 2015.

Hybrid Threats and Justice and Home Affairs

47

—. 2016. “Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats: a European Union Response.” JOIN (2016) 18 final. Brussels, 6 April 2016. —. 1992. “Declaration on Principles Governing External Aspects of Migration Policy.” Conclusions of the Presidency, SN 456/92, 45-49. Edinburgh, 11-12 December 1992. —. 1999. “Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions, 15-16 October 1999.” Accessed October 14, 2016. http://aei.pitt.edu/43337/1/Tempere_1999.pdf. —. 2002. “Seville European Council Presidency Conclusions, 21-22 June 2002.” PE 320.285, Bulletin 24 June 2002. —. 2005. “The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union,” Official Journal of the European Union C53 (3 March 2005): 1-14. —. 2010. “The Stockholm Programme––An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens,” Official Journal of the European Union C115 (5 May 2010): 1-38. Greenhill, Kelly M. 2016. “Open Arms Behind Barred Doors? Fear, Hypocrisy and Policy Schizophrenia in the European Migration Crisis,” European Law Journal Vol. 22, No. 3 (May 2016): 317-332. High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration. 1999. “Final Report of the High-level Group on Asylum and Migration.” 11281/99 (Presse 288-G). 4 October 1999. Huysmans, Jef. 2000. “Contested Community: Migration and the Question of the Political in the EU.” In International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration, edited by Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams, 149-170. London: Routledge. International Organization for Migration. “Key Migration Terms.” Accessed October 10, 2016. http://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms. Juncker, Jean-Claude. 2014. “A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change, Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission.” Strasbourg, 15 July 2014. Keukeleire, Stephan, and Tom Delreux. 2014. The Foreign Policy of the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Lavenex, Sandra. 2010. “Justice and Home Affairs: Communitarization with Hesitation.” In Policy-making in the European Union, edited by Helen Wallace, Mark A. Pollack and Alasdair R. Young, 457-477. Oxford: Oxford University Press. —. 2015. “Justice and Home Affairs: Institutional Change and Policy Continuity.” In Policy-making in the European Union, edited by Helen Wallace, Mark A. Pollack and Alasdair R. Young, 367-387. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

48

Chapter III

Lavenex, Sandra, and Nicole Wichmann. 2009. “The External Governance of EU Internal Security,” Journal of European Integration Vol. 31, No. 1 (January 2009): 83-102. Mogherini, Federica. 2015. “The EU Internal-external Security Nexus: Terrorism as an Example of the Necessary Link between Different Dimensions of Action.” Speech made at the EU Global Strategy Conference organised by EUISS and Real Institute Elcano. Barcelona, 26 November 2015. Accessed October 11, 2016. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5535/spee ch-of-the-hrvp-federica-mogherini--the-eu-internal-external-security-n exus-terrorism-as-an-example-of-the-necessary-link-between-differentdimensions-of-action_fr. Monar, Jörg. 2001. “The Dynamics of Justice and Home Affairs: Laboratories, Driving Factors and Costs,” Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 39, No. 4: 747-764. —. 2010. “The EU’s Externalisation of Internal Security Objectives: Perspectives after Lisbon and Stockholm,” The International Spectator Vol. 45, No. 2 (June 2010): 23-39. —. 2012. “Justice and Home Affairs.” In The Oxford Handbook of the European Union, edited by Erik Jones, Anand Menon and Stephen Weatherill, 613-626. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rees, Wyn. 2008. “Inside Out: The External Face of EU Internal Security Policy,” Journal of European Integration Vol. 30, No. 1 (March 2008): 97-111. Trauner, Florian. 2011. “The Internal-external Security Nexus: More Coherence under Lisbon?” Occasional Paper 89, EUISS, Paris, March 2011. Uçarer, Emek M. 2002. “Guarding the Borders of the European Union: Paths, Portals, and Prerogatives.” In Migration and the Externalities of European Integration, edited by Sandra Lavenex and Emek M. Uçarer, 15-32. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. van Selm, Joanne. 2002. “Immigration and Asylum or Foreign Policy: The EU’s Approach to Migrants and their Countries of Origin.” In Migration and the Externalities of European Integration, edited by Sandra Lavenex and Emek M. Uçarer, 143-160. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Walker, Neil, and Karl Newman. 1998. “Justice and Home Affairs,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 47, No. 1 (January 1998): 231-238.

Hybrid Threats and Justice and Home Affairs

49

Walters, William. 2010. “Migration and Security.” In The Routledge Handbook of New Security Studies, edited by J. Peter Burgess, 217-228. Abingdon: Routledge.

CHAPTER IV THE VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE STORY OF THE EUROPEAN MIGRANT CRISIS HELENE CRISTINI AND CLAUDIO LANZA

Introduction As highlighted by the Clingendael Report released in July 2015 (Drent, Hendriks and Zandee 2015),1 mass migration represents one of the main hybrid threats from the EU’s southern periphery (Libya, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan). Indeed, since the onset of the upheaval (December 2010) that became known as the Arab Spring, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has been in a state of flux, characterised by mounting crises, war and oppression, demographic pressures and dismal economic prospects. As a result, and especially since the second half of 2014, an unprecedented influx of migrants has created significant demographic pressures at EU borders. The associated and ongoing political instability indicates that the EU will continue to function as a magnet for potential waves of migrants in the short and medium term; in the words of the First Vice-President (2014-2019) Frans Timmermans: As long as there are wars and hardships in our neighbourhood, people will continue to risk their lives in search of European shores. There is no simple

1

The Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael” is the leading Dutch think tank and diplomatic academy on international affairs. The Institute provides public and private sector organisations with in-depth analyses of global developments in the fields of economic diplomacy, international security and conflict management. Clingendael specifically focuses on security and Europe, and the position and role of the Netherlands. Through these Reports, Clingendael aims to reflect its objectives as a think tank, academy and platform for debate. For more information see Clingendael’s website: https://www.clingendael.nl/.

52

Chapter IV solution to this complex problem, but it is clear that there is no national solution. There is only a European solution.2

Overall, European countries have found themselves strategically, politically and economically unprepared to handle the hybrid threat posed by this massive influx of migrants. While migration is a natural phenomenon, it can become a hybrid threat––that is, “an adverse circumstance” that may be used “singularly or in combination [with others] by adversaries in pursuit of long-term political objectives” (Bachmann and Gunneriusson 2015). Examining the reactions of European states from 2014 to the first half of 2016, it will be argued that their actions to date have been ineffective. In place of the security-driven approaches commonly deployed to deal with hybrid threats, this chapter analyses causes and consequences for the EU as a global power through a theoretical lens inspired by René Girard’s philosophical anthropology. This alternative analysis reveals that EU institutions and Member States have adopted two distinct approaches when dealing with incoming migrants, driven respectively by economic and security arguments. In practice, both approaches are identical in their treatment of migrants as scapegoats, so hampering integration policies and exacerbating the social discord between native and minority communities. While implementation of the securitization agenda treats migrants as potential infiltrators, economic-driven policies dehumanise and objectify them, undermining effective integration. It will be argued that these approaches are counterproductive as divisive tools that are likely to engender both social discord within European national communities and inter-state disputes at the regional level. Notable instances include the tensions between France and the United Kingdom (UK) over the Calais refugee camp (Glenday 2016; Samuel 2016); between Rome and Paris over the management of migrants at Ventimiglia’s border (BBC 2015b); and between Austria and Italy over the Brennero route (Mesco and Pop 2016). Ineffective approaches of this kind can also have unintended consequences; in particular, by fostering political divisions between its Member States, mass migration could facilitate the emergence of hybrid warfare tactics against the EU as a global actor. In this regard, a number of authors have warned how the refugee crisis might be exploited as a weapon of hybrid warfare by both state (e.g. Russia) and non-state actors (e.g. ISIS), both by fostering political divisions and by sending terrorists to Europe in the guise of refugees (Roell 2016). 2

“European Commission Stands by Italy on Coping with Migratory Pressures on Lampedusa,” Press release, European Commission, February 19. 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4453_en-htm.

The Visible and Invisible Story of the European Migrant Crisis

53

To assess what kinds of power the EU needs in order to be effective against the ongoing transnational challenge represented by mass migration, this chapter assesses the effectiveness of existing theories in understanding the migration policies of EU Member States as compared with an alternative based on Girard’s Mimetic Theory, 3 using an interpretivist approach based on both qualitative and quantitative data (such as statistics from relevant NGOs). The qualitative data are drawn from sources that include documentary research, media reports and institutional and historical documents, informed by a multidisciplinary approach encompassing the insights of Girard and other authors from sociological, philosophical and religious backgrounds. In arguing that policies driven by security and economic gain fail to promote effective integration and create harsh conditions for migrants in host countries, the alternative proposed here is unconventional. Focusing on state-level policies, the aim here is to investigate why migrants are perceived as a threat and, ultimately, why their presence is rejected, even when they are not objectified but are instead treated as useful capital resources serving national interests (for instance, sustaining Western societies’ expensive welfare systems). It is our contention that aside from the massive scale of this new wave of immigration (mostly Muslims, principally from Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria), most migrants—whether seeking refuge, employment or family reunification—are victims of a much deeper, unresolved conflict that impedes their integration and so fosters political instability across Europe. In particular, we contend that the EU migrant crisis reflects an unresolved conflict at a cultural level between two mimetic extremisms: modernity (perceived by some as secular fundamentalism) and Islamic fundamentalism, epitomising both nihilism 3

A member of the prestigious Académie Française, René Girard is a French-born philosopher who has written from the perspective of a wide variety of disciplines: Literary Criticism, Psychology, Anthropology, Sociology, History, Biblical Hermeneutics and Theology, though his work is above all concerned with Philosophical Anthropology (that is, “What is it to be human?”). Over the years, he has developed a mimetic theory where, among other concepts, he analysed the causes of conflict and violence and the role of imitation in human behavior. Even though his theory will be explained later on in the chapter, it is useful to highlight here some pillar points. According to Girard, human desires are not original, but reciprocal, that is a social product. As a result, when individuals desire, they imitate other people’s desires, and these duplicated desires lead to a creative process of learning or to rivalry and violence. When mimetic violence occurs, it rapidly infects the whole community. As a result, as a counter-measure to chaos and violence, individuals and societies blame and project culpability onto an outsider, a scapegoat, whose elimination reconciles antagonists and restores unity.

54

Chapter IV

and endogamy. Ultimately, this chapter discusses the possibility of a new path towards breaking the mimetic chain that, driven by resentment, has entrapped the conflict in the dialectic of a fake clash of civilizations.

The Visible: Causes and Consequences of the European Migrant Crisis Manner and Timing of Responses by EU Institutions and Member States With more than a million migrants and asylum seekers reaching the EU via the Mediterranean in 2015, and almost 300,000 crossing since the beginning of 2016 (UNHCR),4 the scale of movement towards the global North, particularly Europe, is historic and unprecedented. According to the same UNHCR data, from the beginning of the crisis in 2010 to early 2016, most of these new migrants were Syrians (30%), followed by Afghans (16%) and Iraqis (10%). As well as asylum seekers fleeing countries plagued by war and everyday violence, some left their country of origin in search of a better life, or to join relatives who had already found a home in Europe. Still dealing with the consequences of the worst economic crisis in decades, EU institutions found themselves unprepared for this unprecedented influx of immigrants. Indeed, a comprehensive policy framework for dealing with newcomers was agreed only in March 2016 (almost two years on from the crisis in 2014), when EU states finalised a deal with Turkey to curtail the arrival of migrants and so ease intra-European tensions. The European border management agency Frontex now also oversees border control at sea; their Operation Triton replaces the more expensive search-and-rescue (SAR) programme implemented by Italy (Mare Nostrum). Crucially, however, Frontex cannot proactively search and rescue but responds to boats already in distress in the Mediterranean. This is not a long-term solution, offering only contingent humanitarian relief and containment measures that are bound to fail, as migration, by its nature, cannot be strictly contained. Federica Mogherini, EUHR, did underline, when announcing the EUNAVGOR Med operation (which aims to push back traffickers and to disrupt their “business of models”), that it was part of a broader strategy, since a “true comprehensive approach” is needed to 4

United States High Commission for Refugees “Migrants Emergency Response–– Mediterranean” http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php. (Accessed September 15, 2016).

The Visible and Invisible Story of the European Migrant Crisis

55

tackle the root causes of the mass migration influx (Drent, Hendriks and Zandee 2015). For those migrants who successfully reach European shores, the available assistance from EU institutions remains indeterminate. Despite the marginal budgetary flexibility granted to Member States that are immigrant hotspots (i.e. Italy, Greece and Spain), 5 the issue of refugee relocation provides clear evidence that little has so far been achieved in terms of sharing their economic burden with the rest of Europe. In September 2015, the European Commission unveiled a “decisive” EU plan to redistribute 160,000 Syrian, Iraqi and Eritrean asylum seekers from the frontline countries of Italy and Greece within two years (Spiegel 2015). However, one year on, Member States’ support for this Emergency Relocation Mechanism was negligible; with only a dozen spaces made available, the EU Department of Home Affairs reported that the number of refugees actually relocated remained in single digits.6 In practice, Member States are free to act as they choose on this issue, and the response has varied significantly, opening major fault lines across the EU from east to west and north to south (Palmeri 2015). Eastern European members have closed their borders to migrants—Bulgaria in 2014, Hungary in 2015 and Macedonia in 2016—and Austria followed suit in 2015, showing no interest in contributing to search-and-rescue operations or relocation (The Economist 2016a). While northern EU states contributed more to humanitarian efforts, the Emergency Relocation Mechanism remained unable to function at full capacity, and there were demands for greater compliance with the EU’s Dublin Regulation, which provides for asylum claims to be processed in the country where migrants first arrive. Germany remains the single exception to this restrictive turn, welcoming more than 1.1 million in 2015, according to the German Federal Statistics Office. 7 However, given the several violent events in Germany during 2016, political pressure could force Chancellor Merkel to alter her pro-refugee stance in the medium term. 5

EU Commission decision COM (2016) 603 final. The Department for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME). “Emergency Relocation Mechanism––State of Play”. Press release. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migrati on/press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_relocation_en.pdf. (Accessed August 30, 2016.) 7 The Federal Statistics Office “Nettozuwanderung von Ausländerinnen und Ausländern im Jahr 2015 bei 1,1 Millionen” https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2016/03/PD1 6_105_12421.html (accessed September 16, 2016). 6

56

Chapter IV

This situation has three consequences. First, EU measures and the individual policies of Member States may have effectively closed the Western Balkan route for immigrants who entered the EU in Greece and then tried to make their way towards Western Europe through Macedonia and Serbia into Hungary and Croatia. Despite these changes, the underlying factors fuelling this massive flux of migration—poverty and wars—remain unresolved. To relaunch cooperation with African partner countries, the EU presented a new aid plan in June 2016 to curb the influx of African migrants through Libya, building on the deal reached with Turkey in March 2016 (BBC 2016b). This attempt to strengthen the EU’s partnership with the nine MENA countries, including Jordan, Libya, Ethiopia, Nigeria and, more controversially, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan, represents a potential advance. This follows the Valletta summit (in November 2015), involving more than 60 European and African leaders (Traynor 2015), where the European Commission agreed to allocate just €1.8bn to an Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (BBC 2016d). Meanwhile, the expected continued growth in migration from the MENA region will increase the pressure on EU borders in the short term. A second consequence is that conditions remain difficult for those migrants who have already reached Europe, although this varies considerably from country to country. Some migrants have been stuck for years in “legal limbo” in temporary identification centres (Moss 2015), raising concerns about their harsh detention conditions among NGOs such as Amnesty International and UN agencies like UNHCR. The worst of these scenarios are in the illegal hub areas emerging spontaneously across Europe, such as the border towns of Idomeni in Greece and Calais in France, in contrast to the very few lucky enough to receive state assistance. Finally, the migrant crisis has called into question the EU’s position as a global actor. In recent years, Europe has prided itself on the perceived success of its so-called “soft power”—that is, the smooth spread of EU influence from Estonia to Bulgaria, along with the magnetism of its model. However, the inability to accommodate the different national interests of its Member States in welcoming incoming refugees has fostered political divisions (BBC 2016a), undermining solidarity and the appeal of the EU model. Its role as a humanitarian superpower has also been called into question by NGOs and UN agencies, who have accused EU Member States of not doing enough to save the millions of refugees crossing the Mediterranean. In summary, the disparate approaches to the migrant crisis across the EU show a lack of unity and solidarity, and the EU as a whole has yet to implement truly effective policies for responding at regional level to the

The Visible and Invisible Story of the European Migrant Crisis

57

humanitarian crisis of the last six years. The question, then, is why EU countries have been unable to develop such solutions.

Explaining the Responses of EU Member States Beyond the reactions of EU Member States described above, statements like that of Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, urging economic migrants to not come to Europe (BBC 2016c), reinforced the impression of Europe as a “fortress” (Massey 1999; Geddes 2003)—in other words, unwilling to share what is perceived as the burden from the Global South. However, despite public pressure for restriction, it has been observed that the migration policies of liberal democracies over time have been essentially expansive (Freeman 1995), informed by international and national human rights law and the courts (Guiraundon and Lahav 2000; Bonjour 2011). For instance, family reunification in Europe is a symbol of the EU’s openness to new citizens; historically, this was facilitated by the role of domestic courts in protecting the rights of (colonial) immigrants against governments, enabling entry (from the mid-1940s to the early 1970s) and making it easier to gain citizenship (Joppke 2008). Indeed, divergent views on the state’s role and on migration policies appear to have polarised the debate. For instance, scholars like Hansen (2004) have argued that the state’s overall handling of the latest migrant influxes has been consistent with their historical approach: “the history of migration to Europe is one of unforeseen developments and unintended consequences. This was true of labour migration, of colonial migration and, most recently, of asylum-related migration” (Hansen 2004, 1). According to Hansen, since 1980, European states have constructed barriers to asylum as required by international law, welcoming asylum seekers but rejecting economic migrants, although distinguishing clearly between them seems impossible. Against this, de Haas, Natter and Vezzali (2016) argued that migration policies had become less restrictive overall between 1945 and 2014, with liberal policies outnumbering restrictive policy changes. For them, “the essence of modern migration policies is thus not their growing restriction, but their focus on migrant selection” (De Haas, Natter and Vezzali, 1). However, they also noted the difference of approach by Western states with regard to “non-desired” categories, characterised by more border and internal surveillance to limit entry and/or social and economic rights (De Haas, Natter and Vezzali, 21). In the last two years (2015/16), the number of policies restricting economic migrants and asylum seekers has increased sharply across Europe. Consequently, even when migrants are not rejected physically (as

58

Chapter IV

in the case of those held up at Macedonia’s borders) or legally (as in Austria, where thresholds have been established), they may spend months or even years in detention centres. There, they may find themselves forced into unemployment or exploited in illegal jobs, as in Italy in the Agricultural Sector (Amnesty International 2012). Interestingly, such stringent policies have affected only poorer migrants while the “migration of wealthy and skilled Africans to Europe … may actually have become easier” (De Haas, Natter and Vezzali, 29). According to the conventional wisdom (The Economist 2016c), one key justification for a highly restrictive approach to the new wave of immigration is its historic scale. Overall, integration would be too expensive, both for those states with successful previous experience of integration, like Sweden and Norway, and for states with no such policies, like Italy. However, even with the currently fragile budgetary outlook, increasing economic pressure in itself seems insufficient to explain negative perceptions of migrants. On the contrary, given the continent’s troubling demographics and the potential economic gains from migration, EU states seem in desperate need of the young labour force and higher birth rates that these migrants promise (Lutz and Scherbov 2007). Despite the potency of the “migrants pose an economic threat” narrative, it does not account for the restrictive turn that began in 2015. The second main reason for the rejection of migrants is that potential economic gains are overshadowed by security concerns about Islamic terrorism, which is “looming large across the continent” (Park 2015, 1). The so-called war on terror that began after 9/11 triggered lasting destabilization across the Middle East, in which the latest Western military interventions in Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), Libya (2011) and Syria (2014) have played a part. Instead of economic and political stability, war wounds have fostered the emergence of violent extremist groups, some with anti-Western goals, whose strength and legitimacy have increased over time. Among these, Daesh or the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has successfully conducted terrorist attacks across Europe (e.g. Paris). Immigrants from Syria, Iraq and Libya, where ISIS is active, are viewed with suspicion. A 2016 report from the Pew Research Centre, the leading non-partisan US social attitudes survey company, showed that Europe is rejecting the idea that multiculturalism is beneficial to society (R. Wike, B. Stokes and K. Simmons 2016). 8 After a year in which ISIS-backed 8

When asked if diversity had made their country “a better place to live”, only 33 per cent of Britons agreed, mirroring sentiment across the EU, where more than 70 per cent of people in 10 EU countries said that multi-culturalism made their country either a “worse” place to live or made “no difference”. See:

The Visible and Invisible Story of the European Migrant Crisis

59

terrorists attacked Paris and Brussels, more than 50 per cent of people in eight of the ten European nations surveyed said they felt that incoming refugees increased the likelihood of terrorism in their country, as non-Muslim Europeans are suspicious that the Muslim population harbours sympathies for ISIS. Although Muslims constituted just 5.2% of Europe’s total population (38 million) in 2009 and the overwhelming majority of Muslims does not share any violent intent, Islam has been characterised as an inherently violent religion (Fekete 2004), and populist, anti-immigration parties with overtly anti-Muslim slogans are on the rise across Europe (The Economist 2016b). In Germany, the far-right party Alternative Fur Deutschland declared in its anti-Islam Manifesto that “Islam is a political ideology incompatible with German democracy” (Euractiv 2016). At a rally against Islam and the EU in Vienna in June 2016 organised by Europe’s far right, Heinz-Christian Strache, leader of Austria's Freedom Party (AFP), warned refugees: “We will save you on the high seas […] But we will send you back to the harbor where you started out” (Al Jazeera 2016). Regardless of their nationality, Muslims are stigmatised because of their culture, which is perceived as a bundle of backward beliefs and illiberal values that bring social discord to Western societies. In fact, Muslims (whether migrants or European citizens) have become scapegoats— arbitrary innocent victims of closed Western societies, where cynicism, bigotry and xenophobia have fuelled the narrative that refugees are an economic burden, and Muslim refugees are a security threat (if not perceived as a more abstract but equally dangerous identity threat) (Mammone 2015). However, these extreme right-wing parties, which have influenced mainstream immigration policies and discussions of citizenship and belonging (Innes 2010), are not the only ones to blame, given the general disenchantment with traditional political parties following the dramatic social consequences of the 2008 financial crisis and the ensuing austerity policies. It is also noteworthy that extremely conservative forms of Islam such as Salafism and Wahhabism, which represent a real danger to liberal democratic societies, are also gaining legitimacy, pushing Muslim communities in Europe towards a permanent and dangerous state of victimhood, fuelling the growth of an “us versus them” mentality. The two extreme approaches to immigration policy seem to mirror each other. Those who, like Doug Sanders (2011, 2), walked “into the hidden interstices and inaccessible corners of the urban core” found an increasingly

http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/07/Pew-Research-C enter-EU-Refugees-and-National-Identity-Report-FINAL-July-11-2016.pdf.

60

Chapter IV

pervasive securitization agenda, under which Muslims have been “trapped, excluded, resentful”, especially since 9/11. Indeed, Europe’s security approach means that migrants and their descendants have been marginalised in closed communities; with little or no contact with the native community, younger generations in particular have been increasingly alienated. However, this attitude cuts both ways, as some Muslim migrants display a certain bitterness on reaching Europe, fostered by what Olivier Roy (2004) has called a “globalised Islam”, characterised by militant Islamic resentment of Western dominance and an anti-imperialism exalted by revivalism (Leiken 2005). As a result, both resentful discriminators and their resentful victims sow the seeds of conflict and violence; these mimetic habits typify the attitudes of both Westerners and Muslims. Forced to flee as innocent casualties of the war on terror, asylum seekers and economic migrants are perceived, and therefore treated, as a hybrid threat to the economy or to security. This seems to be the visible consequence of a much deeper concern, as the migrant crisis opens a Pandora’s box of resentment and xenophobic fears, fuelled by the imagery of a Christian and secular West under threat from Islam’s desire for conquest. While the Western European states have exclusively blamed (political) Islam for this violent escalation (see next paragraph), Salafism and Wahhabism represent a real ideological threat to every state pursuing a democratic path, because they are perceived as backward ideologies informed by illiberal values. So, has the migration crisis helped to fuel a clash of civilizations? In reality, the conflict between political Islam and the West is only the visible tip of a deeper iceberg, characterised by a mimetic rivalry between their extreme fringes: secular fundamentalism and Muslim fundamentalism.

The Invisible: Another View of the Migrant Crisis As the European Union is confronted by hybrid threats from ethnic tensions, terrorism and migration (to name just a few), it becomes ever more urgent to understand people’s interconnected interiority of intangible stories, of politics, culture and personal history. As mentioned in the Introduction, the alternative lens used here to analyse the migrant condition is inspired by René Girard’s (1977) Mimetic Theory (MT), which we believe can help to deliver the resilience required by the EU if it is to overcome these hybrid challenges. MT proposes that human society began as an act of violence, establishing itself as a religious community that controlled violence by means of violence and persists today. Mimetic desire entails a particular view of human learning, in which imitation is

The Visible and Invisible Story of the European Migrant Crisis

61

not merely a replication of external action but is fundamentally an imitation of another’s desire. Although it is one the most powerful human learning tools, mimesis if not restrained can turn to violence through wanting what the other wants. The triangular relationship of mimetic desire between imitator, imitated and object of imitation can escalate into rivalry to the point of contagious endangerment of society as a whole. We argue here that the EU’s incapacity to handle newcomers has been rendered more difficult by the “war on terror” following 9/11, which hardened Western communities against one group in particular: Muslims. We further argue that it becomes necessary to look into the invisible realm (one consequence of which is the migrant crisis) to make sense of the hybrid challenges engendered by its deceptive and intangible components. What makes this especially difficult is that “we know nothing or almost nothing of the subject and interiority of victims” (Wydra 2015)—in this case, Europeans and migrants—and no science properly questions the political and religious motivations of culture. It is therefore incumbent on us to discern how the migrant crisis is representative of the “liminal” (Wydra 2015)—that is, the migrant crisis falls within a certain sacred, unconscious or invisible reality that can usefully be formulated as “the migrant crisis is a result of an invisible ‘Liminality’”. The latter falls within a sacred, unconscious or invisible reality that can be further divided into two “sacred” (Girard 1977) canopies: one created by modernity and the other by its puritan religious response. In other words, the migrant crisis may be culturally enmeshed in the dogmatic confrontation between two cultures. We can recognise the same essentially “sacred” universal character in both camps, as Islamism’s universalism in the law and the dream of a Caliphate that responds to and entails the alternate perspective of the market and individual rights (Thibaut 2015). The EU’s incapacity to resolve the migrant crisis is testament to a larger conflict, in which refugees’ destiny seems trapped between two “isms”, respectively informed by reason and religion—or better, between the respective “pathologies” of Western nihilism and puritanical Muslim mores, which have begotten secular and Muslim fundamentalism. The real problem is not a clash between reason and religion but between people’s attitudes and the principles forged in them. As Hannah Arendt (1958) observed, the greatest danger in a time of crisis is reliance on pre-established judgements. The question, then, is how we got here.

62

Chapter IV

Secular Fundamentalism? As described by both Asian (Jahanbegloo 2004; Seyyed 2004) and Western scholars (Armstrong 2004), secular fundamentalism opposes all forms of faith in the same categorical way as religious fundamentalists oppose any form of secularisation. Unlike religious fundamentalism, however, secular fundamentalism wears a mask. As Smith (2016) argues, although we are unaware of how culture shapes us, the excessive materialism and nihilism of Western culture moulds who we are and what we love. Berger (1999) contended that this culture came upon us through different modalities: constitutional issues, the Enlightenment, certain systems of law, education or welfare and globalisation. Fears about religious identity have increasingly become questions of ideology, and it is through this ideology that any type of religious sensibility is excluded from the cultural and educational realm. This condition became more acute with the increasing visibility of the Muslim identity in secular Europe, the last bastion of secularism (Berger 1999). For instance, the more or less violent reactions in recent years to blasphemous satirical cartoons came as a surprise to secular Europeans, who were used to seeing the Christian Church (as well as Christians) derided or worse. Over the last 20 years, these societal changes in Europe have polarised the two cultures, setting them up for a more aggressive confrontation. Yet, as discussed by Olivier Roy (2005, 56), demonization of the other is only a different (if more sinister) version of being religious. This ideological model is the outcome of a combination of scientism, utilitarianism and nihilism (Cristini 2015). Modern Western and European culture has witnessed some degradation of its ideals by the ideological conception of science as superior to all other forms of knowledge—an extreme utilitarianism in a neoliberal world free of any moral limitation. Through the merchandisation of people’s consciousness, utilitarianism has fashioned a merchant society with little or no concern for the common good. Hand in hand with this latest version of utilitarianism, nihilism has insulated us against any truth or wisdom prior to the Enlightenment, uncompromising in the face of any hierarchical reference or any sense of an absolute. As a secular mode of thinking, the Western paradigm has inherited the positivist logic of modernisation from the Enlightenment model as hegemonic discourse. As Farneti (2015) argues, Enlightenment values prevail in western democracies and continue to dictate the actions of these governments. This sectarian spirit has been facilitated by the weakening of reason (Cristini 2015). Inherited from ancient Greece, this reason was what

The Visible and Invisible Story of the European Migrant Crisis

63

Girard (2009) called widened reason, not one overwhelmed by a logos at low cost. For instance, the Enlightenment narrowed the definition of reason by reducing it to the practical realm, in which the empirical-mathematical conception of science came to resemble a religion (Girard 2009). In short, the Western understanding of reason has mutated over time, shifting finally to “instrumental reason”, reducing all to the state of things (Rabinovitch 2015). As Brague (2014) has argued, we are now overwhelmed by a logos at low cost, in which democracy, secularization, and modernisation manifest the undisputable triumph of autonomy (the “reasonable self”) over heteronomy (the “religious”). The problem of such a culture is that it has become trapped in a rigid ideological nihilist logic that bears witness to a “présentisme absolu” (Brague 2014), the proof of which is in its uncompromising stand; while Muslim fundamentalism is stuck “in an absolute closed past”, our two “isms” foreshadow the destruction of the future as well as that of a certain past.

Two Rival Cultural Mindsets If, as is argued here, there is an invisible conflict between two ideologically charged blocs, any compromise is unthinkable, as is any solution to the visible problems so caused. As Cowdell (2013, 25) explained, as well as being uncompromising, modernity heightens the mimetic dynamics. The infamous bikini-burkini stalemate (Rubin 2017) is one example of these exacerbated mimetic dynamics at work, epitomising the intensification of the growing deadlock between two uncompromising cultural mindsets and demonstrating how the religious renders public politics “hysterical”. The global emergence of these two ideological blocs has two consequences that are significant in the present context. While Western rationalism seems incapable of seeing the facts driving history (according to Girard, who also pointed out, in Shakespearian terms, a tide in the affairs of men), Muslim puritanism mimetically follows the same path as a louder and more violent fundamentalist minority. Fostering blindness among Muslims, both individually and collectively, this narrows the gap between moderates and radicals. To avoid an escalation to extremes, we must answer the most relevant question: how did we get here? To this end, we must investigate the mechanism that has driven each side into this confrontation—that is, this mimetic rivalry—as migrants increase the visibility of religion in the public sphere, reinstalling religion in public debate, which was taboo in the old Europe from the 1970s onward.

64

Chapter IV

Girard’s lens reveals that the renouncing of a divine mediator only to fall back on human mediation, modernity and modern consciousness has augmented the violence of our times by turning people to “metaphysical hubris”, in which the victims of ontological sickness are everywhere. Mimetic desire illuminates the pathology of both Western and Islam dogmatism (Benslama 2016). Within the Girardian triangle of desire, we can see how mimetism grew with puritan Muslims’ awareness of their own decline and their incapacity to dominate the world politically or technologically (Denoix 2010). First, the Muslim fundamentalist harbours self-resentment before feeling jealousy or hatred for the one who has outgrown them, not least because of their hidden admiration for the latter (Meddeb 2002, 19). This resentment takes root before being directed towards the one who is secretly admired and therefore hated—in this case, the West. For Benslama (2016), the Muslim problem is psychological—he has called it the phantom missing limb syndrome, which involves hallucinating the existence of the missing limb (in this case, the Ottoman Empire) as if it still existed. Muslim movements managed to create this hallucination on the basis that the West had torn Muslims apart, precipitating their downfall, and both of these perverse effects of mimetic rivalry have contaminated relations between Muslims and secular fundamentalists and other Westerners. To avoid oversimplifying, consider the complexities of both camps. Within Islam, fundamentalism has its roots in an identity reaction and a totalitarian reaction (Castillo 2016). The latter is illustrated in the correspondence between the Muslim claim to identity through Islam (in Muslim communities both within and beyond Western countries) and the intensification of atrocities committed by “totalitarian” jihadists both inside and outside Europe. The tragedy that afflicts some radical Muslims can be traced back to the influence in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century of theologians such as Al Maududi, who blamed the end of the Ottoman Empire on Muslims not being “Muslim enough”. This decline could only be arrested by an excess of Islamism, reasserting the Muslim influence on the world (Benslama 2016; Meddeb 2002). Coupled with this idea of a strong or super-Muslim identity (Benslama 2016), the uprootedness of youth in the globalised West, desperately seeking meaning in life, was then easily recuperated by the totalitarian ideology of the jihadists, radicalising them by giving them roots. (Etymologically, “radical” means “root”.) On the Western secular side, there is a disregard and/or wilful ignorance of religious phenomena across all realms of utilitarian and scientific culture, encompassing the media, education and mass consumption, in which a form of the “irrational” is ideologically isolated from its historical roots. In short,

The Visible and Invisible Story of the European Migrant Crisis

65

the confrontational dyadic pattern between these two -isms results not from their fundamental difference but from their extreme similarity (Guillebaud 2014). With regard to the global war on terror, both Western secular liberalism and Islamic fundamentalism insist on their just intentions and their unique identity—for instance, following the Paris terrorist attack in November 2015, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls insisted “They won’t change our lifestyle”, evincing the deeper anthropological difference of the sacred tension with modern secularity. Here, we are witnessing two worlds at loggerheads, caught in a clash of ignorance in their reluctance to acknowledge each other. This mimetic confrontation is found not only between the two sides but also within them, extending beyond a conflict between Western secular fundamentalist countries and puritan Islamic fundamentalist groups or states. In fact, across the Middle East and North Africa, mimetic rivalry can be seen to reverberate in the emergence of the many Muslim fundamentalist groups such as Daesh, which reject Western culture as evil. Across the West, migration has caused this invisible mimetic rivalry to affect the relationship between Muslim and native communities. Nihilists can be found in both secular and Muslim blocs, which are similar in their neglect, alienation, arrogance and hatred for others; they vary only in where they position themselves on the spectrum of their victims’ personal feelings and their will for revenge.

Addressing the Invisible The migrant crisis has become the cornerstone of the struggle against fundamentalism and Daesh, showing how the two hybrid threats of mass migration and terrorism are interlinked. If the EU can assist individual European countries in finding the requisite inner resources to resolve the migrant crisis by welcoming migrants and sustainably integrating them, then political, economic and social solutions will follow. Multiple voices in Europe have noted the lack of a common EU project for the countries of Europe and also for migrants. Yet how can there be such a common project if the EU is deprived of vibrant ideals? Where are the Schumans and the Adenauers, the founding fathers responsible for the historic rapprochement between France and Germany? Where, indeed, are the EU leaders? We need leaders of that same pedigree—to prevent the dislocation of Europe by providing meaningful and visionary direction, to reconcile two diametrically opposed mindsets (Maillard 2016) and to find common ground on which to work hand in hand with the migrants. Pope Francis,

66

Chapter IV

addressing the European Parliament in November 2014,9 referred to the responsibility of Europeans to care more for the sacrality of the migrants as human persons than for the sacrality of the economy. Paul Ricoeur (2002) cited Kingersheim in France as an example of positive integration that aspires to a good life, which includes self-esteem and esteem for others through just institutions. Unlike the migrants we think of today, the mayor Joseph Spiegel and town councillors in Kingersheim, followed by the residents (whom the mayor convinced and involved), successfully transformed a Roma shanty into a viable place to inhabit. When asked if there was some room for spirituality in politics, the mayor of Kingersheim answered that this was achieved by an ethics of conviction and responsibility, without certainty but with a commitment, providing an opportunity for personal growth. The local can instruct the larger community; there can be no new examination of politics without such modest relationships. To date, the migrant crisis has been a scandal or skandalon (obstacle or stone causing a fall) for Europeans and continues to unfold in an apocalyptic manner. From the Greek root apocalypsis, which means revelation, this crisis lifts the veil on who we as Europeans truly are and will lead to our downfall if we fail to resolve it. The Greek word krino is the stem of the English words “crisis”, “crime” and “criteria”, meaning to judge or distinguish but also to condemn (Cowdell 2013, 76). The path of discernment that awaits us entails a loss at the material level, giving away some of our surpluses, but it promises gains in terms of humanity and being while also dismantling the resentment of Muslim fundamentalism. In contrast, choosing condemnation means continuing to play the resentful loaded game of mimetic rivalry by radically refusing to save migrants. This path is based on the fear of difference, the “irrational otherness” epitomising how the forces of mimetism influence our policies and behaviour. More broadly, the hybrid threat posed by migratory pressures on Europe’s borders can be understood as the pharmakon of North-South asymmetry—at once scapegoat, poison and remedy. Left unresolved, this crisis will turn migrants into modern scapegoats, increasingly poisoning North-South relations. Without changes in the political model of the Global North, the migrant crisis will worsen, leading to further radicalisation both within and beyond the West, spreading the narratives of both cultural blocs 9

Pope Francis. “Address of Pope Francis to The European Parliament” (speech, Strasbourg, France November 25, 2014). The Holy See. https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2014/november/documents/pa pa-francesco_20141125_strasburgo-parlamento-europeo.html.

The Visible and Invisible Story of the European Migrant Crisis

67

at an increasing pace. Daesh, whose propaganda portrays the West as a “dark” force to legitimise itself across Muslim communities, will find it easier to minimise the moderate-radical grey zone. In the West, its antagonists’ xenophobic and racist propaganda will further accelerate populist gains. Conversely, by implementing positive integration policies, as in Kingersheim, the local will meet the other by means of an inward dimension, and migrants will become our remedy for the resentment that fosters ontological sickness across both modern societies and Muslim communities. Defeating stereotypes and rigid approaches will be a precondition for implementing policies that can ameliorate the North-South asymmetry. In this way, the EU and its Member States can mimetically influence a more open approach across minority communities. Outside Europe, if resentment can be healed, the attraction to terrorism and the terrorist groups spreading resentment will be obliterated. At a practical level, positive integration can be achieved only if the EU demonstrates clear-sightedness and the necessary realism in addressing the hot issue of Islam, leaving aside the naive optimism that accounts for the structural causes of extremism. These practical measures must include (1) a broad and genuine debate on the type of Islam that can be integrated into Europe, rather than branding any dissenting voice as Islamophobic; (2) a contract of integration that includes learning the local language and mores; and (3) solidarity as the responsibility of the citizen at neighbourhood level, welcoming migrants and helping them to integrate. Instead of denying its reality, these represent realistic measures for the successful management of the migrant crisis (Delsol 2015). These practical changes to integrate migrants through solidarity need not prevent the EU from again taking Angela Merkel’s lead. As she underlined on her trip to Mali, if you want to stem migration, do so at its source (see reference BBC 2016c). By increasing development spending in certain African countries, the EU can seek to reduce the push factors that drive migration to Europe. According to Merkel, Germany’s presidency of the G20 in 2017 can be used to boost investment in the private sector of several African countries. The EU should draw inspiration from that intention. More broadly, at a cultural level positive integration policies should rely on a healthy and compassionate understanding of the person; in the absence of a widespread conversion of the human heart, how can we expect to tackle the ongoing crisis? Such a transformation is needed if we are to counter the effects of the West’s culture of narcissism, which is responsible for the erosion of the subject (Lasch 1979). In short, the EU needs to reform its citizens’ minimal selves; through the active involvement of political

68

Chapter IV

institutions, that understanding of the sacrality of the person can incentivise citizens to take responsibility for building that sense of humanity for everyone, so healing the hunger for being that is the disease of modern Western society. By instilling a sense of belonging, community and solidarity with native populations, migrants can be transformed from scapegoats to symbols of rejuvenation. In Europe, migrants can thrive as part of a renewed culture, empowered by education and a social infrastructure, with real economic opportunities for business and work, as seen in successful cities (Sanders 2011). At the political and institutional levels, a vision-led EU needs to reform its technocratic style of governing, amending its current political model to support a new cultural programme that will harness the invisible inner spiritual resources required to dispel resentment by providing a sense of cultural cohesion and belonging. As mentioned above, resentment makes people increasingly rootless and prey to Dionysian excess through mindless consumption (hunger for having), which translates into an insatiable hunger for being. That ressentiment is also responsible for the rise of nationalist and populist politics, which reached its climax of self-destruction with the departure of “European” youngsters for jihad in Syria, desperately seeking a new identity through an idealistic cause, however deviant. A new, more spiritual model of governance can satisfy that hunger for being and the spiritual among both Muslims and Europeans. A call for more spirituality in politics is not a call to end the principle of laïcité that defines Western democratic culture but a call to humanise politics. If that is the aim, the means of implementing this new EU model of governance should be based on what Saint Paul called katexov (Thes: 2:7)—the restrainer or katexur. In relation to migrants, as the only one who, for a while, acted with a sense of katéchon by restraining herself from “the obsessive isolation of mimetic competition”, Chancellor Merkel has exemplified this new model of governance (Cowdell 2013, 119). As she demonstrated, constraints do not mean less freedom; ironically and to the contrary, by restraining mimetic violence, human beings gain greater freedom as they become capable of relating to each other as persons (Gardner 2011). At the micro level, this means that people can resist negative mimetic desires only through a strong and well-developed subjectivity. Such self-censorship is the only means by which the West can address this migrant crisis—not only in terms of learning to limit itself but also by learning moderation and self-restraint. Freedom in its non-exploitative forms can prevent democracy from dying a long inner death through populism. The attempt to welcome migrants perhaps highlights that human

The Visible and Invisible Story of the European Migrant Crisis

69

development is about how to achieve the task of living together instead of undertaking a project of living together (Brague 2014).10 In summary, to resist and defeat the invisible mimetic contagion, Europeans and migrants must follow their own paths to spiritual individuation. To do so, Europeans must face the demons of resentment associated with their sacred attachment to reason and money, and the migrants’ task is to transcend their ressentiment by letting go their resentful victimhood.

Conclusion To find the necessary resilience to oppose the hybrid threats of the migrant crisis and terrorism, the proposed (and as yet incomplete) alternate programme of long-term EU reform demands an element of clairvoyance. The central problem of the migrant crisis seems not to be about a clash between Europe and Islam; rather, there is a need to replace dogmatic space with a space for debate and dialogue. Only a humanist, eternal and universal vision of the human being within the respective cultures of Europe and Islam can make this possible (Roy 2005). There is no room for sacralised identities that beget sectarianism and hatred; for both Europeans and migrants, a crucial issue will be how to resist the mimetic contagion of identity politics. To contemplate any such dialogue, we must examine our own differences and failings. While European societies emphasise individual rights, Muslim societies insist on established rules for living a good life. While EU countries are characterised by a weak principle of cohesion, Muslims share a weak principle of freedom (Manent 2015). This hampers communication and relationships, especially as Europeans feel that their individual rights are unlimited while Muslims believe that their divine law has unlimited power. For the sake of cohesion, let us reflect for a moment on the opposite view, and how this might help us all. The first step must be to accommodate some moderation (by deflating one’s ontology) as a precondition for a new kind of governance based on spiritual openness, in turn engendering an openness to new political and economic challenges, as well as a greater receptiveness to the other. Second, the integration of this new approach to governance can help both Muslims and Westerners to overcome their ontological sickness. One example of this moderation between modernity and faith is Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, mayor of Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia (Mahbubani 2016). A 10 Learning how to live with the other is different from merely talking about it. It involves experiencing how to make compromises or self-sacrifices.

70

Chapter IV

member of the Christian Chinese minority in the world’s largest Muslim country, Mr Purnama offers a rare example of cohesion. At the visible level, Purnama has been successful in implementing policies to improve transparency and social infrastructure and to fight corruption. As a consequence, Jakarta’s residents are proud of where they live, and of who they are. At the invisible level, in a place where some extremist Muslims have subjected him to harsh criticism, so displaying the negative reflex of the sacred, he has adopted the right mindset or inner attitude. When asked how one succeeds politically, his answer was simple: “Be prepared to die”. In short, the fusion (without confusion) of these two civilizations owes to his boundless courage and the remarkable openness and tolerance of his citizens who have supported his efforts. What kind of power does the EU really need, then, to be effective against the hybrid threat of mass migration? We have argued that the EU must adopt a new road map that transcends the political borders of the modern nation, allowing migrants to melt into Europe and so breaking the deadlock between West and East around “sacred identity”. Only a composite modernity that is pluralist and enriched can support this metanoia, which is possible only if one submits to the experience and passes the test of fragility. The EU’s founding fathers experienced this fragility in the late 1940s after successive wars between France and Germany. By uniting Germany and France economically, politically and idealistically, they finally enabled that profound change. By closing itself to migrants, the EU is likely to further weaken itself, risking its own disintegration. Instead, the EU must play what is perhaps its last card and rise to the challenge of opening up, helping others in order to help itself, and reclaiming its leadership role in the spirit of our liberal founding fathers: foster peace within and without.

The Visible and Invisible Story of the European Migrant Crisis

71

Bibliography 2016. “AfD Readies for Congress, Banks on Islamophobia”, Euractive, April 28, 2016. Accessed May 12, 2016. http://www.euractiv.com/section/elections/news/afd-readies-for-congre ss-banks-on-islamophobia/. 2016. “Africa 'A Priority' as Merkel's Germany Aims to Stem Migration”, BBC, October 11, 2016. Accessed October 31, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37619374. 2012. “Italy: Exploited Labour: Migrant Workers in Italy’s Agricultural Sector”, Amnesty International, December 18, 2012. Accessed May 9, 2016. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/EUR30/020/2012/en/. Arendt, Hannah. 1958. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Armstrong, Karen. 2004. "Resisting Modernity: The Backlash against Secularism," Harvard International Review 25.4: 40. Bachmann, Sascha. 2015. "Hybrid Wars: The 21st-century’s New Threats to Global Peace and Security," Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 43.1: 77-98. Benslama, Fethi. 2016. Un Furieux Désir de Sacrifice. Le Surmusulman. Paris: Le Seuil.

72

Chapter IV

Berger, P. Ludwig. 1999. The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics. Grand Rapids, MI: Ethics and Policy Centre. Betts, Alexander and Gil Loescher. 2011. Refugees in International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2016. “Big, Bad Visegrad”, Economist, January 30, 2016. Accessed January 30, 2016. http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21689629-migration-crisis-ha s-given-unsettling-new-direction-old-alliance-big-bad-visegrad. Bonjour, Saskia. 2011. "The Power and Morals of Policy Makers: Reassessing the Control Gap Debate", International Migration Review 45.1: 89-122. Broeders, Dennis, and Godfried Engbersen. 2007. "The Fight Against Illegal Migration Identification Policies and Immigrants' Counterstrategies," American Behavioral Scientist 50.12: 1592-1609. Castillo, Monique. 2015. "La Laïcité Comme Spiritualité," Études 1: 57-69. Cowdell, Scott. 2013. René Girard and Secular Modernity: Christ, Culture, and Crisis. Notre Dame, IL: University of Notre Dame Press. Cristini, Hélène. 2015. "Les Fondamentalismes Laïc et Musulman Interprétés Avec le Concept de Théorie Mimétique", Revue d'éthique et de théologie morale 5: 85-122. Haas, Hein, Katharina Natter, and Simona Vezzoli. 2016. "Growing Restrictiveness or Changing Selection? The Nature and Evolution of Migration Policies", International Migration Review. Accessed December 25, 2015. doi/10.1111/imre.12288/full. Delsol, Chantal. 2015. “Europe et Migrations”, Le Blog de Chantal Delsol. Accessed June 15, 2016. http://www.chantaldelsol.fr/europe-et-migrations. Drent, M., R. Hendriks, and D. Zandee. 2015. “New Threats, New EU and NATO Responses,” Netherlands Institute of International Relations, July 2015. Accessed December 12, 2015. https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/New%20Threats_New% 20EU_Nato%20Responses_Clingendael_July2015.pdf. 2016. “EU’s Tusk Warns Illegal Economic Migrants: Do Not Come Here”, BBC, March 3, 2016. Accessed March 3, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35714087. 2015. “European Commission Stands by Italy on Coping with Migratory Pressures on Lampedusa.” European Commission, February 19, 2015. Accessed December 22, 2015. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4453_en.htm.

The Visible and Invisible Story of the European Migrant Crisis

73

2016. “Europe Far-right Leaders Rally Against Islam, EU”, Al Jazeera, June 18, 2016. Accessed June 28, 2016. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/europe-leaders-join-forces-isl am-eu-160617203659154.html. Farneti, Roberto. 2015. Mimetic Politics: Dyadic Patterns in Global Politics. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press. Fekete, Liz. 2004. "Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State", Race & Class 46.1: 3-29. Freeman, Gary P. 1995. "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States", International Migration Review: 881-902. Geddes, Andrew. 2003. The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe. London: Sage. Girard, René. 1977. Violence and the Sacred. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. —. 2009. Battling to the End: Conversations with Benoit Chantre. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press. Glenday, James. 2016. “Calais Jungle: Tension between UK and France over Border Asylum Seeker Camp,” ABC, September 17, 2016. Accessed September 17, 2016. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-17/france-uk-tension-over-calaisjungle-asylum-seeker-camp/7851600. Guillebaud, Jean-Claude. 2008. "La Mondialisation du Religieux, Etudes 409.5: 473-483. Guiraudon, Virginie and Gallya Lahav. 2000. "A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty Debate in the Case of Migration Control," Comparative Political Studies 33.2: 163-195. Hansen, Randall. 2003. "Migration to Europe since 1945: Its History and Its Lessons," The Political Quarterly 74.s1: 25-38. Hooke, S. Henry. 1965. Bible Basic English. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2015. “How Is the Migrant Crisis Dividing EU Countries?” BBC, March 4, 2015. Accessed September 29, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope34278886. Innes, Alexandria J. 2010. "When the Threatened Become the Threat: The Construction of Asylum Seekers in British Media Narratives," International Relations 24.4: 456-477. Jahanbegloo, Ramin. 2004. Playing with Modernity (Contemporary Thought/1). Cultural Research Bureau: Tehran. Joppke, Christian. 2008. “Comparative Citizenship: A Restrictive Turn in Europe?” Law and Ethics of Human Rights 2, no. 1: 1-41.

74

Chapter IV

Kearney, Richard. 1996. Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of Action. London: Sage Publications. Lasch, Christopher. 1979. The Culture of Narcissism. American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. Leiken, Robert S. 2005. "Europe's Angry Muslims." Foreign Affairs: 120-135. Lutz, W., and S. Scherbov. “The Contribution of Migration to Europe’s Demographic Future: Projections for the EU-25 to 2050”, Interim Reports, 07, 024, Laxenburg, Austria, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). Accessed September 6, 2016. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/33899902.pdf. Mahnunani, Kishore. 2016. “A Fusion, Not a Clash, of Civilisations in Jakarta,” Financial Times, June 1, 2016. Accessed June 1, 2016. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f510a93e-27f8-11e6-8ba3-cdd781d02d 89.html#axzz4BD0S9PF5. Maillard, Sébastien. 2016. "Le Pape François Peut-il Redonner Sens à l’Europe?" Études 5: 7-16. Mammone, Andre. 2015. “Right-wing Nationalism and Scapegoating Migrants,” Al Jazeera, August 15, 2015. Accessed September 31, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/08/wing-nationalism-s capegoating-migrants-150815105304570.html. Massey, Douglas S. 1999. "International Migration at the Dawn of the Twenty-first Century: The Role of the State," Population and Development Review 25.2: 303-322. Meddeb, Abdelwahab. 2002. The Malady of Islam. New York: Broché Basic Books. Mesco, Manuale and Valentina Pop. 2016. “Tensions Mount between Austria and Italy as Migrant Numbers Rise”, Wall Street Journal, April 15, 2016. Accessed October 12, 2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/euwantsaustriatoexplainthreattoclosebord erwithitaly1460719198. 2016. “Migrant Crisis: EU to Boost Africa Aid to Stem Influx”, BBC, June 7, 2016. Accessed June 7, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope36469264. Palmeri, Tara. 2015. “Refugee Crisis Pits Europe’s North vs. South”, Politico, April 22, 2015. Accessed October 2, 2015. http://www.politico.eu/article/national-issues-challenge-unity-at-migrat ion-summit/. Park, Jeanne. 2015. “European Migrants’ Crisis”, Council on Foreign Relations. Last modified September 23, 2016.

The Visible and Invisible Story of the European Migrant Crisis

75

http://www.cfr.org/refugeesandthedisplaced/europesmigrationcrisis/p3 2874. Ricoeur, Paul. 1996. The Hermeneutics of Action, edited by Richard Kearney. London: Sage. Roell, Peter. 2016. “Migration—A New Form of ‘Hybrid Warfare’?” ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security, 422 May: 1-7. http://www.ispsw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/422_Roell_RINS A.pdf. Roy, Olivier. 2004. Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. New York: Columbia University Press. —. 2009. Secularism Confronts Islam. New York: Columbia University Press. Rubin, J. Alissa. 2016. “From Bikinis to Burkinis, Regulating What Women Wear”, New York Times, August 27, 2016. Accessed September 31, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/28/world/europe/france-burkini-biki ni-ban.html?_r=0. Sanders, Douglas. 2011. Arrival City. How the Largest Migration in History is Reshaping the World. London: Windmill Books. Seyyed, Hossein Nasr. 2004. The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity. San Francisco: Harper San Francisco. Smith, K., and A. James. 2016. We Are What We Love. Grand Rapids: Brazos Press. Spiegel, Jo and François Euvé. 2016. "Reconstruire la Démocratie," Études 5: 29-40. Spiegel, Peter. 2015. “Jean-Claude Juncker’s EU Migrant Crisis Plan Takes Shape”, Financial Times, September 6, 2015. Accessed September 5, 2015. https://www.ft.com/content/56d1fc02-52fe-11e5-b029-b9d50a74fd14. Statham, Paul and Jean Tillie. 2016. "Muslims in their European Societies of Settlement: A Comparative Agenda for Empirical Research on Socio-cultural Integration across Countries and Groups," Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 42.2: 177-196. 2015. “Stranded Migrants: France and Italy Exchange Recriminations”, BBC, June 15, 2015. Accessed September 7, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope33138852. The Department for Migration and Home Affairs. “Emergency Relocation Mechanism––State of Play”. Accessed September 31, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-age nda-migration/press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_relocation_en.pdf.

76

Chapter IV

The Holy See. “Address of Pope Francis to the European Parliament”, Accessed July, 25 2015. ttps://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2014/november/doc uments/papa-francesco_20141125_strasburgo-parlamento-europeo.htm l. The Federal Statistics Office. “Nettozuwanderung von Ausländerinnen und Ausländern im Jahr 2015 bei 1,1 Millionen”, Accessed September 31, 2016. https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2 016/03/PD16_105_12421.html. 2016. “The Rise of the Far Right in Europe.” Economist, May 24 2016. Accessed September 4, 2016. http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/05/daily-chart-18. Thibaud, Paul. 2015. "Nostalgie Républicaine ou Refondation?" Études 3: 43-54. Traynor, Ian. 2016. “EU’s Deep Dilemmas over Refugees Laid Bare at Malta Summit,” Guardian, November 11, 2016. Accessed September 11, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/11/eusdeepdilemmasov errefugeeslaidbareatmaltasummit. United States High Commission for Refugees. “Migrants’ Emergency Response––Mediterranean” Accessed September 30, 2016. http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php. 2016. “Welcome, Up to a Point,” Economist, May 28, 2016. Accessed August 8, 2016. http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21699310-politiciansmust-keep-better-control-migration-and-tell-truth-welcome-up. Wike, Richard, Bruce Stokes, and Katie Simmons. 2016. “Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs,” Pew Research Centre, July 11, 2016. Accessed July 11, 2016. http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/07/PewResearch-Center-EU-Refugees-and-National-Identity-Report-FINAL-J uly-11-2016.pdf. Wydra, Harald. 2015. Politics and the Sacred. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

CHAPTER V THE STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF BREXIT: THE CHALLENGES OF THE COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY IN THE POST-BREXIT ERA FILIZ COBAN

Introduction On 23 January 2013, British Prime Minister David Cameron announced in his Bloomberg speech that a referendum would be held by 2017 on European Union (EU) membership. The Euro-sceptic sentiments of British society1 and EU referenda were used in a Conservative Party manifesto during the election. On 23 June 2016, the British people voted in the referendum over whether or not to remain in the European Union. Although Brexit reflects mainly internal Tory party politics, it turned out to be the most important decision regarding a key member of the EU for over 40 years. After a long discussion,2 the referendum resulted in the victory of the Leave side, with 52 per cent of the vote, versus 48 per cent for Remain. Pointing out the extent of British influence in the development of the Union is a useful starting point for any consideration of imagining Europe after the Brexit decision of the UK on 23 June 2016. Thus, the next section is devoted to revealing the roles of the UK in the European Union. Bearing in mind that the Brexit process will be complex with changes in UK-EU and internal EU relations involving twenty-seven member states, the European 1

Matthew Goodwin. 2015. “The Great Recession and the Rise of Populist Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom.” In European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession. ECPR Press 2 See also: “Implications of the Referendum on EU Membership for the UK’s Role in the World”, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2015-16, 26 April 2016.

78

Chapter V

Parliament and other interested parties,3 the following parts of this study explore the main implications of British withdrawal from the EU for the policies of the Union. Specifically, it focuses research on the extent to which Brexit would influence the European Common Security and Defence Policy (ECSD) and transatlantic relations in dealing with hybrid threats and challenges.

A Brief History of the UK’s Role in Security Cooperation in Europe In the aftermath of World War II, the first European defence agreement against a possible German attack, called the Treaty of Dunkirk for Alliance and Mutual Assistance, was signed between France and the United Kingdom in 1947. In the following year, the first multilateral European defence agreement, namely the Treaty of Brussels, was signed on 17 March 1948 by the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Because of the rising tension of the Cold War, including in the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty established NATO in Washington DC on 4 April 1949. In 1952, European powers began to negotiate on the construction of the European Defence Community under the framework of the Pleven Plan which offered to establish a supranational defence system in Europe. Britain’s objections to the plan led to the rejection of the plan and the abandoning of the EDC in general. However, two years later in 1954 the Treaty of Brussels was reformed to create the Western European Union, including new signatories for European mutual defence plans: West Germany and Italy. It can be said that the UK has acted as the USA and NATO’s main ally and partner in Europe. All British foreign policy decisions either explicitly or implicitly were approved by the United States. The consistent Europeanism of French defence policy thought historically contrasted with the Atlanticism of the British approach.4 As a longstanding identity project, France aimed to pull the United Kingdom into the European security and defence policy, while the British preferred the NATO alliance rather than the continental security. Therefore, in 1959 French President Charles de 3 For a discussion on what positions each of the twenty-seven remaining EU member states and the EU’s institutions might take in negotiations with the UK, see: Tim Oliver, “Brexit: What Happens Next?”, London School of Economics: Ideas, Strategic Update, 16.2 June 2016. 4 Falk Ostermann, “The End of Ambivalence and the Triumph of Pragmatism? Franco-British Defence Cooperation and European and Atlantic Defence Policy Traditions”, International Relations 2015, Vol. 29 (3): 334-347.

The Strategic Consequences of Brexit

79

Gaulle proposed to reshape NATO with the intention of controlling the power of Britain and the United States in Europe. British opposition to these propositions was followed by the French rejection of Britain’s entry into the EEC in 1963. Tensions between Gaullist France and Britain remained when France officially left NATO’s military structures in 1966. De Gaulle’s departure from France’s leadership in 1969 led to a normalisation of relations between Britain and France. Britain’s accession to the European Communities in 1973 made London a part of the Finabel organisation which was constituted to promote inter-operability and co-operation between the national armed forces of EC Member States. Moreover, Britain was among the founding members of the Independent European Program Group for European armaments cooperation and the European Combat Aircraft programme in the late 1970s. In the late 1980s British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher declared that the active cooperation for the creation of a single market in the European Community was favoured by the UK, however it would not allow the elimination of physical frontiers on account of the protection of British citizens. Thatcher and her successors shared the same vision in maintaining national borders, retaining state control and strengthening European security by NATO and the Western European Union which functioned as the military alliance until the construction of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. The new geopolitical reality of the post Cold War period and a united Germany in Europe made new strategies and arrangements necessary for both Britain and France. In the 1990s, even though Britain demonstrated reluctance to further European defence integration, the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 established the three pillars of the European Union including the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Under the terms of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU built the single market and expanded the economic scope of European integration in various policy areas from the structuring of a common defence and security policy to a common justice and home affairs policy. This stage in European integration opened the way for developing a European defence identity. In fact, 1998 was the turning point for promoting the establishment of autonomous defence capabilities within the framework of the EU. The Saint-Malo Declaration was proof of the shift in British strategy at achieving the same preferences with diversionary tactics through supporting the empowerment of European capabilities within NATO. 5 British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s New Labour government’s pro-European policy paved the way for the launch of 5 Lynne Dryburgh. 2010. “Blair’s First Government (1997–2001) and European Security and Defence Policy: Seismic Shift or Adaptation?” BJPIR, 12 (2): 257-273.

Chapter V

80

the European Security and Defence Policy in 1999 at the Cologne European Council. Britain sought new instruments and international cooperation for maximising British interests abroad. Thus, with the aim of improving the defence market and defence industry cooperation, London played a leading role in building a European Defence Agency in 2004. France showed shifts in her defence policy approach after Nicolas Sarkozy became French president in May 2007. Sarkozy declared his intention to reintegrate France into NATO’s structures with the exception of the Nuclear Planning Group. Two countries came to the point that different transatlantic and European traditions should not be barriers to achieve agreed outcomes. Last but not least, as an indication of the intensification of Franco-British cooperation, the Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty signed by Britain and France in 2010 covered a broad spectrum of issues relating to security and defence, including industrial and commercial cooperation and nuclear stockpiles. Even though these attempts have developed cooperation in Europe, they have not contributed to “European” cooperation or to the EU-institutionalist tradition of security and defence integration. Franco-British cooperation has served these two countries’ pragmatic goals and roles in Europe and the world. As the UK-France-EU triangle demonstrates, there is no European security, only the multiple securities in Europe, based on the fragmented evolution in approaches to European defence and cooperation. .

Britain’s Contributions in the EU As summarised in the previous section Britain has been an “awkward”6 partner for European countries since she became a member of the EC in 1973. It should be noted that Great Britain’s approach to European Politics has been an intergovernmentalist one which is more suitable for seeking British preferences regarding the development and extension of the EU in stressing the national level cost-benefit terms and the power of member states at the European level. In addition, policy makers in Britain traditionally have had a more liberal and deregulatory approach to market making. London has managed to secure Britain’s interests in Brussels throughout the last two decades, most notably from the essential parts of European integration such as the Monetary Union and the Schengen borderless area. She has adopted a defensive and suspicious stance in signing up to the institutional development of the Union. Besides this perspective, the UK has designed effective policy making structures both in 6 S. George. 1998. An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The Strategic Consequences of Brexit

81

London and Brussels. 7 UK Permanent Representation has succeeded in keeping contacts with the members of the European Parliament and European Commission to collect information and shape a Europe congruent with British preferences when it comes to legislation.8 In measuring the extent to which the UK has exerted influence over the EU system, a study9 analysed 125 pieces of legislation passed by the EU (1996-2008) to find out the position of member states on each issue in the EU policies. The data indicated that the UK positioned herself very closely to the eventual outcome of the issues, in other words, the legislation passed by the EU represented the British preferences. As another method of measuring the influence, Naurin and Lindahl10 worked on the informal ways such as the contact patterns in which British officials might be effective in the development of the EU. In their research, member states’ representatives in eleven committees were asked which country’s staff was more influential in building a consensus on an issue. According to the results, the UK officials were at the top of the list. Especially, when it comes to forming elements of the Union’s regulatory regime for financial services, British representatives have been remarkably influential in this area. In recent research, Menon and Salter11 used the voting data on decision making to study how the UK government operated in the EU’s legislative system from 2009 to 2014. By searching data gathered from the votewatch.eu project, they found out that London was frequently on the winning side in the vast majority of the votes. The voting patterns showed that the UK gained different alignments based on policy areas. In decisions on budgetary policy, and foreign and security policy the British state was on the losing side. In the votes on the areas of international trade, industry, legal rights and the environment, British policies got support. After the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament became a more powerful institution for blocking and amending EU law. The parliamentary votes demonstrate 7

Hussein Kassim et al. eds. 2001. The National Co-ordination of EU Policy Making: The EU Level. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 8 Hussein Kassim and B. G. Peters. 2001. “Conclusion: Co-ordinating National Action in Brussels––a Comparative Perspective”, in Kassim, H., Menon, A., Peters, B. G. and Wright, V. (eds), The National Co-ordination of EU Policy Making: The EU Level, 296-339. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 9 Thomson et al. 2012. “A new Dataset on Decision-making in the EU Before and After the 2004 and 2007 Enlargements (DEUII)”, Journal of European Public Policy, 19, 4: 604-22. 10 2010. “Out in the Cold? Flexible Integration and the Political Status of Euro Opt-outs”, European Union Politics, 11, 4: 485-509. 11 2016. “Britain’s Influence in the EU”, National Institute Economic Review, No. 236 May: 8.

82

Chapter V

that British MEPs were on the winning side for around 65% of the votes. British MEPs have chaired important committees of the Internal Market, Civil Liberties and Justice and Home Affairs, and International Development. This is another reason that makes the UK influential in the Union. They hold powerful positions and rapporteur positions on more dossiers than representatives from any other member state, except Germany. In the last decade, British politics at home has impacted the country’s capacity for maximising interests and their ability to design outcomes at the EU level. An early work of A. Menon (2004), Leading From Behind: Britain and the European Constitutional Treaty, showed that a political backlash in domestic politics forced British ministers to abandon Britain’s constructive and leading role in shaping the negotiations for constitution building. With no doubt, foreign policy begins at home. For instance, for the sake of being the Conservative Party’s leader, David Cameron took his party out of the European People’s Party which caused Britain’s self-imposed isolation in this important forum. This step deprived party members of access to informal meetings with their powerful counterparts in Europe. Moreover, the UK’s most Euro-sceptic party UKIP won over 25% of the vote in the elections to the European Parliament of 2014 and had more seats (24) than any other British party in the European Parliament. UKIP ideologically opposes and refuses to engage with EU politics. Therefore, its MEPs tend not to participate in the chamber.12 Certainly this attitude reduces British influence to shape outcomes in the Union’s legislation. Furthermore, in 2015 the House of Lords EU Committee addressed several reasons behind the fact of Britain’s diminishing effect over the EU legislative process. The pioneering one is the referendum on British membership due to rising Euro-scepticism and negative perception towards the politics of Brussels. The lack of negotiation and alliance building between the two sides has also contributed to this process and pushed the country towards the referendum. The Brexiteers prefer the NATO membership of the UK rather than an integrated EU foreign policy. It can be said that both the Brexiteers and Remainers have been sceptical of having an EU army.13 The UK keeps NATO membership, however her traditional strong capabilities in diplomacy and foreign policy make her particularly significant when acknowledging the potential consequences of Brexit for the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. 12

Ibid: 11. Hylke Dijkstra. 2016. “UK and EU Foreign Policy Cooperation after Brexit”, Newsbrief September, Vol. 36, No. 5: 1-3. 13

The Strategic Consequences of Brexit

83

After Brexit: its Challenges for the CESDP This section of the study addresses the challenges that the Brexit divorce would bring for the EU and the EU’s CESDP in the present situation, regarding a wide variety of existing conditions and actions the EU has been facing with hybrid threats posed by state and non-state actors through conventional and non-conventional means. In this context, this study argues that European member states’ different approaches to European integration and variations in the practices of law enforcement, border control, intelligence and diplomacy render hybrid threats increasingly complex. In consideration of this point, this section of the study reveals how Brexit might influence the fight against these threats in Europe. It analyses the impacts of Brexit on four likely areas of change: immigration and border management; the EU’s budget and currency system; energy and climate change; and security and foreign policy. In the new growing literature, most researches have focused on the first three areas and their costs and benefits regarding Britain’s withdrawal decision from the EU. 14 However, its strategic effects on security and defence policy still require a scholarly analysis. With a view to this lacuna in the literature, after a summary of the influence of Brexit in these areas, this section sheds a light on how Brexit might impact upon the CESDP in consideration of transatlantic cooperation.

Immigration and Border Management In the context of immigration, as Claudio Lanza and Hélène Cristini highlight in this volume, the refugee crisis has become an ever-bigger challenge for Europe in recent years. The need for EU common action appears as an immediate response to tackle such momentous moves from the wider Middle East and Africa. However, EU member states’ responses have lacked any kind of coordination in the Migrant Crisis. To a greater extent, Brexit would reduce the EU’s ability to establish new coordination and cooperation mechanisms for a centralised border control and an asylum mechanism. The lack of collective action by the immigration policies would hinder the fight against cross-border organised crime and transnational terrorism. The UK has been the most active member to constitute the European Arrest Warrant and to make effective use of Europol. Thus, the 14 “BREXIT 2016: Policy Analysis from the Centre for Economic Performance”, the London School of Economics: The Centre for Economic Performance, June 2016; Gregor Irwin, “BREXIT: the Impact on the UK and the EU”, Global Counsel: June 2015, the last access on 01.11.2016 file:///F:/CESDP/Global%20Counsel_Impact_of_Brexit.pdf.

84

Chapter V

UK’s departure would damage reforms in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. Moreover, Brexit would mean the loss of the UK’s practical approach in fighting against terrorism.

Budget and Currency System Secondly, the UK’s net annual contribution to the Union’s budget is €10.5 billion.15 Without this remarkable contribution, the EU will require new resources. Nevertheless, the loss of the EU’s second-largest economy would have a negative influence on the multilateral negotiations with the countries of other regions. In addition, a post-Brexit EU would become more protectionist. On the one hand, the Commission prefers a top-down approach to creating a Capital Market Union which would be the centre for strong regulation. On the other hand, France pushes for the establishment of an EU finance ministry. Being one of the most economically liberal countries, Britain has been the champion driving force in improving the EU’s single market and liberalising the internal market in goods, services and labour. In consideration of the UK’s bottom-up approach to common market policy and euro-out policy in the euro-zone integration, it should be noted that the UK has blocked federalist ambitions which has served to develop the mechanics of the EU.16 Without the UK, the EU’s progress towards a more powerful economic and financial policy would continue, if Brexit does not trigger divisions and disagreements within the euro-zone.

Energy and Climate Change Energy and climate change policy is the third area in which Brexit would have a possible influence. The UK has always been crucial to climate change issues and the EU’s energy market regulation. The separation of energy transmission from generation, production and supply has been one of the key parts of the UK’s contributions to this area. Unbodying in energy policy has increased competition and created benefits for consumers. The overall effect of Brexit in this area could lead to tougher regulations in a more centralised system of energy market regulations in the EU. When it comes to the climate change issue, it is noteworthy that the British

15

Steven Blockmans and Michael Emerson. 2016. “Brexit’s Consequences for the UK and the EU”, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2016. 16 Ian Bond et al. 2016. “Europe after Brexit: Unleashed or Undone?” Centre for European Reform, April 2016: 3.

The Strategic Consequences of Brexit

85

government’s efforts to cut the country’s CO² emissions have been considerable.

Security and Foreign Policy The fourth area in which Brexit might generate consequences for Europe is security and foreign policy. But, the EU’s CSDP has received little attention since the UK’s membership referendum on 23 June 2016. The Clingendael Report17 elaborated on the outcome of the referendum and determined that it would have an impact on the nature of the EU’s role as a regional and/or global security actor, specifically the EU’s ambition to develop a Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy and the EU’s negotiations with the United States to arrive at a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). That means that it would have an effect on the EU’s capabilities to overcome global security issues, such as fighting Jihadism, dealing with climate change and halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this context, this section focuses on the challenges that Brexit presents for European security and Euro-Atlantic relations. In May 2015, the EU and NATO decided to work together for more effective responses to security challenges and signed a joint declaration on increasing practical cooperation in selected areas. These include: x countering hybrid threats, including through the development of coordinated procedures; x operational cooperation at sea and on migration; x coordination on cyber security and defence; x developing coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities; x facilitating a stronger defence industry and greater defence research; x stepping up coordination on exercises; x building the defence and security capability of the partners in the East and South. Ongoing EU-NATO cooperation to manage the migrant crisis in the Aegean Sea appears to be a sign of this relationship. However, Brexit is likely to have impacts on the EU’s CSDP to varying degrees. The first 17

Peter van Ham. 2016. “Brexit: Strategic Consequences for Europe A Scenario Study”, Clingendael Report, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, February 2016: 3-4.

86

Chapter V

implication of the post-Brexit period is that the EU will lose one of its majority shareholders. The data collected by the European Defence Agency confirm that the UK spent 2% of its GDP on military expenditure. In 2013 the UK’s share in the EU defence budget was 21% or €40 billion of a total of €186 billion. So the second implication of the British decision to leave will be for the European defence market. With an eye to limit the duplication of the defence programme and research, to push up competition and foster innovation, the EU applies single-market logic to the European defence industry by regulating defence procurement and transferring defence goods and services. In 2011, the EU passed two directives of market rules in order to encourage more competition between suppliers across the EU. These procedures have been used by the UK more effectively than other member states. The UK firms might face barriers to getting contracts from the other countries in the post-Brexit process. In addition to this, without a key national industry, the continental defence market would be less competitive and effective. At a practical level, the EU would lose the crucial power projection capabilities and strategic assets provided by the UK. Due to the CSDP which bloomed out of a Franco-British initiative, the fundamental challenge and the third implication of Brexit would be a political one which would require a reconsideration of the CSDP’s governance model. The Franco-British engine at the core of the defence system would be replaced by a new Franco-German engine. 18 A more proactive Paris and Berlin leadership in foreign and security matters would ease the building of a European defence identity without the UK veto. This cooperation would provide sufficient political weight to take integrative steps such as the expansion of the Athena common funding mechanism for EU operations or the establishment of permanent structured military headquarters. Furthermore, Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s dream of a European army could be realised. However, the creation of autonomous EU military headquarters under the new EU governance arrangement would raise new questions regarding transatlantic relations, specifically the continuity of EU-NATO cooperation. As the fourth challenge for the CSDP, Brexit might reveal the deep cleavages in very different visions of EU defence and NATO’s role in European security. Germany’s approach to the development of EU-NATO cooperation seems to be a “sensible division of labour” between two 18

Giovanni Faleg. “The Implications of Brexit for the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy” CEPS Commentary, 26 July 2016, access date: 30.08.2016, https://www.ceps.eu/publications/implications-brexit-eu%E2%80%99s-common-s ecurity-and-defence-policy.

The Strategic Consequences of Brexit

87

organisations as the German defence minister stated at the Munich Security Conference in 2013. 19 On the one hand Germany wants more logistic expenses to be funded jointly by member states, and on the other hand Berlin does not want to fund France’s unilateral operations in Africa by the common budget. Mainly, Germany used to be interested in harmonising national defence policies and coordinating capability development. Paris sees the CSDP as a tool by which its military operations and counter terrorism efforts are supported under the supervision of the EU security system. If France has a more Gaullist approach to NATO, this will lead to the development of the CSDP in opposition to NATO. However, this approach differs from the Central European States’ vision of NATO. It can be said that NATO is a security guarantor for them against Putin’s Russia. In a nutshell, the emergence of the Franco-German engine in the CSDP in the post-Brexit era should not broaden the fault lines between Atlanticist and Pan-European approaches in Europe. As another challenge, it seems that Brexit will be harmful for relationships between the member states and will be an obstacle for promoting relationships between the EU and non-member states. The UK has been an active supporter of the European Neighbourhood Policy, improving relations with the Central and Eastern European States which became members of the Union in the post-Cold War period. The UK has maintained its enthusiasm for eastern enlargement for a long time. British policy makers were the EU’s loudest champions of Turkey’s full membership. Large-scale migration from new member states and the refugee crisis pushed the decision makers to reconsider European politics on admitting any more large and poor states. For instance, a post-Brexit EU would be detrimental for Turkey-EU relations. Ankara has already begun to turn its face to other options for economic and political cooperation. Without a strong supportive partner, the EU would be less credible for Turkey’s expectations and accession plans. The UK has promoted European ties with the countries in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly with China, India and Australia. London has encouraged European countries to make trade agreements with potential economic partners in this region. A British exit would also make it harder for the EU to keep close relations with the Asia-Pacific countries. That also means that the EU would lose its soft power towards other regions after the UK’s exit decision. The Eurozone crisis has already weakened the EU’s power of attraction. Thus, it would no longer be a model of integration for 19

Ian Bond et al. 2016. “Europe after Brexit: Unleashed or Undone?” Centre for European Reform, April 2016: 10.

Chapter V

88

international organisations such as the Association of South-East Asian Nations. Moreover, with its colonial past and heritage Britain has played an important role as a bridge between the EU and many countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. In 2000, the Cotonou Agreement was signed to develop the single market and economic ties between the EU and the countries in these regions. The relationship with the former British colonies would alter after Brexit. The last challenge of Brexit for the European CSDP is related to the means used in collective security. Without the UK, as one of the most active proponents of using the EU sanction, EU foreign policy would become even less influential. The UK has sometimes cajoled other member states into taking steps towards sanctions as instruments of policy change in countries such as Burma, Cuba and more recently in Russia. 20 The British government was determined that there would be a price to pay for Russia’s annexation of Crimea by violating international law. In order to put pressure on Russia, David Cameron was ready to face up to the costs to his country. He did not refrain from persuading others to keep the pressure on Russia to withdraw from Ukraine. In a nutshell, besides taking the leading role in shaping European counter-terrorism policy and being the driving force in governing justice and home affairs, the UK has been an essential partner of European military defence and deterrence. This paper points out that a British exit from CSDP structures would carry at least six implications for the EU and its place in the world: a) the CSPD would have a lower military budget without Britain’s contribution; b) the European defence market would be less competitive and effective; c) the CSPD’s governance model would change; d) a clash of different visions of European security would emanate from Brexit; e) the EU would lose its soft power and its relationship with other parts of the world would be weakened; and f) without the UK, the EU’s sanctions and other means in security and foreign policy would be less effective.

Conclusion This research has examined the role of Britain in the evolution of the common defence and security policy of the European Union and how Brexit might impact the EU’s CSDP and transatlantic alliance. By finding out the strategic consequences of Brexit, it concludes that keeping the common 20

Ibid: 6-7.

The Strategic Consequences of Brexit

89

vision and common identity of the Union is the biggest challenge for the future of European integration and the CESDP. Different traditions and multiple approaches lead multiple interests and multiple securities. Brexit would trigger an in/out referendum in other member states. It is also argued that this presents a challenge for EU-NATO cooperation. On these kinds of concerns, British Prime Minister David Cameron commented that they were leaving the European Union, but not withdrawing from the world. To underline his point, Cameron said 650 troops will be sent from the UK for NATO’s new deterrent forces in Poland and the Baltic states.21 Britain has always been a pragmatic mediator between the EU and the US. In the case of Britain’s defence and security policy shifts unequivocally towards NATO, it would hinder formal political coordination and create institutional tensions in countering hybrid threats. With or without Britain, the EU will be a strategic partner for the United States. Thus, the US would search for alternative channels for influencing European policy making and for maximising its national and security interests in Europe. However, the first indicators of new US President Donald Trump’s distinct perspective on the role of NATO in Europe and his sympathetic approach towards Putin’s Russia signal that without Britain’s contribution Europe would be less stable, less secure and less capable militarily and diplomatically. To sum up, in addition to the British people’s decision to withdraw from the EU, the American people’s election of Donald Trump as US President has opened a “period of uncertainty” for the fight against hybrid threats under the framework of the EU’s CESDP and EU-NATO cooperation.

Bibliography Blockmans, S., and Emerson, M. 2016. “Brexit’s Consequences for the UK and the EU”, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, June 2016. Bond, Ian, Sophia Besch, Agata GostyĔska-Jakubowska, Rem Korteweg, Camino Mortera-Martinez and Simon Tilford. 2016. “Europe after Brexit: Unleashed or Undone?” Centre for European Reform, April 2016. Bond, I. 2016. “Brexit and Foreign Policy: Divorce?” Centre for European Reform, Post-referendum Issue 109, July 2016: 7.

21

Ian Bond. 2016. “Brexit and Foreign Policy: Divorce?” Centre For European Reform, Post-referendum Issue 109, July: 7.

90

Chapter V

2016. “BREXIT 2016: Policy Analysis from the Centre for Economic Performance”, The London School of Economics: The Centre for Economic Performance, June 2016. Dijkstra, H. 2016. “UK and EU Foreign Policy Cooperation after Brexit,” Newsbrief, September, Vol. 36, No. 5. Dryburgh, L. 2010. “Blair’s First Government (1997–2001) and European Security and Defence Policy: Seismic Shift or Adaptation?” BJPIR, 12 (2): 257-273. 2016. “Europe in the World: Towards a More Effective EU Foreign and Security Strategy”, London: The House of Lords European Union Committee, February 2016. Faleg, G. 2016. “The Implications of Brexit for the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy,” CEPS Commentary, 26 July 2016. Ford, R., M. Goodwin, and D. Cutts. 2012. “Strategic Eurosceptics and Polite Xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament Elections,” European Journal of Political Research [Online] 51: 204-234. Goodwin, M. 2015. “The Great Recession and the Rise of Populist Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom.” In European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession. ECPR Press. Irwin, G. 2015. “BREXIT: the Impact on the UK and the EU”, Global Counsel: June 2015, the last access on 01.11.2016 file:///F:/CESDP/Global%20Counsel_Impact_of_Brexit.pdf. 2016. “Implications of the Referendum on EU Membership for the UK’s Role in the World”, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2015-16, 26 April 2016. Kassim, H., A. Menon, B. G. Peters, and V. Wright, eds. 2001. The National Co-ordination of EU Policy Making: The EU Level. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kassim, H., and B. G. Peters. 2001. “Conclusion: Co-ordinating National Action in Brussels––a Comparative Perspective.’ In The National Co-ordination of EU Policy Making: The EU Level, edited by H. Kassim, A. Menon, B. G. Peters, and V. Wright, 296-339. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Menon A. and Salter J.S., “Britain’s Influence in the EU”, National Institute Economic Review, No. 236 May 2016. Menon, A. 2004. Leading From Behind: Britain and the European Constitutional Treaty. Paris: Notre Europe. Naurin, D. and Lindahl, R. 2010. “Out in the Cold? Flexible Integration and the Political Status of Euro Opt-outs,” European Union Politics, 11, 4: 485-509.

The Strategic Consequences of Brexit

91

Oliver, T. 2016. “Brexit: What Happens Next?” London School of Economics: Ideas, Strategic Update, 16.2 June 2016. Ostermann, F. 2015. “The End of Ambivalence and the Triumph of Pragmatism? Franco-British Defence Cooperation and European and Atlantic Defence Policy Traditions,” International Relations, Vol. 29 (3): 334-347. Reeve, R., and T. Street. 2016. “Brexit: Whither UK Defence and Foreign Policy?” Oxford Research Group Briefing, July 2016. Thomson, R., J. Arregui, D. Leuffen, R. Costello, J. Cross, R. Hertz, and T. Jensen. 2012. “A New Dataset on Decision-making in the EU Before and After the 2004 and 2007 Enlargements (DEUII)’, Journal of European Public Policy, 19, 4: 604-22. Van Ham, P. 2016. “Brexit: Strategic Consequences for Europe: A Scenario Study”, Clingendael Report, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, February 2016.

CHAPTER VI TURKEY AND THE EU: CHALLENGES OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISES KIVANÇ ULUSOY1

Abstract Since the late 1950s relations between Turkey and the European Union (EU) have been regarded as a question of foreign policy or as a matter of economic development. The official application of Turkey in 1987 slightly changed this mainly technical and economic perspective. The Helsinki Summit in 1999 at which the EU granted official candidate status to Turkey made a radical change in this regard. The EU’s impact on Turkey’s politics gained legitimate ground with the start of the accession negotiations in 2005. However, the relations made an unexpected turn in response to the recent changes in the common neighbourhood of Turkey and the EU. The Arab Spring and the civil war in Syria brought a humanitarian crisis caused by refugee problems as the central question. In light of the recent changes in the Middle East, this article aims to make a current assessment of Turkey-EU relations.

Introduction Until recent times, the process of European integration in the aftermath of World War II was considered mainly as a process of economic integration. The political dimensions of integration including prospects of forming a supranational federal government or the inclusion of East European countries had a secondary importance. This economic and technical dimension inevitably affected Turkey-EU relations. The issues of 1 Professor Dr. at the Faculty of Political Sciences, Istanbul University Turkey. Correspondence: [email protected].

94

Chapter VI

economic integration, including customs union and the extension of trade dominated the agenda carried out primarily as a matter of foreign policy rather than a reform process. However, the second enlargement of the EU in the 1980s––the integration of Greece, Spain and Portugal––transformed the integration process. Various dimensions of supranational political integration became apparent with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. The latest enlargement of the Union towards Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold War showed that the EU impact on the domestic politics of accession countries reached to a tremendous level. Both enlargements had a geopolitical vocation. While the second enlargement made the EU border Mediterranean countries of the Arab world, the inclusion of Central and Eastern European countries made the EU approach the Russian sphere of influence. Rather than being a major military power, the EU penetrated towards the neighbourhood in the south and the east through its so-called “soft power”. This required us to study the EU norms, institutions and policies as an independent framework of political change in the neighbouring regions. The European impact on member states and accession countries, defined as “Europeanization”, refers to a framework of analysis for a Europe-wide political and social transformation which includes neighbour countries. The relations between Turkey and the EU hitherto regarded as a matter of foreign policy and economic relations by the governing elite have gradually gained a different character over the past decades. The EU has been appearing in a domestic context as an agent of transformation in a variety of respects since Turkey’s official application for membership in 1987. In response to this, the EU underlined the necessity of political reform and the adaptation of foreign policy priorities in its verdict of December 1989. The EU’s response was a sign of change in the character of European integration. The impact on Turkey increased as Turkey-EU relations deepened. The Helsinki Summit in 1999 required Turkey to commit to European values and principles of democracy and the peaceful resolution of border problems. In addition to completing the Copenhagen criteria, a standard requirement for accession countries, Turkey issued a series of political and legal reform packages between 1999 and 2004 to start accession negotiations that brought radical political changes. The EU’s transformative impact was expected to be deeper through accession negotiations starting in 2005. However, relations between Turkey and the EU entered a new period with the Arab Spring which started in 2010 with the self inflammation of a street seller in Tunisia and created a domino effect of social and political upheavals in a series of countries in the Middle East and North Africa.

Turkey and the EU: The Challenges of the Middle Eastern Crises

95

However, in addition to a major geopolitical overhaul in this region which brought the biggest change since the end of the Cold War in international politics and security, the civil war in Syria in particular has seriously shaken the traditional ground of negotiations between Turkey and the EU. This change was in close correspondence with the breakdown of the geopolitical order in the Middle East and North Africa which could be considered as a common neighbourhood both for Turkey and the EU. The social and political upheavals and the resulting refugee crisis in this common neighbourhood shifted the focus from accession negotiations bound to specific policy areas and related chapters to the immediate task of how to respond to the humanitarian crisis created by the Syrian civil war. The social and political crisis that came with the mass protests in the Arab world made a comprehensive perspective of the security which links humanitarian questions with geopolitics as the central theme of Turkey-EU relations. In other words, developing common and comprehensive responses to the humanitarian crisis gained priority compared to the membership negotiations. In terms of geopolitics and security implications, the current stage of Turkey-EU relations looks similar to the period after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Similar to the current one, in that period Turkey and EU relations were negatively affected by the acute developments in the immediate neighbourhood and the transformation of the geopolitical environment. In this context, this article aims to analyse the changing character of Turkey-EU relations in light of the latest developments in the Arab world. In the first part of the article, Turkey-EU relations will be assessed from a historical perspective. The two core drivers of Turkey’s two-century-long process of modernisation, “westernization” and “development”, were the chief motives pushing the Turkish governing elites to develop relations with the EU. The second section, in addition to focusing on the effects of the end of the Cold War on Turkey-EU relations, concentrates on the momentum that Turkey-EU relations gained as a result of the Arab Spring. In this section, apart from underlining the significance of political reform to progress in relations, the humanitarian crisis and geopolitical changes in Turkey’s southeastern border caused by the civil war in Syria will be the central themes of the discussion. The concluding remarks aim to provide a future-oriented perspective to respond to common problems in the neighbourhood. This looks like the only way to attain progress in relations in the mid-term, keeping the membership perspective as the key driver of deepening the approximation in domestic politics and foreign policy priorities.

96

Chapter VI

“Westernization” as a Foreign Policy Since the end of World War II, the “linkage” with the West has been the unquestioned characteristic of Turkish foreign policy. This has still been so, despite claims of the “shift of axis” in Turkish foreign policy as a result of the recent foreign policy moves by the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government which has been governing the country since 2002. In order to understand the chief motives of the Turkish governing elite in the post-war period in defining the priorities of Turkish foreign policy, one should look at their historical experience from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire to the establishment of the Turkish Republic. The two central motives, namely “westernization” and “development” shaped their minds in the post-war period. They have carried out these motives since the Tanzimat (the regulations) era: the political modernisation which started in the early 19th century. Since then, the Ottoman-Turkish political elite has defined both their place in world-wide modernisation and the emerging world order based on the nation-states vis-à-vis political, economic and technological developments in Europe. In a period of drastic political transition, “westernization” corresponded to a major effort of building a “nation-state” from the ashes of the collapsing empire (Davison 1990; Zurcher 2005). In this context, the “westernization” drive pushed the Turkish governing elite to be part of the political and economic currents in the West. For this, Turkey became a member of major international institutions from the early 20th century and established formal and informal “links” with the political and institutional structures in the West. These “links” continued in a stregthened form in the post-World War II period. In terms of security perspective, Turkey became an integral part of the Western alliance which developed in the post-war era against the Soviet expansion and sided with the West during the Cold War. That is why, the “westernization” drive for Turkey appeared as a foreign policy, in addition to being a motive of political, economic and technological modernisation. This was a choice based on realistic expectations in both domestic politics and foreign policy. Turkey, in need of stable economic development and suffering from an imminent security threat from the Soviet Union (SU), made the inevitable choice of becoming a Western ally. Rather than being a mere cultural project, “westernization” was a strategic decision with implications on domestic politics and foreign policy (Cooper 2002). Turkey’s links with the Western security architecture became so strong that her relations with other neighbouring regions such as the Middle East turned out to be the simple by-product of its “western” foreign policy (Bishku 1992).

Turkey and the EU: The Challenges of the Middle Eastern Crises

97

Under the pressure of the post-war democratisation trend, Turkey initiated a multi-party regime from the 1950s onwards. Despite the political polarisation, an inevitable result of initiating democratic politics after almost two decades, there was an apparent “consensus” among the political elite in foreign policy. The governing elite, which included those leading the major political parties––the Republican People’s Party and the Democratic Party––and the top military and civil bureaucracy, made a clear choice of being part of the West. Turkey became an official member of the post-war political and economic institutions from the Council of Europe to the OECD, the IMF and the World Bank. It became an official member of NATO, the key institution of the post-war Western security architecture. The beginning of the relations with the European Economic Community (EEC) which culminated with the signing of the Ankara Treaty in 1963 projecting full membership in the mid-term was an inevitable move towards deepening the relations with the West. These strategic moves of the early post-war period soon made Turkey an integral part of the Western security architecture and capitalist economic institutional network. In addition to the core motives of “westernization” and “development”, the Cold War––the ideological clash between the two blocs––shaped Turkey’s foreign policy from a security point of view (Eralp 1994). In this context, neither the power dynamics of the multi-party regime nor the military interventions that came in 1960, 1971 and 1980 were able to change this perspective. The post-war consensus was resilient and continuous. The linkage with the West was reiterated even by the generals immediately after each military intervention. Turkey’s foreign policy was shaped by Cold War realities from 1945 onwards until the early 1990s. However, there is a variety of issues in Turkey’s foreign policy independent from the international systemic context. These have been shaped by the country’s geographical location independent from conjunctural changes in global politics. These issues reassert themselves in the new systemic context. During the Cold War, Turkey’s relations with Greece and the Cyprus conflict had an extraordinary priority and both affected their relations with the West. They were seriously strained because of Turkey’s power struggle with Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey has border problems with Greece in the Aegean sea which are yet to be resolved despite international pressures. Turkey conducted a military intervention on Cyprus to protect its kins. It defended its intervention within the framework of its guaranteeing powers to keep the political status quo on the island determined by the formation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 (Adamson 2001). Both Turkey’s relations with Greece and the Cyprus conflict are beyond the scope of this

98

Chapter VI

paper. It is sufficient to state that Turkey has been extremely sensitive to the geopolitical changes in the Eastern Mediterranean and takes any foreign intervention as a threat to its national interests. During the Cold War, Turkey regarded Greek moves and developments in the Cyprus question as a threat to its national interests. Turkey, as the major power of the region, entered into rivalry with Greece and Cyprus. To keep its hegemonic status, it regarded any change in the status quo as a threat to its broadly defined national interests. Turkey has been acting as if any change in the status quo in the region would hamper its strategic significance by the West in the long-term. Therefore, it finds any involvement by the actors external to this area as an unfriendly move that would inhibit its strategic significance (Ulusoy 2016). During the Cold War, the Cyprus question and the relations with Greece determined the public perception of the foreign policy including parameters of relations with the US and the EC. The political parties of the centre were also in “consensus” in security relations with the US and regarded the relations with the EC crucial for economic reasons. They were also in “consensus” in regard to the Cyprus problem defined as a “national cause”. One should add that differently from other issues including the relations with NATO and the EC, the political “consensus” on the Cyprus issue extends to the extremist political parties of the left and the right. While the Islamist parties condemned the relations with NATO and the EEC as relations with a “Christian club” they strictly followed the national priorities in the Cyprus question. The extreme left perceived the relations with the West as the relations with an ultimately “imperialist” block of countries, but, they were keen on defending the national interests in Cyprus. For both, the Cyprus issue was a “national cause” that could not be sacrificed for the immediate reasons of national security, identity and interest (Da÷ 1998; Çelenk 2008). During the Cold War, the Cyprus question and the relations with Greece not only affected the relations with the EC but were crucial items of Turkey’s multi-party politics. They triggered the nationalist sentiments that politicians find difficult to overcome. The military intervention of 1980 was a clear break for Turkey. In particular, Turkey’s relations with the EC faced a crucial setback. Different from the US which was indirectly supporting the coup, the EC asked for an immediate restoration of the multi-party regime. It pressurised the military regime to end human rights abuses and restore democracy. In fact, the relations with the EC after the coup were widely determined by the pressures coming from the EU towards Turkey’s human rights violations. Turkey restored the multi-party regime in 1983, but, the pressures continued

Turkey and the EU: The Challenges of the Middle Eastern Crises

99

as the Army governed the country behind the scenes and human rights problems continued especially in the southeast (Da÷ 2001). In this context, the EC’s response to Turkey’s application in 1987 was rather premature. It showed the limited approach that the governing elite carried out towards developments in Europe. The EC rejected the application on democracy and human rights grounds and asked for a policy change in regard to Greece and the Cyprus conflict. However, the response showed that the integration took a major turn towards a political route, which was rather different from how the Turkish elite perceived it (Ulusoy 2007). The political conjuncture was also significant. Eastern Europe was on the verge of great changes and soon it became clear that the priority was for stability in the East rather than the concluding of Turkey’s membership process. There was a fear that the instability in the East could affect Western Europe as the bloody collapse of Yugoslavia demonstrated. In this context, the Turkish perception of the relations with the EC on economic and technical grounds failed to see changes in the integration process with the end of the Cold War. Issues such as the customs union and free movement of workers hitherto shaping the relation continued to be significant but democracy and human rights became crucial for membership and geopolitical changes with the end of the Cold War started to determine the enlargement priorities. Turkey’s reaction to the EC’s decision was a deep resentment, rejecting the EC’s underlining of democracy issues and border problems with Greece and the Cyprus conflict as an unjustified intervention in its domestic affairs and foreign policy problems that could only be resolved through bilateral negotiations. In this context, Turkish foreign policy gave its first clear signs of multidimensionality. From the late 1980s onwards, the developments in the Middle East and the Caucasus due to the crumbling Soviet empire paved the way for the return of policy makers to a pragmatic perspective of defining the national interests in the rapidly transforming international system rather than strictly following an ideological line of “westernization” (Steinbach 1994). The motives for turning to the pragmatic perspective were twofold. Aiming to improve its image in Western eyes, Turkey followed a strategy of increasing its freedom of action in the region and strengthening its position to take on regional roles. The expectation of the governing elite appeared to be that the increasing significance of Turkey as a strong regional player would diminish the pressures of democratization from the West. This would also pave the way for deeper integration with the Western security structures in the new strategic context in which the “identity” factor gained significance in shaping security issues

100

Chapter VI

(Karaosmano÷lu 1994; Sayar 1994). One should also underline that the Kurdish secessionism gained a regional dimension which required Turkey to follow a sensitive foreign policy towards its Middle Eastern neighbours. Turkey needed to mobilise its ties with the West to increase its leverage over them (Bölükbaú 1991). However, despite contrary claims, the application showed that the relations with the EC were already politicised. Parliamentary debates showed that, while the government was prepared to use the application as a propaganda item, the opposition parties used the EC’s response to justify their criticisms against the government (Çayhan 1997; Yalçnsoy ve Aúrm 2000). In this period just after the end of the Cold War, the relations with the EU became an integral item of democratization efforts as political debates on European platforms such as the European Parliament found echoes in Turkey. The EU impact was celebrated by the opposition as an important leverage of reform, but nationalist and statist circles in politics and bureaucracy regarded it as unjustified interventions in domestic affairs. Therefore, the relations with the EU which had come to be technical and economic in character became politicised from the early 1980s onwards. In addition to being a catalyst of the power struggle, they gained significance in defining Turkey’s place in the new world order from a bipolar one to a slightly multi-polar one in which economic competition played a key role. In this context, the big business located in Istanbul and the Marmara region pressurised the political classes towards integration with the EC in bold steps. Like civil society organisations asking for more democratic reforms, business circles came to a conclusion that Turkey’s place was in Europe and for this economic and political reforms were necessary. The relations gained a particular importance in the larger economic transition from “developmentalism” to “market liberalism” as the new hegemonic project of the business class (Yalman 2002). The inconclusive debates on technical issues such as a customs union and the free movement of workers started to leave their place to a larger imperative of defining Turkey’s place in the changing post-Cold War world. The Customs Union was finally realised in 1995 after frustrating negotiations. However, the negotiations about the free movement of workers continued to occupy a significant agenda in relations. The negotiations gained a new dimension and became a stress factor as a result of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the fear that developed in Europe from the mass flow of migrants (ùen ve Koray 1993). The migration from Turkey started in the 1960s due to economic reasons. Turkey used workers’ remittances as a crucial item to cover currency needs for its economic

Turkey and the EU: The Challenges of the Middle Eastern Crises

101

model of “import substitution”. This was in line with the two-century-long drive of “development” and constituted an inevitable framework of relations with the EU (Abadan 1975). However, migration in the 1980s had a different dimension. Most people migrated from Turkey to the EU countries for political reasons. Purges after the 1980 coup brought a flux of asylum seekers and this humanitarian dimension affected the European perception of Turkey. They perceived its application as an opportunity to pressurise for further democratic reforms. The Turkish application and the counter EU strategy created a pattern which is still resonating along the current accession negotiations.

The New Context of Political Reform The end of the Cold War initiated a long era of instability and the globalisation of security concerns. Increasing instability in the Middle East and the Balkans led to state collapses, bloody civil wars and foreign interventions. The changing character of American politics and the emerging unipolar world led to the globalisation of security problems and changed their character due to state collapses in various parts of the world (Fouskas 2003). From Africa to the Middle East and the Balkans, collapsing states brought about humanitarian crises and required a comprehensive approach to security problems. The transnational and “hybrid” character of security threats and humanitarian crises particularly showed that current security problems are beyond the capacity of a single country. A comprehensive perspective of security requires global responses coordinated by major powers and international institutions (King 2001). The relations between Turkey and the EU have also been shaped by this post-Cold War context of non-conventional/“hybrid” security challenges. Turkey has felt this change on two occasions: the collapse of the state in Yugoslavia and the American intervention in Iraq. On both occasions, Turkey had to shelter a massive number of refugees in its territory and link the humanitarian perspective to its foreign security policy. The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan had similar repercussions for Turkey which had to give a response to a humanitarian crisis caused by a regional territorial dispute. This made Turkey an extremely important country in the juncture of the three unstable regions––the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus––which are yet to reach stability (Mufti 1998). Security problems took on a different dimension especially after the 9/11 attacks on the twin towers in 2001. In addition to being global, security problems intertwined with identity issues. The 9/11 attacks on the US

102

Chapter VI

showed the global character of terrorism, but, its significance is more than that as it paved the way for political discourse focusing on the “clash of civilizations” which has been shaping world politics ever since (Ferguson and Mansbach 1997; Roberts 2008). This new era in world politics inevitably shaped Turkey-EU relations. Turkey’s inclusion in the EU has been discussed in two different but interrelated contexts. On the one hand, European public opinion has been deeply affected by the fear of “hybrid threats” coming from the neighbouring countries in the south and the east. On the other hand, the subsequent enlargements brought the EU to problematise its role as a global and regional actor affecting world politics. In both cases, the debates over Turkey revealed a deep clash at the elite and larger public levels in Europe. This highly sensitive post-Cold War global strategic context shaped by the US foreign policy priorities revolving around the “war against terrorism” affected the mode of relations between Turkey and the EU. The political and economic integration in Europe had already gained momentum from the 1980s onwards through the Single European Act of 1986 and the Maasticht Treaty of 1992. The Maastricht Treaty brought questions of European citizenship and identity to the forefront of debates over the future of European integration. In fact, questions of identity in Europe went hand in hand with the politicization of migration issues which became an acute problem in terms of absorbing other cultures in deepening European integration. The debates over “citizenship” and “identity”, once shaped within national boundaries, gained a European dimension through inputs from the major EU institutions and intellectual and political trends (Dahrendorf 1994; Habermas 1994). The most distinguishing factor of these cultural debates in the European political agenda was the question of Turkey’s membership of the EU. Turkey occupied centre stage in post-Cold War European politics. Turkey’s democracy was seriously questioned. Authoritarian tendencies in Turkey’s politics, questions such as the Kurdish conflict, the Armenian issue and the Cyprus conflict came to the European political agenda through portraying Turkey as a significant “other” of Europe defined as a sphere of freedom and democracy. It is possible to follow all these debates on Turkey from the mainstream European media and European institutional platforms such as the European Parliament (Öner 2011; Aydn 2012). The populist trends in European politics prevented the positive evaluation of Turkish membership in strategic and economic terms. The “populist zeitgeist” locked the debates on Turkey to those parochical approaches prioritising security, economic problems and anti-migration discourses defended by the extreme right parties (Mudde 2004). Radical

Turkey and the EU: The Challenges of the Middle Eastern Crises

103

right-wing populism that came to the post-Cold War West European political agenda through extreme right parties was actually a local/regional response to global challenges. Those revisionist parties, taking their power from the general resentment to mainstream politics and their novel program based on anti-immigration policies, formed a radical challenge to the inability/unwillingness of established parties to confront the new political exigencies of rapid changes in the socioeconomic and sociocultural environment (Betz 1994). This new trend in national policies was actually neither a marginal political movement nor a political paradox. First of all, it soon became currency which cornered the established parties competing for voter support and preventing them from formulating sound responses to global challenges. Secondly, this was in close correspondence with the decentralising/anti-statist trends triggered by the EU integration process (Hepburn 2009). The EU policies challenging the European nation-states through increasing pressures of decentralization from Brussels created a kind of provincialism and parochialism which hampered the EU’s global projections. This made the case of Turkey particularly difficult, having a particular significance in terms of the EU’s assertiveness in neighbouring regions from the Middle East to the Eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus and the Black Sea. From the early 1990s onwards the EU entered the most comprehensive process of enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe. This enlargement which was completed in 2004 incorporated ten new countries. It soon became clear that the eastern enlargement had serious geopolitical implications as it made an EU border with the Russian sphere of influence in the Balkans and the Black Sea region, and Mediterranean countries different from Europe in cultural terms (Hill 2002). As a result of this enlargement which included Cyprus and Malta, the EU gained a presence in the Eastern Mediterranean where protracted conflicts such as the Cyprus question and the Palestinian problem determined the mode of relations among the states in hard security terms. In this region, identity issues and security concerns were closely intertwined. In this process of enlargement, which was different from other countries of Central and Eastern Europe where the discourse of a “return to Europe” positively shaped the policy environment of the enlargement negotiations, Turkey was faced with an extremely cold response despite being an official candidate country since 1999 and became the target of a series of negative debates shaped by a climate that was sometimes xenophobic and racist, anti-migration and anti-Islamic which was gradually concurring with European politics. In correspondence with the post-9/11 international geopolitical climate, the debates on Turkey’s EU membership were linked in highly confrontational

104

Chapter VI

terms to the “terrorist threat” and confrontational relations between “Islam and the West”. Alternatively, Turkey was discussed in the context of Europe’s expanding economic problems, stalemate and crisis (Zürcher ve Linden 2007). In this context, it was obvious that debates in regard to Turkey’s membership were beyond the regular debates about a candidate country to the EU. In fact, they related to the greater debate of Europe’s identity and destiny: whether Europe would step towards being an open continent to “different” cultures which would contribute to the creation of a peaceful world order or a closed fortress that would keep wealth, democracy and peace inside (BTK 2014). In addition to these cultural debates closely linked with post-9/11 world politics, the possibility of Turkey’s membership in the foreseeble future initiated a major controversy in regard to Europe’s frontiers linked to the serious questions of the “governability” of this huge sui generis entity with 27 member states (Rehn 2007). The end of the Cold War brought similar kinds of social, political and economic upheavals to Turkey as in other countries. Many issues such as the problems of ethnic and religious groups living in the country that were once regarded as “taboos” under the military-bureaucratic tutelage appeared in the public sphere shaped by expanding media channels from tv channels to the printing press (Kasaba 1997). Those debates, carried out mainly in a polarizing way between Islamist/secular and Turkish/Kurdish dichotomies, found great echoes in the context of Turkey’s EU accession process. Turkey’s adoption of the so-called Copenhagen criteria for EU membership issued in 1993 on the eve of the eastern enlargement particularly became a motto of democratizing forces in the country to pressurise the military-bureaucratic establishment. In a similar vein, parliamentary debates about the core issues of the country and the discourse of representatives of civil society groups started to make regular references to European norms and principles to further their political arguments. They regularly underlined in a normative way that aspiring to be an EU member or part of the European civilization required Turkey to establish a fully-fledged democracy (Alpay 2004). In other words, “westernization” once solely associated in the minds of the Turkish elite with having a secular high culture, functioning state and operating market economy started to gain a concrete political meaning. It was clear that “westernization” required the Turkish governing elite to incorporate the consolidation of a genuine democratic regime as an essential dimension of being regarded as a modern European country. In this context, from the 1990s onwards Turkey-EU relations appeared not only as a debate about Turkey’s place in the world but also as a matter of

Turkey and the EU: The Challenges of the Middle Eastern Crises

105

political restructuring along liberal democratic lines. This process, which started with the negative European response to Turkey’s application, culminated with the Helsinki Summit of the EU in 1999. The EU granted Turkey official candidate status at this summit that paved the way for a series of reform packages radically changing Turkey’s legal and political structures. With the summit decisions, the relations hitherto lacking a basic ground––the mutual commitment of the negotiating parties in regard to full membership––have been situated in a concrete allocation of commitments and responsibilities. The summit overcame the central paradox of Turkey-EU negotiations traditionally defined as the “anchor/credibility” dilemma (U÷ur 2003). The Helsinki Summit initiated a period of mutual commitments between the parties. The essence of the commitments was that the EU had to respond to Turkey’s reform efforts with progress in the accession negotiations. Between 2001 and 2004, successive governments under Bulent Ecevit and Recep Tayyip Erdogan issued nine reform packages which included the abolition of capital punishment, broadcasting in languages other than Turkish (mainly referring to Kurdish) and granting property rights to minority foundations. In the Turkish context, the minorities were legally defined with the Lozan Treaty of 1923 as non-muslim communities––Jews, Armenians and Greeks. In 2005, Turkey-EU relations gained momentum with the start of the accession negotiations that made Turkey more open to European pressures on domestic politics. Turkey became open to the pressures of adaptation to European priorities in areas such as justice and home affairs, social policy, environmental policy and regional development. In these policy areas which are different from the traditional European concerns about democracy and human rights, Turkey became open to European pressures (Tsaruhas et al. 2007). The European impact started to reach the cores of Turkey’s political structures. The accession negotiations have continued since 2005, however, they have had intervals mainly due to political changes in the common neighbourhood of Turkey and the EU. The most important obstacle that has so far emerged is the Cyprus conflict which entered a new phase due to the rejection of the Annan Plan by Greek Cypriots in a referendum just before entering the EU in 2004. It became more complex due to the discovery of natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean which opened a new area of geopolitical competition between Turkey, Israel, Greece and the Cyprus Republic (Ulusoy 2016). The indepth analysis of the current stage of the Cyprus negotiations is beyond the scope of the present paper. However, it is sufficient to state at this moment that it is difficult to think that the conflict resolution

106

Chapter VI

perspectives of the parties are not affected by the major geopolitical overhaul created by the post-Arab Spring turmoil in the Eastern Mediterranean countries. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to think of the resolution of this protracted conflict in the short term.

The Arab Spring and Its Implications One of the most crucial geographical areas with implications for Turkey-EU relations is the Euro-Mediterranean area which includes mainly the Muslim Arab countries and Israel. The Euro-Mediterranean region became a sphere of cultural confrontations and imminent security threats especially after the September 11 attacks. It turned into a region of non-conventional security threats from mass refugee flows to terrorism and other transnational problems such as environmental disasters. Those threats desperately require an integrated approach and the extensive cooperation of states on both shores of the Mediterranean (Calleya 2013). Since 1995, the Barcelona Process that governed the relations between the EU and Arab countries demonstrated the significance of this area for regional peace, stability and prosperity. The EU followed a strategy of transforming their political systems governed by authoritarian regimes. The installation of democratic regimes and liberal economic principles was the key feature of the EU’s approach in this area. The EU aimed to establish a political dialogue and encouraged the mobilisation of civil society actors on both shores of the Mediterranean to boost administrative reform and democratization (Del Sarto et al. 2006). The Barcelona Process gave up its place to the French initiative of the “Union for Mediterranean” in July 2008 which followed similar principles and priorities. However, independent from the EU impact, the authoritarian regimes of the Mediterranean region were shaken by the impressive economic and political transformations from the late 1980s onwards. These dramatic transformations left authoritarian regimes on the verge of collapse. All these occurred as a result of long years of disenchantment and political pressures coming from the bottom and political pressures coming from Northern European neighbours (Aliboni 2010). From 2010 onwards, most of the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa were faced with dramatic upheavals like a “domino effect” after the self-inflammation of a street seller in Tunisia. The Arab people, in mass protests called the Arab Spring, simply asked for “good governance” and “dignity”. The regimes’ responses were fierce leading to massive killings as in Egypt and Syria. The events in Syria turned to a bloody civil war in 2011. The massive changes that could be labelled as “revolutions” in the Arab countries

Turkey and the EU: The Challenges of the Middle Eastern Crises

107

showed themselves on European shores first of all as dramatic refugee flows. The demographs already underlined that the aging of the European populations could be compensated by regulated migration from developing countries when migration flows started to increase from the early 1990s onwards (Fargues 2012). In other words, for many demographs and economists, migration could be an opportunity for development purposes for both shores of the Mediterranean. However, the security situation which became even more acute in the aftermath of September 11 and later the Arab Spring made it extremely difficult to look at migration as an economic opportunity. Under the heavy pressures of the humanitarian crisis and the threat of terrorism, the EU inevitably started to see its relations with the Arab countries as a matter of internal security (Wolf 2012). Justice and home affairs, considered as one of the least centralised policy areas at EU level, gradually turned into a matter of security and control. The member states have been so divided that even a minimum level of coordination in this area turned out to be an extremely difficult effort (Den Boer 1999). The initial positive approach of the early years of the Barcelona Process that linked migration to development and expected a positive impact of the growing population in the economic development of the Euro-Mediterranean area, was difficult to sustain due to expanding cultural conflicts and terrorism in post-9/11 world politics. The civil war in Syria and the acute humanitarian crisis as a result of the massive refugee flows have revealed that the EU countries are still far from formulating a coordinated response despite the issue of a new framework for EU democratic assistance through the “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity” (Teti 2012). In the Euro-Mediterranean context the role of Turkey became extremely crucial in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Turkey, because of its different status as a candidate country with a membership perspective, stayed mostly as an observer of the developments in the Euro-Mediterranean area and the EU policies towards this region. However, the Arab Spring required Turkey and the EU to deepen their cooperation as both were faced with a severe humanitarian crisis caused by the Syrian civil war and the threats of terrorism. Those “hybrid threats” such as the humanitarian crisis, refugee problems, and terrorism shaking the Euro-Mediterranean political agenda are beyond the capacity of a single country. The national or European policies prioritising security concerns but overlooking humanitarian problems do not look very promising because of the massive scale of the problems and their “hybrid” character involving non-conventional threats. In this new geopolitical context, building higher walls and stronger

108

Chapter VI

frontiers will resolve little. The terrorist attack organised against the Charlie Hebdo magazine in France in January 2015 and the fact that the terrorists stayed in Syria and Turkey before this particular attack and many others occurring over the past few years, showed that Turkey and the EU had a very serious common problem of how to deal with these so-called “foreign terrorist fighters” defending a “global jihad” against the West (Yalçnkaya 2015). The Arab Spring provided a rather peculiar type of momentum in Turkey-EU relations in that the massive social and geopolitical upheavals in the common neighbourhood shaped the character of relations rather than the framework of negotiations. In this context, when analysed closely the progress reports on Turkey prepared since 1998, the foreign policy of Turkey and the European neighbourhood policy formulated in the aftermath of the eastern enlargement showed a close parallelism. This parallelism reached such a level that the EU portrayed Turkey as a model country for the emerging Arab democracies in the aftermath of the Arab Spring because of her peculiar experience of adopting a democratic regime in an Islamic political context (Bali 2011). The “Turkish model” actually found resonance in the Arab countries in search of a democratic regime after the Arab Spring (Altunúk 2010). However, soon the limits of this model appeared as the newly established democratic regimes mostly led by the moderate Islamist governments in Egypt and Tunisia were faced with an authoritarian backlash engineered by the forces of the old regimes benefiting from their lack of experience in governance and the increasing concerns of national security. In addition to showing the limits of Turkey as a model of “conservative democracy”, the post-Arab Spring period showed the limits of Turkey as a regional power to radically transform regional geopolitics. As a latecomer to Middle Eastern geopolitics, the post-Arab Spring period showed that Turkey’s power projections in the region would end in futile efforts unless it kept a sensitive diplomatic balance in the region including external actors such as the US, Russia and the EU countries which had clear stakes in the Middle East (Öniú 2014). Responding to the refugee crisis is the key area that will shape Turkey-EU relations in the coming years. Cooperation in migration management as a result of the refugee crisis caused by the Syrian civil war appears to be the backbone of the present momentum in Turkey-EU relations that started with three summits in September 2015, November 2015 and March 2016. The parties came together, despite serious friction to discuss the various issues of humanitarian assistance to refugees. The relationship had already come to its lowest point because of the veto of the Cyprus Republic and various chapters of Turkey’s membership negotiations

Turkey and the EU: The Challenges of the Middle Eastern Crises

109

just after their start in 2005, but a “train crash” did not occur as both parties agreed to keep relations alive and saw the implications of the Middle Eastern crisis. In these summits which took place almost a decade after the start of negotiations, this policy of keeping relations alive showed its relevance. In addition to a “common declaration” to cooperate in the management of the refugee crisis, Turkey and the EU decided to go further in the fight against terrorism, maintaining a high-level political dialogue, and opening new chapters of negotiation. They also decided to cooperate in other areas of common concern such as energy security. Finally, the EU decided to devote 3 billion Euros to be used for the Syrian refugees living in Turkey. In order to understand the current dimensions of Turkey-EU relations, it is sufficient to look at the present stage of the Syrian crisis, the humanitarian tragedy and the security problems that were created both for Turkey and the EU. Turkey, as a result of its geographical position in the juncture of Asia, Europe and the Middle East has been regularly facing migration flows from many countries. It has been a destination for migrants particularly from the adjacent regions from the Caucasus to the Middle East and the Balkans due to historical reasons. As underlined above, in the aftermath of the Cold War, ethnic and religious conflicts in these regions simply increased the volume of migration. However, the civil war in Syria has completely changed the scale and character of the problem that Turkey has been facing. The tremendous bloodshed in Syria and the involvement of many terrorist organisations in the Syrian conflict made Turkey extremely vulnerable to all forms of “hybrid” threats coming from Syria. In particular, the conflicts among the terrorist groups like ISIS and the Kurdish PYD seeking to create their own protected regions in Syria have been spilling over the boundaries of Turkey and destabilising Turkey’s already fragile domestic order as the terrorist attacks over the past year have demonstrated. The terrorist attacks including suicide bombings are not confined to the Turkish border towns with Syria but reach major cities like Ankara and Istanbul. Around 50 people died (mostly police) and 150 people were injured in the latest attack in Istanbul’s city centre after a football match. The present refugee problem is the gravest since World War II but the terrorism dimension and the continuing civil war in Syria have made the task of sustaining a humanitarian perspective towards the problem extremely difficult. This human tragedy naturally affected Turkey and other neighbouring countries like Jordan and Lebanon. It pushed them to coordinate their actions in regard to this common problem (ORSAM 2014). By the end of 2015, the number of refugees who left Syria and came to

110

Chapter VI

border countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon and the EU countries reached 4.5 million. An estimated total of 9 million individuals were displaced in the five years of the Syrian conflict. This has created severe problems in terms of refugee accommodation, clean water, collecting garbage, health and education. The reports detail that they suffer from severe shortages of all kinds of humanitarian assistance (ORSAM 2015). The Turkish government considered the Syrian population to be protected “guests” settled on its territory in the medium term, who will be prepared to return home once the conflict ends. However, this has not been the case over the past five years. This has made Turkey consider the security problems caused by the Syrian civil war from a long-term perspective and as a comprehensive matter. In this respect, the activities of international humanitarian organisations and the Turkish government rightly concentrated on humanitarian issues like child abuse, the rape of women and education psychotheraphy. These are considered crucial to protect the mental health of individuals through providing education and intellectual capacities to resist the temptations of terrorist organisations abusing their desperate situation. This is actually the most fertile ground for terrorist groups to find militants. Turkey is not alone in responding to the refugee crisis. In coordination with the government of Turkey, ten UN agencies (FAO, ILO, IOM, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, WEP and WHO) have been active in Syrian migration management. The provinces of Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan, the three countries bordering Syria, have been feeling the effects of the civil war in a dramatic way. In particular, the Turkish border towns in the southeast such as Urfa, Gaziantep and Hatay have been faced with drastic changes in population composition and the problems of city infrastructure. Those provinces desperately need to upgrade their infrastructure from garbage collection to water supply as most of the Syrian refugees live outside the camps. They started to seriously feel the effects of the Syrian crisis after five years especially through problems of security as terrorist organisations of different kinds operating cross-border found shelters in those cities. 2 According to the reports of the UN High Commissioner, since May 2016 the number of Syrian migrants living in the camps and cities of Turkey’s border provinces reached 2.84 million. According to statistics, in some towns in those provinces the number of Syrian migrants reached more than 5% of the local population. This has left Turkey with an acute “social 2

Author’s interviews with local government officials and citizens in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon.

Turkey and the EU: The Challenges of the Middle Eastern Crises

111

question” which requires the improvement of city infrastructures and security measures. Friction between the local population and migrants due to economic reasons has been exploited by terrorist groups. Benefiting from the almost chaotic situation in the border towns, terrorist organisations operate easily and use the already fragile situation in regard to Turkey’s Kurdish question.3 In response to the refugee crisis, Turkey hitherto followed an “open door” policy and did not send them back to Syria. This policy was in correspondence with Turkey’s international commitments. Turkey opened 26 refugee camps in ten provinces. The camps have been managed by the Presidency for Emergency and Disaster Management (AFAD) operating under the Prime Ministry. The provinces and the number of camps are as follows: Hatay (6 camps), ùanlurfa (5 camps), Gaziantep (5 camps), Mardin (3 camps), Kilis (2 camps), Kahramanmaraú (1 camp), Adana (1 camp), Osmaniye (1 camp), Adyaman (1 camp) and ve Malatya (1 camp). However, only 15% of registered Syrians live in these camps. Most live outside the camps and are in need of humanitarian assistance. As most of them are young, women and children, the dimensions of the “social question” that Turkey has been facing become more dramatic. The refugees living outside the camps suffer from severe shortages of all kinds of human needs from housing and health services to education and social assistance. They live and work under inhumane conditions and their children are not educated. Child labor becomes a common problem for refugees in Turkey. The families suffering from the lack of primary needs are unable to send their children to school. Instead they send them to work or begging. In this respect, to overcome this “social question”, many international and national organisations at both central and local levels have been mobilised. As underlined above, Turkey-EU relations gained new momentum in order to respond to this humanitarian crisis. In the present situation that the end of the civil war in Syria is not in sight, the major task ahead for both Turkey and the EU is to deepen cooperation and increase coordination with other international and national organisations operating in the field.

Concluding Remarks The public opinion surveys conducted in Turkey and Europe over the past few years have underlined that despite the start of the accession negotiations in 2005, both areas are not very optimistic about Turkey’s EU 3

Author’s interviews with local security officers in Gaziantep and Urfa.

112

Chapter VI

membership prospects in the short term. This is understandable when considered in the context of the political problems in Turkey and the economic crisis in 2008 that has deeply shaken the EU structures. The extensive assessment of both is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we can briefly underline that the EU has been in a deep crisis of governance since the conclusion of the Eastern Enlargement. This has become evident with the recent British decision to leave the EU in a referendum. Turkey, due to the aborted coup attempt of 15 July, suffered from a very serious political crisis, if not a complete slide back towards an authoritarian regime. The coup attempt and the government response showed that Turkish democracy is still in the process of consolidation. The Cyprus conflict is still there as a stumbling block before the progress of relations despite the goodwill of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to resolve it. Turkey’s accession negotiations are actually continuing with impressive efforts to consolidate its democracy and resolve this protracted conflict. However, at this stage of the relations, the parties have been facing a major humanitarian crisis in their common neighbourhood. Turkey and the EU have been facing a dramatic refugee crisis caused by the Syrian civil war which has been continuing for almost five years. As underlined above, the relations have so far been regarded as a matter of “high politics” and carried out with the two central motives of Turkey’s two-century-long modernisation efforts: “westernization” and “development”. The negotiations process in 33 chapters related to policy areas initiated a process of major adaptation for Turkey. However, they currently face a new situation rather than a setback as many argue. The central question in Turkey-EU relations is where the civil war in Syria would be evolving. The chief task appears to be about how to respond to the refugee crisis created by this civil war. The main argument of this paper is that Turkey-EU relations actually evolved in the context of changing international politics and the common neighbourhood. The Syrian crisis reveals that the international order and regional power structures have again been in the process of a major reshuffle. The end of the Syrian crisis is not in sight. Therefore, there is no other way than the perception of the humanitarian crisis caused by this civil war as a common problem that can only be resolved through cooperation rather than competition. This is a matter of perception rather than negotiation.

Turkey and the EU: The Challenges of the Middle Eastern Crises

113

Bibliography Abadan, Nermin et al. 1975. Migration and Development: A Study of the Effects of International Migration on Bo÷azlyan District. Ankara: Ajans-Türk Pres. Adamson, Fiona. 2001. “Democratization and Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis”, Political Science Quarterly 116: 277-303. Aliboni, Roberto. 2012. “Societal Change and Political Responses in the Euro-Mediterranean Area.” In Arab Society in Revolt, edited by Cesare Merlini and Olivier Roy, 184-213. Washington: Brookings University Press. Alpay, ùahin. 2004. “Crisis in the Identity Politics of Turkey.” In The Politics of Group Rights: The State and Multiculturalism, edited by I. Ahmed, 101-128. Lanham: University Press of America. Altunúk, Meliha Benli. 2010. Arap Dünyasnda Türkiye Algs. østanbul: TESEV. Aydn-Düzgit, Senem. 2012. Constructions of European Identity: Debates and Discourse on Turkey and the EU. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Bali, Asl. 2011. “A Turkish Model Fort: the Arab Spring”, Middle East Law and Geopolitics 3: 24-42. Ba÷msz Türkiye Komisyonu (BTK). 2014. Avrupa’da Türkiye: De÷iúimin Kaçnlmazl÷. østanbul: Açk Toplum Vakf. Betz, Hans-Georg. 1994. Radical Right-wing Populism in Western Europe. London: The Macmillan Press. Bishku, Michael. 1992. “Turkey and its Middle Eastern Neighbors since 1945”, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 15: 51-71. Bölükbaú, Süha. 1991. “Ankara, Damascus, Baghdad and the Regionalization of Turkey’s Kurdish Secessionism”, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 14: 15-36. Calleya, Stephen. 2013. Security Challenges in the Euro-Med Area in the 21st Century. London: Routledge. Çayhan, Esra. 1997. Türkiye ve Avrupa Birli÷i øliúkileri ve Siyasi Partilerin Konuya Bakú. østanbul: Boyut. Çelenk, Serpil. 2008. Solun Merce÷inde Dú Politika: TøP Deneyimi, 1960-1970, 143-188. Istanbul: Daktylos. Cooper, Malcolm. 2002. “The Legacy of Atatürk: The Turkish Political Structures and Policy-making”, International Affairs 78: 115-128. Da÷, øhsan. 2001. “Human Rights and Democratization: Turkish Politics in the European Context”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 1: 51-68.

114

Chapter VI

—. 1998. Kimlik Söylem Siyaset: Do÷u-Bat Ayrmnda Refah Partisi Gelene÷i, 51-59. Ankara: ømge. Dahrendorf, Ralph. 1994. “The Changing Quality of Citizenship.” In The Condition of Citizenship, edited by Bart van Steenbergen, 10-19. London: Sage. Davison, Roderic. 1990 “Atatürk’s Reforms.” In, Essays in Ottoman Turkish History, 1774-1923: The Impact of the West, edited by Roderic Davison, 242-263. Austin: University of Texas Press. Den Boer, Monica. 1999. “Justice and Home Affairs: Cooperation Without Integration.” In Policy-making in the European Union, edited by Helen Wallace and William Wallace, 389-409. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Del Sarto, Raffaella et al. 2006. Benchmarking Democratic Development in the Euro-Mediterranean Area: Conceptualizing, Ends, Means and Strategies. Euromesco Report, Lisbon: Euromesco. Eralp, Atila. 1994. “Turkey in the Changing Postwar World Order: Strategies of Development and Westernization.” In Developmentalism and Beyond: Society, Politics in Egypt and Turkey, edited by Ayúe Öncü, Ça÷lar Keyder and Saad Eddin øbrahim, 204-229. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. Öner, Selcen. 2011. Turkey and the European Union: The Question of European Identity. Maryland: Lexington Books. Fargues, Philippe. 2012. “Demography, Migration and Revolt in the Southern Mediterranean.” In Arab Society in Revolt, edited by Cesare Merlini and Olivier Roy, 17-46. Washington: Brookings University Press. Ferguson, Yale and Richard Mansbach. 1996. “The Past as Prelude to the Future? Identities and Loyalties in Global Politics.” In The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, edited by Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, 21-44. London: Lynee Rienner. Fouskas, Vassilis. 2003. Zones of Conflict: US Foreign Policy in the Balkans and the Greater Middle East. London: Pluto Press. Habermas, Jurgen. 1994. “Citizenship and National Identity.” In The Condition of Citizenship, edited by Bart van Steenbergen, 20-35. London: Sage. Hepburn, Eve. 2009. “Regionalist Party Mobilization on Immigration”, West European Politics 32: 514-435. Hill, Christopher. 2002. “The Geopolitical Implications of Enlargement.” In Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union, edited by Jan Zielonka, 95-116. London: Routledge. Karaosmano÷lu, Ali. 1994. “The Limits of International Influence for

Turkey and the EU: The Challenges of the Middle Eastern Crises

115

Democratization.” In Politics in the Third Turkish Republic, edited by Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, 117-131. Boulder: Westview Press. Resat Kasaba. 1997. “Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities.” In Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, edited by S. Bozdogan and R. Kasaba, 15-36. Washington: Washington University Press. King, Charles. 2001. “The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Euroasia’s Unrecognized States”, World Politics 53: 524-552. Levenex, Sandra. 2008. “Asylum Policy.” In Europeanization: New Research Agendas, edited by Paolo Graziano ve Maarten Vink, 309-320. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Melotti, Umberto. 1997. “International Migration in Europe: Social Projects and Political Cultures.” In The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity and Community, edited by Tariq Modood and Pnina Werbner, 73-92. London: Zed Books. Mudde, Cas. 2009. “The Populist Zeitgeist”, Government and Opposition 39: 527-650. Mufti, Malik. 1998. “Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy”, Middle East Journal 52: 32-49. ORSAM I. 2014. Suriye’ye komúu ülkelerde Suriye’li mültecilerin durumu: Bulgular, Sonuçlar ve öneriler. Ankara: ORSAM. ORSAM II. 2015. Türk Kzlay Toplum Merkezi Projesi. Ankara: ORSAM. Ortega, Martin, ed. 2003. The European Union and the Crisis in the Middle East. Chaillot Papers, 62, Paris: ISS. Öniú, Ziya. 2014. “Turkey and the Arab Revolutions: Boundaries of Regional Power Influence in a Turbulent Middle East,” Mediterranean Politics 19: 203-219. Rehn, Olli. 2007. Avrupa’nn gelecek snrlar: Türkiye bir köprü mü, köprübaú m yoksa ergime potas m? østanbul: 1001 Kitap Yaynevi. Roberts, Adam. 2008. “International Relations after the Cold War,” International Affairs 84: 335-350. Sayar, Sabri. 1994. “Islam and International Relations of Turkey.” In Cultural Transitions in the Middle East, edited by ùerif Mardin, 215-224. Leiden: E. J. Brill. Steinbach, Udo. 1994. “The European Community, the United States, the Middle East and Turkey.” In Politics in the Third Turkish Republic, edited by Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, 103-116. Boulder: Westview Press. ùen Faruk ve Sedef Koray. 1993. Türkiye’den Avrupa Toplulu÷u’na Göç Hareketleri. Ankara: Elit Basmevi.

116

Chapter VI

Teti, Andrea. 2012. “The EU’s First Response to the ‘Arab Spring’: A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity”, Mediterranean Politics 17: 266-184. Tsaruhas, Dimitris et al. 2007. Bridging the Real Divide: Social and Regional Policy in Turkey’s EU Accession Process. Ankara: METU Press. U÷ur, Mehmet. 2003. “Testing Times in EU-Turkey Relations: the Road to Copenhagen and Beyond,” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 5: 164-183. Ulusoy, Kvanç. 2007. “Turkey’s Reform Effort Reconsidered, 1987-2004,” Democratization 14: 472-490. Ulusoy, Kvanç. 2016. “The Cyprus Conflict: Turkey’s Strategic Dilemma,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 18: 393-406. Ünal, Özgür. 2009. “The Emergence of New Security Threats to the EU and their Implications for EU-Turkey Relations: The Case of Illegal Migration.” In Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: An Unusual Candidacy, edited by Constantine Arvanitopoulos, 95-106. Heidelberg: Springer. Wallace, Helen. 1999. “Politics and Policy in the EU: The Challenge of Governance.” In Policy-making in the European Union, edited by Helen Wallace and William Wallace, 3-36. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wallace, William. 1999. “Government without Statehood: The Unstable Equilibrium.” In Policy-making in the European Union, edited by Helen Wallace and William Wallace, 441-460. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wolf, Sarah. 2012. The Mediterranean Dimension of the European Union’s Internal Security. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Yalçnsoy, Hülya ve Adil Aúrm. 2000. Türkiye’deki Siyasi Partilerin Avrupa Birli÷i’ne Bakú. Ankara: SUDE Ajans. Yalçnkaya, Haldun. 2015. “Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Turkey”, ORSAM Review of Regional Affairs, 31. Yalman, Galip. 2002. “The Turkish State and Bourgeoisie in Historical Perspective: a Relativist Paradigm or a Panoply of Hegemonic Strategies?” In The Politics of Permanent Crisis: The State, Class, and Ideology in Turkey, edited by Neúecan Balkan and Sungur Savran, 21-54. New York: Nova Publishers. Zürcher, Erik ve H. van der Linden. 2007. Avrupa Birli÷i, Türkiye ve øslam, Hollanda Kamu Politikalar Bilimsel Kurulu Raporu. østanbul: Baúlk. Zurcher, Erik-Jan. 2005. “Ottoman Sources of Kemalist Thought.” In Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy, edited by Elizabeth Ozdalga, 14-27. London: Routledge.

CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION GIRAY SADIK1

In Search of Hybrid Policy Implications The EU has been enduring trials with hybrid threats which have been constantly testing European security and the Europeans’ commitment to their proclaimed values. Under these pressing circumstances, Europe has been constructed and reconstructed via hybrid trials from within and abroad. As a Turkish folk-saying stresses, one should not believe oneself to be successful in trials that have yet to transpire. Recent years have witnessed the EU facing on-going threats and trials from an assertive Russia in the East to Brexit in the West, and to the political and social aftershocks of the so-called Arab Spring stretching across an increasing number of trouble-spots from Libya to Syria and Iraq. As these challenges have been affecting Europe inside and out, EU countries and partners need to devise timely long-term political strategies to deal with them. There remains a need to identify key policies which can guide European policy-makers to further improve their cooperation against hybrid threats. As the research presented in this book asserts, this is not only important for European security, but also critical for the strategic relevance of the EU as a global actor and also for its members, partners, and neighbours. Instead of seeking strict conclusions, this book aims to open the debate on the nature of European power as explained in the introduction. The present volume is indeed a search for conclusions, aiming to contribute to the Euro-Atlantic debate on hybrid threats by exploring the promise and pitfalls of the suggested policies in light of the critical discussions in various 1

Associate Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Political Science, Ankara Yldrm Beyazt University, Turkey. Correspondence: [email protected] ; [email protected].

118

Chapter VII

chapters throughout the book. While these debates are necessary, the greater challenge would be to put them into practice and view their viabilities. Evidently, these analyses are likely to have significant policy implications for EU-members, partners, and neighbours. If European policy-makers are to realise that these hybrid threats are unlikely to be solved by xenophobia, extremism, Islamophobia, and shades of nationalism, then the EU may be able to take a sober fresh initiative towards effective measures against these threats. In this regard, forms of cooperation within the EU and outside the EU on its frontiers remain essential components of any effective European foreign policy. Such cooperation demands more than lip-service. Perceived or real inactivity on the part of the EU seriously risks European credibility as a global actor. The longer European policy-makers insist on turning a blind-eye to this need for effective policy, the more likely it is that their self-inflicted damage to the European dream may become irreparable. This edited volume has opened the debate on the question of what kind of power is required on the part of the EU to effectively address the enduring hybrid threats before it is too late for Europeans, old and new. This is why there are multiple chapters in the book on the policy implications of demographic challenges to European security. From the mass refugee influx through Italy, Greece, and Turkey, to the future of the Schengen Area, these interrelated hybrid threats are likely to remain on the EU agenda for its member states, and in its relations with prospective candidate states like Turkey. In this regard, the EU needs to adopt a long-term strategic approach to hybrid threats instead of short-term tactics to save the day such as the recent deal with Turkey, called by many a “refugee band-aid”. This requires a transformation in the mind-set of European policy-makers. It is important to keep in mind that, in the case of hybrid threats, the security of the EU is interdependent with its NATO allies such as the USA and Turkey, as well as with key neighbours such as Russia, and its surrounding regions like the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Eurasia. Europe, with its borders stretching from Africa to Russia, has been well-placed to take advantage of the opportunities of its position. Nowadays, from a geopolitical point of view, the EU appears vulnerable to the demographic challenges from the south, and seems threatened by an increasingly assertive Russia to the east. Furthermore, European countries’ vulnerability to hybrid threats from the violent political instability in the Middle East and North Africa is likely to remain, and may grow. Massing refugees in Turkey and EU countries are presenting a fertile ground for radicalisation and terrorist recruitment. The terrorist attacks at Istanbul and Brussels airports are among the most recent shocking reminders that geography and empty talk alone cannot keep Europe safe nowadays.

Conclusion

119

Following the challenges of Ukraine, these hybrid threats around Europe have gathered more momentum upon the direct engagement of Russia in the Syrian war. It follows that there are multiple chapters in the book discussing EU-Russian relations with respect to Ukraine, Syria, and the pertinent policy implications of these threats for European security. It can be concluded that a change in mind-set is a necessary but not sufficient step towards effective countermeasures against hybrid threats. There is a need to support this mind-set transformation with commensurate changes in European capabilities. Today, with the exception of a few EU countries, most EU members have not met their NATO commitments of a defence budget of a minimum of 2 per cent of their GDP. This supports the claim that the EU has been, and still remains, unprepared against hybrid threats. In this regard, it is also important to add that increasing funds for defence is unlikely to yield effective results in the short-term. While transforming European mind-sets and capabilities, policy-makers also need to keep in mind that hybrid threats are undergoing constant transformation. Perhaps the main conclusion of this edited book is the fact that the analysis of these multifaceted hybrid threats requires diverse expertise. This conclusion needs to be considered when devising strategies to counter these hybrid threats. Countering hybrid threats is not a task that the EU can undertake effectively in isolation. The EU still needs NATO in terms of its military capabilities. This has become ever more evident as EU member states bordering Ukraine rushed to call Washington before Brussels. After all, Europeans calling Washington when concerned about Russia is a decades-old Cold War habit. When it comes to demographic challenges from MENA countries, once again the EU alone is far from being capable. In this regard, the EU continues to need Turkey. Considering Turkey’s decades-long journey for EU accession, the EU has never needed a credible enlargement policy more than today, as EU leverage is declining. In light of growing hybrid threats, this decline can signal the decline of the EU as a global actor, and it is likely to pave the way to its own strategic irrelevance. In conclusion, short-sighted EU policies are likely to exacerbate the hybrid threats of refugees and terrorism which will further isolate the EU and increase the vulnerability of Europeans and their partners. Hybrid threats have been of critical importance for the EU. These threats are likely to remain, if not increase, against the interests of Europeans in the foreseeable future. This edited volume rings the bells for the growing importance of hybrid threats and for the need for timely and effective international cooperation within the EU and with other partners.

120

Chapter VII

Accordingly, hybrid threats of such complexity require further research, as their masterminds seek to transform their adaptability to strategic advantage. Further research on hybrid threats needs to move beyond post-hoc analysis and start building venues for strategic learning.

EDITOR AND CONTRIBUTOR BIOGRAPHIES

Editor’s Biography Assoc. Prof. Dr. Giray SADIK (Associate Professor & Vice Chair, SBF-AYBU) earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Georgia (Georgia, USA) specialising in International Relations and Comparative Politics. International security, public opinion & foreign policy interaction, transatlantic relations (NATO, EU-CFSP) and European and Turkish foreign policies are among his research interests. In addition to Dr. Sadk’s various international publications, his recent research on Euroscepticism and its Eurasian implications was published as a book chapter in Playing Second Fiddle? Contending Visions of Europe’s Development (Universus Academic Press, Sweden, 2015. Available at: http://universus.se/arkiv/book/playing-second-fiddle-2). He was a post-doctoral fellow in the Department of Global Political Studies (GPS) at Malmö University in Sweden; currently, he is Associate Professor & Vice Chair, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Political Science, Ankara Yldrm Beyazt University, Turkey (SBF-AYBU). The website of the European Union Delegation to Turkey at the Academic Network for European Studies in Turkey (A-NEST) provides an access link and forthcoming updates to his biography at: http://www. avrupa.info.tr/sites/default/files/2016-09/DocDrSADIKbio.pdf

Biographies of the Chapter Authors Prof. Dr. Kvanç Ulusoy is currently a Professor of Political Science at Istanbul University. He was previously a Fulbright Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School (2012-2013), a Jean Monnet Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute in Florence (2003-2004) and a fellow at the Madrid Diplomatic School (1996-1997). His areas of research include regime change and democratization, Turkish politics and Turkey-EU relations. Dr. Ulusoy has conducted studies at the Departments of Political Science and International Relations in various universities such as the Middle East Technical

122

Editor and Contributor Biographies

University, Bogazici University and Sabanci University in Turkey, Granada University in Spain, Stockholm University in Sweden and Tsukuba University in Japan. Some of his recent publications include “The Europeanization of Turkey and its Impact on the Cyprus Issue”, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, December 2008; "The Changing Challenge of Europeanization to Politics and Governance in Turkey", International Political Science Review, Vol. 30, No. 3, (November 2009); “Elections and Regime Change in Turkey: Tenacious Rise of Political Islam”, Mahmoud Hamad and Khalil al-Anani (eds) Elections and Democratization in the Middle East: The Tenacious Search for Freedom, Justice and Dignity, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). Assoc. Prof. Dr. Maria Raquel Freire is a researcher at the Centre for Social Studies (CES) and Associate Professor (with agregação) of International Relations at the School of Economics of the University of Coimbra (FEUC). She received her PhD in International Relations from the University of Kent, UK, in 2002. She is currently director of the PhD Programme in International Politics and Conflict Resolution, CES|FEUC. She is also a member of the Governing Board of the European International Studies Association (EISA), and of the Professional Development Committee of the ISA. Her research interests focus on peace studies, particularly peacekeeping and peacebuilding; foreign policy, international security, Russia and the post-Soviet space. She has published widely on these topics. Dr. Hélène Cristini: Half-French and half-Spanish, I started my graduate studies in the US at UT Austin and UMass Amherst. After starting my PhD in International Relations Theory at UMass, I became aware that my dissertation’s interest in finding spiritual solutions to political conflicts would not fit the Western paradigm. It was then that I opted to finish my dissertation at the University of Mumbai, India where I did a comparative study of religions in order to find common solutions to tackle political conflicts. Currently teaching International Relations Theory and Business Ethics at the International University of Monaco (MBA), my research interests for publication alternate between how leaders in management are empowered thanks to spirituality from business and political perspectives. I have recently been using René Girard’s mimetic theory both in the realm of business ethics with managers and in IR theory with secular and Muslim fundamentalisms (Les fondamentalismes laïc et musulman interprétés avec le concept de théorie mimétique in Revue d'éthique et de théologie morale , RETM).

Europe’s Hybrid Threats

123

Dr. Zeynep Arkan Tuncel is a Lecturer in International Relations at Hacettepe University. She holds a BSc in Political Science and Public Administration from the Middle East Technical University, Ankara. She has an MA in European Studies from the University of Exeter and a PhD in International Relations from the University of Kent in Canterbury. Dr Arkan Tuncel has published articles on Federal Governance, All Azimuth, Turkish Studies and Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie and a number of book chapters on EU politics. She is also the co-editor of the 2015 book The EU and Member State Building: European Foreign Policy in the Western Balkans published by Routledge. Her main fields of interest include EU external relations, constructivist and poststructuralist approaches to international relations, and foreign policy analysis. Dr. Filiz Coban works as Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at Canakkale Onsekiz Mart University, Turkey. She holds an Mphil/PhD degree in International Relations from the University of East Anglia, UK. She earned her MA degree in International Relations at the University of Paris X Nanterre and Canakkale Onsekiz Mart University. She studied Philosophy/Sociology as her BA degree at Hacettepe University in Ankara. Her research interests are foreign policy analysis, nationalism and identity politics in International Relations. Claudio Lanza is currently an Italian graduate student in the Department of Political and Social Science at the University of Bologna, I specialised in international politics. My academic background is in Political Science and International Relations Theory. I attended my first cycle of study at the University of Naples “Federico II” where I wrote a policy-driven dissertation on Italy and its geo-economic relationships with some MENA countries, with the goal of highlighting potential political and economic opportunities for the Italian government in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring. My current research interest is in the application of Rene Girard’s Mimetic Theory to the field of International Politics, aiming to design a theoretical model able to bridge the empirical gap between both. My last thesis analyses the effects of the post-2008 European financial crisis on the process of European integration through the mimetic theoretical model, based on a cognitive-mimetic approach. I also applied the Girardian theoretical model in an article in which I analysed today’s USA-Russia relations that soon will be published by the Portal on Central Eastern and Balkan Europe (PECOB). I also published two articles on both Peace and Development in the re: Peace Magazine of the Centre for Peace Studies, University of Tromsø.