European Yearbook on Youth Policy and Research. Vol. 2 Intercultural Reconstruction: Trends and Challenges [Reprint 2023 ed.] 9783112696385, 9783112696378

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European Yearbook on Youth Policy and Research Vol. 2/1999

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1999

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European Yearbook on Youth Policy and Research Vol 2/1999

Intercultural Reconstruction: Trends and Challenges

Editor: CYRCE Circle for Youth Research Cooperation in Europe e. V. Sibylle Hiibner-Funk Manuela du Bois-Reymond Editorial Assistant: Sylvia Trnka

W DE G Walter de Gruyter • Berlin • N e w York 1999

C Y R C E - Circle f o r Youth Research C o o p e r a t i o n in E u r o p e e. V., Headoffice: TheresienstraBe 51, D-80333 Munich, G e r m a n y

Editorial Board: PD Dr. Sibylle Hiibner-Funk, Munich, Germany Prof. Dr. Manuela du Bois-Reymond, Leiden, The Netherlands Editorial Assistant: M.A. Sylvia Trnka, Vienna, Austria

© Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability. Die Deutsche Bibliothek — Cataloging-in-Publication

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European yearbook on youth policy and research I ed.: CYRCE, Circle for Youth Research Cooperation in Europe e.V. Berlin ; New York : de Gruyter Vol. 2. Intercultural reconstruction: trends and challenges. - 1999 Intercultural reconstruction: trends and challenges / ed.: CYRCE, Circle for Youth Research Cooperation in Europe e.V. Sibylle Hübner-Funk ... - Berlin ; New York : de Gruyter, 1999 (European yearbook on youth policy and research ; Vol. 2) ISBN 3-11-016352-7

© Copyright 1999 by Walter de Gruyter G m b H & Co. KG, D-10785 Berlin All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Printing and Binding: WB Druck, Rieden. - Cover Design: Johannes Rother, Berlin. Printed in Germany.

Contents

Editorial

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Section 1 - European Studies 1.1 Youth and Europe: Trends and Challenges Manuela du Bois-Reymond and Sibylle Hübner-Funk 1.2 Youth in Four Post-communist Countries: Political Values and Nationalist Traditions Hilde Weiss 1.3 A Cross-cultural Comparison of Students' Concepts of Europe Bodo von Borries 1.4 Voting Behaviour of Austrian Youth as Newcomers to the European Union Fritz Plasser and Peter A. Ulram 1.5 New Trajectories of Young Adults in Europe. A Research Outline Andreas Walther, Barbara Stauber, Eberhard Bolay, Manuela du Bois-Reymond, Sven M0rch, José Machado Pais, Andreas Schröer 1.6 Designing a European Project on Adolescent Masculinities Kiki Deliyanni and Despina Sakka 1.7 Attitudes of Dutch Young People towards Germany and the Germans Manuela du Bois-Reymond, Henk Dekker, Robert Aspeslagh

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1.8 Xenophobia among Young Germans in the Nineties Meredith W. Watts

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1.9 Young Germans as Europeans: their Attitudes towards Europe Thomas R. Henschel

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Section 2 - European Youth (Research) Policies 2.1 News from the Youth Directorate of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg Irena Guidikova

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2.2 News from the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP), Thessaloniki Burkart Sellin

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2.3 News from the European Parliament, Brussels. VIP Interview with Luciana Castellina, President of the EP's Committee on Culture, Youth, Sports and Media Sibylle Hübner-Funk and Burkart Sellin

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2.4 Experiments in Civic Education: Youth Citizenship and NGOs in Post-communist Countries Jozsef Katus

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2.5 An Experiment in Youth Research Going European: the Case of Luxembourg Charles Berg and Georges Wirtgen

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2.6 Experimenting with a New European Agenda. British Research Programme: Youth, Citizenship and Social Change Andy Furlong

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2.7 An Experiment in Learning about Greater Europe: the European Youth Centre Budapest Peter Lauritzen

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Section 3 - Vocational Training and Intercultural Learning 3.1 Intercultural Learning - Big Bluff or Learning Strategy for the Future? Concepts, Objectives and Practices of Intercultural Learning in Informal Education Peter Lauritzen 3.2 Peer Group Education Today: an Approach in Anti-racist Work Antje Rothemund 3.3 Binational Youth Exchange in Europe 3.3.1 The Franco-German Youth Organisation: Reflections on 35 Years of Experience Dieter Reichel

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3.3.2 Tandem: Co-ordination Centres for German-Czech Youth Exchange in Regensburg and Plzen Carsten Lenk 3.4 Do Joint European Vocational Training Standards Stand a Chance? Recognition and Transparency of Qualifications within the EU Member States Burkart Sellin 3.5 Updating Vocational Training for Young People: Aspects of German-Hungarian Co-operation Tibor Adler

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Section 4 - Networks of European Youth Policy and Research 4.1 International Sociological Association, Research Committee 34: Sociology of Youth Claire Wallace

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4.2 European Sociological Association, Research Network Youth and Generations in Europe Jean Charles Lagree

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4.3 European Newsletter ULYSSES (Understanding Linkages in Youth Studies and Services in the European Scenery) Massimiano Bucchi

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4.4 Research Network EGRIS (European Group for Integrated Social Research) Andreas Walther

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4.5 Intercultural Network ECCE (European Centre for Community Education) Walter Lorenz

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4.6 Intercultural Network ISB (Interdisciplinary Study Group National Image Building) Manuela du Bois-Reymond

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4.7 New International Journal of Youth Studies Andy Furlong

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Section 5 - Conference Reports 5.1 Youth Information and Youth Research. New Approaches, New Strategies: the European Example (Marly-le-Roi/France) Manuela du Bois-Reymond and Sibylle Hübner-Funk

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5.2 Growing up between Centre and Periphery, International Conference of the Gulbenkian Foundation (Lisbon/Portugal) Lynne Chisholm

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5.3 NYRIS 5 - 5th Nordic Youth Research Symposium (T0nsberg/Norway) Ola Stafseng

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5.4 First Meeting of Czech and German Youth (Policka/Czech Republic) Vladimir Dubsky

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5.5 German-Dutch Meeting: Youth at Risk (Noordwijkerhout/Netherlands) René Bendit and Winfried Krüger

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5.6 Youth in the Information Society (Budapest/Hungary) Howard Williamson 5.7 Lifelong Learning in Europe: Options for the Integration of Living, Learning and Working? (Dresden/Germany) Andreas Walther

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Section 6 - Book Reviews 6.1 White Paper on Education and Training: Teaching and Learning - towards the Learning Society European Commission (ed.) Manuela du Bois-Reymond 6.2 Young People and Associations in Europe M. Vanandruel, P. Amerio, O. Stafseng and P. Tap Roberto Albano 6.3 Growing up in Europe. Contemporary Horizons in Childhood and Youth Studies L. Chisholm, P. Büchner, H.-H. Kriiger and M. du BoisReymond (eds.) Peter Somlai

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6.4 Illustrated History of Europe Frédéric Delouche (ed.) Sibylle Hübner-Funk

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6.5 Youth and Life Management: Research Perspectives H. Helve and J. Bynner (eds.) Howard Williamson

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6.6 The New Role of Women: Family Formation in Modern Societies H.-P. Blossfeld (ed.) Lyudmila Koklyagina-Nurse

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6.7 International Handbook of Adolescence K. Hurrelmann (ed.) Peter Somlai

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Contributors

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Editorial "A rose is still a rose," Aretha Franklin sings in a recent song. However, when the French painter René Magritte advertised his surrealist art, he taught us that "a pipe is not a pipe". Regarding the present publication, we go along with him, saying that a yearbook is not a yearbook: it is neither published in intervals of twelve months nor does it cover events that happened within one year. At the time this second CYRCE Yearbook is published', we look back at three years of editorial work, i.e. almost one year more than originally planned. Many factors contributed to this delay. Raising the necessary resources in terms of time, energy and money was more complicated than we had expected. We managed to obtain some basic funds by joining the InfoYouth Network of the UNESCO as its European relais station and by jointly organising a European conference in September 1995. Editing the contents and language of around 40 contributions written by more than 50 authors from 16 different countries was a difficult and time-consuming exercise. As this second Yearbook looks at the intercultural processes needed to reconstruct Europe in the realm of youth policy and research, editing involved much more than simply 'polishing' the manuscripts. Language is a decisive element in the transmission of cultural, ideological and political differences: it also portrays Europe's character as a 'puzzle' of divergent, often controversial realities. The editors therefore have to strive for a balanced presentation of cultural visions and values and a language that adequately transmits them to the readers of this Yearbook. In this respect, the Circle for Youth Research Co-operation in Europe played a decisive role. The 13 CYRCE members co-ordinated sections and/or contributed to the Yearbook in different ways, be it as members of their respective countries, as members of their respective research and/or policy bodies and, in some instances, as members of international youth (research) networks. The six sections of the Yearbook basically follow the structural design of the first volume. The chapter on European Studies (Section 1) deals with comparative European youth research and youth research focussed on Europe. Highlighting some of the fascinations and fallacies encountered in paving the way for a larger and more unified Europe, the chapter on European Youth (Research) Policies (Section 2) presents major trends and targets of institutionalised European bodies working in the fields of youth policy, research and documentation. The chapter on Vocational Training and Intercultural Learning (Section 3) looks at current discussions about the harmonisation of standards in the field of educational and professional qualifications. It also shows how intercultural youth exchange programmes, and especially those on a bi-national basis, may influence the tolerance of divergences. The chapter

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on Networks of European Youth Policy and Research (Section 4) presents transnational (European) youth research bodies and initiatives which constitute stepping stones in establishing a European dimension in the field. In the chapter on Conference Reports (Section 5), the reader will find a selection of European conferences dedicated to youth issues in the period 1995-96. Some were bilateral, some multilateral meetings, but all of them dealt with very topical issues such as the consequences of globalisation in information society, the development of risk behaviour in young Europeans, and chances for life-long learning. The chapter on Book Reviews (Section 6) offers information on noteworthy European and other international works focussing on educational and life-management issues of youth in general, and on young women in particular. Just as in the first section of the Yearbook, the selection in this chapter is based on a notion of Europe that comprises comparative, transnational studies published in English and other European languages. We also reviewed the first schoolbook on European history, written by a team of twelve European historians and published in their languages. Compared to 1995 (when our first Yearbook was published), the economic, political and administrative Europeanisation has definitely progressed in terms of growth and consolidation of the European Union, although the living standard of (young) Europeans has not become more unified. The European Monetary Union is on the verge of being implemented; decisions regarding the expansion to Central and Eastern Europe will follow. In the continuous process of globalisation, these stepping stones towards a larger and more efficient European Union transcend the ordinary life perspectives of the European populations concerned. Despite much scepticism regarding the Euro and the European Union, the prevailing political and economic trends cannot be stopped. Encompassed by setbacks in social policy and welfare schemes, the process of European unification faces high risks of social disintegration and cultural decomposition. The danger of European cultures' eroding under the pressure of a globalised economy seems to be higher than the decisionmakers in charge might want to admit. Resurgent nationalist movements (e.g. in France, Germany and the new states on the Balkan) stress the traditional values of nation states and seem to be more than a simple reaction to these European and global shifts. They demonstrate that processes of economic and political concentration tend to lack interhuman and intercultural understanding which are cornerstones of democracy. The socio-economic concept of harmonisation goes along with visions of peaceful human understanding and participation, but does not take into account the backstage of the two thirds society, i.e. the detrimental effects caused by the growing deprivation of European youth. If defined by indicators such as level of education, housing, nutrition, income, life-expectancy etc., the general living conditions of youth in Europe may be considered quite good as compared to those in non-European countries or in the Third World.

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However, young Europeans' perspectives regarding work are bleak: European economies increase their productivity at the expense of jobless youth, and more and more young Europeans are excluded from the world of gainful work. This growing deprivation has altered the classical concept of youth that was linked to the 'deferred gratification pattern' and the assumption that the deference of gratifications would serve an appreciated aim, i.e. the achievement of full adult status. Nowadays, neither the concept of youth nor the concept of adulthood can be applied in the traditional way. The respective qualifications for a person's success or failure become blurred along with the ensuing responsibilities. This collapse of traditional patterns shifts the focus to cultural manifestations which take on the function of political ideologies, i.e. to differentiate between insiders and outsiders, friends and foes. In order to describe and understand these fundamental shifts, our second European Yearbook transcends the classical definitions of youth by integrating various concepts of young adults, and by opening a path towards the concept of life-long learning. Youth policy and research gain momentum with respect to the development of adequate models of intercultural reconstruction which should come about with European integration. As the re-unification of the two German states constitutes a vital part of European integration, the present volume focuses on major aspects of this event and its influence on the attitudes of young Germans towards Europe and European or non-European 'strangers'. This focus seems to be more than justified by the delicate political issues related to the problems of transnational European migration and the detrimental effects of resurgent nationalism in Germany.

Sibylle Hiibner-Funk September 1998

Manuela du Bois-Reymond

Note 1 Cf. the first volume: CYRCE (ed.). (1995). The Puzzle of Integration. European Yearbook on Youth Policy and Research. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Section 1 European Studies

1.1 Youth and Europe: Trends and Challenges Manuela du Bois-Reymond and Sibylle Hubner-Funk

According to Lepsius (1997), the cultural integration of Europe is primarily a translation exercise which can be facilitated for a small part of the European population by using a lingua franca. Cultural identities remain bound to language, particularly in areas characterised by high semantic differentiation and peculiar connotations.

Where Does Europe End? Following the path mapped out by the first CYRCE Yearbook (1995), this second European Yearbook documents the theoretical and political endeavour of topicalising and promoting a sphere of life and research which exists, but has difficulties in clearly articulating itself as such, i.e. youth and Europe. We shall try to pinpoint the policy and research-related problems and approaches inherent in the topic. The term 'Europe' covers a wide variety of political, cultural and economic realities, which fail to be dealt with in a coherent and publicly visible manner. There is no transnational discourse community on Europe. Post-modern European scholars basically agree that the interesting and most difficult questions of our times are no longer national in nature, and that we have to think and act globally when looking for solutions. Nevertheless, post-modern dialogue lacks a consistent European orientation and is not pursued with this intention. Politicians' interest in the definition of Europe is contingent upon political appropriateness and changing party-political constellations. European politicians, scholars and youth researchers have just taken a few timid steps towards a culture of dialogue visible to the informed public. If leading politicians, scientists and youth experts from all European nations were to participate in a European discussion forum, it would soon become apparent that they cannot agree on one definition of Europe, no matter how hard they try. Acknowledging this fact would be achieving the first goal of such a dialogue: agreement on the fact that Europe is no uniform or clearly-defined construction at any level, be it geography, politics, culture, the military or the economy, let alone the meta-level of reflexion. If we think of Europe's history, of its achievements in humanities and science, Europe is overdefined. If we consider the cruel wars that were fought and the national policies introduced to dominate and marginalise others, Europe is underdefined.

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The second goal to be pursued by this dialogue should be the systematic and comprehensive compilation of the different realities and definitions of Europe. This is something quite different to discussions entered into by politicians or economists to pursue national interests or to form strategic alliances. Researchers will have to transcend their wont national ways of thinking if they want to deal with present and future questions in Europe's postindustrial and post-communist societies and to relate them to these countries' young generations.1 At the institutional level, the definition of Europe focuses on the organisational, conceptual and strategic differences between the European Union and the Council of Europe: the Union's Europe currently comprises 15 Member States, while the Council of Europe has 47 members. This already indicates that there is no clearly defined geopolitical 'Europe', nor will there be one in the future as both the European Union and the Council of Europe are expanding. Tempers in the affected countries run high on the question where Europe ends. Citizens living in the north and west of Europe fear an expansion of the EU to the south and east, i.e. the accession of more Balkan states and republics that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. Plans to expand the EU to the east raise questions about the implications for the political stability and welfare of the west. Many citizens in formerly communist countries hope to get their share of western affluence by being admitted to the 'European house'. Scholars in East and West Europe have started hypothesising about a new iron curtain and a new division of Europe into a rich (northern and western) part and a poor (southern and eastern) part. The admission of Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia and Slovenia to the NATO and their subsequent economic alliance with the EU reinforced these countries' conviction that they 'belong to the West' and that Asia starts at their eastern borders.2 In an interview T. Judt (1996) gave when presenting his book A Grand Illusion? An Essay on Europe, the American scholar underlined that we were giving ourselves a great problem by once more dividing Europe.3 We are currently witnessing the rising fervour of disputes on the future of a Europe after the abolition of confronting blocks (1989-1991). Whatever the result may be, it will profoundly affect the young generations of this continent. The possible division of Europe will have a stronger impact on the chances of the different national youths than those concerned might realise at present.

National and Transnational Youth Politicians and researchers still think of youth as national youth. When they speak about 'European youth', the term simply stands for the addition of different national youths. Youth researchers and politicians working on a Euro-

1.1 Youth and Europe: Trends and Challenges

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pean level and in European networks should be aware of youth's double role as national and transnational youth. This insight will help them to define and study the topic of 'youth and Europe' more systematically. Contradictions of gender, class, ethnicity and generation are characteristic of modem youth. We think that these contradictions must be analysed and dealt with by youth policies against the background of youth's double role (Stafseng 1997). On the one hand, the gender issue varies from country to country. Girls' and boys' experience will be shaped by national, regional and cultural traditions, education, work, family and political disputes about the roles of the two sexes. On the other hand, youth-related gender issues have a lot in common on the European level: take, for example, girls' rising educational ambitions, their access to 'male professions' or the redistribution of gainful work and housework. Youth's double role as national and transnational youth regarding gender is not limited to the structural level, but can also be analysed on the subjective level of experience. This also applies to the relation of classes in the different European countries and manifests itself in the apparent dissolution of traditional boundaries and definitions of class among young people. The phenomenon becomes evident when comparing British to continental youth4 or young people in East and West Europe. In view of these developments, it is all the more important to analyse unifying trends not only in the cultural sphere but also in the risk areas of education and work. Regarding ethnicity, the pertinent terminology in the European countries indicates profound historical, cultural and political differences. At the same time, conflicts between ethnic groups are on the rise and discrepancies in the chances of 'insiders' and 'outsiders' become more pronounced. Generational relations are on the agenda of all European states. From a structural and demographic point of view, the issue is erosion of the 'generational contract': who will pay the pensions of an overly aged population in twenty to thirty years' time? From a pedagogic and cultural point of view, the issues are the older generation's increasing loss of authority, which is substituted by the co-existence of the generations on an equal footing. European youth sciences and youth policies which ignore these fundamental shifts will not reach their goals.

Neglecting the Cultural Dimension Political, military and economic considerations dominate the question how to control the dynamics of an expanding Europe. Scientists and politicians working in the cultural sector have repeatedly criticised that decision-making in the EU neglects the cultural dimension.5 The Treaty signed in Maastricht (1992) is the first to contain an article on the EU's cultural responsibility. Article 128, para. 1 specifies: "The Com-

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munity shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore." The fact that there is no reference to a European educational policy may be taken as an indicator for the half-heartedness of this Article. Actually, it does not regulate contents, but simply explains the formal relationship between the European and the national or regional levels of decision-making. In fact, the EU does not commit itself to any specific cultural programme. Considering that the EU spends a ridiculously low share (less than one percent) of its billions on cultural and educational programmes while subsidising national agricultures with around 50% of its income, one will understand that the EU rhetoric on cultural activities and the revised educational and exchange programmes are inversely proportional to promotional reality. We are all the more convinced that a European youth policy should be consistently defined as cultural policy and equipped with the necessary funding.6 Neglecting the cultural dimension in the policy of the EU will impair efforts to interlink youth policy and youth research on the European level.1 The former cannot be reasonably implemented without the latter and vice versa. Neither the EU nor other European institutions can offer an infrastructure that would lend itself to overcoming the idea of proportional, national representation and the fight for funds allocated to cultural activities. In matters relating to youth, the EU basically pursues a labour-market-oriented qualification policy and a socio-integrative prevention policy. Youth research has shown that the context of youth cultures is vital for defining and understanding modern youth. Young people's life concepts are not only influenced by their education and vocation, but are also characterised by their habits as consumers of culture. We do not want to imply that educational achievements and work are irrelevant for youngsters. However, both spheres have become increasingly subordinate to their (youth) cultural aspirations and actions.8 Youth research is basically organised on a national and not on a transnational European level. Where it calls itself 'European' and receives (some modest) funds from the EU, it is research on indicators, comparing such items as educational achievements and vocational perspectives of the respective national youth cohorts or measuring their political attitudes. (This volume also contains examples of this type of research. The studies clearly show how difficult it is to make methodically appropriate yet significant comparisons.9) A European-oriented youth research which systematically elaborates youth's double role as national and transnational youth - and neither defines it solely as 'human resource' nor solely as risk factor - is imperative for obtaining the complex data needed for a European youth policy.

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European Identities Youth politicians and youth researchers have noted that young people all over Europe are disenchanted by politics.10 In our view, this is less indicative of a new 'apolitical' youth, but rather signals a conflict in which the young people dissociate themselves from the political definitions and practices of the older generation. The youngsters who won't have anything to do with party politics and European politics in their countries engage in transnational environmental and gender politics. They fight at the different ethnic-national fronts with rightist and leftist slogans and actions,11 and experience discrimination and helplessness in their battle for a training or work place on the capitalist labour market.12 All of these issues are highly political, but do not fit into the respective national party programmes. Young people's listlessness is targeted at politicians who propagate outdated bogus solutions detrimental to the youngsters' interests. These politicians handle gender issues as purely administrative or financial problems (protecting the family, child benefits, parental leave, women's quotas). They suppress gender's implicit cultural dimensions (which are made explicit by youth and feminist researchers), e.g. in job creation measures for young women that do not take into account their life situation and wishes for other arrangements. Such politicians approach ethno-cultural issues as 'racism prevention'. They are not prepared to finance educational and socio-pedagogic measures or art projects which would be needed to promote the co-existence of young people exposed to the precarious circumstances caused by the integration of the formerly divided Europe. They should therefore not be surprised if modern youngsters are fed up with official politics and hardly think it worthwhile to strive for a political career. Many Euro-politicians bet on European integration to bridge the gap between 'youth' and 'Europe'. A look at our two European Yearbooks shows that this concept is almost irrelevant for European youth. It does not matter whether they belong to a risk group or are trend-setters: modem youngsters do not associate an existential life reality, let alone a life concept, with Europe. On the one hand, they experience themselves as French, Dutch, Germans, Italians, Greeks, etc. On the other hand, they do not regard French, Dutch, German, Italian or Greek youngsters as European youth but as 'foreigners'. Europe hardly offers institutional provisions enabling young people to develop something like their own 'European' identity. Admittedly, there are a few institutions of learning and experimenting such as the intercultural youth centres in Strasbourg and Budapest or centres of bilateral youth exchange, for example between Germany and France or between Germany and the Czech Republic.13 According to the German sociologist Rainer Lepsius (1997), European identity is not a condition emerging from tradition or to be created by integration policy. Deliberate investments into the European dimension at the time adolescents develop awareness and self-esteem might

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create a suitable basis for a serious and attractive EU youth policy and youth research. It would require extensive contacts between young people from different national and cultural areas, in particular between those from East and West Europe. Other prerequisites are institutionalised and funded cultural and art projects supervised by European art institutions, new types of travel and work in neighbouring countries combined with language courses as well as networks and communication on the personal level and via the media.

Civic Society At present the concepts of civic society, civic education and participation experience a genuine revival in the European political and scientific debate.14 While the discussions about civic society tend to focus on the crisis of democratic national states in Europe, those dealing with civic education and participation point more directly towards the problems of the youth populations. We are convinced that civic education without a European school (cf. BoisReymond 1995; Deutsche UNESCO Kommission 1997) will not turn adolescents into better 'Euro-citizens'; the same holds for participation. Young people must know in what, with whom and to what end they want to or should participate. We have already shown that this is by no means clear. The 'Europe of youth' does not yet exist, though representatives of European youth associations keep proclaiming it. Even the intensive promotion campaigns run for the Youth for Europe programmes did not succeed in permanently bridging the gap between youth and Europe. Europe is not only overdefined in economic terms and underdefined in cultural terms: it is first and foremost a world of old men (and some old women15). If they address anybody at all, it is not youth, but the (mostly also male) functionaries of the respective national youth associations. Studies carried out in both East and West Europe have, however, shown that fewer and fewer young people are prepared to get organised in youth associations (Vanandruel et al. 1996). In the best of all cases, youth representatives in European institutions represent the interests of their own organisations. They by no means speak for the majority of young people in their countries who would definitely object to such a representation. In view of current recruitment systems for youth representatives, the wishes, hopes and participation potentials of non-organised youth hardly have any chance to reach European institutions and politicians. In turn, these are apparently not interested in the discrepancy between organised and non-organised youth interests. An infrastructure and a convincing participation model which will guide youth to multidimensional European reality still need to be developed. The European Voluntary Service is currently in its trial phase. It remains to be seen whether it will get the expected broad backing from young people and whether it may count on appropriate funding.

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Youth and Europe Our time is characterised by a totally new relation between people, learning and work. The older generation has partly lost its model role for youth. We may thus well ask whether it still makes sense to consider youth as a social category, i.e. as a transition phase to adulthood (Heinz/Hiibner-Funk 1997). Youth no longer believes in the possibility of fundamental social change, and thus no longer trusts the rationale of those who pull the strings.16 Youth no longer sees the older generation as path-makers, models and educators. The pedagogic and sociological youth concepts are based on clearly defined life phases which increasingly lose their relevance for the labour market and people's life courses: it could well be that a person aged 35 finds himself or herself at the beginning of her professional career after endless loops of education and waiting periods, while a 25-year old might already have reached the peak of her (professional) career; and both might become unemployed one year later.17 In many respects, modem youth socialises itself and could not care less what adults think about it. This loss of confidence is a great challenge for European youth politicians and educators. If they do not face up to it, generational relations are likely to erode. Youth and Europe seem to be having a hard time with each other. Apparently it is almost impossible to combine the two dimensions and the two realities involved. Young people in Europe lack a common forum to express their different interests; it is already difficult enough to have their interests represented on the national level. The policy made by European institutions is everything except (cultural) youth policy. Who should establish a cultural youth policy on the European level? We would like to address this question to three social groups: European politicians, European youth experts and persons engaged in the cultural sector on the European level. We have specified some of the questions these groups should ask themselves and deal with. Youth researchers, artists, educators and those interested in politics should take the lead as they are comparatively independent and unbiased. A look at the different groups in the different European countries will demonstrate the enormous effort required to initiate a systematic, yet tolerant exchange on the topic of youth and Europe. We think the task should not be offered to politicians in the first instance: their scope of action is severely limited by national, strategic and institutional considerations. We propose that the exchange of views between youth and cultural experts should be intensified and made known to a broader public. We insist that European youth policy must have a cultural backing, because we realise that none of the present problems affecting and involving youth can be grasped without its (youth) cultural connotation. And indeed, young people face a wide range of problems: inappropriate education, unemployment, tensions between the East and the West, xenophobia, problems in the relations between men, women and children, drugs, criminality, etc. The only chance to upgrade Europe to an

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issue which 'turns on' youngsters, taps their potentials and really lets them participate in important decisions is to persistently consider the cultural aspect in youth policy measures. Words are ephemeral and entail the risk of remaining non-committal. We would therefore like to conclude by a specific suggestion: the European Commission should establish a supranational group of independent experts who make European cultural youth policy their business. Its agenda should include research on the cultural relationships between youth and Europe and concentrate on European-oriented research organisations. The manifold contributions to this second European Yearbook show what such a programme and the related research activities might look like.18 Like its predecessor, the second CYRCE Yearbook contains some important elements for establishing a culture-oriented European youth policy and a culture-oriented European youth research which lend themselves to building the future 'house of youth' in and for Europe. Notes 1 Section 4 of the Yearbook contains information on some networks created by youth researchers and youth politicians to promote the 'Europeanisation' of expert discussions at the cultural and institutional levels. 2 Agenda 2000 stipulates that further candidates should be Romania, Bulgaria, the Slovak Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and - subject to certain conditions - also Turkey and Cyprus. EU commissioner H. van der Broek recently warned against interpreting the different treatment of candidates as discrimination. He suggested not to refer to them as 'ins' and 'outs', but as 'ins' and 'pre-ins'. 3 Cf. NRC Handelsblad, 26 July 1997. 4 Cf. the contribution by Andy Furlong in Section 2 of this volume. 5 According to Glotz, Europe is a technocratic project lacking cultural ideas and scholarly participation (cf. Glotz 1996: 592); Featherstone comments: "One of the noticeable features of sociology in the 1980s has been the growth of interest in the cultural dimension of social life" (Featherstone 1991: 112). 6 Cf. the interview with Luciana Castellina in Section 2 of this volume. 7 Cf., for example, Hiibner-Funk/Bois-Reymond 1995; Griese 1995; Chisholm et al. 1995; Chisholm 1996; and the contributions by Charles Berg/Georges Wirtgen, Andy Furlong, Irena Guidikova and Peter Lauritzen in this volume. 8 American researchers studying culture and youth are already one step ahead. They have shown their European colleagues how the commercial sector targeted at children and adolescents has penetrated all aspects of children's and youngster's life including school and educational activities. Cf. Steinberg/Kincheloe 1997; Taboo 1997. 9 Cf. especially the contributions by Fritz Plasser/Peter A. Ulram, Manuela du BoisReymond et al. and Thomas Henschel in Section 1 of this volume. lOCf. the contributions by Bodo von Borries, Thomas Henschel and Hilde Weiss in Section 1 of this volume. 11 Cf. the contributions by Manuela du Bois-Reymond et al., Kiki Deliyanni/Despina Sakka and Meredith Watts in Section 1 of this volume. 12 Cf. in particular the contributions by Burkart Sellin and Tibor Adler in this volume.

1.1 Youth and Europe: Trends and Challenges

11

13Cf. the contributions by Irena Guidikova, Peter Lauritzen, Carsten Lenk and Peter Reichel in Section 2 of this volume. 14Cf. the contribution by J6zsef Katus in Section 2 of this volume. 15 In 1994, the European Parliament had a total of 626 members, 171 of them women. This corresponds to a share of 27.3%. 25% of the 20 in the European Commission are women (cf. Schunter-Kleemann 1996: 609/10). 16 The electoral success of the French social democrat Jospin, and of the British socialist Blair is largely based on people's hope for new solutions to the virulent social problems. Both politicians cultivated a youthful, dynamic image to also appeal to young voters. 17 Cf. the contribution by Andreas Walther et al. in Section 1 of this volume. 18 Cf. Immanuel Wallerstein's warning message to the world-wide community of sociologists: "We cannot really choose between the universal and the particular, any more than we can choose between the structural and the historical. ... The problem before social science today is to evolve a methodology that is consonant with this inability to choose, and to assume collectively the burden of constructing a pluralistic universalism." (Wallerstein 1997)

References Bois-Reymond, M. du. (1995). "Learning for Europe - a Real Chance or a True Illusion?" Pp. 177-185 in The Puzzle of Integration. European Yearbook on Youth Policy and Research. Ed. CYRCE. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter. Chisholm, L. (1996). "Jugend und Bildung in Europa: Soziale Ungleichheiten in der zweiten Moderne." Pp. 20-35 in Die Wiederentdeckung der Ungleichheit. Ed. A. Bolder, W. R. Heinz and K. Rodax. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Chisholm, L., P. Büchner, H.-H. Krüger and M. du Bois-Reymond (eds.). (1995). Growing up in Europe. Contemporary Horizons in Childhood and Youth Studies. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter. CYRCE (ed.). (1995): The Puzzle of Integration. European Yearbook on Youth Policy and Research. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter. Deutsche UNESCO Kommission (ed.). (1997). Lernfähigkeit: Unser verborgener Reichtum. UN ESCO-Bericht zw Bildung für das 21. Jahrhundert. Neuwied, Kriftel/Ts., Berlin: Luchterhand. Featherstone, M. (1991). Consumer Culture and Postmodernism. London, Newbury Park: Sage. Glotz, P. (1996). "Europäische Visionen." Frankfurter Hefte, No. 7 (July), 592-594. Griese, H. M. (1995). "Jugendvergleichsstudien - Königsweg oder Fallgrube?" Pp. 267299 in Deutsch-deutsche Jugendforschung. Ed. A. Bolz and H. M. Griese. Weinheim, München: Juventa. Heinz, W. and S. Hübner-Funk. (1997). "Die Quadratur des Jugendbegriffs. Zur sozialen (Re-) Konstruktion einer Übergangsphase." Diskurs, No. 2, 4-11. Hübner-Funk, S. and M. du Bois-Reymond. (1995). "Youth Research in a Changing Europe." Pp. 253-268 in The Puzzle of Integration. European Yearbook on Youth Policy and Research. Ed. CYRCE. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter. Judt, T. (1996). A Grand Illusion? An Essay on Europe. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux. Lepsius, R. M. (1997). "Bildet sich eine kulturelle Identität in der Europäischen Union?" Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, No. 8, 948-955.

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Schunter-Kleemann, S. (1996). "Frauenpolitische Visionen einer europäischen Demokratieentwicklung." Frankfurter Hefte, No. 7 (Juli), 603-610. Stafseng, 0. (1997). "Conditions and Prospects for Youth Research in the 1990s: Politics and Content." Pp. 33-51 in Jovens em Mudanca, Actos do Congresso International 'Growing up between Centre and Periphery'. Coleccao Estudos e Investigates No. 10. Ed. J. M. Pais and L. Chisholm. Lisbon: Edicoes do Institute de Ciencias Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa. Steinberg, S. R. and J. L. Kincheloe (eds.). (1997). Kinderculture. The Corporate Construction of Childhood. Boulder, Col.: Westview. Taboo. The Journal of Culture and Education. (1997). Vol. I (Spring). Vanandruel, M., P. Amerio et al. (1996). Young People and Associations in Europe. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Wallerstein, I. (1997). "The West and the Rest." ISA Bulletin, No. 72 (Spring), 1.

1.2 Youth in Four Post-communist Countries: Political Values and Nationalist Traditions Hilde Weiss

Empirical studies were carried out in four 'post-communist' countries (Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland) to analyse the ideological and moral orientations of youth in particular regarding ruptures between age cohorts. The researchers studied subjective indicators of the young people's life situation, their political and economic orientations, but were particularly interested in changes of ideological attitudes, i.e. national commitment (nationalism, patriotism) and ethnic intolerance. In the political realm, young and old people basically shared the same orientations even though the latter were less satisfied with the new circumstances, while the departure from national identification was most pronounced among young people in all four countries. However, the young did not abandon handed-down, emotionallyrooted, ethnic prejudices and perpetuated a tradition of national intolerance (at various national levels).

Introduction Phases of political and social upheaval go hand in hand with the problematic issue of the heritage of the past. Even a society deeply divided by ideology must find a common basis for a new beginning and master the problem of reaching minimal consensus about the politics of the past and the prospective social justice. What is the young generation's role in this process? Even in 'post-communist' countries, youth was at least partly socialised in the old educational institutions and, above all, by traditional socialising agents. To which extent are the new values pertaining to democracy and a free market economy current in the young generation and not only in its politically active fraction? Or are the youngsters of the transition period characterised by ambivalence and indecision regarding political and social values, which researchers detect in particular among young people in the former German Democratic Republic (Krebs 1995)? How do their positions compare with those of older age groups? We shall try to answer these questions on the basis of a comparative empirical study carried out in Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia and Poland.1 Since the foundation of the modern national state in the 18th century, the 'political conquest' of youth has been considered a guarantee for the lasting success of a political regime (cf. Kreutz 1974); and youth as a political force and symbol has played an important role in securing power ever since that

14

H. Weiss

time. In totalitarian regimes, youth was consigned to separate, central youth organisations directed by adult representatives of power. Governmental strategies were used to starve spontaneous youth movements that seemed difficult to control and endeavoured to integrate youth's protest potential into the existing youth organisation. As early as the mid-1970s, Kreutz (1974: 69f) put forward the thesis that while youth was granted 'relative' autonomy in both 'bourgeois' and 'socialist' societies, it should be mobilisable for political purposes. This expectation is clearly reflected in German youth sociology which has studied and commented young people's democratic engagement and political apathy ever since Schelsky's analysis of the sceptical post-war generation (Schelsky 1957). According to Kreutz, the expectations placed in youth are contradictory: on the one hand, young people should adapt to state structures; on the other hand, they should be critical of them and (if necessary also actively) oppose them. This bipolar expectation also seems relevant for the events before and after 1989 and has led to paradox consequences. In the generation of those now aged 30-50, persons who adapted to the structures of the socialist state in a politically inconspicuous way, i.e. the 'silent majority', nowadays have better chances for starting a new life. As reported by Kovâcs (1996) for Hungary, more or less the same holds for the old elites, provided their responsibility was not limited to political positions. Many of those who had opposed the regime before the 'turn', who had been politically active (and usually also members of the State Party), who had been discredited in the old system and banned from better positions or careers, were once more discredited after the system had collapsed. Indeed, everybody who had acquired 'secondary' status in the system had, in fact, also been involved as Siklovâ (1992) says in her work on the (former) Republic of Czechoslovakia. While today's youngsters and people up to the age of 30 are the 'preferred' generations of a new democratic era, there is a sharp conflict between resistance and adaptation in the 'middle' generation. In the subsequent analyses, we shall therefore not only compare the old with the young, but also include the middle, 'lost' generation in important questions. Fear of competition and power-political considerations induced the 'gerontocracy' of Eastern European states in the socialist alliance to systematically exclude young people from influential positions (in some countries such as Russia, Romania and Bulgaria up to the present day). However, the central youth organisations offered youngsters the opportunity to participate on an organised basis by acclaiming the official policy. After 1989, the economic crises and existential insecurities developing in the countries of this region albeit in varying degrees - soon caused public life to once more decay. In most 'reform countries', youth has little trust in political parties and organisations; in this way, the young generation hardly participates in politics.

1.2 Youth in Four Post-communist Countries

15

The data discussed in this contribution do not refer to institutional reality (such as membership in parties or organisations), but are based on directly collected values and attitudes. Being indicators, they should contribute to the understanding of the democratic development of societies and their institutions.

Youth in the Everyday Reality of Post-Communist Reform States - Controversial Theses The participation of youth in the transformation process definitely varied in the countries of the present study, just as the process itself caught on differently in each of them. In some instances, youth did, however, play a supportive and participatory role. In Hungary, young people were an active factor of evolutional change; in the other countries, they contributed considerably to the strike and demonstration movements. In general, it can be said that the desire for greater personal freedom and material affluence were identifiable motives of young people in these countries. A 'youth culture' with common characteristics, motives and interests had already been established via the consumption of media a long time ago. While social scientists tend to agree on this aspect, their evaluations of the transition phase as such are highly contradictory. Researchers describe large parts of youth as discouraged and disoriented, and diagnose fear of the future and loss of meaning (Riordan et al. 1995). Above all, it is unclear whether youth is particularly hit by the negative consequences of the system transformation, i.e. by unemployment, insecurity, and cutbacks in social support in areas such as education. More than any other age group, youth is said to be subject to the pressures of performance and individualisation which cool off inteipersonal relationships and lead to an apolitical orientation focusing on money and career. Anomic reactions as a result of the capitalist modernisation wave are said to be most pronounced among young people. Other diagnoses claim exactly the opposite: according to them, the main 'losers' are older people unable to undergo vocational retraining, and in particular those dependent on the state's social services and benefits. While the young are just as affected by lacking public support (e.g. young families, young people in education), all roads to the future are open to them. Being young, it is easier for them to adapt to new situations and to quickly leam new trades. Politically clear of the past, young people can pursue promising careers (in economy, management, journalism, etc.). In Czechia and Hungary, youth is rather deemed to be in the winning position and, in addition to age, education and region have become important prerequisites of the new chance structure (Machonin 1994; Deacon 1992). In Poland and Slovakia, this trend is less evident and researchers such as MachScek (1995) speak about the dete-

16

H. Weiss

riorated position of youth regarding education and the labour market in Slovakia. There is also a difference in opinions about the political attitude of modern youth: in some empirical surveys, youth is depicted as apathetic and said to have radical, ethno-centric and xenophobic inclinations triggered off by disappointment and stress (Hennig 1995; Westle 1995). According to proponents of this view, especially the socially disadvantaged groups of youngsters tend to be intolerant and chauvinistic on account of new social and/or regional disparities. However, it might also be the older people who experience themselves as 'uprooted' in their values and life styles, if they maintain their ideologies and values and thus constitute a potential threat to democracy by supporting authoritarian parties and longing for the past - be it in the form of nostalgia for communism or nationalism. These issues were studied by Kov£cs (1995) who did a comprehensive analysis of the situation in Hungary. He shows the many different layers of transition and proves that it were not the alleged losers who voted for the former communists in the last elections: i.e. neither the young nor the old, but the well-educated and well-positioned 'experts' of the middle age brackets.

Topic, Sample and Methodology of the Four-countries Study The following analyses can by no means capture the socio-structural complexity of the rapid changes that have taken place since 1989, and have not only affected youth and the elderly. What interests us here are the differences between the age cohorts, i.e. whether we can discern tendencies of social disintegration along the age line. The following items will be studied in greater detail: - How do different age groups evaluate their social situation? How do they differ in the perception of their subjective status, well-being and satisfaction with the new conditions? - Are there ideological and political ruptures between the age cohorts? Is there (still) consensus about the new values - such as democracy and a liberal market - and do their evaluations of the new chances and standards of social differentiation and social justice coincide? One limitation refers to the type of data presented in the study: all of them are cross-sectional data, and some findings that might appear to be differences between the cohorts may therefore be expressions of a life phase (e.g. at all points in time of the survey, youth always had a more liberal attitude than adults). Last not least, there is the problem that the amount of data gathered for comparing four countries hardly permits us to consider specific national differences in detail, although they are considerable and point to patterns deeply

1.2 Youth in Four Post-communist Countries

17

rooted in national history as regards the topic of our study - democracy and liberalism vs. nationalism and ethnic intolerance. Moreover, the different experiences with decades of communist rulership as well as the transformation strategies pursued in economic policy also influence the questions addressed in the study. Here, we can only allude to these lasting backgrounds of experience and specific national contexts. The focus is on the extent to which these countries have things in common, whether and in which way the collapse of the regime, the political and social changes are a problem of the age cohorts or generations, irrespective of their national peculiarities. All data mentioned here are based on a quantifying, comparative study (fully standardised questionnaire), preceded by extensive explorative interviews. The fieldwoik was carried out simultaneously in the four countries between November 1995 and January 1996 (oral interviews); the samples were representative (minimum 1,000 interviewees per countries) in all countries. As already mentioned, the study was not only induced by a widespread international research program on the occasion of Austria's 'millennium' (1000th anniversary of the birth of Austria as a nation), but also by the topical problem of emerging ethnic conflicts and nationalist trends in the former 'Eastern bloc' countries. The study was designed to investigate latent inclinations towards ethnic intolerance and nationalism and to analyse democratic orientations and evaluations of the past. A first comprehensive presentation of the results is contained in Weiss/Reinprecht (1997).2 The central concepts constituting the core of the analyses reported below are without exception complex attitudes obtained with the help of attitude scales (Likert scale). Subjective Perceptions: Social Age Status and Social Change In general, it can be said that the social situation and the measure of adaptation to capitalist maiket economy vary greatly in the four countries. While unemployment was very low in the Czech Republic from the very beginning (since its secession from the Slovak Republic) and the standard economic indicators (GNP, convertible and stable currency, etc.) were exemplary in this country, the socio-economic transformation costs were much higher in the other countries (cf. Hausner et al. 1995; Pradetto 1994). Except for the Czech Republic, the unemployment rate is high: in 1993, it was 3% in Czechia, 12% in Hungary, 15% in Poland (Rys 1995), and often showed strong regional variations, i.e. some areas had still higher percentages of unemployment. Yet, detailed data on youth unemployment are scarce. In 1991, the unemployment rates reported for Slovakia were 2.5% to 3.8%; while youth unemployment was unexpectedly high already at that time: "The unemployment of young people who had completed basic and secondary schools, as well as univer-

18

H. Weiss

sities, is now beginning to be seen as a destructive force threatening the organisation and cohesion of society (...) the proportion of citizens in the workforce under 30 years is 26%, but their proportion among the unemployed is 48%" (Machlcek 1995: 144). In Slovakia, the young have established a social network based on self-help (placement services, self-help groups etc.) to bridge difficult periods (Machicek 1995: 145f). In our samples, young people (below 28) in all four countries are hit by unemployment to the same extent as the two older groups, i.e. those aged 29-50 and those aged 50 and above (the differences are statistically insignificant; they only refer to the working population, people in education and retired persons are not included). Just as in the West, the young people's educational levels are higher as compared to their elder colleagues, especially those above 50. In our (representative) samples, the middle age group (age 29-50) of the working population in all countries turned out to be the most 'privileged' in the vocational structure: it had the highest share of middle and higher positions. On a nine-point scale (see Table 1), young people in all countries rank themselves higher than their elder counterparts when asked to indicate their social status (top third); in Slovakia and Poland, there is no difference to the middle age group. When studying the age distribution in the 'better half' of status allocations (above the median), real ruptures between all three age groups can only be found in Hungary. The differences are most pronounced regarding the evaluation of the new yardsticks of justice: while the young believe in distributive justice both for themselves (as regards their standard of living) and in general (as regards the distribution of chances), older people endorse this view much less often. (The middle age group usually is somewhere in between these two positions.) Subjective well-being is also much higher among the young (Table 1); only regarding their satisfaction with life in general there is no difference between the age groups. This result is in conformity with a study on 'subjective mobility' in several Central and Eastern European countries (ReMkovS/Vlachova 1995). Although the middle age group in our samples is not worse off than the young regarding unemployment and vocational status, it shares the feeling of subjective deprivation by the massive structural change with the older age group. We can thus assume that the change of the system has robbed these cohorts of their wont subjective status, but - according to their own evaluation - has given the young a new, higher status. Rehikovi and Vlachova (1995: 151) explain this by a change of values: "Many people see those new values which can contribute to success today, including individual responsibility, activity, competitiveness and continuing learning, not as increased opportunity, but rather as a loss of certainty. This is more pronounced among the older age groups." Moreover, the authors found that these subjective attitudes also influenced the people's political behaviour: while the young tended towards

19

1.2 Youth in Four Post-communist Countries

centre-right parties, the older people showed a preference for leftist parties promising to block socio-economic reforms. Table 1 Subjective Indicators: Status, Justice and Satisfaction. Age Differences in the Four Countries (in %) Hungary (n=1048) age age age median Fair share 55 41 37 in life (2) Fair distribution 39 32 27 of chances (3) 34 High degree of 19 16 well-being (4) High life satis51 62 60 faction (5) Subjective indicator

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