European Politics: The Making of Democratic States 9781685856700

Citation preview

O-00FM

9/23/08

4:16 PM

Page i

European Politics

O-00FM

9/23/08

4:16 PM

Page ii

O-00FM

9/23/08

4:16 PM

Page iii

EUROPEAN

POLITICS The Making of Democratic States

Walter C. Opello, Jr., and Katherine A. R. Opello

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

O-00FM

9/23/08

4:16 PM

Page iv

Published in the United States of America in 2009 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2009 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Opello, Walter C. European politics : the making of democratic states / Walter C. Opello, Jr., Katherine A. R. Opello. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-58826-563-0 (hardcover : alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-58826-589-0 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. National state. 2. Nationalism—Europe. 3. Europe— Politics and government. I. Opello, Katherine A. R., 1973– II. Title. JC311.O67 2008 320.1094—dc22 2008010758 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5

4

3

2

1

O-00FM

9/23/08

4:16 PM

Page v

For Olivia, my wife and lifelong partner —W.C.O., Jr. my mother and lifelong friend —K.A.R.O.

O-00FM

9/23/08

4:16 PM

Page vi

O-00FM

9/23/08

4:16 PM

Page vii

Contents List of Illustrations

ix

1 Introducing European Politics ■

2 3 4 5 ■

1

Part 1 The Formation of the European Nation-State

The Disintegration of the Roman Imperial State The Development of the Monarchical State in the West Nationalizing the Monarchical State The Emergence of the Nation-State in the East Part 2 The Contemporary European Democratic Nation-State

6 The Structures of Government 7 Political Participation 8 Providing for the Well-Being of the Nation ■

123 151 179

Part 3 Unifying Europe

9 From Military Competition to Economic Cooperation 10 Governing the European Union 11 Enlarging Europe’s Commonwealth ■

13 41 61 91

201 233 261

Part 4 The Future of European Politics

12 The Endurance—and Proliferation—of the European Nation-State

283

Chronology Bibliography Index About the Book

299 305 317 331 vii

O-00FM

9/23/08

4:16 PM

Page viii

O-00FM

9/23/08

4:16 PM

Page ix

Illustrations

■ Maps Natural Features of Europe The Roman Empire in 117 Germanic Kingdoms and the Byzantine Empire in 500 Europe in 1200 Europe After the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 Europe After the Congress of Vienna in 1815 Europe on the Eve of World War I Europe on the Eve of World War II The Nation-States of Europe, 2008 The European Union, 2008

5 16 23 35 55 76 94 104 122 262

■ Tables 7.1 The Evolution of Political Party Organizations 7.2 Political Party Families from Left to Right 7.3 Turnout in Selected European States, 1950–2004 7.4 Types of Interest Groups and Social Movements 9.1 A Chronology of European Union Treaties, 1951–2004 9.2 Population and Institutional Representation of EU Member States 10.1 The Barroso Commission, 2004–2009 10.2 Formations of the Council of the European Union 10.3 Presidency Rotation for the Council of the European Union, 2000–2008 10.4 Voter Turnout in European Parliament Elections, 1979–2004 11.1 European Union Membership, 1957–2008 12.1 Independent European States, 1500–2008 12.2 European Ethnonationalism and Regionalism, 2008

240 249 263 285 288

■ Figure 10.1 Party Groups in the European Parliament, 2004

247

ix

156 160 169 171 206 223 235 239

O-00FM

9/23/08

4:16 PM

Page x

O-1

9/23/08

3:56 PM

Page 1

1 Introducing European Politics

Europe is said to be a third of the whole world, and has its name from Europa, daughter of Agenore, King of Libya. Jupiter ravished this Europa, and brought her to Crete, and called most of the land after her Europa. —Pope Pius II, Treatise on the State of Europe (1458)

AT THE END of World War II (1939–1945), the United States (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), erstwhile allies during the struggle against Nazi Germany, became implacable foes and divided Europe into two spheres of influence: the USSR held sway in the eastern half of the continent, and the United States in the western half. In the years after the war, the division of Europe into “West” and “East” came to be regarded as a permanent feature of the European political landscape. However, much to the surprise of scholars specializing in European politics, the division of Europe into two ideologically opposed blocs began to break down during the 1980s. Under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, who became general secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR in 1985, the Soviet Union entered a period of political openness (glasnost) and economic restructuring (perestroika), which included the renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine that ensured the maintenance of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe, if necessary, by armed force. By the end of the 1980s, nationalist elites devoted to the independence and sovereignty of their states emerged in the East. When it became clear that the USSR would not intervene, popular demonstrations against Soviet domination of the states of Eastern Europe occurred. In 1989 one of these uprisings breached the Berlin Wall, the concrete barrier constructed in 1961 that divided that city into eastern and western zones and symbolized the broader division of Europe. Thousands of jubilant Germans from East Berlin thronged through the breach. Shortly thereafter, West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany, or FRG) absorbed East Germany (the German Democratic Republic, or GDR) without Soviet interference. Two 1

O-1

9/23/08

2

3:56 PM

Page 2

EUROPEAN POLITICS

years later, on December 31, 1991, the USSR itself was formally dissolved, its fifteen constituent republics becoming independent states. The seemingly permanent division of Europe into East and West had not been permanent after all. The reunification of Germany, the dissolution of the USSR, the 1995 breakup of Yugoslavia into five new states, and the 1993 Czechoslovakian “Velvet Divorce,” which created the Czech Republic and the Republic of Slovakia, have reconfigured the political landscape of Europe. For the first time in its history, there exists in Europe, from the “Atlantic to the Urals,” a common understanding of how politico-military power ought to be organized and exercised. However, even though a standard form of the state exists across Europe, there remain significant differences between the governing practices in the west and east. We discuss these differences in Chapter 12.

■ Understanding Contemporary European Politics We believe that the best way to understand Europe’s post–Cold War situation is to put it in historical perspective and study it from the point of view of Europe’s “master institution,”1 the nation-state. We see the nation-state as having been created by the unique, geographically specific rivalry among Europe’s “portfolio of competing and colluding polities whose spirit of competition was adapted to diffusing best practices”2 of politico-military rule across Europe. Our basic argument is that incessant “war and preparing for war”3 among Europe’s contending polities over many centuries brought about the formation and spread across Europe of the territorial nation-state. Therefore, we believe that “bringing the state back in”4 and making it the central focus of a course on European politics will give students a solid understanding of the political reconfiguration of the continent in the last decade of the twentieth century. We will show that there was a time in the past when the European nation-state did not exist; that is, a time when there was a variety of competing forms of politico-military rule across the continent, with no form being dominant over any other. We will show how one of these forms, monarchy, was “consolidated by the attractions of the king’s justice and by the centralizing power of the king’s cannon,”5 which allowed it to overawe others. Further, we will show how the monarchical state was gradually overcome by an even more militarily potent form, the nation-state, which eventually became the dominant and only acceptable form of politico-military rule in Europe. Examining the very long-term formation of the European nation-state as a type of rule will allow us to reach conclusions about the recent reconfiguration of the European states system that would

O-1

9/23/08

3:56 PM

Page 3

INTRODUCTION

3

not be possible if we focused on the politics of individual nation-states, as if each had “escaped being brought into being by historical processes and remains set apart, timeless and beyond analysis.”6

■ Defining the Nation-State The concept of the “nation-state” is complex and imbued with multiple meanings and associations, some of them negative. In contemporary usage and political discourse, the words country and nation are used interchangeably to refer to what we mean in this text by the term nation-state. The contemporary nation-state has the following characteristics. First, it is a type of politico-military rule that has a distinct, geographically defined territory over which it exercises jurisdiction. Second, it has sovereignty over a territory that is theoretically exclusive of outside interference by other nationstates. Third, it has a government composed of public institutions, offices, and roles that administers the territory and makes decisions for the people within its jurisdiction. Fourth, it has fixed boundaries marked by entry and exit points and in some cases by fences patrolled by border police and armies. Fifth, its government claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical coercion over its territory and people. Sixth, its people share, to a greater or lesser degree, a sense of nationhood (i.e., national identity). And seventh, its government enjoys, to a greater or lesser degree, the undivided obedience and loyalty of its people (i.e., patriotism).7 How this form of politico-military rule developed in western Europe, how it spread from there to central and eastern Europe, how it governs the territory and people within its jurisdiction, how it manages to survive and even flourish within the context of the European Union (EU), and how many more such units of politico-military rule will appear in Europe in the future are the stuff of European politics and the subjects of this text. It should be noted that we do not idealize the nation-state, but only seek to explain how it arose and spread across Europe.

■ Defining Europe The definition of Europe as a geographical and cultural unity began in the early Middle Ages, the thousand-year period following the collapse of the western Roman Empire. The landmass known at the time of this writing as Europe was known as Respublica Christiana or Christendom during the Middle Ages because it was the portion of the world where Christianity was the prevailing religion. Christendom was then considered to be a single community of Christian believers, despite the ecclesiastical rivalry between

O-1

9/23/08

4

3:56 PM

Page 4

EUROPEAN POLITICS

Rome, the center of western Christianity, and Constantinople, the center of eastern Christianity, about which we will have more to say in the next chapter. For Pope Pius II (1458–1468), “Christendom [was] seen as radiating out from a European base.”8 Gradually, Europe replaced Christendom as the word used to describe this portion of the world. According to one historian, this usage began during the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) when warring Catholic and Protestant kings, not wishing to be reminded of the Catholic Church’s prohibition against Christians killing Christians, began to refer to their common geographical home as Europe rather than Christendom. The last public reference to Respublica Christiana appeared in the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), after which the awareness of “Europe” as a geographical expression replaced the earlier awareness of Europe as a community of Christian believers.9 This religious understanding of Europe has not been forgotten and is brought up in the twenty-first century by certain European leaders as a way of distinguishing Europe from the rest of Eurasia.10 Defining Europe geographically is difficult because it is a “scrawny little gut of earth jutting out from the great Eurasiatic land mass,”11 not a selfcontained continent with obvious geographical boundaries, such as Africa or Australia. It is a peninsula (a portion of land surrounded by water on three sides and connected to a large expanse of land) with several subpeninsulas (Scandinavian, Iberian, Balkan, Crimean, and Italian) jutting into the surrounding seas. In the west the boundaries of the European peninsula and subpeninsulas are clearly marked by their extensive coastlines. In the east the dividing line between the European peninsula and the much larger Eurasian landmass is indistinct, there being no obvious natural feature that clearly marks the separation. The line between Europe and Asia is therefore arbitrary and has changed over time. In the Middle Ages the eastern boundary of Christendom was considered to be the Don River (about 40 degrees east longitude). This boundary remained until the eighteenth century, when, in 1730, a Swedish army officer in the service of the tsar of Russia suggested that the boundary of Europe should be pushed eastward from the Don to the Ural Mountains and the Ural River (about 60 degrees east longitude), which flows into the Caspian Sea. Subsequently, in the late eighteenth century, the tsar had a marker erected in the Urals on the road between Yekaterinburg and Tyumen’ to officially designate the geographical boundary between Europe and Asia. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the idea of the continent of Europe extending from the Atlantic to the Urals had become generally accepted.12 Within Europe there are geographical regions defined by certain natural features. The first is the great northern plain, which extends without interruption for over 2,400 miles from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains.

O-1

9/23/08

3:56 PM

Page 5

5

INTRODUCTION

Greenland Sea

Barents Sea

Jan Mayen

Kolgujev

Denmark Strait

al Ur Mo un n tai

Norwegian Sea

ICELAND

White Sea

s

Gulf of Bothnia

SCANDINAVIA

Gulf of Finland

Volga

Volga

Volga

North Sea Baltic Sea

IRELAND

BRITISH ISLES

Elb

e

AT

GRE

Rh

ATLANTIC OCEAN

NO

LA N P

IN

Vo lg

Don

ine

English Channel

ER RTH

a

tula

Se

Vis

in

e

Sea of Azov

un

Caucasus Mts.

tai

Danube

Alps

Mo

Carpathian

ube Dan

Loire

CRIMEA

ns

Bay Bay of of Biscay Biscay Po

Pyr Douro

Ap

ene

es

IBERIA

ne

s

Balkans Se

a

ITALIA

Sardinia Majorca

Strait of Gibraltar

drira iati tcic

ni

Corsica

Tagus

Black Sea

Danube

AAd

en

Aegean Sea Lesbos

Tyrrhenian Sea

Mediterranean Sea

Sicily

ANATOLIA

Peloponnesus

Ionian Sea

Rhodes CYPRUS

Crete

Mediterranean Sea

Natural Features of Europe

This plain is cut at fairly regular intervals by a series of south-to-north flowing rivers, such as the Seine, Rhine, Elbe, Oder, and Vistula. The second is the mountainous region that traverses the continent from west to east, composed of the Pyrenees, Alps, Carpathians, and Balkans and separating the great northern plain from the Mediterranean Sea. The third is the northern littoral of the basin of the Mediterranean, the cradle of Greco-Roman civilization. The fourth region is the Scandinavian, Iberian, Italian, Balkan, Crimean, and Greek subpeninsulas, all of which protrude into the surround-

O-1

9/23/08

6

3:56 PM

Page 6

EUROPEAN POLITICS

ing seas and give Europe its extensive coastline. Comprising the fifth are the many hundreds of islands off the coasts of these subpeninsulas, the largest of which are the British Isles, Iceland, Ireland, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, and Crete.13 It should be noted that the climate of geographical Europe is unusually temperate for a continent of its latitude (roughly between 35 degrees and 70 degrees north) because of the warming effects of the Gulf Stream. Therefore, northern Europe is relatively mild and wet and southern Europe generally dry and sunny. Central and eastern Europe have a true continental climate of clear, cold winters and hot, dry summers. Europe’s temperate climate is responsible for the variations in the skin color of the continent’s peoples: the moderate levels of sunshine (i.e., low ultraviolet radiation) meant moderate amounts of melanin (pigment) in the skin of European people in general. Europeans tend to be blue eyed, fair skinned, and blonde haired in northern Europe, especially on the Scandinavian peninsula, and brown eyed, darker skinned, and black haired in the south, especially on the Iberian, Italian, and Greek peninsulas.14 The definition of Europe’s regions also has been influenced by culture, politics, and religion. As Christendom fragmented into Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant variants of Christianity, about which we will have more to say in subsequent chapters, each became a factor in the definition of regions: Roman Catholic south, Protestant north, and Greek Orthodox east. After the unification of Germany in 1871, German scholars and statesmen defined a region called “Mitteleuropa” to promote the idea of a special role for Germany in the affairs of central Europe.15 The breakup of the Austrian Empire following World War I occasioned the notion of “East-Central Europe,” to coincide with the empire’s successor states of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. After World War II, Europe was divided into “Western Europe”—the states of which were organized into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Economic Community (EEC), the precursor of the EU—and “Eastern Europe”—the states of which were dominated by the Soviet Union and were organized into the Warsaw Pact. The end of the Cold War division of Europe has allowed older regional designations, such as “Mitteleuropa,” to reemerge.16 The central institution through which Europe’s diversity and unity are simultaneously manifested is the nation-state, having been since 1989–1991 successfully extended from the Atlantic to the Urals. Now Europe’s reconfiguration into a states system in which a common form of politico-military rule prevailed was completed. Despite the fact that each of Europe’s nationstates claims a specific and unique politics, history, and national identity, which create the appearance of wide differences among them, the reality is that they share a common European culture such that, as Edmund Burke wrote in the eighteenth century, “no European can feel him- or herself a

O-1

9/23/08

3:56 PM

Page 7

INTRODUCTION

7

complete exile in any country of the continent.”17 This unity and diversity justifies our looking at the nation-state and the European states system simultaneously. The incessant, violent competition for primacy among different forms of politico-military rule that produced the current uniform European order of similarly organized nation-states resulted in the loss of millions of European lives in wars, revolutions, and genocides. Does the recent triumph of one of these forms of rule, the democratic nation-state, mean that the Machtpolitik of Europe’s “‘warring states’ phase of development as a civilization”18 is finished and a new “cooperating states” phase of peace and harmony has finally begun? Does the increasing inclusion of Europe’s nation-states into the EU at the moment of its triumph as the dominant form of rule mean that the states system is disappearing at the same time as Europe’s master institution is gaining strength? In other words, is the EU reconfiguring Europe’s states system into a megastate of continental proportions? Is the dream of a politically unified “United States of Europe” finally being realized?

■ The Plan of the Book This text is divided into four parts. Part 1 contains four chapters devoted to the historical formation of the European nation-state and states system. The first chapter of Part 1 shows how the collapse of the Roman Empire produced two very different forms of politico-military rule in Europe, feudalism in the west and imperialism in the east. The second chapter focuses on how politico-military rule was monopolized, consolidated, and centralized by monarchs in western Europe, which allowed them to subordinate internal rivals and disconnect their kingdoms from the overarching authority of the Catholic Church. How monarchical states were undermined and replaced by nation-states is the concern of the third chapter. And the fourth chapter discusses the conflict between the nation-states of the west and the imperial states of the east that occupied the greater part of the twentieth century and resulted in the recent triumph of the western form of the nation-state as the only legitimate and acceptable type of politico-military rule permitted on the continent. Part 2 of the book presents the distinctive institutional characteristics of the European nation-state. The first chapter in this part discusses the governing institutions and roles that control and administer the territory and population of the state. The second shows how the gradual democratization of the European nation-state resulted in the development of political parties and electoral systems to connect the people to the governing institutions of the state. In the third chapter we explore how the rise of the nation-state led

O-1

9/23/08

3:56 PM

8

Page 8

EUROPEAN POLITICS

to the development of the idea that the state existed for the betterment of the social and economic conditions of its people; this chapter discusses the rise of the European “welfare state” and the recent transformation of this variant of the nation-state into what can be called market states. Part 3 focuses on the recent attempt by Europeans to realize the longheld dream of a united Europe. In the first chapter of this part, we show how the EU, the current manifestation of this dream, developed from the post–World War II economic and political cooperation among the states of the west. The second chapter discusses the institutions and procedures that have evolved to govern the EU. Examined in the third chapter is how the EU has spread across Europe, first to the south and then to the east. Finally, Part 4 considers the future of the European nation-state and states system. Here we address the challenges the European nation-states face as Europe’s master institution, from the EU outside of them, and from regional and successionist movements inside of them. We also consider the extent to which governing practices in the east diverge from the western model of democratic governance, despite the presence of similar democratic structures.

■ Notes 1. Barbara Ward, Five Ideas That Changed the World (New York: W. W. Norton, 1958), 14. 2. Eric Jones, The European Miracle: Environments, Economies, and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia, 3rd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 115. 3. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990 (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 32. 4. Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 5. Jones, The European Miracle, xxxvi. 6. Ibid., xi. 7. Andrew Vincent, Theories of the State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 19–21. 8. Denys Hay, Europe: The Emergence of an Idea (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), 84. 9. Ibid., 118. 10. For example, the new pope, Benedict XVI, adheres to the idea of Europe as Christendom, having said in an interview with the French newspaper Le Figaro in August 2004 that Turkey is not a European state because the vast majority of its population is Muslim. 11. Howard K. Smith, The State of Europe (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), 3. 12. Norman Davies, Europe: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 8. 13. Ibid., 52–62.

O-1

9/23/08

3:56 PM

Page 9

INTRODUCTION

9

14. Ibid., 50. 15. J. M. Roberts, A History of Europe (New York: Allen Lane, 1997), 570. 16. Davies, Europe: A History, 28. 17. Quoted in Jones, The European Miracle, 111. 18. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 53.

■ Suggested Reading Hay, Denys. Europe: The Emergence of an Idea. New York: Harper & Row, 1957. Jones, Eric. The European Miracle: Environments, Economies, and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia, 3rd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Morris, Christopher W. An Essay on the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Tilly, Charles. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990.

O-1

9/23/08

3:56 PM

Page 10

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

Page 11

Part 1 The Formation of the European Nation-State IN PART 1, WE present a very long-term perspective of the formation of the democratic European nation-state and the European states system. The first chapter of this part explains how the Christianization of the Roman Empire gave Europe its identity as a Christian community and how the disintegration and collapse of the empire created a profound division within Europe in terms of the way Christianity was practiced and the way politico-military rule was exercised that came to separate eastern and western Europe and still influences political practices across the continent. The second chapter covers the history of European state formation from the end of the Roman Empire to the period when the consolidated monarchical state became the dominant form of politico-military rule within the emerging European states system. It will show how war drove the consolidation of the monarchical state and how strong (absolutist) monarchical states came to prevail almost completely across Europe, except in a few locations. The third chapter continues the story of European state formation with a discussion of the way the monarchical state was challenged and eventually replaced by the nationstate. It will demonstrate how effectiveness in war making and nationalism became inextricably linked during the period after the French Revolution and how nationalism was differently expressed across Europe, owing to the different forms of politico-military rule that existed in western and eastern Europe before its advent. The fourth chapter focuses on the transformation during the twentieth century of the multiethnic empires of central and eastern Europe into a multiplicity of nation-states, which resulted in the final triumph of the nation-state over all other forms of politico-military rule.

11

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

Page 12

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

Page 13

2 The Disintegration of the Roman Imperial State

A DISCUSSION OF the formation of the democratic European nation-state and states system must begin with the Roman Empire, for it was the manner in which Roman imperial rule disintegrated that divided Europe into east and west based on competing Christianities (Roman Catholicism in the west and Greek Orthodoxy in the east) and different forms of politico-military rule (feudalism in the west and imperialism in the east). Moreover, the ideal of the unified Roman imperial state remained in the European political imagination from its collapse until the twentieth century, during which time there were innumerable attempts by unifiers to re-create its coherent, continent-wide, imperial politico-military rule, even as Europe was compartmentalizing into rival sovereign, monarchical states.

■ Forming the Imperial Roman State Roman imperial rule reached its greatest geographical extent in the third century AD when its frontiers extended from the shores of the western Mediterranean to the Iberian Peninsula in the west and from the shores of North Africa to the Danube and Rhine rivers and across the English Channel to the United Kingdom up to present-day Scotland. Roman politico-military rule can be divided into three types: monarchical, republican, and imperial. Monarchical rule dates from the founding of Rome, the “Eternal City,” in 753 BC, by Romulus and Remus, the orphaned twins supposedly suckled by a female wolf, to the expulsion of the last of seven kings in 510 BC. Republican rule began in 509 BC with the election of the first ruling consuls by the Senate and ended in 31 BC when the first imperial dynasty was established by Caesar Augustus (31 BC–14 AD). Imperial rule lasted until the collapse of the western portion of the empire in the fifth century AD, 13

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

14

Page 14

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

and the eastern portion in 1453. The Romans were able to build and sustain their empire for two thousand years because of their genius for military organization, administration, law, and civil engineering.1 Rule during the republic was designed to make a return to the kingdom impossible. This was expressed in the motto of the republic—Senatus Populus Que Romanus (SPQR), which means “Roman Senate and People,” in whose name all authority was exercised. This authority was exercised through a complicated set of elected assemblies attended by all citizens. The executive of the republic comprised two consuls appointed by the Senate for one-year terms. These individuals were usually men of considerable experience in public life, having served in a least two subordinate levels of elective office. This gave the Roman governing elite a high degree of cohesiveness and competence because promotion was based on extensive training in lesser offices.2 The republic was a “militarized society where citizenship was synonymous with military service.”3 Every male citizen who owned property was required to serve in the army, if called to duty: “from their teens, war was their whole way of life. Volunteering for service, decorated for bravery, breeding children for the next generation’s army, they were willing to serve as long as they could pass the physical.”4 Therefore, war provided an important arena where male Romans could distinguish themselves in the eyes of their fellows. Serving in the army and participating in the conquest of so-called barbarians (i.e., non-Roman Germanic and Slavonic tribal peoples) was the way that Roman men made their civic contribution. Almost every year Rome’s armies marched out, fought, and humbled an enemy. For Roman men, war was a single-minded search for glory and noble selfsacrifice for the republic, of adversity endured, and victory by the republic over increasingly formidable opponents. By 275 BC the Roman army had conquered the Italian peninsula, defeated the Carthaginians in a campaign known as the Punic Wars (264–202 BC), and, between 201 and 146 BC, conquered the Greeks and Macedonians. Rome’s army was the finest military organization of its time. It was highly trained, superbly disciplined (desertion was punished by death), and extremely mobile, the Romans having built a vast road network in order to move troops rapidly from place to place within the empire. It numbered about six hundred thousand legionnaires at its greatest strength and consumed about 20 percent of the Roman imperial state budget. The army was stationed along the empire’s limes (frontiers), which were demarcated by stone walls and towers.5 In effect, Rome created the world’s first “standing army,” that is, a permanent military force recruited, trained, paid, fed, equipped, and armed by the state. All modern European armies are based on the Roman model of military organization. The victories of Rome’s legions gradually transformed the republic into

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

Page 15

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE ROMAN IMPERIAL STATE

15

an empire. From the rule and assassination of the dictator Julius Caesar on the Ides of March in 44 BC, Rome became an empire dominated by its emperors and military strongmen who seized power often with the aid of the Praetorian Guard. As the institutions of the republic were unable to administer the empire efficiently, many of them, such as the Senate, declined in power. The durability of the empire was bolstered by the transformation of the primitive customary law of the Roman tribes into a rationally codified system of civil, criminal, and public law that was applied uniformly throughout the empire. It was also bolstered by a uniform system of territorial administration. The empire was subdivided into provinces, which were ruled by proconsuls, usually proven generals, appointed by the emperor. The proconsuls were assisted by a small band of administrators, normally drawn from Rome’s wealthy class. The purpose of this administrative system was to collect taxes, keep the peace (Pax Romana), and adjudicate disputes according to Roman law. The official language of Roman government and administration was Latin, but Greek was widely spoken and used as the lingua franca in the eastern provinces. In sum, the Roman Empire constituted a coherent politico-military organization stretching across eastern and western Europe that provided through citizenship—and despite considerable regional variations in local languages and culture—a sense of belonging to a unified world, a single civilization within which Pax Romana prevailed. The disintegration of coherent Roman politico-military rule was gradual, extending over several centuries. It was caused not by classic imperial “overextension” but, rather, by what might be called underextension.6 First, the empire ceased expanding during the reign of Hadrian (ruled 117–138 AD), which meant that booty and tribute from newly conquered peoples stopped flowing into the imperial treasury. Therefore, taxes had to be increased, eventually to confiscatory levels, to pay for the army, bureaucracy, and public works. Second, agricultural production, which relied heavily on slave labor, began to stagnate because no new peoples were being conquered to provide slaves. Third, Rome’s policy of recruiting Germanic and Slavonic tribal peoples (then called “barbarians”) into the army to restore its strength, compromised by manpower shortages, eventually led to the deRomanization of the army. Gradually, the ranks of the army were filled with legionnaires whose commitment to Rome was slight. Power gradually shifted from the city of Rome to the provinces, where provincial generals began to rival one another for power, glory, and wealth, which diverted their attention from frontier defense.7 In an attempt to reverse disintegration, Emperor Diocletian (284–305) divided the empire in 285 AD into eastern and western portions along a line extending north and south through the Adriatic Sea. He devised the “Tetarchy,” the scheme that gave the empire four rulers: Two augusti, or

GAUL

N

RI U M

CA

E

ID IA

S e a

ROM

U

LIBYA EGYPT

S e a

Black Sea

Sarmatia

Red Sea

Arabia

A NI ME IA AR S N U Parthian HY PONT A A BIT CI S Empire O S AD Y PP A R C IA ASIA MES CILICIA OPO TAM IA

M e d i t e r r a n e a n

Aegean Sea

D O N IA

THRACE

DACIA

MACE

M

Ionian Sea

a

IC

Se

R

The Roman Empire in 117

tic

LY

ria

Ad

IL

Germania

LY

Gaetulia

AF

M e d i t e r r a n e a n

M A U R E TA N I A

S PA I N

ATLANTIC OCEAN

BRITAIN

IT A

A

3:56 PM

BI

9/23/08

AR A

O-2 Page 16

16

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

Page 17

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE ROMAN IMPERIAL STATE

17

co-emperors, exercised supreme authority, one in the western portion and one in the eastern portion. Each co-emperor was assisted by a caesar, the second in command, who was intended to succeed him. The areas for which the four rulers were responsible were called prefectures, which were subdivided into dioceses under a vicar. The dioceses, of which there were one hundred, were subdivided into small units of equal taxing capacity. 8 Civil administration was reformed and the army revitalized. Diocletian also declared that the empire rested not on the authority of the people through the Senate but on its special relationship with the gods.9 Politicomilitary power within the Roman Empire was more explicitly joined to religion in order to enlist the gods in the struggle to save the Roman imperial state from collapse.

■ Converting Rome to Christianity The conversion of Rome to Christianity needs to be discussed because Christianity eventually came to define Europe and gave the peoples of Europe a common identity. The official state religion of Rome was polytheism (i.e., the belief in many gods). The Romans worshipped the gods of the Greco-Roman pantheon as well as deified deceased emperors. According to one historian, Roman religion “had nothing to do with individual salvation and not much with individual behavior; it was above all a public matter. It was part of the res publica, a series of rituals whose maintenance was good for the state, whose neglect would bring retribution.”10 The Romans thought that they were especially loved by their gods and their imperial success was seen as having been produced by their divine favor. Romans borrowed the gods of their defeated enemies and integrated them into their pantheon, transforming Hermes of the Greeks into Roman Mercury, and Greek Athena into Roman Minerva, for example. As coherent imperial politico-military rule disintegrated and the harsh methods taken to counteract it created extreme hardship, Romans began to turn away from the official pagan pantheon to foreign gods. Of these, two were especially influential: Mithras, the militant god of the sun from the Persian Zoroastrian religion, and Isis, the Egyptian goddess of motherhood, both of whom promised Romans individual salvation and eternal life. Romans also turned to ancient natural and fertility gods, such as the goddess Cybele, from pre-Roman times. A variety of so-called mystery cults from the eastern region of the empire were attractive as well. Initially, the Roman state allowed people to follow these new religions, provided that they continued to publicly recognize the official gods of Rome and the cult of the deified emperors. The devotees of these alternative religions were

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

18

Page 18

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

mostly, but not exclusively, from the lower and economically distressed classes of Roman urban society, especially slaves and the very poor who were seeking solace in their economic misery. Rome’s aristocratic classes continued to be loyal to the official pantheon of gods, whom they believed had made Rome great. One of the mystery cults to which some Romans were attracted was a Jewish sect that originated in the eastern province of Judea. At first the disciples of Jesus of Nazareth, one of many early nonconformist itinerant teachers preaching in the east at that time and the sect’s founder, proselytized among Jewish communities in the eastern empire and later in the western empire. After the crucifixion of Jesus, Christianity (from the Greek Christos, or messiah, meaning “anointed one”) became a revolutionary social movement that spread rapidly, especially among Rome’s towndwelling, lower social classes, as well as aristocratic women, because its theology was (1) simple and direct (good versus evil); (2) universalistic (all, rich and poor, men and women, were equal in the sight of God); (3) emotionally and psychologically comforting (it offered salvation and eternal life); and (4) charitable (it emphasized concern for the poor and weak). Thus, Christianity carried great hope for the suffering masses during the period of Rome’s disintegration. Moreover, the “physical conditions in the Roman Empire . . . were ideally suited for the spread of Christianity. The establishment of the Pax Romana made it possible for missionaries to travel in perfect safety from one end of the empire to the other, and the strategic Roman roads provided an ideal means of communication. The common languages of Greek and Latin could be understood everywhere.”11 Initially, the Roman imperial state tolerated Christianity. However, because Christians practiced their rites in secret, refused to acknowledge the Roman pantheon and the cult of the deified emperors, and refused to participate in the official public worship of Rome’s official gods, they were declared enemies of the state. Christianity’s monotheism (i.e., the belief in the universality of one God and its idea that all people everywhere were equal in the eyes of that one God) threatened the way Rome understood its relationship to the divine order. Christian pacifism and its emphasis on kindness, humility, charity, mercy, love for one’s neighbor, and individual salvation, offered an alternative understanding to the Roman idea of virtue, which was connected to manliness, war, and the maintenance of the imperial state. Christian virtue was manifested in acts of piety and charity rather than acts of courage and honor on the battlefield. Consequently, the most pious and energetic adherents to Christianity were women. 12 Moreover, monotheistic Christianity revised the Roman view that victory in battle was nothing more than a military victory of one people over another, which allowed the Romans to incorporate their defeated enemies into their state. Rather, Christianity saw victory/defeat as an all-or-nothing proposition, a

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

Page 19

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE ROMAN IMPERIAL STATE

19

struggle between absolute good and absolute evil, which seriously undermined the Roman social order. Therefore, great efforts were made by the Roman state to destroy Christianity by persecuting Christians unmercifully. The greatest persecutions came during the reign of Diocletian, who sought to save the Roman Empire through the application of authoritarian methods. During Diocletian’s reign, many thousands of Christians were tortured and put to death in the arena. Despite these efforts to suppress Christianity, the numbers of Christians increased during the fourth century. Persecutions ended in 311, when an edict of toleration for all religions was issued by Emperor Galerius. Under this edict Christians were allowed to resume their own worship but were urged to pray for the emperor and the empire in order to enlist the Christian god for the welfare of the imperial state.13 In 312 AD, just before a battle for the imperial throne at Milvian Bridge, one of the rival generals, Constantine, had a vision in which he saw a flaming cross in the sky and ordered his soldiers to put the cross on their shields in order to show respect for the Christian god and to enlist this god’s help in battle. Constantine won the battle and became emperor. Afterward, he let it be known that he owed his success to the god of the Christians. In 313 he granted freedom of worship to all Christians and chose the Christian god to be one of the protectors of Rome. Constantine restored to Christians their property confiscated during the persecutions, educated his children in the Christian religion, and was himself baptized a Christian on his deathbed in 337. The emperor Theodosius (ruled 379–395 AD) outlawed paganism in 380. He prohibited blood sacrifices, closed temples, and sanctioned the use of physical coercion to gain conformity to the “new religion” (Christianity). Pagans were persecuted by the Roman state, and military service was restricted to Christians. In 381, Christianity became the established religion of the Roman Empire. In 321, Sunday was declared “the Lord’s Day” (Dominica/Domingo) and an official day of rest and public worship. Roman politico-military power was gradually disconnected from paganism and conjoined to the Christian faith. Christian dogma became binding on all citizens of the empire, and the empire’s survival came to be seen as depending upon the its conversion to Christianity. Emperors took on the responsibility to care for the faith of Romans and increasingly used the coercive power of the state to spread Christianity and ensure the rightness of Christian belief throughout the empire.14 In order to achieve this, Constantine believed that he needed a new capital city free from all pagan traditions. Therefore, he founded and built a new capital on the Bosphorus on the site of the small town of Byzantium in 330 AD. The new city imitated Rome: it was built on seven hills, and had a Senate chamber, baths, aqueducts, a hippodrome, a forum, and the largest

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

20

Page 20

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

Christian church in the empire, the Hagia Sofia. The city’s name was eventually changed from Nova Roma (New Rome) to Constantinople in honor of its founder. Conversion of the empire fused Christianity’s pacifist theology of kindness, humility, patience, mercy, purity, and chastity with the militaristic practices of the Roman imperial state—order, patriarchy, law, hierarchy, war, and conquest. Despite the efforts of Christian emperors after Constantine to completely eliminate the “old religion” (paganism), Christianity also fused with Roman pagan religious practice. In the words of one scholar, the Christian church “took over the vestments of pagan priests, use of incense and holy water in purification, burning of candles before the altar, worship of saints, the architecture of the basilica, Roman law as the basis of Canon law, the title Pontifex Maximus for the pope, the Latin language, and the vast framework of the government of the Empire.”15 In addition, the church also adopted a uniform system of episcopal organization based on the administrative structure of the empire devised by Diocletian.

■ Fragmenting Roman Rule in the West At the time the Roman Republic was expanding northwestward, so-called barbarian Germanic tribes of Franks, Lombards, Frisians, Burgundians, Alemmani, Jutes, Angles, and Saxons were experiencing population explosions that caused them to expand southwestward from the Baltic region and overrun the indigenous Celtic inhabitants of Europe. By 200 BC they had reached the Rhine River, and by 100 BC the Danube. Germanic peoples, such as the Suevi, Visigoths, Ostrogoths, and Vandals expanded southeastward. The Rhine and the Danube rivers became the frontier between the seminomadic Germanic peoples and the Roman Empire. The Celts survived only in present-day Scotland, Wales, Cornwall, the Isle of Man, Ireland, and Brittany. In about 375 AD the Huns, a nomadic warrior people from the steppelands of central Asia led by Attila (433–453), swept westward and attacked the Germanic peoples. To escape the Hunnic army, the Germans fled across the Rhine and Danube into Roman territory, where they were allowed to settle on uninhabited border territory as self-governing allies of Rome in exchange for land, money, and service in the Roman army. A coalition army of Roman and German troops defeated the Huns at Châlons in 451. Slavonic peoples pushed southward as well and threatened the eastern portion of the empire. Eventually, the slow infiltration of Germanic peoples into the empire became a full-scale invasion. From 407 to 429 AD the Roman provinces of Italia, Galicia, and Hispania were invaded. In 410 a Visigoth chieftain,

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

Page 21

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE ROMAN IMPERIAL STATE

21

Alaric, invaded the Italian peninsula and sacked Rome. Rome was sacked a second time in 455 by Vandals, who launched their invasion from north Africa, which they had conquered by taking a roundabout route through the Iberian Peninsula and across the Straits of Gibraltar. The frontier provinces were also overrun; Jutes, Angles, and Saxons invaded Britannia between 441 and 442; Galicia fell to the Franks, Burgundians, Alemmani, and Visigoths. Hispania was overrun by the Suevi, Vandals, and Visigoths. In 476 the last western Roman emperor was deposed and replaced by a German chieftain, Odoacer, who ruled the Italian peninsula as a king. With the western empire’s disintegration as a coherent politico-military entity, the Christian Church gradually replaced the political institutions of the Roman imperial state with its own administrative hierarchy of priests, bishops, and cardinals, ecclesiastical courts, and Canon law. The capital of the western empire, Rome, became the capital of the Catholic (meaning “universal” in Greek) Church. In the fifth century the bishops of the diocese of Rome were able to achieve ascendancy over the church’s religio-administrative structure in the west by arguing that they had inherited their authority directly from Saint Peter, the first bishop of Rome and the apostle to whom Christ reputedly gave the “keys to Heaven,” and established the papacy. The purpose of the Catholic Church was to be the earthly means by which salvation from eternal damnation (to which human beings were doomed because of the sins of the first human beings, Adam and Eve) could be achieved. Although the eastern empire was attacked by Germanic and Slavonic peoples, as well as by the Persians and Arab peoples, its greater wealth and larger population allowed it to survive these onslaughts until 1453, when it was finally conquered by the Ottoman Turks. During the one thousand years of its existence beyond that of the western empire, the characteristics of politico-military rule in the eastern empire diverged widely enough from those that had existed in the original unified empire for it to be referred to by historians as the Byzantine Empire, about which we will have more to say later in this chapter.16 The Germanic invaders of the western continent were stateless, seminomadic, pastoral peoples. Except for an occasional temporary federation (foederati) of tribes, forms of politico-military rule above the tribe did not exist. The basic unit of the tribe was the clan, which was composed of a small number of related families living in village communities. The Germans practiced animal husbandry (cattle, horses, swine) and hunted game. They were polytheists who worshipped a pantheon of Norse gods. Since they lacked the formal structures of politico-military rule, decisions affecting the tribe were made by a chieftain, called “king,” selected from a certain clan. Kings were primarily war-band leaders who, in consultation with an assembly of the tribe’s leading warriors, were expected to lead the

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

22

Page 22

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

tribe in battle, settle disputes among the tribe’s members, and act as intercessors with the gods through the performance of religious rituals, such as making sacrifices for successful hunting, good grazing, or victory in battle. A king’s successor was chosen from among his direct male offspring and confirmed in an act of acclamation by an assembly of all the tribe’s leading warriors.17 As we saw above, the Romans exercised politico-military rule through a set of public offices and institutions. The Roman emperor was an official of the Roman imperial state who ruled by means of a hierarchically organized bureaucracy and army according to Roman law. His power ultimately derived from the people of Rome. In contrast, Germanic kings could not conceive of political relationships on any basis other than one of the personal loyalty. They had no notion that authority could be exercised other than by one man over another. Therefore, the effectiveness of a particular king depended on his military strength alone and the personal loyalty that he engendered among his followers, who swore to serve him with absolute fidelity and who considered it a disgrace to survive him in battle. In exchange for such loyalty, the king provided his followers with food and weapons, as well as a share of the booty taken from the defeated enemies.18

Gradually, along the Rhine and Danube where Germanic tribes had been settled within the empire, a hybrid “social and cultural ‘Middle Ground’” 19 developed on which were blended Roman politico-military institutions and Germanic tribal practices that eventually spread to the entire western empire as the Germanic peoples penetrated deeper into its territory. As coherent Roman politico-military rule collapsed, Germanic kingdoms filled the void. In the Germanic kingdoms, the realm was conceived of as belonging to the king who could divide it among heirs, mortgage it, and give portions of it in marriage as he saw fit. In other words, Germanic kings “considered their new kingdoms as their property, and the [Roman] distinction between public and private would have baffled them.”20 Therefore, the successor Germanic kingdoms did not have any specialized politico-military institutions, such as a standing army and a formal administrative structure. As kingdoms were viewed as the property of their kings, they were ruled with the help of the members of their kings’ households, such as their brothers, sons, and sons-in-law, as well as trusted companions. Ruling in this way was not too difficult as long as kingdoms were small. As kingdoms grew in size, however, a new method had to be found for ruling an extensive territory without the help of a formal administrative structure staffed by civil servants. The method devised was to subdivide kingdoms into small units called “counties” and place in each of them a loyal follower, usually a kinsman, called a count, who would represent the king’s authority and gov-

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

Page 23

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE ROMAN IMPERIAL STATE

23

Anglo Saxon Celtic Kingdoms Kingdoms Kingdom of the Ostrogoths

ATLANTIC OCEAN

Kingdom of the Gepids

Kingdom of the Franks

Kingdom of the Burgundians

Kingdom of the Suevi

Kingdom of the Visigoths

Kingdom of Odoacer

BYZANTINE EMPIRE

Kingdom of the Vandals

Germanic Kingdoms and the Byzantine Empire in 500

ern in his name. Expected to rule their counties as the king ruled the kingdom, counts were granted full military, judicial, and financial powers, which they exercised with help from their own household companions. Thus, the problem of exercising politico-military rule over the Germanic kingdom without the benefit of an administrative structure staffed by civil servants was solved by breaking its territory down into parcels small enough to be ruled personally by a few individuals.21 However, ruling a large territory by breaking it down into small parcels had a significant drawback: it allowed local rulers to become independent

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

24

Page 24

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

of the king and gave them the wherewithal to challenge kingly authority. Kings tried to prevent counts from becoming independent by frequently visiting their counties and directly supervising them. They also established powerful rivals, usually unswervingly loyal companions, on estates scattered throughout the kingdom on whom they could rely to bring a recalcitrant count into line.22 Despite efforts to maintain control from the center, the successor Germanic kingdoms, already fragmented into counties, became even more fragmented into a bewildering array of smaller independent principalities, duchies, and fiefs, each possessing its own military, financial, and judicial powers. Although this fragmentation of politico-military power resulted, in major part, from its delegation downward in a situation where the apparatus of administrative control from the center was absent, it was also the result of dynastic struggles provoked by the dissatisfaction of the king’s heirs with the division among them of the kingdom at his death. Fragmentation of politico-military rule was in addition the result of military threats from outside. The invasion of Europe by Muslims in the eighth century was the first of these. In 711 the followers of Muhammad, an obscure Arab mystic from the Arabian Peninsula who founded his first mosque in 622, crossed the Straits of Gibraltar and entered the Iberian Peninsula, where they overwhelmed the Visigoths and the Vandals. By 732 they crossed the Pyrenees and reached Tours on the Loire River, where they were halted by Charles Martel (“the Hammer”) at the Battle of Poitiers. After this defeat, Muslim armies retreated to the Iberian Peninsula, where they settled and established a durable Islamic presence, called Al-Andalus, that lasted until the Christian Reconquista (reconquest) five centuries later. The second invasion was by tribes from Scandinavia known as Norsemen (Norse, meaning “North”—thus, “Northmen”) or “Vikings.” Invading Swedes penetrated into present-day Russia, and Norwegians and Danes invaded the British Isles and the European mainland by sailing upstream from the mouths of its great, north-flowing rivers (the Vistula, Rhine, Somme, Seine, and Loire), sacking cities as they pushed inland. Vikings entered the Mediterranean in 886. In 911 they were granted land by the Franks on both sides of the mouth of the Seine on which to settle. This territory came to be called Normandy, the land of the Northmen. The third invasion was by the Magyars (Hungarians), a nomadic horse people related linguistically to the Turks and Finns, from the steppes of central Asia, who crossed the Carpathians and the lower Danube and pushed into central Europe. They were finally stopped by the Saxon king Otto the Great (936–973) at the Battle of Lechfeld in 955. In exchange for peace, Germanic kings gave the Magyars land upon which to settle in what is today Hungary. The brunt of these invasions was borne by local counts and their retain-

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

Page 25

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE ROMAN IMPERIAL STATE

25

ers because kings could not raise an army quickly enough to be effective against bands of swiftly moving raiders. Therefore, local counts had to defend their counties themselves. This led them to believe that the counties they defended were their own personal property, not the king’s. The people whom the count defended also came to believe that the local count was their ruler, not the distant king. Thus, the practice of delegating authority and the necessities of military defense against attack by highly mobile raiders gradually undermined the king’s ability to govern his realm through his retainers. Politico-military rule became increasingly fragmented, indirect, and local.23 The decentralized, fragmented, indirect way of exercising politico-military rule in the Germanic kingdoms that replaced Roman rule in the west came to be known as feudalism, the word coming from the medieval Latin feodum, itself a derivative of the Germanic word fee, meaning “cattle” or “property.”24 Feudalism was a method of exercising politico-military rule by means of private contracts among individuals rather than by an institutionalized, public administrative structure and a standing army, as had been the case in the Roman Empire. The feudal social order was organized into “estates” to which rights and privileges were attached. These estates were based on the medieval assumption that humankind since the beginning of time had been divided into three hierarchically ranked categories of people: those who pray (orators), those who fight (bellators), and those who work (laborers).25 Those who pray (the first estate) were the clergy, which included the priests, bishops, archbishops, and cardinals of the regular church hierarchy; the monks, nuns, and abbots, priors, prioresses, and abbesses of its religious orders (Cistercians, Benedictines, Franciscans, and so forth); and the knights, masters, and grand masters of its military orders (Templars, Hospitallers, and so on), about which we will have more to say below. Bishops, archbishops, abbots, masters, and grand masters were equal in status and power to the greatest dukes and counts of the secular hierarchy. Many dioceses and religious orders became extremely wealthy because they controlled huge tracts of land. The military-religious orders were especially powerful because they were composed of armed monks. The clergy served an important religio-cultural function in the feudal age. They constituted, among others, Europe’s educated class, which interpreted the meaning of Scripture, elaborated church doctrines, and carried on the tradition of classical philosophy and science inherited from Rome. Monastery and cathedral schools taught the seven liberal arts: grammar, rhetoric, logic, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. Through its Europe-wide networks of monasteries, cathedrals, and churches, the clergy became respected for its learning as well as feared for its enforcement of Canon law, under which it could formally accuse people of heresy and have

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

26

Page 26

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

them tried and executed, usually by burning at the stake. Few people outside of the clergy were literate in the language of the church and government, Latin. This gave the literate clergy enormous power because the church interpreted and communicated legal and moral ideas across Europe.26 The medieval Catholic Church was, in effect, a Europe-wide religious “superstate,” within which all forms of European secular politico-military rule were contained. Consequently, it was immune from secular authority. It could not be taxed, and its clergy could not be tried in secular courts. It taxed its parishioners (by way of the tithe) and controlled education in its cathedral schools. The church also controlled marriage, divorce, and wills, the records of which it maintained in the archives located in its churches and cathedrals. Given its power and wealth, it was inevitable that there would be tension between the church and secular rulers. As secular power grew throughout the Middle Ages, kings increasingly sought to free themselves from the religious authority of the church. They sought to control the appointment of bishops in their realms and defy the church by taking actions against the wishes of the church hierarchy. The church responded by excommunicating recalcitrant kings, which was usually sufficient to gain their compliance. Gradually, however, even the weapon of excommunication did not work against recalcitrant monarchs. The tables were slowly turned, and the church became completely subjected to secular politico-military rule, as we will see below. Those who fight—the second estate—were members of the nobility, whose sole purpose was exercising politico-military rule. When the Roman Empire collapsed, its large standing army was replaced by small retinues of mounted aristocratic warriors called knights in English, cabalarii in Italian, cavalheiros in Portuguese, chevaliers in French, Rittern in German, and szlachta in Polish. From about the eighth to the fifteenth centuries, bands of heavily armored knights mounted on “cataphracts,” especially bred and trained large warhorses, became the principal military organization of the feudal age. This was made possible by the invention of the stirrup, which allowed the knight to stand firmly on his horse when using a lance in battle. The lance became a formidable weapon because it was backed by the full weight of the horse and rider. Therefore, European warfare changed from swiftly moving skirmishes between light cavalry units to the massed charge of heavy cavalry. Foot soldiers were of little importance in such warfare because they could not stand up to the head-on charge of the heavy cavalry.27 An “army” during the feudal age was a temporary coalescence of many such private retinues of armored knights called into service by the king. Individual knights were responsible for procuring their own military equipment, which included warhorses, sword, shield, mace, helmet, and the very expensive chain-mail coat. They were granted a parcel of land (a fief) from

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

Page 27

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE ROMAN IMPERIAL STATE

27

which they could derive sufficient wealth to feed, clothe, and arm themselves, and, if the parcels were large enough, a number of companions who formed their retinues. Knights were granted, by the king, the power and authority to collect taxes and tolls and dispense justice in their fiefs according to local customary law. The practice of granting land to knights as recompense for military service encouraged localism, which fragmented politico-military rule even more. During the feudal age, Europe became a welter of independent fiefs of various sizes. The splintering of politico-military rule resulted in the “encastellation” of Europe, especially in the west, where feudalism originated and was most deeply rooted. Across western Europe the impregnable stone castle perched on a crag or on the coast provided the inhabitants of the fief with a place of refuge in case of attack. In times of peace, its garrison of knights sallied forth to maintain order within the fief. Gradually, the knights of the garrisons who lived in these castles defied the king’s writ, and they eventually became points of defiant, local politico-military rule and obstacles to the king’s monarchy-wide authority.28 By the twelfth century, all members of the second estate, from the pettiest knight to the greatest duke and the king, came to believe that they belonged to the same group based on their ownership of politico-military power. Thus, an aristocracy gradually came into being, which believed that its sole purpose for existing was to defend and govern the realm. It lived apart from the rest of feudal society according to an ideal of personal conduct and military virtue called chivalry. According to this ideal, all male members of the aristocracy were gentlemen (from the French gentilhomme, or man of good lineage) who were expected to be brave and gallant warriors, have polished manners, a high moral sense, and skill and knowledge in the social arts of courtly life. Knights were expected to protect the church, give aid to the weak, respect women, obey their lords, fight infidels, uphold truth and justice, and keep their word.29 The notion that knights were socially superior to other members of feudal society because of their bravery and devotion to duty, honor, and morality eventually gave rise to the idea that such status could be acquired only by birth. Thus, the right to be a knight became hereditary and the aristocracy became subject to its own legally recognized rights, duties, and obligations. Certain activities, such as trade or commerce, were deemed incompatible with noble status and were legally forbidden to the nobility. Nobles were also forbidden from working with their hands in agriculture or manual occupations. Such activities, because they were mundane and dirty, were considered to be contrary to the honor and good breeding of the nobility. Eventually, the nobility came to be subdivided into legally recognized ranks based on wealth and power, to which specific rights and duties were attached. The most powerful and prestigious were kings, princes, and dukes,

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

28

Page 28

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

followed by counts and knights.30 As we shall see, the second estate dominated European political and military affairs until the early twentieth century. Those who work—the third estate—were the people who lived in towns; these were, for the most part, artisans and merchants. As trade and manufacturing revived after the disintegration of the Roman Empire in the west, a class of merchants who traveled from place to place developed, along the shorelines of the Mediterranean and the North and Baltic seas as well as along the courses of Europe’s major navigable rivers, the Po, the Seine, the Rhone, the Danube, the Rhine, the Thames, and the Tagus. Eventually, these itinerant merchants looked for places where the local lord would allow them to settle and carry out their commercial activities. Usually, they settled near ports and river crossings, or where castles, monasteries, or cathedrals had been built. Soon, all major castles, monasteries, and cathedrals had bourghs (towns) nearby, which had been granted a charter or franchise of privileges and rights in exchange for the payment of a sum of money and an annual income to the local lord.31 People who lived in towns were called burghers and had a distinctive legal status that distinguished them from the nobility and clergy and freed them from the feudal relationships that prevailed outside the town walls. Town charters applied equally to all the residents of the town, not to particular groups. Gradually, towns became economically and militarily self-sufficient. They were surrounded with tall defensive walls and raised their own militias recruited from among their male denizens. People who lived in towns were free from the laws that regulated the feudal society beyond their walls and were, by and large, self-governing. Serfs who escaped to a town and lived within its walls for a “year and a day” without being identified, became free persons under the town’s protection. Some towns, notably in northern Italy and Germany, became free republics detached from obligations to the feudal lords who had chartered them. By the twelfth century, several regions of Europe were experiencing vigorous urbanization. The Italian port cities of Venice, Pisa, and Genoa were the first but were soon rivaled by the cities of Lombardy and the Rhineland, as well as the textile towns of Florence and Siena in Tuscany and Ypres, Bruges, and Ghent in Flanders.32 The merchants who settled in these towns organized themselves into guilds (from the Anglo-Saxon geld, meaning “self-governing”) for protection (there not being any organized police force), mutual aid (there not being any welfare system), and governance (there not being municipal government). As towns grew and attracted artisans such as cobblers, weavers, dryers, fullers, pullers, tanners, wheelers, coopers, smiths (of various kinds), as well as butchers, bakers, and candlestick makers, new guilds were formed in each trade or craft. Guilds regulated these occupations and their level of productivity by controlling the training and licensing of those who practiced them and by preventing competition. Each guild established

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

Page 29

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE ROMAN IMPERIAL STATE

29

detailed rules that regulated the manufacture, quality, and price of the goods produced by the craftspersons whose training and numbers were controlled by the guilds.33 Medieval towns did not, like ancient Roman towns, have baths, temples, and amphitheaters but, rather, cathedrals, guild halls, and town halls. Outside the estates system were the serfs (from the Latin servus, or slave), the lowest of whom were tied to the soil of the lord on whose fief they had been granted a plot of land to farm. Serfs were not slaves because they had certain rights and privileges, which slaves do not have. For example, the lord of the manor on which they resided could not harm his serfs with impunity, and he was obligated to protect them from enemies. Serfs also enjoyed the right to rest on holidays (holy days), which could number as many as fifty a year, in addition to Sundays when work was forbidden. In exchange for these rights and protection, the serf gave the lord a portion of what he produced, along with rent or unpaid labor on the lord’s lands, as well as a tithe (10 percent) of his income to the church. The glue that held the fragmented feudal politico-military system together was “vassalage,” an institutionalized set of personal dependencies within which all men were the “men of other men” to whom they owed obedience and loyalty and from whom they expected unwavering protection, assistance, and beneficence. This system was a blend of the old Germanic institution of comitatus (personal loyalty to the tribal war chieftain) with a new idea of faithfulness and reciprocal obligation.34 In the ninth century, personal loyalty between lords and the vassals began to be entered into with a ceremony presided over by the church, which involved the taking of an oath of fealty sworn by the vassal on the Bible or a sacred relic and an act of homage sealed with a kiss. Ties of vassalage, theoretically, lasted during the entire lives of both lord and vassal.35 By the tenth century, vassalage and other feudal institutions had spread, in varying degrees, to most of western Europe in one form or another. The king was suzerain, or overlord, of the entire realm. Below the king were several dukes who held huge tracts of land and were his direct vassals. Dukes, in turn, retained a number of counts who held counties within their dukedoms and were their direct vassals. Counts, in turn, retained a number of knights who had been granted fiefs within their counties and were direct vassals of their counts. Knights retained a number of companions to whom, as the knights’ direct vassals, they had granted manors. In some cases, kings were considered vassals of the pope, who was, of course, considered God’s vassal on earth. Although vassalage created a reciprocal pyramid of obligation and personal service between superiors and inferiors, which ran from the king down through the great men of his realm and their vassals and their vassals’ vassals to the lowest serf, the reality in most realms was, according to one

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

30

Page 30

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

historian, a “confused mass of conflicting dependencies and loyalties, riddled with exceptions and exemptions, where the once clear lines of service were fouled up by generations of contested privileges, disputed rights, and half-forgotten obligations.”36 It was common practice for a lord at stated intervals or for special purposes to summon his vassals to his court, at which time problems common to the lord and his vassals would be discussed and disputes among vassals adjudicated. Vassals were obliged to attend their lord’s court and give counsel and consent to the lord’s requests. Thus, the court became a council, usually convened on a major holiday such as Christmas and Easter, and was also attended by the upper members of the nobility, the higher clergy of the realm, as well as important burghers from the towns. When these three representative segments of society became too numerous, delegates were chosen from the three estates (clergy, nobility, burghers) of the realm to attend. These delegates did not represent individuals in a particular geographical territory but, rather, the estates from which they were chosen—that is, the group of people everywhere within the realm having the same legal status or position to which bundles of rights, privileges, and obligations were attached. Thus, representation on the king’s council during the feudal age meant the representation of corporate groups, not individuals, resident in a given geographical space, as is the case in the democratic European state.37 The council of the three estates—which came to be called the Parliament in England, Etats-généraux (Estates-General) in France, the Riksdag in Sweden, the Sejm in Poland, the Córtes in Spain and Portugal, the Reichstag in German-speaking realms, and the Duma in Russia—voiced protests, restated the rights of the estates, gave the king advice, adjudicated disputes, and agreed to the king’s requests for money. As the king needed the consent of the estates to levy taxes, especially extraordinary taxes to fight wars, the relationship between kings and their councils was one of constant tension. Kings needed money, especially in times of war, and councils had it to give but expected justification.38 The struggle between crown and estates evolved in two main directions: one was in favor of the king against the assembly of the estates and the other was in favor of the assembly of estates to the detriment of the king.39 As we shall see in subsequent chapters, the way that the struggle between the crown and estates was resolved had a major impact on the way that states were governed.

■ Christendom Divided Once Christianity had become the state religion of the Roman Empire, the conversion of the so-called pagan peoples of Europe became a matter of imperial policy. Whole Germanic and Slavonic tribes were converted by

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

Page 31

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE ROMAN IMPERIAL STATE

31

missionaries and military campaigns. By the “thirteenth century the cross was the universal symbol from the Black Sea to the Atlantic and from the Mediterranean to the Arctic Circle.”40 This Europe-wide Christian community, Respublica Christiana or Christendom, provided the largest unit to which people in Europe felt allegiance during the Middle Ages and took precedence over secular politico-military rule. The idea of Europe as Christendom was enhanced by the rise of Islam, which, like Christianity, was an evangelical religion of conversion and conquest of “infidels,” or unbelievers. Although Arab Muslim armies attempted to conquer Europe and convert its peoples to Islam, they were successful only in certain parts of the west, where, as was mentioned above, they were able to establish a durable presence, such as at Al-Andalus, on the Iberian Peninsula; in the southern part of the Italian peninsula; and on the Mediterranean islands of Sardinia, Corsica, Sicily, and Crete until reconquered by Christians in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. No such Muslim conquests were made in the east, which remained uniformly Christian until the fifteenth century for reasons that will be presented below. The impact of Islam on Christian Europe was enormous. It helped establish the boundaries of Christendom and turned Europe into Christianity’s “main base.” It cut Christianity off and isolated it from other major religious traditions. Christianity and Islam became rivals, both seeking to convert the other, mutually believing the other to comprise infidels. Christian Europeans referred to Muslims as Saracens, a derogatory term derived from the Greek sarakenoi, or “people who live in tents” (the equivalent of the modern slur “camel jockey”). Thus, according to one historian, the rise of Islam “created the cultural bulwark against which European [Christian] identity could be defined.”41 Despite being the largest community within which Europeans increasingly saw themselves, Christendom lacked the universal, coherent, hierarchical politico-military rule that had characterized the Roman Empire. In the west, as was discussed above, universal Roman politico-military rule had been replaced by the chaotic fragmented, decentralized politico-military rule of the feudalistic Germanic kingdoms, which were seen as being under the overall sacred authority of popes, who claimed at the first Lateran synod the same authority over Christendom that Roman emperors had claimed over the empire.42 Although the king of one of these Germanic kingdoms, Charlemagne, who saw himself as the successor of the Roman emperors, attempted to revive coherent Roman politico-military rule in the west when he had himself crowned emperor by the pope on Christmas Day in 800, his “Holy Roman Empire” did not remain intact. Charlemagne’s son, Louis I the Pious, who had inherited the empire intact, willed the empire to his oldest son, Lothar, and subkingdoms to his two younger sons, Charles the Bald and Louis the German. When Louis I died in 840, a dynastic war broke out

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

32

Page 32

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

between Lothar and his brothers for possession of the imperial throne. After a series of bloody battles, they agreed, in 843, to partition the Holy Roman Empire into new kingdoms: West Francia, East Francia, and the Middle Kingdom. Further partitions of these kingdoms followed. Moreover, the feudalistic form of politico-military rule in western Christendom was expansionist because it required new land, the chief source of wealth at the time, in order to maintain itself. The overproduction of warrior-knights and the decreasing availability of unoccupied land on which to establish fiefs in the Frankish core of western Christendom sparked a scramble for fiefs in areas of Europe still untouched by feudalism. The “law of primogeniture,” which required that the family fief be given to the eldest son, forced second and third sons to seek their own fiefs in distant lands. In addition, Normans spread feudalism to the peripheries of Europe when they conquered the Anglo-Saxon kingdom in England in 1066 and took the southern Italian peninsula from the Byzantines in 1072. Feudal politico-military rule was also spread to the Iberian Peninsula by Frankish knights who joined the Christian Reconquista. The result of the scramble for fiefs and conquests was the gradual homogenization of western Christendom around feudal governing institutions and practices by a process of “cellular multiplication” rather than according to a plan devised and implanted by a state bent on becoming an empire.43 Such expansionary pressure, combined with western Christianity’s “militarization”44 and the desire for booty and trade, sparked a “succession of military expeditions from western Christendom to Syria and Palestine in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries whose aim was to recover the Holy Places of [Christianity] from their Islamic rulers.”45 Those who took part in the Crusades, as these military expeditions came to be known, were assured by the pope that they were engaged in a “Holy War” and were guaranteed certain spiritual benefits—after death, Crusader souls would spend less time in Purgatory, and, if they were killed battling the infidel, they would be martyrs for the faith and their souls would go directly to Heaven.46 There were five “official” Crusades: the first in 1096; the second in 1146; the third in 1189; the fourth in 1204; and the fifth in 1217. In between these papally sanctioned major expeditions was a more or less continuous flow of smaller expeditions led by individual barons, clerics, and even children.47 The first three Crusades succeeded in establishing four Christian feudal holdings in Syria and Palestine: the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the Principality of Antioch, and the counties of Edessa and Tripoli. By the Fourth Crusade, however, the ruler of the Ayyubid dynasty in Egypt, Salah al-Din (Saladin), began a Muslim counteroffensive against the Christian “Outremer,” as these holdings were called by the Crusaders. The need to defend the Outremer against resurgent Muslim politicomilitary power under Saladin brought forth a new feudal institution

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

Page 33

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE ROMAN IMPERIAL STATE

33

designed to protect it from his armies—the militarized religious brotherhood. These brotherhoods were composed of former knights who committed themselves to fighting for the faith and took vows of poverty, obedience, and chastity as members of a monastic order. The first such order of fighting monks, founded in 1099 during the First Crusade, was the Knights of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem, who were called Hospitallers. The Hospitallers were followed by the Poor Knights of Christ of the Temple of Solomon, called Templars, which was organized in 1118 to protect Christian pilgrims from the west as they made their way to the Holy Land. The third order of fighting monks was the Knights of the Hospital of St. Mary of the Teutons, or Teutonic Knights, which was organized in the Holy Land in 1190 but eventually shifted itself to Europe, where it participated in the Crusade in Prussia. Two of these orders, the Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights, eventually established “order states” that competed effectively with other forms of politico-military rule during the feudal age.48 Although failing to save Christendom in the east from the Muslims, the Crusades helped strengthen the feudal monarchies of the west, especially those of England and France. The crusades brought about the first regular direct tax, the so-called Saladin tithe, so that kings could pay for military expeditions to the Holy Land. Further, the Crusades rid kings of their more bellicose barons, who relieved their warring impulses by fighting against Muslim armies.49 Meanwhile, the universal politico-military rule of the eastern Roman, or Byzantine, Empire remained intact. Despite being called Byzantines by contemporary historians, the people who lived in the eastern empire considered themselves to be Romans, and the emperor of Byzantium considered himself to be the direct successor of the Roman emperors. In fact, Byzantine emperors claimed control over all lands in the west that had originally belonged to the unified empire. Gradually, the eastern empire was Hellenized as Greek replaced Latin as the official language of imperial administration. In order to defend the eastern empire from enemies and to halt internal decay, the Byzantine emperors became increasingly absolute and despotic. Over time, the old Roman idea that the emperor was the first magistrate among the other magistrates gave way to the idea that he was an absolute ruler whose power was derived directly from God. All restrictions on the power of the emperor that had existed during the period of the unified empire, such as the power of the Senate, dwindled. In the Byzantine Empire, religion and politico-military rule became tightly intertwined. The emperor was viewed as being chosen by God to be the absolute commander of the army, the supreme judge, the only legislator, and the protector of the Orthodox Church.50 Gradually, a vast, centralized, despotic, Greek-speaking administrative structure was created that made “‘Byzantium’ a byword for

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

34

Page 34

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

total subservience, secretiveness, and intrigue.”51 The Byzantine Empire was also extremely paternalist in economic and social matters; trade was controlled by state officials, state regulations governed guilds and industrial production, and state-owned factories provided full employment.52 In the eastern empire there was no separation of secular rule and religious authority as was the case in the west. The church was coextensive with the imperial state. Therefore, the conflict generated in the west by the separation from and the superiority of the church from the secular rule of the various Germanic monarchies was unknown in the east. The Byzantines also understood their way of practicing Christianity to be the true faith, hence the name Orthodox Church. As in the west, the eastern church engaged in missionary activity, first eastward toward present-day Armenia and Georgia and later northward toward the Slavonic tribes of present-day Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Russia. This missionary activity did not involve forced conversion by military conquest as it had in western Christendom, however, because eastern orthodoxy was never militarized as was in the west. The Orthodox Church held strongly to the pacifism of the New Testament and taught that all war was evil, except when waged in the defense of Christendom and only after all diplomacy had failed. Therefore, the Orthodox Church did not honor the warrior, who was denied the sacrament of communion for three years after waging war. In the western Catholic Church, on the other hand, the church held the warrior in high esteem, blessed swords, and favored the notion of “Holy War,” which was symbolized by the cross displayed on the shields and surcoats of the Crusaders.53 Therefore, the Crusaders were looked upon by the Byzantines with great fear and loathing. Because they rejected the idea that war could be holy, the Byzantines came to believe that the Crusaders’ real motives were the conquest and plunder of Constantinople, then the richest city in the world. This fear became a reality when, in 1204, during the Fourth Crusade, Crusaders attacked and conquered the capital of the eastern empire. When they entered Constantinople, the Crusaders, granted the customary threeday period of sack, massacred many thousands of the city’s residents and thoroughly pillaged its wealth. They established the Latin Empire of Constantinople, during which they reorganized the empire along western feudal lines and carried away to the west much of the city’s art treasures and wealth.54 According to one historian, the attack on and conquest of Constantinople by the Crusaders confirmed in the minds of the Byzantines that the Franks (the collective name given to all Western Christians) were primitive, uncultured, bellicose, and predatory, in fact barbarians, beneath comparison with the intelligence and refinement of the Byzantine and Islamic

9/23/08

3:56 PM

Page 35

35

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE ROMAN IMPERIAL STATE

Norwegian Sea

ESTONIA SCOTLAND

SWEDEN

North Sea

IRELAND

DENMARK

Baltic Sea

LITHUANIA

PRUSSIA

WALES

E N GL A N D

POLAND

HOLY

ATLANTIC OCEAN

RUSSIA

ROMAN FRANCE HUNGARY

EMPIRE

Bay of Biscay LEON NAV

ARR

AL UG

CASTILE

RT

Ad

E

BULGARIA

ria

ARAGON

DO

tic

Se

SERBIA

a

MI

KINGDOM OF

NI

ON

M e d i t e r r a n e a n

SO

FT

HE

S e a

THE TWO SICILIES

E AT OT US SP PIR DE F E O

PO

O-2

LA

T

IN

E

M

P

IR

E

AL

MO

HA

DE

S

Europe in 1200

worlds. Their Christianity was superstitious and wrong-headed, riddled with heresies. The whole West was one gigantic apostasy from Christ and genuine culture. In Byzantium, as a reaction against the military superiority of the Western enemy there evolved the myth of the “corrupt West.”55

When Byzantine rule was reestablished fifty-seven years later, the Byzantine Empire had been greatly weakened by its loss of wealth and the loss of coherent, centralized politico-military rule, thanks to the feudal ele-

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

36

Page 36

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

ments introduced by the Crusaders. Gradually, the Byzantine Empire was reduced to its capital city, Constantinople, which finally succumbed to a Turkish Ottoman siege led by Sultan Muhammad II (1451–1481). Granted the customary three days of sack, the city was looted and pillaged. Churches were robbed, holy images burned, and valuable Greek manuscripts destroyed. The sultan ordered the Hagia Sofia converted into a mosque, made Islam the official religion of the empire, and changed the name of the capital city to Istambul.56 After the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks, the center of gravity of eastern Christendom shifted to the north, where the orthodox form of Christianity had been spread by missionaries from Byzantium and provided the basis around which certain Slavonic tribal rulers had unified their kingdoms. Orthodox Christianity, lacking a separate organizational structure, was able to adapt itself to the ethnic divisions within the empire and gave Greek-, Bulgarian-, Serbian-, and Russian-speaking peoples a Christian identity, which provided a bulwark that prevented the Ottoman Empire from conquering eastern and central Europe and converting these regions to Islam. According to one historian, Moscow came to regard itself as the “Third Rome,” after Constantinople, when, in 1472, Ivan III, the great liberator and consolidator of Russian lands, married the daughter of the Despot Thomas Palaeologus, the niece of the last Emperor of Byzantium. He assumed the imperial Byzantine two-headed eagle in his arms, introduced Byzantine ceremonial into Moscow and soon made Russia the leader of the Christian East as Byzantium had once been. If Constantinople was the New Rome, Moscow was to become the “Third Rome.” The great traditions of Byzantium, its faith, its political ideas, its spirituality, lived on through the centuries in the Russian Empire.57

After the failure of the Crusades to establish a permanent western presence in the east, and after the conquest of Byzantium by the Ottoman Turks, western Christendom turned in upon itself and became increasingly closed, bellicose, and compartmentalized into rival feudal units of politico-military rule, which unleashed a race for ascendancy among them that became ever more ruthless and potent with improvements in military technology and administrative capability.58 In eastern Christendom the “Byzantine heritage of absolutism, which persisted as long as Constantinople remained independent, was taken over, on the one side, by the Ottoman Turks, who captured Constantinople in 1453; and, on the other, by the tsar of Russia, who acquired almost all their cultural and governmental traditions from Constantinople.”59 Thus, the division of Europe into east and west originated in antiquity and was not produced by the coming to power of the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917. The Byzantine heritage of absolutism can be seen in later times and

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

Page 37

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE ROMAN IMPERIAL STATE

37

as of this writing in the Russian preference for strong, one-man rule rather than parliamentarianism, about which we will have more to say in the concluding chapter.

■ Summary In this chapter we have shown how the disintegration of universal Roman politico-military rule created different conditions that influenced subsequent state formation across Europe. In the west the disintegration and collapse of the Roman Empire happened earlier and was more complete. Coherent Roman politico-military rule fragmented in confusion and was replaced by a multiplicity of Germanic kingdoms within which politico-military rule was increasingly fragmented and decentralized. As the western empire collapsed, the Catholic Church gradually replaced Roman political institutions. Thus, in western Christendom there were two domains of authority, the secular, or worldly, headed by the emperor and the sacred, or religious, headed by the pope, who was seen as the superior of the two. Therefore, the relationship between secular and religious was in constant tension in the west. The church in the west was set above secular rulers, which, as will be shown in the next chapter, caused much conflict between kings and popes. In contrast, the eastern Roman Empire survived intact for an additional one thousand years. Being under constant threat from Persians, Bulgars, Arabs, Crusaders, and Turks made Byzantium more and more centralized, despotic, and bureaucratic as it sought to defend itself against these threats. Byzantine emperors came to be seen as chosen by God to be the commander of the army, supreme legislator, chief justice, and the protector of the Orthodox Church. Thus, in contrast to the west, coherence and centralization continued in the east. Secular politico-military rule and sacred authority were seen as being combined in a single unified domain. There was no tension between the leaders of the Orthodox Church and the emperor. Secular and religious rule were in harmony. When the Byzantine Empire was finally defeated by the Turks in 1453, the imperial, autocratic, dynastic form of politico-military rule survived in the east, most notably in the emergent Russian monarchy, and in a new empire, that of the Ottomans. Despite the contrasting ways that politico-military rule was exercised in western and eastern Europe, both areas were connected together by the common understanding that they were the heirs of the universal Christian Roman Empire. The shared belief that each was the inheritor of the political, military, and religious traditions of the universal Christian Roman Empire created conflict between eastern and western Christendom as each sought to reunify Christendom under a single religio-political authority: pope and emperor in the west, emperor in the east. Later, western expan-

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

38

Page 38

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

sionism, especially in the form of the Crusades and the conquest of Constantinople by Crusaders, ended the notion that eastern and western Christendom could be unified. Eastern and western Christendom gradually went their separate ways. In the east, the dynastic, autocratic imperial style of rule strengthened and became the dominant form of politico-military rule. In the west, feudal fragmentation began to be reversed as politico-military power was increasingly monopolized and centralized within individual kingdoms around individual monarchs. The consolidated, centralized monarchy gradually came to be the dominant form of politico-military rule. How this consolidation came about, and how the western idea of the monarchical state spread eastward and eventually replaced the eastern style of rule is the subject of the next two chapters.

■ Notes 1. Norman Davies, Europe: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 150. 2. J. M. Roberts, History of the World (New York: Viking Penguin, 1983), 232. 3. Davies, Europe, 159. 4. William L. Langer (ed.), Western Civilization: Paleolithic Man to the Emergence of European Powers (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 222–233. 5. Graham Webster, The Roman Imperial Army, 3rd edition (Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble, 1985), 1–27. 6. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500–2000 (New York: Random House, 1987). 7. Aurelio Bernardi, “The Economic Problems of the Roman Empire,” and M. I. Finley, “Manpower and the Fall of Rome,” in Carlo M. Cipolla (ed.), The Economic Decline of Empires (London: Methuen, 1970), 16–83 and 84–91. 8. Langer, Western Civilization, 294. 9. Hermann Dörries, Constantine the Great, trans. by Roland H. Bainton (New York: Harper Torch, 1972), 3–4. 10. Roberts, History of the World, 252. 11. Stewart C. Easton, The Western Heritage: From the Earliest Times to the Present (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1970), 170. 12. William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 338–339. 13. Dörries, Constantine the Great, 25. 14. Ibid., 191 and 194. 15. Will Durant, Caesar and Christ: A History of Roman Civilization and of Christianity from Their Beginnings to AD 325 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1944), 618–619. 16. Davies, Europe, 238–239. 17. Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 21–35. 18. Langer, Western Civilization, 349. 19. Peter Brown, The Rise of Western Christendom (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996), 16.

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

Page 39

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE ROMAN IMPERIAL STATE

39

20. Herbert H. Rowen, The King’s State: Proprietary Dynasticism in Early Modern France (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1980), 7. 21. Joseph R. Strayer, Feudalism (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1965), 29–30. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid., 34. 24. Ibid., 11–12. 25. Georges Duby, The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined, trans. by Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 26. Perry Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (London: New Left, 1974), 131. 27. Davies, Europe, 311. 28. Robert Bartlett, The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization, and Cultural Change, 950–1350 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 65–70. 29. Andrea Hopkins, Knights (New York: Artabras, 1990), 99–123. 30. Sidney Painter, The Rise of Feudal Monarchies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1951), 29–30. 31. Ibid., 72. 32. Davies, Europe, 335. 33. Painter, The Rise of Feudal Monarchies, 79–84. 34. J. M. Roberts, A History of Europe (New York: Allen Lane, 1997), 132. 35. Jeffrey Burton Russell, Medieval Civilization (New York: John Wiley, 1968), 204. 36. Davies, Europe, 313. 37. Alexander Passerin D’Entrèves, The Notion of the State (Oxford: Clarendon, 1967), 90. 38. Painter, The Rise of Feudal Monarchies, 1–4. 39. Emile Lousse, “Absolutism,” in Heinz Lubasz (ed.), The Development of the Modern State (New York: Macmillan, 1964), 46. 40. Denys Hay, Europe: The Emergence of an Idea (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1957), 20. 41. Davies, Europe, 258. 42. Bendix, Kings or People, 21–35. 43. Bartlett, The Making of Europe, 46–51. 44. Jacques Le Goff, The Birth of Europe, trans. by Janet Lloyd (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2005), 93. 45. Roberts, A History of Europe, 148. 46. Ibid. 47. Friedrich Heer, The Medieval World: Europe 1100–1350, trans. by Janet Sondheimer (New York: New American Library, 1961), 126. 48. Walter C. Opello, Jr., “Early Competitors of the State: The Military Religious Orders,” paper presented at the 44th annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Portland, OR, February 25–March 1, 2003. 49. Langer, Western Civilization, 575. 50. George Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, revised edition, trans. by Joan Hussey (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1969), 30–31. 51. Davies, Europe, 246. 52. Ibid., 246–250. 53. Desmond Seward, The Monks of War: The Military Religious Orders (London: Archon, 1972). 54. Many of Constantinople’s art treasures went to Venice, where they were

O-2

9/23/08

3:56 PM

40

Page 40

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

used to decorate its churches, especially the cathedral of San Marco, including the four gilded bronze statues of prancing horses that adorn the main portal. 55. Heer, The Medieval World, 128. 56. Langer, Western Civilization, 622. 57. Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, 572. 58. Roberts, A History of Europe, 150. 59. Easton, The Western Heritage, 199.

■ Suggested Reading Bartlett, Robert. The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization, and Cultural Change, 950–1350. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. Bendix, Reinhard. Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978. Brown, Peter. The Rise of Western Christendom. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996. Davies, Norman. Europe: A History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Duby, Georges. The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined. Trans. by Arthur Goldhammer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978. LeGoff, Jacques. The Birth of Europe. Trans. by Janet Lloyd. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2005. Ostrogorsky, George. History of the Byzantine State, revised edition. Trans. by Joan Hussey. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1969. Strayer, Joseph R. Feudalism. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1965.

O-3

9/23/08

3:57 PM

Page 41

3 The Development of the Monarchical State in the West

AS WE SAW in the previous chapter, from the time of the disintegration of the Roman Empire, the political landscape of western Europe was fragmented into many competing forms of politico-military rule, despite the steady spread of Christian universalism. Attempts to reestablish Roman rule, such as Charlemagne’s Holy Roman Empire, were quickly eroded by the steady disaggregating pull of feudal politico-military practices. Fragmentation into competing forms of politico-military power in western Europe was also encouraged by its geography. The western part of the European continent, being broken up by mountain ranges, having scattered population concentrations living in valleys, and having considerable climate variation from north to south, was difficult terrain upon which a single, centralized form of politico-military rule—even by the most determined consolidator—could be raised. In the words of one historian, western Europe’s “variegated landscape encouraged the growth, and continued existence, of decentralized power, with local kingdoms and marcher lordships and highland clans and lowland town confederations making a political map of [western] Europe drawn at any time after the fall of Rome look like a patchwork quilt. The patterns might vary from century to century, but no single color could ever be used to denote a unified empire.”1 Thus, there existed no centralized politico-military rule across western Europe that could effectively control and supervise economic and political life in a uniform way, as was possible in eastern Europe and other parts of the world where broad and fertile river basins, such as those of the Ganges, Nile, Tigris, Euphrates, Yellow, and Yangtze rivers, allowed the relatively easy imposition of centralized rule over a wide geographical space. Europe was exceptional in that diverse forms of rule coexisting and competing with one another possessed, or could procure for themselves, the military technology to preserve their independence and prevent the rise of a centralized, Europe-wide empire.2 Consolidation and centralization took place within 41

O-3

9/23/08

3:57 PM

42

Page 42

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

the various kingdoms of western Europe, not at a continental level. Although several attempts were made to reconstitute the universal, continent-wide politico-military rule of the Roman Empire, most notably in the Holy Roman Empire, none was successful. Nonetheless, the idea of a unified Europe lived on in the European political imagination and, as will be seen in Part 3, was achieved in the European Union after World War II.

■ Monopolizing Politico-Military Rule in Western Kingdoms As we saw in the previous chapter, the large, infantry-based standing army of Rome was replaced with a multitude of small private armies composed of retinues of mounted aristocratic warriors after the fall of the western Roman Empire. From about the eighth to the fifteenth centuries, an “army” was a temporary coalescence of many private retinues called into military service by the prince or king. The backbone of these armies were knights who were obligated to appear fully armed to do battle for the king in exchange for their fiefs. Forbidden, for the most part, from performing military service were the members of the second and third estates as well as serfs. The number of men-at-arms in a feudal army was low, usually fewer than three thousand knights.3 Wars during this epoch were mostly about the dynastic claims of monarchs because kingdoms were understood to be their private property. Therefore, the private quarrels of kings over who owned which throne by right of inheritance were accepted as legitimate causes for war. This meant that disputes about the disposition of kingdoms upon the death of their king, when there was no heir apparent, were invariably resolved by war. 4 For example, the Norman Conquest (1066) of England was a result of the hereditary claim of William, duke of Normandy, to the English throne upon the death of Edward the Confessor; the Hundred Years’ War (1337–1453) was fought over lands the English crown acquired by marriage south of the Loire River (Aquitaine), which had been claimed by the French king, as well as over the English king’s hereditary claim to the French throne; the War of the Roses (1455–1485) was a struggle between the ducal houses of Lancaster and York over which family had the legitimate right to the English throne. Kings or princes did not have the ability to sustain the feudal army for long periods of time (the Hundred Years’ War was actually a series of skirmishes between English and French kings stretching somewhat over a century), however, and wars tended to be brief and war-making episodic. In the words of one historian, “Armies were tiny, the theatres of operations vast. A defeated enemy would easily retire and recoup. Action was directed to local

O-3

9/23/08

3:57 PM

Page 43

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MONARCHICAL STATE IN THE WEST

43

castles and strong-points. Sieges were more common than set battles. The spoils of war were more desired than mere victory.”5 Gradually, the introduction of new weaponry onto the European battlefield had a revolutionary effect not only on the way that war was fought but also on the way that politico-military rule in western Europe was organized.6 In the words of one historian, the “modern state without the military revolution is unthinkable. The road from the arquebus to absolutism, or from the maritime mortar to mercantilism, was a direct one.”7 The first new weapon was the longbow, the traditional weapon of the Welsh. When wielded by trained archers, this weapon could fire ten arrows per minute and could strike targets 300 yards distant with great accuracy and penetrating power. The second weapon was the 16-foot Swiss pike, which when used by well-drilled and disciplined foot soldiers who formed into a square (phalanx), could break a cavalry charge by dislodging mounted knights from their horses. During the century and a half after 1300, battles at Courtrai (1302), Crécy (1346), Poitiers (1356), Aljubarrota (1385), and Agincourt (1415) showed that small contingents of longbowmen and pikemen could defeat heavily armored aristocratic cavalry. These battles were the first time during the Middle Ages when there was joint participation of the nobility and common people in war, especially on the English side, which, as we will see in a subsequent chapter, contributed to the rise of popular sovereignty and the nation-state. To protect themselves against arrows shot from longbows, knights replaced their chain-mail coats with plate armor. As a consequence, heavy cavalry became heavier, less maneuverable, and capable only of the forward charge. It was learned that foot soldiers armed with pikes and closed into phalanxes could easily break the direct charges of the heaviest cavalry. Dislodged knights, weighted down by their heavy plate armor, could not regain their feet and were easily dispatched by lightly armed foot soldiers. Therefore, medieval armies increasingly came to have contingents of pikemen and longbowmen.8 The third innovation, gunpowder, which was brought to Europe from China in the fourteenth century, completed the military revolution. Weapons using gunpowder could propel projectiles at heavily armored knights and their stone-walled castles with great penetrating power. Two weapons that used the power of gunpowder to fire projectiles were invented and gradually perfected. One was the arquebus (harquebus), a primitive firearm resting on a stand that discharged lead balls at velocities capable of penetrating the thickest plate armor. In order to increase penetrating power, large-caliber muskets were introduced and later, to augment rates of fire and accuracy, breech-loaded rifles. The other was the cannon, which was made by bundling iron bars (cana) together to form a long tube resting on a stand. Early cannons were

O-3

9/23/08

3:57 PM

44

Page 44

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

inaccurate, cumbersome, and dangerous because they frequently exploded, killing the men firing them. Initially, such cannons could do no more damage to medieval fortifications than the traditional, mechanical siege engines that fired projectiles by means of a counterweighted fulcrum. Gradually, however, metallurgical techniques were developed that permitted the manufacture of lighter, more powerful and more accurate cannons. It was learned that a cannon’s tube could be made stronger by casting it solid in bronze and reaming it out, which made for a tighter fit between projectile and bore, and increased the muzzle velocity of the projectile, and, hence, its penetrating power. Later, cannons were made mobile by placing them on twowheeled carriages drawn by a team of horses. Stone shot was replaced by round lead balls, which, in turn, were replaced by iron cannon balls. Improvements in the composition and manufacture of gunpowder called corning increased the muzzle velocity of projectiles even more.9 The use of pikes and longbows and the development of weapons using gunpowder gradually changed the nature of warfare. First, the feudal host of small contingents of heavily armored knights was gradually replaced by contingents of pikemen, archers, cavalry, and artillery. Second, standardized training and discipline of these contingents were introduced. Third, logistical (i.e., the procurement, maintenance, and transportation of military matériel) systems were developed. Fourth, warfare became the coordinated maneuvering of the contingents against the enemy. Fifth, soldiers of these contingents were dressed in distinctive standardized clothes called “uniforms,” and issued standardized weapons. Sixth, officers and noncommissioned officers were dressed in the same uniforms as the regular troops, distinguished from them only by different insignia of rank, which encouraged unit cohesion and reduced social distance, another factor in the rise of popular sovereignty and the nation-state. Individualistic displays of fighting prowess and heroism, which had been so important in medieval warfare, were discouraged and even punished because they came to be seen as undisciplined behavior that jeopardized the fighting effectiveness of the contingent as a whole. Thus, the revolution in military affairs brought back into existence the kind of army and a way of fighting that Europe had not seen since Roman times.10 Initially, because military service as an obligation of citizenship did not exist in the feudal age, the ranks of these emergent, large, multiunit armies were filled with mercenaries (individuals paid to fight) who were recruited from outside of the monarch’s realm, usually from the peripheral regions of Europe, certain ones of which became favorite recruiting grounds.11 The regiment became the basic unit of military organization of domestically recruited armies. A king wishing to raise an army commissioned a number of officers to hire soldiers at a fixed price. Regiments became permanent institutions having a fixed headquarters in a provincial city, with

O-3

9/23/08

3:57 PM

Page 45

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MONARCHICAL STATE IN THE WEST

45

soldiers recruited from the surrounding countryside, and officered by the male members of the local aristocratic families.12 Troops recruited and officered in this way fought better, were more loyal, and, therefore, less of a threat to the crown itself. The second change in warfare brought about by the military revolution was the replacement of the high stone-walled castle by large low-profile fortifications called trace italienne. This happened because the balance between offense and defense in medieval warfare shifted toward offense with the development of powerful and accurate cannon. High stone-walled castles that had heretofore held out for many months, even years, against the battering from mechanical siege engines were reduced to piles of rubble within a matter of hours when they received concentrated, direct fire from cannons, propelling sizable-caliber iron balls. The low-angled, earthen bastions of the trace italienne fortification could absorb the shock of concentrated artillery fire, even from the most powerful cannons. Therefore, over the course of 300 years, from the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, the king who was able to recruit, train, equip, and supply a large standing army, as well as build a fleet of warships and a line of trace italienne fortifications, could prevail over kings and princes who could not. The advent of large standing armies set in motion social and political changes that gradually transformed the indirect, decentralized politico-military rule of the western feudal monarchy into a new form of monarchy— one that was centralized and ruled directly through an administrative apparatus loyal to the king. In the struggle among the rival forms of politico-military rule that existed during the feudal age in western Europe, kings, although not strong, had an inherent advantage over other rulers. Kings were primus inter pares (“first among equals”) with respect to the nobility and had special responsibilities; they were looked to for providing justice, coining money, designating bishops and abbots, granting town charters, and, most important, defending the realm. However, during the feudal age, kings were expected to “live on their own—that is, to pay the costs of doing these tasks from revenue collected from their own demesne (lands actually possessed by the kings and not held by tenants), as well as by tolls charged for the use of their roads and bridges, fees for fairs, fines levied by their courts, and customs placed on imports.13 During the feudal age, the cost of war to the king was low because armies were small and the expense of arming and equipping knights who made up such armies were carried by the knights themselves. After the military revolution, armies and fortifications became larger and more expensive to build and maintain. Consequently, kings increasingly found themselves in debt and in need of money. Medieval kings were unable to tax or confiscate property, except that of Jews, because their power and authority was limited by the rights and privileges of the estates.

O-3

9/23/08

3:57 PM

46

Page 46

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

Therefore, in order to raise revenue, kings borrowed money, debased the coin of the realm, sold crown lands, and pawned the royal jewels. 14 Eventually, feudal monarchs began to levy taxes on the estates. At first, the concession granted to the king to levy a tax was valid for the estate that had granted it and only for the purpose for which it had been granted. From the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, the king gained the power to directly tax all his subjects. The individuals who collected the revenue from the king’s demesne also began to collect taxes conceded by the estates.15 The burden of direct taxation fell most heavily on the third estate (the burghers) because movable property (i.e., commodities bought and sold) could be more easily taxed than fixed property, such as land and buildings, and because the first and second estates (the clergy and nobility) were immune from taxation. Nevertheless, the burghers did not strongly resist taxation, since they benefited from the territory-wide legal systems that kings were creating at the same time they were levying taxes. Consequently, towns began to renounce their privileges and autonomy and integrate themselves into those emerging territory-wide legal frameworks, which linked the burghers to the developing centralized monarchy.16 The lower nobility also benefited from centralization because it was from the ranks of lesser vassals that the king recruited his tax collectors and judges. They were paid salaries, which supplemented their incomes from their small and unproductive fiefs, and given gifts of additional land. From the ranks of the lesser nobility, then, feudal monarchs began to build a corps of professional administrators and bypass the upper nobility.17

■ Centralizing Politico-Military Rule in Western Kingdoms Although many feudal practices lingered, such as dynastic politics based on family ties, the escalating cost of war brought about by the military revolution caused feudal kings to take actions that eventually resulted in a new way of exercising politico-military power. Gradually, institutions, offices, and bureaucratic techniques that were separate and distinct from the person of the king were built, through which the monarch could rule his realm directly. As was mentioned above, all feudal lords, including kings, had retinues of knights and household servants who helped them defend and administer their demesnes. The most important members of the king’s household were his chancellor, the priest or bishop in charge of the chancel (the altar area of the king’s private chapel), and his steward, the trusted companion in charge of the great hall of his castle. In addition to saying mass for the king and hearing his confession, the chancellor kept the king’s seal, wrote his busi-

O-3

9/23/08

3:57 PM

Page 47

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MONARCHICAL STATE IN THE WEST

47

ness letters to other kings and the pope, and directed the work of the king’s scribes, clerks, and messengers. The steward managed the king’s lands and properties. He was assisted by several bailiffs, who were put in charge of sections of the king’s demesne called bailiwicks.18 Collecting the king’s revenues was not easy because the king’s properties were scattered through the realm and revenues from them were shared with his vassals. The first officials of the king sent out to collect his revenues were estate managers called reeves in England and provosts in France. After the Norman Conquest, England was divided into shires (counties) and a shire-reeve (sheriff) appointed in each, who was responsible for collecting the king’s revenues. Since fines from local courts were part of the king’s revenues, sheriffs were also responsible for ensuring the king’s justice. Sheriffs held court for petty offenses, for which fines payable to the king were levied. Thus, in the feudal age, the collection of the king’s revenue and the provision of his justice were closely intertwined activities.19 Feudal kings began to consider the administration of justice as more than a source of revenue. It came to be seen as a way of asserting monarchical power and authority. Therefore, kings began to increase the jurisdictions of courts. Monarchs insisted that serious crimes, such as murder, be tried in the king’s court, which allowed the king to extend his power into areas of his kingdom where he had no lands or local rights. This permitted the lower nobility to protect itself against its immediate lords, and because it was the duty of the feudal king to see to it that justice prevailed throughout the realm, it allowed appeals from local courts to be heard in royal courts as a way of remedying injustice and creating a uniform application of the law across the realm.20 Throughout feudal Europe, from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century, the tasks of collecting revenue and providing justice were disentwined and two parallel sets of institutions and offices, one legal and the other financial, evolved. While the same individual might be tax collector and judge, he would follow certain procedures and formalities when hearing a case and another set of procedures and formalities when collecting revenue. As these procedures became more complicated, individuals trained in the law, called lawyers, began to appear and take charge of providing the king’s justice. At the same time, individuals trained in accounting began to take over the collection of the royal revenue.21 As these legal and financial institutions evolved separately, their work had to be coordinated. This was done by the king’s chancellor, who was always a high-ranking clergyman, usually a cardinal or bishop. The king’s scribes and clerks, under the direction of the chancellor, developed regular administrative procedures and routines. They drafted orders and instructions. Over time, the chancery, or office of the chancellor, became the administrative center of the monarchy.22 Also, gradually, a group of individ-

O-3

9/23/08

3:57 PM

48

Page 48

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

uals appeared who spent their entire working lives as full-time administrators of the king’s business. This growing band of administrators was recruited from the lesser nobility, who needed the extra income, and the burghers, who wanted the prestige and potential influences that came from being in the service of the king. The development of administrative, financial, and judicial institutions staffed by a small but growing number of professional judges, tax collectors, law-trained clerks, and scribes meant that monarchs were able to control more and more of their realms directly, without the help of the feudal aristocracy. Because the king’s administrators were dependent upon the king for their livelihoods, they were loyal to him. As a result, the personal vassal-lord relationship gradually ceased to be the glue that held the feudal kingdom together, however loosely. The development of territory-wide law courts and systems of direct revenue collection, as well as the growth of the general right to tax, led to the commercialization of economic life and the decline of the nobility as an effective military and political force. The nobility began to lose ground to the burghers and the king. It should be recognized that this was an incremental trend. It happened earlier in western Europe and later in southern and eastern Europe. The nobility was more and more subordinated to the king; those who were not recruited into the administrative apparatus became the officers of the new infantry-based armies. Thus, kings began to gather to themselves the politico-military power that had been heretofore dispersed among their vassals. They began to construct territory-wide “new monarchies,” extending their direct rule all the way down to the local level. The new monarchs made certain that politicomilitary rule centered on them. Gradually, they gained a monopoly of armed force within the realm by destroying the castles of the nobility, disbanding their private armies, and taking over the manufacture of weapons, especially artillery, which became a crown monopoly in all European kingdoms. Larger and larger coherent territorial kingdoms emerged as politico-military rule was increasingly concentrated in the hands of the king and his administrative staff. Public officials in the service of the king eventually replaced the nobility, which had held and wielded politico-military power as a private possession.23 In the words of one historian, “everywhere monarchs raised themselves further above the level of the greatest nobles and buttressed their new pretensions to respect and authority with cannons and taxation.”24 As the apparatus of centralized and territorialized politico-military rule became more and more visible, it gradually destroyed the feudal notion that humankind had been, since the beginning of time, divided into three estates to which rights and privileges were attached. Replacing it was the notion that the king’s realm was composed of a multitude of individuals, or “subjects,” of varying degrees of wealth and position who were all equally under

O-3

9/23/08

3:57 PM

Page 49

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MONARCHICAL STATE IN THE WEST

49

the king’s authority. In time, the realm itself became an individual subject’s primary membership association, not Christendom nor the subject’s estate,25 which helped lay the foundation for the later development of popular sovereignty and of the nation-state. As power and authority became more centralized and more abstract, in the sense of being lodged in centralized institutions and offices rather than in the person of the king, politico-military power was increasingly depersonalized. The idea that there was a public weal superior to private or corporate concerns, which vanished in Europe after the collapse of the Roman Empire, began to reappear. This change involved, first, the development of impersonal systems of law; second, the development of the idea of “sovereignty”; and, third, a change in the purpose of politico-military rule. With respect to the first, the emergence of the king’s legal and financial institutions encouraged the evolution of uniform, impersonal systems of law. Two major legal systems developed in medieval Europe. One was the English common law system, which evolved from the gradual amalgamation of local customary laws into a system of law common to all subjects and administered by the king’s judges, who were sent from his court to hear important cases in local courts. The decisions they made in the multitude of local cases gradually became the law of the realm. English common law was judge-made law that steadily became uniform across the realm as the king’s judges began to consistently “stand by decisions” (stare decisis) made in earlier cases in different places in the realm. The other was the Roman lawinfluenced system in the rest of Europe. Medieval monarchs on the continent were influenced by Canon law and the rediscovery of Roman law in the thirteenth century. They began to write legal codes, increasingly promulgated in the vernacular (the language spoken by common people), that regulated the realm’s forests, rivers, shipping, trade, fairs, and social relations. Thus, whether judge-made common law in England or Roman-influenced, king-made code law on the continent, uniform systems of public law (that is, the same laws were applicable equally to all individuals and localities within the realm) came into existence. These systems eventually replaced the hodgepodge of feudal law and the special rights and privileges (literally, private law), claimed by each of the estates.26 With respect to the second, we need to remember that during the feudal era the king was sovereign only in the sense of being the suzerain, or overlord, of the realm. His power and authority over his realm were greatly restricted by the ancient rights and privileges held by the three estates. As centralization increased, kings began to claim a different kind of sovereignty as the “head of state.” Gradually, this kind of sovereignty came to be lodged in the institution of kingship itself, not in the person of the king. Kings began to claim that they were not simply first among equals, but the absolute ruler of the realm, whose power and authority was free from the

O-3

9/23/08

3:57 PM

50

Page 50

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

ancient control and limitation of the estates. These developments laid the basis for the eventual development of absolute monarchy, about which we will say more below. With respect to the third, we should recall that at the beginning of the feudal age, the king understood himself and his actions to be for the moral and spiritual well-being of his realm and his subjects. The centralization and consolidation of kingly politico-military power in the late feudal era began to change this conception of rulership. Over time, the objective of politicomilitary rule moved away from being about the moral and spiritual redemption of the realm toward being about the efficient administration of the territory and population of the realm, so as to ensure its prosperity and security. The king came to view his realm as an object to be ordered, administered, defended, and improved. As centralization of politico-military power took hold, it led to the idea that the political world was a distinct realm that operated according to its own principles, freed from the constraints and supervision of the medieval church. Eventually, politico-military rule was released from the moral restrictions of religion, especially in the western regions of Europe, such as northern Italy, where Roman ideas of civic virtue had been rediscovered. In the city-states of northern Italy, Roman republican ideas of citizenship and military service were revived by political philosophers who were seeking justification for the increasing secularization of politico-military rule. Gradually, “reason of state”—or, as Americans say, “in the national interest”—unrestricted by the moral scruples of the Catholic Church, became the new morality and the ultimate justification for monarchical policy.27

■ Upsetting the Balance Between Crown and Estates As was discussed in Chapter 2, feudal kings ruled their realms jointly with the three estates of the realm—clergy, nobility, burghers. Historians refer to such joint rule as being “constitutional” because the king’s politico-military power was limited by the traditional rights, duties, and obligations of the three estates. The actions that feudal monarchs took to centralize and consolidate politico-military rule, especially after the revolution in military affairs drove up the cost of war, upset the balance between the crown and the estates that had previously existed. Development of a state administrative apparatus of financial and judicial institutions, having increasingly professionalized staffs beholden to the king, enabled medieval monarchs to administer their realms more and more directly without the involvement of the estates. Not surprisingly, the estates viewed these developments as a serious challenge to their ancient rights, privileges, and obligations. They resisted efforts by the crown to abrogate the medieval “constitution.”28

O-3

9/23/08

3:57 PM

Page 51

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MONARCHICAL STATE IN THE WEST

51

The revolution in military affairs, therefore, intensified the struggle in all of Europe’s medieval realms between the crown, on the one hand, and the estates, on the other, about which was to be sovereign over the kingdom. Would the crown or the estates evolve as the victor? The way that the struggle was resolved had a big impact on the way western European realms were ruled. In the realms where the crown won the struggle, the king increasingly ruled the realm alone. And in the realms where the estates were victorious, kingly rule was weakened and the assembly of estate representatives began to play the dominant role.29 Which of these two outcomes obtained in a particular realm depended upon the relative politico-military power of the crown and the estates at the outset of the military revolution. Although this did not always happen, if situational factors favored the crown, the result was a strong monarchy that became stronger and stronger until all medieval constitutional constraints were eliminated. Such a monarchy was said to be absolute (from the Latin absoluta, meaning “unbound”). In effect, the absolute monarch was one who had decisively won the struggle with the estates and faced no limitations on the exercise of his politico-military power. The absolute monarch ruled the realm directly through a staff of administrative officials who were totally dependent on the crown. In such realms the assembly of estates had been “put to sleep” by the crown; that is, it had been suppressed and was no longer consulted by the monarch or needed for wartime financial resources. Such monarchical politico-military power was justified by the theory of the divine right of kings.30 Victory of the estates over the crown, although a much less likely outcome, did occur in certain European monarchies (e.g., England and Poland), where the estates were in an especially strong position vis-à-vis the crown at the onset of the revolution in military affairs and where other situational factors favored the estates. In these monarchies the joint or “constitutional” rule by an assembly embodying the estates (Parliament in England and the Sejm in Poland) defeated the crown and established itself as sovereign over the kingdom.31

■ Disconnecting Monarchical Rule from Church Authority In the German-speaking lands of the Holy Roman Empire, the emperor was a weak ruler, which allowed papal ascendancy over the German Catholic Church to become steadily stronger. Medieval popes exercised more power in German kingdoms, principalities, and duchies than anywhere else in Europe. A consequence of this was, according to one historian, that they “abused their appointive rights by taking money from candidates to office—

O-3

9/23/08

3:57 PM

52

Page 52

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

the sin of simony; they taxed the clergy . . . by frequent levy of tithes on the pretext of a crusade against the Turks which never materialized; and they unflinchingly exacted amates or first-fruits.”32 In addition to these abuses, certain popes, who were in serious want of money to satisfy their political ambitions and their sumptuous patronage of the arts, sold indulgences (remissions of the temporal penalty for sin) as a way of raising money. Indulgences were sold by licensed vendors who penetrated into every realm of western Europe, except where they were excluded by strong secular power. Because secular politico-military power was weak in the German-speaking realms of the Holy Roman Empire, indulgence peddling was widespread in them, which provoked indignation against the church. Indignation was especially high among the burghers in these realms who were angry about the vast sums of their money being sent to Rome. Their anger was matched by ordinary people and certain members of the clergy. Eventually, indignation and anger became a protest movement that sought to reform the Catholic Church and return it to the original Christianity as preached by Jesus. The first to voice their indignation were Catholic scholars, such as Erasmus of Rotterdam (c. 1466–1536), and certain members of the clergy, such as the Augustinian monk and professor of theology Martin Luther (1483–1546). Reformers, who came to be called Protestants (from the “protests” against the Catholic emperor Charles V at the Diet of Speier in 1526), believed that God’s word found in the Bible was the sole authority of Christian faith. Therefore, Protestant religious practice emphasized the private relationship between the individual and God, which obviated the need for the Catholic Church’s official liturgy (the Mass), the Sacraments, and its meditative hierarchy of priests, bishops, and pope. According to Protestants, doing penance and good works would not save humankind; individuals would be saved by faith and faith alone. God gave faith only to those he chose for salvation. The authority of the Bible, by then translated and printed in the vernacular, replaced the authority of the church and pope; and private judgment replaced that of priests and bishops in matters of faith and conduct. According to one historian: Many medieval practices such as indulgences, pilgrimages, worship of the Virgin and saints were condemned as misleading works and abandoned. At the same time the religious service was materially altered. The impressive mass, conceived to be idolatrous, was more and more simplified until it had been stripped to the bare bones of a service composed of prayer, song, and sermon. Since the priesthood was no longer believed to be a privileged class, a necessary link between God and man, the communion in both bread and wine was conceded to the laity. Finally, Latin was driven from the service and replaced by German.33

O-3

9/23/08

3:57 PM

Page 53

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MONARCHICAL STATE IN THE WEST

53

Although Luther was charged with heresy and disobedience by the church, his reform religion, later called Lutheranism, spread among the small German-speaking kingdoms, principalities, and duchies of the German-speaking area of the Holy Roman Empire. Increasingly, Europe became divided between monarchs who stayed loyal and obedient to the pope and the Holy Roman Emperor and monarchs who rebelled against the church and converted to Lutheranism. Rebellious monarchs tended to be weak kings who realized that “limitations of the power of the church were necessary to the further development of efficient government. Efficient government demanded restraint upon papal intervention, upon ecclesiastical privilege and exemption, upon the legal rights of an authority outside the [realm] to levy taxes.”34 Thus, ecclesiastical discipline and administration, heretofore held by the Catholic Church and exercised by the pope through the bishops of the church, fell into the hands of the monarchs and princes of northern Europe. Lutheranism’s doctrine of “civil submission,” which held that the highest earthly authority over humankind were kings (not the pope) and that obedience to one’s king was every Christian’s duty strengthened kingly power in Protestant realms. In 1530 the Holy Roman Emperor and pope demanded that monarchs who had converted to Lutheranism return to the Catholic fold. Refusing, the monarchs instead organized a defensive alliance for mutual protection called the Protestant Schmalkalden League in 1531. The emperor Charles V, who decided to put an end to the Protestant heresy, declared war in 1545 against the monarchies of the League. Fighting between Catholic monarchs loyal to the pope and emperor and monarchs who wished to remain Lutheran and independent of the church and empire broke out in 1546. Owing to the disloyalty and machinations of certain Catholic monarchs— such as the French king Henry II (1547–1559), who for his own reasons sided with the German Protestants—the emperor failed to stamp out Protestantism by military force and impose Catholic uniformity through the empire. In 1555 an uneasy truce between Catholic and Protestant monarchs was arranged, called the Peace of Augsburg, which recognized Lutheranism as one of the two legal forms of Christianity permitted within the empire. Augsburg also established the right of monarchs to choose between these two religions and to impose their choice on their subjects.35 After Augsburg, Protestantism continued to spread rapidly, especially in Scandinavia, which had been, since the Middle Ages, under the rule of a single monarch. As it spread, Protestantism aided in the creation of new monarchies and contributed to the strengthening of secular politico-military rule in extant realms by breaking down the universal authority of the pope and the Catholic Church. Protestantism helped in the formation of the Kingdom of Sweden by allowing the new king, Gustavus I (1523–1560)—a

O-3

9/23/08

3:57 PM

54

Page 54

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

Swedish nobleman (Gustavus Vasa) who had rebelled against his Danish overlord, King Christian II (1513–1523) in 1523—to spoliate church property and wealth to offset his meager and uncertain revenues. Consequently, Gustavus made Lutheranism the official religion of his kingdom in 1527. Within a decade the Danish monarchy also broke with Rome and became Lutheran. While the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 encouraged the centralization and consolidation of monarchical politico-military rule in weak monarchies, at the expense of the universal church and the empire, it did not solve the “religion question” because, while it recognized Lutheranism as a legal religion, it was mute with respect to Calvinism, which was rapidly spreading outward from Geneva, where it had been founded by John Calvin (1509–1564). A second issue concerned the properties of the Catholic Church being appropriated by secular authorities in Protestant kingdoms, which the church deemed illegal. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, tension between Protestant and Catholic monarchs had increased to the boiling point. Protestant monarchs formed a union in 1608 in order to protect their realms against the Habsburg emperor, Rudolf II (1576–1612), who had vowed to return them to the Catholic fold by forming the Catholic League in 1609. A revolt of Protestants in Bohemia in 1618 sparked the outbreak of fighting between Catholic and Protestant monarchies that grew into a Europe-wide war of faith that began in 1618 and ended in 1648, known as the Thirty Years’ War.36 Not a single war but an aggregation of five periods of fighting (the Bohemian Period [1618–1620], the Palatine Period [1621–1623], the Danish Period [1625–1629], the Swedish Period [1630–1635], and the French Period [1635–1648]), the Thirty Years’ War was a religious “civil war” in the west between Protestant and Catholic monarchies. It should be noted that the armies that took part in the fighting were not national but were composed of mercenaries hired at a fixed price. Hence, armies were hodgepodges of individuals speaking different languages and wearing different uniforms, and of dubious loyalty and discipline. In time, armies disintegrated into bands of armed brigands that marched to and fro across western Europe, raping, pillaging, burning, and terrorizing the civilian population. Eventually, the combatant monarchs, their realms in ruins and their subjects dying of starvation and disease by the thousands,37 declared a truce and made peace. In 1648, Catholic kings and princes met in the city of Münster and Protestant kings and princes met in the city of Osnabrück, where they signed one of the most important documents in the history of the formation of the state and modern European states system: the Treaty of Westphalia, which took its name from the German province within which Münster and Osnabrück were then located. Beyond the territorial concessions agreed to in the treaty, the Peace of

9/23/08

3:57 PM

Page 55

55

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MONARCHICAL STATE IN THE WEST

KINGDOM OF DENMARK SCOTLAND

MUSCOVITE DOMINION

KINGDOM OF SWEDEN

AND NORWAY

IRELAND

WALES ENGLAND

UNITED NETHERLANDS

KINGDOM OF POLAND

Y

THE EMPIRE NG

ATLANTIC OCEAN

AR

KINGDOM OF

HU

OF DO

M

SWITZERLAND

KINGDOM

G.

OF

PO

RT

UG

AL

KI

NG

FRANCE

OF SPAIN

OT

PAPAL STATES

TO

MA

N

KINGDOM

KIN

O-3

OF THE

EM

PI

RE

TWO SICILIES

Europe After the Peace of Westphalia in 1648

Westphalia ended the religious civil war in Europe by establishing the sovereign right of each monarchy to govern itself and conduct its own internal and external affairs without outside interference from other monarchs or the pope. After Westphalia, monarchy became widely accepted as the only legitimate form of politico-military rule across Europe. The idea of the sovereign monarchical state began to “crowd out competing conceptions of how power might be organized to the point where the sovereign territorial [monarchy] became the only imaginable spatial framework for political

O-3

9/23/08

3:57 PM

Page 56

56

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

life.”38 From Westphalia onward, the idea of a unified western Christendom under the religious authority of the pope disappeared. Western Europe compartmentalized into a system of sovereign, territorial monarchical states unabashedly following their own secular interests, which each tried to advance through diplomacy and war. Despite the settlement of the religious wars by the Peace of Westphalia, Europe during the last half of the seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth was in a constant state of warfare caused by the mutually destructive rivalries of Europe’s monarchies. These wars impelled monarchs to extract more and more human and material resources from their realms by increasing centralization and consolidating politico-military power. Gradually, mercenary armies became the exception rather than the rule as monarchs came to recruit more and more of their troops from among their own subjects.

■ Summary In this chapter we have shown that Europe’s geography encouraged the fragmentation of politico-military power after the collapse of the Roman Empire. The continent’s complicated landscape prevented a continent-wide imperial state from forming within which uniform politico-military power could be exercised. Fragmentation in western Europe was manifested politically in the multiplicity of competing kingdoms, principalities, duchies, counties, and fiefs, each held as the private domain of its lord. We have also shown that the revolution in military affairs, specifically the introduction of new weaponry onto the European battlefield, slowly changed the way that war was fought and the way that politico-military power was organized in the west. The use of longbows, pikes, and weapons using gunpowder gradually overcame military fragmentation by transforming armies from small contingents of heavily armored knights called into temporary service by the king to large consolidated formations of soldiers divided into infantry, cavalry, and artillery units, who were trained, equipped, armed, and paid by the king. As armies and fortifications became larger and more expensive to maintain, kings, who were expected to meet these costs themselves, increasingly found themselves in need of money, which required them to levy regular taxes on their realms. Gradually, western kings gained the power to tax their kingdoms directly by constructing a centralized apparatus of offices and institutions staffed by individuals loyal to the crown. The centralized, territorial-wide bureaucracies that they constructed allowed kings to organize and plan large-scale military operations independently of the aristocracy. These actions over time destroyed the medieval idea that society was divided into three estates and replaced it

O-3

9/23/08

3:57 PM

Page 57

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MONARCHICAL STATE IN THE WEST

57

with the idea that society was composed of individuals equally subject to the king’s authority. Kings eventually came to be recognized not as “first among equals,” which limited kingly politico-military power, but as sovereign over the entire realm; this meant that politico-military power was free of the limitations and restrictions placed on it by feudalism. Thus was laid the basis for the development of the new centralized monarchy and, eventually, absolutism. The centralization and consolidation of politico-military rule—first, around the person of the king and, later, around the institution of kingship— did not take place uniformly across Europe. In the west, monarchy strengthened; in central Europe, it weakened because the emperors of the Holy Roman Empire were never able to overcome the fragmented nature of the empire and collect politico-military power to themselves. The Holy Roman Empire gradually disintegrated and disappeared, although it took centuries to do so. In western Europe, especially in the Spanish, Portuguese, French, and English monarchies, kings were able to centralize politico-military rule by constructing the institutions that made direct rule of their realms possible. Kings across western Europe gradually destroyed “feudal constitutionalism,” except in England, where the Parliament was able to survive and even strengthen itself against the crown. As kings centralized and consolidated their rule, they monopolized politico-military power against rival domestic centers of such power; they were also able to increasingly challenge the authority of the Catholic Church to interfere in their realms. Where feudal fragmentation was the greatest and papal power the most arbitrary, a religious movement for reform of the Catholic Church strengthened monarchical politico-military rule by breaking down the universal authority of the pope. Reform religions, such as Lutheranism and Calvinism, provided a kind of “ideological” justification for kings to declare their independence from the Catholic Church. At the time monarchical power strengthened and became increasingly absolute and Protestantism spread, western Europe was plunged into its first “civil war,” which raged from 1618 to 1648. The settlement that ended the war, the Peace of Westphalia, established the sovereign right of each monarchy to govern itself and conduct its own affairs without outside interference. After Westphalia, the notion of a unified western Christendom under the religious authority of the pope disappeared and was replaced by a number of sovereign monarchical states unabashedly following their own secular interest with an increasingly continent-wide monarchical state system. As we will see in the next two chapters, the monarchical states of the west and the imperial states of the east eventually clashed with one another for ascendancy within the European geographical space.

O-3

9/23/08

3:57 PM

58

Page 58

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

■ Notes 1. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), 17. 2. Eric Jones, The European Miracle, 3rd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 3. Samuel E. Finer, “State and Nation-Building in Europe: The Role of the Military,” in Charles Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 102–108. 4. Maurice Keen, Medieval Warfare: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Philippe Contamine, War in the Middle Ages (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980). 5. Norman Davies, Europe: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 440. 6. On the revolution in military affairs, see Lynn White, Jr., Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962); Clifford J. Rogers (ed.), The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995); and Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 7. Davies, Europe, 519. 8. Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, 119–165. 9. Jack Kelly, Gunpowder, Alchemy, Bombards, and Pyrotechnics: The History of the Explosive That Changed the World (New York: Basic, 2004). 10. Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 114–115. 11. Janice E. Thompson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). 12. John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Vintage, 1993), 14. 13. Joseph A. Schumpeter, “The Crisis of the Tax State,” in Richard Swedburg (ed.), The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 102–108; Thomas Ertman, Birth of Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 14. Shumpeter, “The Crisis of the Tax State,” 106. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Joseph R. Strayer, Feudalism (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1965), 61–68. 18. Joseph Geis and Francis Geis, Life in a Medieval Castle (New York: Harper & Row, 1979). 19. Joseph R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 28. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid., 29. 22. Ibid., 33–34. 23. Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978), 77–79. 24. J. M. Roberts, History of the World (New York: Pelican, 1986), 545. 25. Strayer, Feudalism, 67. 26. Poggi, The Development of the Modern State, 60–67.

O-3

9/23/08

3:57 PM

Page 59

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MONARCHICAL STATE IN THE WEST

59

27. Frederich Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d’Etat and Its Place in Modern History, trans. Douglas Scott (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1962). 28. Brian M. Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 18–55. 29. Emile Lousse, “Absolutism,” in Heinz Lubasz (ed.), The Development of the Modern State (New York: Macmillan, 1964), 43–48. 30. Ibid. 31. David Judge, The Parliamentary State (London: Sage, 1993). 32. Ferdinand Schevill, A History of Europe from the Reformation to the Present Day (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1930), 92–93. 33. Ibid., 106. 34. Owen Chadwick, The Reformation (New York: Penguin, 1972), 25. 35. The choice of religion pertained to the crown, not the individual subject, who was required to be of the same religion as his or her sovereign, and should not be confused with modern religious tolerance, which allows individuals free choice in matters of faith. In fact, Augsburg engulfed Europe in a wave of religious intolerance as Lutheran and Catholic monarchs sought to homogenize their realms religiously by expelling dissenters. Nonetheless, Protestantism, in the long run, promoted tolerance because it emphasized the right of individual conscience and because it tended to produce a multiplicity of faiths, which made enforced uniformity unrealizable. 36. The classic work on these wars is C. W. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years’ War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1939). 37. It is estimated that the civilian population of the German-speaking lands declined by one-third to one-half. 38. Alexander B. Murphy, “The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations,” in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds.), State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 91.

■ Suggested Reading Chadwick, Owen. The Reformation. New York: Penguin, 1972. Contamine, Philippe. War in the Middle Ages. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980. Downing, Brian M. The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992. Ertman, Thomas. Birth of Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Giddens, Anthony. The Nation-State and Violence. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500–2000. New York: Random House, 1987. Parker, Geoffrey. The Military Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Wedgwood, C. W. The Thirty Years’ War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1939.

O-3

9/23/08

3:57 PM

Page 60

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

Page 61

4 Nationalizing the Monarchical State

IN THIS CHAPTER we tell the story of how the new centralized monarchies were gradually transformed into nation-states. We will see that the monarchist idea that legitimate politico-military rule flowed from God and was invested in an absolute hereditary king was replaced over time by the idea that this legitimate rule flowed from the people and was invested in leaders chosen by and accountable to them. The kinetic energy for this transformation was nationalism, which appeared first in western Europe as a challenge to absolute monarchy by reformers called liberals, who sought to limit the monarchy by a constitution and to realize individual freedom within the already formed state. As nationalism spread from the west eastward, it was redefined away from the original civic nationalism of the liberals to what can be called ethnonationalism. Ethnonationalism, which was based on the ethnic characteristics of a particular people, sought to break apart the dynastic empires of central and eastern Europe and create new states based on the national communities contained within them. The essential difference between the two is the source of ideas and action: civic “nationalism was initiated ‘at the top,’ [within] a political elite which sought to project its values downwards into society at large. [Ethno]nationalism started ‘at the grassroots,’ at the bottom, seeking to attract mass support before trying to influence or overthrow the existing order.”1

■ Connecting Nations to States Originally, the word nation (from the Latin nation, meaning “place of birth” or “origin”) had no political connotation whatsoever; it referred to groups of foreigners from the same place whose status was below that of Roman citizens. During the Middle Ages the word was used to designate groups of stu61

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

62

Page 62

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

dents from the same geographical locations attending Europe’s medieval universities. Because students from the same regions often took sides as a group in scholastic debates, the word nation came to mean a community of scholars who shared an opinion or had a common purpose. In the thirteenth century the word came to refer to scholars of the Catholic Church who represented secular and religious potentates within church councils. In sixteenth-century England, the term was applied to the population of that realm and made synonymous with the word people, meaning the lower social orders, the “rabble” or the “mob.”2 Gradually, nation lost this negative connotation and came to have its contemporary political meaning: “A socially mobilized body of individuals who believe themselves united by some set of characteristics that differentiate them (in their own minds) from outsiders and who strive to create or maintain their own state.”3 This conception of the nation “locates the source of individual identity within a ‘people,’ which is seen as the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity.”4 Nationalism recognizes the state as the ideal and only legitimate form of politico-military rule. Nations seek to find expression in sovereign states, the boundaries of which should ideally coincide with those of the national community, but do not always, a problem about which we will have more to say below. The nation, understood as a sovereign people, is always seen as fundamentally homogeneous and only superficially divided by status, class, race, and locality. Nationalism thus transformed the new centralized monarchies into nationstates by connecting the state to the people living within it who were increasingly understood to be a homogeneous national community. Nationalism, understood this way, did not exist within the Roman Empire. The Romans never saw their empire as a homogeneous national community but as an overarching politico-military structure containing a multiplicity of heterogeneous peoples. The Roman imperial ideal lived on after the collapse of the western empire in the conviction of the Roman Catholic Church that Christendom was a singular, but culturally heterogeneous, religious community of Christian believers with the pope as its head, and in the notion that the Holy Roman Empire was an overarching, secular politico-military structure subsuming a multiplicity of lesser forms of rule (kingdoms, principalities, duchies, and the like) with the emperor as its head. In the east, sacred and secular universalism was fused and lived on in the Byzantine Empire. Sacred and secular universalism from above and feudal fragmentation from below made nationalism impossible in medieval Europe. Recalling our discussion of feudalism in Chapter 2, feudal monarchies were ruled by kings and nobles who spoke languages and lived lives that were quite different from those of the common people whom they ruled. This was also true of the clergy. The kings, princes, dukes, and other nobles of the feudal

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

Page 63

NATIONALIZING THE MONARCHICAL STATE

63

monarchy shared a common outlook and chivalric culture with kings, princes, dukes, and other nobles across Europe, despite the dynastic wars they frequently fought against one another. In the words of one scholar: “There was nothing illogical in any [noble] man’s ruling over subjects who were alien to him. Germans lorded it in Italy, Frenchmen in Spain, Englishmen in France, with complete equanimity and limpid consciences; even such bizarre spectacles as English or Flemish knights installed in charge of Greek, Bulgarian, or Armenian communities in the Balkans were part of the natural order of things.”5 As we made clear in the previous chapter, the great majority of ordinary people took no part in ruling the realm and had no military obligation, because wars were seen as private disputes among noble families. Ruling and fighting were the dual responsibility of the king and the aristocracy. Ordinary people did not identify with a monarchy-wide community; rather, they “were conscious of belonging to their native village or town, and to a group possessing a local language whose members could communicate without recourse to Latin or Greek. They were aware of belonging to a body of men and women who acknowledged the same feudal lord; to a social estate, which shared the same privilege; above all, to the great corporation of Christendom.”6 Therefore, in order for nations as bodies of socially and politically unified individuals who believe they are united by a set of shared characteristics that differentiate them from other peoples to come into being, the sacred and secular universalism of Christendom as well as the fragmentation of feudalism had to be overcome. This was possible if a centralized, consolidated form of politico-military rule were situated between the universal community of Christendom and the local communities of feudal lords.7 The rise of the new centralized monarchies in the west provided this intermediate politico-military framework within which nations could form. As we saw in the previous chapter, medieval kings in western Europe were able to gradually emancipate themselves from the religious supervision of popes, the political supervision of the Holy Roman Emperors, and the domestic restrictions of the “constitutional” rights and privileges of their estates.8 Over time, the new absolute monarchy created a “unified and unlimited authority, owing no allegiance above and unhampered by any restriction below,” especially after the Peace of Westphalia.9 The destruction of feudalism, which had deprived the common people of a military function and an active political existence, as well as the destruction of the universalism of medieval Christianity, allowed individuals to attach themselves to the consolidating monarchy. As the power of kings increased and the estates were broken down into equal subjects of the king, individuals began to see the whole kingdom rather than their estate as their primary membership association. At first these attachments were per-

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

64

Page 64

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

sonal and religious and were manifested as pride in the person of the king as well as the military, literary, and artistic achievements of the kingdom. Gradually, individuals began to identify with their own kingdom as a whole and came to believe that they had a common stake in its destiny. Eventually, loyalty to the king and identification with his kingdom shifted to loyalty to the whole community of people living within its territorial limits, “a development that in time, led to the nation-state and the struggle for self-determination.”10

■ Changing the Meaning of Nationalism Nationalism, as a political movement, appeared first in western Europe at the end of the seventeenth century. It spread from the west to central and eastern Europe in subsequent centuries. As it did, the way it was understood and manifested changed because the configuration of politico-military rule in central and eastern Europe was different from that of the west. In the west the medieval ideal and tradition of universal politico-military rule had been destroyed by the rise of the new consolidated monarchical states. In central and eastern Europe, the medieval ideal of secular and sacred universalism continued to exist for centuries after it had disappeared in the west. Medieval universalism lived on in the form of the ethnically diverse, dynastic empires of the Habsburgs, Romanovs, and Ottomans. The way that nationhood came to be understood was greatly affected by these two different forms of politico-military rule. In the words of one scholar, the difference between the nationalism of western and eastern Europe was the inevitable result of the different process of historical evolution through which they had passed. The Breton or Provençal felt himself first and foremost a Frenchman no less than the Parisian; it was of a liberated France that he dreamed. It was far otherwise with the Slovenes, who had never known a state of their own; with the Bulgars and Roumanians [sic], whose states had undergone such vicissitudes that their ancient political boundaries had altogether ceased to correspond with their actual conditions; with the Slovaks, who were accustomed, indeed, to the historic state of Hungary, but had never known the day when they had been anything better than underlings within the state. . . . The state to most of them was something altogether alien. But what they did possess . . . was the personal bond of their nationality. The very policy of deliberate differentiation to which they had been so long subjected had kept alive among them the consciousness of this tie. A Serb never felt that he was a citizen of the Ottoman Empire . . . [but] he had known that he was a Serb.11

As we saw in the previous chapter, centralization and consolidation of monarchical power challenged the theocentric worldview upheld by the

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

Page 65

NATIONALIZING THE MONARCHICAL STATE

65

Catholic Church and replaced it with a secular interpretation of politicomilitary power. The philosophical basis that caused this alteration was a Europe-wide intellectual movement known as the Enlightenment.12 Enlightenment thinkers argued that human beings were capable of using reason to discover for themselves the laws of nature according to which they could construct a good society. These thinkers were opposed to monarchy, which they believed was unnatural and riven with privilege, sinecures, nepotism, waste, and abuse. They were also opposed to dogmatic, fanatical religion, which they saw as irrational and superstitious. In stressing that all human beings were capable of thinking and deciding for themselves, of using their reason to distinguish “truth” from “falsehood” and “good” from “bad,” Enlightenment thinkers created a new morality and a new way of considering the problem of “evil.” They believed that human beings were naturally good and that by reason alone they could bring into being the good society. In effect, these thinkers rejected Christianity’s doctrine that all human beings were possessed by the inclination to do bad because they were tainted by the original sin of Adam and Eve. Thus, ignorance, superstition, intolerance, exploitation, ancient customs, and vested interests associated with the monarchy and the Catholic Church came to be seen as political and social evils that had to be eliminated. In the words of one historian, the Enlightenment’s “new rationalism prepared the way for the modern state by its rationalization of all human relations; it cleared away all the underbrush of centuries which stood in the way of the growth of the united nation.”13 The new ideas of this period were manifested politically in a Europewide reformist movement that eventually came to be called liberalism, with its supporters called liberals, a term first used to refer to a political party based on Enlightenment philosophy that appeared in early-nineteenth-century Spain. By the middle of that century, it came to be used throughout Europe to refer to all individuals who wished to reform the absolute monarchical state. Liberalism is based in the idea of the autonomous individual: the man who thinks of himself standing face to face with God and nature, possessing the power of the independent judgment, and answering ultimately only to his own conscience. Liberal ideology takes this individual as its basic fact. It believes that man has an unlimited capacity for selfdevelopment and self-improvement, provided he is free. Personal freedom is a precondition of all progress: with it man can create on this earth nearperfect conditions. The purpose of liberalism is to remove all the shackles—political, legal, social, economic, and even aesthetic—that constrain man and prevent him from giving full play to his personality.14

These ideas were spread throughout Europe by secret organizations (such as the Freemasons) whose members, influenced by liberalism, gath-

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

66

Page 66

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

ered to revel in their freedom from the old order and to discuss the creation of the new. Therefore, liberalism was the form that nationalism took when it first appeared in Europe—in England and France—toward the end of the sixteenth century. Liberals viewed the “nation” as a product of the will of ordinary individuals who had united themselves into a political community by free declaration.15 In central and eastern Europe where the ethnically diverse, uncentralized dynastic empire survived, nationalism was manifested differently, owing to the presence of this different form of rule. Except for the exceptional case of the Russian Empire, there did not exist in eastern Europe a consolidated, centralized monarchical state within which a singular national identity could form. The dynastic empires were patchworks of different peoples distinguishable from one another by language and culture, to a degree unknown in the western consolidated monarchies. In the dynastic empires, “the frontiers of an existing state and of a rising nationality rarely coincided; nationalism there grew into a protest against and in conflict with the existing state pattern—not primarily to transform it into a [liberal] state, but to redraw the political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic demands.”16 Hence, the nationalism of central and eastern Europe began from below as cultural movements, the first sign of which was the “delving into national history and philology; the collection of legends and folklore, the compilation of grammars and text-books”17 by intellectuals and priests of a particular ethnic group. Eventually, these cultural movements, influenced by the success of nationalism in the west, became political movements designed for escape from the dynastic imperial state and for creating an independent state built on the “submerged,” “captured,” or “oppressed” nation within the imperial state. In the process, central and eastern European nationalism constructed itself in opposition to the liberal, civic nationalism of the west, which arose in an effort to empower individuals within the political framework of the already consolidated monarchical state. In contrast, national movements in central and eastern Europe sought to justify their political demands for a state by reference to the past, by extolling the peculiarities of the traditions and virtues of an already existing people held together not by a social contract among consenting individuals but, rather, by traditional ties of kinship and status. In such ethnic nationalism the legal-rational concept of “citizenship” was replaced by the concept of the “folk.”18 The philosophical foundations of “folk” ethnic nationalism were laid by an intellectual movement called Romanticism, which developed in reaction to the rationalistic thought of the Enlightenment. Romanticism was a way of thinking that was first manifested in a philosophical current known as idealism, which came into existence in German-speaking Europe as a reaction to the empiricism of the Enlightenment. Idealists denied that all

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

Page 67

NATIONALIZING THE MONARCHICAL STATE

67

knowledge derives from experience. Idealists, such as Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), argued that the external world as we know it is not the world as it actually is. It is filtered through the mind of the beholder, which contains understandings independent of one’s actual experience. Hence, one does not experience reality as it is but as the mind interprets reality based on previous experience. Essentially, Romantics rejected the Enlightenment’s elevation of reason to the level of universal standard against which all experience was to be measured. They argued that rationalism, in its disregard of the emotional and religious side of human existence, was unnatural. Therefore, Romantics paid much attention to mythology and the symbolic forms of expression found in so-called primitive and ancient societies, which they believed were more authentic than rationally created enlightened societies because the people living in them were more in touch with their full emotive humanity as human beings.19 Romantic thinkers laid the philosophical basis for an alternative understanding of nationalism by considering the problem of the state in light of the nation as a whole people, not the individual. For them the state was a mechanical, juridical construction, the artificial product of politicians and political movements; therefore, it was a historical accident. The nation, they believed, however, was sacred, eternal, organic, and primordial; a product of nature that lay beyond the influence of human beings.20 For Romantics, the nation was considered an extension of the family, a natural unit bound together by ties of blood. Although they believed that nations had always existed, they felt that nations had not always been conscious of their national unity. Nationalism appears within such natural communities, or folkstamms, when the instinctive cultural unity they share becomes self-conscious and aspires to political unity and a state of its own. Romantics’ belief was that a state formed by a nation was a “natural” state and that every nation had its own merit and therefore an inherent right to form its own state, to be politically independent and self-governing, to shape its policy and institutions according to its own national needs. According to their views, all individuals had a right to belong to their own national state, not because they were subjects of a particular historical unit, but by virtue of their having the ethnic characteristics of the nation, no matter where they lived.21 Romantic thinkers rejected liberal nationalism’s separation of the state from the nation. They viewed the nation and the state as one and the same thing. The state was a formal legal expression of the nation. They also rejected liberal nationalism’s preference for a limited state. Instead, they preferred the strong national state because they believed it was the only vehicle through which natural communities (nations) could be expressed and true freedom realized. In addition, Romantics rejected liberal nationalism’s emphases on individual equality and freedom. Instead, they saw free-

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

68

Page 68

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

dom as the obligation of the individual to fulfill his or her own naturally assigned purpose within the nation. Moreover, they argued that human beings were inherently unequal and that the preservation of “natural” social distinctions was essential to the maintenance of a strong national state.22 Finally, Romantics believed that the purpose of democracy was to provide a mechanism for the nation to realize its political ideals rather than to realize individual freedom from state power, as liberal nationalism contended was its purpose. In the west, nationalism meant self-government and the actualization of individual freedom irrelevant of ethnicity. In the dynastic empires of central and eastern Europe, nationalism meant creating an independent unified state based on the “natural” cultural characteristics of a particular people; the first duty of the state was therefore to create a homogeneous national community based on these cultural characteristics, not to advance and protect the freedom of the individual.23

■ Nationalizing European Warfare Not unlike the formation of the consolidated monarchical state, the formation of the nation-state was strongly influenced by war and vice versa. When a state is viewed by the population within it as embodying the aspirations of “the people,” it will be strengthened and its capacity to exercise political-military rule, particularly in times of crisis or war, will be enhanced. According to one scholar of the state, war was a powerful catalyst in the creation and spread of nationalism because it infused the collective consciousness of people with a sense of their national identity, while simultaneously linking that identity closely to the fate of the state itself. Nationalism in turn magnifies the unifying effects of wars, promotes a sense of shared destiny, and strengthens political bonds that might otherwise suffer centrifugal failure. The military origins of nationalism are reflected in the military rituals and symbols that dominate national holidays, when military parades, fireworks, and many-gunned salutes herald a nation’s glory.24

In effect, nationalism solved the problem that monarchical states faced in mobilizing the human and material resources needed to make war with large infantry-based armies. We saw in the previous chapter that early infantry-based armies were composed of mercenaries and the dregs of society (petty thieves, drunks, social misfits) who, having been forced into military service as an alternative to prison, had to be constantly watched over and coerced so that they would not desert, mutiny, or turn their weapons on their officers. Armies made up of paid professionals tended to avoid directly confronting the enemy, preferring to outmaneuver than outshoot them, in

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

Page 69

NATIONALIZING THE MONARCHICAL STATE

69

order to avoid casualties.25 A state connected to a nation proved to be a far stronger form of politico-military rule than a state without a nation. Nationalism of both western and eastern European variants provides an emotional attachment among the people living within the state to their fellow citizens and the political community as a whole that vastly increased their willingness to make sacrifices and bear hardships as soldiers in the service of the state (patriotism), when the latter was seen as an instrument of the people. Intimidation, money, and physical coercion were no longer necessary to fill the ranks of the state’s army and keep soldiers on the battlefield. The army of a nation-state was, therefore, much more capable than a professional mercenary army of a monarchical state at giving battle and destroying the enemy. The competitive advantage of the “nation in arms” over the new monarchical state in war was demonstrated for the first time in Europe in 1792 at the Battle of Valmy in the Argonne forest in northeastern France, when a “ragtag French army under fire from the much better trained and better equipped Prussian infantry, held its ground to the revolutionary battle cry of ‘Vive la nation,’ [to which] Goethe, who was present at the battle [declared] . . . that ‘this date and place mark a new epoch in world history.’”26 The rise of the national state also affected the nature of warfare just as the rise of the new monarchical state had done. As was mentioned in Chapter 3, before the rise of the consolidated monarchical state after the Peace of Westphalia, European war was, for the most part, about property and dynastic claims among noble families. With the coming to the fore of the new monarchies, dynastic wars became increasingly anachronistic. More and more, wars were fought for territorial gain. Wars, such as the Seven Years’ War (1755–1763) between Britain and France and the War of Jenkin’s Ear (1739–1748) between Britain and Spain, as well as many others among European monarchical states during the eighteenth century, were fought in order to wrest control of small pieces of territory from each other, principally outside of continental Europe. With the advent of nationalism, the purpose of war changed again. Increasingly, wars were fought for national reasons. Wars, such as those that followed the French Revolution (1792–1799) and, later, the Napoleonic Wars (1800–1815), were fought to defend the Revolution and to spread the liberal principle of popular sovereignty to surrounding monarchies; the wars of German and Italian unification (1850–1871), the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), World War I (1914–1918), and World War II (1939–1945) were fundamentally about the violent assertion of the principle of national identity, coherence, and self-determination in order to make the borders of nations and states in Europe coincide. More and more, wars were struggles not between monarchs but between whole

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

70

Page 70

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

peoples fighting for their survival as a people, or for a culturally homogeneous state of their own.

■ Spreading Liberal Nationalism by Military Force According to some scholars of nationalism, full-blown national identity appeared first in the English monarchy. The shift in the meaning of the word nation to one referring to a culturally homogeneous people was already under way by the 1500s, and by the 1600s the existence of an English national consciousness, an English nation, was an accomplished fact. English nationality developed hand in hand with the establishment of parliamentary supremacy, the Protestant Church of England, and the growing number and wealth of the gentry—the new aristocracy created by the Tudor monarchs, especially Henry VIII and Elizabeth I. According to one historian, the idea of the English nation, also appealed to the constantly growing middle class, no less than it did to the new aristocracy. It justified the de facto equality between the two in many areas, as well as the aspirations of the members of the former stratum for increased participation in the political process and more power. It made them proud of their station in life, whatever it was, for they were first and foremost Englishmen, and confident in the possibility of higher achievements, for being Englishmen gave them the right to be whatever they wished. . . . Its representatives . . . sat in the House of Commons. And while the increasing importance of the Parliament provided yet another proof that they were indeed representatives of a nation, their national consciousness led them to demand more power for the Parliament. The power of the Parliament and national consciousness thus fed on each other, and in the process both grew stronger.27

Although national identity emerged first in England, its appearance somewhat later in France marked the beginning of what has been called the Age of Nationalism, that is, the reconfiguration of the European states system from monarchical to popular politico-military rule. France was a large, powerful, absolutist monarchical state whose politico-military influence had been manifested across the western half of the continent since the crown was able to reverse feudal entropy and establish a strong monarchy in the fourteenth century. The fact that French kings were able to construct the most absolute monarchy in Europe affected greatly the way that nationalism appeared in France. In contrast to the gradual evolution of national identity in England, French nationalism appeared as a revolutionary challenge to absolute monarchy. The result “was a see-saw history of alternating conservative and liberal regimes interposed with a series of violent revolutionary outbreaks,” 28 the first of which was the French Revolution of 1789,

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

Page 71

NATIONALIZING THE MONARCHICAL STATE

71

arguably one of the most important events in the history of the European state and the states system. According to one historian, the French Revolution plunged Europe into the most profound and protracted crisis which it had ever known. It consumed an entire generation in its tumults, its wars, its disturbing innovations. From the epicenter in Paris, it sent shock waves into the furthest reaches of the Continent. From the shores of Portugal to the depths of Russia, from Scandinavia to Italy, the shocks were followed by soldiers in bright uniforms with a blue, white and red cockade in their hats, and with ‘Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité’ on their lips. For its partisans, the Revolution promised liberation from the traditional oppressions enshrined in monarchy, nobility, and organized religion. For its opponents, it was synonymous with the dark forces of mob rule and terror. For France, it spelt the start of modern national identity. It began with hopes of limited peaceful change. It ended amidst promises of resistance to any form of change whatsoever. In the short run, it met defeat; in the long run, in the realm of social and political ideas, it made, and continues to make, a major and a lasting contribution.29

The French Revolution was in large measure a consequence of Enlightenment thought—the belief in natural law, reason, rights of individuals, and religious toleration. French revolutionaries sought to transform the monarchical state of France, which they considered to be unnatural, oppressive, and corrupt, into a modern, rational, liberal republic. In order to do so, they took the following steps: severed the connection between the French state and the Catholic Church; confiscated church lands; abolished monasteries; de-Christianized the calendar by giving the year’s months descriptive names (e.g., August became Floréal); applied the metric system to all weights and measures; replaced the généralities, which had come into existence without rhyme or reason, with more or less equal-size départements, each of which was named after a geographical feature and was small enough to be administered by a single official of the state, called a prefect; promulgated a written constitution, which created a unicameral legislature; abolished the mercantilist practices of the ancien régime and advocated free trade and nonintervention of the state in economic life; created a new system of uniform taxation; abolished guilds; granted full citizenship to Jews and Protestants; introduced universal conscription; revamped the judicial system by eliminating manorial and ecclesiastical courts and by providing for trial by jury; and abolished the nobility and clergy as legally separated and privileged social classes.30 The revolutionary government of France, called the Directory, vigorously defended the Revolution by sending French armies against the monarchies that were threatening the new republic from without. Revolutionary armies conquered Belgium and Holland. Belgium was annexed, but Holland was left as an independent republic. Armies were also sent against Austria

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

72

Page 72

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

and Prussia. A third army, commanded by Napoléon Bonaparte, was sent against the Austrians and their Piedmontese allies in Italy. Although he was considerably outnumbered, Napoléon quickly defeated both and crossed the Alps to invade Austria itself. The Austrians sued for peace, accepted the Rhine occupation, and gave the entire Italian peninsula to France. Lombardy became the Cisalpine Republic, and the city-state of Genoa became the Ligurian Republic, both modeled on republican France. For his victories in Italy, Napoléon was proclaimed a national hero. While the immediate cause of the wars of the French Revolution was aggressive self-confidence of the French revolutionaries, the underlying cause was which of two forms of the state, based on totally different legitimating principles, was going to dominate the continent. In the words of one historian, the French Revolution had ended feudalism, destroyed the pretensions of royal absolutism and founded new institutions on the principles of sovereignty of the people and personal liberty and equality. The old institutions, which had been overthrown in France, remained established in her continental neighbors. The influence of the Revolution was spreading, undermining the position of other rulers and implicitly challenging the survival of serfdom, feudalism, and absolutism everywhere.31

French military victories in Europe and an attempt by Napoléon to sever the connection of Great Britain with India, by establishing French hegemony over Egypt and Syria, sparked the major monarchies of Europe to form a new alliance against the French Republic, called the Second Coalition (1798–1801), composed of Russian, British, Austrian, Portuguese, and Ottoman armies. Austria and Prussia pushed the French back from the Rhine and out of Italy. It appeared that the French monarchy was about to be restored by external military force. Napoléon, who had returned to France from Egypt in 1799, overthrew the weak Directory on November 9 (the 18 Brumaire, according to the revolutionary calendar). Realizing that France needed strong leadership to end the chaos, stabilize daily life, and prevent a return to monarchy, Napoléon promulgated a new constitution that concentrated politico-military power into the hands of one official, the first consul, who would be appointed for ten years. Napoléon then made himself first consul of France. After establishing his dictatorship, Napoléon renewed the war against the Second Coalition. He crushed the Austrians in Italy and reestablished the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics as well as signing a peace treaty with Britain. Having saved the Revolution from the Second Coalition, Napoléon turned his attention to the consolidation of its “gains” within France. Napoléon replaced the elected officials in each department with individuals he appointed as the first consul, and who were directly responsible

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

Page 73

NATIONALIZING THE MONARCHICAL STATE

73

to him, in order to centralize and consolidate his control over the French state. In 1801 he signed an agreement with the Catholic Church that allowed him to put the clergy on the state payroll, and to nominate all high church officials in exchange for the church’s withdrawal of its claim to properties confiscated during the Revolution. In effect, the concord demoted the Catholic Church from being France’s official state church to being the majority religion among the French people. In 1804 Napoléon unified the French legal system with the promulgation of the Code Napoléon, the culmination of a project launched during the first years of the Revolution to rationalize the French legal system. He also introduced a system of state primary, secondary, and university education. Through these schools Napoléon hoped to create a cadre of well-trained and loyal officials to replace the hereditary nobility of the ancien régime. In 1802 Napoléon made himself consul for life and, in 1804, emperor of the French, having himself crowned in the cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris. Having stabilized the political and social situation within France, Napoléon launched a series of wars against neighboring states that in a few years accomplished what France’s absolute monarchy had endeavored for two hundred years to attain: French hegemony over Europe. He transformed the Dutch Republic of Batavia into the Kingdom of Holland and appointed his younger brother, Louis, as its king. He made the Cisalpine Republic into the Kingdom of Italy and crowned himself as its king. The Ligurian Republic was incorporated into imperial France. These actions sparked the formation of the Third Coalition (1805–1814), composed of Britain, Austria, Russia, and Sweden. Although his fleet was destroyed at Cape Trafalgar off the coast of Spain in October 1805, Napoleon’s armies defeated the armies of the coalition at Ulm and Austerlitz in 1805. After these two victories, he captured Vienna. Napoléon proceeded to strengthen the smaller German-speaking states as counterweights to Austria and Prussia by creating the kingdoms of Würtemberg and Bavaria and the Confederation of the Rhine, the latter composed of all the little states of Germany except Austria and Prussia, with himself as its protector. Having conquered central Europe, Napoléon abolished the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, making its reigning emperor, Francis II (1792–1806), Francis I (1806–1835), emperor of Austria. After disposing of Austria and organizing the Confederation of the Rhine, Napoléon made war on Prussia. The Prussian king’s mercenary soldiers, although well trained and equipped, were no match for Napoléon’s national army, which was fighting for ideals of the Revolution and the French people. The Prussian armies were overwhelmed at Jena and Auerstädt, on October 14, 1806, after which Napoléon entered Berlin. In an attempt to humble Tsar Alexander (1801–1825) of Russia, who had sided with the Prussians against him, Napoléon marched from Berlin

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

74

Page 74

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

and defeated a Russian army at Friedland in 1807, after which he made peace with the tsar at the expense of Prussia, which lost provinces between the Elbe and the Rhine, to make a new kingdom of Westphalia for his youngest brother, Jerome. Prussian holdings in Poland were reconstituted as the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Now at the height of his power on the continent, Napoléon resumed his war with Britain, which had defeated his navy at Trafalgar in 1805. He devised an elaborate commercial blockade, called the Continental System, whereby he seized all British goods within his own or allied territories and prevented all British ships from the former’s ports in order to hermetically seal the continent against British trade and force the British to come to terms. Under the blockade, no ship, not even a neutral one, could put into a French-controlled port if it had previously touched British territory. The only monarchy to defy Napoléon was the Kingdom of Portugal, which being far from France and having been allied to Britain for centuries (the “Oldest Alliance”), refused to join the Continental System. Napoléon responded by invading the Iberian Peninsula and occupying Portugal in 1807, driving out the royal family, which took up residence in Brazil. Napoléon’s attempt to place his brother on the Spanish throne resulted in an insurrection in Spain, which he met with armed force. The Spanish assembled only in small guerrilla bands, ambushed the French detachments, and melted away into the countryside, thus inventing a new kind of war, called guerrilla war (from the Spanish meaning “little war”). In an effort to unify Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals within his Continental System, Napoléon invaded the last independent monarchy on the continent, Russia. In 1812 he assembled an army of 600,000 men— probably the largest military force under a single commander ever seen in Europe up to that time—and marched on Moscow. When he entered Moscow on September 15, he found that the Russians had abandoned the city and set fire to it in order to deny him his victory. After lingering in Moscow until October, Napoléon began his retreat to Paris. Before long, his vast army was overtaken by winter weather, for which it was unprepared. Harassed by swiftly moving bands of Cossacks, lacking adequate food, suffering from disease, Napoléon’s Grande Armée was reduced to fewer than 100,000 men by the time it straggled across the Niemen River into Frenchcontrolled territory. Despite the disastrous Russian campaign, Napoléon raised and trained a new army and made war on a new alliance of monarchical states, the Fourth Coalition (Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia), which had formed against him. Napoléon’s armies were driven by coalition forces from Germanspeaking territory. At the same time, Wellington had pushed the French army out of Portugal and Spain and was pursuing it across the Pyrenees into southern France. Coalition forces invaded France and captured Paris on

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

Page 75

NATIONALIZING THE MONARCHICAL STATE

75

March 13, 1814, and Napoléon capitulated. On April 11 the allies granted Napoléon Elba, an island off the coast of Tuscany, as a sovereign principality, where he was exiled with an 800-man guard of honor. The monarchy was restored when Louis XVIII, the elder of the two surviving brothers of the last reigning king, Louis XVI, was placed on the throne of France. After a few months of exile, Napoléon escaped from Elba, landed in France with his guard of honor, and formed a new army from his former troops who had rallied to him upon learning of his return. Louis XVIII fled France and Napoléon returned to power and resumed the war against the Fourth Coalition, which responded by organizing a vast army under the command of the duke of Wellington. Although Napoléon won some battles against his army, Wellington defeated him at Waterloo in Belgium on June 18, 1815. Narrowly escaping capture, Napoléon fled to Paris, where he again abdicated. While planning an escape to the Americas, he surrendered himself to the British. By unanimous agreement among the coalition, he was taken as a prisoner of war to St. Helena, a remote island in the midsouth Atlantic, where he lived under close supervision until his death on May 5, 1821. France was returned to the monarchical fold, and Louis XVIII reascended the throne. Before he died, Napoléon said: “There are in Europe more than 30 million French, 15 million Spanish, 14 million Italians, and 30 million Germans. I would have wished to make each of these peoples a single united body.”32 The people living within the monarchical states that Napoléon invaded, occupied, and reorganized saw things differently, however. What Napoléon failed to understand is that invasion by a foreign power, no matter the reason, usually ignites feelings of nationalism and social solidarity against the invader. Thus, French armies inadvertently generated a nationalist response in the states Napoléon conquered. In the words of one historian, “The whole of western Europe between the Pyrenees and the Baltic was infused with a strange mixture of general sympathy for the original ideals of the Revolution and an immediate hostility to the practices of the French. It was the perfect mixture for nourishing the seeds of nationalism.”33

■ Resisting Nationalist Revolutions by Military Force The purpose of the Congress of Vienna (September 1814–June 1815) was to find a way to preserve absolute monarchical sovereignty against the rising tide of popular sovereignty engendered by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. The major monarchies of the Fourth Coalition—Austria, Britain, Prussia and Russia—formed an alliance (the Quadruple Alliance, which became the Quintuple Alliance when France was later admitted), and pledged to work in concert (the Concert of Europe) by meeting on a period-

9/23/08

3:58 PM

76

Page 76

GD

OM

OF

SW

EDE

N

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

KIN

KINGDOM OF DENMARK AND NORWAY

RUSSIAN

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN

SIA

AND IRELAND

. NG

GRAND DUCHY OF WARSAW

CONFEDERATION OF THE

ATLANTIC OCEAN

F

R

N

EMPIRE

SWITZERLAND

H

AL UG

E

S

CE

RT

IN

PO

ITALY

IR

OV

P

R NP

KINGDOM

IA

M

YR

ILL

C

KING. OF

OF

AUSTRIAN

RHINE

E

E

G.

EMPIRE

PRUS

OF

KI

KIN

O-4

OF SPAIN

KING. OF

OT

TO

MA

N

KING. OF NAPLES

SARDINIA

EM

PI

RE

KING. OF SICILY

Europe After the Congress of Vienna in 1815

ic basis for twenty years to coordinate the monarchical response to any liberal uprisings that might “disturb the peace” of Europe. The Congress of Vienna gave absolutist monarchical politico-military rule a new lease on life. The most important of the conferees were Prince Metternich of Austria, Karl August von Hardenberg and William von Humboldt of Prussia, Viscount Castlereagh and the duke of Wellington for Britain, Tsar Alexander I for Russia, and Charles Talleyrand for France, which had been returned to monarchical rule by the accession to the French

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

Page 77

NATIONALIZING THE MONARCHICAL STATE

77

throne of one of the two surviving brothers of Louis XVI, Louis XVIII (1814–1824). They thought that the best way to achieve peace and security from liberal nationalism was to reestablish, as far as possible, the absolute monarchical states system as it had existed before the Napoleonic wars. It was believed that these states were legitimate while ones created by Napoléon were not. The frontiers of France were pushed back to those of 1790. Austria received the Italian Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, the French kingdoms of Illyria and Dalmatia, Salzburg, Tyrol, and Galicia. Prussia received a portion of the grand duchy of Warsaw, the port city of Danzig, Swedish Pomerania, Rugia, Westphalia, Neuchâtel, and Saxony as compensation for territory ceded to other monarchies. Calls for the creation of a unified German monarchy were overruled by the German princes who wanted nothing more than a loose alliance. Thus, Napoléon’s Confederation of the Rhine was replaced by another called the German Confederation, a loose alliance of the kingdoms of Austria, Bavaria, and Prussia as well as thirtysix other little kingdoms, principalities, duchies, and free city-states, which replaced the Holy Roman Empire. In the east the kingdom of Poland was given to Russia with the tsar as its king. In the west the Republic of Holland and Austrian Netherlands (Belgium) were brought together into a single kingdom and Sweden retained Norway. The only republic to survive the redrawing of the map of Europe by the Congress was the Swiss confederation. The Republic of Genoa was given to the Kingdom of Sardinia, and the Republic of Venice went to the Austrian emperor as compensation for the loss of Belgium.34 The Italian peninsula had been divided into five independent blocks (the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Papal States, the Kingdom of Sardinia, the Italian territories of the Austrian Empire, and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany); Poles were distributed among Austria, Prussia, and Russia; Belgians were under the auspices of a Dutch king; and Germans were still fragmented into two large monarchies (Austria and Prussia), four midsized monarchies (the kingdoms of Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg, and Hanover), one grand duchy (Baden); several principalities (such as Weimar and Hesse); and three city-states (Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck). Any attempt by liberals to redraw the map of Europe along national lines was to be crushed by the concerted action of the Quintuple Alliance, also known as the Holy Alliance. While the Congress of Vienna fixed the outlines of the map of Europe for the next century, its glaring weakness was the failure to take into account nationalist sentiments that had emerged as a consequence of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. The time was past when people and lands could be traded among monarchs. The territorial reconfigurations of the Congress disappointed Italian, Polish, German, and Belgian

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

78

Page 78

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

nationalists who hoped that the map would be drawn based on the principle of popular sovereignty. For a number of years after the first meeting of the Congress, the Alliance successfully quelled a number of popular revolutions. The first of these came in Spain in 1820 when liberals rose up against Ferdinand VII (1814–1833), who had abrogated the liberal constitution of 1812 as well as reestablished the nobility and clergy, and revived the Inquisition. Taking advantage of the dislocation of the royal family in Brazil, liberals also took action in Portugal, establishing a provisional government. The army rose in revolt in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies as well. These uprisings were suppressed by Austrian and French troops, and deposed absolutist monarchs were returned to their thrones in Naples and Madrid. Alliance intervention in Portugal was blocked by Britain, however, and a constitutional monarchy was established in 1822. The cultural revival among the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire, their revolt against the sultan in 1821, and his violent suppression of the rebels between 1822 and 1827 drove a wedge within the Holy Alliance. Metternich refused to intervene, but Nicholas I (1825–1855), who had succeeded his brother Alexander in 1825, favored intervention to save the Christian Greeks. Three of the Allies (Britain, France, and Russia) sent ships and troops in 1827 and defeated the sultan in 1828, after which he agreed to an independent Greek kingdom and home rule for Serbia, Wallachia, and Moldavia in 1839.

■ Establishing Popular Sovereignty, 1830 and 1848 Meanwhile, in France, Louis XVIII promulgated a constitution in 1814 that recognized the administrative, legal, and military reforms of Napoléon and conceded to the people a share of legislative power in a two-chambered legislature, one of which was a Chamber of Deputies elected from voter lists restricted by very high property-owning qualifications. Being surrounded at court by ultraroyalists who wished to recover their confiscated estates and restore the Catholic Church to its prerevolutionary position, Charles X (1824–1830), Louis’s successor, favored the “ultras” even more. He agreed to indemnify the nobility for their confiscated estates and issued four ordinances in 1830 that restricted the franchise and muzzled the press. These actions resulted in an uprising in Paris of republican working men and students (the July Revolution), which the king’s troops were unable to suppress. Moderate liberals, who favored a constitutional monarchy, were able to place the duke of Orleans, Louis Philip, who had served in the republican army, on the throne without opposition from Charles, who abdicated and fled to England. Although the Constitution of 1814 remained in force, a new

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

Page 79

NATIONALIZING THE MONARCHICAL STATE

79

electoral law was passed that lowered the property qualifications for the franchise, which, by doubling the size of the electorate, enhanced the influence of the middle class. The events of 1830 in France inspired liberals in other European monarchies to rebel against absolutism, seek the establishment of constitutional monarchy, and, in areas under foreign domination, achieve national self-determination. In the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Catholic Belgians (one-half of whom were Flemings, a Germanic people, and the other half of whom were Walloons, a Celtic people who spoke French and looked toward Paris), rebelled against the king, the Dutch-speaking William, who resisted their demand for independence. The alliance powers, meeting in London, acquiesced to the Belgian demand and declared Belgium an independent constitutional monarchy, placing a German prince, Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, on its throne. The Belgian constitution was the most liberal in Europe. It provided for the popular election of both the upper and lower houses of parliament, and the king was required to act through government ministers, who were responsible to the legislature. In central Europe, and in the Italian peninsula, liberal nationalists who sought to bring the state into closer relationship to the nation by overturning absolutism and establishing constitutional monarchies were unsuccessful in achieving their objectives. In Austria and Prussia absolutism continued unchecked. A revolt by nationalists in the Kingdom of Poland in 1830 was crushed by the tsar, who absorbed the kingdom into Russia. Thus, according to one historian, Europe emerged from the decade of the 1830s divided into two political regions: In Germany, Italy, and Poland the forces of conservatism triumphed over those of liberalism, and revolutions were crushed by the concerted actions of Austria, Russia, and Prussia. In France, Belgium, Switzerland, Portugal, Spain, and Great Britain, liberalism triumphed, backed at times by the power of France and Britain. Europe roughly west of the Rhine was moving toward a pattern of liberal, constitutional, parliamentary government. . . . Europe east of the Rhine preserved all the main lines of its . . . political pattern of 1815. This remained the basic fact of [European] international relations until 1848.35

On January 12, 1848, the people of Palermo in Sicily rebelled against the misrule of King Ferdinand II of Naples. Within a month similar uprisings occurred in other Italian cities. Soon, popular insurrections appeared all over Europe, against foreign rulers and/or in favor of social and democratic reforms, in a rising tide of discontent against the monarchical status quo. In February 1848, agitation for electoral reform in France turned violent and the king, Louis-Philippe (1830–1848), abdicated in favor of his grandson and fled. Republicans set up a provisional government and again declared France to be a republic. Universal male suffrage was granted and

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

80

Page 80

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

freedom of the press declared. A new constitution was promulgated, which vested legislative power in a single-chambered assembly composed of 750 members elected by universal suffrage. The executive power was vested in a president elected directly for a four-year term. Louis-Napoléon, nephew of Napoléon I and the pretender to the Napoleonic successions, was elected president of the Second Republic (1848–1852) by trading on the “Napoleonic legend” and the desire for strong rule after the turmoil of the republican insurrection. The republican revolution in France was greeted elsewhere in Europe, especially in the German-speaking monarchies and principalities and in the Italian peninsula, with hope by those who wanted to establish popular sovereignty and a nation-state. On March 13, 1878, liberals in Vienna rose up and drove the arch-monarchist, Prince Metternich, from the city. The weak emperor Ferdinand renounced absolutism and promised a constitution, an elected legislature, and freedom of the press. News of Metternich’s overthrow caused riots to break out in Berlin and many of the capital cities of the smaller monarchical states of the German Confederation. Frederick William IV (1840–1861) surrendered to the liberals, who claimed to represent the people, and promised an elected legislature. Meanwhile, in the Austrian Empire—which was composed of a patchwork of peoples (Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Italians, and others)— national sentiments, which heretofore had remained submerged, burst to the surface. In Lombardy and Venetia the people spontaneously rose up, drove out the Austrian occupiers, and declared their independence. A provisional government was established in Milan. The Austrian army, having regrouped, reinvaded Piedmont and placed Victor Emmanuel II (1849–1878) on the throne. Uprisings in the Papal States, Tuscany, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which resulted in many liberal reforms, were turned back and absolutism reestablished once the revolutionary tide had receded in 1849. Nationalist uprisings of Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, and other nationalities were suppressed by the Austrian army. Surviving the uprisings of 1848 more or less intact, the Austrian Empire returned to the absolutism that envisaged the empire as a unitary state with a common army and administration, and continued to ignore the nationalist claims for selfdetermination and independence growing within it.

■ Unifying Italy and Germany The failure of the Palermo uprising in Italy did not end nationalist agitation for a unified Italian state. Nationalists focused their attention on the constitutional monarchy of Piedmont, whose prime minister, Count Cavour, favored the unification of Italy under Piedmontese leadership. During his

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

Page 81

NATIONALIZING THE MONARCHICAL STATE

81

premiership, Cavour governed with the aid of the liberals in the Chamber of Deputies and in 1856 gave secret encouragement to the formation of the National Society, whose purpose was the unification of Italy. Cavour was able to lure France and Britain into a war against Austria in 1859, which resulted in the defeat of Austria at the battle of Solferino and the withdrawal of its army to the Quadrilateral (the four fortresses of Mantua, Peschiera, Legnano, and Verona, located between Lombardy and Venetia). Fearing a prolonged siege against the Quadrilateral and alarmed by republican uprisings in Tuscany and the Papal States, Victor Emmanuel concluded a peace treaty with the Austrian emperor, Francis Joseph. In Parma, Modena, Tuscany, and Romagna, representative assemblies repudiated their princes and voted for annexation to the Kingdom of Piedmont, which the king accepted in 1860, after consultation with the French king, who demanded Savoy and Nice in return for his support. The Kingdom of Piedmont now comprised the entire peninsula north of the Papal States, except Venetia, which remained Austrian. In the summer of 1860, Giuseppe Garibaldi, secretly encouraged by Cavour, assembled an army of one thousand volunteers in Genoa and sailed for Sicily, where he landed at Marsala; was met by an enthusiastic population, which desired to be rid of their imported Spanish monarchy; and quickly took Palermo and set up a provisional government. In September, Garibaldi, an ardent republican, crossed the straits and took Naples, after which he turned his army toward Rome. Garibaldi’s actions alarmed Cavour, who sent an army into the Papal States, annihilated the papal forces, annexed Ancona and Umbria, and met Garibaldi’s army coming north. Garibaldi yielded to the Piedmontese. A plebiscite organized in October resulted in an overwhelming majority in Naples and Sicily in favor of union with the Kingdom of Piedmont. In February 1861, Cavour summoned to Turin representatives elected from the kingdom’s new acquisitions; they proclaimed the transformation of the Kingdom of Sardinia into the Kingdom of Italy. The Sardinian constitution became the constitution for the new Italian kingdom and Victor Emmanuel its king. Outraged by the spoliation of the Papal States, the pope excommunicated the king and took refuge in the Vatican in Rome, which was still occupied by French troops. A war between Austria and Prussia enabled Italy to acquire Venetia in 1866. Only Rome and its immediate environment, protected by French troops, remained outside the unified Italian constitutional monarchy. The outbreak of war between France and Prussia in 1870, which brought about the withdrawal of the French garrison from Rome, allowed the Italian army to take the city. The papal domain was reduced to the roughly 110 acres around St. Peter’s Basilica, and Rome was declared the secular capital of the Italian constitutional monarchy on October 2.

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

82

Page 82

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

A discussion of the unification of Germany must begin with a discussion of the formation of the Prussian monarchy because it was Prussia that created the first unified German state. As we saw in the previous chapter, the Holy Roman Empire was composed of principalities that owed feudal obligations to the emperor, dozens of independent imperial cities, the noncontiguous lands of the imperial family, bishoprics of the Catholic Church, and minor fiefs owned by the imperial knights. The German national state began as a mark, or march (borderland), of Brandenburg located between the Meuse and Oder rivers. Brandenburg’s expansion eastward during the campaigns to Christianize the Slavonic peoples of the east made its margrave one of the six leading princes to be designated “electors” of the empire. In 1415, after a period of turmoil, the emperor conferred Brandenburg on Frederick of Hohenzollern, who founded a dynasty that ruled the mark uninterruptedly for the next five hundred years. Frederick consolidated his rule by battering down the castles of the nobility and making the roads safe for commerce. His son and successor, Frederick II (1440–1470), imposed royal law on recalcitrant towns, especially Berlin, where he established his residence. His successors slowly extended the power of the crown. During the Reformation the elector Joachim II (1535–1571) became a Lutheran in 1539. In 1609 the elector Johan Sigismund (1608–1619) inherited lands in the west along the Rhine as well as in the east along the Baltic, to the River Vistula. In 1618 he inherited the Duchy of Prussia, which had been created by the Teutonic Knights, who conquered and forcibly Christianized the so-called pagan Prussian tribes in the thirteenth century; it had become a secular duchy when its last grand master, Albrecht, abjured the Catholic faith and became a Protestant in 1524. During the Thirty Years’ War, the elector of Brandenburg-Prussia was George William (1619–1640), who saw his lands invaded and ruined by Catholic and Protestant armies. His son, Frederick William (1640–1688), the “Great Elector,” took steps to consolidate his unconnected lands (Brandenburg, Cleves, and Prussia), each of which was a separate realm with its own laws, customs, and councils of estates (composed of the local clergy, nobility, and burghers), which controlled taxation and administration. His task was to fuse the three domains together into a single realm. Taking advantage of a war between the Swedish and Polish crowns, he seized Pomerania, which had been occupied by the Swedes. In 1660 he gained control over East Prussia. After adding these lands to the original three, he set about consolidating and centralizing politico-military rule within them. He created a standing army over which he had charge, created a common administration for his three domains, and gradually gained control over taxation by breaking the power of the local councils of estates in

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

Page 83

NATIONALIZING THE MONARCHICAL STATE

83

each. Eventually, he succeeded in fusing the three together into a single realm called Brandenburg-Prussia. In 1701 his son, Frederick III (1688–1713), was crowned king of Prussia as Frederick I. Gradually, the title “King of Prussia” took precedence over that of “King of Brandenburg” because Brandenburg was a fief of the empire and was inferior to Prussia, which, since 1660, was recognized as an independent monarchy held in full sovereignty by the Holy Roman Emperor. Frederick’s son and successor, Frederick William I (1713–1740), directed his energies to building the two main pillars of the consolidated monarchy: its army and administrative apparatus. Known to history as the “drill-master of Europe,” he successfully created a standing army that, because of his obsession with military discipline, abhorrence of idleness, and penchant for tall soldiers, became the most powerful military machine in Europe, and a model army emulated across Europe and around the world. Frederick I’s son and heir, Frederick II (1740–1768) came to the throne in 1740. Having the most efficient army in Europe at his disposal supported by a sound administrative apparatus, Frederick II was able to take by military force from the Austrian crown the Duchy of Silesia, which he claimed by hereditary right. Gradually, Frederick became the epitome of the “enlightened despot,” that is, one who rules his subjects with an iron hand for their own good. Prussia had been converted into a monarchy as absolutist as the French prototype. Napoléon’s defeat of Prussian armies at Jena and Auerstädt (Auerstedt) in 1806 sparked a reform movement that sought to “modernize” the Prussian state. Frederick William III (1797–1840), although a staunch absolutist like his father, bowed to necessity and accepted his chief minister’s recommendations that serfdom be abolished; the feudal estates were swept aside, and a united citizenry equal before the law was created. The old mercenary army defeated by Napoléon was replaced by a new national army based on the principle of universal military service. These efforts helped engender a sense of national identity, hitherto unknown in the Prussian feudal state. Frederick William IV (1840–1861), sought to create stronger national unity not through liberal constitutionalism but, rather, through a revival of the estates and the glories of the divinely consecrated absolute monarchy. He dreamed of reestablishing the Holy Roman Empire, within which Prussia would be the leading monarchy. The provincial diets established during his father’s reign were given the right to elect committees to meet in Berlin to discuss legislation for all of Prussia. The 1848 revolution in Paris precipitated widespread uprisings of liberal nationalists in Prussia, who demanded constitutional reform and the unification of the German states into a single empire. Frederick William IV

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

84

Page 84

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

announced his willingness to collaborate and summoned a united Landtag (legislative body) to write a constitution that would merge Prussia with other German states into a united Germany. As the debate for constitutional reform became increasingly radical, the king, encouraged by the restoration of absolutism in Austria, dissolved the Landtag and promulgated his own constitution, which maintained the absolute authority of the crown. It provided for an upper house (Herrenhaus) for the nobility and clergy, and a lower house (Landtag) chosen by a complicated three-class system of voting based on taxpaying ability, which meant that 83 percent of the electorate controlled only one-third of the seats. Government ministers were made responsible to the king, not the Landtag. The press was muzzled, and political meetings were banned. In 1861, Frederick William IV died and was followed on the throne by his brother, William I (1861–1888), who, unlike his predecessor, was reform minded. He turned his attention first to universal military training, which because of certain demographic changes and restrictions on the size of the standing army, had been, for all intents and purposes, abandoned. He determined to make universal military training a reality, one that would provide him with a larger army. When he presented his Army Reform Bill, liberals in the Landtag, who wanted to reduce military expenditures, demanded changes, which the king refused to make. In 1862 the king appointed a Brandenburg Junker (member of the Prussian aristocracy) and staunch defender of royal power, Otto von Bismarck, as his first minister. Bismarck was convinced that German unity was feasible only under Prussian leadership and could be achieved only by the destruction of the German Confederation, created by the Congress of Vienna, and the exclusion of multiethnic Austria. As a larger army was necessary for such a program, he supported the king against the Landtag. Bismarck was able to reconcile the king, Landtag, and Prussian people by a series of brilliant military and diplomatic successes. The first was a quick victory in a war with Denmark concerning the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, which wanted to join with Prussia. The second was a victory in a war with Austria in 1866, ostensibly over the division of the Schleswig-Holstein booty, but actually over the composition of a united German state. After being defeated, Austria ceded rights to Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia and accepted the dissolution of the German Confederation. The third was the formation of a confederation of the states of northern Germany. National unity was incomplete, however, because Bismarck allowed the four south German monarchies (Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse) to form a federation of their own, which they failed to do. In the Prussian-led North German Confederation, the king of Prussia was the chief executive under the title of president and the legislative power

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

Page 85

NATIONALIZING THE MONARCHICAL STATE

85

was held by a Federal Council (Bundesrat), which represented the individual states. The people as a whole were represented in a parliament (Reichstag) elected by universal suffrage. The balance among these components was in favor of the president and Bundesrat, which retained control of policy. Unification of the North German Confederation with the four independent south German monarchies, which had signed offensive and defensive treaties with the North German Confederation, was brought about by the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), sparked by a dispute over the throne of Spain. The French were rapidly defeated by the combined German armies, after which they ceded Alsace and part of Lorraine to Germany. The south German states entered the North German Confederation, which became the German Empire, and the King of Prussia was designated Emperor William I (1871–1888) on January 18, 1871. Bismarck was elevated to the rank of prince and made chancellor of the empire, which, by the terms of the constitution, made him head of the imperial administration. In Italy and Germany, nationalism had triumphed at the expense of liberalism. Both were unified not by revolution from liberal elites but through monarchical activity from above. Two large states now existed in central Europe in place of the previous multitude of small monarchical states. However, their precise boundaries were not yet firmly fixed because there remained significant German and Italian populations, called irredenta (unredeemed ones), living outside of the borders, as well as substantial nonGerman and non-Italian minorities living inside them. The unification of Italy and Germany did not change the boundaries of the Austrian, Russian, and Ottoman empires in eastern Europe. These empires remained intact, although rising nationalist sentiment among the ethnic communities that composed them was creating powerful centrifugal forces, which eventually tore them asunder, as we shall see in the next chapter.

■ Summary In this chapter we have shown that nationalism—which locates the source of individual identity within a homogeneous, sovereign people and recognizes the nation-state as the only legitimate form of politico-military rule— did not exist in Europe until relatively recently. The sacred and secular universalism of the Catholic Church and feudal fragmentation made national sentiment impossible. In order for nations as bodies of socially and politically unified individuals who believe they constitute a single people only superficially divided by class, race, and status to form, the universalism of Christendom had to be broken down and the fragmentation of feudalism reversed. A centralized, coherent form of politico-military rule between the

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

86

Page 86

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

universal community of Christendom and the local communities of feudal lords had to be created. The centralized, consolidated monarchy provided the intermediate politico-military framework within which national communities could crystallize. As monarchies centralized and consolidated, ordinary individuals began to identify with their own king and kingdom and gradually came to believe that they had a common stake in its destiny. Eventually, loyalty to the king and to the kingdom shifted to loyalty to the body of people living within the kingdom. Such sentiments appeared first in western Europe at the end of the seventeenth century, because the consolidated, centralized monarchical state emerged earliest there. Nationalism appeared later in central and eastern Europe, because medieval universalism continued in that part of Europe in the form of the Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman empires. The way that nationalism was manifested was affected by these different forms of politico-military rule. In the west, nationalism appeared as a movement to liberate the individual from the restrictions of the absolute monarchial state; in the east, nationalism appeared as movements to liberate a particular people from the multiethnic imperial state in which it was located. The emphasis on the individual in the original nationalism of the west developed from the Enlightenment, which stressed that all human beings were capable of thinking and deciding for themselves and that politico-military rule should be subordinated to “natural law,” which could be discerned by rational (meaning reasoning) individuals. Such thinking was manifested politically in a reformist movement—liberalism—that sought to base politico-military rule on the idea of popular sovereignty rather than divine right. Liberals viewed the nation as a result of the combined will of ordinary individuals who had united themselves in a political community by individual declaration. Liberals developed the idea that the state should be accepted only if it could be justified by a rational discourse that appealed to universal standards of justice. They believed that individuals were bearers of certain natural inalienable rights, especially the right to private property and the right to be free of arbitrary and capricious treatment by the state. From their perspective a written constitution that limited the power of the state was the best protection for the individual against the arbitrary and capricious power of absolute monarchy. Finally, liberals believed that some form of democratic representation—even if limited by tax-paying and property-owning restrictions on the electorate—was better than rule by an absolute monarch, including a benevolent one. As nationalism spread into the ethnically diverse empires of central and eastern Europe, it was transformed from a movement to reform the monarchical state to movements of different peoples distinguished from one another by language, culture, and race, against the prevailing imperial

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

Page 87

NATIONALIZING THE MONARCHICAL STATE

87

states; they aspired to break down these empires into homogeneous states in conformity with these ethnographic recognitions. Nationalist movements in central and eastern Europe justified their demands for a state not by appealing to the principles of liberalism but, rather, by appealing to the past and the virtues of an ancient, preexisting historical people set apart from others by language, culture, and history. The idea of “citizenship” was replaced by the idea of the “folk.” The central and eastern European alternate understanding of nationalism sprang from the different shape of politico-military rule (empire) and Romanticism’s alternative understanding of the nature of human society. In opposition to Enlightenment thinkers, Romantics believed that the nation was a sacred, external, organic, primordial entity produced by nature that preceded the state. Romantics believed that every nation had an inherent right to form its own state, to be politically independent and self-governing, to shape its institutions and policies according to its own national needs. Essentially, Romantic nationalists rejected liberal nationalism’s emphasis on individual freedom vis-à-vis the state and accepted the idea of the strong state based on a homogeneous national community, even if it meant denying basic rights and suppressing different ethnic groups. Like the formation of the centralized monarchical states, war influenced the formation of the national state. Nationalism enhanced the competitive advantage of states by providing a solution to the problem of mobilizing the human and material resources needed to make war with large, infantry-based armies. A state connected to a homogeneous nation proved to be far stronger than a nationally heterogeneous one. Nationalism vastly augmented the willingness of political communities to endure the huge sacrifices required by modern war, which, increasingly, was fought not for territorial gain but for individual freedom and rights and/or the liberation of a certain people. Although liberal nationalism appeared first in Britain, its appearance in France was more significant for the formation of national states on the continent. The transformation of the British monarchical state into a popular constitutional monarchy was slow and relatively peaceful. In France, however, where absolutism had been firmly established, it was rapid and violent. A revolutionary movement overthrew the monarchy and eventually established a republic. The program of the revolutionaries drew its intellectual sustenance from the Enlightenment and came to be called liberalism. Its principles were equality before the law, religious toleration, popular sovereignty, and nationalism. These principles lay behind the Revolution of 1789, were identified with Napoléon, were resisted mightily by the monarchical states at the Congress of Vienna, animated the uprisings of the 1830s and 1848, and, indirectly, led to the unification of Italy in 1861 and Germany in 1871.

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

88

Page 88

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

■ Notes 1. Norman Davies, Europe: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 812. 2. Liah Greenfield, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 3–8. 3. Ernest B. Haas, Nationalism, Liberalism, and Progress: The Rise and Decline of Nationalism, vol. 1 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 23. 4. Greenfield, Nationalism, 3. 5. C. A. Macartney, National States and National Minorities (New York: Russell & Russell, 1934), 35–36. 6. Davies, Europe, 382. 7. Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background (New York: Macmillan, 1944), 188. 8. Ibid., 226. 9. Macartney, National States, 39. 10. Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History (New York: Anchor, 2003), 120. 11. Macartney, National States, 93–94; italics in the original. 12. J. M. Roberts, A History of Europe (New York: Allen Lane, 1996), 235–238. 13. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, 217. 14. William L. Langer (ed.), Western Civilization: The Struggle for Empire to Europe in the Modern World (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 293. 15. Greenfield, Nationalism, 10. 16. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, 329. 17. Macartney, National States, 94. 18. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, 330–331. 19. Davies, Europe, 611–614. 20. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, 236–249. 21. Macartney, National States, 97. 22. Greenfeld, Nationalism, 348–350. 23. Macartney, National States, 101–103. 24. Bruce D. Porter, War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics (New York: Free Press, 1994), 19. 25. John J. Weltman, World Politics and the Evolution of War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 36–45. 26. Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1. 27. Greenfeld, Nationalism, 49–50. 28. Davies, Europe, 803. 29. Ibid., 677. 30. Robert E. Holtman, The Napoleonic Revolution (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1967), chapter 1. 31. Ibid., 181. 32. David Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon, 2nd edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), 15. 33. Ibid., 31. 34. Davies, Europe, 762. 35. Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon, 153–154.

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

Page 89

NATIONALIZING THE MONARCHICAL STATE

89

■ Suggested Reading Brubaker, Rogers. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Greenfield, Liah. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992. Haas, Ernest B. Nationalism, Liberalism, and Progress: The Rise and Decline of Nationalism, vol. 1. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997. Kohn, Hans. The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background. New York: Macmillan, 1944. Macartney, C. A. National States and National Minorities. New York: Russell & Russell, 1934. Thomson, David. Europe Since Napoleon, 2nd edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962.

O-4

9/23/08

3:58 PM

Page 90

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

Page 91

5 The Emergence of the Nation-State in the East

AS WE HAVE shown, liberals accepted the monarchical form of the state provided that the monarch was limited by a constitution concentrating politico-military power in an elected legislature that represented the people. Gradually, the legitimacy of monarchy itself was questioned by radical liberals who favored a form of the state having as executive not a monarch but an elected president. These radical liberals, or republicans, also favored democratization of the state by expanding the franchise beyond property owners and taxpayers in order to strengthen the relationship between the state and its people. In the words of one historian, the vote was often endowed, by enthusiastic radicals and frightened conservatives alike, with a magic power. Too many radicals expected universal suffrage to bring the millennium—to sweep away before it the last relics of feudalism, of aristocratic and plutocratic privilege, of popular squalor and ignorance. Too many conservatives and moderate liberals took the radicals at their word and feared that democracy would demolish monarchy, church, religion, public order, and all that they cherished.1

Therefore, from the middle of the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century, the states of western Europe became more and more democratic. Legislatures were strengthened and gained control over the exercise of politico-military power. The franchise was widened to include more and more segments of the population of the state in order to satisfy the “belief in the need, desirability or sometimes simple inevitability of a greater measure of popular participation in public life.”2 Popular participation advanced in different ways across Europe depending upon the form of monarchical state that existed. Britain democratized gradually and peacefully because liberals were able to take advantage of the fact that Parliament had emerged over the previous centuries as the winner in the “constitutional” struggle between itself and the crown over which was to 91

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

92

Page 92

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

be supreme. After Parliament had achieved supremacy over the British state, it was relatively easy for liberals and others to democratize it. On the European continent, however, on account of deeply entrenched absolutism, centralized state apparatuses capable of raising and sustaining large armies, weak or nonexistent parliaments, as well as linguistic and cultural fragmentation, democratization proceeded in fits and starts and was accompanied by much violence within and among states. The spread of democratic nationalism from France across the continent was a major cause of European wars beginning with the wars of the French Revolution and ending with World War I. In effect, the “long nineteenth century,” which began with the French Revolution (1789) and ended with World War I (1914–1918), was the twilight of absolute monarchy and dynastic imperialism. During this period, sultans, emperors, and kings were reduced to impotence and popularly elected parliaments and presidents were empowered. “Democracy came into vogue and nationalism appeared to be its natural ally,”3 but at an enormous cost in human lives, as we will see.

■ Eliminating Europe’s Multiethnic Dynastic Empires Although democratic nationalism had become the driving force behind politico-military change in Europe during the nineteenth century, at the dawn of the twentieth century, it was not yet clear that the nation-state was to be the dominant type of rule in Europe, or on planet earth for that matter. Nation-states were a comparatively new political formation. Imperialism was still a powerful force. At the turn of the twentieth century, Europe’s multiethnic dynastic empires, although weakened by nationalism, were still intact. Moreover, certain of the nation-states of western Europe had amassed and held vast colonial empires outside of Europe, in the Americas, Asia, and Africa. Europe, in effect, had entered a phase in which national as well as imperial politico-military rule existed side by side on the continent. In fact, from the point of view of the rulers of Europe’s multiethnic empires, the nation-state “was an anachronism in the modern world, since economic progress seemed to require states to be organized into much larger units. Modern life, therefore, required some kind of political structure which did not deny national feelings but did not give in to them completely.” 4 The multiethnic, dynastic empire seemed to fulfill this need. As we saw in the previous chapter, Germany was not unified until 1871. In order to gain time for the consolidation of rule within the newly unified state, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck sought alliances with Russia and Austria-Hungary in order to protect imperial Germany against France, its traditional enemy since the Napoleonic era.

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

Page 93

THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE EAST

93

In 1879, Bismarck concluded a defensive alliance between Germany and Austria, which brought in Italy, in 1882, called the Triple Alliance, designed to protect the three partners against Russia or France, or both. This action pushed France and Russia into a defensive alliance, called the Dual Alliance, in 1890. At the close of the nineteenth century, Europe was divided into two opposing alliance systems, while Britain, which regarded the difference between the alliances as purely a continental matter, stayed aloof. Nationalist sentiments were especially intense in the Austrian and Ottoman empires. In 1908 the Austrians annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, which outraged the Serbs, who saw these provinces as their own territory. In 1909, Albanians claimed autonomy from the Ottoman Empire, which the Young Turks—Turkish exiles in France, Switzerland, and England who hoped to transform the Ottoman Empire intact into a liberal national state— unsuccessfully attempted to suppress by force. Harsh rule by the Young Turks aggravated the Montenegrins, Serbians, Greeks, and Bulgarians, who, in 1912, went to war against the Ottoman Empire. This military action, known as the First Balkan War, ended in 1913, and the Ottomans agreed to surrender all their possessions in the Balkan peninsula. The victors could not peacefully decide among themselves how to partition their conquest, however, which sparked a second war among them in which the Greeks and the Serbians became allies against the Bulgarians. Romania entered the war on the side of the Greeks and Serbians, and Bulgaria was quickly defeated. In 1913 a treaty was signed among the belligerents that divided Macedonia among them without regard to Bulgarian claims. Being on the winning side in the first and second Balkan war emboldened the Serbs against the Austrian Empire, which was occupying its territory (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and supporting Albanian independence, which would block Serbian access to the Adriatic Sea. On June 28, 1914, a young Bosnian Serb terrorist, Gavrilo Princip, assassinated Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian imperial throne, and his wife, who were paying an official visit to Sarajevo to show support for Austria’s annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to frustrate Serbian designs on these territories. Because it was believed by the Austrians (but never proven) that Princip’s act of regicide was instigated by Serbs, the Serbian government was sent “a humiliating ultimatum . . . which demanded action against South Slav terrorism amounting to intervention in Serbia’s internal government.”5 Although the Serbian reply was conciliatory, it was rejected by the Austrians, who declared war on Serbia on July 28, ostensibly to revenge the murder of their archduke. The real purpose of the war was to punish Serbian nationalists, however. In this effort the Austrians were supported by the Germans. Russia, which had been greatly concerned about the appointment of a German general to command the Ottoman army and about the presence

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

94

Page 94

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

ICELAND

FINLAND

NORWAY

SWEDEN

DENMARK

RUSSIAN EMPIRE

GREAT BRITAIN

NETHERLANDS

GERMANY BELGIUM

POLAND

LUX.

ATLANTIC OCEAN

UKRAINE FRANCE SWITZERLAND

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE

ITALY

ROMANIA SERBIA BOSNIA

PORTUGAL

MONT.

BULGARIA

SPAIN ALBANIA GREECE

OTTOMAN EMPIRE

CYPRUS

Europe on the Eve of World War I

of a German military mission in Istanbul, mobilized their army and declared support for the Serbians. As mobilization signified an intent to make war, Germany mobilized its army on July 31 and declared war on Russia, which had already sent troops toward Austria and Germany. Germany asked France for a declaration of neutrality, which was refused. On August 1, Germany declared war on France. On August 2, German armies crossed neutral Belgium in order to invade France, which they hoped to defeat swiftly before taking on the Russians. The German violation of Belgian

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

Page 95

THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE EAST

95

neutrality moved the British to declare war on Germany on August 5. On the following day the Austrian Empire declared war on Russia. The British and French declared war on the Austrians on August 12. It was thus within ten days of its issuance that the ultimatum sent to Serbia by the Austrians plunged Europe into a war that historians now identify as the outbreak of fighting in a thirty-year-long civil war that was marked by two major wars: World War I (1914–1918) and World War II (1939–1945). World War I had different consequences in western and eastern Europe, however. According to one historian, when war came to Europe, Bretons did not turn on Gascons, nor did Walloons and Flemings fight one another. Scotsmen, Welshmen, Englishmen and many Irishmen fought alongside one another without serious ill-feeling. Only in Ireland did World War I usher in a civil war and even that was not as bloody a conflict as it is sometime assumed. In Eastern Europe, by contrast, it was understood early on that war spelt the dissolution of the old order of multi-ethnic empires and ethnically mixed communities.6

It was assumed by many that World War I would be over within months of its start because German armies rapidly marched through Belgium and arrived on the outskirts of Paris within a month. However, the Germans were stopped and beaten back by the French and had to retreat to the Aisne River, where they dug in. The French dug in opposite the Germans, and a zigzagging line of trenches was dug stretching for 600 miles from the sea at Nieuport in Belgium to the Alps on the German-Swiss border. Despite attempts to break through these lines by both sides with massive offensives, the battlefront remained substantially unchanged until the war ended in 1918. On the eastern front, the fighting—between German and Austrian armies, on one side, and Russian armies, on the other—was much more fluid, however. Able to push the Russians back, the Germans drove deep into Russia. The monarchy was blamed for Russia’s defeats and, in March 1917, food riots among civilians, followed by a mutiny among soldiers and sailors in Petrograd, forced the tsar to abdicate on March 15, 1917. The monarchy was initially replaced with a provisional government composed of a coalition of urban, middle-class constitutional democrats and socialists who pledged to keep Russia in the war against Germany. In November 1917, however, the provisional government under the prime ministership of the moderate socialist Alexander Kerensky was overthrown by radical socialists known as Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Lenin, in what has come to be called the October Revolution. The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, from which the moderate socialists bolted, approved the new government headed by Lenin, Leon Trotsky, and Joseph Stalin. In addition to reorganizing Russian social and economic life along collectivist

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

96

Page 96

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

lines, the Bolsheviks resolved to take Russia out of the war, which they did by signing a peace treaty with Germany at Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. In addition to ending Russian involvement in the war, this treaty ceded to the Germans control over vast Russian territory in the west, including Finland, the Baltic provinces (Estonia, Livonia, Courland), Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine—all part of the Russian Empire since the conquests of Peter the Great. The Ottoman Empire had entered the war in November 1914 on the side of the German and Austrian empires, which brought about the realization of a long-held policy of the Germans: the creation of a compact “Mitteleuropa” extending from the North Sea to the Dardanelles. The Allies, Britain and France, counterattacked from the Persian Gulf and from the Isthmus of Suez through Palestine to safeguard oil supplies from Persia. Despite constant difficulties, the Allies succeeded in decisive victories over Ottoman armies and the empire collapsed in 1918. The additional military power provided by the United States’s entry into the war on the side of the Allies made it possible for British and French armies, reinforced by American units, to break the stalemate and push the Germans out of France and Belgium. The retreat of the Germans precipitated the collapse of the Austrian Empire and the declaration of independence of its various national groups. In November 1918, Germany sued for peace, after which an uprising of Social Democrats in Berlin forced the kaiser off the throne (he fled to the Netherlands) and proclaimed Germany a republic. On November 11, 1918, an armistice was negotiated between the Allies and the Central Powers that brought the first phase of Europe’s thirty-year-long civil war to an end.

■ Replacing Imperial States with Nation-States On January 18, 1919, a conference to arrange the peace was convoked in Paris, to which thirty-two states sent representatives. Its proceedings were dominated by the major states of the alliance (the Council of Four: United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy). Neither Soviet Russia nor the defeated German Empire was in attendance. The most powerful state of the Council was the United States. In the eyes of US president Woodrow Wilson, the war had been fought by the Allies to make the world “safe for democracy” and to further the self-determination of the small nations of Europe, which he had enunciated in his famous “Fourteen Points” in January 1918. The Fourteen Points contained specific proposals for achieving international justice by creating a European states system composed of liberal nation-states. Nine of Wilson’s points specified the territorial changes that needed to be made “pursuant to the principle of self-determi-

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

Page 97

THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE EAST

97

nation” to achieve a stable postwar settlement by redrawing European frontiers to make national and state boundaries coincide.7 These territorial changes were incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles, signed in June 1919, which declared Germany as solely responsible for the war, and meted out harsh penalties to the Germans. Germany had to surrender Alsace and Lorraine to France and, in the east, give Posen, East Prussia, and Upper Silesia to the resuscitated Polish state. Belgium received Eupen and Malmédy, and Memel was given to Lithuania. The port city of Danzig was established as a free city. The coal mines of the Saar region along the French border were given to France as compensation for French mines destroyed in the war. German colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific were parceled out to the victors as mandated territories, which gave the victors through the League of Nations the right of supervision over them. A major objective of the treaty was to weaken the politico-military power of the German state and democratize it. To these ends, Germany was made into a democratic republic (the Weimar Republic); forced to reduce its army to an all-volunteer force of 100,000 lightly armed troops (with no heavy artillery, tanks, or military aviation); demilitarize the Rhineland; and destroy the military harbor at Helgoland. In addition, Germany was required to pay the victors an immense sum of money (20,000,000,000 marks) to indemnify them for war costs. Finally, the area west of the Rhine was occupied by Allied armed forces, the cost of which was borne by Germany. Additional peace treaties were drawn up to deal with the other belligerents of the war. These treaties established the sovereignty and independence of the new states established on the ruins of the Austrian, Russian, and Ottoman empires. The Austrian Empire was reduced to a small republic of German nationality (Austria), disarmed, and required to pay war reparations. Austria was required to recognize the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Poland, as well as cede territory to Italy. Bulgaria was obliged to accept military control, pay an indemnity, restrict its army to 20,000 troops, and cede territory to Serbia. Hungary became an independent republic, its army limited to 35,000 troops, and territory was ceded to Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Serbia, which shrank Hungary to one-third its prewar size. The Ottoman Empire was abolished and its territory occupied. Britain took Mesopotamia and Palestine, France took Syria and southeastern Anatolia, and Italy received southwestern Anatolia. Nationalism within the Russian Empire resulted in the new states of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland proclaiming their independence when the tsar abdicated in 1917. Finland became independent as a republic with an elected president and a single-chambered legislature elected by universal male and female suffrage. Estonia and Latvia also became independent as democratic republics, as did Lithuania. Poland, the largest of these states, was not a new state per se. It had existed as a monarchy before

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

98

Page 98

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

its partition by Russia, Prussia, and Austria and disappeared from the map of Europe. When it reappeared after World War I, it did so as a democratic republic and with boundaries drawn by the delegates at the Paris peace conference. As was mentioned above, Poland was given two regions of Germany, Upper Silesia and a narrow tongue of land along the lower Vistula River—the “Polish Corridor”—that gave Poland access to the Baltic Sea. The port city of Danzig at the mouth of the Vistula, which was German in population, was made a free city-state within a Polish customs union. The Polish Corridor separated the German-speaking population of East Prussia from Germany proper. The revived Polish state immediately went to war with Russia in 1920 in order to incorporate a broad swath of territory to the east into the resuscitated Polish state. The Treaty of Riga, which terminated this conflict, added substantial populations of Russians, Ukrainians, and Ruthenians to Poland. Thus, Poland reappeared not as a pure Polish nation-state, but a state containing large non-Polish minorities that, in addition to Russians, Ukrainians, and Ruthenians, included a large population of unassimilated Jews, who composed a big percentage of the urban merchant class. Czechoslovakia—which was put together by amalgamating the Austrian provinces of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia and the Hungarian provinces of Slovakia and Ruthenia—was designed by the Allies at Versailles to take away as much territory as possible from Austria and Hungary. From its creation, the deep divisions between Czechs and Slovaks that were to bring about the “Velvet Divorce” in 1991 were present. The part of the state that brought together the Czechs was more industrial and wealthier; while the part carved out of Hungary for the Slovaks was agricultural and poorer. The ethnic situation was complicated by the presence of some three million Germans living in the northwestern districts of the country on the border with Germany called the Sudetenland. Application of the principle of self-determination to the formation of the Hungarian Republic resulted in its losing Slovakia to Czechoslovakia, Croatia to Yugoslavia, Transylvania to Romania, and Burgenland to Austria, which thereby reduced the population of the state to less than one-third its prewar size. While Hungary was made almost purely Hungarian, some three million Hungarians remained in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania. The Versailles treaty gave the Romanian Republic Transylvania, Bukovina, and part of the Banat from the Austrian Empire and Bessarabia from the Russian Empire. Although Romanians formed a compact core of the Romanian state, it contained numerous Hungarians, Ukrainians, Germans, Bulgarians, and Jews, which created an ethnic minority problem similar to that of Poland. During World War I, southern Slav ethnic groups worked to bring themselves together after the war into a union. At the Paris peace confer-

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

Page 99

THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE EAST

99

ence, the alliance took Croatia, Batchka, and Banat from Hungary; took Carniola and Dalmatia from Austria; combined Bosnia and Herzegovina, which belonged to both Austria and Hungary; and brought all these together with Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia to form Yugoslavia (the land of the southern Slavs), officially designated as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croatians, and Slovenes. Because the Serbians were the largest of these nationalities, they were able to gain control over the government in Belgrade, the traditional capital of Serbia. The peace settlement after World War I reduced the size of the Kingdom of Bulgaria by giving certain of its western districts to Yugoslavia, its Aegean coast to Greece, making it a Black Sea state. A significant population of Bulgars remained in neighboring states; Macedonia and Romania, on the Dobruja plateau, had they been left to their own devices, would have incorporated themselves into the Kingdom of Bulgaria, a constitutional monarchy. For having finally joined the Allies toward the end of the war, ardent Greek nationalists at the Paris peace conference demanded control over all Greek territory not yet incorporated into the kingdom. Hence, Greece gained from Bulgaria the Aegean coast and from Turkey the whole of eastern Thrace and a salient in western Anatolia centered on the city of Smyrna, where there lived a substantial Greek population. A Greek army, encouraged by the Allies, entered Anatolia in 1922 to eject Turks from this area. The Greeks were defeated by a Turkish army led by Mustafa Kemal, later known as Ataturk, the father of the modern Turkish state. Greeks were ejected from Smyrna, and Anatolia became solidly Turkish. In 1924 the king of Greece, whose Danish family had occupied the throne since 1863, was deposed and a republic proclaimed. During World War I the British and the French agreed (Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1916) to partition the non-Turkish Arab portions of the Ottoman Empire (the provinces of Arabia, Syria, and Mesopotamia) between themselves. After the war the vast Arabian Peninsula was established as an independent Arab kingdom and Hussein, the sharif of Mecca, was installed as monarch. In 1919, after additional negotiations, it was decided that France should receive northern Syria, and Britain Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq, to be administered under the League of Nations mandate system. It was also agreed in the Balfour Declaration (1917) to establish a national state in Palestine for the Jewish people. France, Britain, and Italy agreed to occupy Anatolia and partition it among themselves as agreed in the Treaty of Sèvres, which was signed by a representative of the sultan in August 1920. Turkish nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal quickly reorganized themselves after the war and assembled a national congress at Ankara, where they claimed for the Turkish people the right of self-determination in the predominantly Turkish area of the

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

100

Page 100

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

defeated Ottoman Empire, even if given by the Allies to other states to administer. After the Greek defeat at Smyrna, Turkish nationalists met with representatives of the Allies to negotiate a new treaty for Turkey. These negotiations produced the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which recognized the Turks as a distinct nationality with an unqualified right to Anatolia and the city of Constantinople, thereafter renamed Istanbul. Territory on the European side of the Bosporus was given to the new Turkish state in order to provide a Turkish hinterland for Istanbul. Once the new Turkish state had been recognized, the nationalists deposed the sultan, proclaimed Turkey to be a republic, and moved the capital from Istanbul to Ankara in central Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal (Kemal Ataturk) was elected president of the Turkish Republic and instituted a vigorous program aimed at transforming Turkey into a European-style nationstate. A national assembly and local councils elected by universal suffrage were established. Islam was disestablished and all former religious, military, and civic titles were abolished. In sum, the main consequence of the post–World War I reconfiguration of the map of Europe was a universal strengthening of nationalist ideals and national institutions. Older nations, like Britain and France, emerged from the ordeal victorious only because they sacrificed so much in the cause of national defense and survival. Germany even more forcibly pointed the way toward a form of state capitalism, the regimentation of national resources, capital and labor alike, in the cause of state power. The new states of the Baltic and eastern march lands, whether rivals like Poland, augmentations like Yugoslavia, or new creations like Czechoslovakia, enjoyed separate existence as nationstates. Russia and Turkey, in different ways, embarked upon great new experiments in the social and economic reorganization of the whole community by single-party dictatorships. Everywhere, war gave impetus to the growth of the nation-state, which was also a monolithic state, claiming an allegiance and competence superior to every other human group.8

■ Aligning Nations and States After World War I it seemed that the democratic nation-state was the normal and natural form of politico-military rule for Europe. The evolutionary success of this form of the state had been demonstrated by the fact that the multiethnic dynastic empires had been defeated by an alliance of democratic nation-states and were replaced by a “belt of democracies—stretching from the Baltic Sea down through Germany and Poland to the Balkans— equipped with new constitutions drawn up according to the most up-to-date liberal principles.”9 This optimism was premature, however. The instability of the postwar

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

Page 101

THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE EAST

101

period placed great stress on parliamentary institutions, which the weakest could not withstand. The Depression, brought on by the Wall Street Crash of 1929, and continued ethnic strife created a demand among some Europeans for stronger government than liberalism, with its multiplicity of political parties and cumbersome parliamentary procedures, could provide. Consequently, “an increasing proportion of the citizenry of postwar Europe came to question the efficacy of liberalism and to seek salvation in dictatorships . . . especially . . . [in] countries where the parliamentary system had failed to sink deep roots before World War I, or where it had only come into being since the war.”10 Continuing ethnic strife, or what came to be known as the “national question,” was a major factor in the rise of antiliberal states. As we saw above, the Paris peace settlement attempted to redraw the map of Europe pursuant to the principle of national self-determination. However, European history and geography made a complete reconfiguration of state boundaries according to the Wilsonian ideal of national self-determination impossible to achieve. Consequently, many of the newly created states were just as ethnically heterogeneous as the old dynastic empires they replaced; further, the more or less ethnically homogeneous states still had large numbers of their ethnic group living in adjacent states, known as irredenta (unredeemed ones). In the words of one historian, in the new Czechoslovakia, for example, 51 per cent of the population were Czechs, 16 per cent Slovaks, 22 per cent Germans, 5 per cent Hungarians and 4 per cent Ukrainian. In Poland around 14 per cent of the population was Ukrainians, 9 per cent Jews, 5 per cent Byelorussians, and more than 2 per cent Germans. [In Romania] . . . nearly one in three inhabitants of the country was not Romanian at all: 8 per cent were Hungarians, 4 per cent Germans, 3 per cent Ukrainians—in all there were eighteen ethnic minorities recorded in the 1930 census. . . . Yugoslavia was an uneasy amalgam not just of Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes, but also of Albanians, Bosnian Muslims, Montenegrins, Macedonians, and Turks—not to mention Czechs, Germans, Gypsies, Hungarians, Italians, Jews, Romanians, Russians, Slovaks, and Ukrainians. Bulgaria and Hungary both retained sizeable minorities—accounting for, respectively, 19 and 13 per cent of their populations.11

Thus, most of the new states created by the Allies after World War I were “nationalizing states,” that is, states that were destined to be the “state of a particular nation, but not yet in fact a nation-state (at least not to a sufficient degree).”12 In such states strong pressure arose within the majority nationality to create ethnically homogeneous states “by promoting the language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing, or political hegemony of the nominally state-bearing nation.”13 In response to this pressure, the minority populations began to believe that they would survive as a

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

102

Page 102

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

distinct people only if they exercised their right of self-determination and were given states of their own. At the same time, the pressure to create ethnically pure national states also led to the majority nationality in the ethnically homogeneous states, which had irredenta in adjacent states, to demand the incorporation of these populations within their state no matter where they lived. Therefore, in the first years of the 1920s, extreme nationalists, embittered by the failure of the Versailles settlement to satisfactorily redraw the map of Europe in order to make nationality and state boundaries align as completely as possible, arose in various states of Europe. These extremists came to be called fascists, because the first such party appeared in Italy and chose for its emblem the fasces, a bundle of rods surrounding a projecting ax head carried by lectors in ancient Rome that symbolized the power of the Roman state. Intensely nationalistic, fascist parties sought to create ethnically (and racially) pure nation-states by revising the Versailles settlement so as to alter the ethnic makeup of the population inside the state. In effect, the fascists rejected the universalistic values of liberalism and the settlement the Allies imposed on Europe after World War I, which was predicated on the Wilsonian dream of the equality of all nation-states and reflected in the creation of the League of Nations. Rather, fascists believed that some peoples were naturally superior to others and that European interstate relations constituted a struggle between “superior” and “inferior” peoples, which the former could win only if they created strong, ethnically homogeneous, racially exclusive, politically unified nation-states capable of conquering and/or hegemonizing the latter. Therefore, they sought to overturn the post–World War I settlement and replace it with a “New Order,” organized according to the fascist hierarchical principle of nation-state particularity and superiority/inferiority. One of Europe’s nationalizing states where extreme nationalists had come to power after World War I—Germany—attempted to realize and complete its nation by extending the state in order to bring within it those of the dominant nationality, Germans, living outside in neighboring states. In this way, Germany aimed to create a New Order in Europe based on the “natural” superiority/inferiority of its peoples, each nation with a state of its own. On November 5, 1937, Adolf Hitler, who had been made chancellor of Germany in 1933, held a conference with his principal advisers during which he made clear that his main objective as chancellor would be to acquire a larger living space (Lebensraum) for the 85 million people of Europe who made up the German nation, of which only 66 million then lived within the German state. Germans living outside the state were to be consolidated by annexing the nearly 7 million Germans of Austria and the 3.5 million Germans of the Sudeten territory of western Czechoslovakia. According to one historian, “when Hitler pressed for self-determination on

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

Page 103

THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE EAST

103

behalf of ethnic Germans who were not living under German rule—first in the Saarland, then in the Rhineland, Austria, the Sudetenland and Danzig . . . he was making a . . . demand which implied territorial claims extending far beyond the river Vistula in Poland. Hitler wanted not merely Greater Germany; he wanted the Greatest Possible Germany.”14 There existed in Austria a Nazi party that favored Anschluss, or union, with Germany, which Hitler had aided and abetted in its violent activities against the Austrian government. The establishment of the Dollfuss dictatorship and the banning of all political parties resulted in the Nazi Party uprising and his assassination. The new chancellor, Kurt von Schuschnigg, continued his predecessor’s dictatorial policies and sought to maintain Austria’s sovereignty by signing an agreement with Hitler that promised Austrian cooperation in exchange for Austrian independence. In 1938, Hitler demanded that Schuschnigg include Nazis in his cabinet. Schuschnigg refused and called a plebiscite on the question of national independence. Hitler demanded that the plebiscite be canceled, and Schuschnigg resigned as chancellor and handed over his office to the proNazi Arthur Seyss-Inquart, who immediately appealed for German troops to restore order. According to one historian, on March 12, 1938, “German troops marched in. They occupied Vienna and moved on to Brenner, where they exchanged formal greetings with Italian troops. Hitler drove to Braunau, his birthplace, and visited his parents’ graves, through streets bedecked with swastikas and crowded with yelling enthusiasts. By March 13, the coup was complete, the union of Austria with Germany was announced, and Seyss-Inquart became governor of the new Ostmark.”15 Thus, Austria ceased to exist as a sovereign state. It became economically and administratively part of the German Reich. Its army was incorporated into the German army; “undesirables,” defined as, among others, Jews, Freemasons, liberals, socialists, and communists, were purged; and Schuschnigg was imprisoned. The ease with which Hitler had annexed Austria emboldened him to take the next step in his plan to incorporate all Germans within a greater German state, the annexation of the Germanspeaking Sudetens. As we saw above, Czechoslovakia emerged from World War I with a serious nationalities problem. Its fifteen million inhabitants comprised Czechs, Germans, Hungarians, and Ruthenians, a people closely related to Ukranians. 16 The Germans, who lived in the Sudetenland bordering Germany, had dominated Bohemia during the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but found themselves under Czech rule after the war, which they resented. Many Sudeten Germans wanted their region annexed to Germany. At the same time, Czechoslovakia’s Hungarians wanted to be annexed by Hungary, and the Slovaks wanted autonomy. Hitler’s plan to annex the Sudeten Germans included eliminating the

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

Page 104

104

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

ICELAND (DENMARK)

FINLAND

NORWAY

SWEDEN

SOVIET UNION

ESTONIA SCOTLAND LATVIA DENMARK LITHUANIA

GREAT BRITAIN

PRUSSIA IRELAND WALES ENGLAND

NETHERLANDS POLAND GERMANY BELGIUM LUX.

ATLANTIC OCEAN

SLOVAKIA MOLDOVA

FRANCE HUNGARY

SWITZERLAND

ITALY

ROMANIA YUGOSLAVIA

PORTUGAL BULGARIA CORSICA SPAIN ALBANIA (ITALY)

SARDINIA

TURKEY GREECE

BALEARICS

SICILY ALGERIA

TUNIS CYPRUS CYPRUS (GB)

MOROCCO MALTA (GB)

(FRANCE)

LIBYA (ITALY)

EGYPT (GB)

Europe on the Eve of World War II

Czech state, which had a large, well-equipped army and was backed by mutual-assistance treaties with Soviet Russia and France that promised immediate assistance in case one or the other were attacked by a third state. While it did not have a treaty with the Czechoslovakian republic, Britain

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

Page 105

THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE EAST

105

pledged to support the Czechs according to the terms of Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant. Fearing that collective action to assist the Czechs against the Germans would provoke Hitler, Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister, followed a policy of appeasement. In order to avoid a German invasion of Czechoslovakia and war, Chamberlain proposed a four-power conference in Munich to find a solution to the Czechoslovak crisis. The conference in Munich resulted in an agreement—signed on September 30, 1938, by Chamberlain; Hitler; Edouard Daladier, prime minister of France; and Benito Mussolini, prime minister of Italy—that divided the Sudetenland into five zones the Germany army was to occupy progressively between October 1 and 10. The Czechoslovakian government had no recourse but to accept this agreement, which resulted in the dismemberment of the Czechoslovakian state. The Sudetenland became part of greater Germany. Taking advantage of Czech humiliation, Poland seized the rich Silesian mining district of Teschen that had been given to Czechoslovakia by the Allies per the Versailles settlement, and Hungary obtained by negotiation a sizable strip of southern Slovakia. By the end of November, Czechoslovakia had lost one-third of its population and two-fifths of its territory. In 1939, Hitler encouraged the autonomist movements in the provinces of Slovakia and Ruthenia to break with the Czech state. He called the Czech president to Germany on March 15 and compelled him to sign a treaty that made what was left of the Czechoslovakian republic a German protectorate. Slovakia became a nominally independent state. Hungary occupied Ruthenia.17 Having expanded the German state to include the Germans of Austria and the Sudetenland, Hitler, after signing a treaty of nonaggression with the Soviet Union in August 1939, turned his attention to Poland. On March 21, he told the Polish government that Poland’s German minority needed to be given better treatment and that Germany must have access across the Polish Corridor that separated East Prussia from Germany and contained the Free City of Danzig, which he wanted to incorporate into the Third Reich on the grounds that its population was German. Poland refused. Hitler denounced Poland for refusing Germany’s demand and, on September 1, 1939, invaded Poland without warning. In response, Britain and France declared war on Germany. Thus began the second outbreak of fighting in the European civil war that had begun twenty-five years earlier.

■ Continuing the Alignment of Nations and States At the end of World War II, unlike the events following World War I, there was no large gathering of the Allies, during which the terms of peace could

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

106

Page 106

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

be negotiated. Instead, in preparation for the end of the war, the leaders of the “Big Three” Allies, (the United States, Britain, and the USSR) met in February 1945 at Yalta, in the Crimea, and later in Potsdam, near Berlin, where they agreed among themselves on the configuration of Europe after the war. At Yalta the Big Three agreed to policies concerning the liberation of central Europe from fascism, the creation of a world organization (the United Nations) to succeed the League of Nations, and territorial changes in the Far East. At Potsdam they dictated the postwar settlement, the most important part of which affected Germany. In order to ensure that Germany would never again be a military threat to its European neighbors, militarism and Nazism were suppressed. Munitions factories were taken over by the Allies. Laws based on discrimination on account of race, religion, or political views were repealed. The Nazi Party was outlawed, and Nazi officials were dismissed. Those charged with having committed war crimes were arrested and tried by an international court. The German economy, especially the Ruhr coal and steel industries, was to be controlled by the Allies. Reparations, in the form of capital equipment, such as machinery—not money as after World War I—were to be made. Finally, the Big Three truncated the greater German state created by Hitler. Austria was separated and given back its sovereignty. Poland was given German territory west of East Prussia up to the Oder and Neisse rivers in compensation for Polish territory given to the Soviet Union in the east. The rest of Germany was divided into four zones of occupation (American, British, French, and Russian) and the capital, Berlin, which was inside the Soviet zone, was also divided into four zones of occupation. The entire German state was placed under the direct supervision of the InterAllied Control Commission, composed of American, British, French, and Russian military officers. During 1947, separate peace treaties were negotiated between Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union and the Axis Powers, that is, the states that had been allies of Germany during the war. The treaties with Italy deprived the Italian state of all territory acquired since 1870. Trieste was made a “free city” under United Nations protection. Treaties with Romania gave Bessarabia to the Soviet Union and southern Dobruja to Bulgaria; with Hungary gave a part of Transylvania to Romania; and with Finland ceded to the Soviet Union Petsamo and areas of the Karelian Isthmus, including the city of Vyborg. In addition, all defeated states were required to pay war reparations and accept limitations on the size and composition of their armed forces.18 Thus, when compared with the border adjustments made at the end of World War I, those made after World War II were minimal, with the exception of those for Poland. Nonetheless, the coincidence between nations and

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

Page 107

THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE EAST

107

states was much greater at the end of World War II, not because of border adjustment but, rather, because “close to ninety million people were either killed or displaced in Europe between the years 1939 and 1948.”19 During these years the extermination, deportation, flight, evacuation, and resettlement of millions of people had the effect of ethnically homogenizing the states that had been created after World War I. According to one historian, Romania still had a sizeable Hungarian minority in Transylvania and uncounted numbers—millions—of gypsies. But Poland, whose population was just 68 percent Polish in 1938, was overwhelmingly populated by Poles in 1946. Germany was nearly all German . . . Czechoslovakia, whose population before Munich was 22 percent German, 5 percent Hungarian, 3 percent Carpathian Ukrainian, and 1.5 percent Jewish, was now almost exclusively Czech and Slovak. . . . The ancient diasporas of Europe—Greeks and Turks in the south Balkans and around the Black Sea, Italians in Dalmatia, Hungarians in Transylvania and the north Balkans, Poles in Volhynia (Ukraine), Lithuania and Bukovina, Germans from the Baltic to the Black Sea, from the Rhine to the Volga, and Jews everywhere—shriveled and disappeared.20

Nonetheless, the national question still remained in the Soviet Union, which continued after the war as a multinational empire, and in Yugoslavia, which, despite much intercommunal fighting during the war, retained its multiethnic complexity. These underlying realities were obscured by the Cold War (1946–1989), since it deflected attention away from nationality to ideology, and pitted the states of the west (multiparty liberal democracies) against the states of the east (single-party people’s democracies). It was, however, “not just academics who were taken by surprise; so were policy makers and intellectuals”21 when the nationality question pushed to the surface despite decades of communist rule in these states. As we saw above, the provisional government of Russia under Alexander Kerensky was overthrown by the Bolsheviks in October 1917. Radical socialists (communists), the Bolsheviks had been influenced by the theories of Karl Marx (1818–1883), a German philosopher, economist, journalist, and political activist, who argued that modern capitalism and the changes it brought meant that people, specifically the working class or proletariat, were forced to live lives of great uncertainty, constant change, and extreme exploitation by the owners of capital. For Marx, the agent of historical change was “class conflict,” and he argued that the form that politicomilitary rule took in a state was a reflection of the particular class holding power during a particular historical epoch. During the Middle Ages the “feudal state” reflected the power of the landowning aristocracy. During the modern period the nation-state reflected the power of the owners of industrial capital. That is, the military and police power of the nation-state maintained the social order by keeping the proletariat subordinate to the capital-

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

108

Page 108

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

ist owning class, or the burghers. Nationalism, for Marx, was a form of “false consciousness” that led people to believe their state was a manifestation of a unified people among whom class differences and conflict were superficial. Consequently, when the Bolsheviks came to power, they sought to solve the national question by reconstituting the Russian Empire as an “unnational” state, that is, one based on the philosophical tenets of Marxism, which viewed nationalism as a secondary “personal attribute.” 22 The Bolsheviks assumed that nationalism would disappear as the capitalist owning class was replaced by the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” The Russian state, controlled by the working class, would be “supra-nationalist” and would align itself with the working class of all states to create a worldwide anticapitalist revolution. Notwithstanding their commitment to an un-national state, the Bolsheviks had to contend with the ethnic complexity of the collapsed Russian Empire when constructing a new state on its ruins. This was done in three ways. First, they condemned the historical oppression of the smaller “nationalities” composing the empire by the larger Russian “nationality.” Second, they proclaimed the sovereignty of all nationalities within the old Russian Empire. Third, they recognized the right of the nationalities to selfdetermination, including the right to secede from the new state, should they wish to do so. Therefore, the first constitution promulgated by the Bolsheviks on July 10, 1918, granted autonomy and self-determination to geographical regions defined by distinct ethnic characteristics. The constitution created a People’s Commissariat for Nationalities, composed of presidents and delegates from these regions.23 The resistance by monarchists, liberals, and moderate socialists who were opposed to the Bolshevik seizure of power, the establishment of independent governments along Russia’s frontiers (Lithuania, Moldavia, Ukraine, among others), the revolt of the Don Cossacks, and the declaration of the Republic of the Don, plunged Russia into a civil war that raged from 1918 to 1920. In the confusion of the civil war, Byelorussia, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland declared their independence from the Russian Empire. Gradually, the Red Army was able to establish friendly Soviet-style regimes in Ukraine (1920), Belarus (1920), Georgia (1921), Armenia (1921), and Azerbaijan (1921). In 1922, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan were combined into the Transcaucasian Socialist Soviet Republic and joined to the already existing Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which comprised Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. In 1925, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kirghizstan joined the USSR. Thus, by the end of 1922, a new Russian Socialist Federal Republic extended from the Baltic to the Bering Straits. It, along with the far smaller

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

Page 109

THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE EAST

109

Byelorussian, Ukrainian, Transcaucasian and Far Eastern republics, made up the new Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. Apart from the westward strip running from Helsinki down to Kishinev, remarkably little of the old Tsarist edifice had been lost. . . . In effect, then, one Russian empire had simply been replaced by another.24

However, there were some important differences between the old dynastic imperial state of the tsars and the new federation of Soviet republics of the Bolsheviks. First, the tsarist imperial state did not see itself as suitable for the entire globe and did not aspire to unify the whole world under its authority. The Bolsheviks considered their Marxist ideology to be universally valid and the socialist form of political, economic, and social life destined to be adopted everywhere on earth. Second, when compared with tsarist Russia, the new Bolshevik state was significantly smaller in size, having lost some of its European nationalities (Finns, Poles, Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians), who had formed independent states of their own. Consequently, the new Bolshevik state was more homogeneously Russian than was tsarist Russia. Third, the new state, unlike the old tsarist empire, was organized internally according to ethnic or linguistic criteria as a federation of equal national communities, each of which was granted the right to secede from the federation, should it desire to do so.25 In 1936 a new constitution was promulgated that theoretically concentrated politico-military power of the USSR in an elected All-Union Congress of Soviets, a vast body of over two thousand members that met every two years and that elected a bicameral Central Executive Committee made up of a Council of the Union and a Council of Nationalities. The Council of the Union represented the people of the USSR on a geographical basis and the Council of Nationalities represented the union and autonomous republics. The executive was vested in the Council of People’s Commissars, or cabinet, appointed by the Central Executive Committee.26 However, the unity of the new Soviet state came not from the constitution but from the institutional coherence and unity of the All-Union Communist Party, which set as its goal “the leadership of the proletariat, the toiling peasantry, and all toiling masses in the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat for the victory of socialism.”27 Theoretically, ultimate power and control of the Communist Party rested with periodic party congresses. In reality, power was vested in the Central Committee chosen at each party congress. The Central Committee, which was composed of no more than nineteen members, was itself organized into three executive groups: the Political Bureau, or Politburo; the Organization Bureau, or Orgburo; and the Secretariat. Of these, the most important was the Politburo because it was in this body that the important policies were decided. The Orgburo handled matters of party organization and the appointment of party members to major government positions, the nomenklatura.

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

110

Page 110

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

Thus, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was the institution that cemented the new federated Soviet state together, the centralizing force that counteracted the centrifugal nationalist forces contained within the federation. According to one historian, the Soviet Union was a “party state”—that is, a state in which the civilian organs of the Communist Party [exercised] control over the parallel institutions of the state. There was no branch of human activity which was not subordinated to the relevant department of the state. There was no branch of the state which was not governed by orders from the relevant ‘committee’ of the party. Whatever was going on, be it in the most august of ministries, or in the lowliest of local farms, factories, or football clubs, it could only be legal if organized by the state; and it could only be organized if approved by the Party. Party control over state institutions was exercised by an elaborate array of laws, levers, structures, and psychological taboos. Party control was enshrined in law. The only important clause of the Soviet Constitution was the one which proclaimed “the leading role” of the Party. This simple device ensured that all other clauses of the Constitution, and all other Soviet laws, were subject to the interpretation of the Party and its officials. By outside standards, they were not laws at all. The Party rulebook was a much more efficacious document than the Soviet Constitution. The nomenklatura system ensured that every appointment, from the State Presidency to the Chair of the village council, was exclusively filled by the Party’s nominees.28

Thus, the coherence of the Soviet multiethnic state depended upon the coherence of the CPSU, and its internal decisionmaking systems, known as democratic centralism, ensured that decisions of higher authority were carried out down the line. Party members were sworn to obedience and secrecy; they were trained to execute the wishes of their superiors without question. Debate was discouraged, and when it occurred, it was limited to discussions of means by which decisions made by higher authority could be most efficiently implemented. Therefore, in a very real sense, “the Soviet Union never really existed, except as a fascia for Party power . . . that is why, when the CPSU eventually collapsed, the USSR could not possibly exist without it.”29 The CPSU reached its greatest strength as a unifying force under its second and third general secretaries—Joseph Stalin, as ruthless an autocrat as Ivan the Terrible or Peter the Great and who occupied the post from 1927 until his death in 1953; and Nikita Khrushchev, who filled it from Stalin’s death until he was ousted by the Politburo in 1964, and who maintained the Soviet Empire, despite his denunciation of Stalin’s “Cult of Personality.” Under Khrushchev’s successor, Leonid Brezhnev—general secretary from 1968 until his death in 1983—the centralizing force of the CPSU began to weaken. Brezhnev, believing that the nationalities question had been solved,

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

Page 111

THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE EAST

111

began to let the party’s bosses in the fourteen non-Russian republics of the USSR run their republics without much interference and direction from Moscow. Under Brezhnev’s loose reins, the republics were gradually turned into national fiefdoms. Across the USSR the party’s bosses increasingly refused to carry out decisions made by the center. By the time Mikhail Gorbachev was elected general secretary in 1985, after the deaths of two of Brezhnev’s successors in rapid succession (first Yuri Andropov in 1984, then Konstantin Chernyenko in 1985), the party’s ability to hold the USSR together had all but disappeared. Gorbachev believed that a brighter future for the USSR could not be secured by continuing the arms race with the United States, which required vast sums of money to be diverted away from social programs to the development and production of a nuclear arsenal. Rather, he believed that the money needed to be spent solving the USSR’s serious economic and social problems. In 1987, Gorbachev set forth the strategy by which he hoped to solve these problems. The first step was to end the Cold War with the United States, which he proposed at a summit meeting with President Ronald Reagan at Reykjavík, Iceland, in December 1987. This was followed by the injection of some market principles into the economic management of the Soviet command economy, to which he gave the name perestroika, or “restructuring.” At the same time, he allowed open debate within the CPSU and between the CPSU and the public, which came to be called glasnost, which means “publicity” in Russian but was translated in the West as “openness.” Gorbachev’s reforms had the unintended consequence of reducing even more the ability of the CPSU to provide a strong centripetal counterweight against the growing centrifugal force of nationalism, which had been, since the founding of the multiethnic USSR, pushing outward against control from Moscow. Non-Russian nationalism remained a potent force despite the CPSU’s efforts to create an overriding nonnational identity within the broader USSR. From the time of Brezhnev’s accession to the secretary-generalship, the USSR had been gradually fragmenting into an ever-looser collection of republics within which nationalism was alive and well. More and more, the republics came to resemble autonomous nation-states with their own politics and concerns. Soviet officials in the republics increasingly became “national” politicians as the centrifugal authority of the CPSU weakened. In the words of one scholar, there “were ‘born again’ Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Georgians, and others. With the Moscow center gone, and where the societies and nations were particularly weak, these exCommunists became masters of their new countries without even pretending to share power.”30 The beginning of the end of the USSR as an imperial state began in the eastern and central European states, which the USSR had included in its

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

112

Page 112

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

orbit after World War II. In 1980 in Poland—the most anti-Russian of these so-called satellite states—there began a struggle between the Polish government and a spontaneously organized federation of trade unions in the Gdansk shipyards, called Solidarity and led by Lech Walesa (an electrician by training). Solidarity demanded that it be recognized as an independent trade union federation beyond the direct control of the Communist Party of Poland. After a period of confrontation, the Polish government agreed to Solidarity’s demands. This indication of weakness on the part of the government caused Brezhnev to mobilize forty Soviet Army divisions for an invasion of Poland in order to prop up the wavering government. To prevent a Russian invasion, the Polish military, under the command of General Wojciech Jaruzelski, effected a coup d’état on December 18, 1981, and took over the government. “[In] a few hours, 40,000–50,000 Solidarity activists were arrested; military commissars took over major institutions. Martial law [was declared]. In 1982, having introduced stability by force, Jaruzelski introduced the first stage of economic reform.”31 Economic reform was eventually followed by political reform. In 1989 the Polish government agreed to allow political parties other than the Communist Party to compete in elections for parliament scheduled for June. Solidarity, which had reorganized itself as a political party, resoundingly defeated the Communist Party and won a majority of seats in the parliament in that election. The government, led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was the first in Eastern Europe headed by a non-Communist official since 1945. Soon after, the Polish parliament denounced the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918) and condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968). In September 1989 a coalition government was formed that had a majority of its members from Solidarity. This government was the first noncommunist government in Eastern Europe since 1945. In December 1989 the People’s Republic of Poland became simply the Republic of Poland. Poland’s transition to democracy created awareness in the other states in Eastern Europe under Soviet domination that the USSR would not intervene to salvage Communist Party rule. Consequently, the other states of Eastern Europe began to act independently of Moscow. In August 1989 the Hungarian authorities allowed Germans from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to enter Hungary as tourists even though they knew that they were going to go to the embassy and consulates of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to seek asylum in the West. In September the Hungarians opened their border with Czechoslovakia and the Czechs followed the German example. Shortly, the trickle of asylum seekers became a flood. By November, calls for the reunification of Germany were raised, and antigovernment demonstrations broke out in East Berlin. On November 9, thousands of East Berliners massed at Checkpoint Charlie and began to pour into West Berlin as East German border guards stood aside. Soon after,

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

Page 113

THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE EAST

113

the government of the GDR demolished the Berlin Wall and nine million East Germans visited West Berlin, many encouraged to do so by the 100 Deutschmarks “welcome money” made available by the FRG. In June 1990, parliamentary elections in Czechoslovakia produced its first noncommunist government since 1945. In Romania a violent uprising resulted in the death of the longtime Communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu. A parliamentary election in the GDR in March 1990 produced a coalitional government dominated by the Christian Democrats, the ruling party of the FRG. Soon after, a timetable for the unification of the two German states was negotiated. On October 3, 1990, the GDR was disbanded as a separate state and its five Länder (lands) became part of the FRG.32 Meanwhile, in the USSR the reforms introduced by Gorbachev allowed power to ebb away from the CPSU and opposition parties began to organize, especially in the republics that began to declare their autonomy from Moscow. According to one historian, the thawing of the grip of the past had also revealed the power of nationalist and regional feeling when excited by economic collapse and opportunity. After seventy years of efforts to make Soviet citizens, the USSR was revealed to be a collection of peoples as distinct as ever. Its fifteen republics numbered among them some (above all[,] the three Baltic republics of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania) which were quick to show dissatisfaction with their lot.33

In March 1990 the Lithuanian parliament declared its annexation by the USSR in 1939 invalid and asserted its independence. Latvia and Estonia followed suit. Faced with their secession, Gorbachev did not seek, as Brezhnev had done in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, to revoke the act of independence by sending in the Soviet Army. Rather, he negotiated certain defense guarantees for the USSR with the governments of the newly independent Baltic States. Parliaments in nine of the USSR’s constituent republics declared their independence from the Union. On August 19, 1991, certain high-ranking officials of the USSR made an attempt to seize power by a coup d’état. Gorbachev, who was on vacation at Yalta at the time, returned to Moscow in order to reestablish the legitimate government. Taking advantage of the disorder, Boris Yeltsin, the democratically elected president of the Russian Republic, took control of all Soviet institutions within his republic, a move that was not resisted by the Soviet Army. On December 8, 1991, the elected leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus met at Minsk and announced the end of the USSR and proclaimed the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which was joined by other former republics of the USSR at the second meeting on December 12 at Alma-Ata. Gorbachev resigned as leader of the USSR. Thus, Europe’s last “internal empire” disappeared.34

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

114

Page 114

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

In the words of one historian, its disappearance happened through natural causes. The Soviet Union was not, like ancient Rome, invaded by barbarians or, like the Polish Commonwealth, partitioned by rapacious neighbors, or, like the Habsburg Empire, overwhelmed by the strains of a great war. It was not, like the Nazi Reich, defeated in a fight to the death. It died because it had to, because the grotesque organs of its internal structure were incapable of providing the essentials of life. In a nuclear age, it could not, like its tsarist predecessor, solve its internal problems by expansion. Nor could it suck more benefit from the nations whom it had captured[;] . . . it could not stand the oxygen of reform; so it imploded. It was struck down by the political equivalent of a coronary, more massive than anything that history affords.35

The “natural cause” of nationalism also brought about the disappearance of Yugoslavia. Situated on the fault line between the old Ottoman and Habsburg empires, Yugoslavia, since its emergence as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes after World War I, had been essentially a manifestation of the dream of the Serbs for a greater Serbian state. The dynasty that had seized the Serbian throne in 1903 continued on the throne of the new kingdom. This kingdom’s creation was an outstanding example of the failure of the Allies to solve the nationalities problem after World War I by redrawing boundaries. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes contained Slovenes, Germans, Magyars, Romanians, Vlacks, Albanians, Turks, Jews, Gypsies, Italians, and Serbo-Croats, who themselves constituted an ethnic category comprising Montenegrins, Bosnians, Muslims, Macedonians, and Bulgarians.36 The ethnic complexity of the kingdom was exacerbated by the fact that Serbs and Croats speak the same language, but Croats, being Roman Catholic, use the Latin alphabet to write it, while Serbs, being Greek Orthodox, use the Cyrillic. Also, living among the Christian Serbs and Croats were a substantial population of Bosnian Muslims.37 The politics of the kingdom, which changed its name to Yugoslavia in 1929 in an attempt to override these ethnic differences, was, in the main, about Serb-Croat rivalries. By 1939 the hatred that the Croats had for the Serb-dominated government and army in Belgrade was manifested in a fascist movement called the Ustashi, which was making approaches to Hitler. When the Germans invaded in 1941, they were left in occupation of a huge and hostile territory. The Yugoslav Government fled into exile in London. Croatia declared itself an independent republic. Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Italians took chunks of the carcass. Underground armies proliferated. The terrible [Ustashi] or Croat “insurrectionaries” were set on ethnic cleansing of their Serbian minorities, deploying the full fascist repertoire of death camps and mass execu-

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

Page 115

THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE EAST

115

tions. The royalist Cetniks, who led the Yugoslav resistance, were increasingly opposed to a rival communist movement led by Jozef Broz, “Tito” (1892–1980).38

Tito, with Allied help, won the civil war and established a federal system modeled after that of the USSR, called the Federated People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. Until ten years after Tito’s death in 1980, the differences among Yugoslavia’s nationalities were effectively suppressed by the Soviet-style regime he had put in place after World War II. As the Communist Party collapsed in Yugoslavia, political parties formed around Serb, Croat, Macedonian, and Slovene communities. Elections in 1990 brought to power in Yugoslavia’s constituent republics new leaders based on ethnic majorities. At the same time, ethnic minorities within certain republics had also organized themselves politically and in some cases, such as that of Croatian Serbs, declared their autonomy within their republics. Serious interethnic fighting broke out in Macedonia at Kosovo, where four-fifths of the people were Albanian. Soon the republics were quarreling with one another as the authority of the central government in Belgrade waned. Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from the federation in June 1991, as did Bosnia-Herzegovina by the end of the year.39 In Belgrade the Federal State Council was taken over by Serbian nationalists led by Slobodan Milosevic, who mobilized those Serbs who still dreamed of a “Greater Serbia.” The Serbian-dominated Yugoslav army, after ten days of desultory fighting, allowed Slovenia’s declaration of independence to stand. Declarations of independence by Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia were not allowed to stand, however, because they had sizable Serbian minorities. Now essentially composed of the Serbian and Montenegrin republics, the Federation chose to use armed force to prevent the independence of the rebel republics, as well as to seize Dubrovnik in order to achieve the long-held Serbian goal of having a port on the Adriatic.40 Macedonian independence sparked interethnic violence among its Serbian, Albanian, and Macedonian inhabitants. When Bosnia—where Muslims, Croats, and Serbs typically lived in separate villages or separate neighborhoods in towns as they did in Sarajevo, the capital—decided by referendum in favor of independence in 1992, Serbs living in that republic resisted and proclaimed Sarajevo and other areas to be Serbian. Their action was supported by the Serbian-dominated federal government in Belgrade, which resulted in the imposition of economic sanctions against Yugoslavia by the United Nations. In 1994, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) forces under UN auspices undertook air operations against Bosnian Serbs, who had consis-

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

Page 116

116

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

tently refused to negotiate a settlement in Sarajevo. Gradually, the Serbiandominated federal government in Belgrade stopped assisting the Bosnian Serbs’ attempt to gain control of Sarajevo. In 1995, Bosnian Serbs accepted a cease-fire and met with the presidents of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia in November in the United States for peace negotiations. The peace settlement worked out among them established two entities within Bosnia, one Muslim-Croat and the other Serbian.41 The failure of the Serbian attempt to create a greater Serbia out of the wreckage of the former People’s Federal Republic of Yugoslavia resulted in the emergence of five new states: the independent republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia, and the federated republic of Serbia and Montenegro. In May 2006, Montenegro voted to dissolve its union with Serbia, and a sixth Yugoslavian successor state found itself among the forty-eight other officially recognized sovereign states on the European continent. The collapse of the People’s Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was not the only case in Europe where a state created by the Allies after World War I collapsed after 1989. Slovakia, which had been joined with Bohemia and Moravia to form Czechoslovakia, declared its independence from the federation in 1992, an event known as the Velvet Divorce because the separation took place without violence.

■ Summary After World War I, it seemed that the democratic nation-state was the normal and natural form of politico-military rule in Europe. An alliance of democratic states had defeated the multiethnic dynastic empires and created a plethora of new democratic nation-states in their stead. This optimism was short lived, however, since extreme antidemocratic nationalists who wished to revise the Versailles settlement and redraw the map of Europe began to appear and take politico-military power. Fascists, as the adherents of these movements became known, rejected the liberal democratic principle of nation-state equality and sought to replace it with a European states system based on the principle of nation-state inequality. Certain nations were deemed culturally and racially superior to others and, therefore, deserved to be at the top of the hierarchy, while others were deemed to be inferior and at the bottom of the hierarchy, or not to exist at all. Such movements came to power in Italy, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Greece, and Romania. The coming to power of extreme nationalists in these states, especially in two of the largest and most powerful of them, Italy and Germany, precipitated World War II. The principal instigator of the war was Adolf Hitler, who wished to consolidate the millions of Germans living in neighboring

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

Page 117

THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE EAST

117

states into a single German superstate, the Third Reich, and create a new hierarchical states system in Europe with Germany at the top. At the same time, Hitler sought to purify the German national community by eliminating so-called inferior people. Hitler’s unification of Austria with Germany in 1938; annexation of the Sudeten Germans, also in 1938; and invasion of Poland, which had refused his demand for access to Danzig and East Prussia, resulted in World War II, the second period of open hostilities in Europe’s second “Thirty Years’ War.” After nearly six years of fighting, the war ended in Europe with the victory of the Allies, a grouping of antifascist states that included the Soviet Union. No big peace conference was convened after the war to work out a postwar settlement. Instead, the “Big Three” Allies—Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union—met together to decide the postwar configuration of the European states system. The Big Three, unlike World War I’s victorious decisionmakers, essentially accepted the states system, with minor border adjustments, created by the Allies at Versailles. Only the borders of Poland were changed significantly. Nonetheless, owing to the extermination, deportation, flight, evacuation, and resettlement of nearly ninety million people, the alignment between state and national community borders was much higher after World War II. While greater nation-state coincidence and homogeneity had been achieved, there were still ethnic minorities in most European states, and three states (Soviet Russia, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia) were still a mélange of nationalities. In Russia the Bolsheviks attempted to reconstitute the Russian multinational, imperial state as an “un-national” communist state based on the principle of proletarian solidarity across national borders. The unity of the Soviet multinational state came from the All-Union Communist Party (CPSU), which was seen as representing the working class within each of the Soviet Union’s constituent national republics. As long as the CPSU was able to maintain its coherence and unity as a transnational organization, the federated Soviet Union was able to exist as a unified state. As the CPSU’s centripetal force dissipated under Brezhnev during the 1970s, the coherence of the Soviet state began to decline. Eventually, under Gorbachev, the CPSU’s ability to hold the Soviet Union together disappeared completely, and the states in Eastern Europe over which it had held sway since the end of World War II began to escape from the Soviet sphere of influence. Shortly thereafter, the constituent republics of the Soviet Union declared their independence as well, and the Soviet state collapsed in 1991. The same process of disintegration took place in the multinational Yugoslavia. Tito’s Federated People’s Republic had been no more successful in creating an un-national communist state than had the Soviet Union. Ten years after Tito’s death, the rivalries among Yugoslavia’s national communities, which had been suppressed during Tito’s lifetime, began to come

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

118

Page 118

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

to the surface, and its constituent republics began to go their own way. Extreme Serbian nationalists sought to create a greater Serbia in much the same way that Hitler had attempted to create a greater Germany, by extending the borders of the Serbian-dominated Yugoslavian federation to include Serbians living outside of it. This attempt, which involved much interethnic fighting, failed, however, owing to the eventual intervention of NATO forces. Six new independent states filled in the territory once occupied by the Federated People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. As was the case after World War I, the number of states in Europe increased after the end of the Cold War. At the turn of the millennium, Europe had forty-eight nation-states.

■ Notes 1. David Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon, 2nd edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), 325. The “millennium” refers to the great transformation from the epoch of monarchy to that of popular sovereignty and democratic government. 2. J. M. Roberts, A History of Europe (New York: Allen Lane, 1997), 303. 3. Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon, 552. 4. C. A. Macartney, National States and National Minorities (New York: Russell & Russell, 1968), 181. 5. Roberts, A History of Europe, 446. 6. Niall Ferguson, The War of the World: Twentieth Century Conflict and the Descent of the West (New York: Penguin, 2006), 136. 7. Ibid., 160. 8. Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon, 551. 9. Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 4. 10. William L. Langer (ed.), Western Civilization: The Struggle for Empire to Europe in the Modern World (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 697. 11. Ferguson, The War of the World, 164–166. 12. Rogers Brubaker, “National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe,” Daedalus 124 (Spring 1995), 114. 13. Ibid. 14. Ferguson, The War of the World, 315. 15. Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon, 701. 16. J. Salwyn Schapiro, Modern and Contemporary European History (1815–1952) (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), 972. 17. C. E. Black and E. C. Helmreich, Twentieth Century Europe: A History, 4th edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 524–530. 18. Schapiro, Modern and Contemporary Europe, 922–923. 19. Mazower, Dark Continent, 218. 20. Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2005), 27–28. 21. Mazower, Dark Continent, 361. 22. Macartney, National States, 450–451. 23. Ibid., 455.

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

Page 119

THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE EAST

119

24. Ferguson, The War of the World, 158. 25. Roman Szporluk, “The Fall of the Tsarist Empire and the USSR: The Russian Question and Imperial Overextension,” in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds.), The End of Empire: The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 76. 26. Black and Helmreich, Twentieth Century Europe, 201–202. 27. Quoted in ibid., 203. 28. Norman Davies, Europe: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 1093. 29. Ibid., 1094. 30. Szporluk, “The Fall of the Tsarist Empire and the USSR,” 83. 31. Davies, Europe, 1108. 32. Roberts, A History of Europe, 558. 33. Ibid., 561. 34. William Pfaff, The Wrath of Nations: Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 63. 35. Davies, Europe, 1135. 36. Roberts, A History of Europe, 563–564. 37. Ibid., 564. 38. Davies, Europe, 1010. 39. Roberts, A History of Europe, 577–578. 40. Ibid. 41. Ibid., 578.

■ Suggested Reading Ferguson, Niall. The War of the World: Twentieth Century Conflict and the Descent of the West. New York: Penguin, 2006. Judt, Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. New York: Penguin, 2005. Macartney, C. A. National States and National Minorities. New York: Russell & Russell, 1968. MacDonogh, Giles. After the Reich: The Brutal History of Allied Occupation. New York: Basic Books, 2007. Mazower, Mark. Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999. Pfaff, William. The Wrath of Nations: Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993. Thomson, David. Europe Since Napoleon. 2nd edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962.

O-5

9/23/08

3:59 PM

Page 120

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

Page 121

Part 2 The Contemporary European Democratic Nation-State WE PRESENTED THE long-term history of the European nation-state in Part 1. We saw that feudal fragmentation in the western portion of the European continent was gradually overcome by centralized absolute monarchies, which were, in turn, gradually democratized and replaced, first, with constitutional monarchies and, later, with democratic republics. At the same time, the spread of nationalism from the west into central and eastern Europe resulted in the replacement of the dynastic multiethnic empires with a host of new nation-states, all of which eventually appeared as republics. As the European state centralized and developed, it increasingly standardized its internal governing apparatus and procedures—structures and procedures that link the government to the governed—and policies for the economic and social welfare of the people. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, all of the historical competitors to the nation-state had been eliminated. In Europe today (i.e., as of this writing), the only legitimate and acceptable form of organized politico-military rule is the self-governing nation-state. Therefore, it is possible to speak of a distinctive European model of the nation-state, which exists across the continent from the Atlantic to the Urals—a state that has inherited the accumulated political, economic, and social organizational characteristics and responsibilities from earlier forms of the state, some of which have become entrenched expectations and entitlements. In this part of the book, we will discuss the characteristics of the contemporary European nation-state. Chapter 6 will present its governing institutions and the roles that exercise control over and administer the state’s ter121

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

122

Page 122

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

ritory and population. Chapter 7 will deal with the structures that have been created to link the nation (the people) to its governing institutions. And Chapter 8 will show how the European state, as it became increasingly national and democratic, came to be more and more responsible for the social and economic welfare of its people. We will also show how the archetypal European welfare state is being challenged and transformed by the possibility of nuclear war and the forces of economic globalization into a new variation, the market state.

ICELAND

FINLAND

NORWAY

SWEDEN

RUSSIA

ESTONIA

UK LATVIA DENMARK LITHUANIA RUSSIA IRELAND BELARUS

NETHERLANDS POLAND GERMANY BELGIUM

UKRAINE

LUX.

ATLANTIC OCEAN

CZECH REPUBLIC

SLOVAKIA MOLDOVA

FRANCE

AUSTRIA HUNGARY

SWITZERLAND

ITALY

SLOVENIA CROATIA ROMANIA BOSNIA

PORTUGAL

SERBIA

MONT. SPAIN

BULGARIA

MACEDONIA ALBANIA TURKEY GREECE

CYPRUS

The Nation-States of Europe, 2008

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

Page 123

6 The Structures of Government

AS WE SAW in Part 1, European medieval kingdoms were “constitutional,” in that kings ruled their realms jointly with the three estates, periodically gathered together into a great council. Owing to the revolution in military affairs in Europe and the consequent increased cost of warfare, medieval kings began to construct institutions of direct rule so that they could extract the human and material resources to support a standing army and pay for their wars. These actions upset the “constitutional” balance between the crown and the great council in favor of the crown in almost all monarchies of Europe, the kingdom of England being the major exception because its Parliament was able to hold its own against the crown and eventually gained ascendancy over it. As liberal nationalism developed in the west, parliaments were able to reassert themselves and were gradually transformed from institutions that represented the three estates to institutions that represented the nation, or people. At the same time, monarchs, even absolute ones, were stripped of the power to govern the realm. Governing power was gradually transferred to parliaments, which were increasingly democratized. By expanding the franchise to include a wider cross section of the people by the end of the nineteenth century, parliaments had become the institutions that governed European states, except Russia, where the tsar was still an absolute monarch. By the end of the twentieth century, constitutional parliamentary democracy had become the defining characteristic of the European nation-state.

■ Constitutions Liberal nationalists believed that the best way to preserve individual rights and guarantee the welfare of the people was to limit the power of the absolute monarch by restricting kingly power, through establishing the rule 123

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

124

Page 124

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

of law embodied in a written constitution. Constitutions enshrine the fundamental principles of a nation-state, determine the powers and duties of the government, and guarantee certain rights to the people. As such, they are the organic, basic law of the state. Europe experienced successive waves of constitution writing as liberal nationalism spread across the continent. The first began after the French Revolution of 1789, the second with the uprisings of 1830 and 1848, the third with the collapse of the multiethnic dynastic empires after World War I, the fourth after World War II, beginning with the democratizations of Greece, Portugal, and Spain in the 1970s, followed by the democratization of Eastern Europe in the 1990s. The reunification of Germany in 1990 did not result in a new constitution, despite Germany’s Basic Law (constitution) having been considered an interim document when it was written in 1949. The GDR joined the FRG as five new Länder under the existing constitution, which remains in effect at this writing. Usually, these new constitutions were drafted by an assembly elected specifically for that purpose and promulgated without giving the people an opportunity to ratify it by referendum, although there were exceptions to this rule. Constitutions were ratified by referendum in France in 1958, Spain in 1978, Estonia and Lithuania in 1992, and Poland in 1997. Thus, since the late eighteenth century to the early twenty-first, constitutions have been either markers of a new political beginning in the history of a state with a long history of sovereignty, such as France—which has had multiple constitutions, marking changes from absolute monarchy to republic (1790), back to constitutional monarchy (1830), and, finally, to a republic (1871, 1947, 1958)—or markers of the achievement of national sovereignty, such as Belgium’s in 1830.1 As of this writing, all European states, except Britain, have written constitutions. In this regard, Britain is unique among European states because its constitution is not a single formal document produced in one great act of constitution writing by a constituent assembly. Rather, the British constitution was produced by the accretion of successive historical documents, such as the Magna Carta (1215); successive acts of Parliament, such as the Bill of Rights (1688) and the electoral reform acts of the nineteenth century (1832, 1867, 1884); as well as customs and conventions worked out during the long struggle between crown and Parliament over which was to be the supreme wielder of politico-military power within the kingdom, such as the practice of the crown appointing the leader of the majority party in Commons as the head of the government. European constitutions have certain features in common: they all specify how the government of the state is to be organized, what powers the institutions of the government are to have, how the administration of the national territory is to be arranged, and how the constitution is to be amended. Finally, they provide for a “referee” institution empowered to decide when the constitution has been violated.

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

Page 125

THE STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT

125

■ Parliamentarianism Owing to the fact that the British Parliament never succumbed to absolutism, it became the model to be emulated by other legislative bodies in Europe; therefore, it came to be called the mother of parliaments. The way in which executive and legislative functions were articulated within the British House of Commons were copied, first in France, at the time of the revolution of 1789, then later carried from France to other monarchies, as demands for popular sovereignty spread across Europe. Therefore, the defining characteristic of the European nation-state is government by parliament, which is known as parliamentarianism. In parliamentary government, executive and legislative power and authority are fused; that is, they are brought together in the same institution, parliament. At the same time, the political and symbolic function of the executive are separated. This contrasts sharply with presidential government, which separates legislative and executive power but merges political and symbolic functions in the same office, the presidency. Presidentialism, largely an American invention, was copied by the new states of the Western Hemisphere as they gained their independence from Spain and Portugal in the early nineteenth century. Canada and certain former British holdings in the Caribbean (e.g., Jamaica, Grenada), which follow the European pattern of parliamentary government, are exceptions to this rule.

■ Head of State vs. Head of Government Politico-military power was stripped from monarchs and transferred to an executive committee of parliament (the “government”), about which we will have more to say below. Europe’s monarchs, if they survived, were left with nonpolitical symbolic and ceremonial functions. Thus, in European parliamentarianism there is a clear distinction between the political (head of government) and the symbolic (head of state) leadership at the highest level of the state, which contrasts with presidential government, wherein symbolic and political leadership roles are assumed by the same individual, the president. In Europe the head of state is either a hereditary monarch or an elected president. As of this writing, ten European states (Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden) have hereditary heads of state (kings, queens, princes, or a grand duke) who no longer wield politico-military power but continue as symbolic leaders of the nation. As the symbolic embodiment of the state’s people, the hereditary ruler must remain above partisan politics and be content with “attending major state occasions at home or abroad to repre-

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

126

Page 126

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

sent the nation and greet other heads of state and leading dignitaries.”2 To get involved in the cut and thrust of day-to-day politics would jeopardize the continued existence of hereditary monarchy in these states, although their occasional involvement in politics can contribute to public confidence in the state, as we will see below. In thirty-seven European states (Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, and Ukraine), hereditary rulers did not survive the rise of liberalism and communism and have become republics. In these states the monarchy was officially abolished and replaced by a republic with an elected president as head of state. The president has become the symbolic embodiment of the people and performs the same ceremonial duties as his or her hereditary counterparts. Except in Cyprus and Georgia, presidents are expected to remain above the cut and thrust of the daily political fray.3 Although most of the day-to-day activities of hereditary and elected heads of state are routine ceremonial duties, such as presiding over the formal opening of parliament, receiving the credentials of ambassadors from other states, and going on state visits, from time to time they act as arbiters between the government and parliament. Usually this involves dissolving parliament, calling for elections, and appointing a new government. Occasionally, it involves standing as the guarantor of the state’s governmental institutions.4 For example, in 1981 a group of diehard Francoist army and police officers, led by Lieutenant Colonel António Tejero, burst into the Spanish Córtes brandishing firearms and took the assembled deputies hostage. Tejero and his followers demanded the abolition of democracy and a return to the authoritarian government of the Franco years. They hoped that the king, Juan Carlos, as commander in chief of the Spanish armed forces, would support the coup attempt and rally the army to their cause. Their hope for support from the king was not realized, however. Instead, Juan Carlos, a committed constitutional monarch, lined up senior military officers against the coup attempt and, in a nationally televised address to the Spanish people, announced that he was opposed to the coup. The army followed the king’s orders to stay in barracks. Tejero, realizing that the coup could not succeed, released the deputies unharmed and surrendered. He and his fellow coup-makers were arrested, tried, and imprisoned. Thus, Juan Carlos’s clear and decisive intervention against the coup saved Spain’s fledgling democracy. Even though monarchs and presidents as heads of state are constitutionally empowered to carry out the formal tasks associated with dissolving par-

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

Page 127

THE STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT

127

liament, calling for new elections, and appointing a new government, their actual power in these activities is limited by the method by which they achieve their positions. Hereditary monarchs, because they gain office by birth, and presidents, who achieve their offices by indirect election (i.e., are elected by parliament or an electoral college), have very little actual power over the formation of the government. In five European states (the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, and Italy) presidents are indirectly elected and constitutionally restricted to a ceremonial role not unlike that of a hereditary monarch. Having been indirectly elected, they do not have popular mandates that can be used against the government. In these states the person selected to be president is usually “a mature public figure above the mundane, albeit vital, details of day-to-day politics, fulfilling instead the elevated functions required of any head of state in a constitutional democracy.”5 In twenty-one of Europe’s thirty-seven republics (Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine), the head of state is chosen by direct popular election and has been granted varying amounts of power and authority over the appointment, functioning, and dismissal of the government. These states have been described as semipresidential because of the enhanced role of the president in the governing process.6 There are important differences among these twenty-one republics, however. In some of them (Austria, Finland, France, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Russia), the government is jointly responsible to the president and to the parliament. In these states, which can be called presidential-parliamentary, a directly elected president has constitutional authority to dismiss the government, even if it enjoys the confidence of parliament. In others (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Iceland, Ireland, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine), the directly elected president does not have the constitutional authority to dismiss the government as long as it enjoys the confidence of parliament. These states can be called parliamentary-presidential. It should be noted that the classification of a state as presidential-parliamentary or parliamentary-presidential can change over time. In Finland, Portugal, and Poland, for example, revisions have been made to the constitution that have restricted the power and authority of the president over the government, such that these states changed from presidential-parliamentarianism to parliamentary-presidentialism. Finally, five states do not fit the European mold. Cyprus and Georgia can be classified as “presidential” because the directly elected president in these states is simultaneously head of state and head of government. At the same time, executive and legislative functions are separated. The former is

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

128

Page 128

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

in the hands of the president, and the latter rests with parliament. In Switzerland one of the seven members of the government (Federal Council) serves as head of state for one year, after which another member takes up the post and so on. In San Marino, two presidents (captains-regent) are chosen by the legislature; one is designated head of state and carries out ceremonial tasks, and the other is designated as head of government and carries out political tasks. In Andorra the head-of-state function rests with two “coprinces,” the bishop of Urgel and the president of the French Republic.

■ Governments When Europe’s crowned heads were stripped of their politico-military power, it was transferred to a committee of parliament called a cabinet in Britain and, on the continent, a council of ministers. The cabinet or council of ministers is called the government (a term more or less equivalent to what Americans refer to as the administration) and is chaired by an individual referred to as a prime minister, premier, chancellor, or president of the council of ministers, depending on the state in question. Prime ministers, chancellors, and so on, are the heads of government and, as such, are constantly involved in the dynamics of daily politics. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, British monarchs chose their prime ministers to suit themselves. This practice was ended in 1783 when King George III (1760–1820) was forced to appoint William Pitt the Younger, the leader of the majority in Parliament, as prime minister. Today (i.e., as of this writing), in Europe no head of state has the discretion to choose the head of government without regarding the majority in parliament.7 Therefore, whoever becomes the prime minister (head of government or cabinet) is usually—but not always, as will be noted below—the leader of the political party or coalition of parties that has a majority of seats in parliament. It is the members of parliament (MPs), or deputies as they are usually called on the continent, who are chosen by the people in elections held at maximum intervals, usually four or five years. Although the general rule is for prime ministers and cabinets to come from the leadership of the majority party, it is possible in certain circumstances for them to come from a minority party in parliament or from the upper ranks of civil service. Owing to the fact that the prime minister and cabinet are chosen by parliament and are accountable to it, the process of forming a government after an election can be a long and tedious process, especially when no one party wins a majority of seats in parliament. The prime minister must select individuals for the cabinet who will be acceptable to all parties of the electoral alliance, or coalition. This task is much less complicated when one party

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

Page 129

THE STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT

129

wins a majority of the seats because the prime minister and the members of the cabinet will automatically come from this party, usually from its senior leadership. Single-party or coalition governments must always be able to command in parliament a majority of votes for legislation. Thus, governments are controlled by the majority in parliament through the latter’s threat of withholding its support. If the government loses the confidence of parliament (i.e., the confidence of the majority party or coalition) and cannot get its legislation passed, it must be replaced with a new prime minister and cabinet that has the confidence of parliament. This can happen without having an election. All that is necessary is for the leaders of the majority party or coalition of parties to agree on a new set of individuals to become the government. If they cannot agree on who these individuals are to be, they can ask the monarch or president to dissolve parliament and set a date for a parliamentary election in the hope that it will produce a new majority. Prime ministers also have the authority to ask the president or monarch to dissolve parliament and fix a time for fresh parliamentary elections, if they believe that new elections will produce a new mandate for their party. Governmental stability (i.e., the longevity in office of a particular prime minister and cabinet) in states with strong parliaments and weak presidents is very much dependent upon the ability of the government to maintain the confidence of parliament—that is, to maintain its party’s majority in parliament from election to election—and its ability to maintain the support of the individual members or deputies of the government’s party or coalition of parties after the election. In European parliamentary states, the government can usually, but not always, rely on strict party cohesion (i.e., party “discipline”), about which we will say more later, to maintain the support of individual MPs, or deputies, in order to get its legislative agenda passed and to prevent it from losing a vote of confidence. The government comprises the individuals who head the state’s ministries, although in some European states it is possible to be a member of the cabinet “without portfolio,” that is, without having direct responsibility for a particular ministry. The prime minister, or president, of the council of ministers presides at meetings of the cabinet, which functions according to the principles of individual ministerial responsibility and collective cabinet responsibility. Collective cabinet responsibility “means that the prime minister and cabinet are together ultimately responsible to the elected representatives of the people [i.e., parliament] for executive decisions and actions during their term in office.”8 Once the cabinet has collectively decided on a course of action, all members must be prepared to resign if they cannot garner support for it in parliament (i.e., they lose the confidence of parliament). If the prime minister is forced to resign because he or she loses a vote of confidence, the entire cabinet must resign as well. Individual ministerial

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

130

Page 130

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

responsibility means that “each minister is held responsible for the decisions and actions of his or her own ministry. Ministers must police their department, or pay for serious mistakes or corrupt activities with their resignation.”9 Individual ministerial responsibility is a way of holding the nonelected civil servants in the ministries accountable to the law and to the government. Each state in Europe has specific rules and traditions that define the office of prime minister within the broader governing institutions. In some states the prime minister has greater powers and more freedom to act than in others. Thus, in the words of one scholar, in Britain, Ireland, and Germany, there is a tradition of strong executive leadership from the prime minister. In contrast, in Italy, neither the political elite nor the public has expected the prime minister to be the dominant force in government. In the Benelux [Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg] and Scandinavian countries [Denmark, Norway, Sweden], tradition dictates that the cabinet as a whole should exercise executive power, with the prime minister in the role of chairman.10

In addition to differences in degree of collective responsibility, there are differences across European states in terms of the prime ministers’ power to nominate their own cabinet ministers, reshuffle the cabinet, and organize and reorganize government ministries. There are also differences in terms of the way cabinet posts are distributed among the party’s leadership or the leadership of the parties forming a coalitional government. The usual method is for the parties to control a share of cabinet posts in proportion to the number of seats each contributes to the government’s majority in parliament. The prime minister must also take into consideration internal factions and rivalries with his or her party and, if a coalitional government, the other parties.11 Although hereditary monarchs and weak presidents do not have the power to directly determine the government, the fact that the proportional electoral systems used in most European states (about which we will have much to say in the next chapter) frequently do not produce single-party majorities in parliament gives them opportunities to indirectly determine the direction of government policy. The selection of one party leader over another as a potential prime minister will have profound consequences for the shape of the government. In order to maintain the appearance of nonpartisanship, a formateur, usually a well-trusted senior politician who no longer has a direct political stake in the outcome of the negotiations is appointed. The task of the formateur is to negotiate with the parties in parliament and report the results to the president. This allows the head of state to indirectly preside over the process of government formation and avoid making the choice of a prime minister him- or herself. Even having a formateur does

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

Page 131

THE STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT

131

not always absolve the head of state from being politically implicated in the choice of government, however. If, for example, the head of state chooses a formateur from a party on the right rather than a party of the left, this is taken to mean that he or she prefers a right-wing government. Once a government has been arranged, it must be “invested,” that is, legally empowered to take office and begin governing. In some European states a formal parliamentary vote of investiture is required. In Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland, this is accomplished by taking a vote in parliament on the composition of the government and its proposed program. In other states—Sweden for example—only the prime minister must be invested with a formal vote of confidence by parliament. Once approved, he or she then appoints the cabinet without having to submit the names of the ministers to parliament for its approval. In states without formal investiture, the government assumes office immediately after being designated by the head of state and governs as long as it is not successfully challenged (i.e., loses a vote of confidence) by the opposition in parliament.12

■ Parliaments As we explained in Part 1, parliaments began as assemblies of the three estates of the realm (clergy, nobility, and burghers) called together periodically by the crown to render advice, approve decisions, and grant permission to levy a tax. Medieval assemblies were bicameral; the first (clergy) and the second (nobility) estates sat together in their own upper chamber and the third estate (burghers) sat in its own lower chamber. Initially, the upper chamber was the more powerful of the two. However, as liberal democracy spread, power shifted from the upper chamber to the directly elected lower chamber, which came to represent the sovereign people. Similarly, as republicanism spread across Europe, chambers reserved for the clergy and nobility became superfluous and were either eliminated or replaced with a chamber that represented territorial subdivisions of the state. The only exception to this pattern in Europe was and is Britain, where the hereditary aristocracy and certain members of the clergy (Lords Spiritual) still have their own chamber (the House of Lords), which they have shared, since 1958, with peers appointed for life.13 In seventeen European states (Austria, Belgium, Belarus, BosniaHerzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, and Switzerland) the parliament is bicameral. Bicameralism has two sources. One was federalism. All European federal states (Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Germany, Russia, and Switzerland) have second chambers that

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

132

Page 132

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

represent their territorial subdivisions, such as the Bundesrat, which represents the Länder of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Council of States, the second chamber of the Swiss parliament, which represents the cantons of the federation of Switzerland. The second source was the wish to complement the lower house with a body that represented local government, such as the Sénat in France, which is composed of individuals elected from local councils, and the Seanad in Ireland, composed of individuals who represent corporate groups, such as business, labor, agriculture, and education. The members of the upper chambers are chosen in various ways. A few upper chambers (Italy, Spain, and Switzerland) are elected directly. Others are selected by political elites. In France, for example, the Sénat is selected by an electoral college comprising politicians from local councils. In Austria and Germany the members of the Bundesrat are appointed by Länder governments.14 In Britain, since 1958, the House of Lords has contained nonhereditary “life peers,” a certain number of which are appointed each year by the government; Lords Spiritual (the archbishop of Canterbury and York, twenty-four senior bishops of the Church of England, the head rabbi of the British Jewish community, and, recently, a Muslim imam), who are members only during their time in ecclesiastical office; and Law Lords, senior judges who are appointed by the crown to serve as Britain’s final court of appeal. Thirty European States (Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Sweden, Turkey, and Ukraine) have directly elected unicameral parliaments that carry out the legislative functions of a lower chamber in a bicameral legislature, which, because they represent the will of the people most directly, have more powers and prerogatives than do bicameral lower chambers. Unicameral parliaments almost always have the final word over government policy.15 Lower houses in bicameral parliaments and singlechambered parliaments are similar in terms of their internal organization and procedures, and are the chambers to which governments (the prime minister and cabinet) are responsible. The organizational structure and procedures that specify how debate time is to be allocated, who is to speak, when they are to speak, what matters are to be dealt with by the whole chamber and by what committee, how members are to be allocated to committees, and what kinds of contacts members are permitted to have with outside bodies go back to practices worked out in the British House of Commons in the nineteenth century.16 The bulk of the legislative work of European parliaments does not take place in plenary (i.e., full) sessions. Usually, parliamentary chambers are mostly deserted with a few MPs, or deputies, delivering speeches to a few

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

Page 133

THE STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT

133

bored colleagues as others casually come and go, disregarding the speaker. During a major debate, however, the atmosphere in the chamber can be charged and even tumultuous. The reason for the low attendance and the inattentiveness of those “listening” to the speeches is that almost all MPs already know how they are going to vote on the legislation being debated. In effect, their votes have been determined by their party, committee, or constituents. Thus, in general, speeches given in a European parliament are not an effort to change the minds of the MPs but, rather, are being made to delay the legislation or present to the public the party’s position on it.17 The real work of parliament takes place elsewhere, in its committees, party groups, antechambers, corridors, and nearby restaurants and “watering holes.” All European parliaments have a system of standing (permanent) committees that correspond roughly to government ministries. Many European parliaments also have specialized ad hoc committees, which are appointed as required to deal with a particular policy area or investigate a matter of public concern. Standing committees range in size from fifteen to thirty members. They deal with legislation, policy, and scrutinize administrative actions. They can call ministers and administrators as witnesses. Parliamentary parties are represented on these committees in rough proportion to their seats in the parliament as a whole. A strong committee system can strengthen parliament in its dealings with the government. The strength of parliamentary committees varies across Europe. In France, for example, they are weak, being limited to six in number in the National Assembly. In Germany, committees of the Bundestag examine legislation before it goes to the plenary for debate, during which it can be modified. The Swedish, Danish, Italian, and Dutch parliaments also have well-developed committees.18 The most obvious function of parliaments is to pass legislation, which they do with varying degrees of efficiency and in varying amounts. Parliaments are the basic source of legitimate rules for European states, and their debates on legislation constitute a public record about the policies that are being made. All European parliaments have rules setting forth the procedures for introducing and considering legislation. Although almost all legislation is prepared by the government, it must be introduced by an MP. This is usually done by a government MP when, as is the case in Britain, its members retain their seats in parliament, or the government’s parliamentary party group. Legislation generated by the government has a very high chance (nearly 100 percent) of being passed. On the other hand, legislation generated by individual MPs (so-called private members’ bills) have a very low probability of being passed, except in Italy, where the “number of leggine (‘little laws’) passed as private members’ bills and bills initiated by opposition parties rival the amount of government legislation.”19 Once introduced, a bill goes through a series of steps called readings, a term derived from the practice of clerks reading bills in the British House of

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

134

Page 134

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

Commons. Today bills are not read as such, but are printed and distributed to members in advance of their consideration. Upon being introduced, bills are usually sent to the appropriate committee for study. After the committee has finished the first “reading” of the bill, with any revisions and/or amendments made by the committee, it will be sent to the floor of parliament for its consideration in plenary session. After this second reading, the bill will be sent back to committee for final drafting, taking into account the debate on the bill in plenary session. When the final draft of the bill is finished, it goes back to the plenary for the third reading and final vote. The bill is then sent to the head of state (hereditary monarch or president) for signature, after which it becomes law.20 All European parliaments have presiding officers, either a single president (i.e., “speaker”) or a presidium (collection of presidents) chosen from the major parties in parliament, to administer the rules and conduct parliamentary business. Ideally, the choice of president should be a noncontroversial senior, no longer politically ambitious MP, acceptable to all parliamentary parties and reliable with respect to administering the rules of the parliament and resolving disputes in a fair and equitable manner. The individual members of parliament sit together during plenary sessions according to their party affiliation. Ever since the French Revolution, when the radical republicans sat on the left and the monarchists sat on the right in the National Assembly, the tradition in Europe has been for the parties in parliament to be seated from left to right (from the point of view of the dais) according to ideology: radicals on the left, conservatives on the right, and moderates in between. The leaders of the parties occupy the front rows of seats, while the rank-and-file members take the “back benches” behind them. It should be noted here that the shape of the hall in which the plenary meets in all European parliaments is, more or less, semicircular, except in Britain, where the House of Commons is rectangular. Thus, individual members of parliament are always affiliated, except in rare cases, with a political party whose ideology they share and to which they are beholden for their election. The individual members from the same political party are officially recognized as a “parliamentary group” or Fraktion, as it is called in the German Bundestag. Each parliamentary group has an office and staff within parliament, which is headed by a parliamentary group leader, and operates according to its own internal rules. Parliamentary groups have become well established in European parliaments; consequently, they are given special consideration in the legislative process. For example, parliamentary groups are given representation on standing and ad hoc committees, speaking time in debates, and office space and administrative support.21 Owing to the fact that most Europeans have traditionally voted for a party rather than a person when they cast ballots in parliamentary elections,

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

Page 135

THE STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT

135

about which more will be said in the next chapter, MPs are elected by being the official candidate of a particular party rather than being elected because of their individual abilities and personalities, as in the case for congresspersons in the United States. The primacy of parties over individuals means that individual MPs are beholden to the parties for their election; therefore, they are much more inclined to vote the party line in parliament. Essentially, party leaders can control the behavior of the “rank-and-file members of parliament because the latter know that if they become habitually disloyal to the party line in parliament, the candidate selectors (usually a group of local party activists) may well deny them access to the party label at the next election and thereby cast all but the most resilient out into the political wilderness.”22 The fact that the government is composed of the leadership of the majority party (or coalition of parties) in parliament, the fact that the party parliamentary groups have special standing and function in a highly organized and disciplined way in parliament, and the fact that the majority party (or coalition) controls the chairpersonships of parliamentary standing committees means that the government can, as long as it maintains the confidence of its parliamentary majority, dominate the work of the parliament. In effect, governments can pass any legislation they wish, a situation that is tolerated by the opposition parties because they hope to do the same when their time as government arrives.23

■ Courts As we saw in Part 1, the development of uniform, territorial legal systems was part and parcel of monarchical consolidation and centralization of the realm. Across Europe, legal institutions called courts emerged to apply and enforce the king’s law, which became the law of the realm. This happened first in England under Henry I (1100–1135), who strengthened his power by extending the jurisdiction of royal courts through sending his judges around the realm on regular circuits to hear cases in lower courts. By the end of the twelfth century, the king’s judges had begun to create a uniform body of law through the practice of stare decisis (“let the decision stand”), or precedent. Thus, a uniform, monarchy-wide “law common to all” was created in England by the gradual accumulation of judges’ rulings. As the king’s courts developed, law-trained clerks, or lawyers, became more and more numerous and formed themselves into guilds called Inns of Court, which provided legal training. Gradually, it was accepted that experience practicing law should be a prerequisite for appointment as a judge because of the long experience that was necessary to master the intricacies of the law. The English judiciary gradually established its independence from the crown

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

136

Page 136

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

and became a progressive institution that promoted national unity and the regulation of society.24 On the continent, however, “the legal profession and the courts were among the more stubborn bastions of local and feudal custom. Any attempt to weaken still further the monarch’s power over judicial appointments was construed as retrogressive by those forces oriented to creating a unified . . . state.”25 Thus, uniform legal systems were not achieved until much later than that in England. The approach was different as well. In the late Middle Ages, Roman law was rediscovered by legal scholars in the emerging universities, and they began to advance proposals on how to unify feudal law. Hence, Roman code-law became the basis for the legal institutions on the continent. In France, for example, there were several attempted codifications of the law during the late Middle Ages, but French kings were unable to overcome the semijudicial local parlements, which, since Capetian times, operated according to traditional feudal law in their proceedings. It was the Revolution of 1789 that created the conditions for the unification and codification of French law. The Revolution abolished the local parlements and set up a commission to prepare a uniform code for the republic. The work of this commission did not come to fruition until after Napoléon had seized power in 1799. Its work was promulgated in 1804 as the Code Napoléon and, although revised and amended many times since then, it remains the basis of French law today. The Code Napoléon was imposed and copied in many areas of Europe conquered by French armies during the Napoleonic Wars, especially in Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, and Italy. As legal institutions developed, two basic types of law were gradually recognized: private law, which concerns relations between individuals (or corporate entities) over matters such as breach of contract, divorce, or defamation of character; and public law, which concerns the relations between the individual (or a corporate entity) and the state. Public law includes criminal, administrative, and constitutional law.26 Criminal law defines offenses against the public order; administrative law is concerned with disputes between citizens and the administrative agencies of the state; and constitutional law determines whether a law or decision is in accordance with or violates the state’s constitution. Common-law and code-law systems structure and operate courts differently. Common-law systems have a single, unified set of courts that hears all types of cases (criminal, civil, administrative, and constitutional) and has a single supreme court at its apex. In common-law systems the judicial proceedings are the responsibility of the parties themselves (i.e., their lawyers) and the judge acts as a referee who ensures that the procedural rules are followed. In general, judges in common-law systems are passive arbiters

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

Page 137

THE STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT

137

between two adversaries (the prosecution and defense), although occasionally they may take an active role, especially in criminal cases. Judges in common-law systems, of which there are only three in Europe (Britain, Ireland, and Cyprus), are appointed from among the practicing members of the bar. In code-law systems they are recruited from special schools established to train judges. Graduates of these schools join the judicial services as judges in lower courts and work their way up the court hierarchy until retirement. Advancement is based on performance and seniority.27 In contrast to common-law systems, those of code law have several separate parallel sets of courts, each with its own jurisdiction, judges, and procedures. Civil and criminal cases are heard in so-called ordinary courts, usually divided into criminal and civil divisions. At the apex of the court system is a supreme court that provides authoritative guidance on the correct interpretation of the law with respect to a certain case. Such supreme courts do not hear cases but “quash” decisions of lower courts and order the case to be retried according to its interpretation. In addition to the ordinary courts, code-law states have specialized courts for administrative, tax, social, and labor law matters, each with its own supreme court.28 Also, in contrast to the adversarial nature of judicial proceedings in common-law systems, those in code-law systems are “inquisitorial.” That is, in all but civil cases, the judge takes an active role in the trial. Witnesses are questioned by the judge, not by advocates, who may, however, put questions to witnesses through the judge. Finally, the code-law inquisitorial system does not use juries, except for certain types of criminal cases.29 Usually, decisions concerning guilt or innocence are made by a panel of judges with the assistance of several “lay assessors.” Judicial review of laws and decisions as to their constitutionality does not exist in Europe as it does in the United States. The role of judges in Europe has been to interpret and enforce laws made by parliament. They have not been empowered to invalidate laws, administrative decisions, and judicial rulings on the ground that they are in conflict with the constitution. Historically, the idea that unelected judges could declare a law passed by parliament, which had been elected by the sovereign people, as unconstitutional was seen as inherently undemocratic. In Britain, for example, judicial review was and still is seen as a violation of the principle of parliamentary supremacy. Not even the House of Lords, Britain’s final court of appeal, may declare an act of Parliament unconstitutional.30 Nonetheless, after World War II, many European states opted to establish a special constitutional court to guarantee the constitutionality of laws and decisions. As of this writing, twenty-eight European states (Albania, Armenia, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg,

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

138

Page 138

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, and Ukraine) have constitutional courts. The only exception to the rule is Ireland, where constitutional review is exercised not by a special constitutional court but by the Supreme Court of the regular court system, as in the United States.31 Members of constitutional courts are selected and appointed by political authorities. The most common pattern is for all or some of them to be appointed by parliament such that each of the main political parties receives its proportionate share of the seats on the court. Although appointees need strong legal credentials, their political affiliation is also a major factor in their appointment. Therefore, appointees tend to be, one, former MPs or government ministers with solid legal training or, two, legal academics whose political leanings are a matter of public record. There are two main types of constitutional review: concrete and abstract. Concrete constitutional review is a constitutional challenge to a law connected to a specific case before the court. This type of review can be initiated by any defendant in a court case who believes that the statute under which he or she is being tried does not conform to the constitution. Abstract constitutional review involves the consideration of any law without reference to a specific case before the court. Review of this type can be initiated by a designated set of political authorities, usually the head of state, the prime minister, a certain number of MPs, or the member states in a federation. Abstract constitutional review can be a posteriori, that is, initiated only for a short period (usually up to three months) after the law has been passed; or a priori, that is, initiated before the bill is passed.32 All European constitutional courts practice either a posteriori or a priori abstract review, but not all permit concrete constitutional review. In those states that permit concrete constitutional review, the review process does not take place within the regular court system. Rather, cases involving a constitutional issue are sent to the constitutional court for its consideration by ordinary judges, if there is doubt about the constitutionality of the law under which the case before them is being tried. In about half of the states of Europe, individuals may apply for constitutional review under very restrictive conditions, usually after all judicial remedies have been exhausted.33 In Europe, constitutional review is still a much-contested procedure because it “judicializes” politics and “politicizes” justice. It allows the political parties to shift the political struggle into the judicial arena and allows judges to become politically active. Constitutional courts have become “specialized third chambers” of parliament, which, because they can annul laws (a posteriori or a priori), play a significant role in the policymaking process. In effect, constitutional courts are judicial-political hybrids. 34 Finally, it should be noted that the distinction between common-law and code-law systems is becoming blurred. In Britain and Ireland, law is

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

Page 139

THE STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT

139

increasingly based on statute; in cases where precedent and statute point to different decisions, judges must follow statute. At the same time, in codelaw states, precedence is of increasing significance because the codes are often insufficiently detailed to provide the judge with a decision in every case. To decide cases for which the code is insufficient, judges are increasingly turning to decisions by other judges on similar cases; that is, they are following precedent. Thus, even in code-law states, judges are becoming interpreters of the law rather than mere appliers of it. This means that judges in both common-law and code-law states are important actors in the law-making process: In common-law countries, judges can play a part in “making” the laws by delivering judgements that then become precedents to be drawn on by subsequent judges. Even in [code] law countries, judges can—indeed, must— exercise more discretion than is acknowledged in some accounts that portray judges . . . as mere appliers of unambiguous statutes and codes. In most [European] countries . . . the judiciary is not explicitly politicized and judges are generally seen as “nonpolitical” or “above politics,” but realists accept that the personal and political views of judges will have some bearing on the judgements they deliver, in both common and [code] law jurisdictions.35

■ Ombudsperson In order to safeguard citizens against the misuse of power by public authorities, many European states have created the office of the ombudsperson, or parliamentary commissioner. The office originated in Sweden as a response to an absolutist authoritarian monarchy during which time abuses of power by officials of the crown were common. The Swedish Justitieombudsman was independent of the crown and empowered to prosecute officials who acted illegally, misused their power, or neglected their duties. Over the years since being instituted, the ombudsperson has become a respected and trusted means of recourse against the misuse of executive power in Sweden. Elected each year by parliament, the occupants of this office are usually high-ranking administrators or judges.36 The power granted to ombudspersons in the European states that have them varies widely. In the Scandinavian states, these commissioners can investigate any administrative malfeasance they wish. In Britain the parliamentary commissioner cannot investigate administrative wrongdoing unless requested to do so by a member of Parliament. In other states they can initiate legislation to remedy the situation. While in some states they can intervene only in civilian administration, in others they can investigate on the behalf of prisoners, military personnel, and consumers.37

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

140

Page 140

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

■ Territorial Organization There are three categories of state territorial organization that can be found in Europe: unitary, federal, and confederal. A unitary state is one in which sovereignty is concentrated in and exercised by a single entity within the state, the central government. The unitary state model was a product of French absolutism as well as the Jacobin revolutionary tradition in France, which believed that a strong, centralized state was necessary to counteract feudal fragmentation and protect national unity. Since the state was seen as an expression of popular sovereignty, any division of its sovereignty would dilute the national will. This thinking has been expressed in French constitutions since 1789, which all state in their preambles that France is a “Republic, one and indivisible.” The unitary state model was exported from France to other parts of Europe during the Napoleonic wars, most notably to the Italian and Iberian peninsulas, where it was reinforced by nineteenthcentury, national-state-building elites armed with liberal doctrines.38 For liberal democrats the unitary form of the state was the ideal to strive for because it was seen as the best way to guarantee citizens the same rights and duties, no matter where they lived within the national territory.39 In the twentieth century the unitary state spread to Eastern Europe. As of this writing, forty-one European states (Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Britain, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and Ukraine) are unitary in nature. In these states the national territory is subdivided into administrative districts within which a prefect, or local governor, is appointed by the Ministry of the Interior and given the responsibility of executing the policies of the central government and coordinating the work of the local offices of other ministries (health, education, finance) within his or her district. Unitary states have local government units, such as municipalities with elected governing councils and mayors, but these have traditionally not had much autonomy and have been considered under the tutelage (i.e., guidance) of the central government, which determines their structure and functions and provides a large share of their financial resources. A federal state is one in which sovereignty is constitutionally distributed between the central government and a number of constituent territorial units. Federal states, of which there are only seven examples in Europe (Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Germany, Russia, and Switzerland), were produced by the existence of strong, historical loyalties to the constituent units (Switzerland’s cantons, certain of Germany’s Länder [e.g., Bavaria]) or the need to accommodate strong ethnic nationalism

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

Page 141

THE STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT

141

(Russia’s autonomous republics and Belgium’s French-speaking [Wallonia], Flemish-speaking [Flanders], and German-speaking cultural communities) that had to be accommodated to create the state or hold it together. In a confederation, sovereignty is retained by the states that have united themselves into an alliance or league and have surrendered limited control over one or more state functions (e.g., defense, currency, banking, tariffs) to some joint authority acting on behalf of all member states.40 Although at this writing there are no confederal states in Europe, except perhaps the European Union (covered in Part 3), there have been confederations in the past: the Swiss medieval confederation and Napoléon’s Confederation of the Rhine being two examples that spring immediately to mind. Although federalism is one way to embrace local and ethnic differences and growing sensitivity of central governments to demands for more local control, the more common way is to decentralize and regionalize the unitary state. Decentralization takes two forms: deconcentration and devolution. Deconcentration involves placing certain offices of the central ministries in the districts and giving them the authority to act independently according to local needs. Devolution involves transferring power and authority to locally elected bodies. In both deconcentration and devolution, the central government always retains some supervisory power and the authority to step in and overrule local entities, however.41 Regionalization involves creating a level of government between the central and local levels. Pressure to create regional government within Europe’s unitary states has arisen because of a growing sensitivity to the needs of local democracy, the increasing need to deal with health, housing, planning, and economic development problems on a regional basis, the encouragement of regionalization by the European Union, and the growing demands for autonomy by certain ethnic minorities. In those European states where regionalization has progressed the most, the regions have become “statelets” within the state. This is especially true in those places where the region has a strong sense of ethnic identity based on language and culture, such as the Basque and Catalan regions of Spain, or has a history of having been independent in the past, such as Wales and Scotland in Britain and Corsica in France. These regions have their own legislatures, executives, civil services, official languages, courts, and taxing powers. In fact, regionalization is so strong in certain states, that the state’s formal status as a unitary state is open to serious question. According to one scholar, “The practical political autonomy of a Spanish . . . [region] such as Catalonia is probably far greater than the political autonomy of a typical land or canton in ‘federal’ Germany and Switzerland.”42 Therefore, certain unitary states may be evolving into de facto federal states. What this means for the future of the European states system will be taken up in the last chapter of the book.

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

142

Page 142

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

■ Local Government Both federal and unitary states have some kind of local government, usually called a “commune,” or “municipality,” many of which are small and predate the rise of the centralized monarchical state; that is to say, they are feudal in origin. In all European states it is possible to trace the history of many communes to the Middle Ages, when they were founded as feudal parcels, parishes of the Catholic Church, or fortified towns (burghs). Further, in all European states these medieval structures of local government stayed as they were until the liberal reforms of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Liberals saw the medieval patchwork of feudal government and the strong identity of the people living in them as a challenge to the idea of a unified nation. Therefore, everywhere liberals came to power in Europe, they reorganized local government in order to break down attachments to medieval units. The general thrust of these reorganizations was to create local government units as geographically uniform in size as possible without regard to medieval boundaries and to imbue them with similar powers. There is at least one tier of local government between the basic unit of commune and municipality in all European states and the central government, more or less equivalent to American counties. The size and number of these vary from state to state. There are, for example, nineteen in Norway, fourteen in Denmark, and twelve in the Netherlands. “In some countries, especially those with very large numbers of communes or municipalities, the number of provincial areas is larger. There are over ninety departments in France, over ninety provinces in Italy, and over three hundred powiats drawing together over 2,400 municipalities in Poland, for example.”43 Increasingly, as we mentioned above, European states are creating regional governments between the local and national levels. Spain has 17 regions, Italy 15, Poland 16, and Portugal seven, for example. The relationship between these levels is not hierarchical in the sense of a lower one reporting to a higher one. Rather, each has responsibilities defined by legislation. Usually, the higher levels are responsible for planning and coordination, and lower levels for the actual delivery of services to the people. Thus, across Europe, local councils play an important role in land use planning and environmental control: the zoning of development, the processing of individual applications for new development, the issuing of certain licenses and permits, and the monitoring of noxious land use. Most local councils also have a duty to provide a range of services to local property: fire protection, garbage collection, public utilities, and possibly also police[;] . . . other important aspects of the local infrastructure that are often the responsibility of local councils are local public transport and the local road system as well as one or more of three important aspects of the welfare state: the school system, personal health care and social services, and public housing.44

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

Page 143

THE STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT

143

Despite the lack of hierarchy between or among levels, the ability of the national government in unitary states to guide and influence local government is strong. The system of local government and the powers granted to it are determined by legislative statute. Owing to weak local tax bases, the national government provides, in the form of revenue transfers, between 80 and 90 percent of the money needed by local governments to carry out their responsibilities. Finally, in many European unitary states, the central government can inspect the work of local governments and audit their finances.

■ Bureaucracy As we saw in Part 1, the escalating costs of war brought about by the revolution in military affairs caused feudal kings to seek ways to raise revenue without the approval of the estates of the great council. This resulted in centralized financial and judicial structures that collected the king’s revenue and provided his justice. These structures were eventually entrusted to a high officer of the crown called a secretary or minister who was charged with management of activities within a particular “ministry.” Over time, additional ministries that defined the centralized monarchy were created: war, external affairs, and internal administration. Later, ministries dedicated to mobilizing the economic resources of the state were added: manufacturing, trade, agriculture, and fishing. Finally, ministries charged with providing services to the state’s people in general—such as health, education, and welfare—or to a specific segment of its people—workers, youths, retirees, and women—came into existence.45 All contemporary European states have ministries of agriculture, defense, education, energy, foreign affairs, finance, health, industry, internal affairs, justice, labor, and transportation. Many have ministries of environment, social security, and youth as well as departments and offices devoted to science and technology policy, trade, communications, atomic energy, water, national heritage, and so on. In addition, all European states have many quasi-governmental organizations, such as the National Health Service in Britain, that provide services to their citizens, as well as government-owned (that is, “nationalized”) water, electricity, and railroad companies, although the number of these is declining as such companies are “privatized,” a subject that we will return to in Chapter 8. Whatever the number of ministries, they are all likely to be led by a limited number of high-level administrators who have elite educations and have spent their entire careers in the civil service preparing to occupy a post at the top of the administrative hierarchy of some ministry or governmentowned company. These individuals devise and implement policy in close

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

144

Page 144

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

collaboration with the political head of the ministry and their close political advisers. In most states of Europe, a clear division of responsibilities is maintained between the elected political leadership of the ministry (i.e., the minister and his/her ministerial cabinet of political advisers) who make public policy and the high-level permanent civil servants who carry out that policy. Below the high-level administrators are the rank-and-file administrators of the ministry, who implement the policies passed down to them from the top. Initially, civil servants were recruited from the minor nobility and the emerging burgher class in the towns without regard to competency. Most posts within the king’s service were purchasable and inheritable; that is, they could be bought by a rich burgher and passed on to his son. This practice created a new kind of “aristocracy,” based on the ownership of posts within the state’s administrative apparatus. As the responsibilities of the state increased (a subject about which we will have more to say in Chapter 8), pressure built up to make administration more efficient and effective. In order to overcome the shortcomings of inheritable public offices, merit systems of civil service recruitment were adopted. Prussia was the first state to do this when, in 1794, it required all candidates for government service to have university degrees in agricultural economics, estate management, finance, or administrative law. When Napoléon achieved power in France, he reorganized the administration of the French state and required that appointment to the civil service be dependent upon having university training, especially in engineering and other technical subjects. Finally, in Britain, the Northcote-Travelyn Report of 1854 called for the creation of a merit civil service based on competitive examination. Its recommendations were implemented in 1870.46 Currently, all European states recruit state administrative personnel on the basis of competence determined by competitive examination, which all persons with a university degree are entitled to take. Recruitment is usually overseen by a civil service “commission” responsible for advertising openings, receiving applications, administering examinations, conducting interviews, and recommending individuals for appointments. Despite the procedural similarities across European states in the way that civil servants are recruited, there are different beliefs about what type of academic preparation makes better administrators. In Britain, for example, the ethos is to have generalist, senior-level civil servants who have degrees in liberal arts and the classics and who can handle any administrative task in any ministry. The French preference has been for specialists trained in engineering and science. The German, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese have preferred degrees in law.47 Given that bureaucracy has become essential to the continued existence of the modern nation-state, the question arises as to the power of the permanent civil service in relation to elected political authority. In other words, to

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

Page 145

THE STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT

145

whom is the civil service loyal, itself or the elected political leadership? This problem has been solved in two ways. In Eastern European states, before the collapse of communism, the entire civil service was systematically politicized. To ensure that the civil service implemented the policies of the Communist Party, all key civil service appointments were vetted and approved by the party. The promotion and advancement of these partyappointed individuals, known as the nomenklatura, depended as much on political reliability as administrative criteria.48 Placing reliable party members into key posts of the administration to ensure reliability was a technique also used by Europe’s fascist states during the period between the world wars, it should be noted. In Western Europe, the problem was solved by making the civil service into a politically independent “corps” of professional administrators rather than a “cadre” of partisan functionaries chosen on the basis of political loyalty. In other words, the attempt was to make the civil service into a loyal and efficient administrative machine with no political views of its own but that would simply implement decisions made by the democratically elected political leadership. In practice, however, the civil service itself has its own administrative interests that it seeks to promote even while proclaiming its neutrality. Therefore, even in western states, such as Britain, where the ethos of administrative neutrality is well ingrained, the civil service does not always bend to the authority of its democratically elected political masters.49 Since the 1970s, the need to balance the requirement that elected officials have an ideologically sympathetic and reliable civil service at their disposal, and the requirement that they have the best technical advice possible in an increasingly technical world, have resulted in the politicization of the upper levels of the senior civil service in many European states. Even in Britain where the civil service traditionally has been strenuously nonpartisan, there has been a trend toward creating a political cadre within the senior civil service. On the continent—in France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and Germany, for example—politicization of the senior civil service has been institutionalized by the establishment of a “ministerial cabinet,” that is, a team of about twenty-five trusted political advisers that ministers have the authority to organize, which ensures that the political agenda of the minister (which, in turn, is that of his/her party in parliament) is actually carried out; and the cabinet advises the minister on developments within and without the department that may affect the successful implementation of the political agenda.50

■ Summary All contemporary European states have organic or basic laws or constitutions that embody the fundamental principles of the state, determine the

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

146

Page 146

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

powers and duties of governmental institutions, and guarantee certain rights to the people. The central governmental institution of the contemporary European state is the assembly or parliament. European parliamentary government fuses executive and legislative functions within the same institution and clearly distinguishes the political (head of government) from the symbolic (head of state) leadership of the state at the highest level. In ten European states the ceremonial functions continue to be carried out by hereditary heads of states who have been stripped of their political power. In thirty-seven European states the monarchy has been abolished and replaced with a republic and an elected head of state, called a president, who carries out ceremonial functions, although in some cases presidents have political functions as well. The amount of power presidents have depends upon the method by which they are elected (direct or indirect) and the constitution. In some European states, presidents are directly elected and have been given considerable political power, which they share with the parliament, and five of these are presidential states in which the political and ceremonial functions are fused in the presidency. The government of all but the five European presidential states is a committee of parliament called the cabinet, which is chaired by the prime minister who is usually, but not always, the leader of the party or coalition of parties occupying the majority of seats in the parliament. The government must maintain the confidence of the majority in parliament if it is to govern. If it loses this confidence, it must resign, with a new one appointed by the head of state. The government or cabinet is made up of individuals who head the administrative departments (ministries) of the government and who are selected from the party’s leadership or the leadership of the parties forming a coalitional government. Parliaments in Europe are either bicameral or unicameral. Upper, or second chambers, represent territorial subdivisions of the state (except in Britain, where the House of Lords represents hereditary and life peers), while lower, or first chambers, represent the people and are the chambers from which the government is drawn and to which it is always responsible. The bulk of the legislative work of European parliaments takes place in their committees and party groups. Parliamentary committees examine legislation and scrutinize the administration of policy. Legislation, most of which is introduced by the government, passes through a series of steps (called readings) before it is voted on by parliament sitting in plenary session. The legislative process is overseen by the parliament’s presiding officer (speaker or president), who works with the government and the parliamentary parties to keep the legislative work of parliament flowing smoothly. All deputies (MPs) are affiliated with a political party (except for a very few who are elected as independents) with whom they sit in plenary

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

Page 147

THE STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT

147

session and with whom they join to form a parliamentary group. The parliamentary group of the majority party, through its control of parliamentary committee and its close relationship to the government, controls the work of parliament. There are two basic types of legal systems in Europe, common law and code law. Common-law systems, the primary examples of which are Britain and Ireland, have a single, unified set of courts that hear all types of cases (criminal, civil, administrative, and constitutional), and have judges recruited from the members of the practicing bar, who act as referees in judicial proceedings. Code-law systems have parallel sets of courts for different types of law, each with its own set of judges and procedures. At the apex of each of these parallel systems is a supreme court that can send the case back down for retrial if it finds that legal procedures have been violated. Codelaw systems are inquisitorial, not adversarial, in that judges take an active role in the proceedings. In all European states, except Britain and Ireland, the constitutionality of laws and decisions is determined by special constitutional courts, which are empowered to exercise a posteriori or a priori abstract constitutional review. Concrete constitutional review is permitted in some states under restrictive conditions. In general, the distinction between common-law and code-law systems is becoming more and more blurred as judges in common-law states increasingly follow statutes and judges in code-law states increasingly follow precedent. Many European states have adopted the Scandinavian institution of the ombudsperson in order to guard citizens against the misuse of power by public authorities. The powers of these offices vary widely across Europe. The territorial organization of European states falls into three categories: unitary, federal, and confederal. The unitary state is by far the most common. In such states, of which there are forty-one in contemporary Europe, all sovereignty is concentrated in the central government, and the national territory is subdivided into administrative subdivisions under its direct administration. Local government units exist in all European states, which provide basic services to the people. In Europe’s seven federal states, sovereignty is constitutionally distributed between the central government and the state’s constituent territorial units. In a confederation, all sovereignty is retained by the states that compose it. The only example of this type of “state” in Europe as of this writing is possibly the European Union. All unitary states in Europe are increasingly creating regional governments between the central and local governments, which has made such states more “federal” in nature. Because most European states are unitary states, local government within them has been weak. They lack revenue sources of their own and must rely on transfers of money from the central government to carry out their administrative responsibilities. Despite devolution and

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

148

Page 148

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

deconcentration, local authorities remain under the legal and financial tutelage of the central government. Finally, all European states have well-developed bureaucracies that maintain their integrity, mobilize their economic resources, and provide services to their people. The individuals who staff these bureaucracies are recruited and promoted according to merit-based criteria. In all European states the power relationship between elected officials and career bureaucrats is contested and measures have been taken to make the civil service subservient to the state’s democratically elected leadership.

■ Notes 1. Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver, and Peter Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe: Institutions, Parties, and Government, 4th edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 86–87. 2. Geoffrey K. Roberts and Patricia Hogwood, European Politics Today (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 164. 3. When the states of Eastern Europe became democracies after 1990, none seriously contemplated abandoning republicanism and reestablishing monarchy. 4. Yves Mény and Andrew Knapp, Government and Politics in Western Europe: Britain, France, Italy, Germany, 3rd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 226–227. 5. Gallagher, Laver, and Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe, 25. 6. Maurice Duverger, “A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government,” European Journal of Political Research 8 (1980), 165–187. 7. Mény and Knapp, Government and Politics in Western Europe, 230. 8. Roberts and Hogwood, European Politics Today, 171–172. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid., 173. 11. Mény and Knapp, Government and Politics in Western Europe, 235. 12. Roberts and Hogwood, European Politics Today, 173. 13. The power of the House of Lords has diminished as that of the House of Commons has risen. Since the nineteenth century, the prime minister has always been a member of Commons. The House of Lords has, since 1906, been unable to block legislation that has a clear majority in Commons; the Parliament Act of 1911 provided that Lords would have only the power to delay legislation (no more than thirty days on financial matters and no more than three years on other matters); in 1947 the delay time was cut to one year; life peers were appointed in 1958; and, in 1968, legislation was introduced that would deprive hereditary peers the right to sit in the House of Lords. 14. The number of seats is calculated on the size of each Länder and is as follows: six each for Bavaria, Badden-Württemberg, Lower Saxony, and North Rhine–Westphalia; five for Hesse; four each for Rhineland-Palatinate, Berlin, Brandenburg, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein, and Thuringia; and three for Saarland, Bremen, Hamburg, and Mecklenburg–Western Pomerania. 15. Electoral systems will be discussed in Chapter 7.

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

Page 149

THE STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT

149

16. Ian Budge et al., The Politics of the New Europe: Atlantic to the Urals (New York: Longman, 1997), 256. 17. Stanley Rothman, European Society and Politics (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1970), 442. 18. B. Guy Peters, European Politics Reconsidered (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1991), 78. 19. Ibid., 79. 20. Heads of state in republics have the power to veto bills, which can be overridden by a majority vote of the legislature. Heads of state in constitutional monarchies also have the power to veto bills, but it is rarely, if ever, used. 21. Roberts and Hogwood, European Politics Today, 195–196. 22. Gallagher, Laver, and Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe, 74. 23. Budge et al., The Politics of the New Europe, 252. 24. Rothman, European Society and Politics, 613. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid., 611–612. 27. Budge et al., The Politics of the New Europe, 323–324. 28. Ibid., 324. 29. Ibid., 324–325. 30. Roberts and Hogwood, European Politics Today, 232. 31. Gallagher, Laver, and Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe, 99. 32. Ibid., 93–94. 33. Budge et al., The Politics of the New Europe, 333. 34. Mény and Knapp, Government and Politics in Western Europe, 329. 35. Gallagher, Laver, and Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe, 110. 36. Roberts and Hogwood, European Politics Today, 238. 37. Peters, European Politics Reconsidered, 85. 38. Michael Keating, The Politics of Modern Europe: The State and Political Authority in the Major Democracies (Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar, 1993), 14–15. 39. Gallagher, Laver, and Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe, 291. 40. Roberts and Hogwood, European Politics Today, 248. 41. Keating, The Politics of Modern Europe, 16. 42. Gallagher, Laver, and Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe, 171. 43. Ibid., 175. 44. Ibid., 177. 45. Richard Rose, “On the Priorities of Government: A Developmental Analysis of Public Policy,” European Journal of Political Research 4 (1976), 247–289. 46. Rothman, European Society and Politics, 666–667. 47. Budge et al., The Politics of the New Europe, 282–285. 48. Gallagher, Laver, and Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe, 156. 49. Ibid. The struggle between the elected leadership of a ministry and the ministry’s upper-level civil service is brilliantly and humorously portrayed in the British television series, Yes Minister, which was broadcast by the BBC in the early 1980s. 50. Gallagher, Laver, and Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe, 162.

O-6

9/23/08

4:06 PM

150

Page 150

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

■ Suggested Reading Bowler, Shaun, David M. Farrell, and Richard W. Katz. Party Cohesion, Party Discipline and the Organization of Parliaments. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1999. Doring, Herbert (ed.). Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. New York: St. Martin’s, 1995. Jones, G. W. (ed.). “Western European Prime Ministers,” West European Politics 14, no. 2 (April 1991). Laver, Michael, and Norman Schofield. Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Laver, Michael, Norman Schofield, and Kenneth A. Shepsle (eds.). Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Norton, Philip (ed.). “Parliaments in Western Europe,” West European Politics 13, no. 3 (July 1990). Olson, David M., and Philip Norton (eds.). The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe. London: Frank Cass, 1996. Sartori, Giovanni. Comparative Constitutional Engineering. New York: New York University Press, 1997. Strom, Kaare. Minority Government and Majority Rule. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

Page 151

7 Political Participation

AS DISCUSSED IN Chapter 4, during the nineteenth century and the early twentieth, the democratic nation-state emerged in Europe. Legislatures gained control over the exercise of politico-military power as the franchise was extended to larger segments of the population. France introduced universal suffrage in 1848; the Northern German Confederation in 1867; the German Empire in 1871; Great Britain in 1884; Spain in 1890; Belgium in 1893; Norway in 1898; Russia in 1905; Austria and Sweden in 1907; Italy in 1912; and Denmark in 1914.1 This gradual process of constructing the democratic nation-state involved the development of political parties and electoral systems that connected the people to the parliaments governing them. Initially, European political parties varied considerably according to ideology. However, when by the end of World War I the nation-state was democratized and parliamentarianism emerged as the predominant form of government in western Europe, political parties and the electoral systems within which they competed began to look increasingly alike. Much later, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the one-party states that had dominated Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War era were replaced by the multiparty systems that had come to exist in the western half of the continent. Thus, Europe’s party systems and electoral rules have come to have a standard format as the democratic nation-state spread from west to east. At the same time, Europe’s citizens have come to participate in politics in similar ways. They are increasingly likely to seek out alternative forms of political participation in interest groups and social movements, and, as we shall see in this chapter, these alternatives have proliferated in the past half century.

151

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

152

Page 152

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

■ Developing Political Parties The development of political parties in Europe can be divided into four phases.2 The first phase spanned most of the nineteenth century, a time when the power of representative government was growing. As we saw in the previous chapters, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, most European states had adopted a parliamentary political structure, and while these parliaments originally shared power with an executive (i.e., a monarch), they eventually reduced the executive’s power (i.e., reduced monarchs to figureheads or replaced them with weak presidents), and consolidated such power in the elected assembly.3 In the words of one scholar, “The more political assemblies [saw] their functions and independence grow, the more their members [felt] the need to group themselves according to what they [had] in common, so as to act in concert.”4 At this time, however, only a limited number of people could compete for parliamentary seats, because the franchise was restricted to social and economic elites composed of wealthy white men who owned property. Thus, cadre parties were organized by the elites to compete for office. Recruitment in such a party was based on local status and connections; hence, personal contacts and interpersonal networks were of the utmost importance. Once in power, party members formed parliamentary groups to coordinate their actions,5 which mainly consisted of distributing privileges to fellow elites.6 The second phase of party development lasted from the 1880s until the 1960s. During this period the right to vote was extended to working-class men and women. Mass parties were created to organize the newly enfranchised workers and to elect deputies who would represent their interests.7 To win office, this new type of party mobilized a large but homogenous membership base and waged labor-intensive campaigns that were financed by members’ dues and contributions. Once in office, representatives of mass parties promised to represent the interests of one segment of society (e.g., workers) through party cohesion and discipline. This was in sharp contrast to the cadre parties that derived material resources from an elite group of people who had little use for campaigning, since everyone knew everyone else, and who sought to represent their personal interests once in office. In the words of one scholar: Where the old cadre party had relied on quality of supporters, this new party relied on quantity of supporters, attempting to make up in many small membership subscriptions for what it lacked in large individual patronage; to make up in organized numbers and collective action for what it lacked in individual influence. . . . Reflecting their far more activist political agenda, the life experiences of their supporters and an ethos of struggle, [mass] parties naturally were more amenable to the idea of enforced party cohesion and discipline than were the [elitist] caucus parties.8

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

Page 153

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

153

Typically, mass parties grew out of occupation-based groups such as trade unions. For example, the British Labour Party was created when the Trades Union Congress decided in 1899 to create a parliamentary and electoral organization; and for much of its history, Labour depended on British trade unions for support.9 Another source for mass parties was the Catholic Church and related religious sects. Calvinist and Protestant parties were active in the Netherlands at the turn of the twentieth century, and Italian and German Catholics found a home in the Christian Democratic parties that flourished following World War II. Unlike the Socialist parties that grew out of trade unions and labor movements, Christian Democratic parties competed for votes on a confessional basis.10 In sum, by the turn of the twentieth century, mass parties competing against one another in parliamentary elections had become a fixture of the political landscape in Europe. The expansion of the franchise and the rise of mass parties forced the cadre parties to change their organizational style. They increasingly found that their elitism ran contrary to the mass model of democracy, which called for popular control of government through selection among unified parties. Specifically, the informal and interpersonal networks of the cadre party were incapable of providing the level of popular control that was quickly becoming the norm. In addition, elites were unable to mobilize and organize supporters on a broad scale. At the same time, the cadre parties were reluctant to fully embrace the mass party model for three reasons. First, the elites were unwilling to appeal solely to a specific segment of society (as the mass parties had done with the working class) because members of their natural base (i.e., wealthy landowners and industrialists) were becoming electoral minorities. Second, coming as they did from positions of political power (namely in the form of parliamentary groups), the cadre parties were hostile to party models that grew out of extra-parliamentary organizations. Finally, unlike mass parties, the cadre parties did not have to depend on mass electorates for material resources; instead, elites could continue to rely on large individual contributors as well as the resources that came from their positions in government.11 Therefore, the cadre parties had a mixed response to the growing acceptance of mass parties and the mass model of democracy. On the one hand, they started to look like mass parties when it came to organizational structure (i.e., a large number of members organized into branches that held party congresses at regular intervals). On the other, they differed from mass parties when it came to the type of membership. Rather than target a specific segment of society as mass parties had done, the traditional parties made broad electoral appeals in an attempt to “catch support from all classes.”12 While the cadre parties were adapting to the mass model by creating a new type of party, the “catchall” party (about which we shall have more to say below), the mass party was beginning to decline, for various reasons.

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

154

Page 154

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

First, the need for solidarity among one social group (such as workers) decreased as the group’s demands for certain political and social rights were achieved. This was especially the case following World War II when the state began providing universal welfare services, such as health care and education. Second, it became increasingly difficult for mass parties to represent a specific segment of the population (e.g., workers) when, following World War II, economic growth resulted in greater opportunity for social mobility, which helped to erase class differences. Finally, once the leaders of mass parties won office, they sought to stay there by broadening their appeal beyond the segment of society that was initially responsible for their election. Thus, the leaders of mass parties (like their colleagues in cadre parties) tried to catch as many voters as possible.13 The combination of the aforementioned factors led to the third stage of party development, which lasted from 1945 until the end of the twentieth century and was marked by the replacement of mass parties with catchall parties.14 Unlike mass parties (which, as mentioned, focused their attention on specific segments of the population), catchall parties appealed to different social groups (as long as they did not have significant conflicts of interest). In order to attract such groups, catchalls focused on general issues about which large sectors of the population could agree. Consequently, in the catchall model, parties are relatively uncommitted to a particular set of ideologies but outspoken on issues that are relatively uncontroversial (such as economic growth and development); as a result, these catchall parties tend to look alike.15 According to one scholar, as mass communications grew in the postwar era, the catchall party became “professionalized”; that is, it relied on career politicians with specialized knowledge to win elections.16 Specifically, the spread of mass media in general, and the rise of television in particular, meant that campaigns were increasingly candidate centered and issue oriented. Thus, parties sought experts who knew how to use television and the mass media to the party’s advantage. For example, professional pollsters who could track opinions, public relations experts who could market the party to voters, and advertising agents who knew how to use television to showcase candidates were hired. This is in contrast to the mass party, which was run by a bureaucracy staffed by individuals recruited from within its own ranks. The professionalized catchall party has three other characteristics worth mentioning here. First, unlike mass parties, which emphasized membership, the catchall party focuses on winning elections. While the former therefore developed strong ties to a specific group of adherents and cultivated their sense of belonging, the latter gauges opinions and woos voters. Second, the catchall party relies on interest groups and public funds to survive (unlike the mass party, which was financed through members’ dues and donations). Finally, the professionalized party focuses on issues and candidates that

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

Page 155

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

155

appeal to broad swaths of the electorate (rather than on ideology that appeals to a distinct segment of society, as mass parties were wont to do).17 While professional politicians are still part of the political landscape in Europe today, scholars argue that the catchall party has been replaced by a new type of party, the “cartel” party, a transition to which occurred at the end of the twentieth century, marking the fourth stage of party organizational development.18 Cartel parties have two main characteristics. The first is party-state “interpenetration”; that is, they use state resources for material support. Interpenetration is a response to the decrease in party membership rolls in recent years. Across Europe, citizens are either joining single-issue interest groups, which are small enough to give adherents an active role in the group’s activities, or are disengaging from politics entirely, instead of joining political parties. This decline in membership has forced parties to look elsewhere for material support, and the source they have turned to the most is the state. State subsidies are now the major source of financial support for political parties in Europe. Interpenetration is also due to the party’s own actions. Once in power, party leaders set up rules regarding public funding, which advantage their own parties at the expense of newer ones. For example, in many European states, party subsidies depend on the party’s share of the popular vote or its share of parliamentary seats, or both. While established parties have few problems fulfilling this criterion, newer parties often struggle to win parliamentary representation and, thus, rarely qualify for much-needed state subsidies. Similarly, parties in power can regulate the media in ways that advantage their interests at the expense of those newer entrants into politics.19 The second characteristic of cartel parties is that “they share with their competitors a mutual interest in collective organizational survival,”20 by colluding with other parties on sharing power and making promises not to challenge one another in certain electoral contests. Thus, cartel parties are centralized organizations run by professional politicians that depend on the state and the cooperation of other parties to succeed (and survive) in the political sphere. While this brief discussion of cadre, mass, catchall, and cartel parties (summarized in Table 7.1) provides information about the evolution of parties as organizations, it does not say much about the number or type of parties in a given European state. It is to these topics that we now turn.

■ Party Systems Party systems are defined by the number of parties represented in parliament (or their degree of fragmentation) and the ideological distance between them (or their degree of polarization).21 Accordingly, three types of

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

156

Page 156

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

Table 7.1

The Evolution of Political Party Organizations

Cadre parties, 1800–1880s

Mass parties, 1880s–1960

Catchall parties, 1945–1990s Cartel parties, 2000–present

Organized by well-connected elites with access to capital; Little to no campaigning; In power, party members formed parliamentary groups to coordinate their activities and further personal interests Organized to mobilize the newly enfranchised working class; Labor-intensive campaigns financed by members’ dues; In power, party members represented the interests of one segment of society (e.g., workers) through party discipline Organized to win elections through professional politics; Campaigns intended to woo broad swaths of the electorate; Dependent upon public funds and interest-group contributions for survival Organized by professional politicians; Dependent upon public funds and the cooperation of other parties for success and survival

party systems have been identified. First is moderate two-partyism, which is defined by a small number of parties separated by a relatively small ideological space. An example of this type of system is found in Britain, which has three main parties that are consistently represented in Parliament (Labour, Conservatives, and the Liberal Democrats). The second system, moderate multipartyism, which consists of several parties that are relatively close to one another ideologically. This system exists in states like Germany, Spain, Sweden, and the Czech Republic. Finally, there is polarized multipartyism, which is a system consisting of many parties with wide ideological space between them. Examples include France, Poland, Italy, and the Netherlands.22 The presence of different party systems raises the following question: How did some European states end up with one kind of system (such as twopartyism in Britain or moderate multipartyism in Germany) while others have another system type (such as polarized multipartyism in France)? Most scholars argue that a state’s system is connected to its societal cleavages (or social divisions), and that the strength or weakness of a particular cleavage determines the presence or absence of a particular political party within the system. Political parties that are able to mobilize voters on the basis of their cleavages were the parties that ended up being the strongest in the system.23 The first societal cleavages that spawned different political parties were created by the state formation process itself. As was discussed in Chapter 3, state formation in western Europe involved the gradual disconnection of the absolute monarchy from the overarching power and authority of the Catholic Church. This disconnection was most thorough in northern Europe, where monarchs, after the Treaty of Augsburg (1555), established indigenous Protestant churches, such as the Lutheran Church in Scandinavia and certain German-speaking monarchies and the Anglican Church in Britain. In south-

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

Page 157

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

157

ern Europe the monarchies did not disconnect their realms from the church, which remained allied with the monarchy, although monarchs had been granted a say in who would be appointed to its highest ecclesiastical offices. With the advent of the French Revolution in 1789 and the spread of liberal nationalist ideals throughout Europe in the nineteenth century, supporters of the creation of liberal democratic states began to do battle against those who advocated the preservation of the existing absolutist monarchies. In France, for example, the Revolution led to a violent struggle between the supporters of the newly created liberal democratic state and the Catholic Church, which had sided with the ancien régime (or the monarchical state). This struggle was not only political, but financial (e.g., whether the liberal democratic state should continue to finance church activities) as well as moral (i.e., whether the liberal democratic state, rather than the church, should educate France’s children by way of a centralized, secular, and compulsory public school system).24 Thus, Christian Democratic parties were subsequently created to defend the Catholic religion’s privileged position, while others (mainly those positioned on the political left) were formed to defend the secular state and freedom of religious choice. In contrast, this bitter opposition between the church and the secular nation-state (and the parties it produced) was all but absent in states like Britain, where the battle between the two had been resolved a century earlier when the state took over the Catholic Church and transformed it into the Anglican Church, or the Church of England.25 In addition to the struggle between liberal revolutionaries (or the supporters of the creation of the secular, liberal democratic state) and the monarchists (or those who sought the preservation or restoration of the monarchical state and corporate privileges of the nobility and church), a cleavage connected to the formation of the state emerged. Specifically, differences arose between the center (or the centralizing liberal democratic state) and the periphery (or the ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct groups living outside the state’s capital).26 This divide was reflected in the existence of regionalist parties, which were established to defend ancient local cultures and languages from the strong centralizing and homogenizing tendencies of the liberal state. As the liberal democratic state solidified, political party formation increasingly reflected the societal cleavages created by the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which created conflict between the traditional landowning elites and the wealthy owners of newly created industries. While it is true that divisions between urban and rural interests had existed in Europe well before the Industrial Revolution (we recall that the estate system of the Middle Ages allowed the nobility to represent landed interests and burghers to represent those of the city), divisions between the two were exacerbated by the rapid growth in trade and industrial production. Specifically, conservative agrarian parties often com-

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

158

Page 158

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

peted with liberal-radical parties for control of national legislatures during the nineteenth century.27 The intensity of the urban-rural cleavage varied from state to state, however. In Britain and Germany, for example, the conflict between the two sides was reduced when rural and urban elites started to intermarry and merge their business interests. Thus, landowning gentry and the owners of industry gradually came to see each other as political allies. In states like the Netherlands, France, Spain, and Italy, the rural-urban split continued to be overshadowed by the church-state cleavage; thus, parties in these states were more likely to embody religious or secular causes. In contrast, the rural-urban divide was much more pronounced in Scandinavia, where parties were formed to articulate the interests of urban elites (who had historically controlled national political life) and the newly mobilized peasants (who protested their exploitation by city dwellers).28 However, the rural-urban split was soon overshadowed in all European states by another cleavage created by the Industrial Revolution: the division between owners and workers. The biggest political impact of this cleavage was the organization and mobilization of the working class throughout Europe (which, as mentioned above, coincided with the spread of universal male suffrage throughout Europe). In the words of one scholar, “The rising masses of wage earners, whether in large-scale farming, in forestry, or in industry, resented their conditions of work and the insecurity of their contracts, and many of them felt socially and culturally alienated from the owners and employers. The result was the formation of a variety of labor unions and the development of anti-liberal Socialist parties.”29 The strength of working-class movements throughout Europe depended (in part) on the attitude of the traditional elites. In Britain and Scandinavia, for example, elites did not try to repress working-class organizations and parties; thus workers’ parties in these states were large, mainstream, and pragmatic. In contrast, elites in states like Germany, Austria, France, Italy, and Spain attempted to repress the unions and the socialists, which increased the number of working-class groups that were attracted to Socialist and Communist parties, especially after the Russian Revolution of 1917. Another type of antiliberal party developed in the first half of the twentieth century—extreme nationalists. These parties originated from the dissatisfaction with the settlement of World War I and were supported by independent business owners of the lower-middle classes (i.e., owners of small farms, artisans, shopkeepers, and so on). While the ideologies of these parties varied from state to state (e.g., National Socialism in Germany and Fascism in Italy), they shared a desire to replace the existing liberal democratic state with an authoritarian one that would further the interests of the party’s members as well as protect and preserve the state’s dominant nationality by excluding “outsiders.”30

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

Page 159

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

159

Since the 1980s, such antiliberal parties have taken the form of xenophobic organizations on the extreme right that are highly critical of mainstream cartel parties dominating politics. The extreme nationalist parties accuse the mainstream parties of passing permissive immigration policies, which undermine the well-being of native workers and dilute the “purity” of the nation. During the immediate postwar period, immigrants from Europe’s former colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean were welcomed as a much-needed source of labor, labor that helped to fuel Europe’s spectacular economic growth from 1945 to 1975. However, when many of Europe’s states experienced economic difficulties during the 1970s and 1980s, and a considerable number of native workers lost their jobs, the nonwhite immigrants became a source of resentment. Far-right nationalist parties tapped into this resentment and gained popularity with rhetoric that was racist, anti-immigrant, and frequently anti-Semitic. As we shall see below, these far-right nationalist parties promise to solve the economic and social problems they say have been created by the established parties and their leaders by expelling nonnative workers from the state. Since World War II the cleavages that traditionally defined party systems in Europe have started to weaken as the liberal democratic nation-state has become more and more entrenched. This weakening has been due to several factors, including a commitment to political cooperation in the postwar era and a thirty-year period of rapid economic growth, which created a large new middle class and which changed the nature of the labor force (specifically, a decline in manual labor and a rise in the tertiary, or services, sector). Thus, the differences among social categories that once resulted in support for different political parties have become less pronounced. Instead, a new basis for party support has emerged in the postwar era: postmaterialism, especially in the most prosperous European states. In those states where citizens have achieved a certain level of education and economic comfort, they have stopped basing their political decisions on materialistic values (e.g., a desire to secure material needs like food, clothing, and shelter), starting to base them instead on nonmaterial values, such as environmentalism, human rights, peace, and social justice. It is said that Green parties are supported by people who hold postmaterialist values because of their commitment to the environment and, to a lesser extent, women and multiculturalism. These parties remain on the fringes of the party system of most European states, however.31

■ Party Families As mentioned above, the members of elected assemblies felt a need to group themselves together according to what they held in common. This tendency

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

160

Page 160

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

of grouping together according to shared ideology or interest appeared in the National Assembly of France after the Revolution of 1789. In Chapter 6 we discussed how in that assembly (actually, an indoor tennis court), the representatives arranged their group seating, with respect to the dais, according to their stance on the absolute monarchy (right of dais) versus constitutional monarchy (middle) versus republic (left) issue. Ever since, European political parties have been placed on a left-right continuum depending upon their degree of ideological radicality with respect to the established political, economic, and social organization of the state.32 (See Table 7.2.) The first parties of the left were those of the liberals who wanted to replace the monarchical state with a republic. These parties were gradually displaced by more radical Social Democratic and Socialist parties as the objectives of the liberals were achieved. Socialist and Social Democratic parties were created after the Industrial Revolution in the late 1800s by the newly enfranchised working class to replace the traditional ruling elites with representatives who would protect working-class interests as well as those of society as a whole. Initially, Socialist and Social Democratic parties sought to end the exploitation of workers by overthrowing capitalist economic structures and by eliminating poverty, social inequality, social injustice, and the like. There were two views about how this goal could best be accomplished. According to some, the desired social and economic changes could be achieved only through revolution. Others argued that change could occur through nonviolent reform. The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the creation of the Communist International permanently split the two sides. The revolutionary wing formed Communist parties, while the reformers created Socialist and Social Democratic parties. Thereafter, the

Table 7.2

Political Party Families from Left to Right

Left

Right

Communists

Green

Seek the revolutionary overthrow of capitalist regimes and establishment of a classless, collectivist, and state-owned economy

Seek greater environmental and civil-rights protections as well as peaceful resolution to violent conflict

Socialist/ Social Democrats Seek economic reform through nationalization and progressive taxation, and social reform through social spending and programs

Regional/ Ethnic

Liberal/ Conservative Nationalists

Seek autonomy for a particular region or ethnicity; present across the political spectrum

Seek a free market approach to the economy and limited social spending and programs

Seek to advance the interests of native citizens through racist, antiimmigration policies

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

Page 161

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

161

reformist side could be identified by its opposition to both capitalism and communism. The newly created Socialist and Social Democratic parties wanted to reform both the economy and society. To achieve economic reform, party members used the state’s power over the economy through state regulation and ownership of industries and utilities, progressive taxation and redistributive government spending, and collective bargaining agreements between the state, business owners, and labor unions. In addition to social reforms, socialists and social democrats proposed that the state provide society with a large safety net composed of social security, universal health care, public education, safe working conditions, unemployment benefits, and equal opportunities for women and minorities, among other things. During the postwar boom (i.e., 1945–1975), Socialist and Social Democratic parties flourished in Europe, and their programs received support across the political spectrum (primarily because parties on the right realized that a rejection of the proposed social reforms would be akin to committing electoral suicide). However, when the boom came to an end in the mid-1970s, Social Democratic parties ran into trouble. Specifically, those parties that happened to be in power were blamed for Europe’s economic decline and were penalized for it at the ballot box. Moreover, the Socialist and Social Democratic parties that won power during the 1980s (well after the downturn) had difficulty reconciling their program of nationalizations and public spending with the policy of economic liberalism required by the European Union. For example, the French socialists performed a “U-turn” toward economic austerity in 1983 in order to comply with the economic criteria of the European Union (EU). These difficulties (coupled with the inability of social democrats to regain power in states like Germany and Britain) forced these parties to revise their policy programs. As of this writing, socialists and social democrats throughout Europe have adopted the “Third Way.” This approach calls upon social democrats to embrace some of the key tenets of economic liberalism while using state power to promote equal opportunity and reduce social injustice. Thus, socialist and social democrats in power during the late 1990s and early 2000s (e.g., Tony Blair in Britain and Gerhard Schröder in Germany) did not shy away from privatizing national industries and reducing public spending. In other words, social democrats today continue to believe in using the power of public initiative and the public purse to protect the less fortunate and, in the long term, reduce their numbers via strategies of promoting equality of opportunity. All, however, realize that this power is constrained by what is deemed prudent by international and financial markets and reasonable, taxwise, by their electorates. To them, the state still has an economic as well as a welfare role, but it is as a regulator or framework-setter as opposed to an owner or driver. 33

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

162

Page 162

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

The Third Way has proved particularly popular in central and eastern Europe, where Social Democratic parties have fared particularly well in post–Cold War era elections. For example, the Hungarian socialist party received just over 40 percent of the vote in the 2006 parliamentary elections and social democrats in the Czech Republic received approximately 30 percent of the vote in elections held the same year. Further left on the political party spectrum are Communist and far-left parties. As mentioned above, Communist parties grew out of the split between revolutionary and reform-minded social democrats that occurred during the first quarter of the twentieth century. At that time, Communist parties in states such as France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands argued for the revolutionary overthrow of the existing capitalist regimes and the establishment of a classless, collective society and a state-controlled economy. However, between the time of their founding and the outbreak of World War II, these Communist parties proved to be more nationalistic and betrayed their revolutionary ideological attachment to universalistic objectives (“workers of the world unite”) by joining forces with social democrats in coalition governments to save the state from being taken over by extreme-right-wing parties. Following World War II, Communist parties in Europe took two paths. In Central and Eastern Europe, which fell within the Soviet sphere of influence, Communist parties monopolized political life. That is to say, states in this part of Europe were “one-party dictatorships” that regulated the economy, did away with private property and many personal freedoms, and sought to provide a basic level of economic security and social harmony. However, in the western half of Europe, Communist parties were marginalized by the Cold War. That is, they either failed to win significant political support (e.g., Britain) or, in states where Communist parties received a moderate level of support, they ignored their commitment to revolution and joined coalition governments headed by social democrats (e.g., France, Italy, Belgium, and Sweden). Once the Cold War was over, many Communist parties in Europe (e.g., Italy and Germany) adopted new names and new programs in their quest to survive as institutions. Accordingly, these reformed Communist parties promised to preserve the welfare state (despite the liberal economic policies being adopted by many EU member states), protect the rights of women and minorities, and promote environmentalism, peace, justice, and aid to non-Western states. At the same time, some Communist parties remained true to their founding principles (e.g., the Czech Communist party and, to a lesser extent, the French and Portuguese communists) and continued to campaign on platforms opposing market reforms and supporting state ownership. However, both communists and ex-communists have had a difficult time winning electoral support, with both parties typically winning only a small percentage of the vote in national elections.34

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

Page 163

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

163

Another party that exists within the family of leftist parties is the Green Party. A product of the postmaterial new politics movement of the 1960s, which protested against mainstream politics, society, and culture while at the same time demanding greater social justice and equality, the Greens are primarily concerned with environmental protection. They also seek improved rights for women and minorities, the peaceful resolution of international conflict, and greater assistance to non-Western states. The success of Green parties varies throughout Europe. In some states (e.g., Germany, France, Italy, Finland, Belgium), the Greens consistently garner 5 to 10 percent of the national vote and have played a part (albeit a small one) in socialist-led coalition governments. In other states, support for Green parties is almost nonexistent. In central and eastern Europe, (and to a lesser extent in the southern part of the continent), where the focus is still on achieving a certain level of material well-being, postmaterial values (and the associated movements and parties) have not yet emerged as a significant part of the electoral landscape. The right of the European political spectrum is occupied by conservative parties. As was mentioned above and in Chapter 6, the first conservatives emerged after the French Revolution and sought to conserve monarchy. Later, after the Industrial Revolution, which produced a cleavage between the traditional landed elites and the new urban industrial entrepreneurs, conservatives sought to maintain the privileges of the rural landowning elites. The rural elites formed conservative or agrarian parties to defend their interests, while the urban industrialists formed liberal or radical parties (about which we will have more to say below). Once the electorate was enlarged to included male (and eventually female) workingclass voters, the conservatives broadened their appeal with a combination of paternalist policies (e.g., public assistance to the needy should exist but should be limited) and nationalist promises (e.g., the state should protect its “traditional” way of life at home and abroad). However, after the destruction of World War II, all European parties across the political spectrum agreed that the state should play a significant role in rebuilding the economy and society; therefore, conservative parties toned down their calls to reduce public spending. Yet, when European economies began to deteriorate in the mid-1970s, conservative parties were rewarded at the ballot box, especially in states where the social democrats possessed political power at the time of economic decline (e.g., Germany and the United Kingdom). It was in these states, during the 1980s and early 1990s, that conservatives became more “liberal,” advocating a free market approach to the economy (e.g., the privatization of national industry, reductions in public spending, increases in corporate tax breaks, and the marginalization of trade unions) and to society (e.g., cutting or eliminating various social programs). As of this writing, conservative parties are successful through-

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

164

Page 164

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

out Europe, regularly winning between 30 to 40 percent of the national vote in many states. There are three types of conservative parties. First, there are Christian Democratic parties, which grew out of the church-state cleavage, described in the previous section, to protect the interests of the Catholic Church against the anti-clericism of the liberal and Socialist parties. These parties, with their commitment to “capitalism with a conscience,” were especially popular after World War II. Specifically, they supported state involvement in the economy (especially when it led to “mutually beneficial” businesslabor relations) and in society (particularly when it strengthened the traditional Christian family and its related values). However, the Christian Democrats stopped well short of embracing the social democrats’ vision of a classless and collective society; instead they recognized individualism and opposed unlimited state interference in the economy and society. With the number of churchgoers in decline throughout Europe, as of this writing, Christian Democratic parties have abandoned their religious appeals and adopted the free market ideals of the conservatives; thus, it is increasingly difficult to tell them apart from their secular rivals.35 Agrarian parties constitute the second type of conservative party. As noted above, these parties were created to protect the rural side of the ruralurban divide—that is, the traditional landed elites as well as smaller-farm owners and peasants (especially in Scandinavia). However, as the number of people working in the agricultural sector declined during the twentieth century, so did support for agrarian parties, and their role in European politics in the early-twenty-first century is practically nonexistent.36 The third party type on the right is the liberal party, which emerged after the French Revolution. Initially, liberal parties centered around the protection of individual rights against the power of the absolutist monarchical state. Later, liberal parties came to represent the interests of the urban commercial classes. As of this writing, however, there are two types of liberal parties. One type, known as the neoliberal right, adheres closely to free market principles and objects to any state involvement in the economy or society, especially when it comes to moral issues (e.g., abortion, divorce, same-sex marriage, and so on.). A second type, a more centrist or progressive liberalism, is more permissive of state interference in economic and social issues, especially with regard to civil liberties and civil rights protections for women and minorities. Whatever the type, liberal parties are generally well represented throughout Europe. They receive from 5 to 25 percent of the vote and are frequently invited to form coalition governments with the main parties on both the left and the right. Much farther out on the right end of the political party spectrum are extreme nationalist parties. As pointed out earlier, these parties have become increasingly prominent since Europe experienced economic decline

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

Page 165

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

165

in the mid-1970s. With rising unemployment rates, extreme nationalist parties used anti-immigrant rhetoric and anti-immigration policies to win over native-born blue-collar voters (especially those who were out of work). One popular argument was that jobs as well as public assistance should be reserved for the native born and denied to “undeserving foreigners.” Recently, far-right parties have performed relatively well in national elections. For example, Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of France’s National Front Party, was one of two candidates to qualify for the second round of voting in the 2002 French presidential elections; and the Austrian Freedom Party (headed by Jörg Haider) garnered enough votes in the 1999 parliamentary elections to form a coalition government with the Christian Democrats. While their political breakthroughs were relatively short lived (e.g., Le Pen lost his bid for president, and Haider’s party has been plagued by internal divisions), far-right parties still attract an average of 10 percent of voters in national elections and thus constitute a force that is impossible for mainstream parties on either the left or right to ignore. Finally, it should be noted that there is one type of European party that transcends left-right distinctions: the regional or ethnic party. While these parties differ in their positions on social and economic issues, they are similar in their demands for autonomy (or, at the very least, more power) for a particular region or ethnicity. Regional and ethnic parties are found throughout Europe, and some have even managed to win seats (albeit a small number) in parliament. Examples include the regional parties of Belgium (e.g., parties representing Dutch-speaking Flanders or Frenchspeaking Wallonia) as well as the ethnic parties of Romania and Slovakia (e.g., parties representing Hungarian minorities in both states).37 We will have more to say about regionalist parties in the concluding chapter.

■ Political Parties in Decline? At this writing, scholars of European politics question whether political parties are in decline. Those who see the parties in decline argue that this is evident in the consistent decrease in party membership from World War II and in the low activity rates of those who are nominal members. For example, during the late 1990s, approximately 1 percent of the electorate adhered to a party in Poland and France; 2 percent adhered in Britain and the Netherlands, and 3 percent were members in Germany and Spain. Instead of joining political parties, citizens are more likely to spend their leisure time in activities unrelated to politics, which is unsurprising given the growing numbers of people who are apathetic to things political. Moreover, the people who are still passionate about politics are increasingly attracted to single-issue interest groups or social movements, two topics discussed further below.38

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

166

Page 166

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

We should be careful, however, about assuming that parties are in decline simply because their membership rolls have gotten smaller. As previously mentioned, parties no longer depend on large membership bases for their survival. For example, the recent rise of the cartel party means that parties increasingly rely on state subsidies rather than membership donations and subscriptions for their finances. Also, the rise and spread of television and mass media have resulted in capital-intensive electoral campaigns, which means that a party’s electoral success no longer depends on possessing and mobilizing a large number of members (as it did in the mass party era). In addition, it is argued that parties will remain an important part of the political landscape because they serve a unique function. Specifically, they act as “information-economizing devices for voters who would otherwise be confronted with a chaotic choice of alternatives and agents whom they could neither conceivably hope to know nor trust.”39 This is in contrast to interest groups and social movements, which, as we will see below, are not designed to play the electoral game. However, before we can begin a discussion of these groups and movements, we first must discuss how European parties win power; that is, how citizens’ votes are translated into parliamentary seats.

■ Electoral Systems Two main kinds of electoral systems are employed in Europe: the singlemember plurality/majority system and the proportional system. When elections are governed by the plurality/majority system, they are held in singlemember districts, which means that there is only one parliamentary seat per electoral district. If the election is decided by the plurality system (also known as the first-past-the-post system, or FPP), then the candidate (or party) with the most votes (or a plurality) wins the parliamentary seat. This system is used for parliamentary elections in Britain. However, if the election is decided by a majority, then the winning candidate must receive 50 percent of the vote in a constituency plus one. France uses a modified version of the majority system for its National Assembly elections. Known as the double ballot system, French legislative contests are held in singlemember districts with two rounds of voting on successive Sundays. If a candidate wins a majority of the votes during the first round, she or he is elected. Otherwise, a second round of voting follows, and those candidates who received less than 12.5 percent of the vote in the first round are excluded. The candidate with the plurality of votes in the second round wins the seat, even if she or he fails to achieve an overall majority. The second (and more popular) electoral system used in Europe is the proportional system, or PR. A key element of PR electoral systems is the

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

Page 167

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

167

multimember electoral district, which means that there is more than one parliamentary seat per district. Under party-list PR, each party presents a list of candidates for each district. Each list usually contains the names of as many candidates as there are seats to be filled in the district. The seats are then allocated to the parties in proportion to the votes that they win. These lists are either “open,” which means that the voters (rather than the parties) determine the order of candidates on the list; or they are “closed,” which means that voters can vote only for or against a party’s list. European states began to adopt PR around the turn of the nineteenth century in response to demands made by mass parties supported by the newly enfranchised working class for more equitable representation in national legislatures. The use of PR was also supported by the cadre parties, which feared that the single-member-district plurality system would mean an end to their power because their supporters (i.e., wealthy men) would be in the minority now that the working class had been enfranchised. Thus, PR was thought to be the only electoral system that would guarantee representation of all classes in parliament. At this writing, PR is used in parliamentary elections in all European states, except in Britain and France.40 One variation on PR is the mixed system, which is used in Germany and Italy. Under the mixed system, each voter is given two votes. One vote is cast for a candidate running in the single-member (or local) electoral district. The second vote is cast for a list of candidates running in a multimember district (which usually covers a region or state). The degree to which this system is proportional depends on the breakdown of legislative seats. For example, the mixed system is considered more proportional in Germany than in Italy because approximately half of all legislative seats in the former (but only a quarter in the latter) are determined by the list PR system.41 There is debate about which electoral system has the fairest or most representative results. The plurality system is criticized for being unrepresentative because candidates can win office without receiving a majority of votes, which results in parliaments controlled by parties that may not be backed by a majority of voters. Plurality and majority systems are also criticized for their district magnitude or their number of parliamentary seats per district. These systems have relatively small districts (i.e., one member of parliament per district), which is said to produce less proportional results than those in larger (or multimember) districts. Thus, the single-memberdistrict plurality system used in Britain and the single-member-district modified majority system employed in France are considered less proportional (or representative) than the large multimember districts found in states such as the Netherlands and Russia. Plurality and majority systems do have some positive characteristics, however. They are said to be closely connected to the creation of two-party systems, which means that only one party occupies power at a time (unlike

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

168

Page 168

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

the coalition of parties that control government in states with list PR systems). Single-party governments are lauded as being stable, durable, and capable of keeping their party’s policy promises because they do not need to create a consensus among multiple parties for legislative success (as coalition governments must do). In addition, it is easy for voters to hold singleparty governments accountable for their actions. When only one of two parties controls office, it is hard for its legislators to avoid the blame for unpopular or failed policies. Despite their attributes, plurality and majority systems are not as representative as PR, especially when it comes to the allocation of seats. As alluded to above, the PR system has a more equitable system of seat allocation, especially when districts are large. Specifically, large multimember districts found in PR elections make for a highly proportional election result. The Netherlands, for example, is said to have one of the highest levels of proportionality in Europe because the entire national territory is treated as one multimember district with 150 seats. In addition, election results are said to be more representative than under the plurality-majority systems because a multiplicity of parties can win representation and the main parties of the left and right are more likely to nominate women or minorities to party lists (than to districts where only one seat is available, as is the case in FPP systems). We should note, however, that European states limit the extent to which their system is representative by instituting a threshold or a percentage that a party must win in order to get representation in parliament. The higher the threshold the more difficult it is for smaller parties to qualify for a legislative seat. Some European states (like the Czech Republic, Poland, Germany, and Russia) have set relatively high thresholds to prevent a proliferation of small parties in parliament. By limiting the representation of such parties, these states hope to avoid the highly fragmented party systems and unstable coalition governments that were characteristic of the political landscape of the interwar period. However, given that higher thresholds are said to result in lower levels of proportionality, European states with such thresholds have placed limits on political representation (albeit for a seemingly good cause). Finally, PR is said to be closely connected to the creation of multiparty systems, which often result in coalition governments that represent a wide variety of voters. However, such governments are sometimes criticized, first, for being inefficient and ineffective because their members spend too much time trying to come up with policy compromises; and, second, for being short-lived since their existence depends on the consensus of a potentially wide variety of parties. The proportionality of a state’s electoral system determines in part whether citizens will actually participate in the elections it governs; the

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

Page 169

169

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

more representative or proportional an electoral system, the higher the voter turnout. Since World War II, however, voter turnout has declined throughout Europe, especially in Britain, which is one of the few European states to use the single-member-district plurality system (see Table 7.3). Does this decline mean that electoral systems have gotten less representative? Not necessarily, but it has raised concerns that Europe’s citizens are increasingly apathetic about politics today. Given that voters are faced with elections contested by parties that seem more and more alike (especially when it comes to scandal and corruption), it is not surprising that they are turned off by politics. At the same time, we should be careful about overestimating the extent to which voter turnout has declined. Some scholars argue that we should not compare today’s voting levels with those in the immediate postwar period, since turnout rates in the 1950s were unusually high. In addition, a few instances of poor turnout (e.g., the 2001 elections in Britain and Poland) do not constitute a trend. Instead, scholars are more interested in explaining the variation in voter turnout among European states, which can be explained by a range of factors. For example, it has been shown that certain voting rules (like compulsory voting, voting by mail, and weekend voting), PR electoral systems, and electorally salient elections (e.g., elections that voters feel actually affect the composition of government) explain why turnout is greater in the Netherlands or Sweden than in France or Britain.42

■ Interest Groups As mentioned above, more and more of Europe’s citizens are abandoning political parties for interest groups, which are groups of like-minded people who pressure governments to make policies responsive to their beliefs and

Table 7.3

Italy 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s

94 93 91 89 85 81

Turnout in Selected European States (percentages), 1950–2004

Netherlands Sweden 96 95 84 84 76 80

79 86 90 89 85 80

Czech Germany Republic 87 87 91 87 80 79

N/A N/A N/A N/A 83 58

Britain

France

Spain

Poland

80 77 75 74 75 59

80 77 76 72 69 60

N/A N/A 73 77 78 73

N/A N/A N/A N/A 48 46

Source: Tim Bale, European Politics: A Comparative Introduction (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 142. Note: N/A means not applicable; the states in question had not yet established “democratic” political practices.

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

170

Page 170

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

concerns. They differ from political parties in that they do not contest elections or attempt to influence the state from the inside. Instead, as we shall see below, interest groups use a wide range of strategies to influence the state from the outside. Political scientists study interest groups because high numbers of them are said to create social capital. Defined as norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from the connections among individuals, social capital is thought to be an essential element of well-functioning democracies.43 According to this notion, then, European states with a multiplicity of interest groups are rich in social capital and, as a result, are solid democracies. At the same time, however, political scientists argue that individuals have little incentive to join interest groups, and, thus, a collective action problem exists—that is, most people think that their participation in a group will not make any difference in the group’s goals. Moreover, even if the group’s goals are achieved, the policy benefits are collective, which means that people who do not contribute to a group can benefit from their actions. Thus, there is little incentive to act collectively. Instead, there is incentive to “free-ride,” or to enjoy the benefits of collective action but not participate in acquiring them. In short, free riders benefit from someone else’s activity. For example, during the 1960s and 1970s, women’s groups in most of Western Europe lobbied for reproductive rights. As a result, birth control and abortion were legalized in many European states. All women benefited from the new reproductive rights laws, not just those women who were group members. Thus, the nonmembers, or free riders, received policy benefits despite their lack of group participation. There is one problem, however, with the collective action approach. Empirical studies have shown that people do join interest groups, especially in Europe. For example, residents of northern Europe and Scandinavia have fairly high rates of participation in religious organizations, trade unions, professional associations, and recreational groups.44 Interest groups have thus solved the collective action problem by motivating individuals to participate. They do so by providing a set of special membership benefits, such as informational opportunities (e.g., conferences, newsletters); material rewards (e.g., discounts, coupons, magazines); and social or emotional fulfillment (e.g., being with friends, networking, performing a civic duty). In light of all these solutions to the collective action problem, it is not surprising that a wide variety of interest groups have sprung up throughout Europe (see Table 7.4). Most of these groups fall into one of two categories. First, there are associational groups, which are permanent, well organized, and have a long-term political agenda. Associational groups cover a wide variety of interests, including those that are economic (such as farming groups, trade unions, and business associations); racial, ethnic, or regional (such as antidiscrimination leagues); gender based (such as women’s rights

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

Page 171

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Table 7.4

171

Types of Interest Groups and Social Movements

Interest groups: Groups of like-minded people who exert external pressure on the state to make policies responsive to their beliefs and concerns Associational groups: Permanent groups that have a long-term political agenda • Economic (e.g., business associations and trade unions) • Racial, ethnic, or regional (e.g., antidiscrimination leagues) • Professional (e.g., associations for doctors or lawyers) • Issue specific (e.g., wildlife protection)

Nonassociational groups: Ad hoc groups formed to achieve a specific goal • A group to save honey bees • A group to ban same-sex marriage

Social movements: People engaged in collective action because they believe that neither the state nor established parties or interest groups address their concerns New social movements of the 1960s and 1970s: • Composed of people critical of mainstream society • Sought expanded rights for women and minorities, better protections for animals and the environment, and various peace initiatives • Engaged in contentious action

Social movements of the 1980s and 2000s: • Organized by professionals and financed by member donations • Waged/wage capital and media intensive protests • Less likely to engage in disruptive practices or exhibit antiauthoritarian tendencies

organizations); religious (such as church groups); and professional (such as associations for doctors and lawyers). In addition, some associational groups are formed around a specific issue, such as bird protection. Second, there are nonassociational interest groups, which are created on an ad hoc basis to achieve an immediate goal. These groups are not necessarily well organized and tend to disband once they achieve their objectives (e.g., a group that wants to ban same-sex marriage).45 Almost all interest groups try to influence state policies and have a variety of strategies to do so. One way that the groups get politicians’ attention is by staging public acts (such as boycotts, sit-ins, rallies, and marches) or by purchasing advertisements. Known as “going public,” this strategy ideally generates positive media coverage and is intended to create favorable political opinion toward the group and its views. A second way that interest groups influence politics is through lobbying. Specifically, groups hire lobbyists to influence the passage of legislation by exerting pressure on legislators. Lobbyists are able to have an impact because politicians depend on them for specialized and credible information, which is necessary when deciding how to vote on (or how to draft) a bill. A third strategy that interest groups use is litigation, whereby groups embark on the costly and time-con-

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

172

Page 172

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

suming process of filing or financing a court case. Finally, interest groups exert an influence by engaging in electoral politics, whether it be through campaign activism (e.g., mobilizing voters to support a particular candidate) or campaign finance (e.g., donations to political parties).46 The strategy an interest group selects depends upon internal factors like the amount of money in its bank account, the length of its membership list, and the effectiveness of its leadership. Yet strategy selection also depends upon external factors, like a state’s culture and political institutions, which is known as its political opportunity structure. Thus, to understand an interest group’s strategy, we need to know the context in which it operates. For example, a federal or decentralized state provides interest groups with more pressure points than does a highly centralized state. Similarly, the presence of a supranational governing body (such as the EU) gives interest groups an additional place to focus their efforts. Also, the presence of numerous independent media outlets provide greater opportunity for groups to go public, versus the reliance on state-controlled media, which are limited to only a few television stations or newspapers.47 Further, interest-group strategy depends upon whether the nation-state has a tradition of pluralism or corporatism. In some European states (such as Britain), groups are permitted to advise the government on policy as it pertains to them but are not included in the policymaking process itself. Known as pluralism, this process derives its name from the fact both that the government consults a plurality of groups when drafting bills and that no one group monopolizes the process. In contrast, other European states— most notably Germany and Sweden in northern Europe and Portugal and Spain in southern Europe—have a corporatist tradition, meaning that privileged groups are asked to help the government craft legislation. For example, labor unions and employers’ associations often help governments in corporatist states create mutually beneficial policies: Union leaders agree to wage caps, employers promise to create more jobs, and the government commits itself to economic growth.48 Critics of corporatism argue that it is undemocratic because it privileges some groups over others, but proponents counter that corporatism takes place in states with particularly strong parliaments and thus is not about to replace democratic government.

■ Social Movements Another way that citizens participate in politics and influence the political process is through social movements. In the words of one scholar, social movements are “segments of the population who engage in significant collective action because they believe that neither the state nor the established parties or interest groups have adequately addressed their concerns.”49

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

Page 173

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

173

Beginning in the 1960s, collective action of this kind was referred to as new social movements (NSMs). Composed of people critical of mainstream politics and society because they ignored certain types of people and issues, NSMs demanded expanded rights for women and minorities, better animal and environmental protection policies, and peace initiatives, such as nuclear disarmament. In addition, NSMs often engaged in contentious (or unconventional) forms of political activity, like boycotts, sit-ins, strikes, demonstrations, and rallies, primarily because these activities were thought to be the most effective way to get the government’s attention. While social movements continue to mobilize around postmaterialist concerns, they are less and less likely to be identified by disruptive practices and antiauthoritarian tendencies. Instead, as of this writing, movements wage capital- and media-intensive protests that are professionally staged and backed by well-funded and well-established organizations (for example, Greenpeace protests or Amnesty International rallies). In fact, early-twenty-first-century social movements are more likely to ask (potential) members for monetary donations rather than for help with contentious political expression. Thus, these social movements require low-levels of participation but high-levels of donations from members.50 (See Table 7.4.) Data suggest that there are a wide variety of social movements throughout Europe, but participation levels vary from state to state. Generally, involvement is highest in the economically wealthier states (such as the Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy, and Britain) where citizens are likely to have postmaterial concerns. In contrast, participation levels are lowest in the poorer EU member states (such as those in central and eastern Europe as well as, to a lesser extent, southern Europe), where citizens are still preoccupied with their material well-being. In 2000, for example, between onequarter and one-half of the Dutch population participated in movements devoted to human rights, the environment, and animal welfare. In contrast, less that 1 percent of citizens were members of similar movements in Portugal.51 However, we should be careful not to attribute the variation in participation rates solely to variations in economic development. It is also possible that participation varies because norms about participation differ throughout Europe. For example, the political cultures of northern Europe may encourage group participation to a greater extent than those in the eastern or southern part of the continent. In addition to the variations in movement participation levels, in the European states where participation is high, some movements are more popular than others. Between 1975 and 1989, for example, the French were most likely to participate in movements related to nuclear energy, regionalism, and trade unions; the (West) Germans were more likely to join movements against nuclear energy and nuclear weapons but not for the environment; and the Dutch were most likely to participate in squatters’ move-

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

174

Page 174

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

ments, nuclear disarmament movements, and various solidarity movements.52 However, these differences should not be stressed too much. While it is true that movements vary in size and strength according to a state’s preoccupations and priorities, many of them now transcend European borders, taking on the form of nongovernmental organizations or Euro-groups (that is, coalitions of national groups or movements created to better lobby institutions at the EU level). Regardless of the variation in number and type of social movements throughout Europe, some scholars have argued that Europe is now composed of “movement societies,” especially since citizens increasingly use social movements (as well as interest groups) to express themselves politically. At the same time, however, more conventional forms of political participation are still utilized, such as voting and political party activism, albeit at decreasing rates. Thus, we should view social movement and interestgroup activism as “a common practice that complements rather than competes with the more established forms of political participation.”53

■ Summary There are a variety of ways that European citizens participate in politics. Political parties (cadre, mass, catchall, cartel) long provided the primary means by which Europeans participated in politics. As noted above, these four types of political parties reflect changes in the electorate (namely, the spread of universal suffrage throughout Europe) and changes in electoral techniques (such as the rise of capital-intensive campaigns waged mainly through the mass media). Cartel parties of the early 2000s reflect the interpenetration that exists between political parties and the state. Established European parties depend upon state subsidies for their financial survival, especially during electoral campaigns; once in power, these parties use their control of the state’s resources to ensure future success. While most European states have reached the cartel phase of party development, the type of party system varies throughout Europe from moderate two-partyism in Britain to moderate multipartyism in states such as Germany and Sweden to polarized multipartyism in France and Poland. The nature and number of political parties were largely determined by the struggles that defined the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (i.e., the expanding monarchical state versus the historically privileged Catholic Church); the late eighteenth and the nineteenth century (i.e., the supporters of a liberal democratic state versus the proponents of the monarchical state and churchbased power, as well as the conflict between the center and the periphery); and the nineteenth and the early twentieth century (i.e., traditional landowning elites versus successful industrial entrepreneurs, which later gave way

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

Page 175

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

175

to the battles between owners and workers). The outcome of these struggles varied from state to state, and provides insight into why certain parties emerged in certain states (such as the Christian Democrats in Germany and Italy, the agrarians in Scandinavia, and the socialists throughout Europe). At this writing, however, the social cleavages connected to state formation that defined Europe’s party systems are weakening. For example, the materialist concerns that defined party differences during the nineteenth and the early twentieth century are being replaced by postmaterialist concerns about quality of life (rather than material survival). The rise of postmaterialism has led to the creation of new political parties (like the Greens) and has forced the more established ones (like the conservatives and the Social Democrats) to take a stand on issues like women’s rights, environmental protection, and nuclear energy. At the same time, the postmaterialist concerns of Europe’s citizens have sent them searching for other ways to participate in politics, especially when they believe that the traditional forms of political participation, such as political parties, are no longer effective. This dissatisfaction is heightened in states where parties compete under electoral rules that produce results that are considered unfair, especially by newer or smaller political parties. As mentioned above, the single-member majority/plurality system is said to produce disproportional electoral outcomes in part because of its low district magnitude; and proportional representation is criticized for not living up to its name in states where high thresholds are in place. Accordingly, European citizens are increasingly joining interest groups or social movements to express their concerns about politics, society, and the economy. The formation and mobilization of such movements and groups signifies that there is a wealth of social capital throughout Europe. However, only time will tell whether these social networks will endure. As citizens everywhere are gaining access to an ever-growing number of new computer technologies and Internet-based media outlets (e.g., e-mail blasts, Web pages, podcasts, and so on), it is questionable whether they will have any time for or interest in the face-to-face contact required for the traditional forms of political participation. Thus, the twenty-first century may bring a new form of participation, one that occurs primarily on the World Wide Web.

■ Notes 1. William L. Langer (ed.), Western Civilization: The Struggle for Empire to Europe in the Modern World (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 54. 2. These phases are adapted from Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy,” Party Politics 1 (1995), 5–28. 3. Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1980), 36.

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

176

Page 176

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

4. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, trans. by Barbara North and Robert North (New York: John Wiley, 1963), xxiii–xxiv. 5. For more on parliamentary groups, see Duverger, Political Parties, xxiv–xxv. 6. Katz and Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization,” 18–20. 7. Ibid., xxvii. 8. Ibid., 10. 9. Duverger, Political Parties, xxx–xxxiv. 10. Ibid., xxx–xxxiv. 11. Katz and Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization,” 11–12. 12. Ibid., 12. 13. Ibid. 14. Otto Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of West European Party Systems,” in Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 177–200. 15. For more characteristics of catchall parties, see Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of West European Party Systems,” 177–187. 16. Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 17. Panebianco, Political Parties, 264. 18. Katz and Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization,” 16–25. 19. Ibid., 15–17. 20. Ibid., 20. 21. For details on this distinction, see Giovanni Sartori, “European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism,” in Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966). 22. These typologies are taken from Tim Bale, European Politics: A Comparative Introduction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 107. 23. A key work on cleavages and party systems is Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction,” in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives (New York: Free Press, 1967). 24. Lipset and Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures,” 15. 25. Ibid., 14–15. 26. Ibid., 14. 27. Ibid., 14, 19. 28. Ibid., 20. 29. Ibid., 21. 30. Ibid., 23–25. 31. Bale, European Politics, 146–147. 32. Ibid., 110. 33. Ibid., 112. 34. Ibid., 118–120. 35. Ibid., 114. 36. In response to their electoral decline, some agrarian parties have reinvented themselves and become center parties, embracing ideas from both sides of the political spectrum. For example, center parties in Scandinavia stress privatization and individualism but not at the expense of the welfare state (which provides the agricultural sector with much-needed assistance.)

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

Page 177

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

177

37. Bale, European Politics, 120–121. 38. Richard Sakwa and Anne Stevens, Contemporary Europe, 2nd edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 117–118. 39. Bale, European Politics, 127–128. 40. The history of electoral systems in Europe is more fully discussed in Lipset and Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures,” 30–33. 41. For more information on other types of electoral systems used in Europe, like the alternative vote (AV), the single transferable vote (STV), and the additional and compensatory member systems (ACMS), see Sakwa and Stevens, Contemporary Europe, 84. 42. Mark Franklin, Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies Since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), quoted in Bale, European Politics, 140–141. 43. Robert Putnam provides a complete discussion of social capital in his book Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000). 44. For complete data on European interest-group membership, see Sakwa and Stevens, Contemporary Europe, 120. 45. These interest-group typologies are adapted from Michael Sodaro, Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction, 2nd edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 242–243. 46. These strategies were adapted from Theodore J. Lowi, Benjamin Ginsberg, and Kenneth A. Shepsle, American Government: Freedom and Power, brief 2006 edition (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), 309–321. 47. For a more detailed discussion of political opportunity structures, see Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 48. Example from Bale, European Politics, 187. 49. Sodaro, Comparative Politics, 246. 50. Bale, European Politics, 197–198. 51. For complete data, see Sakwa and Stevens, Contemporary Europe, 125–126. 52. For complete data, see Sakwa and Stevens, Contemporary Europe, 126. 53. Sakwa and Stevens, Contemporary Europe, 128.

■ Suggested Reading Dalton, Russell J. Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 4th edition. Washington, DC: CQ, 2006. Dalton, Russell J., and Manfred Kurechler (eds.). Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Imig, Doug, and Sidney Tarrow (eds.). Contentious Europeans: Protest and Politics in an Emerging Polity. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. Kousis, Maria, and Charles Tilly. Economic and Political Contention in Comparative Perspective. Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2005. Lipset, Seymour M., and Stein Rokkan. Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives. New York: Free Press, 1967.

O-7

9/23/08

4:07 PM

178

Page 178

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

Norris, Pippa. Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Putnam, Robert. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000. Richardson, Jeremy (ed.). Pressure Groups. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Schmitter, Philippe C., and Gerhard Lehmbruch (eds.). Trends in Corporatist Interest Intermediation. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979.

O-8

9/23/08

4:08 PM

Page 179

8 Providing for the Well-Being of the Nation

THE MEDIEVAL KINGDOM mobilized and exploited whatever human and material resources it happened to have within the realm, as shown in Part 1. The medieval monarch was not responsible to the people living within the realm; rather, the people were responsible to the monarch. For their part, the people provided the raw material with which the monarch, the nobility, and the clergy aggrandized themselves. The rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century fundamentally changed this relationship. As the militarily more competitive nation-state gradually replaced rival monarchical states in Europe after the French Revolution, and as wars became struggles between whole nations, the idea that the state existed not only to protect the people from external aggression but also to better the life of the people living within it spread across Europe. While nationalism eliminated the need to use intimidation and coercion to get people to serve the state, especially in the armed forces, by substituting an emotional attachment to the national state (i.e., feelings of patriotism), continued loyalty and willingness to serve the state also came to depend upon the degree to which the state concerned itself with the wellbeing of the nation. This was especially the case toward the end of the nineteenth century, when wars became national struggles for survival. According to one historian, the first place that the state’s concern for the well-being of the people appeared was on the battlefield: “the first systematic use of battle dress to hide rather than advertise a soldier’s presence dates from this period. In contrast, the [monarchical state’s] exaltation of sacrifice to the State had caused uniforms to reach their ornamental peak. The British adopted khaki for colonial campaigns in 1880 and for home service in 1902. The Germans went to field gray in 1910.”1 Thus, the harnessing of the nation to the state fundamentally changed the relationship between the rulers of the state and the people whom they ruled. In the words of one historian: “European rulers and politicians could 179

O-8

9/23/08

4:08 PM

180

Page 180

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

no longer claim to rule according to their own interests, or even, as in the late eighteenth century, in the interests of the state itself. Instead, they increasingly acknowledged their role as servants of the general welfare, ultimately responsible for the well-being of the whole society and guarantors of their peoples’ basic rights.”2 After nationalism transformed the people from impassive and inert subjects into active participants, the state came to rely more and more not only upon the extent to which it was viewed as representing its people but also upon the extent to which it was seen as providing for their well-being; that is, their physical fitness, economic prosperity, and social security. With the rise of the nation-state, “rulers mattered less, and people mattered more,”3 and the legitimacy of the European state rested more and more on the approval of its people.

■ Ensuring Physical Fitness Before the rise of the nation-state, the size and health of a state’s population was left to chance. This changed with the advent of the nation-state not only because the rulers of nation-states began to understand their role as servants of the general welfare but also because the growing importance of conscript armies made the size and health of a state’s population an issue of national security and because most European states had had their populations decimated by wars with rival states. Serious concern for the quantity (size) and quality (health) of the state’s population began toward the end of the nineteenth century as the rivalry and competition among European states was intensifying. Such concern was especially high after World War I, during which millions of Europeans were killed and wounded. Thus, the idea the “nation needed racially sound progeny, that the state should therefore intervene in private life to show people how to live . . . ran right across the political spectrum of inter-war Europe, reflecting the tensions and stresses of an insecure [continent] in which nation-states existed in rivalry with one another, their populations decimated by one war and threatened by the prospect of another.”4 It was during the interwar years that the birthrate, physical fitness, and the mental health of the state’s people became a major concern of policymakers, who were strongly influenced by “scientific racism” (the use of scientific theory and methodology to support racist theories, for example, positions of racial supremacy). This concern led to the organization of ministries of health and the training of cadres of social workers, school psychologists, public health nurses, and family-planning experts. Fascist states took this concern to the extreme. We have seen that in Nazi Germany, for example, concern for the quality of the nation was connected to ideas of

O-8

9/23/08

4:08 PM

Page 181

PROVIDING FOR THE WELL-BEING OF THE NATION

181

racial purity, which resulted in the sterilization of the mentally and physically “unfit” and the extermination of the racially “impure.” Thus, “welfare and warfare were intimately connected, and social policies to improve population numbers and health reflected the anxieties of nation-states keen to defend or reassert themselves in a world of enemies.”5 Concern for the physical fitness of the nation continued after World War II but without the coercive social engineering (such as positive eugenics, which held that to produce a physically and mentally stronger nation, whereby unfit individuals were sterilized to prevent reproduction) of the interwar years. After World War II, Western European states limited themselves to encouraging their citizens to quit smoking, drink less, eat right, and exercise regularly. Coercive state practices in this regard continued in the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern European states until the 1990s, however.

■ Managing Economic Prosperity The purpose of economic institutions is to produce and distribute the material goods (food and shelter) necessary to sustain human life. In medieval Europe, economic production was based on manors owned by the noble families. Which crops were to be planted, where they were to be planted, and how much of the harvest was to be retained by the serfs and how much given to the lord of the manor and the church were regulated by religiopolitical norms and traditions that had been built up over the centuries. In the towns, guilds regulated various occupations (cobblers, pullers, weavers, coopers, bakers, butchers, thatchers, tanners, wheelers, and smiths of various kinds), their levels of production, and the training and licensing of those who practiced them. Each guild established detailed regulations concerning the method of manufacture, price, quantity, and quality of its goods.6 As centralizing monarchs became increasingly needy for money and material resources to support large armies and to fight wars, they became more and more concerned with the economic productivity of the manors and guilds. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries monarchs began to intervene in the economies of their realms in order to enhance their wealth. Such monarchical intervention came to be called “mercantilism” by eighteenthcentury economists.7 Mercantilism assumed that a realm’s wealth was based on the amount of gold and silver it could accumulate and that the quantity of these precious metals one monarchy accumulated was an equivalent loss by another. Monarchs, therefore, wanted to accumulate as much gold and silver as possible. They did this by maximizing manufactured goods exported in exchange for gold and silver, and minimizing imports in order to keep accu-

O-8

9/23/08

4:08 PM

182

Page 182

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

mulated gold and silver in the realm. To make sure that exports exceeded imports, monarchs levied high tariffs (i.e., taxes) on imports in order to keep foreign-made goods out and subsidized the development of domestic industries by granting them monopolies or by founding, owning, and operating the industries themselves. All monarchies of Europe restricted imports by high tariff walls and had large manufacturing enterprises created and chartered by the crown, which enjoyed a monopoly in a particular economic activity, especially those relevant to politico-military power: arms and munitions manufacturing, shipbuilding, and so on. Thus, all European states have a tradition of purposeful state intervention into the economy. With the rise of liberal nationalism, laissez-faire (that is, the Smithian doctrine of opposing state interference in economic affairs beyond the minimum necessary for the maintenance of peace, security, and property rights) took hold first in western Europe, especially in Britain, during the eighteenth and the first part of the nineteenth century. Liberal economic doctrines did not receive comparable predominance in France and elsewhere on the continent, however, because absolutism and mercantilistic practices were more deeply entrenched, especially in the dynastic empires of central and eastern Europe. As we saw in Part 1, the British monarchy was dominated by Parliament and lacked a highly centralized bureaucratic apparatus under the direct control of the crown. The state was primarily engaged in enforcing the law, maintaining order, and defending the realm. Consequently, there was little state interference in the economy and ample opportunity for “creative” private initiative.8 Influenced by laissez-faire doctrines, Parliament, in 1846, repealed the Corn Laws, which had put high tariffs on imported grain in order to exclude it from the British domestic market. As soon as the protection of grain had been abandoned, existing duties on hundreds of manufactured goods were eliminated, such that by 1860 there was only a handful of dutiable goods left in Britain, of which tea, wine, and tobacco were the most important. Thus, in the course of a few decades, Britain had abandoned mercantilism and committed itself to a laissez-faire and free trade economy.9 In the twentieth century, all European states, even laissez-faire states such as Britain, moved away from exclusive reliance on the market mechanism to regulate the economy, gravitating toward more active state intervention to alter its general condition. In Britain, after World War I, the state began ambitious efforts to achieve the goals of economic growth and full employment. The approach the British state used was inspired by the English economist John Maynard Keynes, who sought to devise government economic policies that would end the Depression and prevent future depressions. Contrary to the economic orthodoxy of the day, which argued that governments should decrease spending and live within their means dur-

O-8

9/23/08

4:08 PM

Page 183

PROVIDING FOR THE WELL-BEING OF THE NATION

183

ing depressions, Keynes argued that governments should increase spending during hard times in order to boost aggregate demand to stimulate investment and economic growth. “Keynesian economics” (i.e., the countering of the downward movement of the business cycle with government spending and other government monetary and fiscal policies) became economic orthodoxy in Britain after World War II.10 In addition to pursuing Keynesianism after the war, the British state nationalized (that is, took into state ownership), coal mines, gas and electricity, railways, and steel industries. Wartime rationing was ended and living standards rose as consumer goods, such as cars and refrigerators, once available to the privileged few, became widely available and affordable to the average consumer.11 As mentioned above, the tradition of purposeful state intervention in the economy was stronger on the continent than in Britain. In France, Louis XIV’s finance minister, Jean Baptiste Colbert (1619–1683), intervened mightily into economic matters in the interest of building state power. He built canals and highways, issued detailed standards for manufacturing, encouraged exports, recruited skilled craftspeople from across Europe, abolished internal tariffs, and provided scientific and technical education.12 Despite the liberal ideology of the revolutionaries, the French Revolution resulted in much state intervention in order to eliminate the vestiges of feudalism and rationalize the state’s economic and political structures. As was mentioned in Chapter 4, in the nineteenth century a more logical system of weights and measures was . . . instituted, the system of coinage reformed, a comprehensive legal code [the Code Napoleon] developed, and the tax system reorganized. A national system of education was inaugurated, including, at the highest level, excellent technical schools. Further, Napoleon pushed the construction of an extensive road system and encouraged the development of industries, especially those related to the production of military hardware. He also laid the foundations for the Bank of France.13

Thus, economic liberalism was never able to fully establish itself in France as it had in Britain. The French state never allowed the market mechanism to be the sole allocator of economic resources. Throughout the nineteenth century, the French state continued to subsidize technical education and many other activities, such as road construction, and to operate certain industries. After World War II, segments of French industry were nationalized—including railroads, electricity, gas, aviation, and the Renault automobile works—because the owners had collaborated during the war with the Vichy government. The French state also embarked on a program of national planning.14 In Germany, liberal economic doctrines were even less significant than

O-8

9/23/08

4:08 PM

184

Page 184

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

they were in France. Mercantilistic practices were well entrenched in Prussia and the other German-speaking monarchies, principalities, and duchies. These states built roads, bridges, canals, and railroads. They promoted industrialization by founding technical schools, sending people abroad to learn industrial techniques, encouraging the immigration of craftspersons, and using taxes and government subsidies to expand the economy. From the end of the Franco-Prussian War to the end of World War II, many businesses owned by the aristocracy were taken over by the state governments that composed the German Empire: breweries in Munich, the porcelain factories of Meissen and Berlin, the tobacco factories in Strasbourg. During the Weimar Republic there was a slight shift to liberal economic policies. This movement was halted, however, by the coming to power of the Nazis who, following their corporate ideology, instituted a massive program of state intervention and control. According to one scholar, during the Nazi era, “deficit financing was used for the extensive construction of public works, including the famed autobahns, and business activity was tightly regulated. In 1936 a four-year plan was initiated for the proclaimed purpose of guiding basic production controlling imports and exports, allocating basic resources, overseeing orders and credit, and strengthening foreign-exchange controls.”15 After World War II the West German state abandoned the corporatist economic policies of the Nazis and implemented what came to be called a social market economy, that is, an economy in which the market mechanism allocates goods and services while the government limits its intervention to ensuring that all Germans have a minimum level of economic security. Most, but not all, of the controls put in place by the Nazis were lifted, and certain industries, such as the Volkswagen automobile company, were privatized. In Russia the state was increasingly involved in economic life as the monarchy strove to modernize the economy. Mining and manufacturing industries were founded by Peter the Great. The state built and operated railroads. The state used tariffs and subsidies to encourage metallurgical production. When the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, they sought to eliminate capitalism and establish a socialist economy. This involved eliminating private ownership and the market mechanism as a means for allocating economic resources. During the civil war (1918–1921), the Bolsheviks created a command economy, that is, one in which all decisions affecting the economy were made by the state. These early efforts at a state-run economy were of limited success, however. Industrial and agricultural production almost collapsed, and starvation ensued. In order to revive production, the Bolsheviks inaugurated the New Economic Policy (NEP), which brought back some private ownership and the restoration of the market in goods and services. The NEP succeeded in boosting industrial and agricultural production to pre–civil war levels by the mid-1920s.16

O-8

9/23/08

4:08 PM

Page 185

PROVIDING FOR THE WELL-BEING OF THE NATION

185

At the same time, the Bolsheviks were creating the state organizations necessary for the creation and maintenance of a socialist economy. In 1920 the State Commission for Electrification was created, and in 1921 the State Planning Commission (Gosplan), which was concerned with monitoring the economy and setting production goals. In 1928 the First Five-Year Plan was promulgated and the collectivization of agriculture begun. From this point onward, the entire economy was guided and directed by the state. The command economy established in the 1920s remained until the early 1960s, when, as a response to the growing complexities of a further-developed industrial economy, Soviet economists began to use the market mechanism on a modest scale.17 Thus, until the end of the Cold War, the European continent was divided into two blocs of states following two different economic models. The states of the West had “mixed economies,” that is, economies in which the market mechanism and a certain amount of state intervention were used to manage economic life. The states of the East had “command economies,” in which the market mechanism was nil and the state owned, planned, and managed all aspects of the economy.

■ Providing Social Security During the medieval period, it was the responsibility of the Catholic Church to assist the starving and destitute and to provide education, which it did in cathedral schools primarily to educate young men for the priesthood. As the centralized monarchical state gradually emerged, the responsibilities of providing education and aiding the poor shifted away from the church to the state. Three epochs of social welfare policy that parallel the development of the state can be identified. The first includes the period before the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when the primary concern was relieving poverty among the peasantry. The second epoch began with the Industrial Revolution and lasted until the beginning of the twentieth century. During this epoch the state began to address the social and economic problems created by industrialization and concomitant urbanization. In the third epoch, which began in the decades immediately after World War I and extended to the 1960s, the state came to be responsible for the education, health, safety, and general well-being of its entire population.18 Thus, “wars, depression, and other crises . . . have been a source of social program expansion. [In Britain, for example, during World War II,] a bargain was made, almost explicitly, between government and the public that if they endured the hardship of the war, they would be rewarded with a better Britain.”19 In the first epoch the monarchical state sought to rescue the rural poor

O-8

9/23/08

4:08 PM

186

Page 186

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

from starvation and destitution. The most developed system for providing “poor relief,” as it was called, appeared in the English monarchy during the Tudor period (1536–1603). During this time, several poor relief acts were passed by Parliament. Under these acts, every destitute person was to receive relief and each parish of the realm was to raise money in order to pay the indigent an allowance to supplement their meager wages. By the end of the eighteenth century, their system of poor relief came under heavy criticism because it depressed rural wages and reduced the geographical mobility of the poor who could not seek better employment elsewhere without losing their allowances. Therefore, Parliament passed the Poor Law Amendment Act (1834), which removed poor relief from the parishes and placed it under a central authority. In 1929 the British Parliament passed an act that abolished poor relief and replaced it with a system of public assistance funded by the state and administered by the county councils. In France, until the French Revolution, the king relied upon the Catholic Church to provide poor relief through its hospitals, outdoor relief centers, and charitable foundations. The king provided bread (pain du roi) to the beggars and vagabonds of Paris, and each of his intendants was permitted to use a small share of the king’s revenues to aid the poor in their généralités. The French Revolution abolished the charitable foundations of the church and royal revenues. Poor relief was transferred to the new local authorities (départements and communes) created by the revolutionary government. Préfects of the départements were required to deal with rural destitution and, after Napoléon’s rise to power, to undertake local public-works projects, such as road building, in order to build the economic infrastructure of the state and to provide work for the rural poor. In 1871 the French National Assembly passed a law that required each département to provide public assistance to all who were unable to work because of old age, mental illness, or sickness.20 During the second epoch the idea that the state’s responsibility to provide poor relief was a temporary concession to the indigent, working poor was gradually replaced with the idea that the state should help the laboring class by providing it with a panoply of social services. This new way of thinking about the role of the state was a consequence not only of industrialization and urbanization but the demands of modern warfare as well. It began to be recognized by all European states that the working class of the state’s population needed to be kept well nourished for the purpose of having a healthy and happy industrial workforce, as well as a healthy pool of men from which to recruit soldiers for the state’s armed forces.21 Therefore, states began to establish standards of sanitation in the new industrial towns, regulate the conditions of employment in the new factories, guarantee a minimum standard of living, and ensure against sickness and unemployment, as well as provide social security for the aged.

O-8

9/23/08

4:08 PM

Page 187

PROVIDING FOR THE WELL-BEING OF THE NATION

187

This change in thinking came first in Britain, where European industrialization and urbanization had occurred first. In the nineteenth century, Parliament passed the Factory Act (1833), which created a system of factory safety inspection. The Mine Regulation Act (1842) protected miners; the Factory Act of 1847 limited the workday to ten hours; the Merchant Shipping Act of 1876 protected merchant seamen; and the Regulation of Railways Act of 1889 protected railroad workers. In 1848, Parliament passed the Public Health Act, which guaranteed minimum levels of sanitation in places of work and in dwellings.22 The first state system of insurance against sickness, unemployment, and old age was started in Germany in the 1880s, where Chancellor Bismarck, motivated partly by a desire to win German workers away from the revolutionary Social Democratic Party, which was gaining adherents at a rapid rate, and partly by his view that the Prussian state was responsible for the well-being of its subjects, put through the German Reichstag a body of insurance legislation for labor. The first of these bills, passed in 1883, required employees and employers to contribute to a fund that insured against sickness. Premiums were collected by special insurance societies approved and regulated by the state. The second was a bill that created a system of accident insurance. Passed in 1884, the bill required payments to workers who had been injured while on the job be paid from a fund contributed to by employers who were permitted to form industrial associations to collect premiums and pay claims. In 1889 the last of Bismarck’s social insurance bills was passed. This bill insured workers against invalidism and old age. Workers and employers contributed equally to this fund, and the German state made a contribution to the pension ultimately paid.23 The German system spread to other industrializing European states. In Britain, Parliament passed the Workmen’s Compensation Act in 1897, requiring that employers insure employees against the dangers of their employment. In 1908 the Old Age Pensions Act introduced a pension system paid for entirely by the state for workers over the age of seventy who were unable to support themselves. The next year, Parliament passed the Trade Boards Act, which established a minimum wage for workers in jobs that did not have trade union representation. In 1911 the National Insurance Act introduced a health insurance scheme to which workers, employers, and the state made equal contributions. This act also provided for unemployment insurance in certain industries, such as iron founding and shipbuilding.24 In France, social insurance policy advanced much less rapidly. The first such policy was not initiated until 1905, when the aged poor and incurably ill were provided with state pensions. In 1910 the National Assembly passed the Old Age Pension Act, which provided pensions for wage earners from a fund contributed to by employees, employers, and the state. The assembly passed a second act in 1913, giving aid to families with more than three

O-8

9/23/08

4:08 PM

188

Page 188

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

children in order to encourage the growth of the French population and to lower the then high infant mortality rate. In the third epoch, the idea that the state was responsible for the working poor and destitute was replaced by the notion that it was responsible for ensuring the health, safety, and retirement of the entire population. In Britain the Widows, Orphans, and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act of 1925 extended unemployment insurance to cover most wage earners. A series of housing acts gave the state responsibility for constructing housing. In 1928 the French National Assembly passed a compulsory social insurance law that gave sickness, maternity, invalidism, and old-age insurance to all French citizens. During the Weimar Republic in Germany, unemployment insurance was expanded to include all wage earners. In 1946, the British Parliament passed the Family Allowance Act, which paid benefits to families with two or more children. In the same year, Parliament passed the National Insurance Act, which provided substantial coverage for sickness and unemployment as well as maternity benefits, widows’ allowances, and pensions for the entire population. The National Assistance Act, which was enacted in 1948, required local governments to make accommodations available for the old, the infirm, and the poor who needed a place to live. Finally, also in 1948, Parliament created the National Health Service, which brought together private, local, and national health services and providers under the authority of the state and made them freely available to the entire population.25 After World War II, the French state also strengthened its social insurance programs and extended their coverage to the entire population. The French system of social insurance was paid for by contributions from employers and employees and covered sickness, disability, widowhood, and retirement. In order to rebuild the French population devastated by the war, it included generous family benefits that increased as families got larger. In addition, large families received income tax rebates, reduced fares on public transportation, and larger pensions for their breadwinners. France also began providing an extensive system of state-run hospitals, orphanages, retirement homes, and asylums. Although the French state did not create a national health service, as did the British, it did enhance its extant fee-reimbursement plan, which reimburses patients—who are free to choose their physician—for 80 percent of the cost of medical care.26 The German state also broadened its social insurance programs after World War II. Social security legislation passed by the Bundestag in 1954 sought to make it possible for pensioners to have the same standard of living that they enjoyed during their working years by indexing pensions to reflect earnings and by adjusting pensions upward to counteract inflation. The Federal Unemployment Office made payments and granted low-interest loans to workers to cover expenses they incurred during their search for

O-8

9/23/08

4:08 PM

Page 189

PROVIDING FOR THE WELL-BEING OF THE NATION

189

new jobs, moves to those jobs, and vocational retraining to perform those jobs. Since 1959, German construction workers have received subsidies from the employment office, known as bad weather money, for days not worked on account of rain, snow, or subzero temperatures. In 1996 these payments were replaced with a system that guaranteed workers 75 percent of their gross pay per hour for inclement days during the months from November to March. The German state continues to provide health insurance through the system established by Bismarck in the 1880s, although it was overhauled in 1955. The scheme is still supported by joint contributions from workers, employers, and the state, and is still administered by welfare funds that reimburse physicians of the patients’ choosing and hospitals.27 In Russia up to the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, the state’s role in providing for the well-being of the population was minimal. The earliest social legislation, which was designed to give miners and railroad workers some protection against financial losses incurred by job-related illness and injury, did not take effect until 1893. In 1912 the Duma passed a comprehensive health and accident law that made benefits available for work-related accidents, illness, and death and that guaranteed female workers maternity-leave payments. Russia’s social legislation covered less than one-fourth of the workforce and paid benefits so small that the working class was essentially left to face the hardships of industrial employment without state assistance.28 Owing to the Bolsheviks’ Marxist ideology, which blamed the poverty of workers on the capitalist economic system itself, their coming to power in 1917 radically changed the Russian state’s approach to social welfare. The aim of the Bolsheviks was to provide full social assistance to every Soviet citizen as a matter of right. Although their initial attempts to do so were delayed by the civil war and the NEP, by the late 1920s the Bolsheviks were able to guarantee unemployment insurance, free medical care in staterun hospitals, old-age and disability pensions, as well as compensation for sickness. Unemployment insurance was dropped in 1930 because unemployment had been, at least theoretically, eliminated in the Soviet Union’s socialist economy.29 The Soviet social insurance program derived entirely from contributions based upon a percentage of payroll from the employing establishment and varied from establishment to establishment according to state norms. Benefits were disbursed centrally by the state. Special benefit programs existed for persons with permanent disabilities and those with other disabilities. The Soviet state also operated special homes for orphaned, neglected, and emotionally disturbed children.30 Before the Revolution, medical care in Russia was rudimentary. After the Revolution a massive program of preventive and curative medicine was launched. In relatively short order, a system of free clinics and hospitals

O-8

9/23/08

4:08 PM

190

Page 190

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

was established for the general public, and larger factories and the military established their own medical facilities. While this system was a vast improvement over the situation as it had existed before the Revolution, it was far from satisfactory. The vastness of the Soviet Union meant that available medical resources were spread too thinly across the national territory, and the medical profession was poorly paid. Consequently, most Soviet physicians, except for medical school professors and specialists, were women who were forbidden from working more than five and one-half hours per day so that they could attend to their own households.31 Thus, “from about 1885 [to] 1950, with major spurts of activity occurring during the periods following both world wars . . . in almost all European [states], the major forms of social insurance were adapted and extended to the entire population.”32

■ The Apogee of the Welfare State One hundred fifty years of purposeful state intervention into the economy and society produced the European “welfare state”: that is, a state characterized, especially after 1945, by “a dense tissue of social benefits and economic strategies in which it was the state that served its subjects, rather than the other way around.”33 After World War II, it came to be widely believed in Europe that the state would always do a better job dispensing social justice, distributing goods and services, applying strategies for social cohesion, and creating cultural vitality than would be the case if such matters were left to the enlightened self-interest of the individual citizen and the workings of the market mechanism. The state had become a good thing; and there was a lot of it. Between 1950 and 1973, government spending rose from 27.6 percent to 38.8 percent of the gross domestic product in France, from 30.4 percent to 42 percent in West Germany, from 34.2 percent to 41.5 percent in the Netherlands—at a time when that domestic product was itself growing faster than ever before or since. The overwhelming bulk of the increase in spending went on insurance, pensions, health, education and housing. In Scandinavia the share of national income devoted to social security alone rose 250 percent in Denmark and Sweden between 1950 and 1973. In Norway it tripled. Only in Switzerland was the share of post-war GNP [gross national product] spent by the state kept comparatively low (it did not reach 30 percent until 1980), but even there it stood in dramatic contrast to the 1938 figure of just 6.8 percent.34

Unlike the Soviet Union and the states of Central and Eastern Europe, the states of Western Europe eschewed direct ownership of industry, preferring to exercise indirect control through state management agencies. The state

O-8

9/23/08

4:08 PM

Page 191

PROVIDING FOR THE WELL-BEING OF THE NATION

191

was responsible, directly or indirectly, for the employment and remuneration of millions of men and women who thus had a vested interest in it, whether as professionals or bureaucrats. Graduates from Britain’s leading universities, like their contemporaries in French grandes écoles, typically sought employment not in private-sector professionals, much less industry and commerce, but in education, medicine, the social services, public law, state monopolies or government service. . . . The European state had forged a unique market for the goods and services it could provide. It formed a virtuous circle of employment and influence that attracted nearuniversal appreciation. . . . Faith in the state—as planner, coordinator, facilitator, arbiter, provider, caretaker, and guardian—was widespread and crossed all political divides.35

Thus, by the middle of the 1960s, the national welfare state obtained across Europe as governments in the West and the East managed, with varying degrees of success, the economic prosperity and social well-being of their peoples. However, at the height of its success, the “axiomatic linkage to a people and [the welfare state’s] portrayal as [the people’s] benefactor”36 began to be questioned.

■ Delegitimating the Welfare State The questioning of the beneficial nature of the welfare state began with the massive and unexpected eruption of student protest in Western Europe, the most dramatic instance of which occurred in May 1968 in France, “where nearly half of all French workers, students, professionals, and civil servants staged the largest general strike in history.”37 This event was followed in Italy during the “hot autumn” of 1969 and in other states of Western Europe during the 1970s. Across this part of Europe, students and workers waged widespread grassroots protests against the welfare state outside of the established political party and legislative channels. A general “crisis of governability” in the form of women’s movements, extreme nationalist responses to immigration, demands for nuclear disarmament, environmental protest, and taxpayers’ revolts spread across this area. Ironically, these protests were a consequence of the incredible economic success of the postwar Western European welfare state, which had forced economic growth and ignored the costs in terms of urban sprawl, traffic jams, destruction of forests, pollution of rivers, and the jamming into hastily constructed, high-rise apartment blocks of vast numbers of immigrant workers. Western Europe’s postwar youths were, unlike their parents, unwilling to accept the rigid hierarchies they encountered in corporations, universities, and government agencies and willing to protest against the damaging social consequences and environmental destruction of rapid economic growth.38 If economic growth tempered with greater concern for the damaging

O-8

9/23/08

4:08 PM

192

Page 192

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

social and environmental consequences had continued during the 1970s, social harmony brought about by the economic and social policies of the welfare state might have been restored. However, changes in the organization of production (a shift from mass-producing goods in large-scale factories to small-scale production strategies and the shift to service-based industries) began to shrink the size of the traditional (male) working class and bring increasing numbers of women into the workforce. These changes were difficult to accommodate within the bargaining institutions (labor unions) that had been established after World War II. At about the same time, Western European economies were faced with a sharp increase in oil prices, especially in 1973–1974. The consequences for these affected states were severe economic crises: the extremely high levels of popular support for the welfare state . . . meant that most governments were unable to reduce welfare state benefits significantly. Meanwhile, trade union power limited labor market adjustments, and the increasingly global scale of production encouraged the outflow of investment[;] . . . increasing economic integration [within the European Union] meant that national governments were less able to regulate their domestic economies. In general . . . western Europe suffered a decline in international competitiveness. The result was higher rates of unemployment and inflation, slower productivity growth, and meager increases in living standards. The golden years of the postwar settlement were over.39

The delegitimation of the welfare state continued during the 1970s and 1980s as governments unsuccessfully sought to relegitimate the welfare state by introducing new approaches to economic management. For example, governments in Scandinavia and France attempted to regain labor peace by allowing workers to participate in decisions regarding the introduction of new microelectronic technologies and by expanding occupational health and safety standards. In France the Socialists elected in 1981 expanded the nationalized sectors of the economy. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, these leftist solutions were soon abandoned, however, not least because they could no longer fulfill their promise: unemployment, inflation, aging populations, and economic slowdown [“Eurosclerosis”] placed insuperable constraints upon the efforts of states to deliver their half of the bargain. Transformations in international capital markets and modern electronic communications hamstrung governments’ capacity to plan and enforce domestic economic policy. And, most important of all, the very legitimacy of the interventionist state itself was undermined: at home by the rigidities and inefficiencies of public-sector agencies and producers, abroad by the incontrovertible evidence of chronic economic dysfunction and political repression in the socialist states of the Soviet bloc.40

O-8

9/23/08

4:08 PM

Page 193

PROVIDING FOR THE WELL-BEING OF THE NATION

193

■ Transforming the European Welfare State into the Neoliberal Market State In 1979, with the election of the Tory Party in Britain led by Margaret Thatcher—who blamed Britain’s economic malaise and decline as a world power on the welfare state programs put in place by the Labour Party after World War II, in Britain first, then in states on the continent—there began a frontal attack against the welfare state. During her years as prime minister (1979–1990), Thatcher successfully reduced the power of Britain’s labor unions, privatized public housing, sold off nationalized industries, eliminated social programs, and replaced the Keynesian approach to the management of the economy with monetarism. Thatcher’s neoliberalism (reducing state intervention in the economy and relying more on the market mechanism to distribute goods and services) spread during the 1990s across the European continent as rightist parties, which promised lower taxes, less state intervention, and greater prosperity, came to power. At a deeper level, the rollback of the welfare state and the implementation of neoliberal economic management mark the transformation of the European welfare state into a new variation of the nation-state: the “market state.” Unlike the “public education, universal franchise, and social security policies, promised to guarantee the welfare of the nation, the market-state promises instead to maximize the opportunity of the people and thus tends to privatize many state activities and to make voting and representative government less influential and more responsive to the market.”41 One of the fundamental causes of the transformation of the European welfare state into the market state, not unlike past transformations of the state, was war. According to one scholar of the state, the three strategic innovations (nuclear weapons, international communications, and the technology of rapid mathematical computation) connected to the “Long War” of the twentieth century “wrought a dramatic change in the military culture, and economic challenges that face the nation-state [which creates] increasing difficulty in maintaining the credibility of its claim to provide public goods for the nation.”42 As we saw in previous chapters, one of the state’s most basic reasons for being is security, that is, the protection of its territory and people from attack by other states. The ability of European states to provide such security was undermined by the advances in military technology during the twentieth century that transformed war from being about territorial gain to being about totally defeating the enemy state by penetrating its territory, vanquishing its armies, destroying its infrastructure, and transforming it into a form of the state acceptable to the conquering state. The search for the means to destroy the enemy nation-state’s ability to defend itself in the age of total war led to the development of weapons of mass destruction. During

O-8

9/23/08

4:08 PM

194

Page 194

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

World War II, “nuclear weapons brought the [war-making] strategy of the nation-state to its apogee of [military] effectiveness . . . and ended the Long War by stalemating the superpower military conflict [i.e., the Cold War;] . . . these weapons . . . [have also] progressively undermine[d] the nationstate’s ability to protect the nation from foreign attack.”43 As we also saw earlier in this chapter, another of the nation-state’s most basic reasons for being is providing for the economic well-being of its people. The ability of nation-states to manage their economies has been undermined by developments in electronic communications and computational technology during the twentieth century, especially since the 1950s. These developments have led to the creation of a global economic space that is no longer rigidly compartmentalized by nation-states. Economic globalization has begun to undermine the nation-state’s “reputation as a provider of welfare to the nation by guaranteeing a unified national market and providing protection against foreign competition and access to foreign markets.”44 The globalization of strategic threats (by the advent of weapons of mass destruction) and markets (by the advent of high-speed communications and computation) have put the European welfare state under enormous pressure to adapt to these changes. Only by expanding economically can states hedge against the risks imposed on them from globalization. In Europe this expansion was engendered by the creation of a common European market, which, as we will see in Part 3, has permitted individual states to merge their domestic markets with those of other states, thereby producing a single economic space of continental scope.45 The transformation of the European welfare state into the market state does not mean the end of the state as the master institution of European politics is nigh. Rather, the state is “retooling” itself to the conditions created by globalization. The European welfare state is shifting from its role as “principal actor on behalf of the nation to one in which the State is the facilitator of practical affairs. The market-state seeks a role as enabler and umpire, and shuns the role of the provider.”46

■ Summary In this chapter we have shown that the rise of the nation-state fundamentally changed the relationship between the people and their rulers. Increasingly, rulers came to see the state as the main instrument for providing for the physical fitness, economic prosperity, and social security of the people. The rise of mass conscripted armies and the decimation of populations in increasingly total war led to a concern with the size and health of the state’s population that resulted in the establishment of ministries of health and the training of cadres of social workers and the like. It also resulted in steriliza-

O-8

9/23/08

4:08 PM

Page 195

PROVIDING FOR THE WELL-BEING OF THE NATION

195

tion and genocide in certain states. As the threat of war has receded from Europe, the state has become less concerned with the fitness of its population and limits itself to encouraging healthy lifestyles. As the costs of making war increased, states became more and more concerned with managing their economies to ensure the material means to make war. European states have employed mercantilist, liberal free market, mixed, and command approaches to economic management. Since 1990, all European states, to a greater or lesser degree, have moved away from massive state intervention to regulated market economies. In terms of providing social security, the European state took on greater responsibility, especially after the Industrial Revolution, and then, later, especially during the twentieth century when war became total. In western Europe the approach has been for the state to provide health, unemployment, and retirement insurance. In eastern Europe, until the 1990s, the state provided all social services in state-owned facilities. The apogee of purposeful European state management of economic life and concern for the well-being of the population came in the 1960s. However, in the 1970s the European welfare state began to experience serious financial difficulties brought on by slowed economic growth and aging population. Traditional leftist approaches failed to resolve the crisis, which resulted in the coming to the fore of a neoliberal frontal attack against the inefficiencies of the welfare state. Thus began the transformation of the European welfare states into market states, which are more adapted to the globalization of strategic threats and markets. The market state in Europe has evolved together with the European Union, as we shall see in Part 3.

■ Notes 1. Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History (New York: Anchor, 2003), 204. 2. David Kaiser, Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 273. 3. Ernst B. Haas, Nationalism, Liberalism, and Progress, vol. 1, The Rise and Decline of Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 18. 4. Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 77. 5. Ibid., 103. 6. Sidney Painter, The Rise of Feudal Monarchies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1951), 79–84. 7. On mercantilism, see Benjamin J. Cohen, The Question of Imperialism (New York: Basic, 1973). 8. Stanley Rothman, European Society and Politics (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1970), 734. 9. Ferdinand Schevill, A History of Europe from the Reformation to the Present Day (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1930), 573–574.

O-8

9/23/08

4:08 PM

196

Page 196

THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATE

10. Mark Kesselman et al., European Politics in Transition, 5th edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006), 25. 11. Rothman, European Society and Politics, 748. 12. Norman Davies, Europe: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 631. 13. Rothman, European Society and Politics, 740. 14. Ibid., 740–741. 15. Ibid., 742. 16. Ibid., 743. 17. Ibid., 744. 18. Ernest Barker, The Development of Public Services in Western Europe, 1660–1930 (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1966), 68–70. 19. B. Guy Peters, European Politics Reconsidered (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1991), 227. 20. Barker, The Development of Public Services, 70–73. 21. On the influence of war on the development of social services, see Richard M. Titmuss, Essays on the Welfare State, 2nd edition (Boston: Beacon, 1963), chapter 4. 22. Barker, The Development of Public Services, 73–74. 23. Ibid., 75–78. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Rothman, European Society and Politics, 767–768. 27. Ibid., 772. 28. Ibid., 747. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid., 780–781. 31. Ibid., 782. 32. Peters, European Politics Reconsidered, 228. 33. Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2005), 360. 34. Ibid., 361. 35. Ibid., 362. 36. Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 208. 37. Kesselman et al., European Politics in Transition, 27. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid., 28. 40. Judt, Postwar, 360–361. 41. Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 211. 42. Ibid., 216. 43. Ibid., 217–218. 44. Ibid., 220. 45. Ibid., 469. 46. Ibid., 235.

■ Suggested Reading Barker, Ernest. The Development of Public Services in Western Europe, 1660–1930. Hamden, CT: Archon, 1966. Gough, Ian. The Political Economy of the Welfare State. London: Macmillan, 1978.

O-8

9/23/08

4:08 PM

Page 197

PROVIDING FOR THE WELL-BEING OF THE NATION

197

Inglehart, Ronald. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990. Kitschelt, Herbert. The Transformation of European Social Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Koven, Seth, and Sonya Michels (eds.). Mothers of a New World: Materialistic Politics and the Origins of Welfare States. London: Routledge, 1993. Müller, Wolfgang C., and Vincent Wright (eds.). The State in Western Europe: Retreat or Redefinition? Newbury Park, CA: Frank Cass, 1994. Offe, Claus. Contradictions of the Welfare State. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984. Pierson, Christopher. Beyond the Welfare State? University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991. Rose, Richard. “On the Priorities of Government: A Developmental Analysis of Public Policies,” European Journal of Political Research 4 (1976), 247–289. Schmidt, Vivien. From State to Market: The Transforming of Business and Government. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Solo, Robert A. The Positive State. Cincinnati: South-Western, 1982. Titmuss, Richard M. Essays on the Welfare State, 2nd edition. Boston: Beacon, 1963.

O-8

9/23/08

4:08 PM

Page 198

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

Page 199

Part 3 Unifying Europe THE IDEA OF a unified Europe has been a persistent European dream since the collapse of coherent Roman politico-military rule in the fifth century, as we have shown. Despite the compartmentalization of the continent into autonomous monarchies and, later, sovereign nation-states, many Europeans continued to believe in the underlying unity of Europe. Early efforts to unify the continent politically, such as Charlemagne’s Holy Roman Empire (800–887), sought to re-create the coherent rule provided by Rome, as did the Holy Roman Emperor Otto III (983–1002), who dreamed of reuniting the western and eastern Roman empires. When he seized power, Napoléon sought to unite Europe under French leadership (1804–1815). After Napoléon’s downfall, the states of the Congress System (1815–1822) sought to unify Europe around the idea of a “League of Monarchs” in an attempt to stop the rising tide of liberal nationalism. In the 1840s the Prussian king, Frederick William IV (1840–1861), dreamed of reestablishing the Holy Roman Empire. The nationalists of the 1830s and 1840s, such as Giuseppe Mazzini (1807–1872), sought to unify their nations and, at the same time, create a unified Europe of the nations. After World War I a Pan-Europa movement was founded by Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894–1982), a count of the former Austrian Empire, which included among its members two then-serving European ministers of foreign affairs, Aristide Briand (1862–1932) of France and Gustav Stresemann (1878–1929) of Germany. Coudenhove-Kalergi’s organization favored the creation of a confederation of European states. Even Hitler (1889–1945) dreamed of a unified Europe, the Third Reich, under German domination. In this part of the book, we discuss the formative history, institutions, and expansion of Europe’s latest and most successful attempt at unifying the continent, the European Union.

199

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

Page 200

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

Page 201

9 From Military Competition to Economic Cooperation

WAR AMONG VARIOUS forms of politico-military rule on the continent after the collapse of the Roman Empire eventually resulted in the ascendancy of one of these—the democratic nation-state—over the others, as we saw in Part 1. Beginning with the revolution in military affairs of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, military competition (i.e., war) became increasingly lethal and destructive as European states developed and perfected the organizational and technical ability to mobilize the human and material resources to fight one another. The military competition for primacy among rival forms of the state culminated in the twentieth century, during which time Europe was convulsed by a nearly century-long “civil war” over which form of politico-military rule—nation-state or multiethnic dynastic empire—was going to prevail and become the only legitimate form of rule on the continent. The death and destruction wrought by the “hot” phases of this struggle (World Wars I and II) were greater than any previous wars in human history and caused many European political elites to renounce the use of violence to resolve differences among states.1 Since the end of World War II, European states, beginning with the states in the west, have replaced military competition with economic cooperation to realize the dream of a unified Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. In the words of one scholar, “European states became civilian states, states which retain the capacity to make war with one another but lost all interest in doing so.”2 European states are now partners, not military rivals. They are finally on the path that leads away from the politico-military system within which “war and the threat of war are the omnipresent features of [European] interstate relationship.”3

201

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

202

Page 202

UNIFYING EUROPE

■ Overcoming the Military-Political System Even before the outbreak of World War II, the felt need to overcome the destructive rivalry of Europe’s nation-states generated a body of theory about how this could be done. Academics, such as Ernst Haas 4 and Karl Deutsch,5 and international civil servants, such as David Mitrany,6 argued that the military-political system could be overcome by constructing a Europe-wide structure designed to coordinate common economic policies. Such a structure would attract the interests and attention of economic and political elites within the nation-states and shift them to the European level. Eventually, they argued, the pursuit of common economic policies would replace politico-military rivalry. Known as “functionalists,” Mitrany, Haas, Deutsch, and others all assumed that the creation of a supranational, continent-wide structure within which states cooperated with one another on economic matters would eventually lead to a decline in national identity and the building up of a common European identity.7 The central impediment to this project, of course, were the nation-states themselves, which, as we have shown in the previous two parts of this book, were established by the twentieth century as the only legitimate form of politico-military rule in Europe, the express purpose of which was to provide for the security and social and economic well-being of their peoples. Nation-states had become for the vast majority of Europeans the primary focus of their loyalty and identity as human beings. The functionalists believed that economic cooperation among European states would progressively erode the politico-military power and authority of the nation-state as Europe’s master institution, as “political actors in several distinct [national] settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new center.”8 This process was seen as starting in unthreatening areas of policy, such as commercial relations and market regulation, and moved, little by little, as loyalties were transferred from national to supranational institutions and demands for joint policymaking spilled over from one area to another, toward the most sensitive and symbolic areas of state sovereignty: foreign policy and defense. In order to get this process under way, central institutions had to be created that would, once created, undermine sovereignty.9 As we will see in this chapter, the hopes of the functionalists have not been realized. Their belief that the pursuit of common economic interests would eventually erode the sovereignty of the European nation-state and shift national identity to a Europe-wide super-state has not occurred. In our view, the functionalists underestimated the staying power of the nation-state and failed to understand the extent to which the creation of a Europe-wide economic coordinating structure is a political process among sovereign nation-states and not the consequence of spillover from social and economic

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

Page 203

FROM MILITARY COMPETITION TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION

203

cooperation. The reality is that cooperation among Europe’s nation-states began in the particular political circumstances of the continent immediately after World War II. In the words of one scholar: “Reaction against the protectionist policies of the 1930s, revulsion against [excessive] nationalism, dependence on American aid, and concern over the future of Germany combined to create the impetus for a tighter framework of rules to govern international relations among the reviving national governments of Western Europe.”10 Creating a Europe-wide structure has been, first and foremost, a political process that has varied across time, depending on the leadership and the national interests of the participating states. The successful establishment of this Europe-wide structure, the European Union (EU), does not, however, signify the decline of the national state. Rather, to the contrary, it has led to “the successful reassertion of the nation-state as the basic organizational entity of Europe.”11 What this means for the future of Europe and its master institution will be discussed in Part 4.

■ Toward European Cooperation, 1940s to 1950s The post–World War II impetus for building a Europe-wide structure within which European nation-states could cooperate rather than fight one another actually began before the war was over. In 1941 a group of anti-Fascists imprisoned by Mussolini drew up the Ventotene Manifesto, which called for a postwar, Europe-wide authority that would take over the conduct of European affairs. In 1944, Resistance leaders from across Europe met in Geneva, where they condemned nationalism and pledged to create a European Federal Union. The first European Federalist Congress met in Paris in March 1945 to promote the organization of European nation-states into a federation.12 In 1943, Jean Monnet, a distinguished French international civil servant and functionalist, urged European states to create a customs union among themselves in order to improve their economies and encourage cooperation rather than conflict. In 1944, three small European states—Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—took Monnet’s advice and formed such a union, Benelux. Gradually, these states negotiated a simple common tariff on imports from outside the union and a reduction or elimination of tariffs on the trade among themselves. At the same time, certain European statesmen were calling for a united Europe after the war. In a speech given at the Great Hall of Switzerland’s Zürich University in 1945, Winston Churchill, the prime minister of Britain, called for the formation of a “United States of Europe.” A United Europe Committee was formed in London that included among its members Léon

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

204

Page 204

UNIFYING EUROPE

Blum, the leader of the French Socialist Party; Alcide de Gaspari, the Christian Democrat prime minister of Italy; and Paul-Henri Spaak, the foreign minister of Belgium. At the first Congress of Europe meeting in 1948, delegates agreed to establish a Council of Europe, which came out against unfettered and uninhibited nationalism and dedicated itself to overcoming the mistrust among European states by developing joint organizations and projects that would not involve any surrender of sovereignty.13 The hope of those Europeans who supported European unification during and immediately after the war was that the entire continent would be unified within an all-European structure that would encompass the states from the Atlantic to the Urals. This hope was dashed by the onset of the “cold” phase of Europe’s century-long struggle over which type of state was to be Europe’s legitimate form of politico-military rule. By 1946 the continent was beginning to divide into two hostile spheres of influence (West and East), which inhibited efforts to build a pan-European association. Therefore, early efforts to unify Europe were confined to the western half of the continent because the United States saw the reconstructed nation-states in its sphere of influence, cooperating together in an organized and peaceful way, as the best bulwark against the westward extension of the Soviet imperial state. In order to rebuild the economies destroyed by World War II, the United States offered large sums of money to those European states that agreed to coordinate their rebuilding efforts. In June 1948, sixteen Western European states came together to establish the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) to administer Marshall Plan aid and coordinate rebuilding projects. While the OEEC completed its short-term tasks, it did not achieve its bigger goal of creating a pan-European economy through the cooperation of its members. Although the Council of Europe is recognized today for setting up a court of justice that defends human rights throughout Europe, it was never able to achieve its purpose “of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are [Europe’s] common heritage and facilitating [its] economic and social progress.”14 It was not until 1950 that the building of a Europe-wide structure began in earnest under the leadership of Robert Schuman, the foreign minister of France (1948–1953), and Jean Monnet, then the head of French economic planning. Both men criticized the OEEC and Council of Europe for their interstate approach and pushed for a more ambitious organization, one that would challenge a state’s sovereignty in a circumscribed policy area. Accordingly, in May 1950, Schuman announced his plan (known as the Schuman Declaration) to integrate the French and German coal and steel industries, and invited all other European democracies to join his efforts. It was expected that the plan would be the first step toward a more cooperative Europe. As Monnet put it, “The Schuman proposals provide a basis for

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

Page 205

FROM MILITARY COMPETITION TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION

205

the building of a new Europe through the concrete achievements of a supranational regime within a limited but controlling area of economic effort. The indispensable first principle of these proposals is the abnegation of sovereignty in a limited but decisive field.”15 German and French governments soon accepted the plan, and in 1951 they were joined by Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in signing the Treaty of Paris, which created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). (For a chronology of EU treaties, see Table 9.1.) The ECSC was important for the six founding states (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) in two major ways. First, it had big policy objectives, the most important of which was the creation of a free trade area and a common market for industrial materials like coal, iron ore, steel, and coke. Second, it marked Europe’s first concrete attempt to create significant supranational governing institutions. These included a High Authority, a supranational agency whose power superseded that of the member states, composed of nine representatives—including at least one from each member state—who were to perform their duties independently or without regard for national interests; a Committee of Ministers, comprising ministers from the member states, who were charged with watching over the High Authority and voting on its policy proposals; an advisory assembly appointed by the parliaments of the ECSC members; and a supranational court with jurisdiction over ECSC disputes. Initially, the ECSC was highly successful; customs tariffs and quotas were abolished, and progress was made toward removing nontariff barriers to trade. However, during the late 1950s, when coal became a less important energy source, the Community failed to come up with an alternative energy policy, and the ECSC became less and less relevant. However, before its decline, the ECSC spurred European states to cooperate in other areas. In the early 1950s, with the Cold War and the Korean War in progress, politicians began to argue for more defense cooperation among Western European states, which raised the “German question.” Given that Germany was generally blamed for starting the two world wars, it had been divided, occupied, and demilitarized in the late 1940s. However, when, after World War II, the Soviet Union emerged as the principal threat to liberal democracies in Western Europe, statesmen, such as Jean Monnet, began to press for West Germany’s rearmament. In 1952, Monnet put forward a proposal for a European Defense Community (EDC), which would have a transnational European army containing German troops. This was preferred to the US-backed plan to integrate Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, the EDC and its sister organization, the European Political Community, were never established because the French parliament rejected plans for both organizations in 1954.16 Despite the French refusal to cooperate in the area of military integration, leaders of

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

Page 206

206 Table 9.1

UNIFYING EUROPE

A Chronology of European Union Treaties, 1951–2004

European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)

1951

Treaties of Rome

1957

Exchange Rate Mechanism 1973 (ERM) European Council

1974

European Monetary System 1979 (EMS) Single European Act (SEA) 1986

Treaty on European Union/ 1993 Maastricht Treaty

Treaty of Amsterdam

1997

Treaty of Nice

2001

Constitutional Treaty

2004

Created free trade and common market for industrial products; Created supranational institutions to administer the common market European Economic Community (EEC) established a free trade area among member states; European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) created a common atomic energy policy; Both Communities shared a set of supranational institutions to oversee their policies ERM was created to stabilize exchange rates by keeping currency values of member states within 2.5 percent of one another; Known as the snake in the tunnel The Council was created so that heads of member states could meet two (and later four) times per year to work toward political cooperation Tied EEC monies to a basket currency known as the European Currency Unit (ECU), a weighted average of all member currencies; Replaced the ERM Created an area without internal frontiers and in which there was free movement of goods, persons, and capital; Reformed institutions by extending qualified majority voting and increasing European Parliament powers Created a new organization called the European Union (EU) based on three pillars; Pillar One: The European Community (EC; defined the Union’s policy responsibilities, reformed EU institutions, and provided for the creation of the EMS); Pillar Two: Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (sought to develop and consolidate democracy and create a common defense force); Pillar Three: Justice and Home Affairs (JHA; called for policy cooperation in areas like immigration, terrorism, and drug trafficking) Sought to prepare EU institutions for enlargement but big questions (like the number of commissioners and the voting weights on the Council of Ministers) were not answered Reformed EU institutions for enlargement; Determined the number of commissioners, changed the Council of Ministers voting weights, and raised the number of European Parliament members Sought to streamline EU policies and institutions through the creation of a single, all-encompassing document; Ratification stalled in 2005, owing to opposition from French and Dutch voters

the Western European states continued to work toward defense cooperation and agreed on an alternative proposal: the creation of a European defense group within NATO called the Western European Union (WEU). It was within this loosely structured, essentially consultative organization within NATO that West Germany was allowed to rearm.

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

Page 207

FROM MILITARY COMPETITION TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION

207

Although the six founding members of the ECSC were unable to create the defense organization that Monnet desired, they did not give up on European cooperation. Instead, they recognized that European states were not yet ready to cooperate in politically sensitive areas like defense, and they returned to Schuman’s idea that economic cooperation must precede political cooperation. Accordingly, at a 1955 conference in Messina (Italy), the foreign ministers of the ECSC member states announced that further steps toward building Europe-wide structures should be taken in the economic field. The following year a group of representatives and experts from the six member states, led by Belgian foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak, produced a report that advocated a common market and served as the starting point in the negotiations that resulted in the 1957 Treaties of Rome. The first of these treaties created a European Economic Community (EEC) by establishing a free trade area among the member states (via the removal of all tariffs and restrictions on internal trade), by setting up a common external tariff, and by promoting the free movement of goods, people, services, and capital among member states.17 The treaty also called for the creation of common policies in nonindustrial sectors, such as agriculture and transportation, but provided few instructions about how to do so. Instead, this framework agreement proposed a transitional period in which the necessary details would be negotiated over a twelve-year period.18 The second Rome treaty created the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), which, as its name suggests, was concerned with atomic energy policy (e.g., the promotion of common research, the dissemination of information, the creation of a nuclear common market, and so on). The EEC and Euratom shared the four institutions created by the treaty: a Commission (the European Commission), which would assume the duties of the ECSC’s High Authority; a Council of Ministers that would possess greater powers than its counterpart in the ECSC; an Assembly (the European Parliament) composed of delegates from the parliaments of the member states and whose power was primarily advisory; and a Court of Justice that was to adjudicate disputes that might arise under treaty law. While these institutions were primarily interstate (e.g., most of the decisions of government ministers in the Council would be made unanimously), it was hoped that they would eventually become more supranational. For example, it was thought that majority voting would be increased, that the Assembly would soon be elected by universal suffrage, and that “as the Community proved to be a success, the member states would become less concerned about their national rights and would increasingly cede greater powers to the central institutions.”19 However, as we shall see later, this has not happened. There is no doubt that the founding six viewed European cooperation as a way to improve their economies. A good example of the way that national economic interests manifested themselves during the formative years of

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

208

Page 208

UNIFYING EUROPE

European cooperation can be seen in the French and German positions during the Treaties of Rome negotiations. The French were not enthusiastic about the EEC but were willing to agree to a common market if they received a common agricultural policy in return. In contrast, Germany’s priority was establishing a common market for its industrial products while viewing the creation of a common agricultural policy as a secondary concern.20 The reason for these differences in Franco-German approaches to the Treaties of Rome is found in the different economic (i.e., commercial) concerns of each state. The postwar West German economy was dominated by heavy industry, and the government pursued an economic strategy of export-led growth. Most of the exports (e.g., machine tools, machinery, transport, equipment, and chemicals) were sent to Western Europe and North America (mainly because Germany never established colonial markets and East European markets were closed off to the Germans following World War II). Accordingly, West Germany’s heavy industrial firms pressed for a European industrial free-trade area because it would avoid a high common tariff while its light industries (e.g., textiles, paper, aircraft manufacturing, and so on), which faced competition from Britain and Scandinavia, favored a customs union among the six. Thus, almost all German firms supported some sort of trade liberalization. Therefore, when the chancellor of West Germany, Konrad Adenauer, pursued a customs union, he was backed by industrial interests (even though they held out the hope that an EFTA would soon follow). At the same time, German farmers were skeptical about European agricultural cooperation. Given that farmers had secured domestic price supports that were higher than those of any other state among the six, they feared that a common agricultural policy would mean lower prices, which would decrease German agricultural production and expose German farmers to competition from the other member states (e.g., Italian vegetables, Dutch dairy products, and French grain). Thus, Chancellor Adenauer insisted that Germany maintain control over its agricultural sector by demanding that any pact include “unanimity voting, vague rules and a postponement of decisions concerning the level of price supports.”21 In contrast, France strongly supported a common agricultural policy because farming made up 25 percent of France’s economy (second only to Italy) and Western Europe was in need of many of its products (e.g., grain, sugar, wine, beef, and dairy products). Therefore, if France was to be granted preferential exchange with the six, then French farmers would profit. At the same time, however, postwar pressure from French farmers had led to high price supports, which resulted in a financial crisis in the late 1950s, when agricultural modernization resulted in large surpluses; for example, wheat production in France increased over 800 percent, while sugar and wine increased over 300 percent. The French government realized that it

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

Page 209

FROM MILITARY COMPETITION TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION

209

could not maintain price supports to farmers with such large surpluses, but it was unable to limit or reduce them. Consequently, “preferential treatment in German markets” emerged as the best way to maintain the system of subsidized farm incomes. At the same time, French industry was only moderately interested in a common customs union. While a few industries (e.g., electrical engineering, automobiles, paper, chemicals, and woodworking) supported trade liberalization, many others (e.g., steel, cotton, metal finishers, public utilities) were reluctant for France to sign the treaties because they faced strong competition from the six. Moreover, small business (which represented a larger sector in France than in the six) strongly opposed the common market. Eventually, business and industry agreed to a common trade area, but only on the condition that it proceed slowly and that national governments maintain control through vetoes and escape clauses.22

■ Building a European Economic Space During the 1960s the six focused on fleshing out the details of the Treaties of Rome, expanding what was now called the European Community (EC), and reforming its institutions. This project fell into four areas. First, a common market was created between 1958 and 1962. Negotiations focused on the removal of internal tariffs, the harmonization of external tariffs, and the setting up of a common commercial policy for dealing with nonmember states. The first two were easily accomplished. All member states supported the lifting of internal tariffs (although they disagreed over the timing of their removal), and there was little opposition to putting an external tariff in place (although there was some dispute over which items would be exempted from it). Establishing a nonmember-state commercial policy was more problematic. In an attempt to protect its farmers, the French government insisted on certain provisions (e.g., agricultural price agreements, retention of unanimity voting) before it allowed the EC to participate in international trade negotiations like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The relatively quick creation of the common market has been linked to economic growth during the 1960s, when Europe experienced a building boom (new houses, roads, schools, and so on) and when Europeans began purchasing personal luxuries (cars, household appliances, televisions, and so on). The six also spent nearly a decade (1960–1969) negotiating a common agricultural policy (CAP), which, unlike the common market provisions, had been only vaguely sketched out in the first treaty. There were three positions over the content of CAP. One was that of Italy and the Netherlands (supported by the EC Commission), which sought a “hands off” policy, that is, rapid liberalization of the agricultural market, low price supports, and structural adjustment programs. The Italians and Dutch took

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

210

Page 210

UNIFYING EUROPE

this position because they were convinced that their farmers’ products (e.g., Italian fruit and vegetables) could withstand the competition from other member states. The opposing position was that of Germany and Belgium, both of whom sought protection. Concerned that their farmers could not compete in a free market because they exported fewer products than their neighbors, the Germans and Belgians were wary of quick liberalization plans and keen on high price supports. France, with its high percentage of arable land, took a third position—one between liberalization and protection. It wanted preferential access to the German market (for its agricultural surplus) and moderate price supports for its farmers. Ultimately, it was France and Germany that won the day: The final version of CAP included a system that provided high subsidies for farmers and considerable protection from internal and external market pressures.23 The third concern of the six during this period was enlarging the EC to include Britain, which had stayed aloof from integration for three reasons. First, it feared the EC would interfere with the special relationship it had with its former colonies, the United States, and certain of its European neighbors. Second, the British were wary of losing even a modicum of their sovereignty, which they felt was inevitable if they joined the EC. Finally, British governments claimed that they would be better off outside EC institutions: Britain’s coal and steel capacity surpassed that of the ECSC; the EDC would have limited British defense at a time (i.e., during the Cold War) when the British felt national control over defense was essential to state security; as a member of Euratom, Britain would be expected to share its secrets with less–technologically developed nuclear powers; and the EEC did not have much to offer Britain because Britain had little trade with the continent, it had high tariffs in place, and it feared competition from German producers. Therefore, instead of joining the six, the British established the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with certain nonsignatories of the Rome treaties (i.e., Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland).24 Nonetheless, after the initial success of the EEC and the failure to negotiate an EFTA-EEC agreement, the British made two bids for membership (1961 and 1967), both of which were blocked by French president Charles de Gaulle. According to de Gaulle, British membership could threaten France’s position at the center of the EC stage, disrupt the FrancoGerman alliance, and, given the special UK-US relationship, pave the way for America’s domination of Europe. However, the situation changed when Georges Pompidou was elected president in 1969. In contrast to de Gaulle, Pompidou felt that Britain would be a good counterweight to Germany, that it would support France’s opposition to supranational proposals, and that it would make a significant financial contribution to the Community. Therefore, in 1973 Britain was finally permitted to join, along with Ireland.

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

Page 211

FROM MILITARY COMPETITION TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION

211

Before this, between 1960 and 1966, the six founding states reformed EC institutions, which resulted in a more interstate system. For example, new bodies were established that enhanced the power of the Council at the expense of the Commission. And proposals for the more frequent use of qualified majority (rather than unanimity) voting were met with such hostility on the part of President de Gaulle that he pulled France’s permanent representative from Brussels and announced a boycott of Council meetings. One result of this “Empty Chair” crisis (1965–1966) was the Luxembourg Compromise, which acknowledged a member state’s right to veto EC decisions when “vital national interests” were involved.25 As during the 1950s, the national economic interests of the member states were paramount during the 1960s. For example, CAP included high price supports and strong external protections because France (and to a lesser extent Germany) refused to sign off on a policy that contained anything less (or that was free market in nature). Similarly, a common market was created relatively quickly because the six in general, and German industry in particular, stood to profit from the removal of internal tariffs and the creation of a common external tariff barrier. In 1969, the founding six met in The Hague to discuss the next steps. They agreed that the common market should be expanded into a “European economic space,” that the EC should be enlarged to include other European democracies, and that the governing institutions should be “deepened” by (among other things) increasing budgetary and foreign-policy powers, directly electing the European Parliament, and extending qualified majority voting. These agreed-upon steps were soon taken. First, progress was made toward a greater economic space. In 1973 the European Exchange Rate Agreement was created. Known as the “snake in the tunnel,” this agreement sought to stabilize exchange rates in the EEC by keeping currency values of the member states within 2.5 percent of one another within a broader band of floating exchange rates. This was possible because “the snake” existed outside of formal EC institutions, and five nonmember states (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Britain, and Ireland) were participants. However, currency speculation and devaluation as well as stagflation, resulting from the spike in oil prices during the early 1970s, meant that the snake never became the monetary union that its founders intended it to be.26 Despite the economic problems facing Europe at this time (such as declining growth rates, increasing unemployment, declines in productivity, profits, and investment), the EC member states did not give up their vision of a wider economic space, and in 1979 established the European Monetary System (EMS), membership in which was voluntary. Unlike the snake wherein EC currencies floated within a larger tunnel, the EMS tied Community monies to a “basket” currency known as the European Currency Unit (ECU), which was a weighted average of all member curren-

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

212

Page 212

UNIFYING EUROPE

cies. However, this EMS was like the snake, in that it required participating member states to keep their currencies within a narrow range (plus or minus 2.5 percent). If they failed to do so, then the member’s central bank was expected to intervene and restore the agreed-upon percentage. While it is generally agreed that the EMS was a success (i.e., it created a zone of monetary stability and was linked to a decline in inflation in the EC), it favored some participants more than others. States with strong currencies and low rates of inflation (such as Germany and the Netherlands) had a relatively easy time following EMS rules, while states with weak currencies and high inflation (such as France, Belgium, and Italy) had to make some difficult adjustments to stay in the system.27 France, in particular, was faced with some hard choices. When the socialist François Mitterrand was elected president in 1981, he tried to reinvigorate the French economy by increasing demand (which was expected to increase investment, production, and profits) and beefing up social, employment, and welfare policies (e.g., creation of public sector jobs). By 1982, however, France’s inflation rate was more that twice that of Germany, and between 1981 and 1983 three devaluations of the franc were negotiated through the EMS. Despite these devaluations, high inflation persisted in France and Mitterrand was forced to choose between leaving the EMS (thereby continuing down the path of demand management and social spending) and staying in the EMS, which meant adopting new economic policies. By electing to stay in the system, Mitterrand oversaw the joint revaluation of the franc and deutsche mark and (at Germany’s insistence) the adoption of austerity measures, such as increased social security contributions, as well as higher charges for telephone, gas and electricity service, and cigarettes. In addition to creating a more comprehensive economic area, the founding six wanted to enlarge the EC to include other Western European democratic states. Britain joined in 1973 (see above) along with Ireland and Denmark. Initially, the Irish and Danes were not interested in European integration because their economies were heavily dependent on agriculture; consequently, organizations like the ECSC held little attraction for them. However, when Britain was admitted into the Community, Ireland and Denmark reconsidered. Given that both states had close economic and historical ties to Britain, it made sense for the three to join together. The next enlargement came in 1981, when Greece became a member after improving its economy and convincing Community officials that membership would consolidate Greece’s democracy and its ties to Western Europe. In time, five years later, Spain and Portugal joined, well after the two had ousted their respective dictators and developed their economies. We shall have more to say about these enlargements in Chapter 11. Finally, there was a desire to cooperate beyond building a common eco-

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

Page 213

FROM MILITARY COMPETITION TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION

213

nomic space. The biggest step toward this form of cooperation was the creation, in 1974, of a new institution called the European Council, which initially established biannual meetings of the heads of member states. One of the Council’s priorities was presenting common foreign-policy stances on behalf of the EC, known as European Political Cooperation (EPC). During the 1970s these positions focused on bridging the gap between East and West and providing an alternative to America’s pro-Israel position in the Middle East. However, we should be careful about attributing too much significance to the EPC for the emergence of a common European foreign policy. Its process was interstate and existed entirely outside the Treaties of Rome. Another Council priority was strengthening the European Parliament (EP). This was done by expanding the EP’s budgetary powers and allowing for its direct election, the first of which was held in 1979. Finally, the member states agreed that qualified majority voting would be used when it was required (which was rarely) by the Treaties of Rome. We will have more to say about these efforts to strengthen EC institutions in the next chapter. Throughout the 1970s the leaders of the EC member states had many geopolitical, ideological, and economic reasons to cooperate. For example, West German chancellor Willy Brandt (1969–1974) sought the normalization of relations with East Germany and the Soviet Union (known as Ostpolitik), as well as to achieve greater EC integration through monetary cooperation (or Ostpolitik). Similarly, Brandt’s successor, Helmut Schmidt (1974–1982), criticized the US position toward the East, and he frequently said that a European Monetary System was not merely “an instrument to harmonize economic policies” but part “of a broader strategy for the political self-determination of Europe.”28 Geopolitics and ideology were also important for the French. Strong pro-European sentiment was prevalent among French leaders during this time: Presidents Georges Pompidou (1969–1974), Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (1974–1981), and François Mitterrand (1981–1995) all campaigned on proEurope platforms, and those who tried to use anti-European rhetoric to win elections (e.g., Jacques Chirac) were unsuccessful. Moreover, French leaders saw cooperation as a means of dealing with the “German question” or a strong Germany, unified thanks to Ostpolitik and ready to engage with Europe. In the French view, monetary cooperation would keep West Germany close to (and perhaps dependent upon) its European neighbors. While geopolitics and ideology were important motivating factors for European cooperation during the 1970s, the economic interests of member states were paramount. In the 1970s, West Germany’s economy (unlike those of its neighbors) was doing relatively well; it had trade surpluses, its currency was undervalued, and the Bundesbank (the German National Bank) had kept inflation rates low. Aiming to maintain the state’s economic stability, German leaders insisted that EC economic cooperation precede

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

214

Page 214

UNIFYING EUROPE

monetary integration. That is, member states with weaker economies should get inflation rates and interest rates “in line” with those of Germany and should be responsible for any currency adjustments (e.g., devaluations) that this process required. Only then would the Germans agree to a common currency or a central European bank. Accordingly, during EMS negotiations, the Germans favored a “ snakelike” plan whereby each currency would be tied to every other currency in the system. If a state’s currency slipped outside the band, then its central bank was expected to intervene and make the necessary adjustments to return it to the band. Germany also rejected any proposals for joint decisionmaking or central control of monetary policy. It is hardly surprising, then, that the German plan would have created an asymmetrical EMS; that is, member states with strong economies would have an easier time staying within the band than their less prosperous counterparts.29 In contrast, France (as well as Italy and Belgium) faced economic difficulties during the 1970s: investment was low, production costs were soaring, and inflation was so high that the franc was devalued several times. Accordingly, the French sought a monetary policy that would require states with both strong and weak economies to share the costs of currency fluctuation and reevaluation. Specifically, during EMS negotiations, French leaders backed a plan to tie currencies to the ECU (or currency basket), a plan that required any single currency, strong or weak, that diverged from the basket to be adjusted. France also criticized Germany’s proposal, saying it placed an unnecessary burden on those countries with weak currencies. Given the differences in the economic interests of France and Germany, it is not surprising that the EMS represented a compromise between the two: French leaders got the basket currency they wanted and an exchange rate mechanism was set up according to German specifications. In other words, the EMS was an attempt “to craft a bargain between strong- and weak-currency countries. . . . The strong-currency countries would receive protection against currency appreciation while weak-currency countries would receive support in disinflation. Both would receive relief from currency volatility.”30 The bargain struck to create the EMS provides but one example of the paramount role played by national (economic) interests in European cooperation during the 1970s, and, as the next section will show, such interests continued to shape European cooperation into the 1990s.

■ Cooperation Accelerates In 1981 the Council passed a resolution (known as the Genscher-Columbo initiative) that called for greater European economic and foreign-policy cooperation. Two years later the Solemn Declaration on European Union

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

Page 215

FROM MILITARY COMPETITION TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION

215

urged the creation of a more open internal market and stronger EC institutions. However, before these proposals could be acted upon, the member states had to address the British complaint about the budget. Ever since it joined the EC in 1973, Britain had been complaining that it contributed more than its fair share to the Community’s coffers. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979–1990), in particular, was especially vocal about this issue. Thatcher argued that British taxpayers were subsidizing Dutch, French, and Italian farmers. Therefore, she sought a permanent rebate and limits on CAP spending. After several rounds of talks, a permanent deal was made at a Brussels summit held in early 1984: the British net contribution was reduced (to reflect Britain’s lower per capita income), and Britain was given an annual rebate totaling two-thirds of its annual net contribution. France, under the leadership of President François Mitterrand, agreed to increase its contributions to make up the difference.31 Once Britain’s budgetary complaint was placated, the heads of member states met in Fontainebleau, France, where they called for the creation of a true internal market (i.e., one in which there were no tariff barriers to trade among member states), and charged the Commission with sorting out the details. Accordingly, Commission president Jacques Delors (1985–1995) asked the commissioner for the Internal Market, Lord Arthur Cockfield, to draft a white paper on the subject. Cockfield proposed three hundred measures that would create an internal market and provided a deadline for the market’s completion by December 31, 1992. The heads of EC states unanimously approved the white paper, and its proposals were incorporated into a treaty known as the Single European Act (SEA). Signed in 1986, SEA had two main components. First, it sought to create “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured.”32 To create this truly liberal internal market, the heads of the member states agreed to remove all nontariff barriers (i.e., the elimination of border and customs procedures, the harmonization of industrial standards and food industry regulations, the liberalization of financial services, and so on). Second, SEA reformed the EC’s institutions by extending qualified majority voting (QMV) and increasing the European Parliament’s powers through the cooperation procedure (which essentially allowed the EP to propose amendments). However, soon after SEA was signed, many member-state leaders (except for those in Britain) expressed disappointment with the Act, claiming that it did not do enough to advance cooperation. First, they argued that an economic and monetary union had yet to be achieved. The French, in particular, expressed support for such a union; in October 1987, President François Mitterrand called for a central bank, and the following year Finance Minister Edouard Balladur demanded a common currency, because the French believed that the EMS had become asymmetrical; that is, the German quest

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

216

Page 216

UNIFYING EUROPE

for low inflation and monetary discipline had harmed weak-currency states like France. Second, state leaders claimed the Act did not do enough to further social cooperation. Instead, it only expanded EC policymaking into the vaguely defined area of “economic and social cohesion.” State leaders also criticized the Act for dismantling border controls without providing ways to deal with problems like cross-border crime, drug trafficking, international terrorism, and mass migration from eastern Europe and North Africa. Finally, many leaders believed that SEA failed to adequately address the “democratic deficit” (or the lack of accountability of Community decisionmakers), about which we will say more in the next chapter. In order to address these criticisms, a series of interstate conferences on political union and on economic and monetary union were held throughout the 1990s. Member states’ positions during these negotiations varied: some (such as the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Italy) supported cooperation across the board, while others supported cooperation in some areas but not others. States with weak economies (such as Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Greece) were particularly supportive of monetary and social cooperation. France saw monetary union as a way to improve its economy but opposed a supranational political union because it contradicted its leaders’ Gaullist vision of the French state as strong and independent. Germany, newly reunited following the fall of the Berlin Wall, advocated further political cooperation, but was wary of monetary union primarily because its economy was doing well without it. Finally, Britain adopted a “minimalist position” on all issues, which meant that it was hostile to any proposals for any kind of supranational union, whether political or monetary. Even the EC Commission had a view; the Commission, led by Jacques Delors, submitted a report advocating further monetary and political cooperation in general, and an enhanced role for the Commission in particular.33 Surprisingly, these varying approaches to cooperation did not prevent negotiations from proceeding, and, in December 1991, attendees at the Commission’s Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) presented their proposals at the European Council meeting in Maastricht, the Netherlands. While the IGC on monetary union presented a clear set of recommendations to the Council, the IGC on political union was unable to resolve some particularly contentious problems (e.g., Britain’s opposition to extending the social dimension and adopting a common currency). The Council was able to successfully solve these problems, and the Treaty on European Union (TEU), commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty, was signed in February 1992 and ratified by the member states the following year. In the words of its drafters, the Maastricht Treaty marked “a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen.”34 Accordingly, Maastricht created a new organization called the European

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

Page 217

FROM MILITARY COMPETITION TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION

217

Union, which was based on three pillars: the European Communities, a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The first pillar is considered the most important, for it defined the Union’s policy responsibilities and preserved and strengthened the acquis communautaire, or the Union’s founding organizations, like the ECSC, Euratom, and the EEC (later renamed the European Community, or EC). It also introduced the principle of subsidiarity (or the notion that policies should be decided at the national, rather than EU, level whenever possible), and it established Union citizenship (i.e., under certain conditions, citizens were now permitted to live and work anywhere in the Union and could vote and stand as candidates for the EP and local elections). In addition, the first pillar reformed the Union’s institutions. Specifically, it strengthened the power of the Council of Ministers by extending its use of QMV (as opposed to unanimous voting), and it increased the EP’s powers through the co-decision procedure (which allowed the EP to veto legislative proposals for the first time). Finally, the first pillar extended the EC’s policy purview. For example, a timetable for creating the EMU was established (which meant fixing exchange rates, adopting a single currency, and establishing a European System of Central Banks by 1999), and a Protocol on Social Policy called on member states to further coordinate equal access to employment and social protection, equal pay for equal work, minimum standards for living and working conditions, and freedoms of association and collective bargaining.35 As a concession to its minimalist position during the IGCs, Britain was permitted to opt out of both the single currency and the social policy protocol. The second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, set out broadly defined objectives for the EU, such as safeguarding its common values, fundamental interests, and independence; developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law; and respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. It was up to the European Council to fill in the details by defining common, unanimously supported positions; by deciding if joint action was necessary; and by working with the Western European Union to adopt the requisite defense arrangements. It should be stressed that even though QMV was used to make secondary decisions, the CFSP was fundamentally interstate in nature. Similarly, decisionmaking in the third pillar, Justice and Home Affairs, was primarily among states, even though policy cooperation was expanded to include areas like asylum rules, immigration border controls, drug trafficking, and terrorism. To understand cooperation during the mid-1980s, we must understand the national interests of the member states. In the German case, geopolitical interests and ideology provide an account of the positions adopted by its leaders on political union. Throughout the 1980s, Germany’s foreign minis-

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

218

Page 218

UNIFYING EUROPE

ter (Hans-Dietrich Genscher) advocated European cooperation, and Germany’s support of SEA was consistent with that approach. Germany’s leaders were also ideologically predisposed to support cooperation. Political elites, members of parliament, and even large segments of the public believed in a federal Europe; and some of the German government’s SEA federalist proposals (e.g., expansion of EP powers) met with success. At the same time, German leaders (strong federalists though they were) backed SEA because it would benefit Germany economically. Specifically, German leaders ensured that the Act contain a clause “permitting governments with high regulatory standards [like Germany’s] to maintain high levels of regulatory protection.”36 Such a clause was particularly important given the domestic support for regulation (e.g., in the business sector, with the public, etc.) Moreover, Chancellor Helmut Kohl opposed monetary cooperation until the member states achieved a greater level of economic convergence; accordingly, SEA contained only a rhetorical commitment to further consideration of creating a monetary union. In contrast to the German case, British leaders were motivated by other factors. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher never viewed SEA as a means of maintaining British influence in Europe or as a means of dealing with security threats. Thatcher’s antifederalist ideology made her reluctant to strengthen supranational institutions and to expand EC competence into areas—such as indirect taxation and social legislation—not immediately linked to trade. Thus, the British helped to ensure that the Act neither extended QMV voting nor standardized EP elections. When it came to economic cooperation, Prime Minister Thatcher’s position on SEA largely reflected her domestic agenda, that is, the privatization of industry, the elimination of obstacles to foreign takeovers, and the reduction of regulatory controls. Therefore, Britain demanded and got more liberalization of the internal market and a substantial rebate on previous contributions to CAP. Moreover, one of Thatcher’s economic advisers stated that his advice that decisions be made solely on the basis of British economic interest was invariably accepted. At the end of the day, the British supported SEA because it could not harm British economic interests.37 As in the British case, French support for SEA can be attributed to ideology rather than geopolitics. President Mitterrand declared that one of his main ambitions was the construction of Europe in general, and the EMS in particular. However, Mitterrand did not adopt a pro-Europe attitude until 1983, when he needed to strengthen his legitimacy and increase his public support following the failure of his economic experiment. Moreover, he opposed the construction of a supranational political structure and made sure that forms of interstate cooperation were included in the treaty. Thus, when it came to constructing Europe, Mitterrand was less a genuine Europeanist and more a French nationalist.

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

Page 219

FROM MILITARY COMPETITION TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION

219

France was also nationalist when it came to economic cooperation. French leaders backed SEA because a liberal internal market would benefit the French economy. As mentioned previously, by the mid-1980s the traditional French system of extensive industrial subsidies, controlled credit, and closed financial markets was well on the way to being replaced with more market-oriented arrangements. One way to make such arrangements was within Europe, and French leaders embraced the internal market program. As the secretary of state for European Affairs said at the time, “The proposal for the establishment of a large internal market . . . is the most important proposal for our firms and citizens.”38 Thus, France supported the active liberalization of industrial and food standards as well as the elimination of border controls, all of which were included in the Act. Taken together, geopolitics, ideology, and economic incentives provide a fairly complete account for why the member states supported SEA during the mid-1980s: It meshed with their ideology and suited their national economic interests. As with SEA, the geopolitics, ideology, and economic interests of the member states—especially Britain, France, and Germany—determined the content of the Maastricht Treaty. First, Germany backed the Maastricht Treaty because it was seen as a way to facilitate German unification, which began in November 1989. Specifically, it was said that Kohl offered EMU as a quid pro quo for French support of German unification.39 Second, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Chancellor Kohl were longtime supporters of European cooperation, well before German unification in 1989. Kohl frequently made public his ideological commitment to a bigger and stronger Europe, a “United States of Europe.” This pro-Europe ideology is especially evident in Germany’s attempt to deepen political union during treaty talks. For example, Germany proposed more foreign-policy cooperation, a stronger common social policy, and a more powerful role for the European Parliament. At the same time, German leaders were guided by economic interests. Their position on EMU “reflected a domestic compromise between business and government, on the one side, favoring a competitive currency and macroeconomic flexibility, and the Bundesbank, backed by a certain extent by public and business opinion, on the other, which privileged low inflation.”40 Hence, Germany’s successful EMU proposals included flexible macroeconomic convergence criteria and an autonomous central European bank with the power to keep down inflation rates. Similarly, French leaders were motivated by geopolitical calculations, economic interests, and nationalism. The French supported cooperation in the early 1990s because they wanted to prevent a renewed German threat. In 1989 the French ambassador to Germany had stated that German unification “would give birth to a Europe dominated by Germany, which no one, in the

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

Page 220

220

UNIFYING EUROPE

East or West wants.”41 Integrating a unified Germany into a Europe-wide structure would help allay these worries. At the same time, however, the French maintained their interstate approach to political union and opposed strengthening the EP’s powers and creating a strong common foreign and security policy. As with Germany, economic interests were paramount to the French. By 1983, as mentioned above, Mitterrand had realized that most of Europe’s economic policies advocated “low inflation, market-driven interest rates and greater capital mobility.”42 Accordingly, Mitterrand favored economic liberalization as long as the French franc did not suffer, and French leaders presented the following proposals during treaty talks over monetary union: national control over the European central bank, especially with regard to setting exchange rates, and loose economic convergence criteria. While the German position on monetary union prevailed, the French (with British support) were able to limit political cooperation. For example, the treaty called for only a modest increase in the powers of the EP and a relatively weak common foreign and security policy. As in the German and French cases, geopolitics, ideology, and national economic interests motivated British leaders. Prime Minister Thatcher’s opposition to more monetary and political integration “reflected her own brand of British nationalism, which predisposed her to reject any proposal for centralizing power at the European level.”43 This is evident in Britain’s insistence that it be able to opt-out of monetary union, in its opposition to JHA policy as well as social policy, and in its opposition to increasing the EP’s powers and the extension of QMV voting. At the same time, British leaders had economic incentives to oppose monetary union. Inflation was close to 10 percent in Britain, and leaders were afraid that the fixed exchange rates required by EMU would become uncompetitive. However, in the event monetary union succeeded, the British did not want to be excluded. It was decided to allow Britain to opt out of the monetary provisions that were not thought to be in its best economic interest.

■ Cooperation Stalls? The years following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty were difficult ones for the European Union. First, the ratification of the treaty did not go as smoothly as its drafters had hoped. In the spring of 1992, the Danes expressed their opposition to cooperation in noneconomic areas by initially rejecting the document by a margin of 46,000 votes (50.7 percent versus 49.3 percent),44 and its narrow margin of approval in France (51 percent to 49 percent) was seen as a symptom of wider public skepticism about the newly created Union. Second, in 1992 the EMS experienced economic troubles caused by high unemployment rates as well as currency speculation

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

Page 221

FROM MILITARY COMPETITION TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION

221

and devaluation. Such troubles threatened the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), the foundation of both the EMS and EMU. Finally, Europe failed to adopt a common position on the conflict occurring in the former Yugoslavia, which raised questions about the legitimacy of the CFSP. Thus, the mood was far from “Europhoric” when an IGC was convened in Amsterdam in late 1996 and concluded in Amsterdam in the summer of 1997 to assess the progress of the Maastricht Treaty. Initially, little was resolved when it came to controversial issues like the extension of QMV and the strengthening of the EP because the Euro-skeptic Conservative British government blocked any moves to deepen the Union. However, when the Labour Party won the British parliamentary elections held in May 1997, the new prime minister, Tony Blair, kept his campaign promise to engage “constructively” with the EU, and talks were completed successfully. The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in the fall of 1997 and was ratified by all the member states over the following two years. Yet the contents of the treaty reflected the reluctance of member states to push cooperation further. As one participant put it, “Many governments did not want to reform anything in depth.”45 The major institutional questions (for example, number of commissioners, reweighted voting in the Council of Ministers) were put off until the next IGC, although minor matters were resolved (for example, membership of the European Parliament was capped at seven hundred, and the co-decision procedure was modified to give the EP more power vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers). We will discuss institutional reforms in detail in the next chapter. There were also minor changes to the rules governing the second pillar, CFSP. For example, the European Council was allowed to define a common foreign-policy position, and the Council of Ministers could vote to implement its position with qualified majorities, although unanimity voting was required when no common policy could be agreed upon. Also, CFSP institutions were streamlined with the creation of a “high representative,” who was intended to act as a spokesperson for the EU. Finally, the third pillar, Justice and Home Affairs, was reorganized. Some areas, such as asylum and immigration policy for non-EU citizens and policies to combat fraud and drug addiction, were shifted to the first (EC) pillar, which meant that EU institutions rather than member states determined policy in these areas. However, other policy domains, like border trafficking crimes and terrorism prevention, remained in the third pillar, where member states had the final say. While the Amsterdam Treaty made modest changes to the EU’s existing framework, it failed to achieve its central goal, which was preparing the Union for enlargement. Accordingly, an IGC on enlargement was convened in early 2000 and concluded later that year at the European Council meetings in Nice, France. This IGC was primarily concerned with institutional reform. First, it refigured the composition of the Commission. Initially, the

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

222

Page 222

UNIFYING EUROPE

smaller member states had one commissioner each, while the larger states (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Britain) each had two. However, to prevent the Commission from becoming too big after enlargement, it was agreed that each member state would have one commissioner (thus, the five largest states would lose a commissioner) and that membership limits would be established once the EU had twenty-seven participants. Second, the voting weights on the Council of Ministers was changed. The five largest EU states went from having 55 percent of the vote to 60 percent. At the same time, the smaller states remained over-represented in relation to population size. For example, at 82 million as of this writing, Germany’s population exceeds that of France, Britain, and Italy (the next most populous EU states) by almost 20 million. However, all of these states have the same number of votes in the Council of Ministers. Despite the increase in the number of votes per state, the percentage required to constitute a qualified majority remained the same at approximately 71 percent. Finally, the Nice Treaty raised the ceiling of the European Parliament to 732 members, which still required a cut in the numbers of seats allocated to existing member states (see Table 9.2).46 As in Amsterdam, the treaty signed in Nice, in February 2001, initially met with some resistance: The Irish rejected the document when first asked to vote on it, and critics claimed that the Nice IGC had been too narrow in scope; that is, it failed to address big issues like the balance of power between the Union and the member states and the “constitutionalization” and simplification of the treaties.47 However, it is important to remember that the Nice conference was not given a broad mandate. Instead it was charged with the relatively narrow goal of preparing the Union’s institutions for expansion into central and eastern Europe, a goal that was eventually achieved. Shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Nice, political leaders (such as German foreign minister Joschka Fischer and French president Jacques Chirac) expressed their dissatisfaction with its narrow scope. Accordingly, a declaration was attached to the document that demanded “a deeper and wider debate . . . about the future of the EU” and the holding of another conference that would discuss subjects such as the role of national parliaments in the EU, the simplification of treaties, and the demarcation of responsibilities between the EU and the member states. Shortly thereafter, in February 2003, a constitutional convention was convened. Chaired by former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, it comprised representatives from both national and EU institutions (i.e., representatives of the nation-state leaders, the nation-state parliaments, the Commission, and the European Parliament), who met in plenary sessions and smaller working groups to hammer out a text. When the convention adjourned in June 2003, the draft treaty was submitted to an interstate conference, where it took a

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

Page 223

FROM MILITARY COMPETITION TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Table 9.2

223

Population and Institutional Representation of EU Member States

Pre-Nice: Number of Weighted Votes (% of votes)

Post-Nice: Number of Weighted Votes / % of Votes EU-15 / % Votes EU-27

EP Seats: Pre-Nice / Post-Nice / % EU-27

Member State

Population in Millions (% of EU-27)

Germany Britain France Italy Spain Netherlands Belgium Greece Portugal Sweden Austria Denmark Finland Ireland Luxembourg Total EU-15

82.03 (17.05) 59.75 (12.31) 58.97 (12.25) 57.61 (11.97) 39.40 (8.19) 15.76 (3.28) 10.71 (2.21) 10.53 (2.19) 9.98 (2.07) 8.85 (1.84) 8.08 (1.68) 5.31 (1.10) 5.16 (1.07) 3.74 (0.78) 0.43 (0.09) 375.31 (77.99)

10 (11.5) 10 (11.5) 10 (11.5) 10 (11.5) 8 (9.2) 5 (5.7) 5 (5.7) 5 (5.7) 5 (5.7) 4 (4.6) 4 (4.6) 3 (3.4) 3 (3.4) 3 (3.4) 2 (2.3) 87 (100)

29/ 12.2 / 8.41 29/ 12.2 / 8.41 29 / 12.2 / 8.41 29 / 12.2 / 8.41 27 / 11.4 / 7.83 13 / 5.5 / 3.77 12 / 5.1 / 3.48 12 / 5.1 / 3.48 12 / 5.1 / 3.48 10 / 4.2 / 2.90 10 / 4.2 / 2.90 7 / 2.9 / 2.03 7 / 2.9 / 2.03 7 / 2.9 / 2.03 4 / 1.7 / 1.16 237 (100)

99 / 99 / 13.52 87 / 72 / 9.84 87 / 72 / 9.84 87 / 72 / 9.84 64 / 50 / 6.83 31 / 25 / 3.42 25 / 22 / 3.01 25 / 22 / 3.01 25 / 22 / 3.01 22 / 18 / 2.46 21 / 17 / 2.32 16 / 13 / 1.78 16 / 13 / 1.78 15 / 12 / 1.64 6 / 6 / 0.82 626 / 535 / 73

Poland Romania Czech Republic Hungary Bulgaria Slovakia Lithuania Latvia Slovenia Estonia Cyprus Malta Total EU-27

38.67 (8.04) 22.49 (4.67) 10.29 (2.14) 10.09 (2.10) 8.23 (1.71) 5.39 (1.12) 3.70 (0.77) 2.44 (0.51) 1.98 (0.41) 1.45 (0.30) 0.75 (0.16) 0.38 (0.08) 481.17 (100)

— — — — — — — — — — — — —

27 / — / 7.83 14 / — / 4.06 12 / — / 3.48 12 / — / 3.48 10 / — / 2.90 7 / — / 2.03 7 / — / 2.03 4 / — / 1.16 4 / — / 1.16 4 / — / 1.16 4 / — / 1.16 3 / — / 0.87 345 / — / 100

— / 50 / 6.83 — / 33 / 4.51 — / 20 / 2.73 — / 20 / 2.73 — / 17 / 2.32 — / 13 / 1.78 — / 12 / 1.64 — / 8 / 1.09 — / 7 / 0.96 — / 6 / 0.82 — / 6 / 0.82 — / 5 / 0.68 — / 732 / 100

Source: Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 5th edition (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 84-85.

year for the member states to sort out the most sensitive issues (weighting of votes, number of commissioners, and so on).48 Signed in October 2004, the Constitutional Treaty is composed of a preamble and four parts: Part One covers the EU’s competences, institutions, membership, objectives, and values; Part Two consists of the Charter of Fundamental Rights; Part Three is made up of the existing treaties; and Part Four includes ancillary material. Some of its key provisions are as follows:

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

224

Page 224

UNIFYING EUROPE

1. The adoption of a double-majority voting system. Under this system a law can be passed if it is approved by 55 percent of the member states possessing 65 percent of the population. Previously, laws were passed with the support of half the twenty-five member states representing 60 percent of the population. 2. The election of a president by the European Council for a two-andone-half-year term. Before, the Council presidency rotated through the members states every six months. 3. The appointment of a minister of foreign affairs by the European Council (in agreement with the Commission) who shall conduct the Union’s CFSP. This new post will combine the roles of the external-affairs commissioner and the high representative on foreign policy, and is expected to be prominent only when there is a policy that all members have accepted. 4. The appointment of one commissioner per member state (for a total of twenty-five commissioners) until 2014, when the Commission’s membership will be reduced to no more than two-thirds of the number of member states, with members rotated among the states. Previously, each of the larger states (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Britain) had two commissioners each. 5. The expansion of EP power (to amend laws, control the budget, and approve the choice of president of the Commission). 6. The incorporation of a Charter of Fundamental Rights into EU law for the first time. The Charter is supposed to guarantee various rights, such as the right to life and liberty as well as the right to strike. 7. The inclusion of the subsidiary principle, which means that the EU is subordinate to the member states in certain areas. This principle (first raised in 1975) is that decisions should be taken at the lowest possible level for effective action. Thus, the EU is fundamentally subordinate to its member states. 8. The extension of the Union’s policy purview into new areas (such as asylum policy and immigration). While the document was approved by several member states’ parliaments, it was rejected by French and Dutch voters in the summer of 2005. After a period of indecision, the leaders of EU member states adopted a shortened and simplified version of the Constitution in Lisbon, Portugal, on November 7, 2007. As during previous decades, the national interests of the states were paramount in their respective negotiating positions on the Treaty of Amsterdam. Germany favored a stronger common foreign policy (because it lacked autonomy in this area, such as a seat on the UN Security Council); more involvement in immigration and policing policies (because it had a disproportionate share of EU immigrants); and slow progress on social and

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

Page 225

FROM MILITARY COMPETITION TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION

225

employment policies (because the Christian Democratic German government, like its conservative counterparts, opposed increasing social benefits). Moreover, Chancellor Kohl, who was facing parliamentary elections, made it known that he did not want to finalize any major institutional reforms that might undermine his power at home.49 The French backed some European coordination of immigration and policing policies (provided that the involvement of supranational institutions was limited); they supported expanded social and employment policies (support that was in keeping with the agenda of the ruling Socialist government); and they sought both a stronger CFSP and the ability to act unilaterally, which was in keeping with France’s statist approach to the EU as well as its desire to use the EU to enhance its international reputation. It is of note that when French officials backed a post for a Mr. CFSP, they thought that former French president Giscard d’Estaing would be the one to fill it.50 Despite the election of a Labour government, the British remained hostile to many aspects of integration. They resisted coordinated policing and immigration policies (because they had comparatively strong control over their borders); although they signed on to the social charter, they opposed the integration of social and employment policies (which might harm the labor market); and they sought to maintain a unilateral veto when it came to a coordinated foreign policy.51 Similarly, when it came to the sticky questions raised by institutional reform, the member states sought to preserve their national interests. While most countries voiced public support for QMV, it was qualified. France wanted to extend the system to cover social, employment, and (some) economic policy areas, but it opposed QMV’s use in foreign and defense domains. In contrast, Germany was hesitant to extend QMV over many economic areas but supported its use when deciding foreign-policy issues. In the end, the Amsterdam Treaty extended QMV to noncontroversial areas (e.g., public health, countering fraud); further extensions were postponed. When it came to redistributing Commission positions and reweighting Council votes, national interest was linked to size: “Larger governments . . . valued greater Council representation enough to sacrifice their second Commissioner”;52 smaller governments were willing to reweight Council votes so long as their interests continued to be represented on the Commission. While final decisions on these institutional reforms were put off until later, it is clear that the member states would enter the next round of negotiations with positions that reflected their national interests. As mentioned above, Nice was charged with taking on the Amsterdam leftovers or the institutional reforms necessary to prepare the Union for enlargement. These reforms included extended qualified majority voting, reweighting the Council votes, and changing the size and composition of

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

226

Page 226

UNIFYING EUROPE

the Commission. Debate over these issues pitted big states against smaller ones. Specifically, France and Germany were committed to keeping their powerful positions, whereas Britain insisted on retaining its “à la carte” relationship with Europe. Regarding the size of the Commission, France proposed “a radical reduction” in the size of the Commission while promising a system for the selection of a smaller group of commissioners that would ensure equality among all member states. The small states opposed the French plan, fearing that the reduced Commission would be dominated by the larger states and, as a result, that their interests would be ignored. When it came to Council votes, France insisted on keeping the same number of votes as Germany, even though the latter was more populous than the former. Germany supported the French position on the condition that demography was added to the calculation for qualified majority voting. As was stated above, France and Germany both got what they wanted regarding Council votes (both France and Germany got twenty-nine votes, while the addition of a demographic criterion gave Germany extra voting weight). At the same time, the small states succeeded in maintaining national representation on the Commission when all agreed to have one commissioner per member state until the EU reached twenty-seven. However, given that the Commission is not considered the forum for the representation of national interest and ambition, France did not concede much when it gave up its “radical” plan to shrink the size of this institution.53 Similarly, the debate over the constitution treaty pitted the larger member states against their smaller counterparts. 54 For example, in January 2003, when the constitutional convention was beginning its final deliberations, France and Germany presented a proposal on reforming EU institutions. They called for a long-term president of the European Council, the election of the European Commission president by the European Parliament, the creation of a foreign minister with spots on both the Council and the Commission, majority voting in most foreign-policy matters, and the extension of parliamentary co-decisionmaking. While Britain and Spain supported the call for a standing president of the European Council, they, along with Italy and Poland, opposed the EP election of a Commission president. Instead they favored the status quo—selection of the president by the European Council. Moreover, many of the smaller states called the proposal a Franco-German diktat. Specifically, they feared not only that the European Council president would come from a big state but also that it would undermine the Commission president, who was traditionally viewed as “the champion of the small member states.”55 The outcome of these negotiations (see above) has largely been attributed to the power wielded by the larger member states. As one scholar put it, “The avowed support of the biggest members . . . ensured that the convention would call for an elected European Council president. The opposi-

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

Page 227

FROM MILITARY COMPETITION TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION

227

tion of three of the biggest member states ensured that the convention would not call for election of the Commission president by the European Parliament.”56 The constitution’s negations were also characterized by the split between the founding six and the newer member states, a split driven by national interests. The latter insisted on equal representation on the Commission and equal voting weights on the Council. In particular, Spain and Poland did not want to give up the voting weights they had received in Nice, for these weights disproportionately favored them. In contrast, France and Germany wanted to scrap the Nice arrangement in favor of a doublemajority system that would allow a law’s passage by half of the twenty-five member states representing 60 percent of the population. Spain and Poland opposed the system because it allowed the three largest members to form a blocking minority by themselves. By the time these contentious issues were addressed in the IGC, parliamentary elections had taken place in Spain and Poland and the new political leaders were more amenable to compromise than their predecessors. A new double-majority system was established, which required the approval of 55 percent of the member states with 65 percent of the population. This made it relatively easy for certain member states to form a blocking minority and prevented the three biggest member states to do so by themselves.

■ Summary This chapter has shown that the history of European cooperation is a history of negotiations and bargains made among member states. That is, the content of the European Union’s treaties was determined by the bargaining and compromising among the member states based on their geopolitical, ideological, and, most important, economic interests. These national interests have not just shaped the EU’s past; they exert a strong ongoing influence as well, which can be seen in the attempt by member states to ratify the EU’s constitution. While the ratification process proceeded smoothly at first (i.e., nine member states ratified the constitution by parliamentary vote, and Spanish voters approved of the document via national referendum), in May 2005 the French and Dutch electorates rejected the constitution, and, shortly thereafter, several member states announced that they would postpone their referenda.57 Moreover, when leaders of the EU states met in mid-June to discuss the EU budget, talks collapsed amid bitter recriminations, with French president Chirac denouncing the British position as “pathetic and tragic,” and British prime minister Blair describing the French defense of agricultural subsidies as “bizarre.”58 While it is probably premature to declare the constitution dead, the

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

228

Page 228

UNIFYING EUROPE

events of 2005 did disappoint those who had hoped that the document would result in a European suprastate, that is, a United States of Europe that could project economic, political, and military power around the world. Instead, the stalled ratification process and failed summit meetings highlighted the powerful role that the nation-state and national economic interests continue to play within the European Union. And, as we shall see in the next chapter, such interests have been influential in the formation and operation of the EU’s institutions as well.

■ Notes 1. Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939–1945 (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 263. 2. James J. Sheehan, Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 2008), xx. 3. Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic, 1986), 8. 4. Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe’s Twentieth Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 401. 5. Karl Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957). 6. David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943). 7. William Wallace, The Transformation of Western Europe (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990), 61–62. 8. Quoted in ibid., 62. 9. Wallace, The Transformation of Western Europe, 35. 10. Quoted in ibid., 35. 11. Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the National-State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 436–437. 12. Anne Daltrop, Politics and the European Community, 2nd edition (London: Longman, 1986), 3. 13. Ibid., 4. 14. Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 5th edition (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 12. 15. Ibid., 35. 16. French politicians rejected the EDC primarily because they were uneasy about German rearmament, and because they doubted that an integrated force would be militarily efficient. 17. It is of note that, apart from internal tariff liberalization, which was described in detail, the EEC provided few other guidelines, especially in policy areas. The treaty included vaguely worded provisions concerning agriculture and transport policy. Thus, it was expected that the provisions of this “framework” treaty would be fleshed out in the years that followed. 18. George Ross, “The European Union and the Future of European Politics,” in Mark Kesselman and Joel Krieger (eds.), European Politics in Transition, 4th edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002), 51. 19. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 44.

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

Page 229

FROM MILITARY COMPETITION TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION

229

20. Ross, “European Union and the Future of European Politics,” 51. 21. Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 95–98. 22. Ibid., 109–111. 23. Ibid., 208–217. 24. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 24–27. 25. The Luxembourg Compromise was not the institutional turning point that many claimed it to be because the Treaties of Rome made clear that all new policies had to be approved unanimously. 26. Specifically, currency speculation meant the withdrawal of the UK, Ireland, and Italy; and, fearful that the franc would be devalued against the German deutschmark, France pulled out in the mid-1970s. Moreover, the spike in oil prices hit European economies especially hard because much of their oil supply was imported. Thus, plans to create a European Monetary Union that would establish a common currency and a central bank were abandoned. 27. For details on EMS negotiations, see David M. Wood and Birol A. Yesilada, The Emerging European Union, 2nd edition (New York: Longman, 2002), 126–129. 28. Quoted in Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, 244–245. 29. Specifically, strong states that slipped outside the band could easily sell their own currency, while weak states would have to sell foreign reserves, which could create controversy at home. 30. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, 285. 31. Wood and Yesilada, The Emerging European Union, 59–60. 32. Quoted in Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, 314–315. 33. For further detail on the positions of member states and the Commission on political and monetary union, see Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 62. 34. Quoted in ibid., 63. 35. Social policy coordination was first formally established in the Social Charter of 1989. For details on this charter, see ibid., 313–315. 36. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, 327–328. 37. Ibid., 324–327. 38. Ibid., 341. 39. Ibid., 389, 399. 40. Ibid., 401. 41. Two other geopolitical factors include “Mitterrand’s desire to bolster the prestige of France by maintaining an active French role at the center of Europe and in defense of European federal ideals” and “the traditional Gaullist ideology, now shared by the Socialists, which combined an important role for national executives, a unilateralist desire for independence from the United States, and opposition to supranational institutions, particularly the European Parliament.” Ibid., 405–407. 42. Ibid., 411. 43. Ibid., 419. 44. Eventually, a deal was reached with the Danish, resulting in the referendum’s passage in the spring of 1993. 45. Quoted in Ross, “The European Union and the Future of European Politics,” 74. 46. In addition to its institutional reform, the Treaty of Nice made slight changes to the form and applications of decisionmaking procedures and it expanded

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

Page 230

230

UNIFYING EUROPE

the EU’s policy purview to include more cooperation in fighting organized crime and new social policy objectives, such as combating social exclusion. See Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 87–89. 47. For more on these critics, see Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 170–171. 48. For a full description of the Constitutional Treaty negotiations, see Derek Beach, The Dynamics of European Integration: Why and When EU Institutions Matter (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 176–193. 49. Andrew Moravcsik and Kalypso Nicolaïdis, “Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions,” Journal of Common Market Studies 37 (March 1999), 75. 50. Ibid., 62–63. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid., 78. 53. For more on Nice Treaty negotiations, see Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 170–172, and Beach, The Dynamics of European Integration, 164–165. 54. By 2003, relations between the member states were already tense. The Iraq crisis had caused a rift between those that supported the US invasion (Italy, Britain, Poland) and those that did not (France, Germany, and, after the Madrid bombings, Spain). In addition, certain member states had come to resent France and Germany’s disregard of the Growth and Stability Pact, and the foundation of economic and monetary union. See Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 175. 55. Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 175–176. 56. Ibid., 176. 57. The nine member states that ratified the constitution by parliamentary vote were Lithuania, Hungary, Slovenia, Italy, Greece, Slovakia, Austria, Germany, and Latvia. In France, 55 percent of voters rejected the constitution, while 45 percent supported it. Polls indicated that the rejection primarily reflected voters’ anger at President Chirac and his center-right government for failing to improve the economy. In the Netherlands, 60 percent of voters rejected the constitution, while 38 percent approved of it. It was reported that the Dutch rejection was also due to economic concerns. See Elaine Sciolino, “French Voters Soundly Reject European Pact,” New York Times, May 29, 2005; and Marlise Simons, “Dutch Expected to Vote No,” New York Times, June 1, 2005. 58. Nicolas Watt and Patrick Wintour, “Rebate Row Wrecks EU Summit,” Guardian Unlimited, June 18, 2005, www.guardian.co.uk.

■ Suggested Reading Dinan, Desmond (ed.). Origins and Evolution of the EU. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Haas, Ernst B. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950–1957. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958. Hix, Simon. The Political System of the EU, 2nd edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Moravcsik, Andrew. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998. Rosamond, Ben. Theories of European Integration. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

Page 231

FROM MILITARY COMPETITION TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION

231

Sbragia, Alberta (ed.). Europolitics, Institutions, and Policy Making in the New European Community. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992. Sheehan, James J. Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 2008. Wallace, William, Helen Wallace, and Mark Pollack (eds.). Policy Making in the European Union, 5th edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Wood, David M., and Birol A. Yesilada. The Emerging European Union, 2nd edition. New York: Longman, 2002.

O-9

9/23/08

4:09 PM

Page 232

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

Page 233

10 Governing the European Union

THE INSTITUTIONS THAT were created to administer the European Coal and Steel Community provided a template that was followed closely when the EEC and Euratom were created in 1957. This template was followed again in 1967 when the coal and steel, economic, and atomic energy communities were merged into the EC, with one set of institutions to serve them: the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, and, in 1974, the European Council. Although these institutions mimic the internal governing institutions of the founding six member states, one should not assume that the EU is some type of European suprastate (i.e., state above the member states) in the making, such as a federation or a confederation. Our view is that the EU is essentially a “commonwealth”—that is, a voluntary association of self-governing, sovereign nation-states having a similar political and cultural heritage and that cooperate, rather than fight, among themselves for the economic and social betterment of each. Viewed this way, it is not surprising that, since its creation, there has been a constant political tension within the EU among the member states, as discussed in the previous chapter, and between the member states and the institutions of the EU that is still present as of this writing. For example, in the first half of 2006, there appeared in the European press several stories that chronicled these tensions.1 One such article described the European Commission’s impending lawsuit against Germany, Finland, Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands, and Hungary for restricting the promotion of certain kinds of gambling, such as sports and Internet-based betting, but not others, such as national lotteries. The Commission argued that national lotteries violated EU competition law because they constituted a monopoly on gambling. Member state governments countered that they depended on the revenue generated by national lotteries to finance public projects, and that they had the right to regulate other forms of gambling, which, unlike lotteries, creat233

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

Page 234

234

UNIFYING EUROPE

ed “social ills.”2 A second article described the Commission’s attempts to liberalize the EU’s energy market by filing lawsuits against member states. Specifically, the suits accused French and German energy companies of holding gas and electricity monopolies, which allegedly violated EU energy policies.3 Finally, press reports revealed the Commission’s disapproval of eleven EU member states that had removed several polluted swimming sites from official lists of such sites. The Commission claimed the member states preferred to “delist” the sites rather than clean them up and threatened to take these states to court unless they started complying with EU clean-water regulations.4 This small sample of newspaper articles causes us to question why tensions between the Commission and member states exist. Is the Commission exerting too much supranational power? Are member states clinging too closely to their respective national interests? And what about other EU institutions? Do they conflict with member states, or do they provide a welcoming site for national interests? In this chapter, we will show that national interests of the member states are protected and promoted (albeit to varying degrees) in all of the major EU institutions: the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Council, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice. We will also show that the institutional reforms proposed by the EU Constitution were largely shaped by national interests of the member states. This chapter then concludes with a brief description of the debate over the democratic deficit, that is, to what extent are EU institutions accountable to Europe’s citizens?

■ The Commission The Commission is a unique body that carries out several functions divided among the governing institutions within the member states. In its legislative capacity, the Commission has the exclusive right to propose and develop legislation in most policy areas. However, this right does not originate from a prime minister and government, which derive their power from parliamentary elections. Instead, laws are drafted by a College of Commissioners, whose twenty-five members are appointed by the EU member states (one per state) for five-year terms. The member states also name a president, who is responsible for allocating portfolios to commissioners and setting legislative agendas (see Table 10.1). While commissioners have memberstate governments to thank for their positions, they are not supposed to act on their respective governments’ behalf. Instead, the founding treaties direct them to act “in the general interest of the Community” and to be “completely independent in their duties.”5 This treaty rhetoric does not necessarily translate into reality, however.

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

Page 235

GOVERNING THE EUROPEAN UNION

Table 10.1

235

The Barroso Commission, 2004–2009

Name José Manuel Barroso Margot Wallström Günter Verheugen Jacques Barrot Siim Kallas Franco Frattini Viviane Reding Stavros Dimas Joaquin Almunia Danuta Hübner Joe Borg Dalia Grybauskaité Janez Potocnik Ján Figel Markos Kyprianou Olli Rehn Louis Michel Lászlö Kovács Neelie Kroes Mariann Fischer Boel Benita Ferrero-Waldner Charlie McCreevy Vladimir Spidla Peter Mandelson Andris Piebalgs Meglena Kuneva Leonard Orban

Portfolio President Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy Enterprise and Industry Transport Administrative Affairs, Audit, and Antifraud Justice, Freedom, and Security Information Society Media Environment Economic and Monetary Affairs Regional Policy Fisheries and Maritime Affairs Financial Programming and Budget Science and Research Education, Training, Culture, and Youth Health Enlargement Development and Humanitarian Aid Taxation and Customs Union Competition Agriculture and Rural Development External Relations and European Neighborhoods Internal Market and Services Employment, Social Affairs, and Equal Opportunities Trade Energy Consumer Protection Multilingualism

EU Member State Portugal Sweden Germany France Estonia Italy Luxembourg Greece Spain Poland Malta Lithuania Slovenia Slovakia Cyprus Finland Belgium Hungary Netherlands Denmark Austria Ireland Czech Republic United Kingdom Latvia Bulgaria Romania

Source: www.ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso.

Although commissioners generally refrain from acting as national megaphones, they do express the interests of their respective governments during policy discussions. In the words of one observer, commissioners “bring favored national interests onto the agenda, help clear national obstacles from the path [and] explain to other commissioners what is likely to be acceptable in [their respective] capital.”6 Moreover, commissioners are assisted in their work by personal cabinets, or small groups of (mostly) fellow nationals who are officially concerned with helping the commissioners get their policy priorities onto the legislative agenda. Unofficially, however, they “act as a sort of advocate/protector . . . of the interests of their Commissioner’s country.”7 Thus, we should be careful about defining the Commission as “the promoter of the general interest” or the “conscience” of the EU. This preservation and advancement of national interests is also found in the (varied) division of policy domains between the Commission and the

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

236

Page 236

UNIFYING EUROPE

member states. The EU in general, and the Commission in particular, have extensive policy involvement in only three areas (trade, agriculture, and fishing) and considerable involvement in two (market regulation and monetary policy). However, in all other policy areas, decisionmaking is either shared between the EU and the member states (some areas being regional, competition, industrial, foreign, environmental, energy, transport) or is primarily the purview of the member national states (e.g., health, education, defense, social welfare, citizenship, elections, policing, and criminal justice).8 Thus, member states have maintained control over the most important policy domains and are, therefore, far from being replaced by EU institutions like the Commission. In addition to its legislative function, the Commission has an executive function, which allows it to manage policies once they have been approved by the other EU institutions. First, the Commission has rule-making powers; that is, it clarifies the gray areas in EU law. For example, it clears up confusion about the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) by issuing regulations regarding price supports, and it fleshes out EU trade policy by specifying the Union’s market protections. But member states are not absent from this process; their representatives are consulted before rules are issued. Second, the Commission has supervisory powers; that is, it tries to ensure that EU members respect EU policies. However, the Commission lacks any direct powers of enforcement (e.g., the ability to send police or military personnel into a member state to force compliance with a specific policy). Instead, as mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, its supervisory powers take the form of lawsuits against the offending party in the European Court of Justice, and direct supervision of the national agencies delegated to enforce EU law. The Commission’s supervisory powers are limited by four factors, however. First, it lacks the staff to keep track of everything that is going on; second, some member states ignore the laws because the rules are incredibly complex and require a specially trained monitoring staff; third, the member states do not always want to apply EU law (e.g., the swimming sites example mentioned above); and, lastly, some laws are open to different interpretations and therefore impossible to implement in a uniform manner.9 Therefore, member states maintain their autonomy from the EU despite the Commission’s attempts to wield supervisory or managerial powers over them. Finally, the Commission has a managerial function with regard to the EU’s external relations. Specifically, it manages EU trade relations both in and out of the World Trade Organization (WTO); any special agreements (trade privileges, financial assistance, and so on) with nonmember states; contacts with international organizations (e.g., the United Nations); and applications for EU membership. Of course, national interests are also pres-

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

Page 237

GOVERNING THE EUROPEAN UNION

237

ent in these relations. European Council summits (described in detail below) allow the heads of government of each member state to influence the Commission’s position on external matters that are both economic (e.g., coordinating the EU’s position in WTO meetings) and political (e.g., the Council actively participates in enlargement talks, the purpose of which is to include additional member states). To help it fulfill its legislative, executive, and managerial functions, the Commission has a large bureaucracy. Almost three-quarters of the EU permanent staff works in the Commission, a large majority of whom (80 percent) are occupied with the administration of the EU via twenty-six directorates-general (DGs) and nine non-DG services. The DGs assist the commissioners with the policymaking process. Each DG office is responsible for a specific policy area (agriculture, environment, fisheries, and so on) and is attached to the corresponding commissioner. The main duty of the DGs is to draft policy, which, after extensive internal review, is submitted to the entire College of Commissioners. In contrast, most of the non-DG services are not concerned with policy initiation. Instead, they are responsible for external matters, such as allocating emergency relief, and for internal administrative matters, such as checking for evidence of fraud and corruption within EU institutions, and providing the Commission with legal advice.10 In theory, the people who staff the permanent bureaucracy are recruited on the basis of merit. In reality, however, nationality plays a big role in the selection process. Specifically, top jobs are awarded according to an “informal national quota system,” which ensures that a multinational staff exists.11 This kind of staffing strengthens the position of the member states in the policymaking process because it is difficult for the senior officials who receive these appointments to “completely divest themselves of their national identifications and loyalties.”12 Therefore, for example, if the head of the Agriculture DG is from France, then the policy emanating from that office may disproportionately benefit French farmers. Thus, even the EU bureaucracy is infused with the national interests of member states. The ascendancy of the members’ national interests over European interests (supposedly manifested in the Commission) is especially apparent in EU treaty negotiations. In theory, supra-national institutions wield considerable informal power through the “persuasive manipulation of information and ideas” because they lack “formal voting rights, financial resources and coercive means.”13 According to this theory, the Commission, in its role as supranational policy entrepreneur, exerted informal power to shape European integration in general, and treaty creation in particular.14 In reality, however, the Commission has not played a significant role in any of the major EU treaty negotiations.15 Therefore, for example, it is incorrect to attribute the creation of a common agricultural policy during the 1960s to

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

Page 238

238

UNIFYING EUROPE

the EEC’s agricultural commissioner or to say that the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 was brought about by the policy expertise of then Commission president Jacques Delors. Rather, the Commission’s activities during CAP negotiations have been characterized as “unnecessary” and “ineffective,” while Delors has described his role in Maastricht negotiations as one of policy “coordinator and rapporteur,” rather than policy initiator with privileged access to information or ideas.16 Who then was responsible for the EU’s treaty outcomes? We argue that it was the individual member states. National governments have little reason to rely on supranational entrepreneurs during treaty negotiations because they are equipped with “millions of diverse and highly trained professional employees, massive information-gathering capacity and longstanding experience with international negotiation.”17 Thus, proposals from the member states ultimately shaped the contours of CAP provisions (which explains the program’s high subsidies and price supports), and member state leaders, such as Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany and President François Mitterrand of France, were responsible for acting as policy entrepreneurs during Maastricht Treaty negotiations. In sum, the Commission does not necessarily act in the general interest of Europe. Instead, member-state interests have determined (in part) how the Commission performs its legislative, executive, or managerial functions. Moreover, member-state interest has crept into the Commission’s bureaucracy, and it (rather than supranational entrepreneurs) has shaped the outcome of treaty negotiations. And, as we will show in the next section, member-state interests are even more pervasive in another institution of the European Union, the Council of Ministers.

■ The Council of the EU The Council of the EU, previously known as the Council of Ministers, is composed of member-state ministers who meet in various formations, depending on the subject under discussion, to accept or reject the Commission’s policy initiatives (see Table 10.2). For example, when the Commission drafts a proposal related to foreign policy, it submits the proposal to the General Affairs and External Relations Council, where foreign ministers from each of the member states meet and decide whether to accept or reject it. A similar process happens in the Economic and Finance Council (where economics and finance ministers debate EMU-related bills), in the Environmental Council (where environmental ministers decide on clean-air standards), and in the Agricultural and Fisheries Council (where agricultural ministers [dis]agree with proposals related to farming and fishing). Given that the Council often has the final word on EU policy, it is described as playing a legislative role in the Union’s decisionmaking process. Although,

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

Page 239

GOVERNING THE EUROPEAN UNION

Table 10.2

239

Formations of the Council of the European Union

Formation

Duties

General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

Foreign ministers of member states meet to discuss dossiers that affect the Union’s general policies as well as external relations (e.g., Common Foreign and Security Policy, Foreign Trade Policy, and Development Cooperation) Economic and Financial Affairs Council Economics and finance ministers of member (EcoFin) states meet to discuss economic policy coordination, economic surveillance, the euro, financial markets and capital movements, and so on Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHAC) Justice and Interior ministers meet to discuss the creation of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Main topics include visas, immigration and cross-border crime Employment, Social Policy, Health and Composed of employment, social protection, Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO) consumer protection, health, and equalopportunity ministers who discuss standard of living and quality of life issues Competitiveness Council Ministers of European Affairs, Industry, and Research meet to discuss matters related to European competitiveness, especially in the internal market and industry, and they research transportation, energy, and telecommunications Transport, Telecommunications and Ministers for this council meet to establish Energy Council modern and efficient infrastructures pertaining to transport, telecommunications, and energy Agriculture and Fisheries Council Ministers of Agriculture and Fisheries meet to discuss the development of agriculture, rural development, fisheries, and maritime affairs, as well as consumer health and protection Environment Council Environment ministers work to foster sustainable development, ensure environmental protection, and promote environmental quality Education, Youth and Culture (EYC) Council EYC ministers meet to develop quality education and vocational training and bring a common cultural heritage to the fore Source: www.consilium.europa.eu.

as the following section will show, nothing is truly final until the European Parliament is given its say. While the ministers attending Council meetings vary according to policy area, their goal is the same, to protect the interests of their respective member states. There are two types of member delegations that help ministers to do this. First, there are member-state officials, experts, and (when necessary) junior ministers who accompany the senior minister to Council meetings. These delegations debrief the ministers and ensure that they fully understand

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

240

Page 240

UNIFYING EUROPE

the subjects under discussion.18 Second, there are permanent delegations of member-state representatives based in Brussels. Composed of somewhere between thirty and forty professional diplomats, these delegations resemble miniembassies to the EU, and their heads (known as permanent representatives) meet each week to form the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Comité des Représentants Permanents, or COREPER). This Committee is responsible for prepping Council meetings (e.g., preparing the agendas, overseeing subcommittees and working groups, deciding which proposals will be reviewed by ministers, and so on), and ensuring that the interests of their respective governments are not ignored. Thus, COREPER provides member-state capitals with a direct line to Brussels and exerts considerable influence in the EU decisionmaking process.19 To ensure that the Council of Ministers functions smoothly, the General Secretariat manages its operations. Composed of a staff of approximately 2,500 people and headed by a secretary-general (who doubles as the Union’s high representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy), this office prepares draft agendas, keeps records, provides legal advice and translation services, and oversees the transition of Council presidents.20 This last duty is particularly important because the president of the Council is a member state rather than a person. As shown in Table 10.3, the Council presidency rotates among the EU member states for a six-month term begin-

Table 10.3

Year 2008 2008 2007 2007 2006 2006 2005 2005 2004 2004 2003 2003 2002 2002 2001 2001 2000 2000

Presidency Rotation for the Council of the European Union, 2000–2008 Period First semester Second semester First semester Second semester First semester Second semester First semester Second semester First semester Second semester First semester Second semester First semester Second semester First semester Second semester First semester Second semester

Source: www.consilium.europa.eu.

Member State Slovenia France Germany Portugal Austria Finland Luxembourg United Kingdom Ireland Netherlands Greece Italy Spain Denmark Sweden Belgium Portugal France

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

Page 241

GOVERNING THE EUROPEAN UNION

241

ning in January or July and gives the presiding member state an opportunity to put its stamp on EU policy. Given that the state holding the presidency arranges and chairs Council meetings (i.e., sets the agenda and determines what goes on during the meetings), it has ample opportunity to turn its national concerns into the Council’s policy priority. For example, the United Kingdom used its turn as president during the second half of 2005 to secure an EU-wide agreement requiring telephone and Internet companies to save data for a minimum of six months, data the British believed could be used to track terrorists and criminals. Given that London experienced a wave of terrorist attacks in July 2005, it is not surprising that the British presidency advanced such measures.21 Similarly, when Italy held the presidency during the second half of 2003, its agenda included proposals that were in keeping with Italian national interests—specifically, an investment package to recharge the EU’s more sluggish economies (such as Italy’s), investigations into illegal immigration (which was a particular problem in Italy), and a plan to use Rome’s ties to Washington to improve EU-US relations (which were at a low point following the invasion of Iraq).22 The presiding state also ensures that Council meetings are productive and that they run smoothly; therefore, it tries to build consensus around policy initiatives through a combination of “negotiating, persuading, cajoling, mediating, and bargaining with and between the member states and EU institutions.”23 For example, when the United Kingdom was presiding, it oversaw a compromise between the Commission and EU fisheries ministers regarding the preservation of fish stocks (i.e., one that cut hauls of some fish but increased catches of others).24 In addition to its role as consensus builder, the Council president tries to ensure that there is some degree of policy continuity between past and future presidencies. For example, in one of its last acts as president, the United Kingdom proposed a plan that would allow television cameras into more sessions of the EU Council. When the Austrians assumed the presidency in January 2006, they picked up where the UK left off and oversaw discussions of even more public scrutiny of EU institutions.25 Finally, the government of the presiding member state acts as the Council’s external representative in relations with other EU institutions (such as the European Parliament) as well as with nonmember states. In the past, this role has created some controversy. For example, when Italy assumed the Council presidency in July 2003, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi appeared before the EP, where he likened a German parliamentarian to a Nazi concentration camp guard. His comment generated outrage across Europe, and even though Berlusconi apologized to then chancellor of Germany, Gerhard Schroeder, he was nonetheless criticized for “damaging the Italian presidency” and “hurting Europe.”26

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

242

Page 242

UNIFYING EUROPE

While a member state has much to gain during its turn as Council president, as mentioned earlier (including benefiting from the special status and prestige that comes with the job), there are several drawbacks associated with the position. First, as we saw in the Italian case, a poorly run presidency can result in diminished status and prestige both in and out of the EU; second, the considerable administrative duties connected to the presidency may pose particular difficulties for the smaller states (especially as the EU enlarges); third, consensus-building efforts may diminish the president’s ability to focus the Council agenda on its own national interests; and, finally, there are several points in the policymaking process where rival national interests may be inserted into the agenda. As mentioned above, once the Commission has agreed on a policy proposal, it sends a draft to the Council, where it is examined by working groups composed of national representatives. Guided by national interests, these groups mark up the bill, indicating points of agreement and disagreement. They then send the document to COREPER, which acts as a “filter” for the Council ministers. That is, these permanent national representatives try to fix any problems unresolved by the working group, allowing only the most difficult issues to reach the EU Council, the bill’s final stop. Guided by the presiding state, the ministers usually try to reach a consensus on the final bill so as to avoid a (potentially divisive) vote; however, on certain occasions (such as when competing member-state interests persist), a vote is inevitable. Voting in the EU Council can occur in one of three ways. Unanimity voting, which was originally required for all decisions on new policy and treaty modification, is now limited to areas like CFSP, EMU, and asylum and immigration. Unanimity voting effectively gives each member state a veto over policies that are not in its national interests. However, since the late 1990s, member states have been permitted to “constructively abstain” from voting, which means that they can “opt out” of a policy while recognizing the Union’s decision to accept it. Thus, a member state can preserve its national interests without holding up the policy. A second way the Council can take decisions is by simple majority voting, where each member state has one vote. Except for procedural issues, this system is rarely used; instead qualified majority voting (QMV) is invoked, especially since, as of this writing, it is permitted on most types of policy decisions. Under QMV, each member state has a certain number of votes weighted in proportion to its population. Thus, populous states, like Germany and France, have a greater number of votes than states with fewer inhabitants, like Malta and Luxembourg (see Table 9.2). To be approved, a proposal must get 72.3 percent of the votes (or 232 out of 321 votes), it must be supported by a majority of member states, and the votes must represent a combined total of at least 62 percent of the EU population.27 It is said that QMV stops member states from using their veto to protect national

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

Page 243

GOVERNING THE EUROPEAN UNION

243

interests (as was the case with unanimity voting);28 nonetheless, national interests will continue to guide Council decisions regardless of the voting system as long as these interests are well planted in the Council bureaucracy and embodied by the ministers themselves. Thus far we have seen how the Council of the EU generally operates. One question remains unanswered, however: what role (if any) does the Council play in treaty negotiations? In other words, was the Council of Ministers in any way responsible for the Single European Act or the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice? While the Council presidency oversees treaty talks and tries to forge consensus among participants, its power to determine treaty outcomes is debatable. Some scholars of the EU say that on two occasions (the run-up to Maastricht and Amsterdam), the Council’s Secretariat had substantial leeway to draft certain texts and therefore “subtly [skew] outcomes closer to its own preferences.”29 However, given the fact that these texts pertained to issues that were not politically salient (that is, highly technical, low-priority issues), the impact of the Secretariat was at best minimal. Instead, as the previous chapter showed, the real movers and shakers during treaty negotiations were the governments of the member states and Council presidents, which made sure that the final drafts reflected their national interests.

■ The European Council Another place in which member states can articulate their national preferences is the European Council. The brainchild of French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and German chancellor Helmut Schmidt, the Council was created in 1974 to formalize the ad hoc meetings of EU leaders that had been taking place for nearly a decade. Since then, EU leaders have held regularly scheduled meetings (about four per year) where they discuss current political and economic events, reconcile differences of opinion on economic and foreign policies, issue foreign-policy statements, resolve budgetary disputes, create future plans for integration, and negotiate treaty revisions during intergovernmental conferences.30 While the European Council was recognized in subsequent treaties (such as, SEA, Amsterdam, and Maastricht), it was never designated an official EU institution. Thus, apart from Maastricht’s general pronouncement to “provide the Union with necessary impetus for its development,” there are no hard and fast rules about what the Council can (and cannot) do. Accordingly, much of its agenda is determined by its participants as well as by current events. For example, from the summer of 2005, when French and Dutch voters rejected the EU Constitution, and continuing to the time of this writing, the Council has spent a portion of its meetings debating what to do with the document.31

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

244

Page 244

UNIFYING EUROPE

While changes in participants and events mean changes in the Council’s agenda, as mentioned above, there are some things the Council does fairly regularly. First, it consistently finalizes constitutional matters like revising the founding treaties. As was shown in the previous chapter, EU leaders are primarily motivated by national (economic) interests during these talks. Second, the Council has the final say on many institutional matters, such as choosing the head of the European Central Bank, “ green-lighting” accession agreements, and finalizing the size of the EP. Even here, national interests play a major role. For example, in 1996 the president of France, Jacques Chirac, objected to the appointment of Wim Duisenberg (Germany’s candidate) for the presidency of the soon-to-be-created European Central Bank, insisting instead that Jean-Claude Trichet (governor of the Bank of France) be given the post. After tense negotiations, Chirac succeeded in getting Duisenberg to split the presidency’s sixteenyear term with the French choice. Thus, Duisenberg held the office from 1996 until 2003, when Trichet assumed the post.32 Third, the Council regularly tries to solve budgetary disputes, although it is not always successful in this endeavor. During the summer of 2005, budgetary talks broke down when British prime minister Tony Blair and French president Chirac failed to reach an agreement on agricultural subsidies. France (with its large farmers’ union) insisted on keeping the subsidies untouched, while Britain (with far fewer farmers) insisted on their reform.33 Fourth, the Council often represents the EU to the world. For example, during the spring of 2003 when the United States was preparing to invade Iraq, the Council issued a statement calling on the disarmament of Iraq according to United Nation’s Security Council resolutions.34 While this statement reflected the common approach that EU leaders initially adopted on the situation in Iraq, it later became clear that Europe was divided on the issue. The governments of Britain, Italy, and Spain backed the United States, whereas the leaders of Germany and France were vocal opponents of the invasion. However, such divisions are almost never reflected in Council statements because its decisionmaking is almost always consensual; that is, votes are almost never taken, especially when controversial or divisive issues are involved. Thus, it is easy for the Council to issue common foreign-policy statements while the heads of member governments (guided by their own interests) pursue diverging courses of action. Finally, the European Council has been known to intervene in the EU’s policymaking process. Specifically, it initiates policy in certain areas (such as counterterrorism), it helps the Council of the EU overcome policy impasses, and it tries to guide policy development by delivering messages on particular policy issues. However, the Council’s policy recommendations are not legally binding; instead, it is up to the lawmaking EU institutions to incorporate or disregard what governmental heads of the member states

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

Page 245

GOVERNING THE EUROPEAN UNION

245

have to say. Moreover, the Council typically avoids controversial issues that would necessitate a vote (rather than decisionmaking by consensus). But this does not mean that national interests are suppressed. As we saw in the previous sections, such interests are promoted in both the Commission and the Council. Thus far we have examined three institutions that have been given some part in the legislative process. None looks like or acts like the elective assemblies that do much of this work within the member states. The one institution that most closely resembles a national legislature is the European Parliament, but, as the next section will show, the EP is not a nation-state parliament writ large.

■ The European Parliament In Brussels there is a large, mostly glass building that houses the EP.35 The feeling of openness created by its many windows is reinforced by the many public events held there. For example, in May of each year, the EP hosts “Open Day–Open Doors,” an event that gives citizens a chance to see the Parliament, visit information stands, view exhibitions, attend debates, and take quizzes.36 Given that the EP is the EU’s sole popularly elected body, its image of transparency takes on a special significance. Do EU citizens have a right to know what their representatives are up to in this European institution? The problem is that, until the mid-1980s, members of the European Parliament (MEPs) were not up to very much. Moreover, until 1979, MEPs were not even directly elected. Therefore, one can legitimately ask: What is the purpose of the EP? Whose interests does it serve—those of Europe or those of the member states? And just how democratic or accountable is it? Ideally, a parliament is a place where popularly elected individuals make laws (policies) that the people want them to make. In reality, the European Parliament has (until recently) fallen well short of this ideal. Prior to 1979 its members were indirectly elected; that is, they were selected by the parliaments of the EU’s member states. Moreover, until the mid-1980s the EP had almost no decisional power. It was only consulted on policy. In practice, this meant that the EP was allowed a single reading on a limited number of bills (usually those related to transportation and citizenship) and could only offer nonbinding opinions before the Council decided whether to turn them into EU law. However, in 1979 the first direct elections to the EP were held, and, a few years later, the Single European Act granted the EP more legislative say by instituting two new procedures. The first, known as cooperation, allowed the EP to amend or to reject a bill after a second reading. Given that the

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

246

Page 246

UNIFYING EUROPE

EP’s decision could be overruled only by a unanimous vote in the Council of the EU, the cooperation procedure forced other EU institutions to take the EP’s views more seriously. The second procedure instituted under SEA, known as assent, gave the EP the same amount of decisionmaking power as the EU Council in certain policy areas. For example, bills on enlargement started requiring a parliamentary majority to become law. The Maastricht Treaty gave the EP’s lawmaking powers an additional boost by establishing co-decision. Under this procedure, a majority of both the EU Council and the EP is necessary to promulgate bills in a limited number of areas after a third reading. A few years later the EP was granted even greater powers under the Amsterdam Treaty, which more than doubled the number of policy areas to fall under co-decision and which abolished cooperation (except for a select number of monetary and economic issues). It is debatable whether the implementation of procedures like co-decision and assent really gave the European Parliament legislative power. While it is true that the EP is more centrally involved in the legislative process than at any other point in its history, the EP has neither the power to say “yes” (that is, the initiation and development of policy) nor the power to say “no” (that is, the ability to absolutely reject proposed legislation). Given that these powers are central to the parliaments of the member states, the EP clearly falls short of being a legislative body with the same level of power.37 In addition to its quasi-legislative powers, the EP (in conjunction with the Council of the EU) prepares the Union’s budget. It can propose amendments as well as special appropriations, and it can reject the budget with a two-thirds majority vote. The EP also has the power to oversee the Commission. It questions commissioners, confirms them, forms investigative committees to look into their alleged wrongdoing, and, if warranted, can dismiss them through a vote of censure. For example, in 1999 the EP voted on a motion to censure the Commission then headed by Jacques Santer. While the motion did not pass, some called the vote a victory for democratic accountability because the EP had forced the Commission to publicly defend itself. In fact, following the vote, an independent committee of experts was formed to investigate allegations of wrongdoing within the Commission. Its report (which outlined instances of fraud, mismanagement, and nepotism) resulted in the resignation of the entire College (or Commission).38 Similarly, in 2004 the EP’s objections to certain commissioners forced incoming president, José Manuel Barroso, to reshuffle his College in order to secure the Parliament’s confirmation. Commentators asserted that this “flexing [of EP] muscle” was a sign that the assembly had come of age, that its leaders had finally displayed the unity necessary to successfully take on the Commission and its head.39 While these examples suggest that the EP has a certain degree of control over the Commission, this control is constrained by two factors. First,

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

Page 247

GOVERNING THE EUROPEAN UNION

247

the EP has practically no power to question the Commission about proper policy implementation. As mentioned above, the Commission relies on the member states to see that EU policies are obeyed, and it is improbable that the national agencies involved will appear before the EP for questioning about their “competency and honesty.” Second, the EP has no mandate to manage or oversee the EU Council, the seat of most policy decisions. Thus, it cannot determine whether this branch of EU government is carrying out its duties correctly.40 In sum, on the one hand, the EP has gained legislative powers, which it has wielded with some effect; on the other, the EP still lacks the one power at the heart of all member-state parliaments—the ability to say speedily “yes” or “no” to government bills. Moreover, it is questionable whether the EP’s 732 legislators are accountable to and representative of Europe’s citizens. A look at the EP’s campaigns and political groups reveals a lack of member accountability, while an examination of its membership shows the problems the body has representing Europe’s citizens effectively . EP candidates are nominated by national parties to run in direct elections that are held every five years according to proportional representation. EU voters cast ballots for EP candidates on the basis of national party platforms and promises. However, once the newly elected members reach

Figure 10.1 Party Groups in the European Parliament, 2004

Source: Tim Bale, European Politics: A Comparative Introduction (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 100. Notes: EUL/NGL: European United Left/Nordic Green Left (left parties); Greens: environmental parties; PES: Party of European Socialists (social democrats); ALDE: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (liberals); EPP-ED: European People’s Party–European Democrats (Christian Democrats and conservatives); IND/DEM: independent parties; UEN: Union for a Europe of Nations (nationalist-conservatives); NA: nonattached members (mostly extreme right).

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

248

Page 248

UNIFYING EUROPE

Brussels, MEPs do not sit as member-state delegations. Instead, they sit in pan-European political groups formed around political party ideology. (See Figure 10.1 for a complete list of EP political groups.) As a result, the national party platforms upon which legislators campaigned become less and less relevant and the promises made to voters easier and easier to forget. However, this does not mean that MEPs swear allegiance to their EU political group. There are four reasons that they are not accountable to the political groups to which they belong. First, ideological divisions are prevalent, especially in the larger umbrella groups, such as the Party of the European Socialists, which includes a wide range of socialists and social democrats. Second, groups are divided by the national interests of their members. For example, a French MEP might oppose reductions in CAP subsidies even though his or her political group as a whole supports them. Third, interest groups and intergroups (or informal groups of MEPs formed around a specific issue) compete with political groups for member support. Finally, unlike political parties in member-state parliaments, EP political groups have few mechanisms to ensure member loyalty (e.g., they cannot sanction members who vote against the group), which means it is easy for dissatisfied MEPs to defect. Taken together, these factors create a parliament filled with legislators who are hard to hold accountable for their actions.41 In addition to the problems associated with political groups outlined above, the composition of the EP raises questions about whether EU citizens are well represented in Brussels. First, as in many member-state parliaments, women and minorities are underrepresented in the EP. Women, for example, hold approximately one-third of EP seats, even though they are just over half of all EU citizens. Second, it is said that since the EP is relatively ineffectual, important politicians prefer to stay at home, where they can contest and win seats in more powerful member-state parliaments. Thus, candidates and members for the EP tend to be political has-beens and no-names. There have also been a considerable number of celebrity candidates. For example, supermodels, porn stars, film directors, soccer players, and talk-show hosts have all run in recent elections. 42 It is debatable whether Europe’s citizens will be well served by such candidates. Finally, at about 45 percent, the turnover rate of MEPs is quite high. Considering that it takes time to master the complexities of the EU policy process (and accompanying bureaucracy), high turnover rates may mean that EU citizens are losing those legislators who are (finally) equipped with the necessary skills to navigate the system for them. Given these problems with accountability and representation, it is not surprising that EU citizens feel disconnected from the EP. Few actually know who their representatives are or what they do, and many view EP elections as inconsequential (and perhaps boring), since they neither directly change the sitting government nor make (or break) political careers.

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

Page 249

249

GOVERNING THE EUROPEAN UNION

These feelings of apathy and disconnect are reflected in the generally steady decline in voter turnout rates for EP elections (see Table 10.4). Such feelings are even more understandable if we consider the practically nonexistent role that the EP plays in treaty talks. Scholars of the EU have pointed out that until the Constitutional Convention in 2003, the EP was only permitted to “observe” treaty negotiations. While the Convention had outspoken MEPs who secured greater powers for the EP in the draft treaty (e.g., more say over the budget), these legislators were silenced during final treaty talks held after the Convention. Instead, it was Germany (the member state with the greatest number of parliamentary seats) that ensured that the new EP powers made it into the final draft of the Constitution.43 Once again, we have member states guided by national interests (rather than EU institutions pressing for European integration) that determine the final shape of the treaties. In sum, the European Parliament has gradually gained more and more legislative powers, but it still has far to go before it rivals member-state parliaments. Furthermore, the EP will remain weak as long as the European electorate has such strong misgivings about it. Thus, member states need not worry that the EP will soon usurp the lawmaking powers of their parliaments.

Table 10.4

Voter Turnout in European Parliament Elections, 1979–2004

1979

1984

1987

1989

1994

1995

1999

Previous General 2004 Election

Czech Republic Poland

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

28.3

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

28.32

Sweden

—

—

—

—

—

41.6

38.8

37.8

UK

32.2

32.6

—

36.2

36.4

—

24.0

38.83

Netherlands

57.8

50.6

—

47.2

35.6

—

30.0

39.3

France

60.7

56.7

—

48.7

52.7

—

46.8

42.76

Germany

65.7

56.8

—

62.3

60.0

—

45.2

43.0

Spain

—

—

68.9

54.6

59.1

—

63.0

45.1

Italy

84.9

83.4

—

81.5

74.8

—

70.8

73.1

EU average

63.0

61.0

—

58.5

56.8

—

49.8

45.7

58.0 (2002) 46.3 (2001) 80.1 (2002) 59.4 (2001) 79.9 (2003) 60.7 (2002) 79.1 (2002) 77.2 (2004) 81.3 (2001) —

Source: Tim Bale, European Politics: A Comparative Introduction (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 151. Note: — indicates that there was no election.

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

250

Page 250

UNIFYING EUROPE

■ The European Court of Justice In addition to the legislative, executive, and managerial institutions described above, the EU has a judicial branch called the European Court of Justice (ECJ). It consists of twenty-five judges (one per member state), each of whom serves a renewable six-year term. Since the ECJ cannot initiate judicial action, the justices rule on only those cases referred to the Court. After hearing a series of such cases in the 1960s and 1970s, the justices established two main rules. The first, called direct effect, states that EU law applies directly to individuals and that national courts must recognize and enforce the rights granted to EU citizens by EU treaties. The second, called primacy, asserts that EU law supersedes national law. In the words of the Court, “Every national court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its entirety and protect rights which the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent to the Community rule.”44 These principles guide the justices who hear the cases that come before the Court. The cases fall into two main categories. In the first, known as preliminary ruling, member-state courts ask the ECJ for its interpretation of EU law, which they then use to make a ruling. Preliminary rulings have ensured that member-state courts obey EU law, and that EU law is interpreted uniformly throughout the member states. 45 Second, the Court hears requests for direct action. These cases are typically brought by member states or EU institutions that have reason to believe that EU law is not being respected. Some examples of direct action were mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.46 What has been the impact of the ECJ on the European Union? In short, it has advanced economic and social integration in Europe. In its decisions, the Court has upheld the free movement of people, goods, and services; it has furthered the EU’s competition policy (mainly by allowing the Commission to crack down on states providing illegal subsidies to industry); it has advanced equality between men and women (namely, by ruling that member-state governments are obliged to implement equal pay provisions outlined in the treaties); and it has strengthened external economic relations (by ruling that member states may not make agreements with third parties if they violate EU law).47 While the main job of the Court is to use its rulings to maintain and further European law (and therefore the EU’s interests), member states can exert their influence when it comes to judicial appointments. Member-state governments work together to select a panel of judges who are independent from politics and who have either held a high-level judicial office or established a record of judicial competence. In reality, each member-state gov-

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

Page 251

GOVERNING THE EUROPEAN UNION

251

ernment appoints a judge, who is usually immediately accepted by the other member states; thus, judges are not selected according to a supranational process. Furthermore, member states rarely select judges solely on the basis of their judicial competence. Rather, the typical appointee is someone who “has been involved with the government in his [or her] native country in some way, but who has served in a judicial capacity for, at best, a limited period.” 48 While there is no hard evidence that these appointments are “political” (i.e., a judge is selected because she or he shares the same views and concerns as those appointing her or him), it is possible that ECJ judges bring some member-state interests with them to the bench. The ECJ judges are assisted by nine advocates general (AGs), who carefully review each case and recommend a course of action to the Court. In theory, member states collectively select the AGs, seeking out individuals with strong judicial backgrounds. In reality, the five largest member states get to select one AG each, which means that the leftover positions are filled by the remaining smaller member states. Given this biased selection process, it is possible that the larger member states are more likely to see their national concerns articulated in AG opinions than are the smaller ones.49 At the same time, some would say that the ECJ does not go far enough to protect the national interests of member states. For example, the Council of the EU (a home to national interests) has been known to express its displeasure with certain ECJ rulings, especially ones that further supranational cooperation. Moreover, member states have voiced their outrage at ECJ rulings that ignore their political or economic priorities. The British in particular were angry in 1991 when the ECJ overruled an act of the British Parliament.50 However, member states should not be too alarmed by ECJ rulings that go against them. The fact is that the ECJ has little power to enforce its judgments, and even though the Maastricht Treaty allowed the Court to fine member states that disobeyed its orders, justices have (for obvious reasons) been hesitant to do so.

■ The Constitutional Treaty When the Constitutional Convention was convened in 2002, debate on several controversial topics was begun, one of which was institutional reform. Europe’s governing elites knew that Europe’s institutions would have to be modified if they were to work effectively after enlargement. The EU was to add ten new member states in 2004 and two more in 2007, about which we will say more in the next chapter. There were several EU issues that had to be negotiated. First was the size of the Commission. Some changes had already been made by the Nice Treaty, which did away with the practice of

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

252

Page 252

UNIFYING EUROPE

having two commissioners per big member state (with the smaller states each naming one) and instituted a system of equal representation: every member state would appoint only one commissioner. This change meant that the Commission was going to become too large and unmanageable when the Union grew to twenty-five members. Therefore, it was agreed that when the EU reached twenty-seven member states, something would have to be done to limit the size of the Commission. Accordingly, the conventioneers proposed to cap the number of commissioners at fifteen and allow their appointment to rotate equally among member states with “due regard to demographic and regional balance.”51 Those states that were “off” rotation would be permitted to name one nonvoting commissioner each. During the interstate conference held in 2003 and 2004 to fine-tune the draft Constitutional Treaty, leaders of the smaller states voiced their objection to this proposal. They claimed that despite the provisions for “equality” and “balance,” the bigger states would monopolize the rotations, thereby minimizing the influence of the smaller ones. In response, the heads of government changed the draft treaty so that members could continue to appoint one commissioner each until 2014, when the number of commissioners would correspond to two-thirds of the number of member states. Given that the fate of the Constitutional Treaty is uncertain at this writing, it is possible that in 2014 an entirely new plan to limit the Commission’s size will be in place. However, there will always be debate about limiting a member state’s power to select a commissioner, for both parties stand to benefit from this type of selection process. Member states see their appointees as a way to preserve and further national influence and interests, while the Commission accrues acceptance and legitimacy within the member states if there are national appointments.52 The second reform discussed during the Constitutional Convention was the system of qualified majority voting in the Council of the EU. As mentioned above, each member state is given a set number of weighted votes according to its size. Until the Nice Treaty, QMV required about 72 percent of the total number of Council votes. However, in response to the fear of the bigger states that their voting weight would be diminished once the EU enlarged to twenty-five, the Nice Treaty changed Council voting as follows: First, it reweighted the votes, granting the larger states several more votes than the smaller ones. (For example, Germany gained nineteen votes, for a total of twenty-nine, while Ireland went from four to seven votes). Second, it declared that a qualified majority must consist of at least half (and sometimes two-thirds) of the member states and at least 62 percent of the total EU population. These changes meant that one or two large member states could no longer stop legislation (by composing a “blocking minority”) and that member states would be more reliant on coalitions for passing (or halting) policies that furthered (or hindered) their national interests. While dele-

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

Page 253

GOVERNING THE EUROPEAN UNION

253

gates at the Constitutional Convention were favorably disposed to the double-majority system established at Nice, they decided to alter it slightly. They determined that a favorable vote in the Council would require at least 50 percent of the member states and at least 60 percent of the EU’s total population. During the interstate conference that followed the Convention, the leaders of the smaller states once again claimed that the system proposed by the conventioneers was biased toward the bigger states. In response, the Council’s voting procedure was adjusted once again. In order to satisfy these states, the delegates determined that policy would pass if it was supported by 55 percent of the member states representing 65 percent of the EU‘s total population. In addition, they determined that a blocking minority must comprise at least four member states (representing 35 percent of the population), which would prevent three large member states from halting legislation by themselves. Finally, the Constitutional Convention scrutinized the rotating presidency, which had long been criticized as being inefficient. Specifically, it was said that six months does not give member states sufficient time to pursue a policy program with any degree of success. Accordingly, the draft treaty allowed the European Council to elect a president who would serve a two and a half year term that could be renewed once. This reform would not only eliminate the constant change in EU leadership but also give the international community a specific representative of the EU. While the larger states seem to like this change, the smaller states are less favorable to it. They suspect that the new president will almost always come from one of the larger member states (i.e., Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Spain, or Poland), and that they will lose influence as a result. (At the same time, the six-month rotating presidency is to be preserved in EU Council formations, although it will take a new form. Instead of one member state serving as president at a time, the Council will be governed by a presidency team composed of three types of member states: one small, one big, and one new.) Given that the Constitution is “on the ice” for the foreseeable future, the fate of these Council modifications remains unclear. However, the debate over QMV and the presidency certainly highlighted the tensions between the large and small member states of the EU, each vying for the institutional reform that would further its national influence and interests.53

■ A Democratic Deficit? The expression democratic deficit often surfaces in discussions of EU institutions and has a variety of meanings. While it has been broadly defined as “the lack of democratic accountability in the EU,”54 it can be more accu-

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

254

Page 254

UNIFYING EUROPE

rately described as “the gap between the powers of European institutions and the ability of European citizens to influence their work and decisions.”55 Thus, no EU institution escapes the criticism that it is to some degree undemocratic. Let us consider the institutions in turn, beginning with the European Council and Council of the EU. While it is true that members of these Councils are typically elected national representatives, they have been described as being “removed” from Europe’s citizens: Voters elect legislators on the basis of national campaigns, which tend not to focus on EU-related issues. A small portion of these representatives are invited to form governments and consequently are sent to EU summits and Council meetings.56 Given this selection process, Council members do not appear to be directly linked to EU citizens. Moreover, both Councils have been criticized for making important decisions without consulting the electorate. For example, the European Council negotiates treaty changes behind closed doors, rarely explaining its decisions to the public. Similarly, the EU Council makes important policy decisions in private without ever having to defend them in European-level elections.57 The Commission fares little better with democratic deficit critics. Its members are appointed by national leaders rather than elected by EU citizens; and it is only recently that the European Parliament started holding the commissioners accountable for alleged wrongdoing. In addition, Europe’s citizens have practically no say in the policy development and initiation that occurs in the Commission. Also, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament, two ostensibly democratic EU institutions, do not escape criticism. While the ECJ is praised for being the one place where individual citizens can protest EU laws, it is criticized for its appointment process; as long as the EP is not allowed to confirm judicial nominees, the ECJ will remain cut off from citizens. Similarly, the EP is widely recognized as the direct link between Europe and Europeans because of its direct elections, but these elections are often deemed inconsequential. Given that EP elections are not run by European political parties campaigning on European policy issues but are instead like “second-order national elections,” it is hard to see MEPs providing the connection between the EU, with its policy, and EU citizens. An indication of this failure to connect (or perhaps a result of it) is found in voter turnout rates, which have steadily declined since EP elections were first held in 1979. In addition, while the EP has gradually gained legislative powers, it lacks the one power that would make it a true legislature: the immediate power to approve or reject legislation.58 In light of these criticisms, suggestions for reform have ranged from the simple, such as increasing the live television coverage of Council of the EU meetings, to the complex, such as granting to the EP “real” legislative powers and creating pan-European parties to contest EP elections. However, it is

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

Page 255

GOVERNING THE EUROPEAN UNION

255

unlikely that any fundamental changes will take place, since they would probably reduce the power of member states over EU institutions. For example, a dramatic increase in EP power could make the Union more democratic, but it could also mean a decrease in the authority of the Council of the EU, the protector of national interests. Thus, the member states of the EU have little incentive to make its institutions more democratic.59 At the same time, there are those who argue that EU institutions are not as undemocratic as their critics claim.60 One such argument, the “legitimacy argument,” has three main parts. First, the EU is not ruled by supranational Eurocrats who wield their far-reaching powers in an arbitrary and despotic manner. Instead, EU institutions (and those who run them) are constrained by a variety of fiscal, administrative, and legal provisions, which are outlined in the Union’s treaties. For example, the EU has very little power to implement its own regulations, relying instead on national governments and agencies to do the job.61 Second, EU institutions are directly accountable to their citizens via the European Parliament, whose powers have steadily increased over the years; and they are indirectly accountable via the elected member-state officials appointed to the European Council and Council of the EU. In addition, a large number of individuals (e.g., commissioners and their staffs, national delegations, parliamentarians, and national ministers) scrutinize the Union’s policy process and ensure that information about it is readily available.62 Finally, the EU should not be blamed for voter apathy; its policy purview simply does not encompass the areas EU citizens consider most important, such as health care, law and order, social security, and taxation. Instead, member-state governments shape policies in these areas while the Union deals with subjects like trade liberalization and the removal of nontariff barriers, subjects that are unlikely to generate much public enthusiasm and high voter turnout in EP elections.63 To conclude, the democratic deficit debate will not be resolved any time soon. In 2004 the European Union added ten new members from central and eastern Europe, and two more joined in January 2007. EU expansion raises even more questions about democratic accountability and representation, both of which are discussed in the next chapter.

■ Summary This chapter has shown how the national interests of the EU member states have shaped the major institutions of the European Union. First, it revealed that the interests of the member states have determined in large part how the Commission performs its legislative, executive, and managerial functions, despite the fact that this institution is supposed to act in the general interest of the EU. Second, it has shown how member-state interests are even more

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

256

Page 256

UNIFYING EUROPE

pervasive in the Council of the EU and the European Council, two bodies where member states actively protect and promote their interests during the policymaking and treaty-drafting processes. Third, this chapter has demonstrated how even though the European Parliament has gained legislative powers in recent years, it has far to go before it rivals member-state parliaments. The EP still lacks the power to approve (or disapprove) government bills; and it is debatable if the MEPs are accountable to and representative of EU’s citizens. Similarly, the EU’s member states do not have to worry that the European Court of Justice will interfere too much with their courts. The ECJ has little power to enforce its judgments, and even though the Court now has the power to fine member states for disobeying its orders, its justices have been hesitant to do so. Finally, the chapter points out that recent attempts to reform the EU’s institutions during the Constitutional Convention generated acrimonious debate among the member states, pitting the small against the big and the old against the new. Thus, the future of the EU’s institutions, much like their past, will be determined in large part by the interests of the Union’s members.

■ Notes 1. “From Fuel and Steel to Banks and Gambling—Symptoms of Europe’s Inner Discord,” Financial Times, March 22, 2006. 2. Paul Meller, “European Official Challenges 6 Nations’ Gambling Rules,” New York Times, March 14, 2006. 3. Raphael Minder and Sarah Laitner, “Brussels in Legal Move on Energy Markets,” Financial Times, April 2, 2006. 4. Raphael Minder, “Brussels Tells Most of Europe, ‘It Won’t Wash,’” Financial Times, April 6, 2006. 5. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Part Five, Institutions of the Community, Title 1, Provisions Governing the Institutions, Chapter 1, The Institutions, Section 3, The Commission, Article 213, para. 2. 6. Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 5th edition (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 115. 7. Ibid., 118. 8. For a complete list of variations in policy areas, see John McCormick, Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction, 3rd edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 9. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 136–137. 10. In addition to its permanent staff, the Commission employs a smaller number of temporary relevant experts and select national officials. See Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 118–126. 11. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 118–119. 12. Ibid., 119–120. 13. Robert Cox and Timothy Sinclair, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), quoted in Andrew Moravcsik, “A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation,” International Organization 53 (Spring 1999), 267.

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

Page 257

GOVERNING THE EUROPEAN UNION

257

14. Wayne Sandholtz, High Tech Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). 15. Moravcsik, “A New Statecraft?” 287. 16. Ibid., 287–288, 290–291. 17. Ibid., 273. 18. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 156. 19. For more on COREPER, see McCormick, Understanding the European Union, 90. 20. For more on the General Secretariat, see Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 160–161. 21. Jimmy Burns and Bob Sherwood, “Ministers Offer to Pay Operators to Retain Phone Data,” Financial Times, November 2, 2005; Jimmy Burns and Sarah Laitner, “Clarke Secures EU Backing for Counter-terror Data Retention Plan,” Financial Times, December 15, 2005. 22. Crispian Balmer, “Berlusconi Chides Critics as Italy Takes EU,” Washington Post, July 2, 2003. 23. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 162. 24. Andrew Bolger and Fiona Harvey, “Cod and Herring Catches to Be Cut Next Year,” Financial Times, December 23, 2005. 25. George Parker, “France Dubious About UK Plan to Televise EU Lawmakers,” Financial Times, December 5, 2005; Sarah Laitner, “EU Lawmakers to Permit More TV Filming in Drive to Improve Openness,” Financial Times, December 27, 2005; George Parker, “Leaders to Leave EU Draft Treaty on Ice,” Financial Times, April 28, 2006. 26. Keith Richburg, “Berlusconi Voices Regret for Remark About Germans,” Washington Post, July 4, 2003. 27. McCormick, Understanding the European Union, 93. 28. George Parker, “‘Construction Site’ Littered with Barriers,” Financial Times, February 17, 2006. 29. Derek Beach, The Dynamics of European Integration: Why and When EU Institutions Matter (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 247. 30. Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 239. 31. Initially, it was decided that a yearlong period of reflection would be held; this period was eventually extended until the spring of 2007. For more on the European Council’s discussions of the EU Constitution, see Elaine Sciolino, “Faded Vision Splits Europe,” New York Times, June 19, 2005; Parker, “Leaders to Leave EU Draft Treaty on Ice.” 32. Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 504–505. 33. Nicholas Watt and Patrick Wintour, “Rebate Row Wrecks EU Summit,” Guardian Unlimited, June 18, 2005, www.guardian.co.uk. 34. “European Council Declaration on Iraq,” Presidency Conclusions: Copenhagen European Council, December 12 and 13, 2002, www.consilium. europa.eu, accessed May 15, 2006. 35. It is of note that Brussels is but one location where EP members meet. They hold plenary sessions in Strasbourg, France, and committee meetings in Luxembourg. 36. For more on “Open Day–Open Doors,” visit www.europarl.eu.int/new/ public. 37. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 203–204. 38. “Europe’s Censure Motion,” Financial Times, January 15, 1999; Neil Buckley, “Committee of ‘Experts’ to Tackle Fraud,” Financial Times, January 15,

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

258

Page 258

UNIFYING EUROPE

1999; “Resignations in Brussels,” Financial Times, March 16, 1999. 39. Raphael Minder, “Europe’s Parliament Strives to Keep Points Lead in Sparring with Barroso,” Financial Times, November 18, 2004; Raphael Minder and George Parker, “Parliament Gives a Thumbs Up for Barroso’s New Team,” Financial Times, November 19, 2004. 40. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 206–207. 41. Ibid., 216–221. 42. Raphael Minder, “Celebrities Seek to Cash In on Protest Vote,” Financial Times, June 12, 2004. 43. For more on the EP and treaty talks, see Beach, The Dynamics of European Integration, 196–209. 44. Quoted in Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 245. 45. Preliminary rulings constitute approximately one-third of the ECJ’s case load. While national courts are most likely to bring such cases, sometimes members of EU institutions will ask for preliminary rulings (however, such requests are usually on behalf of national courts). In addition, EU citizens can get the ECJ to hear their case by filing for a preliminary ruling. 46. Although rare, direct action cases can also be brought against the Commission or Council for failing to make sure that EU laws conform to EU treaties. 47. For more information on the cases that furthered EU social and economic integration, see Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 297–298. 48. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 246. 49. Ibid. 50. Specifically, the Court overruled the 1988 Merchant Shipping Act, which required that at least 75 percent of those operating shipping vessels in Britain’s waters be British. The Court said the act violated EU law guaranteeing freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services. Thus, the British could not impose a national quota for owners and operators of ships with British registration. See Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 301. 51. Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 197. 52. Ibid. 53. While the Constitutional Treaty increased the size of the European Parliament from 732 to 750 and granted the assembly additional budgetary powers, these reforms did not generate the controversy that those related to the Commission and Council did. 54. Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 259. 55. McCormick, Understanding the European Union, 135. 56. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 456. 57. McCormick, Understanding the European Union, 135–137. 58. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 455–456. 59. McCormick, Understanding the European Union, 137–139. 60. Andrew Moravcsik, “In Defense of the Democratic Deficit: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2002), 603–624. 61. For more reasons that the EU is not a “superstate,” see Moravcsik, “In Defense of the Democratic Deficit,” 606–611. 62. Moravcsik, “In Defense of the Democratic Deficit,” 611–614. 63. Ibid., 615–617.

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

Page 259

GOVERNING THE EUROPEAN UNION

259

■ Suggested Reading Beach, Derek. The Dynamics of European Integration: Why and When EU Institutions Matter. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Elgström, Ole (ed.). European Union Council Presidencies: A Comparative Perspective. New York: Routledge, 2003. Hix, Simon, Abdul Noury, and Gérard Roland. Democratic Politics in the European Parliament. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Moravcsik, Andrew. “In Defense of the Democratic Deficit: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2002), 603–624. Peterson, John, and Michael Shackelton (eds.). The Institutions of the European Union, 2nd edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Ross, George. Jacques Delors and European Integration. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

O-10

9/23/08

4:10 PM

Page 260

O-11

9/23/08

4:11 PM

Page 261

11 Enlarging Europe’s Commonwealth

SINCE IT WAS founded by the original six member states fifty years ago, the EU has added new states every decade or so, extending its borders to the north, the south, and to the east. It is now more than ever a European commonwealth of states, not just a western European political formation. With each enlargement, the nation-states of Europe have become more and more politically and economically similar. Those applicant states with pasts marked by dictatorial rule and state-controlled economies are (with substantial EU aid) increasingly taking on the characteristics of the Union’s existing democratic market-state members. That is, they are becoming liberal democracies with free market economies. In effect, the EU is an organization that “disciplines” European states to become market states as a requirement for membership in the commonwealth. The spread and consolidation of the European market state is hardly surprising given the Union’s accession criteria, which require that prospective member states guarantee democracy and the rule of law, as well as an economy capable of withstanding the competitive pressures associated with capitalism. Fulfilling these criteria is sometimes easier said than done. For example, the two states that joined the EU in January 2007, Bulgaria and Romania, are struggling to overcome poverty and corruption. Commission president José Manuel Barroso has threatened to withhold EU aid and to strictly monitor these two states “to ensure conditions are met before the countries gain the full benefits of EU membership.”1 Monitoring and withholding EU aid will compel Romania and Bulgaria to accept the marketstate model that now defines all EU members. This chapter tracks the spread of the European market state through a discussion of the EU’s enlargements in 1973, 1981, 1986, 1995, 2004, and 2007 (see Table 11.1). 261

O-11

9/23/08

4:11 PM

Page 262

262

UNIFYING EUROPE

ICELAND

FINLAND

NORWAY

SWEDEN

RUSSIA

ESTONIA

UK LATVIA DENMARK LITHUANIA RUSSIA IRELAND BELARUS

NETHERLANDS POLAND GERMANY BELGIUM

UKRAINE

LUX.

ATLANTIC OCEAN

CZECH REPUBLIC SLOVAKIA MOLDOVA

FRANCE

AUSTRIA HUNGARY

SWITZERLAND

ITALY

ROMANIA

SLOVENIA CROATIA BOSNIA

PORTUGAL

SERBIA

MONT.

BULGARIA

MACEDONIA

SPAIN

ALBANIA TURKEY GREECE

MALTA

CYPRUS CYPRUS

The European Union, 2008

■ Consolidating the European Market State The six nation-states that came together after World War II to form the European Economic Communities did so for three main reasons. First, the founding six wanted to create a lasting peace in Europe. Second, the economies of all six states were in shambles and cooperation was viewed as a way to achieve economic growth and prosperity. Italy, for example, thought its postwar economic problems (that is, unemployment, inflation, and currency instability) could be solved by joining with other states in an economic community; the Benelux states realized that their economic pros-

O-11

9/23/08

4:11 PM

Page 263

ENLARGING EUROPE’S COMMONWEALTH

Table 11.1

263

European Union Membership, 1957–2008

Date

Nation-State

Original member states, 1957

France Belgium Germany (West) Netherlands Italy Luxembourg Britain Denmark Ireland Greece (1981) Portugal (1986) Spain (1986) Austria Finland Sweden Poland Latvia Hungary Lithuania Czech Republic Estonia Slovakia Cyprus Slovenia Malta Bulgaria Romania

First enlargement, 1973

Mediterranean enlargements, 1981 and 1986

Third enlargement, 1995

Enlarging to the east, 2004

Enlarging to the east, 2007

perity was tied to that of their larger neighbors; and France and Germany believed that access to one another’s markets would stimulate economic growth.2 Hence, the Treaties of Rome (1957) removed internal tariffs, erected a common external tariff, and established a common market within which goods and (eventually) people, services, and capital could move about freely among the member states. Given their contents, the Rome treaties could certainly be said to reflect the economic philosophy of the founding six—that a certain degree of free market capitalism would bring prosperity to Europe.3 The third reason the founders decided to cooperate was to consolidate liberal democracy in the region. As was previously mentioned, Europe was divided by the Cold War with its western half allied to the United States and the eastern part dominated by the Soviet Union. As Western European leaders watched the Communist Party come to power in the East, they started to fear that the party would threaten the democratic regimes being (re)established in the West. When the Communists did well in French and Italian

O-11

9/23/08

4:11 PM

264

Page 264

UNIFYING EUROPE

parliamentary elections and took power in East Germany, the heads of the founding six became alarmed. For example, the Christian Democrat–led Italian government of the day claimed that disgruntled Communists would incite internal revolution, while the conservative West German leadership expressed its fear of an invasion from the Soviet-backed regime in the East. For these leaders, cooperation was a good way to stop the Communist threat and turn Western Europe into a safe haven for liberal democracy.4 Given that Europe’s free market economies and democratic nation-states prospered in the first three decades that followed World War II, it is hardly surprising that these two characteristics became requirements for those states that later sought membership in the European Union.

■ The First Enlargement, 1973 Almost twenty years after its creation, the European Community expanded for the first time, adding three new members: Britain, Ireland, and Denmark.5 To understand why it took nearly two decades for the EC to grow, we must first explore the combination of internal and external factors that delayed the British accession and, as a result, slowed down the process for the Irish and Danish. In the immediate postwar period, the British were reluctant to seek membership in the European Economic Community for two main reasons. First, Britain defined itself as a major world power that did not need Europe for its prosperity. Instead, Britain’s connections to its former colonies and its “special relationship” with the United States were considered more valuable than enhanced connections to Western Europe via the EC. Thus, it was unthinkable that the British would give up sovereignty to the supranational institutions supposedly emerging on the continent at that time. 6 Second, Britain did not believe that it would substantially benefit from the areas in which cooperation was occurring; its coal and steel capabilities already exceeded that of the European Coal and Steel Community, its attempt to maintain a world role would have been limited by the European Defense Community, and its nuclear capability would not benefit much from the European Atomic Energy Community. Thus, Britain opted out of the EC and instead joined forces with other nonmember European states (such as Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland) to create the European Free Trade Association, an interstate free-trade area of industrial products.7 Similarly, Denmark and Ireland had few incentives to join the EEC. Their agrarian economies would not benefit from a common coal and steel market, and their strong economic ties to Britain meant that EEC membership (without the British) would not result in many gains. It was not until

O-11

9/23/08

4:11 PM

Page 265

ENLARGING EUROPE’S COMMONWEALTH

265

the late 1950s, when Britain reconsidered its position on the EEC, that the Irish and Danish expressed an interest in Community membership, and their subsequent bids for entry mirrored those of the British. The British reversed their stand on joining Europe because they were increasingly impressed by the EEC’s success,8 and they realized that their day as a world power was over.9 However, both of the British applications filed during the 1960s (one in 1961 and the other in 1967) were blocked by then French president Charles de Gaulle. In de Gaulle’s view, Britain would threaten France’s leadership position within the Community, “unsettle” the Franco-German alliance (upon which the Community was founded), and provide American interests with unimpeded access to Europe. De Gaulle’s vetoes also affected the Irish and the Danish, which applied for membership at the same time as the British but withdrew their applications when Britain was denied entry. It was not until de Gaulle was succeeded by his protégé, Georges Pompidou, in 1969 that the situation became more propitious for British membership. Unlike de Gaulle, Pompidou thought British membership would benefit France: The British could act as a counterweight to Germany (which was ever increasing in confidence and power), serve as a useful ally in the battle to keep European cooperation on an interstate track, and contribute to the EC’s budget (which would reduce the cost of membership to France). Pompidou’s British negotiating partner, the Conservative prime minister Edward Heath, was also enthusiastic about Britain’s accession to the EC. According to a policy paper published by the Heath government in 1971, cooperation would make Britain “more secure,” increase its “ability to maintain peace and promote development,” and create a more prosperous “economy and people.”10 A series of negotiations followed, and Britain, as well as Ireland and Denmark, were admitted to the EC in 1973. Since its accession, Britain’s relationship with the EC (and later the EU) has been defined in large part by the party in power. From 1979 until 1997, when the Conservative Party controlled the government, 11 Britain was generally hostile toward any attempt at supranational cooperation (for example, a common social policy or common currency). Instead, it fought for an interstate economic community based on a deregulated common market. This approach did not always jibe with that of other members and meant that EC-British relations were often contentious. (Recall the earlier discussion of Margaret Thatcher’s fight to get Britain’s money, in Chapter 9.) However, when, in 1997, the Labour Party achieved power, Britain became more cooperative in treaty talks (especially when it came to incorporating the social protocol into the Amsterdam Treaty), and it began supporting supranational cooperation in some policy areas, such as defense. But “Euro-skepticism” has not disappeared from the British government. It has still not adopted the euro, and Tony Blair, Britain’s Labour Party prime

O-11

9/23/08

4:11 PM

266

Page 266

UNIFYING EUROPE

minister from 1997 until 2007, never fulfilled his campaign promise to hold a referendum on the issue.12 Similarly, the Danes have had an uneasy relationship with the EC/EU. The Danish government has economic reasons for cooperation: Denmark has strong trade relations with Britain and Germany, which would have been disrupted if Denmark had remained outside the EEC. At the same time, Danish citizens fear a loss of sovereignty and are skeptical about cooperation. This skepticism was particularly apparent in the public’s initial rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. While the treaty was eventually approved in a second referendum, the Danish government has proceeded cautiously since then. For example, it decided to opt out of the single currency, a decision that received public support when voters rejected the euro in a referendum in 2000. Thus, the Danes have not been wholehearted supporters of cooperation, especially when it moves in a supranational direction.13 In contrast, Ireland has embraced the EC/EU. This is due in part to the fact that the Irish have received substantial aid for agricultural and regional development, which has contributed to the country’s recent period of spectacular economic growth and prosperity. It also owes to the fact that Ireland saw cooperation as a way to break free from its “suffocatingly close” relationship with Britain and to establish itself in a “broader multilateral context.”14 Thus, it is hardly surprising that the Irish tend to be among the Union’s biggest backers.15 In sum, the EC’s first enlargement brought in nation-states that had already consolidated the European market-state model. Britain, Ireland, and Denmark were all established liberal democracies that had embraced free market capitalism (albeit to varying degrees). However, as the next section will show, circumstances were quite different during the next round of accessions.

■ The Mediterranean Enlargements, 1981 and 1986 Nearly a decade after its first enlargement, the European Community turned its attention southward, inviting Greece, Spain, and Portugal to join in the early to mid-1980s. However, unlike the northern states that joined in 1973, these Mediterranean states had only recently made the transition from authoritarian, nondemocratic governance to liberal democracy. Greece first expressed a desire to join the EEC in the late 1950s but was denied membership because its economy (unlike those of the existing member states) was deemed “peasant-based” and “underdeveloped.”16 Instead, the Greeks signed an Association Agreement with the EEC in 1962, which required that they transition to a market-based economy before applying for full membership. Greece was making progress toward this goal

O-11

9/23/08

4:11 PM

Page 267

ENLARGING EUROPE’S COMMONWEALTH

267

when, in 1967, the government was overthrown by the army and a military dictatorship was established. The agreement was put on hold until democratic elections were held in 1974; shortly thereafter the Greek government renewed its efforts to enter the Community, arguing that its membership would bolster and protect its newly established democracy. Membership negotiations soon followed, and Greece joined the EC in 1981. Similarly, Spain, and Portugal were slow to join because neither state fit the ideal EEC governance model when application was first made in the early 1960s. At that time, both states were ruled by dictators (Salazar in Portugal and Franco in Spain) and both had agrarian economies as well as autarkic economic policies (or policies that promoted national selfsufficiency and a nonreliance on imports).17 It was not until the dictatorial regimes had been replaced with parliamentary democracies (1974 in Portugal and 1975 in Spain) that the Spanish and Portuguese membership bids were seriously considered. However, the accessions negotiations were long and arduous. Initially, member states (such as France) feared that Spanish and Portuguese farmers would drain the CAP (common agricultural policy) budget, that the large Spanish fishing fleet would pose problems for the common fishing policy, and that Spanish and Portuguese laborers would flood into the northern member states. It was not until the early 1980s, when socialist governments were formed by Prime Minister Mário Soares of Portugal and his Spanish counterpart, Felipe González, that real progress toward Iberian accession was made. Soares responded to criticisms that Portugal’s economy was not ready for the EC by working with the International Monetary Fund to reduce Portugal’s foreign debt and restructure its economy. González reversed the position of his predecessors and expressed his willingness to adopt the economic measures required for EC membership. Finally, both men visited the Community’s capital cities and cultivated relationships with leaders such as French president François Mitterrand, who initially feared that the Iberian expansion would hurt CAP in general, and French farmers in particular.18 The existing member states responded positively to the efforts of Soares and González, recognizing that it was in their interest to do so; Portuguese and Spanish accession would provide unfettered access to Iberian markets as well as the opportunity to promote democracy in a region that had recently emerged from a period of authoritarian rule. Therefore, by 1985, agreements were reached on the more difficult to resolve accessionrelated issues (e.g., agricultural subsidies, the size of the Spanish fishing fleet, and free movement of Spanish and Portuguese workers within the EC), and both states joined the Community on January 1, 1986. In an attempt to smooth the way for the EC’s newest (and poorest) member states, the European Council (under pressure from the Greek government) agreed

O-11

9/23/08

4:11 PM

268

Page 268

UNIFYING EUROPE

to provide the Mediterranean states with substantial aid so they might “adjust under the best conditions possible to the new situation created by enlargement.”19 Such aid made it easier for Greece, Spain, and Portugal to complete the transition to a free market economy and liberal democratic governance. Since accession, Greece, Spain, and Portugal have been big supporters of European cooperation, which is not surprising given the large amount of agricultural and structural aid they have received from the Community (and later the Union). As the poorest of the three, Greece requested special funds to bolster its economy, but all three states have jealously guarded their aid packages. The battle for funds heated up when the poor, agrarian states of central and eastern Europe joined the Union in 2004 (as we will see below).20 In sum, the enlargements of the 1970s and 1980s doubled the number of EC member states, expanded the Community’s northern and southern borders, widened its economic base, and altered its internal political dynamic (by adding states that could be counterweights to France and Germany) as well as its internal economic “balance” (by adding the poorer Mediterranean states). In the wake of these changes, the EC turned inward and began “deepening” the relations among the existing members,21 which (as we saw in the previous chapter) resulted in the Single European Act, the Social Charter, and the Maastricht Treaty. It was not until the mid-1990s that the newly named European Union again began to consider applications for membership.

■ The Third Enlargement, 1995 In the early 1990s, Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden applied to join the EC. Given that all four of these states were well-established liberal democracies with free market economies, they better fitted the Community’s accession criteria than had the Mediterranean states that preceded them. This fit was due, in part, to their previous membership in EFTA. As mentioned above, EFTA was created (in 1960) by several European states that had decided to remain outside of the EEC (that is, Britain, Portugal, Denmark, Austria, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and, later, Finland, Iceland, and Liechtenstein). By 1966, EFTA had achieved its goal of creating an industrial free-trade area among its members, and ten years later, when it joined forces with the EC, it succeeded in creating a common market for industrial goods in all of Western Europe. The EC and EFTA went on to cooperate in other areas (like the environment, research and development, and transportation), and, during the 1980s, EFTA members began to adopt much of the acquis communautaire (i.e., the EC’s preexisting laws and policies).22

O-11

9/23/08

4:11 PM

Page 269

ENLARGING EUROPE’S COMMONWEALTH

269

However, the EC-EFTA partnership was one of unequal partners. The EC was much stronger and richer than EFTA. It was dictating the terms of common trade policies, and it was well on its way to creating a single European market without consulting EFTA members. Therefore, by the late 1980s, EFTA states that wanted a say in the European decisionmaking process had little choice but to reconsider their position on EC membership. But when EFTA states expressed their interest in joining the EC during the late 1980s, they were rebuffed. As mentioned earlier, in the years following the Iberian accession, EC leaders were more concerned with deepening than widening the Community. In an effort to discourage applications from new members, the EC created, in 1990, the European Economic Area (EEA), which extended SEA to EFTA states. In other words, it set up an integrated market between the EC and EFTA. However, by the time the EEA came into full effect four years later, four of the EEA states (Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) had begun accession negotiations. Therefore, contrary to the EC’s expectation, the EEA did not deter EFTA countries from applying for membership.23 Why did Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden pursue membership even though they were already included in the single market? First, they hoped that membership in the EMS would end a period of economic stagnation they were experiencing. Second, their geopolitical positions had changed since the end of the Cold War. Austrian and Swedish neutrality was no longer necessary, and Finland’s “special relationship” with the former Soviet Union no longer had to be maintained. Third, the four had tired of having to accept EC decisions without having a say in how they were made.24 Accession talks for these states proceeded rather quickly primarily because they had adopted much of the Community’s acquis when they were part of the EFTA and then the EEA. In addition, as well-established liberal democracies with free market economies, they fit the European Union’s market-state model better than their southern predecessors. Nonetheless, membership negotiations did not go smoothly. There were difficult debates over environmental protection standards (which were tougher in the applicant states), agricultural subsidies (which were higher in the applicant states), and the control of oil and gas reserves, as well as fishing in territorial waters (which the Norwegians were reluctant to give up).25 Eventually, compromises were reached on most of these issues: Farmers in the applicant states were permitted to maintain their high subsidies, while crop prices were gradually lowered; the new members were allowed to keep their higher environmental standards, provided that the EU reviewed environmental directives in four years, and transitional arrangements were made regarding the regulation of energy and fishing.26 Once talks among political elites had been completed, citizens of the

O-11

9/23/08

4:11 PM

270

Page 270

UNIFYING EUROPE

applicant states voted on accession in referenda scheduled throughout 1994. A majority of the Austrian, Finnish, and Swedish electorates cast ballots in favor of membership, which went into effect for these states in January 1995. However, a majority of Norwegians, satisfied with their membership in the EEA and concerned that EU membership would harm key economic sectors (such as fishing and agriculture) as well as limit national sovereignty, voted no.27 The addition of three new members in 1995 significantly changed the dimensions of the EU. Its borders were extended well into Scandinavia, which increased its size by about a third and its population by about 6 percent. It also boosted the Union economically. The three new member states were relatively affluent and were able to provide valuable contributions to the EU budget. Finally, the new members brought “traditions of democracy, participation and openness” (traditions that were part and parcel of the Union’s market-state model) as well as more attention to policy issues such as environmental degradation, social security, and global development.28 The impact of the next enlargement, however, was to be quite different.

■ Enlarging to the East, 2004 and 2007 When the Cold War and Soviet imperial domination of central and eastern Europe came to an end, the states in this region began two transitions. Politically, central and eastern European states (or CEES) began abandoning dictatorial one-party regimes for multiparty democracy. Economically, they began replacing state-planned economies with capitalist market economies. In the view of many CEES, the European Union could help with their transition to market states by providing much-needed financial and political support. The EU, for its part, was wary of expanding eastward, however. The Union had always equated European cooperation with the western part of the continent, and (as a result) never developed a comprehensive policy toward Eastern Europe (or Ostpolitik). In addition, the EU thought eastern enlargement would generate a new set of political, economic, and institutional problems: How much financial aid would the CEES receive? What kind of political assistance was necessary to foster democracy? How would EC institutions be reformed to accommodate the new members? While the Union tried to stall membership bids by providing certain states in eastern Europe with substantial reconstruction and development aid during the late 1980s and 1990s, its efforts were not successful.29 The CEES were soon clamoring for entry, arguing that membership was the best way to ensure stability, democracy, and economic reform in the region. Given that the EU had long condemned a “divided Europe” and called for “pan-European integration” (despite its lack of Ostpolitik), it could hardly

O-11

9/23/08

4:11 PM

Page 271

ENLARGING EUROPE’S COMMONWEALTH

271

turn the CEES away. In addition, the Union was not unaware of the potential benefits that would come to it with eastern enlargement, such as new market opportunities and heightened stability and security in eastern Europe. Therefore, in 1993, the European Council established the following conditions for CEES entry into the European Union: applicant states must have a democratic government that respects human rights and the rule of law, a free market economy that can withstand the pressures of capitalism, and the administrative ability to fulfill the obligations of the EC’s preexisting laws and policies.30 These conditions, known as the Copenhagen criteria, marked the codification of the European Union’s market-state model, and they required that the central and eastern European applicant states (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) make changes in two main areas. First, they had to create well-functioning free market economies, which necessitated a host of business and financial reforms (such as the passage of property rights laws and business codes, the establishment of banking and financial services regulations, and the privatization of state-owned companies). In addition, the CEES had to prepare for future economic growth by modernizing agricultural and industrial infrastructures, attracting foreign investment, and discovering new markets. Second, the prospective members had to create wellfunctioning democracies (that is, they had to allow parties to organize and compete in free and fair elections, as well as to develop the skills, attitudes, and administrative structures that define liberal democracies).31 To make sure that these conditions were met before full membership, the EU held multistep accession negotiations. The first step was a “screening process,” which assessed how well each applicant had prepared for EU membership (that is, the progress each had made toward adopting the acquis), and identified areas that needed more work. By 1999, ten CEES (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) had successfully completed the screening process and were invited to take the second step, accession negotiations.32 Negotiation talks were divided into about thirty categories (or chapters), such as agriculture, energy, free movement of capital, and institutional reform. By 2002, most of the contentious topics (such as agricultural subsidies to CEES farmers and budgetary contributions of the new member states) had been dealt with, so the European Council voted to admit all applicants with the exception of Bulgaria and Romania. The following year the third step was taken when accession treaties were approved in each of the eight CEES, either by national referendum or by parliamentary vote (depending on the state). The eight central and eastern European states were not the only ones to officially join the European Union in May of 2004, however. Cyprus and

O-11

9/23/08

4:11 PM

272

Page 272

UNIFYING EUROPE

Malta, two Mediterranean island states, also entered at that time. Unlike the CEES, these two states were well-established democracies with free market economies and thus easily met the Copenhagen criteria. Their belated membership was due to international politics in the case of Cyprus and domestic politics in the case of Malta. Since 1974, Turkey has occupied the northern half of the island of Cyprus, with Greek Cypriots controlling the south. When South Cyprus applied for EU membership on behalf of the entire island in 1990, the Turkish Cypriots objected to the Greeks negotiating on their behalf. The EU gave the south’s application a cool reception, stating that a partitioned state could not be a member of the Union. However, by the mid-1990s, the EU (under pressure from Greece) reconsidered its position on Cyprus. The island was included in the CEES accession talks held during the late 1990s, and it officially joined the Union in May of 2004. Cyprus’s accession has not lessened tensions between Greece and Turkey, however. The Greek Cypriots rejected a UN-backed plan for reunification, and they have threatened to block Turkey’s application for membership (see below).33 In contrast, Malta’s entry into the EU was delayed because of domestic politics. While the island’s conservative government applied for membership in 1990, its application was withdrawn when the “Euro-skeptical” Labor Party took power six years later. However, when the conservatives returned to power in 1998, they reapplied for membership, and Malta was included in the CEES accession talks held the following year. During the talks, the EU voiced its concerns about Malta’s small size and marginal international standing, but did not let such concerns slow down negotiations. Given that Malta was already governed according to the Copenhagen criteria, it was only inevitable that it would be allowed to join with the others in 2004.34 The addition of ten states in 2004 posed several challenges for the European Union.35 First, the EU had to make room for them in its institutions. Previously, new members were simply added to the institutions, their number of votes or seats, or both, commensurate to their population. However, this method was not possible in 2004 because institutions like the Commission and the EP were already too big and insufficient. Therefore, the EU had little choice but to revamp existing institutions in order to accommodate the new members. As was discussed in the previous chapter, institutional reform (e.g., changing the size of the Commission and the voting weights in the Council of Ministers as well as capping the number of MEPs) unleashed considerable debate during the Constitutional Convention, which has yet to be completed.36 Enlargement also created major economic challenges for the EU. While the 2004 accession increased the EU’s population by about one-quarter, it augmented its economic wealth by less than 5 percent and placed great

O-11

9/23/08

4:11 PM

Page 273

ENLARGING EUROPE’S COMMONWEALTH

273

demands on the Union’s financial resources. The first demand was on CAP. Since the economies of most CEES were dominated by large, inefficient agricultural sectors, their governments pressed for high farming subsidies. However, the EU did not have the resources to subsidize farmers in the new states at the same level it was subsidizing farmers in western Europe. Therefore, new applicant states had to accept smaller agricultural subsidies than they had asked for.37 The second demand was on the Union’s cohesion policy (which seeks to reduce social and economic disparities within the Union). A key aspect of this policy is the giving of funds to poorer regions in order to reduce economic and social differences between the richer and poorer member states. Since all of the eastern and central European applicants qualified for these funds, their accession would place a great strain on the Union’s economic resources. Thus, cohesion policy was reformed in the run-up to enlargement, and special monies were earmarked for the new member states.38 A third concern raised by eastern enlargement was in the area of justice and home affairs. Since the Schengen Accords were signed in the mid1980s, the European Union has allowed for the free movement of EU citizens within the Union by dismantling internal frontiers between member states and establishing a common external border. The creation of such a territorial space required member states to cooperate on several matters related to internal and external security, such as setting visa requirements, processing asylum applications, fighting illegal immigration, improving police cooperation, and fighting terrorism and organized crime. Subsequent treaties have attempted to expand on Schengen by creating a common area of free movement, security, and justice. For example, Maastricht established a “pillar” of justice and home affairs, while the Amsterdam Treaty urged closer cooperation in matters concerning the free movement of people (visas, asylum, immigration, and so on).39 During the accession talks, the existing member states expressed concern that eastern expansion would pose problems for justice and home affairs. Specifically, it was thought that the eastern European states were not capable of making their borders secure, and that an influx into the EU of illegal immigrants (and potential criminals and terrorists) would follow their 2004 accession. Therefore, the Union gave the CEES considerable financial and technical assistance to help set up effective border patrols.40 At the same time, it was feared that central and eastern Europeans themselves would flood into western labor markets, exacerbating already high unemployment levels. Thus, states such as France and Germany insisted that restrictions be placed on the movement of citizens residing in the applicant states.41 At this writing, the most recent enlargement occurred in 2007, when Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union after a seven-year wait. In 2000, Bulgaria and Romania—along with eight other central and eastern

O-11

9/23/08

4:11 PM

Page 274

274

UNIFYING EUROPE

European states—were conducting accession talks with the Union. While their neighbors made great strides adapting to the EU’s governance model, joining the EU in 2004 (see above), Bulgarian and Romanian accession was put off. This delay was attributed to the inability of these states to successfully establish well-functioning democracies bolstered by free market economies in the time allowed. While both states made progress, from 2000 on, implementing the Copenhagen political and economic criteria, outstanding problems remained. For example, according to a progress report put out by the Commission in May 2006, the Bulgarian government had not demonstrated that it was investigating and prosecuting organized crime, implementing anticorruption laws, preventing money laundering and embezzlement of EU aid, and completing agricultural reforms. Similarly, Romania had not finished implementing agricultural reforms (e.g., establishing agencies for distributing aid to Romanian farmers and raising veterinary standards for livestock), nor changed its tax system to allow for proper EU tax collection.42 Despite these problems, the EU did not threaten to renege on Union membership. In the words of the EU’s commissioner for enlargement, “It is our goal to welcome Bulgaria and Romania as members in 2007, but it is our duty to ensure that, once they join, they really meet the conditions.”43 In other words, the EU continued to provide the applicants with the technical and financial assistance needed to establish law-abiding democratic governments and prosperous free market economies. By doing so, the Union facilitated Bulgaria and Romania’s transformation into market states, thereby extending the European peace community well into eastern Europe. In addition, the Union stands to benefit from the 2007 enlargement by expanding its market, spreading stability, and fostering its pan-European vision. A second report on Bulgarian and Romanian progress in October 2006 had been favorable and both states were admitted in January 2007. In sum, the transformation of central and eastern European states into liberal democracies with free market economies and, along with Cyprus and Malta, their addition to the European Union marks the spread of the market state to the east. But what of future enlargements? Membership negotiations have already begun with Turkey and Croatia. Do these states conform to the Union’s accession criteria? It is to this question that we now turn.

■ Future Enlargements Currently, the queue for membership includes states in the western Balkans: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Four of these states, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro, made up Yugoslavia before its violent disintegration in the

O-11

9/23/08

4:11 PM

Page 275

ENLARGING EUROPE’S COMMONWEALTH

275

early 1990s (see Chapter 5).44 The EU’s attempts to resolve that bloody conflict were unsuccessful, due in large part to its inability to agree on the best response. Instead, the fighting was ended by a combination of NATO bombings and US-led diplomacy, resulting in the 1995 Dayton peace accords. To compensate for its inability to bring peace to the region, the EU has become the largest donor of development assistance to the western Balkans as a whole. For example, the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization program donated about five billion euros to the area in 2005–2006. In addition, the EU has taken steps to prevent future conflict in the region by establishing a Stabilization and Association Process, which “encourages economic, political, judicial, and administrative reform through the provision of financial aid, trade preferences, and technical advice.”45 In other words, the EU is trying to create stability and prosperity by encouraging the establishment of its market-state model within this region. Thus far, the EU’s approach to the western Balkans has yielded promising results. Croatia applied for EU membership in 2003, received candidate status in 2004, and began its first round of accession talks in 2006. Although it has a fairly strong economy and increasingly stable democracy, Croatia still faces certain obstacles, namely the allegation that it is sheltering indicted war criminals. In addition, the EU signed a premembership agreement with Albania, once a highly doctrinaire communist state, which will increase economic and political reforms in that country in exchange for greater trade with the EU. However, no date has been set for its entry into the Union. Finally, the EU recognized Montenegro as a sovereign state shortly after its people voted to leave its federation with Serbia and declared its independence.46 The EU’s overtures to the western Balkans may soon extend far into eastern Europe to include states such as Ukraine and Moldova, both of which have expressed an interest in membership. Ukraine in particular has received considerable financial assistance from the Union; however, its prospects for membership are uncertain given the growing opposition to the pro-EU president Viktor Yushenko. Perhaps one day the EU will include Russia. We will discuss this eventuality in Chapter 12. For over forty years Turkey has been hoping to enter the European Union, but the EU has been wary of Turkish membership. Turkey first expressed an interest in joining in the late 1950s and signed an Association Agreement with the EEC in 1963. Although the agreement did not guarantee membership, it did include economic and political guidelines for future integration. In other words, it provided Turkey with a plan for adapting to the Community’s political and economic criteria. Over the next two decades, Turkey worked to democratize its governance and liberalize its economy, and in 1987 it officially applied for membership. The Commission

O-11

9/23/08

4:11 PM

276

Page 276

UNIFYING EUROPE

rejected its application on political and economic grounds despite the progress Turkey had made adapting itself to the European market-state model. According to the Commission, Turkey’s human rights record remained questionable; the military’s role in politics (especially its habit of overthrowing the elected government) was still a subject of concern; and its economy needed more “liberalization and modernization.”47 In addition to these “official” objections to Turkish membership, it was feared that Turkey, with its large population, sizable agricultural sector, and relative lack of industrial development, would place considerable strain on the EU’s financial resources in general, and on CAP and the structural funds in particular. It was also feared that Turkey, a predominantly Muslim state with a distinctive language and culture, would make it more difficult for the “Christian club” (as the EU was sometimes called) to develop a common identity. Finally, it was thought that widening the EU to include Turkey would be at the expense of deepening political and economic union among the existing member states.48 Despite these objections, the EU did not definitively turn down the Turkish application for economic and geopolitical reasons. Economically, the European Council realized that the Union could benefit from the vast market of this populous state (the second most populous in the area). Geopolitically, it recognized that the inclusion of a well-functioning Turkish democracy in the EU could help the Turks spread the EU market-state model to their more authoritarian neighbors in the Caucasus and in Central Asia and the Middle East, as well as build a bridge between Europe and the Islamic world.49 Hence, the Union sought a close relationship with Turkey without granting it membership. For example, the EU and Turkey formed a customs union in 1995, but two years later, when Turkey expressed its desire to be included in the forthcoming accession talks with the central and eastern European states, the Union refused, citing Turkey’s persistently questionable human rights record, its recent military coup, and its relatively underdeveloped economy.50 Displeased by this outcome, Turkey threatened to block the reunification of Cyprus unless its application was considered along with the others. While this threat had little impact on the accession of Cyprus, it did keep Turkey’s demands in the spotlight, and in 1999, Turkey was granted accession candidate status. At the same time, the European Council expressed its reservations about Turkish membership, stating that although Turkey “had the basic features of a democratic system,” it “displayed serious shortcomings in terms of human rights and the protection of minorities.”51 As a result, a decision on Turkish accession was put off nearly five years.52 This delay did not deter Turkey’s pro-Islamic government, led by Tayyip Erdogan, which first came to power in 2003, from adopting liberal

O-11

9/23/08

4:11 PM

Page 277

ENLARGING EUROPE’S COMMONWEALTH

277

economic policies (it revalued the currency and advocated the privatizations of national companies like Turk Telecom), advocating social reforms (it instituted penal-code reforms in response to pressure from human rights advocates), and altering Turkey’s position on certain politically sensitive issues (it improved ties with Greece and moderated its stand on Cyprus).53 The work of Erdogen paid off in December 2004 when the European Council gave Turkey the go-ahead to start accession talks. There were some strings attached, however. In order for talks to begin, Turkey was required to sign and implement the Ankara Protocol, which stated that Turkey would not be admitted to the Union unless it recognized Cyprus, “normalized” relations with all member states (meaning Greece), and fully implemented its customs union with the EU. While Turkey signed the document, it has, as of this writing, refused to comply with some of its provisions. For example, the Turkish government has barred planes and ships from Greek Cyprus from entering Turkish air and seaports.54 Dismayed by Turkey’s failure to obey the protocol, the EU’s enlargement commissioner warned of a “train crash” in the Union’s relations with the Turks, and accession talks were put on hold. Moreover, Cyprus threatened to exercise its veto if and when membership talks resumed.55 It was not until the summer of 2006, when a compromise was reached between Cyprus and Turkey, that the first of thirty-five rounds of accession negotiations was held.56 Subsequent rounds of talks are expected to take approximately ten years, and, according to the EU, membership is not a guaranteed outcome. A large section of Turkey’s economy still depends on agriculture, it has a huge foreign debt, and its human rights record (especially with regard to freedom of expression and press) remains questionable.57 If talks are successfully completed, Turkey’s accession treaty must be approved by each of the twenty-five member states. Given that France and Austria have said they will hold referendums on whether to ratify Turkey’s treaty, there is a possibility that the voters in these two states (wary of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and related terrorist attacks) could block Turkish membership by voting no. Yet, if Turkey one day fully meets the Copenhagen criteria and joins the European Union, its membership will mark a major extension of Europe into a region still considered by many as non-European territory.

■ Summary To tell the story of the European Union’s enlargement is to tell the story of the spread of the west European market state defined by free market economies and democratic governance throughout the European continent. This chapter has shown how the founding six (re)committed themselves to

O-11

9/23/08

4:11 PM

278

Page 278

UNIFYING EUROPE

capitalism and democracy following World War II and used these two characteristics as membership criteria for any state that desired EU membership. For those member states that were already established liberal democracies and that had already embraced free market capitalism (i.e., Britain, Ireland, and Denmark in 1973 and Sweden, Finland, and Norway in 1995), membership negotiations went relatively quickly. However, for those states that had not yet adopted the EU’s market-state model (i.e., Greece, Portugal, and Spain of the early late 1970s and central and eastern European states of the 1990s), the accession process was more time consuming. However, the Mediterranean and central and eastern European states were eventually transformed into liberal democracies with free market economies and, with the accession of Cyprus and Malta, the market state was extended to southern and eastern Europe. As the EU turns its attention even farther east, toward states such as Turkey and Croatia, and as these states try to meet the Union’s membership criteria, it becomes more and more likely that the market state will one day span the continent from the Atlantic to the Urals.

■ Notes 1. “EU Entry Requires More Work from Balkan States,” Guardian Unlimited, May 16, 2006, www.guardian.co.uk, accessed May 26, 2006. 2. Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 5th edition (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 22–23. 3. At the same time, the founding six did not abandon all economic controls (e.g., state management and intervention). For details, see Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 42–43. 4. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 23. 5. Norway’s application for membership was also approved in the early 1970s, but its entry was blocked by Norwegian voters who rejected accession in a 1972 referendum. 6. For other reasons the British were averse to giving up sovereignty, see Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 25. 7. Specifically, EFTA removed customs duties and quantitative restrictions on industrial products. For more on why Britain was reluctant to join the EC, see Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 24–25. 8. As Nugent points out in The Government and Politics of the European Union (26), between 1958 and 1969, earnings in the UK increased around 38 percent, while they went up by approximately 75 percent in the EEC (later, EC). 9. By the early 1960s, the UK’s special relationship with the United States had weakened, its empire had all but disappeared, and it was no longer seen as a world power by the international community. 10. Quoted in Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 61. 11. Margaret Thatcher was prime minister from 1979 until 1992; she was succeeded by John Major, who held the post from 1992 until 1997. 12. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 26–27.

O-11

9/23/08

4:11 PM

Page 279

ENLARGING EUROPE’S COMMONWEALTH

279

13. Ibid. 14. Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 63. 15. While the Irish initially rejected a 2001 referendum on the Nice Treaty, their opposition was not attributed to “anti-EU sentiment.” The treaty was ultimately approved in a second referendum held the following year. 16. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 28. 17. Ibid., 29. 18. Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 100–103. 19. Ibid., 103. 20. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 29–30. 21. For more on the political and economic consequences of the first two enlargements, see John McCormick, Understanding the European Union, 3rd edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 67. 22. As Dinan points out in Ever Closer Union, there were many laws to adopt: “On the internal market alone, [there were] approximately 1,400 laws covering over 10,000 pages of text” (137). 23. Swiss voters rejected a referendum to ratify the EEA in 1992, effectively bringing an end to Switzerland’s bid for EC-EU membership. 24. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 30–31. 25. Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 139. 26. Ibid., 140. 27. The Norwegians initially rejected membership in 1972 (see note 5). In 1994 about 52 percent of voters rejected membership, while nearly 48 percent supported it. 28. Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 142. 29. For more on this aid, see Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 143. 30. McCormick, Understanding the European Union, 72–73. 31. Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 145. 32. Accession negotiations for the CEES came in two waves. Five states (i.e., the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, and Slovenia) were recommended for membership in 1998, while negotiations with Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Romania were not opened until 1999. 33. For more on the UN reunification plan for Cyprus, see Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 153. 34. For more information on the Maltese application, see Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 153–154. 35. For a complete discussion of the challenges posed by the 2004 enlargement, see Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 501–504. 36. Details on the 2004 enlargement and institutional reform may be found in Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 502–503. 37. The addition of eight CEES nearly doubled the size of the EU’s agricultural labor force and increased its agricultural area by about half. For more on agriculture in the CEES, see Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 152. 38. For more on cohesion policy and the 2004 enlargement, see Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 373–383. 39. Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 561–582. 40. A European border control was also proposed. See Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 575. 41. At the same time, other member states (e.g., the UK) welcomed the migrants. In 2006 more than 300,000 Polish workers settled in the UK and are said to have fueled Britain’s recent economic growth. For details, see Matt Keating,

O-11

9/23/08

4:11 PM

Page 280

280

UNIFYING EUROPE

“Cream of the Crop,” Guardian, May 20, 2006, www.guardian.co.uk, accessed May 26, 2006. 42. “EU Entry Requires More Work from Balkan States,” Guardian Unlimited, May 16, 2006, www.guardian.co.uk, accessed May 26, 2006. 43. Ibid. 44. For a concise summary of the EU’s involvement in the Yugoslav conflict, see Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 589–592. 45. Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 533. 46. James Kanter, “European Union Moves Ahead with Turkey and Croatia Talks,” New York Times, June 13, 2006. 47. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 497. 48. “Q&A: Turkey’s Entry Talks,” BBC News, October 4, 2005, www.bbc.co.uk, accessed June 18, 2006; Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 498. 49. “Head to Head: Turkey and the EU,” BBC News, September 30, 2005, www.bbc.co.uk, accessed June 18, 2006; “Q&A: Turkey’s Entry Talks,” BBC News. 50. Quoted in Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 156. 51. “Turkey: The Commission Recommends Opening Accession Negotiations,” www.europe.eu/scadplus/en, accessed June 18, 2006. 52. In 2002 the European Council concluded that it would not decide whether Turkey had fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria until its meeting in December 2004. 53. Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 157. 54. “Q&A: Turkey’s Entry Talks,” BBC News. 55. “Turkey Warned Hardline Tactics May Derail EU Talks,” Guardian, April 6, 2006, www.guardian.co.uk, accessed May 26, 2006. 56. Kanter, “European Union Moves Ahead with Turkey and Croatia Talks,” New York Times. 57. On human rights violations in Turkey, see, for example, “Scuffles in Turkey ‘Insult’ Trial,” BBC News, February 7, 2005, www.bbc.co.uk, accessed on June 18, 2006.

■ Suggested Reading Berger, Helge, and Thomas Moutos (eds.). Managing European Union Enlargement. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004. Ginsberg, Roy H. Demystifying the European Union: The Enduring Logic of Regional Integration. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007. Nugent, Neill. European Union Enlargement. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Poole, Peter A. The EU’s Eastern Enlargement. New York: Praeger Paperbacks, 2003. Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.). The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches. New York: Routledge, 2005. Verdun, Amy, and Osvaldo Croci (eds.). The European Union in the Wake of Eastern Enlargement. New York: Palgrave, 2005.

O-12

9/23/08

4:12 PM

Page 281

Part 4 The Future of European Politics WHAT DOES THE historical formation of the state and the European states system tell us about the future of European politics? Specifically, what does the past tell us about the future viability of Europe’s master institution, the nation-state? Will the nation-state continue to be Europe’s master institution, and, if so, will the number of states increase or decrease? Will the EU enlarge until it extends to the Urals? Does the spread of the nation-state across Europe mean that the continent has finally escaped from the Hobbesian world of perpetual war? Will the EU evolve from a commonwealth of sovereign nation-states into a new type of global superpower?

281

O-12

9/23/08

4:12 PM

Page 282

O-12

9/23/08

4:12 PM

Page 283

12 The Endurance— and Proliferation— of the European Nation-State

SOME SCHOLARS HAVE argued that the future existence of the nationstate as Europe’s master institution is being challenged from above by the evolution of the EU’s policies and institutions, especially those related to economic and monetary cooperation, which force member states to give up some of their sovereignty. Others have argued that the European nationstate is being challenged from below by regionalist and ethnic movements that undermine the coherence of the state by making demands ranging from the promotion of minority and regional cultures (language, literature, music) to independence.1 Both views see a future in which the nation-state is moribund as Europe’s master institution because its sovereignty is being “drained off” by the EU and because it is becoming “less useful as a mode of political organization”2 in the age of globalization. Yet other scholars argue, to the contrary, that the future will not bring the demise of the European nation-state because the EU poses little challenge to it, since a common European identity strong enough to counteract national identities has not yet developed.3 The EU does not possess the myths, memories, symbols, and common language necessary to create a feeling of Europeanness strong enough to override loyalties to nation-states. The absence of a European-wide identity, despite efforts by the EU to create one (with a common passport, currency, flag, and anthem) weakens its ability to legitimate its supranational institutions and policies and to challenge the nation-state as the institution with which the vast majority of Europeans continue to identify and to which they remain loyal.4

■ Proliferating Nation-States It should be clear from what we have written in earlier parts of this book that we believe the nation-state will continue to be Europe’s master institu283

O-12

9/23/08

4:12 PM

284

Page 284

THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN POLITICS

tion for a long time to come. Moreover, we believe that the nation-state is experiencing a resurgence and that the number of nation-states in the system will proliferate in the future. If we look back over the history of European state formation in terms of the number and size of the contending politicomilitary units existing in the geographical space of the continent, we can see three broad epochs of state formation. The first is from the collapse of the Roman Empire to about 1800 when the territorial size of European units of politico-military rule increased, with the number of these units decreasing as feudal entropy was overcome by centralizing monarchs who sought, for military purposes, to consolidate their realms and centralize control over them. The second epoch corresponds to the “long nineteenth century” (1798–1918) when nationalism became the driving force of European politics. During this epoch, nationalism simultaneously decreased the number of states in the west, by bringing about the unification of Germany and Italy, and increased the number of states in the east, by breaking the German, Austrian, and Ottoman empires apart into a plethora of new nation-states. The third epoch corresponds to the “short” twentieth century (1918–1991), during which the number of nation-states increased, owing to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the break-up of Yugoslavia, and the separation of Czechoslovakia. The disintegration of the Austrian Empire, the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Czech and Slovak separation, and the gaining of independence, in 2006, by Montenegro from Serbia brought the total number of European states to forty-nine.5 As can be seen from Table 12.1, the number of sovereign political entities in Europe has been steadily increasing since the beginning of the twentieth century. We expect that this trend toward more and smaller nation-states will continue in the future. Despite the fact that the congruence between nation and state is greater now than it has ever been in European history, and that more Europeans live inside ethnically homogeneous states than ever before, the “national question” has not been fully resolved. Only a few “states in modern Europe are ethnically or nationally homogeneous[;] . . . there are always different ethnic groups within the state, and often some of these groups identify themselves as being different ‘nations.’”6 Moreover, there are still millions of Europeans living outside of their own nation-state. The most numerous of these are the “some twenty-five million ethnic Russians [who] have been transformed, by the dramatic shrinkage of political space, from a privileged national group, culturally and politically at home throughout the Soviet Union, into minorities of precarious status, disputed membership, and uncertain identity in a host of incipient non-Russian nation-states.”7 In addition to Russians, many other ethnic groups are attached by for-

•

•

•

•

Before 1500 1600

•

•

1700

• • • • •

• •

•

• •

• • •

• •

• •

• •

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

• • • • • •

• •

•

•

•

• •

• • •

• •

1940

• •

1920

•

1900

•

1800

•

• • • • • •

• •

•

• • • • • •

• •

•

•

• •

•

•

• •

• •

1980

•

•

• •

• •

1960 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

1990 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

2000 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

2007

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • (continues)

2008

4:12 PM

Albania Andorra Armenia Austria Azerbaijan Belarus Belgium Bosnia-Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Georgia Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Latvia Liechtenstein

State

Independent European States, 1500–2008

9/23/08

Table 12.1

O-12 Page 285

285

• • •

• • • • • 11

• • •

•

• • 10

•

•

•

Before 1500 1600

• • 12

• • •

• •

• • 19

• • •

• •

•

•

• •

•

•

1800

•

1700

• • 23

• • •

• • • •

•

•

•

1900

• • 30

• • • •

• • • • • • •

•

•

1920

• • 31

• • • •

• • • • • • •

•

•

1940

• • 33

• • • •

• • • • • • •

• • 33

• • • •

• • • • • • •

•

•

• •

•

1980

•

1960

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 48

• • • • • •

1990

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 48

• • • • • •

2000 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 49

2007

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 49

2008

4:12 PM

Lithuania Luxembourg Macedonia Malta Moldova Monaco Montenegro Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Russia San Marino Serbia Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey Ukraine United Kingdom Vatican City Total

State

continued

9/23/08

Table 12.1

O-12 Page 286

286

O-12

9/23/08

4:12 PM

Page 287

CONCLUSION

287

mal citizenship to one state and by ethnicity to another. The most important of these are “the three million ethnic Hungarians in Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, and Serbia; the two million Albanians in Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia; the nearly two million Serbs living (before the war) in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina; the nearly one million Turks in Bulgaria; the Armenians in Azerbaijan, especially in Nagorno-Karabakh; . . . and the Poles in Lithuania and other Soviet successor states.”8 In addition to these recently created irredenta, many of the established states of western Europe contain within their borders ethnic groups that claim to be nations and have been agitating, and, in some cases, fighting for recognition as such and demanding autonomy or an independent state of their own. Thus, there is much “unfinished nationalism” remaining in Europe despite increasing alignment of states and nations over the last century by frontier revision (after World War I); extermination, deportation, flight, evacuation, and resettlement (during and after World War II); and ethnic cleansing (during the war in the former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1995).9 Unlike nineteenth- and twentieth-century nationalism, twenty-first century nationalism is not about stretching state borders to encompass peoples living outside their own state, however. Rather, it is “divisive” or “disruptive” nationalism, that is, nationalism that “seeks to limit or break the territorial integrity of the existing state in order to detach part of its territory”10 to form an independent state. (See Table 12.2.) Divisive ethnonationalist movements range from mild to extreme: In their mild form they shade off into cultural movements promoting minority culture in the form of language and literature, folk music, and so on. They assume a disruptive form (in the sense of demanding political change) when they seek some kinds of special rights for the minority (such as teaching in the minority language in schools) which can easily develop into demands for a degree of local self-government. Sometimes, perhaps in response to state repression or due to frustration with their inability to command sufficient support through democratic channels, such movements can produce an extreme wing which is prepared to use violence to secure total independence.11

Examples of extreme ethnonationalist groups that have used, or are presently using, violent methods to achieve independent states of their own are the Basques and Catalans in Spain, the Abkhazians and Ossetians in Georgia, Russians in Moldova (the self-proclaimed but unrecognized TransDniester Republic), Chechens in Russia, Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland, Albanians in Serbia (Kosovo), the Armenians in Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karaakh), and the Kurds in Turkey. Mild ethnonationalism is represented, for example, by the rise of movements in Wales, Scotland, and, increasingly, England that want to peacefully undo the Act of Union (1707) and break the United Kingdom into three separate sovereign states. The

O-12

9/23/08

4:12 PM

288 Table 12.2

Page 288

THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN POLITICS

European Ethnonationalism and Regionalism, 2008

Mild

Extreme

Recognition

More Recognition

Autonomy

Independence

Åland Islanders Aragonese Azores Cashoubs Cimbres Csángó Frisia Ingria Lipovians Livonians Ludians Madeira Mócheno Pomaks Prussians Ruthenians Seto Tartars Vepsia Võro Votes Yenish Yiddish

Aromanians Cornish Grishuns Ladins Lorraineans Low Germans Mirandians Moravians Occitanians Roms Scanias Sorbs Wallonians Walsers

Alsatians Aosta Valley Asturias Brittany Canary Islanders Crimea Friuli Galicia Karelia Man, Isle of Sami (Lapland) Sardinia Savoy Silesia Wales

Basques Catalonia Corsica Crimea Faroe Islanders Flemish Gagauzia Irish (Northern) Kosovo (Albanians) Kurds Scots South Tyrolese Trans-Dniestria

Source: www.eurominority.org.

Lega Nord (Northern League), Italy’s third largest party, blames Italy’s economic troubles on unification and wants a separate state called the Republic of Padania. Most ethnonationalist groups do not demand separate states, however. Rather, they work peacefully for greater group rights, self-government, and autonomy for the region of the state in which they live. In general, twentyfirst-century European states, having embraced and incorporated international human rights law into their constitutions, accommodate such demands by devolving governing power to the group’s region. The greatest accommodation to demands for regional self-government, short of independence, is federalism, which constitutionally divides a state’s sovereignty between the central government and a number of territorial units. Seven states in Europe (Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Germany, Russia, and Switzerland) are federations produced by the existence of strong historical loyalties of people to their constituent units (Switzerland’s cantons, certain of Germany’s Länder [e.g., Bavaria]) or the need to accommodate strong ethnonationalism (Russia’s autonomous

O-12

9/23/08

4:12 PM

Page 289

CONCLUSION

289

republics and Belgium’s Flemish and Wallonian communities), which needed to be accommodated politically in order to hold the state together. In the case of Belgium, however, federalism may not hold the state together much longer. The division of Belgium into two nation-states, Flanders and Wallonia, is a distinct possibility.12 Another way of accommodating ethnic group demands for special group rights and self-government is to divide the state into administrative regions between the national and local levels and devolve power and authority to them while maintaining the unitary nature of the state. In the European states where regionalization has progressed most, the regions have become quasi-independent, however. This is especially true in those states where the boundaries of the regions encompass an ethnic group that seeks independence, such as the Basque and Catalan regions of Spain, or have histories of having been independent in the past, such as Wales and Scotland in Britain and Corsica in France. Since these regions have their own legislatures, executives, civil services, official languages, courts, and taxing power, “the practical political autonomy of a Spanish . . . [region] such as Catalonia is probably far greater than the political autonomy of a typical land or canton in ‘federal’ Germany and Switzerland.”13 The trend in Europe toward more but smaller nation-states has been aided and abetted by the existence of the EU, membership in which offsets the economic vulnerability of small states. This means that any small European ethnic group that sees itself as a nation can realistically entertain the idea of becoming a state of its own without suffering the economic consequences. Moreover, the EU’s policy of providing economic development funds to member states on a regional basis has encouraged regionally situated ethnic groups to see the possibilities of independent statehood within the Union. In addition, there exists within the European Parliament a group called the European Free Alliance in coalition with the Greens that supports devolution in Europe.14 In the words of one observer, “The overarching continuity of the European institutions and, now, the single currency [the euro], have made the breaking-up of a nation-state within the Union a much less risky affair than it has ever been[;] . . . schism carries with it no fears of invasion, or ostracism, or financial chaos.”15 Should the “submerged” nations of Europe that have presently organized themselves politically realize their demands for states of their own, the number of nation-states on the continent could increase to about one hundred.16 Europe’s newest nation-state is Montenegro, which became independent by peaceful means from Serbia in 2006. The Serbian province of Kosovo, which Serbs consider their cultural and spiritual heartland, will become Europe’s newest nation-state if its desire to be independent of Serbia is realized. Containing two million Albanians, it has been under

O-12

9/23/08

4:12 PM

290

Page 290

THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN POLITICS

United Nations (UN) administration since 1999, when NATO ended Serbia’s war against the Albanian autonomist movement (the Kosovo Liberation Army) in the province. The UN has recommended that Kosovo be given the “main symbols and assets of a sovereign state: a flag, an army and the right to seek membership in international institutions,” and that it be granted “independence [supervised] by the international community.”17 On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared itself to be an independent state. Serbia has declared Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence illegal under international law. Serbs living in northern Kosovo, which, at this writing, still operates under Serbian national authority, are threatening to resist independence and remain part of Serbia. At the same time, the leaders of the Republika Srpska, the Serbian entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are threatening secession. Thus, these demands for independence, if they are realized, will produce two and possibly three new states.

■ Cooperating, Not Warring, States Although unfinished nationalism will continue to animate European politics for years to come, it is doubtful that the “open warfare between states, a constant feature of the European way of life for three hundred years . . . [that] reached apocalyptic levels between 1913 and 1945,” will break out.18 As of this writing, no European state is “willing to promote the national idea through force of arms, as the Germans had under Bismarck, or to promote egalité and fraternité with the sword, as Napoleon had attempted earlier in the [nineteenth] century, or to spread the blessings of liberal civilization through the cannon’s mouth, as the British had throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centures.” 19 Instead, European states will negotiate compromise, use financial inducement, and temper ambitions. In short, “Europe’s international lifestyle [is about] seeking to avoid war completely.”20 This does not mean that Europeans have completely emerged from the Hobbesian world of perpetual war of all against all for the Kantian world of perpetual peace. Europe will experience war in the future. However, European wars will not be the apocalyptic interstate wars that raged before 1945. Rather, they will be intrastate wars limited to the states in which an ethnic minority’s desire to have a state of its own is so overwhelming that it is willing to take up arms to achieve it, and the state’s desire to maintain its territorial integrity is so strong that it is willing to use armed force to prevent this from happening. Since the end of World War II, Europe has experienced several wars of this type: the Basque war against the Spanish state; the Abkhasian and Ossetian war against the Georgian state;21 the Russian (Trans-Dniester Republic) war against the Moldovan state; the Chechnyan

O-12

9/23/08

4:12 PM

Page 291

CONCLUSION

291

and Kumyk war against the Russian state; the Northern Irish war against the British state; the Albanian, Slovene, Croat, Bosnian, Montenegrin, and Macedonian wars against the Serb-dominated Yugoslavian state; and the Kurd war against the Turkish state. It appears that the epoch of nationalism that began with the French Revolution is not over in Europe. The Wilsonian “Europe of the Nations” is still in the making; therefore, the future of the European nation-state remains a possibility. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, European “states appear, once again, to matter quite a lot . . . [to remain] the core legitimate representative of its citizens, in a way that the transnational union of Europeans [the EU], for all its passports and parliaments, could not hope to match.”22 Europe remains what it has been since the dawn of the age of nationalism, a collection of “nations” seeking states, which are increasingly becoming similar in terms of their formal governing institutions and economic organization.

■ Complicating European and National Identity While the idea of the nation-state is as firmly entrenched on the continent as it has ever been, what constitutes the “nation” of the state has been increasingly complicated—particularly since the end of World War II—by extensive migrations of peoples within and into Europe, “especially from southern Europe (Italians, Portuguese, Yugoslavs, Spaniards) and from North Africa particularly to France, from the West Indies, India and Pakistan to Britain, from Indonesia to [the Netherlands] and from Turkey to Germany.”23 Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, a large number of people have migrated to western European states from eastern European states in order to escape regional war, political persecution, and economic hardship. These migratory flows have primarily been composed of guest workers, their families, individuals from former colonies, co-ethnics with citizenship rights (e.g., ethnic Germans from Poland and the former Soviet Union), and asylum seekers. Temporary labour migration and migration from former colonies predominated in the 1960s and early 1970s, family reunification in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and refugee flows came to the fore during the late 1980s and early 1990s, when increasing migration of co-ethnics and political refugees primarily from eastern Europe drove up the total number of resident aliens in the EU from non–EU member states.24

As we have seen, because European national identity has become increasingly based on ethnicity; because there is no tradition in most European states of receiving immigrants as permanent residents followed,

O-12

9/23/08

4:12 PM

292

Page 292

THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN POLITICS

eventually, by citizenship; and because European states, as a rule, do not permit secondary ethnic identities, many European states are experiencing an “upsurge in racism . . . manifested in rising support for far-right political parties and in a sharp increase in physical (often murderous) attacks upon refugees and immigrants.”25 Parties, such as the National Front in France, which openly advocates the expulsion of immigrants from France, and the Swiss People’s Party, which opposes the construction of mosques, have made considerable electoral gains since the 1990s. In Russia, the ultranationalist Slavic Union, United Russia, and the Movement Against Illegal Immigration seek to rid Russia of its chorny (blacks) and send non-Russian immigrants, especially those from the Caucasus, central Asia, and Mongolia, home.26 The more than eighteen million Muslims who live within EU member states as well as Norway and Switzerland constitute, in the minds of some Europeans, a dire threat to the Christian identity of Europe. Pope Benedict XVI, for example, has made two arguments in this regard. First, because Islam is a consummatory religion (i.e., it offers believers a total way of life), it cannot be simply accepted as just another denomination to be tolerated with others within pluralistic society. It must be kept out because it will demand that all areas of European life conform to its teachings.27 Second, he has argued that Europe has weakened itself against Islam by becoming more and more secular since the Enlightenment. In the pope’s view, Europe’s “loss of faith” and turn toward “godless rationality,” which has relegated Christianity to a European “subculture” and excluded “God from public awareness,” has weakened the continent spiritually and brought it to the brink of “catastrophic collapse.”28 In this vein, Benedict was angered by the failure of the EU to reference Europe’s Christian heritage at the festivities held in Berlin in March 2007 to mark the EU’s fiftieth birthday. He said to bishops gathered in Rome to celebrate the signing of the Rome treaties that the problem was the failure of Europe to regenerate itself, a reference to the historically low birthrate in many EU states, especially strongly Catholic ones. Further, he said Europe was “losing faith in its own future,” was taking “leave of history,” and was “on the path to oblivion.”29 That is, the high birthrates of Muslim immigrants and their steadfast adherence to Islam and the low birthrates and secularism of native Europeans were transforming Europe into “Eurabia,” a post-Christian cultural and political appendage of the Arab/Muslim world.30 For the pope, the re-Christianization of Europe and an increase in the birthrate are essential to its future ability to resist being Islamized and losing its Christian identity. In response to migration flows, EU member states have tightened entry requirements, restricted immigration from certain states, introduced repatriation schemes, and encouraged public recognition and tolerance of ethnic

O-12

9/23/08

4:12 PM

Page 293

CONCLUSION

293

difference. They have not responded with “affirmative action” programs, however. European multiculturalism, therefore, “dodges the crucial challenge of a civic redefinition of nationhood. In Europe . . . on the contrary, multi-culturalism reinforces the ethnic tilt of European nations, in pledging for tolerance towards members of other ethnic nations on their soil. European multi-culturalism thus keeps majority and minority tribes neatly separated.”31 Thus, the response of European states to immigration is to maintain their individual national identities and their European-ness by doing everything they can to stop immigration and by socializing the second and third generations of immigrants into the nation, ethnically defined. This approach will do nothing to reduce tensions between immigrants and “native ethnics,” however, until all immigrants and national minorities are fully acculturated to the dominant nationality. Given the impossibility of stopping all immigration and fully integrating national minorities, the challenge for Europe’s ethnically mixed states will be to mitigate tensions by reducing “the sense of entitlement to nation-statehood built on current [ethnic] understandings of the international system; and [by creating] . . . viable alternatives that maximize political autonomy while minimizing competition over limited resources[,] especially territory.”32

■ Finalizing the EU? It should be clear from what we have written in earlier parts of this book that we do not see the EU as a federal or even confederal state. For us, despite “widening” and “deepening,” the EU remains a commonwealth; that is, a voluntary association of self-governing, sovereign nation-states that cooperate among themselves for the economic and social betterment of each. But what of the future? What of the EU’s “finality,” its end point? Will the EU continue to deepen, that is, evolve into a true confederation or federation, even a United States of Europe? And will the EU continue to widen, that is, eventually include all European states? The question of deepening has divided the member states since the EU (as the EEC) was founded. Witness the running conflict between Britain and the continental member states over the nature of the EU since the former became a member state in 1973. The dispute about the EU’s nature has been exacerbated in recent years by its enlargement to the east. The original member states from western Europe, except for Britain, see the EU’s future primarily in political terms—that is, eventually evolving into a true confederation or federation, perhaps even a United States of Europe. The new member states from central and eastern Europe, especially Poland, see the EU primarily in econom-

O-12

9/23/08

4:12 PM

294

Page 294

THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN POLITICS

ic terms and prefer that it remain a loose alignment of states that cooperate for the economic betterment of all but do not give up their sovereignty.33 How the EU’s “existential crisis” will be solved remains to be seen. It could be that we are witnessing the creation of a new form of politico-military rule appropriate to the post-Hobbesian world of contemporary Europe, where resorting to war to resolve disputes between states is unthinkable. Europe’s warring states system has been replaced by a states system based on “continuous negotiation, tacit consent, shifting arrangements, overlapping competences, diffuse authorizations, and cooperative ventures that effectively obfuscates [sic] previous distinctions between levels of aggragation.”34 Thus, the EU can be seen as a unique, “cosmopolitan” form of politico-military rule that “belongs to the post-modern idea, rejecting [the view] that great centers of state power have to be concentrated at the level of a unified jurisdiction. The idea is rather that a set of rules and codes defined and enforced at a variety of supra- and multinational levels, largely displaced the need for superpowers.”35 In the words of one political scientist, the EU is “an unidentified political object” that will continue to “fly” as long as European nation-states benefit from membership and their leaders remain committed to keeping it in the air. Will the EU continue to widen until it stretches from the Atlantic to the Urals? To reach the Urals would require Russian membership. It is unlikely that Russia will become a member of the EU in the near future, however, for two reasons. First, Russia’s historical suspicion and distrust of the West, which we saw in Chapter 2 originated in antiquity, remains despite the end of the Cold War. Russia’s current leadership increasingly sees Russia as wedged between a still expanding European Union and a vastly empowered China. . . . To the West, just when the Russian elites felt they could at last rejoin Europe, where the country properly belonged, after the long Soviet isolation, they suddenly find themselves confronted with a scene in which they cannot be one European power among others (and the largest), as in the nineteenth century, but face a vast, quasi-unified continental bloc, from which they are formally—and, to all appearances, permanently— excluded. To the east, there is the rising giant of China.36

Therefore, despite the deeply rooted idea among Russia’s liberal elites that, in the words of Catherine the Great, “Russia is a European country” that needs to be returned to, in the words of Mikhail Gorbachev, “its common European home,” there is little likelihood that Russia’s extremely nationalist leader Vladimir Putin would seek EU membership. Second, even if Russia were to apply for membership, there is little likelihood that the EU would look positively upon its application because of Russia’s recent political drift toward traditional Russian absolutism. Reminiscent of the firm and even ruthless authority of Russian tsars and

O-12

9/23/08

4:12 PM

Page 295

CONCLUSION

295

Soviet leaders, Putin, arguing that Russia needs strong consistent leadership to deal with its internal problems and external threats to its security from “Islamic terrorists,” has taken steps to assure that he remains leader beyond the end of his second term of office, which expired in March 2008. In 2003, his political party, United Russia, which occupied 70 percent of the seats in the Duma, pushed through a bill that changed the electoral system from a mixed single-member and proportional system (see Chapter 7) to a pure proportional system and raised the threshold from 5 to 7 percent of the national vote. In addition, he had the Duma pass legislation that did away with the elections for the regional governors. They are now appointed by the president and confirmed by regional legislatures. The changes in the electoral law will assure that Putin’s United Party will have a majority in the Duma even more overwhelming than its present one, which would make Russia a quasi-one-party state.37 On December 3, 2007, Putin’s United Russia Party won 64.3 percent of the vote and garnered 315 of the Duma’s 450 seats. On December 14 he put forward Dmitry Medvedev, a first deputy prime minister, as his preferred candidate for the presidency. Several days later Medvedev nominated Putin to become Russia’s prime minister when the latter’s presidential term expired in March. Simultaneously, United Russia nominated Medvedev to be its candidate in the presidential election in March 2008.38 Medvedev was elected on March 2 with 70 percent of the vote. On May 8, the Duma approved his nomination of Putin as prime minister. Such maneuvers, and Putin’s increasingly autocratic rulership,39 are anathema to the West in general, and the EU in particular. Therefore, Russia would be refused EU membership even if it were to apply for accession. This means the EU will not reach the Urals any time soon.

■ A Global Backwater or Emerging Postmodern Superpower? Given that the motive force behind Europe’s rise to global preeminence— the extremely deadly military competition among its various forms of politico-military rule—has been replaced by permanent, institutionalized, peaceful conflict resolution, is Europe entering a long period of economic and political decline relative to other parts of the globe where the Hobbesian world of war and violence still obtain? As the gangster Harry Lime, in the film of Graham Greene’s novel The Third Man, says: “In Italy, for 30 years under the Borgias, they had warfare, terror, murder, bloodshed—they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci and the Renaissance. In Switzerland, they had brotherly love, 500 years of democracy and peace, and what did that produce? The cuckoo clock.”40

O-12

9/23/08

4:12 PM

296

Page 296

THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN POLITICS

Leaving aside Harry Lime’s ignorance about the Swiss (who had a strong military tradition but, like the Dutch and the Swedes, dropped out of Europe’s politico-military system in the 1800s), can it be said that the EU is becoming the global equivalent of Switzerland: prosperous and peaceful, but useful only as hotel-keepers and watch makers? We think not. We believe we are seeing the creation of a “new political form, a sort of Hegelian synthesis between [a] centralized continental government and a multinational state system,” 41 which is more appropriate for a world in which “globalization and interdependence have undermined old-style power politics and replaced it with a more complex and nuanced set of international relationships, in which ownership of the means of production is more important than the ownership of the means of destruction, and cooperation is more effective than coercion.”42 Once again, Europe is showing the world the way forward.

■ Notes 1. David F. J. Campbell, “European Nation-State Under Pressure: National Fragmentation or the Evolution of Supra-State Structures?” Cybernetics and Systems: An International Journal 25 (1994), 879–909. 2. B. Guy Peters, European Politics Reconsidered (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1991), 53–54. 3. John Hutchinson, “Enduring Nations and the Illusions of European Integration,” in Willfried Spohn and Anna Triandafyllidou (eds.), Europeanization, National Identities and Migration (London: Routledge, 2003), 36–51. 4. Ibid., 47. 5. Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Vatican City. 6. David Gowland, Basil O’Neill, and Alex Reid (eds.), The European Mosaic: Contemporary Politics, Economics, and Culture (London: Longman, 1995), 268–269. 7. Rogers Brubacker, “National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe,” Daedalus 124 (Spring 1995), 108. 8. Ibid. 9. E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 163. 10. Gowland, O’Neill, and Reid, The European Mosaic, 271. 11. Ibid. 12. See Ian Traynor, “Belgium? That’s Something That Doesn’t Exist. It’s Over,” Guardian Weekly, September 21, 2007, 3. See also Tony Judt, “Is There a Belgium?” New York Review of Books, December 2, 1999, 49–53.

O-12

9/23/08

4:12 PM

Page 297

CONCLUSION

297

13. Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver, and Peter Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe: Institutions, Parties, and Governments, 4th edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 171. 14. See www.eurominority.org. 15. Robert Cottrell, “Europe: So Far, It Flies,” New York Review of Books, April 8, 1999, 73. 16. Ibid. 17. Christophe Châtelot, “Kosovo Awaits Final Status,” Guardian Weekly, November 17–23, 2006, 19; and Nicholas Wood, “UN Envoy Urges That Kosovo Be Independent,” International Herald Tribune, March 23, 2007, 4. 18. Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2005), 750. 19. Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 8. 20. John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic, 1989), 19. 21. South Ossetia voted in favor of independence in 2006. The only state to recognize the Republic of South Ossetia is Russia, however. 22. Judt, Postwar, 797. 23. Gowland, O’Neill, and Reid, The European Mosaic, 282. 24. Rey Koslowski, “European Union Migration Regimes, Established and Emergent,” in Christian Joppke (ed.), Challenges to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 169. 25. Gowland, O’Neill, and Reid, The European Mosaic, 282. 26. Marie Jégo, “Shock Troops of Russia’s New Racism,” Guardian Weekly, October 6–12, 2006, 19. 27. Jane Kramer, “The Pope and Islam,” New Yorker, April 2, 2007, 58–67. 28. Russell Shorto, “Keeping the Faith,” New York Times Magazine, April 8, 2007, 38–63. 29. Ian Traynor, “Pope Says EU Is on the Path to Oblivion at the Age of 50,” Guardian Weekly, March 30–April 5, 2007, 6. 30. See Timothy Garton Ash, “Islam in Europe,” New York Review of Books, October 5, 2006, 32–35. “Eurabia” has been popularized by Bat Ye’or, Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2005). 31. Christian Joppke, “Immigration Challenges the Nation-State,” in Joppke (ed.), Challenge to the Nation-State, 27, emphasis added. 32. Chimène I. Keitner, “National Self-Determination in Historical Perspective: The Legacy of the French Revolution for Today’s Debates,” International Studies Review 2 (2001), 26. 33. Roger Cohen, “A Transformed Europe Celebrates Uncertainty,” International Herald Tribune, March 24–25, 2007, 1. 34. Philippe C. Schmitter, “The European Community as an Emergent and Novel Form of Political Domination,” Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Estudio/Working Paper, September 26, 1991, 17. 35. Robert Cooper, The Post-Modern State and the World Order (London: Demos, 1996), 47. 36. Perry Anderson, “Russia’s Managed Democracy,” London Review of Books, January 25, 2007. Reprinted in Harper’s Magazine (May 2007), 15–24. 37. Clifford J. Levy, “With Tight Grip on Ballot, Putin Is Forcing Foes Out of Parliament,” New York Times, October 14, 2007.

O-12

9/23/08

4:12 PM

298

Page 298

THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN POLITICS

38. Luke Harding, “Putin Picks His Successor,” New York Times, October 14, 2007, 5. 39. Paul Starobin, “The Accidental Autocrat,” The Atlantic Monthly (March 2005), 82–92. 40. Quoted in Timothy Garton Ash, “Paying a Price for Diversity,” Guardian Weekly, June 2–8, 2006, 6 41. David P. Calleo, Rethinking Europe’s Future (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 341. 42. John McCormick, The European Superpower (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 2.

■ Suggested Reading Calleo, David P. Rethinking Europe’s Future. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. Cooper, Robert. The Post-Modern State and the World Order. London: Demos, 1996. Eckstein, Harry, et al. (eds.). Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia? Explorations in State-Society Relations. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998. Gowland, David, Basil O’Neill, and Alex Reid (eds.). The European Mosaic: Contemporary Politics, Economics, and Culture. London: Longman, 1995. Huskey, Eugene. Presidential Power in Russia. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999. Joppke, Christian (ed.). Challenges to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Kagan, Robert. Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003. McCormick, John. The European Superpower. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Spohn, Willfried, and Anna Traindafyllidou (eds.). Europeanization, National Identities and Migration. London: Routledge, 2003.

O-13ChrBib

9/23/08

4:13 PM

Page 299

Chronology

753 BC 509 BC 31 BC 117 AD 285

311 312 313

330

375 380

410 455 476

500–600

City of Rome founded. Roman monarchy becomes a republic. Roman republic becomes an empire. Roman Empire attains its greatest extent under the Emperor Hadrian. Roman Empire divided by the Emperor Diocletian into eastern and western portions. Tetarchy established. Christians persecuted. Edict of toleration for all religions issued by the Emperor Galerius. Constantine wins battle of Milvian Bridge; claims victory owed to the god of the Christians. Emperor Constantine grants freedom of worship to Christians and chooses the Christian god to be one of the protectors of Rome. Emperor Constantine builds new capital city for the empire at Byzantium on the Bosphorus. Name changed from Nova Roma to Constantinople in honor of its founder. Roman Empire attacked and invaded by Germanic tribal peoples. Emperor Theodosius forbids pagan worship. The following year, he declares Christianity to be the official religion of Rome. City of Rome sacked by the Visigothic chieftain Alarac. City of Rome sacked by Vandals. German chieftain Odoacer deposes last emperor in the western portion of the Roman Empire and rules the Italian peninsula as a king. Germanic chieftains establish kingdoms within the western empire. 299

O-13ChrBib

9/23/08

4:13 PM

300

732

800

843

911 955 1066 1072 1100 1100–1200

1204 1337–1453 1453 1472

1500 1545 1555

1618–1648

1648

1789–1792

Page 300

CHRONOLOGY

Muslim invasion of Europe defeated by Charles Martel at the Battle of Poitiers on the Loire River at Tours (present-day France). Charlemagne attempts to revive the western Roman Empire by having himself crowned emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. Charlemagne’s Holy Roman Empire portioned into three kingdoms: West Francia, East Francia, and the Middle Kingdom. Invading Vikings granted land on both sides of the Seine River on which to settle, thus ending their invasion. Magyar (Hungarian) invaders from the steppes of Asia defeated by Otto the Great at the Battle of Lechfield. Anglo-Saxon kingdoms in England conquered by the Normans. Normans conquer southern Italian peninsula. Christian reconquest of Iberian Peninsula begins. Crusaders invade and establish Christian feudal states in Syria and Palestine: Kingdom of Jerusalem, Principality of Antioch, and the counties of Edessa and Tripoli. Crusaders attack and conquer Constantinople, the capital of the eastern (Byzantine) Roman Empire. Hundred Years’ War between English and French kings. Constantinople attacked and conquered by the Turkish sultan Muhammad II. Ottoman Empire established. Moscow comes to regard itself as the “Third Rome” with the leadership of Orthodox Christianity shifting to the emerging Russian Empire. Protestant revolt against the Catholic Church begins. Catholic kings led by Habsburg emperor Charles V make war on Protestant kings of the Schmalkaldic League. Peace of Augsburg arranged between Catholic and Protestant kings, which recognizes Lutheranism as one of the two forms of Christianity permitted within the Habsburg Empire. Religious civil war rages between Catholic and Protestant monarchs in western Europe, known to history as the Thirty Years’ War. Peace of Westphalia signed at Münster and Osnabrück (Germany) ending the Thirty Years’ War and establishing the sovereign right of each monarchy to govern itself without outside interference from other monarchs or the pope. French liberals overthrow the absolute monarch Louis XVI; they declare France to be a republic.

O-13ChrBib

9/23/08

4:13 PM

Page 301

CHRONOLOGY

1792–1799 1792 1799 1800 1815

1830

1848

1861 1871 1914

1917

1918

1919

1920 1923

1925–1930

1933

301

French liberals defend the French Revolution by sending French armies against surrounding monarchies. Battle of Valmy shows superiority of French citizen soldiers over Prussian professionals. Napoléon Bonaparte seizes control of the French state and consolidates power by appointing himself first consul. Napoleonic wars begin. Napoléon defeated at Waterloo (Belgium), captured, and banished to St. Helena. Congress of Vienna reestablishes absolute monarchical states. Uprising in Paris of republicans establishes a constitutional monarchy in France. Liberal nationalists challenge absolute monarchs across western Europe but do not succeed except in a few realms. Republican uprising in the Kingdom of Naples spreads to other monarchies of western Europe, this time with greater success than in 1830. Italian nationalists unify Italy as a constitutional monarchy. Germany unified as an imperial state by Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to Austrian imperial throne, assassinated by a young Bosnian Serb, Gavrilo Princip, precipitating World War I. Food riots and mutinies within the Russian imperial army and navy force abdication of the tsar; Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Lenin, seize power. Austrian, Ottoman, and German empires collapse. Russia signs peace treaty with Germany. Armistice signed ending World War I. Peace conference ending World War I held at Versailles, France. Territorial changes made pursuant to the principle of self-determination of peoples creates the following states as democratic republics: Austria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Yugoslavia. Pan-Europa movement founded by Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. Treaty of Lausanne recognizes the Turks as a distinct nationality with an unqualified right to Anatolia and the city of Constantinople, renamed Istanbul. Extreme nationalists seeking to make nation and state boundaries align as completely as possible appear in states created by the Versailles settlement. Nazi Party leader Adolf Hitler appointed chancellor of

O-13ChrBib

9/23/08

302

1938 1939

1944 1945

1946

1948

1949

1950

1951

1957

1960

4:13 PM

Page 302

CHRONOLOGY

Germany and begins to unify all of Europe’s Germans into a single state, the Third Reich. German-Austrian Anshluss (Union) effected by Hitler. Austria incorporated into the Third Reich. Hitler forces the Czechoslovakian government to allow Germany to annex the Sudetenland Germans and invades Poland in order to incorporate the German populations of the Free City of Danzig and East Prussia into the Third Reich. Britain and France declare war on Germany, and World War II begins. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg form a customs union known to history as Benelux. Axis (Germany, Italy, Japan) defeated. “Big Three” Allies (United States, Britain, and Russia) meet in Yalta (in the Crimea) and Potsdam, near Berlin, to decide the configuration of Europe after the end of World War II. Germany truncated into four zones (American, British, French, and Russian) of occupation. Winston Churchill calls for a “United States of Europe” in a speech given in Zürich. Cold War begins as Europe increasingly divides into an Eastern sphere of influence dominated by the USSR and a Western sphere dominated by the United States. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation established to administer US Marshall Plan aid and coordinate rebuilding projects in the Western sphere of influence. Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States create the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an alliance designed to safeguard the freedom and security of the member states. French foreign minister Robert Schuman puts forward a plan to integrate the French and West German coal and steel industries. West Germany and France as well as Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg agree to create the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands sign the Treaties of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom). Austria, Britain, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland sign the Stockholm Convention establishing the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).

O-13ChrBib

9/23/08

4:13 PM

Page 303

CHRONOLOGY

1961

1967

1968 (May)

1973

1974 1979 1980

1981

1984

1985

1986

1987

1989

303

Concrete barrier, known as the Berlin Wall, constructed by East Germany to make the border between East and West Berlin impossible to cross except through designated “gates,” such as Checkpoint Charlie. Britain’s application for membership in the EEC blocked by French president Charles de Gaulle. The EEC becomes the EC. Students and workers in France take to the streets of Paris to protest against the negative aspects of the welfare state: urban sprawl, traffic jams, degradation of the environment, rigid hierarchies of corporations, overcrowding of universities, and the arrogance of governmental bureaucrats. European Community (EC) establishes a currency exchange rate mechanism (ERM) known as the snake in the tunnel and adds new member states Britain, Ireland, and Denmark. European Council created to institutionalize the meetings of the leaders of European Community member states. European Community establishes a basket currency known as the European Currency Unit (ECU). An independent trade union known to history as Solidarity appears in Poland and demands recognition from the communist government. Greece joins the European Community. General Wojciech Jaruzelski takes over government of Poland to prevent invasion by the USSR. Mikhail Gorbachev elected secretary-general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and begins reforms known to history as perestroika and glasnost. The Schengen Accords brings together 13 EU member states, plus Norway and Iceland, to end border controls among signatories, and to strengthen controls at borders with nonsignatories, for the purpose of combating crime and illegal immigration. Spain and Portugal join the European Community. Single European Act (SEA) eliminates borders within the EC, permitting the free movement of goods, persons, and capital among member states. Mikhail Gorbachev meets US president Ronald Reagan in Reykjavík, Iceland, to negotiate the end of the Cold War by reducing the size of nuclear weapon arsenals. Berlin Wall breached by enthusiastic crowd of East Berliners while border guards stand aside. Hungary allows “tourists” from East Germany to enter Hungary in order to seek asylum

O-13ChrBib

9/23/08

304

1990

1991

1992

1993

1995 1997

2000

2002 2004

2006 2007 2008

4:13 PM

Page 304

CHRONOLOGY

in the West at the West German embassy. Noncommunist government elected in Poland. First noncommunist governments since 1945 elected in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Violent uprising in Romania results in the death of longtime communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu. East Germany disbanded and absorbed into West Germany. Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) and nine republics of the USSR declare their independence from the Soviet Union. Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus announce the end of the USSR and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which, in addition to the above three states, includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and, as an associate member, Turkmenistan. Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht, the Netherlands. Slovakia declares its independence from the union of Czechoslovakia. Maastricht Treaty on European Union ratified, and the European Community (EC) officially becomes the European Union (EU). Austria, Finland, and Sweden join the European Union. Amsterdam Treaty makes adjustments in European Union institutions and policies in preparation for enlargement to the east. The treaty also allows member states to participate in selected policy domains at different “speeds.” Nice Treaty makes additional adjustments in European Union institutions: votes in the Council of Ministers reweighted, composition of the Commission adjusted, and qualified majority voting (QMV) extended. The euro becomes legal tender across the European Union. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia join the European Union. Montenegro votes for independence from Serbia. Bulgaria and Romania join the European Union, which celebrates its fiftieth birthday. Kosovo declares its independence from Serbia. In response to Georgia’s attempt to return the self-proclaimed independence of the regions of Abkhasia and South Ossetia to Georgian control, Russia invades Georgia.

O-13ChrBib

9/23/08

4:13 PM

Page 305

Bibliography

Almond, Gabriel A., Russell J. Dalton, and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. (eds.). European Politics Today, 2nd edition. New York: Longman, 2002. Anderson, Perry. Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism. London: New Left, 1974. ———. “Russia’s Managed Democracy,” London Review of Books, January 25, 2007. Reprinted in Harper’s Magazine (May 2007), 15–24. Ash, Timothy Garton. “Islam in Europe,” New York Review of Books, October 5, 2006. ———. “Paying a Price for Diversity,” Guardian Weekly, June 2–8, 2006. Bale, Tim. European Politics: A Comparative Introduction. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Balmer, Crispian. “Berlusconi Chides Critics as Italy Takes EU,” Washington Post, July 2, 2003. Barker, Ernest. The Development of Public Services in Western Europe, 1660–1930. Hamden, CT: Archon, 1966. Bartlett, Robert. The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change, 950–1350. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. Beach, Derek. The Dynamics of European Integration: Why and When EU Institutions Matter. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Bendix, Reinhard. Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978. Berger, Helge, and Thomas Moutos (eds.). Managing European Union Enlargement. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004. Bernardi, Aurelio. “The Economic Problems of the Roman Empire,” in Carlo M. Cipolla (ed.), The Economic Decline of Empires. London: Methuen, 1970. Black, C. E., and E. C. Helmreich. Twentieth Century Europe: A History, 4th edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992. Bobbio, Norberto. Liberalism and Democracy. London: Verso, 1990. Bobbitt, Philip. The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History. New York: Anchor, 2003. Bolger, Andrew, and Fiona Harvey. “Cod and Herring Catches to Be Cut Next Year,” Financial Times, December 23, 2005. Bowler, Shaun, David M. Farrell, and Richard W. Katz. Party Cohesion, Party Discipline and the Organization of Parliaments. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1999.

305

O-13ChrBib

9/23/08

306

4:13 PM

Page 306

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bramsted, E. K., and K. J. Melhuish (eds.). Western Liberalism. London: Longman, 1978. Brown, Peter. The Rise of Western Christendom. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996. Brubaker, Rogers. “National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe,” Daedalus 124 (Spring 1995). ———. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Buckley, Neil. “Committee of ‘Experts’ to Tackle Fraud,” Financial Times, January 15, 1999. Budge, Ian, et al. The Politics of the New Europe: Atlantic to the Urals. London: Longman, 1997. Burke, Edmund. Reflections on the Revolution in France. London: Penguin, 1986. Burns, Jimmy, and Sarah Laitner. “Clarke Secures EU Backing for Counter-terror Data Retention Plan,” Financial Times, December 15, 2005. Burns, Jimmy, and Bob Sherwood. “Ministers Offer to Pay Operators to Retain Phone Data,” Financial Times, November 2, 2005. Calleo, David P. Rethinking Europe’s Future. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. Campbell, David F. J. “European Nation-State Under Pressure: National Fragmentation or the Evolution of Supra-State Structures?” Cybernetics and Systems: An International Journal 25 (1994), 879–909. Cerney, Philip G. The Changing Architecture of Politics: Structure, Agency, and the Future of the State. London: Sage, 1990. Chadwick, Owen. The Reformation. New York: Penguin, 1972. Châtelot, Christophe. “Kosovo Awaits Final Status,” Guardian Weekly, November 17–23, 2006. Cohen, Benjamin J. The Question of Imperialism. New York: Basic, 1973. Cohen, Roger. “A Transformed Europe Celebrates Uncertainty,” International Herald Tribune, March 24–25, 2007. Contamine, Philippe. War in the Middle Ages. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980. Cooper, Robert. The Post-Modern State and the World Order. London: Demos, 1996. Cottrell, Robert. “Europe: So Far, It Flies,” New York Review of Books, April 8, 1999. Curtis, Michael (ed.). Western European Government and Politics. London: Longman, 2003. D’Entrèves, Alexander Passerin. The Notion of the State. Oxford: Clarendon, 1967. Dalton, Russell J. Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 4th edition. Washington, DC: CQ, 2006. Dalton, Russell J., and Manfred Kurechler (eds.). Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Daltrop, Anne. Politics and the European Community, 2nd edition. London: Longman, 1986. Davies, Norman. Europe: A History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Dawisha, Karen, and Bruce Parrott (eds.). The End of Empire: The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1997. Dawson, Christopher. Religion and the Rise of Western Culture. Garden City, NY: Image, 1958. Deutsch, Karl. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957.

O-13ChrBib

9/23/08

4:13 PM

Page 307

BIBLIOGRAPHY

307

Dinan, Desmond. Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005. Dinan, Desmond (ed.). Origins and Evolution of the EU. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Doring, Herbert (ed.). Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. New York: St. Martin’s, 1995. Dorn, Walter L. Competing for Empire, 1740–1763. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1940. Dörries, Hermann. Constantine the Great, trans. by Roland H. Bainton. New York: Harper Torch, 1972. Downing, Brian M. The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992. Dragnich, Alex N., and Jorgan S. Rasmussen. Major European Governments, 7th edition. Chicago: Dorsey, 1986. Duby, Georges. The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined, trans. by Arthur Goldhammer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978. Durant, Will. Caesar and Christ: A History of Roman Civilization and of Christianity from Their Beginnings to AD 325. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1944. Duverger, Maurice. “A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government,” European Journal of Political Research 8 (1980). ———. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, trans. by Barbara North and Robert North. New York: John Wiley, 1963. Easton, Stewart C. The Western Heritage: From the Earliest Times to the Present. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970. Eckstein, Harry, et al. (eds.). Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia? Explorations in State-Society Relations. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998. Elgström, Ole (ed.). European Union Council Presidencies: A Comparative Perspective. New York: Routledge, 2003. Epstein, Leon D. Political Parties in Western Democracies. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1980. Ertman, Thomas. Birth of Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. “EU Entry Requires More Work from Balkan States,” Guardian Unlimited, May 16, 2006, www.guardian.co.uk. “European Council Declaration on Iraq,” Presidency Conclusions: Copenhagen European Council, December 12 and 13, 2002, www.consilium.europa.eu. “Europe’s Censure Motion,” Financial Times, January 15, 1999. Finer, Samuel E. “State and Nation-Building in Europe: The Role of the Military,” in Charles Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975. Finley, M. I. “Manpower and the Fall of Rome,” in Carlo M. Cipolla (ed.), The Economic Decline of Empires. London: Methuen & Co., 1970. Ferguson, Niall. The War of the World: Twentieth Century Conflict and the Descent of the West. New York: Penguin, 2006. Franklin, Mark. Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies Since 1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver, and Peter Mair. Representative Government in

O-13ChrBib

9/23/08

308

4:13 PM

Page 308

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Modern Europe: Institutions, Parties, and Governments, 4th edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006. Geis, Joseph, and Frances Geis. Life in a Medieval Castle. New York: Harper & Row, 1979. Giddens, Anthony. The Nation-State and Violence. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. Ginsberg, Roy H. Demystifying the European Union: The Enduring Logic of Regional Integration. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007. Gough, Ian. The Political Economy of the Welfare State. London: Macmillan, 1978. Gowland, David, Basil O’Neill, and Alex Reid (eds.). The European Mosaic: Contemporary Politics, Economics and Culture. London: Longman, 1995. Greenfeld, Liah. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992. Haas, Ernst B. Nationalism, Liberalism, and Progress: The Rise and Decline of Nationalism, vol. 1. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997. ———. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950–1957. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958. ———. The Uniting of Europe’s Twentieth Century. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999. Hall, John A., and G. John Ikenberry. The State. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. Hall, Rodney Bruce. National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Systems. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. Hancock, Donald M., et al. Politics in Europe, 3rd edition. New York/London: Chatham House, 2003. Harding, Luke. “Putin Picks His Successor,” Guardian Weekly, December 14, 2007. Hay, Denys. Europe: The Emergence of an Idea. New York: Harper & Row, 1957. “Head to Head: Turkey and the EU,” BBC News, September 30, 2005, www.bbc.co.uk. Heer, Friedrich. The Medieval World: Europe 1100–1350, trans. by Janet Sondheimer. New York: New American Library, 1961. Hix, Simon. The Political System of the EU, 2nd edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Hix, Simon, Abdul Noury, and Gérard Roland. Democratic Politics in the European Parliament. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Hobsbawm, E. J. Nations and Nationalism Since 1870: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Holsti, K. J. Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Holtman, Robert E. The Napoleonic Revolution. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1967. Hopkins, Andrea. Knights. New York: Artabras, 1990. Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. Huskey, Eugene. Presidential Power in Russia. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999. Imig, Doug, and Sidney Tarrow (eds.). Contentious Europeans: Protest and Politics in an Emerging Polity. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. Inglehart, Ronald. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990. Isaak, Robert. European Politics: Political Economy and Policy Making in Western Democracies. New York: St. Martin’s, 1980.

O-13ChrBib

9/23/08

4:13 PM

Page 309

BIBLIOGRAPHY

309

Janos, Andrew C. “The Politics of Backwardness in Continental Europe, 1780–1945,” World Politics 51 (April 1989), 325–358. Jégo, Marie. “Shock Troops of Russia’s New Racism,” Guardian Weekly, October 6–12, 2006. Jones, Eric. The European Miracle: Environment, Economics and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia, 3rd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Jones, G. W. (ed.). ”West European Prime Ministers,” West European Politics 14, no. 2 (April 1991). Joppke, Christian (ed.). Challenges to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Judge, David. The Parliamentary State. London: Sage, 1993. Judt, Tony. “Is There a Belgium?” New York Review of Books, December 2, 1999, 49–53. ———. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. New York: Penguin, 2005. Kagan, Robert. Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003. Kaiser, David. Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990. Kanter, James. “European Union Moves Ahead with Turkey and Croatia Talks,” New York Times, June 13, 2006. Katz, Richard S., and Peter Mair. “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy,” Party Politics 1 (1995). Katz, Soloman. The Decline of Rome and the Rise of Medieval Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1955. Keating, Matt. “Cream of the Crop,” Guardian, May 20, 2006, www.guardian.co.uk. Keating, Michael. The Politics of Modern Europe: The State and Political Authority in the Major Democracies. Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar, 1993. Keegan, John. A History of Warfare. New York: Vintage, 1993. Keen, Maurice. Medieval Warfare: A History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Keitner, Chimène I. “National Self-Determination in Historical Perspective: The Legacy of the French Revolution for Today’s Debates,” International Studies Review 2 (2001). Kelly, Jack. Gunpowder, Alchemy, Bombards and Pyrotechnics: The History of the Explosive That Changed the World. New York: Basic, 2004. Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500–2000. New York: Random House, 1987. Kesselman, Mark, et al. (eds.). European Politics in Transition, 5th edition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006. Kitschelt, Herbert. The Transformation of European Social Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Kohn, Hans. The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background. New York: Macmillan, 1944. Kopstein, Jeffrey, and David A. Reilly. “Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World,” World Politics 53 (October 2000), 1–37. Kousis, Maria, and Charles Tilly. Economic and Political Contention in Comparative Perspective. Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2005. Kovalev, Sergei. “Why Putin Wins,” New York Review of Books, November 22, 2007, 64–66.

O-13ChrBib

9/23/08

310

4:13 PM

Page 310

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Koven, Seth, and Sonya Michels (eds.). Mothers of a New World: Materialistic Politics and the Origin of Welfare States. London: Routledge, 1993. Kramer, Jane. “The Pope and Islam,” New Yorker, April 2, 2007, 58–67. Laitner, Sarah. “EU Lawmakers to Permit More TV Filming in Drive to Improve Openness,” Financial Times, December 27, 2005. Lane, Jan-Eric, and Svante O. Errson. European Politics: An Introduction. London: Sage, 1996. Langer, William L. (ed.). Western Civilization: Paleolithic Man to the Emergence of European Powers. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. ———. Western Civilization: The Struggle for Empire to Europe in the Modern World. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. La Palombara, Joseph, and Myron Weiner (eds.). Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966. Laver, Michael, and Norman Schofield. Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Laver, Michael, Norman Schofield, and Kenneth A. Shepsle (eds.). Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Le Goff, Jacques. The Birth of Europe, trans. by Janet Lloyd. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2005. Levy, Clifford, “With Tight Grip on Ballot, Putin Is Forcing Foes Out of Parliament,” New York Times, October 14, 2007. Lichtheim, George. Europe in the Twentieth Century. New York: Praeger, 1972. Lipset, Seymour M., and Stein Rokkan. Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives. New York: Free Press, 1967. Locke, John. A Letter Concerning Toleration, intro. by Patrick Romanell. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955. Lousse, Emile. “Absolutism,” in Heinz Lubasz (ed.), The Development of the Modern State. New York: Macmillan, 1964. Lowi, Theodore J., Benjamin Ginsberg, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. American Government: Freedom and Power, brief 2006 edition. New York: W. W. Norton, 2006. Macartney, C. A. National States and National Minorities. New York: Russell & Russell, 1934. MacDonogh, Gils. After the Reich: The Brutal History of Allied Occupation. New York: Basic, 2007. Macpherson, C. B. The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. Macridis, Roy C. (ed.) Modern Political Systems: Europe. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990. Mazower, Mark. Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999. McAdam, Doug, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald. Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. McCormick, John. The European Superpower. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. ———. Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction, 3rd edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. McNeill, William H. The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963. Meinecke, Frederich. Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d’Etat and Its Place in

O-13ChrBib

9/23/08

4:13 PM

Page 311

BIBLIOGRAPHY

311

Modern History, trans. by Douglas Scott. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1962. Meller, Paul. “European Official Challenges 6 Nations’ Gambling Rules,” New York Times, March 14, 2006. Mény, Yves, and Andrew Knapp. Government and Politics in Western Europe. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. ———. Government and Politics in Western Europe: Britain, France, Italy, Germany, 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Milward, Alan S. The European Rescue of the National-State. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992. Minder, Raphael. “Brussels Tells Most of Europe, ‘It Won’t Wash,’” Financial Times, April 6, 2006. ———. “Celebrities Seek to Cash In on Protest Vote,” Financial Times, June 12, 2004. ———. “Europe’s Parliament Strives to Keep Points Lead in Sparring with Barroso,” Financial Times, November 18, 2004. Minder, Raphael, and Sarah Laitner. “Brussels in Legal Move on Energy Markets,” Financial Times, April 2, 2006. Minder, Raphael, and George Parker. “Parliament Gives a Thumbs Up for Barroso’s New Team,” Financial Times, November 19, 2004. Mitrany, David. A Working Peace System. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943. Moravcsik, Andrew. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998. ———. “In Defense of the Democratic Deficit: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2002), 603–624. ———. “A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation,” International Organization 53 (Spring 1999). Moravcsik, Andrew, and Kalypso Nicolaïdis. “Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions,” Journal of Common Market Studies 37 (March 1999). Morris, Christopher W. An Essay on the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Mueller, John. Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War. New York: Basic, 1989. Müller, Wolfgang C., and Vincent Wright (eds.). The State in Western Europe: Retreat or Redefinition? Newbury Park, CA: Frank Cass, 1994. Murphy, Alexander B. “The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations,” in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds.), State Sovereignty as Social Construct. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Norris, Pippa. Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Norton, Philip (ed.). “Parliaments in Western Europe,” West European Politics 13, no. 3 (July 1990). Nugent, Neill. European Union Enlargement. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. ———. The Government and Politics of the European Union, 5th edition. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003. Offe, Claus. Contradictions of the Welfare State. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984. Olson, David M., and Philip Norton (eds.). The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe. London: Frank Cass, 1996.

O-13ChrBib

9/23/08

312

4:13 PM

Page 312

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Opello, Walter C., Jr. “Early Competitors of the State: The Military Religious Orders.” Paper presented at the 44th annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Portland, OR, February 25–March 1, 2003. “Open Day–Open Doors,” www.europarl.eu.int/new/public. Ostrogorsky, George. History of the Byzantine State, revised edition, trans. by Joan Hussey. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1969. Painter, Sidney. The Rise of Feudal Monarchies. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1951. Panebianco, Angelo. Political Parties: Organization and Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Parker, Geoffrey. The Military Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Parker, George. “‘Construction Site’ Littered with Barriers,” Financial Times, February 17, 2006. ———. “France Dubious About UK Plan to Televise EU Lawmakers,” Financial Times, December 5, 2005. ———. “Leaders to Leave EU Draft Treaty on Ice,” Financial Times, April 28, 2006. Peters, B. Guy. European Politics Reconsidered. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1991. Peterson, John, and Michael Shackelton (eds.). The Institutions of the European Union, 2nd edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Pfaff, William. The Wrath of Nations: Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993. Pierson, Christopher. Beyond the Welfare State? University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991. Poggi, Gianfranco. The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978. Poole, Peter A. The EU’s Eastern Enlargement. New York: Praeger Paperbacks, 2003. Porter, Bruce D. War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics. New York: Free Press, 1994. Putnam, Robert. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000. “Q&A: Turkey’s Entry Talks,” BBC News, October 4, 2005, www.bbc.co.uk. “Resignations in Brussels,” Financial Times, March 16, 1999. Richardson, Jeremy (ed.). Pressure Groups. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Richburg, Keith. “Berlusconi Voices Regret for Remark About Germans,” Washington Post, July 4, 2003. Roberts, Geoffrey K., and Patricia Hogwood. European Politics Today. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997. Roberts, Geoffrey, and Jill Lovely. West European Politics Today. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1984. Roberts, J. M. A History of Europe. New York: Allen Lane, 1997. ———. History of the World. New York: Pelican, 1986. Rogers, Clifford J. (ed.). The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995. Rosamond, Ben. Theories of European Integration. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000. Rose, Richard. “On the Priorities of Government: A Developmental Analysis of Public Policies,” European Journal of Political Research 4 (1976), 247–289.

O-13ChrBib

9/23/08

4:13 PM

Page 313

BIBLIOGRAPHY

313

Rosecrance, Richard. The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World. New York: Basic, 1986. Ross, George. Jacques Delors and European Integration. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Rothman, Stanley. European Politics and Society. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970. Rowen, Herbert H. The King’s State: Proprietary Dynasticism in Early Modern France. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1980. Russell, Jeffrey Burton. Medieval Civilization. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968. Sakwa, Richard, and Anne Stevens. Contemporary Europe, 2nd edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Sandholtz, Wayne. High Tech Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992. Sartori, Giovanni. Comparative Constitutional Engineering. New York: New York University Press, 1997. Sbragia, Alberta (ed.). Europolitics, Institutions, and Policy Making in the New European Community. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992. Schapiro, J. Salwyn. Modern and Contemporary European History (1815–1952). New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1953. Schevill, Ferdinand. A History of Europe from the Reformation to the Present Day. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1930. Schimmelfenning, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.). The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches. New York: Routledge, 2005. Schmidt, Vivien A. Democracy in Europe: The EU and National Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. ———. From State to Market: The Transforming of Business and Government. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Schmitter, Philippe C. “The European Community as an Emergent and Novel Form of Political Domination,” Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Estudio/Working Paper, September 26, 1991, 17. Schmitter, Philippe C., and Gerhard Lehmbruch (eds.). Trends in Corporatist Interest Intermediation. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979. Schumpeter, Joseph A. “The Crisis of the Tax State,” in Richard Swedburg (ed.), The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991. Sciolino, Elaine. “Faded Vision Splits Europe,” New York Times, June 19, 2005. ———. “French Voters Soundly Reject European Pact,” New York Times, May 29, 2005. “Scuffles in Turkey ‘Insult’ Trial,” BBC News, February 7, 2005, www.bbc.co.uk. Seligman, Adam B. The Idea of Civil Society. New York: Free Press, 1992. Seward, Desmond. The Monks of War: The Military Religious Orders. London: Archon, 1972. Sheehan, James J. Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 2008. Shorto, Russell, “Keeping the Faith,” New York Times Magazine, April 8, 2007, 38–63. Simons, Marlise. “Dutch Expected to Vote No,” New York Times, June 1, 2005. Skocpol, Theda. “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

O-13ChrBib

9/23/08

314

4:13 PM

Page 314

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, vol. 1, edited by Edwin Cannon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. Smith, Howard K. The State of Europe. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951. Sodaro, Michael. Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction, 2nd edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004. Solo, Robert A. The Positive State. Cincinnati: South-Western, 1982. Spohn, Willfried, and Anna Triandafyllidou (eds.). Europeanization, National Identities and Migration. London: Routledge, 2003. Spryt, Hendrix. The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of System Change. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. Starobin, Paul. “The Accidental Autocrat,” Atlantic Monthly (March 2005), 82–92. Strayer, Joseph R. Feudalism. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1965. ———. On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970. Strom, Kaare. Minority Government and Majority Rule. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Tarrow, Sidney G. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd edition. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Thomson, David. Europe Since Napoleon, 2nd edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962. Thompson, Janice E. Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. Tiersky, Ronald (ed.). Europe Today, 2nd edition. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. Tilly, Charles. Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990–1990. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990. Titmuss, Richard M. Essays on the Welfare State, 2nd edition. Boston: Beacon, 1963. Traynor, Ian. “Belgium? That’s Something That Doesn’t Exist. It’s Over,” Guardian Weekly, September 21, 2007, 3. ———. “Pope Says EU Is on the Path to Oblivion at the Age of 50,” Guardian Weekly, March 30–April 5, 2007. “Turkey: The Commission Recommends Opening Accession Negotiations,” www.europe.eu/scadplus/en. “Turkey Warned Hardline Tactics May Derail EU Talks,” Guardian, April 6, 2006, www.guardian.co.uk. Urwin, D. W., and W. E. Patterson (eds.). Politics in Western Europe Today. London: Longman, 1990. Verdun, Amy, and Osvaldo Croci (eds.). The European Union in the Wake of Eastern Enlargement. New York: Palgrave, 2005. Vincent, Andrew. Theories of the State. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. Wallace, William. The Transformation of Western Europe. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1990. Wallace, William, Helen Wallace, and Mark Pollack (eds.). Policy Making in the European Union, 5th edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Ward, Barbara. Five Ideas That Changed the World. New York: W. W. Norton, 1958. Watt, Nicholas, and Patrick Wintour. “Rebate Row Wrecks EU Summit,” Guardian Unlimited, June 18, 2005, www.guardian.co.uk. Webster, Graham. The Roman Imperial Army, 3rd edition. Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble, 1985.

O-13ChrBib

9/23/08

4:13 PM

Page 315

BIBLIOGRAPHY

315

Wedgwood, C. W. The Thirty Years’ War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1939. Weltman, John J. World Politics and the Evolution of War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. White, Lynn, Jr. Medieval Technology and Social Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962. Wilson, Frank. European Politics Today: The Democratic Experience, 3rd edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999. Wolin, Sheldon S. Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought. Boston: Little, Brown, 1960. Wood, David M., and Birol A. Yesilada. The Emerging European Union, 2nd edition. New York: Longman, 2002. Wood, Nicholas. “UN Envoy Urges That Kosovo Be Independent,” International Herald Tribune, March 23, 2007. Wright, Gordon. The Ordeal of Total War, 1939–1945. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. Ye’or, Bat. Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis. Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickenson University Press, 2005.

O-13ChrBib

9/23/08

4:13 PM

Page 316

O-14IX

9/23/08

4:14 PM

Page 317

Index

Abkhazians, 287 Absolutism: defined, 51; against liberal nationalism, 76, 77, 92; monarchical, 49–51, 76, 77, 79 Acquis communautaire, 217, 268 Act of Union, 1707 (Britain), 287 Adenhauer, Konrad, 208 Administration: changes in, by Diocletia during Roman Empire, 16–17; changes in, during rise of new monarchies, 50; development of, 48 Agincourt, battle of (1415), 43 Al-Andalus, 24 Alaric, 21 Albania, 93, 126, 132, 137, 140; EU membership, 274, 275; Serb ethnic minority in, 287 Albanians, 287 Albrecht (Hohenzollern), 82 Alexander I, tsar of Russia (1801–1825), 73, 76, 78 Aljubarrota, battle of (1385), 43 Allies: World War I, 92; World War II, 105–106 All-Union Congress of Soviets, 109 Alsace, 85, 97 Amnesty International, 173 Amsterdam, Treaty of (1997), 221, 224, 225, 227, 243, 246, 265, 273; and EU enlargement, 221–222 Anatolia, 99, 100

Andorra, 126, 128, 132, 140 Andropov, Yuri, 111 Anglican Church, 156 Ankara, 100 Anschluss (union), 103 Antioch, Principality of, 33 Arabia, 99 Armenia, 108, 126, 127, 132, 137, 140 Armenians, 287 Army: definition of, 14; during feudal age, 26, 42; mercenary, 54–56; after military revolution, 44; during Roman Empire, 14–15 Arquebus (harquebus), 43 Ataturk. See Kemal, Mustafa Attila, king of the Huns (433–453), 20 Auerstädt, battle of (1806), 73–83 Augsburg, Peace (Treaty) of (1555), 53, 54, 156 Austerlitz, 73 Austria, 71–73, 77, 84, 97–99, 102, 116, 126, 127, 131, 137, 140, 151, 158, 288; absorbed into German Reich, 103–105; EFTA, 210, 264; EU membership, 268–269; presidency of EU, 241; sovereignty regained after World War II, 106; Turkish EU membership, 277 Austrian Empire, 77, 80, 85, 93–95, 98, 103, 114, 284; collapse of, 96 Austro-Hungarian Empire. See Austrian Empire

317

O-14IX

9/23/08

4:14 PM

Page 318

318

INDEX

Azerbaijan, 108, 126, 127, 132, 140; Armenian ethnic minority in, 287; Nagorno-Karabakh, 287 Backbenchers, 134 Baden, 77 Bad weather money, 189 Balfour Declaration (1917), 99 Balkan Wars (1912–1913), 69, 93 Balladur, Edouard, 215 Baltic Republics. See Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania Banat, 98 Barroso, José Manuel, 246, 261 Basic Law (Germany), 124 Basqueland, 141 Basques, 287, 289 Bassarabia, 98, 106 Batavia, Dutch Republic of, 73 Batchka, 99 Bavaria, 288; kingdom of, 73, 77 Belarus, 108, 126, 127, 131, 137, 140 Belgium, 71, 77, 79, 94, 95, 97, 125, 131, 140, 145, 151, 162, 163, 165, 214, 288; ECU, 212; ethnonationalism in, 289; formation of Benelux, 208; formation of the ECSE, 204; GATT, 210; SEA, 216 Belgrade, 99 Benedict XVI, 292 Benedictines, 25 Benelux, 203, 262 Berganland, 98 Berlin, 80, 82, 112 Berlin Wall, 1, 151, 216 Berlusconi, Silvio, 241 Big Three, 106 Bill of Rights, English (1688), 124 Bismarck, Otto von, 84, 92, 93, 187, 189, 290 Blair, Tony, 161, 221, 227, 244, 265–266 Blum, Léon, 203–204 Bohemia, 98, 103 Bolsheviks, 37, 95, 96, 107, 108, 184; economic and social policies of, 189–190 Bonaparte, Napoléon, 72–78, 144, 199, 290 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 93, 99, 115, 116, 126, 131, 137, 140, 288; EU member-

ship, 274 Republika Srpska in, 290 Bosporus, 100 Brandenburg-Prussia, 82, 83 Brandt, Willy, 213 Breman, 77 Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (1918), 96, 112 Brezhnev, Leonid, 1, 110–113 Briand, Aristide, 199 Britain, 73, 95, 125, 137, 140, 145, 151, 158, 161, 165, 211; CAP, 208; electoral system, 166–167, 169; ethnonationalism in, 291; EU, 264–266, 293; EU budget dispute, 215; EU Constitutional Convention, 225, 226; EU membership, 210, 212; EU presidency, 241; Iraq, 244; levels of political participation in, 173; SEA, 216–219; welfare state in, 182–183, 186–188 Broz, Josef (Tito), 115 Bukovina, 98 Bulgaria, 97, 99–101, 106, 126, 127, 132, 137, 140; EU membership, 216, 271, 273–274; Turkish minority in, 287 Bundesbank (Germany), 213, 219 Bundesrat (Germany), 85, 132 Bundestag (Germany), 134 Bureaucracy, 143–145 Burghers, as third estate, 28–29 Burke, Edmund, 6 Byelorussia, 108 Byzantine Empire, 21, 62; Christianity in, 33; church-state relations in, 33; conquest by Ottoman Turks, 36; origins as eastern portion of Roman Empire, 21; politico-military rule in, 33; weakening of, 36 Cabinet (government), 125, 128–130, 135 Caesar, Julius, Roman dictator, 15 Caesar Augustus, Roman emperor, 13 Calvin, John, 54 Calvinism, 54, 57 Canon law. See under Law Carlos, Juan, king of Spain, 126 Carniola, 99 Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, 76 Catalans, 287, 289 Catalonia, 141

O-14IX

9/23/08

4:14 PM

Page 319

INDEX

Catherine the Great, tsarina of Russia, 294 Catholic Church, 4, 7; conflict with Protestants, 52; and education, 185; as Europe’s “religious superstate,” 26; religio-cultural function of, 25; as replacement for collapsed Roman Empire, 21; tension between Church and secular rulers, 26; and welfare, 185 Catholic League (1609), 54 Cavour, Camillo, 80, 81 Ceausescu, Nicolae, 113 Celts, 20 Central and Eastern European States (CEES), 270–272 Central European Bank, 214 Central Executive Committee (USSR), 109 Central Powers (World War I), 96 Chamberlain, Neville, 105 Chancellor, 128 Chancery, 47 Charlemagne (Charles the Great), 32, 41, 199 Charles V, Holy Roman (Habsburg) emperor, 52, 53 Charles X, king of France, 78 Charter of Fundamental Rights, 224 Chechens, 287 Checkpoint Charlie, 112 Chernyenk, Konstantin, 111 China, 43 Chirac, Jacques, 213, 222, 227, 244 Chivalry, 27 Christendom: boundaries of, 4; compartmentalization of, 37; division of, 30–37; Europe as, 3–4 Christian Democrats, 113, 153, 157, 164, 165 Christianity: contrast to Rome’s official state polytheism, 18–19; Eastern (Byzantine) empire compared, 31; edict of toleration, 19; established religion of Roman Empire, 19; fusion with Roman imperial practice, 20; persecutions of Christians, 19; Roman state’s response to, 18–19; spread of, 18; theology of, 18; in the Western empire, contrast with militarization of Christianity in West, 32–33

319

Christian II, king of Denmark, 54 Churchill, Winston, 203 Cisalpine Republic, 72, 73 Cistercians, 25 Citizenship (EU), 217 Civil service, 144–145 Civil submission, Lutheran doctrine of, 53 Clergy, as first estate, 25–26 Cockfield, Lord Arthur, 215 Code law. See under Law Code Napoléon (1804), 73 Cohesion policy (EU), 273 Colbert, Jean Baptiste, 183 Cold War (1946–1989), 107, 205, 210 Collectivization (USSR), 185 College of Commissioners. See Commission of the EU Comité des Representants Permanents (COREPER). See under Council of Ministers of the EU Command economy, 184–185 Commission of the EU, 207, 211, 216, 226, 233, 234, 251–252, 272; bureaucracy of, 237; directorates-general, 237; executive function, 236; legislative function, 234–236; managerial function, 236–238; policy domains of, 235–236; reconfiguration of, 221–222 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 208–211, 215, 218, 236–238, 248, 267, 273, 276 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 217, 220, 221, 224, 225 Common law (English). See under Law Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 113 Communist International, 160 Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 109, 110 Communists, 158, 160, 162, 263 Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization, 275 Concert of Europe, 75 Confederation of the Rhine, 73, 77, 141 Congress of Europe, 204 Congress of Vienna (1814–1815), 75–78, 84 Conservatives, 163–164; in Britain, 156, 265

O-14IX

9/23/08

320

4:14 PM

Page 320

INDEX

Constantine, Roman emperor, 19 Constantinople, 20, 100; conquest of, by Crusaders, 34; conquest of, by Ottoman Turks, 36; Istanbul, 100; Latin Empire of, 35; name changed to Istambul, 36 Constitutional Convention (EU), 222, 224, 249, 252, 253, 272 Constitutionalism, medieval, 123, 124 Constitutional law. See under Law Constitutional Treaty of the EU (2004), key provisions of, 223–224, 251–253 Constitutions, 124 Continental System, 74 Copenhagen criteria, 271, 274, 277 Corn Laws (Britain), 182 Corsica, 141, 289 Córtes, 30 Cossacks, 74, 108 Coudenhove-Kalergi, count, 199 Council of Europe, 204 Council of Four (Versailles), 96 Council of ministers, 128 Council of Ministers of the EU, 207, 211, 221, 222, 226, 233, 234, 238, 272; Comité des Representants Permanents (COREPER), 240–242; and EU treaty negotiations, 243; democratic deficit of, 254; formations of, 239table; General Secretariat of, 240, 243; legislative role, 239; organization and functioning, 238–243; presidency of, 241–241; relationship to the European Court of Justice, 251; voting within, 242–243 Council of People’s Commissars (USSR), 109 Council of the nationalities (USSR), 109 Council of the Union (USSR), 109 Court of Justice of the EU, 207, 233, 234, 236, 250–251 Courtrai, battle of (1302), 43 Courts, 135–139; constitutional, 137–138; in Ireland, 138; origins, 49, 135–136 Crécy, battle of (1346), 43 Croatia, 98, 99, 115, 116, 126, 127, 131, 137, 140; EU membership, 274, 275; Serb ethnic minority in, 287 Crusades, 32–33; conquest of Constantinople, 34–36

Cult of personality, 110 Customs union, 203 Cyprus, 126, 127, 137, 140; EU membership, 271, 272, 276, 277 Czechoslovakia, 97, 98, 101–105, 107, 112, 113, 116, 284 Czech Republic, 2, 116, 126, 127, 131, 137, 140, 156, 162; electoral threshold in, 169; EU membership, 271 Daladier, Edouard, 105 Dalmatia, 77, 99 Danzig, Free City of, 77, 97, 98, 101, 105 Dardanelles, 96 Dayton Peace Accords (1995), 275 Deconcentration, 141 De Gaspari, Alcide, 204 De Gaulle, Charles, 210, 211, 265 Delors, Jacques, 215, 216, 238 Demesne, 45 Democracy. See Popular sovereignty Democratic centralism, 110 Democratic deficit of the EU, 216, 253–255 Départements (France), 186 Depression (Great), 101, 182 Denmark, 84, 125, 132, 140, 142, 151, 211; EFTA, 210, 264, 268; EU membership, 212, 265; rejects Maastricht Treaty, 220 Deutsch, Karl, 202 Devolution, 141 Dictatorship of the proletariat, 108 Diocletian, Roman emperor, 15, 16, 19, 20 Directory, during the French Revolution, 71, 72 Divine right of kings, 51 Dobruja, 106 Don, Republic of, 108 Dual Alliance (1879), 93 Dubrovnik, 115 Duisenberg, Wim, 244 Duma (Russia), 30 Edessa, County of, 33 Edward the Confessor, king of England, 42 Egypt, 72 Elba, 75

O-14IX

9/23/08

4:14 PM

Page 321

INDEX

Electoral campaigns, 166 Electoral systems, 166–169; mixed single-member proportional, 167; partylist PR, 167; proportional representation, 166–167; single-member plurality/majority, 166 Electoral turnout, 169 Elizabeth I, queen of England, 70 Emmanuel, Victor II, king of Piedmont, 80, 81 Empty Chair Crisis (1965–1966), 211 England, 287. See also Britain Enlightenment, 65, 71, 292 Erasmus of Rotterdam, 52 Erdogan, Tayyip, 276 Estates-généraux (France), 30 Estonia, 96, 108, 113, 124, 126, 132, 140; EU membership, 271 Eugenics, 181 Eupen, 97 Eurabia, 292 Eurocrats, 255 Europe, conceptions of, 4–6 European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), 207, 210, 217, 233, 264 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 205, 207, 210, 217, 223, 264 European Community (EC), 209–211, 212, 217, 233. See also European Union European Council (1974), 213, 214, 217, 221, 224, 226, 233, 234, 237, 267, 271, 276 European Currency Unit (ECU), 211 European Defense Community (EDC), 205, 210, 264 European Economic Area (EEA), 269 European Economic Community (EEC), 207, 210, 217, 233, 262, 264. See also European Community; European Union European Exchange Rate Agreement, 211 European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), 221 European Federalist Congress, 203 European Free Alliance, 289 European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 210, 264, 268, 269 European Monetary System (EMS), 211–214, 218, 220, 221, 269

321

European Monetary Union (EMU), 217, 219, 221, 238 European Political Cooperation (EPC), 205, 213 European Union (EU), 7, 42, 141, 161, 162, 172–174, 195, 199; democratic deficit, 253–255; enlargements, 264–274; formation, 202–209; institutions, 233–253; relations with EFTA, 269; relations with the United States, 241, 244, 263, 264 Eurosclerosis, 192 Euroskepticism, 265 Excommunication, 26 Factory Act, 1833, 1847 (Britain), 187 Family Allowance Act, 1946 (Britain), 188 Fascists, 102 Federalism, 131, 288 Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). See Germany Federal Unemployment Office (Germany), 188–189 Ferdinand, Francis, archduke of the Austrian Empire, 93 Ferdinand II, king of Naples, 79, 80 Ferdinand VII, king of Spain, 78 Feudalism, 7, 25; constitutionalism during, 50–51, 57; councils during, 30; definition of, 25; destruction of, 48–49; first estate (those who pray), 25–26; as fragmented politico-military rule, 25; military organization of, 26–27; second estate (those who fight), 26–28; serfs during, 28; social order of, 25–30; third estate (those who work), 28–29; vassalage, 29–30 Finland, 96, 97, 106, 108, 126, 127, 132, 140, 163; EU membership, 268–269 First among equals (primus inter pares), 45, 57 Fisher, Joschka, 222 Flanders, 141, 165, 289 Flemish, 79 Formateur, 130–131 Four Powers Conference (1938), 105 Fourteen Points, 96 Fourth Coalition, 74, 75 Fraktion (Germany), 134 France, 94, 97, 124–127, 131, 137, 140,

O-14IX

9/23/08

322

4:14 PM

Page 322

INDEX

142, 144, 145, 156, 158, 162, 165, 213, 214; British EU membership, 265; CAP, 208–209; Constitutional convention of the EU, 225–227; ECU, 212; EFTA, 210; electoral system, 166–167, 169; formation of the ECSE, 205; GATT, 210; Iberian expansion of the EU, 267; immigration into, 291, 292; Iraq, US invasion of, 244; levels of political participation in, 173; Luxembourg Compromise, 211; national planning in, 183; 1970s economic crisis, 192; QMV, 242; SEA, 216, 218–220; Schengen Accords, 273; Turkey’s EU membership, 277; welfare state in, 182–183 Franciscans, 25 Franco, Francisco, 27 Franco-German alliance, 210, 265 Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), 69, 85, 184 Frederick of Hohenzollern, king of Brandenburg-Prussia, 82 Frederick II, elector of BrandenburgPrussia, 82 Frederick III, king of Prussia, 83 Frederick William I, king of Prussia, 83 Frederick William II, king of Prussia, 83 Frederick William III, king of Prussia, 83 Frederick William IV, king of Prussia, 80, 83, 84, 199 Freedom Party (Austria), 165 Freemasons, 65 French Revolution (1789), 70, 71, 75, 77, 92, 124, 157, 160, 163, 164, 179, 183, 186; wars of (1792–1799), 69, 92 Friedland, 74 Functionalism, 202 Galicia, 77 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 81 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 209 Généralities (France), 186 Genoa, 72; Republic of, 77 Genscher, Hans-Dietriech, 218, 219 Genscher-Columbo initiative, 214 Georgia, 108, 126, 127, 131, 132, 140,

288; ethnonationalism in, 287 George III, king of Britain, 128 George William, elector of Brandenburg-Prussia, 82 German Confederation, 77, 80, 84 German Democratic Republic (GDR). See Germany German Empire, 85, 94, 97, 107, 151, 284 Germanic kingdoms: fragmentation of politico-military rule in, 24–25; military defense of, 25; military threats to, 24; politico-military practices in, 22–23 Germanic tribes, 20; contrast between Germanic and Roman politico-military practices, 22; fusion (blending) of Germanic tribal practices with Roman politico-military rule, 22–23; governance in, 21–22; invasion of the Roman Empire, 20–21 German Unification, Wars of, 69 Germany, 1, 112, 116, 124, 126, 127, 131, 132, 137, 140, 145, 156, 158, 161–163, 165, 172, 205, 213, 289; CAP, 208; Constitutional Convention of the EU, 224–227; dissolution of the GDR, 113; ECU, 212; electoral system, 167; electoral threshold, 168; extreme nationalism in, 102–105, 180–181; formation of the ECSE, 205; GATT, 210; Iraq, US invasion of, 244; levels of political participation in, 173; Luxembourg Compromise, 211; national planning during Nazi era, 183; QMV, 242, 252; Schengen Accords, 273; SEA, 217–219; settlement imposed by Allies after World War II, 106; social market economy, 184; Third Reich, 105, 117; Turkish immigration, 291; unification of the FRG and GDR, 82–85, 92; welfare policy in, 187–189 Gibraltar, Straits of, 24 Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry, 213, 222, 225, 243 Glasnost, 1, 111 Gonzáles, Felipe, 267 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 1, 111, 113, 294 Government (cabinet), 125, 128–130, 135; head of, 125, 128

O-14IX

9/23/08

4:14 PM

Page 323

INDEX

Greece, 78, 99, 116, 124, 126, 127, 131, 132, 137, 140; EU membership, 212, 266–268; SEA, 216; tensions with Turkey over Cyprus, 272; Turkish EU membership, 277 Greene, Graham, 295; The Third Man, 295 Greenpeace, 173 Greens, 159, 163 Guerrilla war, 74 Guilds, 28–29, 281; definition of, 28; purpose of, 28–29 Gunpowder, 43 Gustavus I, king of Sweden, 53 Haas, Ernst, 202 Habsburg empire, 64. See also Austrian Empire Hadrian, Roman emperor, 15 Haider, Jörg, 165 Hardenberg, Karl August von, 76 Head of government, 125, 128 Head of state, 48, 126, 127 Heath, Edward, 265 Heligoland, 97 Henry I, king of England, 135 Henry II, king of France, 53 Henry VIII, king of England, 70 High Authority of the ECSE, 205, 207 Hitler, Adolf, 102–105, 114, 116, 117, 199 Holland. See Netherlands Holstein, 84 Holy Alliance. See Quintuple Alliance Holy Roman Empire, 41, 42, 57, 62, 82, 83, 199; abolished by Napoléon, 73; fragmentation of, 32; replaced by German Confederation, 77; and the wars of religion, 51–53 Hospitallers, 25, 33 Hot Autumn (1969), 191 House of Commons (Britain), 125, 132–134 House of Lords (Britain), 131, 132, 137, 146 Humbolt, William von, 76 Hundred Years’ War (1337–1453), 42 Hungary, 97, 98, 101, 105, 106, 112, 116, 126, 127, 132, 140, 162; EU membership, 271 Huns, 20

323

Hussein, sharif of Mecca, 99 Idealism. See Romanticism Iceland, 6, 126, 127, 132, 140; EFTA, 268 Illyria, 77 Immigration, 292–293 Imperialism, 92 Indulgences, 52 Industrial Revolution, 157, 160, 163, 185 Inns of Court, 135 Inquisition, 78 Interest groups, 155, 165, 169–172; associational, 170–171; corporatist, 172, 184; nonassociational, 170–171 Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) of the EU, 216, 217, 221 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 267 Ireland, 6, 126, 127, 131, 137, 140, 211; EU membership, 210, 264–266; QMV, 252; SEA, 216 Irish, 287 Irredenta, 85, 101, 102, 287 Islam, impact on Europe, 31 Istanbul, 100 Italian unification, wars of, 69 Italy, 72, 97, 116, 126, 127, 131, 137, 140, 142, 145, 151, 156, 158, 162, 163, 214; Constitutional Convention of the EU, 226; ECU, 212; electoral system, 167; fascism in, 158; formation of the ECSC, 207; GATT, 209; Iraq, US invasion of, 244; presidency of EU, 241; SEA, 212; unification of 80–81 Ivan the Terrible, tsar of Russia, 110 Jaruzelski, Wojciech, 112 Jena, 73; battle of (1806), 83 Jenkin’s Ear, War of (1739–1748), 69 Jerusalem, Kingdom of, 33 Jesus of Nazareth, 18 Joachim II, elector of BrandenburgPrussia, 82 Johan Sigismund, elector of Brandenburg-Prussia, 82 Joseph I, Francis, emperor of the Austrian Empire, 81 Judges, 137 Judicial (constitutional) review, 137–138 July Revolution (1830), 78

O-14IX

10/2/08

10:50 AM

Page 324

324

INDEX

Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), 217, 221, 273 Kant, Immanuel, 67 Karensky, Alexander, 95, 107 Kazakhstan, 108 Kemal, Mustafa, 99, 100 Keynes, John Maynard, 182; Keynesian economics, 182–183, 193 Khrushchev, Nikita, 110 Kirghizstan, 108 Kohl, Helmut, 218, 219, 225, 238 Korean War, 205 Kosovo, 115, 289–290 Kosovo Liberation Army, 290 Kurds, 287 Labor unions, 158 Labour Party (Britain), 153, 156, 193, 221, 265 Laissez-faire, 182 Länder (Germany), 124 Lantag (Germany), 84 Latin Empire of Constantinople, 35. See also Crusades Latin language, 15, 26 Latvia, 97, 108, 113, 126, 140; EU membership, 271 Lausanne, Treaty of (1923), 100 Law: administrative, 136, 137; Canon, 20, 21, 43–44, 49; code, 136, 139; common (English) 49, 135, 136, 138–139; constitutional, 136–138; criminal, 136, 137; private (civil), 136, 137 public, 49; Roman, 15, 49, 136 Law Lords, 132 Law of primogeniture, 32 League of Monarchs, 199 League of Nations, 99, 102, 105, 106 Lebensraum, 102 Legal systems. See Law Leggine (Italy), 133 Legislative process, 132–133 Lenin, Vladimir, 95 Leopold I, prince of Saxe-Coburg and king of Belgium, 79 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 165 Liberal Democrats (Britain), 156 Liberalism, 66, 131, 142; economic doctrines of, 182 Liechtenstein, 125, 132, 140; EFTA, 268

Liga Nord (Northern League), 288 Ligurian Republic, 72, 73 Lime, Harry, 295 Lithuania, 96, 97, 108, 113, 124, 126, 127, 132, 137, 140; EU membership, 271; Polish ethnic minority in, 287 Livonia, 96 Local government, 142–143 Lombardy, 80 Longbow, 43 Lords Spiritual, 131, 132 Lorraine, 85, 97 Louis XIV, king of France, 183 Louis XVI, king of France, 75, 77 Louis XVIII, king of France, 78 Louis-Napoléon, 80 Louis Philip, duke of Orleans 78; king of France, 79 Lübeck, 77 Luther, Martin, 52, 53; Lutheranism, 53, 57 Lutheran Church, 156 Luxembourg, 125, 132, 137, 140; formation of Benelux, 203; formation of the ECSE, 205; SEA, 216; QMV, 242 Luxembourg Compromise, 211 Maastricht, Treaty of (1993), 216, 219, 238, 243, 246, 251, 266, 268, 273; ratification of, 220–221 Macedonia, 93, 99, 115, 116, 126, 127, 132, 137, 140 Madrid, 78 Magna Carta (1215), 124 Malmédy, 97 Malta, 126, 132, 137, 140; QMV, 242; EU membership, 272 Marshall Plan, 204 Martel, Charles (the Hammer), 24 Marx, Karl, 104; Marxism, 107–109 May 1968, 191 Mazowiecki, Tadeusz, 112 Mazzini, Giuseppe, 199 Medvedev, Dmitry, 295 Members of parliament (MPs), 134, 135 Memel, 97 Mercantilism, 181–182, 184 Mercenaries, 44, 48 Merchant Shipping Act, 1876 (Britain), 187 Mesopotamia, 97, 99

O-14IX

9/23/08

4:14 PM

Page 325

INDEX

Metternich, Clemens Wenzel, prince of the Austrian Empire, 76, 78, 80 Milan, 80 Military affairs, revolution in, 43–45, 123, 143, 201; during feudal age, 43; impact of, on warfare, 43–44; impact on cost of war, 46; impact on exercise of politico-military rule, 46–50; impact on kingly politico-military rule, 44–46; impact on medieval constitutionalism, 51 Military-religious orders, 25, 33 Milosevic, Slobodan, 115 Milvian Bridge, battle of (312), 19 Mine Regulation Act, 1842 (Britain), 187 Ministerial cabinet, 145 Ministerial responsibility, 129–130 Mitrany, David, 202 Mitteleuropa, 6, 96 Mitterrand, François, 212, 213, 215, 218–220, 238, 267 Moderate two-partyism, 156 Moldova, 78, 108, 126, 132, 137, 140; EU membership, 275; ethnonationalism in, 287 Monaco, 125, 132, 140 Monetarism, 193 Monnet, Jean, 203–205, 207 Monotheism, 18 Montenegro, 116, 126, 127, 132, 137, 140; EU membership, 274, 275; independence from Serbia, 284 Moravia, 98 Moscow, 95; as the Third Rome, 36 Movement Against Illegal Immigration (Russia), 262 Muhammad the prophet, 24 Muhammad II, Turkish sultan, 36 Muslims, 292 Mussolini, Benito, 105, 203 Naples, 78 Napoleonic Code, 73 Napoleonic Wars (1800–1815), 69, 75, 77, 136 National Assembly (France), 160 National Assistance Act, 1948 (Britain), 188 National Front (France), 165, 292 National Health Service, 1948 (Britain), 143, 144, 188

325

National Insurance Act (Britain): of 1911, 187; of 1947, 188 Nationalism: in Central and Eastern Europe, 64–66; development of, 16–64; in England, 70; ethnonationalism, 61; extreme, 101–105, 287; in France, 70; liberal (civic), 61, 123; and the Napoleonic Wars, 75; Romantic, 67–68; unfinished, 287, 290 Nationalization, 183 National planning, 183 National question, 101 National Socialism (German), 158. See also Nazi Party National Society (Italy), 81 Nazi Party (Germany), 106 Neoliberalism, 193 Netherlands, 71, 73, 77, 79, 125, 131, 140, 142, 153, 156, 162, 165; ECU, 212; electoral system, 168; formation of Benelux, 203; formation of the ECSC, 205; GATT, 209; immigration into, 291; levels of political participation in, 173 Neuchêtel, 77 New Economic Policy (NEP) (USSR), 184, 189 New Order (Germany), 102 Nice, Treaty of (2001), 222, 225, 243, 251, 252 Nicholas I, tsar of Russia, 78 Nobility, as second estate, 26–28 Nomenklatura, 109, 110, 145 Norman Conquest of England (1066), 42, 47 Normandy, 24 Normans, 24, 32 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 6, 115, 205, 206, 290 Northcote-Travelyn Report, 1854 (Britain), 144 Northern Ireland, 287 North German Confederation, 84, 85, 151 Norway, 77, 125, 132, 140, 142, 151, 211; EFTA, 210, 264, 268; Muslims in, 292; rejects EU membership, 269–270 October Revolution, 1905 (Russia), 95 Odoacer, 21

O-14IX

9/23/08

326

4:14 PM

Page 326

INDEX

Old Age Pensions Act, 1908 (Britain) and 1910 (France), 187 Ombudsperson, 139 Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 204 Orgburo (USSR), 109 Ossetians, 287 Ostpolitik (Germany), 213, 270 Otto III, Holy Roman emperor, 199 Ottoman Empire, 21, 31, 64, 78, 85, 96, 99, 100, 114, 284; collapse of, 96–97 Ottoman Turks. See Ottoman Empire Padania, Republic of, 288 Paganism. See Polytheism Pain du roi (France), 186 Palermo, 79 Palestine, 96, 97, 99 Papal States, 77, 80, 81 Paris, 95; Treaty of (1951), 205 Paris Revolution (1848), 83 Parliament, 131–135; English, 30, 92 Parliamentarianism, 125 Parliamentary commissioner (ombudsperson) (Britain), 139 Parliamentary groups, 134, 152 Parliamentary supremacy (Britain), 137 Parliament of the EU, 207, 211, 213, 215, 217–222, 233, 234, 239, 272; assent, 246; co-decision, 246; commission oversight, 246–247; democratic deficit, 248–249; election of MEPs, 245, 247–248; and the EU budget, 246; legislative powers of, 245–246; legislative procedures within, 245–246; pan-European political groups in, 248 Party discipline, 129 Party systems, 155–159 Patriotism, 3, 69 Pax Romana, 15 Peers, life and hereditary (Britain), 131, 132 People’s Commissariat for Nationalities (USSR), 108 Perestroika, 1, 111 Persia, 96 Peter the Great, tsar of Russia, 96, 110, 184 Petrograd, 95 Petsamo, 106

Piedmont, Kingdom of, 80, 81 Pike, 43 Pitt, William the Younger, 128 Pluralism, 172 Poitiers, battle of (732), 24, 43 Poland, 77, 79, 96–98, 101, 103, 107, 108, 116, 124, 126, 127, 131, 137, 140, 142, 156, 165; border changes, 106; Constitutional Convention of EU, 226–227; electoral threshold, 169; EU membership, 271, 293; Solidarity, 112 Polish Corridor, 98, 105 Politburo (USSR), 109, 110 Political participation, levels of, 172–174 Political parties: agrarian, 157–158, 164; cadre, 152–153; Calvinist, 153; cartel, 155, 166; catchall, 153–155; Catholic, 153, 156, 157, 164; Christian Democratic, 153, 157, 164, 165; Communist, 158, 160, 162, 263; conservative, 163–164; Environmental (Greens), 159, 163; extreme nationalist, 158–159, 164–165; families, 159–165; Liberal, 160, 164; Liberal Democrats (Britain), 156; mass, 152–153; Protestant, 153; regionalist, 157, 165; Social Democratic, 160, 161, 162; Socialist, 153, 158, 160, 161, 164 Polytheism, 17 Pomerania, 77 Pompidou, Charles, 210, 213, 265 Poor Law Amendment Act, 1834 (Britain), 186 Popular participation, 91 Popular sovereignty, 75, 78–80; expansion of, 91; as national self-determination, 79, 96 Portugal, 74, 78, 116, 124, 126, 127, 131, 132, 137, 140, 145, 162, 172; EFTA, 210, 264; EU membership, 212, 267–268; SEA, 216 Posen, 97 Postmaterialism, 159, 163, 173 Potsdam, 106 Praetorian Guard, 15 Préfects (France), 186 Presidentialism, 125 President of the council of ministers, 138

O-14IX

9/23/08

4:14 PM

Page 327

INDEX

Prime minister (premier), 128, 130 Princip, Gavrilo, 93 Private members’ bills, 133 Protestantism, 57; theology of, 52 Protestant Reformation, 82 Protocol on Social Policy (EU), 217 Prussia, 71, 77, 82, 144; East, 97, 98, 105 Public Health Act, 1848 (Britain), 187 Punic Wars (264–202 BC), 14 Putin, Vladimir, 294, 295 Quadrilateral, 81 Quadruple Alliance, 75 Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), 211, 213, 215 217, 221, 222, 225, 226, 228, 242, 252, 253 Quasi-governmental organizations, 143 Quintuple Alliance, 75, 77, 78 Reason of state, 50 Reconquest (Reconquista), Christian, 24, 32 Regionalization, 141, 289 Regulation of Railways Act, 1889 (Britain), 187 Reichstag (Germany), 30, 85 Renault automobile works, 183 Reparations, 106 Rhineland, 97 Riga, Treaty of (1921), 98 Riksdag (Sweden), 30 Roman Empire, 7, 42, 29, 284; administration, 15–17; army, 14–15; Christianity and, 17–20; division of, by Diocletian, 15–17; law, 15 Romania, 97–99, 101, 106, 107, 113, 116, 126, 127, 131, 137, 140, 165; EU membership, 261, 271, 273–274 Roman law. See under Law Romanticism, 66–68 Rome, Treaties of (1957), 207–210, 213, 263 Rudolf II, Holy Roman (Habsburg) emperor, 54 Rugia, 77 Rule of law, 123–124 Russia, 73, 77, 94, 116, 127, 131, 137, 140, 151, 288; electoral threshold, 168; ethnonationalism in, 287, 291; EU membership, 275, 294–295; immigration, 292

327

Russian Empire, 64, 85, 98, 108; collapse of, 95–96 Russian (Bolshevik) Revolution (1917), 160, 189 Ruthenia, 98, 105 SaaR, 97 Salah al-Din (Saladin), 33 Salazar, António de Oliveira, 267 Salzburg, 77 San Marino, 126, 128, 132, 140 Santer, Jacques, 246 Sarajevo, 93, 115, 116 Sardinia, Kingdom of, 77, 81 Saxony, 77 Schengen Accords, 273 Schleswig, 84 Schmalkalden League (1531), 53 Schmidt, Helmut, 213, 243 Schröder, Gerhard, 161, 241 Schuman, Robert, 204, 207 Schuman Declaration, 204 Schuschnigg, Kurt von, 103 Scientific racism, 180 Scotland, 141, 287, 289 Seanad (Ireland), 132 Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets (USSR), 95 Second Coalition (1798–1801), 72 Second French Republic (1848–1852), 80 Secretariat (USSR), 109 Sejm (Poland), 30 Self-determination, principle of, 96, 98, 101; application of, by Allies after WW I, 96–100; exercised by minorities in states, 102 Semipresidentialism, 127 Sénat (France), 132 Serbia, 78, 93, 97, 115, 116, 126, 127, 132, 137, 140, 289; EU membership, 274, 275; and Kosovo, 290; and Montenegro, 284 Serfs, 29 Seven Years’ War (1755–1763), 69 Sévres, Treaty of (1919), 99 Seyss-Inquart, Arthur, 103 Shire-reeve (sheriff), 47 Shires, 47 Silesia, 98 Single-European Act (1986), 215, 217–219, 243, 268

O-14IX

9/23/08

328

4:14 PM

Page 328

INDEX

Slavic Union (Russia), 292 Slovakia, 2, 98, 105, 116, 126, 127, 132, 137, 140, 165; EU membership, 271 Slovenia, 115, 116, 126, 127, 131, 137, 140; EU membership, 271 Smyrna, 99, 100 Snake in the tunnel (European Exchange Rate Agreement), 211 Soares, Mário, 267 Social cleavages, 156–159; centerperiphery, 157; church-state, 156–158, 164; owners-workers, 158; ruralurban, 157–158, 164 Social Democrats, 160–162 Socialists, 153, 158, 160, 161, 164 Social movements, 172–174 Solferino, battle of (1859), 81 Solidarity (Poland), 111 Soviet Union (USSR), 105–107, 181, 205, 213; disintegration of, 111–114, 284; EU, 263; Finland, 269; formation of, 107, 109; national planning in, 185; welfare policy in, 189–190 Spaak, Paul-Henri, 204, 207 Spain, 116, 124, 125, 131, 140, 151, 156, 158, 165, 172; constitutional convention, 226, 227; democracy threatened, 126; ethnonationalism in, 287, 289; EU membership, 212, 266–268; Iraq, US invasion of, 244; SEA, 216 Speier, Diet of (1526), 52 Srpska, Republika, 290 Stabilization and Association Process (EU), 275 Stalin, Joseph, 95, 110 Standing army, definition of, 14 Stare decisis, 49 State Planning Commission–GOSPLAN (USSR), 185 State Planning Commission for Electrification (USSR), 185 States: confederal, 141; feudal, 22–30; imperial, 7, 66–68, 92; market, 193, 194, 261–264; monarchical, 7; national, 3, 64–66; order, 33; unitary, 140; welfare, 190–192 St. Helena, 75 Stresemann, Gustav, 199 Subsidiarity (EU), 217, 224 Sudetenland (Czechoslovakia), 98, 102;

annexed by Hitler (1938), 103–105 Sweden, 73, 77, 125, 131, 132, 140, 151, 156, 162, 172, 211; EFTA, 210, 264; electoral threshold, 169; EU membership, 268–270; ombudsperson, 139 Swiss Confederation. See Switzerland Swiss People’s Party, 292 Switzerland, 77, 128, 131, 132, 140, 288, 289; EFTA, 210, 264, 268; Muslims in, 292 Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), 99 Syria, 72, 97, 99 Tallyrand, Charles Maurice, 76 Tejero, António, 126 Templars, 25, 33 Teschen, 105 Teutonic knights, 33, 82 Thatcher, Margaret, 193, 215, 218, 220, 265 Theodosius, Roman emperor, 19 Third Coalition (1804–1814), 73 Third Reich, 199 Third Way (British), 161–162 Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), 54, 82 Thresholds, electoral, 168 Trace italienne fortifications, 45 Trade Board Act, 1909 (Britain), 187 Trades Union congress (Britain), 153 Trafalgar, battle of, 73 Transcaucasian Socialist Soviet Republic, 108 Trans-Dniester, Republic of, 287 Transylvania, 98, 106, 107 Treaty on European Union (TEU). See Maastricht, Treaty of Trichet, Jean-Claude, 244 Trieste, 106 Triple Alliance (1882), 93 Tripoli, County of, 33 Trotsky, Leon, 95 Turkey, 99, 132, 136, 137, 140; EU membership, 272, 274–277; formation of, after World War I, 100; Kurds in, 287, 291 Turkmenistan, 108 Tuscany, 75, 80; Grand Duchy, 77 Tutelage, 140, 143 Two Sicilies, Kingdom of, 77, 78, 80 Tyrol, 77

O-14IX

9/23/08

4:14 PM

Page 329

INDEX

Ukraine, 96, 108, 126, 127, 137, 138, 140; EU membership, 275 Ulm, 73 United Europe Committee, 203 United Kingdom. See Britain United Nations (UN), 106, 115, 224, 236, 290 United Russia, 292, 295 United States, 204, 210 United States of Europe, 7, 203, 219, 228, 293 Ustashi, 114 Utrecht, Treaty of (1713), 4 Uzbekistan, 108 Valmy, battle of (1792), 69 Vatican (City), 81, 285table Velvet Divorce (Czechoslovakia), 2, 98, 116 Venetia. See Venice, Republic of Venice, Republic of, 77, 80, 81 Ventotene Manifesto, 203 Versailles, Treaty of (1919), 97, 98 Vichy government (France), 183 Vienna, 73, 80 Vikings. See Normans Volkswagen automobile works, 184 Vote of confidence, 129, 131, 135 Wales, 141, 287, 289 Walesa, Lech, 112 Wallachia, 78 Wallonia, 141, 165, 289 Walloons, 79 Wall Street Crash (1929), 101 War, 26, 42–45, 68–70 War of the Roses (1455–1485), 42 Warsaw, Grand Duchy of, 74, 77 Waterloo, battle of (1815), 75 Weimar Republic (Germany), 77, 97,

329

184, 188 Welfare policy: epochs of, 185–191; impact of war on, 185, 186, 190 Wellington, duke of, 74–76 Western European Union (WEU), 206, 217 Westphalia, 72; Peace (Treaty) of (1648), 54–57, 63 Widows, Orphans, and Old Age Contributory Act, 1925 (Britain), 188 William, Frederick, elector of Brandenburg-Prussia, 82 William I, duke of Normandy and conqueror of England, 42 William I, king of Prussia and first emperor of the German Empire, 85 Wilson, Woodrow, 96 Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1897 (Britain), 187 World Trade Organization (WTO), 236, 237 World War I (1914–1918), 69, 92, 95, 102, 105, 106, 124, 151, 158, 180, 182, 185, 201, 287 World War II (1939–1945), 42, 69, 95, 105–107, 112, 124, 137, 154, 159, 162–165, 169, 181, 183–185, 188, 190, 192, 193, 201–205, 262, 264, 287, 291 Würtemburg, Kingdom of, 73, 77 Yalta (Conference), 106, 113 Yeltsin, Boris, 113 Young Turks, 93 Yugoslavia, 97, 98, 101, 107, 114; disintegration of, 114–116, 274, 284; ethnic cleansing in, 287; ethnonationalism in, 291; formation of, after World War I, 99 Yushenko, Victor, 275

O-14IX

9/23/08

4:14 PM

Page 330

O-14IX

9/23/08

4:14 PM

Page 331

About the Book

THIS INNOVATIVE NEW text explores the nature of European politics in the context of the origin and institutional development of the European states system. Underlying the analysis are a series of questions: • How did the state, the central element of contemporary European political life, emerge from and eventually triumph over the bewildering multiplicity of competing forms of rule that existed in Europe after the collapse of the Roman Empire? • What explains the development of the common methods for managing their economies, societies, and politics found in contemporary European states? • What are the nature and significance of the integration of European states into the European Union? The authors systematically cover the historical background of the European democratic nation-state; its governing institutions and practices; current efforts to unify the continent; and the challenges posed by circumstances ranging from EU membership to internal ethnonationalist movements to the extensive migration of people within and into Europe. In the concluding chapter, they consider the future of the European state in light of its history, current domestic political realities, and the broad forces of globalization. Walter C. Opello, Jr., is professor of political science at the State University of New York, Oswego. He is coauthor of The Nation-State and Global Order, now in its second edition, and Portugal: From Monarchy to Pluralist Democracy. Katherine A. R. Opello is assistant professor of political science at CUNY-Kingsborough Community College. She is author of Gender Quotas, Parity Reform and Political Parties in France. 331