European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis: Leading the Pandemic (Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology) 3031383796, 9783031383793

Citation preview

PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis Leading the Pandemic

Flaminia Saccà · Donatella Selva

Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology

Series Editors Carlo Ruzza, School of International Studies, University of Trento, Trento, Italy Hans-Jörg Trenz, Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa, Italy

Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology addresses contemporary themes in the field of Political Sociology. Over recent years, attention has turned increasingly to processes of Europeanization and globalization and the social and political spaces that are opened by them. These processes comprise both institutional-constitutional change and new dynamics of social transnationalism. Europeanization and globalization are also about changing power relations as they affect people’s lives, social networks and forms of mobility. The Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology series addresses linkages between regulation, institution building and the full range of societal repercussions at local, regional, national, European and global level, and will sharpen understanding of changing patterns of attitudes and behaviours of individuals and groups, the political use of new rights and opportunities by citizens, new conflict lines and coalitions, societal interactions and networking, and shifting loyalties and solidarity within and across the European space. We welcome proposals from across the spectrum of Political Sociology and Political Science, on dimensions of citizenship; political attitudes and values; political communication and public spheres; states, communities, governance structure and political institutions; forms of political participation; populism and the radical right; and democracy and democratization.

Flaminia Saccà · Donatella Selva

European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis Leading the Pandemic

Flaminia Saccà Sapienza University Rome, Italy

Donatella Selva University of Florence Florence, Italy

Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology ISBN 978-3-031-38379-3 ISBN 978-3-031-38380-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023, corrected publication 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Globe made of jigsaw puzzles with a protective medical mask-Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

This project emerged as part of a Project of National Interest (PRIN2017) developed by a national network of universities, funded by the Italian Ministry of Research in 2017, titled ‘The Transformations of Democracy: Actors, Strategies and Outcomes in Opposing Populism in Political, Juridical and Social Arenas’ and directed by Professor Carlo Ruzza of the University of Trento. Professor Flaminia Saccà, a co-author of the volume, was the head of the research unit at the University of Tuscia, where the other co-author, Dr Donatella Selva, worked as a researcher.

v

Contents

1

Introduction 1.1 Leadership Styles and changing Political Cultures 1.2 Plan of the Book 1.3 Methodology References

1 4 12 13 15

Part I Women Leaders Between Competence and Empathy: Angela Merkel and Erna Solberg Introducing Women Leaders: Merkel and Solberg 2.1 The Covid-19 Pandemic in Germany and Norway: Epidemiological and Political Data References

21

3

Angela Merkel’s Approach to the Pandemic 3.1 Between Collective and Individual Responsibility 3.2 Democracy, Institutions, and the Welfare State 3.3 Empathic Leadership 3.4 The Role of Science

35 37 42 52 58

4

Erna Solberg’s Approach to the Pandemic 4.1 Between Collective and Individual Responsibility 4.2 Democracy, Institutions, and the Welfare State

65 67 75

2

26 31

vii

viii

CONTENTS

4.3 Empathic Leadership 4.4 The Role of Science References

80 82 84

Part II Techno-populism, Expertise and the Welfare State: Giuseppe Conte, Emmanuel Macron and Pedro Sánchez 5

Introducing Techno-Populist Leaders and Their Alternative: Conte and Macron Faced to Sánchez 5.1 The Covid-19 Pandemic in Italy, France, and Spain: Epidemiological and Political Data References

87 91 95

6

Giuseppe Conte’s Approach to the Pandemic 6.1 The Relationship with the People 6.2 Ideology and Policies 6.3 The Relationship with Politics 6.4 The Relationship with Europe 6.5 The Relationship with Science

97 99 106 111 115 118

7

Emmanuel Macron’s Approach to the Pandemic 7.1 The Relationship with the People 7.2 Ideology and Policies 7.3 The Relationship with Politics 7.4 The Relationship with Europe 7.5 The Relationship with Science

123 125 128 129 132 134

8

Pedro Sánchez’s Approach to the Pandemic 8.1 The Relationship with the People 8.2 Ideology and Policies 8.3 The Relationship with Politics 8.4 The Relationship with Europe 8.5 The Relationship with Science

137 143 155 167 177 181

CONTENTS

ix

Part III Populist Leaders Against the Virus: Boris Johnson’s and Victor Orban’s Pandemic Narratives 9

10

11

The Pandemic Turn: Populist Government Leaders Facing the Virus 9.1 The Covid-19 Pandemic in Hungary and the United Kingdom: Epidemiological and Political Data References

191

196 203

Boris Johnson’s Approach to the Pandemic 10.1 Strengths: Raising Strong leadership’s Appeal and Exploiting Media Centrality 10.2 Weaknesses: Facing a Reality-Based Colossus Opponent and Taking Responsibility for Unpopular Politics 10.3 Opportunities: Promoting an Authoritarian Turn, Exploiting the Community-Under-Siege Rhetoric, and Riding the ‘Rally Round the Flag’ Effect 10.4 Threats: The Call for Competence Revival, the Emergence of a Scientific Elite Counterweight, and New Communicative Patterns References

205

Viktor Orbán’s Approach to the Pandemic 11.1 Strengths: Raising Strong Leadership’s Appeal and Exploiting Media Centrality 11.2 Weaknesses: Facing a Reality-Based Colossus Opponent and Taking Responsibility for Unpopular Politics 11.3 Opportunities: Promoting an Authoritarian Turn, Exploiting the Community Under Siege Rhetoric, and Riding the ‘Rally Round the Flag’ Effect 11.4 Threats: The Calling for Competence Revival, the Emergence of a Scientific Elite Counterweight, and New Communicative Patterns References

229

206

211

217

221 226

229

232

238

243 246

x

12

CONTENTS

Conclusions References

Correction to: European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis

247 257 C1

References

259

Index

269

About the Authors

Flaminia Saccà is Full Professor of political sociology at Sapienza University of Rome, Italy. She is President of the International Sociological Association—Research Committee Sociotechnics-Sociological Practice (ISA RC26), Board member of the ESA Political Sociology Research Network (RN32), and of the Italian Political Sociology Association (AIS-Politica). She is also Scientific Director of the STEP Observatory and Research Network (on the social representation of gender violence), that includes colleagues from Sapienza University of Rome, from Messina University and the NGO Differenza Donna, and Scientific Director of the Science, Politics and Society (SPo.So) Lab of Sapienza, Tuscia University, and the Italian National Research Council (CNR). Her latest publications focus on women’s leadership and on the social representation of gender violence. Donatella Selva is Assistant Professor in sociology of culture and communication at the Department of Social and Political Science at the University of Florence, where she teaches Digital Media and Digital Cultures and Technologies at the B.D. and M.A. level. She works in the field of political communication and cultural studies, focusing on the impact of technology on social and political processes. She is the member of many national and international associations in the fields of political and media studies. She has recently published a monograph (in Italian) to explore the relationship between social media and processes of emotionalisation of the

xi

xii

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

public sphere, including an analysis of bottom-up communication used by NGOs to promote solidarity towards migrants. She is currently involved in a research network aimed at analysing the mechanisms of manipulation of the public opinion through the lens of platform and algorithm studies.

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1

Fig. 2.2

Fig. 3.1

Fig. 4.1

Fig. 5.1

Waves of Covid-19 in Germany and Norway (number of confirmed cases) (Source Johns Hopkins University CSSE COVID-19 data) Stringency Index in Germany and Norway (Source Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford—Last updated 25 January 2022, 09:20 [London time]. OurWorldInData.org/coronavirus • CC BY) Distribution of the topics addressed in Angela Merkel’s speeches (Source Data from PRIN2017 “The transformations of democracy: Actors, strategies and outcomes in opposing populism in political, juridical and social arenas”, Tuscia University’s research unit) Distribution of the topics addressed in Erna Solberg’s speeches (Source Data from PRIN2017 “The transformations of democracy: Actors, strategies and outcomes in opposing populism in political, juridical and social arenas”, Tuscia University’s research unit) Waves of Covid-19 in France, Italy, and Spain (number of confirmed cases) (Source Johns Hopkins University CSSE COVID-19 data)

26

28

36

67

92

xiii

xiv

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 5.2

Fig. 6.1

Fig. 7.1

Fig. 8.1

Fig. 9.1

Fig. 9.2

Fig. 9.3

Stringency Index in France, Italy, and Spain. (Source Hale, T., Angrist, N., Goldszmidt, R., Kira, B., Petherick, A., Phillips, T., Webster S., Cameron-Blake, E., Hallas, L., Majumdar, S., & Tatlow, H. A global panel database of pandemic policies (Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker). Nature Human Behaviour—Lat updated 26 June, 16:00 [London time]. OurWorldInData.org/coronavirus • CC BY) Distribution of the topics addressed in Giuseppe Conte’s speeches (Source Data from PRIN2017 “The transformations of democracy: Actors, strategies and outcomes in opposing populism in political, juridical and social arenas”, Tuscia University’s research unit) Distribution of the topics addressed in Emmanuel Macron’s speeches (Source Data from PRIN2017 “The transformations of democracy: Actors, strategies and outcomes in opposing populism in political, juridical and social arenas”, Tuscia University’s research unit) Distribution of the topics addressed in Pedro Sánchez’s speeches (Source Data from PRIN2017 “The transformations of democracy: Actors, strategies and outcomes in opposing populism in political, juridical and social arenas”, Tuscia University’s research unit) SWOT pandemic and populist government leaders (Source Data from PRIN2017 “The transformations of democracy: Actors, strategies and outcomes in opposing populism in political, juridical and social arenas”, Tuscia University’s research unit) Waves of Covid-19 in the United Kingdom and Hungary (number of confirmed cases) (Source WHO COVID-19 dashboard) Stringency index in the United Kingdom and Hungary (Source Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford—Last Updated 25 January 2022, 09:20 [London time]. OurWorldInData.org/coronavirus • CC BY)

93

98

124

138

194

196

199

List of Tables

Table Table Table Table

2.1 5.1 9.1 10.1

Dataset description: Germany and Norway Data set description: Italy, France, Spain Dataset description Boris Johnson’s virus labelling

30 94 202 214

xv

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The Covid-19 pandemic has affected countries, political systems, economies, and civil societies in many ways, reshaping, enhancing, and revealing the different political cultures and leadership styles in Europe and throughout the world. In this volume, we focus on how the pandemic has contributed to refining and remaking leadership styles and political cultures, making them sharper and more clearly defined after decades of claims of the demise of ideologies and arguments that similar values and programmes are found in different parties and among various leaders, at least within the West. More specifically, the pandemic has raised questions about the role of the state, the weight and extension of political power, and the role of science in and for society, posing questions of legitimacy in an era when authoritative actors have been attacked alongside authority and hierarchy. The overall levels of democracy, education, and secularisation in Western countries have been challenged in recent decades, including the very concept of authority, contributing, as a secondary effect, to the weakening of states and institutions. Consequently, when we were hit by the Covid-19 outbreak at the beginning of 2020, we found ourselves astonished by the events that followed: the pandemic not only abruptly interrupted our habits, but it also de facto started to challenge our perceptions of the state, science, health, security, politics, responsibility, and society itself. It forced us to © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Saccà and D. Selva, European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9_1

1

2

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

reflect not only on our sense of security and beliefs but also on whether and eventually how the pandemic could reassign a more assertive role to the state and a national, not global, geopolitical order. Day by day, aside from the apprehension, some also began to think about the pandemic as a window of opportunity for rethinking society and the way we manage political, communicative, and governance processes. Indeed, as political and communication sociologists, we found in these momentous times the opportunity to better analyse how political leadership is constructed, represented, and managed in times of crisis. Some of the differences among the European leaders included in our research pertain to their political cultures; others seem to be more grounded in their political socialisation. For instance, the individual path towards political socialisation seems to regularly affect gender roles, even when it comes to political leadership, resulting in a higher probability that women leaders have a more horizontal approach as well as a more listening-oriented style of leadership. This book provides a comprehensive description of how European leaders have faced the Covid-19 pandemic, using a multidisciplinary perspective grounded in political sociology and communication studies. As many have already argued, the pandemic can be read as a meta-crisis, i.e. a crisis comprised of many other sub-crises, such as the crisis of the welfare state (and particularly of the public healthcare system), economic crises, and most of all the crisis of political legitimacy and decision-making when confronted with science. In this view, the pandemic has catalysed trends that were already at play in the contemporary political landscape. Phenomena such as the personalisation of leadership, the reinforcement of the executive branch, and the disempowering of parliaments, and the ambivalent relationship among technocracy, expertise, and populism, have been read as signals of change in the institutions of liberal democracy, or, in the most pessimistic accounts, of their deep crisis. Most importantly, the pandemic has exacerbated the importance of the already-existing cleavage between populism and technocracy, positioning it at the centre of the political conflict (Berti & Ruzza, 2022). Various outcomes have emerged from this critical juncture: for instance, on the one hand, all governments, whether populist or not, have had to interact with subject experts to improve their chances of navigating the coronavirus crisis and managing its devastating effects on national economies. On the other hand, never before has science been as controversial as during the Covid-19 infodemic (as the World Health Organisation has

1

INTRODUCTION

3

defined it), with the circulation of pseudo-science, conspiracy theories, and the emergence of no-mask and no-vax movements, paralleled by scientific disputes and contradictory advice (Eslen-Ziya & Giorgi, 2022). While most literature has focused on describing the varieties of populism, less has been said about the relationship between such variants of populism and their opponents: in a sense, the broader the spectrum of populist typologies, the more accentuated the risk of overly stretching a concept, in this case, leaving little or no chance for the emergence of an alternative to populism. In this book, the relationship between populism and science is examined as a lens to understand: (1) how populism is realigning and adapting to an unprecedented crisis that not only requires that public policies be informed by scientific evidence but also that public communication relies on a scientific register; (2) how non-populism is related to reality-based communication,1 and, as in this case, to science and expertise and how it differs from mere technocracy, starting from the crucial assumption that techno-populism is a specific mode of contemporary political action. This book aims to deepen the analysis of the current turbulence, focusing more specifically on how democratic institutions are changing their organisations and models of authority under the pressure of a required dialogue with expert systems. The originality of the communicative approach allows a focus on the changes that occurred to decisionmaking processes, political representation, and the performance of power. Indeed, our empirical analysis shows that populism is better understood when considered as a communication style rather than an ontology (leading to a binary classification between populists and non-populists) or an ideology (as thin as it may be). On the contrary, the hypothesis that populism is a communication style opens the discussion to a fuzzy logic more closely connected to social and political phenomena. By considering the relationship among leadership, expertise, and science, the 1 A periphrasis of the well-known discourse pronounced by an aide of the Bush administration according to Ron Suskind: ‘The aide said that guys like me were “in what we call the reality-based community,” which he defined as people who “believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.” […] “That’s not the way the world really works anymore,” he continued. “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality—judiciously, as you will— we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors…and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do”’ (Suskind, 2004; see also Halliday, 2010; Saccà, 2016).

4

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

book thus demonstrates how different leaders who have been labelled as non-populists and populists, depending on the case, may employ populist overtones from time to time, although with different nuances. This project emerged as part of a Project of National Interest (PRIN2017) developed by a national network of universities, funded by the Italian Ministry of Research in 2017, titled ‘The Transformations of Democracy: Actors, Strategies and Outcomes in Opposing Populism in Political, Juridical and Social Arenas’ and directed by Professor Carlo Ruzza of the University of Trento. Professor Flaminia Saccà, a co-author of the volume, was coordinated the research unit at the University of Tuscia, where the other co-author, Dr Donatella Selva, worked as a researcher. The co-authors later moved to Sapienza University, and the two units focused on the communication strategies used by political leaders who oppose populism. The book meets the interests of social scientists and scholars of linguistics and rhetoric by providing a comprehensive look at different European contexts. It helps readers to interpret the fragmentation of the European landscape in terms of political and ideological turmoil, discusses the appearance of new actors in the political arena, and reveals the conditions under which Covid-19 has deployed its disastrous effects in each country. In addition, the book is also suitable for any researcher or student looking to access a systematised, coherent, and comprehensive outlook on the features of contemporary political leadership and communication. The methodological consistency of the study is intended to assist readers at the introductory level (i.e. non-specialised in political sociology or communication science) to navigate the concepts.

1.1 Leadership Styles and changing Political Cultures The relationships among politics, citizens, and science have been studied in light of the processes of secularisation dating back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Indeed, throughout recent history, such relationships have evolved in a growing tension among institutions, authorities, and the general public and, in certain countries, between populism and expertise. This process has affected political cultures, the role of information and education, and the relationship between those governing and those being governed. In recent years, we have witnessed a growing polarisation between the two. As such, we observe three overlapping

1

INTRODUCTION

5

phenomena that the Covid-19 context has exacerbated: (1) the relationship among leadership styles, political communication, and processes of leader selection; (2) the relationship among science, politics, and society and its consequences for public policies and investments in culture and education; and (3) the relationship between citizenship and authorities, whether national institutions (state, government, parliament) or European institutions (in particular the European Medical Agency) or scientific authorities at large, illustrating how the gap between citizens and authorities has grown not only due to anti-intellectual rhetoric but to a more general anti-authoritative sub-culture and attitude if not ideology. Indeed, classical sociological theories about the distribution of power have accounted for a clear demarcation between the people and the elite. However, it is only in the last decade that this cleavage has gained centrality in the organisation of political parties, leader selection, the discursive strategies used during the permanent campaign, and, more generally, in the social base of consensus. Understandably, the emergence of populist parties has attracted attention from both scholars and commentators across the world. Yet what is still missing is an outlook on the alternatives to populism, particularly whether the supposed conflict between the general public and systems of experts can be eliminated. The authors argue that the pandemic has reopened a discussion about the foundations of post-democratic societies. More specifically, the necessity to renegotiate a new equilibrium among science/expertise, political institutions/authorities, and popular sovereignty brought by the Covid19 pandemic has illuminated the potentially fragile relationship between the governors and the governed in these times of thin ideologies, emphasising the specific traits of populist, techno-populist, and non-populist styles of leadership. It is in their different attitudes towards experts and civil society, in their different interpretations of the role of the state and public office, that we can more clearly discern their political cultures, their styles of communication, and their different conceptions and management of power. The privileged object of study in this volume is the leadership style of pandemic management by political actors in different European countries. The concept of leadership has been defined in many ways, beginning with the seminal contribution of Max Weber, whose theory on charismatic power is often evoked when it comes to analysing and describing populist leaders. Starting from the very definition that Weber provides

6

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

of the political leader—someone who lives for politics and not of politics, by virtue of their own intimate vocation—it must be acknowledged that it is challenging to attribute charismatic qualities to populist leaders, past or present. Could we seriously affirm that leaders such as Trump, Johnson, Putin, and Orbán fit the Weberian description of ‘political animals’ possessed by the sacred fire of dedication to the task? Weber reminds us that at least ‘some faith must always be there’, a vision that is remote from one’s own—albeit necessary—ambition that allows the charismatic leader to consider events calmly. A sense of objectivity and detachment, of foresight, these are the qualities that every politician, every leader worthy of the name, should possess. A gift of grace, charisma, an exceptional quality, if not a prophetic capacity for discernment and guidance of the community—such is the stuff charismatic leaders are made of—and their nature is neither exhausted nor debased in the communicative capacity we tend to misunderstand today, but which is meant to be a creative revolutionary force in history. Indeed, Weber himself underlined how this type of leadership depends on social enchantment. The extraordinary qualities (real or presumed, it does not really matter) of a charismatic leader are such because the people believe they exist. History has proved that it is not infrequent to encounter this fideistic type of devotion from a population that will follow a leader far beyond any tangible evidence of their inadequacy out of enthusiasm, necessity, or hope. So, we will try to avoid giving in to the temptation to equate the qualities of the leaders under scrutiny with those of an idealistic statesman or stateswoman. We will try, on the contrary, to analyse how they interpret their role and the type of leadership they display, although the study of leadership does not cease to be a fundamental yet slippery slope. Leadership has been discussed in disciplines as diverse as psychology, political science, communication science, and sociology. In particular, for several decades, leadership has been circumscribed to personal, psychological qualities or, from an entirely instrumental perspective, to particular techniques of communication and persuasion. James Macgregor Burns’s distinction between transactional and transformational leadership is a case in point (Burns, 1978). Originating within psychological studies, Burns’s theory referred to two types of leadership (later extended to six) as opposite poles of a continuum from maximum rationality to maximum empathy. While the transactional leader adopts a social exchange mode of interaction (i.e. based on a rational calculus between costs and benefits,

1

INTRODUCTION

7

a disposition to privilege self-interest and the attainment of short-term achievements), the quality of the transformational leader is the ability to influence others’ behaviours by inspiring a moral commitment towards each other, rather than through coercion. The concept of transformational leadership has been mainly used in organisation studies, primarily in the private sector, and applied to small or medium-sized groups; also, it lies at the heart of studies that have investigated the role of communication in the construction of political leadership (Campus, 2013; De Blasio et al., 2012; Sorice, 2014). Elsewhere, we have noted that the Covid-19 crisis urged government leaders to be transformational: interpreting the social change and defining the route to follow while at the same time involving citizens in a collective mission to be performed cognitively and behaviourally (Saccà, 2020; Selva, 2020). However, even if the context directed communication modes in this direction, not all leaders reacted similarly to the same stimulus. As the cases analysed will show, European leaders adopted completely different communication and management modes, depending on their political culture, system of alliances, the course of the crisis, and their relationship with scientific experts and civil society. We can define the concept leadership style as a complex set of argumentative and communicative modes interwoven with specific mediation skills and the exercise of power through the system of political alliances. Leadership style is thus the result of the articulation of different elements, which can be modulated in relation to different factors: endogenous (i.e. the identity characteristics of the leader, such as education, religion, age, ethnicity, and of course, political culture) and exogenous (i.e. the political context, alliances, and relevant issues in the public debate). As for endogenous factors, they affect leadership style in such a way that two women political leaders may react differently to the same situation (synchronic or category variation). As for exogenous ones, they determine the most significant variations so that the same woman in power may adopt one leadership style at the beginning of her term and another towards the end (diachronic or individual variation). In determining leadership style, communication plays a vital role. Indeed, especially in times of crisis, a leader is expected not only to make the most appropriate decisions to mitigate its effects but also to build a base of legitimacy as broad as possible around these decisions and to justify them to the general public, the media, and specific social categories more or less organised into interest groups. In fact, crisis communication

8

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

is not an ancillary part of crisis management but occurs from the earliest stages, if not even before a crisis (Coombs, 2019). Thus, although the situation was the same for all during the Covid-19 pandemic and crisis, communication techniques are now well-established and widespread among all leaders, the outcomes varied widely. As Ruth Wodak (2019) has noted, some leaders resorted more than others to a securitarian, if not outright warlike, value universe. Wodak places this communicative model in a project of renationalising public discourse and identity politics, which has clear political-ideological references in a rightwing sub-culture. On the other hand, Wodak identifies in Angela Merkel and Jacinda Ardern a diametrically opposite model, characterised by the two leaders’ ability to engage in a ‘quasi-dialogue’ with citizens (for the case of Jacinda Ardern, which is beyond the scope of this volume, see an earlier reflection of ours: Saccà & Selva, 2021). Taking it a step further, this volume will show that this different leadership style, which we call empathic, also corresponds to better pandemic management from a political and scientific perspective. So, what is the distinguishing feature that leads to this discrepancy in leadership and management styles during the pandemic crisis? We propose considering this issue in the light of the different political cultures that animate the leaders, i.e. their idea of state, power, leadership, citizenship, and, ultimately, of democracy itself. The term political culture is often used to indicate a way of conducting politics or the political sensibility of a party, a movement, or, indeed, a leader. Originating from Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s (1963) methodological approach to the study of civic culture and deriving from the analysis of civic society’s attitudes towards the political sphere, the concept has since been used in a wider sense. In its orthodox origins, political culture is defined as “the totality of the population’s attitudes, cognitions, feelings and evaluations towards the political system”. Though Almond and Verba introduced a new field of research that focused on new ways to monitor and support the levels of democracy around the world, many critics have pointed out—among other issues—that their approach was limited to individualistic and psychological dimensions. Consequently, it was somewhat incapable of including the complexity of the social dimension of political phenomena. So, in this book, we use the term political culture more broadly; to better explain this choice, we will

1

INTRODUCTION

9

briefly highlight some aspects of the theoretical debate that has accompanied the studies of political culture for half a century, leading to the wider use of the concept. The methodological approach devised by Almond and Verba, which then formed the basis of the research on political culture, draws influence and inspiration, as the authors state from the outset, from earlier work in fields as diverse as psychology, anthropology, and sociology. A certain prominence is given, then, to psycho-cultural studies of political phenomena and research on the ‘cultural personality’, and they mention a long list of authors and texts ranging from Weber to Parsons to Ruth Benedict, from Kardiner to Lasswell, and many others. In the very definition of the object of their analysis, Almond and Verba’s recourse to the subjective dimension of political culture, by its very nature more psychological than social, appears evident. The authors argue that the citizens must internalise the political system, its laws, culture, and values. There needs to be congruity and continuity between the system and its widespread values. Most importantly, they introduce survey methods in order to assess the population’s attitudes, cognitions, feelings, and evaluations towards the political system to monitor if citizens had internalised a democratic civic culture and if they perceived themselves as capable of supporting it. As many authors have pointed out, we believe that it is very limiting to base an analysis of a country’s political culture by attempting to predict its democratic resilience solely on inferences drawn from the citizens’ self-perception. For example, having circumscribed political culture to a psychological, individual, and abstract dimension undermines its methodological resilience and, with it, its predictive capacity. If we refer to Italy in particular, limiting the analysis to self-perception and not actual observed or recorded behaviour has led the authors to believe that our democracy is too fragile to last (Almond & Verba, 1980; see also Saccà, 2015; Saccà & Massidda, 2021). It is safe to assume that if the high levels of electoral participation (historically much higher in Italy than in the United States, for example) had been taken into account, and if the actual participation through large mass organisations had been followed more closely, along with party membership, trade union involvement, and people’s participation in demonstrations and assemblies, the authors would have been able to obtain a clearer picture of the country’s changing reality. The essentially individual, psychological conception of culture seems to have prevented

10

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

the authors from analysing the population’s actual behaviour towards the political sphere and its (positive) effects for democracy. In fact, critics of the original theoretical framework have commented on a wide array of topics, including the very concepts of democracy and participation. As pointed out by Carole Pateman (1980) in an essay included in Almond and Verba’s The Civic Culture Revisited, democracy is not limited to the liberal, Northern American version of the concept. For example, it also entails widespread and direct participation from people of various social classes. Similar observations are made by Wiatr (1980), who nevertheless focuses on the relationship between structure and political culture, arguing that it is not possible to talk about a political culture without taking into account where it originates from or the class structure of a society. Wiatr also notes how Marxist sociology has incorporated political culture as a legitimate instrument of analysis since the work of Burlackij (1970) in the then Soviet Union and of Markiewicz (1971) in Poland; both authors use the term in a profoundly different way than Almond and Verba. For example, Burlackij defines political culture as ‘the level of knowledge and perceptions about power and politics possessed by various strata of society and by various individuals’. However, according to the author, a political culture does not end in abstract and individual knowledge—quite the contrary; in his perspective, it also includes ‘the level of their political activity determined precisely by the social stratum’. Markiewicz, for his part, attaches more importance to cultural aspects, defining a political culture as ‘those elements in the overall culture of a society that refer to the values recognised and considered by a given group and that concern the state’s system of power’. Moreover, Wiatr (1980) further widens the concept, extending it to the totality of attitudes, values, patterns of behaviour existing in a given society with reference to the reciprocal relationship between state power and citizens. It includes knowledge about politics, evaluations of political phenomena, emotional aspects of political orientations, and patterns of political behaviour. Almond (2005) later returns to the issue, summarising the criticisms of his work, including those of communist scholars such as Richard Fage, Robert Tucker, and Stephen White, for whom it is inconceivable to separate attitudes from political behaviour and who also underline the risks and weaknesses of the subjectivisation implicit in the original theory (Fagen, 1969; Tucker, 1973; White, 1979, 1984). However, Almond (2005, pp. 257–258) defends his choice once again by reaffirming the

1

INTRODUCTION

11

necessity of this separation in order to operationalise the analysis of a given political culture. Additionally, while Pateman focuses her criticism on the liberal conception of democracy underlying the theoretical framework of civic culture and Marxist authors highlight the shortcomings of its psychologicalindividualist approach as well as the absence of an analysis that contemplates the relationship between socio-economic structures and political superstructures, others refute the original definition of political culture. Lowell Dittmer (1977), for example, bases his criticism on the “subjective perception of an objective political reality”; Percy Allum (1988, 2006) states that if one limits the analysis to the psychological dimension of culture (political or not), one will only collect percentages on subjective meanings that are not very “meaningful” since, according to Allum, only intersubjective meanings can give life—and of course meaning—to practices. Finally, an analysis of political culture cannot be circumscribed to the individuals that comprise a civic society, as in Almond and Verba’s seminal work, nor is it sufficient to include only the socio-economic conditions underlying it (as in the Marxist approach). Any evaluation must also include the political praxis and actions, the laws, the symbols, and the political roles and actors. In other words, a political culture, just like a culture—according to anthropologists since Edward Burnett Tylor’s Primitive Culture (1871) onwards, should include the analysis of concrete aspects alongside intangible ones: actions as well as values, symbols as well as laws, political/electoral behaviour as well as attitudes, the interaction between institutions and individuals (Wilson, 1992), and as far as we are concerned, the role and actions of the governors as well as the governed. More specifically, we focus on the leaders and their leadership styles: we analyse the way they interpret their role, their idea of state, institutions, authority, and expertise; the relationship between the governors and the governed they seek and institute during their tenure; and finally, the internal political culture and the idea of state and of public responsibility that it implies. We hypothesise that populist leaders tend to adopt a style of leadership that will use and enhance their personal traits, whereas nonpopulist leaders will employ a less individualistic and more institutional, state-based (and collective) kind of power.

12

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

1.2

Plan of the Book

The book is divided into three parts, each comparing two or three leaders according to their adherence to a leadership style. The introduction of each part thus traces the biography of the leaders, their rise to power, and their ideological leanings. Also, each leader’s style during the pandemic is sketched in terms of public policies and containment measures, providing national timelines of the first and second waves of the Covid-19 pandemic. For each national case, the periodisation highlights the main events of the year, the curves of cases and deaths, and the data referring to the fluctuations in each leader’s popularity. The first part (by Flaminia Saccà and Donatella Selva) takes a genderbased perspective to analyse the cases of Angela Merkel (Germany) and Erna Solberg (Norway) as female leadership models. The authors argue that despite conventional accounts of female political leaders, the pandemic has constituted a window of opportunity for a more complex profile. Subsequently, they explain why women leaders have proven to be more effective than men in the management of the pandemic and how their communication style has successfully combined scientific competence, rigour, and empathy. More specifically, in previous generations of female leaders, the traditional spectrum of ‘feminine competence’ was limited to a concept of care, albeit broadened to include the policy areas of the welfare state such as health, family, and education. Analysing the speeches by Merkel and Solberg, the authors claim that these politicians exhibit a new trait in female leadership that is linked to their capacity to put experts’ advice into dialogue with the necessities of the different sectors of society, translating complex scientific arguments into language that can be understood by the broader public. The second part (by Flaminia Saccà and Donatella Selva) addresses the relationship among populism, techno-populism, and expertise by analysing the cases of Emmanuel Macron (France), Giuseppe Conte (Italy), and Pedro Sánchez (Spain). More specifically, the leaders of the Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle) and The Republic On The Move (La République En Marche) have been indicated as examples of techno-populist actors. The authors highlight how notions of ‘technicity’ and expertise have been increasingly used as a source of legitimacy for these new political leaders, who paradoxically rely on a populist communication strategy. This trend calls into question one of the most widespread populist axioms: the people vs the elites. At the same time,

1

INTRODUCTION

13

the pandemic has revealed the fallacies of a political scheme constructed on such a vertical conflict, reintegrating forms of scientific expertise. As the case of Sánchez shows, political expertise has also been invoked as a key element of leadership, substantiating the meaning of politics in contrast with the populist zeitgeist and the politics of hate. At the same time, opposing views of the welfare state emerge from the three leaders’ discourses: a techno-populist and instrumental view is opposed to a symbolic and ideological view. This re-semantisation has produced contrasting results for the three leaders: on the one hand, we see postideological stances going hand in hand with a paternalist leadership style; on the other, transformational leadership has been embraced by those who interpret politics ‘as a vocation’. The third part (by Luca Massidda and Flaminia Saccà) takes an opposite view on leadership styles by analysing two male champions of European populism: Viktor Orbán (Hungary) and Boris Johnson (United Kingdom). It seeks to identify themes, topics, moods, and styles that have characterised the political communication adopted by the two main European populist governments that have struggled most with the coronavirus. The analysis is focused on verifying whether this health crisis has also produced an intensification of populist rhetoric’s traditional characteristics (starting from its main ideological dimensions: appeal to ‘the people’, attacking the elite, ostracising ‘others’) or if it has instead led to a change of its argumentative structures. The comparison is grounded in the two leaders’ approaches to the politics of fear, one of the cornerstones of contemporary far-right populism, which appear more ambivalent than expected at first sight. The authors show that while Orbán has exploited the moral panic and anxiety surrounding the pandemic to further reinforce his leadership and complete his project of illiberal democracy, Johnson initially adopted another strategy, underplaying the risks for the population, but then moved to a radically different style, more dialogical and institutionally respectful.

1.3

Methodology

Each country’s leader constitutes a specific case study and has been analysed with a coherent methodology. By taking a comparative perspective based on the most similar, most dissimilar principle of sampling (on France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom), the book analyses the communicative and performative style

14

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

adopted by the leaders in the framework of different political-media ecologies. Consequently, it underlines how both contextual features (i.e. major aspects of national agendas and the degree of a leader’s legitimacy in parliaments and public opinion) and intervening variables (most of all, the fluctuation of the contagion) have contributed to shaping each leader’s discourse. The research is focused on the oral discourses introduced by leaders (i.e. heads of government such as presidents or prime ministers) on several occasions, from the first speech given between February and March 2020 until the end of 2020. The end of the period covered by the study, of course, does not coincide with the end of the pandemic; indeed, the definitive end of the pandemic could possibly arrive some years in the future. Nevertheless, the period is sufficiently long to cover the first and the second waves of the pandemic (with the exception of Hungary, Norway, and the United Kingdom). Ideally speaking, the first wave is defined as when the leader had to explain to the people the reasons why they should renounce personal freedoms and how they suggested facing this unprecedented crisis. The second wave is not a novelty per se but emerged after a summer in which the leaders worked to overcome the economic knockback through messages of hope and optimism; the need to switch registers again must be justified. Moreover, during the second wave, the discussion on vaccines began to circulate more frequently. Overall, the aim is to compare the distribution of the topics covered by each leader and highlight the discursive strategies with which each leader built their own communication style, hypothesising a clear difference between populist and non-populist styles as regards the management of the pandemic. In order to reach such an objective, all pieces of institutional communication (such as more consolidated formats like press briefings and national addresses and more innovative formats like podcasts, Facebook live streams, and conversations with the public) issued throughout 2020 have been retrieved and analysed, for a total of about 300 pieces of discourse. Each chapter highlights the topics addressed by political leaders during the first and the second waves of the Covid-19 pandemic, the evolution of the national agendas over time, and their parallel development compared to other European countries. In particular, all cases have been analysed through a coherent coding scheme aimed at identifying substantive topics (such as issues of public health, the economy, the representation of scientists, the debates surrounding science and pseudo-science, the leader’s

1

INTRODUCTION

15

self-representation, the main political issues emerging in each country, the relationship between the leader and the media, and international relations) as well as the argumentative strategies and prevailing rhetorical formulas used to address each of those topics. The research is based on an interpretive approach to content analysis, and all materials have been subjected to a procedure of segmentation and coding following an ad hoc coding scheme that highlights the topics, frames, and rhetoric of the leaders. Usually, segments are defined in terms of units of the text that address a certain topic; this implies that we do not follow the segmentation provided by the text (i.e. in paragraphs or lines defined by punctuation). For each segment identifying a topic, we have analysed the frame in which it is addressed. For instance, public health and welfare spending could be embedded in a managerial and economic frame that emphasises the need to preserve efficiency and reduce costs or in a social-democratic frame that highlights equality and civil liberties. Another example is science and scientific disputes, where leaders can embed them as proof of the limited credibility and reliability of scientists in general, contrasting it with the ‘common sense’ of the man of the streets; in contrast, scientific disputes can be dismissed as normal and episodic and used to buttress the correctness of precautionary measures. In cases of overlap, we have applied the most specific category. At the end of the coding, we compared the results across leaders to find similarities and differences.

References Allum, P. (1988). Cultura o opinioni? Su alcuni dubbi epistemologici. Il politico, LIII (2), 221–268. Allum, P. (2006). Democrazia reale, stato e società civile nell’Europa occidentale. Liviana. Almond, G. A. (2005). Cultura civica e sviluppo politico. Il Mulino. Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1963). The civic culture. Political attitudes and democracy in five nations. Princeton University Press. Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (Eds.). (1980). The civic culture revisited. Sage. Berti, C., & Ruzza, C. (2022). Populism, science, and Covid-19 as a political opportunity: The case of the European Parliament. In H. Eslen-Ziya & A. Giorgi (Eds.), Populism and science in Europe (pp. 91–116). Palgrave Macmillan. Burlackij, F. M. (1970). Lenin, gosudarstvo, politika. Izdatel’stvo Nauka. Burns, J. (1978). Leadership. Harper & Row.

16

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

Campus, D. (2013). Women political leaders and the media. Palgrave Macmillan. Coombs, T. W. (2019). Ongoing crisis communication: Planning, managing, responding (5th ed.). Sage. De Blasio, E., Hibberd, M., Higgins, M., & Sorice, M. (2012). La leadership politica: Media e costruzione del consenso. Carocci. Dittmer, L. (1977). Political culture and political symbolism: Toward a theoretical synthesis. World Politics, 29(4), 552–583. https://doi.org/10.2307/201 0039 Eslen-Ziya, H., & Giorgi, A. (Eds.). (2022). Populism and science in Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. Fagen, R. (1969). The transformation of political culture in Cuba. Stanford University Press. Halliday, F. (2010). Shocked and awed: How the war on terror and Jihad have changed the English language. I.B. Tauris. Markiewicz, W. (1971). Kultura polityczna spoleczenstwa. Odra, 11(3), 3–10. Pateman, C. (1980). The civic culture: A philosophic critique. In G. A. Almond & S. Verba (Eds.), The civic culture revisited (pp. 57–102). Sage. Saccà, F. (2015). Culture politiche e partiti in mutamento. In F. Saccà (Ed.), Culture politiche e mutamento nelle società complesse (pp. 23–43). Franco Angeli. Saccà, F. (2016). Culture politiche, informazione e partecipazione nell’arena politica 2.0. Sociologia, 3, 28–40. Saccà, F. (Ed.). (2020). Changing democracies in an unequal world. Franco Angeli. Saccà, F., & Massidda, L. (2021). Culture politiche e leadership nell’era digitale. Franco Angeli. Saccà, F., & Selva, D. (2021). Women political leaders in pandemic times: Comparing Jacinda Ardern and Donald Trump’s representation of the Covid-19 crisis. Hayka. Kylbtypa. Obwectvo, 27 (2), 8–21. Selva, D. (2020). Leaders and emotions in post-representative democracies. In F. Saccà (Ed.), Changing democracies in an unequal world (pp. 67–87). Franco Angeli. Sorice, M. (2014). I media e la democrazia. Carocci. Suskind, R. (2004, October 17). Faith, certainty and the presidency of George W. Bush. The New York Times Magazine. https://www.nytimes.com/2004/ 10/17/magazine/faith-certainty-and-the-presidency-of-george-w-bush.html Tucker, R. C. (1973). Culture, political culture and communist society. Political Science Quarterly, 88(2), 173–190. https://doi.org/10.2307/2149106 Tylor, E. B. (1871). Primitive culture: Researches into the development of mythology, philosophy, religion, language, art and custom. J. Murray. White, S. (1979). Political culture and soviet politics. Macmillan.

1

INTRODUCTION

17

White, S. (1984). Political culture in communist states. Comparative Politics, 16(3), 351–365. Wiatr, J. J. (1980). The civic culture from a Marxist-sociological perspective. In G. A. Almond & S. Verba (Eds.), The civic culture revisited (pp. 103–123). Sage. Wilson, R. W. (1992). Compliance ideologies. Rethinking political culture. Cambridge University Press.

PART I

Women Leaders Between Competence and Empathy: Angela Merkel and Erna Solberg

CHAPTER 2

Introducing Women Leaders: Merkel and Solberg

Women leaders have always faced stereotypes linked to their gender, a legacy of an era when women were precluded from holding public office. Even with the introduction of universal suffrage, there was substantial inequality in access to the electorate, and this situation (especially in some countries) continued for several decades after the Second World War. The first female parliamentarians appeared at different times and in distinct ways in various countries worldwide, while the first ladies of South and North America gradually acquired more space in the news. The presence of women in politics has stimulated an endless stream of literature on vertical segregation, the difference between formal and substantive representation and possible corrective measures at the normative level (see, for example, Kittilson, 2006; Krook, 2009; Lovenduski, 2005; Lovenduski & Norris, 2003; Sanbonmatsu, 2006). However, the study of women’s leadership has mainly been located in a framework outside politics and linked to sectors such as industry, education, or psychology (Klenke, 1996). Indeed, according to some scholars, it is only since the election of Angela Merkel that female political leaders have become a reality worthy of further study (Campus, 2013). Although in 2005, when she was first elected Bundeskanzlerin, she was the 38th female leader in world history, Merkel marked a remarkable discontinuity:

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Saccà and D. Selva, European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9_2

21

22

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

In contrast to many previous female national leaders, Merkel was neither an acting nor interim chief executive selected to briefly fill a leadership void, a relative of a powerful male politician, nor the leader of a weak state. Instead, Merkel was chosen by the Bundestag in her own right to lead the world’s fourth largest economy and sixth largest military spender. (Davidson-Schmich, 2011, p. 325)

This change led to the emergence of a new perspective on female leadership. Studies on the subject identify two major difficulties for women on the road to power in any field. On the one hand, there is still a double standard in the assessment of women’s competence, affecting politics as well as other professional fields, including science (Eichler, 1980). On the other, there is a ‘double bind’ that inevitably draws upon two strongly stereotyped modes of representation of women, reproduced on a loop by contemporary media storytelling: the mother-angel who is docile, submissive, welcoming, and dedicated to caring tasks, or the competent iron lady who is an overbearing, presumptuous witch, sometimes unattractive— even repulsive, and other times seductive to the point of prostitution (Jamieson, 1995; Saccà, 2003, 2021). Within this framework, therefore, competence was historically set in opposition to femininity (understood exclusively as the capacity to care for others). Parallel to this process of female segregation, from antiquity to the present day, a profile of leadership has been built on ‘masculine’ characteristics: the ability to compete and stand out among others, courage, strength, and authority. In the field of political studies, anti-conventional male figures such as Barack Obama have been taken as examples of transformational leadership (Burns, 1978; De Blasio et al., 2012). More recently, women leaders have been attributed with a leadership style devoted to a more dialogic and collaborative mode of consensus building (Campus, 2013). This part of the volume investigates how two women leaders, Angela Merkel in Germany and Erna Solberg in Norway, dealt with the Covid19 pandemic and communicated some of the most difficult decisions in European history. We will see how both leaders helped to re-semantise the meaning of leadership by adopting a style that we call empathic: indeed, in these two cases, empathy—understood as the ability to build cross-cutting relationships, strengthen community ties, and align with citizens’ feelings—was the hallmark of the consensus-building mode. As the empirical

2

INTRODUCING WOMEN LEADERS: MERKEL AND SOLBERG

23

analysis will show, this also fostered the structuring of virtuous relationships with technical and scientific experts and, consequently, a better understanding of pandemic dynamics, necessary countermeasures, and the importance of good crisis communication management. As we have noted elsewhere (Saccà & Selva, 2021), this should not be assumed as obvious; indeed, it is precisely in the relationship between power and science during the pandemic that two different styles of contemporary leadership can be traced. Moreover, the two cases show how it is now more necessary than ever to shelve the false dichotomy of competence vs femininity in order to adopt a closer look at transformations in political leadership. As already mentioned, when Angela Merkel reached the German Federal Chancellery on 22 November 2005, the cap that for many years had prevented women from attaining the highest offices of state was finally blown off. To briefly review her biography, Merkel was born in the German Democratic Republic, where she earned her PhD in physical chemistry. She came to federal politics through the first elections after reunification in 1991, first as an MP and then as a Minister for Women and Youth in the fourth Kohl government. Her political career in the CDU was relatively fast-paced, and she collected several firsts: the first woman to become party secretary, the youngest person in that role, and the first from East Germany—a pastor’s daughter, divorced and childless (Mushaben, 2017). After serving as leader of the opposition, she was elected chancellor in 2005 and remained in office for four consecutive terms until 8 December 2021. Because of her exceptionalism and the way she has handled the role of chancellor of one of the world’s most powerful nations, Angela Merkel has been a case study from multiple perspectives. From the earliest days, her leadership style has been described as ‘leading from behind’, ‘indirect facilitation’, or even ‘strategic manoeuvring’ because it is characterised by the ability to weave relationships and build networks of alliances not only in the domestic but also in the international arena (Mushaben, 2022). During the last two terms, her communication has taken a more central role in shaping leadership. First, Merkel dealt with the so-called refugee crisis of 2015: on that occasion, she developed a style of communication and crisis management that she also adopted later during the pandemic. Central to her approach was solidarity with migrants, bringing

24

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

about a momentous change in German migration policies and meeting the protests of the newly formed far-right Alternative für Deutschland party (Laubenthal, 2019). Communicatively but also politically, Merkel favoured the development of a ‘welcome culture’ that would become a distinguishing feature of Germany that distinguished it from other European countries, fostering the rediscovery of a sense of community beyond nationalism (Funk, 2018). No matter the efficacy of this ambitious project, what is relevant here is the fact that Merkel has changed her leadership style over time, increasingly linking it to a universe of values (and a methodology of power management) conventionally conceived as ‘feminine’. To the qualities exhibited since the beginning of her first term, such as reliability, pragmatism, and mediation skills, she has added empathy and concern for the fate of women, particularly working mothers (Davidson-Schmich, 2011; Von Wahl, 2011). Further, her handling of the pandemic has been characterised by an ‘uncharacteristic sentimentality’ (Kneuer & Wallaschek, 2022). Throughout her tenure, from 2005 to 2021, Merkel maintained a very good overall approval rating, with lows of 68% (in 2018) and highs of 85% (in 2007; Pew Research Center, 2020); data also show that her approval rating was higher among German women (86% vs. 75% of men) and among the more educated segments of the population (88% vs. 78%). Her handling of the pandemic also won the trust of German citizens, which rose from 74% in 2019 to 81% in 2020. In our second case, Erna Solberg served as Prime Minister of Norway from 16 October 2013 to 14 October 2021, as leader of the Conservative Party in coalition with the Liberals and the Christian Democrats. While during her first term, she earned the nickname ‘Iron Erna’ for her neoliberal policies and the zero-tolerance shown towards the refugee crisis, during her second term, she used a more accommodating approach towards workers and welfare (Arora et al., 2022). Although she was the longest-serving conservative leader in office, her political career ended in March 2021 following a scandal. Solberg had planned a dinner for her 60th birthday at a restaurant, which was supposed to be attended by people from different households, thus breaking the anti-Covid-19 rules she had enacted. However, due to the Prime Minister’s illness, the

2

INTRODUCING WOMEN LEADERS: MERKEL AND SOLBERG

25

dinner was postponed; Solberg was fined, and the matter, from a legal point of view, ended there. Politically, however, this affair was seen as a kind of betrayal. The government already had a very low trust rate: in February 2020, only 26.8% of Norwegians expressed support for the Prime Minister, and her handling of the pandemic raised this rating by only five percentage points (Kalsnes & Skogerbø, 2021). Solberg had been very strict from the start in the implementation of virus containment measures, a fact that has undoubtedly benefited Norway (enough to spare it a second wave), but at the same time, this response resulted in extensive criticism. In addition to opposition in Parliament, the Crown Commission established by the same government in late April 2020 ruled that the government handled the pandemic well but violated Norway’s constitution when it ordered the lockdown because that was the prerogative of the Health Board (www.koronakommisjonen.no/). However, the election that ended Solberg’s term in office has been dubbed the ‘climate election’ because it played out according to the oil vs. renewables debate much more than on pandemic issues. On the other hand, the revenues from the sale of oil to other nations make up the bulk of Norway’s wealth, which puts Norway far above other Scandinavian nations and has enabled it to handle the economic impact of the pandemic with relative peace of mind. Although very different in personal histories and political trajectories, the two leaders examined converge in showing how there can be different ways of interpreting leadership, balancing qualities traditionally ascribed to women’s roles with rigorous management of the pandemic crisis. At the same time, although both fall into the category of empathetic leadership, each interpreted this role with different accents. Merkel relied on the narrative of her feelings when she wanted to emphasise the drama of the moment, asking citizens to take the situation seriously and stand in solidarity with one another at a challenging time. Solberg, for her part, reconstructed the sense of national unity around the concept of ‘dugnad’, which can be translated as ‘collective effort’ or ‘collective task’, which, as we shall see, has a distinctive resonance in the world scene.

26

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

2.1 The Covid-19 Pandemic in Germany and Norway: Epidemiological and Political Data Both Germany and Norway started testing the population as early as the end of January 2020 but registered the first positive case within a month apart from each other, on 27 January and 26 February, respectively (Fig. 2.1). Germany began monitoring the situation as early as the beginning of January, thanks to the work of the Robert Koch Institute (RKI); at the same time, the German government was able to benefit from an excellent “enabling environment” for pharmacological research and the development of tests capable of detecting the new coronavirus (Wieler et al., 2021). The fact that it has always financially supported the healthcare system with a large share of the gross domestic product (around 11%) has also favoured the possibilities of patient absorption and especially the spread of intensive care units. This was considered a determining factor for the resilience of the healthcare system and for the fairly low number

Fig. 2.1 Waves of Covid-19 in Germany and Norway (number of confirmed cases) (Source Johns Hopkins University CSSE COVID-19 data)

2

INTRODUCING WOMEN LEADERS: MERKEL AND SOLBERG

27

of deaths during the first wave (compared to other countries of a similar size; ibid.). In Germany, the first measures to combat the pandemic were introduced at the end of February and were aimed at limiting incoming travellers from China, then from Italy. Mid-March saw the restriction of mass gatherings and the closure of schools. The speed of the response led to an initial relaxation of the measures as early as mid-April, concluding by the middle of June. This decision was taken by the Lander governors, and Chancellor Angela Merkel, in a speech to the Bundestag on 23 April, expressed her opposition, having judged this response as too hasty (Kupferschmidt & Vogel, 2020). After a relatively quiet summer, the first cases of the second wave emerged at the end of August. The second wave hit Germany harder than the first, with a peak affecting the country from late October 2020 to mid-January 2021. In fact, Germany’s Stringency Index1 testifies to a swift but not particularly strict initial activation, which settled at 76.85 points for the duration of the first wave (three points below Norway, for example; see Fig. 2.2). The second wave differs, as Germany had to introduce more stringent measures, starting on 17 October (58.8) and peaking at 85.19 on 6 January 2021. In Norway, containment measures were put in place as early as 13 March 2020, when schools were closed following the first Covid-19 fatality. The decision was later described as an ‘early response’ because of the promptness of the Norwegian government’s reaction. In addition to timeliness, its speed was also applauded: Norway’s Stringency Index jumped from 11.11 on 10 March to 40.74 on 12 March to 60.19 on 16 March (Fig. 2.2). All Scandinavian countries shared this approach except

1 The Oxford Coronavirus Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT) assesses a government’s preparedness and efficacy against Covid-19. It considers 20 indicators (quantitative and qualitative) converted in a scale from 0 to 100: C: Containment and closure policies (i.e. school closing, workplace closing, cancellation of public events, restrictions on gatherings, closure of public transport, stay at home requirements, restrictions on internal movement, international travel controls); E: Economic policies (i.e. income support for households, debt/contract relief for households, fiscal measures, international support); H: Health system policies (i.e. public information campaigns, testing policy, contact tracing, emergency investment in health care, investment in vaccines, facial coverings, vaccination policy, protection of elderly people); M: Miscellaneous policies (i.e. policies that do not fit anywhere else). The Index is constantly under review; more information can be found at https://covidtracker.bsg.ox.ac.uk/.

28

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

Fig. 2.2 Stringency Index in Germany and Norway (Source Oxford COVID19 Government Response Tracker, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford—Last updated 25 January 2022, 09:20 [London time]. OurWorldI nData.org/coronavirus • CC BY)

for Sweden (Stangeland, 2020, 2021; Ursin et al., 2020); the exceptional nature of Sweden, within the context of a broadly similar starting point (i.e. a population and public health system capacity similar to other Nordic countries2 ), makes it possible to strongly endorse Norway’s

2 See for instance the data cited in Ursin et al. (2020, pp. 663–665): ‘Norway is a prosperous country with a population of 5.3 million and a GDP per capita of e43,900. […] The over-65-year old’s make up 17% of the population with a median age of 39.5 and an elderly dependency rate of 26.9. Most of the population is concentrated in the south of the country and 83% live in urban areas but there are significant dispersed populations as the overall population density in 2016 was 14.3 people per square kilometre of land area. […] Like other Nordic countries and the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and New Zealand, Norway has a public financed national healthcare system (a Bevridgean system) providing universal coverage for all residents financed through general taxation (74%), the national insurance scheme (11%) and private expenditure (15%) while private health insurance is marginal covering less than 5% of elective services. Co-payment is capped but relates primarily to dental care and outpatient pharmaceuticals. In 2017, Norway spent

2

INTRODUCING WOMEN LEADERS: MERKEL AND SOLBERG

29

Covid-19 response policies. It is precisely the excellent starting conditions regarding the capacity of the healthcare system to respond and the ability of schools to cope with the needs of distance learning that have been shown to be predisposing factors for an ‘early response’ (OECD, 2020). Norway received a score of 79.63 out of 100 at its peak (between 24 March and 20 April 2020) before dropping to 43.52 in early June and 32.41 in October 2020. Indeed, the crisis communication of the government has been lauded for being characterised by ‘clear, timely and repeating messages and advice for actions informed by expert knowledge and delivered by credible political and administrative executives and experts’ (Christensen & Lægreid, 2020, p. 777). In order to determine an end date for the first wave in Norway, we took the reopening of schools as a reference: kindergartens reopened on 20 April, with the rest of the schools opening on 27 April and 11 May 2020. Since 7 May 2020, it has been possible to return to the workplace and hold private events for up to twenty people. Pubs, bars, and theme parks reopened on 1 June, and since 15 June, it has been possible to travel throughout the Nordic countries (Ursin et al., 2020). The more stringent lockdown thus lasted only six weeks, and studies on the subject (Godøy et al., 2021; Rypdal et al., 2021) found that this did not lead to a significant increase in infections among the student population or among teachers, confirming the appropriateness of preventing infection with an ‘early response’ and accompanying reopening with adequate tracking and testing (Melnick & Darling-Hammond, 2020). Indeed, Norway was the first European country to announce that the crisis was almost over, considering low levels of hospitalisation and mortality (Christensen & Lægreid, 2020). Subsequently, in Norway, a full-fledged second wave of Covid-19, comparable to those in other countries worldwide, did not arrive until early 2021. For these reasons, the analysis was limited to the first wave and considered the nineteen speeches delivered by Erna Solberg from 10 March to 4 June 2020 (Table 2.1).

10.4% of GDP on health or e4,545 per capita. […] Prior to the Pandemic there were 2.9 physicians (2018 WB), 3.9 hospital beds (2013 WB) and 18.2 nurses and midwives (2018 WB) per 1,000 population. In 2010, Norway had approximately 300 ICU beds’.

1

First speech

4th March 2020 5th November 21st June 2020 2020 13th March 2020 10th March 2020

9th March 2020

Beginning of lockdown 18th May 2020 11th January 2021 11th May 2020

Ending of lockdown

9th December 2020 4th June 2020

3rd June 2020

Last speech

19

19

19

Number of speeches

19

38

Total speeches

Source Data from PRIN2017 “The transformations of democracy: Actors, Strategies and Outcomes in opposing populism in political, juridical and social arenas”, Tuscia University’s research unit

Erna Solberg (Norway)

2

1

Waves

Dataset description: Germany and Norway

Angela Merkel (Germany)

Table 2.1

30 F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

2

INTRODUCING WOMEN LEADERS: MERKEL AND SOLBERG

31

References Arora, S., Debesay, J., & Eslen-Ziya, H. (2022). Persuasive narrative during the COVID-19 pandemic: Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg’s posts on Facebook. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, 9(35). https:// doi.org/10.1057/s41599-022-01051-5 Burns, J. (1978). Leadership. Harper & Row. Campus, D. (2013). Women political leaders and the media. Palgrave Macmillan. Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (2020). Balancing governance capacity and legitimacy: How the Norwegian government handled the COVID-19 crisis as a high performer. Public Administration Review, 80(5), 774–779. https://doi. org/10.1111/puar.13241 Davidson-Schmich, L. K. (2011). Gender, intersectionality, and the executive branch: The case of Angela Merkel. German Politics, 20(3), 325–341. https:/ /doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2011.606566 De Blasio, E., Hibberd, M., Higgins, M., & Sorice, M. (2012). La leadership politica: Media e costruzione del consenso. Carocci. Eichler, M. (1980). The double standard: A feminist critique of feminist social science. Croom Helm. Funk, N. (2018). A spectre in Germany: Refugees, a ‘welcome culture’ and an ‘integration politics.’ In M. Duarte, K. Lippert-Rasmussen, S. Parekh, & A. Vitikainen (Eds.), Refugee crisis: The borders of human mobility (pp. 289–299). Routledge. Godøy, A., Grøtting, M. W., & Hart, R. K. (2021). Re-opening schools in a context of low COVID-19 contagion: Consequences for teachers, students and their parents. Medrxiv (preprint). https://doi.org/10.1101/2021.03.25. 21254219 Jamieson, K. H. (1995). Beyond the double bind: Women and leadership. Oxford University Press. Kalsnes, B., & Skogerbø, E. (2021). Norway: From strict measures to pragmatic flexibility. In D. Lilleker, I. A. Coman, M. Gregor, & E. Novelli (Eds.), Political communication and COVID-19: Governance and rhetoric in times of crisis (pp. 231–238). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003120254-22 Kittilson, M. C. (2006). Challenging parties, changing parliaments: Women and elected office in contemporary Western Europe. Ohio State Univesity Press. Klenke, K. (1996). Women and leadership: A contextual perspective. Springer. Kneuer, M., & Wallaschek, S. (2022). Framing COVID-19: Public leadership and crisis communication by chancellor Angela Merkel during the pandemic in 2020. German Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2022.2028140 Krook, M. L. (2009). Quotas for women in politics: Gender and candidate selection reform worldwide. Oxford University Press. Kupferschmidt, K., & Vogel, G. (2020, April 27). Reopening puts Germany’s much-praised coronavirus response at risk: Preliminary study plays outsize

32

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

role in debate about when to ease restrictions. Science. https://www.science. org/content/article/reopening-puts-germany-s-much-praised-coronavirus-res ponse-risk Laubenthal, B. (2019). Refugees welcome? Reforms of German asylum policies between 2013 and 2017 and Germany’s transformation into an immigration country. German Politics, 28(3), 412–425. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 09644008.2018.1561872 Lovenduski, J. (2005). Feminizing politics. Polity Press. Lovenduski, J., & Norris, P. (2003). Westminster women: The politics of presence. Political Studies, 51, 84–102. Melnick, H., & Darling-Hammond, L. (2020, May). Reopening schools in the context of COVID-19: Health and safety guidelines from other countries (Policy Brief). Learning Policy Institute. https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ ED606555.pdf Mushaben, J. M. (2017). Becoming Madam Chancellor: Angela Merkel and the Berlin Republic. Cambridge University Press. Mushaben, J. M. (2022). Against all odds: Angela Merkel, Ursula von der Leyen, Anngret Kramp-Karrenbauer and the German paradox of female CDU leadership. German Politics, 31(1), 20–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008. 2021.2000599 OECD. (2020). Initial education policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic: Norway. Education Policy Outlook Country Snapshot. https://www.oecd. org/education/policy-outlook/covid-snapshot-Norway.pdf Pew Research Center. (2020, October 2). Confidence in Merkel is at all-time high in several countries during her last full year in office. https://www. pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/02/confidence-in-merkel-is-at-all-timehigh-in-several-countries-during-her-last-full-year-in-office/ Rypdal, M., Rypdal, V., Jakobsen, P. K., Ytterstad, E., Løvsletten, O., Klingenberg, C., et al. (2021). Modelling suggests limited change in the reproduction number from reopening Norwegian kindergartens and schools during the COVID-19 pandemic. PLoS ONE, 16(2), e0238268. https://doi.org/10. 1371/journal.pone.0238268 Saccà, F. (2003). La società sessuale: il controllo sociale della sessualità nelle organizzazioni umane. Franco Angeli. Saccà, F. (2021). (Ed.). Stereotipo e pregiudizio. La rappresentazione giuridica e mediatica della violenza di genere. Franco Angeli. Saccà, F., & Selva, D. (2021). Women political leaders in pandemic times: Comparing Jacinda Ardern and Donald Trump’s representation of the Covid-19 crisis. Hayka. Kylbtypa. Obwectvo, 27 (2), 8–21. Sanbonmatsu, K. (2006). Where women run: Gender and party in the American states. University of Michigan Press.

2

INTRODUCING WOMEN LEADERS: MERKEL AND SOLBERG

33

Stangeland, B. (2020). How to evaluate the success of the COVID-19 measures implemented by the Norwegian government by analyzing changes in doubling time. Medrxiv (preprint). https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.03.29.20045187 Stangeland, B. (2021, December 3). Norway versus Sweden: A case study in COVID-19 response. Open Access Government. https://www.openaccessgo vernment.org/norway-and-sweden/125378/ Ursin, G., Skjesol, I., & Tritter, J. (2020). The COVID-19 pandemic in Norway: The dominance of social implications in framing the policy response. Health Policy and Technology, 9(4), 663–672. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hlpt.2020. 08.004 Von Wahl, A. (2011). A ‘women’s revolution from above’? Female leadership, intersectionality, and public policy under the Merkel government. German Politics, 20(3), 392–409. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2011.606569 Wieler, L., Rexroth, U., & Gottschalk, R. (2021). Emerging Covid-19 success story: Germany’s push to maintain progress. Robert Koch Institute. https:// edoc.rki.de/handle/176904/8514

CHAPTER 3

Angela Merkel’s Approach to the Pandemic

The communication methods adopted by Merkel varied greatly: in both pandemic waves, the leader used different communication tools, complementing traditional speeches to the Bundestag and press conferences. She included, for instance, podcasts and videos where she spoke directly to citizens on an almost weekly basis; in addition, starting in October 2020, Merkel also added video conversations with citizens—or with some specific groups of citizens, including the elderly in nursing homes, the sick, and workers in certain production sectors. The distribution of topics is quite homogeneous during the two waves, although in the second wave, science and education acquire a more significant role at the expense of the economy and, most of all, the international crisis (Fig. 3.1). Among the topics, public health concerns occupy 31% of the segments surveyed in both the first and second waves and mostly refer to explaining the health policies adopted. Alongside this, 27% and 29% of segments are related to politics, respectively, in the two waves, in which Merkel explains her role (and feelings) in relation to the pandemic, defines the boundaries of competence between the federal and Lander governments, and addresses citizens, praising their spirit of responsibility and sacrifice. The economy is in third place with 18% of the space in the first wave, but its role is reduced to 14% in the second one: in these segments, Merkel © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Saccà and D. Selva, European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9_3

35

36

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

Germany 1st wave

Germany 2nd wave

Education 3%

Education 7%

Crisis 5%

Crisis 13% Politics 27% Public health 31%

Science 8% Economy 18%

Politics 29%

Public health 31%

Science Economy 14% 14%

Fig. 3.1 Distribution of the topics addressed in Angela Merkel’s speeches (Source Data from PRIN2017 “The transformations of democracy: Actors, strategies and outcomes in opposing populism in political, juridical and social arenas”, Tuscia University’s research unit)

explains which measures support productive groups. In this regard, she frequently repeats that health and the economy should not be pitted against each other—both should be safeguarded. The consequences of the crisis at the international level occupy 11% of the segments surveyed in the first wave’s speeches and 5% of the second: among the main topics, there is, of course, Germany’s role within the European Union. References to science recur in 8% of the segments in the first wave but equal those to the economy during the second wave (14%), as the research on vaccines advances. In addition to updates on the development of vaccines (in the second wave), these segments refer to the data on infection trends provided by scientists and to a more general reflection on the role of science in modern society. Finally, the topic related to closed schools and the complications generated by this action in the daily lives of families occupies the remaining 3% of the segments during the first wave and 7% of segments during the second wave. Interestingly, gender issues and topics related to information and disinformation are not addressed at all. Two speeches in particular have most marked Merkel’s path as head of the German federal government during the pandemic: the one on 18 March, in which she addressed citizens via television to announce the start of the lockdown, and the one on 9 December in the Bundestag,

3

ANGELA MERKEL’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

37

made famous by her tearing up and her voice breaking as she emphasised how ‘science is practically begging us’ to avoid unnecessary contacts one week before Christmas.

3.1 Between Collective and Individual Responsibility Since her first address to the nation, Angela Merkel regularly stressed that the coronavirus challenge required everyone to take responsibility: citizens and politicians, federal and Lander governments; all must ‘take things seriously’ and do their part: I firmly believe that we will pass this test if all citizens genuinely see this as THEIR task [capital letters in the original]. Allow me, therefore, to say that this is serious. Please also take this seriously. […] As indiscriminately as each one of us can be affected by the virus, each and every one of us must help. First and foremost, by taking seriously what matters today. Not panicking, but also not thinking for a single moment that he or she doesn’t matter after all. No one is expendable. Everyone counts, and we need a collective effort. (March 18th)

A week before this speech, as Italy was forced to institute drastic containment measures, Merkel responded to reporters quite frankly, ‘we don’t know much’. The situation was particularly serious because long-term forecasting was not possible, and there were no adequate means to counter the virus. Therefore, unity of purpose on the part of the entire country was required: We are in a situation where we don’t know much yet. We have to take what we know very seriously. We have to do everything in our power. We have to take all the necessary measures. This applies to the federal government and all those who have political responsibility. But this also applies to the citizens—the 83 million people who live in our country. (March 11th)

The parallelism between institutions and citizens recurred several times throughout the pandemic. The responsibilities of politicians and institutions in setting a ‘good example’ to counter the spread of the virus were emphasised, as well as becoming champions of solidarity. From the perspective of crisis communication, this is a way to build consensus and defuse possible criticism; at the same time, it served as a constant appeal

38

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

by Merkel to the Lander governors, who tried to take advantage of the situation to gain visibility. Determination, prudence, and, above all, the humility to listen to those who are more knowledgeable on the subject are the characteristics of a leader who can legitimately ask citizens (and opponents) to take responsibility: I think the contribution that the state and state actors can make, including politicians, is that we do what is necessary, that we do it quickly and prudently, that we are determined, and that, above all, we also follow advice when we are not the experts but others. I think this is a contribution to make other people also say, “I want to take responsibility”. (March 11th)

The state and its citizens, therefore, were called to ‘take seriously’ the situation, relying on what science suggested: And this is where, in addition to politics, every single person is also called upon to take the issue seriously, because it is indeed serious. This is what I said on March 8, and this is what I repeat again today. Take the issue seriously because it is serious—and the danger posed by the virus remains just as serious. […] You—and all of us—must continue to see it as a collective obligation that each person holds the fate of the others as well and therefore stick to the measures: minimum distance, mask in public spaces and hand washing. (June 27th)

Merkel repeated this formula whenever she could, reinforcing the importance of simple everyday gestures in helping to combat the virus: ‘You don’t need to be a scientist to do something effective against the virus. No, we can all do something. Every individual can do something’ (December 9th). In this view of shared and extended responsibility, solidarity was the engine of a new collective pact: We can say that in recent weeks and months, in a huge collective effort, we have managed to achieve this goal or at least come close. We have succeeded because all of us—citizens, businesses, the state—have stood together at a difficult time with severe constraints. (13th May)

This sense of solidarity was expressed, precisely, by representatives of institutions towards the general populace, but it was also expressed by citizens towards others, and in particular towards some specific social categories:

3

ANGELA MERKEL’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

39

It is about protecting the elderly and the sick, the so-called vulnerable groups, as we say today. Our solidarity, our reason and our affection for each other are being tested, and I hope we can overcome this situation soon. (April 23rd)

Merkel praised citizens who had shown respect for the new restrictions. As much as this represented a sacrifice ‘in economic and human terms’, the majority of citizens seem to have understood what was at stake. After all, it was through individual behaviour that each citizen showed the elderly and vulnerable that they were not alone: ‘This is how we show the elderly and those with pre-existing conditions that we care, for the virus is most dangerous to them. In short: This is how we save lives’ (March 22nd). Over the summer, when the pandemic ebbed a bit, Merkel deepened this concept of an inter-generational pact by expressing her gratitude to the older generations and calling on the young to do the same: We are all indebted to you older people; thank you for your understanding and attitude in this pandemic. The best way to show this gratitude is to treat our elders with respect and humanity. Wonderful initiatives have sprung up where young people run errands for the elderly or facilitate their daily lives in other ways. I would be happy if these initiatives continued to exist afterwards. The need for inter-generational support will surely still be there when, one day, we no longer have to fear the virus so much. Everyone can do something very simple and effective to express our gratitude to the elderly, which is to follow the basic rules of antiCovid containment: keep your distance, observe hygiene, use a mask. We don’t want to be a country where the streets and means of transportation belong only to the healthiest people and young people; they must belong to everyone, especially the elderly, who hardly dare to go out for fear of contagion. So, those in the supermarket who move around and clear the aisle between the shelves so that an elderly person can pass by at a distance, those inside the store who wear their masks properly and not under the chin are helping to ensure that the elderly especially can participate in life even at this stage of the pandemic. It is nice to think that something good may have come out of this difficult ordeal for all of us: that we feel again more strongly that old and young belong together, that we miss each other when the pandemic temporarily separates us, and that only in the union between generations is a pleasant life possible for all. (July 4th)

40

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

The spirit of solidarity appealed to by Merkel has a pragmatic value, relating to the most thoughtful behaviours to follow: on many occasions, Merkel repeated protective measures (washing hands, keeping a safe distance, using a mask) almost as if to suggest a formula to be learned by heart. At the same time, solidarity has a symbolic and ideal side that the leader did not fail to emphasise. In the following passage, for example, Merkel quoted the German constitution to reconnect the idea of democracy with respect for the life and dignity of every individual. Germany’s fundamental charter, as is well known, is the fruit of one of history’s most important lessons; by quoting it, Merkel defined the pandemic crisis as one of epic proportions, necessitating profound reflections on national character, democratic culture, and the status of each citizen: I am convinced therefore that restrictions, however severe, are necessary for the survival of the community in this dramatic crisis and to safeguard what our constitution places at the centre of our actions: the life and dignity of every individual. (April 23rd)

The pandemic was compared to the economic crisis of 2008/2009, then to German reunification and the Second World War, foundational moments in the nation’s collective consciousness and the definition of its identity: I have had evidence in other situations as well; for example, during the great banking and economic crisis we had in 2008/2009, and we always got along well. We also had excellent cooperation in the big challenge with refugees. There is a lot of responsibility at all levels. (March 11th) Since German reunification – no, since the Second World War, there has not been a challenge to our country in which action in a spirit of solidarity on our part was so important. (March 18th)

Thus, solidarity was an essential element of the strategy against Covid-19, and at the same time, it was a value benchmark. However, such solidarity emerged through a necessary individual awareness. Indeed, individual responsibility was described as an essential ingredient in the strategy to contain the contagion: All measures taken by the state would come to nothing if we were to fail to use the most effective means for preventing the virus from

3

ANGELA MERKEL’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

41

spreading too rapidly—and that is us ourselves. […] That is the message an epidemic brings home—how vulnerable we all are, how much we depend on the considerate behaviour of others and, ultimately, how, through joint action, we can protect ourselves and offer one another encouragement and support. (March 18th)

The attributes that Merkel listed to describe the correct attitude for individuals to follow were patience, rigour, and discipline. Through a strict attitude toward ourselves, disciplined and patient, we have slowed the spread of the virus in recent weeks. It seems like a small achievement, but it is tremendously valuable. We were able to buy time and make the most of it to further strengthen our health system. (April 23rd)

Even at the end of the first wave, Merkel emphasised the need to balance newfound freedom with caution: ‘It’s not over yet, but we have learned how to deal with it, how to reduce risks, and how to combine regained freedoms with caution and prudence’ (July 4th). This message signalled that the danger posed by the virus had not yet been defeated and that although the infections and deaths were down compared to four months earlier, one should not indulge in easy enthusiasm. Once again, the individual’s sense of responsibility would determine the fate of the entire community: ‘The summer of relaxation is over, and now we have difficult months ahead of us. What the winter will be like, what our Christmas will be like—that will be decided in the coming days and weeks. We will decide it through our actions’ (October 17th). Right on the heels of the announcement of new restrictions after a relatively serene summer, Merkel embraced decidedly more dramatic tones: Now we have to do even more; the science tells us clearly: the spread of the virus is directly linked to the number of contacts and encounters each of us has. […] This is precisely my appeal to you today: drastically reduce the number of people you meet, both outside and inside the home. I ask you: give up any travel that is not really necessary, any celebration that is not really essential. […] What got us through the first six months of the pandemic so well? The fact that we stuck together and followed the rules—out of respect and judgement. This is the most effective remedy we currently have against the pandemic. It is needed now more than ever. (October 17th)

42

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

Science inspired these words, but the leader no longer appealed to pure rationality or a sense of responsibility alone; to convince her fellow citizens that they must start limiting their movements again and that the sacrifices made were necessary but not sufficient, something else also came into play. For example, there is a kind of weariness behind such phrases as, ‘I know, actually, politicians are always expected to find new words: but to me, what I told you last week still applies—every single word’ (October 24th). Clashes with Lander governors and oppositions in the Bundestag led Merkel to the famous 9 December 2020 speech. On that occasion, she demonstrated the level of her disagreement—breaking with the relaxed attitude she had taken up to that point, coming almost to tears and warning parliamentarians of the risk they would run. She reminded them: ‘We cannot expect people to be kept in the dark about this’ (December 9th).

3.2

Democracy, Institutions, and the Welfare State

The announcement of the first lockdown was issued through an address to the nation. Merkel stated that the pandemic was an unconventional circumstance but one dictated by the need to ensure transparency and accountability: I’m addressing you in this unconventional way today because I want to tell you what guides me as federal chancellor and all my colleagues in the federal government in this situation. This is part of what open democracy is about—that we make political decisions transparently and explain them. That we justify and communicate our actions as best we can, so that people are able to understand them. (March 18th)

It was about taking responsibility, personally, for policy decisions that would determine the future of the country. Merkel put herself and her personal history on the line to reinforce the idea that these were very difficult and thoroughly considered decisions: Allow me to assure you that, for someone like me, for whom the freedom of travel and the freedom of movement were a hard-fought right, such restrictions can only be justified if they are absolutely imperative. These

3

ANGELA MERKEL’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

43

should never be put in place lightly in a democracy and should only be temporary. – But they are vital at the moment in order to save lives. (March 18th)

In another passage during the same speech, Merkel clearly illustrated the relationship between information derived from scientific-technical knowledge and the decision-making process typical of a mature democracy. Acquiring new data, including learning from experience, served not only as the basic principle of scientific knowledge but also as the foundation for legitimising restrictions and studying new countermeasures: This is a developing situation, and we will ensure that we continue to learn from it so that we can adjust our thinking and deploy new instruments at any time. If we do so, then we will explain our reasons once again.

Merkel also returned elsewhere to the fact that the foundational elements of her decision-making included respect for democratic procedures and consideration of expert opinions. These two elements were not described as opposing each other, but certainly, the pandemic was an occasion when the relationship between the two was put under stress. To overcome this impasse, Merkel relied on accountability: however harsh and anti-democratic the containment measures may have seemed, their democratic nature was ensured by their transparent adoption with respect to responsibilities, justifications, and time limits: I am aware of how much the restrictions weigh on the individual level, but also as a society. This pandemic is a democratic imposition, as it goes to restrict precisely what are our existential rights and needs, both those of adults and children. It is only possible to accept and endure such a situation by clearly and transparently explicating the reasons causing the restrictions and allowing—indeed, urging and listening to—any criticisms and objections. Freedom of the press makes a great contribution. Our federal system makes a great contribution. The mutual trust we have witnessed here in Parliament, as well as throughout the country in recent weeks, also makes a great contribution. It is wonderful to observe how naturally citizens protected each other, limiting their freedoms for the sake of others. (April 23rd)

44

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

For this reason, Merkel willingly accepted that these measures could be discussed. At the same time, she asserted the full legitimacy of her decisions because they were based on the recommendations of top national experts: Our task is always to justify our choices, and certainly we have to discuss them. I have nothing against a social discussion about it. But as federal chancellor, I also feel obliged to share my position within this discussion, and one of these positions, for example, is that of the Leopoldina, who said ‘yes’ about loosening and their effects, but also always said that every chain of infection must be traced. And honestly: we are not able to do that today. Of course, I would feel much better if we were able to do that. (April 20th)

Certainly, Merkel could count on a solid majority and, above all, a great deal of authority gained over fifteen years. Consequently, her governability was assured even at a time of great crisis and confusion such as the pandemic; this governability was accompanied by the ability to manage the crisis quickly and efficiently: Years of political solidity is an advantage at this time. Now we must be able to sustain our economy and create a system that protects workers. Millions of applications have come in for the various support programmes; millions of people and businesses have already received money. We managed to pass all these legislative measures quickly and with an overwhelming majority. Our parliamentary democracy is strong, it is efficient, and it is extremely fast in times of crisis. Also, last night, as you already know, the coalition committee approved additional measures. (April 23rd)

The characteristics described (strength, efficiency, speed) resulted from coordination between the federal government and the Lander. A few times, Merkel mentioned the ‘differences of opinion’ between her and the Lander presidents, but it all happened with great serenity: ‘On the whole, we had a very constructive discussion. Given the federal diversity, it is not surprising that there are always different views; that’s part of the matter’ (May 6th). This situation should not be construed to mean that Merkel shirked her leadership role when speaking with the Lander presidents:

3

ANGELA MERKEL’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

45

My concern to be very careful at the beginning of the pandemic, to stay focused, is something that I have also expressed in all the talks, and I say it clearly in all the meetings with the Lander presidents of the federal states so that the leeway that we have given ourselves—a leeway essentially implemented by the federal states through the general decree, through the responsibility in the Contamination Protection Act—that leeway should be to the least extent possible and not abused. Because I think otherwise, we may run the risk of not being able to observe exactly the effects of the loosening. (April 20th)

There was no shortage of controversy concerning the spheres of competence of the two levels of the state, and the pandemic served in some ways as an occasion to measure the consensus. However, here again, Merkel chose the path of accountability to legitimise her decisions: I know the responsibilities of the states with regard to the law on protection from contagion; we have talked a lot about it, and I respect the powers of the states. I know this from the many meetings we have had together: we can only succeed by joining forces. But of course, I also know my responsibility, the responsibility of the federal government, and that’s why I think it’s imperative that you know what line I’m taking. (December 9th)

In this delicate transmission of information and decisions, Merkel explained that it was important for citizens to follow a similar process and base their behaviour and decisions on knowledge. Democracy does not mean believing every voice or, at the opposite end of the spectrum, blindly conforming to what is imposed from above: Therefore, I call on you not to believe any rumours, but rather only the official messages that we will always translate into many languages. We are a democracy. We thrive not because we are forced to do something but because we share knowledge and encourage active participation. This is a historic task, and it can only be mastered if we face it together. (18th March)

For Merkel, knowledge—not obedience to rules—was the key to stimulating that sense of individual responsibility and community solidarity. This conviction was fundamental and fortified all the passages in which Merkel very frankly described what was known and especially what was not: it was not enough to keep in mind the numbers of infections and

46

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

deaths; it was necessary to understand the limitations of science and the healthcare system. However, knowledge cannot be gained in a day, which is why even in the early days of the lockdown, Merkel emphasised the fact that containment measures were constantly being redefined: Our measures have to be adapted with the same flexibility as the virus is dynamic. We have to learn from the situation, so to say—from experts who keep gaining new insights from this epidemic and from observing the reality around us. We are figuring out which measures are being implemented seamlessly and which ones still require work. (March 22nd)

With great honesty, Merkel stressed that the goal is not so much to prevent infection, which was at that point assumed to be inevitable (with all the appropriate consequences in terms of sickness and death), but to make sure that it happened at a rate that was sustainable for the healthcare system, ‘perhaps one of the best in the world’ (March 19th). If, on the other hand, we know that there are population groups, namely the elderly and immunocompromised people, on whom this viral disease can have more severe effects, then it means that the approach must be aimed at not overburdening our healthcare system, using its possibilities in such a way as to slow down the spread of the virus and the infections. Therefore, all the measures we take are of the utmost importance because they buy us time. And our behaviour is important. It is not in vain, and it is not useless, even if the directions change from time to time. Because the directions and recommendations on how to proceed always start from the question of how do we ensure that our healthcare system is not overloaded during the period of time that we have to deal with the virus. So it’s about buying time. (March 11th)

When it became clear that there were not many options available, Merkel explained that buying time and avoiding hospital overload would require not just public policies and plans to reorganise departments and beds but a widespread rethinking of social life: These (possible) countermeasures do not yet include a vaccine or medication. There are two things we can do at the moment. First, to prepare our healthcare system—above all the hospitals—to handle the large increase in the number of cases. Second, and (this is) the most effective measure we

3

ANGELA MERKEL’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

47

have at our disposal, is to change our own behaviour. This means shutting down public life to the greatest possible, acceptable extent, to reduce the number of interactions people who might contract the virus have to the lowest possible level. (March 22nd)

The emphasis on individual responsibility and a sense of fully mature democratic citizenship, however, did not exempt the need for surveillance and sanctioning measures. Indeed, Merkel specified that: These are not mere state recommendations, these are rules, and they must be complied with in the interest of all of us. Law enforcement agencies will check compliance, and there will be consequences and punishment whenever they determine infringements. I therefore repeat my urgent appeal to all of you—especially to those few who have had difficulties observing the rules over the last few days: Please do your part! Do what’s right for our country! Show sense and heart! (March 22nd)

When the first encouraging signs appeared in early April, Merkel explained that it was necessary to continue with the containment measures for an indefinite time. The only criterion to follow was the contagion numbers, with the goal of safeguarding health, human lives, and the functioning of the healthcare system: I would not be a good chancellor or, at any rate, we would not be a good federal government if we talked about an effective date today. We can’t. We have the first indications of how things might develop. Austria has always been a little bit ahead of us in things, but we have to stick to our numbers. And that is why, in any case, it is not advisable now to talk about a loosening date in Germany. I say with great caution that health protection will always come first. Even when social life starts again, the question of how to continue will always be addressed with the fact in mind that we continue to live in the middle of a pandemic. The virus will not disappear. That is all I can say today. Of course, we are thinking about it. […] I can say right now that it will still be a gradual approach. (April 6th)

In this speech, Merkel not only informed the public that she was unable to give an expiration date for the containment measures but also noted that such a date could not exist. Instead, the gradualness with which these measures would be lifted was a crucial element to understand because it

48

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

concerned the ability to proceed prudently in a situation of significant risk and little knowledge: The days we have gained look forward to a different situation than the initial one. But when we think about how to get to the next stage, we enter unknown territory again because we don’t know how the loosening of measures would work. That’s why we have to move on solid ground. And I also renew the call to continue to stick to the measures, and I also state that we still have to live with and live in this pandemic for a long time. We have to proceed very carefully, in small steps, and continue to monitor the consequences because our goal remains not to overburden the healthcare system in any way and to provide all people with the care they need. (April 9th) I myself was contributing in passing the decree to reopen stores up to 800 square metres. This was a common area of focus for everyone. And the decree was also presented to you. However, I have the impression that since last Wednesday, a debate has begun that foreshadows a certainty that is not at all real today and on which none of us can yet comment; we will not know what effects the decrees have caused before 14 days. (April 20th)

These were the days before Easter and spring, less than a month since the pandemic began in Germany, and Merkel was already introducing the concept of ‘living with the virus’. It will not disappear until we have a vaccine with which we can immunise the population. And that means living with the virus, living in and with the pandemic and then living with the virus. It will not go away, even if, for one day, there are fewer people infected. If we were always together at this distance, the virus would probably not be able to touch us. That is the good news. The bad news is that if we forget everything we have learned and done so far, we will quickly find ourselves back where we started. (April 9th)

Prudence, rigour, and, above all, the ability to understand that science has much longer time frames than those of daily life or the 24/7 news cycle led to the frankness with which Merkel condemned the false hopes of those who relied on a superficial reading of the data. To explain this concept, Merkel compared the pandemic to a marathon that needs slow steps and steady breaths:

3

ANGELA MERKEL’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

49

I am convinced that, especially in the first phase of this pandemic, instead of lingering too long with a false sense of security based on encouraging contagion data, acting with the utmost rigour and tenacity will enable us to reinvigorate economic, social and public life more quickly and sustainably. By maintaining a disciplined attitude from the outset, we will then be able to restore health and the economy, health and social life much more quickly. Again, we will have to live with the virus; however, it is precisely by maintaining focus and constancy from the beginning that we can avoid going from one shutdown to the next, having to isolate groups of people for months at a time, and having to apply terrible conditions in our hospitals, as has unfortunately happened in other countries. […] It would be a pity if we were punished later because of a somewhat rash hope. Let us remain clear-headed and cautious as we move into the next phase of the pandemic. We are in the middle of a marathon in which we must not use up our energy and oxygen too soon. (April 23rd)

After the summer, it soon grew clear that new containment measures would be necessary. Initially, this shift was justified by the need to safeguard the economy and jobs, but then the priority shifted again to health and the functioning of the healthcare system. Thus, in early December, Merkel again appealed to citizens’ sense of responsibility: After almost a year of the pandemic, we see the light at the end of the tunnel. We can hope that we will soon have one or more vaccines available. After that, we can defeat the virus one step at a time. But let’s be realistic— it will not be solved in a few months. The more consistently we follow the rules, wear the mask, keep our distance, use the app, but most importantly, the more we reduce contact and encounters outside the family during these weeks, the faster we will be able to defeat the virus. And so I ask all of you once again, from the bottom of my heart, to remain patient and responsible. (December 5th)

The pandemic, according to Merkel, would be the central issue in national and European politics for a long time to come: No one wants to hear this, but it is the truth: we have not reached the final stage of the pandemic; we are still only at its beginning. We will have to live with this virus for a long time. The central issue of politics in Germany and Europe will still be for a long time how we manage to prevent, at some point, the virus from overwhelming our healthcare system and costing the lives of huge numbers of people. (April 23rd)

50

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

In particular, relations with the European Union and other Member States were a fairly significant issue for Merkel. While Italy was dealing with the effects of the pandemic, Merkel stressed the need to consider the emergency situation and suspend the Stability Pact—a ‘symmetric shock’. According to the chancellor, ‘it is not like in the case of an earthquake, where one country is affected and the other is not, here we are all experiencing a stressful situation’ (March 11th) and ‘it is not the result of bad economic policy’ (April 20th). This argument was motivated by the fact that, according to the leader, ‘The European Union, with its institutions and its Member States, should simply be visible in the face of these major challenges’ (March 11th), which meant, in the immediate term, being able to agree on common policies regarding the procurement of masks and buffers, and to reflect, in the long term, on building European ‘strategic independence’ (April 9th). On the other hand, international cooperation remained necessary for vaccine development. Merkel clarified that the European Union is a system of interdependencies of which Germany is a part: ‘My maxim has always been that Germany will be well in the long run only if Europe is well’ (April 20th). In my opinion, the European Union is facing its greatest test since its founding. In front of us, we have a great challenge regarding the health of our population. All member states of the European Union have to face it, albeit in different ways and at different times. It is a symmetric shock, as the phenomenon is technically called. This means that everyone is equally affected. That is why it must be in everyone’s interest, and it is in Germany’s interest, that Europe comes out of this ordeal strong. (April 6th)

Europe was a symbolic and strategic horizon of extreme importance to Merkel, who exercised political and moral leadership during the pandemic that mirrored her approach throughout her terms as chancellor: ‘we know that Europe has brought us peace. Europe brings us prosperity’ (May 23rd). For us Germans, the commitment to a united Europe is an integral part of our reason for statehood. It is not just abstract nonsense but very concrete concepts: as a community, we have one destiny. Europe must demonstrate this now by facing this unprecedented pandemic challenge. The pandemic

3

ANGELA MERKEL’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

51

affects everyone, but not everyone equally. If we are not careful, it will be used as a pretext by those who act to divide society. Europe is not Europe if it does not see itself as such. Europe is not Europe if, in such hard times, it does not support each other. In this crisis, we also have a duty to show who we want to be as Europe. (April 23rd)

Concretely, this view translated into the need to provide economic support for the recovery of all EU countries by funding subsidies for workers and businesses. What was at stake was the very survival of the EU: The goal is that Europe will emerge united and mutually supportive from this crisis. We know that the virus affects our countries in different ways and that this is why we face a risk that the economic impact of this virus will undermine EU cohesion and that the cohesion we actually need no longer exists. That is why the recovery fund must play a part in enabling all countries in Europe to respond in the right way. This requires an extraordinary, one-off exertion, one that Germany and France are willing to make. Europe needs to stand together. […] we need to talk seriously about where there were shortcomings in Europe and what will define the future of the European Union. This can also include amendments to the treaties; it can include far greater integration. We are presenting the short answer to the crisis today, so to speak. The long answers will need to be discussed because Europe must be developed further. (May 18th)

At an even more concrete level, a united EU meant ensuring that all countries, even the smallest, had access to vaccines in a synchronised manner in order to reopen the borders and flows of people, goods, and capital that ensure the prosperity of the common market. As Merkel explained, It is good that the European Commission, together with the member states, has procured the vaccines. Sometimes the importance of this for us does not appear so obvious. But for many of the smaller European countries, it is crucial that we do not have 27 different contract negotiations with each vaccine manufacturer but that we arrive at a fair distribution. Similarly, it’s critical that we already have these contracts with six partners, with six companies, and that we don’t have discussions of envy regarding the availability of vaccines, at least within the European Union. (December 9th)

52

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

3.3

Empathic Leadership

An important trait of Merkel’s communication concerns her ability to balance calls for rigour, patience, and sound science with expressions of solidarity and empathy for her fellow citizens. Once again, the way she balanced these two aspects was meant to set an example for others as well. This is why she called on people to respect the containment measures, to take the situation seriously and to act ‘with heart and rationality’, an expression she repeated again and again: I have absolutely no doubt that we will overcome this crisis. But how many victims will it claim? How many loved ones will we lose? The answer, to a great extent, lies in our hands. Right now, we can take decisive action all together. We can accept these current limitations and support one another. The situation is serious, and the outcome uncertain. Our success will also largely depend on how disciplined each and every one of us is in following the rules. Even though this is something we have never experienced before, we must show that we can act warm-heartedly and rationally—and thereby save lives. It is up to each and every one of us to do so, without any exception. Take good care of yourself and your loved ones. (March 18th) We are living through very delicate weeks. We are at a crucial stage in the fight against the pandemic. History teaches us that the most challenging wave of a pandemic is the second. And it also teaches us that it is very painful. […] But I think you may feel a little bit like me: in one way or another, we can be proud of what we have been able to do in the last ten months, since the beginning of the pandemic, each as an individual and all of us as a community. We have faced the pandemic with common sense and with our hearts, with discipline and with care for our loved ones, for our neighbours, for our neighbours. We have come a long way. (November 28th)

To convey what kind of disposition of mind is required of each citizen during the lockdown, she referred to a parallel between family and society: This will be difficult for many, and it will also be important not to abandon anyone and to take care of all those who need a dose of cheer and encouragement. As families and as a society, we will find other ways to help each other. Even now, we have come up with many creative ideas for standing up to this virus and its impact on society. Even now, grandchildren are recording podcasts for their grandparents, letting them know they are not

3

ANGELA MERKEL’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

53

alone. We all must discover how we can show affection and express friendship. We are staying in touch via Skype, phone, email, and maybe also by writing old-fashioned letters. The post, after all, is being delivered. We’re hearing about beautiful examples of neighbours helping one another. People are assisting the elderly who cannot themselves go shopping. I am certain there’s plenty more we can do. We will prove, as a community, that we will not abandon one another. (March 18th)

The most immediate example of what it meant to demonstrate a sense of community was offered by the health system workers, to whom the leader offered her deep gratitude: Many of our fellow citizens are working in the healthcare system or on keeping our daily supply intact. We should be eternally grateful for this. We should, above all, limit the opportunities for the virus to spread as much as we humanly can for them. It brings us great hope to see now that millions upon millions of people are also taking very practical measures, restricting themselves to helping and protecting the weaker members of our community out of community spirit and care. I am convinced that this sense of community, this notion of ‘We take care of each other’, will help us all through these hard times together. (March 22th)

Indeed, even where restrictive measures prescribed maximum isolation, Merkel opened a window for what she called ‘humane solutions’: Even in times when the virus is a very real danger, especially for older people, there should not be total isolation. People need people, and when a life ends, no one should be completely alone or hear only a voice on the phone. I would like to thank all those in hospitals and care facilities who use every leeway to make humane solutions possible. (July 4th)

Thus, at the heart of the sense of community was the concept of care, understood not only as medical-pharmacological therapy (cure) but also as love and mutual assistance (care). ‘Caring for others’, especially the most vulnerable, was Merkel’s invitation to her fellow citizens: It is magnificent to observe how carefully, almost lovingly, security and hygiene plans are developed for stores, offices, restaurants, cultural organisations, schools, kindergartens, places of worship and much more. I would like to thank everyone who works to make these things possible: work, shopping, leisure, recreation and health protection. (May 30th)

54

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

In practical terms, this meant implementing personal protective measures and remaining steadfast and cautious. It also meant that there were no ‘tolerable deaths’ because behind each fallen person was a family that had lost a part of itself: I would like to remind again that 200 or more fatalities a day are not figures that can leave us indifferent, because behind them there is always a human destiny, a family, relatives, friends who are suffering. (April 9th) So there are a number of good reasons why the daily numbers from the Robert Koch Institute currently give us hope. However, I remember that behind these numbers is the fate of people who are often engaged in a tough fight against the disease, and sadly also the grief of the more than 8,500 deaths so far. Even now, as I speak to you, in many hospitals, so many families are worried about a relative whose life is in danger because of Covid. Of course, statistics are important to understand how the pandemic evolves, but let’s not forget that we are still talking about people. (May 30th)

In addition to offering sympathy to those mourning a deceased friend or relative, Merkel also expressed solidarity with those struggling precisely because of the lockdown, ‘single parents in particular’ and ‘lonely people’. We must not lull ourselves for a second into a sense of security. We must remain vigilant and disciplined. When I say ‘we’, I mean all of us—citizens of this country. Let’s be clear: I know the situation of many people. I know the situation of parents and children—the situation of single parents in particular. I see the situation of so many people in the restaurant industry, in hotels, and I see the situation of so many people who fear for the future of their business, their enterprise, their company. I also see the situation of so many artists who do not know how to move forward. I see the expectation of churches and religious communities, who would like to offer more than just an online service to believers. And the desire of believers to finally experience community again with others in church services. Certainly, I see the urgent need to be able to exercise freedom of assembly and demonstration again. I also know of the anguish of lonely people who now feel their loneliness even more strongly than ever before. And this also means that the pandemic puts us all very much to the test in this country, both individually and as a community. But at the same time, I am convinced that

3

ANGELA MERKEL’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

55

the best way to cope with all these difficulties, all the hopes and expectations, wishes and demands, is to continue to have the strength and take tough measures, especially at this early stage. (April 20th)

Children, people with disabilities, and older people are other groups who were mentioned as being particularly affected, albeit in different ways, by the consequences of the pandemic and lockdown: It pains me, too, that children are currently unable to meet their friends and friends and miss them very much. It pains me, too, that currently, people can only go for a walk with one other person outside their household and that they always have to be careful to keep a minimum distance. It particularly pains me what people living in nursing homes, retirement homes and institutions for people with disabilities have to endure. In places where loneliness can be a problem, one feels even more lonely in times of pandemic and without receiving visitors. It is cruel to think that when strength fails and a life is about to end, no one except healthcare workers (who, moreover, give their best), can be there. We must never forget these people and the temporary isolation in which they are forced to live. These 80- and 90-year-olds founded our country. It was they who built the prosperity in which we live. They are part of Germany, just like us, their children and grandchildren. And we are fighting the battle against the virus for them as well. (April 23rd) There is one group of people that I care about particularly, and that is the elderly who have had to do without visits to nursing homes for weeks and who cannot leave the facilities. And we know what that means, or we sense it. It’s our duty to think of them in the open times as well, and that’s why it was very important for me to work to make sure that at least one caregiver could have regular access to go visit people in need of care or people with dementia or people with disabilities in institutions for the disabled. (May 6th) I am aware that for so many people, life has become very difficult in these pandemic months. I am thinking especially of parents and children. Until kindergartens and schools can be fully reopened, many activities have to take place simultaneously at home: online classes, parents’ work, family life. It’s hard for everyone. (May 30th)

Being cautious and staying focused was not only an invitation to others but also a kind of reminder to herself:

56

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

I don’t want to hide the fact—and I repeat it even now, just before Easter—that in the beginning, not so long ago, I was often concerned about the dramatic increase in the number of contagions we have witnessed. We don’t know whether or not we will have to tighten our measures, whether the ones we have applied are sufficient or whether we will end up like some of our neighbouring countries, with the need for further restrictive measures. […] And for me, this means that we must not be reckless now. We must not be lulled into a sense of security. And I know this from personal experience: when you have hope, then you gain confidence, you tend to relax and behave a little bit recklessly. No, we have to stay focused. The situation is unstable. (April 9th)

In some circumstances, Merkel left room to reveal her feelings. She did so, for example, when she had to stress the need not to open everything up quickly to avoid squandering the advantages gained through the adoption of restrictive measures: As chancellor, I have respect for every opinion and every argument that is expressed. We live in a free society; we have a higher responsibility to succeed in this challenge, which for me mainly means a healthcare system that is not overburdened. It means not putting our physicians in the position of deciding between one human life and another, a condition that I myself would never want to obtain, and we have the task of avoiding it. No one has to take on this responsibility—no one can take it away from me, but in this situation of responsibility, I have to discuss and argue—and so everyone has his role in society, and mine is just to tell you how things are at the moment. But that doesn’t mean I don’t think day and night about what comes next. (April 9th)

Alternatively, when attempting to further persuade her fellow citizens of the advisability of continuing on the path of virus containment, she described herself as ‘pained’ that circumstances have led her to restrict personal freedoms: ‘Let me emphasise that rarely during my tenure as chancellor have I faced such painful decisions for me as those on restrictions on personal freedoms’ (April 23rd). This statement was made when Merkel was at the end of sixteen long years as one of the most powerful women on the planet, and it was no longer necessary to seek consensus at all costs. Her decision to initiate a series of video conferences with citizens to meet and talk with them cannot, therefore, be read as an electoral tactic but rather as a way of interpreting a leadership role that embraced active listening.

3

ANGELA MERKEL’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

57

The pandemic has brought great restrictions for all of us. Personally, what I miss most is direct contact with people, both in private and as chancellor. Meeting with citizens, listening to them, this is very important to me in my function. To continue to make the exchange possible, we have organised a series of new dialogues with citizens online under the title “Die Bundeskanzlerin im Gespräch” (Conversations with the chancellor). In these video conferences, I want to listen to people tell me how they are coping with the challenges of pandemic life, what their complaints are— what concerns and desires they have with respect to politics. (November 14th)

The speech that most epitomises Merkel’s ability to perform empathetic leadership is the one she gave on 9 December at the Bundestag, during which the leader let her emotions run wild, and her voice shook due to her tears. With Christmas approaching and the start of a second wave of contagion, Merkel encountered significant political resistance to new restrictive measures. Therefore, to convince parliamentarians to support this strict line, she put her whole self on the line: We live like on a roller coaster of emotions. […] We have to do everything we can to avoid going back to exponential growth. The Leopoldina told us that, in this period, we should really reduce and avoid all contacts that are not absolutely necessary. As difficult as it is—and I know how much joy and love there is in setting up the mulled wine or waffle stands—but this is not in line with the agreement to only buy food to take away to eat at home, for example. I’m sorry—I’m really sorry from the bottom of my heart, but if, as a price for this, we have to pay with 590 deaths a day, then it’s not acceptable from my point of view. And that’s why we have to take action! (December 9th)

Merkel spoke of increased debt to finance subsidies to businesses, schools, hospitals, and families; there was talk of new restraint measures. Further, she used the numbers of contagions and deaths that were rising again, referring to reports just released by the most authoritative public health institutes. She told her colleagues, ‘We can’t expect people to be kept in the dark about this’, arguing that citizens should not be treated like children whose toys were to be taken away. Instead, the situation required the utmost seriousness and transparency because it was not only science that suggested this but also the historical magnitude of the moment:

58

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

If science is practically begging us to cut back on contact a week before Christmas before we see grandmothers and grandfathers and other elderly people, then maybe we should reconsider the situation and try to find a way to get the vacations started, not on December 19, but maybe as early as December 16. When people look back on this event that is marking our century, what will people think if we were unable to find a solution for those three days? (December 9th)

Part of the communicative power of this speech lay in the fact that the leader admitted that she was frightened and needed to anchor herself in the guidance offered by those who knew more: It is possible that stopping compulsory schooling may not be the right thing to do, but one will still have to opt for online classes or something else. I don’t know; it’s not even within my competence; I don’t want to get involved. I just want to say: if there are too many contacts before Christmas, we risk spending the last Christmas with our grandparents, and then yes, the loss will be huge. We can’t do that! (December 9th)

Amid the general confusion, the only thing that mattered to Merkel was saving the lives of the most fragile people, safeguarding family ties, and ensuring the integrity of the inter-generational pact that has bound Germany together since the Second World War.

3.4

The Role of Science

As has already been pointed out several times, because of her personal history and her interpretation of leadership, Angela Merkel often returned to science as the foundation for the legitimacy of her decisions. Her confidence in medical-scientific research and knowledge was total, and she wanted to transfer this certainty to her fellow citizens precisely at a time when certainty was lacking: If Europe is where it is today, it is thanks to the Enlightenment and the belief that there is actual scientific knowledge that is best adhered to. And I agree with that. I decided to study physics in the GDR—I probably wouldn’t have done so in the old Federal Republic—because I was pretty sure that you can undo a lot of things, but not gravity, not the speed of light, and not other evidence. And that will always continue to be the case. We don’t have to worry about that. (December 9th)

3

ANGELA MERKEL’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

59

This position was fortified by the Minister of Health and the head of the Koch Institute, who held regular press conferences every week and informed the public of all new information. With much honesty, Merkel stated from the outset that there were many unknowns; thus, countermeasures were also intended to be incremental, or trials-and-errors, a principle of scientific progress. Today, we are dealing with something that cannot be evaluated in advance in terms of effect. We don’t know what immunities will form and how long these immunities will last. We don’t know exactly—now we know a little bit more—how fast the infections will proceed. For example, we still don’t know very well—you were also able to follow the issue that Professor Drosten illustrated—how much the rate of contagion depends on temperature. Gradually these things are being learned as well. So is this virus like the normal flu seasons, decreasing in summer, or should we assume that it is not temperature-dependent at all? So, we still face many unknowns. Therefore, the situation is different. But as in all these crisis situations, prudence and determination to do what is necessary, I think are important. (March 11th)

Certainly, the fact that Merkel has a doctorate in physical chemistry affected her ability to understand and then expound on issues; but more importantly, it also influenced how she built her agenda. For example, before containment measures even began, Merkel stressed the need to invest in research to search for a vaccine against Covid-19: We need to focus on research. I have publicised that we support the CEPI alliance, which is involved in vaccine research, and that we coordinate all of Europe’s capabilities and possibilities. Germany very quickly made 140 million euros in funds available to pursue this vaccination research programme—and for that we also thank the budget committee of the German Bundestag. (March 11th)

Essentially, the strategy was to avoid overburdening the healthcare system while waiting for research to run its course. However, Merkel warned the public that this could take a very long time, which is why the infection curve had to be kept under control: As far as the epidemic is concerned—and everything I tell you about this comes from the federal government’s ongoing consultations with the

60

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

experts from the Robert Koch Institute and other scientists and virologists—the most intensive research is being conducted around the world, but there is still neither a way to treat the coronavirus, nor is there a vaccine. As long as this is the case—and this is what is guiding all of our actions—then only one thing matters, namely that we slow the spread of the virus, flatten the curve over the course of several months and buy time, time in which the research community can develop medicine and vaccine. But, above all, time to allow those who fall ill to receive the best possible treatment. (March 19th)

Science, then, deserved trust but not faith: it was not miraculous and offered answers only following many dead ends. This view relates to Merkel’s understanding of what science is and reveals how she addressed citizens, never offering easy or immediate solutions. However, the science celebrated by Merkel was not a cold, rational calculation; rather, it was the very essence of humanity: passion, tenacity and creativity, the ability to collaborate and overcome differences: The vaccine research began at the beginning of the year. At that time, no one could tell how long it would take to develop one. Today, vaccination centres are already being set up in many parts of Germany because the research results are very encouraging, and it is a record time in human history. It is not far-fetched to assume that in the near future we will have one or more vaccines available to us. There is no risk that they will never arrive. Why? Because man has a great research spirit. Because the best scientists in the world show us what we humans are made of. If there is one good thing about this pandemic, it is its ability to show what we humans are capable of when we put our hearts in our hands, when we act with tenacity and creativity—and above all, when we work together across borders. (November 28th)

There are several passages in which Merkel revealed the nature of the relationship between her and the scientists on whom she relied. For example, Merkel responded this way to a question from a reporter about the possibility of instituting a mask-wearing requirement: First of all, we are still at the stage where we listen to the advice of all the experts, and I must say that at first, I was reluctant to use masks in daily life, if I may say so. Now even the opinion of the experts is changing; of course, we will not oppose it. […] We will be able to be more specific about possible loosening when we have related the concomitant phenomena to

3

ANGELA MERKEL’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

61

each other. Today is not the day to do that. I follow the discussions within the scientific world very closely. We also know that German companies are starting to produce these masks, and many people are also doing it themselves at home. From what I understand, the material has to be as strong as possible to have the maximum effect. But the handling of the masks is also very important. (April 6th)

The reopening also involved technical and scientific knowledge other than that drawn from virologists and epidemiologists. Merkel wanted to establish a collaborative relationship with them as well to reorganise economic and social life: Next week will be a week of important consultations. Many studies have already been published in the last few days that address the question of what the steps toward easing can be. For me, a very relevant study will be the one brought out by the National Academy of Sciences, the Leopoldina: it deals with the question of how to move forward when the experts tell us that we are moving on solid ground. Regarding improving the number of infections—of course, this study involves not only virologists and epidemiologists but also experts in economics, sociologists, ethicists and, therefore, people who have an eye on the whole social life and can give us the right advice. And on that basis and on the basis of all the discussions that are taking place, I will be consulting with the heads of government of the federal states on Wednesday. (April 9th) But I would like to include more people in my thanks today—namely, all those who, in the efforts to power up our public life, our economy and social spheres, are giving thought to how this can take place. I’m impressed to see how, sector for sector and sphere by sphere, concepts are being devised with a close eye on details that focus precisely on the things that are important, that are so decisive in the efforts to fight this virus, namely on keeping distance, protecting ourselves and others, wearing masks, whether to ensure safety in the workplace or in the life of society. […] Once such concepts have been elaborated, then it is, of course, the responsibility of policymakers to decide how things can start up again. Such matters are difficult to decide and weigh. There are no automatic solutions, but rather we must consider the overall situation carefully in every single case. Time and again, we have a great responsibility to do everything in our power to ensure that we don’t relapse into a more difficult phase, but that we forge ahead step by step. (April 30th)

62

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

Merkel thus adopted a concerted public policy approach both horizontally (between different spheres of competence) and vertically (between different levels of state organisation). She was even more ecumenical when it came to encouraging vaccine research: But science is never national: science serves humanity. It goes without saying that when a vaccine or drugs are identified, tested, licensed and made operational, they should also be made available and affordable worldwide. Only with the cooperation of all countries can this virus that is spreading everywhere be repelled and contained. The federal government considers international cooperation against the virus to be of extraordinary importance. (April 23rd)

As stated in the early days, there was no way out of the pandemic without a vaccine. Therefore, based on this belief, Merkel warned that numbers showing improvement might actually be misleading: Looking at the latest data collected by the Robert Koch Institute here in Germany, the indicators show that we are moving in the right direction; for example, the growth of infections is slowing down, and at the moment, there are more cured than infected every day. This is a partial achievement. But precisely because the data would bode well, I feel compelled to emphasise that it is a fragile goal. We are moving on a sheet of thin ice, incredibly thin, I would say. The situation is deceptive, and we are still far from being out of the woods; in the fight against the virus, we must always keep in mind that today’s data show the number of infections from about ten or twelve days ago. Should there be a significant increase in contacts, today’s number of new infections would therefore not tell us how we will be in one or two weeks’ time. (April 23rd)

As is now well known, containment measures do not show their effects immediately—they always appear excessive at first because it is difficult to reason in counterfactual terms. For this reason, Merkel asked citizens to be patient, offering them the calculation of the days needed to be able to assess the effects of the lockdown: The situation we experience now every day is deceptive; because today, by mutual agreement, we decided to reopen the stores. What that means in terms of contagion data, we will see in 14 days and not before, and that is what makes things so difficult. (April 20rd)

3

ANGELA MERKEL’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

63

Since a mass tragedy has not occurred, some people now believe that the danger has been overestimated. This is absolutely wrong! A look at the neighbouring countries that were hit much harder than we were makes one realise what could easily have happened. (May 30th)

In itself, it is not difficult to understand that if the situation improved, it was precisely because of the containment measures, and it in no way meant that these measures were exaggerated or unnecessary. However, as in many other countries, citizens, businesses, and the political opposition in Germany raised concerns that the line was being crossed. In response to these criticisms, Merkel used several types of arguments, including comparing the pandemic trend with neighbouring countries that had not adopted similarly restrictive policies (most likely Sweden or the Netherlands). Another type of argument was that of risk—that is, the ability of each individual to trade an uncomfortable certainty (restrictions on personal freedom) for a hypothetically better future: Even science cannot predict how this new virus will evolve in the summer and what we should expect in the fall. Obviously, it cannot know. Only one thing is certain: as has been the case for the past four months, being prepared, avoiding risks—protecting ourselves and our community from the worst—is largely up to us, each and every one of us. So take care of yourself, your family and your friends. (May 30th)

Science offers no definitive answers, and risks are, by definition, not entirely calculable, so all that can be done is to measure each person’s ability to cope with those risks—the unknowns. Even this argument, to be understood, requires a certain degree of scientific maturity, or at least reasoning skills; however, Merkel used it to emphasise the need to self-regulate during the warmer season, when the virus seemed less threatening, and containment measures were relaxed. Consequently, she praised those who had shown caution: It would be nice to be able to tell you now that it’s over, that we’ve done it. But without effective drugs, without a vaccine, no one can seriously say that yet. What we can say, and I’m incredibly grateful for this, is that so far, we’ve faced this ordeal pretty well. All of us—the vast majority of people in our country—have been guided by prudence, reason and a sense of responsibility to others. […] Our community’s contribution lies in what fortunately did not occur. (May 30th)

64

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

Thinking about risks, listening to science and clearing the field of pseudoscience and doubt, Merkel addressed not only citizens but also political representatives in the Bundestag to urge them to ‘take the situation seriously’: Here I want to say that I think we would do well to take seriously what science tells us, I mean, what the Leopoldina stated yesterday. We are happy when science develops a vaccine. We are happy when we have people who have invented swabs. But when scientists give us directions, we start to think: well, it might be so, but it might not be so. All I can say is: let’s take this seriously! (December 9th)

CHAPTER 4

Erna Solberg’s Approach to the Pandemic

In Norway, the first nationally televised press conference was held by the government on 10 March 2020 and continued daily until 8 April. Thereafter, press conferences were held three times a week, and from 15 June, they were only held when needed but at least once a week. The Prime Minister, the Health Minister, and the Head of the National Institute of Public Health were all present initially; later, the panel included the Minister of Education and Integration and the Minister of Justice and Public Security. Occasionally, when the issues required it, the press conferences were made jointly by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Economic Affairs. Generally speaking, the government took charge of the crisis in an unprecedented manner for Norway, where it is common practice to negotiate and cooperate among different authorities (Kalsnes & Skogerbø, 2021). This practice led to criticisms, but the different approach taken by neighbouring Sweden helped Solberg’s government to justify the strictness of the measures undertaken.1 Erna 1 Norway, Sweden, and Denmark are part of the so-called ‘Nordic model’, which includes high levels of systemic trust, strong social policies, and excellent performance in economic terms. Interestingly, starting from similar backgrounds, the three countries have implemented very different Covid-19 management policies (Ihlen et al., 2023). In particular, in the case of Norway, the Sovereign Wealth Fund from the sale of oil guaranteed subsidies for workers and companies.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Saccà and D. Selva, European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9_4

65

66

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

Solberg also addressed the nation with a televised speech on 18 March and, together with the Minister of Education and Integration, held two Q&A meetings with children (on 16 March and 15 April). The habit of talking to children and giving them specific attention is a Norwegian peculiarity that all leaders have in common. Norway attaches a lot of importance to future generations because they are seen as a real resource in which to invest. On National Day, 17 May, when the constitution is celebrated, Norway displays what it calls its ‘wealth’: where other states show their muscles and display their military forces, in Norway, children from schools of all levels parade through the streets while waving flags. They are taken into account in important issues from the age of twelve in matters that affect them (from religious affiliation to the right to be heard in court when it comes to cases of separation/ divorce cases). Moreover, since March 1981, there has been a children’s ombudsman (https://www.barneombudet.no/english) and a dedicated news broadcast every evening. At the same time, the priority given to children also reverberates in policy decisions, as Solberg explained: ‘The government has chosen to prioritise children, then working life, and finally other activities’ (May 7th). In view of this, the distribution of topics Erna Solberg covers in her speeches differs greatly from that of Angela Merkel (Fig. 4.1). The largest share of attention is taken up by politics (36%): Solberg uses this space to refer to two aspects in particular. On the one hand, she discusses the need to strengthen the relationship with Parliament and the opposition and emphasises how crucial bipartisan support is for carrying out the necessary restrictive policies during the pandemic. On the other hand, she expresses the desire to reward citizens for their behaviour, marked by strong solidarity. The issues most closely related to health policies occupy 29% of the segments, followed by the economy (19%). The focus is then on education (8%), consistent with the country’s underlying cultural approach. The international crisis and the desire for dialogue with neighbouring countries concern 6% of the segments. A residual 2% is devoted to science; here, as in the case of Merkel, gender issues are completely ignored, alongside information and disinformation.

4

Fig. 4.1 Distribution of the topics addressed in Erna Solberg’s speeches (Source Data from PRIN2017 “The transformations of democracy: Actors, strategies and outcomes in opposing populism in political, juridical and social arenas”, Tuscia University’s research unit)

ERNA SOLBERG’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

67

Education 8% Crisis 6%

Public health 29%

Politics 36%

Economy 19% Science 2%

4.1 Between Collective and Individual Responsibility A distinctive feature of Erna Solberg’s communications during the pandemic was her use of the term ‘dugnad’ to explain to fellow citizens what role they could play. It is an untranslatable term in English, but it roughly denotes the idea of a ‘collective effort’, voluntary work to which each community member feels they must contribute (Simon & Mobekk, 2019). It has to do with the idea of res publica and the commons, of course, but it also indicates each person’s role in the creation, maintenance, and management of these goods, a role that—of great relevance here—is taken voluntarily and simultaneously almost taken for granted. Dugnad is translated into practice mainly at the local level to take care of parks, schools, and squares. The relative novelty introduced by Erna Solberg was that she used the concept by transferring it to a national level and exploited it as a discursive tool to maintain social order in the context of temporarily suspending democratic freedoms (Christensen & Lægreid, 2020). Dugnad thus functions as a kind of call or orientation to action, capable of activating resources known to the Norwegian community to

68

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

deal with an unfamiliar situation characterised by great uncertainty. Given its relevance, Solberg introduced this term as early as the first press conferences: It is now absolutely essential that everyone in the country participate in a collective effort to curb the contagion. We will do this in solidarity with the elderly, the chronically ill and others who are particularly vulnerable to the development of severe disease. […] In Norway, we are united when there is a need. We mobilise for collective effort and cooperation in small and large local communities. Now this is more important than ever. The virus is so contagious that we cannot touch each other, but we must take care of each other. (March 12th)

Of course, in this case, dugnad requires two adaptations: first, individuals acting not on behalf of their local community but for the entire nation; second, mobilising symbolically rather than physically instead of suppressing the instinct to help by staying close. We must all protect ourselves to protect others. Let us stick together during this time, not with hugs and handshakes, but by keeping our distance. This will require a lot from each of us. We must take care of each other and help each other to the best of our ability. (March 12th)

Protecting each other, huddling together, mobilising but maintaining a safe distance: such acts required a certain amount of imagination: ‘It’s a situation that brings out a lot of the good that there is in Norwegian society, with creative help and caring for each other, even at a time when we have to keep our distance’ (March 14th). To be very clear about what she meant by ‘creative help’, Solberg also offered examples: Even if we can’t see each other in person right now, maybe it’s time to call and talk to grandparents, elderly neighbours and others who need someone to talk to. (March 13th) Give your neighbour a hand. Make a phone call to someone who may be alone right now. Remember that the choices you make have a great impact on many others. And remember that this is not the time for the “I”. This is the time for the “we”. (March 18th)

4

ERNA SOLBERG’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

69

This ‘collective work’ has a very practical implication since it relieves the healthcare system and public facilities of the burden of caring for lonely older or chronically ill people: The government has also decided to consider measures to better protect the elderly and at-risk groups. It can relieve the health service and save lives. Here I also ask family members and friends to take responsibility and interest. (March 24th)

Not only citizens (of all ages) but also businesses must participate in dugnad, demonstrating their civic sense and willingness to ‘put life and health first’ (March 12th). In concrete terms, this meant reorganising production activities so that people could work remotely: The more businesses that can get going, the less unemployed there will be when everyday life returns. Now we all have to start thinking about whether we can run our normal business in a somewhat abnormal way, working while making sure we don’t infect others. (March 24th)

The situation was in flux, and all sectors of the economy were advised to prepare to parry the blow: For some sectors, it was clear that they would suffer immediately from Covid-19. For others, government measures to contain the spread of infection as well as what is happening in neighbouring countries, have a major impact. This shows that things change very quickly, and the situation requires that we make ongoing assessments of what is needed. This is why already, when we presented the first package two days ago, I emphasised that this was just the beginning. (March 15th)

Towards the end of March, Solberg announced that social, corporate, and workers’ welfare policies would be financed through the Sovereign Wealth Fund: This shows what we can achieve with all the fantastic expertise we have in this country. When the crisis hits us, we show that we are able to think in a new and different way. We are able to use our knowledge in new ways, and we can create outstanding results through collaboration, trust and innovation across branches and sectors. It was not immediately intuitive

70

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

that it would be those in the oil industry and the Defence sector who would help solve a health service challenge, but they did, and they did it on their own initiative. (March 31st)

Clearly, this involved many sacrifices, but the stakes were high: Therefore, we are taking drastic measures in hopes of stopping the virus. We have already introduced several measures to prevent the spread of the infection in line with expert advice. But these measures are no longer sufficient. Today the government will introduce the strongest and most intrusive measures ever in peacetime Norway. The measures will have a great impact on our personal freedom. They are measures that will directly impact our daily lives and the way our society functions. This is absolutely necessary now. (March 12th) Many have already sacrificed and given much. But we must all prepare to sacrifice and give a little more. Again: thank you. Yesterday we introduced the most restrictive measures in Norway in peacetime. Everyone must take part in a collective effort [dugnad] aimed at preventing contagion in solidarity with those who are hit hardest by this virus: the elderly, the chronically ill and others who are particularly vulnerable. (March 13th)

From the earliest days, Solberg tried to explain the reasons for her decisions (‘the most restrictive measures in Norway in peacetime’) by, first and foremost, holding citizens accountable. This approach meant explaining everything very seriously and with the utmost transparency, without minimising the difficulty or urgency of the situation, admitting that it was being navigated day-to-day: ‘we don’t know how long it will take’ (March 14th); ‘we are in a crisis. Not everything will be perfect from the start’ (March 15th); ‘the only thing we know is that it will get worse before it gets better’ (March 18th). Solberg noted the reasoning behind this decision: We are in a completely new situation. It was important to act quickly. The new rules will not always be perfect. Errors and inaccuracies may occur. We will adjust as we go along. (March 18th)

When the contagion curve seemed to be under control, towards the end of March, the first calls to relax containment measures also arrived.

4

ERNA SOLBERG’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

71

Solberg had no doubt that this could not happen immediately because the goal was to have a long view: We cannot give up—the fight against the virus must continue. If we succeed, we can relax the measures and return to a strategy with more targeted monitoring, testing and isolation. The goal is to take back everyday life. The better we are at washing our hands, keeping our distance and not infecting others, the faster we get back to everyday life. At the same time, we have to prepare for the fact that we may not succeed. The government has therefore decided that hospitals will step up efforts to increase capacity. Obtain more equipment. Train more employees. (March 24th)

Using language that was always very clear and addressed to a diverse audience, Solberg likened the undertaking they were facing to a football match: I really feel a strong need to say that we cannot relax and believe that we can now let out a sigh and go back to everyday life as it was before. We are still far from the end of the first half—if we want to compare it to a football match. But with good teamwork, Norway was able to take control of the virus. The task now is to maintain that control. (April 15th)

The approach continued to be one of utmost caution thereafter: We must all continue to abide by the infection control rules and the current recommendations of the health authorities. Being careless could have serious consequences for others. In the worst-case scenario, we have to tighten the measures again. We must work to prevent this, and we must do it together. It is important for me to emphasise this because it is clear that we want to have as much activity in our society as possible—to be able to return as much as possible to normalcy. But this is not the time to start loosening up. We have to be able to hold on a little longer. (April 24th)

This statement did not imply a decrease in authority but rather suggested a fellowship between leaders and citizens: I am confident that we can do this together, with the prevailing message that we are doing extra collective work for those who cannot afford to deal with this virus. (March 14th)

72

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

If we all make an effort, we can find good, workable solutions within the measures to contain the spread of infection that we have implemented. (March 15th)

These commitments established the foundation of an implicit pact between citizens and the government about mutual trust. Solberg knew she had one of the highest levels of social trust in the world, but she did not take it for granted: it needed to be celebrated and nurtured every day, especially during such a severe crisis: The generations before us have created a society in which we trust and respect each other. In times of prosperity and recession, directors and workers in industry have stood side by side. Together we have all helped build the welfare state. When terror and accidents hit us, we came out together. When freedom was threatened, Norwegians gave everything for each other. This has given our country an advantage more powerful than any weapon and more valuable than any oil fund: trust in our fellow man. It is this trust that must sustain us through the crisis in which we now find ourselves. Without the massive trust among citizens and authorities, we could never have engaged the whole of Norway in the collective work to combat the coronavirus. In times of crisis, we understand how much we depend on each other. What unites us is more important than what separates us. The government, the Storting and the whole of politics are doing everything in our power to get us safely through this difficult time. Our common desire to do the best for all who live in Norway will always outweigh our disagreements. (March 18th)

The pandemic was thus described as a challenge of historic significance, one that would indelibly mark collective memory and become part of Norway’s national identity: Although the world is changing, the soul of the Norwegian people is the same. We pitch in when needed; we cooperate and help each other. Thank you to each and every one of you—because you contribute and sacrifice so much for our success. (March 18th) We Norwegians are known for our ability to make a last-minute effort, but when it comes to infection control, sporadic efforts are not enough. Here we have to show perseverance in the long run. Together we have achieved the goal of curbing the virus. Together we will control it in the time to come. And then we can also take back everyday life. (April 7th)

4

ERNA SOLBERG’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

73

Solberg maintained that the different generations in Norwegian society represent greater wealth than that coming from oil. Indeed, children are considered a national asset because they ensure continuity in the country’s values and culture: On Monday, we held a press conference specifically for the children. Tuva, 9, asked me: what can I do to help? I am touched that even our children want to take part in the collective work. That says a lot about Norway. (March 18th)

Children and families feature in several passages of Solberg’s speeches, as recipients of the decisions made and as an integral part of the communities that must reorganise their lives during the pandemic: We have to remember who we have to protect. Therefore, we cannot leave child care to grandparents in at-risk categories. The Minister of Health and Welfare Services will come back on the other measures. This will be a burden on both businesses and families—sick leave with children will be extended in the regulations, and we will contribute to the fact that in the overall package of financial measures. We will also help companies in the time to come. (March 12th) We must stand together to take care of each other. We must do what we can to prevent the spread of the infection to those who are at risk: the elderly and people with previous illnesses (co-morbidities), even if this means that we cannot visit elderly friends or family members. Even if it means grandchildren cannot be near their grandparents. Children cannot play football; adults cannot go to the gym. Concerts and plays are cancelled. It is important that we take care of each other so that everyone feels they have a social life. (March 14th)

Beyond rhetoric, care for children is thus comprised of concrete actions that were translated into practice with the two press conferences dedicated to them on 16 March and 15 April. The Prime Minister explained to them what Covid-19 is and what it would entail for everyone: A lot of children find this a little scary. I understand it well. It is normal to get a little scared when so many complicated things happen together. It’s normal to get a little scared thinking that you might get infected with the coronavirus. But for the absolute most part, coronavirus is not dangerous. Children who get infected with coronavirus get just a little bit sick, like

74

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

when they get a normal cold. So many don’t get infected at all. And even if all your classmates got infected at school, almost all of them would do well. The same goes for Mom and Dad if they were to get infected. Adults with healthy bodies don’t catch it in a very severe form. But the best thing is to make sure that as many people as possible don’t get infected at all. That’s why so many things are closed and erased. If we don’t meet, we can’t even infect each other. So I know that this causes so many things to be turned upside down in everyday life. So many people had to cancel their birthday party. Of course, that’s a sad thing. It can be boring to stay at home all the time, and it’s boring not to be able to meet friends like before. But by staying at home instead of going to school and leisure activities, you keep people from getting infected and sick. (March 16th)

As the excerpt above makes very clear, talking to children about Covid19 meant putting herself on their level, using simple but equally effective language, and above all, stepping into their shoes. Consequently, the passages about what it means to get sick with Covid-19, having to give up a birthday party or the boredom of being at home all day are illustrative of how it is possible to communicate with different audiences. This aspect is even more evident in the following month’s press conference, which took place just after Easter. On that occasion, Solberg acknowledged that she experienced a different Easter than usual but still a joyful one: Welcome to the children’s press conference after a slightly different Easter vacation. I hope you enjoyed yourselves, even though you were not allowed to do all the things you normally do; you were not able to go to the vacation home or visit friends as you usually do. I was also home for Easter. I ate lamb, got an Easter egg and played board games with my husband and children. Some of the things we usually do on Easter, but not quite as usual. (April 15)

In this way, she also attempted to build a relationship of mutual trust with the children, an approach that characterises Norwegian democracy and is based on taking collective responsibility: Before I start answering questions, I would also like to thank all of you who have been busy—who have been taking a little bit more care of your little brother or older brother, and who have been helping Mom and Dad—and helping me—to make the days go for the best, with the special rules we have had lately. Nobody, not even the Prime Minister or the King, can take care of the whole country at the same time. That’s why we need everyone,

4

ERNA SOLBERG’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

75

including you, to help—by washing your hands, sneezing into your elbow and keeping your distance. And no less important, just as important, that you take care of each other during this strange time. (April 15)

4.2

Democracy, Institutions, and the Welfare State

As already mentioned, Norway is part of the ‘Nordic model’ that favours the consensual management of democracy, involving consultations and agreements among different political forces and between them and the social partners, which are often organised in guilds (Ihlen et al., 2023). Even during the pandemic, then, crisis communication included this aspect of political life, with Solberg giving accounts of meetings and dialogues: The situation we are in now is challenging and affects many parts of society. It also means that the government is following this situation on many fronts. The Minister of Health and Welfare Services has ongoing operational responsibility for management, and today he reported on the issue to Parliament. Earlier today, the Minister of Trade, Industry and Fisheries met with various business representatives, and the government received suggestions for important measures. The Minister of Research and Higher Education today took the initiative for a dialogue with universities and university colleges on the conduct of examinations. We also keep the dialogue open with the unions. Close dialogue with business and industry will continue. (March 10th)

However, it was not simply the inertia of an established procedure that favoured this kind of power management. In some countries, such as the United States, Brazil, and Hungary, the uncertainty of the first weeks of contagion spread provided a window of opportunity for greater centralisation of power, to the point that some have discussed the emergence of illiberal democracies (cfr. Part III of this volume). In countries like Germany and Norway, on the other hand, this same uncertainty led to the regular revision of decisions: On Thursday, we introduced the toughest measures we have ever had in peacetime. Having done this in a very short time will always lead to some unanswered questions, practical solutions that are not entirely optimal and

76

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

measures that will have to be adapted along the way. This means that we must always be open to adapting and implementing new measures to ensure that measures work and can be adapted to practical solutions. (March 14th)

Dialogue is thus a political practice of the government that includes the parties in Parliament (the Storting), businesses, and civil society: The government maintains close contacts with the parties in Parliament, and as I said, I had a meeting with party leaders no later than today. My experience is that there is good work being done in Parliament, both on the measures that the government is implementing now and on other measures that are being worked on. I am also pleased with the close cooperation we have with Norwegian businesses, especially in a situation like this. (March 18th) The latest crisis package was agreed tonight at the Storting, and I would like to thank the Storting for the active cooperation. We also work well with the social partners to ensure that the long-term consequences of this crisis are minimised. (March 31st)

Nonetheless, the problem was not the spirit of collaboration between parties but the time-consuming nature of democratic deliberation, which during the Covid-19 crisis proved to be dramatically long: The Storting works hard and conscientiously in this situation, but still, some time and formalities are always required to enact a law or establish an exemption from the law. This is an extraordinary situation in which we need to act quickly. Therefore, the government will send a bill to the Storting this afternoon, which will give the government the authority to be able to quickly establish provisions of the law—including provisions that deviate from the current law—with the exception of the constitution and human rights. All provisions so determined must be reported to the Storting, and the Storting may make decisions that fully or partially repeal the provision. (March 18th) The scope of this law is broad and also applies to issues outside purely socially critical areas. The government believes this is absolutely necessary to make things work. The reason for this is that the crisis we are in has shown that, in many areas, we do not have the legal basis to establish the

4

ERNA SOLBERG’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

77

necessary rules quickly and efficiently. New needs are emerging in many areas, where individuals or businesses can run into problems if we don’t change the rules quickly enough. (March 18th)

In a framework of the partial and temporary subversion of constitutional prerogatives, Parliament typically retains some control over the government’s actions. However, this is an ex-post control and no longer a legislative process characterised by consultations, parliamentary debates, and study committees. Clearly, this is a mediation dictated by circumstances: The government today asked the Storting for amplified powers to handle the situation. This is very unusual in our democracy, but it says everything about how serious the situation is. […] We are in a completely new situation. It was important to act quickly. The new rules will not always be perfect. Errors and inaccuracies may occur. We will adjust as we go along. (March 18th)

Also in this spirit, just over a month after the start of the pandemic in Norway, Solberg established a commission of inquiry into how her government handled the crisis (the so-called Corona Commission): The decisions we made on March 12 and in the days that followed were made in a climate of great uncertainty. […] But posterity will probably also show that something was done wrong and something was done right. It is an important principle in any emergency preparedness work that all events must be evaluated. All exercises must be reviewed to see what we can learn from them. Both our companies and we as a government have a duty to do this. This crisis has far-reaching consequences in all areas of our society. That is why it is important to have an external review that assesses the whole picture. What has worked well? What has not worked? What can be done differently next time? We need to learn from the crisis we are in now so that we are better prepared for the next one. Therefore, the government today established an independent commission to obtain a thorough and comprehensive review and assessment of the authorities’ preparations and management of the Covid-19 pandemic. The commission’s mandate and composition were determined after dialogue with the parties in the Storting. (April 24th)

Solberg described a fully democratic leadership that designated accountability as a strength and encouraged its practice. The review of her performance was also intended to build the know-how on dealing with

78

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

upcoming crises and develop new governance practices. The Corona Commission, as anticipated, concluded its review by stating that the deviation from normal legislative procedures posed a danger to Norwegian democracy but that the Solberg government handled the crisis very well. Certainly, part of this success can be attributed to excellent welfare structures, including a solid healthcare system. That is why, although problems with the supply of masks, tampons, and respirators have also affected Norway, this has happened only in part, without leading to the critical situation that emerged elsewhere. A robust welfare state also implies a very responsive pension system and adequate training and re-employment pathways. However, Solberg placed the energy transition and the international competitiveness of Norwegian companies within the framework of post-pandemic reconstruction policies, returning to her persona as ‘Iron Erna’: The coronavirus crisis adds to a situation characterised by a great need for change in Norway, triggered in part by rapid technological development and strong international competition. The crisis we are now in has certainly not diminished the need for change. The need has been strengthened. Our goal is still to build a Norway that is greener, smarter and ensures a sustainable welfare society. […] In the future, we need more people working and paying taxes. We need more companies that contribute to the Treasury and are not dependent on Treasury subsidies. We need to use this period to create a better basis for value creation in the economy of the future. Increasing the competitive power of businesses has been an important priority for the government for many years. Now it has become more important than ever. (May 29th)

Among the initiatives taken to limit the contagion was, of course, border closures. In late spring, Solberg announced that the reopening of borders for tourist travel was limited to Denmark alone because the two countries shared strict containment measures and showed similar contagion rates: The government signalled in early May that we were working on joint Nordic solutions for leisure travel. We wanted common rules, but this work is now about having bilateral solutions with individual countries. Norway and Denmark have agreed to reopen for tourist travel between our two countries from June 15. This is being announced by Danish Prime Minister Mette Fredriksen as I hold this press conference. The agreement is

4

ERNA SOLBERG’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

79

that Danish tourists, as of June 15, can come to Norway and that Norwegians can vacation in Denmark this summer. Based on the framework and principles we have agreed with Denmark, we will also start a dialogue with the other Nordic countries. We have informed the other countries that until June 15, we can have the same kind of principled approach to openness with them as we now have with Denmark. We will talk with Iceland, Sweden and Finland. (May 29th)

The preferred horizon for international collaboration was the Nordic countries, of course. However, when it came to anti-Covid-19 vaccine research, Norway fit into other networks: the UN, WHO, G20, ECECI, and GAVI. Specifically, Norway has been actively working for years for better international preparedness against epidemics and pandemics. Norway helped found the GAVI vaccine alliance and the Coalition for Epidemic and Pandemic Response (CEPI). In February, we donated 36 million Norwegian kroner to vaccine development through CEPI. The work has paid off, and CEPI now has a potential vaccine ready for clinical trials. We are working to convince additional countries to contribute to vaccine development, and many are now considering increasing their contributions to CEPI. (March 10th)

With these development programmes already underway, Norway catapulted itself onto an international stage far beyond the borders of Europe. Indeed, Solberg placed the vaccine issue within a global perspective: We do not yet know entirely the global scope and consequences of the pandemic. But what we do know is that the whole world is more or less affected. It also means that all countries have a responsibility to limit the scope of this pandemic. The international community must work together to find solutions to combat the virus, primarily by supporting the development of a vaccine, the best possible treatment, and rapid and complete diagnosis. […] It is extremely important to stand together and implement joint financial measures in this situation. Once the vaccine arrives, poor countries must also have access to it – not only because we need to be supportive but also because international collaboration is a key to overwhelming the pandemic. So we need to make sure that everyone can participate in solutions to come out ahead. (April 24)

80

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

Finding the vaccine in the shortest possible time would require the collaboration of the entire international community, both financially and conceptually. Further, because the pandemic was global in scope, it was imperative to address the spread of the vaccine worldwide to avert the emergence of new variants. Solberg described it as a ‘human rights issue’ and a ‘global health security issue’ (June 4th): ‘As long as the virus is active somewhere, we are at risk everywhere: to protect ourselves, we must protect each other’ (May 4th).

4.3

Empathic Leadership

Erna Solberg often talked about herself and how she coped with the pandemic, allowing her to find common ground with her fellow citizens. For example, she confessed that she was afraid: We are in the middle of a difficult time for Norway and the world. Norway is being put to the test. Both as a society, but also we as individuals. During this time, we will all have a different daily life. The drastic measures we are taking now we are taking in hopes of stopping the virus. The coronavirus spreads rapidly. It brings anxiety and fear in both children and adults. I understand that fear well. (March 12th)

Solberg talked about what she missed and how she felt: ‘One of the things I miss the most is being able to hug my friends. It is not possible with the spacing rules we have now. While other things may soon become possible’ (April 15th). She also noted the unprecedented nature of these events, stating, for example, that ‘the last few days have been completely surreal for me—and certainly for all of you. We are in a situation that none of us have ever been in before’ (March 14th), and ‘No one in my generation has ever seen our country face challenges as great as the one we see now’ (March 18th). Although from a different perspective than an ordinary citizen, Solberg declared that she found herself bewildered in the face of an unprecedented challenge. These words underscore the extraordinariness of the moment and make the gravity of the situation even more obvious. Indeed, the measures introduced to contain the contagion changed the physiognomy of social life, and through her communication, Solberg wanted to manage the emotional reactions of fellow citizens by trying to anticipate them, to name them:

4

ERNA SOLBERG’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

81

Everyday life is unrecognisable. Many people feel fear and restlessness. Some people feel anxious. Many people are worried about work and personal finances. You must all know that we do everything in our power to help. […] Although the days are perceived as surreal and confusing, we see cohesion and solidarity. And many are making their contributions. It is absolutely necessary to get us through this period. (March 18th)

Solberg wanted to convey that even in a very uncertain landscape of a succession of announcements, communications, and press conferences, citizens must be able to rely on one certainty: that their Prime Minister and other cabinet members are working to the best of their ability for the well-being of all. The empathy shown by Solberg also was translated into concrete images, revealing the impression that she was familiar with the details of citizens’ personal lives, all equally challenged by Covid-19, of course, but not necessarily in the same ways: Many have to be at work to keep Norway going: they pick up trash; they wash to keep infection away; they drive buses, trains and cabs. They are at the checkout counter at your local food store, often late into the evening. They too are now exposing themselves to the risk of infection. (March 18th)

She also spoke in the first person when she wanted to express gratitude: Initiatives like this impress me and make me grateful. And it makes me optimistic about what this country can do, even for the future—because there will come a time after this crisis. A challenging time in which we will face great challenges that we must solve together. The consequences of both the coronavirus pandemic and the climate crisis will demand that we be able to find new, better and smarter ways of doing things. Today’s news is a good example and inspiration for all of us. (March 31st)

Then there is the sympathy for those who, following the initial containment measures, saw the curve of contagions going down and thought they could return to their former lives in no time. To these people, Solberg recommended patience: It has been 26 long days since we drastically changed the way we live our lives. During this time, we have asked a lot of each of you. The response

82

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

we have received is tremendous patience and willpower in the face of strict infection control measures—even if it is challenging—even if we are more isolated. Even though we lack all the things we otherwise take for granted, we conscientiously listen to the advice of health authorities. (April 7th)

It was a necessary caution to avoid going back to square one, but there was no judgement in her words: To all of you who think it’s taking too long, I understand that impatience. If we can control the contagion in the time to come, we can open more. But if we fail, we must again employ more restrictions. (April 7th)

Talking about emotions and identifying them as commonly held is a communicative mode that follows a precise strategy: on the one hand, it becomes a kind of formula for using multiple language registers, interspersing the parts where it is necessary to introduce decisions and measures in more detail, and often this more instructive part is entrusted to the different ministers in charge; on the other hand, it serves to justify those decisions to accompany the reasoning. It has been said many times that Norway has implemented stringent containment measures and that there and then, this attracted some criticism, although, in hindsight, they were assessed as correct. Most of the time, Solberg justified these decisions by using the language of empathy (also referring to the concept of dugnad); at other times, she called into question expert opinions.

4.4

The Role of Science

There are a few times when Solberg directly cited scientific opinion or contagion numbers for two reasons. First, as noted above, Solberg often called press conferences featuring individual ministers who would explain the latest in the fight against the virus. Consequently, her introductions used the most accessible language possible, directed towards the general citizenry, leaving the ministers to go into more detail. Second, the National Board of Health retained all its prerogatives in monitoring and managing the health emergency, implying a division of spheres of responsibility that was maintained even during the pandemic. Clearly, in the press conference where Solberg announced the first containment measures, there was a direct reference to epidemiological models. However, the rest of the time, Solberg presented her decisions

4

ERNA SOLBERG’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

83

without recourse to the justification that scientific advice could provide. The gravity of the situation was represented by the contagion level and the images coming from neighbouring countries, while it grew increasingly clear that the modus operandi for managing the pandemic was to proceed with the suppression of all unnecessary travel and encounters. Behind this choice, perhaps, was also the desire to present decisions as a single output, even if they resulted from consultations with different parties, so there was no need to specify which parts of the state have cooperated. Unlike other contexts in which leaders have used the argumentative logic that scientific opinion justifies their decisions, in this case, Solberg provided legitimacy to scientific opinions and therefore incorporated them implicitly in her speeches and decisions: It will be a while before everything is completely back to business as usual. How long it will take, we don’t know, but we are constantly working to learn more about the coronavirus so that we can set the right rules for Norway that will work best and give as little hassle as possible with respect to what we want to do. (April 15th)

This approach was used consistently for the first month of the pandemic, but starting on 7 April, when the measures began to be loosened a bit, the advice of scientific experts grew more present: The government decided today what measures we will take in the further fight against the virus. We are doing this on the basis of new analyses from the National Institute of Public Health and advice from the Public Health Authority. The new analyses provide a basis for cautious optimism. We see that the curve of infections has flattened and that infection control measures are working. Together we have reached the target where each patient, on average, should only transmit the infection to one person. As you heard yesterday, the figure is now estimated at 0.7. (April 7th)

On the other hand, it is evident that the measures taken scrupulously followed scientific advice since they respected the criterion of utmost caution. This reality is also evident in Solberg’s communication, as she announced as early as April 2020 that normality was still a long way off, leaving no room for illusions: Just before Easter, the government announced that we will gradually reopen the company. For it to work, we have to do it together, in a

84

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

controlled way and over time. Only then can we still maintain control over the coronavirus and its spread. I have said before that we have to put in the bill of living with infection control measures that limit contact between us for quite a while. I think we need to continue to do that. But that doesn’t mean that the contagion control measures will be exactly the same one, three or six months from now as they are today. We have to constantly try to find the best measures that meet two criteria at the same time: First: the measures have to be the most appropriate to reduce infection. Second: The measures must be as least restrictive as possible. (April 16th)

References Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (2020). The coronavirus crisis—Crisis communication, meaning-making, and reputation management. International Public Management Journal, 23(5), 713–729. https://doi.org/10.1080/109 67494.2020.1812455 Ihlen, Ø., Johansson, B., & Blach-Ørsten, M. (2023). Experiencing the Covid19 in Denmark, Norway and Sweden: The role of the Nordic model. In R. Tench, J. Meng, & A. Moreno (Eds.), Strategic communication in a global crisis: National and international responses to the Covid-19 pandemic (pp. 184–198). Routledge. Kalsnes, B., & Skogerbø, E. (2021). Norway: From strict measures to pragmatic flexibility. In D. Lilleker, I. A. Coman, M. Gregor, & E. Novelli (Eds.), Political communication and COVID-19: Governance and rhetoric in times of crisis (pp. 231–238). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003120254-22 Simon, C., & Mobekk, H. (2019). Dugnad: A fact and a narrative of Norwegian prosocial behavior. Perspectives on Behavior Science, 42, 815–834. https://doi. org/10.1007/s40614-019-00227-w

PART II

Techno-populism, Expertise and the Welfare State: Giuseppe Conte, Emmanuel Macron and Pedro Sánchez

CHAPTER 5

Introducing Techno-Populist Leaders and Their Alternative: Conte and Macron Faced to Sánchez

The misalignment between politics and society is long-standing evidence of the contemporary age. As the historical cleavages have ceased to determine the categories of politics and the cardinal points of political conflict (i.e. left and right), new formations have emerged, rooted in different cultural traditions and social structures, but all sharing one common element: anti-politics (i.e. the contrast with the “political class” or “political caste”); it is the dominant unifying trait of each of the new political formations which have emerged in Western European democracies in the last thirty years (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Mastropaolo, 2000). In fact, multiple populisms have risen and now live side-by-side, such as “techno-populism”, “populism of the élites”, “entrepreneurial populism”, and “media populism” (the list could continue: Blokker & Anselmi, 2020; Heinisch et al., 2017; Wejnert & Woods, 2014). Some argue that populism and technocracy are two sides of the same coin, which sometimes overlap in multiple possible combinations (Bickerton & Invernizzi Accetti, 2021). The most important (albeit not all) political leaders of this time gain power by blending a mix of popularity and expertise, almost irrespectively of the policies they advocate. For historical and geographical proximity, France and Italy appear good examples of how the left–right cleavage has lost centrality and favoured the emergence of new actors,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Saccà and D. Selva, European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9_5

87

88

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

such as Emmanuel Macron’s The Republic on the Move (LREM) and Italy’s Five Star Movement. The case of Emmanuel Macron challenges pre-existing categories of populism and non-populism in a way that makes it complicated to claim he completely fits with one rather than the other (Taguieff, 2017). In this context, Macron has been indicated as the perfect ideal-type of how a certain class of European financial technocrat can compete for (and win) a political position using a populist rhetoric, which in theory would be paradoxical (Bickerton & Invernizzi Accetti, 2021). On the one hand, he won the 2017 elections as the champion of a broad coalition united against the populist far-right of Marine Le Pen. However, he did not run from a traditional partisan standpoint (unlike all the other candidates since the Second World War) but created a personalised party ex novo, The Republic on the Move, just as Silvio Berlusconi had in the early ‘90s in Italy (and others afterwards; Musso, 2019). In a famous interview given during the 2016 electoral campaign, he claimed that France deserved a “Jupiterian President”, a man who was able to rise above the other men, rather than a “normal President” such as his predecessor François Hollande.1 His words resembled the Weberian model of charismatic leader (Weber, 1919/2004) and were inspired by a Gaullist ethos: a supreme leader is the only one to hold all the power like a commanderin-chief in times of war, and the only one legitimated to speak with the people based on a plebiscitarian, direct relationship with them (Chamorel, 2019; Taguieff, 2017). Despite the premises, the popularity of Emmanuel Macron dropped from 57 to 22% at the beginning of 2019.2 That year saw an acceleration in the loss of consensus, when the Yellow Vests movement invaded the streets with violent protests, and the longest strike in three decades was called to protest against the bill on retirement reform. The pandemic has restored some trust in Macron (34% at the end of April 2020), but to a lesser extent than the boost in support enjoyed by other leaders in other countries.3 1 The interview is available in French: https://www.challenges.fr/election-president ielle-2017/interview-exclusive-d-emmanuel-macron-je-ne-crois-pas-au-president-normal_ 432886. 2 Data source: Cévipof, SciencesPo. Available at: https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/ sites/sciencespo.fr.cevipof/files/CEVIPOF_confiance_vague10-1.pdf. 3 Data Source: The Economist. Available at: https://www.economist.com/graphicdetail/2020/05/09/covid-19-has-given-most-world-leaders-a-temporary-rise-in-popula rity. See also Eurobarometer Public Opinion Monitoring in the Time of Covid-19.

5

INTRODUCING TECHNO-POPULIST LEADERS AND THEIR …

89

The Italian case is more directly related to a traditional definition of populism, since almost all observers agree that the Five Star Movement is a populist party (Biorcio & Natale, 2018; Mosca & Tronconi, 2019; Saccà, 2015; Segatori, 2015). The Italian leader during the first and the second waves of the Covid-19 pandemic was Giuseppe Conte, a lawyer and professor. Indeed, like Macron, he did not have a political history, and this was his main source of credit at the time he was appointed as Prime Minister. After the 2018 elections, a coalition government between the Five Star Movement and the League came to power: the two parties gained 227 and 125 seats respectively, whereas the Democratic Party’s coalition obtained only 122 seats.4 The fragile balance between the two forces did not allow any of those to take on the leadership, and the Five Star Movement proposed Giuseppe Conte to exercise a super-partes (i.e. non-partisan) warranty role. In his inaugural speech, he famously defined himself as “the Italian people’s advocate”. The so-called “yellow-green government” was the result of the agreement between the two leaders of the winning parties, Luigi Di Maio and Matteo Salvini, who were nominated as Deputy Prime Ministers. In the wake of this alliance, Salvini eventually resigned in September 2019, but Conte’s cabinet carried on based on radically opposing premises: the Conte II cabinet was sustained by the Five Star Movement, the Democratic Party, and the left-wing party Free and Equal, and it was labelled the “yellow–red government”. Two years later, in February 2021, after another parliamentary vote of no-confidence, Conte resigned and he is currently leading the Five Star Movement. Hence, even if the ideological leanings of Giuseppe Conte are not clearly defined, his fame and fortune belong to a specific political party. The Five Star Movement’s support for an expert might seem

Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/be-heard/eurobarom eter/2020/covid19/en-public-opinion-in-the-time-of-covid19-20200505.pdf. 4 More precisely, within the centre-right coalition, the League, which was the leading component, took 125 seats, Berlusconi’s Forza Italia took 104 seats, Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy 32 seats, and the UDC (largely made up of former Christian Democratics) only 4 seats. The Five Star Movement gained 227 seats running alone. Finally, the centre-left coalition led by Matteo Renzi’s Democratic Party won 112 seats, plus 3 seats by Emma Bonino’s More Europe, and 7 seats by minor parties. The new Free and Equal formation (comprised of a federation of left-wing parties such as Article 1, Italian Left and Possible) won 14 seats. Data Source: Italian Ministry of Interior. Available at: https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it/index.php?tpel=C&dtel=04/03/2018&tpa= I&tpe=A&lev0=0&levsut0=0&es0=S&ms=S.

90

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

contradictory if read through the lens of a definition of populism as anti-establishment and anti-elitist; on the contrary, it fits with the definition of techno-populism based on anti-political rhetoric (Bickerton & Invernizzi Accetti, 2021), as the Five Star Movement has demonstrated since its establishment in 2009 (most importantly, the Five Star Movement agreed to support Draghi’s cabinet throughout the pandemic). The pandemic seems to have consolidated the leadership of Giuseppe Conte: at the beginning of the first wave, his trustworthiness was at its lowest (39%), but immediately after the first few weeks of lockdown, it reached a stable 55–60%, maintained for the rest of 2020.5 The case of Pedro Sánchez is presented here as a radically opposed leadership style, for two main reasons: first of all, although the Spanish socio-political context might appear similar to those of France and Italy, it has some traits of exceptionality if compared with the rest of Europe; and secondly, the political history of the leader is different, as he has had a political career in one of the most important traditional parties, one that has had to deal and compete with populist forces. The economic crisis of 2008–2014 broke the traditional bipolarism typical of Spanish democracy since 1978 (Guiraudon et al., 2015; Morlino & Raniolo, 2018): indeed, Spain witnessed the birth of new left-wing political forces (i.e. Podemos, or “We Can”), which grew in reaction to the austerity policies and competed with the long-established and more institutionalised PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party). At the same time, in the last few years, a centrist anti-political party (i.e. Ciudadanos (Cs), or “Citizens”) and a populist far-right (i.e. Vox) have emerged, further complicating the political scene. Although it has been argued that “populist attitudes” were already present in Spain even before the Great Recession (Rodríguez Sáez, 2021), it is in those years that the PSOE faced much criticism for being “too institutional”, and therefore, incapable of taking advantage of the popular discontent, leaving room for the development of Podemos (Franzé, 2019). In effect, the PSOE is facing a multidimensional crisis: a crisis of ideology, begun during the Zapatero era; a socio-cultural crisis, evident in the increasing misalignment with society; and an organisational crisis, which culminated in September 2016 (Borrell, 2017). Sánchez has a long political career in the PSOE and on many occasions he has highlighted how proud he is to represent this legacy. During his term as the 5 Data Source: Istituto Ixé. Available on Statista at: https://www.statista.com/statis tics/977223/support-for-prime-minister-conte-in-italy/.

5

INTRODUCING TECHNO-POPULIST LEADERS AND THEIR …

91

party’s Secretary-General, he had many ups and downs: in 2016 he sought an alliance with the new centrist party Citizens (instead of the left-wing alliance Unidas Podemos, “United We Can”) but it was not enough to reach a parliamentary majority; after 7 months, new elections were held due to the impossibility of reaching a majority and the parties’ unwillingness to form a government of national unity; and turnout for the PSOE worsened and it became the third political force after the Popular Party and Podemos. He was forced to resign as the party’s Secretary-General in September 2016. In May 2017, he was re-elected Secretary-General and leader of the opposition to Mariano Rajoy’s third term. From that position, he called the vote of no-confidence that led to the Rajoy cabinet’s resignation in 2018 and established an alliance with the left-wing alliance United We Can. With this alliance he won the elections in April 2019, although he could not form a government due to the small majority in Parliament. After the second elections in November 2019, he finally inaugurated his mandate in early January 2020 and began to lead the coalition government formed with United We Can. Barely two months after being sworn in as Prime Minister, Sánchez started to deal with the pandemic. This part compares the cases of Conte, Macron, and Sánchez in view of the fact that they are the leaders of the three countries where technopopulism has come to power. However, as the analysis in these pages will show, a profound difference between Conte and Macron, on the one hand, and Sanchez, on the other, is evident. On the communicativediscursive level, the epigones of techno-populism embody a paternalistic leadership style, which sees the people as suffering and in need of guidance. On the contrary, Sánchez builds his political legitimacy as a leader by recalling the symbols of socialist tradition and national history. Prominent among these is the use of the Welfare State not only as a tactical resource in the management of the pandemic, but above all as a symbol to mobilise the people towards a common goal. For this reason, Sánchez appears closer to a transformational leadership model.

5.1 The Covid-19 Pandemic in Italy, France, and Spain: Epidemiological and Political Data The first wave of the pandemic began in Italy between the end of February and the beginning of March 2020; the first measure adopted was the closure of all schools and universities on 4th March, announced by Conte with a TV address to the nation. The lockdown started five

92

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

days later, and ended on 18th May, although domestic travel was only permitted again on 3rd June. The second wave began in September and lasted until the end of 2020, with a preliminary system of containment measures differentiated on a regional and urban basis, and was followed by an extension to the whole country on 5th November and prolonged until the end of the Christmas holidays, in January 2021 (Fig. 5.1). Spain declared the State of Emergency on 13th March and further prolonged it two weeks at a time until 21st June; the lockdown started on the same day and began to be eased on 27th April. The second wave started in August but the problem was addressed through a regionally differentiated strategy. It was only on 25th October that the national government was forced to declare the State of Emergency again, which then lasted six months. France started the first lockdown on 17th March and ended it on 11th May, with a full reopening on 14th June; the second wave’s lockdown began on 30th October (albeit anticipated by local curfews starting from mid-October) and lasted until 15th December.

Fig. 5.1 Waves of Covid-19 in France, Italy, and Spain (number of confirmed cases) (Source Johns Hopkins University CSSE COVID-19 data)

5

INTRODUCING TECHNO-POPULIST LEADERS AND THEIR …

93

As of 31st December 2020, Italy recorded 84 points out of 100 in the Oxford Coronavirus Government Response Tracker, while Spain stood at 78.7 points and France 64 points (Fig. 5.2). In this index, the stricter and more wide-ranging government policies of containment are, the higher the points. These differences are due to the fact that France and Spain had a lower ranking than Italy in the indicators relating to workplace closing, closure of public transport, restrictions on internal movement, and contact tracing. Moreover, in terms of economic policies, Italy and Spain have been appreciated for their policies on debt/contract relief, while France has been praised for providing more income support for households. In France, the pandemic started about ten days later than in Italy and Spain, but the timing of the government’s addresses to the nation and containment measures coincided; nonetheless, the number (and the overall duration) of speeches, press conferences, and declarations by Pedro Sánchez and Giuseppe Conte exceeded that of Macron’s (Table 5.1).

Fig. 5.2 Stringency Index in France, Italy, and Spain. (Source Hale, T., Angrist, N., Goldszmidt, R., Kira, B., Petherick, A., Phillips, T., Webster S., CameronBlake, E., Hallas, L., Majumdar, S., & Tatlow, H. A global panel database of pandemic policies (Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker). Nature Human Behaviour—Lat updated 26 June, 16:00 [London time]. OurWorldI nData.org/coronavirus • CC BY)

2

1

First speech

9th March 2020 4th March 2020 5th November 21st June 2020 2020 17th March 12th March 2020 2020 14th October 14th July 2020 2020 14th March 9th March 2020 2020 25th August 25th August 2020 2020

Beginning of lockdown 18th May 2020 11th January 2021 11th May 2020 20th January 2021 21st June 2020 9th May 2021

Ending of lockdown

31st December 2020

31st December 2020 4th August 2020

31st December 2020 16th June 2020

3rd June 2020

Last speech

15

25

11

11

19

19

Number of speeches

40

22

38

Total speeches

Source Data from PRIN2017 “The transformations of democracy: Actors, strategies and outcomes in opposing populism in political, juridical and social arenas”, Tuscia University’s research unit

2

Pedro Sánchez (Spain) 1

Emmanuel Macron (France)

2

1

Waves

Data set description: Italy, France, Spain

Giuseppe Conte (Italy)

Table 5.1

94 F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

5

INTRODUCING TECHNO-POPULIST LEADERS AND THEIR …

95

References Albertazzi, D., & McDonnell, D. (Eds.). (2008). Twenty-first century populism: The spectre of Western European democracy. Palgrave Macmillan. Bickerton, C. J., & Invernizzi Accetti, C. (2021). Technopopulism: The new logic of democratic politics. Oxford University Press. Biorcio, R., & Natale, P. (2018). Il Movimento 5 Stelle: dalla protesta al governo. Mimesis. Blokker, P., & Anselmi, M. (Eds.). (2020). Multiple populisms: Italy as democracy’s mirror. Routledge. Borrell, J. (2017). Los idus de octubre: reflexiones sobre la crisis de la socialdemocracia y el futuro del PSOE. Los Libros de la Catarata. Chamorel, P. (2019). Macron versus the yellow vests. Journal of Democracy, 30(4), 48–62. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0068 Franzé, J. (2019, Julio–Decembre). Cercanía programática, lejanía cultural: la relación entre Podemos y PSOE durante la crisis en España (2014–2018). DeSignis: Publicación de la Federación Latinoamericana de Semiótica, 31, 293– 313. Guiraudon, V., Ruzza, C., & Trenz, H.-J. (Eds.). (2015). Europe’s prolonged crisis: The making or the unmaking of a political union. Palgrave Macmillan. Heinisch, R. C., Holtz-Bacha, C., & Mazzoleni, O. (Eds.). (2017). Political populism: A handbook. Nomos. Mastropaolo, A. (2000). Antipolitica: All’origine della crisi italiana. L’ancora del Mediterraneo. Morlino, L., & Raniolo, F. (2018). Come la crisi economica cambia la democrazia. Il Mulino. Mosca, L., & Tronconi, F. (2019). Beyond left and right: The eclectic populism of the Five Star Movement. West European Politics, 42(6), 1258–1283. https:/ /doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2019.1596691 Musso, P. (2019). Le temps de l’État-Entreprise: Berlusconi, Trump, Macron. Librairie Anthème Fayard. Rodríguez Sáez, A. (2021). La génesis del populismo en España entre 2011 y 2013: un análisis desde la demanda. REIS: Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 173, 121–140. Saccà, F. (2015). Culture politiche e partiti in mutamento. In F. Saccà (Ed.), Culture politiche e mutamento nelle società complesse (pp. 23–43). Franco Angeli. Segatori, R. (2015). Sintomi populisti nella crisi italiana. In F. Saccà (Ed.), Culture politiche e mutamento nelle società complesse (pp. 111–131). Franco Angeli.

96

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

Taguieff, P. A. (2017). Macron: miracle ou mirage? Éditions de l’Observatoire. Weber, M. (1919/2004). The vocation lectures: Science as a vocation, politics as a vocation. Hackett. Wejnert, B., & Woods, D. (Eds.). (2014). The many faces of populism: Current perspectives. Emerald Press.

CHAPTER 6

Giuseppe Conte’s Approach to the Pandemic

From March 2020, the government addressed the pandemic by concentrating powers and communication through the figure of the Prime Minister. For each of the key dates of the crisis management, Giuseppe Conte emanated a Ministerial Decree (DPCM) and at the same time addressed the nation through a TV address, a Facebook livestream, or a press conference (occasionally jointly with other key ministers, such the Ministers of Health, of Public Education, and of Economy and Finance). Figure 6.1 compare the frequency of each topic in the speeches given by Conte during the first and the second wave of the pandemic. More specifically, the last speech of the first wave coincided with the full reopening of the country; subsequently, discourse shifted towards the organisational and economic measures needed to return to normality in September. During the summer, the agenda was dominated by the economy (42%), followed by international negotiations within the European Union (19%), measures regarding the education system (16%) and political issues (15%), while public health topics fell to a mere 7%. One of the most noteworthy features of this interlude is the disappearance of science, and that of scientific opinion and epidemiological data, from Conte’s speeches; we can hypothesise that the increase in the relative weight of the economy determined this contraction in scientific content. Also, during the second wave, the increased weight of economic issues © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Saccà and D. Selva, European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9_6

97

98

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

Italy’s first wave 2020

Education 4.2% Information and media 2.5%

Politic s 37.4%

Crisis 10.5%

Public Health 18.9%

Summer 2020

Italy’s second wave 2020

Education 16.2% Information and media 0.9% Crisis 18.9% Politics 14.4%

Education 17.2% Public Health 7.2%

Public Health 24.1% Politics 25.5% Economy 21.4%

Economy 42.3% Science 11.8%

Economy 14.7%

Crisis 5.5%

Science 6.2%

Fig. 6.1 Distribution of the topics addressed in Giuseppe Conte’s speeches (Source Data from PRIN2017 “The transformations of democracy: Actors, strategies and outcomes in opposing populism in political, juridical and social arenas”, Tuscia University’s research unit)

(along with politics and public health) did not leave room for science to reach the percentages observed during the first wave. Despite announcements and intentions to the contrary, in mid-October many Regions introduced a mild lockdown, and schools and universities were closed again on 5th November. The first speech regarding the measures to combat the coronavirus was given on 4th March 2020. In this speech, Conte described the situation as “A challenge that has no political colour, which must rally the entire nation. It is a challenge that must be won with everyone’s commitment: citizens and institutions, scientists, doctors, healthcare workers, civil protection, and law enforcement. All of Italy is called to do its part” (4th March). Indeed, Conte repeatedly underlined that his style of government is oriented to full transparency, openness, and sharing even in the most critical situations. During the period in which images from Bergamo portraying, army trucks collecting and removing coffins in the middle of the night were going around the world, Conte commented:

6

GIUSEPPE CONTE’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

99

From the very beginning I have opted for transparency, for sharing, I have chosen not to minimise or hide the reality that is before our eyes every day. I have chosen to involve all of you in the challenge we are called to face: it is the most difficult crisis the country has experienced since the post-second world war period. (21st March)

That was the second time that Conte compared the Covid-19 pandemic to a war; on 11th March he incited the Italians to increase their sense of community “to win the fight against the pandemic”. Nonetheless, in the following speeches the accent shifted to softer concepts like “emergency”, “challenge” and “crisis”, and in October the pandemic became “the common enemy” for Italy and Europe. Most of the time, the pandemic is portrayed to Italian citizens as a moment that requires many sacrifices. The concept of sacrifice was used very frequently throughout the year, and at every opportunity the Prime Minister emphasised his empathic bond with citizens, using formulae such as “I acknowledge that we are asking for sacrifices” or “I acknowledge that you/we are all making sacrifices”. This constitutes a curious trait of Conte’s discourse and represents an argumentative strategy where the speaker acknowledges he has damaged the interlocutor’s position before the latter can start claiming compensation (in Latin: excusatio non petita, accusatio manifesta); in other words, he tries to prevent possible allegations of being too harsh with the containment measures. Moreover, close to Easter, Conte draws parallels between the pandemic and the ancient Biblical exodus of Israel from Egypt: just as Easter in the Christian tradition represents the sacrifice of Christ to redeem original sin, Easter 2020 would be remembered as a moment of sacrifice for a complete future redemption (6th April).

6.1

The Relationship with the People

As already pointed out, Conte frequently stresses his role as “the people’s advocate”. As such, an empathic relationship is pivotal, but most of all, Conte is indicating that, just like any other individual, he participates in suffering the same sacrifice and hardship: We as the government have taken a new decision based on a premise: we are well aware of how difficult it is to change all our habits, I am experiencing this for myself. So (I find myself) with the utmost understanding

100

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

for all Italians. I understand the families, the young people [...] so our habits need to change, now we all need to give up something for Italy’s sake. (9th March)

The Prime Minister is depicting himself and the whole government as deeply concerned about all the misery the people are feeling: “there are many citizens in difficulty, I would like to tell them that we are not averting our gaze. We are fully aware that at this time there are many people who are suffering, suffering psychologically, we realise that not all of us are used to being at home, we weren’t used to being at home and limiting our daily movements” (28th March). As the pandemic worsens, the dramatic register intensifies accordingly: Today we recorded ten thousand victims, we have exceeded ten thousand victims, a number that has really hit home. The wound in our national community is enlarging, a wound that we will never be able to forget. So first of all, may my thoughts and those of the whole government, and I believe I can safely say of all Italians, go out to these victims and their families. (28th March)

At the beginning of the so-called Phase 2 of the first wave, when some of the containment measures started to ease but the pandemic was still perilous, he showed people how to channel negative emotions in a way that was collectively useful: Therefore at this stage we could also react negatively, we could let resentment take root – or, why not, anger – looking for a culprit, we could blame anyone who comes within our range: our family, our relatives, Europe, the government, politicians, the Regional authorities, the press. […] or instead we can choose differently: chase away anger and resentment, think about what each of us can do to lift up our community, to allow a more rapid recovery. It is up to us, it depends on the task each of us felt they could do. Each of us without distinction. (26th April)

And again during the second wave: This is a complex moment, there is also a lot of fatigue in the country, it is a pandemic that is greatly challenging us, causing anger, frustration, it is also creating new inequalities in addition to those already existing. [...] Italy in the most difficult moments always manages to demonstrate its cohesion and its strength. (25th October)

6

GIUSEPPE CONTE’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

101

Almost at the end of the first wave, this was further stressed to legitimate the government’s work: “your cry for help, your reports have never escaped us. We know this painful photograph of the country and that is why we have done our utmost by taking charge of all this suffering” (13th May). On many occasions, Conte underlined his personal commitment to managing the pandemic, especially by exploiting a rhetoric of hard work and by emphasising extended working hours: “today was an intense day of work with all the ministers” (6th April); “From nine in the morning to midnight, we listened continuously, we discussed” (21st June); “For eight days from nine in the morning to almost midnight I met 122 associations, trade unions, and key figures from the world of culture, entertainment, and citizens” (8th July); and right after the European Council, “Six in the morning, we are all at the end of the fourth day of a very long summit, perhaps we have set the record” (21st July). The emphasis on his personal commitment was instrumental in reinforcing his leadership. On the one hand, it is reminiscent of a sort of “honour code” (i.e. I give you my word, I’m making a direct commitment with you) already in use at the time Silvio Berlusconi famously signed the “Contract with the Italians”. Again, to emphasise his special relationship with the people, he tended to adopt a personal perspective, using the pronoun “I”. For instance, regarding his pride about the “Italian model”, he added: “And I have a deep conviction - and I would like to share it with you - tomorrow they will not only look at us again, and admire us, they will take us as a positive example of a country that, thanks to its sense of community, has managed to win its battle against this pandemic” (11th March), where “they” refers to the other countries in the world. And later during the second wave, he stated: “I do not like to make promises, I prefer to make a commitment on behalf of the whole cabinet” (25th October). On the other hand, his commitment is also to lead “the team” of ministers and staff working with him night and day: We have worked intensely with the ministers but here I also have to thank all the technical staff who worked with us day and night to bring to fruition this great effort. We knew that the country was waiting for it, I can assure you that every hour of work pressed because we knew we had to intervene as soon as possible; it took some time, but I assure you that it was not a minute longer than strictly necessary for such an articulated text. (13th May)

102

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

Besides a personal identification between the leader and the people, Conte aimed to build a wider community bond based on national pride. At the beginning of the first wave, he started to point to the so-called Italian model or Italy system that proudly dealt with the pandemic before any other Western country. For instance, Italy – we can say it loudly, with pride – is proving to be a great nation, a great community, united and responsible. At this moment the whole world is watching us: they are certainly looking at us because of the infection numbers, they see a country in difficulty. But they also appreciate us because we are showing great vigour, great endurance. […] I’d like to remind you that firstly we are the country in Europe to be hit hardest by the coronavirus, but we are also the one that is reacting with the greatest strength and with the utmost precaution, day after day becoming a model for everyone else too. (11th March)

Italian pride is paralleled by his own pride to serve as the Italians’ leader (16th March). During a TV interview with a Spanish outlet, he praised the Italians because “the sense of belonging to the same community, which existed but was a bit latent, has developed even more. I was very proud, and I am very proud, to be the Prime Minister of the Italian people” (8th July). And on the same occasion, he rejected the hypothesis of creating his own electoral list: Not a list, because I am not working for my own benefit, I am working with great commitment, I am honoured to hold this position, as the Italian constitution states, ‘with discipline and honour’. Until the last hour, the last minute, I will always work for the common good with a great spirit of service. I am not working to make my own party. (8th July)

Interestingly, as the speeches follow each other, it is increasingly clear that the public that Conte is addressing is more circumscribed than at a first sight. Indeed, from his third speech he started to reassure public opinion that measures of economic relief would be promulgated in parallel with measures of containment. Governing means having a 360-degree vision: this challenge, as we well know by now, concerns the health of citizens, it is a challenge that puts a strain on our national health system, but it also concerns the stability of our economy, of our productive fabric made up of small and medium-sized

6

GIUSEPPE CONTE’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

103

enterprises. In the choices I have made up to now, we have, together with all the ministers, taken into account all the interests, all the values at stake. I have made a pact with my conscience. In first place there is, and always will be, the health of the Italians. (11th March)

Therefore the “closeness” between the government and the citizens is evident not only in symbolic terms, but in the more practical sense of a public subsidy scheme, an issue that appeared as early as the second week of lockdown, in March 2020: The government is close to the many businesses, traders, professionals, families, grandparents and mothers, fathers, even young people, who are all making enormous sacrifices for the common good, for the highest good which is health: citizens’ health, public health. Nobody should feel abandoned. This has been our goal from the beginning and today this resolution, this approval of the Decree-Law proves it. The State is here, the support and stimulus measures that have been included in this decree are concrete proof of this. A tangible testimony of the presence of the State. (16th March)

The second wave’s containment measures were presented in a similar fashion. In early November, the Conte cabinet decided to anticipate the peak of the epidemiological curve foreseen by the experts with a less onerous and regionally-differentiated lockdown. The decision to favour precaution still needed to be motivated: Someone said: but President, are you optimistic? But it is not a question, I have made it clear I am not thinking in this way […] we must always respect the rules, but if we get there [Christmas] with a certain degree of serenity, consumer confidence will not be affected and we could see economic benefits. (4th November)

Nonetheless, these precautions were not enough and a harder lockdown was decided, starting from December. It took some effort to explain why: “I can assure you it is a painful decision, it is not an easy decision” (3rd December) and “It took us some time, I am starting this press conference a little later because we wanted to include immediate relief measures directly in this Decree-Law. We understand the economic difficulties and we also understand the further economic sacrifice that we are asking of the

104

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

workers directly affected by these measures. We are at their side” (18th December). In this way, the public addressed by Conte is explicitly recalled. The message that the government and/or the State are close to the world of production is repeated in several speeches, also in the form of easily sharable slogans: “today the government is responding “I’m here” and will respond “I’m here” tomorrow too” (16th March); “We are slowing down the country’s production engine, but we are not stopping it. […] The health emergency - but we had foreseen it - is turning into a full economic emergency, but to all of you I say: the State is here. The State is here” (21st March); “today we also want to give a sign of the tangible presence of the State: as I said in recent days, the State is here” (28th March). On this matter, Conte has often taken a defensive position; an interpretation that can also be supported in the light of the events following the crisis of his cabinet and the establishment of the Mario Draghi cabinet (in February 2021). On many occasions, he asked “citizens” to be patient, to be understanding and to trust him and give him the benefit of the doubt. For instance, when the most acute phase of the first wave seemed to have passed, he felt the need to specify his priorities: I want to make it clear: this government is not seeking consensus. This government is trying to do the right thing and will continue to do the right thing, even if this may upset a large number of citizens. But citizens must trust that our decisions are responsible decisions, in the general, collective interest of all. (27th April)

In the same vein, he stressed that his work method relied on full data transparency and on the greatest willingness to dialogue with Parliament, with the opposition, with the experts, with civil society representatives, and so on. Indeed, he said: We have always acted on the basis of the assessments of the technicalscientific committee, always choosing transparency and truth, determined not to fuel mistrust and conspiracies. Truth is the strongest antidote; transparency is the first vaccine to equip ourselves with. (4th March)

The awareness of being criticised is another landmark of Conte’s discourse. He tries to depict himself as a strong and determined leader:

6

GIUSEPPE CONTE’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

105

Also by natural inclination, when I make a decision I try to weigh up all the implications, so when I then make it – and in this case I made it with my other government colleagues, we are always following a line (of reasoning), and only after considerable thought. It is therefore difficult to retrace one’s steps or say, ‘Oh my God, we were wrong’. Obviously, mistakes can happen, with hindsight, [...] but usually when we make decisions we don’t go back on them because there is no reason to. (8th July interview with the Spanish outlet NIUS)

At the same time, however, he also highlights all the occasions and the effort made to ensure the biggest possible deliberation. Above all during the second wave, when the “fatigue” due to the protracted containment was at its highest, Conte admitted that his choices “could legitimately be criticised” but that those were not indiscriminate choices (27th October). When asked to comment on whether he thought that the protests and street demonstrations against his cabinet were incited by extreme-right fringes, he replied: This is not a building isolated from the context of its surrounding reality. I’ve talked to them, I’ve received delegations from associations, even the new ones representing gyms and swimming pools, I’ve met some associations of freelance categories and of restaurateurs; I’ve explained to them what I’ve been doing. We discussed it and obviously they’ve understood that these are painful choices for us, but necessary at this time. […] As far as the drift in terms of violence is concerned, obviously we cannot condone any of these initiatives that are translating into acts of violence, but I believe that no decent Italians can condone them. Even all the people who are suffering at the moment and who are out on the streets clearly have no interest in being exploited by those who in a methodical, systematic way are trying to fan the fire of discontent, and to incite decent people to carry out acts of violence. This is not the Italy we want. (27th October)

He does not condemn the demonstrators for protesting, as they have the right to do so and they have proven they are willing to engage in a dialogue with the Prime Minister and to understand his point of view; the people shall never be blamed for demonstrating anger or frustration, as this is also part of the Five Star Movement’s repertoire of action. But in the last two lines of this excerpt, he refers to someone (probably Matteo Salvini or Giorgia Meloni) who was inciting the people’s violence in an instrumental way, and he distances himself from them very clearly in the

106

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

closing sentence: “This is not the Italy we want”, meaning that this is not his political party or his electorate.

6.2

Ideology and Policies

As briefly recalled in the introduction, Giuseppe Conte was not engaged in politics before 2018 and was not a member of the Five Star Movement at the time he was offered his first appointment as Prime Minister. His ideological leanings are also not so clear because he formed another cabinet with a floating majority, shifting seamlessly from the right to the left-wing of Parliament.1 The following excerpt perhaps illustrates his positioning regarding ideology and policies: I said without any ideological prejudice that if we need funds, surely among the financial instruments we will have to consider is the ESM, but if this is not the case, obviously taking the ESM to resolve a dispute in the public debate makes no sense. (18th October)

From 16th March, the work of the government was focused on drafting decree-laws that could help enterprises and workers; and this trait possibly intensified during the second wave in the autumn. The buzzwords of 1 He explains this circumstance to the Spanish journalists with the following words: “The fall of the first cabinet was brought about by the League because it decided to bring it to an end and go to new elections, also because of a strong consensus in the polls. So it tried to capitalise on this consensus, this electoral advantage. But since we live in Italy, a parliamentary republic, the decision [to call an election] cannot be made by a single party, a single exponent of a political force, so there was this parliamentary process because I wanted the crisis to be discussed before parliament, where the people’s representatives sit. From that discussion a new political perspective emerged that personally surprised me, I never expected such a perspective could arise. At that moment, in reality it seemed difficult to be able to give life to a new cabinet, so the electoral route seemed more likely. However, it is also true that we were in the middle of the summer, with the prospect of holding an electoral campaign that would have brought us close to December with a budget law to be approved. There was no time anymore, so it was a very dramatic prospect. Remember that in the previous term, Italy had risked an infringement procedure for excessive debt twice; I managed to avoid this procedure but with great difficulty. So you can imagine that getting close to the Budget Law, failing to approve it in time would have meant exposing the country again to a serious economic risk and perhaps this was the factor that coagulated the political forces. The 5 Star Movement has shown a great sense of responsibility, as have the PD and the other forces. So don’t ask me why they have decided to ask me again to accept the position of Prime Minister, you should ask them” (8th July).

6

GIUSEPPE CONTE’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

107

those measures remained unchanged between the two waves and the summer: simplification, innovation, tax relief, digitalisation, and speed. Perhaps the most important Decree-Law was the one issued in July (the so-called “Recovery decree”), presented by Conte and the then-Minister of Economy and Finance Roberto Gualtieri as A decree that finally digitalises, simplifies, speeds up administrative procedures, and unlocks construction sites and tenders once and for all. This reform is the springboard for Italy’s economic recovery, to finally make it more agile, leaner, and more modern. (7th July)

“Digitalising everything” is the key to success. The formula of the “Italian model” has been synthesised since Conte’s first words: Do you remember Genoa? [referring to the Morandi bridge’s sudden collapse in 2018 and subsequent rapid construction] This model teaches us that when our country is hit, it knows how to get back up, it knows how to team up, it knows how to come back stronger than before. We will apply it wherever possible. The ‘Genoa model’ must become the ‘Italian model’. (4th March)

In reality, the “Italian model” is not an organic plan, but rather wishful thinking: like any other leader in the world, Conte did not yet have the knowledge base to draw up a comprehensive plan. Of course, in a more general way, the “Italian model” derives precisely from Italy’s position of being in the forefront in combating Covid-19 compared to other Western countries. In effect, despite its vagueness, Conte described the “Italian model” as something acknowledged by European and world leaders: In recent days I have been talking to many European leaders, all of whom are keen to express solidarity and support for our country, so I should convey the solidarity of a long list of leaders from many countries that are close to us. All express admiration for the strength and the resilience of our country. I can tell you, there’s a continuous exchange of information where we are very often asked about the characteristics of our Italian model and they express appreciation for our work. To all Italians listening to us, I want to say: you are making a fundamental contribution in this battle against the virus. (6th April)

108

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

The international praises depend on teamwork (he describes himself as the leader of a team), between his determination and the “Italy-system”: If Italy had not imposed these conditions from the beginning, with force, during the last European Council in March, we would never have achieved this result, a fundamental historical result, a point in our favour. And we must all be proud because the results achieved [are the result of] teamwork. It is the “Italy-system” that has prompted this response, the “Italy-system” that has obtained this response. I was able to do it - I am the visible part of this system - but I assure you that if we had not given proof of this pride, dignity, and strength of character not only at a European but also an international level, I do not think I would have ever achieved this result. (26th April)

The triumphalist emphasis is doubtful, of course. At the beginning of the pandemic, the only certainties were derived from the driving principles that would inspire his subsequent policies: We are also offering our response in the economic sphere, so we can talk about the Italian model not only as regards the strategy to combat the spread of the contagion, but we can also start talking about an Italian model with regard to the strategy, the economic policy, to contend with this great economic and social emergency. (16th March)

Hence, the protection of public health goes hand in hand with the protection of the economy. At the beginning of the first wave, he revealed that he was trying to reconcile as far as possible other interests that deserve to be protected, but if the health of citizens, public health, is endangered, we are forced to choose and impose sacrifices on other interests, even if they are worthy of protection. […] we live in a system in which we guarantee health care; the right to health care for all is a foundation, a pillar, the characteristic of our system of civilisation. (9th March)

No longer able to guarantee a balance of protection for both public health and the economy, Conte declared the national lockdown. Just a few days later, he addressed the public again to reassure them that he was taking care of the economy as well:

6

GIUSEPPE CONTE’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

109

This is a powerful economic manoeuvre. Let me stress that: we have never thought and we are showing that we do not think we can fight a flood with rags, with buckets; fully participating in the efforts that all Italians are making, we are trying to build a real dam for protecting businesses, families and workers. (16th March)

The term “powerful” and the overall tone are echoed again some weeks later: “It is firepower. I do not actually remember such a powerful intervention in the history of our Republic in favour of financing enterprises; it is an enormous amount” (6th April). The intention to reassure enterprises and workers is more explicit during the second wave, also bringing attention to (presumably) encouraging economic data to support the claim that public health and the economy are not antithetical: “If we protect health then we better preserve the productive fabric and now, as you can see, the economic indices are comparatively better in Italy” (7th October); “The economic indices are very positive. To preserve the economic fabric, and therefore our economy, and at the same time to protect health, we must now be prepared to respect these rules” (13th October); “Social life and economic life have started up again” (13th October); “There are signs of economic recovery […] Many analysts, also from abroad, have been surprised” (18th October). In the second wave, indeed, “the strategy has now changed: we must reconcile health and the economy” (18th October). From the first wave’s social safety nets “that are also economic safety nets because they safeguard the enterprises along with workers” (13th May), Conte shifted to “subsidies” “but this time with selective criteria […] we do not have so much money anymore and we must use it carefully” (18th October). The management of the pandemic remained the primary goal on the agenda. But the reasons why seem fundamentally changed: We have a principal duty: to protect the life and health of citizens, the most precious asset, and also – in this kind of situation with falling confidence, etc., and the collapse of supply and demand – to keep the entire economy from falling to pieces. There is, frankly, no other solution but to dedicate ourselves to this goal. (18th October) Averting a second generalised lockdown like the one that happened in the spring; the country can no longer afford it. And this also means protecting health but at the same time preserving the economy. We must indeed

110

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

avoid finding ourselves in the position of having to choose between one or the other, we must do everything possible to protect both health and the economy. (25th October)

Otherwise, the risk is that “our economic, productive, and social system” would be “irreparably damaged” (27th October). Those sentences reveal a certain sense of urgency and anxiety. That is why the second wave’s containment was operated “surgically”, differentiating regions and towns according to their transmission rate index and “taking part in a crazy race against time” to accompany the mini-lockdowns with public subsidies (27th October). A final point here is dedicated to illustrating Conte’s approach to an issue that has been much discussed in Italy: the closure and reopening of schools. Schools and universities were the first environments in which the containment measures were applied, on 4th March. Since schools in Italy closed in mid-June for the summer break, they did not reopen until September, on the eve of the second wave. Therefore, “reopening the schools is a big challenge” (9th September). Conte directly addressed teachers, acknowledging that most of the weight of remote learning fell on their shoulders. He tried to bring them on board by appeasing and praising them: I also wish to address the teachers, the teaching staff in particular: it is up to you to deal with the difficulties, the challenges of this starting point. You are a priceless heritage of competence, passion, and responsibility; we will progressively seek to enhance your role more and more, we need your commitment to better our young people, to improve society. If doctors and nurses in the most acute phase of the emergency were in the frontline to deal with our health in our country, you will now become the point of reference to which the whole society, our national community, will look to protect our children, educate them, and create the conditions for them to improve their personal life and therefore also to build a professional future. (9th September)

Apparently, the education system is part of the “Italian model”: that means that schools as well as universities should be “renewed, more modern, more digitalised, more inclusive”, although technology “cannot substitute and compensate for the sacrifices you have been called to make” (9th September). Later on, the school is described as “an untouchable point of the country system” that requires so many sacrifices, investments

6

GIUSEPPE CONTE’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

111

and commitments (13th October). But even the defence of the school system needs to be embedded in an economic framework, at least from a discursive point of view (i.e. through the adherence to the hegemonic code): therefore, the school system becomes “an asset” (13th and 18th October).

6.3

The Relationship with Politics

Conte has always depicted himself as a citizen and as a professional, on loan to politics. His competence as a lawyer and professor is visible any time that he has to discuss parliamentary procedures, constitutional principles, and balance of power. At the same time, during the pandemic he has concentrated the communication and the decisional power in his hands in an unprecedented manner: it is beyond the scope of this work to assess how much this is a consequence of the exceptional context and how much it is a result of personal ambition. What is clear is that Conte has been heavily criticised since the beginning of the pandemic. Also due to the shift of the parliamentarian majority which sustained his second cabinet, the far-right parties have not been forgiving. More specifically, from August 2019 the relationship between Conte and Salvini began to deteriorate, and during the pandemic the debate fluctuated between political forces that wanted tougher containment measures (the government) and political forces that denounced an authoritarian drift (the far-right) but the roles have frequently been reversed based on expediency. For instance, after six months of pandemic he still received allegations of abuse of power made by the opposition, to which he replied: It seems to me that I have already made it clear that our measures are always respectful of adequacy and proportionality. When we applied the rules, we did so with a decree, the DCPM linked to the Decree-Law, respecting constitutional principles. (13th October)

Another conflictual element has been the use of European funds for the recovery. The theme gained salience from the beginning and saw the two sides in harsh opposition. During one of his speeches, Conte explicitly addressed Salvini and Meloni (by looking into the camera and pointing his finger at them):

112

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

Last night a debate arose, an absolutely legitimate debate, even a very lively one, because I believe it is a sign of the maturity, of healthy democracy that an entire country can have this debate in all its seats [of power], starting with Parliament, and I assure you that the Government will find, as it has done in the past, the opportunity to promptly inform and speak to Parliament, with all the representatives of the people who sit in Parliament. However, it is equally important that this debate develops clearly, without falsehood. That is why I am obliged to make some clarifications. Some facts: the ESM has existed since 2012, it was not established yesterday, it was not approved or activated last night, as was falsely and irresponsibly declared - this time I have to say, I have to give names and surnames - by Matteo Salvini and Giorgia Meloni. They’ve been repeating this since last night, all these hours. This is absolutely not the case. This government does not work under cover of darkness, this government looks Italy in the eye, speaks to it clearly, if it has any proposal it makes it very clearly, looking all Italians in the eye. The Eurogroup has neither signed anything nor established any obligations, it is a lie [...] falsehoods, lies hurt us because they weaken us in the negotiations. Now we had asked the opposition to be united in this sense of responsibility. What happened last night, those lies that are being told, risk weakening not Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, not the government, but the whole of Italy. Because I assure you that it is a very difficult negotiation, because if they let Italy write this agreement it would have already been written. There are 26 other countries, we must work together, we must speak to them, also to the German people, to the Dutch people, we must make them understand what our plan is, we must express our dignity, the strength of our courage, our foresight, and our determination. If this debate continues in these terms here, we risk compromising our negotiating strength. (10th April)

In this long excerpt, there are some striking elements. First, the moral of the story is that the spread of falsehood weakens the negotiations; therefore, it weakens Conte’s leadership on the international scene, much more than on the domestic one; in this way, Conte makes a superimposition between his destiny and the destiny of the country. Second, he defends his work by emphasising two procedural qualities: participation (“the Government will find, as it has done in the past, the opportunity to promptly inform and speak to Parliament”) and transparency (“this government does not work under cover of darkness, this government looks Italy in the eye, speaks to it clearly”). All this insistence on procedures, albeit solicited by the opposition as a pretence, also derives from the fact that in this field Conte can show off his expertise as a technocrat.

6

GIUSEPPE CONTE’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

113

Third, the word “people” occurs three times: the Italian Parliament is where “the representatives of the people sit”, and within the Eurogroup he negotiates with “the German people, the Dutch people”, rather than with Angela Merkel and Mark Rutte. In this formulation, the people are always the protagonist, the main actor who acts, winning or losing; the people, moreover, have some landmark qualities (“our dignity, the strength of our courage, our foresight, and our determination”) that are personality traits that can be found in anyone and of course do not include competence, expertise, or experience. Continuing the speech, Conte once again underlines his political virginity (which is portrayed as a quality) by making a comparison with Giorgia Meloni, a former minister of the last Berlusconi cabinet: This battle to have an ESM without conditions. If, as you say, it is a trap, then I say whoever made this trap should take public responsibility. I remember that it dates back to 2012, there was a centre-right government. If I’m not mistaken, Meloni was a minister […] I was not there just as many other [political] forces were not present. (10th April)

His purity and extraneousness from politics are exhibited as strengths. Indeed, the possibility of undergoing a cabinet reshuffle is described with negative words that echo the key words of the Five Star Movement: A word that makes me shudder just to pronounce it: what does reshuffle mean? An old liturgy of the old politics does not belong to me, I have been here in this position for only two years so I am not used to these formulas [...] then if some political forces were to ask me for evaluations regarding my team’s composition, I won’t shy away from discussion; however, I am the captain of a team […] my ministers are the best. (3th December)

Aside from a few episodes, political disagreement is often downplayed by Conte. In his speeches, he frequently thanks all the political forces of the majority and the opposition. The principles of participation and transparency are key points of his relationship with politics. Transparency, always. We must always speak frankly. We publish all the data we have daily. The Minister [of Health] Speranza has been in Parliament, he has explained and summarised the current situation to the whole Parliament and therefore we have clearly communicated all the data, all the reasoning to our citizens, and shared it with our citizens. (7th October)

114

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

On many occasions, he underlines his efforts to create a climate of dialogue and collaboration with all the political, economic, and social forces. He invites all forces to engage in this with a spirit of service and responsibility, leaving ideological postures aside. For instance, Matteo Renzi’s Italia Viva party asked for clarifications about the draft of the Recovery Plan by 6th January (and that was the casus belli that eventually brought the Conte cabinet to resign); Conte commented on this request by claiming that “all of us should be ready, free and available to perfect this plan right up until the last minute and the last second, in the country’s interest. There is no dogma” (18th December). At the same time, he recalled the constitutional order and the separation of powers (and roles) between the government and parliament: It will not have escaped your notice that the majority, the majority forces voted on some commitments contained in a resolution presented by the centre-right, by the opposition forces, just as it will not have escaped you that we voted almost unanimously for a resolution presented by the exponent of the League. These are signs that are also linked to my request to the presidents of the Chambers – of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies – to find a place, an instrument to ensure a closer and continuous dialogue between government and Parliament. The opposition, as you know, have chosen to refuse a round table. If you notice, I did not call it a control room; because that might suggest a room where management responsibilities are taken on and all responsibilities are fully shared. Instead – I also said this in Parliament – we will always have a round table, it will be there if you [the opposition]) want it, if you change your mind about it, it is still open. However, the government assumes its own responsibilities, […] with full distinction of roles. (4th November)

When this dialogue was lacking for reasons of time and opportunity (i.e. when the epidemiological curve showed a sudden increase), he justified it and assured them he was going to refer to parliament as soon as possible. As already pointed out, dialogue was also sought with the wider civil society, i.e. the associations of entrepreneurs (Confindustria) and trade unions. In addition, another front of political conflict was that between the central government and the regional/local governments. More specifically, this topic was not addressed at all in the first wave, when the national lockdown sparked the opposition of many governors of the Regions of Southern Italy, which at the time counted far fewer

6

GIUSEPPE CONTE’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

115

cases than the Regions of the North (Lombardy, Veneto, and EmiliaRomagna first). That situation of conflict is due to the fact that the Italian Regions have responsibility for healthcare, and they felt stripped of their authority; moreover, governors are directly elected and they usually make a political career by jumping from the Regional to the national political parties’ executives. Despite the controversies, Conte would not address the governors, limiting himself to making general appeals to unity and a spirit of solidarity. During the second wave, the containment strategy radically changed, giving the governors more powers and visibility. Indeed, “we deemed it appropriate and also necessary to restore that relationship between State and Regions that we had built even during the hardest phase” (7th October) and “at the Regional level everyone will have to do their part, I cannot enter into the controversy; we must collaborate, collaborate, collaborate” (18th October). Apparently, the oscillation between a national or a Regional containment strategy only depends on the epidemic: We have pursued a strategy that provided for restrictive measures in correspondence with the most critical areas, therefore based on maximum flexibility and regional circumscription. But the data that we are now examining unfortunately show that the pandemic is running in a fairly uniform, and I would say, absolutely critical manner throughout the nation, hence the need for government intervention to redefine a restrictive framework, bearing in mind that we could in the next few days continue to let the Regions come to some agreement with us on even more restrictive measures based on the evolution of the critical framework at Regional level. (25th October)

6.4

The Relationship with Europe

Europe is an important actor in each of the speeches given by Giuseppe Conte. Indeed, from his first public appearances dealing with the contagion, Conte solicited a coordinated European response: Even before the coronavirus emergency I had stated that the Italian economy needs ‘shock therapy’. It is an extraordinary situation that requires extraordinary measures: we will ask the European Union for all the budgetary flexibility that will be needed to support our families and our businesses. Europe will have to follow us and support our efforts. (4th March)

116

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

A few days later, he reiterated this concept: We want Europe to follow us on this path. The signs, the first pronouncements are important but it is clear that Italy is the promoter of a message that extends to all European institutions. […] Italy is in the front row. We need to facilitate and support states at this stage by doing whatever it takes to help our citizens. It is a European game we want to play that must be played openly with a spirit of collaboration and a shared strategy of help, of true and genuine solidarity. And we trust that all the other Member States will follow us. (16th March)

The way he highlights the role of Italy as the “promoter” of a European response is perhaps better illustrated by the following statement: Here too we are intervening with an ambitious recovery plan after a tragic event [...] today we are formulating a response by ourselves, it is not a plan that has been proposed to us from the outside, it is a plan that we are producing ourselves because we must be aware of the moment in time we are living in, and we must coordinate our efforts all together to be able to recover and give an even stronger frame of reference to the European Union itself, to our common home. (8th July, interview with a Spanish TV outlet)

In this excerpt, Conte labels the European Recovery Plan as a plan that is not “proposed to us from the outside” but produced “by ourselves”: the reference here is to the Stability Pact adopted by the EU to face the Great Recession (mainly focused on the containment of public debt), that appeared as imposed on Southern European countries. This issue is still highly controversial in the Italian political landscape, such that it has been greatly exploited by the Italian populists and by the Five Star Movement in particular, the main shareholder of the Conte cabinet. The refusal of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is thus motivated by the fact that Conte considers it “totally inadequate for the emergency we are living” (April 10th). The negotiations with the European allies concerned the development of “a range of innovative tools” such as Eurobonds; an alternative to the ESM insofar as he wanted them to rely on a unitarian effort (rather than an intergovernmental agreement such as ESM) and with lower conditionalities. Conte acknowledged that he was “working in synergy with 8 more State allies in this fight”, such as Spain and France,

6

GIUSEPPE CONTE’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

117

to obtain those new tools: unlike the Great Recession, this time “the common response is either ambitious or it is not”: If it had been a crisis like in 2008-2009 we could have reasoned about other tools, we could have been there to sophisticate: I like this, I like that. But today we need to invent a range of tools suited to the challenge we are facing. It is a challenge that does not only concern us who are Italian citizens, it does not just concern Italy, it concerns Europe and therefore all the Member States and I am convinced that with our tenacity, with the strength of reason, in the end we will be able to convince everyone that this is the only path available to allow Europe to restart strongly, to raise its head and compete on global markets. (10th April)

Overall, the relationship with the European allies was mainly addressed during the summer of 2020, in the intermediate period between the two waves. Those were the crucial months for the negotiations at the European level, for establishing the common economic policies oriented towards recovery: the media have portrayed those negotiations in the frame of an ideological and political conflict between the “frugal” countries of Central and Northern Europe (i.e. Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden) and the Southern European countries (i.e. Italy and Spain, with the noteworthy support from France and the benevolence of Germany). The development of the Recovery Plan was hailed as “a historic event of extreme importance not only for Italy, for Germany, but for the whole of Europe” (13th July). In contrast to some utterances of the Five Star Movement (which is a member of the Eurosceptic group of EFDD in the European Parliament as was Nigel Farage’s UKIP), Conte shows that he cares about the future of the European Union: I have always stressed the difficulty of the negotiations we were carrying out but at the same time, you will acknowledge, I have always ambitiously tried to represent what the common goal was, a solid strong coordinated European response, equal to the task of the crisis we are experiencing, an unprecedented crisis not attributable to the behaviour of any single State. It is a symmetrical crisis that involves everyone and unites us in this destiny of recession. We must be up to it. (13th July)

118

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

A future that requires more communitarianism than nationalism: We have also acted to protect the autonomy, the prerogatives of the Community’s institutions. We have recently also rejected insidious attempts which tried to insert intergovernmental logics and the logic of reciprocal vetoes to alter the genuine vocation of this European plan. (21st July)

For this reason, in “a moment of stalemate” during the intense weeks of negotiations, he was “inviting everyone to converge towards a common goal” (18th July). At the end of the summits, the “historical moment for Europe” arrived, because “the vision and the determination with which we have pursued this goal have been rewarded” (21st July).

6.5

The Relationship with Science

The management of the pandemic has seen three main protagonists that are more or less linked to science and expertise: the Civil Protection Department (formally a department of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers), which held daily press conferences to release the official data on the epidemiological curves; the Technical-Scientific Committee (TSC) formed for the purpose of this pandemic, composed of epidemiologists, virologists, pneumologists, and senior managers of the public health system, appointed by the cabinet; and the Experts Committee created in April 2020 to advise the Prime Minister on the transition towards the post-pandemic, and comprised of experts in the fields of economics, sociology, and psychology, led by the manager Vittorio Colao. All the decisions and measures regarding the management of the pandemic were shared with these three groups of experts. Consequently, the relationship between Conte and the Technical-Scientific Committee was part of the many consultations that the Prime Minister normally held with multiple stakeholders (i.e. political forces, the Regions’ governors, civil society organisations, religious institutions, and so on). While the decision to declare a national lockdown followed the experts’ recommendations (4th March), the decision to reopen after the first lockdown was made “after several meetings held with the team of ministers, with experts from our Technical-Scientific Committee, with the Regions, Provinces, and Municipalities, with trade unions, the world of business, industry, and with associations of [professional] categories” (April 10th). At the same time, the Committee of Experts, “that will comprise various professionals:

6

GIUSEPPE CONTE’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

119

sociologists, psychologists, experts in work organisation, and managers”, was charged with developing a security protocol for workplaces: this protocol “is our foundational text, our Bible on which to proceed”. The “Phase 2”, it was claimed, would be governed according to a principle of rationality (27th April). That meant that the coordination between central and local government would be pivotal: We have prepared a national monitoring plan based on information flows that will reach us from the Regions on a daily basis. They will have to be specific and timely; this will allow us to keep the epidemiological curve under control and will also allow us to be able to intervene with targeted restrictive measures in case of need. (16th May)

Exiting from the lockdown thus required a lot of caution, and Conte did not hold back from taking on a pedagogical role for citizens, to explain how to interpret the graphs of the epidemiological curve for instance, or how to react to precautionary containment measures: Many citizens are not happy with the new measures of the Decree, this is what we are seeing and it is also understandable: everyone hoped, or at least many hoped, to return to normal soon. The conditions are not in place to return to normal, we need to say this loud and clear. We are now going to go through phase two, that of coexisting with the virus, not the phase of liberation [...] in my opinion it would be irresponsible after so many sacrifices and losses to face phase two in any other prudent way, in an absolutely heedless way, with recklessness and improvisation. (27th April)

The harsh tone is probably a reaction to the criticism he was receiving, to the pressure to reopen as soon as possible; nonetheless, it is worth noting that he did not seek legitimation for his decisions in the recommendations of the Technical-Scientific Committee. Again, the policies are justified by criteria of “rigour, cohesion, participation of all in the sense of responsibility” and “adequacy and proportionality” (7th October). The “highest level of precaution” must be balanced by the will to “obviously avoid measures that can have a negative impact on the economic and social system” (7th October). At the same time, the contradictions and disputes among the scientific community were not a matter of his interest. His unique concern was to be prepared for the eventuality of a second wave:

120

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

Some experts - in short, there is a public debate about a second wave. I don’t know if a second wave will arrive because I’m not an expert, I’m not a scientist, and in any case I understand that as this is a new virus, the forecasts are a bit difficult. I’m simply saying that if there should be a new wave, Italy is equipped to keep this second wave under control too. (8th July)

The alleged controversy between the deputy minister Sileri and the Technical-Scientific Committee, for instance, was easily dismissed as inexistent (7th October): it is our experts - not the Government’s, I mean the experts of the Italian community, those who analyse the data daily – they are providing a careful examination and interpretation of it, they also do it for free, let us emphasise this too. So there has been no desire for controversy, there were a couple of profiles on which there is an ongoing dialogue but nothing much, nothing much, absolutely no controversy. (7th October)

The system of monitoring and the “detailed analysis of the epidemiological situation” were mainly helping the government to formulate an effective strategy for keeping schools open (13th October) and to balance the protection of health and the needs of the economy (18th October). But within a few weeks, the second wave began and once again the scientists’ recommendations became a central theme in Conte’s discourse: The latest epidemiological data we have analysed since Friday, also with the help of the Technical-Scientific Committee’s experts, cannot leave us indifferent. The analysis of the epidemiological curve signals rapid growth with the consequence that the spread of the contagion along with the consequent stress on the national health service has now reached worrying levels in all areas of our peninsula. The Rt index, as you know, indicates that the average number of infections transmitted by each patient has reached the critical threshold of 1.5. The significant number of Covid-positive people recorded yesterday touched the twenty-thousand mark. This also makes those very tracking operations more and more difficult. (25th October)

In this context, adequacy and proportionality of interventions meant promulgating three decrees (DPCM) in a very short period: the acceleration of the contagion thus determined a decisional acceleration. “The careful interpretation of the data” provided by the Technical-Scientific Committee was then the subject of “a lengthy discussion” between

6

GIUSEPPE CONTE’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

121

Conte, the Minister of Health, and Professor Brusaferro (president of the Italian Superior Institute of Health), with the aim of doing “all that is needed to preserve both health and the economy at the same time” (25th October). After a “long discussion with many sensibilities”, Conte felt the need to address the Italian people: We must reassure Italians, this government is a government that, despite the variety of accents, sensibilities, and points of view, has a very clear objective and the results show this because these measures - besides the discussion that took place - paint quite a clear picture: we do not want to directly penalise the economic productive fabric. We’ll achieve this by dosing penalising interventions for some categories and at the same time immediately offering compensation and relief measures. [...] Our goal is not to bring the curve back to zero – this is not a goal when there is an ongoing pandemic, it is unrealistic – but to keep it under control so as not to have a – how can I put it – a critical situation on various fronts. (25th October)

The Technical-Scientific Committee’s recommendations were the most direct supporters of the principle of precaution, also in the light of the spread of the virus in other European countries: We will always move on the basis of scientific evidence, on our scientists. Our TSC experts tell us that for precautionary reasons - taking into account everything that is happening in Europe, not only in Italy but throughout Europe - pressure is expected, an increasingly insistent circulation of the virus which requires further, more stringent measures for these specific social occasions. We are defending our country and we are intervening immediately, even after just a few days, as we have always done, conscientiously and responsibly. (3rd December)

The experts’ advice is thus circumscribed to a negative role: the TechnicalScientific Committee is the one which urges the government to enact restrictive measures (impacting on citizens’ freedoms) based on a fundamentally pessimistic reading of the data and of the epidemiological curve. As far as Conte is concerned, also in this respect, he interprets the role of “people’s advocate”, who understands the desires for conviviality: In particular, I want to emphasise this, the Technical-Scientific Committee met the other day, it sent us a report in which it expressed strong concern

122

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

about the gatherings, the widespread desire - however understandable - of conviviality and sociality that is typical of this period and in particular in the Christmas holidays. (18th December)

Once again, we cannot determine the extent to which such a positioning is the result of Conte’s ideology or rather of the fact that the circumstances (particularly the highly conflictual climate of the final two months of his cabinet) forced him to pre-empt possible criticisms concerning the fact that he would have implemented measures that were too severe or that he had in effect left them in place for too long. It is probably the result of both elements. Finally, as regards the issue of vaccines, Conte is aligned with the rest of Europe in not making vaccination compulsory. The reasons he gives for this choice, however, invoke the dispute between vax and no-vax. This debate is increasingly present in the Italian public sphere and is linked to fairly clear political alignments: previously, the no-vax movement was linked almost exclusively (or at least mostly) to the Five Star Movement’s electorate, but especially after the no-vax and no-mask movements’ protests that took place during the pandemic, symbols and public figures directly linked to the far-right could be identified (in Italy as well as in countries around the world, unfortunately). In Conte’s words, “the principle of self-determination” has to be “safeguarded to extreme limits”. While he claimed he was “for this liberal approach which is also present in our Constitution”, he did not exclude the possibility of making the vaccination mandatory, if the circumstances required it: If we are in a position to manage the contagion curve, as I trust we are doing and as we will continue to do, mandatory health treatment will not need to be imposed, and we totally prefer it this way; we will try as long as we possibly can to safeguard the optional nature of vaccination. (3rd December)

Indeed, Conte seized the opportunity to label the first day of vaccination on 27th December as “Vax Day”, a way to celebrate the imminent “end of this nightmare” (18th December). In this important respect such as vaccination, his choice of understatement makes his words sound vague and contradictory, and therefore, fallacious in convincing reluctant people to adhere.

CHAPTER 7

Emmanuel Macron’s Approach to the Pandemic

Just like Conte, Macron has also benefited from the pandemic to build (or reinforce) his leadership after a turbulent two years. For this reason, most of the excerpts coded with the macro-category of politics are focused on the self-representation of the leader or, alternatively, on the representation of his bond with the French people. Politics is significantly downplayed during the second wave, where public health issues are prevalent. Figure 7.1 show the distribution of the topics addressed by Emmanuel Macron in his speeches. Although differing significantly in their relative weight, a two-point variation is evident for both the economy and education between the two waves. The topic of international relationships and how they are reconfigured during the crisis is more prominent in the first wave than in the second. On the contrary, this is the main difference with Conte; scientific issues acquire more importance in the second wave, also sustained by the disputes about the efficacy of treatments and vaccines. The topic of information and media is completely absent in both waves. France experienced the same escalation of events as Italy, just a few weeks later: the contagion rose and the President addressed the nation twice in four days. On 12th March, Emmanuel Macron delivered his first address to the nation regarding the coronavirus crisis. On 16th March, Macron addressed his fellow citizens again, changing the speech’s overall © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Saccà and D. Selva, European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9_7

123

124

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

France’s first wave Gender 0.6%

France’s second wave Gender 2.2%

Education 4.1%

Education 3.0% Crisis 8.9%

Crisis 15.7% Politics 25.2% Public health 20.9%

Politics 40.7%

Public health 35.6% Science 8.1%

Economy 15.1%

Economy 17.0%

Science 2.9%

Fig. 7.1 Distribution of the topics addressed in Emmanuel Macron’s speeches (Source Data from PRIN2017 “The transformations of democracy: Actors, strategies and outcomes in opposing populism in political, juridical and social arenas”, Tuscia University’s research unit)

tone to a graver, more serious one. During this speech, he used repetition to underline that “We are at war” (“Nous sommes en guerre”): he repeated this phrase eight times to justify the new, stricter measures he was announcing, and to stimulate a sense of unity and patriotism. More specifically, communicating a state of war was intended to: • invite people to be careful and unselfish; • justify the use of emergency legislation instead of the usual governance procedures, circumventing parliamentary debate; • appeal to “all political, economic, social, and associational actors and French people to join this national unity that has enabled France to overcome many of the past crises”; • prioritise the medical supplies needed by hospitals and sustain the capillary distribution for the population; • justify the use of public funds to support supplementary childcare for healthcare workers’ children; • support the regions most hit by the pandemic, with particular emphasis on hospitals;

7

EMMANUEL MACRON’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

125

• justify the closure of intra-European frontiers also within the Schengen area. In the following section, five issues emerging from Macron’s discourse will be discussed: (a) his relationship with the people; (b) his ideology and policies; (c) his relationship with politics; (d) his relationship with Europe; and lastly (e) his relationship with science.

7.1

The Relationship with the People

At the end of this speech, Macron reiterated his personification with the French people through the use of the word “citizens”: while the term “compatriots” is used to identify the people, the word “citizens” is employed by Macron to describe himself as part of a wider collective identity. Indeed, the following excerpt clarifies how Macron is claiming to be a citizen just like any other, shifting from the use of the personal pronoun “I” to “we”: I have a certainty: the more we act swiftly and together, the more we will overcome this challenge. The more we act as citizens, the more we show the same fortitude and patriotic self-sacrifice as our nurses and doctors, our firefighters, and all those involved in civil protection, the faster we will emerge from this life in slow-motion. […] Let’s individually and collectively rise to the occasion. I know I can count on you, my dear compatriots. (March 16th)

One of the lessons learned from this crisis, according to Macron, is that France is “starting to act as a nation again, […] a nation of solidary citizens”, after a period in which “we have gradually become used to being a society of free individuals”: this concept is reinforced by expressions such as “I need each one of you” as much as “we need each other to find solutions, to invent” (October 14th). The personification is used instrumentally to underline an empathic bond, such as when Macron shows he feels the same difficulties and anxieties as other citizens: “We are living through difficult days”, “I am fully aware of what I’m asking of you”, and So when, then, can we hope to foresee the definitive end of this ordeal? When will we be able to reconnect with the life we had before? I know

126

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

your questions, I share them. They are legitimate. I would love to be able to tell you everything and answer each of these questions for you. But quite frankly, in all humility, we don’t have a definitive answer to them. (all on 13th April)

Also, in the middle of the second wave, he repeated this concept: But I will do all I can to fight alongside you, to protect you and to bring this epidemic under control. This ordeal, which has lasted for almost a year, is difficult for each of us. And we are not at the end of it. And I don’t want us to indulge in either resignation or anger. I am optimistic because every crisis has an element of progress, an element of hope. (24th November)

He frequently used repetition to emphasise his relationship with the French people. In the 12th March speech, the first given addressing the Covid-19 crisis: “I am counting on you to…” (“Je compte en…”) respect the containment measures, wash your hands, do your best to avoid gatherings, and so on. After some months, he had not changed this concept: But I have faith in you. Faith in our ability to overcome this ordeal. We must stand firm, each in our own position, in transparency, debate, and in the determination to apply the rules that we set for ourselves, shoulder to shoulder. We will get back on our feet again. If we are united, and we will be united. We need each other, we are a united solidary nation and it is on this basis that we will succeed. We are France. I’m counting on each of you, I’ll be there, we’ll be there, and we’ll all succeed together. (28th October, announcing a second lockdown)

Again in the middle of the second wave, he uses repetition to emphasise his acknowledgement of the serious situation in which enterprises were caught: starting three consecutive paragraphs with “I know…” (“Je sais…”, November 24th) about the sacrifices made by entrepreneurs, about the will of the people to go back to work, and about the sacrifices that the government was demanding of them. At the same time, this intimate relationship was laying the foundations for legitimating the role of the President at a political level, both domestically and internationally. In the TV interview given on 14th July,

7

EMMANUEL MACRON’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

127

Macron recalled his motivations to serve in the political arena, underlining an emotional bond with the nation: I gave the feeling to our fellow citizens that deep down, I was reforming for them, or in spite of them, as if I were changing the country into something which they did not like very much and whose destination was not clear, but was not fair. Now, the reason why I became involved in politics, why I wanted at a certain point to become President, why we have built this pact, is to make France stronger and more independent. And I believe it’s through work, through economics, but also through its social model. And we have contributed to all of this, but we may not have explained this enough, […] I have not shown this enough. Because we haven’t produced enough results, because we haven’t been fast enough, I may not have said it enough. (14th July)

The phrases beginning with “I am counting on the government to…” and “I’m counting on the international allies to…” reveal that Macron is depicting himself as the people’s delegate in those political arenas. He is highlighting the fact that he will certainly monitor and speak on behalf of the French people, so that they can also count on him to do what he is promising. This is also reinforced by expressions such as “I’m going to make it certain”, “I’m overseeing”. For instance, in the following passage, Macron states he is going to oversee the banks and insurance companies: “I hope the banks will be able to postpone all the deadlines far more significantly than they have done, and the insurance companies must be part of this economic mobilisation. I will be attentive to this” (13th April). Afterwards, he does the same with the treatment trials: I myself wanted to understand each of the possible options, to make sure that everything was tried as soon as possible and with rigour. It is not a question of giving a treatment if we are not sure but of carrying out all the clinical trials so that all the leads are pursued. And be assured, our doctors, our researchers are working very hard. No avenue is being overlooked, no avenue will be overlooked. I am committed to this.

And he concludes saying that he will “bring your voice to Europe” as well. While announcing the end of the first lockdown, he doubled his engagement with the French people in terms of economic recovery. He promised to help the economic sectors that were most hit by the pandemic while at the same time not raising taxes; his way of doing that is to involve “all

128

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

the forces of our country, with our enterprises’ fabric, with our employees and the self-employed, our intermediate bodies” (14th June). Also, the decision to impose another lockdown at the end of October was made “after consulting scientists, dialoguing with political, economic, and social forces, after also exchanges with our European partners, and weighing the pros and cons” (28th October). During an interview, Macron was asked to respond to criticisms regarding the infantilisation of citizens: in short, the provision of curfews and rules of containment was criticised by some as it would impinge on civil liberties and fundamentally considered citizens as incapable of assessing the risk autonomously. Macron replied as follows: If we want to go much faster, to be more radical, we need common rules. And that is to set out rules, it is not to infantilise, it is just to say to responsible citizens: here, we are setting rules because we collectively need to set them. Because otherwise, our action will not be strong enough. […] So I don’t think we’re taking measures that are disproportionate. I think we are taking measures that are proportionate to the risk we are seeing. (14th October)

7.2

Ideology and Policies

Indeed, in the speech given on 13th April, after the first few weeks of the pandemic, Macron began to weigh up the situation and addressed the French people with the following words: “Just like you, I’ve seen some failures, still too much slowness, some pointless procedures, also some weaknesses in our logistics. We will review the results, in due course, when it comes to reorganising” (13th April). Although it is unclear what he was alluding to, he continued by saying that “Very often, what has seemed impossible for years, we have been able to do in a few days. We have innovated, dared, acted as close to the ground as possible and many solutions have been found. We should remember this because those are a source of strength for the future” (13th April). In this last excerpt, a specific trait of techno-populism is evident, regarding the rhetoric of “doing”, which contrasts innovation and change (promoted through keywords such as “doing”, “moving” and “acting” in the political slogans) with “standingstill” and “stuck” to “old” procedures and structures, often with no need to specify the direction of travel or the goals of such actions. The conclusion of this speech is very clear on that point:

7

EMMANUEL MACRON’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

129

May we know, in this moment, how to leave the beaten track, leave ideologies, to reinvent ourselves - and may I be the first. There is an opportunity in this crisis: to come together again, to test our humanity, to build another plan in harmony. A French plan, a deep reason for living together. In the coming weeks, with all the components of our Nation, I will try to trace this path that will make this possible. My dear compatriots, we will have better days and we will rediscover these Happy Days. I am convinced of it. (13th April)

Again, on 16th June, he called on his fellow citizens to abandon the “spirit of surrender” which was predicting the end of French industries, but rather to build on the “industrial, productive, and contemporary will and ambition” to gain “the ability to decide quickly, to make hard decisions and to move forward”; with those words he seems to have been inspired by Mark Zuckerberg’s mantra (“move fast and break things”). Also, when he announced the contents of the “France Relance” plan for economic recovery (28th August), he reiterated what resembles an old neoliberal refrain: the simplification of bureaucratic procedures is meant to boost innovation in industries. At the same time, one of the pillars of the plan is to support the reshoring of strategic industries on French soil, especially in the pharmaceutical sector. And the plan is fully rooted in a neoliberal doctrine, where trickle-down economics is the key for redistribution and recovery: I’m saying this very simply: we cannot win any social or health battle if we do not win the battle of production and industry. Because we always finance what we redistribute with what we already produced. And you can’t win any economic battle if you don’t believe in industry and industrial presence. (16th June during the visit to the Sanofi plant)

At the same time, such a position is mitigated by the recognition of the importance of the welfare state, and particularly of public health, to restore the economy.

7.3

The Relationship with Politics

The rhetoric of national unity occurs many times in each speech: on 25th March, for instance, Macron concluded his speech stating that the French nation must act “as a whole” and that it has “the force” not to surrender. Also, there is a parallelism between the war on the virus and the “divisions

130

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

and doubts” spread through the country, also related to the temptation to believe fake news rather than official information: When a war is to be fought, it has to be fought together, it needs a united mobilisation. In our country I see factors of division, doubts, all those who would like to fracture our country today, but we must have but one obsession: to be united to fight the virus. (25th March, speech given during a visit to Alsace, one of the worst hit regions)

This argument returned when ending the first lockdown, on 14th June: The independence of France to live better also requires our unity around the Republic. This is the second axis of this new phase. I can see us being divided over everything and sometimes losing the sense of our history. Uniting around republican patriotism is crucial. We are a nation where everyone, whatever their origins, their religion, needs to find their place. Is this true everywhere and for everyone? No. (14th June)

And it was used again at the beginning of the second lockdown, on 14th and 28th October, when the spirit of national unity was linked to resilience: “We are learning how to be a resilient nation” (14th October); “This is a difficult time that is testing our resilience and our unity. But it is an indicator of who we are. Women and men linked to each other” (28th October); and “Our nation has gone through this year with such unity and resilience: nothing can resist it. Our nation has been capable, in these difficult times, of so much innovation, inventiveness, and generosity: anything is possible for it” (New Year’s Eve address). On 24th November, this message became a motto: “Today we stand together. Tomorrow we will win together”. In a TV interview on 14th July, on the day of French national celebration, Macron was more explicit in addressing the criticisms he received during the first wave and previously (with particular emphasis on the Yellow Vests protests): I can understand this [hostility] because first of all, we are in a country that has this, in its history, in its guts, because also I have probably appeared to be something that I do not believe I am in essence, that people began to hate: this President who would like to reform everything so that it is only the best who can succeed, and so that our country can, finally, adapt to globalisation. This is not my plan. But the game of blunders,

7

EMMANUEL MACRON’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

131

sometimes because of sentences taken out of context, and at other times, by the opposition, by political life, has meant that this hatred could be fuelled. So I see it as you do, I’m looking directly at it. (14th July TV interview)

During the same interview, Macron was again pushed on this issue. In this regard, he separated the democratic debate from “hate, radical speech and brutality [that] are not part of democratic life and that rather weaken democracy” and quoted General De Gaulle saying that what he labelled as the “sad passions” (such as resentment and the spirit of defeat) “sometimes lead us to no longer wanting to move forward because we only think of these divisions” (14th July). Later, responding to criticisms regarding his decision to change the Prime Minister and the cabinet right after the first wave of the pandemic, and to allegations that his government was shifting to the right-wing, he interpreted the handbook of the perfect techno-populist who relies on a supposed meritocracy rather than on political partisanship, dismissed as something similar to a historical or biographical accident: I believe in political shifting. During the Covid crisis, French women and men have been asking us to treat them well and for it to work. They do not ask themselves whether the care is left-wing or right-wing. When the recovery comes, they will ask for it to be effective and fair, they will not ask whether it is left-wing or right-wing. The Government which has been constituted today, and which will be completed in a few days, no doubt by secretaries of state and high commissioners, is a Government which, when I look at it, has women and men who come from what was the right of our political field or whatever it can still be, and from the left, and about as much from one side as from the other. There must be fourteen figures who have had political mandates on the left or who have had commitments in support of the left. […] I specifically stand by this political shift because our fellow citizens elected me over this. Political shifting: that is to say, I take the best, those who are capable of leading this plan. And so I have a prime minister who has this history of being a locally elected official, a senior official that you called back and that I have tried to complement, and a team with competent people who have been in politics sometimes for decades, others who have been here at my side for 3 years, and a few others still who have essentially had a local career. And then figures from civil society, how can I put it, who were not familiar with political life. This is the strength of our country. This is the promise on which I was elected, which I continue to implement. (July 14th TV interview)

132

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

7.4

The Relationship with Europe

On many occasions, Macron has described the destinies of France and Europe as overlapping; speaking about Brexit, he commented: “This choice to leave Europe, this Brexit, has been the child of European malaise and many lies and false promises. But I want to tell you very clearly: our destiny is first in Europe” (31st December). For instance, when he acknowledged that “Everyone saw during this crisis that drugs that seemed common were no longer produced in France and in Europe” (16th June). In this respect, he assumed a leading role in the European landscape. For instance, he claimed that the agreement reached for the recovery plan in the summer was the result of an alliance between France and Germany which dated back to 2018: We have obtained a historic agreement for our Europe with everything we have just described, including in concrete terms. It is the fruit of three years of work between France and Germany, and it is the plan with which the French have trusted me […] This is the most important moment in the life of our Europe since the creation of the Euro. I really want everyone to be aware of this tonight because this historic moment is the fruit of the work of all of us, and therefore we can be proud. (21st July)

He quoted Mario Draghi’s famous saying “whatever it takes” to announce his plans for economic recovery after the first wave (14th June), to further reiterate the financial support for enterprises at the beginning of the second lockdown (28th October), to recall what his government had done to address the economic consequences of the pandemic (24th November), and then in the New Year’s Eve address. More specifically, recalling the first few months, he said: On 16th March, we made the humanitarian choice to prioritise health over the economy by asking you to stay home. […] The new phase which begins from tomorrow will help speed up the recovery. It is necessary and there too I’m counting on you. Because we must fully restart our economy while continuing to protect the most fragile. (14th June)

More repetition for emphasis was used to describe the role of the European Union during the interview on TéléFrance 1: three times Macron began the sentence with “Europe will…”, saying it will “help finance

7

EMMANUEL MACRON’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

133

youth employment”, “allow us to fund industries [that] create jobs, create jobs in the industrial and ecological sectors” and finally “fund a substantial part of this plan”, the “France Relance” plan (21st July). He was even more explicit when he said that through the negotiations that we have held over the last 4 days and 4 nights, France will reach almost 40 billion euros. We are the third beneficiary in Europe of this recovery plan, which, according to the work done by the Government at this stage, corresponds in fact to 40% of the expenditure that will be ours. This means that this money will come from Europe for our budget without us needing to finance it, either by our own debt, or by our taxes. (21st July)

Most importantly, he manages to balance what he calls “strategic independence” with pro-Europeanism: But the independence in which I believe is not a narrow sovereignty which would make history stammer. We will always remain, anyway, in an open world and an open Europe. To be independent is simply to choose openness rather than to endure it. Being independent means being able to withstand the crises that you endure in an open world. This is what we need to improve on. But being independent does not mean closing the borders and wanting to become self-sufficient in France, that would be impossible. And so I believe in this strategic independence which goes hand in hand with European and international cooperation. And that is why we will also continue to move forward. (16th June during the visit to the Sanofi plant)

More specifically, the research and production of vaccines for Covid-19 has been one of the most important testing grounds for this “marriage between our sovereignty, our independence and the cooperation in this battle for health” (16th June); indeed, European cooperation (“the Europe of healthcare”, 16th June) and the refusal of “healthcare nationalism” (14th July) are the only way to accelerate the research towards the cure and to return to competing at a global level. Pro-Europeanism does not imply a surrender of national sovereignty, and I will do everything to ensure that we regain control of our destiny and our lives. But this sovereignty also requires a stronger, more autonomous, more united Europe. This is what we have built in 2020. Because we were

134

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

able to carry out the necessary changes and strengthen our credibility, we were able to convince Germany and then the other members of the European Union to design a single massive recovery plan and to decide on a common united debt to better prepare our future by committing to the ecological and digital transition and by creating as many jobs as we can for our youth. (31st December)

7.5

The Relationship with Science

As far as science is concerned, Macron has often invoked full transparency. This means, for instance, that he has not hidden the disagreements between his scientific experts: “When on 13th April I told you lockdown would be lifted from 11th May - I know that many then advised against it, there was no consensus, opinions differed considerably, including among scientists - but we have collectively and methodically prepared what has been called déconfinement (easing of lockdown measures)” (June 14th). It also refers to the fact that he has detailed the figures and data concerning the spread of the virus and the effectiveness of the containment measures undertaken. The scientists’ role is not frequently highlighted, but when it is, Macron fully legitimates their work as essential for taking the right decisions; those which are the most objective and proportionate. Indeed, he started to think about the scientific council as a permanent advisory body. I make sure that the information is transparent and shared. I believe we are the first country in the world to have requested a phase one evaluation report. It has been made public. Health data is shared just like economic data, all the time. I think that, in the land of the Enlightenment and of Pasteur, we need to stop having these kinds of permanent debates on facts or scientific truth. […] now, we have some certainties. We must stick to the facts and not say every day: this is nothing, we can do it this way. So, if we base ourselves on the facts, we can say: this is serious, it’s serious, but we are mobilising. (14th October)

The reference to the Enlightenment is repeated when he wants to point out the difference between science and pseudo-science. While the former is related to the “scientific rationality” that is part of the national cultural heritage, the latter is associated with “conspiracy, obscurantism, and relativism” (24th November). Consequently, the use of chloroquine for

7

EMMANUEL MACRON’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

135

treating Covid-19 patients, as well as self-medication practices, is rejected unless science can provide any evidence of their efficacy: Gilles Bouleau: Mr. President, if you tested positive for coronavirus, if you had symptoms, would you take chloroquine? Emmanuel Macron: No. […] in this case, given our level of knowledge, from what I’ve understood from the science anyway, there was no established treatment. So if there is no treatment, I won’t take it, so I would defer to the doctors who are treating me who, I believe, would watch the evolution [of the virus] to see how best to support the most crucial days, to prevent the situation from degenerating. But no, you know, we are the land of the Enlightenment. In the land of the Enlightenment, I believe in rationality and therefore in scientific rationality. […] But it is not for the President of the Republic or for a politician to decide the outcome of a scientific debate using political criteria. Nor is it up to a scientist, even if they become a public figure, to act on scientific beliefs. Science has its verification processes and that’s how we do better, I think. […] In a few months, we might see that it was the right treatment, but today, no one has proven that it was the right one. (14th July interview)

On announcing the beginning of the second lockdown, he listed all the options and the benefits and drawbacks for each one, providing figures and detailed data regarding the consequences and the efficacy. Indeed, as “the Scientific Council assessed the consequences” of pursuing a herd immunity strategy (i.e. not doing anything), he clearly rejected this option: “France will never adopt this strategy. We will never let hundreds of thousands of our citizens die, these are not our values, nor are they in our best interests” (28th October). The second option was to only confine elderly people in lockdown, but this was also dismissed as unpracticable and ineffective at that stage of the contagion, also due to the fact that the scientists discovered that, contrary to expectations, youth contribute to the spread the disease even if they do not manifest symptoms. The third option concerned the increase in the testing capacity, but it might not be as fast as the virus; even the strategy of increasing the number of healthcare personnel and facilities would not give any immediate results. Citizens were thus persuaded that the only viable option remaining was a new lockdown. The issue regarding the vaccines deserves even greater caution. Indeed, “a scientific committee will be responsible for monitoring vaccination. A collective of citizens will also be set up to involve the population more

136

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

broadly”, in a “totally transparent framework” (24th November). And most importantly, transparency will be the key for “what we do know, and what we do not know as well”; for this reason, vaccination will not be compulsory (similarly to the line taken by most European countries), in order to pursue a precautionary approach.

CHAPTER 8

Pedro Sánchez’s Approach to the Pandemic

Unlike Conte and Macron, who appear very focused on their own role and on the role of the state towards local authorities and European allies, Sánchez portrays the context of the pandemic as an opportunity to accelerate processes of social, political, and economic transformation: The pandemic has not slowed down, on the contrary, it has accelerated the government’s action without deviating one millimetre, not one inch, from its objectives. [...] In other words, to sum up, the digital transformation, the ecological transition, feminism, social and regional cohesion are the elements that define the political plan that the government wants to implement over the next few years. (29th December)

More specifically, Sánchez introduces themes that are absent from the speeches of his Italian and French counterparts, such as gender equality, socio-economic disparities, and social and inter-generational cohesion. Above all, the need to protect and strengthen the welfare state stands out, as it has proved to be a valuable resource in fighting the virus but has long been under attack from neoliberal policies and austerity cuts. Figure 8.1 shows the distribution of topics during the three phases under analysis: Spain’s first wave between 9th March and 20th June, when the State of Emergency ceased; summer between 21st June and

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Saccà and D. Selva, European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9_8

137

138

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

Spain’s first wave 2020 Gender 0.5% Media 2.0%

Education Crisis 0.7% 7.8%

Summer 2020

Media Gender 3.3% 3.3%

Spain’s second wave 2020

Education 3.3%

Gender 3.4% Media 0.4%

Crisis 11.6% Politics 34.4%

Science 11.0%

Public health 28.0%

Politics 26.4%

Crisis 11.5% Public health 20.7%

Science 1.7%

Public health 26.4%

Politics 32.3%

Economy 29.8%

Economy 15.6%

Education 3.0%

Economy 17.9% Science 5.1%

Fig. 8.1 Distribution of the topics addressed in Pedro Sánchez’s speeches (Source Data from PRIN2017 “The transformations of democracy: Actors, strategies and outcomes in opposing populism in political, juridical and social arenas”, Tuscia University’s research unit)

4th August; and Spain’s second wave between 25th August and 31st December. A comparison of the topic distribution shows that politics and international relations (“Crisis”) receive reasonably stable levels of attention (between 26 and 34% and between 7.8 and 11.6% respectively). Like Italy, during the summer the economy dominates the scene at the expense of science (which contracts from 11 to 1.7%) and to a lesser extent that of public health (from 28 to 20.7%). However, both topics come back to the fore during the second wave (5.1 and 26.4% respectively), whereas in Italy we witnessed a more prolonged absence of science. Furthermore, during the summer new topics emerge such as gender equality and education, and these also maintain their share during the second wave (3.3–3.4% and 3–3.3% respectively). Spain is one of the countries in which democracy was stabilised later in the twentieth century, specifically in 1978 through a process of democratic transition. For this reason, Franco’s dictatorship is still very present in the country’s historical memory. Therefore, when Sánchez had to explain to his fellow citizens why it was necessary to declare a State of Emergency, he used very precise words:

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

139

All too often we human beings have been confused when it comes to identifying our enemies; but this time it is important not to make a mistake. Because now we are facing our real enemy, which is the virus and the pandemic. It is everyone’s enemy and we must all fight it together. I want to be very clear and informative so that Spaniards know what our collective task is: the objective in this battle against the virus is first to reduce its spread, then to stop it and, finally, to eliminate it. We have difficult weeks of effort and sacrifice ahead of us. Those efforts and sacrifices will begin to bear fruit when we achieve the first objective: to lower the curve of the spread of the virus. When we see that the spread of the virus is no longer climbing steeply, but slowing down. That will be the first collective achievement. (14th March)

Understandably, he wanted to clearly differentiate with the State of Emergency typical of authoritarian regimes: We are imposing extraordinarily serious measures on ourselves. And as I said yesterday, it is courage, not fear, that makes us stay at home. […] Respect for authority can be the result of fear, obligation, or conviction. But only the latter option, conviction, is acceptable in our society today. We are a democratic society of free men and women. What we are doing, keeping ourselves locked up in our homes, is a democratic, rational decision, designed not to limit our freedom but to preserve the most important of our assets: life. (22nd March)

And he tried to anticipate questions about the duration of the State of Emergency, with extreme clarity on the issue that would become central one year later, that of the importance of vaccines: Victory over the virus will begin when the number of medical discharges exceeds the number of new infections. Victory will be greatest when the spread to new patients plummets. It is then that our economy will recover strongly. But victory will be complete when, in addition to eliminating it, we have a vaccine to prevent future pandemics. (14th March)

The virus is frequently described as “the real enemy”, the kind that does not allow for distractions and that is progressively more obvious. While he claims that “the war on the virus is permanent” (22nd March), he encourages Spanish citizens to strengthen their sense of national unity, patriotism, and solidarity.

140

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

The pandemic is compared to the economic crisis of 2012, to the Second World War, and to the Spanish Civil War for its potential impact on the country and on the whole world: In recent days, leaders of our neighbouring countries have said, and we have heard them say, that this situation is the most serious our societies have ever experienced since the Second World War, and they are probably not wrong. In our country, certainly, only the very old, who experienced the hardships of the civil war and the post-war period, can remember harsher collective situations than the present one. Apart from them, the remaining generations living in Spain today have never, ever before in our lives, had to collectively face something so hard, so difficult. (21st March)

Sánchez goes as far as to call it a Third World War because of its destructive capacity against Europe, to emphasise the need for alliance among the European partners against a common enemy: Europe is now the epicentre of the Covid-19 pandemic. [...] The purpose of avoiding a Third World War is the historical seed of the European Union. And it has succeeded in that endeavour in almost 70 years of its existence. Now Europe is facing a different challenge, which is to wage a united war against a common enemy decimating the health of its citizens, wherever they live, and threatening not only our social welfare but also our economic progress. (28th March)

This sense of historicity is present in the speeches throughout the entire year, also combined with the awareness of the universality of the challenge: More than a third of human beings, and I want to underline this figure, more than a third of human beings, are at the moment confined to their homes to fight against the virus, against the common enemy. (28th March) Today, Spaniards, like the rest of humanity, face a formidable enemy. A deadly enemy that has invaded our cities and towns, endangering our lives, our health, our economy, in short, our way of life. (12th April) This Covid-19 crisis is the great crisis of our generation. (25th September, address to the UN General Assembly)

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

141

Just one week after declaring the State of Emergency, Spain became one of the countries worst hit by the pandemic. Sánchez acknowledged the situation by quoting the data from the Scientific Committee, and did not sugar-coat the pill for his fellow citizens: What is the current situation? You are aware of the data, they are regularly communicated to you by the Scientific Committee, the technical committee, whom I would certainly like to thank for their exemplary behaviour and dedication. […] Unfortunately, the number of diagnosed cases and deaths will increase in the coming days. As I have said in other appearances, we are at a very critical moment and there are going to be very hard days ahead, for which we have to prepare ourselves from a psychological and emotional point of view. We have to get to the end of next week very strong. Very strong. (21st March)

The same clarity is used in every communication. It aims to inform about the state of affairs and unravel fake news, but above all it is a useful premise for instilling courage and determination: In Spain we are living through the hardest hours, we said this last weekend, this week is going to be very hard, we are facing the saddest, hardest, most distressing hours. As we come close to the crest of the wave, the virus is hitting us with merciless violence. And when the battle becomes more intense, like the current period we are suffering in our country, when the ravages are greater, when we are close to the crest of the wave that is striking us, it is not the time to lower our guard. On the contrary, it is the time to intensify the struggle. (28th March)

Clarity about the seriousness of the situation is a recurring theme that is maintained throughout the year, even when the situation seems to be improving. The principle of precaution is always preferable to a false hope: Being hasty, relaxing or being less united right now would have a worse outcome than sending us back to square one because it would trigger a second wave that would hit us when our resistance is, let’s face it, weaker and our strength is correspondingly weaker. (4th April) It is not yet victory, far from it. We are still far from that victory, from the moment when we will regain that new normality in our lives. But they are the first decisive steps on the road to victory. They are encouraging results because they give us courage, and because they do not allow us to ease up

142

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

for a moment, because we cannot lay down our arms, but what we have to do is to keep fighting. We have now proved that we can save thousands of lives with everyone’s efforts and we will not stop doing it and doing it better; nothing will stop us until we win this war. (12th April)

The dramatisation of the situation (i.e. claiming that Spain is facing a permanent war) is functional to the legitimation of a radical political agenda. In fact, as in the post-war period, the recovery from the pandemic must take place through “major transformations” (digital, environmental, feminist, and intersectional) and a new social pact between institutions and civil society: [We are] suffering from levels of job destruction and recession only comparable to those of the Great Depression of a century ago and the wars of the last century. And, as then, there is only one way to overcome it, the same way we are proposing for Europe and our country: reconstruction, recovery. What, in my opinion, does reconstruction mean? Well, it means that we must tackle the major transformations that will allow us to resume economic growth and job creation as soon as possible, promoting digitalisation, ecological transition, the strengthening of our education systems, science and research, […] the proper functioning of the labour market, which still lacks some improvements, and a tax system that strengthens our Welfare State, especially our health service and social protection services. How can we achieve this reconstruction, this recovery? In the Government’s opinion, by uniting, uniting employers and workers, uniting the different administrations, and undoubtedly uniting the Government and the opposition. The first expression of this unity must be the Pacts for the Economic and Social Reconstruction of Spain which, in my opinion, an overwhelming majority of our society is demanding. (9th May)

The phase of co-existence with the virus began in late April with the transition towards the “new normality” (31/5/2020 and 7/6/2020); from this period on, the presidents of the Autonomous Communities [regional authorities] would lead the management of the pandemic, obviously in constant dialogue with the national government. For this reason, the second State of Emergency took until the end of October to be put in place, despite the fact that the second wave of contagion began in August. Indeed, in September, Sánchez gave the Autonomous Communities responsibility for running an early detection system:

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

143

Q: I want to ask you, first of all, what is your current state of concern about the pandemic numbers, and why is Spain also seeing record numbers in the second wave of the pandemic? President: Well, the state is one of concern. It is true that the wave we are witnessing right now is different from the first wave. [...] Today it is completely different. Today the rate of growth is a little slower and this is a consequence of the extraordinary effort that the Autonomous Communities are making to detect the number of infections through PCR tests. [...] What I mean by this is that the system is much better prepared, that it is true that the data are cause for concern and that we obviously need to reinforce cooperation with the Autonomous Communities and the Spanish Government. (19th September)

In order to facilitate a comparison between Sanchez, Conte, and Macron, the following section will illustrate five issues: (a) Sanchez’s relationship with the people; (b) his ideology and policies; (c) his relationship with politics; (d) his relationship with Europe; and finally (e) his relationship with science.

8.1

The Relationship with the People

The complicated genesis of his mandate, as well as the fact that Spain has had four elections in the last five years, led Sánchez to define his as the “government of dialogue”: I said at my investiture, and I have said it each and every time I have had the opportunity to appear, that this was going to be the legislature of dialogue. It has been so in the social sphere, with the agreements with the trade unions and employers. It has been so at the institutional level, with 15 Conferences of Presidents and with the agreement we have signed today with the Spanish Federation of Municipalities and Provinces. It has been so at the European level with the unprecedented, historic agreement to mobilise 140,000 million euros for Spain alone over the next six years for the major transformations that lie ahead of us. (4th August)

Undoubtedly the context of the pandemic pushed Sánchez in the direction of emphasising the unity of the people against the “enemy”, but this unifying spirit was already present and was due to political circumstances: the difficulty parties had in repositioning themselves in a multipolar framework, the misalignment of citizens, the growth of resentment

144

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

towards politics, and the lack of bipartisan or multi-partisan agreements in the name of social welfare. This led to Sánchez describing himself as “everyone’s president” (14th March), a president that was going to dialogue with everyone and protect everyone from the impact of the pandemic: A couple of weeks ago, the Spanish Government set about drawing up a Shock Plan that we will implement as soon as possible. And, above all, we are going to do so in collaboration and coordination with the social agents. I would therefore like to send out a message of unity, serenity, and stability. This is a cause that does not distinguish between ideas or colours, and it is also demonstrating that in the face of a problem that affects us all, we know how to provide a national response that protects us all. (9th March)

To gain the trust of his citizens, he acknowledged that his duty as “a public representative and decision-maker” is to seek unity through the diverse points of view: But the duty now is to maintain unity, starting with public representatives and decision-makers. No one in my government is going to argue with any administration, nor with any party or political adversary, because our only enemy, the real enemy, the enemy of all, is the virus. We will not allow ourselves to be overcome by fear. Forty-seven million Spaniards trust us to defeat it. If anyone distances themselves from the Spanish Government, we will approach them with the greatest willingness; if anyone shirks their responsibilities, we will strive to take those responsibilities on, even if they are not ours; if anyone polemicises, let there be no doubt in the minds of Spaniards that we will seek to reconcile them with the Spanish Government. (21st March)

The ambivalence of the concept of national unity is always present: on the one hand, it refers to the unity of social partners and the concentration of each individual’s efforts in stopping the spread of the virus; on the other, it appears as a call, an appeal directed mainly at the President’s political opponents. First, when he addresses the citizens: These last seven days have changed us. And the coming weeks, with their harshness, will change us even more. It is inexorable. It is up to us to change for the better, to emerge stronger, wiser, more united from this ordeal. I am sure that when this happens, which will happen very soon,

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

145

many people will be astonished to discover what they are made of. [...] I am sure that each one of us will do everything we can to save as many lives as possible, and to shorten the duration of this exceptional situation. [...] It is not fear that keeps us locked in our homes, it is courage. [...] In the coming weeks, I’m asking you, let us maintain and strengthen our unity; let us all help each other, let each of us contribute as much as we can, because all the forces are needed to defeat the virus as soon as possible. And because it is united, and only united, that we will defeat it. (21st March)

And then, by turning to political forces: I do not have and will not have, as I have said in all my appearances since this crisis began, any other enemy than the virus. [...] The best news Spaniards could receive when they leave their homes is to know that their political representatives have been able to overcome their differences and together draw up a great economic and social reconstruction plan to get the country back on track. I will do everything in my power to achieve this union. (12th April)

If the intention to mend the relationship between society and politics predates the pandemic, it is at this juncture that it is put into practice. It starts with the recognition of a common identity consisting of feelings and behaviours geared towards solidarity, it progresses with thanks for the effort and sacrifices citizens are making, and it ends by pointing to society as an example and model for politics to follow. The characteristics attributed to citizenship are of a purely psychological or emotional nature, and are used to build a common ground between “politics” and “society”, two parts of the country that appear to have been torn apart in the last few years: I can assure you that both the Government and the local and regional administrations are aware of the reality. And we are affected by it in the same way as the citizens. With the same conviction and effort with which citizens are taking measures and applying them in their own lives. With the same concern. With the same courage. With the same desire to be useful and help those who need it most. With the same emotion in the face of generosity. With the same indignation towards those specific acts or words that miserably attack coexistence and the common good. (22nd March)

146

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

Therefore, society is held up as an example of virtue that politics should follow, in contrast to the ideal-type of charismatic leader; and this interpretation carries with it the implication that politics is inherently always to blame (at least until proven otherwise): And finally, with regard to the political struggle, I believe that what Spaniards want is to see all political leaders united. I have said it before: this virus does not discriminate in terms of gender, political opinion, affiliation, central government, or regional governments. And I also believe that what the public wants is to see all political leaders working hand in hand to face a challenge that I insist is serious, where we are going to have some difficult weeks ahead, [...] Because these days, the example of coordination between public authorities of all ideological persuasions, the lesson in effort and professionalism of the healthcare workers, and the impeccable behaviour of all Spanish citizens, united around their common interest, the general interest, show once again that Spain is a country capable of facing the most difficult challenges with unity and with guaranteed success. (10th March) The coordination, collaboration and spontaneous action of so many individuals, of so many civil society institutions, is also an example for us, for public decision-makers. When politics reflects the virtues of society, it becomes greater and more capable. (22nd March)

Sacrifice, generosity, endurance, responsibility, social discipline, and the “morality of victory” are the elements that Sánchez attributes to citizens and that politicians should imitate. In short, we the public decision-makers must humbly take our cue from all of them and fulfil our mission. Let us be guided by the experts and by them alone, let us stand before our citizens and work as much as humanly possible, as we are doing, to combat the only enemy that threatens us in this war: the virus and its harm to health, and the economic and social damage it inflicts. At present, everyone, in Europe and in Spain, at work or at home, needs to choose between cynicism and commitment, between selfishness and generosity, and between defeatism and the morality of victory. (28th March)

Also, those attributes are what makes Sánchez proud of being the Spanish President:

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

147

I also asked you, as President of the Government, personally, each and every one of you, each and every person, not to give in to fear, not to give in to lies and hoaxes, which are unfortunately widespread in the society in which we live, and not to give in to anger. And I could not be more grateful, because you are doing it. I feel very proud to be part of this society and this country. [...] And there is only one way: sacrifice, endurance and the morality of victory. Sacrifice to endure, endurance to win and victory to live. (4th April)

At the same time, the attempt towards an identification between the leader and the people that characterised Conte and Macron is not present here. Sánchez builds a common ground with citizens (psychological and emotional, as mentioned above) by emphasising his ability to empathise with them: In this period, messages inspired by confusion, anger, and anguish have been appearing. And understandably so. Because there is nothing more damaging to a person’s mood than the threat of the unknown. It is a human reaction. But we must act with unity, with responsibility and with social discipline. (14th March) The Government is also aware of all this and of something very important, of the psychological effects of lockdown and of what it means to be at home, endlessly adding up the hours on the same clock. […] Spain has taken extremely harsh measures, which the Spanish people are enduring first-hand, in their own homes. We are proposing a month’s lockdown of Spanish citizens, one month, aware not only of the social, but also the psychological effects that this will have on very vulnerable populations, especially the elderly, people who live alone, or people who are victims of gender violence […]. We are self-imposing extraordinarily serious measures. And as I said yesterday, it is courage, not fear, that makes us stay at home. (22nd March) I understand how difficult it is to continue this effort and sacrifice for another two weeks. These are difficult days for all of us; days that are testing our patience as we are isolated at home; days that are testing our serenity in the face of uncertainty about the future; frantic days for many of us, forced to act and make decisions we had never imagined, also anxious about the fate of sick friends and family members. For many, these are the most difficult days of our lives. (4th April)

148

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

And the same can be said for the second wave: I understand the anguish of the citizens. As a society we have never been faced with anything like this before. I understand how difficult it is to overcome the worries of so many elderly people and to overcome the weariness of a society where we do not know exactly when the final solution will come. I also understand the anguish and uncertainty and even the unease of the younger generations who will once again be forced to restrict their mobility and their social life in a context such as the present one. That is why I would like to thank you all. (25th October)

His ability to empathise with citizens also means that he absolves and justifies those protesting in the streets against the restrictions on freedom of movement declared by the Autonomous Communities at the beginning of the second wave. During a TV interview, he replied to a question about which kind of message he would send to the protesters in Madrid: Firstly, empathy. If they feel this, it is because we need to improve this proximity and this response. Secondly, I understand that there is unease, that there is anxiety and, therefore, what we institutions have to do is to reduce this unease and anxiety as much as possible. And what I can guarantee to the residents of these districts and of all the districts and localities of Madrid, in this case, but also of the country, is that the Spanish Government is determined to lower the curve […] What we are doing is to support and help, in this case the Community of Madrid, to take the best decisions with the greatest possible resources. (19th September)

Yet at the same time, he emphasises the difference between him and the citizens, a difference in role and the responsibility that characterises his role as president. As President of the national government and the person ultimately in sole command, my fundamental task is to coordinate the action to be taken by the public institutions. Not to supplant them, but to make the most of the efficiency, usefulness and capacity of each body and each public institution, avoiding any waste of time, resources or energy in the management of the crisis. As President of the Spanish Government, my task is also to lead. Promptly, without hesitation, as befits the situation we face. With detailed knowledge of the pressing needs and available resources, and with the deepest respect and acknowledgement for the competent authorities. I

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

149

have expressed this to the regional presidents, from whom I have received support and understanding. (22nd March)

This role carries power and limitations at the same time: In order to defeat the virus, it is essential to continue to anticipate it. [...] The most difficult days are coming and they will test all our material and moral capacities to the limit. And also our mettle as a society. That is why I would like to convey to you that I wish we had the power to do something extraordinary and, having done it, to have our lives return to normal immediately. I wish we had it. But we don’t. I humbly acknowledge our limitations, like those of other countries, in dealing with this pandemic. (22nd March) I think we have to approach it with an attitude of humility. [...] Of course, I am very aware of who my enemy is. My enemy is Covid-19, because it is the whole of society’s. [We ourselves have] to implement this unity, for which I am appealing to all of society, and when the political debate comes, we will have that political debate. I can already tell you that this political debate, at least on my part and that of the Government, will be constructive and not because I want to shirk my responsibilities, which I fully accept since obviously it was I who announced and decreed the State of Emergency, of course. I accept them directly because I am the one who currently represents the whole nation in terms of decision-making, but I will do so in a constructive spirit. (4th April)

The principle of precaution and the sense of responsibility on everyone’s part go hand in hand during the phases in which lockdown eases. Therefore, the recipe for the “new normality” is not relying on an obligation to stay at home, but on the widespread sense of emergency: We knew that total lockdown could not last forever. [...] Again we need to continue to make decisions, and after these obviously there will come others, and we can never be completely sure that we will get every one of them right; and it is possible that sometimes we will be wrong. But in any case, we have taken and will continue to take decisions, until we get out of this situation, that no one has ever had to take in the history of our country under a single guide for action: maximum coordination, maximum prudence, and maximum caution, and all with the aim of defending the public health of Spanish society as a whole and saving lives. Focusing on beating the virus without wasting time reproaching anyone. (2nd May)

150

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

The new rules are based on personal hygiene and physical distancing, and are summarised in the “3M” formula: mask, metres, washing hands (“manos” in Spanish). The second State of Emergency, indeed, starts on this premise: There is no general lockdown in this new State of Emergency, but the more we stay at home and the less contact we have, the more protected we will be and the more we will protect our loved ones and also the health of all citizens. We do not need to pass measures to force us to do what needs to be done. Because we know what we have to do: the less mobile we are, and the fewer contacts we have, then the lower chance the virus will have of infecting us. So let’s stay at home as much as possible. (25th October)

Even at Christmas, Sánchez emphasises the citizens’ sense of responsibility and “social discipline”: We must be clear about one thing: throughout our lives, in order to show someone that we loved them, we have embraced them. This year, to show them the same, we may have to stay away from them. From our parents, from our friends, from our siblings. We can continue to preserve the fraternal spirit of Christmas while respecting the health rules that are essential this year. We can do so, because in this very different Christmas season, our priority must be to avoid a third wave. (22nd November)

The leader’s posture towards the citizens is not only one of admiration and gratitude: Sánchez tries to encourage them to be strong, not to give in to fear, impatience, and the desire to return to life. He also asks them to adopt a communitarian attitude towards their fellow citizens, by quoting a famous speech given by John F. Kennedy: We will have to move to an undoubtedly stronger, tighter unity. We must shift from “what can others do for me” to “what can I do for others”. Something that our country already did four decades ago in the Moncloa Pacts, which, as older citizens know, managed to avert very serious threats to our economy and to our democracy. (4th April)

In addition, citizens are also asked to stop another kind of virus, that of disinformation. They can play a decisive role in stopping the “chain of panic”.

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

151

As President of the Government, I’m asking for your cooperation: I know I have it, and at the same time as we slow down the curve of contagion, let us cut the chain of transmission of panic. Let us halt the hoaxes, the speculation, and the fake news with verified information. Let us act with responsibility, social discipline, and a sense of community. I know we are capable of doing it together. (14th March)

When addressing this issue, Sánchez turns paternalistic, acknowledging the citizens’ difficulties and somewhat excusing them for being tempted by fake news and propaganda. In the following excerpt, for instance, he distinguishes between a “normal” fear and a “pathological” fear, which leads to breaking the lockdown rules and feeding on hoaxes: I would like to talk about indiscipline and about social confusion. [...] we don’t have to feel guilty, nor insecure, for having this feeling of fear and uncertainty, it’s normal. [...] But there is another kind of pathological fear that seeks impossible individual solutions, that breaks lockdown rules, feeds on hoaxes and misleading news that generate alarm and panic, and frantically hoards goods or products. It is this kind of behaviour that we must all combat and isolate, that we must all avoid, because it spreads as fast as the virus and is also harmful in our collective battle against the pandemic. There are those who are spreading hoaxes and falsehoods, it is true, but there are many more people who are treating the lies the way they treat the virus: they are breaking the chain of transmission. So I would like to thank them for this civil response. Not spreading unsubstantiated news is one way to fight the virus. And I would like the youngest people, those who are more at home with WhatsApp and social media, to check the information they then pass on to their friends. Because if we do not break this chain, we will be generating alarm and misinformation that makes us weaker in the fight against the coronavirus. (21st March)

While citizens are absolved, others are singled out as guilty: Those who spread advice that contradicts scientific authority are also an ally of the virus. Spreading false news just to harm and confuse. Playing with the emotions of citizens at such a critical time of maximum fragility that we are experiencing, spreading messages of hatred and confrontation, especially if it is done from a public platform, is a threat that adds to the danger posed by the virus itself. (22nd March)

152

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

Finally, when talking to citizens, Sánchez often emphasises the role of three social categories: the elderly, youth, and women. His perspective is inter-generational and intersectional: those three categories have been the most hit by the pandemic, albeit for different reasons. The elderly are represented as particularly vulnerable but also as a sort of safety net that saved the country during the economic crisis of 2008: This is the time for social responsibility and discipline. But it is also a time for commitment to the most vulnerable. Today we must remember that in the economic crisis of 2008 we were saved from it by our elderly: grandmothers and grandfathers who were the lifeline for many families and, therefore, for society as a whole. From their pensions came the money to fill our pantries, to pay the bills or to pay the living expenses of young university students. Their roof was often the roof that sheltered the whole family. Our elderly gave us more than help, they gave us a great example. In this crisis they are the ones who need our help the most. And this crisis also gives us the opportunity to show that we have learned from their example, that we can be worthy of our elders and can take action. Let us show that the solidarity between generations is real. Let us protect our elderly by protecting our elderly. (14th March)

This concept is further reiterated with different but equally profound words: I would also like to say to the elderly, who are more at risk than anyone else, as we all know, and as those of us who govern the country are well aware, that we are not going to abandon you. This is one of the great lessons we are seeing from Spanish society: Spanish society is not going to abandon you. We are going to look after you as you looked after us; we are going to protect your health and your lives with the same determination as we will all lives, all lives equally, whatever their age, because we feel them to be equally valuable and we want you with us. We need you with us. This is your country, before anyone else’s. And from the first to the last of the Spanish people, of your compatriots, from the first healthcare worker to the last child, we are going to fight alongside you, the elderly, for you, the elderly. Because we are all, as I said before, part of the same body. (4th April)

The reflection on the vulnerability of the elderly is accompanied by a reflection on the limits of the current welfare state. In addition, Sánchez

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

153

draws on these considerations to launch a proposal for an “economy of care”: I also believe that one of the great lessons we will have to learn from this epidemic is that we will have to strengthen the welfare state. We will have to strengthen public health. We will also have to strengthen care for the elderly, including care for dependents. And not only in terms of residential homes for the elderly, but also in terms of local services. We have a very costly system that has not proved to be efficient enough to protect the public health of our elderly. Precisely because the elderly want to live in their own homes rather than leave their homes to live in homes for the elderly. I believe that there is extensive, lengthy and very fruitful work that we can conduct over the next few years. Precisely in what we have called the care economy, in order to guarantee: firstly, the well-being of our elderly, public health and the lives of our elderly. […] And thirdly, an economy that can also generate a lot of employment. (19th September)

The youth are asked to care for their grandparents; at the same time, they are represented as suffering and vulnerable in terms of mental health much more than physically, due to school closures and lockdown. But in Sánchez’s discourse, their characterisation is symbolic rather than concrete, as they represent “society’s hope, strength, and imagination” (4th April) and the future, the time in which all leaders will be judged: In most parts of the world, when young people look around them, they do not see an opportunity for life. They see that the doors of progress, of personal advancement are closing; that the deterioration of the environment goes on and on and on. At what point did we decide that the expression “change the world” was no longer meaningful? […] By inaction or omission, we have allowed disaffection and distrust of government to spread around the world. Through indifference or cowardice, we have ignored threats and realities that today seriously affect the physical, political, and moral health of the entire planet. We are witnessing the return of exclusionary nationalism, which we had thought was over, xenophobia, autarchic fantasies, and impudent authoritarianism. We are witnessing the rise of leaderships based on demagogy, lies, fomenting hatred, and confrontation. In the face of this, I would like to make an appeal to the international community. An invitation, in short, to understand the historic moment in which we find ourselves, formulated precisely from the urgency of the present and from the passion of our convictions.

154

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

On behalf of young people: We have an obligation to act. (25th September, Address to the UN General Assembly)

As already mentioned, Sánchez addresses women extensively, thanking them for the often invisible work they do and highlighting the difficulties they encountered during the pandemic: I would also like to thank the women. They represent the majority of our healthcare workers, they are the majority in commerce, in the food industry, in hospital cleaning services, in residential homes, and also in caring for a society that has felt helpless. Some of them, moreover, have unfortunately had to suffer gender violence in this situation, which has unfortunately been exacerbated during these months of lockdown. We will never forget them. And we are working tirelessly for them and for their children. (20th June)

On several occasions, Sánchez points out that women have been more affected by the pandemic than men. For example, it is women who find it most difficult to find a work-life balance while working remotely, and if they cannot do so, it is more likely to be women who leave their jobs (23rd May), which is why measures were being developed to make the working day more flexible (1st September). Generally speaking, “it is again women who bear the brunt of the burden of people to be cared for and looked after” (25th September). In addition, lockdown exacerbated situations of domestic violence against women (14th June), which made it necessary to issue a specific plan to combat this (29th December). Since “a feminist and intersectional response is needed” (28th October), gender equality is one of the goals of Sánchez’s government: A very important goal for this government, and I am convinced for most of our compatriots as well, is gender equality, real equality between men and women. Women make up 51% of the population, and it is they who are once again the most affected by this pandemic, having taken on most of the care work. It is impossible to make Spain a competitive, strong, cohesive country when the majority of the population is being affected by crisis after crisis, that 51% representing the female population in our country. Transformations will not be real if they do not include a gender perspective and equality in all areas. It is not only a question of social justice—it is also a question of social justice—but when women’s rights advance, so does society as a whole. Also, equality between all members of the community,

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

155

because no one can have any doubt any longer that social cohesion is the greatest engine of transformation, growth, and competitiveness of any economy or society. (4th August)

As he claims to be the leader of a feminist cabinet, he pursues this goal through multiple actions. In the context of international governance, the promotion of a women’s empowerment agenda within the G20 and support for the candidature of a woman as president of the Eurogroup are examples of this commitment: I am reasonably optimistic that we can achieve an important position for Spain and also for a feminist government; the fact that there are more and more women at the head of institutions, especially economic institutions, is great news. For the first time we have a female president of the European Central Bank. For the first time we have a female president of the European Commission, and why shouldn’t we have a female president of the Eurogroup for the first time and, moreover, if she is Spanish, wouldn’t that be the best? I think it is also important for the Eurogroup to offer a different perspective, especially at this time when we clearly need the contribution and leadership of the Ministers of Economy and Finance to respond to this enormous crisis we are facing in Europe and in the world, unprecedented in the last 100 years. (8th July)

By emphasising the role of these three categories (the elderly, young people, and women), Sánchez succeeds in restoring complexity and subjectivity to “the people”. While referring to concepts of national unity and social cohesion, like Conte and Macron, Sánchez does not fall into the error of representing the people as a monolith in which differences are indistinguishable and irrelevant. On the contrary, as we will see in the next section, he often emphasises how social and socio-economic differences are exacerbated by the pandemic, and that this requires specific policies to compensate.

8.2

Ideology and Policies

The analysis of Sánchez’s speeches reveals a contradictory (somewhat opportunistic) relationship with ideology. On the one hand, he frequently calls on the political forces in Parliament to overcome ideologies, or if nothing else, to consider that the virus does not recognise or discriminate on the basis of political motives. The word “ideology” has negative

156

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

connotations (i.e. pretextual fights, partisan interests), as is true for many other political leaders of our time, but he still has clear political leanings (or at least they emerge by the end of a turbulent 2020): One of the best things that can happen to the country is that there is a unity of the Left, which is leading this Left, the Spanish Government, at this difficult, complex time, to give it that social perspective, that social empathy to an unprecedented crisis such as the one we are suffering. One of the main lessons, by the way, that I would like to bring to the table, is that we have to strengthen the welfare state. (22nd November)

Indeed, on the other hand, he resolutely sets out the principles that guide his government’s action: solidarity, social justice, the fight against inequality, strengthening the welfare state, and pro-Europeanism. In some passages, he introduces a critical reflection on globalism: A businessman who visited me yesterday said: "This crisis also calls globalisation into question, because now we are seeing that all the markets are closing to the export of certain medicines or certain materials that they want to have guaranteed in their society. Well, I don’t want to make a nationalist speech or one of national pride here, but I think it is also important to vindicate national industry and also, obviously, the need to have a strategic reserve of products so that for this pandemic and for others that may come, we hope in many, many years, many years’ time, we will be able to respond effectively. (4th April) In this context, I would like to encourage the OECD to continue its efforts to develop an indicator that, in addition to GDP, includes other important aspects of advancement and the standard of living related to sustainability, inclusion, and well-being. This new, more sustainable economy needs new, more sustainable and inclusive indicators. Yes, growth should be strong, but also resilient. Yes, the recovery should be vigorous, but also sustainable and green. And yes, we want to engineer powerful, yet socially inclusive and generalised growth that leaves no one behind. (28th October, Address at the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting)

From this perspective, the pandemic has revealed what the strategic sectors are, those in which the State must continue to invest: health, science, and research.

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

157

We have to look up, learn what our weaknesses have been, what our weaknesses are and, although it may sound strange, what the opportunities are for our country in terms of production and self-sufficiency in order to guarantee and preserve security in the medium and long term. (22nd March) We have discovered that Spanish healthcare was not as good as we thought. On the contrary, Spanish healthcare is even better than we thought. What we have discovered is that it was not cared for as it deserves to be. [...] we have seen the immediate response capacity of the system as soon as resources are injected into it. But we have also seen the wounds left by the still recent cuts, which no one can deny in the light of events. And we have understood, once and for all, that no economic situation or political circumstance can justify the mistreatment of our public health service. Because that is tantamount to making us weaker and more fragile, as we have seen during these very difficult weeks. After what we have lived through, society will demand that we take care of Spanish public healthcare in exactly the same way as Spanish public healthcare took care of us in the worst of times. Nor will anyone understand science and research as subsidiary activities, at the mercy of times of plenty, as if it were a luxury only and exclusively for the rich. No one will dare to disguise the brain drain as an educational or life experience. Society will demand a country in which science and research is what it should be and should never have ceased to be, and that it is a strategic sector. (7th June)

The healthcare services, in particular, are extolled: “They are the safest shield we have against common diseases and also in the event of a health emergency such as the current one. They are a source of pride as a country and a safety shield in situations such as the one we are experiencing” (10th March). The importance of the Welfare State is the landmark of Sánchez’s discourse and the element that most differentiates him from the techno-populism embodied by Conte and Macron. The centrality of the Welfare State is stated not only in relationship with the pandemic (in an instrumental fashion), but also with the wider national community (as a cultural and ideological glue). This aspect is highlighted in almost every single address, as a lesson finally learned after years of austerity: These seven days have also changed our way of considering public assets, health professionals, of course, to whom I express our deep gratitude; but also the Armed Forces and the State Security Forces, which we now perceive as an indispensable shield and not as a superfluous expense. [...] If

158

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

we need to rethink this in Spain, in any European country, we also need to do so at the European level, at the Community level. We, Western society, unlike other societies, were not ready for a pandemic, this is obvious. Fortunately, we live in Europe, and unlike other great societies and great powers, we have a strong Welfare State. It is true that it is a Welfare State which in recent years, for various reasons, has suffered cuts. But we have a strong Welfare State, in the areas of health, education, pensions, and dependency, but we need to strengthen it, and I believe that this is one of the great lessons we must learn from this. And (I believe) that we will have to be equipped with resources when all this happens, also at the level of the Welfare State, so that, in the event of possible pandemics that we may face again in the future, hopefully in the very distant future, Spanish society, like all Western societies, will obviously be prepared to face them. (21st March) We are seeing the importance of what is common, of what is public, of what on many occasions we may not have been able to understand and appreciate in all its magnitude. Fortunately, we live in Europe - Fortunately, we live in Spain in a consolidated democracy with a strong Welfare State, but a Welfare State that we have also seen had weaknesses, had fragilities, that need to be strengthened. What is common, what represents us and embodies what we represent as a nation, as a community, which is our Welfare State, must have its essential pillars strengthened. [...] all the lessons this pandemic is teaching us, about strengthening the public sphere, about cohesion, which is an important principle; without a doubt, nothing in conflict with or antagonistic to the individual, to individual freedom, but cohesion as a necessary complement to this necessary freedom. (4th April)

The balance between the demands of the collective and the individual is sought through a policy of strengthening public services. The Pacts for Reconstruction aimed to protect the fixed-contract worker and the self-employed, the temporary-contract worker and the small business owner, and the unemployed and the entrepreneur. And all of them, because there is undoubtedly a gender impact in this economic and social crisis, will have to find their specific response within the great collective response we must give. (9th May)

All categories of workers must be protected (starting from universal basic income, for instance), because society is comprised of all of them:

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

159

Protection is always reciprocal. No one can be safe alone. We all depend on each other. On our health and also on our economic and social well-being. This crisis has shown that we are a strong, resilient, intelligent, disciplined, supportive, and grateful society. (2nd May)

The State of Emergency has many consequences, including changing the balance of power between the government and the market: I announce that in order to ensure the supply of goods and services necessary for the protection of public health, the Minister of Health may: issue the necessary orders to ensure market supply; intervene and temporarily occupy industries, factories, workshops, farms or premises of any kind, including privately owned health centres, services and establishments, as well as those operating in the pharmaceutical sector; carry out temporary requisitions or impose compulsory personal services. (14th March)

He criticises “international organisations, or the Spanish economic research services themselves, whether they are private foundations, foundations linked to financial institutions or others”, because according to him they are anticipating economic forecasts that are too premature and therefore necessarily inaccurate: I think it is very important to be cautious, to wait, shall we say, as long as necessary to understand the extent of the impact of the lockdown on the contraction and stagnation of our economic activity and, consequently, also on employment. Obviously, at the moment, all the forecasts from international, European and national organisations have an “in brackets”, because they do not know exactly what the scale of the economic and social challenge ahead of us is. (18th April) The Spanish Government will present its economic forecasts when they are due, when it submits them to Community authorities, in this case the European Union. It is clear, not only in Spain but in all countries, not to mention international organisations, that when they make their forecasts, they put forward ranges, in short, which also demonstrate the complexity and difficulty they have in forecasting the economic and social impact of this epidemic. Remember, for example, that the forecasts range from minus five points to minus ten points in Gross Domestic Product. In other words, we are talking about forecasts that are themselves estimated with ranges where the difference can be double. What is clear is that the economic and

160

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

social consequences of the pandemic are terrible, tremendous. In Europe and in the world. They will be. They will be. (25th April)

But proceeding in chronological order, from the outset Sánchez made it clear that public health would take precedence over other goods, such as economic interests. He certainly tried to balance the two aspects: This strategy set out by the World Health Organisation has been deployed in Spain in accordance with expert advice and has been implemented in various stages. At all times, efforts have been made to apply measures that are effective from a health point of view and that have the least possible impact on our social life and economic and business activity. This balance between, on the one hand, the effectiveness of social distancing measures on our health and, on the other, the preservation of economic activity and the protection of individual rights, for which our country has fought so hard, has, believe me, characterised the adoption of the measures taken by the Spanish Government in various stages. (21st March)

When explaining the reasons for the first lockdown, he explicitly states that Spain “adopted the most drastic and strictest measures, believe me, in Europe and in the world” (21st March), even if the price has been paid with the rights and freedoms of citizens. If compared to other European countries such as Italy, “Spain is at the forefront. Spain has taken very tough measures, which Spaniards are suffering first-hand, in their own homes” (22nd March). The same applies to the subsequent phase of easing the lockdown: And every step we take is a safe step. Because if we do not do so, if we choose to prioritise business over health, we will end up ruining both health and business. And I want to be very clear on this point: both in the de-escalation (easing of restrictions) and in this New Normality, all sectors will have the full, complete, and committed support of the Spanish Government. We must resume all economic activity as soon as possible, but with full attention to health. Restrictions should not be unnecessarily prolonged, nor should stages be skipped, putting health and, consequently, economic recovery at risk. (16th May)

As the pandemic represents a health crisis but also an economic crisis, the focus is on building a network of measures to support citizens, workers, and businesses in coping with the shock.

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

161

I would therefore like to send a message of confidence to all Spaniards, to all citizens, a message of unity, serenity and stability. But if you don’t mind, I am going to be even clearer, with a determination that is the utmost on the part of the Spanish Government. To combat this public health emergency, we will do whatever is necessary, wherever and whenever it is necessary. And together, let there be no doubt, we will overcome this crisis. (10th March) The Government’s commitment, and my personal commitment as President, is to bring everyone together so that the whole of Spanish society wins. Social and economic reconstruction is our only horizon, unity is our path and, let there be no doubt, leaving no one behind is our duty. (25th April).

The protection of public health is accompanied with the protection of workers and families. In his speech announcing the State of Emergency, Sánchez first described the economic measures put in place to support workers and businesses, and then turned his attention to lockdown provisions. These related to “a mobilisation of resources that is unprecedented in our democratic history” (21st March), resources for hospitals, for providing “a social and economic network that especially protects the most socially vulnerable groups in order to guarantee essential supplies such as electricity, water, communications, etc.”, “to guarantee housing, to guarantee a minimum income”, and to protect workers, self-employed categories, the social economy, and enterprises. In short, “we will do whatever it takes, whenever it takes, wherever it takes” (21st March). When the number of cases started to fall, the focus on protecting the economy rose accordingly: In this second stage, we must also embark on what you have heard me mention in other public appearances: the reconstruction, the relaunch of our economy and our productive system. […] But in this phase of reconstruction we will have to reactivate all our productive resources and protect the most vulnerable individuals and families so that Covid-19 does not add to the trail of civilian victims, to whom we will always pay honour and tribute, a legion of social victims. In this emergency, as I have said on many occasions, no one will be left behind. Rest assured. No one will be left behind. (4th April)

162

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

The relaunch of the economy and of the Welfare State would have to take place through “Recovery Plans”, which required the agreement and cooperation of all political and social forces, along the lines of the Moncloa Pacts that led to the transition from regime to democracy. On 23rd May, Sánchez announced the approval of a universal basic income, the Minimum Subsistence Income (Ingreso Mínimo Vital), a measure envisaged in the alliance pact with Unidas Podemos (United We Can) and in which the then Minister for Social Rights and the 2030 Agenda, Pablo Iglesias, was the main protagonist. Regarding the universal basic income, Sánchez explained that: The poverty rate in our country is the highest of the countries surrounding us and double the European Union average. As you know, before the emergence of this pandemic, the Government had already included the eradication of poverty in its plans; and the disaster, as I said before, caused by the Covid-19 crisis, has led us to speed up this measure. And that is why, last Friday, in an extraordinary Council of Ministers, we approved the Minimum Subsistence Income. [...] Also, as you know, this Government is committed to the 2030 Agenda, to the Sustainable Development Goals, whose first objective is to put an end to poverty in all its forms. [...] We will not allow more broken childhoods, more generations without a future or more families without hope. Our sons and daughters, wherever they are born, wherever they live, must have the same opportunities and the same rights without any risk of exclusion. It is simply a matter of doing what is right, of guaranteeing a dignified and healthy life for those who, even in the worst of times, such as the current health emergency, bring a smile to our faces and fill us with optimism. Neither the Spanish Government nor Spanish society are going to look the other way while our fellow citizens queue up to eat. Especially to feed our children. Since this Friday, as a result of the approval of the Minimum Subsistence Income, our country has gained in social justice, but above all, and this is what I would like to share with you, it has gained in decency. Relief for the most vulnerable will be a priority, and already is, in Economic and Social Reconstruction, but Reconstruction and Economic Recovery must go hand in hand. And the economic priorities will be aligned with those set by Europe. (31st May)

At the same time, the draft law on combating climate change was also presented, which has important consequences for the ecological transition of the entire productive fabric. Other labour reform measures covered aspects such as remote working, “flexibilization”, and the shortening of

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

163

the working day, all linked to the difficulty of reconciling work and family life at a time when schools were closed. As already mentioned, Sánchez sees the pandemic as an accelerator of his government’s political agenda. During a press conference in early August, following a meeting of the Council of Ministers, Sánchez took stock of the first eight months of his government and said he was satisfied with what had been done. More specifically, he judged that the most useful and urgent measure had been the approval of the universal basic income, obtained thanks to “a historic agreement of a progressive coalition government for the first time in the history of our democracy at state level, which would be complemented by various agreements with other political forces and social agents” (4th August): Spain had a transformation plan aimed at strengthening our capacities and possibilities in a global context of rapid change, as we are seeing. And the Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated the need and urgency for these changes [...]: digital transition, ecological transition, giving the policies we put in place a perspective of gender equality and never leaving anyone behind, and being a government that guarantees equality between Spaniards wherever they live, giving equal opportunities to the various regions. [...] We did so guided by a vision: to overcome our problems of social inequality and geographical cohesion by looking forward, pushing ourselves forward with the strength of feminism, digitalisation and ecological transition. (4th August)

The reconstruction and recovery from the pandemic are long-term transformation plans. In this sense, the pandemic has placed Spanish society at a historical crossroads, like 40 years ago when the options were between proceeding with a dictatorship or transforming into a democracy: As 2021 is about to begin, Spain is at a crucial point. It can opt for one of two paths: the path of fear or the path of hope. [...] What lies ahead is anything but easy and there will be those of course who will take advantage of this to discourage us, to instil pessimism and fear in all of society. Because if the problems we have were not enough, they will invent phantasmagorical, crazy conspiracies, imaginary problems, they will draw an apocalyptic picture of our country. But there is another path, and this is the path that the government wants to take, the one it is proposing to Spanish society. It is the path of hope, the path of confidence. No progress can be built on fear. All the collective progress we have achieved has been

164

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

based on trust and hope. With confidence we reconquered freedom and got rid of the dictatorship, after 40 years. With hope we joined Europe and therefore, I have confidence in our country, I have confidence in Spain, I have confidence in the ability of Spaniards to overcome adversity. And mine is not blind confidence, it is based on facts, because our entire history over the last half century is a history of overcoming and progressing. It is a story of confidence, of hope. (29th December)

Predictably, the decision to declare a State of Emergency was heavily criticised. Sánchez defended this decision by stating that his “only ideology is to save lives”, dismissing these criticisms as an excuse: Therefore, there is no plan B. Plan B is plan A. Plan A is the State of Emergency. Because that is what is happening in other European countries, because it is an effective instrument and because it protects many groups. And therefore, as you will understand, the Spanish Government’s only ideology […] is to save lives, to defend public health and to boost economic activity in this new normality. (2nd May)

In another passage, Sánchez clearly stated his position on the possibility of “politicising the pandemic”: We have never wanted to politicise this health emergency. We have never done so [...]. I think it is important to be aware that we need to focus our energies, our objective on stopping the common enemy we have, which is Covid-19, regardless of the ideology we each have, regardless of the political plan we have for our country. Therefore our priority, our ideology, as I have said on many occasions, is to save lives and defend the public health of citizens. [...] Therefore, I believe that what is important is that all the parliamentary groups are aware, beyond the fact that we can better calibrate the co-governance in the de-escalation [of Covid restrictions], we have to be aware that the state of emergency in this de-escalation process is crucial, it is a priority. And secondly, that the state of emergency is not a political plan, it is a necessity in order to be able to deal with a pandemic and it is also a legal measure that is being used by many other governments in our immediate environment, which is Europe. (9th May)

During the second State of Emergency, Sánchez was accused again of abuse of power by the right-wing opposition. More specifically, Vox (unsuccessfully) presented a motion of no-confidence on 21st and 22nd

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

165

October, a few days before the official declaration of the State of Emergency. When asked to respond to this allegation, he answered: President: I often find the public debate so surprising. Here we are talking about supposed Soviet-Bolivarian dictatorships... Q: Social-communist government. President: Social-communist government, I don’t know what regime they are going to bring... I have been governing our country for almost 1,000 days. Spain has not broken up, there is no dictatorship, the Bolsheviks have not come. Of course, there is not going to be a Francoist dictatorship either, as some people are claiming. I believe that we need to focus on the real issues, which are the ones you mentioned, unemployment, inequality, young people, the high cost of housing. All these issues are the ones we want to respond to. And we are responding in these General State Budgets, which have the largest social investment in democratic history. (9th December)

The concept that the pandemic does not recognise political ideologies or colours is repeated several times, as an invitation to representatives in Parliament and in the Autonomous Communities to put aside polemics that are only instrumental in the acquisition of media visibility: The waiting room of a hospital does not understand ways of thinking, colours, ideology or gender. The virus affects people without asking where they are born, where they live or what they think. This problem affects us all as a country and as a country, in unity and in full coordination and cooperation, we are facing it. Because these days, the example of coordination of the public authorities of all ideological colours, the lesson in effort and professionalism of the healthcare workers, and the impeccable behaviour of all Spanish citizens, united around the common interest, the general interest, show once again that Spain is a country capable of facing the most difficult challenges with unity and with guaranteed success. (10th March) There are no political colours, no ideologies, no regions. Our citizens come first. Let us learn from the 40 years of our Constitution. At times, we are 17 autonomous regions, but at other times, as so often in the history of Spain, we must be the great country that we are. We are going to give a joint response reflecting the autonomous state that we are, with the

166

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

Spanish Government leading all the local governments to give a common response. […] That is why, I insist, coordinating and listening to each other is not an option, it is an obligation. The unity of action of all public administrations is an essential condition for us to emerge victorious from this health emergency. (14th March)

In this way, politics is again judged as something potentially harmful, if it is allowed to be overwhelmed by ideological confrontation. On the contrary, when “public representatives” or “political representatives” abandon ideologies, then they can devote themselves to the coordination and collaboration that are necessary to address and solve the real problems of the Spanish people. In reality, the need to avoid politicising the pandemic has determined a sort of “suspension of politics”: In short, I believe that unity does not mean uniformity, unity does not mean uniformity. I believe that when we talk about reconstruction and a call for unity, we are talking about the need for all political families to join forces so that, in the end, the great family that is Spanish society can move forward. This is the effort that all political groups have to make, all political families, in legitimate representation of the will expressed by the Spanish people, and put aside all our partisan interests, issues that may be important from the point of view of political groups but which are not essential, fundamental for what lies ahead, which is the social and economic reconstruction of our country. (18th April)

And the same happens in the whole world: The virus, as we have said on many occasions, and as we know first-hand, does not respect borders, nor does it distinguish between governments of one political colour or another. Conservatives and progressives worldwide and also in our country, from different regions: we are all finding ourselves, sooner or later, faced with the same realities and the same shortages. We are all trying to equip ourselves with the same resources: masks, gloves, respirators, gowns. And if we are all doing it, all the governments of the world are doing it, it is because none of us had in mind the magnitude of the challenge we were facing and, no doubt, the magnitude of the amount of resources we needed to face it. (28th March)

8

8.3

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

167

The Relationship with Politics

As explained in the previous paragraphs, Sánchez emphasises his commitment to a decision-making process that is open to dialogue with all stakeholders, in the spirit of humility, transparency, collaboration, and accountability. On 5th January, when I addressed Parliament, I made a commitment to citizens to lead a government that I described then as active, executive and resolute. Today I would like to reaffirm this commitment to make Spain an example of open government, as defined by the OECD: a government with a culture of governance based on the principles of transparency, integrity, accountability, and stakeholder participation. Because the trust to which we all aspire is not a free gift: it is the fruit harvested by the clarity of intentions, the willingness to scrutinise, the truthfulness of actions and the fulfilment of promises, electoral commitments and parliamentary commitments. (4th August)

On several occasions, Sánchez lists all the steps leading up to the final measure along with the meetings held with political forces. He points out how many press conferences, meetings, and parliamentary scrutiny sessions he has held: Following the line I mentioned before of information transparency, because I think it is very important that the media, who are doing an extraordinary job, reliably pass on information to the public, a total of 34 press conferences have been held: 34 press conferences. The Minister of Health has given 14 press conferences. He has appeared in committee in the Congress of Deputies and will do so again this week. And the Ministry of Health’s director of the Health Alerts and Emergencies Coordination Centre (CAES), Dr Simón, has given 20 press conferences. And 30 interviews have been given to the media to ensure that the information is clear, exhaustive, and timely. So, transparency of information. I believe it has been the most extensive ever carried out in a similar situation in our country. (10th March)

From the very first signs of the pandemic, Sánchez planned weekly meetings with ministers and health officials in the Autonomous Communities, for coordination, collaboration, and communication: “The principles that will be guiding our action in this crisis over the coming weeks with all the

168

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

regional Presidents are threefold: coordination, cooperation, and collaboration. In short, unity” (14th March). These meetings are called “State meetings” (22nd March) because they are an indication that the executive management of the pandemic is fully coordinated. Also the fact that we have held twice-weekly meetings between the Councillors for Health and the Ministry of Health, that every Sunday there are Conferences of Presidents and regional Presidents, when throughout the history of our democracy in these forty-odd years of democracy, there have only been a handful of Conferences of Presidents and now we are holding them on a weekly basis. I believe that this shows that there is a will that transcends the ideological orientation of one government or another, which is to work together, first and foremost to tackle this health emergency and secondly, obviously, the task of reconstruction that lies ahead of us. (18th April)

And from the beginning of May, a co-governance arrangement began: the Autonomous Communities were entrusted with complete management of the pandemic, given their responsibility for health matters, based on a set of indicators identified by the experts. Since the State of Emergency was declared on 14th March, a Conference of Presidents has been held every week. And I would like to remind you that this is the highest number of conferences held in the history of our recent democracy. To give you an idea, during the last 40 years of democracy there have only been six Conferences of Presidents and during these three months there have been 13 Conferences of regional Presidents which, obviously, have not been a walk in the park, there have certainly been tensions, but that is not important as long as the differences are presented with respect and that is something I would like to highlight because this has been the case over the last three months. (7th June)

Coordination and cooperation also extended to the social partners (trade unions and trade associations): indeed, civil society was asked to act in the spirit of the Moncloa Pacts (4th April), when all the different parts of Spanish society and all the political parties had worked together to stabilise the economy during the democratic transition process: That is why, a few days ago, I proposed, as other political forces have done, the Pacts for Social and Economic Reconstruction of the country. These are pacts that should bring together the political forces’ criteria to

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

169

set the broad outlines of the country’s social and economic reconstruction for the coming years. But they should also take the form of a collaboration agreement with other institutions such as the Autonomous Communities (CCAA), the Provincial Councils, Town Councils and the Island Councils. And that they should be extended to an agreement with the social agents, that is to say, with employers and trade unions. Consequently, there is only one way forward. And that path is consensus, dialogue, and unity. Let us give the best of ourselves as representatives of society. The time has come to agree. Spain, as we know very well, is diverse and pluralist. [...] Union is the form, without a doubt, in Democracy; it is the substance and it can be summed up in one word that must unite us all: Reconstruction. (18th April)

This process of continuous collaboration and dialogue entails difficulties and effort, but “this is my way of understanding politics”: We had to coordinate and respond to all the public administrations in one of the most decentralised states in the world; and at the same time, we had to be accountable to Parliament and to the media, as it has to be in a democracy such as ours. We have tried, as a government, to deal with all these issues, to do so despite the difficulty of the activity and the intensity with which we have been living, just as you have, these long weeks of a State of Emergency. We have tried to follow three rules: Firstly, not to polemicise with anyone; secondly, to seek unity; and thirdly, to listen, to listen to every group, to every institution, and to social agents. Contagions cannot be avoided with polemics; the virus cannot be beaten by division; no sick person can be cured by insults. That is my way of understanding politics. And this is why the Government does not and will not engage in polemics with other administrations. And this is why the Government agreed to adapt the format of the Economic and Social Reconstruction Pact that we proposed in order to achieve the unanimity of all the parliamentary groups. And this is why it also took on board the legitimate demands of some regional governments regarding large-scale industry, which was finally considered to be one of the essential services. And this is why the Government also took into account the demands of self-employed workers’ groups and they can now combine the severance benefit with another type of benefit. And this is why the Government responded to the demands of the rural areas and this is why it will be possible to tend private vegetable gardens as of this Saturday. And we listened to the demands of the press associations and modified the format of the press conferences with

170

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

the greatest display of communication and transparency in democracy. (2nd May)

Obviously, the relationship with politics mirrors that of the general concept of ideology. Indeed, as circumstances change, politics can be positive and useful for citizens or extremely harmful and linked to partisan interests. When Sánchez declared the State of Emergency, he thanked the political forces for their support and sense of responsibility: As I said before, I hope I can count on the support of all the political forces. I appeal to your sense of responsibility and I believe that if anything has been demonstrated this week it is that politics, when it collaborates, when it cooperates, when it engages in dialogue, is very capable and very effective in achieving the common objectives we are setting ourselves. (22nd March) Let us not lose focus, nor sight of the objective we have before us. And I understand the parliamentary debate. I accept it and I go every fortnight to submit to the scrutiny and support or non-support of the legislative branch of the Spanish Government, which can legitimately decide what it wants. But I think it is important to be aware of the challenge ahead of us, and it obviously calls for responsibility, and I trust in this responsibility on the part of the parliamentary groups. (2nd May)

The spirit of dialogue and cooperation is emphasised several times as a willingness to listen to and welcome the contribution of anyone, regardless of their party or position: Our objective is, obviously, to contain the spread of the virus and for this reason what we do is to refer to the decisions put forward to us by the experts. What I have done, and what I’m going to do systematically, is to talk to all the leaders of the political parties, to each and every one of the leaders; I’m not going to apply any kind of exclusion. Maximum transparency, both to the public and to the leaders of the different political parties. We will inform them of all the measures that we implement and I must also tell them that we will be grateful for all the measures that they themselves, as the opposition, propose to us so that we can incorporate them into the packages and the emergency plans that we will be implementing over the coming weeks. Have no doubt, Víctor, all the contributions that the opposition can give us from a constructive point of view, if they are feasible, if they are achievable, we will take them on board

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

171

as our own. Because I understand that if this is something we ask of the opposition, we also have to apply it to ourselves. In other words, we are not so much concerned about who is proposing these measures as whether they are actually measures that will contribute to managing the disease and to alleviating the economic effects that they may have on the country as a whole. (10th March)

Politics is not only about the relationship between the executive (the government) and the legislature (the parliament), but also between central government and the autonomous regional governments, which in many cases are led by leaders belonging to parties other than that of Sánchez. In this respect, ideological differences are added to regional differences; their importance diminishes in view of the virus. In fact, it is politics itself that must take a step backwards: the personal interests of individual leaders or representatives, the struggles for power, and media visibility no longer count for anything: This is not about regions, ideologies, or parties, as important as all this is, it is about beating the virus. Here we representatives are not competing for our image, nor our reputation, nor any headlines in the local or international media. This battle is about something much more important, which is saving lives. (22nd March)

As well as calling for unity, dialogue, and cooperation beyond all controversies, in several speeches Sánchez declares his intention to take the first step and lead by example, personally and “with his heart”. The opportunity to demonstrate this willingness of mind and commitment in practice came in September, when the Autonomous Community of Madrid was facing an exponential increase in cases. According to the new provisions based on the principle of co-governance, it was up to the Autonomous Communities to declare the State of Emergency and to establish containment measures; the State, on the other hand, was responsible for supporting the Communities with every possible resource and for ensuring compliance with the general criteria laid down by the Scientific Committee. The Community of Madrid, led by Isabel Díaz Ayuso, of the Popular Party, was the first to experience this system of pandemic management. Contrary to protocol and customs, it was the President of the Government who went to the President of an Autonomous Community to decide together on the measures to be taken, and not vice versa. It was a gesture of the highest symbolic value, especially in a country marked

172

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

by independence movements and terrorism. The intention, in fact, was to put aside the struggle between parties: It was a proposal that I made to the president of the Community of Madrid. I think it was to convey a message that if there is a problem in a region, the Prime Minister also wants to convey that message of proximity, empathy and total collaboration, in this case with the regional government. There will be people who think that, in short, with all the things that have been said by some autonomous governments to the Spanish Government, we have to use another dialectic, but I think that we really have to separate the partisan struggle from the fight against the virus. This is a common enemy. There are not, there are no people who are left or right, who are contagious or not contagious depending on ideology or where they live. We are talking about a common enemy. We must banish the partisan struggle, we must pitch in, and that is what I am going to do. Next Monday I will go to Puerta del Sol (the City Hall) just to help, just to help. [...] I will go to the Community of Madrid, to the Puerta del Sol, to help, to stand alongside the president of the Community of Madrid. I’m not going to replace anyone. I’m not going to judge anyone. I’m not going to assess anyone. (19th September)

Then it is not about humiliation but about humility and spirit of service: For this important meeting to take place, such an important meeting, so necessary for all of Madrid’s citizens, and to take place in the way it did, and for it to have been a fruitful meeting and a constructive and positive meeting. [...] And as I said before, I have told the President of the Community of Madrid that the presence of the Spanish Government in this Royal House of the Post Office [home to the President of the Community of Madrid’s office] reflects the Government’s will to help, collaborate and support. Not to assess, not to judge, not to evaluate; but to support, collaborate and help in everything that is in the hands of the State, in this case the Spanish Government, that is in our power to guarantee the public health of Madrid’s inhabitants. I am here, in short, to bring to the people of Madrid the assistance, support and help of all Spain’s citizens. (21st September)

The harmony between opposing parties did not last long. In fact, as early as April, Sánchez felt the need to rebuke “politics” for the excessive politicisation of the pandemic. Though long, the following excerpt is illustrative of the situation:

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

173

What must be immediate, if you will allow me to use a simile, is the de-escalation of political tension. The destructive power of the virus does not distinguish between regions or political colours. It does not choose cities, nor does it choose countries by the political colour of their government. We are engaged in an all-out war that concerns us all. And the response must therefore be a common, united one. At national, European, and global level. [...] That is the lesson of Spanish unity. And that must be the example from which all politicians must learn. We must now begin to de-escalate political tension; we must leave behind the vulgarities, the aggressive language. From all of us. And I, as President of the Government, am committed to working on the front line to achieve this; as President, that is my responsibility and that is what I’m taking on. Every day our fellow citizens are watching their televisions, attentive to the data and the all-important report that brings us the figures for deaths and contagions, but also the figures for those recovered. And every day they are moved as they witness the formidable image of unity in the hospitals, in the factories, on the balconies of our streets, cities, towns and villages, and also in our homes. And suddenly, that example is tainted, giving way to the spectacle of politicians bickering. The de-escalation of political tension must begin now, as soon as possible. And it must give way to unity, dialogue, consensus, and agreement. This will be my total commitment and I will devote myself to it. As long as this emergency persists, no word will leave my lips but Unity; not a reproach, not a criticism, not a rebuff. Unity and gratitude to all the political forces that have already expressed their willingness to support this Great Agreement for social and economic reconstruction. [...] Therefore, I say it publicly: my proposal is heartfelt and sincere. The opposition (everyone without exception) must be part of the economic and social reconstruction. Just as other political forces that represent the plurality of our country must participate in a leading role. (12th April)

Appealing for a sense of responsibility and willingness to proceed united against the virus did not, of course, mean that there should be no political debate: what should be left outside the parliament and the public sphere were “hatred, hoaxes and divisions”, which are “allies of the virus” (25th April). More specifically, the Popular Party and the extreme rightwing Vox party were accused of obstructionism in a specious as well as an outrageous manner, contrary to scientists’ recommendations. They represent part of the “‘no’camp”, to which Sánchez launches “a cry in the wilderness” appealing for unity and respect:

174

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

And undoubtedly, then, [we need] to put aside all those messages of hatred, of anger that only divide, when what we really want and need in order to save lives, businesses, and jobs is the unity of all [...] I think we have to do it with an enormous dose of generosity because we are talking about the responsibility that each and every one of us has as political organisations, as governments, as institutions, to provide them with the tool that guarantees exactly that. And if I have one regret, it is precisely that the main opposition party is in the ‘no’ camp, in the “no”s of Spain. And indeed, the protests that have been called by the extreme right today, well, I have little to say. This is a constitutional right. We live in a social and democratic state governed by the rule of law. They are, of course, free to mobilise as they see fit. What I do ask, obviously, is that all those criteria, rules, and decisions taken by the health authorities, which they have told us we have to keep to guarantee public health and avoid the contagion of any citizens, are observed. And so, as I said before, although it is a cry in the wilderness for some of these political leaders, the Spanish Government and me personally, what we are going to cry out for is harmony, coexistence, respect, tolerance and not hatred and anger. (23rd May) There are others, such as Vox or, in this case, the Popular Party, who have already announced that they are going to vote against, and they do not yet know the proposal... but well, that is their political position; so, obviously, we will also negotiate the de-escalation (easing of restrictions) period. But what I do insist is that this de-escalation period for the Spanish Government, whether it is four weeks, six weeks, five weeks, or three weeks, I insist, is not a political decision. It is not a political whim. It is not a purely political decision. It is a decision based on science, on the criteria of the experts, who have told us that for each phase we need 14 days, because it is in that incubation period that we can assess what effects the relief measures we are taking are having. (16th May)

By the end of May, when the curve of cases was slowing, the Popular Party pushed for an immediate reopening; Sánchez, on the other hand, following the advice of experts, asked the Parliament for a further extension of the State of Emergency for another 2 weeks, in order to have the power to prevent meetings and gatherings. This dissent led the Popular Party to vote no, and Sánchez to have to explain to citizens why there were no clear indications of the restrictions in place: What was the unusual episode that occurred last Wednesday? That the second party in terms of seats in Congress, that is, the Popular Party with

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

175

89 seats, voted no and therefore put at risk the possibility of a new extension of the State of Emergency in the Congress of Deputies by voting against it, and that means that the Popular Party’s “no” vote opens the door to the Spanish Government’s dialogue with various parliamentary groups, it opens the door to debates that have nothing to do with the health emergency and nothing to do with public health. They have to do with commitments for the legislature, with investment commitments or with approaches to funding, approval or repeal of laws, etc., nothing to do with the health emergency. Instead of voting “no”, all of this could have been avoided, either by abstaining or, as is obvious for a governing party which governs in Autonomous Communities clearly affected by Covid-19, by voting in favour, but unfortunately this was not the case. (23rd May)

Traditionally, within a bipolar system that has lasted 40 years, the Popular Party (PP) is the historical rival of the PSOE. Sánchez reminded the country of this rivalry, describing the PP as an obstructionist party by nature: What this progressive coalition government is seeing is the same as that experienced by socialist administrations before: President Zapatero’s government blocked the renewal of the General Council of the Judiciary for an entire legislature, and when Felipe González was president, he was also ruthlessly opposed by Mariano Rajoy’s government. Besides this being the PP’s natural way of exercising opposition, the context is unprecedented. (1st September)

Faced with this kind of opposition, Sánchez shifted the focus from himself to that of all citizens, “who are looking to politics to instil stability, trust and tranquillity” and are instead forced to witness this spectacle (1st September). Whether you vote for pro-independence parties, parties of recentralisation, parties of the left, parties of the right, nationalist parties, in short, parties of all colours, right now there is a Spanish people that demands and yearns for unity on the part of all the political forces. And in this sense, I believe that this legislature will also need to articulate across-the-board agreements. (14th June) What is useful is to join forces, purposes; what is effective, what makes sense in these critical times, is to cooperate. [...] However, for a long time now, the feeling of public opinion, of our citizens in general, has

176

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

been that this does not happen in politics. And it makes no sense that we should be able to coexist in all areas of life except for in the field of politics, where this understanding is not exactly what is exuded. We cannot accept that it is natural and inevitable for politics to become a source of confrontation, provocation, and hatred. Parliament is set up in a semicircle precisely in order to speak. To speak clearly, even harshly. But also for dialogue. It is not just an arena for fighting, it is not just an arena for insults or provocation or mere confrontation. It is not a question of relinquishing our own ideas or of passionately defending them, nor is it about anyone being asked to act or defend ideas or interests that go against their own values and convictions. The only thing we must relinquish is disrespect, insult, harassment, threats, and provocation. It is a matter of remembering that beyond the legitimate differences that separate us, we are united by a will to live together. (20th June)

In the face of this demanding political public, the opposition leader Pablo Casado appears to be a remnant of the past who has not yet adjusted to the “new direction”: Mr. Casado is very accustomed to hyperbole in politics, whether in his insults, his appraisals or his statements. I said at the beginning, in September, in this new political direction, that we had to eliminate the fight against the epidemic from the partisan struggle. Secondly, that we had to turn the page, to create a new political climate, because I believe that our citizens deserve it, they want it from their politicians. (19th September)

This “new direction” concerns the reconversion of politics into a “positive force” according to the mythical model of the Moncloa Pacts: Even before the pandemic we knew what walls were for: to divide, to segregate, to confront, to separate. With the pandemic we have seen the rise of other walls: those of fear, deception, and hatred. Walls are not the solution. There is another option: [...] We can use the storm we have experienced and turn it into a positive force. A force for transformation. (14th June)

But Sánchez’s appeals seem to fall on deaf ears. He clearly expresses concern that this kind of power play by “traditional parties” (i.e. the Popular Party) only reinforces anti-politics and in particular the extreme right:

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

177

There has been concern about the partisan use that is being made of the pandemic. And this is what I would like to say again, getting back to Spain, at least to remind the traditional political parties that those traditional political parties that use the pandemic to divide, confront and polarise, the only thing they are doing is promoting anti-politics, and anti-politics is precisely what benefits the extreme right. (2nd October)

8.4

The Relationship with Europe

In addition to seeking collaboration and unity with political forces and with the Autonomous Communities, as regards Europe Sánchez embarked on the same path as Conte and Macron. Since the pandemic is a global health emergency, “a coordinated and multilateral response is required” (10th March). Since the beginning of the pandemic, Sánchez has supported the need for a European response from the point of view of emergency management but also of planning economic policies to support the recovery. Indeed, it is in this context that he has repeatedly referred to a new Marshall Plan (for instance on 22nd and 28th March, and 4th and 12th April); besides a plan of public investment, Sánchez also asked Europe to create “a European unemployment fund that is complementary to national ones” (22nd March). And in that sense, I believe that Europe can do, should do, and we are going to demand that it do, much more at this critical moment for all Europe’s citizens […] It is a symmetrical crisis that affects the whole of the EU and therefore it cannot just find a national response. We need to identify and articulate a European response. […] In short, what we are asking the EU for is the same thing that we are asking of ourselves: coordination and secondly, the greatest mobilisation of economic and material resources in history. (22nd March)

Sánchez knows that what he is proposing may run counter to what Europe has done so far. In fact, even if he often compares the Covid19 crisis to that of the 2008 financial crisis, there is a difference: in 2008 it was an asymmetric crisis because there were countries that were hit harder (and here Sánchez speaks explicitly of Southern Europe, with Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Italy) and countries that came out of it better. As a consequence of that crisis, the unemployment rate in Spain was described as “unacceptable”. But the current crisis is symmetrical and

178

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

has hit every country; and it requires a single response (28th March). What is at stake is not only the stability of the European economy, but its relationship with society, with its citizens: I think it is very important that European governments, especially European institutions, are aware that we have to have that sensitivity and that empathy towards society. […] However, I insist, it is very important that the response is not solely national. Europe is much more, it is much more than sharing a single market. Europe is also a philosophy, it is the basic, elementary principles of human rights and of the protection of progress, and in that sense I believe that Europe has to give its all during the coming months. And I believe that even in this misfortune there is a great opportunity to legitimise the European plan. As a European government, because our country is a very pro-European country, we are a pro-European government, of course we are going to work in that direction. (22nd March)

The pro-European commitment is affirmed on many occasions. In a certain sense, the more Sánchez talks about the difficulties of negotiations with other European countries, the more he underlines his deep attachment to the plan of a more united and integrated Europe. Sánchez highlighted his commitment and the commitment of all Spaniards towards this plan to ask for something in return, an equal commitment to support the plan of a fairer society, in Spain as in all of Europe: Of course, we Spaniards have protected Europe, we have done it every time we have gone to vote, every time we have expressed ourselves in favour of the strengthening or weakening of Europe, we have always been committed to the strengthening of our common plan, and now it is up to Europe, the European Union, to protect all European citizens, the weakest, and particularly those countries that are unfortunately now suffering the greatest consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic, such as Spain. (28th March)

The agreement on a guarantee fund for all the member states, without conditionality, would be a step of historical importance, comparable to the creation of the single currency, the single market, the 1957 treaties, and Spain’s entry in the European Community (8th July). The problem is that the party of Eurosceptics has also grown in Spain, and Sánchez knows this well: “Europe must not allow the wolves of anti-European

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

179

populism to seize the opportunity of the crisis to spread their message of hate” (18th April) and “You know that we are living in times in which the consensus of the multilateral system is unfortunately being questioned by a reactionary populism” (22nd November). Therefore, on the one hand, populism is associated with Euroscepticism and anti-Europeanism; on the other hand, pro-Europeanism rejects hatred in favour of social justice and peace, just as the Black Lives Matter movement on the other side of the Atlantic does. Sánchez quotes that movement’s claim: “No Justice, No Peace”: We Europeans learned for example from the 2008 crisis that a lack of solidarity only brings more suffering to everyone; that is why we have now been able to implement solutions that seemed unimaginable a decade ago, that we were not able to achieve. […] It is the reminder that VIRUS is a term that comes from Latin and originally meant poison. The poison of hatred is the most harmful poison because it destroys communities. We are seeing it in some places, notably in an allied and powerful nation like the United States: without justice there is no peace. Nothing can be built on hatred. (7th June)

Europe’s mistakes during the 2008 crisis are still alive in the memory of the Spaniards and still influence political and electoral processes. The pandemic therefore comes at a time when Spain is displaying ambivalent feelings towards Europe, and this time the EU response may represent a decisive element in taking the path of Euroscepticism and sovereignty or continuing to nurture pro-Europeanism. In his own words, “Europe is risking it all” and “this time Europe cannot fail, it must not fail”, because “this is the time of greatest difficulty since its creation and the European Union must rise to the occasion and cannot disappoint its citizens”. Because “even the most pro-European countries and governments, such as Spain, need proof of real commitment on the part of the European Union. We need to verify that Europe will listen and that Europe will act. We need forcefulness and we need solidarity” (28th March). Together with Conte and Macron, Sánchez participated in European negotiations, proposing the establishment of funds without conditionality for post-pandemic reconstruction. Initially, he aimed to fund reconstruction and recovery with Eurobonds: But make no mistake, the Spanish Government will work, it will defend and never relinquish Eurobonds, because that is solidarity, that is Europe

180

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

and of course the determination of the Spanish Government in this is total and absolute. (4th April)

And he finds his closest ally in Italy, a “natural partner” (8th July): [I want] to convey on behalf of the Spanish government and the whole of Spanish society our solidarity, our spirit of brotherhood with a society such as Italy’s, which we feel such an affinity to in cultural, historical, and geographical terms and now also from a social and emotional perspective because of the forcefulness of the pandemic in our societies, our countries, Spain and Italy. Of course, I’d like to add that communication and cooperation with Mr. Conte’s government is total, it is full, as regards our common ground, not only the health emergency but also what Europe should be in the short and medium term. Of course, I believe that if something is bringing to a crossroads the common plan we have shared and that we have been building for decades, it is obviously this pandemic. Therefore, governments such as those of Italy and Spain are working so that this process of integration, this common solidarity of response by Community institutions is total. (18th April)

The announcement of the Recovery Plan came after days of intense negotiations, in which Spain and Italy met with opposition from some countries (and in particular from the Prime Minister of Holland, Mark Rutte). During that time, Sánchez shared his reflections on the future of Europe: The problem is that we have to measure what solidarity means in Europe. [...] what is challenged and what citizens are questioning is this solidarity and how we measure and implement it, how we bring it to fruition in practice. There are countries that, indeed, what they say is, yes, solidarity, but through loans. And, indeed, with some conditions attached. Well, right now what we the Spanish Government are doing, to put our case, but I have no doubt that many other governments are doing the same, is that we are increasing public spending, we are getting into debt, precisely because what we want to do is save lives. Here there is no moral risk, here there is a collective objective of an entire society and all its institutions to save lives. […] Like all of us, we are a government that wants to comply with our fiscal obligations, that wants to have a public system, a sustainable welfare state. A sustainable public pension system, but we are at war. And in a war, what conditions will be attached to that solidarity? (25th April)

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

181

The negotiation game was played on several levels, and Sánchez asked the opposition to do its part: For this reason, I would like to publicly ask all Spanish parties to actively support the European Commission’s Proposal within their respective political families, so that it can be approved by the European Council and can be implemented as soon as possible. Besides being fair, it is essential for our recovery. If Spain wins, we all win: workers, the self-employed, large and small enterprises, the social economy. If Spain loses, it is not just the Spanish Government that loses, we all lose. No one can dream of gaining an advantage by damaging the interests of Spain and all its citizens. So I am asking for responsibility, I am asking for integrity and I am asking above all, above all, for patriotism. (14th June)

Finally, agreement was reached, and Europe had shown its leadership. Today, make no mistake, one of the most remarkable pages in the history of the European Union has been written and, as the convinced proEuropeanist that I am, allow me to convey to you my deep emotion for the moment that we are experiencing. [...] We are building on the momentum to place Europe where it deserves, which is at the forefront of the digital transition, of the ecological transition, without leaving anyone behind and without leaving any region behind either. In short, it is an exercise in leadership and inclusion that has been carried out by the European Council and the European institutions throughout these months and which has come to a climax today. This is the challenge to which all Europeans are called: a European leadership that, I would also like to stress, is more necessary in today’s world than ever. (21st July)

8.5

The Relationship with Science

Since the start of the pandemic, Sánchez has outlined the criteria that guide his government’s actions, and the most important is that of following science: The Government, at all times, and since the beginning of the crisis, a few weeks ago, has been guided by four criteria for action: The first is that all political decisions must be based on scientific evidence, and on the evaluation of the experts. […] As has been said here by other participants,

182

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

faced with a public health problem, what all public powers have to do is be at the service of experts and science. (9th March)

It is clear from the beginning that in the context of the pandemic, political representatives “must give the direction to the experts. Faced with this problem, there can be no opinions or colours: what counts is science and knowledge” (10th March). This means that, of course, every decision (on closures and reopening) is made in accordance with scientists’ recommendations. However, this does not exempt political leaders from the responsibilities associated with their role: We have to adhere to all the recommendations made by scientific experts. Obviously, we take on political responsibilities because we are political leaders […] Those are the responsibility of politicians, governments, that is, we take them on personally, but the confidence I would like to convey to public opinion is that we always decide all measures with the support of science and that we try to make them proportionate. (10th March)

He makes it very clear that the relationship between politics and science is not a question of strength but of roles and competences. Scientists indicate the criteria with which to assess the value of decisions, but it is the politicians who make those decisions and take responsibility for them: The political decision is made by me, the sole command, the delegated authorities, but we make them based on the scientific criteria of experts and not on political criteria, not on criteria of a different nature, but on scientific criteria. And, clearly, when they told me that these kinds of measures had to be carried out, I implemented them despite the criticisms that could be made about me, as they did, and now the scientific committee and the experts who advise the Government are saying that with this dynamic we will indeed soon defeat the virus. (12th April)

More precisely, the role of the political leader is to introduce another element into the equation between science and decision-making: what Sánchez calls “social empathy”, which perhaps follows the concept of “sentimental connection” described by Antonio Gramsci: In short, that uncertainty in decision-making or in knowledge on the part of science is obviously transferred to public decision-making and political decisions. And by this I am not trying to cover up, I accept

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

183

every responsibility because I am also convinced of what I am doing and that determination for which I previously appealed to the citizens applies firstly to me. We have to be determined and to listen. And therefore, the two fundamental elements in the transition strategy when we are already thinking about the light at the end of the tunnel are: first, an extraordinary prudence based on the criteria established by scientists, experts, […] and second, social empathy. We are a government, no one in my position aspires to confine 47 million people simply because there is no other alternative. I believe that we can reconcile both demands, always with the knowledge of science, of the experts, with that necessary social empathy, in reality with a huge number of cases in households and with the need to begin to regain a certain economic and work normality in our country. (4th April)

Another ingredient which comes from politics, of course, is the rule of law. From a merely procedural point of view, Sánchez is very transparent about the process of decision-making, one that involves the local governments. What we are doing is proposing a bilateral approach with each and every one of the regions, with each and every one of the autonomous governments. […] It is the public health services of the Autonomous Communities that put forward proposals to the CAES (Health Alerts and Emergencies Coordination Centre) and to the Public Health Service of the Ministry of Health, regarding which regions, in their opinion based on the evaluation of the markers, can move on to a further phase. […] It is a regulated procedure, it is an absolutely transparent procedure, it is a procedure in which it is the civil servants, always under the premise of scientific criteria, who effectively submit the proposal to be approved at the political level by the Minister of Health; it is then published through ministerial orders. (9th May)

It is always on the advice of the scientists that he presents himself to the country declaring again a national State of Emergency on 25th October 2020, a few days after surviving a motion of no confidence presented by the Vox parliamentarians. On that occasion, the duty of the leader was to be transparent about the seriousness of the situation: From an epidemiological point of view, experts say the reasons for its approval are fully justified. In my appearance last Friday I stressed precisely that the Executive will never hide the real situation of the pandemic from

184

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

the Spanish. The obligation of public officials is to speak clearly and not hide the situation; to convey the reality is the way we understand it, it shows respect for citizens. And the reality is that Europe and Spain are fully immersed in the second wave of the pandemic. (25th October)

The duration (6 months) of this State of Emergency was also recommended by scientific experts. Sánchez acknowledged that science did not have all the answers at that time, and he explained that it would take time to understand how to stop the spread of the virus and develop a cure. I want to be very clear on this point. I want to be very clear on this point: we must be very careful because we do not have an infallible manual. There is no clear roadmap. We are facing something unknown. There is no country in the world that has completed a de-escalation process towards that new reality, that new normal we’ll experience when we have the epidemic under control. There are, of course, partial experiences, and they also come from countries with different cultures and political and social systems that make it difficult to transfer their lessons. (25th April) It is true that we cannot close any door because obviously the virus is an unknown agent also for science in terms of its behaviour. [...] The objective of the Spanish Government, believe me, is to base ourselves on science, on experts. It is what we have done all this time. And to save lives and defend the public health of all citizens. (19th September)

At the same time, Science (with a capital S) represents a value in his worldview: Now we can already draw lessons from this unprecedented emergency. The first thing I would like to share with you is without a doubt that we can never again allow our National Health System to be weakened: it is our safest trench. And the second important lesson that I would like to share with you is the contribution of Science, we must never relegate research and Science again. Science is impetus, it is progress, and our researchers are a source of pride for the whole country. (31st May) I think that in this crisis, on many occasions we forget an explosive element that is the contribution of science. The tireless work that scientists and researchers have been doing worldwide but also in our country. I want to pay tribute and obviously give recognition to the Spanish scientists and researchers who, in short, are doing everything they can to achieve this

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

185

vaccine as soon as possible. Anyway, I think this is very important, not to forget this aspect of science, of research, because we hope it can soon bring us positive surprises. (14th June)

The leader uses words of esteem and gratitude towards Dr Simón, the government’s chief scientific advisor, who, he recalls, was appointed by his predecessor and political opponent. The qualities that he recognises in the doctors and all the scientific experts do not only concern competence but also the spirit of service towards the community and the public good: I believe that we are currently being advised by experts of extraordinary quality, both from a scientific point of view, and from that of their commitment to public service, and as I have done on some other occasions, the only thing I can do is firstly to vindicate their professionalism and secondly, to recognise that commitment. Professionalism and commitment, both in the public health services and the Autonomous Communities. (9th May) I have seen Dr Simón working day and night, from Monday to Sunday. The example of Dr Simón as a civil servant, as a person dedicated to the common good, which is precisely public health, the defence of life, is commendable. I want to recall one thing about Dr Simón. He was not someone we selected, he was someone we already found in the position as director of the CAES when we came to power. And let me tell you something, Spain has had the fortune, the enormous fortune of having a person at the head of the CAES, not only with knowledge and prestige, but also with the human qualities of Dr Simón. (19th September, defending the doctor from criticisms for having taken a week’s holiday)

He also recognises that the lockdown is not the only possible option, as other countries are adopting a “herd immunity” strategy. But his conviction is that this kind of decision costs too many lives and therefore he refuses to consider it: Of course, the strategy that Spain and most European countries are following is not the only one possible. There have been other key nations that announced at first that they would not stop the spread of the virus, in order to immunise the whole population, although this had a very high cost in terms of human lives, but as you know, most of the countries that started in that direction have been forced to abandon it after recognising that it was unsustainable due to the high cost in lives that this strategy entailed. (21st March)

186

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

You will recall a few weeks ago that at the beginning of the health emergency there were those who said that a possible solution would be to allow the virus to circulate freely until what experts and epidemiologists have called “herd immunity”, which means that between 60% and 70% of the population becomes infected, is immunised and, consequently, the virus ceases to circulate. It is true that there were countries that started down this path and had to backtrack when they saw the very serious consequences that could occur. Today we know that if we had followed this path in our country, the infection could have reached more than 30 million fellow citizens, 30 million. And we know, moreover, that it could have cost the lives of around 300,000 people. 300,000 people, one in every 100 infected. Possibly more because it would have brought our health system to a state of collapse and would have increased the mortality rate because many sick people would not have been able to be treated. (16th May)

The experts’ opinion was central in all phases of the pandemic: during the first lockdown, in the transition phase (setting indicators differentiated by region to regulate the reopening and subsequently also the re-closings after the summer), and in dealing with a second wave. Epidemiologists and technical experts were joined by other professionals with expertise, including paediatricians and pedagogists, to outline the criteria for the reopening of social and economic activities. From April onwards, once the criteria and thresholds had been defined at national level, the Autonomous Communities had responsibility for the management of the pandemic. These criteria are contained in a De-escalation Plan: A De-escalation Plan that we have been preparing well in advance, for more than three weeks, and that is based on the criteria of the experts. […] There are countries that have given a linear response and set dates for the opening of different businesses. We are not going to do that. We are not going to put a date on the opening of this or that business. What we are going to create is a kind of scorecard, a series of objective, indisputable indicators on the basis of which the various regions will be able to move towards this new normal in different phases. And in those phases, then obviously we will include the opening of economic activities, opening up to that new normality in our daily lives, for our citizens in their day-to-day life, in their homes. Concluding the de-escalation should lead us to that New Normality to which I have referred in previous addresses, which will govern our lives until we have a treatment, or also a vaccine, that fully

8

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

187

protects us against the virus. And during this journey prudence and unity must be our guides. (25th April)

Given that “there is no zero risk” (8th July and 1st September, illustrating the measures for a safe reopening of schools), and that “the risk is never excessive or overrepresented” (9th December, commenting on Merkel’s appeal to the Bundestag), the mantra must be: “prudence, prudence” (9th May). In fact, from the outset Sánchez stressed that the end of the pandemic and the return to normality would depend on the development of a vaccine. There was no room for doubt about the need to test a vaccine and undergo mass vaccination. In the meantime, citizens should become used to a state of “new normality” in which the principle of caution must be the master. This de-escalation will be a process: asymmetric, gradual, coordinated by the Spanish Government, but co-governed with the Autonomous Communities. And, above all, the de-escalation will be guided by the principles of scientific advice and reason and undoubtedly by the principle, the criterion of prudence. […] These last principles to which I have referred before—that of prudence and the primacy of scientific knowledge—are those that have guided the Spanish Government from the beginning of the management of the pandemic. (9th May)

The vaccine is presented as “Science’s response” (7th September) and the vaccination plan was set up during the final months of 2020. It is very important, I take advantage of your question, Inma, to say that one thing is the vaccine and another is the vaccination. The vaccine can be verified and discovered by science in a matter of weeks, as we have seen. But vaccination is going to be a process that lasts months and, therefore, it is very important to be aware that science is probably already shedding light on the last metres of this pandemic we are suffering, but that we cannot lower our guard and that therefore, we are going to have to achieve the recovery of that normality prior to the pandemic step by step, month by month. But I think what I have said is very important: 13,000 centres to guarantee total and complete accessibility to that Covid vaccine for the whole population, no matter where you live. (22nd November)

188

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

During the same crucial months, part of Spanish public opinion started to question the safety of the vaccines. During a TV interview, Sánchez was asked about this: Q: You already know that there are 52% of Spaniards who say they are not going to get vaccinated. Many of them are suspicious, they are waiting to see the effects. What can be done to build that trust? For example, would you be publicly vaccinated as some presidents have offered? President: Without a doubt, without a doubt. Not only as President of the Government, but also as a citizen. I believe that the health professionals, the European and Spanish drug agencies have extraordinary professionals who validate, after multiple filters, the quality of these vaccines. (9th December)

PART III

Populist Leaders Against the Virus: Boris Johnson’s and Victor Orban’s Pandemic Narratives

CHAPTER 9

The Pandemic Turn: Populist Government Leaders Facing the Virus

Data indicates that 2018 was a golden year for populism in Europe, winning the support of more than one in five voters: 22.2%, up 1.5% compared to 2017 (Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index, 2019). This ‘populist zeitgeist’ (Mudde, 2004) has increasingly translated into the entry of populist parties into government, with the number of European citizens living under populist-supported governments increasing 13-fold in twenty years: from 12.5 million in 1998 to 170.2 million in 2018 (Lewis et al., 2018). Despite the multiplication in the European context of left-populist movements (Damiani, 2020), this growth in consensus has been substantially nourished by the rise of right-wing and far-right populist parties (Mudde, 2019; Wodak, 2015): At the beginning of the 1980s, right-wing authoritarian parties were thus a marginal phenomenon. Only one European voter in a hundred voted for a fascist or right-wing populist party. (…) During the first few years of

The original version of this chapter was revised: Author name “Luca Massidda” has been updated. The correction to this chapter is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9_13 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023, corrected publication 2023 F. Saccà and D. Selva, European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9_9

191

192

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

the 2010s, it looked like right-wing populist parties had reached stagnation, but since 2014 they have grown dramatically. In just four years, their support has gone from 11.6 percent in 2014 to 15.4 percent in 2018. This represents the fastest growth period ever for these parties. (Timbro Populism Index, 2019, pp. 18–19)

The populist wave, driven by the wind blowing from the right, peaked in the five-year period 2014–2018. The 2019 European elections seemed to be the decisive test to measure the extent of this populist rise. On this occasion, populist right-wing parties, winning a total of 161 seats (+43 compared to 2014), obtained the highest parliamentary representation in their European history (Ivaldi, 2020). However, overall the bulwarks of political institutions have held, and the conquest of the Brussels palaces by the populist forces that some had foreseen and many had feared did not occur (Horowitz, 2019). After Brexit and Donald Trump’s unexpected victory in the 2016 US presidential election, Western populism missed its third, decisive political objective: imposing a sovereigntist and Eurosceptic majority on the Brussels parliament for the first time. Despite the growth recorded on the right, driven by the performance of Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National in France,1 Nigel Farage’s Reform UK in England,2 and, above all, Matteo Salvini’s League in Italy,3 in May 2019, almost two out of three voters still supported parties that embraced a pro-European culture and political tradition. Although the definitive consecration failed in 2019, populism has certainly represented in this turbulent beginning of the twenty-first century the “new” lumbering protagonist of contemporary politics—or at least, so it seemed until the opening of the pandemic catastrophe in early 2020. The Covid-19 tsunami hit this scenario in the first weeks of the new decade, with what political consequences? The most important election that occurred during the first pandemic period was the US presidency, which ended with the “dismissal” of Donald Trump. The virus and its hyper-masculine management (Saccà & Selva, 2021) played a decisive role in this political switch and a review of Trump’s contested—but clear—defeat allows us to reflect on the impact

1 The party won 23.3% of the votes, ahead of President Macron’s Renaissance coalition (22.4%). 2 Before the final exit from Europe of the British parliamentarians, this party won the highest number of seats (29) with 30.5% of the votes. 3 It is Salvini’s League, in fact, that recorded the greatest growth of consensus compared to the previous European elections, going from 6.2% to 34.3% (+28.1%) and thus winning 28 seats (from 5 in 2014).

9

THE PANDEMIC TURN: POPULIST GOVERNMENT LEADERS …

193

that the pandemic may have had on populist leaders in government. We can try to analyse this topic by sketching out a simple SWOT analysis. Theoretically, in managing the pandemic from a government position, the populist leader has some “cards” to play, in order to try to politicise the crisis (Berti & Ruzza, 2022). We can isolate a couple of strengths: first, the appeal in times of crisis of strong and charismatic leadership (Massidda, 2020; Viviani, 2019); second, the absolute media centrality received by the government once it is called to manage a pandemic crisis. The Covid-19 global crisis has guaranteed government populism unrestricted media attention; an opportunity that “does not come easily in a media-saturated age” (Moffitt, 2015, p. 202). In short, the pandemic immediately transforms any political government statement in a media event. Populist leaders also reveal structural weaknesses in an emergency. For example, they are forced to deal with a colossal real adversary, the virus, while we know that populist “champions” are used to showing their charisma by facing fictional colossus opponents that populist narrators can easily control (Joosse, 2018). Other weaknesses can be traced back to the need for the government to take responsibility for unpopular decisions (can the populist leader afford to be unpopular?) and to the loss of agenda power—the pandemic completely restructures newsworthiness and the logic of newsmaking. In this contest, it is complicated for populist leaders to continue to dictate the agenda, exploiting, for example, selfmanaged social megaphones to impose their owner issues on the public debate (e.g. stopping migrants’ invasion). It is the virus that dictates the agenda. The opportunity that the pandemic offers to populist governments is to use the emergency to embrace an illiberal or authoritarian turn. Populist leaders can also take advantage of the “community under siege” rhetoric to relaunch their appeal to the people. Populist and non-populist heads of government can also count on the “rally round the flag” effect (Erhardt et al., 2021). Finally, we can identify at least three threats: a call for competence revival, the rise of an elite scientific counterbalance, and the affirmation of new communicative patterns (e.g. the re-statisticalisation of the public debate). Starting from this conceptual frame (Fig. 9.1), here we will focus on how two of the foremost populist government leaders in Europe, Boris Johnson and Viktor Orbán, dealt with the first wave of the pandemic from a communicative point of view. Boris Johnson became Prime Minister on 24 July 2019, following Theresa May’s resignation. Only two days earlier, Johnson had already picked up her legacy as leader of the Conservative Party. His rise to

194

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

Fig. 9.1 SWOT pandemic and populist government leaders (Source Data from PRIN2017 “The transformations of democracy: Actors, strategies and outcomes in opposing populism in political, juridical and social arenas”, Tuscia University’s research unit)

the party leadership was punctuated by a promise to finally complete the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union. Johnson had been one of the main Leave campaigners and then staked his credibility as head of the party and government on the Brexit negotiation table. To accomplish his ‘mission’, however, he needed a solid parliamentary majority and, as a populist leader, total electoral legitimacy. Since he could enjoy neither of them, with regard to an issue as sensitive and crucial as Brexit, in two moves, Johnson tried to remedy the situation. First, in August 2019, by suspending (or ‘proroguing’) the British Parliament for five weeks, then, in October 2019, Johnson resigned and led the country to early elections.

9

THE PANDEMIC TURN: POPULIST GOVERNMENT LEADERS …

195

It was a winning move. The Conservative Party in the December elections, waving the slogan ‘Get Brexit Done’, won in a landslide victory. Parliament was no longer an obstacle to leaving the EU, and Johnson could thus triumphantly sign the Brexit withdrawal agreement on 24 January 2020. However, in a few days, the populist government of the eccentric former mayor of London (2008–2016) would face a much more demanding test. Brexit and then Covid-19 created the conditions to accentuate a tendency towards the centralisation of power in the hands of the executive, paralleled by the progressive delegitimisation of parliamentary debate and the shift towards a post-political landscape that has characterised British democracy in recent years (Fawcett et al., 2017; Ward & Ward, 2022). Johnson played an integral role in this process, steering the country towards a populist ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ (Alexandre-Collier, 2022; Bruff, 2014; Ward & Ward, 2022). If, with the referendum for Brexit, he took the opportunity to strengthen his power and proceed along this path of marginalising dissent, he tried to do the same with Covid-19 at first but ended with a different approach, as the analysis in the following pages will highlight. Eventually, in July 2022, Johnson has resigned as Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative Party after a series of scandals, including that known in the media as “Partygate”: he has been fined for having broken the lockdown rules in June 2020 to attend his birthday party (BBC, 2022). When the pandemic arrived in Europe in February 2020, Viktor Orbán had been head of the Hungarian government for ten years: in April 2010, Fidesz’s landslide victory brought the charismatic leader to the helm of the country. A role Orbán had already occupied, the youngest in Hungarian history, between 1998 and 2002. He was, at the time, the first leader of a former Soviet country who had not previously been a member of a Communist Party. With Orbán’s second term, populism came to rule a European nation. Strengthened by the popular consensus obtained and with a robust parliamentary majority, the conservative leader immediately began to impose his illiberal turn on Hungarian democracy. As early as 2011, Orbán had the political strength to change the constitution and approve a controversial pro-government electoral law. Although declining in support, the Fidesz leader won an overwhelming parliamentary majority in the 2014 elections (133 seats out of 199 in the National Assembly). The following period, 2015–2016, was marked by the European migrant crisis, and Orbán capitalised on the appeal of

196

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

his nationalist and xenophobic rhetoric. In the management (and performance) of the crisis, the populist Prime Minister showed the nation and Europe at large the widespread support for his charismatic leadership. In the 2018 elections, a campaign focused on the fight against immigration and the defence of the national community maintained Orbán’s position at the helm of the country with an undisputed majority. This situation—a consolidated populist far-right government—characterised Hungary when the pandemic opened dramatically on the European front.

9.1 The Covid-19 Pandemic in Hungary and the United Kingdom: Epidemiological and Political Data The cases analysed in this section show a markedly different course of infection from those presented in the previous pages, albeit for very different reasons. In fact, it can be said that in both the UK and Hungary; the pandemic started later than in other European countries (Fig. 9.2).

Fig. 9.2 Waves of Covid-19 in the United Kingdom and Hungary (number of confirmed cases) (Source WHO COVID-19 dashboard)

9

THE PANDEMIC TURN: POPULIST GOVERNMENT LEADERS …

197

In the UK, there were no more than 40,000 cases per million inhabitants until the end of March 2020. However, the situation changed very quickly: by 1 April 2020, the number of cases registered in the UK exceeded those in Norway (44,000 vs. 41,000); on 6 April, the cases in the UK exceeded those in Germany (63,000 vs. 61,000); on 8 April, the same happened with France (67,000 vs. 56,000), then on 10 April with Italy (70,000 vs. 68,000), and finally on 20 April with Spain (67,000 vs. 66,000). This rapid rise also corresponded to a lack of activation of organisational structures in charge of monitoring Covid-19. This situation continued until 26 April 2020, when the Coronavirus Infection Survey (CIS) was launched; from 29 May, it was assisted by the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) in tracking the R-value (ONS, 2021). The virus containment policies, which resulted in some restrictions on citizens’ freedom of movement, were inaugurated on 23 March 2020 and were withdrawn from mid-May, with schools opening gradually from 1 June (ibid.). Throughout the summer, infections in the UK never fell below 8,000 cases per million inhabitants, with a new increase as early as the end of July, gradually intensifying until early September with at least 20,000 cases. In fact, the British authorities placed the start of the second wave at the beginning of September (ibid.), even though the second lockdown started on 31 October (Institute for Government, 2022). This second wave was characterised by a peak in mid-November, followed by containment policies and a local warning system that led to a partial drop in infections in early December; however, within a couple of weeks, the infection rate rose again before Christmas due to the circulation of a new variant (ONS, 2021). In the meantime, in Hungary, in correspondence with the first wave recorded in all Western European countries, the infection level never exceeded 10,000 cases per million inhabitants, when even virtuous Norway recorded 20,000 cases per million inhabitants (this ‘peak’ occurred in Hungary on 13 April 2020). From 31 August 2020 onwards, Hungary saw the number of infections increase, progressively surpassing all the countries considered in this study: already on 4 September 2020, Hungary had more cases than Norway (22,000 vs. 17,000), Germany (14,000), and Italy (21,000), and on 8 September it also surpassed the United Kingdom (40,000 cases vs. 38,000). From mid-September onwards, the gap with the other countries widened exponentially: on 16

198

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

September, 73,000 cases were recorded in Hungary against 46,000 in the UK, 23,000 in Italy, 19,000 in Norway, and 17,000 in Germany. This gap grew even more conspicuous two days later, with 84,000 cases recorded against virtually unchanged statistics in the above-mentioned countries. On 10 November, Hungary also surpassed France and Spain, with 460,000 cases per million inhabitants against 448,000 and 400,000, respectively, before peaking on 28 November with 493,000 cases. Thus, in comparison with the other European countries analysed, there was no real ‘first wave’ in Hungary, but the second wave was much more severe: it is no coincidence that Hungary is the third country in the world in terms of Covid-19 mortality (504.76 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants) and the first among the EU Member States.4 The effectiveness of containment policies can be assessed through the Stringency Index (Fig. 9.3). In fact, the graph shows how the two countries reacted differently in the first weeks of contagion, with the UK activating some measures as early as 20 January, while Hungary moved much more abruptly to highly restrictive policies. On the other hand, the trend of British policies was disjointed throughout the year, with two highs of 79.63 points recorded during the first wave (24 March–10 May) and during the second wave (beginning 24 December). From 10 May to 20 October 2020, policies fluctuated around 64 points, with a low of 60.19 points in the week between 12 and 18 October; after this series of easing and tightening, policies reached a new high between 23 October and 5 November (75 points). The UK health minister stated that the coronavirus posed a moderate risk until mid-February 2020, but at the end of the month, government officials were talking about ‘battle plans’,5 divided into four phases: contain, delay, research, and mitigate. On 16 March, the first daily press briefing was held by Prime Minister Johnson, and from there on, an escalation of restrictive measures began, leading rather quickly (within ten days) to the lockdown. Johnson himself tested positive for Covid-19 on 27 March and was admitted to intensive care, where he remained until 12 April. One year after the beginning of the pandemic, two parliamentary committees, the Science and 4 Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center, Mortality analyses. Retrieved from: https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality. 5 The Health Foundation, COVID-19 policy tracker 2020: Policy narrative timeline. Retrieved from: https://covid19.health.org.uk/theme/policy-narrative.

9

THE PANDEMIC TURN: POPULIST GOVERNMENT LEADERS …

199

Fig. 9.3 Stringency index in the United Kingdom and Hungary (Source Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford—Last Updated 25 January 2022, 09:20 [London time]. OurWorldInData.org/coronavirus • CC BY)

Technology Committee and the Health and Social Care Committee, judged the UK government’s response to Covid-19 harshly, highlighting a number of critical points. First, the initial strategy was geared towards ‘delaying’ the peak of infection rather than ‘containing’ it. In practical terms, this tactic implicitly meant acceptance of the need to achieve herd immunity and resulted in a ‘fatalistic’ approach, ‘neither empathetic nor rigorous’ as in other countries both in the West and in Asia. Responsibility for this choice lay not only with Boris Johnson but with all the bodies involved in decision-making at the time: indeed, the fact that the UK approach reflected a consensus between official scientific advisers and the Government indicates a degree of groupthink that was present at the time which meant we were not as open to approaches being taken elsewhere as we should have been. (House of Commons, 2021, p. 6)

The same report denounces a lack of communication and coordination within the decision-making bodies, as well as a lack of transparency and

200

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

accountability, leading to an inability to consider dissenting voices or welcome best practices from other countries. Once again, therefore, it emphasises how the isolation of the executive translated into the isolation of the entire country: Accountability in a democracy depends on elected decision-makers not just taking advice, but examining, questioning and challenging it before making their own decisions. Although it was a rapidly changing situation, given the large number of deaths predicted it was surprising that the initially fatalistic assumptions about the impossibility of suppressing the virus were not challenged until it became clear the NHS could be overwhelmed. Even when the UK strategy did change dramatically in March 2020, it was because of domestic concern about the NHS being overwhelmed rather than a serious decision to follow emerging international best practice. (pp. 6–7)

The report cites the lack of adequate testing and tracking as errors. Finally, The lack of priority attached to social care during the initial phase of the pandemic was illustrative of a long-standing failure to afford social care the same attention as the NHS. The rapid discharge of people from hospitals into care homes without adequate testing or rigorous isolation was indicative of the disparity. It is understandable that the Government should move quickly to avoid hospitals being overwhelmed but it was a mistake to allow patients to be transferred to care homes without the rigour shown in places like Germany and Hong Kong. This, combined with untested staff bringing infection into homes from the community, led to many thousands of deaths which could have been avoided. (p. 8)

The Hungarian government set up the Hungarian Operational Task Force to analyse and counteract the virus at the end of January, consisting of the minister of the interior, the minister of human resources, and a number of medical experts. Notably, the task force was predominantly comprised of bodies from the Ministry of the Interior and the police, betraying the communicative frame created by the Prime Minister with respect to Covid-19. After the economic-financial emergency of 2011 and the immigration emergency of 2015, the health emergency was the new war front. In fact, even though the contagion numbers were not comparable to

9

THE PANDEMIC TURN: POPULIST GOVERNMENT LEADERS …

201

those of other European countries, the Hungarian government declared a State of Emergency as early as 11 March 2020. On 30 March, parliament passed a law extending the State of Emergency indefinitely, giving the Prime Minister the power of ‘ruling by decree’, suspending all local and national elections, and instituting a penalty of up to five years in prison for those who spread disinformation.6 This passage meant, among other things, that on 9 April, Orbán was able to extend the national lockdown until a later date. The act received so much criticism from the Council of Europe, the UN and the OECD that it was scaled back in mid-June (Kovács, 2021). On the other hand, a loosening of the restrictive measures occurred as early as May (from 76.85 points on 3 May to 66.67 on 5 May), reaching a minimum peak of 40.74 points on 2 November, just a few days before the start of a second wave. For the second and third waves, although the start dates are fairly easy to determine and are indeed marked by the application of new restrictive measures, there is not as much clarity on the end dates. This opacity, of course, is indicative of Orbán’s approach to the pandemic crisis: the ‘rule by decree’ regime has continued through several variants, including the granting of the power to suspend laws through acts of the executive and the extension of the circumstances under which a State of Emergency can be declared (Kovács, 2021). During the second wave, which, as we have said, was much more severe than the first, the containment policies did not seem commensurate: from 4 November until the end of the year, the Stringency Index was 72.22 points, lower than 76.85 in the March–April period and well below Germany’s 85.19 points. In this part of the volume, all these aspects were taken into account to determine the composition of the corpus (Table 9.1).

6 Act XII of 2020 on the containment of the coronavirus. Retrieved from: https://cov idlawlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/ACT-XXII-of-2020-On-the-Containmentof-Coronavirus.pdf.

Dataset description

23rd March 2020 11th March 2020

Beginning of lockdown

4th March 2020

3rd March 2020

First speech 1st June 2020 16th June 2020

Ending of lockdown

29th May 2020

23rd June 2020

Last speech

18

23

Total speeches

Source Data from PRIN2017 “The transformations of democracy: Actors, strategies and outcomes in opposing populism in political, juridical and social arenas”, Tuscia University’s research unit

Viktor Orbán, Hungary

Boris Johnson, United Kingdom

Table 9.1

202 L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

9

THE PANDEMIC TURN: POPULIST GOVERNMENT LEADERS …

203

References Alexandre-Collier, A. (2022). David Cameron, Boris Johnson and the ‘populist hypothesis’ in the British Conservative Party. Comparative European Politics, 20, 527–543. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-022-00294-5 BBC. (2022, July 7). Boris Johnson resigns: Five things that led to the PM’s downfall. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-62070422 Berti, C., & Ruzza, C. (2022). Populism, science, and Covid-19 as a political opportunity: The case of the European Parliament. In H. Eslen-Ziya & A. Giorgi (Eds.), Populism and science in Europe (pp. 91–116). Palgrave Macmillan. Bruff, I. (2014). The rise of authoritarian neoliberalism. Rethinking Marxism, 26(1), 113–129. https://doi.org/10.1080/08935696.2013.843250 Damiani, M. (2020). Populist radical left parties in Western Europe. Routledge. Erhardt, J., Freitag, M., Filsinger, M., & Wamsler, S. (2021). The emotional foundations of political support: How fear and anger affect trust in the government in times of the Covid-19 pandemic. Swiss Political Science Review, 27 (2), 339–352. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12462 Fawcett, P., Flinders, M., Colin, H., & Wood, M. (Eds.). (2017). Anti-politics, depoliticization and governance. Oxford University Press. Horowitz, J. (2019, May 27). Election puts Europe on the front line of the battle with populism. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/ 27/world/europe/europe-election-results-populism.html House of Commons. (2021). Coronavirus: Lessons learned to date. Sixth Report of the Health and Social Care Committee and Third Report of the Science and Technology Committee of Session 2021–22. https://committees.parlia ment.uk/publications/7496/documents/78687/default/ Institute for Government. (2022, December 9). Timeline of UK government coronavirus lockdowns and restrictions. https://www.instituteforgovernment. org.uk/sites/default/files/2022-12/timeline-coronavirus-lockdown-dec ember-2021.pdf Ivaldi, G. (2020). Populist voting in the 2019 European elections. Totalitarismus und Demokratie, 17 (1), 67–96. Joosse, P. (2018). Countering Trump: Toward a theory of charismatic counterroles. Social Forces, 97 (2), 921–944. https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soy036 Kovács, K. (2021, March 11). Hungary and the pandemic: A pretext for expanding power. Verfassungblog on Matters Constitutional. https://verfas sungsblog.de/hungary-and-the-pandemic-a-pretext-for-expanding-power/ Lewis, P., Clarke, S., Barr, C., Holder, J., & Kommenda, N. (2018, November 20). Revealed: One in four Europeans vote populist. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/nov/ 20/revealed-one-in-four-europeans-vote-populist

204

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

Massidda, L. (2020). La politica come rappresentazione. Il carattere della leadership populista nell’epoca dei social media. Sociologia. Rivista quadrimestrale di scienze storiche e sociali, 1, 18–30. Moffitt, B. (2015). How to perform crisis: A model for understanding the key role of crisis in contemporary populism. Government and Opposition, 50(2), 189–217. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2014.13 Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x Mudde, C. (2019). The far right today. Wiley. ONS. (2021, June 29). Coronavirus (COVID-19) Infection Survey technical article: Waves and lags of COVID-19 in England. https://www.ons.gov.uk/ peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/conditionsanddiseases/ articles/coronaviruscovid19infectionsurveytechnicalarticle/wavesandlagsofc ovid19inenglandjune2021#waves-of-covid-19. Saccà, F., & Selva, D. (2021). Women political leaders in pandemic times: Comparing Jacinda Ardern and Donald Trump’s representation of the Covid-19 crisis. Hayka. Kylbtypa. Obwectvo, 27 (2), 8–21. Timbro. (2019). Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index 2019. http://bit.ly/pop ulismindex Viviani, L. (2019). Il carisma nella sociologia weberiana della leadership. Società Mutamento Politica, 10(20), 39–55. https://doi.org/10.13128/smp-11045 Ward, J., & Ward, B. (2022). From Brexit to COVID-19: The Johnson government, executive centralisation and authoritarian populism. Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217211063730 Wodak, R. (2015). The politics of fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean. Sage.

CHAPTER 10

Boris Johnson’s Approach to the Pandemic

We analysed 23 statements on coronavirus given by Boris Johnson between 3 March and 23 June 2020.1 Adopting our populist government leaders’ SWOT model for the observation of the British case, we will try to identify the most significant aspects of the crisis narrative Johnson proposed during the first wave of the pandemic.2

The original version of this chapter was revised: Author name “Luca Massidda” has been updated. The correction to this chapter is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9_13 1 In the analysis of the narrative proposed by Johnson and Orbán, we decided to focus our attention exclusively on the Covid-19 first wave. More specifically, our interest here stems from the impact that the sudden and unexpected arrival of the virus has had on the leadership style and political rhetoric of populist governments. 2 According to Waylen, Boris Johnson’s government’s performance in the early stages

of the pandemic also featured ‘many hyper-masculine leadership traits (…) such as risk taking and the excessive use of militaristic narratives of war and battle’ (2021, p. 1163). It seems to us, however, that at least since March 2020, Johnson’s rhetoric has been marked by a clear ‘remission’ of some of his previous traits that were more clearly reducible to the stylistic canon of right-wing populism, including his ostentatious hyper-masculine bias. Among other ‘champions’ of sovereigntist populism—from Trump to Orbán—it does not seem to us that this same dynamic can be registered. This narrative turn obviously does not necessarily correspond to a more virtuous government action.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023, corrected publication 2023 F. Saccà and D. Selva, European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9_10

205

206

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

10.1 Strengths: Raising Strong leadership’s Appeal and Exploiting Media Centrality Faced with the pandemic emergency, government populism can immediately play a trump card usually present in its “narrative” deck: the appeal of strong, muscular, and agentic leadership in times of crisis. Numerous historical examples show how “leadership is strengthened, legitimised, even venerated when leaders appear at the site of crisis (…) and are able to handle the chaos of the situation and the distress and grief of those affected” (Tomkins, 2020, p. 332). This effect is especially true for populist leaders, who are used to gathering consensus in crisis management (Caiani & Graziano, 2019).3 In the populist performer’s hands, the pressure that a structural crisis imposes can easily be exploited to “amplify or exacerbate the role of individual leaders”, encouraging them to propagate the comforting image of the heroic leader who “rides alone on his or her horse into town to save the local population” (Spyridonidis et al., 2022, p. 682). Here, analysing exclusively the official self-representation offered by the British Prime Minister, we find a first element of mutation in the style of British populist leadership. Johnson’s self-representation is closer to that of a participatory leader than an agentic one.4 He does not present himself in a personalistic way, as the fearless leader who alone faces the virus. In front of the pandemic storm, he is not the “new sheriff in town”. The difference with Trump’s macho posture is evident (Saccà & Selva, 2021), and Johnson’s leadership seems collaborative. The British Prime Minister, different from the US President on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, in managing—and performing—the pandemic’s first wave, does not represent himself “as a populist superhero in times of crisis” (Schneiker, 2020, p. 859).5 The way Johnson and Trump 3 For an in-depth examination of the relationship between crisis and populism in the contemporary literature on populism, we refer here to Moffitt (2015, pp. 191–195). 4 Working from third-party sources, mainly media and expert witnesses, Spyridonidis et al. (2022) come to a different, substantially opposite conclusion, describing Johnson’s pandemic leadership as ‘authoritarian’, ‘heroic’, and ‘populist’. 5 According to Waylen, the performance of Boris Johnson’s government in the early stages of the pandemic also relied on ‘many hyper-masculine leadership traits (…) such as risk taking and the excessive use of militaristic narratives of war and battle’ (2021, p. 1163). It seems to us, however, that at least since March 2020, Johnson’s rhetoric has been marked by a clear ‘remission’ of some of his previous traits, which were more

10

BORIS JOHNSON’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

207

performed the narratives of their illness—both were infected early6 — clearly show the distance that has separated the leadership style of the two populist heads of government in the face of the pandemic. Although Jones (2021) considers both the illness narratives constructed by Johnson and Trump “as performances of masculinity designed to depict themselves as strong leaders” (p. 10), it seems to us, starting from Jones’s own analysis, that the difference in the rhetorical posture assumed by the two populist leaders in the face of the personal experience of contagion is deeply marked. A first agency differentiator, which Jones himself points out, is attributable to the “volume” of the voice broadcasted by the two leaders in their period of illness. If Johnson was a silent patient, Trump was hyper-loquacious. The relative reticence of the British Prime Minister is therefore contrasted, in Jones’s analysis, with the conspicuous exposure of the US President: This included not just discursive exposure (exemplified by the 193 tweets he sent during the 5 days he was in hospital), but also physical exposure, symbolised most potently by his public removal of his mask on his return to the White House. Unlike Johnson, who continued his self-quarantine for 15 days after his release from hospital, Trump took every opportunity to expose himself to others (…). For Trump, exposing himself to others, both discursively and bodily, has long been his signature way of performing masculinity, a kind of rhetorical ‘manspreading’. (Jones, 2021, p. 9)

Another marked difference is found in the representation of the healing moment. While Johnson, just released from hospital (12 April), expressed all his gratitude to the NHS and remained at home for 15 days in compliance with the prescribed quarantine period, Trump, on the day of his dehospitalisation (5 October), tweeted ‘Don’t be afraid of Covid. Don’t let it dominate your life’ and immediately ‘resumed appearances at large

clearly reducible to the stylistic canon of right-populism, including his ostentatious hypermasculine bias. Among other ‘champions’ of sovereigntist populism—from Trump to Orbán—it does not seem to us that this same dynamic can be registered. This narrative turn obviously does not necessarily correspond to more virtuous government action. 6 Trump’s devoted followers, with his “charismatic aristocracy” at the forefront (Joosse, 2018), contribute to the celebration of their leader, the hero whose defeat of the virus served as additional proof of his extraordinary status: “President Trump won’t have to recover from COVID. COVID will have to recover from President Trump”, proudly tweeted Republican Representative Matt Gaetz (Jones, 2021, p. 1).

208

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

rallies, despite concerns from experts that he might still be contagious’ (Jones, 2021, p. 1).7 Overall, while the dominant frame of Johnson’s personal experience of the disease is that of gratitude, with the role of the hero attributed to the entire staff of the National Health Service,8 in Trump, the masculine—and toxic—narrative of the powerful individual superman who subdued the virus is imposed.9 In our opinion, the difference between Trump’s epic self-aggrandisement and Johnson’s “larger story of national heroism centred on the NHS” (Jones, 2021, p. 8) becomes clear. In British storytelling, if the virus was about to be wrestled to the floor, it was due to the collective effort produced by the social 7 ‘UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson was the first major world leader to contract the novel coronavirus, announcing his test result in a video message posted to Twitter on March 27, 2020’. “[…] US President Donald Trump tested positive for the virus on October 2, 2020” (Jones, 2021, p. 1). 8 On the day of his discharge from the hospital, the British Prime Minister declared, “I have today left hospital after a week in which the NHS has saved my life. No question. It’s hard to find words to express my debt […]. In the last seven days, I have of course seen the pressure that the NHS is under. I’ve seen the personal courage, not just of the doctors and nurses, but of everyone, the cleaners, the cooks, the healthcare workers of every description. Physios, radiographers, pharmacists who kept coming to work, kept putting themselves in harm’s way, kept risking this deadly virus. It is thanks to that courage, that devotion, that duty and that love that our NHS has been unbeatable. I want to pay my own thanks to the utterly brilliant doctors, leaders in their fields, men and women, but several of them for some reason called Nick, who took some crucial decisions a few days ago, which I will be grateful for the rest of my life. I want to thank the many nurses, men and women whose care has been so astonishing. I’m going to forget some names, so please forgive me, but I want to thank Po Ling and Shannon and Emily and Angel and Connie and Becky and Rachel and Nikki and Anne. And I hope they won’t mind if I mention in particular two nurses who stood by my bedside for 48 hours when things could have gone either way. They’re Jenny from Zealand Invercargill on the South Island to be exact, and Luis from Portugal near Porto” (April 12th). But the illness he had overcome offered Johnson the opportunity to extend his expression of gratitude to the British public and honour their enormous sacrifice. It is this feeling of civil solidarity that, in the words of the conservative Prime Minister, allowed him to form “a human shield around this country’s greatest national asset, our National Health Service”. 9 At his first campaign trail rally since his Covid-19 diagnosis, Trump presented himself to the crowd claiming his acquired immunity and celebrating his sense of powerfulness (12 October). Two weeks later, on 25 October, Trump told the crowd about the moment of his triumph over the virus: “I took something called Regeneron. The following morning, I felt so good. I felt like Superman. I wanted to get back. I didn’t want to cancel anything”—and his audience responded by cheering its personal superhero: “Super Trump. Super Trump. Super Trump. Super Trump. Super Trump. Super Trump” (Jones, 2021, p. 10).

10

BORIS JOHNSON’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

209

system.10 The leader participated, but the protagonist was the collective, and the community was the hero. This concept, as we shall see, represents a recurring topos in Johnson’s pandemic narrative. At least in his official storytelling, decisions were collegial. Moments of personalisation, when Johnson emphatically used the first person to speak directly to the public, were usually those where he wanted to express empathy, compassion, condolences, and gratitude. There was no superhomistic tension in his rhetoric. There was a personalistic twist in Johnson’s narrative— which is characteristic of late-modern political communication (Bennett, 2012; McAllister, 2007) and even more of the populist discursive style (Engesser et al., 2017)—but it took the form of empathy rather than individualistic assertiveness. Johnson several times used the first person singular in his statements—I —but he did so to show emotional closeness and compassion with his community, not to claim the effectiveness of his political action through an egocentric framing. Comprehension (to understand), sincerity (to level with), and gratitude (to thank) are the emotional intentions connected to the use of the first person singular: I fully understand public concern, your concern, about the global spread of this virus. (March 3rd) I must level with you, level with the British public: many more families are going to lose loved ones before their time. (March 12th) I want to thank families for their sacrifice at this difficult time. I want to thank the whole country for the efforts people are making to comply with these measures. (March 18th)

While it is true that superhomistic rhetoric is substantially absent from his pandemic communication, it must be recognised that even the image of himself as a caring leader, which Johnson at least partly tried to evoke, is overall faded and not very effective (Tomkins, 2020). This double 10 ‘Thanks to your forbearance, your good sense, your altruism, your spirit of community—thanks to our collective national resolve, we are on the brink of achieving that first, clear mission: to prevent our National Health Service from being overwhelmed in a way that tragically we have seen elsewhere. And that is how and why we are now beginning to turn the tide. If this virus were a physical assailant, an unexpected and invisible mugger, which I can tell you from personal experience it is, then this is the moment when we have begun together to wrestle it to the floor’ (April 27th).

210

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

failing of Johnson—he was not an agentic leader, but he was also not able to play the role of a caring one—can be traced back to the specific self-image that he historically offered to his audience: a leader “who refuses to identify with superego figures of authorit” (Yates, 2018) and downplays “associations with parental archetypes in favour of a kind of brotherly presence, which invites fraternal rather than parental identification” (Tomkins, 2020, p. 336). In this way, the figure, even goliardic, of the eccentric big brother, compatible with the current posture of a populist performer, has precluded Johnson from the opportunity to fully embody, in the face of the pandemic, one of the two traditional leadership models: the paternal one of protection ( face to face against the virus ) and the maternal one of care (open arms towards the community; Saccà & Selva, 2021). The second strength we imagined could offer an advantage to the populist government leader committed to facing the pandemic was attributable to the absolute media centrality that the commando position in the middle of the health storm guaranteed them. Here, too, Johnson’s leadership style seems to deviate from the populist standard. Even before the contagion (27 March) that essentially put Johnson out of action for an entire month, transforming him from the crisis’s first narrator to the object of the narrative, the British premier had shown a certain reluctance to occupy the centre stage in the representation of the emergency. In the first days of the pandemic, the British premier intervened only on three official occasions to speak to the nation about the health emergency (the press conferences of 3, 9, and 12 March). It was not until 16 March that Johnson finally agreed “to start holding daily press briefings on the status of the pandemic and the UK’s plans for managing it” (Tomkins, 2020, p. 335). A few days later, however—as we have seen—the disease removed Johnson from the political management of the pandemic. Compared to his populist colleagues in government, Johnson preferred to remain on the sidelines during the first phase of the pandemic narrative. Here, an atypical characteristic that characterises Johnson’s leadership style is manifested and accentuated by the emergency situation. In fact, Johnson did not impose himself on the crowded scene of contemporary neopopulism as a hyper-presentist leader. He was rather “a leader with a long-standing reputation for being selective about whether and when he shows up” (Tomkins, 2020, p. 331). The specific characteristics of Johnson’s political leadership—his “brotherly presence, which invites fraternal rather than parental identification” (ivi, p. 336) and his selective exposure to the

10

BORIS JOHNSON’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

211

public gaze—allowed Johnson to ride the wave of contemporary neopopulism but also prevented him from exploiting the two main strengths that the pandemic crisis seemed to guarantee to populism in government.

10.2

Weaknesses: Facing a Reality-Based Colossus Opponent and Taking Responsibility for Unpopular Politics

Let us now consider how Johnson handled the two main weaknesses that the pandemic imposed on populist leadership: the need to face a real enemy and the obligation to make unpopular decisions. In his analysis of the relationship between charisma and populist leadership, Paul Joosse (2018) highlights the decisive function played, in the social construction of charismatic authority and the staging of its performance, by three counter-roles: devoted followers, unworthy challengers, and colossal players. Here, we are particularly interested in reflecting on how the pandemic affected the relationship between a populist leader in government and the third charismatic counter-role considered by Joosse. Normally, the populist leader sets up the performance functional to the consecration of their charismatic authority, openly facing colossal enemies out of scale in size and power. As Joosse points out, these ‘elephantine opponents are performatively relevant to charismatic affect because preposterous “underdog” victories become a form of proof of blessed status, revealing the charis or “divine grace” that is thought to buoy and propel the charismatic mission’ (p. 924). Charismatic authority must continually offer the public proof of its status to nurture its exceptional legitimacy (Weber, 1995, p. 239). The staging of a clash with a colossal player guarantees the populist outsider “opportunities to engage in interactions that are ‘to scale’ with the grandiose, revolutionary ‘missions’ that typify charismatic aspiration” (Joosse, 2018, p. 924). The David of populism does not need to defeat the Goliath of the “big powers’ or the ‘System’; it is enough for him to set up the spectacle of his heroic challenge, to show himself openly as a representative of the people who does not back down in the face of the threats of the Colossus. It is not necessary to act on an actual conflict; it is enough to stage a ‘game of setting expectations’ in which the charismatic leader has the opportunity—writes Turner—to ‘publically, and repeatedly, ‘stand up’ to power and reject the demands, in the name

212

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

of the nation, its mission, its sovereignty, and so forth” (2011, p. 85). This action triggers a dialectic between “the leader’s bluster and the hegemon’s empty threats”, which is entirely functional to constructing the legitimacy of charismatic authority (Turner, 2003, p. 19). Colossal opponents thus become the fictional protagonists of a performance in which the charismatic leader continuously demonstrates their ability to surpass expectations. It is a trick that the populist illusion easily succeeds in “manufacturing fake expectations to surpass” (Turner, 2011, p. 86) and “empty threats” to face (Turner, 2003, p. 22). It is a choreography that the populist leader establishes, not a real clash. The tests are artificial (ibid.). However, what happens when the populist leader in charge has to deal with a true colossus opponent, i.e. when the test is real? The pandemic has changed the nature of the relationship between populist leaders and hegemons. The colossal enemy is now tangible, the confrontation is real, and the control of its representation is no longer in the hands of the populist direction. The populist government leader thus has two options: accepting the changed conditions of the political and social context in which they are now forced to move or trying—at least partly—to “domesticate” the virus by tracing it back to their traditional rhetoric. Therefore, the alternative is between trying to adapt one’s leadership style to the virus or trying to adapt the virus to one’s leadership style. Johnson seemed to be heading in the first direction. Faced with a real enemy, the British premier did not propose a representation of the virus following the usual rhetoric of populism. He did not blame the responsibility for the virus on a foreign scapegoat, and he did not try to use the spread of pandemic-generated fear to revive strong arguments for populist sovereignism. If we look at all the definitions Johnson used to describe the virus in the first three months of the pandemic (Table 10.1), we see how it was represented as a common enemy but not an “external” enemy. The responsibility for the threat was never attributed to others —to a foreign subject. Instead, the dramatisation effect was due to the nature of the enemy (“an invisible killer”) and the historical size of its threat (“the worst public health crisis for generations”). In the definition of the virus as an enemy, Johnson did not move within blatantly populist narrative logics, the approach adopted by Trump (Parmanand, 2022, p. 47), mocking the virus with macho arrogance (calling it “kung flu”) or placing it explicitly on the axis of the nationalistic we vs them conflict (“the Chinese

10

BORIS JOHNSON’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

213

virus”).11 In Johnson’s statements, the subject of border control entered very late, specifically on 3 June, when England was emerging from the first dramatic phase of the fight against the virus. At the time, the limitations imposed by the lockdown were gradually being eased and schools and businesses were cautiously starting to reopen. Inside the country, the virus finally seemed to be under control. It was at this moment that the Prime Minister shifted his narrative to controlling the nation’s borders to protect it from a second wave of infection that could come from outside. So while we are going to all these efforts here in the UK to control the virus, we must also ensure we don’t reimport the virus from abroad. So the second action I want to update you on is the introduction of public health measures at the border. (…) Now that we’re getting the virus under control in the UK, there’s a risk cases from abroad begin once again to make up a greater proportion of overall cases. We therefore need to take steps now to manage that risk of these imported cases triggering a second peak. So just as we are asking people already in the UK to isolate for 14 days when contacted by NHS Test and Trace, we’re also asking those arriving from abroad to isolate so that they don’t unknowingly spread the virus. (June 3rd)

In his words, border control did not seem to take on any political connotation. Johnson did not resort to nationalistic rhetoric; he left no room, not even subtext, for any form of discrimination against foreigners, nor did he wink at that xenophobic sentimentality that historically is rekindled in moments of social balance’s profound rupture (Berezin, 2006; Massidda, 2020).12 A second element of weakness for populists in government is the need to make unpopular decisions. Johnson’s strategy in dealing with this criticality is clear. The British PM accepted the responsibility to impose 11 ‘In the period between March 13, and September 15, 2020 (…) (t)he expression “China virus” was used 228 times, “China plague” 43 times, “Chinese virus” 25 times, “Chinese plague” nine times, “Wuhan virus” five times, “Kung flu” four times, “China flu” three times, and “Chinese flu” twice’ (Kurilla, 2021, p. 8). 12 It is significant in this sense that immediately afterwards, in this same speech, Johnson

appealed for the unity of humanity in the fight against the virus and announced Britain’s commitment ‘to ensure that the world’s poorest countries have the support they need to slow the spread of the virus’. In Johnson’s words, despite border control, this was a time for connection, not isolation: ‘This virus has shown how connected we are. We’re fighting an invisible enemy. And no one is safe frankly until we are all safe’.

214

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

Table 10.1 Boris Johnson’s virus labelling New definitions

Date

‘virus’, ‘outbreak’, ‘for the overwhelming majority of people (…) this will be a mild disease’ ‘Coronavirus outbreak’ ‘a global pandemic’, ‘the worst public health crisis for a generation’, ‘some people compare it to seasonal flu. Alas, that is not right’, ‘this disease is particularly dangerous for you, for older people, even though the vast majority this will be a mild to moderate illness’, ‘epidemic’ ‘this emergency’, ‘the challenge that we face’ ‘this new Coronavirus’, ‘a disease that is so dangerous and so infectious that without drastic measures’, ‘this enemy can be deadly, but it is also beatable’ ‘unprecedented challenge’ ‘the enemy is invisible’ ‘the biggest threat this country has faced for decades’, ‘this invisible killer’ ‘a physical assailant, an unexpected and invisible mugger’ ‘a challenge we have never seen in our lifetimes’, ‘an uncontrollable and catastrophic epidemic’ ‘the most vicious threat this country has faced in my lifetime’, ‘devilish illness’ ‘this thing’ ‘the extraordinary pressure of this extraordinary pandemic’ ‘a nasty virus still that wants to take advantage of our carelessness’

March 3rd March 9th March 12th

March 16th March 17th

March 18th March 19th March 23rd April 27th April 30th May 10th May 24th June 16th June 23rd

Source Data from PRIN2017 “The transformations of democracy: Actors, strategies and outcomes in opposing populism in political, juridical and social arenas”, Tuscia University’s research unit

unpopular measures, which Johnson immediately defined as “drastic”, “extreme”, “draconian”, and for some, perhaps “excessive”: There is no escaping the reality that these measures will cause severe disruption across our country for many months. (March 12th) I know that many people – including millions of fit and active people over 70 – may feel, listening to what I have just said, that there is something excessive about these measures, ‘Why bring in this very draconian measure? (March 16th) […] drastic measures […] the measures announced are already extreme. (March 17th)

10

BORIS JOHNSON’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

215

In his speech on 10 May, “almost two months since the people of this country began to put up with restrictions on their freedom – your freedom – of a kind that we have never seen before in peace or war”, when the spread of the disease was finally coming down, Johnson offered his first assessment of his work, stating that the public “must recognise that this campaign against the virus has come at a colossal cost to our way of life”. Since the beginning of his narration, Johnson tried to contain the negative effect of these unpleasant choices (and their colossal cost ) by immediately revealing to the public their controversial nature. In this way, using the frame of transparency (“I am sincere”) and that of sharing (“I am close to the people”), Johnson sought to preserve the popular structure of his populist consensus from the trap of unpopular policies. Attempting to position himself as part of the in-group, he tried to manage the problem of negative identity potentially attached to a leader who takes unpopular measures (Andreouli & Brice, 2022, p. 555). “No prime minister wants to enact measures like this”, Johnson declared on 23 March, certainly not a populist one. To make them sustainable, the English PM resorted to a third conciliatory frame: gratitude. The harshness of the measures that the government was forced to take was reflected in the response of the British people. Johnson systematically offered positive reinforcement to the behaviour of “his” people. Indeed, gratitude to the British people for their sacrifice recurred in Johnson’s speeches (“sacrifice”, “effort”, “restraint” are terms that reappeared systematically): I want to thank families for their sacrifice at this difficult time. I want to thank the whole country for the efforts people are making to comply with these measures. (March 18th) Bit by bit, day by day, by your actions, your restraint and your sacrifice, we are putting this country in a better and stronger position where we will be able to save literally thousands of lives of people of all ages, people who don’t deserve to die now. People whose lives can, must, and will be saved. And as we take these actions together and as we make these sacrifices, we can see the impact on the real economy. (March 20th)13

13 In this statement, ‘we see again the construction of a “we” position that puts the PM and the public in the same category of “sacrificial citizens”. This allows the PM to avoid the position of an authoritarian outsider imposing strict rules, and to be instead

216

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

And I want to thank everyone who is being forced to do something differently today. Everyone who didn’t visit their mum for Mother’s Day but Facetimed them, Skyped them, rang them instead. Thank you for your restraint and for what you did. Everyone who was forced to close a pub or a restaurant or a gym or any other business that could have done fantastic business on a great day like this. Thank you for your sacrifice; I know how tough it must be. (March 22nd)

The messaging is clear: British people’s efforts have saved lives, and it is thanks to the sacrifice of the British people that the country is emerging from the tunnel of the pandemic. With this rhetoric of “civic heroism/ civic sacrifice”, Johnson strengthened the bonds of the communitynation. However, he did so by working exclusively on celebrating ingroup solidarity, never seeking reinforcement in the discrimination of the out-group (as is typical of the polarising rhetoric of far-right populism). My message to everyone again today is: your effort and your sacrifice is working and has been proved to work. (April 30th) It is thanks to your effort and sacrifice in stopping the spread of this disease that the death rate is coming down and hospital admissions are coming down. (May 10th) Thanks to the hard work and sacrifices of the British people in this lockdown, we have helped to bring the R level down. (May 11th) I know many of you will find this frustrating – I am sorry about that. But I’m afraid it is unavoidable, given the nature of the invisible enemy we are fighting. It is a complex problem, and we are asking for everyone’s patience as we work through it together. We will inevitably not get everything right the first time. But I must ask everyone to remember it is that same patience, the hard work, and sacrifices of the British people in lockdown that have got us so far and allow us to make the progress we have. (May 28th)

Renouncing the over-exposure of his personal tug-of-war with the virus and avoiding an instrumental representation of the pandemic aimed at strengthening the traditional pillars of populist rhetoric—sovereignism part of the national in-group that “takes actions”, “makes sacrifices” and “saves lives”’ (Andreouli & Brice, 2022, p. 560).

10

BORIS JOHNSON’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

217

and ostracism towards the other—Johnson accepted that it was the virus that ultimately dictated the agenda of his political communication. Here emerges a marked difference from what Orbán has tried to do. As we will see shortly, in fact, the Hungarian leader has systematically sought— and skilfully constructed—within his pandemic communication strategic opportunities for relaunching the strong themes of his political narrative: the identification between the leader and his people, the defence of national borders, the conflict with the European Union and with “globalist elites”, the concentration of power in the executive’s hands, the delegitimisation of political oppositions, and the erosion of the rule of law’s guarantees. However, before moving on to the analysis of Orbán’s pandemic narrative, we must see if and how Johnson instead exploited the opportunities that the pandemic crisis seemed to offer to his populist style of leadership.

10.3 Opportunities: Promoting an Authoritarian Turn, Exploiting the Community-Under-Siege Rhetoric, and Riding the ‘Rally Round the Flag’ Effect In England, Johnson’s eccentric populist and popular leadership could afford to engage in a muscular duel with the rules of international treaties—especially where these seemed to run counter to the will and sovereignty of the British people—not to the principles of British constitutionalism. In the political action of Johnson’s government, and even more so in its narrative, there seemed to be essentially no room for the most “threatening” opportunity that the pandemic crisis could offer to the populist government leadership, the excuse to impress—or reiterate— an authoritarian twist on its political system. In Johnson’s narrative, we do not find, in the face of the Covid-19 emergency, any request to renegotiate the balance of established British power structures. In dealing with the pandemic, Johnson was not calling for a structural redistribution of powers in favour of the government’s ability to act. Again, Orbán’s political and narrative position in Hungary will be very different. Johnson did try, however, to exploit the emotional impact that the “community under siege” rhetoric offers to any government leader and its perfect harmony with the usual sovereigntist narrative revived by rightwing populism. This opportunity passed in Johnson’s speeches through

218

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

the frequent reference to the historical horizon of wartime, the use of war metaphors, the recurrent adoption of a military lexicon,14 and the presence of historical references.15 If, in the first official speech on 3 March, Johnson referred to the need to ‘fight the virus’, with the passing days, the frame of war was increasingly central in the narrative of the British Prime Minister. At the front of the war, however, there were no soldiers—only nurses and doctors: I want to stress the following things: First, we are doing everything we can to combat this outbreak, based on the very latest scientific and medical advice. Second, we have a truly brilliant NHS, where staff have responded with all the determination, compassion and skill that makes their service so revered across the world. And they will continue to have this government’s full support, my support, in tackling this virus on the frontline. Third, we will set out further steps in the days and weeks ahead to help people protect themselves, their family, and in particular, the elderly and vulnerable. (March 9th) The Chief Medical Officer will set out our lines of defence. We have to deploy these at the right time to maximise their effect. The most important task will be to protect our elderly and most vulnerable people during the peak weeks when there is the maximum risk of exposure to the disease and when the NHS will be under the most pressure. (March 12th)

It was, therefore, not a war of military defence that Johnson referenced in the face of the pandemic siege but a war of care. If the only army on the front line wears the uniform of the National Health Service, the muscular and masculine dimension of the war frame softens, and its affinity with the traditional bellicose rhetoric of far-right populism fades.16 In the rear—the space in war normally occupied by health personnel—there was now civil society. With its sacrifice, its solidarity, and its civic sense, it

14 Shield, frontline, front, war, fight, fightback, lines of defence, defeat, combat, plan,

beat, and conflict are words that recur in Johnson’s pandemic narrative. 15 Waylen considers Johnson’s ‘excessive use of militaristic narratives of war and battle’ a signal of his hyper-masculine rhetoric (2021, p. 1163). 16 Orbán—as we shall see—never misses a rhetorical opportunity to put instead at the forefront, on the crucial defensive line of national borders, the ‘real’ army, with its traditional military uniform.

10

BORIS JOHNSON’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

219

contributed decisively—in Johnson’s storytelling—to ease the pressure on the medical trench and thus to protect the most vulnerable.17 The war metaphor acquired its greatest relevance in the speech of 17 March. The epidemiological situation in the United Kingdom was worsening. Within a week, the government was forced to impose the first lockdown on British citizens. Johnson then intensified his call for unity and national solidarity by systematically evoking the horizon of war and recalling the memory of the heroic experience of the Second World War directly: I want to go through our overall plan for beating this new coronavirus. First, we must stop the disease spreading to a point where it overwhelms our NHS. Every country in the world has the same problem. This is a disease that is so dangerous and so infectious that without drastic measures to check its progress, it would overwhelm any health system in the world. […] That is why we announced the steps yesterday that we did – advising against all unnecessary contact – steps that are unprecedented since World War Two. They will have an effect on the spread of the disease. The shielding of vulnerable groups will also reduce suffering, and I want to thank everybody at this stage for what we’re all doing to follow this advice. I stress that although the measures announced are already extreme, we may well have to go further and faster in the coming days to protect lives and the NHS. Secondly, we are doing all we can and as quickly as we can to increase the capacity of the NHS. That means more testing, more beds, more ventilators and more trained staff. It means greater support for NHS and other staff. And it means much better data and much better technology. Third, we must do all we can to boost science and research. We must study this disease, test drugs that already exist and have been through medical trials to see what helps treat severe cases and search for a vaccine. Fourth, we must act like any wartime government and do whatever it takes to support our economy. That’s the main purpose of this press conference this afternoon […].

17 Stay at home, protect our NHS, save lives was the phrase Johnson used most often to motivate civil society’s ‘war’ effort in the rear of its domestic confinement: ‘we want you to stay at home, that’s how we can protect our NHS and save lives. To repeat, I know how difficult this is, how it seems to go against the freedom-loving instincts of the British people. And I also know much, right now, workers and business deserve the financial reassurance we are giving them. But we will get through this. We will get through it together, and we will beat this virus ’ (March 20th).

220

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

Fifth, we will need to strengthen other public services that will be under great pressure from the direct and indirect effects of the disease, such as the effects of staff shortages and from the economic pressures. All institutions will be under great pressure, and we will therefore invest hugely in the people that we all rely on, and again I want to thank all our public servants for what they are already doing. Ultimately, to beat this crisis, we will need a combination of better science, technology, medicine, data, government operations, economic support, learning from other countries and social support. As time goes on, we will learn more and more about the disease and the effects of our actions. And while we need national unity, we also need international cooperation. And although we now need to impose physical distance between ourselves, we must at the same time have closer social support for each other. Yes, this enemy can be deadly, but it is also beatable – and we know how to beat it, and we know that if, as a country, we follow the scientific advice that is now being given, we know that we will beat it. And however tough the months ahead, we have the resolve and the resources to win the fight. (March 17th)

In the most critical stage of pandemic political management, the wartimeevoked horizon amplified the “rally round the flag” effect; the consensual collective reaction that normally relays to the population the immediacy of a systemic shock that threatens the national community (Kritzinger et al., 2021; Mueller, 1973). In his statements, Johnson tried to exploit the “rally round the flag” effect through the use of what we define as a “togetherness rhetoric”: But if we continue to look out for one another, to pull together in a united and national effort, I have no doubt that we can and will rise to that challenge. (March 9th) […] we will get through this, this country will get through this epidemic, just as it has got through many tougher experiences before if we look out for each other and commit wholeheartedly to a full national effort. (March 12th) The people of this country will rise to that challenge. And we will come through it stronger than ever. We will beat the coronavirus, and we will beat it together. (March 23rd)

10

BORIS JOHNSON’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

221

This country came together in a way few of us have seen in our lifetimes. (April 30th) These are careful but deliberate steps on the road to rebuilding our country. And we can only take these steps thanks to what we have so far achieved together. (May 25th) That progress, of course, has only been possible thanks to the dedication of the British people as we work together to beat this virus. (June 16th)

Here too, we see how Johnson’s desire to enhance the sense of community, even at the most dramatic moment for the pandemic government, did not resort to the populist “shortcut” of using the “other” as the enemy.

10.4 Threats: The Call for Competence Revival, the Emergence of a Scientific Elite Counterweight, and New Communicative Patterns Finally, let us observe how Johnson responded to the crisis threats. A “national pride narrative” (Loner et al., 2023) dominated Johnson’s representation of the role played by science in the fight against the virus. The British Prime Minister, in fact, systematically worked a celebration of medical-scientific patriotism into his pandemic narrative from his first official speeches: Let’s not forget – we already have a fantastic NHS, fantastic testing systems and fantastic surveillance of the spread of disease. We will make sure the NHS gets all the support it needs to continue their brilliant response to the virus so far. (March 3rd) […] we have a truly brilliant NHS, where staff have responded with all the determination, compassion and skill that makes their service so revered across the world. And they will continue to have this government’s full support, my support, in tackling this virus on the frontline. (March 9th)

In this way, Johnson tried to neutralise the two main threats that, as a populist government leader, the management of the pandemic presented to him: the call for competence revival and the potential rise of “a scientific elite counterweight”. In the “nationalisation” of the

222

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

conflict (a “national fight against the new coronavirus”), the National Health Service—as we have already seen—was the front line. Building on the identification between the British people and their health workers, Johnson constructed this effective semantic chain: behaving responsibly, protecting the National Health Service, and saving lives. “Stay at home, protect our NHS and save lives” became the central slogan of all his pandemic communication. On 28 May, when the government was close to declaring the end of the first lockdown, Johnson “celebrated” the success of the alliance between the National Health Service and civil society, thanking them for their mutual, heroic effort: At the start of the outbreak, there was significant concern that the NHS would not be able to cope. That turned out not to be the case, thanks to the heroic efforts of everyone who works in the NHS. And the heroic efforts of the British people to contain this virus. (May 28th)

If on the front line, there were, therefore, the NHS heroes, supported by the sacrifice and solidarity of all the British people; in the government war-room, where decisions for the fight against the virus are made, and plans are defined next to the premier—in front of the premier—since the first days of mobilisation, were the scientific experts. Johnson immediately signalled in his narrative the synergistic cooperation between Science and Policy.18 He never claimed the decision-making superiority of political power (with its popular legitimacy) over expert knowledge (and its elite scientific authority). In this way, Johnson did not try to contain the rise of a scientific elite counterweight but immediately came to terms with it. Indeed, scientific knowledge was the first source of legitimacy for political decisions in the government’s actions to combat the spread of the pandemic19 : Keeping the country safe is the government’s overriding priority. And our plan means we’re committed to doing everything possible based on the 18 Working from a much wider time horizon, Loner et al. (2023) confirm that science has been a ‘recurring topic’ in the British Prime Minister’s Covid-19 communication: ‘Boris Johnson cited science 133 times in the 94 speeches delivered in the first two years of the pandemic (the ratio between the extracted fragments and the speeches delivered is 1.41)’ (p. 8). 19 In Orbán, on the other hand, we find a different representation of the (power) relations between political leadership and the scientific elite.

10

BORIS JOHNSON’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

223

advice of our world-leading scientific experts to prepare for all eventualities. (…) The plan does not set out what the government will do; it sets out the steps we could take at the right time along the basis of the scientific advice. (March 3rd)

In its relationship with the scientific world, Johnson’s populist leadership thus aligned itself with the action (and narrative) of the other Western countries’ governments (with the flashy exception of Trump’s United States) by promoting “technocratic-oriented messages about the virus and ‘follow the science’ claims” (Loner et al., p. 3). This continuous representation of a science-driven decision-making process also allowed Johnson’s government the opportunity, if not to dump, certainly to share responsibility for severe restraint measures and unpopular policy choices with medical-scientific authorities: At all stages, we have been guided by the science, and we will do the right thing at the right time. (…) There is no escaping the reality that these measures will cause severe disruption across our country for many months. The best scientific advice is that this will help us slow the disease and save lives. (March 12th) I wanted to bring everyone up to date with the national fight back against the new coronavirus and the decisions that we’ve just taken in COBR20 for the whole of the UK. As we said last week, our objective is to delay and flatten the peak of the epidemic by bringing forward the right measures at the right time so that we minimise suffering and save lives. And everything we do is based scrupulously on the best scientific advice. Last week we asked everyone to stay at home if you had one of two key symptoms: a high temperature or a new and continuous cough. Today, we need to go further because, according to SAGE,21 it looks as though we’re now approaching the fast growth part of the upward curve. And without drastic action, cases could double every 5 or 6 days. (March 16th) I would like to update you all on the government’s plan to defeat the virus and on the latest developments. I am joined once again by our Chief 20 COBR is the acronym for Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms, a series of rooms located in the Cabinet Office at 70 Whitehall. It identifies the Civil Contingencies Committee, which is tasked with handling matters of national emergency or major disruption (https:/ /www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/article/explainer/cobr-cobra). 21 Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies.

224

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

Medical Officer, Professor Chris Whitty, and the Chief Scientific Advisor, Sir Patrick Vallance. From the very beginning of this crisis, I have followed the advice of our world-leading scientists. To defeat coronavirus by taking the right measures at the right time. (March 25th)

Johnson did not evoke the synergy between politics and science in a self-defensive key only in the aftermath of the lockdown imposition, but he “remembered” the guiding role of expert knowledge even when the fight against the virus began to produce results. Consequently, science was framed as the protagonist of the British comeback against an invisible killer. “We are shining the light of science on this invisible killer, and we will pick it up where it strikes”, Johnson said on 10 May. The celebration, even nationalistic, of the British scientific system found its definitive consecration in the announcement—on 16 June—of the first robust clinical trial of the AstraZeneca vaccine: Today, the global efforts to find a long-term solution to the pandemic continue – through a vaccine or effective treatment. And I am delighted that the biggest breakthrough yet has been made by a fantastic team of scientists right here in the UK. I am not really qualified to announce on this drug and its effects, but I will ask Sir Patrick and Professor Horby to say more in a moment. But I am so proud of these British scientists, backed by UK Government funding, who have led the first robust clinical trial anywhere in the world to find a coronavirus treatment proven to reduce the risk of death. […] today, there is genuine cause to celebrate a great British achievement and the benefits it will bring not just in this country but around the world. (June 16th)

The final threat that the pandemic posed to populism struck it precisely in one of its strengths, having imposed itself as the dominant discursive style (Kazin, 1995; Laclau, 2008) in the late-modern political season. We hypothesise that the coronavirus emergency, with its extraordinary agenda-setting power, could introduce into the public debate media logics and communication practices capable of questioning the “affinity” (Gerbaudo, 2018) that instead seemed to link the characteristics of our hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2017) and the discursive style of populism. One of the new communicative patterns imposed by the pandemic crisis—potentially hostile to populism—was that of a renewed interest in

10

BORIS JOHNSON’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

225

statistical and data-driven information. This new popular focus in mainstream public debate on scientific information conflicted with one of the fundamental dimensions of the populist discursive style: simplification. The typical tendency of populist rhetoric to reduce complexity thus clashed with the emergence of an overwhelming need to understand a structurally complex social macro-phenomenon such as the pandemic. The rational argument typical of science divulgation thus became a dominant canon in the mainstream narrative of the pandemic emergency. The times when the populist rhetoric of common sense could afford to mock the elitist intellectualism of expert knowledge seemed abruptly interrupted when the bulletin with epidemiological data on the spread of the virus turned into a daily media event (Dayan & Katz, 1992). This statisticalisation bias represented a challenge to populist leadership.22 Johnson initially tried to resist this new trend, not presenting any statistical data on the spread of the contagion at his conferences. This ‘no-data’ phase ran from 3 to 17 March 2020.23 In the second phase, Johnson included data in his pandemic narrative but selectively valued positive data, particularly those that indicated the progress made by the country in containing the virus.24 This short “only positive data” phase stopped abruptly when Johnson contracted the virus. The Prime Minister’s return to the scene after the illness was marked by the full and systematic integration of statistics into his pandemic communication.25 This “all data” phase of Johnson’s communication started at the end of April and then characterised all his narratives until the end of the first wave.

22 The opposite trend, de-statisticalisation, represents one of the distinctive features of a particularly relevant form of contemporary populism, penal populism (Anastasìa & Anselmi, 2020; Pratt, 2007). 23 Here is an example: “the number of cases will rise sharply and indeed the true number of cases is higher – perhaps much higher – than the number of cases we have so far confirmed with tests” (March 12th). 24 Here is an example: ‘we will massively scale up our testing capacity in the weeks ahead, so we hit 25,000 tests a day’ (March 18th). 25 Here is an example: ‘And sadly, of those who tested positive for coronavirus, across all settings, 26,711 have now died. That’s an increase of 674 fatalities since yesterday across all settings’ (April 30th).

226

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

References Anastasìa, S., & Anselmi, M. (2020). Populist punitiveness in the Italian populistic yellow-green government. Partecipazione e conflitto, 13(3), 1469– 1486. https://doi.org/10.1285/i20356609v13i3p1469 Andreouli, E., & Brice, E. (2022). Citizenship under COVID-19: An analysis of UK political rhetoric during the first wave of the 2020 pandemic. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 32(3), 555–572. https://doi.org/ 10.1002/casp.2526 Bennett, W. L. (2012). The personalization of politics: Political identity, social media, and changing patterns of participation. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 644(1), 20–39. Berezin, M. (2006). Xenophobia and the new nationalisms. In The Sage handbook of nations and nationalism (pp. 273–284). Sage. Caiani, M., & Graziano, P. (2019). Understanding varieties of populism in times of crises. West European Politics, 42(6), 1141–1158. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/01402382.2019.1598062 Chadwick, A. (2017). The hybrid media system: Politics and power. Oxford University Press. Dayan, D., & Katz, E. (1992). Media events: The live broadcasting of history. Harvard University Press. Engesser, S., Fawzi, N., & Larsson, A. O. (2017). Populist online communication: Introduction to the special issue. Information, Communication & Society, 20(9), 1279–1292. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2017.1328525 Gerbaudo, P. (2018). Social media and populism: An elective affinity? Media, Culture & Society, 40(5), 745–753. https://doi.org/10.1177/016344371 8772192 Jones, R. H. (2021). The wounded leader: The illness narratives of Boris Johnson and Donald Trump. Discourse, Context & Media, 41, 100499. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.dcm.2021.100499 Joosse, P. (2018). Countering Trump: Toward a theory of charismatic counterroles. Social Forces, 97 (2), 921–944. https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soy036 Kazin, M. (1995). The populist persuasion. Basic Books. Kritzinger, S., Foucault, M., Lachat, R., Partheymüller, J., Plescia, C., & Brouard, S. (2021). ‘Rally round the flag’: The COVID-19 crisis and trust in the national government. West European Politics, 44(5–6), 1205–1231. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1925017 Kurilla, R. (2021). ‘Kung Flu’—The dynamics of fear, popular culture, and authenticity in the anatomy of populist communication. Frontiers in Communication, 6, 624643. https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2021.624643 Laclau, E. (2008). La ragione populista. Laterza.

10

BORIS JOHNSON’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

227

Loner, E., Fattorini, E., & Bucchi, M. (2023). The role of science in a crisis: Talks by political leaders during the COVID-19 pandemic. PLoS ONE, 18(3), e0282529. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal Massidda, L. (2020). Xenofobia. Tempi e luoghi di un pregiudizio politico. In M. Anselmi & L. Guercio (Eds.), Il nemico (pp. 53–70). Mondadori Università. McAllister, I. (2007). The personalization of politics. In The Oxford handbook of political behavior (pp. 571–588). Oxford University Press. Moffitt, B. (2015). How to perform crisis: A model for understanding the key role of crisis in contemporary populism. Government and Opposition, 50(2), 189–217. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2014.13 Mueller, J. E. (1973). War, presidents, and public opinion. Wiley. Parmanand, S. (2022). Macho populists versus COVID: Comparing political masculinities. European Journal of Women’s Studies, 29(1_suppl), 43S–59S. https://doi.org/10.1177/13505068221092871 Pratt, J. (2007). Penal populism. Routledge. Saccà, F., & Selva, D. (2021). Women political leaders in pandemic times: Comparing Jacinda Ardern and Donald Trump’s representation of the Covid-19 crisis. Hayka. Kylbtypa. Obwectvo, 27 (2), 8–21. Schneiker, A. (2020). Populist leadership: The superhero Donald Trump as savior in times of crisis. Political Studies, 68(4), 857–874. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/00323217209166 Spyridonidis, D., Côté, N., Currie, G., & Denis, J.-L. (2022). Leadership configuration in crises: Lessons from the English response to COVID19. Leadership, 18(5), 680–694. https://doi.org/10.1177/174271502211 26780 Tomkins, L. (2020). Where is Boris Johnson? When and why it matters that leaders show up in a crisis. Leadership, 16(3), 331–342. https://doi.org/10. 1177/1742715020919657 Turner, S. (2003). Charisma reconsidered. Journal of Classical Sociology, 3(1), 5–26. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468795X03003001692 Turner, S. (2011). Classic sociology: Weber as an analyst of charisma. In M. Harvey & R. E. Riggio (Eds.), Leadership studies: The dialogue of disciplines (pp. 82–88). Edward Elgar. Waylen, G. (2021). Gendering political leadership: Hypermasculine leadership and Covid-19. Journal of European Public Policy, 28(8), 1153–1173. https:/ /doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1942160 Weber, M. (1995). Economia e Società. Teorie delle categorie sociologiche. Edizioni di Comunità (Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Mohr, 1922). Yates, C. (2018). On the psychodynamics of Boris Johnson and Brexit. New Associations, (25), 4–5. http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/32578/

CHAPTER 11

Viktor Orbán’s Approach to the Pandemic

Now, we have to take into account Viktor Orbán’s communication. We analysed eighteen statements on the coronavirus given by Orbán between 4 March and 29 May 2020. We have seven Prime Minister’s statements on coronavirus and eleven interviews at the Kossuth Radio programme ‘Good Morning Hungary’. All the analysed texts, including the transcriptions of Orbán’s radio ‘chats’, were extracted from the institutional website of the Hungarian government, www.miniszterelnok.hu. Working through the frame of our SWOT model, we aim to verify if the health emergency has intensified the traditional characteristics of Orbán’s populist rhetoric (starting from its main ideological dimensions: appeal to “the people”, attacking the élite, ostracising the “other”) or if it has rather led to a change of its argumentative structures (as we have seen happened in Johnson’s case, at least partially).

The original version of this chapter was revised: Author name “Luca Massidda” has been updated. The correction to this chapter is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9_13 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023, corrected publication 2023 F. Saccà and D. Selva, European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9_11

229

230

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

11.1 Strengths: Raising Strong Leadership’s Appeal and Exploiting Media Centrality Unlike Johnson, Orbán did not dismiss the opportunity offered by the urgency of the pandemic situation to portray himself as a man of action (Batory, 2023, p. 117) who can exercise the charismatic—or pseudocharismatic—type of populist leadership, thus exploiting its popular appeal in the face of a crisis. Immediately, Orbán moved to the new “setting” of the pandemic in perfect continuity with the role he played in previous seasons of his populist fiction. In the press statement of 23 March, he reminded his fellow citizens that he had already successfully led the country through several other crises: We’ve been through many crises together: I remember the red mud disaster, the floods, the financial crisis, and migration. We’ve had many kinds of crisis, and in every crisis situation – at least when I’ve been in charge of crisis management – what I’ve seen is that when there is trouble in Hungary, the people stand together, join forces, and excel. So I believe that today we have the capacity for cooperation needed to contain the epidemic within limits. (March 23rd)

The charismatic conservative leader had a long personal history of crisis management. This trait of his agentic political personality re-emerged forcefully as soon as Hungary was hit by the first wave of Covid-19. The Hungarian Prime Minister resorted on several occasions to the rhetoric of the strong man, the agentic and muscular leader who decides to take action and commit himself to the fight: Twelve days ago, we made the extraordinary announcement of a special legal order. We needed to do this because scientists seeking a vaccine for the coronavirus say that they haven’t yet discovered one and that even when they do, it will take many weeks – indeed months – before it becomes available to all of us. Most predict that this will happen next year. The question was whether we should wait or take action, and we decided that instead of waiting, we would commit ourselves to the fight. (March 23rd)

In his statements, Orbán presented himself as a fearless leader, a head of state capable of making difficult decisions without being overwhelmed by fear, a leader who is not a coward, and who does not throw in the towel. We’re fighting two viruses: the coronavirus and the virus of fear. […] There are people whose duty it is to conquer their fears because this is the only way they can help others. Above all, we expect this from priests because

11

VIKTOR ORBÁN’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

231

conquering fear requires spiritual strength, and that is their stock-in-trade. In second place come state leaders, who must make difficult decisions, and those who are prey to fear will be unable to make good decisions. In third place are the police, soldiers and disaster management personnel: those serving in uniform. They have undertaken to fight the enemy – physically, if need be. So for these people, courage is an inbuilt duty. Then we have doctors who have taken up the fight against an invisible enemy. (April 3rd) Of course, innate intelligence is important, and education, training, the skills of our professors, and the experience and knowledge of doctors are all important. But the most important thing is for us not to throw in the towel. So we can use our knowledge, our intelligence must be operating, but always the precondition for everything is that we are not cowards. So if trouble strikes, if there’s a sudden challenge, something that we’ve not prepared for, then let’s not wail: let’s keep calm, settle down, look around us, assess the situation, and immediately take the necessary action. And we know what we must do. For this, we need self-confidence. (April 24th)

Facing the pandemic emergency, the Hungarian leader acted like the captain of a ship in a storm. He personally took responsibility, and he directly led the defence operation. This rhetoric of the person alone in charge fits perfectly with the dress normally worn by the populist political leader in the staging of their own political performance. I’ve personally been in many places, and I’ve felt the sourcing of equipment to be my personal responsibility. There’s been a debate over whether it’s right for the Prime Minister to turn up at hospitals and for him to lead the defence operation himself. This is an understandable question, incidentally. But I’m not going to come out and say it’s right because the situation will determine whether one needs to direct defence operations personally or if there’s a crisis in which one should instead give such authority to the Interior Minister or the Health Minister. But now I’ve felt it to be important that I should direct this defence operation personally. This is not because I understand health care – that’s not something that one could easily accuse me of, but I have common sense, and I know how one should mount a defence campaign in a time of crisis. After all, this isn’t the first crisis I’ve seen: there was an economic crisis, a migrant crisis, I’ve seen floods, and I’ve seen the red mud disaster. So I’ve been through the mill. […] Because he leads the government – and thus also the operation of state life – the Prime Minister should be there personally alongside people to prove that there is indeed a point in citizens being loyal to the community and the state because the state will also be loyal to them. At such times one can show with appropriate force that the Prime Minister himself is accepting a personal role and responsibility in the defence operations. (May 8th)

232

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

Here, Orbán was projecting the self-image of a leader who will protect his people from an external threat, activating a “protective masculinity” frame1 that proved at the same time perfectly consistent with his traditional self-representation as an agentic charismatic leader and perfectly functional to the enhancement of his popular role as commander-in-chief in the fight against the virus. As regards political leadership representation, the virus—as we have seen—decisively contributed to ‘normalising’ the eccentric personality of Johnson’s fraternal populism; on the other hand, for Orbán, the pandemic immediately acted as an amplifier of his reassuring image as the father of the country.

11.2

Weaknesses: Facing a Reality-Based Colossus Opponent and Taking Responsibility for Unpopular Politics

Let us now see how Orbán reacted to the possible weaknesses of his “condition” as a populist leader in government during a pandemic. Unlike Johnson, Orbán did not let the virus completely dictate the agenda but tried to maintain control over the representation of the “conflict”. Firstly, he placed his habitual political opponents on the battlefield against the virus as enemies of Hungary. First were foreigners, responsible for having brought an ‘alien’ virus into the borders of the Hungarian nation: Our experience is that the epidemic has primarily been brought into Hungary by foreigners and is spreading among foreigners. (March 13th) We deliberated at length over the closure of universities and eventually decided to effectively quarantine them because there are many foreign students. Our experience is that the epidemic has primarily been brought into Hungary by foreigners and is spreading among foreigners. Most people in Hungary don’t know this, but we have tens of thousands of foreign students here. It is no coincidence that the outbreak started among Iranians, and, as we cannot separate foreign students from Hungarian students, ordering the temporary closure of universities seemed rational. (March 15th) 1 Johnson and Williams describe protective masculinity as a narrative form “in which male leaders draw on traditional conceptions of the male head of household and breadwinner who protects and cares for their family to suggest that they have the necessary masculine characteristics to protect their nation” (2020, p. 944).

11

VIKTOR ORBÁN’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

233

There is a pandemic, however. This isn’t something that we caused; this isn’t something we did: we’ve been saddled with it by others. Now we have to live with it and must manage its consequences. (April 17th)

The infecting stranger frame allowed Orbán to activate another narrative device to prevent the pandemic from completely dictating the agenda. The Hungarian conservative leader here used the virus to reinforce the traditional main issue of his far-right populism: combating immigration and protecting borders. Immediately, in his first speech, Orbán framed the protection from the virus as a border control issue2 : We are monitoring border crossing points, and we are continuously screening people entering the country. (March 4th) We are keeping our borders under full surveillance. (March 20th) […] the police closed our borders to the movement of people […]. At our borders, we are stopping all non-Hungarian nationals. (March 23rd) As regards the military, they are now taking a more active part in border control. (March 23rd)

In his radio interview on 15 March, the Hungarian Prime Minister expressly referred to a war on two fronts —that of migration and that of the coronavirus epidemic—and underlined the “logical” connection that bound these two “threats”: There’s no doubt that we’re engaged in a war on two fronts: on one front, there is migration and on the other, the coronavirus epidemic. And as movement spreads the disease and increases the epidemic to a global scale, and migration is itself movement, there is a logical connection between the two things. But as Hungary has so far successfully defended itself against 2 This rhetorical strategy was also featured in Donald Trump’s pandemic communication. Facing the first wave of the virus as a populist in government, the former US President “was quick to blame immigrants, which is consistent with the ‘fear of outsiders’ invoked in his presidential campaigns and political strategies. Even in the absence of evidence to show that the spread of Covid-19 in the United States was caused by migration policies, border control was a form of pandemic theatre that positioned Trump as the nation’s protector against ‘dangerous foreigners’” (Parmanand, 2022, p. 49). Orbán, as we have seen, sets up exactly this same nationalist “choreography”.

234

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

migration, we are also protected from infections potentially being brought into the country by migrants. We’re not letting in anyone, and we won’t be letting in anyone. (March 15th)

If the scapegoat of the contagious migrant allowed Orbán to continue along the horizontal axis of “us vs them”, which is typical of exclusionary sovereignty, the other enemies of the homeland that the Prime Minister evoked in his pandemic narrative—Europe, George Soros, the political opposition—allowed him instead to strengthen his position on the vertical axis of opposition between the general public and the elite. Europe had a leading role in Orbán’s effort to bring the fight against the virus back to his “comfortable” anti-élite frame. The intensification of the fight against the virus thus paralleled the escalation of the conflict, institutional and rhetorical, with the European Union and its idle officials: So I plainly told the EU nit-pickers […] that this is not the time to come to me pontificating about all sorts of – no doubt fascinating – legal and theoretical questions. (March 27th)

In this way, Orbán exploited the virus to focus on the ideological conflict of sovereignism vs Europeanism, bringing it onto the playing field in the fight against the pandemic. Once again, the attempt was to “tame” the representation of the pandemic by subjecting it, at least in part, to the usual plots of a populist script: Those who want to build an empire in Europe want to break the nationstates into conformity with an imperial order. This has an elegant name so that they can speak about this in refined terms: they call it ‘the United States of Europe’. We want no part of that: we want to remain Hungarians, and we want Hungary to remain a Hungarian country. Because the current Hungarian government stands on this foundation, the believers in empire – the empire builders – will always seize the opportunity to weaken the Hungarian government. The most provocative point of tension and interest in the dispute in the European Union between Hungary and the Brussels bureaucrats, which has been rolling on for more than ten years, is precisely about them attacking the things which are supported by the overwhelming majority of people here in Hungary (…). Now the situation is the same with the distinctive national approach to managing the pandemic. So it’s clear that those who are attacking us have no interest in democracy because the will of the people and majority opinion, in general,

11

VIKTOR ORBÁN’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

235

is behind the Hungarian government’s stance. We’re doing things that the people want, ask, and expect from us. So the dispute is not about democracy but about empire and national independence. (May 8th)

This approach helped Orbán avoid losing control of the narrative and continue to draw strength from the foundation of his populist communication: even in the management of the pandemic, Brussels bureaucrats attempted to hinder government action that corresponded perfectly to the will of the Hungarian people. “The dispute”—Orbán clarified—was “not about democracy but about empire and national independence”. Next to the European Union, another habitual “villain” of the Hungarian people emerged that consistently appeared in the pandemic narrative of the Prime Minister. Several times in his pandemic statements, Orbán found the opportunity to attack George Soros, a historical opponent of his conservative sovereignty. The ethnic threat of the foreigner and the anti-nationalist threat of the European Union were welded in the controversial Hungarian financier and his cosmopolitan project of “world governance driven by global financial interests”: There is a life-and-death struggle over the potential liquidation of national governments’ sovereignty and nation-states’ independence, over whether they can be drawn into a vast system of world governance driven by global financial interests and be rendered subservient. And we find the Soros-style network’s strongest bridgehead among liberal circles within Europe today, the liberals being the strongest representatives of this concept and its realisation. Poor Kossuth and the Hungarian national liberals will be turning in their graves because when they designed their political philosophy and system based on freedom, there was no suggestion that this could only be realised at the cost of Hungary’s or any other country’s sovereignty and independence. We now live in a world in which the liberals have discarded their ties to the nation – they’ve discarded national independence, they’ve discarded national sovereignty, and their goal is the creation of a system of global governance. (May 1st)

The fight against the pandemic was thus inscribed in the long-term systemic conflict between the defence of national independence and the creation of a post-national system of governance, between the interests of a global economic elite and the legitimate representatives of the popular will. There was also Soros’s greedy hand behind the instrumental attacks coming from Brussels in the aftermath of the proclamation by the

236

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

Hungarian government of the “state of danger” (we will discuss this in more detail shortly): The European Parliament is only sitting in some internet-based form, so it’s not really in session. The Hungarian parliament is still at work. Yesterday and the day before yesterday, we submitted sixteen bills. So we’re not only dealing with disease control issues – because it’s the government’s job, the government’s duty to deal with those by decree; but meanwhile, on the normal side of our lives, there are matters in addition to disease control issues. Law-making must continue to operate there, so we’ve submitted these bills, and the Hungarian parliament is working at full tilt. So the claims being made by our opponents – whom in this situation I can unhesitatingly describe as our enemies – are factually incorrect. If I take a good look at the scope and degree of the “state of danger” powers granted to the Hungarian government and to me personally, what I see is that they’re more or less equivalent to the powers that the president of France has under normal circumstances. So it’s absolutely obvious that these are political attacks. And the truth is that this is a network. I’m loath to repeat this mantra, but Hungary has opponents who are only too eager to sink their teeth into this country: they want to plunder it and appropriate its resources. George Soros stands at the centre of this network. His people are in Brussels, in the positions from where the present criticisms are being aimed at us. But as I’ve said, we mustn’t allow ourselves to be provoked. We should lower the adrenalin level a little and concentrate on our job: how to help the Hungarian people and how to save Hungarian lives. (April 3rd) Brussels is a power centre. We exercise certain powers together with Brussels, but bureaucrats have occupied Brussels, and there the scope for rationality is more limited. The new president of the [European] Commission has initiated positive changes, but there are still a lot of problems. There is plenty of work to do in order to shape the centre of the European Union so that it serves the interests of Member States rather than obstructs them and so that it assists our defence operation instead of obstructing it. But we always see the hand of George Soros in developments, and this is also the case now. (April 25th)

The final target of Orbán’s polemical hype was an internal enemy, the political opposition. There were no words—in the Prime Minister’s narrative—to describe the behaviour of those fellow citizens who, inside its

11

VIKTOR ORBÁN’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

237

parliament, attacked and hindered the action of a government committed to defending the Hungarian community and saving Hungarian lives: Again, I’ll speak about experience, as I’ve observed parliamentary debates and have taken part in them over the past thirty years; and I can see when a Member of Parliament is speaking with a clear conscience and when someone is ashamed of themselves for having to perform the task given to them by their sponsors. I’ve seen Members of Parliament who’ve been ashamed of themselves when they’ve attacked the government, and I understand why. So attacking a foreign country when it’s in trouble – when there’s a pandemic, for example, and it’s living through the resulting siege and all the accompanying circumstances – goes beyond the bounds of European civilisation and humanity. But it’s difficult to find words to describe the behaviour of someone who attacks their own country when everyone is preoccupied with the defence operation and how to save lives. When someone does this, when they stand up in Parliament and do this while at the same time retaining some element of decency, then one sees that the more decent opposition Members of Parliament feel ashamed. (May 1st)

According to Orbán, these shameless parliamentarians were only executors answering the commands of external sponsors. Predictably, the name that regularly emerged again is that of George Soros, one of the country’s most gifted sons: I try to avoid giving the listeners the impression that I’m a proponent of conspiracy theories, but although I’m convinced that there are many things in the world that cannot be explained through conspiracy theories, this doesn’t mean that conspiracies don’t exist. I was sure that, as one could see that the infection hubs of Italy, Spain, and France weren’t able to contain this pandemic and that we would be dealing with a Europe-wide pandemic, that financial advice would emerge from investors and speculators on how we should finance the recovery from the crisis. And I was sure that we wouldn’t be hearing the sort of advice in which the beneficiaries would be us because, at times like this, one tends to hear advice in which the beneficiaries are financial investors. And I would have been absolutely amazed if, among these investors, we didn’t find one of our country’s most gifted sons: George Soros. (May 1st)

As we have seen, the Hungarian Prime Minister systematically pointed the finger at the “usual suspects” (migrants and international elites),

238

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

denounced the ineffectuality and alienation of the “bureaucrats in Brussels”,3 and blamed his unpatriotic opposition (Batory, 2023, p. 122). These were the four recurring polemical targets in Orbán’s emergency narrative that allowed him to also inscribe the fight against the virus within the canons of his traditional populist script. In this way, the Hungarian leader tried to maintain control over the representation of the conflict, at least partially, unloading the unsustainable weight of a real colossal opponent on the shoulders of much more manageable villains.

11.3 Opportunities: Promoting an Authoritarian Turn, Exploiting the Community Under Siege Rhetoric, and Riding the ‘Rally Round the Flag’ Effect The decisive variable in assessing Orbán’s response to the pandemic is related to the opportunity to exploit the health emergency to justify an authoritarian turn within the political decision-making process. If, with Johnson, we failed to find ‘clues’ that could suggest we follow this “track”, in the case of Orbán, the situation is more complex. For example, when the Covid-19 emergency arrived, Orbán had already been the head of the government for ten years. He had long since begun to renegotiate the limits of the rule of law and to pursue his project of illiberal democracy. Pandemic management was, therefore, part of a long-term process of illiberal transformation of Hungarian democracy (Hajnal et al., 2021, p. 617) that only “provided enhanced opportunities for this strategy” (Ádám & Csaba, 2022, p. 277). Exploiting the window of opportunity opened by the Covid-19 crisis, Orbán was able to relaunch his longlasting “path towards illiberalism and neo-authoritarianism” (Wodak, 2021, p. 17). In Orbán’s pandemic narrative, this strategy has resulted in the staging of three conflicts, with the Fidesz leader representing himself as engaged in a triple populist arm wrestling contest against the unpopular constraints of the rule of law, against idle European bureaucrats, and against the irresponsible protectors of political pluralism.

3 Orbán thus exploited the new situation to reinforce his traditional Eurosceptic discourse that “combines nativism and populism and accuses the EU of misusing the pandemic to undermine national sovereignty and push through new supranational measures” (Wondreys & Mudde, 2022, p. 90).

11

VIKTOR ORBÁN’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

239

There were three “institutional” moments in Orbán’s response to the pandemic’s first wave that led—in Orbán’s own words—to the “overcoming” of the boundaries of the normal rule of law: the proclamation, provided for by the Hungarian Constitution, of the “state of danger” (11 March), the approval by the parliament of the so-called “Authorisation Act” (30 March) and, finally, its revocation (18 June) “in conjunction with amendments to the regulation of exceptional legal orders” that changed the State of Emergency into a “state of medical emergency” (Batory, 2023, p. 124). The end of the state of danger only superficially brought Hungary back into democracy. According to this bill, in fact, if similar circumstances were to occur, the government would still be able to govern by decree, with even less control by the legislature than before. While Orbán “ostensibly returned his emergency powers”, he substantially “reintroduced them in a different guise, creating the prerogative for the government to declare a ‘state of medical emergency’ without parliamentary approval, which it immediately exercised” (Batory, 2022, p. 10). The first time Orbán addressed the state of danger issue—just two days after its proclamation—the Prime Minister seemed to want to reassure the public, almost distancing himself from an outside democracy situation: In Hungary, a special legal order has a different meaning from that in most European countries. Here it is a special situation regulated in the Constitution when normal constitutional principles and rules are effectively suspended or bypassed, and it is possible to implement measures that the gravity of the emergency demands and which depart from the procedures typical of a democracy. It thus allows for the implementation of swift and immediate measures. This is perhaps unprecedented in our history […]. So this is somewhere between peacetime democracy and a state of war. On this, we must proceed with caution – it’s no accident that civilised countries rarely resort to it. […] But, seeing that in the majority of European countries, the spread of the epidemic is unstoppable, I suggested to the government that we take this decision. This is what has happened. Of course, there are built-in “emergency brakes” because this is, after all, a situation outside democracy, and the government can only introduce it for two weeks. If we want to maintain it for longer, which I think we will have to, Parliament will have to approve it, and Parliament will have to extend it. (March 13th)

240

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

However, with the passing days, the “enhancement” of the constitutional instrument of the state of danger prevailed in Orbán’s communication, and doubts and cautions seemed to disappear. The state of danger exception became a political necessity. Without this “deviation” from democracy, it would not have been possible to safeguard the Hungarian community: I declared a “state of danger” because, under normal circumstances, the measures necessary for the defence effort could only have been enacted after a great many debates over the course of several months. The state of danger gives us the power to enact these measures rapidly and without debate. This is day nine since the declaration of the state of danger, and I can tell you that we have mounted a collective defence for the containment of the virus […]. As a result, today, the community of Hungarians is a community in a state of defence. (March 20th) We immediately saw that we wouldn’t be able to organise Hungary’s collective self-defence – and that even acting together, we wouldn’t be able to ward off this attack – if we followed the usual way of things, pursuing our normal lifestyle, maintaining our lives’ customary organising principles, within the boundaries of the normal rules of law. This is why we sought authorisation and declared a ‘state of danger’. A state of danger means that the government has received both the authorisation and the means to organise Hungary’s self-defence, with the prospect of success. (March 23rd)

Acting within the boundaries of the normal rules of law, it simply would not have been possible to organise an effective strategy to defend the Hungarian people. When on 30 March, the parliament adopted Act XII on the Containment of the Coronavirus, the constitutional (and provisional) exception became the norm, guaranteeing—according to the Hungarian Helsinki Committee—a carte blanche mandate without a sunset clause to rule by decree. However, in the narrative proposed by the Fidesz leader, it was only thanks to the freedom and speed of action allowed by the Authorisation Act that Hungary was able to overcome the first wave of the virus (Batory, 2023, p. 120). A second “narrative” track functional to the predisposition—and legitimisation—of an authoritarian turn emerged in the tendency, in Orbán’s communication, to militarise the health emergency. In his narrative, the defence of the nation was organised simultaneously on four fronts:

11

VIKTOR ORBÁN’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

241

We’ve organised our defences on four fronts. We must hold the line and strengthen our defence in four theatres of operation simultaneously: the military, the police, the healthcare system, and the economy […]. Day by day, our police officers’ tasks are increasing as the worsening situation demands that they take control of an increasing number of areas […]. The situation in terms of our military resources is as follows: 23,950 career soldiers; 9,381 reservists; and 10,649 officers who were discharged in the past five years, meaning that they have capabilities which can be deployed. This represents a military force with a combined total of 43,980. Once again, if I add this number to our police capabilities, we have 139,684 people at our disposal. This is what we must manage. They will be able to maintain public order in Hungary and also the peace which is necessary in order to stave off the infection. (March 23rd)

Border protection—as we have seen—and maintaining public order were two priorities in Orbán’s strategy to contain the infection. Working with this double securitarian track, the Hungarian Prime Minister tried to revitalise, even in the pandemic-changed scenario, two master plots of his far-right populist narrative: law and order rhetoric and that of the defence of the nation. This masculine militarisation of the crisis4 connected seamlessly to the self-representation as an active muscular leader that Orbán attempted to embody from the beginning of the pandemic. The narrative imposition of this military framing (Wodak, 2022) emerged in much more accentuated use than in Johnson’s use of military jargon5 (ivi, p. 10) and war metaphors: We have organised Hungary’s collective self-defence, our communal defence against the global pandemic. (March 18th) 4 Through a visual analysis conducted on the posts published by the Facebook accounts of the Hungarian government during the pandemic, Linnamäki (2021) highlights how this militaristic and masculine representation of virus control was mirrored by the all-female narrative of care work. In the pandemic narrative on social media, control and care are strikingly gendered and hierarchised (Linnamäki, 2021). Here, too, we see how Orbán’s government has tried to exploit the Covid-19 health crisis to strengthen a main argument of its rhetoric and ideology, its anti-gender right-wing political discourse (Kováts & Pet˝ o, 2017). The pandemic state of exception thus has allowed Orbán to carry out his patriarchal project of creating an anti-liberal gender regime that Fodor (2022, pp. 2–3) calls carefare. 5 Battle, combat, self-defence, communal defence, fight, attack, frontline, home front, theatres of operations, defence operations, battle plan, struggle, military plan, weapon, siege, bunker: these are all words that recur in Orbán’s communication.

242

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

Those people will withdraw from the front line, and others will have to take their places. This is a military plan of action (…) the community of Hungarians is a community in a state of defence. (March 20th) The country is currently operating according to something like a military-style plan of operations, with resource management, deployment commands, supplies, and restrictions on movement. (March 27th) We’ve organised our defences on four fronts […]. We must hold the line and strengthen our defence in four theatres of operations simultaneously […]. We have also prepared a battle plan […], we can hold our line of defence in health care. (March 23rd) In the present situation, our most powerful weapon is discipline – or selfcontrol. (April 10th) We’re right in the middle of a major military-style operation; “state of war”. (April 17th) When we have that weapon [the vaccine], we shall impale this virus. (April 24th) Hungary has won the first battle against the virus […]. I don’t want to lull either the citizens of Budapest or the rest of the country into the false belief that victory in the first battle has ended the war. (May 1st)

Hungary was a nation at war, and its collective defence was organised in a “true military plan of action”. On the front line were law enforcement and health workers. But the role of the home front, where all the Hungarian people were engaged, was also decisive. Finally, the third indication of authoritarian tension in Orbán’s pandemic communication is related to the impatience that, on several occasions, he showed towards political and parliamentary confrontation. Managing the pandemic, Orbán revealed consistent intolerance in his confrontations with other political subjects. His political discourse systematically showed signs of impatience with the parliament, political parties, and the opposition. Yet in his statement of 5 March, the Hungarian Prime Minister, asking political parties for “restraint”, clarified how, in addressing the epidemic, “people’s protection is not a political issue, and certainly not a party-political issue”.

11

VIKTOR ORBÁN’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

243

The topos of the mandatory and necessary consent to government action reappeared systematically in Orbán’s emergency storytelling. “Dissent and dispute must be replaced by joint action”, he declared on 23 March. “This is not the time for party-political debates”, he clarified in a 3 April radio interview. The idea that in dealing with a crisis of this magnitude, politics must take a step back and give way to government action was expressed in the most straightforward way on 27 March, when Orbán declared to ‘Good Morning Hungary’ that “politics is not what we need now”: Politics is another matter because politics is still a power struggle: there’s a governing party and an opposition. And the opposition cannot be blamed for wanting power and wanting to get into government, but there’s always someone else there – in this case, us – in that position who must be attacked to gain power. I understand that – this is called politics. But politics is not what we need now. There are times when a country definitely doesn’t need politics but cooperation because the more we come together, the more lives we can save. This is not about power and governance now, but human lives. (March 27th)

In short, Orbán could not tolerate politics and its conflictual, divisive, and non-cooperative nature. Thus, following a logic proper to populism and its anti-constitutionalist vocation, he attempted to exploit the emergency to exclude his political competitors from the circle of legitimacy (Martinico, 2022, p. 16).

11.4 Threats: The Calling for Competence Revival, the Emergence of a Scientific Elite Counterweight, and New Communicative Patterns The last aspect we must examine is that of the relationship with science. Orbán responded to the threat that the potential rise of a scientific counterweight posed to a populist leadership by trying to find a balance between science and politics—a balance based, on the one hand, on the recognition of the role of scientific knowledge (“We are facing an unknown enemy. It follows from this that in our decisions we can only rely on scientific statements and experience”, March 13th). On the other hand, he proclaimed, in the context of the pandemic emergency, the primacy of

244

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

political (leadership) agency. Decisions are made based on scientific statements and personal experience, but it is the latter the most important thing in life as well as in the middle of a crisis: The most important thing in life is experience. Of course, there are philosophical debates about this – whether experience or knowledge not gained through experience is more important, but whatever the debate, it is certain that in politics, experience trumps everything else. So one can only be certain of one thing: that which one has lived through, experienced, and is familiar with. And the piles of books that one may read or the lessons one attends at school and the exams one sits don’t match the importance of what one has grasped with one’s own hands, touched, and seen with one’s own eyes. And this is also true in this crisis. (May 1st)

Once again, we see how, in the face of the pandemic, Orbán refused to relinquish the traditional cornerstones of his populist rhetoric. Instead, he tried to exploit the crisis to reiterate and relaunch them. Orbán recognised the importance of scientific knowledge and respected the distinction between political actors and scientists6 ; nevertheless, in the end, he strongly reiterated, precisely in the context of its maximum social relevance, the uncontested subordination of expert knowledge to political experience—his political experience. Scientific knowledge was an important variable in political decision-making but was “compressed” between what common sense dictated7 and, above all, by what his personal human and political experience suggested to the leader. To blunt the growth of a counter-power of scientific elites, which elsewhere was triggered by the fear of the virus, Orbán did not respond with the “arrogance of ignorance” (Wodak, 2015) as Trump did in the United States but simply claimed the hierarchically superior status of politics and its legitimisation. The centrality acquired by scientific knowledge

6 ‘(W)e’re paying heed to the scientists and epidemiologists. At such times it’s very important for politicians to maintain a clear understanding of their own role, and not to transform into amateur virologists or healthcare experts. Instead we should make it possible for our professors—as we have some outstanding minds—to have access to as much information as possible, to formulate as much advice as possible, and to communicate this to decision-makers’ (April 24th). 7 In his first speech on the pandemic, Orbán declared: “Now the rules we need to put into effect are dictated by common sense” (March 4th).

11

VIKTOR ORBÁN’S APPROACH TO THE PANDEMIC

245

did not, therefore, seem to constitute a real threat to a populist government leader who had consolidated his control in the context of illiberal democracy. Faced with the uncertainty of the pandemic, the Hungarian Prime Minister could afford to assert the predominance of his political common sense without exacerbating the anti-intellectualistic bias of his populist rhetoric. Although Orbán repeatedly referred to the role of science, his pandemic government action clearly sanctioned the undisputed predominance of politics, with hospitals immediately placed under the direct military control of the state (Ádám & Csaba, 2022, p. 282). The same principle of subordination to the political sphere also affected scientific communication. Orbán did not try to escape the data-driven logic that the pandemic crisis quickly and violently imposed on public discourse; instead, he attempted to dictate a political monopoly on the access and dissemination of Covid-19 information and public health statistics (ivi, p. 282). Unlike what we saw in the initial phase of Johnson’s communication, Orbán, already in his first official statement on 5 March, inserted a detailed account of the contagion data—referencing the worldwide scenario—into his pandemic narrative: We have reviewed the situation, and the coronavirus numbers and data for Hungary – as of last night – are the following: there are two confirmed cases; 24 people are in quarantine, so they are in isolation; and 230 tests are in progress – this is the number of samples being tested in an accredited laboratory. Across the world, as of last night, we know of 3,268 deaths due to the virus. In the world today – or rather last night – we know of 95,748 people who have been infected, 53,418 of whom have recovered, so there are people in the world who have recovered from this infection. The Operational Group will provide daily figures for Hungary and the data we have on the situation around the world. That is how things stand today. (March 5th)

At this same conference, Orbán already referenced the vaccine directly, thus entrusting knowledge and scientific innovation with the role of a true gamechanger in the fight against the virus: only when the vaccine became available—he declared—“people’s sense of security will swing back up” (March 5th). The vaccine would be the weapon that would enable them to “impale this virus” (April 24th). However, until the vaccine solution was ready, it was politics—and Orbán as leader—who must take responsibility for decisions. “I don’t want to shift the responsibility onto anyone else”, clearly reiterated Orbán on 24 April, at the crucial time of transition from the first to the second phase of the fight against the virus.

246

L. MASSIDDA AND F. SACCÀ

References Ádám, Z., & Csaba, I. (2022). Populism unrestrained: Policy responses of the Orbán regime to the pandemic in 2020–2021. European Policy Analysis, 8, 277–296. https://doi.org/10.1002/epa2.1157 Batory, A. (2022). More power, less support: The Fidesz government and the coronavirus pandemic in Hungary. Government and Opposition: An International Journal of Comparative Politics, 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov. 2022.3 Batory, A. (2023). Hungary. Creeping authoritarianism in the name of pandemic response. In N. Ringe & L. Rennó (Eds.), Populists and the pandemic. How populists around the world responded to COVID-19 (pp. 117–126). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003197614-10 Fodor, E. (2022). The gender regime of anti-liberal Hungary. Palgrave. Hajnal, G., Jeziorska, I., & Kovács, É. M. (2021). Understanding drivers of illiberal entrenchment at critical junctures: Institutional responses to COVID19 in Hungary and Poland. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 87 (3), 612–630. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852320981138 Johnson, C., & Williams, B. (2020). Gender and political leadership in a time of COVID. Politics & Gender, 16(4), 943–950. https://doi.org/10.1017/S17 43923X2000029X Kováts, E., & Pet˝ o, A. (2017). Anti-gender discourse in Hungary: A discourse without a movement. In R. Kuhar & D. Paternotte (Eds.), Anti-gender campaigns in Europe: Mobilizing against equality (pp. 117–131). Rowman & Littlefield. Linnamäki, K. (2021). Gendered articulations of control and care on social media during the COVID-19 pandemic in Hungary. Frontiers in Political Science, 3. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2021.656731 Martinico, G. (2022). The tangled complexity of the EU constitutional process: The frustrating knot of Europe. Taylor & Francis. Parmanand, S. (2022). Macho populists versus COVID: Comparing political masculinities. European Journal of Women’s Studies, 29(1_suppl), 43S–59S. https://doi.org/10.1177/13505068221092871 Wodak, R. (2015). The politics of fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean. Sage. Wodak, R. (2021). Crisis communication and crisis management during COVID19. Global Discourse, 11(3), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1332/204378921X16 100431230102 Wodak, R. (2022). Legitimizing crisis management during COVID-19. Argumentation et Analyse du Discours, 28. https://doi.org/10.4000/aad.6483 Wondreys, J., & Mudde, C. (2022). Victims of the pandemic? European far-right parties and COVID-19. Nationalities Papers, 50, 86–103. https://doi.org/ 10.1017/nps.2020.93

CHAPTER 12

Conclusions

When we began the research that led to this book, we could not yet determine with sufficient clarity what the consequences of the pandemic would be. However, we immediately felt that this global event was challenging the political sphere in many ways: questioning the role of the state, of expertise, and of authority and exerting stress on the relationship between the governors and the governed. The hypothesis that guided our work was that, beyond its long-term impact, the pandemic offered a framework for the surfacing, crystallisation, and analysis of certain trends: it was reshaping the idea of power and leadership, demanding that political cultures (and maybe even supposedly out-of-fashion ideologies) rethink and clarify themselves in order to orientate collective actions better. The very concepts of ‘collective’, ‘state’, and ‘experts’ were brought back into play after years of neoliberal policies that tended to address the individual rather than the collective, enterprises instead of the welfare state. All of a sudden, this comfortably numb approach seemed under threat. Unfit—as it started to seem obvious—to govern a pandemic, individuals and enterprises were incapable of managing an emergency of this magnitude. It also challenged the idea that every single individual could be adequately informed and act accordingly without expert knowledge. Was the growing anti-intellectual and anti-authoritative attitude going to

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Saccà and D. Selva, European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9_12

247

248

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

be reversed? Moreover, how would the various types of populistic and non-populistic leaders react to the events? After analysing how different European political leaders have represented the pandemic and interpreted their role, we can now say that Covid-19 has enhanced and unearthed underlying political cultures, making them more evident but not necessarily more functional or diverse than they were initially. Nevertheless, it has also demonstrated that a more empathic, ‘listening’-based style of leadership, less tied to ‘masculine’ characteristics, is more effective than a muscular one. It has also shown the limits of the neoliberal logic in the management and thinning of the welfare state and, maybe, above all, of its conception of political power. Just as, it has shown evidence of the limits of post-ideological politics and, conversely, the need for a renewed centrality of a political culture capable of influencing the decision-making process and the content of public policies. Last but not least, we believe that Covid-19 has shed light on the failure of populism in the face of the need to rely on expertise. Our work has focused on how the pandemic has emphasised the role of leadership styles in governance processes and in fostering (or undermining) the relationship between citizens and democratic institutions. This argument is grounded in a comparative analysis of European leadership styles during the pandemic. Through the analysis of political communication, the topics emerging in the leaders’ discourses (populism/anti-populism, party competition, gender, and the relationship with political parties, with scientific expertise, and conspiracy theories) can be seen as variables or levers that different leaders used to build and sustain their legitimation in front of the people. In particular, we argue that the pandemic has produced schizophrenic effects: on the one hand, it has accentuated the authoritarian and antiscientific features of some populist leaders (namely Orbán, but also Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro); on the other, it has reinforced an anti-populist leadership characterised by an emphatic construction of legitimacy and a sincere acknowledgement of the complexity of social reality, far from Manichean representations. Against this backdrop, antipopulists tend to integrate experts’ advice into policymaking, giving birth to different bureaucratic arrangements (which may be more or less institutionalised). In some extreme cases, experts, and scientists become the main, if not the only, source of legitimation of the decision-making process, turning those leaders into what we have called techno-populists. This tendency has resulted in ambivalent effects during the Covid-19

12

CONCLUSIONS

249

pandemic: politics can end up appearing powerless and useless (as in Italy, e.g.) or can be reinforced by the ability of the leaders to engage in a fruitful dialogue with science, starting from acknowledging its own role and field of expertise (as in the non-populistic case of Angela Merkel, e.g.). More explicitly, the analysis of the two female leaders, Angela Merkel and Erna Solberg, showed an unusual way of interpreting political leadership during the Covid-19 pandemic crisis. The type of leadership that emerged combines at its core a solid grounding in the dynamics of power and democracy with a specific communicative and expressive mode that we have called empathic, emphasising practices of listening and sharing, which at times does not disdain an unravelling of the self, of one’s feelings and limitations. This communicative posture in crisis management, far from conferring fragility and insecurity on leadership, actually defines it, strengthening its stature in a continuous redefinition of the basis of legitimacy. However, it does not simply fall back on plebiscitary identification between the leader and citizens: this leadership style aims to build symbolic bonds, creating the basis for shared values and goals, which are then translated into public policies. In both cases, we observe several common features. First, neither leader succumbed to a paternalistic conception of citizens. This approach meant that citizens were addressed with the utmost transparency and seriousness, without sugar-coating; they were given the responsibility to understand the situation and fulfil the moral mandate to participate in community safety. The leaders emphasised the concept of responsibility very well, describing a society made up of interdependent individuals; in the behaviours, values, and sentimental connection created among all citizens lay the meaning of living in a community. Second, this leadership corresponds to a responsible and prudent attitude towards the pandemic, tending not only to respect scientific opinion but to understand it and make it the basis of decision-making. However, as we have seen, this posture towards science corresponded to very different modes of communication between the two leaders. Angela Merkel often explained in more detail the mechanisms of contagion, how scientific research works, and possible options in terms of treatment. She used her scientific expertise to be as clear and transparent as possible, to present policy decisions almost as natural consequences. On the other hand, Erna Solberg eschewed this type of communication, preferring to present decisions as the result of joint work between the government and

250

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

major health and safety agencies and staying on a less technical register. In this case, experts were not placed above the government by virtue of their expertise but were one of the components of decision-making almost indistinguishable from the others, as if scientific opinions were inherent in public policy. Third and finally, there was the co-presence of an attitude of utmost respect towards expert recommendations and an argumentative and expressive mode (characterised by the use of personal narrative and the sharing of feelings). The latter comprises a specific perspective on the polity: a community of interdependent individuals who feel a sense of belonging and responsibility, stretched towards a ‘collective effort’. However, being women leaders does not automatically mean that women are at the centre of the scene. Indeed, in both leaders’ communication, so-called gender issues were confined to the family dimension. The discussion revolved around caring for children as a task entrusted to both parents and single parents; there was little specifically about women’s welfare, problems, and difficulties, and the dangers they experienced locked in their households. In terms of public agenda, this choice resulted from at least two factors: on the one hand, both Merkel and Solberg belonged to an ideological-political area at the conservative centre, meaning that they were not particularly close to more radical feminist perspectives; on the other hand, perhaps the ‘double bind’ induced them to avoid talking about gender issues so as not to risk being confined by them. Put differently, in their attempt to be the leaders of all, women and men, they removed women from the spotlight. The second part of the book focused on the comparison among three leaders that can be further subdivided into two distinct groups: on the one side, we see Giuseppe Conte and Emmanuel Macron interpreting a post-ideological leadership style closer to a techno-populist approach to power legitimation and management; on the other side, Pedro Sánchez, also due to the contextual features of his coalition government, reiterated his adherence to a specific political culture. The three leaders have some elements in common. For example, all three supported a position calling for greater integration and solidarity at the European level. Conte and Sánchez are expressions of coalition governments that have a left-wing ideological position, even if, in the Italian case, there is a strong post-ideological component (the Five Star Movement) that brought him closer to France led by the leader of the personal party, The Republic on the Move (LREM). However, despite the possible similarities

12

CONCLUSIONS

251

in the solemn tone with which they addressed their citizens, only Sánchez managed to supersede the idea of the people as an indistinct monolith: he clarified categories such as workers, the elderly, young people, and women; he affirmed the importance of pursuing an anti-neoliberal political agenda aimed at digital, ecological, feminist, and intersectional transformations; he drew a line of conduct for a politics to rediscover its connection with society; he recalled the significance of pro-Europeanism in contrast to ‘reactionary’ populism and hatred; and finally, he rebalanced the relationship between politics and science in favour of competence. We argue that the post-ideological positioning of Conte and Macron, who presented themselves as experts ‘lent’ to politics, ended up weakening their message and made them the interpreters of a paternalistic leadership model centred on the personal relationship between the superleader and their citizens. This model pairs with an instrumental conception of the welfare state, with a set of tools to manage the pandemic consequences that could be fundamentally reduced to the healthcare system. On the contrary, a more defined positioning towards issues such as the role of the state (and the market) in the processes of globalisation and European integration, as well as the relationship between institutions and citizens, is correlated to a transformational leadership model (Burns, 1978). Sánchez’s clear positioning was visible in his conception of the welfare state, which was evoked as a symbol of Spanish national culture and, simultaneously, of European culture, something of pride. Hence, in this case, the welfare state (re-)acquired an ideological connotation contrasting with the neoliberal agenda. Of course, those differences are due to a complexity of factors, such as individual personality, contextual political opportunities and constraints, and the very constitutional architecture of the three democracies (more or less power to the President of the executive branch, more or less parliamentary control, and so on). All those ‘ingredients’ reverberated in their communication styles, giving birth to various combinations. In a nutshell, the comparison between these three leaders shows how the greater or lesser identification of the leader with the model of ‘politics as a profession’ determines a different outcome in the relationship with citizens, with ideology, with the same idea of politics, with Europe, and finally with science. The third part focused on the alternating fortunes of two populist leaders, Boris Johnson and Viktor Orbán. As is well known, populism has a mutually reinforcing relationship with crises: on the one hand,

252

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

populist leaders emerge especially in contexts of crisis (economic, political, social) so as to exploit disorientation in order to attract public attention without necessarily proposing concrete solutions; on the other hand, and precisely because of this ‘opportunistic’ nature, populists invoke crises or ‘emergencies’ continuously and systematically, and through this way of representing reality, they are in turn one of the causes of the crisis of legitimacy of representative democracy. The systemic shock of the pandemic represented an unprecedented challenge for populist leaders in government. They were forced to face a structural emergency which prevented them from maintaining complete political and narrative control over the performance of the crisis. Although both Johnson and Orbán generically adhered to the label of populism, they could not be more different in terms of the posture adopted towards the pandemic crisis, the way they managed their relationships with democratic institutions, and their strategies for legitimising power, thus confirming the complex and varied morphology of the contemporary populist ‘family’. As the analysis conducted by Luca Massidda and Flaminia Saccà shows, for Johnson, the pandemic seemed, above all, a mitigating factor in his DNA as a populist leader; in Orbán, on the contrary, the health emergency has reactivated and relaunched his populist bias. Although they both came from a conservative political culture, they had different outcomes: Orbán was more inclined to a shift towards illiberal democracy, and Johnson followed a neoliberal (post-) democracy. The analysis focused on verifying whether this health crisis has also produced an intensification of populist rhetoric’s traditional characteristics (starting from its main ideological dimensions: appeal to ‘the people’, attacking the elite, ostracising the ‘other’) or if it has instead led to a change in its argumentative structures. The comparison is grounded in the two leaders’ approaches to the opportunities and threats caused by the pandemic, which appear more ambivalent than expected at first sight. The relative chapters show that Orbán and Johnson adopted a muscular and substantially nationalistic attitude, attempting to ‘nationalise’ the pandemic as an opportunity to celebrate medical-scientific research as a source of national pride. Orbán especially displayed a hyper-masculine leadership style to face the pandemic, using war metaphors, declaring a State of Emergency, and presenting himself as commander-in-chief. The trajectory followed by Johnson is more complicated. In fact, when the pandemic hit the UK, Boris Johnson had just gained popular support

12

CONCLUSIONS

253

through the December 2019 election, completing a cycle of instability that began with the Brexit referendum. In the wake of that election campaign, Johnson continued with a style of leadership that was clearly populist but nevertheless in line with democratic procedures. For this reason, it was easy for him to slide, progressively, into a less dramatic narrative register and made him more inclined to give space to the voice of scientific experts, as shown by the evolution of his labelling of the virus and by the introduction of some positive statistical accounts after an initial ‘no-data’ phase. At first, in fact, he had been trying to avoid facing the seriousness of the pandemic, but things started to change by the end of March, when Johnson tested positive for Covid-19, and the country’s infection index dramatically increased. However, the move away from a hyper-masculine leadership model (effectively portrayed by his closest ally Donald Trump) did not result in establishing an empathetic model, leaving Johnson bereft of references and thus of communicative effectiveness. Johnson avoided presenting himself in a personalistic way as the fearless leader who fought the virus alone. In several respects, especially in the aftermath of the disease, his self-representation was paradoxically closer to that of a moderate leader than an agentic one. Of course, we can still argue that his dialoguing posture was embedded in (and in some respects limited to) the strong network of institutions that have characterised British democracy in the aftermath of fifty years of neoliberal hegemony since the election of Margaret Thatcher. In other words, even if weakened by policies oriented towards the ‘lightweight state’, the agentification of government functions and the centralisation of the power in the executive branch at the expense of the parliament (Fawcett et al., 2017; Ward & Ward, 2022); the British system of checks and balances still played a key role in providing resources but also in imposing constraints on the leader’s actions. Johnson’s ‘moderation’ during the Covid-19 pandemic is understandable only if read against this backdrop. On that occasion, power was parcelled out, and crisis communication was managed from a collegial perspective: in this sense, one must also take into account the statements made by ministers and scientific advisors, who, especially in the first weeks of the pandemic, played the role of extremists, as Johnson himself had done until a few years earlier in the Conservative Party led by David Cameron. Indeed, some statements raised much controversy by suggesting, more or less explicitly, that the government’s strategy was to achieve herd immunity as soon as possible; at different

254

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

stages, such statements have been withdrawn or ‘better specified’, but the point is that they denoted the scarce capacity of managing the crisis, of preventing moral panic, and ultimately, of nurturing the appropriate climate of accountability and trust.1 As mentioned, after the first few weeks, there was no superhomistic tension in his or his government’s rhetoric. Even in the face of illness— Johnson was the first European head of state to test positive for Covid19—his leadership kept, in terms of self-representation, a low profile. Maybe due to the polemics that hit him and his government at the very beginning of the pandemic, we register a reluctance on Johnson’s part to take centre stage in the pandemic narrative, escaping the cone of absolute visibility (and attention) that his position in the management of the crisis would guarantee him, and that marked a significant difference compared to other populist leaders’ over-exposition. Johnson accepted that it was the pandemic crisis that ultimately dictated the agenda of his political communication. He did not try to ‘domesticate’ the virus by tracing it back to usual populist rhetoric. He did not racialise the threat. His rhetorical nationalism never had a discriminating anti-foreigner connotation. The celebration of the British people’s heroism and sacrifice was not sustained by the discrimination of the ‘other’. It is true that the ‘keywords’ of his narrative strategy—Stay home, Protect, Save—correspond perfectly to the lexicon and rhetoric of a sovereigntist populism. However, in a structural crisis such as that opened by Covid-19, we can find similar ‘doses’ of nationalism in the words of fully ‘institutional’ political leaders. For these reasons, we can speak for Johnson’s pandemic communication in terms of a ‘populist remission’. Viktor Orbán, on the other hand, provided us with the opportunity to scrutinise the narrative adopted by an authoritarian populist leader under stress. Even from a rhetorical point of view, Orbán tried to exploit the pandemic to revive his usual populist leadership style. In his selfrepresentation, he utilised a classic populist (and popular) rhetoric. Unlike Johnson, Orbán did not miss the opportunity offered by the pandemic

1 ‘Cummings

denies “too bad” quote on pensioners dying from coronavirus’, Reuters, March 23, 2020. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/ uk-health-coronavirus-britain-cummings-idUKKBN21A0YK; ‘Coronavirus: science chief defends UK plan from criticism’, The Guardian, March 13, 2020. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/13/coronavirus-science-chiefdefends-uk-measures-criticism-herd-immunity.

12

CONCLUSIONS

255

to portray himself as a man of action, as the muscular and hypermasculine charismatic leader who takes action and commits himself to the fight. While the virus normalised Johnson’s eccentric populist leader image, on the other hand, it amplified Orbán’s authoritarian populist selfrepresentation. If Johnson immediately ceded the narrative’s control to the pandemic, Orbán has indeed consistently struggled to maintain it, placing his historical-political enemies on the battlefield against the virus: foreigners, the European Union, George Soros, and the parliamentary opposition. In this way, Orbán could inscribe the ‘pandemic war’ within the canons of his traditional populist script. The determining variable to read the continuity of Orbán’s populist action (and narrative) during the pandemic crisis is his relationship with democratic institutions and the principles of the rule of law. When Covid-19 arrived in Europe, Hungary had been in a ‘permanent state of emergency’ for ten years. The Fidesz leader had, in fact, weathered several emergencies over the years, each time constructing a securitarian narrative to identify an enemy to fight. Over time, this narrative climate created the conditions for strengthening his leadership and legitimising anti-democratic practices, which was also the case with the Covid-19 crisis. The Hungarian premier found in the pandemic an opportunity to delegitimise the established institutions of liberal democracy and thus justify his long-term attempt to go beyond the usual limits of the rule of law. Using the pandemic exception to stretch the limits of the democratic process further, militarising the crisis’s management and its representation, delegitimising parliamentary confrontation and restricting spaces for political dissent, Orbán tried to exploit the situation to make a decisive leap forward in his illiberal democracy project. For these reasons, we can describe Orbán’s reaction to the pandemic as a severe populist relapse. In conclusion, the heterogeneity of pandemic response modes and leadership styles portrayed in this volume demonstrates that this is both a great strength and a great weakness of democracy. On the one hand, it proves that democratic institutions, decision-making procedures, and consensus-building strategies are rooted, enhanced, threatened, or reproduced by the country’s political culture. The cultural specificities of the individual country and the historical-political moment it is experiencing are the first major factors of variation; another, as we have tried to emphasise, is that it derives from the different political cultures of which the different leaders are examples. In an era of depoliticisation and crisis in the legitimacy of representative institutions, Covid-19 has highlighted the

256

F. SACCÀ AND D. SELVA

possible consequences for the democratic fibre, general wellness and prosperity of the nations of a depoliticised and delegitimated political class. The pandemic has proved a challenge not only for the people and national and supranational health organisations but also exposed the democratic quality of the countries involved. Finally, our analysis has evidenced the crucial importance of political culture and ideology in determining how the various actors and institutions gravitating around the decision-making process interact and are managed and communicated by their leaders in times of crisis. In countries like Germany, Norway, and Spain, leaders have been able to reinterpret their role by balancing institutional (and scientific) rigour with the ability to build ‘bridges’ between different parts of society: between political forces, between institutions and citizens, between science and society, between generations. On the other hand, during Covid-19, democracy was folded on itself, even if only for a season or two. In some countries, this led to an accentuation of certain post-political dynamics (as in Italy, France, and the United Kingdom); in others, it offered a further context of justification for the rise of illiberal power (as in Hungary). The restriction of freedoms was one act in the context of rising contagion. However, the relative ease with which democratic systems reacted to the pandemic, centralising power in the hands of the executive and leaving parliaments with an expost supervisory role, should give us all pause. Beyond the immediately visible consequences, in fact, this decision-making mechanism constitutes an important precedent; and it cannot be excluded that, as is already the case in some countries like Hungary, France, and Italy, attempts may be made to manipulate public opinion by crying out for a new emergency in order to justify its use. We have known for several centuries now that the fragilities and contradictions that persist in contemporary democracies are contrasted by the laws that guarantee power alternation, representation, checks, and balances and everything a democratic constitution is made. But, of course, a constitutional architecture is necessary but not sufficient for the quality of democracy and democratic leadership. If a democratic political culture is not promoted, socialised, reproduced, and presided, there will always be risks of reduced rights, representations, and pluralism at every turn of new emergencies. Our study has shown that leaders who displayed a more collegial, institutional (and less personalised) style that has represented a more communicative and listening type of leadership not only have better

12

CONCLUSIONS

257

managed the emergency in terms of infection index but, in doing so, they have also managed to reinforce (and not threaten) the democratic fibre of their nations. Maybe these results could be of some inspiration for the leaders of tomorrow and scholars analysing leadership styles through the lenses of underlying political cultures and communication management.

References Burns, J. (1978). Leadership. Harper & Row. Fawcett, P., Flinders, M., Colin, H., & Wood, M. (Eds.). (2017). Anti-politics, depoliticization and governance. Oxford University Press. Ward, J., & Ward, B. (2022). From Brexit to COVID-19: The Johnson government, executive centralisation and authoritarian populism. Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217211063730

Correction to: European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis

Correction to: F. Saccà and D. Selva, European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9 The original version of Chapters 9 to 11 was inadvertently published with an error in the author name, which has now been corrected. The correction has been updated with the changes.

The updated version of these chapter can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9_9 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9_10 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9_11 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Saccà and D. Selva, European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9_13

C1

References

Ádám, Z., & Csaba, I. (2022). Populism unrestrained: Policy responses of the Orbán regime to the pandemic in 2020–2021. European Policy Analysis, 8, 277–296. https://doi.org/10.1002/epa2.1157 Albertazzi, D., & McDonnell, D. (Eds.). (2008). Twenty-first century populism: The spectre of Western European democracy. Palgrave Macmillan. Alexandre-Collier, A. (2022). David Cameron, Boris Johnson and the ‘populist hypothesis’ in the British Conservative Party. Comparative European Politics, 20, 527–543. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-022-00294-5 Allum, P. (1988). Cultura o opinioni? Su alcuni dubbi epistemologici. Il politico, LIII (2), 221–268. Allum, P. (2006). Democrazia reale, stato e società civile nell’Europa occidentale. Liviana. Almond, G. A. (2005). Cultura civica e sviluppo politico. Il Mulino. Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1963). The civic culture. Political attitudes and democracy in five nations. Princeton University Press. Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (Eds.). (1980). The civic culture revisited. Sage. Anastasìa, S., & Anselmi, M. (2020). Populist punitiveness in the Italian populistic yellow-green government. Partecipazione e conflitto, 13(3), 1469– 1486. https://doi.org/10.1285/i20356609v13i3p1469 Andreouli, E., & Brice, E. (2022). Citizenship under COVID-19: An analysis of UK political rhetoric during the first wave of the 2020 pandemic. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 32(3), 555–572. https://doi.org/ 10.1002/casp.2526

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Saccà and D. Selva, European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9

259

260

REFERENCES

Arora, S., Debesay, J., & Eslen-Ziya, H. (2022). Persuasive narrative during the COVID-19 pandemic: Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg’s posts on Facebook. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, 9(35). https:// doi.org/10.1057/s41599-022-01051-5 Batory, A. (2022). More power, less support: The Fidesz government and the coronavirus pandemic in Hungary. Government and Opposition: An International Journal of Comparative Politics, 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov. 2022.3 Batory, A. (2023). Hungary. Creeping authoritarianism in the name of pandemic response. In N. Ringe & L. Rennó (Eds.), Populists and the pandemic. How populists around the world responded to COVID-19 (pp. 117–126). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003197614-10 BBC. (2022, July 7). Boris Johnson resigns: Five things that led to the PM’s downfall. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-62070422 Bennett, W. L. (2012). The personalization of politics: Political identity, social media, and changing patterns of participation. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 644(1), 20–39. Berezin, M. (2006). Xenophobia and the new nationalisms. In The Sage handbook of nations and nationalism (pp. 273–284). Sage. Berti, C., & Ruzza, C. (2022). Populism, science, and Covid-19 as a political opportunity: The case of the European Parliament. In H. Eslen-Ziya & A. Giorgi (Eds.), Populism and science in Europe (pp. 91–116). Palgrave Macmillan. Bettin Lattes, G. (2001). La cultura politica nella sociologia politica italiana contemporanea: appunti per una discussione. In P. Fantozzi (Ed.), Politica, Istituzioni e sviluppo (pp. 1–33). Rubbettino. Bickerton, C. J., & Invernizzi Accetti, C. (2021). Technopopulism: The new logic of democratic politics. Oxford University Press. Biorcio, R. (2015). Il populismo nella politica italiana: da Bossi a Berlusconi, da Grillo a Renzi. Mimesis. Biorcio, R., & Natale, P. (2018). Il Movimento 5 Stelle: dalla protesta al governo. Mimesis. Blokker, P., & Anselmi, M. (Eds.). (2020). Multiple populisms: Italy as democracy’s mirror. Routledge. Borrell, J. (2017). Los idus de octubre: reflexiones sobre la crisis de la socialdemocracia y el futuro del PSOE. Los Libros de la Catarata. Bruff, I. (2014). The rise of authoritarian neoliberalism. Rethinking Marxism, 26(1), 113–129. https://doi.org/10.1080/08935696.2013.843250 Burlackij, F. M. (1970). Lenin, gosudarstvo, politika. Izdatel’stvo Nauka. Burns, J. (1978). Leadership. Harper & Row.

REFERENCES

261

Caiani, M., & Graziano, P. (2019). Understanding varieties of populism in times of crises. West European Politics, 42(6), 1141–1158. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/01402382.2019.1598062 Campus, D. (2013). Women political leaders and the media. Palgrave Macmillan. Chadwick, A. (2017). The hybrid media system: Politics and power. Oxford University Press. Chamorel, P. (2019). Macron versus the yellow vests. Journal of Democracy, 30(4), 48–62. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0068 Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (2020a). Balancing governance capacity and legitimacy: How the Norwegian government handled the COVID-19 crisis as a high performer. Public Administration Review, 80(5), 774–779. https://doi. org/10.1111/puar.13241 Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (2020b). The coronavirus crisis—Crisis communication, meaning-making, and reputation management. International Public Management Journal, 23(5), 713–729. https://doi.org/10.1080/109 67494.2020.1812455 Coombs, T. W. (2019). Ongoing crisis communication: Planning, managing, responding (5th ed.). Sage. Damiani, M. (2020). Populist radical left parties in Western Europe. Routledge. Davidson-Schmich, L. K. (2011). Gender, intersectionality, and the executive branch: The case of Angela Merkel. German Politics, 20(3), 325–341. https:/ /doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2011.606566 Dayan, D., & Katz, E. (1992). Media events: The live broadcasting of history. Harvard University Press. De Blasio, E., Hibberd, M., Higgins, M., & Sorice, M. (2012). La leadership politica: Media e costruzione del consenso. Carocci. Dittmer, L. (1977). Political culture and political symbolism: Toward a theoretical synthesis. World Politics, 29(4), 552–583. https://doi.org/10.2307/201 0039 Eichler, M. (1980). The double standard: A feminist critique of feminist social science. Croom Helm. Engesser, S., Fawzi, N., & Larsson, A. O. (2017). Populist online communication: Introduction to the special issue. Information, Communication & Society, 20(9), 1279–1292. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2017.1328525 Erhardt, J., Freitag, M., Filsinger, M., & Wamsler, S. (2021). The emotional foundations of political support: How fear and anger affect trust in the government in times of the Covid-19 pandemic. Swiss Political Science Review, 27 (2), 339–352. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12462 Eslen-Ziya, H., & Giorgi, A. (Eds.). (2022). Populism and science in Europe. Palgrave Macmillan.

262

REFERENCES

Fagen, R. (1969). The transformation of political culture in Cuba. Stanford University Press. Fawcett, P., Flinders, M., Colin, H., & Wood, M. (Eds.). (2017). Anti-politics, depoliticization and governance. Oxford University Press. Fodor, E. (2022). The gender regime of anti-liberal Hungary. Palgrave. Franzé, J. (2019, Julio–Decembre). Cercanía programática, lejanía cultural: la relación entre Podemos y PSOE durante la crisis en España (2014–2018). DeSignis: Publicación de la Federación Latinoamericana de Semiótica, 31, 293– 313. Funk, N. (2018). A spectre in Germany: Refugees, a ‘welcome culture’ and an ‘integration politics.’ In M. Duarte, K. Lippert-Rasmussen, S. Parekh, & A. Vitikainen (Eds.), Refugee crisis: The borders of human mobility (pp. 289–299). Routledge. Gerbaudo, P. (2018). Social media and populism: An elective affinity? Media, Culture & Society, 40(5), 745–753. https://doi.org/10.1177/016344371 8772192 Godøy, A., Grøtting, M. W., & Hart, R. K. (2021). Re-opening schools in a context of low COVID-19 contagion: Consequences for teachers, students and their parents. Medrxiv (preprint). https://doi.org/10.1101/2021.03.25. 21254219 Guiraudon, V., Ruzza, C., & Trenz, H.-J. (Eds.). (2015). Europe’s prolonged crisis: The making or the unmaking of a political union. Palgrave Macmillan. Hajnal, G., Jeziorska, I., & Kovács, É. M. (2021). Understanding drivers of illiberal entrenchment at critical junctures: Institutional responses to COVID19 in Hungary and Poland. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 87 (3), 612–630. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852320981138 Halliday, F. (2010). Shocked and awed: How the war on terror and Jihad have changed the English language. I.B. Tauris. Heinisch, R. C., Holtz-Bacha, C., & Mazzoleni, O. (Eds.). (2017). Political populism: A handbook. Nomos. Horowitz, J. (2019, May 27). Election puts Europe on the front line of the battle with populism. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/ 27/world/europe/europe-election-results-populism.html House of Commons. (2021). Coronavirus: Lessons learned to date. Sixth Report of the Health and Social Care Committee and Third Report of the Science and Technology Committee of Session 2021–22. https://committees.parlia ment.uk/publications/7496/documents/78687/default/ Ihlen, Ø., Johansson, B., & Blach-Ørsten, M. (2023). Experiencing the Covid19 in Denmark, Norway and Sweden: The role of the Nordic model. In R. Tench, J. Meng, & A. Moreno (Eds.), Strategic communication in a global crisis: National and international responses to the Covid-19 pandemic (pp. 184–198). Routledge.

REFERENCES

263

Institute for Government. (2022, December 9). Timeline of UK government coronavirus lockdowns and restrictions. https://www.instituteforgovernment. org.uk/sites/default/files/2022-12/timeline-coronavirus-lockdown-dec ember-2021.pdf Ivaldi, G. (2020). Populist voting in the 2019 European elections. Totalitarismus und Demokratie, 17 (1), 67–96. Jamieson, K. H. (1995). Beyond the double bind: Women and leadership. Oxford University Press. Johnson, C., & Williams, B. (2020). Gender and political leadership in a time of COVID. Politics & Gender, 16(4), 943–950. https://doi.org/10.1017/S17 43923X2000029X Jones, R. H. (2021). The wounded leader: The illness narratives of Boris Johnson and Donald Trump. Discourse, Context & Media, 41, 100499. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.dcm.2021.100499 Joosse, P. (2018). Countering Trump: Toward a theory of charismatic counterroles. Social Forces, 97 (2), 921–944. https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soy036 Kalsnes, B., & Skogerbø, E. (2021). Norway: From strict measures to pragmatic flexibility. In D. Lilleker, I. A. Coman, M. Gregor, & E. Novelli (Eds.), Political communication and COVID-19: Governance and rhetoric in times of crisis (pp. 231–238). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003120254-22 Kazin, M. (1995). The populist persuasion. Basic Books. Kittilson, M. C. (2006). Challenging parties, changing parliaments: Women and elected office in contemporary Western Europe. Ohio State Univesity Press. Klenke, K. (1996). Women and leadership: A contextual perspective. Springer. Kneuer, M., & Wallaschek, S. (2022). Framing COVID-19: Public leadership and crisis communication by chancellor Angela Merkel during the pandemic in 2020. German Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2022.2028140 Kovács, K. (2021, March 11). Hungary and the pandemic: A pretext for expanding power. Verfassungblog on Matters Constitutional. https://verfas sungsblog.de/hungary-and-the-pandemic-a-pretext-for-expanding-power/ Kováts, E., & Pet˝ o, A. (2017). Anti-gender discourse in Hungary: A discourse without a movement. In R. Kuhar & D. Paternotte (Eds.), Anti-gender campaigns in Europe: Mobilizing against equality (pp. 117–131). Rowman & Littlefield. Kritzinger, S., Foucault, M., Lachat, R., Partheymüller, J., Plescia, C., & Brouard, S. (2021). ‘Rally round the flag’: The COVID-19 crisis and trust in the national government. West European Politics, 44(5–6), 1205–1231. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1925017 Krook, M. L. (2009). Quotas for women in politics: Gender and candidate selection reform worldwide. Oxford University Press. Kupferschmidt, K., & Vogel, G. (2020, April 27). Reopening puts Germany’s much-praised coronavirus response at risk: Preliminary study plays outsize

264

REFERENCES

role in debate about when to ease restrictions. Science. https://www.science. org/content/article/reopening-puts-germany-s-much-praised-coronavirus-res ponse-risk Kurilla, R. (2021). ‘Kung Flu’—The dynamics of fear, popular culture, and authenticity in the anatomy of populist communication. Frontiers in Communication, 6, 624643. https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2021.624643 Laclau, E. (2008). La ragione populista. Laterza. Laubenthal, B. (2019). Refugees welcome? Reforms of German asylum policies between 2013 and 2017 and Germany’s transformation into an immigration country. German Politics, 28(3), 412–425. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 09644008.2018.1561872 Lewis, P., Clarke, S., Barr, C., Holder, J., & Kommenda, N. (2018, November 20). Revealed: One in four Europeans vote populist. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/nov/ 20/revealed-one-in-four-europeans-vote-populist Linnamäki, K. (2021). Gendered articulations of control and care on social media during the COVID-19 pandemic in Hungary. Frontiers in Political Science, 3. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2021.656731 Loner, E., Fattorini, E., & Bucchi, M. (2023). The role of science in a crisis: Talks by political leaders during the COVID-19 pandemic. PLoS ONE, 18(3), e0282529. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal Lovenduski, J. (2005). Feminizing politics. Polity Press. Lovenduski, J., & Norris, P. (2003). Westminster women: The politics of presence. Political Studies, 51, 84–102. Markiewicz, W. (1971). Kultura polityczna spoleczenstwa. Odra, 11(3), 3–10. Martinico, G. (2022). The tangled complexity of the EU constitutional process: The frustrating knot of Europe. Taylor & Francis. Massidda, L. (2020a). La politica come rappresentazione. Il carattere della leadership populista nell’epoca dei social media. Sociologia. Rivista quadrimestrale di scienze storiche e sociali, 1, 18–30. Massidda, L. (2020b). Xenofobia. Tempi e luoghi di un pregiudizio politico. In M. Anselmi & L. Guercio (Eds.), Il nemico (pp. 53–70). Mondadori Università. Mastropaolo, A. (2000). Antipolitica: All’origine della crisi italiana. L’ancora del Mediterraneo. McAllister, I. (2007). The personalization of politics. In The Oxford handbook of political behavior (pp. 571–588). Oxford University Press. Melnick, H., & Darling-Hammond, L. (2020, May). Reopening schools in the context of COVID-19: Health and safety guidelines from other countries (Policy Brief). Learning Policy Institute. https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ ED606555.pdf

REFERENCES

265

Moffitt, B. (2015). How to perform crisis: A model for understanding the key role of crisis in contemporary populism. Government and Opposition, 50(2), 189–217. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2014.13 Morlino, L., & Raniolo, F. (2018). Come la crisi economica cambia la democrazia. Il Mulino. Mosca, L., & Tronconi, F. (2019). Beyond left and right: The eclectic populism of the Five Star Movement. West European Politics, 42(6), 1258–1283. https:/ /doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2019.1596691 Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x Mudde, C. (2019). The far right today. Wiley. Mueller, J. E. (1973). War, presidents, and public opinion. Wiley. Mushaben, J. M. (2017). Becoming Madam Chancellor: Angela Merkel and the Berlin Republic. Cambridge University Press. Mushaben, J. M. (2022). Against all odds: Angela Merkel, Ursula von der Leyen, Anngret Kramp-Karrenbauer and the German paradox of female CDU leadership. German Politics, 31(1), 20–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008. 2021.2000599 Musso, P. (2019). Le temps de l’État-Entreprise: Berlusconi, Trump, Macron. Librairie Anthème Fayard. OECD. (2020). Initial education policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic: Norway. Education Policy Outlook Country Snapshot. https://www.oecd. org/education/policy-outlook/covid-snapshot-Norway.pdf ONS. (2021, June 29). Coronavirus (COVID-19) Infection Survey technical article: Waves and lags of COVID-19 in England. https://www.ons.gov.uk/ peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/conditionsanddiseases/ articles/coronaviruscovid19infectionsurveytechnicalarticle/wavesandlagsofc ovid19inenglandjune2021#waves-of-covid-19. Parmanand, S. (2022). Macho populists versus COVID: Comparing political masculinities. European Journal of Women’s Studies, 29(1_suppl), 43S–59S. https://doi.org/10.1177/13505068221092871 Pateman, C. (1980). The civic culture: A philosophic critique. In G. A. Almond & S. Verba (Eds.), The civic culture revisited (pp. 57–102). Sage. Pew Research Center. (2020, October 2). Confidence in Merkel is at all-time high in several countries during her last full year in office. https://www. pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/02/confidence-in-merkel-is-at-all-timehigh-in-several-countries-during-her-last-full-year-in-office/ Pratt, J. (2007). Penal populism. Routledge. Rodríguez Sáez, A. (2021). La génesis del populismo en España entre 2011 y 2013: un análisis desde la demanda. REIS: Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 173, 121–140.

266

REFERENCES

Rypdal, M., Rypdal, V., Jakobsen, P. K., Ytterstad, E., Løvsletten, O., Klingenberg, C., et al. (2021). Modelling suggests limited change in the reproduction number from reopening Norwegian kindergartens and schools during the COVID-19 pandemic. PLoS ONE, 16(2), e0238268. https://doi.org/10. 1371/journal.pone.0238268 Saccà, F. (2003). La società sessuale: il controllo sociale della sessualità nelle organizzazioni umane. Franco Angeli. Saccà, F. (2015). Culture politiche e partiti in mutamento. In F. Saccà (Ed.), Culture politiche e mutamento nelle società complesse (pp. 23–43). Franco Angeli. Saccà, F. (2016). Culture politiche, informazione e partecipazione nell’arena politica 2.0. Sociologia, 3, 28–40. Saccà, F. (Ed.). (2020). Changing democracies in an unequal world. Franco Angeli. Saccà, F. (2021a). Culture politiche nel XXI secolo. In F. Saccà & L. Massidda (Eds.), Culture politiche e leadership nell’era digitale (pp. 11–39). Franco Angeli. Saccà, F. (2021b). (Ed.). Stereotipo e pregiudizio. La rappresentazione giuridica e mediatica della violenza di genere. Franco Angeli. Saccà, F., & Massidda, L. (2021). Culture politiche e leadership nell’era digitale. Franco Angeli. Saccà, F., & Selva, D. (2021). Women political leaders in pandemic times: Comparing Jacinda Ardern and Donald Trump’s representation of the Covid-19 crisis. Hayka. Kylbtypa. Obwectvo, 27 (2), 8–21. Sanbonmatsu, K. (2006). Where women run: Gender and party in the American states. University of Michigan Press. Schneiker, A. (2020). Populist leadership: The superhero Donald Trump as savior in times of crisis. Political Studies, 68(4), 857–874. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/00323217209166 Segatori, R. (2015). Sintomi populisti nella crisi italiana. In F. Saccà (Ed.), Culture politiche e mutamento nelle società complesse (pp. 111–131). Franco Angeli. Selva, D. (2020). Leaders and emotions in post-representative democracies. In F. Saccà (Ed.), Changing democracies in an unequal world (pp. 67–87). Franco Angeli. Simon, C., & Mobekk, H. (2019). Dugnad: A fact and a narrative of Norwegian prosocial behavior. Perspectives on Behavior Science, 42, 815–834. https://doi. org/10.1007/s40614-019-00227-w Sorice, M. (2014). I media e la democrazia. Carocci.

REFERENCES

267

Spyridonidis, D., Côté, N., Currie, G., & Denis, J.-L. (2022). Leadership configuration in crises: Lessons from the English response to COVID19. Leadership, 18(5), 680–694. https://doi.org/10.1177/174271502211 26780 Stangeland, B. (2020). How to evaluate the success of the COVID-19 measures implemented by the Norwegian government by analyzing changes in doubling time. Medrxiv (preprint). https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.03.29.20045187 Stangeland, B. (2021, December 3). Norway versus Sweden: A case study in COVID-19 response. Open Access Government. https://www.openaccessgo vernment.org/norway-and-sweden/125378/ Suskind, R. (2004, October 17). Faith, certainty and the presidency of George W. Bush. The New York Times Magazine. https://www.nytimes.com/2004/ 10/17/magazine/faith-certainty-and-the-presidency-of-george-w-bush.html Taguieff, P. A. (2017). Macron: miracle ou mirage? Éditions de l’Observatoire. Timbro. (2019). Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index 2019. http://bit.ly/pop ulismindex Tomkins, L. (2020). Where is Boris Johnson? When and why it matters that leaders show up in a crisis. Leadership, 16(3), 331–342. https://doi.org/10. 1177/1742715020919657 Tucker, R. C. (1973). Culture, political culture and communist society. Political Science Quarterly, 88(2), 173–190. https://doi.org/10.2307/2149106 Turner, S. (2003). Charisma reconsidered. Journal of Classical Sociology, 3(1), 5–26. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468795X03003001692 Turner, S. (2011). Classic sociology: Weber as an analyst of charisma. In M. Harvey & R. E. Riggio (Eds.), Leadership studies: The dialogue of disciplines (pp. 82–88). Edward Elgar. Tylor, E. B. (1871). Primitive culture: Researches into the development of mythology, philosophy, religion, language, art and custom. J. Murray. Ursin, G., Skjesol, I., & Tritter, J. (2020). The COVID-19 pandemic in Norway: The dominance of social implications in framing the policy response. Health Policy and Technology, 9(4), 663–672. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hlpt.2020. 08.004 Viviani, L. (2019). Il carisma nella sociologia weberiana della leadership. Società Mutamento Politica, 10(20), 39–55. https://doi.org/10.13128/smp-11045 Von Wahl, A. (2011). A ‘women’s revolution from above’? Female leadership, intersectionality, and public policy under the Merkel government. German Politics, 20(3), 392–409. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2011.606569 Ward, J., & Ward, B. (2022). From Brexit to COVID-19: The Johnson government, executive centralisation and authoritarian populism. Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217211063730

268

REFERENCES

Waylen, G. (2021). Gendering political leadership: Hypermasculine leadership and Covid-19. Journal of European Public Policy, 28(8), 1153–1173. https:/ /doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1942160 Weber, M. (1919/2004). The vocation lectures: Science as a vocation, politics as a vocation. Hackett. Weber, M. (1922). Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Mohr (Italian translation: 1995, Economia e Società. Teorie delle categorie sociologiche. Edizioni di Comunità). Weber, M. (1995). Economia e Società. Teorie delle categorie sociologiche. Edizioni di Comunità (Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Mohr, 1922). Wejnert, B., & Woods, D. (Eds.). (2014). The many faces of populism: Current perspectives. Emerald Press. White, S. (1979). Political culture and soviet politics. Macmillan. White, S. (1984). Political culture in communist states. Comparative Politics, 16(3), 351–365. Wiatr, J. J. (1980). The civic culture from a Marxist-sociological perspective. In G. A. Almond & S. Verba (Eds.), The civic culture revisited (pp. 103–123). Sage. Wieler, L., Rexroth, U., & Gottschalk, R. (2021). Emerging Covid-19 success story: Germany’s push to maintain progress. Robert Koch Institute. https:// edoc.rki.de/handle/176904/8514 Wilson, R. W. (1992). Compliance ideologies. Rethinking political culture. Cambridge University Press. Wodak, R. (2015). The politics of fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean. Sage. Wodak, R. (2021). Crisis communication and crisis management during COVID19. Global Discourse, 11(3), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1332/204378921X16 100431230102 Wodak, R. (2022). Legitimizing crisis management during COVID-19. Argumentation et Analyse du Discours, 28. https://doi.org/10.4000/aad.6483 Wondreys, J., & Mudde, C. (2022). Victims of the pandemic? European far-right parties and COVID-19. Nationalities Papers, 50, 86–103. https://doi.org/ 10.1017/nps.2020.93 Yates, C. (2018). On the psychodynamics of Boris Johnson and Brexit. New Associations, (25), 4–5. http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/32578/

Index

A Accountability, 42, 43, 45, 77, 167, 200, 254 Anti-Europeanist/anti-Europeanism, 179 Ardern, Jacinda, 8 Authoritarian/authoritarianism, 111, 139, 191, 193, 206, 215, 217, 238, 240, 242, 248, 254, 255 Authority, 1, 3, 11, 22, 44, 71, 115, 211, 212, 222, 247

B Behaviour, 7, 9–11, 39, 40, 45, 66, 145, 215, 236, 249 Belonging, 171, 250 Bond, 99, 102, 123, 125, 127, 216, 249 Businesses, 51, 57, 63, 69, 76, 160, 161, 213

C Care, 12, 22, 26, 28, 39, 53, 67, 73, 108, 117, 153, 198, 208, 210, 218, 241 Charismatic/charisma, 5, 6, 88, 146, 193, 195, 196, 211, 212, 229, 230, 232, 255 Children, 55, 57, 66, 73, 74, 124, 250 Citizens, 4, 5, 7–10, 22, 24, 25, 35–40, 42, 45, 49, 52, 53, 56–58, 60, 62–64, 66, 67, 69–72, 80, 81, 90, 91, 98–100, 103, 104, 111, 119, 121, 123, 125, 128, 129, 135, 138, 139, 141, 143–148, 150–152, 160, 170, 174, 175, 178, 187, 191, 197, 219, 230, 236, 248, 249, 251, 256 Civil society, 5, 7, 76, 104, 114, 118, 142, 168, 218, 219, 222 Cohesion, 137, 155

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Saccà and D. Selva, European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9

269

270

INDEX

Collaborative/collaboration, 22, 61, 76, 79, 80, 114, 166–169, 177, 206 Collective, 7, 11, 38, 40, 72, 74, 125, 158, 208, 209, 242, 247 Communitarianism, 118 Community, 22, 24, 41, 45, 53, 67, 68, 80, 99, 101, 102, 157, 171, 185, 196, 209, 221, 237, 240, 249, 250 Competence, 12, 22, 23, 35, 45, 62, 111, 113, 182, 185, 193, 221, 251 Confidence, 58, 183 Consensus, 5, 22, 37, 45, 56, 88, 106, 191, 192, 195, 206, 215 Conservative/conservatism, 24, 195, 208, 230, 233, 235, 250, 252 Crisis, 2, 3, 7, 8, 13, 14, 23–25, 29, 35, 36, 40, 44, 65, 66, 70, 72, 76–78, 90, 99, 104, 106, 123, 125, 126, 138, 140, 152, 160, 167, 177, 179, 193, 195, 196, 201, 205, 206, 210, 211, 217, 221, 224, 230, 238, 241, 244, 245, 249, 252, 254–256 Crisis communication, 7, 8, 29, 37, 75, 253 Crisis management, 8, 23, 97, 206, 230, 249

D Data, 24, 28, 36, 43, 48, 97, 104, 109, 118, 121, 134, 135, 141, 191, 194, 225, 245 Decision-making, 2, 3, 43, 167, 182, 183, 199, 222, 223, 238, 244, 248–250, 255, 256 Delegitimisation, 195 Democracy, 1, 2, 8–11, 40, 43, 45, 74, 75, 78, 90, 138, 162, 163,

195, 238–240, 249, 252, 253, 255, 256 Dialogue, 3, 12, 66, 75, 76, 104, 105, 114, 142, 144, 167, 169–171, 249 Disabled/disability, 55 Discipline, 6, 41, 146 Disinformation, 36, 66, 150, 201 Domestic violence, 154 Double bind, 22, 250 Dugnad, 25, 67–69, 82

E Economy, 14, 35, 36, 49, 66, 69, 97, 108, 109, 120, 123, 129, 161, 162, 168, 178 Elders, 27, 28, 35, 39, 135, 152, 155, 251 Elite, 5, 12, 13, 193, 222, 234, 235, 237, 244, 252 Empathic/empathy, 6, 8, 12, 22, 24, 52, 81, 82, 99, 125, 209, 248, 249 Enemy, 140, 143, 211–214, 221, 236, 255 Enterprises/entrepreneurs, 106, 109, 126, 128, 132, 161, 247 European/Europe, 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 13, 14, 22, 24, 29, 49, 50, 79, 87–90, 99, 107, 111, 115–117, 121, 122, 125, 132, 133, 137, 140, 143, 177–181, 191–193, 195, 196, 198, 201, 234, 238, 248, 250, 251, 254, 255 European Commission, 51 European Medical Agency, 5 European Union, 36, 50, 97, 117, 132, 179, 194, 217, 234, 235, 255 Eurosceptic/euroscepticism, 117, 178, 179, 192, 238

INDEX

Experience, 43, 74, 113, 123, 171, 207–209, 219, 244, 250 Experts/Expertise, 2–5, 7, 11–13, 23, 29, 43, 44, 82, 83, 87, 89, 103, 104, 112, 113, 118, 121, 134, 168, 174, 184–186, 200, 206, 208, 222, 224, 225, 244, 247–251, 253

F Fake news, 130, 141, 151 Family, 12, 52, 54, 58, 163, 250, 252 Far-right, 13, 24, 88, 90, 111, 122, 191, 196, 216, 218, 233, 241 Feelings, 9, 22, 25, 35, 56, 100, 145, 179, 208, 249, 250 Feminine/femininity, 12, 22–24 Feminist/feminism, 142, 155, 250, 251 Freedom, 14, 41, 56, 63, 67, 121, 148, 160, 197, 240, 256

G Gender, 2, 21, 36, 66, 137, 138, 154, 241, 248, 250 Generations, 12, 39, 66, 73, 80, 256 Globalist/globalism, 156 Governance, 2, 78, 124, 155, 235, 248

H Healthcare, 2, 26–29, 46, 47, 49, 59, 69, 78, 115, 124, 135, 157, 208, 251 Herd immunity, 135, 185, 199, 253 Hoax, 151 Hyper-masculine/hyper-masculinity, 192, 205–207, 218, 252, 253, 255

271

I Ideology/ideologies, 1, 3, 5, 90, 106, 122, 125, 143, 155, 165, 166, 170, 241, 247, 251, 256 Illiberal democracy, 13, 238, 245, 252, 255 Industrial/industry, 21, 129 Inequality, 21, 156 Institutions, 1–5, 11, 37, 38, 118, 142, 192, 248, 251–253, 255, 256 Intersectional/intersectionality, 142, 152, 251 Intimate/intimacy, 6, 126 L Left-wing, 89–91, 106, 250 Legitimacy, 1, 2, 7, 12, 14, 44, 58, 83, 91, 194, 211, 212, 222, 243, 248, 249, 252, 255 Legitimation, 119, 142, 248, 250 Liberal/liberalism, 2, 10, 11, 24 M Market, 51, 159, 178, 251 Marxist/Marxism, 10, 11 Masculine/masculinity, 22, 207, 208, 218, 232, 241, 248 Media, 7, 15, 22, 117, 123, 165, 171, 193, 195, 206, 210, 224, 225, 241 Mediation, 7, 24, 77 Mental health, 153 Mother, 24 N Nationalisation, 221 Nationalist/nationalism, 24, 118, 196, 233, 254 Non-populist/non-populism, 3–5, 11, 14, 88, 193 No-vax, 3, 122

272

INDEX

O OECD, 29, 201 P Parliament, 2, 5, 14, 25, 66, 76, 77, 91, 104, 106, 114, 155, 165, 171, 173, 174, 192, 195, 201, 237, 239, 240, 242, 253, 256 Paternalistic/paternalism, 13, 91, 151, 249, 251 Patriotic/patriotism, 124, 139, 221 People, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12–14, 24, 27–29, 42, 51, 52, 55, 57, 58, 69, 81, 88, 91, 100–102, 105, 106, 113, 121–128, 135, 143, 147, 154, 155, 166, 193, 211, 214–217, 219, 222, 229, 232, 235, 240, 242, 248, 251, 252, 254, 256 Personality, 113, 230, 232, 251 Plebiscitarian, 88 Polarisation, 4 Political culture, 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–11, 247, 248, 250, 252, 255–257 Political opponents, 144, 185, 232 Political parties, 5, 115, 168, 242, 248 Politicisation, 172 Popularity, 12, 87, 88 Populist/populism, 2–6, 11–14, 30, 36, 87–90, 116, 179, 191–196, 205–207, 209–213, 215–218, 221, 223–225, 229–235, 238, 241, 243–245, 248, 251–255 Post-ideological, 13, 248, 250, 251 Post-political/post-politics, 195, 256 Power, 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10–12, 22–24, 58, 75, 87–89, 91, 97, 111, 114, 115, 149, 159, 164, 171, 174, 176, 193, 195, 201, 211, 217, 222, 224, 247–253, 256

Private sector, 7 Pseudo-science, 3, 14, 134 Psychology, 6, 9, 21, 118 Public policies, 3, 5, 12, 46, 248, 249

R Rationality, 6, 42, 52, 119 Recovery plan, 114, 117, 132, 162, 180 Representative/representation, 3, 14, 22, 38, 64, 104, 106, 123, 165, 171, 182, 192, 206, 207, 210–212, 216, 221–223, 235, 238, 241, 248, 252, 255, 256 Research, 2, 4, 8, 9, 14, 15, 26, 36, 58, 59, 62, 67, 79, 94, 98, 124, 133, 138, 156, 159, 194, 198, 202, 214, 247, 249, 252 Responsibility, 1, 11, 35, 37, 38, 40–42, 45, 47, 49, 74, 82, 106, 114, 115, 142, 146, 148–150, 168, 170, 173, 182, 186, 193, 199, 212, 213, 223, 231, 245, 249, 250 Rhetoric, 4, 5, 13, 15, 73, 88, 90, 101, 128, 129, 193, 196, 205, 206, 209, 212, 213, 216–218, 225, 229–231, 241, 244, 245, 252, 254 Right-wing, 8, 131, 164, 173, 191, 192, 205, 217, 241

S Sacrifice, 35, 39, 42, 70, 99, 110, 126, 145, 146, 208, 215, 216, 218, 222, 254 Schools, 27, 29, 36, 57, 66, 67, 91, 98, 110, 111, 120, 153, 163, 187, 197, 213

INDEX

Science, 1–6, 14, 15, 22, 23, 35, 36, 38, 42, 46, 48, 52, 57, 58, 60, 63, 64, 66, 97, 98, 118, 125, 134, 135, 138, 143, 156, 181, 182, 184, 221, 222, 224, 225, 243, 245, 249, 251, 256 Scientific advice, 83 Scientific community, 119 Scientists, 4, 14, 15, 36, 60, 120, 134, 135, 173, 182, 183, 244, 248 Securitarian, 8, 241, 255 Security, 1, 2, 49, 53, 54, 56, 65, 119, 157 Segregation, 21, 22 Socialist/socialism, 91 Social justice, 156, 179 Solidarity, 23, 25, 37, 38, 40, 45, 52, 54, 66, 115, 139, 145, 156, 208, 216, 218, 219, 222, 250 Soros, George, 234, 235, 237, 255 Sovereign/sovereignism, 205, 207, 212, 216, 234, 254 Stability pact, 50, 116 Stereotype, 21, 22 Stringency, 28, 93, 198, 199, 201 Surveillance, 47 Sustainable/sustainability, 46, 215 T Tears, 42, 57 Technicity, 12 Technocracy, 2, 3, 87 Techno-populism, 3, 12, 87, 90, 91, 128, 157 Transformational leadership, 6, 7, 13, 22, 91, 251 Transparency, 42, 57, 70, 98, 104, 112, 113, 134, 136, 167, 199, 215, 249

273

Trump, Donald, 6, 192, 205–208, 212, 223, 233, 244, 248, 253 Trust, 24, 25, 60, 65, 72, 74, 88, 104, 144, 254

V Vaccination, 27, 122, 136, 187 Vaccine, 14, 27, 36, 50, 51, 59, 62, 79, 80, 122, 123, 133, 135, 139, 187, 188, 224, 245 Value/values, 1, 8–11, 24, 40, 73, 135, 171, 182, 184, 225, 249 Vulnerable/vulnerability, 39, 53, 152, 153, 219

W War, 88, 99, 124, 129, 142, 200, 205, 206, 218, 219, 242 War metaphors, 218, 219, 241, 252 Welfare, 2, 12, 13, 15, 24, 69, 78, 129, 137, 144, 152, 156, 248, 250, 251 Women, 7, 12, 21–25, 56, 152, 154, 155, 208, 250, 251 Workers, 24, 35, 51, 53, 65, 69, 104, 106, 109, 124, 158, 160, 161, 208, 219, 222, 242, 251 Work-life balance, 154 World Health Organisation, 2, 160

X Xenophobic/xenophobia, 196, 213

Y Youth, 23, 135, 152, 153