Europe and the Gospel: Past Influences, Current Developments, Mission Challenges 9788376560380, 9788376560373

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Evert Van De Poll

Europe and the Gospel: Past Influences, Current Developments, Mission Challenges

Versita Discipline: Theology, Religious Studies Managing Editor: Robert J. Merecz

Language Editor: Kerry Fast

Published by Versita, Versita Ltd, 78 York Street, London W1H 1DP, Great Britain. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercialNoDerivs 3.0 license, which means that the text may be used for non-commercial purposes, provided credit is given to the author. Copyright © 2013 Evert Van De Poll ISBN (hardcover): 978-83-7656-037-3 ISBN (paperback): 978-83-7656-036-6 ISBN (for electronic copy): 978-83-7656-038-0 Managing Editor: Robert J. Merecz Language Editor: Kerry Fast Cover illustration: © iStockphoto.com / travelif www.versita.com

Contents Endorsements.................................................................................................... 11 Preface................................................................................................................. 13 Introduction Ambiguity and paradox................................................................................... 15 Chapter 1 Look at Europe.................................................................................. 19 1.1. What’s in a Name? ..............................................................................................................19 1.2. Population: Ageing and Changing................................................................................24 1.3. Global influence...................................................................................................................30 1.4. Implications for European Christians .......................................................................36

Chapter 2 Cross over Europe............................................................................. 37 2.1. Diversity....................................................................................................................................37 2.2. Religious zones.....................................................................................................................40 2.3. A Socio-Cultural Cross ......................................................................................................43 2.4. Old and New Divides in the East..................................................................................46 2.5. How does Evangelicalism Fit Into the Picture?....................................................51

Chapter 3 The idea of ‘Europe’.......................................................................... 53 3.1. ‘Europe’ as a Christian realm.........................................................................................54 3.2. Protestant ‘Europe’.............................................................................................................62 3.3. ‘Europe’ as civilisation......................................................................................................65

Chapter 4 Contemporary ideas of ‘Europe’....................................................... 73 4.1. Community of values.........................................................................................................74 4.2. Cultural Zone or Family of Cultures............................................................................77 4.3. House of Nations..................................................................................................................79 4.4. ‘Europe’ as Part of ‘the West’..........................................................................................81 4.5. ‘We’ Versus the ‘others’.....................................................................................................82

Chapter 5 The ‘Construction of Europe’............................................................ 83 5.1. Attempts to Unite Europe................................................................................................84 5.2. The Time Was Ripe .............................................................................................................87 5.3. The Construction of Europe – First Stage.................................................................91 5.4. U-turn in the East.................................................................................................................93 5.5. The construction of Europe – second phase......................................................100 5.6. Emerging Red line in the East....................................................................................104 5.7. Objectives and motto......................................................................................................106

Chapter 6 A Time to Remember, a Time to Build............................................. 109 6.1. Evangelical Views on European Unity....................................................................110 6.2. Remember the Moments of Grace............................................................................113 6.3. Ora et Labora.......................................................................................................................115

Chapter 7 National and European Identities.................................................... 119 7.1. European Identity..............................................................................................................119 7.2. National Identity and ‘Nationalism’.........................................................................123 7.3. The Case of Europe .........................................................................................................126 7.4. Complementary Identities............................................................................................130 7.5. ‘Europe’ and ‘the Other’.................................................................................................134 7.6. Biblical Perspective..........................................................................................................137

Chapter 8 Mobility, Migration and Widening Horizons.................................... 141 8.1. Mobility and Migration...................................................................................................141 8.2. Migration................................................................................................................................144 8.3. Widened Horizons and Reinforced Diversity......................................................147 8.4. Opportunities for Christians........................................................................................150

Chapter 9 Multiculturality and the Issue of Integration.................................. 153 9.1. External Immigration . ....................................................................................................154 9.2. Multicultural Society.......................................................................................................157 9.3. Political Reactions.............................................................................................................161 9.4. Challenges for Churches in Society.........................................................................165

Chapter 10 Muslims in Europe – Facts and Fears............................................... 169 10.1. Facts......................................................................................................................................170 10.2. Muslim Presence Becomes an Issue.....................................................................172 10.3. The Fear for Violent Anti-Western Radicalism................................................173

Chapter 11 Concerns and Prospects – a Soul for Europe.................................... 181 11.1. Crisis and Setback..........................................................................................................182 11.2. Concerns.............................................................................................................................184 11.3. Eurosceptics......................................................................................................................191 11.4. What Next? Options for the Future.......................................................................191 11.5. Give Europe a Soul........................................................................................................196

Chapter 12 Roots of European Cultures............................................................ 203 12.1. Which Roots?....................................................................................................................203 12.2. The Mediating Role of Christianity........................................................................205 12.3. Jewish and Muslim Influences.................................................................................211

12.4. Christian Roots... Presuppositions and Interests............................................214 12.5. Turn Roots Into Sources..............................................................................................219

Chapter 13 Heritage of European Christianity.................................................. 223 13.1. Continued Existence of Churches and Communities..................................223 13.2. The Bible.............................................................................................................................224 13.3. Global Christianity.........................................................................................................224 13.4. Foundational Values in Society...............................................................................226 13.5. Cultural Heritage.............................................................................................................230 13.6. Institutional Heritage ..................................................................................................231 13.7. Christian Political Presence.......................................................................................232 13.8. Implications for Christians.........................................................................................232

Chapter 14 The Mixed Balance of History......................................................... 235 14.1. Setting the Record Straight.......................................................................................235 14.2. Complicity With Injustice, Protests and Alternatives...................................237 14.3. Theological Interpretations of ‘Europe’..............................................................246

Chapter 15 In What Ways is Europe Post-Christian?.......................................... 251 15.1. Post-Christianised..........................................................................................................251 15.2. Post-Constantinian (Christendom)........................................................................253 15.3. Post-Religious (Secularised).....................................................................................261 15.4. Post-Modern......................................................................................................................267 15.5. Post-Evangelised............................................................................................................268

Chapter 16 Barriers for the Gospel, Confidence in God..................................... 273 16.1. A Specific Context for the Communication of the Gospel........................274 16.2. Barriers.................................................................................................................................275 16.3. Confidence .......................................................................................................................279

Chapter 17 How Christian is Europe Today?...................................................... 283 17.1. Christians in a Secularized and Multi-religious Society.............................284 17.2. Marginal Church Membership..................................................................................286 17.3. Believing and/or Behaving Without Belonging..............................................290 17.4. Vicarious and Default Religion................................................................................293 17.5. Europe Still Considered to be Christian.............................................................295 17.6. Post-secular?....................................................................................................................297

Index of names and subjects.......................................................................303 List of Figures..................................................................................................309 List of Tables....................................................................................................311 Bibliography.....................................................................................................313

Europe and the Gospel: Past Influences, Current Developments, Mission Challenges

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Endorsements If you are passionate about the Gospel and curious about Europe, this is a book for you. In a series of essays, Professor Van de Poll leads us as an able tour guide into the wide field of European culture in search for its Christian roots – written by a true European addressing his fellow Europeans. Dr. Patrick Nullens – Rector and Professor of Christian Ethics, Evangelische Theologische Faculteit, Leuven (Belgium).

This is a ground-breaking text giving a clear and easy-to-read overview of how the Bible and its message have been integral to the making and shaping of Europe. It’s a story everyone – Christian or non-Christian – should be taught as it contains the keys to and values needed for a sustainable and just Europe for tomorrow. Jeff Fountain – Director, Schuman Centre of European Studies, Heerde (Netherlands).

Twenty years after German reunification and its declared commitment to a unified Europe, the author has endeavoured to describe the role of the Christian message in the process that started 2000 years ago and is yet to be concluded. This is impressive research on the background and development of Europe – written from an evangelical perspective with the goal to find the Sitz im Leben for the Gospel within Europe.’ As Evangelical Christians, we are part of a long history of the development of what can be legitimately called ‘Europe.’ The author discusses political, psychological, social, religious, and cultural aspects of this development, which have far-reaching implications for a contextualised, meaningful Christian message if it is to fulfil its original purpose. Dr. Klaus Müller – Professor of Missiology, Freie Theologische Hoch-schule, Gießen (Germany).

Endorsements

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Europe and the Gospel: Past Influences, Current Developments, Mission Challenges

Remarkably attuned to current European affairs, this book presents us with other aspects of Europe than just its economic dimension. The author describes how its spiritual and religious identity has developed in the course of its history, and how the predominance of Christianity has made way for a multi-religious society. Pastors, missionaries and other evangelists will find here food for reflection and the basis for well informed and positive action. Dr. Christophe Paya – Professor of Practical Theology, Faculté Libre de Théologie Évangélique, Vaux-sur-Seine (France).

Evert Van de Poll’s book on the evangelisation of Europe is one of very few books which reflects on this theme on the basis of a sound historical, sociological and missiological analysis. With this endeavour, the author takes up the heritage of Lesslie Newbigin in Can the West Be Converted? (1985), and Foolishness to the Greeks: the Gospel and Western Culture (1986). Some have continued in the same vein, for example, Friedemann Walldorf with his historical study, Die Neuevangelisierung Europas (2002), and Jean-Georges Gantenbein in his doctoral thesis, Mission en Europe (2010). Nevertheless, studies on evangelism in the specific context of Europe are still very rare. Evert Van de Poll’s book is therefore very timely. This reflection continues to grow in importance as the continent of Europe continues its process of de-Christianisation. Dr. Hannes Wiher, Associate Professor of Missiology, Faculté Libre de Théologie Evangélique, Vaux-sur-Seine (France).

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Preface Born and raised in the Netherlands, I have lived and studied in the United Kingdom for a number of years. This was followed by a period of Christian ministry and secular profession in my home country. In 1998, my wife and I moved to France where we are pastors with the Baptist Federation, involved in church development and leadership training. We live near the southernmost city of Perpignan, in an area that has close economic links with Spain. It is also marked by an upsurge of Catalan language and culture. Many people identify with the Catalans across the Pyrenees in Spain, who have their autonomous region with a strong tendency towards independence. So we find ourselves on the crossroads of several cultural and national identities. Meanwhile, I am part of the ministry of the Evangelical Theological Faculty (ETF) in Leuven, on the outskirts of Brussels, ‘capital’ of the European Union. I almost wrote, ‘in the suburbs of Brussels,’ but I realise that the cultural distance between the two is much larger than the small number of kilometres that separate the faculty campus from the office buildings in the European Quarter of Brussels. Having pursued my walk of life from one European country into another, and having been engaged in teaching activities outside the continent, I have become increasingly aware of the specific socio-cultural character of Europe. In comparison with other regions of the world, our continent stands out as a whole, despite its cultural diversity, or maybe even because of that. Working and living in different parts of Europe has also made me aware of the challenges of communicating the Gospel in this context. I feel the need to look at ‘my’ continent from different angles in order to better understand its specific socio-cultural character. This has led me to write a series of essays on the world in which I live. I am particularly interested in the influence of Christianity on the shaping of Europe, and its role in current developments such as the process of economic and political integration that has resulted in the European Union.

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My purpose is to give a bird’s eye view of Europe as a whole, so my position is that of a generalist. I make no claim to specialism or originality. Each of the subjects dealt with would merit an in depth study on its own, and the available literature is enormous. While this is work for a specialist, there remains a need for generalist studies that try to present a synthesis. I have consulted English, Dutch, French, German, and some Spanish sources. My feeling is that I just gleaned the corners of the field. The more languages one masters, the more resources one will find. The more one reads, the more one realises how vast each particular subject is. I am writing as a European, addressing fellow Europeans. As I observe what is happening in the continent as a whole, I do not pretend to be altogether neutral. I have lived and worked in the western part of Europe. That has allowed me to have an inside experience in Latin, Germanic and Anglo-Saxon cultures. While this already represents a considerable variety of contexts, it is still very limited in comparison to the cultural mosaic of Europe as a whole. I am a keen observer of, but still an outsider to Scandinavian countries, Eastern Europe, Greece and the Balkans. When people living in those countries read my text, they might sense that it bears the marks of a western point of view. To some extent, this is unavoidable. Everybody in Europe is inclined to look at the continent from the biased position of his or her own country. This is true in all directions: people look from the west to the east and vice versa, from the north to the south and vice versa, from the periphery to the centre and vice versa. As long as we are willing to accept the limits of our standpoint, we can be enriched by those of others. That is why I submit my text to the critical assessment of readers in other European contexts. Our continent is too rich in diversity to be grasped by one person only! In these essays, I bring to light the impact of Christianity on the societies of Europe, past and present. My aim is not only to provide the inquisitive mind with answers and suggest further questions, but also to encourage the reader. The story of the Gospel and Europe began long ago, right at the beginning of the Christian era, and has developed into a remarkable history. The good news is that it has not ended yet! So let us take courage, for the sake of Christ, the communication of his Gospel, the edification of his church and the service of our neighbour in his Name. Evert Van de Poll Perpignan, April 2013

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Introduction Ambiguity and paradox When we study Europe, we have to clarify our position. Where is Europe? Are we talking about somewhere or something outside our immediate sphere of living, or about something which we are part of? Living inside and feeling outside Europe Curiously, many people all over the continent recognize that they’re inside Europe but they feel and think and act as it they are outside. For them, Europe begins where their country ends. While they live in Europe in a matter-of-factway, they feel that Europe lies outside their national border, as a larger circle around it. Somehow or another, their mind’s map does not correspond to the map of physical geography, according to which Europe starts where they are, right within their country. This ambiguity is typical for Europeans. When they talk about ‘Europe,’ they usually mean the continent excluding their own country. It is a Europe-outsidethe-wall, so to speak. ‘Europeans’ are the inhabitants of neighbouring countries who speak foreign languages and have other customs. In a sense, this is only logical. Europe as a nation does not exist. There is no such thing as a European citizenship. Our identity cards are national. Of course, we trade with other Europeans. We have educational exchanges. We translate their books. We spend our holidays in their countries; we like to discover their historic cities, their nature resorts, their touristic attractions, their restaurants and their food. But even while border controls have disappeared to a large extent within the continent, we still cross a mental border whenever we leave our national territory. Then we ‘go into Europe.’ Inversely, our neighbours who from our point of view are in ‘Europe’ do not consider themselves to be inside Europe. In their eyes, it is us who are the Europeans because we are outside their country.

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Where do Christians stand? Christians are no exception to this tendency to think of Europe as something outside of ‘us.’ Their churches have a national rather than a European scope. Europe as a mission field lies outside their country. But this is a misleading representation of reality. Whether we like it or not, Europe starts where we live. We are part of it. Of course, we are also Dutch, French, German, and so on, but at the same time we are European. This is our continent. This is our context. This is where we are called to be a light. Communicating the Gospel in Europe is not ‘foreign mission’ but ‘home mission.’ Inversely, what we do for the advancement of God’s Kingdom in our own country is ‘European mission.’ These affirmations go against the grain of another trend: all over Europe people reemphasize national identities, or regional identities in the case of the Flemish, Scots, Catalans and others. A growing percentage of the population is increasingly apprehensive of further economic integration, the bureaucracy of ‘Brussels,’ and federalist ideas. All of that is labelled ‘Europe’ in a pejorative sense. At first, our countries wanted to be part of the European Union; as soon as they were in it they felt called to defend national interests. In today’s multicultural societies, the majority of the population is increasingly receptive to populist ideas that capitalize on the nation, its cultural heritage, its way of life, and its tradition. All of this has to do with identity. On the one hand, there is a sense of belonging to Europe. On the other hand, people identify with their country or their region rather than with Europe as a whole. How about Christians? To what extent do they share these trends? The question needs to be asked. All the more so since populist movements often support their ideas with a claim to the ‘Christian roots’ of Europe. What is our contribution as Christians to the future of Europe? What is our position in a multicultural society? These are challenging questions to which we must respond. Before we think about our mission, we should come to terms with this curious habit of positioning Europe outside our country, even though we are part of it. We should begin with the realisation that we are in Europe, for better or worse. We are part and parcel of it, and we are in it together with many others. Europe is not only ‘them,’ not only ‘us,’ but ‘them and us.’ Europe does not begin where I cross the border and when I try and understand another language. Europe begins where I live, where I speak my own language, and where I attend church. So when we talk about Europe, we are dealing with ‘us.’ To be more precise, we should say ‘with all of us,’ because we are many countries, many languages, many religious communities and many ways of life. Studying Europe is a good way to put local things in a wider perspective. And maybe it will help us to get rid of some chauvinist pride and prejudice as we come to appreciate others.

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The paradox of a Christianized and secularized continent Besides this ambiguous way of talking and thinking about our continent, there is another ambiguity when it comes to Europe as such; i.e. paradoxical relationship between Europe and the Christian religion. Ever since the Gospel became known to scattered Jews and their neighbours in Philippi, Corinth, Rome and other places on the northern shores of the Mediterranean, it has deeply influenced the history of the peoples in that part of the world that has come to be known as Europe. So much so that without the spread of the Gospel, the impact of the Bible and the influence of institutional churches, Europe as we know it today might never have come into existence. A sweeping statement indeed! But a justified one, given the role of Christianity in the making of Europe. The message that originated in Galilee and Jerusalem has created a cultural, religious and social framework for the peoples living in the continent. Christianity has become the major factor in the political and cultural development of Europe as a whole, and of each European country in particular. Europe is the most Christianised of all continents. No other part of the world has been exposed to the message of the Bible for such a prolonged period of time and in such a consistent way as this continent. Nowhere else is there such a rich Christian heritage. Its cultures are still rooted in Christian values. At the same time, Europe is marked by the abandonment of Christianity, more than any other part of the world. It has given birth to a secularised worldview, atheism, secular lifestyles and political ideologies, so much so that it is called post-Christian.’ Having said that, the question is how the message that was important in the making of Europe can have a positive impact on the secularised and multicultural societies of today. What does it have to say about the foundational values, the identity and the future of Europe? In order to answer these questions, we should always take into account this paradoxical love-hate relationship between our cultures and societies on the one hand, and the Christian religion on the other hand. This really is a key to understanding our continent.

Introduction

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Chapter 1

Look at Europe 1.1. What’s in a name? In this opening chapter we will give a general picture of Europe, its population and its position in the world. To begin with: how did we get our name? The answer is quite a story. We owe the name to the ancient Greeks. The oldest sources date from the sixth century BCE. Most linguistic scholars agree that the word ‘Europe’ was originally a female Greek name. Etymologically, it is a contraction of eurus (εuρύς ‘wide’) and ops (uψ, ‘face’). Europé literally means: ‘someone with large eyes.’ In Ancient Greece, this was also a designation of the earth. Others have suggested that the word Europé was originally derived from the Acadian word erebu, ‘going down’ (of the sun) or ‘evening,’ or from the Aramaic and Hebrew equivalents ereb. Indicating the direction where the sun sets, the word could also mean ‘west.’ Interestingly, the word for ‘rising’ (of the sun), and ‘morning’ is asu or asa.’ According to some historians, this is the origin of the term ‘Asia.’ Whichever theory about the etymological origin of ‘Europe’ is correct; one thing is for sure, the Greeks associated this name with the regions where, according to them, the sun set. And this has remained the case. Europe equals the West, the Occident. In contrast, when the Greeks looked eastward, to the regions where, according to them, the sun rose, they designated them as ‘Asia.’ Thus, Asia equals the East, the Orient. It begins at the coast of Asia Minor, present-day Turkey, which European merchants called the Levant, literally the land of the ‘rising’ (sun). The division between the Orient (sometimes called Morning Land) and the Occident (or Evening Land) has deeply marked the consciousness of Europeans and non-Europeans alike. Geographical and cultural meaning The ancient Greeks used the name Europe mainly in a geographical sense. Initially, it referred to the regions north of the Gulf of Corinth. According to the ancient Greeks, this meant that Europe lay to the north of the centre of the world in which they situated themselves. Sometimes, the whole of the Greek mainland and the Greek isles were collectively called Europé, in order to distinguish them from the regions to the east, Asia. When used in this sense, the name took on a cultural connotation, as it denoted their own civilised culture over and against what they considered to be the inferior way of life of the Persians who dominated Asia. To the Greeks, the people of Asia were Barbarians. Greeks and Persians

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fought bitter wars for many centuries. The siege of Troy is part of this ancient conflict: the city lay on the border of Greek Europe and Persian Asia. Following Alexander the Great’s conquest of the Persian Empire in the fourth century BCE, Greeks sought to Hellenize the peoples of Asia. More often than not, the name Europé also included the regions north of Greece, even though it was not clear where it ended. Ancient scholars discussed this matter at length, without arriving at a consensus. The famous traveller and historian Herodotus (484-425 BCE) wrote: Concerning Europe, nobody knows whether it is not surrounded by seas, nor does anyone know where its name has come from and who has given it to this continent. Perhaps we could agree that it stems from the name of a Tyrian woman called Europé, for whom this continent was as nameless, however, as the other continents. Enough about this matter! As for me, I will at any rate no longer use this name that has become familiar through common usage.1

The myth of Europe Herodotus is referring to a Greek myth in which we meet a certain Europé. According to the myth, Zeus, the supreme deity, disguised himself as a bull in a meeting with the Oceanides, a group of beautiful young women who were playing on the shores of the Phoenician city of Tyre (in present-day Lebanon). However, he was interested in only one them; the young and attractive Europé, daughter of Agenor, king of Tyre. Captivated by her beauty, Zeus seduced her and took her for a ride on his back, but then kidnapped her, swimming to the distant isle of Crete. There he took her as a concubine, and she gave birth to Minos. The pair had two other sons. In order to honour her, Zeus named the regions north of Crete after her. But, as Herodotus rightly remarks, this story had nothing to do with the region to which his contemporaries had attributed the name Europe. The only geographical clue that the Europé myth suggests is that the isle of Crete lies at the crossroads between the three major parts that made up the world for the scholars of Antiquity: Europé in the north, Asia in the east, and Africa in the south. There might be another clue to this curious story. Mythology is never just a product of fantasy, nor just the distraction of storytelling. There is always a message behind these stories. Couched in mythological language, they are telling us something about the real world. What intention or what lesson

1 “Europe, definition” in: Ancient History Encyclopedia, http://www.ancient.eu.com/ europe/ [13 November 2011].

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might the ancient Greeks have had in mind as they transmitted this story from generation to generation? At a face value, this myth might underscore the Oriental origin of the name Europe. Don’t forget, they seem to admonish the Greeks that the land we live in owes its name to people of the East. It was their idea to call us ‘Europe,’ the ‘land where the sun sets,’ the ‘West.’ In his study of the origins of Europe, George de Reynold argues that this was indeed the point. ‘Obviously, it was only in the eyes of Asians, Phoenicians, Assyrians, and Egyptians, that the Hellenic peninsula and all that lay behind were the land where the sun sets, the land of the night, the land of the north. This geographical evidence underlines the view that the word Europe has a Semitic, Phoenician origin. And history has confirmed this view.’2 Why perpetuate the story of this Oriental princess whose name we bear? Several sources attest to the fact that ‘Europe’ had a cultural connotation for the ancient Greeks. They sometimes used it in opposition to Asia and the Persians who lived there: ‘Asiatic’ meant vulgarity, lavishness, despotism and anything Persian, as opposed to ‘Europe’ which was identified with Greece and hence with freedom and civilisation. Is this myth perhaps a critique of such prejudice, such feelings of superiority? Is it a reminder that the origins of their civilisation lay partly in the West and partly in the Orient? Did it convey the message to the Greeks that they needed to draw from Oriental sources to develop their philosophy? That the West cannot live without the East? That we need to remain open to what the Orient has to tell us? A number of authors commenting on the myth think that such is indeed its hidden message. The French philosopher Boucounta Seye, for example, writes: ‘the image of a cultural mixture emerges from this story; Greek identity has become stronger for having opened itself to the Orient.’3 Centuries later, Christian authors like Lactantius retold the same version of the myth to point out that the spiritual origins of Europe lie in Asia. In Jerusalem to be precise. ‘The real ruler of the West comes from the East,’ they stated, referring, of course, to Jesus Christ. This is a tempting interpretation, even though it goes beyond what the ancient Greeks could possibly have had in mind. In our day and age, the myth is used to tell yet another story. As of 2012, an image of this mythical princess appears on euro bank notes to illustrate the common destiny of the nations of Europe.

2 George De Reynold, La formation de l’Europe, p. 116 3 Boucounta Seye, ‘La racine idéaliste à la base de la construction du projet européen,’ in : Hélène Yèche, Construction européenne, p. 18.

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Eastern limit settled much later From the Greeks, the name Europé passed on to the Romans, who took no particular interest in it. The Roman Empire united the regions north, south and east of the Mediterranean Sea, which they therefore called mare nostrum, ‘our sea.’ They also borrowed the idea of civilisation and its corollary, ‘the Barbarians outside,’ from the Greeks. All the conquered peoples were brought under the umbrella of a Greco-Roman civilisation. People living outside the Empire, such as German and Celtic tribes in the north, were simply called ‘Barbarians,’ and their ways of life considered inferior. Maps from the beginning of the Christian era have survived on which Europé appears to be a reduced area in the Balkans. On a map drawn in the fourth century CE, this is the name of one of the six provinces of the Diocese of Thracia. Its territory covers approximately present-day European Turkey. During the Roman period, ‘Europe’ was rarely used. The name corresponded to the regions north of Italy, while excluding Scandinavia, the British Isles, and the Iberian Peninsula. The present-day geographical meaning of Europe began developing in the Middle Ages. Finally there was agreement over its contours in the south (Mediterranean See), the west (Atlantic Ocean) and the north (Arctic Sea). However, there was still uncertainty over the delicate question where Europe ended in the east. For one, the Russian ‘hinterland’ was unknown territory for most Europeans. Besides, no clear-cut natural division existed that marked where European Russia ended and Asian Russia began. In the eighteenth century, with the advent of the modern era, the scientific world finally agreed on the contours of the continent. From that time onward, Europe has had the boundary with which we are now familiar. It reaches from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Ural and the Caspian Sea in the east. In the south it is bordered by the Caucasus Mountains, the Black Sea, the Bosporus Strait, and the Mediterranean Sea. This boundary had first been proposed by Tsar Peter the Great in the seventeenth century because he wished Russia to be part of Europe. In 1730, the German cartographer Philipp Johann Tabbert, called Strahlenberg, followed the lead given by the tsars, and presented a detailed geographical description of the eastern limit of Europe. Geographers have adopted the demarcation line as described by Strahlenberg. For that reason, Europe and Asia are now separated by the Ural Mountains and the Ural River that flows from there to the Caspian Sea. A small continent Europe is a small continent. Africa and North America are four times as big, Asia five times as big. Geographers often call it a subcontinent or a peninsula of Asia,

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because there is no natural oceanic border between them. Together, they are called the Eurasian continent. Europe only represents one fifth of this enormous landmass, as we can see on the following map. Europe’s area is 10.4 million square kilometres. More than forty percent of that is taken up by the European part of the Russian Federation. Consequently, Europe-without-Russia covers about six million square kilometres. The surface of the twenty-seven states that make up the present European Union is about 4.4 million square kilometres. A comparison with the ten largest nations of the world helps us to put Europe’s area in a global perspective. The Russian Federation covers more than 17 million square kilometres, Canada nearly 10 million, China 9.5 million, the United States 9.4 million, Brazil 8.5 million, Australia 7.7 million, India 3.2 million, Argentina 2.8 million, Kazakhstan 2.7 million, and Sudan 2.5 million.

Figure 1.1 Europe and Asia.

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1.2. Population: ageing and changing Our continent, little in size, is a very crowded one, with more than 715 million inhabitants.4 This is the third densest population concentration in the world, after China and India, but well ahead of the United States and any emerging nation in the South. In demographic statistics, a distinction is usually made between Europe and Russia, i.e. the Empire of the Tsars and the subsequent USSR in the past, and currently the Russian Federation. Other statistics distinguish between the 27 members of the European Union and the rest of Europe, including or excluding Russia. All of this can be quite confusing. As of 2012, the EU counts 503.5 million inhabitants, the rest of the continent 211.5 million.5 The latter figure includes the population of the European parts of the Russian Federation and Turkey.6 Although Europe’s population continues to grow, its growth rate is much slower than that of the world’s population. On a global scale, Europe is losing ground. This is not a recent development; it has been going on since the end of the nineteenth century, but it has accelerating since the 1960s. In 1900, Europe without the countries of the former USSR represented 18 percent of the world’s population. In 1950, the percentage had diminished slightly, but still amounted to 16 percent. Fifty years later, however, it had shrunk to merely 8 percent, while at the time of writing at the end of 2012; it is down to 7.3 percent. Predictions are that this downward trend will continue. If we would include the countries of the former USSR, the overall picture would be the same. At the moment, the whole continent represents just over 10 percent of the global population. From baby-boom to granny-boom Not only does Europe show less population growth than the rest of the world, its population is also ageing. The median age has been rising slowly over the last two decades; it will rise more sharply in the near future. In 2009 the average European was 40.6 years old, it is estimated that he/she will be over forty-five in

4 This figure includes the European parts of Russia and Turkey. Source: Statistiquesmondiales http://statistiques-mondiales.com/europe.htm [1 November 2012]. 5 Statistiques-mondiales http://statistiques-mondiales.com/europe.htm [1 November 2012]. 6 According to the Russian bureau of statistics Rosstat, 110 million Russians live in the European part of the Russian Federation, i.e. 79.3% of its total population of 138 million. The European part of Turkey has 13.5 million inhabitants, i.e. 17% of its total population of 79.8 million (Statistiques mondiales http://statistiques-mondiales.com/europe.htm [1 November 2012]).

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2050. Two factors contribute to this phenomenon: (1) rising life expectancy and (2) decreasing birth rate.7 The baby boom after the Second World War has not continued. The birth rate has dropped to an historic low. Meanwhile, due to prosperity and increased medical care, life expectancy is still increasing. Over the last fifty years, it has risen by around ten years for both women and men, to reach 82.4 years for women and 76.4 years for men in 2008. At the moment the ‘gain’ is more than one month every year. Natural growth (the difference between births and deaths) is very low. In comparison with one or two generations ago, the number of children per household has diminished considerably. Birth rates in the various European countries range between 1.5 and 2.0 children per woman. This is well below the so-called replacement rate of 2.1, which is needed to keep the numerical size of a population stable. Demographers talk about a ‘baby crisis’ and a ‘granny boom;’ fewer young people, more people of older age. This trend will go on well into the twenty-first century. In 2000, fourteen percent of the European population was sixty-five years or older. In 2050 this percentage is expected to be at least twenty-five percent, and possibly even as high as thirty-three percent.8 The financial implications of the current demographic trends are staggering. In Europe there are now thirty-five people of pensionable age for every one hundred people of working age. If the present demographic trends continue, there will be seventy-five pensioners for every one hundred workers by 2050. Since in most major European countries, pensions are financed out of current revenues, tax rates will have to increase substantially if benefits are not to be cut. Immigration growth Despite low birth rates, natural growth in the EU as a whole remains positive: 0.212% in 2012. Moreover, the EU continues to attract large numbers of immigrants. This trend has been going on for several decades now. In 2005, the immigration surplus (i.e. the number of immigrants minus the number of people leaving to settle elsewhere) of all the member states together swelled to 1.8 million. This figure has remained stable until 2008, when the economic crisis hit Europe and governments introduced more restrictive immigration

7 For the trends and figures mentioned in this section, see: EU and Eurostat, Demographic Report 2010 (published in 2011). 8 European Commission/Eurostat, Demographic Report 2010, p. 42ff, and Statistiquesmondiales http://statistiques-mondiales.com/europe.htm [consulted November 1, 2012]

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policies. Since then, the surplus has decreased, but it still amounts to more than 1 million per year.9 In 2012, the EU counted more than 20 million citizens born outside the EU, representing 4% of the population. These immigrants, who have obtained the nationality of their destination country,are mainly concentrated in the western part of Europe. Birth rates in immigrant communities are considerably higher than among the rest of the population. Not only because immigrants are younger than the general population, but also because of different cultural patterns of family size and the caring role of women (childbearing, taking care of the household) that persist among second and following generations. This is evident in the large families and the number of Turkish-German schoolchildren in Hamburg. The same scenario can be seen among North African background French citizens, and Nigerian-British residents in London. Second-generation immigrants represent a growing proportion of the population, especially in the big cities in Western Europe. This continued influx plus the relatively high birth rates among citizens of non-European ethnic origin and cultural backgrounds account for almost eightyfive percent of the total population growth.10 As this phenomenon has been going for some decades now, the sociocultural and religious face of the European population is changing drastically. Our societies are becoming increasingly multicultural, and this raises further questions. Will these communities assimilate or remain distinct from the European environment? If they wish to maintain their way of life, to what extent will they integrate into society? And will old-stock Europeans accept their different cultural and religious expressions? These and other questions are taken up in the chapter on immigration, multiculturality and the issue of (Muslim) integration. The prospect of population decrease While the population of the EU as a whole is still growing slightly due to the factors set out above, predictions are that it will decrease in the near future. In some member states, it is already diminishing, as we can observe in the following table.11

9 Idem. 10 Vladimir Špidla (ed.), Europe’s Demographic Future, p. 25. See also: Europe: Population and Migration in 2005. Migration Information http://migrationinformation.org/Feature/ display.cfm?ID=402 [14 November 2011]. 11 Eurostat.

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Table 1.1 Population of selected European countries in 2002 and 2011. Country

Population in 2002

In 2011

Increase/Decrease

Germany

82,440,309

81,751,602

-0.8%

France

61,424,036

65,075,310

5.9%

United Kingdom

59,216,138

62,435,709

5.4%

Italy

56,993,742

60,626,442

6.4%

Spain

40,964,244

47,190,423

12.7%

Belgium

10,309,725

10,918,405

5.9%

Netherlands

16,105,285

16,654,979

3.4%

Ireland

3,899,702

4,480,176

14.9%

Hungary

10,174,853

9,986,000

-1.9%

Bulgaria

7,891,095

7,504,868

-4.9%

Lithuania

3,475,586

3,244,601

-6.6%

Total EU-27

484,635,119

502,489,143

3.7%

What this table does not illustrate, however, is the changing picture following the economic crisis of 2008, as fertility rates declined again and fewer immigrants entered the EU. Between 2009 and 2012, the population of the Western countries still increased, but during the same period, Germany ‘lost’ one million inhabitants, as its population decreased from 82.3 to 81.3 million. All the countries in the eastern part of the EU saw their population diminish at similar rates: Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, the Baltic states, Romania and Bulgaria. Further eastward, the picture is more dramatic. Between 2009 and 2012 alone, Ukraine saw its population decrease from 44.7 to 43.8 million, Moldavia from 4.3 to 3.6 million, European Russia from 112 to 110 million. During the last two decades, the whole of the Russian Federation has seen its population diminish by 13 million! Widespread impoverishment and economic inequalities stimulate emigration and have a negative effect on the birth rate. An additional factor is the lasting effect of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986. Seventy percent of the fallout of radioactive substances has fallen in Byelorussia. Since then, this country has had the highest rates of abortion and child abandonment in Europe. It is unlikely that this country and the north of Ukraine will attract new residents in the foreseeable future. Experts predict that between now and 2050 the total population of the EU will shrink. Figures vary from -3 to -22%, as compared to the 1995 level.

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For Eastern Europe, the estimation is as high as -30% in the most pessimistic scenario.12 It should be added that these countries do not benefit from the demographic ‘benefit’ of ongoing immigration; this phenomenon mainly affects the Western countries. In theory, a major increase of immigration to Eastern Europe in the coming years is possible. In that case, demographic decline will be less dramatic. Predictions of decline The social implications of the current demographic trends are staggering. By midcentury, if current trends continue, Europe will be a society in which most adults have few biological relatives! In a rather alarmist book on world demographic trends, Philip Longman states: Europe doesn’t face the prospect of gradual population decline, but the prospect of rapid and compounding loss of population unless birth rates soon turn upward.

Like population growth, he explains, population decline operates on a geometric curve that compounds with each generation. He predicts that if Europe’s current fertility rate of about 1.5 births per woman persists until 2020, this will result in 88 million fewer Europeans by the end of the twenty-first century.13 The prospect of a declining population suggests economic contraction or even a possible economic crisis. Some media have alerted politicians and the general public about what they call Europe’s baby crisis. Governments have noted the problem, while the EU, the UN and NGOs continue to warn of a possible crisis. History shows that, generally speaking, population decline is intrinsically related to economic decline, and this will sooner or later be coupled with political decline. This is one of the reasons why economists and sociologists speak of the ‘decline’ or the ‘impoverishment’ of Europe in the coming decades, as compared to countries with economic and demographic growth, such as the US, China, India, and Brazil. Such predications are valuable in that they cause people to take stock. They are appeals to act according to the principle of precaution. They should incite us to change our behaviour in order that the future will not turn out to be as

12 See: The Impact of Ageing on Public Expenditure: Projections for the EU25 Member States on Pensions, Health Care, Long-Term Care, Education and Unemployment Transfers (2004-2050), Economic Policy Committee and the European Commission (DG ECFIN), 2006. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication6654_en.pdf [2 December 2011]. 13 Philip Longman - The Empty Cradle, p. 15.

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bleak as the predictions. One can compare it with the catastrophic ecological scenarios that are regularly presented by scientists and transmitted by the media. Moreover, presenting a disturbing future might spark reactions that would prevent the prediction from becoming reality. In other words, the prophecy of population decline might be self-unfulfilling! These predictions have only relative value because they do not take into account exceptional factors, such as an unexpected increase in immigration, an unexpected rise of the birth rate, or the inclusion of new members with a growing population such as Turkey or the Caucasian states. Neither do they reckon with unpredictable aggravating factors such as a pandemic disease or a destructive war, causing perhaps millions of deaths. At any rate, demographic prognostics always have to be used with considerable caution. In the past, such predictions have all too often been proven wrong by the facts. Nevertheless, the trend of diminishing growth and the possibility of population decrease cannot be ignored. Surely these figures are based on assumptions with respect to the population decrease in the coming years. As we have stated above, these assumptions might well be confounded by the facts. In that case, the number of immigrants needed to keep the European economy healthy will be much lower. Immigrants needed, at least on the short term As the population ages, the percentage of young people diminishes and this has direction economic consequences. Younger generations are generally more innovative, energetic and enterprising than older generations, who seem to be more concerned with stabilising what has been achieved. It can be expected, therefore, that our economies will thrive less in the long run. One already notices a difference between Europe and the USA and countries with emerging economies that have younger populations and more vibrant economies. Demographic statistics indicate a shortage of skilled labourers on a scale that will endanger economic growth and the stability of numerous industries. There are two possible solutions: increased birth rate and increased immigration. European governments are now taking measures to increase the appeal for households to have more children; one has to think of higher family allowances, prolonged parental leaves, adapted work patterns, etc. But such measures only contribute to a change in fertility rates which takes more time. These effects will be felt in the medium term and long term. In the short term, only immigration can provide the necessary work force. Moreover, immigration will counter the demographic decline, since the median

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age of immigrants is much younger than that of the majority population14 and birth rates of immigrant communities are higher. According to the Council of Europe, the EU as a whole needs 1.8 million immigrants per year until 2050 if it wants to keep its population stable at the level of 1995. But in order to keep the economies running and to maintain the current ratio between active and retired people, many more immigrants would have to come in: over three million annually.15 These figures are staggering. If the experts of the Council of Europe are right, the present level of immigration, as high as it may be in the eyes of many European citizens, is insufficient to maintain our level of prosperity and welfare. However, authorities are careful to balance the need for immigration with an emphasis on the need for integration. Several countries are adopting a policy of selective immigration. The objective is to promote and encourage highly-skilled migrants to come, if needed and where needed.

1.3. Global influence What is Europe’s place in the world? The present world scene is characterised by what is called globalisation. It should be noted that this globalisation originated in Europe. Historically speaking, this process really is the continuation and further extension of what began as the global spread of European trade and multinational business, science and technology, transport systems (railways!), languages (English, Spanish, French, Portuguese, Dutch), culture (dress, music, calendar, etc.), educational and administrative systems, political structures (representative and constitutional democracy), and military methods on a worldwide scale. From initiator of economic globalisation to one of its players Historians agree that that the first forms of economic globalisation were the Spanish and Portuguese empires in the sixteen century, followed by the East and West India Companies of England, the Netherlands and France in the seventeen and eighteenth centuries. Of course, these were not the only forms of globalisation. Before that, the Muslim world had expanded its religion and culture to northern Africa and

14 ‘Majority population’ is used in French demographic studies as a reference to what others call ‘autochthones’ or ‘old stock Europeans.’ Each of these terms has its own connotations. We will generally use ‘majority population,’ because we find this the more neutral term. 15 See The impact of ageing on public expenditure, footnote 12 [2 December 2011].

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southern and central Asia, and earlier still there was the cultural and political expansion of the Roman Empire, the Hellenistic conquests, not to mention the Chinese and Mongol expansions in the history of East and Central Asia. But as impressive as these empires have been, they did not yet develop a network of commerce and exploitation of resources linking the five continents to the cause of one. This is what European explorers and trading nations set out to do. Thus, they set in motion a development that would lead up to ever more interaction between the economies around the globe. European expansion came to an end at the time of the Second World War and its aftermath. The war had devastated Europe and depleted its resources. In the following decades, the colonies in the rest of the world gained independence. Nowadays, Europe is caught up in the maelstrom of the globalisation that it once set in motion, and of which it was the prime actor for more than four centuries. In the course of the twentieth century, the nations of the Old Continent were bypassed by the USA. Since the 1960s, they have to compete with Japan, and soon afterward with other rivals: China and the growing economies of emerging nations like India, Korea, and Brazil. Be this as it may, Europe as a whole still counts in the world. It is likely to remain a major global player, while its cultural influence continues to be considerable. First economic region in the world Europe counts five of the ten largest economies of the world: Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia. Taken together, the European Union constitutes the largest concentration of economical activity, counting for twenty percent of all the gross national products of the world combined. In comparison, the United States counts for nineteen percent and China for fourteen. Here are some other figures to illustrate the weight of the EU in the global economy (as of October 2011):16 The EU is the single largest economic market, with a capital flow of 2378 billion euro in comparison to 1416 billion Euros for the United States and 2235 billion euro for Asia. When we look at countries that share the euro, we notice a remarkable growth in employment, despite the worldwide financial crisis that hit in 2008. In this so-called Eurozone, 12.5 million new jobs were created between 1999, when the euro was launched on the financial markets, and 2011. This is nearly twice as many as the United States (6.7 million new jobs in the same period), even though the number of inhabitants is not considerably

16 Figures updated till October 2011, mentioned by Thierry Chopin et al., L’Europe d’après, p. 89.

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different (332 million in the Eurozone, against 311 in the US). Moreover, the euro is the second most important reserve currency in the world. To date, it has preserved its high value with respect to the American dollar, the principal global currency. The European Union is the principal actor of commercial exchange and of capital investments. Due to its good infrastructure and its solid educational systems, it remains the first destination of foreign investments in the world: 230 billion euro in comparison to 100 billion euro for the United States and 80 billion euro for China.17 Particular political influence Moreover, the political weight of Europe in world affairs is still considerable. Three of the five permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations are European: Great Britain, France and the Russian Federation. In a recent publication on the development of Europe and its place in the world, Pascal Fontaine has summarised well the way in which it exerts its influence: Europe is the first commercial power in the world. As such, it plays a decisive role in international negotiations, such as the World Trade Organisation and the United Nations. In these contexts, Europe particularly emphasizes themes like the protection of the environment, the development of sustainable sources of energy, the principle of precaution with respect to food and medicine, the ethical aspects of biotechnology, and the protection of endangered animal species. Europe plays a pioneering role in the battle against climate change. It was to first to decide a target level for substantially reducing the emissions of CO2. In 2008, it took the commitment to reduce them with at least 20% towards 2020.18

Russia still counts in the world We should also take note of the continued influence of Russia, the Russian Federation to be more precise. It is often overlooked that this nation is part of Europe as far as her culture, her population and her main religion are concerned. But its borders go far beyond geographical Europe, and its political influence reaches worldwide. Russians play a dominant role in space technology. Russian language and culture as well as Eastern Orthodox Christianity are still very much present in the Central Asian Republics.

17 See also Emmanuel Sales, “Non, l’Europe n’est pas au bord du gouffre!” in Le Figaro, 10 October 2011. 18 Pascal Fontaine, 12 leçons sur l’Europe, p. 9.

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Cultural Europe stretches far beyond geographical Europe We already noted the difficulties involved in defining Europe geographically and politically. This has led some scholars to abandon such definitions, in favour of a cultural one. According to this approach, Europe is not so much a territory as a zone. It is the zone of influence of Western culture that has developed on the European continent and spread far beyond. It comprises all the peoples and regions and states that ‘culturally’ belong to Europe.’ Certain advocates of European integration would like to expand it after the example of the British Commonwealth. In this model, the EU should create cultural alliances so as to create a sort of Commonwealth of Euro-Western culture all around the world, Leaving such ideals apart, it goes without saying that European culture extends to countries and populations in all corners of the earth. Cultural Europe is much larger than geographical Europe. We already mentioned the overseas territories of European states like France, the UK, Spain, Portugal and Denmark. To these we can add the British dominions (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), and Israel. Besides, a considerable part of the population in former colonies is made up of European expatriates and local people with European education, who speak European languages and who have adopted a European way of life. One can see this especially in the countries of the British Commonwealth, in the African and Asian states belonging to the so-called Francophonie, and in Latin America. European languages are world languages Going further still, we mention the spread of European languages all over the world, mainly as a result of colonialism. English, Spanish, French and Portuguese are the first or second language of many countries in the Third World, especially important in the areas of administration, commerce, information, media and education. Russian has the same function in the Central Asian Republics that once belonged to the Soviet Empire. Danish and Dutch are also spoken outside Europe, but they are marginal players among the world languages. Language is a major vehicle of cultural transmission. Billions of people speak European languages, which connects them with the cultures of the Old Continent. Influence of European education, science and technology In the area of science and technology, Europe has been world leader since the Renaissance until the middle of the twentieth century. And even now, European universities and research institutions rank among the best of the world; their influence in the scientific community is still enormous. No wonder that so many foreign students come to be trained in Europe, twice as many as in the US. Among these students are the majority of tomorrow’s world leaders!

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The radiation of European cultures Although Europe no longer imposes its culture as it did in former centuries, its culture still radiates far beyond its borders. All over the world, people are interested in and attracted to European music and other art forms, French and Spanish wine, refined Italian luxury, and British literature. Americans, Chinese, Japanese and the well-to-do elites from emerging countries like Brazil, Dubai, and Korea flock to Europe to see its cultural heritage, historic city centres, cathedrals and other monuments, to admire its landscape, and to taste its culinary riches. France attracts more tourists than any other country, Paris more than any other city. In the area of sport, European countries play a major role, in some types of sport even a dominant one. The magnetic function of Europe’s prosperity Wherever you go, you will find that Europe is envied for its prosperity, its organised society, its social welfare system, and its infrastructure. It functions like a magnet for millions of people in developing countries who are dreaming of better living conditions and a brighter future. For them, Europe is a place where police can be trusted, where politicians are kept in check by democratic means, where supermarkets are filled with a wealth of products, and where petrol stations are always open. In Europe, men and women can move freely on the streets. Generally speaking, one feels much safer here than in many other parts of the world. Major destination for immigrants and refugees No wonder, then, that Europe attracts immigrants and refugees from all over the world. In the last few decades, it has become a major destination for those who flee war, famine, poverty, persecution and ecological hardship. (For more detail, see the chapter on immigration.) Largest provider of humanitarian aid Europe is the principal donor of development aid in the world. In 2011, the European Union and its member states donated 53.8 billion euro, which is 0.43% of their combined gross national product, to development projects in the southern hemisphere. The largest proportion of this aid goes to Africa. This represents about fifty-five percent of all the public development aid in the world (i.e. aid provided by governments), much more than the contribution made by the United States, and certainly more than Japan or the emerging countries.19

19 Figures provided by the European Commission in November 2012, quoted in: “Le Budget de l’Union Européenne,” editorial article in La Croix, 14 November 2012.

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When we add to this the innumerable projects of relief aid and development set up by European non government organisations (NGOs), churches and Christian agencies, we can safely say that that the Old Continent continues to play a very influential role in the economic, social and spiritual development of peoples all over the world. Wherever people are struck by famine, military conflict, natural disasters, or any other calamity, European governments and NGOs are usually the first on the scene with medical teams, food distribution and shelter for refugees. Some NGOs are faith based, others are secular, but we should realise that the humanitarian action of governments and secular NGOs is deeply rooted in the heritage of Christian values. Major role in world Christianity and global mission For many centuries, Europe was the centre of gravity of Christianity, sending out missionaries to all corners of the earth. In the second half of the twentieth century, the centre of gravity shifted to the southern hemisphere, while the United States has taken over the lead in world mission. At the moment, other emerging countries like South Korea, Brazil, India, China, Nigeria, and the Philippines are bypassing the traditional European missionary countries such as Great Britain and Germany. Meanwhile, Europe is marked by decline in church membership and marginalisation of churches in society. The number of missionaries sent out for long term evangelism and church planting in other continents has dropped considerably. All of this is true, but when people draw a bleak picture of Europe, they often do so in comparison to a ‘glorious past.’ But if they do, looking back nostalgically doesn’t help us today. The writer of Ecclesiastes already warned us that it is not a mark of wisdom to ask ‘why the old days were better than these’ (Ecclesiastes 7:10). Moreover, we should not overlook the fact that Europe still counts in world Christianity. Rome is the epicentre of the Roman Catholic Church with more than one billion members (i.e. the official number, including all nominal church members). That is half of all the registered Christians in the world. Visit the ‘eternal city’ and you will be struck, not only by the impressive number of clergymen and clerical institutions, but also by the variety of cultures and nationalities they represent. Eastern Europe is still the heartland of Orthodox Christianity. The United Kingdom still plays a very influential role in the Anglican Church worldwide and in the global evangelical movement worldwide. Germany is also of considerable importance. The contribution of European organisations and church agencies to global missions in terms of personnel and financial support is still considerable.

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1.4. Implications for European Christians From what we have said about Europe, we can draw some conclusions for Christians, churches and mission agencies. Use the advantages of being part of Europe As Europeans, we have enormous advantages, as compared to inhabitants of many other regions in the world. Just think of the economic and financial resources available to us. We have great political advantages – our continent maintains close relationships with its former colonies. Our passports give us entry to countries all over the world, and our embassies offer help and protection in situations of emergency. Then there are the linguistic advantages. European languages are spoken all over the world: English, Spanish, French, Russian and Portuguese. These languages are generally easier to learn when you’ve been brought up in another European language than when your mother tongue belongs to other linguistic families. As Christians living in this part of the world, we share these advantages. They provide us with tremendous opportunities for service, at home and all over the world. It is a matter of good Biblical stewardship that we use them for the advancement of the Kingdom and the service of our neighbours in the rest of the world. Avoid Eurocentrism It is important to realise, however, that Europe is just another part of the world and not its centre (contrary to what was all too often thought in the days of imperialism and colonialism). We should avoid Eurocentrism, i.e. the attitude of ‘we know best how other countries should develop.’ There are deeply rooted presuppositions that ‘our culture’ is somehow the norm for others, that our technological civilisation is superior to theirs. There is a beneficial side to Europe losing its leading role in the world; it can help us come to terms with attitudes of Eurocentrism, or remnants of age-old prejudiced feelings of ‘us’ being the cultural leaders and the historical centre of the world.

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Chapter 2

Cross over Europe Wherever you go in Europe, you find a multitude of crosses. Look around and you cannot escape them. You find them on church buildings, on top of bell towers, beside the road, on mountain tops, in schools and hospitals, in private homes, and on book covers and posters. Countless people wear them as ornaments or amulets, or both. Crosses are carried in processions. Sport clubs have crosses in their emblems. Europe is literally packed with crosses. The cross, of course, symbolizes the Christian faith. It stands for the religion that has created a bond between the peoples of this continent, despite their different cultures, their rival interests and so on. But notice this: as you travel across the continent, you will find crosses of all kinds. In fact, the same cross comes in a great variety of forms. We have the Celtic Cross, the Huguenot Cross, the Nordic Cross, the Maltese Cross, and the Languedoc Cross, to mention but a few. Each of them represents not only the message of Christ but also a region, a language, a nation, a particular history, a local tradition. Ten countries have a cross integrated in their national flag, but the colours and forms are different on each flag. A larger number of regions and provinces have cruciform symbols. Every one of these cross symbolizes a particular history, a particular or regional national identity. At the same time, it reveals something of the identity of Europe as a whole. You don’t find this elsewhere, by the way. Outside Europe, the flags of only six countries bear a cross: Tonga, the Dominican Republic and the four countries that incorporate the United Kingdoms’ Union Jack and its triple cross in the corner of their flags (Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Tuvalu). So here is the point: Christianity has played a key role, not only in the emergence of the cultural unity of Europe but also in the development of its social, political and cultural diversity!

2.1. Diversity Diversity is indeed a remarkable aspect of our continent. We are a mosaic of ethnic identities, languages, national histories, political traditions, cultures, and lifestyles. Ethnic diversity The forebears of the European peoples came largely from the east, some already long before the beginning of the Christian era, settling mainly around

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the Mediterranean, from which some moved further north. Many came with the great people movements towards the end of the Roman Empire and in the centuries following its downfall. They spoke a variety of mainly Indo-Germanic languages. They worshipped a host of gods. Scores of divine names have been recorded. As a result, a great ethnic diversity emerged: besides Romans and Greeks, there were Celts, Scots, Bretons, Picots, Russians, Lombards, Saxons, Franks, Burgunds, Germans, Slavs, Ostrogoths and Visigoths, Frisians, Danes, Vikings and more. Linguistic diversity Europe is also marked by the linguistic diversity of its inhabitants. When the European Parliament meets in Strasbourg, all deputies wear headphones, enabling them to listen to the simultaneous translation of what others are saying. Speakers are proud to use their mother tongue to express their opinions. Hundreds of translators are busy interpreting what each of them has to say, into the twenty or so official languages of the European Union. To American or Chinese observers, this sounds crazy. But for Europeans, this is normal. This is precisely what makes us Europeans: we communicate and cooperate in a multilingual way because we do not want one culture to dominate. To preserve our diversity, we accept that many different languages are used. As Umberto Eco once said: ‘Europe is translation.’ Europe’s linguistic diversity is a major obstacle to its economical cooperation and political integration. Yet others insist that it is an asset, a cultural richness. Because the European Union endeavours to maintain this diversity at all levels, it is held out as a model for other regions of the world where countries are separated by linguistic and cultural borders. The following map shows the linguistic variety. There are three main language families: Latin or Romance (various forms of dots in squares), Germanic (oblique lines) and Slavic (horizontal lines). Scattered among these are other languages, some of them are akin to each other (Basque, Celtic languages in Ireland and the United Kingdom, Finnish, Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian, Albanese and Greek, Hungarian, Turkish.) The geographical distribution of languages is such that we can speak of three major linguistic zones: ‘Latin’ in the southwest, ‘Germanic’ in the northwest, and ‘Slavic’ in the east. Notice the mosaic of languages in the Southeast. Diversity of histories A major element of culture is the collective memory of historical events that shaped the conditions of life of the people. Again, Europe is marked by a diversity of historical experiences. Every European country has its own historical experience and therefore its own memory of the past. Their particular histories have been determined by geographic location, economic developments,

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Figure 2.1 Languages in Europe.

wars and invasions, political rivalry and alliances. The memory of the Poles, for instance, is marked by submission to the surrounding peoples: Prussians, Austrians and Russians. The common memory of the Italians is marked by ages of internal division and the fact that its capital is simultaneously the institutional centre of the worldwide Roman Catholic Church. The memory of the Germans is marked by the clashes between Protestant and Catholic princes, and the fatal imperial ambitions of the Second and the Third Reich. While some nations have a long history, going back to the High Middle Ages (England, France), others have been established much later. Belgium was created in 1830, Slovakia in 1991. Common denominators Although the peoples on the continent have fought each other bitterly and continuously, their histories are marked by some common denominators, so that we can speak of a combined history in which the fate of the European peoples has been closely intertwined. The first one is the Roman Empire. It pacified the southern part of Europe and spread the Greco-Roman culture which gave cohesion to its heteroclite population.

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The second common denominator is Christianity, after it had become the official religion of the Roman Empire. The Christian faith and church institutions became the shared framework for the peoples of Europe, despite their ethnic differences. Different interactions with Christianity Christianity is a common denominator in the history of European peoples, but at the same time it has also shaped their diversity. All of them have been marked by an interaction between Christianity and culture, but this has taken different forms. For a start, when the peoples in the Roman Empire and later on the IndoGerman tribes north of the Empire were Christianised, their cultures were not suppressed but transformed through the influence of the church. Their languages remained, although they adopted much of the ecclesiastical languages, Latin in the West and Greek in the East. Moreover, while the church had a dominant position, she did not exert her influence in the same way everywhere. In some cases, prelates acted in alliance with the existing political powers, in other cases they supported opponents and rivals to the rulers in power. Finally, as divisions within the church developed into military conflicts, they shaped the political map of Europe. The prime example is the rift between Protestants and their opponents within the Roman Church, which gave rise to the religious wars during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Each country had its particular Christian tradition. In each country there was the alliance between the rulers and a particular church. As a result, Christianity took on different national colours. It became a kind of civil religion. In some European countries, the dominant church clearly nourished nationalistic sentiments. One thinks of Orthodoxy in Russia, Lutheranism in Germany, and Roman Catholicism in Spain.

2.2. Religious zones Due to the internal divisions of Christianity, there are now three major religious and cultural zones: • Protestant northern Europe: United Kingdom, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, northern and eastern Germany, Estonia, Latvia. • Orthodox Eastern Europe: Greece, Russia, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Rumania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro. • Roman Catholic Europe: Ireland in the west; Portugal, Spain, France, Italy in the south; Belgium, southern Germany, Switzerland, Austria and the Czech Republic in the centre; Lithuania, Poland, part of Ukraine, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia in the east.

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Christianity has been the dominant religion, to the virtual exclusion of all others. In the past, only Judaism and Islam have maintained a presence. When the Islamic Ottomans ruled over the Balkan regions, from 1453 till the end of the nineteenth century, the majority of the population remained Orthodox or Catholic, while the military, civil servants and some people groups converted to Islam. Their descendents are found in Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, the European part of Turkey and the Caucasian periphery of Russia. This could be called the fourth religious zone, although it is a rather scattered one. Three zones plus a mixed one Roman Catholics constitute the religious majority in twenty-three countries, the Orthodox in ten countries, Protestants in nine countries, and Muslims in two countries. Interestingly, the religious zones and the distribution of languages show considerable overlap, as the following map brings out. The horizontal stripes in the southeast (plus Romania) show the Romance or Latin languages; the densely dotted area in the north and west represent the Germanic languages; while the Slavic languages are the lightly dotted area in

Figure 2.2 Map of languages in Europe and religious affiliations.

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the east is. Finally, the biased strips stand for the remaining languages. (The map fails to bring out that Hungarian is not a Slavic language.) Added to this are three lines that visualize the major religious divides. The line in the west divides the regions with Roman Catholic and Protestant majorities. The horizontal line from south to north marks the historical divide between Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox regions, while the curved line in the southeast indicates the Muslim presence. One can see that the Balkans are a region apart, where different religious communities live side by side, in a complex mosaic of sub-regions that do not always coincide with national boundaries. This region has always been marked by ethnic and religious tensions that often erupted into open conflict, the latest example to date being the war in the former Yugoslavia, from 1992 to 1995. Because of the close relation between religion and national/cultural identity, these peoples seem to remain more attached to their religion. Secularisation percentages are lower than in other parts of Europe. Minorities that do not fit in this picture Of course, such a map is a simplification of reality. It neither brings out the important Roman Catholic communities in predominantly Protestant countries, nor the Protestant minorities in the south or the Orthodox communities in Western Europe. Furthermore, it does not depict the spread of Evangelical churches all across the continent. Notice that there are important religious minorities within all three (or four) zones: • Jews, dispersed all over Europe, the largest communities being found in France, Russia, Ukraine, England and Germany. Not all of them practice Judaism, but it is difficult to ascertain the percentage of secularised Jews, since Jewish culture is permeated with religious customs. • Muslims are present in all European countries, mainly due to a continuous wave of immigration during the last four decades. Besides the historic Islamic ‘pockets’ mentioned above, there are now important Muslim communities in France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and to a lesser extent in Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Switzerland. • Adherents of Asian religions, notably Buddhism and Hinduism, are present in many European countries, notably in the United Kingdom and France. This is due to immigration from former colonies, and to a fashionable openness among ‘post-modern’ indigenous Europeans for oriental religions and philosophies of life. New Age spirituality is to a large extent based on these religions. Finally, an increasing percentage of the population is secularised. This phenomenon can be witnessed all over Europe. It comes in two forms mainly.

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First, the people who are not affiliated with any religious institution. This percentage is the highest in Protestant and ex-communist countries, with peaks in the Netherlands, the eastern part of Germany and the Czech Republic. Secondly, the non-practicing nominal members of Christian churches. This percentage is highest in traditionally Roman Catholic countries. Even though these division lines are a reduction of a much more complex reality, they are helpful in presenting a clearer picture of the diversity of the European context in terms of religion and culture.

2.3. A socio-cultural cross So far we have noticed some regularity in the cultural diversity of Europe. Religion and language are major components of a people’s culture. Moreover, the form of Christianity that prevails in a given country is the outcome of its history. We can simplify the picture of the religious diversity by combining the three major divides in the form of a cross. This enables us to identify four zones and their main characteristics:

Protestant northwest

Slavic east

Predominantly Protestant with important Catholic minorities (UK, Netherlands, Germany)

Roman Catholic countries in the western part and Orthodox countries in the eastern part

Latin southwest

Mixed southeast

Mainly Roman Catholic

Mosaic of Roman Catholics, Orthodox and Muslims

Figure 2.3 Four religious zones in Europe.

North versus South Another factor that has determined the culture of European peoples is their geographic situation, which has to do with climate, natural resources, arable land, commercial routes, and access to ports. For a start, there is a north and there is a south in Europe. The divide between the Mediterranean world and the regions beyond it has a lot to do with climate and vegetation, and therefore with culture, because the natural and weather conditions influence agriculture, food patterns, lifestyle and traditions of a given society. The colder the climate, the harder one must work to survive and make living conditions more pleasant. Another consequence of climate: families in the north live more indoors, in the south more outdoors. People drink wine in the south, beer in the north.

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But there is more to it. At the time of the Roman Empire, the natural northsouth division largely coincided with the limit (limen) between Roman territory and the realm of Germanic tribes. Britannia was the exception, a far off northern country in a Mediterranean Empire! More than a military and political border, this was, at least from the Roman point of view, also the demarcation line between the ‘civilised’ peoples linked together by a Hellenistic-Roman culture, and the ‘uncivilised’ world of the Barbarians. In due time the Roman Empire declined while the Barbarians adopted the (Christian) religion of their former foes. Gradually, the north-south divide lost its significance. But traces remained. Even today, the Latin and Greek zones around the Mediterranean have distinct characteristics, as compared to the north. To mention just one example: extended family structures are more important than any other social structure in the south. Parents help their children with financial aid much longer than they do in northern countries. It is a matter of interpretation where the north ends and the south begins. Belgium for instance has been called the most northern part of Latin Europe while people in northern France point out that the Latin mentality is only found in the southern part of their country. But wherever you draw the line, there is a difference between north and south. The Mediterranean world has a ‘feel’ of its own. Socio-cultural ‘quarters’ It is interesting to see how these different factors interplay. When we combine the geographical, linguistic, and religious zones, we can identify four major socio-cultural ‘quarters.’ We can visualize this in a schematic way by drawing the following cross over Europe: Of course this is a simplification of the real situation, but it helps us to identify more clearly four major socio-cultural parts in Europe. When we draw this cross, we do not want to give the impression that the borders are clear cut. In some countries, different zones seem to overlap. As one travels across Europe, one gradually moves from one cultural region into another. But at some point, travellers will sense that they have entered into another world, another kind of Europe. For instance, when they go from Amsterdam to Moscow, they might get a feeling of transition already at the German-Polish border, or at some point east of Warsaw, but that does not change the principle of the cross over Europe. When travellers go from Copenhagen to Barcelona, somewhere along the way they will realise that they have moved from a Nordic to a Latin kind of region. More variables This cross over Europe is a generalisation, and a tentative one. We do not pretend to have analysed in depth the various aspects of these zones. Further research is necessary to refine and modify it. In order to compare the different socio-

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Northwest Germanic Europe

Slavic east

Germanic peoples and languages

Slavic peoples and languages (some exceptions)

‘Beer’ culture

‘Vodka’ culture

Climate less hospitable

Climate less hospitable

Culture mainly determined by Protestantism Mostly Protestant with Roman Catholic minorities. Some Roman Catholic countries

Cultures determined by Roman Catholicism (western part) or Orthodox (eastern part)

Industrious, enterprising, commercial development

Traditionally, less prosperous than the West

Used to a plurality of religious expressions. Today largely secularised

Some countries are very much secularised (e.g. Czech Republic), others marked by widespread religious practice (Poland)

Latin Europe

Mixed, Balkan Europe

Latin or ‘Roman’ languages

Latin, Slavic, Greek, Turkish and other languages

‘Wine’ culture

‘Wine’ culture or ‘black coffee’ culture

Hospitable climate

Hospitable climate

Culture determined by Roman Catholicism

Cultural mosaic of ‘pieces’ determined by Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Islam

Industrious, enterprising

Traditionally, less industrious and prosperous than the West

Less secularised than NW Europe. High percentage of nominal Roman Catholics

Less secularised, because of relation between religion and national/cultural identity

Figure 2.4 Characteristics of the four zones in Europe.

cultural zones, we have used a number of variables, but to check our provisional conclusions and refine the picture, other variables should be added, such as: • • • • • • • • • • • •

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Individual initiative versus state initiative Take care of yourself versus the state takes care of you Family interests versus the general interest of the nation Role of (extended) family How egalitarian? How tolerant of religious diversity in general, and of Islam in particular? Attitude towards multiculturality and integration How industrious, enterprising? Attitude towards authority Approach to education and learning How open to globalisation? How receptive of American way of life?

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For the purposes of this book, another important variable would be: • How receptive are people to Evangelical Protestantism and church models? Understand resemblances and differences at a regional level Despite its provisional state, this cross clarifies why some national and regional cultures have more in common with each other than with others. Germans, British, Dutch, Norwegians and Swedes recognize much more of themselves in each other than they do when they compare themselves to Italians, Greeks, Bosnians or Romanians. Russians feel very different from French, and at the same time closely akin to Byelorussians and Ukrainians. And so on. It also helps workers in intercultural mission to understand that cultural dividing lines do not always correspond to national borders. On the hand, Europe is not at all a unified whole, despite the process of economic and political integration within the EU. It really is a collection of different contexts. Any European who stays and works in another country for longer than a tourist visit will become aware of the barriers between him or her and the population of that country. On the other hand, the cultures of European peoples are not as diverse as it first seems. They show all kinds of regional correspondences. Within each region there are cultural affinities that explain why people within Latin Europe understand each other easier than people in other regions. Spanish people have more difficulty in learning English than Dutch people for example. Generally speaking, Russians will find the French way of life much stranger than the way of life of Romanians and Slovaks. Germans identify more easily with Scandinavians than they do with Serbs, Greeks or Portuguese. This list of observations can be multiplied ad libitum.

2.4. Old and new divides in the East Let us take a closer look at the divide between East and West, because it is not as clear cut as our socio-cultural cross would suggest. It goes back to the old division between the western and the eastern Roman Empire. After the Empire was Christianised, the division continued between the Catholic Latin West and the Orthodox Greek East. During the Middle-Ages, the peoples to the north and the east were evangelised by Catholics and Orthodox respectively, so the division line spread as well. The Germanic and some Slavic peoples were incorporated in the Catholic realm, most Slavic peoples however in the Orthodox realm. As a result, the dividing line went right up to the northern outskirts of the continent, separating Scandinavia and the Baltic from Russia.

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‘Slaves’ Moreover, there was a deep cultural rift. Germanic peoples as well as Romans and Greeks looked down on the Slavs, as on the other peoples that came from Asia and invaded Europe (Huns, Mongols). When captured, these people were made slaves and traded on the slave markets in the Roman Empire. This practice continued for many centuries. Even during the reign of the Carolingians in the seventh and eighth centuries, Slavs, i.e. slaves, were being sold on the markets of Verdun and other major cities in the Christian world. In fact, ‘Slav’ and ‘slave’ became synonymous in the Germanic and the Roman-Latin languages in the West! While the practice of slavery gradually disappeared, it has added to the feeling of difference between the West and the East, even after the Slavic peoples were evangelised. Two lines between West and East When we come to look at it, there are two parallel frontiers between East and West, as Urs Altermatt highlights in his study on the composition of Europe as a cultural zone. Since the Middle-Ages, a territorial-political internal border runs through Europe that almost exactly corresponds to the eastern border of the former Carolingian Empire. More or less the same frontier was repeated in the 20th century, when the three allies Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill during the conference of Yalta in 1945 divided Europe in two parts. In an almost ghostlike way they reinstalled the ageold inner European border line. A second internal frontier runs more eastward, it is religiously determined, separating Catholic and Protestant from Orthodox Christianity.’20

The first frontier runs between the Germanic and the Slavic peoples. The second lies more eastward; it separates Orthodox Europe from Western Europe. Caught between the two lines are Slavic people with a ‘Western’ Latin form of Christianity (Roman Catholic Poles, Czech, Slovaks, Lithuanians, Lutheran Latvians and Estonians, Reformed and Catholic Hungarians). This explains the ambiguous situation of these peoples. Viewed from the West, they are Eastern Europeans, but they themselves would not like to be wholly identified with the Europeans east of them. Throughout its history, Western Europe has been more prosperous than the East, as it developed global trade routes and colonial empires. As the East lagged

20 Urs Altermatt, Europa: ein christliches Projekt?, p. 65. Our translation from German.

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behind, it has always had a desire to catch up with the West, to belong to the rest of Europe and not to be left out. Their elites were for a long time culturally oriented towards France and Germany. These differences were intensified by the Iron Curtain that was drawn through Europe after the Second World War, dividing the continent into two opposing zones based on rivalling ideologies. Another aspect of this dividing line should be mentioned. ‘Europe’ means ‘west.’ The idea of ‘Eastern Europe’ comes from Western Europeans who have determined the geographical and political foundations of the continent. They saw themselves as the real Europeans – this age-old prejudice still lingers on. After 1945 the countries west of the Iron Curtain had no difficulty in simply attaching the label ‘European’ to their common market, their treaties and institutions of cooperation. After the fall of the Berlin Wall the countries to the east were invited to ‘join’ Europe.’ What has become of Central Europe? Another question comes up in this respect: what has become of Central Europe? In the past the Holy German Roman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire occupied the central part of Europe. The countries that have replaced these empires considered themselves neither as Western nor as Eastern but as Central Europe. However, the Iron Curtain ran right through the middle of Mitteleuropa. West Germany and Austria were integrated in West (the EU, NATO), but the major part of Central Europe became part of the Soviet Bloc and its zone of influence. Due to their common recent history under communism, they now share an historical legacy with other countries in the East, while the rift with the West has deepened. Today, it is difficult to speak of a distinct group of a ‘Central European’ nations. Sometimes, this notion is still retained, but it really belongs to the past While ‘Central’ Europe has virtually disappeared, the question of East and West remains. People in the West often forget that Slovaks, Slovenes, Croats, Hungarians, Czech and Poles like to consider themselves as being part of Western Europe. Eastern Europeans in their mind are Russians, Ukrainians, or Romanians (although the latter speak a Roman language). There is a widespread feeling that they should rather not join the EU. At an international cultural meeting in Prague in 1995, the Polish author Andrzej Szczypiorski gave a talk in which he excluded the Russians from the European civilisation ‘because they lack Roman law, Latin Christianity and WestEuropean Enlightenment.’21 He is not the only one to hold to such views. The Hungarian historian Jenö Szücs has published an influential essay in which he

21 Urs Altermatt, Europa: ein christliches Projekt?, p. 65.

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argues that there are still fundamental cultural and political differences between Western, Central-East and Eastern Europe.22 Perry Anderson has summarised the discussion on this subject as follows: Since the late 1980s, publicists and politicians in Hungary, the Czech lands, Poland and more recently Slovenia and even Croatia have set out to persuade the world that these countries belong to Central Europe that has a natural affinity to Western Europe, and is fundamentally distinct from Eastern Europe. But if Poland, or even Lithuania, is really in the centre of Europe, what is the east? Logically, one would imagine, the answer must be Russia. But since many of the same writers – Milan Kundera is another example – deny that Russia has ever belonged to the European civilisation at all, we are left with the conundrum of a space proclaiming itself centre and border at the same time.23

The interesting thing about this kind of representation is that there seems to be a general feeling among people east of Helsinki, Berlin and Vienna that Europe equals ‘the West.’ In order to reckon themselves to this ‘West,’ they push Europe’s eastern border further eastward, so as to include their countries while distinguishing them from ‘another’ Europe further to the East to which they do not want to belong. If this is so, than it really confirms how real the East-West demarcation is in the minds of people, wherever they would draw it geographically. This is a major cultural frontier.24 Meanwhile, Orthodox church leaders insist that Russia and its neighbours are the inheritors of Byzantine Europe, which stand in continuity with the Christianised Roman Empire. In other words, the East is a different kind of ‘Europe.’ The Balkans Finally there is that peculiar part of Europe that seems to belong to neither its East nor to its West. We have to situate it in the southeast but it is difficult to mark its frontier; it is even more difficult to give it a name. In the nineteenth century, the name ‘Balkan’ came to be used, denoting a region of incessant strife. Indeed, this is an area of tension, because it represents a mosaic of different ethnic origins, language groups, and religions. This is the only part of Europe

22 Jenö Szücs “Die drei historischen Regionen Europas,” essay published in 1983. Quoted in Urs Altermatt, Europa: ein christliches Projekt?, p. 67. 23 Perry Anderson, quoted in Anthony Pagden (ed.), The Idea of Europe, p. 219. 24 For a detailed treatment of this subject see Urs Altermatt, Europa: ein christliches Projekt?, p. 67-72.

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where Islam has maintained a continual presence till the present day. Bosnia and Albania have a predominantly Muslim population. And we should not forget that Istanbul, ancient Constantinople, is a Muslim metropolis on European soil! The case of Greece A specific case is Greece. It has a Mediterranean culture, but it differs from the Latin countries. Greeks are situated in the east, but they are not part of Slavic Eastern Europe, nor would they reckon themselves wholly as Balkan. At the time of this writing (2012), the impact of the financial crisis that erupted in 2008 continues to be felt all over the continent. Problems are most serious in Greece, considered to be the ‘bad pupil’ in the class of countries-with-the-euro. During the debate on whether or not to assist the Greeks with more financial loans that has been taking place, huge cultural differences have come to the fore. As other countries learn how their political, social and economic institutions function, they become aware of the fact that this is a cultural region unlike the western half of Europe. By way of example, let me quote the elucidating testimony of Catherine Martin, a French ‘little Sister of Jesus,’ belonging to the Spiritual Family Charles le Foucault. Having worked in social aid projects, she is well acquainted with Greek society. Here is what she writes: “Living in Greece for eight years now I want to respond to the reactions to the situation in this country that I hear expressed in other countries. The image that is created of Greece for many months now, is the image of a country where corruption reigns, where fraud is a national sport, where scandals erupt and succeed each other to the rhythm of a machine gun. Nothing of that is totally false, and we should not hide the truth, but all depends on the way things are being said (...)

Secondly, nothing is gained when an already weak partner is further humiliated, all the more so when this partner is a whole people. Thirdly, it has become quite apparent that in thirty years of partnership, the others have not succeeded in really getting to know and understand their Greek cousins.’ For it is evident, although we may have forgotten it, that the Greeks are not Occidental Europeans and God willing, they will never be. With regard to the law they don’t have the same considerations as we. Generally speaking, they don’t have the particular rigour that marks the West and which is undoubtedly an inheritance from Rome. A legal norm is not seen as an absolute constraint but more like a simple reference point that has an indicative value. I keep being reminded of what our Greek professor said to us during our first language class: ‘The genius of Latin is its logical rigour; the genius of Greek is its elasticity, the art of nuance. There are rules of grammar but the exceptions, the shades of meaning, the variations and the irregular cases are very numerous indeed.’

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Since living here I am persuaded that what is true for this language is also true for the mentality of this people. What is most important are family links and social links. When someone asks you a assist, you don’t refuse t, even if it entails an infringement of the law. People help out their relatives and their friends, they are sensitive to personal needs, but they don’t have a very strong sense of the common good, so they evade the law without any hesitation in order to help someone. The Greeks themselves admit that they are often willing to swindle. They often admit: ‘this is not good, but this is the way we are, we will never change.’ We rejoice in the diversity of Europe which constitutes its richness, but that implies that we should also reckon with these differences. We should neither be astonished nor should we expect that the Greeks behave altogether like the Germans or the French. If the European Union disserves its name, those who make up this Union should get to know each other in a more than superficial way and not just on the basis of clichés.”25 This testimony is just one of the many possible illustrations of the cultural variety of our continent.

2.5. How does Evangelicalism fit into the picture? Since we are looking at Europe from an Evangelical Protestant perspective, we want to raise the question where and how Evangelicalism fits into the picture. How receptive is the population in each socio-cultural zone to the Evangelical expression of Christian faith, with its emphasis on conversion, personal relation with God and individual responsibility? How do they relate to Evangelical forms of church life, with its ‘low liturgy’ and its emphasis on participating in and contributing to the witness of the Gospel? We would tentatively say that Evangelicalism is strongest in the north-western zone, and weakest in the southern zones. It seems that a population with a Protestant background is more receptive than to a population with a traditional Roman Catholic or Eastern Orthodox background. Is there perhaps a distance between the church model generally used by Evangelicals, and the socio-cultural context of these zones? These are important questions for organisations involved in evangelism and church planting. It would lead us far beyond the scope of this book to deal with them in depth; we only raise them in order to make us aware of the need to take into account the different contexts of each socio-cultural zone.

25 Catherine Martin, “C’est L’Europe qui a une dette envers la Grèce,” in: La Croix, 3 October 2011, p. 31. Our translation, our italics.

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One could narrow the enquiry and distinguish between traditional Evangelical Protestantism on the one hand and Pentecostalism (including Charismatic movements) on the other. Interestingly, Pentecostal movements have done relatively well in countries like France, Spain and Italy, where traditional Evangelicalism has been much more slow to ‘catch on.’ Moreover, in these ‘Latin’ countries there are sizeable charismatic streams within the Roman Catholic Church.

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Chapter 3

The idea of ‘Europe’ Europe is a paradox. Here we have a great number of peoples and nation states living apart but together. They are very different from each other. Don’t say to the Swiss in Zürich that they are German even though they speak the same language more or less. Within the one United Kingdom, people are very conscious of being Scottish, English or Welsh. When crossing the Pyrenees, one is struck by the distinction between Catalans and Castilians. Greeks and Macedonians are worlds apart, as are Serbs and Croats, Poles and Lithuanians, Flemish and Walloons, Sicilians and Milanese. Consider the number of independent nation states, forty-eight in all. Look at their different customs, listen to their different languages. Nevertheless, we call them ‘European’ languages, as distinct from other languages. Each national identity within the geographical confines of Europe has its specific characteristics, not to mention the regional identities that in some cases are even stronger. All of them have a flavour of their own. Indeed, they are a mixed lot, as varied as the multicoloured coat of Joseph. So much so, that they have never lacked reasons or pretexts to fight ferocious wars against each other. Nevertheless, they are all Europeans. When they find themselves in a non-European cultural context, this is also the perception they encounter there. This is more than a continent, more than a geographical area and the sum total of states and people that it represents. Europe is also an idea, a category of the spirit.’ Many authors who have studied the development of Europe make this point.26 Pope Benedict XVI is one of them. In his essay on the spiritual foundations of Europe, recently published under his own name Joseph Ratzinger, he rightly observes: Europe is a geographical concept only in a way that is entirely secondary. It is not a continent that can be comprehended neatly in geographical terms; rather, it is a cultural and historical concept.’27

26 To mention a few examples: Jérôme Broggini, Une idée  d’Europe, 2009; Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe, 1995; Jan Van der Dussen and Kevin Wilson (ed.), The History of the Idea of Europe, 1995; Anthony Pagden (ed.), The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, 2002. 27 Joseph Ratzinger, Europe, Today and Tomorrow, p. 11.

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This is an important distinction. In order to indicate that we are talking about more than a continent or a political entity, we should write ‘Europe’ in inverted commas. As such, it stands for a culture, or rather a family of cultures that have developed in the course of a particular history. However, when and where did this idea emerge? And what exactly did it stand for? As we shall see, there have been various ideas and images, each of them related to specific historical events. Some of them still exist today, while new meanings are arising as well. All these ideas are not mutually exclusive. Some overlap, some are complementary. In this chapter, we shall give a survey of the ideas that held sway in the past, and several ideas associated with ‘Europe’ today.

3.1. ‘Europe’ as a Christian realm When and where did the idea of ‘Europe’ come up for the first time? The ancient Greeks already used the name, but at that time it did not have the geographical meaning of today, nor did it convey the idea of ‘We Europeans.’ The ancient Greeks used the name of Europe only in a geographical sense, but their Europe was limited to Hellas and the southern part of the Balkans. The idea that they and the Barbarian people to the north belonged together, was simply too outrageous to their chauvinistic Greek minds. At that time, ‘we Europeans’ could only mean ‘we Greeks.’ The intellectual and ruling classes of the Roman Empire hardly ever spoke of ‘Europe.’ The only ‘we’ that counted for them, was ‘we Romans’ and ‘our GrecoRoman civilisation.’ In the sixteenth century with the onset of exploration, the people of Europe were faced with cultures they found alien. As these new worlds opened up for them, they not only described themselves as British or German or Spanish but also as ‘we Europeans’ (nos Europai), as the famous scientist Francis Bacon put it.28 In his day, there was clearly an idea of ‘Europe’ which referred to the peoples of the whole continent. So it must have sprung up some time between the Romans and the sixteenth century. Can we be more precise? Yes we can. Frankish ‘Europe’ Historical records show that the idea of Europe first originated in Western Europe, in the Frankish kingdom. Following the baptism of their king, Clovis, in 499 CE, the Franks were part of Catholic Christianity, in communion with

28 Quoted by Anthony Pagden, The Idea of Europe, p. 33.

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the Bishop of Rome. From the heartland, between the Rhine and the Seine, they extended their kingdom in all directions. The conquered tribes were incorporated into their kingdom and Christianised. In the eighth century, the Franks had become the dominant military power in the west. But they were threatened in the south by Arab armies that had already subdued the Iberian Peninsula and that were now crossing the Pyrenees. These ‘Moors’ or ‘Saracens,’ as they have been called afterwards, were fighting under the banner of Islam. It is in the chronicles of these events that we come up with the designation Europenses. The first mention in extant sources of that period is in the Hispanic Latin Chronicle of 754, also called Continuatio Hispana. Compiled in Toledo or Córdoba, this chronicle is attributed to Isidorus Pacensis (Isidore of Beja). He lived under Arab rule in Iberia. His narrative covers the years 610 to 754, and historians consider it one of the best sources describing the Moorish conquest of Spain and southern France. It contains the most detailed account of the Battle of Tours in 732, better known as the Battle of Poitiers. North of the Pyrenees lay what the Muslims called the Great Land (al-Ard al-Kabirah), where, on a Roman road south of Poitiers, the Arabo-Berber army of the amir of Al-Andalus, ‘Abd Allah al-Ghafiqi, encountered the solid mass of Frankish tribesmen led by Charles (the ‘Hammer’). No less than 30,000 Arabs and Berbers swarmed over the landscape of Aquitaine. (Numbers are often put higher at 80,000, and the Frankish army at 30,000.) ‘The men of the North stood as motionless as a wall,’ wrote our chronicler. ‘They were like a belt of ice frozen together and not to be dissolved as they slew the Arabs with the sword.’ And he concludes by saying that ‘the Europeans (europenses) came out as the victors.’ The landmark Battle of Poitiers brought the Islamic advance to a standstill and confirmed the Franks as the leaders and defenders of the Christian peoples of Western Europe. It also marked the failure of a grandiose strategy developed by the Umayyad leaders in Damascus, who were heading the vast and expanding Islamic empire. They had already attacked Constantinople, the capital of the Christian world, several times, but to no avail. They then planned the advance in Spain to continue through Italy and the Balkans and to the north of Constantinople, so as to encircle it. History has taken another course. Constantinople continued to resist for eight more centuries. And in the West, Islamic forces were pushed back south of the Pyrenees. It is in this context that our Spanish chronicler describes the Franks and their allies as ‘Europeans,’ no doubt reflecting a wider usage of this term. This was the collective name for a number of peoples who were Christian. ‘Europe,’ in other words, denotes a Christian realm. Historian and noted expert on this period, David Levering Lewis, concludes: ‘Looking historically, it is evident that the coordination and collaboration of

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Figure 3.1 The spread of Islam in 622-750.

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the bishopric of Rome and the regime of Catholic Franks in the immediate aftermath of Poitiers, led to the creation of Europe as a coherent culture and polity.29 With the Frankish kingdom, a new Christian empire emerged that saw itself as the successor of the Roman Empire and the guardian of its heritage. In ecclesiastical documents, it was called ‘Europe.’ The grandson of Charles Martel was crowned emperor by the Pope in Rome, on Christmas Day in the year 800. Later generations would give him the name Charlemagne, ‘Charles the Great.’ During his lifetime, he was known as Pater Europae, ‘Father of Europe,’ and his empire as Europa vel regnum Caroli, ‘Europe or the kingdom of Charles.’ It was sometimes called a ‘holy Empire.’ It was marked by a close alliance between the spiritual and the temporal powers, even though they remained distinct. For all his endeavours to create a Christianised empire in continuity with the heritage of the Romans of old, and despite the alliance of the empire and the Church of Rome, Charlemagne did not choose Rome as his capital but Aix-la-Chapelle! What were the characteristics of the Carolingian kingdom? Firstly, it established Latin as the common language of administration, education, science and cultural expression. Latin also became the sacred language of the church. Secondly, it was based on the feudal system in which the king delegated the administration and the defence of the vast territory to counts and dukes and bishops, in exchange for loyalty and taxes. This enabled a large degree of regional autonomy. People kept their language, customs and social structures, within an overarching unity. Thirdly, the framework for unity was Christianity and the institutional church to which all spheres of society were linked. ‘The adhesion of the elites of the Germanic and Celtic tribes to the religion of the Franks created a confessional union which in turn fostered a cultural fusion,’ remarks Agnès Graceffa in her analysis of the Frankish system. ‘The progressive Christianisation of the lower ranks of society, and of subdued peoples, whether voluntary or not, finalised this process.’30 In 843, the Empire was divided by the Treaty of Verdun. The western part eventually became France. The middle and the eastern parts have merged to become the Holy Roman Empire, which consisted of a great number of marquisates, counties, duchies and bishoprics. Besides, other kingdoms came into being: England, Aragon, Denmark, and so on. During the Middle Ages, there

29 David Levering Lewis, God’s Crucible: Islam and the Making of Europe, p. 126. 30 Agnès Graceffa, “L’Europe de Clovis comme référence discrète de l’idée européenne,” in: Hélène Yèche, Construction européenne, p. 44.

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was continuous rivalry and warfare between them, but in each political entity the same alliance between throne and altar existed. This gave the inhabitants of all these states, especially the clergy, the nobility and the learned, a real sense of belonging to one Christian realm called ‘Europe.’ Later on, the name ‘Europe’ was gradually replaced by the term corpus christianum, usually translated in English as ‘Christendom.’ But the idea remained the same, namely that of a Christian realm. The horizon of the learned was European rather than national. Clerics, scholars and administrators travelled widely. At the courts of Europe several languages were spoken. A name migrated from East to West The name Europe was originally linked to Greece and the southern Balkans. We cannot retrace exactly how it migrated much later to the far off Frankish kingdom in the West, but we can make a reasonable guess. Here is our reconstruction. The Frankish Empire was considered to be the prolongation of the Roman Empire. As Charlemagne was crowned by the pope, he was invested with the status of the last (Christian) Roman emperor. But at the same time, there was another successor of Rome: the Byzantine Empire in the East. This was the uninterrupted continuation of the Roman Empire of Constantine, the emperor who adopted the Christian faith in 312 CE. He and his successors had made Christianity the official religion, but at that stage, the Christian Roman Empire was not yet called ‘Europe.’ In order to better defend and administrate the vast territory under their control, the emperors divided the Empire into a Western part of which Rome was the capital, and an Eastern part of which Constantinople was the capital. This dichotomy led to the development of a Latin Occident and a Greek Orient. In the West, the Roman Empire crumbled after the invasion of Germanic tribes. Gradually, the Franks gained control and became the new power that dominated the West, in close alliance with the Church of Rome. The Eastern part became the Byzantine Empire, in close alliance the Patriarch of Constantinople, but increasingly independent from the Bishop of Rome. The frontier between the two ran roughly between present-day Croatia and Hungary on one side, and Herzegovina, Bosnia, Serbia and Romania on the other. This has remained a religious and cultural demarcation line ever since, even in Europe today. Orient and Occident went separate ways. Both considered themselves as the perpetuators of the Christianised Roman Empire. Both were losing territories in the south to Muslim armies: the Middle East, Egypt, North Africa and Spain. The Mediterranean Sea that had united the Greco-Roman civilisation was now separating the Christian world from the Muslim world.

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As the Byzantine Empire lost its eastern provinces, it was more or less reduced to Greece and the Balkans, the territory that the Greeks had called Europe. Here we have the historical situation in which the identification of the Christian realm with Europe could emerge. Presumably, clerics and ecclesiastics in the West adopted the name Europe to include the Frankish Empire in the Christian realm that was the continuation of the Roman Empire. ‘Europe’ equalled the world ruled by the alliance of altar and crown. People in those days knew very well that there were churches elsewhere, but these lived under non-Christian rulers. In contrast, ‘Europe’ was ruled by Christian sovereigns, in alliance with the church. Byzantine ‘Europe’ We should emphasize that this idea of ‘Europe’ came in two forms, a Western and an Eastern one. People in the West often overlook the latter. Standing in uninterrupted continuity with the Eastern Roman Empire created by Constantine in the fourth century, the Byzantine Empire has always understood itself to be the true Rome. This idea was reinforced after the downfall of the western Roman Empire and the sack of Rome in the fifth century. From that time onwards, Constantinople, the capital of the East, was called ‘the second Rome.’ Byzantium created its own Greco-Roman world, which differed from Latin Europe in the West in its liturgy, church structure, and alphabet, and by its renunciation of Latin as the language of the learned. Its heartland was the region that the ancient Greeks called ‘Europe.’ Byzantium considered itself to be ‘Europe’ and the inheritor of the Christian Roman Empire in much the same way as the Carolingian Kingdom did in the West. Interestingly, it shared the same characteristics with the former Roman Empire: There was a common language for administration, jurisdiction and science, as well as for the liturgy. At the same time, the various peoples could maintain their cultural identity, but their adhesion to the Christian faith created an overarching unity, a cultural cohesion, a sense of belonging together. The Slavic people in the north were evangelised, became part of ‘Christian Europe,’ but were not incorporated in the Byzantine Empire. Instead of being subject to the hierarchy of the Greek Orthodox Church, they were allowed to have their autonomous church authority. Contrary to the centralised Roman Catholic Church, Eastern Orthodoxy is a family of national ‘autocephalous’ churches, each member having its specific liturgical language and traditions. The two Christian worlds of Europe have gone separate ways. Attempts to unify them have failed. The schism between the Roman Catholic and the Eastern Orthodox Churches in 1054 CE only solidified a development that had begun with the division of the Roman Empire, seven centuries before. During the Crusades, the Western armies on their way to the Holy Land routed Constantinople and

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brought immense suffering to the population of Byzantium, a tragic history that Greek Orthodox people still remember today! In 1453, Constantinople fell in the hands of the Islamic Ottoman invaders. Since then, Moscow became the new centre of gravity of the Orthodox realm, with an independent patriarchate. In order to emphasize the continuity with Eastern Christendom, it was designated as ‘the ‘third Rome.’ As the Gospel spread, Europe became larger and larger It is important to notice that the ‘idea’ of Europe as Christian territory emerged while the geographical definition of Europe was still vague and subject to change. Throughout the Middle Ages, the geographical frontier of Europe coincided more or less with the frontier between Christianity and other religions: Islamic in the south, pagan in the north and the east. Both the Latin and the Greek churches spread the Christian faith in a northern direction. As the Gospel spread and the new peoples were added to the church, Europe became larger and larger. Each tribe that was Christianised entered in the Christian realm of ‘Europe’: Vikings, Danes, Irish, Scots, Goths, and dozens of others. The last ones to accept the Christian faith were the Lithuanians, in the fourteenth century. In this way, Europe gradually took shape as the continent we know today. But there was this demarcation line between the Latin West and the Orthodox East. It ran from the Balkans to the Arctic Sea: Catholic Hungarians, Poles, Lithuanians, Estonians and Finns on one side, Orthodox Romanians, Ukrainians and Russians on the other side. The ‘others’ outside Notice the implication of this idea of ‘Europe.’ Since it is a Christian realm, no part of it should be dominated by rulers of other religious allegiance. This is a deeply rooted notion. Its origins go back to the struggles of Frankish kingdoms in the East and the Byzantine Empire in the East, facing one and the same ‘enemy,’ the invading Muslim armies. David Levering Lewis has written a moving and detailed account of the confrontation with the Islamic world in the south of France, followed by the reconquista of Spain in the following centuries. We agree with his conclusion that this confrontation has been ‘a major factor in the European sense of self and otherness.’31 From a sociological point of view, this is a well-known natural phenomenon. When people develop a collective identity, there is invariably a demarcation line between ‘us’ and ‘the other.’ No matter whether we are at war with them,

31 David Levering Lewis, God’s Crucible: Islam and the Making of Europe, p. 128.

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or only feel threatened by them, or just live far away from them, the ‘other’ is unlike us, and we don’t want to be like ‘them.’ When confronted with them, we are confirmed in our identity. One could even say that the ‘other’ serves to create and reinforce the sense of belonging. Struggles over commercial interests, armed conflicts over territory, campaigns against heretics and dissidents who threaten to disrupt ‘our’ society are the occasions to wave banners, sing national songs, sacrifice goods and life, and pray for the sovereign. Revolutions uproot existing collective identities, but in so doing, they only create new ones which future generations will defend in battle. All of this is well-known at a national or local level. We do not often take into account how much it also applies to the idea of ‘Europe.’ It is striking to see how the conflict with the Muslim world has always served to arouse a sense of belonging, capable of rallying kings and local chiefs and church leaders and local populations for a common cause, i.e. preventing Europe from becoming Islamic. This happened during the Crusades. The same happened as long as the Ottoman Empire posed a threat in the southeast. Twice the armies of the ‘Turks,’ as they were called, advanced as far as Vienna. In 1529 and 1683, the city was besieged. Polish and Lithuanians allied with the Holy German Empire in order to push back the attackers. It was precisely the continued confrontation with the Ottomans that gave European countries a sense of being involved together in a fight against a common enemy. It gave rise to the first ideas of a union of European states, called the Holy Alliance. Already in the sixteenth century, the Spanish theologian, philosopher and educator Juan Luis Vives formulated a proposal to that effect, in which he stated: We have, from Gades [ancient name of Cadiz in Andalusia] to the Ister [ancient Greek name of the Danube] a zone that stretches out between the two seas [the Black Sea and the Atlantic Ocean], the zone of courageous and very powerful Europe. If we unite, we shall no longer be just equal to Turkey, but superior to all of Asia.32

Today, statements like these seem exaggerated, out of place even, but they do reflect the way in which the struggles with the Muslim World reinforced European’s self-understanding. Similar quotes can be found in the writings of other humanists such as Erasmus and Thomas More.

32 This is a quote from his Dialogue on the Conflicts in Europe and the War Against the Turks. Cf. Juan Luis Vives, Obras políticas et pacifistas, introduced by Paul Calero, Madrid: BAE, 1999, p. 91-113.

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The ‘others’ inside Besides the ‘other’ outside, Christian Europe also had its ‘other’ inside: the Jews. They represented the opposite of Christian society. That’s why they had to live in separate quarters and wear distinguishing signs in order to keep them at a distance in social life. In church teaching, Judaism was depicted as the total opposite of the Gospel, as the forbidden alternative, as the thing not to do. When the ‘Christian’ population was faced with famine, pandemic disease and other disasters, the Jews often took the blame, precisely because they were a community apart. The history of anti-Judaism and the discrimination of the Jews during the Middle Ages is a complex one with which we cannot deal in the context of this book. Suffice it to say that ‘the Jews’ were an important factor in forging collective identity. Even though they were part of society, they did not figure in the idea of a ‘Christian Europe.’ Instead, they served as its negative counter image.

3.2. Protestant ‘Europe’ With the spread of the Reformation, a third variant of the same Christian realm emerged; Protestant ‘Europe.’ Interestingly, the Reformation movements only touched Roman Catholic countries, not the Eastern Orthodox regions. Protestantism started as an attempt to reform the existing church, but the internal church conflict over such issues as papal authority, Bible and tradition, indulgences, doctrines, priesthood, sacraments and monastic orders soon took on political proportions. They led to military conflicts. Whereas Catholic rulers insisted on the unity of Christendom through allegiance to the papacy, the reform movements resulted in national churches everywhere in Europe: Anglican (with its Protestant doctrine) in England, Presbyterian in Scotland, Reformed in France and the Netherlands, Lutheran in several parts of the German Empire and Scandinavia. Two centuries of bitter religious wars between Roman Catholic and Protestant powers ripped Europe apart, bringing death and suffering everywhere. The worst was the Thirty Years War that ravaged the German Empire. It is estimated that a third of the population perished! The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 brought peace to parts of Europe according to the principle of cuius regio, eius religio: the religion of the prince shall be the religion of the land. But elsewhere the violent religious conflicts continued When the smoke of muskets and canons finally lifted from the battle fields and the beleaguered cities, the warring nations signed the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, the western European Christian realm found itself cut in two. A new frontier separated the Catholic south from the Protestant north. It largely coincided with

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the ethnic and linguistic border between the peoples with Roman languages in the south and the Germanic peoples in the north. While the southern countries did not allow Protestantism to develop, the northern countries were more tolerant of a plurality of Christian creeds. They had important Catholic minorities. Moreover, the southern part of the Low Countries and Ireland remained firmly Catholic. This religious and cultural frontier ran right through the Holy German Empire, dividing it in Catholic, Lutheran and Reformed lands. Following the famous thesis of Max Weber, many sociologists see a link between Protestant ethics and the rise of capitalism. Be this as it may, capitalism did characterize the North, leading to economic and commercial development, whereas the Catholic south lagged behind. This raises the question whether this was somehow related to the Roman Catholic ethic. Was the emergence of Protestant Europe the end of the classic idea of ‘Europe’? Not really. The leaders of the major Protestant movements did not call into question the alliance between throne and altar, nor the unity of society, polity and the institutional church. Their lands remained part of Europe as a Christian realm, but they developed a new version of it. Protestant Europe is different from Roman Catholic Europe, different also from Greek Orthodox Europe. Political diversity For one, there was no overarching ecclesiastical structure that bound these countries and their churches together. Contrary to the centralised Roman Church, these churches had a national scope. Consequently, they enhanced national and regional identities, sometimes even to the point of igniting independence movements (e.g. in the Low Countries). They played an important role in the economic and cultural development of the country of which they considered themselves an integral part. Another important element of Protestantism was the right of every believer to have access to the Bible in his own language. Protestants translated the Bible into the vernacular of the people. In so doing, they stimulated the development of national languages. Church services were held in national languages as well. Latin receded from the liturgy only to remain in use among theologians. In this respect, we see a certain resemblance with the Eastern Orthodox Churches. Religious diversity As a result, the visible unity of ‘Christian Europe’ disappeared, while its diversity was enhanced. With the rise of Protestantism, any attempt to unite Europe on the basis of ‘one faith, one king and one law’ had become impossible. Christendom had to come to terms with the fact that it existed in several visible forms.

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Freedom of religious practice Protestants insisted on the freedom of religious practice according to personal conviction. They claimed this freedom over and against Catholic princes and prelates, who thought in terms of une foi, une loi, un roi, as the French monarchs put it. In other words, to guarantee the unity of the nation, everybody should be part of the same (Roman) church. However, mainline Protestant churches often found it difficult to grant the same freedom to dissident voices in their midst: Anabaptists, non-conformists and free churches. Many of them were forced to renounce their beliefs or flee. English Baptists sought refuge in Amsterdam. Pilgrim Fathers and many others fled to the tolerant Republic of the Netherlands, or undertook the perilous journey to the other side of the Atlantic; the New World became a haven for Protestant dissenters of all stripes. All of this shows how difficult it was to step out of the mindset of a visibly united Christian society and allow some plurality. But in the end, Protestant states did allow Catholic and other Protestant minorities to practice their form of Christianity. This was a new phenomenon, and it has become characteristic of Protestant ‘Europe.’ The ‘other’ It does not come as a surprise that Protestants forged their own idea of Europe in contrast to that of the Roman Catholic Church. This was the ‘other,’ the primary contrasting reference point. In the sixteenth century, Protestants didn’t hesitate to liken the pope to the Antichrist. To Martin Luther is attributed the slogan: ‘rather Turkish than Popish.’ In his time, armed conflicts broke out between Catholic and Roman princes, while at the same time the Ottoman Empire was threatening to overrun Vienna. Apparently, the frontier of Protestant Europe had changed. The biggest threat no longer was the Muslim world, but the Catholic institutional church. This shows that Protestants were concentrated on reforming Europe, rather than defending it as a whole against outside forces. Inside Europe they struggled for survival and for another kind of ‘Christian’ Europe. Meanwhile, they were going out into the rest of the world. Countries like England and the Dutch provinces developed international trade and commerce. Was the Roman Catholic world the only ‘other’ to the Protestant idea of a Christianised world? We could add the Jews, but only with respect to those Protestants who excluded them from the corpus christianum, as had been the case in the Middle Ages. Other Protestants, however, took a benign position. They showed interested in Hebrew, Jewish learning, and the future restoration of the Jewish nation. Perhaps we should add the Radical Reformation, the so-called Anabaptists and non-conformists. They represented an alternative vision of the church in

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the world, rejected by mainline Protestant churches. Where the latter were established, dissenters of all stripes suffered oppression, discrimination and even persecution.

3.3. ‘Europe’ as civilisation In the early modern period, a new idea of ‘Europe’ emerged. After the ‘discovery’ of America and other continents, Europeans came in contact with other cultures. In comparison, they considered themselves to be more civilised, or even the most civilised part of the world. According to this idea, ‘we Europeans’ share things that ‘others’ don’t have, or don’t have yet: ‘our’ technological inventions, ‘our’ organisation of society, ‘our’ moral values and ‘our’ way of life. Atlases of that time depicted Europe as an empress surrounded by personages wearing various symbols of power. In so doing, they illustrated the new idea of Europe as the superior civilisation. This image was already introduced in 1603 by the Italian artist Cesare Ripa in his work Iconologia. It provided artists with iconographic rules. Europe was to be represented as someone wearing a crown, ‘to show that Europe has always been the leader and queen of the whole.’33 The Enlightenment notion of civilisation Under the influence of the Enlightenment, the old idea of ‘Europe’ as a realm united by the Christian religion, its convictions and its institutional structures, made way for the idea that ‘Europe’ represented a civilised way of life, a society based on individual freedom, rational insight and general moral values, independent of a particular religious creed. This notion of an advanced civilisation was first espoused among the learned, the cultured upper class, and the prosperous elites. These circles were fertile ground for the ideas of Enlightenment philosophers: liberty, tolerance, commerce, progress, rational enquiry and so on. Meanwhile, European elites were interested in the heritage of the ancient Greeks which became a source of inspiration for artists, philosophers and scientists. There they also found this notion of civilisation. The Greeks in antiquity considered their country to be a land of civilised people, as opposed to the barbaric way of life of the Persians in Asia. The Enlightenment philosophers reached back to before Christianity to Greco-Roman Antiquity as the new source of inspiration for the modern civilisation of Europe.

33 Anthony Pagden, The Idea of Europe, p. 51.

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Universal values derived from Christianity During this time the urban elites thought of themselves as Europeans and proclaimed in their salons that, in the words of the conservative Englishman Edmund Burke, ‘no European can think himself as a foreigner in any part of the continent.’ Defining the unity of all Europeans no longer in terms of Christianity or of any religion for that matter amounted to a paradigm shift. As with all paradigm shifts in history, this one was also related to a deep social and spiritual crisis: the religious wars. After all the violence, bloodshed, destruction and spiritual suffering of the wars between Catholics and Protestants, Christianity no longer seemed capable of, let alone qualified to unite all Europeans. This new idea of Europe first emerged in the Renaissance and was developed during the Enlightenment when Europeans began to rediscover the cultures on other continents that were so different from theirs. Another preparatory factor in the paradigm shift was, of course, the Protestant Reformation, with its critique of dominant ecclesiastical institutions, its emphasis on individual freedom of religion, and its acceptance of a plurality of moral convictions within the same society. This also paved the way for the philosophical ideas of the Enlightenment, according to which society and state no longer have a sacred foundation but should be based on moral values and respect for the rights of individual citizens. Christianity was not abandoned. The new idea was rather a further development, considering that the Christian religion, when freed from superstition, bigotry and authoritarianism, was an integral part of the European way of life. During the Enlightenment, rational science was dissociated from religious beliefs, and political institutions from the divine right of a prince. As science and philosophy opened a new spectrum of secular ideas, the European way of life remained connected with Christianity in the area of moral values. Christian morals and virtues were being generalised. Enlightened Europeans adopted them, not necessarily as revealed truth but rather as principles for humankind, and that reason in itself was able to clarify them. The intellectual elite developed the idea of ‘European values, which equalled civilised values.’ As Anthony Smith rightly observes, ‘these values were to a large extent rooted in Christian teaching, but were now seen as universal instead of religious values.’34 This was the common denominator

34 Anthony D. Smith and Atsuko Ichijo, Scottish Nationalism and the Idea of Europe: Concepts of Europe and the Nation, p. 65.

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that created a new sense of belonging across national boundaries. Conservative British philosopher Edmund Burke spoke of ‘the great vicinage of Europe.’ This idea continued to evolve from the eighteenth century till at least the middle of the twentieth century. In the course of time, the idea of ‘Europe’ as a civilisation was associated by Europeans and people from other continents alike, with a variety of elements such as: • arts (especially music: the symphony orchestra, European classical music, European sacred music); • dress (tie and suit for men, certain styles of hair dress and clothing for women) • importance of ‘civilised’ manners; • material well being, prosperity, affluence; • religion (Christianity as a European or Western religion, or inversely, Europe as a Christian continent, in a cultural sense); • individuals are citizens with political rights and duties; • the importance of human rights; • freedom of religion; • the right of individual property; • representative democracy; • rationalism, science and technology, industrial achievement; • belief in progress; • education and personal development. Emergence of the secular state The Enlightenment vision of Europe as a civilisation based on rational insight and universal moral values had far reaching implications for the realm of the state. As Joseph Ratzinger explains: In the realm of ideas, this meant that the sacred foundation for history and for the existence of the state was rejected; history was no longer gauged on the basis of an idea of a pre-existing God who shaped it; the state was henceforth considered in purely secular terms, founded on reason and on the will of the citizens. For the very first time in history, a purely secular state arose, which abandoned and set aside the divine guaranty and the divine ordering of the political sector.35

35 Joseph Ratzinger, Europe, Today and Tomorrow, p. 21.

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In the Enlightenment vision of society, all that pertains to faith in God was considered to be a private affair, belonging to the realm of feelings and not to that of reason. God and his will ceased to be relevant in public live. They do not define the political will of the people. In this way a new type of schism rose in the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century between Christians and secular persons (called laics in French). This rift ran deeply through the Latin nations during the last two centuries. Long and fierce political battles have been fought over Catholic schools, Catholic influence on political parties and state institutions. Issues like abortion, same-sex marriages, euthanasia, and family policies are still arouse deep-rooted antagonisms between secularists and traditionalists, as the two camps are usually called. Protestant countries, on the contrary, have had much less trouble allowing room for liberal and enlightened ideas. As far as mainline Protestant and Evangelical churches were concerned, there were issues to which they were opposed in secular movements, but by and large they accepted democratic pluralism, considering that this did not necessarily destroy the framework of a broad, basic Christian consensus. Ideas of progress and hierarchy of civilisations Closely connected with the notion of civilisation was the idea of progress, according to which humanity was developing continually. There is an evolution of knowledge and moral behaviour. History is the process towards ever higher stages of development. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, philosophers like John Locke, James Tully and Immanuel Kant defended the idea that commercial society under democratic rule based on the political ideas of the Enlightenment, represented the most advanced stage of the progress of humankind so far. Other peoples would do well to follow Europe’s lead, and through their contact with European maritime commerce, they would inevitably enter into a new phase of their development. According to the stadial theory of history that was in vogue at that time, all human societies begin as hunter-gatherer societies. Humans then become pastoralists, less mobile than their predecessors. Then they moved to being agriculturalists, which transformed them into city dwellers and traders. Eventually they become modern, civilised, social beings. The final stage is the ‘commercial society,’ where there is democracy and diplomacy to solve conflicts, open communication, free transaction of goods and habits, and freedom of beliefs and ideas. That was the ‘end of history,’ as Hegel put it, i.e. its finality (in the sense of the Greek word for end, telos). Societies are on their way to become nations like the European ones, who are, therefore, the vanguard of human progress.

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The flip side of this notion was the sense of superiority; European nations considered their civilisation to be superior to what they found in other parts of the world. Anthony Smith explains: The secret of the success of the term ‘civilisation’ is probably its close association with the idea of progress that was heralded by the Enlightenment. The idea of levels or phases of civilisation was the manifestation of the spirit of the time. It also offered a way of making sense of the world the Europeans were discovering. As people in Europe became increasingly aware of the non-European world and the various cultures contained therein, it is no wonder that a scheme of the world which classified each society according to its progress or level of civilisation acquired such popularity. This scheme allowed people to put some kind of order in a chaotic world and, moreover, to put Europe at the top of the hierarchy.36

Civilisation offensive It goes without saying that the notion of a superior civilisation fostered an endeavour to bring others to same ‘level.’ This will to civilize others amounted to a sense of calling; it was a Europe-wide phenomenon. Here we have the secular counterpart – or perhaps the secularised survival – of the missionary drive of Europeans to spread the Christian faith. European nations undertook a so-called civilisation offensive in two directions. First they directed their efforts towards the working class and the poor in their own societies, mainly through education. Schooling became obligatory, and education a priority of the state. Traditionally, education was taken care of by the church, but now secular school teachers came along, in some countries they even took over from religious school teachers as the agents who transmitted knowledge and moral values. Secondly, the civilisation offensive was aimed at the population in the colonies. Europeans introduced their technology, their education and their medical care; they imposed their rule and their system of administration, they fought with superior military means against resisting armies. They developed trade and transport. Call it colonialism, imperialism, expansionism or export of European culture or all of that at the same time. Notice, however, that it was not only driven by economic and political motives but also by the will to civilize the people they subjected to their influence. Europeans honestly believed that they acted in the best interest of the other peoples.

36 Anthony D. Smith and Atsuko Ichijo, Scottish Nationalism and the Idea of Europe: Concepts of Europe and the Nation, p. 66.

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Christian mission and civilisation The combination between the idea of civilisation and the will to spread it to others found a corollary in churches and Christian mission organisations. Not only did missionaries spread the knowledge of the Bible and plant churches, they combined that with spreading key elements of European civilisation. They established hospitals to give European-style medical care, and schools offering European-style education. Christian converts were taught to conduct family life, to organize their finances, to work for a living like Europeans. Church buildings, hymns, organs, liturgical dress, worship styles, church government, Bible schools and theological education were introduced. There was Europeanisation everywhere and in all sectors of life. For the missionaries this was not a question of unduly imposing another lifestyle but of bringing progress through ‘Christianity, Commerce and Civilisation,’ to quote the famous three Cs of David Livingstone. The motives were benevolent. With hindsight, looking back from the position of the twenty-first century, we can be critical of such a combination between mission and civilisation. We are not giving an assessment, but just indicating that this took place on the basis of a certain idea of ‘Europe.’ The ‘others’ Who was ‘the other’ who helped forge this collective sense of ‘we are civilised nations?’ From what has been said before it is clear that the ‘others outside’ were the peoples on the other continents with whom the Europeans came in contact through maritime commerce and in their colonies. In preceding centuries, the Mediterranean region had been the religious and cultural frontier with the Muslim World at the ‘other’ side, but now Europe found itself surrounded by a host of cultures. All of them were very different. Some appeared to be quite advanced in technology, education, and political organisation. This caused leading intellectuals to question the supposed superiority of their own European civilisation. They discovered, so to speak, that ‘they’ were not doing worse than ‘we.’ But this was not the general opinion among the elites, let alone among the general populace who heard or read the stories of explorers and colonial governors. Anthony Pagden recounts the mood of that time as follows: ‘For most Europeans, their continent remained the only place of true civility, of free men living in secure urban communities under the rule of law. The rest of humanity served out its days under tyrannies governed according to the caprice of individual rules, or in nomadic or semi nomadic groups never far from the primordial state of nature.’37

37 Anthony Pagden, The Idea of Europe, p. 52.

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What about the ‘other’ inside Europe? Who represented the counter-image of ‘we civilised people?’ Instead of singling out one specific target group, Enlightenment Europe contrasted itself with all those who wanted to perpetuate the old order: conservative religionists, absolute monarchs, traditional communities with ‘uncivilised’ manners, and so on.

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Contemporary ideas of ‘Europe’ Nowadays, ‘Europe’ no longer stands for advanced civilisation, let alone Christianity. Two devastating world wars have aroused fundamental questions and shaken these old ideas of Europe at their very foundations. Having become wiser and more cautious through the humiliating lessons of their recent history, Europeans are reluctant to use the word civilisation any more. Its connotation of superiority that was commonplace in the past also makes them hesitant. They prefer ‘culture,’ a much more neutral term, generally associated with the idea that all cultures have equal value. Instead of looking back on the history of our continent with pride, and perhaps with prejudice, history has now become a source of embarrassment. If ‘Europe’ meant anything in the decades following the -Second World War, it stood for colonialism,’ cultural superiority complex,’ imperialism,’ slavery,’ and anti-Semitism.’ It signified all the wrongs perpetrated by Europeans in the name of Christianity or civilisation or both. Germans, British, French, Spanish, Dutch, Portuguese, for all our differences, ‘we Europeans’ had to face up to and come to terms with the same negative burden of history. Strangely, this self-critical attitude became so characteristic of the post-War period that it became a sort of identity marker of Europeans in the concert of nations. Nowhere else in the world were people denouncing their historical record in such a way. Given all the wrongs they perpetrated in the past, Europeans would do best to forget about ‘Europe’ and modestly take their seat at the universal table of nations, where every culture and every ethnic group is equal. During the Cold War the continent was split into a Western and an Eastern Bloc. Europeans were driven apart, one side characterised by the American way of life and the other side under the Soviet system. Instead of European civilisation we started to speak of Western cultures, ‘Western’ being the collective term for North America, Australia and the occidental half of the European continent. The other half, behind the Iron Curtain, was not Western. Was it still ‘European?’ Did the Soviet Bloc still belong to Europe? One was no longer sure. It was difficult to see how ‘Europe’ could still denote anything more than a geographical territory, and a divided one, at that. Nevertheless, the idea of Europe as a specific continent whose inhabitants share certain characteristics that make them different from other regions of the world, has survived. But it has taken on new forms. Europeans, generally speaking, still share the notion of exceptionality, the idea that somehow or to some extent, they are an exceptional group of

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peoples, unlike the rest of the world. This does not necessarily imply the notion of superiority, although the distance between the two is short, and the assumption easily made. Anthony Pagden expresses it very well when he writes: Europeans are unusual in sharing a sense that it might be possible to belong to something larger than the family, the tribe, the community, or the nation yet smaller and more culturally specific than ‘humanity.’...What is unusual about ‘Europe’ is that it has for long possessed an identity as a cultural space where there have been and continue to be frequent political unions. It has never, however, constituted a single state, much less a single ethnic group.38

He then shows the difference between Europe and other continents. If the Chinese, the Japanese, or the Koreans now choose to identify themselves as Asians, this is because European notions of ethnicity, and the domination of the world economy by European concepts of exchange, have compelled them to do so. But ‘Asian’ is not a shared identity all over the continent. Similarly, the peoples of, say, Uganda and Congo – nations that are the product of European impositions – are highly conscious of belonging to a continent called ‘Africa’ largely because European colonisation has obliged them, for motives of economic and political survival, to speak of Africa, from Libya to the Transvaal, as if it were the bearer of a common cultural identity. Yet being African in Africa or Asian in Asia provides only the loosest cultural or political cohesion and at most levels no cohesion at all.39 We mention some ideas of exceptional ‘Europe’ holding sway today. They are not mutually exclusive, but often combined.

4.1. Community of values The first is the idea of a ‘community of values,’ a Wertegemeinschaft. According to this idea, ‘Europe’ stands for a model of society built on certain principles, certain values pertaining to the public life and the political institutions. They have emerged in the conundrum of the common history of the nations of this continent. Out of ‘the Christian realm’ and ‘advanced civilisation’ emerged a new idea of ‘Europe,’ consisting of elements such as:

38 Anthony Pagden, The Idea of Europe, p. 53. 39 Idem, p. 53-54.

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• • • • •

Multiparty, representative democracy Human rights Pluralism, both on the religious and the political level State responsibility for the welfare of the people Separation of church and state, also called the neutrality of the state, or laïcité

In the post-war period, the idea of Europe as democracy was prominent. This was a sharp reaction to the horrors of Nazism and fascism which were considered to be ‘fundamentally un-European.’ Nowadays, human rights have become the hallmark of what European nations have in common. They are formulated in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is binding for all member states of the European Union since the Treaty of Lisbon (2008). When a political leader or a social organisation does not respect human rights, protests ensue, precisely because this is considered to be in discordance with being European. At the moment, the Hungarian government has come under severe criticism because of the new constitution that it drew up in 2011. Opponents argue that it limits the democratic control of the government by the parliament, and that some individual civil rights are insufficiently safeguarded. The European Commission has called on Prime Minister Viktor Orban to modify the text so as to ‘reflect the values on which the EU is founded.’40 When values such as democracy, human rights, and pluralism are associated with Europe as a whole, they become concrete signs of Europeanness. Indeed, it is often assumed that all the states in Europe and everyone living on this continent should share these values, at least officially. If not, they should remember that since they belong to Europe, they should adopt them. These values are inscribed in every European treaty and written in the marble of national constitutions. It is difficult to even start a discussion about modifying them because they are so intrinsically bound up with our history. Calling these values into question amounts to touching the basics of our societies. Everywhere on the continent, there is a broad consensus that these values are not negotiable. At this juncture, it is worth recalling the war in the former Yugoslavia. This republic was made up of different ethnic and religious communities. After its disintegration in 1992, Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians entered into a violent conflict over territorial claims that lasted for years Each party contributed its share of harsh violence, but it was especially the so-called ethnic cleansing by Serbian

40 José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, in his address to the press in the European Commission Office, on 18 April 2011.

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troops that shocked public opinion all over Europe. The murder of thousands of Muslim civilians in Srebrenica in 1995 caused an outrage. Journalists and politicians said that they were shocked to see this happen ‘in Europe’ of all places! In other words, this could have been expected in a military conflict anywhere else, but not here. This went completely against their idea of ‘Europe.’ The European Union tried to solve the problem, but it was too divided and had insufficient means at its disposal to solve the problem. It was NATO, the military alliance led by the United States that had to intervene. This again came as a shock. People asked, why weren’t we able to settle it ourselves? After all, wasn’t this was a ‘European’ problem? The vehement reactions to the events in former Yugoslavia revealed that the idea of Europe as a community of nations built on the principles of human rights really existed, and that it was generally accepted. Often considered as universal values Interestingly, Europeans usually hold these socio-political values to be universal, that is, valid not just for themselves but for the world at large. Hence the ‘drive’ of European governments and NGOs to see them respected elsewhere in the world, or implemented where they are not guaranteed by law. Organisations for the defence of human rights see to it that European governments do not ignore human rights issues in international negotiations. This is a source of tension because quite a few non-Western countries have different opinions about individual rights and duties in society, about religious liberties, about freedom of expression, and so on. They accuse Europeans of imposing their ‘interpretation’ of human rights, and of having feelings of superiority, etc. Of course, in the rest of the world, for example, China and the Muslim World, other ideas of human rights exist. When this leads to discussions, Europeans will defend their perception, which they consider to be universally valid. This debate, in turn, often leads to strengthening the feeling that ‘we Europeans’ have to defend the great cause of ‘universal’ human rights. We shall not enter into a discussion of the extent to which the social and political values associated with ‘Europe’ are culturally determined, and whether they can indeed be universalised. The fact of the matter is that many Europeans do feel that the world should respect human rights in the way they understand them. It looks as if this is a new stanza of the old song of the civilisation offensive. As if the missionary zeal to spread Christianity has turned into a mission of spreading the values that are considered foundational for building a better world for all. Of course, no longer do Europeans want to be heard saying that their culture is superior. But very often, they give the impression that they are in a certain way called or morally obliged to promote these universal values.

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Listen, for example, how the Polish philosopher Zygmunt Bauman, gives voice to this notion. In a book directed at European decision makers, he has this to say: More than ever before, our conflict-ridden, drifting planet needs the qualities that Europe, unique among the continents, has developed in more than two millennia of history: its self-criticism, its urge to self–transcendence, exploration and experiment, its conviction that alternative and better forms of human togetherness can be achieved, as well as its dedication to the cause of seeking and promoting this improvement in practice. But today Europe is unsure of itself and its place in a fast-changing world; it is devoid of vision, limited in resources and lacking the will to pursue its vocation. It is also struggling with the consequences of a onesided process of globalisation. … Despite the odds Europe still has much to offer in dealing with the great challenges that face us in the twenty-first century. Through sharing its own hard-won historical lessons, Europe can play a vital role in moving from the Hobbesian-like world in which we find ourselves today towards the kind of peaceful unification of humanity that was once envisioned by Kant.41

The last sentence might need some explanation. The name of the seventeenthcentury English philosopher Thomas Hobbes has become associated with his cynical summary of human nature: ‘man is a wolf for his fellow-man.’ To limit the effects of this natural tendency, Hobbes saw no other remedy than a strong government imposing its laws. Immanuel Kant, a major voice of the Enlightenment, wrote the Treatise on Perpetual Peace (1795) in which he argues that as European nations show other nations the way of democratic governance, commerce and freedom, they pave the way for a peaceful cooperation among all the peoples of the earth.

4.2. Cultural zone or family of cultures A second idea of Europe is closely connected with the first one, but goes further. This is the idea of a cultural zone that overarches the various national and regional cultures found on the continent. All nations and cultures participate, each in their own specific way, in this general culture and this qualifies each one of them as ‘European.’ They are a family of cultures. Like the outdated term civilisation, ‘culture’ refers to all aspects of the life of a certain group of people. It is a container concept, referring not only to values but also to norms, customs, traditions, lifestyle, social institutions, worldview

41 Zygmunt Bauman, Europe: An Unfinished Adventure, p. 35.

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and language. According to a concise but telling definition, culture is ‘the way we do things over here.’ There is a widespread impression that in Europe, people ‘do things in certain way.’ All cultures on the continent seem to be similar to a large extent, and this makes them identifiable as ‘European.’ The most notable similarities are the socio-political values mentioned above, but we should also think of artistic expressions, social customs, dress, sports, and religious traditions. Can we really speak of a European culture? There are so many national differences, so many languages, and so many minority cultures. Our continent really reveals a mosaic of cultures. Nevertheless, all the variety does not wipe out the commonality. Arguably, if the people on the continent would leave aside for a moment their national peculiarities, they would discover certain things that they have in common, all over Europe. One only has to travel abroad to become aware of that. In a hotel lobby in Nairobi, for example, the Finnish and Dutch and Spanish tourists recognize each other as ‘Europeans,’ and in the eyes of the local people, they are indeed. When we travel across the continent, we still feel reasonably at home, things are different but still reasonably familiar, as compared to our experience when we travel outside Europe. Then we have the impression that we have left ‘our’ cultural zone and ended up in another cultural world. At a superficial level, we see many resemblances with westernised nonEuropeans. In a globalized world, all airports and tourist resort centres look the same. But at a deeper level which tourists can only barely touch there is a world of difference. Seen from within Europe, the differences between the way of life in Germany and Italy are easy enough to be seen. But for an outsider those differences will seem less obvious than the similarities. Anthony Pagden is right when he notices, ‘Viewed from within Europe there may be no such thing as a European culture. Viewed from Japan there clearly is.’42 In an analysis of this, Pamela Sticht shows that a ‘European culture’ does not exist in reality, but she argues that we can speak of a certain ‘European cultural identity.’ Some authors call it the ‘European dimension of the various national and regional cultures.’43 On the one hand, there is a considerable linguistic variety. Each country and each region has its particular customs, its specific historical memories. On the other hand, there is much similarity when it comes to leisure, sports, tourism, industry, university education, and

42 Anthony Pagden, The Idea of Europe, p. 24 43 Pamela Sticht, Culture européenne ou Europe des cultures, p. 37 and 48.

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the arts, also called culture with a capital C: literature, theatre, painting, and architecture. A striking example is European classical music typified by church organs, the piano, the symphonic orchestra, and choirs singing four part harmony. This transcends linguistic and national borders. It is born in churches and courts all over Europe, in the course of history it has extended to the theatre, the concert hall and to an ever larger public. During the nineteenth century, music was even hailed as the most eminent way of unifying the divided European nations into a supranational harmony of peace and cooperation.

4.3. House of nations The third idea of ‘Europe’ is that of a commonwealth or a ‘house of nations.’ Adopting the former ideas of common values and a family of cultures, this idea goes further in that it takes on a civil and political meaning: because the countries belonging to this part of the world are bound by a common history, they are destined to cooperate and unite. A house means a household of people who are in it, whether they like it or not. It’s like being family; no one has chosen their brothers and sisters. Often, they have problems getting on with each other. But the moral implication of being a household is that those who are in it should really behave like brothers and sisters. Talking about a house presupposes solidarity! French President General de Gaulle repeatedly stated that he was in favour of what he called a ‘Europe of the nations.’ The idea of Europe as a community of nations is only party realised through the EU. Ideally, the ‘house of nations’ is larger than that. At this juncture, the delicate question arises how large this house really is. Does it suffice for a nation to be in geographical Europe or to have a foothold in it, in order to be reckoned as a member of this ‘house?’ Should other criteria perhaps come into consideration? A ‘house’ is not just about a physical space, but also about a household, a family living in it. The image of a house is associated with identity, and identity, in turn, is tied up with subjective feelings of belonging, with heritage and culture and opinions about ‘Europeanness.’ Do the Arab speaking countries in the Mediterranean region and Turkey belong to the ‘house?’ The latter is member of the European Council, together with almost fifty other countries. In Turkey, the secular state is separated from religious institutions. Nevertheless, many Europeans are persuaded that it has no place in the house as they conceive it. They point out that its largely Muslim population would destabilize the demography of Europe. We agree with Calvin Smith when he analyses: ‘Chief among the concerns raised

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by those not favouring Turkish entry are its human rights abuses and the view that Turkish entry no longer makes this a European union by virtue of its distinct cultural and religious identity.’44 Do Russia, Belarus and Ukraine belong to the house? Russian intellectuals and church leaders often insist that their nation should not be excluded. Given their history, their religion and their culture, they are part of the ‘house of Europe.’ Listen for example to what Metropolitan Mikhail Stakos of the Russian Orthodox Church said during an international conference in Istanbul, in 2000. Speaking about the contribution of the family of Orthodox churches to the construction of the ‘house of Europe,’ he insisted that ‘we should bear in mind all of Europe without national, local, political, cultural, economic, or religious discrimination.’ He went on to say: The fullness of the Church is found already in Europe. It belongs to Europe, and it forms Europe. If these basic thoughts were examined with a serious, critical disposition, then, certainly, the predominantly western European world would come to accept the historical fact that the European reality, in other words Europe, includes Orthodoxy, Catholicism, and Protestantism, just as much as it surrounds the Balkans, Turkey, Scandinavia, the Iberian Peninsula, Russia, and the Baltic States. In other words, from one end to the other – northern, southern, western, central, and eastern Europe.45

Mikhail Gorbachev, secretary general of the Soviet Union in the latter part of the 1980s, also put forward the idea of Europe as a house of nations. He and his government set in motion a process to transform the Soviet Union into a community of politically independent states. He also wanted to put an end to the Cold War and the division of the continent into two opposing military alliances. It is important to understand why Gorbachev and his associates moved in this direction. In order to undergird his policy of perestroika, he used the image of Europe as a ‘house.’ In his view, this house included Russia, Ukraine, the Baltic countries, Belarus, Moldavia, and the Soviet republics in the Caucasus region. So he wished them to take their place as equal partners of those in the western part of the house. The present rulers of the Kremlin no longer seem to be thinking in terms of the house of Europe, as they are creating a rival union between the Russian Federation and its neighbours, but this is another story.

44 Calvin Smith, “Evangelicals, the EU, Turkey and Europe’s Religious Heritage,” see bibliography for details [4 April 2009]. 45 Metropolitan Michael of Austria, “The Contribution of Orthodoxy to the Course Towards a United Europe,” see bibliography for details http://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/ articles/Church_history [consulted 12 May 2009].

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4.4. ‘Europe’ as part of ‘the West’ Finally, there is the idea that ‘Europe’ is part of a larger cultural realm called the Western ‘world’ or ‘civilisation.’ Originally, Europe equalled Occident, the region where the sun sets. For a very long time, the Western world was Europe. Today, it includes countries whose population and whose cultures have European roots: The United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, to which we could add South Africa as well. Together with Europe they constitute the Western world. Moreover, the military alliances of North America with a large part of Europe (NATO), and of the same North America with Australia, New Zealand and some countries in Southeast Asia (ASEAN), strengthen the idea of a common cultural realm called ‘the West.’ ‘Western’ stands for a civilisation that has emerged in Europe and spread to other parts of the word. Its characteristics are the socio-political values and the cultural heritage mentioned above, the predominance of rationalism, science and technology, separation between religious institutions and the state, certain art forms (classical music is called ‘European’ or ‘Western’), consumer lifestyle, apparel (people speak about ‘European’ or ‘Western’ dress), and so on. Authors defending this idea usually connect it closely with European Christianity in the past, and contrast it to the Muslim world, the Hindu world and so on. This perception of a ‘Christian’ Western civilisation is fostered by the dominant position of Christianity in the United States, the political and military leader of ‘the West.’ So the old idea of Europe as Christendom seems to be reappearing. For the largely secularised intellectual elite of European countries it usually comes as a strange and even unpleasant surprise when Muslims, for instance, associate themselves with the United States, under the collective label of ‘the Christian West.’ Since the end of the twentieth century, the idea of Western civilisation and geopolitics coincide, as there is growing antagonism in other regions of the world towards the secularised and materialist lifestyle of the West, including Europe. Islamic fundamentalism is the most conspicuous example. When in 1996 Samuel Huntingdon predicted the possibility of more or less violent confrontations between the West and other civilisations, he hit on something that was about to surface.46 He explains that the nation state is an obsolete concept, and that the great actors in history are now the ‘civilisations.’ One of them is ‘the Christian West,’ and it is threatened by a possible alliance between the ‘Confucians’ (China) and Islam. The title of his book immediately became a catch phrasestanding expression. Some talked about ‘the clash of

46 Samuel Huntingdon, The Clash of Civilisations.

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civilisations’ as a prophecy gradually coming true, others as a warning not to let it happen. The idea of Europe being part of a wider Western civilisation can easily lead to generalisations. We should not overlook the fact that societies in the Western world outside Europe have developed differently from those in France, Germany, or Italy, let alone the Balkans. For all the similarities, Europe is distinct from the rest of the West. It is not without reason that America is often called the ‘New World,’ in contrast to Europe which is designated as the ‘Old Continent.’ We should be more precise. While people in the northern and western part of the continent of Europe are quite receptive to the American lifestyle, people in other parts often have a feeling that this is alien to their culture. Russia, for example, has always been part of Europe but as for their social institutions, their religion and their cultural outlook, many Russians would not like to be equated with Western Europeans, let alone with Canadians, Australians, or Americans!

4.5. ‘We’ versus the ‘others’ Like the former ideas of ‘Europe,’ the new ones have their ‘other’ as well. By way of summary, we mention the emerging economies like China, the Arab and Muslim world, especially militant Islamic fundamentalism. Besides these ‘others’ outside, there are the ‘others inside’: immigrants from non-European countries and the cultural communities to which they are giving rise, especially the Muslim population in Europe. They constitute cultural boundary markers, economic and political frontiers. As such, they reinforce the notion of ‘we Europeans.’ We shall deal with this more in detail towards the end of the chapter that addresses the question of national and European identities.

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Chapter 5

The ‘construction of Europe’ On October 13, 2012, the Nobel Prize committee created a stir by awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to the European Union. All the more surprising since Norway is an outsider to this union; its population voted against membership in two referendums (1972 and 1994). The Prize itself is already something of a surprise, because it is named after the inventor of dynamite, the Swedish chemical engineer, Alfred Nobel (1833-1896). He also owned the Bofors iron and steel producing company. Nobel reshaped it to become a major manufacturer of cannons and other armaments. He held 350 different patents, dynamite being the most famous. Having contributed significantly to military development through his inventions and enterprises, he decided that after his life, his fortune should be used to award an annual Nobel Prize for outstanding contributions in chemistry, physics, literature, and physiology or medicine. In his last will and testament, dated 1895, he also made arrangements for a Peace Prize. This should be awarded to ‘the person who has made the greatest or the best contribution to the brotherhood between the nations and to the abolition or reduction of armed forces, and for the formation and the multiplication of congresses for peace.’ The laureates of the Peace Prize were to be designated by the Norwegian parliament. To this end, Parliament should install a selection committee, in which neither MPs nor government ministers could have a seat. The Prize was to be awarded during a parliamentary ceremony in the presence of the king of Norway.47 The first laureate (1901) was Henri Dunant ‘for his role in founding the International Committee of the Red Cross.’ Many other important figures have followed, such as Martin Luther King in 1964, ‘because this campaigner for civil rights was the first person in the Western world to have shown us that a struggle can be waged without violence’; West German Chancellor Willy Brandt in 1971, ‘for his Ostpolitik,’ i.e. the policy of rapprochement with Eastern Europe; and Mother Theresa in 1979, ‘for the work among the poor done by her and the Missionaries of Charity,’ the congregation she founded. Curiously, Indian leader

47 The other four Nobel prizes are selected and awarded by the Swedish Parliament in the presence of the King of Sweden. See Antoine Jacob, Histoire du Prix Nobel in an interview with Marinane Meunier in La Croix, 15 October 2012

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Mahatma Ghandi was never nominated, despite his impressive policy of nonviolence. At times this prize has been awarded to an organisation, such as the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights, Amnesty International, or the International Red Cross. But never before has it been awarded to a state or a people as a whole, let alone to a union of nations and peoples. In the hall of fame of the Nobel Peace Prize, the EU stands out as unique. The anecdotal part of the story is that a noted anti-European member of the selection committee was just replaced by the former Lutheran bishop of Oslo, Gunnar Stalsett. The latter ‘was much easier to persuade’ when the president of the committee proposed to nominate the EU as the laureate of 2012. Consequently, the proposal was accepted. The president, by the way, was, and still is Thorbjørn Jagland, general secretary of the European Council.48 What was the motivation? The official declaration of the Norwegian parliament stated: ‘Since the horrible suffering of the Second World War, for more than six decades, the EU has contributed to the progress of peace and reconciliation, of democracy and human rights all over Europe.’ The committee and the Parliament of Norway were right; the construction of Europe is really remarkable. Here is the story.

5.1. Attempts to unite Europe History has witnessed several attempts to realise a political unity of the European continent. Sometimes they were inspired by the dream to restore the ancient Roman Empire, and include the rest of Europe. The conquests of the Frankish kingdom could be described this way, but even though Charlemagne was crowned emperor in Rome as the ‘Father of all Europeans,’ his successors were too divided to realise the dream. In the sixteenth century, the Habsburg family ruled the German Empire, Spain and Portugal, and the larger part of Italy. They saw their dream to unify Europe under their leadership shattered on the battlefields of the religious wars that broke out between Reformed and Catholic princes. At the turn of the nineteenth century, Napoleon and his ‘Great Army’ set out to bring Europe under French hegemony, in order that it might pass from the old regimes to the new democratic structures based on the ideas of the Enlightenment. The end of the story was Waterloo and the restoration of the

48 Antoine Jacob, author of Histoire du Prix Nobel.

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old European order. Hitler and his Third Reich tried the same in the twentieth century. We know the outcome. In a sense, communism was also a project to unite the continent, not under one crown or one nation but under one socio-political system. Marxist ideology was not much interested in the European continent as such but rather in the world at large. However, the leaders in the Kremlin believed that the Soviets should lead the march towards international socialism. The Soviet Union behaved like the empires of old, creating oppressive regimes wherever they imposed their rule. All these potentates promised peace, but their method was war and oppression. Their military campaigns invariably turned into nightmares and new dreams of revenge, thus producing the gun powder for the next armed conflict. Ideals and plans in the past Meanwhile, another way of conceiving the unity of Europe emerged; the ideal of union through peaceful means based on mutual understanding. Many had dreamed of it in the past. Some had proposed concrete plans to realise it, such as Georges Podiebrad (Tractatus Europa, 1464), William Penn (Present and future peace of Europe, 1693) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Jugement sur la paix perpétuelle, 1782). In 1788, Maximilien de Béthune, minister of the French king Louis XVI, published his Projet politique, in which he envisaged a ‘community of powers who have nothing to envy from each other since they are equal, and nothing to fear from one another because they will be in balance within a European confederation.’ Emmanuel Kant wrote a very influential treatise called Perpetual Peace, a philosophical sketch’ (1795). In this text he describes the process by which the nations in Europe should be transformed into democratic and commercial societies, and form an alliance for the common good. Liberal democracies, he argued, do not go to war with each other, they cooperate in each other’s interests; they form some kind of league. Therefore, he stipulated that a ‘general confederation of European states should only be comprised of republican regimes, for in a republic there can be no declaration of war without the consent of the citizens.’ He went on to say that this process should include states in other parts of the world as well, until finally a ‘cosmopolitan constitution’ would be possible, as a basis for world peace. In his view, world peace would become possible only once all the societies of the world were ruled by republican and representative governments. Kant’s proposal has proven to be an illusion. Contrary to his prediction, European democracies did go to war with each other. But his proposal contains an idea that has become a regulative idea in Western political thinking: liberal representative democracy is the best model to promote international cooperation and prevent war.

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Towards a United States of Europe Some Europeans moved to concrete action in order to put these ideas in action. At the opening of the Peace Congress of Paris, August 21, 1849, the French novelist Victor Hugo delivered a speech in which he spoke of the creation of the United States of Europe, after the example of the United States of America, finally pacified and united under one government. Here is a quote from this famous speech: One day, the arms will fall from your hands. One day, you French, you Russians, you Italians, you English, you Germans, all ye nations of the continent, you will be melted into a superior unity, without losing your distinct qualities and your glorious individuality, and constitute the European brotherhood, as sure as Normandy, Bretagne, Burgundy, Lorraine, Alsace and all our provinces have been melted into France. One day, there will be no other battle fields than the markets opened to commerce, and the spirits opened to ideas. One day, bullets and bombs will be replaced by votes, by universal suffrages of the peoples, by the venerable arbitrary of a grand and sovereign senate that will be for Europe what the parliament is for England, what the diet is for Germany, and what the legislative assembly is for France.

These lines are engraved on the statute of Victor Hugo in the entrance hall of the Assemblée Nationale in Paris. In the minds of those who campaigned for the formation of a United States of Europe, this federation would be the first phase of a movement aimed at a worldwide understanding of all humankind, irrespective of their castes and nationalities. Addressing the World Exposition of 1869 in Paris, Hugo said: ‘These United States will be called Europe in the twentieth century, and in the following centuries they will be further transfigured and called Humanity.’ In that same nineteenth century, however, waves of nationalism swept across Europe. The idea of a federal European state was not powerful enough to seize either the minds of the rulers or the hearts of the peoples of the continent. Having shed his nationalist illusions in World War I, Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, of the dismantled Austro-Hungarian Empire, , sought to rekindle the fire of European unity in the 1920s by creating the PanEuropean movement. He wanted to bring together the superpowers France, Germany and Russia, but exclude Britain because he considered it to be an ‘Atlantic empire.’ In Coudenhove-Kalergi’s view, ‘Europe has to unite through collaboration, unlike the East (Russia) that wants to conquer it, and unlike the West (the United States) that aims to buy it.’ But before anything of that kind could happen, the continent was to go through yet another round of devastating conflict.

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5.2. The Time Was Ripe In 1945, after the end of the Second World War, there was a strong desire to create a new order that would prevent military conflicts and safeguard a lasting peace. The Iron Curtain Meanwhile, an even more devastating spectre of sheer apocalyptic doom arose. Even before the War was over, the Russians and American allies, represented by Joseph Stalin and Franklin Roosevelt, agreed to divide Europe into two spheres of influence. During the notorious Conference of Yalta on the Black Sea, they drew a line right through the middle of Europe. The British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, who took part in these talks, saw it happening before his eyes without being able to prevent it. He called it an ‘Iron Curtain,’ saying that this new frontier would not only divide Europe in two separate parts but also cause new conflicts in the future. The USA and Western Europe formed a North Atlantic military alliance in order to resist the Soviet Bloc in Eastern Europe. These two alliances engaged in an arms race with nuclear weapons capable of wiping out humankind as a whole. They confronted each other in other parts of the world where they took sides in regional conflicts: Korea, Vietnam, several African countries and most notably in the Middle East. The mutual threat of the two competing powers amounted to a situation that could well turn into a Third World War. It was called the Cold War. The threat of real war breaking out made the realisation of the European idea more urgent than ever. The Council of Europe In this situation, the British took an important step. In a public address to the students of the University of Zürich on the 19th of September 1946, Winston Churchill launched the idea of a ‘Council of Europe’ as he called it. As one of the victors of the Second World War, the British wanted to use their influence for the reconstruction of the continent, not by integrating the nations into a federal structure, but by a reinforced regional cooperation between the countries of Europe. This led to the creation of the Council of Europe, through the Treaty of London signed on the 5th of May 1949. Its headquarters were situated in Strasbourg, the city that had been tossed to and fro by the French and Germans for so many centuries! Nearly all countries on the continent became members, including the Soviet Union. Turkey was also among the signatories! The essential part of the Treaty of London was that the signatories accepted the European Convention of Human Rights. Indeed, human rights issues have always been a priority of this Council. Surely, the Council was not able to overcome division and strife between West and East.

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Nevertheless, it was the only platform in Europe where representatives from the two sides met! The way towards reconciliation Sadly, people in the eastern countries were held in the grip of Soviet domination for decades. Dissidents speaking out against the oppressive system had to pay the heavy price of imprisonment, internment in concentration camps and starvation. On the Western side, however, the time had come to bury one of the most, if not the most harmful antagonism of European history, that between France and Germany. Both countries traced their histories to a common origin, the Frankish Empire of Charlemagne. Despite the fact that they were twin brothers so to speak, they had fought each other for centuries, in a long series of bloody wars. After the Second World War they decided that this would be the final round of fighting. Political leaders of France and the Western part of Germany took the courageous step of reconciliation – the Eastern part of Germany was not included because it belonged to the Soviet zone of influence. This Franco-German reconciliation was a decisive move for Europe, as it paved the way for other nations to join the movement of rapprochement. This became the foundation stone of a process of economic, cultural and political integration. Europe had entered in a completely new phase of its history. From now on, the idea of ‘Europe’ took on a very concrete meaning, namely that of a community of nations, bound by treaty to create a common market. The age old idea was now being translated into real cooperation. As the construction of Europe progressed, the idea of a united Europe became part and parcel of the political and intellectual discourse, at least on the western side of the Iron Curtain. Politicians, intellectuals, journalists, and ecclesiastical authorities strongly supported it. They were convinced that cooperation was the logical consequence of our intertwined historical experiences and our common cultural heritage. The post-war reconciliation was the prelude to a period of peace. Within fifty years it would encompass almost the entire continent. And with peace came prosperity, at a level which former generations would not even have dared to dream about. All of it began with enemies engaging in reconciliation! Of course, this is one of the core elements of the Gospel. For ages this message had been heard all over Europe. Now, finally, politicians had the courage and the wisdom to put it into practice. The crucial role of Christian democratic politicians Among the founding fathers of European integration was a generation of politicians belonging to Christian democratic parties and motivated by the ideal of a community of peoples rooted in Christian social principles. Persuaded

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that the Biblical message of reconciliation was the only way out of the circle of violence that had held the nations of our continents in its grip, they chose the way of reconciliation of enemies. This idea went against the grain of power politics and nationalists of all stripes. Under the leadership of the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer and the French Foreign Secretary, Robert Schuman, the two arch enemies, France and (West) Germany, decided to put an end to their enmity, once and for all, and to work together for the wellbeing of the whole of Europe. This reconciliation was the key that unlocked the process of European integration. Even today, the French-German axis is of fundamental importance for the European Union. The initiatives towards unity were intended as a concrete form of ‘peacemaking,’ in the Christian sense of the word – ‘blessed are the peacemakers’ (Matthew 5:9). There is an anecdotal story behind the European community, which is largely unknown, even in Christian circles today. Three men in particular have laid the foundation of the future European Union: Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer and Alcide De Gasperi. Together they formed ‘a kind of European directorate after the Second World War.’49 The first was born in Luxemburg and lived all his life in Lorraine, the second was a native of the German Rhineland, while the third was Italian, from the northern province of Trentino. Two of them came from border regions that had in the past belonged to the neighbouring country: Lorraine to Germany and Trentino to Austria. As a result, all three spoke German. As committed Roman Catholics involved in Christian social movements, they had been ardent opponents of the Nazi regime and the Italian fascists. The three of them belonged to Christian political parties that developed along the lines set out in Rerum Novarum, the papal declaration on the Christian response to the social questions in modern society, published by Leo XIII in 1891. Schuman, Adenauer, as well as De Gasperi often referred to that basic text as their source of their inspiration. Adenauer regarded uniting Europe as a political and economic aim worth striving for, and also a means of ensuring a sustainable peace, and therefore as ‘a really Christian obligation.’ Invited by Frank Buchman, an American Evangelical evangelist, and under the auspices of the Moral Rearmament Movement, Adenauer and Schuman met several times in Geneva, and learnt to trust one another. Frank Buchman provided a neutral meeting place for more German and French politicians to meet. Friendships were formed and reconciliation was sought. The following quotations illustrate their thinking.

49 As Isabelle De Gaulmyn put it in her article, “Des inspirateurs chrétiens du traité de Rome,” in the French daily newspaper La Croix, 20 March 2011.

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Christianity is a doctrine that intends to define the moral obligation in all areas of life, at least in its general principles ... in order to protect the greatest interests of the human person: his liberty, his dignity and his development (Robert Schuman).50 To the fundamental principles of materialism we must oppose the ethical principles of Christianity that should determine the construction of the state, the limitation of its powers, the rights and duties of individuals, economic and social life, and the relations between peoples (Konrad Adenauer).51 How can we maintain what is noble and human in our national forces? Only by giving them the common ideals of our history (Alcide De Gasperi).52

Jeff Fountain, former director of YWAM Europe, has done well to record this most interesting chapter in modern European history.53 Historian Urs Altermatt notes that ‘the first institutions of West European integration in the 1950s were the work of Christian Democrats, whose aim was reconciliation between France and Germany, after three murderous wars (1871, 1914-1918, 1939-1945), a reconciliation on the basis of Christian democratic foundations.’ It was not without reason, as Altermatt notes, that opponents of this integration labelled it in a mocking way as ‘Vatican Europe.’54 Without overlooking the role played by others Of course, these men were not the only ones to work for reconciliation, cooperation and unity. Other politicians of different persuasions were also involved, so we should beware of depicting the construction of Europe as originally a Christian project. It was a project closely related to Christian values but not uniquely so. Other founding fathers were driven by humanist ideals in a more secular framework of thought. Having stated this, we should add that it remains a remarkable and undeniable fact that Christian democratic politicians played a key role in the construction of a new Europe. Looking back on their commitment to peace and cooperation, and to the initiatives they took, we would say that this a

50 Robert Schuman, Pour l’Europe, quoted by Isabelle De Gaulmyn, op. cit. 51 Konrad Adenauer at the signing ceremony of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, quoted by Gerlando Lentini, Aux racines chrétiennes de l’Union européenne, p. 54. 52 Alcide De Gasperi, address during the annual plenary session of the Council of Europe in 1951, quoted by Isabelle De Gaulmyn, op. cit. 53 Jeff Fountain, Deeply Rooted. 54 Urs Altermatt, Europa: ein christliches Projekt?, p. 78.

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fine example of influencing society with the principles of God’s Kingdom, as leaven that leavens the dough, to use the metaphor used by Jesus (Matthew 13).

5.3. The construction of Europe – first stage Describing in detail the development that led to the present European Union would require too much space. Instead, we will summarize its two stages, each consisting of five major steps forward. 1950 – Schuman Declaration When German and French politicians met to discuss the future of (western) Europe, and when representatives of other countries joined the meetings, the French minister of economic affairs, Jean Monnet, came up with a very practical plan to avoid future war. He considered that when different countries collaborated on the production of coal and steel, their economic interest would be intertwined and armed conflict impossible. So he suggested that the national heavy industries be placed under a supranational authority. Such cooperation would also make Western Europe stronger in the face of outward threats. This was important in those days because of the growing fear of the military power of the Soviet Bloc. Schuman, Adenauer and De Gasperi welcomed the plan. They presented it to their governments, and worked to obtain the support of other governments. On the 9th of May 1950, Schuman addressed a meeting of government leaders of several Western European countries. He outlined the foundations of a future European Union, and took over the proposal of Jean Monnet concerning the heavy industries. This address, which has become known as the Schuman Declaration, convinced the leaders to put the plan into action. This has become the Day of Europe. Almost a year later (April 18, 1951), six countries signed the Treaty of Paris to create the European Community of Coal and Steal (ECCS). Signatories were: France, West Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg. Just six years after the Second World War, the process of reconciliation had reached the point where the former enemies could accept each other, not only as equals but also as partners. 1957 – Treaty of Rome A new and decisive step towards unity was the Treaty of Rome, signed on March 25, 1957, which created the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Energy Community (Euratom). Signatories were: France, Italy, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg. Together they created a common market for an increasing number of goods and services.

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The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg went further down the road of integration. In 1958, they created Benelux in order to cooperate more closely in economic and cultural matters and to abolish all border controls. In 1968, the common agricultural programme was launched, with a view to coordinate the production of cereals and dairy products, so as to prevent surpluses on the one hand, and shortages on the other. This large and far-reaching programme of subsidies has become the vanguard of European cooperation ever since. A year later, in 1959, the Council of Europe took the initiative to create the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Its purpose is to ensure that the European Convention of Human Rights is respected in its member countries. The ECHR is based in Strasbourg. 1973 –EEC and Euratom introduce new common policies Attracted by the success of the EEC and Euratom, other countries wanted to get on the bandwagon. It took much diplomatic effort to convince the French government to give up its opposition to British membership. Finally, the age old prejudice that the English Channel separated the continent from the AngloSaxon world was overcome. In 1973, the door was opened for Great Britain, Denmark, and Ireland to join. The ‘nine’ set out to intensify the cooperation through the creation of the European Fund of Regional Development (EFRED) in 1975. The purpose of this fund was to stimulate the economic development of regions that lagged behind. Industrial plants, roads and railways were built in order to connect isolated zones to the economic centres, and to a Europe-wide network of infrastructure. 1979 – First European elections A decisive step was taken in June 1979 when the citizens of the EEC chose their representatives for a European Parliament through direct and universal elections. Until then everything was decided by the national governments, who also appointed the members of the European Committee that served as the executive body. Parliamentary control was only indirect, through the national parliaments. The newly formed European Parliament would ensure a more democratic basis to the decision making process. 1981 – Mediterranean enlargement In 1981, the EEC became the European Community (EC), with the intent to strengthen cooperation. At the same time, Greece became a member, followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. All three had only recently overthrown dictatorial and military regimes. Through welcoming them, the EC hoped to consolidate the young democracies. The EC also strengthened the regional development program in order to bridge the gap between these southern countries and their partners in the north. All three have benefited enormously from this program. It

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triggered an economic boom that would last until the financial crisis of 2008. But at the same time, the cultural differences between South and West became all the more apparent. Europe discovered a new dimension of its diversity.

5.4. U-turn in the East Until the end of the 1980s, the process of pacification and cooperation was severely handicapped by the fact that the continent was divided by the Iron Curtain. The European Community could not extend beyond the West. At the eastern edge of the divide, the communist countries developed a rival economic community, under the leadership of Moscow. Yet, even in those years of confrontation, the original ideal was not abandoned. French President General de Gaulle, for example, frequently expressed the hope that the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Ural, would one day be united into one community of states. After the destruction of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the subsequent reunification of West and East Germany in 1990, this ideal became a real possibility. The end of Soviet domination provided an unprecedented window of opportunity for the nations of the East to participate in the construction of Europe. Both sides of the former Iron Curtain had the political will to cooperate within a united Europe, from the Atlantic to the Ural. A second ‘Wende’ Before we move on to the next steps in the process, we should pause to emphasize the fundamental significance of the change that took place in the years 1989 and 1990. The Germans call it die Wende, the ‘U-turn’; a well chosen word because it was indeed a complete change of direction in the history of Germany and the whole of Europe. There is a striking parallel with the beginning of the construction of Europe just after the Second World War. At that time the archenemies in Western Europe decided to bury their battle-axes and engage in a process of reconciliation of which we now know the outcome. This was in fact the first Wende, bringing peace and unity to half of the continent. Some forty years later, a similar Wende took place in the other half with the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany. This opened the door to peace and cooperation between the western and eastern countries of Europe. Winds of change Winds of change were already blowing in the East in 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party and thereby the leader of the vast Soviet Union. To the surprise of the Western world as well

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as many at the top of the Soviet hierarchy, he introduced a policy of openness (glasnost) towards the West, consisting of open borders, cultural exchange, and economic collaboration. At the same time, Soviet leadership began a policy of internal reform (perestroika), allowing intellectuals and church leaders to openly question aspects of the communist system as it had developed in the preceding decades. The member states of the Soviet Union obtained more autonomy, while the population in the satellites states of the Warsaw Pact openly criticised their communist leaders, especially in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. There were public demonstrations for change. Unlike in the past, these movements were not crushed by military repression. Meanwhile, the Polish pope, John Paul II, did not cease to call for change in his native Poland and throughout the Soviet Bloc. In hindsight, historians emphasise his important role in encouraging popular aspirations for freedom and change. These developments also affected East Germany. Its hard line government still towed the line of Moscow, and was prepared to shoot down its own civilians who were trying to escape to the West. Through the Stasi, the dreaded state security police, East Germany controlled its population. Nevertheless, people flocked to the weekly prayer meetings in the Lutheran Nikolaikirche in Dresden, where they could speak out freely in the context of a church meeting. One of the participants was a young lady named Angela Merkel! Other places of contestation emerged. More and more people openly called for a change of the communist regime. The big question, of course, was what the Kremlin would do. Apparently, Gorbachev had come to the conclusion that it was useless to go against this ‘tide of history,’ as he made clear to the East German government during a visit in early 1989. In the course of that year, thousands of East Europeans tried to leave for the West, notably via the border between Hungary and Austria. In East Berlin, a handful of people got permits to leave for a day to West Berlin. Then a rumour spread that the gates would be open for anybody to visit the Western part of the divided city. A massive group of people showed up. As they were pressing on the officials, the communist authorities changed their habitual policy. Instead of giving orders to shoot at fellow citizens trying to cross the border to the West, they allowed them to go where they wanted. General Secretary Gorbachev had decided that the Soviets would not deploy their tanks to intervene. Much later, it was revealed that he himself had left for his summer residence on the Black Sea during those critical days, thus adding to the disarray in the Soviet chain of command. Meanwhile, thousands flooded through the gates of the Berlin Wall to the shopping malls on the western side. On November 9, 1989, people from both sides of the Wall started to demolish it (the Berlin Wall did not ‘fall,’ it was destroyed!). History was being written

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in a rapid sequence of epoch-making events. In early 1990, the old guard of politicians in East Germany was voted out of office during the first free elections. The West German government pressed for the reunification of divided Germany, and the Kremlin gave up its opposition. Within a year, on October 3, 1990, the two Germanys officially united. Meanwhile, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact was crumbling rapidly. First Poland, then Czechoslovakia, one country after another saw communist rule come to an end. Within the Soviet Union itself, Russia, Ukraine, the Baltic countries and the other member republics made bids for independence. The Kremlin lacked the power to resist the tide. Western leaders have generally praised Soviet Union leader Gorbachev for not forcefully resisting the demise of the Soviet Union. In reality, it remains unclear to this day whether the Kremlin did not in fact sanction military actions against Georgians, Azerbaijanis and Lithuanians, who rebelled against the central government in Moscow between 1989 and 1991. When Soviet troops violently quelled the demonstrations, twenty people were killed in Georgia, 143 in Azerbaijan and fourteen in Lithuania, not to mention the wars and unrest in Nagorno-Karabakh, Trans-Dniester and Central Asia. Many have not forgotten the tragedy that unfolded in the Georgian capital Tbilisi on the night of April 8, 1989 when Russian soldiers used sharpened spades and poison gas to break up a protest march in the city. Some twenty years after these events, as researchers gained access to the archives of the Kremlin and private documents of Gorbachev, it became clear that this leader was not as peaceful and as democratic as the West had always thought. Apparently, he has indeed tried to crush the independence movements with armed force, so as to ‘save’ his ailing Soviet Union.55 But military reaction to the independence movements in the East was limited to Lithuania Georgia and Azerbaijan only, and it was rather quickly given up. One republic after the other gained its independence and changed its political system, including Russia, under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin. Consequently, the Soviet Union became devoid of its substance and the all-controlling Soviet Communist Party powerless. On Christmas Day 1991, both were formally dissolved. Rarely, if ever, was the political map of Europe redrawn so harmoniously and in such a short period of time.

55 Cf. Christian Neef, “The Gorbachev Files - Secret Papers  Reveal Truth Behind Soviet Collapse,” in Der Spiegel, 8 November 2011. For a description of this history, see also Andreas Rödder, Deutschland einig Vaterland: Die Geschichte der Wiedervereinigung (2009).

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Former enemies strike a deal As so often in decisive moments of history, there was a personal story to this dramatic turn of events. The remarkable position taken by Gorbachev was the outcome of a deal, struck with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, concerning the reunification of the two Germanys. Details of their meetings have long been shrouded in obscurity, but as the official papers of the Kremlin during the final period of the Soviet Union (1985-1991) have become accessible in the last few years, more has become known. One of the interesting sources is the private diary of Anatoli Cherniae, Gorbachev’s closest aide. It brings to light several personal experiences of the General Secretary and his private ideas about Western leaders.56 Here is the story.57 As soon as the Iron Curtain was lifted, there was a general feeling in East and West Germany that the reunification of Germany was inevitable. What would determine whether it would be realised in a peaceful way, was whether Gorbachev and Kohl would overcome their mutual antagonism. Personality was the crux of the matter. Until then, Gorbachev had gotten on quite well with Western leaders such as American President George Bush senior, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and French President François Mitterrand. But what about the German Chancellor? Kohl and Gorbachev were about the same age, both were marked by the Second World War, but their backgrounds and their views were diametrically opposed. Born in the Palatine near France, Kohl grew up in a very anti-communist environment. He developed his career as a member of the Christian Democratic Party, his economic vision was liberal and he espoused the free market. Gorbachev was born on the far eastern extremity of Europe, in the Caucasian city of Stavropol. His career was developed within the Soviet Communist Party of which he became the General Secretary in 1985. When Gorbachev introduced reforms, Kohl didn’t trust him. ‘I will not let myself be fooled,’ he told a Newsweek reporter in 1986, ‘Gorbachev really is not a liberal.’ Asked what he thought of the policy of openness to the West, he even added that when it came to public relations, the General Secretary was using the same ploys as Goebbels.

56 Jean-Marie Chauvier, “How Mikhail Gorbachev Allowed the Downfall of the Berlin Wall and the DDR (Communist East Germany),” in: Global Research, 12 November 2011. Article based on the personal diary of Anatoli Cherniae, member of the Politburo of the Soviet Union and a personal aide of Gorbachev. 57 In this and the following paragraphs, we follow the reconstruction by Matthias von Hellfeld, “How Kohl and Gorbachev Sealed the Deal on German Reunification,’ published on the website of Deutsche Welle, 14 July 2010, and Christian Neef, op. cit.

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Gorbachev’s suspicion was similar. The Soviet leader viewed Kohl as a mediocre provincial politician, and as a mouthpiece of the Americans. For years, he had deliberately bypassed West Germany during his trips to Europe. But he came to the realization that he could not get round the Chancellor if he was to succeed in his policy of open relations with the West. So he invited him to come to Moscow in 1988. At first, Kohl refused, saying that he would not ‘take orders to travel there.’ Gorbachev insisted, and Kohl gave in. In October 1988 the two met for the first time personally. But relations remained icy. One year later, when Gorbachev received East Germany’s (last) communist leader Egon Krenz at the Kremlin, he said to him: ‘It seems that Kohl is not the greatest intellectual, but he enjoys a certain amount of popularity in his country, especially among ordinary citizens.’ However, in the spring of 1990, rays of cordiality pierced the clouds of distance. During the first post-Iron Curtain year, the two leaders began to see each other as partners for change in Europe. Kohl gave up his habitual hard antiSoviet line. As for Gorbachev, he told a journalist of Der Spiegel that he had not forgotten the reference to Goebbels, but that he had forgiven the Chancellor. On June 13, Kohl and Gorbachev met in Bonn. The direct outcome of their private talks was a common declaration concerning the relation between the DDR (Communist East Germany) and the Soviet Union, in which the two leaders recognised the right of any state to freely choose its political and social system. Meanwhile, another problem had to be solved: the delicate issue of Germany and NATO. West Germany was a member of this military alliance with the United States. Over the course of 1989, the Soviets had already agreed in principle to German reunification in their consultations with the United States. They were prepared to let this most prosperous Soviet country leave the Kremlin’s sphere of influence and join the West. But the asking price was that the enlarged German nation would no longer remain a member of NATO. For a Cold War hardliner like Kohl, this condition was out of the question. He was in favour of a strong NATO, and reunited Germany should be part of it. ‘The Kremlin had been vacillating somewhat on NATO, but nothing was a done deal,’ writes historian Andreas Rödder. ‘The bottleneck was whether Germany would be part of this Western military alliance.’58 Gorbachev and Kohl needed to come to terms; there was no other way. So they decided to discuss the matter during a summit in Moscow on July 14. At stake was the future, not only of Germany and the Soviet Union but of an entire continent. Whether this would be a peaceful future depended to a large extent on the personal peace between these two men. ‘During this summit, they started a real friendship,’ explains journalist Eike Frenzel, ‘a friendship which

58 Andreas Rödder, Deutschland einig Vaterland, quoted by Matthias von Hellfeld, op. cit.

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had historical repercussions.’ She provides most interesting behind-the-scenes information. During a concert of the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra in the Kremlin, the two heads of state and their spouses got to know each other. The atmosphere became friendly. Mikhail Gorbachev recalled later: ‘this was a wonderful evening; we have talked quite frankly about general questions and problems.’ And Helmut Kohl did his best to relax the atmosphere, stating that he would follow the example given by the General Secretary and that he wanted to open a new chapter in German-Soviet relations. He emphasised the common destiny of these two men who had grown up during the Cold War, saying that ‘we want to establish a relation of trust.’ Later, Gorbachev told one of his aides that he was ‘impressed’ by the approach of the Chancellor.59

Gorbachev proposed to extend the summit by inviting Kohl to his vacation residence in Stavropol, the town where he was born. Kohl would only accept on the precondition of German membership of NATO. The Kremlin did not object, and so the second meeting took place, on July 16, under the shadow of the Caucasian Mountains. ‘Already during the first conversation, Gorbachev agreed in principle to not stand in the way of a reunified Germany being part of NATO and regaining its full sovereignty,’ recalls Horst Teltschick, deputy head of the German Chancellery who took the minutes at the meetings. The mood was extraordinarily friendly. On a riverside walk taken by both delegations, Gorbachev’s wife even presented Kohl with a bouquet of handpicked flowers. ‘That was a signal,’ remembers Teltschick. ‘There was no chance of a quarrel. Both sides wanted a positive outcome.’ Kohl convinced Gorbachev, if he still needed convincing, that a unified Germany in NATO would not be a threat to the Soviet Union. And on July 17, he was able to announce that the Soviet leader had given the go-ahead for West and East Germany to reunite and join the Western military alliance. Kohl had obtained all that he wanted. But what did Gorbachev get in return? The Soviet Union was faced with an enormous debt as a result of the arms race with the US, and the war in Afghanistan. Its economy was in a dire straits, and there was a food shortage due to failed harvests. Gorbachev realised that in such a situation, the Kremlin could no longer maintain control over its satellite states in the East.

59 Eike Frenzel, article written in connection with the television documentary Je t’aime, moi non plus – une amitié à la portée historique (‘I love you, me neither – a friendship with historic significance’) broadcasted by the German-French channel Arte on December 29, 2009.

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In return for German reunification and NATO membership, Kohl agreed to pay the costs of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany and their resettlement at home. He also promised financial aid aimed at stabilizing Soviet finances. The total amount West Germany ultimately paid to the Kremlin is estimated at between 50 and 80 billion Deutsch marks (25-40 billion euro). Apparently this was a bargain from the German point of view. Afterward Kohl admitted that he would have agreed to even double that sum, while Gorbachev regretted that he hadn’t asked for more. End of the Long European Civil War The personal chemistry between the German Chancellor and his Russian counterpart proved to be decisive. Hardly three months later, all inner-German borders were gone. Within a short time, the political map of Europe had completely changed, to the amazement of the peoples of West and East alike. The Long European Civil War, as British historian Geoffrey Barraclough has called the seventy-five years between the outbreak of the First World War and the end of the Cold War, had come to an end. This was the personal side, but the political side should not be forgotten, as Christian Neef emphasises in his description of the relationship between the two leaders: Gorbachev needed the influential German chancellor, now that the situation was becoming dicey at home. There were shortages of everything in the shops – meat, butter, powdered milk – and his popularity was sinking. In those months, Gorbachev reached for the phone more and more often to discuss the situation with his ‘friend Helmut,’ who had suddenly become his political adviser. The two men used a special telephone line.60

At that time, American diplomat Condoleezza Rice was Director of the Soviet and East European Affairs for the US National Security Council. As such, she witnessed from the inside the political changes that were taking place. Several years later, when she had become US Secretary of State, she looked back at that time: In a period of rapid change like the end of the Cold War, the time from early 1989 really through to 1991, personal relationships meant a great deal more than they might have at any other time.61

60 Christian Neef, op. cit. 61 Interview from 1997, quoted by Matthias von Hellfeld, op. cit.

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When enemies cross the border that separates them without weapons, when they meet and join hands as partners for a common cause, only then is peace in the making. This principle is intrinsic to the message of the Bible that has been foundational to the cultures of Europe. Too often, leaders have neglected it, to the peril of their people. Sometimes, they have put it in practice, to the benefit of all.

5.5. The construction of Europe – second phase From this point onwards, the construction of Europe entered into a second phase. The door was opened to the East. Several countries in the former Soviet Union took concrete steps to enter the European Community. They needed to change the rules of their economy so as to be compatible with the common market, and implement a democratic political system. Moreover, their legislation on human rights needed to conform to legislation in the European Community. 1991 – Treaty of Maastricht A major step forward was the Treaty of Maastricht, signed in December 1991. The European Community became the European Union (EU). More powers were granted to the European Parliament in order to increase the democratic quality of the Union. Cultural exchange was to be promoted; the level of higher education was to be harmonised in order that diplomas and degrees were recognised in all member states. This led to the introduction of the same bachelor/master structure in all European universities, ratified by the Accords of Bologna. Maastricht’ also decided to open up utility services, public transport and communication to free market competition. As a result, national companies have gradually lost their monopoly positions. 1995 – Schengen Agreement Already in 1985 Benelux, France and Germany had signed the Schengen Agreement in order to create a zone without borders. (Schengen is a small town on the Luxembourg-German border.) The Schengen Area operates very much like a single state: there is free internal travel between the countries, but there are (stringent) border controls for external travellers coming in and leaving the area. The five countries implemented this area of free travel in 1995. At that time, negotiations were already underway with other countries. Initially independent from the EU, the Schengen Area became part of the EU through the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. At that occasion, all member states signed the Schengen Agreement, except the United Kingdom and Ireland, while two non-member states, Norway and Iceland, joined the Schengen Area.

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2002 – Common currency, the euro The most far reaching decision of the Maastricht Treaty was the introduction of a common currency and the creation of a European Central Bank to protect it against inflation. After a period of preparation, twelve countries replaced their national currencies with the euro on January 1, 2002. Since then, five more countries have adopted the euro. Together they constitute the Eurozone. Other countries are preparing to join. Some EU members, however, are reluctant to do so. Among them, significantly again, is the United Kingdom which is clearly not prepared to give up its valuable pound, nor to subordinate London’s financial market to European control. 2004 – Enlargement to the East After a period of transition and transformation following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, nine former republics were ready to enter the EU. The German Democratic Republic had already been taken up in a reunified Germany in 1990 and thus integrated into the EU. In 2004, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and the three Baltic states became members. All of a sudden, the EU grew in size (from sixteen to twenty-five countries) and population (in excess of 400 million). A new balance was being created between the member states. Three years later, Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU, bringing the total number of member states to twenty-seven. 2008 –Treaty of Lisbon Meanwhile, government leaders had taken the ambitious step to design a real constitution that would define the philosophical basis and the common values of the Union, clarify its decision-making process, establish its governing structures, and ensure legal procedures. Until then, Europe was run on the basis of directives and treaties, but it lacked a comprehensive text that undergirds them all: a Constitution. All member states had one, so why not the Union as a whole? In 2004, a draft constitution was presented for ratification to all member states. While most governments left it to the national parliament to discuss, two of them organised a referendum: the French in 2005 and the Dutch in 2006. In both cases, the majority voted against. This made other governments apprehensive. Opinion polls indicated that if they had subjected the constitution to a referendum, the majority would have rejected it. European leaders decided to leave the project. Instead, they adopted a simplified version in the Treaty of Lisbon (2008). Unlike the draft constitution, this Treaty did not define the common values and the common identity of Europeans. The project of a European citizenship was abandoned. However, the Treaty made the European Declaration of Fundamental Rights binding for all member states; every citizen can now

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appeal to European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), based in Strasbourg. Two new positions were created: a President of the European Council and a European High Commissioner of Foreign Affairs. Four capitals Where should the European institutions be located? This has been a tricky question ever since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. At that time, the French proposed Paris (obvious from their point of view), but this candidature was rejected, mainly because of the chaotic public transport system of the French capital. What about Rome? That would give the impression that Europe was somehow linked with the Church of Rome. Finally, Brussels was agreed upon. Factors in favour of this city were that it was multilingual (Dutch and French), and that it was already home to the headquarters of NATO. As the construction of ‘Europe’ developed, Brussels gradually became a sort of European capital. But one should not say that too loudly. Europe is attached to its diversity, and every member has its national pride. In order not to create the impression that a particular nation would dominate the new ‘Europe,’ a compromise was found by creating several ‘capitals’: Brussels for the European Committee, Luxemburg for the European Court of Justice, and Strasbourg for the European Parliament. At a later stage, Frankfurt would be added as the financial capital, home to the European Central Bank. Prospects of further enlargement To date, the EU is comprised of twenty-seven members. This is an impressive number when we realise some fifty years earlier the project began with just six countries. However, as the following map shows, the EU is still considerably smaller than geographical Europe which is comprised of forty-seven nations, or forty-eight, when one includes the Republic of Kosovo. What are the prospects of further enlargement? Insiders assume that the number of member states will rise to over thirty within a decade or two. Iceland has requested membership, but Norway has not taken any steps in that direction, despite the fact that it is part of the Schengen Area. In two referendums, 1976 and 1994, the majority of Norwegians voted against membership. The result was the same in the Swiss referendum of 1992. For the time being, Switzerland will remain an enclave surrounded by the EU. As for the states that have emerged from the disintegration of Yugoslavia, only Slovenia has joined the EU, while Croatia is a candidate member ready to join in 2013. Macedonia is also a candidate, but the date of entry remains uncertain. The Serbians have been divided on the issue. During the war over the control of Serbian-populated areas in Croatia and Bosnia from 1992 to 1995, NATO forces intervened against the Serbians. This war has left deep suspicion among the Serbians with regards to ‘the West,’ including Western Europe.

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Figure 5.1 European Union in June 2013.

However, the tide is changing. In 2011, the government took the important step of arresting the popular former general Ratko Mladiç and handing him over to the International Court of Justice in the Hague in order to stand charges of war crimes against humanity. This was a precondition to be met before Serbia could apply to be a candidate for EU membership. In the course of 2012, the European Commission recommended that this official status should be given to Serbia, as well as to Montenegro and Albania. Presumably, these countries will become members in due time, although it is difficult to foretell exactly when. Kosovo is a complicated case. This (former) province of Serbia has declared its independence, but Serbia still considers it to be its territory, even as the historic cradle of the nation. Five EU members equally refuse to recognize it: Spain,

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Slovenia, Greece, Cyprus, and Romania. Like Serbia, the last three have a largely Eastern Orthodox population. Turkey has been a candidate member since 2005, but negotiations on the entry conditions do not seem to be making real progress. Some EU countries are in favour of Turkish membership; Great Britain for example. They emphasize the perspective of a larger common market and the economic opportunities that will open up, and they point out that Turkey is already member of the Council of Europe and of NATO. Other governments are against, as is the majority of the public all over Europe. Finally, there are the microstates. The Vatican has observer status in the EU, the others are indirectly represented: Andorra and Monaco by France, Liechtenstein by Austria and San Marino by Italy.

5.6. Emerging Red line in the East What about the countries of the former Soviet Union that have gained independence after the disintegration of that empire? Certainly, a window of opportunity opened up in the 1990s to include them fully in a united Europe. But while Poland, the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria joined ‘the West,’ the countries further east have remained outside: Belarus, Ukraine, Russia and the Caucasian states. Have the Western leaders been too demanding? Have the leaders in the East been too attached to their own culture and not willing to adopt all the Western criteria? It is up to historians to analyse why this unique chance to see all of Europe united was not seized. For the time being, Byelorussia, Moldavia, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia are not likely to become members of the EU. As for the Russian Federation itself, it is quite doubtful whether it will even want to consider joining the EU as ‘just’ one of its members, even when a new pro-Western regime would come to power. Granted, it is European with respect to culture and history. But the majority of its territory is located in Asia. Given its immense size, four times as large as the EU, and its geopolitical ambitions, Russia considers itself at least as important as the EU as a whole. So if there is to be any rapprochement, it will presumably take the form of bilateral cooperation or of a partnership between the EU and Russia with its sphere of influence. In 2000, with the arrival of Vladimir Putin in power, a different wind began to blow. He and his government are less prone to seek collaboration with Western Europe than their predecessors. They consider the EU to be simply part of the Atlantic military alliance (NATO) dominated by the US. They were not at all pleased that the US extended its anti-missile network of launching bases to Poland and Romania. Even though NATO maintains that these bases

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were established to meet the threats of Iraq, Iran and Islamic terrorism in Central Asia, the Russia interpreted it as a threat to its position. When Georgia no longer towed Moscow’s line, asking to become member of NATO and opening its territory to US military presence, the Kremlin intervened. Apparently the Georgians had crossed a ‘red line’ they should have respected. In 2007, the Russians used an internal ethnic conflict in Georgia as a pretext to invade the country. Due to the intervention of French president Nicolas Sarkozy, acting president of the Council of Ministers of the EU, an armistice was agreed to, on the condition that the country remains in Moscow’s sphere of influence. Other incidents in recent years have confirmed that Moscow considers the countries east of the EU as being in its zone of influence; the cuts in the delivery of natural gas to Ukraine come to mind. While most Ukrainians, especially in the Russian-speaking east of the country, are opposed to joining NATO, a majority of the population is in favour. But Russia continues to woo the country into its own Eurasian Union, the alliance with Kazakhstan and Belarus, which is intended to comprise the whole of the former Soviet Union. Eurasianism The ideological approach underlying the creation of this economic and political union is Eurasianism. According to this political idea, there is a fundamental difference between Western European culture, heavily influenced by the US, and Eastern European and Asian culture, of which Russia is the centre. Caroline Humphrey explains: ‘Eurasia’ has always been an idea directed against the influence of ‘the West’ in Russia, since it proposes that Russia is not in essence a European country but a unique civilisation, created by the union of the Slavic and the TurkishMongol steppe peoples. The idea re-emerged in metropolitan circles in the 1990s in response to the perceived failure of ‘Western’ models of democracy and capitalism in Russia. In contemporary versions, the key is the importance of ‘the state.’ For example, what distinguishes Russian history from that of Europe is that, in Russia, progress, and indeed all important initiatory action derives from the state and not from civil society, it comes down from above. The ideal state is not the exploiter but the protector of the poor and weak. Another key theme is the unity and equality of all the peoples in a common Eurasian ‘super-nation,’ which distinguishes it from the European colonial empires.62

62 Caroline Humphrey, Eurasia and the Political Imagination, p. 264f.

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This ideology seems to guide the policy of the current leaders in the Kremlin.63 Consequently, the border with the EU is increasingly becoming a Red Line that keeps two political realms apart. Running from the Black Sea in the south to the Arctic Sea in the north, it also includes the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, between Poland and Lithuania.

5.7 Objectives and motto What is this construction of Europe all about? Every treaty that has been signed since 1949 formulates a number of objectives. The main ones are (1) preserving peace through cooperation and integration, and (2) creating a single common market so as to guarantee economic progress. Usually, any new treaty takes over the objectives of the former ones, sometimes in a modified version, while adding new ones. At the moment, the foundational text of the EU is the Lisbon Treaty of 2008. Article 3 sums up the official objectives in five paragraphs. Here is the short version of this article, in which we have marked the key words in italics. 1. The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples. 2. The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime. 3. The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance. It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child. It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States. It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.

63 Cf. John Besemeres, ‘President Putin of Eurasia,’ in: The Interpreter, published by the Lower Institute of Foreign Policy, 7 October 2011.

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4. The Union shall establish an economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro. 5. In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter. The way in which the third objective is elaborated reflects the ongoing discussion within Europe about the negative side effects of uncontrolled economic development. It should be kept in balance with the ecological concern for a sustainable development, and with the social concern for justice. Moreover, all member states should equally benefit from it and equally share the burdens. The fifth objective is significant as it responds to the critique of Eurocentrism. Whether the EU is as interested in the development of the rest of the world as this text would have it, is a matter of opinion. We should bear in mind, that the original vision of a united Europe has always had this universal scope. Unity in diversity – the European dream A major characteristic of Europe is cultural diversity, and one of the explicit aims of the EU is to guarantee this diversity. In May 2000, the European Parliament organised a contest among young people in all the member states, asking them to propose a motto for the EU. According to the selection committee, the best proposition was ‘unity in diversity,’ and the Parliament unanimously adopted it. Interestingly, Indonesia and South Africa have the same motto which does not come as a surprise given that these countries are very multiethnic and multicultural, not unlike Europe. On the other hand, Europe is quite unlike the United States of America with which it is often compared. They also have welcomed a multitude of cultural identities. Their motto is ‘one out of many,’ e pluribus unum. It is printed on every dollar banknote. Here we have two different visions of dealing with diversity: unification (USA) or plurality (EU). The first emphasizes the unity of the nation while allowing for a certain measure of cultural distinction between the various communities within society, whereas the second guarantees national identities within a community of nations. The first model can be likened to a melting pot in which people are assimilated to one new way of life (in this case the American one), the second to a mosaic of cultures side by side and interwoven. The first goes with a common language; the second recognizes dozens of official languages.

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American scientist Jeremy Rifkin has written a detailed comparison of ‘the European dream’ and ‘the American dream’ in which he argues that the first dream is quietly eclipsing the second one. According to him, the European Union is a creative solution to cultural diversity that can serve as a model for other parts of the world.64 Unity in diversity is the cornerstone of the EU. No nation should dominate another. Such is at least the noble objective. In reality, larger countries carry more weight than smaller ones. The so-called Franco-German couple is particularly strong. But decisions can only be made on the basis of a qualified two-thirds majority. Deputies in the European Parliament are proud to speak their national or regional languages during the debates – impressive battalions of interpreters provide simultaneous translation in all recognised languages of the Union. Why not give up this Tower of Babel confusion for one single language? Such musings are only logical in the American model, not in the European one. While English is the mother tongue of less than fifteen percent of the EU population, over forty percent of all its citizens have a working knowledge of it. In education it is well on its way to become the new Latin of Europe, in multinational corporate businesses it is the obvious corporate language, and it serves as the lingua franca in trade, commerce and international transport. Nevertheless, other languages retain their importance, especially French, German and Spanish. It remains to be seen whether Europe is going to switch to one (or two or three) operational languages, and relegate the other official languages to a secondary level, to be used only in their particular country and at certain levels of activity. As long as EU policy makers are committed to diversity and as long as they are prepared to pay for the cost of translation, chances are that for the time being, the construction of Europe will be multilingual.

64 Jeremy Rifkin, The European Dream.

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Chapter 6

A time to remember, a time to build Halfway between the impressive buildings of the European Council and the European Parliament in Brussels, there is a small chapel. It seems a bit lost in this area dominated by the offices of the European Union that make up a bureaucratic labyrinth. Surrounding the EU offices are a further network of offices housing representatives of enterprises, professional branches, trade unions, non-government organisations, local and regional administrations, church denominations and a host of other religious bodies, all of them buzzing like bees around the EU centres of decision, trying to influence their directives, to focus attention on their specific concerns, to present their projects in order to obtain one of the many subsidies available to promote the cause of a united Europe. Here, in the administrative heart of the European Union stands the Chapel of the Resurrection, attached to an ancient convent transformed into offices. In 2002, it was been entrusted to the Jesuits to be used as a centre of spiritual nourishment for the people working in the European quarter of Brussels. Since then, this place of worship is also called the ‘Chapel of Europe.’ People on their way to their office enter regularly, during prayer offices or in between, for silent meditation or prayer, or to talk with others about spiritual matters. ‘When you write administrative texts all day long,’ said one official ‘reciting the Psalms early in the morning is a precious poetic moment for me.’ ‘I suffer a bit from the fact that I find myself in a machine whose captain doesn’t seem to have a vision for the long term,’ adds another. ‘When I come here, I find meaning.’ Some come requesting; others take part in discussion groups. This is a place where people have the opportunity to seek God, to listen to the readings of his Word.65 Out of place, this little chapel? One might think of it as just another vestige of the past, a souvenir of times gone by. Protestants might object that it is too Roman Catholic. Even so, the symbolic meaning of this tiny place of worship in the shadows of the European office buildings should not be overlooked. It reminds civil servants, lobbyists and decisions makers of Christianity. It connects ‘the construction of Europe’ to the spiritual values that should undergird it. And it invites Christians to remember and to build, to pray and to become involved, in some way or another.

65 Cf. Loup Besmond de Senneville, “Au Cœur de Bruxelles, une chapelle pour l’Europe,” La Croix, 29 February 2012, p. 15.

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6.1. Evangelical views on European unity How do churches respond to the construction of ‘Europe’? The Roman Catholic Church has always taken a keen interest. Ecumenical Protestants have expressed more nuanced views. Generally speaking, they hold to the ideal of a pacific Europe, but many church leaders are critical of the EU’s emphasis on a free market economy to the detriment of social protection, and with respect to its immigration policy, which they find too restrictive. Several Eastern Orthodox leaders have endorsed the ideal of European unity, insisting that they want to see their countries become part of it. At the same time, they are critical of the materialism and the secularism of Western Europeans. The political leaders of other Orthodox countries, Russia in particular, are keeping their distance from the EU. In this section, we will limit ourselves to the responses of the Evangelical movement. As one might expect in a movement that is characterised by theological diversity and the autonomy of churches and organisations, there is no one Evangelical response. Different viewpoints exist. We can summarize them in the following categories:

Suspicious rejection The first category of views could be called suspicious rejection. Since its conception, the EU has been viewed with deep suspicion by premillennialist Christians. They regard the EU as a type (if not the actual embodiment) of the anti-Christ, Beast of the end times depicted in the Book of Revelation. Interpreting this apocalyptic figure as a revived Roman Empire, they point out that the initial Treaty was signed in Rome, that the EU encompasses most of the old Roman territories, and that it maintains close connections with the Church of Rome which is seen by many premillennialists as a precursor of the apostate world religion in the end times. Meanwhile, some Reformed Protestants view the EU with suspicion for quite different reasons. They fear that it will turn out to be yet another attempt to create a political unity stretching across Europe with close ties to the Church of Rome. This revives painful Protestant memories of Catholic empires in the past. When melded together – the premillennialist belief in a new kind of Roman Empire and the old Protestant fear of a Europe-wide Catholic bloc, these views represent a powerful rejection of the EU project for theological reasons. Suspicion of the EU is further strengthened by the fear that it will ultimately replace national sovereignty, to which many Christians are attached. They

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regard the EU’s increasing power as ominous, which further feeds into a theological rejection of a European union.66 Critical of the tendency of Eurocentrism A second category of Evangelicals are critical of the development of European unity for other reasons. For instance, they criticize its protectionist economic policy, which they see as an unjust treatment of the poorer countries, or the immigration policy, especially when it comes to refusing political asylum to refugees who have fled religious persecution. Some consider that the whole idea of a ‘European’ unity is in fact a tendency to Eurocentrism, which they fear will foster cultural bias and feelings of superiority towards non-Europeans, especially in the underdeveloped world. A major focal point of Evangelical criticism are the EU directives calling for tolerance and aimed against discrimination for reasons of race, religion, sexual orientation, etc. There is a fear that this will lead to the imposition of ethical views that are at odds with traditional Christian morality, e.g. in the area of parental authority, homosexuality, same-sex marriage, adoption, medical experiments, abortion, and so on. A nuanced constructive approach A third category of Evangelicals take a nuanced positive view. An example of this approach is the Evangelical European Alliance. In 2005, it adopted a declaration that presented a Christian evaluation of the construction of Europe.67 According to the EEA, Evangelicals have not adequately reflected on the EU and the future shape of our continent. Through this Declaration, the EEA wants to encourage such reflection. ‘Ever closer union’ is a moving target and so the text starts with the following questions: How close? With what end in mind? Should the EU be an economic superpower or a political superpower as well?’ Underlying these questions is the question whether Christians should cooperate with the integration process. In order to arrive at an answer, the Declaration first offers what it calls a ‘Biblical framework for political engagement,’ saying that the Bible encourages us to work out the implications of our salvation by living a life worthy of the Gospel. Democratic politics is one way in which a society decides the values by which it will be governed. Alternatives are totalitarian government of one form or another, or war.

66 In this paragraph, we have used the analysis of Calvin Smith, ‘Evangelicals, the EU, Turkey and Europe’s Religious Heritage’. 67 “The European Union,” in: European Evangelical Alliance Perspectives, September 2005.

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‘Democracy is not an explicitly biblical idea but it fits well with the biblical view of humanness. Made in the image of God and having God-given care-taking responsibilities, all of us should play a modest part in choosing the values of our democratic societies. At the same time, because we are all affected by sin and temptation, power should be dispersed as widely as possible.’ Then it argues under what conditions Christians can and should be involved in the construction of Europe: If the EU is a community of nations working together to resolve their differences through politics rather than conflict, then Christians will want to actively support it. ‘Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called the sons of God,’ taught Jesus (Matthew 5:9). Indeed, the end of war will be one sign of God’s coming Kingdom (Micah 4:1-5). If, on the other hand, the EU is an embryonic ‘super-state,’ then the biblical principles identified in the ‘framework’ above may cause us to be concerned about the risks associated with the concentration of power in the hands of fewer fallen people. God is sovereign over every dimension of life so ‘all Christian thinking must begin not with man but with God.’ That applies not only to national politics but also to the EU Treaties and all EU Directives and policies. Evangelicals will want these to reflect biblical values and principles. As Christians we have to ask what forms of European integration will most foster biblical values in the political and economic system.

Towards the end of the Declaration, its authors outline a ‘vision of the future of Europe.’ What are the proper Christian aspirations for the European fellowship? ‘It has become a strong fellowship of rich and poor countries,’ says the document. ‘This fellowship must be developed as the world changes: for example, in relationships between rich and poor.’ It goes on to mention the EU Solidarity Fund, established in 2002 to help the countries hit by dramatic flooding, and the EU fund ‘Water for Life,’ set up to fund water projects in the poorest areas of the world, especially in Africa, but also the Caucasus and Central Asia. The EU has donated 1 billion euro towards this initiative.  ‘These kinds of actions are of vital importance. European unity can only be promoted when Europe shares its prosperity with others,’ underlines the Declaration which goes on to say: In the future the EU will also focus on securing the fundamental rights of European citizens. In the future EU will work even more than before on liberalising the market for goods and services and will give underdeveloped countries better possibilities to export their crops and goods to the EU. The EU also strengthens the resources to battle terrorism, organised criminality, human trafficking, money laundering, drug-dealing and other cross-border problems.

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We believe that EU citizens should engage in debate about which decisions should be reached together (at EU level) and what should be decided nationally, regionally, or locally. The EEA is committed to playing its part in that debate, and has its own views about what should be highest on the shared agenda at this stage of history.

Finally, the EU needs to be values-driven, and not just economy driven: ‘We have a dream of a vibrant 21st-century Europe, in which variety is valued, and in which each culture makes its own unique contribution, in an atmosphere of mutual respect.’ What does this mean? A Europe committed to reconciliation, peace, liberty of conscience and religion, and the European Convention of Human Rights. A Europe marked by respect for every individual, the sanctity of life, and the institution of the family. A Europe committed to the poor and disenfranchised: a Europe in which the voiceless have a voice, opportunities are created for the disadvantaged, and redemptive possibilities are fostered for both victims and perpetrators. A Europe with a strong identity, whose self-definition nevertheless actively encourages Europeans to take their place as partners with the rest of the world, should humbly recognize that it has a lot to learn as well as to give. Europe should resist all attempts to become a new 21st century Empire, but rather engage in partnership with the rest of the world. In short, a Europe shaped by those timeless values that have played such an important part in shaping the past: a forward looking Europe committed to overcoming historic animosities, and to making a generous contribution to the welfare of the wider world.

We find the approach of this Evangelical declaration a balanced one. It shows a way between euphoria and rejection, it encourages Christians to play a constructive role.

6.2. Remember the moments of grace In drawing some practical conclusions for Christian action in this chapter, the first thing that comes to mind is the very Biblical action of remembrance. A Jewish saying warns us that ‘lack of remembrance leads to captivity.’ In other words, if we don’t recall the decisive moments of our history, our failures and distress, and the moments of salvation, we are bound to suffer again from the very thing that we’ve been redeemed from. With respect to the construction of Europe, there is a need to remember. When we believe that our God is the Lord of history, then He is also sovereign of contemporary European history. It is not always easy to discern his hand in

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the affairs of individuals, let alone in those of nations. But sometimes one can clearly discern a moment of grace; a new opportunity of liberty, for instance, or the surprise of peace. After all, when God’s people pray continuously for a turn of events, could we not expect that from time to time, the Lord would intervene? Personally, I am convinced that there have been such moments of grace in recent European history. One of them was the initiative of European politicians after the Second World War to work for reconciliation between former enemies, and to cooperate for the common interest. Since these are basic Christian principles put in action, could we not expect some kind of blessing from the Most High? And should we not attribute the success of European unification to the good hand of the Lord moving in a mysterious way? There is indeed a profound spiritual significance to this turn of events. To express that, I could do no better than quote Cardinal Walter Kasper. In a public speech delivered in October 2009, on the theme of Europe, he had this to say: For our generation, the European idea of the Europeans of the first hour, Adenauer, Schuman, De Gasperi and others, almost came as redemption, as a salvation. After the bitter years of the Third Reich, Germany was again admitted as a full member of the community of European peoples. After the destruction of the war, a zone of peace emerged in Europe, founded on respect for the universally valid human rights, and on a new awareness of the humanist and Christian roots of Europe. Europe has become a success story. It is a sign that things can also change for the better, if only there is the will, and I would add the reasonable wisdom to do repentance and to reconcile.68

A second moment of grace, I would suggest, was the turn of events in 1989 and 1990: the demolition of the Berlin Wall. It had separated the divided city, and was a symbol of the Iron Curtain that divided Europe into a Western and an Eastern part, coexisting but prepared for war, both heavily armed with immensely destructive weapons. Now, all of a sudden, people could travel to and fro, meet and befriend the ‘enemies’ at the other side. Just one year later, the two Germanys were re-united. Within a few years the once so awe-inspiring Soviet empire had collapsed. In its place, several independent states emerged that undid the communist shackles that held them tight. Since then, many countries in the East have joined the EU. From Moscow to Madrid we can now travel to and fro, meet each other, study at each other’s universities, collaborate, set up joint

68 At the celebration of the seventieth birthday of Erwin Teufel, former Prime Minister of the ‘Bundesland’ Baden-Württemberg, in Tübingen, 12 October 2009.

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ventures, freely discuss our opinions, and pray and worship together. And all of that happened through peaceful means, without one bullet being fired! If this is not grace, a divine response to the aspirations of God’s people who have suffered so much from warfare and lack of freedom, then I do not know to whom or to what else we could honestly attribute this extraordinary change in Europe. In the 1980s, Open Doors, the international organisation for solidarity with persecuted Christians, called for ‘seven years of prayer’ in order that our brothers and sisters behind the Iron Curtain would be preserved and that the regime would change. Many more believers have prayed, in other settings, all over the world. Would it be presumptuous to say that these prayers are somehow related to the fact that things have changed indeed, by the grace of God? Pass the story on I belong to the generation of baby boomers, born after 1945. Ours is the first generation in European history to be born and to grow up in the absence of actual warfare! We have lived through the Cold War, but by the grace of God it never burst out in a hot one! We have become used to democracy. We find it no more than natural that we solve international problems by negotiation. Since the end of the Cold War, we no longer have enemies within Europe. In 1992, we were so shocked when Bosnians, Croats and Serbs took up arms against each other. We had almost forgotten that such a thing was still possible in our continent. This conflict has left deep wounds on the people that fought for three years over territory and identity, and deep scars in the consciousness of my generation. Never again such a thing! But now, as the generation that has a living memory of war is disappearing, my generation and those of our children are becoming used to such a situation. Europe with its open borders is something they take for granted. It is up to us to remember these events, to be grateful for the positive things that have been achieved, to tell the story, passing it on to next generation.

6.3. Ora et labora How can we make a constructive contribution to the future of Europe? Following the motto of the Benedictine order that did so much for the spiritual, cultural, and economic development of Europe in the past, we would say: ora et labora, pray and work. The Chapel in the European quarter of Brussels is very well placed. But when you come to think of it, any church community anywhere on the continent can be a ‘Chapel for Europe.’ Chapels for Europe – places to pray for European decision makers, to intercede for our national politicians.

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Between sixty and seventy percent of all the decisions affecting the daily life of citizens in the EU are made at the European level, by the European Council, Commission and Parliament. European directives take precedence over national legislation. Under these circumstances, Paul’s injunction to give thanks and intercede for those who govern us (1 Tim. 2) should be applied also to the authorities at the European level. When we think of their responsibility and their impact on the living conditions of people all over the continent, we will have reason to intercede, and also to give thanks (the last element is often forgotten!). When was the last time that your pastor interceded for the European Commission during the Sunday service? For which politician do you pray? Prayers are based on information about the players on the European scene. Therefore, we should make efforts to know the names of our representatives in the European institutions, what they stand for, what the issues are, and what projects are being prepared. Foster Biblical values, counter secularist oriented policies We should be concerned about the fact that so many decision makers on a European level operate with a secularist mindset. Instead of technocratic economics-driven policies, Europe needs value-driven policies. As Christians we represent the religion that has transmitted, and still transmits values that are foundational in European societies: values of individual dignity, protection of life, family, freedom of religion, personal initiative, solidarity with the poor, and the importance of education, to name but a few. As alternative worldviews are being put forward, we are challenged to bring these values to light, to foster a right understanding, to enter into a discussion with those who defend alternative views, to show the importance of spiritual convictions. At this point, we notice the reluctance of European politicians to take into account the viewpoints of religious communities. They are often ill equipped to understand them. Dialogue of EU with churches and other faith communities One final venue of action cannot be left unmentioned. In the beginning of the 1990s, Jacques Delors, president of the EU Commission at that time, established a dialogue with churches, religious associations and communities and philosophical and non-confessional organisations. Dialogue offered them an opportunity to engage in the European integration process. It allowed for an open exchange of views on pertinent EU policies between EU institutions and important components of European society. The starting point was talking to representatives of organisations active in the fields of science, culture, and religion. The aim was to exchange ideas about the meaning and implications of the European integration process. Consequently, the EU Commission introduced a regular dialogue with religious groups,

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churches and communities of conviction. Delors’ successors, Jacques Santer, Romano Prodi, as well as the current president, José Manuel Barroso, have kept up the tradition and developed it further, regarding it as an important instrument of participatory democracy. In 2008, the Treaty of Lisbon made this the dialogue a legal obligation, enshrined in primary law. It is interesting to read Article 17 of this Treaty, which defines the relation between the EU and religious communities: 1. The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States. 2. The Union equally respects the status under national law of philosophical and non-confessional organisations. 3. Recognising their identity and their specific contribution, the Union shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with these churches and organisations. This dialogue is organised by the Outreach Team of the Bureau of European Policy Advisors (BEPA). Needless to say, it is up to churches, ecumenical councils, Evangelical alliances and Christian organisations to take up this open invitation to participate in the construction of Europe. They should not refrain from presenting their point of view to politicians and government officials – whether on the level of the EU or in their own country. Moreover, churches certainly have important things to say, given their long and rich experience in dealing with social problems like poverty and exclusion, discrimination, drug addiction, prostitution, family conflicts, as well as multicultural tensions, and accepting the stranger in our midst. Many other issues could be added to this list. A reminder – the European flag We should always bear in mind that the ‘construction of Europe’ began as a project of reconciliation of former enemies and peace through cooperation. This idea, in turn, was, at least in its initial stages, closely related to Europe’s Christian heritage. A reminder of this background is the European flag. It shows twelve yellow stars forming a circle on a blue field. Initially chosen by the European Council as a symbol of European cultural unity, it was later adopted by the European Union and its Parliament. It symbolizes all that binds people in Europe together: their values and their heritage. It is the symbol of their diversity within an overarching unity. Where and how did it originate? The design was created by Arsène Heitz, a painter of modest fame from the Alsace, and a devout Roman Catholic. As he revealed much later, he was inspired by the miracle medal in a chapel in

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Paris, located at 140 rue du Bac. This medal represents the Virgin and her crown of twelve stars, an image borrowed from the Book of Revelation (‘a woman surrounded by the sun, with the moon under her feet and with a crown of twelve stars on her head, Rev. 12.1). The blue field of his design stood for the traditional mantle of the Virgin. Presumably, the European Council choose this design on purely esthetical grounds, as a symbol of the cultural heritage of Europe. The original Biblical meaning has been ‘generalised’ so as to include religious and non-religious people alike. 69 But for Christians, it is clear what the symbol conveys in its Biblical sense. Seen in this perspective, the flag can serve as an invitation to pray and work for the continued influence of the Biblical message on ‘the construction of Europe.’

Figure 6.1 European Union flag.

69 Cf. Jean-François Susbeille, Le déclin de l’empire européen, p. 193f.

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Chapter 7

National and European identities The perfect European should be: humorous as a German, generous as a Dutchman, discreet as a Dane, famous as a Luxembourger, technical as a Portuguese, humble as a Spaniard, cooking like a Brit, available as a Belgian, controlled as an Italian, driving like the French, organised as a Greek, sober as the Irish.70 Europeans reading these lines will immediately recognize the stereotypes of other countries which they so like making jokes about. At the same time, such jokes reveal prejudices and chauvinism. They are a way to assert the virtues of one’s own country over and against the failings of ‘the others,’ the ‘aliens.’ Underlying them is a collective identity, a sense of belonging called nationalism. Some prefer the word patriotism, to avoid the negative connotations associated with ‘nationalism.’ The more European integration progresses the more identity becomes an issue. On the one hand, there is the ‘Europeanisation of Europe.’ As people travel, migrate, meet, exchange and collaborate on a continental scale, their horizon becomes more European. The common market reinforces this process, as major political decisions are taken on a European level. But the backlash is an increasing concern about national sovereignty and interests. Feelings of patriotism come to the fore. Euro-scepticism abounds. The bottom line of it all seems to be that Europeans are primarily attached to their national or regional identity. How does that affect European identity?

7.1. European identity Since the project of European integration began, there has been a concern to stimulate an all-encompassing, overarching European identity, a sense of belonging which is necessary to carry the project through. In 1972, at a summit meeting in Copenhagen, the nine members of the European Community issued a Declaration on European Identity. This is the first time that an official text mentions the existence of an identity that is common to all the national cultures. According to this text, European identity is based on certain socio-political values such as plural democracy, the separation of church and state, and human rights. It is also based on ‘common ideals,’ ‘common

70 EU (funny) postcard, 1993.

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objectives,’ and ‘common concepts of life.’ At the same time, it cherishes the variety of national and regional cultures, in accordance with the official motto: unity in diversity. To put it simply: a Frenchman is European as a Frenchman, an Italian as an Italian.71 As we have seen in the chapter on the ‘idea’ of Europe, a certain measure of common cultural identity exists. It is shared not only by the twenty-seven countries of the EU but also by Swiss, Norwegians, Icelanders, Macedonians, Serbs and Ukrainians who are not (yet) part of it. One should even include the Russians. Despite their diversity, all these peoples share a common background (Greco-Roman, Christian, Enlightenment humanist) and a common history (even though it is marked by internal strife and warfare). The question is whether this existing cultural affinity is enough, or whether a common European culture should be further enhanced, and whether a civil European identity should be created. From the point of view of further integration, the need for this should be fairly obvious. If integration is to succeed, a certain consensus is required, not only at the level of Eurocrats, politicians, cosmopolitan intellectuals, and transnational businesses, but also among ordinary people, in view of the fact that integration is voluntary. The people must feel involved if there is ever to be a people’s Europe. They should identify with the EU and the decisions it is making must command a measure of respect and be considered legitimate. A sense of European solidarity becomes even more important if the integration is to proceed past the current level of political and economic union towards a federal ‘United States of Europe.’ National interests and European policy The question becomes all the more urgent since an increasing number of people in the member states accuse the EU of taking control, jeopardising their jobs and their social welfare system. They insist that their own governments should act more concisely to defend more their national interests. Clearly, they are attached to their national identity. Of course, there have always been conflicts over national versus common European interests. Ever since countries began to work together to create a common market, they have defended their own economy, continuously attempting to maximise gains and minimise costs. But until now, there has been a sufficient sense of belonging together to seek compromises. In fact, the EU has been called ‘a machinery of compromise.’ There is a broad consensus that different political viewpoints should not be allowed to lead to a collapse of the union.

71 Pamela Sticht, Culture européenne ou Europe des cultures?, p. 46.

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As the current financial crisis continues, solidarity is severely tested. Some economies are more affected than others. Some countries are no longer able to reimburse their debts if others do not come to the rescue. Underlying the tedious negotiations over financial aid, there is the fundamental question: What is holding us together within the EU? Do Germans believe that it is also in their best interests to prevent Greece from going bankrupt? Do we have a sense of belonging that is strong enough to stick together, instead of choosing separate ways to solve our problems? The whole project of the EU is based on the voluntary decision of member states to overcome their national differences and to work together for the general interest of all. But voluntary consent cannot do without democratic support of the population. How can the construction of Europe arouse the necessary popular consent? From the perspective of the European institutions, the response is clear: by fostering the European identity. Fostering a European identity Two approaches can be used to address this issue. The first could be called bottom up, the second top down. These are two sociological concepts, denoting the different ways in which political or managerial decisions are made: either they emerge from the population, and leaders take that into account, or they are taken by the leadership, and implemented from the top down. In the case of Europe, the two approaches are combined. On the one hand, there is the hope that the process of unification will in and of itself create a common identity. On the other hand, the institutions take concrete measures to stimulate this development, and to add new elements so as to give this emerging cultural identity a civil dimension as well. The European Council promotes exchanges between the peoples on the continent and develops a Europe-wide cultural policy. Each year, for example, one or more cities are designated ‘cultural capital of Europe’. Other European institutions have done much to facilitate a process of cultural rapprochement so as to stimulate the development of a common identity. Subsidies are available for festivals, educational and research projects, exchange programs, multilingual publications, and so on. Culture is already uniting us Meanwhile, there is the tremendous impact of European integration, not only at an economic level but also in the area of culture and identity. In our local store, we can buy products from most other countries. In our cities and towns, we are surrounded by tourists and migrants from all over the continent. Inexorably, the Europeanisation of Europe continues. (See the chapter on mobility and the widening of horizons.)

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Even as we are struggling with the euro-crisis, we discover that there is no turning back. We’ve gone too far together to cancel the whole project and return to the pre-common market status quo. In a recent interview, the well known author Umberto Eco, a staunch supporter of further integration, recalled how far we have already come. Thanks to the open borders we have discovered how much we have in common, at least on a cultural level. ‘It is culture that has made Europeans out of us, who for such a long time have fought fratricidal wars.’ As we are faced with the debt-crisis, we should not forget that historically speaking our only bonds are warfare and culture.... We have enjoyed peace for less than 70 years now, but that period was enough to make the idea of a war between Italy and Germany, for instance, seem outrageous. The United States of America have used a civil war to become really united. I hope that for us, culture and a common market will suffice.72

He finds that economists pay far too little attention to the cultural fraternisation that is going on, for example through the Erasmus Program. ‘This has created the first generation of young Europeans. It is a kind of sexual revolution. A young Catalan meets a Flemish girl; they fall in love, get married and become Europeans, as do their children.’ Umberto Eco would love to see these exchange programs be extended to taxi-drivers, technicians, industrial workers, to all professions in fact. This is all the more needed since ‘our common identity is still too superficial.’ Confronted with the rise of populism and xenophobia, ‘we need an identity that goes deeper that what we have now.’73 European citizenship – one bridge too far? It is precisely this concern for a more deeply rooted identity that has led European institutions to foster a European identity that goes further than the cultural resemblances between the various countries. The idea was to move towards a civil identity, comparable to a national identity. One of the steps taken is the introduction of European citizenship. According to Article 8 of the Maastricht Treaty (1991), one can be a European citizen only if one is also a citizen of the country in which one resides. For the time being it is not clear, however, what such a ‘European nationality’ exactly means and what civil rights are connected with it. This uncertainty is due to the simple fact that

72 Interview with Umberto Eco by Gianni Riotta, La Stampa, 25 January 2012. 73 Idem.

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a European state in the classical sense of the term does not exist. Therefore, as one observer succinctly puts is, ‘homo europeanus is still waiting to be made.’74 Despite far reaching harmonisation of national laws and jurisdiction, the EU is not a sovereign state, nor is the European Commission a government on the same level as national governments. Despite this limitation, certain measures have been taken to foster a kind of national European identity. Just like nations have symbols to express their unity, so Europe has been provided with some symbols of unity. Already in 1955, the Council of Europe introduced the European flag: a blue plane with twelve stars set in a circle. The blue denotes a cloudless sky, a symbol of peace, the number twelve stands for the completion of European peoples, while the circle signifies their unity. The first version of the design carried a red cross in the centre, but after repeated protests by Turkey, the Council deleted it. In 1964 the Council of Europe declared the 9th of May as the Day of Europe, because this was the date of the Schuman Declaration (see chapter 5, § 3). In 1972, it chose the last stanza of Ode an die Freude, the poem of Friedrich Schiller put to music by Ludwig van Beethoven in his Ninth Symphony as the European hymn. It contains the famous line, Alle Menschen werden Brüder (‘All humans are brothers’). Whereas the European Parliament adopted these three symbols, the other institutions of the EU never confirmed this decision. They were also omitted in the most recent Treaty, that of Lisbon (2007). Even so, every country is free to use them. Since the Treaty of Maastricht, the European flag accompanies the national flags at official occasions and in public buildings. We are getting used to seeing the two side by side. Other tangible signs of civil identity are the European passport, the European driver’s license, and a very important one; the euro. However, a real European identity in the sense of the existing national identities is only a remote possibility, contingent on the creation of a federal European state.

7.2. National identity and ‘nationalism’ At this juncture, an interesting but delicate question arises: is a national European identity feasible? Isn’t there going to be a conflict with national and regional identities? In order to answer this question, it is instructive to look at the dynamics of nationalism.

74 Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia, in: Anthony Pagden (ed.), The Idea of Europe, p. 189.

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‘Nationalism’ National identity is a subjective reality: who a person is in relation to the country in which they live. A Dane ‘feels’ Danish, and has a sense of belonging to the other Danes. But national identity is also objective in that there are objective criteria that mark nationality. In order to be entitled to Danish nationality one has to be born in Denmark, have Danish parents, or obtain Danish citizenship. And there are also objective obligations – a Dane is subject to Danish law – and privileges – a Dane is entitled to vote and to obtain social allowances, for instance. Social scientists use the term ‘nationalism’ to describe this national identity and the sense of belonging that goes with it. Nationalism is a sense of community that is felt by the people and by outsiders. It is a modern phenomenon of European origin. It emerged in England and France, and spread to other nations beginning in the seventeenth century. Since then, it has strengthened ancient national ideas and feelings and motivated ethnic communities, willing to become political nations, to develop action plans. In modern nation states, national identity is fundamental. Its inhabitants are citizens, who should identify first and foremost with the nation. In Europe, nationalism has become a loaded term with negative connotations: the nation was exalted to such an extent that Germans, French, British, Spanish, Italians and so on went to war against each other and oppressed other people. But nationalism does not necessarily need to be an exaggerated chauvinism with respect to one’s own nation and a violent attitude towards others. It can be just a sense of national identity. Call it patriotism, if you like. Nations, ethnicities and states It is certainly true that nationalism in the modern sense of the term, related to the nation state, didn’t appear before the seventeenth century, but the nations are much older. The idea of national communities existed long before the 1600s. Read medieval literature and you find many descriptions of what we would call nations – England, Spain, France, Germany, Italy, and so on – even if those particular countries didn’t exist as states. The markers of nations were language, customs, geography, and at times, religion, although during the Middle Ages all these nations existed within Christendom. How should we understand nationalism in the sense of national identity, linked to patriotism? Anthony Smith is a leading researcher and has published several books this subject.75 In an interview following the publication of his book, Cultural Foundations of Nations, he described nationalism as follows:

75 Our summary is based on his books, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (1995) and The Cultural Foundations of Nations (2008).

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Its core doctrine is a very abstract one. It says that the world is divided into nations, and each has its character, its destiny, its history, that people should belong to a nation, that the loyalties of a nation overrides all other loyalties, that nations should be free and express themselves fully and that a world of peace and justice is the one that’s founded on free nations. This is what the doctrine actually says – whether you regard this as a good thing or a bad thing. In itself it doesn’t lead in any particular direction, as far as crimes are concerned or indeed as far as benefits are concerned, except the desire for freedom.…In each country, this doctrine has been married to other particular ideas of particular nations, particular ethnic communities, particular political communities, which change the tenor and the tone of that core doctrine. 76

Each national community, each ethnic community has added something, something specific, which accords with their particular circumstances, the particular lot in which they find themselves. For example, in Poland they believed that Poland was a crucified Christ, which had to be resurrected. Nowhere is this part of the doctrine of nationalism. The French believed that France was a beacon of civilisation, rationalism, progress and so forth. This was the meaning of nationalism for them, though it’s not the doctrine as such. There is one basic idea but there are many nationalisms. All European nations have pre-modern origins. They have dominant ‘ethnic cores.’ Historically, nations have been identified by a common language, ethnic and cultural affinity, and in some instances by a common religion. Increasing globalisation has blurred many of these differentiating factors. Today nations are also differentiated by their different tax systems, currencies and foreign exchange rules, and by citizenship and immigration laws. The relation between the nation and its (imagined) past The central question in our understanding of nationalism, according to Smith, is the role of the past in the creation of the present: ‘Nationalism draws on the pre-existing history of the ethnic group that makes up a nation, viz. the dominant group in nations that comprise more ethnic groups. The promoters of nationalism fashion this history into a sense of common identity and shared history.’77 This is not to say that this history is altogether factually true. Nationalisms are often based on historically flawed interpretations of past events and tend to

76 Interview of Bohdan Tsiupyn with Anthony Smith in: The Ukrainian Week, 10 August 2012, at the occasion of the publication the Ukrainian translation of his book Cultural Foundations of Nations.   77 Anthony Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, p. 57.

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aggrandize small or even inaccurate parts of history. Nationalistic interpretations of the past are frequently fabricated to justify political ambitions, ethnic strife, cultural prejudice and the like. At this point we should be critical. We concur with Anthony Smith when he writes: History is no sweetshop in which its children may ‘pick and mix.’ History cannot be simply disregarded either. The challenge for scholars as well as nations is to represent the relationship of ethnic past to modem nation more accurately and convincingly. In this continually renewed two-way relationship between ethnic past and nationalist present lies the secret of the nation’s explosive energy and the awful power it exerts over its members.78

7.3. The case of Europe How does this relate to Europe? Can the dynamics of nationalism be transposed to a European scale? Is it possible that a European national identity emerges? What are the possibilities and what are the obstacles? The European ‘elite’ and the material interest of the people In the case of nation states, it has always been the self-appointed task of an intellectual and political elite to define the elements of the national identity, and then to diffuse them among the rest of the population; top-down. In Europe, there is also such an ‘elite’: bureaucrats in European institutions, politicians, intellectuals, international business people, artists, scientific researchers, students studying abroad.79 They are doing precisely the same thing; expressing a European identity and spreading it from political and educational institutions downwards to the wider population. But the Europeanism of the ‘elite’ is confronted with the down to earth expectations of the population as to what Europe will provide them in terms of security, professional opportunities and economic prosperity. The development of a European identity is seriously handicapped when such gains are not ‘delivered,’ especially in democracies where politicians depend on voter approval. As Elisabeth Bakke rightfully observes, it is not enough to present people with grand ideas.

78 Anthony D. Smith, ‘The role of nationalism in the reconstruction of nations,’ in: Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 1, nr. 1 (1994), p. 18-19. 79 See Chapter 8 on mobility, migration, and widening horizons.

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The people must have a reason for adhering to these ideas. The elites of the EU Union [sic] can only succeed in ‘winning more souls,’ if they can give people something in return, a reason to support the European cause. Economic growth and low unemployment may be such reasons. A European citizenship may be seen as an asset for those who want to work other places, since it makes it easier for people to participate. A European citizenship that implies better social rights than hitherto may be an extra asset in areas where social welfare is not very developed. A European identity is thus more likely to come about if the European Union succeeds in achieving its economical aims. 80

These considerations are as valid today as when they were written in 1995. More integration and possible nationalist backlash A European identity will be easier to foster if the integration is extensive, than if it is minimal. The existence of common education programmes and mass media is important in this respect since they widen national horizons and foster a sense of belonging on a European scale. If the EU is better integrated, the focus of interest will be more European, as people tend to direct their interest to the level where the major decisions are made. Opposition will also become European, rather than national. However, opposition to a new European state may be articulated in nationalist terms. In such an event, further integration may also lead to conflict and an erosion of European identity. People may feel their own or ‘the national’ interests threatened by an EU that interferes in their lives. There may also be resistance against moving decision making power from the local and national level. It should be kept in mind that the situation is not the same as in the past, when heterogeneous populations were moulded into a nation. At that time the elites did not have to fight strong existing allegiances. In the European case, a European identity will have to be fought for against strong existing national identities. In a democracy, one cannot prevent others from winning souls for their (national) case, even if it is contrary to a European identity. This is the main reason why the formation of a civil European identity is a difficult, and most likely, a very time-consuming project, if at all possible. Obstacles to a common identity Apart from these pragmatic considerations, there are huge road blocks on the way to a common identity. Many authors have highlighted these obstacles. In

80 Elisabeth Bakke, ‘Towards a European Identity? See bibliography for details [consulted 5 May 2012].

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terms of defining the objective foundations for such an identity, the problem is twofold, explains Elisabeth Bakke. In the first instance, the geographical extent of Europe is less than clear. Where does it end? If we take the borders of the EU we exclude several other European nations. Secondly, even within the EU the cultural differences are rather large, in terms of language (many), religion (several) and historical traditions (various). In terms of diffusing a European identity, the basic obstacle is the lack of a single European language, a lingua franca, which impedes the development of a united European horizon, a Europe-wide public space, a European communication network. Foreign language abilities are limited, especially among the uneducated and the elderly; they are less developed in the southern countries as compared to in the north. A decision to make a lingua franca compulsory in the school systems would eventually improve people’s abilities to communicate cross-border, and would probably increase mobility, but not necessarily. Experiences of other multicultural locations suggest that a majority prefers to live among their own kin. The cultural barriers against mobility might not be all that easy to overcome. A major (maybe the most serious), obstacle is that the EU at present doesn’t possess the sufficient means to build a strong European identity, because the competence in cultural and educational matters is still placed at nation state level. This means that the Union will have to depend on national governments in order to diffuse a European identity. 81 Elisabeth Bakke wrote her book before most East European countries joined the EU. She feared that such an enlargement would hamper even more the development of a European identity, at least in the short term, because it would mean more traditions, more religions, more languages, and more historical backgrounds to integrate. However, on a cultural level, the new members of the EU seem to be perfectly at home. Evidently, they belong to the same family of cultures. Lack of ‘national’ European history? From the development of nationalism (in the neutral sense of the term), we can learn that it is always related to a common history of the nation, whether a real one or a legendary version of past events. Any sense of belonging to ‘Europe’ depends on a common history, a common ‘story’ of where we came from and what has made us into what we are. Of course, Europe lacks common ‘national’ heroes, because the hero of one country in the past invariably was the nightmare of others (Charlemagne, the

81 Elisabeth Bakke, op. cit.

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Habsburg emperors, the Tudors, or Napoleon). We have many local heroes but we are still waiting for European ones – maybe the founding fathers of the EU could obtain this status in the near future. We have a collective memory of the common European struggle against Muslim invaders, but political leaders are very cautious indeed to use this as an identity marker in today’s multicultural societies. Having said this, the memory of these events has certainly not died out. It is still alive in Muslim countries, and in Europe it is an element of the unconscious collective memory that can be triggered through conflicts involving Muslim fundamentalism for example. In the 1990s, French and German politicians proposed that the Frankish Empire of Charlemagne be the historical basis and model for European integration. This led to protests from political and church leaders in Eastern Europe who argued they were left out of such a history. Instead of looking for a common historical episode, it is more fruitful to bring to the fore the common values that have been forged through the complicated history of European peoples. Celebrating our common cultural and religious heritage can also foster a sense of belonging across national borders. We should not be too pessimistic with regard to the lack of a ‘national’ European history. It is true that European history is marked by internal warfare, but precisely this could be considered to be the founding history of Europe, in the sense that we have finally learned the lesson that Europeans should not solve their problems by military means. Our history can become a source of determination: never wage war again. The battle fields of yesterday can become European shrines of commemoration and fraternisation today. We see this happening already when English, French and German political leaders stand together, hand in hand, before the memorials of the First and Second World Wars, or when young people from several countries make a journey to Auschwitz. It is at moments like these that a foundational story of Europe can take form. If Polish and Russian heads of state could also join hands in historic places where their forebears fought, if Greeks and Turks, Serbs and Bosnians could commemorate their war-ridden past together, what a powerful impulse would that be for unity! Absence of common enemies? Another obstacle, perhaps as important, according to authors writing on European identity, is the absence of common enemies. The struggle against an invader, a competitor, a rival power or whatever threatens ‘us,’ is an effective mean to rally people behind a common cause. It is in this context that national heroes are born, national histories are forged, laying the groundwork for national myths that are so important to nourish the sense of belonging to one nation. Elisabeth Bakke remarks: ‘Drastically speaking, what the European Union needs, to bolster

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a European identity is probably a nice little war against Russia. Short of that, a “trade war” or a “sports war” could conceivably function as a substitute in the myth making process.’82 The identity shaping effect of sports has not been analysed very much, nor put in practice. The EU does not have specifically European sports teams at the moment, which does not help to foster an overarching sense of belonging. While top level football teams have players from many countries, they arouse among the supporters local and national pride rather than a feeling of Europeanness. In the commercial arena, the prospects for an identity-shaping ‘war’ are more realistic. Existing trade tensions between the EU and China on the one hand, and between the EU and the United States on the other, already help strengthen the awareness that we have to fight our commercial battles together. The more the European public is hurt economically, either as producers or consumers, the more it will develop a feeling of solidarity in its struggle against the common enemy.

7.4. Complementary identities There seem to be three ways forward to develop a European identity in the absence of a federal European state. Core values The first is to foster the awareness of common values. Each treaty that has been signed so far refers to them, with the intent of creating a ‘European awareness’. The most important of these values are: • • • • •

Human rights Parliamentary democracy Unity in diversity Tolerance of a plurality of lifestyles and cultures Separation of state and religious institutions

Pascal Fontaine explains that the EU endeavours to promote a humanist and progressive vision of humanity. According to this vision, humanity is placed at the centre of a revolution of the whole planet that it should master but not subdue. Neither economic market mechanisms nor unilateral action of

82 Elisabeth Bakke, op. cit.

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individual countries can sufficiently guarantee that the needs of the nations and their citizens be met. He goes on to say: The EU not only carries a message but also represents a model endorsed by the large majority of the citizens. The Europeans share a rich heritage of values, such as human rights; social solidarity; freedom of enterprise; equitable sharing of the fruits of economic growth; the right to live in a protected environment; the respect of cultural, linguistic and religious diversity; the harmonious synthesis between tradition and progress. This heritage brings Europeans together, and distinguishes them from other parts of the world. For example, while capital punishment is still practiced in many countries, it has been abolished in all the countries of the EU. 83

The Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is binding for all member states following the Treaty of Lisbon (2008), enumerates all the rights recognised by the member states and their citizens. The cultural European identity in terms of values supersedes national states and their borders. It applies to people of different ethnic origins and religious practices. Proponents of the European project add that we precisely need a Community or Union of Nations in order to safeguard these values dear to all of us. Common roots A second way to develop European ideally is to emphasize the common cultural and religious heritage and the common historical experience of the peoples in the union. However, in the case of Europe, this has turned out to be highly sensitive. The Preamble of the Treaty of Lisbon (2008) reiterates previous treaties by stating that ‘we are drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe.’ Christianity is not mentioned. Of course, this flies in the face of history, since Christianity is the single most important constituent of European cultures. But opinions are divided because of ideological presuppositions and political interests. Not referring to Europe’s Christian roots is often justified by political arguments: explicit mention of these roots would aggravate tensions in a multicultural society, and offend neighbouring Muslim countries).84 Even so, the question of our roots is of utmost importance. Spanish author Soledad García insists on the importance of these roots for the development

83 Pascal Fontaine, 12 leçons sur l’Europe, p. 9 84 More about this issue in the Chapter 12 on the roots of Europe.

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of a European identity. He specifies: ‘Hellenism, with the search for discipline, rationality, perfection, beauty and justice; Roman law and institutions, which created a model of organised and stable power; and Christianity (with elements of the Judaic tradition), have contributed powerfully to the spiritual, moral and human principles of our societies.’85 Anthony Smith concurs: These patterns of European culture, the heritage of Roman law, Judeo-Christian ethics, Renaissance humanism and individualism, Enlightenment rationalism and science, artistic classicism and romanticism, and above all, traditions of civil rights and democracy...have created a common European cultural heritage and formed a unique culture straddling national boundaries and interrelating their different national cultures through common motifs and traditions,...a cultural heritage that creates sentiments of affinity between the peoples of Europe. It is here...that we must look for the basis of a cultural Pan-European nationalism that may paradoxically take us beyond the nation.86 Complementary identities A third way forward is to adapt the idea of European identity to the reality of the moment, by considering it as being complementary to national and regional identities. For the time being, this is the only feasible option, and perhaps the only desirable one. Except for the cosmopolitan elite, people in Europe still primarily identify with national territory, flag, anthem, football team, political parties, holidays, customs, and so on. Moreover, many people have multiple identities. They can feel Scottish and British at the same time, Catalan and French, Flemish and Belgian, Bavarian and German, although their priorities may vary. So it is quite possible to acquire a new identity without necessarily shedding any old ones. A European identity may thus provide an extra identity layer rather than replace national or local identities. We find this option confirmed by the statistics concerning ‘European awareness’ in various countries. How many people consider themselves Europeans and not only Slovenes, Dutch or Portuguese, etc? Here are the percentages of ‘Euroconsciousness’ in some countries, according to the statistical bureau of the Council of Europe: As for Belgium, figures are unfortunately lacking for Flemish and Walloons. This would have allowed for an undoubtedly interesting comparison. The percentage of those who identify as ‘Euro-citizens,’ was fifty-three in the EU as a

85 Soledad García, European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy, p. 4. 86 Anthony Smith, National Identity, p. 174.

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Table 7.1 ‘Euro-consciousness’ in selected European countries. Percentage of people who identified themselves as Euro-citizens. Luxemburg

75

Netherlands

54

Italy

66

Belgium

53

France

64

Austria

52

Denmar

60

Sweden

49

Spain

59

Ireland

43

Germany

56

Greece

40

Netherlands

54

Great Britain

28

whole. Sixty-four percent of the inhabitants of the Eurozone felt more European as a result of the introduction of the common currency.87 The question was not eliminative; respondents didn’t have to choose between options. They could identify themselves as Europeans instead of or along with being Swedes, Irish, Greeks, etc. A matter of time? History is an ongoing process and cultures are continually developing. We cannot foretell what the near future holds for Europe nor can we predict what will become of its nations as the process of unification continues. The possibility exists that our national identities will fade away, as our countries become more and more integrated in a common market with common political structures, just as in the past provincial and regional identities have lost much of their force when states integrated them into a larger national community. If this is so, then it might be only a matter of time, of a very long time perhaps, for the words of Victor Hugo to come true: ‘One day, you French, you Russians, you Italians, you English, you Germans, all ye nations of the continent, you will be forged into a superior unity, without losing your distinct qualities, and constitute the European brotherhood, as sure as Normandy, Bretagne, Burgundy, Lorraine, Alsace and all our provinces have been melted into France.’

87 Figures published in: Euro-Barometer, nr. 56, October-November 2001. The EuroBarometer is published each year by the European Committee in Brussels. We only cite some of the countries mentioned in this research.

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7.5. ‘Europe’ and ‘the other’ The idea of European identity is a form of group identity. As such, it creates a bond between some while excluding others. Presenting European identity in terms of a common cultural heritage, a shared historical experience and so on, becomes quite problematic in the present multicultural society. While some citizens can recognize themselves in this picture, others feel excluded. Most European countries have important minorities with other cultural backgrounds. Can they partake in the European identity? Will they? In the past, European Jews were excluded from full citizenship because they did not fit into the picture of a Christian society. Similarly, European Muslims and other minorities nowadays can easily be given the impression that their culture and their religion are alien to the ‘European experience.’ What is their place in the house of Europe under construction? This is an important issue. Identities are forged out of shared experiences, memories and myths, in relation to those of other collective identities. They are in fact often forged through conflicts with other peoples and states. Writing shortly after the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany, in the year when the Maastricht Treaty was signed (1992), Anthony Smith had this to say: There is another and equally important issue raised by the project of European unification and its relationship with nations and patriotism. The idea of who ‘we’ are is often the opposite of the identity of the others. Who or what then, are Europe’s significant others? Until now, the obvious answers were the protagonists of the ideological Cold War. In this context Europe was often seen as a third force between the superpowers and their allies, though there was always something unreal about such a posture. Now, however, the problem of relationship to other identities has become more perplexing. To whom shall Europe be likened, against whom shall it measure itself? Europe is increasingly wholeheartedly a part of the ‘capitalist’ and ‘democratic’ camp of which the United States is likely to remain the military leader.88

China and the Muslim World? In our view, the two main candidates, if we can say so, to serve as Europe’s significant other, are China and other emerging powers with respect to our economic interests, and the Muslim world with respect to maintaining the

88 Anthony D. Smith, ‘National Identity and the Idea of European Unity,’ p. 60.

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modern character of our society. It is difficult to foretell which of these frontiers will contribute most to European identity. Another element should be added. In the past, the idea of ‘we Europeans’ always stood in opposition to an external ‘other’ and an internal ‘other’: Muslims outside and Jews inside during the Middle Ages, uncivilised peoples outside and backward religion inside during the Enlightenment. Similarly, we have the impression that today the non-European immigrants, in particular the Muslim communities, are considered as the internal ‘other.’ Not only do they serve as the negative contrast of the image of ‘we Europeans,’ but also as scapegoats for economic problems. According to Anthony Smith this prospect is a real one. The more inchoate sense of the ‘outsider’ has recently found expression in various European conflicts, directed at immigrants and guest-workers. Might not the older nationalistic exclusive attitudes to foreigners now become ‘Euronationalist’ exclusion of blacks, Asians and other non–Europeans? There is some evidence for this. But it is difficult to disentangle it from the older attitudes. If it is the case, it supports the idea that there is a continuum between collective cultural identities. 89

Recent history has confirmed these remarks. The creation of open borders within the EU under the Schengen Agreement reinforces a common identity of those whose roots are ‘inside,’ as opposed to those who come or have come from ‘outside.’ It heightens the importance of the common borders around Europe as a whole, and these frontiers in turn have an effect on creating an out-group, so vital to the formation of identity. So the unwanted but almost inevitable consequence of creating the common market is the rise of racism and xenophobia, directed against immigrants. Apparently, the memory of the confrontations between ‘Europe’ and the Muslim world in the past has not died. It lingers on, as an undercurrent in the collective memory of our cultures. This might well explain why people feel so strongly about the visible signs of traditional Islam in their neighbourhood. In chapters 9 and 10 we will deal more in detail with immigration and the issue of Muslim presence. When people feel that their national identity is threatened, their reaction is often ‘my country first.’ This can degenerate into xenophobia and even racist tendencies. These dangers are well known to individual European states. The European institutions in particular are actively working against racial discrimination, ethnic antagonism and anti-Semitism in the member states.

89 Idem, p. 62.

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Darrell Jackson, former staff member of the Council of European Churches, points to the same danger. He is concerned that Christians too easily accept the development of a European identity, because it seems at times to have been too readily tied up with concepts of ‘Fortress Europe.’ He writes: A European identity that is solely identified with the European Union, the Schengen Agreement, the free movement of peoples only within the internal market, or the tightening of external border controls, is an identity that deepens an ‘Us’/‘Other’ dichotomy. Europe’s historical and recent experience of nationalisms should be sufficient warning against the dangers of defining ourselves in opposition to who we are not. All nationalisms tend to assume that members of the nation share certain essential commonalities. Many of these are mythological in character. A similar danger lurks in the corridors of Brussels and Strasbourg. Whether these are to be found in the comments of the same Roman Catholic interlocutor who stressed the importance of referring to Europe’s ‘Christian roots’ or of the politician who speaks of Europe’s Enlightenment commitment to civilisation and individual liberty. These essentialist understandings of Europe fail to take into account our own shared history of ‘barbarism,’ restriction of civil liberties, or of an earlier version of Europe founded in Greek’s classical version of democracy (which incidentally excluded women and slaves).90

Darrell Jackson fears that talking about our common roots as Europeans leads people, consciously or unconsciously, to draw a new lines between ‘us’ and the ‘other.’ Consequently, we tend to demand that others have to become like us in other to be accepted. According to Jackson, the Bible offers another perspective, that of ‘us’ and the ‘other’ becoming ‘we,’ without losing our specific identities. Towards a distinct and inclusive European identity The deeper question remains. Is not cultural exclusion built into the process of pan-European identity formation? Will not a unified Europe magnify the virtues and the defects of each of Europe‘s national identities, precisely because it has been built in their images? And might a European ‘super-nation’ resemble, in its internal politics as well as its external relations, this national model? This fear is often expressed. It still haunts the European political arena, as each of the national states seeks to influence the future shape of a European union along the lines of its own self-image. In relation to minorities within

90 Darrell Jackson, ‘Where Do You Come From?’ See bibliography for details [Consulted May 5, 2010].

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Europe, as well as to states and peoples outside the continent, these images have not been appealing ones. Facing and understanding these problems are preconditions for forging a panEuropean identity that will eschew these undesirable and self-defeating images and features. Again, Anthony Smith helps us to formulate the major challenge before us: ‘Developing and shaping a cultural identity that is distinct as well as inclusive, differentiating yet assimilative may yet constitute the supreme challenge for a Europe that seeks to create itself out of its ancient family of ethnic cultures.’91 Taking this challenge one step further, we would say, that as Europeans, especially as European Christians, we should draw from our own cultural and religious wells to develop our societies and our idea of Europe. At the same time, we should allow for people whose roots are elsewhere, to participate in the European experience. As for them, they shall have to realise that they are part of countries of which the social and political values are rooted in the heritage of Christianity and the Enlightenment.

7.6. Biblical perspective It is interesting to place these reflexions in a Biblical perspective. To this end, it is good to return again to the Declaration of the European Evangelical Alliance concerning the Christian response to the unification of Europe.92 Three parameters The Declaration mentions two main parameters: The Bible affirms the unity of humanity, and recognizes at the same time that humankind exists in collective units called nations. Quoting Acts 17, Deuteronomy 32:8 and Genesis 9:29, it affirms ‘the unity of humankind in that all people were descended from the three sons of Noah.’ It goes on to describe ‘the Biblical view of nationhood.’ Humanity is reconstituted after the Flood into a manifold world of nations not into a homogeneous multitude. Genesis 10 identifies groups of people organised by land, language, family and tribal units and nations. Following the Babel incident we find these divisions serving to restrain fallen humankind’s full potential for evil.

91 Anthony D. Smith, ‘National Identity and the Idea of European Unity,’ p. 64. 92 Quoted at length in Chapter 6 § 1, Evangelical Views on the Construction of Europe.

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So nations are, at the very least, used by God for our good. Nowhere are they condemned in the Bible, though specific nations are judged for their idolatry and savage conduct towards other nations. One nation, Israel, was clearly formed, nurtured and blessed by God to serve his salvation purposes, but punished when it worshipped idols and failed to honour and obey God. It is true that super states or empires such as Assyrians, Babylon, the Medes and Persians, and Rome were also used by God, to punish Israel for its apostasy, but the Bible does not tend to present them in a positive light. We conclude, then, that though the Bible sees humankind as one, national divisions based on geographical, linguistic and cultural differentiation are also part of the biblical worldview. The only qualification is that national arrogance and idolatrous nationalism are seen as evil and will be judged.93

To this we would add a third Biblical parameter: the unity of people of different cultures and nations in Jesus Christ. The unity of the church is unity in diversity. Faith in Christ does not suppress national identity but expresses itself in the cultural context of nations and people groups. Of course, the church is not the world. However, being the salt of the earth and a light to the world, the church holds out a model, a final perspective if you like, for humanity. Christian identity is not formed in contrast to any group of humans. Our struggle is not with flesh and blood, but with principalities and powers that influence the human scene by aggravating walls of separation, tensions between nations, ideologies that exclude, racism, and excessive nationalism. Modest patriotism as well as a supranational perspective Taking these parameters into account, we come to the conclusion that there is room for a distinctive national or local identity, but not for nationalist exclusivism, let alone for feelings of cultural superiority. Patriotism is a good thing, as long as it remains modest, without chauvinism and prejudice against ‘foreigners.’ A sense of belonging to the nation motivates us to serve the community at large. As believers we should help build our nation in terms of justice, peace, protection of the poor. We can take pride in the culture of our people inasmuch as it confirms Biblical values. But we should honestly recognize the forms of evil for which our national flag often serves as a cover up. As Christians we should protest against any form of patriotism that makes one category of people look down on others. And given the unity of humankind, we should look further than our national horizon, be concerned with suffering elsewhere, and encourage collaboration with other nations.

93 ‘The European Union,’ in: European Evangelical Alliance Perspectives, September 2005.

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We can celebrate the cultural diversity of different countries, without forgetting where we come from ourselves. We can take pride in the heritage of our own culture as well as delight in the heritage of others. Europe can be a model based on this inclusive vision, an overarching identity that leads people to collaborate across national boundaries. It can serve as a basis for solidarity between the strong and the weak. If this is the vision for the construction of Europe, Christians can participate in a European identity. However, Europe can also become an instrument of power politics in the world, its can become exclusivist, an instrument to oppress diversity. It is clear that Christians cannot participate in any form of Eurocentrism. Finally, we should recognize the need for every culture to be continually transformed in the light of Biblical values. This is true for Europe as a whole, for every single state, and for all people groups that live on the this continent.

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Chapter 8

Mobility, migration and widening horizons In 1973, my wife and I travelled from Hoogeveen in the north of the Netherlands to Birmingham in the UK, where we planned to study for the next three years at a Bible institute. Looking back now, I have the impression that it happened in another era, another world, even though this is not even forty years ago. At that time without mobile telephones, fax machines, computers, videos, or the internet, we were undertaking a world journey. Months of preparation had been necessary: putting aside money for the huge travel costs compared to the living standard of that time, obtaining visas and medical checks, buying tickets at the travel agency – there was only one in our home town of 40,000 inhabitants – and organising all kinds of practical aspects, not to mention the correspondence with the Bible institute, all by post. The day of departure arrived. As our parents, family, and friends waved good bye while the train slowly began moving, we experienced the melancholy of leaving for a destiny far away. And far away it was! It took us almost two days to get there. We did not belong to the happy few who, in those days, could afford an airplane ticket, so we were bound for the Hook of Holland, where we would take the overnight ferry to Harwich. So far so good. Until now we had managed to carry all our possessions in four suitcases and some handbags. On the other side of the North Sea, we disembarked into the different, unknown world of British train travel. Finding our way in the London railway stations, discovering the London underground, dragging our luggage through tunnels and stairways, getting to the right platform to board the right train, to Coventry and then to Birmingham, we found ourselves in a completely other world. Today, travelling a distance like that is nothing for most Europeans. Young people have already seen more countries before they enter university than their parents could dream of seeing in a lifetime.

8.1. Mobility and migration As international borders lose their significance, and as people all over Europe are becoming extremely mobile compared to those in previous decades ago, they are becoming more acquainted with each others’ cultures. Internal migration alters the social landscape of hitherto remote and closed regions. National horizons change into European horizons.

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Policy of increased mobility One of the most striking consequences of the process of European integration is the increased mobility of its population. Spending holidays in another country is no longer reserved for the elite, as it was in the past (English and Russians on the Cote d’Azur, diplomats in European capitals, top scientists and artists on invitational tours or educational projects). Most of the population, from all socioeconomic classes, can afford it, and it is made easy through a network of transport lines. Increased mobility is the deliberate result of the integration of national markets into a Europe-wide open market. As tariff barriers are lifted, enterprises can easily be active in the markets of other member states. Moreover, one of the principal goals of the EU is to enable the free movement of goods and services and consumer products between its various member states. To that effect, the Schengen Area has been created in which border controls have been greatly reduced. International transportation networks of high speed trains and easy-to-travel motorways are developing. Low-cost air companies have revolutionised travel patterns. Companies like Ryanair and Easyjet started with connections from Britain to places in southern Europe where British people liked to go. Within less than a decade they and other airlines have developed a network linking all major cities in Europe. Offering tickets that are cheaper than travelling by any other mode of transport, they have attracted a large clientele that hitherto never would have taken a plane for a European destination, so much so that Europe has caught up with the US in domestic air travel. Europeans spend their holidays in other countries, buy a secondary residence there, and even decide to settle there. Low-cost air travel has revolutionised mobility within Europe and contributed to the increase of migration. Increasingly diverse and mobile population A Eurobarometer survey notes that a growing number of mobile young people all over the EU are interested in looking beyond national borders. About one in five of the respondents had either worked or studied in another country at some point, lived with a partner from another country or owned a property abroad. Half of these respondents had ties to other countries by ancestry; the other half were most often young and well educated and had consciously made a life choice that brought them into contact with people from other countries. They shared a strong desire, if not propensity, to move abroad, up to four times greater than those who did not have any connection to another country. This phenomenon is likely to become even more important in the future.94

94 European Commission/Eurostat, Demographic Report 2010, p. 4.

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As mobility and migration have intensified over the last decades, a growing proportion of the working-age population was either born abroad or has at least one parent who was born abroad. According to the most recent Demographic Report, the proportion had reached fifteen percent in 2008, a level that has remained almost stable ever since. The Report summarizes the main aspects of this phenomenon as follows: Changing patterns of migration and mobility in Europe are making national sentiments and feelings about belonging to a particular nation more diffuse and complex, especially in the case of mobility between EU Member States. Although traditional long-term, employment-driven, male-dominated migration still takes place, other forms of migration and mobility are emerging.... People are moving abroad for shorter periods, mainly to other Member States, to seek work, pursue their education or other life opportunities. These mobile people tend to be well-educated young adults, towards the higher end of the occupational scale. Increasingly, this form of mobility is based on personal preferences and life choices, and not only on economic opportunities. The increased propensity to be mobile could be of great benefit to the EU by enabling a better matching of skills and language ability with job opportunities.95

Another trend is that people settle in another country while continuing to work for an employer in their home country. For instance, one lives in a sea resort just south of Barcelona while working for a company in Berlin or London. Combining work and residence in different places in this way, implies that they regularly ‘commute’ great distances, usually by plane or high speed train. Finally, an increasing number of people are migrating for their retirement. Low-cost air travel makes it quite easy now to regularly visit friends and children, or have them come visit. The emergence of a ‘European elite’ Finally, increased mobility is resulting in the emergence of a ‘European elite,’ made up of people who feel more European than French, German or Italian. Two processes are at work here. One is the development of a sense of ‘belonging together’ among the Eurocrats. This is clearly observable in places like Brussels and Strasbourg. The other is the growth of a group with no ‘home country.’ These Eurocrats and mobile professionals are young or middle aged; they have a similar education and probably also social background in terms of social class; they work with people from other nationalities every day; they speak

95 Idem.

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several languages fluently, and know quite a bit about each others’ culture; they do not represent their country but the EU; they are far away from home (except those who are natives of Brussels or Strasbourg), and do not have much family or old friends around, so they keep company with each other. Groups of friends are not national in composition; just like their place of work, they criss-cross national divisions. In a multicultural environment like this, people start to define themselves as cosmopolitans. They may even define their identity in direct opposition to the national. Being from somewhere in particular ceases to be important; the multicultural environment is much more fascinating. Yet, these people still have some of their original culture intact, their Christmas traditions, their values, their food, that they also are proud of. Then they start intermarrying, and this is the other process at work: The children of an Italian and a Dane grow up in Brussels. The Italian does not speak Danish and the Dane does not speak Italian. Their home language is French or maybe English. They do not know either of their parents’ countries, cultures or languages very well, but neither do they feel very Belgian. They may provide a truly European amalgam, disconnected from the particularities of national culture. Over some generations they may provide the germ of an emerging European identity.

8.2. Migration It is useful to distinguish between intra-EU migration and external immigration of people from outside Europe. Within the twenty-seven member states of the European Union (EU-27), internal and external migration flows are almost equally important in terms of numbers. A peak was reached in 2008, when about 3.5 million persons settled in a new country of residence within the EU-27. More than 1.8 million (fifty-two percent) were citizens of a country outside the EU. The remaining 1.7 million were intra-EU migrants. In fact, the last figure is the net result of two categories. The twenty-seven member states received nearly two million migrants from other member states. Romanians have been the most numerous among them, followed by Poles, Bulgarians and Germans.96 About 300,000 of them returned to their native country after having lived for a period of time in another European country. However, in certain countries the number given of returning nationals is incorrect since some returning migrants are not recorded at all, as is the case in Romania and France.

96 Cf. Anne Herm, Recent migration trends.

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Since 2008, migration is on the decrease, due to the economic crisis and more restrictive immigration policies.97 According to the latest overall statistics provided by Eurostat, 31.9 million persons with citizenship in a country different from their country of residence were living in the EU on 1 January 2009, representing 6.4 percent of the total population. More than a third of them (11.9 million persons) were citizens of another member state. Two-thirds come from outside the EU (20 million, i.e. 2.5 percent of the total population). Every year, about 700,000 migrants become citizens of their host country. They leave the category of ‘immigrant’ and join the ranks of ‘nationals.’ Often, they are still specified as foreign-born nationals, but their children will be just nationals. However, as immigrants keep coming in, and as new immigrants outnumber those who are naturalized as citizens, the number of foreign-born persons in Europe keeps growing. They are concentrated in Western Europe, as we can see on the following table of Eurostat, showing the percentages as of 2009. Table 8.1 Percentage of foreign-born citizens in selected countries in 2009.

Country

% Foreign-born

% Born within EU

% Born outside EU

Luxemburg

32.2

26.7

5.6

Denmark

8.8

2.6

6.2

Netherlands

10.9

2.5

8.4

Germany

11.6

4.2

7.5

Austria

15.2

6.1

9.1

France

11.0

3.3

7.8

UK

11.0

3.5

7.5

Spain

13.8

5.0

8.9

Italy

7.3

2.3

5.0

Poland

2.7

0.6

2.1

Czech Republic

3.7

1.3

2.4

Romania

0.8

0.3

0.5

97 European Commission/Eurostat, Demographic Report 2010, p. 3ff.

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It is estimated that by 2060, persons with at least one foreign-born parent will account for almost a third of the EU population. At that time, an even larger percentage of the work force will be of foreign descent. Intra EU migration flows In this chapter, we look at migration within the EU, leaving the subject of external migration for the next chapter. We can observe a number of major fluxes. First, there is a movement to the main economic centres of Europe. Take for example the young professionals, hopping from one big European city to another. A generation of West European citizens have pioneered a new kind of highly skilled and educated migration. Some authors call them ‘Eurostars,’ hinting at the name of the fast trains running between London, Paris, and Brussels. In an integrating Europe, they appear to face none of the discrimination and limitations on work and settlement that still restrict other migrants in Europe. Prime evidence of the cosmopolitan promise of European free movement can be found in Amsterdam, London and Brussels, three classic Eurocities, but in other cities as well. Yet there is a reverse side to migration. Even with all formal legal barriers down, things are not always so simple for those who want to work and settle in another country. Cultural differences remain, they even resurface after having been ignored or pushed aside in the first stages of their migration experiment.98 Second, there is the movement from East to West. People in the new member states in the East take advantage of the possibility of setting and working in another country. While the UK is the most popular destination of Polish migrants, the great majority of Romanian expatriates have settled in Spain, where the Romanian community has now swelled to some 800,000 persons. The driving force behind this flow is economic. Migrants move westward in order to earn higher wages than they would in their own country, or simply to find work. In some parts of Poland and other Eastern countries there is a massive exodus, leading to a desertification of rural areas. A third flow is from north to south, mainly the coastal zones of and the islands in the Mediterranean Sea. The main drive is the prospect of more pleasant living conditions: a warmer climate, more space and a more relaxed, easygoing life style. British and Germans are leading this move, with annual figures of nearly 100,000 and 90,000 migrants respectively. In 2007, British authorities estimated

98 Cf. Adrian Favell, Eurostars and Eurocities.

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the British population in Spain to be 700,000.99 Since then, the number is slightly down, but still impressive. An interesting case is the isle of Majorca, where German migrants now make up almost forty percent of the population. Once European citizens will have the right to vote in local elections in their place of residence, we might see several German mayors take office there! It should be added that the economic crisis of the last years has reduced this flow considerably. As migrants see their pension income dwindling, some are resettling in their native country!

8.3. Widened horizons and reinforced diversity As Europeans travel to each others’ countries, and as many of them settle elsewhere in Europe, temporarily or permanently, they discover other cultures and learn to appreciate them. Widening of cultural horizons In fact, this meeting of cultures is yet another official objective of the EU. Already in the 1950s, the idea of jumelage or twin cities was introduced. At that time it was a way of fostering reconciliation between peoples who had fought each other, so French and Italian and German and Belgian cities were interconnected. This functioned well for a time but seems to have lost momentum. A new impetus backed conjointly by the EU and the Council of Europe was the nomination of a cultural capital of Europe each year. Due to the success of the program and the consequent affluence of new candidates, there are now several cultural capitals at the same time each year. Other actors are contributing to the meeting of cultures and the widening of horizons as well. Think of the European sport championships, the Eurovision Song Festival, New Year Concert and other musical programs relayed simultaneously in a number of countries. Besides, there are numerous local festivals that bring together artists of many countries. Special mention should be made of the Erasmus exchange program of university students and faculty. At the moment it is voluntary, but chances are that in the near future the EU will oblige students to do a certain part of their studies at another university in the Union. The idea is to foster a European awareness in young people who will be the leaders of tomorrow.

99 British Immigrants Swamping Spanish Villages?’ Article published on 16 January 2007 at http:// www.byebyeblighty.com/1/british-immigrants-swamping-spanish-villages/ [10 October 2007].

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Characterised by diversity: ‘Europe is translation’ Looking at increased mobility, the exchange between different nationalities and the ongoing internal migration in the EU, one sometimes gets the impression that the various European cultures are becoming more and more alike, as people adopt customs, foods, expressions, habits and dress from other countries. Tourism, increased mobility and internal European migration, mentioned in a previous chapter, all contribute to this process of rapprochement. Are we witnessing a process of cultural integration, the emergence of a panEuropean culture? This is difficult to say. We are persuaded that diversity is a fundamental characteristic of the European cultural zone, to which virtually all Europeans seem to be strongly attached. Authors commenting on the idea of Europe as a cultural zone, emphasize that it ‘constitutes an interconnected whole’ or ‘an existence in variety.’100 Within this unique cultural zone, a great diversity of national and regional cultures flourishes. Following the idea of Europe as a cultural realm, it would be a loss to adopt one single language. It is a matter of principle that a great number of languages should be able to coexist, without that dividing people. It is typically European that people within the same cultural realm speak different languages. The multilingual mode of operation of the European institutions is a case in point. ‘A certain measure of multilinguism is the destiny of European citizens,’ explains a Romanian member of the European Commission.101 What is true for languages is true for Europe as a cultural zone in general. Umberto Eco reiterated this idea in one short phrase, ‘Europe is translation.’ People adopt elements of other cultures Mobility and internal migration within the EU widen our horizons but at the same time they strengthen local cultural prejudices. There is a meeting of cultures but a single ‘European’ lifestyle is not on the horizon. People adopt some elements of the way of life of the people they rub shoulders with in the social potpourri that is contemporary Europe. They pick and chose as they like from the elements of many cultures that are present in every city in Europe: food, clothing, music, a word of German here and an Italian expression there. However, most people take pride in their own culture. People can enjoy the diversity precisely because they maintain, generally speaking, their original national and regional identities. It is precisely our cultural diversity that makes it so interesting to meet other Europeans. While

100 Anthony D. Smith, Atsuko Ichijo, Scottish Nationalism and the Idea of Europe, p. 72. 101 Leonard Orban, ‘Celui qui a la langue traverse la mer.’ See bibliography for details.

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working with them and living among them, we savour the particularity of our different cultures. Instead of entering a melting pot where everybody comes out pretty much the same, we take pride in our diversity. We are happy to agree that we disagree on such cultural highlights as the time to drink coffee – or tea. Europe as a context for rediscovered patriotism The Europeanisation of Europe is ambivalent; it widens cultural horizons, at the same time it provides a context for rediscovered patriotism. ‘The interaction between the different cultures is alright,’ people seem to be saying, ‘but we don’t want to be overruled.’ French and Spanish don’t want English to become the only international language. German scholars might want their books translated into English, but do not like English to become the new Latin of the whole of Europe. We see the same ambivalence in the multitude of cultural festivals and sports events. They certainly create a feeling of belonging together, of being part of Europe, but at the same time, people are keen to maintain their own culture. Never do people become more patriotic then during football games in the Champion’s League and the European championship of national teams. Look at the flags, the banners, the faces painted with national colours, and sportsmen obliged to learn the lyrics of the national anthem and sing them aloud as cameras are zooming in on them! The Europe of open borders, mobility, migration and exchange is a context for rediscovered patriotism. Social researchers argue that the exposure to other European cultures often nourishes national sentiments. As we all know, going abroad and tasting the food over there, can be a good means to better appreciate things at home.102 Biblical perspective From a Biblical point of view, the encounter with people in other countries and the widening of cultural horizons are of paramount importance. As long as people live separated from each other, they can foster prejudice. Enemy images abound where people feel threatened by people ‘out there,’ but when they get a chance to really meet each other, they might be challenged to change their mind. The Bible teaches the unity of humanity; we all descend from a common ancestor and God is the Creator and Father of all. While the Biblical revelation takes place in the context of God’s relation to a particular people, we see in the Bible a constant movement from the one to the many, from one people to all nations. It is full of stories where people meet each other across physical and cultural borders. While the church is and remains rooted in Israel, its scope is

102 See for instance, Anthony Smith, ‘National Identity and the Idea of European Unity’ in: International Affairs, Vol. 68/1 (January 1992), p. 55-76.

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truly universal. The Christian faith creates fraternity between Jews and Gentiles, Greeks and Barbarians, thus illustrating the unity of humanity. Biblically speaking, unity does not mean uniformity but presupposes and even enhances diversity. Jews do not become Greeks and Greeks do not become Jews. Believers remain part of their cultural environment. The vision of the new creation illustrates this through the image of the New Jerusalem in which all nations, tribes and languages (cultures) will be represented. The more we meet people and visit their countries, the more we will be able to appreciate the differences, and the value of belonging to a particular people with a particular culture. The more we widen our horizons to a European scale, the more we will be motivated to solve our problems through peaceful means.

8.4. Opportunities for Christians Integrating and unifying Europe offers tremendous opportunities for individual Christians, churches and mission agencies, to contribute to the witness of the Gospel. Here is some food for thought and motivation for action. Changing social and religious landscape Mobility and internal migration in Europe are changing the social landscape of hitherto remote and closed regions. In some places, it amounts even to a complete mutation. This development can be observed in many regions. While in many countries this phenomenon of internal migration has not been welcomed very warmly (e.g. France), Britain has been more welcoming towards Eastern European migrants. This has influenced the Catholic Church in Britain greatly. 750,000 Poles, of which many are Catholics, live now in Britain. Jenkins states that eighty-two of Britain’s Catholic churches now serve Polish communities. Another consequence of this movement of internal migration is that many Polish priests are ‘exported’ to Britain. The British situation is not unique although the numbers of internal migrants stand out in comparison to other Western European countries. Jenkins does not provide clear examples of other countries, but we might mention the Netherlands as a second example. Just like in Britain, the Catholic faith migrates along with the Polish people. In cities like Utrecht and Rotterdam, Polish Catholic churches can be found, with Polish priests and Polish used as main language. It seems that the integration into Dutch Catholic churches of these Polish Catholics is less developed than it is in Britain. Adopt a Europe-wide perspective Churches and Christian organisations by and large have a national perspective. Orthodox, Protestant and Evangelical denominations are limited to their own

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country, in contrast to the multinational structure of the Roman Catholic Church. However, national borders are losing their importance. Our economies have become intertwined. Our cultures influence each other. Nationalities mingle in big cities as well as in small towns and even little villages. Many professions require working in different countries. People from all over the continent meet and work together. Our daily life is as much determined by European directives as it is by our national parliaments and governments. Most of us pay our bills with a common currency of which the purchasing value is dependent on European policy. Inasmuch as Europe is becoming an integrated whole, churches, mission agencies, Christian organisations and individual Christians should adopt a Europe-wide perspective. We should ask ourselves, what is our role in Europe? How we can relate to other Europeans who come our way? How we can influence the development of our continent? Partnerships on a European scale Due to increased mobility, combined with telephone and internet communication, it is becoming much easier for people in different European countries to meet each other, not only occasionally (during a holiday or at a seminar) but also regularly. Business partnerships, educational exchange, personal friendships and professional relationships are now developing across national borders. We can easily extend this to partnerships between local churches in different countries, between local churches and mission agencies, and so on. Churches with many resources can help others that are lacking sufficient resources. Of course, partnership should always be a two way undertaking. Each partner should give and receive. Language barriers do exist, but that shouldn’t prevent people from working to understand each other in order to cooperate, as the European parliament illustrates. New opportunities for church development As borders are becoming mere lines on maps and the population landscape changes, new opportunities for church development arise. To mention one of many examples: Languedoc Roussillon, the French region along the Mediterranean Sea to the east of the Pyrenees. This is the area where my wife and I have been living and working for several years now. The local population is a mixture of origins (Occitan, other parts of France, Spanish immigrants). Most people are culturally southern French; not to be confounded with Parisian French! Besides, part of the original population takes pride in their Occitan or their Catalan culture. Economically, the region depends on wine, agriculture and tourism. Traditionally the religion is Roman Catholic. Medieval counter movements that gained a wide popular following were cruelly suppressed. Protestantism was

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widespread in the sixteenth century, at one time even comprising more than half the population, but it was virtually wiped out during the Counter-Reformation. Today the population is largely secularised. Practicing Catholics are a minority. There is a some interest in the history of the Cathars, the medieval religious countermovement that held sway in this region, combined with esoteric New Age spirituality, but this concerns a limited group of mainly highly educated people. Given the religious and cultural background of the region, it is not surprising that the Protestant and Evangelical presentation of the Gospel has aroused very little interest among the population. There are a few Reformed churches and some Evangelical churches, but only in large cities. Most churches have a small membership. But lo and behold, since the end of the last century, Europeans from the north buy secondary residences or come to settle permanently. In the provinces along the eastern Pyrenees, the number of British, German and Belgian migrants has risen above the 100,000 level. Christians among them look for a church to worship in. Some are joining French-speaking congregations; some create fellowship groups in their own language, others join an international church, while many do not connect at all. Obviously, this opens up new opportunities. Some of these migrant Christians can strengthen existing churches and contribute to outreach in the surrounding areas. Those who lack language proficiency will need new fellowships, which can in turn reach out to other expatriates and tourists who speak the same language. Existing and new churches can cooperate for special events, and establish relationships with Roman Catholic clergy. Their pastors can encourage each other. Creative thinking and positive action combined can open new windows of opportunity for the Gospel, just like anywhere else in Europe where migration is changing the socio-cultural and religious landscape.

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Chapter 9

Multiculturality and the issue of integration One of the most delicate issues in Europe is immigration. Under the pressure of public opinion, governments emphasize that non-European immigrants should learn the language and adapt to the civil mores of their host society in order to ‘integrate.’ This insistence on integration shows that people in Europe are keen to preserve their values, their lifestyle, their language, their national institutions, and so on. However, this is much less an issue for migrants and refugees moving from one part of Europe to another. They seem to fit in reasonably well. They are able to adapt to the new context. Maintaining some of their customs and creating their own religious communities does not prevent them from integrating in the new society. Moreover, the local population does not consider them as complete strangers. Of course, the Hungarian refugees asking asylum in the Netherlands in 1956 did have some problems of integration. So did the Italian mine workers in France and Belgium in the early decades of the twentieth century; so do the Polish migrants coming to Britain today. In due time, they become an integral part of society, because the cultural distance is relatively small. How different is the story of immigrants from the Maghreb, from sub-Saharan Africa, and from the Middle East! How difficult it is for them to become accepted as fellow Europeans! Even when they have obtained citizenship, even after two or three generations, they are still labelled as immigrants; as French, Germans or Austrians ‘of this or that background.’ Interestingly, Latin Americans have fewer problems integrating, precisely because they seem to have more affinity with ‘European’ cultures. The place of immigrants and their communities in European societies is a real concern; it provokes emotional reactions of all kinds. However, popular opinion is not always in line with reality. Sometimes, the number of immigrants is grossly exaggerated. Meanwhile, it is clear that Europe needs many new immigrants in the years to come in order to keep its economies running and to prevent population decrease (see chapter 1.2, page 29). After a brief look at some facts and figures concerning immigration, we shall concentrate on its corollary; the multicultural society.

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9.1 External immigration Migration flows from inside and from outside Europe are equally important in terms of numbers, as we have noted in the preceding chapter. At present, about 3 million persons settle in the EU each year, slightly more than half of them come from outside the EU. External immigration has been going on for many years. We can distinguish various periods and categories. Migrant workers and family reunion After the Second World War, Western Europe entered into a period of unprecedented economic growth. Industries developed to satisfy increasing demand for consumer products, so much so that there was an urgent need for more workers than the population itself could supply. Since the late 1950s, industries and governments actively enrolled migrant labourers from Turkey, Morocco and other countries where there was a surplus of labour. Initially, this was seen as a temporary measure. Sooner or later these hundreds of thousands so-called ‘guest workers’ would return home, the authorities thought. For that reason, housing facilities were provisional, in many cases even appalling as compared to that of the European population. However, many ‘guest workers’ stayed while new migrant labourers kept coming in. The situation changed completely when in the late 1970s, these ‘guest workers’ were allowed to bring their families in. As a result of the family reunification policy, the immigrant communities grew in numbers. Definitely, they were here to stay. Attracted by the prosperity in Europe, an increasing number of so-called ‘economic refugees’ from poverty stricken areas are leaving their native country in the hope of finding better economic prospects over here. In this respect, Europe has joined the US, Canada and Australia as a major destination for people fleeing poverty and misery. Postcolonial backlash Another factor is the backlash to colonialism. In three waves, the colonies of Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands obtained independence: around 1949 (India, Pakistan, and Indonesia), around 1960 (the end of British and French rule in Africa and Indochina) and around 1975 (Surinam, Portuguese Africa). What no politician had foreseen was the subsequent backlash of colonialism, i.e. the ongoing migration of people from these colonies to the former European mother countries. Given the close cultural and economic ties that continued to exist, large numbers of Africans, Latin-Americans, Asians and Islanders from Oceania came to settle in Europe. This has turned out to be an unstoppable movement; it is still going on.

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Seekers of asylum A third category of migrants are political asylum seekers. The EU is the principal destination. Some have come from neighbouring countries like Turkey, but far greater numbers are arriving from countries all over the world that are caught in political turmoil or where human rights are violated. For those who are familiar with the history of France, it should come as no surprise that this country is the favourite destination. In terms of the number of asylum seekers arriving, it outnumbers by far all other countries. If this trend continues, it might well bypass the US, which is ten times greater in size and five times greater in population.103 Since the promulgation of the ‘Human and Citizen Rights’ in 1792, France has always taken pride in its defence of human rights. It considers itself to be a guide to other nations in this area. This implies that it sees itself as a haven for the politically oppressed. A closer look reveals that French authorities can be very unwelcoming at times, not to speak of the population, but the image is still there: this is the country of human rights. So it attracts the largest number of seekers of asylum. Some figures People from all corners of the globe continue to come to Europe, turning it into the primary immigration region worldwide. At the moment, the number of immigrants in the EU has risen to well over 45 million, that means more than ten percent of the population! Immigration has become the major contributing factor of population growth during the last decades.104 Since the early years of this millennium, it is the only growth factor in the EU.105 After a rapid growth until 2003, the rise in immigration slowed down but there is still a net increase (incoming immigrants minus those who are leaving Europe) of more than 1.5 million per year. At the same time, natural growth of the majority population was negative: minus 63 000 persons. The four countries with the largest number of immigrants are Germany (10 million), France (6.5), United Kingdom (5.4) and Spain (4.8). These figures date from a few years ago. Since then, they may have changed, but the raking is certainly still the same. While some immigrants have legal status, many others are illegal workers, employed in the parallel economy. An estimated seven million immigrants within the EU have irregular status, with half a million new ‘irregulars’ arriving each year. The exact number of illegal immigrants can only be estimated, but the

103 Anne Herm, Recent Migration Trends, p. 45. 104 Jean-François Jamet, L’Union européenne et l’immigration, p. 31. 105 According to a report of the European Council published in 2005.

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approximate figures provided by government agencies are impressive. France offers an example that illustrates the general situation in Western Europe. As of 2012, the annual influx of legal immigrants in that country is 200,000, while about 100,000 migrants leave the country. At the same time, the number of illegal immigrants is put between 200,000 and 400,000. In 2011, about 90,000 verdicts of expulsion were pronounced, but ‘only’ 30,000 of them were actually carried out.106 At certain times, governments have legalized immigrants who have a regular job but who were not entitled to a residence permit under normal regulations. These massive exceptional regulations have taken place in Spain and in Italy, for example. Such measures were meant to legalize an existing situation that could no longer be denied, nor reverted. Obviously, there was work for these people and the economy could not do without them. Giving them legal status would also take them out of the parallel economy. The reverse side of the coin was that these measures attracted even more economic refugees who tried to get in these countries illegally, hoping to benefit from a similar regularisation policy in the future. Where do external immigrants come from? Contrary to the widespread opinion that ‘all’ newcomers are either poor black Africans or Muslims from North Africa and the Middle East, the origin of non-EU immigrations is much more diverse. According to the reports of Eurostat, the statistical bureau of the European Council, forty percent of the citizens who are not born in the country of their residence come from another EU country, sixty percent from elsewhere.107 Within the entire EU, there were 16.7 million residence permit holders from outside Europe in 2009. The numbers are roughly proportional to the population of the continents of origin. Each of the five largest member states attracts the majority of the people from a particular continent: most Africans hold permits in France (1.6 million), most Asians in Italy (1.1 million), most Europeans in Germany (2.6 million), most South Americans in Spain (1.5 million), while the United Kingdom attracts most immigrants from North America and Oceania. A look at individual countries of origin reveals that in 2008, Morocco ranked first. Here are the ten most numerous citizenships of non-EU immigrants in that year, based on Eurostat estimates.

106 Figures provided by INSEE, the French National Institute of Statistics, March 2012. 107    These and other figures mentioned in this section are taken from: European Commission/ Eurostat, Demographic Report 2010, p. 44.

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Table 9.1 Number of non-EU immigrants in the EU countries in 2008. Morocco

157,000

Brazil

62,000

China

97,000

United States

61,000

India

93,000

Turkey

51,000

Albania

81,000

Russian Federation

50,000

Ukraine

80,000

Colombia

49,000

The largest proportion of Indians and Chinese entered the EU for the purpose of education or employment. Seventy-two thousand Chinese and 61,000 Indians were issued education related permits respectively, whereas 51,000 Chinese and 63,000 Indians entered the EU for employment reasons. By contrast, Moroccans were granted the highest number of permits issued for family reasons (62,000), and less than 5 per cent (7,000) were granted permission to reside for education reasons. Of course, there are fluctuations each year, but these numbers are a good indication of the variety of origin. It helps us to put immigration into a realistic perspective.

9.2. Multicultural society As immigration continues and new communities develop, especially in Western Europe, national societies are changing drastically. Until some decades ago, they were largely mono-ethnic and dominated by one European culture. Since then, they have become increasingly multiethnic and multicultural. As many second and third generation immigrants maintain the culture of their parents and grandparents, society is becoming multicultural. Although this change takes places all over the continent, it affects the western part far more than the eastern part. However, this difference might be just a matter of time. The more the countries in the East are taken up in the process of economic and political integration, the more likely it is that their borders will open up for non-European immigrants. While there are now various cultural groups living alongside each other, the traditional European culture remains the dominant one. This applies to the large majority of the population; it is also the frame of reference for all the minority groups in the country. Most politicians are part of the traditional European cultures, and most political parties defend its values. Sociologists call this the phenomenon of the Leitkultur, to indicate that in our multicultural societies, there is always one culture that takes the lead. The Leitkultur is invariably a European one.

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Secularised societies with various religious minorities Immigrants have brought with them their religions as well – usually inseparable from their culture. This is true not only for those who live in non-dominant cultural communities, but also for those who are integrated in the culture of the host country. We find Tibetan and South-East Asian Buddhists, Sikhs, Hindus of all stripes, Sunni and Shiite Muslims dispersed all over the EU. Christian migrants created migrant churches based on specific ethnic and cultural identities, or joined European churches. At the same time, the number of practicing Christians is in constant decline, so much so that churches have become minorities in countries where they once occupied a dominant and privileged position. The large majority of those who left the fold of Christianity or were born to non-Christian parents have not adopted another religion. While it happens that autochthones convert to non-Christian religions, their numbers seem to be very limited indeed. Generally speaking, the alternative for Christianity, as far as Europeans is concerned, is a non-religious mode of life and a secular worldview. Consequently, we should not describe European societies as multi-religious, but as secularised societies with various religious minorities – Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, Sikh, Hindu, Jewish, etc. Immigration of Christians as well as Muslims Public opinion tends to associate immigration almost exclusively with Muslim migrants and the growth of Muslim communities in big cities. Media coverage of clandestine immigration and political debates on this matter often reinforce this image. This image in turn determines general attitudes towards all migrants, especially in Western Europe, where most Muslim are concentrated. What media often overlook and politicians hardly take into account, is that the majority of non-European immigrants are not Muslims. The table of the top ten countries of origin outside the EU (see page 178) only shows two Muslim countries: Morocco and Turkey. In fact, many immigrants have come, and continue to come from countries where Christianity is the major religion. It might be true to say that more Christian than Muslim immigrants are coming into Europe today. Philip Jenkins has made an inventory of immigration and the rise of migrant communities, both Christian and Muslim. He comments: If commentators worry that the presence of some 15 million Muslims in our nations portends to the imminent conquest of Europe, it is curious that more attention is not paid to a Christian phalanx several times larger.108

108 Philip Jenkins, God’s Continent, p. 56.

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Separation of bicultural communities Many migrants keep speaking their traditional languages, while using the official language of the country to communicate with the wider society. This is part of a wider phenomenon: the bicultural way of life developed in migrant communities. We see this not only among first generation migrants who live in close proximity to people of their ethnic group (as can be expected), but also among second- and third- and following generations (which is more surprising). As a result, people are part of ethnic, immigrant background communities that are attached to the original culture and religion. At the same time they live in a European society and adopt the language, the school system, and many cultural elements. They are bi-cultural. A corollary of this phenomenon is the concentration of bicultural groups in certain areas, mainly urban areas. Visit the big cities in Western Europe, go from one part of the older inner city to another, from one suburb to another, and you will notice the concentration of communities that have developed because of immigration. As you notice the shop signs, the way people dress, the type of restaurants, the products on the street market, as you hear people converse in their traditional language – Turkish, Arabic, Urdu, Hindi or an African vernacular – and as you notice the small number of ‘European whites’ on the street, you are observing something people do not like talking about. In the urban areas, there is a certain level of separation along ethnic and cultural/religious lines. As people of non-European origins move into a quarter and become more numerous, ‘old stock’ Europeans move out and settle elsewhere. Of course, this is not based on administrative constraint. There is no deliberate policy behind this. No government wants to be accused of promoting anything that smacks of segregation. It is not politically correct to even use this term. Not all migrants live close to their ethnic communities, but many do. In countries with a centralised government and a strong national culture, the prospect of different communities living separately from each other is often used as a foil. It is seen as a great danger to national cohesion. French politicians call it communautarisme. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that a certain measure of separation exists. We prefer not to call it segregation. But that does not change the facts. The more people are encompassed by their own cultural group, or rather, bi-cultural group, the more others will perceive them as different. Consequently, the social link with the rest of society can become problematic. And it does! The multicultural society today is not producing the same kind of social mix that has resulted from the influx of immigrants from other European countries in the past. Young people who have grown up in an African quarter are meeting more difficulties on the job market than others. Bearing a Muslim name proves to be a handicap when mingling with

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the majority population, or with other migrant communities for that matter. All of this is fertile ground for prejudice, discrimination, ethnic antagonism, and the like. Particularly disturbing is the avowed anti-Semitism of radical Islamic groups. Synagogues, Jewish schools and institutions are regularly targets of violent attacks. Extreme rightwing groups target both Muslims and Jews, as well as migrant communities in general. Cultural diversity is enriching In principle, there should be no problem for Antilleans, Nigerians, Syrians, Turks, Moroccans, Chinese or Sikhs to form communities of their own alongside the majority population, all of them within the larger framework of the national society. As long as their leaders are able to work together for the common good, social tensions can be kept at a minimum. As long as their children go to the same school, follow the same educational path, the feeling of belonging to one society will be fostered. Migrant communities are important for the national economy. Many of them display commercial talents and entrepreneurial drive. Because they have to work hard to obtain their place in the host country, they are in fact contributing considerably to the economy. Of course, we should not ignore that many migrants are unskilled labourers, doing jobs that are less than satisfactory. But this need not remain so. In the long run, other professional prospects will open up, as these people integrate in society and their children enter professional and higher education. Migrants excel in many disciplines. We now have lawyers, artists, doctors, teachers, mayors, MPs and cabinet ministers of immigrant background. Not to mention the world of sports! The higher the level of a football club, the more the team on the ground is multicultural. (Although, when you look at the sidelines, you will notice that the position of coach still seems to be reserved for Europeans. Sign of a Leitkultur in sports?) Cultural diversity can contribute to the welfare of the city, and it does. One of the attractions of London, Amsterdam, Berlin and other cosmopolitan cities is precisely their vibrant multicultural character, where restaurants serve dishes and theatres stage artistic styles from so many backgrounds. Viewed from these angles, the influx of immigrants is a real chance for the future of Europe! ...and causing apprehension As true as this may be, there is also a reverse side to the picture. The presence of migrant communities is not only making the economy work better and enriching our societies, it is also causing apprehension and misgivings among the majority population. Concerns are generally concentrated on the presence of Muslims in Europe, i.e. on their religious practice, to be more precise.

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Whether these concerns are justified is another matter, we just mention them as a matter of fact. Examples can be found in excess in the media, the popular press, and more and more in intellectual circles as well. Alarmist voices are raised to warn us of the danger called ‘Islamisation,’ by which is meant that Islam will become very influential in society, so that others will have to comply with the demands of this religion.

9.3. Political reactions The emergence of a multicultural society sparks tensions and political debate. Authorities are faced with the challenge of dealing with the influx of immigrants and related problems. The US model of the ‘melting pot’ does not work, for the simple reason that on the ‘Old Continent,’ the national cultures have developed long before massive immigration from outside Europe began in the 1960s. Mosaic model of multiculturalism Governments have by and large opted for two alternative models. First, the mosaic model: let people maintain their original culture and allow them to develop their own community, as long as they abide with law and order. This approach has been adopted in Great Britain, Germany and the Netherlands – until the swing of the political pendulum after 2000. The underlying ideology is multiculturalism – not to be confused with the multicultural society that is just a matter of fact. When a multicultural society is not only seen as a given situation but as a desirable state of affairs, something to be strived for, we should speak of multiculturalism. Sadly, the term multicultural society is often used in this ideological sense as well, which hampers the public debate in this issue. Multiculturalism is the ideal of a society that is made up of a mosaic of cultures and lifestyles, in which nobody is expected to adopt the dominant culture. Immigrants should of course accept democracy and obey the law, but in other areas they are free to adapt as much as they want to the European cultures, or to retain as much as they wish of their original culture. They can have their own schools, hospitals, societies, clubs, as long as they respect the legal requirements that apply to every citizen. Multiculturalism in politics is the corollary of postmodernism in philosophy, which rejects the idea that there is one absolute truth, one great story, one true religion, because, according to postmodern thought, such ideas are always instruments of power and domination. Instead, there are many versions of truth, many local stories, many religions and many cultures living side by side. In this view, the one basic value is tolerance, and the political structure most adapted to a pluralist society is a plural European style democracy.

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Integration The second model is integration: immigrants should not only abide with the law of the host country and accept democracy but also adopt the basic values and the public way of life of the host culture. While they can practice their own religion (in private) and have a certain freedom of cultural expression, they should send their children to the existing educational institutions, accept modern medical care, join existing political parties. They should be dissuaded to set up their own parallel structures, because there is a fear that they will develop a community of their own. France offers a typical example of this approach. Neither one of these models has been able to prevent social and political tensions, but in recent years, the pendulum is clearly swinging to integration. Philip Jenkins sums up very well the dilemma facing European political leaders: The rise of religious diversity forces European nations to confront issues of tolerance and minority rights that most had thought long settled. How can societies balance the right to religious freedom with the need for balance and secularism in public life? Resolving the competing pressures toward conflict and assimilation challenges European values of tolerance and pluralism. The dilemma can be phrased simply. European states, and the European Union, preach certain core values, including secularism, tolerance, individualism, and progressive views on gender, family, and sexuality. At the same time, they must deal with communities who differ radically from these values at many key points. We are only beginning to see the legal and constitutional battles arising from these struggles.109

Authorities are becoming much more demanding of immigrants. Instead of leaving allowing them to develop their own subcultures, they now require loyalty to the state, the nation, to the crown or the flag, the values of their host country. They should learn and speak the official language(s). In this respect, Jenkins speaks of ‘the end of multiculturalism, advocated by the intellectual and political elite of many European countries.’ He is right. It has now become generally accepted that they insist on integration and a high level of cultural adaptation. German chancellor Angela Merkel agreed that ‘the notion of multiculturalism has fallen apart. Anyone coming here must respect our constitution and tolerate our Western and Christian roots.’110

109 Philip Jenkins, God’s Continent, p. 233f. 110 Quoted by Peter Schneider, ‘Das Versprechen der Freiheit,’ in Der Tagesspiegel, 23 February 2006.

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A few decades ago, statements to this effect would have aroused scandalised reactions in the press. Nowadays, leaders of any mainline party can say things like this without creating too much of a row. Assimilation or integration? In some countries, Switzerland for example, immigrants who want to obtain permanent citizenship must pass examinations to prove language proficiency, knowledge of political and social institutions, and acquaintance with national history. But this really means the end of the model of integration, adopted by other European countries. Instead, there is a demand for assimilation. Ricardo Lumengo, a Swiss Christian politician, describes this shift as follows: Someone integrated is someone who accepts a way of life that is similar to the average autochthon citizen. This is the case when a foreign person takes, in a general sense, part in social life, shows a willingness to learn the language that is spoken in his region, and makes sufficient efforts to attain financial independence by a money earning job, respects the usages and customs, the law and the judicial order of his host country. Every demand that goes beyond these requirements is no longer a matter of integration but amounts to assimilation. Integration provides the foreigner with the possibility to conserve his cultural identity while at the same time adopting or adding the culture of the host country. This constitutes richness, not only for the foreigner himself, who finds his person and his dignity confirmed, but also for the host country that can now benefit from the cultural and intellectual contribution of the integrated foreigner.111

However, such neat distinctions are often lost in current discussions of the future of the multiethnic, multicultural and multi-religious society. The political pendulum is clearly swinging from the ideal of multiculturalism to the demand for assimilation. This does not mean that political parties, governments and intellectuals are giving up on the multicultural society as such. The principle of diversity is still widely adopted, but there is a growing concern that the original European majority culture remains the Leitkultur. In the public and political realm, minorities should adapt to its core values, its norms, its language, and recognize its historical roots (Christian and other). Meanwhile, they are allowed freedom of (religious) expression in the private sphere. The political debate now centres on the way in which cultural diversity and national coherence should be kept in a balance.

111 Ricardo Lumengo, ‘Le chrétien face au défi de l’immigration,’ in: Frédéric Baudin et al., Foi, politique et société, p. 138. Our translation from French.

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Populist movements against immigration A clear signal of the changing tide is the upsurge, all over Europe, of political movements whose major agenda is limiting immigration and demanding that immigrants who are already here either assimilate or leave. They argue that the national cultural heritage is threatened by the growing number of nonEuropean inhabitants. Usually they are Eurosceptic, i.e. highly critical of European integration. In their view, the Schengen Agreement has opened the floodgates for immigration. In the media, these movements are often called extreme rightwing but this term is highly pejorative, generally used by people of opposite political persuasions; their self-perception is different. A leading thread in their discourse is their patriotism, focussing on traditional values, cultural heritage and national territory. So we would prefer a less pejorative designation: populist movements and political parties. Another frequently used label is ‘anti-immigration party.’ This is not always justified. Some of these movements do not wish a ban on immigration as such but only on illegal immigration. They advocate a policy of selective immigration. The electorate of these parties typically live in residential zones where they feel threatened in their cultural identity. As one sociologist put it, they simply want to grow old in the same society as the one in which they grew up. We should further differentiate between racialist and national socialist groups on the one hand and patriotic movements on the other. While the first defend extremist positions, based on a radical rightwing ideology, the latter are rather populist and less ideological. The latter category of patriotic movements is much larger and more influential. While their electorate does not represent more than a maximum of fifteen percent in most countries, it is difficult to say to what extent their ideas are held outside their constituencies. Surveys bring out two factors that have to be taken into account. First, the media and the intellectual elite in most European countries still consider these parties extremist. This inhibits potential support. Second, many older people who are favourable to the program of these parties, still hesitate to vote for them because they fear racist tendencies that recall the racism of the 1930s and 1940s. Given these factors, we can safely assume that the percentage of the population approving their political program is higher than their electorate. Even when one does not agree with their agenda one should take them serious as an important phenomenon in society.

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9.4 Challenges for churches in society Immigration and the social tensions that go with it are of special concern for Christians. They pose a number of challenges for churches. Biblical principles with respect to immigrants Firstly, we are challenged to reflect on the Biblical principles with respect to foreigners settling in a new country. In his lecture during a recent conference on ‘Faith, Politics and Society,’ the already mentioned Swiss politician Ricardo Lumengo dealt with the issue of immigration. He mentioned the following Biblical principles that should inform the actions of governments and the reactions of the general public: • All human beings are created in the image of God, so their individual dignity should be protected. • The fundamental rights are the same for all inhabitants of a country. • Persons in deprived social circumstances and minorities merit our solidarity. • The state should strive to maintain social peace on the basis of justice, which means the integrity and the reciprocal concern of all members of society.112 According to Lumengo, these principles allow us to demand integration. However, integration does not mean total assimilation. As for political authorities, they should treat foreigners and autochthones on an equal footing. Society should accept foreigners without racial prejudice. We find this a balanced approach, in line with our understanding of Biblical social principles. Accepting the foreigner who sojourns in our country is a recurrent theme throughout the Bible. Christ Himself is the supreme example of the stranger in our midst, who welcomed all who come to Him. Christians are, by virtue of their faith, strangers and sojourners in the world. So we should not be guided by fear for the other, i.e. fear for his otherness, however human such an attitude might be in the encounter with widely divergent cultures. The challenge for us is that we need to learn to live with a certain level of cultural difference between our primary social surrounding and other communities in society.

112 Ricardo Lumengo, ‘Le chrétien face au défi de l’immigration,’ in: Frédéric Baudin et al., Foi, politique et société, p. 135-142. Our translation from French.

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Get to know other religious communities Secondly, as Christians we are entrusted with the mission to make the Gospel known to all ethnic and cultural groups of people, but we are also called to show them neighbourly love, after the example of our Lord. Practically speaking, this implies that we do not ignore immigrant communities and individual immigrants, but make an effort to relate to them, to get to know them, so as to better understand their way of life and their specific needs. Our knowledge of the other should not just derive from books on the Eightfold Path of Buddha or the Five Pillars of Islam, but also and even primarily from personal contact. Muslims are confronted with secularisation, the separation of church and state, materialism, and the attraction of a non-religious lifestyle, just like us as Christians. On a political level, there are issues in which they appear to be our allies instead of our opponents, despite our different religious convictions. One thinks of abortion, same-sex marriage, religious education, confessional schools, permission to build religious edifices, recognition of religious customs and holidays, to mention but a few examples. There are several areas of common concern, and this in turn creates natural opportunities to show practical help and share our faith. Communicate the Gospel to other religious communities in their European context The challenge to communicate the Gospel to people belonging to other religious communities is evident, but are we sufficiently sensitive to the fact that most of them belong to migrant communities? They are Muslims, Buddhists and Hindus, not in a predominantly Muslim, Buddhist or Hindu country but in a country where they are a minority. As such, they are more often than not concerned to maintain their cultural identity, of which religious practice is an important element. In many cases, they maintain strong links with their mother country. This raises the question whether churches are attuned to their specific needs. Our congregations are culturally part of the mainstream in society, so there is a considerable distance with the immigrant community. It will not be easy for immigrants who are open to the Gospel, to cross the line between their context and our European churches. Quite often this proves to be too difficult. Here we are confronted with the need of contextualize the Gospel within our own society! Migrant churches might be part of the answer but we should keep in mind that they are not by definition closer to other ethnic minorities. A Congolese church for example, might find the cultural distance from Pakistani Muslims or Surinam Hindus as great as any given ‘European’ church would find it. At any rate, there is a need for cooperation and fellowship of migrant and other churches.

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Reach out to Christian Diaspora communities As we have mentioned above, many immigrants are part of a Christian diasporic community. Missiologist Jonathan Ingleby notes that moving into a new culture far away from familiar friends and family can be a difficult process. Leaving these people just to ‘get on with it’ is certainly not an appropriate response. Diasporic communities live with a constant sense of being under threat. ‘Christians in their dealings with threatened minorities have a responsibility to do everything they can to alleviate this sense of threat, whatever its source.’ On the other hand, diasporic people are usually hoping for something new. They have not travelled such a long distance under such difficult circumstances only to remain the same people that they were before. ‘In a very profound way the Gospel offers people a new start and maybe that is the newness they have been looking for all their lives.’ Ingleby makes some interesting observations in this regard: Diaspora people are often keen to do something for their home country. Because a Diaspora never loses contact with ‘home,’ because of the network effect, there is constant traffic between those at home and those in exile, so to speak. The Gospel can be part of that traffic. This is one of the great joys of the postcolonial situation. There are so many bad outcomes of the colonial experience that it becomes a dispiriting task to catalogue them. Yet the continued connection between, say, Britain and India seems, from the point of view of the gospel, an example of redemption. Not that it excuses the history of British imperialism, but it takes something which had much that was evil and exploitive and uses it for blessing.113

Defend and reinforce basic values of our own cultural tradition Finally, there is a challenge with respect to the multicultural society as such. Among intellectuals there is a peculiar tendency to downgrade traditional Western values and to excel in tolerance towards other ideas. ‘They see in their own history only what is blameworthy and destructive, but they are not capable of perceiving what is great and pure in the heritage of the West,’ writes Joseph Ratzinger, who criticizes this attitude of downgrading the traditional moral values that have played a crucial role in the development European societies. He goes on to say:

113 Jonathan Ingleby, ‘Postcolonialism, Globalisation, Migration and Diaspora.’ See bibliography for details.

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Europe needs a new – and certainly a critical and humble – acceptance of itself, if it wants to survive. Multiculturalism...is sometimes little more than the abandonment and denial of what is one’s own, flight from one’s own heritage. But multiculturalism cannot exist without shared constants, without points of reference based on one’s own values. It surely cannot exist without respect for what is sacred. We can only respect what is sacred to others, if we ourselves have respect for what is sacred. We can do this only if what is ultimately sacred, God Himself, is not foreign to us. The God who has compassion on the poor and the weak, on widows and orphans, on the stranger; the God who is so humane that He Himself became man, a suffering man, who by suffering together with us gives dignity and hope to pain. If we don’t do this, we not only deny the identity of Europe, but we also deprive others of a service to which they have a right. 114

Other authors, whether Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Protestant or Evangelical, have expressed similar concerns. Appreciating and trying to understand values of communities of non-European origin is laudable as such, but this should not lead us to depreciate our own Western culture. No society, not even the multicultural one, is sustainable without a moral basis that undergirds its structures, its institutions and its laws. In European societies, there is a moral basis with deep historical roots. This is not a matter of putting Western culture above others, but of recognising that it contains fruits of the Biblical message: basic values, institutions and beliefs, passed on to us through our cultural tradition. We as believers have a responsibility to defend and to reinforce them.

114 Joseph Ratzinger, Europe, Today and Tomorrow, p. 33.

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Chapter 10

Muslims in Europe – facts and fears In recent years, the British journalist Christopher Caldwell has aroused quite a debate through his publications on what he calls the ‘revolution in Europe.’ Quoting a host of surveys and statistics, Caldwell argues that large-scale immigration, particularly of Muslims, is in the process of transforming Europe profoundly. ‘From the strife-torn banlieues in the larger French cities to the multiplying minarets of Middle England, we are a very long way indeed from the merry multicultural melting-pot of bien pensant fantasy.’115 Putting the question whether ‘you can have the same Europe with different people in it,’ he goes on to describe the ‘predicament’ of today’s societies: The predicament actually consists of two different problems that, because they overlap, are often mistaken for a single problem. There is the problem of Europe’s ability to assimilate immigrants, and there is the problem of Europe’s difficulties with Islam.

Christopher Caldwell paints an alarming picture of our values and our social structures drowning in a sea of immigration and of politicians advocating the wrong policies. He calls for another policy. Immigrants should be put to the choice; accept the European way or leave. Much can be said against the view of Caldwell and those who take a similar position. For instance, we would take issue with their argument that immigrants are taking jobs away from Europeans. The job market is much too complicated to reduce the problem of unemployment to the presence of immigrants. Furthermore, we are not so sure that all the Muslims in Europe will radicalize and become inimical to European cultures. Some will, but others might not. And who can tell the proportions of the former and the latter, say, within ten years’ time? Nevertheless, this portrayal of the ‘immigration problem’ and this warning against the rise of fundamentalist Islam sounds a bell among a considerable proportion of the majority population. For this reason, we should pay attention to it. As Christians we are challenged by these kinds of protestations to look for Biblical guidance with respect to the attitude to be taken, and enter the public debate.

115 Christopher Caldwell, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, p. 21.

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10.1. Facts It is difficult to compare the number of ‘Muslims’ in Europe with the number of Christians, since we are used to differentiating between practicing, nominal and non-Christians within the same ethnic or cultural group. Muslims, on the other hand, will not be so comfortable with the distinction between religious practice and belonging to an ethnic community, a distinction which they often perceive of as being ‘European.’ Official statistics of Muslims communities refer to communities, irrespective of the rate of religious practice. They include everyone belonging to an ethnic cultural group that is nominally Muslim. In France, for instance, all immigrants from North Africa, first and second and third generation together, are counted as Muslims, since they originally come from a Muslim country. Having said that, there is no question about the fact that the number of people in Europe who consider themselves as practicing Muslims is growing indeed. They are mainly concentrated in the major urban areas in Western Europe. Consequently, the picture is quite different from country to country. Muslim presence is very limited in the East and in Nordic Europe, but increasingly dominant in the largest cities of Western Europe. Muslims make up twenty-four percent of the population in Amsterdam; twenty percent in Malmo and Marseille; fifteen percent in Paris, Bradford and Birmingham; and ten percent or more in London and Copenhagen.116 However, these concentrations should be seen in relation to population figures for the EU as a whole. When we do that, we see that Muslims account for an estimated four percent of its total population, i.e. 20 to 21 million people. The four European countries with the largest Muslims communities, both in absolute numbers and in percentage of the general population, are France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. The following table outlines the estimated numbers (in millions) and the percentages of the total population: Table 10.1 European countries with the largest Muslim communities (numbers are in millions). Country

Total population

Muslims

% of total population

France

64

4.5 - 5.0

7.0 - 7.8

Germany

82

3.0

3.7

United Kingdom

59

1.5 - 2.0

2.5 - 3.4

Netherlands

16

0.7

4.4

116 Timothy Savage, ‘When Town Halls Turn to Mecca,’ The Economist, 6 December 2008. Quoted in John Micklethwait and Adrian Woolbridge, God Is Back, p. 279.

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Growth prospects for Muslim communities Several demographic studies point out that this percentage will rise in the short term because of continued immigration and high birth rates but that it will stabilise within a few decades at 10 to 15 percent. The reasons are twofold. Under the pressure of public opinion, governments will limit immigration. Moreover, there is an increasing emphasis on assimilation. Inasmuch as Muslim families succeed in integrating into society, and adapt to the European way of life, they are expected to have less children. Demographers like Youssef Courbage expect demographic growth of the Muslim communities in Europe to slow down in the near future, provided immigration does not rise dramatically. As Muslim Europeans rise on the social ladder and attain more prosperity, they argue, their families will be smaller – as is generally the case. We see this effect already in the more prosperous Arab countries. Moreover, it can be expected that more Muslim women will have paying jobs in the future, which usually results in postponing the age at which they give birth to their first children, as well as limiting the number of children per woman.117 Quoting recent demographic studies, Philip Jenkins supposes that quantitative growth of the Muslim population in Europe will continue. Countries with large Muslim communities such as France, Germany and the Netherlands will probably have significant Muslim minorities of ten to fifteen percent in 2o25. In that year (which is only thirteen years from now!) the total number of Muslims in Europe will probably have risen to about twenty-eight million, with twenty-four and thirty-eight million as low- and high-end projections. By 2050, countries like France and Germany might be dealing with a Muslim population of twenty percent (in France, perhaps even twenty-five percent). At the same time, Jenkins puts the picture for the whole of Europe in perspective, so as not to give way to exaggerated pictures of the future of Europe: by 2025 the continent of Europe will perhaps have forty million Muslims out of a total population of 500 million, i.e. only eight percent. This total amount could increase to fifteen percent by 2050.118 The Muslim population will indeed increase in the short term, but not so drastically that it will soon become a majority in Europe. Prospects are that the number of Muslims will remain constant as a minority. Having said this, there might well be Muslim majorities in many provincial towns and some major cities in Western Europe. A case in point is Brussels. One fifth of its multiethnic

117 For a detailed discussion of this topic see: Youssef Courbage and Emmanuel Todd, Le rendez-vous des civilisations. 118 Philip Jenkins, God’s Continent, p. 119.

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population of 1.2 million belongs to the Muslim community. If current developments continue (autochthon Belgians settling in suburbs, migrant families concentrating in the inner city), the administrative capital of Europe will have a Muslim majority within thirty years!

10.2. Muslim presence becomes an issue The presence of Muslims arouses mixed feelings among the majority population. Public opinion about immigration largely focuses on this category. There is a widespread feeling among the majority population that Muslim ways of life are incompatible with the modern character of European societies. Repeatedly there are debates about ritual slaughter, women refusing medical care from male doctors, prayer in the streets in the absence of a mosque, the construction of mosques financed by Arab countries, the question of whether or not to allow minarets adjacent to these mosques including amplified daily calls to prayer, etc. A sensitive issue is whether Muslims should be allowed to wear headscarves and traditional dress that shows their religious allegiance in state schools, hospitals, and public buildings. In some countries Muslims can set up their own private schools in which Islamic religious education is an integral part of the curriculum. Other countries have problems with that. Similarly, there is debate about Islamic banks, hospitals, recreation areas, sport clubs, and so on, that would allow Muslims to maintain their religious customs. Reasons for misgivings Why would all of this be a problem? Isn’t religious tolerance one of the European core values? Why do secularised people feel ‘threatened’ by the visible presence of Muslims whereas they don’t seem to care much about the presence of African Christian migrants, nor about Asian communities practicing Buddhism or Hinduism? The main reason is that Muslim communities in Europe are often associated with Islam worldwide, in two regards. First, they evoke the image of societies dominated by traditional Islam, in North Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. Most Europeans might find these countries interesting as tourists, but they would not like to live in a society like that. They suspect that a Muslim-dominated context is at odds with the European values to which they are attached: democracy, human rights, the separation of state and religious institutions, individual freedom of conscience and expression, a Western lifestyle, and so on. Because Muslims are associated with such countries, they are often perceived as ‘strange’ elements in a Western society.

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Secondly, there is uncertainty as to whether the Muslim community as a whole will find the synthesis between the practice of Islam and the framework of a modern Western society amenable. Quite a number of individuals have, in fact. One finds perfectly integrated Muslims at all levels of society, in all professions. I personally know an imam of a mosque who is also surgeon and head of a department of a public hospital; he is perfectly attuned to the culture of his secular and Roman Catholic colleagues; his children take piano lessons in order to learn classical music. All the while he does not make a secret of his religious convictions. Respect for the Creator is important for him. Because we have this respect in common, he is willing to collaborate with me and other Christians in the public realm. Similar examples exist in plenty. And yet, while it is well known that the large majority of the Muslims in Europe are moderate, law-abiding people, quite willing to live by the rules of a democratic, pluralist society, there is a feeling among other Europeans that this will not remain so. They fear that an increasing number of their Muslim neighbours will follow more traditional forms of Islam, or even fall prey to radical groups avowedly opposed to Western society. Whether or not this fear is justified is a matter of debate, but it does exist. Such fears are usually not so much fostered by facts and statistics but by single events with with media coverage. Public opinion about Muslims in Europe is not so much associated with people like the surgeon I just mentioned as with militant conservative Islamic groups campaigning for the introduction of Sharia, the traditional Islamic law. As one sees more veiled women and bearded men in long dresses, these fears are amplified. For a few years now, British Muslims have been allowed to apply certain elements of Sharia law when it concerns internal matters of their community. This gives additional food for thought and brings us to a third element that comes into play.

10.3. The fear for violent anti-Western radicalism There are doubts as to whether Muslim communities will keep their distance from radical forms of Islam that are vehemently anti-Western. Surely, fundamentalist preachers are active all over Western Europe. Apparently their main objective is to keep the young generation in these communities from drifting away from their religion, either into delinquency or into a secular, materialist European lifestyle or into both. Not only do they insist on strict observance of Islamic traditions, but also on resistance to a ‘Western’ or a ‘Christian’ society which they denounce as decadent and godless. Why would this be problem in a multicultural society? Why can’t we accept the presence of communities with radically different lifestyles? What is the

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difference between particular groups of conservative and Orthodox Christians, whose lifestyle is quite different from society around them, but whose presence is not a problem? We call them fundamentalist, but we don’t sleep a minute less quietly for that. On the contrary, Muslims fundamentalism arouses suspicion and fears, even though, from a sociological point of view it is similar to Christian and Jewish fundamentalism. Public opinion does not follow academic reasoning, though. It suspects that the radical Islamic groups are fertile ground for terrorist networks trying to recruit young people for Jihadist operations. The terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York (11 September 2001), the Atocha Railway Station in Madrid (September 2004) and the Oxford Street Subway Station in London (July 2005), have made a deep impact on the Western European mind. The vehement reactions all over the Muslim World to the cartoons of Mohammed published in a Danish newspaper some years ago, easily confirms the image of a Muslim community fallen prey to fundamentalism. It is true that second- and third-generation migrants in Muslim communities are attracted by radical versions of Islam. It is also true that some of these young people, born in Manchester, Marseille, Madrid or Munich have gone to the tribal zones of Afghanistan, or some other place in the Middle East, in order to be trained in urban warfare, terrorist attacks, setting up secret networks, etc. The internet has proven to be a particularly useful means to spread Jihadist ideas and embroil people in militant networks. Islamic extremism is a disturbing phenomenon because of its anti-Western stance combined with its militant attitude and its acceptance of violence as a means to propagate its cause. What makes it even more disturbing is that Jihadist groups are not confined to such remote places as Chechen, Afghanistan, Mali or Iraq; they also recruit French, British, Spanish and other European citizens. This is a challenge, not only for governments, but also for churches who are called to be peacemakers, even in a multicultural society. Social researchers clarify the context that contributes to the rise of radical Islam. Unemployment, discrimination and inferior housing conditions create a sense of exclusion. This causes an identity crisis among young generations of Muslims. Their parents and grandparents wanted to become French like the French, Germans like the Germans, but integration failed. Many of these young people are involved in drug trafficking and crime. This generation seeks identity and personal value. When fundamentalist groups catch up with them, they turn to Islam. In a surprisingly short period of time they can radicalize. Some of them are willing to engage in violence in the name of Jihad. All of this takes place. However, we should beware of exaggerating the phenomenon. Consider for instance the most recent terrorist attack to date. In March 2012, a young French Muslim, born of Algerian parents, killed three soldiers, a rabbi and three children in a Jewish school in Toulouse, acting as

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he said, in the name of Islam. Fortunately, he was quickly identified, and caught in his apartment. He resisted the armed forces until he was shot dead. Police discovered later that he was planning a whole series of similar attacks. This dramatic episode triggered strong reactions from government and police services. All over the country, young Muslims suspected of being part of networks planning terrorist attacks, were arrested, some of them convicted and put in jail. However, it also became clear that radicals are few in number. In October 2012, a network of French-born young radicals was rounded up. Their leader, thirty-two-year old Jeremy Louis Sidney, had been identified as the one who had organised the grenade attack on a Jewish kosher shop in the Paris suburb of Sarcelles one month earlier. Sadly, such acts of anti-Semitism are recurrent in France. As police caught up with Sidney, they discovered that he and his network were preparing for other violent attacks on Jewish targets. Sidney had recorded rap songs, and posted them on the Internet, a common way of promoting Jihadist ideas. Analysts tell us that the number of French citizens prone to becoming involved in terrorism should be put at a few thousand at the highest, i.e. 0.05 percent of the total Muslim population.119 The same phenomenon of European-born Jihadists is known in Spain, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany. Probably, their number can be estimated to be the same percentage as in France. Even though these people can be extremely dangerous, their number is very limited, as compared to the rest of the Muslim population. So we should not conflate the entire community with this minority of extremists. Religious or national identity, which comes first? A last point merits our attention. In European countries, the state has taken over many functions hitherto exercised by the church (education, medical care, social welfare, marriage, civil registration, etc.) With the increase of the functions of the state, Europeans are encouraged to identify with the state. National identity becomes primary, religious identity optional. In earlier times, this was not the case. People identified with local or regional communities and with their religious group at the same time. This shift is typically European, but it can also be observed in other western countries. On the contrary, most Muslims have a different outlook when it comes to religious and/or national identity. This makes a comparison interesting. Generally speaking, Muslims give priority to their religious identity. This certainly has a bearing on the self-identification of Muslims in Europe. Even

119 Cf. ‘Ces jeunes islamistes français prêts à devenir terroristes, La Croix, 9 October 2012, p. 2-3.

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those Muslim citizens who feel ‘French,’ ‘German’ or ‘British’ will not necessarily give priority to their national identity. This is important to keep in mind when trying to understand their stance in society. The following table, based on recent surveys, shows the breakdown, in percentages, of what people’s primary identity is, national or religious, in various countries.120 It shows striking differences between Europe and other regions.

Figure 10.1 Religious and national identity in selected countries in 2011.

120 ‘Muslim-Western Tensions Persist,’ Pew Research Centre, 2011, page 5. http://www. ab.gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/1_avrupa_birligi/1_6_raporlar/1_3_diger/Pew-Global-AttitudesMuslim-Western-Relations-FINAL-FOR-PRINT-July-21-2011.pdf [28 April 2013].

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Muslim views on Religion and State When it comes to Islam in our societies, the media and politicians invariably insist on the separation of church and state, even though they conveniently forget to translate this principle into ‘separation of mosque and state.’ It is clear that Islam has another tradition. It is a comprehensive religion. Religious life and social life are inseparable. A central notion in Islam is the community, the ummah. Even so, the vast majority of Muslims in Europe seem to accept the principle of separation of state and religious institutions. Whether this will continues to be the case, remains to be seen. What will happen in places where the Muslim community is becoming a sizeable minority and their religious practice increasingly visible? Some radical Islamic groups strive to increase the influence of Islam in European societies. At the same time, moderate voices within the Muslim community advocate the Europeanisation of Islam (called ‘Euro-Islam’), similar to the way in which Enlightenment principles have changed the position of Christianity in society. It remains to be seen which of these options will win the day. Modern European societies are based on the principle of pluralism. The Finnish missiologist, Risto Ahonen, may well be right in suspecting that the growing Muslim population will put this principle to the test by calling into question many western cultural values and demanding the introduction of Sharia law. ‘The great majority of Muslims living in Europe have adopted a secular way of life. Nevertheless, the growing Muslim population will force secular Europeans to choose sides.’121 Philip Jenkins argues that some Muslim circles are seriously bent on creating a Muslim-ruled Eurabia in Europe, the creation of which, in their view, will be made possible by growing immigration and high fertility rates.122 Even though such an idea may seem like wishful thinking, Muslims might acquire a majority position in some areas. This in turn might well lead to introducing Islamic Sharia law, at least as far as the Muslim community in specific areas is concerned, in matters of marriage, heritage, family law, etc. During a seminar in Leuven, Christine Schirrmacher, a German missiologist and noted expert on Muslims in Germany, made it clear that we should distinguish between the Muslim community for whom Islam is a culture and a religion and those individuals and organisations within this community who have a political Islamic agenda. The first seek integration with the freedom to practice their

121 Risto Ahonen, ‘The Postmodern “Culture of Conversion” as a Challenge to Mission.’ Paper presented at the Mission Conference in Edinburgh, 2010. 122 Philip Jenkins, God’s Continent, chapter 5.

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religious customs. They want to be part of the larger German society. The latter seek to change the rules of democratic society, introduce elements of Sharia, and ultimately extend the Ummah (‘the land of Islam’) to Europe. As far as we can gather from available surveys, the majority of the Muslim community does not support this political agenda.123 Important questions How, as Christians, do we respond to the presence of Muslims in our midst? Much could be said in answer to this question. In keeping with our generalist approach to trends and issues in Europe, we emphasize only two points. We present them in the form of questions, indicating that they merit much more reflection than we can offer in this chapter. Muslims and the European experience Firstly, there is a fundamental issue underlying the various political reactions to the multicultural society. It seems to us that the bottom line is the concern that the European character of society be maintained. Discussions about the place of Muslim communities highlight this concern. They turn around one question: will our Muslim fellow citizens find a compromise between their religious practice and the basic values of democracy, pluralism, tolerance, equality of men and women, separation of institutional religion and state, and so on? Will mainstream Muslims find a synthesis between their tradition and the western model of society? Will they identify with the country in which they live, in the same way as other religious communities do? All of this boils down to the intriguing question whether Islam in Europe will evolve towards an Islam of Europe, enabling Muslims to consider themselves not as aliens in the socio-cultural context of their country of residence, and definitely not in opposition to it, but as German, Dutch, British, Spanish or Italian citizens, and as such heirs of Europe’s religious and cultural heritage? But then, the ball is not in one court only. Will the other Europeans accept fully integrated Muslims who also maintain their religious practice? Tolerance has always been understood to be a key element of modern democratic societies, and now it is being put to the test. Will Europeans apply this principle to their Muslim fellow citizens to the same extent as they claim it for themselves? As for us, we would hope that our Muslim neighbours will fully participate in the ongoing European experience, and that our societies will be open to them to playing a role.

123 Christine Schirrmacher, in a lecture on ‘Reactions to apostasy in the Muslim community,’ given during the Doctoral Colloquium of the Evangelical Theological Faculty in Leuven (Belgium), 5 September 2010.

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Relate to Muslims and witness of our faith Secondly, Muslims constitute not just a social and political ‘issue.’ We are constantly influenced by all kinds of human, worldly reasoning, varying from naïve multiculturalism to xenophobic nationalism. But ours should be another approach. Whatever the way in which they practice their religion, whatever their attitude to their European environment, whatever their view on the place of Islam in society, these are men and women for whom Jesus has sacrificed his life, ‘for God so loved the world.’ So the challenge for us is to critically assess our attitude in the light of the Biblical commands to love our neighbour as ourselves and to be a witness of what God has done for us through Jesus Christ. Our impression is that few Christians develop personal relations with Muslims, and that churches do little to create bridges between them and the Muslim community in their neighbourhood. We do not want to overlook the exceptions to this general picture, but for many ‘believers in the pew’ the world of Islam remains a distant and unknown reality, even though it is present at their very doorstep. In times past, missionaries had to make extensive preparations and travel far to communicate the Gospel to Muslims. Today millions of them have become within reach of Christians in Europe. Imagine the huge task for missionaries in a Muslim country to adapt to the culture, gain confidence, talk about Jesus and develop a community of followers of Christ. The barriers are enormous! But now, Muslims have come to us. They speak our language, take the same trains, send their children to the same schools, work in the same office. All of this creates many occasions to relate to them, get to know them better, and give them the opportunity to see how Christians live. The basic question is, what image of the Christian faith are we giving our Muslim neighbours? What do they hear us say? It is up to individual Christians and church communities to take an interest in their concerns in terms of housing, work, schooling, and so on. We can pray for them. We can learn more about Islam, study differences of doctrine and practice. We can seek ways to dialogue in order to learn about their experience, religious or other, and share our faith.

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Chapter 11

Concerns and prospects – a soul for Europe Ladies and gentlemen, I have spent my whole life in Europe. Nevertheless I am still relatively a youngster in the European Union. That is because I grew up in the former German Democratic Republic, and only seventeen  years ago, after German reunification and the collapse of the socialist system, was I, together with many millions of others, accepted into the European Union. Consequently, until the age of thirty-five I only knew the European Union from the outside. I have only been an insider since 1990. Almost everything in life looks slightly different from the inside than it does from the outside, as we well know. That goes for all houses, and it is also the case with Europe. From the outside, the European Union is a historic success story without precedent. The European Union is one of the most impressive works of peace on Planet Earth. European unification is a happy achievement for the people of Europe. It safeguards their freedom and paves the way for prosperity.... That, then, is Europe as perceived from the outside. From the inside, too, the European Union is a wonderful house....I don’t ever want to leave this house. I am convinced that there is no better place for us to live than in our shared European home! We are now in the process of fitting it out. We are extending it. We are renovating parts of it. Sometimes I think we are so busy extending and renovating the building to allow almost half a billion Europeans to make their home there, that we easily overlook its greatness and uniqueness in the midst of all the construction work. Then we are hardly able to see what is special about the building and what is at its heart. Ladies and gentlemen, when you are at home, you will sense that this is the situation for many people in Europe today. They are asking themselves, ‘What should Europe be?’ ‘Why do we need Europe?’ ‘What holds Europe together in its innermost being?’ ‘What defines this European Union?’ Some believe that the attempt to define the essence of Europe is pointless. To be quite honest, I beg to differ. Let me recall Jacques Delors’ famous appeal that we have ‘to give a soul to Europe.’ Allow me to add my own thoughts – we have to find Europe’s soul. For we do not really need to give a soul to Europe – it already has one. Is this soul synonymous with diversity? Hardly anyone has expressed this more beautifully than the author Karel Zapek, a great European from Prague,

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who said, and I quote, ‘The Creator of Europe made her small and even split her up into little parts, so that our hearts could find joy not in size but in plurality.’124 These excerpts from a speech given by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2007, address what is the heart of the European Union. When the Treaty of Maastricht was signed, the consequences were far reaching. The member states had agreed to create a political union, a federation in fact, and to introduce a common currency. The second has been implemented, the first has been postponed, and postponed, and now, political leaders are no longer sure whether they really want that. In this time of uncertainty, it has become apparent that something more is needed to keep Europeans on the road of unity. There is construction, but where is the soul?

11.1. Crisis and setback In 2008, when the ink of the Treaty of Lisbon had just dried, a financial crisis erupted that brought the process of integration to a standstill and threw the whole EU into turmoil. This crisis began in the USA where the speculative ‘subprimes’ had lost their value overnight. The real estate market crumbled. Banks saw their solvability put in jeopardy. At first, American and European banks were severely hit, and then the governments themselves as they tried to refinance the banks. Their debts spiralled, all the more so since they decided to no longer abide with the ‘golden rule’ of the Treaty of Maastricht that government lending should never be more than three percent of the GNP. At the same time, there was a rapid rise in unemployment all over the EU. While Germany, Austria and the Netherlands show the lowest percentages, most countries were severely hit, especially Spain where over twenty percent of the labour force is now jobless. For governments, unemployment means more costs and less tax income. Some countries with a weak economy that borrowed on the financial market were faced with much higher interest rates, which meant even more spending. Their running budget was threatened. For the seventeen countries in the Eurozone, this meant that they were collectively drawn into a crisis. However, the ‘strong’ ones were reluctant to help out the ‘weaker’ ones. Financial markets lost confidence, governments were forced to increase taxes, heavily reduce spending, and in some cases even to lower income and pensions of civil servants.

124 With these sentences, Angela Merkel opened her speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 17 January 2007, shortly after she had been elected Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

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Most severely hit by the crisis was Greece. Unable to reimburse its colossal debts, this country is now under the financial control of the EU in order to prevent further economic disaster. There is a real danger that it will go bankrupt. One is left to ponder the possible consequences for other countries, especially those that are already in a perilous position such as Spain and Portugal. Even France, the second largest economy of Europe, seems to be unable to avoid the danger zone. At the moment of writing, the economic crisis is still in full swing, especially in the Eurozone. It highlights the peculiar situation of seventeen countries that have a common currency, but no common government to protect it. This raises the question as to what kind of unity should be aimed at: a federal government in order to run the EU economy as a whole? Or a looser structure, in which individual countries can deploy their strength and chose their own measures to combat unemployment? Public opinion is largely opposed to giving up more national sovereignty to supranational institutions. All kinds of solutions are on the table of government leaders who regularly meet to solve the crisis. Their basic approach seems to be: save the system as we have it. Two influential members of the European Parliament, French ecologist Daniel Cohn-Bendit and former Belgian (liberal) Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, recently published a passionate plea for a ‘supranational revolution,’ in order to install as soon as possible a federal European government.125 Fringe voices propose more radical options: limit the common currency to countries with a stronger economy, capable of paying their debts; abandon the euro altogether and return to previous national currencies.’ With regards to the near future, optimism is a rare commodity among economic analysts and intellectuals. Meanwhile, public opinion is becoming less certain about the ability of the EU to solve the crisis, although the degree of pessimism with regards to the future of Europe varies from country to country. According to a recent opinion poll, the French are the most pessimistic of all!126 The need to rethink Europe The current crisis is a serious setback for the construction of Europe. It began because too many countries, such as Greece, acted on old national impulses under the umbrella of a single currency. They spent too much money – borrowed from other EU countries – with little regard for the new European

125 Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Guy Verhofstadt, Debout l’Europe! 126 Opinion poll conducted by IFOP in 2011, in more than twenty European countries, published in La Croix.

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rules on fiscal discipline. Instead of one-for-all and all-for-one, it was more often simply all-for-one. Financial markets finally gagged on the red ink and now insist that the EU’s seventeen member states create a political authority as strong as their economic union. But this would mean that each nation would need to give up a lot more sovereignty, such as control over spending on health and education. That was precisely one of the reasons why French and Dutch voters rejected the project of a European Constitution in a referendum (2005 and 2006 respectively). Alerted by this signal of negative public opinion, other governments decided to abandon the project altogether. The European Commission called for a ‘Reflexion Pause,’ a year to rethink the future of the EU. One year became two years, but no challenging new vision developed. And then the fire of the financial crisis broke out, putting the future of the euro in jeopardy. Since then, European leaders are preoccupied with saving the furniture that they find it hard to think about long-term policy. The underlying question is: what is binding us together as European nations? Why should we help out each other in times of crisis? Until the crisis, the EU was able to foster bonding across borders by touting the economic benefits of freer trade, freer immigration, and subsidies for the poorest nations given by the wealthier ones, mainly Germany. For decades, that was enough. Now, with a deep financial crisis and higher unemployment, some of those benefits are disappearing. EU leaders must scramble to come up with other reasons for people to call themselves European even as they retain individual national identities.

11.2. Concerns We will not go into all the issues that are being discussed, but briefly notice a number of major concerns in the EU today. Poll driven opportunism In each country, public opinion favours national interests. Politicians wishing to be re-elected have to take that into account. In such a climate, it is hard to find leaders courageous enough to say with European founding father, De Gasperi: ‘we are not thinking of the next elections but of the next generation.’ But this is precisely what we need. Recently, German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has offered an analysis of the current deadlock of the European process. One of the factors is what he calls ‘poll-driven opportunism.’ Political parties naturally avoid discussion of unpopular issues. This is understandable when one considers that parties have

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to win elections. But political parties also have the responsibility, says Habermas, to stimulate public debate, formulate proposals for the long term, and address unpopular issues. It is here that his criticism is levelled: It certainly seems as if, these days, politics is in general characterised by a lack of perspective and creative drive. The growing complexity of matters requiring regulation necessitates quick responses from politicians who have less and less room for manoeuvre. They shamelessly follow the opportunistic script of poll-driven pragmatism....To the extent that politicians make decisions based exclusively on the prevailing public mood, which they slavishly chase from one election to the next, the democratic process loses its purpose. The point of a democratic election is not simply to illustrate the natural spectrum of public opinion; instead, it should reflect the outcome of an opinion-forming process. The votes cast at the polling booth take on the institutional weight of democratic codetermination only in conjunction with publicly articulated opinions formed by a communicative exchange of standpoints, information and reasoned argument about key issues. 127

Habermas is right in saying that the EU will not be able to develop a democratic character as long as political parties are too afraid to even discuss alternatives to decisions with far-reaching implications. Democratic deficit A second concern is closely linked to the first; the deficit of democracy. The principal decisions are taken by the EU Council (the government leaders of the member states) and the various Councils of Ministers, on the basis of a two thirds majority. The Treaty of Lisbon established this rule in order to prevent deadlock situations, in which one nation could block a certain measure ad infinitum. In the past this has happened, but today, when a minority of countries oppose a particular decision, they have to accept it, even when a majority of their national parliaments, representing the people, are against that decision. Of course, they can try to renegotiate the matter in the future when the political colour of other governments will have changed, but that is never sure. For the time being, they have to go along with the majority decision. Moreover, the EU has no constitution. Neither is there a separation of powers because the main institutions have several functions. For instance, the powerful

127 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Post Truth Democracy or a Pact for Europe?’ in: Ulrike Guérot and Jacqueline Hénard (ed.), What Does Germany Think About Europe? (ECFR), London, 2011, p. 83-87.

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European Commission has both legislative and executive powers. And finally, the controlling function of the European Parliament is quite limited in comparison to that of any national parliament. A great deal of the governing power is in the hands of the technocrats of the European Commission and the Central European Bank, the latter even being independent from the political institutions. This situation nourishes a general feeling among citizens of the member states that the bureaucracy of ‘Europe’ is far away, and at the same time much too influential. Indeed, seventy-five percent of the decisions taken by their national parliaments are the result of prior decisions made at a European level! This alone is sufficient reason for the European Parliament to be given full parliamentary powers. Those who defend the current system, argue that the EU is not built on coercion but on voluntary association of the peoples. Each treaty has to be discussed and ratified by national parliaments or by referendum in all the member states, before it is adopted. Moreover, they argue, each member state has democratic control of what its government does on the European level. One of the requirements for any new member is precisely that it has a well-functioning democracy. But even defenders of the current system have to admit that there is a democratic deficit. The European Commission is insufficiently controlled. ‘Although its mission is to defend the general interest, its democratic legitimacy is ambiguous,’ acknowledges Thierry Chopin, director of studies of the Robert Schuman Foundation. ‘It has an increasingly political character. The commissioners are political figures and together they are responsible to the European Parliament. At the same time, the Commission acts like an independent organ when it comes to regulations and directives. For instance, it controls the states in order to make sure that they apply the rules of competition on the open European market.’128 Moreover, the Commission has the authority to impose penalties on states whose budget deficit surpasses the limits agreed upon by the EU. Negative effects of a liberal common market Thirdly, there is the concern about the negative effects of the liberal economic model of the common market, based on competition, free enterprise and free movement of goods and services, which does not have a sufficient means of protection. It leads to a rude competition within Europe. And it causes the

128 Jean-Dominique Giuliani, interviewed in the article ‘L’avenir de l’Europe,’ in La Croix, 25 October 2012. Cf. Thierry Chopin et Y. Bertoncini, Politique européenne. Etats, pouvoirs, citoyens. Manuel sur les questions européennes en préparation, collection ‘Amphis,’ Presses de Sciences Po, Dalloz, 2010.

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transfer of enterprises to countries in the EU with lower wages, such as Bulgaria where the minimum monthly salary is 123 €. In France it is 1100 € net per month, which corresponds more or less to the level in other Western Member states. (Luxemburg is top of the rank with 1758 €.) European economies are exposed to the influence of financial markets and economic globalisation, without sufficient protection. National governments as well as the EU need to act firmly to protect the poor, the non-privileged, the unemployed, the weak, as well as the environment that has no voice of its own. Such protection is not a matter of benevolence but of justice, and needs to be anchored in the law. The EU is in the process of harmonising national legislations in order to prevent unequal competition between countries. However, the question is whether the European norms will be adapted to countries with lower levels of social security and environmental protection, or whether they will enforce more stringent norms. However, we should not lose sight of the positive aspects. ‘Since the introduction of the common currency, twelve years ago, the states of the Eurozone have created sixteen million jobs, against eight million in the United States,’ argues Jean-Dominique Giuliani, president of the Fondation Robert Schuman. ‘The euro has stimulated economic exchanges within the zone, and Europe as a whole is the major exporter in the world, with eighteen percent of global exports. It also attracts most foreign investments.’ He admits, however, that there is a danger in weakening our systems of social protection for the sake of becoming more competitive. ‘We need to preserve these systems in order to organize the solidarity in our societies.’129 Even so, there are growing concerns that the EU will hand over the common market to a liberal economy, thus jeopardising national interests. Politicians have to take this into account as they operate on a European level. Their constituencies demand that economic and political cooperation be beneficial for their own country in the first instance, and for others in the second. Thus, every government is keen to obtain as much out of the EU as it puts into it in terms of financing new infrastructure, agricultural subsidies, regional development, and so on. Negotiations between the member states are ongoing. There is a constant tension between independence and integration. On the one hand is the ideal of unity, guaranteeing lasting peace on the continent. On the other hand people are keen to defend their national and regional interests, afraid to lose their level of prosperity because of competition on a common market. They are attached to their way of life, their language, and their cultural values.

129 Jean-Dominique GIULIANI, op. cit.

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How to control immigration into ‘our country’? A fourth concern is that the Schengen Agreement of free travel has stimulated the influx of immigrants. Once non-Europeans succeed in entering one Schengen country, they can easily move to another one. National governments within the Schengen Area are pressured by public opinion to drastically reduce the number of immigrants, but they seem incapable of putting up barriers around national territories. The only way in which they can hope to reduce the influx is to cooperate with other countries so as to put up barriers along the borders of the Schengen Area. In recent years, a European task force has been created to that effect. These efforts are concentrated on the ‘weak’ parts of these frontiers, such as the Greek-Turkish border, the southernmost Italian island of Lampedusa, the Spanish enclaves in North Africa (Ceuta and Melilla), and the Spanish Canary Islands west of the Moroccan coast. These controls do not seem to be as effective as many would have it. Voices are being raised to review the Schengen Agreement altogether, so as to reintroduce controls at the national borders. The point on which this whole issue hinges is the multiculturalism of society. Autochthones have problems with the presence of non-European cultures in their society when this presence becomes too visible. They fear that this presence will change the character of their society, that is to say, its European character, which they want to preserve,. We shall deal with this question in the chapter on immigration and integration. Lack of political impact in the world Then there is the concern that Europe does not carry sufficient weight in world affairs. Notwithstanding their political integration, European nations still speak with multiple voices on the international scene. They represent a quarter of the global economy but seem incapable of effectively defending their interests. While they are losing market shares everywhere, they do not succeed in conquering sufficient new markets to keep their industries going. Moreover, the liberal policy of the EU exposes her member states to imports from low-cost producers such as China and India that do not apply the environmental and social controls that are required for European producers. There are insufficient import barriers. As a result, Europe is continuously losing ground in the globalisation game. One of the reasons for this, critics argue, is that Europe does not have enough political impact in the world. That’s why she is not able to impose her point of view in economic negotiations or human rights issues. Aware of this weakness, the EU decided to create a Rapid Deployment Force made up of 60,000 troops, capable of intervening within sixty days up to a distance of six thousand kilometres. But this did not increase Europe’s influence. During the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011 in North Africa and the Middle-East,autocratic regimes were confronted with popular upheaval, which in some countries

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even led to civil war. ‘During these events, the EU stimulated changes towards more democracy without proposing concrete solutions to the violent clashes,’ comments political analyst Sylvain Kahn. ‘Despite their attachment to human rights, European states have collaborated with the old dictatorial regimes, especially those of Tunisia and Libya in order to counter the wave of immigration to Europe via their countries. In this region, the USA were more credible when it talked about democracy than the EU.’ 130 When civil war broke out in Libya, France and Great Britain wanted to give military support to the national uprising and oust Colonel Khadafy, but they had to appeal to NATO and the military support of the Americans, because Germany was opposed to this intervention, so the Rapid Deployment Force stayed on its bases. ‘This proves that the EU is not yet an autonomous actor on the global scene,’ concludes Sylvain Kahn.131 Meanwhile, the External Action Service, led by the European Foreign Affairs Secretary, Lady Catherine Ashton, was created to ensure that the EU speak with one voice. But she is like a conductor of an orchestra whose members are not playing from the same scores.. There simply is no European foreign policy approach because member states are too much attached to their sovereignty in this respect. The same weakness appears in international negotiations on trade agreements, measures against climate change, and so on. In short, Europe has the economical importance and the population size but neither the political weight nor the military means of a world power. But then, the question is: why should it? When the project of bringing the European nations together was launched, the objectives were peace and prosperity, not becoming a global power, let alone an empire! Gradually, the element of combined political influence in the world has come into play. Understandably, because in economic globalisation no single European nation can stand up and defend its interests by its own means. Those days have gone. So it is necessary to join forces, to speak with one voice, so as to give sufficient weight to our position when it comes to defending our labour, our environment, our social welfare, and our security. However, there is a real danger here. This necessity of concerted action should not turn into ambition pursuit of political influence for the sake of becoming a world power, precisely because Europe has played that power game so often in the past. We should beware of imperial ambitions in disguise!

130 Sylvain Kahn, interviewed in the article ‘L’avenir de l’Europe,’ in La Croix, 25 October 2012. We follow the analysis of Sylvain Kahn, which he has elaborated in: Histoire de la construction de l’Europe depuis 1945, Paris: PUF, 2011. 131 Idem.

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Having said this, we should add that Europe definitely has global influence, even on the political level, particularly in areas such as human rights, humanitarian aid, and the environment. Given its impressive size, the European market is a vector of influence. The health norms and antipollution criteria for the production of goods are the most stringent in the world. ‘Europeans do not feel the influence of their market and their industrial norms on the rest of the world,’ writes an analyst, ‘but their trade partners really feel this impact.’132 Secularist agenda A sixth concern is that governments are absorbed by financial problems, that they have a limited, purely economic vision of Europe, while ignoring moral values, cultural integration, social welfare, and the plight of the poor in developing countries. Officially, the EU recognizes that it needs to respect the common values that result in coherence, also that these values are intrinsically bound up in the historical cultural and religious heritage of the peoples on this continent. But there is a real concern that the governing elites will downplay the importance of one of the roots of European culture, if not the main one: Christianity. European treaties only go as far as mentioning ‘the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe’ as the sources to draw inspiration from.133 Many Christians are concerned about the secularist agenda that is at work in the current process of integration. This might well lead to member states being compelled to submit to European legislation that runs counter to Biblical values. Citizens might find themselves compelled to accept norms that run counter to their convictions, in the name of tolerance and a secular interpretation of human rights. Christians are already noticing that their moral views are being marginalised, or even not taken into account at all, in directives on equal treatment, discrimination, same-sex marriage, scientific research on embryos, cloning and other bio-medical ethical issues. Of course, the question is whether this putting aside of Biblical views on social, political and ethical matters can be attributed to the process of European integration. In reality, it is part of a much wider phenomenon, i.e. the secularisation of society and the advance of the science of technology that is disconnected from spiritual or religious concerns. Some suspect, however, that the project of ‘Europe’ plays into the hands of this phenomenon, as it becomes

132 Zaki Laïdi, in Dictionnaire critique de l’Union européenne, Paris: Armand Colin, 2008. 133 Cf. the Preamble of the Treaty of Lisbon (2008), as well as the preambles of previous European treaties.

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more and more an economic and technocratic affair, driven by a secularist agenda. Several church leaders have voiced the concern that this is indeed the case. They fear that the construction of Europe only plays into the hands of a consumerist and materialist lifestyle, while failing to recognize the spiritual foundations of society.

11.3. Eurosceptics All these concerns are fertile ground for Euro-scepticism of all sorts. This is a collective term for people who are critical towards European integration as such, or who are opposed to certain aspects of it. For some, the current crisis shows that it is a mistake to place the control of our national economies in the hands of a European bureaucracy that is not subject to the democratic control of the people. People holding this Euro-sceptic view are in favour of cooperation between states, but they insist that every nation should fully preserve its sovereignty. They are usually critical of the common market, the harmonisation of economic regulations and the introduction of free competition in public sectors (railways, energy, communication), because they consider them as threats to national systems of social security, local industry, and regional agricultural production. Other sceptics argue that the EU fosters an attitude of Eurocentrism. Instead of limiting our focus to Europe, they argue, Europeans should be concerned with global issues such as protecting the environment, global warming, access to natural resources, migration, poverty, world trade, human rights, and so on. They suspect that the construction of Europe is intended to create a super-state, and that it is just a disguised version of old European imperialism. During election campaigns, Euro-sceptic ideas are frequently used to attract voters. They are not limited to one political stream. Right wing and populist parties play into Euro-sceptic sentiments in the name of ‘patriotism’ and national sovereignty. Left wing parties are doing the same when they denounce the influence of financial markets and emphasize international solidarity on a global scale.

11.4. What next? Options for the future We think that the critical points made by Euro-sceptics should be taken seriously, but it would be wrong to only blame ‘Europe’ for the crisis, or for everything else that people perceive as a threat, e.g. globalisation, immigration. The question is not whether the peoples of Europe should continue to cooperate and unite for the common interest.

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Leaving the EU or dismantling its institutions? Theoretically, it is possible that member states could leave the EU, and even that the members could decide to dismantle its institutions, or some of them. This means abandoning the project of integration. We suppose that only a very few people in Europe, a part from the Euro-sceptic populist political parties, consider this to be a realistic option. This is not a reasonable alternative to the present situation. Not only because we might fall back into the old antagonisms of the past that have been so ruinous. But also because in a globalized world, where new economic giants are emerging, the European states will have a hard time maintaining their prosperity if each of them fights independently for survival. And finally, when every nation concentrates on its own interests, the weak ones will suffer at the hands of the strong ones. Our recent history has shown that is better to join forces and stick it out together in the problems Europe is faced with. The European project has already gone so far, so much has already been constructed that it would be a terrible loss to give up now. Until now, every single nation has profited from it, in one way or another. They have more to lose than to gain when they opt out. So cooperation is the only way ahead. However, the question is: what kind of cooperation, what kind of unity, what kind of political structure? As painful as the current crisis is for citizens all over the continent, there can be a positive side insofar that it forces the political leaders and the public at large affected by it to pose fundamental questions about the finality of the common market and the EU. How do we go on from here? Where do we want to go? As intellectuals, economic and financial leaders, politicians and governments discuss the future of the EU in the light of all the concerns that have been raised, different options are being envisaged. What will be the outcome of the deliberations of our political leaders, under the pressure of financial markets, public opinion, conflicting national interests and so on? Making forecasts is hazardous, since there are several possible ways ahead. We will discuss five options that have a chance to be realised.134 The common market model Ever since the construction of Europe began, there has been a difference of opinion as to the kind of union that should be aimed at. For a long time, there were two options, called ‘wider union’ and ‘deeper union.’

134 See for a review of the discussion about the options for the future: Jan Werner Müller, ‘Denkpause ohne Gedanken?’ He distinguishes three options that more or less correspond to the first three we mention.

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The first one is that of a large common market that creates optimal opportunities for producing and commercialising goods and services. Public services should be liberalised to make free competition possible. Member states should adopt common economic rules to harmonize regulations and remove administrative barriers. To a certain extent, they should also harmonize their foreign policies, particularly in the area of trade agreements, import controls and the like. But every state should remain sovereign. Proponents of a ‘wider’ union are not in favour of supranational economic governance, let alone an integrated European army. Viewed from this angle, there is good reason to let Turkey join the union, because that means an additional eighty million consumers! Britain has always been a supporter of the wider union model. The member states have already delegated much of their national jurisdiction to the Brussels bureaucracy, but in the ‘wider union’ model they should go no further than that. The European Commission should only implement what the Council of European government ministers decide. Each state remains responsible for social welfare, education, immigration, police, justice and defence, although they do cooperate in these areas. Only the economic domain should be regulated by the EU, because this is in the interest of European consumers, commerce, services and industry. Through a system of checks and balances, the institutions of the EU would see to it that certain standards of quality are met, and that countries do not hamper free competition and open markets. The federal model Following the second model, called ‘deeper’ union, the member states would gradually hand over their sovereignty to a federal European government. The original architects of the European project were thinking along these lines. Proponents of this view want to go further than economic cooperation in a common market. They emphasize the need for a strong and common political governance of the integrated economies. Moreover, they want the union to be deepened at various levels: on the social level, with measures to guarantee welfare; on the cultural level, with programs to promote both European identity and cultural diversity in the regions; and on the judicial level, with special attention on human rights. They are also in favour of harmonising foreign policy and defence policy. Germany has traditionally been in favour of this option. The main argument is that Europe can only maintain its prosperity, as well as its social welfare system, when it is united in a federal structure. A second argument is that it will become necessary in the near future for Europe to take its security into its own hands, in order to limit the military dependence on the United States. Adherents of the deeper union model emphasize the common values and the common heritage of European peoples. They constitute the European identity,

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which is indispensible for a federal union. People in Europe need a collective sense of belonging. If they do not have it, they will not easily identify with a supranational state! In recent years it has become clear that the majority of the population in most countries is against a federal European state. The rejection of the Constitutional Project in two referendums (France, 2005, and the Netherlands, 2006) confirms this. However, during the current financial crisis, government leaders are pleading for ‘more Europe’ to guarantee the value of the euro through common economic governance at the EU level. Clearly, this points in the direction of more power for the European institutions, and therefore of a federal Europe. The confederation model Halfway between the ‘wide’ model of a free common market and the ‘deep’ model of a federated Europe there is a third model: Europe as a confederation of nations. It envisages a community of independent states with a legal structure above it. Member states collaborate on various levels: industrial development, education and research, transport, communication networks, energy resources. They might try and coordinate foreign policy, but this is only a secondary axis of cooperation. Defence, police and justice remain national competences. The main objective of the community is to maintain peace, to foster the economic prosperity of the member states, and to recognize and to safeguard their cultural diversity. Instead of a federal union, which looks too much like a classical homogenous state, the EU should be a ‘community of the many,’ as the well known legal scientist Joseph Weiler has put it.135 In this model, the EU should have federal laws but without federal government. Since Europe is not a state, its institutions cannot force the citizens of the member states to obey these laws; this is the domain of each government. However, Europe can agree to formulate these laws together, because they express common values and serve common interests. They can be promulgated ‘in the name of the peoples of Europe.’ This model promotes the cooperation between states qua states, represented by their government leaders. A European parliament might exist but is not really necessary; perhaps only to control the policy and the budgets of communal institutions. It seems that this model becomes more attractive as the federal model loses support in public opinion. As Jan-Werner Müller observes, ‘it

135 Quoted by Jan Werner Müller, ‘Denkpause ohne Gedanken?‘

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corresponds to the trend of today, i.e. a reappraisal of national and regional cultures. It has the advantage of being open ended, allowing for different ways to the future.’ 136 Europe of regions A variation on this model is to develop a ‘Europe of regions.’ Instead of developing the EU on the basis of cooperation between sovereign nation states, this model envisages a union, not only of states but also of peoples who do not have their own state. It should encompass both national entities and regions, all of them maintaining their specific characteristics and cultural heritage. A union of French and Germans and Austrians, and equally of Flemish, Basques, Catalans, North Italians, Scots, Welsh, Laps, Bavarians and so on. The EU has already gone a long way in giving more status to regions. It has invested considerable funds to stimulate the economic development of regions; it subsidizes regional infrastructures, it has fostered cooperation between regions across national boundaries; promoted cultural and educational projects. Several regional languages are now officially recognised. People can study and do research in these languages, even on a university level. Be that as it may, it is not at all certain whether the member states of the EU will accept regions as members on equal footing. For the time being, this model seems to be too idealistic to be fully realised. Pragmatic options The question can be put why the EU should ‘move ahead’ to more integration. It is often said that the project is stagnating, that there is a lack of vision. But is the present EU really as bad as it is sometimes portrayed? Why could we not accept that the present structure is already an enormous achievement? Perhaps it is better not to change it fundamentally. This is the pragmatist option, of people like former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt who used to say that people with visions should see a doctor! In other words, don’t try and sell us a grand idea about another Europe but help us to keep the present one going, and to improve it step by step. The pragmatic option leaves the structure of the EU basically as it is now: less than a federal union but more than a common market, a union of sovereign states that is doing much in favour of regions. This option points to several ways forward. For pragmatic reasons, Europeans could decide to hand over more jurisdictions to ‘Brussels,’ or, on the contrary, decide to reintroduce border controls, and even arrive at a consensus that a

136 Jan Werner Müller, ‘Denkpause ohne Gedanken?‘

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particular country leave the euro and return to its national currency. All decisions should be made, however, with a view to the common interest. One particular pragmatic option has recently been put on the table, the so-called Europe of two speeds. As discussions about giving the European institutions more control over economy and finances are in a deadlock, some politicians are saying: let the member states who are in favour go ahead with it; and let the others follow at a distance. It has become impossible for all twentyseven member states (and even more in the near future) move ahead at the same pace, and at the same level of economic development and thus this pragmatic approach. So why not split up into groups? One is moving faster than the other, but this should be no problem, for in the end, everyone in Europe will benefit. This idea is also based on the discrepancy between stronger economies in the north and the weaker economies in the south. Some argue that it is better to have two common currencies, a ‘northern’ and a ‘southern’ euro. It remains to be seen whether this particular idea of ‘Europe of two speeds’ will be realised. But it seems to us that the pragmatic approach as such is the most likely one to be adopted in the near future.

11.5. Give Europe a soul All the options mentioned so far concentrate on financial and economic problems. They do not provide answers to the more fundamental questions that are at stake, to which Angela Merkel referred to in her speech quoted at the outset of this chapter: ‘What should Europe be?’ ‘Why do we need Europe?’ ‘What holds Europe together in its innermost being?’ ‘What defines this European Union?’ No society is sustainable without shared moral, social and political values. But for these values to be alive in the hearts and minds of citizens, they need to be taught, transmitted, kept alive, articulated, reformulated, and applied to concrete problems. This is not a matter of passing on items of rational knowledge, but of inner motivation. We will only respect certain values when they have meaning for us. They are bound up with the meaning of life as such. They are part of a worldview. Manager state According to Marcel Gauchet, ‘the European Union appears to be the most complete example of a modest manager state’.137 Indeed, the bureaucratic

137 Marcel Gauchet, Le Désenchantement du monde. Une histoire politique de la religion, Paris: Gallimard, 1985.

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concern of the Brussels administrative system for ‘managing’ things and defining rules and procedures and industrial norms is staggering. The obsession with detail in certain European directives therefore sometimes borders on parody, e.g. regulating the minimum and maximum size of cucumbers or the colour of tomatoes that are allowed on the market. But where do spiritual values come in? One gets the impression that they have quietly left the scene after the first generation of politicians who laid the foundations of the EU. The American theologian George Weigel illustrated this profound change in politics by comparing it to two buildings that dominant the skyline of Paris: the Notre Dame Cathedral and the gigantic modernist building at the entrance of the modernistic office quarters La Défense, constructed in the form of a cube. The cathedral, whose rich architectural symbolism epitomises European Christianity, stands for the roots of our culture, the source of our values. The geometric and abstract cube, on the contrary, constructed around an open space in the middle, is functional but empty at its centre. Weigel sees it as an image of a contemporary Europe that has become a technocratic enterprise, disconnected from its Christian roots.138 French political scientist Bérengère Massignon concurs. In her analysis of the way in which the EU functions, she also notes the removal of spirituality from politics. She concludes that this ‘results in a symbolic deficit that goes some way towards explaining its democratic deficit: without shared beliefs, how can European citizens rally around a European integration that is the domain of experts and the result of complicated trade-offs between national political leaders?’ 139 The dilemma of a modern neutral state A state can define norms of behaviour, norms of production, norms of administrative procedures etc., but norms flow forth from values. When it comes to values, the EU, like any modern state is faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, state institutions cannot function when society does not accept the values on which their decisions are based. Only dictators ignore this. On the other hand, the state depends on others to educate and transmit these values. State institutions cannot impose values, since values are matters of conscience, and in this domain the freedom of conscience should be respected. In modern European societies, the state is neutral, at least it claims to be, so it is not well

138 George Weigel, The Cube and the Cathedral. 139 Bérengère Massignon, ‘The EU, neither God nor Ceasar’. See bibliography for details [5 May 2010].

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placed to prescribe or even to propose certain moral values since they are usually connected to religious or ideological convictions. If the modern state takes its neutral position seriously, it should respect existing ethical views, whether religious or secular. In a pluralistic democracy, moral principles can only be inscribed in laws when they are already shared by the large majority of the citizens. And this is where religion comes in. It is in the interest of the state that churches and other religious institutions transmit, teach and foster the values that are essential for society, so as to create the moral cohesion which the state itself cannot impose, and in order that the citizens support both their national institutions and the construction of Europe. Christians have a special responsibility in this respect, because they are called to live out and transmit the Biblical values in which the socio-cultural principles of today’s European societies have their origin. A ‘soul’ for the EU Some European leaders have realised this dilemma. When the EU replaced the European Community through the Treaty of Maastricht (1991), the president of the European Commission of that time, Jacques Delors, took the initiative to bring politicians and faith communities together in order to discuss the spiritual foundations of Europe. The idea was to ‘give Europe a soul.’ He set up an informal but structured dialogue with representatives of churches, other religious communities and secular humanists. During the meeting with leaders of Protestant churches in 1992, he formulated his concern as follows: We are in effect at a crossroads in the history of European construction.... Believe me, we won’t succeed with Europe solely on the basis of legal expertise or economic know-how. It is impossible to put the potential of Maastricht into practice without a breath of air. If in the next ten years we haven’t managed to give a soul to Europe, to develop a spirituality and give it meaning, the game will be over.140

What Delors was getting at, was that the European project needed a qualitative change. Having been primarily concerned with economic integration, Europe should develop an identity that makes it more than a system of technical and political arrangements. Europe should speak to the imagination of the people, so that they would have a sense of belonging that will help them overcome

140 Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission, in a speech during a meeting with Church representatives in Brussels, 4 February 1992.

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short-sighted national interests. The ‘soul’ has to do with convictions, with values, with cherished traditions, and with a story, what social scientists call a ‘national myth.’ The appeal to faith communities Significantly, Jacques Delors directed his appeal to give Europe a ‘soul’ to the representatives of faith communities. He invited them, not only to develop proEuropean feeling among the population, but also to dialogue with European politicians about social issues, ethical questions and the place of religion. Bérengère Massignon points out that the appeal made to faith groups coincided with the collapse of the communist utopia, itself a secular religion which offered humanity a vision of secular superiority. Ten years later, the events of 11 September 2001 reinforced the need to overhaul the dialogue between the EU and faith communities. Through interfaith meetings, the EU Commission Presidency sought to encourage a dialogue between different communities in society so as to avoid the fulfilment of Huntington’s calamitous prophecy of an irredeemable ‘clash of civilisations.’ As more religious leaders were and continue to be invited, the question is whether the debate is losing its substance. This remains to be seen. Meanwhile, Bérengère Massignon cautions: Let there be no mistake: appealing to faith communities in this way does not equal de-secularising politics. Relations between faith groups and the European Commission are taking place in a neutral and pluralistic context, albeit, it should be added, without institutional form. The European Commission has introduced a forum for dialogue and informal contacts. However these initiatives depend on the good will of the European institutions. 141

It should be noted that within the EU, the place of religious communities and their institutions in society comes under the jurisdiction of national governments. The EU does not legislate in this area; it can only intervene when there is a possible conflict between national decisions and human rights. Moreover, as a neutral institution, the European Commission does not choose the religious representatives, nor does it define which religions should be included in the informal dialogue. In principle, every faith community can participate if it wishes to. Informal as it is, this dialogue is important because it shows that the EU is aware of the important role of religion in society. Here is a tremendous challenge for churches, ecumenical councils and representative Evangelical alliances as we already noticed in chapter 6, paragraph 3.

141 Bérengère Massignon, op. cit.

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Giving or finding a soul? The expression ‘give Europe a soul’ is flawed. A soul is not something to be created by government policy, nor something to be proposed by organisations in civil society. Churches cannot invent a soul either. A soul has to be found and recognised as such. A soul is what gives cohesion to a group of people. What is the ‘soul’ on a national or European level? Some would say a sense of belonging, a collective identity, which makes people say, ‘this is my country, or ‘this is our culture. The sense of belonging to a given country or to ‘Europe’ can diminish when people have the impression that there is no place for them in this country, or when they feel that the EU is not about them and their concerns. The sense of belonging to a nation or to ‘Europe’ can also be stimulated. Governments can do something in this area, but the scope of their action is always limited, because collective identities need deeper roots than political authorities can provide. Creating the conditions for economic prosperity is not sufficient to give people the sense of belonging without which a democratic state cannot really function. Measures to improve social welfare are not enough either. We need to go deeper than a material level, deeper also than the level of laws and regulations, and look for the roots of our culture, the sources from which people draw the values that underlie their norms and their behaviour and their sense of belonging to a nation or a people group, or to ‘Europe’ for that matter. In the final analysis, a soul of a collective entity has to do with collective memories of historical events, with cultural values and moral convictions that people have in common. Just like the soul of a body is the spiritual centre of all its organisms, the soul of a society or a political union is the immaterial level of basic values underlying the laws, the social institutions and the political structures. The awareness of this immaterial level is often denoted by the term ‘identity.’ It is the collective identity of a people that creates a sense of cohesion. When people share the values of a society, they can identify with it. Just like a body can weaken when it is not sufficiently fed, a soul also can lose much of its vigour when it lacks moral and spiritual nourishment. This holds true for individual human beings; this also applies to societies. Governments can do something to foster the foundational values, but not enough. Parents, teachers, educators and civil societies can contribute much more. Churches are particularly important, because they have a moral and a spiritual message. They appeal to the conscience of people, and they foster spiritual convictions. It is a good thing for the EU to have recognised this, and to have opened a permanent dialogue with representatives of faith communities.

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Heart for Europe In front of the main entrance of the European Parliament Building in Strasbourg stands a sculpture. It is entitled, Europe à cœur, and reminds every passerby of the essence that surpasses technocratic management, economic measures and political alliances: have a heart for Europe; take its construction to heart. But the symbolism carries more meaning still: the heart of the process of European integration is taking care of people, ensuring peace and good living conditions. It can also be taken as a reference to the core values of the EU (‘core’ from corus, cœur, heart). This sculpture symbolizes the need for a heart in the matters of Europe. Churches represent a message that can be a source of spirituality for Europeans today. We have reason to be concerned about the developments in our continent, but instead of leaving it at that, we can also see these concerns as a challenge to communicate the Gospel as a source of spiritual meaning; a challenge also to propose the Biblical message anew as a source of inspiration for the peoples of Europe.

Figure 11.1 Sculpture Europe à Coeur in front of the European Parliament Building in Strasbourg.

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Roots of European cultures In a society where groups of considerably different religious and cultural outlooks coexist, and which is governed on the basis of a democratic political system, it is imperative that there is a broad consensus about basic values underlying norms, laws, rules and procedures in the public realm. For instance, modern European states base their legislation on the principle of equality of men and women. But if part of the population is not in agreement, there is a problem. Can they be forced to accept female doctors in hospital to treat their men? Many other examples could be given in the areas freedom of opinion, abiding with the laws implemented through democratic procedures, the prohibition of polygamy, and so forth. Such and other basic values are enshrined in our constitutions, guaranteed by European treaties. The question, then, is why do we give fundamental importance to these values instead of others ones? The answer is, quite simply because these values are the outcome of the conundrum of European history. They are rooted in cultural and religious traditions that have shaped our society. That’s why in Europe, even in a pluralist and multicultural society, most people do not wish to legalise, for example, polygamy. That’s why we are attached to social welfare and public assistance to the poor. That’s why we find tolerance a basic value, even to the point of not tolerating intolerance. Immediately, another question comes up. What are the roots of Europe? In this connection, mention is often made of its ‘Christian roots.’ When Christians insist on this, they can create the impression that our cultures are mainly, or solely the fruit of Christianity. If this is what they intend to say, they should not be surprised when others are very uncomfortable with the idea of being part of such a ‘Christian Europe.’ Some reject the idea entirely, saying that modern western culture is rooted in the Enlightenment. People taking this position are usually highly critical of the role of churches in the past, accusing them of intolerance and opposition to progress. Who is right? What are the roots of Europe? This is a delicate issue. Entrenched positions abound in both camps. In this chapter we will present a nuanced view of the roots (plural) of European cultures. We are particularly interested in the role of Christianity in relation to other roots.

12.1. Which roots? What are the common origins of the various European cultures? Pamela Sticht argues that they are rooted in a number of heritages: the Greco-Roman

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civilisation, Christianity and Judaism, as well as all the forms and concepts that have resulted from them, such as, for example, humanism and rationalism.142 However, most scholars writing about the subject agree that there are three main sources. In this respect, the French philosopher Paul Valéry is often quoted for his classic summary, given in a lecture at the University of Zürich in 1922, devoted to the future of Europe. He asked the question: how can we recover from the First World War, not just economically but also spiritually? In his view, Europe was profoundly affected by a ‘crisis of the spirit,’ which could only be overcome by looking again at the origins of our cultures and drawing from these spiritual sources. He defined them eloquently as follows: Every race and each territory that has been successively Romanised, Christianised and submitted, as far as the spirit is concerned, to the discipline of the Greeks, is absolutely European.143

Since the Renaissance, says Paul Valéry, these three have combined to form European humanism, and this in turn has become the basis of all the various cultures in the European cultural zone. What exactly do we owe to these three sources? Let us mention the most significant elements. Our cultures are indebted to: • Hellenistic philosophy, with its foundational emphasis on reason, humanism, republic and democracy, art, science and technology; • Roman thought, with its emphasis on linguistic precision (Latin), law, written documentation, administration of territories, expansive imperialism; and • Christianity, with its monotheism, its moral values such as forgiveness and the love for our neighbours, and its expansive moral missionary endeavour. To put it in the more prosaic terms of the same Paul Valéry again, the basis of European cultures is the interplay of three distinct influences. The first is the influence of Rome, [the].eternal model of organised and stable political power. This curious power, superstitious and reasoned at the same time, steeped in a judicial spirit, a military spirit, a religious spirit, a formalistic spirit, was the first to impose on the conquered peoples the benefits of tolerance and good administration, and these peoples have recognised the majesty of its institutions and its laws, the apparatus and the dignity of its magistracy.

142 Pamela Sticht, Culture européenne ou Europe des cultures? p. 38. 143 Quoted by Jérôme Broggini, Une idée  d’Europe. See bibliography for details. Our translation from French.

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The following influence was that of Christianity...which was aimed at the deeper level of consciousness and reached it progressively. But our mind is fully European only when it can make use of tenets that distinguish them most profoundly from the rest of humanity and which have come to us from Greece. To Greece we owe the discipline of the spirit, the extraordinary example of perfection in all the orders,...a method of thought by which one tries to relate all things to man, to man as a complete being, the best of our intelligence, the fineness and the solidity of our knowledge, the clarity, the purity and the distinction of our arts and our literature,. [the quest] for a system of references in which all things should finally be integrated.144

When we say that these three influences are at the root of European societies and cultures, we are saying at the same time that they no longer exist as such. Rome has fallen. Athens is no longer the scholarly centre of the intellectual world. Christianity has developed far beyond Jerusalem and the stages of the early church. There has been a long process of interaction with the cultures of Germanic, Celtic, Slavic and other people groups, on which the Greco-Roman world had looked down as uncivilised ‘barbarians.’ After they had overrun the Empire and conquered Rome, they did not put an end to its civilisation. On the contrary, they adopted the religion of those they conquered (Christianity), as well as their administrative skills and literary skills. As a result, this ‘mixed multitude’ of tribes became interconnected. But they perpetuated this heritage each in their own Germanic, Celtic and Slavic contexts, through a variety of cultural expressions. The root influences of ‘Rome,’ ‘Athens’ and ‘Jerusalem’ accounts for a certain unity. This is our common heritage. But we should always keep in mind the paradoxical truth that this unity only exists in diversity. Pamela Sticht puts it well when she writes that ‘the heterogeneous European cultures are characterised by the antagonisms of which they are made up.’145

12.2. The mediating role of Christianity ‘On the path of Christianity’s pilgrimage, Europe was born, and the Gospel was her mother tongue.’ Quoting this line by Goethe, French cardinal Paul Poupard comments that ‘the Gospel has had on her [Europe] not just an occasional or

144 Paul Valéry, Note (ou L’Européen), first published in La Revue Universelle, 1924, reprinted in Europes de l’Antiquité au XXe siècle, collection Bouquins, Paris: Robert Laffont, 2000, p. 414-425, our translation from French. 145 Pamela Sticht, Culture européenne ou Europe des cultures? p. 40.

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superficial influence; it has become her very form. It has shaped her societies and formed her cultures.’146 For any unbiased reader of history, it goes without saying that the spread of Christianity was the single-most important factor in making Europe more than just a geographical unit. Without the conversion of the tribes north of the Roman Empire to Christianity, there would never have been the idea of ‘Europe’ as encompassing all the peoples of this continent. We should not exaggerate the importance of Christianity to the point of making it the only constitutive force in the making of Europe. Surely, neither Goethe nor Cardinal Poupard would ignore our indebtedness to Greek cosmology and rational thinking and Roman administrative skill and law. Nor should we overlook the Hebrew Bible. The church transmitted Greco-Roman and Jewish-Biblical heritage But they point out that Christianity played a unique and crucial role, even with respect to these other roots. It is doubtful whether the European peoples would have embraced a Greco-Roman heritage if Christian scholars and artists had not transmitted it on to them. Commenting on the way in which the three heritages intersected, Jérôme Broggini explains that Christianity has forged European culture, in the sense that it has transmitted the heritage of Rome, but in the context of a Christian worldview. ‘In a similar vein, the Romans had recognised their indebtedness with respect to the Greeks, as they assimilated the culture of the logos.’ This pattern, Broggini goes on to say, was also followed with respect to the to Christianity’s Judaic past. ‘Remember that on a religious level, Christendom saw itself as the continuation of the Old Covenant [with the people of Israel].’ 147 In other words, patterns of assimilation were repeated. The Romans embraced the rational philosophy of the Greeks and then the church embraced Roman administration along with the Greek legacy. At the same time, the church also incorporated its own Jewish and Biblical background. Subsequently, the church transmitted this heritage, together with its own message and worldview, to the peoples of Europe. To be more precise, the Greeks and the Romans have left us with a worldview in which the natural dominates the spiritual, which in turn is the basis of critical and theoretical rationalism, as well as a political order in which the reason of the state has precedence over any religious reason. Christianity has served as a bridge between this heritage and the peoples in the realm of Christendom, and

146 Cf. Paul Poupard, Le christianisme, ferment de nouveauté en Europe, Paris: Parole et Silence, 2005. 147 Jérôme Broggini, ‘Une idée  d’Europe’, see bibliography for details [14 May 2010]. Our translation from French.

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it founded the moral and humane values which the majority of European people have in common. In so doing, it played a crucial role in the making of ‘Europe.’ Today our cultures drink from the wells of Athens, Rome and Jerusalem. But the interesting question is why this is so. Why haven’t these old civilisations fallen into oblivion? The fact that we still speak of Rome and Athens and Jerusalem today, is due to Christianity. It was the Christian church that transmitted the legacies of Greek philosophers, Roman administrators, and Biblical prophets. Christian theologians combined Greek philosophical thinking with the message of the Gospel. Christian rulers built on Roman legal and administrative ideas, as they structured the Christianised society. This in turn provided the basis for the development of European science and arts. Whether this was a good thing to do, is a matter of opinion, but there is no question about the fact that this has determined the development of European cultures. The Christian synthesis The late Pope John Paul II was keen to both admit the multiple sources of European cultures and the special role of Christianity. In his message to the Congress of the European Federation of Catholic Universities in 2003, he affirmed: If a new European order is to be adequate for the promotion of the authentic common good, it must recognise and safeguard the values that constitute the most precious heritage of European humanism. Multiple are the cultural roots that have contributed to reinforce these values: from the spirit of Greece to that of Roman law and virtue, from the contributions of the Latin, Celtic, Germanic, Slav and Finno-Ugric peoples, to those of the Jewish culture and the Islamic world. These different factors found in the Judeo-Christian tradition the power that harmonised, consolidated and promoted them.148

This interesting quote reveals that Christianity not only played a mediating role in relation to previous heritages but also provided the framework for the cultures of the peoples that converted to Christianity. These cultures were not altogether suppressed but rather were transformed through the Biblical message and the practice of the ‘new’ religion. The practice of pagan religions was forbidden, but many popular traditions could live on in a Christianised form. There was a fusion of the Christian worldview with a great variety of ethnic and regional ways of life. At the same time, it was the story of the Bible that created a bond between the peoples of Europe. The interaction between Jewish, Greek, Roman, but also Germanic and Slavic cultures, combined with the spirit of

148 Jeff Fountain, Deeply Rooted, p. 75.

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Christianity and the ideals of the Enlightenment, has brought about a synthesis. On this foundation, Europe and its cultures have developed, through a complex and dynamic process. The ‘European experience’ The view of a threefold common heritage is shared by most historians. ‘Europe’ has emerged out of the combined influence of Athens, Rome and Jerusalem. Initially, it took the form of a Christianised realm, or rather a dual realm, one Latin and Catholic, the other Greek and Orthodox. Some find this too reductionist. They point to other common sources that developed at a later stage and to which European cultures are also indebted: the concept of the nation state, the ideas of the Enlightenment such as the natural rights of every human being and the separation between the state and religious institutions, the influence of rational science and technology, and the French Revolution. These developments together are referred to as the ‘European experience,’ in which all the peoples on the continent participated in one way or another. Anthony Pagden, for example, writes that the key influences of this ‘shared experience’ were ‘the Roman Empire, Christianity, the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution.’149 We agree that later developments have played an important role in forging societies and cultures. Their influence can be felt all over Europe today. But they would almost certainly not have come about, at least not in the form they took, if there had not been the prior developments which are at the basis of the European experience and which we call our common roots. It was Christianity that paved the way. We agree with Cardinal Walter Kasper when he said: The Christian tradition holds a mediating position. The heritage of antiquity has been transmitted through monks and clerics. On the other hand the modern Enlightenment, for all its opposition to the established churches of its time, cannot be understood without the preceding Christian history. Ideas of human rights are already found among the Scholastics in the seventeenth century, who in turn referred to the fundamental Christian view of man as it is found in the Bible. Inversely the modern Enlightenment has had repercussions on the modern forms of Christianity that have contributed greatly to the spread of ideas of tolerance and religious freedom.150

149 Christopher Pagden, The Idea of Europe, p. 214. 150 Walter Kasper, public address at the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of Erwin Teufel, former Prime Minister of Baden-Württemberg, in Tübingen, 12 October 2009.

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Other roots The beginning of the European identity lies in Christianity and in the Christian synthesis of other heritages. On this basis, the identity has developed through subsequent movements that have exerted a decisive influence. During the Renaissance of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, there was a revived interest in Antiquity, especially in Greek and Roman literature, architecture, and philosophy. This coincided with an emphasis on the value of humanity. Personal expression, beauty and creativity, rational enquiry and moderate tolerance were emphasised, over and against superstition, traditionalism and violent strife over religious and doctrinal issues. Erasmus of Rotterdam is a well-known example of this intellectual outlook called Humanism. The Reformation reinforced this humanistic outlook. Luther and other Protestant leaders emphasised the value of personal faith and individual responsibility before God. They paved the way for a religious pluralism within one and the same country. They also contributed to the liberation of the state and its institutions from the hold of the church, even though the emancipation of the state has certainly gone beyond what Luther and Calvin had wished. Protestantism has been a major intellectual force. Many sociologists subscribe to the thesis of Max Weber that the Protestant work ethic is the origin of capitalism. The Enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries continued along these lines, with an emphasis on individual freedom, and scientific development free from preconceived doctrinal ideas. Immanuel Kant coined the famous slogan: ‘people should “dare to further develop their knowledge.’ One of the main challenges put forward by Enlightenment philosophers was the reorganisation of political structures. They rejected the divine right of kings and emperors and the Constantinian alliance between throne and altar. Instead, they defended the sovereignty of the people, given expression through its elected representatives in a parliamentary system. In line with their political vision, they called for a balance between legislative, executive and judicial powers, as well as a separation of the institutional church and the state. Surely these movements have moulded the modern mind. They have given birth to the scientific-technological adventure to which Europe has given delivered itself so wholeheartedly. The Enlightenment sparked of the French Revolution which in turn sparked a series of political reactions throughout the nineteenth century. Ultimately, the Enlightenment ideal of parliamentary democracy became the standard political system throughout the continent. Yet ambiguously related to Christianity However, it should be kept in mind that the Renaissance and the Enlightenment were not meant as alternatives to Christianity as such, but rather protests against a kind of institutional Christianity that they labelled suppressive and intolerant. We should see them against the background of religious wars

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between Protestant and Catholic princes. The protagonists of the Renaissance developed their humanism on the basis of their Christian convictions. While all Enlightenment philosophers were highly critical of established churches, only few of them rejected Christianity as such. Most of them were deists (i.e. they believed that God existed and created the universe, but not that he intervened in the history of humanity). They stressed the moral values of the New Testament, and promoted a rational enquiry into the origins of Christianity. Moreover, it is highly significant that these movements of thought arose in a European context. The question can and should be asked: Why did these movements originate in this part of the world and not somewhere else? The answer is that they are indebted to Christianity. They are the fruits of the seeds sown by the church, even though the church was very reluctant to harvest them! The Swiss historian Mariano Delgado asks the same question and explains: Why did the American and the French Revolutions, which have to be considered as the foundations of parliamentary democracy and aimed at universal implementation, only emerge in the bosom of a world marked by western Christianity? Would they have been possible without the Christian reception of Antiquity and without a theology that had been so much in favour of reason, historical progress and the moral equality and freedom of all men?151

The same can be said of modern technology and the Industrial Revolution, as well as the reaction of socialism, which have deeply marked our modern European societies. They would not have emerged, at least not in the form which they have taken in Europe, without the influence of the Christian message with its emphasis that nature is not divine, that humanity is created in the image of God and called to dominate the earth, and so on. What is socialism if not secularised Biblical social ethics? What is the dream of an ideal communist state if not a secularised version of the eschatology of Biblical prophets? One can also think of freedom of religious practice and tolerance, which are foundational to the modern pluralist democracy. These values are generally attributed to the influence of Humanism and the Enlightenment. Historically, they have developed from the struggle for tolerance within the Christian world. Discriminated and persecuted Christian minorities have fought for it throughout the period of the religious wars. It was precisely to defend their cause that Enlightenment philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth century argued for freedom of conscience and religion. There is a direct relation between the

151 Mariano Delgado, ‘Europa als christliches Projekt,’ in: Urs Altermatt, Europa: ein christliches Projekt, p. 53. Our translation from German.

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universal human rights of today and the moral teaching of the church, which in turn is based on the ethical commandments of the Bible. Moreover, the rationalism that characterizes European science and technology and that has given birth to the secular worldview of modernism is an offspring, not only of Greek philosophy but also of Christian thought. All of this is now couched in secular terms, but the fact that it developed in Europe and not anywhere else is in itself a telling indication of its close connection with Christendom. This was the context in which the social and political values of Europe emerged.

12.3. Jewish and Muslim influences We have been concentrating on Christian roots. What about the influence of other religions? In a preceding paragraph we quoted a lecture given by the late Pope John Paul II in which he described the roots of ‘European Humanism.’ Interestingly, he included ‘the contribution of the Islamic world.’ But he was careful to add that this was integrated, together with other elements, ‘in the Judeo-Christian tradition.’ In this one statement, he touched on a delicate question that is a live issue: to what extent are Judaism and Islam part of the roots of Europe, and should they be mentioned explicitly? Judaism and the making of ‘Europe’ To begin with is the question of the influence of Judaism on the development of European societies and cultures. Today, it is commonplace to speak of JudeoChristian instead of Christian roots, because this is more politically correct. In doing so, people mark their distance from the persecution of European Jewry in the past. We appreciate this motivation. We agree that the Jewish communities dispersed all over the continent have been an integral part of our history. Two things should be kept in mind. Firstly, the Jewish communities in Europe were marginalised for a very long time. Churches depicted Judaism in a very negative way. Many spheres of society were closed to those Jews who did not convert to Christianity. Granted, there were contacts between Jewish rabbis and Christian theologians (mainly Protestants). Individual Jews have played an important role in commerce, finance, science, philosophy and arts, but this was the exception rather than the norm. Secondly, the Jews in Europe have become an influential minority since their so-called Emancipation. Beginning at the end of the eighteenth century, one country after the other granted them civil rights. From then on, they have come out of their isolated ‘ghetto’ communities to fully participate in the social, economic, and cultural development of the country in which they lived.

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But it should be noticed that many of them assimilated to a large extent. Even though they were inspired by Judaic notions of justice, the value of man, or by the Messianic dream of a better world to come, they acted more or less like ‘Europeans’ and not so much in a distinctly Judaic way. Think of the many Jews in the forefront of the socialist and communist movements, for example. In fact, Jews who maintained their traditional way of life and the religious practices of Judaism were less integrated in society, less influential, less involved. Thirdly, the major contribution of the Jewish people to Europe was the Hebrew Bible. Judaism passed on this heritage from generation to generation within the context of the Jewish communities. Judaism was not a missionary religion; its intent was not to bring other peoples into its fold but rather to ensure the continued presence, if not the survival, of the Jewish people. Meanwhile, the church transmitted the message of the Hebrew prophets to the European peoples, albeit in a Christianised form. We would argue, therefore, that Judaism as a religion has played a secondary role in the making of ‘Europe.’ Talking about the Judeo-Christian roots can be misleading because it might create the impression as if the two religions, Judaism and Christianity, have exerted equal influence, as if they have worked side by side to forge our cultures. Having said this, there is no way of denying that the influence of the Jews as a community and as individual members of society is very remarkable indeed. They are an integral part of our history. Their contribution is an element of ‘the European experience.’ Islam and the making of ‘Europe’ What about the role of Islam in the making of ‘Europe.’ The growing numbers of Muslims in Western Europe and their increased visibility (mosques, traditional dress, halal butchers, segregated migrant areas, etc.) provoke mixed reactions, varying from tolerance and acceptance to discrimination and rejection. As a result, such feelings easily interfere with the historical question about their role in the development of Europe. Did Islam contribute to the common heritage of Europe? This question is easily linked with another question: does Islam have a place in Europe today? To what extent should Muslims adapt their religious practice to ‘European’ norms and standards? However, we should try and dissociate these two questions. When we look to the past, we can distinguish three periods of interaction between Europe and the Muslim World. Firstly, we think of the Moors on the Iberian Peninsula, from the eighth century until 1492. Under their rule, Jews and Christians were tolerated minorities, which allowed for intellectual and artistic exchanges. This period is often presented as a haven of peaceful coexistence, a golden age of science and philosophy, ‘an Indian summer of interfaith

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collaboration between Christians, Muslims,’ as David Levering Lewis put it,152 in contrast to the rest of Europe, where Jews and ‘heretics’ were discriminated, persecuted, expelled. We should not exaggerate the contrast. In the Muslim emirate, Christians often experienced hardship. There were periods of severe discrimination as well. Be that at this may, it is an anachronism to speak of ‘Muslim Spain,’ as often happens today. During the Muslim presence, this was Al-Andalus. Moreover, the Moors considered themselves as part of the House of Islam, not of Europe. Spain came into existence much later, as a merger of the Christian kingdoms that gradually took possession of the Iberian Peninsula. Spain was Catholic from its very beginning. It came after the Muslim emirate. Including Al-Andalus in ‘Europe’ is yet another anachronism, because at that time, there was still great uncertainty about the confines of Europe as a geographical entity. But one thing stood out, ‘Europe’ was a Christian realm. The Muslims were considered to be a foreign element. That was the bottom line of the reconquista, the recovery of all the land that once had belonged to the ‘Christian’ world so as to integrate it into ‘Europe.’ It took seven centuries to fully realise this. Two kinds of interactions between Muslims and Christians characterized this period. On the one hand, there was intellectual exchange, as Arab scholars passed on Greek philosophy and Babylonian science to Jewish scholars and via them to Christian scholars. ‘Toledo transmitted most of what Paris, Cologne, Florence, and Rome would know of Aristotle and Plato, Euclid and Galen, Hindu numbers, and Arab astronomy.’153 On the other hand, there was confrontation, as the world of Islam was seen as foreign in Europe, as a world that should be kept at bay. The same pattern can be observed during the Crusades in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Of course, this was first and foremost a violent clash between two worlds over the control of what Christians called the Holy Land. Crusaders against Muslim forces: that is the classic picture. While most Europeans have forgotten about it, it is still very much alive in the collective memory of Muslims in the Middle East. However, this is not the whole picture. There was also interaction between Muslims and Christians as Europeans came in contact with a highly developed culture and new products. Commercial relations developed. Venice and Geneva became the prosperous centres of this new trade of spices, foods and other merchandise. Moreover, there were attempts to spread the Christian faith among Muslims through peaceful dialogue and exchange of ideas. Raymond Llul

152 David Levering Lewis, God’s Crucible, p. 125. 153 Idem.

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sought contact with religious leaders in Andalusia; Francis of Assisi even went as far as Egypt. The third interaction between Europe and the Muslim world took place in the Balkan region, where the Turkish Ottomans ruled from 1453 till the beginning of the twentieth century. Again, we see the two aspects mentioned above. There was a constant drive of the European powers to push the Ottomans back to Asia. The Turks did not try and convert the whole population by force. The large majority remained Orthodox or Catholic, the Turks developed a judicial system in which each religious community constituted a Milit. Each Milit was allowed freedom of religious practice and a large extent of local autonomy provided that the churches did not try and convert people. Granted, in order to join the army and the civil service, people had to convert to Islam. Even so, only a minority of the population became Muslim. As a result, this region has always been characterised by religious diversity and interaction on a social, economic and cultural level. The Turks living north of the Bosporus and the indigenous Muslim communities in and around Bosnia and Albania are part of ‘the European experience,’ as far as the Balkan region is concerned. But they have not contributed significantly to the development of Europe as a whole. That is because for a very long time, Islam has been considered as a religious, political and cultural frontier. We would argue therefore, that Islam is not part of the foundational sources of European cultures. However, the Muslim World did play an important role in the intellectual development of Europe, as it made people on the continent familiar with non-European science, philosophy. The commercial development of Europe owes much to the opening of new markets in the lands of the Star and the Crescent.

12.4. Christian roots... presuppositions and interests We are not just discussing a subject of historical interest. The roots of European cultures are a matter of considerable debate. Constitution Controversy This discussion became a real political issue when the EU decided to design a constitution. In 2004, a draft constitution was presented for ratification by all member states. The text not only defined the decision-making process, the governing structures and the legal procedures of the EU, but also its philosophical basis and common values. While most governments left it to their national parliaments to discuss, two countries organised a referendum: the French in 2005 and the Dutch in 2006. In both cases, the majority voted against.

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What was the problem with the draft constitution? In Christian circles, the discussion focussed on the fact that the constitution mentioned ‘our common cultural heritage’ without specifying the Christian roots of Europe. Many people found this unacceptable. Some objected that the text did not make any reference to God as supreme authority. It is not clear, though, to what extent these considerations layed a role in public opinion. In public discussions, the criticisms focussed on other points. Some argued that this constitution would lead us too far down the road to a federal European state; they didn’t want to lose national sovereignty. Others found that it favoured the liberal free market, to the detriment of social protection. For many people, rejecting the constitution was just a way of voicing dissatisfaction with their national government, or an occasion to protest against the introduction of the common currency, the euro. Whatever the reasons, public opinion had serious reservations about the so-called Constitutional Project. This made other governments apprehensive. Opinion polls indicated that if they had subjected the constitution to a referendum, the majority would have rejected it. Instead of pushing the matter forward, European leaders decided to abandon this constitution. Instead, they opted for a simplified version of it, which would concentrate on the administrative structure and the procedures of decision-making. This became the Treaty of Lisbon, adopted in 2008. Unlike the draft constitution, it did not elaborate on the common values and the common identity of Europeans. The Constitutional Project triggered off a debate about the roots of Europe, in which the central issue was the significance of Christianity in the making of Europe. Some downplay this, even to the point of ignoring it completely. Others explicitly emphasize our Christian roots. Why is there so much debate and polemic around this question? Because opinions about this matter are not just opinions, they are related to certain presuppositions and agendas which we will now clarify. Hidden agendas Clearly, the question of our historical cultural roots is related to the question how people of different cultural origins can live together in one modern society. The connection between these two questions is not a problem in and of itself. When we recognize that Europe has Christian roots, we are not necessarily implying that the practice of another religion has no place in our society. It can also be an argument for religious tolerance. Problems arise when we present a ‘story of how Europe was made’ that is biased by political interest or by ideological presuppositions, or both. They can come into play unconsciously, because of our presuppositions that make us blind to certain elements of our common history. For example, staunch socialists tend to consider the French Revolution as the major reference point

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of modern European history. As they focus on the organisation of social justice, the redistribution of wealth, the political consciousness of the citizens, and the guiding role of the state, they tend to bypass religious institutions, or even consider them to be a hindrance to progress. On the basis of this presupposition, they tend to ignore Europe’s Christian roots. Postmodern philosophers would say that any ‘grand saga’ of Europe is like a meta-story that claims to explain everything. But more often than not, such a ‘story’ serves to impose one particular vision, to fit everything into a system of thought, in the interests of those who dominate society. One needs to ‘deconstruct’ them in order to discern in what ways they are used as instruments of power, to defend certain interests. We will not go into this postmodern approach to history. Suffice it to say that it is always useful to detect hidden agendas, ideological presuppositions and political interests. This is particularly true when it comes to the common roots of Europe. Secularist agenda People with a secular worldview are prone to relegate the practice of the Christianity, and of other religions for that matter, to the past. They do not easily acknowledge that religion could contribute positively to improved living conditions, social peace, and so on. When they combine this presupposition with a secularist agenda for society, they try and keep any religious practice within the private sphere. Furthermore, they believe that we should draw from non-religious sources of inspiration for the advancement of the public sphere. As a result, Christianity is excluded from the political discourse about values and norms as are Judaism and Islam. When people with this worldview and this agenda look back to the making of Europe, they are prone to wilfully or unconsciously downplay the Christian roots and focus on the heritage of Renaissance Humanism and the Enlightenment only. Evangelism through idealising the past On the Christian side, many people insist on Europe’s Christian roots in order to arouse interest in Christianity among their secularised fellow Europeans. Clearly, their agenda is to communicate the Gospel. In order to show the relevance of the Biblical message for social justice, reconciliation between peoples, moral values, etc., they emphasize the way in which the church and individual Christians have contributed to the development of our societies. They point to the rich cultural heritage, from cathedrals to universities, from classical music to popular local traditions. In their zeal to gain a hearing for the Gospel, they are prone to draw a very positive picture of Christianity’s role in the past; too positive perhaps, while downplaying or even ignoring the harm that has been caused in the name of the same religion.

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We see this happening time and time again. The Roman Catholic Church aggressively does this as it pushes for an official and explicit recognition of Europe’s Christian roots. Behind this endeavour might be operating an idealised image of the way in which the church held together the European peoples in the Middle Ages. Others might cherish the age old dream of Europe as a Christianised body of peoples, cultures and institutions of which the Roman Catholic Church is the (religious) ‘soul.’ At any rate, Roman Catholic bishops explicitly remind Europe of its Christian roots. During a mass meetings in the vicinity of Paris, the late Pope John Paul II cried out: ‘France, what have you done with your baptism?’ In other words: ‘return to the Church!’ Clearly, this message was part of the program of New Evangelism, launched by the same pope in 1982. Writing under his name Joseph Ratzinger, Pope Benedict XVI insists: ‘Believing Christians should think of themselves as a creative minority and contribute to Europe’s recovery of the best of its heritages and thus to the service of all mankind.’ 154 Similarly, we find Protestants idealising their golden age, and Russian Orthodox expressing their nostalgia for the glorious past of their great nation; while Evangelicals like to recall the revivals in the eighteenth century that transformed British society and perhaps protected it from the excesses of the French Revolution taking place in their country. Multiculturalism and our ‘religious heritage’ Those who are concerned about a peaceful development of the multicultural society suspect that emphasising our Christian roots to the exclusion of other religious roots might be taken by Muslims as a message that there is no place for them in Europe. For that reason, they prefer to present the story of its origins in more general terms, downplaying the important role of Christianity in the past. Sometimes, this concern for social peace is combined with the ideal of multiculturalism. Multiculturalists plead for tolerance and dialogue, but are opposed to any exclusive claims to truth and efforts to affect religious changed (denoted as ‘proselytising’). The basic understanding is that all religions are equal. According to this point of view, people will avoid mentioning Europe’s Christian roots and prefer to speak in general terms of a ‘religious heritage’ that leaves it to the reader to include or exclude particular religions. Nationalist movements insisting on Christian roots On the opposite side of the political spectrum are nationalist movements and political parties, sometimes labelled ‘populist’ or ‘extreme right wing.’

154 Joseph Ratzinger, Europe, Today and Tomorrow, p. 33.

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They are basically a form of protest against the multicultural society, especially against the ideology of multiculturalism. In the last few decades there has been an upsurge of these movements all over Europe. Their agenda is to safeguard a national or a regional culture. Immigration is their target. In particular, they are very concerned about the growth of the Muslim population and its increased visibility in society. Their agenda is assimilation, a sort of ‘inculturation.’ Interestingly, patriotic politicians often emphasise the Christian roots of their nation, and of Europe as a whole, even when they are not practicing Christians themselves. For them, Christianity is first of all a cultural reference. Faced with the customs of other religions, they lean on the traditional values and the lifestyle of their ‘own’ people, which are indeed bound up with the traditions of Roman Catholicism, Protestantism or Eastern Orthodoxy. Their agenda is not to promote Christianity, or a particular expression of it, but to present it as an integral part of the national history. In their zeal to preserve traditional culture, they are prone to exaggerate certain facts and ignore others, to turn certain events into legends, so as to create a ‘national myth’ that tells the story of the people in an idealised way. It usually goes like this: out of the shadows of history arose a people; at a certain moment its king was baptised and the people became part of the Christian realm of Europe; other people groups were conquered and made part of the ‘nation’; several heroes have fought against its foes; we are proud of our heritage; our obligation is to maintain our identity, and to work for prosperity and peace in our land. Reappraisal of Christian roots The debate about Europe’s roots goes on. Arguments are exchanged, and history is called up as witness. But what do historians tell us? Whatever their personal opinion about Christianity, they cannot honestly ignore the fact that the European cultures today owe more to the influence of Christianity than to anything else. Lately, the tide seems to have turned. Church leaders are no longer alone in reminding Europe of her Christian roots. Intellectuals, politicians and the media are less hesitant to recognize that the cultural heritage of Europe has been shaped by Christianity. For example, the influential German philosopher Jürgen Habermas emphasised, in a series of essays, the need to recognize clearly and without ambiguity the place of Christianity in the cultural heritage of Europe and the values that are now generally recognised as foundational for society. Christianity, and nothing else, is the foundation of liberty, conscience, human rights, and democracy, the benchmarks of Western civilisation. To this day, we have no other options. We continue to nourish ourselves from this source.

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Everything else is postmodern chatter....Recognising our Judaeo-Christian roots more clearly not only does not impair intercultural understanding, it is what makes it possible.155

Statements to this effect are heard increasingly often. It seems that there is a general reappraisal of Christianity as one of the major roots of European societies today. We think that this is necessary in order to do justice to its determinative role in the making of Europe.

12.5. Turn roots into sources Drawing this chapter to a conclusion, we would underline that the influence of Christianity is a decisive factor in the making of Europe as a cultural zone. It is one thing to recognize this as an historical fact; it is another thing to take up the responsibility that it implies. Roots only function when they nourish life. If not, they are just dead wood. A root functions when it takes nourishment from the soil and transports it to the living organism above the ground. Dutch Reformed pastor and president of L’Abri Fellowship, Wim Rietkerk, concurs. Our common Christian heritage has provided the spiritual infrastructure of our civilisation, he writes, the public philosophy of European culture, if you like. ‘When we ask ourselves what to say to our fellow Europeans today, we must realise that we already have the seed that we must sow in our pocket. This seed is our common Christian heritage.’156 Our message to the Western European should be: focus less on the fruits and more on the roots themselves. If our Lord would address the European Parliament in Strasbourg today, in answer to the question, ‘What shall we do with this whole civilisation?,’ I believe he would say something like Micah said to the Israelites: ‘I have shown you, oh man, what is good and what the Lord requires of you. It is to act justly, to love mercy and to walk humbly with your God (Micah 6:4). The basic problem with European man is not that he does not know what justice is. He does know. And he knows what mercy is. But he believes that he can achieve them without walking humbly with his God. That is the key point today. The biggest mistake he ever made was to think that he could keep

155 Jürgen Habermas, in a lecture given in 2006, quoted in Philip Jenkins, God’s Continent, p. 264f. 156 Wim Rietkerk, ‘God’s Experiment’. See bibliography for details [16 May 2010].

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enjoying the fruits without the roots, without walking humbly with his God.... There is no future for a Western civilisation cut off from its roots. We should state very clearly that it is impossible to keep believing in man’s calling, if we do not believe that man was given that calling from God, and to keep up all social structures, family life, morality and values of our society without being rooted in nutritious soil.157

Because these values are part and parcel of our cultural tradition, we can defend them. We can argue for their plausibility, explain their origin. These values help us to show that Christianity is relevant for society today. And we can link them with the invitation to be reconciled with God. In other words, they are bridges for the communication of the Gospel. In so doing, we are turning these roots into a spiritual source. At this moment, these values are under attack. Take the value of the dignity of man for example. Witness the danger in new legislation on the handicapped, the unborn and the terminally ill. There is a tendency to limit the medical costs spent on them. Think also of experiments with human embryos, genetic engineering, and cloning, presented as technological ‘advances’ but also as means to ‘improve’ human beings. We notice in passing that Pope Benedict XVI in particular has identified this as one of the major intellectual and ethical frontiers in Europe today. Wherever he speaks, he insists that when scientists and politicians lose sight of the fundamental value and dignity of each individual human being, as it is rooted in the Biblical message of man created in the image of God, man runs the risk of becoming the enemy of mankind. A specifically European feature today appears to be precisely the separation from all ethical traditions and the exclusive reliance on technological reasoning and its possibilities. But will not a world order with these foundations become in reality a horrific utopia? Does not Europe need...some corrective elements derived from its great tradition? The inviolable nature of human dignity ought to become the fundamental, untouchable pillar of ethical regulations. Only if man recognizes that he is an end and not a means, only if the human being is sacred and inviolable, can we have confidence in one another and live together in peace....Faith in God the Creator is the surest guarantee of man’s dignity.158

157 Wim Rietkerk, op.cit. 158 Joseph Ratzinger, Europe Today and Tomorrow, p. 42-43.

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He notices a curious, paradoxical situation. The European culture of technology and commerce has spread victoriously through the entire world, but the culture steeped in a Christian worldview and based on Biblical values seems to be fading away. With the triumph of the post-European technological, secular world, with the globalisation of the way of live and its manner of thinking, one gets the impression everywhere in the world…that the very world of European values – the things upon which Europe bases its identity, its culture and its faith – has arrived at its end and has actually left the scene; that now the hour has come for the value systems of other cultures....Europe, precisely in this hour of its greatest success, seems to have been hollowed out....There is an interior dwindling of the spiritual strength that once supported Europe. 159

As individual believers and as churches, we represent Christian roots. That’s fine and that’s interesting. That is also very challenging. We have the opportunity to draw spiritual truth from the Bible, apply it to the problems facing us today, and transmit the truths to men and women here and now, to their families, enterprises, schools, hospitals, and governments. In so doing, we reconnect our contemporaries to the very spiritual sources that are at the origin of our cultures. During a colloquium on the cultural and spiritual roots of Europe in 2008, the philosopher Francis Jacques challenged the participants by saying: ‘As representatives of the heritage in which European cultures are rooted, we are challenged to turn these roots into spiritual sources.’160 He was ever so right.

159 Idem, p. 24. Our italics. 160 Francis Jacques, ‘Athènes, Rome et Jérusalem,’ in Francis Jacques, Les racines culturelles et spirituelles de l’Europe, p. 17f.

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Heritage of European Christianity Christianity has shaped the cultural landscape of Europe. Idioms of speech, proverbs, topographical names and family names, architecture, music, literature and other art forms, educational institutions, health care and social aid structures, even infrastructure, all these bear the marks of prolonged Christian influence. Holidays and popular festivals have biblical roots, and many social customs are based on the teachings of the church throughout the ages. Even the preponderance of human rights in the political realm is inexplicable without acknowledging their roots in Christian ethics. Despite its decline, Christianity is still the major religion in all European countries, except one or two in the Balkans. Making an inventory of this heritage would need more books that any person is able to write. By way of summary we shall list a few elements that stand out.

13.1. Continued existence of churches and communities However we think about the alliance between altar and crown, however we evaluate the methods used to spread the faith and to Christianize entire societies, we have to acknowledge that Christianity has been preserved in Europe, in contrast to other regions where it has become virtually extinct (Central Asia) or reduced to a minority (North Africa and the Middle East). Once upon a time, it flourished in those regions as well, but the pressure of local rulers proved too strong as they subordinated society to their religion. The military campaigns of Muslim caliphs and sultans depleted vast regions of their Christian populations. For a long time, Europe was a bastion where the church could develop. Monasteries and cathedrals were built, as well as parish churches in every town and village. Liturgies and festivals, theological and spiritual traditions, doctrines and pastoral wisdom have been preserved and transmitted from generation to generation. We have libraries full of theological works; we have countless moving stories of evangelists, monks, mystics, pastors, Christian laymen and pioneers; we have an enormous treasury of hymnal and instrumental music. This is a rich heritage, a legacy to the global church and the world alike. This heritage not only consists of what has been preserved from the past but also of an impressive number of church institutions and local communities today. All of them are tributary to centuries of European Christian tradition, the fruit of ongoing evangelisation. Standing on the shoulders of former generations, they are living witnesses to a long history of faith. They are part of the heritage of Europe and the Gospel.

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13.2. The Bible When enumerating the heritage of European Christianity, special mention should be made of the Bible. It did not originate in the West but in the East. The oldest translations were made there as well. But Europe has been instrumental in preserving the text through a long of tradition of manuscripts being written by countless faithful copyists, both in the Latin and Greek parts of Christendom. When the printing press was invented in Europe, the Bible was among the first books to be printed in great numbers, and disseminated among the population. Translations were made in all the vernacular languages of Europe; and these translations had a formative influence on the development of these languages. It is not an overstatement to say that Bible translation helped to emancipate the languages of the people. In so doing, it gave value to their cultures, stimulated their national identity, contributed to their literature, and fostered their spiritual development. Through European colonists and missionaries, the Bible has been distributed in commercial stations, colonies and unexplored inland regions all over the world. And there, the same pattern repeated itself as the Bible was translated into local languages. Often, missionaries wrote grammars, taught people to read and write, so as to be able to read the Holy Book. This gave value to the indigenous language and culture, thus stimulating the ethnic identity of the people and contributing, in the long run, to their emancipation from European domination.

13.3. Global Christianity When considering the heritage of European Christianity we have to look beyond the continent as well. Legacy of mission The link between Europe and mission has for a long time been almost intrinsic. As the explorers opened trade routes and as European nations founded colonies in the East and West and South, the call to evangelise the ‘heathen’ was heard and heeded. Catholic missionary congregations took the lead in the sixteenth century; they planted the Church of Rome in their expanding colonies. It was at that time when the Latin word mission took on its particular meaning of planting churches in regions that were not yet Christianised. The kings of Spain and Portugal were commissioned by the pope to establish the church in their colonies, and to bring in the indigenous people. Franciscans, Dominicans and Jesuits were particularly zealous to carry out

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this mission. Their model was the corpus christianum of Europe. But as they were confronted with other cultures, they realised that some measure of accommodation was necessary. This led to vehement discussions in the church whether or not the European liturgy should be fully implemented everywhere, or whether it should be adapted to indigenous language and culture. Protestants were slow to follow, but when they did, beginning in the eighteenth century, they deployed a missionary enterprise that could stand up to all comparisons with the missionary endeavours of the Catholics before them, in terms of personnel, zeal and sacrifice. Meanwhile, the Russian Orthodox Church spread Christianity to the outer limits of the vast empire of the tsars; to Central Asia and throughout Siberia, even to Alaska! From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, North Americans joined the movement but Europe remained the leader of Christian mission – Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox combined – till the second half of the twentieth century. This missionary enterprise has left deep imprints on the minds of nonEuropeans. Many of them consider Christianity to be a European religion, and Europe as a Christian continent. Of course, this is no longer the reality, but ideas that have taken such a long time to develop do not easily change or disappear! Of course, the way in which the Gospel was spread and churches were planted bore the marks of European culture. Certain elements of the missionary enterprise can be criticised and their negative influence should be acknowledged in all honesty: attitudes of superiority, contempt and rejection of local cultures, accepting the system of colonialism, serving the interest of European powers. But for all the negative aspects than can be enumerated, the impact as a whole remains an impressive one. Churches have now been planted everywhere in the world, Christianity is the largest world religion in terms of church membership. This global spread is to a large extent the outcome of four centuries of uninterrupted and large-scale European mission. Institutional heritage European missionaries also left a rich heritage of schools and hospitalsall over Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania. Many of them have developed into large institutions. They have generally come under government control, but their origins cannot be denied. It is a fact of history that many leading politicians in the former European colonies were educated in mission schools! In most developing countries, the basis of the educational and medical infrastructure has been laid by Europeans, for the largest part by mission congregations and organisations.

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13.4. Foundational values in society The Biblical message has been transmitted by human beings who did not always live up to its ideals. But notwithstanding all the prejudices, mistakes and weaknesses of the church, the message has taken root. The Bible has become the most influential book in the making of the European mind. When the Gospel spread through Europe, pagan cultures were offered a hopeful perspective. The cyclical cosmology of the pagans disintegrated and gave way to the idea that the world could change, that people should work to transform their living conditions, and that there was a future promised by prophets and apostles. Nature was disenchanted, no longer seen to be under the control of spiritual forces that kept people in thrall but was the work of the Creator, entrusted to the dominion of man. Man was given the unique position of being created in the image of God, called to work and live according to the moral values of the revealed Word of God. Relationships were renewed, monogamy became the norm, and the family assumed a central place. Political authority came to be reinterpreted as delegated authority under the supreme authority of the unique God who stood above creation. Biblical values of justice, liberty, human dignity, and personal responsibility, created a completely different culture. Wim Rietkerk comments: ‘This, I suspect, is what God had in mind with the rise of Europe.’161 Christianity has made a lasting impact by developing values that have become foundational for European societies. These values are now secularised, or generalised if you like. They have become part and parcel of our culture, so we take them for granted. They serve as presuppositions for political decisions as well as personal decisions. But many people forget that they have been forged over a long period of time, in Christianised Europe. Seven pillars In an article summarising the impact of Christianity on European culture, Wim Rietkerk distinguishes seven values that have become foundational for the development of our societies. He calls them ‘the pillars on which the European house is built.’ • The importance of man’s calling – Man is called, not to escape the world, neither to adapt to the world, but to change it. Europeans do not believe that we should escape the material world as Eastern gurus preach, or that we should accept life as fate, as Muslims hold.

161 Wim Rietkerk, ‘God’s Experiment’. See bibliography for details [16 May 2010].

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• The meaning of labour – Man is called to cultivate the earth, to explore its potential and to develop communities. Work is meaningful. Our choices shape the world. Our actions have the potential to enrich lives and we should take responsibility to ensure that they do. • The structures for inter-human relationships – Monogamy in European culture is a fruit of Christianity, as is the place of the family, the protection of marriage, structures for school, business, university, and finally civil government. • Moral order – every non-Christian European will agree that it is wrong to cheat or to steal and that the highest value is to love your neighbour as yourself. • Human rights – the socio-political values of solidarity with the poor, equality under the law and before the law, freedom of the individual, and so on. They are written in the marble of national constitutions and European treaties. • The dignity of man – Every human being has a unique and intrinsic value, having been created in the image of God. That is a precious treasure of European culture. Rietkerk gives the following illustration: All over Europe traffic stops when an ambulance passes. We hardly are aware of it, we do not watch it, but it is remarkable. All these strong and healthy people behind the wheel of their cars stop and wait for one weak, ill individual. That does not happen in India. Europeans understand that a person is not just a wheel in a machine. He or she is an original. That is a pillar that cannot be absent in the house of our culture. 162

It is tempting for us Christians to ‘annex’ all the values that are commonly held to be foundational in European societies. In so doing, we may overemphasize their Biblical origin, while overlooking the fact that some of these values can also be traced back to Greek and Roman philosophers. Swiss Archbishop Jean-Louis Bruguès recognizes this in his article about the Christian roots of Europe. He identifies six values that have determined our European identity, values that still determine our view of human life. These ‘foundational basic laws’ are the dignity of man, the search for justice, the need to speak truth and the freedom to follow these principles even when they run contrary to social customs or to the will of political rulers.163

162 Wim Rietkerk, op. cit. 163 Jean-Louis Bruguès, ‘Die christlichen Wurzeln Europas,’ in Urs Altermatt (Hrsg.), Europa: Ein christliches Projekt?, p. 17.

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Other values are the need to cooperate for the common interest, the principle that we should treat our subordinates as we would like to be treated by our superiors. All of that was already taught by Greeks and Romans, although they only applied it to part of society. In their ‘democracy,’ slaves were excluded and women had inferior civil status. This would only change through the influence of the Biblical message, as we shall point out in the following paragraphs. The unique value and natural rights of every human being Jean-Louis Bruguès goes on to mention one value ‘that should be the most well-known of all but that is widely ignored because the Biblical heritage has become the blind spot of the secularised societies.’ What is this value? Man is created in the image of God. With this basic law, which is based on the Judeo-Christian revelation, everything in ethics is said, or at least the most essential is said. Here all the other basic laws that we have collected in our journey through our history, find their source and their culmination, their justification and their explanation. Every human being is created in the image of God, unique, special, irreplaceable and indispensible. Evil can harm him and trials can discourage him, but he always remains greater than his guilt. Because he is created by the God who is the source of all truth, he is capable of learning this truth and of living accordingly…. Every man is a new image of God, and this gives him unique value. Every man enjoys the sanctity of being from the moment of his conception till the hour of his death. This value lends him certain natural rights that are linked to his person and that do not depend on laws of society or the recognition of the group. 164

The list of these rights has lengthened as centuries passed, and is still not finished: the absolutely primal right to live, the right not to be hurt physically and morally, the right to marriage and to raise children in a family, the right to culture, the right to freedom of conscience and opinion, the right to the sharing of responsibility. Europe has become increasingly sensitive about these rights; it continually strives to formulate them more comprehensively and more profoundly. In this sense, Europe has never ceased to be Christian.’ Here is the principle to which the Biblical message has given birth in Europe: all men are born equal and are worthy therefore of respect, freedom and happiness. Today, Americans and Europeans and other ‘Westerners,’

164 Jean-Louis Bruguès, op. cit., p. 18.

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whether they are religious or non-religious, consider this value to be selfevident and therefore universal. As it is written in the American Constitution; ‘We consider it to be evident that all men are born equal.’ However, in many other parts of the world this is far from self-evident. Even in ancient Greece and Rome this was not self-evident. This is not the contribution of Athens or Rome. This is the unique contribution of Jerusalem, transmitted by the church. Charity (neighbour love) Closely linked to this principle is the Christian tradition of charity or agapé.’ According to this principle, we have to love God above all things and our neighbour as ourselves. This principle extends to every human being, in the first place to those who have material and spiritual needs, whatever their colour or creed. Granted, not all Christians have acted on this principle. But church history is full of examples of unrestricted and sacrificial love, examples that have inspired others to act similarly. They still speak to the hearts and minds of our modern secularised contemporaries. The Christian teaching of charity is one of the main sources of Western ethical values. ‘This principle has caused a re-evaluation of all values (Umwertung aller Werte) in the first centuries of our era,’ affirms Dutch philosopher Govert Buijs. ‘Its consequences in the western world today are still visible in the aid offered by churches and Christian agencies.’165 And in secular humanitarian work, we would add. It is a typical European and Western reflex to immediately organize relief and rescue, food and shelter, whenever there is a natural disaster in the world, whenever refugees are fleeing zones of warfare, whenever famine breaks out in drought ridden areas. Virtually all NGOs in development work are western. You won’t find such a massive aid offered by China or Japan or Islamic countries, despite their accumulated wealth. It is a typical western thing, and it is due to the influence of the Christian principle of charity. Human rights Our inventory of Christian heritage also includes human rights. There is in Europe an almost absolute attachment to human rights. Surely, their formulation in modern, secular terms dates from the Enlightenment. It is often claimed that the Enlightenment did not take this notion from Greek philosophy, but this is impossible. Mariano Delgado explains:

165 Govert Buijs, ‘Tegenwind van Geest,’ in: Erik Borgman (e.a.), De werking van de Heilige Geest in de Europese cultuur en traditie, p. 21ff.

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The idea and praxis of democracy in Antiquity were closely related to the presupposition of natural inequality. In ancient Greece, the citizens put themselves proudly over and above women, strangers and slaves. The idea that every man as such is a rationally acting being, who deserves an equal measure of freedom and respect, simply did not exist then.166

One had to wait for the seed of the Gospel to take root in Europe, before the idea of the fundamental unity of mankind could make way. When one comes to think about it, human rights are to a large extent secularised or universalised Christian ethical principles.

13.5. Cultural heritage Europe has an extremely rich Christian cultural heritage. Visit any museum and you will find paintings of Biblical scenes, sculptures of Biblical persons. In any concert hall you can hear Biblical texts and Christian beliefs sung by professional musicians. Composers have set the Gospel accounts of the passion of Christ to music and countless Europeans listen to a performance of Bach’s St. Matthew’s Passion , for example. Cathedrals are crowded with tourists who admire the edifices that were constructed for the glory and adoration of the triune God. As guides explain to them the symbolism of the architecture and the meaning of the works of art, people are hearing the message of the Bible, everyone in his own language, and seeing it portrayed before their eyes. Church officials of Canterbury Cathedral tell us that tourists entering this famous sanctuary outnumber the people who attend worship services. This illustrates that the architectural heritage of Christianity is of great importance for society in general as much as it is to the Christian community. These are just some of the many elements of Christian cultural heritage. There are many more. Think of the plethora of Biblical words and expressions that have become part and parcel of everyday language. Think of the personal names. Millions of Europeans bear a Biblical name. In countries dominated by a Roman Catholic tradition, it is even the majority of people! Think of the hundreds of thousands of towns and villages, streets, bridges, rivers, mountains and forests named after a Biblical person or a saintly Christian who has marked church history.

166 Mariano Delgado, ‘Europa als christliches Projekt,’ in: Urs Altermatt, Europa: ein christliches Projekt, p. 53. Our translation from German.

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Think of the festivals that mark our calendar. Our holidays were originally Christian holy days. Most people participate in the popular customs during Christmas and Easter, but Christmas trees, Boxing Day presents, Easter eggs and the like originate in the Christian celebration of these festivals. And don’t forget the many, many local festivals that often have a link with the church. Monasteries and abbeys throughout the continent developed agriculture, beer production, wine culture, culinary recipes and herbal medicine. Whenever you have a drink, remember that you might well be tasting a Christian heritage! We could go on and on and on, but let us add to this short list just one element of immeasurable richness: the Biblical and traditional Christian imagery that is omnipresent today in books, films, children’s stories, theatre plays, publicity spots, advertisements, and popular music.

13.6. Institutional heritage Motivated by the Biblical message to be the salt of the earth and light to the world, churches and individual Christians have created many institutions: universities, schools, hospitals, social welfare centres, trade unions, political parties, sport clubs, and so on. European societies are literally filled with them. This is yet another important part of the Christian heritage. General institutions of Christian origin Many secular universities and schools, libraries, orphanages and rehabilitation centres today started as Christian, or church related institutions, many secular hospitals as Christian hospices. Today’s hotels have their predecessors in hostels for Christian pilgrims throughout the ages. Quite a number of these institutions have been dissociated from their Christian origin and taken on a general character. But their existence today is no less a legacy of Europe and the Gospel. Some institutions have retained their Christian identity, but they serve and attract a much wider population than only the community of believers. They are outposts of Christianity outside the church. Here are two examples. Christian medical social service Many non-Christians work in ‘Christian’ hospitals, care centres, rehabilitation centres and so on. These institutions were set up by concerned Christians. Their policy is still based on the confessional convictions of their founders, but their public is much larger. They are an important and indispensible part of the national health care systems in every European country.

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Christian schools The same can be said of confessional Christian schools. In countries with a state school system, Protestant and Roman Catholic schools attract many pupils from non-Christian families. Even Muslim parents often prefer to send their children to a Christian school when there are no Muslim schools nearby, considering that they at least teach respect for the Creator. Catholic private schools in France and southern European countries enjoy a high reputation for the quality of education, the level of discipline and the attention paid to individual pupils. Many secularised parents send their children to these schools, accepting the religious instruction as part of the package.

13.7. Christian political presence Although there is an official separation between church and state in virtually all European countries, Christianity is present on the political scene. Some individual politicians, while belonging to a secular political party, explicitly relate their action to the Christian faith. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair is an example. In several countries, there are ‘Christian’ political parties, sometimes closely linked to a particular denomination. They endeavour to apply Christian and Biblical principles to current political issues. Interestingly, these parties not only draw support from an identifiable Christian constituency but also from people who are not affiliated with any church. This wider electorate approves of the political program of such parties, or just the performance of their leader. Consequently, Christian politicians and parties can obtain election results that outweigh the number of potential Christian voters. Examples are the Christian democratic parties in several highly secularised countries. In some countries (Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands) they have at certain times even succeeded in obtaining the post of prime minister. Again, this political presence today is the fruit of consistent Christian political involvement in the pluralistic democracies of Europe, throughout the preceding centuries. As such, it is part of the Christian heritage.

13.8. Implications for Christians Besides formidable barriers, European societies also present us with typical bridges for the Gospel. As Christians we are in a privileged situation. The message we wish to communicate has been influencing our societies for many ages and left many traces. Elements of Christianity are present everywhere around us. They become bridges for communicating Biblical truth. Here are some venues of action and further reflection.

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Explain Christian heritage There is a rich Christian heritage in every European country. It is there for everybody to see and hear and read and touch and visit. But who will be a guide? Many people visit cathedrals without understanding their symbolism. They enjoy sacred music and admire famous paintings of Biblical persons without understanding the real meaning. They use the benefits of hospitals and school that were once Christian institutions, but they have no idea why and how they came about. They give their children names of Christian saints while ignoring their history. Here we have a countless number of bridges for the Biblical message. We only have to explain, simply explain. Because we are familiar with the Bible, we have the key to unlock the meaning of this rich cultural heritage to our contemporaries. As Christians we are ideally equipped to explain European culture to our contemporaries who are ignorant of its background. Christian heritage centres have developed in several locations that organise lectures and heritage tours.’ The last thing is not difficult; every church can do it. Throughout Europe there are things that will interest a wider public. People are generally fond of discovering culture, ranging from local music to local cuisine and local customs, and also natural sites with a history, architecture, and so on. In most cases, there is a link with the history of the church. Find out about it and transmit it to others. David Brown, General Secretary of the French Evangelical Student Movement, Groupes Bibliques Universitaires, and pastor of a new church community in Paris, has worked hard to set up an exhibition to show the unfolding story of salvation by using Christian cultural heritage. He has selected sixteen paintings of well known painters, from Leonardo da Vinci and Rembrandt to Goya and Van Gogh. Each painting represents a Biblical story. Placing them in a certain order tells the story of creation, the fall, and salvation, from Genesis to Revelation. In a very well done glossy brochure, he offers background information about the artists and the story of each particular painting. He also invites the visitor to try and place his personal history in this grand story. In so doing he uses Christian cultural heritage as a bridge to communicate the Gospel. He is wise enough to do this implicitly! Give visitors the freedom to look for themselves, and to ask further questions if they like. Christian institutions – where the world meets the message A second avenue to pursue is the presence of schools, universities, hospitals, nurseries, rehabilitation centres, libraries, holiday resorts, and so many other institutions all over Europe – even to a certain extent, albeit limited, in countries where communist rule has destroyed so much of this institutional heritage. These institutions have been created by Christians and still have a confessional base. Even sport clubs! That is where the world can meet the message, provided

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we do not let the Christian identity be further diluted in larger structures that have a neutral character. Several European countries have trade unions and political parties with a confessional base. While they have been created to defend the position of Christians, they attract many people outside the visible church community. Christian views on social and political issues receive tremendous exposure through these organisations. There is a growing awareness among politicians today that the state cannot and should not attend to everything that needs to be taken care of. There is a tendency to limit the scope of the welfare state, while keeping vital services intact. Politicians recognize the need for intermediate organisations to play a crucial role in providing education, welfare, medical care, and so on. This leaves more room for institutions with a Christian identity to serve a wider public. In so doing, they give credibility to the message of the church.

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Chapter 14

The mixed balance of history The legacy of Christianity is not altogether glorious. There are things to be proud of; there are also things to be ashamed of. Everyone involved in communicating the Gospel in one part of Europe or another will have the same experience: so many people want to stay away from the message because of the negative picture of Christianity in general, and church institutions in particular. The negative record of Christians is always a major hindrance for evangelism, but nowhere is the criticism levelled against Christianity as widespread and as strong as in Europe. The negative image of Christianity is largely based on its past record. The problem is that this characterization contains a considerable amount of truth. Europe is marked by the influence of Christianity, but not always in a positive way. Churches have often played a dubious role, to say the least. One thinks, for example, of the violent persecution of so-called heretics, dissenters and non-conformists by the combined forces of church and state authorities. Today Europeans have lost much of the feeling of superiority they had in the past. Instead, they have become critical of their own history. In this context, people are very much aware of what church leaders and lay Christians have done wrong in the past. Sadly, blame is often levelled against European Christianity as a whole. Sometimes Christianity is discredited as far as its place in the public sphere is concerned. Many secularised people hold to the opinion that it is alright for people to practice their faith in the private sphere, but don’t want the church to try and dominate the public sphere, or influence the political debate so as to impose its views. Enough of that has happened in the past. Generalisations always fall short of reality. The categorical criticisms levelled against ‘the church’ are no exception. When we look at history, we have to admit that much harm has been done in the name of Christianity, but also recognize that Christians were often the first to speak out in protest against that. This should also be taken into account. So let us set the record straight.

14.1. Setting the record straight The late archbishop of Paris, Cardinal Jean-Marie Lustiger (a Jesus believing Jew), has repeatedly challenged both timid Christians and staunch critics of religious involvement in the public place to set the historical record straight. ‘Part of the

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challenge we face today is to recognize that Europe (and indeed the entire West) is suffering from a false story about itself, and about the relationship of Biblical religion to its formation and its history.167 In his frequent appeal to critically engage modern culture so as to remind it of its indebtedness to Christianity, the American Roman Catholic author George Weigel asserted that ‘the Church needs to be vindicated from the “black legends” that circulate around its history, such as the Crusades, Galileo’s trial and the Inquisition.’168 However, there is no room for triumphalism. We should understand these statements in the context of the debate with those who defend a secular humanist approach to the development of modern society. Certainly, it is a good thing to correct the negative view of the role of the church. But when we set the record straight, we should not overstate the case by emphasising only the positive side of it while underestimating or even ignoring the notorious role it has often played. It is a matter of intellectual honesty to recognize sins, to rectify false teaching, and to ask forgiveness for the wrong that has been done. Cardinal Walter Kasper strikes the necessary honest tone, when he says: Besides the magnificence of Europe, there is also the misery and the shameful history of Europe. Europe has often betrayed its high ideals: in the crusades, in the religious wars, in the colonising of other peoples, in two world wars and at least in the Shoa, the destruction of European Jewry. Theses dark sides of our history have contributed to an uncertainty of our identity. 169

Wim Rietkerk concurs. He cautions that when we only put forward the positive outcomes of Christianity, this can easily smack of Eurocentrism. We should beware of doing that because Europe has hardly been a good example. In fact, when taking stock today of so many centuries of European history, we should all be very regretful. Right from the beginning there was a deep sinfulness and violence in European culture, in which church and state conspired together. The same Charlemagne who created a form of European unity, killed 4500 Saxons in one day because they did not want to be baptised and enter the Christian world.

167 Quoted by the American author Georg Weigel in his address during the Lustiger Symposium at the Collège des Bernardins in Paris, 11 February 2010. 168 Idem. 169 Walter Kasper, public address at the occasion of the 70th anniversary of Erwin Teufel, former Prime Minister of Baden-Württemberg, in Tübingen, 12 October 2009.

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Later came the crusades, then the religious wars, then slavery, then colonialism, and finally, in the twentieth century, Europe burst into flames during two world wars. Hardly a history to be proud of at all!170

However, we should not go to the other extreme and become so guilt-laden that we no longer dare to speak positively of the blessings of the Christian heritage. Moreover, when we admit the complicity of the church in the shameful events of the past, we should also recognize the Christian counter movements and individual voices that spoke out against it, in the name of faith. We mention a few examples.

14.2. Complicity with injustice, protests and alternatives European Christianity has been blamed for suppressing freedom, condoning warfare, fuelling feelings of nationalism and racism, supporting slavery, collaborating with colonialism, and inventing capitalism, to name but the most frequent accusations. Going over this list and looking back to what happened, we notice that Christianity was part of the problem and at the same time a source of protest and reform. The Church became her own critic The cross was the supporting beam of the power structures of states in alliance with the church, but at the same time it was the thorn in the flesh of those who used their power for their own interests only. It is the French historian, Jacques Dalarun, who remarks on this in his study of medieval Christianity and the question of governance. As a specialist in medieval history he cannot but acknowledge that this period was marked by the absolute ideological domination of Christianity. But the Church also transmitted the words of Christ that was very critical of the abuse of power. This critical attitude towards power structures, which is intrinsic to the Gospel, caused people to have fundamental doubts about the established order of their day, and indeed of all sorts of power politics.’ As a result, the church became her own critic! We should not forget that the Church in the past has often been subservient to the established powers, but time and time again there was a return to the Gospel which put Christians in opposition to a society where people were treated

170 Wim Rietkerk, ‘God’s Experiment’. See bibliography for details [16 May 2010].

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unequally, on the basis of birth or physical power. On the one hand, there was the world of warriors and princes where people were heavily dominated. On the other hand, there were the monasteries, where the abbot was the servant of all servants. One could say that these were two opposing models. In reality, they created a tension, a permanent dialectic.171

Dalarun shows that the monasteries developed a form of democracy, based on the model ‘to govern is to serve.’ He corrects the generally accepted idea that the history of modern democracy started with the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, which adopted the democratic model of Athens and the Greek philosophers in Antiquity. ‘We cannot just jump from the Enlightenment to Antiquity, and say that the Church in the meantime has contributed next to nothing to modern democracy,’ he argues. ‘Of course, the medieval Church did not invent it, but there have been real attempts to develop democratic forms of governance on a limited scale.’172 All over the Christian world there have been repeated attempts to confront kings and rulers with the Biblical demands of justice, equity and mercy. The voice of the Bible offered checks and balances to political power. Several parliaments came in existence because the leading class of citizens presented the princes with their demands. To this we should add the forms of governance developed by followers of the Protestant Reformers in the Netherlands during the seventeenth century. In their model, the prince did not have absolute power, he could govern in collaboration with the representatives of property-owning citizens. This model influenced Enlightenment thinkers as they developed their ideas of representative democracy. What we are saying, then, is that the church has played more than one role. While we can blame Christians for being compliant with power politics, intolerance and the like, we should also give credit to Christians who have been inspired by the Gospel to take alternative positions. In the following, we shall mention and shortly discuss five accusations levelled against European Christianity. Intolerance and freedom First on the list is the issue of intolerance and freedom. Mariano Delgado has taken up the challenge and prepared a defence. He explains that Europe was for many centuries a ‘Christian project.’ The church and the state worked together

171 Jacques Dalarun, interview in La Croix, 28 September 2012, in which he comments on his book Gouverner c’est servir. 172 Idem.

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to develop a corpus christianum. But the seeds of the Gospel were gradually yielding other fruits that were not to the liking of the institutional church: fruits of individual freedom, equality, and brotherhood based on respect for the innate value of each individual human being. Enlightenment philosophers reaped them, and the French Revolution made them the foundational marks of a new social order, in which there was no place for a dominant and privileged church. But why was this Revolution so vehemently anticlerical? Why did it choose the slogan Ni Dieu, ni maître (‘neither God nor master’)? Why did its militants ransack convents, turn monasteries into military barracks and church buildings into stables? Why all of that, only in order to implement ideas that were essentially rooted in the Biblical message that every human being is created in the image of God? On the one hand, the French Revolution would not have been possible without the experience of Europe as a Christian project. On the other hand, we must acknowledge that a secular Humanism also developed that did not need to refer explicitly to Christianity as its foundation, a Humanism that considered Christianity to be its negative flipside, precisely in the area of religious freedom. Delgado explains: This human right of freedom, which is so dear to us nowadays and which is an indispensable element of the Christian view of man, also in the eyes of the Church, had to be fought for in a fierce battle with the intertwining forces of state and Christianity, in the French Revolution. Only through this battle did this alliance of state and church, in which Christianity was considered to be the public religion of society, collapse in the western world. This was mainly the consequence of the religious wars and the experience that religion opposed people instead of being the basis of peaceful living together in one society. 173

We should not forget that the development of the religious neutrality of the state and of a secular pluralistic society came about in this historical situation of the western world. In those days the religious parties were unable to relate the official and obligatory character of this religion to every individual person’s right to freedom of belief and conscience. In order to realise the personal right of freedom, the state put an end to its amalgamation with the dominant religion. When Mariano Delgado describes this conflict, he thinks mainly of Roman Catholic countries. There, the opposition of the secular state to the institutional church has been fierce, as he himself points out:

173 Mariano Delgado, ‘Europa als christliches Projekt,’ in: Urs Altermatt, Europa: ein christliches Projekt, p. 52. Our translation from German.

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With her faith in the moral equality and the freedom of all human beings, the church had laid the foundation of freedom but she did not understand the logical consequence of this faith, namely a society based on the equality of all citizens and the autonomy of secular political authorities. Those who fought for personal freedom saw the church in those days as a barrier, or even as an enemy, so they became anticlerical. The idea of equality and freedom that had been fostered by the church turned against the institutional church.174

In countries where Protestantism was the dominant form of Christianity, this conflict was not so intense. Nevertheless, the institutional Protestant churches in their alliance with monarchs and emperors have also been a hindrance to the development of individual freedom. On the other hand, we should not forget that Christians were the first to strive for freedom. Think of the persecuted Protestants in France and the nonconformists in England who appealed to the individual conscience of the believer over and against doctrinal and political tyranny. They formulated the principle of freedom of conscience and the freedom to practice one’s religion, according to one’s conviction. This principle became a foundational element for Enlightenment philosophers and the American Revolution. It was included in the ‘Human and Citizens Rights,’ promulgated after the French Revolution, and integrated into the constitutions of all modern states. Colonialism Another black page of our history is colonialism. European Christianity is often put wholly on the side of colonialism, but notice that it not for religious motives but for reasons of commerce, protection of trade routes, development of plantations, exploitation of natural resources and extending political power that several European nations set up colonial empires. It was a matter of imperialism, not of Christian mission. It was for gold and silver that the Spanish explored the Americas and subdued its indigenous peoples. It was for lucrative commerce that the Portuguese set up colonies along the newly explored trade routes. Once the process of colonisation had begun, the pope came in with the demand that the Roman Church be implanted in the colonies. So Franciscan, Dominican and Jesuit envoys went out to Christianize the indigenous people. It is at this point that the imbrications of colonialism and mission began, and the church has been blamed for this ever since. The accusation is that Christianity simply supported colonialism and condoned its excesses. A closer look reveals that the truth is a bit more complicated and less negative than that.

174 Idem.

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The missionaries set up mission stations with farms, schools, medical hospices, churches (including choirs, church bells and church organs!). Many major cities in Latin America and in the USA have grown out of these missions. San Diego and San Francisco are well known examples. Historian Dana Roberts explains that the reasons for building them where twofold. ‘The overriding concern was pragmatic for missionaries: the need to grow food for themselves and their converts. Successful food production and the provision of water resources were not only necessary for survival. At the same time, they were, in the minds of both missionaries and converts, a visible symbol of the superiority of Christianity over traditional ways of life.’175 Christian mission developed under the umbrella of colonial rule that offered missionaries protection and land. Following the feudal European pattern, the conquerors gave land rights to colonists and church leaders, so that they became lords over the indigenous people. However, while they profited from the colonial system and seriously limited the freedom of local people, missionaries were also highly critical of its excesses. They defended land of indigenous people against pressure from colonists to apprehend it. They openly challenged the idea, defended by European rulers and theologians, that Indigenous people were an inferior race, or perhaps sub-human and that they could therefore be exploited and relegated to an inferior status. These are men and women created in the image of God, they protested, just like Europeans. One of them, Bartholomeas de Dias, even went to a dispute organised by the king of Spain to defend this point of view. Later on, Protestant nations developed their colonial empires. They also acted for economic gain and political power, but again missionaries followed the merchants and the soldiers. They also set up mission stations, with schools and churches and farms, for the same reasons that the Catholics had done this earlier, but contrary to the procedure in Catholic colonies mentioned above, they had to buy their land. Dana Roberts explains that the acquisition of mission stations ‘required complex negotiations among missionaries, chiefs or local rulers, and the colonial powers. Since missionaries brought with them Western education and medical care, and acted as mediators with the colonial officials, local leaders competed with each other to have their own resident missionary.’ She goes on to cite two telling examples of the way in which the Christian mission often acted in favour of the indigenous population, against the interests of colonists and governors:

175 Dana Roberts, Christian Mission, p. 107.

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In 1833, a Sotho leader named Moshoeshoe invited two missionaries from the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society to become his counsellors and to move his people toward Christianity and Western education. With the assistance of the missionaries, Moshoeshoe was able to consolidate the boundaries of what became Lesotho and prevent its takeover by white colonists. Similar missionary assistance prevented Botswana from being incorporated into white-dominated South Africa.176

Regularly, colonial rulers seized land and allocated it to the major church denomination of their own country, expecting the missionaries to civilize the so-called ‘natives.’ Christian mission was seen as a useful way to do that, all the more so since the missionaries themselves were motivated to introduce European education, medical care, manners and organisation as part of the new, Christian way of life. We should add that Enlightenment thinkers accepted colonialism, if only for the time being, because they saw it as a means to civilize the dominated peoples. This was the good end that justified questionable means. Only very few ‘enlightened’ minds raised questions with respect to the objective as. Generally speaking, European nations found that adopting their civilisation was a form of progress. .177 However, missionaries were also the first to recognize the value of indigenous cultures, to defend the rights of indigenous peoples, and to oppose the greedy exploitation of their lands by European companies. Slavery and abolitionist movements Closely connected to colonialism is another dark side of European history; slavery. Again, blame is often levelled against Christianity for having condoned and even supported this tragedy that went on for more than three centuries and which has left indelible an mark even today. Slavery as such is not an invention of the ‘Christian’ Europeans. Already in Biblical times, slavery existed to different degrees, from servitude to bonded labour and cruel exploitation. In ancient Israel there were also slaves, but the way in which they should be treated according to the Torah was exceptionally humane at that time. After seven years, any bonded servant should be given the opportunity to become a free man! The Greeks and the Romans had slaves – and looked down on them. The economy of the Roman Empire was even built on this system. The Arabs traded slaves from East Africa to the north.

176 Dana Roberts, op cit., p. 108-109. 177 See chapter 3.3 ‘Europe as Civilisation’.

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Even so, these parallels in history do not take away the gravity of the facts: European merchants captured more than thirty million Africans, shipped them to the other side of the Atlantic, and sold the survivors as slaves to European planters in the colonies. Having emptied their ships of their human ‘load,’ they filled them with sugar and other products, which they sold in the markets of western Europe, as well as gold and silver. This triangular trade was extremely lucrative; it made merchants wealthy and secured the prosperity of cities like Lisbon, Cadiz, Nantes, Amsterdam and London. To the slave trade we should add the system of slavery. ‘Christian’ masters treated their African slaves as less than human. Given the treatment these people had to endure, it is all the more incredible that they accepted the Gospel presented to them by evangelists who were more often than not financially supported by the churches of the plantation owners. It cannot be denied that theologians have defended slavery. Churches have not disciplined members who clearly violated Biblical commandments with regards to their slaves. One could be a slave trader and a church member without any problem. The system was condoned by Roman Catholic and Protestant clergy alike. So is Christianity to be blamed for having sanctioned this horrible and repulsive treatment of millions of Africans? Yes and no. While many church leaders collaborated, others resisted. While some preachers of the Word appealed to the Old Testament to justify the slave trade and the slave system, others appealed to the same Bible to speak out in protest. It was only a matter of time before the seeds of human dignity and ‘love your neighbour as thyself’ began to yield the fruit of a movement calling for the abolition of the slave trade and slavery. The first abolitionists were evangelists in the eighteenth century. Some Enlightenment philosophers were won for the same cause, though others did not seem to bother. It is striking that the founding fathers of the US, who were very much influenced by Enlightenment philosophy, based their constitution on the principle that ‘all men are born equal and merit therefore freedom and happiness,’ but did not extend these rights to the black population that suffered on the plantations. The French Revolution revealed similar contradictions. While the deputies in the National Assembly abolished the cruel slave trade, it maintained the system of slavery. Many leaders of the so-called abolitionist movements were Evangelical Christians: Gospel preachers, pastors, politicians, writers, including converted slave traders such as John Newton. Most famous among them is perhaps English member of parliament, William Wilberforce. It was mainly due to his influence that the British government abolished the slave trade in 1807. But slavery continued. Abolitionists had to fight a long battle with politicians concerned with economic interests and fellow Christians condoning the system to have it abrogated. But their movement could not be stopped. In

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the course of the nineteenth century, abolitionists succeeded in influencing public opinion and convincing reticent politicians to put an end to this scandal in the Christian world. Great Britain was the first to do so. In 1833 it adopted the Slavery Abolition Act that outlawed slavery in the entire British Empire. A copy was brought to William Wilberforce on his deathbed; it was read out to him only days before he passed away. The struggle in the US was much more difficult. The southern states didn’t want to give it up. It took a bloody four-year civil war before black Americans obtained freedom and civil rights (1858). Their segregation continued, only to be abolished in the 1960s under the pressure of the civil rights movement, lead by yet another Gospel preacher, Martin Luther King Jr. Capitalism and Christian social movements We mention a third dark side, although not everybody would agree to what extent this was indeed a negative part of European history: capitalism and the Industrial Revolution. The latter was based on (1) the application of science and technology to production processes and new products; (2) an effective division of labour; (3) the distinction between capital and means of production on the one hand and labour on the other hand. From the outset, industrialisation and capitalism went hand in hand. As profits for investors far outweighed the wages for labourers, the gulf between rich and poor widened. But investors could also lose all their capital overnight, a risk that is not often appreciated in criticisms of capitalism. The Industrial Revolution accelerated economic development and made mass consumption possible; it led to the modern consumers’ society, first in Europe and the USA, and then in other parts of the world. But the industrialisation also brought exploitation of workers, unhealthy working conditions and deplorable housing conditions, uprooted family life, child labour and other forms of social injustice. It also deepened the rift between rich and poor. Reactions to these negative effects of capitalism combined with industrialisation were diverse. The most powerful ones were socialism and communism, based on the theories of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. These movements did not reject industrialisation as such but the capitalist economic system. Towards the turn of the twentieth century, there was a divide between revolutionary communism on the one hand, and evolutionary socialism on the other hand. The latter accepted multiparty democracy and strove to reach its goal through peaceful means within the present system. This has in due time become social democracy. It should be noted that communism and social democracy are European phenomena though they have spread to other parts of the world, where they have taken on a local colour. We have Chinese and Cuban style communism, African and Latin American versions of socialism, but this does not alter the origin of the basic ideas.

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What about the church? It cannot be denied that church leaders and Christian entrepreneurs have supported both capitalism and industrialisation. Moreover, many Christians took a position against socialism and communism because they were put off by the anti-religious rhetoric of these movements. However, there is another side to the coin. In the course of nineteenth century, Protestant and Roman Catholic social movements developed. Social justice was their agenda, the Bible their source of inspiration. They protested against the capitalist exploitation of industrial workers. At the same time they provided an alternative to the communist secularist agenda in which there was no place for religion. Proponents of this Christian counter-current are the Social Gospel movement in the United States, the Christian Socialists in the UK, the ‘Reveil’ movement and Abraham Kuyper in the Netherlands, and various Christian politicians and entrepreneurs who worked for social reforms such as Lord Shaftesbury in England and Raiffeissen in Germany. One also thinks of the call of the Roman Catholic Church for social justice (e.g. the famous document Rerum novarum). As for the Ecumenical Movement in the twentieth century, it has always strongly emphasised the need to defend the rights of the poor, and to liberate them from oppressive economic structures. Granted, these individuals and movements were not welcomed by the whole of the Christian community. They were often suspected of socialist sympathies; a very serious ‘sin’ in the eyes of their brethren. Free enterprise, free market and individual competition were widely favoured; the economic disparities between rich and poor were often accepted as an inevitable evil in a fallen world order. Then there was the Calvinist idea that material wealth was God’s reward for industriousness and prudent management of financial resources. Here we notice again the dual role of European Christianity. On the one hand, it has fostered capitalism and accepted the conditions of the Industrial Revolution so that it contributed indirectly to its negative effects. On the other hand, it has given birth to movements that were highly critical of this development. Christian politicians have played an active role in implementing laws putting an end to social injustice. Christian organisations have done much to relieve the social and economic distress of working people. Anti-Semitism and solidarity with Jews We cannot review the historical record of European Christianity without mentioning Christian anti-Judaism. Certainly, the problem is older than the church. Anti-Semitism was already widespread in the Roman Empire and Persian Empire as the Book of Esther makes clear. But when Christianity became the established religion in the east and west of Europe, it fuelled these age-old antiSemitic sentiments in a dramatic way. Throughout many centuries, the church rejected the Jews as a nation, suppressed their religious practice, accused the Jews of having murdered Christ, and took discriminatory measures by enclosing

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them in ghettos. In so doing, the church fostered popular anti-Semitism, and this in turn has made it possible for the Shoa, this tragedy of all European tragedies, to take place in the most Christianised of all continents. Did the Shoa happen despite Europe’s Christian roots, or as a result of them? Is the church to be blamed? Yes and no. While the church has practiced antiJudaism, some of her members have emphasised that the Jews are still God’s chosen people and that they be should be respected as such. While most theologians taught that the promises of the prophets with respect to the future restoration of Israel applied in a spiritual sense to the church, some theologians maintained that they still apply to the Jewish people. While most Christian folk did not care at all about what would become of the Jewish people, some Christians helped Jews return to their homeland, pleaded the cause of Jews who were accused of treason, sheltered Jews who were persecuted, and saved Jews from being killed. Yes there are Christian anti-Semites, but there have also been Christian friends of the Jewish people. Conclusion We conclude that European Christianity has brought great blessing but also done considerable harm. This chapter, as well as the preceding one about Europe’s Christian heritage have demonstrated this. Our conclusion is that by and large Christianity has been a blessing for Europe. We say this without ignoring the problematic elements of its past record, the many things that we should be ashamed of as heirs of our Christian forefathers. In the final analysis, the balance sheet shows a positive result indeed!

14.3. Theological interpretations of ‘Europe’ From a human point of view we could leave it at that, but as believers we want to consider another aspect as well, i.e. the theological significance of it all. We believe that God intervenes in the affairs of human individuals and families and peoples. Wherever the divinely revealed Word is announced the Holy Spirit works to bring it to fruition. The Spirit continues to work in the people who live according to this message after the example of Christ. And this has an effect on their surroundings, the social structures in which they live. We believe in common grace illuminating man’s notions of good and evil. We believe in divine providence. We believe that God brings about his plans, interacting in a mysterious way with the affairs of men and women on this earth. All this sounds like solid theology to Evangelical ears. But if we affirm this, what does this imply for the case of Europe? This continent has been exposed for a long time and so intensively to the message of the Bible and to the active presence of Christian churches – more than any other part of the world. It seems

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difficult, then, to escape the conclusion that God is somehow involved in the development of European cultures and societies. Moreover, we should do justice to the work of God through the Christian church in Europe’s history, and not attribute all the results of the prolonged influence of the Biblical message to human factors only. The question is how do we relate the human scene to God’s influence. What is our theological interpretation of the phenomenon of ‘Europe?’ Where is God’s hand in all of this? Several theologians have formulated answers to this question, trying to do justice to both the positive and the negative results of European Christianity. God’s experiment? Believing that God has revealed basic moral values and a notion of his existence to all mankind, in the conscience of every individual, Wim Rietkerk asks the question: how is it possible that European cultures developed in such a specific way, different from those of other peoples? He qualifies Europe as ‘God’s experiment’178 – an expression borrowed from Anton van Ruler, a Dutch Reformed theologian who wrote, in the decade following the Second World War: The Holy Spirit converted pagan hearts but at the same time He created out of them a Christianised culture. The sinful pagan existence was not removed but renewed. God’s purpose was a visible demonstration of the coming Kingdom as a foretaste of what would happen when Jesus would come back and when all of creation will be renewed. Looking at the history of Europe against the backdrop of the work of the Holy Spirit [in societies and cultures], it was an attempt of God to give a foretaste of the coming Kingdom.179

We find this formulation too optimistic. It does not keep the necessary distance between the sinful world of Europe and the Kingdom of God. While developing the idea of Europe as God’s experiment, Wim Rietkerk employs the image of gradually moving towards a synthesis. For centuries, Christianity was dominant, while paganism and humanism remained the undercurrent. At the time of the Enlightenment this began to change. By the twentieth century, the undercurrent of a non-Biblical world view has become dominant, and Christianity an undercurrent. ‘We could perhaps see this as God’s judgment on Europe,’ he comments. ‘Observing our situation today, our response should first be one of real mourning, of repentance and of prayer.’

178 Wim Rietkerk, op. cit. 179 Quoted by Wim Rietkerk, op. cit.

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Fruits of the fruits of the fruits of the Spirit Theologian and noted critic of modern western culture Francis Schaeffer asked: how is it possible that many individuals are not Christian but that the norms and values of our society circle around Christian values? His explains that ‘the key elements of European civilisation are the fruits of the fruits of the fruits of the Spirit.’ It is like a stone thrown in the water, creating ever wider concentric circles. The further away from the first impact of the stone, the vaguer the circle. It starts with the individual. The fruits of the Spirit in the individual begin in their own lives, and then create institutions and values in a culture, which make it possible also for non-Christians to participate [in the wider effects of Christian presence] and so share in the fruits of the fruits of the fruits of the Spirit. 180

The flip side of this is the dual attitude of many people today. They recognize the important influence Christianity has had on the past, but they consider it irrelevant for society today. While they applaud the social actions of the church in favour of the poor, they do not find her message of salvation relevant for today’s problems. Our society is attached to the fruits of the fruits of the Christian message, on a social and cultural and educational level, but the primary fruit of a restored, reconciled relationship with God is left aside as a private affair of those who believe in Him. Wheat and tares We would propose another interpretation of the phenomenon of Europe. It is like the field in the parable of Jesus where wheat is sown but other seeds as well. Both grow together (Matthew 13). This seems a suitable image. Christianity has sown much good seed and this has produced wheat, yet other religions and philosophies have sown their ideas, values, images of God and man. This has produced all kinds of weeds that hamper the development of the grain. For the time being, until the coming of our Lord, it is impossible to separate the two without doing harm to the good seed. So we have to accept a situation like that of a field with a mixed produce. Sadly, the weeds limit the quality of the crops. On the other hand, the good seed coming up limits the proliferation of the seeds sown by the ‘enemy’ in the hearts and minds of our fellow Europeans. The presence of the church as light and salt and leaven in society is a restraint, preventing the field from being completely dominated by the weeds. We need to add that this image is not as simple as it might seem at first glance. The wheat is not wholly on the Christian side, nor are the weeds only

180 Quoted by Wim Rietkerk, op. cit.

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found ‘in the world.’ Jesus used this image in connection with the Kingdom of God. The Kingdom is not to be equated with visible forms of Christianity. Weed is being sown in the world, but also in the minds of individual believers, in church communities, in Christian institutions. That’s why European Christianity has not only brought blessing to society, but also harm. Cautions The parable of the wheat and the tares makes us cautious. It invites us to be honest about ourselves. It also invites us to detect the weeds in our midst. We should discern all spiritual values, worldviews and political promises against which we come up, in the world as well as in our own midst, putting them to the test of God’s Word, in order to retain what is good. Another caution is that we are not in a position to uproot all weeds so as to create an ideal society. When Christianity was the majority religion, Christians often sought to prematurely ‘pull the weeds’ of other creeds and faiths by legally imposing (their form of) Christianity on everyone else. This has lead to intolerance and persecution. This in turn has alienated many people from a living faith in Jesus Christ. When Christians were in a minority position, they have often sought to prematurely ‘get away from the weeds’ by isolating themselves from society and culture, only to discover that weeds were growing up in the midst of their subculture, even in the splendid isolation of monasteries and individual prayer cells! In other words, there is no way of escaping the harsh reality that there is no wheat without weeds. As for us, we are called to sow the good seed, so that our societies can benefit from its fruit and be nourished by it. The image also stimulates us to make a positive contribution to society. We cannot prevent weeds from growing up, but instead of lamenting the sort of Europe under the influence of materialism, secularism, esoteric thought, nationalism, violent fundamentalism of all sorts, anti-Christian sentiments, counter-Biblical ethics and what have you, we can follow the advice of Paul that only by doing good will we overcome evil. So we want the seed of the Gospel to spread, sprout, grow and yield fruit, in churches as well as in societies at large.

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Chapter 15

In what ways is Europe post-Christian? In terms of religion and society, Europe presents us with a paradox: No other region in the world has been exposed to the Biblical message and the influence of the church for such a prolonged and intensive way as Europe. At the same time, nowhere is the abandonment of the Christian faith and the retreat from institutional churches as wide-spread as in Europe, and nowhere else has this been going on for such a prolonged period of time. Ours is not only the continent of beautiful cathedrals but also the continent of almost empty beautiful cathedrals, of chapels in ruins, deserted monasteries, church buildings turned into cultural centres, shops or apartments, or converted to mosques. Once Europe was the heartland of worldwide Christian mission, now it has become a major mission field. Our societies are now multi-religious and non-religious. Ours is the most secularised of all continents. Present day European societies and cultures are not only the outcome of the age-old influence of Christianity, but also deeply influenced by modes of thought and movements that deliberately distance themselves from Christianity. They are rooted in Biblical values and a Christian worldview but also marked by secularisation in politics and public life, by modes of thought that more or less have rejected traditional doctrines and ethical claims of Christianity. This is the paradox of Europe: its societies are marked as much by the Christian faith as by its abandonment and rejection. Failing to take into account the two sides of the coin leads to misrepresentations. Either we draw a picture that is too optimistic with respect to the influence of the church, or we depict an image that is too much the opposite. Two questions flow from this paradox. Firstly, in what sense has Europe become post-Christian? Secondly, to what extent are European societies still influenced by the Christian faith? In this chapter, we shall take up the first question.

15.1. Post-Christianised It is commonplace today to say that Europe is post-Christian. However, statements to this effect lack precision. In what sense has it become post-Christian? Or is it perhaps post-something-else? When we examine it more closely, the term post-Christian means different things, depending on the context in which this term is used.

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Christianity has not been relegated to the past Firstly, it can mean that Christianity has been relegated to the past, and that society is emancipated from its influence. Granted, Christianity is no longer the dominant religion. Looking at the dramatic decline of religious practice in Europe over the last century, at least in quantitative terms, some commentators have come close to suggesting that further de-Christianisation is inevitable, and that the ‘death of Christianity’ is only a matter of time. Claire Berlinski claims that ‘Europe has in the past several centuries seen a complete – really complete – loss of belief in any form of religious belief.’ But this is a ‘gross exaggeration,’ as Philip Jenkins rightly comments. Having quoted this author, he estimates that ‘Europe still has a solid minority of committed believing Christians.’181 Neither Europe as a whole nor any single European country can be called postChristian in the sense that Christianity no longer counts, that it has disappearing from the scene. Even though practicing Christians represent a minority of the population, they constitute an important and influential minority. They are the largest of all religious communities in Europe. It is true that everywhere in Europe, church membership is dwindling. But there are also vibrant churches. Evangelical Christianity in particular, to which we should also reckon Pentecostalism, shows stability and growth. Another sign of vitality is the charismatic movement in the Roman Catholic Church. Moreover, the number of migrant churches is increasing, while some existing countries have been revitalised by the presence of Christians from other parts of the world. How Christian was Europe in the past? Saying that Europe has become post-Christian presupposes that it once was Christian. But was it ever that, really? The answer depends of course on how we define ‘Christians.’ If the definition is ‘born again’ or ‘having accepted Jesus as personal Saviour and Lord,’ the answer is definitely no. Europe has never been Christian in this sense. But these notions are typically Evangelical. Many churches used other criteria. If you define Christians in terms of ‘discipleship’ or ‘active church membership,’ you will be disappointed by the history of Europe. Even though Christianity was the official religion, many people were not very keen to live by all its principles. For centuries, priests and pastors have complained of low church-attendance. For most people, religious practice was limited to certain rituals at certain times. Read the Pensées of Blaise Pascal and you will notice that a lifestyle-as-if-God-

181 Philip Jenkins, God’s Continent, p. 56.

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does-not-exist was already a phenomenon in seventeenth century France! Lamenting reports of concerned Anglican ministers of the state of religion in eighteenth-century England describe a totally depressing situation. Not even during the Reformation or the religious upsurges in the Middle Ages was the majority of the European population to be found in church every Sunday; far from it. Surveys have shown that the golden age of active participation in church life and involvement in mission in the English-speaking world and in Protestant Europe was the period between 1750 till the end of the nineteenth century. In the past, Europe has never been totally Christian in the sense that everybody was a believer in Jesus. There were always many non-Christians to be evangelised, disconnected church members to be reached, new generations to be educated in the faith, churches to be reformed, unjust structures to be changed, social evil to be dealt with, and societies in want of Christian values. Post-Christianised However, there is a difference between the present and former times. For ages, society was Christianised, which means that Christian morals served as the frame of reference for legislation, social norms, public life and private life. This is no longer the case. Practising believers are a minority among other minorities. Their principles of conduct are in many respects at variance with those of the mainstream population. The public sphere is now largely disconnected from Christian norms and values. This did not happen overnight and the process is still going on. The degree of de-Christianisation varies from country to country, but the overall tendency in Europe is that Christianity is losing ground in terms of numbers and of influence in society.

15.2. Post-Constantinian (Christendom) A second way in which Europe can be called post-Christianised is that we are witnessing the end of an era in which society and politics were dominated by the combined influence of the institutional church and the state. This era and this system are called Constantinian, after the first Roman emperor to embrace Christianity, Constantine the Great. In his famous Edict of Milan in 313 he put an end to the long series of persecutions of churches in the Roman Empire. He granted Christianity the status of religio licita, ‘officially permitted religion.’ Here we have the beginning of Christendom, based on the alliance between throne and altar.

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Constantinian alliance of throne and altar In English publications, this system is often called Christendom, not to be confounded with Christianity.182 We prefer the designation Constantinianism, which is used in other languages. A lucid description has been given by the Dutch scholar of cultural history, Feitse Boerwinkel, already in 1974.183 We will follow his presentation. After Constantine the Great had made Christianity the official religion of the ruling class, it soon became the privileged religion of the empire as a whole. From that time onwards, ‘the state wants the invincible church to be the guarantee for its own existence.’184 Roman religions were based on the foundational principle do ut des, ‘I give in order that you give.’ This means that man offers cultic worship to a divine being (or beings), in exchange the divinity offers his protection to human society. When Constantine won the battle against rival Roman generals, under the sign of the cross, he concluded that the god of the Christians was invincible and very powerful. Therefore, the people of his empire needed to render favour to this divinity. So Christianity became the official religion of the state. Constantine granted many privileges to the Church. He ordered the construction of church buildings in Rome, his new capital Constantinople and many other cities. Clergy were exempt from state duties. Bishops were given judicial powers and allowed to make use of imperial transport. This is the beginning of the European custom that ecclesial institutions are exempt from paying taxes. The church obtained the right of legacy and the right of asylum. In a church building, state officials had no authority to take someone prisoner or to execute someone! As for Constantine himself, his position remained somewhat ambiguous. He turned the persecuted church into an established church. In 325 he even convened the famous Council of Nicaea to settle doctrinal matters that divided the church. Nevertheless, he postponed his baptism until shortly before his death. After the Edict of Milan in 313, he ordered the construction of several temples for Roman gods. Apparently, he wanted to remain on good terms with both the Christians and the adherents of the very popular Mithras cults.

182 The English term ‘Christendom’ looks the same as christendom in Dutch, and Christentum in German, but the meaning is not the same. The latter terms denotes Christianity as such, they are the equivalent of ‘Christianity’ in English. 183 Feitse Boerwinkel, Einde of nieuw begin, 1974. 184 Hendrik Berkhof, De kerk en de keizer, quoted by Feitse Boerwinkel, op. cit., p. 52.

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Dominance of Christianity After 324, when he had become the sole ruler of the empire, Constantine made it increasingly clear that he demanded of his subjects that they become members of the church. Yet he never crossed the line between persuasion and coercion. This was done by one of his successors, Theodosius, in 380. Just recovered from a serious illness, he wanted to show his gratitude by issuing a law that made it compulsory for all his subjects to accept the Christian faith: We order that those who obey this law shall be called Catholic Christians. We order that the others, whom we deem outrageous and foolish, shall have to bear the shame of being heretics. They are not allowed to call their meetings church meetings. They will be dealt with by divine wrath. They shall also be punished by us, we have this authority on the basis of the divine will.185

Tis implies that the church has become a state church. From now on, all other religions, Jewish and pagan, as well as deviant Christian groups, would be persecuted and their building demolished. Already in 385 the first heretics are put to trial. Boerwinkel is cautious, and rightly so, to distinguish the Constantinian system of the alliance between throne and altar, and the Theodosian system of official Christianity to which everyone should belong. While the first allows for a certain measure of religious plurality in society, the second is much more intolerant. Constantine introduced the alliance between throne and altar, i.e. between the political power and the institutional church. He made Christianity the privileged and dominant religion. Theodosius amplified this by making Christianity the only religion in society. A European phenomenon In the Constantinian system the church is the established religion of the state. This arrangement has been taken over by the successors of the Roman Empire in the West and in the East. It became the rule everywhere in Europe. Even Protestant countries, for all their protest against the abuse of clerical-political power, have not gone as far as abolishing it. They have established a Protestant state church (Lutheran, Anglican or Reformed), although its dominance in actual practice has been less stringent than that of Roman Catholicism. Of course, an intrinsic link between politics and religion is not uniquely European. All ancient societies knew it. What makes the European case so remarkable is that it was Christianity, of all religions, which entertained this

185 Edict of Theodosius, 27 February 380, quoted by Feitse Boerwinkel, op. cit., p. 53.

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symbiotic relation with civil government. This is all the more startling when we realise that Christian churches started as a countercultural movement, with values that were subversive in the society of that time. For that reason they were persecuted, marginalised, and considered to be a threat to the social system. A movement that challenged the legitimacy of the ruling powers for three centuries became the legitimisation of emperors and kings. The alliance between the state and the institutional Christian church has originated and developed in Europe. In English, this is called ‘establishment.’ The underlying ideal was to create a Christianised society, under the combined rule of church and state. The first uses the spiritual powers of preaching and sacraments, the second has the temporal powers of law and, if need be, military arms. The underlying conviction was that of ‘one king, one law, one faith.’ In order for a country or an empire or a state to be united, it should belong to one religion. Thus, Christianity became the guarantor of national cohesion. The sovereign prince needed the legitimization of the church, in order to confirm the divine right by which he ruled. Hence coronations in churches, and official prayers at the opening of parliamentary sessions The Constantinian system has determined European history, and marked the socio-cultural development of each and every country on the continent. Counter movements We should note that there have always been counter movements that wanted to change this. Usually designated as heretics and sects, they were not tolerated because they called into question the existing system. Persecution was their common lot. Many sought refuge in the New World. The most challenging critique of the Constantinian system came from the Anabaptists and the Non-Conformists movements. Their church model was that of a community of professing believers, not dominated by the state and not allied to political power. This ‘radical reformation’ was met with fierce opposition from both Catholic and Protestant leaders. Separation of church and state The Theodosian system of a state church came to an end with the Enlightenment principle of the separation of church and state. This led to the creation of a secular state, which, by the way, is yet another European phenomenon. The separation of church and state was first implemented outside Europe, in the United States at the time of their independence in 1776. Some years later it was introduced in France, in the wake of the French Revolution, by a Regulation adopted in the National Assembly in 1795. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, other countries adopted the same principle, although the church often retained certain privileges. In some countries, there

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are still established churches (Lutheran in Denmark, Anglican in England, Orthodox in Greece, for example), although their political role is limited, and part of a parliamentary democracy. Be that as it may, the principle of separation of church and state is now generally accepted as a basic value in European societies. The Enlightenment and the secularisation of the state were not so much anti-Christianity as they were opposed to the Constantinian and Theodosian arrangement of a dominant and privileged state church. Be that as it may, some churches were bitterly opposed to these new ideas. In Roman Catholic and Orthodox countries, the separation of church and state took place in the context of long battles, fuelled by fierce anticlericalism on the one side, and outright conservatism on the other. In other countries, this separation was brought about gradually and by peaceful means. But the net result was the same: the state became neutral. Here are the main characteristics: • The divine right of the sovereign ruler (who reigns by the grace of God) is replaced by the sovereignty of the people. • Inhabitants are no longer subjects of the prince but citizens of the nation. • The law is not based on the will of the king but on a constitution that is voted on by the elected representatives of the people. • Governments are formed by the elected representatives of the people, in order that they execute the will of the people. • Religion is a matter of private concern, outside the civil and political realm, which means the disestablishment of the official state church. • Pluralism is the guiding principle of democracy. This implies religious tolerance. In French, this principle is known as laïcité. There are two kinds of laïcité: an ideological and a pragmatic form. The first is rigid, opposed to any Christian involvement in education, medical care, social welfare and parliament. Its adherents are against any form of state support for religious institutions. The second is pluralist and less rigid. Its adherents allow for confessional schools (Christian, Jewish or Muslim), hospitals, trade unions, charitable societies, political parties and so on, as long as they abide by the rules that are set for the whole society, and as long as they do not seek to dominate, and as long as they do not impose their views on people outside their constituency. Opportunities for nonconformists For a long time, the ‘free’ non-conformist churches were in at a disadvantage in comparison to the historical churches that represented the dominant religion. They did not receive the same privileges granted to established churches.

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Where the Constantinian arrangement receded, ‘free’ churches of all stripes were allowed to build sanctuaries, set up schools, influence the political debate, and have a voice in the public domain. Indeed, in some countries, Evangelical churches are becoming more important, more visible, and more involved in society. Recently, the Belgian government has recognised Evangelical churches as one of the two wings of Protestantism. As a consequence, the state is prepared to pay the salaries of their pastors, in the same way that it remunerates other Protestant pastors, and following the same criteria. Some Evangelical churches have welcomed this opportunity. Others are more reluctant, since they are afraid of possible government influence on internal church matters in the future. In other countries, however, the historical churches are still considered to be the national church, the religion of the people. In Russia and Serbia, for instance, the Orthodox Church fosters nationalistic sentiments, thus perpetuating the close ‘Constantinian’ link with the State. Throughout Eastern Europe we see Orthodox clergy and politicians join forces to limit the action of Evangelicals and other non-traditional churches, because they are seen as foreign elements, as ‘Western sects.’ The end of the Constantinian era Is this the end of Christendom? This is often stated, but we should distinguish between the Theodosian system of a state church and the Constantinian dominance of Christianity in society. This important nuance is brought out by Feitse Boerwinkel when he writes: With the French Revolution [i.e. the introduction of the principle of the separation of church and state] the Theodosian era in which the church was privileged by the state ended. Prior to the French Revolution, church membership was assumed. The superiority of Christianity with regards to other religions was also assumed. With the French Revolution, the power of the church comes to an end, but not its influence. That has continued until our day. To be more precise, until the 1970s at which time the assumption that everyone belonged to a church rapidly crumbled. In our view, the 1970s mark the end of the Constantinian phase of the European church.186

Post-Constantinian means: the church has lost its dominant place; the state has taken over functions that hitherto were exercised by the church: education (the introduction of state schools), medical care (hospices become hospitals),

186 Feitse Boerwinkel, op. cit., p. 53-54.

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welfare (orphanages, hostels), civil administration (registration of births and marriage). Here are some other elements of a post-Constantinian situation: • • • • • • • •

Disestablishment of the church (the separation of church and state). Legislation no longer exclusively based on Christian moral values. Christianity no longer the reference religion. Churches no longer privileged, although certain privileges still exist in some countries. Church membership no longer assumed. Civil marriage obligatory, church marriage optional. State responsible for education, medical care and social welfare. National identity takes precedence over religious identity.

Vestiges of the Constantinian era Even though Europe has become largely post-Constantinian, several vestiges of the old system remain in virtually every country. • In the Netherlands, churches have a special and privileged legal status. • In Germany and Switzerland, government collects ‘church tax’ from church members. • In Greece, Orthodoxy is the official religion of the state. • In the United Kingdome, the queen is the head of the Anglican Church and the defender of the Christian faith; some bishops are automatically members of the House of Lords. • Even in France, where the state is so committed to its neutrality in religious matters, the state maintains and restores church buildings that were built prior to 1905 (the year in which the separation of church and state became effective). Look at the Constantinian vestiges in Belgium, for example. Only a minority of the population regularly attends church, but there is a continued influence of the Roman Catholic tradition in society.187 Here are some special arrangements still in existence today: • About seventy percent of Belgian children still attend a Catholic school. • Many hospitals and universities have a Catholic flavour. • The Catholic tradition is still very present with regard to public holidays

187 See Patrick De Pooter, De rechtspositie van Erkende Erediensten en Levensbeschouwingen in Staat en maatschappij, Gent: Larcier, 2002, p. 66-67.

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(e.g. All Saints, Assumption of Mary) and school vacations (Christmas, Easter, Ascension Day, Pentecost). • On the national holiday, a ceremonial Te Deum is celebrated that political, military and royal representatives attend. • In the Belgian order of precedence, representatives of the Roman Catholic Church have a higher place than representatives of other faith groups. • Several Belgian trade unions and social security insurance societies have a Catholic history and profile. There definitely is a Catholic civil society consisting of a plethora of societies and institutions. Together they represent an important majority of the Belgian population.188 This list is certainly not exhaustive but offers a general overview. How about the relation between church and state? In Belgium there is no state religion, but neither is there a strict separation church and state. Religion is present in the public sphere and there is public funding of (recognised) religion. There are seven recognised religions, including Protestants and Evangelicals.189 They (can) receive public funds to cover the salary of their ministers, and subsidies for building churches, carrying out social projects, etc. if they meet the criteria set out by the state. The motivation behind the decision to actively support certain religions is the conviction that these groups have a moral and social utility, serve the general interest of the people, and act as the guardians of morality. Johan Lorein describes this rationale as pluralistic Constantinianism: the state actively supports the church and acknowledges that its role is useful to the general benefit of society. Instead of one recognised church, however, there are now several recognised religions.190 In this system there is a structural difference between recognised religions and other ones. At the same time, the Belgian constitution affirms the fundamental equality of all religions. This leads to a paradoxical situation: even though the various groups are officially regarded as equal they are not treated equally.

188 Lieven Boeve, ‘Katholieke’ identiteit van organisaties en instellingen uit het cultureelmaatschappelijke middenveld’ in: Peter De Mey and Pieter de Witte (ed.) De ‘K’ van Kerk: De pluriformiteit van katholiciteit. Antwerpen: Halewijn, 2009, p. 109. 189 These are Roman Catholic, Protestant (consisting of two recognized wings, Protestant and Evangelical), Anglican, Jewish, Islamic, Orthodox and Humanists (‘secular philosophy of life’). 190 Johan Lorein, Assignment paper for the course Europe and the Gospel, Evangelical Theological Faculty, Leuven, August 2012.

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Even among the recognised groups there are significant differences. The most important one is found in the criteria for the funding of ministers. Roman Catholic parishes receive local funding for priests based upon general population rates, while the other religions are dealt with on the basis of ‘effective members’ as criterion for the funding of ministers.191 The reason for this difference is mainly historical: The constitution of 1831 recognised not only Roman Catholicism but also Protestantism and the Judaism. It was decided that only Roman Catholic priests should receive a state salary as a way of compensation for the state’s appropriation of Catholic buildings. While this system made sense in 1831, it is now no longer valid. Another area in which the Roman Catholic Church maintains a privileged position are the criteria that are used to recognise religions. These criteria seem to be based upon Catholicism. Recently the recognition of Buddhism in Belgium became a problem because it did not meet these criteria. Given the above reality, Johan Lorein concludes that the Roman Catholic Church still dominates the legislation, as primus inter pares. 192 Given the vestiges of the Constantinian arrangement, as described in the above overview, we conclude that institutional churches are still privileged in many ways. This confirms the impression that Europe remains attached in a special way to Christianity.

15.3. Post-religious (secularised) Thirdly, the qualification ‘post-Christian’ can be used in the sense that Europe is secularised, post-religious. When we look at the behaviour of our fellow citizens, at their political views, their scientific explanations of the world, their economic values and sexual norms, we cannot escape the conclusion that many of them live and act etsi deus non daretur, as if God does not exist. Europe has become post-religious. To put it more precisely; the majority of its population is now post-practicing Christian. Usually, where Christianity is abandoned, people do not adopt another religion. They remain irreligious. Even many of those who do attend church (regularly or occasionally), do not necessarily believe the doctrines taught by that church, nor do they always feel obliged to abide with its ethical principles. As far as their social conduct is concerned, they are more or less like the unchurched, secularised population.

191 Patrick De Pooter, op. cit., p. 302-303. 192 Johan Lorein, op.cit.

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Disregard of traditional religious (Christian) values Everywhere around us, we see the extent to which the European population has become post-religious. Conspicuous signs are the decline of religious rites and customs, and the disregard of traditional religious values and norms in the public space. In the European context, these values are Christian - or Judeo-Christian if you like. Morals based on religious convictions and sacred texts are give way to ethics based on ‘inner worldly’ considerations, be they philosophical, pragmatic, social, economic, or political. For example, the ‘facts’ that count in the world of science are studied on rationalistic grounds only, disconnected from the ‘values’ of religion. In the realm of governance, the state is separated from the church. Public and nonconfessional institutions have taken over the role of church-related institutions in education. The welfare state is developed as the secular alternative to the social function of the church in the past. We see this shift also taking place in areas like marriage and family, education and social manners, financial scruples, sexuality, attitudes toward the weak and the elderly, respect for life in its embryonic stage as well as in its final suffering stage, and so on. Currently, abortion has been legalised under certain conditions in most European countries and certain forms of euthanasia are also allowed. It is difficult to tell whether a majority of the public is in agreement with this. If so, it is a silent majority. Pro-life organisations and political parties that oppose these practices constitute minorities. Until fairly recently, the idea of civil marriage possible for same-sex couples met with general public disapproval. Today, it is accepted by the majority of the public. Some countries (The Netherlands, Belgium, even Spain) have passed laws allowing it, notwithstanding their long history of Christian political involvement and despite protests from religious institutions. Other countries are preparing to follow suit. As homosexual and lesbian couples demand the right to parenthood, they put forward several options: adoption, in vitro fertilisation, egg/sperm donation, surrogate motherhood, and perhaps other modalities still. All of this is debated. People with religious convictions are very hesitant, to say the least, but opinions also vary among those who argue along purely secular lines. Of course, alternative ways of procreation made possible by medical technology were and still are primarily used by heterosexual couples. Christians and adherents of other religions who take different views are not, in general, categorically against them. But when these alternatives are made available for single parents and same-sex couples, they lead us far away from the Christian model of marriage of man and woman as the context for procreation and parenthood. They are also at odds with the traditional views of other religions, Judaism and Islam in particular.

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All of this is part of the general trend to rethink, on a non-religious basis, the connection(s) between marriage, living as a couple, procreation, and biological parenthood. Disregard of traditional values is not only a matter of private ethical issues such as the examples mentioned above; it is also relevant in the economic and political realms: unbridled financial markets, hedonist consumerism, individualisation, anti-immigrant attitudes, and so on. What people do in the private and the public realm is related to moral convictions called values. Our values are part of our worldview, related to certain philosophical and spiritual convictions, but this spiritual dimension is often overlooked. This is due to the fact that many people live and act on the basis of a worldview that only takes into account what is visible to the eye, tangible and verifiable to the rational researcher, explicable in natural scientific terms. Secularisation The technical term for this phenomenon is secularisation. However, using this term may lead to confusion because it can convey several meanings. Surprisingly, it was at first a Christian theological term, denoting the temporal terrestrial realm, as distinct from the spiritual realm. We live in the present age of this world (seaculum), but we hope for the age or the world to come,’ the age of all ages (seaculum saeculorum). ‘Secular’ referred to the world of ordinary believers — as distinct from the clergy — who lived in the world, in contrast to monastic communities who lived according to a religious rule. During the French Revolution, civil authorities took over many church-owned properties, such as monasteries, schools, orphanages, and so on. The technical term for that was the ‘secularisation’ of ecclesiastical possessions, so that they could be administered by terrestrial, i.e. secular authorities. Much later, the word secularisation reappears in the context of sociological studies. Sociologists use it to denote the rational worldview that has emerged since the Enlightenment, a worldview that does not take into account the intervention of a divine being in human history. Secularisation means excluding God from scientific research and political action. Later still, the same term is used to denote the decline of church membership, the abandonment of organised religious practice, and even the abandonment of any religious belief. Nowadays, the term secularisation is generally used in this sense although it implies the former sociological sense as well, because people with a religious mode of life usually have a secularised, i.e. non-religious worldview. The alternative of no religion at all – a European phenomenon Giving up the Christian faith in large numbers is not something that only happened and happens in Europe. This has also happened in North Africa and the Middle East, where Christianity has been the dominant religion for many

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ages but lost this position to Islam. A number of peoples in Central Asia were once Christian, now they are Buddhist. Christian people groups in India have (re) turned to Hinduism. But there is one fundamental difference. While these peoples have turned from Christianity to another religion, or returned to the religion of their ancestors, Europeans have given up Christianity for no other religion at all. Some may have retained certain beliefs, but they are no longer part of organised religion. In this part of the world, the alternative to Christianity is not another faith, but no faith at all, i.e. a non-religious worldview, a secular life-style. The typical European non-Christian is not a convert to another religion, but someone defining himself as ‘without religion.’ Secularisation as a non-religious worldview and a non-religious way of life is a European phenomenon, historically speaking. It originated in our part of the world. While it has now spread to other regions of the world, mainly countries with a western culture, Europe still stands out as the continent where it has taken root more than anywhere else. No outside pressure Another remarkable thing about this phenomenon is that it took place, and still takes place, not because of external pressure but because of internal factors within ‘Christianised’ Europe itself. Several movements emerged in reaction to the predominant place of the church in society. They challenged its doctrines, and secularised its morals. Many Europeans became disillusioned with the institutional church. Why? Generally speaking, this was not because they were attracted by another religion. People abandon the Christian perspective of heaven and a new earth to come. Why? Generally speaking, not because they find more hope in Islam or Buddhism but because they prefer inner-worldly perspectives of a better society brought about by human means only. Today, many have become disillusioned with secular ideologies as well, which leaves them with very little expectation of a better possible world. Christianity disappeared from Central Asia and North Africa and it has been marginalised in the Middle East because of the impact of outside forces, invasions, and the social pressure of other religions. In contrast, Europe is deChristianising itself. Relatively low percentage of atheists Despite ongoing secularisation, atheism remains a minority option for Europeans. Clearly, people can live secular lives while still having sacred hearts. They might suppose that a divine being exists, they might be deists or agnostics, but the attitude taken is often that of practical secularism. As French people often say: ‘I can’t tell whether God exists or not, but at any rate, he doesn’t bother with me much, so I’m not bothering with him.’

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With the downfall of communism, the official atheism of the Soviet authorities and their anti-religious policy has disappeared. This was followed by a resurgence of religious practice all over Eastern Europe. How many atheists are there really? That is, how many people are convinced that there is no divine supreme? According to a survey conducted in 2005, fiftytwo percent of EU citizens of the member states believe in a personal being called ‘God,’ while another twenty-seven percent believe that there is some sort of spirit or life force. Only eighteen percent believe that no spirit, ‘God’ or life force exists. The remaining three percent declined to answer.193  Another survey conducted in 2004, showed that twenty-five percent on average of the people in Western Europe identified as atheists, over and against twelve percent in Central and Eastern Europe. Its authors also noted some other remarkable disparities. The percentage of atheists varies from four percent in Romania and eight percent in Greece, to a surprisingly high forty-one percent in The Netherlands and even forty-nine percent in the Czech Republic.194 Such high figures are often brought up. However, the wording of the questionnaire does not always make the necessary distinction between convinced atheism on the one hand and practical atheism on the other (living as if there is no God). The latter is usually coupled with agnosticism (not being sure whether God exists). Taking this distinction into account, French sociologists agree that in their country atheists account for only fifteen percent of the population, and that this is the highest percentage in the whole of Europe, with possible exceptions of the Czech Republic and parts of other European countries, such as the eastern Länder in Germany.195 Most people who do not identify as practising a religion are in fact agnostics rather than declared atheists. Has Christianity paved the way for a post-religious society? Sociologists of religion have pointed out that when Christianity supplanted the preceding pagan religions in Europe, it brought about a certain measure of secularisation. Christian missionaries denied the existence of gods and spirits related to natural phenomena – Boniface cut down the holy oaks of the Saxons to prove the non-existence of the deities that were supposed to send fire from heaven to punish him. In spreading the message of the Bible, the church has disenchanted and demythologised nature.

193 Eurobarometer, statistics provided by the Council of Europe, 2005. 194 Wall Street Journal, European edition, 23 December 2004. 195 See e.g. Frédéric Lenoir, Le Christ philosophe, Paris: Plon, 2007, as well as the survey published by Le Monde des religions, July 2005.

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Moreover, the church introduced a distinction between political and spiritual authority. Even though the European thrones were in alliance with the institutional church, the two spheres were seen to be parallel, precisely because they could not be equated. The first wielded temporal power by the use of the sword; the second exerted spiritual power by the use of the Word. While Roman Catholics, Orthodox, Protestants and Radical Reformation movements disagreed on the way in which church and state should relate to each other, they all insisted on the fundamental distinction between the two, following the statement of Jesus, ‘Give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar, yield to God what belongs to God’ (Matthew 22). Protestants developed the principle of freedom of religion and tolerance. This amounted to denying the authority of the state to intervene in matters of conscience. In all these respects, Christianity paved the way for the secularisation of politics that was to come about in the wake of the Enlightenment. Christianity has also contributed to the development of an autonomous scientific research, through its emphasis on rational enquiry. Initially, the church applied reason and philosophy to Biblical revelation. Rational enquiry served to understand God’s Word (theology), God’s principles for society (law), and God’s laws of creation (medicine and natural sciences). The idea was to ‘try and think God’s thoughts after Him.’ Gradually, the study of the laws of nature became independent from the religious context, leading to secular rationalism and a secular worldview which no longer explained reality in relation to a divine being. Modern science and technology have developed out of this. But they would probably never have come about without the prior phase of Christian rationalism. Here we have yet another way in which Christianity can be said to have paved the way for a post-religious society. Churches and missionaries have generally presented their faith as being superior to all other belief systems. Christianity, they say, provides the answer to the fundamental problem of man that no other religion can resolve, i.e. how to be reconciled with God. Of course, this is a Christian way of making the comparison. But it shows that, from a Christian point view, this faith is the nec plus ultra. So if people give up Christianity for whatever reason, where would they look for something better? If one follows the rationale of Christianity, then the logical answer would be nowhere, because Christianity was already considered to be superior to all others. This is exactly the conclusion drawn by Europeans who are disaffiliated from church institutions, and who no longer practice the Christian faith. They have developed a secularised, non-religious way of life.

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15.4. Post-modern Contemporary Europeans are often described as postmodern. It would be more precise to say that a considerable portion of the population (e.g. the young, the cosmopolitan and the affluent) has a more or less postmodern mindset. Is this yet another way in which Europe is becoming ‘post-Christian?’ To answer this question, we must take a very brief look at the shift from modern to postmodern. A reaction to the Enlightenment and modernism Postmodernism, or ultramodernism,196 is not a clearly defined movement but rather a philosophical outlook, a mindset. Postmodernism has permeated every aspect of European culture, but it began as a philosophical critique of totalitarian regimes such as Nazism. Reacting against social structures and ideologies that claimed to represent absolute truth, postmodern philosophers argued that such claims were claims for absolute loyalty that were instruments of power. Philosophers like Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard and Jürgen Habermas set out to deconstruct these systems in order to bring to light the political and economic interests behind them. They serve to oppress people, to exclude all rivals, and to maintain the ruling elite. This leads to oppression of individual freedom. Nazism and Soviet communism were prime examples, as they were perpetrated the worst horrors of the twentieth century: the genocide of the Jews in the Shoa and the Gulag Archipelago of forced labour camps in Siberia. From a postmodern point of view, the same mechanisms are evident on a much wider scale. The dogmatic rationalism and the belief in scientific progress that characterize modern Western culture are equally suspect, when they serve to impose this one worldview, without tolerating alternative worldviews. Hence the name of this critique: postmodern. In a similar vein, this critique can also be applied to cultures claiming to be superior to others, to religions claiming to be ‘the only way.’ Postmodernism has become a school of thought that sharply critiques the Enlightenment with its faith in the triumphant march of science and continuing social progress. Human beings are fundamentally a mystery even to themselves so instead of relying on the limited power of reason, this mystery can often better be explored by means of music, aesthetics, intuition, religion and other rich worlds of experience. Postmodernism has been characterised as a turning away from objectivity to subjectivity, according to which everyone has the right to live according to his or

196 French authors, in particular, prefer the term ‘ultramodernism.’ Cf. Jean-Paul Willaime, Europe et religions, p. 204ff.

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her ‘truth.’ One of the fundamental claims of postmodernism is that there is no absolute truth and no single worldview that is better than any other, let alone superior. Claims to that effect should be critically dismantled. The age of these so-called meta-narratives is over. Instead, all religious, moral and philosophical viewpoints have a value as such, because they are related to a particular real life context. In principle, they are of equal value. Postmodernism is a philosophical corollary of the multicultural society: cultural and religious differences should be accepted. Diversity is inevitable. This position leads to a pluralist outlook; let there be room for different values, ethical norms, religious beliefs, etc. If there is any universal value, than it should be tolerance. Is Postmodernism a reaction to Christianity? Returning to the question put in the preceding paragraph: is postmodernism a reaction to Christianity? The answer is ‘yes’ inasmuch as it is critical of any claim to absolute truth, including the Christian one. But the Gospel presents Jesus as the only Name by which people can be saved. There is an exclusivist element in Christianity that cannot be denied if we want to remain loyal to the Biblical revelation. Postmodernism has a problem with that. In this respect it is a reaction to Christianity. There is unease with missionary efforts to bring non-Christians to this one faith in one unique saviour who is the way, the truth, and the the fullness of life. However, the answer is ‘no’ inasmuch as postmodernism is not a reaction to any religious experience and practice. Postmodernism is not against religion, nor does it present itself as an alternative religion. People with a postmodern outlook are not closed off to religious belief and spiritual experience, quite the contrary. One can be postmodern and practice a religion – as long as one remains tolerant of other forms of ‘truth,’ a postmodern person would add. From the Christian standpoint, the great problem of postmodernism is its pluralism, which leads to relativism.

15.5. Post-evangelised Several missiological publication place Europe among the ‘evangelised world,’ a term indicating that at least fifty percent of the population has unrestricted access to an understandable presentation of the Gospel.197 Indeed, any

197 Apart from the ‘evangelised world’ there is the ‘non-evangelised world’ where less than 50% of the population has free access to an understandable presentation of the Gospel, and the ‘unreached world’ where less than 2% of the population is Christian. In missiological jargon, these are called World C, B and A respectively.

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observer will notice the plethora of literature, movies, videos, television programs, Christian items in the news, Christian television channels, journals, tracts, billboards, and bookstores, all presenting the message of the Bible, not to mention church buildings which people can enter, Christian schools, Christian hospitals, Christian holiday centres, museums with Christian art, and religious education in schools. The list can be expanded at length. It seems almost impossible to not be informed about the message of Christianity. Furthermore, churches regularly engage in evangelism aimed at arousing an interest among the un-churched. To this we should add the countless occasions on which individual believers talk about their faith to non-Christian friends and colleagues. Finally, there are church planters all over the continent, trying to bring people together in new communities, in areas where the Christian testimony is deemed insufficient, or thought to be completely lacking. (It is a matter of debate whether such initiatives should also be undertaken in towns that already have an important Roman Catholic or Orthodox presence.) Yes, Europe is being evangelised at length and to a large extent. We should add that this has been going on for many centuries. Even so, despite the fact that Europeans have access to the Christian faith, and despite the impressive amount of evangelism efforts, a great number of our contemporaries do not seem to be interested. It is as if these people are saying, ‘I know all about Christianity, in Europe we have seen a lot of it, but I prefer leaving it in the past. I appreciate the heritage of Christian art, I appreciate what Christians are doing for the poor, and so on, but as for me, I’m not interested in joining a church. I can pray on my own, when I feel the need for it.’ In a very real sense, Europe can be called post-evangelised. Talking about the Gospel gives the impression of presenting ‘old news’ instead of ‘good news.’ While becoming a Christian represents a step forward in other places of the world, it is seen as joining the religion of the past in Europe. In his interesting book on the way today’s secularised citizens in the United Kingdom look at the church and Christianity, Anglican pastor Allan Billings makes some thought provoking observations. What he says about British society can easily be applied to other European countries: Whether the losses in Church attendance spell terminal decline, as some have predicted, is debatable: the Church has considerably resources and the fall in numbers is not uniform across the different types of Anglicanism. But...if the starting point for assessing the place of religion in Britain today is with numbers of active members, the message of decline cannot be disputed. Moreover, this is in spite of considerable efforts at evangelism during the final decade of the 20th century. The inescapable message of the twentieth century was that the British people do not want to attend Churches on a regular basis and there is no

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strategy of either evangelism or Church restructuring that can make a significant difference to that.198

The exceptional continent How different the situation is in other parts of the world, not only in the developing countries, but also in a modern and highly technological society like the United States. British sociologist Grace Davie has characterised Europe as ‘the exceptional continent.’ She gives us two important starting points to understand why this is so. In Europe, the rise of modernity (a worldview based on rational science and technology) has been accompanied by secularisation and the decline of religious practice. But this combination is not a universal phenomenon. In other parts of the world, the development of a society along the lines of western technology and rational science does not seem to hamper religious practice. On the contrary, in United States, Canada, Korea, China, and Latin America, to mention a few striking examples, religious communities are thriving and secularisation remains limited in scope. It seems that the European combination of modernity and secularisation is the exception to the rule.199 In a recent publication, Peter Berger, Grace Davie and Effie Fokas compare the religious practice in Europe and in the United States.200 While there are similarities, the differences are striking. Their analyses show that religion occupies an important place in American society, while European societies are much more subject to secularisation. Could Christianity become marginalised or even extinct? Suppose we extrapolate the trends in the USA and in Europe. Should we then come to the conclusion that the Christian faith will continue to prosper over there, and continue to decline over here? Certainly, Christianity is still a vibrant and influential religious community. Here and there we see thriving, growing churches. The number of immigrant churches has risen sharply over the last years. But even so, the overall decline of Christian religious practice continues. The proportion of un-churched Europeans is growing steadily. This raises the question, could it be that Christianity in Europe will sooner or later be marginalised or even become extinct?

198 Allan Billings, Secular Lives, Sacred Hearts, p. 11. 199 Grace Davie, Europe: the Exceptional Case, p. 137 and p. 145 200 Peter Berger, Grace Davie and Effie Fokas, Religious America, Secular Europe?

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In theory this is possible. Throughout history, there are examples of both. North Africa once had a thriving church. Christianity in the Middle East is marginalised where earlier it was the dominant religion for many centuries. Central Asia offers similar examples. Looking at the figures of diminishing church membership, we should not jump to conclusions though. Developments in the area of religious practice are never linear. Others refuse to believe that faith in Jesus could one day become a rare phenomenon in our lands. Hoping for revival they point to signs of revitalisation in the present. However, the presence of some almond blossoms does not yet make the summer of a reChristianised Europe. In theory, then, both scenarios are possible: gradual extinction despite occasional local upsurges, or renewal and revival. Philip Jenkins does not believe in the possibility of the first scenario. Looking at earlier periods in history when leading thinkers were convinced that Christianity was doomed or in its final days, he finds that often the opposite happened. Similarly, current predictions about the inevitable further decline of Christianity ‘is perhaps the best indicator that it is about to expand or revive.’201 For the time being, one cannot be certain of any scenario, as Grace Davie rightly pointed out in her study on the spread of religious beliefs and values in western European societies. She gives two reasons for this uncertainty. ‘There exists no simple alignment between modernity, secularisation, and the decline of religious sensibility.’202

201 Philip Jenkins, God’s Continent, p. 288. 202 Grace Davie, Europe: The Exceptional Case, p. 137 and p. 145.

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Barriers for the Gospel, confidence in God Back in 1985, Lesslie Newbigin posed the question: ‘Can the West be converted? Or is a remorseless decline in Christian faith to the point of extinction inevitable?’203 He dedicated the latter years of his life to exploring what an effective missionary encounter with European culture would mean. Combining practical urban church ministry in Birmingham and missiological reflection, he worked to gain more insight into the needed context for the witness and service of the church on our continent.204 ‘Here,’ he said, ‘without possibility of question, is the most challenging missionary frontier of our time.’ 205 When Newbigin talked about the West, he really meant Europe, or Western Europe to be precise, for this was the context in which he worked and reflected on the way to communicate the Gospel. He called it a pluralist society. We have called it a multicultural, secularised society with various religious minorities (see chapter 9). Nowadays, it is commonplace to include Europe in a larger socio-cultural and political context called ‘the West.’ Viewed from this perspective, there would not seem to be a need to single out Europe as a special subject of analysis. One is tempted to apply the same approaches that are used for other western societies. Quite often, this is what happens. Strategies to evangelise un-churched North Americans are too easily transferred to Germany, Austria, Greece or Spain, on the assumption that un-churched people are alike everywhere in the western world. The success of such ventures is limited to those situations where people closely share a North American mindset. In other situations, such efforts bear no fruit. This alone is sufficient evidence that we are dealing with different contexts. Communicating the Gospel in this part of the world is not just a matter of applying the general theology of Christian mission. We cannot satisfy ourselves with adopting approaches that have proven to be successful in other countries with similar western cultures. Many who try to do this experience the same discouraging results: for some reason or another, things work differently over here.

203 Lesslie Newbigin, ‘Can the West Be Converted?’ p. 7ff. 204 As an outcome of this reflexion, Lesslie Newbigin published Foolishness to the Greeks in 1986, and The Gospel in a Pluralist Society in 1989. 205 Leslie Newbigin, ‘Can the West Be Converted?’ op. cit., p. 7.

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16.1. A specific context for the communication of the Gospel Newbigin was right; there is a need to relate mission theory to Europe as a specific context for the communication of the Gospel. In recent years, the discussion about a contextual approach to mission in Europe is emerging. Despite the importance of this subject, publications from an Evangelical perspective are still relatively rare. Even so, a few inspiring publications are worth noticing. The South African mission theologian, David Bosch, whose Transforming Mission (1991) is one of the most influential books in missiology today, recognised that he had not sufficiently dealt with the challenge of missiology in the context of western culture. Setting himself this task, he wrote A Missiology of Western Culture, published posthumously.206 In order to communicate the Gospel in the European context, he argued, we need to recover the missionary nature of the church and theology. Furthermore, we need to rethink the proper way to engage public life; be open to what churches elsewhere can teach us about missionary experience; reflect on authentic ways of speaking of God; and challenge the so-called autonomy of human reason, this key element of western secularised culture. In the United Kingdom, Stuart Murray has written about the challenge of evangelism in a post-Christendom society, from an Anabaptist perspective. Instead of lamenting the fact that Christians have become a minority, he says, we should embrace this marginality and discover fresh ways of being church and engaging in mission.207 In France, Hansjörg Gantenbein, has developed a model for mission in Europe, based on his analysis of four countries in particular (United Kingdom, France, the eastern part of Germany and Romania).208 On the other side of the Rhine, Friedemann Walldorf has published a comparative study of the different theological approaches to mission in Europe that have been developed in Roman Catholic, ecumenical Protestant and Evangelical circles.209 This work prompted the Arbeitskreis für evangelikale Missiologie in Germany to hold a colloquium and produce a publication on the communication of the Gospel in a postmodern European context.210

206 David Bosch, Believing in the Future. 207 Stuart Murray, Post-Christendom. 208 Hansjörg Gantenbein, Mission en Europe. 209 Friedemann Walldorf, Die Neuevangelisierung Europas. 210 Klaus W. Müller (ed.), Mission im postmodernen Europa.

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16.2. Barriers We join this ‘conversation’ in all modesty, by identifying some typical European barriers to the communication of the Gospel. They are directly related to our analysis in the preceding chapter. Here is the first one: Why God, or why religion? The widespread secularisation of European societies partly explains why models of evangelism that have worked well in Latin America or in Africa do not yield much fruit in Europe. In those parts of the world, the Gospel is communicated among people with some kind of religion: Roman Catholic, animistic or other. As they accept the Evangelical message, they remain religious. They already believed in God, or at least in a divine reality. For them, the cosmos is inhabited by spirits and supernatural beings. They don’t have to change this religious worldview in order to accept the Gospel and become Christian. What changes for them, is their image of God, their doctrinal convictions, their religious practices and their spiritual experience. Perhaps they only change denominational attachment. At any rate, they do not change their worldview on a fundamental level; it remains religious. For secularised people in Europe, the situation is radically difficult. Accepting the invitation of the Gospel implies that they become religious, that their secular worldview is transformed into a religious one. Obviously, this is an additional obstacle. The question is not, which God, what religion? But why God, why religion in the first place? Does God exist? What does ‘God’ mean? Are you talking about a force, a person, an idea, a projection of a human father figure? Can we experience this God? And if so, why is this important? What is the relevance of religion any way? When I’m not poor, depressed, lonely, ill, or jobless, what would I need a religion for? What does this ‘God’ add to my life? This set of questions constitutes the first evangelism frontier in Europe. There is another side to secularisation: it has replaced the religious practice of Christianity. To be precise, secularisation is the secularisation of Christianity. That implies that some Christian elements are retained, such as the idea of the intrinsic value of man, ideas of individual responsibility and freedom, social and cultural values. Secularisation is ‘post-Christian,’ but only in a partial manner. It takes over the humanist values but detaches them from their original religious context. This results in secular humanism. Secularised people don’t see the need to return to a religious worldview in order to work for a better world. The general feeling is that ‘we can manage without.’ A striking example is the recent book by the French philosopher and former government minister of education Luc Ferry, entitled ‘The Revolution of Love.’ In it, he develops what he calls a ‘secular spirituality,’ based on the Biblical concept of love. He thinks highly of Jesus, ‘the supreme example of an altruistic lifestyle.’

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He takes serious the teachings of the church on how to live the commandment to love your neighbour, and summarizes it in the principles of solidarity, the primacy of the common interest, and the value of selfless service. But he confesses to be an agnostic, almost convinced that the God of the Bible is a human creation. In the past, people needed this imagined divine being, he argues, but ‘we have to do without, and we can do without.’ According to Luc Ferry , ‘we have to move on from the humanism of the Enlightenment and its critics, move on from the antireligious stance of thinkers like Nietzsche, and develop a new spirituality: the sacralisation of humanity by practicing the originally Christian principle of love.’211 Viewed from such a perspective, secularisation is a stage that comes after Christianity. What is the next step? There is no next step, at least not a religious one, because secular humanism considers itself to have advanced beyond all religions. For a secularised European to become Christian really amounts to a conversion in the true sense of the word, a complete turnaround in direction. From the point of view of secular humanism, it goes against the thrust of the historical intellectual development of a whole continent! Embracing a religion, even Christianity is seen as a backward step. If this is how secularised people feel about ‘becoming religious’ or ‘adopting a religion,’ than it constitutes a formidable barrier for the communication of the Gospel. One might object that the picture is not as grim as this. Aren’t there growing churches everywhere in Europe? Indeed, there are. But a closer look reveals that they are not as successful in reaching secularised fellow citizens as one might think. Their message and their mode of church life elicit more response among nominal Christians who occasionally attend church, and among members of mainline Protestant and Roman Catholic churches, in other words, among people familiar with Christianity, among people with a religious worldview. This is the ‘pool’ where they ‘fish’ most successfully. As far as we can see, the majority of people joining an Evangelical church already had some religious beliefs. We don’t say this in order to criticize these churches, but only to indicate how difficult it is for the same message to find a hearing among really secularised people. Why Jesus? Once the barrier ‘why God?’ is overcome, we are confronted with a second one: ‘why Jesus?’ If someone is interested in Christian spirituality, he will find it fair enough that Jesus be placed in the centre. But is this necessary for everybody

211 Luc Ferry, La révolution de l’amour – Pour une spiritualité laïque, p. 7ff. The typical French word laïque has a specific meaning in France, for which there is no English equivalent. It can refer to the neutrality of the state, to the secular or non-religious character of the public sphere, and to the secular or non-confessional form of education. Ferry uses it in the wider sense of secular life, both public and private.

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who seeks God? Isn’t it sufficient that each one has his or her experience of the divine reality? If someone finds Jewish tradition more attractive, why isn’t that an equally valid option? Europeans steeped in a pluralist mindset have difficulty with a message that calls for faith in God and in Jesus Christ as his Son, while excluding all other religions present in the multicultural society. Moreover, any claim to absolute truth or universal value runs counter to a postmodern posture. Evangelists from other continents will find that people in Europe are so critical, so suspicious. They are not quickly convinced by a miracle. While short summaries of the Gospel in the form of a few clear cut statements might work in other contexts, most Europeans are not ready to accept any clear cut message demanding a simple yes or no for an answer. Through their education they have learned that religious matters are more complex than that. Multicultural society presents them with various religious experiences. According to their European value system they should be tolerant rather than try to impose one religious point of view. They might well be interested in spiritual questions about the meaning of life, they might be willing to take into account religious answers, but they are hesitant to respond when Jesus is presented to them as the unique way to find the truth about our human existence. To this we should add another factor. The question ‘why Jesus’ is not the same when it is asked in Europe as opposed to other regions of the world where Christianity is a relatively young religion, or a new religion altogether. In Europe, the name of Jesus is associated with a long history of the church, including the negative aspects of Christianity’s record. At secondary school, teenagers learn about the crusades, the wars between Catholics and Protestants, the persecution of the Jews, the abuses of power in the name of Christianity. However, most people are only superficially familiar with the person of Jesus. From what they know, they will have a positive impression of his ethical conduct, but Christian faith in Jesus the Saviour is quickly associated with the institutional church in their country, which enjoys a far less positive reputation! This creates a huge barrier for presenting Jesus as the Bible presents him. As messengers of the Gospel we have a lot to explain, in Europe more than anywhere else! Furthermore, many people put Jesus in the box of a particular form of Christianity that has dominated their country. More often than not, they have a negative picture. Dutch people associate believing in Jesus with what they call ‘Calvinism’: a list of do’s and don’t’s, strict Sunday observance and boring church services with long sermons. French people associate Jesus with the little Christmas baby, the child in the arms of a Madonna, the sculpted figure on a crucifix, and going through the motions of a dull mass ritual. Similar stereotypes exist in every other country. As people associate the Christian faith with such preconceived ideas, they are hindered from taking a fresh look at Jesus. How shall they discover Jesus in a fresh way, as they have never seen him before?

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Why church? Once passed the first and second barriers, a third one rises before our eyes: ‘why church?’ Remember, Europe is post-Constantinian. In the past, church membership was self-evident and an obligation. People had no choice. There was no salvation outside the church, said the theologians. In addition, outside the church there was no acceptance, no marriage, no civil service, no school, and no Christian burial. This has left deep traces in the mind of Europeans, even today. Becoming a church member is associated with obligations. A service to go to every Sunday, money to give, doctrines to believe, rules to obey, not to forget the things you shouldn’t do. People like to be allowed the freedom to choose their activities, to decide for themselves. Today, Europeans are free from such constraints. Church membership is no longer expected. It is no longer a must, no longer a matter of social respectability, but an option. Surely, there are still many nominal church members. In some cases, they are under social pressure from family members to become active members, but strictly speaking, they are under no obligation to attend a service, or even to remain registered. So why should people join a churches if they don’t like to commit themselves to all the obligations that go with it? Why can’t we pray to God at home, they say, why can’t we just follow the ethical principles of Jesus in daily life? We should add an important point. In non-European countries, churches have to attract members on a voluntary basis. Over there, church is something you decide to participate in. If you don’t want to belong to a particular church any longer, you go to another one. This explains why Europeans relate differently to church commitment than Americans, for example. This also explains why in post-Constantinian Europe, free churches of the Pentecostal and Evangelical type are doing better than historic churches in attracting new members. They have always had to reach out to people in order to arouse their interest. But these churches are also at a disadvantage because of their view of church life. Emphasising that Christians should live as committed disciples of Jesus, they insist on the minimum requirement of attending the weekly Sunday service. Moreover, there are Bible studies, home groups and prayer meetings to attend, evangelistic activities to participate in, and youth groups and worship teams to volunteer for. Besides, people are strongly encouraged to pray and read the Bible every day if they want to grow in the faith. And of course, there are the moral principles to live by. These expectations are quite demanding when one compares them to the freedom offered by a permissive society, especially in the areas of living as a common-law couple and sexuality. Of course, Evangelical churches will not present these ‘obligations’ as a burden, but individual believers might experience them in that way. This is not very attractive for people who have bad memories of church in the past.

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In a post-Constantinian society, church membership is no longer assumed. This fosters the privatisation of religion. Faith in Jesus Christ is not necessarily linked to membership of a religious institution: the famous ‘believing without belonging.’ It also fosters the ‘behaving without belonging’ attitude; people are willing to put Christian principles in practice, but not necessarily in the context of a faith community. Apparently, these attitudes are also making inroads in Christian assemblies known for the level of commitment of their members: traditional Protestant, Pentecostal, Evangelical, Baptist, Adventist and so on. There is a tendency towards ‘behaving and believing without too much belonging.’ This shows that the ‘belonging’ side of Christianity is no longer self-evident, even for people who believe in Jesus. What is new? Then there is a fourth barrier. In post-evangelised Europe, the Gospel is not easily presented as good news. The Bible, the church, God, the stories of Jesus and apostles, all of this has become part of our cultural heritage. When people hear about it, their first and automatic reaction is, ‘we know all that.’ The problem is that they only think they do, but that doesn’t change their reaction. The Gospel has been around for ages. So how can it still surprise? How can it be heard as good news? Certainly, people need to hear it as something ‘new’ in order to be willing to change their mind. Presuppositions are much harder to correct than ignorance. When it comes to the message of the church, preconceived ideas and traditional misrepresentations abound. These images usually put off people rather than attract them to the Gospel. We are faced with widespread indifference; so many people simply don’t seem to be interested in God and religion at all. How can we change these images and preconceived ideas? How can we arouse curiosity for something that will be ‘new’ to many Europeans, namely a living faith relationship with God?

16.3. Confidence Clearly, there are formidable obstacles to making our faith convictions understood. What is our attitude as believers in Jesus Christ in the socio-religious situation of Europe today? When we look to the future, we can share the uncertainty of those who observe phenomena and trends. Humanly speaking, Christianity does not seem to be in for a massive comeback in the short run. But as believers we have something else to go by. We do not know what the future holds, but we know Him who holds the future, and who is more than capable of creating surprises in societies bent on further de-Christianisation and secularisation.

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Granted, there are many barriers that hinder our fellow citizens from hearing the Gospel as good news instead of an old-time and obsolete religion, but we can have confidence that the Word of God is able to create for itself a new hearing, time and time again. In the final analysis, the task depends not on our arguments, not even on our apologetics, as well developed and attuned to the modern mind as they may be, but on the Spirit of God. He convinces hearts and minds. The same Spirit can make us creative in finding ways to overcome the obstacles, to identify bridges for the message, to make a positive contribution to society, to present Biblical truth in eye-opening ways. In his book The Gospel in a Pluralist Society, Lesslie Newbigin deals with the question how to present truth, and how to live according to the conviction of truth, in a multicultural, secularised and postmodern society. As the church will continue to shrink and become a minority, it is called to testify, as a minority, to the truth for all humankind. What Newbigin wrote is still as relevant today as it was in 1989 when he published the book. His concluding remarks about ‘confidence in the Gospel’ are worth quoting: The Gospel is news of what has happened. The problem of communicating it in a pluralist society is that it simply disappears into the undifferentiated ocean of information. It represents one opinion among millions of others. It cannot be ‘the truth,’ since in a pluralist society truth is not one but many. To claim that it is true for everyone is simply arrogance. It is permitted as one opinion among many. Churches have been eager to avoid the charge of arrogance. They have been eloquent in their efforts to distance themselves from what is now judged to have been the arrogance of missionaries who talked of the evangelisation of the world in their generation. 212

In reaction to this supposed or real arrogance, Newbigin notices that Christians develop different attitudes. One is ‘timidity,’ an exaggerated modesty to avoid any form of testimony that might offend people of other persuasions. The other mood is ‘anxiety.’ Christianity is perceived to be a good cause which is in danger of collapsing through lack of support. Anxiety can lead to activism, ‘a strident summons to more energetic efforts in evangelism and social action.’ Of course, it is important for Christians to be active in both areas, but this can be an expression of anxiety when there is ‘an underlying mood which lays too much stress on our own activities and is too little controlled by the sense of the greatness and majesty and sufficiency of God.’

212 Lesslie Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society, p. 242.

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Over and against this kind of Christian activity which only thinly masks a lack of confidence in the sufficiency of God, Newbigin suggests an attitude of ‘confidence.’ He explains: In a pluralist society, any confident affirmation of the truth is met by the response; ‘Why should I believe this rather than that?’ Of course, if it is indeed an ultimate belief, then it cannot be validated by something more ultimate. And if, as always happens in a pluralist society, we are asked: ‘But why start with Jesus?’ we have to answer that no rational thought is possible except by starting with something which is already given in some human tradition of rational thought and discourse. Our immediate answer may well be, ‘Why not?’ For the ultimate answer we have to wait for the end of all things. A Christian must welcome some measure of plurality but reject pluralism. A plural society provides us with a wider range of experience and a wider diversity of human responses to experience, and therefore richer opportunities for testing the sufficiency of our faith than are available in a monochrome society....But we must reject the ideology of pluralism. We must reject the invitation to live in a society where everything is subjective and relative, a society which has abandoned the belief that truth can be known and has settled for a purely subjective view of ‘truth for you but not truth for all.’213

In one of his last publications, Newbigin has further developed this theme of confidence. We need to have the ‘right kind of confidence,’ he writes, not so much in our methods as in God. Through his Spirit, God brings to life the words of God in men and women, even today.214 We can trust Him for that. Our confidence is that God can use the testimony of faithful Christian discipleship to speak to the hearts and minds of our fellow-Europeans.

213 Idem, p. 244. 214 Lesslie Newbigin, Proper Confidence (1995).

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Chapter 17

How Christian is Europe today? The person on the other end of the line spoke very poor French. From what she said, I gathered that she was trying to find la Chapelle. On a shivery winter day in 2004, she had decided to contact a pastor. By some inexplicable means she had obtained a tract of the Baptist congregation of which I was the pastor. Our meeting hall was the basement of an apartment building, located at a corner somewhere in the complicated system of alleys, squares, shop windows and restaurants that make up the commercial centre, Saint Georges, in the middle of the historic centre of Toulouse. We called it la Chapelle. Apparently, the person had not been able to find it (no wonder!), but fortunately the tract listed a phone number. So she called it and that’s how she got me on the line. I guided her by phone through the labyrinth to the front door of our chapel. She came in and we got talking. I learned that she was a Japanese immigrant, staying with a friend in an apartment not far from the chapel. She was hoping to find a steady job. For the time being, learning French was the main challenge. Then she told me the reason for contacting me. ‘I want to become a Christian, could you tell me how?’ I must admit that I was rather taken aback, and immediately caught by suspicion. In France, this is not the question people will ask you right away. Was this just a way of getting a residence permit, by becoming member of a church? Was the next question perhaps of a financial nature, or a demand for lodging? Working in downtown Toulouse had made me careful. However, when she told me her story, I heard nothing to raise my suspicion. Her name was Akiko. As she didn’t speak English and as her Japanese was all Chinese to me, we had no language alternative but French. She had searched for spiritual truth in her home country, but found no peace in traditional religion. She had travelled and lived in several other countries. She believed that there was a God who cared for us, but she didn’t know how to contact him, how to have peace of heart with this God. Which religion can help me, she wondered. After her arrival in Europe she noticed that there were churches everywhere she went. Gradually, she came to the conclusion that in Europe, one needs to be a Christian to approach God. As simple as that! But then, how does a young Japanese woman become a Christian? Good question. She tried to find out in several Catholic churches in the centre of Toulouse, but to no avail. Finally, she decided to try the Protestant way of becoming a Christian. This was the beginning of a whole year of preparation for baptism. My wife and I took all that time to explain the Christian faith, making sure that her motivation was sincere. Akiko faithfully attended all church services, and began

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to participate in prayers. Easter Day 2005 arrived, the day of her baptism. When she rose up from the water in the baptistery, she smiled and heaved a deep sigh: ‘Finally,’ she whispered. ‘Now I really am a Christian!’ Akiko has continued to follow the Lord, even after she left France. We have occasionally received news from her, confirming that she kept to her faith commitment. This is a remarkable story, by all means! But notice what triggered Akiko’s search for faith in the first place: church buildings, cathedrals, chapels. Christian edifices communicated to this Japanese immigrant that in our part of the world one has to seek God through the Christian faith. In her eyes, Europe, and even France of all places, was Christian. In the preceding chapters we have asked the question in what way has Europe become post-Christian. But this is only one side of the coin, one part of the paradox of our continent. The other side is that Christianity still occupies a very important place in society. So we have to ask a second question: how Christian is Europe today?

17.1. Christians in a secularized and multi-religious society To begin with, how large is the Christian population? Until the 1960s, European societies were largely mono-ethnic, with a European culture and Christianity as the dominant religion. Since then, large scale immigration has changed the traditional white face of Europe into a multicoloured one. Our societies have become multiethnic, multicultural and multi-religious. Meanwhile, the number of practicing Christians is in constant decline during the last decades. Conversions of Christian or secularised Europeans to other religions are exceptional. Consequently, it would be a simplification to describe European societies either as multi-religious or as secularised. To be precise, we should say that we live in largely secularised societies with various religious minorities: Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, religious Jews, etc. Special position of Christianity Europe is becoming increasingly pluralist, yet only partly so, because the traditional culture of the country remains the dominant one. Sociologists call it the Leitkultur, to indicate that in a multicultural society there is always one culture that takes the lead. This is invariably a European one. This implies that the religion that was (and still is) part of the Leitkultur also maintains a special position. In one country, it is the Lutheran Church, in another one the Anglican Church, or the Reformed or the Roman Catholic or the Orthodox Church, but in all cases it is Christianity that remains the frame of reference.

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For this reason, Europe is still considered to be Christian, as we saw in a preceding chapter. Consequently, the position of Christianity remains a special one. The scope of its action extends beyond its constituency of practicing members. The situation is paradoxical. A large majority of Europeans lead a secular lives. Yet many of them maintain a certain level of association with Christianity. Churches are losing the ability to define the beliefs and influence the behaviour of the vast majority of Europeans. Meanwhile, they continue to have a significant role in the lives of both individuals and communities, most obviously at times of celebration or loss. They are no longer able, however, to exert any form of control. This is a European story, brought about for European reasons, quite different, for example, from the continuing religious vitality of the United States, or indeed the rest of the world. Even so, despite the pluralist ethos according to which all religions are of equal value, Christianity remains the most attractive one when secularised Europeans are seeking for spiritual meaning. All of this means that we cannot limit the scope of Christianity to the number of Christians only. It is present outside churches in many ways. This will become apparent as soon as we ask the question how many Christians there are in Europe. The limitations of quantitative approaches Counting Christians is a complicated matter. Distinguishing ‘real’ from ‘nominal’ Christians is even more complicated. Quantitative approaches have serious limitations. Quite often, they only take into account one or two parameters of adherence to Christianity, namely church attendance and/or church registration. You can count the number of people in the pews, you can count the number of names on the church register, but how do you count those who believe in their heart that Jesus died for their sins? Clearly, other criteria are equally valid in determining whether someone is a Christian. For example: • • • •

Belief in basic Christian doctrines Individual religious practice (prayer, reading the Bible) Lifestyle related to Christian ethical and socio-cultural values Demanding Christian ceremonies as rites of passage (birth, confirmation or religious adulthood, wedding, and funeral)

All these criteria are not necessarily linked to church attendance. Church members who hardly ever attend church (the classic sociological definition of a nominal Christian) can: • Observe Christian traditions such as Christmas and other holidays, religious ceremonies related to national commemorations, etc.

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• Insist on a church wedding ceremony, want their children to be baptised (or ‘christened’ as Anglicans say), and their loved ones given a Christian burial • Hold to Christian norms and values with respect to marriage, sexuality, family and education, protection of human life, bioethics, and tolerance • Believe that God exists, that Jesus is the Son of God, that there is a heaven and a hell • Read the Bible and/or pray in private These variants show that a more refined approach is needed to get an idea of the scope of Christianity beyond the visible community of believers assembling for worship on any given Sunday.

17.2. Marginal Church Membership We have stated that our societies are marked by the abandonment of Christianity. But the loss in numbers is not as complete as it looks. It depends on whom you count as ‘Christians.’ Numbers of practicing Christians are relatively small. When one takes church attendance on an average Sunday as a criterion, the percentage in most European countries is less than ten percent. Exceptions are staunchly Catholic countries like Italy, Poland and Ireland. Some Orthodox regions in Eastern Europe also show higher percentages. But then, not every committed Christian goes to church every Sunday. Philip Jenkins speaks of a ‘solid minority of committed believing Christians.’ Some sixty million to seventy million West European Christians assert that religion plays a very important role in their lives, and many of those attend church regularly.215 If he is right, we should put the figure for the whole of Europe at 100 to 120 million, i.e. fifteen to eighteen percent of the population. When we take into account all those who are registered as church members, the figures rises considerably. This indicates the existence of marginal church members, also called nominal Christians. Nominal church members Nominal means that a person is registered as Protestant, Orthodox or Roman Catholic but does not practice this religion. Some nominal Christians come to a point where they demand deregistration, but their percentage is very small

215 Philip Jenkins, God’s Continent, p. 56.

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indeed. Meanwhile, the nominal ranks are continually swelling. There are two ways of ‘becoming’ nominal (although it is usually not a decision but rather a quiet process): - Being baptised as infants because their parents wished to express their adherence to a certain community or follow the tradition of the grandparents do not personally connecting to any form of church life. - No longer participating in church when once they did. Notice, however, that nominal Christians do not sever all links with the institutional church. Although their daily life is largely secularised, and although they may have a secular worldview, they wish to maintain at least an administrative link with organised religion. Reasons may vary: - - - - -

‘It is useful to maintain membership to ensure a Christian burial.’ ‘The church does good work for the poor and I want to support that.’ ‘In times of need, I might need the church.’ ‘Maybe God would be offended if I deregister.’ ‘I want to end up in paradise, not somewhere else.’

Minimal church membership In many countries there is a notion of minimal church membership. That means that there is a minimum requirement to fulfil in order to benefit from the services of the church in times of need, and to be sure that at the end of your earthly existence your family will have a Church funeral. This notion is particularly widespread among Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox populations. In the past, the Roman Catholic Church has defined minimum requirements of church attendance: go to confession and mass at least once a year. The typical period of the year varies from country to country: Christmas, or Easter, or Palm Sunday. If not, people run the risk of no longer benefiting from the grace of God as it is mediated by the church. Orthodox churches have similar guidelines. Many church members opt for the minimum requirement to ensure a good conscience. A few years ago I talked with Ronaldo Diprose, then academic dean of the Italian Evangelical Bible Institute in Rome, about the place of Roman Catholicism in Italian society. I also asked him about the level of religious practice. Over ninety percent of the Italians are baptised Catholics. He explained that this is even part of the national identity. However, the overwhelming majority hardly ever attend a mass, but that doesn’t mean that the church is not important for them. Almost all Italians consider themselves as good Catholics. They honestly believe that if you’re baptised in

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the church, if you have done First Communion, if you’re married in church, and if you go to confessional and to mass once a year at Easter, then you’re a good Catholic.216

Minimal church membership is based on the idea that when you are not interested in church life, you still want to keep on good terms with the church in order to be acceptable to God. Today, this notion is often subconscious. For many people, it has become automatic to do the minimum thing and be comfortable. It almost goes without saying. A typical European phenomenon Marginal church membership is widespread in Europe. In some countries it entails more than half of the population! One might even go as far as to say that this phenomenon is typical of the religious situation in the ‘Old Continent.’ Nowhere else in the world is there such a large percentage of nominal Christians. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this phenomenon affected large sections of the working class in the industrialised parts of Europe. After the Second World War it has become more generalised, especially since the 1960s. It can be observed in all historic churches, Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant. In passing, we notice that a similar process of estrangement from traditional relation can be observed among the Jewish and Muslim communities in Europe. Two examples serve to illustrate the scope of what we are talking about. In France, some sixty-five percent of the population defines itself as Roman Catholic (or Christian, which in this country commonly amounts to the same). An even higher percentage has been baptised in this church. Roughly half of the marriages include a church ceremony. But only seven to nine percent attend mass at least once a month. For the younger generation, the figures are considerably lower.217 In the past, the Spanish population was overwhelmingly and staunchly Roman Catholic, but this is rapidly changing. While 82.4 percent of the population still identify as Roman Catholic, only 47.7 percent of them, that is thirty-nine percent of the population, ‘practise’ Catholicism, according to the same criteria as used in the case of France. It should be noted that the number of nominal Christians is considerable in countries whose history has been dominated by Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy

216 This conversation took place during my stay at the Italian Evangelical Bible Institute in Rome, 22 March 2010. 217 Survey published by Le Monde des religions, July 2005.

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(Italy and Greece are the most telling examples). In countries whose history has been dominated by Protestantism, it is less common. Historic Protestant churches have lost a considerable proportion of their nominal members. Interestingly, Evangelicalism is far less affected by nominal membership. The major reason seems to be that it is a conversion movement rather than an historic tradition. However, there are signs that the phenomenon is also beginning to make inroads in these circles. Different criteria, different variants Notice that definitions of nominal Christianity vary. It is a confusing term that can mean different things. Historic churches practicing infant baptism consider all baptised members as Christians. Some give them a provisional status, considering them as Christian in view of a confirmation at a later stage in life. The fact that they hardly ever show up in church is not a reason to exclude them. Evangelical churches, however, link Christian identity to a faith decision. People are consciously incorporated into the church through baptism or public confession or both. Viewed from this angle, nominal church members still need to receive salvation, and therefore are not ‘real’ Christians. Here is, for example, the definition proposed by the influential Lausanne Committee of World Evangelisation. A nominal Christian is a person who has not responded in repentance and faith to Jesus Christ as his personal Saviour and Lord. He is a Christian in name only. He may be very religious. He may be a practicing or non-practicing Church member. He may give intellectual assent to basic Christian doctrines and claim to be a Christian. He may be faithful in attending liturgical rites and worship services, and be an active member involved in Church affairs. But in spite of all this, he is still destined for eternal judgment (cf. Matt. 7:21-23, Jas. 2:19) because he has not committed his life to Jesus Christ (Romans 10:9-10).218

Obviously, different criteria of determining Christian identity result in different statistics. Evangelical authors put the percentage of Christians at less than one percent in countries with a Roman Catholic or Orthodox tradition, and at an average of four to five percent in countries with a Protestant tradition. On the contrary, government statistics usually based on church attendance, present quite another picture, as do historic churches who present figures of their registers. They mention percentages ranging from fifty to sixty in countries

218 Christian Witness to Nominal Christians Among Roman Catholics, Lausanne Occasional Paper nr. 10, p. 4.

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that are most secularised, to more than ninety percent in countries where church membership is still assumed. Generally speaking, Evangelical churches closely relate Christian identity to active church membership. This explains why nominal membership is not so widespread among them, although it exists. According to the criteria generally adopted in socio-religious studies, a nominal Christian is someone registered as a church member while not practicing his religion in terms of attending church services, except occasionally.

17.3. Believing and/or Behaving Without Belonging When we look at forms of ‘Christianity’ outside the circle of practicing believers, we notice more than only nominal Christians. In order to bring this out, it is useful to use more variables than church attendance or official membership. Believing without belonging To begin with, we should distinguish ‘belonging’ and ‘believing.’ These technical terms have been introduced by Grace Davie in 1994, and adopted by most sociologists of religion in western Europe, as they analyzed the outcomes of the European Value Studies (EVS). - Belonging stands for church attendance. - Believing stands for holding Christian beliefs in God, life after death, heaven, hell, sin, etc. The European Values Studies (EVS) are a series of surveys conducted by a number of universities in several European countries at regular intervals (1981, 1990, 1999). The latest survey dates from 2008. What makes the EVS interesting is that they use more criteria to assess the religious situation of modern Europe: denominational allegiance, reported church attendance, attitudes towards the church, indicators of religious belief and subjective religious dispositions. From the data emerges a widespread phenomenon known as ‘believing without belonging,’ the name given to it by Grace Davie. 219 There are two types of variables to measure religious practice, she says: on the one hand those concerned with feelings, experience and the more numinous religious beliefs, on the other hand those which measure religious orthodoxy, ritual participation and institutional attachment.

219 Grace Davie, Religion in Britain since 1945.

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It is only the latter (i.e. the more orthodox indicators of religious attachment) which display an undeniable degree of secularisation throughout Western Europe. In contrast, the former (the less institutional indicators) demonstrate considerable persistent religious adherence. With this in mind, I am hesitant about the unqualified use of the term secularisation even in the European context. Indeed it seems to me considerably more accurate to suggest that West Europeans remain, by and large, unchurched populations rather than simply secular. For a marked falling-off in religious attendance (especially in the Protestant North) has not resulted, yet, in a parallel abdication of religious belief – in a broad definition of the term. In short, many Europeans have ceased to connect with their religious institutions in any active sense, but they have not abandoned, so far, either their deep-seated religious aspirations or (in many cases) a latent sense of belonging.220

On the basis of the most recent EVS data, Grace Davie even comes to an opposite conclusion. ‘Religious belief is inversely rather than directly related to belonging. In other words, as the institutional disciplines decline, belief not only persists, but becomes increasingly personal, detached and heterogeneous and particularly among young people.’ Believing without belonging has quickly become a catch phrase that rings a bell with most people who study the religious situation in their country. It describes the phenomenon that Christian beliefs are widespread beyond church institutions. It is found among nominal church members, and even among those who are no longer registered as such. Many Europeans seem to be secularised at face value, but retain a ‘latent sense of belonging’ because they share a number of beliefs inherited from the Christian past. Behaving without belonging – cultural Christians However, this distinction does not suffice to discern the spread of ‘Christianity’ outside the visible church community. We should enlarge the two variables (belonging-believing) to a triangle: belonging-believing-behaving. This helps us to see more clearly yet another category of persons. We owe this insight to Allan Billings. Together with some colleagues, this British Anglican priest analyzed the religious situation in his region. According to the 2001 census in the UK, over seventy-six percent of people identified themselves with ‘a faith tradition’ (answering this question was not compulsory!). These faith traditions comprise not only Christianity but also other religions, as well as vague notions of ‘spirituality.’ Unsatisfied with the secularisation theories, they used the idea of believing without belonging as a tool to better understand these people in their

220 Grace Davie, Europe: The Exceptional case, p. 7f.

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cities, towns and villages. But this didn’t give much more clarity. Most people who were not churchgoers appeared to be quite eclectic in what they believed. ‘They thought of Christianity more in terms of praxis, a way of living, than a set of beliefs.’ Billings describes them further: They live Christian lives; they are Christians because their lives reflect the life and values of Jesus Christ. Like him they acknowledge that we live in a creation; that God cares for us, that we should care for one another, and so on. It is the religion of the golden rule: do unto others as you would have them do to you. Sometimes they feel the need to attend a Church on such occasions as a Christmas Carol Service or Midnight Mass. They want family weddings and funerals to be held at a Church. They watch and feel uplifted by Songs of Praise on Sunday-night television. Sometimes they might want to hear inspiring music at a cathedral Matins or Evensong. They see the Church, in other words, as a spiritual resource. But they do not want to belong. 221

We could call this ‘behaving without belonging.’ Granted, this is a diluted form of practising Christianity. It only touches the social behaviour side of it, omitting the belief side and the worship side almost entirely. Allan Billings calls such people ‘cultural Christians.’ He distinguishes them from ‘church Christians’ (who go to church and adhere to its basic beliefs). This term should not be confused with the Kulturchristentum in nineteenthcentury German, although there are similarities. As I talk with people in my French surroundings and look at their attitude to Christianity, I recognize this description. In this country, I meet many cultural Roman Catholics, as Billings meets many cultural Anglicans in Britain. I suspect that the reader could meet them in any European country. This cultural Christianity is the effect of more than a thousand years of Christianity that has left behind a legacy of stories, words, images, and rites, through which Christian beliefs are transmitted. Think of the popular idea of Saint Peter at the gate of heaven, of the deceased floating on a cloud to heaven, of a horned devil that tempts people to commit a deadly or ‘capital’ sin. It has above all left us with values and a morality, notices Allan Billings: ‘The way we treat one another – especially the sick, the aged, the poor, the stranger in our midst – owes a great deal to the Biblical notion that all people are created in God’s image and deserving of care. We are a people who have been shaped and continue to live by Christian values.’222

221 Alan Billings, Secular Lives Sacred Hearts, p. 11. 222 Idem, p. 15f.

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He goes on to say that many people want to abide with social values that have a Biblical origin, and which they do not hesitate to call Christian values. They feel that they are doing what can be expected of any Christian. And God, if he exists, will certainly approve. He will accept them. It is lived Christianity. It is hardly ‘believing without belonging,’ since most people are not much interested in beliefs; the attachment is more emotional and practical than intellectual. 223

Belonging without believing/behaving Pastors who ‘know their flock’ will add to this that the inverse phenomenon also exists. They are usually saddened to observe that people belong to the church without believing and/or without behaving as Christians should. But that is an alternative way of defining the phenomenon of nominal Christianity described in the preceding paragraph.

17.4. Vicarious and default religion There is yet another way in which Europe is more Christian than one would have thought when looking at the visible presence of the church community. While the vast majority of the people live secular lives, they do not disregard Christianity. In society, all religions are tolerated and treated equally before the law. According to the postmodern worldview no religion is exclusive. Even so, Christianity is not reduced to one of the many religious options. Even in the pluralist, multicultural society where secular humanism dominates the public sphere, many un-churched people maintain an indirect, often unconscious link with Christianity. Two phenomena confirm this. Vicarious religion The first phenomenon is called ‘vicarious religion.’ The term was introduced by Grace Davie and Danièle Hervieu-Léger, a British and a French sociologist of religion. They noticed that the church embodies the collective religious memory of the whole nation, including people who do not practice the Christian religion. In this respect, the church has a function for the society at large. People appreciate that there are churches, they find them useful. Moreover, they see them in relation with the history of their nation. The church is part of the national cultural heritage, so the church should go on, even when they do not participate themselves. Grace Davie has this to say:

223 Idem, p. 18.

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For particular historical reasons (notably the historic connections between Church and State), significant numbers of Europeans are content to let both churches and churchgoers enact a memory on their behalf (the essential meaning of vicarious), more than half aware that they might need to draw on the capital at crucial times in their individual or collective lives. The almost universal take up of religious ceremonies at the time of a death is the most obvious expression of this tendency; so, too, the prominence of the historic Churches in particular at times of national crisis or, more positively, of national celebrations.224

This is a typical European phenomenon, sociologists notice. Everybody in Europe seems to be able to easily understand it, but in other parts of the world people find it difficult to grasp, as if it is something outside their experience. Default religion? Related to this is a second idea in which Christianity is the default religion of Europeans. If you are not religious yourself, but want something religious, this is the religion you turn to, as long as you do not have a particular preference for another one. Secularised people who wish a religious funeral for their deceased loved ones are unlikely to approach a rabbi or an imam. Either they ask a professional undertaker to organize an eclectic mix of texts and traditions with a more or less spiritual connotation, or they request the services of a clergyman. What is the default setting to which Europeans return when they are thinking about spiritual matters, about God, prayer, afterlife, sin, the origin of man? Two options seem to be prevalent. Either an esoteric New Age kind of spirituality made up of elements of Asiatic religious traditions and/or of elements from preChristian pagan religions in Europe. For this option, one needs to have a more than average acquaintance with such traditions. One needs to be a deliberate seeker of spiritual meaning in order to follow this track. In computer terms, this is not a default setting, but a customisation, based on personal configurations. The other option is taking up Christian traditions that linger in the collective subconscious of European people. For this option, one doesn’t have to make much effort. It is there, disseminated in our culture, to be found in any church around the corner. If you’re looking for spiritual meaning and you don’t customize, this is what you get: a Christian image of God, a Christian image of man, a Christian idea of prayer, and so on. What about other religions? As far as we can observe and generally speaking, neither Islam nor Hinduism are attractive options for Europeans in search of spirituality, inner peace or whatever term we could use for a renewed religious

224 Grace Davie, Europe: The Exceptional Case, p. 19.

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interest. Certainly, Muslims are actively engaging in missionary activities, but apparently these are aimed mainly at the second and third generation of Muslim migrants who are drifting away from the religion of their parents. Islam is still very much a communitarian religion. ‘Old stock’ Europeans who convert to Islam almost always do this in the context of a mixed marriage. More research is needed to learn about conversions for other reasons. From the available publications on the spread of Islam in Europe, we get the impression that the number is limited. Many Europeans have a benevolent attitude towards Judaism, Christians in particular are interested in its traditions, but in the eyes of both insiders and outsiders, this remains the religion of the Jewish people. Judaism is not at all a missionary religion. Rabbis do not encouraged non-Jews to become Jews. Very few take this step. Those that do, do so mainly in the context of mixed marriage.

17.5. Europe still considered to be Christian Despite massive secularisation and the development of a multi-religious society, Europe is still considered to be Christian. In a cultural sense Christianity has left Europe with a rich cultural heritage of values, ideas and images, artistic expressions, traditions, festivals, wedding and funeral rituals, local social customs, symbols, etc. This heritage can be found everywhere. It gives a Christian ring to our national and regional cultures. And they make Europe still look Christian to outside observers. There is a widespread popular feeling that ‘we are a Christian country’ – that is, in a cultural sense. Many non-religious people in Europe have the idea that the appropriate religion in Europe is Christianity. While they have no problem with churches continuing to function because ‘they always have,’ they are often apprehensive about the presence of ‘too many mosques.’ They tolerate them, as they think modern citizens should, but nevertheless, they feel that Islam is foreign to ‘our country,’ ‘our way of life.’ A mosque is considered to be a nonEuropean edifice. One thinks of the row over the Swiss referendum resulting in a vote against the construction of minarets. One thinks of the popular outcry in Italy when action groups wanted to have crucifixes removed from public schools. One also thinks of the political parties who attract voters with the message that the Muslim presence becomes a threat to our cultural heritage, saying that after all, ‘we’ are a Christian country. Other faith communities do not fit easily into our societies which regard the privatisation of religion as normal practice. Muslims in particular, find it normal

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to practice religious customs both privately and publicly. This has led to heated controversies about wearing head veils in public schools, medical treatment by doctors from the opposite sex, subsidising the construction of non-Christian religious buildings, etc. But public signs of Christian faith do not arouse the same level of protest. Instead, they are taken for granted as part of the landscape. One will find that secularised people actively oppose the destruction of a chapel because they consider it a beautiful element of the cultural heritage of the village. Al these examples illustrates that Christianity is seen as a normal part of the cultural landscape of Europe. In a civilisation sense The French political scientist Jean-François Susbeille has recently published a study on the decline of ‘the European Empire.’ His scenario of future doom is debatable. What makes his argument interesting for our subject is his repeated claim that ‘in this twenty-first century, the European Union remains the cradle of the Christian West, a community of countries who share common values.... Christianity is indeed one of the foundations of Europe.’225 Statements to the effect that Europe is part of western Christian civilisation can be found in many other essays on global issue and geopolitical developments. In a religious sense A middle-aged well-to-do woman in our congregation called Catherine once told me: Born in a Roman Catholic family, I abandoned religion as a teenager. Later in life I began searching for more spirituality in my life, but I didn’t want to learn Tibetan words and become Buddhist, like my son. I tried, but that made me feel far away from home. So I went to a church because that is much closer to my culture. At first I went to a Roman Catholic parish church, but felt not really welcomed. A few months later, I discovered a small Protestant church building just down the road, where Bible study discussions were held every Wednesday. I asked whether I, as a Catholic, could attend, and the group welcomed me without asking questions. Gradually I have drawn closer to experiencing a relationship with God. This was like returning to my lost spiritual roots.226

225 Jean-François Susbeille, Le déclin de l’empire européen, p. 187, 192. 226 She regularly came to the Free Evangelical Church in Castelnaudary, France, during the time that I lived there. This particular conversation took place in September 2009.

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What made this woman decide to come back to a church? It was her awareness that Buddhism was ‘far from home,’ while a church is ‘much closer to my culture.’ In the eyes of many, Christianity is the most appropriate religion of Europe.

17.6. Post-secular? There is a widespread assumption that secularisation is definitive, a no-return phase in the cultural of human development. Entering the secularised phase means the end of all religion. Only people with a residual religious worldview might link up with the church again, but people with no notion of divine reality whatsoever, are unlikely to change. Such is the assumption. Secularist philosophers give ample food to this idea. They argue that religion is a temporary phase in the development of humanity. Once this phase is past, there is no turning back. Massive decline in church membership in the post-war decades seems to substantiate this scenario. But is it realistic? Several indicators seem to point to the contrary. The past century has been marked by secularisation, but this does not mean that the present century will just follow the same path. We cannot draw a straight line from yesterday to tomorrow. This is what the old secularisation theory did, according to which Europe will inexorably become less religious. But there are several signs that the future might well be different, less secularised. Return of religion in private and public sphere Notice the ‘return of religion’ in the public sphere, in the arts, in popular music, in philosophical debates. There is a growing interest in spiritual matters among a wide range of people raised in a secular environment. So much is happening in the area of religion and society. Look at the new religiosity that has spread among Europeans who have not been brought up in a religious context. Often labelled as New Age or New Religious Movements, this can take the form of Eastern meditation, esoteric speculation, an interest in heretical movements of the past (Catharism for example), neo-paganism (Celtic cults revisited), or an ethical form of Buddhism combined with a bit of ‘spirituality’: seeking transcendental truth in the inner self. There is also a new interest in Christianity. The number of adult baptisms in Roman Catholic churches, the popularity of Gospel music, the number of people taking part in spiritual retreats in a monastery, the ongoing success of Taizé, the charismatic movements in historic churches, the young people with no Christian background whatsoever who are attracted to Evangelical musical events, and so on. Although the people concerned often are nominal church members, we also find among them people who come out of a completely secularised environment.

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Several social scientists see signs that the decline of Christianity is about to come to a standstill. American investigative journalists, John Micklethwait and Adrian Woolbridge, were so intrigued by the ongoing news of religious communities and by people in their highly secularised environment who appeared to have linked up with the Christian faith again, that they decided to concentrate their research on this subject; not only in the US but also in Europe. The result is a most challenging book called God is Back. Quoting research in the area of religion, collecting data about religious practice, reading publications and talking to opinion leaders in society, they arrived at the conclusion that ‘a global revival of faith is changing the world.’ Not only Christianity but also Islam, Hinduism and other religions are progressing in highly modernised societies, including Europe. Leaving journalistic hyperbole aside, the facts they collected are telling us that a new kind of religious adherence is winning ground all over Europe. While fewer people are inclined to remain faithful to the tradition of former generations, hence the decline of historic churches, a growing number of people is receptive to the Christian faith through a process of personal enquiry, leading to a spiritual experience and to some kind of conversion. This corresponds with the observations of sociologists like Danièle Hervieu-Léger that the typical twentyfirst-century believer is a ‘pilgrim’ and a ‘convert.’227 For this reason, Evangelical, Pentecostal and Charismatic faith expressions are finding increasing response, as Micklethwait and Woolbridge point out.228 According to the World Christian Encyclopaedia, these churches and movements accounted for 8.2 percent of Europe’s population in 2000, nearly double to that in 1970.229 Pentecostalism is France’s fastest-growing religious movement. Meanwhile, migrant churches are thriving in all the larger cities in western Europe, thus changing the perceptions of Christianity among the general population. On the one hand, Europe is becoming markedly more secular. Traditional Christian values are set aside; legislation follows majority opinions that run counter to what the church has always taught. On the other hand, there is an upsurge in religious practice, even in the urban areas. This comes as a surprise to the largely secularised world of social sciences. Moreover, the place of religious communities and their customs in society is a regular issue in political discussions.

227 The title of one of the main publications of Danièle Hervieu-Léger: Le pèlerin et le converti. 228 John Micklethwait and Adrian Woolbridge, God Is Back, p. 356ff. 229 Quoted by John Micklethwait and Adrian Woolbridge, God Is Back, p. 136.

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Secular and religious trends So what is the trend Europe? Is it secular or religious? ‘Predicting the future about religion in Europe is tricky as more than one thing is happening at once,’ says Grace Davie, whose analyses we have found useful to get a picture of the place of Christianity in today’s society. A few years ago, a journalist of The Guardian put this question to her, ‘Is Europe’s future Christian?’ Her answer was: The historic Churches of Europe are losing the ability to discipline both the beliefs and behaviour of the vast majority of Europeans. The process is unlikely to be reversed and will lead, other things being equal, to an increase in secularisation in most parts of the continent. Other things, however, are not equal, given that the rest of the world is arriving in Europe – pretty fast. New communities have arrived, which understand their religious lives very differently from their European hosts. Among them are forms of Christianity which challenge the historic Churches of Europe – in terms of fervour as well as belief; they are markedly more conservative. Among them also are other-faith communities, some of which do not fit easily into our societies which regard the privatisation of religion as ‘normal.’ Hence the series of heated controversies about the wearing of the veil in public school, for instance.230

Religion is important in today’s society. Traditional religious practices are not disappearing as secularist intellectuals have thought they would, but remain important for a considerable part of the population. This creates problems (should ritual slaughter by Jews and Muslims be allowed; should the state help migrant communities to build better places of worship; what kind of religious education should be taught in public schools?), but politicians are often ill equipped to take decisions. Here we notice the effects of secularisation, one of which is the systematic loss of religious knowledge. It follows that necessarily sensitive debates are very often engaged by people who, literally, do not know what they are talking about – with respect to their own faith, never mind anyone else’s. ‘It is little wonder that things get out of hand,’ notes Grace Davie, who emphasizes that ‘little will be gained, conversely, by denying the realities of the past, by contempt for the seriously religious, and by the (sometimes deliberate) cultivation of ignorance about faiths of any kind.’ She adds that Europeans should be better informed about their religious heritage, and build on its positive dimensions – those of generosity and welcome. Europeans, moreover, should ensure that there is a place in their societies for those who take faith seriously, whatever that faith might be. ‘The

230 Grace Davie, ‘Is Europe’s Future Christian?,’ interview in The Guardian, 1 June 2009.

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largest proportion of these people will still be Christian, but in ways rather different from their forebears.’231 So is Europe becoming post-secular? While the process of secularisation is still going on, we are witnessing new forms of church life (all kinds of missionary and ‘emerging’ churches, religious communities) and a host of revitalised existing churches. Micklethwait and Woolbridge conclude their research by saying: Give people the freedom to control their lives and, for better or worse, they frequently choose to give religion more power. Give religious people modern technology and they frequently use it to communicate God’s Word to an evergrowing band of the faithful....Religion is proving perfectly compatible with modernity in all its forms, high and low. It is moving back toward the centre of intellectual life. But it is also a vital part of popular culture, with Christian barbershops and tattoo artists, skateboarders and stand-up comedians. Christian rock-music is ubiquitous.232

In his book on the future of religion in Europe, Philip Jenkins has devoted a whole chapter to these phenomena, aptly called ‘Faith among the ruins.’233 They may be portending days in which the Gospel will gain a larger hearing still. Hope At the end of our investigation we want to quote once more Lesslie Newbigin. We don’t need promises of coming revival or statistics of church growth, he says, to have confidence for the future. Instead, we must accept the facts. We are a minority, but that should not worry us, because our hope is not based on figures but on the faithfulness of God. In a pluralist society there is always a temptation to judge the importance of any statement of the truth by the number of people who believe it. Truth, for practical purposes, is what most people believe. Christians can fall into this trap. It may well be that for some decades, while Churches grow rapidly in other parts of the world, Christians in Europe may continue to be a small and even shrinking minority. If this should be so, it must be as an example of that pruning which is promised to the Church in order that it may bear more fruit (John 15). When that happens it is painful. But Jesus assures us, ‘My Father is

231 Grace Davie, op cit. 232 John Micklethwait and Adrian Woolbridge, God Is Back, p. 355. 233 Philip Jenkins, God’s Continent, chapter 3.

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the gardener.’ It is a summons to self-searching, to repentance, and to fresh commitment. It is not an occasion for anxiety. God is faithful, and he will complete what he has begun.234

The last phrase reminds us of the words of the Psalmist as they are echoed in the traditional greeting pronounced at the beginning of Protestant church services: ‘Our help is in the name of the Lord, who is faithful in eternity, who never abandons the work that his hand began.’ If we can say that he began a work through the apostles who set foot on the shores of Macedonia at the beginning of the Christian era, and that he has continued the work during many ages in what has come to be called Europe, then we may have confidence that he will not abandon it, but bring it to completion, according to his good purposes.

234 Lesslie Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society, p. 244.

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Index of names and subjects A

abolitionist 242, 243 Adenauer, Konrad 89, 90, 91, 114 Ahonen, Risto 177 Al-Andalus 55, 213 alliance of throne and altar 254 Altermatt, Urs 47, 48, 49, 90, 210, 227, 230, 239 American Revolution 240 Anabaptists 64, 256 anti-Judaism 62, 245, 246 antisemitism 73, 135, 160, 175, 245 assimilation 162, 163, 165, 171, 218 atheism 17, 264, 265

B

Bach, Johann Sebastian 230 Bacon, Francis 54 Bakke, Elisabeth 126, 127, 128, 129, 130 Barbarians 19, 22, 44, 150, 205 Barraclough, Geoffrey 99 Barroso, José-Manuel 75, 117 Bauman, Zygmunt 77 Beethoven, Ludwig van 123 behaving without belonging 279, 290, 291, 292 believing without belonging 279, 290, 291, 293 Benelux 92 Berger, Peter 270 Berlinski, Claire 252

Index of names and subjects

Berlin Wall 48, 93, 114 Béthune, Maximilien de 85 bicultural communities 159 Billings, Allan 269, 270, 291, 292 birth rates 25 Blair, Tony 232 Boerwinkel, Feitse 254, 255, 258 Bosch, David 274 Brandt, Willy 83 Broggini, Jérôme 53, 204, 206 Brown, David 233 Bruguès, Jean-Louis 227, 228 Buchman, Frank 89 Buijs, Govert 229 Bureau of European Policy Advisors 117 Burke, Edmund 66, 67 Bush, George senior 96 Byzantine Empire 58 Byzantine ’Europe’ 59

C

Caldwell, Christopher 169 capitalism 63, 105, 209, 237, 244, 245 Champion’s League 149 Charlemagne 57, 58, 84, 88, 128, 129, 236 Charter of Fundamental Rights 131 Cherniae, Anatoli 96 China 134 Chopin, Thierry 31, 186 Christendom 58, 60, 62, 63, 81, 124, 206, 211, 224, 253, 254, 258, 274, 316

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Europe and the Gospel: Past Influences, Current Developments, Mission Challenges

Christian democratic politicians 88 Christian mission 70 Christian realm, Europe as 54, 55, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 74, 213, 218 Churchill, Winston 47, 87 civilization offensive 69 Clovis 54, 57 Cold War 73, 80, 87, 98, 99, 115, 134 colonialism 33, 36, 69, 73, 225, 237, 240, 242 common roots 131 common values 130 complementary identities 130 Constantine 58, 59, 253, 254, 255 Constantinian system 255, 256 Constantinople 50, 55, 58, 59, 60, 254 corpus christianum 58, 64, 225, 239 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard 86 Council of Europe 87 Courbage, Youssef 171 Crusades 59, 61, 213, 236, 277 cuius regio, eius religio 62 cultural capitals of Europe 121 cultural European identity 131

D

Dalarun, Jacques 237, 238 Davie, Grace 270, 271, 290, 291, 293, 294, 299, 300 Day of Europe 91, 123 Declaration on European Identity (1972) 119 default religion 294 De Gasperi, Alcide 89, 90, 91, 114, 184 Delgado, Mariano 210, 229, 230, 238, 239 Delors, Jacques 116, 181, 198, 199 Democratic deficit 185 Derrida, Jacques 267 Dialogue of EU with Churches and other faith communities 116, 199 Dias, Bartholomeas de 241 Diaspora communities 167 Diprose, Ronaldo 287 Dunant, Henri 83

304

E

Eco, Umberto 38, 122, 148 Edict of Milan (313) 253, 254 Enlightenment 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 77, 84, 135, 137, 203, 208, 209, 210, 216, 238, 242, 247, 256, 257, 263, 266, 267, 276 Erasmus 61, 147, 209 Erasmus program 122 etsi deus non daretur 261 Eurabia 177 Eurasianism 105 Euratom 91, 92 euro 31, 101, 123, 133, 182, 187 Eurocentrism 36, 107, 111, 139, 191, 236 Euro-consciousness 132 euro-crisis 122, 183 European Charter of Fundamental Rights 75 European Community 92 European Community of Coal and Steal 91 European Constitution, project 184, 215 European Convention of Human Rights 87, 92, 113 European Court of Human Rights 92, 102 European driver‘s license 123 European Economic Community 91 European ‘elite’ 126 European Evangelical Alliance 137 European flag 117, 123 European Fund of Regional Development (EFRED) 92 European identity 127, 136 Europeanism 126 Europeanization 70, 119, 121, 149, 177 Europeanness 75, 79, 130 European Parliament 38, 92, 100, 102, 107, 108, 109, 123, 182, 186, 201, 219 European passport 123 European Values Studies 290

Index of names and subjects

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‚Europe’ as a cultural zone 77 ‚Europe’ as a family of cultures. 77 ‚Europe’ as a house of nations 79, 80 ‚Europe’ as a revived Roman Empire 110 ‚Europe’ as civilization 65 Europé, name, myth 19, 20, 22 Euro-scepticism 119, 191 Eurostat 156 Evangelical European Alliance 111 exceptional continent 270

F

Ferry, Luc 275, 276 Fokas, Effie 270 Fontaine, Pascal 32, 130, 131 Fountain, Jeff 90 Frankish (Carolingian) kingdom 57, 129 freedom of religion 66, 67, 116, 266 French Revolution 208, 209, 210, 215, 217, 238, 239, 240, 243, 256, 258, 263

G

Gantenbein, Hansjörg 274 García, Soledad 131, 132 Gauchet, Marcel 196 Gaulle, General de 79, 93 Giuliani, Jean-Dominique 187 glasnost 94 globalisation 167 globalization 30, 31, 45, 77, 125, 187, 188, 189, 191, 221, 315 Goethe, Wolfgang 205 Gorbachev 95 Gorbachev, Mikhail 80, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99 Goya 233 Graceffa, Agnès 57 Gulag Archipelago 267

H

Habermas, Jürgen 184, 185, 218, 219, 267 Habsburg 84, 129 Heitz, Arsène 117

Index of names and subjects

Herodotus 20 Hervieu-Léger, Danièle 293, 298 Hobbes, Thomas 77 Holy Roman Empire 57 Hugo, Victor 86, 133 Human and Citizens Rights 240 Humanism 210, 216, 239 human rights 67, 75, 76, 80, 84, 87, 100, 107, 114, 119, 130, 131, 155, 172, 188, 189, 190, 191, 193, 199, 208, 211, 218, 223, 227, 229 Humphrey, Caroline 105 Huntingdon, Samuel 81

I

immigration, external 154, 156 immigration, issue of 165 immigration of Christians 158 immigration policy 110, 111 immigration surplus 25 Industrial Revolution 210, 244, 245 Ingleby, Jonathan 167, 315 integration 13, 16, 26, 30, 33, 38, 45, 46, 88, 90, 92, 106, 111, 112, 116, 119, 120, 121, 122, 127, 129, 142, 148, 150, 153, 157, 162, 163, 165, 174, 177, 182, 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 195, 197, 198 Iron Curtain 87, 88, 93, 114, 115 Islamic extremism 174 Islamization 161 Islam, radical forms 160, 173, 174, 177 Islam, traditional forms 173

J

Jackson, Darrell 136, 315 Jacques, Francis 221 Jeltsin, Boris 95 Jenkins, Philip 158, 162, 171, 177, 219, 252, 271, 286, 300 John Paul II 94, 207, 211, 217

K

Kant, Immanuel 68, 77, 85, 209 Kasper, Walter 114, 208, 236 King, Martin Luther 83, 244

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Kohl, Helmut 96, 97, 98, 99 Kundera, Milan 49 Kuyper, Abraham 245

L

Lactantius 21 laïcité 75, 257, 276 Lausanne Committee of World Evangelisation 289 Leitkultur 157, 160, 163, 284 Lewis, David Levering 55, 57, 60, 213 life expectancy 25 Livi-Bacci, Massimo 315 Livingstone, David 70 Llul, Raymond 213 Locke, John 68 Longman, Philip 28 Lorein, Johan 260, 261 Lumengo, Ricardo 163, 165 Lustiger, Jean-Marie 235, 236 Luther, Martin 64 Lyotard, Jean-François 267

M

marginal Church membership 286, 288 Martel, Charles 57 Martin, Catherine 50, 51 Massignon, Bérengère 197, 199 Merkel, Angela 94, 162, 182, 196 Micklethwait, John 170, 298, 300 Middle-Ages 22, 46, 47, 57, 60, 62, 64, 217, 253 migrant workers 154 Milit 214 minimal Church membership 287 Monnet, Jean 91 Moors 55, 212, 213 More, Thomas 61 mosaic model 161 Müller, Jan-Werner 194 multiculturalism 161, 162, 163, 168, 217, 218 multicultural society 16, 131, 134, 153, 157, 159, 161, 163, 167, 173, 174, 178, 188, 217, 218, 268, 277, 284, 293

306

multilingual 148 multireligious society 12, 163, 284, 295 Murray, Stuart 274 Muslim presence in Europe 170, 172 Muslims in Europe 42 Muslims in Europe; demographic growth prospects 171 Muslim world 30, 55, 58, 61, 64, 81, 82, 134, 135, 212, 214

N

Napoleon 84, 129 nationalism 124 national myth 199, 218 nation and its (imagined) past 125 neo-paganism 297 Newbigin, Lesslie 12, 273, 274, 280, 281, 300, 301, 316 Ni Dieu, ni maître 239 Nobel, Alfred 83 Nobel Peace Prize 83, 84 nominal Church members 286 Non-Conformists 64, 256

O

ora et labora 115 Orban, Viktor 75 Orthodox Europe 40 Ottoman Empire 61

P

Pacensis, Isidorus 55 Pagden, Anthony 49, 53, 54, 65, 70, 74, 78, 123, 208 Parliamentary democracy 130 Pascal, Blaise 252 patriotism 119, 124, 134, 138, 149, 164, 191, 218 Penn, William 85 perestroika 94 pluralism 75, 257 Podiebrad, Georges 85 Poitiers, Battle of 55 population 24

Index of names and subjects

Evert Van De Poll

population decrease 26 populist movements and parties 16, 164, 191, 192, 217 post-Christendom 253 post-Christian 17, 251, 252, 261, 267, 275, 284 post-Christianised 251, 253 post-colonialism 154 post-Constantinian 253 post-evangelised 268 postmodernism 216, 267, 268 post-religious 261 post-secular 297, 300 Poupard, Paul 205, 206 Prodi, Romano 117 progress, idea of 68 Protestant Europe 40, 62 Putin, Vladimir 104

R

radical Islam 174 Raiffeissen 245 Rapid Deployment Force 188, 189 Ratzinger, Joseph 53, 67, 168, 217, 220, 314 Ratzinger, Joseph (Pope Benedict VIV) 53, 67, 167, 217 Ratzinger, Joseph (Pope Benedict XVI) 53, 220 reconciliation (between former enemies) 88 reconquista 60, 213 Reformation 62, 64, 66, 209, 253, 266 Rembrandt 233 Renaissance 33, 66, 204, 209, 216 Rerum Novarum 89, 245 Reynold, George de 21 Rietkerk, Wim 219, 220, 226, 227, 236, 237, 247, 248 Rifkin, Jeremy 108 Ripa, Cesare 65 Roberts, Dana 241, 242 Roman Catholic Europe 40 Roman Empire 57, 59, 245, 253, 255

Index of names and subjects

roots of Europe, Christian 11, 16, 114, 131, 136, 162, 197, 203, 204, 205, 208, 209, 211, 212, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 221, 227, 246 roots of Europe, Greek 204 roots of Europe, idealised Christian 216 roots of Europe, Jewish 206, 211 roots of Europe, Muslim 212 roots of Europe, Roman 204 roots of Europe, Slavic 207 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 85 Ruler, Anton van 247

S

Santer, Jacques 117 Sarracenes 55 Schaeffer, Francis 248 Schengen Agreement 100, 135, 136, 164, 188 Schirrmacher, Christine 177, 178 Schmidt, Helmut 195 Schuman Declaration 91, 123 Schuman, Robert 11, 89, 90, 91, 114, 186, 189, 314, 315 Second World War 154, 247 secularisation 166, 190, 251, 257, 263, 264, 265, 266, 270, 271, 275, 276, 279, 291, 295, 297, 299, 300 Secularist agenda 190, 216 seekers of asylum 155 separation between ethnic communities 159 separation of Church and State 119, 130, 256, 257 Seye, Boucounta 21 Sharia 173, 177, 178 Shoa 236, 246, 267 Slavery 242, 244 Smith, Anthony 66, 69, 124, 125, 126, 132, 134, 135, 137, 149 Smith, Calvin 79, 80, 111 socio-cultural cross 43, 46 soul of/for Europe 198

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Europe and the Gospel: Past Influences, Current Developments, Mission Challenges

Soviet Union, dissolution 95 stadial theory of history 68 Stakos, Metropolitan Mikhail 80 Stalin, Joseph 47, 87 State Church 255, 256, 257, 258 Sticht, Pamela 78, 120, 203, 204, 205 Strahlenberg 22 Susbeille, Jean-François 118, 296 Szczypiorski, Andrzej 48 Szücs, Jenö 48, 49

T

Tabbert, Philipp Johann 22 Taizé 297 Thatcher, Margaret 96 Theodosius 255 Theresa, Mother 83 Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) 100 Treaty of Lisbon (2008) 75, 101, 117, 131, 182, 185, 190, 215 Treaty of London (1949) 87 Treaty of Maastricht (1991) 100, 101, 122, 123, 134, 182, 198 Treaty of Paris (1951) 91 Treaty of Rome (1957) 91 Treaty of Utrecht (1713) 62 Treaty of Verdun (843) 57 Treaty of Westphalia (1648) 62 Tully, James 68 Turkish membership 104

308

U

ummah 177 United States of Europe 86, 120 unity in diversity 107, 120, 138

V

Valéry, Paul 204, 205 Van Gogh 233 Verhofstadt, Guy 183 vestiges 259, 261 vicarious religion 293 Vives, Juan Luis 61

W

Walldorf, Friedemann 12, 274 Weber, Max 63, 209 Weigel, George 197, 236 Weiler, Joseph 194 Wende 93 Western civilization 81 Wheat and tares, Parable of 248 Wilberforce, William 243, 244 Woolbridge, Adrian 170, 298, 300

Y

Yalta 47, 87 Yugoslavia, war in former 42, 75, 76

Z

Zapek, Karel 181

Index of names and subjects

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List of Figures Figure 1.1 Europe and Asia. Figure 2.1 Languages in Europe. Figure 2.2 Map of languages in Europe and religious affiliations. Figure 2.3 Four religious zones in Europe. Figure 2.4 Characteristics of the four zones in Europe. Figure 3.1 The spread of Islam in 622-750. Figure 5.1 European Union in June 2013. Figure 6.1 European Union flag. Figure 10.1 Religious and national identity in selected countries in 2011. Figure 11.1 Sculpture Europe à Coeur in front of the European Parliament Building in Strasbourg.

List of Figures

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List of Tables Table 1.1 Population of selected European countries in 2002 and 2011. Table 7.1 ‘Euro-consciousness’ in selected European countries. Percentage of people who identified themselves as Euro-citizens. Table 8.1 Percentage of foreign-born citizens in selected countries in 2009. Table 9.1 Number of non-EU immigrants in the EU countries in 2008. Table 10.1 European countries with the largest Muslim communities

List of Tables

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Aufsätze

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