Eurasian Corridors of Interconnection: From the South China to the Caspian Sea 0415857716, 9780415857710

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Eurasian Corridors of Interconnection

Connectivity, as well as conflict, characterizes Eurasia. This edited volume explores dynamic geopolitical and geo-economic links reconfiguring spaces from the eastern edge of Europe through the western edge of Asia, seeking explanation beyond description. The ancient Silk Road tied together space, much as pipelines, railroads, telecommunications infrastructure, and similar cultural and constructed links ease the mobility of people and products in modern Eurasia. This book considers Eurasia along an interlinked corridor, with chapters illustrating the connections as a discussion foundation focusing on the shared interactions of a set of nation states through time and across space, generating more positive considerations of the resurgently important region of Eurasia. China’s interests fall into three chapters: the southeastern border with Vietnam, the southwestern Himalayan edge, and the western Muslim regions. Russia’s recovery relates events to a larger landmass context and focuses on the importance of historic mobility. A geo-history of the Caspian considers this petroleum-rich area as a zone of cultural and economic interconnection. The fi nal focus on Central Asia treats the traditional heart of “Eurasia”. The concluding chapter pulls together strands linking subregions for a new concept of “Eurasia” as an area linked by vital interests and overlapping histories. Susan M. Walcott is Professor of Geography at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. Corey Johnson is Assistant Professor of Geography at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

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Eurasian Corridors of Interconnection From the South China to the Caspian Sea Edited by Susan M. Walcott and Corey Johnson

NEW YORK

LONDON

First published 2014 by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Simultaneously published in the UK by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2014 Taylor & Francis The right of Susan M. Walcott and Corey Johnson to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Eurasian corridors of interconnection : from the South China to the Caspian Sea / edited by Susan M. Walcott and Corey Johnson. pages cm. — (Routledge advances in geography ; 10) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Eurasia—History. 2. Eurasia—Geography. 3. Eurasia—Politics and government. 4. Geopolitics—Eurasia. I. Walcott, Susan M., 1949– DS5.E87 2014 950—dc23 2013027362 ISBN13: 978-0-415-85771-0 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-79644-3 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by IBT Global.

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Contents

List of Figures List of Tables 1

Introduction: A Conceptual Overview

vii ix 1

SUSAN M. WALCOTT AND COREY JOHNSON

2

Creating a Border Between China and Vietnam

15

JAMES ADAMS ANDERSON

3

Himalayan Hinterlands: Highland Axis of Asia

33

SUSAN M. WALCOTT

4

Where Inner Asia Meets Outer China: The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China

49

STANLEY W. TOOPS

5

Russian Repositioning: Mobilities and the Eurasian Regional Concept

72

ALEXANDER C. DIENER

6

Geographies of Obdurate Infrastructure in Eurasia: The Case of Natural Gas

110

COREY JOHNSON

7

Islam as a Source of Unity and Division in Eurasia

130

MATTHEW DERRICK

8

Conclusion: Middle Ground

157

COREY JOHNSON AND SUSAN M. WALCOTT

Contributors Index

169 171

Figures

1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2 6.1 6.2

Various boundaries previously proposed for Eurasia, including Central Asia, CIS, and former Soviet satellites. Core areas of reconceptualized Eurasia, broader area of interlinkages spanning South China to the Caspian Sea. Demographic Eurasia, circa 1 AD. Sino–Vietnamese frontier region. Mt. Everest within the Himalayan massif, from Katmandu to Paro, Bhutan. Map of Himalayan physical and political major features. Xinjiang regional map. Xinjiang population, 2010. Xinjiang minority population percentage, 2010. Map of the Russian Empire. Central Eurasia Transit Network. Map of INOGATE countries. Map of main natural gas pipelines linking western Eurasia.

4 7 10 18 33 36 51 60 66 79 94 120 125

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Tables

1.1 3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4a

Sample Timeline of Major Events Shaping Eurasia Demographic Comparison Economic Composition Comparison Contested Histories Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Population by District in Xinjiang in 2010 Population by Minzu (Ethnicity) and District in Xinxiang, 2010 4.4b Population by Minzu (Ethnicity) and District in Xinxiang, 2010

11 36 41 52 61 63 65 66

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1

Introduction A Conceptual Overview Susan M. Walcott and Corey Johnson

The term “Eurasia” almost invariably invokes images of geopolitical intrigue and even primordial human struggle. In his novel Nineteen Eighty-Four George Orwell (1949) referred to the neo-Bolshevik superstate in control of Europe and northern Asia as a metageographical “Eurasia,” one of three constantly contesting power blocs. In popular modern usage, Eurasia is often accompanied by discussions of a “Great Game,” “a chessboard,” and civilizational chasms (Brzezinski 1997; Kaplan 2009). Such depictions of Eurasia became more prevalent following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the growing regional influence of China and India. Many social scientists use the term uncritically to denote a field of ethnic, political, or economic conflict, the big territorial Space in which old-fashioned confrontations occur (e.g. Freire and Kanet 2010). These connotations are related in no small part to the region’s place in past imperial power struggles, and an overwhelming sense that “geography is destiny” in the spaces between the major powers on the globe’s largest landmass (Kaplan 2009). In this regressive perspective, China and the U.S. replace Russia and Great Britain as contending geopolitical “chess” strategists, with intervening interests such as nuclear India and Pakistan along with semi-resurgent Russia. Portrayals of this type obscure the fact that connectivity, as well as conflict, characterize Eurasia now and throughout most of history. It would be naïve to discount negative uses of “Eurasia,” because the term evolved in particular historical and geographical contexts. The terms Eurasia and Eurasianism continue to be influential in Russia and the orbit of the former Soviet Union as geostrategic philosophies that recall Mackinderian classical geopolitics concerned with the influence of the great center of a bi-continental landmass (Morozova 2009; Senderov 2009; Laruelle 2008; Shlapentokh 2007). The founder of British geopolitics saw countries contending for natural resources at the heart of Eurasia, even prior to the age of petroleum, transportation routes, and trading centers. His boundary of the “pivot area” ran from the Caspian Sea to western China’s arid Taklimakan desert, now distinguished by the mummified remains of Celtic-type post-glacial melt migrants in western China between Mongolia and Tibet (Barber 2000). Swanstrom (2005) extends Eurasia from its Central Asian

2

Susan M. Walcott and Corey Johnson

heartland pivot east to China, following movements of natural resources through pipelines and trans-Islamic terrorists. Multiple interdependencies bind the region’s interests, from the shared prosperity inducement of trade to military power projection—underlined by the fear that conflict may lead to the termination of economically essential access to markets (Norling and Swanstrom 2007). Much like the term “geopolitics,” Eurasia bears the baggage of prior eras of state-centered hegemonic misuse, imperialist hubris, and intermittent ignorance by Western powers (O Tuathail 1985; Lewis and Wigen 1997). Boundaries of this region can now be distinguished by separate blocs of allied, largely contiguous nations, from the European Union on the west to organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on the east (also known as the “Shanghai Five” for the number of its core members). Regional blocs as well as national borders assert pressure on the frontiers (Walters 2004). Geostrategies to manage frontier border issues include working through networks and colonial borders, invoking real and imagined relationships as ways of territorializing space. In some functional sense frontiers are “fuzzy” rather than fi rm lines, depending on political assertions and invocations of sovereignty or advantage to stretch their power zones past spaces formally delineated as borders, encompassing considerations of groups in one territory working on behalf of or sharing the goals of a core within another territory. The simple question informing the idea for this book asks: What should the regional term “Eurasia” include, and on what basis? We find it worth noting that the origins of the term in natural science were about the geologic and biogeographic unity of the world’s largest landmass, yet it is used far more commonly today as shorthand for Central Asia. Few Europeans or Asians would consider themselves residents of the region “Eurasia.” Furthermore, few geographic terms are used quite so loosely with respect to a delimitation of where a place actually lies than Eurasia, as if it is either self-evident or irrelevant. Finally, qualitatively the geographic moniker Eurasia is most commonly used in regressive, throwback contexts. When writing of the incorporation of China or Vietnam into a deeply interpenetrated 21st century global economy, “Asia” or some regional variant thereof suffices, whereas power plays around natural resources or military strategy is more likely to take place in a “Eurasian” context. Why is this? Is the term worth salvaging? We propose that it is time for rethinking the regional concept of “Eurasia” as a scale of analysis and as a geographical place. This edited volume is motivated by the relative neglect of economic, cultural, and political interactions at the analytical scale of Eurasia, and by our belief that current debates assume that Eurasia is merely a catchall term for bare ambition and geostrategic wrangling. Taken together, the contributions to this edited volume argue that what unites Eurasian space is at least as important as what divides it. We hope this edited volume will provide a set of possibilities for imagining a new functional regional conceptualization. We explore this

Introduction

3

by examining dynamic geopolitical and geo-economic links reconfiguring Eurasian spaces from the eastern edge of Europe through the western edge of Asia. The framework of this book considers borders not simply as barriers but as zones of political and economic transfer, and sites where mutual interests as well as contestation become most apparent. Understanding Eurasian geography requires understanding the nature of three basic notions: (1) We are dealing with a highly contested term that must be unpacked; (2) however geographically defi ned, Eurasia is a dynamic space where interests overlap and therefore give rise to conflict at multiple scales; and (3) Eurasia, as the earth’s largest landmass, represents historically and presently a zone of interconnectivity. It is this last notion that in our view previous treatments most neglected.

WHERE IS EURASIA? ORIGINS OF A CONTESTED TERM In common usage, the term “Eurasia” often functions as a surrogate term for Central Asia, which is curious when one considers its origins. The Austrian geologist Eduard Süss used the term Eurasia in the late 19th century in order to challenge the then dominant cultural conceptualization, dating to the ancient Greeks, that Europe and Asia were two different world realms. He argued, instead, that Europe and Asia, at least geologically and zoogeographically speaking, belonged together (Kaiser 2004). Not long thereafter, following the geopolitical upheavals in the wake of World War I, a group of exiled Russian intellectuals—mainly linguists and geographers—based in Sofia, Prague, Paris, and Vienna made a political project out of “Eurasianism.” This viewpoint rejected Eurocentric conceptions of “universal” cultural values, and replaced it with Slavocentrism. Russia, in particular, stood at the cultural and geographic heart of the world’s largest landmass. As such, Russia had a special, hegemonic role in shaping affairs there and served as a bridge between West and East. In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, this brand of Eurasianism has re-emerged in Russian political discourse (Bassin 1991; Senderov 2009; Morozova 2009). Counter perspectives to this also emerged, such as the notion that Eurasia no longer exists in the sense of a “natural” habitus for Russia’s geopolitical ambition, so it must choose between regressive regional ambition and a place in the increasingly globalized economy dominated by the West and East Asia (Trenin 2002). The common mental map of “Eurasia” therefore reflects the places that were most involved in past hegemonic struggles over the core of the large Eurasian landmass. These struggles took place primarily between European powers and Russia during the 19th and 20th centuries. They involved territorial struggles, ideological struggles (in the case of the Cold War), and resource struggles (the prize of Caspian oil, for example), and shared a common element of geopolitical wrangling between the (then) greatest

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8

Susan M. Walcott and Corey Johnson

borderlands as an interlinked region that is of interest, particularly in a region of the world so often seen as fraught with past and future challenges to peaceful coexistence. The consequences of threats posed by border confl icts accentuates the importance of fi nding new ways to negotiate their presentation as positive potentialities based on their past histories as areas of exchange. Chapters are designed to do more than advance an arcane argument by and among regional experts. They aim to serve as a discussion foundation for students and instructors involved in regional studies by combining an examination of a particular set of nation-states, focusing on their shared interactions through time and across space. It is hoped that this contribution to a perspective shift could prove a useful grounding for more positive considerations of the possibilities of this resurgently important region of Eurasia, broadly conceived to capture an appropriately wide range of interactions. Duara (2010) eloquently argues that the contemporary period represents a type of “back to the future” given the unsatisfactory non-congruence of national and socio-economic boundaries at present. Agreeing with Lefebvre that capitalism produces the space it requires and that boundaries are socially constructed, he cites the global reach of imperialism in the 19th–20th centuries that was preceded by interlinked cultural and trade networks that are revived in the post-Cold War period, drawing on economic and cultural grounds for regional integration. Systemic shocks focus attention on potentially mutually-sustaining prospects of cooperation, linked through “corridors of exchange” via demographically mobile economic connections.

METHODOLOGY Case studies provide a context-specific, regionalized approach whose sensitivity to local realities address a major problem in top-down analyses. This book deals with issues arising out of claims of territorial sovereignty in order to access political-economic benefits from resources and/or locational control. Specific resources over which control is sought include oil and gas pipelines, water use from rivers channeled by dams and irrigation hydrologic systems, and strategic passageways controlling movement of people, military, and economic supplies. Issues examined include: • • • •

Economic integration and inequalities Strategic cooperation and confl icts Topographic divisions and transgressions Place constructed by specific geographic-historical context and situated knowledge • Globalization as a structural force plus individuals as local actors, interacting to create a transnational regional activity space.

Introduction

9

At the eastern edge of Eurasia, China’s interests fall into three chapters. The initial chapter on China and Southeast Asia focuses on China’s historic ‘Silk Road’ interactions with the more Indian-cross influenced areas to its southeast. These carry over to border crossing intersections with strategic military and economic interests. Shifting reconstitutions of borders and historic overlaps are explored as they extend into the present, by James Anderson, who is a specialist on the China–Viet Nam boundary. The southwestern frontier with south Asia via the Himalayas follows. The Himalayan massif creates a physically and culturally distinct region set apart from but affected by its predominantly lowland neighbors of India and Pakistan. Our examination looks at the interactions and intersections of India (including Sikkim), Nepal, Bhutan, and China (focusing on Tibet) in cultural terms as well as current political and demographic considerations. Particular interest falls on Bhutan as a less well-known but strategically important exemplar of the tectonic pressures along the necklaces of nations—and former states—rimming the mountain range (Zurich and Karan 1999). Flexible borders continue to change and adjust to simmering pressures even in the present. China’s Muslim borderlands discuss the contemporary remnant of Silk Road interactions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. This area forms a cultural intersection of the Han world to its east and Silk Road ties to the Muslim west that continues to greatly influence developments in a crossroads region beyond its cartographic boundaries. As part of its continuing repositioning, Russia’s recovery since the demise of the Soviet Union entails renegotiating relations with its new neighbors (the “near abroad”) and regaining its role in regard to resource provision and military muscle flexing. Many specialists in this giant country arrogate the term “Eurasia” to their own region and its sphere of contiguous influence, but this chapter relates events internally as well as externally to a larger landmass context and focuses on the importance of historic mobility patterns from Tsarist to contemporary times. A geo-history of the Caspian considers this petroleum-rich area as a zone of cultural and economic interconnection. Oil and gas pipelines of a strategically located area link it to a broader regional context of development potential. The author’s background is in Eastern Europe, enriched by recent research on borders and energy sources extending through the Caspian and beyond. The fi nal focus on Central Asia treats the traditional heart of what “Eurasia” meant when considered as a separate region. Central Asia continues to be embroiled in domestic unrest bubbling beneath the surface and regional interconnections, written by a specialist on non-Russian ethnic groups in this region. Inescapable Russian links in turn bring China and its former communist mentor back into a wary, explorative strategic alliance in part seeking cooperative approaches to suppressing restive subject Muslim populations with their borders—a transboundary demographic challenge from ethnic minorities feeling disempowered and discriminated against. The concluding chapter pulls together similar strands linking the

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10 Susan M. Walcott and Corey Johnson

Introduction

11

preceding sub-regional close examinations of areas, scaling them up to a new conceptualization of “Eurasia” as an area linked by vital interests and overlapping histories. Figure 1.3 displays the general location of demographic groups prevalent in 1 AD between the eastern China and Caspian coasts. The largely topographic and river valley patterns of these peoples demonstrate the human-environment alignments prevalent over the next 2,000 years.

Table 1.1

Sample Timeline of Major Events Shaping Eurasia

c. 9000 BCE

Domestication of sheep and goats in the Middle East; humans manage mobility

c. 3800 BCE

Wheel appears in Mesopotamia; humans increase mobility across region

c. 1200 BCE

Sacred Vedas written by Aryan invaders of India, carried from Persian plains

340–326 BCE

Macedonian “Alexander the Great” advances throughout Asia Minor to India

264 BCE–395

Unified Roman Empire

100 BCE

Roman armies meet silk banner waving Parthians—edges of empires

50 BCE

Romans begin trade for spices and silk, Asian luxury goods

97 BCE

Chinese military reaches Black Sea

c. 150

Huns control Central Asia

375

Stirrups invented in Western China/Mongolia, enabling effective mobile nomad armies

552

Turks control central Asia

622

Mohammed’s flight from Mecca to Medina

625

Tibet unified

630–751

Chinese control Central Asia

745

Uighurs (Muslims) ruling Turkish dynasty

882

First Russian state, centered in Novgorod

1096

First Crusade begins

1167–1227

Genghis Khan

1250

Turks take Asia Minor

1257

Mongols take Vietnam

1300–1337

Ottoman Empire begins, consolidates control over Byzantium Continued

12

Susan M. Walcott and Corey Johnson

Table 1.1

Continued

1352

Ottomans reach Gallipoli

1336–1405

Tamerlane, ruler of Central Asia from capital Samarkand

1418

Vietnamese rise against China

1529

Ottomans stopped by Charlemagne from taking Vienna

1581

Cossacks begin Russian consolidation of Siberia

1597

Persians expel Uzbeks from Afghanistan

1664

Cossacks in Persia

1706

Demise of Mughal (Muslim) Empire in India

1718

Chinese army sent to Tibet repulsed by Mongols

1723

Russians capture Caspian capital of Baku from Persians

1724

Russia and Turkey carve up Persia

1735

Russia and Persia defeat Turkey

1750

Tibetans expel Chinese

1758

China occupies East Turkestan

1813

Persia cedes Caucasus to Russia

1814

Britain v. Gurkhas in Nepal; two years later Nepal a British protectorate

1820s

Russia and Persia dispute Caucasian states

1842

British out of Afghanistan, gain foothold in Hong Kong

1873

Russia annexes Uzbekistan; next year, Turkestan

1878

Chinese take part of Turkestan, three years later all from Russia

1881

Russia annexes Transcaucasus

1907

Britain and Russia divide Persia; contending and fracturing through another century

An adequate treatment of Eurasia requires an appreciation of the historical events that tied this region together, as listed in Table 1.1, beginning with mobility generators from climate to technology and conquest.

CONTRIBUTORS Chapter contributors to this edited volume represent regional specialists in history, economic, cultural, and political geography who bring a multi-dimensional outlook to consider forces at work in transboundary spaces that are often underexamined but nevertheless of great strategic importance. The disciplinary composition of chapter authors illustrates the interest in interlinkages across Eurasian space, and the richness of perspectives that can

Introduction

13

be brought to analyzing regions and boundaries in lieu of a shared understanding (Brunet-Jailly 2005, Balzer 2011). Combinations of diversity and commonality crisscrossing Eurasia include physical, cultural, and artistic evidence from Paleolithic population migration traced by DNA links, through contemporary colonial collapse and electronic globalization leading to new transboundary infusions. Developing a greater understanding of the specific and far-reaching similarities of cultural, historical, and geographical interconnections across Eurasia can sharpen and deepen our analysis of past patterns and assessment of unfolding future possibilities. REFERENCES Balzer, M. 2011. Seeking roots? Multidisciplinary reconsideration of Eurasia. Anthropology & Archeology of Eurasia 50 (1): 3–5. Barber, E. 2000. The mummies of Urumchi. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Bassin, M. 1991. Russia between Europe and Asia: The ideological construction of geographical space. Slavic Review 50 (1): 1–17. Brunet-Jailly, E. 2005. Theorizing borders: An interdisciplinary perspective. Geopolitics 10 (4): 633–649. Brzezinski, Z. 1997. A geostrategy for Eurasia. Foreign Affairs 76 (5): 50–64. Duara, P. “Asia redux: Conceptualizing a Region For Our Times.” Journal of Asian Studies 69 (2010): 963–83. Escobar, P. 2010. China’s pipelineistan “war” anteing up: Betting and bluffi ng in the new Great Game. www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175306. Evers, H.-D., and M. Kaiser. 2004. Eurasische Transrealitäten—Das Erbe der Seidenstrasse. In Auf der Suche nach Eurasien: Politik, Religion und Alltagskultur zwischen Russland und Europa, Ed. M. Kaiser, 36–78. Bielefeld: Transcript. Freire, M. R., and R. E. Kanet (Eds.). 2010. Key players and regional dynamics in Eurasia: The return of the ‘great game.’ Houndmills; NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Johnson, C., et al. 2011. Interventions on rethinking ‘the border’ in border studies. Political Geography 30 (2): 61–69. Kaiser, M. 2004. Postsowjetisches Eurasien—Dimensionen der symbolischen und realen Raumaneignung. In Auf der Suche nach Eurasien: Politik, Religion und Alltagskultur zwischen Russland und Europa, Ed. M. Kaiser, 79–106. Bielefeld: Transcript. Kandiyoti, R. “What Price Access to the Open Seas? The Geopolitics of Oil and Gas. Transmissions from the Trans-Caspian Republics. Central Asian Survey 27(2008):75–93. Kaplan, R. D. 2009. The revenge of geography. Foreign Policy May/June (172): 96–105. Laruelle, M. 2008. Russian Eurasianism: An ideology of empire. Washington, DC, Baltimore, MD: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Johns Hopkins University Press. Lewis, M. W., and K. Wigen. 1997. The myth of continents: A critique of metageography. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Morehouse, B. “Theoretical Approaches to Border Spaces and Identities. In Challenged Borderlands: Transcending Political and Cultural Boundaries, edited by V. Pavlakovich-Kochi, B. Morehouse and D. Wastl-Walter, 19–39. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004. Morozova, N. 2009. Geopolitics, Eurasianism and Russian foreign policy under Putin. Geopolitics 14 (4): 667–686.

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Murphy, A. B., and J. O’Loughlin. 2009. New horizons for regional geography. Eurasian Geography and Economics 50 (3): 241–251. Newman, D., and A. Paasi. 1998. Fences and neighbors in the postmodern world: Boundary narratives in political geography. Progress in Human Geography 22(2): 186–207. Nichol, H., and J. Minghi. 2005. The continuing relevance of borders in contemporary contexts. Geopolitics 10(4): 680–687. Norling, N. and N. Swanstrom. 2007. The virtues and potential gains of continental trade in Eurasia. Asian Survey 47: 351–73. Orwell, G. 1949. Nineteeen Eighty-Four. New York: Penguin. O’Tuathail, G. 1987. Beyond empiricist political geography: A comment on Van Der Wusten and O’Loughlin. Professional Geographer 39: 196–197. Paasi, A. 2005. Generations and the ‘development’ of border studies. Geopolitics 10: 663–671. Paasi, A. 2010. Regions are social constructs, but who or what ‘constructs’ them: Agency in question. Environment and Planning A 42: 2296–2301. Pavlakovich-Kochi, V., B. Morehouse and D. Wastl-Walter, 2004. Challenged Borderlands: Transcending Political and Cultural Boundaries,Aldershot: Ashgate. Senderov, V. 2009. Neo-Eurasianism. Russian Politics & Law 47 (1): 24–46. Shlapentokh, D. 2007. Russia between East and West: Scholarly debates on Eurasianism. Leiden; Boston: Brill. Swanstrom, N. “China and Central Asia: A New Great Game or Traditional Vassal Relations?” Journal of Contemporary China 14 (2005): 569–84. Tagil, S. 1983. The question of border regions in Western Europe an historical background. In M. Anderson, Ed., Frontier regions of Western Europe. London: Frank Cass. Trenin, D. 2002. The end of Eurasia: Russia on the border between geopolitics and globalization. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. U.S. Department of State. 2011. Bureau of Europe and Eurasian Affairs. www. state.gov/p/eur/index.htm. Walters, W. “The Frontiers of the European Union: A Geostrategic Perspective. Geopolitics 9 (2004): 674–98. Zurick, D. and P. Karan. Himalaya: Life on the Edge of the World. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999

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Creating a Border Between China and Vietnam James Adams Anderson Mountains and rivers have demarcated the border [of our country]. The customs of the North [China] and the South [Vietnam] are also different. We fi nd [in antiquity] that the Triê ̣u, the Đinh, the Lý, and Trâ n ̀ [dynasties] built our country. Alongside the Han, Tang Song, and Yuan [dynasties], the rulers [of our dynasties] ruled as emperors over their own part [of the world represented by the North and the South]. Nguyễn Trãi (1428) “The Great Declaration of the Wu’s (China’s) Pacification.” (Wolters and Reynolds, 2008, 209)

INTRODUCTION: THE SINO–VIETNAMESE FRONTIER AS TRIBUTARY GATEWAY Borders and their older cousins, frontiers, receive a great deal of attention in East Asian studies these days, but such political divisions can mask the “true” relations between communities on either side of the partition. The editors of this volume have stressed that a border is less a fixed line drawn in the sand, and more “a zone of interconnectivity” (Walcott and Johnson, Introduction). I agree with this contention, and argue that any study of the Sino–Vietnamese border must also take into consideration the web of both localized and region-wide political, cultural, and economic relationships that permeate the boundary between these two polities. A corollary to the argument is that the border appears solid only from the distant Chinese and Vietnamese centers of power, where the textual records of border history were maintained. For the chroniclers of the dynastic histories for both courts, the physical divide between China and Vietnam could even be imbued with epidemiological qualities. The common belief of northern scholars of northern (i.e. Chinese) regimes was that the Sino–Vietnamese frontier region was susceptible to deadly clouds of miasmic malaria, which marked the true division between the civilized North and the uncivilized South (Zhang 2005, 68–77). Although the creation of the Sino–Vietnamese border was many centuries in the making, this political divide was fi rst accomplished 800 years before the colonial French authorities surveyed the Sino–Vietnamese frontier, dissolved the remaining tributary bonds between the Chinese

16

James Adams Anderson

Qing (1644–1911) and the Vietnamese Nguyê ̃n (1802–1945) courts, and inscribed their own partition between China and Vietnam.1 The border established by French surveyors was in fact very similar to the existing premodern boundary, fi rst established in the late 11th century. In this chapter I will describe this unusually resilient borderline, as well as examine the Sino–Vietnamese borderlands in the larger context of premodern Sino– Vietnamese relations. Early developments along China and Vietnam’s shared frontier were deeply influenced by the relationship fostered by these two polities (Anderson 2007). At the highest levels of leadership, the physical boundary played less of a role in delineating the two spheres of authority than did ritual acts that, as dictated in ancient texts, re-affi rmed the mutual obligations of the long-standing bond between China and Vietnam. The frontier may have divided two states, but it also often served as a gateway for material and cultural exchange. Interregional trade will be examined later in the chapter, but I will fi rst discuss court-to-court interaction in a political context commonly known as the “tribute system.” The acts of offering and receiving tribute, the protocol required of tributary guests and hosts, and the processions of tribute embassies were all part of the tribute institution (Hevia 1995). Some scholars have argued that emperors and their officials were required to overlook the tangled state of Realpolitik on their empire’s periphery to allow room for the ideal Chinese world order implied in the tribute system (Wang 1983, 62). As I have stated elsewhere, “beyond the greatest military threats faced along the northern frontier, Chinese adherence to a universalistic notion of rulership actually required hegemonic expression. Coercion and hegemony could be considered tools of harmony and order, and in the intersection of purposes, a Chinese emperor found the means to project both political power and moral authority. In this case, virtue and coercion were both essential components of a Chinese emperor. However, when the situation dictated a withdrawal from a position of universal superiority and even the acceptance of bi-lateral equality, the Chinese court could make these accommodations in policy without permanently subverting adherence to the conventional world order.” (Anderson 2007, 25–26)

THE EARLY SINO–VIETNAMESE FRONTIER AND THE NAM VIỆT LEGACY The earliest evidence in the Chinese court chronicles of a distinct political order emerging in the region of the modern Sino–Vietnamese border points to the Warring States Period (403–221 BCE). This was a politically dynamic time, and 333 BCE was a pivotal year in the development of the Sino–Vietnamese political divide, although the frontier itself had not yet

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17

moved to its current location. In that year, as Sima Qian recorded in the Han period annalistic history “Record of the Historian” (Shiji 史記), the Chu 楚 state (770–220 BCE), located in the central Yangzi Valley, invaded the Yue 越 (Viê ̣t) state, then situated at the mouth of the Yangzi River. In the midst of continued turmoil in the region, the Yue elite moved south and separated into several smaller kingdoms known collectively in traditional sources as the “One Hundred Yue (Bai Yue 百越)” (Taylor 1983, 14–15). The Shiji account listed the kingdoms as the Southern Yue (Nan Yue 南 越 or Nam Viê ̣t), centered on the banks of the Xi River near modern-day Guangzhou, the Min Yue 閩越 in modern Fujian province, Eastern Ou (Dong Ou 東歐) in southern Zhejiang, and the Western Ou (Xi Ou 西甌) in modern Guangxi. The Western Ou kingdom’s territory included the Red River Delta of northern Vietnam. Imperial period Chinese and Vietnamese historians further argued that the southward migration en masse of political refugees had produced the Yue or Viê ̣t people. Keith Taylor has argued more convincingly that the Viê ̣t elite and a standing military force fled the chaos of the north for greater security in these particular regions of southern China and northern Vietnam, and then established themselves among the existing population (Taylor 1983, 16). Moreover, Cindy Churchman contends that the Tai-speaking Li and Lao peoples inhabiting the modernday southern Guangxi region were fiercely resistant to subjugation by outside authorities, leading to the development of an “interior frontier” in the Red River Delta and North China Plains. Inhabitants shared cultural ties and yet remained separate politically (Churchman forthcoming). Such an explanation reflects early textual accounts that reference regional identities. From the perspective of the Chinese early imperial chronicles, the Viê ̣t migrants represented an outer layer of Zhongyuan 中原 society, less civilized than the “core” communities of the North China Plain, but not fully peripheral to the civilizable whole. From the perspective of later Vietnamese elite, the link to Western Ou and the collective “Hundred Yue” gave them access to the cultural heritage of the Central Plains without insisting on the political subjugation of the southern region to any particular northern political order. The boundary between these two spheres was in this manner recorded in the region’s collective history and through the textual accounts given permanency. The Nam Viê ̣t (nanyue 南越) kingdom (207 BCE–111 BCE) along the southern frontier of the Qin and early Han empires would be the fi rst regionally powerful state to solidify the political divide. The Nam Viê ̣t was a strong example of a state informed by the “zone of interconnectivity” that was the Sino–Vietnamese frontier, having emerged from a violent interaction between northern and southern powers. In 180 BCE the Vietnamese Âu Lạc kingdom’s (ca. 220 to 180 BCE) ruler King An Dương (An Dương Vương 安陽王) was defeated by Triêụ Đà (Zhao Tuo 趙佗: r. 207–137 BCE), the former Qin military commissioner sent by the newly unified Chinese empire. When the Qin empire quickly crumbled after the death of its founder, Triêụ Đà consolidated local power in the region

18 James Adams Anderson around modern-day Guangzhou, and only re-established ties with the new Han Dynasty after naming himself the “Martial King of Nam Viê ̣t (nanyue wuwang 南越武王)” (Chen 1986, 107–108). Once peaceful relations were established with the Han court, Triêụ Đà turned his attention to southern expansion. With the conquest of the Âu Lạc kingdom, Triêụ Đà’s kingdom stretched from Guangzhou along the South China coast all the way to the southern reaches of the Red River Delta. This southern coastal kingdom, with exclusive control of trade through a region well north of the modernday Sino–Vietnamese border, would remain for Chinese rulers a worrisome historical reminder of how prosperous their Vietnamese neighbor could become with a strategic foothold in southern China. As I noted in The Rebel Den, “The strength of the Nam Viê ̣t kingdom, although short-lived in comparison to Chinese dynastic power, also provided an example for subsequent generations of Vietnamese leaders who sought confi rmation for their own political legitimacy” (Anderson 2007, 35). When the Han court fi nally re-established relations with Triêụ Đà in 179 BCE, the Nam Viê ̣t ruler sent a tribute mission laden with luxury items from both the Tongking Gulf region and beyond, including “a pair of white jades, 1,000 kingfishers’ feathers, ten rhinoceros horns, 500 purple-striped cowries, a vessel of (edible) cinnamon-insects . . . , forty pairs of kingfishers and two pairs of peacocks” (Wicks 1992, 28). Triêụ Đà’s successors,

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Creating a Border Between China and Vietnam

19

his grandsons, initially enjoyed strong relations with the Han court, which in turn enhanced the kingdom’s volume of regional trade. It was during this period that the frontier, as gateway to desired exotic commodities, fi rst started to play a significant parallel role. With access to trade passing through the Tongking Gulf, rulers on the North China Plain engaged with a commercial maritime network of emporia across Eurasia. In fact, prior to the 7th century the region of northern and north-central Vietnam was the most important maritime trade partner of central China for channeling goods and ideas, such as Buddhist teachings, from Indian Oceanbased merchants (Li 2011, 48). However, close ties between the Chinese and Vietnamese leadership led to an eclipsing of Nam Viê ̣t authority by Han interests, both inside and outside the leadership in Guangzhou. After political turmoil within the Nam Viê ̣t court led to the assassination of the ruler Triệu Hưng (Zhao Xing 趙興) in 112 BCE, the Han made a concerted effort to bring the region back under their central control. In the era of Han administrative control (111 BCE–40 CE) the Sino– Vietnamese political divide was officially erased to absorb the former Nam Viê ̣t territory into the Han empire, placing the boundary well south of the modern-day borderline. The Han court assigned new administrative prefectures to the south: Giao Chỉ (Jiaozhi 交趾) extending from modernday Guangxi to the Red River Delta, Cưu Chan (Jiuzhen 九真), extending from the southern Delta to modern-day Nghê ̣ An province, and Nhâ ̣t Nam (Rinan 日南) as the southernmost region bordering on the kingdom known to Chinese chroniclers as Linyi 林邑 (Lâm Ắp), located on the southern edge of modern-day Quan ̉ g Bình Province (Hardy, Cucarzi, and Zolese 2009, 62). This region would form the general outline of the autonomous Đa ̣i Cồ Viê ̣t kingdom which emerged in the mid-10th century. The Han court planned to introduce administrative practices modeled on the rest of the empire, but the regional rule was adjusted to produce maximum political stability and to minimize disturbance to the flow of trade through the region. As Churchman contends, a common bond of culture and education between this Han-administered region of northern Vietnam and the inland Han empire led within several generations to two very similar societies separated by a wide swath of culturally dissimilar and fiercely independent communities comprised of the Li and Lao peoples of South and Southwest China (Churchman forthcoming). The accepted modern Vietnamese narrative presupposes that the local elite, the Lac̣ lords, struggled collectively to break free from Han oppression in this period. However, experiences under Han domination likely provided the lessons required to secure eventual independence. The Lac̣ lords accepted titles from the Han court to enhance their prestige, and by submitting tribute from their region, they built up an institutional relationship with the central court. The failure of anti-Han resistance such as the Trưng sisters’ rebellion (39–43 CE) points to a lack of cohesion among the local aristocracy, a cohesion that didn’t develop until centuries of evolving institutions through contact with successive northern regimes had passed.

20 James Adams Anderson The legacy of the ancient Nam Viê ̣t kingdom lingered in the memories of local leaders on the South China coast prior to the emergence of an independent Vietnamese kingdom in the 10 th century. A self-governing polity which straddled the boundary of the Chinese state at the height of its imperial power, and which could monopolize the South Seas trade passing through the region, was an aff ront to the Chinese central court but a desired goal of any frontier official with political ambitions. The local strongman Sĩ Nhiếp 士燮 (137–226) and his family made just such an attempt in the late Han period. Sĩ Nhiếp’s forebears originally fled to the south from the regime of the Han usurper Wang Mang 王莽 (r. 9–23 CE), so he was among the Sino–Vietnamese elite with roots on both sides of the frontier (Holcombe 2001, 155). In 196 the governor of Giao Chi ,̉ Zhu Fu, was murdered, and in the name of restoring order Sĩ Nhiếp took control of Giao Chi ,̉ Cưu Chan, and the South China region of Nanhai 南 海, delegating the administration of the region to various family members (Wu 1995, 171–172). The territory Sĩ Nhiếp and his family controlled reached from modern-day Guangzhou to the frontier with the Linyi kingdom in central Vietnam, closely resembling the Nam Viê ̣t’s kingdom at the height of its authority (Anderson 2013, 268). The late Han empire was no longer strong enough to overcome assertion of local autonomy, so the court attempted to reassert central control in 203 by promoting the status of Giao Chi ̉ to that of a province (Taylor 1983, 72). However, Sĩ Nhiếp and his family held real power, using their strategic control of regional trade in luxury items to enhance their political resilience when the Han fi nally collapsed. As the passage in the Cefu Yuangui notes, When the Wuda Emperor 呉大帝 (i.e. founder of the Wu kingdom, Sun Quan 孫權, 182–252) . . . came to the throne, the person in charge of Giao Chi ̉ 交趾, the prefect Sĩ Nhiếp, sent an emissary to the Wu court with a variety incense and bolts of fi ne hemp cloth, numbering in the thousands, as well as such treasures as bright pearls, large cowries, colored glass beads, jade, tortoiseshell, rhinoceros horn and elephant ivory. The envoy also brought strange goods such as various fruits including bananas, coconuts, and longan. Sĩ Nhiếp’s younger brother was prefect of Hepu (the well-known trading port), and at the same time he presented several hundred tribute horses. The Emperor made a note of these generous gifts, and bestowed titles upon the local leaders as a sign of his gratitude for support. (Wang 1960, 197: 2380–2381) Although the pearls may have been local to the Tongking Gulf region, many of these products such as the glass beads, cowries, and ivory came from regions well south of the area controlled by Sĩ Nhiếp, perhaps even as far west along the Indian Ocean network as the Indian Sub-Continent or, in the case of the glass beads, the Persian Gulf region. The appeal of the Sino–Vietnamese frontier region in this era, therefore, depended on access

Creating a Border Between China and Vietnam

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to trade articles from throughout the southern rim of Eurasia, marking this “zone of connectivity” both a political boundary and a commercial gateway for interregional exchange.

BUDDHISM AS A CULTURAL UNIFIER AND A POLITICAL DIVIDER Beginning in the post-Han period, Buddhism’s spread into East Asia provided another factor that unified the region culturally and intellectually. However, Buddhism’s influence in political life would eventually highlight another division between China and Vietnam. During the Period of Disunion (220–589) when China was no longer unified, Buddhism provided a kind of solace in a chaotic world. Buddhist activities centered on Buddhist temples and provided social stability. Chinese religious practice before Buddhism was limited in scope and highly cultist, but Buddhism in its many manifestations linked worshippers to much larger communities of believers and provided satisfying answers to life’s big questions. Buddhism, particularly Mahayana Buddhism, also had a profound influence on Vietnamese society. The strongest source of influence came from the north, with local adaptations. As Antoine Nguyen Tan Phat wrote, The Chinese also brought ancestor worship and the stress on the collective family to their southern neighbors; but to the Vietnamese, more than the spirits of one’s ancestors must be propitiated: There is a vast world of spirits, good and bad, that must be dealt with as the situation requires and for these occasions a Buddhist monk or a (Daoist) priest or an astrologer may be utilized. (Nguyen 1982, 84–85) The transmitters of Buddhism to Vietnam were 2nd-century religious refugees from China and religious missionaries from South Asia. The first person credited with bringing Buddhism to Vietnam was the Chinese monk Mouzi 牟子 (b. 167 CE), a Daoist convert forced to flee China in 189 CE, and whose text Mouzi’s Removal of All Doubts (Mouzi Lihuolun 牟子理 惑論) included the fi rst known defenses of Buddhism against its earliest critics (Thakur 1986, 169–170). The second most important figure was the son of a Sogdian merchant, known in the Chinese and Vietnamese sources as Kang Senghui 康僧會 (Khương Tàng Hô ̣i, d. 280 CE), who converted to Buddhism while in Vietnam and translated numerous sutras from Sanskrit into Chinese (Trâ n ̀ 2004, 77). Kang also brought these teachings to China, contributing other new texts to the larger Buddhist canon in East Asia (Nattier 2008, 149). The influences of Buddhism in Sino–Vietnamese relations continued during the cosmopolitan Tang dynasty (618–906). At the point when the early Tang court was devoutly Buddhist, its institutions for Buddhist patronage spread

22

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to northern Vietnam. Tang pilgrims heading south or on to India would often pass through Vietnam. Some would stay in the region for extended visits, contributing to spiritual activities of local Buddhist communities. In this way Buddhism weakened the divide between the regions of China and Vietnam within the Sangha of believers. However, a new political division emerged during the course of the Tang dynasty. Buddhism depended heavily on court patronage, and when that patronage declined in China during the Tang due to direct competition with the aristocratic class and Confucianized national elites, so did Buddhism’s fortunes. In Vietnam, however, Buddhist leaders continued to receive court patronage. When the late Tang period persecutions of Buddhists spread, Vietnamese Buddhist leaders took control locally. In Vietnam Thiền 禅 (Chan or Zen) Buddhism arrived a couple of generations after it was introduced in China, but Thiền would become the most important sect of Buddhism for the political elite of the post-10th century Vietnamese court. The first Patriarch of the first Thiền sect was the South Asian monk Vinituraci and its second patriarch was one of Vinituraci’s most important disciples, the Vietnamese monk Pháp Hiển 法顯 (d. 624), native of the region near modern-day day Hanoi (Nguyen 1992, 82–83). There were 27 subsequent patriarchs of this sect, but there was no further record of the school after 1216. The patriarch of the second Thiền School, Wu Yantong, came to Vietnam from Guangzhou in 820 as the descendant of a wealthy settler family. This school had a strong influence on the history of Vietnamese Buddhism. A seventh-generation adherent of this school was the second emperor of the Lý dynasty (1010–1225), Lý Phâṭ Mã 李佛瑪 or Lý Thài Tông 李太宗 (1028–1054), who was a patron of the Buddhist Sangha and temple construction (Nguyen 1992, 118). In the Lý court monks were even allowed a role in imperial administration, something that was never formally allowed at the Song court in this same period. Through continuous court patronage Buddhism became the state religion by the mid-12th century, with a special focus on the Thiền and “Pure Land.” Such a close association between political and religious spheres of authority would no longer hold true in the central courts of China after the decline of the Tang. At this point Buddhism began to create another level of division on the Sino–Vietnamese boundary.

LATER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONFIGURATION OF THE SINO–VIETNAMESE FRONTIER The Tang 唐 (618–907) dynasty marked a transitional period in the arrangement of the Sino–Vietnamese frontier, following changes in titles and accompanying responsibilities that the Tang court assigned to its representatives in the south. In the early Tang period, the Chinese court sought to exercise direct political control over the region of Vietnam. In 679, the name for Giao Chỉ had been changed to An Nam (“the Pacified South”), indicating the position, according to the Chinese leadership, that Vietnam occupied within the Tang Empire. The Tang administrative units in Vietnam were

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regularized after 706 as circuits (dao 道), districts (xian 縣), and protectorates (du hu fu 都護府). Nhâ ̣t Nam had once again been made a part of Vietnamese territory, and the Tang court ordered the administrator of An Nam to appeal to surrounding local rulers to engage in proper tributary protocol and thereby to bring order to the region beyond the southern frontier. Throughout much of the Tang dynasty the An Nam Protectorate remained an integral part of the Chinese empire, and military appointees to this protectorate from the central court ruled the region with varying degrees of independence (Anderson 2007, 37). The lowlands region remained under Tang control under this administrative system. The highlands remained under native leadership with the “bridled and haltered” (jimi zhou) system. The problem that emerged was that officials appointed to these permanent administrative positions (mostly military governors) established their own administrations. This pattern would later affect the administration of An Nam, particularly after the abolition of the An Nam Protectorate (Annan duhufu 安南都護府) as an administrative unit in late 866 (Fan 1977, 595). At that point, as had been the case in Sĩ Nhiếp’s day, local administrators sought to consolidate power and establish semi-autonomous rule. In the period from the fall of the Tang through the founding of the Song Dynasty (968–1279) conditions became right for an independent polity to emerge under local leadership from the Red River region. As I have noted elsewhere, “The Song dynasty’s fi rst rulers initially sought to project an image of sweeping territorial dominance before actually achieving it. . . . by including the Vietnamese kingdom rhetorically in the category designated for tributary kingdoms while granting official titles that suggested a greater amount of political independence. Meanwhile, Vietnamese rulers used the evolving relationship with China to set the foundation for their own indigenous base of power” (Anderson 2007, 39). Three successive Vietnamese ruling families, the Ðinh 丁 (r. 968–980), the Lê 黎 (r. 980–1009), and the Lý 李 (1009–1225), accepted tributary ties with China while clan leaders competed locally with other powerful elite (Anderson 2013, 273). When Lý Công Uâ n ̉ 李公蘊 (r. 1009–1028) in the late summer of 1010 established his new capital at an ancient citadel now renamed Thăng Long 升龍 (modern-day Hà Nô ̣i), the Vietnamese ruler signaled a shift in the center of power away from the coast to the central delta region. At this point the Lý focused on political consolidation of the northern periphery of the kingdom, which entailed coming into closer contact with the people residing and ruling in the frontier areas. These encounters eventually brought Chinese and Vietnamese interests into confl ict by the mid-11th century. Up until the successive rebellions of the Taispeaking frontier chieftain Nùng Trí Cao 儂智高 (ca. 1025–1054), the Song court regarded frontier disturbances as the responsibility of their vassal representative, the Lý court. This changed after Trí Cao and his followers

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spread across much of South China in the early 1050s (Anderson 2007, 100–113). The Song fi nally sent a top general Di Qing 狄青 (1008–1057) and his trusted subordinates to the region, and a Chinese attack on the Nùng rebels at Kunlun Pass sent Trí Cao and his forces into retreat. The end of Nùng Trí Cao’s attempt to carve out a new political boundary of the frontier, however, resulted in an even larger confl ict between the Chinese and Vietnamese courts. Following Nùng Trí Cao’s defeat, growing tensions at the frontier were largely the product of shifting demography and local disturbances. Song settlers moved south in large numbers, while the Lý rulers expanded the court’s control over the uplands closest to the frontier region (Anderson 2007, 123– 124). By 1069, Lý Nhật Tôn 李日尊 (r. 1054–1072) had secured control of his realm well enough to change the name of the kingdom to Đa ̣i Viêṭ (“The Great Viêṭ Kingdom”), and distance his court from the imperial regulations of his Chinese neighbors (Toghto et al. 1983, 488: 14069). In 1075, in order to thwart an attack from the north, the Lý court ordered General Lý Thường Kiệt (李常傑; 1019–1105) to attack the Song by sea and by land. The Song court managed to ally with Champa and the Angkor kingdoms to launch a counter-attack in late 1076. Lý Thường Kiệt successfully defended the Vietnamese capital at Thăng Long with the assistance of indigenous militia leaders from the Sino-Vietnamese frontier region. Hostilities eventually subsided and after a period of calm in 1084 a clear border was mapped out between the two states, the first such court-negotiated border in China’s history (Anderson 2007, 144). With the exception of the Ming occupation of the Đa ̣i Viêṭ kingdom in the early 15th century, this formal frontier between the two polities would remain in place through the early modern period. During the Trần 陳 (1225–1400) dynasty, the territorial integrity of Vietnam was successfully defended against the expanding Yuan dynasty, stemming the tide of Mongol conquest in Southeast Asia. In 1288, following two previous unsuccessful invasion attempts, the Mongol ruler Khubilai Khan assembled an invasion force of 300,000 men and 500 war junks. He had new political designs on the Trâ ǹ leadership, having chosen a royal family defector, Trần Ích Tắc 陳益稷 (1254–1329), to replace the reigning king Trần Nhân Tông 陳仁宗 (1258–1308). Khubilai desired with this victory to use the Trần kingdom as a stepping stone into the Southeast Asian region, but the Mongols were ultimately thwarted in this expansionist effort. The Yuan army captured the Trần capital at Thăng Long, but Trần forces cut off the Mongols’ supply lines. After a series of attacks and counter-attacks, the Mongols were confronted by Trần defenders at the Bạch Đằng River where the general Trần Hưng Đạo (ca. 1232–1300) famously used a defense of submerged iron-tipped stakes to disable the Mongol navy and throw the attackers into disarray (Lê 2000, 147). The Yuan forces were completely defeated. Soon thereafter Trần Nhân Tông sent a delegation to Beijing to present tribute and request vassal status after “begging forgiveness” for driving off the Mongol invaders. Hardly mollified by this behavior, the Mongols initially

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planned another attack, but with the death of Khubilai Khan in 1294 this plan was never realized. Thereafter Yuan-Đa ̣i Viêṭ relations remained stable and the existing border between the states remained fi rm. Following the fall of the Yuan in 1368, the victorious Ming dynasty’s decision to dissolve the boundary between Vietnam and China under its second ruler the Yongle Emperor reflected the different personalities of the fi rst two Ming rulers. The Hongwu Emperor, founder of the dynasty and father to the Yongle emperor, was cautious in frontier affairs and admonished his subjects not to disturb China’s neighbors. The “Ancestral Admonitions” (Zu Xun 祖訓) of the Ming court specifically counseled that they should not invade Vietnam, among other neighbors of China (Kang 2010, 98). Peaceful and impartial China was to remain a moral example for others to emulate, emphasizing the ceremonial aspects of tribute relations. In contrast the Yongle Emperor couldn’t avoid bringing turmoil to the southern frontier as he pursued an increasingly expansionist policy. In the autumn of 1406 a force of 215,000 Ming troops attacked Vietnam, ostensibly with the goal of driving out a Vietnamese usurper and restoring the Trần family to the throne. However, once the troops entered into Vietnamese territory their goal changed to regional domination. By the end of 1407 Ming forces occupied most of the Đa ̣i Viê ̣t kingdom (Whitmore 1977, 53). At this point the southernmost periphery of the Ming empire reached as far south as modern-day Quảng Nam province. However, the border would revert to its former location before long. The Ming attempt to absorb Vietnam completely through aggressive colonization, and thus erase the frontier delineation, did not fare well. The Chinese court made the mistake of sending unaccomplished officials down to fi ll posts in colonial administration, and many Ming administrators treated the occupation as an occasion for personal economic gain (Whitmore 1977, 64–65). Local resistance, led by the former official Lê Lợi 黎利 (1385–1433), began by attacking the colonial government’s garrisons and supply lines, gradually wearing down occupying Ming army’s resolve. In 1418 Lê Lợi’s supporters launched a widespread revolt. When the Yongle emperor died, the next two Ming emperors followed the policy of occupation. However, in 1427 court advisors recommended abandoning the occupation attempt, quoting Hongwu’s own opposition (Anderson 2013, 266). The occupation’s opponents at court argued that whereas Vietnam may have once been part of China and so should be able to be civilized, local Vietnamese would not accept this civilizing mission (Taylor 1999, 150). Simply reviving tributary relations provided a more practical solution. Vietnamese historians long have had a different reading of events. It is generally accepted in Vietnamese scholarship that the founders of the Latter Lê (Hậu Lê 後黎) Dynasty (1428–1788), as reflected in the quote at the beginning of this chapter, saw essential differences between Vietnamese and Chinese cultures that were suddenly as plain as the mountains and rivers that divided the two regions. However, I would instead agree with the

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view espoused recently by Liam Kelly that the new Lê leadership regarded its mandate to rule as validated by a moral order shared by northern and southern regimes (Kelly 2005, 19–20). Proclamations of the early Lê may have presented Chinese and Vietnamese political pasts as clearly separated. However, common values such as those expressed through the performance of tributary protocol, for example, still held the two regions together in a special bond. The frontier remained at peace for nearly a century after the Ming withdrawal. However, renewed efforts to form a separate state in the frontier region launched a particularly active phase in Sino–Vietnamese relations. In 1527 Mạc Đăng Dung 莫 登庸 (1483–1541) established a separate regime, the Mạc 莫 dynasty (1527–1677), in the area of modern-day Cao Bằng. When the Ming court initially refused to recognize his rule, Mạc Đăng Dung pleaded for support. The Ming court finally recognized this frontier region as a colonial protectorate of the Ming empire but Mạc Đăng Dung had already cleverly abdicated to his son as the new “king” of the Đa ̣i Viêṭ kingdom so that Mạc Đăng Dung could serve as a Ming frontier administrator in the same region (Zhang 1974, 321: 8330–8331)! Despite protests from the Lê court, the Ming court decided that the Mạc and the Lê should continue to rule Vietnam as co-vassals of the Ming empire (Anderson 2013, 267). It took the Lê court 47 years before it was able to drive the Mạc out of the capital at Thâng Long in 1592. Even then, the Mạc lingered in the northern frontier region until 1677, at which point the territorial struggle between the rival Nguyễn and Tri ̣nh clans engulfed all of northern Vietnam. China’s interior experienced upheaval during the Ming–Qing transition period in the mid-17th century when the Ming forces engaged in pitched battles with the Qing forces in the South and Southwest. When the political situation was uncertain, the Lê court under Tri ̣nh clan control and the Mac̣ court, then ruling over the frontier province of Cao Băng, both sought to move the frontier northward (Sun 2001, 50). In the summer of 1647, shortly after Qing forces had driven the Southern Ming Yongli 永 曆 regime out of northwestern Guangdong province, the Lê/Tri ̣nh court claimed loyalty to the fallen Ming and dispatched more than 300 warships to attack and annex the coastal prefecture of Lianzhou 廉州. After hearing the news of the naval invasion, the local administrator at Lianzhou sent word to the Qing court which dispatched its own troops to drive back the Lê/Tri ̣nh invaders. In 1659 the Mac̣ kingdom’s ruler, Mac̣ Kính Diệu 莫 敬耀, invaded southern Guangxi with the same claims of Ming loyalty, this time conspiring with native tusi chieftains to augments his forces (Sun 2001, 50). The remnants of the Southern Ming Deyang 德陽 regime rallied behind the Mac-led ̣ forces, but they too were eventually crushed by the Qing. The Mac̣ chose temporary political survival by recognizing the authority of the emerging Qing Dynasty, sending envoys to the Qing court with a formal apology and returning the conquered territory, thus bringing the frontier back to its original location.

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MODERN BORDER NEGOTIATIONS By the 19th century most frontier differences between Chinese and Vietnamese rulers were resolved, but problems with the Western powers from the other end of Eurasia were just beginning. In 1802 Nguyê ̃n Á nh as the Gia Long 嘉隆 emperor (r. 1802–1820) took the throne as the ruler of the new Nguyễn dynasty (Woodside 1988, 17). Gia Long benefitted from Western assistance in reuniting the northern and southern territories of his kingdom, but this foreign assistance came at a price. By the mid-19th century the French were already more involved in Vietnam than was any other European power in the region. French victory in the 1884–1885 Sino– French War ensured that colonial authorities would continue their unchallenged expansion in the frontier region. The Treaty of Tianjin signed in the aftermath of the war established the Border Demarcation Commission to which both French and Chinese delegations were assigned. In July 1885 the new 12-year-old Nguyễn emperor, Hàm Nghi 咸宜 (1873–1943), fled into the Vietnamese uplands and called for popular opposition to the French. However, the resistance came much too late. Hàm Nghi was soon captured by the French and exiled to Algeria. In the late spring of 1885, Qing troops had already begun to withdraw from the frontier region following the conditions of the Treaty of Tianjin that created the French colonial Tonkin Protectorate (Luong 2010, 39). Two years later, on June 25, 1887, the Sino–French Treaty was signed to accept the newly-surveyed markers for a fi xed land border between the Qing Empire and the French protectorate. The new colonial order was fi rmly in place; the ancient tributary Sino–Vietnamese relationship was shattered, yet the 11th-century boundary between these two states had hardly moved. The Sino–French management of the Vietnamese border continued for half a century until the end of World War II. In the name of bandit suppression, the late Qing general Su Yuanchun 蘇元春 (1844–1908) established a system of border management that achieved a common purpose for both Qing and colonial French authorities, and the date of September 21, 1896 marked the official beginning of the Sino–French “mutually-patrolled national border (diuxun 對汛)” policy (Fu 2011, 146). Fu Shiming contends that the introduction of the telegraph pushed the management of the Sino–Vietnamese border into a new phase. After nearly 60 miles of telegraph lines were strung across the South China coast, the time it took to carry news from the Sino–Vietnamese border to the capital in Beijing was reduced from 20 days to four or five (Fu 2011, 145). The application of this new technology resulted in more rapid responses to local disturbances. The border was in this manner brought more fully into the affairs of both Chinese and French authorities, and this trend only accelerated after the founding of the Republic of China in 1911. Japanese conquest of northern Indochina in 1940 changed little in the borderlands, as Japanese authority eventually ruled through the Vichy French, but the post-war revolutions in

28 James Adams Anderson both Vietnam and China led to a transformation of border management culminating in the establishment of checkpoints at designated locations. With the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), socialist regimes on both sides of the border, the border was celebrated as a site of Communist solidarity and Sino–Vietnamese brotherhood. The former site of official premodern frontier encounters, Zhennan (“Subduing the South”) Pass, was renamed Munan (“Peaceful Ties with the South”) Pass in 1953 and again renamed Youyi (“Friendship”) Pass in 1965. China’s active support for the DRV’s struggles against French-led and later U.S.-led forces, in part through cross-border supply lines, turned the region into an active revolutionary site. However, the border soon lay at the center of renewed confl icts when Sino–Vietnamese relations soured at the end of the U.S. confl ict. In the late summer of 1978 a violent clash erupted between Vietnamese and Chinese border officials and civilians. This skirmish was followed by the February 1979 border war launched by the PRC’s new leader, Deng Xiaoping, in response to the reunified Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s (SRV) invasion of Cambodia and the perceived mistreatment of ethnic Chinese (Hoa Kiê u ̀ ) communities in Vietnam after the reunification of the country in 1975. Officially, the post-1979 border remained an icy barrier between the two nations until the 1991 normalization of diplomatic ties. Chan Yuk Wah refers to the intentional silence on the 1979 border war in Vietnamese public announcements after 1991 as a strategy for reviving good relations with China without the need to fully address past areas of contention. In her analysis Chan moves beyond the purely political to the rhetorical realm when she argues that the modern-day Sino–Vietnamese border is “a metaphoric space for imagining the cultural and power politics involved in Vietnam–Chinese interactions which seek to bring about the maintenance of a harmonious relationship” (Chan 2009, 231). However, the border was not a flashpoint for everyone; cross-border relations differed between indigenous and non-indigenous inhabitants of the region. While military and civilian representatives of the Hanoi and Beijing governments embraced or confronted each other, depending on the winds of political change, local peoples interacted through trade and cultural activities in all but the tensest times (Womack 1994, 496). The frontier remained a zone of connectivity for those who lived closest to it. Although contestations of the land border have largely been resolved since the normalizations of relations between the PRC and SRV in the early 1990s, the Sino–Vietnamese maritime border has since become the focus of increasing regional tensions and put new strains on cross-border relations. The Chinese military analyst Liu Yazhou has laid out a clear overview of the crisis, which he summarized in the following manner: The confl ict in the South China Sea is, on the surface, a contention over a few rocky islands but in reality is a contention over resources. Seen in

Creating a Border Between China and Vietnam

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terms of historical standards China has gained the upper hand; seen in terms of geographical criteria the Philippines and other countries have gained the upper hand. In the new century, the highest objective of all countries is to control and exploit as much of the world’s resources as possible to meet their own political and economic needs. (Liu 2007, 36) Beijing’s strategic planners appear to have heeded Liu’s advice, particularly in the manner with which Beijing argues for the historical validity of the claim to the “nine dash line,” which is the U-shaped maritime zone that extends south from the shores of Guangxi and Guangdong in China into the South China Sea (Nanhai 南海) or Biê n ̉ Đông (“Eastern Sea” in Vietnamese) to a point just north of the Indonesian Archipelago. Ken MacLean highlights the fact that “this line was the fi rst major extension of China’s southern frontier in over half a millennium, since the Mongols moved into Dali (now Yunnan) and the Ming briefly took Đa ̣i Viê ̣t (northern Vietnam)” (MacLean forthcoming). Beijing claims that imperial Chinese claims on the islands of this region date from as early as the 8th century, but the “nine dash line” came into existence with a 1947 cartographic projection produced by the post-World War II Republic of China’s government two years before their control of the mainland fell to Communist Chinese forces. Vietnamese authorities were at this time preoccupied with the developing conflict with returning French colonial forces, but in 1974 PLA naval forces seized several islands in this region from Republic of Vietnam (RVN) military defenders. Although at war with the RVN during this period, Hanoi has since highlighted this event as the flashpoint that began the current stand-off. In recent years there have been multiple encounters between Chinese and Vietnamese naval, coast guard, and even civilian vessels, such as marine surveying ships and fishing vessels. Many of the encounters resulted in the impounding of vessels on one side or the other, leading to diplomatic protests, angry editorials in the official presses, and even street demonstrations in Vietnam. Carl Thayer argues that the aggressive behavior of the Chinese participants is locally guided and not a direct result of Beijing’s preferred policy (Thayer 2012). However, these actions along a contested maritime border spurred diplomatic responses and will continue to do so until the matter is satisfactorily resolved by all parties involved. The natural resources below the surface of this maritime region are the much desired prizes of this contest for sovereignty, but they are not the only strategic considerations. As noted elsewhere, the South China Sea/ Biển Đông was historically an important segment of transregional maritime trade network that linked trade originating as far north as Okinawa to the east and Indian Ocean trade from the south (Anderson 2011, 93). Today about half of the trade goods shipped by sea worldwide pass through the South China Sea/ Biển Đông region (Nguyễn 2005, 26). For this reason Washington has shown a strong interest in keeping the shipping lanes out

30

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of the hands of a single nation, which is a position that Beijing fi nds difficult to accept. This confl ict therefore holds ramifications for the future of Sino–Vietnamese relations and also plays a role in shaping interaction between the once dominant power of the region, the U.S., and the increasingly influential traditional power, China.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS Regional confl icts and local contestations for political power are often emphasized by modern historians describing the evolution of a fi rm border between the Vietnam and China. However, the perspective one takes on border activity makes all the difference. As the editors of this volume write in the introduction of redefi ning borders, “the consequences of threats posed by border confl icts accentuates the importance of fi nding new ways to negotiate (borders’) presentation as positive potentialities based on their past histories as areas of exchange” (Walcott and Johnson, Introduction). The narrative of Sino–Vietnamese relations could be constructed in several alternate ways, focusing on the rise and fall of trade, for example, even at times when the frontier region was a source of anxiety for rulers of both northern and southern regimes. Officially sanctioned trade between the central governments respected the political division at the frontier, whereas unofficial trade among subaltern communities flowed easily through the region when restrictions were lifted. Lastly, cultural exchange and the flow of ideas passed easily across a frontier invisible to most frontier inhabitants. But these ideas, such as Buddhism, would in turn lead to social structures and political practices that reinforced the separation between northern (Chinese) and southern (Vietnamese) polities. The frontier between China and Vietnam has existed simultaneously as a line of division and a contact zone since the late 11th century. NOTES 1. Please note that prior to the 20th century modern names for the countries examined in this chapter and their inhabitants are not relevant. However, as a shorthand to simplify our discussion of various geographical regions, I have used the terms “Vietnamese” and “Vietnam” to describe persons and places located near or to the south of the Red (Hồ ng) River delta, and the terms “Chinese” and “China” to describe persons and places associated with courts and political centers north of the Red River delta.

REFERENCES Anderson, J. 2007. The rebel den of Nùng Trí Cao: Loyalty and identity along the Sino–Vietnamese frontier. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

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Anderson, J. A. 2011. ‘Slipping through holes’: The late tenth and early eleventh century Sino–Vietnamese coastal frontier as a subaltern trade network. In N. Cooke, L. Tana, and J. A. Anderson (Eds.), The Tongking Gulf through history (pp. 87–100). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Anderson, J. A. “Distinguishing Between China and Vietnam: Three Relational Equilibriums in Sino-Vietnamese Relations” Journal of East Asian Studies 13 (2013): 259–280. Chan, Y. W. 2009. Language power: Relational rhetoric and historical taciturnity—A study of Vietnam–China relationship. In H. K. Leong (Ed.), Connecting and distancing: Southeast Asia and China (pp. 230- 252). Singapore: ISEAS. Chen, J. (Trans. and Ed). 1986. Ngô Si Liễ n (15th century). Đa ̣i Viê ̣t sử ký toan thu’ 大越史記全書 (The complete history of the Great Viet). Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Toyo Bunko Kenkyujo Fuzoku Toyogaku Bunken Senta. Churchman, C. Forthcoming. “Where to draw the line? The Chinese southern frontier in the fi fth and sixth centuries. In J. Whitmore and J. A. Anderson (Eds.), Forging the fi ery frontier: Two millennia of China’s encounters in the borderlands of the south and southwest. Leiden: Brill. Fan, Z. 范祖禹 (1041–1098). 1977. Tangjian唐鋻 (Mirror for aid in government of the Tang), Vol. 2. Taipei: Shangwu. Fu, S. 2011. The border connecting mechanism of Guangxi after the Sino–French War (中法戰爭後的廣西邊境對汛). Guangxi Ethnic Studies廣西民族研究3: 144–149. Hardy, A., M. Cucarzi, and P. Zolese. 2009. Champa and the archaeology of Mỹ Sơn (Vietnam). Singapore: NUS Press. Hevia, J. L. 1995. Cherishing men from afar: Qing guest ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Hoàng, X. H., and V. T. Hà. 2003. Lý Thườ ng Kiet, ̂ li ̣ch sử ngoa ̣i giao và tông giáo triề u Lý. Hà Nô i:̣ Quân đo ̂ ̣ i nhân dân. Holcombe, C. 2001. The genesis of East Asia: 221 B.C.–A.D. 907. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Kang, D. C. 2010. East Asia before the West: Five centuries of trade and tribute. New York: Columbia University Press. Kelley, L. C. 2005. Beyond the bronze pillars: Envoy poetry and the Sino– Vietnamese relationship. Honolulu: Association for Asian Studies. Lê, Đ. S. 2000. Tràn Hưng Đao, ̣ nhà quân sự thiê n tài. Hà Nô i: ̣ Nhà xuát bả n Chính tri ̣ quóc gia. Li, T. 2011. Jiaozhi (Giao Chi) in the Han Period Tongking Gulf. In N. Cooke, Li T., and J. A. Anderson (Eds.), The Tongking Gulf through history (pp. 39–52). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Liu, Y. March–April 2007. The grand national strategy. Chinese Law and Government 40 (2): 13–36. Luong, H. V. 2010. Tradition, revolution, and market economy in a North Vietnamese village, 1925–2006. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. MacLean, K. Forthcoming. From land to water: Fixing fluid frontiers and the politics of lines in the South China/Eastern Sea. In J. Whitmore and J. A. Anderson (Eds.), Forging the fi ery frontier: Two millennia of China’s encounters in the borderlands of the south and southwest. Leiden: Brill. Nattier, J. 2008. A guide to the earliest Chinese Buddhist translations: Texts from the Eastern Han [Dong Han] and Three Kingdoms [San Guo] Periods. Tokyo: International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology, Soka University. Nguyễn, H. T. 2005. Maritime delimitation and fi shery cooperation in the Tonkin Gulf. Ocean Development and International Law 36. Nguyen, T. T. 1992. History of Buddhism in Vietnam. Hanoi: Social Sciences Publishing House.

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Nguyen, T. P. A. 1982. Mahayana Buddhism in Vietnam and its background in India and China. Ph.D. dissertation, California Institute of Integral Studies. Sun, H. 2001. “On negotiations during 1644–1885 in the Qing Dynasty about the Guangxi-Guangdong section of the Sino–Vietnamese land boundary (清代中越 陸路邊界桂粵段交涉述論).” China’s Borderland History and Geography Studies 中國邊疆史地研究 10 (2): 49–57. Taylor, K. W. 1983. The birth of Vietnam. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Taylor, K. 1999. The early kingdoms. In N. Tarling (Ed.), The Cambridge history of Southeast Asia from early times to c.1500 (Vol. 1, Part 1) (pp. 137–182). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thakur, U. 1986. Some aspects of Asian history and culture. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications. Thayer, C. A. 2012. South China Sea: Significance of the latest cable cutting. Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, December 4. Toghto et al. 1983. Offi cial History of the Song Dynasty (Songshi). Beijing: Zhonghua. Trầ n, Q. T. 2004. Danh nhân li ̣ch sử kinh Bắ c. Hà Nô ̣i: Nhà xuát bả n Lao đo ̣ng. Wang, G. 1983. The rhetoric of a lesser empire: Early Sung’s relations with its neighbors. In M. Rossabi (Ed.), China among equals: The Middle Kingdom and its Neighbors, 10th–14th centuries (pp. 47–65). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Wang, Q. et. al. 1960. Cefu yuangui 冊府元龜. Beijing: Zhonghua. Whitmore, J. K. 1977. Chiao-Chih and Neo-Confucianism: The Ming attempt to transform Vietnam. Ming Studies 1: 51–92. Wicks, R. S. 1992. Money, markets, and trade in early Southeast Asia: The development of indigenous monetary systems to AD 1400. Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell. Wolters, O. W., and C. J. Reynolds. 2008. Early Southeast Asia: Selected essays. Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University. Womack, B. June, 1994. Sino–Vietnamese border trade: The edge of normalization. Asian Survey 34(6): 495–512. Woodside, A. 1988 Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of Vietnamese and Chinese Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century. Cambridge: Harvard. Wu, S. (Ed.). 1995. Lê, Tă ́ c. An Nam Chí Lược 安南志略. Beijing: Zhonghua. Zhang, T. 張廷玉. 1974. History of the Ming Dynasty (Mingshi 明史). Beijing: Zhonghua. Zhang, W. 2005. Regional and ethnic prejudice: A cultural interpretation of ‘Miasma’ (zhangqi 瘴氣) and ‘Miasma Disease’ (zhangbing 瘴病) in Traditional China. Ethno-National Studies (Minzu Yanjiu 民族研究) 3: 68–77.

3

Himalayan Hinterlands Highland Axis of Asia Susan M. Walcott

The Himalayan range continues to edge higher, projecting a massive rising physical presence due to the ongoing collision between the Indian subcontinent and the Laurasian landmass to its north. In a political sense the zone of intersection also intermittently shifts higher on the scale of conflict or cooperation, in acknowledgement of the continuous political pressure underlying the current uneasy stability in the region. The extent of the Himalayan mountain system depends on which ranges are included. Geographers Zurick and Karan (1999) use a conservative boundary framework from the Indus River in Pakistan’s Baltistan region through the Brahmaputra River in northeastern India, running more than 2,600 kilometers across five countries (Pakistan, India, Nepal, Tibet/China, and Bhutan). Segments in the range can be divided to reflect political as well as physical characteristics, from Nepal and the contested Punjab to Sikkim and the Hindu Kush. The Pamir Plateau, to which the term “Roof of the World” was fi rst applied, illustrates the connectivity of this mega region from Pakistan through China (Shirakawa 1976). The limestone seabed of the Tethys, upraised by the Indo-Eurasian plate collision, currently towers an average of 13,100 feet. The plateau spawns major rivers supplying the countries

Figure 3.1 Bhutan.

Mt. Everest within the Himalayan massif, from Katmandu to Paro,

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of south, southeast, and east Asia: the Indus of Pakistan, the Salween of Myanmar, Thailand’s Irrawaddy, China’s Yangtze and Yellow rivers, and Bangladesh’s Brahmaputra (Palin 2004). This chapter focuses on the border area spanning northwest to northeast India to illustrate interactions linking regional edges from China to Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim Asian cultural regions.

“ZOMIA”: AREA STUDIES AND THE SOCIOPOLITICAL ECOLOGY OF ASIAN UPLANDS Examining the history within spaces unearths the social complexity and underlying dynamism needed to project a valid spatial metaphor (Smith 1992, Diener and Hagen 2012). Recovery of scale leads to the recovery of meaning, such as reframing the bordered identity of “Bhutanese refugees” who are ethnic Nepali immigrants to Bhutan expelled in fear that Sikkim’s demographic inundation from its poor western neighbor nation could also wipe out the identity and independence of Bhutan. The “Lhotshampas” (ethnic Nepali immigrants) settlement in the lower lying southern areas of Bhutan, along the relatively sparsely populated southern border with India, also concerned Bhutan’s large mentor due to Nepali agitation for a separate “Gorkaland” state. The city of Shillong, in the extreme northeast of India, used as an urban example of a regional cultural crossroad by the author of the term “Zomia” (van Schendel 2002), is the capital of a periodically unsettled state more at home in the highlands (average elevation almost 5,000 feet high) than in its lowland south Asian political parent. The areas on which this book focuses intentionally constitute the hinterlands and unstable margins counter-influenced or alternately largely ignored by the major regional cores: China, India, Russia, and colonial Western powers. State entities are unavoidably used as references (Nepal, Bhutan, etc.), but the focus is more importantly on spatial containers of shared knowledge and practices at interstitial locations of varied degrees of overlap. Eurasia itself is a geographical metaphor separating a part of the world from others—not Africa or the Americas, for example, but as social constructs perpetually transformed in a spatially-expressed power struggle between the national and global scale (Swyngedouw 1997). “Geographies of knowing” are produced through understanding more about these places, both their cohesive and confl icting internal natures and their contextual relationships (Gregory 1994, van Schendel 2002). This “scaling up” produces less exhaustive histories of individual areas but rather highlights higher level interchanges of shared experiences, creating grounds for familiarity and understandings (Smith 1992, Brenner 1999). As discussed later, it is critical to understand the relationships among Tibet and Bhutan, these two and Sikkim, and the latter with Nepal, which is aligned culturally more closely with India but is politically as semi-

Himalayan Hinterlands

35

autonomous as Bhutan—with China always seeking to expand its influence to the south. Considered marginal peripheries in the past by the Great Power “cores,” the Himalayan nations are now major strategic sites of interests, controlling riverine headwaters of power generation and a scarce non-renewable resource. Language affinity ties include links to a Sanskritderived script—and the use of English as the medium of trade and the educated, along with many who speak a variety of regional tongues. Religious commonality builds on a native chthonic/shamanic set of practices that is integrated to varying degrees with a major religion (Hindu-BuddhistChristian), among a population dispersed in small village units due to the ecological exigencies of their mountain setting. These in turn prodded border crossing trade among nomads and merchants dealing in ecologicallyproduced goods from cordyceps to salt and animal husbandry, a ‘process geography’ of uncounted border transgressors who alternate from being prohibited to permitted or ignored through porous passes and by various regulatory regimes. This region exists between the binaries of power, less a sharp tectonic fracture zone than an area meriting more attention to the underlying connective bridges (Agnew 1999). For most of the history of human settlement in the Himalayan region the political map of nations featuring the giant entities labeled China and India did not exist (Table 3.1). In such a topographically fragmented area it was only practical for local strongmen to control small territories and make shifting alliances with other groups controlling access to various commodities in demand. For example today’s Tibet, now controlled as the far western extension of Han China, cartographically represents only the third section (along with Amdo and Kham) of major territories occupied by Tibetan people whose migrating tribal descendants form the demographic core of Bhutan and northern Indian areas such as Sikkim, Mustang, and Ladakh. As a cultural confluence of overlapping interests, this corridor includes several nuclear-armed regional rivals with a long history of shared interactions as well as incidents. The few narrow physical points of passage consist of politically-constricted mountain passes, hence the strategic military and economic importance of controlling their access (Walcott 2010). Three altitude levels run across the region, differentiating the type of economic activities practiced there: the barren or frozen high Himalayas, the “duar” foothills, and the luxuriantly tropical “tarai” lowland (Figure 3.2). This tri-part division also roughly separates out various ethnic groups that historically settled in these areas: upland nomads related to Tibetan stock on both sides of the high Himalayas, Indo-Nepalis in the lowland terai, and ruling class ethnic groups in the mid-levels. The interplay of internal and external factors over time and through space works to create network of multi-faceted interlinkages and communities of shared trans-state characteristics. A brief demographic overview of the major Himalayan hinge countries indicates their relative size and stage of development. Whereas the population metric indicates the “yam between

36

Susan M. Walcott

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