EU Promotion of Human Rights for LGBTI Persons in Uganda: Translating and Organizing a Wicked Problem 3031458257, 9783031458255

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EU Promotion of Human Rights for LGBTI Persons in Uganda Translating and Organizing a Wicked Problem Lydia Malmedie

EU Promotion of Human Rights for LGBTI Persons in Uganda

Lydia Malmedie

EU Promotion of Human Rights for LGBTI Persons in Uganda Translating and Organizing a Wicked Problem

Lydia Malmedie Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences University of Potsdam Potsdam, Germany

ISBN 978-3-031-45825-5 ISBN 978-3-031-45826-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45826-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Marina Lohrbach_shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, my special and heartfelt thanks to all interviewees for their precious time and trust. I am hugely grateful for them having shared their thoughts and insights and I hope they find their perspectives well represented in the text. It has been difficult in these past months to follow the news of Uganda’s new anti-homosexuality act knowing how it likely affects the lives of several people I engaged with. This situation highlights the great privilege of being able to think and write in safety and comfort and that equality should never be taken for granted. This book is based on my dissertation for which I benefitted from the supervision and advice of Theresa Wobbe and Arndt Sorge. I am also greatly indebted to the academic and practical advice of Andrea Liese. A very hearty thank you also to the rest of the faculty at the Research Training Group at the University of Potsdam on “Wicked problems – Contested Administrations. Knowledge, Coordination, Strategy,” and especially Valeska Korff, Harald Fuhr, and Maja Apelt. The financial support which made the dissertation project possible in the first place was a full-time 3-year fellowship from Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), a finalizing grant from the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences at the University of Potsdam and a scholarship from the Central Office for Equal Opportunities University of Potsdam, Germany. The in-depth empirical research this book is based on was only possible because of the support in kind by the Royal Embassy of the Kingdom v

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

of the Netherland, Kampala, Uganda and the Heinrich-Böll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya which provided me with a desk space, colleagues, and contacts. This organizational affiliation facilitated getting general orientation in the national contexts and certainly opened some doors. Finally, I would like to thank all my colleagues, friends, and family for the unwavering inspiration, comments, proof-reading, psychological support, encouragement, and patience. I am especially grateful to Nina Reiners, Claudia Meier, Alejandro Esguerra, Eva Schindler, Katja Hericks, Arlena Liggins, Alex Smith, Anna Davidson, Christof Roos, Nora Kreft, Daniela Krüger, Jenna Büchy, Esther Schelander, Jennifer Bansard, Léa Renard, Alexander Knoth, Ursula Hermes, Dorothee Hermes-Malmedie, Johannes Malmedie, Lea Malmedie, and Julia Tomanek.

Contents

1

Introduction Central Argument and Contributions Contributions Methodology Positioning Structure Literature

1 4 4 10 11 12 14

2

A Wicked Problem and Its Travels in a Modern World The Wickedness of the Problem The EU as a Complex Modern Organization in Flux The Uncertainty and Hot-Buttoned Nature of Human Rights for LGBTI People Ambiguity of Normative Principles Versus Accusations of Neoimperialism The Problem Definition as Key The Travel of Ideas Translating and Sensemaking as Organizing Translating Ideas Re-embedding Through Sensemaking

21 22 24 26 27 28 30 35 38 41

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CONTENTS

Sensemaking as Organizing Making Sense of Wicked Problems Contestation and Institutional Change Summary Literature

44 46 47 49 50

3

The European Union as a Modern Empire Systems of Difference The End of Colonialism, the Continuation of Imperialism European Communities and Colonial Territories Producing and Using Authoritative Knowledge Uganda in Figures Development Cooperation Summary Literature

59 61 64 65 70 71 73 75 75

4

Contested Human Rights A New Equality Discourse, Leading to a Nation-State Model Rights Qua Personhood From a New Equality Discourse to the Nation-State Model A New Category of Human Differentiation of the Category of Human Human Rights’ Impact on Development Human Rights as a Global Norm Contested “Western” Human Rights The Dilemma of Human Rights Promotion Beyond State Sovereignty Summary Literature

79 80 81 82 83 84 86 88 89

From Deviant Sexuality to LGBTI Sex and Gender During the Modern Period Toward the Autonomous Gendered and Sexual Individual Knowing About Sex, Relationships, and Sexuality in “Africa” Legal Norms and Their Legacy Africa on the Rainbow Map Threat to the Nation Versus Self-Determination

95 96 97

5

90 92 92

99 101 102 104

CONTENTS

6

7

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Decriminalization and Demedicalization Self-determination and Human Rights The Success of LGBTI An Acronym and Its Meaning(s) LGBTI as a Compound Cultural Category in Flux Summary Literature

104 106 107 109 110 111 112

The EU as a Complex Modern Organization The EU Today as a Meta Organization and a Focal Organization EU as a Meta Organization EU as a Focal Organization The Effects of Formal Structures LGBTI at the EU Human Rights and LGBTI Within the Structures of DEVCO and EEAS European Union Delegation and Member State Embassies in Uganda Human Rights and LGBTI in the EU Delegation and Embassies in Uganda Economic Underpinnings of a Normative Union One EU, Three Pillars Aiming for Coherence Coherence Within the EU Coherence Between the Internal and External Dimensions The EU’s Legitimacy Under Threat Summary Literature

115

Human Rights for LGBTI in EU Foreign Policy Travels of an Idea A Counter Idea The Anti-Homosexuality Bill Criminalization as the Problem Negotiating Neoimperialism Further Categorizing the World A New Version of the AHB

149 150 156 159 164 166 167 168

116 117 118 124 124 126 129 132 133 134 137 138 139 139 142 142

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8

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Signed and Annulled Summary Literature

170 172 172

Dealing with a Wicked Problem in Brussels A Highly Contested Topic Contesting Contestation Making of a Toolkit An Action Point with LGBTI Guidelines Drafting LGBTI Guidelines Adopting Guidelines LGBT Becomes LGBTI Defining and Redefining the “Problem” in Policy From Sexual Orientation to LGBTI Establishing the European Union as Savior in the EU Parl Resolutions Prosecuting States as the Problem in the LGBT Toolkit Contestedness as the “Problem” in the LGBTI Council Guidelines Continued Negotiations: The Politics Problem Definitions “Human Rights Taliban” “…They Are Emotional” “…Eclipsing Other Rights” “The West Against the Rest” Summary and Preliminary Analysis Literature

179 180 183 185 187 190 192 195 197 198

Dealing with a Wicked Problem in Kampala A Highly Contested Topic Definitions of the Problem “It Touches on the Raison d’être” “They Are Exaggerating” “It Doesn’t Matter What Happens in Uganda” “I Also Expected Them to Pay More Attention to Us” “We Don’t Pay for Our Values” Temporary Stability “As Soon as You Have One Dead Body”

245 250 252 253 258 268 279 288 292 293

200 202 205 219 220 221 225 227 229 238 241

CONTENTS

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“It’s a Matter of Time” “They Are Never for Crisis” Summary and Preliminary Analysis Literature

296 299 301 303

Conclusion Organizing a Wicked Problem Explaining Contested Institutional Change A Better Grasp of Context Attention Hindering Decoupling Further Research Literature

307 308 310 312 313 315 317

Annex A: Methodology

319

Annex B: List of Interviews and Documents

329

Annex C: Interviews and Documents Cited

345

Annex D: Uganda and Human Rights

349

Annex E: List of EU & Member State Representation in Uganda

351

Glossary

353

Literature

357

Index

361

About the Author

Lydia Malmedie has published on topics such as sexual orientation and gender, non-discrimination, EU policies, and advocacy in social work. She completed her dissertation as a member of the Research Training Group on Wicked Problems, Contested Administrations: Knowledge, Coordination, Strategy (WIPCAD) at the Department of Economics and Social Sciences of the University of Potsdam, funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). Lydia works as a deputy head of the LGBTI Unit at the Berlin Senate and is a lecturer and module coordinator in the areas of human rights and social work.

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Abbreviations

ACP AHA AHB CFSP COAFR COHOM COREPER CSO DEVCO DG EC EDF EEAS EEC EIDHR EU EU Comm EU Parl FARUG FRA HR/VP HRD IDAHO IDAHOT ILGA

African, Caribbean, Pacific countries Anti-Homosexuality Act Anti-Homosexuality Bill Common Foreign and Security Policy Council Working Group on Africa Council Working Group on Human Rights Committee of Permanent Representatives (of the Council) Civil Society Organization European Commission Directorate-General for Development Directorate-General (of the EU Commission) European Communities European Development Fund European External Action Service European Economic Community European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights European Union European Commission European Parliament Freedom and Roam Uganda (CSO) Fundamental Rights Agency High Representative/Vice President (of the European Commission) Human Rights Defenders International Day Against Homophobia International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia International Lesbian Gay Association xv

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ABBREVIATIONS

LGBT LGBTI MEP NPM RELEX SMUG SOGI/E TEU TFEU UDHR UN U.S. USD WWI/II

Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex Member of the European Parliament New Public Management (Directorate-General for the) External Relations Sexual Minorities Uganda (CSO) Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity/and Expression Treaty on the European Union Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Universal Declaration of Human Rights United Nations United States (of America) U.S. Dollar World War I/II

List of Tables

Table Table Table Table

7.1 A.1 A.2 B.1

Table Table Table Table

C.1 C.2 D.1 E.1

Timeline of events Data sources, treatment and analysis Background interviews in Brussels and Kampala Full list of interviews, observation notes, and documents, sorted by date Interviews and documents cited Code for citations explained Human rights treaties Uganda is party to List of EU member state representation in Uganda

151 323 326 330 345 347 349 351

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

On 29 May 2023, Uganda’s President Museveni signed into law a bill stipulating the death penalty for some same-sex sexual conduct. This provision, among others, makes the law one of the world’s most severe regarding the lives of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans+, and intersex (LGBTI)1 people. This news was like a déja-vu moment of 2009. At the time, I was working in London for a human rights civil society organization (CSO) in cooperation with the UK government on celebrating difference and preventing homophobic bullying in primary schools. The stark contrast between the context in which I was working, where the government supported measures against homophobic bullying and for celebrating difference, and one where the state imposed the death penalty on samesex sexual conduct was apparent. The response in British media at the 1 The acronyms LGBT and LGBTI are used in this study as a placeholder and a general marker of sexual orientations and gender identities and expressions which are regarded as “dissident” from a cis-heterosexual norm, i.e., from the expectation that, e.g., a person categorized as female at birth has the gender identity of woman, whose behavior and dress are congruent with what is regarded as appropriate for a woman, and who is sexually attracted to men. The + after trans indicates that this includes a range of trans identities. Many other acronyms are used today by activists and general and academic discourse. LGBT and LGBTI are used here because they reflect official EU terminology during the period covered. The acronyms themselves, including their emergence and use, specifically within EU policy discourse, will be problematized as part of the study.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. Malmedie, EU Promotion of Human Rights for LGBTI Persons in Uganda, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45826-2_1

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time to a proposed bill in Uganda called the “Kill the Gays Bill” was an outcry and highlighted the difference in legal protection between the United Kingdom, a former colonial power, and Uganda, a former protectorate of the British Crown. In 2010, the European Union (EU) passed a concrete and far-reaching toolkit and later guidelines for promoting human rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans+ and intersex (LGBTI) people in countries such as Uganda. While I was glad to see the EU concerning itself with the rights of LGBTI persons, I was also puzzled: The EU is a very complex organization torn between national sovereignty and greater integration into a meta organization. Because EU foreign policy is the one policy area that is still intergovernmental, I wondered how, given the patchy protection of sexual orientation and gender identity in the EU member states themselves, such a contested topic could become part of EU foreign policy, especially as it was still uncertain what human rights for LGBTI people entailed. I also wondered about the legitimacy of the EU promoting such contested values abroad and interfering with the sovereignty of outside countries. An intervention, given that existing legislation criminalizing same-sex sexual acts in many countries, including in Uganda, is a relic from colonial times, would surely be regarded as neoimperialist. Further, I wondered how EU staff working in countries where homosexuality was criminalized would deal with the ambiguous situation of having to implement this kind of policy in such a legal national context in their everyday work. The EU promoting human rights for LGBTI persons in Uganda constitutes a wicked problem, in the Rittel and Webber’s (1973) sense: a constellation steeped in complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity, due to a pluralist society, characterized by a multitude of distinct social groups with different—and often contradicting—demands and values.2 Rittel and Webber declared traditional Weberian bureaucracy unfit to deal with

2 According to Rittel and Webber, wicked problems have ten, largely overlapping, characteristics. These include that wicked problems have no starting point and no definitive solution but many different ones. They saw every wicked problem as unique, and, therefore, there is no opportunity for public administration to learn by trial and error. According to them, every wicked problem can be a symptom of another problem, and different representations of a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways. They also pointed out the planner has no “right to be wrong”: there is no public tolerance of experiments that fail (Rittel & Webber, 1973, 160).

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such problems, a view that contributed to calls for public administration reforms. Contrary to this common scholarly conviction of public administrations being unfit to deal with wicked problems, the EU is addressing the situation. This prompts the question: How is a wicked problem dealt with by a public administration in times of modernity in a globalized world? The topic of LGBTI becoming part of EU foreign policy, against the odds, constitutes a process of contested institutional change prompting the theoretical question: How does a highly contested idea become institutionalized in a public administration? The EU’s promotion of the idea of human rights for LGBTI persons, involving the EU headquarters in Brussels and the EU delegations and EU member states in Uganda, are processes of translation, as conceptualized by Czarniawska and Joerges (1996) and Karl Weick et al.’s (2005) understanding of sensemaking (i.e., the travel of an idea across time, levels [from local to global], and different contexts, requiring re-embedding of the idea in each local context by way of sensemaking. This scenario prompts the theoretical question: How is such an idea translated and made sense of across time, nested levels, and cultural boundaries in a complex environment? 3 I address the abovementioned questions through an interdisciplinary approach and a fine-grained sociological, new institutionalist theoretical perspective, well suited to capturing the complexity in social phenomena and uncovering institutions, understood as taken-for-granted rules, norms, and ideologies, based on shared meanings in a society, underlying an organization’s dealing with a wicked problem. In search of answers, I traveled to Brussels and Kampala, where I spoke to EU staff and diplomats and CSO staff working on topics of development and LGBTI and human rights, attended meetings and events, and analyzed official and unofficial documents.

3 These dimensions are relevant to any analysis in today’s glocalized world (Drori et al., 2014, pp. 8–10). They have to be understood to be highly overlapping and interrelated: Across time is about how institutional meaning is developed and starts to settle, nested levels refer to the organizational hierarchies, institutions themselves, within a public administration and the stratified governance from global macrolevel to the local microlevel, in which organizations their staff are situated and which has emerged over time, while the cultural environment refers to particular bundle of institutions in an environment which can include rules, such as national jurisdiction and differ depending on the organizational units and level in the hierarchy, for example. These three dimensions, or axis circumference, are a wicked problem.

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On a theoretical level, this book’s findings thus speak mainly to scholars of new institutionalism and those interested in organizations and public administrations, but the empirical findings detailed in this book are of interest especially to scholars in international relations and EU studies, human rights, and gender and sexuality studies. Generally, this book is for anyone interested in the wicked problems of our modern times and those who wonder how public administrations address these.

Central Argument and Contributions The main theoretical finding about wicked problems is that such problems do not lead to the public administration standstill that management literature often predicts, nor does it require novel structures and ways of working to be “solved”; rather, wicked problems are actively dealt with by staff in the organization. Staff working on issues that may be considered wicked, even if they perceive contradictions, see it as their task to make sense of them and, therefore, organize them. This organizing is done based on tacit knowledge by filtering out certain aspects and voices, disregarding some, linking them to a variety of institutions in the environment and organizational context. In effect, this process employs existing categories, thereby reducing complexity, dealing with ambiguity by decreasing attention through decoupling elements and entities, and confronting uncertainty by enacting and proselytizing this particular response to others to remain legitimate. All this, the book shows, builds on, and in turn leads to, incremental institutional change, refuting the explanation of external shocks. Contributions On a theoretical level, this book first addresses the topic of contested institutional change, commonly explained as the result of an external shock in which major, environment-altering events unsettle institutions to such an extent that they motivate change of otherwise stable norms and taken-forgranted structures. This book sees a different process at play here, one of incremental change, whereby small alterations in the everyday enactment4 of institutions layer atop one another and engender change through their 4 Enactment refers to the process of acting upon ideas, structures, and visions and the outcome of this process (Czarniawska, 2005, p. 271). This concept reverses the idea of

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INTRODUCTION

5

interplay with each other and the environment. To this illustrative end, this book provides empirical insights into the translation processes undergone at EU headquarters in Brussels, while simultaneously advancing its theoretical contribution to the literature on institutional change— showing exactly how, by building on one another and in combination with a changing external environment, small changes at the microlevel can lead to macrolevel change. Secondly, this book addresses the travel of ideas, a process traditionally studied as one of diffusion. In a contributory scholarly turn, this book instead approaches the process as one of translation and sensemaking , which, I argue, provide a fertile pathway for understanding how ideas travel, are formed, and are embedded. In contrast to diffusion, the concept of translation allows one to consider the context and directs attention to the reciprocal influences between the manifestations on local level and abstract global levels. These theoretical insights concern institutional change in a wide sense, where, in the first instance, change has already occurred and is becoming institutionalized, while the second part is situated at a far earlier point in the change process—namely, when a new idea has just arrived. This book, rooted in sociological institutionalism and organizational studies, borrows from and contributes to several other disciplines and bodies of literature, including international relations, EU and LGBTI studies. In spanning the crosscultural and crossorganizational contexts of EU headquarters in Brussels and the EU delegations and member state embassies in Uganda, this book contributes a much-needed example of the process of translation across cultures (Greenwood & Suchman, 2013).5 In placing the EU, with its characterization as an international and intergovernmental organization, as the central research subject, this study contributes to a growing, but still lacking, body of organizational research with a focus on global organizations (Drori et al., 2014, p. 7).

implementation and is used to refer to the process of people creating the environment which also constrains them (Weick, 1988, p. 305). 5 For case studies on the travel of ideas, including those that examine the process across national boundaries see, for example, Meyer and Höllerer (2010) or Eva Boxenbaum (2006). This book responds to the critique that most of the studies on translation are restricted to the Global North (Meyer, 2014, pp. 417, 419) by spanning minority and majority countries, and hence very different cultural and institutional settings.

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By analyzing what makes up the “local context” into which an idea is re-embedded, the book contributes to sharpening the useful analytical lens that translation provides. This book adds to this discussion on the importance of attention and “fashion” theorized by authors such as Barbara Czarniawska (2005) by demonstrating how staff members try to reduce attention, and thereby reduce pressure, to turn a political issue into one that can be confronted within existing programs and policies. While many studies in organizational literature and the field of sociological new institutionalism examine the processes at work when a new structural feature becomes “fashionable,”6 I explore institutional changes of a very different quality: Firstly, on some level, these changes personally affects those working to enact them and secondly, I address the travel of a different kind of concept—one that is less technical and more normatively loaded.7 This book also provides a new sociological and interdisciplinary angle to academic research on human rights and sexual orientation and gender identity—topics that have thus far mainly been pursued from a legal research perspective.8 Focusing on the organization as the globe joint connecting institutions ranging from internalized rules to external laws, this book provides a more holistic perspective. This present research further advances the increasing number of empirical studies on transnational LGBTI movements (Carroll, 2010; e.g., Kollman & Waites, 2009; Santos, 2012; Seckinelgin, 2009; Thoreson,

6 The New Public Management (NPM) reform and its various by-products (e.g., increasing audits) being one such popular example (e.g., Power, 1999 on the audit society). 7 Institutional change regarding sexual orientation and gender identity is much more fundamental to values and identities and is more wide-reaching than “technical” changes are, as it calls into question some of the most entrenched ideas regarding (a) sexuality, (b) the distinction of people into male and female, and (c) the “traditional family” as the basis for societal organization. 8 Studies mostly focus on non-discrimination legislation generally (Ammaturo, 2016;

e.g., Arnardóttir, 2003; Kukura, 2005) or specifically within the EU (e.g., Bell, 2002; Kochenov, 2006) and the rights aspect in the domain of legal studies (e.g., Heinze, 1994; O’Flaherty & Fischer, 2008) and, to a certain extent, of political science (e.g., Kollman & Waites, 2009). As mentioned previously, only a few scholars have addressed human rights from a sociological and interdisciplinary position (Michael, 2012, p. 3).

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2014), as it shows how transnational civil society influences the horizon of expectation on the EU and national EU governments.9 An additional contribution concerns the literature on the EU, whose organizational, political, and legal aspects have typically been studied separately, by blending these approaches through the lens of sociological new institutionalism and therefore taking into account the EU’s structure and politics, their contingencies and interplay.10 Through this theoretical lens, this book recognizes the EU’s self-proclaimed identity as a normative power11 and “norm giver” (Kinzelbach & Kozma, 2009; Manners, 2002; Palm, 2014). Crucially, in this book, I understand the normative identity as a façade and not fact—a façade crucial to questions of legitimacy and for explaining the way human rights for LGBTI are dealt with. The book uses mainly concepts and terminology derived from sociological institutionalism, but as political science and international relations scholars increasingly adopt and incorporate constructivist perspectives influenced by sociological thinking, this book also contributes to narrowing the disciplinary gap. More specifically, the book’s findings are relevant to scholars interested in the practice turn in international relations and EU studies of the past decade (e.g., Adler-Nissen, 2016; Austin & Leander, 2022; Cornut, 2015; De Franco, 2022; Drieschova & Bueger, 2022; Drieschova et al., 2022). The thorough case study encompasses the practice in EU headquarters, EU delegations, and embassies and reveals how everyday doing is based on underlying norms and in turn shapes these on international level informing latest norm research on norm emergence, translation, and change (e.g., Björkdahl, 2002; Jurkovich, 2020; Zimmermann, 2017). Related, the sensemaking aspect

9 Hakan Seckinelgin problematizes practices of global human rights activism and asks how transnational human rights networks and global norms for LGBT rights affect people’s politics in the Global South, arguing these interventions are Eurocentric and based on a Western ontology of sexuality (Seckinelgin, 2009, p. 104). 10 Legal scholars have focused mostly on the EU’s structure, interpretation of legislation, and the case law of the ECJ, without much regard for the political aspects (Howard, 2011; e.g., Weiß, 2011). In political science, the EU’s decision-making or agenda-setting, policy emergence and their implementation, Europeanization, and multilevel governance are of interest (Princen, 2011; e.g., Tsebelis, 2008) and, along with policy studies, pay little regard to structural aspects (e.g., Lombardo & Rolandsen Agustín, 2016). 11 i.e., as an entity expected to act as guided mainly by norms in world politics and without motivations of material gain and reliant on soft power in the form of economic, diplomatic, structural, and political means (Craig & Búrca, 2011, p. 303).

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ties into political sociology’s interest in knowledge production and travel of ideas (e.g., Berger & Esguerra, 2018; Tickner, 2016). Another way this study advances the literature on the EU is by adding to existing studies that either address norm diffusion vis-à-vis third countries12 or legal changes related to the LGBTI topic vis-à-vis EU member states or accession countries.13 Such studies argue that to remain legitimate, the EU must lead by example on human rights and that the chasm between verbal affirmation of human rights and action must be closed for greater coherence—an argument qualified by this study, as it takes the chasm as a given and a form of decoupling, while arguing the attention on greater coherence of EU policies and the perceived needs of the EU to be recognized as a unitary actor bear a strong impetus for change. This book further refutes the common notion of a consciously planned policy agenda leading to change,14 arguing instead that microlevel sensemaking and shifting interpretations at the individual and meta organizational levels coconstitute each other in a particular institutional environment, which might appear, in hindsight, to have been part of a particular strategy. While not positioned directly within the realm of postcolonial studies, this book speaks to some of its concepts and attempts to adopt postcolonial sensitivity in both its theoretical approach and empirical and analytical 12 Example, Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig, who examine formal rules and found the EU’s legitimacy and power vis-à-vis a third country makes formal rule adoption (i.e., transposition into national laws) more likely, but, as the scholars conceded, this does not allow for conclusions on the level of rule application (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 807). 13 See, for example, Borg-Barthet (2012) and Kollman (2009) with regard to accession countries, Slootmaeckers and Touquet as well as Ayoub (e.g., Ayoub, 2015; Slootmaeckers & Touquet, 2016). How diffusion works in the case of EU member states and accession candidate countries is very different from third countries because there are different rules and procedures for alignment of laws and policies, even though they are currently questioned even by some member states. 14 Example, Francesca Romana Ammaturo (2015), with regard to the Council of Europe, introduced the concept of the Pink Agenda and traces this agenda in judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on LGBTI asylum cases. She argued the pink agenda as an ideology is employed by nation-states and international human rights organizations to promote “gay” rights and at the same time creates a dichotomy between a queer-friendly “West” and trans- and homophobe non-Western countries. Ammaturo regarded the pink agenda as part of an attempt to foster a European identity and as central in the endeavor of creating a European citizenship beyond the nation-state (2015, p. 1132).

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methodology. This approach adds value to the debate because, like studies on issues concerning LGBTI, such as sexual citizenship,15 the general study of organizations, and the EU in particular, has thus far remained mainly associated with the analysis of minority countries, i.e. countries of the “Global North” or “Western” countries. Scholars have called for a decentering of the “West”; despite more studies taking the dynamics of globalization into account,16 scholarship combining a postcolonial and an organizational approach remains lacking,17 including critical engagement with the travel of ideas from postcolonial standpoints put forward (e.g., by Joseph A. Massad [2007, p. 173] and Jasbir Puar [2013, p. 337]). Lastly, this present book provides a new empirical angle by making EU delegation staff members based in Uganda its research object, from sociological and organizational perspectives. To date, the Ugandan case has been mainly addressed within the fields of political, feminist18 and cultural studies19 or from, in the case of Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Bill (AHB) and Act (AHA), a legal perspective (e.g., Bompani & Valois, 2017; Hollander, 2009).20 Other studies have focused on external factors

15 Normative debates, such as those on sexual citizenship, for example, have long domi-

nated the field and have usually taken a very Eurocentric approach which several recent publications have challenged. See, for example, Diane Richardson (2015, p. 1). 16 In 2011, a special issue of Organization was dedicated to postcolonialism; however with a focus on the Asian and Latin American geographical contexts, with Lize A.E. Booysen and Stella Nkomo’s (2010) article on management with a specific focus on South Africa as an exception. 17 The reason some scholars see journals as gatekeeping (Mir & Mir, 2013, p. 92). One exception is said to be the journal Organization, but it was not until the mid-1990s that ideas from postcolonial literary theory were first used to critique postmodernism and problematize organization studies themselves (Radhakrishnan, 1994). Other authors over the years have shown how the notion of diversity and its successful management serves to continue global colonialism (Banerjee & Linstead, 2001). Another early example of a postcolonial view on organizations is an edited volume by Anshuman Prasad (2003), with a focus more on private organizations than on public administrations. 18 For example, a feminist line of argument suggests the “waves of homophobia that

seem to be sweeping the African continent” in general and Uganda in particular serves to “entrench patriarchy and heteronormativity as legitimate and fixed in African society” (Msibi, 2011, p. 55). 19 Ugandan author Sylvia Tamale (2003, 2009, 2011) offers both a feminist theoretical perspective and empirical examples on sexuality from an “African” perspective. 20 For one exception of a sociological study on Malawi, see Joe Mienga (2012).

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to explain the emergence of the AHB,21 or on internal strategic political reasons used as a distraction from other policy issues (Bompani & Valois, 2017, p. 54), focused on the AHA as a sensitizing event, leading to institutionalization of LGBTI in U.S. and Swedish foreign policy (Rainer, 2021), focused on civil society’s advocacy strategies (Jjuuko & Mutesi, 2018) or have explained the Ugandan stance toward the AHA and homosexuality generally (Sadgrove et al., 2012; Vorhölter, 2012) and how homosexuality is enacted as “un-African” (Rao, 2015). In short, this book, due to its combination of epistemological stance, theoretical approach, and research focus, fills several gaps in the literature of multiple fields and therefore offers new insights for several research areas.

Methodology This book explores how the topic of LGBTI became institutionalized in EU foreign policy and how staff members at the EU delegation and member state embassies deal with this topic. This book’s core is an explorative qualitative case study, with data derived from observations, interviews, and document analysis.22 More specifically, the book employs a combination of qualitative, explorative, and interpretative means in a single-embedded case study methodology to capture detailed actions in context, while remaining open to differing explanations. Such a design allows for the identification of contextual influence and observations over time, general patterns, and the microlevel, where people make sense. Concretely, this means “brushing up on everyday life” and observing the “untroubled comprehension” of people in their day-to-day lives (Weick, 2012, p. 151). People’s stories recounting what happened are presented alongside observations of daily routines and enacting, which itself is still often transmitted verbally. Accordingly, official, and unofficial documents, news reports, observations, and interviews were used to determine the sense people have made and what people consider as action. 21 External factors, such as the increased influence of Christian (mainly US) churches and pastors in Uganda (Oliver, 2012); the emergence of new donors, such as China, said to have decreased Uganda’s dependence for development aid on Europe and the United States (Wagner & Cafiero, 2014); or a combination of factors, including pan-Africanism, HIV, the global LGBTI movement, etc. (Jjuuko & Tabengwa, 2018). 22 See Annex 1 for more information on data collection and analysis.

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I immersed myself in the data, capturing process by acknowledging and analyzing everyday practice and stories about practice in context, according to a grounded theory-inspired methodology (GTM) based on Corbin and Strauss (2008). Data collection was left deliberately open to build organically throughout the research process, and theoretical sampling directed my attention to “different context, people, [and] places” (Goulding, 2009, p. 383) to the point of data saturation. Most of the data collection spanned the period of November 2013 to November 2017 and interviewees mainly included EU officials in Brussels from the European External Action Service (EEAS) and EU Commission (EU Comm), EU delegation staff, and member state embassy staff in Uganda and staff of influential LGBTI activists and CSO representatives in Brussels and Kampala (for a detailed list, see Annex 2). Along GTM principles, I did not seek objectivity (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 32) and employed abductive reasoning to produce “plausible connections and relationships” (Sorensen et al., 2007, p. 1148). Another researcher would tell this story differently. This does not make the research any less valid but requires a specific transparency and selfreflection necessary to enable readers to critique a particular narrative and interpretation and to acknowledge likely blind spots.

Positioning Due to the topic of the book, the author’s gender presentation—and especially their perceived sexual orientation—is of particular relevance, as it influences the access one gets, how interviewees respond, and, more internally, the observations one makes and how data is analyzed (Halberstam, 2012).23 My own gender presentation and sexual identity as a queer androgynous woman allowed me to establish rapport rather easily with several LGBTI activists, who—I believe—took these characteristics and associated codes to imply my status as an ally, a designation tangibly 23 Especially when researching the promotion of human rights for LGBTI persons, the researcher’s perceived sexual orientation therefore matters. Such assumption of someone’s sexual orientation is often based on their gender presentation and where there is a perceived incongruence between attire and/or habitus and the ascribed sex, this can lead to people suspecting someone might be lesbian, gay, or bisexual—or, where there is the awareness of these categories—transgender or intersex. For a reflection on easier access of an openly gay researcher, see Walter L. Williams on Being Gay and Doing Research on Homosexuality in Non-Western Cultures (Williams, 1993).

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supported by my professional background of working for an LGBT CSO in the UK. My perceived race and its associated socioeconomic and educational privileges as a white European of a middle-income, semi-academic household, with an international education, and my fluency in English brings a familiarity with the work, basic conventions, and habitus in (international) organizations. These factors were likely an advantage in gaining trust and access to staff members of embassies and the EU delegation. Furthermore, my access to Ugandan CSOs was likely aided by my status as a researcher from a donor country with ties to embassies and the EU because meetings might have been viewed as a potential pathway toward procuring funding. The final parts of this study, which took place once the interpretation process was basically complete, were performed while I worked as an expert for the state administration of Berlin in the broad field of non-discrimination and specifically in its LGBTI unit which provided me with important insights into the public sector and the inner workings of German bureaucracy.

Structure This study consists of three main parts (a) the introduction and theoretical framework including an outline of human rights for LGBTI persons as a wicked problem; (b) the context across time, cultural boundaries, and hierarchical levels, identified as paramount for studying wicked problems including information on the institutional environments and relevant historical shifts, leading to the situation that leads to the wicked problem of the EU’s promotion of human rights for LGBTI persons; (c) the empirical tracing of the emergence, travel, and sensemaking of the idea of human rights for LGBTI persons in Brussels and Uganda and how EU staff in Brussels and the delegation in Uganda, alongside member state embassy staff, organize this problem and make it manageable. The first part of Chapter 2 presents the topic of human rights for LGBTI persons as a wicked problem along the dimensions of complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty and highlights the issue’s inherent contestedness. Chapter 2 further provides a brief historical view of how the theoretical perception of public administration s vis-a-vis the social world changed over time. Chapter 2 explains the choice of translation over the concept of diffusion and details the choice of an organizational approach, based on sociological new institutionalism. Chapter 2 also makes the case

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that due to ever-present contestation, the problem’s definition is always political and its promotion for greater legitimacy is imbued with power. Chapter 3 provides context by tracing the shifts from a colonial world order toward the nation-state system post-World War II (WWII) and the emergence of the European Communities (EC) and highlights how coherence became increasingly important to legitimacy as the European Economic Communities (EEC) became the EU. Chapter 3 shows how knowledge about former colonial countries is still largely dictated by a Eurocentric view steeped in the “Western” view of modernity and related aspects. Chapter 4 sheds light on the shifts that led from first rights for individuals to human rights and provides a historical overview of the emergence of human rights during the period of modernity. Chapter 4 also explains how the rise of social movements contributed to the creation of new horizons of expectations in terms of differentiation and participation and enabled the link to LGBTI topics and outlines human rights’ establishment as a global norm and their link to development cooperation. Chapter 5 outlines the wickedness and fluidity of the concepts of sexual orientation and gender identity and how “knowledge” and governance of sexuality in many African societies are inseparably intertwined with Eurocentric and colonial perspectives into today. Further, Chapter 5 provides the historical background to the emergence of the acronym LGBTI and argues the abstraction in the form of the acronym was crucial to enable the global travel of the concept. Chapter 6 introduces the EU as a modern meta- and focal organization in its full complexity and introduces the main organizational EU entities involved in its foreign policy. It further comments on the role of human rights and LGBTI in the EU and points out the hierarchies related to development policies as a continuation of colonial power dynamics. It also includes the importance of appearing rational and coherent for the EU to preserve its legitimacy and argues these horizons of expectation are important drivers for policy and action. Chapter 7 pulls together the strands of EU, human rights, and LGBTI across time, by chronologically outlining how the idea of human rights for LGBTI and its counter idea traveled and manifested in policy in EU member states and in Uganda and how the close but mostly hidden link between development aid and human rights ultimately contributed to the AHA’s annulation.

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Chapters 8 and 9 form the empirical core of this book, which provide close-ups on the translation and sensemaking processes taking place in Brussels and Kampala, respectively. These chapters, by analyzing changes in problem definitions as they are negotiated and promoted at the individual, organizational, and interorganizational levels, show how staff filter, link, and categorize the topic of LGBTI, i.e., how they organize the wicked problem, making it manageable and integrating it into their routine work. The conclusion in Chapter 10 outlines the main contributions of the study to the theoretical literature, including wicked problems, institutional change, translation, and sensemaking, and to empirical studies on human rights, the EU, and LGBTI. It further provides a comparison of the ways in which the topic of human rights for LGBTI persons is dealt with in Brussels and in Kampala and points toward specific factors influencing how a wicked problem is handled by a public administration and ultimately organized. This process of organizing starts from the moment the contested idea is noticed and gains attention from EU delegation staff and member state embassies, who all regard it as a small issue rather than a wicked problem. Despite this initial assessment, the issue gains attention. This last chapter also makes limitations transparent and suggests areas for further research to delve deeper into this study’s findings.

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LGBT Human Rights. (Neo)colonialism, Neoliberalism, Resistance and Hope (pp. 269–306). University of London Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10. 2307/j.ctv5132j6 Jjuuko, A., & Tabengwa, M. (2018). Expanded Criminalisation of Consensual Same-Sex Relations in Africa: Contextualising Recent Developments. In N. Nicol, A. Jjuuko, R. Lusimbo, N. J. Mulé, S. Ursel, A. Wahab, & P. Waugh (Eds.), Envisioning Global LGBT Human Rights. (Neo)Colonialism, Neoliberalism, Resistance and Hope (pp. 63–96). University of London Press. http:// www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctv5132j6 Jurkovich, M. (2020). What Isn’t a Norm? Redefining the Conceptual Boundaries of “Norms” in the Human Rights Literature. International Studies Review, 22(3), 693–711. https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viz040 Kinzelbach, K., & Kozma, J. (2009). Portraying Normative Legitimacy: The EU in Need of Institutional Safeguards for Human Rights. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 10(4), 603–620. Kochenov, D. (2006). EU’s Numerous Contradictory Approaches to Minority Protection: Internal-External Paradox and Mutually Exclusive Pre-Accession Standards. In SSRN eLibrary. Presented at the “Exchanging Ideas on Europe 2006: Visions of Europe: Key Problems, New Trajectories” UACES 36th Annual Conference and 11th Research Conference, Limerick, Ireland. Accessed 4 November 2012. Kollman, K. (2009). European Institutions, Transnational Networks and National Same-Sex Union Policy: When Soft Law Hits Harder. Contemporary Politics, 15(1), 37–53. Kollman, K., & Waites, M. (2009). The Global Politics of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Human Rights: An Introduction. Contemporary Politics, 15(1), 1–17. Kukura, E. (2005). Sexual Orientation and Non-discrimination. Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 17 , 181–188. https://doi.org/10.1080/146313 70500332890 Lavenex, S., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2009). EU Rules Beyond EU Borders: Theorizing External Governance in European Politics. Journal of European Public Policy, 16(6), 791–812. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760903087696 Lombardo, E., & Rolandsen Agustín, L. (2016). Intersectionality in European Union Policymaking: The Case of gender-based violence. Politics, 36(4), 364– 373. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395716635184 Manners, I. (2002). Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2), 235–258. https://doi.org/10. 1111/1468-5965.00353 Massad, J. A. (2007). Desiring Arabs. University of Chicago Press. Meyer, J. W. (2014). Empowered Actors, Local Settings, and Global Rationalization. In G. S. Drori, M. A. Höllerer, & P. Walgenbach (Eds.), Global

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Themes and local Variations in Organization and Management. Perspectives on Glocalization (pp. 413–423). Routledge. Meyer, R. E., & Höllerer, M. (2010). Meaning Structures in a Contested Issue Field: A Topographic Map of Shareholder Value in Austria. Academy of Management Journal, 53(6), 1241–1262. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMJ. 2010.57317829 Michael, F. (2012). On the Interactions Between Law and Social Science in the Understanding and Implementation of Human Rights. In F. V. Njau (Ed.), Beyond the Law: Multi-disciplinary Perspectives on Human Rights (pp. 3–16). Pretoria University Law Press. Mienga, J. (2012). How Sociology Enriches Human Rights: The Case Study of Malawi’s First Openly-Gay Couple. In F. Viljoen (Ed.), Beyond the Law: Multidisciplnary Perspectives on Human Rights (pp. 95–115). Pretoria University Law Press. Mir, R., & Mir, A. (2013). The Colony Writes Back: Organization as an Early Champion of Non-Western Organizational Theory. Organization, 20(1), 91– 101. https://doi.org/10.1177/1350508412461003 Msibi, T. (2011). The Lies We Have Been Told: On (Homo) Sexuality in Africa. Africa Today, 58(1), 55–77. https://doi.org/10.2979/africatoday.58.1.55 O’Flaherty, M., & Fischer, J. (2008). Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human Rights Law: Contextualising the Yogyakarta Principles. Human Rights Law Review, 8(2), 207–248. Oliver, M. (2012). Transnational Sex Politics, Conservative Christianity, and Antigay Activism in Uganda. Studies in Social Justice, 7 (1), 83. https://doi. org/10.26522/ssj.v7i1.1056 Palm, T. (2014). Normative Power and Military Means: The Case of the EU in FYR and Moldova. In M. Wilga & P. I. Karolewski (Eds.), New Approaches to EU Foreign Policy (kindle ed., pp. 145–162). Routledge. Power, M. (1999). The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification. Oxford University Press. Prasad, A. (2003). Postcolonial Theory and Organizational Analysis: A Critical Engagement (2003rd ed.). Palgrave Macmillan. Princen, S. (2011). Agenda-Setting Strategies in EU Policy Processes. Journal of European Public Policy, 18(7), 927–943. https://doi.org/10.1080/135 01763.2011.599960 Puar, J. (2013). Rethinking Homonationalism. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 45(02), 336–339. https://doi.org/10.1017/S00207438130 0007X Radhakrishnan, R. (1994). Postmodernism and the Rest of the World. Organization, 1(2), 305–340. Rainer, E. C. (2021). From Pariah to Priority How LGBTI Rights Became a Pillar of American and Swedish Foreign Policy. State University of New York

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Press. http://erf.sbb.spk-berlin.de/han/872773256/ebookcentral.proquest. com/lib/staatsbibliothek-berlin/detail.action?docID=6730408 Rao, R. (2015). Re-membering Mwanga: Same-Sex Intimacy, Memory and Belonging in Postcolonial Uganda. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 9(1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2014.970600 Richardson, D. (2015). Rethinking Sexual Citizenship. Sociology, 1–17.https:// doi.org/10.1177/0038038515609024 Rittel, H. W. J., & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning. Policy Sciences, 4(2), 155–169. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF0140 5730 Sadgrove, J., Vanderbeck, R. M., Andersson, J., Valentine, G., & Ward, K. (2012). Morality Plays and money matters: Towards a Situated Understanding of the Politics of Homosexuality in Uganda. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 50(1), 103–129. Santos, A. C. (2012). Social Movements and Sexual Citizenship in Southern Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. Seckinelgin, H. (2009). Global activism and Sexualities in the Time of HIV/ AIDS. Contemporary Politics, 15(1), 103–118. Slootmaeckers, K., & Touquet, H. (2016). The Co-Evolution of EU’s Eastern Enlargement and LGBT Politics: An Ever Gayer Union? In K. Slootmaeckers, H. Touquet, & P. Vermeersch (Eds.), The EU Enlargement and Gay Politics: The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on Rights, Activism and Prejudice (pp. 19–44). Palgrave Macmillan. http://www.palgrave.com/jp/book/978 1137480927. Accessed 6 November 2016. Sorensen, J., Van Maanen, J., & Michel, T. R. (2007). The Interplay Between Theory and Method. Academy of Management Review, 32(4), 1145–1154. Tamale, S. (2003). Out of the Closet: Unveiling Sexuality Discourses in Uganda. Feminist Africa, 2. https://feministafrica.net/feminist-africa-issue2-2003-changing-cultures/ Tamale, S. (2009). Law, Sexuality and Politics in Uganda. In M. Mutua (Ed.), Human Rights NGOs in East Africa. Political and Normative Tensions (pp. 51–74). Fountain Publishers. Tamale, S. (2011). Researching Sexualities in Africa. In S. Tamale (Ed.), African Sexualities: A Reader (pp. 13–22). Fahamu/Pambazuka. Thoreson, R. R. (2014). Transnational LGBT Activism: Working for Sexual Rights Worldwide. University of Minnesota Press. Accessed 28 July 2016. Tickner, J. A. (2016). Knowledge Is Power: Challenging IR’s Eurocentric Narrative. International Studies Review, 18(1), 157–159. https://doi.org/ 10.1093/isr/viv026 Tsebelis, G. (2008). Thinking About the Recent Past and the Future of the EU. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 46(2), 265–292. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00788.x

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CHAPTER 2

A Wicked Problem and Its Travels in a Modern World

When Rittel and Webber (1973) first conceived of the concept of wicked problems in 1973, they critiqued the assumption that problems are objective, given, and can be solved rationally in a modern pluralist society. They instead suggested certain problems’ solutions were predetermined by the problems’ very definition—solutions that, once defined, needed to be legitimized as the “right one” by public administrations. With this core argument, the authors challenged the dominant idea that social problems could be solved through top-down expert decisions that took a technical and rational (or “engineering”) approach, a framework of action that only required gathering the necessary information to proceed. Currently, the concept is rarely understood in its radicalness, and literature on wicked problems lies in the realm of generally rational organizations, in which problems are accepted as given and with the assumption that they can be solved (e.g., through better cooperation or structural changes). Scholarly attention to the concept of wicked problems has seen renewed interest since the beginning of the twenty-first century (Head, 2008). This recent uptake is testimony to the perception the social world of today, due to new technology and greater interconnectedness, is more complex, uncertain, and ambiguous than it was in the 1970s; it is a world that sees an increasing array of challenges placed on public administrations. As such, the very concept of wicked problems has, as a subject of

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. Malmedie, EU Promotion of Human Rights for LGBTI Persons in Uganda, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45826-2_2

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interest, expanded past the academic community, resonating with practitioners and policy makers. This burgeoning interest has resulted in increasing degrees of scholarly work on wicked problems that see the concept as characterized by three main components: (a) complexity, (b) ambiguity, and (c) uncertainty (Head & Alford, 2013, p. 6). This chapter details what makes the EU promoting human rights for LGBTI persons a wicked problem. After highlighting a shortcoming of how the literature addresses such problems generally—within conventional problem–solution lines of thinking—this chapter explains how the scholarly fixation of solving wicked problems has focused the debate on the far end of a problem-solving process, when the practical reality is knowledge creation and negotiation around meaning are what matters most. One chief aim of this book is to reorient this focus to the beginning of the process, when sense is made to define a problem in the first place. The second part of this chapter proposes a conceptual framework suitable to study the problem definition based on sociological new institutionalism and more specifically involving the concepts of institutional change, translation, and sensemaking.

The Wickedness of the Problem EU promotion of human rights for LGBTI persons in Uganda is taking place during a time that is diffusely perceived as one of increasing complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty. These overlapping characteristics, ever yet on the rise, are perceived to make the world less predictable on socio-politico-economic levels,1 ,2 which, by design of classic bureaucracies, are separated into clear areas of competencies and strict hierarchies.3 Societies, it could be argued, have become increasingly pluralist, have

1 This perception is not just prevalent within academia; politicians have raised diagnoses of an increasingly complex world (Luther, 2017; Sylvester & Thomson, 2013). The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for example, published a Learning Compass 2030 with the aim to help students “develop the tools they need to navigate an increasingly complex, volatile and uncertain world” (Schleicher, 2019). 2 The COVID-19 outbreak is most obvious example of such a problem where complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguities loom large across the world. 3 Max Weber’s ideal type bureaucracy is still influential to date (for an introduction, see Kruse and Barrelmeyer [2012]).

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increased in velocity4 of change, and have become even more intertwined across national borders over the past 50 years. In such an interconnected world, ideas travel more quickly and in a less directed way, with the practical implication being it is not just organizations on a world level5 (e.g., states and international organizations) that determine what is considered appropriate domestic and international conduct; it is also citizens around the globe, CSOs,6 and international media that contribute to what is deemed appropriate or horizons of expectations. Nation-states and other organizations, such as the EU, in their endeavor to match these expectations and thereby ensure legitimacy, must therefore reconcile a minefield of conflicting demands of differentiated social groups shaping global expectations.7 In case of the EU promoting human rights for LGBTI persons, there are several aspects that contribute to the wickedness of the problem: the EU’s organizational structure, the uncertainty of what human rights for LGBTI people entails, and the ambiguity of normative principles versus accusations of neoimperialism.

4 The internet and social media have resulted in “information floods.” At the same

time, there is an ever-greater effort to rationalize, optimize, and make measurable. All realms of life are affected, whether these are gadgets that measure our sleep patterns or the search for a partner on online platforms. 5 Organizations in this study are regarded not as a-priori entities but as outcomes of organizing processes, created and recreated through action itself (Czarniawska, 2014, p. 17). The concept incorporates whole public administrations of nation-states but also much smaller clusters of organizing such as individual units. 6 The term civil society organizations (CSOs) will be used in this study over the term nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) because the term is simultaneously more specific and more encompassing—more specific because it relates solely to societal organizations (NGOs might include churches or even businesses) and more encompassing because the organizations to which it refers include those that are not necessarily formally organized or registered (NGOs hold the opposite connotation). 7 Head and Alford (2013), for example, see public administrations as confronted by different and often contradicting demands from increasingly pluralist societies. The authors see this as a new challenge to public administrations’ practice. As organizations, they need to be accountable, yet, faced with contradicting demands, which will determine a public administration’s action? They suggested traditional Weberian bureaucracies with their hierarchical structures, clear division of competencies, and rigid structures, built to last rather than change, are unfit to deal with wicked problems.

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The EU as a Complex Modern Organization in Flux The EU, as a complex modern organization in flux, retains legitimacy only through the difficult endeavor of creating the perception of being a rational and unitary actor. As a unique organization and public administration, combining intergovernmental and supranational elements, the EU is endowed with often unclear and inconsistent competencies.8 This is especially true for the EU’s foreign policy, elements of which are governed in different ways: trade, diplomacy, and security are matters of each sovereign member state and at the same time regulated within the framework of the EU’s intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), while the EU’s development cooperation, for example, is governed at the supranational level.9 As such, the EU is, in effect, two different types of organizations: (a) a meta organization and (b) a focal organization. A meta organization consists of other organizations as members instead of individuals (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2005, p. 12), whose membership is voluntary and who are all considered equal (Djelic, 2014, p. 45). While the meta organization embodies the global, its members represent the local. This setup bears a certain level of paradox, as one defining feature of organizations and of nation-states in particular is their independence and sovereignty (Ahrne et al., 2016). While the EU, as a meta organization, has to portray itself as autonomous and independent on an international level, the same goes for its member states, each with their own priorities and strategies, sources of legitimacy in the form of their electorate, public administration, and representations through their embassies. This paradoxical orientation spurs high levels of complexity and ambiguity, as it leaves the EU and its member states facing multiple horizons of expectations (i.e., competing demands in constant tension) with no apparent natural equilibrium to settle them.10

8 The debates about the procedures to elect the head of the commission in 2019, for example, are testimony to this. 9 The CFSP is a wide policy field including trade and security issues in addition to diplomacy. In this book, the term foreign policy refers to the part of the CFSP narrowly concerned with diplomacy and matters not purely affecting member states or internal governance. 10 The forum for the intergovernmental level of the EU comprises the Council and the Council of Ministers, consisting of the heads of states of its members/ministers of its

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At the same time, the EU comprises supranational elements as a public administration and focal organization, i.e., an organization consisting of clusters of different, more or less self-contained organizational subunits, each with some degree of autonomy and a collective identity (Sorge, 2002, p. 12).11 On a supranational level in Brussels,12 organizational entities form the EU headquarters. These entities are comprised of smaller organizational units. In so-called third countries (i.e., nonmember states, such as Uganda), the EU, as a whole and in its constituent parts, is represented by one EU delegation,13 which has a distinct identity compared to the EU delegations in other countries, in addition to being direct extensions of the EU itself. With these organizational structures comes the negotiation of a delicate balance that pulls the EU constantly— in two diametrically opposed existential directions: (a) one that follows notions of national sovereignty among member states on a more intergovernmental level and (b) another moving toward greater integration

states, respectively. The Council is the highest decision-making body, where heads of state first and foremost represent national interests, as they are responsible to their electorate. 11 As a note of clarification: In EU treaties and in much of the academic literature on the EU, the various EU organizational units—the EU Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council—are collectively referred to as “institutions.” Institutions, in this book, refer to a bundle of formal and informal rules and are to be differentiated from mere organizational structures. Such structures take the term organizational entities —used for the EU Commission, European Parliament, Council, and European External Action Service (the latter does not formally have the status of a European institution in the treaties). The study refers to organizational units to denote EU delegations and member state embassies, which are somewhat separate from the main headquarters administration. 12 This study makes one main distinction between Brussels as the European “capital” and Uganda as an African country. This dichotomy is reflected prominently in the structure of the Chapters 8 and 9 of this study. Across this book, Africa and African countries are not understood as given units of analysis; rather, they constitute notions of a continent and of countries and should be understood as “categories, whose very existence in human imagination is a product of history, indeed a history of connections across large spaces” (Cooper, 2014, p. 90). Accordingly, terminology, such as the West, developing countries, and third world countries, is either avoided or referenced in quotation marks to signal their status as constructed categories, rather than pre-existing entities. Furthermore, this book uses EU member states, European countries, donor countries, and countries of the global North as shorthand reference to countries that are currently donors, rather than recipients, of development aid, and many hold a colonial past as empires. 13 EU delegations are like embassies, in that they represent the EU and its member states in third countries (i.e., countries outside of the EU). They lack certain competencies though, reserved exclusively for member state embassies, such as a consular section.

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with more authority over its members as an organization and public administration at a supranational level.14 These shearing aspects feature in organizational entities and across levels of the EU hierarchy, which has several differing, often contradictory, demands and expectations in need of negotiation. These demands stem from various sources of legitimacy, including different EU member states, EU member states’ citizens, international social movements, and third countries’ governments, citizens, and CSOs. For example, certain member states (generally, those with high levels of legal protection for LGBTI persons) have been pushing for the EU’s promulgation of a hardline stance for countries that criminalize same-sex sexual activities, while other members regard this move as superfluous and advocate instead for other issues to take priority. The Uncertainty and Hot-Buttoned Nature of Human Rights for LGBTI People There is uncertainty in the EU’s comparatively unsettled organizational structure and functioning with the topic of LGBTI. The very meaning of LGBTI and what it entails to promote human rights for LGBTI persons remain matters of contestation. Across history, the concepts of sexual orientation and gender identity have always been in flux, yet the crystallization into the acronym LGBTI is recent, as is the link to the topic of human rights, both of which have aided unprecedented prominence of the topic. Despite this attention, at the time, there existed very little precedence at the national and international levels about how to address human rights for LGBTI persons in third countries: there are no best practice templates or examples of organizations perceived as successful that could be imitated to guide the EU’s action. Existing rules and regulations concerning the LGBTI topic are often highly contested, which heightens the degree of difficulty in predicting the intended and unintended consequences of action. This contestedness leaves staff members in EU organizational units and its member state embassies with high levels of uncertainty about their engagement 14 According to Bayer and Mordt (2008, p. 142) on Weber, a state is characterized by holding a monopoly of physical force. While the EU is far from this scenario, recent discussions around an EU army nevertheless demonstrate a move in this direction, at least regarding the external dimension.

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of LGBTI as a new topic of policy. They are also without prior knowledge or experience on which to build foreign policy in this particular topic and context. Although sexual orientation has been linked to fundamental rights in the EU, primary EU legislation for LGBTI is patchy and prohibits discrimination only with respect to employment. Moreover, there exists no EU-wide regulation on topics such as gender recognition or medical interventions for intersex children, which has given rise to differing levels of protection and rights for LGBTI persons among member states. This mosaic of protection within the EU and the intergovernmental nature of EU foreign policy also leads to greatly differing expectations and therefore ambiguous demands on the EU. Ambiguity of Normative Principles Versus Accusations of Neoimperialism Outside the EU, human rights for LGBTI persons seems a concept ever more in contestation. Many African countries are former colonies or protectorates of European powers, the British Empire in particular, the legacy of which is shown in the colonial-era laws that still criminalize same-sex sexual conduct. Since 2014, several countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, have introduced changes to make legislation, remaining from colonial times criminalizing same-sex sexual conduct, even stricter. Uganda is a prominent example because the proposed legislation initially included the death penalty. The colonial aspect poses further complication to the EU, whose legitimacy stems from portraying itself as a modern organization and normative power (Manners, 2002)—one guided by principle, rather than self-interest—and more through output than democratic-input legitimation. As a public administration, the EU must be regarded as acting; hence, sustaining legitimacy for the EU includes the promotion of human rights and its principle of equality. In contexts where such promotion clashes with the universal principle of national sovereignty (e.g., in promoting human rights for LGBTI in independent countries external to the EU), there is much room for ambiguity. With LGBTI’s link to fundamental rights in the EU (see Chapter 7), it has become increasingly difficult to justify the notion that LGBTI persons outside of the EU do not deserve the same protection and rights as those within it. Moreover, to appear inactive considering other countries’ introductions of stricter legislation persecuting LGBTI persons

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would put the EU’s legitimacy at risk; however, the balance is delicate, as, in appearing active, the EU must still negotiate a challenge to its legitimacy, deflecting accusations of neoimperialism and of the imposition of “Western” values onto third countries. The Problem Definition as Key In the past, wicked problems have been studied from multiple angles and within many disciplines, which have honed in on different thematic issues, with climate change as the most commonly pursued and equality and diversity issues receiving much less attention (Danken et al., 2016, p. 30). Scholars of organizations addressing wicked problems have concentrated on developing strategies to solve them—generally inspired by a governance perspective that sees wicked problems as a “solvable” administrative challenge (Daviter, 2017, p. 2). To this end, certain studies have classified wicked problems—describing, for example, their degree of “wickedness” and developed typologies—to match them with appropriate (policy) approaches (Peters, 2005). Some have suggested specific remedies, such as better coordination (e.g., Bouckaert et al., 2010), while others have identified responses to a problem’s individual components via, for example, greater coordination to counter complexity, better strategies to meet the challenges of ambiguity, and more knowledge to alleviate uncertainty (Daviter et al., 2016). Scholars have proposed changes to organizational structures, highlighting the potential of different organizational forms, such as networks, to overcome the challenges of a fragmented modern society (Roberts, 2000; Weber & Khademian, 2008). All these proposed approaches to better deal with wicked problems are still based on the general assumption that organizational design should mirror the environment to deal with problems in the most efficient way. One of the most innovative aspects of Rittel and Webber’s (1973) wicked problem concept has been largely ignored by scholars of more functionalist literature concerned with solving such problems. Rittel and Webber remarked on the two traditional avenues in which planning problems are typically engaged: (a) de facto decision-makers and experts and (b) trying to please as many actors as possible. They deemed neither fit for the aim. Instead, they argued—from a self-reflective and constructivist perspective, rather than a functionalist one—that any planning is political, and, as such, experts or planners are necessarily part of a political game, where their problem definition presupposes a preferred solution.

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A problem is then understood as a given for which a solution has to be found, but the definition of a problem itself presupposes its solution and how it is dealt with on a practical level (Danken et al., 2016). Even where this aspect is acknowledged, scholars generally do not take it seriously.15 Concentrating on the process of defining a problem—in contrast to the problem’s solving—has far-reaching consequences for the study of wicked problems. From this perspective, a problem never exists independently of its environment, but complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity change from being understood as characteristics of a problem to the context conditions under which a wicked problem can emerge. What constitutes a problem to a particular actor depends on the context in combination with an actor’s (tacit) knowledge. This knowledge is constituted by institutions or categories which help make the complex world manageable (Jenkins, 2000, p. 8) and are formed and stabilized through social processes (i.e., in real or imagined dialogue with others) and therefore requires negotiation of meaning. Given that how a problem is defined includes a preferred solution, it is therefore essential to examine the process of a problem definition. This book contributes a crucial exploration by empirically examining in detail how a wicked problem is defined and dealt with at the working level. Observing actors in their complex environments making sense at microlevel allows identification of underlying assumptions and taken-for-granted rules or institutions of these actors. I argue studies focusing on solutions to wicked problems fail to address one crucial aspect of the phenomenon identified by Rittel and Webber: a wicked problem’s definition presupposes its solution. Taking this aspect seriously has implications for research, as it redirects focus from the problem’s solution to its emergence: the social process of establishing what the problem is as one of sensemaking as the beginning of potential institutional change. Rendered as such, these problems may be seen as they are: highly dependent on the institutional context of which organizations and their staff members are part. Moreover, complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity are not properties of a pre-existing problem but rather of a 15 A recent exception is Brian W. Head’s publication in which he reemphasizes that the “analysis of how policy actors frame problems allow scholars to gain a closer understanding of the effects produced by different ways of framing policy issues, and understanding whose interests underlie particular framings. By interrogating or questioning the commonsense meanings and values that are embedded in claims about policy problems and solutions, it is possible for analysts and scholars to clarify and reveal the underlying interests, ideological positions and cultural assumptions” (Head, 2022, p. 19).

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context. In times of globalization and interconnectedness, this context is never just confined to a local level. As Djelic and Quack (2013, p. 300) pointed out, institutions and their processes cannot be understood without taking transnationalization into account, which requires theoretical concepts to capture contexts along the axes of time, (nested) hierarchical levels, and cultural contexts proposed by Drori et al. (2014a). The Travel of Ideas The travel of ideas has traditionally been studied across disciplines as a process of diffusion, a concept capturing “the spread of something within a social system” (Strang & Soule, 1998, p. 266), a particularly workable definition. In practice, this “something” might refer to an idea in form of an institution, management practice, structure, or model. Diffusion remains a popular concept today, especially in early new institutionalism, international relations, and EU studies and provides one—I argue, too limited—explanatory avenue for change through adoption of templates from elsewhere. For example, in early new institutionalism, scholars interested in quantitative, longitudinal, macrolevel approaches within a positivist ontology (Zilber, 2013, p. 161) asked whether a rule was adopted, and then later, to what extent (Walgenbach & Meyer, 2008, p. 182). In international relations, prominent diffusion research includes, for example, the more historical institutionalist approach influenced by the world polity idea (e.g., Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Risse et al., 1999)16 and scholarship on social movements focuses on how nongovernmental actors influence the institutional environment and motivate state actors to change their behaviors to maintain legitimacy (specifically on Kenya and Uganda, see Schmitz [1998, 1999]; Walgenbach and Meyer [2008, p. 88]). The concept of the boomerang pattern describes how national groups lobby transnational organizations to pressure their governments in contexts where domestic routes for pressure are less fruitful or blocked (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Similar to other diffusion studies in international relations, the spiral model (Risse, 2017) assumes a norm itself is static, as are the actors, and therefore falls short of capturing the stage of when an idea has not yet turned into a taken-for-granted norm and is still highly contested. In EU studies, the interest is in whether 16 These perspectives revolve around the actors involved and their constellations but register their impact on a macro-international level (Zwingel, 2012, p. 18).

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particular EU policies have transnational impact on the domestic policies, institutions, and political processes of member states and accession candidates (see Börzel & Risse, 2012; Risse, 2017). Explanations include the transnational embeddedness of a country’s LGBT organizations as an explanation for the adoption of LGBTI-friendly policies by new EU member states (Ayoub, 2015) and the existence of national social movements influences whether international laws and rules are transposed onto national laws (Slootmaeckers et al., 2016). Diffusion, while helpful to answer certain questions of if or to what extent, falls short in capturing the complexity of how. Specifically, one first point of critique concerns how local contexts are ignored in most studies of diffusion. In new institutionalism empirical research, diffusion has been mostly quantitative (as noted by Walgenbach & Meyer, 2008),17 usually focuses on the field level (i.e., on relationships between organizations), and does not account for microprocesses (as noted by Zilber [2013, p. 161]). Second, studies of diffusion in new institutionalism usually disregard power and politics by portraying organizational actors as largely “governed” by institutions, as string puppets and “cultural dopes,” without much individual agency (see Snow & Benford, 1999, p. 25, for critique). The focus on institutions, which are somewhat synonymous with stability, means diffusion studies struggle to explain institutional change. This perception of actors as passive has been challenged by institutional entrepreneur literature, which instead portrays actors as change agents who can influence the “rules of the game” (Dorado, 2005; Fligstein, 2001; Garud et al., 2007; Maguire et al., 2004), ignoring that even powerful actors are unable to simply impose change because “norms must always be accepted to be meaningful” (Wooten & Hoffman, 2013, p. 136).18 Diffusion literature and institutional entrepreneur literature thus fail to take into account the interplay between different organizations 17 Recipients of templates are therefore considered rather passive. Nils Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson, for example, criticized the (mostly quantitative) studies for not accounting for the impact of the various ways in which actors interpret and define ideas (Brunsson, 1993; Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). 18 Much of the institutional entrepreneur literature relies on the idea of objective,

external factors, such as external shocks in the form of laws, technological advances, or other events that would put entrepreneurs in a position from which they could effect change (Hardy & Maguire, 2013, pp. 204–205). Others argued entrepreneurs who act and take risks in the face of external events are not aware that they are taking risks but are simply “responding to unanticipated situations” (Powell & Colyvas, 2013, p. 285).

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and individuals, and feedback loops between institutions and (en)acting on microlevels remain understudied. Many have shown even if organizational structures in an organization become similar, practices often remain heterogeneous (Walgenbach & Meyer, 2008, p. 186). This insight highlights the need to study organizations beyond the ceremonial adoption of structures and policies and on the level of practice and processes.19 Another criticism is organization studies of the last decades deemed the notion of diffusion as too static, in a way that was reminiscent of a physical process, while empirical studies suggest a dynamic process in interaction with the environment (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2013, p. 221). Studies examining the EU might apprehend the political aspects influencing its various actors but fail to address the highly significant administrative structure at play. Similarly, this literature conceptualizes actors as strategically motivated and with considerable agency over events and their environments, paying little attention to the taken-for-granted institutions by which actors are restricted and action organically comes about. Context is accepted as pre-existent or given, rather than constructed by actors and their practices. Furthermore, these approaches stay mainly in the realm of conceptual thought and fail to offer answers relevant to the daily and pragmatic organizing work in which actors regularly engage.20 With its focus on states as monolithic entities, international relations theory traditionally has failed to attend to the microlevel practices of actors (e.g., diplomats) as an autonomous concept (Adler-Nissen, 2016, p. 94; Constantinou & Sharp, 2016, p. 16). National sovereignty is often

19 This is, of course, not to claim that structures do not matter. Research has shown even ceremonial adoption (i.e., adopting a policy but not implementing it) can have consequences on formal structure and practice (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2013, p. 220). This study suggests it is exactly this interplay that needs to be considered and that only a focus on practice can reveal the underlying institutions that influence the outcome. 20 Recent strands of political science scholarship have made important contributions to studies of international relations by engaging with a more constructivist understanding of translation informed by sociology, anthropology, and postcolonial and cultural studies (Berger & Esguerra, 2018; Capan et al., 2021). While some studies remain tied to more unitary notions of actorhood and strategic agency, for the most part they retain the notion of pre-existing norms and contexts which are subjected to change, rather than adopting a dialectic understanding of their existence as a product of everyday doing. Moving towards sociological and organizational studies, the practice turn in international relations and EU studies has led scholars to also place greater interest on the ways in which actors manage conflicting institutions on a day-to-day basis instead of focusing on simply describing a structure or status quo (e.g., Adler & Pouliot, 2011; De Franco, 2022).

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portrayed as the natural order of the world; however, it is not a preexisting social category and has to be understood as a “bundle of ideas” (Cooper, 2014, p. 93). Similarly, the idea that “national sovereignty should trump other rights was the outcome of political processes— and remains contested” (Cooper, 2014, p. 93), an aspect that most mainstream international relations literature has failed to recognize. The diffusion concept has been criticized from a queer postcolonial perspective because of the implied imposition of certain ideas, and the associated Eurocentric perspectives, power dynamics, and dominant discourses underlying such transfers (e.g., Bhabha, 2004; Massad, 2007; Spivak, 1988) and through concepts such as homonationalism (Puar, 2013, p. 336). In organization studies, postcolonial voices gained visibility in the field only in the mid-1990s (Mir & Mir, 2012).21 These limits of diffusion and queries into the extent to which organizations can be regarded as rational have led researchers of new institutionalism toward constructivist approaches to understand organizational processes—namely, those who use the theories of translation and sensemaking. Largely propagated since the mid-1990s by Scandinavian organizational scholars (e.g., Sahlin & Wedlin, 2013, p. 230), these approaches, which describe reality as socially constructed, reflect scholars’ growing interests in how ideas change in circulation and within the flux of institutional settings, a shift away from organization studies’ focus on facets of circulation.22 In practical terms, these approaches can capture multiple levels—from the microlevel of individual actors’ sensemaking to the macropolitical level—required to address a wicked problem. In sociological new institutionalism, the research focus has therefore shifted from defining shared characteristics of organizations adopting templates or rules to analyzing the ideas they adopted as sources of innovation and

21 In international relations and some branches of more critical development studies, academics with a background from the “Global South” addressed the topic of dependencies perpetuated in previously colonized areas in the form of aid in and the ways in which this interlinked with notions of sexuality and notions of African leadership (e.g., Nkomo, 2011). 22 Barbara Czarniawska and Berward Joerges (1996) pioneered these approaches in their

adoption of the phrase translation of ideas. They deemed this term more fitting than the image of diffusion, which is reminiscent of an automatic process found in physics, while the notion of translation, going beyond mere language translation, already embodies the idea of interpretation. Similarly, Sahlin-Andersson around the same time described the process of translation as an “editing process” (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996).

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change (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2013, p. 219; Walgenbach & Meyer, 2008, p. 97). Translation is a process that includes an abstract idea (e.g., the very notion of human rights for LGBTI persons), traveling as a quasiobject or linguistic artifact, before being re-embedded and made sense of in different contexts, which, importantly, changes the idea and those who translate it (Czarniawska, 2002; Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005).23 This “fit” between the local context and the abstract idea (the local re-embedding) does not happen by itself; it requires sensemaking , a process conceptualized by Carl Weick, whereby something new (a cue, in the form of an idea or action) is noticed, labelled, and connected on the individual level—in sum, organized—to institutions (i.e., existing frames and templates to fit it into the local context (Weick, 1995, 2009a; Weick et al., 2005). Institutions, understood as rules, norms, and ideologies based on shared meanings within a society (Meyer & Rowan, 1983, p. 84), direct “more or less taken-forgranted repetitive social behavior” (Greenwood et al., 2008, pp. 4–5).24 These structures and procedures, in their particular contexts, are assumed to be uncontested in their meaning (Zilber, 2002, p. 235); however, such institutions must fit into and are always part of a wider context or environment characterized by a complex web of institutions that are often in conflict, which crystallizes at the point of “doing.” The local context is thus paramount for the sense that will be generated and therefore deserves specific focus. This garnered sense allows for action and may be promoted as a viable option and may lead to institutionalization, which, as a key part of institutional change, describes the process of solidifying an emergent set of rules. This institutionalization requires “a reciprocal typification of habitualized action of types of actors” (Berger & Luckmann, 2013, p. 72)—that is, when an action becomes abstract and is no longer a single occurrence in a particular context but more generally understood. Crucial for this process is the garnered sense’s iteration over time: a repetition of re-enacting required for rules to settle 23 Other authors, such as Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson (1996), referred to the process of translation as editing, a term that highlights the changes which take place in order to create a fit with a local context. 24 While earlier academic work was interested in this persistence, only more recently has change, or “dynamics and contestation,” of institutions become the focus (Powell & Colyvas, 2013, p. 277).

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and become fully institutionalized within an environment. To increase the legitimacy of the interpretation that has been made locally, it needs to be iterated at the very beginning of an institutionalization process and then promoted to become a widely accepted viewpoint before it can be fully institutionalized and provide temporary stability. This locally generated sense happens within and contributes to the wider context in a dialectic process spanning the local and the global within a globalized modern world—a process termed glocalization, which has been conceptualized as taking place across the three axes of nested levels, cultural boundaries, and time (Drori et al., 2014b). In short, people’s everyday usage (i.e., (en)acting, which can also be verbal) of institutions in a specific way in a local context is the focus of this book.25

Translating and Sensemaking as Organizing This book’s conceptual framework is based on new institutionalism, which, 40 years after its conception, still retains much of its appeal. Particularly well suited to understanding how public administrations deal with the globalized world’s increasing array of wicked problems, the theoretical framework of sociological new institutionalism allows researchers to problematize modernity and to “grasp not the universal laws that generate social practices, but [rather] the social practices that generate universal laws” (Dobbin, 1994, p. 123)26 —in other words, the social constructivist dimension at the microlevel that undergirds macroinstitutional processes (i.e., the importance of context and the like). Sociological new institutionalism furthermore accounts for the historical-institutional context as having an effect on the present through abstracted templates, blueprints, or models (Christensen & Laegreid, 2016, p. 3).27 Sociological new institutionalism provides a theoretical lens able to capture change 25 Context is not a particular point or place but rather a surrounding space which entails that studying context requires shifting attention in a way that zooms out and softens the focus to capture more than the immediate object of attention. 26 Based on the idea that reality is socially constructed, a process described by Berger and Luckmann (2013) in their seminal work from 1967, sociological new institutionalism takes a constructivist and interpretatively oriented approach to the study of organizations and the travel of ideas. 27 This is based on Schütz’ idea of typifications of actions, which form the Lebenswelten into which people are born and which are constituted by the sedimented experiences of previous generations (Meyer, 2013, p. 521).

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processes, complexity, levels, and context. In contrast to economic models that continued to conceptualize people and organizations as functionalist, rational, and strategic actors, motivated by maximizing power and profit, new institutionalism took the assumptions of the garbage can model28 into account and promoted the view that organizations strive for legitimacy, instead of efficiency. Additionally, the school of thought gave a certain focus to the (first normative and then more cultural-cognitive) institutions that limited and enabled actors. The striving for rationality and efficiency became the pursuit of a strong, socially constructed global myth of what it means to be a modern society, rather than an act of conscious and deliberate agency (Walgenbach & Meyer, 2008, p. 119). Within the framework of new institutionalism, legitimacy is determined by the perceived institutional environment that forms a horizon of expectations29 within which organizations and actors operate. Under this view, legitimacy is regarded as the currency of organizational survival and, while it can be achieved by corresponding to the expectations dictated by the institutional environment, each organization of a particular organizational field is also involved in shaping this environment (Greenwood & Suchman, 2013). In their attempt to satisfy of perceived expectations, organizations, on the surface, become increasingly structurally similar.30 These structural changes in the name of legitimacy 28 The garbage can model of organizational choice (Cohen et al., 1972) suggests continuous streams of problems and solutions are matched with each other, a process dependent on what is available at any point of time, the allocation of energy, and the linkages between the streams. 29 In modern societies, this horizon of expectation is based on rationality, efficiency, rule of law, and the idea of human beings’ general equal worth. Organizations and actors need to have an ordered set of preferences and strategies to achieve these goals within a framework of legal rules. Furthermore, in combining the individual with the postulate of non-discrimination, it is no longer legitimate in a modern system to justify the different “worth” of certain individuals based on “inherent” differences in their personhood. Instead, “stratification must be justified in terms of immediately rational functional and coordinative requirements” (Frank & Meyer, 2002, p. 92). These expectations can be in contradiction to one another, forming different horizons of expectations. 30 This similarity on a structural level, termed isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 149), is here understood as the “relationship between an organization and its institutional context” to secure legitimacy (Greenwood et al., 2013, p. 9). A number of empirical studies especially on New Public Management (NPM) in the United States showed that organizations adopt templates such as NPM not because they objectively make them more competitive, but because it appears appropriate to adopt these changes and necessary to retain legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Organizations are, hence,

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and to satisfy what is deemed an appropriate requirement, however, are not necessarily reflected in practice but can be decoupled—as mentioned before (Brunsson, 1995). Different ways of decoupling can (partially) satisfy multiple and contradicting demands (Heintz & Werron, 2014, p. 297). Decoupling also takes different forms: over time, between organizational entities and between talk and action (Orton & Weick, 1990, p. 217). This practice, often employed by organizations, has been conceptualized as “organized hypocrisy”: saying one thing, deciding another, and doing a third (Brunsson, 2003). Decoupling in this way has been said to enable modern organizations to, at least partially, meet their primary requirement to act, despite multiple conflicting demands from their environment. This process stabilizes the image of an organization because it instills a perception of legitimacy; at the same time, however, if noticed, decoupling undermines the perception of coherence and consistency of an organization—that is, the image of an organization as a unitary actor. Organized hypocrisy is highly dependent on the institutional environment. Stability arises only with the general assumption of tight coupling between talk, decision, and action. In “Western” democracies, this is the general assumption but left open is the question of whether this also holds true for environments such as Uganda, which are formally democracies but are subjected to a one-party rule, a limited rule of law, and limited possibility for CSO to hold the government to account—in other words, where skepticism toward organizations is likely to be much more prevalent. Structural, superficial similarities can only occur where ideas spread or diffuse to different organizations across time and space. There are several assumptions that underlie the concept of diffusion, especially that an idea itself remains unchanged in the process of traveling from one site to another. Further assumptions include that there are better or worse implementations or adoptions (i.e., those closer to the original templates and those that are not) (Boxenbaum, 2006). The other idea is that by paying closer attention to microprocesses, it is possible to better

following and creating rationalized myths about how successful organizations behave to correspond with what they perceive to be the behavior that will grant them maximum legitimacy and therefore survival. They thus follow a logic of appropriateness to secure their survival rather than a logic of consequence and adopt practices and procedures which they believe have been rationalized and institutionalized in society—becoming structurally similar as a result.

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understand when re-embedding or recontextualization is successful or not (Meyer, 2014b, p. 87). These assumptions black box the involved ideas and changes to them, and the process that leads to these changes (Campbell, 2004, p. 78). Furthermore, these assumptions make diffusion approaches ignorant to the process of idea genesis and context. The core difference between translation and diffusion is that translation does not assume static entities and instead places the coconstruction and negotiation of a social world at the center of the travel of an idea. In doing so, translation captures the process cognizant of how that what is being translated and those who do the translation mutually constitute each other (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996). Scandinavian scholars have employed a sociological approach to new institutionalism and focus on the study of organizational everyday practice and organizing processes rather than structure (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2013, p. 92; Christensen & Laegreid, 2016, p. 3).31 Practice is thought to be always mediated through actors who are constrained and enabled by multiple institutions in a local context, in which they make sense of an idea and then act upon the sense they made. Translation therefore assumes a feedback loop and coconstruction, which is also central to the notion of wicked problems in that identifying the problem is an integral part of the solution. Translating Ideas Translation theory, as developed through the works of Czarniawska and Joerges (1996), holds that ideas manifest in a constant stream, rather than as objects of purposeful diffusion. In this stream, in the present globalized world, the speed by which ideas get exchanged and the geographic distance they travel are amplified by the reach of information technology. Before locally embedded ideas can travel and be translated, however, they must be theorized and made abstract to enable their recognition as relevant beyond their immediate sphere of influence (Strang & Meyer, 1993). These abstract ideas can travel and cover cultural, spatial, and temporal distances, as quasiobjects, via some sort of vehicle (e.g., someone’s mind). These quasiobjects often take the form of words or labels, which may 31 Sociological institutionalism is sometimes referred to as Scandinavian institutionalism, as mainly organizational scholars from Denmark, Norway, and Sweden advanced work in the 1990s, inspired by U.S. colleagues Richard W. Scott, James G. March, and John W. Meyer, have enriched this strand (Czarniawska, 2013; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2013, p. 230).

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be considered linguistic artifacts (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996). These templates—sometimes referred to as blueprints —enable such ideas to travel and pass through cultural filters to then be filled with meaning by others, re-embedding them elsewhere, locally.32 Translation, then, according to Czarniawska and Joerges, as the overarching process of the particular becoming theorized and abstracted, no longer assumes an original idea or template, instead tracing the idea as something in constant flux, always changing, even after being made concrete in a specific context. A few studies have examined translation across national and cultural boundaries and across levels, from macro to micro. Boxenbaum (2006) traced the translation of diversity management from the United States across national and cultural boundaries to Danish firms, where managerial practice contradicted traditional values at first, before seeing their “successful” translation.33 In contrast to Czarniawska’s understanding of translation employed here, Boxenbaum believed in an “original” template. Boxenbaum emphasized the strategic choices of actors but loses the constraints and limitations actors are subjected to out of sight. Another study concerns the case of shareholder value in Austria. Renate Meyer and Markus Höllerer (2010) explored how a contested idea (shareholder value) is framed and labelled at the organizational-field level. Their findings highlight that even individual actors’ interpretation of an idea is strongly linked to their social position and identities, which greatly constrains the extent to which they can be seen as acting deliberately and strategically. Many translation studies in the new institutionalist framework focus on managerial concepts and restrict their lens to the contexts of the Global North—a point of criticism for John Meyer (2014a, pp. 417, 419). While this Euro-/“Western”-centric approach characterizes the

32 Whenever an idea lands and takes root, it is always already re-embedded in a local context and has changed (Rottenburg & Kaufmann, 2017, p. 222; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2013, p. 225). 33 Boxenbaum considered the U.S. diversity management the original and, in the case of Danish adoption, considers it a successful translation. Boxenbaum showed translation took place at three different levels. At the individual level, actors selected a frame that reflected their background. At the strategic level, actors agreed on a pragmatic frame to secure funding but simultaneously made it more challenging to connect the management practice to the existing dominant democracy principle. The actors made up for this and achieved legitimacy on a third level by incorporating the principles of highly legitimate practices into the diversity management frame, thereby creating a hybrid frame.

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existing literature, many insightful translation studies exist to bridge the Global North/South divide. Richard Rottenburg (1996) provided such study in the book When Organizations Travel , published in the same year as Czarniawska and Joerges’ (1996) text on the travel of ideas.34 In reference to DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) work, Rottenburg (1996) noted the structural similarities between organizations in the “West” and those in African countries and suggested the functional systems undergirding structural façades of formal organization modeled from the “West” often work completely differently in other contexts. Rottenburg dismissed the notion of coercive similarities (e.g., through World Bank measures) and of normative similarities, for example, a result of “Western”-trained managers, as too obvious. Rottenburg was instead interested in structural similarities through mimetic processes as an orientation toward a perceived image of the “West” “presented by all parties as contextually independent, infallible models” (i.e., as the norm to aspire to; p. 194). Rottenburg pointed out Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) text on rationalized myths possesses a blind spot in its sole focus on “Western” societies—taking for granted that society is thoroughly rationalized and differentiated. This fixation leads to underestimating the legitimating force of formal rationality, which has become part of a global discourse available to actors around the world (Rottenburg, 1996, p. 236). Due to this myth of formal rationalization toward which modern societies must aim, they are distinguished from other societies through a consistent demand for “purposive-rational processes of change” (Rottenburg, 1996, p. 237). What leads to greater legitimacy for countries on a world stage, therefore, often differs from what grants legitimacy within the country itself. This is a very important distinction, which moves the context into 34 More recently, bridging North and South in organization studies is Marie-Laure Djelic, whose single case study investigates the translation of the concept of competition regulation in East Africa (Djelic, 2014). In this study, Djelic used the allegory of the Banyan tree to paint a picture of the idea of competition regulation, as a seed originating from a global/transnational “galaxy” that takes hold in existing structures on the ground in Africa. This seed grows into a regional trunk through a combination of organizational resources and local activism. From this trunk, aerial roots reach down toward the ground to then thicken, eventually forming local trunks, or national regimes, that support the main structure but still take their sap and energy from the regional trunk, rather than from the ground. Djelic pointed out the mediating function between the global and local spheres through bridging missionaries, some of whom are local, but there is also a group of foreign (Western) ones who increasingly also work for development organizations, such as the British Department for International Development (DFID).

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focus and leads to the question: What happens when the global and national stages intersect and collide? Studies from multiple fields have shown certain abstract rules, concepts, or frames are translated into local contexts, examples of which include studies on the implementation of laws and regulations (Dobbin, 2009; Edelman et al., 2001; Fuller et al., 2000). These studies often focus on the “if” but neglect the “how” of translation. Several empirical studies have provided relevant insights into the dynamics and influences of the translation process. Engle Merry (2006), for example, found the proximity of translators to the local context matters,35 while Mosse (2004) argued in the case of aid policy and practice, a policy is formulated to legitimize practice, rather than to guide it.36 This scholarship implies the re-embedding process at the microlevel also has macroimplications, where practice is translated back into policies. These microlevel processes can be studied through sensemaking, as detailed the following section. Re-embedding Through Sensemaking Confronted with a constant stream of input in their daily environments, organizational actors attend to certain ideas and ignore others through bracketing, labeling, and creating connections. This process enables action: with such forms of categorization, actors produce an ordered social reality by reducing the many voices or the equivocality (i.e., the constant stream of cues; Weick, 2009a, p. 144) that surrounds them. This activity of organizing is a proactive and a reactive process (Czarniawska, 2002, p. 323), meaning actors and organizations react to their environments, while (re-)creating themselves and their (organizational) identities: they mutually constitute each other. An abstracted idea turned quasiobject travels across time and space and transcends levels to land in other local contexts, where it needs to 35 In this very relevant study about women’s human rights, the authors argued the closer translators are to the local context, the more hybrid the transplants, whereas translators who are closer to the global source create replicas of the global template. 36 The study found staff members tasked with the consultancy on implementation

fill policies with meaning and translate them into projects and then project outcomes back into policies. This suggests a process contrary to general belief that policies are implemented and then evaluated. Instead, the study finds that policies mainly fulfill a legitimizing function in this translation process. In practice, it is the organizations’ goals around preserving rules and administrative order which trump specific policy-related goals.

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be re-embedded. As noted by Campbell (2004, p. v), this process of re-embedding has been treated as somewhat of a black box by new institutionalist scholars.37 Sensemaking, as a theoretical framework, lends itself to opening this black box because it specifies the re-embedding process in detail, allowing scholars to take seriously the one aspect of wicked problems that has so far been disregarded by most empirical studies on the topic, namely the notion that the definition of the problem determines the solution. Sensemaking, as conceptualized most prominently by Karl Weick in the mid-1990s, does not constitute a comprehensive theory but rather a framework (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014, p. 61), defined as a mindset or heuristic (Weick, 1995). At a basic level, sensemaking concerns the creative process of fitting new (theorized) ideas—or cues, as Weick called them—into existing frames of a local context and applies a fine-grained lens to its understanding of translation’s re-embedding process. The sensemaking approach provides the analytical tools for examining the role of actors in the re-embedding process and allows researchers to capture the nuance of the context within which sense is made, a crucial ingredient when aiming to apprehend translation across time, levels, and cultural contexts. Scholars in organization studies generally analyze translation on a mesoorganizational level, rather than a micro one. Sensemaking as a process originates at the microlevel, with individuals, and as the “hinge,”38 given that these individuals are always socially embedded in their environments (Weick, 1995, p. 36). Sensemaking, according to Weick (1995), has to be understood as a fundamentally social process, as individuals account for how they believe others will perceive them, which makes them follow a logic of appropriateness. Furthermore, actors

37 The re-embedding process has been described as a form of editing through bricolage and the active recombination of existing elements (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). Both concepts, translation and editing, aim to create a fit between locally existing frames or editing rules, via familiar scripts, templates, and categories in a given time and place—a fit, in other words, between this new idea or practice and the situation and context (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2013, p. 225). 38 That is, as the link between the individual mind and psychological level and the societal level.

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are restricted and enabled by multiple institutions, a context they simultaneously enact and shape (Powell & Colyvas, 2013, p. 282).39 Actors representing organizations often act as the organization, whose values, beliefs, and goals are internalized, meaning “individual behavior is more ‘macro’ than we usually recognize” (Chatman et. al, as cited in Weick, 1995, p. 23).40 Put simply, individuals care about how they are perceived (i.e., by coworkers), the perception of which will also have been formed by the organizational culture, which their behavior then shapes. When representing their unit in exchange with other organizational units, they worry about the status of their unit; as head of state at an international meeting, their concern centers on how actions will be conceived by other international organizations. The generated sense privileges the need for plausibility to an (presumed) audience over accuracy. As much as higher level assumed expectations influence an individual’s sensemaking, sense made locally can also vice versa have macrolevel political effects. Sensemaking therefore bridges the various aforementioned levels and is thus suitable for tracing the translation processes across these levels. Sensemaking bridges the temporal gap between the new and the known (or taken-for-granted), as the beginning of an institutionalization process. Sensemaking and institutional theory intersect in the context which is made up of institutions. These institutions determine which connection between a cue and a frame is regarded as appropriate. In this way, institutionalized categories enable sensemaking in the first place, because “people can see only those categories and assumptions that they store in cause maps built up from previous experience” (Weick, 1988, p. 312). At the same time, sensemaking can be regarded as the prerequisite or “feedstock” for new institutions and institutionalization (Weick, 1995, p. 32). This means that sensemaking allows for consideration of the time dimension. 39 Organizations can also be understood as influencers because just like the individual, they are steeped in a context made up of different, sometimes contradicting institutions within a world society. Therefore, sensemaking does not remain on the individual level, but also reaches the organizational level (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014, p. 58), where a subjective understanding is turned into “something more tangible” and intersubjective through categorization (Weick, 1995, p. 14). Organizations can be understood as forming the level between the “intersubjective and the generally subjective,” because the idea is that people can be replaced in their organizational function (Weick, 1995, p. 65). 40 Even organizations to which actors belong are embedded in a wider context and at the highest level within a world society.

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Sensemaking as Organizing Sensemaking is a form of organizing (Mikkelsen & Wåhlin, 2019, p. 2; Weick, 2009b, p. 195) the social world’s ongoing stream of stimuli through simplification. Sensemaking is the definitive tool people use to distinguish between routine and nonroutine and “to understand ambiguous, equivocal or confusing issues or events” (Brown et al., 2015, p. 266). The reason why people make sense is to (re)gain control and predictability in their surroundings (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014, p. 75) and to make decisions about paths forward. Sensemaking is an active and constructive process41 to create knowledge, one by which people “impose order, counteract deviations, simplify, and connect” (Weick, 2009b, p. 195). It is constructive, a process that simplifies the world by making cognitive overload less likely—facilitating routines via bracketing streams and labelling (Weick, 2009b, p. 199). Feedback loops and interactive components distinguish enactment from the ordinary use of the concept of organizing. Sensemaking is therefore about how actors generate what they interpret (Weick, 1995, p. 13), describing it as a cyclical process that, like translation, takes feedback loops into account. Specifically, actors make sense based on existing building blocks of institutions and in interaction with their environment through noticing, framing, and enacting. Noticing Something as New The perception of a stimulus as new provides the general trigger for the sensemaking process, especially when there is a large enough discrepancy between expectation and occurrence. When this discrepancy interrupts taken-for-granted identities, roles, and routines—something that occurs, say, when an organization’s members perceive a gap between their organization’s mission and its projected image in the world—sensemaking accordingly arises to restore their normativity (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996, p. 29; Maitlis & Christianson, 2014, p. 77). Identity can trigger sensemaking when under threat and guide sensemaking at the same time because a perceived identity as an organizational actor “shapes what we enact and how we interpret” (Weick et al., 2005, p. 416), affecting others’

41 This understanding contrasts with scholars representing the rational choice school of organization studies, which regard organizations and the environment as static.

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perceptions, which “stabilizes or destabilizes our identity” (Weick et al., 2005, p. 416). Categorizing and Setting a Course for Action In categorizing and classifying, people generate what they interpret in a process of sensemaking deemed framing or labelling. Labelling is similar to categorizing and specifically includes what Zerubavel (1997) called lumping and splitting. Sensemaking is about labelling an ambiguous issue or cue to attach it to general frames or legitimate categories (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996, p. 33). Potential connections are dependent on what one ultimately regards as an appropriate connection and these connections form a kind of story which has consequences for action because once something is labelled as a problem, “that’s when the problem starts” (Weick, 1995, p. 79). The very suggestion that something is a problem may trigger specific responses—namely, that it can or should be solved (which might involve relocating funds). Thus, for organizations and in the world at large, problems do not exist per se and simply need to be solved; rather, they are instead constructed from situations that are “puzzling, troubling and uncertain” (March in Scott, 2014, p. 208). (En)acting as Changing the Environment That Changes Actors Enactment is understood as the action people take based on institutions of which they have made sense, thereby confirming the sense (Weick, 1988, p. 307); in other words, enactment can create a self-fulfilling prophecy (Weick, 2006, p. 1729).42 Enactment of an idea predates sensemaking, as it structures the environment and generates new cues, making the world more orderly according to Weick (2009b, pp. 149–195). What is deemed appropriate action depends on an organizational actor’s identity, which “shapes what we enact and how we interpret which affects what outsiders think we are and how they treat us” (Weick et al., 2005, p. 416). What is more, enactments that appear small can have large-scale consequences down the line (Weick, 2009a, p. 203). Especially when politics are involved, the act of sensemaking itself is not the aim of enactment but a means to an aim—to make one’s own sense stick via acceptance by others, leading to institutional change and 42 Compare to Hirschauer’s notion of doing difference—only through acting on a difference does it become a social reality and reduce complexity (Hirschauer, 2014). Further, statements can also constitute actions when regarded as speech acts (compare Austin, 1986).

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institutionalization (Weick, 2009b, p. 203). This link to politics leads to the following questions: What happens when people differ in the sense they make? What happens when the potential institutional change is contested? Attempts to provide answers—to induce sensemaking through a top-down authoritarian process—have been termed sense giving (e.g., Foldy & Goldman, 2008). Sense giving assumes sense can be dictated by someone with leadership authority and that sense and sensemakers are stable, unchanging entities in a constant context. If one accepts the social construction of reality, this idea of a one-way transmission of sense seems unfitting. More precise would be to assume sensemaking, especially the proliferation of sense, is always a matter of negotiations, which are influenced by underlying institutions. Making Sense of Wicked Problems In the conceptualization of how feedback loops organize, sensemaking enables researchers to address what positivist theoretical frameworks struggle to account for in the study of wicked problems, i.e., the constructivist nature of wicked problems and that the “process of formulating the problem and of conceiving a solution or re-solution are identical, since every specification of the problem is a specification of the direction in which a treatment is considered” (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 161). Even if actors make sense all the time and their categorizing is quick, ongoing, and mostly unconscious, sensemaking appears to be best studied in instances when an idea arrives that is perceived as new and highly contested. It is in these instances that sense cannot be made easily, as the arrival of such an idea typically causes an interruption in ongoing work routines and has the potential to challenge taken-for-granted structures. It is those extreme and revelatory cases that best allow for fruitful examination because, in these contexts, it presumably takes longer for sense to settle and for actors to negotiate meaning. Specifically, these cases refer to times when actors are partly or fully aware that they do not know what is going on in a particular context. A longer lag time allows for observation and therefore, and, as Weick (1995, p. 45) suggested, “we need to watch people deal with prolonged puzzles that defy sensemaking, puzzles such as paradoxes, dilemmas, and inconceivable events”—or wicked problems.

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Contestation and Institutional Change Contestation is present at all stages of the sensemaking process, which, in combination with translation, can be understood as one of potential institutional change. Abstract ideas can be noticed and categorized, but, unless they are embedded and repeatedly enacted, do not take hold in any given place, do not make a difference, and do not lead to institutional change. Even though contestation is omnipresent, this aspect is understudied regarding sensemaking, institutional change, and organizations. Institutionalization, sensemaking, and organizations have been regarded as the opposite of contestation, as something that creates stability and enables routines. Represented in norms, social rules, and taken-for-granted structures, the notion of stability inherently undergirds the modern conception of institutions, whose establishment Meyer and Rowan (1977, p. 341) detailed as the result of “social processes, obligations or actualities come[ing] to take on a rule-like status in social thought and action.” Similarly, sensemaking is said to make the world less unique and more typical, stable, and enduring (Weick, 1995, p. 97). In Weick’s (1993) seminal case study on the Mann Gulch disaster, the tragedy occurred partly due to a lack of contestation. A more recent study looked at how business leaders stabilize their careers within and beyond large organizations through sensemaking in the form of storytelling (Maclean et al., 2012). Organizations are conceived as creating stability during a constant flow of information by ordering, categorizing, and dividing a continuous stream into segments. Despite this process, many aspects of organizational life remain uncertain, due to an inability to predict all consequences, and ambiguous, a result of lack of capacity to sort the flow of information and events into mutually exclusive categories, codes, or specifications (Weick, 1995). This ambiguity manifests because organizational actors are always embedded in institutional contexts and environments, which leaves them faced with different expectations, identities, and rules for action, all at once (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2013, p. 222). Contestation is present at all levels. Different people will notice different ideas, depending on their backgrounds, socialization, and tacit knowledge (i.e., the repertoire of institutions available to them). Secondly, depending on where and how actors are embedded, they can be faced

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with differing and even contradicting rules and expectations. Even takenfor-granted rules and institutions can never be specific enough for all new ideas and are not self-reinforcing. They are always ambiguous, must themselves be interpreted to be re-enacted, and are therefore continuously based on negotiations and contestation (Sheingate, 2010, p. 180), needing to be enacted and maintained through everyday interactions (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 24). It is through these processes that continuity and change are produced (Powell & Colyvas, 2013, p. 277), and, as such, it is these interpretations at the microlevel that allow for “incremental change [to take] place in the ‘gaps’ or ‘soft spots’” between rules and their interpretation (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 14). Parallel interpretations of something new are one reason contestation arises. Another reason is that during periods of institutional change, contestation is always present in some form. To understand such change, translation provides a particularly key framework (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996, p. 7). The first step in the translation process is that actors need to make sense of any abstracted template. If the meaning sticks, it iterates and turns into repeated actions, which may become more widely accepted, and subsequently leads to institutional change (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005; Djelic & Quack, 2013; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2013). Studies have predicted where institutionalization is high, resistance to changing a particular action is also high (Zucker, 1977, p. 739). An institutional change process is therefore never smooth but “lumpy and uneven” and involves complex negotiations and struggles over meaning. This book follows these negotiations and struggles closely. In addition, different institutional dimensions often change at different speeds and times (Campbell, 2004, p. 39). It is therefore important to adopt a long-term perspective on the context. Literature on institutional complexity and conflicting institutions has typically explained organizational responses through the concept of decoupling (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017, p. 113). Decoupling in literature is often discussed as a decoupling of policy from practice or enacting (e.g., Tilcsik, 2010). This book, in contrast, supports the notion that decoupling is nuanced and varied. Where public administrations deal with wicked problems, decoupling takes place between organizational units on the same level, between different levels, between talk and action. The ever-present contestedness and plurality of contradicting institutions and sensemaking turn organizing into a highly political act.

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In “enabl[ing] and constrain[ing] which problems are considered relevant and which solutions are regarded as appropriate in a politicaladministrative context,” therefore the way something is organized may be deemed political (Christensen & Laegreid, 2016, p. 3). Furthermore, the way something is organized orients one to give selective attention to some aspects, while excluding others. As Scott (2014, p. 208) pointed out, with reference to the scholar March, because “time and capabilities for attention are limited, theories of decision making are often better described as theories of attention or search than as theories of choice” Such negotiations around meaning take place across all of levels—from the individual microlevel to the organizational mesolevel and, finally, the global macrolevel.43

Summary This chapter outlined two scholarly pathways used to study the travel of ideas: (a) diffusion and (b) translation. This chapter identified translation as a promising avenue to overcome what diffusion misses, given its ability to capture the nuance of the emergence and change processes that shape ideas and institutions and its privileging of context as a realm for focus. At the granular level of process, translation describes how ideas become abstract and are therefore can travel before they land in a different context, where they undergo interpretation and re-embedding at the microlevel. This process of interpretation and re-embedding into the local context can be studied as sensemaking, which this chapter defined as a way of organizing whereby an abstract idea in a different context is noticed, categorized, and then enacted, as a social process spanning

43 This is the reason why studying sensemaking and institutional change can also reveal something about power. Analyzing on the microlevel and mesolevel, in which institutions that make up the local building blocks of sensemaking, takes priority over others, revealing something about the relative power of some institutions over others within a particular context. While the institutional literature often disregards power and politics, a recent study has explored the link between institutional complexity and decoupling with regard to both concepts (Kern et al., 2017). Kern et al. show (2017) that in their case study actors are engaged in something the authors call strategic decoupling and that decoupling is not simply a reaction to a top-down process but that the relationship between subunits determines relative power. Kern et al. called for more research on intraorganizational decoupling and studies on decoupling across levels.

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different levels. In short, sensemaking is a process through which knowledge is produced at the local level through practice. At all levels of this organizing process, there is contestation making visible underlying salient power structures. Given the importance of context to the understanding of wicked problems, it is paramount to outline the institutional environment for this particular case. The empirical research and data analysis point toward four main contingencies or thematic bundles that form the backdrop of the EU’s promotion of human rights for LGBTI persons in Uganda: (a) postcolonial history, (b) human rights, (c) the LGBTI topic, and (d) the EU as an (highly complex) organization—each of which embodies the features of wickedness (complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity) and must be understood within the metaframe of modernity, encompassing increasing rationality and individualization.

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CHAPTER 3

The European Union as a Modern Empire

Colonialism1 has become delegitimized,while imperialism2 is still practiced. The power differential, which defines both concepts, continues to exist in different forms but must be denied for continued legitimacy and is constantly challenged. While in a speech in 2006, the president of the EU Commission described the EU as “the first non-imperialist empire in history” (Barroso, 2006),3 Uganda’s President Museveni has accused the EU of engaging in “social imperialism—to impose social values of one group on our society” (Karimi & Thompson, 2014), as he signed a controversial bill that which further criminalized same-sex

1 Colonialism is here considered as a particular form of imperialism, practiced during a specific historical time period, during which it was regarded appropriate for European powers to acquire and rule over people outside of their own territory. 2 Imperialism can be defined as “the will and the ability of an imperial centre to define as imperial its own national interests and enforce them worldwide in the anarchy of the international system,” which at the time went hand in hand with the extraction of resources, and the establishment of rule over the territories based on the assumed “rightful acquisition, permanence, and responsibility” of the colonizer over colonized territory and its people (Osterhammel, 1997, p. 12). 3 Barroso later clarified in an interview that what was meant by the comment was that the EU as a union of states came together voluntarily rather than under military threat (Mahony, 2007). Barroso was therefore not talking about EU foreign policy but about its internal structure and member states.

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sexual relations.4 Signing this bill demonstrates Uganda’s sovereignty in the face of mounting pressures from the EU and some of its member states to annul the new legislation—citing human rights violations against Ugandan LGBTI people as the reason. The EU’s policies today still include aspects that are key to imperialist dominance, namely categorization, indirect rule, the divide and rule principle, civilizing of the “Other,” formal sovereignty versus de facto inequality, and the challenge of coherence. Therefore, the EU can be understood as an empire, which, according to Cooper (2014, p. 40), can be defined as “large, expansionist political units that preserve and reproduce differences among the peoples and places they incorporate.” This definition stresses the coproduction of differences, a process which can be regarded as categorization, without making a clear distinction between the center and periphery and without referring to territories. To fully understand the institutional context of the EU dealing with a wicked problem in Uganda, these relational aspects must be considered, which is only possible with knowledge of the historical context. Just like the British and French Empires built on previous structures and institutions, rather than completely replacing them, the EU’s history is inseparably linked to colonialism and processes of (de)colonialization which this chapter explains. The late nineteenth-century expansion of European colonial rule was itself closely linked to increasing rationalization and the development of modern bureaucracies across Europe. Controlling territory remotely was no easy endeavor and required organizational structures and people-power to govern “subjects” at a distance dispersed over territory (Burbank, 2011, p. 16). Without existence of a one-size-fits-all approach, dealing with these challenges drew from many different models of exercising power, which existed in parallel, were characterized by extensive legal rules and written records, and measured, categorized, and classified production and populations in increasingly “standardized” ways.5 With these models, the colonial powers, specifically the British in Uganda, thus, 4 “We see how you do things, the families, how they’re organized. All the things, we see them, we keep quiet,” he said. “It’s not our country, maybe you like it. So there’s now an attempt at social imperialism—to impose social values of one group on our society” (Karimi & Thompson, 2014). 5 The longer the British occupation lasted in countries such as Kenya, the more structures were established and the more the Kenyan colonial territory came to resemble “a

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“juridified” and formalized pre-existing African societal structures (Osterhammel & Jansen, 2012, p. 35), with a view to reproduce the legal and administrative structures of the home country and turn “Africa into the orderly, productive, controllable society, that seemed vital in the post-war [WWI] conjuncture” (Cooper, 1996, p. 2).

Systems of Difference During the so-called scramble for Africa, in the years 1884 and 1885, Britain and Germany divided up Eastern Africa and borders were drawn without regard to local communities or languages.6 This demonstrated the colonial empires’ power of defining boundaries and people as it also established more abstract systems of difference and categorization. Colonial rule, and especially indirect rule, relied on a system of difference by way of ordering and creating and/or stabilizing hierarchies among the people living in colonized territory, establishing the conquered population as inferior to the occupiers (see Chatterjee, 1997). Colonized territory was controlled by tying it to the empire through direct or indirect rule, two types of governance which often coexisted in practice. Indirect rule, in contrast to direct rule, was not carried out by administrators sent by the colonial state to the territory,7 but instead by a small group of imperial agents—British officials and staff, in the case of Uganda—who would influence politics “behind a facade of traditional dynasty” by advising local cooperative elites (Osterhammel & Jansen, 2012, p. 62).8 For this type of rule to be effective, colonial power relied on the domestic authorities’ legitimacy with the local population (Osterhammel, 1997, p. 20). The installation of “chiefs” who enjoyed traditional

functioning state and economy, built on settler agricultural exports, mostly to the UK” (Hornsby, 2013, p. 29). 6 The delineations of then established British East African British Protectorates still changed a number of times until independence—as late as 1902, in the cases of Kenya and Uganda (Hornsby, 2013, p. 21). 7 See Eckert (2006) and Osterhammel and Jansen (2012) for more detail on the difference of direct and indirect rule (Eckert, 2006, p. 81; Osterhammel & Jansen, 2012, p. 12). 8 Uganda, for example, always remained a British crown protectorate and was never fully colonized—in contrast to neighboring Kenya—a feature of which Ugandans are quite proud.

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authority, or those endowed with authority as governors, was justified with the preserving of “traditional African cultures” and resulted in keeping or creating separate governing structures (Cooper, 2014, p. 59). To this end in Uganda, the British designated local authority figures, whom missionaries had converted to (angelical) Protestantism (Mutibwa, 1992, p. 2), as chiefs of the Buganda Kingdom to dominate the other “tribes” (Ofcansky, 1999).9 One effect of this was that it was the Buganda, rather than the British, who were regarded as the enemy and oppressors by many (Okuku, 2002, p. 12). Underneath these empowered authorities, whole groups of people were delineated into ethnic “tribes” and placed in racial hierarchy to each other. In terms of the colonized populace, this governance structure led to ascribing them ethnicities, which solidified the precolonial “moving and morphing communities,” within which, “at an individual level, ethnic identities were not genetic, but fluid and incorporating” into exclusive categories linked to territorial origin (Hornsby, 2013, p. 25). This imperialistic policy of divide and rule effectively separated the population into a mosaic of groups (versus a unified oppressed group) less threatening to the colonial power. Based on these assigned roles and tasks, they served different societal and administrative functions and whose assumed “value” to the colonial state varied. Based on this difference, people were further categorized into citizens and noncitizens, groups subject to different legal systems. The language of the law, regarded as the foundation of the modern bureaucratic state, and which, as abstract rules intended to be applied rationally based on logical reasoning to all citizens who are considered equal before the law (Mamdani, 1998, p. 1, 2001), only applied to a minority of the inhabitants of the colonized territory. Those who were considered “civilized,” such as settlers and noncolonized populations, which included people of Asian and Arab descent and those from different regions of Africa, were governed by civic law. Everyone else who counted as “native” and belonged to the colonized population was ascribed an ethnicity (Mamdani, 1998) and was governed by what was deemed

9 The duties and privileges were set out in a contract between the British and the Buganda Kingdom (Otunnu, 2016, p. 86).

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customary law and cultural rules of that community.10 Systems of difference were frequently contested and had to be re-enforced and legitimized in different locations—that is, on the colonial territory, but also, importantly, vis-à-vis the colonizing country’s own citizens back in Europe. This legitimization was achieved through the advancing of ideology backed by science and formalized through legislation (Osterhammel & Jansen, 2012, p. 35).11 Since the fifteenth century, the European colonial “project” was supported by and legitimated through an ideology of a cultural superiority, in which the perception of a European “us” defined as “normal,” ideal cultured and led by rationality and willpower stood contrasted to an in-need-of-colonizing “them” or the “Other”—people perceived as inferior without history and primarily led by instinct (Eckert, 2006, p. 80). This ideological framing was used to justify a civilizing mission, which was posed as the “self-proclaimed right and duty to propagate and actively introduce one’s own norms and institutions to other people and societies, based upon a firm conviction of the inherent superiority and higher legitimacy of one’s own collective way of life” (Osterhammel, 2006, p. 8). In other words, such missions were about setting a “standard of civilization” (i.e., establishing one’s own values and systems as universal norms; Osterhammel, 2006, pp. 16–17). The “success” of the civilizing mission ultimately led to its demise, as the religious and formal education of “natives” (as means to colonize the mind) destabilized the difference between the “civilized” and the “barbarians” and created thinking space for questioning the hierarchical colonial structures that marked the colonized people’s lives.12 WWI further destabilized the colonizer/colonized difference, as African soldiers, who had fought and died for the empires, demanded citizenship rights—the same rights as those living in the colonial state—in the war’s aftermath. The colonizers’ ideology of a civilizing mission, which

10 One’s ethnicity was ascribed based on where one’s ancestors had lived, and each ethnicity was supposed to have its own culture and authority. 11 Coercion, such as physical violence via corporal punishment, was one common but ineffective form of enforcing rules and hierarchies with regard to the local population (Eckert, 2006, p. 74). It is costly and requires large numbers of person-powers though, which were not available even in the settler colonies. 12 As more “subjects” of the British protectorate Uganda turned Christian, conversed fluently in English, were formally educated and on this basis employed scientific reasoning, the basis for distinction from British citizens waned.

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depended on hierarchies and justified difference, was therefore threatened by the “Other’s” adoption of civilization and use of the same tools to destabilize the difference on which the authority of the colonizers was based (Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2009, p. 501).

The End of Colonialism, the Continuation of Imperialism In addition to problems of upholding “difference,” post-WWI, it had become difficult for colonial powers to justify the upkeep of colonial territories to voters at home, for reasons of (e.g., in the case of the British Empire) cost (Cooper, 2014, p. 17). As such, the traditional notion that colonies must be self-sufficient enterprises shifted accordingly in favor of “interventionist policies and metropolitan finance with the explicit aim of raising colonial standards of living” (Cooper & Packard, 1997, p. 7), laying the foundation for a schema of development cooperation.13 That said, the underlying motivation of the colonial state remained nonaltruistic, driven to strengthen the connection to the colonial state and rebuild the empire rather than to address concerns about poverty (Burbank, 2011, p. 29). The post-WWII period was characterized by countries gaining independence from their Western European Empires and the first negotiations concerning the formalization of a European community and shared market. At that initial discursive point during the 1940s and early 1950s, it was not clear whether the European project would be bound to European territory or whether it should include overseas territories and thus spread the “burden of empire” across more states; other European countries, however, were not keen to assume that responsibility (Cooper, 2014, p. 95).14 While France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in hope to retain their

13 During the last years prior to Ugandan independence, for example, Great Britain was very active and invested heavily in its African colonies; this activity of development colonialism is also called the second colonial occupation because the state administration grew and became involved in evermore local matters (Osterhammel & Jansen, 2012, p. 45). 14 The relationship with overseas countries and territories was included in part four and annex 4 of the EEC 1957.

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empires,15 Britain, at that point, decided against membership and was already on the path to substitute their formal colonial control through a “Commonwealth” of independent nations, while French African states initially enjoyed formal association with the EEC alongside France’s assumption of membership, but the more integration progressed in Europe, the more they were excluded and “Othered” (Cooper, 2014, pp. 95–96; Kottos, 2015, p. 313).

European Communities and Colonial Territories The relationship between the EEC (as the main predecessor of the EU) and the colonial territories was initially a “special” one where the territories were not members but associated. Amid its inception, discourse arose regarding formal inclusion of the territories into the EEC. With the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the then-six member states decided on a package for the sub-Saharan Africa colonies providing for free trade and the establishment of the European Development Fund (EDF; (Carbone, 2017, p. 294), the funding of which would be provided by member states and then allocated to former colonies on the basis of need. In 1963, this agreement became part of the Yaoundé Convention (renewed in 1969). Although this dynamic of the European countries formally dictating the terms of engagement between European countries and territories changed with the rise of decolonization in the 1960s and 1970s, the structures on which these relations were based were not simply dismantled. The unequal relationships between European countries and their overseas colonies and protectorates had been institutionalized in legislation and in organizational structures over decades and, even, centuries. As decolonization arose in waves in the mid–late twentieth century, followed by newly independent countries joining the United Nations (UN) as formally equals to their former colonial powers, this asymmetric relationship was delegitimized and morphed from an advert power imbalance into a structure of “formal diplomatic relations and back-office relations” (Cooper, 2014, p. 100). With colonial countries’ independence, in unison with the parallel paradigm shift of statehood and national sovereignty becoming a universal model of governance, states then came to be regarded as sovereign members of a community of equals. As Cooper 15 The EEC also established a European Development Fund for overseas countries and territories of some member states (Craig & Búrca, 2011, p. 6).

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(2014, p. 100) described, underneath this entire process was a transition from a structure of layered politics that combined horizontal and vertical elements—in which inequality was frankly admitted and made into an explicit object of reform—to one that was formally that of equivalent nation-states, but whose reality was highly skewed, unchecked by citizenship structures above those of the nation-state itself. The relation of heads of national states of African countries with the (former) imperial governments, indeed, even in the context of formalized sovereignty and independence, were only provided equal standing on the surface. Unequal economic associations fostered since colonial times were not simply terminated and deinstitutionalized at the end of colonization and countries’ claim to independence and national sovereignty: Existing structures of domination and inequality continued to be used and integrated into the way development aid was distributed through the EU system, as the contracts governing the relationship between the EEC and third countries show. Among the community of nations, it was no longer legitimate for countries to formally dominate others as the nation-state model, and with it, the notion of sovereignty came to be regarded as the only legitimate universal model. The main change during the period of decolonization was not in the nature of the relationship between the EU and African countries. The difference was rather that now, the persisting power differential, while previously openly expressed, now had to be camouflaged. A compelling example for this continued unequal relationship is the introduction of aid conditionality in the Lomé Convention.16 The first Lomé agreement (1975), negotiated between the EEC and newly independent African countries, together with countries in the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) region, was hailed at the time as introducing a new era for the EEC-African relationship and moving it from colonial relationships toward mutual cooperation and equality (Carbone, 2017, p. 294).17 The first Lomé agreement included a human rights clause (i.e., Article 16 The Lomé Convention was in force until 2000 and renewed four times, as Lomé II in 1979, Lomé III in 1984, Lomé IV in 1989, and Lomé IV in 1995. 17 The Lomé agreement was negotiated after a 1996 EU Commission green paper, which described the postcolonial era as coming to an end while acknowledging the importance of the EU’s relationship with African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries for EU’s identity (Carbone, 2017, p. 296).

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5), later strengthened in the most recent renewal of the Lomé IV agreement, in 1995, in the document’s deeming of human rights as an essential element and a reason over which the EEC could legally suspend aid (if human rights, the rule of law, and democratic principles were not adhered to); this option of aid conditionality has hardly ever been used (Del Biondo, 2011). This clause did not mean that the asymmetric power structures ceased and rather indicates the continuance of their influence and production of more continuity than change regarding power structures. In the 1980s and 1990s, when new public management (NPM) had become a wide-spread organization and public administration fashion championed in its member states, the EU faced questions from its constituent countries, most notably the UK, around “aid effectiveness” and “value for money” (Dimier, 2014, p. 145), resulting in changes to development aid distribution from a “neo-patrimonial” approach based on personal relationships between EU personnel and African ruling elites18 to a “bureaucratic logic” with greater emphasis on “bureaucratization” and “professionalization” of the relevant department (Dimier, 2014, p. 7).19 Soon after in 2000, and in the same spirit, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement20 was signed, which governs the current relationship between the EU and sub-Saharan Africa (Carbone, 2013a, p. 4).21 The structures of imperial domination and influence described did not simply disappear with the independence of former colonial territories and the ascension of new countries, like Great Britain, to the EU, although they have undergone some degree of change. While the world’s territory is currently organized into formally sovereign nation-states equal in their 18 When first established, the EU Commission’s department on development cooperation was characterized by a continuation of the structure of indirect colonial French rule vis-à-vis African countries; even today, DEVCO is a very francophone department. 19 However, while the rhetoric changed and moved toward a language of partnership, an asymmetry in the relationship remained manifested through trade and development and resulting political weight. 20 Signed in 2000 and valid for 20 years, the agreement has been reviewed every five years since: 2005, 2010, and 2015. 21 There likewise exists formal diplomatic EU strategy toward Africa, whose outset began in 2000 with a first Africa-EU summit at the level of head of states and, for example, the joint Parliamentary Assemblies and regular meetings at the ministerial and expert levels.

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autonomy, this is not de facto the case. These structural inequalities, as mentioned above, are re-enforced through frameworks of “development aid” and the transfer of “expert” knowledge, which advances notions of power inequity in its presupposition of a knowledgeable donor and a “developing” country. In contrast to colonial period, during which the budgetary transfers of empires to their overseas territory were grounded in the “naturalized” rule of difference (i.e., the perceived superiority of the “European race”), funding transfer relations today are justified by functionalist considerations (i.e., supporting countries’ development). At the same time, the production of knowledge and determination of what knowledge counts as authoritative and reliable remain a matter of query. As Cooper (2014, p. 91) noted, development aid fundamentally curbs a country’s sovereignty “in cross[ing its very] boundaries.” These inequalities are politically masked through the EU’s documented emphasis regarding the importance of equality and its use of terms such as “partner countries” and “dialogue” in, for example, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement between the EU and ACP countries. The Cotonou Agreement announced the end of the postcolonial era. Scholars regard it as part of an attempt to “normalize” the relationship between the EU and its former colonies toward an equal partnership (as the name suggests), which formally they already were (Carbone, 2013a, p. 4). At the same time, the agreement shifted responsibility for development away from the EU and onto recipient countries.22 This shift was achieved by framing development “aid” as development “cooperation,” a process the agreement linked to trade liberalization and the performance of the recipient countries. This in turn, allowed blame to be saddled on these countries for perceived failed progress (Carbone, 2017, p. 300). African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries highly criticized the bilateral Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and individual ACP countries as highly skewed in favor of an

22 For example, in line with this logic that entitlement to aid is based on a country’s need, which had been part of the Lomé Agreement.

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economically powerful EU,23 which motivated greater emphasis on security, climate change, and social issues in the second (2010)24 update of the agreement.25 Importantly, this update also reinforced the sovereignty of ACP states and highlighted the role of nongovernmental actors and local government, designating CSOs with a greater role, formally.26 The Cotonou Agreement concerned the eradication of poverty and development, political, economic, and trade cooperation (“European Commission - The Cotonou Agreement”, n.d.), thus cutting across areas in which the EU enjoys different competencies (see Chapter 7). Thus, for the first time, in the name of reducing transaction costs through coherence, development became linked to other policy areas of the EU.27 Just like the Lomé agreement, it includes an article that allows for its own suspension but only as a “measure of last resort” (Article 96) (a factor whose relevance becomes evident in Chapter 8). Article 8 of the agreement, also referred to as Article 8 Dialogue, specifies that deep political dialogue shall take place between the parties, one objective of which is to prevent triggering Articles 96. Human rights are emphasized in the agreement as an essential and fundamental element (i.e., Article 9.1) toward which cooperation should be directed, and the partnership is intended to 23 In 2007, at the second EU-Africa summit, once more a new era in the relationship between the EU and Africa was announced in the form of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) celebrating a “EuroAfrican consensus on values, common interests, and common strategic objectives” (Carbone, 2013b, p. 121). This appears to be in contrast to the African countries’ critique of the Cotonou Free Trade Agreement and the European Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that preceded the meeting, in which the African countries announced they would “no longer accept any imposition by the EU” (Carbone, 2013a, p. 3). 24 The first update to the agreement in 2004–2005 still aimed to enhance effectiveness and quality of the relationship. 25 For example, it also added a whole section on HIV/AIDS. 26 Article 4 of the 2010 revised agreements lays out the general approach of the

relationship and emphasizes sovereignty of the ACP countries: “The ACP States shall determine the development principles, strategies and models of their economies and societies in all sovereignty.” It furthermore adds that non-state actors and decentralized authorities shall be provided, where appropriate, with financial resources and be involved in the implementation of cooperation project and programs “in areas that concern them or where these actors have a comparative advantage” (Art. 4, European Commission, 2010). 27 The agreement specifies that, for the first time, “the role of other EU policies for the development of ACP countries is recognized and the EU commits to enhance the coherence of those policies to this end” (European Commission, 2010).

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“actively support the promotion of human rights” alongside democratization, consolidation of the rule of law, and good governance (i.e., Article 9.4).

Producing and Using Authoritative Knowledge Abstract, quantitative measurements, and data points (e.g., a country’s gross domestic product)—chiming with the metaframe of modernity— remain the basis of what counts as legitimate knowledge and are considered a suitable basis for policy, but their presumed superiority is also questioned. The struggle over what counts as reliable and authoritative knowledge is a political one and depends on “whether an issue is defined primarily as technical—and thus subject to consideration by ‘qualified’ experts—or as something that concerns a broader constituency” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 19). If the former, it can be dealt with by diplomats and expats as the experts. If the latter, the authority of abstract data becomes a matter questioned along the principles of participation and representation—offshoots of the contemporary equality discourse and its spotlighting of the inequalities and lack of visibility that pertain to certain groups. With the now-taken-for-granted quality of the notion that all humans are equal, to dismiss the experiences and opinions of some in favor of the experts’ view has become more difficult to justify.28 This likewise applies to the transfer or imposition of finances, knowledge, and technology by one organization, e.g., to another. Furthermore, with increased importance given to the individual, the expectation of greater participation and “authenticity” has reshaped who is regarded as legitimate to speak on particular issues. The rules about what counts as legitimate knowledge, however, are still dictated by the metaframe of modernity,29 which poses another incongruence difficult to navigate. The inequality

28 This dynamic is similar to the colonizer who wished for colonized subjects to become “civilized,” while simultaneously fearing this as a threat to their “dream of authority, authenticity, and power” presenting the danger of viable alternatives to the established knowledge regime” (see Papoulias (2004) in Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2009, p. 501). 29 Even if Global South CSOs can now reach an audience beyond the borders of their own country, they have to frame information in a way that is meaningful to policy makers in the global North to qualify for funding.

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of the colonial period continues, inscribed within the power dynamics of authoritative expert knowledge, such as statistics.30 Closer examination of statistics reveals many underlying uncertainties as statistical categories (that what seems worthy of measurement). Moreover, the classification processes forming these categories (who/ what should belong to which category) have changed over time and rely on consistent collection of data.31 Hence, the statistical data available for countries like Uganda, where systems of data collection are often not in place, is largely based on estimates. Despite these obvious shortcomings, this information is what forms European countries’ looking glass and thus is used as the foundation for EU policies (see also Jerven, 2013).

Uganda in Figures Such highly authoritative knowledge about Uganda32 (based on World Bank data from 2016 on Uganda, unless otherwise specified) “reveals” that the territory that today forms Uganda is located in East Africa on the

30 Statistics are one example of a highly authoritative form of knowledge that allows for comparison across, e.g., time and geographical distance, and is viewed as a highly objective measure for determining “progress” and a legitimate basis for policy making. International organizations offer quantified knowledge on nearly every aspect of life, fundamentally shaping the knowledge about a country. These “facts” constitute interpretations because a priori categories that “capture” reality do not exist—in actuality, organizations such as public administration construct both the categories and their measurement (e.g., on category of “migrant” see Renard, 2018). 31 For example, the World Bank concedes that the way urbanization is measured, for example, differs considerably across countries and “there is no consistent and universally accepted standard for distinguishing urban from rural areas”—with countries basing their definition of “urban” on the size or characteristics of settlements, and others using infrastructure or administrative structure as the ground for classification (World Bank, n.d.). 32 Based on World Bank data on Uganda from 2016 (World Bank, 2016).

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equator,33 has a landmass of 241,550 square kilometers,34 and, as a landlocked35 country, is characterized by mainly tropic and subtropic climates in the south and a semiarid one in the north.36 Ugandan society features a high number of ethnic groups37 and registers income inequalities often along ethnic lines.38 English and Swahili are the country’s official languages; the second-most spoken language is Luganda, with much of the populace also fluent in their own “tribal” languages. Uganda counts as a primarily rural country, and as such, despite 52.4% of Ugandans possessing a mobile phone subscription and 14.7% an internet connection (wireless and fixed), access to news and information remains quite inaccessible for the majority of the population. Uganda has been praised by the so-called international community for its work on tempering the HIV/ AIDS crisis—indeed hailed as the “first African country to successfully control and reduce the AIDS epidemic” (Carmody, 2016, p. 58) with only 7.3% of its population today living with HIV/AIDS. The literacy rate stands at 73.2% of the adult population. In terms of English oral capability, there exists little data on how much of the populace speaks English at a level that allows them to, e.g., consume international news. Religion-wise, the 2002 Ugandan census suggests that 42% of Ugandans are Roman Catholic, 42% are Protestant (Anglican 36%, Pentecostal 7%, Seventh-Day Adventist 1.5%), 12% are Muslim, with 3% belonging to other religions, and 1% to none (Central Intelligence Agency, n.d.)— figures that reflect the successful missionizing efforts engaged particularly by Christian churches during colonial times that remain ongoing.

33 Uganda borders five countries: Kenya to the East, Tanzania and Lake Victoria in the South, Rwanda in the South West Corner, the Democratic Republic of Congo in the West, and South Sudan in the North. 34 Comparable in size to the German landmass and about half the size of, e.g., Kenya. 35 It is landlocked but borders one of the great African lakes, Lake Victoria, and

contains a number of other large lakes and a network of rivers, including the river Nile which originates in the country. 36 The tropical parts include rich rainforests in the South West famous for its primate populations. 37 Some ethnic “tribes” overlap with neighboring countries, as borders were drawn by the British without regard to ethnic communities. 38 Uganda’s Gini coefficient, which measures relative income inequality (where 100 is maximum inequality), is at 44.6 and Kenya’s at 47.7 (World Bank, 2016).

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Uganda is attested a low Human Development Index (HDI),39 ranking at number 163 among the world’s countries with a rating of 0.483 (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.).40 The country still classifies as low income41 (“WB Update Says 10 Countries Move Up in Income Bracket” 2016), with a per capita GDP of 1,825 USD42 and an annual GDP growth rate of 5% (World Bank, 2016). The net official development assistance in 2016 amounts to 7%, while foreign direct investment net inflow is 4.8% of gross domestic product. Uganda is a member of the 2010-established East African Community (EAC), alongside Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan.43 International tourism forms a major part of the economy with 1,323,000 international inbound tourists annually.44

Development Cooperation The EU Comm provides development aid to third countries in the areas of human rights and democracy promotion under the broader budget category of governance. While human rights only constitute a small percentage of this category, which includes other measures such as anticorruption, comparing the allocation of funds to a specific third country under governance can nevertheless provide a first indication of the priorities and relationships that structure the country’s relation to the EU Commission. In the case of Uganda, the country has received aid from the supranational EDF, administered by the EU Comm and replenished every five years by participating member states. In the funding period 2008–2013, Uganda specifically received 10.2 million Euros for its governance sector and 2 million Euros for its non-state actors such as CSOs, 39 HDI measures key dimensions of human development including a long and healthy

life, being knowledgeable, and having a decent standard of living. 40 For example, Kenya in comparison scores 0.548 and ranks at 145th place. 41 For example, Kenya fares better economically compared to Uganda and is regarded

as one of Africa’s promising “Lion Economies.” It was upgraded from a low-income country to a low middle-income country by the World Bank in 2015. 42 For example, Kenya’s GDP per capita (3,083 USD) is nearly double that of Uganda. 43 The East African Tourist visa encompasses Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda and allows

for easier travel between these countries for visitors and tourists and hence further connects these countries. 44 In comparison, Kenya has an annual of 1,340,000 international inbound tourists.

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indicating the relationship between the EU Comm and the Ugandan government is stronger than the relationship between the EU Comm and civil society (in comparable countries, e.g., Kenya, the figures are reversed).45 As Uganda has ratified all major international human rights conventions, its formal commitment to the topic is high (see table annex 4), but this metric should be viewed with healthy skepticism. Indeed, a quantitative analysis by Hafner-Burton et al. suggests that repressive governments that are more autonomous internally (i.e., that lack fear of being held accountable by a strong civil society) more readily sign human rights treaties, for these grant such countries easy legitimacy as an actor on the world stage without repercussions (Hafner-Burton et al., 2008). This finding supports the notion that in Uganda, particularly with Museveni being an unrivalled head of state for over 30 years, CSOs express little influence compared to, for example, Kenya, where the government regime has seen frequent change, especially recently, allowing CSOs to exert considerable influence in the domestic political process (Murungi, 2009, p. 45). A country’s politics become quantified through, e.g., the Freedom House Index,46 which measures a country’s openness on a scale from 0 to 100. On this scale, Uganda scores a 35, making it a “not free state”47 (Freedom House, 2017). In terms of its formal governance structure, Uganda is a presidential republic, with a president as the head of state, and has been governed as a multiparty democracy since 2005; in actual practice, however, Museveni has ruled the country as president and sole

45 In comparison, in the same time period, Kenya received less than half of this amount (4.6 million Euros) for its governance sector but more than double the amount for its civil society (4.6 million Euros) (Crawford, 2013, p. 150). 46 Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report is an annual publication in which countries’ political rights and civil liberties are given numerical ratings. It aims at drawing a picture of the de-facto on-the-ground fulfilment of rights and not whether they are legally guaranteed. Just like other large-scale indexes of this kind, it can be criticized for greatly oversimplifying the matter, relying on incomplete data. It has furthermore been challenged for being biased toward civil and political rights and liberties and for giving little attention to social, economic, and cultural rights and for not applying the same strict standards to North American or European countries. 47 Kenya, with 51 points, is classified as a partly free state.

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candidate of his party (the National Resistance Movement) for the past 31 years.48

Summary This chapter presented the inherent complexities, ambiguities, and uncertainties in today’s relationship between the EU and its member states with its former colonial countries that have resulted from the delegitimization of colonialism and parallel continuation of inequalities which was possible within the “Western” metaframe of modernity. This chapter further established how European colonialism was as a system based on the notion of rightful rule that stemmed from taken-for-granted assumption of European superiority over other races and was justified through systems of difference. These established differences were constantly contested and finally delegitimized amid rising global demand for equal rights and the Empire’s decline and subsequent regrouping within the EC’s associative framework that emerged after WWII. The processes of de-colonialization that followed in the wake of this new equality discourse resulted in the universal spread of the nation-state model, while the parallel rise of CSOs meant new legitimacy sources for states and greater degrees of differentiation given to societal categorization of what constituted a human. Even with these paradigm-shifting phenomena, colonial structures of difference and processes of producing authoritative knowledge continued in practice. These were marked by the notable shift of categorization away from “inherent” differences (e.g., race) to functional differences (e.g., less vs. more “developed”) which could be quantified. These differences were formalized in treaties increasingly focused on emphasizing human rights and equality—concepts whose development Chapter 4 is concerned with.

Literature Barroso, M. J. (2006). Europe’s Challenges in a Globalised World. In Opening Session of the Global Jean Monnet Conference, ECSA-World Conference. Presented at the Global Jean Monnet Conference, ECSA-World Conference, Brussels.

48 Museveni is thought to be close to the military and opposition is often violently suppressed. New NGO Laws have been criticized by the international community for ill-defined provisions that could lead to greater government interference on a “legal basis.”

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European Commission - The Cotonou Agreement. (n.d.). http://ec.europa.eu/ europeaid/where/acp/overview/cotonou-agreement/cotonou_dialogue_en. htm. Accessed 3 January 2014. Freedom House. (2017). Freedom in the World 2017 . Freedom House. https:// freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017. Accessed 6 November 2017. Hafner-Burton, E. M., Tsutsui, K., & Meyer, J. W. (2008). International Human Rights Law and the Politics of Legitimation: Repressive States and Human Rights Treaties. International Sociology, 23(1), 115–141. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0268580907084388 Hornsby, C. (2013). Kenya: A History Since Independence (Reprint edition). I.B.Tauris. Jerven, M. (2013). Poor Numbers: How We Are Misled by African Development Statistics and What to Do about It (Illustrated edition). Cornell University Press. Karimi, F., & Thompson, N. (2014, February 25). Uganda’s President Museveni Signs Controversial Anti-gay Bill into Law. CNN . http://www.cnn. com/2014/02/24/world/africa/uganda-anti-gay-bill/index.html. Accessed 1 August 2014. Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Cornell University Press. Koro-Ljungberg, M., Gemignani, M., Chaplin, S., Hayes, S., & Hsieh, I. H. (2009). “Mission Civilisatrice”: Fixing Scientific Evidence and Other Practices of Neo-colonialism in Social Sciences. International Review of Qualitative Research, 1(4), 491–513. Kottos, L. (2015). Linking Europe and Empire: Making Strategic Choices on the Eve of the Treaty of Rome. In P. Winand, A. Benvenuti, & M. Guderzo (Eds.), The External Relations of the European Union: Historical Contemporary Perspectives (pp. 311–329). P.I.E. Peter Lang. Mahony, H. (2007, July 11). Barroso Says EU is an “Empire.” EU Observer. https://euobserver.com/institutional/24458. Accessed 10 July 2018. Mamdani, M. (1998, May 13). When Does a Settler Become a Native? Reflections of the Colonial Roots of Citizenship in Equatorial and South Africa. Inaugral Lecture at University of Cape Town. http://citizenshiprightsafrica.org/wp-con tent/uploads/1998/05/mamdani-1998-inaugural-lecture.pdf. Accessed 26 March 2017. Mamdani, M. (2001). Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 43(4), 651–664. Murungi, B. K. (2009). To Whom, for What and About What? In M. Mutua (Ed.), Human Rights NGOs in East Africa. Political and Normative Tensions (pp. 37–47). Fountain Publishers.

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Mutibwa, P. M. (1992). Uganda Since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes. Africa World Press. Ofcansky, T. P. (1999). Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa. Hachette UK. Okuku, J. (2002). Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratisation Process in Uganda. Nordic Africa Institute. Osterhammel, J. (1997). Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview. Ian Randle Publishers. Osterhammel, J. (2006). Europe, the “West” and the Civilizing Mission. German Historical Institute. Osterhammel, J., & Jansen, J. C. (2012). Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen (7., vollst. überarb. und aktualisierte Aufl.). Beck. Otunnu, O. (2016). Crisis of Legitimacy and Political Violence in Uganda, 1890 to 1979. Palgrave Macmillan. Renard, L. (2018). Mit den Augen der Statistiker. Deutsche Kategorisierungspraktiken von Migration im historischen Wandel. Zeithistorische Forschungen - Studies in Contemporary History, 3. https://doi.org/10. 14765/zzf.dok.4.1290 United Nations Development Programme. (n.d.). Human Development Index (HDI). Human Development Reports. http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/ human-development-index-hdi. Accessed 15 January 2017. WB Update Says 10 Countries Move Up in Income Bracket. (2016). World http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/07/01/ Bank. new-world-bank-update-shows-bangladesh-kenya-myanmar-and-tajikistanas-middle-income-while-south-sudan-falls-back-to-low-income. Accessed 14 September 2016. World Bank. (2016). Uganda Data. World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/ country/uganda. Accessed 13 September 2016. World Bank. (n.d.). Glossary Data Bank. https://databank.worldbank.org/met adataglossary/sustainable-development-goals-(sdgs)/series/SP.URB.TOTL. IN.ZS. Accessed 29 November 2020.

CHAPTER 4

Contested Human Rights

In addition to the ambiguity encompassed in the notion of the EU as an empire, understanding how human rights have contributed to and, at the same time, challenge the sovereignty of nations adds to the understanding of how LGBTI could be considered human rights and be promoted in countries, such as Uganda. Through the linking of development cooperation and human rights in EU policy in the 1990s, EU interventions in sovereign countries for specific human rights become a possibility and an expectation. At the same time, this possibility contradicts the notion of equality between states and undermines the concept of sovereignty, which prohibits interference in internal affairs of a state. In short, human rights encompass two dimensions of equality: equality between nationstates and equality between the nation-state and individual humans—both affecting power differentials. In addition, human rights refer to both, the codification of international law which is applied and interpreted in local and international courts and human rights as a concept refer to a normative frame that forms a horizon of expectation and escapes clear and final interpretations, both are highly interrelated (Koenig, 2005, p. 11). Both aspects must be taken into account to understand, how, over time, human rights became institutionalized as a global norm, enabled through their linkage to the metaframe of modernity, as this history provides the backdrop for LSBTI being regarded as a human rights issue.

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To describe the wider institutional environment concerning human rights, this chapter explores the first documents demarcating human rights’ manifestation as an idea and then the way its meaning has changed, in particular, over the latter half of the twentieth century. In doing so, it foremost outlines the reinforcing relationship between state sovereignty and human rights orchestrated within the metaframe of modernity. It explicates the contribution of human rights’ principle of equality to the midcentury phenomena of decolonization and of the rise of the nationstate model into the universal form of political organization. In further steps, this chapter outlines the relationship of societal sacralization of the individual—a concept fundamental to modernity and human rights— to society’s ever greater differentiation of the category of human (i.e., into social groups like LGBTI persons), which will include discourse on the effect of social movements on the conception of new categories. In concluding, this chapter shows how human rights and development cooperation become more closely linked—a development I argue, that challenges the very notion of state sovereignty even more.

A New Equality Discourse, Leading to a Nation-State Model The hierarchical skew within European societies where an individual’s wealth and gender determined status and rights changed as European countries went through major political reforms at the turn of the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries. Two watershed documents—the Déclaration of the Droit de l’Homme et du Citoyen in France 1789 and the U.S. Bill of Rights in 1791—established and codified, for the first time, that citizens, regardless of their birth status, hold rights, enshrining therein the right of the individual versus the authority, in law (Hoffmann, 2011, p. 13; Koenig, 2005, p. 27). These formulations of rights and the development of a legal system curtailed a certain degree of the elites’ (church, royalty, and the aristocracy) established power, regulating their framework of arbitrary rule, and can thus be considered a key starting point in human rights’ development into a societally realized construct. As nation-states formed in Europe during the nineteenth century, so emerged the reality of national citizenship, which provided a strong mechanism for inclusion in its granting of the same political and social rights to people within a territory regardless of their class, wealth, and, at a

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later stage in history, their gender (Koenig, 2005, p. 42). These political reforms further limited the power of the old elite and broadened the scope of rights holders by introducing the system of one man one vote (Kruse & Barrelmeyer, 2012, p. 15), laying the foundations for democracy as a system of input legitimacy that could hold the ruling elites accountable. Citizenship, although an inclusive force, may likewise be deemed a mechanism of exclusion, as, in the absence of a world citizenship, it requires membership of one state to have any rights at all, as Hannah Arendt famously remarked in 1949 (DeGooyer et al., 2018, p. 5). Rights Qua Personhood In 1948, in reaction to the atrocities of WW-II and the Holocaust, in which a state had not only not protected but had eliminated many of its own and other countries’ citizens, the Universal Declaration of Human rights (UDHR) conceptualized rights as independent of nations for the first time in history (Koenig, 2005, p. 50). The UDHR’s novelty concerned its extension of rights to all humans qua personhood and its claim of human rights’ universality, which, in combination with the equality and non-discrimination principles, formally established the world’s individuals as equals, regardless of their location or nationality. Put differently, the UDHR, for the first time, gave rights a universal scope in granting rights to all humans everywhere, expanding beyond certain nationals or groups of people, positioning the non-discrimination imperative, thereby as a universal norm (Wobbe & Malmedie, 2018, p. 107). The UDHR is often regarded as the starting point of the contemporary concept of human rights. After controversial debates, the nonbinding document became part of the charter that established the UN.1 With this establishment, human rights were accordingly transferred from the remit of individual sovereign states to inter-state cooperative frameworks, becoming the subject of a world polity represented through the United Nations (Koenig, 2005, p. 51). In the decades following the UDHR, 1 Even with the UN regime including the European Charter of Human rights and the ECtHR, the only legitimate body to enforce rights remains the nation-state, resulting in tension between the claim to universality of human rights and reliance on nation-states to enforce them which in turn conflicts with the principle of national sovereignty.

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human rights saw further codification in catalogues of positive rights and binding international treaties, which coincided with the development of international human rights regimes replete with treaty bodies and mechanisms to claim rights.2 From a New Equality Discourse to the Nation-State Model During the 1950s, a new equality discourse based on human rights started, and by the 1960s, human rights became a language through which to articulate the right to and demand of equality and selfdetermination. The groundwork for this phenomenon was laid at the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, where colonialism was declared incompatible with human rights based on the principle of equality as set out in the UDHR. This discourse ultimately delegitimized the hierarchy that defined the relation between “developed” and “developing” countries. This first large-scale international conference of (mostly) newly independent states from Asia and Africa stressed the universality of human rights and ultimately precluded the UN Human rights Covenant’s plan to limit its application to the “old” powers and not the newly independent states and colonial territories (Burke, 2010, pp. 37–44). At the time of the conference, human rights were thought to be realized through people’s self-determination—, in a more bottom-up process; however, only a few years later, in the 1961 UN Resolution No. 1654, self-determination was limited to a “sovereignty-based approach”—i.e., resulting from a top-down approach advanced by states rather than people and without a clear link to democracy. This interpretation carried through into the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights where self-determination was not clearly linked to democratic processes and where democracy is

2 Regional human rights regimes emerged, some with more power to enforce and formal sanction mechanisms than others. The African regional human rights regime as part of the African Union (AU) includes the African Commission, as a quasi-judicial body of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant international human rights law. The African Commission can only issue non-binding recommendations to states while the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (Art. 1 of the Protocol on the African Court) can issue binding judgments, but only nine of thirty countries’ party to the African Charter of Human and People’s rights recognize the competence of the Court to receive cases from nongovernmental organizations and individuals.

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only used to refer to societies rather than to a political system (United Nations General Assembly, 1966).3 These struggles over the meaning of human rights took place in a polarized world divided into two main political blocks—communist and capitalist—a division reflected in the codification of two differing 1966 international covenants that remain binding.4 Beyond a discourse among these opposed ideologies, human rights developed into an increasingly important tool for independence movements amid decolonization, of which the 1968 Human Rights Conference in Teheran serves as an illustrative example. At this conference, human rights were cited to condemn (neo)colonialist practices as violations of the UDHR by “third world countries” who emerged as a group seeking their emancipation from the East/West divide of the Cold War (Heintz et al., 2015).

A New Category of Human Social movements have played and still play a crucial part in the institutionalization of LGBTI issues as human rights. Social movements, as a phenomenon, are closely linked to decolonization and global economic aspects. In Europe and North America, the 1970s followed the post-WWII economic growth period with a time of recession and economic stagnation. Although directly manifest within these continents, the effects of this economic downturn substantially spread to newly independent third countries, especially those marking the former colonial territory of “Africa,” whose economies struggled with lessened “Western” demand, making tangible the vast extent to which the world had become economically interconnected. By this point, many former colonies and protectorates had achieved independence and the main model that had been institutionalized was that of independent nation-states. With this legitimized focus on sovereignty, this period saw human rights, as an meaningful construct within the public consciousnesses of Europe and

3 Autocratic rulers who emerged in many countries following independence could interpret self-determination narrowly as sovereignty of the nation-state and could therefore turn it into an end in itself (Burke, 2010, p. 58). 4 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which reflected individual rights, was favored by the United States and its allies, while the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) reflected the values of the Eastern Bloc countries around the Soviet Union.

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North America, gather traction (Turner et al., 1995, p. 6). Human rights extended beyond legal discourse to become “the new language of international legitimacy” (Heintz, 2015, p. 25; Koenig, 2005, p. 50; Moyn, 2010, p. 216). The growing worldwide prominence of human rights was, at least in part, due to novel social movements and an exponential rise in the number of CSOs raising awareness with respect to human rights violations occurring elsewhere in the world (Boli & Thomas, 1999). These organization pointed out atrocities of dictatorships who had come to power in many newly independent states (e.g., Idi Amin in Uganda).5 As new technologies became affordable, the social world contracted in unprecedented ways, spatially and temporally (e.g., communication was possible over great distances in near real time), resulting in new forms of global solidarity.6 A substantive and universal privileging of the individual and of the ideology of capitalism emerged, particularly as the communist political system imploded. The nation-state, which had been the main reference point, became regarded increasingly as part of an international system populated by other international governmental and nongovernmental organizations (J. W. Meyer et al., 1997). It was this institutional environment in which human rights were able to spread further and which resulted in reinterpretation of the category human. Differentiation of the Category of Human Beginning with the formation of certain transnational social movements in the 1970s, the understanding of what categorically constituted human changed. For one, the ever greater societal sacralization of the individual gave rise to new identity groups who have demanded their rights explicitly be respected under the UDHR’s remit in its so-stated equal and universal application to all humans (Heintz et al., 2015). An early example of such groups includes those who have championed gender equality, which has gathered traction as a matter of societal importance, as it came to

5 For example, Idi Amin rose to power in Uganda in 1971 and established his nearly decade-long rule based on large-scale violence and oppression. 6 For examples, televised images of the Vietnam War (the first of this kind of war imagery) are said to have fundamentally contributed to delegitimize this war among U.S. citizens.

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constitute a facet inextricably linked to human rights and the international development aid agenda.7 The increasing differentiating of humans would dominate the human rights agenda two decades later. By the 1990s, civil society had become increasingly organized in NGOs, and human rights CSOs had mushroomed in Europe, in the United States, and even in former colonial countries. With this rise came a proliferation of particular demands and political influence,8 which became manifest, for one, in the declaration of the 1993 UN World Conference in Vienna, where the global promotion of democracy was a main topic of discourse. Likewise, by the turn of the millennium, the human family had become taken-for-granted, in the sense that human rights apply to everyone. At the same time, this “family” was now differentiated into new global subcategories, among them vulnerable persons and women.9 Simultaneously, the individual and their inherent dignity had been placed on a pedestal (Heintz et al., 2015, p. 260). These developments resulted from and at the same time further strengthened national and transnational identity movements. Knowing of others imagined to be similar to oneself with regard to characteristics and challenges can lead to the emergence of strong imagined communities (Bennani, 2015, p. 322). These communities may form social movements that then demand rights from national governments, leading the discourse of individual rights on a global human rights level to reflect back to national level, where it is instrumental “in the formalization and expansion of many citizenship rights to those who were previously excluded or marginalized in society” (Soysal, 2012, p. 385). The emergence of one such sub-group, LGBTI, will be addressed in Chapter 5.

7 The 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) established a legally binding application of human rights with regard to women; at the same time, women were “discovered” as a particular group that had been ignored by development aid (Escobar, 1995, p. 13). 8 The 1990s, regarding the relationship between the “developing” and “developed world,” were dominated by the realization that the expected “trickle down” effect of economic growth had not taken place. Poverty in former colonies and protectorates had not been eliminated. Governing regimes in the countries receiving aid were accused of corruption and were blamed for the “disappointment.” 9 Hannah Bennani shows that these categories were created at the example of the emergence of indigenous people (Bennani, 2015, p. 325).

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Human Rights’ Impact on Development Countries seeking independence in the 1960s and 1970s and social groups looking for greater recognition employed the concept and language of human rights for emancipatory purposes, based on the new equality discourse inherent to human rights. Development cooperation, in contrast, skewed to old inequities, directly continued unequal colonial relationships, and remained based on asymmetrical roles inherent to “donor” and “recipient” countries. Moreover, as a contemporary (mostly “Western”) concept, development was not a construct tied to abstract rights and duties, but rather based on theories of change through practical interventions in the form of development cooperation. I argue that the rise in the importance of human rights during the twentieth century and the new equality discourse challenged these notions, shifting away from essentializing categories toward a seemingly more dynamic model of progress. This model of progress, formulated in the ideological environment of the modernization theories that dominated the 1950s and 1960s, led to the era of decolonization and guided development aid policies for subsequent decades, placed countries and cultures at different stages of development (Cooper & Packard, 1997, p. 17). Conceived as a linear process, they all aimed toward appearing modern to be regarded legitimate, with European and North American countries considered the archetype to which other countries aspired and whose level they tried to achieve. Development aid was the means for this and the addressees at that point were governments at the nation-state level.10 In the 1990s, human rights were no longer regarded as something to be achieved once development had taken place but as an integral part of development—perhaps even its precondition (Heintz et al., 2015, pp. 254, 261). As such, a right to development was established in exchange for recognizing human rights as universal,11 marking the

10 The shared goal of representatives of either theory was for “developing countries” to become modern and industrialized. The belief was that “developing countries” only required funding and had to follow the model of “developed countries” and achieving the same status was only a matter of time and finances. Economic development was regarded as a linear process and as the prerequisite for the realization of social progress and human rights. 11 After difficult negotiations prior to the Vienna Conference in 1993, industrialized countries had agreed to a “right to development,” which was codified in the UN declaration on a Right to Development and in exchange, countries of the Global South had

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convergence between the development and the human rights professional communities.12 In a further development, human rights’ increased prominence became manifest in the establishment of organizational structures and a myriad of different tools and procedures at both the UN and EEC/ EU levels—one example being the European Initiative for Democracy and Human rights (EIDHR) of 1994, a fund to finance human rights projects.13 On a practical level, the extent to which human rights, as a construct based on notions of equality, have influenced development aid policy remains a matter of dispute. As recently as 2005, the relation of development with human rights was regarded as disconnected—as two ships passing in the night, unaware of each other and linked only ceremonially (Alston, 2005).14 The loose linking of theoretical justification and practice is no surprise, given the very different logics of the two concepts of human rights and development cooperation: human rights are drafted and primarily understood as a legal set of rules, notwithstanding the lack of a world court to adjudicate their enforcement. As legal rules, they are ahistorical (i.e., lacking a time dimension) and binary (i.e., there is a violation or not). As formalized principles, human rights are widely recognized for their universality (their applicability to all humans everywhere), indivisibility (that no

dropped the idea of a strong cultural relativism, which at the time was mostly around “Asian Values” and had conceded to the universality of human rights and the focus on the individual as the rights holder (Koenig, 2005, p. 88; Opitz, 2002, p. 153). 12 What the relationship between human rights and development should look like and how it could be mutually beneficial was also discussed in academia (Hamm 2001, pp. 1005–1006) and formalized on the UN level with a 2003 Statement of Common Understanding on Human rights-Based Approaches to Development Cooperation and Programming (United Nations Development Group (UNDG), 2003). 13 Only three years later, in 1997, the EIDHR created a fixed budgetary line to fund a human rights master program that would produce graduates of human rights and democratization and thus human rights experts and professionals. 14 Alston suggests that while on a strong political level, there had been much commitment by the UN to mainstream human rights into development in the 1990s, in the practical implementation of the Millennium Development Goals, human rights did not play much of a role. He further suggests that there was deliberate reluctance to adopt a language of rights while from the human rights side, there is said to have been little understanding for the “need to set operational priorities” and suggests that human rights proponents need to “tailor their prescriptions more carefully to address particular situations” (Alston, 2005, pp. 826–827).

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one of their constituent rights may be regarded in isolation), interdependency (that all rights under the “human rights umbrella” relate to one another), and inalienability (that rights are inherent and unable to be renounced or stripped from one by another). In contrast to human rights, development cooperation is based on the notion of transformative aspiration over time through resource reallocation and the provision of expertise based on authoritative knowledge passed from so-called developed donor countries to developing recipient countries. Development aid (or development cooperation, as it was renamed) constantly reproduces a differentiation between developed and developing countries. Development cooperation therefore does not destabilize these categories—it even creates further categories of least developed countries and middle-income countries. This reinforces difference, while human rights emphasize equality.

Human Rights as a Global Norm Today’s world is conceived as ever more globalized (Djelic & Quack, 2013, p. 300; see also Heintz & Werron, 2011). In this world, the idea of human rights as extending to all humans has been institutionalized as an abstract concept, with the question of whether “they in themselves represent a meaningful legal or moral category” (Hoffmann, 2011, p. 1) being rarely challenged, “appear[ing] to be beyond question” (Hoffmann, 2011, p. 1). A reason for this consensus stems from the work of national and international CSOs, who, together with (some) inter- and supranational organizations (e.g., the EU, UN), shape a global culture of human rights, grounded in their moral authority and political influence, which contributes to the creation of a normative horizon of expectations that states cannot ignore (Koenig, 2005, p. 106). At the practical level, this shared frame does not mean that human rights for all is a reality but that governments must at least pretend to adhere to human rights to remain legitimate.15 Establishing human rights, as an abstract concept, as a global norm leads to questions about the extraterritorial obligations of states and 15 Even when the U.S. government took the decision to leave the UN Human Rights Council, they did so with reference to the alleged bias of the Council and not with the explicit statement that human rights are not important. In a similar way, in most countries, even autocratic rulers hold some form of election, even if these are not free nor fair.

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inter- and supra-governmental organizations, such as the EU—trying to become recognized as an entity among states (e.g., at the UN and in other international forums). Public perception generally regards laws as static and conservative and as independent of politics. Nonetheless, the meaning of legal norms is constantly being renegotiated, reinterpreted, and re-enacted, in courts, usually, and through authorized judges. No such finite judicial authority of interpretation, like a world-supreme court or world-constitutional court, exists for human rights “permeated by and permeating actors with powerful cultural values or institutional frames” (Djelic & Quack, 2013, p. 306). Without an independent authority and sanctioning mechanisms, the final interpretations (e.g., how to balance rights, how to reconcile them with the principle of sovereignty; Hoffmann, 2011, p. 1) are dependent on continuous negotiations between nation-states, which remain the main guarantors of rights, in addition to international organizations and (international) CSOs, who serve as the states’ sources of legitimacy.16 It is through these negotiation processes that entities like states and organizations coconstitute each other and form their identities and those of their staff members. Through these negotiations, which are essentially a struggle around meaning, politics are reintroduced as a prominent influence, because “at the end of the day, power relations [inevitably] come into play” (Brink et al., 2010, p. 15). Contested “Western” Human Rights One chief struggle concerning the meaning of human rights lies in their contested claim to universality as a “Western” concept—a result of their origin in early codifications of positive European and US laws and their close linking with modernity, which is said to have its origins in Europe.17 Furthermore, the UDHR, the cornerstone document of the modern human rights system, is often portrayed as having mainly been written 16 The UN Periodic Review, for example, shows how CSOs’ shadow reports on states human rights records have gained in importance. 17 A prominent attempt to link a concept more locally grounded in the sub-Saharan African geographical context to human rights is Ubuntu which is difficult to translate into English but suggests “a person is a person through other persons” (Metz, 2007, p. 323). While some sees the entailed community aspect in no contradiction, but in aid of the individual (Metz, 2011), others challenge this as distorting the original meaning and power of the concept (Oyowe, 2013). Overall, the influence of these philosophies on the human rights discourse and practice has been limited.

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by “Western powers,” as many of today’s countries did not yet exist as independent nations at the time.18 The main principle of human rights—its postulate of equality—sits at odds with the practical reality of adjudicating a human rights system in which one part of the world imposes on the other a set of rights and obligations. The counter argument to these various points is that modernity, in which human rights were conceived and understood, is no longer just “Western” and instead characterizes it as a globally accepted normative frame that fundamentally shapes other institutional layers. In further counterpoint, non-Western countries’ emancipatory efforts have fundamentally shaped the development of human rights in such a way that, in interaction with other events, paved the way for the idea of human rights for LGBTI persons to emerge.19 These counterarguments, while addressing the rhetorical attempt of some states to opt out of human rights, do not help solve the dilemma of human rights’ practical interference with national sovereignty. The Dilemma of Human Rights Promotion Beyond State Sovereignty States remain human rights’ main guarantors in the absence of a world court, which raises questions about extraterritorial obligations to promote and enforce human rights beyond one’s own borders in contexts where this broader norm is not adhered to.20 In a way, this dilemma between upholding norms and respecting a nation-state’s sovereignty as the foundation of the modern political world order shaped the creation of the UDHR. The dilemma, however, still exists today. Half a century since the UDHR’s conception, the world has reached another level of globalization and economic integration, posing greater challenges to national governments to regulate transnational corporations.

18 As some scholars, e.g., Barreto, point out, so-called third world countries were represented at the UN Generally assembly when the UDHR was debated, including Asian, African, and Latin American countries and that ignoring their contribution is to render them invisible (Barreto, 2013, p. 17). 19 Authors like Barreto have pointed out that often the interactions between empires and colonies entangled in the concept of human rights have been ignored (Barreto 2013, 6). 20 UN peace keeping missions are one such tool but limited to large-scale violent conflict and they always require a Security Council mandate.

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In 2001, this challenge was met with a set of principles in a UN report called the Responsibility to Protect and affirmed in a 2005 UN resolution on the same issue.21 The report, pioneeringly formulated the expectations of states to not only respect and protect human rights, but also to proactively fulfill human rights described in the 2008 Ruggie Principles on business and human rights (adopted in June 2011 by the Human Rights Council; Ruggie, 2011),22 and, later, the “Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (Salomon & Seiderman, 2012).23 These principles specifically formulate an obligation for all states to “respect, protect and fulfil human rights, including civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, both within their territories and extraterritorially” (Principle 3) and further spell out the conditions under which these extraterritorial obligations arise, including when “a state exercises control, power, or authority over people or situations located outside its sovereign territory in a way that could have an impact on the enjoyment of human rights by those people or in such situations” (Principle 9a). These principles on extraterritorial obligations and texts on their interpretation make specific reference to diplomacy and development cooperation as means to exert influence (De Schutter et al., 2012). Such codifications contribute to a horizon of expectation on states as well as transnational organizations like the EU to use their influence in promoting human rights in such areas as LGBTI.

21 The report was drafted as a response to the genocide in Rwanda and the Balkan war in the 1990s by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) tasked by then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. In 2005, this political commitment of the responsibility to protect was then endorsed in the form of a UN resolution. 22 These so-called Ruggie Principles highlight the challenges of states to control and

to govern corporations operating transnationally in an economically globalized world in which nation-states, as signatories to the international human rights framework, ultimately remain the main guarantors of human rights. The principles reiterate the states’ duty to protect from and to remedy human rights violations by third parties but limited this to “within their territory and/or jurisdiction” (Ruggie, 2011). 23 A group of human rights experts, invited by the University of Maastricht and the

International Commission of Jurists, gathered in Maastricht in September of 2011. By deducting from existing human rights law, they recognized the asymmetrical influence of some states beyond their territory and identified what scholars have called an accountability gap between the de facto economic globalization and a state’s legal responsibility and influence being restricted to their territory and jurisdiction.

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Summary This chapter sheds light on the concept of human rights, tracing its emergence within the metaframe of modernity and the changes in meaning over time. Once a powerful frame for colonial countries to demand sovereignty, human rights have now become increasingly challenged as a “Western” concept, posing a dilemma in which, on the one hand, promoting human rights abroad has come to be an expectation, but, on the other, it is challenged as neoimperial. Concepts of sexual orientation and gender identity are part of this conglomerate in ways Chapter 5 explains.

Literature Alston, P. (2005). Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and Development Debate Seen through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals. Human Rights Quarterly, 27 (3), 755–829. https://doi. org/10.2307/20069811 Barreto, J. -M. (2013). Human Rights from a Third World Perspective: Critique, History and International Law (1st ed.). Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Bennani. (2015). Indigenenrechte sind Menschenrechte—Zur Institutionalisierung einer globalen Kategorie und ihrer Verortung im Feld der Menschenrechte. In B. Heintz & B. Leisering (Eds.), Menschenrechte in der Weltgesellschaft (pp. 317–351). Campus Verlag. Boli, J., & Thomas, G. M. (1999). Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875. Stanford University Press. den Brink, M. V., Loenen, T., & Tigchelaar, J. (2010). Sex Segregation and Equality in a Multicultural Society: Inferiority as a Standard for Legal Acceptability. SSRN eLibrary, 6(2), 1–16. Burke, R. (2010). Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights. University of Pennsylvania Press. Cooper, F., & Packard, R. (1997). Introduction. In F. Cooper & R. Packard (Eds.), International Development and the Social Sciences. Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge (pp. 1–41). University of California Press. De Schutter, O., Eide, A., Khalfan, A., Orellana, M., Salomon, M., & Seiderman, I. (2012). Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Human Rights Quarterly, 34, 1084–1169. DeGooyer, S., Hunt, A., Maxwell, L., Moyn, S., & Taylor, A. (2018). The Right to Have Rights. Verso.

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Djelic, M.-L. (2014). Competition Regulation in Africa Between Global and Local: A Banyan Tree Story. In G. S. Orori, M. A. Höllerer, & P. Walgenbach (Eds.), Global Themes and Local Variations in Organizations (pp. 90–103). Routledge. Djelic, M.-L., & Quack, S. (2013). Institutions and Transnationalization. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, & R. Suddaby (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism (pp. 299–323). Sage Publications. Escobar, A. (1995). Development and the Anthropology of Modernity. In Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (STU-Student edition., pp. 3–20). Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. Accessed 13 March 2018. Hamm, B. I. (2001). A Human Rights Approach to Development. Human Rights Quarterly, 23(4), 1005–1031. https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2001. 0055 Heintz, B. (2015). Die Weltgesellschaft und ihre Menschenrechte: Eine Herausforderung für die Soziologie. Menschenrechte in der Weltgesellschaff (pp. 21– 64). Campus Verlag. Heintz, B., Bennani, H., & Müller, M. (2015). Die Aushandlung der Menschenrechte: Ein Vergleich der beiden UN-Menschenrechtskonferenzen in Teheran (1968) und Wien (1993). In B. Heintz & B. Leisering (Eds.), Menschenrechte in der Weltgesellschaff (pp. 236–282). Campus Verlag. Heintz, B., & Werron, T. (2011). Wie ist Globalisierung möglich? Zur Entstehung globaler Vergleichshorizonte am Beispiel von Wissenschaft und Sport. KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift Für Soziologie Und Sozialpsychologie, 63(3), 359–394. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11577-011-0142-5 Hoffmann, S. -L. (2011). Introduction: Genealogies of Human Rights. In Human Rights in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge University Press. Accessed 19 February 2015. Koenig, M. (2005). Menschenrechte. Campus. Kruse, V., & Barrelmeyer, U. (2012). Max Weber. Eine Einführung. UTB. Metz, T. (2007). Toward an African Moral Theory. Journal of Political Philosophy, 15(3), 321–341. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2007.00280.x Metz, T. (2011). Ubuntu as a Moral Theory and Human Rights in South Africa. African Human Rights Law Journal, 532–559. Meyer, J. W., Boli, J., Thomas, G. M., & Ramirez, F. O. (1997). World Society and the Nation-State. American Journal of Sociology, 103(1), 144–181. https://doi.org/10.1086/231174 Moyn, S. (2010). The Last Utopia. Harvard University Press. Opitz, P. J. (2002). Menschenrecht und Internationaler Menschenrechtsschutz im 20. Jahrhundert. Wilhelm-Fink Verlag. Oyowe, A. O. (2013). Strange Bedfellows: Rethinking ubuntu and Human Rights in South Africa. African Human Rights Law Journal, 13, 103–134.

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Ruggie, J. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011). http:// www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_ EN.pdf. Accessed 17 March 2018. Salomon, M. E., & Seiderman, I. (2012). Human Rights Norms for a Globalized World: The Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic. Social and Cultural Rights. Global Policy, 3(4), 458– 462. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2012.00206.x Soysal, Y. N. (2012). Post-national Citizenship: Rights and Obligations of Individuality. In E. Amenta, K. Nash, & A. Scott (Eds.), The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology (pp. 383–393). John Wiley & Sons. Accessed 24 November 2016. Turner, B. S., Rowland, R., Connell, R. W., Waters, M., & Barbalet, J. M. (1995). Symposium: Human Rights and the Sociological Project. The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, 31(2), 1–44. https://doi. org/10.1177/144078339503100201 United Nations Development Group (UNDG). (2003). The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation: Towards a Common Understanding Among UN Agencies. United Nations Development Group. https://hrbaportal.undg.org/the-human-rights-based-approach-to-develo pment-cooperation-towards-a-common-understanding-among-un-agencies. Accessed 31 August 2017. United Nations Development Programme. (n.d.). Human Development Index (HDI). Human Development Reports. http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/ human-development-index-hdi. Accessed 15 January 2017. United Nations General Assembly. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. , Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171 (1966). https://www.ohchr.org/Doc uments/ProfessionalInterest/ccpr.pdf. Accessed 31 July 2019. Wobbe, T., & Malmedie, L. (2018). Diskriminierungsverbot und AntiDiskriminierungsmaßnahmen in der Europäischen Union. In M. Bach & B. Hönig (Eds.), Europasoziologie. Handbuch für Wissenschaft und Studium (pp. 104–119). Nomos.

CHAPTER 5

From Deviant Sexuality to LGBTI

Gender and sexuality are categories fundamental to the order of any society, penetrating many spheres and levels of life (Wharton, 2005, p. 7). These categories form social realities and generally determine what we wear and eat to the jobs we chose and how we raise children. As such, these categories have always been regulated and policed. Given the importance to society’s order, gender and sexuality are usually regarded and presented as the “natural” order of things at any particular time, and any deviation of the interpretation is usually highly contested. In other words, these categories claim strong normative powers. At the same time, the categories of gender and sexuality, what they include and how they are evaluated, have changed considerably over time, differ across cultural context, and remain in flux, thereby contributing to the uncertainty the environment in which the EU promotes human rights for LGBTI persons. At the same time, understanding some of the developments helps with understanding how LGBTI could become linked to human rights and travel globally. This chapter begins with an overview of the (re-)organizing of gender and sexuality during colonial times in colonial territories through legislation from the empires, whose legacy, notably still felt today, did not completely replace other understandings of sexuality, gender, and relationships. Then, it shifts focus to certain legislative changes in European countries which demonstrate important links between authority and the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. Malmedie, EU Promotion of Human Rights for LGBTI Persons in Uganda, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45826-2_5

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creation of knowledge: gender and sexuality, once “discovered,” were matters heavily regulated and policed—the ways of which have changed considerably over history. Given the importance to society’s order, gender and sexuality are usually regarded and presented as the “natural” order of things at any particular time and any deviation of the interpretation is usually highly contested. In other words, these categories claim strong normative powers. During the current period of modernity in “Western” countries, the individual is regarded as possessing ultimate authority of definition. This chapter shows the extent to which the categories of sexuality and gender have been in flux and how unsettled their meaning still is. I argue further that the success of LGBTI’s global travel can be explained through its highly abstract form as an acronym in combination with its link to the ever-changing concept of human rights.

Sex and Gender During the Modern Period Until the age of Enlightenment and the beginning of the modern period around the beginning of the seventeenth century, the “one gender” model, under which women were simply regarded as deficient men, formed Europe’s dominant conception of gender (Gildemeister & Hericks, 2012, p. 195). It was only through complex interactions between societal and scientific developments that the categories of men and women came to be seen as polar opposites. Their differences were explained through the “inherent” difference of their physical bodies. This means an analogy was discursively created between the body and its ascribed sex and the gender as the social role (Gildemeister & Hericks, 2012, pp. 195–196). This understanding of gender also condensed in rules and legislation regulating sexuality, such as law and moral codes of the church, during the Middle Ages in Europe. This regulation largely coalesced around procreation, in which any sexual acts not for procreative purposes were regarded as sodomy and punishable, irrespective of the gender of the persons involved. One particular legislative example includes the English Sodomy Act, established under Henry the VIII, which prescribed death for sodomy and bestiality (Thompson, 1989, p. 32). This legislation related to the subsidiary role gender occupied in the organization of premodern societies. Then, the distinction between men and women found basis both on the division of labor in the household unit and on reproductive work (Kinsman, 1996, p. 54)—in short, not on the

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essentialized “natural” bodily differences tied to Europe’s conception of personhood today. In addition to understandings of gender, the socioeconomic situation in a particular place and time impacts sexuality. The era of the rise of industrialization and capitalism of the late eighteenth century proved particularly formative for the emergence of subcultures that had major implications for the ways in which societies were organized (e.g., in terms of family life), and formed a contextual environment suitable for a category of homosexuality to emerge. New means of production broke open the tight unit of interdependencies of the household, which had linked production, reproduction, and sexual relations. Moreover, urbanization and wage labor created more physical distance possibilities and greater economic independence for (almost exclusively) men from the household and lessened influence of inter-generational social regulations.1 Also generated were greater degrees of private spaces, in terms of accommodation and new, anonymous public spaces, such as public toilets, which became known cruising grounds for men seeking sexual relationships with other men. These spaces allowed for more possibilities for sexual encounters and same-sex sexual networks, which necessitated new institutions.2 In response to these new autonomies and initial networks of same-sex sexual communities claiming spaces, new norms of respective sexuality emerged and shifted “the emphasis of regulation of sexuality from marriage and kinship networks to sexuality and sexual identity themselves” (Kinsman, 1996, p. 55), creating a new category that could also serve as a spring-board for identity movements. Toward the Autonomous Gendered and Sexual Individual This latest shift was closely linked to pedagogical and medical discourses that cultivated knowledge about sexuality of the middle of the eighteenth century; sexuality was subjected to the rule of “professionals” (i.e., educators and psychiatrists; Foucault, 1983, pp. 32–36). Toward the turn of the

1 Mainly men of an emerging middle class first had the means to make use of this new independence and articulate sexuality as part of self (Kinsman, 1996, p. 55). 2 The experiences of persons differed depending on gender and class. While men became breadwinners, especially middle-class women were more confined to the household without the same financial independence nor access to public spaces as men.

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twentieth century, medical and legal discourses distinguished homosexuality from other sexual “perversions” (Foucault, 1983, p. 42), indicating a category of greater social importance along with sexuality (Kinsman, 1996, pp. 61–62). With the late nineteenth century’s increasing stress on individualization, sexuality came to be regarded as an innate part of the autonomous person (Beachy, 2010, p. 803; Kinsman, 1996, p. 55). Modern sexuality as a concept was thus invented when “sexuality became property of the individual”; as such, it became more clearly separated from procreation (Giddens, 1991, p. 168). In parallel, homosexuality came to be regarded as distinct from other sexual deviances and tied to personhood with the rise of individualism.3 Sex and sexuality did not gain meaning in a vacuum. These shifts were closely tied to race, class,4 capitalism, and the nation-state. As a territory’s population came to be regarded as a resource, sex became linked to national economic factors and was subjected to increasingly fine-tuned state control, becoming “a public stake between the state and the individual” (Foucault, 1983, p. 32).5 The policing and ordering of sexual relations occurred in parallel with the rise of imperialism and became an anchor point for the racism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, during which sex became about producing the next generation of soldiers and workers and about maintaining the Imperial “race,” while sexual “perversion” became associated with national and moral decline (Kinsman, 1996, 63).

3 Regulation had “moved from the local community and the Church to a bureaucratic State, with its criminal code, police, professional groups, official knowledge, and social policies” (Kinsman, 1996, p. 63). 4 Around the turn of the twentieth century, middle-class men, psychologists and sexologists such as Krafft-Ebing, argued that homosexuality was inborn and the homosexual no social threat in response to the opposite claims adjudicated, at the time, in the courts (Beachy, 2010, p. 801; Weeks, 1976, p. 216), e.g., the Oscar Wilde trial in England in 1895 (Kinsman, 1996, p. 62). Other medical professionals such as Magnus Hirschfeld in Germany and Havelock Ellis in the UK even tried to declassify homosexuality as an illness but lost the argument at the time (Weeks, 1976, p. 216). 5 My own translation from German. Original: “Der Sex ist zum Einsatz, zum öffentlichen Einsatz zwischen Staat und Individuum geworden.”

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Knowing About Sex, Relationships, and Sexuality in “Africa” The notions of sexuality and gender in an “African” context are closely linked to Europe and “Western” perceptions—even if only in opposition to these perspectives. In the past 15 years, a wake of stricter (proposed) legislation with respect to same-sex sexual activities and homosexuality in certain African countries has spurred much debate around whether samesex sexual activities are “un-African.”6 This debate considers whether homosexuality is an import of the “West” or something that had been part of African culture (however defined) during precolonial times. This question itself is problematic, for one, because “traditional” African cultures were for the most part oral cultures that became strongly disrupted by colonialism (Murray & Roscoe, 2001, p. 9); the accounts of “Western” anthropologists and colonial regimes, which are strongly Eurocentric, form the understanding of sexuality on the African continent. In addition, the notion of homosexuality’s “un-Africanness” is problematic because it implies there are universally understood definitions of sexuality and gender when these categories are, in fact, highly contingent. What is defined as sexuality, accepted sexuality, and taboo, in every society, is strictly governed by several social institutions, specific to the time and place. Gender and sexuality must be regarded within systems of knowledge production and authority.7 Such knowledge is produced through multiple narratives of scientists, academics, and activists. The few counter narratives to those of the colonizers show the historic variety in understandings of sexuality and gender within “tribal” communities on the African continent.8 Examples include

6 For a differentiated discussion on homosexuality being un-African, see Jjuuko and Tabengwa (2018). 7 For example, European anthropologists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries researching “tribal” cultures on the African continent tended to either not to mention same-sex sexuality or fetishized it and shaped what is today considered knowledge about the history of the continent’s people (Murray & Roscoe, 2001). See also Jjuuko and Tabengwa on the topic (2018, pp. 70–71). 8 The often mainly oral cultures of many communities in combination with the “civilizing” efforts of the colonizers wiped out histories, accounts, and lifestyles in favor of modern norms of “Western” ways of organizing societies.

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the “lesbian” sangomas of the Zulu culture,9 the fluid gender roles of the Mashoga identity of Africa’s East Coast,10 and Kenyan “tribes” that allow women who cannot bear children or who become widows without having children to marry another woman who will bear children in her place.11 Some academics and activists have used historical studies that have mentioned same-sex sexual conduct in African “tribes” and communities to substantiate the claim that same-sex sexual practice has been part of Uganda’s history, predating colonialism. In making this claim, they generally avoid proclaiming the practice as fully accepted and cite historical and personal accounts of contemporaries to demonstrate same-sex relationships as having existed and to thereby advocate their legitimacy today.12 This struggle for a particular sense and claiming narratives for a specific cause is also evident in the example of the last precolonial King of the Buganda Kingdom (which later became Uganda). King Mwanga is said to have engaged in same-sex sexual activity with his male servants. When they turned to Christianity and consequently refused his advances, he had them killed. On the one hand, this story is remembered every year through a mass pilgrimage in Uganda and the celebration of those servants as Christian martyrs who died for their beliefs (Rao, 2015, p. 14); on the other, it has been used to demonstrate that homosexuality existed within the Buganda monarchy prior to colonization by referring to Mwanga as “gay” (Tamale, 2003, p. 2). By using today’s “Western” 9 This is an example for communities and “tribes” where marriages and cohabitation between two people of the same sex were and are specifically regulated by customs, as is the case for the “lesbian” Sangomas or healers in Zulu culture (for an autobiographic account, see Nkabinde, 2009). 10 Described as a “locus of cross-dressing and homosexuality” (Murray & Roscoe, 2001, pp. 85, 87), boys are punished for displaying behavior that is deemed inappropriately effeminate; those who reach adulthood can become mashoga—a socially stigmatized but recognized identity locally. 11 Nancy Baraka, a journalist from Nairobi, reports: “When an elderly woman from Kikuyu, Kisu, Kamba or Kalenjin “tribes” decides she needs a female wife it is encouraged, not solely for the sake of inheritance but also as a way of encouraging procreation.” This is still customary and accepted today. These relationships are not meant to be sexual and while the, usually, older woman takes on the provider role and pays a bride price, their social relationship is that of “mother-in-law” and “daughter” (Morgan & Wieringa, 2006, p. location 315). 12 For example, Sylvia Tamale writes that she had “met many Ugandan gays and lesbians who…never had any form of interaction (direct or indirect) with whites” (Tamale, 2003, p. 2).

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terminology, the author links to the global templates of these identities, enabling comparison and applicability of human rights vis-à-vis the (modern) state and erasing local differences, determined by context where individualism and other aspects of modernity might not play the same role as they are assumed to in many donor countries’ societies. Similarly, terminology for homosexuality in African languages generally and within the spoken languages of Uganda specifically provides hints, but their exact meanings remain open to interpretation. The existence of such words provides further indication that the construct itself exists as a distinct societal concept within “tribal” cultures; however, how distinct this is from colonial influence is difficult to determine. Most of these terms hold a negative connotation today, but a few considered more neutral have been reclaimed for self-description, such as kuchu, used in Uganda, a word previously little known in mainstream society (Tamale, 2003, p. 3). From today’s perspective, it is easy to conclude that same-sex sexual conduct and relationships were, in one form or another, as present in African precolonial societies as elsewhere in the world and that gender roles varied across “tribal” cultures and that the boundaries between male and female were more porous in some cases than others. However, just like the “creation” of homosexuality in Europe, this does not mean that at the time any or the same relevance was given to these relationships and identities. Legal Norms and Their Legacy During colonial times, sexuality in African colonial territory became governed not just through traditions and customs but through civic law. Similar to terms in local languages, that such legislation exists is proof there was a perceived need to regulate same-sex sexual behavior and, hence, that such behavior existed in societal life. Uganda’s penal code stems from the Victorian era (i.e., the latter half of the nineteenth century), and at least three of its articles concerning sexuality are considered controversial (Jjuuko & Tabengwa, 2018). These aim to prohibit committing “unnatural offenses,” which carries a sentence of lifelong imprisonment (Art. 145); “attempts to commit unnatural offenses” at 7 years of imprisonment (Art. 146); and “indecent assaults on boys under 18” at 14 years of imprisonment, with or without corporal punishment (Art. 147).

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Two main aspects are noteworthy regarding the above articles. First, Article 145 does not specifically criminalize same-sex sexual relationships, but does, as it stands, ban all sexual practices that do not necessarily lead to procreation—be they between people or with animals. Second, there is clear gender bias in Article 145’s section (c), as it criminalizes only those who allow “male persons” specifically to possess “carnal knowledge” of themselves, with only indecent assaults on boys prohibited, not those on girls.13 Other countries under British colonial rule, such as Kenya, have similarly phrased articles in their criminal law code.14 This centuriesold Ugandan penal code, while prohibiting generally any “unnatural offenses,” had been interpreted to mean mainly male but also female homosexuality (i.e., gay men and lesbians). While it is silent on gender, trans + people are also highly affected by this interpretation and the way this legislation has been portrayed in the media as being about anyone who can be regarded as deviant from the norm of women and men. Trans and intersexual persons often experience stigmatization and discrimination to those perceived as homosexual.15 Africa on the Rainbow Map Cartography is regarded as an important and powerful tool of the modern period, as it was one of the main bases for exploring and subsequently measuring and allocating (i.e., appropriating) territory thereby condensing the world to 2-D coordinates. Maps are considered highly rational and objective and have great authority because of this. They order and reflect the worldview of societies—for example by placing a

13 Embassies and delegations attempted to convince the Ugandan government to change their proposed antihomosexuality legislation into general child protection legislation they would support—but without success [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_1]. 14 In Kenya’s penal code, for example, the wording defining unnatural acts is identical to that of the Ugandan law, but the punishment is more lenient in Kenya with fourteen years of imprisonment instead of lifelong imprisonment (Kenyan Penal Code, 1970, p. Art. 162–165). 15 Due to cis-heteronormative assumptions which presume a match between a person’s sex, their gender presentation, identity, and affection to the opposite gender/sex. If this normative congruence is upset, generally that person will be assumed gay or lesbian rather than trans + , for example, as this concept is not yet as well known.

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focus on Europe and the Northern hemisphere, making them appear disproportionally large compared to, for example, the African continent. Africa has been internationally portrayed as the “homophobic” continent, for which the ILGA World Rainbow Map of 2013 serves as an example in its very clear establishment of African countries as the “problem” (ILGA Europe, 2013).16 The map visually divides the countries of the world into 10 color-coded categories, from deep red (denoting countries that impose the death penalty) to deep green (denoting countries that have opened up marriage to same-sex couples).17 It is focused on the existence of legislation without regard for whether laws are applied, creating a visual dichotomy between predominantly “homophobic” countries on the African continent and the green rest of the world—visually reinforcing the notion of a “modern” Europe and a “backward” African continent. The underlying idea about the importance of legal rules and their implementation is based on a European understanding of the importance of rights but less applicable in countries where the rule of law does not have the same standing and does not penetrate daily life as deeply, as it does in many EU countries (also see Klapeer, 2016, p. 9). The map therefore illustrates a Eurocentric worldview and reinforced certain polarization about the issue of LGBTI rights.18

16 On the politics of the rainbow maps, see also Francesca Romana Ammaturo and Koen Slootmaekers’ contribution (Ammaturo & Slootmaeckers, 2020). 17 Uganda on this red continent is part of the bracket of second most severe (ILGA Europe, 2013), colored dark red, for countries which impose a prison sentence on homosexuality exceeding 14 years up to lifelong, only exceeded darker red countries which impose the death penalty. The map’s legend explains that it is only about the existence of legislation, i.e., “laws [which] are aimed at lesbians, gay men and bisexuals and at samesex activities and relationships. At times, they also apply to trans and intersex people” (ILGA Europe, 2013). Unlike many world maps produced in Europe, the map is proportional in terms of country size with the effect that the African continent features large and prominent in the middle of the map with the majority of country areas colored in red. This “red” continent, with some spillage of red into the middle East and south East Asia, and some in East Asia, is surrounded in the North, the West, and East by countries shaded in green. 18 In 2023, ILGA World launched a new database including a map generator which is not just based on legislation but now takes many more aspects into account than just laws and together with the ILGA World Monitor provides a much more differentiated picture.

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Threat to the Nation Versus Self-Determination The so-called success story of LGBTI (human) rights in many donor countries of the Global North is linked to a multitude of factors of which such polarized portrayal in the maps explicated in this chapter is one element. Another element is homosexuality becoming a distinct concept closely linked to self-determination and associated human rights over the decades. One starting point for this development was when across Europe, the harsh punishments for sodomy, common during medieval times, relaxed after the French revolution (Beachy, 2010, p. 807) paving the way for the creation of spaces that constituted “cultural opportunity structures” (Frank & Mceneaney, 1999). Especially during the 1920s in Europe, subcultures of persons considered “sexual and gender deviant” flourished, becoming increasingly visible in metropoles like Berlin, London, and Paris, even though same-sex sexual conduct among men remained a criminal offense. The rise of the Nazi regime in Germany and fascism in Europe brought an end to this episode.19 Decriminalization and Demedicalization Even after the defeat of the Nazi regime, the gay men who had been deported to concentration camps remained captive, serving prison sentences, as homosexuality was still a criminal offense in most of Europe, including in the newly formed Federal German and German Democratic Republics. Early-day CSOs in the 1950s were unsuccessful in using human rights as a frame for demanding equality for homosexuals.20 It

19 The Nazi regime, legitimized its power through the notion of a superior Arian race, supported through scientific discourses of race and “purity” and procreation (Oosterhuis, 1997, p. 187). In line with this ideology, the Nazi regime tightened paragraph 175 of the German code and deported an estimated 5,000–15,000 men known or suspected to be homosexual to concentration camps (Oosterhuis, 1997, p. 187). The history of lesbian and trans + prosecution during this time is only little researched and gender nonconforming people were likely subsumed under the category of homosexual. The category of gender, whose conception in Europe was limited to the two exclusive categories of men and women, only started to gain greater conceptual nuance in the 1960s, as the so-stated “clear” distinctions of sex as natural and gender as socially determined became matters of contestation (Gildemeister & Hericks, 2012, p. 8). See, for example, Simon Garfinkel’s 1968 Studies on Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967). 20 The first International Congress for Sexual Equality was held in Amsterdam in 1951, soon after the UDHR had been established (Paternotte & Seckinelgin, 2015, p. 421). At

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was not until the civil rights movements of the 1960s, which aimed to dissolve the instilled concept of the nuclear family and (perceived) oldfashioned notions of sexuality, that calls for the decriminalization and demedicalization of homosexuality gained renewed attention. As a construct in societal consciousness, sexual orientation required firm establishment as a distinct category before the first legislative changes within Europe could arise,21 which ultimately took place in the 1980s, when the European Court of Human rights (ECtHR)22 ruled, in Dungeon v. UK, that criminalization of same-sex sexual acts constituted discrimination and a violation of the right to privacy under the European Convention on Human Rights. More than a decade later, the International Human Rights Committee passed a similar judgment in the case Toonen v. Australia.23 Case law instances such as these, with interpretations followed by subsequent legislative changes,24 led to a number of the conference, the represented CSOs from different Western European countries “called on the UN to ‘initiate steps towards granting [the] status of human, social and legal equality to homosexual minorities throughout the world’” (Rupp, 2011, p. 1014). In the United States, a lobby group was founded in 1980 with the name: Human rights Campaign (HRC) (Thoreson, 2014, p. 28). In Europe, the International Gay Association, later renamed into the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA), was founded. At the same time, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, on the one hand, further stigmatized gay men but, on the other, resulted in a perceived urgency in terms of public health campaigns. This eventually led to resources being directed at organizations working in HIV/AIDS prevention, and to greater general visibility across borders of the homosexual movement in many European countries. 21 It had to be established as distinct from concepts such as pedophilia, which until then, some CSOs had been propagating rights for within the same umbrella category of sexual minorities, as an “ab-normal” sexuality. 22 The ECtHR is Europe’s part of the Council of Europe, the regional judiciary system on international human rights law. 23 The International Human rights Committee ruled (similar to the 1994 Toonen vs.

Australia case) that criminalization of same-sex sexual acts in the form of sodomy laws amounted to discrimination and a violation of the right to privacy under Article 17 of the ICCPR. 24 In 1990, this changed legal status of sexual orientation in a number of European countries manifested in the medical realm and homosexuality was declassified as a mental disorder by the World Health Organization (WHO). Transgender, however, remained classified as gender incongruence in the WHO’s International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD)—this will now change with the 11th version of the ICD gender incongruence, which will reclassify it from the mental disorder it is today to a “sexual health condition.” The justification for the reclassification is that “evidence is now clear that it is not a mental disorder, and indeed classifying it in this

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reforms worldwide of laws governing sex in general terms (Frank et al., 2010, p. 867). Across Europe, such case law led to changes in national policies and legislation with regard to same-sex sexual relations (Frank & Mceneaney, 1999),25 a development that for transgender and intersex issues took until the beginning of the twenty-first century.26 Self-determination and Human Rights Sexual orientation has become increasingly linked to the individual as a human right and as a matter of privacy. In Europe and the United States, starting in the 1990s, together with the concept of gender, sexual orientation has increasingly become conceived as a matter of self-determination and an individual’s autonomy. In late stages of modernity, since the 1990s, societies are said to have been atomized and more concerned with the ensuring of the individual’s autonomy, emancipation, and selfdetermination by way of liberation from the past and from domination by others (Giddens, 1991, p. 211). This emancipation also affected notions of sexuality, which became decoupled from reproduction, while the body came to be perceived as decoupled from gender. Particularly influential around this time was the notion of doing gender,27 as advanced by Judith Butler in her 1990 book Gender Trouble, which fundamentally challenged the notion of a pre-existing gender binary and explicated how sex, gender, gender expression, and sexual orientation are assumed to can cause enormous stigma for people who are transgender” (World Health Organization, n.d.). 25 A quantitative study suggests a general trend toward decriminalization of same-sex sexual behavior until 1995 (Frank & Mceneaney, 1999). Full equalization in law between same-sex sexual acts and opposite sexual acts is an even more recent phenomenon in Europe. In Western Germany, for example, Article 175, which criminalized same-sex sexual acts, was first weakened in 1969 and only fully repealed in 1994. In the United States, this development took another decade, and in the state of Texas, for example, homosexuality was outlawed until a ruling of the Supreme Court in 2003 declared state-level bans on homosexuality unconstitutional. 26 For an analysis of how Germany established a third sex category as the first country in the EU, see Angelika von Wahl (von Wahl, 2022). Outside of the EU, countries such as Nepal and Argentina—to name just two—in the past decade have also introduced high levels of protection for sections of the LGBTI spectrum, granting far-reaching rights in a number of areas related to sexual orientation and gender identity. 27 According to this understanding, gender is no specific characteristic but a verb referring to the performative action by which gender is produced.

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correspond (Butler, 2006). All of these developments have contributed to the present-day demand to prioritize an individual’s identity over the ascriptive momentum of society, making the individual the authority.28 These developments toward greater self-determination were aided through explicitly tying sexual orientation and gender identity to existing human rights law, codified in the 2006 Yogyakarta Principles,29 which spurred highly symbolic watersheds on the international level in the form of, e.g., the first ever statement on human rights and sexual orientation and gender identity at the 2008 General Assembly of the UN.30 Increasingly recognized in the global domain as constituent under the institution of human rights, LGBTI entered EU foreign policy as a distinct matter of address, which Chapter 6 will delve into.

The Success of LGBTI The successful travel of the concept LGBTI, and ultimately human rights for LGBTI, is partly because of its form as a highly abstract umbrella acronym, which many categories of people, identities, and movements can and do include themselves. LGBTI brings together three distinct categories and subsumes many different identities and identity templates—the

28 This has also led to legal changes in some EU member states. Malta already passed a bill in 2015 which recognizes the right of each person to their gender identity, based on self-determination. The UK scrapped the need for a medical assessment before change of gender in 2017, Luxembourg in 2018, and in Germany, there is currently a debate under way since the constitutional court ruled it amounted to discrimination that there is no positive entry for intersex persons. These changes mark a trend toward the right to self-determination of the individual, making each person the expert, as supposed to leaving the power of definition of one’s sex (and gender) to the professionals—be they lawyers, psychologists, or doctors. 29 The principles were written by a group of human rights experts and LGBT activists, who got together to discuss how human rights applied to LGBT issues. The result was the Yogyakarta Principles, which outline the application of human rights with regard to sexual orientation and gender identity. The principles’ potential influence was unclear at the time but constitute one early manifestation of the idea that human rights apply to people regardless of their sexual orientation and gender identity. 30 The statement was introduced by Argentina on behalf of 66 states. Events that followed include a speech by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on human rights day on equality for LGBT persons in 2010 (Ban Ki-moon, 2010). In December 2011, then Secretary of State of the U.S. Hillary Clinton, in a much noted speech, affirmed that LGBT rights are human rights.

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first three letters “LGB’” refer to identities around sexual orientation,31 the fourth letter T denotes the gender identity category “trans + ” (which stands for both “transsexual” and “transgender”),32 and the last letter “I” refers to the physiological category of “intersex.”33 LGBTI, as a category, therefore includes subcategories that appear not to have much in common and thus serve as identity references for people with very different experiences. The acronym LGBTI has generally not been a template for identity, and the identities represented by the different letters can overlap in any one person, yet it has been used as a label highly recognizable to those who feel addressed.34 Furthermore, the extent to which identities and experiences of people who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex differ depends on the context and on other intersectional factors.35 The five-letter combination of LGBTI therefore serves as a handle for a very wicked pluriverse of complex combinations of identity templates, highly ambiguous demands, and without a definitive authority over meaning.

31 Sexual orientation refers to who someone is attracted to. L stands for lesbian, a term which generally refers to a woman who is attracted to/or engages in sexual and/ or romantic emotional relationships with other women. G stands for gay, which generally refers to a man who is attracted to and/or engages in sexual and/or romantic emotional relationships with other men while bisexual refers to a person who engages in sexual and/ or romantic relationships with either men or women. 32 Trans + is often used as an umbrella term for different identities and generally refers to a person who feels that the sex they were assigned at birth is not congruent with their own gender. Some trans + people identify as transsexual and seek complete or partial gender reassignment through hormone treatment and/or surgery to realign their body with their gender. Gender reassignment surgery is not just a matter of choice but very much of accessibility and affordability. 33 Intersex is a medical category which, in contrast to trans + , is concerned with the chromosomal, gonad, phenotype, or hormones of a person traditionally used to sort people into the binary categories male and female. It is not regarded as a psychological disorder but rather a physiological medical one. 34 For example, a woman can be a lesbian and a trans + person. An intersex person can identify as a gay man. 35 In some contexts, a lesbian woman might not have much in common with a gay man. In another context, a lesbian, white, middle class European, might have much more in common with a gay man with a similar socioeconomic background than with a lesbian woman from Kibera, a slum in Kenya’s capital or a woman in a romantic relationship in a rural town in Uganda.

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An Acronym and Its Meaning(s) According to marketing logics, LGBTI should not be a well-known acronym: it is too long, not distinct but rather a work in progress (its letters have, for instance, changed order, often cited in previous contexts as “GLB”), has continued to see additions, does not stand for one long name in shorthand, brings together different categories and groups as well as terms,36 is not particularly memorable nor pronounceable, and does not have word-like phonetics37 —yet, the acronym LGBTI has been remarkably successful in traveling distance and has become globally recognized. The acronym turns sexual orientation and gender into a highly abstract and modern form,38 and its nondistinctiveness makes LGBTI translatable globally: void of inherent meaning, it appears free from cultural understandings of sexuality and gender and serves as a universal container for many different meanings without contestations being obvious at first.39 The abstraction, because it has been less contested, has led to the 36 This makes it different from acronyms that consist of the same three letters, such as Lehmann Gross Bahn or Laser Guided Bomb. 37 Acronyms that marketing perspectives deem successful typically include three letters (less frequently four or five) and need to be distinctive, identifiable, and memorable (Feldman, 1969, p. 73). 38 Acronyms, even though they have existed at least since Roman times, have become increasingly popular since World War II (Algeo, 1973, p. 270). They can be regarded as a very modern form of language. During the postwar period, there was some academic interested in acronyms and their use, sparked by what was then coined ACROMANIA. Acronyms were part of the military, then political (e.g., government departments) discourse before they entered popular speak as these contractions became very popular in military speech and political discourse, e.g., SNAFU : situation normal, all “fouled” up; AWOL: absent without official leave (Baum, 1955). This is termed an economization of language and is another form of rationalization and abstraction in the sphere of language. As a specific category and short-hand, originating from military use, that often still bear the semantic traces of their constituent words and categories. New media, such as text messaging and Twitter, have led to a wave of novel acronyms, some of which have become widely known, even across languages such as “LOL” for “laughing out loud.” 39 Just like some organizations come to be known by the acronym of their name, more than the name itself like for example the UN and UNESCO (Baum, 1955, p. 108), LGBTI has also replaced the individual meanings of its components in policy language of the EU. The association with sex, very prominent in sexual orientation, is no longer present. LGBTI has become a global template, internationally understood and stripped of local specifies. This allows for easier travel and the acronym could therefore more easily spread internationally and through EU documents.

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increased use of the acronym LGBTI in mainstream media, policy, and politics. Its meaning being obscured at the same time, many people are still unsure about its exact meaning or the meaning of each of its components (including EU staff), yet with a bit of practice, the acronym also rolls off the tongue and marks the speaker as “knowledgeable” on these matters of sexual orientation and gender. LGBTI as a Compound Cultural Category in Flux The acronym is flexible regarding its compounds, and the categories or letters that constitute it are highly political and in- and outgroups continue to be negotiated. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex are cultural categories that have two main functions: (a) they help order the world by reducing ambiguity and (b) they allow the person who classifies to create a difference between self and an “Other” (Hirschauer, 2014, p. 173). Categories thus always include and exclude as reflected in the many debates within and between CSOs and social movements about the “correct” and most inclusive terminology. These debates—reflected also in academia—take place between individuals, groups, or communities who claim identities represented in the acronym on how these categories should be understood, who is included, who excluded, who silenced, and who is most visible claiming authority over meaning.40 These debates differ, depending on cultural and national legal contexts with some communities arguing for the use of other terms and acronyms, perhaps more local or with a different connotation such as SOGI/E,41 men who have sex with men (MSM) or kuchu and which, in some cases, 40 Common current debates within and between communities revolve around, for example, whether a trans + woman attracted to women should be accepted as a lesbian even if she was not socialized as a woman, whether another T should be included in the acronym to distinguish transsexual from transgender, whether a Q for queer should be added while some queer people explicitly understand their identity as a non-category and would not want to be included. 41 SOGI or SOGIE (“Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity/Expression”) is more commonly used in UN contexts and can be considered more neutral than LGBTI, on the one hand, because it is not linked to specific identities and is a symmetrical term, i.e., only referring to a specific category rather than a particular classification or identity. At the same time, SOGI has been criticized by academic scholars for the underlying presumption that sexual orientation and gender identity are stable categories, which is disputed and not the understanding promoted in this study (see, for example, Picq & Thiel, 2015; Thoreson, 2014). Common current debates within and between communities revolve around the

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are also identities. The politics of the acronym are not just relevant within or between communities but also vis-à-vis policy makers and organizations and can have financial implications of receiving funding or not. Many activist groups worldwide, as the empirical evidence shows, use LGBT or LGBTI for international communication, e.g., with the EU, but have their own preferred terms or use other abbreviations which already suggests that the use of the acronym is political and attached to economic aspects. Struggles around definitions are also often about visibility and resources and countering the understanding of LGBTI as synonymous with male homosexuality.

Summary This chapter established sexual orientation and gender identity as concepts in flux, despite their often-evoked characterization as timeless and reflective of a “natural” gender and sexual order of society. This chapter showed how, within the metaframe of modernity, sexuality became a construct fundamentally linked with the individual, subject to formal legislation and exported to colonial territories, such as Uganda, where it undergoes constant local reinterpretation until today. While the first major changes to such legislation built on sexual orientation within the frame of the right to privacy, actual revolutionary power in the domain of human rights took place only as conceptions of human took on greater nuance. The delineation of the category sexual orientation as a distinct category enabled the link to human rights and with it self-determination. More global travel of this concept was finally possible through the de-linking from sex and high level of abstraction in form of the LGBTI acronym. In other words, once sexual orientation and gender identity had cocooned in the acronym LGBTI, these had become highly abstract and traveled more easily. By providing the historical background to the emergence of the LGBTI acronym in a particular time and space, this chapter prepares the groundwork for understanding why the topic is with the way it is by EU staff members and member state embassy staff members within their organizational and cultural contexts—details of which Chapter 6 outlines.

identity lesbian with some so-called trans exclusionary radical feminist groups (TERFs) trying to establish, for example, that this identity requires XX chromosomes.

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Literature Algeo, J. (1973). Acronyms. American Speech, 48(3/4), 269–274. https://doi. org/10.2307/3087835 Ammaturo, F. R., & Slootmaeckers, K. (2020, May 28). Engenderings: The Politics of Rainbow Maps. LSE Blog Engenderings. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/gen der/2020/05/28/the-politics-of-rainbow-maps/. Accessed 16 June 2020. Ban Ki-moon. (2010, December 10). Confront Prejudice, Speak Out against Violence, Secretary-General Says at Event on Ending Sanctions Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. Presented at the GA Side-Event. https://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sgsm13311.doc. htm. Accessed 11 April 2018. Baum, S. V. (1955). From “Awol” to “Veep”: The Growth and Specialization of the Acronym. American Speech, 30(2), 103–110. https://doi.org/10.2307/ 454270 Beachy, R. (2010). The German Invention of Homosexuality. The Journal of Modern History, 82(4), 801–838. https://doi.org/10.1086/656077 Butler, J. (2006). Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. Routledge. Feldman, L. P. (1969). Of Alphabets, Acronyms and Corporate Identity. Journal of Marketing, 33(4), 72–75. https://doi.org/10.2307/1248679 Foucault, M. (1983). Sexualität und Wahrheit 1. Der Wille zum Wissen. Suhrkamp. Frank, D. J., Camp, B. J., & Boutcher, S. A. (2010). Worldwide Trends in the Criminal Regulation of Sex, 1945 to 2005. American Sociological Review, 75(6), 867–893. Frank, D. J., & Mceneaney, E. H. (1999). The Individualization of Society and the Liberalization of State Policies on Same-Sex Sexual Relations, 1984–995. Social Forces, 77 (3), 911–943. https://doi.org/10.2307/3005966 Garfinkel, S. (1967). Agnes Study. In Studies in Ethnomethodology (pp. 116–165). Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (repr.). Polity Press. Gildemeister, R., & Hericks, K. (2012). Geschlechtersoziologie. Oldenbourg Verlag München. Hirschauer, S. (2014). Un/doing Differences. Die Kontingenz sozialer Zugehörigkeiten. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 43(3), 170–191. ILGA Europe. (2013, May). ILGA-Europe Rainbow Map 2013. http://thu mbnails.visually.netdna-cdn.com/ilga-europe-rainbow-map_5198e5ff9736c. jpg. Accessed 16 January 2014. Jjuuko, A., & Tabengwa, M. (2018). Expanded Criminalisation of Consensual Same-Sex Relations in Africa: Contextualising Recent Developments. In N. Nicol, A. Jjuuko, R. Lusimbo, N. J. Mulé, S. Ursel, A. Wahab, & P. Waugh

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(Eds.), Envisioning Global LGBT Human Rights. (Neo)colonialism, Neoliberalism, Resistance and Hope (pp. 63–96). University of London Press. http:/ /www.jstor.org/stable/https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv5132j6 Kenyan Penal Code. KEN-1970-L-28595 § 63 (1970). http://kenyalaw. org/Downloads/GreyBook/8.%20The%20Penal%20Code.pdf. Accessed 19 October 2016. Kinsman, G. (1996). The Regulation of Desire: Homo and Hetero Sexualities (2nd ed.). Black Rose Books. Klapeer, C. M. (2016). LGBTIQ-Rechte als Indikatoren von ‚Entwicklung‘? Postkolonial-queere Perspektiven auf entwicklungspolitische Debatten um sexuelle Menschenrechte. In Feministische Kritiken und Menschenrechte. Reflexionen auf ein produktives Spannungsverhältnis (pp. 95–112). Verlag Barbara Budrich. Morgan, R., & Wieringa, S. (2006). Tommy Boys, Lesbian Men, and Ancestral Wives: Female Same-Sex Practices in Africa (1st ed.). Jacana Media. Murray, S. O., & Roscoe, W. (2001). Boy-Wives and Female Husbands: Studies of African Homosexualities (1998th ed.). Palgrave Macmillan. Nkabinde, N. Z. (2009). Black Bull, Ancestors and Me: My Life as a Lesbian Sangoma. Jacana Media. Oosterhuis, H. (1997). Medicine, Male Bonding and Homosexuality in Nazi Germany. Journal of Contemporary History, 32(2), 187–205. Paternotte, D., & Seckinelgin, H. S. H. (2015). Chapter 14 - “Lesbian and Gay Rights are Human Rights”: Multiple Globalizations and LGBTI Activism. In D. Paternotte & M. Tremblay (Eds.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Lesbian and Gay Activism (pp. 408–438). Ashgate. Picq, M. L., & Thiel, M. (2015). Introduction. In M. L. Picq & M. Thiel (Eds.), Sexualities in World Politics: How LGBTQ Claims Shape International Relations (pp. 1–22). Routledge. Rupp, L. J. (2011). The Persistence of Transnational Organizing: The Case of the Homophile Movement. The American Historical Review, 116(4), 1014–1039. Tamale, S. (2003). Out of the Closet: Unveiling Sexuality Discourses in Uganda. Feminist Africa, 2. https://feministafrica.net/feminist-africa-issue2-2003-changing-cultures/ Thompson, R. (1989). Attitudes Towards Homosexuality in the SeventeenthCentury New England Colonies. Journal of American Studies, 23(1), 27–40. Thoreson, R. R. (2014). Transnational LGBT Activism: Working for Sexual Rights Worldwide. University of Minnesota Press. Accessed 28 July 2016. von Wahl, A. (2022). From Private Wrongs to Public Rights: The Politics of Intersex Activism in the Merkel Era. German Politics, 31(1), 59–78. https:// doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2021.1982902 Weeks, J. (1976). “Sins and Diseases”: Some Notes on Homosexuality in the Nineteenth Century. History Workshop, 1, 211–219.

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CHAPTER 6

The EU as a Complex Modern Organization

Two major factors related to the EU directly contribute to the wickedness of the case. The EU, as a complex (public) organization and an unsettled polity (Murdoch, 2015, p. 1676), consists of interconnected formal structures and of institutions in the form of politics and norms (Bach, 2018a, p. 82). These two aspects are mutually constitutive: certain political and normative ideas have sowed, over history, what today forms the EU’s formal structures, which themselves continually shape the EU’s political and normative order or institutional environment. Given this relation, conceiving the EU as “a straightforward, unified, demand-response model” would be inaccurate—a point in line with John Campbell. A more appropriate line of thinking, and the perspective of this book, instead understands the EU as “a[n]…ambiguous, complex, and nuanced” organization “staffed by multiple actors with conflicting agendas and interests confronting diverse and imperfect information” (Campbell, 2004, p. 208). These ambiguities and complexities, partly resulting from the layering of developments over time, are important to understand, as the context within which staff make sense, while promoting human rights for LGBTI persons.

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Accordingly, this chapter introduces the EU in its “wicked” entirety as a modern public organization within a modern world.1 To this end, it details the various complexities and ambiguities that undergird the EU’s very functioning, starting with the webbiness inherent in the EU’s competency structure as a meta organization, which consists of different entities with partly overlapping competencies, before explaining those pertaining to its current formal administrative structure. Subsequently, a brief historical overview detailing the emergence of these structures over time will be sketched out—from the 1950s as economic communities to the attempt of the EU as a global unitary actor promoting human rights externally with the Treaty of Lisbon (see detailed information in this chapter). Such an overview provides the necessary information to understand this part of the “local” context within which staff make sense and the institutions that structure their everyday work, doing and thinking.

The EU Today as a Meta Organization and a Focal Organization In its capacity as a public organization, the EU’s main task is not to “produce” tangible products but to organize a particular part of social life. This “output” is difficult to evaluate (Greenwood et al., 2013, p. 4) and makes the EU prone to challenges of legitimacy due to a remaining lack of direct democratic input legitimacy, especially in relation to foreign policy.2 To counteract this legitimacy deficit and to portray itself as a modern organization, the EU must “pose as a social actor” (Ahrne et al., 2016, p. 8). To appear as a legitimate actor, it must appear rational, formalized, coordinated, and independent of other actors to remain legitimate (Drori et al., 2006). The EU, therefore, has to demonstrate that it is part of the “modern project of rationality, progress, and justice” (Brunsson, 1993, p. 2). To this demonstrative end, organizations show rationality largely by producing formalized work plans and strategies and using quantifiable 1 The formal structure referred to here, unless otherwise specified, is the structure at the time of empirical data collection between 2013 and 2017 as it formed the context at that particular time period. 2 The EU Parl gained considerable powers over the decades in terms of legislative, supervisory, and budgetary powers, but remains in a consultative role in foreign policy (Craig & Búrca 2011, pp. 55–57).

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data that Czarniawska (1998, p. 8) describes as “tables, lists and recipes” which are “undoubtedly the modern props of organizational knowledge.” The EU engages in the use of such props to a vast extent and is considered an exaggerated bureaucracy,3 yet to create the perception of coherence and presenting as a unified actor remain considerably difficult given the EU’s complex structure. This structure, in practice, results from a dilemma: the process of increasingly close cooperation between EU member states while respecting the integrity of their national sovereignties—something the countries must preserve to remain legitimate in the eyes of their own citizens. EU as a Meta Organization The EU’s political integration process has always been a negotiation of the two already mentioned contradicting forces: national sovereignty at one pole and supranational integration into the meta organizational framework of a union or confederation at the other. The distinction between national competencies and supranational competencies is often unclear, particularly regarding EU foreign policy, which leaves the EU to function as a highly complex structure. The EU embodies further complexity in its capacity as a meta organization (Drori et al., 2014, p. 96), which saddles a certain paradox in which both the EU itself and its member states must pretend to be independent of each other, while at the same time reliant, for legitimacy and relevance (Ahrne et al., 2016, p. 8). The EU is set up as an entity in itself, as one among nation-states and on the same level, while at the same time, it relies on its members for its existence and on them transferring competencies to the EU-level.4 The EU, as a meta organization, spans the local and the global, and its members can have greater relevance on an international level through being connected. At the same time, member states are shielded from

3 In the realm of development cooperation, this includes the country strategies and country report, for example. 4 Scholars have distinguished the EU from nation-states due to its lack of an army as a civilian power (Linklater, 2005; Wong, 2017), yet recent discussions among member states with regard to EU security policy means that this might change in the medium term.

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external pressures,5 such as the international UN governance, as the EU creates its own rules and interpretations of human rights, which it then enacts back into the world through its foreign policy, as Chapters 7, 8, and 9 will show. EU as a Focal Organization Apart from a meta organization, the EU is also a bureaucracy—with hierarchies, specialization, and departmentalization—and a focal organization. The latter means that on an administrative level, it exists of “more or less self-contained organized unit[s] with a reasonable measure of autonomy and a collective identity” (Sorge, 2002, p. 12).6 The competencies of the EU’s organizational entities are much less rigid than traditional divisions of functions within national governments and have shifted over time and with treaties (Craig & Búrca, 2011, p. 32). These entities span from strictly intergovernmental to supranational and are influenced by the dilemmas associated with the EU’s meta organizational structure. This means that national aspects often still play a role, if only on informal level because, for example, staff members speak the same mother tongue and can relate easily. The organizational entities are involved, to varying degrees, in EU foreign policy addressing human rights, whether that be their formal competencies within the areas of development cooperation or the EU’s CFSP, or the more informal ways in which they influence the political expectations ultimately saddled on the EU and different organizational entities. These ways of formal and informal engagement simultaneously reflect and shape of the EU’s work on topics, such as human rights and LGBTI, thereby contributing to the complexity that marks the general environment in which the EU engages foreign policy. The most relevant organizational entities for the EU’s promotion of human rights for LGBTI persons outside of the EU’s constituency are the Council, the EU Comm, and the EEAS—each of which can be located at a different point between supranational and intergovernmental.

5 Often this external pressure results from monitoring systems which establish expectations that can be contested by creating one’s own internal monitoring system (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2014, p. 46). 6 For a full list of EU institutions, bodies, and agencies, see https://europa.eu/eur opean-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies (European Union, 2016).

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The Council of the European Union7 (est. 1958), also called the Council for short,8 which, as the main legislative and decision-making body of the EU, can clearly be located at the intergovernmental rather than supranational end of the EU’s administrative spectrum. As an organizational entity with its own staff (general secretariat) and structure, it is separate from the European Council—a quarterly meeting of heads of state of the member states.9 The Council consists of government ministers from each member state, who convene in different constellations, depending on topic area (e.g., the Foreign Affairs Council configuration includes the member states’ respective ministers for foreign affairs) and can take binding decisions for the member states. The presidency rotates every 6 months, an exception being the Foreign Affairs Council, which is always chaired by the high representative/vice president (HR/ VP). The Council takes decisions with a qualified majority, except from areas regarding the EU’s CFSP, which require unanimity. Together with the EU Parl, the Council forms the chief decision-making body of the EU. The Council meetings are prepared by member states ambassadors in a weekly meeting of the Committee of Permanent Representatives10 (COREPER), which discusses, and, where possible, agrees in private on Council agenda items.11 The COREPER can establish working groups on particular topics on administrative levels, where members are delegates from each member state (General Secretariat of the Council, 2016, p. 23), for example, the Council’s Working Party on Human Rights (COHOM) and the Council’s Working Party on Africa (COAFR). These formal convening bodies can subsequently establish informal working groups (e.g., the preparation of policy like the LGBT toolkit).

7 The Council of the EU is not to be confused with the European Council, a quarterly meeting of heads of state of the member states. 8 For further information on composition, competencies, and role, see also Craig and Búrca (Craig & Búrca, 2011, pp. 41–47). 9 For further information on the European Council, see Craig and Búrca (Craig &

Búrca, 2011, pp. 47–50). 10 Permanent Representatives are the ambassadors of the member state to the EU. 11 COREPER is called an “auxiliary body” to the Council and there are two configu-

rations: COREPER 1 consists of the deputies of the permanent representatives to the EU and COREPER 2 consists of the permanent representatives themselves (General Secretariat of the Council, 2016, p. 18).

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The EU Comm, established in 1958, stands as the EU’s most supranational and politically independent entity, helming the roles of proposing legislation (which has earned it the title of “motor of integration”) and implementing policy (Craig & Búrca, 2011, pp. 37–38). The EU Comm is also the EU’s watchdog with respect to treaties and is tasked with “coordinating, executive and management functions.” As such, the Commission possesses very considerable powers and plays an important role in the EU’s strategic planning in its aim “to achieve interinstitutional agreements” (The Member States, 2009a, Art. 17 para 1). The EU Comm continues to represent the EU externally in areas apart from the EU’s CFSP, which is the domain of the EEAS, headed by the HR/ VP. The EU Comm consists of 28 commissioners—one for each member state—plus the president, proposed by the European Council and elected by the EU Parl. Each of the 28 commissioners leads a directorate-general (DG) on a particular policy area, akin to ministries in nation-states. The DG relevant for EU’s foreign policy and human rights objectives is the DG for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO)12 which is responsible for allocating funding for development projects and monitoring and evaluating their execution and success. This DG consists of a Policy and Thematic Coordination section and a Geographic Coordination section, with DEVCO.B on Human and Society Development—responsible for human rights—as one of four departments within the former. The EEAS,13 as the administrative entity and with the remit to support the role of the EU’s HR/VP, is a hybrid structure, embodying intergovernmental and supranational elements. Together, the EEAS and the HR/ VP are mainly responsible for the EU’s CFSP, which remains intergovernmental, yet staffing and history of the remit covered point toward its hybrid structure.14 The HR’s role, first established by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, was expanded with the Lisbon Treaty’s enactment by linking it to the vice presidency of the EU Comm and providing it 12 Since 2021, DG DEVCO has been called DG International Partnerships (DG

INTPA). 13 Formally, the EEAS does not have the status in the treaties of a “European Institution” next to EU Parl, EU Comm, and ECJ but de facto fulfills the function of a major EU organizational unit—it has a structure, legal address, budget, objectives, and staff (Sus, 2014, p. 59). 14 For a history of CFSP, see Duke (2011).

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with the power to speak on behalf of the whole of the EU. The position is, per the Lisbon Treaty, supported by the EEAS as an administrative body and quasi-diplomatic corps with staff recruited from three sources: the EU Comm, the Council Secretariat, and member states diplomatic staff. This conglomerate further contributes to the hybrid nature of the EEAS which creates ambiguities at headquarters in Brussels—evident, for example, in the schism that frames EU’s dissemination of statements.15 Formally founded on 1 December 2010 through a Council decision, the EEAS began work in January 2011. The EEAS took over functions on foreign affairs, which, until then, were carried out mainly by the EU Commission’s DG for the External Relations (DG RELEX) in conjunction with the Council Secretariat. This entailed, among other things, DG RELEX’s staff being subsumed within the EEAS, alongside staff from the Council secretariat and seconded diplomats from the EU member states, suggesting a complex layering of organizational identities. The formal structure of the EEAS is telling regarding prioritizing of geographic over thematic issues. It is split into six departments,16 five of which are dedicated to geographic regions17 and one to thematic topics under Global and Multilateral Issues, which includes section VI.A Human Rights and Democracy and is linked to the COHOM. The VI.A.’s subunit Human Rights Strategy and Policy Implementation is where LGBTI issues are situated. Among the five geographic sections is one directly focused on the Africa and North Africa region and consists of two more layers of hierarchy, narrowing down to a unit on East Africa, which includes Uganda (Section II, Department A, Unit 1). Similar in structure to the EU Comm DG DEVCO, the structure of the EEAS demonstrates the heightened relevance of geographic over thematic topics and how the world is divided and organized at EU headquarters. 15 If the EU High Representative wishes to issue an official statement on behalf of the EU and its member states, this requires all 28 member states to give their approval; but the HR/VP herself can supersede this process by making a statement on her own behalf, via herself or a spokesperson. 16 The structure reflects the EEAS under HR/VP Lady Ashton. With the second HR/ VP Francesca Mogherini taking office in November 2014, the structure of the EEAS was changed and simplified. For example, all different units now report directly to the managing director of a department rather than to different deputy directors. 17 The regional departments are: I: Asia and the Pacific; II: Africa; III: Europe and Central Asia; IV: North Africa, the Middle East, Arabian Peninsula, Iran, and Iraq; V: Americas.

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At the EU delegations in third countries, the levels of hierarchy are fewer, but the complexity remains. The Treaty of Lisbon foresaw that the newly created EEAS should oversee the EU Comm’s so-called outpost offices in third countries, which became the EU delegations. Until then, the outpost offices’ main tasks concerned overseeing development aid and representing the EU Commission abroad. With the EEAS in charge, the EU delegations assumed an additional political function, similar to embassies, but without a consular section. The staff members in EU delegations come from the same three backgrounds cited for the EEAS HQ—although in 2011, the majority of staff members were moved from the former EU Comm DG RELEX (Keukeleire et al., 2016, p. 67), supported by a small number of nationals from the host country. The EEAS’ budget is small compared to the EU Comm’s funds for development cooperation, which can lead to situations where formal power with regard to foreign policy lies with the EEAS, while CSOs court DEVCO staff for funding. The logic of the EEAS is based on good diplomatic relations—difficult to quantify—while DEVCO’s aim is to spend development aid in a way considered “effective,” i.e., according to the monitoring and evaluation of projects. Apart from these three organizational entities introduced above—the Council, EU Comm, and the EEAS—with a formal remit in EU foreign affairs and policy, there are other organizational entities paramount to shaping EU internal policy and therefore also the institutional environment: the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as well as a number of EU agencies such as the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA). The ECJ, as the EU’s main judiciary body,18 has almost no competencies with regard to foreign affairs, excepting the so-called smart-sanctions capacity it may impose on individuals as detailed in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in Art. 40, TEU and Art. 275.2, TFEU.19 However, 18 The ECJ ensures equal application of EU legislation across member states and, more broadly, that EU entities act in line with EU law. Each member state sends one judge to serve on the bench; however, in the past, the ECJ has been reproached for its (perceived) excessive supranational character, with member states criticizing the court as encroaching on their competencies in certain cases (Craig & Búrca, 2011, 399). 19 The ECJ’s jurisprudence in this regard has shaped external relations in contexts. See Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR about restrictive measures against private persons. For a discussion, see Isiksel (2010).

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the ECJ has helped solidify human rights for LGBTI persons EU-wide through its rulings on sexual orientation granting greater protection and especially through rulings on asylum law, influenced the context and discourse of non-discrimination, human rights, and sexual orientation also with regard to EU foreign policy.20 The EU Parl’s overall competencies have increased over the years and regarding non-discrimination actions its consent is required, as mentioned above; however, regarding CFSP matters, its formal role is limited to regular consultation by the HR/VP, rather than an active role (Article 36 TEU). Due to the legitimacy it enjoys regarding EU citizens, its resolutions play an important part in shaping the environment and setting expectations. Regarding LGBTI, these expectations are internally formulated by the EU Parl’s largest intergroup: the LGBTI Intergroup.21 The Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), as the EU’s own monitoring body, does not have a formal role with regard to the EU’s foreign policy nor the remit to check member states’ compliance with fundamental rights. And yet, through its research reports, for example, based on surveys of LGBTI persons (and voters) in EU countries and some applicant countries, however, it considerably influences the environment and shapes expectations of member states and the EU as a whole (Fundamental Rights Agency, 2015).

20 For example, the November 2013 ruling on C-199/12 to C-201/12 permitting asylum claims based on sexual orientation of persons from countries where homosexuality is criminalized. 21 The EU Parl’s Intergroup is an “informal forum for Members of the European Parliament who wish to advance and protect the fundamental rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people” and which constitutes a knowledge source and entertains strong connections with Brussel-based LGBTI CSO (The European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT Rights 2010). It is currently the intergroups with the most members of 150 Members of the EU Parl (MEPs). Its mandate includes monitoring of the EU Institutions in terms of LGBT issues within Member States and beyond. They furthermore act as a link between Civil Society organizations and the EU Parl. Since the intergroup’s copresidents are not also MEPs, it is difficult to distinguish between their statements made as the spokespersons for the Intergroup and in their capacity as MEPs. One of the Intergroup’s priority areas is the monitoring of the Commission and the copresidents have criticized the EU Comm in the name of the intergroup and the EU Parl in the past, for example, for agreeing to remove a clause on non-discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation from the terms of the Cotonou Agreement (European Parliament Intergroup on LGBT Rights, 2010).

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The Effects of Formal Structures Formal structures like the ones described above influence the way problems are perceived and tackled. The most notably obvious effect stemming from the EU’s structure is that, given the more numerous and dominant geographic departments, the singular thematic department responsible for human rights is sidelined; there exists, that is, a very clear division between geographic and overarching topics and little integration of the two. This arrangement is just one of very many. The department structure of the German foreign ministry, for example, gives substantial focus to thematic issues, with geographic domains being subsections of the specific thematic departments themselves. To name certain points of tension in the case of the EEAS: polarization arises between staff working on thematic issues and those working on a particular geographic area or specific country (as Chapter 8 shows), and those working on thematic topics may become sidelined in the weighing of pushing topics versus good diplomatic relations with a particular region. Furthermore, the EEAS’s structure makes thematic topics the concern of those working within the thematic department, where topics can, thus, be isolated, untouched, even in consideration, by those in the geographic departments and units. Moreover, it appears the responsibility of thematic unit staff to identify specific world regions to place these topics, while staff in the geographic units can pick and choose the topics within their geographic region and then seek the expertise of staff in the thematic department. If the overall department structure was more along topic issues, geographic units within this structure would have to pay greater attention to this overarching topic.

LGBTI at the EU To understand how the EU engages matters of LGBTI human rights, it is necessary to understand the structure and competencies of the organizational units and how they are meant to work together. Broadly speaking, the three main organizational entities described in Chapter 8 are responsible for EU foreign policy regarding human rights and LGBTI. Formally, new legislation and policy is initiated top down, via a decision at the level of the EU’s political leadership, i.e., via the HR/VP or an EU Commissioner. While the Council sets the overall policy, the EU Comm remains responsible for managing its implementation, development cooperation

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(Council of the European Union, 2010, Art. 9.1), and the sizable budget this involves, and the EEAS is tasked with overall strategic and coordination responsibilities and support (Council of the European Union, 2010, Art. 9.2), as well as with oversight of the EU delegations abroad.22 EEAS and Commission are expected to consult with each other “in all matters relating to the external matter of the Union” (Council of the European Union, 2010, Art. 3.2). All three—the EU Comm, the Council, and the EEAS—constitute large bureaucratic entities, located in their own separate purpose-built buildings in Brussels and characterized by strict hierarchy and departmentalization, objectivity, and the use of written documents as their chief form of official communication. It is through these written records that information is transmitted from the working level to the top (i.e., the political level) and how tasks are allocated from the top down to so-called working level. These entities’ departmentalization channels this exchange along vertical lines of control and command. The higher the level in the hierarchy, the less staff produce their own documents and the more they merely comment on and sign off on dossiers—written by working-level staff, considered experts qua their roles and without management responsibilities. It is the working-level officers who generally meet with NGOs and enter consultation with same-leveled staff at other entities, which allows for informal negotiation before a topic’s more formal discussion at higher levels—that of head of units, of directors, and of the Council, where decisions are then formalized.

22 The EU delegations, each with a head of delegation who can represent the EU as a whole abroad, report to the high representative but are staffed by EU Comm staff, EEAS staff, and seconded diplomats of the member states.

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Human Rights and LGBTI Within the Structures of DEVCO and EEAS Within the EU Comm, the topic of LGBTI is located within DG DEVCO,23 one of 28 EU Commission DG.24 The DG DEVCO’s structure constitutes two main sections, given relatively equal weight on the organigram, each overseen by a deputy director general: the first concerning Policy and Thematic Coordination and the second, Geographic Coordination. The former (thematic) is itself split into four branches, one of which is DEVCO.B on Human and Society Development. A range of thematic units lie under the remit of DEVCO.B. The first of five,25 and the most relevant unit for this study, is the unit DEVCO.B.1 on Governance, Democracy, Gender, Human Rights. In contrast to the EU Comm organigram, the EEAS’s structure demonstrates its clear prioritization of geographic organizational units over their thematic counterpart and therefore how the world is divided up and organized for the political and diplomatic relations. This priority is apparent in that in 2014,26 the then HR/VP Lady Ashton, as the first to serve in this newly created post since 2009, oversaw managing directors of six departments, five of which are dedicated to geographic regions.27 LGBTI as a topic is located deep in the hierarchy within the thematic VI department which covers Global and Multilateral Issues. This thematic department is split into the subunits VI.A Human Rights and 23 Before the EEAS existed, authority for EU foreign policy lay with DG RELEX; but with its creation, the EEAS assumed responsibility for strategic and diplomatic ties, with the EU Commission mainly responsible for development policy. The EU Commission’s relevant organizational unit for EU foreign policy in Sub-Saharan Africa and in matters of human rights is DG DEVCO. 24 Each DG is headed by commissioners of a member state. Croatia was the last country to join the EU in 2013 and brings the number up to 28. 25 The other four units cover topics such as B.2 Civil Society, Local Authorities; B.3 Employment, Social Inclusion, Migration; B.4 Education, Health, Research, Culture; B.5 Instrument for Stability, Nuclear Safety. 26 With the second HR/VP Francesca Mogherini taking office in November 2014, the structure of the EEAS was changed and simplified. For example, all different units now report directly to the managing director of a department rather than to different deputy directors. While a hierarchical level was cut, the main organizational structure into geographic regions and a small thematic section did not change. 27 I: Asia and the Pacific; II: Africa; III: Europe and Central Asia; IV: North Africa, the Middle East, Arabian Peninsula, Iran, and Iraq; V: Americas.

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Democracy and VI.B on Multilateral Relations and Global Issues.28 The department VI.A. itself branches into three units in the organigram and is also connected via an arrow to the Council’s Working Group on Human Rights (COHOM).29 VI.A.’s first section, VI.A.1 Human Rights Strategy and Policy Implementation, is the most relevant for this book’s subject, as its remit concerns human rights promotion vis-à-vis third countries, and is where the LGBTI file is located, tended to by a single staff member who is a seconded national diplomat, i.e., is on a usually 2-year shortterm “loan” to the EEAS from a particular member state of which they are a national. The EEAS’s organigram shows LGBTI is allocated in a particular place with a clear focus on implementation, such within human rights rather than in a section responsible for maintaining relations in forums, such as the UN, which is covered by VI.A.2.30 Furthermore, the topic has no direct link to the EEAS’s geographic sections and these touch on LGBTI only when a particular issue arises within their respective regions, as was the case with Uganda. The remit for Uganda is found in the geographic departments. The macro-region of Africa itself is split into “Africa” and “Northern Africa” in the department structure. Each of the five geographic departments is then subdivided into two sections further separating out regions and then once again subdivided into units covering even smaller geographic sections of a handful of countries. In the case of Department II on Africa, it is split into section II.A (II.A.1. Horn of Africa, East and Southern Africa, and Indian Ocean) and section II.B (West and Central Africa). The former is then in turn split into two regional units (II.A.1 Horn of Africa, East Africa, and Indian Ocean; II.A.2 Southern Africa). The 28 The managing directors (MD) of the six departments oversee two more tiers in the hierarchical structure and, in case of the geographic departments, also have one or more general regional unit report to them, such as II.1 on Pan-African affairs. Departments I, II, III, and IV are split into two parallel sub-branches while the others only have one deputy director. 29 COHOM has regular meetings which consist of human rights experts from member states and EU Comm representatives and they can set up specific informal working groups or task forces, for example, for the preparation of a policy, such as the LGBT toolkit (see Chapter 8). 30 Even though the EU has also raised LGBTI issues in these multilateral forums and has pushed for a second UN resolution on LGBTI, for example, the main focus is on the relationship with third countries.

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department links to the Committee on Africa in the Council (COAFR), a Council working group similar to COHOM but with a regional instead of a thematic focus. Staff need to navigate these complex formal structures, and in these negotiations, there are some topics considered easy to work on and others considered difficult. The former category includes matters of women and children’s rights, which fit neatly into these existing formal structures and align with existing institutions and the EU’s horizon of expectation; the latter category includes matters such as LGBTI, which are plagued by high degrees of contestation. When the EU introduced gender issues into its development cooperation in 1995 through a Council resolution, general consensus in the EU was that this was appropriate, and discussions eschewed mainly around the ways to do this (Elgström, 2000). This ease was enabled through a prior process of connecting human rights and women rights, which had taken place via a number of high-level conferences tightly integrating both concepts.31 This is not to imply women’s rights and what they entail are uncontested, but that incorporating them into EU development policy at the time was possible without much resistance in the organization. Similarly, children’s rights are considered easiest to work on because the sanctity of children is a very strong institution, not just among staff within the EU organization but also on a global level, to which the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as the most ratified human rights convention is testimony. Governed by such strong institutions, challenging children’s human rights would threaten an individual’s and organization’s legitimacy—accordingly, their rights requiring protection is taken for granted. The situation is markedly different for matters of sexual orientation, gender identity, and LGBTI, which are characterized by high degrees of

31 Building onto the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which already referred to “equal rights of men and women,” three international World Conferences on Women’s Rights and a fourth in 1995 on Equality, Development, and Peace in September 1995 in Beijing had taken place. At this last conference, the First Lady Hillary Clinton gave her speech titled “Women’s rights are human rights.” The EU could therefore align itself with debates on a wider international level and the EU Comm refers to this in a communication to the Council and the EU Parl the EU Comm by outlining that: “The European Union contributes to all the international forums for the promotion of women’s rights. Its concerns in this area stem from its general responsibility to protect and promote universal rights, of which women’s fundamental rights form an integral, inalienable and indivisible part” (DEVCO, 1995).

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complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity—particularly in the domain of EU foreign policy—and are polarizing even among member states.32 European Union Delegation and Member State Embassies in Uganda Staff at the EU delegations and member state embassies in Kampala, Uganda’s capital, define the wicked problem very differently from staff in Brussels, as they make sense within a different organizational context, external environment and according to different expectations and sources of legitimacy. In Uganda, as in other third countries, the EU is represented as both a focal- and meta organization—through its delegation and through member states respectively, which form organizational entities and are loosely coupled to EU headquarters in Brussels, and the respective member state capitals. Staff in the delegation and embassies further belong to professional and organizational entity groups by either being part of the political diplomatic section and linked to the EEAS/foreign ministry or the development section and are linked to the EU Comm DEVCO/foreign ministry or development ministry. In its capacity as a meta organization, the EU is represented through its delegation and some of its member states, as organizations in their own right, via their own embassies, each with their own sources of legitimacy.33 The EU’s legitimacy again depends on all the member states. While the Treaty of Lisbon placed the EU delegations in a coordinating role in third countries, decisions in Uganda—given the intergovernmental nature of foreign policy—must be taken together with member state embassies of the 10 member-state countries represented in Uganda via embassies.34 32 The staff member who has worked on both children’s and LGBTI’s claims, it is “[t]he worst file” and “the polar opposite” to children’s rights [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS _ Mid_PD25_MarL]. 33 The number of foreign representations in a country allows for some inferences on how important it is considered by other countries but of course the number is also affected by the ties between the countries and the security situation in the country or available infrastructure. 34 The member states “shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union’s action in this area. … They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations” (The Member States, 2009b, Art. 24.3).

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This diplomatic framework, due to interlinking competencies, makes the situation complex. On top of their meshing competencies, delegation and embassies, while being extensions of the EU and their respective nation-states, are also organizational entities in themselves, focal organizations with their own internal dynamics which are also influenced by formal structure such as size. All these aspects, including the number of staff members and main tasks, influence staffs’ navigation of the LGBTI topic. Delegation and embassy size can vary greatly, from being a threeperson office to employing several hundred staff members in some countries. While job titles vary from embassy to embassy, there are usually strict formal hierarchies structuring embassies and delegations. These are particularly important when liaising externally, where behavior is governed by diplomatic etiquette and where communication typically happens on shared hierarchical levels—levels that, because of the different titles involved, can sometimes be difficult to establish [event_UG_MS_ KoningsDag_PD93]. The Ambassador and the Head of Delegation lead the embassy and EU delegation, respectively, and they not only represent but embody the member state and EU, respectively. These high-level positions are followed by the deputy, often referred to as the first secretary, who is also usually the head of the political section or the operational section or both. They manage a team of diplomats,35 also called officers, who usually work on several different topics each, from trade relationships to specific large infrastructure projects; and as the “experts,” they are in contact with the relevant government officials, businesses, and CSOs. These diplomatic international staff members are usually on rotation, i.e., they are only ever posted to a country every 4 to 6 years. The general every day running of an embassy and its activities is ensured by several (often) host country nationals, who are employed as secretaries, cleaners, drivers, and security personnel.36 Unaffected by rotation and usually from 35 The appointment process of diplomats and their training differ considerably from country to country with some more formalized programs like a degree program, while other countries train their diplomatic staff more on the job. 36 There are generally two types of contracts in embassies and delegations, international

and national. International contracts are better remunerated, but internationals can also be employed on national contracts, while nationals of the host country cannot usually be employed on international contracts. International contracts are usually also linked to immunity, and they have to be approved by the host country. EU member state embassies have different rules around the employment of local staff. While countries like Germany

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the country or, at least, region, they usually have substantive tacit knowledge of the local environment and often function as “cultural” translators and filters.37 The EU delegation and member state embassies generally have two main tasks38 : (a) fostering political, economic, and cultural relations and (b) administering development aid. These tasks subsequently alter the relevant horizon of expectation. The task of a traditional diplomat in the political section of an embassy in a country like Uganda is mainly diplomatic representation at events, negotiations with the host government, strategy formulation, and, to a large extent, gathering information and reporting to headquarters, i.e., to produce knowledge (Neumann, 2012). The task of someone working in the operational section, i.e., development section, is to oversee development projects funded by the embassy or delegation or the respective country and to spend the allocated amounts effectively.39 The EU delegation in Uganda is an average size delegation with 55 staff members in total. Structured into five sections, each with its own head of section,40 the political section is rather small with four staff members, compared to the development section, which has 28 staff members. All staff members are either listed as EEAS or EU Comm (DEVCO) staff, the latter outnumbering the former 42 to 13, indicating

do not employ local staff above assistant level, other embassies, such as the Netherlands, employ local staff also in officer roles. 37 They act as translators because they provide context knowledge for the foreign diplomats and as filters by using their own contacts, for example, to government officials. 38 EU delegations do not have consular powers, i.e., they cannot issue visas which is a main task of an embassy or consulate. Visa for the EU Schengen area therefore always have to be applied for at and issued by one of the member states. It is also the member state embassies that are responsible for their own nationals in the host country. 39 Embassies are responsible for these operational areas to different extents as sometimes other official organizations exist which are more or less separate from the embassy, for example, the British Council responsible for art and cultural representation or the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) responsible for the majority of the German development assistance in host countries. 40 The five sections of the EU Delegation in Uganda are: Head of Delegation section with two staff members; Political, Press and Information with four staff members; Cooperation with 28 staff members; Finance, Contracts, Audits with eight staff members; Administration with 13 staff members.

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where priorities lie.41 The EU delegation in Kampala is situated on the top two floors within a modern high-rise building with different kinds of offices, accessible via a special elevator after an initial security check on the ground floor and security passport check before one enters a waiting room area decorated with posters on EU aid and great views over Kampala. The physical workspace of embassies differs widely and ranges from one floor in an office building, like the Dutch embassy in Kampala, to a whole block of buildings, including a swimming pool and generous gardens, as in the British Embassy. Human Rights and LGBTI in the EU Delegation and Embassies in Uganda The topic of human rights for LGBTI persons in Uganda at the EU delegation, as well as in many embassies, is located at two levels in the hierarchy—the senior level, i.e., the ambassador or political affairs attaché, and as part of a singular mid-level staff member’s remit in the development cooperation section. In an EU delegation locally, there is usually just one person formally responsible for all human rights issues on a political level, alongside several other issues,42 yet this person does not necessarily have a background or any particular knowledge, interest, or expertise in human rights when assigned the topic. Where they do, these staff members can have considerable agenda-setting powers: when tasked with preparing the monthly Head of Mission meetings, for example, they can put human rights onto the agenda, which otherwise would not get discussed, after which the topic “trickles down” the hierarchy, with other staff having to take note [KE_EU_Del_Mid_PD16]. Due to the abovementioned duty to cooperate with the EU in foreign policy, it matters which countries have embassies in Uganda because their national policies on particular issues also influence cooperation

41 The section Head of Delegation and Political, Press and Information are exclusively EEAS but those working in the largest section dealing with development cooperation, and are considered the “operational” side, and those working for the finance, contracts, audits section are exclusively Commission staff. The administrative staff section is mixed and comprised of both, EEAS and EU Commission staff. 42 Since 2013, EU delegations have staff who are assigned the position of designated Human Rights Focal Points. These can be either EEAS or DEVCO staff.

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with the EU delegation and each other at the country level.43 The ten countries represented through an embassy in Uganda, with the exception of Romania, are mostly richer EU countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom) and long-standing EU members, i.e., members since at least 1995 (see Annex 5 for table overview).44 Diplomats describe the group of ambassadors as generally a “homogenous group” [UG_MS_High_ PD65_JD] with reference to the topic of human rights for LGBTI persons. In general, these countries have domestic legislation and policies that surpass the EU minimum requirements of non-discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation at the workplace as prescribed through the 2000 Employment Equality Directive (Directive Establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation 2000/78/ EC 2000). In addition to the mentioned EU member states embassies, Norway and the United States are also present through their own embassies—both countries are considered “like-minded” with regard to LGBTI issues by EU delegation staff [UG_EU_del_mid_PD60] and their representatives join or organize meetings with the EU member state embassies and have issued statements together with the EU delegation and member state embassies.

Economic Underpinnings of a Normative Union In addition to partially interlacing structures, the parallel existence of the EU’s original main purpose as an economic community and its façade of a normative union, creates tensions which need to be navigated. The Treaty of Rome (1957) established the European Communities (EC), encompassing the prior established European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the new EEC. Nondiscrimination then became embedded in the EC’s functioning out of a market logic to ensure fair competition among the member states via

43 In Uganda, 18 EU member state countries are represented, out of which ten have an embassy in Kampala. The other countries have merely consulates whose main task is to process visa applications and to handle matters relating to own nationals in the countries but not development aid nor political diplomacy. 44 Romania as the only Eastern European country which only joined the EU in 2007 also has an embassy. In addition, Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Malta, Poland, and Spain have consulates in Uganda.

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a firmly embedded market-based approach (Christensen, 2001, p. 52; McCrudden & Kountouros, 2006, p. 30). Economic and market reforms were legitimized by accompanying social policies said to have subsequently self-emancipated from their market integrationist origins, moving the EU existentially toward a social citizenship model, in which it became guarantor of fundamental social rights (Bell, 2002, p. 2; Kochenov, 2006, p. 487). As part of this shift, non-discrimination, as an EU ideal, is said to have changed from being the means to an end (common market) toward an aim in itself (Craig & Búrca, 2011, p. 390). The development of intra-EU social policies has not completely followed the nation-state model that is democratically legitimated across the continent. The underlying principle of EU citizenship (introduced with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992) has remained market-based and is closely related to the freedom of movement, rather than to social welfare programs or political participation (Wobbe & Biermann, 2009, p. 47). Although the European Parliament has been endowed with greater decision-making powers vis-à-vis the EU Commission and the EU Council, the EU is still not democratically legitimized through direct means, with political participation primarily possible only through national parliaments. This constellation is relevant because it contributes to the complexity of differing horizons of expectations and associated strive for legitimacy. One EU, Three Pillars The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) transformed the European Economic Communities into the EU, characterized by a so-called pillar structure that distinguished policy areas with various levels of integration and, therefore, three differing modes of decision-making: one EC pillar at supranational level dealt with by the European Community as a whole, another on CFSP, and a third on Police and Judicial and Co-Operation in Criminal Matters—the third of which is dealt with on an intergovernmental yet cooperational basis. The treaty, having allocated development policy into a separate policy area in the budget, also “committed EU member states to coordinate actions” (Cosgrove-Sacks, 2000). The EU Commission itself was granted the competence to represent the EU in economic relations, and, by 1996, the EU Commission was represented with offices in 140 countries implementing development policy as a major donor (Cosgrove-Sacks, 2000, p. 5).

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Human Rights Become Part of EU Primary Law Similar to social policies, human rights can be considered an addendum and was not initially central to the EU. Human rights initially were used— particularly by way of the ECJ—primarily to legitimate further integration on the supranational level. Beginning in the 1970s, the ECJ, in its judgments as a “general principle of Community law,” started applying fundamental rights (e.g., Internationale Handelsgesellschaft bH v Einfuhrund Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970) despite their lack of explicit mention in the Treaty of Rome.45 These references to the higher legitimate legal order of fundamental rights46 allowed for greater judicial integration, as it supported the ECJ’s claim of supremacy over member states’ constitutional courts (McCrudden & Kountouros, 2006). At the same time, it established the ECJ as interpreter of international human rights law next to the ECtHR and, in its famous 1998 ruling on Grant v South-West Trains, established a new legal category of sexual orientation as a ground for non-discrimination for the EU (Lisa Jacqueline Grant v South-West Trains Ltd, 1998), in contrast to earlier rulings of the ECtHR.47 The ECJ’s non-discrimination jurisprudence was formally codified in EU primary law. The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1999 was the first treaty to refer to human rights and explicitly included the category of sexual orientation as a protected ground of discrimination. The treaty also established human rights and non-discrimination as founding and main principles of the Union, respectively, and empowered the Commission to take steps to prevent discrimination on grounds of race and ethnicity, religion or belief, disability, age, and sexual orientation (Craig & Búrca, 2011, p. 854). Three years later, in 2000, making use of the powers conferred to it by 45 This can be regarded as part of a more general global trend of increased importance of jurisprudence over legislation and the postulate of equality over difference based on the idea of human rights (Wobbe, 2009, p. 40). 46 Fundamental rights can be regarded as a transposition of human rights into community law. 47 The ECJ claims independence in interpretation of international human rights law and sets separate legal precedents applicable to EU member states, which can sometimes even stand in conflict with ECtHR rulings, even though in many cases the ECtHR and the ECJ refer to each other’s judgments. In the Grant case, the ECJ did not follow jurisprudence of the ECtHR on non-discrimination and instead of categorizing sexual orientation under sex, it created a different category of sexual orientation, reinforcing its sovereignty over the interpretation of international human rights law for within the EU.

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the Amsterdam Treaty, the Council passed the 2000/78/EC Employment Equality Framework Directive, which anchored sexual orientation formally within the EU’s non-discrimination policies as primary legislation binding for all member states.48 Fundamental Rights as the EU’s “Almost Constitution” In the early 2000s, a Constitutional Treaty, that would have supplanted the various EU treaties into one comprehensive, was conceived, bringing the EU closer to a “United States of Europe” in introducing a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and expanding the qualified majority vote in the Council to additional areas (but without the CFSP, which would still require unanimity). This vision of a United States of Europe did not become reality for the vetoes of a number of countries. Importantly, however, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (first proclaimed on 7 December 2000) linked sexual orientation and gender identity explicitly to fundamental rights (applicable within the EU).49 In its preamble, the Charter refers to sources of human rights law—the European Convention of Human Rights and the ECtHR—yet remains distinct from both. With these references, it describes sexual orientation and gender identity as characteristics protected from discrimination and links it to human rights codified by another international organization, establishing a first close link between these concepts in EU policy. The Charter thus integrated a concern for fundamental rights in the EU’s law and crafting of policy, “facilitated by the fact that the acquis of the EU in the area of fundamental rights was now codified into a single catalogue of rights that was perceived as highly legitimate” (De Schutter, 2011, p. 3). The Charter was adopted in Strasbourg on 12 December 2007 and entered into force only with the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty of Lisbon, a compromise after the failed Constitutional Treaty, was ultimately successfully approved by all member states because it made certain concessions. It amended two earlier treaties: the TFEU

48 As the title of the directive suggests, this was only the case within the domain of employment. 49 In both Art. 20 on the application of the Charter and Art. 21, a free-standing article on non-discrimination—i.e., a clause that does not only refer to other articles of the Charter or EU citizens but more generally to anyone within the EU’s jurisdiction.

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and the TEU and avoided the use of certain statehood-associated vocabulary (e.g., “constitution” and “embassies”) present in the failed Constitutional Treaty50 (mentioned above) it was created to replace (The Member States, 2009a).51 It kept unanimity as requisite in the EU’s decisionmaking in CFSP and can thus be regarded as a compromise between calls for greater integration with limited accountability to citizens and the preservation of member states autonomy. Together with the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force on 1 December 2009,52 the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights became legally binding on member states (ascribing it the same status as the treaties) with one limitation: with a separate protocol Poland and the UK ensured that the Charter could not be used to claim inconsistencies between UK law and the Charter, thus proofing its own legal system against “interference” through the ECJ.53

Aiming for Coherence Organizations striving for legitimacy to survive do so within the metaframe of modernity, which prescribes coherence and unitary actorhood, as these are closely linked to rationality. Accordingly, the main aim of the Lisbon Treaty, as the substitute for the Constitutional Treaty, was to strengthen the EU’s role as a unitary organization on the international level vis-à-vis other organizations (third countries and other international organizations), through ensuring greater coherence (Craig &

50 The Constitutional Treaty was never ratified due to lost referendums in France and the Netherlands. The rejection of an EU constitution by voters in these two countries were interpreted by some as reflecting the “perception that human rights, and social issues more generally, are still not given sufficient importance” (McCrudden & Kountouros 2006, p. 31). 51 The TEU sets out the more general provision with regard to the EU’s governance and external action while the TFEU includes more specific policy provisions, including on the EU’s external action and development cooperation. 52 The Treaty of Lisbon, already a compromise after the failed Constitutional Treaty, was also rejected in a first referendum by Ireland, but approved in another subsequent referendum in the country, allowing for ratification by all (then) 27 member states in December 2007. 53 The UK, with the 1998 Human Rights Act, had effectively already integrated the European Convention on Human Rights into its national law allowing UK courts to pass the judgment but in case of the Charter rejected the feared ECJ’s expansion of power.

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Búrca, 2011, pp. 302–303).54 Coherence matters on several dimensions: between different EU policy areas (e.g., development policy and political cooperation), between member states’ policies, between member state and EU communications, and between EU internal and external policy (the EU practices internally what it promotes externally) over time (the EU walks the talk, i.e., does what it says) (Duke, 2011; Lerch & Schwellnus, 2006). The Treaty itself prescribes several changes to meet this expectation of increased coherence. Coherence Within the EU The Treaty of Lisbon pioneeringly gave legal personality to the EU as a whole entity (Art. 47 TEU). For the first time, the EU became a singular whole entity that included the member states. With regard to the EU’s internal direction at the existential level, the Lisbon Treaty declared “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and the respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities” ex-post as founding principles of the EU on the basis that these values are “common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail” (Art. 2, TEU). These values were linked to the rights included in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (enacted into force with the Treaty of Lisbon), which, in turn, are portrayed as a direct derivative of the “constitutional traditions common to member states” (Article 6, TEU) (see also Pernice, 2008, p. 240). Together, this creates a triad of legitimacy at different levels, with values close to natural law at the highest level of abstraction, positive law at the regional level,55 and legal tradition at the nation-state level. The evocation of shared values and their advancement in the “wider world” can be seen as the necessary continuation of the attempt to create a European identity or culture to increase legitimacy in other areas. The EU, as a union of independent countries, each with their own traditions, 54 Coherence and consistency are often used interchangeably also by formal EU documents and also depend on the language they are translated into (Duke, 2011). See also on this topic (Cremona, 2011; Gebhard, 2017). 55 Positive law refers to human made law in contrast to natural law which is god-given or inherent due to being human as is the case with human rights within regional human rights regimes such as the Council of Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights.

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cultures, and values and governments striving for legitimacy themselves, and therefore a “community of values,” in which “the commitment to human rights becomes the most ready currency” necessary to create such a European identity (Weiler, 2001, p. 229). Such an identity, where it reinforces shared values can also compensate for perceived decoupling (Orton & Weick, 1990, p. 212), for example, of talk and action. As such, the Treaty may serve to help the EU regain credibility for its commitment to human rights vis-à-vis its citizens, in the wake of accusations that the ECJ has engaged human rights discourse and language, respectively, to encroach on member state competencies and to further commercial goals (Craig & Búrca, 2011, p. 399). Coherence Between the Internal and External Dimensions Through their establishment as overarching values and founding principles of the EU itself in the Lisbon Treaty, they could be promoted more credibly abroad, notwithstanding that human rights clauses had been part of the EU’s bilateral trade and cooperation agreements with third countries since the 1990s (McCrudden & Kountouros, 2006, p. 9). Along with the UN Charter and international law, human rights were established as the norms that should guide the EU’s work internationally (Art. 21.1 TEU). Human rights in this case also included sexual orientation, which, as part of the non-discrimination principle, was explicitly listed as a protected ground, not just regarding the policies and activities of the EU itself (Art. 10, TFEU). Accordingly, the Treaty of Lisbon has been described as an important milestone in the EU’s development with regard to its internal and external dimensions of human rights and non-discrimination policy (Guild, 2010).

The EU’s Legitimacy Under Threat Due to the EU’s inherent dynamics at the political and structural levels, its legitimacy remains under constant threat. This threat largely stems from the fundamental tensions that continually arise between the EU’s international and supranational elements and associated chafing between the EU’s autonomous legal and bureaucratic rule over organizational processes and its legitimacy remaining dependent on member states’ parliaments and the general public sphere (see Bach, 2018b, pp. 65–67).

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On a formal level, the EU is reaching for unified actor hood,56 but tensions remain—and have, in some domains, intensified—due to the heightened expectations, the EU’s own treaties evoke. The Treaty of Lisbon, simultaneous to giving legal personality to the EU as a whole (Art. 47 TEU), placed a duty on the EU to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights (Art. 6(2) TEU). This accession, on the one hand, would mean taking EU integration to a new level in bringing the EU closer to becoming an autonomous supra-state as an equal signatory among nation-states (Howard, 2011)57 ; on the other hand, it would eclipse the EU’s autonomy in making it subject to the rulings of the European ECHR and the ECJ, which would lose exclusive jurisdiction over the EU’s legal agreements (European Court of Justice, 2014).58 Despite the aim to integrate the three aforementioned pillars formally into one through the Treaty of Lisbon, de facto, a two-pillar system still exists (Laurensen, 2014, p. 22). The EU has fully integrated its external commercial policy, but, on a political level, there remains no willingness to agree on a “community” option regarding foreign policy because foreign policy is one major aspect of national sovereignty. Hence, the EU’s CFSP remains intergovernmental and separate from other issues (Craig & Búrca, 2011, p. 27; Laurensen, 2014, p. 17). This constellation means that EU foreign policy is still decided exclusively by the Council and requires unanimity of all members which often leads to blockages. Despite the changes the Treaty of Lisbon introduced, the unified actorhood of the EU remains a façade requiring constant reinforcement, particularly in the domain of EU foreign policy. As such, the EU is saddled with the essentially impossible task to strive for a coherent foreign policy to demonstrate its status as a unified organization and, at the same time, cater to multiple demands of member states for sovereignty and the realities of the governing structure. Such dilemmas are said to be dealt with through decoupling to at least partially satisfy the multiple

56 The Treaty of Lisbon gives legal personality to the EU as a whole (Art. 47 TEU) and placed a duty on the EU to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights (Art. 6(2) TEU). On a symbolic dimension, the EU as a whole was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on 2012, the Nobel Prize committee giving external recognition to the EU as a whole (“The Nobel Peace Prize for 2012” n.d.). 57 The 47 Council of Europe (CoE) member states had to agree to an amendment of the CoE statutes for this to become a possibility (Craig & Búrca, 2011, p. 399). 58 This is likely the reason why this accession has not yet taken place.

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and in part contradicting demands (Heintz & Werron, 2014, p. 297). Chapters 8 and 9 sketch out how this situation of unclear competencies and contradicting demands, omnipresent also in the day-to-day work of EU staff, leads to staff at working-level filtering demands, categorizing expectations, de/coupling and enacting the established order back into the world. The other main challenge with the EU’s existential framework, particularly regarding to human rights, arises with respect to normative dimension. Despite the talk about human rights as a founding principle, there remains today no explicit commitment in primary legislation to the protection and promotion of human rights across internal policy in the same way as it exists for foreign policy. This reality involves the accusation that the EU is not leading by example but instead decoupling internal and foreign policy. Furthermore, the EU’s own monitoring body, the FRA’s lacking remit to check member states’ compliance, has led to the accusation of the EU having a double standard when it comes to fundamental/human rights (Craig & Búrca, 2011, p. 393). Its reports and studies, however, can highlight shortcomings and place a spotlight on certain policy areas, as was the case, for example, with the EU’s first survey (launched in 2012) on the experiences of LGBT people across the continent (Fundamental Rights Agency, 2015). A third challenge to the EU’s legitimacy is the questioning of the EU’s image as a normative power able to promote norms beyond its borders (Hyde-Price, 2006; Manners, 2002; Pernice, 2008; Sicurelli, 2010). Constituting a crucial aspect of EU identity, this image, while upheld, increases the EU’s legitimacy with its citizens, even with its underlying market-based model59 ; however, accusations have been articulated that speak to certain inconsistencies: namely, that EU’s human rights promotion has not been engaged consistently across third countries and that aid conditionality has been made use of only very selectively (Duke, 2016, p. 70). The accusation is, in other words, that the EU is not walking the talk: it fails to render its statements speaking to the importance of human rights tangible through action. This cumulates in the accusation of organizational hypocrisy, in which the EU is perceived to merely engage

59 See Lerch and Schwellnus (“[the way] the Union justifies its policies, its demands and criticisms vis-a-vis third countries is an important aspect of the Union’s legitimacy and persuasiveness”) (Lerch & Schwellnus, 2006, p. 317).

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in ceremonial adoption of human rights language and policies decoupled from implementation, which threatens legitimacy (Alston & Weiler, 1998, p. 674; Craig & Búrca, 2011, p. 393; Kinzelbach & Kozma, 2009, p. 617). It includes the accusation of practicing cultural imperialism, for example by promoting a predominantly “Western” discourse of sexual orientation and gender identity in form of the “LGBT model” (Weeks, 1995) and “Western values” beyond EU’s borders and therefore engaging in a “civilizing mission” (Linklater, 2005).

Summary This chapter outlined two interrelated elements relevant to understanding what orchestrates the EU’s functioning: its formal organizational structure, and the norms and expectations that form the environment in which it operates. The complexity of the EU’s foreign policy apparatus became apparent in the fact that the EU remains an emergent polity consisting of intergovernmental and supranational aspects that have continually risen and been changed over time. As an organization consisting of many focal organizations, most notably the newly established (2010) EEAS, the EU’s internal formal and informal interplay is complex, with competencies and administrative processes often unclear—a complexity also apparent in the locus of the topic of LGBTI within the formal structures of the organizational entities of the EU Comm DEVCO and the EEAS. The ambiguity stems from the EU as a meta organization which requires convincing as a unitary entity on one hand, while on the other hand each member state vies for autonomy to stay legitimate vis-à-vis its citizens. Therefore, two forces are pulling the EU in different directions: greater EU integration and national autonomy. It is therefore a constant struggle for the EU to appear coherent and consistent to the extent requisite for claiming and retaining status as a legitimate unitary actor and one which plays out at the level of mid-hierarchy staff at the EU headquarter and the delegations in engagement with CSO and member states representatives.

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CHAPTER 7

Human Rights for LGBTI in EU Foreign Policy

Particular constellations of factors form the preconditions of the complex processes that engendered the embedding of LGBTI as a human rights topic within EU foreign policy: One is the EU’s institutional environment, another its political constellation. A third factor were developments in Uganda in the mid-to-late 2000s, in interaction with the ability of specific EU staff to recognize opportunities and to link the construct of LGBTI to core frames of the EU which allowed staff to translate the issue at the micro-level of the EU’s work environment. This chapter addresses environmental and contextual factors. Its aim is to provide a detailed, but by no means exhaustive, account of the greater surroundings which shaped the emergence of LGBTI as a topic of EU foreign policy before subsequent Chapters 8 and 9 detail developments in the ongoing stream of sensemaking cues that undergird them. These chapters are based on interviews, close readings of pertinent documents, and abductive inference grounded in background knowledge of the aspects that structure everyday work at a public administration. This chapter speaks to the mutually constitutive translation of the idea of human rights for LGBTI persons in Brussels and Uganda. A timeline of events in both geographic locations, in Brussels, Belgium, the “capital” of the EU, where the main EU organizational entities are physically located—and Kampala, Uganda’s capital and political center,

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provides an overview of interconnections, which have importance detailed in the following parts of this chapter (Table 7.1).

Travels of an Idea Some 2000s-era shifts to the EU’s organizational environment and to the broad institutional environment within which the EU stakes its claim as a legitimate actor played roles in the topic of LGBTI issue’s initial receiving of tangible attention at EU headquarters in 2009. Among them is contrarian ideology—a counter idea, against the protection and promotion of human rights for LGBTI persons—that had traveled and was noted around the turn of the twenty-first century, outside the EU, in particular African countries.1 Attention to this phenomenon was brought to bear by CSOs and scholars, who offered reflection and analysis on what they saw as a “trend” of homophobia and how homosexuality was portrayed as “Western” in African countries, in opposition to “African” cultures (Hoad, 2000; Reddy, 2001, p. 85). Buttressing such discourse was practice: National LGBTI CSOs in North America and Europe increasingly worked on LGBTI topics with an international angle. With greater legal protections for LGBTI persons becoming reality in an increasing number of European countries,2 resources were available, allowing work on issues outside their borders. This shift of engagement opened a pathway to pursue continued legitimacy of LGBTI rights, in the wake of the legalization of same-sex marriage in a number of EU countries, which gave rise to thinking the movement’s main aims had been achieved. Increased public attention to the plight of LGBTI persons outside of the EU and those within the EU claiming asylum on the basis of their sexual orientation, motivated solicitations for support by EU LGBTI-focused CSOs, and reinforced the categorizing countries with regard to their LGBTI policies into those considered “perpetrating” countries, on one side, and “saviors,” on the other.3 1 These counter ideas also existed inside of the EU but in media reporting one focus

was very much on “the other” countries and their homophobic policies. 2 For example, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, and Sweden opened up marriage for samesex couples within the first decade of the twenty-first century. 3 For example, in Germany, the Hirschfeld-Eddy Trust was founded in 2007 with the aim to further the protection of human rights for LGBT persons, support human rights activists, and fight prejudice (Hirschfeld-Eddy-Stiftung, n.d.-a). Stonewall in the

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Table 7.1 Timeline of events Brussels, Belgium 1990s

1999 2000

Homophobic remarks by Ugandan presidents and officials Treaty of Amsterdam includes human rights and sexual orientation Employment Equality Directive 2000/78/EC includes sexual orientation

2003

2004

Public outcry against attempt to introduce homosexuals as “vulnerable minority group” into report to government EU Parl resolution on Annual Report on Human rights in the World mentioning sexual orientation

2005

2006

Yogyakarta Principles published by independent experts

July–December 2009 25 September 2009 01 December 2009

EU Council Presidency of Sweden Media attention in the U.S. and in Europe on the Ugandan AHB Lisbon Treaty enters into force and with it the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU EU Parl resolution on AHB Uganda

17 December 2009 January–June 2010 Council Presidency of Spain 08 June 2010 LGBT toolkit passed October 2010

01 December 2010 01 January 2011

Kampala, Uganda

Ugandan constitution changed to define marriage as between a man and a woman Red Pepper newsletter publishes list of alleged homosexuals

Ugandan AHB proposal published

Rolling Stone Newspaper article publishes names and pictures of alleged homosexuals under the headline “Hang them!”

EEAS founded EEAS formally takes up work

(continued)

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Table 7.1 (continued) Brussels, Belgium 26 January 2011 17 May 2011 17 June 2011 October 2011

01 December 2011 2012

Murder of Ugandan LGBTI activist David Kato EEAS statement on IDAHO Day uses “LGBTI” First UN resolution on human rights, sexual orientation, gender identity David Cameron introduces “aid conditionality” by threatening to cut aid to all countries criminalizing same-sex sexual acts EEAS takes over responsibilities of EU Comm DG RELEX Council conclusions on Civil Society as the root of democracy and sustainable development in Europe’s external relations

2012

25 June 2012

19 June 2013 17–19 June 2013 24 June 2013 20 December 2013 20 December 2013

New version of AHB introduced without death penalty First EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human rights and Democracy with LGBTI guidelines passed in Council LGBTI guidelines passed by COREPER ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly in Brussels LGBTI guidelines passed in Council Ugandan Parliament passes AHB without quorum Statement by EU HR/VP Catherine Ashton on the adoption of the AHB in Uganda

24 February 2014 28 February 2014

04 March 2014

Kampala, Uganda

President Museveni signs AHA into law Public Statement on the AHA undersigned by Diplomats in Uganda from EU member states, the EU delegation, as well as the US, Australia and Iceland Declaration by the EU HR/VP on behalf of the EU on the AHA

(continued)

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Table 7.1 (continued) Brussels, Belgium 2014

August 2014

Kampala, Uganda

EEAS issues internal guidelines on the LGBTI guidelines specifically for Africa Constitutional court annuls AHA on formal grounds

CSO engagement included lobbying efforts vis-à-vis national governments to include the topic in foreign policy and encouraged exchange with activists from the “Global South”. Some LGBTI-activists from the “Global South”, who spoke English and presented the “right” stories, were increasingly invited to Europe as panelists and to present on the situations in their home countries. These narratives were based on personal stories of hardship, discrimination, and violence toward LGBTI persons and were accompanied by appeals for support from EU countries or the EU itself in the form of applying pressure on the home government (BMZ & LSVD, 2013; European Commission, 2014; HirschfeldEddy-Stiftung, n.d.-b; Hirschfeld-Eddy-Stiftung & Dreilinden, 2013; “Pride and Prejudice: Homosexualität und Religion in Subsahara-Afrika. Stärkung von LSBTI Menschenrechten”, 2014). These visits provided platforms and opportunities for activists to meet directly with EU member states foreign ministers or their staff. Public discourse on the legal situation of gay people in countries outside the EU gained prominence, as individual cases of people seeking asylum in EU member states on the basis of sexual orientation became public,4 and the ECtHR passed a judgment on the matter, highlighting the aspect of criminalization which, according to the judgment, can

UK, Europe’s largest national organization for human rights for LGBT persons started its international work in 2011 (Stonewall 2016). 4 For example, in Germany, already in 2005 the feature film “Unvailed” (“Fremde Haut” in German starring Jasmine Tabatabai) had addressed the topic of a woman fleeing from Iran to Germany because she faced the death penalty in her home country Iran for being lesbian. In the UK, for example in 2008, there were reports on people seeking asylum in different EU countries on grounds of their sexual orientation for fear of execution or torture in their home countries (“Gay Iranian granted asylum in UK”, 2008).

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amount to persecution and thus be a valid reason for an asylum claim.5 The “problem” arrived in EU countries from the margins, in the form of LGBTI asylum seekers. EU-external developments were interrelated with contemporaneous changes in the EU as an organization. These developments included the explicit mentioning of sexual orientation in the EU’s internal non-discrimination policy via the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam and the Employment Equality Directive 2000/78/EC.6 Formal internal policy changes were not the only shifts. The EU Parl, likewise published, as part of the EU Parl’s Annual Report on Human Rights in the World in 2004, a resolution that gave explicit first mention to the topic of human rights and sexual orientation in the context of EU foreign policy (European Parliament, 2004). In this resolution, the topic, although a minor point, was unmistakably tangible: the document, in its exact references to “sexual orientation” and “same-sex consensual sexual relationships,” linked the topics to human rights, non-discrimination, and the death penalty—three frames that, despite the EU Parl’s lack of formal role with regard to foreign policy, would be taken up by subsequent resolutions and policies (e.g., the LGBTI toolkit).7 The resolution advanced clear expectations to combat abuses based on sexual orientation worldwide, imploring the EU Council and Commission to take action vis-à-vis 5 The ECJ departed in a judgment on asylum seekers (ECJ - C-199/12, C-200/12 and C-201/12, Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel v X, Y and Z) on grounds of sexual orientation from the judgment of the ECtHR in the case of Dungeon vs. UK (see Chapter 5). The ECtHR held that that criminalization can amount to persecution and that the existence of laws is therefore enough for a violation. The ECJ, in the case XYZ vs. xx, ruled that “the criminalisation of homosexual acts per se does not constitute an act of persecution” but that there needs to be indication that it is actually applied. 6 This directive establishes a general framework for equal treatment in the area of employment and occupation on the ground of grounds of religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation. 7 The role of the EU Parl is assessed differently by staff of the EU Commission working for DEVCO and staff working on LGBTI issues at the EEAS, the former being more independent of member states, while the latter in EU common foreign policy relies on member states’ consensus. (“EU Parliament has nothing to say in foreign policy and a declaration is a statement good for the media but does not have direct influence”) [BE_ EU_Comm_DEVCO_Mid_PD8]. A staff member working on human rights for LGBTI persons at the EEAS says that the “resolution of the EU Parliament is taken very seriously by EEAS. It is also a good reference document on moral value and guidance. We would use it to support our cause – it’s a good temperature check” [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_ PD10].

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third countries that criminalize same-sex sexual behavior.8 It therefore started to shape a horizon of expectation with regard to the EU’s foreign policy. Around the same time, certain member states, particularly those with high levels of domestic LGBTI protection, began to incorporate issues of sexual orientation within their foreign policy, however, neither these activities nor the EU Parl’s resolution had immediate wider effect [BE_ CS_Mid_PD5_KS]. A former staff member of the then-titled European Parliament’s Gay and Lesbian Intergroup9 said while in 2005, some member states, such as the Netherlands, incorporated issues in the orbit of sexual orientation in their foreign policy,10 neither the member states, generally, nor the EU Commission were interested in working on the topic on a political level.11 Soon after, in 2006, human rights experts

8 The resolution mentions sexual orientation for the first time in its thematic section titled “Human rights and fighting terrorism,” in which it implores countries not to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation, along with other protected grounds, during measures of emergency (European Parliament, 2004, para. 108). The second mention arrives in the resolution’s section on the death penalty, in which the EP “urges states which impose the death penalty on persons accused of same-sex consensual sexual relationships to abolish such laws and judicial practices;” (European Parliament, 2004 para. 168). Later on in the resolution, the EP calls on the EU Commission and Council to “address and take concrete measures in respect of those countries which have laws that discriminate on the grounds of sexual orientation; calls on those countries which have laws that make same-sex consensual sexual relationships between adults a criminal offence to abolish them;” (European Parliament, 2004, para. 215). 9 It is now called the European Parliament’s LGBTI Intergroup. While located at the EP and financed by individual MPs, the Intergroup also lobbies and works with the EU Comm. Its main aims at the time were, according to the staff member, awareness raising of the topic of LGBTI, advocacy, influencing the EU organizational units of the EU Parl and EU Comm, and providing support to those Members of the European Parliament who worked on the topic. 10 EU member states whose national policies and legislation already provided farreaching protection against discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation were among the first to incorporate LGBTI issues in foreign policy, such as Sweden, mainly in the form of ad-hoc interventions, e.g., with short-term NGO programs and through conferences and meetings, without specific policies in place, as a 2005 report by SIDA, the national Swedish development organization found (Samelius & Wågberg, 2005, pp. 47–48). 11 Within the EU, LGBTI still was mostly avoided as a supranational topic. Neither the Council nor the EU Commission DG RELEX in Brussels, responsible for foreign policy, showed much interest to start working on LGBTI issues at the political level within foreign affairs, according to the then-coordinator of the European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBTI Rights (“There was no real appetite from the Member States or

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drafted the Yogyakarta Principles (see Chapter 5)—without any official mandate—and its impact was ultimately unclear.12 A Counter Idea One reason why the topic of human rights for LGBTI persons gained importance was because its counter idea13 traveled. Homosexuality and how best to deal with it had been a topic of Ugandan politics and had been framed in particular ways long before human rights for LGBTI persons became a topic for EU foreign policy. Already in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Ugandan government representatives are on record for condemning homosexuality and labeling it a “Western” concept.14 In these statements, they do not simply condemn homosexuality. Uganda’s head of state Museveni, for example, explicitly made reference to the increase in protection of human rights for LGBTI persons in the U.S., showing they have been noted in Uganda and positioned himself in opposition to these developments. In a statement in 1998, a Ugandan minister of state linked homosexuality and the “West” and implied there are attempts to “rebrand” homosexuals under the term “sexual orientation” to veil its meaning—under what is presumably perceived as more neutral and technical language.15

the EU Commission to push LGBTI through at high-level,” i.e., the political level) [BE_ CS_High_PD05]. 12 As Chapter 8 shows, within the EU Comm’s Annual Activity Reports, sexual orientation only makes occasional appearances and then in relation to non-discrimination rather than human rights. 13 The assignment of one idea as the main idea and another as the counter ideas is arbitrary and depends on the perspective. 14 Already in the 1990s International LGBTI CSOs, such as the U.S.-based Interna-

tional Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) have been reporting for a number of decades now on antihomosexual rhetoric by African politicians, however their reports did not attract attention of policy makers or politicians in Europe. For example, IGLHRC reported that a number of African politicians made homophobic remarks, including Ugandan President Museveni who told reporters that when he had been to the U.S. he had seen “a rally of 300,000 homosexuals. If you have a rally of 30 homosexuals here, I would disperse it” (Hoad, 2007, p. xiii). 15 One Ugandan minister issued a statement in 1998 saying that the “West is bringing up homosexuality and lesbianism under a different name, called sexual orientation” (For a very comprehensive account of statements and news coverage see Bompani & Valois, 2017, p. 56).

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The narrative of homosexuality as a “Western” threat to Uganda’s independence was contested within Uganda. In 2003 report to the Minister of Gender, the proposed Equal Opportunities Commission was urged to address the rights of homosexuals with a different frame, namely as members of the category of a “marginalized social groups in Uganda” (Tamale, 2003, p. 4), and the homophobic narrative was labeled as illogical, with the underlying meaning that it was defying progress and modernity (Tamale, 2003). This proposed counter narrative resulted in much contestation and public and media attention on the topic for the first time in Uganda. The frame of human rights for gay people was strongly rejected by the Ugandan government, the Ugandan women’s movement, and citizens, who reinforced the frame that “homosexuality” was foreign and specifically “Western,” that it posed a threat to Uganda’s independence and needed dispersing, rather than protection and rights. This strong reaction reveals how powerful the link to sovereignty already was, tapping into strong underlying frames of Uganda’s colonial history under indirect rule and continuation of indirect control due to its heavy reliance on aid and “Western” dominance.16 In the following years, this narrative gained strength. In 2004, for example, a government-owned newspaper investigated and published on an allegedly “gay organization” operating at Makerere University (Tatchell, 2007). In 2006, a Ugandan tabloid newspaper, The Red Pepper, published the names of 45 alleged homosexuals.17 The

16 The homophobia expressed in the Ugandan media was categorized by Tamale in her 2003 paper as illogical and placed in opposition to her own reasoning, thereby linking it to modernity, science, and progress (Tamale, 2003). Tamale herself, in later writings, linked the responses to the proposed report to slavery and apartheid and, as an academic, situates herself in the realm of logic where these raw emotions and opinions have no place. She wrote that “the degree and extent of this bias came as a nasty shock to me; such bigotry and injustice I had read about only in history books on slavery and apartheid. That society could vilify the harmless, private, victimless acts of consenting adults defies logic” (Tamale, 2003, p. 1). She further describes that the Ugandan media was “dominated by emotive views and opinions from the public” (Tamale, 2003, p. 1). Tamale herself, were thus also accused by some (and envied by others) for allegedly driving the agenda in exchange for money from the Global North. Interestingly enough, a few years later, Museveni would use natural science to refute the claim that homosexuality was innate and would use this as a basis to justify him signing the antihomosexuality act. 17 Earlier that year a paper in Cameroon had run a similar story which suggests an important role of news outlets on the travel of ideas in this case (Awondo et al., 2012; BBC News, 2006).

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power of these narratives of the counter idea to more rights for LGBTI persons also influenced legal changes: in 2005, as part of a wider constitutional change, Uganda introduced a clause in its constitution which made it explicitly “unlawful for same-sex couples to marry” (Human Rights Watch, 2006; Mujuzi, 2009). This constitutional change happened even though in Uganda, only a small number dispersed LGBTI CSOs were operating, providing support and safe spaces for people, rather than lobbying for marriage or any legal change. In 2007, a number of Ugandan activists held a first press conference, publicly outing themselves and propelling the topic further into public debate in Uganda (Hollander, 2009, p. 48). This increased attention in Uganda did not happen independently of developments elsewhere on the topic of human rights for LGBTI persons. At that time, in the EU, North America, and South Africa, LGBT social movements won legal battles and many countries expanded the rights of LGB people and introduced same-sex marriage.18 Uganda’s constitutional change is therefore a counter idea19 to that of greater equality and more rights for LGBTI persons20 —a counter idea which traveled and was translated into legal form of a constitutional change.

18 In 2005, the state of California first allowed for same-sex marriage, which was, however, highly contested and blocked by the Governor. In the UK, the same-sex marriage act was passed in 2004 and in 2006 the Equality Act made discrimination based on sexual orientation with regard to goods, facilities, and services illegal. In Spain and Belgium, same-sex marriage had been introduced in 2003 and 2005, respectively. 19 In Europe, the EU had passed primary legislation in form of the 2000 workplace directive which prohibited discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and in the early 2000s, several EU member states opened marriage to same-sex couples. At the same time, there were also similar constitutional changes in other countries as well, also within the EU. For example, in 2013 a right wing group in Croatia, which had only become an EU member state a few months prior, called and won a referendum to change the constitution to clearly define marriage as between a man and a woman (The Guardian Online, 2013). 20 For example, the constitutional change in Uganda occurred less than a year before

South Africa passed the Civil Union Act allowing for same-sex couples to marry (Awondo et al., 2012). Not only did South Africa legalize marriage as the fifth country in the world but after its experience of apartheid, it also became one of the only few countries in the world which specifically mentions sexual orientation as one of the prohibited grounds for discrimination in its constitution (Awondo et al., 2012, p. 157).

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The Anti-Homosexuality Bill The rise of LGBTI issues as a matter for EU address was due, in large part, to changes in the external environment—the criminalization of homosexuality—most emblematic in Uganda’s proposal of the death penalty for those guilty. This counter idea led to tension of a previously little attended to topic within the EU’s foreign policy necessitating responses by member states and the EU delegation. A first version of the Ugandan proposal, the AHA, was advanced in 2009 and specifically included the codification of “aggravated homosexuality”21 as a novel offense, for which punishment was the death penalty (Bahati, 2009). Upon the bill’s introduction, its probability of becoming law was quite slim, due to it being first tabled as a private members bill by Mr. David Bahati, a Member of Parliament, rather than a government one.22 Nonetheless, as an “idea whose time has come,” this proposed bill sparked great media interest in Europe and the U.S, becoming party to debates on the death penalty and contravening notions of legislative change toward increased protection and rights for LGBTI persons. Media reports in North America and Europe branded Uganda as the homophobic country and titled the proposed legislation the “Kill-the-gays-bill.”23

21 Aggravated homosexuality is a new concept the bill introduced, which included, for example, situations of repeated offenses, an HIV-positive “offender” or one person being younger than 18 years old. In addition, the bill foresaw life-long imprisonment for someone found guilty of “attempt to commit aggravated homosexuality” (Art. 4(2)) and foresaw punishment of those who were seen as “aiding or abating homosexuality” with imprisonment up to seven years. It also called for the extradition for gay Ugandans living abroad back to Uganda for trial. This provision has no grounding in international law, holding no precedent, even in the case of murderers (Ssebaggala, 2011, 46), as extradition happens on the basis of bilateral agreements. Adrian Juuko and Monica Tabengwa described this as a new quality of legislation as in their interpretation it broadens the criminalization from same-sex sexual conduct to homosexuality per se (Jjuuko & Tabengwa, 2018, p. 66). 22 Under common law, private member bills can be introduced by any MP, but they are given less time to be debated than government bills and only a minority of bills proposed this way become law (House of Commons, 2012). This bill therefore had little chance to ever become formal law. Despite this, the Ugandan Anti-Homosexuality Bill became a crystallization point for EU foreign policy on human rights for LGBTI persons. 23 It may seem curious that the bill received as much media attention in the U.S. where, contrary to the EU, the death penalty is still practiced in a number of states and where a number of states also still have antisodomy laws. In 2008, however, there

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Media attention about the bill prompted public statements from politicians,24 CSOs,25 and EU entities positioning themselves against this bill. Reports on the legal situation of LGBTI persons in other countries had no immediate news value, as such reports had existed for some time; however, the proposed change to introduce the death penalty in Uganda gave rise to a certain urgency to respond, all this compounded by the important EU core value—the abolition of the death penalty. Therefore, the combination of new and more severe legislation on homosexuality and the death penalty resulted in the Ugandan draft bill being noted and given attention. These two factors explain, to some extent, the urgency

arose public debates on the death penalty and executions had hit an all-time low in the U.S., prior to a Supreme Court ruling on whether lethal injections were constitutional. One explanation is the fact that the topic of LGBTI rights was high on the agenda and already received a lot of publicity during the Proposition 8 campaign. A year before the proposed bill in Uganda, in 2008, voters in California had approved Proposition 8, which abolished marriage for same-sex couples in a state generally regarded as one of the most socially liberal in the U.S. Several U.S. states still today have sodomy laws criminalizing intercourse that does not serve a reproductive purpose, even though such laws had been ruled unconstitutional in 2003 (Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) n.d.). 24 U.S. president Barack Obama, for example, specifically condemned the Ugandan draft bill (“Obama condemns Uganda anti-gay bill as ‘odious’” 2010). 25 A senior diplomat of a member state embassy in Uganda says that the topic of LGBTI “was very high on the agenda also for mainstream human rights CSOs,” referring to organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch [UG_MS_High_ PD61_MaJ]. Human Rights Watch published a statement on 15 October 2009 endorsed by a total of 17 international and African human rights organizations and consisting of a common part that clearly framed the issue as a human rights concern, stating that the draft bill “would violate human rights and should be withdrawn immediately” (Human Rights Watch, 2009b). The quote of David Kato, activist and representative of a Ugandan LGBTI organization Sexual Minorities Uganda (SMUG), portrayed the bill as antimodern and anti-African, saying that the bill was “a blow to the progress of democracy in Uganda,” and that it went “against the inclusive spirit necessary for our economic and political development. Its spirit is profoundly undemocratic and un-African.” In contrast, the international human rights organizations’ statements addressed very specific human rights: right to health and right to justice. Human Rights Watch was quoted to raise concern about the bill’s impact on HIV/AIDS prevention. Amnesty International argued that the proposed bill was immoral as it criminalized people for who they are, thereby staying close to the organization’s original aim of fighting unjust imprisonment. The implications for action of the different framings were very different, while Kato’s framing was much more wide-sweeping and general; the other framings could lead to a patchwork of exceptions or protections. Kato therefore reinforced the link of human rights for LGBTI persons modernity and labels countries which criminalized same-sex sexual relationships as “backwards” (see also Gosine, 2015; Klapeer, 2016).

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and attention of other countries with similar or even more severe legislation criminalizing homosexuality (e.g., Iran or Saudi Arabia) is not as high. A European Parliament Resolution On 17 December 2009, 5 years after its first on the topic, the EU Parl passed another resolution,26 specifically on the Ugandan AHB.27 This resolution reflected recent changes in the wide institutional environment and of the legal setting of the EU with the Treaty of Lisbon (see Chapter 6). The EU Parl framed criminalization of same-sex sexual acts by linking it to existing topic areas and refined and reinforced the horizon of expectation. In reference to the death penalty, the Treaty of Lisbon, and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, the resolution codified LGBTI as a human right which linked it to the right to privacy; stipulated that the Bill could have direct effects on international donors and development aid; warned of spill-over effects to other African countries; and reiterated CSO warnings about how the bill could impact HIV/AIDS prevention programs. The EU Parl resolution was direct and specific in outlining expectations for organizations. For one, it called “on the Ugandan authorities not to approve the bill” and requested other (African) regimes to “review their laws” and decriminalize homosexuality. For another, it “call[ed] on the Council and the Commission to make urgent representations to the Ugandan authorities,” and in the case that the bill became law, to “reconsider their involvement with Uganda,” and to extend beyond Uganda by taking a more proactive approach of “concerted international action to promote respect for human rights” (European Parliament, 2009, para. 8).28 26 The Treaty of Lisbon, which had entered into force a few weeks prior, on 1 December 2009, did not grant the EU Parl a formal role in foreign policy but considerably strengthened the EU Parl’s powers with regard to budgetary matters, for example, including development aid. 27 The European Parliament is traditionally very pro human rights. While it formally has no influence in determining EU foreign policy, it does approve the budget of the EU Commission, including that of instruments like the EIDHR, and it can set expectations through resolutions which are difficult for the EU Commission and EEAS to ignore completely. 28 The European Parliament “Calls on the Council, the Commission and the Member States to analyse the situation in third countries in relation to executions, criminalisation

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Formulating Expectations The EU Comm and EU member states with representation in Uganda reacted to the publishing of the Bill with statements—some public, some less blatantly so—whose specifics revealed the underlying institutions at play. At the supranational political level in Brussels, the Commissioner responsible for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Mr. de Gucht, condemned the bill in a public statement and personally wrote to President Museveni, stating, “respect for human rights is of the greatest importance to the Commission and to the European Parliament” and “expressed his confidence to the President that, under his guidance, such retrogressive legislation [would] not be allowed” (“European Parliament Debate Uganda: anti-homosexual draft legislation”, 2009). This communication reinforced the polarization between “backward” (anti-LGBTI) legislation29 and human rights and linked the bill’s death penalty proposal to the EU/Ugandan arrangement of development aid, as the statement was made by the Commissioner of Development and Humanitarian Aid rather than the newly appointed High Representative and Vice President of the Commission Lady Ashton.30 It outlined what was expected of President Museveni, who was addressed as a partner with the power to determine events in his country, regardless of democratic process.31 EU member states who condemned the bill include the United Kingdom, France, and Sweden (European Parliament, 2009; The European Parliament’s LGBTI Intergroup, 2009)—all stakeholders with an interest in Uganda: each hold embassies and are donors to the country. Additionally, the EEAS, in its initial report on Human rights and Democracy in the World Report 2008–2009 and in reference to the Cotonou Agreement, indirectly linked the bill to the agreement’s clause that or discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and to take concerted international action to promote respect for human rights” (European Parliament, 2009, para. 8). 29 The statement cited makes clear that restrictive legislation, curtailing instead of protecting rights based on sexual orientation and gender identity, was portrayed by the EU as outdated and as going against the direction of progress. 30 Lady Ashton had been appointed a few weeks prior to the publishing of the Bill, on 19 November 2009. 31 At the EEAS headquarter in Brussels staff later say they feel there was nothing more they could have done to prevent the Bill from being passed because they “tried to influence the government but if government loses control of events…” [BE_EU_ EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19]. A statement which formulates the clear expectation that the government, dominated by the president Museveni, influences events in his favor.

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allowed for the suspension of cooperation in contexts of human rights violations.32 The Ugandan Government Reaction These initial reactions from the EU’s highest political levels appeared to have their desired effect of persuading the Ugandan government to distance itself from the bill, a view on cause and effect shared by contemporaneous reporting (Rice, 2010a). In December 2009, the Ugandan government, avoiding explicit endorsement of the bill’s ideas, stated it did not support the “promotion of homosexuality” (Ssebaggala, 2011, p. 106). Further distancing efforts came a month later, in January 2010, when the BBC reported Museveni was not in favor of the bill due to its status as a “foreign policy issue,” which he clarified in his calls with the Canadian and U.K. Prime Ministers, and the U.S. Secretary of State. who according to Museveni, had all called him only to talk about “gays” (“Uganda President Museveni wary of anti-gay bill”, 2010). This crystallization is supported by a confidential cable33 sent on 24 January from the U.S. embassy in Kampala to the U.S. Secretary of State. According to the message, Museveni only spoke of the bill during the meeting and said it would “be significantly amended or perhaps shelved completely.” The president was reported to have “stressed that he [was] handling the issue and [had] urged the U.S. to give him space to deal with the legislation internally.” These comments “echo[ed] those of [Ugandan] Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa, assuring the Ambassador on January 21 that the bill [would] likely ‘die a natural death’” (Uganda Kampala, 2010). Shortly after, African countries, such as Burundi, introduced similar legislation, followed by further statements from “Western” politicians condemning the developments (Ssebaggala, 2011, 106). Accordingly, Uganda became synonymous with reversing a trend of human rights for 32 “Towards the end of 2009, the EU expressed concern at the discussion of a Ugandan anti-homosexuality Bill” and that “EU representatives made concerted efforts to remind Ugandan authorities of their international obligations, including under the essential elements of the Cotonou Agreement” (European External Action Service, 2010, p. 146). 33 A cable is a form of written internal diplomatic communication between embassies and headquarters and describes a particular meeting or event that had occurred. The one mentioned above was recently made public together with thousands of other similar documents through WikiLeaks and reports on a meeting between the newly appointed U.S. ambassador to Uganda and President Museveni.

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LGBTI persons—a flashpoint of so-called state-sponsored homophobia in Africa, in which governments played to and amplified anti-gay sentiments in their respective countries through legislation.34 This attention to the topic changed the horizon of expectation for the EU and its member states, pressing the topic of LGBTI into a place of greater visibility in the EU.35 Criminalization as the Problem The murder of prominent Ugandan LGBTI activist David Kato in January 2011, 3 months after the publication of his name on Rolling Stone’s “list of alleged homosexuals” (Rice, 2011), marked a further shift in the EU’s external environment, as influential media outlets, such as the BBC, linked the crime to the Uganda’s AHB, a link that enabled criminalization of same-sex sexual activity being regarded as “the problem” within EU foreign policy. The death called into question Museveni’s assurances to the U.S. embassy that “nobody in Uganda [would] be executed for homosexual behaviour” (Ssebaggala, 2011, pp. 48–49) and that he would “handle” the bill (Bompani & Valois, 2017, p. 58), threatening his legitimate standing with international donors.36 At the same time, 2011 34 In 2009, for example, the government of Burundi passed a law that introduced a two-year prison sentence for same-sex sexual acts (Ssebaggala, 2011, 106). Homosexuality had not been criminalized at all until then (Human Rights Watch, 2009a). Later, other countries, like Nigeria and The Gambia, passed legislation very similar to Uganda’s AHA. These cases all did not receive the same level of public attention, hence did not create the same pressure to react for embassies and delegations. 35 Uganda was known for its “vigorous campaign against HIV/AIDS,” until this, where it became known for “its hardening stance against the LGBT community” (“Uganda country profile”, 2016). 36 The Rolling Stone became (in)famous for publishing the pictures, names, and addresses of 100 alleged homosexual Ugandans on 21 October 2010 with the tagline “Hang Them” (Rice, 2010b). David Kato was a leading activist of the LGBTI community and director of the organization Sexual Minorities Uganda (SMUG). He had also been the plaintiff in a lawsuit against the paper and won. The exact circumstances of his death remain unclear, but the BBC reported that a man confessed bludgeoning him to death with a hammer after David had allegedly made sexual advances at him. The man was subsequently sentenced to 30 years in jail (“Ugandan man jailed for gay murder”, 2011). His murder kept Uganda in the headlines, derided by international press as a homophobic country (Kron, 2012). Awareness among a European public was furthermore raised by events of human rights organizations and through film screenings and other events such as debates and podium discussions. For example, the documentary “Call me Kuchu,”

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being an election year, Museveni’s legitimacy highly depended on being regarded as legitimate by Ugandan citizens and to not be perceived as a “puppet” of donors, which included the EU. The Ugandan government tried to satisfy donors and citizens’ demands by announcing the AHB was “unnecessary,” as homosexuality already constituted a criminal offense— thus neither endorsing the legislation nor condemning it. Three months after David Kato’s death, the Ugandan cabinet subcommittee responsible for amending the AHB, asked that the legislation be withdrawn from Parliament in April 2011 (Bompani & Valois, 2017, p. 60). Development aid cooperation with EU donor countries continued. This episode is strongly reminiscent of indirect rule during the colonial period, when local rulers were supported by the colonial power but not too overtly because it was in the Empire’s interest that they retain legitimacy among the local population. With the end of the Ugandan parliamentary session 1 month later, delegation staff, EEAS staff in Brussels, in unison with international CSOs’ experts, seemed confident the AHB would not reappear on the government’s agenda.37 The media and academics attributed this turn of events to the apparently unexpected and severe international pressures on Museveni (Bompani & Valois, 2017, p. 53), with threats to cut development aid and making this threat a major topic in the diplomatic relationship with the country. Even though the “problem” of the AHB seemed to have thus been “solved,” attention to LGBTI issues did not wane in European countries. As laws were changed across Europe, granting more rights to LGBT persons (with intersex, the “I” of LGBTI, not yet a big topic) and samesex couples, there was a parallel inculcation of sensibility to discriminatory laws arising in other places of the world. There came new public awareness, beyond Uganda, that the introduction of the AHB in Uganda was where the French film team happened to be in Uganda around the time of David’s death and had documented parts of the lawsuit, and homophobic remarks by the pastor leading the funeral service and reactions to his death. In 2012, the film toured film festivals and won numerous prizes in the U.S. and Europe. Screenings were often arranged in collaboration with international human rights organization, such as Amnesty International, and further contributed to raising awareness among the general public regarding the plight of Ugandan LGBTI persons (Amnesty International, 2012). 37 “[The bill] was put on life-support May 13, 2011, at the close of Ugandan’s last parliamentary session, and in all likelihood, will be impossible to revive” (Ssebaggala, 2011).

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about introducing harsher penalties and that same-sex sexual acts were already a criminal offense—in Uganda and other former colonial countries. The issue, thus, became no longer merely about the EU stopping a singular, new piece of legislation in a particular country, but rather about a higher political level EU focus to promulgate the decriminalization of same-sex sexual relationships, widening the focus and changing the horizon of expectation. Negotiating Neoimperialism In October 2011, at a meeting of Commonwealth heads of state, U.K. Prime Minister David Camerons, threatened to cut aid to countries that “ban[ned] homosexuality” (The Guardian, 2011). This threat was noteworthy. As this statement was explicitly against all countries with legislation criminalizing homosexuality, rather than against those introducing stricter laws, it declared the status quo of many African countries, whose penal codes outlawing homosexuality stemmed from colonial times, as untenable.38 This threat by a former colonial power that had “exported” the sodomy legislation in the first place, gave rise to multifaceted backlash; criticism of Cameron’s idea of aid conditionality, of using aid as a lever, came from the potentially affected governments themselves and, perhaps unexpectedly, from LGBTI CSOs. In a statement, 53 organizations working on LGBTI issues across the African continent criticized British “aid cut” threats, pointing to how this idea was based on an inequality stemming from colonial times, with the actual law a direct British Empire relict—a little acknowledged and reported aspect.39

38 To say nothing about its explicitly narrow focus on homosexuality and preventing its banning, versus the full LGBTI spectrum and a broader, more proactive approach to create a climate where LGBTI organizations can register. 39 “The imposition of donor sanctions … does not, in and of itself, result in the improved protection of the rights of LGBTI people. Donor sanctions are by their nature coercive and reinforce the disproportionate power dynamics between donor countries and recipients. They are often based on assumptions about African sexualities and the needs of African LGBTI people. They disregard the agency of African civil society movements and political leadership. … The history of colonialism and sexuality cannot be overlooked when seeking solutions to this issue. The colonial legacy of the British Empire in the form of laws that criminalize same-sex continues to serve as the legal foundation for the persecution of LGBTI people throughout the Commonwealth” (“Statement on British ‘Aid Cut’ threats to African countries that violate LBGTI rights”, 2011).

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The connection between this particular political demand and development aid was therefore delegitimized on grounds of the historic relationship. Prior to Cameron’s statement, LGBTI had already been portrayed as a Western import by proponents of the AHB, a view that Cameron’s statement, as an official policy of the former colonial power, could be read to confirm. Although the CSOs statement gave specific mention to Britain, it also more generally criticized the existing power imbalance between European donor countries and African recipient countries, while simultaneously demanding recognition of African civil society’s agency. This criticism motivated the recasting of aid cuts into the practice of rechanneling aid away from particular governments (those regarded as “sponsoring homophobia”) directly toward CSOs that had developed in parallel (Dunne, 2012).40 While the problem of the bill seemed to have been managed, it had morphed in European public consciousness from being about the AHB in Uganda into a more general “problem” of criminalization of same-sex sexual acts. Further Categorizing the World On an international level, on 17 June 2011, the UN Human rights Council passed its first-ever resolution on sexual orientation and gender identity. The resolution linked the macroframes of human rights’ universality with the principles of dignity and equality and LGBT persons.41 The short document mainly concerned tasking the Human Rights Council with creating a report on violence and discrimination faced by people on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity around the world. Without an explicit focus on a specific region or country, it emphasized the importance of creating an evidence base.42 It passed on 17 40 This idea, while appealing to CSOs hoping for funding, is not as easily implemented, as will become clear later on in Chapter 9. It is also not something that is foreseen in the Cotonou Agreement, for example, which governs the relationship between the EU and “developing countries.” 41 It links to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two covenants to stress the universality, interdependence, indivisibility, and interrelatedness of human rights and human dignity and equality and to a General Assembly resolution 60/251 of March 2006 which affirms that the Human Rights Council should promote human rights for all without any distinction. 42 The resolution expresses “grave concern at acts of violence and discrimination, in all regions of the world, committed against individuals because of their sexual orientation

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June 2011 (23 votes in favor, 19 against—including Uganda—with three abstentions), dividing the world into countries for and against LGBT human rights (Resolution on Human rights , sexual orientation and gender identity, 2011). Six months after this resolution, U.S. President Barack Obama issued a memorandum43 on 6 December 2011, “directing all agencies engaged abroad to ensure that U.S. diplomacy and foreign assistance promote and protect the human rights of LGBT persons” (The White House, 2011). This move by the U.S. as the second largest donor of total official development aid after the EU and its member states, explicitly amalgamated diplomacy, development aid, human rights, and LGBTI persons. International LGBTI CSOs capitalized on this high-level momentum. For example, the ILGA World issued the first world scale overview map (see also Chapter 5), identifying locales of sexual orientation law in May 2012, which ILGA Europe had already been issuing annually for European countries since 2009 (International Lesbian Gay Association (ILGA) 2012). A New Version of the AHB Contrary to the EU delegation’s and member state embassies’ shared expectation that the AHB would never resurface, MP Bahati introduced a new and less draconian version of the AHB in February 2012. This version omitted the death penalty but still suggested life imprisonment for the novel offense of “aggravated homosexuality” (Kron, 2012).

and gender identity” and requests “the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to commission a study … documenting discriminatory laws and practices and acts of violence against individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity, in all regions of the world, and how international human rights law can be used to end violence and related human rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity” (Resolution on Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity, 2011). For a discussion on “evidence base” as a tool of colonial domination see Koro-Ljungberg et al. who claim that “the current discourses defining and operationalizing evidence function as power/knowledge regimes that aspire to maintain the power within the dominant domains of discourses” (Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2009). 43 A presidential memorandum is similar to an executive order. It is a binding law for the executive branch issued by the president of the U.S.

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A few months later, the link between imperialism and human rights for LGBTI persons was discursively reinforced in a speech by Canadian Foreign Minister John Baird and in a direct reply delegitimized as neocolonial. Prompted by the Minister’s critique of Uganda’s human rights record with regard to sexual minorities,44 the speaker of the Ugandan Parliament, Rebecca Kadaga, rejoined, “Uganda is neither a colony nor protectorate of Canada and, as such, her sovereignty, societal and cultural norms are to be respected” (“Kadaga, Canadian minister in gay row”, 2012). Her reproach was legitimized by Ugandan citizens upon her return to Uganda, which motivated her subsequent promise to enact the AHB into law as a Christmas present to Ugandans (Bompani & Valois, 2017, p. 53). The new legislative proposal was again followed by increased intra-EU attention to the broad plight of LGBTI people in Africa. In November 2012, for example, MPs of the Green party requested information from the German government in a Kleine Anfrage, broadly addressing the criminalization of homosexuals in Africa, with particular attention to (proposed) legislation in Uganda and Nigeria. In its own response, the German government reminded of the numerous occasions in which it made its disapproval of the AHB clear to its Ugandan counterparts, while keeping the option of potential repercussions with respect to the countries’ development cooperation arrangement (Deutsche Bundesregierung, 2012). Kadaga kept her promise and, a year later, the new AHB was unexpectedly tabled in Parliament on 20 December 2013 and ultimately passed, only months after the LGBTI guidelines were released by the EEAS in Brussels. This development took the EU delegation and headquarters, as well as member states, by surprise, because of the timeframe—the vote took place only a few days before Christmas, a time during which many diplomats would have already left for holiday—and because (they say) they had been given assurances by the Ugandan government that the bill would be rejected.45 These unexpected developments necessitated sensemaking to ascertain next steps. Interlocutors at the EEAS and the EU 44 This exchange too place at the inter-parliamentary meeting in Canada on 25 October 2012 which the speaker of the Ugandan Parliament was attending. 45 “There was a clear understanding with the senior Cabinet Minister that the bill would not go through. My predecessor had been in touch with the LGBTI community and said the same thing” [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_1].

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delegation claimed this vote happened without the knowledge of the President Museveni [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19, UG_EU_del_High_ PD51_1]. This claimed ignorance justifies continued EEAS’ cooperation with the president. It can also be seen as one way to ex post rationalize their reliance on Museveni’s promise. It does not require great changes in the way of working, even after the vote and the standard tools of influence in form of public statements and informal dialogue with the government continued to be used. At the EU, staff members working at EEAS headquarters in Brussels said, “When Uganda passed the LGBTI bill, [they] reacted immediately” [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD22]. According to the EU delegation’s account, they immediately pressed for a statement from Brussels that was issued the same day, which is said to have been “lightning speed” for the EU [UG_EU_del_High_PD71_2]. This statement shows the announcement is considered an action in itself. It also shows there is pride in having been able to publish a statement very quickly because it is regarded as an accomplishment for those whose task it is to coordinate the different actors. The statement itself can therefore be regarded as an indicator of a successful cooperation. Signed and Annulled Museveni signed the law into force at the end of February 2014,46 leading to great alarm among LGBTI CSOs, activists, and people identifying as LGBTI, many of whom left the country and claimed refugee status

46 In October 2014, two months after a new law had been passed in The Gambia, a round table event took place at the European Parliament organized by the European Parliament’s LGBTI Intergroup. An Amnesty International researcher on the country and two LGBTI human rights defenders reported back on the situation and asked why there were no sanctions levelled against The Gambian government. According responses noted that sanctions would fall within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement, but that it was ultimately up to the EU Commission to propose such a response and to the Council and the member states to then act. Experts at the meeting reported that the EU delegation in the Gambia was hesitant because they reportedly feared negative impact on other areas of their other work, specifically on improving prison conditions [event_BE_EU Parl_Gambia LGBT_PD83]. Even though the topic of the new law was raised with the EU commission, nothing happened. An EEAS staff member said that whether any action is taken depends on the member states’ interest and attention [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD22], but the cases of Uganda and Kenya suggest that it depends on perceived threats to legitimacy through the link to an organizational core mandate where LGBTI is not one itself.

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in neighboring Kenya, as they feared violence and arrest. International human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International, moved its staff member working on LGBTI topics in the East African region from Uganda to Kenya out of worry of repercussions with the new law in force [UG_CS_HR_Mid_PD49_StM]. Six months after it had been signed into law, the AHA was annulled by the Ugandan constitutional court in August 2014, on the ground it had been passed by Parliament without a quorum. The court, which usually takes months, even years, to arrive at decisions on other issues, was fast on this matter [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19]. After intensive lobbying by the EU, the UN Human Rights Council passed a second UN resolution on human rights, sexual orientation, and gender identity in September 2014 (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2014). The EU had pushed behind the scenes for South Africa to again take the lead on this second resolution and the expressed hope was that this would send a strong signal to other African countries and would also avoid for LGBTI to be regarded as a “Western issue.”47 South Africa, in contrast to the first resolution, was no longer prepared to be at the forefront. EEAS staff had not expected that the topic of LGBTI legislation would come back and that countries like South Africa would no longer champion LGBTI issues. They say they were “surprised to see how the situation has changed [for the worse] in three years” [BE_EU_ EEAS_HR_Mid_PD10]. Similarly to the surprise at Museveni signing the law into force, this element of unexpected change justifies why only now a more forceful reaction was prompted. In the end Argentina (see Chapter 5), as a country from the Global South, took the lead which at least meant a non- “Western” country was regarded as advocating the case of human rights for LGBTI persons. In 2016, a third resolution was passed by a slim majority in the Human rights Council, this time mandating an independent expert on LGBTI issues.

47 A DEVCO senior staff member said that “Argentina would take over the lead of

the resolution if South Africa formerly relinquishe[d] leadership” but they also noted that with the African Commission on Human Rights just having passed a first ever resolution condemning violence based on sexual orientation or gender identities, South Africa’s argument to not champion the UN resolution was weaker—a prediction which would not materialize [event_BX_EU_EIDHR_Forum_PD82].

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Summary This chapter traced the travels of the idea of human rights for LGBTI persons and its counter idea and pointed out pertinent changes in the institutional environment of the EU, the particular constellation of which allowed for LGBTI to become a topic and included within EU foreign policy. A particular focus of this chapter was on the interplay between changes in particular EU member states, at the meta organizational level EU in Brussels, on the international level of the UN, and the national level in Uganda. The first part of this chapter therefore established the wider institutional environment and the changes within it as the framework within which EU staff make sense of human rights for LGBTI persons and to which they contribute (as Chapters 8 and 9 detail). Main changes involved criminalization of LGBTI coming to be regarded as a problem and the accusations of neoimperialism, an accusation which required careful calibration of open use of pressure from EU member states and the EU itself. This calibration was necessary to maintain legitimacy and included negotiating the accusation of neoimperialism formulated by multiple organizations in the realm of institutional shifts on the international stage at the UN. Recategorizing and further differentiating between countries merely criminalizing and those actively seeking to further criminalize was one way in which this impasse was dealt with on a macro level. The annulment of the AHA ultimately demonstrates the underlying power structures reaching back to colonial times and how these, within the metaframe of modernity, continue to impact today’s re-embedding of ideas.

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Kadaga, Canadian minister in gay row. (2012, October 25). Daily Monitor. http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Kadaga--Canadian-minister-ingay-row/688334-1594430-t0reff/index.html. Accessed 22 November 2016. Klapeer, C. M. (2016). LGBTIQ-Rechte als Indikatoren von ‚Entwicklung‘? Postkolonial-queere Perspektiven auf entwicklungspolitische Debatten um sexuelle Menschenrechte. In Feministische Kritiken und Menschenrechte. Reflexionen auf ein produktives Spannungsverhältnis (pp. 95–112). Verlag Barbara Budrich. Koro-Ljungberg, M., Gemignani, M., Chaplin, S., Hayes, S., & Hsieh, I. H. (2009). “Mission Civilisatrice”: Fixing Scientific Evidence and Other Practices of Neo-colonialism in Social Sciences. International Review of Qualitative Research, 1(4), 491–513. Kron, J. (2012, February 28). Ugandan Lawmakers Push Anti-Homosexuality Bill Again. The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/29/ world/africa/ugandan-lawmakers-push-anti-homosexuality-bill-again.html. Accessed 26 January 2014. Mujuzi, J. D. (2009). The Absolute Prohibition of Same-sex Marriages in Uganda. International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, 23(3), 277–288. https://doi.org/10.1093/lawfam/ebp001 Obama Condemns Uganda Anti-gay Bill as “Odious.” (2010, February 4). BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8498836.stm. Accessed 17 August 2017. Pride and Prejudice: Homosexualität und Religion in Subsahara-Afrika. Stärkung von LSBTI Menschenrechten. (2014, November 28). Presented at the Konferenz, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin. Reddy, V. (2001). Homophobia, Human Rights and Gay and Lesbian Equality in Africa. Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equity, (50), 83–87. https:// doi.org/10.2307/4066409 Resolution on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. A/HRC/ RES/17/19 (2011). https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ GEN/G11/148/76/PDF/G1114876.pdf?OpenElement. Accessed 21 August 2017. Rice, X. (2010a, January 14). Uganda Rows Back on Draconian Anti-gay Law After Western Outrage. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2010/jan/14/uganda-backpedals-on-gay-law. Accessed 28 August 2017. Rice, X. (2010b, October 21). Ugandan Paper Calls for Gay People to be Hanged. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/ 21/ugandan-paper-gay-people-hanged. Accessed 17 August 2017. Rice, X. (2011, January 27). Ugandan “Hang Them” Paper has no Regrets after David Kato Death. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2011/jan/27/uganda-paper-david-kato-death. Accessed 5 October 2020.

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Samelius, L., & Wågberg, E. (2005). Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Issues in Development (p. 80). Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). Ssebaggala, R. (2011). Straight Talk on the Gay Question in Uganda. Transition, 106, 44–57. https://doi.org/10.2979/transition.106b.44 Statement on British “Aid Cut” Threats to African Countries that Violate LBGTI Rights. (2011, October 27). Pambazuka News. https://www.pam bazuka.org/activism/statement-british-aid-cut-threats-african-countries-vio late-lbgti-rights. Accessed 11 December 2017. Stonewall. (2016). Acceptance without exception worldwide: Campaigning for equality for lesbian, gay, bi and trans people across the world. Stonewall. Tamale, S. (2003). Out of the Closet: Unveiling Sexuality Discourses in Uganda. Feminist Africa, 2. https://feministafrica.net/feminist-africa-issue2-2003-changing-cultures/ Tatchell, P. (2007, September 17). Ugandan Gays Demand Freedom. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/sep/ 17/ugandangaysdemandfreedom. Accessed 21 August 2017. The European Parliament’s LGBTI Intergroup. (2009, December 1). African Caribbean Pacific - EU Assembly: The European Union Speaks Up Against the Ugandan Anti-Homosexuality Bill. http://www.lgbt-ep.eu/parliamen tary-work/eu-speaks-up-against-anti-homosexuality-bill/. Accessed 21 August 2017. The Guardian. (2011, October 30). Countries that Ban Homosexuality Risk Losing Aid, Warns David Cameron. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian. com/politics/2011/oct/30/ban-homosexuality-lose-aid-cameron. Accessed 17 August 2017. The Guardian Online. (2013, December 1). Croatians Vote to Ban Gay Marriage. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/01/croatiavote-ban-gay-marriage-referendum. Accessed 2 February 2018. The White House. (2011, December 6). Presidential Memorandum: International Initiatives to Advance the Human Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Persons. whitehouse.gov. https://obamawhitehouse.archives. gov/the-press-office/2011/12/06/presidential-memorandum-internationalinitiatives-advance-human-rights-l. Accessed 17 August 2017. Uganda Country Profile. (2016, February 29). BBC. http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-africa-14107906. Accessed 13 September 2016. Uganda Kampala. (2010). Uganda: Ambassador Credentialed; Gets Earful on Anti-Homosexuality Bill (Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy No. 10KAMPALA45_a). https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10KAMPALA45_a. html. Accessed 21 March 2017. Uganda President Museveni Wary of Anti-gay Bill. (2010, January 13). BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8456624.stm. Accessed 17 August 2017.

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Ugandan Man Jailed for Gay Murder. (2011, November 10). BBC News. http:// www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15685648. Accessed 5 December 2017. United Nations Human Rights Council. Resolution on Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity (2014). https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/ RES/27/32

CHAPTER 8

Dealing with a Wicked Problem in Brussels

The first decade of the twenty-first century saw substantive expansion of rights related to sexual orientation and gender identity in the EU (see Chapter 5). Even with these developments, the EU’s population—and the EU’s LGBTI citizens, in particular—continued to have very different lived realities, quality of life and enjoyment of rights. These rights largely depend on the EU member state in which they live and are subject.1 Belgium, as the host country of the EU headquarters in Brussels, lies at the end of the spectrum with the greatest rights and protection for LGBTI persons, having introduced same-sex marriage in 2003. The EU as an employer changed their staff regulations on equality in 2004 to include sexual orientation and in 2014 to grant employees in same-sex relationships but without the possibility to marriage the same employment benefits as those in marriages, a representative of the staff network of LGBTI EU employees Egalité reported [BE_EU_Mid_PD13]. The immediate environment of staff working at the EU headquarters in Brussels has influenced and been influenced by the legislation of EU member states. This applies to Belgium as the country where the headquarter

1 Largely depending, that is, on the extent to which the national jurisdiction under which an EU citizen is subject protects such rights, and—relatedly—what is domestically regarded as appropriate with regard to homophobic attitudes.

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offices of organizational entities like the EEAS and EU Comm are based, as well as the EU’s own regulation as an organization. The following sections introduce the LGBTI topic as a highly contested issue in the EU as an organization and detail how, despite this contestation, the topic was integrated into EU’s foreign policy. The second section analyses how the problem was defined and redefined through collective sensemaking over time and crystalized in different policy instruments as quasi objects. Then, in analyzing the ongoing negotiations about the officially established EU foreign policy in the realm of human rights for LGBTI persons across organizational entities of the EU Comm and EEAS, this chapter identifies the underlying institutions, mainly organizational rather than moral, which staff link to in order to justify their respective sense made.

A Highly Contested Topic It is unclear exactly when LGBT first emerged as a topic in the EU Comm’s work, but prior to 2009, the topic’s engagement fell within the remit of an openly gay DG RELEX staff member (hereafter deemed Staff Member A),2 whose main activity on the topic coalesced around attempts to accredit LGBT-focused CSOs with the UN Economic and Social Council [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25]. Without mention in the EU Comm’s Annual Activity Reports and without direct sway vis-à-vis EU external policy, this activity appears to have either taken place outside of formal policy or was, at least, not regarded as worth of reporting. When Staff Member A departed from the EU Comm around 2009, their responsibilities were redistributed among the team, a process that relegated this file, unpopular among staff, to the fringe of immediate attention.3 2 Staff members with the explicit remit of LGBT/LGBTI in EU foreign policy, within first the EU Comm DEVCO and later the EEAS, will be called Staff Member A–D in the order of them taking up office. 3 Staff Member B who eventually managed the file attributed a large reason for this internal reluctance toward engaging LGBTI issues as a policy matter to staff worries of being designated LGBTI themselves: “No one wanted to do it and it got pushed around a bit… It was the only file where colleagues thought that their stance on this reflected on them personally” [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25]. These colleagues’ older ages possibly furthered this reluctance, said this staff member—those older generally holding traditionalist views less receptive to social topics like LGBTI. This staff member, in

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These sentiments of aversion pushed the file into the periphery, ignored by the EU Comm until another staff member (hereafter deemed Staff Member B), themselves socialized in an LGBT-positive environment, took over the file’s management. Their remit was broader in DG RELEX, addressing human rights in a general sense; accordingly, under Staff Member B’s direction, the specific topic of LGBT became engaged within the wider frame of human rights rather than only with regard to UN relations. The first mention of this engagement formally appeared in the 2010 Annual Activity Report of DG RELEX, the entity responsible at the time for the EU Comm’s external policy. This report, which annually outlines the facets of said policy—its areas of engagement, its actions, its resources spent—gave the LGBT external policy directive, in 2010, its first explicit EU Comm mention, via reference to “actions on LGBT rights” (stated without further detail of what they exactly entailed; European Commission, 2010).4 This generalized engagement of LGBT topics in the realm of EU foreign policy provoked strong reactions from other DG RELEX, and later EEAS,5 staff, at all levels of the hierarchy. It incited sexist comments from mainly male colleagues [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_

contrast, held no negative associations with such topics due to their personal history and background: “I had no issues personally. I have gay people in my family and in the school I went to” [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25]. 4 In its Section 1.2.3, the report listed activities carried out as part of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), for which DG RELEX was responsible. The EIDHR is the EU financial instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights and provides small-scale financial support to CSO and individual human rights defenders and in contrast to other EU programs, and the EIDHR does not have to make the beneficiaries transparent for the budget audit, to protect their identity and it does not require permission by the home country of the activist or where the money and support is going as is the case with development aid more generally. The EU Comm report here lists specific objective 1, which is described as sensitive and as a priority. The objective is the promotion of democracy and human rights through the support to civil society and to victims of human rights abuses. One of the activities listed under this objective are actions on LGBT rights (European Commission, 2010). The report does not elaborate what these “specific actions” were, but this is likely a reference to the task force within COHOM, which drafted the Toolkit to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of all Human rights by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) People [from now on LGBT toolkit] published a few months later. Today, the EIDHR is still administered by the EU Comm but has moved to the B1 Unit on Democracy and Human rights at DG DEVCO. 5 I.e., when DG RELEX became part of the newly established service.

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PD25], demonstrating LGBT was linked to sex, something that gave permission to disregard professional boundaries, and indicating it was not regarded as an appropriate topic for the EU Commission/EEAS’s address. Further attesting to the topic’s considerable intra-EU contestation and its emotional charge is its prompting of staff to disregard hierarchies and seemingly prioritize underlying social institutions over the EU’s formally defined mode of operation. Expressing dissent toward LGBT being linked to the EU’s human rights work in third countries, some staff began to ignore strict established chains of communication—a backbone of every bureaucracy. As one example, a high-ranking (director-level) staff member of an EEAS geographic section eschewed communication lines by directly e-mailing lower-ranking Staff Member B, who was not within their chain of command but of a different unit. In this e-mail, the director wrote the EEAS “could not do anything on this issue there [i.e., on LGBT in Africa] because it [was] a different cultural environment” [BE_EU_ Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25].6 Such contestation was common in the DG RELEX human rights unit. Staff Member B was confronted by friction or disinterested superiors, one of whom questioned their work on the topic by saying, “Why are we doing this again?” [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25]. Staff Member B was able to justify their engagement of LGBT issues by framing the topic as intrinsically linked to the EU’s work on human rights. They also referred to seven countries where same-sex sexual acts were punishable by death and where people experienced torture due to their sexual orientation, the two weighty frames made tangible in the EU Parl’s resolutions [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25]. With this, Staff Member B reminded higher level staff of a key designation that trumped all factors of ignorance: that the human right to be free from torture is an absolute right that can never be curtailed.7 In addition, as prohibition of the death penalty constitutes an important aim of the EU and a prerequisite

6 Staff Member B working on the file could not reply directly to this e-mail without breaking the established communication rules. Formally, any response would have had to go through their own director and so they did not react to this e-mail at all, as it did not follow the line of command [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25]. 7 The right to be free from torture is unlike, for example, the right to life, which a state is allowed to curtail under certain circumstances—e.g., the police is allowed to shoot to kill under certain conditions.

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for membership—enjoying the firm legitimacy of undisputed common ground—it is a strong source of legitimacy. The Staff Member B’s linking provided rationale to re-embed the idea of human rights for LGBTI persons into the work priorities of the unit and the wider EU, while simultaneously highlighting the effects on LGBT individuals on an emotional level, making it a more difficult topic to ignore. Despite this rationale, which re-embedded human rights for LGBT persons into the work priorities of the human rights unit, the wider hierarchy of the EU Comm continued to ignore the topic and its established file. This neglect became apparent during a leave of absence of Staff Member B. The staff member who took over in the interim (hereafter Staff Member C ) essentially engaged in zero work on the file and saw no need to justify their dismissal of what constituted a defined part of the job [BE_ EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25]. Such defiance illustrated how a socially legitimated viewpoint—in this case, strong contestation of LGBT matters as a topic the EU should be concerned with—took precedence over the organizational rule, the requirements of the EU’s formal administration. This occurrence speaks to a work environment in which it was acceptable to ignore an outlined topic of responsibility. This act also strongly suggested there was no expectation by superiors to work on the file. Contesting Contestation These emotionally charged reactions and contestations at multiple levels in DG RELEX and, later, the EEAS, make it seem unlikely the LGBTI topic would ultimately become part of official EU foreign policy—and yet, it did, through a combination of political will, shifts in power structure, and a certain individual’s ability and willingness to frame the topic in ways that made LGBT issues difficult to ignore and due to their ability to navigate the administrative rules for advancement. To continue the chronological outline: interim Staff Member C ’s aversion to the LGBT file continued, in spite of a political development that demanded the EU’s immediate attention and action: the government of the Netherlands, upon input from a national CSO and the International Gay and Lesbian Association of Europe (ILGA), had submitted a draft suggestion to the EU for an LGBT toolkit: the first official policy outlining the EU’s engagement on LGBT in foreign affairs. When Staff Member B returned from leave, Staff Member C told them they had “4 days to do a toolkit” on LGBT [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25].

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The tight timeline was due to the Council-agenda-related repercussions of Staff Member C ’s lack of initiative. If items for the COREPER’s agenda were not fully discussed in the working group and prepared 5 days in advance of a COREPER’s meeting, they required being postponed to a subsequent meeting and therefore might not make it onto the Council’s agenda of that month. Because Staff Member C had not worked on the topic, it became Staff Member B’s task to turn the NGO’s draft suggestion into a format appropriate, in form and language,8 for consideration by the Human rights Working Party of the Council (COHOM). The proposal for the toolkit came at an opportune time, during which two EU member states with substantive and sweeping national policies on LGBT issues9 held the 6-month-long rotating Council presidency directly after one another—Sweden from July to December 2009 and then Spain until June 2010. This circumstance played a definitive role in the Council’s pushing for the creation of an LGBT toolkit, as both countries enjoyed considerable agenda-setting power. Additionally, Spain’s tenure—represented through the country’s Minister for Equality Bibiana Aido—is said to have played a particularly “important role” during subsequent negotiations of the LGBT toolkit in the Task Force of the Council’s Working Group on Human rights (COHOM) [BE_EU_ EEAS_HR_Mid_PD18, BE_EU_Mid_EU Comm_PD11]—testimony to the importance individuals in national roles can have due to particular constellation on the international scene. The political will to draft EU foreign policy on LGBT came as a surprise to many working within the EU Comm, given the topic’s relative disregard to date in such a domain. “Everyone was surprised about that” [BE_CS_Mid_PD14], remarked one staff member who worked on LGBT issues for a large international human rights organization, offering evidence it was more circumstance than carefully planned strategic lobbying from the NGO-side underneath the EU’s tilt in this particular policy direction. As one EEAS staff member put it:

8 They said “there was little time, so I said, ok, I will write this Toolkit. And I rewrote the NGO document and ‘councillified’ it, so to speak” [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_ PD25]. 9 Sweden and Spain both have high levels of national protection for LGB persons from discrimination and had previously opened marriage to same-sex couples: Spain, in 2005, and Sweden, in May 2009 (Civil Partnership had existed in Sweden already since 1995). Both countries likewise have strong LGB CSOs.

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It only takes two people to push something like the toolkit through. They convince others. … There is often not much on the Council’s agenda and so the question is “Who has prepared something?—We’ll take that.” Or “There is a new presidency and they wonder, what can we sell?” [BE_EU_ Comm_Mid_PD11]

The implication is topics can get onto the Council’s agenda by way of bottom-up engagement through proactive proselytizing to gain the necessary legitimacy. Another way an issue can become a Council topic is through strong political will combined with the right constellation of formal authority. Once a topic has been set as one that will provide legitimacy as it shows action and active shaping of EU policy according to a county’s own national policy, it likely sticks. Making of a Toolkit Although the human rights frame for LGBT seems “natural” today, it became taken for granted through specific recent decisions on the way of its emergence. In June 2010, just before the end of Spain’s rotating presidency, the Council formally adopted the LGBT toolkit, a nonbinding document that outlined practical guidance to EU diplomats in third countries on promoting and protecting LGBT rights in unison with international and civil society organizations and local governments. This toolkit constituted the EU’s first formalized directive on LGBT and human rights in the realm of foreign policy, and, as a document and quasiobject, was a crystallization of collectively made sense and turned this into a document and quasiobject. The initial draft document of an LGBT toolkit, specifically prepared by the returning-from-leave Staff Member B within a few days, sparked little debate among the members of the COHOM working group10 tasked with discussing the toolkit prior to it being referred to COREPER (see Chapter 6). This uncontroversial treatment is not surprising, as the task force’s members were mainly representatives from “progressive member states”—i.e., member states in favor of a toolkit, who themselves had already enacted national legislation broadly offering definitive protection 10 Such a task force is an informal subgroup within COHOM formed of representatives from interested member states. Member state representatives chose which task forces they attend, depending on the topic.

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on grounds of sexual orientation, and, in some cases, gender identity and intersex.11 Countries who opposed this idea were not involved, apart from one country with very conservative legislation at the time: Malta.12 According to a participant in the group, the Maltese representative never interjected in discussion and was only there to “make sure to know what was going on” [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25]—a neutrality that generally characterizes “conservative member states’ approach to the topic” [BE_EU/BE_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD10]. After the task force discussions, the toolkit draft moved into the realm of COHOM, where conversations firmly anchored the topic of LGBT in the frame of human rights. The meetings, always chaired by the country’s representative who holds the presidency—Spain, in this case— were deemed highly influential by an EEAS staff member in shifting the balance on human rights for LGBTI persons in EU external policy [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25]. The meetings featured presentations from different LGBTI CSOs—among them, Transgender Europe, ILGA Europe, and a regional Spanish LGBT organization—and together coalesced to create “quite a discussion” in COHOM [BE_EU_Comm/ EEAS_Mid_PD25]. This particular constellation allowed for NGOs to voice their opinions and concerns. One arising point of contention, the staff member who participated remembers, revolved around whether the toolkit should be on “LGBT rights” or on “human rights for LGBT people” [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25]. COHOM settled on the latter, which had significant repercussions for how the topic would be handled going forward. To posit the toolkit as one concerned with LGBT rights would limit the document’s scope to defining and protecting specific rights for people who identify as LGBT. To instead tie the toolkit to the promotion of human rights for LGBT people importantly broadened this scope, anchoring the topic in the wider and very

11 Legislation on sexual orientation on one hand and gender identity and intersex on the other is often very separate within member state legislative paradigms and has changed at different times. Sweden, for example, considered one of EU’s beacons with regard to legislation on sexual orientation, still required transgender persons to undergo sterilization before being able to undergo gender reassignment surgery. 12 Malta’s legislation now affords wide ranging protection from discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and has a very liberal legislation on gender identity; but, at the time, it was one of the most conservative member states with regard to sexual orientation and gender identity.

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strong framework of human rights and all associated laws, policies, and mechanisms.13 The members of COHOM passed the document on 8 June 2010. With this decision, the LGBT topic became formally anchored as part of EU foreign policy on human rights. Nine days later, on June 17 2010, the COHOM sent written correspondence along with the toolkit to the Political and Security Committee of the Council,14 taking note of the decision (Council of the European Union, 2010). An Action Point with LGBTI Guidelines Even with the aforementioned anchoring in the EU’s external policy, the toolkit’s creation did not necessarily infer wide staff approval of LGBT as a topic for EU foreign policy; even after its approval by the Political and Security Committee of the Council, it continued to be contested in the domain of EU everyday work. EU Comm staff, for instance, questioned whether they had to follow the toolkit, expressing skepticism of its status as high-level policy.15 With the Treaty of Lisbon coming into force and with it the emergence of the EEAS, at the end of 2009, came paradigm shifts within the EU’s intraorganizational processes, including those concerned with

13 A large aspect motivating this fundamental debate into classifying LGBT within

the human rights or not lay not on the controversy of the topic per se but rather on the initial toolkit draft’s unclear composition; poorly distinguishing human rights and LGBT from one another with “sloppy language,” this original document appeared too inconsistent and open to interpretation [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD18]. As such, the already—‘councillified’ document had to again be translated, this time from an internal draft into a formal legal document. These kinds of formal legal documents are governed by certain formats and rules that allow for specific references and preclude others, based on formal legalistic rule base of the EU. 14 The main role of the Political and Security Committee is to monitor the international situation in CFSP and help define policies by drafting opinions for the Council — on the Council’s demand or on its own initiative. It furthermore monitors policy implementation, has a privileged link to the Secretary-General/High Representative, and coordinates, supervises and monitors discussions on CFSP issues in different Working Parties, whose reports they must examine and to whom they can send guidelines. (Council of the European Union, 2001). 15 For example, staff at the EU Comm would ask, “Do we really need to work on this? Is it a council decision?” [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25].

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foreign relations. These shifts resulted in great uncertainty,16 and some played out with the consultation process of the first ever Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human rights and Democracy, which passed on 25 June 2012. As it was the first strategic framework of this kind, no template existed for the consultation process, of which the EEAS, a nascent organizational entity, was now in charge. ILGA Europe submitted a consultation response, which went one step further than the LGBT toolkit and included LGBT guidelines as one action in the action plan [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25]. This suggestion, an idea directly from the margins rather than a member state, was subsequently included in the consolidated draft action plan by Staff Member B as Point 22(a). It was included despite a stated worry by the responsible Staff Member B of its effectiveness: the concern was that such guidelines would be less strong in promoting human rights for LGBT persons than the LGBT toolkit, ultimately diluting their purpose [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_ PD25]. The action plan tasked the EU Council with developing public guidelines building on the EU’s LGBT toolkit (Council of the European Union, 2012). The inclusion was only possible because this amendment was advanced by a CSO, rather than a member state, and therefore was less politicized. As a staff member involved in the process remembered, If one of the member states would have included it, it could have caused a split between those [member states] more motivated and the others, and they would have seen it as the issue of a few member states. We [the EEAS] couldn’t put it in because it hadn’t come from member states. [BE_EU_ Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25]

Even with this backgrounded tension, chances were deemed good for the suggestion to pass, as this action plan also included the suggestion to create guidelines on religion. Accordingly, the two guidelines became

16 Staff Member B admitted to this uncertainty, saying, “there was a consultation [with civil society on the Strategic Framework and Action Plan], and so on, but no one really had an overview of what was going on and I didn’t either” [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_ PD25].

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somewhat coupled, in which any controversy about one would have called into question the legitimacy of the other.17 To frame these developments at the level of translation and sensemaking: The idea of comprehensively promoting rights for LGBT persons, coming from the margins, passed the filter of a staff member’s recognition as relevant because it was recognized by the Staff Member B as an opportunity. Its inclusion then arose not because of strategy but because, once more, internal and external organizational factors aligned in a specific way: Staff Member B recognized the external amendment coming from the margins as a chance and through circumstance it was coupled to another set of guidelines being passed—canceling out contestation.18 This scenario shows once more that the institutional background and organizational knowledge of persons matter in the EU’s policymaking. Had a less experienced staff member, or one who did not think the topic relevant to human right, been in charge, the outcome would have been different. It also shows the rather ad-hoc way in which such changes, which can have greater effects down the line, happen through a combination of factors—a phenomenon further evidenced by this statement of a high-ranking senior EEAS staff member whose remit includes human rights issues: “I don’t remember why they put it in the action plan. Probably because in the action plan there is everything which relates to human rights, so someone said, oh oh, don’t forget the rights of LGBTI persons” [BE_EU_ EEAS_High_PD23_a]. In other words, the LGBTI guidelines were included in the action plan not as a result of a coherent, multifaceted preplanned strategy, but simply because all other related and relevant issues were already included. The above statement implies, in a mocking way, that if the issue had not been included, there would have been criticism because someone might feel excluded. This also supports the notion that high-level staff working on

17 Staff Member B said, “Because it is a package, also with the Guidelines on Freedom of Religion, I thought, let’s see if it’s going to be accepted. And it went through as a package” [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25]. 18 The staff member themselves reflected on this: “A lot of the work is very tedious and reactive but…once in a while, something flies by and you have to grab it. You need to be prepared to do it” [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25]. This statement suggests that the staff member interprets their action as outside of the routine, as something new.

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human rights do not take the issue quite seriously but now include it because it has become expected to do so. Drafting LGBTI Guidelines Once the LGBTI guidelines were listed in the action plan, they had to be created, as the progress of an action plan is easily monitored, and the legitimacy of the organizational entity responsible therefore depends on following through with the actions announced. There was never any question regarding whether the guidelines would be created.19 As nine other guidelines already existed, the guideline’s creation, procedurally, was portrayed as a mainly “technical” and not political process [BE_EU_ Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25]—and, moreover, framed an opportunity to practically expand on a topic now fundamental to the EU’s work.20 Even though the eventual realization of such guidelines after their becoming an action point was never in question, there was still much room for interpretation on their eventual scope, their applicative use, their target groups, and their legal underpinnings. The initial discussions within the working group tasked with the drafting reportedly coalesced around whether to draft from scratch or to use the toolkit as a basis from which to build [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD18]. After a debate with reportedly little dissent, the toolkit path was chosen,21 as it was regarded to allow for easier implementation and monitoring given the toolkit’s existing annex

19 A senior staff member working in the human rights unit explains that the LGBT guidelines simply happened because “it was in the action plan” [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_ High_PD23_a]. 20 In the words of a staff member who was involved: “We worked on the guidelines for eight months. It was more like, ‘we have the toolkit, it’s an emerging issue, let’s upgrade it’” [BE_EU_Comm_DEVCO_Mid_PD7]. 21 The Action Plan stipulates that the guidelines should be based on the LGBT toolkit. The extent of this basis and the question of whether the toolkit’s specific text should even be referenced, however, were matters of discretion and debate within the Council’s working group tasked with the guidelines’ draft—a process that, again, involved microlevel interpretations to translate the abstract idea of “guidelines” into the concrete document.

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in table format, which allowed for assessment of a particular country’s situation.22 As an entity part of the CFSP, the guidelines’ drafting was the sole responsibility of the EEAS, who consulted the EU Comm on a working level23 and particularly the organizational entities of DEVCO and DG Justice, who are responsible for Fundamental Rights [BE_EU_EEAS_ HR_Mid_PD18]. Most of the negotiations around wording happened bilaterally behind closed doors. The drafting process, while involving some CSOs such as ILGA Europe in Brussels, did not include the EU delegations, one of the EEAS legal team explained, “They [the staff in EU delegations] can’t draft” [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD18]—transmitting a clear understanding of staff role that foresees a clear division between rule-making at the headquarters and rule-taking organizational units in the EU delegations. After consultations with CSOs and the LGBT Intergroup of the EU Parl,24 comments on the toolkit were merged and discussed with staff in other organizational units and member states’ representatives in the Council.25 Unlike some other human rights issues where there is unanimity (e.g., on the death penalty), LGBTI is treated differently by member states, making negotiations challenging in the topic’s polarization: for instance, some wanted only protection but not promotion of human rights for LGBTI persons.26 Because it had been used in a statement by the high-representative/vice president already, LGBTI (instead of LGBT) could be used in the guidelines, and any later discussions on an

22 One mid-level EEAS staff member who was involved in the working group says that “All were in agreement that the toolkit is a very good document, especially the annex, which can be used for the implementation and to measure” [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_ PD18]. 23 I.e. at the expert level rather than at management or political level. At the working level positions can be exchanged and levels of discretion and negotiation points identified and perhaps even agreed upon. 24 The Lesbian and Gay Intergroup was later renamed LGBTI Intergroup. 25 “We decided to use the toolkit text, consulted with NGOs, then with the LGBT

Intergroup of the EU Parl. We then merged the comments and negotiated it in the Council” [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD18]. 26 One EEAS staff member from the legal unit describes this as a broader existential challenge for the EU’s coherence: “while some member states are very ambitious, others are more laid back and also don’t have the legislation in their own country. It seems like it is a test of internal and external coherence” [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD18].

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organization level to drop the “I” in a document or title of an event were rejected with reference to the “I” in the guidelines [BE_EU_Comm/ EEAS_Mid_PD25]. After these behind-the door negotiations, which were likely influenced by greater polarization of the external environment on the issue, the guidelines were approved by COREPER II,27 the Council’s main preparatory body, and then formally by the Foreign Affairs Council on 19 June 2013 in Luxembourg as part of a list of issues without further discussion (Press Release 3250th Council meeting Foreign Affairs, 2013, p. 18). When the guidelines were passed by the Council, the topic of LGBTI had reached the international political level, as evidenced in the simultaneous happening of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly in Brussels (17– 19 June 2013), where the topic of LGBT caused an éclat.28 This meeting was overshadowed by an open confrontation between African participants and the EU representatives. A staff member from the geographic unit responsible for Africa at the EEAS speaks of “a cultural confrontation” during which “the EU was accused of cultural imperialism” because they upheld the importance of human rights for LGBTI persons [BE_EU_ EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD15]. This accusation of imperialism and a perceived normative clash and polarization that was directly and publicly formulated at the meeting. Statements of participants were not new but had already been perceived as “problems,” to which the guidelines, in an indirect way, provide an answer. Adopting Guidelines The guidelines, like the toolkit, were (and remain) far reaching and ambitious in scope, which is puzzling, given the EU is often criticized for not

27 COREPER II is the Committee of Permanent Representatives, which consists of the member state ambassadors to the EU. COREPER II deals with foreign affairs, among other topics. Their weekly meetings take place in private where issues are discussed, and once agreement has been reached among the different positions of the member states, the issue is passed on to the Council’s agenda as the decision-making body, either as an A point, where no discussion is needed, or a B point, on which debates take place in the Council meetings which are public. 28 The meeting brings together the Members of the European Parliament and the elected representatives of the African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP countries) that have signed the Cotonou Agreement. Its self-proclaimed aim is promoting the interdependence of North and South.

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practicing what it preaches (Wouters & Hermez, 2016, p. 7), a perception that challenges legitimacy. The loose coupling between EU internal and foreign policy on an administrative level made this seeming paradox possible, as internal and external policy do not move in parallel. A staff member who played an important role in COHOM at the time of the guidelines’ discussion agreed the guidelines are very far reaching, while clarifying there is no formal reason as to why foreign policy should follow internal policy, other than the postulate of consistency: It’s true that maybe sometimes we are too ambitious; the guidelines are very strong. There is the idea of consistency, but formally there is no reason to follow [EU] internal policies [when it comes to foreign policy]. So even if internal [EU policy], it is not yet perfect, that is no reason why we shouldn’t push for that externally. [BE_EU_Comm_DEVCO_Mid_PD7]

They further remarked on “a gap between Brussels policies and the delegations” and the practical reality that the guidelines “are also a political tool” [BE_EU_Comm_DEVCO_Mid_PD7]. The guidelines are also a political tool in that they create an expectation which delegations have to position themselves toward. The guidelines’ adoption is also about knowledge creation and “finding a common moral ground” among member states, which “serves to enhance internal protection by deepening a common understanding on a particular fundamental right” (Wouters & Hermez, 2016, p. 7). Given this political nature and guidelines’ far reach and comprehensiveness beyond the actual situation in many member states, it may be unclear why did the guidelines not meet more opposition from member states at the time of the negotiations. For most member states, LGBTI is a minor topic not of great importance to national interests. One EEAS staff member explained countries that are more critical of the idea of human rights for LGBTI persons are generally the smaller or less influential EU member states [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19]. The same staff member reported the diplomats who work for the countries opposed to human rights for LGBTI persons in Brussels often tend to have a more liberal stance than their government or population of the country has which they represent. This is said to be due to their education level and international experience in Brussels—a constellation which gives the impression of an in-group of diplomats who agree, versus an out-group of governments and populations. As long as there are no instructions that

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require diplomats to “toe the line” of the government, their own convictions play a role. Because the topic of human rights for LGBTI persons is not of great importance, the diplomats in this case did not have instructions from their governments and would not oppose something like the guidelines. One staff EEAS member put it like this: “The people preventing a gay pride march taking place in Vilnius have very different views than the people sitting around the table in COHOM, so [the diplomats] are not prepared and do not want to block anything. They might not be at the forefront [championing LGBTI rights], but they are certainly not going to oppose them [LGBTI rights]” [BE_EU_ EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19]. The level of attention and the level of importance given to a topic widens or decreases. If the topic is regarded as small, compared to other topics, it does not enter high politics. If given instructions to address a topic deemed of interest to their national governments, they must follow these. In such a case, they often make it clear the position they are taking differs from their personal opinion. An example of this is when there was a discussion around the death penalty, of which the Polish government was in favor. The diplomat in Brussel said, “I now have instructions from Warsaw, which I shall read verbatim” [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19]. This example shows the greater the interest in a topic by those with formal authority, the smaller the chance for decoupling either horizontally or over time. The guidelines were not discussed any more in the Council but were formally “rubber stamped without discussion” in its meeting on 24 June 2013 in Strasbourg [BE_EU_Comm_DEVCO_Mid_PD7] (Council of the European Union, 2013). That there was no discussion at that level shows it was not considered a topic important enough, compared to other issues with regard to external action and EU foreign policy. The guidelines themselves, once passed as foreign policy, became part of the wider environment and had the potential to push the EU’s internal LGBTI policy to achieve the consistency for which the EU policy strived. Staff Member B, who was already involved in the toolkit’s development, said, “We might have pushed internal policies through external ones” [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25]. The LGBTI guidelines renewed calls from CSOs in Europe (mainly ILGA Europe), the EU Parl, and

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some member states for a new EU equality directive. While the new directive seemed impossible to achieve because some member states blocked it in the Council, the EU Comm eventually published a list of actions to advance LGBTI equality within the EU in 2015 (DG Justice & Consumers, 2015)—which might have not seemed necessary without the LGBTI guidelines. LGBT Becomes LGBTI The guidelines notably augmented the LGBT acronym, the reference used by the toolkit of 2010 and the Strategic Framework and Action Plan of 2012, with the term intersex, as noted above. It would be easy to assume that this addition was likely based on a strategic informed decision-making process from the top political levels. The combination of intersex with LGBT is puzzling, however, because it refers to a range of physiological conditions classified as not wholly fitting the socially constructed, scientifically legitimized categories of male or female. The term was featured in the LGBT toolkit in the definitions section but was conflated with and ultimately subsumed about transgender. This conflation of two distinct identity constructs reinforced a suspicion that there existed little expertise and even awareness with regard to trans and intersex issues within the toolkit working group.29 Staff Member B, who was particularly responsible for the LGBT file, claimed a critical role in this process in how they apprehended a new idea—of adding the “I” to LGBTI . They had heard this six-letter acronym being used and saw a chance to refute the argument that sexual orientation and gender identity were not innate30 —then included the “I” for intersex and therefore a recognized biologically defined category— and justified this new idea in EU’s vocabulary through a functionalist argument.

29 Policy and legislation around lesbian and gay issues, as mentioned in Chapter 6, had advanced in many EU member states, but trans + and intersex were not yet on the agenda of many member state governments and did not feature in public discourse. Even though LGBT was used, the acronym was mainly associated with sexual orientation and not with a person’s gender identity or sex. 30 “These people are really born intersex and no one can dispute that and so it can strengthen the argument and of course it is an important issue. Before, I don’t think there was a debate on intersex” [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25].

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When tasked with drafting a statement from the High Representative Lady Ashton on the International Day Against Homophobia (IDAHO),31 17 May 2011, Staff Member B included the “I” in the acronym LGBT, simply “to see if it would fly through the hierarchy, to see if anyone would notice” [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25]. The change was not challenged by superiors in the EEAS until it reached the organizational entity’s highest levels. The HR/VP asked about the meaning of the I . Once explained, it was approved without further contestation. With this, a single staff member, simply through a microlevel change of adding one letter to a statement, contributed to the establishment of a new EU macrostandard. Other IDAHO statements made by EU officials from other EU organizational units, such as the EU Parl, EU Comm, and Council, included reference to homosexuality and LGBT but never intersex (The European Parliament’s LGBTI Intergroup, 2011). The EEAS therefore set a new standard by using the five-letter acronym in the guidelines. Subsequent statements from other EU organizational entities increasingly used the five-letter acronym instead of LGBT—for example in the drafting of the LGBTI guidelines. This short episode shows how, at a low hierarchical level, change can be introduced that then produces ripple effects on other EU organizational units. While LGBTI’s reference is often regarded as synonymous with solely lesbian and gay issues—ignoring trans and intersex aspects—the inclusion of the “I” in its physical reference alone nevertheless provides trans and intersex activists and organizations with a strong claim to be included in the policy-making process. This referential change from LGBT to LGBTI exemplifies the often-ad-hoc nature of changes in organizations and shows that these changes are often much less based on long-term strategic planning or top-down processes than is generally assumed. In summary, this section shows how the changing context and horizon of expectation, in combination with internal developments on the working level, provided the setting for LGBTI to become part of foreign policy. It outlined the environmental changes building onto each other, while shaping and being shaped by intraorganizational processes 31 IDAHO has since been turned into IDAHOT including the T for transphobia or some organizations even use IDAHOBIT, which stands for the International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia and Transphobia.

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on the microlevel. In the complex, uncertain, and ambiguous environment of EU foreign policy and EU formal organizational structure, the abstract idea of human rights for LGBT persons causes contestation once it is no longer decoupled from the EU’s core of foreign policy work and threatens to impact development aid and diplomatic relations. Staff members navigate formal structure by drawing on personal socialization and by using this tacit knowledge to translate the topic of LGBTI into the organizational work context, by filtering information, categorizing, and framing it as a human rights topic. This link made it very difficult to ignore because by that point human rights had been made central to the EU’s foreign policy along with the focus on coherence with the Treaty of Lisbon. This framing by linking the topic to existing categories or institutions is then enacted into the world through resulting policies, further shaping the horizon of expectation. The above account suggests neither political will nor microlevel translation processes would have been enough to bring about this initial change. It took the specific combination of an individual’s knowledge and their abilities and motivation to translate the topic into the work of the EU and to convince others of it. They linked the topic to powerful taken-forgranted EU frames with political will, amplified by a formal shift in power constellation to move the topic along and turn into an initial quasiobject of the toolkit, which later was recodified and continues to be interpreted to eventually form the guidelines.

Defining and Redefining the “Problem” in Policy As a problem’s very definition contains its implied solution, an analysis of documents with such definitions promises to reveal underlying assumptions about the way to solve an issue at stake. Official public documents—the EU Parl resolutions, the LGBT toolkit, LGBTI guidelines, and other reports (e.g., Annual Activity Reports or work plans)—form, as outward expressions of an organization’s activity, highly symbolic parts of an organization’s façade, designed in a way that both is believed to be appropriate and increases legitimacy. These texts can be regarded as “talk” (see Chapter 2) that signals attention, and, very often, they are invitations for third parties to hold an organization to account, as it is then possible to point out discrepancies between talk and action. Analysis of document terminology—its specifics, frequency, and changes over time—as the manifestations of ideas can add to answering

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the pertinent how questions: how LGBTI became part of EU foreign policy, how the “problem” to address was defined, and how this definition changed over time. This analysis sheds light on other pertinent queries that ultimately orchestrate the sensemaking process at the heart of this book: who is regarded legitimate, which knowledge is considered relevant, which differentiations are considered valid, which aspects are included, which references are made. This analysis shows a general shift—an institutional change—took place, amid the EU’s codification of LGBTI issues in its foreign policy, after which it was no longer sufficient to consider EU staff as experts, with the experiences and voices of those affected demanding consideration. This development prompted greater knowledge and a differentiated understanding of “sexual orientation.” At the same time, the “problem” became reconceived, shifting from the act of promoting human rights for LGBTI persons to addressing the contestation such promotion had inspired. From Sexual Orientation to LGBTI Between 2009 and 2010, there arose a lexical shift in the umbrella term used to refer to LGBT issues—“sexual orientation,” prior to 2010, and “LGBT,” post-2010—which coincided with heightened frequency of the topic in EU reports. The analysis32 of reports from Brussels-based CSO and EU entities revealed sexual orientation was not given much prominence and was mainly restricted to EU internal policy.33 In the 2010 report, the identity terms bisexual, gay, lesbian, transgender, and the

32 The following reports were coded with Atlas.ti 8’s auto-coding function for the terms sexual orientation, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, transphob, homophob, homosexual, human rights, LGBT, LGBTI, and SOGI within annual reports from international human rights organization Amnesty International 1998–2015, Human Rights Watch 2004–2016, and the Annual Reports 2000–2015 of Brussels-based LGBT lobbying organization ILGA Europe. From EU entities, the analysis included, on the intergovernmental level, the EEAS Annual Report 2010–2015 and, on the supranational level, RELEX reports 2004–2010 as the EEAS’s predecessor in the EU Commission in terms of political external relations and DEVCO annual reports from 2001 to 2015. Finally, another group of reports were the EU’s general Annual Activity Report 2001–2014. The European Parliament’s annual report on Human Rights in the World was also taken into consideration, and the Fundamental Rights Agency’s annual report 2005–2016. 33 In the EU Commission’s Annual General Reports, it makes a very occasional, and mostly singular appearance in the 2001, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2013

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acronym LGBT are first mentioned, suggesting an opening toward the identities and also plights of people behind this term. Absent from the next two reports, the terms and acronym make a comeback in 2013 and 2014, with whole paragraphs specifically dedicated to these topics under the heading of human rights and non-discrimination it is given much greater attention. “Intersex” appears for the first time in 2013, expanding the acronym to LGBTI, which, in the 2014, report supersedes the four-letter acronym completely. The acronym LGBT and later LGBTI replaced expressions, such as sexual orientation and gender identity, in the EU’s General Activity Report.34 When the EU entities started using LGBT in 2009, ILGA Europe had already moved on to use “LGBTI,”35 suggesting a clear direction of travel of this idea from CSOs to the EU entities. Reference to LGBT in EU reports occurred more frequently starting around 2009, a crucial turning point. The acronym was first in cooccurrence with the terms “lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex” and, in later reports, such as the EEAS report 2014, as a term in its own right, without spelling each term out,36 suggesting an emancipation over its components, as other acronyms were first introduced in brackets in the same index (e.g., international humanitarian law or freedom, security and justice; European External Action Service EEAS, 2014, p. 3). From 2011 onward, LGBTI substituted “LGBT” in EU documents,37 testimony to the acronym becoming more known and standing on its

reports. Where it is used, it is usually mentioned alongside other characteristics of nondiscrimination, for example, in the context of the EU Employment Directive, i.e., for EU internal policy. 34 One reason for this could be that the acronym is more abstract and can therefore travel more easily (see Chapter 6). 35 CSOs like ILGA Europe also started using the acronym LGBT (at least) a decade earlier than the EU entities; the acronym was used already in the earliest available report 1999–2000, yet this occurrence does not mean that CSO at the time directly engaged with issues going beyond then topics of lesbian and gay and perhaps bisexual. 36 This is the case in the index of the report, which includes one subchapter titled “Enjoyment of human rights of LGBTI persons.” 37 This is the case, e.g., in the EEAS reports, which see continuous decline of the use of LGBT from 2012 onward, in favor of LGBTI This is similar to the Amnesty International reports where LGBT is also phased out in favor of LGBTI. For the identity terms such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, there is a slow decrease with the exception of intersex.

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own, replacing the terms it includes. Intersex, as a recent addition from 2012 onward, is not always fully absorbed into the acronym. Establishing the European Union as Savior in the EU Parl Resolutions The EU Parl’s early resolutions, which called for combatting abuses related to sexual orientation worldwide, were justified through their pioneering linkage to human rights and the EU’s existential stance visà-vis the death penalty. The 2004 resolution established first links, which a subsequent resolution would also use. The later 2009 resolution, a reaction to the proposed AHB in Uganda, was substantially more specific and made clear reference to the EU’s own principles, treaties, and policy. In direct opposition to the proposed Ugandan bill, an early version of which proposed the death penalty, the 2009 resolution evoked one of the EU’s undisputed cornerstone principles and criteria for EU membership—the abolition of the death penalty. Had the proposed AHB not included the death penalty, it is unlikely it would have received as much attention and, consequently, not have provoked the strong reactions it did. The resolution, secondly, referred to legal documents—the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and the Treaty of Lisbon (which had just entered into force)—that stress the importance for the EU of upholding and promoting human rights. Reference to these pieces of legislation, especially the Treaty of Lisbon, as central to the EU’s legitimacy, made a very strong case as to why the EU should concern itself with such matters that could otherwise be regarded as strictly of national concern, i.e., of Uganda itself.38 Thirdly, the resolution shifted the terminology from same-sex sexual acts and sexual orientation to the acronym LGBT,39 broadening the realm

38 The reference to documents governing the EU internally, namely the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and specific articles of the Treaty of Lisbon on human rights, answers the implicit question as to why the EU should care about this proposed law in Uganda. The Lisbon Treaty, consisting of the TEU and TFEU, turned the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights into a binding document and had only entered into force a few weeks prior, on 1 December 2009. These references serve as reminders of values the EU claims are the basis for its own existence. 39 The European Parliament resolution referred to “LGBT” rather than simply to “homosexuality” or “sexual orientation” as the Ugandan Bill does and thereby positioned the criminalization of same-sex relations within the greater LGBT orbit. To further elaborate on this second point, the resolution claimed in its section B that the Ugandan bill

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from prohibited same-sex sexual acts to the multiple identities included in the LGBT acronym. The resolution turned the abstract criminalization of particular sexual orientations in matters of identity and self-determination and rendered what happened to LGBT people in Uganda comparable and relevant to the EU and its member states. This comparison was evoked even more strongly by positing LGBT as protected under international human rights, through the resolution’s reference to the right to privacy, an implicit reference to early ECtHR case law (see Chapter 5 on Dungeon v. UK). This reference opened a trajectory of ‘development,’ situating Uganda at the far end and the EU, having ‘overcome’ the period of criminalization, at the other end, marking progress in line with modernization theories (see Chapter 2). Fourthly, the resolution linked to the universality of international human rights treaties to which Uganda is party and to statements by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, implying that a breach of these tacitly justifies an intervention in a domain that would otherwise strictly lie in the orbit of a country’s internal affairs.40 Fifthly, the resolution stipulated possible consequences—namely, that passing the proposed AHB into law could have a direct effect on international donors and implying the international development “community” was in agreement with the EU Parl in condemning the bill.41 This threat made the perceived power imbalance between Uganda and the EU on “proposes to introduce harsher penalties to criminalize homosexuality and to punish all those alleged to be lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender (LGBT) with life imprisonment or the death penalty” (European Parliament, 2004). The draft of the Ugandan AHB was solely focused on same-sex sexual acts and quite explicitly listed all the practices it sought to prohibit. The only point where it mentioned gender identity was as a possible synonym to homosexuality. At the very end in 18(2), the bill specifies that different definitions such as “sexual orientation,” “sexual rights,” “sexual minorities,” and “gender identity,” shall not be used in any way to legitimize homosexuality, gender identity disorders and related practices in Uganda” (Bahati, 2009). 40 This includes mentions of the UN Convention on Human Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Individual Freedoms, without specifying articles or provisions but later “recalls statements by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee” pointing out that “a State cannot, through its domestic law, negate its international human rights obligations”(European Parliament, 2009, para. G.4). 41 It states that the EP is “extremely concerned” about the effect the law could have on international donors, nongovernmental organizations and humanitarian organizations who “would have to reconsider or cease their activities in certain fields should the bill pass into law” (European Parliament, 2009, para. G.4).

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the basis of financial dependency substantially visible, showing the linking of aid to certain conditionality (as the Cotonou Agreement implicitly allowed) as taken for granted by the EU, something that would be questioned over the following years. Sixthly, it warned of possible spillover effects to other countries in Africa where, it specified, “homosexuality is legal in only 13 countries” (para. 2)—thus marking the continent, not just the country of Uganda, as a location of the problem. Lastly, the resolution referenced unnamed CSOs that had pointed out the possible impact of such a bill on HIV/AIDS prevention, thus referring to an important area in development aid and creating urgency and establishing a topic of civil society actors’ concern. Considering the greater importance given to CSOs at that point, the resolution further increased legitimacy of this claim and increased the urgency by implying achievements of EU development projects and aid would be threatened. In short, the 2009 EU Parl resolution defined the “problem” as the proposed death penalty, which stood contrary to the EU’s own law and a threat to the EU’s development achievements. Such proposals in Uganda required urgent EU action through a stick-and-carrot approach to prevent spillover across the African continent, with the aim of upholding universal human rights for LGBT people. Given the EU Parl’s lack of a formal role in EU foreign policy, the body would not be held responsible if the wide horizon of expectations it casts is not fulfilled. The resolution, in this case, can be considered an action of the EU Parl and as an enactment of a particular sense into the world, shaping the horizon of expectations. Prosecuting States as the Problem in the LGBT Toolkit Despite the lack of formal impact, the EU Parl contributed to the 2010 LGBT toolkit as the first official EU policy document explicitly affirming LGBT rights within EU external relations by setting an initial horizon of expectations. The 14-page document and its two annexes embodied a first formal consensus of the EU member states regarding a further definition of the “problem” to address regarding LGBTI issues. The toolkit identified as this problem that gender identity and sexual orientation “continue to be used as justifications for serious human rights violations around the world” by certain states (Council of the European Union, 2010, p. 2). The suggestion was, that the “problem” was governments’ promotion

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of homophobia based on strategic considerations, rather than existing legislation and salient institutions—institutions based on colonial legacy criminalizing and demonizing homosexuality. The implied solution with the toolkit was to provide incentives to change a perceived rational and strategic government’s strategy, without taking the institutional context into account. Similar to the EU Parl resolution, the toolkit set the EU apart from third countries, designating EU “Headquarters and the EU Missions in partner countries” (Council of the European Union, 2010, p. 8) as responsible for “solving” the problem. It furthermore deemed COHOM as the responsible entity for mainstreaming LGBT issues in EU’s external action (Part IV on general measures) and for promoting implementation by EU member states, EEAS, EU Comm, and the EU Parl. In designating its purpose, the toolkit used the acronym LGBT, which it established as a, more or less, singular group42 in need of protection by the EU, portrayed to be their savior.43 This simplified portrayal of LGBT as a singular group implied a general response, rather than differentiated responses for specific subgroups of the acronym.44 LGBT people 42 It defines the LGBT people affected mainly as one coherent group in need of support rather than diverse groups that fight for their own rights and classifies LGBT people as constituting “a vulnerable group” (p. 2) and not vulnerable groups in plural. 43 This is done by spelling out the EU’s understanding of people as individuals and rights’ holders and linking it to the EU’s key aim in external action of promotion and protection of human rights. The toolkit states that those belonging to the acronym LGBT are “often victims of persecution, discrimination and gross ill-treatment” and that in “several countries, sexual relations between consenting adults of the same sex are considered a crime and punished with imprisonment or with the death penalty” (p. 2). This sets the EU apart from “Other” countries or third countries outside of the EU which are considered prosecutors and establishes the EU as responsible for upholding these individuals’ rights. It then indicates how it plans to realize the enjoyment of human rights for these individuals, namely through “different tools of external action including the financial instruments available both through the EU institutions and the Member States” (p. 2). 44 There are exceptions to this—one with regard to sexual violence, where the toolkit differentiates to a certain extent along gender lines by pointing out that trans- and women (meaning cis-women), for example, are more vulnerable compared to men (meaning cisand transmen) with regard to sexual violence. It therefore links to the violence against women frames for which there are legal tools, such as CEDAW on international level. Another exception is in annex II, which consists of a checklist to assess and monitor the situation in a particular country for LGBT persons. A few questions in this checklist evolve around existing laws, differentiating between sexual orientation and gender identity, as these are codified in different sets of law. Intersex people are not mentioned, and challenges faced by bisexual people are not specifically addressed. Bisexual people are often

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are further object of the toolkit and primarily cast as victims, rather than acknowledging the role of LGBT activists and CSOs as subjects and agents of change in their own right. The toolkit, in contrast to the resolution, went beyond human rights as the source of its own legitimacy in referencing policy coherence as an aim and justification in itself,45 claiming that it would “further contribute to reinforcing and supporting the EU’s human rights policy in general” (Council of the European Union, 2010, p. 2). Through this link, the toolkit anchored the topic of human rights for LGBT persons within the EU’s external action and diplomacy, i.e., in the realm of the EEAS, decoupling it thus somewhat from the development cooperation responsibility of the EU Comm. In further extension, the toolkit stretched beyond the two human rights links advanced by the resolution vis-à-vis LGBT: the right to be free from torture and the right to privacy.46 The problem was broadened to include legal and sociopolitical aspects—apparent in the very detailed and concrete checklist table of Annex II, in which the toolkit raised expectations above what was the reality within many EU countries, demonstrating the decoupling of foreign and EU internal policy. With raised expectations came greater nuance in ascertaining what constituted “problematic” policies: the issue became about whether events, such as Pride,47 were allowed and whether they could take place in a country without “excessive political obstacles” (Council of the European Union, assumed to fall within the heterosexual category when in an opposite sex relationship, or within the gay or lesbian categories when in a same-sex relationship, thus not requiring specific measures. The toolkit therefore establishes LGBT as one collective category of persons who are vulnerable because governments use their (presumed) LGBT status as an excuse to violate their rights. 45 The toolkit tasks COHOM with compiling a compendium of good practice “in order to promote cross-learning and policy coherence” (p. 8). 46 Its indicators are mostly about whether legal provisions, either protective or punitive, exist. This is especially the case for issues around transgender persons where question 4.4 asks: “Can transgender people change their gender designation in official documents?” and as indicator: “Does the law and/or administrative regulation permit this?” 47 Pride refers to cultural and/or political marches and/or celebrations and gatherings

to celebrate LGBTI existence and culture and to create visibility. In Germany Pride is also known as Christopher Street Day, a reference to the Christopher Street in New York where the first ever Pride march took place in June 1970 as a reaction to the raid of the Stonewall Inn, a famous club for LGBTI persons. This first pride march is often regarded as the beginning of the so-called gay-rights movement.

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2010, Annex II, 6.2); or as another example, whether trans citizens could change the gender on their birth certificates.48 The toolkit, compared to the EU Parl resolution, defined the “problem” with nuance and employed additional frames, most notably that of policy coherence as a legitimizing aspect that in turn directly linked to the necessity of the EU having to present as a unitary organization in order to remain legitimate. At the same time, it omitted historical context. Contestedness as the “Problem” in the LGBTI Council Guidelines The LGBT toolkit had been drafted rather quickly and was passed at the level of the Council’s Political and Security Committee, while the LGBTI Council Guidelines were formally passed by the Council, the EU’s highest decision-making body, and became part of a suite of eight established human rights guideline documents on various topics.49 The “upgrade”

48 Many EU countries do not have the legal protections listed in annex II in place, nor are they free from political interference with human rights for LGBT persons. For example, while many EU countries have provisions in place for people to legally change their gender, there are often very strict criteria that prevent people from doing so. Transgender Europe’s 2017 map shows that in a number of countries, including Greece, Belgium, and the Czech Republic, and sterilization is still required before trans + people can undergo gender reassignment while Sweden only dropped this requirement in May 2013. Other examples are the initial 2011 ban of the pride parade in Budapest by the police before a court ruling allowed it to proceed. Furthermore, data such as that of a survey by the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency shows that 47% of respondents felt discriminated against on grounds of their sexual orientation in the last twelve months (Fundamental Rights Agency, 2014). 49 The EU LGBTI Council guidelines were formally passed during the Foreign Affairs Council Meeting in Luxembourg on 24 June 2013—the same meeting at which the Guidelines on Freedom of Religion or Belief, which had also been an action point in the Strategic Framework, were also passed. The other guidelines cover the topics death penalty, torture, children in armed conflict, human rights defenders, rights of the child, violence against women, promotion of international humanitarian law, and human rights dialogues with third countries. The latest guidelines are on freedom of expression and were passed in 2014, which makes a total of eleven guidelines. The topics are very diverse and do not follow a particular pattern but include human rights for specific groups such as children, women and human rights defenders, and define specific human rights topics such as freedom from torture and, on a more operational issue specific to the EU, the human rights discourse. The eclectic mix of topics already hints at the fact that there is no master plan for topics on which guidelines should exist, but they emerged as a response to perceived current (and often global) topics or because certain a member states made it their priority.

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of the 2010 LGBT toolkit to the LGBTI guidelines were a result of a number of incremental changes and particular constellations, internal and external to the organization (Malmedie, 2016) and was not controversial in itself. The guidelines were based mainly on the toolkit text, sharing its overall structure. Also similar to other existing human rights guidelines, the LGBTI guidelines consisted of three main parts: (a) an introduction, (b) a section outlining operational settings, and (c) annexes (see also Wouters & Hermez, 2016, p. 10).50 To briefly outline the guidelines’ specifics: Part I, the introduction, posits the reason for action, the purpose and scope of the guidelines and provided definitions and the legal framework; Part II consists of the operational guidelines, i.e., the main content section, in which four priority areas of action (compared to three in the toolkit) are defined alongside listed tools for their engagement; Part III provides general measures, which precedes two annexes that follow almost identically in the toolkit’s format—Annex I, which lists international and regional legal instruments, declarations, statements, and other relevant documents, and Annex II, which provides a table checklist for monitoring the situation of LGBTI in a particular country. Despite their many similarities, the guidelines differ from the toolkit in important ways, reflecting changes to the external environment in the 3 years since the toolkit’s creation that demarcate the kind of knowledge vis-à-vis LGBTI and human rights regarded as legitimate in the domain of EU foreign policy. The main shift between the toolkit and the guidelines arose in the latter’s framing of the contestedness of human rights for LGBTI persons as the “problem.” This conceptual shift was flanked by emphasizing the LGBTI individual as a rights holder, greater differentiation of the groups within the LGBTI acronym and their particular needs, a redefinition of who constituted “experts,” and a change regarding to what counted as legitimate knowledge. The guidelines themselves countered the “problem” of contestedness via increased references of higher level norms on the UN level and the specificity of each individual case. Contestedness as a Problem In defining the “problem” to address, the LGBT toolkit distilled focus to two main issues: (a) criminalization and (b) discrimination of LGBT persons. In consequence, this spelled out the EU’s mostly unequivocal 50 Beyond these main elements, there is no standardized format, and all guidelines look slightly different.

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expectations of third countries that they would provide remedy on both fronts. The LGBTI guidelines, in contrast to the toolkit, posit contestation of the concept of human rights for LGBTI persons itself as the problem, stating it as a topic for which there are “particular sensitivities” that may lead to “sensitive discussions” (Council of the European Union, 2013, para 4, 8). In its beginning, the guidelines identify the root cause for discrimination against LGBTI persons “in societal norms and perceived roles that perpetuate gender inequalities” (para. 2). This problem definition puts the onus on the third country’s cultural norms and still ignores the role former colonial powers have historically played in establishing these institutions, roles, and structures via traditional classification of persons as either male or female. Compared to the toolkit, which entailed the rather static singularity of LGBT-based prosecution as the problem, the guidelines, by conceiving contestation of the EU’s promoting of LGBT human rights itself as the problem, assign themselves the “moving target” of discourse. The problem definition outlined in the guidelines centers on, in other words, a struggle over the interpretation and meaning of human rights generally, and, more specifically, on who exactly constitutes rights holders. In the absence of a world court, the guidelines contribute to the struggle over a definition of the category of rights holders and the grounds on which one may not be discriminated against. If the struggle around meaning itself has been identified as the problem, a ‘solution’ therefore must influence the narrative and establish one’s own as the taken-for-granted perspective. The LGBTI guidelines document itself is an embodiment of a proposed “solution.” It speaks to the plurivocality and institutional complexity that pushes and pulls the EU in opposite directions: (a) the principle of diverse cultures and national sovereignty and (b) the EU’s identity as a normative power that places human rights at its core of external action. Analogous to the problem definition, the guidelines also entail greater ambivalence toward the solutions they suggest and reflect a greater plurivocality than the toolkit, as its drafting arose when the aforementioned contestation had not yet been identified as threatening human rights’ status as a highly legitimate institution and a universally applicable concept.

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Justifying Intervention with Universality The guidelines attempt to self-legitimize as an intervention on this highly contested topic by carefully and purposefully linking LGBTI to (a) human rights, (b) international binding documents on the UN level, (c) interpretations of said documents, and (d) other policy and nonbinding documents. The guidelines’ initial paragraph provides the first of these firm links (i.e., of LGBTI to human rights) in defining the issue at hand not as a creationary one—in which new rights specific to LGBTI persons were to be conceived—but rather a matter more broadly prescriptive: namely, of non-discrimination in the application of human rights.51 This positioning staunchly reinforced the decision made amid the toolkit’s drafting to advocate for “human rights for LGBT persons” rather than “LGBT rights” which while also highlighting the importance and farreaching consequences of this decision. In avoiding creating extra rights or setting LGBTI apart from other grounds of discrimination, and instead harkening to already existing and relevant international instruments,52 this close link neutralized accusations of neoimperialism53 and legitimated the EU’s efforts to protect and promote human rights for LGBTI persons in third countries. The guidelines provide legal argument for LGBTI persons’ inherent inclusion in the reach of human rights doctrines by noting the wide applicative scope of the ICCPR and ICESCR’s respective nondiscrimination clauses and the fact that “various UN Treaty Bodies and Special Rapporteurs” have supported the interpretation that LGBTI is covered (para. 9). The guidelines provide further backing to this position via reference to the Yogyakarta Principles as a nonbinding application of international human rights law about sexual orientation and gender identity (para. 12). This reference explicitly mentions the different UN bodies

51 All human rights should apply to LGBTI persons and that “no new human rights are created for them” (para. 1). 52 This was done by the guidelines’ reference to the ICCPR and ICESCR, which, together with the UDHR, form the main pillars of the international human rights architecture. 53 Another way the guidelines counter the imperialism accusation is by reference to the consensus achieved with so-called developing countries articulated at the Vienna Conference in 1993 and which established a “right to development” in exchange for relinquishing the “cultural relativist” position (see Chapter 5 for more details).

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that have referred to the principles, granting them a legitimacy they were considered to lack at the time of the toolkit’s writing.54 While references to global and universal human rights are prominently featured in the guidelines, the EU’s own legislation (i.e., primary and secondary law55 ) is only given subordinate reference—a common feature of the whole suite of council guidelines (Wouters & Hermez, 2016, p. 13). This privileging follows in line with the EU’s self-endorsed image as a normative actor, whereby international institutions are thought to lend greater legitimacy to the EU’s external action than its own rules, which are easily accused of being agents of self-interest or of cultural imperialism. In the guidelines’ case, this positioning becomes patently obvious in paragraph 8, which first states that the EU, in its work, builds on “international standards” and only secondly mentions the EU’s “own legislative framework” as a basis for its work (para. 8). As a regional organization compared to the UN as a global organization, the EU’s legislative framework can be referred to as guiding the EU’s action but not necessarily applicative beyond its boundaries (for said worries of overreach); accordingly, the guidelines are unable to make the claim that EU legislation should be applied to countries outside of the EU—at least without jeopardizing its reputation as a normative actor and thereby losing legitimacy. Legitimizing Action Through a Case-by-Case Approach At the same time as they emphasize the universality of human rights, the guidelines, somewhat contradictorily, highlight how local social context muddies the conception of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to protecting and promoting human rights for LGBTI persons. In some world locales, the very topic itself is often quite sensitive and tied to “societal norms” (para. 2). Accordingly, this problem definition calls for a specific solution, which the guidelines prescribe as one “tailor made [and] … case-by-case approach” that “tak[es] into account the local realities” (para. 2, 6, 8).

54 According to a staff member and legal advisor working on human rights in the EEAS, the LGBT toolkit did not include the Yogyakarta Principles, for they were not regarded legitimate at the time, having been written by experts without an official mandate and not a legitimate legal source that could be cited. “We couldn’t get the Yogyakarta Principles in, for example” [BX_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD18]. 55 Generally, the EU treaties are referred to as primary law while secondary legislation are the laws that are based on the principles and objectives of the treaties.

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To this end, the guidelines suggest, in the operational tools section to be implemented by the EU delegations, including the topic of LGBTI within the existing human rights strategies of each third country in which they are based.56 In any case, the guidelines make clear a “differentiated approach to these [LGBTI] issues and priority focus may be required in different countries and regions”—thus acknowledging the importance of context while suggesting mainstreaming the topic into existing, countryspecific policy formats, with an emphasis on noting particular occurrences of violations and structural discrimination (B.31.1). This new focus on context renders the guidelines inherently contradictory because they claim a one-size-fits-all status qua their status as guidelines, yet they relocate the responsibility of what is appropriate in a specific actor time/space on the local level, putting the onus on EU delegation staff to decide what is appropriate. The guidelines, at this point, lose their guidance character. This inherent ambiguity can only be solved by decoupling between levels—the normative high-level policy and the case-by-case ‘pragmatic’ level of the day to day doing and acting. In further prescription of the approach, the guidelines suggest relying less on legal measures and arguments or public pressure, in favor of the use of diplomatic pressure. The guidelines justify this latter approach with reference to the expected outcomes and the cause itself, stating a “consistent but persuasive approach, rather than a public and conflictual approach may be more likely to have a positive effect” and that the “EU is committed to advancing the human rights of LGBTI person in a meaningful and respectful way” (para. 8). This tone differs greatly from the LGBT toolkit and the EU Parl’s resolution, which publicly demanded that the EU Comm threatens with changes to development cooperation. Using diplomatic, rather than legal measures or public pressure, removes action from direct public scrutiny. Such action may still involve coercive measures such as threats, but when it is “silent” (behind closed doors), it is far less visible and therefore allows deviation from normative claims without risk of appearing inconsistent and thus of jeopardizing legitimacy. This approach allows for hypocrisy and easier decoupling of talk and action and therefore provides EU staff with more room to maneuver ambiguities. This form of non-transparency is ultimately a form 56 One new addition in the section regarding third countries is the reference to human rights country strategies, which are confidential strategies of the EU delegations on the respective country in which they are operating.

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of decoupling public talk from action taken locally. It also masks power imbalances because diplomacy is formally carried out at an equal level between sovereign countries (as “members of the international community”), which minimizes possible accusations of cultural imperialism. So long as the lack of transparency itself does not become a threat to the EU’s legitimacy or that of its delegations, it, in short, serves to satisfy several demands at once. This multiform tackling is not the case with approaches that apply legal measures or argue from a strictly legal point of view, as law is by definition binary: legal/illegal; guilty/not guilty.57 Such approaches require a shared understanding of legal rules and a politically independent legal system, honored by the executive, in order to be effective. In many countries, especially postcolonial African countries where human rights for LGBTI persons are viewed critically or same-sex sexual acts are criminalized, an independent and fully functioning judiciary does not exist—and even in its limited state, it does not enjoy the same legitimacy that judiciaries do for the EU administration and its member states. The reason for this is that the system itself in former colonial countries was imposed by colonial powers, layered on top of existing justice systems and more or less well embedded into the local context.58 LGBTI Individuals as Rights Holders In further difference to the toolkit, the guidelines strongly emphasize LGBTI, in their status as rights holders, to be individuals, rather than a collective. While the LGBT toolkit, in title and text, address LGBT people, the guidelines modify this referent to LGBTI persons. This change might seem minor but holds considerable semantic significance. The former implies a group identity, while the latter is related to personhood (i.e., persons as individual rights holders and legal subjects; Frank & Meyer, 2002, p. 89). In recent decades, the individual has become more and more central in national and global cultural accounts of the operation of society. 57 An example for a legal argument could be pointing out that only same-sex sexual relations are prohibited in certain countries but not being LGBTI and that therefore no one should be prosecuted for the latter. 58 Legal rules and also the metarules regarding the way a legal system is meant to function always require the relevant local mobilization which will be weak where there is a conflict with strong social institutions (Griffiths, 2003).

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This focus on the individual continues a long historical process, intensified by the consolidation of a more global polity and the weakening of the primordial sovereignty of the national state. Increasingly, society has become culturally rooted in the natural, historical, and spiritual worlds through the individual, rather than through corporate entities or groups. This shift has produced a proliferation and specification of individual roles, accounting for what individuals do in society. It has also produced an expansion in recognized individual personhood, accounting for who individuals are in the extrasocial cosmos and fueling elaborated personal tastes and preferences. Where it has been contested, the shift to the individual has also produced a rise in specializing identities (e.g., in such domains as ethnicity or gender). These identities offer accounts of individuals’ distinctive linkages to the cosmos, and they serve to bolster individual claims to standard roles and personhood. Over time, specializing identities tend to get absorbed into roles and personhood. And in turn, expanded roles and personhood provide further bases for specializing identity claims. Because many theorists mischaracterize the relationship of specializing identities to roles and personhood, the literature often overemphasizes the anomic character of the identity explosion and the closeness of the coupling between social roles and identity claims. On the contrary, specializing identities tend to be edited to remain within general rules of individual personhood and to be disconnected from the obligations involved in institutionalized roles. This designation, as the master human identity, as David John Frank and John W. Meyer (2002, p. 89) described it, emphasizes individual choice, taste and preferences as legitimate in line with increased rationalization. The guidelines’ use of personhood as a concept therefore takes the notion of LGBT beyond the idea of a collective and “citizenship” and its tie to territory and tethers it more closely with the idea of universal human rights (see Chapter 3). The idea of an individual’s rights resonates with two other key differences between the toolkit and the guidelines regarding who they consider an expert and which respective roles they accord to Human Rights Defenders (HRD), CSOs, and individual LGBTI persons. The toolkit designated those working to promote and protect human rights for LGBT people as HRD but did not go beyond this definition. The guidelines, in contrast, grant HRD a much more substantial role, establishing them as actors in their own right regarding the work on LGBTI. Moreover, the guidelines fracture EU engagement with third country LGBTI persons

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into three different intensity levels (or categories): from consultation to cooperation to required informed consent. At the first level, the local LGBTI community of concern is generally approached as a source of information to “consult and take into account […] about the most appropriate ways to act and react” (para. 18). In combatting LGBTI-phobic violence, the EU delegations are further tasked to work together with civil society “to develop legal and other measures to prevent, monitor and effectively prosecute perpetrators” (II.A.3 para. 28). At the third level, the guidelines specifically mention that any actions with regard to individual cases of human rights violations “should only be pursued if the person concerned gives his or her informed consent” (B. Operational Tools). The guidelines acknowledge LGBTI persons are most affected by any actions taken by the EU and its member states to combat discriminatory laws and practices, while establishing such persons as sources of information. Furthermore, the guidelines imply that to generate data about the domestic extent of violence motivated by perception of sexual orientation and gender identity, cooperation with local LGBTI communities is necessary. In both situations, the experts and those with the power to define directive remain the EU staff. It is only about individual cases—contexts in which EU staff must first obtain the informed consent of the person concerned—that the guidelines restrict the EU staff’s power to decide on a case-by-case basis according to their own judgment and proclaimed expertise. Greater Differentiation In further fleshing the toolkit’s general reference of specific EU legislation on gender, the guidelines acknowledge sexual orientation and gender identity as constituting distinct categories within the acronym LGBTI. The guidelines list EU legislation pertaining to sexual orientation, similar to the toolkit, and refer to the EU Gender ReCast (European Parliament, European Council, 2006) and the EU Asylum Qualification directives, which explicitly speak to the issues of gender identity and expression (Directive 2011/95/EU , 2011). Apart from citing legal documents, the guidelines refer to specific concerns of transgender persons—e.g., the required “proof of sterility or infertility” that many countries (including a number of EU member states) require before a person is allowed to undergo gender reassignment surgery and/or hormone treatment (para. 20). Along these same lines, the guidelines likewise acknowledge existing legislation that specifically targets transgender and gender

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variant persons—among them, antiprostitution and nuisance laws and laws outlawing ‘cross-dressing’ (para. 16). Lesbian, bisexual, and transgender women are specifically mentioned as particularly vulnerable targets of bias-motivated killings and rape (para. 26). These inclusions demonstrate greater general knowledge, sensitivity, and attention to gender biases and the issues pertaining to transgender persons. The same engagement did not extend to intersex. Although the guidelines use the acronym LGBTI , intersex-specific issues—where the outlawing of sex altering interventions on intersex infants is one of the main demands of intersex activists59 —feature nowhere in the guidelines, despite their relevance and topicality. This omission suggests the guidelines’ addition of the letter “I” to be in name only and not the result of meetings with the intersex lobby or an accounting of their demands. Likely this ignoring of the intersex lobby stemmed from the fact that “intersex” as an identity category (rather than a medical diagnosis) was still in its nascent stages at the time the guidelines were written. Perhaps emblematic, certain EU LGBT organizations, such as ILGA Europe and the European Parliament’s LGBT Intergroup, were likewise yet to include intersex issues as part of their lobbying and advocacy work.60 This exclusionary episode provides further evidence to the previous subchapter’s characterization of the ad-hoc adoption of LGBTI as a template into the guidelines. And its effect was, in any case, pioneering: in using the acronym, the EU then became a trend-setter for LGBTI, and such use would soon become standard practice, replacing the acronym LGBT. While awareness of intersex issues is indeed greater today, knowledge of such issues remains lacking.61 The inclusion of the “I” in the acronym then provided the opportunity for intersex organizations to demand their 59 The Third International Intersex Forum took place 29 November—1 December 2013 in Valletta, Malta and brought together 34 activists representing 30 intersex organizations from all continents. The first demand in their declaration is to end “mutilating and ‘normalizing’ practices such as genital surgeries, psychological and other medical treatments through legislative and other means,” reaffirming the declarations of the previous two forums (“Malta Declaration”, 2013). Since then two conferences have taken place. 60 ILGA Europe published a document on Intersex in 2014 in which it explained the organization’s own ignorance and lack of expertise and lack of perceived legitimacy on intersex issues. The organization started to upskill its staff on intersex in 2011, but the topic was not included in the organization’s strategic work plan until 2014. (ILGA Europe, 2014). 61 Especially relative to the other identity groups constituting LGBTI.

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issues to be also substantially reflected in policies and practices and that they should be involved in their development as those affected. The guidelines likewise demonstrate greater specificity than the toolkit regarding age and consent. The guidelines add consenting adults and to the toolkit’s general referent of what countries criminalize: same-sex relations. This insertion, through linking it implicitly to the individual and self-determination of adults, more clearly delineates sexual orientation from, e.g., pedophilia involving minors and from rape, which is by default without consent. This specification can therefore be interpreted to counteract the oft-evoked actual or perceived fear of homosexuals as predators and as “recruiting” children.62 Further differentiation between the guidelines and the toolkit arises in the former’s more nuanced reasoning of how punitive laws of a country with regard to same-sex sexual encounters, coupled with the state of a country’s legal system, affects LGBTI persons lives in ways beyond the letter of the law—an aspect covered in what the guidelines add as a fourth priority area for action (II.A.3). This section, which did not exist in the toolkit, details the different forms of violence LGBTI people face and their oft-linking to “a climate of impunity,” in which such acts of violence go unpunished—something the guidelines explain to be more often the case in countries that either directly criminalize consenting same-sex and transgender adult relations or do not protect them explicitly through legislation (para. 24). To put it in terms of a problem definition: This additional section further fleshes the “problem” posed to the EU as encompassing different forms of violence—links this to criminalization of same-sex sexual acts but also the rule of law more generally. What is usually criminalized in countries is only the act of same-sex sexual relations itself, which—where suspected—accordingly becomes subject to criminal investigation and court proceedings. Beyond such sexual acts, identifying as LGBTI is not criminalized and neither is running LGBTI organizations or campaigning 62 This linking of homosexuality with pedophilia is very common and already played a role during Oscar Wilde’s time, as mentioned before. Opponents of equality for LGBTI persons also still commonly play to this fear and use this frame today. It flares up in debates around whether to include nonheterosexual relations in sex education curricula in schools, in discussions around whether gay men should be able to adopt and is underlying legislation in Russia and Lithuania for the protection of minors from any publication which mentions homosexuality. It also features very strongly in Bahati’s draft of the Ugandan AHB.

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for decriminalization or LGBTI rights. And yet in reality, in many countries where same-sex sexual activity is criminalized, these aspects are conflated as a general result of weak rule of law and human rights for LGBTI persons having become a politically and normatively highly charged issue. In contrast to the toolkit, the guidelines capture these nuances and point toward criminalization as the problem, resulting in a shift in focus away from historic responsibilities due to colonialism, when powers imposed laws, including those criminalizing same-sex sexual activity. The focus is moved instead to current governments’ responsibilities of decriminalizing and addressing shortcomings in the rule of law. This again fits neatly in the development discourse on improving rule of law in so-called developing countries for making them more attractive places for foreign investment. Neither the EU Parl resolutions nor the LGBT toolkit and LGBTI guidelines acknowledge this historic responsibility or evoke the colonial past as this would render any intervention today illegitimate. What Counts as Reliable Knowledge Another significant difference between the toolkit and guidelines lies in the latter’s greater emphasis on different sources and kinds of data, the lack of which it identifies as a problem and suggests to “[e]ncourage civil society organisations to properly document human rights violations affecting LGBTI persons” (Section B para. 8) and to “track and monitor” (section B para. 2) the situation with the tool of the Annex II checklist. Among additional information sources the guidelines mention are LGBTI CSOs in third countries and have been described above. Expanding engagement regarding LGBTI communities and CSOs in third countries is one way to combat this dearth of data, although in providing mainly narratives, and not figures. As the language of a modern organization in their enjoyment of high levels of legitimacy, figures remain necessary to the EU’s aims—as Peter Miller (2001, p. 382) put it, “What is counted, usually counts.” This according need for data that fits with the modern organization of the EU is reflected in the guidelines’ novel priority area of action on combatting LGBTI-phobic violence. As a means to support civil society and governments to “monitor cases of violence,” upskill police, and provide assistance to victims, this priority area calls for introducing the use of hatecrime statistics, which would enable quantification of the overall situation vis-à-vis violence via counting incidents (Council of the European Union,

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2013, para. II.A.3.28). Once established, such abstract data enjoys high levels of legitimacy in modern organizations, as it can be compared over time and placed in relation to other countries, which subsequently allows for the data user’s “rational” prioritizing according to specific abstract criteria and, then eventually, their action. The guidelines’ idea of monitoring to generate reliable figures is based on the assumption that the way EU staff work with LGBTI organizations in Brussels can be replicated in other settings. In Brussels, those working on LGBTI at the EEAS today rely on ILGA Europe, an LGBTI organization they deem to be highly trusted and professional, for information and figures [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS _Mid_PD25, BE_EU/BE_ EEAS_HR_Mid_PD10].63 Such robust confidence in ILGA’s work and judgment is largely attributed to the organization’s capacity to effectively translate the demands of their member organizations into the language of the EU administration. This capacity purveys status as being an ally, rather than an outside lobby organization, to EU staff working on LGBTI [BE_ EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25].64 For staff based in EU delegations in third countries, cooperating with CSOs similar to ILGA Europe is likewise appealing, as it allows them to circumvent the government in third countries which either is lacking of statistics on LGBTI-phobic crimes or does not even consider such occurrences as crimes in the first place. Such trust in figures provided by CSOs, however, is not the same in Uganda where the understanding the purpose of figures differs between the EU delegation and local CSO. While the EU stresses the importance of ‘accurate’ figures, activist in Uganda see figures more as a campaign tool, are less concerned about verification and know that only extreme figures will capture attention. The CSO is less concerned about inflated figures affecting their organization’s legitimacy in Uganda because such way of using figures is regarded as standard practice employed also by the government itself. Apart from the call to develop monitoring instruments as a measure of the guidelines, Annex II of the guidelines itself can serve as a monitoring tool at the metalevel. Already part of the toolkit, this annex, formatted as a checklist, was deemed particularly “practical” by staff at

63 The responsible officer of LGBTI at the EEAS states that, for all information they need, “ILGA has the figures” [BE_EU/MS_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD10]. 64 Compare also to the concept of Transnational Lawmaking Coalitions (Reiners, 2021).

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the EEAS in Brussels for its broad reach, allowing one to monitor the LGBTI situation in a particular country and the related work of the delegation. Annex II is one of the reasons human rights staff in Brussels described the LGBTI guidelines as “more practical than you might expect” [BE_EU/BE_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD10]. The underlying assumption is the more “practical” a document is perceived to be, the greater the chances that it will be used by those who are meant to implement it (i.e., the EU delegations and member state embassies), rather than just remain on the “talk” level, but as Chapter 9 shows, this is not necessarily the case, empirically. To summarize, this subchapter has shown how, in the 3 years since the toolkit’s creation, the EU’s formal problem definition has changed from constituting a low-level issue—that is, a problem of low priority, dealt with at lower levels of the EU hierarchy—to a political one engaging the highest decision-making body of the EU. This shift away from leaving the subject of human rights of LGBTI persons to the experts, toward a more active, politicized, and contested approach closely contours EU’s redefinition of the problem at hand, from human rights violations against LGBT people to the contestation of human rights for LGBTI persons itself. This redefinition reflects the certain existential shearing posed to the EU by perceived change in the environment, whereby it, in its foreign policy work on LGBTI, must reconcile accusations of neoimperialism by third country governments (and their threat to EU legitimacy) with the likewise legitimacy threat of being perceived inactive by some member states and CSOs. Acknowledgment of EU member states’ responsibilities in shaping legislation during colonialism is not part of the problem definition and therefore do not feature as part of the proposed solutions either—a circumstance which otherwise would make any justification of interventions at all difficult given the strong sovereignty norm in today’s “community of nations.” Instead of a self-critical approach, the guidelines established the contestation of human rights for LGBTI persons as well as the accusation of imperialism as the problem. Particularly relative to the EU Parl resolutions and the LGBT toolkit, the guidelines embody the changes to the idea of human rights for LGBTI persons due to the high levels of contestation the topic has prompted in the meantime in the environment, while at the same time the guidelines embody the enactment of a particular interpretation into the world. As crystallization of this new problem definition based on

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years of microlevel EU sensemaking involving filtering, categorizing, de/ coupling and enacting, the guidelines propose a multifaceted solution: through justifying intervention with reference to widely accepted institutions; by emphasizing a case-by-case approach, which provides a large margin of appreciation and interpretation on the local level; redefining the role of CSOs and individuals working on LGBTI issues in third countries; and by emphasizing the need for “hard” data in terms of figures of incidents, which fit with the evidence-based policy-making of modern administration.

Continued Negotiations: The Politics In 2015, when I conducted interviews in Brussels, LGBTI had been formally institutionalized as part of EU’s foreign policy approach to human rights—a characterization corroborated by relevant staff.65 And indeed the topic was deemed no longer “taboo” [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_ Mid_PD21] in the EEAS and had been designated to an officer (hereafter deemed Staff Member D), who is a seconded expert, i.e., a career diplomat from an EU member state with advanced protection of rights for LGBTI persons, as solely responsible for the LGBTI topic.66 The general expectation from a functionalist or an instrumentalist legal point of view would be that once the LGBTI guidelines codified the idea of human rights for LGBTI persons and were passed by the Council, they just needed to be implemented. In actuality, negotiations about the meaning of the guidelines and the problem definition they were conceived to address continue to take place as staff in Brussels working for different units in the EEAS and EU Comm try to make sense of what this policy means and should mean for their work—that is, as they translate the guidelines into their own practice. These negotiations are acts of collective sensemaking, always with the aim of preserving one’s own legitimacy, that of one’s organizational unit, and that of the EU. In this sensemaking 65 A mid-level staff member from the EEAS human rights unit said that the “work we do on LGBT is part of the broader human rights work we do” [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_ Mid_PD21]. 66 Usually, they are seconded from a member state with strong legal protection for LGBTI persons. See also the research by Kelly Kollmann and David Paternotte on the “Velvet Triangle” and the importance of informal relationships and overlapping memberships in contributing to policy convergence on same-sex marriage across Europe (Paternotte & Kollman, 2013).

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process, staff members draw on, as well as contribute to, a mix of institutions from very different sources—from formal organizational rules to taken-for-granted cultural norms. Importantly, these negotiations have had a concentrated focus on practice, no longer evolving around the conceptual linking of human rights for LGBTI persons under the umbrella of human rights, but rather now on the how of concrete action. As EU Comm staff put it, “the main question is ‘what to do’” [BE_EU_Comm_DEVCO_Mid_PD12]. Problem Definitions Despite the now-explicit directive of formal policy, there remain great uncertainties and ambiguities for EU staff in advancing a subsequent cohesive approach in practice, which plays out in rifts, mainly between those EEAS and EU Comm staff members working on human rights and those working in geographical units. The guidelines defined the EU’s main problem as the external promotion and protection of human rights for LGBTI persons—as the contestation of the topic itself—which goes to the core of the EU’s legitimacy as a unitary modern organization, putting at stake its role as a normative actor able to influence the institutional environment beyond its borders. This problem definition becomes less clear-cut in the administrative setting in which Brussels staff make sense: for them, this definition differs according to their respective contexts and what they regard as increasing the EU’s legitimacy, which is done through them employing frames available to them. This fracture becomes no more obvious than in these aforementioned rifts, where staff perception of what challenges the EU’s legitimacy differs based on their affiliation (EEAS vs. DEVCO) and their units’ policy foci (human rights vs. geographic). In part, the fault lines lie where public administration literature situates them, based on the concept of turf battles between organizational entities vying for “jurisdiction” or “reputation” (Maor et al., 2013; Wilson, 1989). Although a staff member from the DEVCO Governance, Gender and Human rights Unit described the relationship as more cooperative than it used to be, they also said the turf war between the EU Comm and the much newer EEAS has continued, due to the oft-unclear division of competencies,67 in which the “EEAS might push things but the 67 “The EEAS and EU Commission used to be more antagonistic. The Commissioner before the current one would say we need to fight for our competencies and watch what

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Commission [as the ultimately more operational body] runs the projects and has the last say” [BE_EU_Comm_DEVCO_Mid_PD12]. At the same time, a long-standing and more-senior staff member of an EEAS geographic unit suggested that despite the highly formalized structure of the EEAS and the EU Comm, interplay depends on the informal interface of personal relationships—on “who speaks to whom and updates each other” [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19].68 With this in mind, it is not much of a surprise that, with regard to human rights for LGBTI persons, the main fault line is between the geographic units and the human rights units in the EU Comm and the EEAS. In both organizational entities’ their primary working unit’s structure is organized according to geographic areas. While those working for human rights for LGBTI persons in the EEAS would like to see the EU take a clear stance against third countries where same-sex sexual relationships are criminalized and LGBTI persons persecuted through statements and actions, those working in the geographic units regard their relationships with third countries at risk in face of such categorical approaches. At the DEVCO of the EU Comm, the main interest of staff working for human rights and those working within geographic units is to be able to continue to provide development aid and therefore the categorization into legitimate and illegitimate approaches is not quite as stark as at the EEAS. “Human Rights Taliban” At the EEAS, the remit of geographic staff involves all political affairs corresponding to a particular country (i.e., diplomatic ties and trade). Their principal organizational aim is to maintain good relations with the country. In comparison with the geographic units, the human rights unit is small and just one of several thematic units. Their tasks are to advance and mainstream human rights through the organization and to advance human rights globally. This advancement involves, for example, pushing for an EU statement that makes the Union’s position clear, as was the

is happening very closely. The current one is calmer and about cooperation and happy to wait until things come to us” [BE_EU_Comm_DEVCO_Mid_PD12]. 68 According to the staff member, this also includes the relationships with delegation

staff.

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case with the murder of Ugandan LGBTI rights activist David Kato.69 When a topic receives heightened attention to the extent that it becomes able to influence the work of the geographic units and the relationships they have with third countries (e.g., human rights for LGBTI persons), this is perceived as a problem and threat. Where good relations with other countries are regarded as the main priority, the promotion of contested human rights issues is regarded as counterproductive. The staff working for the geographic units define the problem as one of internal misdirection: they see human rights staff working on LGBTI issues as being too focused on a “single issue”70 and undiscerning of the “bigger picture”—problematic, in other words, due to unwillingness to compromise and a privileging of the singular aspect of LGBTI issues over other EU-important concerns. In short, staff working on human rights for LGBTI persons are categorized as extremist in their ideology—to such an extent that they have been labeled by geographic staff as “Taliban” or “Ayatollahs of human rights.”71 ,72

69 When news about the violent death of prominent Ugandan LGBTI human rights activist David Kato reached the EEAS, the reactions between the human rights unit and the geographic unit were very different. A staff member who was working on LGBT issues within the human rights unit for the EEAS at the time when Ugandan activist David Kato was killed say that they experienced the news as “traumatizing” because they had met David Kato in person only a month before: “I still remember this meeting very well. I didn’t know him personally but we [from the human rights unit] all felt we weren’t doing strong enough statements […]. He [David Kato] came to see us, he gets killed and we do not even do a statement. […] We really tried from the human rights side and even my Head of Unit, who is quite a conservative man, was working for this and didn’t make himself particular popular” [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25]. The geographical desks were cautious to issue a statement because the circumstances of the death were not clear [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25]. 70 The staff member responsible for the LGBTI dossier calls it “the ‘one man issue’ criticism” [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD10]. 71 “It was generally the same with other human rights. RELEX Geodesk [geographical desk] would call us the Taliban because we would distract attention from trade and diplomatic issues” [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25]. Another staff member at the human rights unit of the EEAS reports that uses a very similar phrase also associated with religious fundamentalism when talking about the relationship with the geographic units within the EEAS. “We are sometimes called the ‘Ayatollah’s of human rights defense’” [BE_EU_ EEAS_HR_Mid_PD10]. A senior staff member in the geographic unit confirms these nicknames [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19]. 72 Also speaking to this characterization is a long-serving staff member from the EEAS geographic unit on East Africa, who suggests that staff working on human rights are

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Not exactly known as an advantage for one’s career progression, the topic of LGBTI has been engaged mostly by staff who deem it important due to their personal institutional environment or socialization. This more intrinsic, emotional motivation, as opposed to a more distant, rational and professional approach, is regarded as the reason for a rift with staff working in the geographic unit, who do not necessarily share the same enthusiasm.73 In contrast to those working on human rights issues, staff working in the geographic units “think that human rights are a dangerous distraction from the Realpolitik and the only thing we should be concerned about are power interests and that we have nice trade relations and other relations with third countries.” [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_ Mid_PD19]. How this perceived antagonistic dichotomy between the human rights and geographic sections’ task units is suggested to be “solved” is through engaging human rights issues via a case-by-case approach and linking it to the importance of knowledge of the pertinent country— that is, “in the right moment and manner, especially to the right result. Sometimes in public, sometimes private [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_ particularly reckless with regard to the collegial relationships undergirding their work on any topic: When working within the institutions, one of the most striking things, on any dossier, it so much depends on the person handling it. And especially within human rights. LGBTI rights are no different than other human rights, but some colleagues are very keen to raise the issues and they don’t very much care that they will upset our counterparts. These colleagues are sometimes known as the human rights Taliban. [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19]

73 A staff member working at the geographic unit of the EEAS suggests, that “only the people interested in human rights go to work in the human rights unit” [BE_EU_EEAS_ GEO_Mid_PD19]. However, some staff are seconded to this position from a member state administration, like for example the EEAS staff working on human rights for LGBTI. While socialized within a member state with high levels of protection for LGBTI persons, this staff member is more moderate and diplomatic than their predecessors in the job and that “there needs to be a balance of interests [of LGBTI human rights] with regard to economics and trade” [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD10]. While their predecessors (Staff Member A and C) had either identified as part of the LGBTI-Community themselves or referred to personal connections, this current staff member’s approach suggests a more detached professional take with the general conviction of importance of human rights and LGBTI due to the sociopolitical environment they are from, but less personal and emotional engagement and tacit knowledge than their predecessors.

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Mid_PD19].”74 Accordingly, those considered best placed to decide which approach to take toward a particular third country are not, actually, staff of either the Brussels-located units, but instead the delegation head of that country, who knows the local/national context.75 The senior heads of delegation often belong to an older generation, whose socializations have generally touched less on LGBTI issues. Their task is also to manage the delegation as a whole (i.e., also ensure its functioning and it fulfills its purpose—one main task of which is development aid distribution). They are likely to ignore the topic of LGBTI as a matter for external policy, even with the LGBTI guidelines explicit directive, in favor of good relations to the host country’s government as a prerequisite for the work of the delegation. A top-down approach thus does not seem to work. Working with CSOs Given the internal resistance, rather than trying to get heads of delegations to act on the guidelines through a top-down coercive process,76 human rights staff spend their energy on shaping the institutional environment by making the guidelines more widely known beyond simply the head of delegation, i.e., to CSOs and EU delegation staff.77 The reasoning behind such targeting may be cast as such: CSOs in member states represent the electorate and where member state governments have committed to human rights for LGBTI persons internally, their legitimacy is at stake if they are not regarded as acting on human rights violations against LGBTI persons elsewhere. The EEAS Staff Member D therefore ensured CSOs of member states knew about the EU’s LGBTI guidelines and plans to translate them into member states’ languages,78 enabling

74 “Of course, it should be somewhere between the two” [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_ PD19]. 75 “It depends very much on the head of delegation what happens” [BE_EU_Comm_ DEVCO_Mid_PD12]. 76 The EEAS does not finance CSOs in third countries, as this lies within the remit of

the EU Comm, and thus has no formal relationship with them. “The EEAS doesn’t have the money. The EIDHR is there to fund NGOs” [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD10]. 77 E.g., by distributing them to activists visiting Brussels. 78 Translation into member states’ languages is regarded as a way to leverage support:

“We will also have [the Guidelines] translated into Member States’ languages. [...] Member states use it against EU delegation. Where there is a more conservative Head of

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CSOs to pressure their foreign ministries, with the hope they would pass this pressure to the embassies, which would then pressure delegations.79 And indeed, media attention on LGBTI-targeted human rights violations, combined with the expectation of member states to act in contra, is thought to make it difficult for heads of delegations to decouple their action from the guidelines’ talk.80 Rather than pushing action from the top, a changed institutional environment where it appears inappropriate to disregard the topic of human rights for LGBTI persons decreases the possibilities of decoupling between the “talk” of the guidelines and “action” at the level of the EU delegations. It also maintains the legitimacy of the EEAS staff working on human rights for LGBTI as the effect is indirect and therefore a less direct challenge to the geographical units’ work and the work of the EU Comm, relying on good relations with third countries for their development aid distribution. “…They Are Emotional” Rationality being one of the main characteristics of an ideal bureaucracy, any emotional responses, rather than logical reasoning, appear to clash with this perceived foundation. In the case of the EU, the level to which this is regarded as a problem differs. For example, Staff Member B who has worked both for the EU Comm and, later, the EEAS’s human rights unit on LGBTI specifies each body’s spotty regard among staff for human rights as a personally relevant issue, as the ultimate impasse: I feel [the topic of LGBT is] the final frontier. And the only people who were fighting for it were those persons who were personally implicated. And I felt you can’t have a human rights issue where that’s the case. Everyone should see it as their issue. [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25]

Delegation, it could be hard to convince them otherwise. And their own political affairs officer will use it” [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD10]. 79 “Head Quarters [of some member states] are pushing more and the media attention helps” [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD10]. 80 “NGOs like [the LGBTI guidelines] and we want them to because delegations have so much on their plate. There is nothing secret about it that we give it out to activists who are in Brussels, at least once a month. They [the activists from third counties] are also brought in by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, for example, and they were received up to the cabinet level in EEAS” [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD10].

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Such emotive motivations are portrayed by high-level staff members in the EEAS’s remit of human rights as problematic, due to the way they chafe with the contrasted socializations of delegation leaders, for whom LGBTI is less of a personal touchstone and who understand an administration or bureaucracy as meant to follow policy, not emotion.81 There remains no suggestion as to how one can sway EU heads of delegations to change their views on LGBTI issues. The EEAS offers training for junior staff who are the human rights focal points in delegations, perhaps to upskill the next generation of possible head of delegations and to affect the environment and what is considered appropriate (which shows that even in a context where formal policy exists, there remains room for loose coupling in different ways82 ). Rationality Rules While acknowledging human rights for LGBTI persons is an emotive issue, there have been attempts by both parties, i.e., those who are in favor and those who reject the idea to use emotionality as a way to discredit the other side as inappropriate. While for some staff, a sense of justice and morality trumps formal structure, others at the EU conceive its administration to best be based on purely rational decision-making; under such a view, policy decisions based on emotions become delegitimized. Accordingly, the EU, as a meta organization and public administration, is marked by certain internal shearing, in which staff attitudes differ from the EU’s official stance and policy. This undermines consistency and their legitimacy to challenge what they formally criticize in other countries— i.e., introducing stricter legislation against LGBTI persons (like in the case of Uganda).

81 “[Those who work on human rights for LGBTI persons] are emotional. And the

challenge we have is that in some delegations, some Ambassadors will not really embrace it. They belong to a different generation. They have different cultural backgrounds, and we really need to do more to overcome [this resistance]. Because it’s not their personal choice. It’s part of the consolidated policy so they have to subscribe to it” [BE_EU_ EEAS_High_PD23_a]. 82 This is acknowledged by a higher level staff member at the geographical desk (“Of

course in a well-oiled bureaucracy, all the officials would carry out the instructions they’ve been given. That’s what should happen but doesn’t [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19]”). Which is to mean that those who accuse others of being fundamentalist about their work are just as irrational and guided by norms themselves, but rather clothe them in a functionalist way.

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A constant tug of war over the more dominant frame takes place within the EU public administration—human rights as a highly normatively loaded one, based on the equality principle, on the one hand, and maintaining solid relations that secures influence and a continuation of Empire, on the other. While human rights stands as a powerful frame externally to justify work on LGBTI, the same cannot be said about their status internally to the administration, where the longer term relationships with other countries as a continuation of Empire is the frame within which human rights should fit. The more powerful frame in this administrative context is therefore that of rationality, which is in line with modern organizations and regarded as generally appropriate by those working in such an organization. The frame of the modern organization is therefore strongly evoked and shows how the negotiations have reached a metalevel, away from thematic content. It also demonstrates how loosely coupled the units even within an organizational entity are and how much they can diverge, depending on their main task. “…Eclipsing Other Rights” Since the publishing of the guidelines, the case of Uganda has played a particular part in unsettling policy paths forward, largely stemming from the vastly greater attention the Ugandan AHB received in European and US media over other contemporaneous Ugandan legislation with likewise negative human rights implications.83 Staff members working in the geographic unit have cautioned against such high-level attention and have defined it as a problem because it only stokes further challenge; says one: “I am not, for a moment, seeking to minimize LGBTI rights. It’s absolutely correct they have now attained the same value as other rights. But they are now almost in danger of eclipsing other rights” [BE_EU_EEAS_ GEO_Mid_PD19].

83 One of these other laws were the Public Order Management Act 2013 granting the police with wide powers to restrict meetings. Another legislation was the AntiPornography Act, which criminalizes the production and distribution of pornography but also contributed to incidences of women being stripped naked in public for their ‘indecent’ dress. A third bill debated in Uganda around the same time were amendments to the NGO-Registration Act which proposed to change the process of registering NGOs and would grant government wide-sweeping powers to control and deny registration (see also Jjuuko & Tabengwa, 2018, p. 66).

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To support their claim, this staff member subsequently references a 2014 Amnesty International84 report on discriminatory legislation in Uganda and also refers to the high media interest (Amnesty International, 2014): “[The Amnesty International report] says that Uganda’s donors’ response to LGBTI is much stronger than on other issues. [...] and whenever there was something on the anti-homosexuality bill, the next day there was huge media interest” [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19]. The statement above indirectly argues within the human rights frame itself, which stipulates human rights’ indivisibility. This form of reasoning fits well with the notion of evidence-based policy and, as such, underlines the speaker’s own distancing from what they would consider emotion-led policy-making. The statement shows that, on the one hand, the LGBTI topic has been formally institutionalized within the frame of human rights—it is compared to other groups and other human rights issues on the same level; on the other hand, it seems to be the only human rights issue where the accusation of a “too much” is even feasible. This, again, shows the topic has not yet achieved the same taken-for-granted status as other protected groups, and is rather, to some degree, still resisted. The argument of human rights for LGBTI being pushed “too much” gets linked to another important frame of a modern organization—that of effectiveness. A staff member working within the geographic unit suggests that heightened attention creates the problem in the first place, intimating a causality between the laws gaining attention and their application: [Laws], if left alone, might not do too much harm. There are anti-gay laws on the books in many countries, but, in a vast majority, they are hardly enforced. Not that this justifies them, but most people would let sleeping dogs lie. Unfortunately, African politicians have discovered them as an easy way to whip up popularity. [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19]

This statement implies the EU should better not provoke attention and “create” a problem where there was none. Criminalizing of same-sex sexual relations, according to this interpretation, only becomes a problem when exploited for political gain, which in turn is only possible once such criminalization has been barraged with media attention. Regarding its implication for EU policy, this statement therefore discredits a proactive approach, instead advertising one more pragmatic and less principled 84 An organization regarded as highly legitimate by staff working on human rights.

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or legalistic, which is inherent to human rights to a large extent, qua them being rights. Moreover, it redirects the focus to the action and away from symbolic rules and toward the country contexts. The demand is only feasible because it implies that the rule of law within states is limited and that legislation, even though it exists, is not applied. At the same time, it also disregards those laws, even in contexts where few court cases exist featuring their application, are the basis for extortion and blackmail and are generally used to legitimize violence and discrimination against people perceived to be LGBTI or simply different. Stressing Equal Importance The criticism of LGBTI issues being granted too much attention is also known and acknowledged by those working on human rights for LGBTI persons within the EEAS.85 They can stress that human rights for LGBTI persons are at the same level as other human rights, but they could not halt their work as the accusation of overreacting would imply. Their role and task is to protect and promote human rights for LGBTI persons in EU foreign policy—to do so by not acting, as the problem definition of a “too much” suggests, would erode their legitimacy as a staff member within the public administration as well as their legitimacy with the human rights community, i.e., others working on human rights for LGBTI persons in the administration but also with regard to CSOs. “The West Against the Rest” Two more related problem definitions cut across those who work in the geographic units and those who work for human rights in the EEAS and the EU Comm: (a) erosion of the EU’s organizational legitimacy by not being perceived as acting in a consistent and unified way and (b) the fear of the debate becoming polarized in a way that would leave the EU isolated in its position. Staff from both the EEAS units—human rights and geographic—counter these quandaries in stressing current “European consensus” about LGBTI, although they differ in their estimates of the degree to which this consensus has been achieved. The EEAS Staff Member D regarded consensus on human rights for LGBTI persons 85 “Human rights are equally important and at the moment LGBT gets lots of attention. There has been criticism that we are overreacting, even” [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_ PD10].

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not as taken for granted but rather as something that requires ongoing work, particularly in “the COHOM, [where] a uniform EU approach [on LGBTI and human rights] is a concern” [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_ PD10]. This implies that a common position by all EU member states is precarious and something that must constantly be established and maintained between member states. Higher level staff working for the geographic unit, in contrast, are optimistic. They are convinced CSOs’ professional and successful lobbying campaigns on the topic of human rights for LGBTI persons86 have changed “perceptions internally [of the EU]” [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_ Mid_PD19]. They back far-reaching statement further with indirect reference to the wide-spread adoption of protective legislation pitching the EU versus “Africa”87 : “Well, perhaps with the exception of Malta, by in large, there is a complete consensus within Europe on LGBT rights but of course this is not matched by feelings in Africa. On the contrary, there are anti-gay cultural prejudices” [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19]. DEVCO and EEAS staff agree that the EU serves as a buffer for member states by portraying their own national and the EU’s policy as more or less loosely coupled. This partially satisfies multiple demands of national constituency, other EU countries, and third countries. Member states with less national protection of rights for LGBTI persons do not contest the formal EU position, as the LGBTI topic is by now too closely linked to human rights which in turn have been established as a core value of the EU’s foreign policy, and these countries can therefore still enjoy legitimacy in the EU, without upsetting their own constituency.88 In countries where a national constituency demands action, reference can be

86 The “EU is very responsive to lobbying and LGBTI lobby is very professional and very good to putting their message across” [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19]. 87 According to them, it is this consensus, indicated by the fact that “gay marriage has made progress everywhere,” that “is naturally feeding through into EU foreign policy” [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19]. 88 A DEVCO staff member explains that “The member states would not say anything against the EU acting though [on third countries for disrespecting human rights for LGBTI persons].” An EEAS staff member similarly states that “The conservative member states stay neutral [with regard to LGBTI]” [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD10].

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made to the EU’s work on the topic without jeopardizing the relationship with third countries.89 The above account stresses the unity and glosses over any existing differences between and within EU member states. As mentioned in Chapter 6, on the EU legislative level, there remains patchy de facto protection against discrimination and violence against persons perceived as LGBTI, as well as a wide-spread lack of legal protection against discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation beyond that in employment contexts.90 The utility of this image of a unified EU on the topic of human rights for LGBTI persons may seem limited, but as a high-level staff member at the EEAS explicates, the appeal becomes apparent in envisaging the topic as a symbol for a liberal EU: [Human rights for LGBTI persons is] seen as a kind of symbol for our tolerant society. And that then extends to religious tolerance and the fight against any kind of religious extremism as part of the European project. It all started off by overcoming national barriers but now it is about overcoming sexual barriers, religious barriers, trade barriers, etc., etc. So it all goes back to the same kind of philosophy. That should not be forgotten. [BE_EU_EEAS_High_PD23_b]

In other words, human rights for LGBTI persons is used as an indicator for the EU’s common value base and identity to buttress the Union internally and shore up its legitimacy as an organization by highlighting commonality. It evokes the image of a singular liberal society within the EU and draws a firm border between the Union and the outside. Outliers are acknowledged (e.g., Malta), but by drawing the comparison with the “Other” in the form of African countries, these differences are portrayed as small in comparison. The dichotomy is strengthened through reference to laws in Europe versus feelings in Africa. This framing, as such, produces an “ingroup” of EU member states and a distinct out-group. 89 The above DEVCO staff member states that “member state countries are happy if we [they] doing the human rights work because then they can say it’s not [us] but the EU” [BE_EU_Comm_DEVCO_Mid_PD12]. 90 Which is to say nothing of the EU’s persistent wide-spread harmful legislation and medical regarding transgender and intersex persons.

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This dichotomy of “EU” versus the outside, or the “Other,” is regarded as positive because it strengthens EU identity internally at the same time that said coherence strengthens EU legitimacy as an organization externally. While evoking a dichotomy, such polarization easily provokes the notion of a “West” trying to promote their set of cultural values to other states. This promotion is not regarded as a problem per-se, but in cases where such promotion is perceived as illegitimate because it is construed as curtailing other states’ sovereignty in a postcolonial world order, these “Other” countries might form a value block that would threaten the EU’s legitimacy and challenge the “Western” narrative of liberalism: “In Brussels and on the ground [in EU delegations], we see the danger of the ‘West against the rest.’ The question is how not to create cultural blocks where countries get behind ‘Africanism.’ And at the same time how to also stay credible within the EU” [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD10]. The challenge posed to EEAS Staff Member D is to inhibit creation of such a block at the same time as strengthening internal cohesion, which echoes the crux of Empire and the paradox of the EU mentioned in Chapters 3 and 6. Moreover, it demonstrates the contest for meaning on a global scale, where it is important to spread and gather support for one’s own interpretation to enhance its legitimacy without being seen as doing so, which could be regarded as neoimperialist practice and challenge the legitimacy of the organization as a whole. This conundrum is handled differently by the EEAS geographic units and the human rights unit. Silent Diplomacy In a position where being regarded as too active as well as appearing inactive might trigger a loss of legitimacy, Staff Member D, responsible for the topic of LGBTI, resorted to higher level and behind-the-scenes activities—referred to as silent diplomacy.91 This approach allows continued activity but decouples it from direct scrutiny. Justified with the argument

91 “Silent diplomacy” or “quiet diplomacy” refers to negotiations that are not public, as opposed to diplomacy that uses public naming and shaming as a way to pressure and influence action.

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of effectiveness and the aim, it achieves temporary stability but simultaneously contradicts the EU’s principle of transparency and can delegitimize the EU’s actions vis-à-vis CSOs.92 Staff Member D’s push for international-level change (rather than only on regional EU-level) through a UN resolution—an example of which arose at the UN level, in 2014—is reminiscent of the time when LGBT issues were first dealt with in EU foreign policy (see Chapter 7).93 This time, however, with contestation as the identified problem, much emphasis was given to the worry that the perceived legitimacy of such an LGBTI-targeted resolution on Human rights, Sexual orientation, and Gender identity (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2014), would be diminished if the pushing parties were merely the “Western” states. The concern was that such a move could lead to an “African block” and more neutral countries voting against this resolution [BE_EU_EEAS_ HR_Mid_PD10].94 The objective was, thus, not to pass a resolution but to shape the international institutional environment in a more indirect way. To achieve this, lobbying was undergone behind the scenes to press other countries, like South Africa, to take a leadership role, which they resisted for the second UN resolution on the topic. The challenge in this episode was to promote the EU’s perspective and this to be known internally without being seen to do so externally. Underlying this problem definition is the ‘solution’ to not be seen as lobbying or championing the cause for human rights for LGBTI persons too openly vis-à-vis the “global community of states,” while still being perceived as doing enough to remain legitimate with member states and

92 “[The] problem with that approach is always that NGOs are, of course, concerned about silent diplomacy because they can’t see it” [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19]. 93 At the beginning of the engagement with the topic of LGBT in EU foreign policy

with Staff Member A activities were directed at UN level and now again the focus is to proselytize a particular sense through UN resolution. 94 “[The EU] pushes for [a UN] resolution or at least cross-regional statement but doesn’t just want it to be the EU and the US” [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD10]. Another resolution on LGBTI was achieved a few months after the interview. The first UN Human Rights Council resolution—Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity was adopted 17 June 2011 (A/HRC/RES/17/19), a second Human Rights Council resolution—Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity was adopted 26 September 2014 (A/HRC/RES/27/32) and the latest, the resolution on the Protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity was adopted 30 June 2016 (A/HRC/RES/32/2).

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CSOs. This indirect approach caused some frustration for Staff Member D in working on LGBTI within the EEAS, as it required a lot of work to convince superiors and other organizational units, such as the delegations, to act via crafting statements and the like, even with the established formal policy of the LGBTI guidelines.95 At the geographic unit, the apprehension of being accused of imperialism is shared. Staff therefore stress the importance of working with “African voices” and “African opinion formers more generally” so as not “to be seen as hoisting [their] own views on the Africans” [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19]. Guidelines on the Guidelines Leadership within the EEAS’ human rights section has expressed a shared concern of the EU being perceived as acting in an imperialist way, especially regarding countries “where sovereignty is a concern” [BE_EU_ EEAS_High_PD23_b], i.e., former colonial countries. Such a perception would threaten the EU’s legitimacy as a whole, not just that of particular units. This concern, in step with the general ambiguities described in the preceding subsections (including the enigma of conceiving a coherent policy on Africa with the LGBTI guidelines as official EU policy, the reluctance by a number of heads of delegation to actually implement them, and the difficulty posed locally by heightened attention to and contestation of the topic—led the geographic unit of the EEAS on Eastern Africa to draft a confidential document for the LGBTI guidelines specifically for the African context.96 This document can be considered guidelines for the guidelines itself—just for Africa. In light of the high attention on the topic and the level of contestation from some heads of state from African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries, the African guidelines provided the foundation for continuing development cooperation in African countries with legislation adverse to human rights for LGBTI

95 “It’s small steps and also goes backwards. This is also my frustration with EU and the UN, you can’t go in and say, ‘do this’ because then they say ‘no.’ It’s small steps: Lambrinidis talks, then the delegation, then. … There is a big fear of stepping on people’s toes” [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD10]. 96 The document is internal and confidential; hence it was not possible to obtain a copy. The content of the document was explicitly referred to during the interview [BE_ EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19].

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persons. The African guidelines, by being more specific about a “geographic” area insulated those working in that particular context against the general guidelines by specifying a required case-by-case approach: We felt that we needed additional guidance on going about promoting LGBTI rights but in the African context given that Uganda is in such a hornet’s nest with the ACP group. So, we’ve done a paper on this which has been approved by COAFR and COHOM and has been sent to all delegations as policy guidance [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19].

Although the perceived need is for greater specificity—hence, guidance for a particular geographical region—the African guidelines’ “solution” to combat contestation is, seemingly paradoxically, the opposite of granular, advocating for the EU to broadly emphasize the idea of nondiscrimination with regard to all groups of persons rather than to focus on LGBTI issues in particular. This approach has been likewise suggested by another staff member from one geographic unit on an African region, with first-hand experience of the diplomatic stress the EU’s focus on LGBTI can inspire.97 They suggest the way forward is “to go beyond this [confrontation] and include LGBTI under non-discrimination” [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_ Mid_PD15], i.e., a less identity-based approach that includes LGBTI within a broader and more symmetrical, rather than reactive and legalistic, non-discrimination framework. In line with this suggested approach, the African guidelines do not focus on particular groups’ rights, stressing instead, according to a senior EEAS staff member, that the EU is “concerned about any vulnerable group suffering from discrimination” [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_ PD19]. Other suggested measures include to raise issues consistently, not only amid the context of impending legislation, and to do more outreach through the media—measures geared toward shaping the institutional environment rather than attempting direct change.98

97 They were present at the EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly in 2013, in which there was open confrontation between African participants and the EU representatives. 98 This also includes the African guideline’s suggestion of working on a more general global level with the UN’s Free and Equal Campaign around LGBTI issues, which also includes celebrities from the Global South.

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Reception The high-level staff member from the EEAS human rights unit describes these Africa-specific guidelines as “very good [and] pragmatic,” an instance in which the guidelines of 2013 have been “translated [...] into something more operational” [BE_EU_EEAS_High_PD23_b] and indeed: [The African guidelines are] a recognition that sometimes more discrete diplomacy is more effective. Especially in the case of countries and governments that place a lot of emphasis on their sovereignty and that see an interference as a post-colonialist heritage. So we’ve got to be very careful about that too. And sometimes people forget it actually. [BE_EU_EEAS_ High_PD23_b]

Hence, the link granting the guidelines legitimacy is their contribution to effectiveness, a strong frame within any modern organization. Where a policy is more operational, the assumption is that it can be turned into action more easily. Ironically, the more the guidelines are regarded operational, the more they provide justification for not taking any action on the topic of human rights for LGBTI persons. The African guidelines, by more strongly emphasizing the case-by-case approach and the expertise of the delegations than did the LGBTI guidelines, de facto decouple the EU delegations in African countries from the policy of the headquarters: The delegations have the option to be active on the topic or not.99 This option is justified via explanation that to raise the issue of human rights for LGBTI persons might turn it into a topic in the first place: In some cases, it might be counterproductive [to raise the topic]. The last thing you want is to whip up a debate where everything is going along quietly and then maybe there’s an old relict of a law from the colonial period that hasn’t been used for 30 years; yes, in an ideal world, it wouldn’t be there. But it is the delegations that are best placed to assess this. [BE_ EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19]

In sum, the African guidelines bridge the gap between official policy of the EU LGBTI guidelines and everyday practice, granting heads of delegations the legitimacy to make sense and essentially make their own

99 “It’s up to each delegation to decide” [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19].

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rules. But by doing so, they internally allow for decoupling the African geographic units from the LGBTI guidelines. To summarize: despite now normative recognition of LGBTI rights as human rights and the protection and promotion of such rights in third countries as a formally institutionalized topic of EU foreign policy in the LGBTI guidelines, there remain continued negotiations, as staff make sense of the guidelines and try to embed them within their own work at the EEAS and EU Comm in Brussels. Within these negotiations, the differences between these two macro-entities play a less important role than those within the entities and between units. Clearly, each entity’s organizational structure ordered along mainly geographic, rather than thematic, categories impacts how EU staff members make sense, as does each staff member’s socialization. To put this continued sensemaking into practical terms: This subchapter made apparent the EU’s paradigm for promoting and protecting human rights for LGBTI persons externally does not follow a simple top-down approach of policy implementation. It instead depends on staff’s immediate roles, task environments, and related sources of legitimacy, which modify the pertinent problem definitions and, with this, their implied solutions. For those working in the EU’s geographic units, human rights for LGBTI persons is perceived as a threat to their work. Accordingly, the “solution” they conceive is to decrease internal and external attention to LGBTI issues and to decouple their work from the sweeping LGBTI guidelines through the case-by-case African guidelines, so as to limit disruption to their general tasks of development cooperation. This is achieved through linking their own work to the ideals of the modern organization—i.e., rational, evidence based, outcome oriented, operating on a legal basis and being pragmatic at the same time, while discrediting the work of those in the human rights unit working on LGBTI as disregarding the bigger picture, acting emotional and imbalanced. Staff working on human rights for LGBTI persons continue to have to justify pushing for the ideals of the guidelines in spite of their contestation by staff members of the geographic units and the delegations. They deal with this situation less through trying to “enforce” the guidelines and more indirectly by changing the institutional environment. This change is achieved through raising awareness of the guidelines with CSOs, framing disregard of the guidelines as emotional and therefore an inappropriate response for a modern organization, conceding that all human

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rights should be of equal importance, while at the same time regarding the public attention to the topic as aiding the cause. The problem definition of the contestation itself and the accusation of imperialism, as provided by the guidelines, is a threat to the EU as an organization as a whole and is accepted by those in the human rights and geographic units as a problem. Silent diplomacy, as opposed to the act of naming and shaming, allows for temporary stability, as it circumvents public scrutiny and therefore allows for hypocrisy and the responding to different sources of legitimacy. Moreover, it enables staff working on human rights for LGBTI persons to be active, while avoiding challenge to the geographic units’ work; and it keeps the tight link to universal human rights, while allowing for a case-by-case approach by locating the knowledge with the delegations, which shifts the decision-making accordingly and depoliticizes it.

Summary and Preliminary Analysis This chapter showed how separate developments resulted in a constellation that made it possible for an idea, which had been long ignored and not recognized as a relevant topic for the EU, to be formally institutionalized as part of EU foreign policy. It traced the translation of the idea of human rights for LGBTI persons over time and described its re-embedding into EU foreign policy, to a point of crystallization in the form of two quasiartifacts, which, through continued sensemaking, became part of a horizon of expectations, contributing to the protoinstitutional change toward a more clearly defined problem definition that shapes today’s EU actions. To this end, this chapter detailed how the topic was first publicly addressed by the EU Parl and not the EU Comm, although responsible for EU foreign policy at the time through DG RELEX. This chapter further illustrated how internally contested the topic was throughout the entirety of the EU hierarchy and identified an important element contributing to LGBTI human rights’ institutionalization: an internal change in the administration combined with an increased capacity and willingness due to their socialization of a Staff Member (B), who was able to make the necessary links to relevant frames to push the topic of LGBTI forward internally. This staff member’s push was buttressed by parallel changes to the EU’s external environment. These changes included those stemming from the rotating Council presidency, which

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resulted in a shift of political clout and with it, priorities and legislative change in a number of EU member states toward greater legal equality of LGBTI persons and governments’ commitments to advance change in this policy area, which instilled greater awareness of the LGBTI topic among the European populace. These changes, in their subsequent interplay with wide-spread media attention cast on Uganda’s introduction of the AHB in 2009, engendered a dichotomy in which the criminalization of homosexuality was linked to frames such as “uncivilized” and “underdeveloped,” and placed in contrast to ideals of modernity and, thus, the EU. With this dichotomy, the EU’s duty to promote human rights for the LGBTI-minority was accordingly strengthened. This chapter then showed how the toolkit did not automatically lead to guidelines. Rather, the emergence of the guidelines was once more due to a particular constellation of the institutional environment combined with the ability of staff to recognize this as an opportunity as such that the drafting of guidelines first became an action point in the umbrella policy of a Strategic Framework and Action Plan, which then subsequently led to the guidelines’ existence. The detailed analysis of the toolkit and the guidelines revealed how the problem definition in policy changed from being mainly about the “Other” countries’ behavior to about underlying cultural norms, in which contestedness of the topic itself became defined as the problem. At the practical level, the EU units subsequently became pulled into the different directions ascribed by their respective sources of legitimacy, necessitating the EU to perform a split in legitimizing its actions through highlighting violence and referring to the universality of human rights, on the one hand, while emphasizing a case-by-case approach, on the other. CSOs were “discovered” as one part of the “solution” (as it allows to circumvent third country governments) and as relevant to the EU’s legitimacy. Through later internal guidelines on the guidelines for Africa, the topic became re-embedded to an even greater extent within existing priorities. Even with the LGBTI Council guidelines’ formal anchoring of the topic of human rights for LGBTI persons within the EU’s external human rights frame, there remains no final clarity or a consensus on an administrative level regarding the best way the topic should be dealt with policy path forward. Unmistakably obvious is that putting the guidelines into practice is not a matter of simple implementation. Instead, negotiations around meaning and definition of the problem continue and each EU

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unit, according to their source of legitimacy, frames the problem differently and hence regards different ways of dealing with it as the solution. Those working at the EEAS on human rights for LGBTI persons still have to legitimize their work. Linking to human rights’ immanent frames, such as indivisibility, and those of modern organizations, such as rationality and effectiveness, categories of staff units are created superseding organizational entities. Through characterizing the work on human rights for LGBTI persons as emotional etc., this work is devaluated, and the top-down enforcement of the guidelines blocked. This stalling results in human rights staff resorting to more indirect influencing of the institutional environment through awareness raising by CSOs. Temporary stability is achieved via the implications of accusations of imperialism, which threatens the legitimacy of the EU as an organization as a whole, to the extent it has become recognized by both the human rights and geographic units as a problem, leading them to agree on silent diplomacy as a “solution.” Removed from immediate scrutiny, this allows staff to decouple talk of universal values and a case-by-case approach of action, thereby serving ambiguous demands. The problem of high attention on the topic of human rights for LGBTI persons has thereby been dealt with. This complex context can be disentangled in part along the overlapping axes of glocalization: time, nested levels and culture which make several aspects apparent: Firstly, time is a crucial factor as the problem definition shifts and is shifted over time and the direction of the shift is evidently highly contingent on institutional shifts in the wider global environment and on organizational level. Secondly, the formal hierarchy within the organizational structure matters as it determines the horizons of expectation staff steer toward and re-embed the subject into. The higher the level in the hierarchy, the wider the horizon of expectation and the need to reconcile multiple demands within the same organization while at working level of officers, the unit’s task is a strong determinant in the direction of sensemaking and action. The formal hierarchy is clearly subverted at several points making the nested nature of levels apparent and how seemingly small changes at a lower level in the structure (like adding a letter to an acronym) can have wider implications. Similarly, concrete actions are justified with a constant closer and more lose linking of higher level concepts and the metaframe of modernity with lower-level concepts generally being more contested yet by linking them with higher level concepts also the potential to redefine them and to undermine their taken-for-granted nature.

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Lastly, the relevant cultural environments at the EU in Brussels are those of the organizational units and their organizational aim and the expectations connected to this aim. At the same time, the cultures of these small organizational units are also infused by staff members’ prior socialization within other legal national contexts of origin and past experiences as these also influence the sensemaking and re-embedding process. Legitimacy for one’s own problem definition is sought by linking to the broader aims of the modern organization.

Literature Amnesty International. (2014). Rule by Law: Discriminatory Legislation and Legitimized Abuses in Uganda (No. AFR 59/006/2014) (p. 96). Amnesty International. Bahati, D. (2009). Anti-Homosexuality Bill. Pub. L. No. 18. http://www.pub liceye.org/publications/globalizing-the-culture-wars/pdf/uganda-bill-septem ber-09.pdf Council of the European Union. (2001). Council Decision of 22 January 2001 Setting Up the Political and Security Committee. OJ L 27/1. Council of the European Union. (2010). Toolkit to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of all Human Rights by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) People. Pub. L. No. 11179/10. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ uedocs/cmsUpload/st11179.en10.pdf. Accessed 6 November 2012. Council of the European Union. (2012). EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy. Pub. L. No. 11855/12. https:// www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/ 131181.pdf Council of the European Union. (2013). Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of All Human Rights by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Persons. DG Justice and Consumers. (2015). List of Actions by the Commission to Advance LGBTI Equality. European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discri mination/files/lgbti_actionlist_en.pdf Directive (Recast) 2011/95/EU. 337 337 9–26 (2011). http://data.europa. eu/eli/dir/2011/95/oj. Accessed 16 July 2020. European Commission. (2010). DG External Relations 2010 Annual Activity Report. European Commission. European External Action Service EEAS. (2014). Annual Report 2014 on Human Rights and Democracy in the World (No. 11107/14). EEAS. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2014-human-rights-annual_ report_en.pdf. Accessed 8 March 2020.

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European Parliament. (2004). Resolution on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the World 2004 and the EU’s policy on the Matter (2004/ 2151(INI)). European Parliament. (2009). European Parliament Resolution of 17 December 2009 on Uganda: Anti-homosexual Draft Legislation. P7_TA(2009)0119. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7TA-2009-0119&language=EN European Parliament. (2006). European Council. Directive (Recast) 2006/54/ EC. L 204/23 23–36. http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/54/oj. Accessed 22 April 2019. Frank, D. J., & Meyer, J. W. (2002). The Profusion of Individual Roles and Identities in the Postwar Period. Sociological Theory, 20(1), 86–105. https:// doi.org/10.1111/1467-9558.00152 Fundamental Rights Agency. (2014). EU LGBT Survey—Main Results. Fundamental Rights Agency. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-eu-lgbtsurvey-main-results_tk3113640enc_1.pdf. Accessed 16 November 2014. Griffiths, J. (2003). The Social Working of Legal Rules. The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 35(48), 1–84. https://doi.org/10.1080/073 29113.2003.10756567 ILGA Europe. (2014). Destination >> Equality: Intersex (Magazine). ILGA Europe. http://ilga-europe.org/sites/default/files/magazine_ilga-eur ope_summer_2014_web.pdf Jjuuko, A., & Tabengwa, M. (2018). Expanded Criminalisation of Consensual Same-Sex Relations in Africa: Contextualising Recent Developments. In N. Nicol, A. Jjuuko, R. Lusimbo, N. J. Mulé, S. Ursel, A. Wahab, & P. Waugh (Eds.), Envisioning Global LGBT Human Rights. (Neo)colonialism, Neoliberalism, Resistance and Hope (pp. 63–96). University of London Press. http:// www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctv5132j6 Malmedie, L. (2016). Contested Issue and Incremental Change. The Example of LGBTI in EU Foreign Policy. der moderne staat – dms: Zeitschrift für Public Policy, Recht und Management, 9(1), 35–50. https://doi.org/10.3224/dms. v9i1.23639 Malta Declaration. (2013, December 1). OII Europe. https://oiieurope.org/ malta-declaration/. Accessed 14 March 2020. Maor, M., Gilad, S., & Bloom, P.B.-N. (2013). Organizational Reputation, Regulatory Talk, and Strategic Silence. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 23(3), 581–608. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/ mus047 Miller, P. (2001). Governing by Numbers: Why Calculative Practices Matter. Social Research, 68(2), 379–396. Paternotte, D., & Kollman, K. (2013). Regulating Intimate Relationships in the European Polity: Same-Sex Unions and Policy Convergence. Social Politics:

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International Studies in Gender, State & Society, 20(4), 510–533. https:// doi.org/10.1093/sp/jxs024 Press Release 3250th Council meeting Foreign Affairs. (2013). Luxembourg. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/ en/foraff/137593.pdf Reiners, N. (2021). Transnational Lawmaking Coalitions for Human Rights. Cambridge University Press. The European Parliament’s LGBTI Intergroup. (2011, May 17). Almost all EU Institutions Mark International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia. https://lgbti-ep.eu/2011/05/17/eu-leaders-on-idaho-2011/. Accessed 16 November 2014. United Nations Human Rights Council. (2014). Resolution on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/ RES/27/32 Wilson, J. Q. (1989). Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. Basic Books. Accessed 30 November 2020 Wouters, J., & Hermez, M. (2016). EU Guidelines on Human Rights as a Foreign Policy Instrument: An Assessment (KU Leuven, Working Paper No. 170). https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_ papers/new_series/wp161-170/wp-170-wouters-hermez-web.pdf. Accessed 19 January 2017.

CHAPTER 9

Dealing with a Wicked Problem in Kampala

In 2011, BBC Three aired a documentary titled “The World’s Worst Place To Be Gay?” in which well-known and openly gay British DJ Scott Mills traveled to Uganda to render, for a predominantly British audience, a lived experience in a society supposed to be a locus of homophobia.1 The documentary featured an amalgam of interviews with priests, politicians, journalists, and ordinary citizens. Mill’s reporting seemed to confirm the portrayal of Uganda as a homophobic country, with a homophobic population (The World’s Worst Place to Be Gay? 2011). While Mill’s broadbrushed characterization got at the most vociferous side of Uganda’s persecution of homosexuality, it did not paint the full complexity of the legal, social, and cultural particularities that together bind the situation of Ugandan LGBTI people’s experience.2 1 In January of the same year, the BBC documentary was released, Ugandan activist

David Kato had been murdered and the sensationalist approach and illustration of juxtaposing the image of a “liberal Britain” against a “backward Uganda” (similar to another British documentary about Uganda by Stephen Fry “Out There”) has been analyzed and criticized academic scholars (see for example Otu, 2017; Rao, 2020, pp. 39–42). 2 The situation for Ugandan LGBTI persons changed considerably for the worse in 2023 when new anti-LGBTI legislation entered into force, once again imposing the death penalty for certain same-sex sexual acts and considerably widening the scope of criminalization to include anyone who does not report someone suspected to be LGBTI or who lets property to LGBTI groups etc., creating an atmosphere of fear far outstripping the situation in 2011 and the following years.

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On the legislative and activist ends, the Ugandan penal code, as mentioned in Chapter 7, still includes colonial-era antisodomy laws, introduced by the British Empire, criminalizing same-sex sexual acts. Despite strictly only criminalizing same-sex sexual acts, the legislation has been interpreted by the NGO bureau of the Ugandan Ministry of Internal Affairs to preclude the capacity of LGBTI organizations to formally register as NGOs. Notwithstanding their formal registration, LGBTI activists and CSOs have been active in Uganda and even featured in the media.3 While some such organizations take the form of grassroots networks, others4 are professionalized. These formal organizations have websites, host community events, possess small resource libraries with relevant literature otherwise unobtainable in Uganda, organize Pride, and engage in fundraising with international donors; additionally, their staff represent the LGBTI community at embassy events in Kampala and are invited to speak in Europe and the US5 (Organizations specifically working on LGBTI rights and not more generally on human rights are not officially registered as CSOs in Uganda).6 A small, informal underground LGBTI scene also exists, with activities including private gatherings in meeting spaces only known to a clandestine circle of people who know one another. Another aspect negatively affecting the lives of LGBTI persons in Uganda is that even though the existing legislation does not allow for fellow citizations to commit violence against LGBTI individuals, impunity for such crimes is generally high and often regarded by the public as legitimate and appropriate, resulting in crimes often not being thoroughly investigated.7 3 LGBTI CSOs have existed in Uganda at least since the mid-aughts (i.e., 2000s). Prior to the AHB, they were mostly oriented toward service provision and connecting people who identified as LGBTI and less directed at lobbying, advocacy, or project work. 4 Well-known examples are Sexual Minorities Uganda (SMUG) and the Human Rights Awareness and Promotion Forum (HRAPF), a legal aid organization that supports vulnerable communities, including LGBTI people. 5 See, for example, Sexual Minorities Uganda (“What is Sexual Minorities Uganda?”

n.d.). 6 A bank account in the name of the organization—as required to receive funds from different development aid organizations—is possible only if an organization is formally registered. 7 For laws and legal rules to have any effect and be strong institutions, it is not enough that they are written down somewhere. Like any other institution, they have to be known,

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Socioculturally, the particular context leaves LGBTI persons vulnerable: Family ties and one’s “tribal” heritage (i.e., ancestry and lineage, for many Ugandans’ identities) are traditionally important, as is the case in many countries without a comprehensive social security system. Survival generally depends on kinship ties and church communities, where the state cannot provide support. These connections are therefore crucial to one securing employment, housing, etc. On top of this, privacy is a great luxury in Uganda only a few can afford—which makes it very challenging for same-sex relationships to go unnoticed by neighbors and relatives. The dependence on family, “tribal” communities, and religious communities, in combination with the housing situation, poses difficulties, especially to LGBTI persons whose family and religious community often expel and disown them, once they are learned or suspected to be LGBTI, which—in the absence of state provision—leaves people without a safety net. Despite these threats of violence and discrimination at home, by authorities, within the education system, in Ugandan religious communities, and at society at large, many LGBTI Ugandans openly identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans or intersex, or as kuchu, the catch-all selfdescription used by members of the community.8 For those who want to live openly or are forcibly outed, the options are often limited: Activism, work for international CSOs, and sex work are often the only avenues of employment available. The attention of international donors and personal contacts to international human rights organizations is often a lifeline.9 The plight diverges from that of LGBTI persons residing in EU member states with regard to what, in both environments, is deemed acceptable and taken for granted. In EU member states, although many

used, and mobilized and, where necessary, enforced in order to have an effect (Griffiths, 2003). 8 Kasha Jacqueline Nabagesera, for example, is open about her relationships with women and in 2003, founded the organization Freedom & Roam Uganda (FARUG), which supports LGBTI persons who get in touch with questions, provides emotional support, creates networks, and engages in advocacy work, raising awareness of LGBTI issues through, for example, the 2014-founded bombastic magazine (“Bombastic Magazine Issue #1 Online Edition”, n.d.). 9 As a result of their openness in contravening a heterosexual norm, their lives become even more at risk of violent attacks from individuals and from security agents of the government. With regard to the former, Human Rights Watch, for instance, recently reported on a violent deadly attack against an openly gay employee of HRPF (Human Rights Watch, 2019).

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LGBTI persons face discrimination, stigma, and acts of violence—as the surveys of the FRA show10 —such oppression is, at least formally, not regarded as acceptable. All member states are required to implement the standing EU antidiscrimination directives protecting sexual orientation in the realm of employment. Furthermore, the EU member states’ legal systems, based on the modern notion of law, is strongly institutionalized, regarded as an important pillar of the state by citizens and (still mostly) enjoys independence from member state governments11 —preventing arbitrary interpretations of legislation and the levels of impunity present in Uganda. In addition, EU countries’ justice systems generally enjoy their own legitimacy and decisions can be challenged at European level at courts like the ECtHR and the ECJ. While in some EU countries, discrimination of and resentment toward LGBTI persons are still rife and also openly propagated by politicians,12 it does not (currently) appear acceptable to call for outright criminalization or even the death penalty. The EU delegation and member states’ embassies, as representatives of the transnational and national organizations of the EU in Uganda, are influenced by the previously described institutional environments. They derive legitimacy from a number of sources within a net of mutual dependencies: (a) cooperation with each other, as the Lisbon Treaty provides organizational legitimacy to the EU as a whole, (b) in answering to their respective headquarters, whose legitimacies are, in turn, reliant on member organizations/their electorates and (c) in honoring the bounds of their presence in Uganda. The diplomatic presence in Uganda is only possible by—and thus inextricably linked to—formal invitation of the Ugandan government, an invitation that could be revoked to thus threaten the two EU’s main organizational aims domestically: spending 10 In 2012, the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency carried out a first survey on LGBT people’s lives across member states to address a lack of robust statistical data. In 2019, a follow-up survey was carried out on discrimination, hate crime, and challenges faced by LGBT and intersex people showing that while more people are open about their gender identity and sexual orientation, they also fear violence and discrimination (Fundamental Rights Agency, 2020). 11 Recent legal changes in Hungary and Poland have also curtailed the independence of the judiciary. 12 In Poland, more than 80 municipalities have announced themselves as LGBTI-free zones (Noak, 2019), and the Hungarian Parliament just outlawed transgender people’s capacity to have their gender legally recognized by making chromosomes at birth the only determinant for gender (Walker, 2020).

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their allocated amount on development aid, as well as maintaining good relations with the Ugandan government. On the other side, the Ugandan government derives its legitimacy by being regarded as such by its constituents, an aspect aided by (a) the continued availability of development aid, which enables it to generate output legitimacy within a political system where the democratic input legitimacy through democratic elections is rather weak, and (b) the important notion of sovereignty, in light of a colonial history, which legitimates the government as an organization vis-à-vis their electorate. These enmeshed sources of legitimacy, with demands that are partly contradictory,13 web a particularly wicked situation that staff of the EU delegation and member state embassies are required to navigate.14 This chapter describes how EU delegation and member state embassy staff engage and make sense of this negotiation, on the ground—showing, namely, how they define the “problem” they are posed in ways fluid and numerous yet always heavily informed by their concern to sustain legitimacy amidst institutional complexity and contradicting pressures and expectations from the host government, other embassies and the EU delegation, headquarters back home, and CSOs locally. This chapter begins with a recounting of how the idea of human rights for LGBTI persons landed within the topical remit of the embassies and delegations in Uganda through inquiries from these units’ headquarters, which posited a new horizon of expectations upsetting that of these units’ more immediate work environments. The chapter then gives space to the different problem definitions emergent in the sensemaking processes engaged by EU delegation and member state embassy staff and to the presupposed solutions these definitions entailed, the enactment of which bred further problems. This chapter then details subsequent redefining and negotiating of the problem definition, continued until the achievement of temporary stability, which allowed for the flexibility to deal with further emergent cues and expectations while outwardly projecting

13 E.g., EU cooperation as per the Lisbon Treaty vs. striving for national legitimacy; remaining legitimate vis-à-vis the Ugandan government vs. vis-à-vis their own headquarters; spending allocated development aid budget vs. meeting expectations to cut aid. 14 I.e., situations in which staff are faced with contradicting demands, high levels of uncertainty and no knowledge considered as reliable and great complexity of interrelating factors making reactions and outcomes very hard to predict.

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the image of sticking to a coherent approach that ensured organizational legitimacy. Subsequently, this chapter shows the EU delegation and member state embassy staff prioritize the expectations connected to the more immediate organizational task, which grants them legitimacy, over expectations at a higher political level. To this end, they make sense of the wicked problem by organizing it which takes the form of splicing it into different aspects, then linking these to pre-existing programs and different higher-level institutions granting legitimacy. Underlying this process is the salient notion of a power asymmetry and a “Western” superiority. This chapter therefore shows how institutions and organizational context form the local environment of staff into which a wicked problem is organized, therefore further specifying the local environment so important to the concept of translation.

A Highly Contested Topic Into the new Millennium of 2000, the protection and promotion of human rights for LGBTI persons was dismissed by the EU delegation and member state embassies in Uganda as “a fluffy human rights issue” [UG_MS_Mid_local_PD63]. It was considered therefore a less important and “softer” topic, compared to “hard” topics, such as economic or security interests, and therefore one which would justify less attention. Accordingly, for most of the twenty-first century’s first decade, correspondence between staff for both entities—EU delegations and member state embassies—and Ugandan LGBTI CSOs was entirely non-existent,15 and, more broadly, the topic had yet to become recognized as one fundamentally tied to development aid and diplomacy.16

15 A sign of the unimportance of the topic at this point is that “[t]here wasn’t a great

deal of communication between the EU and LGBTI organization,” as a representative of an international human rights CSO in Uganda says [UG_CS_Int_Mid_PD53]. A further indicator for this is that the topic was not included in development cooperation and planning, and that if any funding was provided, this was very ad hoc (“Maybe there was some funding for IDAHO [International Day Against Homophobia] but because there was no real crisis situation, there wasn’t much money” [UG_CS_Int_Mid_PD53]). 16 Development aid from EU countries can be channeled through different avenues— (1) the embassies and EU delegation, (2) from headquarters (i.e., EU DEVCO/foreign ministry/ministry of development) directly, or (3) through national development aid agencies or international CSOs. The German foreign ministry states that it is very difficult to assess exactly how much funding they contribute to LGBTI causes because the funding is

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This negligible attention shifted in 2009, as a result of the AHB’s proposal, and subsequent media coverage led the EU Comm (the EEAS had not yet been created) and some member states’ foreign ministries to turn to the EU delegation and pertinent embassies in Uganda for information regarding the plight of local LGBTI persons. Staff at member state embassies and delegations were thus expected to address the issue, carrying a new horizon of expectations informed by the institutions structuring legitimacy of the administration (i.e., CSOs, the Ugandan government and electorate) and organizational goals and purpose (i.e., spending the allocated budget for development cooperation). This urgent need resulted in, to use the words of a staff member of an international human rights organization in Uganda [UG_CS_Int_Mid_PD53], “a flurry of activity” from staff (involving meetings on the topic and contacting CSO for information). Until this point, what was taken-for-granted in the delegation and member state embassies’ on-the-groundwork environments in Uganda— what went more or less uncontested—was the counter idea and the Ugandan government’s expectation that foreign representatives would avoid interfering in what was considered a domestic issue. This flurry of activity, spawned from the headquarters’ queries for information, fundamentally destabilized this distinction, creating ambiguities regarding the EU’s role vis-à-vis the Ugandan government and what they deemed their sphere of domestic concern. To attenuate these ambiguities and navigate a horizon of expectations in such a way to maintain legitimacy and keep true to their organizational aims—in short, to “deal with” the wicked problem at hand in the way existentially best—EU delegation and member state embassy staff organized it. They did this via the process of sensemaking, which included very often not declared as such [event_BLN_AA_Konsultation mit Zivilgesellschaft Aktionsplan_PD138]. Despite these difficulties, the Global Philanthropy Project (GPP), founded in 2009, aims at capturing the sums governments spent on LGBTI issues/projects per annum, and their data suggests that the funding landscape has changed considerably since 2009. The data on development aid for LGBTI issues has increased as more organizations and governments started funding this cause specifically and felt the need to provide figures to GPP to remain legitimate. A look at the list of top ten donors for LGBTI causes in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2013 lists the Swedish government with nearly 9 million USD as providing the most support, followed by HIVOS, a Dutch development organization in second place, and then international human rights organization and private trusts such as Arcus Foundation, Open Society Institute, Oxfam, and the European Union at tenth place with 1.7 million USD (Hammond et al., 2014, p. 57).

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reformulating these challenges as a more distinct and approachable set of problems, whose address could be executed as part of the process of re-embedding the idea of human rights for LGBTI persons into their existing work structures. The pressures to engage with the topic differed greatly between member states and between member states and the EU and was greatest on those member state governments that have strong protection for LGBTI persons from discrimination, with active and vocal LGBTI CSOs, like for example Sweden and The Netherlands [UG_MS_dev_Mid_ PD59].17 Another factor was being a donor of development aid to Uganda. CSOs would point out hypocrisies in promoting human rights for LGBTI persons, while providing money to a government perceived to undermine this exact goal. CSOs thereby coupled domestic policies with foreign policy—possible due to the link to universal human rights. The following subchapters detail staff’s problem definitions of EU delegation and of embassies engaged with the topic in Uganda.

Definitions of the Problem Usually, EU delegations and member state embassies raise topics to their respective headquarters’ attention, not the other way around.18 Reaching the delegation and member state embassies from the top of the hierarchy was therefore already a political problem, rather than one the delegations and member state embassies had identified. Staff members of the EU delegation and of some member state embassies were expected to deal with the issue to direct action of their respective headquarters.19 Having to “deal” with the topic first meant having to make sense of it, and there were many ways in which the problem was defined. This problem definition of EU delegation staff and member state embassy staff differed substantially, depending on pressures, and changed over time,

17 See also Rainer (2021, p. 148). 18 One high-level diplomat of one country possessive of a very strong national LGBTI

lobby responded to the question of whether the topic was perceived differently in relation to other topics, with: “There is interest in it from the capitals—it is demand driven I would say” [UG_MS_High_PD55]. 19 As a high-level diplomat explains: “Latest from 2009, every embassy had to deal with it” [UG_MS_High_PD65_JoD].

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as solutions implied in the problem definitions came to be regarded as problems themselves. “It Touches on the Raison d’être” The reason why the EU delegation and some member state embassies in Uganda were under such high pressure when the topic of human rights for LGBTI persons received attention at their headquarters—and therefore became highly political—was because the topic had become linked to development aid. The notion of aid conditionality (see Chapter 8) came to define response discourse surrounding the AHA, a discourse about whether to stop development aid to Uganda as a way of using one’s influence to prevent a particular legal change or at least affect the country’s policy implementation.20 With such a question came an existential implication: This close linking of the previously loosely coupled spheres of development aid and foreign policy threatened to severely impact an important organizational aim of both embassies and the EU delegation: the distribution of development aid. Failing to exhaust the allocated budget would again result in cuts and render many delegation and embassy staff members’ jobs in Uganda obsolete, particularly those jobs with remit beyond the area of consular affairs.21 ,22 The close linking of the two spheres means development aid could be stopped for political reasons, if the conditions attached to it were not met. Cutting aid would itself have far-reaching consequences, given the way in which development cooperation operates along a very different logic to the political and traditional diplomacy of an embassy.

20 This expectation was possible due to the Ruggie-Principles—see Chapter 4. 21 As such, in necessarily broaching this delicate arrangement of cooperation, the very

act of promoting human rights for LGBTI persons “touche[d] on the [EU and member state diplomatic corps’] raison d’être” [UG_MS_High_PD65_JoD], as one high-level member state diplomat explained. 22 A high-level diplomat who had shown engagement and interest in the LGBTI topic (for one, by simply being in the audience at an event on the topic in his home country) explained that the actual interest of the embassies is development aid: “What’s the interest of the embassy? An exception are the U.S., France, and Belgium who also have military interests. The others only have development. LGBTI is a factor which gets in the way. When at home the picture is painted that the bill has to be stopped because otherwise there won’t be any development cooperation, then it is not about LGBTI in the first place” [UG_MS_High_PD65, UG_EU_del_High_PD51_1].

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Diplomacy is more about the ability to react ad hoc to events and situations, dealing with issues to manage and stabilize the relationship with the host government, as compared to longer-term development strategies.23 This characteristic of diplomacy renders political considerations a matter of the short term, based not on formulaic and detailed, long-term planning, but rather on improvisation engaged always in dialogue with headquarters—an approach contrary to the longer-term logic of development aid, whose planning is contingent on highly formalized budgeting and on the implementation of programs to deliver projects. Such strategies, in contrast to the old way of distributing development aid based on personal relationships, empire style, grant legitimacy due to their perceived objectivity and their formal delinking from direct politics.24 Such features also make them very cumbersome to change in instances when they become relinked (i.e., when development aid is to be diverted from a particular country due to political will, requiring much work and further negotiations to be altered25 ). The practical repercussions, if headquarters then decides that development aid should be cut, would thoroughly upset routines and render irrelevant these multiannual

23 EU delegations also have human rights country strategies. These are confidential and sometimes not even shared within the EU delegation with staff members belonging to DEVCO who work in the operational development section rather than in the political section. 24 This different logic within development cooperation has not always been there, as Dimier has shown via the example of changes in the way EU development aid used to be administered (see Chapter 3). Any work on LGBTI issues was based on an ad-hoc system relying on a system of personal relationships. With the process of decolonization and greater emphasis on sovereignty and the community of nation-states, this system was delegitimized and, after some contestation, changed into one that, in its organizational processes, appears more objective and less influenced by personalities and politics of the day. A similar process took place in many EU member states. In the case of Germany, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for political and diplomatic work and staffing the embassies and a Ministry of Development Cooperation, which also oversees the work of the GIZ, the national development organization, which is a private company owned 100% by the German state. The issue of LGBTI is now a reason for both ministries to work more closely together and since November 2017, they have been working on a joint document on how to include LGBTI in foreign affairs and development aid. 25 A senior diplomat puts it this way: “We have strategies for development, but for political, more contextualized issues, it is in dialogue with headquarters and the situation that we decide” [UG_MS_High_PD55].

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strategic plans for development cooperation based on lengthy negotiations.26 Such a decision would result in staff members either being posted elsewhere or assigned to take over a new or different portfolio. In the case of Uganda, repercussions greatly informed the EU delegation and member state embassies’ subsequent sensemaking, to the effect that aid cuts had to be avoided above all. Diverting aid away from the Ugandan government toward Ugandan LGBTI CSOs—rather than cutting aid entirely—was not considered a viable alternative for most member states embassy staff and the EU delegation staff, given the strong extent to which formal bureaucratic structures appeared to constrain what was perceived possible. While such a move would help the EU and member state governments retain legitimacy with CSOs and demonstrate that something was done as a reaction to the AHB, it would also fundamentally upset the EU’s relationship with the Ugandan government, greatly complicating its capacity to operate in the country. Moreover, LGBTI CSOs appeared an inefficient target for a robust influx of resources, as these organizations are small and do not have the systems in place nor the staff capacity to quickly absorb, distribute, and account for large amounts of funding, which, in the Ugandan context, becomes further complicated by the formal hurdles posed by many CSOs’ lacking registration—a requirement of donors. Furthermore, supervising the spending of funds distributed to smaller CSOs would also require more resources on the part of the donor, with an additional concern arising in the fact that if the allocated development aid funds go unspent within the foreseen budgetary cycle, the money will be cut, meaning fewer resources and influence for the organizational entity distributing it in the following budgetary cycle.27

26 The description of a senior diplomat from a member state embassy conveys this lengthy process: “We always do a thorough assessment when planning our five-year strategy for Uganda. And every year we do a one year analysis … and check where we can add value. Then [our] government can pick and choose. We are still working on that [now in April 2015] even though it was approved in September 2014” [UG_MS_ Mid_PD55]. 27 “If we would have left JLOS [Justice, Law and Order Sector pool fund of different donor countries], then we would have had to spend the two million annual fund differently. And if we hadn’t spent them, then they would have been cut. And NGOs can’t absorb so much money; they usually have smaller projects” [UG_MS_dev_Mid_PD59].

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Generating and Agreeing on Sense The new horizon of expectation established by the headquarters required to focus attention and to spend time on a topic newly noticed and to even be considered one.28 Against the backdrop of the Brussels-led information requests, the EU delegation and member state embassy staff defined their first immediate problem to address as having to “paint a nuanced picture” of the local situation [UG_MS_High_PD61]. This novel attention took standard bureaucratic forms and started, as reported by one EU member state diplomat [UG_MS_Mid_PD55], with the creation of a file, comprised of folders with notes and information on the AHB and LGBTI matters, thus creating a physical space for the staff’s bracketing of what had so far been only part of an ongoing stream of information. Particularly on the latter matter—i.e., transcribing the plight of Ugandan LGBTI people—information gathering came chiefly as a product of increased interaction and communication between EU member state embassies themselves, between the embassies and the EU delegation, and external meetings with certain CSOs.29 ,30 With little knowledge on topics relating to sexual orientation and gender identity and no contacts to LGBTI CSOs in Uganda, the larger frame of human rights was the starting point and frame within which the topic was addressed. Within these arrangements of correspondence, collective sensemaking arose through communication and sharing of information, among a selected group, in meetings both formal and informal, which, in proliferating sense, directed interpretations toward greater legitimacy (ways in which pockets of sense came to stick).

28 A high-level EU diplomat said that “the whole delegation […] spent more time than they ever wanted on it [the topic of the LGBTI]” [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_1]. 29 Meetings where such knowledge is produced and networks are forged are not always

official events, as there are several unofficial encounters during which EU delegation staff and embassy staff exchange information. One example is the amateur football league in Kampala consisting of an EU delegation team and embassy teams, and their trainings and games provide valuable opportunities for exchange. 30 An EU delegation staff member who had just taken up their post when the AHB was proposed remembers: “There were different meetings that were organized. I think Norway organized a meeting at the ambassador’s residence, and then [a general Ugandan human rights NGO] had a meeting and so quickly I had a network. … And there was the Security Committee of the LGBTI community. [A local LGBTI organization] had a meeting. … And then of course also phone calls and we have regular contact with people” [UG_EU_del_Mid_PD60].

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To sensitively navigate the Ugandan government’s expectation not to interfere in domestic affairs, while honoring higher-level information requests, the issue of LGBTI came to be subsumed within the larger frame of human rights via the manifold existing human rights forums—among them, the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF)31 and the solely EU member states—composed Human rights Defenders Working Group,32 which brought together diplomats from EU embassies and like-minded countries [UG_EU_del_mid_PD60]. Apart from these established human rights working groups, ad-hoc meetings likewise took place, and an unofficial specific group on LGBTI issues, convened by the US embassy, was founded to coordinate action around the AHB in a closed-circle setting [UG_CS_HR_Mid_PD49; UG_EU_del_mid_PD60].33 At the time of this writing, the group had only convened a few times, but given its status as unofficial, it poses no threat to the relationship with the Ugandan government and served as a forum for donors to convene and negotiate common positions. EU delegation staff envied the US embassy for this initiative [UG_EU_del_Mid_PD60], presumably because while an opportunity to demonstrate activity and leadership on the subject, the informal nature of the meetings would have posed little threat to the Ugandan government.34

31 A formal organizational structure established in 2011, to which seven donors present in Uganda contribute funding (Austria, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the EU), which has multiannual action plans, and whose vision it is to “empowere [Ugandan citizens] to engage in democratic governance and [for] the state [to] uphold citizens’ rights” (“What is DGF? | Democratic Governance Facility”, n.d.). 32 The Human Rights Defenders working group awards an annual EU human rights defenders award, recognizing activists for their work. In 2015, like in previous years, it was hosted by the embassy of Belgium with all participating embassies asked to cast their votes. These were not without political consideration and despite some LGBTI activists having been nominated and regarded as worthy by several representatives, there was general agreement that it would be politically impossible to award them the human rights defenders prize as this would threaten legitimacy with the Ugandan government [event_ UG_EU_- EU HRD WG_PD139]. 33 In terms of make-up, this group consists solely of donor country embassies and does not include international or local CSOs. 34 One EU delegation staff member noted that this group could have been set up by the EU if staff had thought of it [UG_EU_del_Mid_PD60].

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Meaning-Making Through Figures Considering the possibility and subsequent implications of development aid being cut entirely, much of the activity of member state embassy and EU delegation staff coalesced around finding information to relativize the situation of LGBTI persons in Uganda. To this end, they attempted to decrease EU notions of urgency and, with this, decreased attention of their respective headquarters on Uganda, by shifting the problem focus to quantity of cases—touching on the scale of the “problem.” As quantifiable data and figures constitute the currency of a modern organization, the involved data gathering sought to render this issue measurable by supplying estimates of people affected by the proposed AHB and the number of Uganda-wide attacks on LGBTI people. Embassy staff explained it is because of this pressure from headquarters that “[w]e need to know about cases to see how big of an issue it is in terms of harassment etc.” [UG_MS_High_PD61].35 Embassies and delegations accordingly exchanged information on cases of police harassment of people believed to be LGBTI and on similar incidents, which staff used to argue that threat levels were not as high and negotiate the appropriate consequences vis-à-vis their headquarters. “They Are Exaggerating” The relationship of the EU delegation and member state embassy staff with CSOs local to Uganda is best described as highly ambivalent, constituting a complicated mutual dependency that has changed over time. With the introduction of the AHB in 2009, delegation and member state embassy diplomats, at first, exclusively sought the information and advice of general human rights organizations, rather than LGBTI CSOs, to aid 35 Some, like for example the Embassy of the Netherlands and the Austrian Consulate and Austrian Development Aid (ADA) organization, did so with the explicit aim of stopping the freezing or diversion of aid from their Government to Uganda [UG_MS_dev_ Mid_PD59]. While the Austrian consulate staff succeeded to convince their government to continue as is but to fund LGBTI projects in addition, the Dutch embassy did not manage to convince their headquarters that the cause would be better served if they continued funding to the Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS). It also meant a loss of influence and information—an important aspect of the diplomatic work and something that once the immediate attention on the issue had lessened, had to be rebuilt. “It’s problematic for those who are part of the sector support and who have such high pressure like the Netherlands [who cut funding] and now have trouble getting back in [to the pool of funders]” [UG_MS_dev_Mid_PD59].

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their collective sensemaking.36 This selective focus stemmed from familiarity and ease of engagement: these diplomats had established contacts in these organizations, worked with them before—e.g., through the DGF37 —and deemed these organizations as a less-threatening entity than LGBTI CSOs in the eyes of the Ugandan government.38 ,39 By avoiding engagement with Ugandan LGBTI CSOs, delegation and member state embassy staff circumvented challenges to their own legitimacy vis-à-vis the Ugandan government; however, they simultaneously threatened this legitimacy and that of their headquarters by disappointing expectations of the transnationally connected global LGBTI civil society, which had provided representatives of Ugandan LGBTI CSOs the platform to speak on panels and at conferences in Brussels and EU countries,40 thus pressuring the EU’s organizational entities and 36 Rainer (2021) also reports how US foreign policy leaders approached CSO in Uganda when the AHA was first proposed (Rainer, 2021, pp. 155–156). 37 As one employee of an international human rights organization reports: When the AHB was published, the “diplomats were getting very active; they asked for information and what they should do” [KE_CS-Int_Mid_PD53_NeG]. Human rights CSOs recount that while their dealings with the EU delegation does not amount to an official partnership, “it is [nonetheless] a partnership of some sort,” meaning meetings take place and some funding is provided [UG_CS_HR_Mid_PD49_StM]. 38 Around the same time of the AHB, the government proposed legislation that threatened to curtail civil liberties and CSOs’ work in Uganda more generally—among them, the Anti-Pornography Act and a new NGO Registration Act. Considering this more general threat, LGBTI activists in Uganda managed to bring organizations from a wider spectrum together and built the Civil Society Coalition on Human rights and Constitutional Law [the Coalition from now on] in 2009. This broad coalition includes 28 organizations from LGBTI-specific ones to general human rights CSOs. It included LGBTI CSOs representatives and activists as well as highly professionalized lawyers and academics. 39 Even later, when CSOs challenged the AHA in court, the EU delegation, according to activists, still related mainly to those petitioners who did not identify as LGBTI [UG_ CS_LGBTI_High_PD141]. Throughout the years of the AHB looming, no forum was established for regular exchanges between LGBTI CSOs and diplomats, only among diplomats themselves without CSOs. 40 For example, Kasha Jacqueline Nabagesera, cofounder of the lesbian CSO Freedom and Roam Uganda (FARUG), but also Frank Mugisha, director of Sexual Minorities Uganda (SMUG), have been invited to several events organized by CSOs and sometimes by government agencies, MPs, or EU entities themselves. The German foreign ministry and the federal ministry for development and economic cooperation, for example, hosted several events. On these occasions, activists from Uganda would also lobby foreign ministries of the countries they were visiting. In combination with LGBTI CSOs and party pressure, this would direct attention of the ministries to the topic, and they would inquire

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member states’ foreign and development ministries/agencies in a changed environment in Europe and demanding “authentic voices,” not just talk about but with people affected by policies.41 Creating Attention The reluctance of EU delegation and member state embassy staff in Uganda to engage with the topic of LGBTI specifically (and not just with human rights more generally) became increasingly difficult. Ugandan LGBTI CSOs, aided by international CSOs,42 indirectly pressured the EU delegation and member state embassies present in Uganda through member states’ own headquarters, forcing them to engage with the topic of human rights for LGBTI persons. Contrary to the expectation that geographic proximity is relevant, headquarters staff in Brussels and at some member states were more susceptible to the life stories of LGBTI Ugandans. Brussels staff are not primarily tied to the same organizational aims as their colleagues in Uganda and passed the pressure to act onto Uganda-based staff, resulting in EU delegation and member state embassy staff blaming Ugandan LGBTI CSOs for stoking the pressure to deal with the topic in Uganda through CSO’s lobbying on the international level.43 They further regarded the attention on the topic of LGBTI issues at their

with their embassies about the situation for LGBTI persons and what the embassy’s activities in response to it. In some countries, like for example Germany, national LGBTI organizations pushed members of parliament of opposition parties to submit parliamentary questions, forcing the government to report on and justify its activities on the topic of LGBTI abroad. 41 Part of the changing horizon of expectations at EU headquarters was the linking of aid effectiveness within EU’s external actions and CSOs. This was made explicit, for example, in a 2012 Council Conclusions welcoming the Commission’s initiative, which recognized the importance of civil society as the roots of democracy and sustainable development in Europe’s external relations and hence connected civil society to aid effectiveness because they help establish accountability (Council of the European Union, 2012). 42 Amidst the fraught aftermath of the AHB’s proposal, Ugandan LGBTI CSOs became increasingly backed by international CSOs, like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, which started to take vested interest in the topic of LGBTI. This support afforded the LGBTI CSOs certain utility, as international CSOs not only are more difficult to undermine in terms of their objectivity and quality of data, but they also already package information in a way relevant to the EU and member states. 43 Because this threatened the organizational aims of good relationship to the Ugandan government and spending the allocated development aid.

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headquarters as exacerbated, reframing the problem as one of too much attention generated by Ugandan LGBTI CSOs.44 No longer legitimate to fully dismiss “authentic voices” of those concerned,45 delegation and embassy staff mainly disapproved of how the activists invited to speak would describe the situation of LGBTI persons in Uganda. The diplomats dismissed the accounts and personal stories of LGBTI persons as a subjective and inaccurate portrayal of the whole situation.46 Such personal stories are powerful because they are much easier to re-embed into one’s own reality, as they refer to frames administrative staff are familiar with. LGBTI CSOs’ effective lobbying at the national level at member states’ capitals and at the supranational level at the EU headquarter in Brussels ultimately resulted in greater attention from the EU and from member state staff in Uganda, yet this approach also soured the relationships, for example, with the EU delegation’s staff: If you ask the [diplomatic] missions here, they won’t be happy with us. We went to the capitals and told them to be tough. The EEAS [at headquarters] pushed. [In Uganda] it was a matter of life and death, so they pushed [the units] here and made statements. [UG_CS_LGBTI_High_PD64]

44 As one high-level embassy staff member put it “LGBTI are also quite strong, and they travel a lot and manage to put it in the spotlight” [UG_MS_High_PD61]. 45 Considering a more globally connected civil society with EU-based LGBTI CSOs providing platforms and amplifying voices of activists from countries like Uganda and the concept of aid effectiveness being linked more closely to CSOs within EU policy, CSOs and especially those of the Global South had increased in importance as sources of legitimacy. A number of high-level events in the first decade of the twenty-first century indicated a new emphasis on aid effectiveness, donor coordination, and recipient ownership more widely (Carbone, 2017, p. 299). One of these events was a “Structured Dialogue on the involvement of CSOs and Local Authorities in EU development cooperation,” which took place during 2010–2011. The connection of the two frames in the wider environment, aid effectiveness and CSOs, made it much more difficult to simply ignore local CSOs, and patently obvious is its establishment of a clear expectation within the EU for involvement of CSOs in foreign affairs more generally and human rights promotion more specifically. 46 Their life stories include reference to financial hardship for those who have been disowned by their families and are ostracized by their communities and church for being regarded as LGBTI, aggression from their neighbors, eviction from their home, the difficulty to find a job and living in constant fear of discovery or violence.

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The civil society staff member reported the same pattern for embassies, but they differentiated between people they trusted and those where they felt that they were decoupling talk—the promise to raise the topic with the Ugandan government—from action. One CSO representative complained: The US Embassy is the same. I met up with senor officials in the US and the Ambassador got extra strong. In the UK, I met with the Foreign Secretary – they kept their stance and we believed them because they fed back from meetings. Others just said ‘yes, yes, we raised it.’ [UG_CS_ LGBTI_High_PD64]47

EU delegation and member state embassy staff regarded Ugandan LGBTI CSOs as “unpredictable.” They accused them of catapulting [UG_EU_ del_High_PD51_1], via the influence of their panel speeches, the human rights concerns of Ugandan LGBTI people to the top of the attention of some member states’ embassies and the EU delegation. This attention appeared, to delegation and embassy staff on the ground in Uganda, to be exacerbatory48 and the resulting pressure to act as poisoning the relationship with the Ugandan government. To address the undergirding issue—this problem defined as too much influence of Ugandan LGBTI CSOs’ vis-à-vis headquarters’ policy—staff employed two distinct approaches: (a) approaching general human rights CSOs instead of LGBTI CSOs as their primary source of information and legitimacy and (b) directly competing in their sensemaking with Ugandan CSOs and questioning CSO’s status of experts. (Re-)Establishing Themselves as the Experts To counter the burden of CSO pressure and to restore their authority as experts, diplomats, even well-meaning ones, who considered human 47 Other activists confirm these statements, also suggesting that the embassies and delegation staff “don’t like [Ugandan LGBTI] people pushing them to do their work” as well as saying that embassy staff will write in their activity reports that they met with the LGBTI community to satisfy the expectation of headquarters but will not, in actuality, support the LGBTI community through, for example, funding for equipment or similar [UG_CS_LGBTI_High_PD70]. 48 One member embassy state high-level staff member explains that when “activists travel to the US and the EU, they inflate the figures [of the number of people arrested in Uganda for homosexual acts] 10 times” [UG_MS_High_PD61].

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rights for LGBTI persons to be important, began questioning the merit of the information activists provided. The diplomats questioned the motives of international CSO’s supporting Ugandan LGBTI causes and criticized them for lacking the necessary contextual information on Uganda—how job insecurities, violence, and arbitrary arrests affect a large portion of the population, on the grounds of ethnicity, political affiliation, or a related characteristic [UG_MS_High_PD61].49 They relativized local persecution concerns by linking them to general frames of underdevelopment, as do Ugandan politicians, to “Other” the Ugandan situation to render it incomparable to the LGBTI paradigm in the EU.50 In at least one case, embassy staff appealed to LGBTI CSOs in their home country to refrain from pressuring their headquarters, arguing too much pressure was harmful for the cause [UG_MS_High_PD61], thereby applying the boomerang pattern mechanism in reverse.51 In enacting these arguments, diplomats argued a less destabilizing pathway would be to embed the topic of Uganda and LGBTI within human rights more generally. Limiting the necessity to engage with 49 Undermining their motives is one way to delegitimize their engagement. One midlevel staff member of an embassy suggests cynically that the reason for this was less the concern about LGBTI persons in Uganda and rather the potential to fundraise in Europe and the U.S. given the climate of notoriety charactering the topic [UG_MS_High_PD61]. This insinuates that CSOs have ulterior motives while the embassies are focused on the outcome only. For international but also national LGBTI CSOs, a shift of attention to the Global South was certainly an opportunity to receive more funding, as the examples of large national LGBTI CSOs show. Andil Gosine, for example, shows that the two large national LGBTI CSOs, COC, and RFSL, from the Netherlands and Sweden respectively, started to consider international work as a core part of their activities and one which secured funding (Gosine, 2015, p. 5). 50 One high-level EU delegation staff member refers to conversations with the Ugandan government where they refer to a statement by a Ugandan official saying that Ugandan agriculture technology was 2.000 years behind that of the farmers in the EU so how could they be expected to be “ahead on social issues” such as attitudes toward homosexuality [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_1]. 51 This application of the boomerang pattern usually describes how CSOs enlist international organizations as allies to pressure their own government when direct routes of influencing are blocked. In this case, it is a government appealing to a CSO to decrease pressure on their headquarters and therefore constitutes a differently administered form. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, in their model of a boomerang pattern, regard states, intergovernmental organizations, and CSOs as unitary actors. Such a conceptualization obscures interorganizational as well as intraorganizational dynamics as are present here where embassies, as organizational entities, aim to influence their own governments (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).

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LGBTI CSOs specifically would allow the organizational units on the ground in Kampala to retain legitimacy vis-à-vis the Ugandan government. Accordingly, in realizing this approach, the EU delegation would not hold meetings solely on LGBTI issues, instead subsuming the topic, when raised, in meetings on human rights [UG_CS_LGBTI_High_ PD141]. The CSOs suggested talk at such meetings was decoupled from action, implying the engagement was solely for the façade of involving LGBTI CSOs to satisfy headquarters’ expectations, and they did not actually inform decision-making—testimony to which may be found in the delegation’s continued engagement with Museveni, even after the LGBTI CSOs had specifically requested the relationship’s discontinuance.52 When staff engaged with Ugandan LGBTI CSOs, they did so in an ad-hoc and selective way. As one example, a select few activists (those known to be internationally connected) were invited to key delegation functions on human rights, such as the Human rights Defender Awards ceremony, held at the Head of the EU delegation’s residence. Such careful filtering of engagement increased competition among LGBTI CSOs for attention and funds,53 while privileging some voices over others (e.g., of trans people54 and LGBTI people living outside urban centers55 ), filtering 52 One senior and well-known activist with experience taking part in several international meetings says that “there [was] a lot of organizing” but then adds that there was ‘no outcome.’ They went on to describe the EU delegation’s engagement as ‘wanting the easy way out’ and not to ‘get their hands dirty’—suggesting that the EU was very cautious not to upset the government by truly engaging with the LGBTI community [UG_CS_ LGBTI_High_PD64]. Another activist talks about the EU’s backhand deals with the Ugandan government and that they never truly consulted the LGBTI Community on the topic of LGBTI—something the US embassy did [UG_CS_LGBTI_High_PD141]. 53 The selective nature of these invites is noted by other activists: “I have never been invited to the EU head of delegation’s residence” [UG_CS_LGBTI_High_PD141]. 54 A Ugandan trans activist says that the focus of donor countries generally has been

on gay people when trans people are more affected and deserve specific attention because they are often the most visible when they do not pass (i.e., are recognized as belonging to their preferred gender) as their preferred gender and are therefore target of much abuse in public spaces. They do not feel that their situation has been recognized or addressed even though they are part of the LGBTI acronym and very vulnerable in many respects: “Donors have been supporting homosexual people but they [homosexuals] don’t have a problem. We are the face of homosexuality. … People [in Uganda] don’t believe trans people exist” [UG_CS_Mid_PD56]. 55 EU delegation and member state embassy staff, for example, mainly engage with CSOs in the capital but not beyond. An EU delegation staff member admits that their knowledge does not extend outside of the capital and make random guesses saying they

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voices, and reducing the polyphony of demands. This filtering also has the effect of solidifying the implicit consensus among diplomats of LGBTI to refer mainly to male homosexuality, an understanding justified further by statements suggesting gay and lesbian issues can be discussed with the Ugandan government but that “trans gets too complicated” [UG_MS_ High_PD65].56 Such a statement serves as an example of how the main reference point and source of legitimacy for member state embassy and EU delegation staff in Uganda is the Ugandan government. Such assumptions about the knowledge also mask uncertainties because even staff members whose job descriptions include the topic of LGBTI are uncertain about the meaning of intersex, for example [UG_MS_dev_Mid_PD59; UG_MS_High_PD61]. In addition to EU delegation and embassy staff filtering voices and collapsing the meaning of the acronym into the G, LGBTI CSOs were, and still are, expected by the delegation and many member state embassies to translate their own concerns into the context of a modern organization, as meetings usually take place entirely on the embassies’ and delegation’s terms.57 Activists say they are asked to attend meetings without having been informed of the purpose of the meetings [UG_CS_LGBTI_ High_PD64], and they lament that the meetings always take place at the delegation or embassy offices themselves, which makes activists feel summoned [UG_CS_LGBTI_High_PD64] and even “intimidat[ed]” [UG_CS_LGBTI_High_PD141]. None of these circumstances, however, precluded certain activists from traveling to Europe and addressing policymakers there. To address this scenario, the EU delegation and member state embassies employed a

believe that people in the rural areas “probably have other problems or [gay] people there are hiding more” [UG_EU_del_mid_PD60_SaB]. 56 Similarly, a high-level EU delegation staff member suggests that at the Ugandan government, they “don’t know about trans” [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_1]. 57 The civil society coalition against the AHB in Uganda had created a Security Committee with the main task of researching cases of human rights violations which enjoyed credibility with EU delegation and member state embassies because they provided what was considered systematic figures of violations [UG_CS_LGBTI_PD141]. This is a further example of how LGBTI CSOs are responding to the expectation to translate events into a format compatible with the EU’s more technical and formal way of working. CSOs are doing the work of re-embedding the local situation into a European context, rather than the EU delegation translating policies in a way which works best in the Ugandan cultural context.

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credibility tactic of questioning the motives, objectiveness, and credibility of LGBTI CSOs to ostensibly define what counted as credible knowledge and information, and to lessen pressure from headquarters to take action on the issues addressed by the CSOs. They did this, for one, by accusing Ugandan LGBTI CSOs of acting exclusively in their own interests and pursuing their own goals,58 hence, building on a similar accusation that LGBTI activists appeared to only work on the issues in question to travel to Europe because they “want to remain relevant” [UG_EU_del_ High_PD71_2].59 For another, they directly attacked activists’ stories by labeling them as exaggerated—the claim being activists overstate the local threat to LGBTI persons to coerce action via increased attention and pressure. Such dismissal is evident in the frequent complaint by LGBTI CSOs that activists are not believed when they raise issues with the EU delegation, which requires proof that incidents have taken place,60 as is emblematically manifest in the following quote by a senior diplomat of a country known for high levels of LGBTI protection: We also have battles with NGOs sometimes because they also inflate numbers. We therefore need to balance and need to be clear with the

58 An example of which comes from one senior staff member at the delegation, who says that Ugandan LGBTI CSOs “are very selfish. [They] want to remain relevant” [UG_ EU_del_High_PD71_2]. 59 But while there is great underlying judgment about the motives of activists measured against a Eurocentric idea of CSOs operating at best as volunteers out of conviction, this disregards the precarious reality of many activists. In contrast to most EU countries, Ugandans do not have universal health insurance or social welfare. The extended family and church membership form somewhat of an insurance where people borrow money from relatives, or the congregation may help with paying a hospital bill. Those ostracized by their families for being perceived as or identifying as LGBTI much more heavily rely on their job and hence some form of donor funding. It is also true, however, that a high public profile as an LGBTI activist can be a life insurance (which did not work for David Kato) for a period of time. As long as international attention is there and an activist is known to be associated with diplomats, it might deter police or even fellow citizens from harming them or arbitrary arresting them. At the same time, such a public position including appearances on national TV also make activists easy targets and the close relationship to donor countries can also make it seem more worthwhile to arrest them hoping for a bribe in return for their release [UG_CS_LGBTI_High_PD70]. 60 “The EU has a tendency to disagree with what we are saying to them and want research done. They question everything. … At the second human rights defenders meeting we had to prove so much that these things [e.g., arrests, beatings] are happening. They would have liked video proof” [UG_CS_LGBTI_High_PD141].

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Ugandan government that we can’t accept it [the bill] but we also need to speak to the NGOs to have them present their data realistically. [UG_ MS_High_PD61]

Although it is unclear what it means to present data “realistically,” the wording undermines the CSOs’ expert authority and delegitimizes their approach. At the same time, such statement aims at projecting the EU diplomats’ own expertise, which had since been called into question by LGBTI activists’ highlighting, at the diplomats’ EU-side headquarters, issues EU delegation and member state embassy staff had deemed unworthy of reporting back home. To solve this newly conceived problem by re-establishing themselves as the experts, diplomats instilled the image of themselves as “objective,” with their impulses sublimated to the frames of modernity and bureaucracy, and discredited LGBTI CSOs as necessarily biased because of the activists’ personal involvement. A senior diplomat from a country known for its favorable LGBTI policies and flat hierarchical structures provides an example for this self-characterization, saying: We keep a very close ear to the ground and speak to organizations. We don’t always agree on what’s most strategic to do. Of course, many individuals are personally invested. [But] we can take a step back and do what is strategically best. [UG_MS_Mid_PD55]

The underlying message to this statement is the EU possesses a modern organization’s objectivity and capacity to plan strategically, therefore ultimately knowing what’s “best” for Ugandan LGBTI persons. This statement therefore includes the notion of superiority and points toward underlying salient imperial institutions. Distributing Information Instead of Consulting LGBTI CSOs feel they are not being taken seriously, as information, in most cases, seems to be a one-way street, flowing from the CSOs to diplomats. In describing a launch event of the EU African guidelines (described later in this chapter), one activist spoke indirectly about the CSO/EU organizational unit relationship: “It wasn’t about consulting us, it was merely about distributing the guidelines to us, informing us” [UG_CS_LGBTI_High_PD141]. LGBTI CSOs appear to have different understandings regarding the role CSOs play in determining the actions

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of the EU and member states’ organizational units in Uganda than do embassies and delegations. CSOs have an expectation of being treated as experts on their own lives or those of people they claim to represent—after all, they have spoken on high-level panels and been received by ministers in Europe. The EU delegation and embassies, in contrast, view CSOs more as sources of information, with the delegations and embassies as the experts who use this information to determine what should happen next. This fracture in self-understanding has stressed EU/CSO relations, as one activist of an LGBTI CSO complained, The EU [after the AHA’s proposal] had lots of negotiations behind the scenes and diplomatic conversations [with the Ugandan Government], even when we said ‘no.’ But how can you have a dialogue with people who are legislating something like that? [UG_CS_LGBTI_High_PD64]

Beyond speaking to the EU’s perceived betrayal of the Ugandan LGBTI CSOs by continuing and making opaque their dialogue with the Ugandan government, this quote makes clear, once more, the dilemma the EU delegation and member state embassies face: they have to appear consistent and true to the ideals on which the EU’s organizational identity as normative actor is based, while stabilizing the basis for fulfilling their more immediate task of distributing development aid contingent upon good relations with the Ugandan government. The activist’s statement also points to how the EU is attempting to solve this double bind: acting out of plain sight and behind the closed doors of silent diplomacy. “It Doesn’t Matter What Happens in Uganda” In the broad chronology of staff’s sensemaking that undergirds aid-based policy approaches, the final decision about whether to cut aid is ultimately taken at headquarters, showing the immediate institutional context of Uganda to only matter to a certain point. As one senior staff member of an embassy put it, “It doesn’t matter what happens in Uganda. What matters is what goes on back home” [UG_MS_High_PD65]. This statement points toward the hierarchical relations between the organizational entities in Uganda and their headquarters, which, at the point of high

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attention, became closely linked, leading to a curtailing of discretion at the working levels in delegation and embassies. Dealing with Headquarters Generally, embassies and delegations, as organizational entities, enjoy high levels of independence from headquarters (see Chapter 8). The ambassadors embody a nation’s politics abroad but, at the same time, are bound to instructions from their home governments, in the odd case concrete instructions are given. Communication is typically a one-way street, where embassies and delegations send regular country reports to the ministries in their capitals but rarely receive instructions. As such, EU headquarters, viewed from the vantage point of a member state embassy or the EU delegation, are described as a black box, a place where even senior staff are never sure what happens with the information they impart [UG_MS_High_PD65], let alone the interpretation of this information and the instructions it might lead to. Experienced and senior embassy staff deal with this disconnect by widely spreading the information and their analysis to ensure its dissemination to the EU level. They extend communication beyond channels dictated by the hierarchical structure in which they operate. One staff member said, “I also send emails which are going [...] to the country officers in the Foreign Ministry to the permanent representation in Brussels because you never know what headquarters are doing with it and what they forward” [UG_MS_High_PD65]. This usually loosely coupled relationship can result in communicative hindrances, particularly in cases where staff based in third countries seek to get one’s message across or seek a certain response from headquarters. Diplomats also use the geographical distance to satisfy the sometimes contradicting expectations of their headquarters and the Ugandan government, using it to decouple further and to exercise their own judgment about which topics should be given priority. In the case of human rights for LGBTI persons, while some member state governments expected the topic to be given priority on the ground in Uganda, embassy staff, exposed to the Ugandan government’s expectations and those attached to their organizational roles dissented, deeming this prioritization as inappropriate for the Ugandan context. Their solution was to highlight work on the topic of LGBTI in their regular confidential reports to headquarters, giving the appearance of giving priority to the topic, without this reflecting the actual time or effort

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actively spent.61 A high-level diplomat said, “We argue [for certain measures] with [reference to] human rights … but we don’t actually focus so much on it in development work. It is rather discussed so much more” [UG_MS_Mid_PD55].62 One practical way member state embassy staff thus settle the ambiguous demands from headquarters and the local context is to decouple talk from action. Another embassy has commissioned a study to try to make their headquarters “understand where [homophobia in Uganda] comes from,” thereby translating the situation into the language of politicians back home [UG_MS_High_PD61]. Member state embassies, as extensions of their governments, are under much more direct pressure from national CSOs and constituents than EU delegations are, as their headquarters, the EU Comm, and the EEAS, are only accountable to the Council and ultimately member states, rather than a direct electorate.63 This loose coupling allows the EU delegation and its headquarters to disregard a certain degree of the plurivocality of demands from an electorate or civil society of member states and take decisions with reference to their own perceived expertise, claiming a stable and rational approach, rather than being driven by public opinion, which is regarded as more political.64 This dynamic between the EU delegation, member state embassies, and their headquarters was featured in negotiations around

61 Hosting a researcher like me can also serve to showcase that the embassy is dealing with the topic of human rights for LGBTI issues vis-à-vis their headquarters. At the same time, such a researcher is only loosely coupled to the embassy, and therefore can be decoupled from the embassy’s own work so as not to upset the relationship with the Ugandan government. 62 The decoupling between the work on the ground in a particular country and the way this work is communicated to headquarter is common. When the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) became a new standard for development policy at the GIZ, existing development projects were categorized into the different goals in the Nepal country office. There was not even a question about whether this new framework would require new or different projects at the operational end. 63 The EU Parl is accountable to an electorate and MEPs in turn put indirect pressure on the EU Comm and EEAS, notwithstanding the EU Parl’s lack of a formal role regarding foreign policy. 64 “National [LGBTI] organizations would relate to member states probably. I wasn’t in touch [with any] directly, I don’t think. Member states had more direct pressure from NGOs. That’s the thing that’s good about Europe: Collaborate and the EU Commission can be a stable middle ground, not directly under pressure” [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_ 1].

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crafting formal statements to respond to the Ugandan Parliament passing the AHA and Museveni’s signing it into force. Coordinating Embassies Amid negotiations, the problem posed to high-level EU delegation staff was to coordinate a common response among member state-embassy staff in Uganda to maintain diplomatic amicability with the Ugandan government and not to threaten existing channels of development aid; however, an agreement locally among embassies became nonviable, as the high attention from headquarters to the AHA had the effect of the headquarters becoming very involved, complicating the EU delegation’s coordinating role65 on the topic. This role was already fractured between ambiguities of hierarchy vis-à-vis EU foreign policy and domestic pressures to which member states were exposed. Although the Lisbon Treaty demands cooperation, national sovereignty remains a defining element of foreign policy. With the topic of human rights for LGBTI becoming politicized to the point it received attention at the national level in Europe, EU foreign policy became more closely coupled with domestic politics and questions of legitimacy. This development limited the member state embassies’ perceived options for acting and resulted in the engagement of a top-down approach, especially in member state countries where national CSOs’ pressure to act was high. One highlevel diplomat from such a country spoke to this limitation and how EU attention gave rise to it: if the “image is created [back home] that Uganda is a homophobic country, that is a killing for political space. If the [AHA] had been signed without publicity, that would be a different ball game” [UG_MS_Mid_PD62]. Hence, decoupling talk from action becomes more difficult with greater attention and when the activities of the delegation and embassies are under scrutiny. The EU delegation and its headquarters, the EU Comm, and the EEAS, are somewhat shielded from public pressure: They are accountable to the member states represented in the Council but not to a direct electorate,66 allowing high-level staff at the EU delegation to filter and disregard some of the plurivocality of demands and to claim to take 65 This role was confirmed by member state diplomats [UG_MS_Mid_PD55; UG_MS_ dev_Mid_PD59]. 66 The EU Parl is accountable and MEPs in turn put pressure on the EU Comm and EEAS even the Parliament it does not have a formal role regarding foreign policy.

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decisions based on their expertise, rather than on public expectation. The problem of the EU delegation, however, was to coordinate member states’ responses determined by the domestic pressures they faced. The attention of the capitals, considered a problem by high-level staff members at the EU delegation in Uganda, demanded swift agreement on a particular line of communication: “The urgency [to act] was there because of the attention from capitals” [UG_EU_del_High_PD71-2].67 Increased attention, and with it pressure to cut or divert aid, on the Swedish and Dutch government in particular—both countries considered to be front-runners with regard to pro-LGBTI legislation in the EU— led to statements that created particular expectations.68 Divergence of individual member states from an agreed way forward among ambassadors in Uganda led a high-level EU delegation diplomat to conclude, “Some embassies are unable to control their capitals” [UG_EU_del_ High_PD71-2], articulating the expectation that embassies engage in sense giving vis-à-vis their headquarters, thus reversing the formal line of hierarchy and retaining their room for maneuver even in light of high attention. To reduce headquarters’ attention and regain room for discretion, embassy staff asked their national LGBTI CSOs to ease the pressure the activists put on headquarters [UG_MS_High_PD61]. The embassy therefore effectively started lobbying LGBTI CSOs and tried to increase acceptance of its own version of the situation and increase legitimacy of their approach to continue dealing with the government [UG_MS_High_ PD61]. The embassy staff member reported proudly that their national LGBTI CSOs checked with the embassy, rather than blindly relying on 67 Sweden’s government was one that came out with a strong statement announcing that it would cut aid to the Ugandan government on 5 March 2014, a week after Museveni had signed the AHA. The government of The Netherlands likewise announced that they would stop budget support to the Ugandan government, and for over twelve months, it was not clear how this announcement would exactly affect the work of the embassy and its role as part of the Justice Law and Order budget support. Even when the Act was annulled a few months later and the embassy argued against a change in aid policy to Uganda, Dutch headquarters still took measures and did not simply decouple earlier talk from action. Among changes was that a new role was created in the embassy for sexual and reproductive health, also covering LGBTI issues. 68 One senior diplomat recounts how a minister on a formal visit to Uganda was very bold and outspoken demanding LGBTI-equality from the Ugandan government, thereby causing a problem by way of its decreasing of delegation legitimacy vis-à-vis the Ugandan government [UG_MS_High_PD61].

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what Ugandan LGBTI CSOs told them [UG_MS_High_PD61]. They therefore appear to have been successful in efforts to re-establish themselves as experts, rivaling the perceived monopoly of Ugandan LGBTI CSOs in interpretation of the situation. Three Statements Formal statements, as standard tools of diplomacy, are testimony to the complex relationship between the EU delegation, embassies, and headquarters, and enact sense made and agreed on vis-à-vis a particular policy matter or situation. There are multiple types of statements in EU foreign policy, each requiring different levels of clearance, but the decisions about which level is appropriate, how these are drafted, and where (whether at the delegation or at headquarters) are political and thus can expose underlying institutions.69 The Ugandan AHA prompted three statements by EU delegation and member state embassies between December 2013 and March 2014. Individual member states’ headquarters released their own statements that, in part, diverged from the message agreed on the EU level. As a reaction to the Ugandan Parliament passing the AHA, the first statement was an easy achievement, compared to those following, according to a senior EU delegation diplomat [UG_EU_del_High_ PD71_2]. It was discussed at the ambassador level in Uganda, agreed to by member states’ headquarters, and then sent to the EEAS for publishing the same day as the vote,70 suggesting the statement’s framing was primarily driven by those working in Uganda. Published formally as a 69 Statements can be released by the EU delegation itself at the lowest level, then statements by the spokesperson of the High Representative, statement by the High Representative herself, and a statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU. A statement on behalf of the EU would have required the consent of all EU member states and can take a long time to agree on, especially in the domain of controversial issues. A statement issued directly by the High Representative has to be along a standard response and align with agreed EU positions but does not require each member state’s prior consent (Auswärtiges Amt, 2013). The content of a statement is relevant in so far as it has to be at the level of the strongest common denominator. In any case, there is usually a trade-off between the strength of a statement (both in content and level) and the speed at which it can be produced and signed off by the relevant parties. A statement is therefore also indicative on how controversial a topic is or which importance it is given. 70 “There are always discussions around whether statements should be done locally or centrally. … We discussed those locally among the ambassadors, sometimes in Brussels, but usually we agree with headquarters and discuss them here, then send them to Brussels

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statement by the EU’s high representative, the statement carried medium diplomatic weight and did not require the assent of all EU member states, making a fast release possible.71 At the level of its content, the short statement reflected consensus among EU delegation and EU member states’ diplomats that continuation of development aid was paramount, for which retaining legitimacy with the Ugandan government was required. Accordingly, the statement avoided language that could challenge legitimacy with the Ugandan government, did not mention possible consequences, and ascribed the principles of nondiscrimination within the legal frames of the human rights covenants and the African Charter, without explicitly stipulating LGBTI as a matter of human rights.72 This uncontroversial wording likewise enabled a timely agreement without much negotiation. The statement made a distinction between the law and its implementation by pointing toward the consequences not of the law itself but of its implementation. It therefore split the letter of the law, as agreed on by the legislator, from its implementation through the executive branch of government headed by the president.73 Additionally, rather than urge for publishing and clearance. But there are no clear cut rules on statements” [UG_MS_ Mid_PD55]. 71 There were three EU statements in total—the first after the parliamentary vote, the second before the president signed the AHA into law, and the third after the president had signed [UG_MS_Mid_PD55]. 72 The statement uses verbs such as ‘regret’ and ‘urge’ but not ‘condemn’ or ‘expect.’ It does not refer to EU treaties or principles or even the obligations to respect human rights under the Cotonou Agreement, which automatically could have implicitly referred to the option of suspension of the agreement and aid—hence, it avoids any reference to possible consequences and any sanctions in the form of development aid, as the different member states represented in Ugandan did not agree on this point. The statement mentions the AHB explicitly but refers to the general group of ‘all minorities’ in Uganda rather than LGBTI persons, thus avoiding terms regarded as inappropriate in the Ugandan context. Furthermore, the statement locates the AHA within the frame of the non-discrimination principle as binding in international and regional human rights law and the Ugandan constitution, rather than making it a human rights concern. To cast the statement of the EU High Representative in full: “I regret the adoption of the anti-homosexuality bill in Uganda. The implementation of this law would contravene essential principles of nondiscrimination enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights and in the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, both ratified by Uganda. I urge the Ugandan authorities to ensure respect of the principle of nondiscrimination, guaranteed in the Ugandan Constitution, and to preserve a climate of tolerance for all minorities in Uganda” (European External Action Service EEAS, 2013). 73 As per the Ugandan Constitution Art. 91, the President can pass a bill back to Parliament to be reconsidered or for parts of it to be reconsidered. However, parliament

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the president to respect the principle of nondiscrimination, it entreated him to ensure it was respected—calling on the duty to protect rather than portraying the executive as the perpetrator. This undermined—and even contradicted—the idea of rule of law, in the case of Uganda, as it promoted nonimplementation of a law passed by parliament and signed by the president. The tacit sensemaking is indicative of an underlying idea that the EU and its member states can influence the president to a point, overriding the rule of law, in which the decision of the legislature registers as merely symbolic, and thus decoupled from its actual implementation. Once Museveni signed the AHA into force, subsequent statements made were, in comparison to the first statement, made agreeing more challenging, considering further change to the institutional environment: it had become harder for the EU to justify continuation of direct diplomatic relations with Museveni and of development aid to Uganda. The perceived need for greater legitimacy through enlisting more signatories is apparent in this second, more unusual, less official statement.74 Issued only 4 days after Museveni’s signature, the public statement, signed by individual ambassadors and other diplomats, was posted on embassies’ websites. This gesture suggested that underneath the official diplomatic relationship between nations, a more personal relationship between ambassadors and the president was at stake, reminiscent of the ‘old way’ of distributing development aid, i.e. according to a patrimonial model (Public Statement by Diplomats from the European Union, U.S., Canada, Australia, Norway and Iceland in Uganda, 2014).75 Similar to the first statement, this one was also careful to preempt accusations of

always has the final word, and if passed three times, a bill does not need the assent of the president to enter into force. Museveni, by not signing, could have therefore delayed the law entering into force but could not simply overrule the will of parliament (Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995). 74 According to a senior diplomat, the statement was ‘ad-hoc’ and “those who wanted to, could join” [UG_MS_Mid_PD55]. However, not all wanted to join, and even though the possibility of a joint statement was discussed within the PDG group at the OECD level, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), reportedly, did not back such a statement and Japan and South Korea never committed either [UG_EU_del_High_ PD71_2]. 75 The statement starts with the words: “We, the undersigned, are deeply concerned and disappointed” (Public Statement by Diplomats from the European Union, U.S., Canada, Australia, Norway and Iceland in Uganda, 2014).

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imposed values, skirting any use of didactic language about LGBTI.76 At the same time, the statement, arising within the country-level Ugandan diplomatic arena, rather than disseminating from EU and member states’ headquarters, enabled an immediate expression of disagreement with the on-the-ground situation, while remaining anodyne—thanks to the rather personal-level of its issuance and the greater legitimacy due to its broadened coalition of donors.77 These two aspects were perceived as particularly crucial for circumventing further accusations of imperialism, as Museveni had used other politicians’ statements to justify signing the bill, yielding an act of defiance of attempts to curtail Uganda’s sovereignty.78 Following the public statement by Uganda-based diplomats came the EU’s official declaration on the AHA, which took the EU more time to agree on. The reason for this delay was the statement’s stronger challenge to the Ugandan government and its higher-level issuance, i.e., on the level of the high commissioner on behalf of the EU, which required consensus of all member states.79 Increasing legitimacy, the

76 The statement omits explicit reference to LGBTI and instead ties into the frame of a belief in “common indivisible rights” of all humans and Uganda’s duty to protect the rights of all its citizens. 77 A high-level member state diplomat describes it even as “the one occasion where we felt we should do something in the country and show our support [to LGBTI persons]” [UG_MS_High_PD55]. 78 One senior diplomat from a member state said: “Museveni used statements from the West, especially Obama’s, to say it influenced his decision [to sign the bill]. We have to take this into consideration. It’s a major media thing and is therefore handled differently” [UG_MS_High_PD55]. The statement issued by the EU reflects this caution not to provide further fodder for the accusations of imperialism. 79 “The European Union condemns the adoption of the AHA by Uganda on 24 February. The EU fully shares the concerns expressed by the United Nations SecretaryGeneral, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Desmond Tutu. The EU is firmly committed to the promotion of human rights worldwide and denounces any discriminatory legislation. The EU will review how best to achieve this in Uganda in this changed context. The AHA contradicts the international commitments of the Ugandan government to respect and protect the fundamental human rights of all its citizens. The EU calls upon Uganda to ensure equality before the law and nondiscrimination in line with its obligations under international human rights law, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights. The EU urges the state of Uganda to protect every individual against discrimination or violence and to repeal the Anti-Homosexuality Law” (EEAS, 2014).

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statement explicitly referred to other organizations’ and individuals’ criticisms of the AHA, such as that leveled by the UN and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Desmond Tutu, a black South African former bishop, and again referenced Uganda’s own commitments under international law without directly mentioning LGBTI persons. What made this statement stronger compared to previous ones lay in its “denounce[ment of] any discriminatory legislation,” its urging of Uganda to “repeal the Anti-Homosexuality Law,” and its clarity of the EU’s intentions vis-à-vis the existing EU/ Ugandan diplomatic arrangement (Public Statement by Diplomats from the European Union, U.S., Canada, Australia, Norway and Iceland in Uganda, 2014). This agreement, given the changed context, was to be reviewed, thus hinting at the possibility of cutting aid. In parallel to these statements, the EU delegation’s problem was to foster a coherent EU response that would strike a balance between the demand to continue development cooperation and some member states’ headquarters wanting to cut development to retain legitimacy domestically.80 A formal EU statement does not preclude individual countries from issuing their own statements, so long as they are semantically in line with the EU’s stated response.81 In this case, the pressure from national CSOs was substantial enough in some member states that these countries’ headquarters released their own statements, diverging from the consensus position the EU managed to cultivate among diplomats in Uganda.82 Statements are generally less a product of a rogue embassy; as one senior staff member of the EU delegation explains, member stated, “Statements are not decided here. Ministers will talk and the capitals make the statement” [UG_EU_del_High_PD71_2]. In such cases, the domestic

80 A high-level EU delegation staff member says: “But then some member states who were bilateral came out directly with their comments and Article 96 of the [Cotonou] Agreement, which is about suspension of aid. The EU tried to hold the group together. It was a fine balance” [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_1]. 81 A high-level diplomat at the EU delegation says: “Reactions from London etc. [that] is not a problem but if the substance is different, it is a problem. The rule book is the Cotonou Agreement” [UG_EU_del_High_PD71_2]. 82 “What makes it complex is that the EU is not alone. Other member states are there. It was difficult to communicate that aid cuts and it would only exacerbate the issue” [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_1].

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threat to a member state’s legitimacy necessarily prompts a response that diverges from their embassy’s assessment.83 Such inconsistency between member states and between member states and the EU delegation84 was noticed in Uganda, to the extent that it affected the EU’s legitimacy as a unitary organization, particularly in the eyes of Ugandan CSOs, who characterized the EU’s tepid statement in response to the AHA as something that “made [the EU] look stupid,” [UG_CS_LGBTI_High_PD64], given the much stronger statements disseminated by some member states—e.g., that from the Swedes, which had made it more difficult for other EU countries and the EU delegation to justify continuing development aid to Uganda while evading accusations of hypocrisy—i.e., decoupling talk about human rights for LGBTI persons from action which challenge legitimacy and undermine the image of the EU as a normative power with human rights as its fundamental principles.

83 As was the case with Sweden’s minister for international development cooperation who announced aid cuts to Uganda upon Museveni signing the law into force, thereby keeping in line with earlier statements and national policies rather than the common EU approach agreed to among diplomats in Uganda. In 2009 as an early response to the proposed AHB, the Swedish minister for international development cooperation announced that aid would be cut if the bill was passed in an ad-hoc statement on a radio show in Sweden. In 2013, Sweden already had LGBTI issues formally included in its foreign policy and, as a factsheet from the Ministry of Employment states, considered “the rights of LGBT persons [...] one of the prioritized areas that the Government emphasizes in development cooperation.” The aim of this policy was to “improve the living conditions of LGBT persons in the countries with which Sweden has development cooperation” (Swedish Ministry of Employment, 2013). Actions included capacity development for organizations working on LGBTI issues. In October 2014, Sweden formally launched its explicit feminist approach to foreign policy which explicitly included LGBTI issues (Regeringskansliet, 2017). See also Rainer (2021) for details on the Swedish government’s reaction (Rainer, 2021, p. 149). 84 Statements even differed within countries where, in some cases, ministries reacted differently. In Germany, for example, development aid to Uganda was also suspended due to alleged corruption. The ministry of development, however, claimed it was also in response to the AHA, a portrayal which the Foreign Ministry did not agree with [UG_ MS_High_PD65].

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“I Also Expected Them to Pay More Attention to Us” The EU directly addressed the AHA with the Ugandan government at meetings in Kampala and in Brussels.85 Based on these clear messages of disapproval imparted by the EU at these meetings and the signals from the Ugandan government, there was a clear expectation that Museveni would withdraw or halt the bill because of the EU’s pressure, due to its vantage as a major donor. The bill’s subsequent passing by the Ugandan Parliament therefore came as an unexpected event to high-level diplomats at the EU delegation and member state embassies [UG_EU_del_High_ PD51_1; UG_MS_High_PD65]. When news of the AHA’s passing first broke in Uganda on 20 December 2013, this sparked several reactions from different levels of the EU and member states. The agreed strategy by EU delegation and member state embassies in Kampala was to focus on influencing the president not to sign the law into force. Such efforts of persuasion were administered at high political levels, where a high-ranking EEAS official traveled from Brussels to Uganda to discuss this matter directly with the government [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19]. Only a few weeks later, Museveni signed the bill, despite having given personal assurances that he would not. Museveni’s signing unsettled the problem-definition on which the EU organizational units had staked their negotiations with headquarters regarding policy paths forward for Uganda’s LGBTI situation. One senior member state diplomat expressed, “The issue is not government policy— it’s driven by individuals. This is what we could say to our politicians for a long time, but that changed when the president signed the law in February 2014” [UG_MS_High_PD55]. This framing of the problem as stemming from a few individuals, rather than as systemic and topdown, had legitimized continued engagement with the government and the president, in particular. Exemplary of this problem’s framing is an EU delegations staff member, who explained, 85 Staff at the EEAS geographic unit said that they “had been telling the government at every opportunity … that this [anti-homosexuality] act is a very bad idea” [BE_EU_ EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19]. This happened through the topic being raised as part of regular confidential political meetings which are foreseen by Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement (see Chapter 5.4 on Article 8 in the Cotonou Agreement). In addition, the topic was reportedly raised at bilateral meetings between the head of delegation and other diplomats in Kampala with the president, the prime minister, and the deputy prime minister.

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There is a lot of aggression towards LGBTI persons from their neighbors etc. I met a (same-sex) couple recently and they lived in a shared compound in a house. But other families would call them names and write on their wall and the wall of their doghouse. They would write “gay bitches” etc. It seems like it is more common among the population than government. [UG_EU_del_mid_PD60; emphasis added]

With this framing, continued dialogue on an informal level was possible— at least prior to the AHA’s passing—because embassies had managed to convince their headquarters, even in spite of certain member states’ pushing for stronger reactions and diversions of development aid, that responsibility for the AHA lay not with the Ugandan government but individual politicians86 who were acting to maximize their power. This way, the delegation had been able to decouple the proposed legislation from Museveni and to justify and legitimize continued cooperation; however, when Museveni signed the AHA into law, it became a problem to continue to justify cooperation with the Ugandan government vis-à-vis their own headquarters. Continued Engagement with the Government LGBTI CSOs in Uganda had requested donors to not negotiate with the Ugandan government in case the law was signed and had asked them instead to administer a forceful public statement on redirecting aid [UG_CS_LGBTI_High_PD64; UG_CS_LGBTI_High_PD70]. This plea was ultimately ignored by the EU delegation and some member state embassies, which revealed underlying institutions and alliances pertinent to their sensemaking. When the AHB first attracted attention and became political, threatening some countries’ and the EU’s development aid to Uganda, the topic was escalated to high political-level of heads of delegation and ambassadors, who addressed the topic in meetings with each other and with the Ugandan government.87 In these meetings, officials regarded 86 Politicians like Bahati, who had introduced the bill and Kadaga, the speaker of the Ugandan Parliament, who was celebrated for her reply to the Canadian foreign minister, challenged his criticism of the Ugandan AHA as an imperialist attitude (Jjuuko & Tabengwa, 2018, p. 83). 87 A local staff member from an embassy said that the “heads of missions were talking to the [Ugandan] government” [UG_MS_Mid_local_PD63] about the bill. A senior member state diplomat says that the “ambassador has taken part in the meetings [on LGBTI issues]

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the Ugandan government as part of the solution, rather than the problem, given that the continuation of development aid in Uganda, was a shared interest of Museveni, the EU delegation, and member state embassies active in Uganda. Museveni’s interest is why his dismissal of the request to prevent the AHA came as such a surprise, ultimately taken as an affront; as one high-level EU delegation diplomat expressed: “I also expected them [the Ugandan government] to pay more attention to us as partners after 50 years of development aid and counting” [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_ 1]. This quote hints at (highly illegitimate) underlying imperialist institutions taken-for-granted by the EU delegation staff but which require constant refuting of the possible accusation.88 Ultimately, however, the EU delegation staff fell in line with the Ugandan government’s arguments and heeded the sovereign country’s leader’s requests, testimony of which is senior delegation staff’s calling (quoting Museveni) for patience and a softer, less confrontational approach to LGBTI issues, shaped with the Ugandan context in mind.89 This senior delegation staff member, following Museveni’s argument, linked the topic of social development toward a society tolerant of LGBTI rights to economic development of the country and evoked a hierarchy of equalities, starting with a desired gender equality in heterosexual relationships. The use of these arguments reveals a clear underlying notion of a linear development, following a European model, which self-evidently

even” [UG_MS_High_PD61], and a diplomat from another embassy says that, into today, “it is being discussed on all levels in [our] embassy” [UG_MS_High_PD65]. In a Head of Delegation meeting in 2015, LGBTI is still mentioned as part of the report of the Democratization and Human Rights working group for the past month [event_UG-HoM Mtg at NL Embassy-Agenda_PD101]. 88 The imperial connotation is that because the EU, supposedly supported Uganda and the Ugandan government financially, it should, even in matters formally regarding its domestic policy, pay attention to the wishes of its long-term partner. This negates a colonial and postcolonial history of exploitation and suggests that Uganda’s government owes the EU for its allegedly ‘selfless’ support. 89 A high-level staff member at the EU delegation familiar with the Ugandan head of state’s arguments says that “Museveni pointed out the historical perspective. [He said that] ‘It was illegal in Europe only a few years ago. Agriculture here is 2,000 years behind, there are women with bent backs in the village. So how do you expect us to be ahead on social attitude?’ If we were provoking by promoting that would have adverse consequences. ‘You have to be patient’ they said. Attitudes are changing. To discuss Gay Marriage in Uganda is ludicrous. We first have to get equality in hetero marriages” [UG_ EU_del_High_PD71_2].

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holds equality in heterosexual relationships must first be achieved before a society’s tending to secondary issues, such as equality for LGBTI persons. This way of arguing follows a heteronormative and Eurocentric logic and the idea of sequencing “progress” according to the way it developed in the West.90 Importantly, it is thus an argument in the tradition of modernization theories and follows the logic of development, rather than the logic of human rights. It introduces a weighing or prioritization of one equality issue over another and is justified by suggesting attitudinal change happens by itself, without the need for intervention. It further reduces the importance of the topic in comparison to other social issues, while ignoring the legislative aspect of prosecution of a minority. This prioritizing, however, is somewhat contrary to the fundamental principles of human rights which postulate that all rights are of equal weight and interconnected. Overall, this argument therefore makes apparent that human rights are just one frame of many employed to justify a particular course of action. Continued engagement with the Ugandan government after the AHA’s proposal was further justified through means of categorization, i.e., through, specifically, differentiating between Uganda’s existing law and the AHA. This categorization tended to the Ugandan government’s claim of the EU’s unfair treatment regarding the discontinuance of development aid because such a threat had not been employed toward other countries with similar existing legislation. This argument aimed to categorize the legislative status quo in Uganda as based on colonial law and therefore ascribed the Ugandan government limited ‘culpability’ and did not therefore require a change in the relationship between the EU and its member states vis-à-vis the Ugandan government. The Ugandan government’s active movement to further criminalize LGBTI persons by new legislation, however, was regarded as a different category and as necessitating (counter)action from the EU and its member states.91 90 A counter argument could be that through same-sex marriage, more equality in hetero marriages is introduced because marriage is decoupled from strict gender roles. 91 The reporting in the media—the Ugandan, as well as “Western”—was not very differentiated. When it reported on Uganda’s existing legislation, often unmentioned was that this law stemmed from colonial times and outlawed merely same-sex sexual acts rather than homosexuality. In practice in Uganda, however, this distinction in the legislation was also rendered meaningless, as organizations were refused registration because their name included ‘sexual minorities.’ A high-level member state diplomat says: “That’s what I have been asking as well. Is Uganda being treated fairly? The law was inherited by colonial

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Agreeing on Museveni as a Man of Reason The EU delegation’s and some member state embassies’ staff (whose development aid was mostly at risk of being cut or rechanneled by their governments) continued to agree on continued engagement with the Ugandan government and Museveni, even after the president spurned his previous assurances and signed the AHA into force, but the problem definition changed. The signing resulted in greater difficulty of certain member state embassies’ staff to legitimize continued relationships with the Ugandan government vis-à-vis their headquarters nonetheless changed the focus: earlier agreement among the EU delegation and member state embassies was to concentrate efforts on preventing the AHA’s realization into law, which turned into discussions on what to do next. To orient the discourse and policy paths, EU delegation and member state embassy staff—particularly those who feared impending shrinkage of their remit in Uganda—sought more information on why Museveni backtracked, which staff of the EU delegation, in particular, kept emphasizing that this came as a surprise that no one anticipated [UG_MS_ High_PD65; UG_EU_del_High_PD51_1]. To briefly contextualize the sensemaking, here: To analyze, anticipate, and steer is the job of political staff at the EU delegation; as such, with the EU-organizational units’ argument vis-à-vis their headquarters that the bill came from the political fringes, rather than the government, information and reformulation of the problem definition became required to re-establish Museveni as a man of reason and thus keep him a viable partner and ally in solving the problem as defined. To this end, staff solicited the Ugandan government for background information on the circumstances of the bill signing [UG_EU_del_High_ PD51-1].92 When it emerged ministers had been kept in the dark about the signing, it was presumed Museveni did not deceive Uganda’s “international partners,” but rather came under great pressure from his own

masters. When you put the [new] law into force, that’s of course is an active step to discriminate which is why it received attention” [UG_MS_High_PD61]. 92 A high-level EU delegation staff member, when informed about Museveni signing the act, immediately reports to have called the Ugandan foreign minister to learn that the minister had also not been informed of the intention to sign the bill.

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party to act against his assurances.93 This information paralleled accounts by EU delegation staff that Museveni had mentioned “problems with his people” [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_1]. The EEAS and delegation staff provided legitimacy to the above-mentioned characterization of Museveni—as not some incorrigible actor vis-à-vis LGBTI, but as a leader who, beholden to his political reality and, more specifically, the threat of loss of legitimacy in his party, acted rationally in the moment, preserving his diplomatic legitimacy. A high-level meeting took place in the wake of Museveni signing the bill. The meeting included the head of the EU delegation, EU member state ambassadors, and ambassadors of like-minded countries whose arrangement of development aid were similarly threatened (e.g., the U.S. and Norway) [UG_EU_del_High_PD71_2]. The meeting, chaired by the head of the EU delegation, was to establish consensus on how to proceed [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_1] and attempted a common problem definition. Reported discourse among member state ambassadors concerned whether they could provide information to Museveni that would show homosexuality as having a genetic basis [UG_MS_High_ PD65], which would have meant arguing within the frame of reference used by Museveni: namely the frame of science. One high-level staff member of an embassy clearly rejected this frame, choosing instead a pathway that would highlight the frame of fundamental rights [UG_MS_ High_PD65], which, referring to natural law at its basis, implies scientific proof is not necessary. Staff capacity to portray Museveni as a man of reason was largely aided by Museveni’s self-characterization. In a speech, he justified his signing of the AHA into law with reference to science94 (rather than personal dislike or religious arguments), which, in evincing and showing himself to fulfill the expectations of a modern administration to engage in “evidencebased policy making,” conveyed Museveni as tangibly rational.95 Further 93 EEAS staff and a senior delegation diplomat mention that the day Museveni signed the bill coincided with the unofficial announcement that he was going to be the sole presidential candidacy from his party, implying that this internal power play was the reason for the president to sign [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19; UG_EU_del_High_ PD51-1]. 94 Museveni, in his speech, reported to have tasked a team of researchers to find out whether homosexuality was innate or deviant behavior that could be changed. 95 LGBTI campaigns in Europe and the U.S. have been successful also because they managed to establish that sexual orientation is a predisposition and not a choice, to

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support of this portrait came from high-level EU delegation and member state-embassy diplomats’ abilities to pose Museveni and his capacity for reason in contrast to his citizens96 —a distinction likewise promoted by the EEAS in Brussels, differentiating between the head of state as a rational person in opposition to the media, other politicians, and Ugandan citizens, who instead are susceptible to “myths” about homosexuality.97 Such a contrast posed Museveni as the rational intermediate between the EU and the irrational “Others” of Uganda—the politicians, the media, and the population. This way of classifying Museveni leaves the image of the president as rational and modern intact and hence making it easier to justify why they continued to see him as a partner in the ‘solution.’98 With this reasoning, Museveni re-embedded the topic of LGBTI issues in a way that made it more difficult for the EU delegation and member states embassies, conceived to be unwilling to themselves translate the

the effect of being able to establish lesbian, gay, and bisexual people as a group which needs protection from discrimination. Museveni’s use of science challenged exactly this explanation of homosexuality, which has come to be accepted and taken for granted in Europe. Instead, Museveni claimed that evidence shows the importance of nurture regarding the phenomenon of homosexuality. In a public speech at the signing of the act, he argued that because of this and “Western” interference to that regard, something should be done to dissuade people from these practices and therefore he would sign the law. 96 “Museveni is a 70 year old man—he is quite informed, more than what you’d get in a village. He requested some scientific reports and wrote letters, and some are quite informed” [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_1]. 97 “He [Museveni] is a sophisticated man,” who, they stress, personally, “has no issue with homosexuality whatsoever” [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19]. 98 A senior EU delegation staff member reports from a meeting with government officials in which the staff member’s attempt to reason that discrimination on grounds of sex was illegitimate was met with an argument based on religious concept of sin— which the staff member disregards as ‘stupid’: “Statistically it is wrong that more boys are abused and so I asked them: ‘Are you implying that a girl child has less sufferance than a boy, physically or psychologically? It is discriminatory and we have a problem with it. You introduce a difference by imposing higher penalties [on the abuse of boys with the AHA].’ Someone said ‘Yes, it is because it is a double sin: Rape and homosexuality.’ I don’t think it was the president who said it. It’s too stupid” [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_ 1]. This statement shows that the statistical argument, as the language of reason and rationality, is not considered of great value in conversation with the Ugandan politicians. Instead, the argument is made through non-discrimination which is a concept which enjoys great legitimacy in a context where discrimination between ‘tribes’ has long been a topic. The religious argument is dismissed as ‘stupid’ and therefore as irrational.

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topic into the local environment, to challenge his decision and easier to relate to it, justifying continued development aid. In other words, Museveni linked his signing of the AHA to the metaframe of modernity, namely, rationality, effectiveness, and “manners,” as the assumed bedrock of civilized people and presents himself and his policy as legitimate to EU diplomats.99 The Ugandan president, in linking his interpretation to modernity assumed the power of definition—a power that traditionally “Western” countries had considered their prerogative. Given Uganda’s colonial history, this dynamic reveals the underlying institutions of classical indirect rule, which relied on ‘local’ leaders regarded as legitimate rulers by the population, who simultaneously were reliant on the colonial powers to support them in their position of ruler but demonstrates the limits of their control by using ‘their’ frames of reference.100 If not concealed, this dynamic posed the threat of delegitimizing the parties involved. Museveni, the EU delegation, and member state embassies were thus required to strike a careful balance in their actions to avoid the loss of legitimacy with their respective electorates. Such loss of legitimacy looms, on Museveni’s side, if regarded as allowing EU intervention, and, on the EU-side, if regarded as intervening in Uganda’s sovereignty too unreasonably or in ways not enough. Moreover, in the case Museveni lost his legitimacy in his own party and with the population, via being regarded as a pawn of indirect rule, the influence of EU and member states would be diminished. Hence, securing his legitimacy 99 In his speech, Museveni draws a line between “Western” other and “Ugandan”— the former who are ‘impolite’ in breeching sovereignty and the latter, including himself, who are building on science and arguments in their actions—i.e., who are modern: “Can somebody be homosexual purely by nature without nurture? The answer is: ‘No.’ No study has shown that. Since nurture is the main cause of homosexuality, then society can do something about it to discourage the trends. That is why I have agreed to sign the Bill.” He goes on: “Since Western societies do not appreciate politeness, let me take this opportunity to warn our people publicly about the wrong practices indulged in and promoted by some of the outsiders…Since my original thesis that there may be people who are born homosexual has been disproved by science, then the homosexuals have lost the argument in Uganda” (“President Museveni’s full speech at signing of AntiHomosexuality Bill”, 2014). 100 As a reminder: Museveni has ruled Uganda for the past 30 years, and EU and member states rely on him to be regarded as legitimate by the population to champion their interests. These interests may diverge between member states, but especially regarding development aid the relationship between member states and Museveni is one of mutual dependency.

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on the back of homophobic and anti- “Western” rhetoric seemed to be the lesser worry and has been portrayed as ultimately positive for human rights for LGBTI persons in Uganda [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_1]. In sum, the process of translation takes place differently than it would commonly be imagined as a re-embedding of abstract global frames at different loci. Rather than the embassies and the EU delegation directly re-embedding EU policies in Uganda, the Ugandan president, by using the global metaframe of modernity and an evidence base familiar to European diplomats to retain legitimacy with donors, translates the idea in a way that enables diplomats to re-embed it into their context influenced by domestic politics. Diplomats of EU member states and the EU delegation in Uganda generally agreed attention to the topic of LGBTI and Uganda was problematic. The underlying reasons, explanations, and justifications for this problem definition, however, differ, depending on the institutional building blocks individuals have at their disposal including their professional role and function within the organizational entity, the expectations from their headquarters and their values. Some embassy staff believe the topic of LGBTI to be less important than other issues affecting more people (given the limited time and resources) [UG_MS_High_PD61], others do not feel comfortable with it or did not have much knowledge on the topic,101 yet others argued the attention to be detrimental to the aim of promoting human rights for LGBTI persons [UG_MS_Mid_PD50]. This last point is also reflected in the different reactions to the annulment of the bill by the Ugandan constitutional court, while for the EU delegation and headquarters it was enough that the attention had subsided and development aid had not been cut, some member states had hoped for a verdict on substantial grounds rather than formal grounds (the AHA had been passed without a quorum)—a ruling supportive of the EU’s and member states’ condemnation of the legislation would have further legitimized a continuation of development aid to Uganda.102

101 Some diplomats’ way to deal with this insecurity and being uncomfortable, when forced to deal with the topic because their headquarters regarded it as important, was to make inappropriate jokes about the topic, for example how guests should best be greeted so no one would be offended with ‘ladies and gentlemen and others’ [observation notes]. 102 One high-level embassy staff member explained with regard to the AHA’s annulment: “It doesn’t matter that it’s on formal grounds. Another group of donors said that it should have been on the fundamentals. I don’t care. I say: ‘be pragmatic’” [UG_MS_

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“We Don’t Pay for Our Values” The EU delegation and member state embassies agreed the way forward in the wake of Museveni’s defaulting on not signing the AHA was to prevent actual implementation of the legislation, with the intent to continue aid.103 The announcement of some member states’ governments, to discontinue aid was dismissed as an “overreaction.”104 Informal Threats Notwithstanding the dismissal, the EU attempted to leverage the coercive power of its donor vantage to pressure the Ugandan government into not implementing the new law. This intervention included formally decoupling the threat of aid cuts from the AHA, and instead framing them on the grounds of corruption—grounds much less controversial because corruption is widely accepted in development politics as hindering progress in modern states,105 and, as a seemingly “objective” and less value-based reason, such framing would likely not provoke accusations of neoimperialism. To these ends, however, a high-level EU delegation staff member claimed there was never public threat to cut aid, for the simple reason that the EU does not “pay for [its] values” because “that would be cultural imperialism” [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_1], but this claim appeared as a façade. Despite never publicly threatening or officially linking the AHA and the temporary suspension of aid after the AHA had been signed into force, unofficially the EU’s message through unofficial communication channels with the Ugandan government was that definite suspension of aid remained a possibility.106 High_PD73]. Similarly, at the EEAS, staff back in Brussels admit that they are “just happy with the result” [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19]. 103 A high-level EU staff member said they “want the law repealed but since it’s reality, what then?” [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_1]. 104 “Sweden cancelled its bilateral cooperation. They don’t work with government

anymore. I think they are overreacting” [UG_MS_High_PD73]. 105 Anti-corruption measures are closely linked to good governance, a concept made popular as a conditionality for receiving development aid of the Bretton-Wood organizations in the 1980s and 1990s, aiming at guaranteeing an effective use of the funds by making reforms toward a bureaucracy modeled on that of European countries a precondition (Onazi, 2013, p. 69). The perception of corruption is highly cultural (Melgar et al., 2010). 106 The same diplomat was quick to point out the EU’s suspension of its 22 million Euro budget support to the Ugandan government after the AHA’s signing and that

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In the end, the threat was realized: The EU, other member states, and other organizations107 ultimately froze payments to the Ugandan government. Their respective reasonings for doing so differed, sometimes even internally, from one member state ministry to the next. The German Foreign Ministry, for example, was strictly against formally tying the freeze in payment to the AHA, while the Federal Ministry for Development and Economic Cooperation claimed the two were related [UG_ MS_High_PD65]. This difference in response highlights the different logics undergirding EU and EU member state’s development aid, where a certain structural and power imbalance between donor and recipient countries is immanent and accepted as a given, and foreign policy, where the formal acceptance of equality among all national states is paramount to maintaining legitimacy. Just as informal and decoupled from public messaging is sometimes the support of CSOs in Uganda by delegation and embassy staff members. CSOs specifically mention individuals and point out their great personal efforts in the work for LGBTI persons [UG_CS_HR_Mid_PD49]. Such efforts involved embassy staff inviting LGBTI activists to their homes, for example—a gesture highly appreciated by the activists as genuine [UG_CS_LGBTI_High_PD141] and partially satisfied demands without challenging the Ugandan government. The “Rule Book” Regarding the EU’s delay and member states’ suspension of aid, the dilemma of the EU delegation was to appear as an active response to the AHA’s signing at no risk to their own conduit of development aid to Uganda. To navigate this sensitive balancing act, they publicly evoked the Cotonou Agreement, a formal agreement between the EU and ACP countries, of which Uganda is part (see Chapter 3), as “the rule book” to which member states did not adhere when cutting aid unilaterally [UG_

“support payment [was] pending” which they claim Ugandan Minister of Finance knew, thereby neutralizing any accusations that the EU did not act in response to the legislation. Yet the staff member reiterates that they “were making no threats” [UG_EU_del_High_ PD51_1]. Furthermore, the signing of a new 5-year national program of the European Development Fund for a total of about 560 million Euro is said to have been delayed by the headquarter [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19], again with no reference to the AHA. 107 International organizations reacted, as well—the World Bank, for one, temporarily froze its loan to Uganda (Gosine, 2015, p. 9).

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EU_del_High_PD71_2].108 They suggested that rather than Uganda breaking the rules, those headquarters who had suspended aid had not adhered to this contract with the Ugandan government which, according to the EU delegation, foresaw the Article 8 Dialogues in case of problems rather than immediate suspension of aid which is a “matter of last resort,” under Article 96 (European Commission, 2010). Accordingly, the “rule book” and the utility it provides in meetings between the EU delegation and Ugandan government ministers, as part of Article 8’s framework, took a different form in this specific situation than it had before, a change that helped the EU cultivate legitimacy, the perception of its re-acting to the new legislation. Having agreed the matter of the AHA should be discussed as part of an Article 8 Dialogue meeting, the remaining question among the EU delegation and member state diplomats in Uganda became whether the topic should be integrated into a regular Article 8 Dialogue meeting as one agenda item among others or whether a meeting should be arranged solely on this. The latter option was selected and portrayed, by those at the top of the hierarchy of the EU delegation, as reflecting the urgency of the topic and how seriously it was being taken [UG_EU_del_High_PD71_2]. This Article 8 Dialogue, while not at the level of the president, occurred with the Ugandan Foreign Minister and several other Ugandan ministers in attendance. In preparation of the Article 8 Dialogue, the different expectations of EU home governments affected the demands to be discussed. Some member state representatives wanted to see the law repealed, as it constituted a human rights violation. Others were more cautious because it had been passed by Parliament and signed into law by the president. In the end, EU diplomats settled on the demand (which was directed from the very top of the EU hierarchy in Brussels) that the law should not be implemented and that formal (i.e., public) assurances would be given that health projects would not be negatively affected and that the police would not specifically target LGBTI persons [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_1].

108 A high-level EU delegation staff member explains: “The EU is guided by clear procedures of the Cotonou Agreement: Article 8 Dialogue” [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_ 1].

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Written Assurance The EU delegation and member state embassy staff succeeded in influencing the Ugandan government to split the application of the AHA by categorizing HIV/AIDS as an area that would remain unaffected in its implementation, thereby making it possible to justify continued HIV/ AIDS-targeted development aid vis-à-vis their headquarters. EU staff members’ legitimizing efforts negotiated some form of written guidelines from the Ugandan Minister of Health that homosexual citizen’s access to HIV/AIDS treatment would not be affected by the AHA. The logic of negotiating such a form of assurance was that this statement, although ultimately not widely publicized in Uganda and not available online, could be used publicly if necessary to remind the government of its own commitment, according to an embassy staff member [UG_MS_ High_PD61], implying that publicizing this document would tarnish the Government’s legitimacy if exposing it as incoherent in its policies. The excitement about a statement contradicting national legislation in combination with the agreed problem of preventing implementation of the new AHA among member state embassies and the EU delegation points at a taken-for-granted legitimacy of the interference of donors to influence domestic policies. The statement, presented as a major achievement and an improvement within this particular policy area to the situation prior to the AHA [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_1; UG_ MS_High_PD61], clearly contrasts national legislation and underlines the assumption that in the case of Ugandan legislation and implementation are not as closely coupled as in modern states, presuming a form of ever-present hypocrisy. In summary, over time, EU delegation and embassy staff defined and redefined the “problem” during a process of sensemaking and sense consolidation. After successfully ignoring the topic of human rights for LGBTI persons, the topic’s politization morphed it into a matter of existential importance challenging the core organizational tasks and existence. Rather than identifying the prosecution of LGBTI persons through the AHB/AHA as the problem, staff recognized the attention on the topic and Ugandan LGBTI CSOs at its source as that which required addressing. Through quantifying the “problem,” it was downplayed as little information on “hard cases” existed. Increasingly staff needed to justify sidelining Ugandan LGBTI CSOs as the authentic voices, shifting the problem definition toward headquarters’ susceptibility toward the

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Ugandan LGBTI activists reportedly “exaggerated” accounts of the situation for LGBTI persons in Uganda. The challenge was therefore to re-establish the embassy staff’s authority and expert status by discrediting Ugandan LGBTI CSOs and activists by measuring them against a Eurocentric model of CSOs, accustomed to speaking the language of modern bureaucracies and using quantitative measures to support their demands. A matter also of hierarchical levels imposing expectations, EU delegation and embassy staff, at least on a façade, yielded to the expectation of engaging with those most affected—Ugandan LGBTI CSOs and activists—by filtering and inviting selected groups and individuals to meetings—but always within the greater framework of human rights and never as equal partners but rather as recipients of information. The EU delegation’s problem, without having to deal with the direct pressure of the CSOs, was to reach common positions with member state embassies and for these to align their headquarters with that position. Three statements served to formally codify sense and demonstrate EU action. The sense agreed upon among diplomats in Uganda was challenged by headquarters and the sensegiving in this direction did not succeed, demonstrating how national legitimacy sources can trump EU postulates of cooperation in a situation with high attention and less opportunity to decouple. This chapter further clearly demonstrated how EU delegation and embassy staff through (re-)categorizing Uganda’s AHB/AHA and Museveni’s actions continued to justify and legitimize cooperation with the Ugandan president through their headquarters. And lastly, through cloaking the salient imperial relationships between the EU and the Ugandan president by de- and re-coupling their talk and action, both sides’ legitimacies were stabilized.

Temporary Stability Behind the EU organizational units’ efforts to mitigate frictions posed and heightened by Museveni’s signing of the AHA into force, attention by the European media and by member states’ governments lessened, to the extent the repeal of the bill through the Ugandan Supreme Court in August 2014 was hardly covered by media in the EU.109 This marked an inflection point in the units’ human rights work for Ugandan LGBTI: the 109 The conviction still lingers among EU residents interested in LGBTI issues, that Uganda introduced the death penalty.

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combination of staff settled on a collective sense and the constellation in the institutional environment, resulted in temporary stability that partially satisfied contrary demands, namely demonstrating action in face of human rights violations while ensuring the continuation of development aid. The attention-related insecurities percolating from the EU and member states’ highest levels lightened, paving the way for the topic to become refined, via the way this collective sense was made, into a technical problem, one that could be treated at the level of officers and standardized procedures, as a singular problem among others. The wicked problem, at its original core a lump of different colored yarns and pieces of materials, became organized, through the imperfect but forward-moving distilling of staff sensemaking, into a patchwork cloth, each corner thinly stretching toward different horizons of expectations. Not all the fabric has been used, not all the stitches are very strong, but, for now, it holds. “As Soon as You Have One Dead Body” With the enactment of the AHA, a major problem for the EU and its member states was to keep up the appearance of coherence, in light of what was conceived by the Ugandan government as unequal targeting, in which the EU and its constituent parts seemed to be treating Uganda differently from other countries with similar legislation [UG_EU_del_ High_PD51_1]. EU delegation and member state embassy staff addressed this critique by defining the problem in Uganda as one of individual cases of violence against LGBTI persons, rather than systemic, state-driven homophobia. The extent to which individual cases, such as the death of David Kato in 2011, had sparked diplomacy-fraying media attention, cautioned EU delegation and member state embassy staff. They feared that reporting on LGBTI-motivated violence or, especially, death110 — whether at the hands of officials or through citizens who felt legitimized

110 One high-level EU delegation staff member expresses this nervousness around the signed bill: “As soon as you have one dead body that changes everything, say a lynching” [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_1]. The problem, as defined by the EU delegation staff member, was therefore not the possible loss of life in itself but the repercussion on the EU delegation and some member state embassies’ work this might have.

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through the new law—could reignite the interest that had since considerably subsided, which could again spike pressure to stop development aid to the Ugandan government [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_1]. On-the-ground developments stressed the risk; the number of reported security incidents increased after the AHA’s enactment [UG_EU_Del_ mid_PD60]. The earlier sensemaking had lodged LGBTI issues within the human rights frame and allowed the EU delegation and member state embassy staff to integrate possible incidences of violence against LGBTI persons111 into already existing policies, structures, and programs, namely those for ‘HRD.’ As such, once the topic of LGBTI became less “explosive” in immediate work environments, the EU delegation could shift their engagement with the topic from continuous tending to an ad-hoc approach. This allowed for a reactive, rather than a proactive, approach: dealing with the topic when sporadic LGBTI-focused interest from headquarters arose or a security incident occurred (i.e., when an LGBTI person had been arrested, attacked or whose office had been broken into, etc.).112 Conveniently enough, each EU delegation across the world already has a designated staff member particularly responsible for HRD113 ; in Uganda, their remit additionally includes LGBTI issues, with their general role to assess whether a particular person qualifies as an at-risk human rights defender, according to established criteria and, subsequently, whether they are eligible for assistance from the EIDHR fund for human rights project at DEVCO (see Chapter 6). These determinations form a practical example of the EU delegation’s integration of the topic of human rights for LGBTI persons into its existing structures. The formalized authority that organizes them, essentially renders—a least, on some level—the highly political topic of human rights for LGBTI in

111 The LGBTI guidelines, in contrast to the LGBT toolkit, included a section specifically on violence. 112 Ugandan LGBTI CSOs say that other embassies are not engaged in the topic unless they are asked questions by their headquarters, or a minister is coming to visit [UG_CS_ LGBTI_High_PD64]. 113 I.e., the topic of human rights defenders (HRDs) is part of their responsibilities, and they will be referred to in case of requests from headquarters to report on the situation of HRDs or are the point of contact for HRDs who approach the delegation.

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Uganda into a more technical negotiation, with specific rules, criteria, and designated people in charge. The same process of sorting the LGBTI topic into existing structures may be observed at the EU headquarters in Brussels. There, the staff responsible for HRD (i.e., those in the EU Commission office for the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights [EIDHR] at DEVCO) are often contacted first by LGBTI people from Uganda who are in crisis for emergency funding and support. Working more closely with the funding instrument, Brussels-based staff can be more knowledgeable than EU delegation staff locally in Kampala, where human rights and LGBTI constituting only two of many topics areas for which a staff member at the delegation or embassy is responsible. The EU Comm staff members then request information from the EU delegation in Uganda who contact local CSOs to assess whether a particular request for support is genuine and to exclude any overlap in funding from other donors [UG_ CS_HR_Mid_PD49]. There are criteria used to determine whether someone qualifies as a human rights defender, which LGBTI CSOs have criticized as too limited. For example, one criterion is the individual in question be not “merely” a service provider but someone who has shown themselves to be political in their work.114 Such a criterion is reflected in the questions the responsible staff member at the Ugandan EU delegation said they use to determine whether someone qualifies for assistance: “Do you do anything to change public opinion?” and “Have you spoken to the churches?” [UG_EU_del_ mid_PD60]. The criterion of one’s public activism has been highly criticized by LGBTI CSOs due to its blindness to the local reality: LGBTI persons can be at great risk in being out (open about their sexual orientation) without being politically active, but, given this criterion, they would not qualify for the support they need. Moreover, this funding structure encourages a particular kind of activism that might not be what activists deem right or in which they want to engage but one they nonetheless engage as the only way to receive support when threatened. 114 When someone asking for support is recognized as a human rights defender at risk, the EU delegation helps with their relocation out of immediate danger where needed [UG_CS_HR_Mid_PD49]. Where the EU cannot directly fund human rights defenders, e.g., to leave their home for a while or install stronger locks or cameras, perhaps because no bank account exists, they channel funds through human rights CSO in Uganda who can further distribute funding and who make sure “that there is accountability,” i.e., to ensure the funds are spent for what they were allocated [UG_CS_HR_Mid_PD49_StM].

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When delegation and embassies are alerted to an arrest of an alleged LGBTI person—by the coalition’s security committee, for example—can push for the person’s release by speaking to the relevant Ugandan government officials. Such notification was what reportedly happened when one general human rights organization conducted a human rights defenders workshop raided by police. The organizers were accused of “having an orgy,” and several people were arrested but subsequently released after an intervention by an embassy [UG_CS_HR_Mid_PD49_StM]. As getting someone released means work for embassies, however, activists (apparently) have been told “don’t get arrested,” something they see as a discouragement to do anything because this risk is ever present [UG_ CS_LGBTI_High_PD141]. “It’s a Matter of Time” After the Ugandan constitutional court annulled the AHA in early 2014, attention on the human rights situation for LGBTI persons in Uganda— from European media, Brussels, and member state governments—waned [UG_MS_High_PD73], as the very few requests for information from headquarters on the topic since the annulation demonstrates.115 Efforts engaged by staff of the EU delegation, member state embassies, and some Ugandan LGBTI CSOs to frame the situation as a societal rather than a political problem largely contributed to this decreased interest. In categorizing the Ugandan president as rational and Uganda’s citizens as homophobic, and framing the problem of violence against LGBTI persons as a matter of individual occurrences, rather than systemic violence perpetrated through legislation, such as the AHA, and the government’s rhetoric, the EU delegation and member state embassies turned the topic of human rights for LGBTI persons into one that punctures an equilibrium—one that only has to be dealt with when it appears acutely and does not require systematic, strategic addressal. In other words, in managing to reduce the political intensity of the topic and therefore the hierarchical level at which it is addressed (i.e., the Ugandan Government and EU-side

115 “It’s much quieter now on that topic” [UG_MS_High_PD61] a member state embassy staff member explains. A high-level staff member of a Ugandan LGBTI CSO agrees that with the AHA annulled, the delegation’s and embassies’ “interest is now totally gone” [UG_LGBTI_CS_High_PD64]. They predict that “if the law comes back, the interest will come back.”

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headquarters), the topic is no longer an existential threat that requires continuous attention. It can then be addressed with officer-level, ad-hoc, through pre-existing procedures in response to specific incidences. Moreover, in framing the issue at hand as a societal problem rather than a political one—presuming Ugandan citizens, rather than the Ugandan government, to be the perpetrators of violence—the EU delegation and member state embassies shift the onus for conceiving of a “solution” from themselves to the populace itself. Social change—with regard to this particular case—is portrayed as best achieved without EU intervention, whereby the direction of change is taken-for-granted as moving toward a “Western” model as the ideal.116 Indeed, as a mid-level staff member responsible at the EU delegation for the topic of LGBTI and who has a Ugandan partner opines that change on human rights for LGBTI “should come from within” Ugandan society [UG_EU_del_mid_ PD60]. This stance becomes further emboldened in light of the colonial heritage of Uganda’s antigay legislation, a legacy that threatens to stain further interference by the EU as devoid of legitimacy, which, although ignoring that development aid is qua definition interference in domestic affairs of another country, distinguishes LGBTI-centric interference by the EU from other social issues considered standard areas of development aid, such as child labor, women’s rights, anticorruption measures, etc. In transferring the onus for realizing proactive change for LGBTI, to Ugandan society itself, the EU delegation and member state embassies defined a new “problem”: namely, to keep the local environment primed for the change they sought but without the legitimacy breach of openly applying coercive measures. For staff, this meant, in practice, keeping LGBTI out of public debate’ in such a way to subdue stunting increases of media attention to the local situation because “with silent pressure, if the constituency is demanding [that the topic is addressed], you can always say it’s been talked about” [UG_MS_High_PD65]. Staff 116 The desired societal change on the Ugandan LGBTI front, to put this in specific terms, is understood to be slow and gradual and hard to be externally directed. Member state embassies and LGBTI CSOs take the “West” as the blueprint for how this change happens; one Ugandan LGBTI CSO activist, for instance, in comparing the LGBTI movement in their country to the women’s movement in the ‘West,’ sees the former’s realization of change as only “a matter of time” [UG_CS_LGBTI_High_PD64]. With this, certain Ugandan LGBTI CSOs concur with the EU delegation and EU member state embassies reiteration that “taking it slow is better” [UG_MS_High_PD61].

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could satisfy different demands through a quiet diplomacy approach, in which Europe’s LGBTI-related concerns apropos Uganda would only be (supposedly) addressed behind closed doors versus public statements [UG_MS_High_PD65, UG_EU_del_Mid_PD60]. The merit of this approach lay in its ability to prevent close public scrutiny at the same time as following the expectations of Museveni, who, as one EU delegation staff member from the LGBTI-responsible operational section explains, “like[d] it better if [staff] raise[d] something with him directly and talk[ed]” [UG_EU_del_mid_PD60]—with further appeal found in the avenues it gave the EU delegation to pass on critique on the Ugandan government’s treatment of LGBTI persons and issues (e.g., in private meetings, where says the same staff member, “we deliver[ed] the message we ha[d] to deliver” [UG_EU_del_mid_PD60].117 In sum, and under the problem-solving orientation of quiet diplomacy, the topic of human rights for Ugandan LGBTI persons is not considered part of the actual day-to-day work of staff from the EU delegation and a number of member state embassies but rather something that is dealt with on an ad-hoc basis, when it threatens areas of core organizational aims, such as development aid or when a particular staff member deems the issue important.118 EU delegation staff monitor the situation to be able to react in case of another threat of the achieved equilibrium but are not proactive. A high-level staff member of the EU delegation explains: “At the moment we are paying careful attention. If the bill came back, all our work would be impacted” [UG_EU_del_High_PD71_1]. Subsequently, several new bills were announced (one in December 2014) but for a number of years, the established equilibrium was stable until the bill leading to the 2023 act was introduced into parliament.

117 I.e., they meet the expectation of headquarters to address the topic with the government without any consequence for development aid—for either the Ugandan government or the EU delegation. 118 LGBTI CSOs value the support some individual diplomats provide ad-hoc but also strive for a more consistent and institutionalized way of engagement with the delegation and member states: “We will find a better and more consistent way of working with the embassies so that when one person leaves…” [UG_LGBTI_CS_High_PD64].

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“They Are Never for Crisis” One might presume the complexity of problem definitions necessitating the balance of partly contradicting expectations to remain legitimate would push the EU delegation and member state embassy staff to turn to the LGBTI toolkit or guidelines for concrete direction—or more specifically, to translate the documents’ general frameworks of LGBTI policy to the context in Uganda to guide tangible action. Instead, most member state embassy staff are either entirely ignorant of the LGBTI guidelines’ existence or, to the extent they are aware, are dismissive of the guidelines’ usefulness to their work.119 One reason for the former lies in the guidelines’ lack of emphatic dissemination by the EU delegation and member states’ headquarters—a phenomenon that supports the empirical claim that human rights for LGBTI’s is regarded as a secondary (i.e., side-lined) topic by EU organizational staff, addressed only for the attention it was given at headquarters.120 In the case of the latter, motive appears to lie in the general skepticism staff have for policy considered an important action in Brussels (e.g., the guidelines), which they see as talk—decoupled from their actual doing—with little applicability to the local context and next-to-no utility within their daily work also due to the time lag.121

119 To quote two EU officials on these points: A high-level diplomat asked, when posed a question about the LGBTI guidelines, “Which ones?” [UG_MS_High_PD65_ JoD], with a deputy ambassador with the human rights brief characterizing further: “The EU guidelines, if they exist, they’ve not been used” [UG_MS_High_PD73]. In the staff view, the LGBTI guidelines are neither useful as a wide EU directive (to which, one high-level delegation staff member’s noting of the document’s absence from their desk when assuming their position attests), nor specific enough to be useful in a situation of crisis they faced in Uganda [UG_EU_del_Senior_PD51-1]. A high-level EU delegation staff member explains that guidelines are not for crisis because then there is no time to consult them, and each crisis is unique and guidelines therefore too general [UG_EU_ del_High_PD51_1]. 120 An embassy staff member responsible for LGBTI issues in Uganda that “Before coming here I had heard of the EU toolbox, and it was promoted in Brussels and our Ministry, but I’ve never seen it here. [The] EU never said: let’s look at the toolbox” [UG_MS_High_PD72]. 121 Given that the negotiation and work they require means by the time they are

agreed upon, they are out of date. To cast this in the words of one high-level member state diplomat: “When it is a dossier in Brussels, it’s already out of date here. We said to them—we won’t sign anything that’s already out of date. It takes a lot of work to vote on a human rights paper. It’s very cumbersome, always too late, no one looks at it ever again and it distracts from the daily work” [UG_MS_High_PD65].

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Accordingly, the EU guidelines are not considered to be of great utility and staff of some member state embassies either circumvent the abstract EU guidelines in preference of their own national policy and even LGBTI guidelines, as they are chiefly answerable to, and derive their legitimacy for action primarily from, their own governments or claim they use both—national and EU policy [UG_MS_Mid_local_PD63]. Moreover, in consulting EU and international frameworks to organize local action, diplomats, in any case, appear to generally favor their reference to general human rights policy over policy particular to LGBTI persons—for example, the EU’s 2008 Human Rights Defender Guidelines, which carry a country-specific implementation strategy for Uganda122 and are similar to the UN HRD Guidelines.123 A particular implementation strategy in this case represents a ready-made translation of highly abstract but also highly legitimate UN guidelines first into an EU policy and then Uganda-specific context—which may thus explain its privileging. While not specifically on LGBTI, member state embassy staff say these guidelines can be applied to LGBTI persons who are HRD,124 an example thus of the way the issue of human rights for LGBTI has been created to fit within existing policies, strategies, and programs.

122 A mid-level EU delegation staff member says: “We also have specific EU guidelines on Human Rights Defenders on Uganda and LGBTI is part of it. Not all countries have that. And of course, then there is the Country Strategy with broad categories and nonspecific on LGBTI, but it can be covered under the categories” [UG_EU_del_Mid_ PD60]. 123 One embassy staff member discloses that they “reference more the UN documents rather than the EU documents. And we have a broader discussion on values etc.” [UG_ MS_Senior_PD73]. 124 This document, the Local Implementation Strategy on the HRD guidelines is directed at EU member state embassies in Uganda plus Norway as they are organized in the Human Rights Working Group of development partners in the capital Kampala which reports to the forum of Partners on Good Governance and Democracy. This short three-page document outlines what the EU HRD guidelines are, what the definition of HRD is and then lists suggested actions for supporting HRD in Uganda. The bullet point actions are listed under three headlines: (A) Monitoring, reporting, and assessment, (B) Support and protection of HRDs, (C) Promotion of HRDs work in multilateral and regional fora. It stipulates that consequences should be considered before any action is taken. It furthermore states that the approach should be “tailored to the case at hand” and that the EU Member state embassies should seek advice from local and international HRDs regarding appropriateness of action (European Union Delegation Uganda, n.d.). The document also includes a short annex of further materials and lists of HRD organizations where one organization on LGBTI is listed.

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Guidelines on the Guidelines The above criticisms notwithstanding, the experiential and political complexities particular to the Ugandan situation, on the heels of the AHA’s threatening of EU/Uganda arrangements of development aid, ultimately fostered the Brussels-led creation125 of a policy document, more general and specific at the same time, to serve as a base for EU action in Uganda: the non-public EEAS internal guidelines on the LGBTI guidelines for the African region. Published in 2014, this document not only embodies a translation of the LGBTI guidelines into an imaginary “African” context but also legitimizes ex-post the EU’s continued cooperation with the Ugandan government in the aftermath of the AHA. Moreover, as an internal rather than public policy, the African LGBTI guidelines constitute a tangible realization of quiet diplomacy that circumvents CSO scrutiny. In stressing the importance of basing the EU’s and its constituents’ local action within a case-by-case approach, this policy casts a wide net of legitimacy to specific response frameworks— with any response on the table—and grants cover to the EU’s in-country stakeholders to evade the topic of LGBTI so long as they make the case that such evasion constitutes the best “strategy” in an “African” domestic context where the topic is highly contested—a context where, so it could be argued, intervention would be most important as human rights of LGBTI persons and their lives are most at risk.

Summary and Preliminary Analysis This chapter traces the EU delegation and member state embassy staff in Uganda who did not notice human rights for Ugandan LGBTI persons as a relevant EU topic and thus within their remit, which shifted when the matter—inspired by the AHB’s notoriety—received attention in Europe and was relayed through the EEAS and EU Comm in Brussels and member states’ headquarters. The topic of human rights for LGBTI persons turned into a question of defining what human rights entail and the expectation in countries providing development aid to the Ugandan government and with high levels of legislative protection of LGBTI was to 125 The EU delegation had not contributed to the drafting of the LGBTI guidelines but in this case, the experiences of the Ugandan EU delegation’s staff members with the Ugandan government over the AHA informed the EEAS’s geographical section’s drafting of the EU’s African LGBTI guidelines [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_1].

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discontinue this as a form of sanctioning deviance from what is perceived nationally as appropriate. This pressure to discontinue aid turned the topic into a priority and was passed on to the embassies in Uganda. Similarly, the EU, due to much of its legitimacy being based on being perceived as normative with the EU Parl having formulated clear expectations, was in a situation where it risked being regarded as engaging in hypocrisy and thus losing its legitimacy vis-à-vis a strong EU civil society if regarded as inactive in face of legislation which so clearly contravened its founding values. The topic’s novel urgency, whose address constituted a diplomatic minefield, both compounded and drew out the topic’s inherent wickedness: it initially disrupted the work routines of the EU delegation and member state embassies, threatened the stakes on which their legitimacy stood, and imperiled their two existential tasks: the distribution of development aid and the entertaining of good relations with the Ugandan government. Yet, the topic was made sense of within everyday doing and seamlessly incorporated. These developments, engaging the EU and some of its member states’ highest levels of diplomat, turned the topic political and heightened attention and from “Western” media outlets, resulting in heavy scrutiny from Brussels, and several member state headquarters, which so imposed on staff response frameworks that staff, in turn, came to define this heightened attention as their main problem to address. Their dealing with the problem, amidst contradicting horizons of expectations, required the process of sensemaking. As part of this sensemaking process, staff—to attenuate activist tensionstoking vis-à-vis headquarters and the Ugandan government, to privilege their own voices as the “experts” apropos the situation at hand, and to ultimately draw from a less polarizing, more credible source to base subsequent action—filtered who was to inform their sensemaking, in approaching general human rights organizations for pertinent data rather than LGBTI CSOs. Staff then categorized and classified through positing Museveni as a rational partner against the backdrop of irrational homophobic Ugandan citizens, thereby linking to larger frames of modernity. Positing Museveni as rational justified continued relations with the president—a precondition for achieving the organizational aims of diplomatic ties and distributing the allocated development aid. To further distill their problem’s practical complexities and orient their local response from a stronger point of negotiation, they also decoupled particular policy areas from others—using, for instance, a statement to stress domestic

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continuance of HIV/AIDS programs even with the AHA’s (potential) implementation. This is an instance which makes tangibly evident the EU’s expectation of the Ugandan government to keep their talk and action free of decoupling regarding promises made to them but simultaneously ask them to decouple the two vis-à-vis its citizens by not implementing the AHA. The explanation for this differing expectation is the assumption of a power differential in favor of the EU as the donor and its according assumed ability to dictate the terms. The glocalization axes of time, nested levels, and culture serve as dimensions that permeate context in a globalized world in this part of the case study. The previous sections show that with time, an initial scramble for sense became more solidified as EU delegation and member state embassy staff in Uganda agreed on the attention as one main problem. This sense diplomats in Uganda had agreed on was not in all cases accepted at their headquarters as diplomats thereby engaged in a meaning-making competition with CSOs. It is apparent that general frames with existing projects are linked to, such as the human rights defender guidelines. In terms of culture, understood as bundles of institutions forming a particular context, it becomes obvious that context must be further specified regarding translation theory. Whatever forms a staff members’ particular local context is not easy to determine. The organizational task appears to be most influential in directing sensemaking—i.e., the continuation of development aid—leading to larger metaframes like modernity and also values being bent to fit this sense. Regarding different levels, the more attention the higher the hierarchical level and the more politicized a topic. Since higher-level staff members’ sources of legitimacy differ, the horizons of expectation differ. Since greater attention leads to closer coupling, the aim becomes to lessen attention to allow for more flexibility and a technical approach to the topic by adopting an off-the-shelf program and linking LGBTI to it, thereby striking a balance of being active but not provoking the Ugandan government.

Literature Auswärtiges Amt. (2013, July 1). Common Foreign and Security Policy. http:// www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Europa/Aussenpolitik/GASP/InstrumenteG ASP_node.html. Accessed 21 August 2017.

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Bombastic Magazine Issue #1 Online Edition. (n.d.). Kuchu Times. https:// www.kuchutimes.com/bombastic-magazine-online-edition/. Accessed 24 May 2020. Carbone, M. (2017). The European Union and International Development. In International Relations and the European Union (3rd ed., pp. 292–315). Oxford University Press. Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. (1995). https://statehouse.go.ug/ sites/default/files/attachments/Constitution_1995.pdf Council of the European Union. (2012). Council Conclusions on the Roots of Democracy and Sustainable Development: Europe’s Engagement with Civil Society in External Relations. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/132870.pdf EEAS. (2014). Declaration by the High Representative on Behalf of the European Union Concerning the Ugandan Anti-Homosexuality Act. (OR. en). http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressd ata/en/cfsp/141310.pdf. Accessed 5 April 2014. European Commission. (2010). Cotonou Agreement (revised and consolidated). Pub. L. No. 22000A1215(01). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02000A1215%2801%29-20100622&qid=160 7806110226. Accessed 2 April 2014. European External Action Service EEAS. (2013). Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the Adoption of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill in Uganda. Pub. L. No. 131220/05. European Union Delegation Uganda. (n.d.). Local Implementation Strategy [sic] for the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders Uganda. http://www.kam pala.diplo.de/contentblob/3035188/Daten/1147491/downloaddatei_poli tics_HRD_EULocalImplementation_1101.pdf. Accessed 6 September 2017. Fundamental Rights Agency. (2020, April 30). Does Hope or Fear Prevail Among Europe’s LGBTI People? European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. https://fra.europa.eu/en/news/2020/does-hope-or-fear-pre vail-among-europes-lgbti-people. Accessed 27 July 2020. Gosine, A. (2015). Rescue, and Real Love: Same-sex Desire in International Development. Institute of Development Studies. Griffiths, J. (2003). The Social Working of Legal Rules. The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 35(48), 1–84. https://doi.org/10.1080/073 29113.2003.10756567 Hammond, N., Kan, L. M., & Maulbeck, B. F. (2014). 2013–2014 Global Resources Report : Government and Philanthropic Support for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex Communities. June 2016: Funders for LGBTIQ Issues and Global Philanthrophy Project. http://www.lgbtfunders. org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/2013-2014_Global_Resources_Report. pdf. Accessed 17 December 2017.

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Human Rights Watch. (2019, October 15). Uganda: Brutal Killing of Gay Activist. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/15/ uganda-brutal-killing-gay-activist. Accessed 26 May 2020 Jjuuko, A., & Tabengwa, M. (2018). Expanded criminalisation of consensual same-sex relations in Africa: Contextualising recent developments. In N. Nicol, A. Jjuuko, R. Lusimbo, N. J. Mulé, S. Ursel, A. Wahab, & P. Waugh (Eds.), Envisioning Global LGBT Human Rights. (Neo)colonialism, Neoliberalism, Resistance and Hope (pp. 63–96). University of London Press. https:// doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv5132j6 Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Cornell University Press. Melgar, N., Rossi, M., & Smith, T. W. (2010). The Perception of Corruption. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 22(1), 120–131. https:// doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edp058 Noak, R. (2019, July 20). Polish Cities and Provinces Declare ‘LGBT-Free Zones’ as Government Ramps Up ‘Hate Speech.’ The Independent. https:// www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/poland-lgbt-free-zones-hom ophobia-hate-speech-law-justice-party-a9013551.html. Accessed 4 April 2020. Onazi, O. (2013). Good Governance as a Metaphor for Development. In Human Rights from Community (pp. 69–94). Edinburgh University Press. Accessed 27 May 2020. Otu, K. E. (2017). LGBT Human Rights Expeditions in Homophobic Safaris: Racialized Neoliberalism and Post-Traumatic White Disorder in the BBC’s The World’s Worst Place to Be Gay. Critical Ethnic Studies, 3(2), 126–150. https://doi.org/10.5749/jcritethnstud.3.2.0126 President Museveni’s full speech at signing of Anti-Homosexuality Bill. (2014, February 24). Daily Monitor. http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/ Museveni-s-Anti-Homosexuality-speech/688334-2219956-4xafil/index. html. Accessed 21 August 2017. Public Statement by Diplomats from the European Union, U.S., Canada, Australia, Norway and Iceland in Uganda, § Australia. (2014). https://www. gov.uk/government/news/british-high-commissioner-signs-public-statementagainst-anti-homosexuality-act. Accessed 21 May 2020. Rainer, E. C. (2021). From Pariah to Priority How LGBTI Rights Became a Pillar of American and Swedish Foreign Policy. State University of New York Press. http://erf.sbb.spk-berlin.de/han/872773256/ebookcentral.proquest. com/lib/staatsbibliothek-berlin/detail.action?docID=6730408 Rao, R. (2020). Out of Time: The Queer Politics of Postcoloniality. Oxford University Press. Regeringskansliet, R. (2017, October 30). Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy—Examples from Three Years Of Implementation. Regeringskansliet.

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Text. http://www.government.se/information-material/2017/10/swedensfeminist-foreign-policy--examples-from-three-years-of-implementation/ Swedish Ministry of Employment. (2013). Factsheet: Equal Rights and Opportunities Regardless of Sexual Orientation, Transgender Identity or Expression. Stockholm. http://www.government.se/49b72d/contentassets/5970b8ef2 b714759a7c123ee12023da8/equal-rights-and-opportunities-regardless-ofsexual-orientation-or-transgender-identity-or-expression-fact-sheet. Accessed 16 December 2017. The World’s Worst Place to Be Gay? (2011). BBC Three. http://www.bbc.co.uk/ programmes/b00yrt1c. Accessed 14 April 2017. Walker, S. (2020, May 19). Hungary Votes to End Legal Recognition of Trans People. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/ 19/hungary-votes-to-end-legal-recognition-of-trans-people. Accessed 26 May 2020 What is DGF? | Democratic Governance Facility. (n.d.). Democratic Governance Facility. https://www.dgf.ug/page/what-dgf. Accessed 20 July 2020. What is Sexual Minorities Uganda? (n.d.). Sexual Minorities Uganda (SMUG). https://sexualminoritiesuganda.com/mission-and-team/. Accessed 24 May 2020.

CHAPTER 10

Conclusion

This book started out from the empirical puzzle of the EU as a public administration promoting human rights for LGBTI persons in Uganda. The 2023 anti-homosexuality act in Uganda (and similar legislation under consideration in other countries such as Kenya), increasingly right-wing governments in EU member states paired with skepticism toward human rights and strong anti- “West”-rhetoric in a number of former colonial countries given new options to align with Russia and/or China leave no doubt regarding the ongoing relevance of the questions regarding the wicked problems this book addresses. This book conceptualizes the situation of the EU promoting human rights for LGBTI in Uganda during the time period of 2009–2017 as a wicked problem. The problem is wicked because the situation is characterized by the complexity of the EU as a public administration, the uncertainty of what human rights for LGBTI people entail and an ambiguity regarding the legitimacy of an intervention or non-intervention. This approach shifts the focus to the process of the problem definition. The reason for this research angle is the conviction that the problem definition already presupposes the solution which makes it vital to gain a better understand of the building blocks this definition is based on. An understanding of how knowledge is created, on which basis and resulting from which negotiations a problem is formulated, makes it possible to address underlying structural issues. In this book, I therefore set out to understand the everyday practice and sensemaking of EU staff and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. Malmedie, EU Promotion of Human Rights for LGBTI Persons in Uganda, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45826-2_10

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EU member states embassy staff in dealing with a problem of particular wickedness. In doing so, this book addresses several questions around how public administrations deal with wicked problems, how contested ideas can become institutionalized and how an idea is translated and made sense of across time, nested levels and cultural boundaries. The answers to these questions provide insights for wicked problem research as well as the concepts of translation and contested institutional change. This book therefore prompts interesting avenues for further research first and foremost for the field of sociological new institutionalism and public administration research but also for research on practice in international relations and EU studies and for studies on human rights and gender and sexuality topics.

Organizing a Wicked Problem Public administrations, as this book’s empirical case illustrates, despite being widely regarded as unfit to deal with wicked problems in times of modernity, are already doing so. Taking seriously an aspect that had been neglected in wicked problem research, this book focuses on the process of problem definition as a form of sensemaking at microlevel. This sensemaking takes the form of filtering, categorizing, and breaking the problem into parts that are then coupled with pre-existing programs and policies. EU staff and member state embassy staff therefore organize the wicked problem in their everyday work, making it manageable. In Brussels, at the EEAS and DEVCO, the problem definition initially highly depended on an individual’s ability as well as their position to label the topic and to link LGBT to more abstract frames, including human rights, closely connected to the EU’s organizational identity. Once attached, this link required justification, external promotion, and internal promotion to the EU through multiple organizational entities. Internally, the problem definition was and continues to be dependent on immediate organizational entities’ identities and tasks, which are aligned with the metaframe of modernity and its associated expectations, namely, rationality and effectiveness. In Uganda, at the EU delegation and member states’ embassies, the driver for staffs’ problem definitions is not the topic itself but the primary aim to retain legitimacy for the organizational entity as a whole—to ensure continued development aid. Accordingly, the problem definition is aligned with arguments that ensure legitimacy for continued engagement

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with the Ugandan government—a perceived precondition for continuing development aid in the patrimonial form. At the same time, underlying imperial institutions, revealing perceived power imbalances between donor and recipient, surface and reveal the EU and member state embassies staff’s expectation that Ugandan President Museveni will use his power to change legislation accordingly. This pressure is only applied informally, reminiscent of indirect rule during colonialism. While indirect rule at the time of colonialism was regarded as an efficient way to exercise control, this form of dominance of one country over another is no longer legitimate in the “Western” notion of modernity, and the EU could no longer overtly coerce President Museveni into changing legislation on LGBTI issues. Such open pressure would jeopardize the legitimacy of the Ugandan president and of the EU. This finding therefore confirms the importance of the “Western” notion of modernity as a powerful myth, yet as one whose meaning is being (re-)negotiated and is closely tied to tacit power structures similar to those during colonial times but which have to be denied to be upheld. The book therefore shows that the way in which this organizing of a wicked problem takes place is highly contingent on the local context consisting of institutions understood to be formal (organizational) structures, taken-for-granted scripts, and tacit knowledge. Based on this tacit knowledge, staff make sense by initially filtering specific aspects that appear relevant based on their own socialization and aims of the organizational unit of which they are a part. Some aspects are then categorized and linked to other institutions in the form of pre-existing programs and policies, while other aspects are delinked. This generated sense is promoted widely for increased legitimacy. Underlying this sensemaking process are salient power structures based on legitimacy and understood as relational, rather than absolute structures of authority. They play an important role as institutions on the macro-level influence local sensemaking and re-embedding of ideas, but they do not dictate or control them. These findings have major implications in that they show addressing wicked problems does not require redesigning organizations. Such wicked problems are already organized and addressed in everyday doing and within the formal structures of organizations through sensemaking with pre-existing “solutions.” These pre-existing solutions, however, turn out to be partial and provisional, are modified along the way, and are made workable. It further implies that if staff can tackle a problem at microlevel

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like the one addressed in this study—a highly wicked problem due to its highly emotional components—problems that are “less” wicked can also be handled. For wicked problem research, this book shows that starting from the evaluation of solutions is a futile endeavor because such approaches ignore the nature of wicked problems and attempts to conceptualize them as a priori and static when they are the opposite—with no beginning and ever evolving. Any study of wicked problems must therefore use a more constructivist and process-oriented approach, and should focus, as this book did, on the problem definition itself. The framework of this exploration could be applied to other wicked problems, for example, the way public administrations have dealt with the COVID-19 pandemic, which strongly supports the claim here that the problem is being organized and made manageable in everyday doing. The problem definition clearly drives the responses and different horizons of expectations—for example, concerning public health, economy, and children’s rights—that determine measures, which also continue to be negotiated. Regarding the study of a situation which spans different levels, the conceptualization as a wicked problem proves to be a useful avenue. In placing the EU as the central research subject, this study contributes to a growing, but still lacking, body of organizational research with a focus on intergovernmental and international organizations. This book therefore highlights the intersection of public administration studies and international relations. Focusing on the problem’s definition, rather than its “solution,” and by conceptualizing staff’s turning such a problem manageable as a process of translation and organizing, enables a more thorough understanding of how public administrations deal with wicked problems as well as to explain contested institutional change.

Explaining Contested Institutional Change A highly contested topic, human rights for LGBTI persons, became part of EU foreign policy through a combination of factors internal and external to the EU as an organization and developments at global (e.g., the UN) and local (e.g., Uganda) levels, as this book shows. This incorporation was the result of a unique constellation in which LGBT issues were first linked to human rights and then became incorporated into EU foreign policy. These findings challenge a perspective common in normative and positivist literature: that such change is based on long-standing

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strategic planning and management as well as powerful actors. Instead, this book supports the thesis that specific institutions combined with the abilities of individuals to make links at the microlevel can lead to macro changes. Contrary to some scholars’ proclamations (e.g., Fligstein, 2001; Greenwood et al., 2013; Jacobs, 2010), institutional change therefore does not happen as a response to external changes. Such external changes do not exist a priori or independently of those who perceive them as the EU delegation and member-states staff’s obliviousness to homophobic statements by Ugandan politicians demonstrates. Only when recognized as an issue and a link enabled through prior socialization in combination with other factors is forged, change occurs. Individual’s strategic choices matter less than commonly assumed in much of organizational and political science literature and any study focusing only on formal decisions and external events falls short of capturing the full picture. In addition, this book demonstrates that just because initial change had occurred and the topic of human rights for LGBTI persons had formally become part of EU’s foreign policy, the meaning for staff’s everyday work continues to be negotiated at microlevel, challenging the notion of simple implementation of policy and instead highlighting ongoing translation. These findings contribute to a richer understanding of institutionalization processes and, more specifically, provide insights into the institutional change process prior to institutionalization (i.e., before an interpretation becomes accepted as self-evident or is taken for granted), referred to as protoinstitutionalization (Oberg et al., 2014). During protoinstitutionalization a new idea is re-embedded into a particular environment and starts an institutional change process, where meaning and knowledge are created, which then may solidify and gain legitimacy. Several interpretations compete during this time, as evident from the case discussed in this book. This book further details how a particular sense gains legitimacy when multiple actors accept it as appropriate and then promote their interpretation to gain legitimacy more widely. One practical implication concerns staff recruitment and posting because their background and tacit knowledge play an important role in whether and how a new and contested topic is embedded into the local context. Therefore, staff selection and who is posted and placed in which position with which background knowledge—while not all determining because many more factors influence the overall situation—matters. The ongoing translation suggests that such placements matter continuously as

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links require repeated reinforcement and enactment. Since organizational research takes structural aspects into account, this book demonstrates the enormous value of organizational and public administration research for international relations and EU studies. Disregarding these aspects and focusing only on the political sphere and strategy neglects major factors influencing the social reality.

A Better Grasp of Context This book contributes to the understanding of how ideas travel, by offering “multi-level explanations that account for recursive influences” of the local and global—studies which remain scarce (Powell & Colyvas, 2013, p. 278). In addition, this book takes the process of globalization into account as demanded by translation scholars (Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996, p. 11). Providing an application of the dimensions of glocalization relevant in modernity, i.e., time, cultural context, and nested hierarchical levels, this book takes account of these highly interwoven dimensions and as such ensures the research subject is considered in its full complexity as demanded by Drori et al. (2014). The book’s empirical case shows how an idea travels, lands and is made sense of at the local level. Everyday practice influences, and is, influenced, apart from individual’s tacit knowledge, also by abstract global concepts—a sensemaking process based on organizational aims and institutions reaching back to colonial times. This book, therefore, suggests a way to study the reciprocal influence between organizations and the institutional context taking seriously a so-far neglected aspect in wicked problem research: the process of problem definition. Such a focus on the problem definition requires taking the, in much of translation literature so far underspecified, concept of local context into account. In analyzing how the Uganda-based EU delegation and embassy staff’s sensemaking and re-embedding differed from that of Brussels and capitalbased staff, this book suggests the local context is constituted by the immediate (geographic) environment and the organizational setting, with the former taking precedence, unless there is heightened attention on the topic by headquarters. In addition to the geographic proximity’s impact on sensemaking, this case shows how a perceived power relationship determines this process. For example, CSOs’ demands in Uganda were ignored by the EU and member states until this practice was no longer legitimate, due to institutional shifts that gave more weight to “authentic

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voices” of people affected compared to policy experts. This interlinking between sensemaking and power warrants further research. Similar to the garbage can model of organizational choice (Cohen et al., 1972), which suggests continuous streams of problems and solutions are matched with each other (a process dependent on what is available at any particular point of time, the allocation of energy, and the linkages between the streams), staff members’ definitions of a problem’s presupposed solution is closely oriented to what is considered the main task of the organizational entity and is affected by the attention on the topic. The novel aspect this book contributes is the notion that, what is “around and available” depends on the staff member in question and the organization in a particular time and place. Rittel and Webber (1973) noted regarding wicked problems that once a “solution” is defined, and it needs to be justified as the “right” one by public administrators. The very definition of what is “right” and what is “wrong” is central when it comes to responses. This book suggests the definition is highly dependent on the immediate organizational context and more specifically the organizational aims. The organizational aims are therefore influential in determining what this time and place constitutes. Put differently, the aims of the staff members’ organizational unit, more than the national and cultural context they are situated in, formal hierarchical structures and the greater organizational context, influence the sensemaking. The closer the organizational context, the more powerful it is.

Attention Hindering Decoupling Just because a particular idea has crystalized into policy, its meaning is not fixed and continues to be contested. One way to deal with such contestation as suggested by the literature is by decoupling which can take place between organizational units on the same level, between different levels, between talk and action. I show in this book that under the conditions of high attention contradicting demands cannot simply be handled by decoupling. Diverging from Orton and Weick’s (1990, p. 217) suggestion, attention does not compensate for the direct effects of loose coupling. For decoupling to be possible, attention first needs to be reduced. One way to achieve this is by rendering the topic from highly politicized into a technical one by connecting it to the metaframe

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of modernity through reference to effectiveness and rationality and categorizing it into legitimate and less legitimate knowledge. This process constitutes the actors as the rightful interpreters, while it delegitimizes others and forms of knowledge declared as less abstract and rational but rather emotional and subjective. This ascription of what and who is considered rational and effective changes over time and is used to justify existing routines, programs, and partnerships. This book therefore adds further nuance to literature on how a highly contested topic receiving high levels of attention is rendered technical and thereby less political (Murray Li, 2007). This book offers a novel way to research politics and policies of countries regarded as “developed” in the “Global North” intersecting with the EU and the setting of a country of the “Global South” which has been categorized as “developing.” Prompted by assumptions of modern bureaucracy’s superiority, Max Weber regarded the spread of increased rationalization and bureaucratization as inevitable and prophesized that modern bureaucracy as organizational forms would increasingly penetrate all spheres of social life (Kruse & Barrelmeyer, 2012, p. 124) and that these interrelated phenomena—rationalization, and with it, bureaucratization—would spread geographically from the so-called West to other parts of the world. He also predicted forms of rationalization and bureaucracy would replace “premodern” ways of societal organizing centered on personal authority of a ruler who derives power from traditional status. Weber defined patrimonialism in opposition to a modern bureaucracy and state characterized by rationalization and abstraction and written legal rules and regulations (Charrad & Adams, 2011, p. 8; Kruse & Barrelmeyer, 2012, p. 114). This book’s case-study shows that such clear distinction becomes destabilized as soon as rationality itself is demasked as a myth of modernity. This is evident in the EU’s response to Museveni’s attempt to legitimize the AHA through “scientific” proof. The EU’s answer reveals the underlying assumption that the power of definition over what is “modern” remains with the bureaucracies of the donor countries of the Global North, regardless of whether the means contradict this notion of a modern democracy, namely threats used to will changes overruling a national legal system and bureaucratic structures of a sovereign country. The EU and its delegations therefore displayed patrimonialism in their claim to “traditional” authority over Uganda. This finding highlights the importance of not taking the metaframe of modernity for granted and

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to regard it as one powerful institution used to legitimize and delegitimize particular definitions.

Further Research This book contributes to additional fields of literature including international relations and EU Studies, raising new questions in these areas as well. For example, this book adds further nuance to scholarly understanding of the interplay between public administrations and CSOs by explaining a reverse boomerang effect. The so-called boomerang effect describes the way social movements circumvent blockages with their national government by applying pressure through the international arena. The reverse boomerang effect shows that organizational units of public administrations circumvent their headquarters by directly addressing international CSOs to try reduce the organizations’ pressure on national governments. The central agent is a public administration rather than a CSO and rather than building pressure on governments, concerns relieving pressure. This phenomenon of the reverse boomerang effect adds an important and so far under-researched perspective to the branch of international relations literature concerned with traveling norms and the role of CSOs (e.g., Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Liese, 2006). The practice turn in international relations, and especially the critical strand, is oriented toward sociological theories and therefore contributes to bridging the gap between the disciplines (Cornut, 2015). This book offers an approach from the other end by firstly referring to sociological frameworks and concepts and secondly connecting these with a research topic traditionally associated more with international relations. This generates interesting linkages with practice research in political science and EU studies which could be explored further. For example, the book’s finding regarding the importance of attention as well as the practice of organizing a wicked problem to make it manageable strongly resonate with the notion of (in)visibility and anti-political theory and practice regarding international practice theory by Austin and Leander (2022). Another interesting topic worth exploring further on the topic of human rights is the way in which they are integrated with development cooperation, for example, in EU policy, despite different logics: human rights based on the principle of equality, legality and the value of the individual and development cooperation necessitated by and based on

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continuous inequality and often large-scale statistic-based interventions. The former provides the latter with continued legitimacy, masking the colonial origins of aid. As human rights become more integrated into development politics and equality is formally given greater emphasis, the terminology has changed from development aid to development cooperation. In 2021, the EU Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) was renamed DG International Partnerships (DG INTPA)—further suggesting a relationship between the EU and Third countries as equals. An exploration of how EU staff perceive this described shift and whether it remains a façade or impacts how people relate to counterparts would be an interesting avenue for future studies. Apart from the already mentioned further investigation into the influence of the immediate organizational context on sensemaking, this also includes empirical questions on the topic of LGBTI human rights. In light of latest developments in Uganda and considering the ongoing process of translation, prominent questions concern the way EU delegation staff and member state embassy staff dealt with and are still dealing with the 2023 Ugandan AHA in comparison with the previous legislative process. Further research could include a comparative analysis of national context, i.e., another case of EU member state and delegation staff dealing with the promotion of human rights for LGBTI persons, for example, in Kenya. Such a study would be able to further qualify the identified factors of immediate organizational aims and staff’s socialization and tacit knowledge as the main drivers of their sensemaking in a context with a different (historic) relationship between the EU and a third country. On the topic of EU and LGBTI policy generally, one puzzle for future studies is how EU Comm’s LGBTIQ Equality Strategy for the years 2020 until 2024 (European Commission, 2020) was conceived, given the ever greater polarization around LGBTI issues and rule of law among member states and how in the process, the LGBTI acronym got extended to LGBTIQ in the current strategy document. Further research studies might investigate the interplay between the EU’s foreign policy and this strategy and the extent to which the former “necessitated” the latter to ensure continued legitimacy—i.e., foreign policy pushing internal policy, as was also suggested by this book. Another question to explore is how this strategy’s aims of LGBTIQ equality figure into all EU policies as well as into EU funding programs, and how the EU’s leading the call for LGBTIQ equality around the world will be dealt with by staff in different positions.

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Questions concerning the human rights of LGBTI persons, like these last ones, are interesting from a researcher’s perspective. People affected by human rights violations would certainly prefer these questions had no relevance because human rights were taken for granted. And yet, as this book makes clear, institutions and policies need to be continuously reenacted and therefore taking rights for granted is never good advice.

Literature Austin, J. L., & Leander, A. (2022). Visibility: Practices of Seeing and Overlooking. In A. Drieschova, C. Bueger, & T. Hopf (Eds.), Conceptualizing International Practices: Directions for the Practice Turn in International Relations. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/978100 9052504 Charrad, M. M., & Adams, J. (2011). Introduction: Patrimonialism, Past and Present. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 636, 6–15. Cohen, M. D., March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1972). A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17 (1), 1. https:// doi.org/10.2307/2392088 Cornut, J. (2015). The Practice Turn in International Relations Theory. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.113 Czarniawska, B., & Sevón, G. (1996). Introduction. In B. Czarniawska & G. Sevón (Eds.), Translating Organizational Change (pp. 1–12). De Gruyter. Drori, G. S., Höllerer, M. A., & Walgenbach, P. (2014). The Glocalization of Organization and Management: Issues, Dimensions, and Themes. In G. S. Drori, M. A. Höllerer, & P. Walgenbach (Eds.), Global Themes and Local Variations in Organization and Management. Perspectives on Glocalization (pp. 3–23). Routledge. European Commission. (2020). Union of Equality: LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020–2025., Pub. L. No. COM(2020) 698 final. https://ec.europa.eu/info/ sites/info/files/lgbtiq_strategy_2020-2025_en.pdf. Accessed 21 November 2020. Fligstein, N. (2001). Institutional Entrepreneurs and Cultural Frames—The Case of the European Union’s Single Market Program. European Societies, 3(3), 261–287. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616690120079332 Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Sahlin, K., & Suddaby, R. (2013). Introduction. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, & R. Suddaby (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism (pp. 1–46). SAGE Publications.

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Jacobs, A. M. (2010). Policymaking as Political Constraint: Institutional Developments in the U.S. Social Security Programme. In J. Mahoney & K. Thelen (Eds.), Explaining Institutional Change. Ambiguity, Agency and Power (pp. 94–131). Cambridge University Press. http://www.cambridge. org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-pol itics/explaining-institutional-change-ambiguity-agency-and-power. Accessed 22 October 2015. Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Cornell University Press. Kruse, V., & Barrelmeyer, U. (2012). Max Weber. Eine Einführung. UTB. Liese, A. (2006). Staaten am Pranger: Zur Wirkung internationaler Regime auf innerstaatliche Menschenrechtspolitik (2006 edition.). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Murray Li, T. (2007). The Will to Improve. Duke University Press. Accessed 26 July 2018. Oberg, A., Korff, V., Oelberger, C., Kloos, K., & Powell, W. W. (2014). Between Contestation and Convergence: The Proto-Institutionalization of Nonprofit Performance Metrics. Unpublished, 1–84. Orton, D. J., & Weick, K. E. (1990). Loosely Coupled Systems: A Reconceptualization. Academy of Management Review, 15, 203–223. Rittel, H. W. J., & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning. Policy Sciences, 4(2), 155–169. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF0140 5730 Powell, W. W., & Colyvas, J. A. (2013). Microfoundations of Institutional Theory. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, & R. Suddaby (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism (pp. 276–298). SAGE Publications.

Annex A: Methodology

This book employs a design suitable to identify the contextual influence and observations over time, of more general patterns and of the microlevel, where people make sense. As such, it employs a combination of qualitative, explorative, and interpretative means within a singleembedded case study methodology to capture detailed actions in context while remaining open to different explanations. The main methodological question is how can sensemaking be observed? This is best done by studying the mundane—by “brushing up on everyday life” and observing the “untroubled comprehension” of people in their day-to-day lives (Weick, 2012, p. 151). Key for this are utterances and people’s stories recounting what happened alongside observations of daily routines as the sensemaking process particularly manifests verbally or through enacting, the latter of which itself is still often transmitted through language. Accordingly, especially observations and interviews, but also official and unofficial documents and news reports are relevant to determining both—the sense people have made and what people consider as action.

Grounded Theory Inspired Methodology What remains of actions, by nature fleeting are stories and accounts. Talk and discourse therefore play a central role for the study of sensemaking processes, as they encompass not only observable data but also how sense © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. Malmedie, EU Promotion of Human Rights for LGBTI Persons in Uganda, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45826-2

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is mostly generated and mediated in human contexts (Brown et al., 2015, p. 267; Weick, 2012, p. 149). Indeed language allows for “the construction of ‘plausible accounts of equivocal situations’” and, thus, temporary stability for individuals in their ever-changing social world (Weick, 2012, p. 145) and justifications are “crucial anchors” within the process of organizing, as they bind people to actions that are consistent with them. And such actions tend to recur, stabilize, and serve as resources for dominant stories (Weick, 2012, p. 144). One way in which these practices and stories in context can be captured is by a grounded theory inspired methodology (GTM). GTM is well suited to examine how actors within organizations engage wicked problems, as it allows for the necessary flexibility to capture the complexity inherent in social phenomena (Goulding, 2009, p. 381; Lee, 1999, p. 45). GTM further calls for heightened sensitivity toward the data and for the researcher to immerse themselves into the data and their context rather than to seek objectivity (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 32). Since people make sense within a particular context and are guided by institutions and strive for legitimacy, this necessitates to capture both the many varieties of interpretation and the contextual considerations these processes typically involve. Approaches grounded in observational data, which explicitly take context into account, are crucial tools to do so, as they can glean not only action but inaction as well, thereby “developing adequate accounts of the social construction of legitimacy,” or the “doing of legitimacy,” as Stephen R. Barley calls it (Barley, 2013, p. 508). GTM is especially applicable within the contexts of wicked problems because one of its core assumptions is that the world is complex, often ambiguous, evidencing change as well as periods of permanence; where action itself although routine maybe problematic tomorrow; where answers become questionable and questions ultimately produce answers. (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 6). Specific virtues of GTM’s data-driven (rather than theory-driven) investigations further include its ability to enable study of little-researched empirical phenomena and of contexts where the researcher has a specific affinity with the topic at hand (Breuer et al., 2017, p. 11). GTM might be more accurately described as a research style or approach rather than a comprehensive theory (Breuer et al., 2011, p. 428; Reichertz & Wilz, 2016, p. 57). Hence, the approach this study takes is inspired by the characteristic elements of GTM and its approach, applying

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a number of its tools and techniques, but does not to claim to apply GTM in its entirety. The GTM this book employs is based on the framework developed by Juliet Corbin and Anselm Strauss in 2008 (as formulated in the 2nd edition of their seminal work Basics of Qualitative Research: techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory). This approach welcomes a researcher’s theoretical and tacit background knowledge and recognizes the usefulness of a theoretical framework to accompany inquiry and provide initial concepts because our “backgrounds and past experiences provide the mental capacity to respond to and receive the messages contained in the data” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 33). Corbin and Strauss’s acknowledgment of the existence and importance of institutions within the research process makes it compatible with the study’s broad interpretative new institutionalist theoretical framework. Their approach of GTM furthermore aims to capture multiple perspectives and locates the researcher’s own experience within, rather than outside of, research practice and the research object (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 10), which together help to connect the levels of this study’s interest—between microlevel practice and macro-level institutions. This approach is combined with the openness and flexibility introduced into GTM by Clarke and Charmaz, who reject the underlying positivism of “traditional” grounded theory and argue for a more openended practice focused on meaning-making (Clarke, 2003, p. 559). This combined approach corresponds well with the my constructivist ontological and epistemological stance inspired by the idea that the notion of reality, and also the reality of the researcher, is socially constructed and constantly reconstructed through social processes, guided by socialization and institutions (Berger & Luckmann, 2013). As such, GTM differs from strictly hermeneutical understandings, which assume an invisible world of meaning to exist independently and the researcher’s task to be concerned with uncovering pre-existing meaning (Reichertz & Wilz, 2016, p. 63).

Case Study Design This book revolves around the “how” of a process under specific context conditions, a question best addressed through a case study design (Yin, 2009, p. 8). More specifically, this book employs a qualitative case study design particularly well suited to the domain of translation and enactment processes (Campbell, 2004, p. 79), as it considers the context in which

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these processes manifest. The case of the EU promoting human rights for LGBTI persons is a revelatory case because it provides the opportunity to “uncover some prevalent phenomenon previously inaccessible to social scientists” (Yin, 2009, p. 49). On a theoretical level it offers a novel approach by examining how a wicked problem is dealt with in practice; and on an empirical level, as it looks at the case of Uganda’s introduction of the Anti-Homosexuality Act in new scholarly light—i.e., regarding the EU’s role. In its examination of a public administration’s practical management of a wicked problem, this book studies multiple subunits within a single case (Yin, 2009, p. 50), of which there are two in this present study: the dealings that manifest at the EU’s Brussels headquarters and those of the EU delegations and member state embassies in a third country—in this case, Uganda. This embedded case is a “critical case” as it challenges a significant theory (Yin, 2009, p. 48), i.e., the common assumption that public administrations are unable to deal with wicked problems. The selection of a very wicked problem for examination, allows to demonstrate that, against the odds, public administrations are indeed, contrary to this assumption, engaging with wicked problems in such a way that make them manageable and therefore holds explanatory power for cases which are less extreme. This book spans different levels of analysis, from the micro-practical level to the macro institutional level, the distinction of which is mainly analytical because both are interrelated and often highly interdependent (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 97). Starting point is the microlevel of everyday sensemaking of individual staff members at the EU, its delegation in Uganda and member state embassies of an abstract macro-level idea at world level. Organizations in this process are regarded as “tools for collective actions” (see also Perrow, 1986), i.e., as distillation points of individual sensemaking. The meso-level cooperation between organizations has often been studied as part of an organizational field, as defined by DiMaggio (1991). While useful, the organization field approach obscures the fact that organizations do not exist a priori but are created and re-created through action itself. In line with Czarniawska (2014, p. 17), this book, therefore, takes these processes as “outcomes rather than inputs of organizing” which allows to take inter- and intra-organizational aspects more into account rather than only staying on the formal surface or organizations.

ANNEX A: METHODOLOGY

Table A.1

323

Data sources, treatment and analysis

Sources

Treatment

Analysis

Primary EU Documents Semistructured interviews

Imported into Atlas.ti Turned notes into continuous text, imported into Atlas.ti Field notes memos in Atlas.ti Memos in Atlas.ti

Coded in Atlas.ti Coded in Atlas.ti

Observations Prior knowledge

Atlas.ti Atlas.ti

Practically, this approach entails examining activity at (1) the working level of desk officers1 at EU headquarters in Brussels and (2) the delegation level in Uganda.2

Data and Analysis In line with a GTM framework, data collection was not directed a priori and instead left deliberately open to build organically throughout the research process. Moreover, theoretical sampling was used to uncover new sources of data whenever a new question emerged that required an answer (Egan, 2002, p. 283). Theoretical sampling also directed the attention of the researcher to “different context, people, [and] places” (Goulding, 2009, p. 383) (Table A.1). The data sources for this study include (a) semistructured interviews with EU officials working on human rights and LGBTI issues for the EU in Brussels and at EU delegations, with EU member state embassy staff, and with civil society actors working on the topic in Brussels and Uganda; (b) observation notes from Brussels and Kampala, and (c) an array of textual documents (e.g., official and unofficial EU documents, reports, and website texts). Data has been collected to a point of saturation as

1 Desk officers refer to experts working either on geographical areas or on thematic areas. 2 Specifically in Brussels, this includes the EU Commission, where the unit B1 “Gover-

nance, Democracy, Gender and Human rights” is particularly important as LGBTI issues are dealt with by a policy officer of this unit. At the EEAS, the staff member responsible for the topic area, as well as the geographic unit and desk officers, together play an important role in shaping and interpreting policies and statements. Most interviewees therefore represent the working level or policy level, rather than high-level political functions.

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is customary for grounded theory research. Most of the data collection spanned the period of November 2013 to November 2017. The data this book is based on was collected in a way which Czarniawska (1998, p. 19) calls “anthropologically inspired,” taking seriously one of the main assumptions of ethnology that the meaning of words is only revealed in the context in which they are uttered and which therefore requires field research (Rottenburg & Kaufmann, 2017, p. 126). This book’s empirical chapters are largely based on semistructured interviews with a tendency toward guided conversation around open questions addressing themes. Interview partners were identified via both theoretical and snowball samplings3 and included EU officials in Brussels from the EEAS’s human rights unit, EU staff responsible for the geographical area of sub-Sahara Africa, with those responsible within the EU Commission (and in particular DEVCO), staff within the Council working group COHOM, staff of influential civil society organizations that lobby the EU on LGBTI issues in Brussels. In Uganda, interviewees included EU delegation staff who work in Section II on political affairs—i.e., those that engage in political diplomacy (EEAS affiliates, mostly), as well as those currently working within operations, i.e., development aid (mainly DEVCO staff), the delegation’s human rights focal point (typically a junior position). The main questions concerning processes revolved around how Brussels policies (e.g., the LGBTI guidelines) are, or are not, being used in their work—and by whom within the delegation’s structure. The, mostly open, interview questions were informed by concepts emerging from background research and the initial field research in Brussels, as well as by observations and aimed at shedding light on processes and procedures related to human rights for LGBTI persons, and in particular, the way these actions or inactions are justified, rationalized, and made sense of. Additionally, interviewees included staff of local (i.e., Ugandan-based) representatives of general human rights CSOs and specific LGBTI organizations and individual activists. Interviews were carried out in situ and in person to better understand interviewees’

3 Theoretical sampling is based on the ongoing coding and analysis of data which generates new question with the aim to contribute to and build theory. Snowball sampling, whereby interlocutors would share contacts they believe to be knowledgeable on the topic is because it also provides the researcher with a better sense of the relationships and connections within the action net and furthermore facilitates access to new interviewees.

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context, taking into account that “work practices do not take place in a vacuum” (Nicolini, 2009, p. 120). Interviews combined with observations provided data points not just on what was said but also rich direct observations regarding the processes of setting up meetings with EU delegation staff, access to the office buildings, etc. Direct observation was, in part, often participatory, especially at work meetings, although this was not intentional. Sites for participatory observations included interview settings, events, and meetings. Observations at member state embassies included interactions in team meetings, high-level representative events and receptions, meetings with other embassies, donors, and civil society. Several documents were analyzed in depth because of their particular importance as they fundamentally shape the institutional environment within which the EU and its member states act and provide general frames for action. These documents include in particular primary legislation such as the EU Treaties, with the Lisbon Treaty 2010 (The Member States 2009), which entails the TFEU) and The Treaty on the European Union (TEU), the EU’s Toolkit on the Promotion and Protection of the Enjoyment of all Human rights by LGBT People (Council of the European Union 2010) and its Guidelines on the Promotion and Protection of the Enjoyment of All Human rights by LGBTI Persons (Council of the European Union, 2010, 2013). Reference to the latter two documents is found throughout the book for they were formulated in Brussels but are directed at the EU Delegations and therefore aimed at bridging these different institutional environments. Other relevant documents include statements by EU High Representative (HR/VP) Catherine Ashton on the Anti-Homosexuality Bill in Uganda and on similar legislation in other African countries (EEAS, 2014; European External Action Service EEAS, 2013) (Table A.2). This study’s data was stored, sorted, and analyzed with the help of Atlas.ti, a qualitative data analysis software. For each interview, a record was created that included a variety of coded metadata (e.g., date, time, location of the interview, organization, job title, position, and who recommended the interviewee), as well as background information and observations on the context. All but two interviews were recorded by hand, via notetaking, rather than by audio means, to create a congenial, informal atmosphere in which interviewees felt more inclined to share information, on and off the record. The keyword notes were fleshed out

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Table A.2

Background interviews in Brussels and Kampala

Organization/entity Brussels, Belgium EU Comm HQ EEAS HQ EU mixed Civil Society Bx Total Kampala, Uganda EU Del Uganda MS Embassy Uganda Non-EU MS Embassy Uganda Civil Society Uganda Intern. Civil Society Total

No. of interviews (no. of interviewees)

8 7 5 8 28 3 (2) 11 (9) 2 4 6 26

and turned into sentences after each interview. Later, these were uploaded into Atlas.ti. Analysis was iterative and non-separate from coding involving a continual weave between data, codes, and then, further analysis. After the initial rounds of open coding of selected interviews, the code list was reviewed and further condensed and used for coding the other documents in such a way that still remained open to new emerging codes, themes, and dimensions. I created a thick description as an answer to the question of “what is going on,” parallel to several rounds of coding, that integrated codes into families, drew out themes and concepts, and revised both the code structure and countless conceptual maps. Another question that arose during analysis concerned how the changes to the LGBTI acronym were reflected in EU documents and was answered with the help of Atlas.ti’s word crunch analytical tool establishing the frequency of particular words within documents. I used memos, composed in Atlas.ti, throughout the research process as reflective tools; as a way to take note of thoughts and ideas; and as a first avenue to analyze and sort the data into themes and concepts. Further tools crucial to ‘break open’ and interpret the data include Adele Clarke’s situational analysis (2003). Prior to the empirical field research, I carried out a risk assessment including

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aspects regarding country access, protection of the anonymity of interlocuters, data safety and personal safety, and minimized or mediated these identified risks successfully.

Annex B: List of Interviews and Documents

See Table B.1.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. Malmedie, EU Promotion of Human Rights for LGBTI Persons in Uganda, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45826-2

329

Date YYYY/ MM/DD

2013/11/24 2013/11/25 2014/04/07 2014/04/07 2014/04/07 2014/04/08 2014/04/08 2014/04/08 2014/04/10 2014/04/10 2014/04/19 2014/05/12 2014/05/15 2014/05/20 2014/05/20 2014/08/28 2014/10/15 2014/10/22 2014/10/23 2014/10/24

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 17 18 19 20 21

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Type_ Background documents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Type_Events/ Type_ Observations notes Interviews 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

Actor_BE CS

Full list of interviews, observation notes, and documents, sorted by date

Primary Document [PD] Nr

Table B.1

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Actor_Civil Society 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Actor_EU Delegation

330 ANNEX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS

Date YYYY/ MM/DD

2014/10/24 2014/10/30 2014/11/03 2014/11/04 2014/11/18 2014/12/12 2015/01/23 2015/02/10 2015/02/24 2015/04/08 2015/04/08 2015/04/09 2015/04/10 2015/04/13 2015/04/14 2015/04/15 2015/04/17 2015/04/18 2015/04/20 2015/04/20 2015/04/20 2015/04/21

Primary Document [PD] Nr

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 30 31 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Type_ Background documents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Type_Events/ Type_ Observations notes Interviews 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Actor_BE CS

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0

Actor_Civil Society

(continued)

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

Actor_EU Delegation

ANNEX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS

331

Date YYYY/ MM/DD

2015/04/22 2015/04/23 2015/04/24 2015/04/27 2015/04/28 2015/04/29 2015/05/04 2015/05/10 2015/05/12 2015/05/13 2015/05/13 2015/05/15 2015/05/06 2012/05/10 2013/11/21 2013/11/25 2013/11/26 2013/11/28 2013/12/05 2014/03/26 2014/05/12 2014/10/14 2014/10/15 2014/10/28

62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 141 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85

(continued)

Primary Document [PD] Nr

Table B.1

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Type_ Background documents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Type_Events/ Type_ Observations notes Interviews 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Actor_BE CS

0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Actor_Civil Society 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Actor_EU Delegation

332 ANNEX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS

Date YYYY/ MM/DD

2015/01/28 2015/02/09 2015/04/27 2015/05/07 2015/09/08 2015/10/08 2015/11/03 2015/12/08 2015/03/13 2015/05/12 2015/04/29 2009/05/15 2011/02/13 2012/09/20 2012/11/29 2012/11/29 2013/12/27 2014/05/16 2014/05/16 2014/10/29 2014/12/29 2015/01/01

Primary Document [PD] Nr

86 87 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 109 110 111 112 114

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Type_ Background documents 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Type_Events/ Type_ Observations notes Interviews 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Actor_BE CS

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Actor_Civil Society

(continued)

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Actor_EU Delegation

ANNEX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS

333

Date YYYY/ MM/DD

2015/01/01 2015/01/01 2015/01/25 2015/02/13 2015/02/13 2015/04/13 2015/04/24 2015/05/12 2015/09/03 2014/00/00 2015/06/10 2013/02/28 2013/12/05 2015/09/23 2015/04/08 2017/03/09 2017/05/01 2017/07/11 2017/11/22 2017/11/22 2015/04/16

115 116 117 119 120 122 123 124 126 127 128 129 130 131 134 135 136 137 138 139 140

(continued)

Primary Document [PD] Nr

Table B.1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0

Type_ Background documents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Type_Events/ Type_ Observations notes Interviews 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Actor_BE CS

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Actor_Civil Society 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Actor_EU Delegation

334 ANNEX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS

2013/ 11/24 2013/ 11/25 2014/ 04/07 2014/ 04/07 2014/ 04/07 2014/ 04/08 2014/ 04/08 2014/ 04/08 2014/ 04/10 2014/ 04/10

1

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

Date YYYY/ MM/ DD

Primary Document [PD] Nr

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_EU Member State Embassies

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

Actor_ EU mixed

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU_ Comm

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU_ EEAS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ Intern CS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ Local CS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ nonEU Member State Embassies

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Geo_ BLN

1

0

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Geo_ Uganda

(continued)

Geo_BE

ANNEX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS

335

2014/ 04/19 2014/ 05/12 2014/ 05/15 2014/ 05/20 2014/ 05/20 2014/ 08/28 2014/ 10/15 2014/ 10/22 2014/ 10/23 2014/ 10/24 2014/ 10/24 2014/ 10/30

11

23

22

21

20

19

18

17

15

14

13

12

Date YYYY/ MM/ DD

Primary Document [PD] Nr

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_EU Member State Embassies

(continued)

Table B.1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

1

Actor_ EU mixed

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Actor_ EU_ Comm

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU_ EEAS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ Intern CS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ Local CS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ nonEU Member State Embassies

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Geo_ BLN

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

1

0

0

1

0

Geo_BE

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Geo_ Uganda

336 ANNEX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS

2014/ 11/03 2014/ 11/04 2014/ 11/18 2014/ 12/12 2015/ 01/23 2015/ 02/10 2015/ 02/24 2015/ 04/08 2015/ 04/08 2015/ 04/09 2015/ 04/10 2015/ 04/13

24

53

52

51

50

49

31

30

28

27

26

25

Date YYYY/ MM/ DD

Primary Document [PD] Nr

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_EU Member State Embassies

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU mixed

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

Actor_ EU_ Comm

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU_ EEAS

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ Intern CS

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ Local CS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ nonEU Member State Embassies

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

Geo_ BLN

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

Geo_ Uganda

(continued)

Geo_BE

ANNEX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS

337

2015/ 04/14 2015/ 04/15 2015/ 04/17 2015/ 04/18 2015/ 04/20 2015/ 04/20 2015/ 04/20 2015/ 04/21 2015/ 04/22 2015/ 04/23 2015/ 04/24 2015/ 04/27

54

65

64

63

62

61

60

59

58

57

56

55

Date YYYY/ MM/ DD

Primary Document [PD] Nr

1

0

1

1

1

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

Actor_EU Member State Embassies

(continued)

Table B.1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU mixed

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU_ Comm

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU_ EEAS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

Actor_ Intern CS

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

Actor_ Local CS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Actor_ nonEU Member State Embassies

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Geo_ BLN

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Geo_BE

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Geo_ Uganda

338 ANNEX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS

2015/ 04/28 2015/ 04/29 2015/ 05/04 2015/ 05/10 2015/ 05/12 2015/ 05/13 2015/ 05/13 2015/ 05/15 2015/ 05/06 2012/ 05/10 2013/ 11/21 2013/ 11/25

66

77

76

75

141

73

72

71

70

69

68

67

Date YYYY/ MM/ DD

Primary Document [PD] Nr

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

Actor_EU Member State Embassies

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU mixed

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU_ Comm

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU_ EEAS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Actor_ Intern CS

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

Actor_ Local CS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

Actor_ nonEU Member State Embassies

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Geo_ BLN

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Geo_ Uganda

(continued)

Geo_BE

ANNEX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS

339

2013/ 11/26 2013/ 11/28 2013/ 12/05 2014/ 03/26 2014/ 05/12 2014/ 10/14 2014/ 10/15 2014/ 10/28 2015/ 01/28 2015/ 02/09 2015/ 04/27 2015/ 05/07

78

94

93

87

86

85

84

83

82

81

80

79

Date YYYY/ MM/ DD

Primary Document [PD] Nr

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_EU Member State Embassies

(continued)

Table B.1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU mixed

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU_ Comm

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU_ EEAS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ Intern CS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ Local CS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ nonEU Member State Embassies

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

Geo_ BLN

0

0

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

1

Geo_BE

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Geo_ Uganda

340 ANNEX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS

2015/ 09/08 2015/ 10/08 2015/ 11/03 2015/ 12/08 2015/ 03/13 2015/ 05/12 2015/ 04/29 2009/ 05/15 2011/ 02/13 2012/ 09/20 2012/ 11/29 2012/ 11/29

95

106

105

104

103

102

101

100

99

98

97

96

Date YYYY/ MM/ DD

Primary Document [PD] Nr

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_EU Member State Embassies

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU mixed

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU_ Comm

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU_ EEAS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ Intern CS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ Local CS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ nonEU Member State Embassies

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

Geo_ BLN

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

Geo_ Uganda

(continued)

Geo_BE

ANNEX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS

341

2013/ 12/27 2014/ 05/16 2014/ 05/16 2014/ 10/29 2014/ 12/29 2015/ 01/01 2015/ 01/01 2015/ 01/01 2015/ 01/25 2015/ 02/13 2015/ 02/13 2015/ 04/13

107

122

120

119

117

116

115

114

112

111

110

109

Date YYYY/ MM/ DD

Primary Document [PD] Nr

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_EU Member State Embassies

(continued)

Table B.1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU mixed

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU_ Comm

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU_ EEAS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ Intern CS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ Local CS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ nonEU Member State Embassies

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Geo_ BLN

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

Geo_BE

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

0

0

0

Geo_ Uganda

342 ANNEX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS

2015/ 04/24 2015/ 05/12 2015/ 09/03 2014/ 00/00 2015/ 06/10 2013/ 02/28 2013/ 12/05 2015/ 09/23 2015/ 04/08 2017/ 03/09 2017/ 05/01 2017/ 07/11

123

137

136

135

134

131

130

129

128

127

126

124

Date YYYY/ MM/ DD

Primary Document [PD] Nr

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_EU Member State Embassies

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU mixed

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU_ Comm

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ EU_ EEAS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ Intern CS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ Local CS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Actor_ nonEU Member State Embassies

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Geo_ BLN

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

Geo_ Uganda

(continued)

Geo_BE

ANNEX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS

343

2017/ 11/22 2017/ 11/22 2015/ 04/16

138

140

139

Date YYYY/ MM/ DD

Primary Document [PD] Nr

0

0

0

Actor_EU Member State Embassies

(continued)

Table B.1

1

0

0

Actor_ EU mixed

0

0

0

Actor_ EU_ Comm

0

0

0

Actor_ EU_ EEAS

0

0

0

Actor_ Intern CS

0

0

0

Actor_ Local CS

0

0

0

Actor_ nonEU Member State Embassies

0

0

1

Geo_ BLN

0

0

0

Geo_BE

1

0

0

Geo_ Uganda

344 ANNEX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS

Annex C: Interviews and Documents Cited

See Tables C.1 and C.2.

Table C.1

Interviews and documents cited

Primary Document [PD] Nr

Date YYYY/MM/DD

Reference in text of interviews/ observations/docs cited

5 7

2014/04/07 2014/04/08

8

2014/04/08

10 11 12

2014/04/10 2014/04/19 2014/05/12

13 14 15 18 19 21

2014/05/15 2014/05/20 2014/05/20 2014/10/15 2014/10/22 2014/10/24

[BE_CS_High_PD05] [BE_EU_Comm_DEVCO_Mid_ PD7] [BE_EU_Comm_DEVCO_Mid_ PD8] [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD10] [BE_EU_Comm_PD_PD11] [BE_EU_Comm_DEVCO_Mid_ PD12] [BE_EU_Mid_PD13] [BE_CS_Mid_PD14] [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD15] [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD18] [BE_EU_EEAS_GEO_Mid_PD19] [BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD21]

(continued) © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. Malmedie, EU Promotion of Human Rights for LGBTI Persons in Uganda, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45826-2

345

346

ANNEX C: INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS CITED

Table C.1

(continued)

Primary Document [PD] Nr

Date YYYY/MM/DD

Reference in text of interviews/ observations/docs cited

22 23 24 25 49 50 51 53 55 56 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 67 70 71 72 73 141 82

2014/10/24 2014/10/30 2014/11/03 2014/11/04 2015/04/08 2015/04/08 2015/04/09 2015/04/13 2015/04/15 2015/04/17 2015/04/20 2015/04/20 2015/04/21 2015/04/22 2015/04/23 2015/04/24 2015/04/27 2015/04/29 2015/05/12 2015/05/13 2015/05/13 2015/05/15 2015/05/06 2014/05/12

83

2014/10/14

93 101

2015/04/27 2015/04/29

138

2017/11/22

140

2015/04/16

[BE_EU_EEAS_HR_Mid_PD22] [BE_EU_EEAS_High_PD23_a,b] [BE_EU_EEAS_High_PD24_a,b] [BE_EU_Comm/EEAS_Mid_PD25] [UG_CS_HR_Mid_PD49_StM] [UG_MS_Mid_PD50] [UG_EU_del_High_PD51_1] [UG_CS_Int_Mid_PD53] [UG_MS_Mid_PD55] [UG_CS_Mid_PD56] [UG_MS_dev_Mid_PD59] [UG_EU_del_Mid_PD60] [UG_MS_High_PD61] [UG_MS_Mid_PD62] [UG_MS_Mid_local_PD63] [UG_CS_LGBTI_High_PD64] [UG_MS_High_PD65] [UG_MS_Mid_local_PD67] [UG_CS_LGBTI_High_PD70] [UG_EU_del_High_PD71_2] [UG_MS_High_PD72] [UG_MS_High_PD73] [UG_CS_LGBTI_High_PD141] [event_BX_EU_EIDHR_Forum_ PD82] [event_BX_EU Parl_Gambia LGBT_ PD83] [event_UG_MS_KoningsDag_PD93] [event_UG-HoM Mtg at NL Embassy-Agenda_PD101] [event_BLN_AA_Konsultation mit Zivilgesellschaft Aktionsplan_PD138] [event_UG_EU_-EU HRD WG_ PD139]

ANNEX C: INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS CITED

Table C.2

347

Code for citations explained

Type (if not interview) Location Organization type

Organizational entity Organization unit

Hierarical level Primary Document [PD] Nr. in Atlas.ti

event = event doc = document UG = Uganda BE = Belgium MS = Member State EU = European Union CS = Civil Society Organization EEAS = European External Action Service EUComm = EU Commission HR = Human rights GEO = Geographic LGBTI = lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, intersex (where specific CS) mid = officer level high = managerial level 1–140 (additional figure after PD Number = 1st/2nd interview with same interviewee; a, b = several interviewees in one interview)

Annex D: Uganda and Human Rights

See Table D.1.

Table D.1 Human rights treaties Uganda is party to Treaties

Uganda ratification date

CAT: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

3 November 1986 – 21 June 1995 –

CAT-OP: Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture CCPR: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights CCPR-OP2-DP: 2n Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights aiming to the abolition of the death penalty CED: Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women CERD: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

– 22 July 1985 21 November 1980

(continued) © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. Malmedie, EU Promotion of Human Rights for LGBTI Persons in Uganda, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45826-2

349

350

ANNEX D: UGANDA AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Table D.1 (continued) Treaties

Uganda ratification date

CESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

21 January 1987 14 November 1995 17 August 1990 6 May 2002 30 November 2001 25 September 2008

CMW: International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families CRC: Convention on the Rights of the Child CRC-OP-AC: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict CRC-OP-SC: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children child prostitution and child pornography CRPD: Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

Source Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human rights, 2015

Annex E: List of EU & Member State Representation in Uganda

See Table E.1.

Table E.1

List of EU member state representation in Uganda

EU Country (EU accession date)

Uganda (Kampala) embassies/consulates

Austria (1995) Belgium (1958) Bulgaria (2007) Croatia (2013) Cyprus (2004) Czech Republic (2004) Denmark (1973) Estonia (2004) Finland (1995) France (1958) Germany (1958) Greece (1981) Hungary (2004) Ireland (1973) Italy (1958) Latvia (2004) Lithuania (2004)

Consulate (Kampala)a Embassy (Kampala)a – – Consulate (Kampala) – Embassy (Kampala)a – Consulate (Kampala) Embassy (Kampala) Embassy (Kampala)a Consulate (Kampala) Consulate (Kampala) Embassy (Kampala) Embassy (Kampala) – –

(continued) © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. Malmedie, EU Promotion of Human Rights for LGBTI Persons in Uganda, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45826-2

351

352

ANNEX E: LIST OF EU & MEMBER STATE REPRESENTATION …

Table E.1

(continued)

EU Country (EU accession date)

Uganda (Kampala) embassies/consulates

Luxembourg (1958) Malta (2004) Netherlands (1958) Poland (2004) Portugal (1986) Romania (2007) Slovakia (2004) Slovenia (2004) Spain (1986) Sweden (1995) United Kingdom (1973) Total EU MS embassies Total EU MS represented through embassy or consulate EU

– Consulate (Kampala) Embassy (Kampala)a Consulate (Kampala) – Embassy (Kampala) – – Consulate (Kampala) Embassy (Kampala)a High Commission (Kampala)a 10 18 Delegation (Kampala)a

‘Like-minded’ Non-EU countries Norway Canada United States

Embassy (Kampala) Consulate (Kampala) Embassy (Kampala)a

a Background interviews were carried out with staff at these embassies/consulates (Reflects status of

representation in 2015)

Glossary

Civil Society Organization (CSO) is a term which includes nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) but also initiatives and groups of people not necessarily registered as a formal organization. Context is here used synonymously to the environment which is constructed through sensemaking and consists of institutions, including formal structure and typified behavior, at a particular time/ space intersection and therefore taken-for-granted rules and horizons of expectations. Decoupling is here used in line with Karl E. Weick’s definition to mean less coupled or more loosely coupled rather than completely independent or separate from. In Orton’s and Weick’s words, something is loosely coupled if there is “a distinctiveness and responsiveness” (Orton & Weick, 1990, p. 205). Where public administrations deal with wicked problems, decoupling takes place between organizational units on the same level, between different levels, between talk and action. Enactment refers to the process of “acting upon ideas, structures and visions” and the outcome of this process (Czarniawska, 2005). This concept reverses the idea of implementation and is used to refer to the process of people creating the environment which also constrains them (Weick 1988, p. 305). Glocalization describes the dialectic process spanning the local and the global by which sense is produced locally within a wider context it then

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. Malmedie, EU Promotion of Human Rights for LGBTI Persons in Uganda, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45826-2

353

354

GLOSSARY

contributes to and changes and takes place across the axes of nested levels, cultural boundaries, and time (Drori et al. 2014). Modernity is a highly abstract, normative concept which originated in the “West” and gained prominence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The concept includes notions like progress, civilization, the rise of today’s legal system, and the national state as a distinct social form. Modernity therefore is here referred to as a metaframe, i.e., an abstract higher level concept that encompasses a bundle of other concepts and permeates all “modes of social life or organizations” with increasing depth expanding globally (Kruse & Barrelmeyer, 2012, 70– 72). Some scholars described the 1990s, with its shift away from the time dimension toward the space dimension, as a new distinct era of the postmodern, while authors like Anthony Giddens highlighted the continuities between the modern and the present era (Giddens, 1991), an understanding shared by this present study. Horizon(s) of expectations is what guides individual’s and organizations’ sensemaking and which promises legitimacy and therefore organizational survival. In modern pluralist societies, there are competing demands in constant tension with no apparent ‘natural’ equilibrium to settle them, which is why horizons of expectations captures this notion better. Ideas are here understood according to Czarniawska and Joerges (1996) as abstract thoughts and concepts which can travel in an interconnected world as long as they have a vehicle. This vehicle can be someone’s head, or when it is turned into a quasi-object in form of a report, a policy or an article. Institutional change is commonly explained as the result of an ‘external shock,’ in which major environment-altering events unsettle institutions to such an extent that they motivate change of otherwise stable norms and taken-for-granted structures. This study instead conceptualizes institutional change as more incremental, whereby small alterations in the everyday enactment of institutions layer atop one another and engender change through their interplay with each other and the environment. Institutions are here understood quite broadly as rules, norms, and ideologies, which are based on shared meanings within a society (Meyer & Rowan, 1983, p. 84), and which direct “more or less taken-for-granted repetitive social behavior” (Greenwood et al., 2008, pp. 4–5). These “structures and procedures,” within their particular

GLOSSARY

355

contexts, are assumed to be uncontested in their meaning (Zilber, 2002, p. 235). Intergovernmental refers to national governments deciding on the basis of their full sovereignty. International level refers to the interaction, connection, and communication across national borders, for example, through media and of international CSOs and NGOs. Legitimacy is what organizations strive toward to survive (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 353). Organizations therefore attempt to satisfy (or at least partially satisfy) what they perceive as “desirable, proper or appropriate within some social y constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Such expectations determining what is considered appropriate remain elusive and are therefore referred to as a horizons of expectations. LGBT(I) refers to lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, and intersex. As an acronym, it has been successful in traveling, mainly due to its abstract nature which encompasses different elements related to both, sexual orientation, and gender identity. Organizations in this study are regarded not as a-priori entities but as outcomes of organizing processes, created and re-created through action itself (Czarniawska, 2014, p. 17). The concept incorporates whole public administrations of nation states but also much smaller clusters of organizing such as individual units. Focal organization refers to organizations like the EU which consists of clusters of different organizational entities, each with a certain degree of autonomy and collective identity (Sorge, 2002, p. 12). A meta organization consists of other organizations as members instead of individuals (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2008, p. 2), whose membership is voluntary and who are all considered equal (Djelic, 2014, p. 45). Proto-institutionalization describes the emergence of an institution or social norm within an institutional change process at the point when the new or changed meaning has not yet solidified and is widely accepted but is just in the process of being formed. A particular sense needs to be iterated and promoted to become a more widely accepted viewpoint before it can be fully institutionalized and provides temporary stability. Re-embedding describes creating a ‘fit’ between a more abstract idea and the local context which changes both, the idea and those who

356

GLOSSARY

create the fit (Czarniawska, 2002; Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005). Sensemaking is a concept conceptualized by Carl Weick, which describes the process by which something new (a ‘cue,’ in the form of an idea or action) is noticed, labeled, and connected to institutions, i.e., existing frames and templates, creating a fit between the idea and the local context (Weick, 1995, 2009; Weick et al., 2005). Supranational refers to a level of integration of sovereign nations above the national and to which nationals have relinquished competencies, like for example the EU Comm. Translation is understood here in line with Barbara Czarniawska et al., describing a process that envisages an abstract idea—e.g., the very notion of human rights for LGBTI persons—to travel as a quasi-object or linguistic artifact, before being re-embedded and made sense of in different contexts and hierarchical level, which changes both the idea and those who translate it (Czarniawska, 2002; Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005). Wicked problems as conceptualized by Rittel and Webber in 1973 (Rittel & Webber, 1973), are complex, hydra-like problems of social policy, with no root cause and characterized by complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity, increasingly posed to contemporary public administrations.

Literature

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Index

A African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 201 “African” context, 99 Aid conditionality, 66, 67, 141, 166, 253 Ambiguity, 2, 4, 12, 22–24, 27–29, 47, 50, 79, 110, 129, 142, 210, 307 Anti-Homosexuality Act (AHA), 9, 10, 13, 159, 171, 172, 268, 271, 273, 275–284, 286–292, 294, 296, 301, 303, 307, 314 Anti-Homosexuality Bill (AHB), 9, 10, 161, 164, 165, 167–169, 200, 201, 227, 239, 251, 255–258, 280, 291, 292, 301 Attention, 4–6, 8, 11, 14, 21, 26, 28, 32, 37, 49, 105, 124, 150, 158, 160, 161, 164, 165, 169, 180, 183, 194, 197, 199, 200, 214, 217, 222, 227–229, 234, 237, 238, 240, 247, 250–253, 256, 258, 260–262, 264, 266, 269,

271, 272, 279–281, 287, 291–293, 296–299, 301–303, 312–315

B Boomerang effect, 315 Boomerang pattern, 30, 263 British empire, 27, 64, 166, 246

C Categorization, 41, 60–62, 75, 221, 222, 282, 314 Category, 4, 29, 33, 43, 45, 47, 49, 62, 71, 73, 80, 83–86, 88, 95–99, 103, 105, 107–111, 128, 135, 157, 195, 197, 207, 213, 214, 237, 240, 282, 302, 308, 309, 314 Contestation, 128 Ceremonial, 32, 87, 142 Civil society, 7, 74, 85, 167, 202, 213, 262, 270, 302

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. Malmedie, EU Promotion of Human Rights for LGBTI Persons in Uganda, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45826-2

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362

INDEX

Civil Society Organization (CSO), 1, 3, 11, 12, 23, 26, 37, 69, 73–75, 84, 85, 88, 89, 104, 110, 122, 130, 142, 150, 153, 158, 160, 161, 165–168, 170, 180, 183, 185, 186, 188, 191, 194, 198, 199, 202, 204, 212, 216–219, 224, 225, 229, 230, 233, 234, 237, 239, 240, 246, 247, 249–252, 255, 256, 258–268, 270–273, 277, 278, 280, 289, 291, 292, 295, 296, 301–303, 312, 315 Coherence, 37, 60, 69, 117, 137–139, 197, 204, 205, 232, 293 Colonial(ism), 60–64, 75, 82, 92, 95, 99–102, 111, 157, 165–167, 169, 172, 203, 207, 211, 216, 218, 234, 236, 246, 249, 282, 286, 297 Colonizer, 63, 64, 99 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 24, 118–120, 123, 134, 136, 137, 140, 191 Complexity, 2–4, 12, 13, 22, 24, 28, 29, 31, 36, 48, 50, 117, 118, 122, 129, 134, 142, 207, 245, 249, 299 Consistency, 37, 193, 194, 226 Constructivism, 7, 28, 33, 35, 46, 310 Contest, 2–4, 12, 14, 26, 30, 33, 34, 39, 46, 48, 63, 75, 89, 95, 128, 157, 180, 187, 206, 208, 212, 218, 222, 238–240, 250, 251, 301, 308, 310, 311, 313, 314 Contestation, 13, 26, 27, 47, 48, 50, 109, 157, 180, 182, 183, 189, 196–198, 207, 218, 220, 233–235, 237, 238, 313

Context, 1–6, 10–13, 27, 29–32, 34–36, 38–43, 46–50, 60, 66, 90, 95, 97, 99, 101, 108–111, 115, 116, 123, 129, 154, 163, 196, 197, 203, 205, 209–211, 213, 220, 224, 226, 227, 229, 231, 234, 235, 240, 241, 247, 250, 255, 265, 268–270, 277, 281, 287, 299–301, 303, 309, 311–313, 316 Cotonou Agreement, 68, 69 Criminalization, 2, 27, 59, 105, 153, 159, 161, 164, 166, 167, 169, 172, 201, 203, 206, 211, 215, 216, 221, 228, 239, 246, 248 D Decolonization, 65, 66, 80, 83, 86 Decouple, 4, 8, 37, 48, 106, 139–142, 194, 197, 204, 210, 211, 225, 232, 236, 237, 262, 264, 269, 271, 275, 278, 280, 288, 289, 292, 299, 302, 303, 313 Decriminalization, 105, 166, 216 Developing, 68, 82, 88, 216, 314 Development aid, 13, 66–68, 73, 85–88, 122, 131, 161, 162, 165, 167, 168, 197, 202, 221, 224, 225, 249, 250, 252–255, 258, 268, 271, 274, 275, 278, 280–284, 286, 287, 289, 291, 293, 294, 297, 298, 301–303, 308, 309, 316 Development cooperation, 13, 24, 64, 73, 79, 80, 86–88, 91, 118, 122, 124, 128, 132, 169, 204, 210, 234, 237, 251, 253, 255, 277, 315, 316 Differences, 60, 75, 96, 97, 101, 212, 231, 237 Diffusion, 5, 8, 12, 30–33, 37, 38, 49

INDEX

Diplomats, 3, 32, 65, 70, 121, 122, 124, 126, 129–131, 133, 165, 169, 193, 194, 197, 210, 221, 235, 248, 257–259, 261–263, 265, 267, 269, 271, 274–277, 279, 284–287, 290, 292, 300, 302, 303 (Directorate-General for the) External Relations (RELEX), 121, 122, 180–183, 238 E Embassy, 5, 7, 10–12, 14, 24, 26, 111, 122, 129–133, 137, 162–164, 168, 218, 225, 246, 248–253, 255–263, 265, 267–273, 275, 277–281, 283–289, 291–303, 308, 309, 312, 316 Embedded, 39, 42 Embeddedness, 31 Empire, 59–61, 63–65, 68, 75, 79, 95, 165, 227, 232, 254 Empirical, 111, 299, 307, 308, 312, 316 Enactment, 4, 10, 34, 44, 45, 48, 120, 141, 202, 218, 219, 249, 263, 293, 294, 312 Environment, 3–5, 8, 12, 28–30, 32, 34–37, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 50, 80, 84, 86, 95, 97, 115, 118, 122, 123, 129, 131, 142, 149, 150, 159, 161, 164, 172, 179, 181–183, 192, 194, 196, 197, 206, 218, 220, 223–226, 233, 235, 237–241, 247–251, 260, 275, 286, 293, 294, 297, 311, 312 EU Commission (EU Comm), 11 EU delegation, 3, 5, 7, 9–12, 14, 25, 122, 125, 129–133, 159, 168–170, 191, 210, 213, 217,

363

218, 224, 225, 232, 236, 248–253, 255–258, 260–262, 264–274, 277–281, 283–299, 301–303, 308, 311, 312, 316 EU foreign policy, 2, 3, 10, 27, 107, 117, 118, 123, 124, 129, 140, 149, 154, 156, 164, 172, 180, 181, 183, 184, 187, 194, 197, 198, 202, 206, 229, 233, 237, 238, 271, 273, 310 EU headquarters, 5, 7, 25, 121, 129, 150, 179, 269, 295 Eurocentrism, 13, 33, 99, 103, 282, 292 European Commission Directorate General for Development (DEVCO), 120–122, 126, 129, 131, 142, 191, 220, 221, 295, 308, 316 European Commission (EU Comm), 73, 74, 120–122, 124, 126, 131, 142, 162, 180, 181, 187, 210, 220, 221, 225, 237, 251, 271, 295, 301 European Court of Justice (ECJ), 122, 123, 135, 137, 139, 140, 248 European External Action Service (EEAS), 118, 120–122, 124–127, 129, 131, 142, 162, 165, 169–171, 180–183, 187–189, 191–193, 196, 199, 203, 204, 217–221, 224–226, 229–232, 234–237, 240, 251, 261, 270, 271, 273, 279, 284, 285, 301, 308 European Instrument for Democracy and Human rights (EIDHR), 87, 294, 295 European Parliament (EU Parl), 119, 120, 123, 154, 155, 161, 182,

364

INDEX

196, 197, 200–203, 205, 210, 216, 218, 302 External changes, 311 External shock, 4

F Fashion, 6, 67 Focal organization, 13, 24, 25, 116, 118, 130, 142 Formal structures, 115 Frame(s), 39, 43, 88, 92, 104, 111, 156, 157, 161, 181–183, 185, 186, 190, 197, 205, 220, 227, 228, 236, 238–240, 256, 257, 261, 263, 267, 274, 282, 284, 286, 287, 296, 302, 303, 308 Framing, 44, 45, 63, 68, 182, 197, 206, 237, 273, 279, 288, 296, 297 Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), 122, 248

G Garbage can model, 36, 313 Gender identity, 2, 6, 13, 26, 92, 107, 108, 111, 128, 136, 142, 167, 168, 171, 179, 186, 195, 199, 202, 208, 213, 233, 256 Globalization, 312 Global North, 39, 104, 314 Glocalization, 35, 240, 303

H High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP), 119, 120, 123, 124, 126, 196 Horizon of expectation, 7, 36, 79, 88, 91, 128, 131, 155, 161, 164, 166, 196, 197, 202, 238, 240, 249, 251, 256

Human rights, 1–4, 6–8, 12–14, 22, 23, 26, 27, 34, 50, 60, 66, 67, 69, 70, 73–75, 79–92, 95, 96, 101, 104–107, 111, 115, 116, 118–121, 123, 124, 126–128, 132, 133, 135, 136, 138–142, 149, 150, 154–158, 161–163, 167–169, 171, 172, 180–194, 197–202, 204–213, 216, 218–234, 236–240, 246, 247, 249–253, 256–258, 260, 262–264, 269–271, 274, 278, 282, 287, 290–303, 307, 308, 310, 311, 315–317 Human rights Defenders (HRD), 212, 257, 294, 295, 300 Human rights frame, 294

I Idea, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12–14, 21, 23, 30, 33, 34, 37–42, 45–49, 80, 88, 90, 103, 115, 149, 150, 156, 158, 159, 163, 166, 172, 183, 186, 188, 189, 193, 195, 197, 199, 212, 217–219, 226, 235, 238, 249, 251, 252, 268, 275, 282, 287, 308, 309, 311–313 ILGA World Rainbow Map, 103 Imperialism, 59, 64, 98, 142, 169, 192, 209, 211, 218, 234, 238, 240, 276, 288 Implementation, 37, 41, 103, 121, 124, 127, 142, 190, 203, 237, 239, 253, 254, 274, 275, 288, 291, 300, 311 Inconsistency, 278 Institutionalism, 5, 7 Institutionalization, 10, 34, 35, 43, 46–48, 238, 311 Institutions, 43

INDEX

Intergovernmental, 2, 5, 24, 25, 27, 118–120, 129, 134, 140, 142, 310 International relations, 4, 5, 7, 30, 32, 33, 308, 310, 312, 315 K Kato, David, 164, 165, 222, 293 Kill-the-gays-bill, 159 Kuchu, 101, 110, 247 L Labelling, 44, 45, 156 Law, 1, 31, 62, 63, 67, 79, 80, 96, 102, 103, 105, 106, 135–138, 159, 165, 166, 168–171, 201, 202, 208, 211, 213, 215, 216, 229, 236, 274, 275, 277, 279, 280, 282, 284, 290, 316 Legal, 2, 6, 7, 9, 26, 60, 61, 84, 87–89, 98, 101, 103, 110, 135, 138–140, 153, 158, 160, 161, 190, 191, 200, 202, 204, 206, 208, 210, 211, 213, 219, 231, 237, 239, 241, 245, 253, 274, 314 Legal changes, 8, 158 Legality, 229, 315 Legalization, 150 Legal protection, 2, 150 Legal system, 62, 80, 137, 211, 215, 248, 314 Legitimacy, 2, 7, 13, 23, 24, 26–28, 30, 35–37, 40, 59, 61, 63, 74, 75, 81, 84, 89, 100, 116, 117, 123, 128, 129, 134, 137–139, 141, 142, 150, 165, 172, 183, 185, 189, 190, 193, 197, 200, 202, 204, 209–211, 216–220, 224–226, 229–234, 236–241, 248–251, 254–256, 259, 262,

365

264, 265, 271, 272, 274–278, 284, 286, 287, 289–292, 297, 300–303, 307–309, 311, 316 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex (LGBTI), 2, 3, 5–8, 10–14, 22, 23, 26, 27, 34, 50, 60, 79, 80, 83, 90, 91, 95, 103, 104, 107–111, 115, 118, 121, 123, 124, 126, 127, 130, 132, 133, 142, 149, 150, 153–156, 158–162, 164–172, 179, 180, 183, 186, 187, 189–199, 202, 205–240, 245–253, 255–269, 271–274, 277–282, 285, 287, 289–303, 307, 309–311, 316, 317 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender (LGBT), 12, 31, 111, 141, 142, 158, 165, 167, 168, 180–189, 191, 192, 195–199, 201–204, 206–208, 211, 212, 214, 218, 225, 230, 233, 310 LGBT guidelines, 188 LGBTI guidelines, 187, 190, 194, 195, 197, 205–207, 216, 218, 219, 224, 234, 236, 237, 239 LGBTI rights, 150 LGBT toolkit, 119, 183–185, 188, 195, 197, 202, 205, 206, 210, 211, 216, 218 Logic of appropriateness, 42 Lomé Agreement, 66, 69 M Macroframes, 167 Macrolevel, 5, 30, 43, 49 Media, 1, 23, 102, 110, 159, 164, 165, 227, 228, 235, 246, 251, 285, 292, 296, 302 Media attention, 157, 160, 225, 228, 239, 293, 297 Mesolevel, 49

366

INDEX

Mesoorganization, 42 Metaframe of modernity, 50, 70, 75, 79, 80, 92, 111, 137, 172, 240, 286, 287, 308, 314 Metaframes, 303 Meta organization, 24, 116–118, 129, 142, 172, 226 Microlevel, 5, 8, 10, 29, 32, 33, 35, 41, 42, 48, 49, 196, 197, 308, 309 Modern(ity), 3, 13, 35, 36, 80, 89, 90, 96, 101, 106, 157, 239, 267, 286, 302, 303, 308, 309, 312, 314 Museveni, Yoweri, 1, 59, 74, 156, 162–165, 170, 171, 264, 271, 275, 276, 279–281, 283–286, 288, 292, 298, 302, 309, 314 Myth, 36, 40, 285, 314

N Negotiation, 14, 22, 25, 26, 28, 46, 48, 49, 64, 66, 89, 110, 117, 125, 128, 131, 166, 172, 180, 184, 191–193, 219, 220, 227, 237, 239, 249, 254, 255, 257, 258, 268, 270, 271, 274, 279, 280, 291, 295, 302, 307, 309–311 Negotiation of meaning, 29 Neocolonialism, 83 Neoimperialism, 2, 23, 27, 28, 166, 172, 208, 232, 288 New institutionalism, 4, 30, 31, 33, 35, 36 New Public Management (NPM), 67 Nonimplementation, 275 Norm, 7, 8, 13, 30, 40, 81, 88, 90, 102 Normative, 6, 7, 23, 27, 36, 40, 88, 115, 133, 141, 192, 209, 210,

216, 220, 227, 237, 268, 302, 310 Normative frame, 79, 90 Normative power, 27, 95, 141, 207, 278 O Organize(d), 4, 12, 14, 34, 49, 67, 85, 97, 118, 121, 126, 221, 250, 251, 293, 308–310 Organized hypocrisy, 37 P Postcolonial, 33, 68, 211, 232 Power structure(s), 50, 67, 172, 309 Practice, 7, 11, 26, 30, 32, 35, 37–39, 41, 48, 50, 59, 61, 74, 75, 83, 87, 100, 102, 117, 138, 150, 167, 213–215, 217, 219, 220, 232, 312, 315 Problem definition, 14, 22, 28, 29, 207, 209, 215, 218–220, 229, 233, 237–241, 249, 252, 253, 283, 284, 287, 291, 299, 307, 308, 310, 312 Protoinstitutionalization, 311 Public administration, 3, 4, 12, 14, 21, 24–27, 35, 48, 67, 149, 220, 226, 227, 229, 307, 308, 310, 312, 315 Q Quasiobject, 34, 38, 41, 185, 197 R Rationalization, 40, 60, 212, 314 Re-embedding, 3, 34, 38, 41, 42, 49, 172, 183, 238, 239, 241, 252, 285, 287, 309, 312 Reverse boomerang effect, 315

INDEX

S Self-determination, 82, 104, 106, 107, 111, 201, 215 Sensemaking, 3, 5, 7, 8, 12, 14, 22, 29, 33–35, 41–50, 149, 169, 180, 189, 198, 219, 237, 238, 240, 241, 249, 251, 255, 256, 259, 262, 268, 275, 280, 283, 291, 293, 294, 302, 303, 307–309, 312, 313, 316 Sexual orientation, 2, 6, 11, 13, 26, 27, 92, 105–111, 123, 128, 133, 135, 136, 139, 142, 150, 153–156, 167, 168, 171, 179, 182, 186, 195, 198–202, 208, 213, 215, 231, 233, 248, 256, 295 Sexual orientation and Gender identity/ and Expression (SOGI/ E), 110 Social movement, 13, 26, 30, 31, 80, 83–85, 110, 158, 315 Sociological new institutionalism, 6, 7, 12, 22, 33, 35, 308 Solution(s), 21, 22, 28, 29, 38, 42, 46, 49, 197, 203, 207, 209, 218, 219, 237, 240, 249, 253, 269, 281, 307, 309, 310, 313 Sovereign(ty), 2, 24, 25, 27, 32, 33, 60, 65–69, 79–83, 90–92, 117, 140, 157, 169, 207, 211, 212, 218, 232, 234, 236, 249, 271, 276, 281, 286 T Tacit knowledge, 4, 47, 131, 197, 309, 311, 312, 316 Taken-for-granted, 4, 30, 32, 34, 43, 44, 46–48, 70, 75, 85, 128, 197, 202, 207, 220, 228, 230, 240, 247, 251, 281, 291, 297, 309, 311, 317

367

Third country, 8, 25, 26, 28, 66, 73, 83, 122, 127, 129, 137, 139, 141, 155, 182, 185, 203, 207, 208, 210, 212, 216–219, 221–225, 230, 231, 237, 269, 316 Translation, 3, 5–7, 12, 14, 22, 30, 31, 33, 34, 38–44, 47–49, 84, 85, 90, 91, 149, 189, 197, 238, 248, 250, 259, 287, 300, 301, 303, 308, 310–312, 316 Transnationalization, 30 Travel(ing), 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 23, 30, 34, 37–41, 49, 95, 96, 107, 109, 111, 150, 156, 158, 172, 199, 245, 265, 266, 279, 312, 315 Treaty on the European Union (TEU), 122, 123, 137, 138 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 122, 136

U Uganda, 1–3, 5, 9–13, 22, 25, 27, 37, 50, 59–62, 71–74, 100, 101, 121, 127, 129, 131, 132, 149, 156, 158–167, 169–171, 200–202, 217, 227, 228, 235, 245–251, 253, 258, 260, 263, 265, 268, 271, 272, 277–280, 282, 285, 287, 289–293, 295, 298, 299, 301, 303, 307, 312, 316 United Nations (UN), 82, 85, 87, 89, 91, 118, 128, 139, 167, 171, 180, 181, 206, 208, 209, 233, 277, 300 United States (of America), 10, 80, 156, 163, 164, 168, 257, 275, 284

368

INDEX

Universal Declaration of Human rights (UDHR), 81–84, 89, 90 W Wickedness, 13, 22, 23, 28, 50, 115, 302, 308 Wicked problem, 2–4, 12, 14, 21, 22, 28, 29, 33, 35, 38, 42, 46, 48,

50, 60, 129, 250, 251, 293, 307–310, 312, 313, 315 Wicked problem, 12, 29 World War II (WW-II), 13, 81, 83

Y Yogyakarta Principles, 107, 156, 208