EU Migrant Workers, Brexit and Precarity: Polish Women's Perspectives from Inside the UK 9781447351634

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EVA A. DUDA-MIKULIN

EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY Polish women’s perspectives from inside the UK

POLICY PRESS

RESEARCH

EVA A. DUDA-MIKULIN

EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY Polish women’s perspectives from inside the UK

POLICY PRESS

RESEARCH

First published in Great Britain in 2019 by Policy Press North America office: University of Bristol Policy Press 1-9 Old Park Hill c/o The University of Chicago Press Bristol 1427 East 60th Street BS2 8BB Chicago, IL 60637, USA UK t: +1 773 702 7700 t: +44 (0)117 954 5940 f: +1 773 702 9756 [email protected] [email protected] www.policypress.co.uk www.press.uchicago.edu © Policy Press 2019 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested. ISBN 978-1-4473-5162-7 ISBN 978-1-4473-5164-1 ISBN 978-1-4473-5165-8 ISBN 978-1-4473-5163-4

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The right of Eva A. Duda-Mikulin to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Policy Press. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the author and not of the University of Bristol or Policy Press. The University of Bristol and Policy Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Policy Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design by Policy Press Front cover: image kindly supplied by Getty Images Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Policy Press uses environmentally responsible print partners

Contents

List of tables

iv

Abbreviations v Definitions

vii

Notes on the author

viii

Acknowledgements ix Prologue

x

one

Introduction and context

1

two

Polish migration to the UK

23

three

The British paid labour market

45

four

Brexit – the UK’s exit from the European Union

63

five

Precarious lives post Brexit vote

83

six

Conclusion and policy implications

103

Notes

115

References

119

Appendix

143

Index

149

iii

List of tables

1

Forms of un/employment

46

2

Types of occupations

49

3

Migrants – UK based

144

4

Return migrants – Poland based

146

iv

Abbreviations

A8 A2 Brexit

CBOS CEE DWP EDM EEA ENG EU EU8

Accession 8: EU Member States which joined on the 1 May 2004, see EU8 Accession 2: EU Member States which joined on 1 January 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) is the shortened term for the British exit from the European Union signifying the process of withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union Centre for Public Opinion Research (PL: Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej), a major opinion polling institute in Poland Central and Eastern Europe Department for Work and Pensions Eva Duda-Mikulin European Economic Area English (language) European Union ‘new’ EU Member States which joined the EU on 1 May 2004 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia)

v

ABBREVIATIONS

EU15

HO IOM NHS NINo ONS PL PLM UK UN USA WRS

‘old’ EU Member States (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden) including the UK Home Office International Organisation for Migration National Health Service National Insurance Number UK Office for National Statistics Polish (language) paid labour market the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United Nations United States of America Worker Registration Scheme

vi

Definitions

Economically inactive: not in work and not looking for work Economically active: in work and/or unemployed but actively seeking work Employed: in work/economically active Unemployed: not in work but actively looking for work/ economically active International migrant: definitions vary among different data sources, and between datasets and law but a migrant can be defined on the basis of: nationality, country of birth or length of stay. Migrants may be defined as foreign-born, foreign nationals, or people who have moved to the UK for a year or more. For the purpose of this book a migrant is defined as a foreign (Polish) national who has been resident in the UK for at least 6 months. A returnee refers to a return migrant who having lived in the UK for a minimum of 6 months, has subsequently moved back to Poland, and at the time of the interview lived in Poland.

vii

Notes on the author

Dr Eva A. Duda-Mikulin (legally known as Eva Anna Duda) is an academic with extensive research and lecturing experience. Eva assisted with and/or coordinated a number of qualitative and quantitative research projects within the broad disciplines of social policy and sociology. She previously taught on both undergraduate and postgraduate courses at various higher education institutions. Eva currently works as Lecturer in Inclusion and Diversity at the University of Bradford. Previously, Eva worked as Senior Research Associate at Manchester Metropolitan University. Prior to that she worked as Research Associate for the Welfare Conditionality project at the University of York. Before then, Eva was Research Assistant at Sustainable Housing and Urban Studies Unit at the University of Salford. Prior to starting her academic career, Eva worked in the voluntary community sector with some of the most disadvantaged communities (for example migrants, asylum seekers, refugees). Eva is passionate about working with marginalised communities using participatory methods in order to achieve greater social justice. She tweets as @DrEvaDuMik.

viii

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank the research participants for offering their time and sharing their stories. I would like to acknowledge those whose funding enabled me to conduct this research: the University of Salford for my PhD Scholarship (2011-2014); a Fellowship from the Jagiellonian Polish Research Centre in London (2012) which supported my field research; the Fran Trust for conference funding awarded twice (2013, 2014) which enabled me to engage with the critical minds of fellow academics and receive feedback which informed my analysis. I would like to offer my gratitude to my critical academic and non-academic colleagues and friends who kindly offered their time and read earlier versions of different chapters which proved invaluable in shaping the whole content: Alina Rzepnikowska, Anne White, Majella Kilkey, Aneta Piekut, Kelly Hall, Barbara Janta and Matthew Tarr. Special thanks to Alan Kay for his support throughout the stressful final months. My thanks also go to my PhD supervisors, Peter Dwyer, Anya Ahmed and Lisa Scullion who guided me through the sometimes rough and bumpy route towards academic enlightenment. Last, but not least, I would like to thank my friends: Basia, Aneta, Gabi, Natalia, who showed real interest in my writing and kept motivating me by asking questions such as: How is the book going, almost done? Is it going to be a bestseller? Will you be the next J.K. Rowling? Will I get a signed copy? They can always put a smile on my face. ix

Prologue1

Researchers do not choose research topics without theoretical or ideological preconceptions or inclinations. Social reality is being modified when researched, while researchers are not impartial observers. Thus, empirical results are not demonstrated from a ‘neutral’ position. Hence, it is crucial to reflect on the researcher’s own positionality within the research process. This reflects the fact that researchers ‘position themselves’, which means they are inevitably affected by their background (for example experience, views, culture, history) which in consequence influences the research they undertake (Yuval-Davis, 1997; Creswell, 2013). Whilst I am a Polish native speaker and a migrant to the UK who interviewed fellow Polish migrant women, this fact did not make me an unproblematic ‘cultural insider’ to all of the participants. As a Polish migrant woman and a researcher, at the same time I had to negotiate these roles throughout the course of the research. It could be argued that in this study I was a “familiar stranger” (Agarwal et al, 2009). This is to symbolise the fact that I was somewhat similar (with regard to certain characteristics, for example nationality, gender, migration status, sexual orientation, often also age, class, marital status), thus in some ways an ‘insider’ and ‘familiar’ to the research participants. At the same time, I was a ‘stranger’ in the sense that I took the role of an academic researcher gathering information on fellow migrant women who could have had very different experiences (for example in Poland/the UK or in migration experience).

x

PROLOGUE

For this book, I spoke to migrants and return migrants. In the former category were people who were UK-based, and in the latter were people who having first migrated from Poland to the UK and spent some time there (minimum 6 months) had returned back to Poland. Participant recruitment in the UK did not pose a challenge as I had very good links with the voluntary community sector in the area through voluntary work at various non-governmental organisations that work with migrants. This fact meant that I had an extensive network of fellow migrants who were either service users, volunteers or employees. Moreover, through my previous voluntary work I had built trust with these organisations and thus they were largely happy to assist with my research. Therefore, the UK-based participants were relatively easy to recruit but this was not the case with regards to return migrants who were Poland-based. Being based in the UK whilst trying to recruit participants in Poland was a challenge; hence, I firstly conducted the UK interviews and asked my UK participants whether they knew people who returned to Poland (that is ‘snowball sampling’). I also got in touch with Poland-based organisations that assist voluntary returns of migrants. This part of recruitment took a lot longer as I needed time to identify relevant individuals, make contact, arrange the interviews and organise a field trip to Poland. I recognised the research participants as experts on their own lives who took part in the interview as a “co-construction” of meaning (Hesse-Biber, 2014). I, as both an expert and an insider, aimed to compare the accounts of the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ (that is contrast the participants’ views with what is known from academic literature). It can be asserted that particularly because I am part of the Polish migrant community in the north of England, I had little trouble finding other Polish migrant women who were willing to participate in the research despite the fact that this community is often referred to as ‘hard to reach’. However, it should be noted that in almost any interview

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EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY

situation the researcher will be both an insider and an outsider at the same time (Hesse-Biber, 2014). While the former is built on commonalities, the latter makes any differences explicit and in any interview situation the two sides are likely to be similar in some respects and different in others. This is due to various ‘axes of difference’ intersecting one another (cf. ‘intersectionality’, Crenshaw, 1989). It is likely that the researcher will always differ in some respects to the research participants whilst s/he will also have some commonalities. An interview constitutes an opportunity to explore these and continuously renegotiate them throughout the research process. From the onset, I was open about the roles I played and my background. At the beginning of each interview, I introduced myself giving the research participants some background to my migration history (that is sharing my own biography). Arguably, this exercise can contribute to minimising distance, reducing the hierarchy and extending rapport between the research partners. It also emphasises certain shared characteristics (for example the migrant status). The interviewees were given the opportunity to choose their own pseudonyms, which can potentially increase their feelings of research ownership. Reciprocity is vital in qualitative research, particularly that of a feminist/gendered alignment (cf. Hesse-Biber, 2014). I feel strongly about the process of giving back; thus, I offered to distribute any relevant research outputs to the research participants and/or the interview transcripts to those interested, and I offered incentives. I wished to be a ‘reflective partner’, a ‘conscientiser’ with the aim to better the participants’ situation in some way (Blaikie, 2007). This, I believe, was achieved by giving them a voice and the opportunity to be heard, thus, providing more balance to the existing literature on gendered lives of Polish women migrants. I did my best to ensure the power relations of the interview interaction (Mason, 2002) were maintained at a level convenient for both parties (that is the interviewer and the respondent), so that no one party was able to unduly exercise power over

xii

PROLOGUE

the other, as is expected when adhering to feminist principles. I wished to combine my knowledge and experience with that of the research participants. When asked personal questions that relate to my migratory experiences, I provided an honest and detailed answer. It is difficult to totally eliminate the interviewer effect (if at all possible); however, it is believed it was minimal, given that I shared sex, ethnic origin, nationality, native language and often age range with the respondents, but this cannot be known for sure. I endeavoured to be sensitive to the cultural, religious and socio-economic background of the research participants. At all times, I ensured that I was humble, moderately dressed and used everyday language. This is not to undermine the research participants but rather to acknowledge that I did not wish to be seen as a person of authority exerting her dominance. I simply wanted to be seen as ‘one of them’, a Polish woman with emphasis on commonalities rather than differences. It is noteworthy that many of the interviewees must have felt at ease in my company as many used phrases such as: “we”, “us”, “you know how it is”, “you’ve been through this”, and so on. This confirms they indeed felt that I was ‘one of them’ and in many cases that was true for me too. This is recognised as an expression of mutual belonging to both home and host societies. This suggests that the interviewees not only assumed a shared sense of belonging to the Polish nation but also similar migration experience. However, this supposed commonality of experiences cannot be taken for granted but should be reflected on and probed further. Otherwise, the research is in jeopardy of lacking in transparency as certain information can be lost due to falsely assumed commonality of experiences. In this research, there were many moments of assumed similarity and of difference between myself and the respondents. On many occasions the shared origin, spoken language and experience of migration seemed to stimulate discussions and foster mutual rapport. The fact that I emphasised my migration ‘journey’ at the beginning of each interview encouraged the interviewees to ‘open up’. At

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EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY

the same time, this assumed sameness sometimes appeared to act as a constraint. This was the case when the women expected me to immediately recognise certain situations or cultural contexts due to sharing the aforementioned characteristics. In such situations I always checked that I understood them correctly by asking further questions or for clarifications. It is worth noting that my researching Polish migrant women as ‘one of them’ proved to be challenging at times. Unsurprisingly, I found myself emotionally involved in the research. Thus, I cared about the end results not only because I wished to carry out rigorous research but because I was concerned about how Polish women are portrayed since I am one of them. This meant that I had to constantly reflect on my position as an insider (a Polish woman) and an outsider (an academic researcher) and ensure that my background did not taint the research findings. Although, this may seem like a contradiction to what I argued before with regards to researchers’ background being part of the evidence, I believe this ought to be considered with caution so as not to spoil the empirical contributions. Brexit and I In the national referendum on the 23 June 2016 the UK voted to leave the European Union. The margin was small with 51.9% votes to leave and 48.1% to remain in the EU (Electoral Commission, n.d.). Then on the 29 March 2017 Article 50 was triggered marking the start of formal Brexit negotiations. As the UK Prime Minister Theresa May triggered it, by default she turned approx. 4.2 million people into ‘bargaining chips’ (this includes British expats2 in Europe). May refused to guarantee the rights of EU citizens despite the concerns expressed by academics, pressure groups (for example The3Million; British in Europe) and the general public. The UK government took some time to provide any clarification on EU citizens’ rights. The

xiv

PROLOGUE

future of those caught in between (that is ‘the labour’) remains uncertain and greatly dependent on Brexit negotiations. This is a historic moment that 60 years after the Treaty of Rome created the European Economic Community which then transformed into the EU and 43 years after the UK joined, it has now filed for a divorce from the other 27 members. Brexit has, to date, generated a lot of attention from the various sides of the debate but arguably it all boils down to immigration. People have been migrating since the beginning of time, but the issue of migration has now been elevated to a key national concern and is one of the most contentious and divisive matters in the UK and beyond. Migration has become a dirty word in itself. Ethnic minorities have wrongly become the scapegoats. Meanwhile, the British government continually fails to deliver on its promise to reduce net migration to the tens of thousands. The UK wishes to retain the trade deals agreements while at the same time it wants to fortify itself from the rest of Europe, despite the fact that it is a part of it. On the 24 June 2016 I was truly devastated and I even shed some tears over what seemed like my ruined future. I am technically an imported (ex)wife (not to be confused with a trafficked person), originally from Eastern Europe (geographically speaking Central Europe really) and so it is often assumed I am an economic migrant. March 2018 marked a decade since I made my home in the UK. My now ex-husband is British born and bred. I studied in the UK; I gained my Master’s degree and my PhD here. I have been working here. I bought my house here. I adopted no fewer than five four-legged companions here. But this does not change much, except for the fact that due to my former marriage to a British subject the residency requirement is reduced from 5 to 3 years and I do not need to hold Permanent Residence for a year before applying for naturalisation as is normally the case. As an EU national living in the UK who also researches migration within the European context, I am upset and confused. The result of the referendum

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EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY

made me feel unwelcome. When I woke up the day following the Referendum the world seemed a different place, more hostile. When I went about my everyday activities, suddenly I found myself very wary about the way my neighbours look at me. I tried not to speak in public so as not to attract attention to my foreign accent. I felt singled out and targeted despite no obvious changes in the behaviour of those around me. Still, I had considered this decision as a clear indication that migrants are unwelcome and so that got me thinking about what my options were. The thought of returning to Poland crossed my mind but having spent the last 10 years in the UK straight after university meant that I no longer recognised my home country as familiar or felt I belong or fit in there. The thought of having to start everything over filled me with dread and anxiety. So, I settled for Scotland and thought that if the worst comes to the worst I will be looking to move there as a place that seemed more friendly, welcoming and appreciative of migrants. Yet, I was hoping that dust would settle, and I would not have to move the life I have built in the UK to anywhere else. It felt like I had no choice but to officially regulate my stay by acquiring permanent residence (PR) despite having already gained this status by exercising my treaty rights. The process of obtaining PR has undergone many changes but remains lengthy with the requirement to produce a number of documents from the 5-year qualifying period (all P60s/payslips/bills for every year). I passed the dreaded Life in the UK test with which I assume an average Brit would struggle. I paid £12823 and then, I was lucky enough to be invited to swear allegiance to the Queen (NB those who are born here are not required to do this). I looked forward to becoming another (angry) voter. This seemed like an obvious order of things for me because of work, friends and practically all my adult life that I spent in the UK, but I can see why those whose profession and work experience can be more easily transferred elsewhere (that is a lot of my friends) are inclined to wait and see and then perhaps leave.

xvi

PROLOGUE

The personal is political. The private is political as secondwave feminists argued. This emphasises the connections between personal experience and larger social and political processes. So, this is how my personal experience links to my own research; and this is how I have inadvertently, due to Brexit, become my own living-lab. I am now more conscious of possible exposure and subsequently of becoming a target on a daily basis. That said, now that I hold British citizenship, I promised myself to try and challenge any negative attitudes I come across. This is needed at this uncertain time when people are constantly exposed to fake news and to headlines that shout blame and point fingers at those who cannot easily defend themselves.

xvii

ONE Introduction and context

Here is why you should read this book1 The issue of immigration was a decisive factor in the pre-Brexit vote debates and it is still one of the most divisive topics in the UK. Therefore, it is worthy of attention, and whilst the British people had an opportunity to have their say on Brexit (the UK’s exit from the EU), migrant workers from the EU have not. In this book the voices of economic women migrants from Poland will be presented. This publication gives them a voice and the opportunity to be heard as it is based on original data from 40 qualitative repeat interviews (including eight repeat interviews) with female Polish nationals, who are migrants to the UK, conducted before and after the Brexit vote. The book will provide wider policy implications for the British and other EU countries’ authorities, for example the need for labour in the light of ageing societies; disparity between the image of an economic migrant in public debates and the lived experiences of women migrants with their traditional gendered responsibilities that often migrate with them, regarding the complexity of acquiring British citizenship.

1

EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY

This work is original for three key reasons. Firstly, it is based on the latest cutting-edge research findings collected in the UK and Poland before and after the Brexit vote. Furthermore, it offers insights into the lived experiences of EU migrants to the UK, as they try to negotiate their futures following the referendum on the UK’s membership in the EU. Finally, this book provides an insider perspective, as the author is an EU national (Polish woman) settled in the UK (see the prologue). This text aims to fill a gap in knowledge and literature on the subject of Brexit from the EU migrants’ perspective with wider implications for the UK and its labour market. To date, there has been no such publication. The British paid labour market, in part, relies heavily on migrant workers from the EU. Hence, it is important to gauge what may occur post Brexit when the UK may no longer be a desirable destination as seen through EU migrants’ eyes. This book will further develop the notion of precarity and add Polish women migrants’ gendered experiences to migration theories. It will also consider the wider implications of Brexit for the British paid labour market as it is, largely, reliant on workers from the EU. Some sectors of the British economy: agriculture, healthcare and hospitality for instance, employ considerable numbers of EU workers. Should these workers leave, the economy would, no doubt, suffer. This monograph is relevant to academia, policy and practice, as it is very timely and corresponds with the UK’s formal exit from the EU, which brought (and continues to bring) with it considerable uncertainty among British and other residents, most notably, EU nationals living in the UK. It will also be of interest to current and prospective migrant workers as well as other countries considering a similar referendum (for example see ‘Frexit’, ‘Grexit’). The overall aim of this publication is to deliver evidence-based and research-informed data on Brexit and its implications for EU nationals in the UK and in consequence for British citizens, too. This book will do that by engaging

2

INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

with new empirical data from 40 qualitative interviews with Polish women migrants and will attempt to address the following research questions: 1. What are the views of Polish women migrants to the UK on Brexit? 2. How, if at all, has Brexit affected them? 3. What are their future plans in the light of Brexit (in comparison to their original migration motivations)? 4. How do their (work and other) experiences compare preand post-Brexit vote? This book aims to challenge current thinking about Brexit, migration and the paid labour market which has been poisoned by neoliberal neopopulism (or as some argue neo-Fascism, Giladi, 2018). In this book, I will argue that, in the light of Britain’s ageing population, it cannot afford to lose its relatively young, skilled and unskilled labour force which is, to a large extent, provided by the EU through the Freedom of Movement. Neoliberalism and neopopulism as an important context Late 20th century political economy and social science theorists grappled with the postmodernisation of the globe through concepts such as empire, post/colonialism and integration. The humanities, social sciences and cultural studies have also responded to recent 21st century complex entanglements of technology, global citizenship, labour and consumption. Nevertheless, we know little about those living at the heart of all these processes: people often ignored by mainstream society. This gap in our knowledge is especially worrying when one acknowledges the growing global population caught up in this intersectional nexus. This book seeks to understand the deep interconnections of migration, the process of Brexit and precarity. Ever since the Brexit vote on 23 June 2016, EU

3

EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY

migrants who reside in the UK have been waiting for clarity around their rights to live and work in the UK and their entitlements post Brexit. Although this is a matter that often features in public debates, a lack of any guarantees from the government is prevalent. Hardening of borders is a trend across Europe and the rest of the world while a rise of the xenophobic right in Europe is evident. With the election of the new President of the United States of America (USA), neopopulism got into a full swing whereby facts based on research and expertise no longer matter as politicians and policymakers appeal to the public’s emotions rather than rational decision-making. This is arguably how post-truth and anti-intellectualism have been embraced when the opinions of experts (for example practitioners, researchers, scholars) are readily dismissed. In June 2016 Michael Gove, the UK Justice Secretary, proclaimed that “Britain has had enough of experts” which was then circulated in popular tabloids which claimed that experts are Britain’s greatest enemies. Contemporary examples of populist leaders include: Donald Trump (USA); Marine Le Pen (France); Nigel Farage (UK); Jeremy Corbyn (UK); and Geert Wilders (the Netherlands) all of whom have experienced electoral success, to a greater or lesser extent, by following a populist agenda. The abovementioned is linked to a rise of neoliberalism – the dominant ideology shaping our world today. Some authors stipulate that we now live in the age of neoliberalism which is characterised by global capitalism and consumerism with gradual erosion of the welfare state (Thorsen and Lie, nd). At a time of economic austerity, cuts to public services and raising English nationalism, migrants have been increasingly cast as scapegoats – the cause of social and economic problems in the UK and as a drain on society (Barker, 2016; Guerrero, 2000). This narrative was part of the campaign to leave the European Union by Brexit campaigners (Goodwin and Heath, 2016) and resulted in an increase in racially motivated hate crime

4

INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

immediately after the referendum result revealed that Britain have (by a narrow margin) voted to leave the UK (Taylor, 2017; Rzepnikowska, 2018). Hughes (2017, p.  477) argues that “Brexit – a political phenomenon that has invested heavily in cultural racism and ableism” is the latest manifestation of the neoliberal reality in the UK. Post-Brexit-vote Britain is characterised by a racialised discourse which somewhat validated racist rhetoric and has led to an unprecedented increase in hate crime (Sharman and Jones, 2017; Rzepnikowska, 2018). The Brexit campaign for Britain to leave the EU was designed to appeal to voters’ emotions and facts were hardly at its centre (Monbiot, 2017). Whilst the UK is preparing to separate itself from the rest of the European continent, globally, the contemporary world is characterised by increased interconnectivity (cf. ‘global village’ by Marshall McLuhan, 1962) which leads to transnationalism with lesser significance of borders between (certain) nation states (for example Europe has become a fortress, Carr, 2016). This economic, global connectivity is put against separation with regards to immigration and welfare policies. Neoliberalism is a global phenomenon. In Poland, after the transformation of 1989 and a transition to free-market capitalism, the gap between the rich and the poor grew bigger, the unemployment rate climbed right up and social trust declined which translated into a decrease of feelings of togetherness and community (Szahaj, 2014). In 2004, when Poland was admitted to the EU, the unemployment rate in Poland stood at over 20 per cent, in 2009 it decreased to just under 11 per cent (GUS, 2009). In comparison in the mid-1990s and the early-2000s the British economy was experiencing significant economic growth with less than 5 per cent unemployment in 2004 and substantial labour shortages (ONS, 2008). Today, the unemployment stands at 4.5% in Poland (GUS, 2018) while in the UK it is at 4.4% (ONS, 2018). This explains the large in-migration following

5

EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY

accession in 2004 and may also suggest increased willingness to return today. International migration as an inevitable part of globalisation Migration is an age-old strategy to improve life. Yet, it was only relatively recently, in the 19th century, that migration was recognised as a social phenomenon and consequently investigated (Gabaccia, 2014). Arguably, due to the forces of globalisation, people’s mobility between and within national borders became normalised and today it is a necessity in some work environments (for example banking, marketing) and for some people’s livelihoods (Vollmer, Sert and İçduygu, 2015; White, 2011). Migration is one of the key processes of social change and development (Klagge et al, 2007). Migration is increasingly understood as a process rather than a one-off event (Ackers, 1998; Lutz, 2010; Pemberton and Scullion, 2013). In the past, migration was characterised by a movement of people from point A to point B, now those moves appear to have become more unpredictable (Wallace, 2002). According to some scholars, ‘the mobility turn’ in social sciences emphasises the divide between the largely unwanted migration of (regarded as low-skilled) labour migrants and the more positively perceived mobility of highly-skilled professionals (Faist, 2013). Castles and Miller (2009) note that we now live in the ‘age of migration’ that is characterised by the acceleration, increased fluidity and unpredictability of international movements. Moreover, a ‘feminisation of migration’ has been observed, which implies that increasingly more women become migrants, which may not be such a new phenomenon (Zlotnik, 2003). Arguably, there are now more people on the move than ever before. In 2015, around 3.3 per cent (which accounts for approximately 244 million people) of the world’s population lived in a country that is different to their home country (UN, 2017). Europe and Asia are hosts to the majority of them,

6

INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

while the USA continues to be the most popular destination. This book focuses on post 2004 international migratory flows between Poland and the UK, two Member States of the EU (still). In 2013, the UK was home to approximately 7.8 million international migrants, which made it the fifth most attractive destination country in the world and within the UK, “EU nationals accounted for 4 in every 10 long-term migrants in 2013” (OECD-UNDESA, 2013). There was an increase of net migration (that is the difference between in and out flows) into the UK from the EU (from 177,000 in 2012 to 243,000 in the year ending March 2014) with approximately 66 per cent of EU citizens who migrated to the UK entering for employment purposes (ONS, 2014). The same has been said about Polish migrants to the UK, the majority of whom have been identified as economic migrants (Irek, 2011). In 2017, an estimated 220,000 EU citizens immigrated to the UK, and about 130,000 emigrated abroad. Thus, ‘net migration’ from the EU was around 90,000 – the lowest level recorded since 2012 (Full Fact, 2018). It can be argued that in recent decades the population of the UK has become more ethnically diverse which translated into the current era of super-diversity (Vertovec, 2007). Since the 1990s, there has been a rise in net immigration recorded with a greater variety of countries of origin. The UK remained an attractive destination for migrants for most of this time due to a relatively low unemployment rate, labour shortages and comparatively high economic performance, particularly in relation to Central and Eastern Europe (ONS, 2008; Trevena, 2009). A benefit of this process is the possibility of increased innovation which is conceivable through the exchange of knowledge and ideas between different migrants’ cultures and nations. Its other consequences, however, may include racial, religious and other similar conflicts (Vertovec, 2007). Indeed, riots due to racial tensions have occurred in the UK in 2001 in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley (BBC, 2001; Chu, 2011).

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EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY

However theorised, migration has become inevitable in the contemporary world and, due to globalisation, it is likely to accelerate while the forces attempting to slow it down will remain powerless (Bauman, 2016). In 2004, the EU152 were joined by ten new countries, the Accession 8 (A8) predominantly from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (Poland was among them). It is noteworthy that migration from the A83 to the UK has been identified as one of the most significant social phenomena of recent times (Pollard, Latorre and Sriskandarajah, 2008). In fact, the UK has never experienced as significant a flow of people as it did post 2004 (Trevena, 2009). Furthermore, Polish nationals migrating to the UK post 2004 constitute the largest immigrant community from CEE countries that joined the EU in 2004 (Trevena, 2009). Polish migrants constitute a vibrant and growing community in the UK as many are permanently settled there (Isański and Luczys, 2011). Polish migrants were chosen as the focus of this study because they represent a distinctive case of large-scale economic migration to the UK enacted within the new institutional settings of intra-European migration. In 2010, Polish nationals accounted to around 550,000,4 then that figure increased to 658,000 in 2011 and to 713,000 in 2012. This translates to 14.9% of all migrants to the UK (Salt, 2012). The prominent position of Polish migrants in the British labour force is confirmed by the 91,560 UK National Insurance Numbers (NINo) issued to Polish nationals between June 2013 and June 2014. Poland holds the top position in terms of NINos allocated to foreign-born individuals (ONS, 2014). In 2017, 74% NINos were allocated to residents from the EU and Polish nationals were second, behind Romania, among the top five nationalities with highest NINos issued (DWP, 2018). Still, almost all EU nationalities recorded a fall in registrations since 2015 (DWP, 2018). Recent migration statistics demonstrate that from mid-2016 to mid-2017 Poland was the most common country of birth for overseas-born

8

INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

population of the UK with more Polish women (467 to 439) than men moving primarily for work-related reasons (ONS, 2017). Despite the fact that Polish migration to the UK has been studied extensively, predominantly post 2004 (for example Burrell, 2008; Ryan et al, 2009; Temple, 2010; White, 2011; Cook et al, 2012; Kilkey et al, 2013; Pemberton and Scullion, 2013; Garapich, 2014; Gawlewicz, 2014; Duda-Mikulin, 2017a; Rzepnikowska, 2017), there is a lack of comparative data on EU migrants’ experiences from before and after the UK referendum on membership in the EU in 2016 (Currie, 2016; Portes and Forte, 2017; Guerrina and Masselot, 2018). Although, gendered studies of migration are now gaining recognition, there is limited literature in relation to Polish women (Kindler and Napierała, 2010; Slany et al, 2011; Krytyka Polityczna, 2014). It is true that Rzepnikowska (2018) previously explored the experiences of Polish women before and after the EU referendum but this was in relation to racism and xenophobia. Arguably, traditionally there has been a male bias in social research (Oakley, 1981; Morokvasic, 1983) and migration (Lutz, 2010; Yeoh and Ramdas, 2014), and comparative social policy often relies on secondary data rather than primary research (Ackers, 1998). It can be said that it is not that women are absent from migration theories but that their portrayal is inadequate (Donato et al, 2006; Lutz, 2010). This book seeks to contribute to the task of addressing that omission. Women migrants and migration as a gendered experience Gender is a ‘force shaping human life’ but it has been ‘regularly sidelined in research on international migration’ (Pessar and Mahler, 2003, p. 812; Donato et al, 2006; Lutz, 2010). One’s gender is not only related to biological and psychological difference but also social and cultural factors and thus is a social construct. Gender is linked to characteristics and expectations

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EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY

of women and men in any given society (Oakley, 1972). The concept of gender relates to both men and women, of course, but this book focuses on women. Female migrants began to appear in the literature from the mid-1970s; previously they were often portrayed as ‘followers, dependants, unproductive persons, isolated, illiterate and ignorant’ (Morokvasic 1983, p.  16). More recent studies consider women to be active decision makers (Kindler and Napierała 2010). This book focuses on women in migration as breadwinners, caregivers and free mobile agents. A male bias in migration theory and literature is still evident (Morokvasic 1983; Lutz 2010; Yeoh and Ramdas 2014). Migrants are often portrayed as male, single and unburdened by a host of gendered responsibilities that have been traditionally and stereotypically assigned to women (Boyd and Grieco 2003; Temple 2011). Even when a migrant has a family, he (as often asserted) is repeatedly represented as a migrant in his own right, a pioneer (Zlotnik 2003), whilst his female partner is frequently depicted as a ‘tied mover’ or a ‘trailing wife’ (Cooke 2001). In this book, internationally mobile women are considered as agents and represented as such. Despite increasing numbers of mobile women, migrants are still portrayed as somewhat genderless whereby considerations of gender do not feature. Worldwide, approximately 48 per cent of all migrants are women (UN 2016); and ‘over the past thirty years, more females than males migrated to the UK’ (Vertovec 2007, p. 1040). Thus, some scholars emphasise the contemporary feminisation of migration5 (Castles and Miller 2009), while others argue this has been evident since the 1970s (Zlotnik 2003). More than half of the foreign-born UK population are women (Vargas-Silva and Rienzo, 2017). Yet, women migrants are largely neglected in literature on economic migration. This is while the majority of post 2004 migrants to the UK have been characterised as labour migrants (Akhurst et al, 2014).

10

INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

Precisely because women have, for long, been viewed as those attending to the needs of others, be they senior relatives, young children or those who fall ill (and men more generally), these gendered expectations make understanding their international moves particularly complex. Moreover, gender ideology prevalent in the country of origin can ‘migrate’ with women, thus putting an additional strain on them as they settle in the new country but may still be somewhat constrained by the gender roles commonplace in their home country (DudaMikulin, 2017a). Issues around work-life balance remain particularly problematic for women migrants (Sweet, 2014) (cf. ‘double burden’, Hochschid and Machung, 1989) (and men too; see Kilkey, 2010). Women have become increasingly more active in the paid labour market; thus, they are less likely to be in a position to balance work with informal caring roles in the home (Daly and Rake, 2003; Płomień, 2009; White, 2011). Those who leave their homes and migrate elsewhere to take up care work often contribute to the creation of ‘migration care chains’ whereby they provide care work to the children of others while their own are attended to by their parents, for instance (Lutz and Palenga-Möllenbeck, 2012). This book is important because it focuses on women who continue to be the main caregivers and domestic workers doing the lion’s share of responsibilities tied to the private sphere (Keryk, 2010; Boyle, 2013). At the same time there has been a rapid increase in women’s employment rates (Fraser, 2013). Women’s increased participation in paid work does not automatically shift the burden of housework on to their male counterparts (Orloff, 2002; Keryk, 2010; Fraser, 2013). Moreover, the nature of relationships is changing and we now observe fewer marriages, more cohabiting, less stable relationships and decreasing family size (Pascall, 1997; Lewis, 2009; Fraser, 2013). What is more, the adult worker model prevalent in the UK and Poland translates into the increasing

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EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY

pressure on adults to engage in paid work (Williams, 2010), contribute substantially to the processes outlined above. Thus, women’s gender role expectations may be challenging when women become migrants. This is how women’s precarious position within the public and private spheres is framed while the vote to exit the EU is likely to affect these processes. This book focuses on how the abovementioned themes play out in the post-Brexit-vote UK in relation to Polish migrant women. As noted earlier, women migrants in Europe constitute over half of all migrants (Zlotnik, 2003; OECD-UNDESA, 2013). However, ‘the idea of a male breadwinning nuclear family structure and presumptions about gender roles within the family has dominated traditional models of migration behaviour’ (Ackers, 1998, p. 44). All countries of the European Union have seen a ‘feminisation’ of their labour force which indicates that an increasing number of women engage in paid employment (Ackers, 1998; Lutz, 2010, 2011). The European population is ageing due to increasing life expectancy combined with decreasing fertility and birth rates (Fraser, 2013) which result in a ‘caring gap’ (Anderson, 2000, p. 110) or ‘care crisis’ (Williams, 2010) and ‘global care chains’ (Kilkey, 2010a, 2010b). The abovementioned has been occurring at the time when there are fewer women who stay at home to provide care, when marriage breakdown and geographical mobility rates are on the increase, which arguably make familial responsibilities more difficult to administer (cf. Aranda, 2003; Lutz, 2010; Ben-Galim and Silim, 2013). The latter may be more difficult when partners try to reconcile a ‘dual-location household’ with gendered ‘responsibilities’ that are transnational (Smith, 2011) and employ long-distance caregiving (Aranda, 2003) or engage in transnational motherhood practices (Lutz, 2011; Cieślik, 2012) and face ‘double caring responsibilities’ (Ryan et al, 2009). The shift in the way relationships are organised and the removal of state support make it increasingly difficult for families, and,

12

INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

for women to manage the basic domestic and care work of the family (Płomień, 2009; Kofman, 2012). Further, transnational migration of mothers often challenges traditional family structures, gender-specific roles patterns and conventional images of motherhood (Lutz, 2011). The argument put forward by Lutz (2011), which is particularly important to this research, is that while migrant mothers engage in the paid labour market taking up the role of the breadwinner, the caregiving practices are not simultaneously assumed by their male counterparts. On the other hand, women’s transnational mothering (cf. ‘Euro-orphans’; ‘E-family’; White and Ryan, 2008) consists of sending remittances as a way of ‘long-distance caregiving’ (Aranda, 2003), but may contribute to a ‘double burden’ (cf. Hochschild and Machung, 1989; Doucet, 2011). This issue is also related to the fact that care is considered as a commodity which can be purchased or retailed depending on needs and resources (Orloff, 2009). A combination of those processes is partly a result of the fact that grandparents (or indeed parents) are less likely to be in close proximity or are simply unavailable (Anderson, 2000). Despite the fact that more women have joined the paid labour market, the power within the division of labour at home has not changed; this has been referred to as ‘dehousewification’ (Chan, 2012). As a result, women still do the lion’s share of housework and, despite the fact that there is evidence of increased involvement of men in parenting, childcare is still defined as women’s work (Keryk, 2010; Boyd, 2013; Kilkey, Plomien and Perrons, 2013). Precisely due to this, women who are migrants are often under pressure to reconcile their transnational gendered ‘responsibilities’ that are related to, on the one hand, their parents and other family members in their country of origin and, on the other hand, their children who are more likely to be with them in the host country. Those gendered expectations that cross international borders can therefore prove to be particularly tricky to reconcile.

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EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY

According to Kofman (2012) there are three main processes that explain present trends and which are an important context to this book. Firstly, the shrinking of the welfare state makes care work an individual responsibility. Secondly, women’s increasing rates of employment on the one hand, and the persisting sexual division of labour at home on the other, increase the struggle for women to reconcile various roles. Thirdly, women’s increasing migrations make balancing different responsibilities ever more difficult. These processes provide a backdrop for this book, demonstrate the complexity of female migrants’ lives and emphasise the importance to research this area. Lost in translation: the links between ‘migrant’, ‘refugee’ and ‘mobile person’ Anyone wishing to study migration needs to first understand a host of phrases that are relevant in explaining this phenomenon. There are many terms in operation and their intricacy sheds some light onto the complexity of migration theory and the immigration system itself. Indeed, a politicisation of the term ‘migrant’ is evident in the UK. Migration can be divided into international movements and those within the boundaries of one nation state but it is the former that causes considerably more concerns and often occupies news headlines. It is also the former that is considered in this book. Perhaps the most significant distinction in migration studies is that between voluntary and forced migration movements based on migration motivations and urgency to move. The former is often undertaken for economic reasons (or for marriage and family reunification or to study). The latter is characterised by far less choice and could be more accurately described as fleeing persecution, conflict or environmental disasters. All migrations can be divided between voluntary (for example for work) and forced (for example seeking asylum). However, some scholars postulate that the boundaries between forced and economic

14

INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

migration have become blurred (cf. ‘asylum-migration nexus’, Castles and Van Hear, 2005). As noted above, more recent literature recognises people’s ‘mobility’ as more relevant than ‘migration’ as it signifies fluidity and blurring between its various types and a greater unpredictability of individuals’ mobility patterns (Bakewell, O’Reilly, 2009). ‘The mobility turn’, as already noted, emphasises the hierarchy between perceived-as-unwanted migration of lowskilled labour migrants and the desired mobility of highly-skilled professionals (Faist, 2013). Refugees and asylum seekers do not feature in this categorisation as they belong to the asylum system. This signifies another complication to the hierarchy of migrants defined as those who cross international borders. All of the above categories of migrants, to a greater or lesser extent, are perceived as outsiders, hence less deserving and in consequence valued less. There are several ways of defining a migrant depending on: nationality/citizenship; length of time spent in the host country (usually 12 months); and place of birth (Anderson and Blinder, 2017). There are also many different migration routes: 1) moving to study; 2) economic migration for the purpose of undertaking paid work (pre-arranged or sought upon arrival); 3) family/ marriage migration for the purpose of joining family/spouse; and 4) asylum seeking when individuals flee their countries of origin due to having a well-founded fear of persecution (Anderson and Blinder, 2017). In this book, economic migrants take centre stage and they are understood as voluntary migrants who cross international borders for the purpose of paid employment. In here, EU migrants to the UK are considered and Polish migrants serve as a case study. These individuals will hence forth be referred to as ‘migrants’ while ‘return migrants’ are those who having first moved from Poland to the UK had subsequently moved back to Poland.

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EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY

Case studies used in this book: who are the people behind them? Methodology, methods and sample This book offers important insights that are of wider relevance to all those interested in developing a more in-depth understanding of EU women migrants’ experiences within the UK. This section provides details of primary research data collection, participant recruitment, sample characteristics and data analysis. The case studies presented in this book are based on 40 indepth interviews with 32 Polish women migrants to the UK. Initial 32 qualitative interviews were conducted in 2012-2013 (Duda-Mikulin, 2015a) and then supplemented by additional 8 repeat interviews carried out in 2017-2018. Polish migrants represent the largest recent migration ‘wave’ to the UK enacted within an intra-European context and thus, their experiences are often perceived as representative of the majority of EU migrants in the UK. The purpose of this study was gaining in-depth knowledge and understanding and thus, qualitative methodology was adopted. Additionally, qualitative methods are favoured by feminist researchers (Stanley and Wise, 1990; Maynard, 1994) and I wished to ‘empower individuals to share their stories, [and] hear their voices’ (Creswell, 2013, p. 48). Semi-structured interviews were the chosen research methods. Strategic purposive sampling was adopted (Mason, 2002). Snowball or chain sampling was also employed to enable inclusion of various individuals to take part in the research (Ritchie et al, 2003). I sampled across the North West of England (mainly the county of Greater Manchester). This part of England was chosen as the area with the second highest population density in England (ONS, 2011). I already had excellent connections with EU migrants and organisations that work with them through my previous (voluntary and paid) work. The fieldwork in the UK was followed by fieldwork in Poland.

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INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

The sample consisted of two groups of women who identify themselves to be of Polish origin. For the purpose of this research, Polish origin is understood as being born in Poland and speaking Polish as a native language. In total, 40 interviews were conducted – 16 with migrants in the UK and 16 with return migrants in Poland and further 8 repeat interviews with migrants. UK-based participant recruitment was facilitated by my previous active involvement in the migrant voluntary community sector where I established an extensive network supported by mutual trust. This was followed by Poland-based return migrants’ recruitment which was enabled through snowball sampling whereby those based in the UK were asked to consider if they know of others who returned. The repeat interviews that were carried out post Brexit referendum were not easy to secure as many people have moved on and I lost touch with them. I had to re-establish links with my UK-based participants half of which agreed to share their views. The sample included relatively young individuals, with the youngest participant at the age of 20 and the oldest 57, most of whom were in their 20s and 30s (during the initial phase in 2012-2013, this should be altered by 5-6 years to represent their age today). The majority of the migrants (see Table 1) had secondary education, whilst the majority of the return migrants (see Table 2) had higher education degrees. Overall, the majority of the research participants came from cities; many of the migrants originated in smaller towns and rural areas while most of the return migrants were from larger urban areas. Many of the migrants were single with children, whilst the majority of the return migrants were in a relationship, with an equal split between those with and without children. All of the return migrants who were in a relationship had a Polish partner, whilst a couple of the migrants had British partners. The majority of the research participants worked in menial jobs in the UK but most of the return migrants were able to secure relatively better

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EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY

jobs after their return to Poland. At the time of initial interviews (2012-2013) the interviewees had lived in the UK for between six months and eight and a half years. The data were thematically analysed by systematic reading of the transcripts followed by their organisation into categories of preliminary codes (Braun and Clarke 2006). Through constant comparison, a number of themes were identified (see Duda-Mikulin, 2015a). Data collection and data analysis were conducted simultaneously enabling recognition of the data saturation point (Ritchie et al, 2003). This research was subject to institutional ethical approval which was gained from the Universities of Salford (initial phase) and Bradford (repeat interviewing phase). I was guided by a number of ethical principles, namely: respecting the dignity, rights, welfare and safety of research participants; ensuring informed consent and voluntary participation; protecting anonymity;6 and doing no harm (Olsen 2012). All interviews were audio recorded for the purpose of verbatim transcription and took place in a range of venues including respondents’ homes and cafes. Six Skype interviews were also carried out with those in more remote locations (see Duda-Mikulin, 2014). As a token of appreciation for their time, each interviewee was given £10 upon completion of the interview (initial phase only). Translation issues were considered as this research involves two languages – Polish and English (cf. Gawlewicz, 2016). All of the interviews were conducted in the Polish language. I did not intend to encourage interviewing in the Polish language, but felt this language was more appropriate when it comes to respondents whose first language was Polish (cf. Temple, 2005, 2010, 2011). I am aware that much has been written about the ways meaning may be changed through the process of translation (Temple, 2005). However, great care was taken in the translation of the interview extracts and quotations with the help of a qualified professional translator. Although it is accepted that translators and interpreters somewhat influence the research

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INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

too (Temple, 2002) this was given much reflection. Moreover, upon receipt of the translated transcript, I had undertaken ‘quality assurance’ to ensure the specific meanings were not changed. It could be argued that I, a post-accession migrant and a Polish native speaker, with support from a professional translator and a native English speaker, was able to ensure good quality translation and equivalence. Structure of the book This first chapter introduces the reader to the context and the themes under exploration. The rest of this chapter sets out the wider context of neo-liberalism and neo-populism. Then attention is turned to international migration and its significance. Migration as a gendered experience is outlined and the many terms in use are explained. The final section gives further details on methodology, methods of data collection and sample characteristics. Chapter two is devoted to Polish migration to the UK. This chapter discusses the historical overview of Polish migration comparing the post-World War II diaspora with post accession migration. The characteristics of recent Polish migrants to the UK are presented. EU migrants’ legal status is outlined bearing in mind the complexities that will follow the UK’s exit from the EU. This is contrasted with real voices and new qualitative accounts from women migrants from Poland to the UK. In chapter three, I discuss existing statistical data on UK’s labour force and its characteristics. This quantitative data is complemented with rich qualitative accounts from recent Polish migrants to the UK. Different sectors of the economy are explored, in particular agriculture, horticulture, hospitality, customer services and healthcare. These are most reliant on workforce from the EU. Data on population characteristics is analysed taking into account the fact that it is ageing rapidly as is the rest of Europe. This increases the need for foreign-

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EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY

born labour to take on jobs unpopular with British workers, particularly when the EU labour force is younger and fitter in comparison to UK-born workers. This also suggests that after Brexit the UK is likely to experience labour shortages in certain areas of the economy. Indeed, news media reports argue that a ‘Brexodus’ has already started with EU migrants leaving their jobs and leaving the country in light of uncertainty following Brexit. Chapter four is devoted to the process of ‘Brexit’ – the British exit from the European Union and the complexity around it. First, a brief history of the European Economic Community and the EU is provided. After 43 years as part of the European community, in June 2016, the UK people decided to leave. In March the following year, the UK Prime Minister officially started the process of Brexit. Second, the political complexity behind the decision to hold the referendum is explored. The wider context and political climate worldwide is analysed with particular focus on the rise of distrust, disillusion and identity politics. The context of the new populism as the prevalent ideology is put against the political situation in the UK with David Cameron starting talks on the need for the people to have their say in the run up to General Election 2015. Third, results of the referendum are analysed and critically discussed taking into account data on voters and their demographic characteristics. While Brexit was decided by a relatively small margin of people, the topic of immigration was key in the debates preceding the EU referendum. The complexity of Brexit for EU migrants will be demonstrated by drawing on qualitative accounts from recent Polish migrant women to the UK. Chapter five investigates the notion of ‘precarity’, particularly in relation to the paid labour market and the migrants within it. I first refer to Guy Standing’s (2011) theorisation of the precariat as the new dangerous class and its relevance to migration and migrants. The fashioning of precarious workers is analysed and put against the backdrop of EU workforce (Lewis et al,

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INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

2015; Anderson, 2010; Waite, 2009). Precarity has been much discussed by politicians (Neilson and Rossiter 2008) and in the theorisation of neo-liberal labour (Standing, 2011). This discussion provides a global and comparative perspective on how the socio-political, cultural, demographic and geographic context interlinks individual migration experiences. I explore whether precarity and migration are synonyms and whether the process of migration always brings about some element of uncertainty. The chapter ends with discussion on precarity in contemporary world which is characterised by increased job insecurity which consequently heightens uncertainty about our future. The final chapter offers a comprehensive conclusion to what has been explored in the previous chapters. Starting with the wider global context of neo-liberalism and neo-populism and migration as an important social phenomenon within it; then, turning to migration from the EU to the UK and framing all of the above within the theme of precarity. Subsequently, looking at the British paid labour market, its needs and composition of the sectors within it. Finally, moving on to the referendum on UK’s membership in the European Union and the wider political climate in Britain and their implications for the EU labour force. This chapter provides a deliberation of some possible outcomes of Brexit and the likely visions for the post-Brexit future for the British paid labour market, for British labour force and migrant labour force. Policy recommendations with reference to British authorities but also the authorities of migrants’ sending countries are outlined. These will also be relevant to the authorities of other EU member states, particularly the so-called Accession 8 (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) and Accession 2 countries (Bulgaria and Romania). The points above are illustrated through extracts from interviews with migrant women talking about pre- and post- Brexit experiences and plans for the future.

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TWO Polish migration to the UK

This chapter is devoted to EU migration to the UK which is illustrated by looking at Polish migration. People have been migrating since time began; recently however, the issue of migration has been elevated to a key national concern in the UK. It is now one of the most contentious and divisive matters in contemporary Britain and beyond. Meanwhile, the government continually fails to deliver on its promise to reduce net migration to the tens of thousands. This chapter presents the most up-todate statistical data in relation to EU migration to the UK and migrant characteristics. This is contrasted with new qualitative data from Polish women migrants to the UK. This chapter also provides an explanation of the current complexities related to EU nationals’ rights in the UK. A series of qualitative accounts are presented to illustrate the abovementioned points: one of Kornelia, a low-skilled and low-waged factory employee, and that of Oliwia, a long-term well-integrated customer service manager, who notes “I love the UK, but it broke my heart and I will leave”.

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Historical overview and numbers1 Whilst the UK has witnessed many waves of international immigration over the centuries (Craig, 2012), Poland has by contrast been a country of emigration (Iglicka, 2010; Janeta, 2012); although, it is increasingly portrayed as a destination country, too (Keryk, 2010). In the second half of the 19th century Polish people (mainly poorer peasants and Jews) started moving away from eastern Poland. The most popular destinations were the USA followed by Canada and Australia. Germany, a neighbour to the west, also proved to be a common choice for work (Castles and Miller, 2009). Between the two World Wars many more Polish people decided to leave the country. As a result of the Second World War, the Polish borders moved to the west and mass displacement of Polish people, Germans, Ukrainians, Belarusians and Lithuanians occurred (White, 2011). It can be asserted that the history of Polish migration is as complex as that of the country itself. The first major inmigration was observed during the period of Poland’s partitions (1772, 1793 and 1795), when Poland was successively divided between the great powers of central Europe, namely Russia, Austria and Prussia. It is difficult to gauge with any accuracy the numbers of people leaving Poland at this time. However, it is true to say that during this period, many Polish nationals migrated. The most common destination at the time was North America. Polish migration to the USA had now been established and would continue at a steady pace for the next two centuries. Whilst Polish migrants and exiles continued to arrive in many European countries and the USA throughout the 19th century, the first real ‘wave’ of migration to the UK occurred much later (Davies, 2001; Morawska, 2001). During the Second World War many thousands of Polish men arrived in Britain through various routes through Europe. Perhaps the greatest contribution of all by Polish servicemen to the defence of Britain and other countries during the

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POLISH MIGRATION TO THE UK

Second World War was that of RAF 303 Squadron. RAF 303 Squadron was staffed almost entirely by Polish nationals and played a crucial role throughout the Battle of Britain in 1940. With British pilots at a premium in the early stages of the war, the squadron was instrumental in the days of the battle (Olsen, and Cloud, 2003). Following service in the skies above Britain, Polish soldiers and airmen, female auxiliaries and children settled in the UK. However, due to political tension between the Polish government in exile and the British government in 1945, the status of these people was unclear. Eventually, the British government decided on a policy of encouraging Polish nationals to return to their homeland. This policy was brought to an abrupt end when it became clear that the new communist regime in Poland ruthlessly persecuted those who either opposed the new communist order or who had any relationship to the wartime government and the British armed forces (Davies, 2001). In spite of their service during the war years, the British authorities were reluctant to promote the settlement of Polish people in the aftermath of WWII. Thus, Polish nationals were encouraged to migrate to the Commonwealth countries such as Canada, South Africa and Australia. By the mid-1950s, it was decided that those Polish people remaining in the refugee camps in the UK, known as Polish hostels at the time, would be given the right to remain in the UK and would be naturalised as British citizens (cf. Polish Resettlement Act 1947). The hostels had been mostly located in the West Midlands and the West Country, notably around Worcester and Cirencester. The conditions within the camps were relatively good and many Polish men were able to find work in the local areas to supplement the provisions within the camps. By the end of the camps’ operations, many had become overcrowded as families grew and the need to provide children with education was particularly pressing. Many of the servicemen and their families stayed in the area whilst others moved to various parts of the

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EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY

UK. More than 200,000 Polish ex-servicemen and women, together with their children, eventually settled in the UK with the largest concentration found in London, the seat of their last elected government in exile (Davies, 2001). During the communist period (1945-1989) out-migration from Poland was very limited; indeed, the majority of citizens did not possess a passport, which was only administered on special request and reasonable grounds (Morawska, 2001; Stola, 2010). Thus, official out-migration was minimal while illegal escape to the West was desired by many although not easily implemented (Düvell and Garapich, 2011). During this time the most popular destination countries were Canada and the USA (Łobodzińska, 1996; Morawska, 2001; Wallace, 2002). After the fall of the Berlin wall, the borders were open again. Then, during the post-Cold War era in the 1990s, Polish nationals again mainly migrated to the other side of the Atlantic with relatively small numbers coming to the UK (Temple, 1994, 1999; Garapich, 2008b). Polish post accession migration to the UK As already stated, on 1 May 2004 ten new countries joined the original European Union Member States (EU15):2 The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta. The first eight of those countries are referred to as the Accession 83 (A8, also known as EU8) countries.4 In 2004, the UK was one of only three countries5 to open its labour market to the A8 nationals, a decision, it can be argued, which was based on the need for workers rather than altruism. Additionally, the predictions were that only a small number of migrant workers would arrive in the UK, however, the actual numbers were greatly beyond statisticians’ predictions (Currie, 2008). As the new states from Central and Eastern Europe joined the EU, many of their nationals almost immediately decided to exercise their newly won rights to free

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POLISH MIGRATION TO THE UK

movement as EU citizens which resulted in large numbers of people moving to the UK. As mobile European citizens, many migrants assumed they could improve their lives and remit money home as a result of wage disparities and the relatively low unemployment rate in the UK (cf. Dustmann and Weiss, 2007; ONS, 2011). Following the expansion of the EU, migration from the Accession 8 (A8/EU86) to the UK was identified as a significant social phenomenon (Pollard, Latorre and Sriskandarajah, 2008). Polish migrants to the UK were the largest migrant community from CEE countries that joined the EU in 2004 (Trevena, 2009). The majority of Polish migrants to the UK have been identified as economic migrants (Sobis, Junjan and de Vries, 2016; Akhurst et al, 2014). At the time of accession, the UK was an attractive destination for economic migrants due to a relatively low unemployment rate, labour shortages and comparatively higher economic performance, particularly in relation to CEE countries (Trevena, 2009). The UK has witnessed many waves of international immigration over the centuries (Craig et al, 2012). Polish migration to the UK post EU accession was ‘one of the most intensive migration flows in contemporary European history’ (Trevena 2009, 1). Prior to the beginning of the 21st century, the UK experienced relatively small A8 immigration whilst after 2004 it was confronted with ‘the largest ever wave of immigration’ (Drinkwater, Eade and Garapich, 2006, p. 2). In 2004, the UK was in need of workers to meet labour shortages and foreign labour was seen as a solution to this (Currie, 2008). Still, certain measures (for example Worker Registration Scheme; Habitual Residence Test) were put in place to protect the UK welfare system. While some sources claim that large numbers of A8 workers have left the country in the aftermath of the global economic crisis in 2008; others acknowledge that there is a constant circulation of A8 migrants moving between the UK and their homelands in order to access work (White, 2014). Additionally, substantial numbers appear

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to be long-term residents settled in the UK (White, 2014). That said, following the Brexit vote, some scholars note that ‘Brexodus’ has begun with EU migrants leaving their jobs and the country (Swinford, 2017; Luyendijk, 2017; Agerholm, 2016) which is linked to the overwhelming uncertainty (and raciallymotivated abuse) that followed the result of the referendum (Luyendijk, 2017; Taylor, 2017). More on this can be found in chapter four. It was estimated that between one and two million Polish nationals left Poland for the West after 2004; hence the Polish community is said to be the most rapidly growing migrant community in contemporary Britain (Valenta et al, 2015). Migrant Polish nationals soon became the single largest foreignborn resident group in the UK (Trevena, 2009) and by 2011 the Polish language became the second, after English, most widely spoken language in England (ONS, 2011). Polish migration to the UK is not a new phenomenon as the idealised stereotype of a Polish migrant worker was coined in relation to the postWWII Polish diaspora. It points to a hard-working, educated, compliant worker, who makes few demands on welfare services in the UK (Drummond and Judd, 2011). Despite the fact that in the past the majority of post-accession migrants to the UK were young male adults (UKBA 2009), recent data demonstrates more female than male migrants (ONS, 2017). Thus, it is important to explore women from EU countries and add to the literature on international women migrants and female economic migrants within the context of Brexit. Evidently, the recent wave of Polish migration to the UK is not unique in some respects (for example home/host country) but it is novel in others (for example scale, motivations). Furthermore, it cannot be taken as read that members of the Polish post-war diaspora and their families continue to identify as Polish (cf. Temple, 2010, 2011). Many second and third generation Polish immigrants to the UK may by now identify as British or reconcile multiple identities (Temple, 2010). Irek

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(2011, p. 6) offers a comparison between the post-war diaspora and the more recent Polish arrivals, clearly portraying the recent economic migrants in a comparatively less positive light: “almost sacred political migration and ordinary, profane and rather shameful economic migration”. Similarly, the following quotation demonstrates a comparison between the post-war and post-accession Polish migration to the UK. After the end of communism, migrants were seen as primarily economically motivated as opposed to earlier politically motivated migrants. (…) Post-accession migrants are seen as market-oriented individuals, using migration as an opportunity for personal and educational development, the older established Polish London Diaspora is viewed as traditional, anti-liberal, more inward-looking and explicitly relying on family and Christian values. (Garapich, 2008, p. 137 as quoted in Erel, 2011, p. 704) However, it should be emphasised that, although the previous flows of Polish migrants to the UK post WWII are important to acknowledge, this book deals exclusively with those Polish nationals who arrived in the UK post 2004. Having outlined the above, it is hardly surprising that Accession 8 migration to the UK has been studied extensively, particularly since the European Union enlargement in 2004 (for example Drinkwater, Eade and Garapich, 2006; Slany, 2008; Grabowska-Lusińska and Okólski, 2008; Burell, 2011; Dustmann and Frattini, 2013; Pemberton and Scullion, 2013). There have been a number of studies focusing on migrant workers from the new A8 countries (for example Kilkey, 2010; Scullion and Morris, 2010; White, 2011; Cook et al, 2012) but few of them focus on women (for example Janta, 2013; Siara, 2009) and fewer still explore pre- and postBrexit vote experiences (for example Rzepnikowska, 2018).

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Migrants’ portrait The majority of post-accession migrants are young adults, with over 80 per cent of those registered with the WRS between 18 and 34 years of age (UKBA, 2009). ‘Around 69 per cent of people born in Poland were aged 25-49 compared with around 34 per cent of the UK population as a whole’ (Hawkins and Moses, 2016). About one third of recent Polish migrants to the UK came from rural areas whilst over 40 per cent originated in towns with a population of under a hundred thousand (Fihel and Kaczmarczyk, 2009, as quoted in White, 2010, p. 566). This is comparable with my sample (see Table 1 and Table 2). However, it is noteworthy that there is a clear lack of reliable sources of statistical data in regard to the size and scale of migration to the UK as well as the size and scale of out-migration from Poland (Trevena, 2009). The data is fragmented and does not offer a full picture as there is no one consistent way for recording people’s migrations; thus, producing accurate estimates has proved to be a challenge.7 With regard to estimates about the Polish migrant population in the UK, whilst in September 1939 there were approximately 3,500 Polish nationals, following the EU enlargement the Polish Embassy estimated that in the first five weeks 50,000 Polish nationals migrated to the UK (Janeta, 2012). Between the end of 2003 and 2011 the Polish-born population in the UK increased from 75,000 to 532,000 (ONS, 2011). According to some of the Polish sources, post 2004, between one to two million nationals emigrated to the West (GUS, 2012). Whilst this figure is not nation specific, in light of many sources reporting that the UK was the most popular destination for Polish nationals, it is likely that a significant proportion of these migrants relocated there. According to the most recent statistical estimates from the ONS, in 2017, there were 907 thousand Polish nationals in the UK out of which 439 were male and 467 were female (ONS, 2017). Polish nationals still held the top place of the most

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common countries of birth for overseas-born population in the UK. Out of the eight English regions (North East, South East, North West, South West, Yorkshire and the Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands, East) in only two (West Midlands and Yorkshire and the Humber and in London) Poland was beaten by India as the most common country of birth. Out of the four UK nations (England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland), only in Northern Ireland Poland was not the most common country of birth of its residents as the Republic of Ireland was (ONS, 2017). According to the ONS estimations on UK resident population by nationality, between 2011 and 2016, this has largely remained the same for EU8 nationals who form 2% (Vickers, 2017). White (2011) argues that for Polish nationals who chose to migrate to the UK post the EU enlargement in 2004, migration became a way of life and a ‘livelihood strategy’. For others, migration may be a way ‘to have fun and enjoy life before going back to the normal life and a normal family in Poland’ (Cieślik, 2012, p. 15). Post-accession migrants are often seen as ‘individual actors engaging in the rational pursuit of economic goals’ (Irek, 2011, p. 1). White (2011) explains that due to ‘brain overflow’ in Poland, whereby almost half of 19-24-year-olds were university students, workplaces for graduates could not keep up with the demand. The lack of opportunities was an important push factor for young Polish nationals to move to the UK. Lena is a good example of someone who tried her best to fit in and settle in her new place in the UK but she found it difficult to adjust to the new surroundings which did not match her expectations. This was whilst her aspirations were raised by the fact that she learnt English at school and expected it to make things easier and that she was educated to a degree level. Lena eventually returned to Poland as she was not satisfied with her standard of living and with the UK setting as she had higher ambitions than to work in menial jobs and only those seemed available.

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LENA (return migrant8): Well, basically, first of all we went to a crappy place, a town that was an industrial town. And work there was mainly in factories, it was difficult to find anything else. That’s one thing; another was the language, for me. I don’t know if you heard of the dialect from that area. (…) And that was difficult for me, to switch, because you learn [English] at school for so long and go there [UK] and it turns out it’s no use anyway [because you can’t understand the different accents]. (…) That surprised me and that those people, there’s this mentality, so simple, people are simple (…). They don’t need to grow, develop, go to college or university. No one there goes to university. Everyone focuses on work and earning and partying at the weekend. Julia, quoted below, found herself jobless while her partner was out of work too and so they weighted up their options and decided to go abroad to search for a better life where work is better paid and translates into a higher standard of living. JULIA (return migrant): It looked as though I’d lose my job here in Poland. You know, the issue was that my boyfriend didn’t have a job either, right, he also, they made him redundant too yeah so, we wondered what to do. Are we going to work for 1,000PLN [approx. 200GBP/month]? Do we look for another job or should we definitely go [abroad]? Yeah, and basically, he came up with the idea of leaving, we’d been together for two years by then so we had some plans that we’d be together and it turned out that my boyfriend remembered that he knew someone in Manchester. Yeah, so he called him and [he-the

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friend] took care of everything for us. So, we had an easy beginning, very easy, because basically, we had everything ready, we even had a job taken care of because this friend found us work and a week later, we went to work...9 Other scholars emphasized the ‘brain drain’ of Polish migrants to the UK who cannot utilise their skills here and, despite being relatively well educated, find themselves in low-paid, low-skilled jobs (Grabowska-Lusińska and Okólski, 2008). This was the case with some of my interviewees. Others however, came to the UK in order to secure a better life for their offspring. Monika, whose account is presented below, fell pregnant while in college and believed that she would be better off with her mother who, at the time, lived in the UK and who explained that Monika will be able to better manage her education and finances in the UK than Poland. This was due to cultural implications and the availability of her mother to help out. MONIKA (migrant): I was at technical college in Poland yeah, but I met a guy, I got pregnant and I decided that I couldn’t manage and bring up a child in Poland, right? And study at technical college as well? Yeah and my mum was here [UK] so I decided to come here because I knew it would be easier for me to finish college because the level of education here isn’t like it is in Poland yeah and generally you get a lot of help from the state, right? Financially, I knew I could manage and that I wouldn’t end up on the streets or whatever. Yeah so, I came just like that but I wasn’t optimistic, I didn’t like the weather here, but I’ve got used to it now, I’ve been here for 3 years so I think, you know, I want to stay here I guess [laughs].

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Some of my respondents were motivated by love and a chance to be with their partner. Women migrants were traditionally considered followers of male pioneer migrants; thus, this is often linked to the phenomenon of ‘trailing wives’ (Bruegel, 1996; Cooke, 2001). This signifies migrant women as ‘tied movers’ who would not become mobile if it was not for the fact that they are in a relationship with someone who could be identified as a pioneer migrant (Cooke, 2001). Many migrants were also influenced by their networks (Ryan, 2009) and the fact that they heard of many friends leaving for the UK which raised their curiosity and eventually led to ‘chain migration’ (MacDonald and MacDonald, 1964). This was true for Klaudia, who followed her partner to the UK as at the time she did not wish to pursue a higher degree. KLAUDIA (return migrant): I went for love… I finished further education and immediately left with my boyfriend, he went two months earlier and I went to be with him. (…) he was the kind of person who don’t [sic] like to study, right, and he left for money. On top of that it was the kind of time when everyone was going [to the UK], all of his friends and that had left too …I also didn’t see myself at uni at the time, I was 19. It is recognised that life-course stage has a major impact on decisions regarding migration (Cieślik, 2012). Most of the postaccession migrants were at the beginning of their adult lives. Many came to the UK to gain transferable experience that can later be utilised anywhere they may subsequently decide to move (Bielewska, 2011). This could be said about Maria and Ola, for instance, who perceived a trip to the UK as an opportunity to try and experience something new, have an adventure. While Maria is a highly educated independent pioneer migrant, Ola migrated with her partner who she later married. Maria was

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intrigued by the diverse UK society while Ola was motivated by opportunities to study in the UK. MARIA (migrant): They said that it’s very interesting [in the UK], it’s multicultural, greater variety, lots of different people, cultures and cuisine. The UK is an immigration country and so there’s more happening and there’s this diversity. Poland is mono-cultural, that bored me, I wanted to experience a setting that is more diverse so maybe that’s why I came here [UK]. OLA (return migrant): [I wanted to study in the UK] because I heard that it’s a great adventure, good idea to move out of the [parents’] house. Because I studied in the same city where I lived so if it wasn’t for uni course I probably wouldn’t have moved out because I couldn’t afford it and there was no other good reason. And this way I could try it on my own, fend for myself, without the parents. ‘Brain training’ is particularly applicable here as some of the respondents migrated to study in the UK (Szewczyk, 2012). ‘Fluid migration’ trend is noteworthy, which is characterized by no settlement goal and no specified period of time (Bielewska 2011). This can be contrasted with ‘intentional unpredictability’ coined by Eade, Drinkwater and Garapich (2006). That said, I previously argued that ‘unintentional unpredictability’ is more applicable with regards to my respondents and arguably many other Polish migrants to the UK (Duda-Mikulin, 2017a). Whilst previous migratory decisions were linked to economic reasons, today there is evidence of migration being perceived as an adventure and a way to learn about the world (Kindler and Napierała, 2010). White (2011, p. 36), referred to ‘migration culture’ in regard to specific places in Poland where people

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see migration as a natural way of life. This could be said for Wiktoria, a middle-aged low-skilled worker, who managed fine financially while in Poland but this was because she worked three jobs at one time. WIKTORIA (circular migrant): I had a few things going on in Poland, I had a few bar jobs mostly, but I also had a lot of jobs in factories and the factories, basically shut down and that was it for me too … yeah and, unfortunately, life is better here yeah, and basically, in my opinion work is much better. Of course, it’s not easy in terms of work, it’s not easy ere ‘cos we worked in packing for 12 hours, 5 days a week for 12 hours, that was a lot, it’s not easy to stand in one place for 12 hours it’s not easy. But despite everything, you make money and somehow here [UK], for that kind of money you can live normally, not like in Poland. In Poland, I wasn’t short of money; I wasn’t short of money because I had three jobs. Among the more recent Polish migrants to the UK close friendships with the native British population or other more settled migrant communities are uncommon (Temple, 2011); however, many also admit to dislike and mistrust their coethnics (Irek, 2011). Migrants seem to be eager to cultivate Polish customs sometimes more strongly than they did before emigration, especially when they have children in the UK; ‘their Polishness does not define their whole life but appears when circumstances demand it’ (Bielewska, 2011, p. 103). It should be acknowledged that the majority of Polish nationals are Roman Catholics; many regularly attend church services and believe in ‘family values’ (Czekanowski, 1961; Łobodzińska, 1996; Irek, 2011; Temple, 2011) and even ‘young people locate family on the top of the hierarchy in terms of values’ (Mikołajczyk-

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Lerman, 2011, p.  115). Certain scholars argue that Poland, in comparison to the UK, is considerably more traditional, conservative, slow-paced and safe and that ‘family values are lost in England’ (Cieślik, 2012, p.  18). Having explained the characteristics of recent Polish migrants to the UK, now attention is turned to their legal standing. EU migrants’ rights In the run-up to the signing of the Treaty of Accession in 2003, there were many debates around granting the rights to free movement of persons originating from the new EU8. The original Member States (EU15) feared the consequences enlargement may have on their economies and the general wellbeing of their citizens. They were anxious that increased migration of the less privileged new Member States’ nationals could potentially impact on the wages and unemployment rate of their citizens. Therefore, transitional arrangements were agreed and resulted in denial of full access to the EU law for Central and Eastern European nationals (A8 and A2) (Currie, 2008). The temporary restrictions on access to labour markets were imposed to safeguard the original Member States’ economies and could be in place for a maximum of seven years after the accession of the new Member States (until the 30th April 2011). The EU15 were not allowed to monitor migration from the new Member States but they were entitled to determine the conditions which A8 nationals had to fulfil in order to access employment. Those from the new Member States who found employment had the right to be treated equally with host state nationals in regard to work conditions, access to housing and social and tax advantages (Currie, 2008). The restrictions were addressed predominantly to workers, and a distinction was made between workers and self-employed persons. The latter category was excluded from the restrictions imposed on workers. What is more, those who lived and worked in the EU15 countries prior

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to the EU enlargement were not subjected to the transitional provisions if they had previously been resident for a continuous period of 12 months (Currie, 2008). In regard to the national implementation of transitional restrictions, there were considerable differences between the EU15 states as the decisions were made independently by each Member State on what restrictions to implement. The UK opted for labour market access provided the migrants registered on a Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) with the requirement to complete twelve months of continuous employment before being eligible to access certain welfare rights (UKBA, 2009). The UK authorities decided to take advantage of the national insurance and tax contributions of the A8 workers giving them no immediate rights to welfare entitlements in return (Currie, 2008). This is seen as problematic particularly since many of the A8 workers were incorporated in the so-called ‘3D jobs’ – dirty, dull and dangerous (Favell, 2008). Prior to the EU expansion in 2004 and in its aftermath too, the British press painted a rather negative picture of EU8 migrants (for example Ramesh, 2010; Pidd, 2011; Bakalar, 2013). Moreover, other members of the EU15, by imposing certain more or less restrictive transitional arrangements, put pressure on the UK to act similarly. However, as noted earlier, the UK was also in need of workers (Currie, 2008). The right to access the paid labour market was not challenged, given the EU8 workers registered on the WRS but the habitual residence test (HRT) which regulates access to benefits was altered. The HRT consists of two parts and an individual in question must pass both: right to reside and the actual habitual residency. Those with right to reside include those who are either considered to have permanent residence or qualified persons (Homeless Link, 2012). The WRS together with the altered HRT were meant to protect the UK welfare system from being taken advantage of by EU8 nationals, and at the same time enable the country to fill its labour shortages.

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Due to the post 2004 transitional arrangements A8 nationals had only restricted rights to welfare in the UK, however, this changed after the seven-year transitional period ended at the end of April 2011. From May 2011 an A8 national who was a jobseeker, a worker, a student, a self-employed person or was in a position to financially support him/herself was permitted to remain in the UK beyond the initial three-month period. However, in order to be able to claim out-of-work benefits, an A8 national must show that they are habitually resident in the UK and intend to permanently stay in the country (Currie, 2008; Homeless Link, 2012). Arguably, the improved access to welfare rights that A8 migrants gained on the 1st May 2011 has had little effect on the numbers of Central and Eastern Europeans migrating to the UK (Dustman and Frattini, 2013; Akhurst et al, 2014). Indeed, it has been noted that large numbers of A8 workers have left the country after the 2008 economic crisis (Pollard, 2008; Gentleman, 2011). Other sources however, have acknowledged that there is a constant circulation of A8 migrants who come to the UK to access work (UKBA, 2009; Harris, 2011; Pidd, 2011; White, 2014); this is while many are long-term residents settled in the UK (White, 2014; 2016). It is noteworthy that from the end of 2013 the British authorities have introduced measures that impose gradually more restrictive access to welfare for nationals of Central and Eastern Europe. In December 2013 a more robust Habitual Residence Test was announced for means-tested benefits claimants. From January 2014 income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) claimants must have resided in the UK for a minimum of three months to have their claim successfully processed. Additionally, jobseekers have to demonstrate they have a ‘genuine prospect of finding work’ to keep receiving JSA after six months. In March 2014 a minimum earnings threshold was introduced to decide if a person was in ‘genuine and effective’ work, and thus had a ‘right to reside’ in the UK. Then from April 2014

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CEE jobseekers have been excluded from receiving Housing Benefit when they receive JSA. Moreover, from July 2014 new jobseekers need to have lived in the UK for three months before being entitled to Child Benefit or Child Tax Credit (Kennedy, 2014) (also see chapter four regarding post Brexit rights). The UK has gradually been becoming more inward looking and isolationist. The restrictions placed on non-EU migration have been in many respects extended to EU migrants. Although the expanded EU may present a structural context that enables migration for EU citizens, European citizenship remains a ‘highly stratified status’ (Dwyer, 2004, p. 162) which offers preferential rights to economically active migrants, as the original goal of the EU was to promote and facilitate the movement of workers (Ackers, 1998). The majority of recent Polish nationals in the UK are considered to be economic migrants (Düvell and Garapich, 2011; Akhurst et al, 2014), thus their movement has been relatively unobstructed; although as explained above, the opportunities in relation to welfare rights have been curtailed at different points in recent years (Pemberton and Scullion, 2013). Polish migrants enjoy a host of social rights in the UK by virtue of being European citizens. Yet, European citizenship remains a hybrid type of supranational citizenship. Its hybridity stems from the fact that access to European citizenship is controlled entirely by the national authorities of member states of the EU, whilst its content in terms of rights associated with it – by the supranational European executive, legislature and judiciary. (Osipovic, 2010, p. 84) However, European citizenship does not ensure the same entitlements to all citizens who possess it (Dwyer 2004). The privileged treatment of economically active migrants originates from the rationale underpinning EU citizenship, namely the promotion and facilitation of workers’ mobility and ensuring

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they are not worse off when moving than when staying in their home countries (Ackers, 1998). It is noteworthy that EU citizenship tends to disadvantage women, whose relationship with the paid labour market is often disrupted by informal caring responsibilities. Instead of being treated as citizens in their own right, through the recognition of the economic value of care and domestic work, women’s claims to social rights linked to EU citizenship are often recognised through their own or their partners’ paid employment only. One consequence of this is women’s ‘very high levels of personal dependency on working spouses’ (Ackers 1998, p. 316). It has been highlighted that EU8 migration is linked to ‘the proactive and defensive engagement of social citizenship’ (Cook et al, 2012; also cf. Ellison, 2000 who originally coined this phrase). Cook and colleagues (2012) suggest that A8 migrants are active agents who utilise their national and European citizenship rights to their advantage. This illustrates the interplay of structure and agency in migration (Morawska, 2001). By migrating to the UK (as European citizens) they actively exercise their newlygranted rights to movement, residence and work in order to access opportunities abroad (Cook et al, 2012). However, such migrants are not averse to returning ‘home’ to their country of origin to exercise their national citizenship rights in order to access services (for example a dentist, undergo prenatal tests, and so on) and/or purchase goods (for example cigarettes, alcohol, meats, medicines, and so on) that are less costly or perceived to be of better quality than those available in their host nation. At the same time, their engagement with members of local host communities is often minimal (Hunt et al, 2008; Trevena, 2009; Ryan, 2011; Temple, 2011; Cook et al, 2012). The established communities seem to be mutually wary in regard to the new arrivals as the host country’s nationals often view migrant workers as potential competitors for increasingly scarce resources, jobs and housing in particular. Through ‘defensive engagement’, the locals use their national citizenship status to

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reassert primacy over new arrivals (Cook et al, 2012). This may be true particularly in the on-going global recession of 2008 (although there have been voices that this came to an end now) and now the ‘hostile environment’ of post-Brexit-vote Britain. Many EU8 migrants live in UK neighbourhoods where accommodation is relatively inexpensive and which are already home to diverse ethnic communities who have previously settled in Britain (Hunt et al, 2008). That said, many migrants visit their local shops that sell products from their home countries and interact with each other almost exclusively (cf. White and Ryan, 2008; Ryan et al, 2009; Temple, 2011). This translates into minimising their contact with the native population or other existing communities and engaging with them only when necessary (cf. Rzepnikowska, 2017). It is noteworthy that this is not solely a phenomenon associated with A8 migrants or the UK. Arguably, newly arrived migrants tend to live in clusters as it often proves to be more financially viable, safer and is a response to hostility from the host population (cf. Cook et al, 2012). Thus, it can be asserted that the EU citizenship status serves as ‘structure’ or structural context to the recent Polish migration to the UK while citizenship as practice (that is undertaking the actual movement from Poland to the UK) corresponds to ‘agency’ and migrants’ agentic powers (cf. citizenship as status and practice, Lister, 2003; agency and structure in migration, Morawska, 2001; Bakewell, 2010). Due to the Brexit vote and the overwhelming uncertainty linked to it (see more in Chapter five), many EU8 migrants to the UK now try to formally regulate their stay and apply for permanent residence (PR) card which confirms that they have been legally exercising their EU rights to live and work in the UK. Gaining PR is a necessary step if one wishes to naturalise as a British citizen (or rather subject). However, PR is not required by law as, according to EU law, one is automatically seen as permanently resident when s/he exercises their EU rights for a continuous 5-year period (Migration Watch UK, 2017). Indeed,

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there has been an increase in applications for both PR and British citizenship (BBC, 2017). However, despite such campaigns as The3million and British in Europe, over 4 million EU migrants in the UK and UK migrants in EU countries remain unprotected with no guarantee of any rights post Brexit but government officials imply little change to the situation of those who are already in the UK.

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THREE The British paid labour market1

In this chapter, I discuss existing statistical data on UK’s labour force and its characteristics. The quantitative data is complemented with rich qualitative accounts from recent Polish migrants to the UK. Different sectors of the economy are explored in particular agriculture, horticulture, hospitality, customer services and healthcare. These are most reliant on workforce from the EU. Data on population characteristics are analysed taking into account the fact that it is ageing rapidly as is the rest of Europe. This increases the need for foreignborn labour to take on jobs unpopular with British workers, particularly when the EU labour force is younger and fitter in comparison to UK-born workers. This also suggests that after Brexit the UK is likely to experience labour shortages in certain areas of the economy. Indeed, news media reports argue that a ‘Brexodus’ has already started with EU migrants leaving their jobs and the country in light of uncertainty following Brexit. The chapter is supported by extracts from qualitative interviews with women migrants from Poland with the aim to bring in real-life stories from those who took advantage of the right to free movement and engaged in paid work in the UK.

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The UK paid labour force The UK Office for National Statistics (Clegg, 2018a) reported that between June to August 2017 and September to November 2017 estimates from the Labour Force Survey show that the number of people in work increased, the number of unemployed people was little changed, and the number of people aged from 16 to 64 not working and not seeking or available to work (economically inactive) decreased. There were 32.21 million people in work, 102,000 more than for June to August 2017 and 415,000 more than for a year earlier. The employment rate (the proportion of people aged from 16 to 64 who were in work) was 75.3%, higher than for a year earlier (74.5%) and the joint highest since comparable records began in 1971. The unemployment rate was 4.3%, down from 4.8% for a year earlier and the joint lowest since 1975. For the same period, female employment rate stood at 70.9% and 79.8% for men (Clegg, 2018b). Table 1: Forms of un/employment Economically inactive:

not in work and not looking for work

Economically active:

in work and/or unemployed but actively seeking work

Employed:

in work/economically active

Unemployed:

not in work but actively looking for work/ economically active

In comparison, the employment rate in Poland in the final quarter of 2017 stood at 56.2% for people aged 15 and older. This is relatively low compared to the UK but may be due to large discrepancies between men and women and definitional issues whereby older people are also included. Female employment rate was at 48% in comparison to 65.1% for men. The unemployment rate for the same period was 4.5% for those 15 and older. The unemployment rate was slightly higher for

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Polish women (4.6%) than Polish men (4.5%) (GUS, 2018). Eurostat (2018) data demonstrates that in 2017 the employment rate in Poland stood at 70.9% and in the UK at 78.2%; and for women in Poland at 63.6% while for women in the UK at 73.1%. This shows that although the unemployment rate is now comparable between Poland and the UK, more women in the UK are in work in comparison to women in Poland. One possible explanation to that is the relatively more generous welfare state in the UK which enables women to balance their paid and unpaid roles. The ONS estimates that, in December 2017 there were 2.35 million EU nationals working in the UK, 101,000 more than for a year earlier (Clegg, 2018c). The employment rate for EU nationals (81.2%) was higher than that for UK nationals (75.6%) and higher than that for non-EU nationals (63.2%). The economic inactivity rate for non-UK nationals from EU countries has been lower than that for UK nationals since the mid-2000s. This reflects low economic inactivity rates (and correspondingly high employment rates) among migrants from Poland and other East European countries within the EU. Employment rates vary between countries of origin, however. In 2015, the employment rates of foreign-born male workers from: EU8 (91%), EU2 (89%), Oceania (87%), India (84%), The Americas (81%), Pakistan (80%), and Bangladesh (79%) were higher than those of UK-born men (78%). Indeed, according to the same estimates EU8 women’s employment rates stood at 78%, same as that for UK-born men (Rienzo, 2017). Still, this should not be a surprise given that the majority of migrants from the EU8 come to the UK for work purposes and thus are strongly economically motivated, as already discussed in previous chapters. According to the ONS (Vickers, 2017), in 2016, 11% of the UK labour market comprised non-UK nationals out of which EU nationals contributed 7% and non-EU nationals 4%. There are higher proportions of international migrants in some

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industry sectors than others; 14% of the wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants workforce are international migrants and 12% of the financial and business services sector’s workforce comprises international migrants. Considerable numbers of EU nationals are employed in the above whilst 8% of workers in manufacturing are EU8 nationals. Over a quarter of EU142 workers (27%) and non-EU workers (29%) are employed in the UK public administration, education and health sector. The highest proportion of resident EU8 nationals (estimated 26%) worked in the wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants sector; 22% of EU8 nationals were estimated to be employed in the manufacturing sector. This was followed by: financial and business services (13%); transport and communication (12%); public admin, education and health (10%); and construction (9%) (Vickers, 2017). EU8 workers are employed as process, plant or machine operatives (11%), this is followed by elementary occupations (10%) and skilled trade occupations (5%). The majority of EU8 nationals who are resident in the UK work for the private sector as employees as opposed to self-employed persons (Vickers, 2017). The majority of non-UK nationals are employed in elementary occupations in which approximately 669,000 nonUK nationals are employed (510,000 are EU nationals); this is followed by professional occupations, in which an estimated 658,000 non-UK nationals were employed (352,000 were EU nationals). Non-UK nationals are more likely to be in jobs they are over-qualified for than UK nationals; approximately 15% of UK nationals were employed in jobs they were deemed to be over-educated for (in relation to other workers), compared with almost 2 in 5 non-UK nationals (37% of EU14, EU2 and non-EU nationals and 40% of EU8 nationals). Moreover, EU2 and EU8 work more hours than UK nationals; half of working EU8 nationals (50%) and nearly two-thirds of EU2 nationals (61%) work more than 40 hours per week, compared to a third of UK nationals (32%). Compared to the national average

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(median) earnings (£11.30 per hour), EU14 nationals earned more (£12.59) whereas EU8 and EU2 had the lowest (£8.33) hourly rates (Vickers, 2017). Table 2: Types of occupations Elementary occupations:

Low-skilled. Elementary trades and related occupations. Elementary administration and service occupations, e.g. selling goods, cleaning or freight handling.

Professional occupations:

High-skilled and upper middle skill level: e.g. Corporate managers and directors; Science, research, engineering and technology professionals; Health professionals

Source: ONS

ONS statistician’s commentary included below demonstrates the substantial proportion of EU migrants within the UK paid labour market. Today’s analysis shows the significant impact international migration has on the UK labour market. It is particularly important to the wholesale and retail, hospitality, and public administration and health sectors, which employ around 1.5 million non-UK nationals. Migrants from Eastern Europe, Bulgaria and Romania are likely to work more hours and earn lower wages than other workers, partly reflecting their numbers in lowerskilled jobs. Many EU migrants are also more likely to be over-educated for the jobs they are in. (Vickers, 2017) The proportion of those in employment was highest for EU8 and EU2 nationals (estimated 83%) whilst non-EU nationals had the lowest proportion of people in employment (estimated 62%); this reflects the fact that many non-EU nationals immigrate to study or for family formation reasons. In 2016, the majority of non-UK workers (unfortunately, no specific data on EU8 was

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available), were aged 25-39 which is a much higher proportion in comparison to UK nationals for the same age groups (Vickers, 2017). Foreign-born workers are slightly younger than their UK-born counterparts (Rienzo, 2017). The occupational profiles of foreign-born and UK-born women are broadly comparable. A greater share of female migrants is employed in professional, and at the low-skilled end in elementary and processing occupations. About 29% of the female migrants in the professional occupations are nurses and midwives. Compared with UK-born nationals, the foreign-born workforce has become more educated. Foreign-born men and women evidenced higher educational attainment than their UK-born counterparts during 1993-2015, with the educational attainment gap increasing over time (Rienzo, 2017). Regardless of the high proportion of EU workers in the UK labour force, there seems to be a broad consensus among academic researchers that the share of immigrants in the workforce has little or no effect on native wages (Dustman and Frattini, 2013). Research suggests that migration to the UK has a negligible impact on average wages of native workers but more significant effects are evident for certain groups. Generally, low-wage workers lose while medium and high-paid workers gain. The wage effects of immigration are likely to be greatest for resident workers who are migrants themselves. No significant impact of overall immigration on unemployment in the UK was found, but data suggests that migration from outside the EU could have a negative impact on the employment of UK-born workers, especially during an economic downturn (Nickell and Saleheen, 2015). This section based on recent data on the UK paid labour market and EU migrants within it points to the fact that they constitute a high proportion of the UK labour force. Also, workers from the EU are younger, better educated and demonstrate higher economic activity when compared to native employees. The following section complements the quantitative

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element by bringing in qualitative accounts from Polish women migrants. (Reliance on) Migrant labour I would like to open this section with a quote from Aniela, a casino croupier turned masseuse, who explained how her work colleagues discussed and reacted to the result of the referendum on UK’s future in the EU. There were chats when I still worked in the casino. Brits were annoyed. My boss has two children and he was saying that he’d want for them to be able to travel and that if they leave [the EU] then who knows what’s going to happen. They were frustrated, those who voted to stay, because I then worked with many people from the EU, so there was a divide. But we had open conversations during work and most of them wanted to stay [in EU]. About 70% of staff in the casino were foreign. From France, Spain, Italians, Poles, Czechs, you know. And so, why would they vote to leave if the casino was practically reliant on migrants who were very good employees anyhow. (ANIELA, migrant, age 38, single, after Brexit referendum) One of the major driving forces behind Brexit was immigration (also see chapter four). Indeed, Brexit has elevated migration to one of the most contentious and divisive issues in the UK today. Naomi Klein (2017) emphasises that, due to ‘racial capitalism’, ethnic minorities have wrongly become the scapegoats of practically any current crisis worldwide. Meanwhile, the British government continuously fails to deliver on its promise to reduce net migration to the tens of thousands. The UK seems to be trapped in a contradictory relationship. On the one hand, the UK wants to retain trade deal agreements, and on the other, the UK wishes to fortify itself from the rest of (already fortress)

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Europe, forgetting it is actually a part of it. However, can the UK afford to cut itself off and potentially lose the migrant workers whose contributions to certain sectors of the UK economy will not go unnoticed as evidenced in the last section? As illustrated at the beginning of this chapter, hospitality, manufacturing, construction and healthcare are among some of the sectors of the UK economy that rely very heavily on EU migrant workers. Indeed, some of their representatives have already spoken about their fears regarding worker recruitment post Brexit (O’Carroll, 2018; Morris, 2018). The UK agriculture and horticulture sectors have long relied on migrant labour. This reliance has increased in recent years due to the seasonal nature of demand and falling unemployment in the UK. Labour Force Survey estimates suggest 27,000 people from other EU member states worked in UK agriculture in 2016. A further 116,000 EU nationals worked in the UK’s food manufacturing sector. During peak seasons, the agriculture sector is further dependent on a large temporary workforce – thought to be around 75,000 strong – to supplement regular, permanent staff in harvesting crops. It is estimated that 98% of this number are recruited from elsewhere in the EU. (McGuinness and Garton Grimwood, 2017, p. 3) Sector representatives acknowledge being reliant on EU workers and express their worries about post Brexit future and the likely labour shortages. Below is an extract from a recent report for the British Hospitality Association on the EU labour migration in the hospitality sector. Between 12.3% and 23.7% of the UK hospitality sector workforce is currently made up of EU nationals. In a scenario in which there is no new migration into the UK hospitality sector from 2019; existing EU nationals

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are not required to leave; and the recruitment of UK and rest of world workers remains constant, we estimate that the hospitality sector faces a recruitment shortfall of upwards of 60k per annum workers from 2019. It will be hard to fill the potential recruitment gap with the current unemployed and inactive population – existing vacancies in the hospitality sector are already proving hard to fill despite existing initiatives in place to attract these workers. Regions such as London (with 25.7% – 38.0% EU nationals), service lines such as hotels (22.1% – 34.1% EU migrants) and restaurants (13.8% – 26.1% EU nationals) and within these businesses, roles including waiters and waitresses (75.3% EU nationals), chefs (24.6% EU nationals) and housekeeping staff (37.1% EU nationals) are more highly reliant on EU workers. (KPMG BHA, 2017, p. 4) As discussed in the abovementioned report, in some sectors, current recruitment strategies already include targeting the native labour force but are met with limited success. Therefore, employers in manufacturing, for instance, are anxious about the likely damage Brexit is predicted to do to staff recruitment and workers’ desire to fill positions in the UK. Restrictions on the movement of people between the UK and the EU may be as important to businesses as any potential restrictions on trade. (…). Labour is a major concern for food and drink manufacturing as well as for non-food consumer goods manufacturing. Among manufacturing businesses, food and drink have the larger share of EU workers. (KPMG, 2017b, p. 6) Decreased EU migration is likely to have a negative impact on the UK economy as it relies heavily on the migrant workforce from the EU. Research shows (Harris, 2016) that a high

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percentage of staff working in the NHS, health and social care, construction, manufacturing, hospitality, agriculture and customer services are from other EU countries. Some of these sectors depend on the EU labour force (Doward and Robertson, 2017). The majority of Polish migrants to the UK are labour migrants who come to take on paid work (Knight, 2014). This has been said often enough. Economic migration applies to men and women migrants and through their engagement in the paid labour market, migrants make valuable contributions towards the British economy. They contribute through taxation and taking up jobs unpopular with the native labour force thereby filling any skills shortages and employment gaps as confirmed by representatives from the hospitality sector, for instance. It is, of course, true that these people also access various services (for example housing, education, healthcare) but research shows that they contribute more than they take out (Dustman and Frattini, 2013). Indeed, there has already been a decrease in job uptake by workers from the EU. Despite a shortage of nursing staff (Dykes, 2016), some sources report that there has been an increase of EU healthcare staff resigning (Agerholme, 2017; O’Carroll, 2017). Academic staff no longer feel welcome either (Talbot, 2017). It is also crucial to recognise migrant women’s roles in ‘topping up’ birth and fertility rates (Janta, 2013) through which they contribute to the prevention of the ageing process (Randall, 2017). Predictions for future outside of the EU The UK is a country of immigration. Not everyone likes to hear that though. Polish migration to the UK is far from new and I do not intend to repeat well-rehearsed debates on its scale or migrants’ work ethic. This is a well-trod territory (for example see Bell and Domecka, 2017; White, 2016). Instead, by comparing findings from my doctoral research with recently

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collected qualitative data from interviews with Polish women migrants I speculate about the potential consequences of a ‘Brexodus’ – the potential mass exodus of EU migrants from the UK as a result of Brexit. In my doctoral research (Duda-Mikulin, 2015a), I studied Polish women migrants to the UK and their migration motivations and motivations to return to their home country as well as some of women’s gendered transnational responsibilities (see Duda-Mikulin, 2014, 2013a, 2013b). The latter is, however, outside the scope of this book (see Duda-Mikulin, 2017a). Economic reasons featured firmly as strong motivators to move to the UK but there were also other reasons. My respondents migrated to undertake a degree at a British university; some followed their partners who had arrived earlier; and some were motivated by curiosity and the chance of an adventure before settling down. Among those who returned to Poland having first migrated to the UK (see also Duda-Mikulin, 2017a), economic reasons were cited most frequently. However, other motivations also played part: joining family in Poland; accomplishing their initial goal (for example sufficient savings; graduation with a degree); missing family and friends; wishing to settle down in their home country; or simply finding the UK undesirable for a longer stay. Below I showcase some of the most prominent migration motivations of my interviewees. A difficult economic situation with limited availability of suitable jobs was often mentioned while migrant networks facilitated moves to the UK. Julia, a young woman with secondary education who followed her partner, experienced this. JULIA (return migrant, pre-Brexit): It looked as though I’d lose my job here in Poland. You know, the issue was that my boyfriend didn’t have a job either, right, he also, they made him redundant too so we wondered what to do. Are we going to work

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for 1,000PLN [approx. 200GBP/month]? Do we look for another job or should we definitely go [abroad]? And basically, he came up with the idea of leaving, we’d been together for two years by then so we had some plans that we’d be together and it turned out that my boyfriend remembered that he knew someone in Manchester. At the time of my respondents’ initial migrations, unemployment was on a high in Poland and it was relatively easier to find work in the UK. Many migrants had to, however, sacrifice jobs in line with their education/qualifications in return for relative stability and comparatively higher pay. FAUSTYNA (return migrant, pre-Brexit): You could say it was due to economic reasons; we wanted to save up for a house. We were supposed to go to my husband’s family and friends first. I was going to go first, but when I was waiting for my flight, my husband found a job in the UK on the internet, I didn’t know exactly where we’d go at the time but knowing that he had a job and accommodation we chose this option with a job sorted and didn’t bother our friends. Then he left as I was still finishing my internship here in Poland, then I joined him and was looking for work and after about a week I got some job too. Faustyna and Ariela, both educated to a degree level, migrated for economic reasons and both utilised their networks in facilitating their moves that is Faustyna was meant to rely on her friends to arrange accommodation; Ariela migrated with a friend for company.

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ARIELA (return migrant, pre-Brexit): At the time it was very popular to go [to the UK] and it was clear it was the easiest place to find work and make some money and we hoped to save up some money too. The likely earnings were attractive enough and many migrants were motivated by the fact that they would be able to save up and eventually return. For others potential uprooting did not constitute a problem as due to the stage of their lives they were not (yet or not any more) tied down by children or relationships. This was the case for Wiktoria who was then a single divorcee in her mid-40s with one adult child. WIKTORIA (migrant, pre-Brexit): It turned out that, relatively speaking, it was tough in Poland to get work. The situation was hard so I didn’t stay. I didn’t really have anyone to stay for... I had a few things going on in Poland, I had a few bar jobs mostly, but I also had a lot of jobs in factories and the factories, basically shut down and that was it for me too. The comparatively more difficult economic and socio-political situation in Poland was often mentioned and thus migration for work in the UK where work was readily available and ensured good standard of living was a tempting option. The fact that Poland is now one of the most significant migrant sending countries in Europe (Grabowska et al, 2018) meant that many Polish people knew or were aware of others who had already migrated. Hence, reliance on social networks to provide accommodation and share insights regarding work opportunities was commonplace (Ryan et al, 2009). Marianna, a middle-aged married woman (with husband resident in Poland) mother to two adult children, was initially invited to the UK

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by her acquaintances; later her daughter followed and joined her in the UK. MARIANNA (migrant, pre-Brexit): So, my daughter has a friend who came here with her family, two years before I was invited over. My daughter came on holiday for a month, later, their daughter came to stay with us on holiday and so I met her parents on Skype, we chatted and they invited me over to work, that there would definitely be work here, good money etc. Yeah, so, basically, I came here in January, I just finished the tax year in Poland so I took a year’s unpaid leave so that if, for whatever reason, if it didn’t work out here, I could go back to Poland to my old job. ‘Cos you could say I didn’t have it that bad in Poland but I wanted to give it a go because it was supposed to be better here. At this moment in time we can only assume what may occur after the UK officially leaves the EU but migrant labour force is likely to be less readily available which may lead to labour shortages in certain areas of the economy, particularly those identified at the beginning of this chapter as those most reliant on foreign labour force from the EU (Brinded, 2017). The interview extract below from Kornelia, a single low-skilled manual worker in her mid-40s, demonstrates that migrants are wary of their post-Brexit future in the UK. KORNELIA (migrant, post Brexit): I’m worried. If we leave then something will definitely change but I don’t know what exactly. But they wanted this when deciding. It was all about immigrants. Besides I always said that if somebody wants my job then fine, take it. I once even said to a Brit co-worker

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[in the same factory], if you want then come and work here and that I can give it away to him, my job. He just smiled and turned away and got back to his, in my opinion, better type of job. Kornelia, quoted above, reflected on the fact that in her view there is a fairly clear divide between the natives and the foreigners which is most clearly evident in the type of work the two groups undertake. She and others I spoke to are of the opinion that British people due to being native can count on relatively better or easier jobs in comparison to migrants. Kornelia even offered her British colleague to swap roles which he either seemed not to take seriously or was simply not interested. The ageing of the UK population increases the need for foreign-born labour to take on jobs unpopular with British workers (Gardiner, 2017). As already demonstrated, the EU labour force is younger and fitter in comparison to UK-born workers. Hence, after Brexit the UK is likely to experience labour shortages in certain areas of the economy. Indeed, some scholars (Taylor, 2017) and journalists (Agerholm, 2016; Swinford, 2017) argue that a ‘Brexodus’ has already began with EU migrants quitting their jobs and leaving the country in light of uncertainty (and racial abuse, Agerholm, 2016) of EU nationals in the UK and UK nationals in the EU (some 1 million British migrants, often favourably referred to as expats, on the Spanish Costas) following the referendum on EU membership in 2016 (Luyendijk, 2017). More frequent returns of fellow countrymen and women and whole families were also observed after the EU referendum in 2016 by some of the people I spoke to as illustrated in the quotation below from Kasia, a pioneer migrant mother in her late 30s whose young child and husband joined her in the UK. KASIA (migrant, post Brexit): I noticed a lot of returns among friends and people I know, a friend had a

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van and used to send packages to Poland but now that’s more difficult as he has one house move [UK – Poland] a week. Families with children are returning which is bad as the children will be affected by frequent moves (e.g. two in 5 years) which are decided by their parents. Withdrawing children from school and their environment will impact on their sense of self, identity and selfesteem, am I polish, am I British? Why didn’t they [UK] want me? [they will be asking themselves] Kasia pointed out the fact that Brexit-related uncertainty is likely to affect not only adults but also children which may be particularly problematic. The rights of children of EU parents have been briefly discussed in national press (O’Carroll, 2018) but unless the parents are legally allowed to stay, the children whose both parents are non-British cannot count on any special treatment. Thus, EU children who may not know any other country as their home but the UK are in a precarious position too. When it comes to economic migration, one needs to realise that all available evidence shows that migrants contribute. EU migrants contribute through taxation, national insurance contributions, through spending their earnings (for example rent, shopping) thereby reinvesting in the British economy and they contribute through filling jobs unpopular with the native workforce. ONS data (Vickers, 2017; Rienzo, 2017) on population characteristics discussed above points to the fact that EU migrant workforce is comparatively younger to the British-born labour force. Additionally, demographic data with population prognosis (Randall, 2017) demonstrates that the UK is ageing rapidly which translates into a need for younger workforce which may prove hard to find without immigration. Population ageing increases the need for foreign-born labour to take on jobs unpopular with British workers thereby increasing

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the younger cohort of workers. This remains possible for now as the EU labour force is younger and fitter in comparison to UK-born workers.

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FOUR Brexit – the UK’s exit from the European Union1

This chapter is devoted to the process of ‘Brexit’ – the British exit from the European Union and the complexity around it. First, the wider context and political climate worldwide is analysed with particular focus on the rise of distrust, disillusion and identity politics. Second, a brief history of the European Economic Community and the EU is provided. In June 2016, after 43 years as part of the European community, the UK people decided to leave. In March the following year, the UK Prime Minister officially started the process of Brexit. Third, the political complexity behind the decision to hold the referendum is explored. The context of the new populism as the prevalent ideology is put against the political situation in the UK with David Cameron starting talks on the need for the people to have their say in the run up to General Election 2015. The results of the referendum are critically discussed taking into account voters’ demographic characteristics. While Brexit was decided by a relatively small margin of people, the topic of immigration was key in the debates preceding the EU referendum. Fourth, migrants’ legal status is explored. The chapter culminates in a

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series of qualitative narratives with the aim of illustrating preand post-Brexit-vote reality for those who exercised their EU Treaty rights and came to work in the UK. The complexity of Brexit for EU migrants is demonstrated by drawing on in-depth accounts from recent Polish migrant women to the UK. Context matters: the rise of distrust and disillusion The populist movement that led to Brexit challenged key elements of globalisation such as immigration, transnational regulation and the dominance of technocratic experts. (Taylor, 2017, p. 5) As discussed in chapter one, the context of raising neoliberalism and neopopulism is important to acknowledge, as it has had a significant influence on the result of the UK referendum on the EU membership. As already explained, neopopulism relies on emotions and not facts, whereby experts are easily dismissed as those with no real-life experience, whilst post-truth and antiintellectualism make it impossible to learn from history and to move beyond empty promises. In 2016, Michael Gove, the then Secretary of State for Justice, proclaimed that Britain has had enough of experts and arguably with this statement he started a war on truth and on experts. Moreover, some scholars argue that the Brexit campaign is the latest manifestation of neo-Fascism and so it should be called out (Giladi, 2018). This is while global capitalism and consumerism put increasingly more emphasis on spending and profit. This is a difficult time for migrants who are cast as outsiders and thus easy scapegoats. Hughes (2017) postulates that Brexit is the latest manifestation of the neoliberal hegemony as it has invested heavily in cultural racism. The recent referendum on EU membership somewhat validated a racialised discourse with racist rhetoric and has led to an unprecedented increase in hate crime (Rzepnikowska, 2018; Sharman and Jones, 2017). Neopopulism is a direct consequence of economic

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insecurity and austerity and it is linked to the changing working practices in post-industrial (post-modern) economies which result in increased job insecurity (Taylor, 2017). However, it is also a response to cultural change and an anti-progressive agenda which can be understood as a reaction to campaigns advocating for human rights, environmental protection, race, gender, migration equality and disability equality (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). The growing importance of free market capitalism, with limited involvement from the state, requires social actors to take the role of consumers who are in competition with one another and are only as valuable as their labour power (Monbiot, 2017). The structural inequalities that disadvantage migrant communities are wilfully ignored or erased as the myth of the fairness of free market labour is constantly reproduced. Globally, the contemporary world is characterised by increased interconnectivity which leads to transnationalism with lesser significance of borders between nation states (International Organisation for Migration, 2010). Yet, Europe is a fortress (Taylor, 2017; Carr, 2016). Still, some individuals find it difficult to move between countries. Those labelled as migrants are often at the periphery of society, they are the ‘hard-to-reach’ or more accurately the ‘easy-to-ignore’ (Matthews et al, 2012). The category of ‘migrant’ is a social construct signified by a limited inclusion, or in some cases, total exclusion from the category of citizens (see Duda-Mikulin et al, forthcoming). Bauman (2016, p. 3) notes that migrants have been produced as ‘human waste or more correctly wasted humans (the ‘excessive’ and ‘redundant’ that is the population of those who wither could not or were not wished to be recognized or allowed to stay)’. The waste of human life has been vividly represented through our television screens with ‘ghost ships’ sailing through the Mediterranean overloaded with vulnerable migrant people in search of safety. In modernised societies, migrants have been abandoned to the category of human waste (Bauman, 2016).

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‘Migration crisis’ was invented in order to remove emphasis from the state failing its people and instead to focus on what later became a ‘migration panic’, a convenient scapegoat (Bauman, 2016). As Bauman argues, migration is an age-old strategy to improve life but “our modern way of life includes the production of redundant people (locally inutile – excessive and unemployable – due to economic progress, or locally intolerable – rejected as a result of unrest, conflicts and strife caused by social/political transformations and subsequent power struggles)” (Baumann, 2016 p. 3). Within this context the Brexit vote occurred. This is important to acknowledge as it provides the backdrop which influenced national attitudes and in consequence the result of the referendum. Arguably, the Brexit vote was a form of a quiet rebellion against the authorities brought about by those considered as the losers of the recent social reforms (Seidler, 2018; Taylor, 2017). Brief history of the EU For the purpose of this book it is important to outline a brief history of the European Union. In 1957, the Treaty of Rome created the European Economic Community (EEC), or the ‘Common Market’. The six founding countries were: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. On the 1 January 1973, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the European Union raising the number of Member States to nine. In 1981, Greece became the 10th member of the EU, and Spain and Portugal followed five years later. In 1986, the Single European Act was signed. This is a treaty which provides the basis for a vast six-year programme aimed at managing issues with the free flow of trade across EU borders and thus created the ‘Single Market’. In 1993, the Single Market was completed with the ‘four freedoms’ of: movement of goods, services, people and money. In 1995, the EU gained three more new members:

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Austria, Finland and Sweden. In 2004, the political divisions between eastern and western Europe were finally declared healed when no fewer than 10 new countries joined the EU, among them was Poland, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. In 2012, the European Union was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Croatia became the 28th member of the EU in 2013. On the 23 June 2016 the UK filed for a divorce from the EU as the then UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, promised a national referendum on the membership in the EU. 51.9% of the British public voted to leave and 48.1% to remain in the EU. The turnout was at an all-time high at 72.2% (The Electoral Commission, nd). The most significant discrepancies in voting preferences were along the lines of level of education and age – those better educated and younger tended to vote to stay within the EU. The most dramatic split is along the lines of education. 70% of voters whose educational attainment is only GCSE or lower voted to Leave, while 68% of voters with a university degree voted to Remain in the EU. Those with A levels and no degree were evenly split, 50% to 50%. Age is the other great fault line. Under-25s were more than twice as likely to vote Remain (71%) than Leave (29%). (YouGov. UK, nd.) On the 29 March 2017 Article 50 was triggered marking the start of formal negotiations and conditions for the UK to leave the EU. A transition period was agreed, which is meant to last from the end of March 2019 until the end of December 2020 (but there have been debates about its extension). The UK considers keeping many EU laws and on the 26 June 2018 the EU (Withdrawal) Bill received Royal Assent, which signifies the start of the transfer of EU laws into UK law. Lawyers estimate that the process of leaving the EU may take anything between two and 10 years as there is no formal procedure for

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leaving (no one has attempted this before) and many policies and regulations need to be designed from scratch. Arguably, the UK had always had a ‘special’ relationship with the EU. The UK never had the official EU currency and was allowed to restrict the movement of labour. This was done by implementing the Worker Registration Scheme and the No Recourse to Public Funds rule after 3−6 months of unemployment (see Chapter three). The founding principles of the EU are: freedom of movement of persons, goods, services and capital (Europa.eu, nd); ‘the free movement of workers is one of the fundamental principles of the European Union’ (Light and Young, 2009, p.  285). The EU is primarily concerned with free movement of workers and economic and trade ties. Its aim was to protect workers’ rights to live and work in EU countries (Ackers, 1998). The Member States approved certain social security provisions for migrant workers, which mainly concerned employment and economic policy. Throughout the years, EU social policy continued to be established and protected by the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (1989), the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the Lisbon Agenda (2000) (Dwyer, 2010). The EU put in place various policies (for example the Maastricht Treaty) to protect the rights of its members’ citizens. Those citizens are seen mainly as workers, since the EU’s primary aim has been stimulating economic growth of the European community by free movement of migrant workers (Ackers, 1998; Currie, 2008). Hence, it seems as though the EU plays, in some respects, a similar role to a nation state whereby it protects its citizens’ rights and has clear criteria of inclusion and exclusion. It is evident that the existence of such supranational bodies as the EU, make citizenship tied exclusively to a membership of one nation state problematic (Morris, 1998). Brexit is likely to put a halt to the principle of freedom of movement, but it is still unclear what, apart from migrants, will be subject to it. Having briefly outlined the history of the EU and some of the

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EU founding principles, attention is now turned to the analysis of the result of the referendum. The referendum on the UK’s membership in the EU Immigration was a central issue in the EU referendum, and public anger and insecurity around this issue was systematically exploited by the Leave campaigns. (Taylor, 2017, p. 2) The roots of Brexit can be traced back several decades. This is linked to what Taylor (2017) termed ‘British exceptionalism’, whereby Britishness is supposedly incompatible with Europe as it is ‘exceptional’ and ‘separate’ (Taylor, 2017, p. 15). The de-industrialised UK economy caused economic insecurity towards the EU which, together with a perceived decline in British culture and identity due to immigration, played a part as did a rise of nationalism (and neo-Fascism, Giladi, 2018) which followed the above (ibid.). The British were long perceived as ‘reluctant Europeans’ and an ‘awkward partner’ in the EU (Hobolt, 2016) and the most Eurosceptic Member State since joining the EU in 1973 (Taylor, 2017). The latter may be rooted in the British post-colonial past and post-Imperial decline of what was once a world power. Brexit is a proof that Britain voted for change while the Leave campaign instilled racists with newly-found confidence through a set of half-truths and deception (Seidler, 2018). In the run up to the British referendum on EU membership, the EU became portrayed as an unnecessary evil forgetting that its roots are in a collective desire to prevent conflicts in Europe. The emphasis was on the alleged copious amounts of money that the UK is required to send to the EU while forgetting all the financial support received by British farmers, universities and scientific research and various projects in deprived areas (Seidler, 2018). In 2013, due to Eurozone crisis and the growing

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share of the UK workforce coming from abroad, the then British Prime Minister David Cameron attempted to address Euroscepticism by holding an in−out referendum on EU membership. This promise was a way for Cameron to be able to stand in the next general election and speculations point to the situation that he himself (as a quiet EU supporter) did not believe the referendum would actually occur. The decision to exit the EU was underpinned by ‘two tribes’ who represented two cultures and identities: Remain-supporting winners and Leave-supporting losers. The former group was characterised by cosmopolitan and liberal views whereas the latter were by nativism and nationalism (Taylor, 2017). These were linked to the ‘culture wars’ around the issue of immigration with the infamous Leave supporters’ slogan ‘take back control’. This ‘working class uprising’ as Seidler (2018) termed it is: A warning against injustice and against inequalities in the workings of global capitalism and a demand that we should rethink how the economy works and in whose interests the laws and arrangements of a neoliberal economy are working. (Seidler,2018 p. 116) When the UK joined the European Economic Area in 1973, this was predominantly motivated by economic reasons, as a way to manage post-Imperial decline (Taylor, 2017). The belief that Britain was a ‘world power’ with an ‘exceptional’ history and developmental trajectory defined by the legacy of Empire and the financial pre-eminence of the City, continued to define the relationship between the United Kingdom and ‘Europe’ throughout the eras of Thatcherism and New Labour. (Seidler, 2018 p. 22) Arguably a sense of superiority was always present in the way the UK interacted with the EU. The anti-EU discourse relies on

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the assumption that British people are fundamentally different from Europeans. This is also evident in the current Brexit negotiations, where the UK Prime Minister Theresa May boasts about how the EU will manage without the UK and conveys various demands related to trade which are mainly dismissed by EU officials as unreasonable. May appears to think the UK can have the best of both worlds – tight migration management and free trade agreements with the EU. This is rejected by the President of the European Council Donald Tusk as contradictory to the EU values which are all about the free movement of goods which goes hand in hand with the free movement of people. Brexit can be perceived as ‘passive revolution’ where the British people defied the leadership and expert advice and voted to leave the EU in order to regain sovereignty. This however, may not be that easily achieved as the UK will remain bound by EU laws. The unbalanced Brexit campaign relied on new social media technologies whereby public figures and politicians can communicate with their electorate. This means factchecking is limited as news organisations are not involved. The former UK Independence Party (UKIP) leader Nigel Farage’s ‘Breaking Point’ poster is one example of unambiguously racist manipulation suggesting EU migrants storming for Britain while it actually portrayed Syrian refugees in Slovenia. Many public figures, the late Jo Cox British Labour Party politician among them, expressed their worries about the “whipping-up hatred in the EU referendum debate” which contributed to “creating division and playing on people’s worst fears” (Seidler, 2018, p. 100−101). Immigration continued to increase under the Coalition government, and in the context of declining wages and welfare retrenchment, working class English nationalism developed an increasingly Eurosceptic flavour. (Taylor, 2017, p. 33)

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That said, during the run up to the referendum, the general public was made to believe that it is migration from the EU that is the cause of all the problems, without realising that non-EU immigration is relatively higher and that it will not be affected by the referendum result (Seidler, 2018). Many people wrongly assumed that non-EU migrants will be prevented from entering the UK. Other voices raise the point that whilst many young people could not vote, equally many older people who cast their votes would have passed away by now. Thus, the young should have a say on what will be their future. After over two years of negotiations, by mid November 2018, a draft agreement was reached setting out the terms of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union. The UK Prime Minister May’s cabinet supported it but there were over 20 resignations and some letters of no confidence. It is yet to be approved by the UK Parliament and the EU Commission. This is while some members of the opposition campaign for a ‘People’s Vote’ – another chance for the British people to have their say with more evidence and knowledge in-hand. UK businesses wait in anticipation, but many prepare for a no-deal Brexit. There are still more questions than answers, the most pertinent being about the terms of the new immigration system together with the rights of EU migrants already resident in the UK; resolution of the Irish border; and the future of the devolved countries that comprise the UK (for example Scotland in the vast majority voted to remain part of the EU). Despite the neoliberal globalisation, Brexit seems to indicate the beginning of the end of neo-liberalism as ‘Brexit articulated a rejection of cosmopolitanism and a demand for a stronger role for the state against the liberalising forces of globalisation’ (Taylor, 2017, p. 40). However, the jury is out on how this will unfold when the forces of globalisation are put against the will of merely (literally just over) half of the UK people to separate themselves from Europe.

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Migrants’ legal status in light of Brexit Within Continental Europe, migrants and asylum seekers have been ‘othered’ as ‘strangers’, as they generate feelings of existential ambivalence within ‘Fortress Europe’. (Bauman, 1991 as cited in Taylor, 2017, p. 51) The post-Brexit-vote reality is that many of EU migrants are ‘in limbo’, overwhelmed by the feelings of uncertainty and precarious status. While Theresa May and the European Commission claim they are keen to protect the rights of those European nationals who are legally resident in other Member States, at the time of writing this book these are just empty promises. The3Million campaign group have their hands full of work as they continuously point out that Theresa May has refused to guarantee the rights of EU citizens despite the wide consensus around the issue and the deep concerns they expressed, in conjunction with so many other organisations including British in Europe (see also Chapter five). Many of EU nationals in the UK now seem to feel the need to regulate their stay by acquiring a formal document confirming their permanent residence in the UK. Having said that, there is no guarantee that it will have any leverage as the whole system is meant to undergo a reformation. Indeed, no one knows for sure what will be required of EU citizens post Brexit. Still, this document offers some, be it limited, sense of security. On Monday the 26 June 2017 Theresa May unveiled plans for a new system whereby EU nationals must reapply for ‘settled status’ and for ‘pre-settled status’ for those who do not qualify for the former under a new regime. This is linked to additional fees, and although the system is said to be more user-friendly, delays are likely given the track record of the UK Home Office (previously the UK Border Agency, although this ceased to exist due to inadequacy).

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The permanent residence (PR) application is a complex process which under the new ‘settled status’ scheme is meant to be simplified. In comparison to other EU countries, the UK made this process very formal and complicated. Still, those who wish to apply for British citizenship need to first have PR. Some may feel they have no choice as they have made the UK their home and they do not see themselves anywhere else. When Article 50 was triggered more than 4.2 million people were turned into ‘bargaining chips’ (approximately 3 million EU nationals in the UK and approximately 1.2 million UK nationals in the EU), or ‘sacrificial lambs’, as some have suggested (O’Carroll, 2017). Those millions of people became a potential concession which could be used to advantage in Brexit negotiations. This figure will be higher if we include the children of these individuals. I previously speculated on the potential impact of Brexit (Duda-Mikulin, 2015b) and I put forward my feelings on the day of the start of the official withdrawal from the EU (Duda-Mikulin, 2017b). The post-Brexit UK appears bleak and for some, namely EU nationals, precarious with overwhelming feelings of uncertainty. Often, migration and precarity go hand in hand. Precarity is often characteristic of migrants’ lives, which can be disrupted by a lack of knowledge and awareness about their rights and obligations, a lack of job security and support networks (for example family). Consequently, this is linked to limited material and psychological well-being. For women migrants, this can be further compounded by their attachment to the private sphere, which often constitutes a barrier to their engagement in the paid labour market on the same footing as men (see recent blog Duda-Mikulin, 2018b). Due to the above, Polish women migrants and other EU migrants to the UK (together with UK migrants in the EU) are feeling under pressure to regulate their stay as they fear for their future following Brexit. While the process of obtaining permanent residence (PR) and British citizenship (naturalisation,

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see Blinder, 2017) is lengthy and complex (Travis and Stewart, 2016), many migrants seek to obtain it, which suggests they consider staying for good while many others are planning to leave (Wood, 2017). The UK authorities should recognise that the process of obtaining PR is not fit for purpose. It will likely exclude a number of people, namely, women who are homemakers or carers or those who are in unregulated work or do cash-in-hand jobs as well as disabled migrants (Huijg, 2018). One of the women I spoke to declared: “I love the UK, but it broke my heart and I will leave”. This was said by Oliwia, a Polish woman in her early 40s who has been living and working in the UK for well over a decade (since 2004). Oliwia works in sales, and customer service is the thing she loves to do. Oliwia has a busy social life and is a regular theatre, opera and concert goer and has a diverse social network including British friends and colleagues. She feels well and truly settled in the UK. That said, when I spoke to her, Oliwia stated that she is very disappointed with the UK and the government’s treatment of EU workers, and that she will not be going through the lengthy and costly process of gaining PR. She would rather leave. Oliwia unashamedly said that she is angry and upset with the way she is treated like a “second-class citizen” despite her best intentions and contributing through work and taxation whilst never even considering being reliant on welfare. She feels betrayed and is prepared to leave the country if the process is too costly or complex. From the conversations I have had with other Polish women migrants, it is clear that while some are prepared to follow the very strict regulations and obtain PR/citizenship, others feel they have been compliant throughout their lives in the UK and are not prepared to “bend over backwards” and apply for PR or the new settled status, or whatever other new name it may be given. Many migrants feel betrayed and messed about with at this time of uncertainty for all, but most of all for EU migrants, who are starting to feel the pull of (what certainly used to be)

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‘home’. Nevertheless, there is still not much clarity as to what will occur after 2020 and the end of the transition period. Brexit through the eyes of the ‘bargaining chips’ In any case, linking what is seen as ‘uncontrolled’ migration to the UK with the EU is flawed, as the majority of migrants in the UK are non-EU nationals (Blinder, 2013). This is the reason that public opinion shifted towards an EU referendum, as people associated it with being able to regain control of the UK borders. Far-right-wing Eurosceptics have gained more support by portraying the EU as an infringement on British national identity. What we need to realise is that migration is an inevitable part of human life, especially in today’s world, characterised by job uncertainty and increased mobility, to meet economic and other demands. As Professor Bridget Anderson noted, migration is not the cause but the symptom of other problems. It is an ageless strategy to improve one’s life and it will not end. No fences or water cannons will stop it. And while the Brexit negotiations are ongoing, the lives of EU migrants do not remain unaffected. Kornelia has been in the UK for about eight years and mostly worked in manual jobs. Before she came to the UK, she worked in many different countries including Italy, Germany and Austria. She is considering British citizenship but has not yet started the process. Kornelia is now in her early 40s and her biggest motivations to remain in the UK are her pension contributions. She does not think she would manage to earn a decent pension if she had returned to Poland now. KORNELIA (post Brexit): I think that this whole idea about Brexit was all to do with getting rid of immigrants. Because they keep saying they take jobs from Brits. There are too many of us. They allowed too many in. And really, I don’t think

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anyone actually realised the consequences of this decision [to leave the EU]. Kornelia by voicing her concern that “there are too many of us” “they allowed too many in” seems to buy into the Leave campaign arguments. On the one hand she is aware that reducing the numbers of migrants is the idea behind Brexit, and at the same time she has been influenced by anti-immigrant discourses whilst being a migrant herself. Oliwia, a singleton in her early 40s who works as a retail manager, has been in the UK for well over a decade. She is mostly angry about the current situation in the country and the fact that she now has to consider formally regulating her stay in light of Brexit. That said, she does not intend to apply for PR or citizenship. She decided to take her chances and wants to wait and see how the situation unfolds. OLIWIA (post Brexit): I never had that feeling of being terrified like some of my friends. I just thought it’s more of the same stuff, just another fad. But the more time passes [from the Referendum] the more anxious I get. I’m starting to feel insulted. If I think about it, especially my countrymen who are more vulnerable and can’t defend themselves like I can because they don’t speak fluent English or lack confidence, then I just think that it’s a massive insult. Kasia, 39, finished her postgraduate studies in the UK and works as a welfare adviser to new migrant communities. She was a pioneer migrant as she arrived first, before her partner and child. She then had another child in the UK. It is fair to say that Kasia is well-informed about the complexity of the welfare system and the implications of Brexit.

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KASIA (post Brexit): They definitely won’t get what was promised during the Brexit campaign. For example, limited immigration, more money for the NHS. I think these are just empty promises. I don’t think it’ll change anything, it might make life a bit more difficult, make it a bit more difficult for everyone regardless of whether it’s immigrants or citizens. Kasia is worried about her and her family’s future but hopes that realistically not much will change. KASIA: I just thought, we’ll just have to wait and see. Of course, I was hoping that as friends were saying that despite the Referendum they won’t leave [the EU]. But it’s done now. When they signed Article 50 it was all clear that it will happen, but we don’t really know for sure… Aniela, a casino dealer turned masseuse aged 38, was not aware of the fact that her rights are under threat, as she is uninterested in British politics. As a single woman she confessed that she would have no difficulty packing her bags and moving to another country should such a need arise. She explained that she would leave if she had no right to work in the UK. Aniela is waiting for more clarity but leaves her options open. ANIELA (post Brexit): I don’t worry about things I have no control over. I’m not worried. I don’t worry about stuff from the outside, whether it’s to do with the country or being made sacked from work. I can’t control this. But if I don’t have the right to work in here, then I’ll just leave.

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Wiktoria, a manual worker aged 54, admitted that she tries to stay informed about the recent developments with regards to EU migrant workers’ rights. She arrived in the UK in later life for work reasons as she struggled to make ends meet in Poland despite holding several part-time jobs. WIKTORIA (post Brexit): I’m not emotional about this whole thing that they can through me out or deport, nope. But most people were thinking this way, so they might be thinking this still. What’s going to happen? But I think nothing will change. I read the regulations and what not and I think it won’t change. One of the major driving forces of Brexit is immigration. This book tries to make sense of what the situation is for EU migrants to the UK who are women, as the Brexit vote has complicated their entitlements to permanent residence or the new ‘settled status’. While there is still no clarity on the rights of EU nationals following Brexit, the process of regulating migrants’ stay is largely not fit for purpose and has a blind spot for certain groups that find themselves ineligible (for example disabled people). This is while the UK population is ageing and in need of workers to fill labour shortages (for example nurses). In 2017, in a ground-breaking report to the European Parliament by Samia Badani, New Europeans argued that the level of anxiety experienced by EU27 citizens and Britons in Europe constituted a potential violation of their human rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (New Europeans.net email communication). Various social media campaigns (for example see Twitter hashtags: #HandsOffOurRights #GreenCardForEurope #IAmEuropean) demonstrate a widespread concern about people’s rights and futures.

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May refused to guarantee the rights of EU citizens, despite the concerns expressed by academics (Universities UK, 2016), pressure groups (The3Million; British in Europe) and the general public (Johnson, 2017). The UK government took a while to provide any clarification on EU citizens’ rights, but a lack of clarity is still prevalent. The UK will certainly manage without the EU, but opinions are divided as to how well it will be able to manage. Only time will tell, but the future of those caught in between – economic migrants who provide labour in the UK – remains uncertain and greatly dependent on Brexit negotiations (Serhan, 2017). Despite increasing numbers of women migrants, migrants are often depicted as male, without regard to gendered responsibilities in relation to household or children. More than half of the foreign-born UK population are women (Vargas-Silva and Rienzo, 2017). Yet, women migrants are largely neglected in literature on economic migration. This is while the majority of post-2004 migrants to the UK have been characterised as labour migrants (Akhurst et al, 2014). My research (DudaMikulin, 2015a, 2017a) highlights the need to overcome this one-dimensional perception of economic migrants. Women migrants are often intertwined (or ‘sandwiched’) in conflicting gendered expectations arising from two locations: the home and host countries. Thus, it should be acknowledged that economic migrants, too are entangled in multifaceted familial and other relationships that may make it more difficult for them to stay mobile or remain outside their country of origin (DudaMikulin, 2017a). This is also likely to affect their entitlement to ‘settled status’ post Brexit. The British authorities should acknowledge the vital roles migrants, and women migrants in particular, play in the British economy. It is also crucial to recognise migrant women’s roles in ‘topping up’ the birth and fertility rates (Janta, 2013); by doing so they contribute to the prevention of an ageing population (Randall, 2017).

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Further restrictions on social welfare entitlements, which are likely to follow Brexit, will not stop the forces of migration. Indeed, they are likely to have devastating consequences. They will do nothing to prevent Britain’s ageing population but will increase the probability of a demographic crisis by accelerating its ageing process. This, combined with labour shortages, will no doubt prove challenging (for example see Channel 4 series British Workers Wanted). This is the reason why the UK government should, as it did in the past, look at women migrants as a solution to some of its problems and not just a threat. Additionally, the British who left in pursuit of a life in the sun are also uncertain about their futures (Hall, 2016). They may soon feel the pull of home. The British expats (note, not migrants) in Spain are those in their retirement age and the UK may struggle to meet their health needs upon their return to the country. Particularly in light of the crisis in the NHS and the fact that increasingly more health and social care staff from the EU quit their jobs post the Brexit vote. As discussed in chapter three, a high percentage of staff working in the NHS, health and social care, hospitality, agriculture and services are from other EU countries. There has already been a decrease in job uptake from the EU and claims have been made that there has been an increase of EU healthcare staff resigning. Some may view this as a desirable and positive development, but that can be easily challenged in light of staff shortages within the NHS which already struggles to find UK-born workers to fill vacancies.

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This chapter investigates the notion of ‘precarity’, particularly in relation to the paid labour market and the EU migrants within it. I refer to Guy Standing’s (2011) theorisation of the precariat as the new dangerous class and its relevance to migration and migrants. The fashioning of precarious workers is analysed and put against the backdrop of an EU workforce (Lewis et al, 2015; Anderson, 2010; Waite, 2009). Precarity has been much discussed by politicians (Neilson and Rossiter 2008) and in the theorisation of neoliberal labour (Standing, 2011). This discussion provides a comparative perspective on how the sociopolitical, cultural, demographic and geographic context interlinks individual migration experiences. I explore whether the process of migration always brings about some element of uncertainty and thus whether precarity and migration are synonyms. The chapter ends with a discussion on precarity in the contemporary world, which is characterised by increased job insecurity, which consequently heightens uncertainty about the future. Throughout this chapter I present extracts from interviews with Polish migrants to the UK referring to their lives before 2016 and at present, as well as their plans and hopes

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for the future. These are offered to illustrate how people’s lives were affected by the Referendum result. Fashioning of precarious workers1 Bourdieu (1963) is said to first use the French equivalent precarite when describing casual workers in opposition to permanent employees. In this chapter, the following definition of precarity is seen as particularly useful: ‘precarity can be understood as literally referring to those who experience precariousness. Precarity, thus, conjures life worlds that are infected with uncertainty and instability’ (Waite, 2009, p.  416). The term precarity is linked to other words with similar meaning like risk, insecurity, uncertainty and vulnerability. Yet, it encompasses all of these ‘qualities’. Precarity as a term only relatively recently entered English parlance as Waite (2009) asserts. Its meaning can be understood as a condition and a point of mobilisation. The former is seen as characteristic of general neoliberal reality or can specifically relate to work conditions in the paid labour market. The later meaning emphasises a political potential that comes with precarity which is increasingly used to describe capitalist exploitation of workers and which stimulates visions of alternative reality. Scholars highlight that ‘the term precarity is less useful as a descriptor of life in general and more useful when attempting to understand particular groups in society who experience precarious lives as a consequence of their labour market positions’ (Waite, 2009, p. 414). Indeed, those who have attempted to theorise precarity can be divided into two groups: those who see it as characteristic of embodied experiences of exploitation in post-Fordist societies (Bauman, 2007; Ettlinger, 2007); and those who point to its particular relevance towards conditions and experiences of employment (Anderson, 2007; Tsianos and Papadopoulos, 2006). Insecurity is, of course, far from a new experience for the working class. The ‘precariat’ was coined to emphasise that the new insecurities felt by the

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working class correspond to Marx’s proletariat. ‘The precariat is to postindustrialism as the proletariat was to industrialism’ (Foti, 2005, p. 3) and thus is it believed to hold a revolutionary potential. Standing (2011) blames globalisation for creating the precariat, which he argues is a new emerging social class which is suffering from job insecurity, but also identity insecurity, not least due to workfare social policies. Standing emphasises that the precariat comprises immigrants, young educated people, and the old industrial working class. The case can be made that our working lives have a huge effect on all other aspects of people’s everyday reality. The concept of the working poor who are in paid work and in poverty at the same time stresses the wide-ranging effects of people’s employment status and conditions on their overall life quality (Patrick, 2017). This is particularly characteristic of neoliberal advanced capitalist economies and labour markets within these. Many analysts argue that precarious employment based on temporary work contracts, job insecurity, zero-hours contracts with no guarantee of future work have become prevalent in post-Fordism (Amin, 1994). These conditions are particularly characteristic of low-skilled and low-paid jobs but are also evident in relation to other sectors of the economy like higher education, for instance (Reisz, 2015). With regards to the former, these types of jobs often prove unpopular with the native workforce and thus are undertaken by immigrants, as discussed in chapter four (IPPR, 2017). Still, it needs to be acknowledged that some individuals may find short-term employment attractive. However, this is only relevant if the said individuals can exercise choice in their employment decisions rather than have no control over the type of employment that is available to them (Waite, 2009). Despite the fact that migrating is as old as life itself, it was only relatively recently, in the 19th century, that migration was recognised as a social phenomenon and consequently investigated (Gabaccia, 2014). Arguably, due to the forces of

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globalisation, people’s mobility between and within national borders became normalised and is a necessity in some work environments (for example banking, marketing) and for some people’s livelihoods (Vollmer, Sert and İçduygu, 2015; White, 2011). In the past, migration was characterised by a movement of people from point A to point B, now those moves appear to have become more unpredictable (Duda-Mikulin, 2017a; Wallace, 2002). According to some scholars, ‘the mobility turn’ in social sciences emphasises the divide between the largely unwanted migration of (regarded as low-skilled) labour migrants and the more positively perceived mobility of highlyskilled professionals (Faist, 2013). Castles and Miller (2009) note that we now live in the ‘age of migration’ that is characterised by the acceleration, increased fluidity and unpredictability of international movements. Moreover, a ‘feminisation of migration’ has been observed, which implies that increasingly more women become migrants (Castles and Miller, 2009), which may not be such a new phenomenon (Zlotnik, 2003). The differentiation among migrants needs to be acknowledged as it is a diverse category which comprises individuals of various immigration statuses. Migrants’ immigration status affects their rights and entitlements and consequently some migrants will have more security at destination than others. Additionally, the context of the ageing of the UK population increases the need for foreign-born labour to take on jobs unpopular with British workers (ONS, 2017; Gardiner, 2017). Hence, after Brexit the UK is likely to experience labour shortages in certain areas of the economy (IPPR, 2017). Indeed, some argue that ‘Brexodus’ has already begun with EU migrants leaving their jobs and the country (Luyendijk, 2017; Swinford, 2017; Agerholm, 2016). This is linked to overwhelming uncertainty (and racial abuse) which followed the Brexit vote (Luyendijk, 2017; Agerholm, 2016). Within this context, it is important to explore gendered migrations and precarity and consider the wider implications of Brexit.

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This chapter is concerned with unpacking the contested interconnections between migration, gender and precarity. This is explored against the backdrop of the post-Brexit-vote UK, which is characterised by the prevailing uncertainty that crept in following the triggering of Article 50 in March 2017. It needs acknowledging that while Brexit has been a significant watershed in terms of EU migrants’ experiences, their situation in the UK post 2004 (and before that) has been characterised by precarity in large part because of the mode of their incorporation in the labour market. And, there were prior significant ‘moments’ of uncertainty and racialisation specifically associated with the recession in 2008−09 (Rzepnikowska, 2018; Kilkey et al, 2013). This chapter aims to critically analyse the process of migration through the lens of precarity taking into account Polish women migrants. This is meant to redress the existing imbalance in migration literature, which has for a long time been genderblind (Yeoh and Ramdas, 2014; Pessar and Mahler, 2003). Also, relevant here are the particular uncertainties created for women by the privileging of paid work with free movement rights (Kilkey, 2017). Moreover, the fast-changing political scene in the UK calls for an exploration of how Brexit is likely to affect EU migrants currently resident in the UK. This chapter contributes to debates on economic migration to the UK and more specifically gendered migrations of EU women migrants in light of Brexit. It aims to add to discussions on migrants’ precarious position started by Waite (2009) and continued by Anderson (2010) and Lewis at al. (2015). Precarity and migration – are they synonyms? Often, if not always, migration is a risk-taking activity and precarity may be the cause of migration and/or the outcome following migration (Moniruzzaman and Walton-Roberts, 2018). Migrant workers provide ‘hyperflexible labour’ frequently employed through agencies and in temporary work (Anderson,

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2010). The sectors of the economy that attract new migrants, in themselves, offer precarious employment (Lewis et al, 2015); while migrants tend to be employed in the so-called ‘3D’ jobs – dull, dirty and dangerous (Favell, 2008). Work in construction may be dangerous and often depends on a steady flow of contracts (Ahmad, 2008). Work in hospitality and catering is characterised by unsociable and long working hours (Anderson, 2010). Zero-hours contracts are commonplace and offer no security or guarantee if more work will be available in the future. Additionally, due to a lack of knowledge and awareness and often limited support networks, new entrants are particularly prone to precarious and exploitative work conditions (Pemberton and Scullion, 2010). Hence, it can be said that international migration is inherently precarious. ‘Human life is quintessentially transitory (…). Uncertainty and contingency are at the heart of the human condition’ (Barbier, 2002, p. 1). Unsurprisingly, precarious situation prior to migration often constitutes a strong migration motivation for many individuals. Voluntary migrations for work are often motivated by uncertain or insecure work or livelihood in the country of origin. ‘Precarity is already a well-known issue of the pre-migration phase; it helps push migrants out to seek work and a life overseas’ (Piper and Lee, 2016, p. 480). Migrants are prepared to leave their homelands in search of a better life and this has implications for their feelings of (in)security. Whilst voluntary migrants may choose to move to seek or take up work elsewhere, those who are smuggled or illegal entrants are inevitably in a considerably more precarious position but outside the scope of this book (Ahmad, 2008). Few migrants can afford the luxury of having their livelihoods transferred in their entirety from one country to another and so may need to be prepared for a relative decrease in the standard of living, at least at the beginning. Indeed, migrants are heavily represented in low paid and low skilled jobs undertaking the kind of work that natives are often unwilling to do (IPPR, 2017).

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Socio-economic position and class structure is likely to be disrupted by migration as initially economic migrants are likely to experience downward mobility with regards to their position and standard of living (Ryan, 2011). ‘For many migrants, although not all, movement across space is accompanied by downward social mobility, resulting in a precarious location on the fringes of the British working class’ (McDowell, 2008, p. 500). Migrants’ class position may be further complicated by the level of their English language skills, occupation and future aspirations (Drinkwater, Eade and Garapich, 2006). This may be true particularly for economic migrants whose goals are related to accumulating financial resources and who therefore may take up positions that do not match their qualifications or experience (cf. Iglicka, 2010). Indeed, this is the case with many recent Polish women migrants like Anna who at the time was in her early 30s and educated to a degree level. ANNA (return migrant): Well, you see, three years went by and we thought that we need to make our minds up about whether we stay there [UK] and buy a flat and look for a better job or maybe start a university course or something, or we go back to Poland. Because during those three years you have really one foot here and one foot there… Migrants typically engage in highly precarious forms of employment that do not provide sufficient social benefits or adequate levels of income despite the fact that in theory EU migrants have the same rights as UK workers (Woolfson, Fudge and Thörnqvist, 2014). It is noteworthy that EU8 migrants have been positioned within the UK migration regime to take up ‘low skilled’ jobs; thus Tier 3 route (for non-EU workers) was never opened because it was assumed new EU citizens would fulfil this role (as opposed to Third Country Nationals from outside the EU) (Kilkey, 2017). Limited social entitlements and

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insecure employment coupled with a lack of family networks and new unfamiliar setting are challenging for migrants. All of the above results in precarity as migrant workers are particularly susceptible to being locked into categories of work characterised by insecurity (Lewis et al, 2015). This is in the context of a general rise in employment insecurity for everyone (Standing, 2011). Therefore, a combination of financial, social and legal insecurity is characteristic of migrants’ experiences. The types of jobs available to migrants are highly precarious whilst their socio-legal status is often too but less so for EU8 (until Brexit). Western capitalist countries attract migrants who then tend to be clustered in jobs at the bottom end of labour markets that are routinely precarious (Standing, 2011). Due to neoliberal globalisation, precarity is now widespread and it arguably does not only apply to the paid labour market but almost every aspect of our lives (Bauman, 2007). Migration processes and immigration restrictions compound precarity to produce various unfreedoms that can close down any real and acceptable alternative to engage in (severely) exploitative labour. (Lewis et al, 2015, p. 588) Lewis et al (2015) assert that a migrant worker is subject to ‘multiple points of vulnerability’ cast in the lower echelons of the paid labour market which in itself is characterised by hierarchies of precariousness. They draw attention to the divide between good and bad migrants. The former relates to EU migrants who are often portrayed as hard-working and not too dissimilar culturally; however, this narrative begun to shift with economic recession in 2008-09 (Rzepnikowska, 2018). The latter is in reference to asylum seekers and refugees who in contrast are perceived as bogus and a burden and are in many respects unlike the host population. Lewis et al (2015) argue that migrants are characterised by ‘hyper-precarity’

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due to multidimensional constraints that stem from their labour market position, socio-legal status, transnational social reproduction and gender relations. Hyper-precarity is a creation of neoliberal labour markets and increasingly more restrictive immigration regimes. This occurs whilst migrants’ perception of temporariness regarding their stay in the destination country encourages them to take on low-skilled, low-waged and insecure jobs (Anderson, 2010). Still, these jobs pay relatively better than the jobs migrants can hope to secure in their home countries. Having discussed precarity in migration, now attention is turned to how women migrants experience precarity. Women migrants Like male migration, female migration is motivated by a complex web of social relations. In this sense precarity takes on multifaceted meanings in cultural, social, and economic terms and is reflective of a multi-layered state of crisis. (Piper and Lee, 2016, p. 480) There are differences between how migrant men and migrant women experience the process of migrating which in itself is a gendered activity (Lutz, 2011). Those who become mobile and who also bear certain gendered ‘responsibilities’ encounter different, in many cases more complex, difficulties in their pursuit of a better life abroad. ‘Migrants are exposed to multi-layered forms of precarity in and beyond labour markets throughout the entire migration cycle’ (Piper and Lee, 2016, p. 474). As the authors assert, these forms of precarity relate to both male and female migrants and although they primarily focus on marriage migrants in Asia, many of the issues they touch on are relevant to A8 migrants to the UK. Piper and Lee (2016) consider reproductive labour as constituting new forms of precarity outside of the paid labour market. This can be added to migrants’ already precarious status

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in economic, legal and social terms as shown above. Moreover, cultural norms may also impede women migrants from reaching job security as patriarchal systems may stand in their way. Studies indicate that migrant women, in contrast to men, are often over-represented in the low-paid and low-skilled occupations (Castles and Miller, 2009). Indeed, migrant women tend to be employed in irregular and insecure employment such as domestic labour sector, care work and agricultural work. In the absence of or limited access to sufficient social safety networks, women migrants are among the most precarious of workers (Lutz, 2011). Patriarchal family as the locus of the reproduction of labour power, characterised under neoliberalism by the inadequacy of public service provisioning, which, in turn, results in a preponderance of women working in precarious sectors such as care work or housework. (Piper and Lee, 2016, 476) Additionally, women migrants tend to be sandwiched between care responsibilities in relation to their home and the new host countries. This chapter draws on Ryan et al’s (2009) concept of ‘double caring responsibilities’ as an illustration of gendered expectations that cross-national borders (that is in ‘home’ country in relation to parents and in the host country in relation to the new family). This term demonstrates the need to balance care priorities in two geographical locations which confirms the gendered nature of migration and the problematic character of women’s migrations. Polish women have been found to appreciate the relatively more extensive welfare state in the UK which provides more security when it comes to raising a family whilst the comparatively more flexible paid labour market enables women to also participate (DudaMikulin, forthcoming). One of the interviewees, Ksenia, aged 38 and with higher education who currently works in property management,

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expressed her worries about her and her family’s future post Brexit. She talked about her disappointment with the way EU migrants are now treated despite their long-term contributions. She felt betrayed by her host country and the fact that in spite of her best intentions and enjoying her newly-built life in the UK, she found herself in a precarious position with regards to rights and entitlements. Having had her first child in the UK with her British partner, she is now worried about the family’s future. KSENIA (post Brexit): I’m disappointed because I was very pleased to be in the EU but since the UK decided to leave, I’m still an immigrant without British passport so I’m vulnerable. I’m worried about what will happen next as they haven’t decided yet. I might have to apply for residency or citizenship which is costly. Now that I started a family here and I have a child here, that’s linked to new worries. Will I have problems accessing the NHS or getting social assistance? I’ve been here for 10 years but I don’t know if I’ll have equal rights same as Brits. I work here, I’ve been paying taxes for the last 10 years and I never asked for benefits. I don’t know how it’ll all work. I have worries and I’m disappointed and I’m concerned about my child and his future. That said he’ll have dual citizenship but my position is more uncertain. We’re waiting for a decision and I’ll probably have to act fast, stressed about all the changes as changes never come easily but we’ll see. Piper and Lee (2016) argue that reproductive labour and care are characterised by an element of crisis. Because women are assumed as the natural providers of unpaid work and care in the private sphere, this has obvious implications for their participation in the paid labour market. The public and private

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divide is often seen as the root of the problem for women (Walby, 1994; Lister, 2003; Lewis, 2009). Women are primarily in charge of the private, hence incapable of engaging in the public on the same footing as men. They can, of course, participate in the public but only having first mitigated the loss of their domestic and care work in the private sphere (Anderson, 2000). Caregiving is unappreciated even though it is an inevitable part of everyone’s life (Orloff, 2009; Erel, 2012). The difficulty with the two spheres is that there are different values attached to the male and female domestic work. The former is often perceived as skilled whereas the latter unskilled, seen as coming naturally to women (Kilkey, 2010). Women can resolve the work−life conflict by either having fewer children or engaging in less demanding jobs (Łobodzińska, 1996). It is unlikely they can have it all (cf. ‘great expectations’, Lanning, Bradley, Darlington and Gottfried, 2013). When women disappear from the labour market, they disappear from the analysis of paid and unpaid work and welfare (Lewis, 1992). Further, even though ‘caring is now understood as work’ (Lutz, 2011, p. 6) women still undertake the majority of it in Poland (Keryk, 2010) and the UK (Boyle, 2013). Care work is a highly gendered activity, and a ‘feminisation of the caring sector’ is evident (Daly and Rake, 2003, p. 56). Across European countries women experience ‘double burden’; hence they find themselves in a generally precarious position. ‘Women are pressured to serve dual roles – to participate in the labour market and carry out reproductive labour at home – without adequate social support’ (Piper and Lee, 2016, p. 488). Additionally, women who become migrants may be able to improve their overall situation by crossing international borders but this carries with it the possibility of further complications related to: the already mentioned ‘double caring responsibilities’ (Ryan et al, 2009); ‘dual location households’ whereby the family is split between two countries (Smith, 2011); ‘flying grandmas’ who provide care when needed; children from migrant families by some called ‘Euro orphans’ (White, 2011; Urbanska, 2009);

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and ‘transnational motherhood’ whereby women who are mothers remain internationally mobile (Lutz, 2011). The kind of moral responsibility around care provision is illustrated in Kornelia’s account. It is noteworthy that Kornelia originates from a rural area and as a singleton the needs of her parents are elevated as a top priority. KORNELIA (post Brexit): I’d like to find someone and just live here [UK], stay here. But I’m most worried about my parents because they live alone. And it’s just this one thing that worries me, because they will only get older. That’s why my plans here that I want to stay here for good, this is what I want, but what will happen and what I will have to do, only time will tell. EDM: So, the way I understand it is that you think you might have to go back? KORNELIA: I think there might be this issue. Freedom of movement privileges paid work and thus those who are in the UK as dependants (rather than workers) have more conditions and fewer rights. This is something illuminated especially in the context of Brexit. Post-Brexit-vote precarity It is perhaps no surprise that the result of the British referendum on EU membership has added to migrants’ sense of uncertainty. This is particularly true as there have been no guarantees from the UK government around EU migrants’ rights as outlined in chapter three. Below is a conversation with Aniela who was not aware of the complexity of migrants’ rights post Brexit or the consequences of it for her. She admitted that she is not interested in the politics of Brexit as she does not need to worry about something over which she has no control. Aniela explained she

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will wait for firm plans and laws and then decide whether she wants to stay in the UK or move elsewhere. EDM tells about the lack of guarantees after Brexit regarding rights of EU migrants. ANIELA: No, I didn’t know about this because there’s no news about when we will leave [the EU] and whether it’ll happen at all. That will take a lot of time and bring about lots of changes. They’ll have to change laws, legislations and lots of other stuff. If there’s a decision about all this, because we can’t just assume, for now it doesn’t get to me, it’s just all up in the air. To the uncertainties explored above in relation to migrants and women migrants, doubts around Brexit with migrants’ social rights, entitlements and legal rights under threat should be added. The UK population has experienced a steady corrosion of welfare rights and entitlements with increasing welfare conditionality particularly since austerity measures were introduced following the global economic crisis (Dwyer and Wright, 2014). In the context of the Brexit vote in the UK and the new President of the United States of America, precarity has arguably become a fixed condition of societies worldwide where uncertainty does not only affect our working lives but it has penetrated almost every area of our livelihoods. Additionally, this is heightened for migrants and for women migrants whether we consider the paid labour market or the general picture. Tightening of immigration regimes has meant greater conditionality with regards to migrants’ welfare rights (Kennedy, 2014). This was occurring before Brexit for EU migrants (Kilkey, 2017). Oliwia, a single long-term and well-integrated resident in the UK explained that she feels betrayed and angry with the British government for the lack of protection, assurance or care about

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the future of EU citizens resident in the UK post Brexit. Oliwia asserted that she feels like a “second rate person” and that the UK government is “two-faced” as “they use us when they need us, then open borders, now they want to close them”. OLIWIA (post Brexit): I was really surprised by the outcome. It shows that people’s opinions were emotional rather than rational. The propaganda beforehand didn’t help. Brexit showed an ignorance, lack of knowledge about how Britain and EU are connected. As a person still living here, I feel insecure, let down and disappointed. I feel used, tricked. I feel like I’m unable to live here fully as I don’t trust what’s next. Living here for 14 years I showed great integration with society, at the same time remaining proudly Polish. I don’t want to feel being pushed to apply for British passport. I contributed enough of my youth, taxes and hard work. It’s just not fair. I don’t want to feel like a second-class citizen. So far, the future in UK looks gloomy, unstable, changeable. I build my life here for 14 years and it will be hard to leave it. But if I’m pushed to do it, I will get back. The trust is broken. I team up with the rest of the world and I perceive Brexit as embarrassment. Kay and Trevena (2017) assert that the feeling of insecurity is prevalent among CEE communities in the UK. Thus, the Brexit vote could have only added to these feelings of uncertainty as full legal protections for EU nationals are yet to be ensured by the British government. The legal insecurity experienced following the Brexit vote in the UK is widespread among EU migrants to the UK. The British Prime Minister, Theresa May, is yet to provide clear and comprehensive information on the future of EU workers resident in the UK. May proposed a ‘settled status’

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as a new way for migrants to regulate their stay but this was not approved or indeed welcomed by the European Commission. Unsurprisingly, migrants feel uncertain about their future and unable to make plans (Luyendijk, 2017; Agerholm, 2016). Despite the fact that the UK government seems to be eager to provide assurances, the few mistakes they have made tell a different story. The wrongly sent letters asking EU migrants to the UK to prepare to leave the country is one such example (Busby, 2017; Home Office News Team, 2017). Linked to the above is the heightened sense of insecurity, anxiety and stress for all those who may be affected, predominantly EU nationals in the UK and UK nationals in the EU (for example some 1 million British expats2 on the Spanish Costas; Ahmed, 2015). Additionally, there has been an unprecedented rise in hate crime towards migrants recorded across the country since the Brexit vote (Civitas, 2016). All the major media (BBC, 2017; Channel 4 News, 2016; Channel 4 Dispatches, 2016; Lyons, 2016 for the Guardian; England, 2017 for the Independent) documented this rise in the aftermath of the EU referendum. Additionally, fears over the legal status of EU workers in Britain have led to employment exploitation (Whitehead, 2017). This is one of the reasons behind migration activists such as Nicolas Hatton (see ‘the3million’) starting campaigns with the aim to fight for and protect the rights of EU migrants. The truth is that there are currently more questions than answers in relation to Brexit and the future after the divorce. Kornelia, a manual worker in her early 40s, similarly to other respondents shared her thoughts on how insecure she feels with regards to the right to live and work in the UK post Brexit. She explained that due to similar uncertainties that followed the referendum result many of her friends already decided to leave the country. KORNELIA (post Brexit): Of course, I feel insecure, especially since no one knows the details of how

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Brexit will impact on us… I don’t know what rights I’ll have regarding work or if there’ll be additional obstacles in terms of buying a flat or a house. Many of my friends are thinking of going back to Poland. People apply for permanent residency but no one knows if that’s even going to help… The worst thing is that I feel like we’re not taken seriously. The UK government might come up with new rules and regulations to do with our rights in the UK post Brexit and we won’t be able to do anything about it. And the fact that we still know nothing is disrespectful if I’m honest. The substantial increase of EU migrants seeking to regulate their stay in the UK suggests they now feel the need to attempt to secure their future (Blinder, 2017). This points to heightened precarity after the Brexit vote. Many EU nationals already applied for permanent residence (PR) and British citizenship (naturalisation) which suggests they consider staying for good (Travis and Stewart, 2016) while many others are planning to leave (Wood, 2017). The process of obtaining PR has undergone a number of changes but remains lengthy with the requirement to present reams of documents from the 5-year qualifying period (for example P60s/payslips/bills for every year) and so may be difficult for some (for example disabled migrants, Huijg, 2017). This could be the case for women migrants who are not engaged in the paid labour market as they are homemakers, for instance. This is rooted in the privileging of paid work with free movement rights within the EU. They may experience trouble in regulating their stay due to a lack of continuity of employment. The same can be said about those in unregulated employment (for example cleaning, construction, care work) or those doing cash-in-hand jobs. They may find it difficult to collect the required substantial documentation for PR. Those

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women migrants who are in part time work or on zero-hours contracts may find it difficult to secure their residence. The considerable increase in EU nationals looking for clarity and more security and to legally regulate their stay created a demand for immigration advice. In response to this UK Citizenship for European Nationals (UKCEN) was established and provides pro bono legal assistance to all those unclear about their rights in light of Brexit. To demonstrate the demand which signifies heightened feelings of uncertainty and anxiety, UKCEN by December 2017 provided support and information to more than 17,000 EU/EEA citizens and their families seeking to obtain UK citizenship and/or PR certification (UKCEN, 2018). Migrants’ lives, particularly after the Brexit vote, are characterised by widespread uncertainty. This newly defined form of precarity (or hyper-precarity, Lewis et al, 2015) is rooted in the exigencies of neoliberal globalisation and globally networked capitalism. Although migrant labourers as a category should not be considered as the new precariat, there may be particular spatiotemporal contexts where the activism and mobilisation of precarious migrant labourers indicates their precariat potential. (Waite, 2009, p. 426) Meanwhile, ‘London’s economy is now dependent upon the labour power of low-paid workers from across the world’ (Wills et al, 2010, p.  29). Positions such as cleaners, carers, builders, cooks, waiters, to name just a few, in great majority, are outsourced from outside the UK, often from within the EU (IPPR, 2017). Therefore, the need for foreign labour is evident. Additionally, Poland for instance recovered quite well after the 2008 economic crash and now has a record low unemployment of 4.7% compared to the UK at 4.3% (Eurostat, 2017). This will no doubt make it more attractive to post-2004 emigrants and may stimulate return migrations. As already noted, some claim

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that a ‘Brexodus’ has already begun (Luyendijk, 2017; Agerholm, 2016). This, however, is based on the assumption that people are and remain mobile while there are many ‘migrants’ who feel ‘settled’ in UK, who have a non-Polish partner, children in school, or skills that are not transferable. The Brexodus narrative rests on assumptions of mobility and may not appreciate how ‘settled’ some EU8 citizens have become (Kilkey and Ryan, forthcoming).

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SIX Conclusion and policy implications

Concluding remarks This book offers important insights into the world of the UK paid labour but from the point of view of EU migrants and more specifically Polish women whose livelihoods have been disrupted by the Brexit vote and the decision that the UK should leave the EU whilst any solid guarantees with regards to migrants’ rights are yet to come from the UK government. Through analysis of the new data generated in qualitative interviews, this book makes an original and grounded contribution to understanding the significance and impacts of the result of the referendum on Britain’s membership in the EU on migrant workers from the EU resident in the UK. The prologue aimed to bring in a personal perspective by reflexively engaging with the Brexit vote through a renegotiation of my insider- and outsider-ness. I am an academic researcher who is a Polish woman and a migrant to the UK and I now hold dual citizenship – Polish and British. In the prologue I explored how the different aspects of my identity, namely that of a researcher and a migrant intersected.

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The first chapter was purely theoretical and aimed to set the scene and to convey the message that migration is important in our globalised world and that it is doubtful that it can be stopped. This first chapter introduced the reader to the context and the themes under exploration. The first section explained why this book is an important reading for all those who are interested in contemporary British social policy in relation to migration and the EU. I referred to the context of neoliberalism and neopopulism in the UK and globally, within which Brexit is occurring. I defined international migration and its scale and discussed the UK’s rank in relation to other countries. Migration motivations were explored with reference to global inequality as one of the reasons, perhaps the most important reason, that people become mobile. The process of migration as a gendered experience was considered and women as migrants were brought to the fore. The complexity of terminology was examined by looking at the following terms: im/migrant, refugee, mobile person. These are often applied inconsistently and can be confusing. In this chapter, I provided details of primary research data collection, participant recruitment, sample characteristics and data analysis. The case studies presented in this book are based on 40 in-depth interviews (including 8 repeat interviews) with Polish women migrants to the UK. Polish migrants represent the largest recent migration ‘wave’ to the UK enacted within an intra-European context and thus, their experiences could be seen as representative of the majority of European Union (EU) migrants in the UK. An outline of the remaining chapters was also provided. Chapter two included an overview of EU migration to the UK and migrants’ characteristics with the message that migration to the UK is not new. This chapter was devoted to EU migration to the UK. People have been migrating since time began; recently however, the issue of migration has been elevated to a key national concern in the UK and beyond. It is now one of the most contentious and divisive matters in contemporary

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Britain and globally. Meanwhile, the government continually fails to deliver on its promise to reduce net migration to the tens of thousands, but should it? This chapter presented and discussed most up-to-date existing statistical data in relation to EU migration to the UK and migrant characteristics. These were contrasted with new qualitative data from women migrants from Poland to the UK. This chapter provided an explanation of the current complexities related to EU nationals’ legal status in the UK. Finally, a series of interview extracts were presented to illustrate the abovementioned points: one of Anna, a highlyskilled academic worker, another of Kornelia, a low-skilled and low-waged factory employee, and that of Oliwia who notes “I love the UK but it broke my heart and I will leave”. Chapter three looked at the British paid labour market and more specifically economic migration to the UK and its impact with the message that migrants contribute through taxation and the alleviation of labour and skills shortages. In this chapter, I discussed existing statistical data on the UK’s labour force and its characteristics. This quantitative data was complemented with rich qualitative accounts from recent Polish women migrants to the UK. Different sectors of the economy were explored, particularly agriculture, hospitality, customer services and healthcare. These are said to be most reliant on workforce from the EU. Data on population characteristics was analysed, taking into account the fact that it is ageing rapidly as is the rest of Europe. This increases the need for foreign-born labour to take on jobs unpopular with British workers, particularly when the EU labour force is younger and fitter in comparison to UK-born workers. This also suggests that after Brexit the UK is likely to experience issues with staff recruitment and labour shortages in certain areas of the economy. Indeed, news media reports argue that a ‘Brexodus’ has already started with EU migrants leaving their jobs and leaving the country in light of uncertainty following Brexit. This is in line with my empirical findings. The chapter was supported by extracts from qualitative interviews

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with women migrants from Poland with the aim to bring in real-life stories from those who took advantage of the right to free movement and took on work in the UK. The fourth chapter focused on Brexit – the UK’s exit from the EU with the key point being around disrupted livelihoods of EU migrant workers. This chapter was devoted to the process of ‘Brexit’ – the British exit from the European Union and the complexity around it. Firstly, the context of neopopulism was brought to the fore. Here, I explored the criminalisation of migrants and referred to the writings of Zygmunt Bauman (2016). Secondly, a brief history of the European Economic Community and the EU was provided. After almost 43 years as part of the European community, in June 2016, the UK people decided to leave. In March the following year, the UK Prime Minister officially started the process of Brexit. Thirdly, the political complexity behind the decision to hold the referendum was explored. The wider context and political climate worldwide was analysed with particular focus on the rise of distrust, disillusion and identity politics. The context of the new populism as the prevalent ideology was put against the political situation in the UK with David Cameron starting talks on the need for the people to have their say in the run up to General Election 2015. The results of the referendum were analysed and critically discussed, taking into account voters and their demographic characteristics correlated with the socioeconomic situation in the country. While Brexit was decided by a relatively small margin of people, the topic of immigration was key in the debates preceding the EU referendum. The chapter culminated in a series of case studies with the aim to illustrate pre- and post-Brexit-vote reality for those who exercised their Treaty rights and came to work in the UK. The complexity of Brexit for EU migrants was demonstrated by drawing on qualitative accounts from recent Polish migrant women to the UK.

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Chapter five considered precarity post Brexit vote and migrants’ future plans with the message that precarious legal status and a lack of guarantees are likely to affect EU migrants’ future plans. This chapter investigated the notion of ‘precarity’, particularly in relation to the paid labour market and the migrants within it. I referred to Guy Standing’s (2011) theorisation of the precariat as the new dangerous class and its relevance to migration and migrants. The fashioning of precarious workers was analysed and put against the backdrop of EU workforce (Lewis et al, 2015; Anderson, 2010; Waite, 2009). Precarity has been much discussed by politicians (Neilson and Rossiter 2008) and in the theorisation of neoliberal labour (Standing, 2011). This discussion provided a comparative perspective on how the socio-political, cultural, demographic and geographic context interlinks with individual migration experiences. I explored whether the process of migration always brings about some element of uncertainty, and thus, whether precarity and migration are synonyms. The chapter ended with a discussion on precarity in the contemporary world, which is characterised by increased job insecurity, which consequently heightens uncertainty about the future. Throughout this chapter I presented extracts from interviews with migrants to the UK referring to their lives before 2016 and after, as well as their plans and hopes for the future. Finally, this ultimate chapter offers conclusions and policy implications that are relevant to EU migrant workers who are women within the context of Brexit. The book’s contribution to migration theory, economic migration, gendered migration and debates on Brexit from the social policy perspective are offered here. Policy recommendations with reference to British authorities but also to the authorities of migrants’ sending countries are outlined. These are also relevant to the authorities of other EU member states, particularly the EU8 (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) and EU2 countries (Bulgaria and Romania).

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Policy implications This research contributes to debates on economic migration to the UK and more specifically gendered migrations of EU women migrants in the light of Brexit. It aims to add to discussions on migrants’ precarious position started by Waite (2009) and continued by Anderson (2010) and Lewis at al. (2015). However, it is noteworthy that the Brexodus narrative rests on assumptions of mobility and may not appreciate how ‘settled’ some EU nationals have become (Kilkey and Ryan, forthcoming). This work is important for three key reasons. Firstly, it is based on the latest cutting-edge research findings collected in the UK and Poland before and after the Brexit-vote. Furthermore, it offers insights into the lived experiences of EU migrants to the UK as they try to negotiate their futures following the referendum on UK’s membership in the EU. Finally, this book provides an insider perspective as the author is a Polish woman settled in the UK. This text aims to fill a gap in knowledge and literature on the subject of Brexit from the EU migrants’ perspective with wider implications for the UK and its labour market. To date, there has been no such publication. The British paid labour market, in part, relies heavily on migrant workers from the EU. Hence, it is important to gauge what may occur post-Brexit when the UK may no longer be a desirable destination as seen through EU migrants’ eyes. As was illustrated in chapter three, the UK paid labour market, in certain sectors, is highly reliant on migrant workers from the EU. Should their rights not be ensured and protected post Brexit, they are likely to leave the UK and move elsewhere, which is what the qualitative findings indicate. Various employers and sector representatives already expressed their concerns about future restrictions and the ability to recruit labour. This was confirmed in the most recent interim update from the UK Migration Advisory Committee. This is likely to have a domino

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effect, as difficulties with staff recruitment may lead to relocation of production overseas, which consequently would translate into overall workforce reduction, product cost and depreciation of wages. On the other hand, migrants from the EU to the UK are currently in a precarious position due to Brexit, which is imminent and also due to the gradual increase in welfare conditionality, which can result in a number of issues. They are likely to be more prone to homelessness and developing mental and other health issues, which would then put a pressure on already scarce resources due to public cuts. Those migrants could of course be sent back home but even voluntary deportations are met with high costs. Additionally, whilst the British Prime Minister Theresa May declares her desire to guarantee the rights of EU citizens, she declined to issue further assurances until the rights of UK nationals currently resident in the EU are confirmed. Should all those British citizens living elsewhere in Europe wish or need to return to the UK, the UK health and social care system would be under enormous pressure to meet their needs, as they are likely to be older. The NHS is the biggest employer of Black and Minority Ethnic staff in Europe and post the Brexit vote there has been a 30% reduction in nursing staff from the EU. These are worrying signals, which suggest that EU workers do not feel welcome anymore. And while the NHS is understaffed and experiences difficulties in recruiting workers from within the UK, the EU and beyond, this is likely to worsen after the UK leaves the EU. Therefore, Brexit is likely to result in higher social welfare costs regardless of how one looks at it. The UK is so used to migrant labour that it is difficult to imagine how it would manage with an even more restrictive migration regime. This is not to suggest that migration would stop after Brexit but that a more closely managed migration system is likely to disrupt staff recruitment and upset the trust built between current migrants and their networks which could provide a continuous flow

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of flexible labour. A new migration management system will bring in an additional layer of bureaucracy for the UK Home Office, which is already under a lot of pressure, and its track record leaves a lot to be desired. The UK paid labour market is likely to suffer, either because EU migrants will start choosing other destinations or because employers will have to jump through additional hoops to recruit from overseas as is the case with non-EU workers. The government’s plans to have a new system with “settled status” are heavily criticised for creating the same dangers that have ruined the lives of members of the Windrush generation. Both British and Polish authorities should take notice of the complexities around Brexit and migrants’ rights in order to better understand the precarious situation of migrants, the reasons that led them to leave the home country and those that drive them to remain in the host country. The image of an economic migrant in public debates needs to incorporate women migrants some of whom have very gendered responsibilities that often migrate with them. This fact influences women migrants’ rights and entitlements including with regards to the new settled status and consequently, British citizenship. There is a dire need to change the narrative around migration from blame-based to perceiving it as an everyday process stimulated by globalisation, which makes it inevitable for people not to move between what are made-up boundaries only visible on paper which separate nation states. Migration is not the root of the problem, but it is a symptom of other problems, while globalisation elevates it into a national or even international concern. It is likely that Britain’s exit from the European Union next year (in March 2019) will trigger a spike in hate crimes and a return to a climate of hostility such as that seen in the 1990s. Indeed, racist attitudes have been emboldened by Brexit in the UK and the new president in the US, both of which demonstrate a need for a counter-narrative.

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This study emphases the disparity between the image of an economic migrant in popular and public debates and the experiences of women migrants. A lack of consideration for the needs of women and gender-neutral immigration policies are evident. There is a need for policy makers to take into account the specific needs of women, as well as to acknowledge diversity among them. This research has highlighted the need to overcome this one-dimensional perception of economic migrants and their influence on host and home countries. Women (migrants) are not just care givers but paid workers, too. Contrary to some negative perceptions and misinformation about the reasons people move to the UK, access to financial support from the state was not confirmed. However, increasingly more restrictions are being imposed on migrants from within Europe (for example the Immigration Act 2014) and changing welfare regimes with increasingly more conditional access to welfare should also be noted (cf. Dwyer, 2010; Pemberton and Scullion, 2013). This research emphasises the necessity to reevaluate (and eventually redefine) certain policies with the aim of greater gender equality, particularly in the light of Brexit. There is a need for further exploration of whether social policies are well suited to these new assumptions underlying contemporary work-life balance in migration. The theoretical perspective adopted in this book and the empirical findings suggest a number of policy implications which diverge from current practice, namely around the work-life balance as it is experienced differently by women migrants. This research has shown that women migrants are often intertwined in conflicting gendered expectations arising from two locations – the home and host countries. Thus, it should be acknowledged that economic migrants too, are entangled in multifaceted familial and other relationships that are likely to complicate their entitlements to ‘settled status’, for instance. It is argued here that migration theorists should acknowledge women as migrants in

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their own right and consider their gendered ‘responsibilities’ which may migrate with them. Moreover, the British authorities should recognise the vital roles migrants, and women migrants in particular play in the British economy. The fiscal benefits of EU migrants have been considered elsewhere (for example Dustman and Frattini, 2013). However, it is crucial to acknowledge migrant women’s roles in ‘topping up’ the birth and fertility rates, since by doing so they contribute to the prevention of an ageing society. Therefore, it could be considered that further restrictions on welfare entitlements and benefit sanctions will accelerate the ageing process. On the other hand, the Polish authorities should recognise that the outflow of vast numbers of mostly young and well-educated people is undoubtedly linked to their perception of Poland as a comparatively less attractive country and to the relatively limited support from the Polish state. More familyfriendly policies are needed in Poland. The importance of this should not be dismissed in the light of Poland’s decreasing birth and fertility rates (GUS, 2016). The matter of immigration was a decisive factor in the preBrexit-vote debates and it is still one of the most divisive topics in the UK. Therefore, it is worthy of attention, and whilst the British people have had an opportunity to have their say on Brexit, migrant workers from the EU have not. This publication gives them a voice and an opportunity to be heard as it is based on original data from 40 qualitative interviews with female EU citizens in the UK, conducted before and after the Brexit vote. The book provides wider policy implications for the British and other EU countries’ authorities, for example the need for labour in the light of an ageing society; disparity between the image of an economic migrant in public debates and the lived experience of women migrants with their gendered responsibilities that often migrate with them; regarding the complexity around regulating their stay or acquiring British citizenship.

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This text is essential, as there is a clear gap in knowledge and literature on the subject of Brexit from the EU migrants’ perspective with wider implications for the UK and its labour market. This book further develops the notion of precarity in relation to EU migrants to the UK in the light of Brexit. The British paid labour market, in part, relies heavily on migrant workers from the EU. Some sectors of the British economy: agriculture; healthcare and hospitality for instance, employ considerable numbers of EU workers. Hence, it is important to gauge what may occur post Brexit when the UK may no longer be a desirable destination as seen through EU migrants’ eyes. It considers the wider implications of Brexit for the British paid labour market. Should these workers leave, the economy would, no doubt, suffer. This book is relevant to academia, teaching, policy and practice as it is timely and corresponds with the UK’s formal exit from the EU, which brought with it considerable uncertainty among British citizens and other residents, most notably, EU nationals living in the UK. It will also be of interest to current and prospective migrant workers as well as other countries considering a similar referendum (for example France, Greece). This book offers important contributions to migration theory and push and pull factors which determine people’s migration motivations. It adds to our understanding of economic migration between Poland and the UK. It offers important insights into gendered migration of Polish women. It also contributes to debates on Brexit from a social policy point of view. This research is relevant to a wider European context for several reasons. The potential break-up of the UK is one of them. Other European countries have also experienced deep divisions (for example Spain and Catalonia) and consider holding a referendum about independence. Moreover, in some EU countries anti-EU sentiment has increased (for example Italy, France) and thus their future in the EU is uncertain and perhaps also depends on how the UK manages this transition.

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Other countries, Denmark for instance, have largely been Eurosceptic. These divisions and increased hostility directed towards the European Union demonstrate that Europe is divided, and many countries look inwards for protectionist measures; hence, nationalism is on the rise. Yet, it remains to be seen whether the forces of globalisation will prove stronger and show that cooperation and partnership are necessary in these hostile neoliberal and neopopulist times. Furthermore, there is a clear need for more research in this area, especially given the continually-changing Brexit reality and fast-approaching March 2019, which will mark the UK’s exit from the EU. It will be interesting to see how the Brexit negotiations unfold and how this will affect EU migrant workers resident in the UK as well as the UK paid labour market. Moreover, it will be fascinating to revisit my interviewees at some time after Brexit in order to explore the real impacts of the UK’s exit from the EU on their everyday lives. The Windrush generation scandal demonstrates the extent of the British ‘hostile environment’ which makes everyone born overseas feel precarious, including individuals and families who have resided in Britain for decades. The treatment of Commonwealth subjects is cause of a great concern among EU nationals in the UK. They came to Britain as EU citizens while exercising the freedom of movement and are now asked to produce proof of their right to stay in the emerging postBrexit scenario. Research shows that EU citizens and their family members living in the UK under EU law are at risk of ‘falling through the cracks’ of the UK−EU negotiations, with their rights of future residence, work and citizenship in question after Brexit. Only time will tell so let’s watch this space.

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Prologue 1

2

3

Parts of this prologue are based on my PhD thesis “Gendered migrations: the influence of the process of migration on Polish women’s perception of gender roles” (2015), University of Salford. Note on terminology – EU residents in the UK are termed immigrants while UK residents in the EU are termed expats – this use of terminology emphasises pejorative connotations and demonstrates a divide between desired and undesired entrants. Here is how much it cost me to naturalise: £65 for PR card (+optional £10 for Nationality Checking Service) + postage cost £50 Life in the UK test [NB English language test is needed for those who did not study here] £1282 Citizenship application (+optional £50 for NCS) + postage cost [NB this has now increased to £1330] £19.20 Biometric details £72.50 UK passport = approx. £1600

one 1

2

Parts of this chapter (mainly 1.1 and 1.2) are based on my PhD thesis “Gendered migrations: the influence of the process of migration on Polish women’s perception of gender roles” (2015), University of Salford. EU15 refers to the 15 Member States of the EU prior to the accession of ten new states in 2004, these are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,

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3

4

5

6

France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. A8 (also called EU8) refers to eight out of the ten countries that joined the EU on the 1st May 2004, those are: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. It should be noted that arguably, there is no one reliable source of statistical information on the scale of Polish migration to the UK. Some scholars (for example Castles and Miller, 2009; Kilkey, Lutz and Palenga-Möllenbeck, 2010; Lutz, 2011) note that female migrants are on the increase which is mainly due to women migrants undertaking domestic and/or care work in economically more prosperous countries. Others however (for example Zlotnik, 2003), argue that the number of women migrants has been rising steadily since the 1970s. What has been named a ‘feminisation of migration’ is nonetheless noteworthy as it brings attention to women migrants who are considered in this paper. All of the participants’ names used in this book are pseudonyms chosen by the interviewees themselves.

two 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Parts of this chapter (mainly 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3) are based on my PhD thesis “Gendered migrations: the influence of the process of migration on Polish women’s perception of gender roles” (2015), University of Salford. EU15 – “old” EU Member States (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden) including the UK EU8 (or Accession 8 – A8) migrants refers to the eight out of ten former Eastern Bloc states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and their nationals that joined the European Union (EU) on the 1st of May 2004, those are: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. The other two: Cyprus and Malta are beyond the focus of this research project; however, there were no restrictions imposed on the nationals of those countries. The other two were Ireland and Sweden; both permitted immediate and unrestricted free movement of labour from the EU8. A8/EU8 – Accession 8 often referred to as the EU8 – ‘new’ EU Member States which joined the EU on 1 May 2004 (that is: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia). There are several British sources of information that provide details on the highly problematic matter of statistical data regarding people’s in- and outflows. In regard to the post-accession migrants the following tools are

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NOTES

8

9

relevant: the Worker Registration Scheme, National Insurance Number registrations (NINo), International Passenger Survey (IPS), and the Labour Force Survey (LFS) (Pollard, Latorre and Sriskandarajah, 2008). A returnee or more accurately a return migrant is a person who having lived in the UK for a minimum of 6 months has subsequently moved back to Poland and at the time of the interview lived in Poland. Most of the interviews with return migrants were in fact conducted in Poland. All of the interviews were conducted in Polish but a professional translator was employed to supply English versions of the interview extracts.

three 1

2

Parts of this chapter (3.2 and 3.3) use data from two of my recently published blog posts: “I love the UK but it broke my heart and I will leave”. Speculating about Brexodus. Gender, Place and Culture 25-year anniversary blog series; Does Brexit mean my exit? A lack of consideration for women migrants in light of post-Brexit-vote uncertainty. The UK Social Policy Association 50-for-50-years blog series. According to ONS, EU 14 includes: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain (except Canary Islands), Spain (not otherwise specified), Sweden, Canary Islands, Monaco, Vatican City, Republic of Ireland.

four 1

Parts of this chapter use data from two of my recently published blog posts: “I love the UK but it broke my heart and I will leave”. Speculating about Brexodus. Gender, Place and Culture 25-year anniversary blog series; Does Brexit mean my exit? A lack of consideration for women migrants in light of post-Brexit-vote uncertainty. The UK Social Policy Association 50-for-50-years blog series.

five 1

2

Parts of this chapter are based on a journal paper: Duda-Mikulin, E.A. (2018). Gendered migrations and precarity in the post-Brexit-vote UK: the case of Polish women as workers and carers. Special Issue of Migration and Development. Doi: 10.1080/21632324.2018.1502004 Rather interestingly, UK migrants within the EU are often referred to as ‘expats’ and not migrants. The term ‘expats’ has more positive connotations and demonstrates the divide between what is perceived as good and bad immigration.

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142

Appendix

Research participants’ characteristics can be found in the two tables that follow. Respondents’ age should be adjusted by 6 years as these details were recorded during the initial phase of interviewing in 2012–2013. The names are pseudonyms that the participants chose for themselves. Those women, whose relationship status is other than ‘single’, are or were in a relationship with Polish men. The symbol (S) indicates that the interview was internet-based with the use of Skype software.

143

144

30

25

Aleks

Ewa

Bernadetta 57

33

38

Barbara

Kasia

33

Maria

29

32

Aniela

Amelia

32

Ksenia

Village

Town

Secondary City

Secondary Village

Secondary Village

N

N

Child/ren – Y/N (age)

HR admin (FT)

4.5 years No

Occupation (current) Length of Welfare state in the UK (full/part time in the experience in the UK/PL time) UK

Dealer in a casino 4.5 years No (FT) N Researcher 7 years No (academia) (FT) Divorced/single. Y (20/14/8/4) Full time carer (FT) 5 years Yes – in PL and UK – Originally follower a in receipt of DLA for man. her child Married (Polish). Y (5/3) Home-maker 8.5 years Yes – in the UK – in Originally came with her receipt of child benefit partner. Married (Polish). Pioneer Y (10/3,5) BME Health and 6.5 years Yes – in the UK – in migrant later joined by wellbeing advisor receipt of child benefit her family. (PT) Single. Originally joined N Picker in a factory 2.5 years No her sister. (FT) Partnering (Polish). N Picker in a factory 7 months No Originally came with her (FT) partner. Divorced/single. Y – 3 adult Carer/domestic 6 months No Originally joined a children help (FT) friend.

Originally Relationship status/family migrated from context city/town/ village City Partnering (British). Originally followed a man. Village Single. Originally joined brothers. Town Single. Pioneer migrant.

Secondary Village

B.A.

Higher

Ph.D.

M.A.

Higher

Age Education

Name

Table 3: Migrants – UK based

EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY

145

25

33

35

37

20

48

Kinga

Michalina

Kornelia

Oliwia

Monika

Marianna

Secondary Village/city

Secondary City

Secondary Village

48

Wiktoria

N

Y (5)

Y (5/3)

Y – 1 adult

Child/ren – Y/N (age)

Married (Polish husband Y (26/20) in PL). Originally invited by acquaintances, later followed by her daughter.

Single. Originally joined N a friend. Single. Originally joined Y (2) her mother.

Originally Relationship status/family migrated from context city/town/ village Secondary City Divorced/single. Pioneer migrant later joined by her daughter. Secondary Town Married (Polish). Originally followed a man. M.A. City Partnering (British). Originally came with a friend. Secondary Village Single. Originally joined her sister.

Age Education

Name

18 months

Yes – in the UK – in receipt of Child Benefit

No

Production 4.5 years No operative (factory work on production line) (FT) Retail assistant 8 years No (FT) Cleaner (PT) 2.5 years Yes – in the UK – in receipt of Child Benefit and Working Tax Credit Unemployed 4 years Yes – in the UK – in receipt of Jobseekers Allowance

Stay-at-home-mum 6.5 years Yes – in the UK – in receipt of Child Benefit

Stay-at-home-mum 6 years

Carer/domestic help (FT)

Occupation (current) Length of Welfare state in the UK (full/part time in the experience in the UK/PL time) UK

APPENDIX

146

M.A.

M.A.

B.A.

M.A.

Higher

B.A.

Education

Originally Relationship status/ migrated family context from city/ town/village City Single. Originally migrated with friends. City Engaged. Originally migrated with a friend. City Engaged. Originally joined her brother. City Partnering. Originally migrated with her partner. Village Married. Originally migrated with her partner. City Married. Originally migrated with her partner. Y

Y

N

Y (2)

N

N

Child/ren – Y/N (age)

Café assistant (PT)

Bar manager (FT)

Admin. work (PT)

2.5 years

Maternity leave Barmaid/ 3.5 years agency work/IT work (FT)

Maternity leave KP/chef (FT)

2 years

5.5 years

6 years

5.5 years

Work done in Length of the UK (full/part time in the time) UK

Assistant Factory work accountant (FT) (FT)

Full time mum

Occupation (current) in Poland (full/part time) Tutor, practice administrator (FT) Store manager (FT)

Yes – in PL

Yes – in PL

Yes – in the UK – in receipt of Child Benefit No

No

No

Welfare state experience in the UK/PL

Each of the respondents was asked to choose a pseudonym for themselves. The only conditions were that it is a Polish feminine name. It is acknowledged that Nikita is a Slavic masculine name but the researcher felt it necessary not to impose on the interviewee’s willingness to be interviewed.

29

Ola (S)

1

30

28

Marta

Faustyna (S)

32

Nikita1

28

28

Olga

Lena

Age

Name

Table 4: Return migrants – Poland based

EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY

Higher

Higher

31

26

30

31

Anna

Julia (S)

Paulina

Magda (S)

Matylda (S) 29

Higher

Secondary

Higher

B.A.

26

Ariela

Education

Age

Name

147

City

City

Town

City

N

Y (3 mths)

Child/ren – Y/N (age)

Engaged. Y Originally migrated with her partner.

Partnering. N Originally migrated with her partner. Partnering. N Originally migrated with friends. Engaged. N Originally migrated with her partner.

Originally Relationship status/ migrated family context from city/ town/village City Married. Originally migrated with a friend. City Married. Originally migrated with her partner.

Work done in Length of the UK (full/part time in the time) UK

Graphic designer (FT)

Project administrator, didactics tutor (FT)

Shop/post 4.5 years office work then research assistant/Ph.D. student in HE (PT) Barmaid/ 18 months waitress in hotels (PT)

Accountant (FT) Fast food/ 18 months restaurant (PT)

Fast food/care 5 years work for elderly (PT) HR specialist Barmaid/ 3 years (FT) cleaner/ receptionist (FT) Sales specialist Factory work 10 months (FT) (FT)

Occupation (current) in Poland (full/part time) Unemployed

No

No

No

No

No

Yes – in PL

Welfare state experience in the UK/PL

APPENDIX

Klaudia

26

Secondary

B.A.

29

Maja

Secondary

B.A.

36

Dorota

Education

Gabrysia (S) 26

Age

Name

City

Town

City

Y (16/7)

Child/ren – Y/N (age)

Single. Originally followed her partner.

N

Single. Originally N joined her extended family. Married. Originally Y (5) joined her brother.

Originally Relationship status/ migrated family context from city/ town/village City Single. Originally followed her partner.

Consultant, sales person (FT)

Waitress/ financial adviser (PT) Student

Occupation (current) in Poland (full/part time) Full time mum 5 years

Receptionist in 5 years a casino (FT)

In warehouse, 3.5 years shop assistant, waitress (FT) Runner in a 5 years restaurant (FT)

No work

Work done in Length of the UK (full/part time in the time) UK

Yes – in the UK and PL – in receipt of Child Benefit No

Yes – in the UK and PL – in receipt of Child Benefit No

Welfare state experience in the UK/PL

EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY

148

Index

Note: Page numbers for tables appear in italics. ‘3D’ jobs 38, 88 The3Million 43, 73, 98 A8 migrants 8, 27–8, 37–40, 91

Bauman, Z. 65–6 Bielewska, A. 36 birth rate 12, 54, 80, 112 Bourdieu, P. 84 ‘brain drain’ 31, 33 ‘brain training’ 35 Brexit 63–81, 87 and immigration 51 labour shortages 45, 58, 86 and staff recruitment 53 ‘Brexodus’ 28, 45, 55, 59, 86, 101, 105, 108 British citizenship 74–5, 99 British exceptionalism 69 British expats 59, 81, 98, 109 British Hospitality Association 52–3 British in Europe 43 British press 38, 98 Bulgaria 67 business services 48

A academic staff 54 Accession 2 countries 21 Accession 8 (A8) countries 8, 21, 26–7 Ackers, L. 12, 41 age 50, 67, 72 ageing population 12, 19–20, 59, 60–1, 79, 81, 86 and migrant women topping up birth rate 54, 80, 112 agency 41, 42 agriculture 52, 81, 92, 113 Anderson, Professor Bridget 76, 87, 108 Article 50 67, 74 Asia 6 asylum seekers 15, 90 austerity 65, 96 Austria 67

C Cameron, David 67, 70 capitalism 64, 65, 100 care 95 carers 75 care work 11, 12–14, 92, 93, 94

B Badani, Samia 79 Barbier, J.-C. 88

149

EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY

cash-in-hand jobs 75 Castles, S. 6, 86 catering 88 Catholics 36 Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 8, 27, 40, 97 ‘chain migration’ 34 Child Benefit 40 childcare 13 children of EU parents, rights of 60 Child Tax Credit 40 church services 36 Cieślik, A. 31, 37 citizenship British 43, 74–5, 99 European 40–1, 42 class structure 89 ‘Common Market’ 66 communication sector 48 communist period 26 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 68 connectivity 5 construction 48, 54, 88 consumerism 64 Cook et al 41 Cox, Jo 71 Creswell, J.W. 16 Croatia 67 cultural racism 64 culture, migration 35–6 customer services 54

‘double caring responsibilities’ 92, 94 drink manufacturing 53 Drinkwater, S. 27, 35 ‘dual location households’ 12, 94

E Eade, J. 27, 35 earnings, UK national average 49 economic inactivity rates 47 economic migrants attitude to 111 and Brexit 80 and downward mobility 89 and EU citizenship 40 economic migration 14–15, 54, 55–7, 60 educational attainment 50, 55, 67, 85 education sector 48 elementary occupations 48, 49, 50 employment effect of migration 50 exploitation 98 insecurity 90, 92 and obtaining PR 99–100 rights 37, 38 employment rate 46, 47 equality, gender 111 Erel, U. 29 EU (Withdrawal) Bill 67 EU2 countries 107 EU2 nationals 48, 49 EU8 countries 107 EU8 migrants 47, 89 EU8 nationals 48, 49, 90 EU14 nationals 48, 49 EU15 countries 8, 37 EU citizenship 40–1, 42 ‘Euro orphans’ 94 Europe, and migrants 6 European Commission 73, 98 European Economic Community (EEC) 66 European Union (EU) 7, 66–9

customs, Polish 36

D ‘defensive engagement’ 41–2 dehousewification 13 Denmark 66 disabled migrants 75 domestic labour sector 92 domestic work 94

150

INDEX

Euroscepticism 70 Eurozone crisis 69 expats 59, 81, 98 exploitation 98

hate crime 4–5, 64, 98, 110 Hatton, Nicolas 98 Hawkins, O. 30 health problems 81 health sector 48, 54, 81, 109, 113 higher education 85 homelessness 109 homemakers 75 Home Office 110 horticulture 52 hospitality 52–3, 54, 81, 88, 113 ‘hostile environment’ 42, 114 hotels 48 hourly rates 49 housework 13 Housing Benefit 40 Hughes, B. 5, 64 human rights 79 human waste and migrants 65 hyperflexible labour 87 hyper-precarity 90–1

F family networks 90 family values 36–7 Farage, Nigel 71 female employment rate 46, 47 female migrants, occupations 50 feminisation of migration 6, 10, 86 fertility rate 12, 54, 80, 112 financial services 48 Finland 67 ‘fluid migration’ 35 ‘flying grandmas’ 94 food manufacturing 52, 53 forced migration 14–15 Foti, A. 85 free market capitalism 65 free movement of goods 71 free movement of people 71 free movement of workers 68 free trade agreements 71

I immigration 69, 70, 71, 72, 79 inequality, global 104 insecure employment 65, 84–5, 91, 92 insecurity 65, 88, 90, 97, 98 ‘intentional unpredictability’ 35 Irek, M. 28–9, 31 Ireland 66

G Garapich, M. 27, 35 Garton Grimwood, G. 52 gender 9–14 gendered responsibilities 13, 92, 112 gender equality 111 global capitalism 64 global inequality 104 globalisation 6, 72, 85, 86, 90, 100, 110, 114 Gove, Michael 4 Greece 66

J job insecurity 65, 84–5, 91, 92 Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) 39–40

K Kay, R. 97 Klein, N. 51 Kofman, E. 14 KPMG 53

H Habitual Residence Test (HRT) 38, 39

151

EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY

Mikołajczyk-Lerman, G. 36–7 Miller, M. 6, 86 mobility 15, 89, 101, 108 ‘the mobility turn’ 6, 15, 86 Moses, A. 30 motherhood, transnational 13, 95

L labour 45-61 hyperflexible 87 reliance on migrant workers from the EU 110, 113 reproductive 91, 93 Labour Force Survey 46, 52 labour migrants 54 Leave campaign 69 Leave-supporting losers 70 Lee, S. 88, 91, 92, 93, 94 legal status, migrants 73–6, 97, 98 Lewis et al 87, 90–1, 108 life-course stage and migration 34–5 Light, D. 68 Lisbon Agenda 68 low-paid jobs 85, 88, 91, 92 low-skilled jobs 33, 50, 85, 88, 89, 91, 92 low-skilled labour migrants 15 Lutz, H. 13

N National Insurance Numbers (NINos 8 nationalism 69, 114 neoliberal globalisation 72, 90, 100 neoliberalism 4, 5, 64, 72 neopopulism 4, 64–5 net migration 7, 23, 51 networks 34, 55, 56, 57–8, 74, 88, 109–10 lack of family 90 social safety 92 New Europeans 79 NHS 54, 81, 109 Nobel Peace Prize 67 non-EU immigration 72 No Recourse to Public Funds rule 68 nurses 50, 109

M Maastricht Treaty 68 machine operatives 48 male employment rate 46, 47 manufacturing 48, 53, 54 May, Theresa 71, 72, 73, 97–8, 109 McDowell, L. 89 McGuinness, T. 52 media 38, 98 men and educational attainment 50 and employment and unemployment rates 46, 47 mental health 109 midwives 50 migration and globalisation 6, 8, 85–6, 110 and precarity 87–91 to the UK 7, 23–43 ‘migration care chains’ 11 ‘migration culture’ 35–6

O ONS (Office for National Statistics) 46, 47, 49, 60 Osipovic, D. 40 out-migration 26

P paid labour market 2, 38, 45–61, 84, 108, 110, 113 and women 11, 13, 41, 74, 92, 93 part time work 100 patriarchal family 92 People’s Vote 72 permanent residence (PR) 42–3, 74–5, 79, 99

152

INDEX

pioneer migrants 34 Piper, N. 88, 91, 92, 93, 94 Poland and emigration 24–5 employment 46–7 image of 112 joined EU 67 unemployment 5, 100 Polish language 28 population Polish in the UK 30–1 see also ageing population Portugal 66 post-accession migration 29, 31 postmodernisation 3 post-war migration 29 precariat 83 precarity 20–1, 74, 83–101, 109, 113 ‘pre-settled status’ 73 press, British 38, 98 private sector 48 private sphere 93–4 processing occupations 50 process/plant operatives 48 production, relocation of overseas 109 professionals 48, 49, 50, 86 proletariat 85 public administration 48 public sphere 93–4

restaurants 48 retail trade 48 return migrants 15 rights 37–43, 68, 79–80, 96, 109, 110 Roman Catholics 36 Romania 67 Rome, treaty 66 Ryan et al 92

S Second World War 24–5 Seidler, V.J. 70, 71 self-employed persons 37 servicemen, Polish 24–6 services 81 ‘settled status’ 73, 74, 75, 79, 80, 97–8, 110 Single European Act 66 Single Market 66 skilled professionals 15, 86 skilled trade occupations 48 social care 54, 81, 109 social entitlements 89–90 social networks 57–8 social policy, EU 68 social rights 40, 41 social security 68 social welfare 81, 109 socio-economic position 89 socio-legal status 90 Spain 66, 81 staff shortages 81, 109 Standing, Guy 83, 85 studying 15, 33, 35 super-diversity 7 Sweden 67

R ‘racial capitalism’ 51 racism, cultural 64 RAF 303 Squadron 25 referendum, EU 67, 69–72 refugees 15, 90 relocation of production overseas 109 Remain-supporting winners 70 remittances 13 reproductive labour 91, 93 responsibilities, gendered 13, 92, 112

T Taylor, G. 64, 69, 71, 72, 73 ‘tied movers’ 34 Tier 3 route 89 ‘trailing wives’ 34

153

EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY

transition period, for leaving EU 67 transnationalism 5, 65 ‘transnational motherhood’ 95 transport sector 48 Treaty of Rome 66 Trevena, P. 27, 97 Tusk, Donald 71

White, A. 30, 31, 35–6 wholesale trade 48 Wills et al 100 Windrush generation scandal 110, 114 women and employment and unemployment rates 47 number of migrants 10, 12 and obtaining PR 75 occupations 50 and precarity 91–5 and social rights 41 Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) 38, 68 workers’ rights 68 working hours 48 working poor 85 work-life balance 11, 111

U UK employment 46, 47, 50 government wrongly sent letters asking EU migrants to leave 98 joined the EEC 66 number of migrants 7 unemployment 100 welfare rights 96 UK Citizenship for European Nationals (UKCEN) 100 UK Migration Advisory Committee 108 uncertainty 96, 97, 100, 113 unemployment 5, 37, 46, 47, 50, 68 low 7, 27, 100 unpredictability, intentional 35 unregulated work 75, 99 USA, and migrants 7, 24, 26

Y YouGov. UK 67 Young, C. 68

Z zero-hours contracts 88

V Vickers, P. 49 voluntary migration 14–15, 88

W wages, effects of immigration 50 Waite, L. 84, 87, 100, 108 waste of human life and migrants 65 welfare and Brexit 76–7, 81, 109 in Europe 111 rights 38, 39, 96

154

How has the Brexit vote affected EU migrants to the UK? This book presents a female Polish perspective, using findings from research carried out with migrants interviewed before and after the Brexit vote – voices of real people who made their home in the UK. It looks at how migrants view Brexit and what it means for them, how their experiences compare pre- and post-Brexit vote, and their future plans, as well as considering the wider implications of the migrant experience in relation to precarity and the British paid labour market. Eva A. Duda-Mikulin is an academic researcher and a lecturer at the University of Bradford.

EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY

“This book could not be more timely. Eva Duda-Mikulin excellently captures the concerns of individuals during one of the most significant political moments in recent years. The book is a must-read for anyone with an interest in Brexit and its effects on EU workers.” Kamran Khan, Open University of Catalonia

EVA A. DUDA-MIKULIN

EU MIGRANT WORKERS, BREXIT AND PRECARITY Polish women’s perspectives from inside the UK

EVA A. DUDA-MIKULIN P O L IRCEYS EPARRECSHS

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