EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership: Policies, Instruments and Perceptions 3030929965, 9783030929961

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EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership Policies, Instruments and Perceptions Edited by Maria Raquel Freire · Paula Duarte Lopes · Daniela Nascimento · Licínia Simão

EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership

Maria Raquel Freire · Paula Duarte Lopes · Daniela Nascimento · Licínia Simão Editors

EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership Policies, Instruments and Perceptions

Editors Maria Raquel Freire Faculty of Economics and Centre for Social Studies University of Coimbra Coimbra, Portugal

Paula Duarte Lopes Faculty of Economics and Centre for Social Studies University of Coimbra Coimbra, Portugal

Daniela Nascimento Faculty of Economics and Centre for Social Studies University of Coimbra Coimbra, Portugal

Licínia Simão Faculty of Economics and Centre for Social Studies University of Coimbra Coimbra, Portugal

ISBN 978-3-030-92996-1 ISBN 978-3-030-92997-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92997-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

The idea for this book and its development benefited from different contexts and the input of various colleagues across continents. We would like to start by acknowledging the dialogues established with colleagues from different parts of the world at various scientific events. The actual idea sprang from stimulating conversations held in result of the Round Table ‘Russia and the European Union in the Contemporary World’ in Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, India, amidst a Universitywide strike in March 2018. The structure and several author invitations stemmed from two panels we organised for the FLACSO-ISA Joint International Conference in Quito, Ecuador, the following July. Second, we would like to acknowledge the role two different scientific networks had in the development of this edited volume: the Marie Skłodowska-Curie European Training Network ‘Around the Caspian: A Doctoral Training for Future Experts in Development and Cooperation with Focus on the Caspian Region’ (CASPIAN), led by Licínia Simão, and the Jean Monnet Chair and Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence (PRONE) at the University of Coimbra, led by Maria Raquel Freire. These networks enabled an exciting environment for us to participate in enticing conceptual debates and exchanges on field experience that nourished the development of this publication. We would also like to acknowledge the support and patience from both Ms. Ambra Finotello and Ms. Christina Brian (Springer editors), as well as from the anonymous reviewer who

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provided insightful comments and suggestions that in fact allowed for this discussion to continue. This book was concluded in home confinement throughout the world due to the COVID-19 pandemic, although each chapter had been researched and written before 2020. Besides other pressing issues and dynamics, the role of the EU in the current pandemic reflects the continuous existing tension between its potential and others’ expectations and its accomplishments. The current situation has revealed an EU that continues to be a bit too reactive, too slow, and too divided, but in which the sum of the parts has definitely been bigger than the EU itself. At the same time, the world has been accompanying what the EU and its Member States have been doing to contain and mitigate the current pandemic. The focus on a welfare state and on the discussion of basic human rights, regarding refugees and migrants, have been recurrent aspects. In addition, discussions on more or less coherent approaches to the European Union social contract have also been part of the debate/reflection. In such a discussion, any realist would say ‘time will tell’; any liberal would argue that the institutions create path-dependency from which the EU will not easily be able to deviate from; but any constructivist would argue that any assessment of EU actorness will reflect the social view of the actors assessing it. As of today, we believe it really depends, not only on the Member States and on the EU institutions, but also and foremost on each and every European. Coimbra, 2021

Maria Raquel Freire Paula Duarte Lopes Daniela Nascimento Licínia Simão

Contents

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EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership: Policies, Instruments and Perceptions Maria Raquel Freire, Paula Duarte Lopes, Daniela Nascimento, and Licínia Simão Unpacking the EU’s International Actorness: Debates, Theories and Concepts Licínia Simão

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Part I Actorness across EU Policy Areas 3

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The Added Value of European Diplomacy for EU Regional and International Actorness Heidi Maurer

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Global Player Status? EU Actorness and Democracy Promotion Anna Khakee

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Securing Peace Through Humanitarian Action: The EU Response to Complex Emergencies Daniela Nascimento

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CONTENTS

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Taking Its Rightful Place? Legitimising Discourse and EU Actorness in the Nexus of Trade and Regulation Elitsa Garnizova

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The EU Actorness in the Security Field: The Case of Georgia Shu Uchida

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Part II EU Regional Actorness 8

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The EU in the Wider Caspian: Actorness and Social Limits of Recognition Elham Gharji

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The EU and North Africa, or the Actorness of the Possible Nizar Messari

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An Asset or Liability: Turkey’s Potential in Availing EU Global Actorness Erhan Do˘gan and H. Deniz Genç

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Global Giant, Regional Dwarf? Perceptions of EU Actorness in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Zhanibek Arynov

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Russia vis-à-vis the European Union: Perceptions and Perspectives for Cooperation Larisa Deriglazova

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Part III 13

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External Views on EU Actorness

Brazilian Perspectives on EU Global Actorness in the Case of Digital Technologies Regulation and Internet Governance: An Opportunity to Improve Mutual Relations? Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann and Paula Sandrin The European Union as a Global Actor: An Indian Perspective Rajan Kumar

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China’s Considerations and Perceptions About the EU Dingding Chen and Yu Xia

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“S/he Who Pays the Piper”: Examining the (De)legitimising Influence of European Union’s Financial Support to the African Union Babatunde Fagbayibo

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The European Union Actorness: A View from Washington D.C. Aleksandar Jankovski Conclusion Maria Raquel Freire, Paula Duarte Lopes, Daniela Nascimento, and Licínia Simão

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Notes on Contributors

Zhanibek Arynov has a Ph.D. in International Relations and a former CASPIAN Fellow at the University of St. Andrews. His thesis examines European Union-Central Asia relations with a specific focus on images and perceptions of the EU in the region. He also holds an M.A. in International Relations from Al-Farabi University, Kazakhstan. He served as a Junior Researcher at the Institute of National Studies, Almaty, Kazakhstan. He has joined the Graduate School of Public Policy as a Postdoctoral Scholar in 2019. Prior to joining the GSPP, he served as a Senior Expert of the Program of Eurasian Studies, Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP), a think-tank based in Nur-Sultan (Astana), Kazakhstan. Dingding Chen is a Professor of International Relations at Jinan University (China) and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (Berlin, Germany). He is the Vice-President of ISA Asia Pacific and the Founding Director of Intellisia Institute. He worked previously as an Assistant Professor at the University of Macau. His research interests include Chinese foreign policy, Asian security, Chinese politics, and human rights. Larisa Deriglazova is a Professor at the Department of World Politics, Tomsk State University (Russian Federation). Her research interests include conflict and conflict resolution in International Relations, armed

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forces and society, human rights and social dimensions of European integration. She has participated in several research projects internationally funded and is currently the Director of a Jean Monnet Center of Excellence with a focus on youth (2015–2018). She has published her research both in Russia and abroad. Erhan Do˘gan is an Associate Professor and Researcher at Marmara University (Turkey). His research and publication has been mainly focused on Turkey-EU Relations and NGO involvement into Turkish Foreign Policy processes. He has conducted doctoral and post-doctoral research at different academic institutions like Ohio State University, Mershon Center (1999–2000), ULB, Brussels (2000), Dublin City University (2008–2009), Higher School of Economics, Moscow (2013– 2014). Babatunde Fagbayibo is an Associate Professor in Law at the University of South Africa. He is also the acting manager of the Centre for Public Law Studies (Verloren Van Themaat Centre) of the Department of Public, Constitutional and International Law, University of South Africa. His research interests include the institutional development of the African Union, transnational policy analysis, new paradigms of inter-state relations, and governance and democratisation in Africa. He currently serves as the assistant editor of the Southern African Public Law journal and also a member of the editorial board of the African Journal of Democracy and Governance (RADG). Maria Raquel Freire is a Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Coimbra and Researcher on Peace Studies at the Centre for Social Studies (CES) at the same university. She coordinates the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence PRONE at the University of Coimbra and held a Jean Monnet Chair. She is also Visiting Professor in the Post-Graduate Programme in International Relations, Federal University of Santa Catarina, Brazil. She is the President of the Assembly of the Faculty of Economics of the University of Coimbra, and a member of the Scientific Council for Social Sciences and Humanities of the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology. Her research interests focus on peace studies, particularly peacekeeping and peacebuilding; foreign policy, international security, Russia and the postSoviet space. Her work has been published in journals such as European Politics and Society, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, East

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European Politics, European Security, International Peacekeeping, International Politics, Asian Perspective, Global Society, Journal of Conflict, Security and Development, among other. She is the author of Conflict and Security in the Former Soviet Union: The Role of the OSCE, Routledge Revival Series, 2018. She has also edited several volumes with Palgrave MacMillan and other. Elitsa Garnizova is a Researcher at LSE Consulting, London School of Economics and Political Science. Her primary research interests include European trade and investment policy, European foreign policy, and international affairs. She holds an M.A. in European Studies: Transnational and Global Perspectives from KU Leuven, Belgium, and a B.Sc. in International Economic and Management from Bocconi University, Italy. H. Deniz Genç is an Assistant Professor at Istanbul Medipol University (Turkey). Her areas of interest are international migration, primarily irregular migration, transnationalism, and minorities. She conducted post-doctoral research in the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), at the University of Oxford (2015). She has published several articles on different aspects of international migration in refereed journals, including International Migration, Turkish Studies, and Migration Letters, as well as several book chapters in edited books by distinguished Turkish scholars. Elham Gharji holds a Ph.D. in International Relations—International Politics and Conflict Resolution from the University of Coimbra and is a former CASPIAN Fellow with the Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra. He worked for the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Deputy Director General for Regional Cooperation. He has also worked as President of Gawharshad Institute of Higher Education in Kabul, where he taught subjects on Central Asian Politics. He has frequently appeared in national and international media to discuss political issues in Afghanistan as well as in the region. Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann is a Professor at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio). She was a Visiting Scholar at the Freie Universitaet Berlin (2012–2015), Erfurt Universitaet (2010–2012) and London School of Economics and Political Science (2008–2010). She has published about legitimacy and democracy at the global level, international organisations and regional integration in Latin America and Europe, among others.

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Aleksandar Jankovski is a Lecturer in Politics at Lake Forest College, Northeastern Illinois University. His research interests include Foreign Policy Analysis, Security Studies and International Political Economy. He has been involved in several research projects and published internationally on his research topics. Anna Khakee is a Senior Lecturer at University of Malta. She worked previously as a Senior Researcher at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies and for several years as a consultant to the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre, EuroMeSCo, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), among others. Rajan Kumar is an Associate Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University (Delhi, India). His research interests include International Politics; Foreign Policy of India; Politics and Society in Russia and Central Asia; and Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods in Social Sciences. He has collaborated in various international research projects, as well as published on his research interests both in India and abroad. Paula Duarte Lopes is a Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Coimbra and Researcher on Peace Studies at the Center for Social Studies (CES) at the same university. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from The Johns Hopkins University, USA (2006). She was the national coordinator of the SPBuild MSCA ITN and currently coordinates the Erasmus+ E-NOTE project. She has also participated in other research projects, being currently involved in a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence and another Erasmus+ INCOPS project. Her research interests are focused on global interventionism dynamics, ranging from water governance regimes, through development aid, to peace missions. She has conducted fieldwork in Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, France, Mozambique and Timor-Leste. Her work has been published in peer-reviewed journals, such as African Security Review, International Environmental Agreements, International Peacekeeping and Water, among others. She has also contributed to several edited volumes published by Routledge and Palgrave MacMillan, among others. Heidi Maurer is a Lecturer in EU Politics at University of Oxford. She is a Senior CR Fellow at St. Anthony’s and participates in the activities of the European Studies Center. She coordinates the Jean-Monnet

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Network NORTIA: Network on Research and Teaching in EU foreign affairs (2017–2020). She is a member of the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES). Nizar Messari is an Associate Professor at Al Akhawayn University (Morocco). He is currently the Vice President for Academic Affairs. He was previously an Assistant Professor at The Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, (PUC-Rio, Brazil). He has also been involved in various national and international scientific associations and responsible for organizing and convening several international scientific events in that capacity. He has published and been involved in national and international research projects focused on his research interests. Daniela Nascimento is a Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Coimbra and a Researcher at the Peace Studies Group of the Center for Social Studies (CES). She holds a Ph.D. in International Politics and Conflict Resolution from the University of Coimbra and a European Master’s Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation from the Inter-European Center for Human Rights and Democratisation, Venice/Padova (Italy). She is a Board Member of the Portuguese Political Science Association and a member of the Council for Military Higher Education at the Ministry of Defense. She has also participated in various national and international funded research projects, being currently involved in a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence and three Erasmus+ projects (CaloHex, INCOPS and E-NOTE). Her research interests focus on peace studies, human rights, peacebuilding, humanitarian action, especially in the African context and Timor-Leste. She has published various peer-reviewed articles in journals such as African Security Review, International Journal of Peace Studies, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, European Politics and Society and International Peacekeeping, among others. She is the author of “International Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding Strategies. The Complexities of war and peace in the Sudans” (Routledge, 2017). Paula Sandrin is a Professor at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio). She holds an M.A. and a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Westminster. She has taught and is interested on issues of international security, foreign policy and EU’s and Turkish public diplomacy.

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Licínia Simão is a Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra. She is a researcher and a former member of the Executive Board at the Centre for Social Studies, where she was the national coordinator of the CASPIAN ITN. Since 2018 she has been an advisor for the Portuguese Minister of Defence. For the period 2018–2021, she has also been the Coordinator of the IR Section at the Portuguese Political Science Association. Licínia holds a Ph.D. in International Relations (specialisation in European Studies) from the University of Coimbra, with a thesis on the European Neighbourhood Policy for the South Caucasus. Her research interests include foreign policy analysis and security studies, with a focus on European foreign and security policy and the former-Soviet space. She has several publications in peer-reviewed journals such as European Security, East European Politics and Small Wars & Insurgencies, among others. Her most recent publication is the book “The EU’s Neighbourhood Policy towards the South Caucasus: Expanding the European Security Community” (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). Shu Uchida is an Assistant Professor at Organisation for Regional and Inter-regional Studies, Waseda University, and a former Marie-Curie Fellow with the Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra. He previously worked for the Davis Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University, as a Visiting Fellow, the Embassy of Japan in Georgia, as an Attaché, and the OSCE/ODIHR Presidential Election Observer Mission in Georgia, among others. Yu Xia is a Research Assistant of Intellisia Institute.

List of Figures

Fig. 10.1

Fig. 10.2

Fig. 11.1 Fig. 11.2 Fig. 11.3 Fig. 12.1

Turkey’s Alignment with CFSP Instruments (%) (Source Elaborated by the authors. Data from European Commission Progress Reports on Turkey [2008–2020]) Declarations in CFSP and Turkey’s Alignment (Source Elaborated by the Authors. Data from European Commission Progress Reports on Turkey [2008–2020]) Attributes of the EU’s perceived actorness as a global player (author’s figure) Attributes of the EU’s perceived weakness as a regional actor in CA (author’s figure) Attributes of the ‘Decaying Europe’ Narrative (author’s figure) Russian public opinion towards the EU (index of positive and negative attitudes), 2003–2018 (Source Levada Centre (2019b) Public opinion 2018. Yearbook, graph 25.1. p. 153)

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List of Tables

Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 9.1 Table 9.2 Table 12.1

EU financial capabilities, by main programming tool EU and EU Member States aid towards governance and democratization (USD million) Global presence: comparison EU institutions and top democracy assistance donors among EU Member States Evolution of Europe-North Africa Cooperation The renewed Mediterranean Policy (1995–2004) The EU and Russia self-perception and perception of another in regard to different aspects of global affairs

59 66 67 150 151 219

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CHAPTER 1

EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership: Policies, Instruments and Perceptions Maria Raquel Freire, Paula Duarte Lopes, Daniela Nascimento, and Licínia Simão

Introduction The European Union (EU) is a major player in international affairs, promoting a wide agenda shared among its 27 Member States. Since the signature of the Treaty of Rome, in 1957, and the establishment of the European Communities (EC), the initial peace project, dealing mostly with economic integration, soon developed into a broader political project, characterised by a complex institutional structure encompassing political, economic, environmental, societal and security dimensions.

M. R. Freire · P. D. Lopes (B) · D. Nascimento · L. Simão Faculty of Economics and Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra, Coimbra, Portugal e-mail: [email protected] M. R. Freire e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. R. Freire et al. (eds.), EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92997-8_1

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The development of the EC allowed for the institutions and processes sustaining them to grow, expand and deepen. This created a set of new expectations regarding the ability of the new institutions to help advance Member States’ interests and to contribute to world affairs. The difficulties of this process have been many and are well studied, but what is most relevant here is the deepness and broadness of today’s EU project that, on the one hand, informs and influences the functioning of a large part of Europe, including its foreign policy, and, on the other hand, projects itself with various intensities beyond European borders. A fundamental issue shaping EU international actorness is the ever evolving international and regional contexts. The end of the bipolar confrontation not only changed radically the European regional context, but also opened important opportunities for the EU to lead in the advancement of a democratic and rules-based international order. The current context of increasing contestation to this order (Acharya, 2014; Dunne, 2010; Howorth, 2010; Ikenberry, 2011) is, in our view, a new important element that needs to be factored into any analysis of EU leadership. This volume contributes to this discussion by analysing how the EU has been repositioning itself in this contested international order, by means of its presence and of how this gives meaning to its capabilities, which end up reflecting its sense of self-identity in the complex internal and international contexts of its actuation. The current shape of the EU is the result of a tremendous accomplishment in integration among different states coming together to cooperate for peace and for political, social and economic stability. However, in the past few years, the EU has been facing serious internal and external challenges. At the domestic level, Brexit required important adjustments to EU politics and the populist drive in many EU countries, visible in the election of far right parties to power, has made way for agendas that significantly limit democratic rights and liberties, including on issues related to migration flows to Europe. This is also visible in narratives that aim to divide societies, as in the case of SARS-COV 2 pandemic socio-economic

D. Nascimento e-mail: [email protected] L. Simão e-mail: [email protected]

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impacts’ management. At the external level, linked to these challenges, one can mention the urgent need to manage and overcome the violent conflicts that affect the EU close and more distant neighbourhoods— from Libya and Syria to South Sudan and further East to Ukraine, and which feed the movement of displaced populations towards Europe. The refugee and migrant (so-called) crises are a clear illustration of the interconnectedness of the domestic and external environments and of the intersubjective nature of the challenges facing the EU. It is also worth mentioning the challenges posed by the rise of China and its implications for the existing international order; the uncertainties resulting from the Trump Administration years and the efforts by the Biden Administration from January 2021 to mend relations with traditional partners across the Atlantic in a context of global power shifts; the impacts of the so-called emerging economies and the resulting fault lines, with Russia pursuing a more militarised foreign policy and Brazil facing a deep political crisis; or the lingering instability and violence in the Middle East that continue to feed violent extremism from Afghanistan to the Persian Gulf and the Sahel, and more recently to Mozambique. The combination and interrelation of these challenges, both domestic and external, show the deep connections that exist between the nature and drive of the EU integration project and its international projection. The perceived ability of the EU to cope, address and mitigate many of these challenges is fundamental to its ability to be recognised by other international actors as a relevant partner and player. The design of a new global order, which is still in flux, presents many challenges to the discussion of EU actorness. In this context, the EU thrives to keep a clear and active role, with global contours, in order to contribute and shape this drawing-in-the-making of the international system. The EU international presence has been developing gradually, pushed simultaneously by the demands of this international context and the possibilities of an evolving integration process. The gaps between expectations and capabilities, which have famously framed early views and assessments of EU international actorness, have been addressed mostly at the level of the capabilities, with important instruments being provided to the EU foreign policy institutional framework, allowing it to move gradually from a purely reactive stance to a more proactive one (Ginsberg, 2002; Hill, 1993; Larivè, 2014, p. 202; Toje, 2008). From aiming mainly at establishing a voice in the international system that would be recognised as legitimate by other major actors, the EU has gradually claimed a proper

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role as an actor in some of today’s major international issues, resorting to various approaches, designs and operational features. The Neighbourhood Policy, the European Security Strategy (European Union, 2003) and the Global Strategy (European Union, 2016), which enhanced defence capabilities and participation in diverse negotiating formats, are just some illustrations. The presence of the EU, which traditionally has been understood as an important part of its self-definition, reveals itself in these distinct formats and issue-areas that this book explores in further detail. Indeed, in this self-definition and in the construction of its actorness, the EU faces the tension between what it is, what it does, what it aims at and what it achieves. EU actorness has also been significantly addressed and assessed at the conceptual level, with key EU institutions leading the way in terms of thinking how the Union should present itself and act in global affairs (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009; Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2007; Smith, 2013). Strategic documents such as the European Security Strategy of 2003 or the Global Strategy of 2016 clearly express this ambition to conceptualise the Union’s presence in articulation with the fundamental values and principles stated in its founding treaties. The normative dimension associated with the EU’s development underlines the wording of these documents, positioning the EU as an actor capable of identifying and navigating challenges and opportunities. Nevertheless, it also reveals a tendency for a more pragmatic approach to international affairs, giving the Union more leeway in a complex context. The reach of EU international presence has been uneven, with a much stronger—though often contested—capacity to shape the choices of neighbouring countries in the European continent, either through enlargement or neighbourhood and proximity policies (Barbé & Johansson-Nogués, 2008; Börzel & Lebanidze, 2017; Forsberg, 2013; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2013; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004; Smith, 2005). At the international level, significant differences persist across distinct thematic areas, as is the case of the EU’s fundamental role in global humanitarian, development and environmental policies, along with its trade positioning, and its rather marginal role in terms of global security, for example (Arts & Dickson, 2004; Hill et al., 2017; Holden, 2016; Soderbaum & Van Langenhove, 2006; Telò, 2009; Woolcock, 2016). These are all issues that the chapters in this book explore, making evident that the EU international actorness varies depending on sectorial areas. This means, for example, that the Union is usually approached as being stronger in areas where regulatory

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and financial instruments—as opposed to hard power capabilities—are central. Illustrating this trend is the enlargement process of the Union. From Lisbon to Zagreb, the EU’s various enlargements brought the initial community of six to the borders of Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia. On the one hand, Turkey remains in an increasingly frozen integrative path, showing important normative and geopolitical divergences that make Brussels and Ankara drift further apart and prevent the success of cooperative solutions for regional problems (Arikan, 2017; Karakas, 2013; Rumelili, 2011). The EU’s Eastern enlargement, on the other hand, has had fundamental implications on EU relations with its new neighbours, with Russia, as well as within the Union, where adjustments to successive enlargements had to be made (Haukkala, 2010; Popescu & Wilson, 2009). In the Western Balkans, the EU continues to advance a model of political consolidation, economic development and peaceful management of the complex conflicts of the region (Bieber, 2011; Mirel, 2018; Noutcheva, 2012). Under enlargement, the EU’s regulatory and financial instruments became powerful political tools empowering the Union’s international presence. The process is far from complete, but clearly the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was designed to advance EU influence in Europe, beyond integration frameworks, and seeking to consolidate a different political map of Europe, with consequences at all levels of EU action (Börzel et al., 2017; Korosteleva, 2017; Korosteleva et al., 2014). The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), established in 2008 as a means of relaunching the Barcelona Process, provided ground for a platform for dialogue and for developing projects in various sectorial areas with this southern neighbourhood region. The adoption of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009 set a more proactive framework for EU relations with its Eastern neighbours, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, including elements of economic integration and political association available to the interested partners and building on the principle of differentiation. Moreover, the need to address Russian concerns and agenda was also very much present in this process. Russia rejected its participation in the ENP, claiming a differentiated approach from the one offered by the EU to other neighbours (Lavrov cited in Pop, 2009). In this context, the definition of a strategic partnership was negotiated, which has been, however, undermined by the Rose and Orange Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, in 2003 and 2004, respectively, as well as the events of 2008, with the five days war

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in Georgia and, particularly in March 2014, with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and persisting violence in Eastern Ukraine. Either through enlargement, neighbourhood policies or strategic partnerships, the EU’s regional policies are the most important test to its ambition to be recognised as a relevant international actor. This is true for all major powers in the international system. The neighbourhood is often used to test new approaches and instruments, to project influence and exert political pressure, which are often less effective at a global level (see, e.g., Samokhvalov, 2018; Yunling, 2016; Forsberg, 2013). This is also valid for the EU in many of its international policies, which project internally and regionally established practices. This line of analysis is pursued throughout the chapters of this volume. Besides its neighbourhood, recognised in EU documents as a fundamental area for the development of its external relations, the definition of global partnerships has also been a clear focus in the EU agenda. Aiming at giving “teeth” to this will, the EU presented its Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (European Union, 2016), in June 2016. The Strategy clearly affirmed and recognised the Union’s global aspirations, both in terms of the global role assigned to the EU and in terms of the various areas the EU is focusing on, from military capabilities and anti-terrorism to inclusive societies, human rights and peacebuilding (European Union, 2016, p. 4). This Strategy clarifies the EU’s role in a world of contested leadership, placing it as an active player in the process of reshaping the international system. The changing configuration of international relations from the bipolar system to a multi-actor and multi-level system of governance brings new relevant actors into play, including states, international organisations, private companies, nongovernmental actors, transnational networks, many times competing for leadership. Dynamics of competition and cooperation define relations in international affairs and evidence how and in which areas a certain actor, or a combination of actors, might assume a leadership role. The multilayered composition of the international system and the combination of distinct roles performed by different actors make the current setting a challenge for the affirmation of leadership. In this collective work, we focus on EU relations with its neighbourhood and with major powers in the international system, such as India, China or Brazil, among other, evidencing the various actors that are part of the bigger configuration of relations, including non-state actors whenever relevant, as well as a focus on regional dynamics when these assist in clarifying processes of decision

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and action. In this way, the various contributions to this volume highlight how EU actorness plays out in different sectorial areas and contexts of actuation, assisting in better grasping which kind of actor the EU is, or wants to be. By putting forward a multilateral and regional/global agenda, the EU seeks to be part of this reshaping of the international system, where cooperation and formal and informal mechanisms for integration constitute anchoring principles. Federica Mogherini’s1 foreword to the Global Strategy clearly states that “the EU will engage in a practical and principled way, sharing global responsibilities with [its] partners and contributing to their strengths. [The EU has] learnt the lesson: my neighbour’s and my partner’s weaknesses are my own weaknesses. So [it] will invest in win–win solutions and move beyond the illusion that international politics can be a zero-sum game” (European Union, 2016, p. 4). The document therefore provides an important roadmap for the affirmation of the EU global role, by highlighting principles, identifying tools and addressing partnerships and good neighbourly relations as central to this effect. Finding a balance between the normative dimension of the self and the principled pragmatism approach that the Union has been consolidating has been challenging to this actor’s conceptualisation. Indeed, the document does not clearly define which type of global actor the EU is and how it wants to be recognised. EU global actorness is thus maintained as an evolving concept, contested from different perspectives, but increasingly undeniable and unavoidable, and whose understanding is central to the affirmation of the Union in global terms. Bearing this context and multiple views in mind, this book contributes to the improvement of existing understandings of the EU’s role in the international system by engaging with the debates on global actorness and mapping new conceptual and theoretical avenues to better understand how agency and power are exerted at the global and regional levels. Overall, the book addresses the following questions: what can we learn from the EU’s own understanding of its global actorness and what can we learn from other actors’ perceptions of that same global actorness? In order to provide an answer to these questions, the book focuses on the EU as an illustration of international agency and it starts by 1 Federica Mogherini was the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, from 2014 to 2019.

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unpacking the main debates around the conceptualisation of EU actorness (Chapter 2). Whereas initial debates focused on the mismatch between the declaratory nature of EU’s ambitions and the lack of capabilities to enforce them, more contemporary debates have begun to address other complex challenges dealing with the purpose and legitimacy of EU global actions, with issues of recognition and effectiveness, as well as addressing the reach of the Union’s actorness. This view focuses on conceptualisations of power, including the ability to shape the context for policy development, as well as the ability to act in specific settings and regional contexts. It conceives of capabilities as being both material and ideational, and it includes an inter-relational dimension that is evident on issues of status recognition and legitimacy, as facilitators of international actorness. Licínia Simão’s chapter provides ground for identifying opportunities and limits, arising from the actorness debate, which the following chapters address more specifically. This analysis is conducted in three steps. Firstly, looking at how the EU positions itself internationally in certain areas and dimensions. This first step builds on the idea of a normative Europe, actively advancing the currently contested liberal international order, unveiling different types of policies, instruments and European perceptions on issue-areas that relate directly to this overall image. This analysis of EU actorness across different policy areas provides a multi-dimensional reading of EU policies, instruments and practices in specific policy sectors and various regional and global dimensions. Through these contributions, we identify specific limits and opportunities and map expectations and capabilities activated in these specific sectors, thus contributing to the overall systematisation of convergent and divergent trends in EU actorness projection and effectiveness. For this effect, several policy sectors are analysed, namely diplomacy (Chapter 3 by Heidi Maurer), democracy assistance (Chapter 4 by Anna Khakee), humanitarian action (Chapter 5 by Daniela Nascimento), trade (Chapter 6 by Elitsa Garnizova) and human security (Chapter 7 by Shu Uchida). Secondly, the book analyses the EU regional actorness, moving the discussion forward, by engaging, on the one hand, with the EU’s own perspective towards its regional contexts and, on the other hand, with the perspectives of regional actors on the EU. These two dimensions derive from the widely studied conceptualisation of the EU as mainly a regional power and from the understanding that this regional dimension builds on EU policies and instruments to reinforce its global presence. Looking

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at the Eastern neighbourhood and the Caspian region (Chapter 8 by Elham Gharji), as well as North-Africa (Chapter 9 by Nizar Messari) and Turkey (Chapter 10 by Erhan Do˘gan and H. Deniz Genç), provides a specific lens to better understand EU regional actorness, in terms of its policy frameworks, goals and instruments, as well as its practice. How the EU positions itself in its neighbouring regions, and how its neighbours perceive the EU, becomes crucial to better understand its overall goal of becoming a global actor. Finally, the third step engages with non-European perspectives as another fundamental dimension of this book, which aims at shedding light on the perceptions and associated expectations from outside the EU’s own boundaries and regional contexts, such as for example Central Asia (Chapter 11 by Zhanibek Arynov). In fact, the way the EU is perceived by others in this system of contested leadership is central to understanding how it is understood in terms of its policies, instruments and overall capability to lead and act as a global power. Therefore, the combination of what the EU defines as the policies and instruments to attain its global agenda, what the EU offers and its partners perceptions of the Union’s role as an international actor in different geographies needs to be thoroughly analysed. The book includes perspectives from the BRIC countries—Brazil (Chapter 13 by Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann and Paula Sandrin), Russia (Chapter 12 by Larisa Deriglazova), India (Chapter 14 by Rajan Kumar) and China (Chapter 15 by Dingding Chen and Yu Xia), from the United States of America (USA) and from the African Union (AU). The underlying logic was to include other global players, such as the USA (Chapter 17 by Aleksandar Jankovski), for its evident global role in the international system, which has become increasingly contested, and for the traditional good transatlantic relations linking the EU and the USA, and the western norm-sharing that characterises this relationship, to better understand the underlying dynamics of political recognition and status attribution. Considering the nature and goals of the proposed analysis, the then-called emerging economies (BRIC) were also inevitably included, in order to better grasp the perspectives of actors often pressured between competing political, social and economic models of development, and thus illustrating the issue of a contested global order. The narrative that emerged within this “club diplomacy” of a more equal and just order, promoting South-South relations, was very much developed in contrast to the perceived prevailing US hegemony. The AU (Chapter 16 by

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Babatunde Fagbayibo) is also a part of this analysis, bringing the views from an international organisation, which evolved in close articulation with the EU and addresses many of the issues the EU puts forward as priorities in its strategic documents. Thus, the AU provides an important illustration of EU’s ability to be perceived as a leading partner by regional organisations. The concluding chapter builds on the contributions of the various authors, presenting a systematised analysis of EU global actorness from within, in its neighbourhood and beyond. This analysis is contextualised within the current situation of contested leadership at the international level. Furthermore, the final chapter identifies future research avenues, highlighting the main dimensions that may well contribute to a better understanding of the EU’s global role in the future. From the various readings and analyses on outside perceptions of the EU, from major powers and a multilateral forum like the African Union, we believe the international order is still to a great extent organised around main powers and thus open to contestation. And that is why we argue that the EU should move on to promote a different self-projection in order to gain further and clearer space and status in this contested order. We specifically aim at bringing two main contributions on EU actorness: the first, arguing that conceptualisations of power are still read through a grid that is very much traditional and linked to a state-centric approach that is not adequate to analyse such a sui generis actor, and the second, underlining the pressing need for a roadmap clarifying EU strategies regarding its own role in the international system. We hope that the reflections, analyses and contributions in this book can help shed light on how to better accomplish these needs.

References Acharya, A. (2014). The end of American world order. Polity Press. Arikan, A. (2017). Turkey and the EU: An awkward candidate for EU membership? (2nd ed.). Routledge. Arts, K., & Dickson, A. K. (Eds.). (2004). EU development cooperation. From model to symbol. Manchester University Press. Barbé, E., & Johansson-Nogués, E. (2008). The EU as a modest ‘force for good’: The European neighbourhood policy. International Affairs, 84(1), 81–96.

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Bieber, F. (2011). Building impossible states? State-building strategies and EU membership in the Western Balkans. Europe-Asia Studies, 63(10), 1783–1802. Börzel, T. A., & Lebanidze, B. (2017). ‘The transformative power of Europe’ beyond enlargement: The EU’s performance in promoting democracy in its neighbourhood. East European Politics, 33(1), 17–35. Börzel, T. A., Dimitrova, A., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2017). European Union enlargement and integration capacity: Concepts, findings, and policy implications. Journal of European Public Policy, 24(2), 157–176. Dunne, T. (2010). The liberal order and the modern project. Millennium, 38(3), 535–543. European Union. (2003, December 12). A better Europe in a secure world. European security strategy. Brussels. European Union. (2016, June). Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe. A global strategy for the European Union’s foreign and security policy. Retrieved March 7, 2019, from https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/ files/regions/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf Forsberg, T. (2013). The power of the European Union. What explains the EU’s (lack of) influence on Russia? Politique Européenne, 39, 22–42. Ginsberg, R. H. (2002). Conceptualizing the European Union as an international actor: Narrowing the theoretical capability-expectations gap. Journal of Common Market Studies, 37 (3), 429–454. Haukkala, H. (2010). The EU-Russia strategic partnership. The limits of postsovereignty in international relations. Routledge. Hill, C. (1993). The capability-expectations gap, or conceptualizing Europe’s international role. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(3), 305–328. Hill, C., Smith, M., & Vanhoonacker, S. (Eds.). (2017). International relations and the European Union (3rd ed.). Oxford University Press. Holden, P. (2016). In search of structural power: EU aid policy as a global political instrument. Routledge Howorth, J. (2010). The EU as a global actor: Grand strategy for a global Grand Bargain? Journal of Common Market Studies, 48(3), 455–474. Ikenberry, G. J. (2011). Liberal Leviathan: The origins, crisis, and transformation of the American world order. Princeton University Press. Karakas, C. (2013). EU-Turkey: Integration without full membership or membership without full integration? A conceptual framework for accession alternatives. Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(6), 1057–1073. Korosteleva, E. (2017). Eastern partnership: Bringing ‘the political’ back in. East European Politics, 33(3), 321–337. Korosteleva, E., Natorski, M., & Simão, L. (2014). EU policies in the eastern neighbourhood: The practices perspective. Routledge. Larivè, M. (2014). Debating European security and defense policy: Understanding the complexity. Routledge.

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Lavenex, S., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2009). EU rules beyond EU borders: Theorizing external governance in European politics. Journal of European Public Policy, 16(6), 791–812. Lavenex, S., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2013). Democracy promotion in the EU’s neighbourhood: From leverage to governance? Routledge. Mirel, P. (2018, January). The Western Balkans: Between stabilisation and integration in the European Union. Fondation Robert Schuman European Issues, 459. Noutcheva, G. (2012). European foreign policy and the challenges of Balkan accession: Conditionality, legitimacy and compliance. Routledge. Pop, V. (2009, March 21). EU expanding its ‘sphere of influence’, Russia says. EUObserver. Retrieved March 12, 2019, from https://euobserver.com/for eign/27827 Popescu, N., & Wilson, A. (2009). The limits of enlargement-lite: European and Russian power in the troubled neighbourhood. European Council of Foreign Affairs. Rumelili, B. (2011). Turkey: Identity, foreign policy, and socialization in a postenlargement Europe. Journal of European Integration, 33(2), 235–249. Samokhvalov, V. (2018). Russia and its shared neighbourhoods: A comparative analysis of Russia-EU and Russia-China relations in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood and Central Asia. Contemporary Politics, 24(1), 30–45. Scheipers, S., & Sicurelli, D. (2007). Normative power Europe: A credible utopia? Journal of Common Market Studies, 45(2), 435–457. Schimmelfennig, F., & Sedelmeier, U. (2004). Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(4), 661–679. Smith, K. E. (2005). The outsiders: The European neighbourhood policy. International Affairs, 81(4), 757–773. Smith, M. (2013). Foreign policy and development in the post Lisbon European Union. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26(3), 519–535. Soderbaum, F., & Van Langenhove, L. (Eds.). (2006). The EU as a global player: The politics of interregionalism. Routledge Telò, M. (2009). The European Union and global governance. Routledge. Toje, A. (2008). The consensus-expectations gap: Explaining Europe’s ineffective foreign policy. Security Dialogue, 39(1), 121–141. Woolcock, S. (2016). European Union economic diplomacy. The role of the EU in external economic relations. Routledge Yunling, Z. (2016). China and its neighbourhood: Transformation, challenges and grand strategy. International Affairs, 92(4), 835–848.

CHAPTER 2

Unpacking the EU’s International Actorness: Debates, Theories and Concepts Licínia Simão

Introduction Developing in the space between operational capacity, on the one hand, and purpose, legitimacy and recognition, on the other, the European Union (EU) global identity as an international actor has been consolidating. Adding to the important steps taken at the institutional level, namely following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU actorness has also benefited from the enlarging field of agency in International Relations, often reflected in practices of recognition and legitimation. Thus, despite resistance in some academic and policy-making sectors to viewing the EU as a meaningful and relevant international actor in its own right, the Union has proved an inescapable reference in specific sectors, including on global trade and development policies, as well as

L. Simão (B) Faculty of Economics and Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra, Coimbra, Portugal e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. R. Freire et al. (eds.), EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92997-8_2

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in specific regions, including the Western Balkans, the countries formerly integrating the Soviet Union, and parts of Africa. The puzzle driving this chapter is the apparent contradiction between the EU’s drive towards the development of new capabilities and the lingering reluctance of others in recognising the EU as a legitimate and relevant international actor, capable of shaping the regional and global context. This line of reasoning continues the logic underlining Christopher Hill’s 1993 article, which saw the gap between the Union’s capabilities and what was expected of the EU as a major explanation to its limited international role (Hill, 1993). In fact, this chapter makes the argument that efforts towards narrowing this gap over the last decades have focused on capability development, but largely missed the opportunity to establish clear political guidelines, with important consequences for the EU’s international actorness. Some of these contradictions and limitations have been addressed in more contemporary literature on the topic, which this chapter maps and engages with. Whereas initial debates on EU actorness focused on the mismatch between the declaratory nature of EU ambitions and the lack of capabilities to enforce them, more contemporary debates have begun to address other complex challenges dealing with the purpose and legitimacy of EU global actions, with issues of recognition and effectiveness, as well as addressing the reach of the EU actorness. How we conceive EU actorness is thus a fundamental issue, as the concept needs to aggregate issues both related to purpose and institutional capabilities and related to external recognition, attractiveness and global presence (Hill, 1993; Kratochvil et al., 2011). The adjustment of EU policies following a push for more capabilities suggests an inversion of the logic of policy making that assumes that strategic objectives should be set and then the necessary means and instruments defined. Although the practice of world politics (and particularly that of the EU) is often contingent and reactive to events, driven by particular interests that lobby political power for attention and resources, the EU’s most significant steps towards reform envisioned in the Lisbon Treaty aimed primarily at reinforcing its internal coherence and ability to speak with one voice, namely on foreign and security policy issues (Brandão, 2010; Drieskens, 2008). From this perspective, EU actorness has been closely linked, not only to the institutional setting of the Union, but also to the external impulses in the global context. For instance, the Union’s initial competences, limited to trade and economic cooperation, help explain why the

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EU’s engagement in the field of security and conflict management was driven by the European Commission’s focus on the root causes of insecurity rather than on the military instruments to tackle crises (the trend towards a growing attention to military instruments is also explained by the political consensus and the financial and institutional backing of EU institutions to Common Foreign and Security Policy and more recently to the Common Security and Defence Policy). On the other hand, the integrated nature of security consolidating since the 1990s and reinforced by the post-9/11 policies also required the Union’s pillar structure to be reformed and new transversal instruments to be made available (Brandão, 2010, pp. 50–51). This chapter starts by mapping the existing state of the art on EU actorness, focusing particularly on the debates on international agency and the main tensions resulting from its application to the EU. The persistence of a state-based model of analysis of international actorness has often led to a negative bias against the EU and has proved a limited tool in imaging new forms of agency at the international level. It then moves on to address the issue of operational capacities, linking their development to the issues of purpose, legitimacy and recognition. This framework of analysis identifies key conceptual links between the different dimensions of “actorness” in the current contested international context and reinforces the constructivist argument of the book that actorness should be defined in a way as to encompass processes, values and principles, norms and rules, as well as the intersubjective nature of relations, which attribute meaning to capabilities.

Defining Actorness: Between the Specificities of the EU and the Need for Generalisation The literature on EU global actorness has been mushrooming for over fifty years, since the first articles appeared, responding to the achievements of the European Communities, as well as the proliferation of actors in the international system in the late 1970s. Thus, one of the tensions of this early literature was, on the one hand, the drive to contribute to the conceptualisation of actorness in international relations and, on the other, the desire to look at the specificities of the external presence of the European Communities (Cosgrove & Twitchett, 1970; Sjöstedt, 1977). Actorness became often linked to the latter and to the literature on European integration. Sjöstedt’s definition has been often cited

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in works dealing with EU actorness, namely those hinging on the idea of actorness as presence (Allen & Smith, 1990; Hill, 1993). He defined actorness as “the capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system” (Sjöstedt, 1977, p. 16). This approach focused mainly on the domestic conditions to exercise presence, including: (1) delimitation from others and its environment; (2) autonomy to define its own laws and decisions; and (3) having the structural pre-requisites for international action, including legal personality, diplomatic agents and the capacity to conduct negotiations with third parties (Sjöstedt, cited in Hill, 1993, p. 309). This line of research, linking actorness to EU integration, proliferated during the 1990s, when, after the end of the Cold War, the newly established European Union was faced with a series of international crises demanding greater international action.1 The new literature emerging in this period highlighted the internal–external nexus, influencing the ability of the EU to act and to be perceived as a relevant actor in international affairs. It is therefore no surprise that the works by Jupille and Caporaso (1998), and Bretherton and Vogler (1999, 2006), which became points of reference in this literature in the 1990s, conceptualised actorness in a way that recognised the importance of the external context in which the EU was acting. Notions of “opportunity” (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999), “recognition” and “autonomy” (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998) became now more prominent in the analysis of the many empirical cases testing EU global and regional actorness (Drieskens, 2017, p. 1537). More recent work, namely by da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (2014), underlines how relations between internal and external cohesiveness are affected by the external context, whereas Bretherton and Vogler (2013, p. 387) underline how opportunity has come to shape the outcome of the EU’s external actorness following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. It becomes striking that the ability of the EU to be a relevant international actor rests thus, not only on the internal capabilities to exercise power, but also on the opportunity to do so and on the recognition by others of its instruments of action. Underling this reflection, however, is the issue of identity. The concept of presence raises the question of what type of international actor the 1 These included the end of the Soviet Union and the political fragmentation that ensued, the end of the Yugoslav Federation and the violent conflicts in the Balkans, new violent conflicts in the Horn of Africa, among others.

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EU is (Manners, 2010). “Prioritizing being over acting, these approaches argue that the EU has international impact because it is different from other (state) actors” (Drieskens, 2017, p. 1541). In his 1993 article, Hill advised against normative discussions about the nature of the EU, seeing it as imposing an unproductive discussion onto an analysis that should be focused on the processes of “crafting the endless necessary compromises between national interests and the long-run requirements of a working international system” (Hill, 1993, p. 307). This view explains Hill’s approach to assessing the foreign policy of the European Communities, from the viewpoint of its ability to establish stable patterns of activity— rather than its ability to articulate a coherent narrative on the purpose and meaning of such developments. But he nevertheless engages with Adam and Smith’s concept of presence and attributes specific “functions” to the European Communities, responding to the external demands of the international system. These include the stabilisation of Western Europe, managing world trade, being a leading voice of the developed world in relations with the South and providing a second western voice in world diplomacy (Hill, 1993, pp. 310–311). The issue of defining purpose of action and seeking legitimacy, both domestically and externally, is closely related to the issue of defining acceptable and expectable functions to a specific actor. In fact, in defining the EU’s international identity, we cannot separate the importance of the results of EU international action from the process leading to the definition of its international presence. As Hill himself argues in a later paper, the whole point of the original conceptualisation was to argue that the relationship between ends and means was particularly problematic with respect to European foreign policy, and that ends themselves were hardly settled. Rather, they were in flux, the result of continual interaction between external and internal definitions, making it difficult to know what resources the EU needs in fact to mobilise […] Moreover there remained the more straightforward matter of a potentially painful contrast between what the publics or outsiders might think the EU could/should do, and what it actually could deliver. (Hill, 1997, p. 3, emphasis added)

Besides the ontological debate over the EU’s identity, the literature has also engaged with the epistemological questioning regarding the observable patterns of action and of how EU international actorness should be

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studied. An interesting debate is that between purpose/legitimacy and the “effectiveness turn” (Brattberg and Rhinard, cited in Drieskens, 2017, p. 1539) in studies dealing with the EU’s international actorness. Both the special issues edited by da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (2014) and by Niemann and Bretherton (2013) continue the tradition also developed by Smith (2010) of focusing not on whether the EU classifies as an international actor, but whether its policies and activities have significance in the international scene. This tension between focusing on the definition of what an international actor is and on what it does and how it operationalises its presence remains unresolvable. What is clear, is that both approaches are needed if we are to better understand how and in what circumstances European foreign policy makes or can make a difference in international affairs. Moreover, as the literature on EU actorness seems to reflect also the empirical realities of EU political debates and policy options, it is puzzling to find, for instances, that after the end of the Cold War the EU’s ability to impact international affairs has diminished, despite the important changes in domestic institutional capability following the Maastricht Treaty (Bretherton & Vogler, 2013). Gehring et al. (2013) further argue that EU actorness also depends on whether third parties see an interest in recognising the EU as a relevant international actor in specific contexts and settings, such as multilateral organisations, and that often formal participation is less relevant than the capabilities to act in specific governance issues. This seems to suggest that coherence between internal narratives, the instruments available and external expectations and perceptions of the EU needs to be assured, if the Union is to increase its ability to have a relevant impact on international issues. As the EU has come to invest a great deal in the improvement of specific capabilities, namely in defence (particularly after 1999 and more recently, following the adoption of the EU Global Strategy, in 2016) and diplomacy, bridging the gap between the purpose of these actions and the internal and external perceptions (i.e. the legitimation) is a fundamental step to improve the ability of the Union to be and act as a relevant international actor. Moreover, linking the literature on the external perceptions of the EU and its ability to be an international actor is also crucial. Research on external perceptions of the EU has developed at the intersection of geographical and thematic lines. Influenced by critical readings, which highlight the importance of perceptions and images of the self and other to policy development (Dalby, 1991; Fanon, 1961; Said, 1978), this

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literature highlights several important aspects to bear in mind when addressing the issue of EU actorness. One central issue is the difficulty in defining the degree to which the EU is the main agent, considering the simultaneous presence of EU Member States and their bilateral policies, as well as the desirability of having the EU speaking and deciding on behalf of its Member States (Bachman, 2013). The EU’s multilevel governance system remains hard to grasp and the imposition of a Brussels bureaucracy is sometimes questioned as leading to a lack of creativity and flexibility (although providing stability), which are needed to find solutions to complex governance problems, including in the fields of environment or development. This impacts the ability of the EU to be perceived and acknowledged as an international actor on its own right, diluting its presence, even if its practical impact remains high. Another central issue relates to a perceived geopolitical misalignment between the EU and some of its strategic partners.2 The perception of a declining and conservative Europe is often advanced through post-colonial lenses, hampering potential for innovative interactions (Jain, 2012).

Anchoring Actorness on Purpose, Legitimacy and Recognition Conceptualising actorness to include the issues of purpose, legitimacy and recognition raises the central issue of the relevance of addressing the EU beyond the framework of the nation-state. Although this is a recurrent debate in EU actorness (and global actorness more broadly), the issue of purpose and direction of EU policies raises once more the spectrum of the nation-state as the measure against which EU policy making occurs. It is our view that the debate on whether EU actorness should be addressed based on the prevailing notions of the nation-state foreign policy making or rather as a sui generis reality is misleading, and both notions should be combined when relevant. Issues pertaining to legitimacy, perception, recognition and capability development in EU international actorness debates often begin by defining these processes according to the practices of states. The processes of legitimation of the Union’s external presence are often linked to debates on the democratic deficit of the EU, whereas

2 Since the early 2000s, the EU defined a series of strategic partnerships, including with the United States, Russia, China and India, among others.

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the perceptions of whether the EU has agency in international relations often rests on conceptualisations of power that are rooted in the historical examples of great powers. On the other hand, even though the sui generis nature of EU integration is a good starting point to address the efficiency of its external relations, it nevertheless proves limited, when the expectations of what the EU is supposed to achieve and how it is expected to achieve it remain linked to the state-based model. Its very presence in international affairs is still grasping with the state-based nature of diplomacy and representation in formal settings. This tension has shaped debates dealing with the issue of purpose, namely by authors putting forward normative arguments regarding the need for a grand strategy upon which EU domestic and external legitimacy can be anchored. [T]he development of a foreign policy that is based on the fulfilment of the EU’s vital interests, defined according to the established needs and goals of the Europeans is a fundamental element in the constitution of a EU international actorness that is seen as legitimate both by its international peers, and by its own people. (Barrinha, 2016, p. 443)

According to this view, the a priori definition of the purpose (the needs and goals) for its international action remains a fundamental step in presenting the Union as a legitimate representative of EU citizens’ interest and a reliable international partner. Although “national” purpose has hardly been an assurance of moral and normative standings in nation-states’ foreign policies (Dornan, 1971), the existence of a clear pronouncement on the purpose of existence of a specific actor and of its policies and instruments is a minimum requirement for any empirical assessment of the nature of its international presence. From this perspective, it can be seen as a fundamental step in any critical assessment of the goals defined by the EU’s global action and the emerging EU identity. Rather than setting a fixed agenda, what this process allows is a structured and clear internal and external debate on what the EU wants from its international presence and how it aims to achieve it. The EU founding treaties remain the guiding documents for the definition of purpose. The wording of the Lisbon Treaty, namely on the topics related to the CFSP, underlines that developing these steps contributes to “reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to

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promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world” (European Union, 2012, preamble). It adds in article 3.5 of the Treaty of the European Union, In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter. (European Union, 2012)

Furthermore, the European Security Strategy of 2003 places the EU as a global actor, due to the achievements in the European integration process, namely the successful enlargements and the consolidation of democratic regimes in Europe, as well as the sheer size of its population and wealth. The diagnosis is concluded with the acknowledgement that “Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world” (European Union, 2003). The 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS) has proved a particularly important exercise in defining the appropriate place for the EU in the global order and in the promotion of peace and security (in Europe and beyond it) (European Union, 2016). But as Mälksoo (2016, p. 384) argues, the EUGS […] displays growing concerns about the Union’s ability to fulfil its historical mission to maintain peace and security even in Europe. It shows the EU as increasingly anxious to prove its relevance for its own citizens, yet notably less confident about the Union’s actual convincingness as an ontological security framework for its constituent members.

And the author adds “While the EU’s confidence in the value of its unique set of capabilities as a comprehensive security actor has apparently grown, its status concerns about its place among the traditional security providers, such as the USA and NATO, remain yet to be sorted out in practice” (Mälksoo, 2016, p. 384). This position engages with the issues raised by authors supporting a view of actorness that is focused both on the effectiveness of its actions and on the definition of its presence globally. The two dimensions, as we have seen, remain profoundly interconnected. In fact, Jupille and Caporaso’s criteria (recognition, authority,

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autonomy and cohesion) suggest exactly that. If recognition entails acceptance by EU’s partners and interlocutors (be they the traditional actors of governance or the emerging ones claiming international agency), the authors’ focus on cohesion and authority raise the issue of the ability of the Union to develop the competences and capabilities to act in accordance with a specific view of the goals to be achieved (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998, see also Niemann & Bretherton, 2013). This suggests that the EU is more likely to have international actorness if its capabilities are developed in line both with the Union’s stated purpose and the global identity it aims to develop. Although the authors do not make this claim in their original work, the subsequent theorisation by Bretherton and Vogler puts forward a set of categories that raises the profile of the normative agreement (both domestically and externally) underlying the EU global actorness (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999, 2006). Their focus on opportunity, presence and capability is worth recovering in more detail, as we are dealing with a highly contested global order. The authors define opportunity as “the external environment of ideas and events – the context which frames and shapes EU action or inaction” (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, p. 24), focusing on the rules, structures of power and perceptions, as elements defining this context (Niemann & Bretherton, 2013, p. 266). Such a focus on the structures of meaning and on how they are constantly reshaped through intersubjective processes once more places the normative debate about purpose of action in foreign policy at the core of the research agenda on actorness. Following this line, their understanding of presence as “the ability of the EU, by virtue of its existence, to exert influence beyond its borders” (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, p. 24) focuses on the nature of the EU’s “existence”, how it presents itself to the world and how it is recognized by others. Capabilities are addressed by the authors both in terms of the domestic coherence, consistency and availability of policy instruments, but evidencing a particular concern with the issue of the “external perceptions of the EU’s ability and willingness to act externally, hence linking capability with both presence and opportunity” (Niemann & Bretherton, 2013, p. 266). The global context since the 2010s is one of receding normative consensus, both inside the EU and globally, as evidenced in revisionist policies, including among western powers and alliances, and active and vocal contestation of the neo-liberal economic model sustained by the global powers against the exploitation of millions in the global South

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(including in the periphery of the EU itself, as the austerity measures adopted after the financial crises of 2008 have demonstrated). Reinforcing EU capabilities, as a means to avoid the problematic lack of domestic purpose, runs the risk of creating the appearance of movement in European integration, but failing to reinforce both domestic consensus and external recognition. The options taken have only partly been sanctioned by EU citizens, reinforcing the democratic deficit of the EU. This is all the more dangerous as there is a growing link between the self-portrayed technocratic nature of EU decision-making and the rise of populism in Europe, since both contest party politics as the means through which democratic consensus is established (Bickerton & Accetti, 2017). Globally, the EU’s presence remains a contested feature of global politics at different levels. The perceived lack of coherence and reliability creates uneasiness among other international actors, whereas the development of new means of global contestation has also given rise to the growth of more vocal grassroots movements contesting the self-perceived normative nature of the Union’s global presence (Icaza, 2010). Addressing both levels of legitimation constitutes a central step to reinforce opportunity (since the EU is perceived as shaping the structures of meaning through discourse and practice), presence (presenting goals of global action that resonate with its citizens and respond to global demands) and capabilities (as the EU would address global challenges based on a clear mandate to act). Although legitimacy can be derived from a range of complimentary vectors (Lord & Magnette, 2004), it is also ultimately derived from the capacity to advance and manage purpose. The next section probes into some of the EU’s most relevant areas of actorness, such as trade, peace and security, as well as enlargement and the Union’s neighbourhood policy, in order to address the issue of regional actorness as well as the contradictions that emerge from the growing development of EU capabilities at a time of diminishing consensus on the purpose of action, domestically and internationally.

Beyond Capabilities, the Challenges of Imagining EU Global Actorness Imagining the Union’s global actorness, its role in international affairs, and the contributions the EU could make to international politics has been at the heart of European integration. Having been awarded the Nobel Peace prize in 2012 for “over six decades contribut[ing] to the

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advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe” (Nobel Peace Committee, 2012), the EU saw the peace rationale embedded in the early years of European integration recognised at the highest levels. Moreover, its policies of enlargement have also been presented as significant contributions to regional peace and stability, contributing to overcoming the East–West divide of the Cold War and the violent fragmentation of the Western Balkans. Continuing in that path, the Union’s Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) further aimed at stabilising its periphery, through assistance for state building and reforms, and some degree of economic integration. This view has led several authors to highlight the relevance of the EU’s regional actorness to the Union’s definition and sense of self. Their arguments suggest that it is in the context of its enlargement and neighbourhood policies that the Union’s collective identity is set, and it is here that the tension between normative and interest-based external action has become more obvious (See Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, especially Chapter 6; Juncos & Whitman, 2015; Pomorska & Noutcheva, 2017). Relying on the export of its own integration model, but conservative in terms of the possibilities of accession to EU institutions, the EU has become an “empire in denial”, “project[ing] its power into what is perceived to be a vacuum in the region [Western Balkans], [but] seek[ing] to avoid the direct political responsibilities associated with empire” (Chandler, 2007, p. 593). Both in its southern neighbourhood and to the East, the EU has become increasingly contested, partly for failing to deliver on the initial image of the ENP as the framework through which the Union’s security community would be enlarged to its neighbours (Simão, 2018). Relations with North-African partners have become increasingly framed by security concerns linked to the instability of the Arab Spring, the violent conflicts in Libya, Syria and between Israel and Palestine, as well as migration and terrorism originating from the Sahel. What is noteworthy is not so much that these concerns have become so prominent, but rather that the EU has been unable to address them in a way that is consistent with its own self-perception as a norms-based international actor with interests and responsibilities in its periphery. Thus, the issue is not so much that the EU has responded to these challenges through an interest-based policy (Cebeci & Schumacher, 2017), but rather that the definition of its interests is increasingly shaped by tensions around the prevailing narratives of what the EU is, what it values and how the international order should be addressed. These dilemmas have also become visible in its policies towards

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its Eastern neighbours, including Russia. Although the EU has, over the last ten years, become more engaged than ever before in the political, economic, social and security dynamics of the countries of the formerSoviet Union, its engagement has been unable to establish a hegemonic narrative about the future of the region within the Euro-Atlantic structures (Kakachia & Minesashvili, 2015; Larrabee, 2010). This is partly due to Russia’s active contestation of this vision (Ademer, 2017; Haukkala, 2008), but also the result of the fragilities emerging within Euro-Atlantic relations and the meaning of this community. More globally, one of the most well-established areas of EU presence has been trade and economic regimes and governance structures. The EU represents all its Member States at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and negotiates bilateral trade agreements on their behalf. Through the European Central Bank and the European Commission, it has been at the forefront of managing the Euro-Zone, a crucial part of the world economy. Although the EU has clearly taken the necessary institutional steps (and continues to do so) to be granted competences and means in these fields, the interconnected nature of these policies, impacting social, environmental, development and security policies raises issues as to how far the EU can provide relevant answers to these interrelated challenges, considering the need to act in articulation with its 27 Member States. The EU’s partnership agreements, established with countries all over the world, include strict measures on trade, which have sought to adjust to the different particularities. However, as argued by Langan when dealing with EU-Africa Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries trade and economic relations, here too is a normativity-output gap, since “In fact, by providing a moralised framework for the roll-out of second-generation liberalisation, EU decent work agendas may close down policy space for more interventionist ACP economic agendas that would more closely align with pro-poor norms” (Langan, 2014). Trade also has a direct bearing on the EU’s development policies— another major area where the EU stands out as a leading international actor, mobilising both significant global financial resources and shaping the normative grounds of development through its partnership with important organisations, such as the OECD and the UN. As argued by Young and Peterson, this important connection has nevertheless produced an important paradox (Young & Peterson, 2013), especially following the 2000 Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the ACP countries:

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the one hand, a greater emphasis on trade as a tool for development, with particular attention to the concerns of those most in need; and on the other hand, a number of policy initiatives, for instance the conclusion of trade agreements with emerging markets, which have adverse consequences for them. (Carbone & Orbie, 2014, p. 2)

Once more, the logics of bureaucratic management, the advancement of narrow interests of specific states and interest groups and the lack of a clear definition of the purpose of the EU global action on development, trade and economics have contributed to the paradoxes and contradictions undermining its global actorness. Lack of purpose has also left the EU underperforming in its relations with emerging powers. Tied to a narrative of normative superiority— infused with post-colonial biases—which is built on the instruments of power of the twentieth century, the EU has rather focused on the competition for resources in a fast changing and crowded international system. It has found that emerging normative contestation is taking place in the backdrop of the contradictions of the capitalist liberal system the EU and the United States have sustained since World War II (Kavalski, 2013; Keukeleire & Hooijmaaijers, 2014). Thus, on the one hand, the novelty offered by the EU’s governance system and its potential for innovative solutions to the challenges posed by globalisation have proved too limited in their ability to be seen as a model by others. The experiences of Latin America’s Mercosul and Asian’s ASEAN have confirmed the difficulties of reproducing the EU model elsewhere. On the other hand, pressures to reaffirm the nation-state as the basic unit of the international system, in a context of receding cosmopolitanism and increased protectionism, as well as contested multilateralism, have raised questions on the relevance of the EU for addressing global issues. Moreover, recognition of the EU as a legitimate international actor by emerging powers such as China and India has varied, partly due to the EU’s inability to translate its strategic partnerships into the cornerstone of a new international normative set, namely one that would allow for more inclusive forms of participation by emerging powers. These illustrations evidence the challenges faced by the EU in its affirmation as a global actor. Deriving from the need to provide coherence and meaning to capability development, we have argued that the definition of purpose for EU action entails dealing with internal legitimacy

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and external recognition, bearing in mind the specificities of the broader context in which actorness is developed.

Conclusion This chapter deals with the tensions emerging between the conceptualisation of the EU actorness as focusing largely on capability development and the visible lack of political consensus on purpose and direction of the Union’s global presence. Starting with the claim, by Christopher Hill, in his 1993 article, that the EU evidenced a capabilities-expectation gap, this paper argues that the EU’s decision to bridge this gap has rested mainly on capability development, rather than on the adjustment of expectations—both domestic and external—namely through the creation of the necessary processes for domestic consensus building and the shaping of the external normative environment. Putting forward a proposal to focus on purpose and legitimacy as two important components in the assessment of the EU global actorness, the chapter starts by mapping the existing literature to enquire to what extent it incorporates these concerns. Initial literature on actorness posed the question in terms of the evolving nature of agency in the international system, particularly during the 1970s, when a series of non-state actors began to emerge in international politics. The 1970s also showed the European Communities as being particularly active in regional and world affairs. Reflecting these trends, rapidly the literature on international actorness developed, marked by this tension between generalisation and the specificities of European integration. Early works on the EC’s global presence underlined aspects that were relevant to the notion of “presence” and opened the way for future research on actorness that engaged with the idea that what the EU does depends on what type of international actor the EU is. A more recent “effectiveness turn” in EU actorness literature, including the work by da Conceição-Heldt and Munier, and Niemann and Bretherton continued the tradition by Karen Smith, addressing not what the EU is, but whether its policies and activities have significance in the international scene. Jupille and Caporaso, and Bretherton and Vogler’s works also strand along this division, highlighting particularly the importance of the global context, opportunity and recognition, as complements to the existence of capabilities and instruments.

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Moreover, the debate on whether the EU actorness should be addressed based on the prevailing notions of the nation-state foreign policy making or rather as a sui generis reality is misleading and both notions should be combined when relevant. For instance, a moral argument can be made for the definition of purpose in the framework of the development of the EU’s foreign policy, since this is a fundamental step in presenting the Union as a legitimate representative of EU citizens’ interest and a reliable international partner. This position engages with the issues raised by authors’ supporting a view of actorness that is focused both on the effectiveness of its actions and on the definition of its presence globally. The EU is more likely to have international actorness if its capabilities are developed in line both with the Union’s stated purpose and the global identity it aims to develop—namely the one stated in the EU’s founding treaties and its strategic documents (the ESS and the EUGS). This coherence is even more relevant since the global context is one of receding normative consensus, both inside the EU and globally. Reinforcing the EU capabilities to avoid the difficult lack of domestic purpose and sense runs the risk of creating the appearance of movement in European integration, while lacking a democratically chosen common vision. Also, globally, the EU’s presence remains a contested feature of global politics at different levels. All these illustrations suggest that a clearer connection with EU citizens in the definition of purpose for the EU’s global presence is a fundamental step bridging the gap between the developing capabilities and the apparent lack of legitimation of the EU’s direction. External legitimacy is also reinforced when this purpose is again rooted in the democratic processes of decision-making, since it allows the EU to again contest the set of social norms guiding international relations, in alignment with the most pressing needs of individuals. As the chapter sought to illustrate, by dealing with the EU’s enlargement and neighbourhood policies, but also with policies such as trade, development and in relations with strategic partners, the EU actorness is shaped by intersubjective processes that attribute meaning to the Union’s capabilities, to its policy options and to its presence. This integrated view of actorness allows for a deeper understanding of how these different dimensions interact. Legitimacy, capabilities and purpose have all combined to make enlargement and, to some extent, neighbourhood policies areas where EU actorness is clearly recognised as legitimate, necessary and relevant. On sectorial areas like trade, development or

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strategic partnerships, the existence of tools and resources gives the EU leverage, but these advances as far as EU Member States perceive it to be advantageous to their own interests. Acknowledgements The author acknowledges funding for research from the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Innovative Training Networks (ITN-ETN) of the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, under grant agreement “CASPIAN - Around the Caspian: a Doctoral Training for Future Experts in Development and Cooperation with Focus on the Caspian Region” (642709 — CASPIAN — H2020-MSCA-ITN-2014).

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PART I

Actorness across EU Policy Areas

Part I analyses the ways in which different policies and instruments used by the EU in specific sectorial issue-areas shape the Union’s global actorness. It engages with the conceptual mapping of actorness developed in the second chapter, discussing how each specific topic under analysis fits in the broader debates about actorness in International Relations and regarding EU’s international role. The layout of Part I engages with different EU policy-areas based on the illustrative nature of these sectors rather than its comprehensiveness. It includes areas which are traditionally considered well-established fields of action for the EU, with solid instruments for action (ex. trade, democracy promotion or humanitarian action), as well as fields where the EU is a newcomer (diplomacy or security). This Part also addresses the issue of perceptions and the scope for externalisation of internal and regional approaches in these different sectorial areas. These lines of analysis allow for questioning the existing arguments regarding the importance of instruments to make EU actorness thrive, as well as for the importance of niches and opportunities for EU’s affirmation in less traditional fields.

CHAPTER 3

The Added Value of European Diplomacy for EU Regional and International Actorness Heidi Maurer

Introduction The European Union (EU) and its Member States have actively worked on improving their diplomatic toolkit since 2009: a more active and potent High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRVP) is meant to be the “face” and diplomatic interlocutor at the level of foreign ministers. She/he is meant to steer and facilitate the formulation and implementation of a coherent European foreign policy. The European External Action Service (EEAS) is tasked to support and facilitate the HRVP in this endeavour as “a quasi-diplomatic corps” (Duke, 2002), while the EU delegations in 128 third countries now

H. Maurer (B) Danube University Krems, Krems, Austria e-mail: [email protected] University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. R. Freire et al. (eds.), EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92997-8_3

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represent the EU also politically and coordinate EU Member States diplomatic activities on the ground outside the EU (Bicchi & Maurer, 2018). The aim of these institutional adaptations is not to create a more federallike foreign policy actor, but to establish diplomatic actorness for the still hybrid European foreign policy cooperation system that the European Union institutionalised since the Maastricht Treaty in the 1990s (Smith, 2013, 2018). This chapter investigates how the EU and its Member States developed European diplomacy as a foreign policy tool, and it critically assesses in what manner European diplomacy is able to support the EU in exerting agency in its relations with third countries, thus contributing to the Union’s perceived actorness. By drawing conceptually on the changing nature of diplomatic interaction, the chapter emphasises the communicative and relational character of diplomacy and therefore illustrates the strengths but also challenges of the EU as a diplomatic actor. The chapter starts with a conceptualisation of what diplomacy is and what it is not, before addressing the contributions of diplomacy to actorness and the perception thereof by third actors. The empirical part of the chapter shows how the EU upgraded its diplomatic actorness, especially since the changes introduced with the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. It first outlines the structural adaptations and then shows how this more conducive structure for diplomatic actorness led to diplomatic agency, but also in what aspects the EU is still distinct from “normal” diplomatic actors. In conclusion, the chapter shows that diplomacy is a tool that provides information, feedback and input for political strategy, but it cannot replace or compensate for a foreign policy strategy. Secondly, the EU is a hybrid international actor, and this hybridity is also reflected in its daily diplomatic interactions. This said, the Union’s understanding and familiarity with multi-layered and multi-level negotiations and policy discussions make it particularly conducive to benefit from the current increased network quality of diplomatic interaction. And lastly, while the EU keeps improving its institutional structures and processes, it still lacks a clear monopoly on foreign policy decision-making. Instead, the EU remains a multilateral subsystem that combines the diplomatic efforts of the EU and of its various actors with the diplomatic activities of its Member States.

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A Conceptual Discussion: How Does Diplomacy Matter for Actorness Diplomacy is, in its traditional definition, the political tool of national foreign policy. States in the external pursuit of their national interests use different tools in a strategic manner. Next to economic and military instruments, diplomacy subsumes all communicative and relational activities that are employed to achieve a certain objective. The editors of the Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy suggest that “diplomacy at its essence is the conduct of relationships, using peaceful means by and among international actors, at least one of them usually governmental” (Cooper et al., 2015, p. 2), while Sending et al., (2015, p. 4), in their recent study on the constitution of world politics through diplomatic practice, suggest the traditional definition of diplomacy to focus on the “process of dialogue and negotiation by which states in a system conduct their relations and pursue their purposes by means short of war”. According to Art. 3 of the Vienna Convention, the functions of diplomatic missions consist of representation, interest protection, negotiation, providing analysis and information, and the promotion of friendly relations. Diplomats are thus the eyes, ears and mouth of their sending state. They implement the decisions of their government by promoting their country and its interest, and they provide input for government decisions by providing information and insights from the ground in the host country. Diplomacy comes in many different forms and shapes: it ranges from high diplomacy in crisis situations to every-day low diplomacy fostering good relations. Rana (2011, p. 17) suggests that for diplomats nowadays “the working environment is polarized” ranging from crisis diplomacy, to hard and soft security, to “traditional exchanges (…) among privileged interlocutors, marked by elegant receptions”. With international politics changing dramatically in the past decades, this also impacted on the manner and characteristics of diplomacy. Those changes, however, did not alter the essence or salience of diplomacy. “The essence of diplomacy has never disappeared” although “diplomacy today takes place among multiple sites of authority, power, and influence” (Cooper et al., 2015, p. 1). Diplomacy is adapting to different circumstances with “national frontiers […] becoming less relevant in determining the flow of ideas, information, goods, services, capital, labour, and technology” (Cooper et al., 2015, p. 5). In addition, with the differentiation between the

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internal and external getting more blurred, foreign ministers lost in prestige and influence to other governmental departments, in particular prime ministers (Lehne, 2015). High diplomacy is therefore also increasingly “handled directly by heads of government and their offices. The professional now works mainly on low diplomacy” (Rana, 2011, p. 17). In addition, foreign ministries also increasingly have to explain their existence to citizens and gain legitimacy for the public resources spent by emphasising the added value that the diplomatic network and their consular work provide for citizens when they travel or live in third countries. This goes in hand with non-state actors also having gained more and more attention as receivers of diplomatic outreach activities in the form of public diplomacy. Scholars of diplomacy therefore suggest that the changing circumstances moved diplomacy from club diplomacy to network diplomacy. Network diplomacy, according to Heine (2006; see also Neumann, 2012), now includes more actors, is built upon less hierarchical structures, focuses not only on written but also oral output, offers higher transparency and moves the purpose from signing agreements to the overall increase of bilateral flows as its main purpose. How does diplomacy now relate to actorness? First, as a political tool, diplomacy is about communicating actorness but also about being recognised as a diplomatic actor within the strong symbolic nature of diplomatic interactions. Being considered a state, i.e. a traditional actor in international relations depends on the diplomatic recognition by other states. And this holds also true for the European Union, even though the EU is not a state but a state-like political entity in international affairs. As Simão argues in this book, the more advanced definitions of EU actorness emphasise the need for external recognition for actorness: “The ability of the EU to be a relevant international actor rests thus, not only on the internal capabilities to exercise power, but also on the opportunity to do so and on the recognition by others of its instruments of action” (Simão in this book). Diplomacy in its interactive nature thus contributes not just to the actions of an actor but even more importantly to shape its external perception and recognition by other actors. For the EU, to behave, react and look like a traditional diplomatic actor supports its perceived standing in the international community. Secondly, the strategic quality inherited in the very definition of actorness helps to distinguish between diplomacy and any other non-strategic form of external (public) relations. Actorness assumes the ability to set strategic objectives and align instruments and means accordingly, towards

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the outside world (see Simão in this book). Actors thus aim to define their foreign policy in a strategic manner, clearly prioritising objectives and aiming at aligning various instruments to achieve those objectives. Foreign policy is different from “presence” or “external relations” (Allen, 1998; Allen & Smith, 1990). External relations, often nowadays also termed as “external governance” (Lavenex, 2004), refer to the external dimension of distinct policy areas, which in themselves might follow policy area objectives, but which are not aligned to overall objectives as defined by political leadership. Diplomacy is therefore distinct from external governance in that it inherits strategic considerations. In the foreign policy literature as well as in the wider policy context, the term “diplomacy” is often used quite lightly, subsuming all kinds of activities that point to the interactions outside of the polity, e.g. science diplomacy (López de San & Schunz, 2018) or cyber diplomacy (Barrinha & Renard, 2017). Diplomacy is also frequently used in its widest meaning in European foreign policy scholarship (e.g. Bicchi & Bremberg, 2016; Carta, 2012). Such a wide definition, however, misses the strategic nuance that diplomacy inherits as a foreign policy tool (see also the discussion by Bátora, 2005, p. 46). Herranz-Surrallés (2016, pp. 1388–1389) provides an insightful distinction between “diplomacy” and “governance” regarding the energy sector. She suggests that governance follows the paradigm of the respective sector, while diplomacy is guided by a more strategic political planning. In a similar approach, Mitzen (2015, p. 112) suggests that while “diplomacy has long been understood as a practice of representation, it is now ‘about much more’ in that it is also about governance”. Yet, she also emphasises that conceptually a separation is useful as “representing and governing are distinct” (Mitzen, 2015, p. 12). Therefore, HerranzSurrallés’ differentiation sits smoothly with the conceptual distinction between foreign policy and external relations. While different areas of external relations (e.g. trade or development assistance) can be coherent and strategic in their own right, foreign policy is about political prioritisation and the strategic pursuit of national interests. Diplomacy, as a tool of foreign policy, is therefore following a political strategy that clearly identifies priorities across policy areas. It is a political activity that is aimed at furthering the foreign policy objectives of the respective polity. For the EU, its peculiar “identity” (see Simão, p. XX) creates tensions for its diplomatic actorness, to the point of “EU diplomacy” becoming a contradiction in terms. The EU is a hybrid foreign policy actor (Smith,

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2013, 2018), and it produces European foreign policy cooperation rather than European foreign policy. This means that the EU takes a position if all Member States agree, and, even more importantly, that EU foreign policy is not replacing but complementing national foreign policy activities. Despite this peculiarity, since the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has aimed to develop a full-blown diplomatic actorness for its toolkit. The very definition of diplomacy, however, as the strategic pursuit of a hierarchically clear-cut (national) foreign policy interest creates therefore tensions for the terminology of “EU diplomacy”. On the one hand, the EU diplomacy complements—and in the best case adds value—to national diplomatic activities, while, on the other hand, EU diplomacy can only represent the unanimous agreement of all actors involved. Building on those conceptual reflections, this chapter investigates how the EU and its Member States attempted to build a suitable diplomatic representation that allows them to adapt to the new demands in diplomacy, while at the same time increasing their perceived actorness in international affairs despite being a peculiar foreign policy actor. As is common in EU reforms, the focus was first predominantly on institutional innovation, with the idea that diplomatic agency is only possible in a structure that is suitable for a more comprehensive EU diplomacy.

Since 2009: A Structure of EU Diplomatic Representation More Conducive to EU Actorness European foreign policy has been developing in the past 30 years into a densely institutionalised cooperation system, with the aim to increase the international actorness of the EU, i.e. the EU’s ability to act but also its recognition by others as a reliable and relevant interlocutor. Most of this transformation has focused on creating institutions and procedures to intensify the foreign policy cooperation and coordination of EU Member States in Brussels via the strengthened role of the HRVP and the establishment of a quasi-foreign service, the EEAS (Bátora, 2013; Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018; Riddervold & Trondal, 2017; Spence & Bátora, 2015). The HRVP was given a triple-hatted position as VicePresident of the European Commission, as chair of the Foreign Affairs Council, and—most importantly for European diplomacy—as boss of the newly created EEAS. The EEAS is meant to support the work of the HRVP in formulating and implementing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the work of the European Council and

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European Commission presidents respectively in their areas of external representation (Council of the European Union, 2010a). Despite this intensified institutionalisation, the EU is still relying on European foreign policy cooperation rather than on a unified, state-like foreign policy. The HRVP is to support the Member States who collectively decide EU foreign policy positions. But neither the HRVP nor the EEAS are meant to replace the 27 national foreign policies of the EU Member States. They facilitate the collective decision-making by the Member States and represent the EU, once the Member States agree on a collective position. The EU is therefore not a traditional foreign policy actor but keeps representing a “hybrid structure of external relations”, which means “a political, institutional and legal structure derived from heterogeneous sources, or composed of elements of different or incongruous kinds” (Smith, 2013, p. 700). The Lisbon Treaty aimed at transforming the European foreign policy system further, in providing a stronger impetus for political and security prioritisation, but Smith (2018) suggests that in terms of European diplomacy this transformation has not taken place and that “EU external action remains essentially a hybrid construct”. With the Lisbon Treaty, Member States indeed agreed to increase the international actorness of the EU also by reforming the diplomatic representation of the European Union abroad. European Commission delegations in third countries were transformed into EU delegations and became—next to the administrative headquarters in Brussels—an integral part of the EEAS. The EU delegations are now representing the Union abroad, also politically. Furthermore, they “shall act in close cooperation with Member States’ diplomatic and consular missions” (Art. 221, TFEU) and coordinate and support Member States on the ground (for more details see Bicchi & Maurer, 2018). The diplomatic representation was not built from scratch but could rely on already existing resources that were adapted accordingly. Already in 1955, the European Commission had opened its first diplomatic representations in London (a European Commission delegation since 1967) and in Washington, DC (European Commission delegation since 1970), followed by a representation to the OEEC/OECD in Paris (1965), a liaison office with GATT (1965) and a liaison office in Santiago (European Commission delegation after 1968). By 1979, the European Commission had established “some 50 representations in third countries”

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(Hill & Wallace, 1979, p. 50).1 These delegations represented the EU in the area where it had exclusive (e.g. in trade matters) or shared competences (e.g. research and innovation). The granting of diplomatic status to these delegations has been negotiated with third countries throughout the 1980s, whereas in 1985 European Commission delegations got the right to fly the EU flag, similar to national embassy counterparts. However, in political matters, the diplomatic representation was much more complex and inconsistent. Formally, it was the embassy of the Member State holding the rotating presidency in the Council of Ministers that represented the EU diplomatically towards third countries and coordinated EU initiatives on the ground. If the respective Member State did not have a diplomatic representation in the third country, the task was taken over by another EU Member State. Regarding European external representation, Aggestam et al. (2008) concluded that this arrangement of “local presidencies” did not work very satisfactorily: it posed a considerable bureaucratic burden on the rotating presidency, it added inconsistency due to this 6-monthly switch in representation, and it was often perceived that the rotating presidency rather used the six months to get more attention for its bilateral rather than EU representation. Aggestam et al., for example, illustrate that the Slovenian presidency in 2008 was only representing the EU in 20 countries, while in 130 countries they had to ask other Member States. Or during the German presidency in 2007, 27 local presidencies were exercised by seven different Member States (Aggestam et al., 2008, pp. 36–37, for additional discussion see Baltag & Smith, 2015). The political representation of the EU in third countries was therefore not only ineffective and patchy, but it was also not in any form connected to the activities of the EU delegations. This split in diplomatic representation was confusing for third parties, and it made it difficult for the EU to be considered a wholesome international actor with different actors diplomatically representing two distinct entities in different ways. Since December 2009, it is now the EU delegations that represent the EU diplomatically, also in political matters (see Council of the European Union, 2010b for more details). In 2019, the EU reached a diplomatic network comprising 128 EU delegations to third countries, 8 multilateral delegations to International Organisations (AU in Addis Abeba, UN 1 For full list see European Commission (2014, pp. 348–349); for more detailed discussion see Morgenstern-Pomorski (2018, pp. 19–28).

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in Geneva, OECD/UNESCO in Paris, WTO in Geneva, UN in New York, FAO in Rome, CoE in Strasbourg, UN/IAEA/OSCE in Vienna, and 4 representation offices in Hong Kong and Macao, Kosovo, Taiwan, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip). In terms of network size, the EU diplomatic network ranks fourth compared to EU members. Only France, Germany and the UK have denser diplomatic networks (see Austermann, 2014, p. 48). With the structure adapted in a way that would favour a more united diplomatic representation of the European Union, we will in a next step see if this more conducive structure for the EU to act and be perceived as an international actor also led to the desired diplomatic agency.

European Diplomacy as a Network of EU and Member States Activities in Third Countries When the European Commission delegations were elevated to full-blown diplomatic missions as EU delegations, the ambassador, the press section and the political section, have been moved to work for the EEAS, while remaining delegation staff are still employed by and accountable to the European Commission. The EEAS and its delegations were meant to receive a third of staff from the European Commission, a third from the foreign policy unit in the Council Secretariat and a third from Member States. Resources were thus shifted, but the EEAS did not necessarily receive more human resources with the additional tasks taken over with the Lisbon Treaty. If a EU delegation is hosting more technical European Commission experts, who are responsible for external assistance management, or if it is more political in its set-up depends, of course, on the type of relationship the EU has with the third country and its historical growth (Bruter, 1999). Even in current times of technological innovation, staff numbers still matter for diplomatic postings, and they very often give a good indication of the salience that is given to a (diplomatic) relationship. In terms of staff, the biggest EU delegations are in Turkey, Serbia, Ukraine, China, Bosnia, Egypt, the USA and Kosovo. The biggest contingents in terms of European Commission staff are in Turkey (119 staff), Serbia (87), Ukraine (74), Bosnia (72) and Kosovo (69). In contrast, the

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biggest contingent of EEAS staff are in the EU delegations in the USA (59 staff), Russia (37), Japan (36), China (35) and Ukraine (28).2 The staffing in the EEAS is rather peculiar compared to the diplomatic services of for example the Member States. In 2017, about 4,000 people were working for the EEAS: half in Brussels and half in the delegations. Only a fourth of those are “AD posts”, thus on the level of diplomats and/or officials, and a third of those are covered by diplomats sent from the EU Member States. In EU delegations, the largest group of EEAS staff are local agents, which make up nearly 50% of EEAS staff in delegations. This percentage of local staff is considerably higher than what Member States normally employ. The EEAS, in addition, draws upon 420 contract agents and 450 seconded national experts as main staff categories. The overall 2,000 EEAS staff in EU delegations is furthermore supported by 3,616 Commission staff, which are deployed to EU delegations around the world (all numbers from EEAS, 2018, pp. 39–40). After the Lisbon Treaty, the EU delegations are now meant to conduct traditional diplomatic tasks, next to the continued management of external assistance in third countries. In addition, the Treaty and the Council decision establishing the EEAS suggest that they shall coordinate the activities of EU actors on the ground, which of course includes the coordination of diplomatic representations of the EU Member States present in a third country. There are only three capitals where all 27 Member States and the EU delegation are represented: Beijing, Moscow and Washington, DC. Some observers suggested that EU Member States would downsize their diplomatic networks. Evidence, however, shows a different trend: “On the contrary, despite the economic crisis and the creation of the EEAS, EU member states have continued to invest in expanding their diplomatic networks” (Bicchi & Maurer, 2018, p. 15). Member States do not necessarily use more staff but rather seem to be shifting their scarce resources into places where they feel that a bilateral representation can provide them added benefit, while in places with a strong EU relationship they might downsize their diplomatic representation also due to the EU cooperation on the ground. Legally, diplomats working in the EU delegation are bound by international diplomatic law such as the 1961 Vienna Convention, which 2 Staff numbers as provided to the author by the EEAS in March 2016. More updated, detailed numbers are not made available by the EEAS, although the annual EEAS human resource reports provide useful indications about general trends.

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describes the functions of diplomatic missions as representation, protection of interests, negotiation, observation and promotion of friendly relations. In addition, EU diplomatic representation is also informed by the competence division as presented in EU law. On these grounds, Duquet (2018, p. 19) concludes that “the range of tasks performed by Union delegations is both broader and more restricted than that of states”, while Baltag (2018, p. 12) also emphasises that the Lisbon Treaty “means more work” for the EU delegations. They now had to be the eyes, ears and mouth of the European Union, but, at the same time, the EU delegations also started to organise regular coordination meetings for diplomats of EU Member States on various levels: while ambassadors from EU Member States had regular meetings already before the Lisbon Treaty, those meetings were now also extended to the deputy heads of missions, the political and economic counsellors, and a variety of other counsellor formations (see Baltag, 2018; Bicchi, 2018; Maurer & Raik, 2018; Terzi, 2018). Political counsellors, for example, could attend up to four EU coordination meetings in Washington, DC, which the EU delegation organised in various manners: they invited guest speakers from the host country, who preferred to brief the EU27 instead of 27 individual Member States; they would exchange views on current affairs or also discuss positions coming out of Brussels and how to implement those on the ground (Maurer & Raik, 2018, p. 73). The intensity and quality of such EU coordination meetings are new, not their existence. Already in 1979 Hill and Wallace were investigating European diplomacy and its “distinct, though interconnected, spheres”. They showed that outside the Community, the embassies of the Nine and their missions to international organisations have learned to consult à neuf , to exchange information, to make joint statements and demarches, to vote together on political resolutions, and on occasion to send back joint reports to their ministries. (Hill & Wallace, 1979, pp. 48–49)

Taylor (1980) showed that political cooperation among EC Member States’ embassies in Washington, DC became institutionalised and more regular under the leadership of the rotating presidency, as well as that smaller Member States profited comparably more from this intensified process. Taylor also points out that measuring European diplomatic coordination abroad is not a black-and-white issue, but rather a transforming

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process over time, as his quote of Etienne Davignon indicates: “our consultation has become a political phenomenon and is recognized as such externally… which is clear progress over what existed previously” (Taylor, 1980, p. 41). The coordination meetings now organised by the EU delegation are predominantly welcomed by diplomats of EU Member States embassies, but naturally “participants differ in what they bring to and take away from meetings” (Bicchi, 2018, p. 11; for similar assessment see Maurer & Raik, 2018; Terzi, 2018, p. 8). The bigger Member States often have their own (human) resources and networks for in-depth information-gathering, but all other medium- and small-sized Member States profit from the additional information and insights that are provided during those coordination meetings and by the EU delegation. These meetings do not lead Member States to automatically adapt their bilateral relations (Bicchi, 2018) and they are not there to replace bilateral activities (Maurer & Raik, 2018), but “at the very least, the chair aims to provide national representatives with operational conclusions, referred to as ‘a line to take’ or ‘talking points’, which are summarized in minutes to be circulated after the meeting” (Bicchi, 2018, p. 11). These coordination meetings for most European diplomats therefore mean an additional opportunity for information-gathering and for explaining the rational of their national positions to their European colleagues on the ground. For the EU delegation, it is furthermore a good opportunity to inform diplomats from the Member States about (policy) developments in Brussels. The information gathered at those meetings is then again used by national diplomats in their political reporting back to the capital. EU delegations adapted within a few years to their new diplomatic roles. They represent the EU and its Member States, negotiate on behalf of the EU based on the mandates received from Brussels, send political reports analysing the situation on the ground and promote the EU and its relationship. After the Lisbon Treaty, the EU delegations had the authority to inform about the EU and what it does. The picture is, however, still more nuanced “when it comes to presenting, explaining and implementing concrete policies” (Duquet, 2018, p. 9). In areas where the EU does not enjoy broad competences, its representational role is less active and more observatory. This is also the case in political representation: the EU delegation can only represent and defend the political decision of the EU, if such a decision has been taken by EU Member States in Brussels. If the Foreign Affairs Council did not come to an

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agreement, then the EU delegation is not in the position to represent any EU position. The adapted structure allowed the EU delegations to boost their visibility on the ground but also vis-à-vis headquarters: “The size of the Political Sections has boosted EU delegations’ chances of playing a more political role, as several EU ambassadors have referred to the ‘activism’ of the heads of Political Sections in, for example, drafting political reports for Brussels or maintaining an efficient network of political contacts” (Bicchi, 2018, p. 7). Staff in EU delegations had to learn how to think more diplomatically, and to also show this different mindset in the kind of reporting and analysis that they send back to headquarters. The EU delegations, in adapting to their diplomatic roles, also break with diplomatic practice on two occasions: in the consideration of human rights protection and in their lack of consular protection for EU citizens. EU delegations adapt a slightly different role than what diplomatic tradition would suggest when it comes to the protection of human rights. Duquet (2018, p. 10) points out that “legal scholars express doubts as to whether formally criticising internal human rights matters is permitted” while “the EU remains a frontrunner in engaging its delegations in the direct support of democracy initiatives and the protection of local human rights’ defenders” EU Member States sometimes on purpose rather prefer the EU to take a strict stance, as this allows them to still pursue their national (economic) interests (Terzi, 2018, pp. 12–13). In addition, diplomats on the ground feel there is still a tension between a distinct EU approach and the usual diplomatic practice, as the following account suggests, In one southern Mediterranean country, for instance, the EEAS in Brussels has suggested a tougher approach to authorities in the country after an election round that just reconfirmed them in power. This was, however, mitigated by the local EU ambassador, who stressed the need to cooperate with authorities on the ground, however unpalatable. As mentioned by the interviewee (an EU ambassador), it would not have been necessary to stress the need for political realism in a national diplomatic system. (Bicchi, 2018, p. 7)

This distinct EU approach in terms of the protection of human rights is a purposeful stance promoted by headquarters in Brussels, but it puts EU diplomats on the ground sometimes at odds with what is considered

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“diplomatic” behaviour. EU delegations have a clear mandate to protect EU interests according to EU law, but their protection for EU citizens is legally less developed (Duquet, 2018, pp. 11–12). EU delegations are not in the position to offer consular protection to EU citizens, but the EU facilitated an agreement between Member States that EU citizens can turn to any Member State represented in their country, in case their home country is not diplomatically represented (Council of the European Union, 2015). Diplomatic agency in the EU can therefore still come from various sources: it is now the EU delegations that are more prominently representing the EU in diplomatic affairs, but they do so in coordination with and not in replacement of the bilateral diplomatic efforts of the 27 EU Member States. This chapter illustrated in what ways the EU diplomatic actorness is in line with current trends in the diplomatic realm, but also in what aspects the EU remains a peculiar coordination system of diplomatic representation.

Conclusion: How Does European Diplomacy Contribute to EU Regional and International Actorness The European Union and its Member States upgraded their diplomatic representation in third countries considerably during the past decade, in order to strengthen the regional and international actorness of the EU and its recognition as a “normal” diplomatic interlocutor. The changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty brought valuable structural adaptions to mitigate the lack of a unitary foreign policy decision-making hierarchy in the EU. Those changes provided the opportunity for a stronger diplomatic actorness, but still inherit some of the peculiarities that make the EU a distinct diplomatic actor. The main aim of this book is to show concrete steps in the EU’s development of operational capacities but also to highlight the dissonance that the lack of clear additional political consensus on the purpose and direction of the EU’s global presence has created for EU actorness in relations with partner countries. This chapter on European diplomacy adds to this discussion with a threefold assessment: First, diplomacy is a tool that provides information, feedback and input for political strategy,

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but it is not a replacement for a foreign policy strategy. So to say, diplomacy is often referred to as being the eyes, ears and mouth of an actor, but diplomacy is not going to replace the mind of the actor. Secondly, because of its particular foreign policy identity and history (Damro, 2012; Smith, 2013), the EU is used to multi-layered, multi-faceted, multi-actor and multi-level policymaking. In this regard the move from traditional club diplomacy to increasingly more relevant network diplomacy plays to the strength of the European Union, although most EU diplomatic reforms aimed at making EU diplomacy more “traditional”. In its effort to harmonise the coordination between EU actors on the ground, the EU created a multilateral network between those actors. The latter therefore have more and qualitatively improved opportunities for exchange, but diplomats on the ground only inform foreign policy positions, they do not decide them. Thirdly, despite this very strong attempt to being perceived as a traditional foreign policy actor, EU foreign policy did not manage to overcome one deficiency that is not present in any state-like system: if Member States do not agree, there is no EU foreign policy position and thus also nothing to be represented diplomatically. The upgrades in European diplomacy strengthen the diplomatic toolkit at the disposal of the EU and its Member States, but it cannot replace or mitigate the lack of a clear foreign policy decision. Overall, thus, the EU is still a peculiar regional and global actor, and this peculiarity is also mirrored in the added value of European diplomacy.

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Baltag, D., & Smith, M. (2015). EU and Member State diplomacies in Moldova and Ukraine: Examining EU diplomatic performance post-Lisbon. European Integration Online Papers (EIoP), 19, 1–25. Barrinha, A., & Renard, T. (2017). Cyber-diplomacy: The making of an international society in the digital age. Global Affairs, 3(4–5), 353–364. Bátora, J. (2005). Does the European Union transform the institution of diplomacy? Journal of European Public Policy, 12(1), 44–66. Bátora, J. (2013). The “Mitrailleuse Effect”: The EEAS as an interstitial organization and the dynamics of innovation in diplomacy. Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(4), 598–613. Bicchi, F. (2018). The European cooperation in the southern Mediterranean: The multilateralization of bilateral relations? The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 13(1), 117–135. Bicchi, F., & Bremberg, N. (2016). European diplomatic practices: Contemporary challenges and innovative approaches. European Security, 25(4), 391–406. Bicchi, F., & Maurer, H. (2018). European cooperation abroad: European diplomatic cooperation outside EU borders. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 13(1), 1–18. Bruter, M. (1999). Diplomacy without a state: The external delegations of the European Commission. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(2), 183–205. Carta, C. (2012). The European Union diplomatic service. Ideas, preferences and identities. Routledge Cooper, A., Heine, J., & Thakur, R. (2015). Introduction: The challenges of 21st century diplomacy. In The Oxford handbook of modern diplomacy (pp. 1–31). Oxford University Press Council of the European Union. (2010a, August 3). Decision establishing the EEAS, 2010/427/EU, OJEU L 201/30. Council of the European Union. (2010b). EU diplomatic representation in third countries—First half of 2010. Document No. 17770/1/09, Brussels. Council of the European Union. (2015). Council Directive 2015/637 of 20 April 2015 on the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries. Brussels. Damro, C. (2012). Market power Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 19(5), 682–699. Duke, S. (2002). Preparing for European diplomacy? Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(5), 849–870. Duquet, S. (2018). Bound or unbridled? A legal perspective on the diplomatic functions of European Union delegations. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 13(1), 21–40.

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EEAS. (2018). European External Action Service human resources annual report 2017 . Retrieved March 12, 2019, from https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/ files/2018_05_15_hr_report_2017_final.pdf European Commission. (2014). The European Commission 1958–1972. History and memories of an institution. European Commission Heine, J. (2006). On the manner of practising the new diplomacy (CIGI Working Paper Series on Re-shaping Diplomacy). Centre for International Governance Diplomacy. Retrieved March 12, 2019, from https://www.cigionline.org/ publications/manner-practising-new-diplomacy Herranz-Surrallés, A. (2016). An emerging EU energy diplomacy? Discursive shifts, enduring practices. Journal of European Public Policy, 23(9), 1386– 1405. Hill, C., & Wallace, W. (1979). Diplomatic trends in the European community. International Affairs, 55(1), 47–66. Lavenex, S. (2004). EU external governance in “wider Europe”. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(4), 680–700. Lehne, S. (2015, February). Are prime ministers taking over EU foreign policy? Carnegie Europe. Retrieved March 20, 2019, from https://carnegieeurope. eu/2015/02/16/are-prime-ministers-taking-over-eu-foreign-policy-pub59070 López de San, R., & Schunz, S. (2018). Understanding European Union science diplomacy. Journal of Common Market Studies, 56(5), 247–266. Maurer, H., & Raik, K. (2018). Neither fish nor fowl. How EU delegations challenge the institution of diplomacy: The cases of Moscow and Washington. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 13(1), 57–74. Mitzen, J. (2015). From representation to governing: Diplomacy and the constitution of international public power. In O. Sending, V. Pouliot, & I. Neumann (Eds.), Diplomacy and the making of world politics (pp. 111–139). Cambridge University Press. Morgenstern-Pomorski, J. H. (2018). The contested diplomacy of the European External Action Service: Inception. Routledge. Neumann, I. (2012). At home with the diplomats: Inside a European Foreign ministry. Cornell University Press. Rana, K. (2011). 21st century diplomacy. A practitioner’s guide. Key studies in diplomacy. Continuum Books Riddervold, M., & Trondal, J. (2017). Integrating nascent organisations. On the settlement of the European External Action Service. Journal of European Integration, 39(1), 33–47 Sending, O. J., Pouliot, V., & Neumann, I. (2015). Diplomacy and the making of world politics. Cambridge University Press. Smith, M. (2013). Still rooted in Maastricht: EU external relations as a ‘thirdgeneration hybrid’. Journal of European Integration, 34(7), 699–715.

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Smith, M. (2018). Does the flag still follow trade? Agency, politicisation and external opportunity structures in the post-Lisbon system of EU diplomacy. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 13(1), 41–56. Spence, D., & Bátora, J. (Eds.). (2015). The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia. Palgrave Macmillan Taylor, P. (1980). Political cooperation among the EC Member States’ embassies in Washington. Journal of European Integration, 4(1), 28–41. Terzi, O. (2018). Coordination between the EU Member States’ embassies and the EU delegation in Turkey: A case of European diplomatic representation. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 13(1), 97–116.

CHAPTER 4

Global Player Status? EU Actorness and Democracy Promotion Anna Khakee

Introduction This chapter argues that, in a comparative perspective, the European Union (EU) does not suffer from any “actorness deficit” when it comes to democracy promotion. There are certainly some fundamental problems with the EU democracy promotion agenda globally. However, it is not particularly useful to analyze these in terms of limits to the EU’s internal or external actorness. In fact, EU Member States have been quite happy to “upgrade” a substantial part of their democracy promotion policies to the European level. Thus currently, the EU institutions are clearly, together with the USA, the key global players in this respect. An assessment of internal actorness in terms of financial capabilities and cohesiveness, and external actorness as measured by global presence, the

A. Khakee (B) Department of International Relations, Faculty of Arts, University of Malta, Msida, Malta e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. R. Freire et al. (eds.), EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92997-8_4

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breadth of initiatives and recognition by other actors, all point essentially in the same direction: EU actorness is not in doubt, even though on one score, institutional autonomy, it is less solid. A brief comparative analysis between the EU institutions and EU Member States in terms of financial capabilities and global presence further supports this argument. Although a majority of EU Member States has enshrined democracy promotion in their foreign policy doctrines, they cannot match the European Commission on the ground. As the analysis below shows, in recent years, the three top bilateral EU Member State donors together accounted for approximately as much democracy assistance as the EU institutions pledged by themselves. Likewise, the extent of the global presence of EU institutions is unmatched by even top Member State donors. The holistic and comparative approach adopted in this chapter differs from that taken by the few existing studies on EU actorness in the area of democracy promotion. The focus here is global, examining (a) total levels of democracy assistance (defined as foreign aid funding specifically aimed at institutions and groups considered fundamental for democracy to emerge/consolidate) and (b) democracy promotion policies more broadly, thus also including positive/negative conditionalities as well as public pronouncements in support of democratic actors and aims in third countries. In contrast, current studies tend to centre on the Neighbourhood policy exclusively or have a broader focus than democracy promotion (Börzel & van Hüllen, 2014; Juncos & Whitman, 2015; Noutcheva, 2015). Current studies also do not contrast EU democracy promotion with that of states, as does this chapter. This global and comparative take puts EU actorness in perspective, and conclusions differ as a result. While actorness as a concept will, quite logically, be action-focused, it is argued here that it would be analytically unproductive—as some of the actorness literature has tended to do—to compare the EU to some ideal standard of perfect policy effectiveness. How can we expect levels of effectiveness of EU policy that states, which are considered the “baseline” actors in the international system, do not achieve? Thus, the main, glaring problem of EU democracy promotion noted time and again in the literature is the recurrent policy clashes between the purportedly “European” values of democracy and human rights, on the one hand, and hard-nosed economic and security interests of the EU and EU Member States, on the other (Del Biondo, 2012; Hollis, 2012). More recently, the internal

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challenges to liberal democracy manifest within many Member States are also increasingly seen as diminishing the credibility and effectiveness of EU democracy promotion outside of the block. However, and crucially, this fundamental problem of conflicting agendas is not unique to the EU. It hampers the legitimacy and ultimately the effectiveness of virtually all state-sponsored democracy promotion efforts.1 It is thus not a problem of actorness per se, lest we conclude that all democracy promoting actors suffer from a deficit in actorness. Rather, the problem is better analyzed in terms of (lack of) policy consistency or, alternatively, coherence as discussed in the EU context by Simon Nuttall and Carmen Gebhard respectively (see Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014), and the consequences of these on effectiveness. So while existing studies such as those by Juncos and Whitman (2015) and Noutcheva (2015) have essentially come to a negative conclusion regarding EU actorness, this chapter’s findings are more in line with those pertaining to EU actorness in the wider development policy arena, which are more sanguine (see e.g. Carbone, 2013; Simão in this book and indeed “classics” in the actorness debate such as Hill, 1993). This chapter is structured as follows: It starts by setting the conceptual and methodological foundations in section one, before analyzing EU democracy promotion in terms of internal and external actorness in section two. The third section compares EU actorness to that of EU Member States, financially, geographically and thematically. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the extent to which the EU’s unique actorness position in world politics—neither a state nor an international organization—does in fact strengthen its position as a democracy promoter.

Operationalizing Actorness in the Context of Democracy Promotion Eschewing a detailed discussion—found elsewhere in this book—of the “cottage industry [which] has flourished around actorness” (Drieskens, 2017, p. 1537), this chapter adopts a two-pronged understanding of the concept. In line with current theorization of actorness, it differentiates between its internal and external dimensions. Internal actorness

1 For a discussion of US democracy promotion see e.g. Mitchell (2016).

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is defined in terms of institutional and financial capabilities as well as cohesiveness, while external actorness is taken to mean the extent of the actor’s global presence and recognition by other relevant actors. As noted by Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (2014, p. 964), “these broad concepts remain rather vague, making operationalization difficult”. Given the primarily empirical aim of this chapter, the focus of this section is on tackling this vagueness head on, attempting to translate this general conceptualization into observable qualities. Financial capabilities can be measured in a relatively straightforward manner in terms of EU budget allocations for democracy assistance— although, as will become evident in the next section, in practical terms arriving at reliable and precise numbers is far from easy. Institutional capabilities have been operationalized as the extent of autonomy (institutional independence). Institutional independence, in turn, depends on the control and oversight mechanisms by Member States in a given issue area. Following Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (2014, p. 966), cohesiveness is defined here as the ability of the EU to “formulate internally and represent externally a consistent position with a single voice, even if this is not the preferred position of all the Member States”. It is operationalized through the collective decision-making rules either formally (EU representation rules in terms of EU exclusive/shared/supporting competence) or informally, where Member States choose to present a common front although they are not obliged to (idem, p. 967). Likewise, while global presence can be expressed in fairly straightforward terms—if not perfectly—as activities in democracy aid recipient states, recognition, in the context of democracy promotion, poses some problems. Recognition has been discussed in various terms in the literature. Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (2014, p. 965) differentiate between de jure diplomatic recognition and de facto recognition “whenever third parties decide to interact with the EU and thus implicitly recognize it as an international actor”. Licínia Simão’s (in this book) operationalization in terms of “acceptance by the EU’s partners and interlocutors” is considerably more difficult to gauge empirically, but is, as will be further elaborated below, nevertheless particularly interesting in the context of democracy promotion. This chapter employs a definition of democracy promotion adapted from Philippe Schmitter and Imco Brouwer (1999, p. 12) as “all overt and voluntary activities adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by… foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to the

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political liberalization of autocratic regimes, democratization of autocratic regimes, or consolidation of democracy in specific recipient countries”. It thus encompasses positive and negative democratic conditionalities,2 as well as various verbal pronouncements in instances when the behaviour of particular governments is perceived as breaching democratic or human rights norms. It also englobes democracy assistance/democracy aid, used interchangeably and denoting foreign aid programming with the strengthening of democratic norms, institutions and behaviour as its main aim. In theory and in practice, drawing the line is not always straightforward: does for instance support for decentralization fall under democracy assistance? However, in line with the overwhelming majority of exiting scholarship, this chapter peruses democracy aid data based on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) definition of democracy assistance. This definition tends to inflate the amount of aid devoted to democratic strengthening by including some items that are not clearly focused on the core of the democratization agenda. However, it can be safely assumed that it does so in a similar manner across donors and thus does not distort the overall conclusions.3

Analyzing EU Democracy Promotion in Terms of Internal and External Actorness This chapter opened with the assertion that, comparatively, there is no EU “actorness deficit” in the area of democracy promotion. This section substantiates this claim through an assessment of internal actorness in terms of institutional and financial capabilities as well as cohesiveness, and external actorness as measured by global presence and recognition by other actors. It also nuances it, by differentiating between democracy

2 I.e. “carrots” such as closer economic ties, institutional memberships etc., on the one hand, and sanctions of various kinds, on the other. 3 Balancing this, DAC data also underestimates financing for human rights and democracy, as many aid projects will directly or indirectly (not least through so-called mainstreaming) contribute to supporting this agenda even though it is not identified as their main objective (correspondence with European civil servant DG Near, July–August 2019).

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aid and democracy promotion writ large—actorness in the former case is more entrenched than in the latter. In terms of EU financial capabilities as a key aspect of internal actorness, it is clear that the EU institutions are a top democracy assistance donor. The next section, which details levels of EU democracy aid as compared to that of Member States, substantiates this further. Here, a brief additional comparative note is illuminating: the commitments of democracy aid of the USA—the most important democracy promoter globally—have (very roughly) averaged USD3.4 billion yearly over the 2012–2017 period, while those of the EU institutions have amounted to some USD2.7 billion (calculated from OECD 2019). In other words, while the most important individual EU Member State in this area, namely Germany—with a yearly average of some USD1.4 billion over the same period—does not play in the same league as the USA, the EU institutions clearly do. The democracy aid infrastructure of the EU is complex, as Table 4.1— non-exhaustively—illustrates.4 Many analysts have criticized the plethora of funding instruments, noting the negative impacts on efficiency and effectiveness. Without minimizing the problem, it is worth underlining that it is quite typical of large aid donors and so cannot be attributed to a deficiency in actorness. Again, a comparison with the USA shows that a wide array of implementing mechanisms is not a uniquely European conundrum.5 Analyzing the institutional capabilities/autonomy of the EU in the area of democracy promotion is rendered very complex by the fact that policies are pursued by a number of EU institutions and through several instruments. The control and oversight mechanisms by Member States are not the same throughout. Given this complexity, an exhaustive analysis is impossible within the space of this chapter. In a nutshell, while democracy aid, as part of development aid, is a shared competence, human rights and democracy promotion at the broader level are Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) competences. In accordance with Article 4 TFEU, the EU can conduct and implement a common democracy aid policy while at the same time Member 4 Due to a lack of precise and comparable data per instrument, sums do not add up across tables. 5 See for instance Congressional Research Service (2019, pp. 9–16) for a description of the complex US system of democracy support.

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Table 4.1 EU financial capabilities, by main programming tool Programming tool Thematic instrumentsa EIDHR European Endowment for Democracyb Development Cooperation Instrumentc —thematic components ‘Civil society organisations and local authorities (CSO-LA)’ and ‘Global public good and challenges’ Regional instruments Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) European Neighbourhood Instrument

European Development Fund (EDF)g

Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II)

Funding envelope (EUR billion)

Year(s)

1.33 0.014 1.91 (CSO-LA) Approx. 0.35 (relevant sectionsd of Global public good and challenges only)

2014–2020 2018 2014–2020

At least 1.77e

2014–2020

No pre-set allocations for democracy aid at outset of funding cycle Total funding envelope: 15.43 f No pre-set allocations for democracy aid at outset of funding cycle Total funding envelope: 29.09 h No pre-set allocations for democracy aid at outset of funding cycle Total funding envelope: 11.70

2014–2020

2014–2020

2014–2020

a The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) is cited in European Commission docu-

mentation as part of the funding infrastructure for democracy and human rights. However, only a fraction of the activities funded under this instrument are related to furthering democracy. Moreover, in the most recent cycle of funding, funds were squarely aimed at more hard-core security issues such as countering terrorism and organized crime. As a consequence, it is not included b Contrary to the other instruments listed in Section one, the EED is not yet global in scope, though its geographical remit has been continuously extended c The DCI in principle covers 47 countries in Latin America, South Asia and North and South East Asia, Central Asia, Middle East and South Africa. However, its thematic components cover all developing countries, including those covered by the ENPI and the EDF (European Commission, 2019a) d Includes only the part of the programme potentially relevant to democracy aid, namely the 27.5% of the envelope devoted to Gender equality, women’s empowerment and the protection of women’s and girls’ rights; children and young people, non-discrimination; employment, skills, social protection and social inclusion; growth, jobs and private sector engagement, culture”. Even so, this inflates the figure, as employment, skills, social protection; growth, jobs and private sector engagement, and culture are not democracy assistance areas, but cannot be separated out due to the lack of granularity of the data e Calculated as at least 15% of the total of 11.81bn as per Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Annexe IV f Usually, approximately 20–25% of the bilateral financial envelopes for ENI countries are allocated to the strengthening of institutions and good governance, with an additional 5% of support for civil society development (correspondence with European civil servant DG Near, July–August 2019) g The EDF covers mainly former European colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific h Excludes funding for Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs), which are under Danish, Dutch, French or UK sovereignty but do not form part of the EU territory or of the single market Sources European Commission (2014); Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Annexe IV; Churruca Muguruza et al., 2014, chart 5; personal communication Lydeke Schakel, M&E Manager at EED, 30 January 2019

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States remain free to adopt their own programming. Democracy aid as a consequence falls under the Commission and its Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DevCo). When it comes to democracy aid programming, institutional autonomy varies according to instrument. Thus, the EED6 —though admittedly a special case—quickly managed to gain “significant independence from Member States in its funding decisions” (Youngs, 2015, p. 2). The Commission has found it useful to provide for instance some of the ENI funding to the nimbler EED, providing it with extra funds for smaller, new or informal organizations (correspondence with European civil servant DG Near, July–August 2019). Other funding instruments listed in Table 4.1 have somewhat less wiggle room. EEAS Delegations are consulted on for instance EIDHR programming locally (PEM Consult, 2017, p. 48). Member States weigh in strongly on general budget levels and priorities, while the Commission retains the initiative on detailed allocations. The (in principle confidential) Human Rights and Democracy Country Strategies—providing the consensus view of Member States and EU institutions on the state of democratic development in particular countries—are meant to serve as a basis for joint programming (correspondence with European civil servant DG Near, July–August 2019).7 This has long been the “holy grail” of European development policy more broadly, implying that Member States would conform to a joint set of priorities and programmes in each recipient state, increasing coherence, efficiency and effectiveness (Furness,

6 It must be underlined that the EED is not, strictly speaking, an EU institution, although it is usually analyzed as such. It is a private foundation, the Board of Governors of which is dominated by representatives of the EU Member States, the European Parliament, the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS). EED funding mainly comes from the European Commission and voluntary Member State contributions (EED, 2018). 7 The Country Strategies are increasingly being complemented by so-called Democracy Profiles, which offer a political economy (rather than more legally) based analysis of the prospects and hurdles for democratization or democratic consolidation in recipient countries. These are developed directly by the EU Delegation and Member State representatives in the countries concerned, then reviewed and approved by the relevant services in Brussels and by Member States in the framework of the COHOM working party. They are meant to further increase joint programming, but also to increase coherence and coordination overall, including on policy dialogue (correspondence with European civil servant DG Near, July–August 2019).

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2013). Further complicating the matter, it should be noted that the European Commission is a funder and relies in part on Member States for implementation: in fact, Member States’ agencies, together with CSOs, the UN and other international organizations are key implementing partners (correspondence with European civil servant DG Near, July–August 2019). The broader democracy promotion agenda as a CFSP area requires unanimity and falls under the Council and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) (Furness, 2013, p. 116). Unanimity requirements notwithstanding, remarks and statements by the HR on developments related to democracy and human rights in particular countries have become routine occurrences. The Commission will, likewise, react to breaches of democratic and human rights norms perceived as more serious. The extent to which EU Member States decline to voice their individual positions as a consequence of statements and reports such as these varies from case to case and from one Member State to another. It is also important to note that pronouncements by the HR and the Commission, while possessing a degree of autonomy as long as there is a common position to fall back on, are in practice calibrated so as not to elicit a negative reaction by Member States. European election observation is an interesting part of the agenda. It is perhaps the most visible of all democracy promotion strategies. Here, rather paradoxically, the EU institution that formally has the least power in the definition and execution of foreign policy, namely the European Parliament (EP), has carved out a key role for itself. Though funding is in part provided through the EIDHR and missions are undertaken together with the European Commission (which, as a rule, provides most resources and personnel) or with outside bodies such as the OSCE, the Chief Observer of EU missions is traditionally a member of the European Parliament (Gawrich, 2015). Through this role, “Election Observation Missions have indeed been a ‘loophole’ to increase the EP’s role in the CFSP” (ibid., p. 122). In terms of formal collective decision-making rules, cohesiveness is a mixed bag in the area of democracy promotion as noted above: shared in the case of democracy assistance, while democratic conditionalities and sanctions fall under the CSFP. In terms of presenting a joint European front on the general importance of democracy and human rights in EU foreign policy, cohesiveness has been relatively strong up until the present.

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Article 21(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states that the Union will seek to advance democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms in its external relations.8 On this basis, in its most recent development policy strategy, the so-called Agenda for Change, the EU has made support for “human rights, democracy and other key elements of good governance” one of two pillars on which all development policy should be founded (European Commission, 2011). The importance that the EU in principle accords to democracy and human rights has been further emphasized in a number of documents, such the Action Plans on Human Rights and Democracy. Similarly, at the formal level of international treaties, the EU has, since 1995, consistently included democracy, human rights and the rule of law as “essential elements” in bilateral agreements. This is the case of, for instance, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (and its predecessor), which covers EU cooperation with African, Pacific and Caribbean states, the Association Agreements with Eastern and Southern neighbours from Ukraine to Morocco, as well as the cooperation agreement with Mercosur signed in 1995. So clearly, in these respects, the EU has managed to show cohesiveness. The founding in 2013 of the EED is another example of the relative cohesiveness of the EU in the area of democracy promotion. Far from all Member States were enthusiastic about the idea (Giusti & Fassi, 2014; Kostanyan & Nasieniak, 2012). Up until 2017 (i.e. the most recent information available), several EU Member States, including key players such as France and Italy, have chosen not to fund the institution (EED, 2018). This notwithstanding, cohesiveness has nevertheless been strong enough to let the EED both be established and function coherently and quite autonomously from the Board of Governors, where all Member States are represented (Youngs, 2015). In the related area of human rights, the EU has also shown a degree of cohesiveness, as argued by scholars. Thus, in the United Nations Human Rights Council, the EU has been quite effective in producing joint declarations and resolutions. With the exception of Israel, it has also shown unity in voting within the Council (Smith, 2015, Tables 10.1 and 10.2). Cohesiveness should not be exaggerated, however. As noted by legal scholars, TEU Article 21(1) cited above and other relevant provisions

8 See also Article 3(5) TEU.

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did not confer new or extended competences to the Union to act in the area of human rights and democracy. Similarly, at the level of policy formulation, in 2007–2008, there was considerable debate among EU Member States on whether to adopt a European Consensus on Democracy. This would have followed the European Consensus on Development of 2005 and the 2007 European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid9 and underpinned European action through clearer definitions of democracy and democratization. However, this proved too sensitive and contentious (Neuman, 2017, pp. 64–65).10 There has also been very little appetite among EU Member States to apply sanctions, suspend trade agreements or withhold development assistance in cases of blatant violations of human rights and democratic norms.11 To what extent this is a consequence of a lack of cohesiveness rather than a general unwillingness on the part of national governments to get tough when it comes to defending democratic values is not always clear. Scholars agree that there is an evident north–south divide in this respect, with northern states more willing to use conditionalities than their southern European peers (Smith, 2015). This has sometimes led individual Member States to issue for instance travel bans or arms embargos, even in the absence of EU-wide agreement: this happened in the Khashoggi case, where individual Member States, including Germany, halted arms sales to Saudi Arabia and issued travel bans on Saudi citizens allegedly involved in the murder of the dissident journalist inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul (Pearson, 2018), while others were more reluctant to do so. As concerns global presence, defined here in terms of presence in democracy assistance recipient states, the EU possesses more actorness than Member States. Given the complexity of programming, one single, precise figure is difficult to come by. Thus instead, some examples are provided here to illustrate the EU’s reach. The EU has undertaken some 120 EU election observation missions since 2000. In 2017, EIDHR

9 Thanks goes to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the latter example. 10 See however the EU Agenda for Action on Democracy Support in EU External

Relations of 2009 (European Council, 2009). 11 For a discussion on the minimal use of the human rights conditionalities under the EU Generalised System of Preferences, see Velluti (2016), for a discussion on conditioning aid and the use of sanctions, see Smith (2015).

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supported projects in 120 countries; in 2016, the number was 106 (European Commission, 2019b).12 Likewise, CSO-LA targets 114 countries for 2018–2020 (European Commission, 2018, section 5.4). An extremely conservative estimate of a presence in 120 countries yearly would therefore imply that the EU is active in almost twice as many states as its most geographically wide-reaching Member State (Germany): in reality, the number is probably considerably higher (an EU civil servant estimates that virtually all countries in which the EU has aid programming see some form of human rights/democracy projects [correspondence with European civil servant DG Near, July–August 2019]). A de jure operationalization of recognition does not make much sense in the context of democracy promotion, as the issue here is not formal international organization membership or treaty accession. The de facto operationalization in terms of third party decisions to interact with the EU, thus implicitly recognizing it as an international actor, is more relevant. Democracy assistance is to a large extent based on consent. Of course, some (and in fact an increasing share) of the EIDHR and EED programming is, in essence, kept secret to protect the safety of the beneficiary individuals or groups from agents of the state in which they are operating. However, the vast majority of EU democracy aid programming is accepted in advance by the recipient government. While there are governments that have consistently refused all democracy assistance, they tend to form a minority. More common is government reluctance to accept particular types of democracy promotion, such as EU election observers. Over the last decade, an increasing “backlash” against democracy promotion has been noted, in particular when it comes to support for independent civil society organizations. Does this mean that EU actorness in terms of international recognition is getting more limited? The short answer is: not more than that of states. In fact, rejection of US democracy promotion is more pronounced than that of the EU. Grudging acceptance of the presence of EU democracy assistance programming and election observation missions does not mean acceptance of the legitimacy of the EU as a democracy promoter writ large, however. Concerns in this respect have been numerous: from double standards stemming from its internal workings (lack of internal democracy, inability to crack down on democratically deficient EU Member States) 12 In fact, EIDHR is not restricted to developing countries, but can also fund CSOs in the Global North, including the USA and Russia.

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and its external policies (e.g. its failures to uphold international refugee law, its good working relations with a number of authoritarian rulers and its failure in some instances to recognize democratic election results not to the Union’s liking). Using such a broad operationalization of recognition, the EU does suffer from limits to its external actorness. To what extent it differs from states in this respect is another matter. As I have argued above, this sort of legitimacy problems plagues many bilateral democracy promoters to at least the same degree.

No Lesser Than States: EU Actorness in Comparative Perspective When it comes to historical pedigree, it is clear that some EU Member States have considerably more long-standing democracy assistance programmes than do the European institutions. At present, however, and as this section makes clear, the EU is by far the largest democracy promoting actor in Europe: Table 4.2 shows that no single Member State comes close to matching the EU institutions in terms of funding commitments. The three top bilateral EU Member State donors, namely Germany, Sweden and the UK, together account for approximately as much democracy assistance as the EU institutions pledged by themselves.13 Germany, the largest bilateral democracy aid donor, rather consistently commits less than half the EU budgeted support. EU democracy assistance is also more stable across years. Table 4.3 zooms in on the five largest bilateral EU Member State donors and the EU institutions, examining the geographical and thematic reach of each. It becomes clear from the table that almost all of the top European democracy aid donors are active in the five areas defined here as the key components of the democracy assistance agenda, namely election support, human rights promotion and protection, judicial reform, strengthening the independence of the media and reinforcing civil society. It is in terms of global presence that differences become more readily apparent. As already mentioned, in a very conservative estimate the EU institutions are involved in democracy assistance in 120 states globally, while among top Member State donors the average is around 50 states.

13 The picture remains quite stable over time: for the period 2005–2014, the top five donors remain the same (European Parliament, 2016, Fig. 2).

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Table 4.2 EU and EU Member States aid towards governance and democratization (USD million)

Austria Belgium Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Luxembourg The Netherlands Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Slovenia Spain Sweden United Kingdom EU Institutions Bulgaria Estonia Latvia Lithuania Malta Romania

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

42 66 3.5 263 94 104 1153 0.03 .. 69 22 13 543 .. 5.1 .. 2.1 146 719 950 2735 .. .. .. .. .. ..

41 97 5.7 362 95 129 1241 0.03 .. 74 48 17 297 21 5.8 1.6 2.5 62 758 454 2816 .. 4.1 .. .. .. ..

15 124 4.7 361 90 119 1555 0.16 0.19 69 74 14 268 14 3.9 1.9 2.3 124 850 587 2435 .. 2.6 .. 0.45 .. 3.5

22 77 6.1 408 76 98 1163 0 0.62 55 118 21 1318 18 3.1 3.6 1.7 77 563 611 2385 .. 2.8 .. 0.73 .. 1.1

27 64 4.9 174 27 455 1619 .. 0.3 54 63 24 297 13 2.8 2.7 1.0 81 692 413 2906 0.22 4.4 0.43 1.0 .. 69

30 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 25 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.54 .. .. .. 0.02 ..

Source OECD (2018) ODA total commitments, Government and Civil Society-general (code 151). Figures have been rounded14

As noted in an evaluation of EIDHR from 2017, “No Member States conduct election observation [as opposed to broader election support],

14 The code 151, labelled “government and civil society” encompasses also elements which go beyond democracy assistance (see section two of this chapter for a further discussion). However, not all Member States report at finer levels of granularity, hence the necessity to rely on this code.

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Table 4.3 Global presence: comparison EU institutions and top democracy assistance donors among EU Member States15 Donor

EU institutions Denmark Germany The Netherlands Sweden UK

Total funds (2012–2016, USD)

Global presencea

Active in key areas of democracy aidb

13,277 1,568 6,731 2,723 3,582 3,015

120+ 43 65 10 35 53

Yes Partiallyc Yes n.a Yes Yes

a Defined as the number of states in which the donor funds democracy support programming b Defined as: election support, human rights promotion and protection, judicial reform, strengthening

the independence of the media, and reinforcing civil society c A detailed search of the Danida database indicates that there are few, if any projects in the media sector Sources Danida (2019), DFID Development Tracker (2019), GIZ Project Data (2019), OECD International Development Statistics (2018), SIDA (2017), European Commission (2019b), personal communication, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands 24 January 2019

none have as broad a geographical focus as the EIDHR” (PEM Consult, 2017, p. 79).

Conclusion This chapter shows that, by and large, the EU possesses an important degree of actorness in the area of democracy promotion. However, given that democracy promotion is an amorphous and pluri-faceted phenomenon, it is hardly surprising that a single line is difficult to discern. As a consequence, the EU possesses a greater degree of actorness in democracy assistance (i.e. democracy aid programming) than in democracy promotion writ large, and in particular as concerns sanctions. However—and contrary to predictions of the EU being a different, new type of more “civilian” or “normative” actor—the main problem of EU democracy promotion lies elsewhere, and is, in fact, identical to that of states. The problem is not that the High Representative cannot criticize

15 Global presence and activity areas are based on the latest available data, which differ from donor to donor. The table is thus illustrative.

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an institutional crisis in Venezuela or an electoral process in the Democratic Republic of Congo: she can and she does. It is also not that the EU institutions are hampered in their democracy assistance programming by conflicting agendas of Member States. Although it surely happens, it is not the rule. In fact, the EU is less of a hybrid actor than could be surmised when it comes to democracy promotion. The problems it faces are those of states: in a contest between competing policy goals, democracy promotion rarely gets the upper hand. Just like national governments will express dismay at a stolen election or a jailed human rights activist only to move on to other items on the agenda, so will the EU. Looking towards the future, the cohesiveness of the EU in the area of democracy promotion may well come to weaken, as leaders of some Member States—both old and new—are more and more overtly contesting the liberal post-WWII consensus. Significant electoral successes of authoritarian-leaning parties in Member States in the years to come will eventually come to impact on what has so far remained a relatively lowkey area of EU external action. Such developments will also presumably have an effect on international recognition—which is, as noted, already challenged in some quarters. However, again, this does not necessarily single the EU out as a different, more limited type of actor on the international stage. In fact, we are already seeing some such developments in the case of the US. Sharp internal rifts in US foreign policy implementation in the area of democracy promotion and increased rejection of the US’s role internationally are, arguably, already weakening its position in the area of democracy promotion. Acknowledgements The author wishes to sincerely thank the reviewers of this chapter as well as the participants of the IBB Seminar of 13 March 2019, University of Malta—and in particular the discussant, Stefano Moncada—for very useful comments on previous drafts. As always, the responsibility for any errors remains solely the author’s.

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European Parliament. (2016, July). Good governance in EU external relations: What role for development policy in a changing international context? EP/EXPO/B/DEVE/2015/02. Furness, M. (2013). Who controls the European External Action Service? Agent autonomy in EU external policy. European Foreign Affairs Review, 18(1), 103–125. Gawrich, A. (2015). The European Parliament in International Election Observation Missions (IEOM): Division of labour or decreased influence? In S. Stavridis & D. Irrera (Eds.), The European Parliament and its international relations. Routledge. Giusti, S., & Fassi, E. (2014). The European Endowment for Democracy and democracy promotion in the EU neighbourhood. The International Spectator, 49(4), 112–129. GIZ Project Data. (2019). Project with individual project sites search, code 151 Government and Civil Society, general. Retrieved August 21, 2019, from https://www.giz.de/projektdaten/index.action;jsessionid=4562E76C8 B74BF10F3B9162C68C9158B Hill, C. (1993). The capability-expectations gap, or conceptualizing Europe’s international role. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31, 305–328. Hollis, R. (2012). No friend of democratization: Europe’s role in the genesis of the Arab Spring. International Affairs, 88, 81–94. Juncos, A. E., & Whitman, R. G. (2015). Europe as a regional actor: Neighbourhood lost? JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 53(1), 200–215. Kostanyan, H., & Nasieniak, M. (2012, June). Moving the EU from a laggard to a leader in democracy assistance: The potential role of the European Endowment for Democracy (CEPS Policy Brief No. 273). Mitchell, L. A. (2016). The democracy promotion paradox. Brookings Institution Press. Neuman, M. (2017). The Visegrád Group as a vehicle for promoting national interests in the European Union: The case of the Czech Republic. Politics in Central Europe, 13(1), 55–67. Noutcheva, G. (2015). Institutional governance of European Neighbourhood Policy in the wake of the Arab Spring. Journal of European Integration, 37 (1), 19–36. OECD. (2018, 2019). International Development Statistics. Retrieved November, 27, 2018 and January 17, 2019, from http://www.oecd.org/ dac/stats/idsonline.htm OECD DAC (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee). (n.d.). DAC codelist. Retrieved August 21, 2019, from https://webfs.oecd.org/crs-iati-xml/Lookup/DAC-CRSCODES.xml

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Pearson, A. (2018, November 19). Germany issuing travel bans to 18 Saudis over Khashoggi’s death. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved August 21, 2019, from https:// p.dw.com/p/38UpX PEM Consult. (2017, January). Evaluation of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) 2014–2020. Draft Evaluation Report Volume 2—Annexes. Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation for the period 2014–2020. Official Journal of the European Union, L77 Schmitter, P. C., & Brouwer, I. (1999). Conceptualizing, researching and evaluating democracy promotion and protection (EUI working paper series, no. 99/9). SIDA. (2017). Democracy and human rights portfolio overview 2016. Retrieved August 21, 2019, from https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resour ces/portfolio_democracy_and_human_rights_2016_webb.pdf Smith, K. E. (2015). The EU as a diplomatic actor in the field of human rights. In J. Koops & G. Macaj (Eds.), The European Union as a diplomatic actor. Palgrave Macmillan Velluti, S. (2016). The promotion and integration of human rights in EU external trade relations. Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, 32(83), 41–68. Youngs, R. (2015). The European Endowment for Democracy, two years on. Carnegie Europe. Retrieved August 21, 2019, from https://carnegieeurope. eu/strategiceurope/61190

CHAPTER 5

Securing Peace Through Humanitarian Action: The EU Response to Complex Emergencies Daniela Nascimento

Introduction In the past years, the EU has become a prominent actor in the international realm, having made considerable advances in the broad field of international crisis response (Howorth, 2005; Tercovitch, 2014). The specific context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)’s emergence was characterised by various and evolving security threats, including failed states, violent internal conflicts and humanitarian crises, thus requiring a different approach within the framework of the EU’s response mechanisms. Moreover, the EU has also had to address the many obstacles

D. Nascimento (B) Faculty of Economics and Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra, Coimbra, Portugal e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. R. Freire et al. (eds.), EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92997-8_5

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and difficulties in seeking and achieving Consensus among its Member States with regards to why, where and how to respond to such threats, as well as to the overall institutional goal of promoting peace, security and stability within and beyond its borders. Drawing on this evolution and background, and focusing particularly on its humanitarian dimension, this chapter assesses the role of the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) as the cornerstone EU instrument in humanitarian action, analysing the extent to which it has contributed to EU’s increased actorness and capacity to promote peace and security at the global level. The argument put forward is that, despite the internal limitations and obstacles that continue to characterise the EU, namely of a political and decision-making nature, ECHO has been able to continuously increase its role and image, reinforcing its capacity to work as a neutral actor in the context of humanitarian crises. By doing so, it has significantly contributed to the internal and external acknowledgement and recognition of the EU as a relevant and capable international actor in this realm.

Humanitarian Action Within the EU: An Overview When it comes to identifying the first manifestations of humanitarian action and concerns within the EU, one has to refer immediately to the creation of its own Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department, ECHO, in 1992. The creation of ECHO is not only a good demonstration of the EU’s will and capability in this realm (Ravichandran, 2011), but also clearly demonstrates that although Member States play a role within the construction of EU’s humanitarian aid policies, the institutions contribute significantly to formulating and executing humanitarian policies and programmes on EU’s behalf. In the face of multiple crises worldwide and because of an increased awareness of the importance of addressing severe humanitarian crises worldwide as part of its increasing role as a civilian and/or normative power, the European Commission (EC) at that time created ECHO in great part to engage the Community more actively in complex emergency situations but without resorting to military or coercive instruments and strategies. Following this important institutional step, the EC made another significant advance with the approval of the 1996 Council Regulation on

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Humanitarian Aid (European Council, 1996) providing the legal framework for the elaboration of its own humanitarian policy. This document officially made direct reference to the idea of a humanitarian imperative and underlined that the essential aim of humanitarian aid is to prevent or relieve human suffering irrespective of any political considerations (Orbie et al., 2014). According to the Preamble of the Regulation, the main objective of the humanitarian aid provided by the EC should be to ‘provide ad hoc assistance and relief and protection for people in third countries who are victims of natural or man-made disasters, in order to meet the humanitarian needs resulting from these different situations’ (TFEU, 2012, p. 143). Later, the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid was adopted and signed by the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission in June 2007. This official document, entitled ‘Towards a European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid’ (European Commission, 2007; European Council, 2008) basically defines the EU’s policy framework in response to humanitarian crises. It sets out why, how and when the EU must act in this field in a coherent, effective and adequate way. It also defines the values, guiding principles and policy scope of EU humanitarian aid aimed at strengthening its capacity to help people suffering in crisis zones across the globe. One of the fundamental provisions of the Consensus is that both European Member States and institutions accept to work in coordination and complementarity with other international actors and agencies, as a way to reinforce preparedness for disaster response and assistance to harsh humanitarian crises, in articulation with both civil and military protection capabilities required necessary. As a result of this Consensus, the EU also adopted an Action Plan for the period of 2008–2013 (European Council, 2008) responding to the established objectives and principles of action and guiding cooperation between the Commission and EU countries on these matters. The implementation of this Action Plan was subject to an internal review by the European Parliament in 2010 (European Parliament, 2010) and to an independent assessment in 2014 (ADE & King’s College London, 2014), confirming the validity of the Consensus and recommending its implementation under a new framework through an Implementation Plan adopted in November 2015 and which would be implemented in the following 18 months. This Implementation Plan established three priority areas which included (a) upholding humanitarian principles and

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International Humanitarian Law (IHL); (b) promoting a stronger needsbased approach and enhanced coordination and coherence aimed at sustaining effectiveness; (c) and greater consistency of actions of both the Commission and individual Member States in the field of humanitarian aid. Based on this Consensus and in order to reach out to those living in humanitarian crises’ contexts and fulfil the established and expected goals, a variety of fundamental principles guiding its humanitarian assistance were also adopted and embraced: it must not be used as a common foreign-policy instrument and it should comply with the principles of neutrality (not taking sides), impartiality (not discriminating among victims) and independence (acting autonomously from governments or other political actors) (Dany, 2014, p. 1). The EU also reinforced its position by playing an active role in the international humanitarian system, influencing its shape and the definition of its norms and practices (Brattberg, 2013, p. 7), namely through the active presence and involvement in the World Humanitarian Summit that took place in Istanbul in 2016. This evolution was further and progressively complemented by a focus on conflict prevention and early warning through the work of the Commission in development aid. With all the innovations brought by the Treaty of Lisbon, such as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), the EU aimed at being a more visible and active player in the field of crises response (Pirozzi, 2013; Zwolski, 2012), including through humanitarian aid with ECHO becoming a Directorate-General working together with DG Development and Cooperation (EUROPE Aid) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) (Dany, 2014). Within the framework of the EU, ECHO works as an independent actor from external humanitarian organisations, as well as from internal EU institutions such as the Commission and the Council, through decision-making mechanisms that allow it to act on various dimensions of humanitarian assistance. It is important to underline that within the EU, humanitarian aid is a field of parallel competencies between the EU and the Member States, and the Commission is mandated to coordinate these multiple activities. At the same time, the Member States oversee ECHO via the comitology system through the Humanitarian Aid Committee. However, this

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committee has never disapproved of any ECHO proposal, which underlines ECHO’s autonomy. (Dany, 2015)

The creation of such a structure to manage the allocation of humanitarian aid to crises worldwide is of fundamental importance for EU’s action in this area since it demonstrates not only its willingness, but also its capacity to play an active, responsive, timely and relevant role in this field (Ravichandran, 2011). This institutional evolution has been decisive for the rapid increase of humanitarian assistance capacity within the realm of EU’s external action and thus its location within the complexity of a multi-level context ‘reflecting the interconnectedness of multiple governance levels and policy arenas in the policy process’ (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 17 apud Dany, 2014, p. 3). Recognising humanitarian assistance as an important soft-power area, the EU has thus managed to establish itself within the realm of humanitarian assistance through its presence and resources.1 Despite the fact that it does not actually work on the field, but rather relies on the hundreds of partner institutions working on the ground in affected regions worldwide and to which it channels significant amounts of money, all these developments contributed to the recognition of the EU as one of the world’s largest humanitarian aid donors (if not the world’s most important humanitarian actor at least collectively). The EU spends around one billion euros each year2 (ECHO, 2019), through financing and coordination of various projects implemented by humanitarian organisations in the field who serve as partners in this area3 (Dany, 2014).

EU Humanitarian Actorness As addressed in this book, it is given that in the past few decades, the debate on the relevance of the EU as a global actor has gained momentum 1 Funds come not only from the Community budget, but also from the European Development Fund (EDF) and the Emergency Aid Reserve (EAR). The Emergency Aid Reserve was created only to help ECHO respond to unforeseen disasters and humanitarian emergencies. 2 The initial EU budget of ECHO, as programmed in the EU’s Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) 2014–2020, is approximately e1 billion per year (a total of e7.1 billion was adopted for the entire seven years of the MFF) (ECHO, 2019). 3 The majority of the money is spent in sub-Saharan Africa followed by the Middle East and Central Asia (Brattberg, 2013).

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and increased relevance, with various academic and policy contributions addressing the many ‘faces’ and dimensions of EU external projection and actorness (see Simão in this book). Sjöstedt’s definition of actorness as ‘the capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system’ (Sjöstedt, 1977, p. 16) clearly underlines the issue of presence. This idea about external presence was further elaborated by Bretherton and Vogler (2006, 2013) who defined ‘actorness’ as implying ‘a scope of action and room for manoeuvre referring to external behaviour’ (Hettne, 2011, pp. 31–32). Bretherton and Vogler (2006, p. 30) refer to four requirements for actorness which include commitment to shared values and principles; domestic legitimation of decision processes and priorities relating to external policy; the ability to identify policy priorities and formulate consistent and coherent policies; and the availability of, and capacity to utilise, policy instruments (diplomacy, economic tools and military means). Their focus on opportunity, presence and capability, also referred to in the theoretical chapter is also noteworthy here, The authors define opportunity as ‘the external environment of ideas and events – the context which frames and shapes EU action or inaction’, focusing on the rules, structures of power and perceptions, as elements defining this context. (…) Following this line, their understanding of presence as ‘the ability of the EU, by virtue of its existence, to exert influence beyond its borders’, focuses on the nature of the EU’s ‘existence’ and how the EU presents itself to the world and with what goals in mind. Capabilities are addressed by the authors both in terms of the domestic coherence, consistency, and availability of policy instruments, but evidencing a particular concern with the issue of the ‘external perceptions of the EU’s ability and willingness to act externally, hence linking capability with both presence and opportunity’. (Simão, in this book)

Much of the literature on the EU portrays it as a regional power whose ability for external projection weakens as geographical distance away from the EU increases (Börzel & Risse, 2012; Lavenex, 2011), whereas others argue that the EU possesses a ‘range of effective civilian instruments for projecting international influence that is unmatched by any country’ (Moravcsik, 2010). Others, like Orbie, even suggest that the widespread malaise in intra-EU politics which has emerged in the past few years, has to some extent, served to ‘increase the interest and attention in the

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Union’s international activities and its capacity to project itself as a strong player in the international arena’ (2016, p. 1). Drawing on these approaches and perceptions and looking back specifically at the EU’s evolution in the humanitarian realm, one can affirm that one way the EU has asserted and consolidated its actorness and capabilities in this area was by broadening its definition of humanitarian assistance. In fact, and despite the various principles and guidelines of classic humanitarianism which were incorporated in, and assumed by the EU, its humanitarian aid framework, the EU was not immune to the significant conceptual and empirical changes that took place at the international level in relation to the place and role of humanitarian action in face of new security challenges and complex emergencies, after the end of the Cold War, and which conflated in the so-called new humanitarianism. Given the changes in violent conflict and post-violent conflict circumstances, the traditional objectives of saving lives and relieving human suffering became questioned in their impact (Anderson, 1999). The so-called new humanitarianism, which emerged as a response to this criticism, claimed broader and longer-term objectives for humanitarian action, such as development and peace (Duffield, 2001). Overall, the occurrence of the so-called complex humanitarian emergencies made it clear that traditional responses based on the classical principles of impartiality and neutrality could no longer effectively or sufficiently respond to such complex needs. A clearer analysis of the contexts was defended, seeking a combination between the immediate needs and future development, reinforcement of local services and structures, empowerment, participation and enhancement of the populations’ capacities, human rights promotion and protection and contribution to peacebuilding (Fox, 2001, p. 276; Macrae & Leader, 2001, p. 25; Nascimento, 2015). In fact, most humanitarian crises after the end of the Cold War were related to situations of violent conflict which somehow explained and justified the increasing link and merge between the humanitarian and security agendas (Duffield, 2001; Versluys, 2007, p. 6) and the calls for a more integrated intervention approach to account for the multifaceted nature of internal conflicts and humanitarian action (Nascimento, 2015). In sum, the recognition of new types of crises and emergencies, of a more complex nature and which result from political action and the enlargement of the concept of security, much more human-centred and with political, economic and social dimensions alongside the traditional physical one (Versluys, 2007) help explaining the broadening of objectives

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and also the positioning of many international actors involved in this field, namely the EU through ECHO. This adaptation enabled the EU to adopt a broader definition of humanitarian assistance, used also for conflict prevention, as ‘actions undertaken over the short-term to reduce manifest tensions and to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict’ (Bayne, 2003). By enlarging this definition, although sticking to its fundamental principles of action, the EU also aimed at increasing its capability in this field by making decisions regarding provision of emergency assistance to a broader range of conditions, including emergency relief to disaster victims and assisting refugees (Ravichandran, 2011). As a result of these changes and adaptations, humanitarian action was incorporated in the broader EU’s crises response apparatus and mechanisms, contributing to enlarging its civilian capabilities in the face of violent conflict and other types of crises and security threats, also leading to the promotion of a so-called Comprehensive Approach within the EU’s crisis response apparatus, aimed thus at providing a more systematic definition and implementation of a coherent strategy for crises management and prevention (Dany, 2014, p. 10). This would ultimately and ideally result in the improvement of the various crises response mechanisms and instruments by ‘spanning the diplomatic, security, defence, financial, trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid fields’ (Dany, 2014, p. 10; European Commission/High Representative, 2013). However, this has not been a linear nor a consensual proposal. In fact, most non-governmental organisations (NGOs) linked to EU’s humanitarian aid in the field and who are the direct implementers of most of ECHO’s aid, strongly believe(d) that this move could be counterproductive for humanitarian goals since it could undermine the established principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality (Dany, 2014, p. 12). From the EU’s side, and despite its adherence to fundamental principles of humanitarian action which affirm that the sole aim of humanitarian action is to prevent or relieve human suffering without any sort of discrimination and without being guided by, or subject to, political considerations, one can definitely identify an attempt to approach the relief-development-security nexus within its broader crises response apparatus and mechanisms particularly after the mid-1990s (Versluys, 2007, p. 8). An analysis of some of the fundamental EU documents and regulations concerning humanitarian action shows this quite clearly. For example, the 1996 Council Regulation on Humanitarian Aid broadens the concept of

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humanitarian aid by going beyond emergency aid and including rehabilitation tasks thus bridging the gap between short-term emergency aid and long-term development aid (Versluys, 2007, p. 8). Also, in 1999, there was intense discussion within the EU on the possible extension of the role of ECHO to include development goals as a result of an evaluation that concluded that sustainability of ECHO’s work was limited. This evaluation was in line with the previous analysis, since it focused on the possible—and for some, desirable—long-term impact of ECHO’s work way beyond humanitarian relief. In this context, a few solutions were suggested: one was to limit ECHO’s role to emergency and humanitarian relief, maintaining its initial focus; another suggested the explicit extension of mandate to include operations that would mix relief with developmental goals; a third one was to create an additional EC structure that would deal with these broader goals. At the end, most Member States agreed that ECHO should maintain its original focus and concentrate solely on short-term humanitarian relief (Brusset & Tiberghien, 2002, p. 59 apud Versluys, 2007, p. 9). But most importantly, what also resulted from this discussion on the EU’s humanitarian aid impact in terms of broader crises response and influence was a clearer concern for the creation of the necessary conditions to promote smoother transitions from humanitarian assistance towards rehabilitation and development aid. However, as Versluys argues, this would entail committing more resources to both ECHO and ActionAid than the EC actually does. According to this author, most of the work and results achieved in terms of linking relief and development in crisis and post-violent conflict situations is mostly due to ECHO’s capacity to extend its own action to other areas and goals (Versluys, 2007, p. 9). Also, when it comes to the specific interrelations between humanitarian assistance and crises mechanisms of a more military nature, some interesting developments in terms of reinforcing EU’s capacity in this area have occurred. Most prominently, the creation of the EEAS in 2010 which, in turn, established a new Crisis Response Department to help reinforce its crises response capacity (Brattberg, 2013), namely in its humanitarian dimension. Additionally, ‘the new Crisis Platform put forward also suggested an increased integration between disaster response/humanitarian assistance activities and the CSDP instrument during future crises situations’ (Brattberg, 2013, p. 9). Nevertheless, this

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merge of CSDP instruments with aid for disaster prevention and interlinkage of elements of CSDP that go hand in hand with providing humanitarian aid to affected countries resulted in two different approaches to this relation. On the one hand, the EU often resorted to humanitarian aid as a way to compensate for the lack of a consensually and coherently established CDSP, allowing it to more actively, and often exclusively, intervene in many crisis scenarios through other crisis response tools and mechanisms, particularly through ECHO’s presence and activities (Versluys, 2007, p. 11). To some extent, this would allow a reinforcement of EU’s humanitarian role as these activities implemented specifically by NGOs linked to ECHO are usually less controversial and better accepted. Although CSDP missions are mostly defined to prevent and address violent conflicts, the combination of more military elements with civilian and humanitarian ones could actually contribute to more effective and sustainable responses to the most urgent humanitarian crises. This would also contribute to a more rapid and effective delivery of aid even in situations of natural disasters. The argument here is that the combination of certain elements of CSDP with humanitarian action could increase EU’s external legitimacy (Ravichandran, 2011) and improve its external image as a relevant security actor at the global level, reinforcing both its preventive and reactive capabilities in face of humanitarian crises. Another relevant development for this discussion was the creation of the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) in 2000 which aimed at responding to reconstruction objectives in former Yugoslavia, namely Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. Even though these developments could demonstrate an increased interlinkage between humanitarian action and other types of crises response mechanisms, the definition of specific instruments within CSDP contributed to a certain limitation of the use of ECHO’s work as a tool to prevent or respond to crisis. Therefore, and although underlying the importance of an integrated response to such emergencies and crises, the EC has made it clear that it is also crucial that the different mandates of humanitarian, development, civil protection and military instruments are preserved and respected, emphasising that coherence should not undermine or negatively affect the operational conditions to allow neutral, impartial and non-discriminatory humanitarian aid (European Commission, 2005, p. 9). According to Pontiroli et al., “through ECHO, it has been possible to define and implement a number of measures and principles aimed at distinguishing between EU humanitarian aid and wider political and military effort” in

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EU’s policies and practices (Pontiroli et al., 2013), thus contributing to the creation of conditions for other mechanisms and instruments to be put in place and render more sustainable and legitimate the overall EU action in crisis response. Also, the allocation and amount of resources channelled through ECHO are protected from Member States’ more selfserving interests, which might lead them to devote all humanitarian funds to high-profile crises allowing for donor visibility, or to allocate humanitarian resources on the basis of security considerations or historical ties4 (Versluys, 2008, p. 214). From the evolution of the specific humanitarian action dimension, and as mentioned in the book’s theoretical chapter, EU actorness can be said to be closely linked, not only to the institutional setting of the EU, but also to the external impulses in the global context, aggregating issues related to internal legitimacy and institutional capabilities, as well as to external recognition, attractiveness and global presence. Of importance is also the consideration of how this action and presence is perceived by European citizens. According to the 2017 Eurobarometer survey, asking what European citizens thought about EU humanitarian aid: over 7 out of 10 citizens were aware of EU funds to humanitarian aid activities, almost 9 out of 10 citizens thought EU-funded humanitarian aid is important and 66% agreed that EU humanitarian aid is more efficient than individual countries acting separately (Eurobarometer, 2017). This is, overall, a very positive image of the EU’s humanitarian apparatus in place, confirming its capacity not only to be present in this arena, but more importantly, to be perceived as a legitimate and important international humanitarian actor.

Haiti as an Illustration From the various crisis situations where ECHO has been active in, Haiti is, in our view, probably one of the most illustrative and interesting cases in terms of the EU’s enactment of actorness in the humanitarian realm. Haiti has in the past decades lived through a particularly complex situation concerning its stability, security and development, mainly due to extreme and structural poverty, environmental degradation and violence 4 To a certain degree, ECHO is free to allocate resources to areas facing the most acute humanitarian needs, rather than having to follow the foreign policy-oriented agenda of the CFS (Versluys, 2008, p. 214).

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related to high political instability, factors that have justified a significant international presence, namely through the various phases of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). On January 12, 2010, an earthquake further devastated the country, almost wiping out the capital Port-au-Prince and its surrounding areas, which increased the emergency complexity in an already difficult political, economic and social situation. This fragile context resulted in the reinforcement of MINUSTAH’s contingent in the country as well as in an enlargement of its mandate in order to support the reconstruction and stabilisation of the country. This was set in motion through the attribution of special tasks in an effort to assure humanitarian capacity for recovery and of joint planning among the various actors in the field (Goulart & Costa, 2013, p. 68). It also sought to promote the intervention of a significant number of other international actors in the country, from humanitarian and development non-governmental organisations to major international organisations, such as the EU. The 2010 earthquake triggered a massive response from the international community, including European countries, mostly at the humanitarian level. It is important to underline that the post-2010 intervention in Haiti by European states individually and by the EU as an international actor took place in a distinct context from other EU intervention contexts, be them a result of natural catastrophes or of violent conflicts. This particular intervention context was characterised by the fact that not only the Haitian population was a victim of the earthquake, but also the international missions’ staff and infrastructures in the country themselves were victims in this context.5 The EU’s response was indeed massive and quite fast, allocating around 100 million euros to finance projects in essential areas such as health (10.5%), accommodation (31%), water and sanitation (21%), nutrition and food assistance (20%), protection (2.5%) and disaster risk reduction (8%), which resulted in improving around 4 million people’s lives (ECHO, 2012). This aggregated intervention was criticised by the lack of European coordination in managing the assistance, particularly due to the fact that various European countries had also separately sent national teams and missions (European Council on Foreign Relations,

5 This is an important aspect to take into account, since the international presence in Haiti had been mainly associated with the United Nations, and only after 2010 were the European countries and the EU able to contribute more significantly.

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2010). However, one has to acknowledge that this situation was overcome very quickly, with the 24 EU Member States present in Haiti and Norway’s decision to transfer coordination of all their activities in the field through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (ECFR, 2010). In this particular case, one can identify an alignment of objectives triggered by the acute humanitarian concerns which created the opportunity to coordinate the individual presence and intervention of Member States, collectively, at the EU level and also of the Member States within the UN. The initial lack of coordination was quickly followed by an exercise of readaptation of the various areas and means of intervention of the different EU actors and ended up contributing to the creation of a Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department in December 2010 and of the Crisis Platform in 2016, which was meant to ideally evaluate the type of required responses and respective coordination mechanisms and procedures in similar future situations. The need and space opened for a response based on the humanitarian imperative, which underlines ECHO’s functioning and mandate in the face of humanitarian crises of such a dimension. This worked as a legitimising element in this frame of action and rendered clear the predominantly reactive nature of such interventions, without being anchored and/or dependent of any pre-established decision-making mechanisms. It was, to some extent, an anti-political response mostly given the equally non-political nature of ECHO’s action whose underlying principles are very much based on classic humanitarianism i.e. independence, humanity, neutrality and impartiality. At this level, a study in 2006 did conclude that ECHO is ‘neither formally guided by, nor subject to, any foreign policy when managing the implementation of humanitarian aid’, thus allowing it to ‘act throughout the world, including in many regions where there are underfunded crises, or so-called “forgotten” crises – regions and situations’ (Daldrup et al., 2006; Dany, 2015, pp. 423–424). Furthermore, the capacity to manage failures and contradictions was also present in EU’s approach and action in Haiti, attempting to rapidly overcome the more negative image of an uncoordinated actor in its initial phase, opening space for other collaborations aimed at being more effective. Here, again, ECHO presented itself as an essential umbrella for the intended coordination among all intervention areas and actors, including humanitarian action, civil protection and post-crises reconstruction. In this sense, Bretherton and Vogler’s approach to actorness (2006) is again of particular relevance and pertinence here, especially when

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they refer to the fundamental role played by opportunity in shaping the outcome of the EU’s external actorness, rendering clear that the ability of the EU to be a relevant international actor rests not only on the internal capabilities to exercise power, but also on the opportunity to do so and on the recognition by others of its instruments of action.

Conclusion In line with the previous analysis, one can affirm that despite the various interlinkages and evolution within the EU in its broad and enlarging crises response apparatus, humanitarian action has remained a fundamental dimension of EU’s external action, and that various efforts have been made not to undermine and challenge its continuity and (desirable) effectiveness as a neutral and impartial form of assistance in crises situations. This EU dimension, which in our view adds to its actorness, has been increasingly consolidated since the creation of ECHO in 1992 and materialised in the significant amounts of aid channelled for that purpose, rendering the EU one of the world’s largest humanitarian donors. In fact, the creation of ECHO opened a window of opportunity for the EU to assume a more prominent international role through non-military means. European initiatives in the field of humanitarian aid have thus come to be seen as ‘symbolic politics’ (Olsen, 2004, p. 85), allowing the Union to assert its identity—and especially its civilian power image—on the international scene (Versluys, 2016). The apolitical character of humanitarian aid is thus very much cultivated by the EC as it is viewed as one of the main vehicles for safeguarding access to crises’ victims and the security of humanitarian aid workers. In this sense, and in line with what is established in the Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, it is particularly important that the EU clearly distinguishes, both in its policies and practices, humanitarian aid from other crisis response tools, especially where different initiatives coexist. This will ensure that EU’s humanitarian aid will not be seen as part of, or aligned with, EU political, military and development action (Pontiroli et al., 2013). Assuring a united and effective presence within the sphere of humanitarian action, development aid and/or crises response, facilitating a more cohesive relation between the various actors and decision-making levels involved, still requires a clearer and more coherent stance in terms

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of what is the role, place and responsibility of the various actors and institutions involved, and what is their added-value in terms of rendering humanitarian action a more effective, influential and sustainable mechanism in face of complex humanitarian emergencies which pose a threat to international peace and security. Still, and by focusing on the humanitarian dimension of its external action and projection, one can thus argue that despite some still existing limitations and problems in terms of clarifying exactly where, when and with whom it should act and intervene, ECHO has managed to come clean in terms of its commitment to the provision of neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian aid, aimed at, also through such dimension, helping the EU to affirm itself as a relevant actor in an ever more complex international peace and security realm. Acknowledgements The author would like to acknowledge that research leading to these results has received funding from the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Innovative Training Networks (ITN-ETN) of the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program, under grant agreement CASPIAN— Around the Caspian: a Doctoral Training for Future Experts in Development and Cooperation with Focus on the Caspian Region (642709—CASPIAN—H2020MSCA-ITN-2014). The author would also like to acknowledge the support granted by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology under its Strategic Project (UID/SOC750012/2019).

References A.D.E., & King’s College London. (2014). Evaluation of the implementation of the European consensus on humanitarian aid, Contract No ECHO/ADM/BUD/2013/01203. Retrieved October 7, 2019, from https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2014/european_consensus_ main_en.pdf Anderson, M. B. (1999). Do no harm: How can aid support peace—Or war. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Bayne, S. (2003). Conflict prevention and the EU: From rhetoric to practice. In BOND, Europe in the world essays on EU foreign, security and development policies (pp. 19–30). British Overseas NGOs for Development. Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2012). From Europeanisation to diffusion; introduction. West European Politics, 35(1), 1–19.

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Brattberg, E. (2013). Doing well by doing good: The role of humanitarian aid in Europe’s global strategy. UIBrief . Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI). Bretherton, C., & Vogler, J. (2006). The European Union as global actor (2nd ed.). Routledge. Bretherton, C., & Vogler, J. (2013). A global actor past its peak? International Relations, 27 (3), 375–390. Brusset, E., & Tiberghien, C. (2002). Trends and risks in humanitarian action. In J. Macrae (Ed.), The new humanitarianism: A review of trends in global humanitarian action (pp. 51–62). Overseas Development Institute. Daldrup, U., Grünewald, F., Maij-Weggen, H. R. H., & White, G. (2006). Evaluation of the European Commission’s directorate general for humanitarian aid (DG ECHO) 2000–2005, 2. Retrieved October 7, 2019, from ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2006/dg_echo.pdf Dany, C. (2014). Beyond principles vs. politics: Humanitarian aid in the European Union (ARENA Working Paper 11). ARENA Centre for European Studies. Dany, C. (2015). Politicization of humanitarian aid in the European Union. European Foreign Affairs Review, 20(3), 419–438. Duffield, M. (2001). Global governance and the new wars, the merging of development and security. Zed Books. ECHO. (2006). Financial Report 2006. European Commission. ECHO. (2012). Two years of the European Commission’s humanitarian aid and civil protection response in Haiti: Two years after the earthquake. European Commission. ECHO. (2019). Funding for humanitarian aid, ECHO website. Retrieved October 7, 2019, from http://ec.europa.eu/echo/funding-evaluations/fun ding-for-humanitarian-aid_en Eurobarometer. (2017). Special Eurobarometer 453, Report Humanitarian Aid. Brussels. European Commission. (1996). Council regulation concerning humanitarian aid, 1257/96 (20 of June). OJ L, 163, 1–6. European Commission. (2005). Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘Reinforcing EU disaster and crisis response in third countries’, COM (2005) 153 final. European Commission. (2007). Towards a European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, COM (2007) 317 final. European Commission. Brussels. Retrieved October 7, 2019, from https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/consensus/ acte_en.pdf European Commission/High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (2013). The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crisis, JOIN (2013) 30 final. Brussels.

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European Council. (1996). Regulation (EC) No. 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 on humanitarian aid. Official Journal of the European Union, L 163, 02/07/1996, pp. 1–6. European Council. (2008). The European consensus on humanitarian aid, para. 10 (30 January 2008). Retrieved October 7, 2019, from www.eur-lex.europa. eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:025:0001:0012:EN:PDF European Council for Foreign Relations. (2010). 57 – Response to the earthquake in Haiti, European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2010. European Parliament. (2010). Report on implementation of the European Consensus on humanitarian aid: The mid-term review of its action plan and the way forward, A7-0375/2010, 6–7. Retrieved October 7, 2019, from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-// EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2010-0375+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN European Union External Action. (2016). Crisis platform. Retrieved October 7, 2019, from http://eeas.europa.eu/crisisresponse/what-we-do/crisis-pla tform/index_en.htm Fox, F. (2001). A new humanitarianism: A new morality for the 21st century? Disasters, 25(4), 275–289. Goulart, S., & Prado da Costa, R. (2013). International cooperation in Haiti: Organization for what? Revista Brasileira De Estudos Latino-Americanos, 3(1), 65–102. Hettne, B. (2011). The European Union as an emerging global actor. In J. U. Wunderlich & D. J. Bailey (Eds.), The European Union and global governance: A handbook. Routledge. Hill, C. (1990). European Foreign Policy: Power bloc, civilian model—Or flop. In R. Rummel (Ed.), The evolution of an international actor: Western Europe’s new assertiveness. Westview Press. Howorth, J. (2005). From security to defence: The evolution of the CFSP. In C. Hill & M. Smith (Eds.), International relations and the European Union. Oxford University Press. Lavenex, S. (2011). Concentric circles of flexible European integration: A typology of EU external governance relations. Comparative European Politics, 90(4/5), 372–393. Macrae, J., & Leader, N. (2001). Apples, pears and porridge: The origins and impact of the search for ‘coherence’ between humanitarian and political responses to chronic political emergencies. Disasters, 25(4), 290–307. Manners, I. (2002). Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms? Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2), 235–258. Moravcsik, A. (2010). Europe, the second superpower. Current History, 109(725), 91–98.

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Nascimento, D. (2015). One step forward, two steps back? Humanitarian challenges and dilemmas in crisis settings. Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. Retrieved October 7, 2019, from https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/2126 Olsen, G. R. (2004). Changing European concerns: Security and complex political emergencies instead of development. In K. Arts & A. K. Dickson (Eds.), EU Development cooperation: From model to symbol? (pp. 80–100). Manchester: Manchester University Press. Orbie, J. (Ed.). (2016). Europe’s global role: External policies of the European Union. Routledge. Orbie, J., Elsuwege, P., & Bossuyt, F. (2014). Humanitarian aid as an integral part of the European Union’s external action: The challenge of reconciling coherence and independence. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 2(3), 158–165. Pirozzi, N. (2013). The EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management. DCAF. Pontiroli, A., Ponthiew, A., & Derderian, K. (2013). Loosing principles in the search for coherence? A field-based viewpoint on the EU and humanitarian aid. Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. Retrieved July 3, 2021, from https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/2010 Ravichandran, S. (2011). The European Union actorness and presence in humanitarian assistance affairs. E-International Relations. Retrieved May 30, 2019, from http://www.e-ir.info/2011/08/24/the-european-union%E2%80%99sactorness-and-presence-in-humanitarian-assistance-affairs/ Sjöstedt, G. (1977). The external role of the European Community. Saxon House. Tèlo, M. (2007). Europe: A civilian power? European Union, global governance, world order. Palgrave Macmillan. Tercovitch, G. (2014). The EEAS crisis response system. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 22(3), 150–157. TFEU. (2012, October 26). Consolidated version of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union. Official Journal of the European Union, 326, 47–199. Versluys, H. (2007). Coherence in EU external action: The case of humanitarian action, UNSPECIFIED, Montreal, Canada (Unpublished). Retrieved September 18, 2019, from http://aei.pitt.edu/8057/1/versluys-h-05g.pdf Versluys, H. (2008). Depoliticising and Europeanising humanitarian aid: Success or failure? Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 9(2), 208–224. Versluys, H. (2016). European Union humanitarian aid: Lifesaver or political tool? In J. Orbie (Ed.), Europe’s global role: External policies of the European Union (pp. 91–116). Routledge. Zwolski, K. (2012). The EU as an international security actor after Lisbon: Finally a green light for a holistic approach? Cooperation and Conflict, 47 (1), 8–87.

CHAPTER 6

Taking Its Rightful Place? Legitimising Discourse and EU Actorness in the Nexus of Trade and Regulation Elitsa Garnizova

Introduction In April 2018, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) sent an unequivocal message to global leaders that “strong trade growth in 2018 rests on policy choices” (World Trade Organisation, 2018). In June 2019, it pronounced that the slow trade growth of 2018 has persisted in the following year (World Trade Organisation, 2019). The statements highlight the negative effects of anti-trade sentiments, increased uncertainty

This chapter draws on some of the data analysed in Garnizova (2018). The chapter does not reflect on the changes brought about by the Covid-19 crisis. E. Garnizova (B) London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. R. Freire et al. (eds.), EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92997-8_6

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and higher tariffs as well as the lack of willingness by governments to tame the wide range of protectionist measures. While the news cycle was quick to profess this as the result of the United States of America (USA)—China trade conflict, multiple governments across different regions make use of different trade and non-trade barriers, going much beyond the more obvious tariff measures. Thus while significantly contributing to global trade slowdown, trade tensions are not solely to be blamed. Non-tariff measures and regulatory issues, albeit not new, are an important focus of the global economic context. Trade protectionism was not the cause of the Global Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis but the consensus around trade domestically and multilaterally suffered substantially. The European Union (EU), instead, used the opportunity to position itself as a firm protector of the rules-based global trading order. As former Trade Commissioner, Cecilia Malmström, stated during the unveiling of the trade package of the 2017 State of the Union: The world needs leaders in trade. The EU continues to champion free and fair trade, at the forefront of a group of like-minded countries. Today’s package of proposals shows this leadership in action. (European Commission, 2017a)

The need for leadership is situated in a context defined both by a fragile consensus on the political goals, which need to guide EU trade policy, as well as by a receding normative consensus on the value of free trade and the value of the WTO. The statement highlights the linkages between internal and external dynamics, where EU actorness depends on internal capabilities but also on opportunity and recognition. While the chapter chronologically focuses on the speeches up to the fall of 2017, EU actorness in trade and its discourse have been challenged in 2018 and 2019 within the scope of the renewed negotiations with the United States of America. In particular, as the European Parliament (EP) was split over expressing support for the negotiations with the USA, Member States in the Council voted hesitantly for the opening of negotiations. As Evenett (2019) observes the approach of the European Commission to the USA has resembled “a tactic to buy time” rather than an effective strategy to change the course of President Trump’s policies. Further studies are needed to explore EU actorness vis-à-vis the USA under the different administrations.

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Instead this chapter engages with debates on the EU actorness in a regional and global context by analysing the purpose and legitimacy of the EU in trade policy, particularly in the period between the launch of the Market Access Strategy (MAS, 1996) to the suspension of the negotiations with the USA (2017). Since the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) is one of the oldest remits of the EU and it falls under the Union’s exclusive competencies, it is often expected that the EU will be an assertive actor in trade and trade-related issues vis-à-vis third countries (Garnizova, 2018). While it speaks with one voice in international organisations and has been proclaimed the champion of the “rules-based order” in trade (The Economist, 2018), its ability to set the rules, export the Acquis Communautaire, and act as demandeur—its actorness—varies with its purpose and context. What the chapter shows is how ideas about the EU shape what agents consider to be the ultimate purpose of trade policy and how this is reflected in policymakers’ talk. In turn, in the period reviewed, we have an extension of purpose of trade policy towards achieving regulatory reform and regulatory standards. The overextension is both necessitated and made easier in a changing global context with the challenges of globalisation, technology, and geopolitics. Finally, we illustrate how the meanings and representations used to define the EU’s purpose are contested, challenging EU’s legitimacy. We highlight the social construction of actorness, where agency and structure are tangled in a mutually constitutive relationship and where ˇ internal and external factors interact (see Cmakalová and Rolenc [2012] and Vogler and Bretherthon [2006]). Thus, the EU actorness depends on the ways it conceptualises itself (its purpose) and its means (instruments) within a fluid global context, which at different times has varied in its attitude to trade liberalisation. How the EU sees itself in the global economy is particularly important for its purpose in an increasingly globalised world. In strategic documents, the Commission defines globalisation in terms of its changing pace and dimensions (e.g. technological change and knowledge components), in terms of the “force for change” spurred by the increased opportunities for global trade, and its challenges. On the one hand, bringing in technology into the trade policy discourse acts as a tool to reshape the discourse by moving away from the disruptions from globalisation to the disruptions from technology. In this way the two become interlinked, providing a range of instruments

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that the EU can use to address such a challenge. On the other hand, the focus on technology also has a role to play vis-à-vis EU actorness and even leadership when it comes to promoting multilateral cooperation. Global supply chains and the data economy produce opportunities for digital technologies and e-commerce among other areas, where the EU can shape the global rulebook. It is still unclear to what extent the EU can be a leader in those areas versus being caught in-between the USA and China. While trade policy can be seen as the most likely case for the EU to have presence, opportunity, and recognition, the extension of the trade policy regime to cover regulatory matters has raised important issues on the legitimacy of EU trade policymaking. When we look at legitimacy as the “capacity to advance and manage purpose” (Chapter 1 in this book), it becomes clear that differences in understanding the ultimate purpose of trade can cause problems with legitimacy. The EU itself has seen a change in its purpose as an natural extension but other actors within the EU have perceived this an overextension of its purpose over the domestic regulatory realm, for which a different set of processes must be followed (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2018). We use a constructivist approach drawing on discourse analysis of primarily EU Commission documents and speeches of Trade Commissioners. The methodology used aims to capture how policymakers invoke certain rationales and justification for action. This entails responding to the question how different trade policies are legitimised, which is broken down in three steps (Dunn & Neumann, 2016): locating the limits of certain discourses vis-à-vis EU’s own purpose and instruments; identify the representations, which are used to understand legitimacy; understand how the representations change over time (Garnizova, 2018). Thus, the chapter highlights how the EU mobilises discourse about its role in the world to promote legitimacy internally and externally.

EU Actorness in Trade and Regulation The theoretical framework to this book highlighted that the literature on actorness uses recognition, effectiveness, and reach of the EU as the key components to understand the objectives and legitimacy of the EU (Bretherton & Vogler, 2005; Niemann & Bretherthon, 2014). The questions, which we tackle here, are: how purpose is defined in trade policy

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and how purpose is constituted in both the internal and external levels of legitimation. ˇ Starting from the social construction of actorness (Cmakalová & Rolenc, 2012; Vogler & Bretherthon, 2006), legitimacy can be conceptualised as a core criterion for EU actorness. Legitimacy was already one of the prerequisites in Sjöstedt (1977), defined as the “domestic legitimation of decision processes and priorities relating to external policy” (in Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). It also features in Bretherton and Vogler’s framework as an internal capability required for EU actorness (2006, p. 30). Others look at legitimacy in the external dimension of EU policy, where Rosamond (2005), for example, argues about “legitimate presence” while Damro (2010) highlighted that the EU’s identity can be best understood as a market. Kratochvil et al., (2011, p. 398) deem the EU as a framing actor, having “the ability to influence the Member States in matters of their and the EU’s external policies”. Rather than looking at Member States exclusively, we expand this to the broader group of interests—both those of business and business associations, of civil society organisations (CSOs), and of citizens overall. The conditions for framing to be successful are for: (1) debates on trade policy to recognise the EU as the main actor; (2) societal actors to react to the same events; and (3) for these actors to consider the same options—as inspired by the framing of the Commission (Kratochvil et al., 2011). These aspects bring front and centre the role of ideas in influencing what agents consider to be the ultimate purpose of trade policy. The way that the EU conceptualises itself and its means have implications for its legitimacy. The analytical focus is thus on the communicative discourse1 of the European Commission on trade regulation and the role of trade policy. This entails understanding the dominant discourses in the EU i.e. those discourses which “predominantly determine the use of language and hence promote certain meanings” in the speeches and documents analysed (Larsen, 2002). The analysis looks at whether there are particular kinds of rationales and justifications, which dominate EU documents, keeping in mind the broader political and economic context. 1 Schmidt provides a differentiation between different types of interactive processes where actors are “engaged in ‘coordinative’ discourse of policy construction, and political actors engaged with the public in ‘communicative’ discourse of deliberation, contestation, and legitimisation” (Schmidt, 2017, 2011).

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Recent contributions in International Political Economy provide a support for such an approach since a number of authors have identified that ideas matter in the way that they shape means-ends relationships (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2018; Siles-Brügge, 2014; Woll, 2008; Woll & Artigas, 2007). In their study of the role of legitimising discourse, De Ville and Siles-Brügge (2018) highlight six variants of trade policy paradigms,2 which guide both the goals and the instruments of trade policy. What they found is a dominance of the free trade paradigm, which they define in terms of the means (liberalisation) and ends (economic welfare). They also analysed how the EU Commission drew on alternative paradigms such as “the idea of ‘fair trade’ – establishing a level playing field in the international trading system – and ‘embedded liberalism’ – providing sufficient policy space for pursuing domestic policy goals”, as well as “trade as foreign policy” (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2018, p. 258). In this chapter, we focus particularly on how the expansion of trade policy to the areas of non-tariff measures and regulatory barriers has changed the definitions of free trade and protectionism. Such additions extended the purpose of trade policy to the “internationalisation of regulatory regimes in order to facilitate trade and trans border operations” and means such as “regulatory reform or creation of regulatory standards” (Woll, 2008). These ends-means relationships, initially conceived for the multilateral trade negotiations, have been extended to the logic of the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Returning to the pre-conditions set out by Kratochvil et al., the Commission is recognised as the main actor in negotiating trade agreements and it actively engages with societal actors. Internally, societal actors have criticised the EU for doing an “imperial stretching” of trade over domestic regulation, resulting in a strong internal contestation on whether FTAs are the most appropriate tool to address such issues (BEUC, 2017). What we do in the next section is to first define the purpose and instruments of EU trade policy, and then trace how these meanings and representations are used to legitimise the specific shape of trade agreements. The period covered is from the MAS (1996), culminating with the

2 Mercantilism, Free Trade, Listian (neo-mercantilism), Embedded liberalism, Fair Trade, Trade as Foreign Policy (De Ville & Siles-Brügge 2018, pp. 244–245).

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negotiations on free trade agreements with Canada (2009–2016),3 USA (2013–),4 and Japan (2013–2017)5 as a way to shape global standards and be the rule-maker of the twenty-first century.

Definition of Purpose in Trade As the theoretical chapter outlined, the European Union has often struggled in clearly defining its purpose. In trade policy, the Union is characterised by a “liberal aspiration”, which is enshrined in Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome. At the onset, the role of trade policy was to promote trade between Member States in view of developments in conditions of competition within the Union and the need to eschew disturbances in their economies (ex. Article 27 TEC; para. a &b.). Thus, from the Treaty of Rome, trade policy was conceived as an instrument to support the internal market and the competitiveness of Member States in the world economy. The Single European Act (1986) provided a “leap in the scope of EU trade policymaking”, where the dynamics in the internal market were paralleled with the expansion of the CCP (Holmes, 2006; Reiter, 2012, p. 444). The European Court of Justice stepped in this debate a number of times, but particularly with its Opinion 1/94 where the Court dismissed the premise that Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) agreements are outside the scope of Article 113 (Court of Justice of the European Union 1994). The conclusions delineated that the purpose of the Common Commercial Policy is trade facilitation rather than harmonisation of standards. The 2007 review of the Single Market asserted that the EU has developed “a modern and innovative regulatory and supervisory framework, with the EU being looked upon as the global standard-setter” thus

3 Dates listed in brackets reflect the official launch and the signature of the agreement. The EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) provisionally entered into force on 21 September 2017. 4 Negotiations over the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership were suspended after Donald Trump’s inauguration in early 2017. In 2019, both the EU and the USA published negotiating directives for re-launching negotiations over EU-USA agreement. 5 The EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement entered into force on 1 February 2019.

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developing a comprehensive approach towards regulatory cooperation, convergence of standards, and equivalence of rules (European Commission, 2007). The Treaty of Lisbon broadened the scope of the CCP, reflecting both the external dynamics and also internal drive for more comprehensive bilateral agreements through Article 207(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The position of EU trade policy within the external agenda was very important. The relevance of the historical evolution of the CCP is the way in which it is used as a justification for the critical importance and centrality of liberalisation to EU integration. Commissioners have noted at different occasions the centrality of trade policy to the European Union as well as the “revolutionary” nature of the Single Market in its advancement of regulatory cooperation (De Gucht, 2010, 2013). Commissioner De Gucht even underlined how “the ‘progressive abolition of restrictions to international trade’ is a constitutional objective of the European Union under the Treaty of Lisbon” (De Gucht, 2014). This understanding, that the progressive abolition of restrictions forms the core of the CCP allows for the mobilisation of different actors around the same purpose, as well as makes space for the use of different instruments to achieve these goals (Garnizova, 2018). Since the launch of the Global Europe Strategy (2006), the European Commission puts the explicit economic logic behind FTA negotiations through assessing the scale of a potential market by the scale of barriers. The purpose behind this was to target the largest market access potential. This purpose came hand in hand with the need to ensure enhanced cooperation with top trading partners. While the instrument remained undefined in scope, the justification for the use of enhanced cooperation was the lack of progress on the multilateral level as well as the need to address regulatory issues. The persistent idea that the EU has not been able to fight barriers in third countries has prompted not only the use of multiple tools and the emergence of regulatory cooperation, but also the introduction/reinvigoration of initiatives to enable the Commission to seek better reciprocity/level-playing field and leverage (Garnizova, 2018).6 In relation to these instruments, Commissioner for Trade, Cecilia Malmström,

6 Examples are the International Procurement Instrument and the Framework for Screening of Foreign Direct Investment (European Commission, 2017a).

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highlighted that “[g]lobal trade is one of our fundamental economic freedoms” (Malmström, 2018). Such instruments are meant to highlight that the EU, while a free trader, is not naïve and also that the Commission is responding to concerns of Member States. Since then enforcement has become a core component of EU trade policy’s purpose. The use of the treaties and frameworks in the Commission’s discourse evokes a strong and clear sense of purpose for EU’s trade policy. The relevance of these frameworks goes beyond their existence but how they are used to highlight the natural progression of EU’s purpose from liberalisation of trade between Member States to global trade as freedom. The discourse is meant to resonate both with EU citizens internally and with global demands since achieving its purpose would allow the EU to be a legitimate global standard-setter, thus taking its rightful place.

Legitimising Discourse on Trade and Regulation The chapter turns to the role of the European Commission’s legitimising discourse or how the EU advances its purpose. In a context of stalled multilateralism, the Commission legitimises free trade agreements with the need to be a rule-setter and to promote global standards, in order to ensure the fairness of globalisation. The legitimising discourse is traced through three peaks: impossibility not to act post-failure at the multilateral round, external competitiveness proofing to act, and securing its place in the world (through global value chains) in the midst of anti-liberalisation sentiments. Each of these is traced below, where we highlight how it advances the EU’s understanding of its purpose and the context. Impossible to Stand Still Up until the Global Europe Strategy (2006), the EU defined its role in trade in terms of the multilateral negotiation context. In the postSeattle crisis (1999), it tried to promote itself as the liberal force behind liberalisation against protectionism, particularly a force, which recognises questions of legitimacy. The Trade Commissioner at the time, Pascal Lamy, challenged the natural extension of the rules governing trade to regulation and urged for stronger recognition of the diverse worldviews shaping regulatory choices. Talking about the contestation surrounding the Seattle Ministerial Conference, Lamy pointed to an explanation in

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the changing substance of trade policy: on “collective preferences” and “administration of protection” versus “administration of precaution” (Lamy, 2000, 2015). He recognised that regulatory issues are “deeply embedded not only in the institutional infrastructure of an economy, but also reflect the collective preferences and moral choices of a society” (Lamy, 2000). His interventions highlighted a moral aspect of regulatory choices which requires “managed globalisation” (European Commission, 1999). Namely that the EU’s purpose cannot be pursued irrespective of the global context and part of being a legitimate actor is to consider the cost of domestic regulation in developed economies on developing countries. In contrast to the recognition of the norms and values behind regulatory choices, the dominant discourse during the period from 1996 to 2006 was that of identifying the effective modes of regulation or even an optimal regulatory process. The idea behind the availability of an optimal regulatory process can be seen as direct link to the EU’s experience as a revolutionary experiment and as a model. In the years between the Market Access Strategy (1996) and the Global Europe Strategy (2006), there was constant attention to the developments in the Doha Development Round but also stronger language by the Commission on its desire to continue with rule setting. In the light of the fact that the link between national law-making and international rules became a key issue of contention in the WTO, the European Commission warned of a growing camp of protectionists, which insisted on the separation between trade and regulation (European Commission, 2001). The extension of the purpose of trade policy from tariff liberalisation towards regulatory reform most broadly had a ripple effect internally. More precisely, there was a double shift in trade policymaking: firstly, a broadening of the definition of a trade barrier and extending trade agreements over regulation, and secondly, provoking the need for the EU to look internally at how its own regulatory choices affect trade (Garnizova, 2018). Example of the debate which unfolded around the link between trade and regulation is the 2005 Market Access Symposium during which participants pondered how conflict between the two can be resolved (European Commission, 2005). One of the takeaways was that: Trade agreements addressing regulatory barriers in third countries were described as the agreements of the future. But this would imply also being

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ready to address any deficiencies in our own internal market before we could proselytise to the outside world. (European Commission, 2005)

The exchange highlights three points: highly competitive sectors in the EU wanted the Commission to deal with “excessive or at least inappropriate regulatory environment” in the third countries and the EU itself; and what constitutes the “perfect” regulatory process (European Commission, 2005). This connection between the internal and external purposes of trade policy has been questioned for its legitimacy in the way that it uses the threat of external competitiveness to promote internal reforms. In this first representation of EU actorness, the EU is acting because it is impossible not to, given the internal and external context. The stalemate at the WTO and the existence of diverse regulatory barriers necessitate the EU to extend its purpose beyond tariff liberalisation through the multilateral setting and into the realm of bilateral agreements and instruments to channel non-tariff measures. It actually used declining consensus externally to take action, which puts it on the course to develop the widest network of FTAs. This action prompted a self-reflection internally on whether there is an optimal regulatory process and how the EU’s own regulatory choices affect trade more widely. We can observe a loop between the extension of its purpose to questioning the legitimacy, where the Commission’s discourse intensifies in the following two representations. External Competitiveness Proofing to Act After the Global Financial Crisis, the EU’s legitimating discourse turned towards reinforcing the need for agreements, which tackle regulatory issues. The Commission mobilised societal actors around the need to promote EU standards and also look more closely onto how it does things internally. Commissioner Ashton early on defined the negotiations with the USA and other like-minded countries as an effort not only to achieve convergence between the two largest markets but also to avoid a situation where other countries would create “their own” standards (Ashton, 2009). The threat of fragmentation resulting from other countries choosing their own standards provides a justification for negotiations with the USA over regulatory issues. Early on regulatory convergence was set out as one of the goals of regulatory cooperation. The purpose set out

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was to achieve cooperation on a global scale where the negotiations with the USA present the opportunity through which the EU can shape such global structures. The tenures of Ashton and De Gucht are also associated with a discourse, which understands the EU’s purpose to reform internally in order to reform externally. Ashton introduced the understanding of negotiations over regulatory issues as a potential towards a “transatlantic market” (Ashton, 2009). The growing discussion on regulatory cooperation was still limited to future obligations and in particular regulatory cooperation as form of “effective early warning system” or a weak form of exchanges (Ashton, 2009). Ashton mobilised a discourse around the possibility for achieving reform by introducing the long-term goal of “market for regulation”. While the focus was on a “transatlantic market”, it had feedback effects on the treatment of regulatory issues in general and the EU’s selfperceived role in particular. The potentiality of a “market for regulation” speaks to two processes: learning through competition and achieving the most efficient regulatory tools. The communicative discourse wanted to legitimatise the market as the locus where good regulation is selected over bad regulation (Garnizova, 2018). This discourse was largely abandoned for other agreements, except for the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, where it reappeared in a much softer form in terms of the potential for learning. The possibility that the EU may explore regulatory change at the European level was also hinted by De Gucht in his Keynote speech on the linkages between the internal market and external trade (De Gucht, 2012). He raised the question whether there is the possibility for a twoway approach, notably “[c]ould we consider adapting our own regulations in a spirit of give and take, while recognizing that our own regulations are often the fruit of legislation?” (De Gucht, 2012). De Gucht’s intervention made use of rhetorical tools to highlight both the necessity and appropriateness to take action (De Ville & Orbie, 2014; Huet & Eliasson, 2018; Siles-Brügge, 2014). His statements also frame regulatory heterogeneity as the core of the regulatory agenda and an important element of the “external competitiveness proofing” of EU’s regulation, where new initiatives are assessed for their impact on trade and investment (De Gucht, 2012, p. 6). The purpose of free trade in this instance reinstates the overall paradigm and not only stretches to include regulatory heterogeneity but

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also all regulatory reform. This marked the extension of what can be negotiated and a move towards the possibility that regulatory choices can be subject to discussion. This serves as a clear extension of the “impossible to stand still” representation. Here, again the need for EU actorness is brought about by the fact that there is an opportunity to be a global standard-setter and that the EU has the instruments. A clear linkage between the internal and the external dimension emerges as well as the need for the EU to look internally, so that it can act externally. Such discourse culminates in the next section where the EU is supposed to take its rightful place as a shaper of rules. Securing Its Place in Global Value Chains The end of De Gucht’s term and the beginning of Cecilia Malmström’s were marred by strong contestation, and the Trade for All Strategy (TfA) was conceived as a communication device to respond to the challenges. With the TfA, the dominant understanding is a discourse where the EU needs to champion liberalisation and rule-making in a world defined by global fragmentation (European Commission, 2015, p. 10). The problem is defined as the need to address “regulatory fragmentation” and due to the importance of the task, the EU is also ready to mobilise a wide are of policy tools to fulfil this requirement (European Commission, 2015, p. 10). The language on the cost of other countries’ regulations is even stronger in the 2017 report of the implementation of the TfA (European Commission, 2017b). The report puts the blame on the frequent use of domestic policies by all countries for undermining the rules-based system (European Commission, 2017b, p. 2). The imperative for the EU to strengthen its rightful place in global value chains allows the space for multiple instruments to be used, but particularly it again situates trade agreements as both supporting the efforts at the international level by encouraging international standards of transparency and good governance and also allowing for “ambitious elimination of barriers” and regulatory cooperation (European Commission, 2015, p. 13). Trade agreements are also pointed out as a “way to give political momentum” to regulatory cooperation, which can then feed into future multilateral work (European Commission, 2015, p. 13). The surfacing of regulatory fragmentation as

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the main issue to be addressed positions the EU as the champion of regulatory issues in international fora and positions the EU’s FTAs as a global good (Garnizova, 2018). While there is a clear continuation of some of the earlier language of the Commission, the TfA came in a moment of strong internal contestation. The challenge was not necessarily towards the specific means of trade policy (trade agreements per se), but of the overall purpose (who is trade policy for?). In an attempt to address stakeholders’ concerns, the Commission in the TfA “made a pledge” that “no trade agreement will ever lower levels of regulatory protection; that any change to levels of protection can only be upward; and that the right to regulate will always be protected” (European Commission, 2015, p. 20). While in the first and the second representation, the negative association of a threat was used,7 in the face of contestation, the EU tried to represent regulatory cooperation in a more positive light. Among the benefits presented were: the way regulatory cooperation “can also help promote high standards” and “promote EU standards in a way that will help consumers everywhere to benefit from the highest and most effective levels of protection” (European Commission, 2015, p. 20). More importantly, trade policy and trade agreements are illustrated as the right place for such dialogue to take place since it provides it with a political momentum (European Commission, 2015). The concerns surrounding the relationship between trade and regulation not only persisted, but also took a strong turn towards rethinking the relationship between the two. The fears of some organisations focused on the appropriateness of trade agreements to address regulatory issues, the structures created for discussions over regulatory issues, and the implications for the regular legislative process. In the case of the Canada Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) precisely these concerns required the Parties to issue (and then clarify) a Joint Interpretative Instrument on the CETA (Official Journal of the European Union, 2017). While the dynamics of discourse-backlash-discourse can be further explored, the evidence presented here focused on the legitimising discourse of the Commission, which aims to expand the EU’s purpose from trade facilitation to internationalisation of regulatory aspects. In the

7 For elaboration on the use of globalisation as a threat, see Siles-Brügge (2014).

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last section, we showed an overreach of trade policy free trade discourse into regulation and a positioning of regulatory issues in the heart of the “open markets” agenda. While the Commission tried to legitimise its extended purpose within the context of global value chains and new areas of concern such as ensuring high standards for consumers, stakeholders challenged the legitimacy of such discourse. Moreover, they did not seem to challenge the specific tools but the need for the EU to communicate its purpose. Linking this back to the theoretical framework to the book, once again the EU was more focused on adjusting its capabilities, rather than adjusting the expectations. In the case of trade policy, the exaggeration of what specific instruments can achieve to shape global rules backfired in the way that stakeholders contested the overextension of EU’s purpose without the required processes to ensure transparency and legitimacy.

Conclusion EU’s purpose in trade policy can be seen as purpose created through the available instruments. While its purpose before the failure of the Doha Development Round was phrased within its contribution to the multilateral trading system, the change of instruments to FTAs broadened the range of objectives, which the EU wanted to tackle. The mushrooming of non-tariff measures and regulatory issues, one of the reasons for lack of agreement at the international level, prompted the Commission to expand the range of purposes FTAs serve by turning them into a forum for conceiving and exporting global standards. These dynamics culminated with the agreements with TTIP, Japan, and CETA, which all carried the rationale that regulatory heterogeneity creates a cost through fragmentation in global value chains, which can only be addressed through regulatory compatibility and convergence. While multiple paradigms and discourses interact in EU trade policymaking, we highlighted the legitimising discourse around three representations: the need to act, getting prepared to act, and taking its rightful place as an actor. While Damro (2010) suggests that the EU’s identity relies on the conception of the market and market building, we look specifically at how this identity had to make way to problem-oriented discourses, particularly when contested. The discussion provided here allows us to understand better how EU actors understand means-ends relationships and then legitimise them. It also showed that EU’s legitimising discourse faces contestation, which in

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turn reduces its actorness. While currently the EU perceives this challenge to be a failure of communication, it seems that there is a much more fundamental challenge and more contested legitimacy of the EU as a global standard-setter. Tracing the different representations of its actorness, we can see that contestation affects EU’s ability to shape rules in the way that stakeholders can challenge the purpose of EU’s trade policy and it can prompt the European Commission to redefine goals in order for them to better resonate with citizens (e.g. focus on consumers). Contestation also reduces EU actorness in the way that EU’s discourse is targeted at achieving internal legitimacy and ensuring that there is a mandate to act in a certain way. At the same time, with the EU’s structure, this is a difficult task to achieve if trade policy is to be flexible to respond to global challenges. While this chapter finishes with the period of contestation, a natural extension is the study of the renewed attempts for negotiations with the USA, the negotiations with Mercosur, as well as the discussions surrounding the future of the Generalised System of Preferences. For each of these negotiations, we can trace how does the EU defines its purpose, how other actors understand this purpose, and how these negotiations are legitimised within the broader context.

References Ashton, C. (2009). The transatlantic challenge: Working together to shape the rules of globalisation. Speech by Catherine Ashton at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 26 October 2009. BEUC. (2017). Beyond trade: EU consumers in global markets. BEUC Vision. Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs, Brussels, Belgium. Retrieved August 26, 2019, from https://www.beuc.eu/publications/beucx-2017-095_eu_consumers_in_a_globalised_market.pdf Bretherton, C., & Vogler, J. (2005). The European Union as a global actor (2nd ed.). Routledge. ˇ Cmakalová, K., & Rolenc, J. M. (2012). Actorness and legitimacy of the European Union. Cooperation and Conflict, 47 , 260–270. Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) Official Journal, C 115, 9 May 2008, 2008/C 115/01. Damro, C. (2010). Market power Europe: EU externalisation of market-related policies (No. E-paper No. 5), MERCURY.

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Dunn, K. C., & Neumann, I. B. (2016). Undertaking discourse analysis for social research. University of Michigan Press. De Gucht, K. (2010). The implications of the Lisbon Treaty for EU Trade policy. Speech by Karel De Gucht, European Commissioner for Trade, S&D seminar on EU Trade Policy, Oporto, 8 October 2010. De Gucht, K. (2012). Keynote Speech. Working together for growth: Making the most of the internal market and external trade, 20 January 2012. De Gucht, K. (2013). Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)— Solving the regulatory puzzle. Speech by Karel De Gucht, European Commissioner for Trade, The Aspen Institute Prague Annual Conference / Prague, Czech Republic, 10 October 2013. De Gucht, K. (2014). EU trade policy as means to influence globalization. Speech by Karel De Gucht, European Commissioner for Trade, HumboldtUniversität zu Berlin, Berlin, 22 May 2014. De Ville, F., & Orbie, J. (2014). The European Commission’s neoliberal trade discourse since the crisis: Legitimizing continuity through subtle discursive change: EC’s trade discourse since the crisis. Brazilian Journal of International Relations, 16, 149–167. De Ville, F., & Siles-Brügge, G. (2018). The role of ideas in legitimating EU trade policy: From the single market programme to the transatlantic trade and investment partnership. In Handbook on the EU and international trade. E. Elgar. European Commission. (1999). Hearing of Mr. Lamy. Brussels, Belgium. European Commission. (2001). Statement by Mogens Peter Carl. European Commission. (2005). Workshop 2—Beyond tariffs: The importance of regulatory questions. European Commission. (2006). Global Europe: Competing in the world: A contribution to the EU’s growth and jobs strategy. Brussels, Belgium: European Commission, Trade. European Commission. (2007). A single market for 21st century Europe. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. COM(2007)724 final. European Commission. (2015). Trade for all: Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy. Publications Office of the European Union. European Commission. (2017a). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Balanced and Progressive Trade Policy to Harness Globalisation. COM(2017)492 final. European Commission. (2017b). Report on the Implementation of the Trade Policy Strategy Trade for All: Delivering a Progressive Trade Policy to Harness Globalisation. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the

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Schmidt, V. A. (2017). Theorizing ideas and discourse in political science: Intersubjectivity, Neo-institutionalisms, and the power of ideas. Critical Review, 29, 248–263. Siles-Brügge, G. (2014). Constructing European Union trade policy. Springer. Sjöstedt, G. (1977). The external role of the European Community. Saxon House. The Economist. (2018, May 6). Europe stands up for global trade rules. Retrieved May 6, 2018, from https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21741157someone-has-europe-stands-up-global-trade-rules Vogler, J., & Bretherthon, C. (2006). The European Union as a protagonist to the United States on climate change. International Studies Perspectives, 7 , 1–22. Woll, C. (2008). Firm interests: How governments shape business lobbying on global trade. Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Cornell University Press Woll, C., & Artigas, A. (2007). When trade liberalization turns into regulatory reform: The impact on business–government relations in international trade politics. Regulation & Governance, 1, 121–138. World Trade Organisation. (2018). Trade statistics and outlook: Strong trade growth in 2018 rests on policy choices. Retrieved August 31, 2019, from https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres18_e/pr820_e.htm World Trade Organisation. (2019). Report on G20 trade measures (mid-October 2018 to mid-may 2019). Retrieved August 31, 2019, from https://www.wto. org/english/news_e/news19_e/g20_wto_report_june19_e.pdf

CHAPTER 7

The EU Actorness in the Security Field: The Case of Georgia Shu Uchida

Introduction Georgia is located in the South Caucasus region, which comprises three small countries: Georgia, the Republic of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan), and the Republic of Armenia (Armenia), within a triangle of regional powers i.e., the Russian Federation (Russia), the Republic of Turkey (Turkey), and the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran). Historically, Georgia has been profoundly influenced by the struggles among the Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the successive Persian regimes such as the Safavid Dynasty. These struggles devastated Georgia’s territory. Thus, Georgia has experienced a number of wars since the dawn of its history and lost its sovereignty a number of times. Even right after its independence in 1991, due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Georgia experienced several intrastate armed conflicts and, later on, an armed conflict with

S. Uchida (B) Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. R. Freire et al. (eds.), EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92997-8_7

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interstate characteristics with Russia in 2008. As such, to date, Georgia has gone through complex and various forms of armed conflicts. In the contemporary context, there is a tug of war between the West and Russia over the area between the EU and Russia, since both are attempting to maintain certain physical and intangible influence over the area, due to political, economic, and security motives. The divergence between the West and Russia has the potential for friction in the area, and indeed armed conflicts have erupted in this region, illustrated by the 2008 war in Georgia and the Ukrainian crisis since 2014. Georgia is regarded as a Small Power in this chapter. Toje (2011, p. 47) describes Small Powers as follows: The strategic behavior of Small Powers is characterized by dependence. A Small Power recognizes that it cannot obtain security by relying solely on its own capabilities (Rothstein, 1968, p. 29). They cannot affect the international system alone but with some concerted effort they can affect the way the system works (Keohane, 1969). A Small Power plays a dispensable and non-decisive part in a great power’s array of political and military resources. Small powers therefore tend towards a policy of either strict neutrality or alliance (Reiter, 1996, p. 71). Those “located in geopolitical regions critical to maintaining a great power’s position in the international system [tend] to opt for alliance” (Mares, 1988, p. 456). In an alliance, Small Powers tend to follow the alliance leader closely, lend it what support they can and avoid antagonizing it (Posen, 2004, p. 7). Under regional hegemony with a low probability of punishment, Small Powers tend to adopt neutrality (Walt, 1985, p. 18).

In the case of Georgia, neutrality cannot be an option since it is located within a triangle of regional powers i.e., Russia, Turkey, and Iran, and it has gone through complex and various forms of armed conflicts to date. Thus, the “dependence” of Georgia on regional powers, including the EU, or the superpower, the United States of America (USA), is a cornerstone of its security. Without greater powers, Georgia would have extreme difficulty in surviving under the current World Order. Thus, although military components are crucial if Georgians are to defend themselves against military aggression by opponents, these components alone cannot guarantee security in Georgia, because Georgia’s military cannot resist that of its northern neighbour: Russia. In this context, the western démarches profoundly affect the internal and international policies of Georgia, a small power, and the likelihood

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of Georgia re-engaging in armed conflict, namely vis-à-vis the breakaway regions and Russia, has greatly diminished for the time being. Georgia’s aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration, particularly with the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have been a substantial driving force for political, economic, social and judicial reforms in the country. Partly because of this objective, Georgia held free and fair elections several times, and even contributed a battalion to the NATOled missions in Afghanistan. Also, the West offered Georgia possible membership in NATO as an incentive not to change its diplomatic Euro-Atlantic integration trajectory, though the prospect for joining the Atlantic Alliance has been postponed without any date to be resumed. Also, in the security dimension, particularly with regards to Russia and the breakaway regions, the EU’s role is often perceived and understood by Tblisi as rather limited. The possible scenario in which Georgia would move in a different direction in the future, if the commitment from the West to Georgia is not enough to meet the demands from Georgians, cannot, thus, be ruled out. For a small state such as Georgia to function as a sustainable country, and in order to preserve its security, it needs a patron. At this stage, Georgia has no alternative other than the West to rely upon. In fact, former foreign minister of Georgia, Irakli Menagarishvili, stated to the author in August 2017 that “Russia’s aggressive strategy toward Georgia is simply pushing Georgia to Euro-Atlantic integration”. Nonetheless, if Georgia would start to regard the West as a less trustworthy patron, it could return to the Russian orbit, or even lookout to China, as suggested by the Belt and Road Initiative. In fact, the Chinese economic influence in Georgia is drastically increasing (e.g., signature of a Free Trade Agreement between the two [FTA, 2017]). China might be an option for Georgia to depend on, at least economically, although there are hardly any historical ties between them. Thus, the visa-free regime for Georgians in the Schengen area could be a crucial signal from the EU to Georgia not to change its diplomatic trajectory. The move is important not only for Georgia but also for the West, since it needs to soothe the region because of energy security and for sustainability on the EU’s periphery. Hence, the EU’s engagement with Georgia is crucially important for both the EU and Georgia. In this challenging internal and regional context, this chapter analyses human security in Georgia with a particular focus on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), which have been supported by the EU’s initiatives, emphasising the relevance of local integration of

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both 2008 war-related IDPs and IDPs from the early 1990s war, a process which Georgians themselves can eventually lead. The EU security actorness in Georgia will be assessed from the viewpoint of human security, an area where the EU has been gaining increasing recognition. Despite limited capabilities regarding more traditional security dealings in its neighbourhood, the EU has proved to be a relevant security actor in other dimensions, such as human and societal security, as the chapter argues in the case of Georgia.

Security Studies Scope Security is no longer achievable only by traditional military means, and countries face not only traditional conflicts with clear-cut nation-state enemies but also other challenges. Thus, there is an emerging consensus among policymakers and scholars regarding the need for a more integrated approach to security and development policies in post-conflict countries (Gabriëlse, 2007). As far back as June 1945, the United States Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, articulated the concepts of “freedom from want and freedom from fear”, which are crucial components of human security (Fukuda-Parr, 2010). After observing the consequences of the San Francisco Conference, Stettinius stated the following to his government: The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front, where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front, where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace. No provisions that can be written into the Charter will enable the Security Council to make the world secure from war if men and women have no security in their homes and their jobs. (Stettinius 1945 cited in Okubo, 2011, p. 22)

According to the Human Development Report (UNDP, 1994), Fifty years ago, Albert Einstein summed up the discovery of atomic energy with characteristic simplicity: “Everything changed”. He went on to predict: “We shall require a substantially new manner of thinking if mankind is to survive.” Although nuclear explosions devastated Nagasaki and Hiroshima, humankind has survived its first critical test of preventing worldwide nuclear devastation. But, five decades later, we need another profound transition in thinking – from nuclear security to human security.

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For some time, the concept of security has been narrowly interpreted as security of territory from external aggression, or global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust, and the concept has been related more to nation-states than to individuals (UNDP, 1994). Consequently, human security could be considered a relatively new concept to approach issues not adequately addressed by a state-centric approach. However, a number of criticisms of human security have been made so far. For example, Paris (2001) contends that unless properly defined, the idea of human security cannot influence policymakers, practitioners, and scholars. Moreover, an important element of human security is “freedom to live in dignity”, it is, however, difficult for quantification of the degree of dignity. According to the report “Human Security Now”, human and state security are mutually reinforcing and interdependent (Commission on Human Security, 2003). They are not contradictory but complementary ideas, thus, without human security, state security cannot be attained and vice versa. In addition, “Human Security Now” argues that the state remains the fundamental provider of security, although the state often fails to fulfil its security obligation and at times has even become a source of threat to its people (Commission on Human Security, 2003). In fact, during the last one hundred years, far more individuals have been killed by their own governments than by foreign armies, and today, more than 95% of armed conflicts occur within states (Human Security Centre, 2005). In the case of Georgia, although US military support enhanced the quality of state security prior to August 2008 (IIFFMCG, 2009), Georgia could not adequately protect its citizens. Instead, it became the source of the threat, as illustrated by the failure to preserve the human security of IDPs, primarily from Abkhazia in the 1990s. Subsequently, in Georgia, the guarantee of state security by military means did not necessarily reinforce or complement human security. Regarding IDP issues, the Georgian government, particularly the Saakashvili administration, focused on the voluntary repatriation of IDPs to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, not local integration in the Tbilisi Administered Territory (TAT). In fact, on December 7, 2007, former President Saakashvili noted as follows: “I really believe that the January 5 elections will be held normally and they will give us a ticket on a train taking us to Sokhumi [the capital of breakaway Abkhazia], I will return these people [(IDPs)] to their homes”.1 1 Civil.ge. Saakashvili Focuses on IDP Return to Abkhazia in Campaign. December 1, 2007. Retrieved July 20, 2019, from http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=16474

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Although it seemed that Saakashvili’s administration intended to address the IDP issue via repatriation, an anonymous UN officer stated her view on the issue to the author as follows: “the Saakashvili administration may have forced IDPs into a limbo in the TAT on purpose in order to appeal to the international community, as many Georgians were victimized by Russia’s aggression”. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that the IDP issue was simply politicised and that the IDPs might have been regarded as a means rather than an end. That is, a certain segment of the population could have been deemed dispensable to attain national or material objectives, such as territorial integrity. Conventional paradigms associated with state security may regard IDPs as a means to maintain such paradigms. Consequently, unlike the discussions in the “Human Security Now” report, the guarantee of state security does not necessarily reinforce or complement human security in Georgia. Thus, in this research, security is defined relatively (Buzan et al., 1998) widely because the threats to Georgia are not only war with external enemies but also political and socio-economic challenges within the state, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The armed conflict Georgia experienced vis-à-vis Russia had inter-state characteristics. Therefore, although an anthropocentric approach is considered crucial to address the issues within the sovereign state realm, the importance of a state-centred approach remains relevant in order to protect states from external threats. Needless to say, the state-centric approach is still essential to prevent human displacement caused by external aggression, for example, but it does not necessarily contribute to the effective protection of existing IDPs as illustrated by the Georgian case. Therefore, both human security and state security approaches and dimensions are important, although both function with different agendas and in different timeframes. The human-centric approach contributes to protect existing IDPs and may complement state physical safety, by removing a possible trigger factor for reversion to armed conflict in Georgia and eliminating a cause of justification for Russian intervention. At the same time, the state-centric approach is important to defend the state from external threats and prevent causes of human displacement. However, once human displacement occurs, the state-centric approach may hinder, and indeed in Georgia it did hinder, the protection of IDPs, and may allow the state to take advantage of vulnerable groups such as IDPs as a means of protecting national interest, including territorial integrity and sovereignty.

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Accordingly, the chapter examines the issues on the ground for conflict prevention and transformation objectives within both the state security and human security scope in an effort to understand how the EU supports Georgia to achieve sustainable peace. The nexus between capabilities and expectations, as developed in Chapter 2 of this volume, sustains the analysis. Security building is one of the main objectives of the EU’s intervention in Georgia and clearly, the association to human security promotion for stability building in the country is linked to readings about EU actorness in Georgia, as further analysed.

The EUMM in Georgia: Monitoring IDPs The European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia is an EU civilian monitoring mission. Since deployment, it has patrolled day and night, specifically in the areas adjacent to the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABLs)2 of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (EUMM, 2014). It is headquartered in Tbilisi and has field offices in Gori, Mtskheta, and Zugdidi. Its mandate is valid throughout Georgia. However, the de facto authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have denied it access to the territories under their control (EUMM, 2014). The mission’s extensive presence through hotlines ensures it has the capacity to gather accurate and timely information on the situation. When appropriate, this information is disseminated to relevant assistance and response bodies (EUMM, 2014). As such, the EUMM has enough capacity to monitor ABLs as an early warning initiative. Furthermore, the mission has the capacity to gather detailed information on security issues, including through satellite monitoring. Its performance is framed within the new tasks of joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance, and post-conflict stabilisation as defined in the Treaty of Lisbon (European Union, 2010). This allowed the EUMM to integrate a Human Security Team, which mainly monitors the situation of IDPs in Georgia. IDP issues represent social vulnerability towards multiple stress factors, such as the armed conflicts and Russia’s political and military pressure, with the IDPs per se eventually reinforcing social vulnerability at large. In this way, the Human Security Team in the EU’s mission could have a relevant contribution to conflict prevention and stabilisation.

2 This terminology is mainly used by the West.

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As discussed earlier, the Saakashvili administration only focused on voluntary reparation of IDPs to the breakaway regions, which was/is exceptionally difficult within the current political environment, rather than local integration in the TAT. Thus, the social vulnerability of Georgia might become a trigger for other possible armed conflicts, rendering the EU’s stabilisation role as part of its security-building agenda of most relevance. This issue is elaborated in this section.

IDPs in Georgia Although there are some humanitarian or political reports on IDPs in Georgia, there are very few that elaborate the IDP issue in Georgia in terms of security. In per capita terms, the South Caucasus region possesses one of the world’s largest number of IDPs and refugees. Addressing the issue of IDPs as variables, which the Georgians themselves can control within its societal dimension, is crucially important as it might identify ways for seeking sustainable peace in Georgia. It might remove a source of further destabilisation and a possible trigger factor of armed conflict; and it might eliminate a justification for external intervention by Russia. Moreover, local integration of IDPs in the TAT might contribute to advancing the discussions at the humanitarian working group of the Geneva International Discussions, as social and human development measures might have the necessary influence on diplomacy, and the synergy of these measures could have an influence on addressing protracted conflicts in order to achieve sustainable peace. The author conducted interviews at more than 20 IDP collective centres for two years mainly with the EUMM officers, and the majority of IDPs stated they felt despaired in face of the realities in the TAT. They seek repatriation to the breakaway regions although this is an extremely difficult process. IDPs fled into the TAT in two different timeframes: IDPs mainly from Abkhazia in the 1990s (old IDPs), and mainly from South Ossetia in 2008 (new IDPs). Although new IDPs attracted a lot of international assistance, especially in IDP collective centres in Tserovani, the circumstances of the old IDPs are serious (257.022 IDPs in Georgia, according to UNHCR Georgia, 2014), and the issues related to lack of attention to basic human needs have remained since the 1990s. Medical facilities, drinking water, and firewood for heating are widely lacking. Thus, this research focuses mainly on old IDPs.

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A durable solution for old IDPs is voluntary repatriation to their homelands in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, it is exceptionally difficult to repatriate old IDPs because the de facto authorities of both regions, which have been supported by Russia, do not allow them to do so, partly because of demographic issues. According to the “ministry” of foreign affairs of Abkhazia, the census conducted in 2011 shows that 51% of the population is ethnic Abkhazian and 20% is ethnic Georgian, although the Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia says that 17.7% are ethnic Abkhazians and 45.7% are ethnic Georgian in 1989. Thus, if Georgian IDPs would repatriate to Abkhazia, ethnic Abkhazians could be the minority again in Abkhazia. This is a reason why Abkhaz “authorities” are concerned with their repatriation. There is another issue affecting old IDPs in Georgia. Many old IDPs have not been properly integrated in the host communities in the TAT because of issues such as property rights and the lack of an appropriate social safety net. This fact indicates that, if IDPs are to repatriate coercively as a group to the breakaway regions, a crisis may occur at the ABLs, which could escalate into large-scale conflicts. In fact, IDPs are/have been detained by Russian border guards at the ABLs on a regular basis. Moreover, there were around 1.600 IDP collective centres in 2012 although there were 5.911 IDP centres as of November 2009. The number of centres was rapidly decreasing due to the fact that some of them were privatised and granted to IDPs. Otherwise, some IDPs were removed from those collective centres via an eviction process. In the context of the interviews, a number of IDPs shared with the author that they had to occupy a different building for the winter months partly because of eviction. This caused an increased density of occupation leading to a volatile social situation. In fact, when the author visited Zugdidi in November 2012, which is very close to the ABL of Abkhazia, a number of IDPs had started to occupy the former Soviet academy buildings. Ivanishvili, who was elected as the prime minister of Georgia in October 2012, claimed that these occupations were provoked by the United National Movement (UNM), the former ruling party under the Saakashvili administration. The author could not find any proof that the occupation in Zugdidi was provoked by the UNM, although we could not rule out the possibility that some of the occupations in Tbilisi might have been provoked by the UNM. However, the biggest concern was that once again IDPs

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were politicised, and many political elites turned a blind eye to the main problem of IDPs.

Old IDPs Regarding the old IDPs in the 1990s, the Gamsakhurdia administration set the policy of randomly allocating vacant houses and ruins to IDPs, such as former military compounds and schools, except in the capital city Tbilisi. Thus, IDPs were scattered all through Georgia making it difficult for the government to monitor their situation. Subsequently, many IDPs moved into and occupied ruins in Tbilisi in order to find a job and better living conditions, although their original registrations were not updated, even after having moved to Tbilisi. This made the situation more difficult for the government, especially the Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees of Georgia (MRA), to trace the move of IDPs. Since the 1990s, the Georgian government has not set any proper protection policy for old IDPs. In 2008, the Saakashvili administration finally enacted the new IDPs protection action plan. However, the armed conflict surged in August 2008 over South Ossetia (see UNHCR, 2009) and due to the war, new IDPs fled into the TAT and old IDPs were kept in limbo. Thus, this chapter emphasises the importance of local integration in practice, understanding local integration and voluntary repatriation as not exclusive objectives. Local integration of IDPs should become the focus, since voluntary repatriation to Abkhazia and South Ossetia is exceptionally difficult. In the future, a time might come when voluntary repatriation might be possible. However, there is no clear justification for the government to keep old IDPs in a limbo until that time. In theory, the human-centred approach is crucially important for the protection of IDPs because territorial integrity and reintegration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into the TAT would be the top priority for the Georgian government, and IDPs protection would be less important. However, if IDPs are marginalised from the state security perspective, this might lead to a volatile social situation, possibly exacerbating the physical safety of the state. The state security approach is intended to strengthen state physical safety, but it needs to be combined with the human security agenda. If the state does not take seriously IDPs protection, there might be unintended adverse effects. This is where the EU’s human security agenda

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might prove capable, with important impacts to our understanding of the EU’s actorness in its neighbouring regions.

IDP’s Local Integration into Georgian Society In this section the author elaborates on data gathered from interviews conducted with IDPs in November 2012. It should be noted that all the IDPs presented here are anonymous, and the numbers show the quality of living conditions: from 1 (worst) to 9 (best as IDPs collective housing). For Purchasing Power Parity, one large pack of flour cost roughly 25 Lari, and 25 Lari was approximately 10 USD in 2012. From this series of interviews, the author identified that the ABL crossing of Abkhazia was becoming more difficult by the autumn of 2012, and IDPs felt they were in a limbo. Thus, they started either to occupy new buildings or to sit in front of foreign embassies in Tbilisi in order to appeal to the diplomatic corps and to make them aware of the severe realities faced by IDPs. It should also be noted that the case of Batumi can be considered reasonably successful, with the collective centre in Batumi becoming instructive and regarded as a successful case of an old IDPs protection project, providing stable accommodation, financial support, and information sharing to IDPs. Zugdidi (Newly Occupied Former Soviet Science Academy): 1 When the author and EUMM officers visited the Zugdidi centre, IDPs were then occupying this former Soviet academy building. According to some IDPs, 1. We were provoked to action by the new settlement of IDPs in Tbilisi. Now thirty families have broken into this building. 2. There is no gas, electricity or water. 3. We rented a house here in Zugdidi, yet the owner came back from Russia and we were forced to leave. That’s why we have decided to occupy this building since we cannot afford to rent a house again. 4. The MRA has been turning a blind eye to our issues, and we are required to hand in an official document to the appropriate government official even to request a blanket. We do not know anyone from the government, and this is the big problem for us.

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5. The tenants of the newly constructed IDPs centres in Poti and Batumi have already been selected by the government, and we cannot enter there. 6. Some of us went back to Gali in Abkhazia on a regular basis, yet it is extremely difficult to cross the ABLs. (Note: an anonymous EUMM officer stated that IDPs may have started to occupy new buildings because of unchanging factors such as the fact that it is getting more difficult to go back to Abkhazia, plus there is no firewood for winter.). According to a male IDP at this building, allegedly ill-treated by Russian border guards: 7. I entered into Abkhazia from Nabakevi to see my relatives in Galion on October 30, 2012, but I was captured by Russian border guards. They handed me over to a bandit. The bandit called my wife asking 15.000 RUB ransom. Eventually, we paid 500.000 RUB ransom to them, and I escaped. When I tried to go back to the TAT through the ABL in Nabakevi, I was caught by other Russian border guards, and they treated me badly. I was in Abkhazia for a month, and I came back to the TAT three days ago. Also, I think my right arm is broken now. An anonymous EUMM patrol officer stated that “Based on my police experience, I do not think he is lying to us. Also, this incident shows that border control is becoming stricter”. A high-ranking official of the EUMM Zugdidi office stated to the author that “there are no means to ascertain the validity of his testimony, yet it is very rare to get such information from IDPs in person. We will investigate the issue”. Tsukadiasi Village Close to the ABLs of Abkhazia and Enguri Dam: 1 Although the author did not visit individual properties, the village was practically abandoned, and the most basic comforts of civilisation were notably absent. It was an extremely cold place although it was only November. A local NGO worker protecting IDPs in this village and anonymous EUMM officers stated to the author: 1. 22 families live in this village due to eviction in the capital city of Tbilisi.

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2. IDPs routinely freeze to death here. 3. Here there is only one kindergarten, but no school. There used to be public transportation in this place run by local government, but the salary of the driver went unpaid so the driver could not buy any fuel. Thus, service halted three months ago, and villagers can no longer commute anywhere. 4. There is no pharmacy here, so they have to go to another town to buy even basic remedies such as cold medicine. 5. Those who are working for the operation of Enguri dam come from another place, thus no villagers here were hired. 6. Some IDPs go back to the Gali district in Abkhazia for subsistence farming in summer, but they stay here during the rest of the year. 7. MRA forced IDPs to sign a contract to transfer property rights although some IDPs tried to refuse. 8. In winter, this village is totally isolated from the rest of the country due to bad road conditions and very heavy snow. Poti (Newly Built Collective Centre): 8 Both the exterior and interior were tidy and clean. This centre was even above the average living standards in Georgia. Also, it was warm enough inside of the centre because Poti is located in the Black Sea area. However, the big problem seems to be the fact that there was no follow up or close communication from central and local governments. IDPs were extremely impassioned when speaking to the author, and they complained that there were no entertainment venues there such as a theatre. The author felt that they did not require luxury goods, but they were simply suffering from psychological marginalisation. That is, the building per se was totally suitable for decent living but follow up attention was missing. According to some IDPs, 1. The centre consists of 1.080 flats. All of us were allocated a place here by the government in 2011 due to eviction. At that time, the government guaranteed the employment of at least one person per family. However, this was a broken promise. Regarding employment, 90% are unemployed and life was better before coming here. However, some of us are working at the Poti port. 2. We have access to gas, water, and electricity.

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3. We receive 28 Lari per person because every single flat is self-owned. Thus, we have the right to sell the flat, yet nobody has done this so far. 4. We have some grievances, but we do not want to go back to our previous situation. Batumi (Newly Built Collective Centre): 9 This centre was constructed with the support of the EU. The centre should be regarded as a prototype of a successful IDPs collective centre. IDPs were smiling, and they helped each other plant trees in their courtyards. They were satisfied with their quality of life there. However, they were educated and sufficiently skilled to earn decent wages compared to other IDPs in other collective centres. On humanitarian grounds, it was not clear whether they should be regarded as the top priority to be protected by the government. Thus, the criteria for allocation of IDPs were highly uncertain. According to some IDPs there: 1. 608 families live here, and each family consists of 1–8 members. 2. All of us paid rent for more than 19 years before coming here. Thus, I have never received an IDP’s allowance from the MRA. 3. At the moment, 90% are unemployed, and we receive 28 Lari a month. We have access to water, gas, and electricity. 4. Humidity in the basement is the biggest problem. Except for this, we do not have any major problems. 5. We know that our collective centre is better than that in Poti. 6. Big families get more space, such as a 15-member family that got 5 flats.

Conclusion As we can see in the case of the Poti collective centre, the sheltering of IDPs not only provides them with housing, but also with the additional essential supporting social, economic, and environmental foundations for a decent standard of life. However, the top priority must be accommodation. Only few cases, out of the twenty centres where the author conducted interviews with IDPs from 2011 to 2013, are here presented as an illustration of persistent problems. In fact, many IDPs centres were

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simply in ruins, and did not even have roofs. Under these circumstances, IDPs could not live there with human dignity. Also, a series of interviews with IDPs at more than twenty collective centres for two years made it clear that the majority of them wanted to be repatriated to their original lands in Abkhazia. Thirty-eight donor countries pledged 45.5 billion USD at the conference for Georgia’s reconstruction in Brussels in 2008 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2008), and they are still determined to protect new IDPs in Tselovani’s new IDPs collective centre. Many diplomats from the West continue to visit only the Tselovani IDPs centres for new IDPs. However, the living conditions there are far better than that of older IDPs, even better than the ordinary living standards in some areas in Georgia. Thus, having EU Member States assist the Georgian government to implement the housing construction projects for the older IDPs to decrease differentiation that contributes to further social vulnerability in the country would be welcomed. As shown in the research presented above, the collective centre in Batumi should be regarded as a successful case of an old IDPs protection project, which could become the model for responding to human security concerns in this regard until a fundamental change of the situation might allow different political measures. Addressing the issue of IDPs would contribute to reinforce social sustainability in Georgia, and it could be performed by Georgians themselves. Local ownership based on good governance is a key factor to the sustainability of the country. At this stage, through its Monitoring Mission, the EU has been focusing on human security and stabilisation as a source of overall security. Nonetheless, the capacity of the EU mission is limited in face of the wider context of the conflicts and IDPs’ needs, though its role has been acknowledged as providing for an enhanced feeling of security. Expectations should not fall out of the limited role of the EU in Georgia. Nevertheless, and despite the narrow agenda of the EUMM, the capabilities put to work have met the expectations generated, with a positive assessment of the mandate’s fulfilment, considering all its limits. Moreover, addressing the IDPs issue might help to establish a foundation for addressing protracted conflicts because this approach might have impacts upon multilateral diplomacy. Social and human development measures might have influence on diplomacy, and the synergy of these measures could have influence on addressing the protracted conflicts in order to achieve sustainable peace. Hence, the EU’s involvement in the peacebuilding process in Georgia has been fundamental,

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not only regarding the national security perspective, but also pressing for human security as a fundamental dimension for achieving sustainable peace. Thus, the EU security actorness, with a crucial contribution both on humanitarian and peacebuilding grounds, has been evidenced in the particular case of Georgia, highlighting its potential in human and societal security, where it might deliver and correspond to local expectations, while showing also the underlining potential contributions to the national security. Acknowledgements The author acknowledges funding for research from the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Innovative Training Networks (ITN-ETN) of the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, under grant agreement “CASPIAN - Around the Caspian: a Doctoral Training for Future Experts in Development and Cooperation with Focus on the Caspian Region” (642709 — CASPIAN — H2020-MSCA-ITN-2014).

References Buzan, B., de Wilde, J., & Wæver, O. (1998). Security: A new framework for analysis. Lynne Rienner. Commission on Human Security. (2003). Human security now: Protecting and empowering people. Commission on Human Security. Retrieved August 29, 2019, from https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000130589 European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM). (2014). Our mandate. Retrieved August 29, 2019, from http://www.eumm.eu/en/ about_eumm/mandatet European Union. (2010). Common security and defence policy. Retrieved August 29, 2019, from http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affa irs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0026_en.htm FTA. (2017). Free trade agreement between the Government of Georgia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China. 13 May. Retrieved August 29, 2019, from http://www.economy.ge/uploads/files/2017/foreign_trade/tav isufali_vachrobis_shetanxmeba_georgia_china/shetankhmeba_2018/page_0_ 60_145_179_china_georgia_fta_for_georgia_.pdf Fukuda-Parr, S. (2010). Poverty and violent conflict: Rethinking development. In N. Tschirgi, M. S. Lund, & F. Mancini (Eds.), Security and development: Searching for critical connections (pp. 17–46). Lynne Rienner. Gabriëlse, R. (2007). A 3D approach to security and development. PFP Consortium Quarterly Journal, 6(2), 67–74.

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Human Security Centre. (2005). Human security report 2005: War and peace in the 21st century. Oxford University Press. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG). (2009). Report Volume 1. IIFFMCG mandated by the Council of the European Union. Keohane, R. O. (1969). ‘Lilliputians’ dilemmas: Small states in international politics. International Organization, 23(2), 291–310. Mares, D. R. (1988). Middle powers under regional hegemony: To challenge or acquiesce in hegemonic enforcement. International Studies Quarterly, 32(4), 453–471. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2008). “Georgia (in Japanese).” Accessed December 30, 2021. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/ kuni/09_databook/pdfs/03-08.pdf Okubo, S. (2011). Globalization, human security, and the right to live in peace. In S. Okubo, & L. Shelly (Eds.), Human security, international crime and human trafficking. Asian and western perspectives (pp. 9–35). Routledge. Paris, R. (2001). Human security: Paradigm shift or hot air? International Security, 26(2), 87–102. Posen, B. (2004). ESDP and the structure of world power. International Spectator, 39(1), 5–17. Reiter, D. (1996). Crucible of beliefs: Learning. Cornell University Press. Rothstein, R. L. (1968). Alliances and small powers. Columbia University Press. Toje, A. (2011). The European Union as a small power. Journal of Common Market Studies, 49(1), 43–60. UNDP. (1994). Human development report 1994. Oxford University Press. UNHCR Georgia. (2014). Georgia: 2014, UNHCR regional operations profile— Eastern Europe. Retrieved August 29, 2019, from http://www.unhcr.org/ pages/49e48d2e6.html UNHCR. (2009). Protection of internally displaced persons in Georgia: A gap analysis. Retrieved August 29, 2019, from http://www.unhcr.org/4ad827 f59.pdf Walt, S. (1985). Alliance formation and the balance of world power. International Security, 9(4), 3–41.

PART II

EU Regional Actorness

Part II discusses EU’s positioning in its neighbouring regions, including the ‘“neighbours of the neighbours’”. In doing so, it contributes to the debate on the Union’s regional actorness and to analyse the existing instruments and approaches in a time of contested leadership in the EU neighbourhood and beyond. Part II includes examples covered by the EU’s enlargement and neighbourhood policies, but also Russia and Central Asia, in order to understand how the diffusion of power develops throughout the structure of concentric circles underlying the EU regional presence. What do we learn from EU regional actorness, in terms of rendering policy frameworks, goals and instruments operational? What conceptualisation of the EU emerges from the analysis of its regional presence? What are the limits and challenges to EU regional actorness?

CHAPTER 8

The EU in the Wider Caspian: Actorness and Social Limits of Recognition Elham Gharji

Introduction The European Union (EU) has been active in the wider Caspian region— encompassing the South Caucasus and Central Asia—ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It has been involved in many projects supporting the development of the Former-Soviet states in the region, building trade infrastructures, supporting political reforms and promoting democratic values. In doing so, the EU has been aiming at deepening cooperation with the states in the region and integrating the region’s economy into the European market. The EU’s activities in the wider Caspian region feed into a number of competing forms of regionalism and regional cooperation schemes that started after the collapse of the Soviet Union allowing external players, such as the EU, to advance cooperation with the states in the region.

E. Gharji (B) Ottawa, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. R. Freire et al. (eds.), EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92997-8_8

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The EU has since supported several regional connectivity projects as well as political association programs with some Former-Soviet states in the Caspian. At the same time, other actors such as Russia have also pursued regional cooperation with the Former-Soviet Caucasus and Central Asia in an attempt to maintain its regional leadership and political influence. This multiplicity of actors, in addition to creating a competitive regional environment in the region, has made “actorness” to be largely a comparative concept. Actorness understood “as an actor’s role ‘in relation to other actors’ in the international arena” (Sjöstedt cited in Hill, 1993, p. 309) is fundamentally a social and comparative concept and is defined in relation to other actors in the global arena, and their relative social recognition in the international society. Building on the argument about “recognition” and “legitimacy” in the debate on the EU actorness presented in the conceptual framework of this book, this chapter argues that the EU’s social recognition as an actor in the Caspian region can be analysed in terms of how it compares with other actors in the region, mainly, Russia. In practical terms, it argues that EU actorness and thus its effectiveness and recognition in the Caspian are self-constrained by lack of ambition and the self-protective nature of its policies. In theoretical terms, it argues that the wider Caspian region resembles a regional international society centred on Russia’s historical role as the lead state. This regional international society is partially coproduced by East–West identity dynamics that also define EU policies towards the region. These dynamics affect the EU actorness in terms of its recognition, conceptualised as social status in this chapter. Using the English School theory of international relations, the chapter argues that there are social and normative limits to recognition of the EU in the wider Caspian region.

The EU’s Activities in the Wider Caspian Region The EU’s regional engagement in the Caspian started soon after the fall of the Soviet Union. The EU started investments to promote regional trade and cooperation in the wider Caspian region encompassing the overlapping geography of the Caucasus and Central Asia. As early as 1993, the EU invested in the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia

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(TRACECA),1 promoting regional economic cooperation both internationally and intra-regionally among 13 Former-Soviet countries, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, and also other countries like Bulgaria, Turkey, Iran and Romania via a series of transport linkages through sea, road, train and aviation. The EU developed institutional frameworks such as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) in the 1990s and the Technical Assistance to Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS). The latter was particularly used to promote cooperation with the Former-Soviet states, including Russia. A cooperation framework called the Black Sea Synergy was developed in 2009 linking cooperation with the existing Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), aiming at promoting cooperation with a diverse group of states, some of which are now members of the EU. In 2007, the EU launched its first strategy for Central Asia with the purpose of enhancing its cooperation with states in the region in the areas of “rule of law, education and environment” (European External Action Service, 2019). Since then, the EU has “increased its development cooperation, and established cooperation mechanisms” (Boonstra et al., 2019). The EU has allocated over e1 billion between 2014 and 2020 in areas such as the “rule of law, environment, water, trade and border management” (European Commission, 2019). The EU has been working to enhance its cooperation with the region multi-laterally as well as bilaterally. In 2015, the EU signed an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Kazakhstan and it is currently negotiating to sign one with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. In 2017, the EU started to work on a new strategy for Central Asia and in May 2019, the EU adopted the document “European Union and Central Asia: New Opportunities for Stronger Partnership”, to become the new EU-Central Asia strategy, which focuses on “Central Asian states’ capacity to overcome internal and external shocks and enhancing their ability to embrace reform”, and “supporting economic modernisation, promoting sustainable connectivity, and investing in youth” (European Commission, 2019). The strategy emphasises on promoting sustainable regional cooperation and connectivity in the region, including integration of Afghanistan into the cooperation mechanisms with Central Asia. 1 For more details see TRACECA’s website. Retrieved December 19, 2018, from http://www.traceca-org.org/en/traceca/history-of-traceca/

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Launching the joint communiqué on the new strategy, the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini stated that Central Asia is “becoming more and more strategic, amid positive internal and regional dynamics, as well as increasing global challenges that demand a strengthened partnership” (European Commission, 2019). The launching of the EU’s Central Asia strategy in 2007 was followed by a more comprehensive set of programs within the framework of the Eastern Partnership initiative (EaP) with a number of other Former-Soviet states in the wider Caspian. Launched in 2009, the EaP is the most important EU policy initiative linked to the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy and concerns the EU’s relationship with its six Eastern neighbours—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine—, aiming at “strengthening and deepening” EU relations with these countries by supporting economic development and market opportunity, good governance, regional connectivity and energy efficiency as well as people-to-people contacts. In the Eastern Partnership summit, which took place in Brussels in November 2017, the EU endorsed 20 key deliverables for 2020 in the areas of cooperation identified above. The EaP follows a comprehensive model of engagement with the Caspian states, combining bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, including the European Neighbourhood Instrument, which, according to the European Commission (2018), is “the key financial instrument for cooperation with the EaP countries during the period of 2014–2020”. The EU’s Eastern neighbours participate also in all other initiatives such as the Erasmus+, TAIEX, Twining, SIGMA and the Neighbourhood Investment Facility as well as in Cross-Border Cooperation programs.

EU Actorness in the Caspian: Purposes, Effectiveness and Recognition By pursuing economic integration and political association with the Former-Soviet states in the wider Caspian region, the EaP seeks to strengthen the EU’s role and position in the international politics of the region. As such, the EaP can be perceived as an instrument to position the EU as a geopolitical actor in the region. In fact, scholars have discussed the geopolitical nature of the EU for a long time. Browning and Jeonniemi (2007) for example, argue that “[a] geopolitical drive premised on an imperial logic has been evident in the EU” in terms portraying

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the “EU as possessing a “peace mission” to bring stability throughout Europe” and thus, providing it with the “moral and identity prerogatives to try and organise the space beyond its borders and to spread “European values” to those on the outside”(Browning & Joenniemi, 2007, p. 7). They further argue that the security discourses ensuring stability and European security through promoting “European values” demonstrate the EU’s geopolitical nature. While the EU can in fact be considered as a geopolitical actor in the wider Caspian, its purpose and scope of activities are not expansionist in nature. In other words, the EU appears not to be a contender for regional leadership or willing to enlarge the EU to include the FormerSoviet Caspian states. Rather, the EU’s ambitions are quite limited, and its efforts are focused on ensuring European security through creating a favourable environment in its eastern neighbourhood. Although the range of economic and mobility incentives offered by the EU to the EaP partner states, particularly through the Association Agreements, have had significant geopolitical implications for the region, as witnessed in the context of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014, the EaP does not offer EU membership. In fact, the ENP, on the basis of which the EaP is devised, is an alternative to EU enlargement, and its core objective is to make sure that the EU is “surrounded by a ‘ring of friends’” (Smith, 2005) rather than expanding into the Former-Soviet space. This is evident in the EaP not offering future EU membership to partner states. The EaP has been primarily seeking European security objectives through structural intervention to promote free trade, improve human rights and good governance in its eastern neighbourhood. Though such interventions can still be interpreted as inherently geopolitical, aiming at creating and enhancing a political space in the region that is favouring the EU, interventions such as economic development and trade facilitation are pursued with the purpose of improving livelihood, to prevent instability in the region, which can in turn affect European security. The EU’s geopolitical tools are limited to liberal instruments aiming at creating social determinants of peaceful relations such as liberal political and economic reforms, human rights and civil society values, which could enhance region’s security and support close relations with the EU in the long run. Beyond this, the EU appears to have no ambition for regional leadership.

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Given the purpose and scope of its activities, the EU can be defined as a protective geopolitical actor as opposed to an expansionist one. “Protective” refers to the primary focus of the EU’s neighbourhood policies on European security as their end objective. The EU is not necessarily interested in the region for the sake of taking over it, but rather its interest derives from the fear of instability and insecurity at its Eastern borders. As Browning and Jeonniemi (2007, p. 7) argue “[t]he point is that the EU has tended to see its outside as a source of instability and insecurity”. This has essentially been the security logic of the ENP and the core geopolitical objective of the EaP. The protective nature of the EU and its lack of ambition beyond its normative agenda have affected the effectiveness of its role as an actor. The EaP has “resulted in minimal change to the east, as well as contestation from eastern partners and regional actors such as Russia” (Christou, 2010), while failing to accommodate the European aspirations of some of its partners such as Georgia and Ukraine by denying them future membership in the EU. This implicates the EU and affects its role in the region in another substantive way, which is important for the argument of this paper: By defining the Caspian as an European security defence line, the ENP and the EaP indirectly reinforce the idea of Europe as an exclusive international society vis-à-vis the Former-Soviet space and thus, engage in “othering” of the Caspian region. This identity dynamic has further impacted the effectiveness of the EU as it can be counter-productive to the EU’s efforts and their effectiveness. Browning and Christou (2010, p. 109) have argued that the ENP’s effectiveness depends on two factors: “first, where the partner countries are located (and locate themselves) along a continuum of positive–negative otherness with respect to the EU and; second, their ability to utilise particular strategies of marginality to pursue their goals”. The EaP appears to locate the partner countries in the “other” side of the idea of Europe, and thus, creates the first condition for its ineffectiveness. By creating a social hierarchy in EU-Caspian relations, the EaP externally constructs the identity of the states in the wider Caspian as the “other” e.g. FormerSoviet region outlying the European social space. This dynamic not only discourages the European aspiration of some of the EaP partner states by pushing them to the farthest margins of the European society, but contributes also to the re-shaping of their regional identity as the FormerSoviet space in which Russia plays a historical role. In this sense, if the EU is aiming at a liberal transformation in the region through promoting

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“European values”, its policy towards the region is significantly undermined by the EaP’s latent function of European border creation and maintenance in the Eastern neighbourhood. To put it in a theoretical perspective, by denying future membership to the Former-Soviet states towards its East, the EaP introduces the EU as an exclusive international society. International society is a central concept of the English School theory of international relations. By international society is meant “a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, [that] form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions” (Bull, 2002, p. 13). Barry Buzan (2014, p. 36) defines international society as “the institutionalization of shared interests and identity amongst states and the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules and institutions amongst them”. The concept of international society is very useful in analysing the social dynamics that facilitate or constraint an actor’s external recognition. In the case of the EU, the EaP indirectly engages in border creation and border maintenance with regards to the Former-Soviet EaP partner states. By denying EU membership to the EaP states, the EU presents itself as an exclusive international society that differentiates itself from the Caspian. This has implications for EU’s social recognition. Recognition in the actorness debate ultimately refers to the social status of an actor in an international society, and thus, it is closely defined in terms of how that actor relates to the international society in terms of certain social parameters such as values and identity that facilitate actor’s recognition and role. Some scholars have defined status as “collective beliefs about a given state’s ranking on valued attributes (wealth, coercive capabilities, culture, demographic position, socio-political organization, and diplomatic clout)” (Larson et al., 2014, p. 7). However, a more comprehensive definition that grasps also the social or inter-subjective understanding of the status is offered by Murray (2018), who defines status as a recognized identity, not the acknowledgment or acceptance of a state’s characteristics or capabilities. Despite a state’s desire for and material capacity to take up a particular role in international society, it cannot simply assert its social status: only when recognized does it assumes the authority it needs to secure the identity it seeks.

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Reflecting on the EU’s role in wider Caspian region, it seems the EU, despite being the largest donor to Central Asia, lacks the social status it aspires to have. EU’s influence in the region remains very limited, and its social status is socially constrained partially due to its policy of self-differentiation vis-à-vis the Former-Soviet space. In contrast, Russia, which “has never scored high as a source of aid to Central Asia […] has remained the most influential actor politically, militarily and economically” (Juraev, 2014, p. 78). This is due to several factors: At the policy level, the difference can be explained in terms of the social purpose of EU and Russia policies. While the EU behaves as an exclusive actor in the wider Caspian, Russia acts as the “big brother” seeking to unite the region under its leadership. At social level, the issue concerns historical and socio-normative determinants of recognition this is briefly touched upon next.

Russia in the Wider Caspian Russia has historically been a major actor in the wider Caspian region. Though its influence since the fall of the Soviet Union has varied across time and space (Gayoso, 2009), it continues to be a major geopolitical actor in the region. It has often confronted the EU’s programs in the region. The most significant Russia-EU contention in recent years includes the conflicts in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014. The latter is particularly significant as it is an ongoing process linked with EUUkrainian relations following the trade deal that polarised the Ukrainian national politics and led to the current conflict. The increasingly aggressive role that Russia has been playing over the last decade has reinforced the perception about Russia’s hegemonic or expansionist foreign policy towards the region. Russia’s aggressive posture, particularly in the context of the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine can be interpreted as its determination to defend its geopolitical interests in the Former-Soviet space, which is often referred to by Russia as its “sphere of influence”. Over the years since after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s role in the wider Caspian region has been increasingly enhanced through varieties of regional structures such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and more recently the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in which Russia has a leading role. These structures have often been referred to as Russian hegemonic means to control the region.

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For example, in 2012, the then USA Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to the EEU as a project aiming “to re-sovietise the region. It’s not going to be called that… It will be called Eurasian Union and all of that. But let’s make no mistake about it. We know what the goal is and we are trying to figure out effective ways to slow down or prevent it” (Clinton, cited in Clover, 2012). While there may be elements of hegemony in Russia’s relations with the states in the wider Caspian region, Russia’s leading position in the region has less to do with is material superiority. Materially, Russia scores far less than the EU. Russia’s position in the region has to do more with its social recognition along certain social parameters that enable Russia to legitimise its role as the lead state. It is important to underscore that Russia’s social status in the wider Caspian region is not given either. Russia’s position in the region’s hierarchy is shaped through a continuous negotiation involving elements of “consent and dissent to the hierarchy” (Saivetz, 2012). In fact, the relationship with countries in the wider Caspian varies a great deal and it can be seen in a “continuum” (Gayoso, 2009) from very Russia-friendly (e.g. Kazakhstan) to very Russia-unfriendly or Russia-hostile (e.g. Georgia). Other countries generally fall between these two ends with respect to their relationship with Russia. Russia has sought to strengthen its position in the wider Caspian region through a variety of means, including by the civilizational discourse of “Eurasianism” that has been promoted in opposition to the EU’s policies towards the region. The idea of Eurasianism is about defining an independent identity in terms of normative and ideational structure of the Former-Soviet space. It is about seeking a form of cultural sovereignty vis-a-vis Western universalism with respect to liberal norms and values. Eurasianism is deeply rooted and the idea that the Former-Soviet space is an “autonomous” world, which is also treated differently by the external powers, including the EU within the framework of the EaP. The implied “othering” of the wider Caspian region by the EaP has re-enforced and also externally reproduced the Former-Soviet identity of the region. This has benefited Russia by allowing it to assume the leading position in shaping the regional identity and its normative discourse. Russia’s Eurasianism comes with a strong element of European norm contestation, some of which strongly resonates with the Former-Soviet authoritarian regimes, allowing for Russia’s normative leadership in the region against the backdrop of the western criticism of the Former-Soviet

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authoritarian regimes. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, western pressure for the liberalisation of political space led to resistance by the Russian political elites, who sought ways to counter the promotion of liberal democracy into the countries of the Former-Soviet Union, by inventing normative concepts such as “sovereign democracy”. Rooted in the idea of the 1990s of “managed democracy”, which proposed the need for the elites “to control the electoral choices of the masses”, sovereign democracy “goes a step further by limiting the list of elites who are eligible to steer the masses” (Liik, 2018, p. 2). At a more normative-philosophical level, the tenet of the idea of “sovereign democracy” emphasised not only the principle of sovereignty, but also the fact that it is undemocratic to impose external values on the sovereign will of another nation. This became the principle normative argument on the basis of which, Russia as well as some other Former-Soviet states legitimated policies to ban foreign NGOs, civil society and rights groups. Of these norms, sovereignty resonates strongly with other authoritarian Former-Soviet states. From “sovereignty” and “centrality of state” emerge other norms such as state and regime security that legitimatise a wide range of authoritarian practices. Through promoting counter-norms, Russia assumes leadership in the wider Caspian by “validating” authoritarian governance and “shielding” the authoritarian states against western criticism (Cooley, 2017). This has a significant implication for the role of the EU and its policies in the region. While the EU engages in European border creation and maintenance in the Former-Soviet space, Russia invests in the normative divisions and identity discourse to “own” the social space, garner greater recognition and enhance its own actorness at the expanse of the EU. Russia’s position in the wider Caspian region can be best understood through the lens of the English school theory. Russia sits at the centre of what can be potentially defined as the Former-Soviet regional international society. Trine Flockhart (2016, p. 15) suggests that an “ideal–typical international society can be thought of as a cluster of sovereign states (usually) converging around a leading state, where the society will be defined by power and identity and by its primary and secondary institutions”. She further argues that: The central question to ask when assessing if a cluster of states can be said to be an international society has to be if the participating states share a common interest in maintaining the order. Such a shared interest is likely

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to be more robust if they also share similar internal/domestic settings and when participating state benefit from staying a member. (Flockhart, 2016, p. 15)

The wider Caspian region to a large extent resembles a regional international society as characterised above. Despite the European aspirations of Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, most Former-Soviet Caspian states share a strong interest in maintaining the Westphalian and existing authoritarian regional order. Most also share strong similarity in domestic political settings due to the Soviet legacy. The region’s external identity as “Former-Soviet” is another element of its definition as a regional international society. Though it is hard to say that the region converges around Russia as a power, Russia appears to enjoy considerable influence and social recognition particularly in Central Asia. Even in aspiring European states of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, the society is deeply divided on the question of the Russia. In addition to having played the historical role of a “civilizer” state, Russia’s position in this regional international society is backed by the East–West identity dynamics reflected upon above in the contest of the EaP. Factors concerning similarity in governance system and norms facilitate Russia’s recognition in terms of its relative social status compared to the EU. Similarity in domestic governance arrangements, which can be linked to the shared Soviet legacy, plays an important role in not only social recognition of Russia as the leading state, but also facilitation of Russian authoritarian norm diffusion or authoritarian learning in the region. This gives a hint also about why European democratic norm diffusion in the Former-Soviet space has been very slow despite years of participation of the Former-Soviet states within the liberal Pan-European institutions such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe.

Conclusion The EU has been active in the Former-Soviet space of the wider Caspian region ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It has supported numerous regional integration projects aiming at integrating the economy of the region into the European market. It has also invested in its normative power in the region by supporting reforms aiming at democratisation, stronger civil society and open public sphere. At the institutional level, the

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EU has pursued political association and partnership agreements with a number of the Former-Soviet states to further strengthen its position in the international affairs of the region. Although such mechanisms have helped the EU to position itself as an actor along other actors in the region, they have not necessarily translated into strengthening its actorness in terms of influence and social recognition. The problem of recognition has been a key issue concerning the EU “actorness” debate both in the Caspian and more generally in the global arena. Theoretically, the problem of recognition can be conceptualised in terms of the “social statuses” of actors in international societies. Additionally, recognition is a comparative concept, and it finds meaning in how an actor e.g. the EU’s social status compares with other actors e.g. Russia in a given international society e.g. the wider Former-Soviet Caspian region. Looking from this perspective, this chapter argued that the EU actorness recognition in the wider Caspian region is externally circumscribed by two factors: first, by the EU’s self-identification vis-à-vis the FormerSoviet Caspian states, and the identity of those states; and second, by the relative “social status” of Russia which, despite facing some discontent in the region, continues to enjoy primacy over the EU. The EU policy in the wider Caspian region has been informed by the logic of European security. As such, those policies treat the wider Caspian region as the eastern border of the EU rather than extended realm of European social space. Reflected well in the logic of EaP, the EU policies indirectly engage in border creation and border maintenance with regards to the wider Caspian region resulting into the EU being perceived as an exclusive international society. The inherent contention between seeking association and economic integration with the EaP partner states and keeping Europe as an exclusive international society has significantly impacted EU’s recognition in terms of its relative social status in the Caspian. EU’s Self-differentiation in relation to the Former-Soviet Caspian has contributed to an identity dynamic, which Russia has sought to exploit through its discourse of Eurasianism and European norm contestation in the region. Russia’s relative primacy to the EU in the wider Caspian region is another factor for EU’s performance in the region and its recognition as actor. Russia has played the historical role of a socialiser state—to avoid the English School term of “civilizer”—in the region and sits at the centre of what can be defined as the Former-Soviet Caspian regional international society, partially coproduced externally by the EU’s self-differentiation practices vis-a-vis the Caspian.

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While the EU tend to treat the region as the “other” along the spectrum of the liberal values and norms, Russia emerges to “own” the region by the discourse of Eurasinaism and liberal norm contestation that defend the authoritarian systems of the region against western criticism and “validate” the region’s regimes. While Russia’s role and leadership remain contested including by the states in the region, it nevertheless appears to be far more assertive and influential compared to the EU. The EU on the contrary lacks the ambition and accordingly the recognition to be the leading actor in the wider Caspian region. Acknowledgements The author acknowledges funding for research from the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Innovative Training Networks (ITN-ETN) of the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, under grant agreement “CASPIAN - Around the Caspian: a Doctoral Training for Future Experts in Development and Cooperation with Focus on the Caspian Region” (642709 — CASPIAN — H2020-MSCA-ITN-2014).

References Browning, C. S., & Joenniemi, P. (2007). Geostrategies of the European neighbourhood policy DIIS working paper. Danish Institute for International Studies. Retrieved December 19, 2018, from https://www.econstor.eu/bit stream/10419/84610/1/DIIS2007-09.pdf Browning, C. S., & Christou, G. (2010). The constitutive power of outsiders: The European neighborhood policy and the Eastern dmension. Political Geography, 2(29), 109–118. Bull, H. (2002). The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics (3rd edn). Palgrave. Buzan, B. (2014). An introduction to the English school of international relations: The societal approach. John Wiley & Sons. Christou, G. (2010). European Union security logics to the east: The European neighborhood policy and Eastern partnership. European Security, 19(3), 413– 430. Clover, C. (2012). Clinton vows to thwart new Soviet Union. Financial Times (December 6). Retrieved June 26, 2019, from https://www.ft.com/content/ a5b15b14-3fcf-11e2-9f71-00144feabdc0 Cooley, A. (2017). Whose rules, whose sphere? Russian governance and influence in the post-Soviet space. Task Force White Paper. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved June 25, 2019,

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from https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/06/30/whose-rules-whose-sph ere-russian-governance-and-influence-in-post-soviet-states-pub-71403 European Commission. (2018). Eastern partnership. Retrieved December 28, 2018, from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighb ourhood/eastern-partnership_en European Commission. (2019a). Joint communication ‘European Union and Central Asia: New opportunities for stronger partnership’. Retrieved May 17, 2019, from https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_communication_-_ the_eu_and_central_asia_-_new_opportunities_for_a_stronger_partnership.pdf European Commission. (2019b). The European Union and Central Asia: New opportunities for a stronger partnership. Retrieved May 17, 2018, from http:// europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-2494_en.htm European External Action Service. (2019). Factsheet on the EU-Central Asia cooperation. Retrieved May 17, 2019, from https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/ files/factsheet_centralasia_2019.pdf Flockhart, T. (2016). The coming multi-order world. Contemporary Security Policy, 37 (1), 3–30. Gayoso, C. (2009). Russian hegemonies: Historical snapshots, regional security and changing forms of Russia’s role in the post-Soviet region. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 42(2), 233–252. Hill, C. (1993). The capability-epectations gap, or conceptualizing Europe’s international role. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(3), 305–328. Jos Boonstra, J., Laruelle, M., Marazis, A., & Tsertsvadze, T. (2019). A new EU-Central Asia strategy: Deepening relationships and long-lasting impacts. EUCAM Working Paper No. 20. Juraev, S. (2014). Comparing EU and Russia’s engagement in Central Asia. Le Europe En Formation, 4(374), 77–93. Retrieved June 14, 2019, from https://www.cairn.info/revue-l-europe-en-formation-2014-4-page-77.html Larson, D. W., Paul, T. V., & Wohlforth, C. W. (2014). Status and world order. In T. V. Paul, D. W. Larson, & W. C. Wohlforth (Eds.), Status in world politics. Cambridge University Press. Liik, K. (2018). Winning the normative war with Russia: An EU-Russia power audit. European Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved June 22, 2019, from https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/EU-RUSSIA_POWER_AUDIT_.pdf Murray, M. (2018). The struggle for recognition in international relations: Status, revisionism, and rising powers. Oxford Scholarship Online. Chapter. Saivetz, R. C. (2012). The ties that bind? Russia’s evolving relations with its neighbors. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 45(3–4), 401–412. Smith, K. E. (2005). The outsiders: The European neighborhood policy. International Affairs, 4(81), 757–773.

CHAPTER 9

The EU and North Africa, or the Actorness of the Possible Nizar Messari

Introduction North Africa in general and Morocco in particular are a clear instance of the potential of the European Union (EU) as an influential player in world affairs. In this region, the EU is a key political, security, economic and trade partner. It is linked to the region by several types of agreements and treaties, and it is host to the majority of migrants originating from that region. The EU and some of its Member States are also key investors, contributors to development and partners in security issues of North African states in general, and Morocco in particular—from fighting terrorism to controlling migration. In North Africa, the EU has the means to influence actors, politics and the economy, and it does so. Although that influence varies from one country of the region to the other, it is possible to assert that, in general, the EU is not effective in delivering

N. Messari (B) Al Akhawayn University, Ifrane, Morocco e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. R. Freire et al. (eds.), EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92997-8_9

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on all the commitments it makes in the region. A relevant question to ask becomes then: is the influence of the EU in the region up to the expectations of Maghrebi people and their representatives? A caveat is necessary at this stage: North Africa and the Maghreb are used in this chapter inter-changeably to refer to Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Not only these three states have followed comparable dynamics since their independence, but their relationship with the EU and its members has also followed, broadly speaking, similar paths. Coinciding agendas for North Africa and the EU started with their formal inclusion in world politics: Morocco and Tunisia became independent sovereign states in March 1956, and barely a year later, the Treaty of Rome was signed, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC). This is to say that the EEC has existed almost since the independence of those two countries and preexisted the independence of the third one, Algeria. This means that the diplomatic apparatus of each one of these three North African states has only known a world in which there was a coordinated European actor, first the EEC, then the EU. This observation per se explicitly materializes the argument of this chapter: EU actorness is a key factor in the insertion of North Africa in world affairs. But as Simão stresses in her introduction to this volume, although she does not directly mention North Africa, and referring to the EU’s current policy toward its neighboring regions: the EU has become increasingly contested, partly for failing to deliver on the initial image of the ENP as the framework through which the Union’s security community would be enlarged to its neighbours ... [W]hat is noteworthy is not so much that these concerns have become so prominent, but rather that the EU has been unable to address them in a way that is consistent with its own self-perception as a norms-based international actor. (Simão in this book)

The case of North Africa illustrates this argument in very explicit ways: the EU presence is undeniable, the EU attempts to address some of the hot sensitive issues in the region, but those attempts are very limited and timid. In this chapter, the focus is on the relations between the EU and Morocco. Morocco prides itself for having achieved an “Advanced Status” in its partnership with the EU, but that “Advanced Status” has not resulted in concrete measures of partnership between both parties, nor

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has it stopped the relations between both parties from going through important crises. As a matter of fact, over the last few years, whenever red lines in Morocco’s priorities—on top of which the issue of the Western Sahara—were crossed by the EU or its Member States, Morocco pushed back and defended its interests forcefully, resulting in significant crises in the relations between both parties. Therefore, the argument in this chapter is that although the EU feeds expectations among North Africans for holding high moral standards, disappointment among that same population on the EU actorness on the ground is real since EU’s actions are ultimately crafted within the traditional limits of realism, i.e., selfinterest and pragmatism. This results from the fact that EU actorness in North Africa privileges advancing EUs interests with North African states rather than advancing the respect for democracy and human rights in that region. In order to make this argument, the chapter first briefly presents a conceptual framework that explains EU North Africa relations before it dwells on the evolution and the state of the relations between North Africa in general, and Morocco in particular, and the EU. It ends by focusing on the case of Morocco as an illustration of the argument of this chapter, i.e., that the EU bends to pragmatism and political realism at the expense of its self-image of a norm-based international actor whenever its key interests are under threat.

Framing the Analysis of Relations Between the European Union and North Africa Relations between the EU and North Africa are neither new, nor do they take place in a void. As mentioned earlier, the independence of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia has almost coincided with the establishment of the EEC, and the foreign policies of the three North African states have not known a world without a prominent common European player.1 In this part, the chapter evokes some conceptual frameworks that can explain the

1 Relations between independent North African states and the EU carry the weight of the relations established during the colonial period. For instance, the dependence of Tunisia’s and Morocco’s agricultural products—after independence—on the European consuming markets is a consequence of an economic model established during the colonial period. Those economies still carry some of those dependencies until today.

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contemporary relationship between the EU and North Africa and situates it within the broader historical evolution of that relationship. One of the aspects that frame the relations between the EU and its North African neighbors is whether it exercises some kind of normative influence on the region or not. This is not a new debate, and the objective in this chapter is not to dwell on it.2 However, it is relevant to mention that even hard core supporters of the idea that the EU is a normative power, like Ian Manners (2002, 2006b) for instance, admit that there are limits to that power, in particular when it comes to security issues. To be more precise, Manners does not define security as an area in which the EU cannot be a normative power, but instead, he affirms that in the field of security, the EU cannot be considered a Kantian paradise or exception. This means that for the EU to be a normative power in security issues, not only some conditions have to be addressed—such as the progress/establishment of democracy, for instance—, but there are limits to what can be achieved (Manners, 2006c). This has the merit of lowering the expectations regarding the actorness of the EU in general, and in a geographical area like North Africa in particular. In such a nondemocratic setting as North Africa, the security predicament of the EU—as opposed to its normative aims—dictates EU priorities objectives. These limitations are deepened by the fact that for Europe to be able to be considered a global normative leader, it has to go beyond Europe itself, and be able to export and defuse liberal norms beyond its limits (Egan, 2014; Larsen, 2013). In other words, this is somehow the dilemma of the chicken and the egg, or which one comes first: the willingness to be considered a global normative power or the necessity of acting beyond its borders? For others, finally, it is only a truly cosmopolitan Europe that can play the role of a global norm leader and norm setter, and that is still very far from being an EU reality (Sjursen, 2006). In sum, the ambitions of the EU as a global norm setter should be moderated, particularly when its security interests are at play. It is also important to notice that the extent of European influence depends on finding partners to work with. According to some scholars, the EU has been more effective in affecting change when it exercised its influence and power for democratization through empowering societies (Noutcheva, 2015). As a matter of fact, societies embedded with 2 See Manners (2002, 2006a, 2006b) as well as Pace (2007), Rosecrance (1998), Scheipers & Sicurelli (2007) and Sjursen (2006).

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democratic values are potentially more apt to push change in the states they belong to. This is confirmed by the fact that the EU has been more successful in affecting change, and eventually integrating Central and Eastern Europe than it has been with North Africa and the Middle East (Zielonka, 2013), although the weight of eventual EU membership as a defining incentive for reforms in the two former regions was real and important. This means that what is observed “on the ground” is the vindication of power realism rather than that of social constructivism, i.e., that unless the EU encounters or has local partners who can push for change in their own societies, the EU remains very much limited in its scope of action and on what it can achieve as a global norm setter. Instead of being defined as a norm setter and a moral leader, the global actorness of the EU is reduced to its simplest and crudest expression—the defense of EU’s interests. This does however not mean that there are no expectations—among the people and civil society outside the EU—that the EU should aim at the moral high ground and make a stand in favor of human rights, democracy and cosmopolitanism.

The Evolution of EU-North African Relations In concrete terms, this has translated into a rich and diversified history of relations between Europe (first the EEC and then the EU) and North Africa in trade and commercial terms, as shown in Table 9.1. More recently, and more specifically, after the EEC became the EU, a deepening and expanding of those relations took place, affecting politics, society and culture, as shown by Table 9.2. This means that the EU is a key partner of the three North African states, economically, commercially as well as politically and socially. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative (EMPI), often referred to as the Barcelona Process, launched in 1995 and through which the European Union established a framework to deal with North African states, has also served as a framework for relations between the EU and the Maghreb.3 In the early 1990s, the then EEC and the North African states were engaged in what was known as the “4 + 5 process” in which four

3 See Pace (2004).

Evolution of Europe-North Africa Cooperation

Multilateral—within the 1981–1986 Framework of TH CEE enlargement process with adherence of Greece then Spain and Portugal Within the framework of 1978, 1981, the 1976 cooperation 1986, 1992 agreement

Additional Protocols: Second and Third enlargement

Source Elaborated by the Author

Financial Protocols

Multilateral—within the 1976–1992 framework of the Global Mediterranean Policy

Cooperation agreements

1969

Bilateral (inspired by Rome Treaty)

Association Agreements

Date

Nature of the Agreement

Accord

Financial aid

Agricultural preferences—export quotas and schedule—financial assistance—Agricultural goods restrictive measure on Maghrebi agricultural export

Trade—tariffs advantages—reciprocity

Implications

Morocco-Algeria-Tunisia

Morocco-Algeria-Tunisia

Morocco-Tunisia-Algeria with the EEC

Morocco—Tunis with EEC

Signatories

The first generation of trade and cooperation agreements: The Global Mediterranean Policy (1970–1990)

Table 9.1

Adjustment Policies by IMF and World Bank

Decolonization—Cold War—regional unrest after the “sand war” between Morocco and Algeria Detente

Context

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2008 revitalised ENP strategy

No seismic shift but more focus on security challenges. EU offers financial aids as long as they meet strict eco, political conditions

Regional relationship and dialogue, aiming at achieving peace, stability and growth in the Mediterranean Partner Countries

Implications

“More for more”: stronger conditionality, increased funding, visa-facilitation, civil society facility, democracy endowment, comprehensive free trade Tunisia

Arab Spring—Crimea, Palestinian-Israeli conflict, protracted Syrian crisis

End of the Cold War—Birth of UAM2nd Gulf war—Algerian crisis and its spill-over effect—New EU agenda: Migration, terrorism—drug trafficking War on terror

Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey

Ukraine, Modova, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Lybia, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia Morocco

Context

Signatories/beneficiaries

THE EU AND NORTH AFRICA, OR THE ACTORNESS OF THE POSSIBLE

Source Elaborated by the Author

2012

“All but membership”

Advanced Status

2004

Advanced Status

Multilateral (Barcelona process)

The EU neighborhood policy

1995–2004

05/25/2011

Multilateral (Barcelona process)

Euromed Partership

Date

New and ambitious European Neighborhood Policy

Nature of the Agreement

The renewed Mediterranean Policy (1995–2004)

Accord

Table 9.2

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southern EU Member States (France, Italy, Portugal and Spain) negotiated directly with the five states of the Maghreb (the Maghreb being defined in its broad sense, which includes Libya and Mauritania in addition to Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). The insignificant progress made through the Barcelona Process resulted in its gradual irrelevance and eventual replacement in the following decade by the EU Neighborhood Policy.4 Currently, and as shown in Table 9.2., Morocco and Tunisia hold what is called an “Advanced Status” in their relations with the EU. All of these frameworks deal, in one way or another, with economic and trade relations, political and security relations, not to mention social issues. Algeria holds a relatively strong positioning in its dealing with the EU, both in terms of economic and trade relations, due to its major oil and gas reserves. On the political front, Algeria holds uneasy relations with the West in general, as it considers that its own influence in the Sahel and West Africa could be threatened by Western interventions—particularly French and American interventions. Algeria also criticizes Western based mediations—and interventions—in the Middle East conflicts, and particularly in Palestine, Iraq and more recently in Syria, which—from Algeria’s point of view—tend to undermine essential Arab interests in general, and Palestinian interests in particular.5 However, French admission under President François Hollande of its role during the colonial period, and in particular during the Algerian war of independence, helped in narrowing the gap between both sides regarding that painful episode to both parties, but in particular to the Algerian people, and has contributed to bringing France and Algeria closer.6 In addition, Spain and Italy have closer and more cooperative relations with Algeria than France.7 In economic and commercial matters, Tunisia is dependent on its trade with the EU. However, during the Tunisian revolution that toppled the

4 See for instance Emerson & Noutcheva (2005), Yousef (2017) and Cavatorta & Francesco (2014). 5 See Willis, 2014. 6 It is worth mentioning that President Hollande stopped short from apologizing for

war crimes committed during the colonial period or the Algeria war of independence (Le Monde 2012). 7 This chapter is drafted in the midst of the protests in Algeria against the regime, which started in February/March 2019. The consequences of these events are difficult to judge at this juncture.

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regime of Ben Ali in 2011, Tunisian human right activists were disheartened by the lack of support of the EU to their demands for regime change.8 Economic and political issues tend to coincide in Tunisia’s current relations with the EU. Parallel to this, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the EU Neighborhood Policy have significantly downgraded the weight of political issues in North Africa’s relations with the EU and emphasized instead economic and trade matters in a move that avoided weakening North African regimes politically by putting them under the spot on issues like democracy, freedom of speech and human rights. The Arab Spring as well as the above mentioned 2019 street protests in Algeria against the regime in general, and President Bouteflika in particular, which were met by lukewarm support from EU authorities and EU Member States leaders, confirm the sensitivity of the EU and its leaders to the political stability of the region. This state of things is further confirmed by the relations of the EU with Morocco.

The Case of Morocco Morocco’s trade relations with the EU are solid, although Morocco is strongly dependent on the EU market. Strong in the sense that the EU is by far Morocco’s main trading partner, but dependent in the sense that trade negotiations and agreements with the EU, just like in the case of Tunisia, are between a gigantic economic powerhouse, the EU, and a small and developing economy, Morocco, which needs investors, markets and transfer of technology.9 Nevertheless, Morocco has managed to advance in its relations with the EU through several stages of cooperation and partnership, and was thus the first partner to have achieved an Advanced Status in its relations with the EU, a status the former head of the EU Romano Prodi described informally as “everything but membership”. As for migration, it is fair to argue that the dominating theme of Morocco’s relations with the EU is the externalization of EU’s border management policy, and Morocco’s use of its resistance to it in order to

8 See Willis 2014. 9 This has been Morocco’s dilemma since independence, as discussed by Abdelkhaleq

Berramdane in his Le Maroc et l’Occident (Berramdane 1987).

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obtain gains in other areas. Migration is one of the issues that have dominated the Morocco-EU agenda, as it was at the previously mentioned Euro-Mediterranean Conference held in Barcelona in 1995 that “explicit reference was made, for the first time, to the need for increasing the rate of development among the countries on the southern coast of the Mediterranean Sea as a way of reducing migratory pressure … The term co-development first appeared in the official Spanish literature in a document related to immigration rather than development aid” (Lacomba & Boni, 2008, pp. 130–131). The objective was to provide the populations from the southern Mediterranean countries with conditions that would convince them to remain in their countries of origin rather than migrate to Europe. However, according to Lacomba and Boni (2008, p. 141), internationally implemented development projects improve the living standards of the local population, but not to the extent of stopping emigration.” The reason they present for this is that “the advantages of emigration for the population as a whole are far superior to those gained from international cooperation. One of the reasons for this is that emigrants’ remittances have a direct effect on their families economies … while development projects contribute to the collective welfare in the middle and long term.

As previously alluded to here, Morocco was initially reluctant to cooperate with the EU on controlling non-Moroccan migrants in transit in Morocco, as it considered it a problem for the EU, not for Morocco. The Moroccan argument was that it had no quarrel with those migrants since their objective was to enter Europe without an authorization, not to remain in Morocco. It is only under heavy European insistence as well as the confirmation of the fact that this new situation—Morocco being a transit state—was not a temporary one, but one that would last for a long period of time, that Morocco ended up accepting to cooperate with the EU on this matter (El Qadim, 2015). Two turning points should be emphasized here: first, the launching of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2004, with its emphasis on the importance of positive cooperation from neighbors in order for them to be considered as partners of the policy. That insistence convinced Moroccan authorities of the need to intensify their cooperation with the EU on migration in order to achieve other objectives, not necessarily linked to that issue. The second turning point is more dramatic in the sense that successive

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tragedies suffered by sub-Saharan Africans in Morocco—from drowning in the Mediterranean to being “dumped” in the desert by Moroccan authorities, and from police attacks against their camps to humiliation in the streets of Moroccan cities—, which were initially denied by Moroccan authorities and revealed mainly by the European press, tarnished the image of Morocco both in Europe and in Africa and convinced Moroccan authorities that they needed to crack down on border crossing of the Morocco-Spanish border and cooperate with the EU on this issue.10 One of Morocco’s most significant and forceful actions in this sense was the introduction in November 2003 of a law dealing with “the entrance and the residence of foreigners in Morocco, and irregular emigration and immigration”, known as Law 02–03. Coincidentally or not, the introduction of Law 02–03 came a few months after Morocco had approved its terrorist law 03–03, which dealt also partially with the existence of what it considered foreign terrorist rings in Morocco. Just like with the Moroccan government, the resistance of the Moroccan parliament to the introduction of both laws was considerable, and it was only the long insistence of EU and US authorities and the magnitude of the Casablanca terrorist attacks of May 2003 that tipped the balance within the Moroccan parliament toward the analysis and eventual approval of both bills. It is noticeable that Law 02–03 “introduced many of the suggestions made in the EU’s (1999) Morocco Action Plan that had been angrily rejected by the Moroccan government at the time. It granted significant powers to the Moroccan police force and army in their responsibilities to tackle clandestine migration” (Collyer, 2007, 672). In this sense, Law 02–03 was presented since the beginning to Moroccan legislators in the context of Morocco’s negotiations with the EU on migration issues, and there was no secret about that. A key aspect in this evolution in the field of migration was Morocco´s intense cooperation with the EU and its Member States. As I affirm elsewhere with Johannes van der Klaauw (2010) [M]eetings between heads of law enforcement agencies and migration officials take place in a number of forums such as the Western Mediterranean 5 + 5 dialogue, the EuroMed forum and the Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue. The 5+5 Dialogue was first launched in 1990 and then again in 2001 as a forum for political dialogue which brings together ten 10 See Messari & Van Der Klaauw (2010).

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countries bordering the Western Mediterranean Basin: five countries of the Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia) and five countries of the European Union (Spain, France, Italy, Malta and Portugal). … The Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue started in 2002 – 2003 as an informal process dealing with issues related to transit migration through the Mediterranean region with a view to preventing irregular migration and thus creating the conditions for legal migration.

Outsourcing the control of migration movements was one of the key mechanisms put together by EU authorities. It was accompanied by both pressure and European funding to encourage Morocco to control its maritime and land borders with Europe. MEDA I (1996–2001) and MEDA II (2001–2006) contributed significantly to the financing of Morocco’s fight against “illegal immigration”, and in particular within what Moroccan and EU authorities called “Morocco’s Strategy to Fight Illegal Immigration”. This new type of migration monitoring has resulted, as already hinted at earlier here, since 2004, in a real hunt for migrants and in serious violations of human rights by the Moroccan police. Events such as the ones that took place in the gates of the two Spanish strongholds in Northern Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla, in October 2005, when migrants decided to attempt entering those Spanish cities without previous authorization and were repelled and shot at by Moroccan border officers represent a dramatic example of that. The scenes of migrants trying to run over the borders of Ceuta and Melilla in groups of 300 individuals, and sometimes of 7 to 800 individuals, and of the Moroccan and Spanish police trying to stop them, have been common and regular on those two borders. These attempts happen despite the efforts of Spanish and Moroccan authorities of reinforcing the barriers and walls of separation between those two cities and Morocco (Gabrielli, 2015). Moreover, an important aspect of cooperation between Morocco and EU Member States in migration control was the establishment of “Joint naval patrols… between Spain and Morocco in 2004… Territorial controls within Morocco have also been considerably extended under EU sponsorship” (Collyer, 2007, p. 672). Indeed, in December of 2004, an EU-Morocco program of “Border control management” provided institutional support to the Moroccan Ministry of Interior new Directorate for Migration and Border Control, with training programs, equipment (such as radars, infrared cameras, electromagnetic sensors and so on) for the

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cost of 40 Million Euros. In August of 2006, and as a follow up step, the EU added 67.5 Million Euros as an assistance for Morocco to step up its fight against what it called “clandestine immigration”. More expressively, and [i]n response to growing pressure from the EU and particularly from Spain, the Moroccan government instituted controls along the Mediterranean coast, forcing boats to depart from further and further south on the Atlantic coast, at greater and greater risk. From 2002 onwards this was enhanced by technical support from the SIVE [integrated system of external vigilance]. (Collyer, 2007, p. 684)

a technology-based sophisticated system of space control—including maritime space—introduced in 2004 at extremely high financial costs which allowed that country to increasingly monitor and act in the “protection” of its borders. More recently, and in response to the recent revamping of the Western Mediterranean illegal migration route, in December 2018, the EU also decided to provide Morocco with an aid of 148 Million Euros to assist it in fighting illegal border crossing to Europe (Fernandez-Molina, 2016). The fall of the regime of Ben Ali in Tunisia in January 2011, and the relative instability that followed it, as well as the quasi civil war that followed the fall of the regime of Kaddafi in Libya and the 2018 EU crackdown on the Libyan route due to developments in Libya such as slavery, brought back, as already mentioned here, the Moroccan crossway to Europe as an appealing one to potential African migrants, and pushed further EU’s attempt of externalization of its borders. Informal and formal interviews with migrants and civil society activists show that 2011 and early 2012, and then since the second half of 2018, have seen a substantial increase in the number of African migrants in Morocco, as well as an increasing abuse of violence by the Moroccan police to clamp down on those movements (Cavatorta, 2014; Colombo et al., 2019). According to the Moroccan Ministry of Interior, during the first semester of 2019, Morocco managed to abort 25.000 attempts of crossing the Mediterranean Sea to reach the European continent, in an increase of approximately 30% when compared to the same period in 2018. These efforts made jointly by Morocco and Spain were the consequence of the record arrival of some 57.250 illegal migrants to Spanish coasts during 2018 (as compared to 22.414 in 2017), which in part resulted from

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the closing or tightening of the Eastern Mediterranean migration route, between Turkey and Greece, as well as the already mentioned tightening of the central Mediterranean migration route between Libya and Italy (Telegraph, 2019). According to the Moroccan Ministry of Interior, this result was reached not only due to the patrols in the sea, but also and mainly due to the dismantling, during that same period, of 50 smuggling groups that assist migrants in crossing the sea in exchange of substantial sums of money (Lakome, 2019). It is within the context of the recent evolution of Moroccan foreign policy that relations with the EU need to be analyzed: the central importance of the issue of the Western Sahara, the rising importance of economic and trade matters, and the fact that Morocco increasingly sees itself as a major and influential player on its continent, which means that it has interests to defend and prestige to protect.11 Recent episodes in Moroccan relations with the EU (and some of its Member States) symbolize these new orientations. Before discussing them, a caveat is necessary to underline their relevance. Traditionally, when faced with unfriendly actions from powerful partners like the EU, Moroccan diplomacy used to avoid confrontation and adopted a low profile until the crisis would pass (Berramadane, 1987; El Houdaigui, 2003). However, in this case, Morocco adopted a confrontational posture and was uncharacteristically assertive and bold. In December 2015, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that the agricultural agreement between Morocco and the EU could not include products from the Western Sahara. In February 2018, the same EU court suspended also the Fishing agreement between Morocco and the EU, for the same reasons. As a consequence, Morocco decided, already in February 2016, to suspend all its collaboration with the EU, at all levels. It was only after the EU Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs adopted amendments in July 2018 extending the scope of the EU-Morocco agreements to the Western Sahara that normalcy was reestablished to Moroccan-EU relations. Finally, in January 2019, 11 Over the last decade, Morocco’s foreign policy can be characterized by three important shifts, although some long held priorities, such as the issue of the Western Sahara and the importance of Morocco’s Western alignments and alliances, remained unchanged. The major shift in Moroccan foreign policy in the current decade has been the rise of the African continent as a key target of Morocco’s foreign policy, the growing importance of trade in the agenda of Moroccan diplomats, and finally, Morocco’s growing boldness and assertiveness in dealing with foreign powers. For more details, refer to Barre (2012).

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the European Parliament approved those same agreements—regarding agriculture and fisheries and including in them the Western Sahara—and brought to closure the crisis with Morocco.12 In this long crisis with the EU, and according to the previous discussion on Morocco’s foreign policy priorities, despite the rise of the importance of the economic agenda for Morocco, the Western Sahara continued to be the priority-setter mentioned earlier. What this episode shows, besides Morocco’s emboldened and more assertive diplomacy, is that the EU in general, and its Member States in particular, deal pragmatically with issues, and put principles and norms in the backstage. When foreign partners, even relatively weak ones like Morocco, are assertive and do not budge on what they consider key 12 This episode falls in the same category of enhanced Moroccan assertiveness as two other episodes, one with France and the other one with Sweden. In February 2014, the head of Moroccan Intelligence was in a visit to France, and as he was hosted at the residence of the Moroccan Ambassador (i.e., formally on Moroccan territory and out of reach of France’s justice system), he was subpoenaed by the French police in response to a complaint of a French NGO accusing him of torture, notably in the Western Sahara. Despite the French government’s immediate formal excuses, Morocco suspended judiciary cooperation with France until trust between both sides could be re-established. The consequence of the suspension of Moroccan-French judiciary cooperation had important consequences at several levels, the most relevant of which was the suspension of cooperation between Moroccan and French intelligence offices. The conjunction of terrorist attacks on the French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo in January 2015—which underlined the urgency of reestablishing Franco-Moroccan Intelligence cooperation—as well as long and complex negotiations between the Moroccan and the French governments resulted in formal and official guarantees given by France to Morocco regarding the immunity of its officers in France, and then to the reestablishment of the judiciary cooperation between Morocco and France, and a return to the regular solid relations between them. As was with Sweden, in 2014, discussions regarding the eventual recognition of the Sahrawi Republic by Sweden became public and recurrent, alarming Moroccan authorities. When the Social Democratic Party launched an internal consultation on the issue, Morocco took several measures, some of which were of retaliatory nature, while others were conciliatory. As for the former, in September 2015, Morocco blocked the opening of an Ikea store in Morocco. As for the latter, the government convinced leaders of Moroccan political parties to visit Sweden during the autumn of 2015 and convince their counterparts of the Moroccan position. Symbolically, the first of such visits was led by a woman, Nabila Mounib, who was back then already the leader of a socialist party, and which was, and remains part of the opposition. Morocco also committed to accept the repatriation of some 800 Moroccan unaccompanied minors who were illegally in Sweden. When Sweden abandoned the idea of recognizing the Sahrawi Republic in January 2016, diplomatic relations between Morocco and Sweden went back to normal and the crisis became part of the past.

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issues, the tendency in the EU is to make the necessary concessions and defend its important material interests. This includes highly sensitive security issues, like fighting terrorism, as well as social and economic issues, like stopping illegal migration or establishing agriculture and fishing agreements.

Conclusion One can affirm that EU actorness in North Africa in general, and in Morocco in particular, oscillates between three ideal types. The first ideal type is framed according to a representation of the EU as the holder of the moral high ground and on a self-projected image of a normative power, a power that does good. The second one is of an ambition, a projection of the EU as a world power, a power that holds influence far away from its borders. The third one is the pragmatic, materialist and ultimately realist one, in which the EU is faced with stark and difficult choices that stir it away from the moral high ground. As very often in these situations, these ideal types are seldom concretely materialized: the EU navigates somewhere within the virtual triangle set by its three poles. EU pragmatism and adherence to realism—as opposed to moral high ground norm setting—is evident in EU’s continuing policy of externalization of its border management, regardless of the costs to human rights. In the same order of ideas, the 2019 dichotomy of the hard line taken by the EU and its Member States against the regime of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela as compared with the passive and indulgent position regarding developments in Algeria (both of which were taking place at the same time) are yet another example of EU’s realism. Otherwise, how could those double standards regarding the adoption of a moral high ground and the relativism of EU’s attachment to human rights and democracy be explained? As a matter of fact, that same cautious—not to say callous— reaction had characterized the EU and some of its Member States during the Tunisian Revolution that toppled the regime of Ben Ali back in 2011. Concretely, this means that the EU would like to be an influential player worldwide, and ideally, as a norm setter, it would like to adopt the moral high ground. However, that position is easier to keep when events are geographically remote from Europe and choices have a lesser impact on the ground. With Algeria—regarding street protests throughout 2019—, or with Tunisia back in 2011, or with Morocco regarding the Western Sahara or cooperation on fighting illegal migration, when concrete EU

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interests are at play, it is more flexible, more pragmatic, more attuned to self-interest, in sum, more realist and more likely to abandon norm setting and the moral high ground. This is the more regrettable that study after study, and survey of public opinion after survey, expectations on the EU in North African societies are high. In this region, individuals and civil society expect the EU to support their plea for more democracy and enhanced respect for human rights and hope that it will make regimes accountable for their acts. Civil society groups apply for EU based grants and other forms of financial support in order to defend human rights and democracy, and they hope that the EU will go beyond the financial aspect and support them and defend them against potential abuses by their regimes. When that support does not happen, disappointment is considerable, and disillusion leads to disengagement. Is the EU willing to extend its actorness and engage other states by setting that high level of norms?

References Barre, A. (2012). Les Nouveaux axes de la diplomatie marocaine. In M. Mokhefi, & A. Antil (Eds.), Le Maghreb et Son Sud: Vers des Liens Renouvelés. CNRS. Berramdane, A. (1987). Le Maroc et l’Occident. Karthala. Cavatorta, F. (2014). EU–MENA relations from the Barcelona process to the Arab uprisings: A new research agenda. Journal of European Integration, 36(6), 619–625. Collyer, M. (2007). In-between places: Trans-Saaran transit migrants in Morocco and the fragmented journey to Europe. Antipode, 39(4), 668–690. Colombo, S., Otte, M., Soler i Lecha, E., & Tocci, N. (2019). The art of the (im)possible: Sowing the seeds for the EU’s constructive engagement in the Middle East and North Africa. MENARA Final Reports No. 4. Retrieved May 11, 2019, from http://www.menaraproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/ 04/menara_fr_4.pdf Egan, M. (2014). Narratives, norms and governability in the European Union: An introduction. Journal of European Public Policy, 21(6), 794–880. Emerson, M., & Noutcheva, G. (2005). From Barcelona process to neighborhood policy: Assessments and open issues. CEPS Working Documents No. 220, 1 March 2005. El Houdaïgui, R. (2003). La Politique Etrangère sous le règne de Hassan II . L’Harmattan. El Qadim, N. (2015). Le gouvernement asymétrique des migrations: Maroc/Union européenne. Dalloz.

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Fernandez-Molina, I. (2016). Moroccan foreign policy under Mohammed VI, 1999–2014. Routledge. Gabrielli, L. (2015). Récurrence de la crise frontalière : l’exception permanente en Espagne. Cultures & Conflits, 99–100, 75–98. Lacomba, J., & Boni, A. (2008). The role of emigration in foreign aid policies: The case of Spain and Morocco. International Migration, 46(1), 23–150. Lakome. (2019). Retrieved May 11, 2019, from https://lakome2.com/societe/ 116996 Larsen, H. (2013). The EU as a normative power and the research on external perceptions: The missing link. Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(4), 896–910. Le Monde. (2012). Retrieved December 19, 2018, from https://www.lemonde. fr/afrique/article/2012/12/19/francois-hollande-en-visite-en-algerie-dansl-espoir-de-tourner-une-page_1808125_3212.html Manners, I. (2002). Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms? Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2), 235–258. Manners, I. (2006a). The European Union as a normative power: A response to Thomas Diez. Millennium, 35(1), 167–180. Manners, I. (2006b). Normative power Europe reconsidered: Beyond the crossroads. Journal of European Public Policy, 13(2), 182–199. Manners, I. (2006c). European Union ‘Normative power’ and the security challenge. European Security, 15(4), 405–421. Noutcheva, G. (2015). Societal empowerment and Europeanization: Revisiting the EUs impact on democratization. Journal of Common Market Studies, 54(3), 691–708. Pace, M. (2004). The euro-mediterranean partnership and the common mediterranean strategy? European Union Policy from a Discursive Perspective in Geopolitics, 9(2), 292–309. Pace, M. (2007). The construction of EU normative power. Journal of Common Market Studies, 45(5), 1041–1064. Rosecrance, R. (1998) The European Union: A new type of international actor. In J. Zielonka (Ed.), Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. Kluwer Law International. Scheipers, S., & Sicurelli, D. (2007). Normative power Europe: A credible Utopia? Journal of Common Market Studies, 45(2), 435–457. Sjursen, H. (2006). The EU as a ‘normative’ power: “how can this be? Journal of European Public Policy, 13(2), 235–251. Telegraph. (2019). Retrieved May 11, 2019, from https://www.telegraph.co. uk/news/2019/01/05/eu-illegal-migrants-hit-five-year-low-spain-becomesnew-gateway/ Van der Klaauw, J., & Messari, N. (2010). Counter-terrorism measures and refugee protection in North Africa. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 29(4), 83–103.

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Willis, M. (2014). Politics and power in the Maghreb: Algeria. Oxford University Press. Yousef, A. (2017). Europe’s relations with North Africa: Politics, economics and security. I.B. Tauris Zielonka, J. (2013). Europe’s new civilizing missions: The EU’s normative power discourse. Journal of Political Ideologies, 18(1), 35–55.

CHAPTER 10

An Asset or Liability: Turkey’s Potential in Availing EU Global Actorness Erhan Do˘gan and H. Deniz Genç

Introduction Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a burgeoning literature on European Union (EU) actorness. Many studies discussed whether the EU could be considered as an actor in international politics. Having acknowledged its actorness, many others tried to make sense of the nature and level of this actorness. This chapter aims to advance these earlier studies by presenting a discussion of Turkish perspectives on EU actorness. It discusses Turkey’s alignment with EU’s Common Foreign and Security

E. Do˘gan (B) Departent of Political Science and International Relations, Marmara University, Istanbul, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] H. D. Genç Department of Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul Medipol University, Istanbul, Turkey e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. R. Freire et al. (eds.), EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92997-8_10

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Policy (CFSP) and underlines that despite its membership application, Turkey has chosen to follow other foreign policy priorities based on its own interest calculations. The chapter argues for the existence of a correlation between Turkey’s reluctance or cooperation on the one hand, and the EU’s capability to develop and conduct a CFSP, on the other hand, sketching a link between Turkey’s alignment and EU actorness. Building on the analysis of CFSP chapters of European Commission Progress Reports on Turkey, the chapter then discusses the reasons for Turkey’s non-alignment, Turkish political elite’s foreign policy choices, and their perspectives on EU actorness. Lastly, it highlights that Turkey could have played a critical role in the process through which the EU would exercise regional actorness and later global actorness. On this account, the chapter begins by providing a brief account of history of Turkey-EU relations and changing dynamics of international politics, which transformed these relations. The chapter continues by discussing EU actorness and it reflects upon EU actorness in Turkey by outlining the Turkish perspectives on CFSP and Turkey’s progress in internalising the relevant acquis. The analysis is built on CFSP sections of European Commission Progress Reports on Turkey and refers to papers of selected Turkish academics, who have written extensively on CFSP and Turkey’s position vis-à-vis the policy.1

Milestones of Turkey-EU Relations When Turkey was invited to apply to the newly established European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959, the main dynamic that was working there was related to the general security concerns and geostrategic calculations of the EEC countries and their allies. Indeed, it is claimed by some scholars that the foundation of the EEC was mainly encouraged, supported (Dinan, 2006, p. 67) and even pushed by the United States of America (USA) which was trying to back up the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) security architecture in Europe and the Atlantic with a supranational economic integration of its European allies, against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in their hegemonic struggle. 1 The first Progress Report on Turkey was released in 1998. This study examines CFSP chapters of 23 Progress Reports on Turkey, released in the period between 1998–2020. The reports can be reached at https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/regular-reports-turkey-744.

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Differently from Greece, which started a similar process for association with the EEC during the same years, Turkey could not complete the process. Eralp (2009) refers to the temporality concept in explaining why Turkey could not be a full member of the EEC and then EU. According to him, “Turkish developments diverged from the dynamics of European integration with regard to the sequence, speed, and duration of events” (Eralp, 2009, p. 148). This difference regarding the political motivations set Turkey and the EU apart and pushed these two different polities in different directions. In times of crisis, the geostrategic and security related concerns brought Turkey and the EU closer, in times of peace and in less problematic times, the EU tended to put a distance to Turkey as it saw Turkey as a liability instead of an asset. In December 1997, meeting in the Luxembourg European Council, the EU heads of state agreed to launch an accession process with all applicant states (Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), Malta and Greek Cypriot government on behalf of all Cyprus) except Turkey. This approach was not surprising as with the Cold War end, the new Russian Federation was not perceived as a threat anymore, and Turkey’s role as a security provider in the southern flank of NATO was diminished. With these changing dynamics of international politics, new calculations were being made and Turkey, with its low level of economic development, huge regional disparities, weak record of democracy and human rights, and with unstable neighbours would be a real burden. In addition, Turkey had had problems with Greece regarding the use of the Aegean Sea and Cyprus had been a protracted conflict to which Turkey had been a party. No doubt, these issues influenced the EU approach to Turkey. Another important factor that started to be discussed at the time was “the identity of Turkey”. The question was whether Turkey was European. The Turkish government responded to the Luxembourg European Council by partially suspending the political dialogue with the EU. US involvement in the recognition of Turkey’s candidacy and also positive approaches of the major EU Member States’ leaders to Turkey contributed to the process. Jacques Chirac, President of France, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder supported Turkey’s candidate status. President Chirac “frame(d) the issue of Turkey as a geopolitical issue for the future of Europe. For him it was in Europe’s interest to keep Turkey within the family rather than letting it look east to the Asian and Muslim world” (Sitzenstuhl, 2016, p. 6). So the leaders of the EU Member States decided to give a greenlight

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to Turkey to proceed with the accession process by granting it candidate status at the 1999 Helsinki European Council. After Turkey was recognised as a candidate country, the Turkish governments engaged in intensive reform processes to meet the Copenhagen Criteria to start accession negotiations. In these years, the EU was occupied with the accession of the CEECs plus Malta and the Greek Cypriot government. Accession negotiations with Turkey started in October 2005. However, since then, there has first been a slowdown and then a stalemate in relations.

Changing Dynamics of International Politics: A Lesser Role for Both Turkey and the EU During the early 1990s, nobody was in a position to foresee the trajectory of events for the upcoming decades. The Cold War was over. The CEECs would be “returning to Europe”. Turkey, on the other hand, would have a diminished role in Europe. Very rapidly it returned to its ages old role as “the other” in the eyes of its European partners. Rising identity politics contributed and then cemented this understanding. As the post-Cold War dynamics were changing, Turkey’s fragile position did not improve in the 1990s. The post-Cold War status quo was challenged for the first time by the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990. This occupation was responded by a US-led international coalition harshly in 1991. This first Gulf War was followed by the War in Yugoslavia (1992–1995), and then by 9/11, which changed the context and showed that the challenge was not a conventional or a traditional one anymore. Now, there were many different groups scattered around the Muslim populated parts of the world where they benefitted from the power vacuums that existed in geographies of failed states like Afghanistan and Somalia. They have challenged the security of the states and populations by terrorist attacks. Following 9/11 attacks, the US declaration of war on terrorism led to the creation of an American-led global counterterrorism campaign, which paved the way for military operations in Afghanistan in 2001 and the war in Iraq in 2003. The Iraqi war was followed by a US-led occupation of Iraq (Genç & Öztürk-Tunçel, 2017). EU Member States were divided on how to respond these challenges and the changing international environment. When the USA, in its global war on terror decided to occupy Iraq before 2003, leaders of the United Kingdom (UK), Spain, Portugal, Czech Republic, Italy, Hungary, Poland

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and Denmark joined the war effort, with a declaration published in different European media (BBC, 30 January 2003). They were followed by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia. Germany and France were highly critical of this US initiative and were unhappy with the declared support of their fellows from the EU to the USA. It is even stated that after the Vilnius ten declaration, President Chirac criticised these countries and said that “It is not well brought up behavior. They missed a good opportunity to keep quiet” (CNN, 18 February 2003). France and Germany openly declared their opposition to the US occupation plan (The Guardian, 22 January 2003). France even signed bilateral agreements with the Iraqi government before the US plan was implemented (The Guardian, 10 October 2004). While the Member States were taking their individual positions based on their interest calculations, the EU was unable to develop a strategic position and capability as well as unity and harmony within, in order to claim an actorness in world politics. The divide within the EU, right before the Iraqi invasion by the USA was the monumental exposition of this fact. The EU’s inaction vis-à-vis the Serbian aggression over Bosnia (1992–1995) and Kosovo (1998–1999) were the other two crucial examples during the 1990s. The EU was not there during the Libya War (2014), in Syria (2011), Egypt (2011) as France, the UK or even Germany were there as independent countries. Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014 was also very challenging for the EU, as Member States divided over the reaction, measures, and sanctions that would apply to the Russian Federation (Genç, 2014). These international developments have challenged EU actorness in the Balkans, Middle East, and North Africa, as it could not perform an effective and influential actorness. In most of those cases, there were mainly normative statements rather than some robust policy decisions. One of the reasons for ineffective actorness lies in the EU’s multilayered policy making structures. There is at least a two level game constantly reiterating when a policy is sought to be developed: the EU politics level and the domestic politics level. Issues which could be considered within the confines of domestic politics are carried at domestic level. However, there are many issues which are considered within the competence of the EU institutions. Even over the negotiation of those issues, domestic political concerns and priorities of Member State governments are carried to the EU level. This is a useful mechanism for governments to kick the ball out of the game and earn some time at their

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domestic settings. Next to that, the EU Commission bashing is almost costless for all governments. As it is weak and small compared to national governments, the Commission cannot respond effectively to the challenges directed at itself. In terms of the number of staff, it is smaller than the Istanbul municipality, and it needs the cooperation of member governments to be able to implement its decisions. Moreover, the EU needs geostrategic partners to extend its reach beyond the traditional reach. Our age is witnessing tremendous changes. The USA has been trying to keep its superpower status, while Russia has been challenging the system by increasing armament, military power projections and actual interventions. The EU Member States do not have independent capabilities to project their power and presence to strategically important areas, such as the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Black Sea and Central Asia. This would only be possible through cooperation and harmony within the Union plus possession of some power enhancing assets, including military bases, logistic bases, geographical proximity, cultural and religious similarities, and positive luggage of history. Turkey, in these respects, can be a powerful ally with which the EU can easily step into the Middle East, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. All these regions are quite crucial for the future of the EU. The USA’s and Russia’s unilateral actions over these regions, with their consequences, have a huge destabilising effect over the EU. Turkey’s geographical location and identity have been considered as a kind of threat by many narrow looking European politicians. To the contrary, it should be seen as an asset. As the following analysis puts forward, Turkey seems to have approached EU’s foreign policy half-heartedly and we believe there is a correlation between Turkey’s reluctance or cooperation on the one hand, and the EU’s capability to develop and conduct a CFSP, on the other hand. Therefore, as we discuss in the following sections, we sketch a link between Turkey’s alignment and EU actorness.

Turkey’s Alignment/non-Alignment with CFSP: Implications for EU Actorness In the late 1990s, CFSP was still a new policy and it was being developed. Since then, the EU has conducted its foreign policy with the help of several instruments/tools, such as “common positions”, “joint actions”, “resolutions”, “statements”, “decisions”, and “declarations”. When they

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were invited, the candidate countries were expected to align with these. The level of alignment was monitored by the European Commission carefully, and it was announced in the Progress Reports statistically in percentiles. We believe that Turkey’s level of alignment per year and the Commission’s evaluations on Turkey’s progress in internalizing CFSP give us clues about Turkish political elite’s approach to CFSP and EU actorness, whether the EU was perceived to have ability to formulate coherent policies, capabilities to conduct them, and credibility to convince other actors to follow it suit. According to Öni¸s (2010), many analysts would agree that the years between 2002 and 2005, were “the golden age” of Turkey-EU relations as the government pushed for reform packages to internalise the Copenhagen criteria, which would convince European leaders to open the negotiations process. Turkey was putting strenuous efforts to comply with the acquis and this reformist and cooperative spirit was reported by the Commission in the Progress Reports of the early 2000s. Moreover, we understand that the European Commission underlined that “Turkey [was] an important actor in its region and it praised Turkey’s efforts and initiatives promoting stability, prosperity, and security in the regions it is engaged with: Caucasus, Black Sea, Central Asia, Balkans, Middle East, and Mediterranean” (European Commission, ). It took part in peacekeeping and observer missions of the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); it supported the Middle East Peace Process during the 2000s; and it has played an important role in the international campaign on the fight against terrorism. Moreover, the Commission praised Turkey for calling other Muslim (populated) countries to introduce more democracy and transparency into their political systems (European Commission, 2003). Yet, although Turkey’s efforts were praised highly, when we read between the lines, we understand that Turkey was very cautious in aligning with the CFSP. The 2000 Progress Report noted that “Turkey has regularly aligned its positions with those of the Union and when invited to do so, has associated itself with the Union’s joint actions and common positions”. The Report further underlined that “Turkey should maintain the orientation of its foreign policy in line with that of the Union” (European Commission, 2000, pp. 66–67). Similarly, in 2002, the Commission noted that “Turkey continued to position its foreign and security policy in line with that of the EU”, however, in 2003, it

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hinted that Turkey’s efforts in aligning CFSP were falling short of the expectations: Turkey should focus further efforts on ensuring that its foreign policy orientation remains in line with the Union’s developing foreign and security policy. In particular, Turkey should ensure that its national policies and practice conform to the EU’s common positions, should defend these positions in international fora, and should ensure that all sanctions and restrictive measures can be duly implemented. (European Commission, 2003, p. 122, emphasis added)

Furthermore, in 2005, it openly stated that Turkey’s alignment with the Union’s foreign policy was selective, meaning that Turkey was deliberately not aligning with all common positions, sanctions, and statements: Turkey has generally aligned itself with EU common positions and declarations in particular as regards terrorism and non-proliferation. In some instances, Turkey decided not to align itself with EU common positions in particular as regards the International Criminal Court. However, Turkey’s overall record suggests that alignment has been somewhat selective from a geographical point of view with delays or lacunae observed as regards the Balkans, Asia (Burma) and Africa (Darfur). (European Commission, 2005, p. 127, emphasis added)

After 2006, the reports noted an intensification and diversification of Turkish foreign policy. The Commission reported about high level visits to Iran and Iraq, an active role in the Middle East Peace Process and bilateral cooperation agreements with Iraq, Syria and Tunisia. It was repeatedly noted that Turkey was active in promoting regional stability and in this respect, it supported the European Neighborhood Policy. Turkey was reported to have an enhanced positive role of regional stabilisation and regular political dialogue between Turkey and the EU continued to cover international issues of common interest, including Iran, Iraq, the South Caucasus, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Middle East Peace Process, the Balkans (European Commission, 2008, 2009, p. 86). Yet, despite this active foreign policy, Turkey’s approach to CFSP was still selective. Though it aligned with 109 out of 124 CFSP declarations in 2008, presenting the highest level of alignment (88%) in all years reported, it was reported that Turkey did not follow the EU position in statements concerning Iran (one case on freedom of expression),

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Russia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, China, Sudan, Belarus, and Mauritania (European Commission, 2008). Similarly, in 2009, the Commission (2009, p. 87) underlined that “Turkey did not follow the EU position expressed in statements concerning some Africa-related issues and in declarations concerning for example Uzbekistan, Syria, Iran, and Yemen”. Moreover, as it is seen in Fig. 10.1 below, this selective approach to alignment with CFSP instruments became evident in the following years. Turkey’s level of alignment fell sharply. It should also be noted that EU’s ability to develop coherent and effective foreign policy positions, strategies, and instruments were severely limited due to the turbulence of the 2010s. Arab Spring brought chaos to the Middle East, where interests of the Member States differed. Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014 divided the Member States further. Due to their experiences in history, central and eastern Members of the Union were terrified by the move and called for harsher measures on Russia. However, the other Member States were less enthusiastic about applying coercive measures (Genç, 2014). Similarly, their positions and approaches to the Syrian conflict differed. Therefore, 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Fig. 10.1 Turkey’s Alignment with CFSP Instruments (%) (Source Elaborated by the authors. Data from European Commission Progress Reports on Turkey [2008–2020])

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meeting on a common ground in formulating CFSP positions for the crises has been difficult for the EU. In line with this, as it is presented in Fig. 10.2, the number of High Representative declarations on CFSP decreased in the period between 2010 and 2018. In 2018 the number of declarations starts to increase. As it is presented in Fig. 10.2, despite the fact the number of EU declarations started to increase by 2018, the distance between Turkey’s foreign policy positions and the CFSP was getting wider and Turkey’s level of alignment remained very low. Moreover, several issues of disagreement were noticed in every report, but Turkey has not changed its positions on them. We understand that Turkey has had red lines in these issues and the EU has been unable to convince the Turkish political elite/political leadership to change their attitudes. One of these red lines is Cypriot participation in the EUNATO cooperative framework, so-called Berlin Plus. Turkey has vetoed Cypriot participation in a joint EU-NATO endeavour, and the Commission (2010, p. 93) reported in every report since 1999 that “the issue of EU-NATO cooperation, going beyond the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements, involving all EU Member States, continues to be unresolved”. Similarly, 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

2020

2022

High RepresentaƟve DeclaraƟons on behalf of EU and Council Decisions Turkey's alignment

Fig. 10.2 Declarations in CFSP and Turkey’s Alignment (Source Elaborated by the Authors. Data from European Commission Progress Reports on Turkey [2008–2020])

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Turkey has vetoed Greek Cypriot Administration’s accession to the Wassenaar agreement concerning the Code of Good Conduct on Arms Export. Another issue that Turkey did not take any step despite Commission’s persistent notes was the Statute of the International Criminal Court. In addition, although the bilateral dialogue process continued on various levels, several meetings were held by officials and there has been an official exchange of letters between Prime Ministers, there has been no progress in opening of borders with Armenia (European Commission, 2005, 2010, 2015). Furthermore, we understand that Turkey dragged its feet in following EU positions, joint actions, sanctions, and declarations about Iran and Russia. In the case of Iran, Turkey supported the EU position on Iran’s nuclear programme (European Commission, 2009), however, it did not support the EU, the USA, and other countries in the UN Security Council (UNSC) for additional sanctions against Iran in 2010 (ibid, 2010, p. 95), and in 2011, it was reported that it did not align with restrictive measures imposed by the EU on Iran, in addition to the 4th round of UNSC sanctions (ibid, 2011). In 2012, the Commission reported Turkey’s non-alignment with declarations and Council decisions on Iran but also on Syria, Libya, Tunisia, and Bahrain this time. Following this low level of alignment, the Commission (2013) noted that “Turkish alignment with CFSP declarations should increase” (emphasis added). In the case of Russia, on the other hand, Turkey and the EU dissented on the sanctions related to the annexation of Crimea by Russia. As it is noted in the 2014 Progress Report (European Commission, 2014, pp. 74–75), Turkey condemned and did not recognise the annexation of Crimea by Russia and has expressed a particular interest in the security of the Crimean Tatars. In line with this, Turkey voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolution on the territorial integrity of Ukraine, however, it did not align with Council decisions, including EU restrictive measures on Russia’s annexation of Crimea and events in eastern Ukraine. The following year, the Commission (2015, p. 81, emphasis added) underlined that “in the coming years, Turkey should align itself more closely with EU declarations and Council decisions”. Similarly, the recent Progress Report noted that “Turkey should take urgent steps to significantly improve its alignment with EU declarations and Council decisions on CFSP” (European Commission, 2018, p. 96, emphasis added). In the final analysis, several conclusions can be drawn about Turkey’s foreign policy choices, EU’s choices about Turkey and the Turkish political elite’s perception of EU actorness at the international level. First of all,

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we understand that, despite the introduction of many reforms and amendments, Turkey has been very cautious in aligning and as a result orienting its foreign policy in line with that of the EU. Especially since the second half of the 2000s, Turkey’s level of alignment with CFSP was very low and it did not raise above 50% alignment during the 2010s. As we understand from the Progress Reports, one of the reasons for this non-alignment has been Turkey’s quest for becoming an active player in the regions it is engaged with by making the most of its multiple regional identities. Interestingly, studies note that diversification and increased multilateralism of Turkish foreign policy, its reliance on soft power tools such as economic measures and diplomatic instruments emerged as a result of the interaction with European foreign policy making, indicating a Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy (Müftüler-Baç, 2011, pp. 288–289; MüftülerBaç & Gürsoy, 2010). However, despite indications of Europeanisation, Turkish foreign policy was not in line with that of the EU. One of the reasons for this mismatch is the perception of the EU as a weak international actor. As presented by Müftüler-Baç and Süleymano˘glu-Kürüm (2015, pp. 273–274), Turkish parliamentarians perceived the EU as a weak actor with difficulties in portraying regional actorness, lacking coherence in building foreign policy and political union. According to the parliamentarians, the CFSP was weak, less important compared to the US foreign policy, and it made EU an ineffective global actor. However, many underlined that Turkish accession could boost EU’s international stance by increasing its power. Abdullah Gül, then Minister for Foreign Affairs (cited in Müftüler-Baç & Süleymano˘gluKürüm, 2015, p. 275), underlined this argument in 2006 by noting that “if the EU wants to be a global actor, it has to realize Turkey’s power and its possible role in enhancing the EU’s stance in global affairs”. Another important reason is the EU’s domestic context. As AydınDüzgit and Kaliber (2016) note, the euro crisis in 2008 went hand in hand with the rise of far-right political parties in many EU Member States and this paved the ground for a negative climate for Turkey’s membership. As the aggressive opponents gained ground, supporters of Turkey’s full membership became less and less vocal. The concerns about an unfair treatment in the accession process was also raised by Ahmet Davuto˘glu (2010, pp. 15–16), then Minister for Foreign Affairs in 2010: The process of accession negotiations is lengthy and difficult. We were aware of this fact before we set out on this journey. Yet, we face several

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political obstacles in stark contradiction to the commonly agreed framework for the negotiations. This serves only to undermine the credibility of the EU. […] we also believe that the EU should do more to preserve the credibility and consistency of political Europe. Our list would be shorter, comprised of only three items: 1- The EU should abide by the principle of pacta sund servanda, 2- The EU should not allow bilateral issues to hold back the accession negotiations and 3- It should not let Turkey’s accession process be manipulated for domestic politics. I am of the opinion that there are basically two paths the EU can take. Either it will be a global power with a dynamic economy or remain a continental power with a more inward-looking perception. The starting point should be to focus on a functioning and productive relationship between Turkey and the EU.

When the EU was not able to give assurances to Turkey that the accession process would proceed as it was defined by the EU Treaties, it lost its credibility in the eyes of the Turkish political elite, who became more and more estranged and suspicious about the end results of intensive reform processes in the country. In this respect, the EU was not able to exercise effective actorness and its normative/transformative power in Turkey weakened, resulting in low level of alignment not only in the field of CFSP, but also in other policy fields as well. As Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber (2016, p. 2) note, Turkey has experienced a process of deEuropeanisation that can be explained as “the weakening of the appeal and influential capacity of European institutions, policies, norms and values, leading to a retreat of EU/Europe as a normative/political context for Turkish society and politics”. A further reason that weakened EU actorness in the eyes of the Turkish political elite has been the international turmoil in EU’s and Turkey’s immediate neighbourhood. The outbreak of the Arab Spring and later the civil war in Syria changed the dynamics for all important international players in the Middle East fundamentally. The international conjuncture was so unpredictable that Turkey’s good relations with Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Russia deteriorated very rapidly in the early 2010s. Though the relations with Russia developed positively later and then settled on a delicate balance which would be broken at any time, the relations with other countries remain problematic. As it is noted earlier, these developments have also limited EU actorness as Member States dissented and could not meet on a common ground. The recent tensions over the exploration activities for oil and gas in the Eastern Mediterranean have strained Turkey-EU relations, while Turkey’s

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bilateral relations with several Member States deteriorated. Cyprus is a divided island, so its exclusive economic zone is also divided. Recently, Turkey blocked the drilling operations of vessels contracted by European companies, which were commissioned by the Greek Cypriot Administration without taking the divided status of the island into consideration. When Turkey reacted, the planned drilling activities had to be aborted and on top of it, Turkey sent a drilling platform accompanied by military vessels to the exclusive economic zone of the Northern Cypriot Turkish Republic, which is recognised only by Turkey. Turkey had already strained relations with Greece over maritime rights. In March 2018, European Council “strongly condemned Turkey’s actions in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea and underlined its full solidarity with Cyprus and Greece”, and “it called Turkey to cease these actions and respect the sovereign rights of Cyprus to explore and exploit its natural resources in accordance with EU and International Law” (European Commission, 2018, p. 24). The tensions increased and the crisis deepened when Italy, France, Egypt and Israel also became parties to the crisis. In March 2019, the EU called on “Turkey to refrain from any such acts, to which it would respond appropriately and in full solidarity with Cyprus” (European Commission, 2019, p. 7). As the drilling activities of Turkey continued in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Council decided to suspend negotiations with Turkey on the Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement, endorsed the proposal to reduce the pre-accession assistance to Turkey for 2020, invited European Investment Bank to review its lending activities in Turkey, discussed further restrictive measures and stressed that in case of renewed unilateral actions or provocations in breach of international law, the EU would use all the instruments and the options at its disposal in order to defend its interests and those of its Member States (European Commission, 2020, pp. 3–4). The EU adopted these measures but they failed to soothe the tensions, let alone solving the crisis. The tensions between Turkey and Greece escalated in August 2020, the heat out of the crisis was taken by Germany and the USA (BBC, 25 August 2020). As this very recent crisis shows, rather than the EU, its Member States are more active in foreign policy, and from time to time the USA steps in to mediate. If the EU could have developed a CFSP including Turkey, its power in the region would have multiplied vis-à-vis the other powers who almost totally dominate the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition, the crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean shows that Turkey’s interests and actions could not be defied in the regions understood as vital by the political

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leadership. Lastly, it should be noted that the EU has had soft power, but the recent international developments necessitate hard power as well as a single voice, both of which have been missing in the EU, thus weakening its global actorness in the eyes of the Turkish political elite.

Conclusion As it is outlined in the previous pages, in order to be perceived to have actorness, the EU is expected to gather numerous qualities: capabilities, internal self-understanding, recognition and presence, institutionalization, autonomous decision-making structures, ability of Member States to agree, the ability of making its presence felt, taking responsibility, and cohesion. In the field of foreign policy, the EU’s common policy has been developing with different tools other than the ones that are listed above and required to be an institutional actor. Though they are still weak when compared to those of a state, the EU is highly institutionalized and has developed decision-making processes. However, as the relevant sections of the European Commission Progress Reports on Turkey reveal, in the eyes of the Turkish public and the political elite, the EU is not recognised as an influential foreign policy actor, which can identify policy priorities and formulate them coherently with a single voice built on domestic legitimation of decision processes, and priorities. As the decrease in the level of alignment in the 2010s showcased, the EU has lost its credibility to convince Turkey to follow its foreign policy priorities and orientations. In other words, in the eyes of the Turkish political leadership and the bureaucrats, the EU fell short of exercising actorness in the field of foreign policy. As it is discussed in the previous sections, there is not only one reason for these perspectives and perceptions of the Turkish political elite. One of the reasons is the prolonged candidacy status. Turkey has been a candidate country, but there is a conviction among the Turkish political leadership that the country has been treated unfairly and discriminated during the accession process. The country’s accession negotiations proceeded very slowly in the period between 2005 and 2010, and no real progress was recorded after 2010. Multiple vetoes of France and the Greek Cypriot Administration at the European Council already meant that most of the negotiation chapters would be frozen. It should be highlighted that the Eurozone crisis and the rising far-right parties and populism deepened the divisions over Turkey’s full membership in Europe, showing that the

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Member States lacked the ability to agree. Turkey and the Turkish bid for full membership have been targeted in the election campaigns and by all kinds of groups, which have been against European integration as that position was almost costless for them. Even though, Turkey could not be the reason for all structural problems that EU faces; the EU institutions and the supporters of Turkey’s full membership in different Member States remained silent while Turkey was scapegoated. Moreover, the EU was not able to approach Turkish candidacy with a single voice under its enlargement policy. As a result, the EU has lost credibility, reliability, and persuasiveness in the eyes of the Turkish political elite, bureaucrats, and public. This disappointment caused by EU’s differential/discriminative treatment of Turkey has had negative implications in its actorness for Turkish bureaucrats and policy makers. Secondly, since the second half of the 2000s, Turkey has tried to engage with multiple regions to diversify and expand its foreign policy. In taking these steps, the aim was giving up the old habits of focusing only on a single geographical sphere such as Europe or the Middle East and turning to a wider notion of geography (Kalın, 2012, p. 12). In other words, in line with this new expanding foreign policy priorities, Turkey was trying to make the most of its multiple regional identities. In the face of difficulties in the accession process, it must have been difficult for such a political leadership, which was trying to give Turkey a clout in global politics, to accept the asymmetrical relationship with the EU. Due to its nature, this asymmetrical relationship (Börzel & Soyaltin, 2012, p. 11) between the EU and the candidates was not one between equals; the candidates were at the same time the demanders for full membership. Contrary to the dynamics of such a relationship, the political leadership in Turkey has repeatedly made their ambitions known to make Turkey a more influential actor in world affairs. In this case, it would not be wrong to assume that Turkey aligned the CFSP instruments selectively on purpose, it chose the ones that suited its interests, while it skipped many others. Lastly, when the international conjuncture has changed rapidly, Turkey, the EU, and the EU Member States have found themselves in international turmoil. The outbreak of the Arab Spring, annexation of Crimea, the civil war in Syria, reiteration of armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and escalation of tensions between Iran and the USA changed the dynamics for all relevant players in the surroundings of Turkey. While Turkey’s good relations with Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Russia deteriorated

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very rapidly in the early 2010s, the EU was in trouble in foreign policy as well. The crisis in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea by Russia, civil war in Libya, unrest in Tunisia, civil war in Syria, and the refugee movements have thrown CFSP far from success and the EU far from actorness. All of these crises needed capacity, capability, credibility, decision-making processes and a single voice for the EU to conduct a coherent foreign policy, and the EU has been falling short of these. The EU has not been able to make its presence felt, and it has failed to take responsibility. Rather than the EU itself, its Member States, those with foreign policy and diplomacy traditions have been active in these international crises, even if they were frequently sidestepped by the USA and Russia. This has been another factor that weakened EU actorness in the eyes of the Turkish political elite. Though the EU seemed to fall without a safety net, it was not alone, both Turkey and the EU, which have been metaphorically depicted “to be together in the same boat”, are not in the boat, they are skydiving in terms of foreign policy, and they need each other to reach the ground safely. The EU needs critical partners to extend its reach beyond its traditional area. Moreover, we are witnessing a power transition in the international system. While the USA is declining, China is rising and the Russian Federation also steps in the emerging power vacuums and fills them in its immediate neighbourhood, which it shares with the EU and Turkey. Except a few ones, most of the EU Member States do not have independent capabilities to project their power and presence in strategically important areas. Therefore, it seems that this is the right moment for the EU to develop further relations with Turkey. With Turkey, the EU can step over three problematic areas with one single partner; these are the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. Turkey’s geographical location and identity have been considered as a kind of threat by many European narrow looking politicians, however they are also an asset. The inclusion of Turkey in EU structures as an equal partner would be a positive, strong message to the rest of the world. This would restore the sincerity of the EU’s democratic liberal ideologies and universalist claims and enhance the EU’s ideological influence around the world. Keeping the door closed to Turkey by referring to the predominantly Muslim population of this country would simply undermine the universality claims of the European project. Considering the troubles Turkey has been experiencing in foreign policy in recent years, such an inclusion would build trust and help Turkey in reformulating its priorities. Turkey’s

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inclusion into the CFSP, on the other hand, requires a fair and reasonable approach. Its identity should be recognised and its capabilities should be respected. Only if Turkey is given an honourable position within the EU, it would be an asset. This would also contribute to Turkish democracy.

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European Commission. (2003). 2003 Regular report on Turkey’s progress towards accession. Retrieved August 4, 2019, from https://www.avrupa.info. tr/sites/default/files/2016-11/2003.pdf European Commission. (2005). Turkey 2005 progress report. Brussels, 9 November 2005 SEC (2005) 1426. Retrieved August 4, 2019, from https:// www.avrupa.info.tr/sites/default/files/2016-11/2005.pdf European Commission. (2006). Turkey 2006 progress report. Brussels, 8.11.2006 SEC (2006) 1390. Retrieved August 4, 2019, from https:// www.avrupa.info.tr/sites/default/files/2016-11/Turkey_progress_report% 202006.pdf European Commission. (2008). Turkey 2008 progress report. Brussels, 05.11.2008 SEC (2008) 2699 final. Retrieved August 4, 2019, from https://www.avrupa.info.tr/sites/default/files/2016-11/turkey_progress_ report_en%202008.pdf European Commission. (2009). 2009 Regular Report on Turkey. Brussels, 14.10.2009 SEC (2009) 1334. Retrieved August 9, 2019, from https:// www.ab.gov.tr/regular-progress-reports_46224_en.html European Commission (2010). Turkey 2010 Progress Report. Brussels, 9 November 2010 SEC (2010) 1327. Retrieved August 4, 2019, from https:// www.avrupa.info.tr/sites/default/files/2016-11/tr_rapport_2010_en.pdf European Commission. (2011). Turkey 2011 progress report. Brussels, 12.10.2011 SEC (2011) 1201. Retrieved August 4, 2019, from https:// www.avrupa.info.tr/sites/default/files/2016-11/tr_rapport_2011_en.pdf European Commission. (2013). Turkey 2013 progress report. Brussels, 16.10.2013 SWD (2013) 417 final. Retrieved August 4, 2019, from https:// www.avrupa.info.tr/sites/default/files/2016-11/tr_report_2013_en.pdf European Commission. (2014). Turkey 2014 report. Brussels, 8.10.2014 SWD (2014) 307 final provisoire. Retrieved August 4, 2019, from https://www.avr upa.info.tr/sites/default/files/2016-11/turkey-progress-report%202014.pdf European Commission. (2015). Turkey 2015 report. Brussels, 10.11.2015 SWD (2015) 216 final. Retrieved August 4, 2019, from https://www.avrupa.info. tr/sites/default/files/2016-11/tr_rapport_2015_en.pdf European Commission. (2018). Turkey 2018 report. Strasbourg, 17.4.2018 SWD (2018) 153 final. Retrieved August 4, 2019, from https://www.avr upa.info.tr/sites/default/files/2018-06/20180417-turkey-report.pdf European Commission. (2019). Turkey 2019 report. Brussels, 29.5.2019 SWD (2019) 220 final. Retrieved August 4, 2019, from https://www.avrupa.info. tr/sites/default/files/2019-05/20190529-turkey-report.pdf European Commission. (2020). Turkey 2020 report. Brussels, 6.10.2020 SWD (2020) 355 final. Retrieved October 21, 2020, from https://www.avrupa. info.tr/sites/default/files/2020-12/turkey_report_2020.pdf

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Genç, D. (2014). Ingiliz, Fransız ve Alman Basınında Kırım Sorunu. In Z. Yıldırım, H. Çomak, & C. Sancaktar (Eds.), Uluslararası Politikada Ukrayna Krizi. Beta Yayınları. Genç, H. D., & Öztürk-Tunçel, D. (2017). Globalization and global society. In N. Do˘gan & J. Drew (Eds.), Introduction to international relations (pp. 238– 267). Anadolu University Press. ˙ (2012). Turkish foreign policy: Framework, values and mechanism. Kalın, I. International Journal, 67 (1), 7–21. Müftüler-Baç, M. (2011). Turkish foreign policy, its domestic determinants and the role of the European Union. South European Society and Politics, 16(2), 279–291. Müftüler-Baç, M., & Gürsoy, Y. (2010). Is there a Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy? An addendum to the literature on EU candidates. Turkish Studies, 11(3), 405–427. Müftüler-Baç, M., & Süleymano˘glu-Kürüm, R. (2015). Deliberations in the Turkish parliament: The external perceptions of European foreign policy. Journal of Language and Politics, 14(2), 258–284. Öni¸s, Z. (2010). Contesting for Turkey’s political ‘centre’: domestic politics, identity conflicts and the controversy over EU membership. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 18(3), 361–376. Sitzenstuhl, C. (2016). When president personality influences foreign policy: Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy’s policies towards Turkey’s accession to the European Union (1995–2012). In Abstracts of the 24th Congress of Political Science, Poznan, 24–28 July. The Guardian. (2003, January 22). France and Germany unite against Iraq war. Retrieved August 4, 2019, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2003/jan/22/germany.france The Guardian. (2004, October 10). France’s Saddam deals revealed. Retrieved August 4, 2019, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/oct/10/ france.iraq

CHAPTER 11

Global Giant, Regional Dwarf? Perceptions of EU Actorness in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Zhanibek Arynov

Introduction The European Union (EU) and Central Asia (CA) have a 25-year long history of bilateral relations. Since the early nineties, this relationship has been steadily expanding, and the EU has been increasing its profile in the region. In June 2019, the EU adopted a new Strategy for Central Asia, which promises to further deepen this partnership (European Commission, 2019). With the intensification of EU-CA relations, academic attention to the topic has also visibly increased. Yet, the literature has predominantly focused on the perspective of the EU. Various studies have dealt with what the EU intends to achieve in Central Asia, how the EU acts towards

Z. Arynov (B) Graduate School of Public Policy, Nazarbayev University, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. R. Freire et al. (eds.), EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92997-8_11

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the region, and with what effect, and also proposed recommendations for what the EU needs to improve in its policy (e.g. Boonstra & Tsertsvadze, 2016; Emerson et al., 2010; Melvin, 2008; Warkotsch, 2011). The dominance of EU-centrism, inter alia, is a reflection of the tendency in broader European Studies literature, where the emphasis has also long been on what kind of international actor the EU is: civilian power (Duchêne, 1973), normative power (Manners, 2002), civilising power (Sjursen, 2006), or ethical power (Aggestam, 2008). Such Euro-centrism leaves one aspect neglected, which is how external actors perceive the EU and whether they share these (self) prescriptions. The argument is simple—the EU international actorness is subject to recognition by other players it interacts with. Therefore, how externals perceive Brussels is equally important for its international identity and roles. Only in the previous decade scholars of European Studies started paying attention to this issue and scrutinising perceptions of the EU in the eyes of others (for review see Mišík, 2013; Lucarelli, 2014). However, the authors, despite covering an extensive geographical area, have been neglectful of Central Asia (a few exceptions include Arynov, 2018; Bekenova & Collins, 2019; Peyrouse, 2014; Spaiser, 2018). To partly fill this gap, this chapter aims to analyse perceptions of the EU actorness in two countries of Central Asia—Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The main argument is that the kind of actor the EU can be in the region and the kind of policies it can successfully implement depends not only on its abilities as an international actor and the resources at its disposal, but also on what kind of actor Central Asians perceive the Union to be. In other words, Brussels’ actorness, role, and effectiveness in the region are partly shaped by Central Asians. Constructivists argue that power relations between the Self and the Other are important in shaping mutual identities. The more powerful the Other vis-à-vis the Self, the more influential it becomes in determining the latter’s identity. Therefore, it is normally the Significant Other who has the most visible impact on determining the Self’s identity and roles (Wendt, 1999, p. 341). Given the power disparity between the EU and the Central Asian countries as well as the fact that CA is not Brussels’ Significant Other, one may argue that what the five states of the region think of the EU has little impact on Brussels’ actorness in the region. Such an argument is also in line with the literature on the New Great Game in Central Asia, which treats the states of the region as mere pawns of the game played by powerful external actors (Cuthbertson, 1994; Karasac,

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2002; Menon, 2003; Smith, 1996). However, such an approach is largely criticised as it neglects the agency of the Central Asian states. They are capable of not only being independent subjects, but also of writing the rules of the game with which even the most powerful external players have to comply (Cooley, 2012; Edwards, 2003). In that sense, how Central Asians perceive the EU does play a role in shaping the limits of its behaviour in the region. The chapter specifically focuses on perceptions of the EU as a global actor and a regional actor in CA. Such a distinction between global and regional dimensions is necessary because an actor “may have a great deal of influence in one region of the world, while having little or no influence in other parts of the world” (Baldwin, 2002, p. 178; Dahl, 1968, p. 408). Therefore, perceptions of the EU are also likely to vary depending on the context where its actorness is examined. It is further acknowledged that states are not monolithic entities. Consequently, perceptions of the same object may vary within a state depending on internal perceivers. The chapter specifically examines the EU perceptions held by intermediate level opinion-makers in Kazakh and Kyrgyz societies, which include middle-range politicians, scholars/thinktank experts, journalists, and civil society representatives. Overall, 53 and 35 in-depth interviews were conducted with Kazakh and Kyrgyz opinionmakers, respectively, who had certain experience with the EU, its different institutions and projects. The data was collected during the two rounds of fieldtrip to Astana and Almaty, Kazakhstan in September–November 2015, and Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan in May–June 2016. The chapter proceeds in five parts. The following second section scrutinises the EU perceived actorness as a global player and argues that Brussels is recognised as an economic giant, an influential soft power, but a politically intermediate actor. Section three then shifts the focus to the regional context. It claims that in the particular context of Central Asia, Brussels is seen as a second-tier regional actor. In addition, the section also discusses perceived reasons for the EU’s low profile in Central Asia. The fourth section elaborates on an evolving perception of “decaying Europe”. It claims that although the EU is recognised as a capable global actor, albeit with limited influence in Central Asia, its general influence is perceived as being in decline due to the internal troubles within the EU. The chapter ends with a summary and conclusions on findings.

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Z. ARYNOV Economic Giant: - As powerful as the US and China - Successful Integration - GDP, Trade, Investment, Technology etc. - Euro

The EU as a Global Actor

Influential Soft Power: - Attractive Culture - Admirable Values -Soft Foreign Policy

Fig. 11.1 figure)

Intermediate (Geo)Political Power - Already established, but inferior to the US, China and Russia - Institutional Complexity; - Lack of Internal Consensus; - Over-dependence on the US

Attributes of the EU’s perceived actorness as a global player (author’s

The EU as a Global Giant It becomes obvious that today’s European Union positions itself to a great extent as an established global power in its own right. As Bengtsson and Elgström (2012, p. 106) argue, “[t]he EU sees itself as a […] great power, with the interest, capacity, and obligation to impact on developments in the various empirical settings”. A quick survey of EU-produced narratives easily reveals this pattern. Nevertheless, the question arises: whether the external world shares the EU’s self-image of a global actor. In the case of Central Asia, the answer to this question appears to be positive. The collected data demonstrates that in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan there is no denial that the EU is an “established, recognised, and equal [to other] global actors”.1 However, the degree to which it is a powerful global actor varies across issue-areas. Overall, the image of the EU can be summarised as that of an economic giant, intermediate (geo)political actor, and influential soft power (Fig. 11.1). 1 Interview with journalist, Kazakhstan.

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Economic Giant External perceptions of the EU as an economic giant are not new in the literature (e.g. Chaban et al., 2013; Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2007; Lucarelli and Fioramonti, 2010). Similarly, in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the very idea of the “European Union” in the first instance is associated with economic success. The EU is often referred to as “a new economic phenomenon”2 or “a powerful gravitational center of the world economy”.3 The “proof” of the EU’s economic power is usually articulated in comparative and/or superlative forms. The former denotes cases where interviewees tend to compare the EU to other international actors to demonstrate that it is, at least, performing equally well in economic terms. The EU is commonly compared with the USA and China in this fashion. The very fact that Brussels’ economic potential is juxtaposed with the economically wealthiest states in the world suggests that the EU is already perceived as belonging to the same category. In the words of some interviewees, “the EU has already proven that it is economically powerful and competitive. It has more potential than the USA”4 ; or “the EU can beat all its competitors including the USA and China owing to its technological development, progress and human potential”.5 Another type of “proof” of the EU’s economic might is presented in the form of superlative adjectives used to describe it. The Union is frequently referred to as the “leading”, “biggest”, “richest”, “wealthiest”, and “most developed” actor.6 These superlative narratives are normally backed by various statistical data related to the EU’s economic performance: among others, the absolute size of its GDP, market capacity, investment potential, technological development, and competitive currency, which are used to illustrate the dominance of the Union’s economic capability. For example, a Kazakh journalist described the EU as “the most developed region […with] the population of 500 million people, […producing] 23–25% of the world economy, and […owning] highly

2 Interview with scholar/think-tank expert, Kyrgyzstan. 3 Interview with scholar/think-tank expert, Kazakhstan. 4 Interview with politician, Kyrgyzstan. 5 Interview with journalist, Kazakhstan. 6 These superlative adjectives repeatedly appear in collected data.

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advanced technology”,7 whereas a Kyrgyz politician similarly referred to it as “the biggest integrational success of the countries that unite a 500-million-people market and control one third of world production”.8 It is also worth separately mentioning here that the Euro has come to symbolise the EU’s economic might in the eyes of Central Asians. It is perceived that a European currency has been capable of challenging the long dominance of the American dollar. However, the lingering crisis in the Eurozone seems to have undermined this positivity (Chaban & Elgström, 2014; Chaban & Holland, 2013; Holland & Chaban, 2014). As a result, moderate scepticism towards the Eurozone, and generally towards the EU’s economic performance, can be observed too (see below). (Geo)political Intermediate Actor The EU has often been referred to as an economic giant, but a political dwarf, including by external audiences (e.g. Chaban et al., 2013). However, this image of “dwarf” does not seem to coincide with how the EU is perceived in the Central Asian states. Here I follow Ginsberg (2001, p. 9), who claims that a “political dwarf would have no international influence. […] The EU instead is an economic superpower and a partially developed political actor: more than dwarf and less than a superpower”. That is to say, the EU is an intermediate (geo)political actor. This claim more accurately captures the perceptions of the Union’s (geo)political actorness by Central Asians. The image of an intermediate (geo)political actor does not reject the EU’s political agency, rather accepts it as an already established geopolitical player. Interviewed opinion-makers often articulated that “the EU crossed the line of being a mere economic actor long ago. Taking into account its common foreign policy, the EU represents a fully-fledged political actor”.9 Yet, what makes it “intermediate” is that it is still perceived to be inferior to the most powerful geopolitical competitors— the US, China, and also Russia. As some respondents put it, “the EU is a political actor. But, to be honest, I do not perceive it as capable of

7 Interview with journalist, Kazakhstan. 8 Interview with politician, Kyrgyzstan. 9 Interview with scholar/think-tank expert, Kazakhstan.

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competing with the US, Russia or China”10 ; or “Brussels cannot politically compete with Washington, Beijing or Moscow in its own right. It possesses more economic influence than political”.11 Three perceived reasons for why the EU remains (geo)politically inferior can be extrapolated from the gathered data. Firstly, a commonly agreed opinion among interviewees is that the EU’s ability to compete equally with other global actors is undermined by the complexity of its institutional structure. The EU is viewed as a highly bureaucratic actor, where decision-making requires more time and effort. This hampers Brussels’ ability to be an impulsive actor capable of responding to its internal and external environment immediately. The Union is perceived as “a big giant that moves too slowly”.12 Another interviewee similarly claimed that “while the EU is still discussing the issue, other actors will have already reacted to it”.13 Secondly, it is believed that such institutional complexity is exacerbated further by the lack of internal consensus within the EU. When it comes to (geo)political matters, the EU is not recognised as a monolithic and unanimous actor, but rather a complex cohort of myriad and sometimes contradictory voices. Brussels’ political ability is believed to depend on whether, and how fast, these different voices come together. This implies that “when all Member States have a common position on the issue, the EU becomes a very capable political actor. But with the advent of sensitive and conflicting issues, the common voice is diminished by the voices of separate Member States”.14 Finally, the EU (geo)political over-dependence on the US is also often mentioned as another important factor undermining its political capability. Very often European foreign policy is seen as, if not a direct continuation of American politics, then at least as being highly influenced by the USA. Some respondents in both countries were quick to state: “I am always surprised how the US alone is able to rule twenty-eight European countries. European countries follow the US on everything it

10 Interview with civil society representative, Kazakhstan. 11 Interview with scholar/think-tank expert, Kazakhstan. 12 Interview with civil society representative, Kyrgyzstan. 13 Interview with scholar/think-tank expert, Kazakhstan. 14 Interview with journalist, Kyrgyzstan.

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says”.15 In this context, Brussels is wanted to develop a more independent foreign policy and prevent itself from the “American dictate”. Influential Soft Power The third dimension of the EU’s capability as a global actor is its perceived soft power. In both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the attractiveness of the EU is undisputable. Yet, it is worth mentioning here that the notions of “European Union” and “Europe” are frequently used interchangeably (Barcevicius et al., 2015), including in Central Asia. Therefore, this attractiveness is not necessarily a result of the EU’s policy performance in the region as an international institution, but rather it may derive from a historically idealised image of “Europe”, who has long played the role of a Significant Other for many post-Soviet countries (see Neumann, 1996; Buranelli, 2014; White & Feklyuinina, 2014). From the perspective of soft power, the EU is not compared to any other actors, but is rather referred to as the most attractive one. In the words of the respondents, “the EU is a leading actor in terms of soft power”16 ; or “nobody doubts that the EU is the most admirable actor”.17 Three perceived sources of the Union’s soft power can be identified from the data. They overlap with what Joseph Nye mentioned to be the three pillars of soft power: culture, political values, and soft foreign policy (Nye, 2004, 11). To start with, culture is a highly visible and attractive aspect of the EU’s soft power (Barcevicius et al., 2015). The EU, or Europe in general, is frequently referred to as the core civilisation driving world history, and consequently, its culture is seen to have made a positive contribution to global cultural enrichment. European culture is described as the richest and most attractive, both vertically and horizontally. Vertically, it is perceived to have historically deep roots and originate from ancient times; horizontally, it embraces diverse cultural aspects like literature, architecture, music, and painting. “The very word ‘European Union’ is associated with certain aristocratism. It is a cultural center for me”, as put by one

15 Interview with journalist, Kyrgyzstan. 16 Interview with scholar/think-tank expert, Kazakhstan. 17 Interview with politician, Kyrgyzstan.

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respondent.18 In the words of another interviewee, “we used to receive culture and some traditions from Europe; we grew up on European authors. I have only positive attitudes towards Europe”.19 Another attractive aspect of Brussels’ perceived soft power are its political values, which are broadly understood as democracy and human rights. However, there is a visible polarisation in both Kazakh and Kyrgyz societies in terms of whether these values are necessarily a positive aspect to be admired (see below; see Omelicheva, 2015). Despite this division, the dominant view among interviewed opinion-makers is that the adherence to values of democracy and human rights is another important feature that makes European countries attractive. How the EU Member States follow democratic principles in their political life, how human rights are defended, and how European citizens enjoy equality is recognised as an appealing achievement. “In fact, the first association that I have of the EU is with democratic institutions, human rights, and a universal system of values”20 ; or “we do not have to necessarily talk about the EU in economic terms. The EU is more than an economy. First of all, [it is] about human rights and democratic political systems”,21 as articulated by some interviewees. Finally, soft foreign policy conducted by the EU also positively contributes to its overall attractiveness. In this context, “soft” is frequently referred to as the way the EU behaves in the international arena. The Union is perceived as a less assertive and aggressive international player that “tries to avoid prescribing its vision to others as, for example, Russia does”.22 It is often articulated that “in the context of other global players, the EU can be conceived as the softest actor [which] is never involved in conflicts”.23 This makes it a more trusted player, the one with no hidden (geo)political aims, rather with benign intentions (see also De Pedro, 2009; Efegil, 2010; Peyrouse, 2014; Spaiser, 2018). At the same time, this softness of foreign policy is also seen as one of the reasons of why the EU cannot compete equally with other great powers: “to a certain 18 Interview with scholar/think-tank expert, Kazakhstan. 19 Interview with journalist, Kyrgyzstan. 20 Interview with politician, Kazakhstan. 21 Interview with scholar/think-tank expert, Kyrgyzstan. 22 Interview with journalist, Kazakhstan. 23 Interview with scholar/think-tank expert, Kyrgyzstan.

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degree, it is good that the EU is a soft actor. On the other hand, this does not allow one to view it as something strong, a counterbalance to others, or a leading great entity”.24

The EU as a Regional Dwarf The EU, as argued above, is recognised as an already established global player, albeit with some variance of its perceived power across issue areas. However, when it comes to the regional context, Brussels does not seem to enjoy the image of an influential actor capable of making a difference in Central Asia. In other words, its global power is simply not perceived to extend to Central Asia. The thesis on the EU as a weak actor in Central Asia is not new in the literature (e.g. International Crisis Group, 2006; Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2013; Matveeva, 2006; Melvin, 2012). The data collected for this research confirms that perceptions of the EU are also that of a “weak” actor in the region. As put by some respondents: “you do not have to necessarily be an expert or conduct research to say something about the EU’s policy [in Central Asia], because the conclusion a priori is the same – the EU is a weak player”,25 or “the EU is objectively a weak actor. It has no influence to shape the main geopolitical processes in the region”.26 At the same time, a closer look at data reveals that the notion of “weak” is a comparative category and its meaning varies between the two countries under study. In Kazakhstan, the EU is perceived to be weak in comparison to Russia, China, and the US, whereas in Kyrgyzstan, Brussels is seen to be weaker even than Turkey and Kazakhstan, let alone the “big three”. In other words, despite being equally referred to as a “weak” regional actor, the degree of Brussels’ perceived weakness varies in the two countries. Overall, at least six perceived reasons for why the EU has limited influence in Central Asia can be inferred from the collected data (Fig. 11.2). The lack of a well-defined agenda and strategic vision is referred as one of the main reasons why the EU has limited influence in Central Asia.

24 Interview with scholar/think-tank expert, Kyrgyzstan. 25 Interview with scholar/think-tank expert, Kazakhstan. 26 Interview with politician, Kyrgyzstan.

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Lack of Well-Defined Agenda

Competition between Member-States

Lack of Will and Interest

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Shortage of Resources

The EU as a Weak Regional Actor

Poor Communication

Difficult Regional Context

Fig. 11.2 Attributes of the EU’s perceived weakness as a regional actor in CA (author’s figure)

The majority of interviewed elites, even those directly involved in EUrelated professional activities, expressed doubts as to whether they fully understand what the EU wants to achieve in Central Asia, and whether it has a clear strategy towards its objectives. “I personally find it difficult to comment on the EU’s policy here. Ask me about the US or Russia, and I will tell you. Their policies are well formulated. But the EU?!”.27 What needs to be emphasised here is that the interviewees were those who had direct or indirect relations to EU-related initiatives. This implies that even the most informed elites seem to have little knowledge of the general idea behind Brussels’ policy. The shortage of economic and political leverage is perceived to be another reason hindering the EU’s influence in the region. The Union is perceived as lacking the instruments and means to back up its declared priorities and push certain policies. What the EU as a unified actor mainly does in Central Asia is said to be small-scale projects, technical assistance, or training, which are too specific and narrowly targeted and, therefore, doomed to be inconspicuous. Even if the Union successfully implements such projects, their “results cannot be directly observed or physically

27 Interview with scholar/think-tank expert, Kyrgyzstan.

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touched”.28 From this aspect, the EU is unfavourably compared to China, which is recognised as investing in grandiose and large-scale infrastructure projects. The competition between EU Member States is repeatedly referred to as yet another factor undermining the EU’s position as a regional actor in Central Asia. The EU’s policy in the region is sometimes viewed through the prism of its Member States, rather than through the EU as a single actor. As a result, some EU Member States become more visible than the Union itself, especially Germany: “despite the EU’s self-adopted position as a unified actor, I cannot see that. What I see are individual states. For example, Germany acting as the smotryashchiy [watchdog]”.29 This suggests that in Central Asia the EU competes with its own Member States for visibility, and quite often loses the competition. The EU’s poor communication policy is perceived as further limiting its already scarce visibility. Brussels is frequently criticised for having underdeveloped public relations or public diplomacy activities in both countries. The Union is said not to provide sufficient information support for its policies and projects, and as a result, what it does in the region, for the most part, is not noticed by target groups. Moreover, it is further articulated that even its success stories usually remain under-communicated and thus unnoticed. “Some states are able to present even their small projects as great success stories, whereas it is exactly the opposite with the EU. Despite the EU doing much, it is unable to demonstrate that”, a Kazakh expert opined.30 This implies that the EU’s problem is not just in its policy initiatives as such, but also in the way they are presented and promoted. Another perceived reason for the EU’s relative passivity in Central Asia is the lack of Brussels’ interests in the region. It is commonly acknowledged among interviewees that Central Asia does not belong to the EU’s sphere of immediate interests; rather, it is a remote region for Brussels. As a result, the EU is perceived as unwilling to invest much resources and attention to such a distant region. “We [Central Asians] cannot criticise the EU because of our peripheral importance to them. In order to criticise we should first explain why they need us. But we act on the premise

28 Interview with journalist, Kyrgyzstan. 29 Interview with scholar/think-tank expert, Kyrgyzstan. 30 Interview with scholar/think-tank expert, Kazakhstan.

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that they need us by default. That is an unacceptable position”, argues a Kazakh interviewee.31 Similarly, a Kyrgyz respondent further elaborated: “The EU has neither the time, nor resources, nor interest to fully devote itself to Central Asia”.32 In other words, Brussels is viewed as remaining comparatively weaker in Central Asia not just because of its inability to develop a more active policy, but also because of its unwillingness to do so. Finally, it is equally acknowledged by opinion-makers that the relative weakness of the EU is not just the Union’s fault, but also a result of the difficult political context in Central Asia. As articulated, what the Union is trying to achieve in the region demands more cooperation from local governments. In this regard, Central Asia is not the best possible environment for the EU’s declared intentions and policies: “the movement is two-way. For now, one side [Central Asia] is not functioning properly”.33 Local governments are recognised as sometimes limiting the EU’s efforts in the region because of their reluctance and/or inability to cooperate. Reluctance mostly refers to Brussels’ democratic activities, when local governments are perceived to artificially build various administrative barriers against such initiatives. As for inability, the inefficiency of local governments to cope with provided support, poor policy performance, and high levels of corruption are said to raise serious barriers to European policy effectiveness. Overall, there is also scepticism that the EU will be able to overcome the mentioned difficulties any time soon and transform into a truly influential player in Central Asia. That is to say, Brussels is doomed to remain a second-tier actor at best, as perceived.

Decaying Europe? The data collected in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan reveals another interesting, yet hardly surprising, aspect of perceptions of the EU actorness. This is the thesis that today’s EU represents a decaying international actor. Such a rising negative perception is mainly a consequence of

31 Interview with scholar/think-tank expert, Kazakhstan. 32 Interview with scholar/think-tank expert, Kyrgyzstan. 33 Interview with politician, Kyrgyzstan.

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Moral Degradation

Economic Decline

‘Decaying Europe’

Demographic Decline

Fig. 11.3

Political Disagreements

Cultural Decline

Attributes of the ‘Decaying Europe’ Narrative (author’s figure)

internal troubles that the EU has been suffering from, such as the longlasting economic crisis, the refugee crisis, and Brexit (Barcevicius et al., 2015; Chaban & Elgström, 2014; Chaban & Holland, 2013; Holland and Chaban, 2014). The “decaying Europe” narrative constructs the image of the EU as an economically, politically, demographically, culturally, and morally declining power (see Fig. 11.3). To clarify, this is not to say that the Union is perceived to be an already weak global actor, but still a capable one in decline. First of all, the narrative of the economic crisis in the EU has become one of the most powerful elements that contributes to current perceptions of Brussels. It is repeatedly articulated by interviewed opinion-makers that the European countries are “being shattered by the economic crisis”34 or “unsuccessfully trying to extinguish the fire of economic crisis”.35 This implies that Europe’s economic wellbeing is seen to be in steady decline, and more importantly, the EU has found itself unready for such a challenge. A scepticism in the EU’s future can be observed as a result. As figuratively put by one respondent,

34 Interview with scholar/think-tank expert, Kazakhstan. 35 Interview with scholar/think-tank expert, Kyrgyzstan.

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today European countries are suffering from a severe economic crisis. I associate them with old men; old men who have already used all resources, who are tired, and who lack the power to perform as well as they used to in the past.36

Secondly, the EU is also seen as experiencing the period of political decline in the sense that the level of political disagreement is increasing among EU Member States. As it is perceived, due to the different visions and interests of Member States, the Union lacks internal consensus on how to tackle the challenges. Consequently, the EU international position as a single actor is seen to be questioned. It is often articulated that internal division may further cause a greater political crisis or even crush the EU: “There are huge internal debates about migration issues, and this may lead to a reconsideration of what the European Union is”.37 Thirdly, EU Member States are also perceived to be in demographic decline, the narrative largely triggered by the refugee crisis. The fact that the EU is open to more and more people of non-European origins is perceived as a change in its “European appearance”. This suggests that the native population in Europe is in constant decline, while the number of migrants is expanding. A Kazakh politician claimed that “if we look at statistics, the indigenous population of Europe is not increasing despite general growth. This growth is provided by non-Europeans. When we go to France, we rarely meet French people, mostly migrants from North Africa”.38 These kinds of widespread narratives construct the image of a literally dying Europe. Fourthly, and closely related to the previous case, the growing number of non-Europeans is perceived to cause not only demographic problems, but also cultural difficulties in European countries. The fact that migrants or refugees prefer living in their own communities without being integrated into local European society is frequently emphasised by interviewees as a vital problem, since it threatens the most attractive aspect of Europe—its European-ness: history, culture, traditions, values, etc. In other words, what is at risk is the European identity. As put by a Kazakh politician, “today Europe is heterogeneous. Because of their tolerance and democracy, the Europeans are not able to defend their identity. If 36 Interview with politician, Kazakhstan. 37 Interview with scholar/think-tank expert, Kazakhstan. 38 Interview with politician, Kazakhstan.

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you go to France or Germany, absolutely alien non-European traditions dominate their everyday life”.39 In this context, the policy of European multiculturalism is often blamed for this by interviewees. Finally, and most visibly, the European societies are perceived as experiencing moral degradation. First of all, this is associated with the rights of sexual minorities and same-sex marriages, which cause exclusively negative attitudes in both countries. In this regard, there is even a special notion used in reference to Europe—Gayropa—which results from the combination of words “gay” and “Europe” in Russian (Foxall, 2019; Gaufman, 2017; Riabov & Riabova, 2014). As a result, Gayropa has become the most visible negative aspect of the EU’s image in Central Asia. The reason behind the increase of “Decaying Europe” narrative in Central Asia is twofold. On the one hand, it reflects the objective internal troubles taking place in EU Member States. On the other hand, this can also be partly explained by the role of Russian media in disseminating the negative image of the EU across the entire post-Soviet space, especially in the post-2014 period, which has been reported by other studies too (Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group, 2018).

Conclusion The findings of this chapter suggest that the EU international actorness as such is recognised in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The point of debate is, therefore, not whether the EU is already an established player in its own right, but how powerful it is as an actor. Moreover, the Union is perceived to be more of a state-like actor than an international organisation. This can clearly be observed from the inclination in both countries to compare the EU with other states like the US, Russia, and China. The very fact that the Union is commonly juxtaposed with the most capable states in world politics seems to demonstrate that it is already perceived to be, or at least expected to be, among them. It is in relation to them that the EU is perceived to be a “giant”, “intermediate actor”, or “weak actor”. In this sense, the EU’s perceived actorness is commonly constructed in relation to that of the strongest states in world politics. As a global actor, the EU’s perceived actorness was found to be highly issue specific. In both countries, the EU is easily recognised as

39 Interview with politician, Kazakhstan.

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an economic giant and highly attractive soft power, but an intermediate actor in terms of its (geo)political capabilities. This complexity of perceptions makes it challenging to find one generalised image of the EU as a global actor. Nevertheless, I follow Barry Buzan’s and Ole Waever’s definition here to argue that it is possible to summarise the EU’s image as that of a great power. In Regions and Powers, Buzan and Waever (2003) propose a three-level classification of international actors in terms of their overall capability: superpowers, great powers, and regional powers. Great powers, in contrast to superpowers, “need not necessarily have big capabilities in all sectors” (Buzan & Waever, 2003, pp. 34–37). Therefore, in this classification, the EU seems to fall exactly into the category of great powers, but with unbalanced capabilities across issue areas. At the same time, the findings suggest that there is a significant discrepancy between the global and regional dimensions of the EU perceived actorness. Despite being recognised as a great power in the global context, Brussels, however, is viewed as a great power, whose influence does not extend to Central Asia. As a regional actor in Central Asia, the EU is equally referred to as a “weak” actor in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but the perceived extent of its “weakness” varies in the two states. In both countries, the relative weakness of the EU in the region is perceived to be caused by a range of factors, intrinsic to the EU as well as to the region itself. Finally, it is also worth noting that the findings in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan seem to be hardly different from each other. Similarly, they are hardly different from findings in other regions, as the existing literature suggests. In this sense, Central Asia is not a unique destination, where the EU enjoys special perceptions different from other geographic locations. Overall, the recognition of the EU as a global great power seems to increase expectations from it. The Union is expected to overcome its limitations as a regional actor, becoming a more active player in Central Asia. On the other hand, its image as a second-tier regional actor plays a positive role for Brussels. In contrast to other more powerful actors, the EU is trusted and referred to as the most benign actor. In this context, perceived benevolence is the EU’s most obvious comparative advantage vis-à-vis others—the USA, China, and even Russia. It is this advantage that the EU could capitalise on in Central Asia.

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CHAPTER 12

Russia vis-à-vis the European Union: Perceptions and Perspectives for Cooperation Larisa Deriglazova

Introduction Relations between Russia and the EU developed at the end of the Cold War when both actors imagined Europe to be a peaceful and prosperous region without dividing lines, although their visions and means to achieve the dream differed. From the early 1990s, the EU and Russia have aimed at a strategic partnership and deep cooperation based on shared values and goals (EU & Russia, 1997). However, since 2014 both actors have been in open conflict and imposed sanctions on each other. Since then, the security agenda in its most militarised terms has been determining

This study was supported by the Tomsk State University Development Programme («Priority-2030»). L. Deriglazova (B) Faculty of Historical and Political Sciences, Tomsk State University, Tomsk, Russia

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. R. Freire et al. (eds.), EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92997-8_12

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the essence of Russia and EU discourse towards each other (Haukkala, 2015). Today, Russia and the EU regard each other as being “natural partners” in the contested neighbourhood with a widening gap in values, interests and goals. Analysts from both sides argue that a new Cold War has started in Europe with arms race, hostility and fear of armed conflict between Russia and the EU countries or their allies (Casier, 2019; Cohen, 2018; Nitoiu, 2016). Such situation between Russia and the EU only at first glance looks as a dramatic departure from previous partnership rhetoric. To my opinion, the current situation presents an opening up of a long-lasting conflict with periodical crises, manifested disagreements and persistent dissatisfaction in relations demonstrated by both partners. An analysis of the Russian vision of the EU on official, experts’ and public levels is important to understand hopes and realities for cooperation in the first two decades of the 2000s and to foresee some possible development. In order to understand the logic and essence of the current state-of-the-art in EU-Russia relations from the viewpoint of Russia’s foreign policy, one needs to consider those changes that had occurred in Russia and the EU since 1991 and how these changes influenced Russia’s national interests in response to inner and external developments and challenges. When Russia re-examines itself, the EU often plays the role of an important “other” and this has been expressed in major official documents and reflected by leading Russian scholars.

Sources and Methods Western scholarship has evaluated Russia’s vision and its perception of the EU (Forsberg, 2018). Our interest is to study Russian approaches to the EU, which originated from Russia’s expert community, official sources and public opinion. In 2000s, the representation of Russia at the official level and of the expert community has dramatically changed. This change signifies a real informational revolution in the way public institutions have presented themselves and often they aim at external audiences not less than at the Russian public. English language translation of official documents and important speeches of senior officials became available

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on these websites.1 This trend is a contrast to forcing out of Russia almost all international funds and think tanks directed at the analysis of foreign policy, due to legislation regarding non-for-profit organisations and their possible foreign support since 2005. Under legislation on so called “foreign agents” (2012) and on ‘undesirable foreign organisations’ (2015)2 many non-governmental organisations had to close down, were stigmatised or subjected to large fees.3 In 2011, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC)4 was established, providing expertise on Russian foreign policy, attracting Russian and international scholars. Having independent status, RIAC is funded with state resources as other think tanks in Russia, which raises a problem of independent expertise available in Russia. In 2005 and 2006, two Russian TV channels were established with the goal of presenting Russian points of view for the international public. Russia Today 5 delivers English version of news coverage and Russia 24 (Vesti)6 provides four languages service—Russian, English, French and German, and has broad international coverage, including the territories of the United States of America (USA) and European countries. Analysing Russia’s vision of the EU as a foreign policy and global actor, it is important to consider that realpolitik thinking and statist approaches dominate among Russian experts on international relations since the 1990s (Kassianova, 2001). Although Russian experts expressed a range of opinions on EU-Russia relations, the difference concerns whether Russia ‘needs Europe’ and cooperation with the EU (Borko, 2015; Kortunov, 2018), or whether Russia does not need Europe as ‘it has exhausted its

1 See, for example, Internet sites of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation http://www.mid.ru/en/main_en; Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC)— https://russiancouncil.ru; journal ‘Russia in Global Affairs’—https://globalaffairs.ru/ that both have Russian and English language versions of their major publications. 2 Ministry of Justice included 15 foreign organisations, including German Marshall, Open Russia Foundation and Open Society Institute in this list—https://minjust.ru/ru/ activity/nko/unwanted. 3 The law on foreign agents passes 5 years. How life of non-for-profit organisations and all the public space in Russia has changed. Novaya gazeta. 20.11.2017—https://www.nov ayagazeta.ru/articles/2017/11/20/74607-5-let-odinochestva. 4 Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), https://russiancouncil.ru/en/. 5 Russia Today, https://www.rt.com/. 6 Russia 24 (Vesti), https://www.vesti.ru/onair/.

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resources’ and there is nothing that ‘Europe could teach Russia’ (Entin et al., 2018; Gromyko, 2014; Karaganov, 2018; Pushkov, 2018).

Russia and the EU in the Post-Cold War World: Giants, Dwarfs or Worms In the early 1990s two major processes in Europe coincided and they determined EU-Russia relations, where Russia and the EU moved in opposite directions and have changed in regard to their geopolitical landscape and inner arrangements. The first process was the deepening of European integration and its transition to a qualitatively new level with the strengthening of EU supranational institutions. The second process was the disintegration of the Eastern bloc and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) as its leader. In 1990s, the EU became ‘a beacon on a hill’ for Eastern European countries in their transition as it seemed to realise the ideal of a peaceful and prosperous Europe (Deriglazova, 2018). In contrast to the EU, in the 1990s Russia went through several deep crises (ideological, economic, political, social) and was losing its attributes of a great power. Russia’s economic and ideological influence was ruined and it struggled for transformation of its polity, politics, economics and social structures. Russia agreed with the USA on nuclear disarmament in Europe (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty, 1987)7 regarding the elimination of superpowers’ missiles deployed in Europe. Russia supported disintegration of the military Warsaw bloc,8 the reunion of Germany and did not make active efforts to prevent the Eastern enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia accepted the mostly peaceful disintegration of the USSR with some remnants of influence based mostly on previously existing military, political, financial and economic integration with some of the former soviet republics. Some Russian officials and experts regard the nineties as a period of voluntary decline of Russia, its submission to the West and self-denial of great power status (Pushkov, 2018). 7 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm. 8 The Warsaw Treaty organisation was founded in 1955 and united the USSR and seven countries of the Eastern and Central Europe: Eastern Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania.

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In its relations with Russia, the EU conducted a policy of democratisation and Europeanisation of Russia, framed by a policy of technical assistance, aiming to help the latter in its transition towards an economically and politically stable neighbour with whom partnership could be pursued in high politics, including military and security matters. The transformation of Russia in a partner-country of the EU was a pragmatic policy in regard of several special features of Russia that were routinely referred in all major documents on EU-Russia relations till recently (David & Romanova, 2016). The transformation of Russia towards a market economy and its membership in the WTO was a well pronounced goal of the EU, although some European analysts regretted that the economic rationale was more important than the goal of political transformation of Russia (Marquand, 2009). The EU emphasised the importance of political transformation of public institutions in Russia toward democratic institutions and ensuring human rights principles within Russia’s progress in reforms (European Commission, 2001, 2006). For Russia, the EU was an economically developed, politically stable and friendly neighbour that provided financial and technical assistance to reforms. Russia became a member of pan-European political organisations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OCSE) and the Council of Europe. The G-8 format was another way to keep Russia as still a military giant within the circle of the most powerful countries cooperating in global security matters. The Russia-NATO Council was created in 2002 to structure relations of former enemies and to discuss contentious issues based on the consensus principle (Godzimirski, 2005). Importantly for Russia the EU in the 1990s was not associated with NATO, and potentially EU-Russia relations had not the same level of mistrust and animosity as those between Russia and the USA. The major idea behind integration of Russia into pan-European organisations was ‘socialising Russia’ that would become a ‘normal’ European country with no ambitions of a great power or any special interests in Europe. Richard Sakwa argued that the Ukrainian crisis symbolised EU’s failure to make Russia a normal European country and compared Russia’s problem in the post-Cold war Europe to Germany after WWII (Sakwa, 2015). Sakwa believed that ‘the Ukraine crisis is only the symptom of a larger failure to establish both the institutions and processes that could have fostered trust and genuine interdependence between Russia and the EU’ and named Ukraine being ‘the nemesis of a united Europe’ (Sakwa, 2016, p. 87).

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The EU Eastern enlargement marked an important change in relations between Russia and the EU. By 2004 it had become certain that Russia would never be a part of the EU, and Russia refused to join the EU Neighbourhood Policy. The Eastern NATO enlargement that preceded the EU enlargement strengthened the security agenda between partners and added new reasons for mistrust in Russia vis-à-vis its European partners. Ukraine and Georgia’s application for NATO membership and the NATO Bucharest summit in April 2008 revealed strong resistance of Russia to such development and only some EU countries understood Russia’s concerns. Andrey Zagorski as early as January 1993 wrote that Russia had been pushed away from Europe and this was reinforced by the “European choice” of some countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).9 Zagorski argued that this made Russia to be integrated with Central Asian countries and thus became a more Eurasian than European country in a “complex and stormy surrounding of European periphery” with its “extremely sharp social, economic and political problems, inner inter-ethnical, and potentially interstate conflict” (Zagorski & Mickle, 1993). In the 2000s, Russia started claiming the sovereign status of the country and demanded the EU to treat Russia as an equal partner (Torkunov, 2006). Timofei Bordachev (2006) argued that a strategic alliance between the EU and Russia should be based on equality and rejection of Russia’s voluntarily admitted status of a “junior partner” who is “an object for inspection and instruction”. He stressed that the future model of Russia-EU relations “must reflect Russia’s special role in Europe and the world” (2006, pp. 115–117). The Eastern enlargement contributed to a clearer distinction between the EU and Europe in Russia. Alexander Grushko, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,10 expressed the difference in a ‘conceptual triangle’: 9 In 1997, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan created a political organisation GUAM and were about to leave the CIS. See Internet site of the GUAM, http://guam-organization.org/en/about-the-organization-for-democracyand-economic-development-guam/. 10 Aleksandr Gruchko was Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2005–2012 and from

January 2018, he is responsible for relations with European countries, interaction with the EU, the OSCE, NATO and the Council of Europe, http://www.mid.ru/ru/about/ structure/deputy_ministers/-/asset_publisher/7AT17IymWZWQ/content/id/647885? p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_7AT17IymWZWQ&_101_INSTANCE_7AT17IymWZWQ_lan guageId=en_GB.

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Firstly, Russia is a part of Europe. Secondly, the EU is not the whole of Europe and does not represent Europe in its entirety. And thirdly, Russia is not considering joining the EU in the conceivable future. Thus, in the context of these red lines we will try to build up a partnership. (What would be… 2008, p. 23)

This statement represents well the position of official Russia in regard to Russia’s belonging to Europe and the attitude towards the EU. Being expressed in 2008 it continues to be dominant not only in official, but also in public discourse. The distinction between the EU and Europe contributed further into identity search in Russia at the level of the elite and the public. Many Russian and Western experts believe that Russian identity is still under construction, though some of its constants are certain (Piontkovsky, 2006). Valentina Feklyunina described persistence of Russia’s “discourse of difference” and stress on civilizational and cultural dimension of European identity in opposition to normative and values identity promoted by the EU (Feklyunina, 2018). Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes (2014) evaluated the entire transformation of Russia during reforms from “weak and good” towards being “bad and strong”. Most Western policymakers in the early 1990s gave the highest probability to “weak, good Russia” wherein Russia would be economically, politically and military weak, while its foreign policy would be loyal towards Western countries. According to the authors, “strong, bad Russia” meaning a country that would succeed in reforms and have a strong economy, stable polity and possess considerable military strength while being hostile to the West, “could not be imagined at all”. Comparing the transformation of Russia and the EU since the 1990s, we could use a definition given by Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf (1997, pp. 185–187). In the mid-1990s, the authors defined the EU as being “an economic giant, political dwarf and military worm”. To paraphrase this expression to Russia, the latter was a declining military giant, shrinking to political dwarf and economic worm for most of the 1990s. Russia mostly lost its political influence abroad, while its former allies were looking for a more powerful and prosperous leader (Nygren, 2008). Only in the 2000s economic growth and the stabilisation of political institutions have started that led to growth of a strong state that regained control over major economic and political spheres (Tsygankov, 2014). Russian military power was exercised in 2008 in conflict with Georgia that

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took many European politicians by surprise, and this was an important turning point in relations between the EU and Russia. In the 1990s and 2000s, the EU grew economically and politically gaining more weight as a global economic power extending its influence beyond immediate borders. The EU hard power also developed, although mainly European security remained tightened to NATO. The EU idea of “Bigger Europe” implemented through the Eastern enlargement outbid the idea of ‘common European home’ from Lisbon to Vladivostok that was put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev. Fyodor Lukyanov reasoned that instead of “Greater Europe” has emerged “Little Europe” and that the EU “has failed to become a major and independent international player”. He blamed the EU for “being largely responsible for the crisis in Ukraine, and insufficient policy in the Mediterranean paralysed by the Arab Spring and ensuing events” (Lukyanov, 2016, p. 16). Yet, geographical proximity of Russia and the EU and their political and economic magnitude to nearby countries generated the challenges of coexistence in the contested neighbourhood and with rather opposing new identities (Morozov, 2008; Radchuk, 2011). Thus, the EU and Russia imagined “ideal Europe” in the early 1990s as a region of peace and prosperity without dividing lines, although they completely disagree on who is responsible for the current conflicts and how to secure Europe again. At the same time, both actors are certain that they have been true to the agenda of united Europe of the early 1990s that turned into the divided Europe in 2014. Lukyanov (2019) argues that this new divide in Europe represents the end of the long twentieth century with its revolutions and big wars, although the future of Europe is seen in turmoil. Anatoly Torkunov expressed officially along with many Russian experts the opinion that Russia has become a ‘great Eurasian power’ (Torkunov, 2018).

Perceptions of the EU in Russia For the EU, Russia represents a failure of its policy of Europeanisation as democratisation of a former communist country and normalisation of a hegemon of the Eastern bloc. Russia with its enormous resources could create a safe, stable and predictable area of cooperation in regard to its initial desire to integrate with the EU in many spheres based on shared values, aspiration for democracy, rule of law and human rights. Instead,

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today EU Eastern border raises constant concerns from political, military and security aspects and requires additional material resources to mitigate those concerns (Laruelle, 2016; Kolstø and Blakkisrud, 2016; Snyder, 2018). Petr Kratochvíl (2008, p. 417) concluded that the idea of a “normalisation” of Russia contrasted with the Russian elite’s perception of Russia being a great power and treated unfairly by the EU. Kratochvíl found that the Russian elite has “predominantly negative attitude to Europeanisation’ as being ‘inappropriate for or unacceptable to Russia”. Studies of Russian public opinion through the entire period showed that the majority of Russians evaluated the country being a great power and regretted it was weakening (Levada Centre, 2019a). The annexation of Crimea was cheered by the Russian public, when about 80% of respondents evaluated this event as a return of Russia’s greatness (Levada Centre, 2015). The ‘Crimea phenomenon’ revealed once again public support to official foreign policy what was argued in some previous studies as being “strikingly congruent” (Tumanov et al., 2011). Perceptions of the EU by the Russian public have mirrored hopes and reservations towards a united Europe. In the 1990s, and similarly to other Eastern Europeans, many Russians believed that the end of the Cold War would start a new era in relations with Europe. Today, for many Russians, the EU symbolises a missed opportunity for the country to be integrated with this economically prosperous Union. The conflict over Ukraine raised concerns among many Russians of the EU not being a real partner to Russia, but rather a weak and submissive ally of the USA. These perceptions could be regarded as resulting from massive official propaganda, but hesitations of Russian public towards the EU could be tracked since the early 2000s. Longitude studies of the Levada Centre fixed well all the ups and downs of Russian views towards the EU. Fig. 12.1 presents the index attitude of Russian public towards the EU as a difference between positive and negative answers. The graph shows that Russian society was divided in their attitude towards the EU after the war with Georgia in 2008, Maidan events, in Ukraine, in November 2013. Since Crimea, the majority of Russians dislike the EU and only in March 2018 the balance returned towards the still almost equal division between those who have positive and negative evaluation of the EU. This data from quantitative studies is confirmed by the qualitative study of the EU perception in ten EU partner-countries including Russia, contracted by the European Commission in 2015. In Russia, the EU is

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Fig. 12.1 Russian public opinion towards the EU (index of positive and negative attitudes), 2003–2018 (Source Levada Centre (2019b) Public opinion 2018. Yearbook, graph 25.1. p. 153)

perceived as a good partner in economics, trade, science and education exchange. The Russian case showed the most negative perception about the EU among all cases and was evidently caused by EU-Russia interaction in the political sphere, mainly within the neighbourhood. The EU was described as arrogant, hypocritical, aggressive and having very bad relations with Russia (Analysis, 2017). Russian respondents viewed the EU as an actor that cannot deal with the Eurozone crisis on its own; as being in the shadow of the USA in the issues of scientific development; as a less important actor in the post-Soviet space; as a passive consumer of Russian gas and oil; as an incoherent actor that cannot speak with a single voice on matters of multiculturalism, and as an actor that is still searching for its own identity through external development actions (Analysis 2017, p. 57). Many of these perceptions reflect real problems that the EU has in different areas and that are discussed by media, politicians and the public. Although those issues have been presented in negative context by Russian media, these created a distorted picture of the real situation in EU countries. According to Lev Gudkov, former head of the Levada Centre, the attitude of the Russian people towards the EU lies in the psychological sphere: the EU countries represent the ideal that Russians could not reach

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in the foreseeable future and therefore they criticise eagerly all the imperfections that they have to tolerate in their own country without serious prospects of change (Gudkov, 2015). Olga Gulyeva similarly stated, to Russia Europe is a model of individual freedom, social norms and values. In this respect, the European Union is an example of economic modernisation, economic dynamism and development. Yet, at the same time, EU-Russia political relations are characterised by the antagonism typical of great power relations and contextualised by an understanding of Russia as being in Europe, but not of Europe. For Russia, Europe is charming and frightening, appealing and repellent, the antagonist and the protagonist. (Gulyaeva, 2013, p. 188)

Russia’s negative perception of the EU as a global and capable actor could be interpreted following a psychological approach when Russian elites and the public felt as not being recognised and accepted by the EU as a true European country and reliable partner. In many Eastern EU Member States, public and politicians have negative perception of Russia and this does not facilitate mutual trust and cooperation. Thus, for official Russia, many Russian experts and to most of the Russian public, the EU presents an arrogant and Russophobe player who could not be ever trusted or become a real partner (Analysis, 2017; Gulyaeva, 2013; Kratochvíl, 2008). At the same time, economic cooperation between Russia and EU countries remains the major source of Russia’s national wealth, thus political tensions should be solved to avoid deterioration of economic cooperation. The EU and Russia are linked to each other by their geographical proximity and they cannot ignore each other in addressing various issues—from security challenges to environmental problems, economic development and political dynamics.

Russia’s Assessment of the EU as a Foreign Policy and Global Actor Discussing Russian views on the EU it is important to underline current political trends in Russia, such as the claim that Russia is a specific country with its own path and thus Western countries could not judge it according to their standards. This vision is well present in Russia during the last ten years by scholars, who support state interests (so called gosudrastveniki–statist) and those who believe in a great power status of Russia

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(derzhavniki) (Lukin, 2018). Russia’s vision of the EU is conditioned by strong state logic developed through Putin’s leadership in a response to inner and external challenges (Tsygankov, 2014). The monograph by Marina Strezhneva and Daria Rudenkova (2016) specifically analysed the “EU architecture of foreign policy”. The authors followed the widely accepted arguments that the EU represents a sui generis foreign policy actor that combines several levels of interactions— intergovernmental, supranational and of Member States. The authors emphasised that various external EU actions have a clear separation between those that deal with high politics and security matters and those that do not deal with security issues—low politics. Strezhneva and Rudenkova discussed horizontal and vertical negotiations (soglasovanie), in defining ‘high’ and ‘low’ external politics of the EU. They suggested distinctions between (1) vertical negotiations within high politics; and those of (2) horizontal negotiations within low politics regarding trade, development aid, and normative power actions. The authors were critical of the EU’s self-assessment of being a superpower, which they regard as ‘wishful thinking’, as the EU lacks hard power (military capacities) and firm political unity needed for effective actions concerning security crises (Strezhneva & Rudenkova, 2016, pp. 7–8). Following the suggested distinction, EU Eastern Neighbourhood and Development aid policy should be within low politics. Nevertheless, the Neighbourhood policy touches upon security concerns, including possible membership in NATO, political reforms and future orientation of countries. As the Ukrainian crisis showed this area of EU external action could lead to deep crisis. Thus, Russian experts, officials and public see the EU as a weak foreign policy actor having no hard power and depending on NATO and the USA to solve security issues. This vision of a weak dependent Europe is popular in the USA and often pronounced by USA leaders. Russian experts debate EU legitimacy as a foreign actor since it ‘could not talk with one voice’ and has constant disagreements. The Russian experts acknowledge the duality of the EU external policies, although their analysis rather follows European scholars’ debates. For Russian foreign policy such duality of the EU represents challenges and opportunities to explore for reaching national interests and search for divide and to continue the development of bilateral relations with EU countries.

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Russia-EU relations could be defined as relations between a pure Westphalian state—Russia, and post-Westphalian entity with some features of the classical state—the EU (Sakwa, 2016, p. 87).

EU Neighbourhood Policy and EU as a Normative Power and Democracy Promoter Russian experts often regard the EU neighbourhood policy as a continuation of high politics, not as soft power or the EU as a global promoter of human rights and democracy. Many Russian authors do not consider the EU to be a true normative actor, since they view the EU neighbourhood policy it as a way to fulfil the EU’s own agenda and to interfere into the national policy of sovereign countries. Vladimir Pozner (2018), Russian journalist and a former member of the Presidential Human Rights Council, and Fyodor Lukyanov (2016), editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, referred to the established practice of using the human rights agenda by Western countries in their policy towards the Soviet Union and Russia. EU support to oppositional forces in the CIS in the early 2000s led to growing suspicion of the Russian political elite of EU interference in the country’s politics in the context of the so called colour revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Vyacheslav Morozov noted that democratisation as a foreign policy of Western countries rather discredits the very idea of democracy (Morozov, 2011). Strezhneva and Rudenkova addressed this issue in evaluating positive and negative conditionality in the case of the Eastern enlargement. They argue that the ‘nondemocratic, unbalanced process of Enlargement facilitated readiness of some associated countries from Central and Eastern Europe to voluntarily abandon national sovereignty on exchange of firm assurance of coming accession’ (Strezhneva & Rudenkova, 2016, p. 17). For the authors, democratic negative conditionality was a direct interference into inner political life of candidate countries (p. 16). Human rights dialogue as cooperation between the EU and Russia turned into ritual exchange of accusations regarding human rights violations since 2011. Russia officially challenged the EU’s normative power and legitimacy of civil society and human rights groups working in Russia with international financial support as “foreign agents”. In 2012, Russia’s Duma held hearings on violations of human rights in EU countries. A special division in the Ministry of Foreign affairs was created to present the official point of view on human rights and cooperation in this area

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with the EU. Thus, the human rights dialogue turned into its opposite—a battleground. The evaluation of the EU as an aid provider and humanitarian agent is a sensitive issue in Russia as the country was receiving EU aid from 1992 till 2006 through the special TACIS Programme (Technical Assistance to Commonwealth of Independent Countries), having received the largest financial aid for its reforms through the 1990s and early 2000s (Grigoriadis, 2015; Marquand, 2009; Short et al., 2006). Sergey Karaganov’s statement that ‘we drained out the treasury of Europe’ (Karaganov, 2018) reflects two meanings: (1) that under sanctions Russia is not receiving European financial resources that were available before, and (2) that Russia should look for another source for its development.

Conclusion: Understanding Russia’s Stance on the EU and How It Influences Perspectives for Cooperation To better understand Russia’s attitudes towards the EU and the rationale beyond its thinking, we could compare Russia and EU visions of themselves and perception of one another on certain areas of international cooperation. Table 12.1 entitled ‘EU and Russia self-perception and perception of another in regard to different aspects of global affairs’ summarises those differences. The current official attitude of Russia towards the EU as a global actor could be defined as the behaviour of a revisionist power11 that challenges the legitimacy of the EU as a global actor (Mead, 2014). The current conflict between the EU and Russia could be understood through the theory of power transfer that concerns hard power and military capabilities. In accordance to Organski and Kugler (2011, p. 174), challengers are those powerful and dissatisfied great nations who have grown in power after the imposition of the existing international order. Their elites face circumstances where the main benefits of the international order have already been allocated.

11 Revisionist power is a country that would like to change the existing world order in accordance to its power.

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Table 12.1 The EU and Russia self-perception and perception of another in regard to different aspects of global affairs12 Perceptions

Russia perceives the EU

Russia EU perceives self-presentation Russia

EU selfpresentation

Actor in security matters

No actor as has no hard power

Global actor promoting multipolarity

Economic actor

Important partner Important and as the EU reliable partner depends on Russia’s resources Weak actor Great power

Cooperative superpower combining soft and hard powers Global actor

Challenger

Important actor uses assistance programs as FP tool Not actor Double-standards Human rights violator

Challenger that uses assistance programs as FP tool Challenger that undermines international standards

Foreign policy actor Assistance and development aid actor Normative actor

Global actor

Sovereign democracy

Challenger Aggressor Nuclear weapon state Challenger

Global normative actor Global actor

Normative power with highest standards

Indicator partner/ actor/ challenger/ Source Elaborated by the author

The essence of revisionist approach came into light during the famous president Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007. After that, many international events provided additional reasons for open contradictions between actors and accusations of being unfair and drifting apart from previously agreed principles. The return of Russia’s greatness whether accepted, questioned or challenged by Western analysts, was noticed and analysed since the mid-2000s (see e.g. Hedenskog, 2006; Kanet, 2007; Nygren, 2008). Russian politicians and political analysts had cheered the return of Russia to the global scene as a powerful country, which they accessed as logical and long-awaited event 12 Table is based on author’s analysis of Russia’s self-presentation and perception of the EU from official sites of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and official documents regarding national security and national interests of Russia. The self-presentation of the EU actorness and perception of Russia is drawn from EU official papers and sites.

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(Karaganov, 2018; Pushkov, 2018; Surkov, 2018). Only some European experts revealed, ‘Russian foreign policy actions follow official rhetoric quite precisely’ and thus should not be regarded as ‘inconsistent and unpredictable’ (David, 2016, p. 37). Russia sought to challenge the rationale of EU sanctions in connection to Crimea and the Skripal cases as effective instrument and tries to undermine the unity of EU actions by enforcing bilateral relations with some of the EU countries and EU candidate countries. Russia’s relations with Turkey and Serbia illustrate deep engagement with problematic candidate countries, while the Nord Stream case and Russia’s cooperation with German companies illustrate the latter. If to follow USA strategic thinking on Russia as a revisionist power, the latter would not be ready to discuss security problems with the EU, but would only count on the USA. The EU faces dilemma of Europeanism or Atlantism where the security agenda is a key concern (Sakwa, 2016, p. 87). This might change if the EU would stop to build up its hard power, create closer links with NATO, and would definitely break the link between EU enlargement and NATO. Nevertheless, one must admit low probability of such development. In the foreseeable future, the EU unlikely would separate from NATO military coordinated capabilities to stand against perceived danger of Russian threat. It is even less a possibility for Eastern European countries not to look for NATO’s membership as an ultimate guarantee for their security vis-à-vis Russia threat—real or imaginary. Thus cooperation in security matters should be based on pragmatic politics with the ultimate goal to avoid ‘the worst scenarios possible’ similarly to the time of Cold war confrontation and this requires the development of a new vision of coexistence and common principles that would secure Europe (Zagorski, 2016). The EU should accept openly that Atlantism remains an important element of European security arrangements and the USA remains an important actor of European security. Thus, trialogue of Russia, the EU and the USA is a given reality and should be treated accordingly. Another consideration for EU-Russia relations understands that the Russian political class and masses challenge the normative power of the EU. Specifically, NATO should stop presenting itself as an organisation for democracy promotion, but as it is, a military and political alliance dealing with challenges, threats and having acceptable responses and where Russia is perceived as a challenger and threat. Russia political elite

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understands well EU duality and contradictions of being a post-modern normative actor and behaving as a realist state. At the same time, the EU has ‘soft power’ attractiveness for many Russians in economic, social and cultural terms and this attraction should be valued and nourished further through education, scientific, cultural and people-to-people cooperation. The EU should avoid ideological pressure and exercise normative power over Russia, because the EU has not any leverage to influence Russia through accession or integration. At the same time, all EU Member States and Russia are members of the Council and Europe and they are bind by institutional constrains and norms constrains in the area of human rights. European policy towards Russia should not be based on expectation of soon political regime change and active involvement with open opposition to the regime in the country. As Vladislav Surkov argued that Putin created a modern political system in Russia that would transcend his physical leadership for decades (Surkov, 2019). Indeed, the modern Russian state concerns powers’ distribution, functions of political and public institutions, legality and legitimacy of its current social, economic and political arrangement. Thus, the EU strategy towards Russia should avoid normative rhetoric while dealing with mainly foreign policy representatives of the political elite. Russia similarly to the EU could be considered to be sui generis, although not being within the EU normative frames and its institutions reach. Russia has clearly a European normative dimension and European longing in culture, societal standards and lifestyle. Thus, the EU should rely on a multidimensional approach of differentiating and selective cooperation as some analysts suggest (Fischer & Timofeev, 2018).

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PART III

External Views on EU Actorness

Part III includes an analysis of the recognition of EU actorness in nonEuropean countries’ foreign policies. It focuses on major international actors beyond EU’s neighbourhood, including regional organisations. These contributions cover several policy areas already addressed in the first part of the volume, allowing for cross-readings, with a particular focus on the issues and moments when considerations and perceptions about the EU were a priority and considered strategic or alternatively were only marginal and secondary. What readings of EU international actorness do these suggest, including at the conceptual and practical levels?

CHAPTER 13

Brazilian Perspectives on EU Global Actorness in the Case of Digital Technologies Regulation and Internet Governance: An Opportunity to Improve Mutual Relations? Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann and Paula Sandrin

Introduction The question of whether the European Union (EU) has international actorness involves, on the one hand, issues of purpose (needs and goals) and institutional and operational capacities, and, on the other hand, issues of internal and external legitimacy i.e. if internal and external actors

A. Ribeiro Hoffmann (B) · P. Sandrin Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. R. Freire et al. (eds.), EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92997-8_13

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perceive and recognise the EU to have legitimate agency in specific issueareas (Simão in this book; Bretherton & Vogler, 2005). Hence, in order to establish if the EU has actorness in a given sector or regional area, it is important to take into consideration third-countries perceptions of the EU. This chapter investigates EU global actorness from the point of view of Brazil. There is considerable literature on third-countries perceptions of the EU (Adriaensen et al., 2013; Chaban & Holland, 2018; Lucarelli, 2014) and a few studies on Brazilian perceptions (Braghiroli & Salini, 2014; Fioramonti & Poletti, 2008; Guimarães & Piefer, 2016; Sandrin & Ribeiro Hoffmann, 2018). Some have addressed the EU as a whole, some have disaggregated issue-areas such as security, trade or human rights. We found no study on Brazilian perspectives on the EU global actorness focusing on the issue-area of digital technologies regulation and internet governance despite the fact that these topics have received a lot of attention recently with the threats to democracy coming from the spread of disinformation and interference in electoral processes (Dai, 2018; Flyverbom et al., 2019; Hofmann et al., 2017). Given the relevance of this topic, and the fact that both the EU and Brazil have addressed it in their multilateral and bilateral cooperation, we focus in this issue-area as an illustrative case of third-countries perceptions of EU’s global actorness. The analysis is based on secondary sources (Sandrin & Ribeiro Hoffmann, 2018; Santoro & Borges, 2017; Saraiva, 2017) and official documents from the European Commission (EC) and European Parliament (EP). Our main argument is that in the case of digital technologies regulation and internet governance, Brazilian perceptions of the EU have been positive and that EU has been influential due to EU’s technical expertise and leadership; the presence of institutional infrastructure which made the flow of information and cooperation easier and EU’s and Brazil’s alignment of interests to counter the United States of America (USA) influence and the spread of disinformation. The chapter proceeds as follows: the first section contextualises BrazilEU relations within the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels. The second section focuses on the case study of digital technologies regulation and internet governance, and the final section concludes with an overall assessment of EU global actorness from the point of view of Brazil.

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EU-Brazil: Multilayered and Cyclical Relations In order to analyse Brazilian perceptions of the EU and its meaning for the EU’s ambition of being a global actor, it is important to understand how both parts interact, the content of these relations, and the structural conditions under which they have evolved. A main characteristic of EU-Brazil relations is that they are multilayered i.e. they take place at the bilateral, inter-regional and global levels. In fashion with EU foreign policymaking, whose system of governance has been referred to as being multilevel (Hooghe & Marks, 2001), these three levels of interaction are highly institutionalised, even if informal relations take place as well. Another trend is that these relations have not been constant, rather, they have evidenced ups and downs according to structural economic and geopolitical factors, and domestic political regime change. Despite these general trends, different issue-areas have specific characteristics; the case study addressed in this chapter is an example of a positive perception of the EU as a global actor from a Brazilian point of view. With the creation of Mercosur in 1991, the inter-regional level became the main level of interaction and engagement between Brazil and the EU, the bilateral level being established much more recently, in 2007, and not being a mechanism for, for instance, trade relations (Arana, 2017; Gratius, 2018). EU-Mercosur relations have been framed as one of the best examples of “pure” inter-regionalism, which, together with EU-ASEAN, was the cornerstone of EU foreign policy strategy in the 1990s of fostering a “world of regions” (Doctor, 2015). Other motivations for these relations pointed out in the literature include both parts’ interest in balancing US influence in Latin America, interests and cultural proximity with Portugal and Spain, and economic/trade gains (Santander, 2014). EU-Mercosur relations carry a broad agenda, covering political dialogue, development cooperation and economic negotiations, including trade liberalisation (Arana, 2017; Ribeiro Hoffmann, 2016). Despite numerous achievements in areas such as development cooperation and political dialogue, trade negotiations followed a stop-and-go pattern, given the lack of consensus mainly on agriculture, procurement and intellectual property (Bianculli, 2016; Borras & Kluth, 2018; Doctor, 2007, 2015). These relations have been negatively affected by the “crisis of Latin American regionalism” (Sanahuja & Comini, 2018), and the election in 2019 of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro given his dismissive approach to Latin America and regionalism (Malamud, 2018), as

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well as EU’s enthusiasm for bilateralism, instead of a “world of regions” (Meissner, 2018; Renard, 2016). Still at the inter-regional level, Brazil also interacts with the EU within the context of relations between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). When CELAC was created, EU-CELAC replaced the EU-LAC countries summits, which had started in 1999.1 EU-CELAC relations are influenced by global level geopolitical trends, such as the relations between Latin America and the USA and, more recently, China (Nolte, 2018; Roy, 2012; Sanahuja, 2015). In terms of content, the first EU-CELAC Action Plan, from 2013, established eight main topics: science, research, innovation and technology; sustainable development, environment, climate change, biodiversity and energy; regional integration and interconnectivity to promote social inclusion and cohesion; migration; education and employment to promote social inclusion and cohesion; the world drug problem; gender; investments and entrepreneurship for sustainable development (Council of the European Union, 2013). The second Action Plan, from 2015, added Higher Education and Citizen Security (Council of the European Union, 2015a), but the achievements of these dialogues have been considered short of expectations (Council of the European Union, 2015b). By 2016, the crisis of Latin American regionalism was felt at the EU-CELAC level, and the Summit planned to 2017 did not take place (Krapohl, 2019; Telò, 2017). Brazil and the EU also interact at the global level, within the UN system and multilateral negotiations. At this level, often Brazil has a differentiated agenda with EU Member States, depending on the issue-area, such as a dialogue for UN Security Council Reform, including Germany, or the Oslo Group for Global Health, including France. Finally, Brazil has also longstanding bilateral relations with the EU, starting with the accreditation of a Brazilian Ambassador to the European Communities in the 1960s. Brazil-EC/EU bilateral relations remained in the shadow of inter-regionalism for a long period, until the establishment of the Special Partnership in 2007. The announcement of the partnership was very controversial at the time, given the expected negative impact on Mercosur (Meissner, 2015; Ribeiro Hoffmann, 2009). Despite this, a certain division of labour evolved, in which trade negotiations remained at Mercosur’s level, and the Partnership focused on political dialogue 1 While LAC was an informal grouping of Latin American and Caribbean’s states, CELAC is a regional organisation created in 2011.

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and cooperation. Political dialogue takes place at executive (presidential, ministerial and technical) and parliamentary levels; the partnership supported dialogue among the business and civil society sectors as well. Two Joint Action Plans were issued in 2008 and 2012, laying out the main objectives of the partnership and instruments to implement it (Council of the European Union, 2011). Saraiva (2017, p. 2) distinguishes two types of sectorial dialogues: multilateral sphere dialogues and bilateral cooperation dialogues. The former involves international political issues and is held by diplomats, and their interactions and impacts are exerted by means of Brazilian and/or European (EU or EU Member States) actions in multilateral forums. The latter focus on bilateral cooperation issues, often of technical nature, mostly related to Brazilian domestic politics, and are held by diplomats from the European External Action Service (EEAS) and Brazilian agencies (Saraiva, 2017, p. 2). Between 2008 and 2016, 228 dialogue actions were supported, involving 68 Institutional Partners (41 Brazilians and 27 Europeans), within 30 different sector dialogues. During these eight years, divided into 3 phases of implementation, 8 calls for proposals have been launched”.2 Among the topics covered are digital technologies regulation and internet governance (under the themes of information society and cyber politics), which are addressed in the next section. Saraiva assesses both types of dialogues during the governments of Presidents Lula (2003–2011) and Dilma (2011–2016) and argues that while the bilateral initiatives were more successful than the multilateral dialogues during Dilma’s government, the overall results of the partnership are below expectations due to fundamental underlying differences. According to her: Firstly, Brazil has shown preference for a pluralistic multipolar world order of sovereign states that tolerates different world views, while the EU stands for an international society of states that is liberal and normative. Although Brazil belongs to the Western world with regards to domestic customs and visions, its foreign policy sustains an international approach based on respect for the sovereignty of foreign states, accepting different ideologies and political regimes. Secondly, Brazil’s diplomatic policy to build coalitions within international institutions and to forge ties with other emerging countries, some of which have non-liberal models in place, is relevant and

2 Refer to http://www.sectordialogues.org/background.php.

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leverages Brazil’s positions in international politics. Finally, while Brazil does share values with the EU and does follow Western patterns domestically, diplomatically speaking it does not recognize the EU as a normative power in the international order. (Saraiva, 2017, p. 15)

Blanco and Theodoro Luciano (2018, p. 3) also advance that EUBrazil strategic partnership “follows a descending path”, especially when comparing with EU-Mexico partnership, created in 2008, which is in an ascending and promising direction. The same assessment is reached by Gratius, who argues that “Brazil-European Union relations punch below their weight” and the state of current paralysis is due to “Brazil’s deep political, moral, social, and economic crisis and its consequent global decline” and the then “unpopular government of Michel Temer” (Gratius, 2018, p. 1). Despite the current state, Gratius argues that the bilateral level is more promising than the inter-regional in fostering EUBrazil relations in future given the complexities in reaching common interests and consensus among Mercosur Member States: The analysis of selected sector policies in Brazil-EU relations confirms a preference for pragmatic realist bilateralism over liberal inter-regionalism: trade (exclusive supranational EU competences and inter-regional level), investment (supranational and national levels), development (supranational, local and national levels), security (national level), and climate change (all levels). The failure of inter-regional trade negotiations contrasts with positive results in Brazil-Member States relations and strategic relations with Brussels. Thus, to advance bilateral relations, neglecting the MERCOSUR dimension, seems to be a more viable option than pushing for interregionalism that has not proven to be successful in any of the five areas analysed (trade, investment, development, security, and environment). (Gratius, 2018, p. 16)

As this section has shown, Brazilian perceptions of the EU have evolved within a context of dense relations taking place at bilateral, bi-regional and multilateral levels. Current relations are in a deep crisis in all levels. In addition to the crisis of Latin American regionalism, Brazil finds itself in one of its worse economic and political crisis since democratisation; with increasing levels of uncertainty under the government of President Bolsonaro which started in January 2019. Brazilian perceptions of the EU as a global actor are affected by these domestic changes. The next section focuses on a case study of digital technology.

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Brazilian Perceptions of EU Actorness in Digital Technology There are only a few studies on Brazilian perceptions of the EU making use of media analysis, elite interviews or opinion polls, such as Sandrin and Ribeiro Hoffmann (2018), Guimarães and Piefer (2016), Braghiroli and Salini (2014) and Fioramonti and Poletti (2008). These studies have measured how well-known the EU is in Brazil and whether Brazilians have positive or negative perceptions of the EU in general or in particular issue-areas across time periods, and have shown that the EU, in general, was seen in a positive light by the majority of Brazilians across the time periods reviewed, although specific events, such as the Eurozone crisis, Brexit and the refugee and migrant crisis, unsurprisingly affected the overall general perception negatively (Sandrin & Ribeiro Hoffmann, 2018). Also unsurprisingly, most studies have shown that the issue-area of highest EU visibility and positive evaluations in Brazil is economy, in particular trade. The EU is usually perceived as an influential international actor and an important trade partner for Brazil. These studies, thus, mostly try to gauge whether the EU is visible in Brazil and whether it is seen in a positive or negative light. When it comes to EU actorness, the most recent data from a public opinion poll conducted in 2015 and which compared EU’s performance in several sectors with those of other countries (the USA, Japan, China, Russia and India) and organisations (United Nations, Mercosur, World Bank, World Trade Organization, NATO, NAFTA and ASEAN) reveals that most Brazilians place the EU among the most influential global players in economic affairs and trade, maintaining global peace and stability, fighting climate change, protecting the environment, supporting developing countries and promoting human rights (Sandrin & Ribeiro Hoffmann, 2018). The survey did not contain any specific question on EU’s performance regarding digital technologies and internet governance and regulation, but most Brazilian respondents felt that the EU performs well in science and research and when it comes to the development of new technologies (PPMI, NCRE, NFG, 2015, p. 32). Given the lack of quantitative and qualitative data, we try to gauge whether the EU is recognised by Brazilian governmental and non-governmental actors as an important and legitimate international actor in the sector of internet governance and regulation of digital technologies in general, and the fight against disinformation in particular, by outlining EU’s and Brazil’s main initiatives

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in these issue-areas, the context in which they were designed, and how cooperation among them unfolds. The analysis is based on the secondary literature and primary sources such as EU documents. The issue of internet and digital technologies governance and regulation, which includes cyber security, data protection, online privacy and confidentiality, digital democracy, online platforms and social media regulation, investment and innovation, has been a priority for both the EU and Brazil in the last decade and the focus of cooperation between the two. One of the 10 EC priorities for the 2015–2019 period, under Jean Claude Juncker’s leadership, has been the “Digital Single Market” strategy, which involved a plurality of efforts concerning the internet and digital technologies, including roaming charges, wireless broadband, digitisation of the labour market and data protection. The EU has taken a leadership role when it comes to data protection, with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which regulates how personal data of EU citizens can be collected, stored and processed, coming into effect on 25 May 2018. The GDPR has been considered “gold standard for data protection” (Dworkin & Leonard, 2018, p. 21), encouraging non-European companies and non-European countries, including Brazil, to adopt its rules or develop its own legislation, as we will discuss in more detail below. When it comes to the specific issue of disinformation, since 2015, the EU has been launching several initiatives. One of the first steps has been the creation of the European External Action Service East Stratcom Task Force to challenge Russia’s disinformation campaigns. The FacebookCambridge Analytica data scandal3 increased concerns with the potential impact of disinformation on democratic and electoral processes, particularly on the European elections of spring 2019, and led the European Commission to step up its efforts. In early 2018, Mariya Gabriel, then Commissioner for Digital Economy and Society, convened a High Level Expert Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation, composed of members from academia, written press, broadcasting and fact-checking organisations and online platforms, and tasked it with helping the EU to develop a strategy for tackling disinformation (European Commission, 2018b). 3 In March 2018, The Guardian and The New York Times revealed that Cambridge Analytica, a British political consulting firm, had collected the personal data of millions of Facebook users without their consent and used it to influence public opinion for political purposes.

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Taking into account the report produced by the High Level Expert Group, the results of a public consultation on Fake News and Online Disinformation and an Eurobarometer survey, the EU launched an unprecedented self-regulatory and voluntary Code of Practice on Online Disinformation, consisting of a set of nonbinding guidelines (hence, without compliance or enforcement tools) that encourages companies like Google, Facebook, YouTube, Mozilla and Twitter to increase transparency for online political advertising and online bots and to reduce the number of fake social media accounts (European Commission, 2018a; Scott, 2018). The Code is unprecedented since it is the first time worldwide that digital technology companies agree to standards to tackle disinformation (even if it is on a voluntary and self-regulatory basis). The Code defines disinformation as “verifiably false or misleading information that is created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public, and may cause public harm”. “Public harm” is understood as “threats to democratic political and policymaking processes as well as public goods such as the protection of EU citizens’ health, the environment or security” (European Union, 2018). Finally, in December 2018, an Action Plan against Disinformation (European Commission, 2018c) was endorsed by the European Council. Among other initiatives, the Action Plan created a Rapid Alert System on Disinformation to enable Member States and EU institutions to facilitate the provision of alerts on disinformation campaigns in real-time and the development of common responses. The Plan also increased resources and specialised staff to reinforce the Strategic Communication Task Forces of the European External Action Service. Governance and regulation of digital technologies and the internet have also been on the top of Brazil’s political agenda since 2013, when revelations by the United States’ National Security Agency (NSA) former contractor Edward Snowden of US espionage on Brazilian leaders and corporations were made public in a series of articles to the British newspaper The Guardian. Snowden revealed that the NSA had monitored the then Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff’s phone calls, spied on Brazilian embassies, on the state oil corporation, Petrobras and intercepted citizens’ personal data. In response, President Rousseff delivered a speech at the opening of the 68th Session of the UN General Assembly in September of that year, in which she accused the United States of violating international law and suggested the creation of a new global legal system to govern the

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internet and guarantee the “freedom of expression, privacy of the individual and respect for human rights”. She argued that “The time [was] ripe to create the conditions to prevent cyberspace from being used as a weapon of war, through espionage, sabotage and attacks against systems and infrastructure of other countries” (Rousseff in Borges, 2013). Since then, Brazil has approved domestic legislation regulating the use of the internet by citizens, firms and internet providers (Internet’s Civil Framework), co-sponsored, along with Germany, two resolutions at the UN General Assembly (69/166 and 68/167) to tackle the issues of internet privacy and surveillance and hosted two major conferences on internet global governance: the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on Future Internet Governance (NETMundial) in 2014 and the UNESCO’s Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in 2015 (Santoro & Borges, 2017). These initiatives also placed Brazil in a leadership position in the area of internet governance and regulation, particularly concerning digital privacy and surveillance. Along with these individual initiatives by the EU and Brazil on the regulation of digital technologies and the internet, they have also been involved in joint cooperation efforts. In the context of BrazilEU’ strategic partnership, sectorial dialogues on information society and cyber politics were established, involving cooperation between Brazilian Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Science, Technology and Communications and Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG CONNECT). In particular, following the revelations of mass internet surveillance by the NSA, the issue of internet governance has been, since 2014, increasingly important in the sectorial dialogues as well and, as a result, Brazil and the EU agreed to work in coordination in international fora, such as the Internet Governance Forum and NETMundial, pushing for a less US-centric and a more international, inclusive and transparent internet governance, based on a multi-stakeholder system involving governments, the private sector, technical and civil society experts (European Parliament, 2015; Traynor, 2014). When Brazil hosted NETMundial in 2014, both the EU and Brazil endorsed principles on internet governance established at the event (European Parliament, 2015). The EU and Brazil, together, have successfully challenged US influence over the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the US-based private non-profit corporation which manages the internet’s domain name system. In 2016, the Obama administration agreed to give up direct US government oversight

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control of ICANN (Farrell, 2016), a diplomatic victory for the EU and Brazil. In addition to these deliberate cooperation efforts, the EU has been influential in the creation of Brazil’s data protection legislation. The implementation of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) exerted pressure on Brazil to set up its own legislation regulating the collection and treatment of personal data, since anyone, anywhere, who handles EU citizens’ personal data, can face penalties (Muggah & Hurel, 2018). Inspired by the GDPR, Brazil’s legislation on personal data protection was sanctioned by the Presidency in August 2018 and will come into effect in 2020 (Terra, 2018). Furthermore, in June 2018, ahead of Brazil’s Presidential elections, a Brazil-EU International Seminar “Fake News: Experiences and Challenges” was held at Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court, supported by EU-Brazil Sector Dialogues Support Facility, which gathered together high level Brazilian and EU officials and civil society experts to discuss the impact of disinformation on elections and on democracy and ways to tackle it (Dialogues European Union—Brazil, 2018). Also in June 2018, Brazilian Supreme Electoral Court (TSE) and Facebook and Google signed a memorandum of understanding aiming to prevent the spread of fake news in the upcoming elections (Alves, 2018). Hence, both the EU and Brazil have been increasingly concerned with the regulation and governance of digital technologies and the internet, the spread of disinformation and its impact on democracy and electoral processes, and have been engaged in separate and joint efforts to tackle them. From the point of view of Brazilian officials and civil society, the EU is perceived and recognised as having legitimate agency and being a relevant actor on this issue-area. Its actions and policies have global reach and influence and are, in fact, an “inescapable reference” (Simão in this book) in this specific sector, as is clearly visible, for example, in the case of the GDPR and how its implementation exerted pressure on Brazil to formulate its own legislation on the subject. In addition, as the issue of fake news and its impact on electoral processes became a growing concern around the world, the EU and Brazil have been collaborating on initiatives to discuss and put forward options to curb them. Although Brazil, in its own right, has international actorness when it comes to internet governance and regulation, the country’s authorities and civil society organisations recognise EU’s leadership.

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As we have argued in the beginning of this chapter, long-term structural and historical factors, short-term domestic regime changes and EU’s positioning in particular issue-areas help shape Brazil’s perception of the EU and EU actorness in the country. In the case of digital technologies regulation and internet governance, we can say that Brazilian perceptions of the EU have been positive and that EU has been influential due to several interrelated factors. First, as an economic heavy-weight and a “norm entrepreneur” and pioneer in this particular issue-area, the EU created a context in which Brazil was either pressured into following EU guidelines or voluntarily turned the EU into a source of technical expertise and leadership. Second, sectorial dialogues on information society and cyber politics constituted an institutional infrastructure which made the flow of information and cooperation easier. Finally, and more importantly, EU’s and Brazil’s alignment of interests—at that time, to counter US influence and the spread of disinformation—facilitated bilateral cooperation. The EU identified an opportunity to exert influence and seized it. Given the importance of these factors, we anticipate a decrease in EU actorness in Brazil in this particular issue-area during Jair Bolsonaro’s government. Although the first two factors—EU leadership and expertise and the presence of institutional infrastructure—are likely to remain the same, the current far-right government does not seek to counter US influence nor the spread of disinformation. In fact, this government is moving away from traditional Brazilian foreign policy principles such as multilateralism, non-interventionism and a commitment to universal human rights towards alignment with Donald Trump’s foreign policy goals (do Vale, 2019). Furthermore, Jair Bolsonaro’s election has been described as the beginning of a “new political order based largely on disinformation spread through social media” (Noel, 2019). Hence, the growing distance between Brazil and EU’s interests might mean a decrease in EU influence in this policy area.

Conclusion This chapter has aimed at investigating Brazilian perceptions of the EU as a global actor. It focused on the illustrative case of digital technologies regulation and internet governance given the relevance of these policy areas in dealing the problems of data protection and disinformation and fake news, as well as interference in electoral processes. This issue-area

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turned out to be a case of a very positive role attributed to the EU from a Brazilian point of view, as the EU has taken a leadership role in the world and cooperated with Brazil in the context of sectorial dialogues, both at the bilateral and multilateral spheres. Mutual recognition of each other’s actorness and common goals have created synergies capable of creating changes in the landscape of internet governance, which were visible in the case of USA relinquishing of control over ICANN. In spite of the initiatives outlined above, during Brazilian Presidential elections of 2018, there was widespread circulation of misinformation, including fake news and polarising political messages, via social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter and internet messaging services, such as WhatsApp (owned by Facebook). The problematic entanglements between digital technology, disinformation and electoral processes continue to cause concern to democratic stability. Although this could be an opportunity for increasing bilateral cooperation, due to the current Brazilian government’s close alignment with the USA and its use of disinformation campaigns, we foresee a growing distance between Brazil and the EU in this issue-area.

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Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2001). Multi-level governance and European integration. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Krapohl, S. (2019). Regionalism: In crisis? In T. M. Shaw, L. C. Mahrenbach, R. Modi, & X. Yi-Chong (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of contemporary international political economy (pp. 89–101). Palgrave Macmillan. Lucarelli, S. (2014). Seen from the outside: The state of the art on the external image of the EU. Journal of European Integration, 36, 1–16. Malamud, C. (2018). What foreign policy now for Brazil? Retrieved November 18, 2018, from http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_ es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ ari120-2018-malamud-what-foreign-policy-now-brazil Meissner, K. (2015). The time has come to look at Brazil. The EU’s shift from interregional negotiations with MERCOSUR to a bilateral Strategic Partner with Brazil (EUI Working Papers n. 2015/37). Meissner, K. (2018). Resorting to bilateralism: The EU, MERCOSUR, and the strategic partnership with Brazil. Journal of European Integration, 40(1), 51– 66. Muggah, R., & Hurel, M. L. (2018, May 30). How Brazil could become a regional leader on data protection. Americas Quarterly. Retrieved November 15, 2018, from https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/how-brazilcould-become-regional-leader-data-protection?fbclid=IwAR09E2nPWUkT3 ijq5jQuJvGSORwNc9HSiv10zrZas3Of-W6Vr1A1z1D8M9c Noel, P. (2019, March 12). How fake news conquered Brazil. Medium. Retrieved August 21, 2019, from https://medium.com/news-to-table/how-fake-newsconquered-brazil-617ef6769ebc Nolte, D. (2018). China is challenging but (still) not displacing Europe in Latin America. GIGA Focus Latin America. Retrieved August 21, 2019, from https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publication/china-is-challe nging-but-still-not-displacing-europe-in-latin-america PPMI, NCRE, NFG. (2015, September 14). Public opinion survey on the perception of the EU and EU’s policies abroad. Retrieved August 21, 2019, from https://ec.europa.eu/fpi/showcases/analysis-perception-eu-andeus-policies-abroad_en Renard, T. (2016). Partnerships for effective multilateralism? Assessing the compatibility between EU bilateralism, (inter-)regionalism and multilateralism. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29(1), 18–35. Ribeiro Hoffmann, A. (2009). EU-Mercosur relations after the EU-Brazilian strategic partnership. In W. Hofmeister, M. Saraiva, & Estevao Martins (Eds.), EU-Mercosur relations. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Konrad Adenauer. Ribeiro Hoffmann, A. (2016). Inter- and transregionalism. In T. Risse & T. Börzel (Eds.), Oxford handbook of comparative regionalism (pp. 245–267). Oxford University Press.

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Roy, J. (2012). European Union-Latin American relations in a turbulent era (Jean Monnet Robert/Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 12). Sanahuja, J. A. (2015). The EU and CELAC: Reinvigorating a strategic partnership. EU-LAC Foundation. Sanahuja, J. A., & Comini, N. (2018, May 4). Unasur: ¿‘Sudamexit’ o la estrategia de la silla vacía? Esglobal. Retrieved August 21, 2019, from https:// www.esglobal.org/unasur-sudamexit-o-la-estrategia-de-la-silla-vacia/ Sandrin, P., & Ribeiro Hoffmann, A. (2018). The EU seen from Brazil: Images and perceptions. In N. Chaban & M. Holland (Eds.), Shaping the EU global strategy: Partners and perceptions. Palgrave Macmillan. Santander, S. (2014). The impact of the Iberian States on European UnionLatin American relations. In F. Baert, T. Scaramagli, & F. Söderbaum (Eds.), Intersecting interregionalism—Regions, global governance and the EU . Springer. Santoro, M., & Borges, B. (2017). Brazilian foreign policy towards internet governance. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 60(1), 1–16. Saraiva, M. G. (2017). The Brazil-European Union strategic partnership, from Lula to Dilma Rousseff: A shift of focus. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 60(1), 1–17. Scott, M. (2018, October 7). Why we’re losing the battle against fake news. Politico. Retrieved November 12, 2019, from https://www.politico.eu/art icle/fake-news-regulation-misinformation-europe-us-elections-midterms-bav aria/ Telò, M. (2017). Regionalism in hard time: Competitive and post-liberal trends in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Routledge. Terra. (2018, November 14). Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados Pessoais [LGPD]: como ela afeta os negócios brasileiros? Terra. Retrieved November 15, 2018, from https://www.terra.com.br/noticias/dino/lei-geral-de-protecaode-dados-pessoais-lgpd-como-ela-afeta-os-negocios-brasileiros,48ea75d8efc6 0d2711c2b8cd8ec70952o5i561tf.html Traynor, I. (2014, February 12). Internet governance too US-centric, says European commission. The Guardian. Retrieved November 15, 2018, from https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/12/int ernet-governance-us-european-commission

CHAPTER 14

The European Union as a Global Actor: An Indian Perspective Rajan Kumar

Introduction The European Union (EU) has evolved into an influential entity with a high degree of credibility, relevance and legitimacy in the international system. It is easily the deepest form of regional integration among sovereign nation-states ever conceived in world history. Its integration in the last few decades through various iterations evoked a proto-image of the post-Westphalian international order based on shared sovereignties and re-imagined political community. More than an organisation, it shaped up into a supra-national structure governed by common laws on currency, security and foreign policy. With a robust economy and liberal democratic politics, it commanded very high respect and acceptability as a global actor. Way beyond its borders, it influenced the creation of other regional organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asian

Present Address: R. Kumar (B) School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, India

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. R. Freire et al. (eds.), EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92997-8_14

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Nations (ASEAN), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the African Union (AU) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). However, long before the EU could transform into a real political community, it began to crumble—particularly at a juncture when it was expected to play a leading role as a saviour of free trade, the rule of law and democracy. The succession of economic and political crises in Europe has eroded the credibility and viability of the EU as a unified diplomatic actor on the world stage. The Eurozone crisis and Brexit have dented its image, and it is no longer prescribed as a quintessential model for integration. It is viewed as a house-in-disarray whose survival is in question (Indian Express, 2019; Thompson, 2018). Internal contradictions have been accentuated by geopolitical developments in the neighbourhood and beyond. The refugee crisis, failing multiculturalism, the conflict in Ukraine and the Euro-Atlantic rift have subjected the EU to unprecedented strains. A growing geopolitical uncertainty caused by an inconsistent United States and an assertive China, however, has pushed the EU closer to India. Indo-EU relations have improved significantly in recent years. India’s perception of the EU has changed favourably. It is believed that the EU has begun reciprocating to Indian overtures by offering its diplomatic support in the contentious dealings that India recurrently tends to have with Pakistan and China. This gradual shift in the strategic orientation of both actors is a significant departure from their policies in the past. We can identify certain broad trends in the relationship with the EU and its earlier variants with the help of the following classification: scepticism and mistrust in the Cold War period; recalibration and warming up in the 1990s; and mutual recognition and selective engagements in the last two decades. This classification from 1957 to 2018 runs the risk of over-simplification, but this parsimony is useful in structuring the analysis presented here.

India’s Historical Perception of the European Union The evolution of the EU has run parallel to India’s emergence as a post-colonial state after the end of the Second World War. In the initial years, Indian perceptions towards Europe in general and this institution in particular were shaped by post-colonial attributes emanating from the

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history of India’s colonisation, the anti-colonial struggle, the politics of the Cold War and its policy of non-alignment. A long history of colonisation and the national liberation movement against the British Empire profoundly impacted India’s attitude towards Europe. It developed, to borrow the phrase from Isaiah Berlin, a paradoxical outlook towards the West: a simultaneous desire to emulate the Western ideas and institutions co-existed with a deep-seated yearning to embrace the tradition and renounce the Western values as individualistic, immoral and materialistic; a de trop or an unwelcome outsider (Hardy, 2013). Europe was seen as a coloniser and India developed an inner emotional hostility and suspicion towards it. The fear of recolonisation was not completely absent. India’s support for anti-colonial movements in Africa and Asia was reviled in Europe. During the Cold War period, Europe repeatedly snubbed India and favoured Pakistan in international forums. On the sensitive issue of Kashmir, many European countries were seen taking the side of Pakistan in international forums. The 100th Resolution of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)—the Irish Resolution of 1962—which urged India and Pakistan to enter into direct negotiations on the disputed territory in Kashmir—was supported by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and China. These powers also supported the 99th Resolution of the UNSC, which called for a ceasefire when India invaded Goa, a Portuguese held territory. In both cases, India’s diplomatic position was salvaged by the Soviet Union’s veto (The Economic Times, 2016). It blocked this move involving two European members of the UNSC. The general mood in Europe was “vehemently anti-Indian” (Simha, 2016). The anti-colonial sentiments and the emerging de facto partnership with the Soviet Union cast a long shadow over India’s policy towards Europe. In the beginning, India considered the emergence of the European Economic Community (EEC) as “disturbing and undesirable” (Lall, 1973). India displayed no interest until Britain joined the Community in 1961. But even then the general attitude was that of apathy, indifference and suspicion (Bhoothalingam, 1972, p. 7; Gupta, 1971, p. 507; Jain, 2015). Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister and the most important political figure in the post-colonial India after the death of Mahatma Gandhi viewed the emergence of a common economic and political association of the West European countries as inevitable. Nehru’s chief concern was that a unified Western Europe might retard the pace of decolonisation in Asia and Africa (Nehru 4 February 1957a, p. 467; 22

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February 1957b, p. 553). Nehru’s approach towards the EEC was influenced by anti-colonialism and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the early years (Jain, 2015, p. 11). NATO had threatened India to come to the rescue of the Portuguese rule in Goa (Jain, 2015, p. 11). Further, many of the European countries supported Pakistan during the 1971 war which led to the independence of Bangladesh. Leading European nations criticised the nuclear explosion of 1974 as a destabilising development in the region. The USA and its European allies viewed India as an illegitimate aspirant of the club of nuclear weapon states. India-EU diplomatic engagement during the Cold War period generally remained low-key because South Asia was of “peripheral interest” to Europe (Jain, 2015, p. 11). The liberal international order created by the USA and its allies spread to other regions with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. At this critical historical juncture, India was experiencing severe economic difficulties. In these circumstances, Manmohan Singh, the reformist Finance Minister of India, responded positively to pressures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to undertake policy changes that reflected the liberal economic philosophy undergirding the EU. Momentous and seemingly irreversible decisions were taken during the five-year tenure of the Narasimha Rao-led Congress government to integrate India with the global economy. Inevitably, the foreign policy discourse in India was heavily influenced by the emerging unipolar world order and the global diffusion of the policies of economic liberalisation. The legacy of India’s leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was ridiculed as a foreign policy doctrine, and a vocal lobby in the commentarial class began to advocate a realignment of India’s external policies with the West. These champions of a pro-Western outlook fashioned themselves as “pragmatists” and derided the “idealists” of the Nehruvian period. This naïve and superficial demarcation of the history of India’s foreign policy continues to dominate the newspaper discourse even today. The so-called idealists were rejected because of their close association with the legacy of state socialism that was undergoing a severe crisis of legitimacy with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Critics found the label “idealism” to be a useful polemical tool to disparage India’s partnership with the Soviet Union and defeat in the China War. Of course, it was within this supposedly “idealist” phase that India intervened militarily to facilitate the break-up of Pakistan with the creation of Bangladesh and carried out the nuclear explosion of 1974. It is safe to say that this artificial demarcation

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between idealism and pragmatism is ahistorical and fallacious. The reality is that India foreign policy choices during the Cold War period were a calibrated and cautious response to a bipolar world where the choices for a regional power like India were limited. Given the long history of colonial conquest by European powers such as Britain, France, Portugal and Holland, it would have been ahistorical and irrational to expect that a newly independent country, led mostly by the erstwhile freedom fighters, would forge a close partnership with the ex-Colonial rulers. Ever since the Age of Enlightenment introduced the ideas of scientific temper, individual liberty and representative government in the nationstates of Europe in the eighteenth century, these countries projected themselves as the torchbearers of these values on the global stage. However, India’s collective memory of European colonial rule belied such claims as self-serving and dubious. During the independence struggle and thereafter, the anti-imperialist Indian elite was highly resentful of the general tenor of the British imperialist historians to justify colonial rule by recounting its contributions to Indian modernisation. This legacy of European hypocrisy is at the root of the general prickliness of the Indian political and academic elite to European sermons on India’s human rights record and the quality of its democratic institutions and practices. They resent being subjected to ethical prescriptions from Europe which itself has a long history of bigotry, double standard, racism, xenophobia, ethnic profiling and religious discriminations (Jain, 2017, p. 417; Tharoor, 2007). Indians often find Europeans to be “opinionated” who judge others from a high pedestal of reason and enlightenment (Jain, 2017, p. 421). European prescriptions on human rights were intrusive and at times counterproductive. India did not like being lectured on human rights violations in Kashmir and other places—an issue which keeps recurring in European parliaments. India considers this issue to be an internal matter allowing no intervention from external players.

The EU in the Post-Cold War Period The disintegration of the Soviet Union was hailed in the global policy and academic discourse as a sign of the triumph of liberal economic and political governance. The EU became the key model for institutional collaboration on regional integration. It intensified the ties that bound the European states into a loose supra-national structure, envisioning a prototype of the future political reconfiguration. A unified European

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entity emerged as a post-modern phenomenon that promised to supersede sovereign nationhood in modern world order. The Indian political elite welcomed the process of European integration, but was sceptical of its relevance to India given the developmental gaps, Cold War mind-set and strategic orientations of the two regions (Kavalski, 2016). The 1990s was the period when the EU was trying to develop a strategy to incorporate the post-Soviet states into its ambit, while India was struggling to overcome the balance of payment crisis and integrate its economy to the global capital and technology. The “pragmatists” of the 1990s advocated a quick realignment of India’s policy with the US. Europe was seen as a “normative” and “economic power” and not necessarily a military power (Kavalski, 2016, p. 193). Hence, it was still not on the radar of these pragmatists. This is unsurprising since US supremacy over the international system in the 1990s was so ubiquitous that it was inconceivable that any serious challenger would emerge in the near future. Moreover, there was greater cohesiveness within the USEuropean transatlantic alliance in the triumphalist phase of its victory over the Soviet-led communist bloc. India’s European policy concentrated on building on existing bilateral security cooperation and diaspora ties with Britain, Germany and France. However, the persistence of fundamental divergence in the geopolitical interests of India and these European nations remained a serious obstacle in these efforts. Britain remained the main entrepot for India. India’s linkages with Britain remained strong in terms of economic trade as well as intellectual networks which can be attributed to the prestige associated with the use of the English language in the post-colonial politics and economy in India. Germany was viewed as a strong economy and commanded strong goodwill among the ruling elite. Except for Britain and to some extent France, the knowledge of European affairs remained confined to a segment of the academic community and bureaucratic elite that were experts in the region. A segment of the left-liberal scholars was very well-versed in European history and politics, as the dominant framework within the Indian social science academic establishment is highly Eurocentric. Moreover, many Indian scholars have developed epistemic connections with their European counterparts since independence. In short, European ideas weighed heavily on Indian intellectual discourse, but it could not penetrate the popular culture, the way the USA or the Soviet Union did.

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Stereotypes of India developed over centuries of colonial contact remained dominant in the popular European consciousness. India was associated in the average European mind with Gandhi, Buddha, resplendent Maharajas and snake-charmers. Hollywood films further exacerbated these perceptions. The mysticism and spirituality of the oriente, as commented Edward Said (1979), dominated the worldview. The EU was seen traditionally as an obstacle to India’s ambition to secure a privileged position in international financial institutions (Allen & Smith, 2015, p. 167). That perception continues in a somewhat abated form. In the World Trade Organization (WTO), the EU protects its farmers, disregarding the interests of farmers from the developing countries. The UNSC, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the G-7, the IMF and the World Bank are the main institutions of global governance where India is either absent or a marginal player (Kumar, 2017). India often confronts Europe and America in these institutions. The system of global governance does not grant the privileged status that India aspires for. India had to struggle at every step to break the barriers and make an entry into privileged clubs. The slow pace of reform is often interpreted as the reluctance of the EU and the US to recognise India’s interests and aspirations. The EU is seen as a semi-autonomous player, subordinate to US security and economic interests. On several occasions, it has failed to articulate its independent positions. It is viewed as towing the lines of the USA even when its members are sceptical about American unilateralism. In the Iraq war, despite some divisions, Europe could not take a position different from the USA. The nuanced differences of European positions hardly get media attention in India. NATO is perceived as the security arm of the EU, and the distinction between the two is often blurred in the predominant anti-Western analytical frameworks in India. There is a general perception that the EU has outsourced its security requirements to NATO. NATO is seen as an organisation which seeks to protect and promote the interests of the USA and Europe (Chenoy & Kumar, 2017). The NATO bombings in Serbia, Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria have invited severe criticism from several quarters in India. The EU’s tacit approval or enthusiastic participation in these interventions makes its members culpable for the human rights violations that were perpetrated by the US-led coalition. The absence of global legitimacy for NATO interventions has undermined the credibility of the EU as a champion of

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democracy and the rule of law. As India and China became the focus of investors and multi-national companies looking for avenues of investment, interest in these emerging markets grew among influential actors in the global financial community. In the 2000s, the global presence of software and service sectors, the 2008 nuclear deal with the USA and its ability to withstand the exogenous shock of the global financial crisis contributed to a positive image of India. During the financial crises of 1998 and 2008– 2009, India continued to grow at a reasonable pace. To bail out the falling economies of Europe, Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, committed $10 billion to the IMF (The Times of India, 2012b). In 2001, a Goldman Sachs analyst drew European attention to India by coining the BRICS acronym to indicate the new group of non-Western nations that were beginning to act in concert on the global stage. Tangible actions by the BRICS group such as pledging $75 billion to the IMF’s bailout fund for the Eurozone crisis further contributed to changing European perceptions about India. The worst affected EU members derogatorily referred to as the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) were the intended beneficiaries of this external assistance. China agreed to contribute $43 billion while India, Russia and Brazil contributed $10 billion each (The Times of India, 2012a). The BRICS states which were debtors in the 1990s became creditors to the West.

India-EU Selective Engagements The Indian foreign policy establishment is currently focused on managing ties with the USA, containing its extremely hostile rivalry with Pakistan and the growing asymmetry with China (Mohan, 2018a). These preoccupations have contributed to the relative neglect of the security and economic importance of the EU in Indian policymaking and academic circles (Jain, 2012). The Indian lack of interest is reciprocated within the EU except for the issue-areas of trade and the environment. Indian media attention on the EU is scarce (Jain, 2012, p. 36). The EU for a long time did not develop an independent and clear strategy for India. The EU’s indifference to India is understandable given its preoccupation with internal disputes. Prime Minister of Netherlands Mark Rutte summed up this state of mutual indifference between the two sides: “The EU is India’s largest foreign trading partner and source of investment. Nevertheless, the EU is not on the radar of Indian public opinion, its media or its politicians. One constant factor in any Indian policy-scenario is the absence of

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the EU. Likewise, India is still largely absent from the strategic agenda of the EU or its Member States. This is a mistake” (Choudhary, 2018). China was the main focus of the EU in Asia. The EU-India strategic partnership has been “overshadowed by the India-US and the India-China relationships”, and India has been missing from the strategic calculus of the EU (Allen & Smith, 2015, p. 171). The EU “lacks imagination” in its dealings with India and does not recognise the fact that “India is looking for a third option while dealing with China and the US” (Allen & Smith, 2015, p. 171). India and the EU have developed institutional mechanisms for cooperation, but the process has been frustratingly slow. Both EU and India aspire to be global players, but remain confined to playing a leading role only in their neighbourhoods (Kavalski, 2016). The first India-EU summit-level meeting took place in Lisbon in June 2000 at the initiative of Portugal, which held the Presidency of the EU (Mohan, 2000). They signed the “strategic partnership” treaty in 2004. But this remained more declaratory than substantive. The EU is a marginal player in South Asia. The relationship between India and the EU is neither really strategic nor a real partnership (Allen & Smith, 2015, pp. 171–172; Kavalski, 2016). India would like to be treated as more than just a big market for investment and commerce. It wants to develop close security, economic and political partnerships with the EU. The two sides, however, have failed to reach a breakthrough on the EU-India Free Trade Agreement despite 16 rounds of talks. They seem to disagree on intellectual property rights, visa regimes, movement of labour and custom duties. The EU demands a cut in duties on wine, cars, dairy products and strong laws on copyright violations. India demands a liberal visa regime, the status of “secure data nation” and better mobility for IT and service professionals from India to Europe (Mohan, 2018c). The two-way trade between India and the EU dipped to USD 88.4 billion in 2015–2016 from USD 98.5 billion in the previous fiscal (The Economic Times, 2018). Import restriction and tariffs are a recurring source of friction between the two partners. Since the advent of Trump has heightened tensions within the USAEU transatlantic alliance, the EU has begun reconsidering its overall diplomatic strategy. The attention of the European Union has turned positively towards India. Recently, the French Ambassador to India Alexander Ziegler and Charge D’affaires at the German Embassy, Jasper Wieck jointly authored a column in which they wrote:

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The close partnership between our two nations is also of great importance all over the world. Germany and France together support important central points of international relations: Common input for a multipolar rulesbased order, a trade and development policy based on partnerships, a free and open Indo-Pacific region, and support for global solutions for global challenges – like climate change (...) Germany and France are ready for close and dynamic cooperation on all levels towards India. Together with India, we are at the forefront of a multipolar order that trusts in democratic and rules-based principles. (Ziegler & Wieck, 2019, p. 14)

It was interesting and probably the first time that the two ambassadors joined hands to show what values they stand for collectively. More than the substance of the article what mattered was a collective recognition and a desire of the two most important countries of Europe to align their vision with India. They underlined the role of India and Europe in upholding the law and rule-based international order. They consider the threat of liberalism to be coming from outside like China in the IndoPacific Sea or Russia in Europe; while in reality the greatest threat to liberalism in Europe, America as well as India is internal from the populist, majoritarian and hyper-nationalist leaderships. The EU and India need to recognise this ominous development before it becomes unmanageable, and must cooperate extensively if the rule-based international order and democracy are to be protected. The global promotion of European values or democracy is a subject of running controversy. India tends to be generally opposed to interventions undertaken in the name of “international community” in internal affairs. As in other parts of the developing world, there is grave suspicion among Indian scholars regarding the efficacy and legitimacy of such projects sponsored by Western governments and NGOs (Chenoy & Kumar, 2017). Indian opinion is firmly against foreign-imposed regime change as was the case recently in Georgia and Ukraine. India treats Russian claim in Ukraine as legitimate and has called for a diplomatic resolution of the disputes involving all the stakeholders (Chenoy & Kumar, 2017). A similar official position was taken in the case of Syria. India’s sensitivities on such interventionism are grounded in its fears that these instances would be treated as precedents to support further internationalisation of the Kashmir issue. This is the reason why India has a deep aversion to the involvement of the UN in resolving this dispute. Therefore, as India and Europe are warming up to each other, they need to

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recognise some of the fundamental contradictions that prevail in their worldview. As mentioned earlier, an assertive China and the uncertainty triggered by US behaviour during the Trump administration is having a positive impact on India-EU relations. As the EU is actively seeking partners in Eurasia and India-Pacific, it is likely to shed its earlier indifference towards India. The frostiness in USA-EU ties was underlined by President Emmanuel Macron of France who declared that Europe could no longer remain dependent on the US for security (Mohan, 2018b). India bought Rafale fighter planes from France and signed security agreements with several countries in Europe. Experts believe that India and Europe should partner as a hedge against rising China and US retrenchment in Eurasia (Mohan, 2018b). India no longer views European affairs from a Soviet perspective as was the case in the Cold War. The contemporary foreign policy of India is to engage with all the powers including Russia and Europe. There are clear signs that Brussels is pushing hard for closer ties with India. The annual summit between India and the EU was resumed in 2016 after a gap of four years (Mohan, 2018c). There seems to be a “renewed political will” and the EU has produced an ambitious “Agenda for 2020” to widen political, security and economic ties with India (Mohan, 2018c). The EU is in the process of revising its country strategy for India, the older one dates back to 2004. In the words of Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice President of the European Commission, Europe’s partnership with India has never been stronger. We are the world’s two largest democracies. We share the idea that a multipolar world needs multilateral governance: that internationally agreed rules are protection against conflict and chaos. We stand on the same side of global politics: our partnership can make a difference for peace, security and sustainable development in our respective regions and all around the world. (Mogherini, 2018, p. 12)

Europe is putting forward a new strategy for its relationship with India, “a roadmap to make our partnership even closer—to serve our citizen’s interests and to contribute to world peace” (Mogherini, 2018, p. 12). The two sides have signed agreements on countering terrorism, maritime security and nuclear non-proliferation. The EU’s new country strategy

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for India proposes military cooperation, dialogue on Afghanistan, Central Asia, technical cooperation, counterterrorism and cybersecurity. European commercial presence has grown significantly in recent years. Currently, more than 6000 European companies are working in India. India-EU works together on clean energy and climate change. The EU supports India’s clean Ganga initiative.1 Mogherini has also suggested that Europe sees India as “an indispensable interlocutor in our work for global peace and security, and our new strategy charts the way for broader and deeper cooperation” (Mogherini, 2018, p. 12). Mogherini stated that India is looking beyond its immediate neighbours and is emerging as a more confident global power and a reliable partner. They will cooperate on issues related to Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Both India and the EU share security concerns in the Indian Ocean, which are vital for energy supplies and global trade. Free and secured navigation has been threatened by China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and other parts of the Indian Ocean. The EU and India have similar concerns with the geostrategic and economic consequences of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that connects more than 70 countries including 14 in Europe. India refused to participate in the BRI citing the issue of impingement of sovereignty in Pakistan occupied part of Kashmir. Like India, the European participants in the BRI have also raised the issue of transparency, sustainability and international norms and standards. The EU is also planning EU-Asia connectivity projects in collaboration with India. The EU’s positions on climate change and Iran, which were opposed to the US stance, got favourable reviews in India. India supported the EU’s concerns on climate change despite US withdrawal. Similarly, attempts by the EU to develop Instrument In Support Of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX)—an alternative payment mechanism to allow trade between the EU and Iran— received wide approval in India.

Conclusion India considers the EU to be an important actor in the international system. It never doubted its ability to influence other actors. However, most scholars will concede that its actorness, from India’s perspective,

1 For further detail, see Clean Ganga Europe Desk, http://www.cgangaeudesk.eu/.

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is compromised due to several factors (Chenoy & Kumar, 2017; Vanaik, 2008). First, its inability to put the house in order following the economic crisis and Brexit. The image of the EU will largely depend on the way it manages the ongoing internal political and economic crisis. Second, the artificial division between NATO and the EU headquarters at Brussels appears less convincing to an outsider. It is difficult to defend that the EU is rule-based and norm-based, and what NATO does in the name of security is none of its business. The overlapping membership of the principal countries of Europe in both organisations defies the logic of wall of separation. Third, the fact that the EU plays a subordinate role to the USA also makes it a less relevant entity. This perception prevails in Indian policymaking. In the 1990s, the major effort of India’s foreign policy was geared towards the USA, with a mind-set that the EU will automatically fall in line. Fourth, for an emerging country like India, the EU needs to reform the institutions where it has traditionally been a dominant player in the post-colonial world order. A delay in reforms may push India to search for alternative global institutions. Fifth, the EU needs to recognise that the threat to liberalism and the rule-based order is more internal than external. Several states of the EU are witnessing the rise of hyper-nationalist and racist parties. These developments jeopardise the liberal democratic order that the EU espouses all over the world. A general impression is that the EU must place its own house in order first, before venturing out into democracy promotion to other countries. Its support for humanitarian intervention appears dubious since most of the European states fail to accept refugees. Europe and India are grappling with serious domestic issues such as the rising wave of nationalism, protectionism, threats to democracy, aggressive neighbours, a rift in the traditional partnership and pressure to adjust to a new economic and security environment. The two partners can work towards containing the rise of populist authoritarianism. Liberalism is under threat, despite some positive signs in Germany, France, Portugal, Hungary and even India. India and the EU need to develop strong intellectual and civic networks to stall the expansion of illiberalism. They need to retrospect into their economic and social policies which engendered such developments. Without such scrutiny, the talk of saving liberal order and institutional cooperation will appear meaningless.

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References Allen, D., & Smith, M. (2015). The EU, the US and India: Strategic diplomacy and great power politics. In M. Smith, S. Keukeleire, & S. Vanhoonacker (Eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges. Routledge. Bhoothalingam, S. (1972, July 1). India and the EEC. German News. Chenoy, A., & Kumar, R. (2017). Re-emerging Russia: Structures, institutions and processes. Palgrave Macmillan. Choudhary, D. R. (2018). India largely absent from EU’s strategic agenda: Rutte. The Economic Times. Retrieved October 7, 2018, from https://eco nomictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-largely-absentfrom-eus-strategic-agenda-rutte/articleshow/64298449.cms Gupta, S. (1971). Commonwealth South Asia and the enlarged community. The Round Table, 6(244), 507–510. Hardy, H. (2013). Isaiah Berlin: The power of ideas. Princeton University Press Jain, R. K. (2012). The European Union as a global power: Indian perceptions. Perspectives, 20(2), 31–44. Jain, R. K. (2015). Jawaharlal Nehru and the European Economic community. India Quarterly, 71(1), 1–15. Jain, R. K. (2017). India, the European Union and the human rights. India Quarterly, 73(4), 411–429. Kavalski, E. (2016). The EU-India strategic partnership: Neither very strategic, nor much of a partnership. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29(1), 192–208. Kumar, R. (2017). India and the BRICS: A cautious and limited engagement. International Studies, 54, 1–4. Lall, K. B. (1973). Remarks by Ambassador-designate to the Community in a meeting at the Belgian Embassy in New Delhi attended by EEC Heads of Mission based in the country, 11 May. Cited in FCO 37-1186, Minute of Sir Terence Garvey, British High Commissioner, New Delhi on meeting between Community Heads of Mission and K. B. Lall, 14 May 1973. Mogherini, F. (2018, November 22). Partnership with a difference: Together, India and EU can res-shape their regions and influence global affairs. The Indian Express. Mohan, C. R. (2000, February 17). First India-EU summit in June. The Hindu. Mohan, C. R. (2018a, September 11). Raja Mandala: Reconnecting with Europe. Indian Express. Retrieved October 7, 2018, from https://indianexp ress.com/article/opinion/columns/narendra-modi-ram-nath-kovind-indiaforeign-policy-asean-nations-5349432/ Mohan, C. R. (2018b, September 18). Raja Mandala: Two Discourses on Strategic Autonomy. Carnegie India. Retrieved October 7, 2018,

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from https://carnegieindia.org/2018/09/18/raja-mandala-two-discourseson-strategic-autonomy-pub-77278 Mohan, G. (2018c, June 28). A new pact with Delhi. Carnegie India. Retrieved October 7, 2018, from https://carnegieindia.org/2018/06/28/new-pactwith-delhi-pub-77065 Nehru, J. (1957a). Letter to K.M. Panikkar, Indian Ambassador to France, 4 February. In Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru, 36. Oxford University Press. Nehru, J. (1957b). Letter to Epstein. In Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru, 37 ( pp. 552–553). Republished by Oxford University Press New Delhi (2006). Said, E. W. (1979). Orientalism. Vintage. Simha, R. K. (2016, November 1). Veto No. 100: How Russia blocked the West on Kashmir. Russia Beyond the Headlines. Retrieved October 7, 2018, from https://www.rbth.com/blogs/stranger_than_fiction/2016/11/ 01/veto-no100-how-russia-blocked-the-west-on-kashmir_644137 Tharoor, S. (2007, October 14). Can India afford an ethical foreign policy? Times of India. Retrieved September 30, 2018, from https://timesofindia. indiatimes.com/home/sunday-times/all-that-matters/SHASHI-ON-SUN DAY-Can-India-afford-an-ethical-foreign-policy/articleshow/2456205.cms The Economic Times. (2016, March 11). Veto to blame for non-resolution of Kashmir issue: Pakistan. Retrieved October 7, 2018, from https://econom ictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/veto-to-blame-for-non-res olution-of-kashmir-issue-pakistan/articleshow/51357318.cms The Economic Times. (2018, September 23). EU-India ‘fully committed’ to move forward on free trade pact: Official. Retrieved October 4, 2018, from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/ eu-india-fully-committed-to-move-forward-on-free-trade-pact-official/articl eshow/65919850.cms?from=mdr The Indian Express. (2019, October 4). A crisis called Brexit. Retrieved October 4, 2018, from https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/editorials/brexituk-theresa-may-european-union-5751341/ The Times of India. (2012a, June 19). BRICS pledges $75 billion contribution to IMF’s bailout fund. Retrieved October 7, 2018, from http://timesofin dia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/BRICS-pledges-75-billion-contri bution-to-IMFs-bailout-fund/articleshow/14266972.cms The Times of India. (2012b, June 21). India offers $10 billion to combat fallout of the Eurozone crisis. Retrieved October 7, 2018, from http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/edit-page/India-offers-10-billionto-combat-fallout-of-the-eurozone-crisis/articleshow/14305045.cms Thompson, H. (2018, December 10). Broken Europe: Why the EU Is stuck in perpetual crisis. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved October 4, 2018, from https:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2018-12-10/broken-europe

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Vanaik, A. (2008). Misconceiving Asia. In B. Emmott (Ed.), Rivals: How the power struggle between China, India and Japan will shape our next decade. Allen Lane. Ziegler, A., & Wieck, J. (2019, January 22). The Franco-German Tango. The Times of India.

CHAPTER 15

China’s Considerations and Perceptions About the EU Dingding Chen and Yu Xia

Introduction: An Overview of the Evolution of China-EU Relations This chapter focuses on China-European Union (EU) relations from 2003 to 2016. With sufficient evidence, the relations during this period can be divided into 5 stages: development stage (2003–2006); crisis stage (2006–2009); overall recovery stage (2009–2011); suspicion stage (2011–2014); new development stage (2014–2016) (Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the EU, 2003).

D. Chen (B) Jinan University, Guangzhou, China e-mail: [email protected] Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin, Germany D. Chen · Y. Xia Intellisia Institute, Guangzhou, China e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. R. Freire et al. (eds.), EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92997-8_15

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China has released its first European policy documents in October 2003, which signalled that China and the EU have established a “Comprehensive Strategic Relationship”. Since then, China-EU relations have entered a stage of rapid development. With frequent exchanges of toplevel visits, the two sides have enhanced their mutual understanding and friendship. In 2004, Chinese leaders visited eight EU countries and the EU headquarters; in 2005, Chinese leaders visited seven EU countries. Correspondingly, in 2004, the leaders of five EU countries and the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, visited China. In 2005, the leaders of 10 EU countries and EU leaders visited China.1 In economic and trade relations, in the first three quarters of 2004 alone, the total bilateral trade volume reached US$128.02 billion, more than the total trade volume in 2003. The EU leaped to China’s largest trading partner, and China has become the EU’s second-largest trading partner. In 2005, the bilateral trade volume in the first three quarters alone reached US$157.79 billion, a year-on-year increase of 23.7% (China Customs, n.d.). However, since 2006, Sino-European relations have become cloudy. In October 2006, the EU issued two new policy documents on China and began to require China to learn more from European values and comply with Western rules, with the aim of re-regulating China-EU economic and trade relations. Since 2007, Sino-European trade disputes have become particularly fierce and more politicised. In addition to accusing China of dumping large quantities of cheap goods on the European market, the EU has also taken a politically high pressure to force the Chinese official currency, the renminbi (RMB), to appreciate against the euro (EUR). The crisis period of China-EU relations reached its peak in 2008. The anti-China forces in Europe first made use of the “Tibet issue” to raise controversy and elaborately planned the “3.14” Lhasa riots, according to the German Foreign Policy website publication of April 8, 2008 (Lhasa/Berlin, 2008). The anti-China forces in the West have politicised the Olympics to demonise China. For example, French

1 Including Portugal (in January), Ireland (in January), England (in January), Austria

(in April), France (in April), Belgium (in June), Czech Republic (in June), Spain (in July), Estonia (in August), Hungary (in September); EU leaders from the European Council, European Commission and European Parliament (in May), President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, and the Secretary General of the European Union Council, Javier Solana.

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President Nicolas Sarkozy has publicly emphasised that his precondition for attending the Beijing Olympics is that the Chinese government must make progress on the negotiations with the Dalai Lama. However, from a trade perspective, China-EU economic and trade relations have not been significantly affected by changes in the political climate. According to China Customs statistics, the bilateral trade volume between China and the EU in 2007 was US$356.2 billion, a year-on-year increase of 27%. The EU continued to maintain the status of China’s largest trading partner and became China’s largest export market. In 2008, the total bilateral trade between China and the EU reached US$425.577 billion, an increase of 19.5% over 2007. After 2009, China increased its efforts to visit Europe at a high level. At the end of January, Premier Wen Jiabao visited Switzerland, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the European Union headquarters; in April, President Hu Jintao met with British Prime Minister Brown and, in July, visited Italy. At the same time, high-level visits and dialogues between China and the EU continued. The eleventh China-EU Summit held in the Czech Republic in May 2009 marked a new beginning of China-EU relations. At the summit, Chinese leaders made the following important points clear2 : (1) the core of China-EU relations is strategic and comprehensive, and the key is to keep pace with the times; (2) give full play to the strategic role of the China-EU Summit in guiding development; (3) the most important thing in China-EU strategic cooperation is the principle of mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; (4) hope that the EU will recognise China’s market economy status as soon as possible. EU leaders indicated that EU-China relations are strategic and comprehensive and are willing to further strengthen EU-China Summit and other mechanisms in a spirit of candour and openness. They are willing to treat China’s market economy status in a fair and objective manner and express their political will to resolve the issue of arms embargo on China. In 2010, China-EU relations were fully restored, and high-level talks were frequent. The bilateral trade volume not only stopped the loss, but also hit a new high, and the science and technology and culture developed in an all-around way. From the perspective of economics and trade, 2 Pan Geping. (2009). China-EU Summit: Enhancing Strategic Mutual Trust and Leading to Practical Cooperation. Xinhua News Agency. Retrieved September 5, 2019, from http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-11/27/content_1474905.htm.

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affected by the financial crisis, the bilateral trade volume between China and the EU in 2009 was US$364.1 billion, down 14.5% year-on-year. However, by 2010, the bilateral trade volume between China and the EU reached US$479.7 billion, a year-on-year increase of 31.8%, an increase of 12.7% over 2008 before the financial crisis. It is worth noting that the rapid growth of EU exports to China has become a major highlight in the development of Sino-European trade (China Customs, n.d.). In 2011, with the deepening of the European debt crisis, China’s investment in Europe began to increase. These moves have caused controversy over whether China is “saving the Euro” or “sporting for Europe” inside Europe. To some extent, China and the EU have entered a period of suspicion. The two sides have not understood each other nor reached consensus on rulemaking and strategic intentions, but Chinese leaders are still constantly transmitting to the European society the signals of deepening cooperation and pursuing a win-win situation. In 2013, the Sino-European Photovoltaic (PV) products trade dispute was a case of mutual accumulation and eruption. The high-level leaders of the two countries have continuously adopted diplomatic efforts to use the ChinaEU Economic and Trade Mixed Commission, the China-EU high-level economic dialogue, and other dialogue mechanisms to finally reach a settlement of trade disputes, and officially launched trade and investment negotiations to promote the further development of China-EU economic and trade relations. However, during this period, the overall trade performance of China and the EU worsened. In 2011, the bilateral trade volume between China and the EU reached US$567.2 billion, an increase of 18.3%. However, the bilateral trade volume between China and the EU in 2012 was only US$546.043 billion, a decrease of 3.7%. In 2014, with the work of the new leader of China on the right track, China-EU relations entered a new period of development. In April, China issued a second policy document on Europe. The document pointed out that it is necessary to “strengthen all-round cooperation with the EU” and that “the EU is one of the priority directions of China’s foreign policy” (MFA of the People’s Republic of China, 2014). In the trade area, the two sides signed a number of economic and trade agreements. This momentum continued in 2015, but due to the sluggish global trade, the bilateral trade volume between China and the EU fell by 7.2% over the same period (China Customs, n.d.).

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Motivation: Complementarity and Recognition (2003–2006) Around 2003, bilateral relations between China and the EU went towards an all-around and deep-seated position, enjoying frequent interactions, implying that the EU had also become one of China’s strategic priorities. The driving motivation behind the strategic position of China-EU relations was that the two sides had formed a basis for mutual understanding and mutual recognition in the process of engagement. The proportion of China and the EU in the world economic structure was constantly increasing: China’s weight in the world economy had become heavier, compared with that before opening-up; though the EU was in a slower economic development, its integration process was gradually accelerated, with remarkable achievements, and the economy steadily recovered; the EU also surpassed the United States of America and Japan to become China’s largest trading partner (Zhou, 2004, p. 226). Thus, the strategic position of the EU in Chinese development planning came from internal demand and recognition of the economic approaches, in which the EU formed a regional economic cooperation with a perfective organisation structure. In other words, the EU was foremost a huge economic community to China at that time, when China wanted to integrate into the world economic market and considered the support from the EU was crucial. In this circumstance, complementarity brought China-EU relations closer and closer: possessing higher capital availability, higher technical content, and less technology transfer restrictions (Zhou, 2006, p. 105). Besides the proper match in economic demands, embracing of values constructed the foundation of the strategic position. Shortly after joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), China attached importance to trade and multi-polar development; the EU was committed to maintaining economic growth and sustainable development. On the one hand, the EU hoped to spread values and transform China’s market environment in its contacts with China; on the other hand, China also recognised the fairtrade environment provided by the EU as “a normative power” (Lilei, 2008, p. 29). To be more specific, although China has not accepted EU standards on human rights or democracy, it has accepted other norms from the EU such as multilateralism, sustainable development and peace, and has made all efforts to apply these norms while interacting with the EU.

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Obstruction: Misplacement and Conflict (2006–2009) With the continuous deepening of contacts between China and the EU, friction developed. According to the EU’s 2006 document on China, economic and trade issues had been transformed from a solid foundation in China-EU relations to the most prominent issue in the EU’s China policy, including EU companies’ external migration and trade deficits. It was part of the broader partnership with China and the approach set out with China: “Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities” (European Commission, 2006), which turned Europe from friendly to vigilant. The negative reports of some mainstream media in Europe during the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games and the criticism of human rights issues also made the understandings about China misplaced. According to the EU, the main reason for this unbalanced trade was the lack of a reciprocal free market. However, fundamentally, the rapid development of China’s economy is a direct cause of this. In 2007, China’s economy achieved a GDP growth of more than 10% for five consecutive years, gradually changing the trade structure, having as its main export commodities, and hoping to export more, high value-added technology-intensive products. However, the EU felt unprecedented pressure. Therefore, the EU’s understanding of China turned to a “panic sentiment”, and there was a tendency to suppress economic and trade exchanges through political pressures, which triggered an anti-China storm in the Western world. Trade rules became a difficult topic in China-EU relations, and further trade development was blocked. The cognitive abilities of both sides are based on their respective empiricism: China considers the EU from its own perspective, focusing on economic gains; the EU also measured China with EU standards, especially requiring a restrict market-oriented economy. Under such concerns, China’s strategy lacked “strategic partners”. The bilateral relation between China and the EU was focused on economic and trade relations. Once trade frictions occur, they are prone to collapse. In addition to the cognitive misalignment, the contradictions of values, which China had no desire to toss with, became a time bomb that could trigger conflict. Since the mid-1990s, political issues, including human rights and the “Tibet issue”, had not caused much trouble for bilateral relations, implying that the political issues were subordinated to economic and trade development. The EU’s China strategy has been supporting

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China’s economic and social reforms. It could be seen that the purpose of the EU is to promote China’s transition to EU values through assistance to China. However, due to the development of Chinese values and the failure to “converge” with the EU, the EU’s disappointment was obvious. First of all, the long-standing contradiction on human rights has gradually become prominent. In 2006, a document of the Council of the EU stated that “the Council continues to have serious concerns about the human rights situation in China and deeply regrets the fact that there has been little progress in a number of areas” (Council of the EU, 2006, p. 9). However, from the perspective of China, the EU’s excessive concern was an act of interfering in its internal affairs, and also an act of splitting the country, which touched the bottom line for China. Many Chinese believe that the EU’s interference in China on human rights issues “had ulterior motives”, causing political contradictions that heated up rapidly. Trade connections seemed to form a vast network of relationships, but it was difficult to withstand the test of value conflicts.

A Buffer Zone: Economic Bonds Go First (2009–2011) The China-European relations that had experienced such a trauma were linked to changes in the world financial markets. In 2009, the European sovereign debt crisis broke out and became the economic problem that had the greatest impact in Europe and the world economy. The European countries, which were deeply mired in the debt crisis, on the one hand, relied on cooperation among Eurozone countries to implement self-rescue measures; on the other hand, they also looked for external assistance from countries like China, who had huge foreign exchange reserves at that time. China took this opportunity to restart China-EU economic and trade exchanges. In other words, economic and trade relations had once again become a buffer zone between China and Europe, and the concerns of both sides have shifted to this serious economic problem. China helped Europe in order to maintain the current trading environment. Unlike the EU, China’s economic model relies heavily on exports to drive growth. China had been reforming but not yet been fully reformed, and foreign trade was still the first engine to drive economic growth. The EU was the world’s largest economy, and the recession in the European economy was bound to drag China’s exports. It was in China’s own interest to take some of its financial resources and increase

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holdings of Euro assets. Therefore, in this round of sovereign debt crisis, economic cooperation projects between China and the European countries have stimulated market confidence and accelerated the pace of economic recovery.

Suspicions and Differences: Different Expectations (2011–2014) Although China-EU relations have been buffered by bilateral trade and avoided political confrontation, the unstable cornerstone brought suspicion and friction. First, under the influence of the European debt crisis, European countries’ trade protectionism has risen. The governments of the EU Member States and the European Commission continue to pressure China to open the service market and government procurement. The EU’s survey of Chinese PV products is considered an example of protectionism. In addition, the EU’s repeated use of the “anti-dumping” clause and non-recognition of China’s “market economy status” are regarded as signs of the lack of trust and lack of positive performance in strategic relations. From the perspective of China, most scholars believe that the expression of the EU’s China policy is “Constructive Engagement”, which means that it aims to “change” China through constant contact (Pan, 2012, p. 27). The EU considers itself to be the maker of the “standards” in the international system and hopes that China will act in accordance with those standards. This different positioning becomes the starting point for the suspicion and differences between the EU and China. Therefore, China and the EU can only be guided by understanding and coordination of actions, and by establishing problem-solving mechanisms. In April 2010, during the European Commission President José Manuel Barroso’s visit to China, China and the EU decided to upgrade the level of strategic dialogue. On September 1, the same year, the first high-level strategic dialogue between China and the EU was held in Guiyang, China. In 2012, the first meeting of High-Level People-to-People Dialogue (HPPD) (China-EU, 2013) was officially held in Brussels to promote the construction of mutual trust, which covers seven areas including education, science and technology, culture, media, sports, youth and women (included in 2014). As the third pillar of China-EU relations, the HPPD plays an irreplaceable role in eliminating differences in understanding and enhancing mutual trust and friendship.

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Change: Re-Recognise and Balance (2014–2016) The mutual understanding and policy interaction between the two sides have been changing significantly. From the perspective of the European side, its demand for trade cooperation and doubts regarding politics and strategies rose simultaneously, and the inter-governmental cooperation situation coexists with a negative public opinion towards China. In a survey from the German Marshall Fund of the United States, although 62% of Europeans do not see China’s military development as a threat, the proportion of Europeans who see China as a military threat has risen slightly compared with previous surveys.3 From the perspective of the Chinese side, its understanding of Europe goes deeply, strengthening policy initiative towards the EU. In 2014, President Xi made a historic visit to the EU headquarters and reached important consensus with EU leaders on building China-EU partnerships for peace, growth, reform, and civilisation. China hopes to further deepen the China-EU comprehensive strategic partnership for mutual benefit. China emphasises the importance of the EU as a whole, while seeking to relate with the European sub-regions and develop bilateral relations with major powers. Specifically, China’s re-recognition of the EU is mainly reflected in the diversification of channels for contacting with Europe. First, it realises some impossibilities and difficulties between the two sides. Second, while continuing to support European integration, China has developed a more proactive and balanced policy towards Europe: “sub-regionalization” and “re-nationalization” happen, thus China “explores new ways and new channels” (Tao, 2012) and enhances relations with major European powers such as Germany, France, Britain and Italy and opens up cooperation in sub-regions with Central and Eastern Europe, Northern Europe, and Southern Europe. Third, China has upgraded its strategic positioning towards Europe, in order to transcend bilateral relations and address issues such as “climate change, environment/biodiversity, global health and infrastructure” (China-EU Joint Statement, 2015). The document “Deepen the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit and Win-win Cooperation: China’s Policy Paper on the EU” published in 2014 for the first time officially defines China-EU relations as “an integral part of China’s efforts to build long-term, steady and healthy 3 Transatlantic Trends 2011, Key Findings, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2011.

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relations with major powers and a priority in its foreign policy” (MFA of the People’s Republic of China, 2014). It can be seen that China’s promotion of its own grand strategy is inseparable from good relations with the EU. The EU has not been marginalised by China, it has become a subject that China has always considered and approached by means of diversification.

Capability-Expectations Gap As it is mentioned above, China-EU relations went through several stages between 2003 and 2016. However, these changes do not indicate a less important Europe for China. During the time when the priority of the EU dropped, China still maintained close relationships with European countries, which might have been deemed as disintegrating the Union. What explains this imbalance of relationships between China and the EU? The capability-expectations gap (Hill, 1998) suggested by Christopher Hill serves as a measurement for evaluating the process of change in European foreign policy. It might also be applicable to understanding China-EU relations and variation of the EU’s priority in China’s foreign policy. Capabilities consist of material strength as well as manipulation of resources, together making up a state’s capacity to reach a collective decision. With this concept, Hill demonstrated the dilemma faced by the EU that there are significant differences between the myriad hopes for and demands of the EU as an international actor, and its relatively limited ability to deliver. This gap is derived from drawbacks of extant treaties to consolidate the EU. Yet the deeper tension rests on the limitation of the EU actorness. The problem laying between collective external behaviour and specific foreign policy is fundamental and is intensifying as the EU continues to enlarge, resulting in declining expectations and increasing budgetary pressures and complications regarding the decision-making process.

Expectations: From Exporting Values to Expanding Cooperation To explain it more specifically, it is necessary to review the EU’s policy documents on China. Since 1995, the EU published policy documents almost every three years. Through a series of statements, the EU’s

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strategic recognition of China has matured, heading from Constructive Partnership, Comprehensive Partnership to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (Fang & Guan, 2017, p. 70). Although the EU stressed that China’s rise was unprecedented and China would be the EU’s significant partner (European Commission, ), Feng (2011, p. 2), Dean of the China Institute of International Relations, suggested that China was just an important part of the EU’s new strategy for Asia. Zhao and Ding (2018, p. 17), senior researchers at the Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC and the Institute of Development at the State Council, concluded that since the EU’s first China policy, the keyword was “engagement”. The “engagement policy” is based on the conviction that China could be shaped by the EU’s vision of economic liberalisation and political democratisation. In 2003, the EU released its first global security strategy document, which is full of optimism and is entitled “A Secure Europe in a Better World” (European Union, 2003). At that time, the EU believed that it was undergoing “a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history”, and that “the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies” (European Union, 2003). To sum up, the EU’s expectation was to reshape China with its values. The expectation and optimism culminated in 2006, when the EU issued its fifth China strategy document, “A Maturing Partnership-Shared Interests and Challenges in China-EU Relations” (European Commission, 2003), pressuring China to take on more international responsibilities (Xiao, 2014, p. 54). At the same time, the EU issued a trade and investment policy document with China, expressing dissatisfaction with China’s trade policies, such as intellectual property rights enforcement and market access policies. Before the debt crisis in 2009, the EU’s expectation concentrated on exporting values. However, with China’s emergence in the global crisis and Europe’s deep debt and economic dilemma, the expectation changed. A year later, in 2010, a report (Feng, 2011, p. 3) initiated in the EU Council examined the EU’s strategic partnership and began to take more practical measures into consideration. Similarly, in the second global security strategy document released in 2016 (European Union, 2016), it was pointed out that “a stronger EU is needed, and the European project is being questioned”. These insecurities of the EU made it less confident in face of China’s rise and it tried to change its previous “engagement policy” towards China.

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Ten years after the last policy document, the EU released a new document titled “Elements for a new EU strategy on China” (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2016). Generally speaking, the document shows consistency in the EU’s strategic understanding of China but also demonstrates some new trends. In its relations with China, Fang and Guan (2017, p. 79), professors at the Renmin University of China, suggested that the EU now pays more attention to strengthening its actorness through enhancing integrity and playing a collaborative role with China in global governance. Feng (2011, p. 3) suggested that, effortless attempts reminded the EU of the failure of the previous “unconditional engagement”. The evolution of the EU’s expectation partly explains its changing ranking in China’s foreign policy and the variation of capability also offers accounts, as analysed in the next section.

Capabilities: An Obstacle to Fulfil Expectations Capability is defined as material strength and ability to manipulate resources (Hill, 1998, p. 8). Unlike sovereign states, the EU’s foreign policy is affected by both its supranational institutions and the member governments. Based on the negotiation of agricultural agreements in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) between the EU and the US, Meunier (2000, p. 105) developed a model based on three variables, which may determine the outcome of the EU’s negotiation with other entities: first, the internal voting rules in the EU; second, the competence delegated by Member States to EU negotiators, which is crucial in determining the potential external bargaining power of the EU; and third, the negotiating context relative to the status quo. Meunier concluded that the EU’s institutional structure is more suitable for defence. This is especially true when the European Commission has limited negotiation authorisation and the agreement results require the consent of all Member States. In line with Meunier’s studies, Wang (2014, p. 92), Associate Professor at the University of International Business and Economics in China, suggested that the EU’s strong defensiveness in economic diplomacy stems from the EU’s consensus or a majority voting mechanism along with the limited authorisation and profound shared interests and values among Member States, which are far beyond those with any third party.

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The trait of defensiveness greatly constrained the EU’s capability to meet its expectations when dealing with relations with China. The EU is still unable to develop a substantive overall strategy and various policy documents cannot provide specific action guidance. The incomplete authority has always restrained the EU, yet the impact of the gap on its relations with China was not obvious in the earlier stages. The negative effect of the lack of capability was manifested only after the debt crisis. The current development of China-EU relations has a noteworthy new feature: China’s bilateral relations with EU Member States are better than the EU’s overall relationship. The diversification of interests among EU Member States in developing relations with China have made China-EU relations “unbalanced”. From reviewing the EU’s statements related to its foreign policy, it is apparent that the EU has always emphasised the need for strengthening political cooperation and coordination among Member States, yet the new strategic document rarely highlights the EU’s overall considerations and overall interests. In the context of the current setbacks and multiple predicaments of European integration, the EU’s policy towards China has clear goals of enhancing capability and narrowing the gap on expectations. The EU’s expectations in relations with China were transformed from an engagement policy to a more practical approach of promoting mutual benefits. In the early phases, depending on a strong foundation of the economy, the EU gained powerful bargaining ability and expected to transform China. Turbulence before the financial crisis can be seen as deliberate punishment made by the EU to warn China of deviating from the path designed by the EU. The frustration of the EU’s economy and the rise of populism among European countries after 2009 resulted in weakened capability. At the end of 2009, the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, in which the content of institutional reform is of great significance to the EU’s unification and coordination of foreign policy. According to the new Treaty, the European Council has extended the term of the permanent Chairman to help maintain EU policy continuity. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy presides over the Foreign Affairs Council and is one of the Vice-Presidents of the European Commission, improving the condition of lack of coordination between various agencies and Member States. With all the enhancement of capability, the sound of China attempting to split the EU still lingers on, indicating the EU’s setback in getting along with China as an entirety. The EU has been and will always be an important

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partner of China, but whether the EU could better fulfil its expectation by narrowing the gap with capabilities remains to be seen. In other words, the actorness of the EU will play a critical role in improving the bilateral relations with China.

References China Customs. (n.d.). Retrieved May 30, 2019, from http://www.customs. gov.cn China-EU Joint Statement. (2015). China-EU Summit Joint Statement: The way forward after forty years of China-EU cooperation. Retrieved May 30, 2019, from http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/07/01/ content_281475138155668.htm China-EU. (2013). China-EU 2020 strategic agenda for cooperation. Delegation of the European Union to China. Retrieved May 30, 2019, from https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china_en/15398/EU-China%202 020%20Strategic%20Agenda%20for%20Cooperation Council of the EU. (2006). 2771st Council Meeting General Affairs and External Relations, Press Release, 16291/06 (Presse 353), Brussels, 11–12 December. Retrieved May 30, 2019, from europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-06353_en.pdf Ding, Y. (2009). Different expectations causing discord in China-Europe relations. Chinese Journal of European Studies, 5. Retrieved May 30, 2019, from http://ies.cass.cn/english/cjo/201205/t20120515_2464324.shtml European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (2016, June 22). Elements for a new EU strategy on China, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, JOIN(2016) 30 final. Brussels. Retrieved May 30, 2019, from http:// eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/joint_communication_to_the_eur opean_parliament_and_the_council_-_elements_for_a_new_eu_strategy_on_ china.pdf European Commission. (1995). A long-term policy for Europe-China relations, Communication of the Commission. COM(1995)279/final. Retrieved May 30, 2019, from http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/ docs/com95_279_en.pdf European Commission. (1998, March 25). Building a comprehensive partnership with China, Communication from the Commission. COM(1998) 181 final. Brussels. Retrieved May 30, 2019, from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1998:0181:FIN:EN:PDF European Commission. (2003). A maturing partnership—Shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations, Commission Policy Paper for Transmission to the Council and the European Parliament. COM(2003) 533 final, Brussels,

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10 September 2003. Retrieved May 30, 2019, from https://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=URISERV:r14207&from=EN European Commission. (2006, October 14). Competition and partnership, Commission working document accompanying COM(2006) 631 final: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities A policy paper on EU-China trade and investment. COM(2006) 632 final, Brussels. Retrieved May 30, 2019, from https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/pub lication/2c65b426-2484-459d-a60d-8847e8765a5d/language-en European Union. (2003, December 12). A better Europe in a secure world. European Security Strategy. Brussels. European Union. (2016, June). Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe. A global strategy for the European Union’s foreign and security policy. Retrieved March 12, 2019, from https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/glo balstrategy/files/regions/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf Fang, L., & Guan, K. (2017). Elements for a new EU strategy on China: Policy connotation and posture. Peace and Development, 4. Retrieved May 30, 2019, from http://www.caifc.org.cn/c2.aspx?id=4454 Feng, Z. (2011). The EU’s China policy and the prospect of China-EU relations in the new situation. Contemporary International Relations, 2, 1–5. Hill, C. (1998). Closing the capacities-expectations gap? In J. Peterson & H. Sjursen (Eds.), Common foreign policy for Europe? Competing visions of the CFSP. Routledge. Lhasa/Berlin. (2008, April 8). Die Fackellauf-Kampagne. German-ForeignPolicy. Retrieved May 30, 2019, from https://www.german-foreign-policy. com/news/detail/4118/ Lilei, S. (2008). Discussion about the EU as a normative power. Deutschland Studies, 1(29). Meunier, S. (2000). What single voice? European institutions and EU-U.S. trade negotiations. International Organization, 54(1), 103–135. MFA of the People’s Republic of China. (2014, April 2). China’s policy paper on the EU: Deepen the China-EU comprehensive strategic partnership for mutual benefit and win-win cooperation. Retrieved May 30, 2019, from https://www. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzcs/t1143406.shtml Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the EU. (2003). China’s policy paper on the EU . Retrieved May 30, 2019, from https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ ce/cebe/chn/zozyzcwj/domzc/ Pan, C. (2012). Problematizing constructive engagement in EU-China policy. Europe and China: Strategic partners or rivals? Hong Kong University Press. Tao, S. (2012). A changing Europe and its relations with China, remarks by vice foreign minister Song Tao at seminar on situation in Europe and China-Europe relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC. Retrieved May 30, 2019, from https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb//wjbxw/t961113.htm

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Wang, H. (2014). The characteristics of the EU’s economic diplomacy and China’s countermeasures. Europe Studies, 4, 92. Xiao, L. (2014). Rethinking of the China-EU relations—In the case of the China-EU comprehensive strategic partnership. Pacific Journal, 22(6), 51–59. Zhao, K., & Ding, Y. (2018). The imbalance of China-EU relations: Interpreting the adjustment of the EU’s China policy. Contemporary World, 4, 14–17. Zhou, H. (2004). China-EU partnership: Possibilities and limits. China Social Science Press. Zhou, H. (2006). The Destiney of European constitution: Development report of Europe (2006–2006). China Social Science Press.

CHAPTER 16

“S/he Who Pays the Piper”: Examining the (De)legitimising Influence of European Union’s Financial Support to the African Union Babatunde Fagbayibo

Introduction One of the defining features of European Union (EU) actorness in Africa is the extent to which it has positioned itself as a major financier of regional integration programmes. Although this financial assistance has ensured the sustainability of some regional integration projects, there are perceptions regarding how this affects the legitimacy of regional institutions in Africa (ICG, 2017; Lucarelli, 2014, p. 9; Olukoshi, 2010, p. 53; Vanheukelom, 2016, p. vi). The excessive reliance on external funding by the AU invariably encourages the non-commitment of Member States

B. Fagbayibo (B) University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. R. Freire et al. (eds.), EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92997-8_16

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to finance the integration process. In addition, dependence on multiple external donors, who in most cases require different reporting procedures, has often led to a chaotic and fragmented implementation of programmes in the AU (Vanheukelom, 2016, p. 19). The legitimacy issue raises three imperative points. The first one speaks to the genuineness of the “pan-Africanism” designation of AU programmes and projects when non-African actors underwrite funding. The second relates to the sustainability of programmes, in particular if external donors decide to turn off the funding tap. The third is about how such funding diminishes the institutional assertiveness of the AU, as it has to compete with its Regional Economic Communities (RECs) for accessing financial resources from the EU (ICG, 2017, p. 14). Closely linked to this is the issue of the EU using its financial support to influence AU policy decisions and direction (Ncube & Akena, 2012; Olukoshi, 2010, p. 53; Vanheukelom, 2016). The AU has in recent times put in place policy measures to reduce and/or eliminate financial dependency, with the latest being the 0.2% import levy on all “eligible imports” into the continent (AU 2016a, 2016b). However, the problematic lack of political will prescribes cautious optimism in this regard. The national and regional institutional efficiency required for implementing this decision is either lacking or remain obstructed by the inability of political elites to reconcile themselves with the big vision. In addition, Member States have not arrived at a consensus on the implementation plan (Louw-Vaudran, 2018). Concerning funding, one key recommendation of the Kagame Report on reforming the AU is the narrowing down of AU functions in order to cut costs and enhance its efficiency (Kagame, 2017, p. 7). This chapter reflects on the legitimacy question arising from overreliance on EU funding. We argue that it is in the best interest of both the EU and the AU to commit to a programme that in the short to medium-term drastically reduces, and in the long-term eliminates funding. The current structure of funding is neither sustainable nor ideal for the vision of partnership between both organisations. It has essentially created an asymmetrical, donor–recipient relationship, where the EU is often regarded as the “patronising cash machine” (ICG, 2017, p. 19) and the AU as the “problematic child” with the begging bowl. Furthermore, while the continuation of this arrangement enhances EU’s legitimacy as a global actor (Söderbaum, 2013), it conversely diminishes AU’s legitimacy and the will to implement realistic, internal funding options.

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The chapter begins with an overview of EU funding architecture for continental integration in Africa as an important part of its actorness. It then considers the link between AU financial dependence on the EU and the curtailment of its legitimacy in effectively realising integration goals. It concludes with some suggestions on the way forward.

EU Funding of Continental Integration Process in Africa The Idea of EU Actorness Before discussing the specifics of EU funding for Africa’s continental integration process, it is imperative to situate it within the concept that drives its articulation and implementation. This concept is what many scholars have referred to as EU actorness. Sjöstedt (1977, p. 16) defines EU actorness as “the capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system”. Carbone (2013, p. 342) observes that this definition embodies two criteria: autonomy and coherence. Autonomy speaks to the degree to which the EU is autonomous from its members, and thus recognised as an independent entity on the global arena (Carbone, 2013, p. 342). Coherence entails the ability of the EU to formulate common policies and determine the extent of the obligations of all parties involved in the implementation of such actions (Carbone, 2013, p. 342). According to Niemann and Bretherton (2013, p. 265), Sjöstedt’s definition is premised on the EU possessing state like attributes and thus speaks to internal rather than external characteristics. In conceptualising the external character of the EU, Bretherton and Vogler (1999, pp. 5–6) identify three features: presence, opportunity and capability. Presence signifies the ability of the EU “to exert influence; to shape the perceptions and expectations of others” (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999, p. 5). Despite its external character, presence is ultimately a result of internal policies and processes (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999, pp. 5– 6). Opportunity is described as the extent to which external dynamics shape EU’s action or inaction (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999, p. 7). As Bretherton and Vogler (1999, pp. 7–8) explain, the ideological environment of the post-Cold War, which prioritised globalisation and neo-liberal orientations, played an important role in shaping the external policies and processes of the EU. An example is how the EU continues to promote a

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neo-liberal understanding of regionalism in the developing world. Capability denotes the ability of the EU to formulate and implement policies (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999, p. 9). At the heart of this is the nature of the institutional development and interaction within the EU, particularly how this affects operational efficiency and internal coherence (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999, pp. 9–12). Scholars have, however, argued that the concept of actorness is not sufficient in understanding the external impact of EU’s policy choices and implementation (Carbone, 2013, p. 343; Niemann & Bretherton, 2013, p. 267). The argument is that the idea of effectiveness may prove to be a more useful analytical tool for understanding EU’s external role (Carbone, 2013, p. 343; Niemann & Bretherton, 2013, pp. 267–268). The reasoning behind this is that effectiveness can be concretely assessed against EU actions and stated intentions. Factors such as the way in which external actors respond to EU’s actions; aid effectiveness; the cost and benefits of EU funded development policy programmes; and the extent to which the EU is able to “speak with one voice” to external actors have been identified as standards for gauging this concept (Carbone, 2013, p. 343; Niemann & Bretherton, 2013, p. 267). Carbone (2013, p. 343) makes a distinction between internal effectiveness (EU actorness) and external effectiveness (“ability to achieve desired goals in the international arena”). As Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (2014, p. 968) note, external effectiveness should not be construed as a binary, either-or measure, but rather as “a continuum going from low to medium to high effectiveness”. Niemann and Bretherton (2013, p. 267) opine that since actorness requires a minimal level of coherence, it logically precedes (external) effectiveness. This link is, however, not automatic as a number of variables, such as the preferences of other international actors may reduce or even topple EU’s effectiveness (Carbone, 2013, p. 343; Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014, p. 974). Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (2014, p. 973) show how the nature of EU’s negotiating partner often determines its approach to negotiations at the global stage. Where the other player is a weak bargaining party, the EU exploits this by obtaining more concessions. An example of this is the extent to which the EU was able to use its advantageous bargaining power to ensure that a democracy clause was included in its trade agreement with Mexico (Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014, p. 973). As we will show later in this chapter, the EU has applied this approach in its negotiations on trade with African countries, particularly at the level of funding channels towards migration and

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security measures. Observers have argued that this is an example of the correlation between the capacity of the EU to act as a unit/single voice (internal cohesiveness/coherence) and achieving positive outcomes as a global actor (external effectiveness) (Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014, pp. 969–970; Söderbaum, 2013, p. 60). The link between EU funding and its actorness is the extent to which it utilises aid disbursement as a development policy instrument to establish itself as a global actor (Carbone, 2013, p. 345; Hettne & Söderbaum, 2005; Söderbaum, 2013). By strategically channelling funds towards development cooperation and security policy in Africa and other parts of the global South, the EU seeks to project itself as an important global player and what some refer to as “a force for good” (Söderbaum, 2013, p. 56). EU policy on aid is in some cases a function of its internal cohesiveness/coherence. Although Member States have some latitude to pursue national policies on aid disbursement, in recent years, the EU has sharpened its processes for articulating and implementing aid policies through collective action (Carbone, 2013, pp. 345–346; Söderbaum, 2013, p. 58 and 60). However, in practice, some have argued that the lack of internal coherence, due to different geostrategic interests of its Member States and the unwillingness to allow the EU Commission to lead the process, weakens the effectiveness of its aid policies (Carbone, 2013, p. 348; Söderbaum, 2013). Another dimension of EU actorness in respect to its funding programmes is the issue of presence. As Söderbaum (2013, p. 57) observes, the EU has been able to use its prime donor status to influence global processes and establish its footprints. In addition, presence is linked to EU’s soft power goals, which speaks to its intention to use aid as a means of promoting the principles of human rights, democracy and good governance in the global South (Hettne & Söderbaum, 2005, p. 545; Le Pere, 2012, p. 259). EU Funding for African Integration Drive A combination of historical and strategic geopolitical and economic factors informs EU’s financial support for Africa’s integration experiment. One such is how the history of colonialism, especially the extent to which the colonial experience has forged strong economic linkages, albeit skewed, between the ex-colonies and their former colonisers. This has ensured that countries like France, the United Kingdom (UK), and

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Portugal still trade extensively with their former colonies (Mold, 2018). Such influence, particularly in the case of France and the UK, play a key role in shaping bilateral and multilateral funding arrangements for Africa in the EU (ICG, 2017, p. 6; Söderbaum, 2013, pp. 58–59). As one observer puts it: “the rule of thumb for EU policy toward Africa is a threeway divide: one-third Britain, one-third France, and one-third everyone else” (De Waal, 2016). Another factor is security, especially as it relates to migration of Africans to Europe and how such migration flows are framed as the reason behind increased terrorist attacks in Europe (ICG, 2017, pp. 7–8). EU’s response to this has been through a series of policy options that normatively links security, governance and development (ICG, 2017, pp. 8–9; Le Pere, 2012, p. 259). As Le Pere (2012, p. 259) notes, such normative linkage lies at the heart of the conditional requirements the EU attaches to trade and aid. In addition, the EU has offered incentives, through its Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (ETFA), to some African governments to help curb migration (ICG, 2017, p. 8). Lastly, since the AU is modelled after the EU, with national and transnational elites envisaging an EU-like future for the AU, there is a sense of obligation on EU’s part to encourage AU’s success (Fagbayibo, 2017; Haastrup, 2013, p. 791). This is expressed through EU’s strategic support to AU institutions such as the Commission and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP). For example, the EU and its Member States are the biggest contributors to the AU Commission by funding about 80% of its programme budget (European Commission, 2015). Similarly, Navarro (2010, pp. 207–208) notes how the European Parliament plays an influential role in ensuring that EU provides funding for PAP, and the establishment of a joint strategy and a joint parliamentary committee. Stapel and Söderbaum (2017, p. 3) note that EU funding for regional organisations in Africa covers both direct transfers and indirect funding. In terms of direct transfers, the EU directly channels funds to regional organisations in Africa while indirect funding denotes the use of intermediary actors and organisations to transfer money from the EU to African regional organs (Stapel & Söderbaum, 2017, p. 3). EU funding of continental integration programmes, in addition to funding arrangements by Member States, is provided through two principal frameworks: the PanAfrican Programme (PanAf) and the African Peace Facility (APF), which has now been replaced by the European Peace Facility (EPF) (EU, 2017,

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2018; Hauck, 2020).1 Established in 2014, PanAf is an instrument for supporting continental and trans-regional initiatives (EU, 2018). From 2014 to 2020, the EU was expected to spend e845 million through the PanAf initiative on three key pillars: governance, migration and security (Pillar 1); investment and growth (Pillar 2); and knowledge and skills (Pillar 3). According to the European Commission, the EU has since 2014 committed an amount of e400 million of the entire e845 million to various EU-Africa initiatives (EU, 2018). Established in 2003, the APF was the framework through which the EU supported the AU Commission and its RECs to operationalise the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (EU, 2017, p. 5). Between 2004 and 2019, the EU allocated over e2.68 billion to peace and security measures in Africa, with 93% of these funds spent on peace support operations (Hauck, 2020, p. 6). Unlike the APF, the EPF is structured to bypass the AU Commission by allocating funds directly to sub-regional and national military operations, and allows the EU to directly procure military equipment (Fabricius, 2021; Hauck, 2020). The architecture of EU funding is an indication of its normative approach to asserting its legitimacy as a global actor (Carbone, 2013; Hettne & Söderbaum, 2005). In this respect, the EU has strategically allocated funds towards issues that enhance its soft power, altruistic concerns and more importantly, security measures that will ensure that Africa does not jeopardise Europe’s stability. The EU has utilised PanAf as a soft power tool through the funding of democracy and governance programmes, and exchange programme for scholars and students. There is, however, no gainsaying the fact that one issue at the core of EU funding architecture is security (Stapel & Söderbaum, 2017, p. 9). Both PanAf and the APF have initiatives aimed at stemming the flow of African refugees and migrants to Europe, and combatting terrorist groups in north, east, west and central Africa. EU’s policy approach and allocation of funds to addressing security has not been without criticisms. One such criticism is the tendency to view Africa from a lens that sees it as a problematic supplier of agents or refugees bent on destabilising Europe (ICG,

1 The EU channels funds to national and regional projects in Africa through some other mechanisms. These are the European Development Fund, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, the Development Cooperation Instrument, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and the EU Food Facility.

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2017, pp. 7–8). This has led to the channelling of funds to repressive regimes in Africa to use “any means necessary” to help stem migration to Europe (ICG, 2017, p. 8). In addition, the EU has been criticised for attempts to pressure African countries to receive deported migrants, spending more money on securing borders rather than addressing the root causes of migration, and the prioritisation of European aid agencies over local actors that are more familiar with the issues on the ground (Barana, 2017, p. 2; ICG, 2017, p. 9).

Assessing the Nexus Between Financial Dependency and AU’s Legitimacy The Quest for Alternative Sources of Funding the AU The AU has over the years established initiatives on how to reduce and eliminate dependence on external donation.2 The first initiative in this regard was the “High Level Panel on Alternative Sources of Financing the African Union”, chaired by the former Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo. The Panel was inaugurated in 2011, with the mandate of reviewing the eight financing options that were initially recommended by the AU Commission, and then come up with a more feasible plan of action (AU, 2012, p. 2). The Panel only chose three out of the eight options, basing its decision on the ease of collection, little strain on government, sustainability and equity (AU, 2012, p. 5). The Panel, therefore, recommended the following: US$2.00 hospitality levy per stay in a hotel, US 5 cents levy per text message sent, and US$5.00 travel levy on flight tickets originating from or coming to Africa from outside Africa (AU, 2012, p. 6). The Obasanjo Report failed to garner the muchneeded consensus at the AU Assembly, as some Member States whose economies are reliant on tourism felt that the hospitality levy would make the sector uncompetitive, and negatively affect their already struggling airline industry (Apiko & Aggad, 2018, p. 2). Furthermore, these Member States believed despite their small to medium-sized economies, 2 In 2005, the Conference of African Ministers of Economy and Finance (CAMEF),

held in Dakar, Senegal, started the discussions around finding alternative sources for funding the AU. This was followed by other meetings in Ethiopia, in 2008, and in Cameroon, in 2010. These meetings set the stage for the establishment of the Obasanjoled “High Level Panel on Alternative Sources of Financing the African Union” (AU, 2012, p. 2).

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this would ensure they would become the largest contributors to the AU budget (Apiko & Aggad, 2018, p. 2). Given these concerns, the AU abandoned the report, in order to engage in further exploration of ideas that Member States would find equitable, sustainable, predictable and ultimately acceptable (AU, 2016a). At the 2015 AU Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, the AU Assembly adopted a new scale of assessment that is targeted at ensuring that Member States fund 100% of the operation budget, 75% of the programme budget and 25% of the peace and security budget (AU, 2015). In realising this objective, the AU, in 2019, adopted a revised scale of assessment (2020–2022), with three tiers: Tier 1 is assessed at 45.151% of the Union’s assessed budget (Member States with GDP over 4%); Tier 2 is assessed at 32.749% of the Union’s assessed budget (Member States with GDP between 1 and 4%); and Tier 3 is assessed at 22.100% of the Union’s assessed budget (Member States with GDP less than 1%) (AU, 2019a). The AU has also adopted the nine golden rules of financial management as a means of ensuring accountability and transparency of its expenditure (AU, 2018a, pp. 4–5). The latest plan for finding alternative sources of funding the AU is the 2016 decision of the AU Assembly to adopt the report of the High Representative of the Peace Fund, Donald Kabureka, on the proposed 0.2% import levy on all “eligible imports” to finance the AU (AU, 2016b). So far, about 17 countries are at various stages of implementing the decision on the collection of the 0.2% import levy (AU, 2020). As laudable as these processes are, there are questions regarding the lack of the necessary political and good will in implementing laid out plans. As Turianskyi and Gruzd (2019, pp. 16–17) observed, the operationalisation of the 0.2% plan is already behind schedule due to push back from powerful interests such as South Africa and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) bloc. This is due to concerns relating to the financing plan’s conflict with national and international legal norms, lack of confidence in those tasked with managing the collected funds, and what is perceived as Paul Kagame’s “methods and authoritative style” of decision making around the implementation of the plan (Turianskyi & Gruzd, 2019, pp. 16–17). Effective implementation of the 0.2% import levy will have to rely on certain variables, some of which the AU has paid little attention to. One is the institutional efficiency of national institutions tasked with collecting the levy. This speaks to issues

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such as the capacity of national technocrats in articulating and implementing this policy, accountability and transparent measures to ensure accuracy of monies collected and, in general, good governance standards in Member States. The second is the general lack of awareness around this policy. It is imperative to secure the buy-in of civil society in the evaluation and monitoring of this process (Fagbayibo, 2019). The involvement of civil society, especially the private sector has the potential of unlocking other reliable and sustainable sources of funding. The third variable is the importance of adopting a flexible approach that allows Member States to explore and determine sources other than the rigid implementation of the 0.2% levy (Apiko & Aggad, 2018, p. 15). Allowing a flexible approach will encourage efficiency and compliance as it puts the sovereignty of Member States at the core of determining measures that suit their national peculiarities. Lastly is the lack of urgency in reforming the AU. The AU organs that are expected to shape the implementation of the import levy either lack meaningful powers (AU Commission and PAP) or not yet in existence (Court of Justice chamber of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the financial institutions). The Legitimacy Question The fact that the EU funds the bulk of programmes and projects of the AU affects its legitimacy of the latter in three major ways. The first relates to the optics of ownership. EU’s extensive funding of micro and macro projects calls to question the authenticity of AU’s control of the pan-Africanism narrative. Programmes ranging from infrastructure development, mobility of academics, AU research grants to academics, and the training of electoral officials are in the main financed by the EU. Some of these programmes are not necessarily capital intensive to the extent that Member States cannot fund them. However, the excessive reliance on external donors provides a comfort zone that has made implementation of alternative sources of funding unnecessary. The symbolism of having EU imprint on these projects, coupled with the realisation that any fluctuation regarding the funding flow could jeopardise these programmes, places a serious question mark on AU’s seriousness. The AU is essentially outsourcing pan-Africanism. This situation has engendered cynical views regarding the AU (ICG, 2017, p. 20). As the donor in this relationship,

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the EU perceives itself as operating from a much stronger bargaining position and thus expects the AU to acknowledge this reality and implement EU supported initiatives. The second question relates to the sustainability of funded programmes, particularly if or when external donors decide to scale down or completely stop funding the AU. The AU experienced this in 2016 when the EU unilaterally reduced its funding of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by 20% and subsequently suspended payments to AMISOM troops because the AU failed EU’s Pillar Assessment on the management of EU funding (ICG, 2017, p. 19). Although the EU later resumed funding, this proved to be a stark illustration of the extent to which donors are not obligated to continue funding the AU. Another dimension is how UK’s exit from the EU will likely affect the funding of AU peace and security programmes, as the UK contributes about 15% of the budget of the European Development Fund (De Waal, 2016; ICG, 2017, p. 6 and 20). The rise of right wing, nationalist parties across EU Member States is another factor that is likely to affect the flow of EU funding to the AU. As Barana (2017, p. 2) notes, EU’s “crisis mode”, short-term approach to addressing the migration issue is a direct response to the growth of populism in Europe. This has resulted in the EU diverting funds initially meant for development issues in Africa towards migration and border management (Barana, 2017, p. 2). This position has raised concerns among African actors, with the AU engaging in initiatives to take ownership of policy measures relating to migration issues. One such is the AU decision to create an “African Migration Observatory” in Morocco, tasked with “the support of existing continental initiatives on migration, through the collection, exchange, analysis and sharing of data with a view to efficiently address migration challenges” (AU, 2019b). The AU had expressed its clear objection to the EU’s proposal on sending rescued migrants in international waters to so-called “regional disembarkation platforms” outside Europe (News24, 2018). The third leg of the legitimacy quandary is the extent to which the funding undercuts AU’s authority over its RECs. The EU has been accused of bypassing the AU by funding ad-hoc security arrangements such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) and G5 in the Sahel (ICG, 2017, pp. 12–13). The new EPF further reinforces this approach (Fabricius, 2021). The AU’s primary responsibility of ensuring peace and security on the continent is undermined as the EU channel funds

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directly to these forces, with little or no input from the AU (ICG, 2017, pp. 12–13). In this respect, the AU loses political and financial oversight over arrangements that should ordinarily fall under its APSA purview. EU’s selective approach to funding peace and security measures has in certain cases led to rivalry and competition between AU and its RECs (ICG, 2017, pp. 14–15). EU’s preference for working with ad-hoc security arrangements and RECs is an implicit acknowledgement of AU’s weakness to effectively coordinate and implement its APSA framework. These approaches will have negative implications as they embolden RECs to see no real value in subjecting their authority to the AU. Some have also highlighted the inextricable link between the decisions of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) on peace operations and donor driven prescriptions (Vanheukelom, 2016, p. 33). The AU’s inability to fund its peace and security operations has exposed it to EU’s influence especially the conditionality attached to such funds, which in some cases influences choices and decisions about peace operations and the lack of consistency regarding the imposition of sanctions against erring Member States (Vanheukelom, 2016, p. 33). Furthermore, the AU has complained about how the EU uses its financial influence to get smaller African countries to push positions that go against the continental agenda (ICG, 2017, p. 18). For example, the EU has been criticised for preferring to only negotiate its Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with sub-regional groupings rather than a continental collective (Sicurelli, 2010, p. 183). AU officials have expressed concerns about how these arrangements undermine pan-African integration drive by pitting regions against each other (Sicurelli, 2010, p. 183). Vanheukelom (2016, p. 11) noted that external donors in certain cases only channel funds to “darling sectors, policy preferences or preferred projects” even if it is at variance with AU’s desired priority. The irony of EU’s selective approach regarding the funding of security and trade negotiations is that it also supports AU’s capacity to coordinate the activities of RECs and Member States. The three points discussed in the foregoing lie at the heart of EU’s perception of the AU as an unequal partner. The over-reliance on external funds has ensured a feeling of entitlement on the part of AU, and resentful feelings anytime the EU decides to work against the collective African position (ICG, 2017, pp. 17–18). The question then is how the AU can reclaim respect and become an equal partner in the interregional relations with the EU. The rhetoric on building strong partnership between the

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EU and AU can only be realised through an active approach that provides strict guidelines and timelines on the significant reduction and eventual termination of EU funding. EU actorness thus needs to be repositioned from a “feeding bottle” mentality to one that commits itself to genuine and durable partnership.

Conclusion: Is a Post-Donorised AU Possible? Paul Kagame’s assertion that “the independence and self-reliance of the African Union is an existential question for our continent” (cited in ICG, 2017, p. 5) is one that neatly captures the essence of urgency. As shown in the foregoing, the EU has been able to deploy its funding of the AU and its RECs as a strategy for enhancing its geopolitical and economic influence. It is an indelible component of EU actorness in Africa. Be it in its altruistic or self-interest context, external donations to the AU projects the optics of a lopsided relationship. It even becomes more puzzling when political elites and regional technocrats’ express concerns about EU’s attitude but do very little to implement strategies on selfreliance. In our view, a genuine partnership between the AU and the EU cannot be realised within the current framing of a donor–recipient relational context. The question then is how can the AU move beyond its donordependent state of existence? Some would argue that current efforts spearheaded by the Rwandan President, Paul Kagame, provide a feasible path out of this quagmire. However, the concern is that as with previous plans, current efforts may be affected by dysfunctional politics of Member States concerning regional integration issues. The flow of EU funds, together with that of other external donors, continue to provide some sort of guarantee and a false sense of normalcy. However, this is not sustainable due to its link to political and economic currents in donor countries. The way forward is one that requires an agreement between the AU and the EU on how to scale back on funding. In this respect, both organisations will have to draw up a plan that contains short to medium term strategies on reducing and finally terminating funding. It is not enough to mention issues of dependency and self-reliance without providing solid guidelines. This can only be done within certain contexts. Undergirding these contexts is the imperative of reconceptualising EU actorness in Africa within the paradigmatic lens of complete AU self-reliance. In this

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respect, the concept of EU external effectiveness in its partnership with the AU should be seen beyond the current perception of the AU as a weak bargaining party and the tendency to use its funding to manipulate AU processes. This will require a genuine commitment to ensuring the termination of undue interference with ongoing AU efforts at reforming its institutional processes, particularly self-financing strategies and capacity building strategies. This does not imply that EU-AU relations should be severed; but rather that the partnership is built on respect of ownership and legitimacy of programmes, and a shift in the mental model that views the relationship as hierarchical. This process should start from the EU, with actors reconsidering the attitudinal approaches to the design and articulation of policies aimed at Africa. This reform of EU’s internal effectiveness/cohesion in relation to its African policies is necessary for securing the buy-in of its African partners. Such shift in attitude will then go a long way in repositioning the modus of its external effectiveness, especially the role the AU must play as a truly equal partner. This position is not possible in a milieu where one party is solely responsible for giving financial aid. The positive perception of EU external effectiveness in Africa will, in the medium-to-long term, depend on how it is able to progressively scale back its financial commitments and allow the AU to determine the parameters of technical cooperation on realising selffinancing goals. This implies the sharing of ideas and strategies on raising funds, strategic investments in human development, and cooperation at global fora on issues that have direct and indirect impact on human and material developmental efforts. It is imperative to review both PanAf and the new EPF, with timelines provided regarding its phasing out. Without doing this, both will remain locked in a donor–recipient, master–servant relationship. As for the AU, there must be a smart, innovative and holistic approach to implementing funding strategies. The usual expectation that Member States will all agree to funding strategies is one that has not and will not work. In addition, funding should be conceptualised within the broader context of good governance, effective public management, increased awareness around regionalism, private sector-led initiatives and public– private partnership programmes. The 0.2% import levy cannot be the only source of funding the AU, as its implementation is susceptible to unpredictable currents. As such, more streams of engagement and activities are needed to ensure flexibility, predictability, sustainability and equity of funding.

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As Fassi and Aggad (2014, p. 8) argue, there should be a shift from a demand-driven discussion of financing to a supply-driven one. The demand-driven narrative is one that looks at how to tap into Africa’s riches as a means of financing regional integration while the supply-driven angle focuses incentivising actors to provide funding (Fassi & Aggad, 2014, p. 8). This point is very important in the African context as regional integration is still seen as a zero-sum game, mainly due to the scant benefits derived from the process thus far. This point was at the heart of the refusal of the Obasanjo Report by Member States that felt that the hospitality levy would ensure that they contribute more to the AU at the expense of their small and/or medium-sized economies (Apiko & Aggad, 2018, p. 2). The narrative could have been framed in such a way that provided those Member States with concrete measures on “return on investment” either through arrangements such as rebates from a dedicated consolidated fund or as Fassi and Aggad (2014, p. 8) suggest, funding of infrastructure to support their tourism sector. Another important strategy in this respect is the adoption of flexible mechanisms in raising funds for the AU. Countries such as South Africa, Egypt, Mauritius and Seychelles have already indicated their intention to raise the 0.2% tax via means other than import levy (Apiko & Aggad, 2018, p. 7; Turianskyi & Gruzd, 2019, p. 16). This should be encouraged as it allows countries to exercise flexibility and other innovative means of raising the required tax levy. Countries, like South Africa, with relatively developed tax collection systems are in a better position to look at alternative means and assist other Member States in strengthening their taxation systems. One other important component of the flexible strategy is the consideration of measures that allow coalition of willing Member States to come together to push uniform ideas and platforms for raising funds. In this regard, the AU Commission could provide operational guidelines for such coalitions (Fagbayibo, 2016, pp. 164–165). Private sector-led initiatives are important as well. The private sector in Africa remain a major engine of sustainable growth in Africa and can play a major role in achieving self-financing goals. The AfroChampions Initiative is an important platform in this respect. The initiative is already involved in pan-African integration projects such as committing US$1 million to promoting the AfCFTA, awareness campaign around the African Passport, and the launch of the African Sovereign Wealth Funds Index (AfroChampions, 2018, AU, 2018b). This platform, and other similar platforms, could help advance meaningful strategies that

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ensure that private-sector actors raise funds for AU programmes and help set business-oriented programmes through which the AU could directly benefit from. The quality of public sector in African countries is another critical aspect of raising funds for the AU. Issues of corruption, underqualified public officials in charge of sensitive positions, and poor working conditions are measures that continue to affect the effectiveness of public service across the continent. The imperative of transparency in the collection of levies cannot be understated. For example, it was reported that in connivance with officials, about 90% of cargo coming into Nigeria are under-declared by the Nigerian Ports (Abagi, 2018). This already shows that there will be a problem with the calculation and collection of the 0.2% import levy. Other potential aspects of raising funds for the AU could be affected if corrupt activities are not effectively addressed in Member States. The AU must be proactively engaged in ensuring this through programmes aimed at capacity building, awareness campaign around ethics and importance of improving working conditions in Member States, and introduction of incentives to Member States that efficiently comply with fund raising targets. The measures discussed above are critical steps in providing a feasible path forward for the AU in asserting its legitimacy as the primary driver of regionalism on the continent. Rather than deploying more funds to the AU, the EU should ensure that it engages in fair trade and negotiations practises with African partners; respect the AU common position on negotiating with the EU as one bloc; allow African entrepreneurs have better access to its market; cooperate with the AU in terms of stopping illicit financial flows from Africa by European firms; and provide meaningful technical support to technology innovation drive across the continent. All these measures are important for sustainable domestic resource mobilisation, which in turn could translate into increased finances for the AU.

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CHAPTER 17

The European Union Actorness: A View from Washington D.C. Aleksandar Jankovski

Introduction Two core theoretical premises inform the empirical work of this chapter. First, human beings are “cultural beings” endowed with the ability to “take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance” (Weber, 1949, p. 81, quoted in Ruggie, 1998, p. 856). Thus, “sentience makes a difference, and…social systems cannot be understood in the same way as physical ones. When units are sentient, how they perceive each other is a major determinant of how they interact ” (Buzan, 2001, p. 476; emphases added). All of this is to write “that social reality does not fall

A. Jankovski (B) Department of Political Science, Northeastern Illinois University, Chicago, IL, USA e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] Department of Social Sciences, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, IL, USA

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from heaven, [rather] human agents construct and reproduce it through their daily practices ” (Risse, 2007, p. 3; emphasis added). And second, the kinds of social reality sentient human agents “construct and reproduce” are best imagined as arrayed along a continuum. At one extreme, and employing here the language of game theory, sentient cultural beings may “perceive each other” as constituting a social system best described by the game “deadlock”. In this game, not only is defection the instrumentally rational move for both players but the game’s outcome, mutual defection, is the preferred, Pareto superior Nash equilibrium.1 By contrast, at the other extreme of the continuum, sentient human agents may “perceive each other” as constituting a gemeinschaft social system. Here, social actors view their relations as a community. In this view, the social system is “something organic and traditional, involving bonds of common sentiment, experience, and identity” (Buzan, 1993, p. 333). And occupying roughly the middle of the continuum, sentient human agents can “perceive each other” as constituting a gesellschaft social system. This “understanding sees society as being contractual and constructed rather than sentimental and traditional. It is more consciously organisational: societies can be made by acts of will” (Buzan, 1993, p. 333). Five caveats are in order. First, gemeinschaft social systems are not to be thought of as some sort of post-politics systems where all conflict has dissolved away. Friction is a natural corollary of—and, occasionally, a positive factor in—all social relations. This, of course, remains emphatically true in world politics. After all, “[g]iven the juxtaposition of different political communities, each with its own values, preoccupations, prejudices and sensibilities, friction in international relations is 1 Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane give two examples of deadlock-type situations in world politics. Citing Kenneth Oye study of “monetary diplomacy”, Axelrod and Keohane posit that “[s]hifts in beliefs, not only about international regimes, but particularly about desirable economic policy, led leaders… to prefer unilateral, uncoordinated action to international cooperation on the terms that appeared feasible” (Axelrod and Keohane 1985, p. 230). Thus, it was not a question of “a failure of coordination where common interests existed (as in Prisoners’ Dilemma); rather, [it was a question of] decay of these common interests, as perceived by participants” (Axelrod and Keohane 1985, p. 230). And, citing Stephen Van Evera, Axelrod and Keohane note that “[b]eliefs are as important in the military area” (Axelrod and Keohane 1985, p. 230). In 1914 “the European payoff structure actually would have rewarded cooperation; but Europeans perceived a payoff structure that rewarded noncooperation, and responded accordingly. Beliefs, not realities, governed conduct” (Axelrod and Keohane 1985, pp. 230–231).

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always present, even between states and nations that perceive a wide area of common interests and whose relations are close and amicable” (Bull, 1977, p. 165). Second, the proposed delineation of social reality among deadlock, gesellschaft and gemeinschaft ideal-types is a rough-hewn one. Moreover, particular instantiations of social systems will only faintly resemble these three ideal-types. Indeed, the given instantiation of a social system will likely fall in the interstices between ideal-types. Third, and building on the previous, there are degrees, as it were, of gemeinschaftness and gesellschaft-ness. The continuum view is crucial here and the rough-hewn tripartite distinction should not distract from this. Fourth, reasonable people can disagree as to where along this continuum we may best place a particular instantiation of a social system. There is nothing theoretically sacrosanct about the placement; it is open to interpretation and contestation. And fifth, the ideal-types of deadlock, gesellschaf and gemeinschaft present a static—or tableau—view of what are, in reality, dynamic social systems. That is, it may well be true that at any given time a social system will closely resemble this or that ideal-type. However, if we introduce time into the model, we will see that the social system has evolved from time t to time t + 1. Indeed, this insight will prove particularly valuable when analysing USA–EU relations during the Administration of President Donald Trump. In view of the foregoing, the principal task of this chapter is to examine the ways in which the individuals in the US foreign policy establishment,2 qua sentient human agents, perceive the European Union. In so doing, I examine the social system constructed by the USA and the EU. Recalling that “human agents construct and reproduce [their social reality] through their daily practices”, we also recall that the central way they do so is via “speech acts” for “saying is doing” (Kubálková et al., 1998, p. xi). In view of this, I provide a tour d’horizon of speech acts on EU–USA relations emanating from the Administrations of Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Donald Trump. This will make it possible for me to

2 Here, I have in mind—in addition to the President and the Vice President of the United States of America—the top five hierarchical levels in the United States Department of State which, ordered from top to bottom, are: Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and the other officials at the level of Under Secretary, Assistant Secretaries of State and Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State. Of additional importance are the National Security Adviser (formally, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs) and his deputies.

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articulate the two core claims of this chapter. First, the speech acts analysed below lead to the conclusion (however tentative) that successive US Administrations have perceived the EU as an important actor—indeed, a great power—in the international system and have acted accordingly. More tellingly, perhaps, second, I claim that US officials perceive the EU– USA relations as constituting a gemeinschaft social system.3 That is, USA officials perceive the social system that they create with their EU counterparts as “something organic and traditional, involving bonds of common sentiment, experience, and identity”. I also advance two ancillary arguments. First, the passage of time from the Administration of President Obama to the Administration of President Trump has, it appears, altered this gemeinschaft understanding. After all, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini stipulated that “[w]e believe we are probably entering a time of a more pragmatic and transactional kind of relationship with the United States” (Borger, 2017). This “assertive” speech act seems to indicate that the EU–USA relationship is decaying—in the perception of the most important participants—from a gemeinschaft (involving bonds of common sentiment) into a gesellschaft (transactional and instrumental) relationship. Still, caution is in order. First, it is an open question to what degree the relationship has, in fact, decayed. Second, nothing, a priori, militates against the relationship improving yet again, even if President Trump were re-elected in 2020. And third, the passage of time has scarcely altered the perception in Washington D.C. of the EU as a great power—at least in the economic realm. Finally, I place the EU–USA relationship in the context of the international order writ large. I shall argue, first, that the international order, as such, has shown a remarkable staying power. Second, the challenges— posed principally, though not exclusively, by the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation—to the post-Cold War unipolar, “hyperpower” moment of the USA can perform a positive role. Third, the social systems that the EU constitutes with the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation are of the gesellschaft type that is at considerable distance away from the gemeinschaft end of the continuum.

3 Recall here my admonition that there is nothing theoretically sacrosanct about this. Reasonable people may well disagree about my placing the EU-USA relationship on the gemeinschaft end of the continuum.

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The remainder of this chapter unfolds as follows. In the next section, I (i) briefly outline the constructivist theorising relevant to this chapter and (ii) briefly outline the English School theorising pertinent to this chapter. In the following section, I provide a tour d’horizon of “speech acts” on EU–USA relations emanating from the Administrations of Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama and President Donald Trump. In the last section, I place the EU–USA social system in the context of the international order writ large.

Demarcating the Theoretical Terrain: Constructivism and English School For want of space, I can do no more than adumbrate the most salient characteristics of constructivism and English School theorising, as they pertain to the current study. We recall that constructivists posit human beings are “cultural beings” endowed with the ability to “take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance” (Weber 1949, p. 81, quoted in Ruggie, 1998, p. 856). Thus, “sentience makes a difference, and… social systems cannot be understood in the same way as physical ones. When units are sentient, how they perceive each other is a major determinant of how they interact” (Buzan, 2001, p. 476). All of this is to write “that social reality does not fall from heaven, but that human agents construct and reproduce it through their daily practices” (Risse, 2007, p. 3). Thus, “to the extent that structures can be said to shape the behavior of social and political actors…constructivists hold that normative or ideational structures are just as important as material structures” (Reus-Smit, 2005, p. 196). For their part, Nicholas Onuf-style constructivists emphasise the notion that “saying is doing: talking is undoubtedly the most important way that we go about making the world what it is” (quoted in Smith, 2001, p. 52). Namely, “language is both representative and performative. People use words to represent deeds and they can use words, and words alone, to perform deeds” (Onuf 1989, p. 82, quoted in Zehfus, 2015, p. 59). We can distinguish among three types of speech acts. Assertive speech acts are “speech acts stating a belief…with the intention that the hearer accepts this belief” (Onuf 1989, p. 87, quoted in Chebakova, 2011, p. 18). Directive speech acts “contain an action the speaker wishes the hearer to perform (regulative intent)” (Onuf 1989, p. 87, quoted in Chebakova, 2011, p. 18). Finally, commissive speech acts “consist of

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the declaration of the speaker’s commitment to a stated course of action” (Onuf 1989, p. 87, quoted in Chebakova, 2011, p. 18). On the English School side of the ledger, international society “exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the workings of common institutions” (Bull, 1977, p. 13). And, by international order we shall understand “a pattern or disposition of international activity that sustains those goals of the society of states that are elementary, primary, or universal” (Bull, 1977, p. 16). The goals of international society, then, are “preservation of the system and society of states itself”, “maintaining the independence or external sovereignty of individual states”, peace, and the three “common goals of social life” of life, truth and property (Bull, 1977, pp. 16–17). Finally, as noted above, Bull proposes five primary institutions as the pillars on which international society and order rest: balance of power, great powers’ management, war, diplomacy and International Law. Drawing on the work of Ferdinand Tönnies, scholars have distinguished between gemeinschaft and gesellschaft understandings of social systems. The “gemeinschaft conceptualisation sees society as something organic and traditional, involving bonds of common sentiment, experience, and identity. It is an essentially historical conception: societies grow rather than being made” (Buzan, 1993, p. 333). A gemeinschaft social system is a “community of feeling and tradition” (Glenn et al., 1970, p. 45). It is “defined by shared values, beliefs and expectations” (Ikenberry, 2018, p. 17). Thus, the gemeinschaft view presents us with a social system “in which culture is grown [while the] gesellschaft [view is one] in which culture is produced” (Devlen et al., 2005, p. 189). Thus, in the gesellschaft understanding, a social system is “defined by formal rules, institutions and governmental ties” (Ikenberry, 2018, p. 17). The “gesellschaft conception views international society as being contractual[,] meaning that states with common interests have established by dialogue and consent common rules and organisations for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements” (Pourchot & Stivachtis, 2014, pp. 70–71). Monica Hakimi has provided a remarkably insightful discussion of the concepts of community. She distinguishes between a “community as constituted by shared precepts” and “community as constituted partly by conflict”. On the “community as constituted by shared precepts”

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view, “international community can be constituted only by commonality”. Thus, the more that community members share, the thicker or stronger their community is thought to be. Of course, community members inevitably also disagree. But in this conception, ineradicable diversity and discord detract from, rather than enhance, the community. The community exists despite, not because of, those qualities. (Hakimi, 2017, p. 322)

That is, in this conceptualisation, “community bonds are stronger” and “community members…act to advance collective interests” (Hakimi, 2017, p. 322).With respect to “community as constituted partly by conflict”, Hakimi notes that it is possible for “[p]eople [to] coalesce into a community not necessarily by overcoming their differences but by engaging together in what Aristotle called a practice of justice—a practice of trying to establish and hold one another accountable to standards that are generalizable for the group” (Hakimi, 2017, p. 325). On this view, the “practice of justice helps unify a community both by solidifying areas of agreement and by structuring persistent conflict” (Hakimi, 2017, p. 325). Finally, we also take note of the idea that “great powers” perform an indispensable function with respect to international society. States acquire the status of a great power when they “assert the right, and are accorded the right, to play a part in determining issues that affect the peace and security of the international system as a whole. They accept th[is] duty, and are thought by others to have the duty” (Bull, 1977, p. 196). A corollary of this is the idea that irrespective of the capabilities it possesses, a state is not a great power unless its political leadership “assert[s] the right’ and ‘accept[s] the duty’ to be a great power. It is also correct, however, to note that no amount of ‘assert[ing] the right’ of a great power will mean much unless the state does, as a matter of empirical fact, possess the capabilities requisite to be a great power. Furthermore, the ‘inequality of states in terms of power has the effect… of simplifying the pattern of international relations, of ensuring that the say of some states will prevail while that of others will go under, that certain conflicts will form the essential theme of international politics while others will be submerged” (Bull, 1977, p. 200). There, then, exists a kind of division of labour among states. The central position that great powers occupy in international society means that their “say” will prevail. They consider themselves

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“guardians” and “custodians” (Bull, 1977, p. 17) of international society and act accordingly.

The EU as a Great Power: The View from Washington D.C. Having thus delineated the theoretical terrain, in this section, I examine the speech acts of the most important officials in the US foreign policy decision-making hierarchy. The speech acts amply demonstrate that US foreign policy officials have recognised the EU as an important actor— and even a great power—in international society, and have acted accordingly. Moreover, US officials view EU–USA relations as constitutive of a gemeinschaft international society. George W. Bush Administration: “The US-European Marriage is Going to Be fine…No Possibility of Divorce Between Us” US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, declared that “the United States has been, from the very beginning, supportive of European integration, going all the way back to the coal and steel community. And the USA remains supportive of the European project” (Rice, 2005a). She underscored the fact that “President [Bush] made very clear that we believe that a united Europe, a Europe that is strong and capable, a Europe that is clearly at its core democratic”. Moreover, US Secretary Rice clearly articulates a gemeinschaft understanding when she takes note of Europe “that has a long tradition and heritage with the United States ” (Rice, 2005a). Finally, therefore, “we want to see the European project succeed because a strong Europe will be good for the forces of democracy. We would hope that a strong Europe would be outward looking, that it would continue to bring, as it has new, more members” (Rice, 2005a; emphasis added). The US Secretary noted that she and the EU High Representative Javier Solana “had wide-ranging discussions, as befits the wide-ranging and deep relationship that the United States and the EU enjoy” (Rice, 2005b, emphasis added). The two officials “had an opportunity to talk about Sudan and the importance of assisting the African Union mission”. They also discussed the “deepening” EU–USA “dialogue on the Middle East”, particularly Iran and Iraq (Rice, 2005b).

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US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, R. Nicholas Burns,4 “acknowledge[d]” that he could not “remember any time in the 60 years since the end of the [Second] World War when we had such a profound disagreement as over the war in Iraq. We’ve had a profound disagreement on the Kyoto Treaty which I know, having lived in Europe for the last eight years, is an important issue here – a vital issue for many Europeans; a profound disagreement over the International Criminal Court” (Burns, 2005). Still, he stipulated that “the United States has embarked on a new relationship with the European Union”. Indeed, “I’d like to make a very safe bet”, he argued, “that the US-European marriage is going to be fine”. There’s “no possibility of separation and certainly no possibility of divorce between us. I say that because I’m mindful of the history of our two continents ” (Burns, 2005; emphasis added). President Bush maintained that the “United States continues to support a strong European Union as a partner in spreading freedom and democracy and security and prosperity throughout the world. My message to these leaders and these friends was that we want Europe strong so we can work together to achieve important objectives and important goals” (Bush, 2005). Tellingly, he then, provided a readout of the topics that he discussed with the EU leadership during the EU– USA Summit. The two leaderships “‘talked about the Middle East’, ‘talked about Iraq’, ‘talked about Afghanistan’, ‘talked about the broader Middle East’, ‘talked about…Ukraine and Georgia, as well as the Balkans’, ‘talked about terrorism’, ‘talked about Iran’, ‘talked about our collaborative efforts in Darfur’, and ‘talked about [the two] economies” (Bush, 2005). Finally, sounding a gemeinschaft note, President Bush noted that “the relations with Europe are important relations… because we do share values’ such that ‘the friendship between our respective countries in the EU are strong” (Bush, 2005). Daniel Fried, USA Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs,5 also acknowledged that it was “not exactly a news flash” that

4 The position of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs is the third highestranking position in the Department of State; R. Nicholas Burns held that position from 2005 to 2008. 5 The position of Assistant Secretary of State is located on the fourth tier of the hierarchy in the United States Department of State. Moreover, the Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs heads a geographic bureau, a “barony” in the parlance of the State Department, and reports to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

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“U.S.-European relations… went through… a difficult patch”. However, the “atmospherics have vastly improved”, he noted. More specifically, and advancing a gemeinschaft argument, he noted that “[i]t is… the intention of United States, to take these good atmospherics and put the U.S.-European relationship to work for common objectives based on our common values and common assessments” (Fried, 2005a). On a different occasion, Assistant Secretary Fried noted that “President Bush made strengthening and deepening the transatlantic strategic consensus a signature goal of this, his second term”. Indeed, “it was no accident that President Bush’s… first overseas trip of his second term was to Brussels, where he met not only with NATO, but he also met with the European Council, in an extended and very useful session” (Fried, 2005b). Mr. Fried further noted that constant contact between USA and EU officials “is the reality of transatlantic cooperation today”. Moreover, unlike in 2003–2004, “we no longer hear are the voices calling for a strong Europe as a counterweight to the United States – ‘a check on U.S. economic, political and military power”’ (Fried, 2006). Finally, “Why Europe?” His answer was eloquent, and perfectly in keeping with a gemeinschaft understanding of international society. Together, America and Europe constitute a single democratic civilisation with common values. Together, America and Europe constitute a quorum of democratic legitimacy… When divided, we create a moral fog over events and their significance. When united, we are clear. The friends of freedom want the United States and Europe to be united. The enemies of freedom would rather we stayed in the fog. (Fried, 2006). Judy Ansley, USA National Security Council Senior Director for European Affairs, spoke of the fact that the United States government is “working today with the EU on the full range of global challenges. This is no longer a relationship that’s just about bilateral issues ” (Perino, 2007; emphasis added). Her statement is, thus, indicative of EU’s great power status—that is, the idea that the EU plays the role of a “guardian” or “custodian” of international society. “[W]e’re working, really, globally with the EU”, posited Director Ansley. Some of the issues tackled by the two great powers include: “resolving the final status of Kosovo, with the goal of supervised independence”, Belarus, “the Middle East where through a revived Quartet process we’re hoping to restart the peace process”, Daniel Fried held this position of Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs from 2005 to 2009.

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Lebanon, Iran with the EU-3, Afghanistan and Iraq, Darfur, “terrorist financing” and “proliferation”. Tellingly, Director Ansley also mentioned that the USA and the EU were working on “spread[ing] development and human rights throughout Latin America” (Perino, 2007). Thus, the EU qua great power is also operating in the Western Hemisphere, long understood as the United States’ sole ambit. Barack Obama’s Administration: “Towards a Transatlantic Renaissance” with “A Global Partner of First Resort” Philip H. Gordon, the USA Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs,6 took note of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and spoke of the “implications for future relations between the European Union and the United States”. Mr. Gordon affirmed the idea that “The United States and the European Union form a community of shared values and a partnership of shared interests ” (Gordon, 2009, emphasis added). This, again, is perfectly illustrative of my thesis that US officials comprehending EU–US relations in terms of gemeinschaft society. The EU, continued the Assistant Secretary, is “one of our most crucial partners in addressing regional and global challenges around the world”. Thus, “[i]n view of all of the many ties that bind the United States and Europe together, the Administration welcomed the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1. We believe that this treaty marks a milestone for Europe and for its role in the world” (Gordon, 2009). And, in closing his remarks, Mr. Gordon addressed the many areas where the USA and the EU cooperate, including the “Middle East, where the EU joins us as a full partner in the Quartet, together with the UN and Russia” (Gordon, 2009, emphasis added). US Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Victoria Nuland,7 posited that no “bouts of turbulence changes the fundamentals: America needs a strong Europe, and Europe needs a strong America. The greater the Transatlantic and global challenges, the more important it is that the United States and Europe address them together” (Nuland, 2013). She spoke of “a Transatlantic Renaissance”. “Europe is our global 6 Philip Gordon succeeded Daniel Fried and served as the USA Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs from 2009 to 2013. 7 Victoria Nuland succeeded Philip Gordon and served as the USA Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs from 2013 to 2017.

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partner of first resort” (Nuland, 2013). Assistant Secretary Nuland further underscored the depth of the USA–EU relationship. With respect to the Ukrainian crisis, Mrs. Nuland noted that the United States has “been working in lockstep with our European partners” (Nuland, 2014). US Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton,8 noted that “our shared values between the USA and the EU are the bedrock of our cooperation, and we are promoting those values together” (Clinton, 2012a). And, on the “occasion of Europe Day”, Secretary Clinton pointed to the fact that throughout EU’s history, beginning with the European Coal and Steel Community, “the bonds between the European Union and the United States have strengthened as we work to promote the tenets of freedom and democracy. Our common values and shared interests for a more peaceful world are anchored in the rich history of our transatlantic partnership” (Clinton, 2012b). “I am grateful”, continued the Secretary, for the vital role the EU plays around the world. From its leadership on bringing peace to the Middle East to its support for dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, to its commitment to isolating oppressive regimes and its support of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, the EU continues to help solve global problems. (Clinton, 2012b)

US Secretary of State John Kerry9 stipulated that “we want more engagement with Europe, and we think Europe can be more of a partner in those efforts” (Kerry, 2013a). He took note of the fact that “European Union is today our largest trading partner. And let me remind everybody, Europe standing alone as an entity is the largest economy in the world”. Moreover, there is a “tremendous opportunity to broaden and deepen our already strong economic ties” (Kerry, 2013b). For her part, EU High Representative Ashton declared EU–USA relations as being “a great partnership, and the work that we do between the European Union and the US on so many issues, of which Iran is one of the greatest examples but by no means the only example, it’s crucial we share the same values, we work together to try and deliver for people across the world” (Kerry, 2013c).

8 Hilary Rodham Clinton served as the United States Secretary of State from 2009 to 2013. 9 John Kerry served as the United States Secretary of State from 2013 to 2017.

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After a meeting with Lady Ashton, Secretary Kerry noted that “Lady Ashton and I just covered a lot of ground, but since we’re in agreement on so much of it, we were able to cover it quite quickly” (Kerry, 2014a). We witness, once more, the depth and breadth of the USA-EU relationship, as well the incredibly high level of accord and congruence in the positions of the two great powers. “We discussed, most importantly”, added Mr. Kerry, “our shared strategy of using the tools of diplomacy in order to reduce the conflicts that are threatening Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and other parts of the world, but particularly there” (Kerry, 2014a). Among issues discussed by the two foreign ministers were Ukraine, “South Sudan, Nigeria and Iran…. I think you see the breadth of the things that we’re talking about ” (Kerry, 2014a, emphasis added). To further emphasise just how much USA and EU views align, I should like to point to the number of times that Lady Ashton used the phrase “like you”—or derivative thereof. High Representative Ashton noted that: “As you’ve said, we’ve talked about a range of issues”. “We know, too, that Ukraine has the right to defend its territorial integrity”. “I pay tribute, like you, to the OSCE, and I join the chief monitor of the special mission”. “Like you, too, we are focused on the elections and the importance of free and fair presidential elections”. And, “Like you, our thoughts are with the parents of the Nigerian girls and with the girls themselves” (Kerry, 2014a, emphasis added). Secretary Kerry conveyed his congratulations on the election of Donald Tusk to be the President of the European Council and Federica Mogherini to be the next EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Noteworthy is the fact the Secretary once more stressed the fact that “President Van Rompuy and especially High Representative Ashton, [were his] close colleague and partner on the full range of global security issues ” (Kerry, 2014b, emphasis added). The Secretary and the new EU High Representative “had [their] first bilateral in [Mogherini’s] new capacity” on 3 December 2014. EU High Representative Mogherini pointed to the fact that she and Secretary Kerry “discussed a lot…[the] situation in Syria and in Iraq, the fight against Daesh and the common effort against terrorists in the area, and to stabilize the region”. She further stated: “we also had a discussion on the Middle East peace process, where we are looking forward to work together”. “We also discussed Libya”. “And we will now unfortunately leave you soon without

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questions because we are starting an EU-U.S. Energy Council”, quipped the new High Representative (Kerry, 2014c). On Europe Day, Secretary Kerry conveyed, yet again, the message of the importance that the US government attaches to the European Union. The Secretary wrote that the European Union is an essential partner in promoting peace in Syria, countering ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant], and combatting the scourge of terrorism. Together we support Ukraine against Russian aggression. We work closely together to find solutions for the global refugee crisis, which affects all of us. The European Union was essential to the conclusion of the climate change agreement in Paris in December, and in bringing about the landmark deal with Iran to reduce the threat from nuclear weapons. (Kerry, 2016b)

And finally, after meeting with High Representative Mogherini, the Secretary once more underlined the fact that EU High Representative Federica Mogherini [has] been a great partner on so many vital issues, as I just described to people….We seem to have a massive amount of our global agenda contained in the relationships here in this room, which speaks volumes to the strength of the EU-U.S. partnership in general, and I know people in certain countries take note of that because I think it’s important. (Kerry, 2016a, emphasis added)

Donald Trump’s Administration: A “Foe”, “Competitor” and “Consortium” or “Deep Heritage”? In analysing Mr. Trump’s Administration, we perforce begin with the negative. John Bolton, the National Security Adviser from 2018 to 2019, is known as a strident critic of the EU. For Mr. Bolton, “EU officials are beyond the pale” and he “repeatedly emphasizes his distaste for ‘EUroids’ and their love of international norms”, which he claims “profoundly [threaten] to diminish American autonomy and self-government, notions that to us spell ‘sovereignty”’ (Gowan, 2018). Still, Mr. Bolton is “‘not really interested in democracy’ but rather in the building of American sovereignty and security” (Rogan, 2018). The motto that best encapsulates his thinking may well be, “It’s America first, stupid” (Rogan, 2018). Respecting the EU, Mr. Bolton principal complaint is that the otherwise “compelling, indeed powerful, business reasons” for “integrated

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continental market” are quite frequently “tinged with a discernible antiAmericanism, a desire to have a state strong enough to be a separate pillar in the world” (Bolton, 2000, p. 220). His real concern, therefore, is the EU’s attempt to supplant the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), become a “separate pole”, and thereby usurp America’s role on the European continent. He writes that “[o]ver the years, advocates of a stronger EU argued closer integration would make the EU better able to stand up to the United States. These same advocates then turned around and argued to Americans that a stronger EU would be a better global partner for the United States” (Bolton, 2009). Mr. Bolton avers that “[a]lthough innocuous sounding”, the Common Foreign and Security Policy’s “clear objective is an EU international policy separate and apart from America” (Bolton, 2016). Thus, from Mr. Bolton’s vantage point, the “hidden agenda of ‘ever closer union’, was not (as Washington was always soothingly assured) to make the EU a better partner of the United States, but to make it a competitor” (Bolton, 2010b; see also Bolton, 2014). In fact, should “EU members chose deeper political and economic integration[,] [that would] fundamentally affect US global security interests ” (Bolton, 2014; emphasis added). The EU’s “common foreign and security policy, and particularly the prospects of a robust EU military capability”, writes Mr. Bolton, “have constituted a dagger aimed at NATO’s heart” (Bolton, 2010a). After all, “there’s advantage to having troops and assets forward-deployed” (AIE Media, 2015). Indeed, in a refreshingly forthright statement, Mr. Bolton noted that “we are doing it [that is, United States’ forward deployment in Europe] for us, not for them; we are not doing it because we are altruists” (AIE Media, 2015). In the final analysis, therefore, Mr. Bolton’s overriding goal is to “demonstrate to Europe that the EU is not the alpha and the omega” (Bolton, 2017) and reclaim America’s rightful place as the only “pole” on the Continent. Finally, then, Richard Gowan (2018) has argued that Mr. Bolton “is not a man who responds well to appeals to order and stability, let al.one international law”. Thus, Bolton respects the kind of power that involves militarism or at least gruff self-assertion. European governments are not going to point missiles at Washington to get Trump’s and Bolton’s attention. But they should think about how they can weaponize their tangible sources of influence, such as trade, to engage in some pretty brutal transactional talks with the new

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National Security Advisor on issues like Iran. This is the only language he understands. (Gowan, 2018)

President Trump, too, has criticised the EU. “Well I think we have a lot of foes”, argued Mr. Trump. “I think the European Union is a foe, what they do to us in trade. Now you wouldn’t think of the European Union but they’re a foe…. It doesn’t mean anything. It means that they are competitive” (Reuters, 2018). And, while on the campaign trail, Mr. Trump declared the EU a “consortium ‘designed’ so that it could compete with the United States” (Schatz, 2016). EU leaders, on the eve of Mr. Trump’s ascension to the presidency, “through gritted teeth… insist[ed] that the ties anchoring the globe since World War II will endure – if not with much warmth, then at least through the sort of transactional relations Trump can understand” (Witte et al., 2017). The EU High Representative Mogherini stipulated as much: “We believe we are probably entering a time of a more pragmatic and transactional kind of relationship with the United States” (Borger, 2017). Yet, there is a stochastic nature of Mr. Trump’s approach to things, including the EU. Indeed, more than stochastic, President Trump’s approach appears highly transactional—or gesellschaft —in nature.10 Mr. Trump posited that Brexit is a good thing for both sides for it compelled the other EU Member States to “get their act together” (Hughes, 2017). The President no longer seemed certain that the EU “will start to come apart”. Rather, “they have done a very good job in bringing it back together” (Hughes, 2017). After his meeting with the US President, President Tusk declared that “[w]e agreed on many areas, first and foremost[,] on counter-terrorism”. Moreover, President “Trump also agreed to setting up a joint EU-US ‘action plan’ on trade – an indication the new occupant of the White House is not as set on shunning free trade deals and promoting protectionism as some in Europe had feared he might”. Indeed, EU officials said the meeting had been constructive and friendly. 10 Not all leaders object to President Trump’s transactional approach. For an interesting take, see Friedman and Bayoumy (2019). Friedman and Bayoumy quote the Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid thus: “Actually, I’m quite sorry: Thinking back historically, when everybody else said it nicely, we didn’t react. I mean, Barack Obama said so as well, and then we said, ‘It’s all fine and dandy but we don’t see it’s a necessity’. It’s an irony that with this more transactional policy-making style [of Trump’s], we are now in Europe discussing 2 percent [‘and promising to devote $100 billion more to security by the end of 2020, which’] is not peanuts” (Friedman and Bayoumy 2019).

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Tusk and Juncker joked with Trump about the EU having “two presidents” and being “too complicated”. The US leader appeared to mix the two of them up during remarks in January, deepening concerns in Brussels that the reality TV star in the White House failed to take the European Union seriously (MacDonald & Holland, 2017). Finally, “EU officials believe Trump has come to appreciate more since taking office the value of European integration to US interests. US businesses have taken advantage of its single market to reduce the costs of exporting to Europe” (MacDonald & Holland, 2017). The constructive tone did not last—yet again illustrating the unpredictable and transactional nature that is central to Mr. Trump’s approach. Mr. Trump “slammed” the EU for being “very protectionist with the US” and demanded that this had to “stop”. “His latest broadside against Brussels [came] as the EU braces for potential US tariffs on steel and aluminium” (von der Burchard, 2017). The US President “claimed in an interview with ITV broadcast…that the EU had been ‘very unfair’ on American exporters, and that it would ‘morph into something very big’ that would ‘turn out to be much to [the EU’s] detriment’” (Boffey, 2018). And, perhaps revelatory of the real reason for Mr. Trump’s pique with the EU is the fact that he noted that his own experience with the EU had not been a good one. The “bloc had made it difficult for him to set up golf courses” (Boffey, 2018). Reviewing “Trump’s war on Europe”, Julie Smith and Rachel Rizzo (2018) write that Trump’s views toward the EU have been consistently negative for years. During the presidential campaign he made several disparaging remarks about the EU, including that it was created to beat the United States when it comes to making money. He also openly supported Brexit. Making matters worse, Trump has forged a close relationship with Nigel Farage, the far-right, anti-immigration, anti-establishment leader of the UK Independence Party who has served as Trump’s tutor on the EU since late 2016. (Smith & Rizzo, 2018)

The President “launched a two-front war with the European Union” (Smith & Rizzo, 2018). Mr. Trump “announced he would place 25 percent tariffs on steel and 10 percent tariffs on aluminium imports” (Smith & Rizzo, 2018). And, the “president and his advisors have also decided to take a hostile stance toward recent EU efforts to strengthen

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defence cooperation and integration across the Continent” (Smith & Rizzo, 2018). On 25 July 2018, Presidents Trump and Juncker announced a plan that brought USA–EU relations from the brink of a trade war. In scripted remarks, Mr. Trump said that while the two sides were pursuing a bilateral deal, “we will not go against the spirit of this agreement unless either party terminates the negotiation. We also will resolve the steel and aluminium tariff issues, and we will resolve retaliatory tariffs” (Palette & Whalen, 2018). Still, “Europe’s fragile peace deal with the US on trade [was] at a breaking point” by 17 October (Hanke et al., 2018). Finally, in a sign that not all is lost, The Wall Street Journal reported that “US [and] EU trade teams seek fast results and big savings” (Peker, 2018). Playing “good cop” to Mr. Trump’s “bad cop” is Vice President Mike Pence. Indeed, EU officials seemed to have warmed to the US Vice President. Mr. Pence “express[ed] the commitment of the United States to continued cooperation and partnership with the EU” (Pence 2017a). He noted that the USA “understand the deep heritage of Member States in the European Union with people in the United States of America”. The Vice President also noted that the Administration was “[l]ooking for ways that we could reassure…leaders of the European Union of our commitment to ongoing cooperation and that maintaining that partnership in the years ahead is hopefully a resonant message that came through, and it’s my great privilege to be here to deliver it” (Pence, 2017a). The United States of America and the European Union share the “same purpose: to promote peace and prosperity through freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. And to those objectives we will remain committed” (Pence, 2017b). Mr. Pence declared that history will attest that when the United States and Europe are peaceful and prosperous, we do advance the peace and prosperity of all the world. Our economies are the world’s largest – accounting for half of the world’s economic output. Transatlantic commerce supports 14 million jobs on both continents and improves the lives and well-being of all of our citizens. (Pence, 2017b)

For their part, EU officials said they were encouraged by what they called Mr Pence’s clear assurances, including on US backing for holding the European Union

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together after Brexit, though they will watch closely to see how far Mr Trump’s actions match his deputy’s words. “We got everything we were looking for”, one official said. (ABC, 2017)

And, Donald Tusk, “told reporters that Mr Pence had given him affirmative answers to three questions on Mr Trump’s support for the current system of international law, NATO and ‘the idea of a united Europe’” (ABC, 2017). Finally, Federica Mogherini “said at a news conference … that she… welcome[d] the same ‘message of continuity’ about trans-Atlantic cooperation that Vice President Pence brought by visiting Brussels in February, soon after Mr. Trump took office” (New York Times, 2017). US Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, A. Wess Mitchell noted that America also works closely with the European Union. Altogether, at present, we maintain over 35 ongoing structured dialogues with the EU on everything from security and energy to trade and human rights. The EU stood with us first in imposing and then continuing to renew sanctions on Russia in the period since the start of its aggression in Ukraine. It is also a critical partner in counterterrorism. (Mitchell, 2018b; emphasis added)

Mr. Mitchell also noted that “[u]nlike in 1919, in 1945 we did not leave Europe. We created permanent bases for US troops, we formed the Marshall Plan, we created NATO, and supported the establishment of the European Union” (Mitchell, 2018a). Indeed, the Assistant Secretary argued that “[p]reserving the West cannot happen without Europe”. Mr. Mitchell added, “America and Europe together are the West and the heart of the Free World”. Still, continued Mr. Mitchell, “[o]ur Europe strategy begins by acknowledging that Europe is once again a theatre of serious strategic competition and needs to be treated as such in how we think about our role and mobilise our allies” (Mitchell, 2018a). Concluding remarks are in order about EU–USA relations during the Administration of President Trump. First, as indicated above, nothing, a priori, militates against the relationship improving yet again, even if President Trump were re-elected in 2020. Still, the stochastic nature of Mr. Trump’s approach means that for the foreseeable future, the operative word in EU–USA relations is “transactional”. However, this does not undermine the fact that USA–EU relations are best conceived as constitutive of an international society. Indeed, for all the seesaw-like movements

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in EU–USA relations during the first two years of his presidency, it is demonstrably clear that Mr. Trump considers the EU as an important actor. After all, if the EU were irrelevant, why label it a “foe” and a “competitor”? And, in Mr. Bolton’s case, if the EU were irrelevant why would the potential for the emergence of a true EU military be concerning, or a dagger to the heart of NATO? Concurring with former Under Secretary of State Burns; “I’d like to make a very safe bet that the US-European marriage is going to be fine”. There is “no possibility of separation and certainly no possibility of divorce between us. I say that because I’m mindful of the history of our two continents”.

Discussion: EU–USA Social System in Context I locate, in this section, the EU–USA social system in the context of the international order writ large. I argue, first, that for all the talk about the decay of the post-World War II US-constructed international order, the international order as such has shown a remarkable staying power. Namely, the rising People’s Republic of China (PRC) and resurgent Russian Federation (RF) are certainly keen to challenge the dominance of the USA. Nevertheless, the PRC and RF continue, as Hedley Bull would have it, to “share [with the United States of America] in the workings of common institutions” (Bull, 1977, p. 13) of international society.11 Moreover, the great powers continue to be “conscious of certain common interests and common values, [and to] form a [gesellschaft ] society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another” (Bull, 1977, p. 13). Linking this argument with the above-discussed gesellschaft notion of international society, the great powers have, via “dialogue and consent” established “common rules and organisations for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements” (Pourchot & Stivachtis, 2014, pp. 70–71).

11 Hedley Bull proposes the following five as the primary institutions of international

order as such: diplomacy, balance of power, great powers’ management, International Law, and, to be sure, war. That is, if Bull was correct, if cooperation in these institutions is what buttresses international order as such, then all the great powers at the time of this writing perceive these institutions as immensely valuable—albeit it may be that most of the great powers do so on instrumental, gesellschaft, grounds.

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Importantly, all four actors, the EU, USA, PRC and RF, continue to understand one another as great powers encumbered with the task of “play[ing] a [central] part in determining issues that affect the peace and security of the international system as a whole. They accept the duty, and are [generally] thought by others to have the duty” (Bull, 1977, p. 196). By way of but one example, “Europeans believe that they share a number of key interests with Russia in Syria”—“meaningful stability” being perhaps the primary one. Of course, there remain “deep and critical differences over the mutual interpretation of meaningful stability” and “most Europeans believe Moscow bears the first-mover responsibility if it wants to shift course and draw in Western support” (Barnes-Dacey, 2019). For its part, “China’s diplomatic engagement on Syria has been reactive, cautious, and pragmatic” such that “the overriding aim of China’s Syria policy has been to maintain a stable and friendly government in power in Damascus”. To this end, “the Chinese [UN] delegation has consistently opposed coercive measures by blocking censures, demands for ceasefires, the use of sanctions, and International Criminal Court (ICC) referral” (Calabrese, 2019). Nonetheless, the crucial point from the perspective of this chapter is that the EU, the Russian Federation, and the People’s Republic of China continue to be conscious of certain common interests and to cooperate in the institution of great powers’ management. Second, the Chinese and Russian challenges to the dominance of the USA have certainly accentuated the element of friction in international society. However, [i]t would be illusory to imagine that great powers are always concerned to avoid dangerous crises, or to dampen these down when they occur. Crises are sometimes deliberately manufactured by the great powers, or deliberately brought closer to the point of war, because the preoccupation of the great power concerned is with securing diplomatic victory. (Bull, 1977, p. 202)

Moreover, and paradoxically perhaps, the element of friction can perform a positive role. After all, it would be mistaken to assume that crises, or the intensification of them, could never play a constructive role in relation to the purposes of international order. The maintenance of the balance of power…would scarcely

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have been possible without the resolve of particular great power, or combination of them, at particular times, to issue threats and so create or intensify crises. (Bull, 1977, p. 203)

Thus, viewed from the prism of international society, the Chinese and Russian challenges to US dominance may even be a welcomed antidote to the American “hyperpower”, unipolar moment of the 1990s. Third, the social systems that the EU constitutes with the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation are of the gesellschaft type. Moreover, these two social systems appear to be a considerable distance away from the gemeinschaft end of the continuum. By contrast, the EU-USA social system is much closer to the gemeinschaft end of the continuum even during the Administration of President Trump. Two examples would suffice to illustrate this contention. The People’s Republic of China has encountered “a more sceptical EU”. The European Union came late to the industrial, political and security threats China poses. For a long time, Europe saw China as another Japan, only with some humanrights issues. But with the outspoken ambitions of the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, and continuing battles over technology transfer, closed markets and industrial espionage, that is changing. (Erlanger, 2019)12

Indeed, the “mood is certainly tougher now”. The European Union “labelled [the People’s Republic of China] an ‘economic competitor’ in critical industrial fields and a ‘systemic rival’ politically”. And the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, “said tartly that ‘progress is slower than we like’”. The 21st EU-PRC summit saw “difficult negotiations” such that “the European had a hard time finding agreement on a joint statement with the Chinese that is serious about substance” (Erlanger, 2019). In fact, it was not until the EU delegation “threaten[ed] not to sign a joint statement” that the Chinese delegation, led by Premier Li Keqiang, “promise[d] to conclude a longdiscussed bilateral investment deal by the end of 2020, which would

12 “President Emmanuel Macron of France said that the European Union had finally woken up to China. ‘China plays on our divisions’, he said. ‘The period of European naïveté is over’” (Erlanger 2019).

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improve market access and a promise to limit forced technology transfers” (Erlanger, 2019). And, the President-elect of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, “said the bloc should apply the same ‘guidelines’ to China as it does to Russia and must not ‘underestimate itself’ in terms of the influence it can have with Beijing” (Gutteridge, 2019). Presidentelect Leyen’s statement is telling of the EU-PRC-RF triangular relations: “Where Russia attacks the cyber sector militarily, China takes economic advantage. We must define and enforce our interests in terms of China together as Europeans. They are not as aggressive towards us as Vladimir Putin’s Russia. China gently ensnares us” (quoted in Gutteridge, 2019). Finally, “[d]iplomats in Beijing are…braced for a more confrontational era of China-EU relations over the five years of her mandate”. Indeed, given that President-elect Leyen is “more Atlanticist than Oriental”, expectations are that she “will attempt to establish strong ties in Washington, despite recent tensions” (Gutteridge, 2019).

Conclusion In this chapter, I sought to defend two principal and two ancillary arguments. First, successive United States Administrations have recognised the EU as an important actor—and even a great power—in international society and have acted accordingly. Moreover, second, US officials view EU–USA relations as constitutive of a gemeinschaft international society. Importantly, third, this remains true, albeit in an attenuated, gesellschaft form, even during the Trump Administration. Fourth, the international order has proven remarkably resilient with the great powers playing a crucial role. Finally, the social systems that the EU constitutes with the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation are of the gesellschaft type.

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CHAPTER 18

Conclusion Maria Raquel Freire, Paula Duarte Lopes, Daniela Nascimento, and Licínia Simão

This volume focuses on EU global actorness and is organised according to three main dimensions of analysis: policies, regions and external visions which, combined, bring an innovative contribution to the existing studies on the EU’s role at the international level. The main questions underlying this study were, first, what can we learn from the EU’s own understanding of its global actorness and, second, what can we learn from

M. R. Freire · P. D. Lopes (B) · D. Nascimento · L. Simão Faculty of Economics and Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra, Coimbra, Portugal e-mail: [email protected] M. R. Freire e-mail: [email protected] D. Nascimento e-mail: [email protected] L. Simão e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. R. Freire et al. (eds.), EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92997-8_18

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other actors’ perceptions of that same global actorness? This led us to look at the EU’s international agency by revisiting the theoretical debates on EU global actorness, and analysing the areas and instruments available for its enactment. This exercise allowed us to unpack the various meanings and implications of EU’s global role, from the viewpoint of its presence, of its capacities and of its self-identification in the current and highly contested international order. The main conclusions from this study point to three aspects: first, although we are indeed facing and living in a changed and changing international context and internal dynamics, one can affirm that EU actorness has remained rather stable; second, the trend suggesting a more pragmatic approach by the EU can be viewed as consolidating, as visible in its “principled pragmatism”. Still, the normative dimension has not been discarded, as it remains understood as essential to the EU’s identity and evolution, in the sense that an effort to move onwards to redimension expectations and invest in capacities has been put in place with mixed results. This points out to a strengthening in capacities but difficulties in adjusting expectations. Third, the persisting distance between what the EU can do and what it would like to do, very much owing to political willingness, still limits its ability to project its global actorness according to most of the external perceptions included in this book. As previously mentioned, the different chapters engage with the debates on global actorness in a contested international order, following the framework of analysis on EU actorness suggested in Chapter 2, by Licínia Simão. The main axes of EU actorness bring together the triangulation of processes, values and principles, as core to the self-identification of this actor; norms and rules as part of the constitutive nature and development of the EU; and the intersubjective nature of relations, which together confer meaning to capabilities, provide a sense of purpose and legitimacy, and lead to the recognition of this actor by others as an eventually relevant global player. The chapters look at how agency and power are exerted at the global and regional levels, mapping the areas and instruments available for EU global action, and unpacking its meanings and implications for the Union’s global role. The puzzle guiding this volume paved the way, on the one hand, to grasp what we may learn from the EU’s own understanding of its global role in its various areas of action and, on the other hand, from other actors’ perceptions of that same global actorness. In this way, the various contributions shed

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light on how different and/or convergent interpretations of EU’s international role might contribute to the debate on EU actorness both in conceptual and practical terms. This is based on critical research and analysis of external perceptions of the EU “developed at the intersection of geographical and thematic lines highlighting the importance of perceptions and images of the self and other to policy development” (Simão in this book). The approach adopted in this book assumes that EU actorness has been closely linked not only to the institutional and normative setting of the Union, but also to the external impulses in the global context. The Constructivist approach implicit in our reading of actorness provides the ground for this differentiated reading of what actor the EU is/would like to be. The chapters clearly show that reflections on the balance between capabilities and expectations are still relevant today as are issues pertaining to notions of purpose and legitimacy or recognition and effectiveness. International agency does not develop in a vacuum and the exercise of legitimate and effective power requires not only objective and material means, along with identity-related and normative-oriented decisions, but also a conducive context, both at home and abroad. Assessing the EU ability to exert power at a time of contested leadership in the global order has proved a rather powerful, though challenging and difficult, exercise. It has revealed that the balance between domestic consensus on the value of institutions, norms, and rules, on the one hand, and the mastering of material means to act globally, on the other hand, needs to be stroked. If the EU institutions are to make a difference on how the global order in the twenty-first century is or can be shaped, the relevance of common action and consensus-building will need to be constantly restated. This is the normative consensus on which the Union’s domestic, regional and, to some extent, global actorness continues to thrive. But because the sources of global power are constantly shifting and because the context is today one of significant contestation to the values underpinning the liberal-democratic global order, if the EU is to lead, it will definitely have to prove its relevance and role in responding to today’s challenges. As we finalise this volume, Europe and most of the world are still struggling with a massive SARS-COV 2 pandemic. This pandemic, and the many challenges it brought, has also resulted in pushing globalisation trends backwards, halting human contacts globally, and pressing for fast-track adjustments to capitalism that will definitely shape the future

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of international relations in quite distinctive ways. This is also an important example of how the relevance and adequacy of institutional settings needs to be (re)adjusted to varying challenges facing human societies world-wide. New challenges require new tools, new structures and new frameworks for both understanding and acting in the international realm. In our view, this is another opportunity for the European institutions to continue to prove that more EU is—or should be—the answer to the dilemmas of our time, rather than less EU. Nevertheless, and as the pandemic context has proved so far, finding consensus to move ahead in a coherent and cohesive way remains a difficult task among Member States. In fact, one particularly concerning trend that has been developing within the EU is the resurgence and strengthening of nationalisms, which have already significantly contributed to undermining the much-needed cohesion power for the EU to assert itself as a global player in the fight against this major threat. What this will mean to each European, to the ones that look for refuge in Europe and to those who seek cooperation and solidarity from Europe will tell much of the story of future EU actorness. Looking back to past actions, as the different chapters of this volume somehow do, allows us to better grasp how relevant the EU may turn out to be in the coming years. The changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon have been most relevant, in the sense that it operated a fundamental structural adaptation that sought to mitigate the lack of a unitary decision-making on foreign policy. These changes provided the opportunity for a stronger diplomatic actorness but are still insufficient to change the power discrepancies between EU institutions and Member States. The assessment varies across policy areas, since both the High Representative and the European External Action Service (EEAS) have specific competencies and require coordination mechanisms across the Commission and other EU institutions, making the EU still often unable to present a coordinated position. For example, the main problems of EU democracy promotion are, in fact, identical to those of states. But contrary to what could be expected, Member States cannot match the European Commission in the area of democracy assistance. In fact, the cohesiveness of the EU in the area of democracy promotion may well be weakened as leaders of some Member States are more overtly contesting the liberal postWWII consensus (Khakee in this book). Moreover, the fact that the EU is perceived as a sui generis actor (Wunderlich, 2012), or as a hybrid actor

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(Khakee in this book) with a multi-layered foreign policy where decisionmaking is still in the hands of Member States, contributes further to this complexity. The EU is visible in its diplomatic role and action, but its complex structure cannot replace or mitigate the lack of a clear foreign policy decision-making process (Maurer in this book). This is linked to the idea that the EU is still very reactive when it comes to specific policies and actions, lacking a coherent and more permanent strategic vision, which we argue the Global Strategy (European Union, 2016) seeks to overcome. This means that the EU international actorness is very much dependent on the international context as well as the local contexts with which it engages. It also evidences the continuity in EU actorness understandings and the mismatch that persists between capabilities, expectations and perceptions. The first part of the book looked at how different instruments and dimensions of action used by the EU in specific sectorial policies influence and shape its global actorness. Engaging with the ideas of “normative Europe”, capacities and presence, these chapters analyse the EU role and action in the fields of diplomacy, democracy promotion, humanitarian action, trade and human security. The analysis developed across these chapters highlights how EU actorness is largely dependent on how Member States perceive EU institutions to be useful for their own objectives. Political willingness and interest-driven policies are not a novelty. Nevertheless, the Europeanisation of views and understandings regarding challenges and the benefits of acting at the European level plays a critical role in the very process of proving institutions with the means to address international issues. This is very much visible in the areas of humanitarian action, democracy assistance and human rights promotion. These are the areas where the Union’s normative identity is better consolidated and where the EU continues to lead, with increased support and recognition, both internally and internationally. Although we are witnessing a global backlash when it comes to democracy, with authoritarian trends becoming more appealing in many societies including in Europe, this continues to be a field of action where coherence between EU identity and action is denser. Member States continue to either genuinely believe their action is more effective when pursued at the European level, or to allow the EU to continue its action in these fields, even though they do not pursue these goals in their own national policies. This reinforces one of the conclusions from this collective work and which points out to a clear change in contexts, but a rather stable

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EU actorness, informed by long-lasting ambiguities that keep the EU such a sui generis actor. At the same time, it also underlines the more pragmatic positioning of this actor, in line with its intention to be recognised as a relevant power in the international system. In this process, as argued and visible in the thematic chapters, the strengthening and consolidation in terms of capacities has not always been accompanied by the necessary adjustments in terms of expectations, and vice-versa. These keep being high and, many times, distant from the instruments available to the EU as an actor. The constant interplay between its internal and external dimensions of actuation is, therefore, central to interpreting EU actorness. Linked to this aspect, another important conclusion from these chapters evidences the increased ability of the Union to have an impact whenever its international actions tend to reproduce its own domestic structures. The context is changing, and contestation has increased, making EU policies less appealing and of interest to others. Contestation is visible, for example, in trade—a field where the EU has built its most effective means of international action—limiting its ability to shape international processes, namely around data. This is also an area where other powers seek to lead and therefore are less willing to let the EU define the rules of the game. This leads us to reinforce this idea that context is a most relevant and salient aspect influencing the capacity of the EU to be perceived and/or perform as a relevant actor in the international realm. Although the EU has been able to have an impact in people’s lives, particularly in certain areas—humanitarian action, development policies, being recognised as one of the biggest international aid donors, with ECHO leading—the EU still remains very limited in terms of its ability to actually shape dynamics of global power and regional stability. Assuming the role of a global benchmark for regional integration and social cohesion, development policies are a signal of the EU’s international presence and recognition. Nevertheless, most of its instruments are better suited to providing humanitarian responses to violence and crises, rather than preventing them (Nascimento and Uchida in this book). At the level of trade, because of the changes in US foreign policy, brought by the former Trump Administration, the EU’s main partners traditionally sustaining trade liberalisation through multilateral forums are now privileging a more protectionist agenda. Contestation has been affecting the EU ability to shape rules since stakeholders can challenge the purpose of EU trade policy, at the same time it also reduces EU actorness in the way that its discourse is directed at achieving internal legitimacy and ensuring there is

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a mandate to act in a certain way. However, the European Commission may redefine goals in order to better resonate with citizens (e.g. focus on consumers), and it is clearly recognised as a global player in trade terms. It thus seems clear that the capacity and impact of the EU as an international actor depends very much on the specific context, instruments and sectorial area of actuation. This is interlinked with the technical dimension inherent to EU actuation, through its involvement in capacity-building projects, be them of a more juridical or economic nature. For example, as Khakee argues in this book, the EU is perceived as being stronger in terms of democracy assistance than in democracy promotion, which means that the EU’s presence is more recognised in terms of what it does rather than on its capacity to engage politically. The expectations-capabilities gap becomes in this way key to assessing EU international actorness. In the second part of this volume, the authors look at the regional dimension following the concentric circles understanding of the EU’s wider neighbourhood, including its Neighbourhood Partners, both to the East and South, and Turkey. This regional approach has been present both in terms of the definition of EU actorness, through its conceptualisation mainly as a regional power, and in terms of its very own affirmation as a global actor. Based on the understanding that a strong regional dimension of EU policies and instruments reinforces its global presence, the questions that arise from these contributions refer to many of these issues and challenges. When coherence between the EU’s self-established identity and Member States’ goals is less dense, internal divisions emerge, hampering EU international actorness from within. The same is true for issue-areas or regional contexts in which EU’s actions are perceived as less legitimate or more contradictory. The case of Turkey illustrates this rather well (Do˘gan and Genç in this book). Because the EU is not a wellestablished military and security actor, it is often confronted with direct contestation of its role—as is the case of relations with Turkey and the management of security in the great Middle East. It is also a given that the EU has been struggling with a certain tension regarding its capacity to enlarge. On the one hand, enlargement is quite commonly and consensually understood as the best way for the EU to promote its principles and values. On the other hand, it is also a fact that it cannot keep enlarging its borders indefinitely. So, at some point, its capacity to use the enlargement card may be lost, which means the EU may have to assume the risks of border making when deciding not to enlarge or when promoting a policy such as the Neighbourhood Policy.

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Moreover, and adding to this inner tension, some countries sitting in the EU’s regional context, such as Turkey and other Mediterranean countries who do not want to become EU members, use its proximity and geographical relevance to put pressure on the EU. Russia also plays with this dimension, claiming it feels excluded from European dynamics and that it should be part of it. To some extent, the EU has been hostage to these dynamics, but it is important to understand the extent to which it can actually shape regional processes. In fact, it seems the EU is still changing its own identity, clearly following a more pragmatic approach since the ENP revision in 2015. The drafting of this document evidences how the context was clearly shaping the EU understanding of what it could deliver and gain in terms of foreign policy and external action. A less interventionist positioning from the EU became clearer, preferring the prevalence of the status quo in its relations with the neighbourhood countries. This pragmatic turn renders the EU less focused on its normative and prescriptive approach, adopting stability as the underlying principle in these relations. This is another main conclusion the contributions to this volume reveal, along with the idea that this pragmatic conduct follows the strengthening in capacities but falls short again in adjusting expectations. This leads us to conclude that the imbalance referred to by Hill (1993) when it comes to the “capabilities-expectations” gap remains an issue of relevance with particular effect on coherence and legitimacy. This is particularly visible in the move from a transformative diplomacy approach to supporting resilient societies, as it became clear within the framework of the Neighbourhood Policy, for example. The chapters in this section make this acknowledgement about the benefits arising from bilateral cooperation, but in the case of the southern dimension it also becomes clear that moving away from a normative and values-centred agenda opens the door to questioning EU credibility and legitimacy. “Although the EU feeds expectations among North Africans for holding high moral standards, disappointment among that same population on the EU actorness on the ground is real since EU actions are ultimately crafted within the traditional limits of realism” (Messari in this book). Some argue that this more pragmatic and bilateral approach might erode the integrative potential of the ENP (Blockmans, 2017, pp. 1–2). This also means that the model for EU relations with its neighbourhood is changing, still being unclear what its new configuration will be. The contributions in the book in terms of this regional dimension tend to highlight that recognising EU regional actorness is more difficult given the way it positions

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itself in its neighbourhood—East, South and in relation to Turkey. The policies developed and defined for these specific areas still lack ambition thus compromising the EU’s clear capacity to enhance its presence and be recognised as a leading regional power. Moreover, the various authors in this book concur that events such as the 2008 financial crisis and the continuous—and often harsh—internal disagreements and political developments on issues like migrants and refugees have negatively impacted on the aspirations to a more prominent EU role and recognition in this region. Furthermore, Russia’s role as a fundamental player in this wide regional area cannot be dismissed, with its increasing influence spanning from the post-Soviet space to the Mediterranean and the Middle East (as in the case of the Syrian conflict). At the time of writing, the difficult EURussia relations, with sanctions in place, a very limited political dialogue and almost any positive prospects shadowed by complex issues in the agenda, such as Eastern Ukraine or the Navalny case, are not good indications for the future. Moreover, the Russian divisive approach towards the EU keeps paying off, with the rows about the Russian Sputnik V SARSCOV 2 vaccine within the EU, constituting a clear example of the policy of nationalisms gaining place in face of a global threat. These developments point to a mixed assessment of EU actorness with regard to its neighbourliness area, both as a provider of security and of political-economic support, and as a limited actor in terms of what it actually is able to deliver. Again, the assessment of EU’s presence, in its normative and pragmatic facets, is balanced by the capacities it is employing and the limits of its involvement. Nevertheless, and despite the limitations identified by the authors, there is also a recognition of EU regional actorness, translated in its ability to act and shape policies and practices in its neighbouring space. Trade or the judiciary have been identified as areas where this acknowledgement is clear. And again, the stable nature of EU actorness seems to permeate its actions in these distinct contexts close to its borders. Notably, the context in which the EU is acting, be it temporal or spatial, is fundamental. The policy adjustments, such as the shifts evident in the Global Strategy towards a more pragmatic approach and how these have been reflected in EU relations with its vicinity are the result of this encounter with context, clearly privileging the regional dimension. Moreover, in areas where EU capacities have been strengthened, such as trade or diplomacy, as discussed previously, the recognition by others of its competencies becomes clearer. Other

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less developed areas, such as security and defence, reveal how capabilitydevelopment is in place but the recognition of the EU as a privileged interlocutor is still lagging behind. In the end, this course of action consolidates EU actorness as it has been conceptualised, not bringing very innovative insights regarding how this actorness might be reinterpreted. The third and last part of this volume engages with external views of EU actorness, aiming at having a non-EU centred reading about its actorness by focusing on the major players engaged in this context of contested leadership of the international system. The combination of what the EU defines as the policies and instruments to attain its global agenda, and what the EU offers as an international actor in different areas is analysed. The way the EU is perceived by other players in the current international system is, in our view, central to the understanding of how it is interpreted by other countries in terms of its policies, instruments and overall image as a global actor. This is indeed a most relevant contribution from this study, departing from Eurocentric approaches to interpret this actor. In this context, the EU is generally perceived as having both the potential and even the influence in areas such as finance, trade or development aid, but its actorness has been very much constrained by internal (which are strongly highlighted by many of the contributions in this section) and external factors, including the contested nature of the current liberal order. This makes it even more interesting for EU actorness to be built around a rules-based order that seeks to project its image as a distinct actor. For example, the EU’s further engagement with the need to promote rules-based guidelines for regulating new technologies, such as the use of artificial intelligence, adds to power-centred approaches an important nuance that distinguishes the EU from other actors. Perceptions of and around the EU also vary according to sectorial areas, and the image of the EU can be summarised, simultaneously, as that of an economic giant, an intermediate (geo)political actor, and/or an influential soft power (Arynov in this book). In the case of Central Asia, even though the EU is recognised as a benign power, particularly when compared to other actors, the most common assertion is that “Brussels does not seem to enjoy the image of an influential actor capable of making a difference in Central Asia. In other words, its ‘global power is simply not perceived to extend to Central Asia’” (Arynov in this book). On the other hand, Russia’s perception of the EU is very much built on competing goals, interests and visions, with Russia seeking to “challenge the major activities of the EU as a global actor” (Deriglazova in this book). As for

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India, despite perceiving the EU as an important actor in global terms, its actions are compromised mostly by the many internal challenges and shortcomings it has been facing, such as Brexit, the EU-NATO relationship and what is seen as a subordinate role to the USA (Kumar in this book). China also perceives the EU as a relevant actor, and also considers it does not always deliver in terms of capabilities. That is why China still privileges bilateral relations with European states (Chen and Xia in this book). In a somehow opposite way, and despite the changes in the Trump Administration political alignment, the USA continues to perceive the EU as an ally and a partner, in the sense that it can be argued that the core essence of the transatlantic relationship remains intact (Jankovski in this book). In fact, the election of Joe Biden swiftly implied a realignment of the traditional transatlantic relations, signalling this traditional commitment of US foreign policy towards its European counterparts. Finally, perceptions about the EU from actors, such as the African Union, refer a problematic reading of the EU’s global role, very much in line with traditional role model approaches (Fagbayibo in this book), read locally as “will-imposition” and mostly based on significant economic incentives, which do not always translate into a positive understanding of the Union’s approach. These chapters convey the message that there is a trend of consolidation of expectations in this more pragmatic format that has been informing EU practice. From these readings on outside perceptions of the EU, from major powers and a multilateral forum like the African Union, it becomes clear that the international order is still to a great extent organised around main powers. What the EU gives to the international system is thus perceived as less than what it is expected to and, in some cases, desired to. In fact, from a traditional logic and conception of power, it can actually be questioned if the EU really fits. In this sense, reading the international context not from a state-centred approach but from a more diverse perspective of the international order, where different actors with different configurations interact, would provide a differentiated perspective on EU actorness. This would be, to our understanding, more in line with this actor’s specificities and value-added in a complex order. The EU should thus move on to promote a different self-projection in order to gain further and clearer space and status in this contested order. Regional powers acknowledge that the EU retains important elements of power, either historically, structurally or context specific, but they tend to perceive it in a dynamic way. Because they may disagree

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with how the EU shapes specific issue-areas or because they may wish to lead in others, these regional powers may side-line the EU by deliberately undermining the Union’s most effective instruments of power, including its ability to define the rules of the game, its ability to entangle other players in a web of norms and rules enshrined in international institutions, i.e., in managing international affairs according to its own regional European experience of institution and consensus-building. This suggests that the international order may come to reflect more or less EU’s ambitions and means of action, depending on how the Union convinces others that its way of managing issues derives benefits for others. However, considering the nature of the European project, undermining the common basis of action and its normative boundaries may further contribute to reinforce the divisions already visible within the EU and ultimately unravel the European project itself. Pushed between coherence and results, the EU international standing in a time of contested legitimacy and presence depends highly on the ability to restate the relevance of institutions, consensus and common action in a context of nationalisms and egotistic forms of policy-making. In order to become a (more) relevant actor, and be perceived as such, the EU has to demonstrate stronger and clearer internal capability to exercise power, find opportunities to do so and be recognised by others for that. The Treaty of Lisbon was an important step to provide institutional mechanisms to act, but it is still not enough as the EU needs to create opportunities in the international context to act in a legitimate way. Here the concept of presence—meaning identity—is key. The lack of strategic vision, nevertheless, hampers this goal. The diffuse nature of the EU also impacts on this. According to Hill (1993), the issue of coherence between what the EU says and what it does is not of much relevance. Actorness should be defined instead as the ability to create stable patterns of action. In this way, the normative dimension is important. Regarding the capabilities-expectations gap, “EU’s decision to bridge this gap has rested mainly on capability development, rather than on the adjustment of expectations – both domestic and external – namely through the creation of the necessary processes for domestic consensus building and the shaping of the external normative environment” (Simão in this book). It seems clear that purpose and effectiveness are both needed, and for this the EU should better adjust its narrative internally and externally, in order to foster a coherent discourse, and assure a better match between its own and others’ expectations and capabilities.

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At the end, this approach and way of looking at EU actorness aims at bringing two main contributions. First, the fact that conceptualisations of power are still read through a grid that is very much traditional and linked to a state-centric approach that is not adequate to analyse such a sui generis actor. In fact, as mentioned by Simão in this book, one can affirm that the persistence of a state-based model of analysis of international actorness has often led to a negative bias against the EU and has proved a limited tool in imaging new forms of agency at the international level. Second, there is the need for a roadmap clarifying EU strategies for its role in the international system. The constant dialectical relations between what the EU is abilitated to do, and what the EU can and does want to do, has hampered a clearer reading of intentions. Also, the definition of a statement of purpose is contentious. According to some, this could limit what the EU can do. In this case we could be reinforcing this dialectical relation without moving forward. Barrinha (2016), for instance, argues the development of foreign policy based on the fulfilment of vital interests defined according to values of the Europeans is essential, meaning that by obliging the EU to define a purpose statement it will have to balance its interests with those of its citizens in order to have a strong democratic basis. The Global Strategy sought to compromise the EU with a vision. However, the a priori definition of purposes and goals is lacking. This also has to do with the EU as a reliable international partner, since without this clear purpose it is difficult to understand what effectiveness and legitimacy, for example, really mean. Clearly, different dimensions of EU actorness will remain more important in a certain moment and context, but the EU has revealed itself to be a persistent and innovative actor making its way in a turbulent and ever contested international order without losing its role. The EU’s proven capabilities in technical terms, its historical record of dialogue-promotion and the ability to foster consensus should be valued, but it has to learn how to shape the broader context within which these approaches will need to be applied. A more conducive environment is key to the success of its approach to international politics.

References Barrinha, A. (2016). The European Union: An imperfect democracy, politics and international relations commentary, Canterbury Christ Church, 11 March. Retrieved Feburary 7, 2020, from https://canterburypolitics.wordpress.com/ 2016/03/11/the-european-union-an-imperfect-democracy/

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Blockmans, S. (2017). The obsolescence of the European neighbourhood policy. CEPS and Rowman and Littlefield International. European Union (2016). A global strategy for the European Union’s foreign and security policy, shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe, 15 December. Retrieved Feburary 7, 2020, from https://eeas.europa.eu/top ics/eu-global-strategy/17304/global-strategy-european-unions-foreign-andsecurity-policy_en Hill, C. (1993). The capability-expectations gap, or conceptualizing Europe’s international role. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(3), 305–328. Wunderlich, J.-U. (2012). The EU an actor sui generis? A comparison of EU and ASEAN actorness. Journal of Common Market Studies, 50(4), 653–669.