Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan 0195779061, 9780195779066

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ETHNICI1Y AND POLITICS IN PAKISTAN

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ETHNICITY AND POLITICS IN PAKISTAN Feroz Ahmed ·'I

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Oxford University Press Oxford

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New York 1998

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Oxford University Press, Walton Street, Oxford

Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bombay Calcutta Cape Town Oar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Luntpur Madras Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi Paris Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto a11d associated companit.1 in Berlin Ibadan

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Oxford is a trade mark of Oxford University Press ©Oxford University Press, 1998 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press. This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hire' out or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in a1y form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and'without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.

ISBN 0 19 577906 1

Printed in Pakistan at Punjnad Graphics, Karachi. Published by An1eena Saiyid, Oxford University Press 5-Bangalore T own, Sharae Faisal PO Box 13033, Karachi-75350, Pakistan.

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Contents page

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Foreword

Yll

Introduction

Xl

.

1

l . The Nationality Theory

2. The Separation of East Pakistan

12

3. The Language

41

Qu~tion in Sindh

4. The Sindhi Grievances

61

5. The Rise of Mohajir Identity

89

6. Myths and Realities of the Mohajir Problem

136

7. The Futility of Ethnic Politics

159

8. Contradictions and Co-optation in Balochistan

172

9. The Pushtoon Question

183

10. The Integration of Pushtoons

212

] 1. Nationality or Ethnic Group?: A Reconsideration 229 12. Ethnicity, Class, and the State

249

13. Trends Towards Integration

261

Conclusion

271

Index

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List of Tables page

1. Gross Domestic Product in 1959-60 Constant Prices

16

2. Educational Disparities

16

3. Some Economic Indicators

19

4. Inter-regional Trade

20

5. Selected Social Indicators, Karachi, 1959

48

6. Mother Tongue and Language of Literacy by Province, 1961

51

7. Federal Civil Servants from Sindh by Urban-Rural Domicile, 1993

152

8. Distribution of Pushtoons, 1961

190

9. Number of Selected Manufacturing Industries and their Gross Fixed Assets (in million rupees), 1967

196

10. Senior Military and Civil Service Officers by Ethnicity/Regions

252

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Foreword The end of the cold war has been proclaimed as the culmination of political history. Democracy had triumphed and the nation-state has proven to be more enduring than the collectivist order. Yet in this moment of victory, the nation-state is being challenged by the drive of racial, cultural and religious minorities for self-determination. A wave of ethno-nationalism is sweeping the world, buffeting both old and new nations, from Great Britain, Canada and Russia to Spain, Sri Lanka and Sudan, etc. The basis of nation-state is in question from internal forces. The myth of national homogeneity is being exploded by the social diversity of constituent minorities, Pakistan is the fulfillment of a minority's demand for self-determination . It was the first ethno-nationalist state in the post-colonial era. Yet as an independent nation, Pakistan largely ignored the social diversity of its people and the economic disparities of its regions. It constructed a 'national ideology' based on a mechanical nation of unity and simplistic ideas of cultural homogeneity. This neglect of social diversity and disregard of ethnic and regional interests has exacted a heavy cost from Pakistan. A majority of its population broke away to form a separate country, Bangladesh. The remainder of Pakistan continues to be besieged by political instability, ethnic and now sectarian violence and economic inequality. The root of these problems lies in Pakistan's failure to acknowledge and accommodate its ethnic diversity and economic disparities. Ethnicity particularly is a much talked about, but little understood, topic. Feroz Ahmed started to analyze ethnic and class disparities of Pakistan long before they were fashionable topics. As a social scientist, he was among the pioneers who

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FOREWORD

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initiated the empirical analysis of ethnic issues. As a journalist, he attempted to inform political discourse with sociological facts. He persistently drew attention to the social diversity in ·Pakistan's society and passionately argued for bridging disparities of political power and economic opportunities among provinces, ethnic groups and social classes. He_illuminated political events with social theories and viewed concepts and notions through the prism of _political activism. Ethnicity and class have been emblems of his writings. This posthumous book bears premonitions of his untimely death. In it he brought together and reassessed his writings on major issues of the ethnic divide in Pakistan's history. It is a unique book in which the author muses over his past conclusions and observations with the benefit of hindsight. Feroz Ahmed's writings are based on the best practices of social analysis. Explicit in value orientations and informed by progressive ideals, his writings are backed by rigorous empirical observations .and theocratical formulations. This book exemplifies these achievements. It examines theoretical debates about the 'nationality' question and the Bengalis' autonomy movement in the late 1960s, the language issues of the Bhutto era, and the Muhajir Quami Movement in the 1980s. Thus it analyzes Pakistan's contemporary history from the perspective of divergent ethnic and economic interests competing for their rightful places in the polity and in society. Its historical narrative gives readers a feel of the intellectual and political battles raging at the time of various epochal events that - . have shaped Pakistan's political development. The reassessment of past events in the light of subsequent developments and recent theories lends an aura of freshness to the narrative. Ethnicity is not a threat to Pakistan's national unity, provided it is acknowledged and accommodated. The modern concept of national unity is organic in conception. It is a unity of a system made up of distinct parts. It is a

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unity of diversities. Like most contemporary soc1eues, Pakistan is a 'community of communities' where peace, stability and prosperity lie in promoting quality of individuals, the rule of law, and the balancing of group interests. In a Pakistan organized along these lines, ethnicity will tum into a force of national fulfilments and coh~sion, linking people into a well-knit hierarchy of communities ranging from local, regional and provincial to national levels. Such a vision needs to be fostered. This book beckons readers towards such a goal.

Mohammad A. Qadeer Queen's University, Canada

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o;o1tizer urban population . These claims are not consistent either

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with the past population trends or with any current social realities. If these claims were correct, then the Mohajirs would be the fastest breeding human group ever recorded in history. To lend scientific legitimacy to their standpoint, some professional supporters of these claims compare the urban situation in Sindh with that of the United States where inner city Blacks are the worst enumerated group. This analogy is totally irrelevant to Pakistan where the urban population, because of its higher level of literacy and civic consciousness and due to better logistics and communications, is likely to be enumerated more fully than the rural population. Using population figures: Besides being able to understand the big political controversy about the census, it is important to know how to use the population figures correctly. First of all, the user must be careful about the unit he/she is referring to. One scholar writing in The Friday Times sometime back, while talking about Sindh kept referring to the data about Karachi which too were incorrect. Secondly, when one cites figures for more than one point in time to show change or trend, it is essential that the geographical limits of the unit be consistent. Since a lot of population controversy and confusion has been about Sindh, an example from that province will illustrate the point. Prior to independence the data for the provinces and the princely states were listed separately in the census reports. Therefore, to get figures for Sindh one needs to add those for the Khairpur ~tate which was listed along with other states of Bombay Presidency through 1931. Most of the population characteristics in the 1941 census were tabulated for only a ten per cent sample due to the war time economy drive. In the 1951 census report, Karachi was not included in Sindh and the data about it appeared in the Pakistan volume instead of the Sindh volu1ne. Therefore, for that census year one needs to add Karachi figures to those of Sindh. In 1961, there were no provinces

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due to the One Unit. There were Divisions and Districts. So, to get the figures for Sindh, one needs to add up the data for Hyderabad and Khairpur Divisions and Karachi District (part of Karachi Division). In the 1972 and 1981 censuses the boundaries of Sindh were the same as today. It is only when we have the same boundaries that a valid comparison can be made. Definitions of certain terms and operationalization of some variables often change from census to census. For example, the definition of literacy was not the same in 1961 as it was in 1951. But the most notorious piece of information-and with the most inflammatory potentialhas been the figures about languages. In the 1961 census, there were questions about the mother tongue of the individual, other languages spoken by the individual, and the language of literacy. In 1972, the census was not only taken a year late because of the war and dismemberment of the country in 1971, but the language riots and ethnic tensions in Sindh forced the government to exclude all questions about language from the census. In 1981, the language question returned, but in a different way. Instead of asking about the mother tongue of the individual, the census asked about the language usually spoken in the household. This turned a lot of Punjabis and other non-Urdu-speaking persons into Urdu-speaking, and rendered the language figures incomparable with the 1961 figures. The 1981 census also for the first time listed Siraiki as a separate language. Because of this, Punjabi for the first time was recorded as a language of less than 50 per cent of Pakistan 's population. Prior to this Siraiki was treated in the census as a dialect of Punjabi in Punjab and of Sindhi in Sindh. The above example shows how treacherous it would be to equate the language recorded in the census with ethnicity. Hov;ever, there are the broader problems associated with the connection between language and i':.ltionality (or ethnicity). Nationality formation is often a

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very complex process in which individuals and groups of varying backgrounds may come to identify themselves as a single nationality or ethnic group and accept a lingua franca; but may continue to speak different languages at home. Thus, in Sindh most people who list their mother tongue or household language as Balochi, Brauhi, Siraiki or Rajasthani dialects (and some Gujrati) consider themselves Sindhis by nationality. Therefore, the size of the Sindhi nationality is much larger than the numbers indicated by the strict census listing of the households speaking Sindhi. Similarly, the numbers of Urdu-speaking ethnic group are much smaller than indicated by the number of households recorded in the census as speaking Urdu. The population census can be a treasure house of cultural information, in addition to being a useful source of data for economic, social and demographic planning. It is most unfortunate that it has been politicized to such an extent that over and above its inherent shortcomings and errors we have deliberate manipulation and rigging. The myths and misinformation concerning the demography of ethnicity, language and urban-rural composition are simply staggering-and too divisive for the country. A concerted campaign is needed to educate the public about the need to have a fair and unbiased census. The struggle should begin with the journalists, academics, and scholars educating themselves about this critical national issue. Population census is everybody's business, and is not an exclusive territory of demographers. However, everyone needs to be a little bit of a demographer to understand the complexities of the census and to get the most out of its data.

The middle class factor ( 1991) During the last decade-and especially during the past five

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years-in Pakistan as a whole, and in Sindh in particular, the middle class factor has emerged as an extremely important factor in politics. Nothing has highlighted its importance more than the emergence of Mohajir Qoumi Movement (MQM). The MQM, which today rules Sindh's two major cities, dominates the Sindh provincial government, and is a coalition partner in the federal government. It prides itself on being middle class, and challenges other nationalities to either emulate its example or to follow its lead. Both by implication and explicit statements, the MQM claims itself-and Mohajirs-to be superior for being a 'free' middle class force rather than a 'feudal slave.' Crude, distasteful, and self-serving as it is, the MQM's boast-but more importantly its effectivenesshas not gone unnoticed by other ethnic groups in Pakistan, especially by Sindhis. Today, an increasing number of Sindhis are articulating . the view that the misery and relative backwardness of the Sindhi people is owed, in a large measure, to the stranglehold of the zamindar (landlord) class over the economic, social, political, and spiritual life of the ordinary Sindhis. The inability of Sindhis to withstand the onslaught on their rights, and the ability of the MQM to defy the state machinery and to impose its writ during the Benazir period, is attributed, in part, by many observers to the difference between the two groups in the relative strength of the middle class. Furthermore, Sindhis are getting sick and tired of being stereotype as 'feudal'-and, by implication, deserving of all the scorn and unfair treaunent. A middle class spectre has begun to haunt the Sindhi middle class. It is time to ask what are . the facts? What is the status of the Sindhi middle class? How important the middle class factor really is? Can the class formation change? How soon? By what means? What does the failure to rapidly de".elop a middle class entail for Sindhis as a whole? Will such a development mitigate or intensify ethnic tensions?

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The first thing that I would like to say in this context is that like most social problems, ethnic strife in Sindh is an exceedingly compl.ex issue. The relative strength of the middle class in the different ethnic group is not the only explanatory variable. At this point, it may not even be the most important factor in explaining the political dynamics in Sindh. However, there is no doubt in my mind that it is acquiring increasing significance. To understand that, one first needs to put the question in the context of the third world in general where power is increasingly shifting to the urban middle classes, consisting of the military and civil bureaucracies, and the emerging trader and industrial capitalist classes. The role of the traditional landlord or tribal elites has been either eliminated or reduced considerably. Secondly, in the context of Pakistan, not only have the class origins of the military and civil bureaucracy become, over the years, more middle class than 'feudal,' but also the urban industrialists, traders, and white-collar professionals are rapidly replacing the traditional 'feudal' class as the military-bureaucracy's principal allies. Despite self-serving propaganda of certain ethnic-class forces and the misguided Marxism of some activist, the landlord class's share in the state power in Pakistan has been progressively reduced for sometime now. However, the proverbial vaderas in Sindh and the sardars in Balochistan continue to be the dominant classes of their respective ethnic groups, both socially and politically. As long as ·their dominant position within their respective ethnic groups is not displaced by the middle class, the decline of the sardars and vaderas at the national power level will be correlated with the decline in the economic and political position oJ the Baloch and Sindhi nationalities in the wealth and power matrix of Pakistan. However, it should be clear that the Sindhi middle class cannot metamorphose overnight into the leading class of its nationality. Emergence and decline of. class forces is an

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ET HNICITY AND POLIT ICS JN PAKISTAN

evolutionary process, which may, sometimes, be.accelerated by revolutionary upheavals. One such upheaval, the Partition of 1947, had a devastating effect on the strength of the Sindhi middle class by expelling in one swoop the bulk of it for belonging to the wrong religion . It is debatable whether the Partition helped or hindered the growth of the Sindhi Muslim middle class. However, it is quite certain that the influx in such large numbers of welleducated, urbanized, middle class refugees from India into the towns and cities of Sindh frustrated the expectations Sindhis had of Pakistan. Many events have since taken place, including the formation of One Unit, which have proved to be detrimental to the growth of the Sindhi middle class. But, from the point of view of that class, no development has had a more profound-and an almost cataclysmic-impact than the emergence of Mohajir ethnic separatism under the leadership of the MQM. ·Far from forming an alliance with the Sindhi middle class or inspiring it to a more active role, the MQM, by frontally attacking the Sindhi collective interests, has pushed the Sindhi middle class deeper into the embrace of the landlord class. At the same time, it has formed an alliance with the most retrograde feudal elements in the Sindhi population (the late Jam Sadiq Ali and his cohorts), and has become a potent force for the re-feudalization of Sindhi politics. Thus, the Sindhi middle class is caught between a rock and a hard place. Yet, it has to advance and play its historical role. What is its historical role, and how can it play it? The role of the middle class is, indeed, a difficult one: to be the leading class of its ethnic group, and to lead it into the twenty-first century. Neither Pakistan's ruling establishment nor the MQM brand of Mohajir nationalism will be pleased with the maturation and rise of the Sindhi middle class. They will do everything in their power to keep t~e vaderas in business, and to pressure the middle class to remain dependent on the landlord class. And if it advances none the less, the ethnic tensions are likely to increase in the

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short run. But, in the long run, the presence of a strong, viable middle class in each ethnic group should be beneficial for bringing about a detente, if not harmony, among the ethnic groups. Now it may be asked whether the difficulties facing the Sindhi middle class presage its doom. Is it the fate of the Sindhi middle class to be stopped in its tracks? Can anything be done to reverse it? I am a firm believer in changing fate by struggle, guided by clear thinking. Admittedly, I do not have a recipe for success. However, I can venture to share with you some of the raw thoughts that cross my mind when I think about the future of the Sindhi middle class in Pakistan. I have grouped these ideas into ten points: 1. Free yourself from the spiritual dependency on the feudal class. Stop worshipping the vaderas. Give respect to the accomplished individuals of the middle class. Don 't foist semi-literate, feudal demagogues upon the welleducated professionals. Develop middle class role models for your children. 2. Stop equating Sindhi identity with rural background. Reject the false dichotomy of Sindhi as rural, and Mohajir as urban. Give the urbanized Sindhis their due. Stop asking what is your goth (village) . Start asking what is your shehr (city/town). 3. In the modern world, the illiterate cannot lead the literate; the rural people cannot lead the urban people; .· the vadera cannot lead the professional; and, increasingly, the less qualified cannot lead the more qualified. 4. The trend towards urbanization is universal and irreversible. So be prepared to face it. 5. No outside power is going to come to help Sindhis create a little paradise of their own. So demand your piece in the pie of Pakistan. 6. Although affirmative action is necessary and progressive, the present quota system cannot last for ever. Be prepared to phase it out, and think of surviving and

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flourishing under a total merit system. 7. Stop the unreal raag (song) about assimilation. The urban does not assimilate into the rural; the modern does not assimilate into the pre-industrial; the officiallypromoted national language and the voluntarily accepted lingua franca does not assimilate into a language which has been relegated by historical circumstances to the status of a regional language. These are the facts of history and sociology. Ignoring them could be perilous. 8. Put an end to your insularism. Reach out to other groups. Ethnic-specific rights are not necessarily at odds with the rights of the people of Pakistan as a whole. Put out more informational material in English, Urdu and other languages of Pakistan. 9. Create more effective middle class institutions. 10. Forge links with haris (peasants) and other labouring people; and take the lead in the welfare of the common people. No struggle will have legitimacy if the common masses do not see it as their own struggle.

The urban-rural factor (1997) Few concepts have been as misused in Pakistan's current political discourse as the term urban. There is a great deal of complaining about the inadequacy of urban job quotas, claims about the 'true' proportion of the urban population in ·Sindh, and discussion about the need to reconcile the urban and rural communities in the province. No one seems to challenge the assumption in this discourse that equates urban with Mohajir and rural with Sindhi. Stereotype of ethnic communities seems to get a sanction from all quarters. Such labelling can have many undesirable consequences. The first question to ask is: what do we mean by urban? Despite sociologists' emphasis on the cultural characteristics of cities and to\ms and the idea of the urban person, the

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concept of urbanization, at its core, is a demographic one. Urbanization simply means concentration of people in relatively small places and an increase over time in the percentage of the population living in urban places. There is no standard definition of an urban place. Despite the United Nations' recommendation that places with a compact population of 20,000 or more inhabitants be regarded as urban, countries have adopted their own operational definitions. The United States, for example defines an urban place as a locality with a population of 2,500 or more. In Pakistan, the population censuses prior to 1981 have used a definition of urban that includes, 'all municipalities, civil lines, cantonments and any other area inhabited by not less than 5,000 persons and consisting of continuous collection of houses.' 1 Some areas with less than 5,000 residents were also included among urban places if they possessed distinct urban characteristics. This definition, however, was changed in the 1981 census which regarded, in addition to the cantonments, all municipal corporations', municipal committees or town committees as urban if they were so declared by the provincial govemments.2 Therefore, by the census definition, 43.32 per cent of Sindh's population was urban in 1981, .up from 40.45 per cent in 1972 and 37.85 per cent in 1961.3 It is difficult to say whether the urban population in Pakistan is underenumerated or over-enumerated, relative to the rural population. However, as a general rule better educated persons and regularly-built, compact urban dwellings tend to ·get better enumerated than less educated persons and irregular and scattered housing units. Be that as it may, one fact is undeniable, that is, Sindh is the most urbanized of all provinces of Pakistan and that urbanization is probably proceeding more rapidly in this province than in any other province. Therefore, if a reasonably accurate census is ~ken , one should expect the urban proportion in Sindh to increase even further-and possibly cross the 50 per cent mark.

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There is a common tendency to equate urban with Karachi. Indeed, Karachi is the primate city of not only Sindh, but possibly of all of Pakistan. A primate city is defined as a city which has at least twice as large a population as that of the next largest city. No doubt, Karachi captures the essence of Sindh's urbanism. Yet, it comprises 63 per cent of Sindh's urban population, while 37 per cent of the province's urban dwellers live in other cities and towns. 4 Urbanity and ethnicity: Regarding ethnicity and urbanrural residence, there is often a tendency to equate the two. Just to take a recent example, while reporting on the results of the February 1997 elections, many journalists stated that the Peoples Party's success was confined to rural Sindh or that the PPP captured rural Sindh while the MQM was the winner in urban Sindh. However, the fact is that the PPP won National and Provincial Assembly seats in Karachi, Sukkur, Larkana and other towns and cities. If cities other than Karachi and Hyderabad are perceived as rural, then the MQM too won in its 'rural' redoubts of Sukkur, Nawabshah and Mirpur Khas. Further, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) won seats in Karachi, some small towns as well as rural areas of Sindh. What actually happened was not urban-rural division, but ethnic division in which the MQM won only in the Mohajir-dominated constituencies and the PPP won only in the predominantly Sindhi-Baloch constituencies. However, the PML (N) 's astonishing success mitigated the ethnic polarization in the elections to s~me extent in that its winning candidates were Sindhi, Urdu-speaking, and Punjabi. Although it is true that a vast majority of the Urduspeaking people are urban, it is not true that all Sindhis are rural. In fact, 95 per cent of Urdu-speaking households in 1981 were in the urban areas of Sindh. But they comprised only 49.7 per cent of all urban households. On the other hand, while the Sindhi-speaking households were 15 per cent urban overall, they comprised 18.3 per cent of Sindh's

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urban households.~ Many of these families have been urban for generations, and it would be absurd to stereotype them as rural just because they speak Sindhi. Besides, more than 30 per cent ofSindh's urban households speak neither Urdu nor Sindhi at home. Due to large-scale migration into Sindh's cities from outside the province, the percentage of these other ethno-linguistic groups is likely to increase. Furthermore, with transformations taking place in Sindh's agrarian system, rural to urban migration within Sindh, which had thus far remained low compared to the migration from upcountry, is also likely to accelerate. This will have the effect of increasing the proportion of Sindhi population in the cities. Despite a substantial overlap between urbanrural residence and ethnicity in Sindh that we now observe, it is important to make a distinction between ethnicity and residence. These are two very different variables and they should be treated as such. Urban quotas: In relation to urban residence, the one issue that has been most emotive and divisive is the question of the fairness of the urban quotas. As shown by Izharul Hasan Burney in his accurate overview of the quota system,6 the quotas fixed for Sindh in the federal civil services in the 1973 constitution were 11.4 per cent for rural Sindh and 7.6 per cent for urban Sindh. By this accounting, the urban areas were allotted 40 per cent of Sindh's quota, which is close to the urban population percentage in 1972: 40.45 per cent. However, two more facts need to be taken· into consideration in order to get a correct idea about quotas. 1. These proportions are computed on the basis of all jobs rather than the 90 per cent quota-based jobs. If the remaining 10 per cent of the merit-based jobs are excluded from the denominator, the share of urban Sindh residents would be 8.44 per cent rather than 7.6 per cent. In addition, they would be entitled to compete for the I 0 per cent jobs on the basis of merit. As shown in Table 7, the actual number of jobs obtained by candidates fro1n urban

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Sindh greatly exceeds their allotted quota, while the number of jobs obtained by the residents of rural Sindh falls short of their allotted quota.

Table 7 Federal Civil Servants from Sindh by Urban-Rural Domicile, 1993 Federal Civil Servants

Urban

Rural

Total Sindh

Number Per cent Number Per cent Number Per cent 17,309

48.2

18,638

51.8

35,947

100.0

BPS-19 & 20

259

50.6

253

49.4

512

100.0

BPS-21 & 22

39

69.6

17

30.4

56

100.0

All jobs

Source: Government of Pakistan, Federal Government Civil Servants Census &purt, July 1993, Islamabad: Pakistan Public Administration Centre, Management Services Division, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Pakistan, August 1995, pp. 129-30.

2. The definition of urban used for the purposes of job quotas is not the same as the census definition. Urban areas for this purpose are defined as the cities of Karachi, Hyderabad, and Sukkur. Towns like Mirpur Khas and Nawabshah, where the MQM won, as well as Dadu, Jacobabad, Kotri, Shikarpur, and Larkana are included in rural areas. In fact, this definition of urban, excluded ninety-four towns and cities of Sindh per the 1981 Census, including seventeen cities with over 25,000 population, six cities over 50,000 population, and three cities over 100,000 population. In 1972, a year before the new quotas went in to effect, the combined popu latio n of Karachi, Hyderabad, and Sukkur amounted to 31 per cent of Sindh's population. In other words, these urban areas were allotted ahn ost one-th ird 1nore jobs than warr anted by their proportion in the census. It is ironic that this fact has been

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twisted into its opposite and used as a foundation for perpetual agitation against alleged job discrimination. Similar misreading or misinterpretation of numbers had fuelled complaints and anger from the very early years of Pakistan. Even today, one hears some individuals say that a two per cent quota had become the fate of Karachiites. The mystique of 'two per cent' is so great that the late Maulana Salahuddin, shortly before his assassination, disregarding the current quotas, demanded that Karachi's quota be increased from 2 per cent to 10 per cent. 7 The 2 per cent figure, which lost its relevance in 1971 due to the separation of East Pakistan, was indeed a real number; but it was 2 per cent of all Pakistan (including East Pakistan) jobs. Twenty per cent of these were decided on merit. Thus, Karachi's actual percentage of quota-based jobs was 2.5 per cent, whereas its proportion in the population in 1951 was 1.48 per cent (1,122,406 out of 75,842,165 persons). If anything, Karachiites were getting more than their share. Furthermore, they had the opportunity to compete for the remaining 20 per cent jobs on merit. Given the tendency to equate residence with ethnicity, protest against the alleged discrimination against a city. or the urban population in a province, be it in job or admission quotas or in the provision of civic amenities, becomes part of the arsenal of ethnic politics. It is a well known fact that all jobs actually filled for urban Sindh do not go to the Urdu-speaking individuals or persons · considered Mohajir by any definition. Similarly, a good proportion of the rural Sindh jobs are filled by the Punjabi settlers and Urdu-speaking persons. This is yet another example of the lack of complete concordance between ethnicity and urban-rural residence. The purpose of this article is not to evaluate the pros and cons of the quota system, but to point out with reference to it how the meaning of the ter1n urban can be confusing and how it can, when treated synonymously with ethnicity, become a source of unfounded clai1ns,

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resenunent, and prejudice. Chapter 7 will show how some of the urban problems, which affect all ethnic communities, have been turned into ethnic problems and made into a forceful argument in support of alleged ethnic discrimination. The quest for inter-communal understanding and harmony can only be built on the bedrock of truth and accuracy, not on obfuscation and misrepresentation.

Negotiating with myths (1995) The bad news is that violence has not yet ceased in Karachi. The good news is that the People's Party government and the MQM are talking to each other. There would be few who would not welcome the talks and pray for their success which would bring peace to Karachi, Sindh and Pakistan. In fact, the Karachi situation has become the principal focus of the media in Pakistan. The editorials, analyses, and commentaries in the print media tend to define in a large measure the intellectual environment in which the parleys are taking place. Reading about the Karachi situation in the English language press, one finds an amazing repetition of a series of myths, obfuscation of argument, and even plain lies. These shibboleths seem also to be favouring one side (the MQM) and putting an extraordinary burden on the Government side. Concessions made under this form of duress cannot be expected to be lasting and just to all the concerned parties. The following are some of the common cliches found in the newspaper articles these days: • M ohajirs have made great sacrifices for Pakistan. • Mohajirs have created Pakistan.

The above cliches have been repeated over and over again in different contexts over the past forty-seven years. What do they exactly mean in the present context is anybody's guess. Ho\vever, the connotation that Mohajirs

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should be treated as more equal than others i~ inescapable. The above two claims are not only exaggerated, but are irrelevant to the current situation. Even if Mohajirs had contributed nothing to Pakistan, as a people they have the same rights as any other group in Pakistan and deserve adequate participation in national affairs.

• Mohajirs have been treated unjustly. • The demands of the MQM (and Mohajirs) are genuine. The above two assertions are made without consideration of facts and without reference to the rights and demands of other people living in Sindh.. No equitable settlement can be made on the basis of uncritical acceptance of these claims. The matter is quite complicated and cannot be resolved in a spirit of debate and confrontation. By any measure of material progress, the Urdu-speaking people as a group are far ahead of any other major ethnic group in Pakistan. However, the expectations of this group are much higher than those of any other group, and despite the reality of their relatively privileged position, they do have the perception that they are being discriminated against. In politics one needs to deal not only with the reality but also with the perception. • The MQM is the so/,e representative of urban Sindh. This is probably the most untrue of the claims being made and has far-reaching consequences. It is based on a number of erroneous assumptions and layers of myths. No one would dispute the fact that the MQM represents an overwhelming majority of the Urdu-speaking people and some Memons and sections of other small communities. However, urban areas do not mean Karachi or Hyderabad alone. And even in Karachi, the Urdu-speaking people do not comprise a majority. The question of language in the 1981 census was loaded in favour of Urdu by asking which language is spoken in the household. Therefore, the percentage speaking Urdu at home does not necessarily represent the percentage of the Urdu-speaking ethnic group.

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There are Sindhis, Punjabis, Seraikis, Pushtoons, Balochis and others who also inhabit the cities of Sindh and whom the MQM not only does not represent but, for whom it is anathema. In fact, a significant number of Urdu-speaking people oppose the MQM. Therefore, the MQM should be dealt with on the basis of its political strength and its record of securing a large percentage of votes (owing to its capability to register and get out the vote) rather than on the basis of the sweeping claim of being the sole representative. In fact, the whole idea of sole representation is undemocratic and amounts to demanding fiefdoms and perpetrating warlordism. • The MQM is a farce to reckon with. • There can be no peace without the MQM. .

These two statements are not untrue. But the emphasis on these in the present context raises several questions. Why were not the same commentators concerned when the People's Party, despite its electoral strength, was excluded by the MQM:Jam Sadiq coalition after the 1990 elections? Why did nobody say that the PPP is a force which cannot be ignored? Furthermore, is this realism a recognition of the MQM's electoral strength or its capacity to create violence? Is this a call to respect the democratic process or to capitulate to armed blackmail? • Sincerity is needed in negotiating with the MQM.

This statement implies that the MQM is not to blame for the impasse. Only the Government (or the PPP) has to show its sincerity. Since the PPP is in power both at the Centre and in Si.ndh, it, no doubt, has a greater responsibility to show flexibility and accommodation towards the MQM and secure peace and stability. However, the MQM's character and history of behaviour cannot be ignored. The MQM is an ethnic exclusivist party whose guiding ideology is ethnic bigotry. Its rhetoric and tactics resemble those of fascist parties, and its propensity towards violence is well

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documented. The PPP has many undesirable features, including an incompetent feudalist leadership but its character cannot be equated with that of the MQM. Furthermore, it was the MQM that betrayed the PPP government in 1990 and helped the establishment to bring it down. It collaborated with jam Sadiq Ali to persecute the PPP. It had ·no moral compunctions to becoming a senior partner in the Sindh government despite representing only a minority. None of the commentators, who are now counselling generosity and accommodation towards the MQM, criticized the MQM for its undemocratic behaviour or showed sympathy for the PPP. While the PPP government has to demonstrate its sincerity and willingness to ensure the participation of the . MQM in the political process, a lot of iron-clad guarantees need to be obtained from the MQM too regarding shunting violence and the politics of blackmail. TI?-e end of ethnic hatred as a political platform is not something that can be obtained as a concession during the negotiations. It is the responsibility of the electorate that supports the MQM to press it to eschew its ethnic rhetoric. • When the Agartala case against Mujibur Rahman could be dropped, why cannot the criminal cases against Alta/ be withdrawn~

This argument which has appeared in a few newspaper articles is perhaps the most dangerous recipe for peace that has been put forward. Peace cannot be made simply on the basis of analogies. We still do not know if the charges against Mujib were true. If they were, it was wrong to drop them. The position Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has taken is just and reasonable. Altaf and other MQM leaders accused of crimes should stand trial whose fairness should be guaranteed by all methods available nationaly and internationallly. Any concession on this point would legitimize the politics of blackmail and terror and spell disaster for the nation.

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The law enforcement agencies claim that they have a lot of evidence against the MQM leadership. They should also be given a chance to present it in a court of law. Benazir Bhutto and Asif Zardari were tried in courts and Murtaza Bhutto is facing charges in a court. Why should the MQM leadership be treated any differently? Whatever deals are being struck between the MQM and PPP about spoils, there are some basic questions of principles that should not be ignored or bartered away in the current negotiations. These are:

• Whatever the reasons and whosoever to bla~, the Urduspeaking peopk of Sindh have been cut off from the political process and feel a deep sense of alienation. They cannot be punished for supporting the 'wrong' party. Every effort must be made to assure their full participation in the political process and economic and social life of Sindh and Pakistan. • No concession should be made at the expense of the kgitimate rights of the Sindhi peopk and other ethnic groups living in Sindh. • No false claims should be accepted. • No quarter should bf. given to terrorism and blackmail.

NOTES 1. Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Division, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Statistical Yearbook 1987, Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1987, p. 635. 2. Ibid. 3. Government of Pakistan. Statistics Division, Population Census Organization, 1981 Census Report of Sindh Province, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, December 1984, p. 8. 4. Ibid., p. 107. 5. Ibid. 6. Burney, Izharul Hasan, 'Quota Syste1n: l\fechanics & Flaws,' Dawn, 26.June 1987. 7. Salah11ddin, l\loha1nn1ed. · Knl'achi aur Sindh KP Shehri A1asai/,' Tait.beer (Urd11). Decen1her 15, l 9'l4.

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The Futility of Ethnic Politics Years of militant ethnic politics, and the attempts to suppress it, far from finding a solution, actually led to an almost intractable situation in urban Sindh. The electoral success and the mass popularity of the Mohajir ethnonationalist movement seemed to have trapped it in a deadend street. From this statement, more general conclusions about the futility of ethnic politics can be drawn. This chapter was originally delivered as a lecture to a large Mohajir audience in November 1995. F.A.

*** The concern about the violence, insecurity, and atmosphere of mistrust to which our kith and kin in Karachi are subjected to on a daily basis seems to be on the minds of all of us here in North America. Yet, there is a feeling that one can do little to alleviate the situation. I, however, believe that each one of us can make a small but important contribution to creating an understanding between social groups and mitigating some of the major reasons for conflict and violence in Sindh. In the very least, we can make an effort to grasp the real facts and acquire an objective understanding of the economic., social, and political roots of the conflict, and disseminate that knowledge and spirit of reconciliation in wider circles of family, friends, organizations, and institutions. To do that we would need to combat many of our prejudices, myths,

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and exaggerated claims generated and sustained by the emotive propaganda of our respective ultra nationalists. It is interesting that when Pakistan is being consumed by the cancer of ethnic hatred and. conflict, the United States is also experiencing the worst racial polarization in three decades. Certainly, there are many parallels in the two situations, including the inflaming of passions and mistrust on both sides of the divide. But there are important differences too; and one of these is that in America there is a sizeable segment of the intelligentsia, the government, and the. people ~at finds this racial cleavage unacceptable, and is making concrete efforts to promote understanding and to heal the wounds. President Clinton has said that he would not hesitate to set up a Commission if that is what it would take to address the problem. In Pakistan, no one seems to feel the need to· apply expert knowledge and conduct objective analysis of social problems with a view to addressing them sincerely and scientifically. It is a tragedy that even a Harvard and Oxford-educated Prime Minister has adopted an attitude towards these problems which is no different from that of the semi-literate, cavalier, and opportunistic run-of-the-mill politicians of the country. Positions created on the pretext of addressing a problem almost invariably degenerate into fulfilling a patronage obligation. Be that as it may, the citizens have to continue their search for peace and amity in Karachi, Sindh and Pakis.tan. In my capacity _as a social scientist and an educator, I have decided to make my small contribution by identifying the barriers to ethnic understanding, and addressing them one by one in the form of lectures and articles whenever opportunity presents itself. While addressing today's topic of prospects of ethnic politics, let me point out that in America the reality of ethnic differences is recognized without hesitation and efforts at removing disparities and creating harmony are built upon that recognition. In Pakistan, on the other hand, in the name of national unity,

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we denied for too long the historical and sociologcal fact of ethnic diversity. Pakistan's constitution does not recognize nationalities or ethnic groups. In fact a law passed in 1975 prescribes a punishment of seven years imprisonment for persons advocating the existence of more than one nationality in Pakistan. The·refore, it sounds tragically amusing to hear a political party demand the recognition of its ethnic group as the fifth nationality. There is nothing wrong about identifying oneself with one's own historically-formed ethno-linguistic group, being proud about that identity, safeguarding its collective interests, and promoting the language and culture of that group. What is wrong is to harbour ethnic prejudice and hatred, and to practice ethnic discrimination. A lot of bad blood has flowed both from the suppression of ethnic diversity and from the expression of ethnic prejudice.

Misidentification of problems In the backdrop of the current political conflict and violence in Karachi as well as Sindh as a whole, there is a tragic misidentification of too many problems as ethnic problems. In the language of social science we call it reductionism, i.e., to reduce multiple causation of a problem to a single convenient variable. This has led to increased alienation of the Mohajirs (principally the Urduspeaking people) and antagonism between them and the government and between them and other ethnic groups. A few examples of the problems most frequently cited in the press as the reasons for Mohajir alienation would illustrate the point. Unemployment: It is basically an economic .problem. There are not enough jobs to go around\ The economy is not growing rapidly enough and the population is growing too rapidly. The job opportunities for the educated youths in Karachi are quite limited. But this problem is not specific

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to Mohajirs; youths of other groups also face the same problem. Further, Karachi is not the only city with an unemployment problem; urban areas of the rest of Sindh and other provinces also have serious unemployment problems. Furthermore, the rural areas of Pakistan have a a much worse employment problem than the urban areas. That is why the direction of migration is from rural areas to cities rather than the other way round. Much is said about the injustices of the quota system in government jobs. There certainly are good reasons for modifying that system, but the quota system is essentially a red herring. Even if all government jobs were filled on the basis of open competition (or 'merit'), it would make a negligible difference in the employment situation of the Mohajir youths. Municipal services: The people of Karachi are facing severe hardships due to a lack of adequate water supply, sewage and solid waste disposal, roads, transportation, and electric and gas supply. But these are civic amenity problems, not ethnic ones. All ethnic groups in Karachi suffer from the lack or inadequacy of these amenities, and people in other towns of Sindh suffer even more. Urban dwellers all over Pakistan face these problems. Besides, the rural population of Pakistan generally does not even have a semblance of civic amenities. Having said that, I would like to add that this is not an argument for justifying the rapidly deteriorating municipal services in Karachi. The citizens of Karachi do not deserve such steep decline in the quality of life. The Government can and should do better, not only because it is the citizens' right, but also for its own sake since it would help it gain the trust of the people. While government policies, attitudes, and corruption tend to compound every social problem, the above two problems have their roots in the unmitigated population explosion which has led to straining the services way beyond their limited capacity and to environmental deterioration that is gnawing mercilessly at the quality of life. H there is

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an ethnic component to these problems, then the ethnic groups which are more middle class and better educated tend to be impacted less rather than more by these ecological problems. Human rights .violation: The MQM and its supporters are raising a hue and cry all over the world that Pakistan is conducting a genocide of Mohajirs. Since the launching of the army operation in Sindh by Nawaz Sharif and the intensification of the counter-insurgency measures by Nasirullah Bahar recently, there have been numerous incidents of citizens of Karachi being subjected by the lawenforcement agencies to forced entries into homes, illegal searches, beatings, imprisonment, torture, extortion and other forms of repression. Both Amnesty lntemati.onal and the Pakistan Human Rights Commission have alleged illegal detention, and death in custody of several individuals who were either MQM militants or alleged gangsters who were later on embraced by the MQM. Such actions deserve unequivocal condemnation and all Pakistanis, irrespective of their political affiliations, should strive to prevent the repetition of such incidents. However, putting the question of political repression in a proper perspective would help in understanding the nature of repression and save the citizens from the unnecessary intensification of ethnic hatred. First, the very Operation Clean Up, at its inception, while claiming four lives in Karachi as a result of one MQM faction's attack on the other, killed dozens of people in rural Sindh, including the now infamous Tando Bahawal massacre. Second, thousands of rural Sindhis were killed by the law enforcement forces during the 1983 MRD agitation and subsequently, and some of which was graphically documented by Herald (November 1986) . What has happened now is that the kind or repression which was previously reserved for certain ethnic groups or the rural population has been meted out to Karachi's urban population. If it is wrong now, it was wrong then. If it is

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wrong for Mohajirs, it was wrong for Sindhis. Third, the current government operation in Karachi is directed, among other alleged sources of violence, against MQM rather than against Mohajirs as a group. Howsoever unsavoury certain aspects of this operation may be, it is essentially not different from the generic repression that a state applies against the forces which defy its authority; and in this case, the force is by no means a boy scout battalion. It has a history of armed confrontation with the party now in power, is currently engaged in violent acts, and has not disavowed use of force. The violent conflict in Karachi has already caused a lot of pain to the citizens and brought a bad name to the country. Let us not inflame the situation further by the use of hyperbole and characterizations which do not fit. Local elections and autonomy: The MQM and its diehard supporters allege that the Government's failure to hold local bodies elections in Sindh is part of a conspiracy to disenfranchise Mohajirs. There is no denying that not holding the local bodies elections is a violation of the democratic and constitutional rights of the citizens, and that if such elections were held now, the MQM would erobably sweep them in Karachi, Hyderabad, and some other cities in Sindh. In that sense it amounts to robbing the MQM of power at the local level which it can achieve by democratic means. Also, given the Mohajir people's overwhelming support for the MQM and given the present political stalemate which has kept the MQM from participation in national and provincial governments, the absence of local elections amounts to completing the alienation of Mohajirs from the political process. · None the less, while characterizing the refusal to hold local elections as a conspiracy against Mohajirs, it would be worthwhile to take into account a few relevant facts. First, in Pakistan, while · the military regimes are too anxious to hold non party-based local elections to give a semblance of participation to the people who have been denied a say in ·

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the national and provincial governments, the elected civilian national governments, thus far, have been loath to hold such elections due to the fear of losing them. This is so regardless of the ethnic dimension of the political problem. Second, the Benazir government's hesitation to hold local elections, it appears, stemmed as much from the fear of losing in Punjab as from the expected MQM victory in urban Sindh. Third, given a lack of agreement between the PPP and the MQM, any local election at this time would give an added lethal edge to the MQM, already possessing the power to paralyze Sindh by strikes and inflicti~g harm through its urban guerrilla tactics, to undermine the PPP Government. This would make the political negotiations completely meaningless, and amount to th'e PPP's unconditional surrender. In realpolitik terms, it would be a suicide for the PPP, especially given the MQM's own record of having played an important role in bringing down Benazir's government in 1990 and then collaborating with jam Sadiq Ali to persecute the PPP. This sordid background · cannot be ignored while viewing the current PPP-MQM tussle. Fourth, the failure to hold local elections has affected all the provinces and all ethnic groups. However, it has had a qualitatively different impact on Mohaji'rs; and this fact alone underlines the urgency of reaching an accord between the PPP and the MQM. Finally, one must not ignore the fact that local governments have very little power and .resources to do anything for the people. In the absence of decentralization and local autonomy, local power can largely become a source of graft and a barricade for the battles with the national and provin cial governments. All of the above issues are being used to fuel the engine of ethnic politics, resulting in increased alienation of Mohajirs from the state and society, and increased hostility between them and other ethnic groups. Yet, it appears th(lt

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the ethnic factor is either secondary or tertiary to the primary economic, social and political factors.

National and provincial politics State power in Pakistan is highly centralized, with the military-bureaucratic establishment at its core and the military being the ultimate arbiter of power. This state preserves an economic structure that is dominated by the industrial and commercial capitalist class, including the drug and gun barons, and the landlord class, commonly known as the feudal class. None of these classes or power groups have equal or even proportional representation of the different ethnic groups in Pakistan. This fact is most fundamental toward understanding the reality of power and privilege in Pakistan. Let us look at this ethnic matrix of class and power and see where different groups, particularly Mohajirs, fit in it. The military is predominantly Punjabi and Pushtoon, with a diminishing participation of Mohajirs. The civil bureaucracy is also dominated by Punjabis and Pushtoons, with still a sizeable representation of Mohajirs. The capitalist class is largely made up of Punjabi, Pushtoon and Mohajirs (both Gujrati and Urdu speaking). All major ethnic groups, except Mohajirs, have a landlord class of varying strengths, with Sindhis and Siraikis having the strongest. Under a military regime, where the capability of mobilizing votes does not matter, usually the political influence of landlords in the national government is reduced somewhat, and the military's economic alliance with the capitalist class, especially the bazaar, is translated into great political influence of the latter. Therefore, the groups which are represented well in the military, bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie find themselves in a relatively advantageous position and feel closer to the centres of power, if other major factors remain equal.

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Under a democratic system based on adult franchise, where votes count a lot, the social power of the landlord class is harnessed to garner the votes and is translated into greater political influence. This results in landlords dominating provincial governments, having federal ministers, and getting a freer access to the loot of the state. Favouritism and nepotism practised by landlord politicians trends to benefit the members of their own ethnic group more than it does others, unless checkmated by other more powerful groups like the military. One major variable that mediates between ethnicity and power is the demographic strength of the various ethnic groups which is especially critical in the democratic system. The only source of population data is the official population census, the last of which was taken in 1981. Despite their shortcomings, these censuses over a period of more than one hundred years have shown some remarkable internally consistent and externally validated trends. According to the census figures, Pakistan's population consists of about 55 per cent Punjabis (including Siraikis), 13 per cent Pushtoons, 12 per cent Sindhis, and 7 per cent Urdu-speaking (one-third of whom live outside Sindh). The 1981 census enumerated the following percentage of households (not individual speakers of mother tongues) where Urdu is 'usually spoken': Pakistan, 7.6%; Sindh, 22.6%; and Karachi, 54.3%. If we juxtapose the ethnic matrix of power to the demographics of ethnicity, it is clear that when the minority-or the dominated, as was the case with the Bengali majority-ethnic groups pursue ethnic politics, they must do it with an explicit or implicit option of separation. Otherwise they are not a serious nationalist movement. The history of ethnic nationalism in Pakistan bears that out. • Bengali nationalism, spearh eaded by the Awami League, first expressed itself in the demand for tl1e acceptance of six points which \\IOuld have turned

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Pakistan almost into a confederation, and finally it led to separation, aided by India. • Puahtoon nationalism expressed itself in the demand for Pushtoonistan which, despite denials, contained a strong current of yearning for merger with Afghanistan . Today, Pushtoons seem to be well integrated with the state of Pakistan; yet the irredentist nostalgia has not died out completely. • The Baloch nationalists have from time to time raised the demand for Balochistan. A process of co-optation see~s to be under way; yet there is still a strong sentiment for separation. • Sin~hi nationalism expressed itself in the Jeeye Sindh Movement and the demand for an independent Sindhudesh. It lacked popular support, not the least because the populist appeal of the PPP was combined with a reassuring Sindhi leadership of the Bhuttos. The demand for separate rights or secession waxes and wanes with an ethnic group' s actual or perceived satisfaction of its expectations from the larger society and the state. The balance between alienation from and integration with the state depends not only on what a group is actually able to receive or on its estimate of the prospects of achieV:ing, but also, among other things, on the degree of the popular support an ethnic nationalist movement is able to mobilize. Many an objectively justified nationalist moveme'1t in the world has been given up because of its failure tO sustain popular support. On the other hand, successful mobilization of popular support at a highly charged level of emotion can box a movement or party into a positio n that co mpels it to r ej e ct reasonable compromises.

The dilemma of Mohajir nationalism The Mohajir nationalist movement, led by the MQM, is the

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latest nationalist show in town. It has surpassed all other ethnic movements in Pakistan, with the possible exception of the Bengali movement, in achieving the consensus of its ethnic group around ethnic exclusivist slogans (even Awami League's demands pertained to the political structure and policies of Pakistan). Yet, it is one exceptional ethnic movement which lacks an 'historical homeland' for ·the group it represents. Now, let us look at the prospects of the Mohajir nationalist movement in the light of Pakistan's ethnicity-power matrix and the demographics of ethnicity. The Urdu-speaking Mohajirs have moved from a position in the early years of Pakistan when the civil bureaucracy dominated the state and the Mohajirs dominated the bureaucracy to the present position in which: • The military dominates the political structure and the Mohajirs do not have a significant influence in it. • The Mohajirs have an adequate representation in the higher echelons of the civil bureaucracy but do not dominate it as before. ' • The most influential sectors of the industrial, commercial, and criminal bourgeoisie are not Urduspeaking Mohajir. • At the provincial level, in the absence of a modus vivendi with the dominant class of the Sindhi society, i.e., the landlord class, the Mohajir is excluded from even the circumscribed power of the Sindh government. Where will the pursuit of ethnic politics take the Mohajirs? An overwhelming majority of the Mohajirs supports a movement which is not only ethnic exclusivist, i.e., by definition precludes the support of other groups, but is in confrontation with all other groups and the state itself. Even if it garners 100 per cent of the Mohajir votes, the MQM cannot go much farther than it has in a democratic system even if it is modified to r e flect proportional representation. The MQM can lead neither the national nor the Sindh government. And if these

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governments do not need the assembly votes of the Mohajir nationalist party, the rules of parliamentary politics do not require the dominant party to include the former in a coalition government. Such coalition can come about only as a gesture of goodwill or as a concession to blackmail. The MQM has already lost the goodwill of alt other ethnic groups. What it is left with is the ·solid support of its own ethnic group in the major urban centres of Sindh. It seems to have ·been doomed by its own politics to the role of a pressure group. The logical outcome of the ideology, demography, and localized concentration of popular support for the MQM is the dem.a nd for a separate Karachi or Mohajir province; and such a province, if it comes into being, will only be a stepping stone for a demand for a separate state, because having a Mohajir province will satisfy Mohajir grievances no more than the existence of Sindh and Balochistan has satisfied Sindhi and Baloch aspirations. The crea.tion of such a province will be fraught with insurmountable obstacles. Furthermore, the demand for the division of Sindh is perceived by Sindhis as a declaration of war, and will be met with strong resistance. Even if such a province comes into being, its Mohajir character can be assured only by a degree of ethnic cleansing that will dwarf the horrors of Bosnia, for despite Mohajir nationalists' absurd demographic claims, Mohajirs will have, if at all, no more than a razor thin majority in such a province. Thus, the demand for a separate Karachi or Mohajir province is a no-starter and Mohajirs can ill-afford it. The pursuit of e thnic politics under the virulent ideology and practice of MQM is part of the problem, not a part of the solution. How do Mohajirs expect to achieve their rights by antagonizing 93 per cent of Pakistan's population? It is time to think about it. As General Mirza Aslam Beg pointed o ut during his recent visit to Washington, the MQM first fought with Pushtoons, then with Punjabis, then with Sindhis, then with the arn1y, and now it is fighting with

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Balochis. He further said that the alliances MQM is making · will take it nowhere; and if Mohajirs can get anything, they can get it only from the Sindhi population. I reminded him that whosoever instigated the MQM to break its alliance with the PPP in 1990 did a great disservice to Mohajirs, Sindh, and Pakistan. I understand people want to hear about solutions and not just the analysis of the problems. If solutions were that simple and easy, I am sure they would have already been implemented. My contention is that analysis and understanding of the problems do not necessary lead to solutions, but problems cannot be solved without scientific understanding. Therefore, scientific analysis of the problem in Sindh is not a sufficient condition for solving it, but it is a necessary condition. I am only going to mention two preliminary 'solutions' towards bridging the ethnic divide which I have repeated often: first, all the talk about dividing Sindh must stop; second, there is no need to quibble about the definitions of a nationality, ethnic group, or Mohajir; instead one must respect the Urdu-speaking people as a distinct ethno-linguistic group and stop demanding the unfeasible cultural assimilation from them. Let us remove these barriers to understanding first and then move onto removing some more. If Mohajirs have trapped themselves in the dead-end street of ethnic politics, others who wish to see harmony prevail in Sindh and Pakistan, should make it possible for them to get out of that cul de sac.

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Contradictions and Co-optation in Balochistan Balochistan's first representative provincial government, led by the National Awami Party's Attaullah Mengal, was brought to an early end in 1973, ironically, by the first popularly elected Federal Government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Dismissal of the Mengal government and the resignation, in protest of Mufti Mahmud's government in Frontier precipitated a serious political crisis which, among other things, brought influential sections of Balochs to the conclusion that it was futile to seek redress within the framework of Pakistan. An armed insurrection took place in Balochistan from 1973 to 1977, and the military was used to suppress it. The first section below was written immediately after the dismissal as an editorial in Pakistan Forum. The stress on the separateness of Balochi and Brohi was, obviously, overdrawn-an error rectified by the author in several of his later writings. The second section has been written specially for this book as an update on the Baloch question. F.A.

*** Contradictions in Balochistan President Bhutto' s decision to dissolve the elected governn1ents of Balochistan and Sarhad cannot be

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condoned by democratic elements in Pakistan, even if they are bitterly opposed to the policies of the National Awami Party. Bhutto's virtually unchallenged interference in these provinces leads to the consolidation of a centralized and authoritarian structure which he has been trying to establish in Pakistan. On that score Bhutto's getting away with his high-handed actions is a setback for the democratic forces in the country. However, there is another side to the recent developments in these two provinces. The failure of the NAP and its supporters to mobilize popular opposition to the central government's arbitrary actions has once again exploded the myth of the NAP's popularity and ability to launch resistance to central authority. If there were any illusions-at home or abroad-about the real strength of the alleged or potential secessionists in Balochistan, Bhutto has laid them bare. The recent events have also forced many people to reconsider the false analogies they have been drawing between Bangladesh and Balochistan. Unlike the Awami League, which led a Bengali nationalist movement cutting across all the classes, the NAP in Balochistan is a mere assortment of Balochi and Brohi tribal leaders. On the lingual basis the Brohis have as much in common with the Balochis as Tamils have with Pushtons. Although Attaullah Mengal and his 'progressive' supporters have been successful in clouding that difference and in perpetuating the theory of Brohi assimilation, t he amorphous nationalism of the NAP has never had any appeal for Balochistan's 28 per cent Pushton and 12 per cent Sindhi population. With the help of Jam of Lasbela and Abdul Samad Achakzai the central government succeeded in further alienating the Sindhi and Pathan ele1nents from the NAP. However, the main reason for the opposition by the J ain and Achakzai was not lingual. T heir opposition was part of the internal con tradiction among the privileged sections of

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Balochistan, involving an intense tug of war between the Balochi Sardars (tribal leaders) themselves. The Sardars belonging to the NAP as well as to other parties had succeeded in transforming the tribal communal relations into feudal relations. While trying to consolidate their grip over the seized tribal lands, the Sardars of the NAP were also anxious to get a quick slice of the capitalist cake, which made them ally with Karachi-based capitalists like Fancies and Haroons on the one hand, and to-conflict with Balochi Sardars like Nabi Bukhsh Zehri, who had concessions in mining and quarrying, on the other hand. The efforts to keep open the smuggling route in Lasbela forced the NAP to step on the toes ofJam Ghulam Qadir. The NAP Sardars' attempts to establish overall political hegemony in order to further their narrow interests brought the wrath of their former mentor, Akbar Bugti, whose blow proved to be decisive. Then th ere was the little warlord by the name of Doda Khan Zarakzai who did not find the exploits of the NAP Sardars to 'his liking. Bhutto understood that these internal conflicts among Balochistan's rulers had precedence over the centre-province conflict, and took full advantage of it. Compounding the NAP Sardars' problems was the class struggle in their own camp. The extortion of Sardari tax by Bizenjo and Mengal led to peasant resistance which was violently suppressed in Jhal Jhao and other areas. With their traditional source of popular support greatly eroded, the central government's strike against Bizenjo and Mengal could only bring a sigh of relief from their peasants. For whatever else it may be, the central government's action in Balochistan has brought back into focus a set of facts \Vhich every observer of the Balochistan scene must unde rstand: (a) the n1ove1nent of the NAP is not a national nlovement, (b) the Sardars belonging to the NAP represent only a s1nall fraction of the ruling class of Balochistan, and (c) the tribal loyalties-a negative aspect-on which the N1\P had built its popular support are in the process of

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disintegration. Bhutto's calculated actions have cut the NAP Sardars down to size and have conveyed a message to their domestic and foreign sympathizers that the internal dynamics for an Azad Balochistan is not viable-at least for now. Granted that tables can be turned and loyalties can change, and that the great integrationist of today, Akbar Bugti, can become the flag-waver of tomorrow's secession, it must not be forgotten that this internecine warfare is a way of resolving the conflicts of a class trying to leap from tribalism into capitalism. It has nothing to do with the aspirations of the Balochi people. No amount of rhetoric about 'socialism' and ' national self-determination' can convert the self-interest of reactionary Sardars into a cause worth fighting for. In order for the people's movement to make headway in Balochistan it will be necessary for the progressive forces there to reject the leadership of Sardars and other exploiters, be they Bizenjos or Bugtis.

A 1997 update Since the writing of the above piece twenty-four years ago, a number of fundamental changes have taken place in the political configuration in Balochistan. The immediate consequence of the dissolution of the NAP Government was the armed rebellion in Balochistan and Pakistan military's counter insurgency operation, supported by the · Shah of Iran, to suppress the resistance. Youths belonging to the Baloch Students' (BSO) as well as to the new guerrilla formation the Balochistan People's liberation Front (BPLF) took up arms in defense of Balochistan's sovereignty. All major Baloch leaders of the NAP, Khair Bux Mari, Attaullah Mengal and Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, supported the struggle to a greater or lesser extent, with Mari having the clearest and closest association with the movement and Bizenjo having doubts about the efficacy of

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armed struggle and desirability of total independence. The Baloch leadership, along with the rest of the NAP leadership and allies, remained incarcerated throughout the rest of the Bhutto period, charged with sedition and tried by a special tribunal inside the Hyderabad prison. Even though BPLF never openly proclaimed independence to be its aim, the confrontation in Balochistan had led to the total alienation of the nationalist elements, particularly the youths, from Pakistan. For many years no radical Baloch activist wanted to hear about Pakistan or do anything with an all-Pakistan initiative at home or in exile. So much so that the venerated Baloch statesman Bizenjo was denigrated as 'Baba-i-Mazakerat' (Father of Negotiations) for continuing to seek provincial autonomy by peaceful means. The conflict in Balochistan, while radicalizing the Baloch national movement, also had a corrosive effect on the Bhutto regime itself. It undermined its legitimacy and strengthened the hand of the military. It was this shift in the balance of civil-military equation that emboldened the Chief of the Army Staff, General Ziaul Haq, to stage a coup d'etat against Bhutto on 5 July 1977. Two developments taking place at this stage had a profound effect on the fortunes of the Baloch nationalist movement in Pakistan: (a) General Ziaul Haq's withdrawal of the Hyderabad Conspiracy Case against NAP leaders and granting them, and the BPLF militants, general amnesty; (b) a leftist revolution in Afghanistan led by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in April 1978. Soon after their release from prison, Bizenjo and Mengal broke from their Pushtoon allies, left the NAP's successor organization the National Democratic Party (NDP), and launched the new Pakistan National Party (PNP). Some months later, however, Mengal left Pakistan first for treatment in the United States, and then stayed in London where he proclaimed independence for Balochistan. Mari, who had never joined the NDP, also left Pakistan about the

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same time and established himself in Afghanistan, close to his estimated 3,000 armed militants. Neither was involved in any significant way in the struggle against the military regime of General Ziaul Haq which lasted eleven long and painful years. Bizenjo stayed in Pakistan and continued his quest for autonomy and nationality rights within the framework of a united Pakistan. While Mari's mystique and Mengal's independence proclamation continued to fuel the youths' dream of liberation, the situation on the ground progressively turned against the Baloch. Nearly three million Afghan refugees poured into Pakistan, one-third of whom settled in Balochistan. This migration drastically altered the ethnic balance in favour of the Pushtoons and against the Baloch. The creation of the world's largest Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station in Pakistan, the basing of the Afghan Mujahidin organizations in Pakistan, and the ideological propaganda campaigns in support of the Afghan insurgency and its mentor, General Zia, turned the political climate radically against the secular and progressive forces, as well as Baloch nationalists, in Pakistan. Ziaul Haq intensified his efforts to bribe and co-opt the Baloch elite and succeeded in buying the loyalties of the former BSO President and guerrilla combatant Khair Jan Baloch and several other activists of the Baloch struggle. His decision to turn Pakistan into a frontline state for the American-supervised insurgency to topple the leftist regime and eject the Soviet Army from Afghanistan, created the so-called heroin-Kalashnikov culture which corrupted the political culture of Balochistan at least as much as it did the politics of the rest of Pakistan. The post-Zia period (1988-present) saw the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, the collapse of the Soviet state itself in 1991, the removal of Najibullah 's POPA Government in 1992, and the ascension to power of the various right-wing theocratic governments in Kabul. It has also witnessed the continuation of the heroin and

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Kalashnikov culture as well as massive opportunities for political corruption. While the non-nationalist Sardars and other elites of Baloch society have continued to benefit from the Pakistan state's co-optation offers and the opportunities for corruption , many of the erstwhile nationalists have also joined the fray. Bizenjo died in 1989. Mari, who was evacuated by a Pakistani military plane at the time of the fall of Kabul in 1992, has remained aloof from open politics since his return to Pakistan. Mengal, who had gone back and forth between London and Pakistan in the early 1990s, is currently heading the Baloch National Party (BNP) , but appears to be a reluctant player in a game of politics whose rules have changed entirely since his golden days in Pakistan's politics in the 1960s and early 1970s. In the February 1997 elections, the BNP has emerged as the largest single party in Balochistan, but with no more than one-fourth of the seats. His son, Akhtar, has become Chief Minister with the support of Akbar Bugti's Jamhoori Watan Party and Maulana Fazlur Rahman's jamiat-ul-Ulema-ul-Islam. Pursuit of personal interests and abandonment of the ideals of collective good come in handy to the ruling establishment to fragment the political allegiances and the electoral mandate. While the conflict between Balochs and Pushtoons has taken the form of armed clashes, the Baloch electorate has been divided to such an extent that no party or grouping can claim to speak for even a plurality of the electorate. Commenting on the results of the 1993 elections, Professor Waseem wrote, 'with ten parties and nine independents represented on the floor of the Balochistan Assembly, the provincial politics seemed to provide an opportunity for freewheeling activity to various political entities .. .' 1The 1997 results are only slightly better. While this split mandate has necessitated accommodation and coalition building, it has also institutionalized corruption, floor crossing and, what has come to be known as horse trading (selling the parliamentary support to the

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highest bidder). Above all, it has given a tremendous leeway to Pakistan's ruling establishment to manipulate the political process in Balochistan and set the rival politicians vying with one another for the crumbs from Islamabad's table. The voices of Baloch nationalism, as those of any other ideal or principle, have been muted. 2 While many circumstantial reasons can be found to explain the decline of Baloch nationalist movement, the following five factors remain fundamental: (a) The level of development of productive forces, the character of the social organization, and the degree of consolidation of a political state. Even Gankovsky noted that of all the major ethnic groups of Pakistan, only the Baloch had not consolidated itself into a 'bourgeois nation' at the time of independence.3 Colonial and post-colonial encounters and the imperatives of economic development of the state of Pakistan have rendered the Baloch society incapable of protecting its collective interests against external intrusions. Development has meant dispossession of resources, and democracy has marginalized the Baloch in a multi-ethnic state. Furthermore, Balochs in different parts of the province have different types of social organizations. Their nationalist demands are often incongruent with the exigencies of a modernizing country. The non-tribal civic society, such as that of the Makran coast, not only lacks powerful leadership but seeks solutions to its problems in a different way, including out-migration to Sindhi cities and emigration to the Gulf, than through a militant nationalist movement. (b) Demarcation of the provincial boundary. Not only have some of the historical lands of the Pushtoons been included in the so-called British Balochistan, but the Kalat confederacy itself was a multi-ethnic entity, containing large . chunks of Sindhi-speaking territory, including the state of Lasbela. On the other hand, large parts of Balochistan were ceded to Iran and a strip was annexed to Afghanistan as a result of the British forward policy in the region. The net

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result of these developments is that Pakistani Balochistan has never been a homogenous Baloch national territory. (c) The small population size of the Baloch. Even if the Baloch remain united, their absolute and relative small numbers doom them to a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis Pushtoons and the Pakistani state. Even though the Pushtoons of Balochistan may be less numerous than Balochs, they have the support of their brethren in NWFP and the Pushtoons are an integral part of Pakistan's ruling establishment. Furthermore, Pakistan's policy toward Afghanistan, driven by the Pushtoons in Pakistan's ruling class, is aimed at establishing Pushtoon hegemony in that country. (d) Ambiguous ethnic identification. Unlike Sindhis and Punjabis, who adhere to an evolved identity which does not invoke racial roots, the Baloch, like the Pushtoons, have a primordial identity based on alleged racial genealogy. For contradictory reasons, this identity tends to be quite inclusive. On the one hand, the people of African origin, because of the exclusive emphasis on paternal heritage, are considered Baloch-which is culturally correct. On the other hand, any person of the Baloch 'race' who may have culturally, economically and politically assimilated into Sindhis or Punjabis, is still regarded as Baloch and expected to support Baloch nationalism. Baloch nationalist politicians, youths and intellectuals feel no inhibition in making territorial claims on parts of Sindh, while denying the Sindhis of Balochistan a distinct cultural status. Extraterritorialism, based on such racial identity, leads to conflict of interest with fraternal ethnic groups and even contradicts Baloch claims of oppression and discrimination. If Legharis, Mazaris, Talpurs, Jatois and Zardaris are Baloch, then there is little for Balochs to complain about. The inability of the Baloch to articulate their demands in modern ethnic and political terms tends to undermine the struggle for their rights.

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(e) Link-up with geopolitics. Historically, the fate of the Baloch people and Baloch national movement has been linked up with big power rivalry in the region.4 With the collapse of the Soviet state and the end of the cold war, super power rivalry has been removed as a factor fuelling the nationalist movements in the region. Similarly, with the end of the Pahlavi dynasty, the interventionist role of Iran, which was opposed to Baloch aspirations, has ended, at least for the time being. To the extent that the expectations of foreign support raised the hopes of Baloch nationalists, this factor is no longer operative. The Baloch have to seek solutions to their problems almost entirely within a domestic Pakistani framework. If the Baloch leadership has failed to develop a'consensus around a cohesive strategy for dealing with Islamabad, the political establishment has also seen fit to ignore the Baloch as a collectivity. Fragmentation and selective co-optation seem to have worked so far for the rulers of Pakistan. However, this is not the process by which nations are built. If this process works in the long run, the Baloch can only expect to be reduced to the status of marginalized aborigines. Refusal to accept this eventuality would translate into repeated cycles of rebellion and repression. As we shall see in the next two chapters, the Pushtoons of Pakistan are engaged in an altogether different process--that of organic integration rather than mechanical co-optation.

NOTES 1. Waseern, Mohammad, The 199) Elections in Pakistan, Lahore: Vanguard, 1994, p. 180. 2. For an overview of the development of Baloch nationalist consciousness, see Baloch, lnayat Allah, "The Baluch Question in Pakistan and the Right of Self-determination,' in Zingel, WolfgangPeter and Zingel-Ave Lallemant. Stephanie (Eds.), Pakistan in its Fourth Decade: Current Political, Social, and Economic Situation. Hamburg: Deutsches Orient lnstitut, 1983. pp. 188-209.

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3. Gankovsky, Y.V., The Peoples of Pakistan: An Ethnic Histury; Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1971, p . 208. 4. For a detailed examination of Baloch nationalism and its relationship with regional and super power rivalries, see Harrison, Selig, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baloch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, I 981.

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The Pushtoon Question The dismissal of the National Awami Party's government in Balochistan and the resignation of its coalition government in the Frontier province in 1973, reversed the hopeful trend of the forces of ethno-nationalism participating in Pakistan's parliamentary politics. As among the Baloch, nationalist sentiments were intensified among many Pushtoon supporters of the NAP. Several crossed the border into Afghanistan or engaged in armed actions directed from there. Secession of provinces and the prospects of survival of Pakistan as a state became a major theme of political discussion in Pakistan and among foreign observers interested in Pakistan affairs. The chapter below was written in 1973 as an analysis of the nature of Pushtoon nationalism and the prospects of an independent Pushtoonistan. F.A.

*** The Pushtoonistan (or Pukhtoonistan) question has once again came into sharp focus as a result of some recent developments in the region, including the Army intervention in Balochsitan and the overthrow of the Afghan monarchy by the pro-Pushtoonistan elements led by Sardar Daud Khan. The former development underscores the unwillingness of the largely Punjab-based and pro-Irani central authorities in Pakistan to allow even a modicum of self~governan ce to the smaller nationalities. The latter development conies as a timely antidote to the centralizing influences in the region, and rekindles the hopes of the Pushtoon nationalists. Sardar

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Daud alluded to the Pushtoonistan question when he singled out Pakistan in his first speech as the only country with which Afghanistan had unresolved problems. In a recent interview with AlFatah, Ajmal Khattak, the National Awami Party's (NAP) self-exiled Secretary-general in Kabul, clearly stated that his aim was to create an independent Pushtoonistan on the model of Bangladesh. 1 Because of the association of the Afghanistan Government and the NAP with the Pushtoonistan slogan, the Pushtoon national question is often confused with that slogan and is dismissed by proving the ill intentions of these parties. Below we shall try to discuss the concept of Pushtoonistan as advocated by the Afghan Government and the NAP, and the Pushtoon national question per se. I

The Afghan claim The Government of Afghanistan, especially during the previous administration of Daud Khan, has been particularly active in raising the Pushtoonistan issue in international forums, including the United Nations, and in encouraging the Pushtoon nationalists in Pakistan. Giving aid and comfort to self-exiled nationalists like Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (Bacha Khan), Ayub Khan Achakzai and AJmal Kh~tak has been a part of the Afghan policy to demonstrate its solidarity with the Pushtoonistan movement east of the. Durand line. · On the face of it the Afghan Government's interest in Pushtoonistan is prompted by its concern for the oppressed Pushtoon people in Pakistan. It therefore considers it as its duty to support the secession of Pushtoons from Pakistan and to allow them to form an independent Pathan state by the name of Push toonistan or Pukhtoonistan. The concept of that Pukhtoonistan is quite clearly reflected in a postage sta1np issued by Afghanistan in 1969 and still displayed at the Kabul airport. It shows Sarhad

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(with its tribal belt) and the whole of Pakistani Balochistan as the territory of the proposed Pushtoonistan. Pushtoonistan for the non-Pushtoon people of Pakistan, but not for the Pushtoons of Afghanistan! So much for the national basis of Afghanistan's Pukhtoonistan. Although it is true that backwardness of productive forces gives rise to backward and crude ideologies which in turn result in the absurdities like the above, in this particular case the absurdity is quite self-serving. The Afghani elite consists of Persians who occupy important positions in the Government. The official language of Afghanistan is Persian (Dari) rather than Pushto. The name of their airlines is Aryana. Having a Pathan monarch and Pathan Prime Ministers did not change all this. It is quite conceivable that under Daud Khan Pushtoon nationalism may be intensified and that the Persian identification may be discarded in favour of Pushtoon identity. But that will intensify the national question in Afghanistan itself, for the Pushtoons, according to most estimates, comprise no more than one-half of Afghanistan's population. A Pushtoon Afghanistan will then raise the question of national self-determination for the Tajiks, the Turkmenians, the Uzbeks, and the Hazaras. The dilemma the Afghan rulers find themselves in consists of the fact that if they do not establish their own Pushtoon bonafides they cannot convince others of their sincerity about Pukhtoonistan, but if they do, centrifugal forces are set in motion in their own country. None the less, the veneer of self-determination for the Pushtoons cannot hide the old territorial question: the Afghan consider the Gandamak treaty of 1878 and the Durand agreement of 1893 as unjust agreements imposed upon them by the British colonialists. There can be no doubt that these and subsequent agreements between Afghanistan and the British rulers of India were signed under force or under the threat of force. The British were, naturally, a\vare of it, and their policy to\vard the Tribal areas and Article 11

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of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921 were based on the recognition of the Afghan Government's interest in the tribes of east of the Durand line. From the time of Dost Mohammad every Afghan Government has hoped to reannex the territories east of the border, extending upto the river Indus. At the time of India's partition in 1947 the Afghan Government urged the British to allow the Pathans two additional choices, annexation with Afghanistan and independent Pushtoonistan, in the referendum held in Sarhad. In the post-war era, when self-determination makes better diplomacy than outright claims of annexation, it was not surprising that independent Pushtoonistan became the format of Afghanistan's irredentist claims.2 Thus an Afghan-supported Pukhtoonistan can only be the first step towards annexation or, at best, a semiautonomous satellite. In either case it does not offer good prospects to the Pushtoons of the more advanced regions east of the Durand line. The longing for such a reunion on the side of the border does not reflect progressive nationalism, but rather medieval particularism. It does not even fall within the purview of the national question as enunciated by Lenin. The division of the Pushtoon nationality into two sovereign countries may be unfortunate, but not unique by any means. Such questions have been and can be resolved by economic integration rather than by liberal sentimentalism. If the latter criterion were applied to Afghanistan itself it would have to cede its northern territories to the Soviet Union . Repeating this the world over we shall be engaged in drawing a perfect ethnogeographical map, but not necessarily in advancing history.

Pushtoonistan and the NAP The K.hudai K.hid1natgar (Red Shirt) movement in the settled districts of Sarhad, led by Ghaffar Khan, and the

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Wrore Pushtoon movement in the Pushtoon-speaking areas of Balochistan, led by Abdul Samad Achakzai, emerged as the most articulate expressions of Pushtoon national sentiments against the British. Having opposed the creation of Pakistan and failed, the nationalists half-heartedly reconciled with Pakistan. Since then their attitude, and that of their successor organization the NAP, has been quite ambivalent towards Pakistan. Farigh Bukhari, in his biography of Ghaffar Khan (Bacha Khan), insists that by Pushtoonistan Ghaffar Khan simply meant a renamed province within Pakistan. 3 Obviously, the matter had never been as simple as the renaming of an area. Ghaffar Khan has continued to contradict himself throughout the history of Pakistan. Now he and his son, the NAP chief Wali Khan, loudly proclaim that they are not secessionists. Obviously, they are in Pakistan where it is considered treason to advocate separatism. Ajmal Khatak, who now occupies Ghaffar Khan's seat in the safe haven of Kabul, threw some light on the dilemma of his colleagues when he told the reporter of Al-Fatah that the secessionists seldom openly advocated separatism and that their objective was no less than the establishment of an independent Pushtoonistan. That the Pushtoon nationalists always had secession at the back of their minds and that this urge was particularly intensified after Bangladesh was also indicated in the conversations this writer had with Professor Muzaffar Ahmed of the Bangladesh NAP in October 1971. In the interview published in Pakistan Forum of the same month he defended the nomenclature NAP (Wali-Muzaffar) on the grounds that they were still one party and that the separation of West Pakistan's smaller provinces was as much an objective of the party as the creation of an independent Bangladesh.i After the interview he told this writer that he had met with Wali Khan in London and had teased him about his 'integrationist' role during the constitutional talks in Dhaka. Wali, according to Muzaffar, was disturbed at East Pakistan's separation at that stage and said that either

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there should be one Pakistan or n·o Pakistan because without the Bengalis the Pathans and Balochis would find it very difficult to cope with the Punjabis. Our purpose in initiating the above discussion is not to raise the secessionist alarm about the NAP, but rather to establish the fact that the separatist option has been under consideration by the NAP as it should be by any nationalist movement. However, instead of basing our judgement of the NAP on whether or not it is secessionist, we shall try to analyse its character and see if it can advance the struggle of the Pushtoon masses. Therefore, it will first be necessary to develop a framework for such analysis.

National question and the Pakistani left No question-not even the Sino-Soviet conflict-has created more confusion in the Pakistani left than the national question. Partly the problem could be attributed to the failure to comprehend Lenin's dialectical postulates on the question, and partly to the difficulties in applying theoretical generalities to the concrete situation of Pakistan. But it is the conflicting i.nterests of the petty bourgeoisie of the smaller nationalities on one hand and of Punjab and the Urdu-speaking group on the other which have led to the present confusion in which one section has clung exclusively to the 'secessionist' aspect of Lenin and the other exclusively to his 'integrationist' aspect.

The secessionists To these 'socialists' the hallmark of a leftist in Pakistan is to support any regional movement which calls itself oppressed and demands the right to self-determination. In their view any centrifugal force, regardless of its class character and ideological content, is a progressive force; to

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oppose it is to side with the ruling classes of the oppressor nationality. This position of theirs is based less on the analysis of the national question in Pakistan than upon a deeply-seated belief that Pakistan is an 'artificial' state which must be done away with as soon as possible. The only thing that can be said in their defence is that they are not Pakistan chauvinists; but many of them are Indian chauvinists, who do not apply the same principle of centrifugalism to India which is much more heterogeneous and whose union is much more 'unnatural' than Pakistan's. But that is beside the point. The main probl.em with their thesis is that in actuality all states are artificial-man was not born with a state; it evolved. And there is no uniform basis for the formation of states in this world. The theoretical confusion of these elements leads to political practices which are self-contradictory and often against the interests of the people. For example, they accuse as chauvinist anyone who does not support the independence of Bangladesh, but they would not support the independence for the Kashmiris. Worse than that, their support for the NAP has gone to the extent of opposing the movement of Pushtoon peasants. When given a choice between the Pushtoon peasants and the Pushtoon landlords, they have chosen the latter. This is their understanding of the national question. In fact, it has become difficult to distinguish between them and the feudal nationalists they support. Therefore, most of the criticism against the NAP would also apply to them.

The Integrationists There are many Pakistan ideology chauvinists who are masquerading as leftists and socialists. Some of them, by a strange twist of logic, try to prove that the Pushtoons (and for that matter Sindhis and Ba lochis) are not even a nationality. 5

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Pointing out the fact that nation is a bourgeois phenomenon, they deny that the Pushtoons can be a nation in the absence of the development of capitalist relations of production. The continuation of the vestiges of tribal or clan type of social organization among the Pushtoons is cited as the final proof in support of their argument that the Pushtoons are not even a feudal nationality.

Table 8 Disbibution of Pushtoons, 1961

Pakistan (est.)* Sarhad (est.)* Peshawar & Mardan divns. States, tribal areas (est.) Balochistan Zhob dist. Loralai dist. Quetta dist. Punjab Sindh Karachi dist.

Number

%

6,439,807 5,786,049 2,686,049 3,100,000 351,041 83,994 67,626 164,042 152,820 149,946 105,482

13.5 76.0 64.9 90.0 28.0 95.8 61.1 61.3 0.6 1.8 5.2

... (13. l) (68.3) (68.3) (99.7) (25. l)

(0.8) (3.1) (8.7)

*Estimated by the author by including FATA. ** Figures in parentheses are for 1981. Sarhad does not include FATA. Sources: Government of Pakistan. 1961 Po/J11/(ltion Cnuus, Vo/rant 3 (West Pakista 11) , K>irachi"s Manager of Publications, 1963; Governmen t of Pakistan, 1Wfli11 Findings 1>f tllP 1981 1'0/11tlfltin11 Ce11.rn.1. Islamabad, Go,·cn11nen t of Pakistan .

Although it is true that the predominant mode of production in th e Pushtoon areas-or for that matter in the whole of Pakistan-is not capitalist, it is not correct to say that it is dorninated by the so-called tribal relations. Tribal con11nunal ov,rnership of property was already on its \vay out \vhen the British intervened and facilitated the usurpation of cornrnunal lands by the tribal leaders and

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budding feudal lords. Consolidation of feudal nationality was also accelerated in the process. Inte raction between the so-called tribal and 'settled' cultivated areas was also enhanced, and the movement of population within the 'settled' areas took place on a large scale. It is because of this that today there are few places in the region where the peasants are exclusively of any one tribal origin. If we take the Mohmands as an example, we notice that although the Mohmand Agency is considered as their home, there are probably more Mohmands in Charsadah and other areas of Peshawar and Mardan districts than in the Agency. These Mohmand peasants work along with peasants of other tribal origins on the lands owned by landlords belonging to various tribes. Today when the peasants of various Pushtoon tribes have organized themselves on class lines in a single movement and when the landlords of different tribes have been compelled to forge their class unity in the form of the Association fo r the Protection of the Rights of the Landlords, it is only an anti-Pushtoon bigot who can venture to say that the Pushtoons are not a nationality. The Pushtoons have in fact gone beyond the stage of feudal nationality. The development of commerce and industry has resulted in the creation of Pushtoon proletariat and Pushtoon bourgeoisie, albeit a small o ne. Capitalist relations of production have been super-imposed upon the semi-feudal relations in agriculture. Colonial and neocolonial interferen ces, unfortunately, do not allow for the smooth transformation of mode of production and social organization as some of our 'straight' intellectuals would want to have. Thus, we obtain simultaneous existence of tribal, feudal and bourgeois relations in the sa1ne national territory. The integrationists h ave also learned to juggle with the statistics perta ining to the present provin cial and international boundaries. They would, for example, point out that there are more Pushtoons living outside the Sarhad

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province than inside it, and that there are other ethnic groups residing in Sarhad. It is probably true that there are more Pushtoons living in Afghanistan (about 9-10 million) than in Pakistan (about 8.5 million) and that a large number of Pushtoons live in Punjab and Sindh. It is also true that peoples like Gujar, Kohistanis, Kalash and the Khowar-speaking Chitralis from compact minorities amidst the Pushtoons, and that the districts of Hazara and Dera Ismail Khan speak mainly Hindko, which is considered a dialect of Punjabi. But what does that have to do with defining a nation or a nationality? The community of territory which Stalin considered as an essential requirement for a group to be qualified as a nation cannot be tampered with by arbitrary lines drawn in the middle of a national territory. If that were so the people of the Irish Republic would not be considered as a nation because there are still Irish living in Ulster. Similarly, we would be denying the nationality status to the Kurds because their national territory is split up between the states of Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria. Likewise, the existence of Uigurs and Tatars in Kazakhistan, and of Kara-Kalpaks and Tatars in Uzbekistan would make the Kazakhs and Uzbeks non-nationalities. As far as the question of non-Pushto border areas is concerned, their status can be decided on the basis of lingual and cultural realities, and according to the wishes of the people inhabiting those regions. Concretely, the people of Hazara and D.I. Khan should decide whether on the basis of lingual affinity they would want to be a part of Punjab or on the basis of their historical and economic interchange with the Pushtoon people they would want to stay in a Pushtoon entity with an autonomous status. The same right should be accorded to the people of Zhob, Loralai and Quetta districts in Balochistan, where the mother tongue of the majority is Pushto, to decide which entity they would like to be a part of.

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Behind the exercise to prove the Pathans (and others) as a non-nationality lies the recognition that the socialists must support the right to self-determination. Therefore, if a group is defined as a non-nationality the question of its self-determination does not arise. The same paradox of calling oneself a socialist and at the same time opposing national self-determination is resolved by another acrobatic feat, i.e., by assigning primacy to the external forces in the development of motion. The crudest example of such adherents of the theory of external causation is to be found among the leftists of the Outlook variety who think that the national question in Pakistan did not exist until Gankovsky wrote the Peopks of Pakistan. 6

The character of Pushtoon nationalism While applying the terminology of Lenin and Stalin to the national question in our region, many leftists seem to think that the substance of the question in our region is also the same as in the cases studied by Lenin and Stalin. Thus any group which raises the national question is called 'national bourgeoisie' and is treated as such. As Mariano Otero said, 'an error of language has led to an error of policy.' Let us see if the characteristics of the present-day Pushtoon nationalism correspond with the main features of national movement described by Stalin: The bourgeoisie plays the leading role ...The chief problem for the young bourgeoisie is the problem of the market. Its aim is to sell its goods and to emerge victorious from competition with the bourgeoisie of a different nationality. Hence its desire to secure its 'own', its 'home· market. The market is the first school in which the bourgeoisie learns its nationalism. 7

As far as the Pushtoon bourgeoisie is concerned, there is no doubt that it is relatively s1nall and underdeveloped.

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Yet, there are three Pathan families which are counted among the top thirty capitalist families of Pakistan: the Khatak family, the Hotis and the Khanzadahs. 8 The leading capitalists among the Pushtoons happen to be landlords as well. Their capital is invested throughout Pakistan in' enterprises as diverse as textiles, construction, truck assembling, mechanical engineering, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, tobacco processing, canning, insurance and banking. In the Sarhad province the main concentration of the Pushtoon capital appears to be in sugar manufacturing-facilitated by the ownership and control of sugar fields in the province. Premier Sugar Millsalleged to be the largest in Asia-is controlled by Mian Gui Jehanzeb, Mir Afzal Khan, Yusuf Khattak, and Colonel Sharif. The Charsadah Sugar Mills are largely controlled by the Hotis.9 The market for their refined sugar extends all over Pakistan, wh~re as a result of contrived conditions sugar fetches a price many times above the world market price; in the recent past the price of sugar had gone up as much as Rs 7.50 per seer (i.e., roughly 40 cents a pound) . Tax holiday and other subsidies granted to the sugar industry have helped the sugar barons a great deal in multiplying their fortunes so rapidly. It is quite understandable, then, why these capitalists have always supported an integrationist party-the Muslim League or the People's Party. Among the middle and petty bourgeoisie of Pushtoons there is considerable support for Pakistan, either because their businesses extend into the rest of Pakistan or they are agents or contractors of the outside bourgeoisie . Particularly interesting is the case of the truck owners: the long distance trucking between Peshawar and Karachi is O\vned and operated mainly by Pathans, and these trucks still display the photograph of Ayub Khan-a symbol of in tegrationists. Thus the nationalist struggle is not led by the Pushtoon bourgeoisie; it is not primarily a struggle for markets.

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In order to understand the nature of regional friction and correctly identify the class basis of the present stage of Pushtoon nationalism, it would be necessary to keep in mind one general feature of capitalist development and a peculiarity of neocolonial societies: (1) uneven development of different regions seems to be a general law of capitalist growth; the dominant bourgeoisie invests in the areas where it can maximize its profits and where it feels its capital is secure; (2) in the neocolonial societies the state plays a far more important role in development than it did, for example, in Europe when it was at a comparative level of development. The narrow basis of state power allows the dominant bourgeoisie to establish monopolies and to widen regional disparities. In order to maintain its privileges it resorts to repressive measures, particularly against the less developed regions. In Pakistan the effects of such .development are manifested in the concentration of industries in Punjab and lower Sindh, and in the greater underdevelopment (or 'neglect') of Sarhad and Balochistan.

The 'neglect' of Sarhad In the 1961 census the present territory of the Sarhad province and its adjoining tribal belt comprised roughly 17.7 per cent of West Pakistan's population, whereas the 1967 census of manufacturing showed that only 7 per cent of the fixed assets and slightly more than 6 per cent of production in manufacturing industries were in that province. Table 8 illustrates this fact quite clearly. Similarly, the Central Government's policy of agricultural development has favoured the Purtjab landlords over the others. According to the Planning Comn1ission •s survey of farm mechanization in 1968, only 5.4 per cent of '"'est Pakistan's tractors and 3.3 per cent of its tubewells 'vere in the Sarhad province, 10 despite the fact that it is deficient in

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-food. In 1964-5, its share of West Pakistan's food production was as follows: Wheat 7 per cent, rice 1.1 per cent, gram 7.4 per cent, bajra 4.6 per cent,jowar 6.9 per cent and maize 51 per cent. 11 (The magnitude of the last figure can be quite misleading because maize production constituted only 6.6 per cent of the above mentioned food items plus barley.) The movement against the lopsided development and against the political arrangements corresponding to it, is therefore waged not by the bourgeoisie which has succeeded in spite of it, but by the classes whose growth has been stunted by it. Specifically, these classes are the petty bourgeoisie and the landlords desiring to become industrial capitalists. The main ideologue of this movement is usually found in the educated segment of the regional petty bourgeoisie which is denied its due share in the government jobs, because of the narrow and parochial base of state power. Their economic desires are politically translated into the demands for political liberties and autonomy or . secession.

Table 9 Number of Selected Manufacturing Industries and their Gross Fixed A.Mets (in million rupees), 1967 Type

No.

Pakistan Assets

Food Tobacco Textiles Chemical Non-metallic minerals Electrical machinen· Transport machinery Miscellaneous

270 46 793 323 90 124 125 448

644.11 95.30 1480.86 800.11 208.99 112.13 150.36 181.33

No.

13 6 15

7 6

7• 5 8

Sar had Assets

123.02 29.82 105.34 12.55 0.83 0.39* 0.33 2.57

•figures for Sarhad were combined with those of Punjab: the figures mentioned here are th;

faced with the questions of national self-determination and cultural autonomy for the ethnic communities living within multi-ethnic states or countries occupied by imperial powers. The 'successful' resolution of the national question in Western Europe held as a model to many Communist leaders and scholars, not so much for formulating policy as for developing an analytical framework, to address the problem in Russia and Eastern Europe. A major thrust of this effort was to disntinguish between the state and nation, and to recognize that many states were multinational. Although there was nothing uniquely Marxist about it, the definition of nation developed by Stalin became the standard definition of nation and nationality in Marxist political and academic circles.2 Stalin defined nation as a 'historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up, manifested in a community of culture.' 3 All of the foregoing characteristics must be present in a community to qualify as a nation. Stalin's definition precluded race and tribe, and emphasized emergence of nations as a phenomenon of bourgeois development. Neither Stalin nor Lenin, who emphasized national self-determination and formulated an elaborate nationalty policy, 4 made any effort to distinguish between nation and nationality.5 Karl Kautsky's attempt to make such a distinction left no mark on the prevailing Marxist theory of nations and nationalism. 6 However, later day Soviet scholars have tried to differentiate between nation and nationality by positing the nationality theory on the bedrock of the Marxist theory of historical materialism . Thus, the various stages in the development of productive forces, have not only been linked with their corresponding social formations and political and cultural superstructures, but tied with corresponding types of ethnic con1munities and their levels of ethnic consciousness.; Significantly, Gankovsky adds the subjective criteria of spiritual culture and ethnic

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consciousness to the objective criteria of the community of territory, economic life, language, and material culture to the definition of 'human ethnic community.·~ A distinction is, therefore, made between the 'nationalities' of the slaveowning and feudal societies and the 'nations' of capitalist and socialist stages. 9 Keeping in mind the unevenness of the development of economic forces, cultural attributes, and ethnic consciousness amongst the different ethnic communities, Gankovsky was careful enough to title his book on Pakistan as The People of Pakistan (people being the translation of the Russian word 'narodnost'), while recognizing that Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, Pushtoons, and Balochs had already developed as feudal nationalities by the time of the British conquest. 10 The presence of a large concentration of Urdu-speaking immigrants from India in lower Sindh was noted, but without any attempt to categorize the group. Gankovsky and Soviet scholars in general did not relate the difference between nation and nationality to the presence or absence of the state. However, the Soviet constitution, while categorizing the major ethno-linguistic groups as nationalities and organizing the territory on nationalitybased republics, recognized in theory their right to selfdetermination, including the right to secede. The right of self-determination was, therefore, supposed by Third World adherents of the Soviet nationality theory to be an inherent right of any ethnic community in a multi-ethnic state that met the criteria of Stalin's definition of a nation, and thus of nationality. In Pakistan's context, the Marxist defmition of nationality became the cornerstone of the nationality position of the multi-ethnic National Awami Party (NAP) and some of the leftist parties, such as the Mazdoor Kisan Party and Pakistan National Party, which later split from it. The major political formation of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), the Bengali nationalist Awami League, informally subscribed to the major tenets of this nationality view. Th us, a1nong the

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political leaders, cadres, and intelligentsia of the Bengali, Sindhi, Pushtoon, and Baloch nationalities, as well as among Punjabi and Urdu-speaking leftists, it became axiomatic that Punjabi and Urdu-speaking groups dominated the state, while Bengalis, Sindhis, Pushtoons, and Balochs were the oppressed n ationalities. So long as this view prevailed among the proponents of the nationality theory, and the Urdu-speaking population itself supported the status quo, the theoretical problematic posed by the non-categorization of the Urdu-speaking community as a nationality remained unaddressed . For the governments of Pakistan, at least till Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's overthrow in 1977, nationality remained a buzz word and evoked strong reaction. The Government's case for banning the NAP in 1975 and the trial of its leaders on the charge of sedition was based in a large measure on a resolution passed by the Central Working Committee of the party to the effect that there were four nationalities in Pakistan . The Government also passed a law in 1975 prescribing a seven-year imprisonment for individuals advocating the presence of more than one nationality in Pakistan. The state of Pakistan and the right-wing establishment have traditionally equated the word nationality with secession and, thus, considered it anathema to Pakistan's integrity and survival as a state. Since the proponents of the nationality theory, generally, ha