Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy 9780804768016

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Ethnic Nationalism in Korea

THE WALTER H. SHORENSTEI N ASIA-PACIFIC RESEARCH CENTER

Studies of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Andrew G. Walder, General Editor The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University sponsors interdisciplinary research on the politics, economies, and societies of contemporary Asia. This monograph series features academic and policyoriented research by Stanford faculty and other scholars associated with the Center.

a l s o p ub li s h e d in t he s h o r e n s te i n a sia - pa c if ic r esea r c h c ent er s e rie s

China’s Cultural Revolution as History Edited by Joseph W. Esherick, Paul G. Pickowicz, and Andrew G. Walder (2006) Prospects for Peace in South Asia Rafiq Dossani and Henry S. Rowen (2005)

Ethnic Nationalism in Korea g e n e a l o g y, p o l i t i c s , a n d l e g a c y

Gi-Wook Shin

Stanford University Press Stanford, California

Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 2006 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press. Printed in the United States of America on acid-free, archival-quality paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Shin, Gi-Wook. Ethnic nationalism in Korea : genealogy, politics, and legacy / Gi-Wook Shin. p. cm.—(Studies of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center) Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 0-8047-5407-1 (cloth : alk. paper)—isbn 0-8047-5408-X (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Nationalism—Korea (South) 2. Ethnicity—Political aspects—Korea (South) 3. National characteristics, Korean. 4. Korea (South)— Civilization. 1. Title. II. Series. ds917.27.s47 2006 320.5409519 — dc22 2006002200 Original Printing 2006 Last figure below indicates year of this printing: 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 Typeset by G&S Book Services, Inc. in 11/14 and Adobe Garamond

Contents

Figures and Tables

ix

Acknowledgments

xi

Introduction: Explaining the Roots and Politics of Korean Nationalism

part i origins and development 1 2 3 4 5

Pan-Asianism and Nationalism Colonial Racism and Nationalism International Socialism and Nationalism North Korea and “Socialism of Our Style” Ilmin Chuu˘i and “Modernization of the Fatherland”

part ii contentious politics 6 7 8 9

Universalism and Particularism in Nation Building Tradition, Modernity, and Nation Division and Politics of National Representation Nation, History, and Politics

part iii current manifestations 10 Ethnic Identity and National Unification 11 Between Nationalism and Globalization Conclusion: Genealogy, Legacy, and Future

1

21 25 41 58 79 96

111 115 135 151 166

183 185 204 223 vii

viii

contents Appendix 1: Coding Standards on Textbooks

239

Appendix 2: Coding Standards on Magazines

241

Appendix 3: Findings of Statistical Analyses

243

Notes

251

Bibliography

269

Index

289

Figures and Tables

Figures 6.1. 6.2. 12.1.

Change of Contents, Textbooks: Traditional vs. Western in 1890s and 1900s Change of Contents, Kaebyo˘k and Tongkwang : Traditional vs. Western in the 1920s and 1930s Genealogy of Korean Nationalism

122 130 227

Tables 6.1. 6.2. 6.3. 6.4. 6.5. 6.6. 9.1. 10.1. 10.2. 10.3. 10.4. 10.5.

Contents of Textbooks Textbooks: Particularistic vs. Universalistic Textbooks: Contents by Period Contents of Magazines Magazines: Particularistic vs. Universalistic Magazines: Contents by Period South Korean Attitudes Toward the United States Independent and Control Variables Dependent Variables Impact of Ethnic Identity on Unification Attitudes Impact of Ethnic Identity on Behaviors Associated with Unification Impact of Ethnic Identity on Perceived Differences Between North and South Korea

121 122 123 128 129 130 177 191 192 195 196 197 ix

x

figures and tables 10.6. 10.7.

Impact of Ethnic Identity on the Possibility of South Korean Hegemony upon Unification Impact of Ethnic Identity on Distinction Between North Korean People and Communist Regime

Coefficients from Ordinal Logistic Models Analyzing Impact of Ethnic Identity on Unification Attitudes Appendix 3.2. Coefficients from Binary and Ordinal Logistic Models Analyzing Impact of Ethnic Identity on Behaviors Associated with Unification Appendix 3.3. Coefficients from Ordinal Logistic Models Analyzing Impact of Ethnic Identity on Perceived Differences Between North and South Korea Appendix 3.4. Coefficients from Binary and Ordinal Logistic Models Analyzing Impact of Ethnic Identity on the Possibility of South Korean Hegemony upon Unification Appendix 3.5. Coefficients from Ordinal Logistic Models Analyzing Impact of Ethnic Identity on Distinction Between North Korean People and Communist Regime

197

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Appendix 3.1.

244

245

246

248

249

Acknowledgments

This project began almost ten years ago when I was seeking to explain antiAmerican movements that had erupted in South Korea in the 1980s. I was interested in explaining why South Korea, once considered a best friend and ally of the United States, had embraced anti-American rhetoric and movements during its pursuit of democracy. My research found that the movements had inherently been related to the politics of national identity, since with the anti-American rhetoric dissidents had sought to challenge the authoritarian state’s definitions of nation and national identity. This interest in anti-Americanism naturally developed into a larger project on Korean nationalism covering the entire twentieth century with a focus on both the historical roots and contemporary relevance of identity politics. The project became much larger than I initially thought and thus took longer than I expected. My move to Stanford in the summer of 2001 further delayed completion of the project. It is thus with great pleasure (and also relief ) that I express my gratitude to so many people and institutions that have supported the project over the past decade. In particular, I was blessed with many talented students at Stanford who assisted me in carrying out the research needed for this book project. Grace Bang, Paul Y. Chang, Rachael Joo, Young-Choon Kim, Jeong-Woo Koo, Jung-Eun Lee, Maia Pierce, Stella Shin, and Suh-Young Shin deserve my deep appreciation. I was equally blessed with numerous grants in carrying out this project. A fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities xi

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acknowledgments

(FA–32712 –94) allowed me a year of leave from teaching and other obligations so that I could focus on the project. Grants from the United States Institute for Peace (USIP– 088 –99F) and the Munhwa Daily in Seoul enabled me to conduct a survey in the fall of 2000. I am particularly gratefully to Dr. Kim Chin-Hyo˘n, then chairman of the Daily, for his generous support. A grant from the Korea Research Foundation (03 –R27) aided me in carrying out research on the interplay of national and transnational forces. Faculty research funds from the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford greatly helped me in completing the book. Besides generous funding, the Center provided an ideal environment for research with great staff support, particularly provided by Shiho Barbir, Okky Choi, Jasmin Ha, and Victoria Tomkinson. Muriel Bell, Mariana Raykov, and Alexandria Giardino at Stanford University Press deserve credit for the smooth publication process of this book. Early drafts of various chapters were presented at the following meetings: the Korea Institute at Harvard University; the Departments of Sociology at Cornell University, at the University of California, Davis, and the University of Washington; the Council on East Asian Studies at Yale University; the Centers for Korean Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, and the University of Hawaii; the Asia Research Center at the University of British Columbia; the Graduate School of International Studies at Ewha Women’s University; the Department of Political Science at Korea University; and the Institute for Modern Korean Studies at Yonsei University. I am grateful to the hosts of these institutions who have afforded me wonderful opportunities to share and refine my views: Carter Eckert, Mary Brinton, Ming-cheng Lo, Daniel Chirot, Mimi Hall Yiengpruksawan, Robert Scalapino, Clair You, Hagen Koo, Yun-Shik Chang, Eun-Mee Kim, HyukBaek Im, and Young-Ick Lew. Parts of some chapters were published elsewhere: Chapter 7 in Comparative Studies in Society and History 41, no. 4 (1999); Chapter 8 in Korea and the Korean War, edited by Young-Ick Lew and Chae-Jin Lee (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2002); and Chapter 9 in Nationalism and the Construction of Korean Identity, edited by Pai Hyung-Il and Tim Tangherlini (Berkeley: The Institute of East Asian Studies at UC Berkeley, 1998). Last but not least, I cannot express enough how much I owe to my family for their continuous understanding and support throughout the project. Their unconditional affection, and even my children’s teasing, was

Acknowledgments

xiii

refreshing as I was constantly engaged in numerous projects, including building the new Korean Studies Program at Stanford University. Without my family by my side, I would not have been able to complete this book. With deep appreciation and love, I dedicate this book to them: William, Ashley, Kelley, and especially Michelle (Mee-Sun).

Ethnic Nationalism in Korea

Introduction Explaining the Roots and Politics of Korean Nationalism

One afternoon in June 2002 hundreds of thousands of Korean people filled the plaza in front of city hall in Seoul, Korea. They were shouting, “Taehan min’guk” (Republic of Korea, or literally, the Great Han People’s State), and “Oh, p’ilsu˘ng K’oria” (Oh, victory Korea), and “Uri nu˘n hana” (We are one). The scene was reminiscent of the June 1987 uprising in which equally large numbers of Koreans gathered at the plaza to demand democratic reform from Chun Doo Hwan’s authoritarian government. This time, however, they did not come out to the plaza as dissidents; they were fans rooting for the Korean soccer team that had just advanced to the semifinals of the Japan-Korea World Cup 2002. As the New York Times reported, “On the vast city hall plaza where a half-million demonstrators shouted protests against dictatorial rule a generation ago, about 200,000 red-shirted young people roared a new set of slogans this rainy afternoon with equally nationalistic message” ( June 11, 2002). According to estimates, on that day at least seven million Koreans poured into the streets all over the nation to cheer for the soccer team. Even in Los Angeles, at 4:30 a.m. twenty thousand Korean Americans filled the Staples Center (home of the Los Angeles Lakers) to cheer for the Korean team. A “red wave” of Korean soccer fans (also known as the “Red Devils”) appeared in other places as well, such as Paris city plaza, the Korean embassy in Germany, and Varsseveld in the Netherlands, hometown of the Korean soccer team head coach Guus Hiddink. This fervor over the World Cup was not simply about soccer. It was also about national pride, identity, and confidence. After Korea’s victory over Spain led to a semifinal showdown with Germany, President Kim Dae 1

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Jung proudly proclaimed that it was “Korea’s happiest day since Dangun [Tan’gun]—the god-king who, according to legend, founded the Korean nation” in 2333 BC (Asia Times Online, June 25, 2002). A survey of 542 Koreans conducted by Han’guk Research between June 27 and 28, 2002, showed that 75 percent of the respondents felt “strong pride” that they were Koreans during the games; 76 percent felt renewed confidence in Korea’s capability in the world (Korea Herald, July 10, 2002). Korea’s success aroused national pride among ethnic Koreans abroad as well. In Japan, during the KoreaGermany match at Tokyo Stadium two rival Korean political organizations, the pro-South mindan and the pro-North choch’ongnyo˘n, cheered together for the first time, chanting, “Taehan min’guk.” The Korea Times quoted Kwo˘n Pyo˘nghyo˘n, chairman of the Overseas Koreans Foundation: “One of the most important impacts of the World Cup on the 5.6 million overseas Koreans was to arouse their pride in being [ethnic] Korean and to bond with one another beyond differences” ( June 27, 2002). The strong sense of unity and national pride displayed by Koreans during the World Cup arises in large part from an identity based on a common bloodline and shared ancestry. President Kim’s reference to Tan’gun, the mythic founder of the Korean people, was not an accident; rather, it reflects a deep-rooted sense of ethnic national identity and unity shared by Koreans. Recent polls in South Korea confirm what these newspaper accounts reveal: a survey conducted in South Korea on December 1999 by the Korea Broadcasting Station (KBS) and by Hallym University found that 68.2 percent of the respondents in South Korea consider “blood” the most important criterion of defining the Korean nation; 74.9 percent agree that “Koreans are all brothers and sisters regardless of residence or ideology”; 67.5 percent say they are “proud of our national history.” 1 I conducted a survey in the fall of 2000 in South Korea; the results reveal similar views of nation and national identity.2 Ninety-three percent of the respondents reported, “Our nation has a single bloodline”; 95 percent agreed that “North Korean people are of the same Korean ethnic-nation.” In addition, 83 percent felt that Koreans living abroad, whether they had emigrated and attained citizenship elsewhere or were born outside Korea and were considered legal citizens of a foreign country, still belong to the han race because of shared ancestry. Reflecting such a racialized notion of nation, South Koreans feel much stronger attachment to Korean descendants in Japan (62 percent) and the United States (63 percent) than they do to Japanese (18 percent) or Americans (17 percent)

Roots and Politics of Korean Nationalism

3

living in Korea. For precisely this reason nationalistic slogans such as “We are one” invoked belief in ethnic unity and greatly appealed to the Koreans who gathered at the Seoul plaza as well as to the oversea ethnic Koreans who congregated to celebrate in various parts of the world.3 The question “What accounts for the rise and dominance of this strong sense of ethnic national unity?” requires scrutiny, and yet despite its importance to Korean society, the historical origins and politics of Korean national identity based on a sense of ethnic homogeneity has not received adequate scholarly attention. Ethnic unity is widely assumed on both sides of the Korean peninsula, and most Koreans do not question its historicity. Indeed it seems “politically incorrect” to question the eternal and natural essence of Korean ethnic unity.4 However, one cannot assume that Koreans’ ethnic national identity is fixed, or is something that stems from ancient times. As Carter Eckert notes, prior to the late nineteenth century, “There was little, if any, feeling of loyalty toward the abstract concept of ‘Korea’ as a nationstate, or toward fellow inhabitants of the peninsula as ‘Koreans’” (1991, 226). As such, Korean national identity based on ethnic homogeneity should be understood as a product of particular historical processes that require scholarly attention. On the other hand, belief in ethnic homogeneity is not simply a myth or a fantasy that lacks a substantive, historical base, as some scholars have claimed (for example, Grinker 1998). Although it does entail elements of construction in its formative processes, it has real social and political significance. As Connor points out, ethnic national identity can engender “a reality of [its] own, for it is seldom what is that is of political importance, but what people think is” (1994, 140; emphasis in original). Identity has crucial behavioral consequences. Indeed, a sense of ethnic unity has served Koreans in a variety of ways from being an ideology of anticolonialism to that of national unification. This book seeks to identify the historical processes through which Koreans came to develop national identity based on shared bloodline and to specify the ways in which this ethnic national identity has played out in Korean politics and society. Concerning the first issue, I focus on two interrelated processes: the rise and dominance of “nation” as a major source of collective or categorical identity over nonnational or transnational forms (class, for example), and the rise and establishment of a racialized and ethnicized notion of nation. With regard to the second point, I look closely at how the politics of ethnic national identity have played out in various fields,

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including anticolonialism, civil war, authoritarian politics and democratization, national division and unification, and globalization.

Contending Views of the Origins of the Korean Nation Scholars of nationalism debate the relationships among nation, nationalism, and ethnicity. Their dialogue centers around the extent to which the nation should be understood as something new and modern (“constructed,” cf. Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Giddens 1984; Hobsbawm 1990), or as a continuation of long-standing patterns of ethnicity, built on preexisting geographic or cultural foundations (“primordial,” cf. Connor 1994; Geertz 1963; Smith 1986, 1991). This dispute is over whether nationhood is a product of nationalist political mobilization of uniquely modern dimensions, or, conversely, whether the prior existence of ethnicity in fact explains much of modern nationality. The issue is particularly complicated in the Korean context, where there exists substantial overlap between the levels of race, ethnicity, and nation. When Koreans shouted, “We are one,” in Seoul’s city hall plaza and in Los Angeles’s Staples Center, they meant that Koreans are one race, one ethnicity, and one nation, regardless of their current legal citizenship, place of residence, or political beliefs. Although race is understood as a collectivity defined by innate and immutable phenotypic and genotypic characteristics and ethnicity is generally regarded as a cultural phenomenon based on a common language and history (see Yoshino 1992), Koreans have not historically differentiated between the two. Instead, race has served as a marker that strengthened ethnic identity, which in turn was instrumental in defining the nation. Race, ethnicity, and nation were conflated, and this is reflected in the multiple uses of the term minjok, the most widely used term for “nation,” which can also refer to “ethnie” or “race.” What accounts for the rise and establishment of such a strong sense of ethnic national identity or racialized notion of nation held among Koreans? As in the general literature on the study of nations and nationalisms, there exist several contending views to explain the origins of the Korean ethnic nation.5 First, those who advocate an ethnicist or primordialist view regard the idea of Korean ethnic national unity as natural, since all Koreans are considered descendants of Tan’gun. An Hosang, the first minister of education of the Republic of Korea, for instance, defined nation, and particularly the Korean ethnic nation, as a “natural product” of those who share the same “bloodline”

Roots and Politics of Korean Nationalism

5

and “fate” (1992, 49, 59). For An, because the most important criterion that defines a nation is bloodline, one is “born into a particular nation as its sons and daughters” (An 1992, 59). As such, nation is an ascriptive feature of individuals, not a social construction of a particular society. Many Korean historians, regardless of their ideological views, held the same view. In 1947 the prominent South Korean historian Son Chint’ae wrote, “Since the beginning of history, we [Koreans] have been a single race that has had a common historic life, living in a single territory. . ., sharing a common destiny” (cited in Duncan 1998, 198). Similarly, the well-known Marxist historian Paek Namun noted in 1946, “The Korean nation is a unitary nation with a common blood, territory, language, culture, and historical destiny for thousands of years” (cited in Pang 1992, 124). They argued that the Korean nation has been in existence since the dawn of historical time or at least since the Silla unification of the seventh century. The contest among the Three Kingdoms was taken as a struggle for the political unification of the Korean nation. As such, the contemporary sense of ethnic unity was the natural extension of historical experiences—the Korean minjok existed even if the word did not. Political leaders such as Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee of the South and Kim Il Sung of the North shared the same view. While in contention for national legitimacy and representation, they did not dispute the ethnic homogeneity of the Korean nation, which they agreed spanned thousands of years and was based on a single bloodline. In the early 1990s, North Korea even announced discovery of the tomb of Tan’gun, the mythic founder of the Korean nation, and some South Koreans sought to erect an honorary Tan’gun statue in every government office building. This primordialist view is still popular among the Korean populace, as shown in the surveys mentioned above. Modernists or constructionists, by contrast, regard the Korean nation as a modern product of nationalist ideology that was espoused at the end of the Choso˘n dynasty. Prior to this period, they argue, Korea was a status society with a clearly defined vertical hierarchy, which divided people into elite (yangban), commoners, and slaves. The Korean elite would have found the idea of nationalism not only strange but also uncivilized, and they may have considered themselves to be members of a larger cosmopolitan civilization centered around China.6 In such a situation, people would not and did not recognize themselves as belonging to one national community.7 In Henry Em’s (1999) view, the Korean nation was born only with Korea’s integration into the modern world system of nations and the subsequent rise of

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ethnic-nationalist historiography (minjok sahak) in the early twentieth century. He argues that even though Korea had a central bureaucratic state for more than a thousand years, unlike the modern nation-state, it was not interested in “nationalizing” its subjects. Ties were primarily hierarchical rather than “horizontal” as they are in the modern national community.8 Em also points to the rise of ethnic-nationalist historiography that replaced dynastic historiography as crucial to the birth of minjok—this “for the first time narrated the history of Korea as the history of the Korean minjok, a category inclusive of every Korean without regard to age, gender, or status distinctions” (1999, 339). In this view, the Korean nation was no exception to the general pattern of nation building seen elsewhere: it was a fundamentally modern construction that developed in conjunction with the emergence of the modern world system. This modernist (or postmodernist) position is gaining more currency among the new generation of Korean scholars in various fields, from literature to history to the social sciences (H. Kwo˘n 2000; H. Sin 2003; C. Yim 1999). At its extreme, Koreans’ sense of ethnic homogeneity is even taken as “myth,” “fantasy,” or “illusion” that lacks substantive historical base (Grinker 1998). A third group of scholars dispute both positions by attempting to address the uniqueness of the Korean experience (Duncan 1998; Schmid 2002). While they do not accept the Korean nation as natural as primordialists claim, they warn against applying the Western model to the Korean case. In particular, they refer to the remarkable stability of territorial boundaries and the endurance of the Korean bureaucratic state, and they attend to the potential these have as social and cultural bases for ethnic identity. For instance, John Duncan claims that “the organizational activities of the state may have created a homogeneous collectivity with a sense of shared identity much earlier than happened in the countries of Western Europe that provide the model for ‘modernist’ scholarship” (1998, 200 –201). Although these scholars use different terms in referring to the enduring collective identity maintained by premodern Koreans, such as “pre-modern nation” (cho˘n ku˘ndae minjok) (No 1997), “proto-nation” (Duncan 1998), or “ethnie” (M. Cho 1994), they all seem to agree that because of its presence, modern nationalism was able to take root rather quickly in Korea in the late nineteenth century. In Schmid’s (2002) words, this protonation just needed to be reframed in a new language of nation and nationalism. For these scholars, it would be misleading to mechanically apply the Western model to the formation of the Korean

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nation—instead, historical developments of premodern Korea should be taken into account in any explanation of the formation of the modern Korean nation. It seems to me fruitless to continue to debate whether the Korean nation is modern or primordial. It is apparent that the very notion of nation we use today is modern and Western in its origins, largely having to do with the rise of the world system of nation-states. There is no compelling evidence to show a direct connection between the premodern conception of a political community or identity (whether it be ethnie or protonation) and this modern sense of nation. Premodern Koreans held multiple forms of identity, and there was no assurance that nation as a form of collective identity would prevail over other rival forms, nonnational and transnational, in the modern era. Similarly there was no guarantee that ethnicity would become the primary basis of the Korean nation, as it has had to compete with other potential sources of nation. To be sure, the modern claim to nationhood is often evoked through the language of kinship and descent, and ethnicity can be a basis for nation or national identity as in Korea. Still, the two need to be conceptually and analytically distinguished. Calhoun does this by defining ethnicity as “networks of social relationships” and nation as “categories of similar individuals.” The former is reproduced through direct “interpersonal interactions,” and the latter through “the mediation of relatively impersonal agencies of largescale cultural standardization and social organization” (1997, 28). In Benedict Anderson’s words, nation is an “imagined” community whose members are connected to each other through imagination vis-à-vis the impersonal medium of print capitalism. As a form of “categorical identities,” the defining characteristic of nation or nationality is, then, “identification by similarity of attributes as a member of a set of equivalent members” (1997, 42). As such, the individual does not require the mediation of family, community, region, or class to be a member of the nation. In essence, nationality should be understood as an attribute of the individual, not of intermediate associations.9 Premodern Korea had no such conception of nation as a categorical identity, although one could argue that it had some agencies of “large-scale cultural standardization and social organization.” Therefore, debate about whether the Korean nation is modern should be replaced with explanations of the historical processes in which the nation rose, was contested, overrode other contending forms of collective or categorical identities, and came to

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be conflated with ethnicity and race. Nation or national identity remains a contested terrain in contemporary Korea, subject to constant challenge and reformulation.

Embedded, Contingent, and Contested: An Analytical Framework Nation is a product of social and historical construction, especially as the result of contentious politics, both within and without, in historically embedded and structurally contingent contexts. Let me elaborate key elements in the formation of a nation, that is, historical embeddedness, contingency, and contentious politics. embedded

I view the formation of nation embedded in particular social relations and history. Although the modernist view is correct in claiming that the formation of any nation inevitably includes the element of construction (Hobsbawm 1990; Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983), it is not simply the abstract process that is often conceptualized. Rather, a “nation” is socially and historically rooted, and aspects of modernity (for example, capitalism) that are said to influence the formation of the nation can have different meanings and significance in concrete cases. This explains why the spread of nationalism does not necessarily follow the pattern of its first emergence and why nationalism assumes different forms and functions as it spreads (Greenfeld 1992). In the Korean case, a sense of external threat as well as specific Korean historical experiences (for example, colonization) have been largely responsible for the rise and continued dominance of an ethnic, organic conception of nation, which stressed internal solidarity and submission to collectivist goals. In addition, historical embeddedness can explain the continuing power and vitality of nations in this global age. In contrast to predictions from both modernization theorists and Marxists, neither economic development nor social revolution were able to uproot nationalism. Instead, nation has continued to carry mobilizing power in many parts of the world, as most clearly illustrated by ethnic nationalism and conflict in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Nationalism commands popular appeal since nation building incorporates native elements—preexisting sentiments, cultural heritages, and ethnic formations—into its formation process. As Calhoun rightly points out, demonstration of invention and manipulation should not be taken to mean that “nationalism has nothing to do with ethnicity and

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draws no strength from the emotional commitments people forge in their everyday social relations” (1997, 30). In Smith’s view, as an ideology “nationalism can take root only if it strikes a popular chord and is taken up by, and inspires, particular social groups and strata” (1995, viii). In the Korean case, for instance, the Tan’gun myth struck a popular chord among Koreans just as they were facing foreign aggression. The myth’s utility in countering colonial racism and assimilation policy has left a long-lasting legacy. Historical embeddedness, not abstract formulation, explains not only the origins but also the continuing power of nation and nationalism in the present day. contingent

That the formation of nation is embedded in particular social relations and history does not mean that the rise of nation is inevitable or that preexisting ethnic relations or cultural heritage determines a particular form of nation. Instead, both the rise of nation as a form of collective identity and the development of a particular notion of nation are a matter of historical contingency. First, there are no objective conditions that necessitate the emergence of nation and nationalism, though earlier social science theory sought to “predict” the emergence of nationalism (see, for example, Deutsch 1953). As many scholars of nationalism have shown, nationalism first emerged out of a concurrence of events in one country, England, and then spread due to historical coincidence. In Michael Mann’s view, “Anderson’s much-touted ‘print capitalism’ could have as easily generated a transnational or a federal West as a community of nations” (1994, 2). By the late nineteenth century, nationalism became a powerful modern ideology that other countries came to emulate. Korea closely followed the Japanese model in the early stages of the modern nation-building process, as Japan demonstrated the efficacy of nationalism in its rise to a power in an emerging East Asian regional order. By the second half of the twentieth century, nationalism became a “canon” in both parts of the Korean peninsula and produced contentious “politics of national representation” between them. Still, it would be misleading to assume that the hegemonic position that nationalism has enjoyed in the peninsula was inevitable. In the process of its emergence and dominance, nation, as a form of categorical identity, had to compete with other forms, nonnational and transnational, such as race and class.10 Its hegemonic position was not destined, but rather is largely due to historically contingent situations. Even in premodern Korea, as John Duncan shows, there existed “several levels of identity” and “which particular identity

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took precedence at any given time was dependent on historically contingent circumstances” (1998, 220). Thus, historical contingency should guide an explanation of the rise and dominance of nation as a categorical identity. Similarly the rise and development of a particular notion of nation is historically contingent. Nation building is a historical process where various elements operate to varying degrees depending on specific historical and political conditions. As Smith argues, “Every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms. . . .Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate; at other times it is the ethnic and vernacular components that are emphasized” (1991, 13). Brubaker’s comparative study of nationhood in France and Germany (1992) illustrates how a varying mixture of these elements produces distinctive forms of nationality in different historical and structural contexts. In Kuzio’s (2002) view, ethnic factors tend to overshadow civic elements in times of crisis such as immigration, foreign wars, and terrorism. In the Korean case, once again, a sense of external threat was largely responsible for the rise of the ethnic notion of nation. It is simply wrong to regard the establishment of an ethnicized notion of nation in modern Korea as inevitable or natural. Scholars must specify historically contingent contexts that produced a particular notion of nation and nationhood. contested

I consider contestation a key element in the historically contingent process of nation formation. Although the current literature on nationalism focuses on competition among different ethnic groups vying for state power or contention among different kinds of nationalism, I examine a much larger field of contentious politics in nation-building processes. In particular, I pay close attention to two interrelated processes: one in which nation came to dominate other forms of collective identities (for example, class, gender, race), and the other in which a particular notion of nation and nationhood came to dominate competing interpretations of the nation. First, nation as a collective identity competes with other forms of identity from the local to the transnational. The history of modern Western Europe shows that the rise and dominance of a nation occurred at the expense of local-regional (for example, feudal lords) and transnational (for example, churches) rivals (Mann 1993). Likewise, in modern Japan, national narratives were caught between two forces: an impulse to assimilate colonial subjects as citizens of the Japanese

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empire, and the equally powerful drive to distinguish itself from its backward Asian colonies (Tanaka 1993). Duara summarizes: “Rising almost simultaneously with nationalism as a global ideology in the late nineteenth century were various transnational ideologies such as pan-Europeanism, panAsianism, and later pan-Arabism, pan-Africanism” (1997, 1033). Even before contending over its very notion (civic or ethnic, for example), the nation as a source of collective identity has had to compete with other forms, nonnational, subnational, or transnational. Second, the notion of nation is contested as well. In the process of nation building different elements operate to varying degrees depending on specific historical and political conditions. However, this does not mean that structural conditions determine the rise and dominance of a particular notion of nation. Instead it must be seen as the outcome of contention over other competing notions. As Sato (1998) claims, nation can be considered “a field of politics” in which different conceptions of nationhood and forms of nationalism compete for dominance—state versus oppositional nationalism; political-territorial versus ethno-cultural conception of nationhood; civic and individualistic versus ethnic and collectivistic notion of nation, and so on (see also Brubaker 1992). This kind of internal contention is inevitable since the notion of nation, as Calhoun points out, is “so deeply imbricated in modern politics as to be ‘essentially contested,’. . .because any definition will legitimize some claims and delegitimize others” (1993, 215). Thus, this study seeks to identify two interrelated processes that has led to the formation of ethnic/racial nationalism in Korea: (1) one in which the nation came to dominate over other forms of categorical identities such as region and class (discussed in Part I); and (2) the other in which an organic, racialized, and collectivistic notion of nation based on common blood and shared ancestry came to prevail over other notions of nation (discussed in Part II). Once again it is my view that the rise and dominance of ethnic nationalism or an organic notion of the Korean nation was a product of contentious politics, both within and outside of Korea, in historically embedded and structurally contingent contexts.

Nationalism as a Force of Modernity In recent years, there has been a great deal of discussion and debate among scholars in Korea and elsewhere over the concept of modernity. Terms such

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introduction

as “East Asian modernity,” “colonial modernity,” “high modernity,” and “postmodernity” illustrate the diversity and scope of such debates (Barlow 1997; Giddens 1990; Harvey 1989; Shin and Robinson 1999; Tu 1996). In the Korean context, the debates particularly focus on identifying particularistic and universalistic features of modernity that appeared in Korea (see the special issue of ch’angjak kwa pip’yo˘ng 21, no. 4 [1993]). The question arises because while modernity is often associated with Western Europe, what appeared in Korea was quite different from what happened in Europe. Contrary to earlier modernization theories, which assumed that societies develop along the line of Western modernity, it has now become clear that there are multiple paths to the modern world. Barrington Moore Jr.’s (1966) seminal work on diverse paths to modernity—West European bourgeois democracy, German / Japanese fascism, and Russian /Chinese communism— clearly established this idea. However, there exists much less consensus over how to specify the paths that lead to a particular form of modernity. In the field of East Asian studies in general and Korean studies in particular, a prevailing view has emphasized the role of the “developmental state” in the East Asian or Korean transition to modernity (Amsden 1989; Evans 1995; Johnson 1982; Wade 1990; Woo 1991). The East Asian or Korean state, according to this view, was able to act as an agent of modernity since it possessed both the “capacity” to lead the transformation with an efficient Weberian bureaucracy and “autonomy” largely insulated from society (Evans 1995; Johnson 1982). In short, the “developmental” role of the state would differentiate East Asian from West European experiences in their transition to modernity.11 Recently, however, scholars have begun to question such a statist approach as exaggerating the exceptional trajectory of the East Asian (and Korean) road to modernity. They claim that social groups and classes have played an equally important role in East Asian (and Korean) cases. Hagen Koo (1993), for instance, argues that Korea’s transition to the modern world has not been a smooth, evolutionary process, nor has it been dictated by the state or a foreign (even colonial) power. Instead, it has been highly “contentious,” and individuals, groups, and social classes have equally contributed to its transition processes. My earlier works (1996, 1998) likewise showed that agrarian class structure and conflict shaped Korea’s road to modernity. The present study should be understood in this larger context, that is, as an effort to specify a mechanism of Korea’s transition to modernity.

Roots and Politics of Korean Nationalism

13

Following an important tradition in historical sociology, I focus on nationalism as a major force that has influenced Korea’s transition to the modern world. Gellner’s (1983) seminal work on “nations and nationalism” showed how nationalism was a necessary component of the overall process of modernization by supplying “a mobile, literate, culturally standardized, interchangeable population.” In a different context, Gerschenkron defined nationalism as “an ideology of delayed industrialization” considered necessary to “break through the barriers of stagnation in a backward country. . .[and] to place [its] energies in the service of economic development” (1962, 29). In the East Asian context, nationalism, often in the form of developmentalism, became a major mobilizing force behind first Japanese and then Korean modernization projects. Liah Greenfeld in her study of “five roads to modernity” argues that the emergence of nationalism predated the development of every significant component of modernity. According to her, the rise of civic-individualistic nationalism in England and ethnic-collectivistic nationalism in Germany were instrumental in shaping the kind of modernity that appeared in these respective countries (that is, liberal democracy and authoritarian fascism respectively). In her view the causal order in the relationship between nationalism and modernity must be explicit: “Rather than define nationalism by its modernity, I see modernity as defined by nationalism” (Greenfeld 1992, 18). Although Greenfeld overlooks the reciprocal or interactive nature of their relationships and the historical fact that nationalism and modernization arose almost simultaneously in many parts of the world including Korea (see Shin and Robinson [1999] for a discussion of the interactive nature of modernity and nationalism), her argument that nationalism is not simply a reflection but rather is a defining feature of modernity should be taken seriously. Thus this study is based on the premise that while nationalism is shaped by modernity, it also shapes, if not determines, the forms and nature of modernity that a particular country takes. In Korea, for instance, one can argue that nationalism based on common blood and shared ancestry has functioned as a key mechanism to establish collectivism or a strong sense of oneness. This is said to be a key feature of Korean modernity that presents a sharp contrast to the individualism of Western modernity. Nationalism can also be seen as instrumental to the rise of a “developmental ethic” that contributed to the success of Korean modernization. Although the developmental ethic may have been associated with Confucianism, as some scholars

14

introduction

have argued (Berger and Hsiao 1988), what transformed the Confucian ethic from a hindrance to promoter of capitalism was its linkage to nationalism. The Park regime was able to create a developmental ethic among Koreans by skillfully fusing the Confucian respect for hierarchy, harmony, and loyalty to authority with the nationalist slogan of “modernization of the fatherland.” Similarly, militant nationalism expressed in juche (chuch’e, or self-reliance) ideology is a defining feature of North Korean modernity (Cumings 1993). Finally, by looking at the contentious politics of nationalism (both internal and external) as specified above, this study can identify specific sites of contention among various social groups as well as that between state and society in shaping Korea’s road to modernity.

Beyond Essentialism There exists a strong tradition in the scholarship on nationalism, from Hans Kohn (1945) to Donald Horowitz (1985, 2001), that views political nationalism as civic, integrative, and constructive, while ethnic nationalism is seen as dangerous, divisive, and destructive. Ethnic cleavages are considered more fundamental and permanent than other forms of cleavage, and conflict arising from them are said to be the most difficult to deal with. For instance, Diamond and Plattner argue that the “conflicts [ethnicity] generates are intrinsically less amenable to compromise than those revolving around material issues. . .because at bottom they revolve around exclusive symbols and conceptions of legitimacy. . .characterized by competing demands that cannot easily be broken down into bargainable increments” (1994, xviii). Recent research in ethnicity and nationalism that has focused on the potential danger that ethnic nationalism poses to social stability and political development in the former Soviet Empire and Eastern Europe reflects such an orientation (Diamond and Plattner 1994; Horowitz 2001; Mostov 1994; Urban 1991). Yet such a view essentializes the nature of ethnic nationalism, overlooking diversity and complexity in its role and functions.12 In Japan, for instance, ethnic nationalism is said to have functioned as a major form of “populist attack on the [authoritarian] state” in place of civil society. According to Kevin Doak, the postwar “liberal” Japanese state “has not yet completely uprooted . . . ‘love of the fatherland’ and replaced it with . . . ‘love of society,’” so that civil society had to compete with ethnic nationalism as an alternative source of antistate sentiment (1997, 299).13 Also in the “new”

Roots and Politics of Korean Nationalism

15

unified Germany, ethnic nationalism is being activated by the state as a potentially unifying force. Faced with the painful process of reunification, the German elite has deployed ethnic nationalism as a strategy to entice the people to finance the costs of a delegitimized German Democratic Republic regime and an apolitical German Federal Republic. As a result, the prevailing political slogan shifted from “We are the people” to “We are one people.” Although this “superficial” appeal to ethnic nationalism raises growing concern among German intellectuals (Fulbrook 1994; Offe 1990), it illustrates the complex use of ethnic nationalism that is often overlooked in current literature on nationalism, which is primarily based on the multiethnic states. Korean scholarship on nationalism has often asked whether nationalism is good, and whether it should be seen as an ideology of domination or as one of resistance (see the inaugural issue of yo˘ksa munje yo˘n’gu). Although recent scholarship has begun to point out the dark side of Korean nationalism and its fascist potential (H. Kwo˘n 2000; C. Yim 1999), the prevailing view continues to cast it in a positive light, that is, as an ideology of anticolonialism, anti-imperialism, and national unification. Nationalism has also colored historical scholarship, producing highly nationalistic master narratives in both sides of the peninsula (Shin and Robinson 1999). As history, especially the history of nationalism, was closely linked to regime legitimacy, each side “patronized” its own version of nationalist master narratives. Yet, one must recognize the double-edged nature of nationalism, which can be both a blessing and a curse. The rise of nationalism would be a blessing for those people who share a common language, culture, and history but who have no nation-state to call their own. This was the case for Korea under Japanese rule. At the same time the liberating potential of nationalism can be easily converted to the basis or rationale for domination and repression, intolerance, and persecution, as seen in postcolonial Korea, both North and South (especially before the 1987 democratic transition). Thus, nationalism in itself is fairly harmless. Only when combined with other ideologies can its effect be felt. As Smith (1991) points out, nationalism allows for “chameleon-like permutations” because it can be combined with ideologies like liberalism, racism, and romanticism, which serve a variety of goals from democratic to authoritarian, divisive to unifying, modern to antimodern. Indeed, ethnic nationalism has been combined with different forms of ideologies in modern Korea, the Left (communism) and the Right (capitalism), modern (industrialism) and antimodern (agrarianism), authoritarian

16

introduction

and democratic politics, and local and transnational forces (globalization). Ethnic nationalism has also intensified tensions and conflict between the two Koreas, while still serving as an ideology of national unification. Scholars need to specify historical and political contexts to reveal the multiple roles and functions that ethnic nationalism has played, rather than assuming its uniform nature or function, or making a priori moral judgments. Only then can a proper evaluation of both the prize and price of Korean ethnic nationalism be undertaken.

Toward a Sociology of Nationalism The book departs from most previous works of Korean nationalism with a specific focus on its ethnic dimension. It does not intend to be a general study of Korean nationalism, but rather focuses on the blood-based notion of nation that prevails in Korea today. It is my belief that having a more specific focus, rather than a general study, is key to advancing an understanding of Korean nationalism and also to facilitating constructive debates on the origins of the Korean nation. In fact, those few studies that have a specific focus in the study of Korean nationalism (for example, Robinson’s [1988] cultural nationalism) have made better contributions than general studies have. Methodologically, this book takes a macro historical-sociological perspective. Most of earlier works (Kim Tohyo˘ng 1994; Pang 1992; Pak Ch’ansu˘ng 1992) are primarily historical and descriptive, narrating the history of Korean nationalism based on key nationalist figures. Although intellectuals are often leaders of nationalist movements and their writings are used extensively as materials for my own analysis, nationalism is more than an intellectual discourse or narrative. Nationalism does not consist of ideas that are free floating but rather of ideas that are socially, historically, and locally embedded. Moreover, despite the fact that nationalism by definition is supposed to include all people, it was often built on a particular class and class interest. Thus, instead of focusing on intellectual history, this book seeks to identify social and historical conditions that have shaped the rise and development of ethnic nationalism in twentieth-century Korea. For this reason, I use a variety of sources and data, including speeches by political leaders, public opinion surveys, and various writings by intellectuals and activists. In so doing, I take ethnic nationalism as a key organizing principle of Korean society. In the Durkheimian sense, ethnic nationalism represents a

Roots and Politics of Korean Nationalism

17

major form of “mechanical solidarity” of Korean society. Mechanical solidarity, according to Emile Durkheim, comes from “likeness” between members of society and prevails to the extent that “ideas and tendencies common to all members of the society are greater in number and intensity than those when pertain personally to each member.” This solidarity can “grow only in inverse ratio to personality” (Durkheim 1933, 129 –30). Koreans’ national identity based on common blood and shared ancestry can be considered representative of such a mechanical form of solidarity. However, it should not be taken as a primitive form to pass away with modernization. Contrary to Durkheim’s prediction, ethnic nationalism has not disappeared or been replaced by “organic solidarity” as societies modernized or globalized.14 In Korea, decades of rapid industrialization and globalization have not uprooted ethnic nationalism; instead Koreans’ ethnic national identity has intensified in response to the penetration of these transnational forces.15 The presence and power of ethnic nationalism was well displayed at the Seoul plaza when Koreans cheered for their national soccer team at the 2002 World Cup. Seen in this way, the study of ethnic nationalism demands a more sociological approach: as a form of solidarity or organizing principle of society, rather than simply as intellectual discourse, it has crucial behavioral consequences. In this book, I view nation as a contested field of politics. Whereas previous works have focused on the contention between bourgeois and Marxist versions of Korean nationalism, I examine much larger fields of contention, between national and transnational forces as well as between different notions of nationhood.16 In so doing, I seek to overcome the bifurcated view of Korean nationalism and to recover voices and stories marginalized by the master narratives of nationalist historiography on both sides of the peninsula (Duara 1995; Shin and Robinson 1999). My goal is to demonstrate that modern Korea has been a rich repository of the diverse and contending views of a political community in search of a new, modern, viable nationhood. Such a search continues today. Finally, I evaluate the prize and price of ethnic nationalism in modern Korea. Nationalism is like a double-edged sword, wielding both a blessing and a curse. Indeed, nationalism has had much to contribute during Korea’s turbulent years of modern transformation as a force of anticolonialism and modernization, for instance. It still offers a source of inspiration and pride for many Koreans and functions as a key ideological basis for national unification of divided Korea. At the same time, nationalism has exacted a heavy price

18

introduction

to Korean society, culture, and politics. It marginalized other competing voices and was, in the name of an abstract, immortal nation, used by authoritarian states (in both Koreas) to suppress civic rights and individual freedom. Korea continues to face the tough task of transforming national identity based on common blood and ancestry into a more open, civic, and democratic identity.

Korea as a Case In the general literature on nations and nationalism, East Asian nations are largely treated as exceptional cases. In his well-known book on nationalism, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, Eric Hobsbawm, for instance, regards China, Japan, and Korea as “among the extremely rare examples of historic states composed of a population that is ethnically almost or entirely homogeneous” (1990, 66). To be sure, East Asian nations, especially Korea, have different experiences and trajectories in their modern nation-building processes, but these need to be integrated into or used in developing “general” theories of nationalism, rather than being relegated into “particular” or “deviant” cases of nationalism. As Emigh (1997) argues, a “deviant case analysis” can make a crucial theoretical contribution by comparing a single case to some generalization based on the knowledge of numerous cases. Korea has had experiences different from most other nations, even Japan and Germany, which are often compared with Korea, and its experience can be useful in understanding complexities in nationalism. First, in contrast to many West European and African countries where a more territorial notion of nation took place and ethnicity was attenuated or even suppressed by modernizing forces or nation-building efforts, in Korea ethnicity has been a key marker of nation and national identity. Korea, unlike other countries, has long maintained a coherent political community within a stable territorial boundary with a well-established agrarian bureaucracy. Also Korea has had a fairly homogeneous ethnic, protonation, or historic nation, if not the nation in the modern sense, for centuries. Such historical experiences present significant contrasts to Western Europe, in which the current geographical and political map was not formed until the modern era and where nationalism primarily functioned as a political ideology to integrate diverse ethnic groups into a coherent political community called nation. Korea has been divided since 1945, violating the “nationalist principle of congruence of

Roots and Politics of Korean Nationalism

19

state and nation,” to use Gellner’s (1983) famous phrase. Yet the violation in Korea—“one ethnic nation, two states”—is the opposite of most other cases where multiple ethnic groups were contending for state power. Second, while Korea resembled and was influenced by Japan in developing nationalism, the two countries still showed important differences. During the formative years of nation building, Japan was an imperialist power, while Korea was its colony. Also, unlike European colonialism in African and Latin American countries that established new but quite arbitrary administrative units that later became national boundaries, Japanese colonialism did not draw a new geographic boundary. Instead, it sought to assimilate Koreans into the Japanese empire as imperial subjects. In contrast to prewar Japan in which nationalism was fused with militarism and imperialism, nationalism in colonial Korea functioned as an ideology of anticolonialism, carrying a positive connotation among the populace. Colonial Korea saw the development and articulation of ethnic nationalism based on shared blood and ancestry that countered colonial racism and assimilation. Thus, Korea differs from Japan where a sense of ethnic homogeneity was, for the most part, a post–1945 product that replaced the prewar model of the multiethnic Japanese empire (Lie 2001; Sato 1998). Third, one may point out that Korea resembles divided Germany in the sense that both nations maintain a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity and were split into two parts after 1945. Still, Korea differs from Germany where a similarly strong ethnic nationalism was discredited after 1945 due to its prewar linkage with Nazism. In contrast, nationalism, as a political resource, has been extensively used and promoted in postcolonial Korea. Today, Korea is the only place in which ethnic homogeneity (real or perceived) remains broken into two political entities.17 Thus, from a comparative perspective, Korea offers a fascinating case in the study of nation and nationalism. One may argue that as a “deviant” case, though it may be interesting in itself, the study of Korean nationalism is not theoretically important since it lacks generalizing power. By contrast, some, especially most Korean scholars, have not paid proper attention to the theoretical or comparative relevance of the Korean case. They remain “case studies” of Korean nationalism. It is my belief that the history of Korean nationalism presents a theoretical challenge to the study of nations and nationalism and thus can contribute to the current literature. A study done in this manner can help to overcome an essentialized view of ethnic nationalism prevalent in

20

introduction

the current literature. As such, this study aspires to offer more than a mere description of the history of Korean nationalism. I hope that this study can offer larger theoretical implications for the general literature on nations and nationalism.

What Is Ahead? This book is divided into three parts. Part I focuses on specifying historical processes in which nation has come to dominate rival forms of collective or categorical identities in modern Korea. Nation is treated as only one of many competing sources of collective identity for Koreans in their transition to the modern world. Part I considers four major transnational forces: pan-Asianism (Chapter 1); colonial racism (Chapter 2); international socialism and communism (Chapters 3 and 4); and capitalism and modernization (Chapter 5); all of which have competed with nationalism. Part II examines the processes and politics of contention among various notions of the Korean nation. Even as nation became a dominant source of collective identity, there was no consensus over its basis and it was subject to contentious politics. Part II starts with examining the contention between individualistic/civic/universalistic and collectivistic / ethnic / particularistic understandings of nation at the turn of the twentieth century (Chapter 6). Chapter 7 investigates the contention between modernist and antimodernist (agrarian) conceptions of nation during colonial rule. The focus then shifts to the post–1945 contention between the two Koreas over national representation (Chapter 8), and one between official and popular versions (in the South) during authoritarian rules and democratic movements of the 1960s through 1980s (Chapter 9). Part III looks at current manifestations of ethnic nationalism in (South) Korea. Two main issues that confront Korea today are unification and globalization. Because current discourse and policy on unification is based on the premise that Korea will be unified since it is an ethnically homogeneous nation, Chapter 10 evaluates this claim with close attention paid to the ways in which ethnic identity shapes views of the North, national division, and unification. Chapter 11 examines the interplay of nationalism and globalization, the latest in the array of transnational forces that have appeared in modern Korea.

one

Pan-Asianism and Nationalism

On Christmas Day 1890, British trader A. Henry Savage-Landor traveled from Japan to Korea, a place very few Europeans had ever visited. Five years later he published his observations, depicting Korea as “the land of the morning calm,” a poetic description that became well known. Ironically, the phrase was not intended as praise of Korea, but rather as a way to convey a former glory that Korea had lost. Korea, he wrote, “[seemed] to have entirely lost the vigour and strength of their predecessors, the Koraians ([Koryo˘] Koreans).” To Savage-Landor, “morning calm” meant dullness, not serenity. He further claimed that the name “Corea is nothing but a corruption of the dead and buried world ‘Korai’ [Koryo˘]” (1895, 31). Savage-Landor was both right and wrong. On the one hand, the Choso˘n Korea he observed had lost its earlier vitality because its long-lived system no longer functioned effectively. The long-standing regional order centered on China was crumbling and a new order began to emerge. In the process, Korea found itself forced to open its doors to Japan in 1876. Soon Korea faced internal peasant uprisings and major external wars, notably the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 –95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 – 05. Savage-Landor failed to appreciate such forces of change and transformation at work, throughout Korean society as well as outside the peninsula. Western ideologies and thought such as the theories of civilization and enlightenment (munmyo˘ng kaehwa), social Darwinism, nationalism, and liberalism were introduced (often through Japan) to Korea, while old ideologies, such as Confucianism, were revitalized, and new native religions, such as Tonghak (Eastern Learning), appeared. All emerged as potential resources for creating a new Korea. 25

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origins and development

Korean elites also traveled widely in Japan, China, and beyond, and the publication of newspapers and magazines offered new public forums to introduce ideas and debate the efficacy of various old and new ideas. Koreans were eager to reform their ancient system and create a modern Korea. The Kapsin coup of 1884, Tonghak peasant rebellion of 1894, Kabo reform of 1894 –96, Independence Club activities of 1896 –98, and a campaign for ch’o˘ksa wijo˘ng (rejection of heterodoxy and defense of orthodoxy) represented such efforts (Chung 1995; Yu 1990). Late nineteenth-century Korea was hardly “the land of the morning calm” that Savage-Landor described. What he perceived as calm may very well have simply been the calm before a big storm that would soon sweep across the country. Various efforts to reform the ancient regime did not simply concern socioeconomic and political issues. They were closely related to the issue of identity. A sense of national identity not only reflects the emergence of modernity but also operates to shape the particular form and direction of modernity that a country will take. Korea was no exception to this pattern. With the decline of China, rise of Japan, and the increasing presence of the West in the East Asian region, the main question for Korea in the late nineteenth century was how to position itself vis-à-vis a newly emerging regional and world order. Would Korea still identify itself as part of the East, while disassociating itself from China? Would Korea disassociate itself completely from the East and accept Western civilization? Would Korea perhaps identify itself as separate from both East and West? Or would Korea mix both Western and Eastern elements to create something new? The quest for answers to these questions would inherently shape Korea’s efforts to reform its ancient system and to defend the nation from outside forces. Koreans in the late nineteenth century faced the daunting task of simultaneously modernizing their country and (re-)creating its identity. To be sure, this question of identity was not new to Korea. Even before the modern era, Koreans had “several levels of identity,” which often competed for primacy. In contrast to the popular image of Choso˘n Korea as the “hermit kingdom,” in the earlier periods of the millennium, Korea actively participated in the larger East Asian cultural sphere.1 During the Koryo˘ period, for instance, Korean Buddhists engaged in the Sinitic and Sino-Indian world order (Buswell 1998), while during the Choso˘n dynasty, the Korean yangban elite identified with other East Asian literati (Duncan 1998). Nevertheless, these Korean Buddhists and yangban developed a separate identity within

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27

the larger cultural sphere and possessed a sense of distinctive territory and political community, if not the modern notion of nation. They saw little contradiction in participating in the Sinitic world while maintaining an independent Korean identity. What particular identity took precedence, as Duncan (1998) points out, ultimately depended on historically contingent circumstances, such as the rise of a more independent stance toward the Chinese civilization and the emphasis on distinctive elements of Korean civilization after the Manchu conquest of China in 1644. The rapidly changing regional order since the mid-nineteenth century once again necessitated Koreans’ search for a contemporary, yet distinct, identity. It had to be an identity that could offer inspiration for Korean people and guide their efforts to create a modern and viable Korea. It also had to be an identity that would help Koreans defend their country from encroaching foreign aggression. Although most Korean elites and intelligentsia shared a sense of crisis and necessity in creating a new identity, many disagreed over the proper form of such an identity. At the turn of the twentieth century, two ideologies competed in this context: pan-Asianism and nationalism. To date, scholars and historians have focused largely on nationalism while neglecting pan-Asianism, even dismissing it due to its association with Japanese imperialism.2 Nevertheless, pan-Asianism, like nationalism, stimulated a radical rethinking of the Korean nation and offered a vision for a modern Korea in a changing regional and world order. In fact, Kim Minhwan’s (1988) quantitative analysis of 1,950 articles taken from five major newspapers published at the turn of the twentieth century shows that pan-Asianism was more salient than nationalism as an ideology of Korean independence and security, at least until the Japanese Protectorate Treaty of 1905. Pan-Asianists sought to offer a new vision of the region as a cultural entity by showing how the notion of a common Eastern heritage could shape a new understanding of the Western notion of civilization and enlightenment, one that worked to the benefit of Korea. Put another way, a transnational notion of the East was appropriated for the national agenda in the face of Western challenges.

East, West, and Social Darwinism Pan-Asianism and nationalism were modern phenomena in the sense that both were stimulated by a new world-system of nation-states dominated by the West.3 By the time Korea joined the world-system in the late nineteenth

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origins and development

century, the Western notion of “civilization” (munmyo˘ng, or bunmei) had become dominant in international discourse, provoking a radical rethinking of the nation, the region, and the world (Duara 2003). Korean intelligentsia introduced, discussed, and debated the values of Western, liberal, and cosmopolitan universalism. In particular, many in Korea, as well as in China and Japan, embraced the international standard of civilization as a way to make their countries fully sovereign and modern in an emerging worldsystem of nation-states. As a parallel to Fukuzawa Yukichi’s well-known An Outline of the Civilization, which prescribed a Japanese appropriation of Western notions of civilization, Yu Kilchun’s So˘yu kyo˘nmun represented how Koreans should approach the Western conception of civilization. This concept’s universal applicability and its suitability as a framework for social and political reform in their own countries attracted both of these authors. Embracing the Western notion of civilization by no means excluded the possibility of developing an alternative conception of civilization. Far from discarding their East Asian or cultural heritage, East Asian leaders and intellectuals sought to selectively utilize elements of an Eastern or “indigenous” tradition in creating a new framework. In this context the notion of the “East” (to¯yo¯ in Japanese; tongyang in Korean) developed as a counter to the “West.” The concept allowed Japanese and Koreans to appropriate Western notions of civilization into their own context while seeing themselves as an alternative locus of civilization (Tanaka 1993). This logic formed a basis for translocal identity, such as pan-Asianism.4 Alternatively, nationalists investigated their own history and heritage, searching for evidence of uniqueness and greatness. For instance, the Korean script, previously the language of women and the lower class, was identified and promoted as a Korean national heritage that would distinguish Korea from the rest of East Asia and prove Korea’s advancement. Korean history was also presented as a narrative of an ethnic nation, rather than as a part of a China-centered East Asian history. Whereas pan-Asianists looked into common traditions within East Asia to produce a counternarrative to the Western discourses of civilization, nationalists focused on promoting their own cultural heritage to establish the idea of a distinct ethnic nation. Social Darwinism played a prominent role in the process of appropriating Western notions of civilization. In the West, social Darwinism served to explain social inequality and to justify imperialist expansion. European scientific and technological accomplishments were interpreted as

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29

incontestable proof of Western racial superiority and were used to rationalize “civilizing missions” of the rest of the world. In other words, as Presenjit Duara (2003) indicates, international law and its standard of civilization became increasingly positivist, reflecting the social Darwinist concept that certain races were more civilized than others. Although the notion of civilization itself did not preclude the possibility of a certain race becoming more civilized, the idea that there existed a hierarchy of races with different capacities to achieve civilization became a naturalized ideology. Furthermore, as many scholars have noted, social Darwinism was closely linked with racism. When it was introduced to East Asia, social Darwinism not only offered a conceptual framework to explain current national inequalities but also worked to guide East Asian responses to the “civilizing” West. East Asians used the same social Darwinist logic to defend themselves from the aggressive “civilizing” efforts of the West. In so doing, the German version of this ideology, which focused on the collective struggle for existence among nations and races, rather than the Anglo-American focus on individual capitalist competition, wielded a strong influence on East Asian understandings of social Darwinism (Wiekart 1993). Kato¯ Hiroyuki (1836 –1916) of Japan was highly influential in shaping East Asian understandings of social Darwinism and its application to social and political reform. He argued that in international relations, as in the biological world, societies obey the laws of “the struggle for existence” and “natural selection.” Kato¯, in contrast to Spencerian individualist theories, understood state, nation, and race as social organisms (yu¯kitai), which were the basic units of political struggle. As an organism, the nation was more than the sum of the individuals it comprised, and there was an asymmetrical relationship between the individual and nation. The nation “cannot sacrifice itself for the good of the individual, for that would lead to anarchy and universal misery” (Davis 1996, 70). He combined this organic, collectivistic notion of the state/nation with Confucian notions of kinship, regarding the state/nation as a family and thus a family-state. He depicted “internal struggle” (for example, class struggle) as an unacceptable contest among family members; thus, individual interests must yield to collective interests (for example, nation) in Japan’s “external struggle” with other nations. This organic and collectivistic understanding of social Darwinism was introduced to Korea in the 1880s (K. Ch’oe 1999; Cho˘n 1996; K. Lee 1978). On his return from a trip to Japan, Yu Kilchun (1856 –1914) wrote his

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well-known “theory of competition” (kyo˘ngjaengnon) that reflected the Kato¯ian view of social Darwinism. In the theory, Yu defined nation as a social organism dividing nations into three groups according to their respective level of enlightenment: the enlightened, the semienlightened, and the unenlightened. He also argued that nations struggled for survival and that, through competition, a nation could progress from one level to the next. The works of Huxley and Spencer were translated into Korean between 1904 and 1907, and Liang’s Yidali jianguo sanjie zhuan (Biographies of Three Heroes who Restored Italy) were translated in 1907.5 Social Darwinism was considered “the trend of the world,” and terms like “triumph for the stronger and defeat for the weaker” (usu˘ng yo˘lp’ae) and “struggle for existence” (saengjon kyo˘ngjaeng) gained real value as they circulated among Korean intellectuals. As the first modern “ism” introduced to Korea, social Darwinism offered an analytical framework to guide Korea’s road toward modernity. In a speech he titled “Struggle for Existence,” Yun Hyo-jo˘ng summarized: The rule that the stronger wins and the weaker loses is observed in our daily life and it is an acknowledged practice in our time that the stronger preys upon the weaker. Observing the situation of our country, however, we cannot but feel regret. . . . If one does not know the rule of struggle for existence, one is apt to fall victim to the stronger. It should be asserted that our compatriots who live in the 20th century should delve into the essence of the law of struggle for existence. (cited in K. Lee 1978, 43)

By adopting this new, modern law of social Darwinism, Koreans could discard their old-fashioned fixed ideas and develop a bright outlook on the future. Social Darwinism thus exerted a prescriptive power in the minds of Korean leaders and intellectuals.

Race / Region and Nation Although Korean intellectuals and reformers generally subscribed to the social Darwinist view of the world, there were disagreements over the understandings of the basic units of struggle, positions on imperialism (especially their view of Japan), and solutions to Korea’s national peril. Some saw the present world as an arena of competition among races, especially between the white race and the yellow one, and regarded other Asians, especially the Japanese, as important allies in the fight against the white race. For

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them, cooperation and solidarity among the yellow race, and particularly the peoples of China, Japan, and Korea, would be necessary for defending not only the region but Korea itself. This first group I call “pan-Asianists.” In sharp contrast to them, other Koreans viewed this time as imperialistic and called for energetic nationalism to defend Korea from imperialist forces. For them, Japan was a country with imperialist ambitions; therefore, an alliance with it would in no way help Korea to protect its national sovereignty. This second group I call “nationalists.” I argue that race / region and nation offered two of the most important “modern” sources of categorical identity for Koreans at the turn of the twentieth century. Pan-Asianists accepted race as a new base of Korean identity. Influenced by social Darwinian racism, they viewed race as the basic category of distinction in the world and understood the present global situation as one of racial struggle, especially between the yellow (hwangsaek injong) and white (paeksaek injong) races. Although the geographic boundary of the yellow race was nebulous, the notion of yellowness was largely restricted to the idea of the East—and specifically Korea, China, and Japan. Pan-Asianists positioned Korea as part of this yellow race, rather than as a distinctive race within the East Asian region, as nationalists did. They called for regional solidarity and cooperation against the threat of Western white imperialism. Pan-Asianism was not, however, strictly territorial. It was also cultural and often invoked a shared race and cultural heritage. Using a traditional metaphor, Korea, Japan, and China were depicted as “lips and teeth” (sunch’i chiguk), suggesting that these three nations belonged to the same race because of shared cultural heritage. Pan-Asianism appeared in Korea under the names asia yo˘ndaeron (Theory of Asian Solidarity), tongyang chuu˘i (Easternism), aisa chuu˘i (Asianism), tongyang p’yo˘nghwaron (Theory of Eastern Peace), and samguk tongmaengso˘l (Thesis on Alliance among Three Nations). Hwangso˘ng sinmun and taehan hyo˘phoe (the Great Korea Association) were major proponents of Korean pan-Asianism.6 In principle, pan-Asianists believed East Asian nations could survive the white onslaught only if the three acted together. An Kyo˘ngsu (1853 –1900), for instance, serialized articles under the title “il ch’o˘ng han tongmaengron” (A Theory of Solidarity among Japan, China, and Korea) in Nihonjin from June 5 to September 20, 1900. He argued that unless the three countries of Asia united, Asia would fall to the “white race.” He proposed to form a league in which they would be mutually obligated to defend each other in

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the event of one’s national crisis (Yi Kwangrin 1989). Kim Okkyun, a leader of the failed Kapsin coup of 1884, advocated samhwa chuu˘i, which argued for cooperation among the three Asian nations in defending the region from Western advance (Chaeo˘n Kang 1984). Yun Ch’iho, a progressive leader of the Independence Club (tongnip hyo˘phoe), also noted the common bond among East Asians and called for their unity against the “arrogant” white race, particularly the Russians. In a diary entry written on May 7, 1902, he expressed a deep-rooted racial prejudice against the West (Russia) and an appreciation for a common Asian cultural heritage: The meanest Japanese would be a gentleman and scholar compared to a vodkadrunk, orthodox Russian. Between a Japanese and a Korean there is community of sentiment and of interest, based on the identity of race, of religion, and of written characters. Japan, China, and Korea must have one common aim, one common policy, one common ideal—to keep the Far East the permanent home of the yellow race, and to make that home as beautiful and happy as nature has meant it to be. (1984, 5:327)

Yun’s racially termed views became the basis for his pan-Asianist arguments. An Chunggu˘n’s “Theory of Eastern Peace” equally stressed the need for collective efforts among Korea, China, and Japan to secure peace in Asia. Some leaders even urged fellow Koreans to support Japan in its fight against Western civilization in such struggles as the Russo-Japanese War, which was seen as a war between the “white” and “yellow” races (hwangso˘ng sinmun May 31, 1904). For them, Asian solidarity did not necessarily attenuate the sovereignty of each nation. Instead, alliance among the yellow people of Asia would provide both national independence and regional security once and for all. To be sure, such a call for a broad, regional identity and solidarity was not entirely new. Koreans had identified themselves as part of a Chinacentered regional order for a long time. This sense of a small China, or so chunghwa, was an important part of Korean elite identity during the Choso˘n dynasty. Yet this time it would have to be different. In particular, this new form of identity and solidarity would have to reflect and accommodate a new regional configuration characterized by the decline of China, the rise of Japan, and the increasing presence of the West, especially Russia. In Andre Schmid’s words (2002), the rise of pan-Asianism required a “de-centering of China.” It was no accident that pan-Asianism first appeared in Japan and often advocated Japanese leadership in promoting regional solidarity

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and security. Japan, while attempting to become “civilized” and “sovereign” based on the Western notion of bummei kaika, felt that these discourses were limiting. Instead, Japan pursued an alternative focused on Asia, or to¯yo¯, with the claim that since Asian people were similar racially and culturally, they could develop a new and distinctive civilization (Tanaka 1993). Such a view resulted in aggressive, imperialist expansion, leading to colonization of Taiwan and Korea.7 In the early years, however, it contained an element of idealism, especially compared with the later notion of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. In Duara’s view, early versions of pan-Asianism had a “solidarity-oriented, non-dominating conception of Japan’s role in reviving Asia” as well as the conception of Japan as “the harmonizing or synthesizing leader” (Duara 2003, 98). It was in this context that Japan supported and protected political exiles and revolutionaries from other Asian nations, such as Sun Yat-sen and Kim Okkyun. This solidarity-orientation of Japanese pan-Asianism attracted Korean intellectuals and reformers of the time.8 When hu˘ngahoe (the Association for a Prosperous Asia, later called asea hyo˘phoe) invited Kim Hongjip and his colleagues who were at the time on a trip to Japan, to its September 5, 1880, meeting, Yi Choyo˘n, Yun U˘ngyo˘l, and Kang Wi were present.9 Upon their return to Korea, they informed the king about the association and declared, “When Korea, Japan, and China are united, Asia can repel assaults from the West” (cited in Yi Kwangrin 1989, 141). Other Korean reformers, including Kim Okkyun, Yu ˘ Yunjung, Pak Cho˘ngyang, and Kilchun, So˘ Kwangbo˘m, Hong Yo˘ngsik, O Yi Sangjae, visited the association, apparently attracted by the idea of Asia’s collective solidarity and cooperation.10 Some Koreans went further by viewing Japan as a nation that could elevate Asian civilization to another level. They explicitly advocated Japanese leadership for regional security from the Western menace. They maintained that though Japan shared their yellowness, its civilization was far more advanced than its neighbors. It was in this context that Yun Ch’iho cheered Japan’s Russo-Japanese War victory in 1905 as a triumph of the yellow race over the white one and went on to praise Japan as “Asia’s Paradise.” Yi Yonggu, a leader of Ilchinhoe (the Advancement Society), cited the “need for cooperation, guidance, and help from Japan for ‘protecting Korean independence’ and for establishing Korea as a ‘modern, progressive nation.’” 11 Not all Koreans accepted such a “solidarity-oriented, non-dominating conception” of pan-Asianism. Some were suspicious of Japanese promotion

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of pan-Asian ideas and were concerned that Japan might not prove as cooperative as it would have them believe. In their view, Japan concealed imperialist ambitions while promoting pan-Asian solidarity and finally revealed these ambitions after its victory in the 1905 war against Russia. Yunyo˘n p’iltok, a textbook published in 1907, articulated this cautionary stance: as Korea and Japan were historically considered “lips and teeth,” Koreans were sympathetic to the Japanese war against Russia. However, Japan changed its “diplomacy” after the war, putting Korea in a dangerous position, destabilizing China, and isolating Japan (2:200 –201). A teacher’s guide to the textbook added that after Japanese victory over Russia, a decades-old Japanese promise to support Korea’s reform and independence turned into an “excessive measure,” the 1905 protectorate treaty (3:452). Japan indeed betrayed its earlier promise of Asian solidarity when it made Korea its protectorate country. Editorials in hwangso˘ng sinmun, an early supporter of pan-Asianism, also expressed their concerns with Japan’s imperialist ambitions. They charged that Japan would protect and promote only its own interests without regard to its neighboring nations and thus would cooperate only to ensure its own national interests. In their view, Japan was an uncertain partner with the West and could be so in the East as well. History confirmed such concerns and anxieties. When Japan forced Korea to sign the 1905 treaty, the newspaper’s editor-in-chief Chang Chiyo˘n published the famous editorial on November 20, “We Wail Today”: . . . since he [Ito¯] had hitherto devoted himself to bringing about stability and peace among the three nations of the East, . . . officials and civilians alike gave him a big welcome all the way from the port to Seoul. . . . How could these five totally unexpected articles of the treaty be proposed? Since the proposed provisions will not only affect Korea but also cause division among the three nations, one wonders about Marquis Ito¯’s ultimate intention. . . . The so-called ministers of our government, who are not even worthy of being compared to dogs and swine, sought their own rewards and gains, got frightened by momentary threats, . . . handed over to foreigners a nation with a four-thousand-year history and a dynasty that has lasted five hundred years, thereby reducing twenty million souls to slaves of foreigners. . . . Alas! How deplorable! Fellow countrymen, now slaves to foreigners, are you alive or dead? Should we let the national spirit that has preserved for four thousand years since the days of Tangun and Kija (Chi Tzu) disintegrate overnight? How deplorable! How deplorable! Fellow countrymen! Fellow countrymen! (cited in P. Lee 1996, 422 –23)

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In his view, the treaty not only jeopardized the security of Korea but also put the whole East Asia region into peril by creating division and tension among neighbor nations. Using nationalist rhetoric, the piece expressed a bitter sense of betrayal and ended the newspaper’s long-standing advocacy of pan-Asian alliances. An Chunggu˘n, an early advocate of “Theory of Eastern Peace,” was said to have assassinated Ito¯ Hirobumi, a key Japanese promoter of pan-Asianism who later became an architect of the protectorate treaty and first residency-general in Korea, because Japan violated its promise of Asian solidarity. Whereas pan-Asianists advocated a broad regional identity and solidarity, nationalists regarded nation, not race or region, as the basis for a new, modern Korean identity. Korean nationalists attempted to transform a centuries-old sense of a political community into a modern form of national identity. They no longer considered Korea to be part of China or a Chinacentered regional order, but rather as an independent sovereign state in the world system. Also, in place of loyalty to the monarchy and attachments to the family, clan, and village, they sought to redirect people’s loyalty to a new, all-embracing identity of Koreans as a unique ethnic nation. Like pan-Asianists, Korean nationalists accepted the basic premise of a modern world-system of nation-states and the social Darwinist principle of the world as an arena of struggles among nations and races. However, in their view the current world was an arena of struggle between imperialism and nationalism, not among races. Therefore the competing “other” was not the white race, but other nation-states, especially imperialist countries, including Japan. In an article published in Taehan maeil sinbo on “Imperialism and Nationalism,” Sin Ch’aeho, leader of the first generation of Korean nationalists, urged his fellow Koreans to recognize that imperialism had replaced isolationist Monroeism as a major ideology of super powers and that the only way to resist imperialism was through the promotion of nationalism. In his view, “Imperialism invades into the places where nationalism is weak” (C. Sin 1982, 2:108 –9). Korean nationalists, unlike pan-Asianists, saw the dangers of imperialism (both Western and Eastern [Japanese]) and called for a strong national identity that could help Korea survive in a world of rampant imperialism. Korea’s backwardness and adversity would not be overcome through racial unity or regional solidarity, but through the cultivation of national consciousness and engagement in a national struggle against imperialist powers, be they Western or Eastern.

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In promoting national consciousness and identity, Korean nationalists such as Sin Ch’aeho, Pak U˘nsik, and Chu Sigyo˘ng were directly engaged in contentious politics with pan-Asianists. Sin Ch’aeho, an extensive contributor to Taehan maeil sinbo, fiercely criticized tongyang chuu˘i (Easternism) as a view held only by the ignorant, confused, and disloyal. He characterized pan-Asianists as those who “ruined the country . . . , fawn on foreigners . . . , [and] are confused and ignorant.” He also charged, “No Koreans use Easternism as a means of saving the nation, but there are foreigners who employ Easternism as a way of stealing the national soul (kukhon), so Koreans must beware” (C. Sin 1982, 2:88 –91). In his view, protecting the nation (poguk) was far more important and urgent than protecting the race (pojong) (C. Sin 1982, 2:53 –54). His April 12, 1908, article raised more questions concerning pan-Asianists: “They [pan-Asianists] claim that this is an age of race war [injong cho˘njaeng]. Where the yellow race prospers, the white race perishes, and where the white race prospers, the yellow race perishes. Our yellow race, they argue, must be united around Japan to preserve our race. Is this the talk of a drunk or sleepwalker?” (C. Sin 1982, 2:61). Chang’s editorial “We Wail Today” was another fierce denunciation of the pan-Asianism advocated by Ito¯ and fellow Korean thinkers. In establishing a new nation-based identity and solidarity, Korean nationalists appreciated the value of their own history and language, rather than a common East Asian heritage. Sin Ch’aeho proclaimed, “Without the nation, there is no history; without history, the nation cannot have a clear perception of the state.” In his view, history was an “indispensable instrument . . . in instilling nationalism [minjok chuu˘i] and implanting national awareness in our young people so that they can compete on equal terms with other nations in the struggle for survival, where only the winners are allowed to exist and the losers perish” (cited in P. Lee 1996, 423 –24). This new history would have to be one of the Korean minjok, as Em points out, “a category inclusive of every Korean without regard to age, gender, or status distinctions” (1999, 339; emphasis added). It was in this context that early twentieth-century Korea saw great efforts to reinterpret Korean history as one of an ethnic national history, not the conventional dynastic one subject to Chinese dominance in the region. This new historiography established a racial and ethnic genealogy of the Korean nation that emerged from Tan’gun, the mythic founder. Sin, for instance, argued that the Korean people were descendants of Tan’gun Choso˘n who merged

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with Puyo˘ of Manchuria and eventually became the Koguryo˘ people. The Koguryo˘ remained the ethnic or racial core (chujok) of the Korean nation, which had survived and thrived through defense and warfare against outside forces (C. Sin 1982, vol. 1).12 The Korean race should be considered to be distinct from, and not a part of, the Chinese, Japanese, or any other Asian race.13 As Schmid points out, it was “the bloodline, the genealogy of the racial nation that provided unity to Sin’s new narrative” (1997, 33). Early twentieth-century Korea witnessed a growing interest in the study and development of Korean language and literature. As in nationalist movements elsewhere, language, especially vernacular language, became a critical part of Korean national identity. Chu Sigyo˘ng had been the foremost proponent of the Korean alphabet and paved the way for a new genre of national literature. In an “Essay on Korean Language and Letters,” published in 1907, he lamented that Koreans only revered the Chinese writings and had failed to honor and use the national script made by King Sejong (1418 –50). However, to “transform the thoughts and broaden the knowledge of the entire population,” he argued, there is “no choice but to use our national script to write and translate in various fields of study so that men and women alike may study with ease.” It was a serious blemish that “in this peninsular land with a four-thousand-year history and twenty million people, the language of daily use had to depend only on oral communication.” He argued, “The people of the entire country shall all value, love, and use our language and script as the basic and primary language of our country” (cited in P. Lee 1998, 425 –26). For him, han’gu˘l should be the basis for a new Korean national identity, and its use should be encouraged to make Korea a strong and prosperous nation. Therefore, promoting the script as the national language as well as presenting Korean history as one of an ethnic nation was integral to Korean nationalist movements. Various textbooks published at the time reflected such nationalist concerns and efforts by stressing the importance of national language, history, customs, heroes, and identity. For instance, Ch’odu˘ng sohak, a textbook published in 1906, called for celebrating a holiday for the nation’s birth with the Korean flag displayed in front of household doors. It also promoted the use of the Korean script as a symbol of national independence (4 : 217–22). The textbook included stories of “three scholars,” Hong Ikhan, O Talche, and Yun Chip, who had been sent to China as prisoners after opposing Choso˘n’s surrender to the Ch’ing’s seventeenth-century invasion (4 : 398 –

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401). Yunyo˘n p’iltok, a textbook published in 1907, described in detail the late sixteenth-century Japanese invasion and discussed how Admiral Yi Sunsin had fought against it (3:162 –225). Many examples of Korean heroes, especially those who defended Korea against foreign—that is, Japanese and Chinese—aggression appeared in Korean textbooks. These texts aimed to inculcate national consciousness and spirit among the Korean people. Such efforts to promote national identity became all the more important after the 1905 Treaty of the Protectorate. Although Korean nationalists tried to create the image of a new, modern, independent nation, the political situation did not provide a favorable context. As a result, their efforts increasingly shifted to stressing the importance of reviving the national spirit, which was seen as the essence of national identity.14 In their view, a nation was like an organic body with its own will and life. Thus, even when its political state was in trouble, the nation could revive so long as it preserved its spirit. Korean nationalists began to favor Sin Ch’aeho’s view of nation expressed in Choso˘n sanggosa as “an organic body formed out of the spirit of a people . . . descended through a single pure blood line.” For him “the nation does not perish even when the formal state (hyo˘ngsikcho˘k kukka) disappears if its spiritual state (cho˘ngsinjo˘k kukka) still thrives” (C. Sin 1982, special volume, 160 – 61; emphasis added). Sin’s biographies of the Koguryo˘ General ˘ lchimundo˘k, the Koryo˘ General Ch’oe Yo˘ng, and the Choso˘n Admiral Yi U Sunsin were all efforts to provide role models exemplifying the best qualities of the Korean national spirit.15 Pak U˘nsik (1895 –1925), who contributed extensively to hwangso˘ng sinmun, was another key figure, who likewise stressed the centrality of the national spirit as a way of reviving Korea as a nation. He viewed the nation-state as an organism consisting of two parts, kukhon (soul of the state) and kukpaek (body of the state), roughly corresponding to ethnic and political bases of the nation. Kukhon comprised the “national language, history, religion, [and] studies,” while kukpaek included the “economy, military, territory, technology,” and more (U˘. Pak 1997). The nation-state prospered when kukhon and kukpaek were fused, but it faltered when each stood isolated. Pak claimed that after 1905, Korea lost kukpaek but not kukhon. If Koreans could preserve and strengthen kukhon, they could recover kukpaek and unite both aspects as one entity. Until that fusion, Koreans should shore up kukhon, the national soul, by maintaining their national history, kuksa. To that end, he wrote Han’guk t’ongsa (The Bitter History of Korea).

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Thus, for early Korean nationalists, what seemed most crucial was not a new territorial demarcation or Korea’s bond with East Asian neighbors. Rather, it was to establish distinctiveness of the Korean nation and fight encroaching imperialism. Korea had maintained a consistent territorial boundary since the eleventh century and had established a centralized bureaucracy for a long time, thereby possessing a shared sense of political community, if not the modern sense of nation. Korean nationalists mobilized such historical experiences and framed them in a modern (nationalist) language to create a new sense of national identity. In contrast to pan-Asianists, they saw the greatest threat to their country coming from their “yellow” neighbor, Japan, and not from the “white” West. They believed that cultivating national consciousness and identity would be most critical in defending their nation from outsiders. As Korea’s sovereignty slipped, especially after the 1905 treaty, national survival became increasingly framed in spiritual terms. Korean nationalists regarded nation as an organic body with its own life and stressed common blood and shared ancestry as the essence of the Korean nation. As such, the national spirit, or essence, was considered immortal. They argued that so long as Koreans preserved the national spirit, they could revive their nation even when its political sovereignty was lost.

Concluding Remarks Pan-Asianism and nationalism emerged as two major modern ideologies for the Korean people in the face of Western challenges. Both shared a sense of crisis and felt urgency in creating a new identity that could offer a conceptual framework for defending and strengthening Korea in its increasingly precarious situation. The two groups, however, had different understandings of the world and thus offered different solutions to the peril at hand. Pan-Asianists saw the world in terms of struggles among races, primarily between the white and yellow races. They advocated a broad regional alliance across East Asia to defend the region and the country against white Western imperialists. In contrast, nationalists understood the modern world-system as an arena of contest among nations, especially between imperialists and nationalists. They saw the greatest threat to the Korean nation coming from its yellow neighbor, Japan, rather than from the white race. Consequently, they redefined Korean identity, not as part of, but as distinctive from China or Japan, and they promoted this identity through the reinterpretation of

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history and the use of Korean script. For them, nation, not region or race, should be the basis of a new collective identity to which Koreans should adhere and promote. Still the notions of both region and nation as sources of categorical identity were racialized. Pan-Asianists understood the East Asian region from a cultural and racial perspective, and nationalists conceptualized nation in ethnic, cultural, and racial terms. Social Darwinian racism did affect the respective conceptualization of region and nation in modern Korea. Ultimately, nation triumphed over region as a defining source of Korean identity. Yet this outcome was not inevitable or predetermined. Instead, its triumph was historically contingent: it was Japan’s colonization that stripped legitimacy of pan-Asianism as a source of a new Korea. Some pan-Asianists felt betrayed, while others accepted and even supported Japanese colonial rule.16 As a result, pan-Asianism of early twentieth-century Korea has been ignored or even accused of being an ideology of imperialists or imperial collaborators in Korean historiography. However, this should not elide an understanding of its primary motivation, especially before 1905, as an effort to preserve Korea’s national sovereignty in the face of encroaching imperialist forces. As Schmid points out, “Yellowness, as a category transcendent to the nation, was not seen as undermining the sovereignty of the nation. Indeed, an alliance of the yellow people of the East offered a means for Korean nationalist goals to be best attained” (2002, 111). Still, panAsianists provoked an intense reaction from nationalists, who accused the former of misguiding Korea’s reform efforts. These two competed against each other as sources of Koreans’ modern identity and as a principle of reform and change. In short, nationalism developed in tandem with nonnational forces that offered alternative forms of collective identity for Koreans. The interplay of national and transnational forces continued after Korea became Japan’s colony in 1910.

two

Colonial Racism and Nationalism

Many have argued that colonialism was a primary factor in the rise of nationalism throughout the world, and particularly outside the West. The argument follows that with the arrival of colonial forces native people launched cultural and political movements to counter the unfortunate fate colonialism dealt them. Current Korean nationalist historiography, which posits Korean nationalism in direct opposition to Japanese colonialism, maintains this premise. However, although there is no question that the rise of Korean nationalism had much to do with Japanese colonialism, its relationship was far more complex than what current nationalist scholarship contends, that is, a narrative of colonial oppression met with national resistance. Korean responses to Japanese colonialism were far more diverse. In addition to nation-based categories of identity, numerous other forms of nonnational concepts of identity, based on gender, class, and region, for example, were used as organizing principles of collective identity. It is a mistake to subsume the various and often-competing forms of collective identity that existed in Korea during colonial rule under the rubric of “nation.” And at that, even nation-based responses to colonialism were not monolithic. Colonial Korea saw the rise of multiple forms of nationalism—modern and antimodern, cultural and political, and ethnic and civic. Therefore, the competing versions of nationalism as well as the multiple layers of colonialism and alternative narratives of political community and identity need to be specified in the context of colonial rule. What follows is an exploration of how the ideological component of Japanese colonialism— colonial racism—shaped the development of nationalism in Korea. Notably, the insistence on the 41

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unique racial origins of the Korean people and the promotion of a Koreacentered view of East Asia had particular importance in nationalist responses to colonial racism. The former was ethnic, whereas the latter was pan-Asian, and the meanings of the nation remained a contested terrain throughout the colonial period (1910 – 45).

Colonialism and Racism In The Origins of Totalitarianism, political scientist Hannah Arendt identifies race and bureaucracy as two key devices of colonial rule. According to her, “Without race as a substitute for the nation, the scramble for Africa and investment fever might well have remained the purposeless ‘dance of death and trade’ . . . of all gold rushes.” And without bureaucracy as a substitute for government, she continues, “the British possession of India might well have been left to the recklessness of the ‘breakers of law in India’” (Arendt 1951, 185). Her observation of European colonial rule in Africa and India also captures the nature of Japanese colonial rule in Korea. Japan ruled colonial Korea with a powerful colonial bureaucracy under the leadership of the so¯tokufu (governor-general) and that included repressive agencies like the military and police. Furthermore, racism—a guiding principle of colonial policy—was mobilized throughout its colonial territories. First and foremost, racial categorization legitimized Japan’s colonial rule on the grounds that Koreans were an inferior race needing the guidance of a superior race to bring about “civilization and enlightenment” to their country. Colonial racism also justified the later assimilation policy of ko¯minka (or, the making of imperial subjects). In short, Japan sought to subjugate Korea using the discourses of colonial racism and activated the colonial-style bureaucracy to carry out its colonialist policies. In turn, such Japanese efforts played a significant role in shaping the nature and development of Korean nationalism. Colonial racism can be traced back to the late nineteenth century when Japan advocated pan-Asianism based on the notion that East Asians shared a common historical and cultural heritage. According to Mark Peattie, four assumptions in Japanese culture were central to Japanese ideas of racism and assimilation: (1) the do¯bun do¯shu (same script, same race) formula of cultural and racial affinity within the Chinese cultural sphere; (2) the influence of the Chinese Confucian tradition that produced a moral tone as expressed in the theory of isshi dojin (impartiality and equal favor); (3) the

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linkage of the Japanese emperor as head of the Japanese race to the state; and (4) the belief that the Japanese historical experience provided the race with unique talents for the assimilation of foreign people and ideas (Peattie 1984, 97–98). However, Japan’s ideas of assimilation based on these assumptions met with criticism from both liberal and conservative Japanese. Liberals argued that assimilation was impossible and would inevitably provoke resistance if Koreans were not given social and legal equality to the Japanese. Conservatives, by contrast, contended that colonized peoples were “inferior races” and should be ruled as colonial subjects, not as extensions of Japan. Yet after the “Manchurian Incident” of 1931, critics on both sides were silenced and assimilation became the undisputed principle of colonial policy in Korea. If racism offered an ideological basis for colonial assimilation, so¯tokufu functioned as an agent of its policy implementation. Japan sought to replace Korea’s old “agrarian bureaucracy” with a modern Meiji-style one. In contrast to the British, who allowed each colony to have its own legislature with some local representation and autonomy, the Japanese established a highly centralized and forceful so¯tokufu that “stood above and apart from a society” (Cumings 1984, 486). In particular, the “military” rule of the first decade was distinct from the “indirect” British rule of India, which entertained the concept of trusteeship (Gann 1984). It was “rule with an iron fist” military policy, and not coincidently, all governor-generals in colonial Korea were military generals. This harsh military rule met strong nationwide resistance from Koreans in March 1919. Koreans, who had a long, cherished history of a centralized state and political community, resented Japanese rule. Inspired by the Wilsonian principle of national autonomy and self-determination, Korean leaders declared independence, asserting Korea’s liberty and equality within the world of nations. The movement was to be nonviolent and peaceful, but the March First declaration was followed by widespread demonstrations, some characterized by violence against Japanese individuals. It “drew people from all walks of life into a celebration of Korean national will” (Eckert et al. 1990, 278). Begun in Seoul and P’yo˘ngyang, Korea’s two largest cities, the movement quickly suffused throughout the country, mobilizing more than one million people.1 Although the movement, which lasted several months, failed to recover Korea’s sovereignty or to gain recognition of its sovereignty by other powerful nations, it provided a catalyst for the expansion of the

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nationalist movement as a whole. This movement has been regarded as the first modern nationalist mass movement in Korean historiography. The movement caught the Japanese by surprise, and it provoked brutal repression of protesters. Estimates of casualties range from the official Japanese count of 553 dead, 1,409 injured, and 12,522 arrested between March and December, to a Korean nationalist figure of more than 7,500 deaths, roughly 15,000 injured, and some 45,000 arrests. Although the figures were disputed, the impact of the events was clear: the Japanese had to reconsider their harsh military rule. They realized that Korea, with its long history of a distinct and unified political identity, could not be ruled with an iron fist and that “indigenous elements” of Korean society needed to be incorporated into colonial policy. As a result, the so¯tokufu made key organizational changes. It placed the Bureau of Academic Affairs directly under the Office of the Governor-General (Ordinance 386, August 20, 1919) and established the Department of Religion and the Department of Research on National Treasures under the Bureau of Academic Affairs. These departments were specifically designed to investigate Korean customs, cultures, traditions, rituals, religions, and institutions, with the explicit purpose of providing a “scientific basis” for colonial racism by searching for elements in Korean history and culture that could be used for the assimilation policy expressed in naisen ittai (Ch’oe So˘g’yo˘ng 1997). For instance, the bureau supported a project to investigate the history of Shamanism, a folk-religion that the Confucian elite in Choso˘n Korea considered superstitious. In Shamanism, the Japanese saw some potential utility for colonial rule, especially in their assimilation policy. The Japanese searched for elements in Shamanism similar to their own Shintoism, which they could use to support their theory of nissen do¯soron (or, theory of common Japanese and Korean ancestry). The theory claimed that both Japanese and Koreans descended from the nikkan race and that the common descent of the Japanese (Nihonjin) and Koreans (Cho¯senjin) from one race was indicated by shared blood, culture, and language from ancient times.2 Based on this theory, it was argued that although Koreans had a lower “degree of civilization,” under Japanese patronage they could advance and eventually become imperial citizens (sinmin) of the Japanese empire. Such transformation was possible because “the yellow race together possessed superior elements, and the only reasons for the present Korean racial decline were bad government and confining geographical factors” (Pai 2000, 38).

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On its face the new Japanese policy appeared to appreciate Korean tradition and culture, but its underlying goal was to demonstrate that Korea was one part of the larger East Asian sphere in which Japan was dominant. By showing that Koreans and Japanese belonged to the same race, the Japanese hoped to justify their assimilation policy of transforming Koreans into “imperial subjects” of Japan. As Sato points out, “Japanese colonial rule was an experiment of transforming the de facto multinational or multiethnic empire into a homogeneous ‘nation-state’” (1998, 325). Despite all the assimilationist rhetoric, however, the Japanese never extended equal rights, legal or political, to their colonial subjects. For example, the changing of Korean names to Japanese ones under this policy did not signal inclusion. As Robinson points out, “public documents, domicile registration, school and job applications all required two sets of names” despite registration of a new Japanese name (Eckert et al. 1990, 318). Koreans had no political representation within the Japanese empire as no Korean was ever elected to the Diet, and Japanese discrimination against Koreans was justified on the grounds that Koreans were not yet ready for equal treatment due to their low degree of civilization. In the words of Sato (1998), the Japanese granted Koreans “subjectship,” not “citizenship.” The Japanese assimilation policy did not simply attempt to eradicate any notion of Korean identity; it attempted to create a new one.3 Contrary to conventional nationalist accounts that the Japanese consistently and systematically sought to eradicate Korean identity, Henry Em points out, “The Japanese colonial state actually endeavored to produce Koreans as subjects— subjects in the sense of having a separate (and inferior) subjectivity” (1999, 353). In Em’s view, the logic of racist colonial policy compelled the so¯tokufu to reconstitute Korean identities into a homogeneous “Cho¯senjin” category. Cho¯senjin thus became “both a bureaucratic and derogatory classification that applied to all Koreans regardless of gender, regional origin, or class background” (Em 1999, 353). However, highly conscious of their distinctive history, Koreans resisted the imposition of this colonialist categorization and policy. As Robinson claims, “In a society where deep reverence for lineage had been a way of life for millennia, such a policy could only engender the most profound resentment” (Eckert et al. 1990, 318). The insistence on the unique racial origins of the Korean people and the promotion of the Korea-centered view of East Asia became particularly important in the nationalist response to Japan’s colonial racism and assimilation policy.

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Empire and Nation With Japanese colonization in 1910, Korean nationalism was severely suppressed and nationalist activities shifted to foreign places, including Shanghai and Honolulu. Ten years later the Japanese instituted a new colonial policy known as bunka seiji (cultural rule), which allowed some limited space for “cultural” activities on the part of colonial subjects; subsequently, nationalist activities began to reemerge on the peninsula. While continuing to suppress radical, Communist activities, Japan tolerated and even encouraged moderate activities as far as they did not directly challenge the colonial system. It was a policy of incorporation designed to subsume moderate nationalists into the colonial system. Koreans were allowed to engage in cultural activities such as the publication of newspapers and magazines. Consequently, colonial Korea witnessed the rapid growth of “print capitalism” in the 1920s. As in the birth of Western nationalisms (Anderson 1983), the development of Korean nationalism during Japanese rule was indebted to the growth of “print capitalism.” 4 Besides engaging in publication, Korean nationalist leaders founded and fostered various programs and organizations such as the National University, the Korean Language Research Society, and the Society for the Promotion of Native Production to promote national spirit and identity among Koreans.5 Robinson (1988) refers to these activities as “cultural nationalism” because they focused on nonpolitical, cultural arenas to raise national consciousness, rather than directly opposing colonial power. Korean cultural nationalists of the 1920s, however, did not generally appreciate or respect their traditions and culture. On the contrary, they criticized their own historical heritage, especially the Confucian heritage, as backward and sought to reconstruct Korean nationality largely based on modern liberal Western thought. The best-known example was Yi Kwangsu’s “Minjok kaejoron” (A Theory of National Reconstruction). Yi acquired a “modern” education in Japan and returned to Korea right after the March First movement. He became one of the most prolific writers and influential intellectuals of the colonial period. In the theory, Yi attempted to offer a blueprint for the Korean nationalist movement.6 Yi stressed the necessity of creating a “new person,” or a new national character. He compared England and Korea and attributed their contrasting fate to their respective national characters. For him, nationality was not enduring, but rather could be readily reconstructed with individual cultivation

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and mass education. He believed that Korea could improve its current colonial situation only through the reconstruction of nationality. He divided nationality into two tiers, primary and secondary. The primary features of Korean nationality were civic virtues, such as righteousness, humaneness, and valor. The secondary features included hypocrisy, nonsociability, underdevelopment of science, and exclusiveness. Although he acknowledged the positive values of the primary tier, his main intention was to transform the negative values of the second tier. As a concrete step toward national reconstruction, he urged intellectuals to form associations that could lead to a reconstruction movement. The movement would have to be moral and spiritual, rather than political, as the reconstruction of nationality was more important than political independence, at least for the time being. In advocating national reconstruction, Yi considered Korean tradition, especially (neo-)Confucianism, an obstacle to progress and development. Instead, he championed Western individualism and free will, and he called for a reconstruction of the nation’s inner character as well as its outer material manifestations.7 His argument little appreciated Korea’s past and appeared to be more cosmopolitan than nationalist in outlook (Yi Kwangsu 1922/1962). In the late 1920s, this tendency for cultural nationalists to have a cosmopolitan outlook with little appreciation of Korea’s past began to change. As the Japanese stepped up their efforts to assimilate all things Korean into a Japanese context, Korean nationalists began to defend their heritage, reevaluating it in a more positive light. Furthermore, they increasingly defined nation in racial and collectivistic terms. Still critical of the Confucian legacy, they searched for national symbols in Korea’s folk traditions,8 such as Shaman songs, folktales, beliefs, and rituals because they wanted to proclaim them as uniquely characteristic of Korean culture and identity ( Janelli 1986).9 Drawing on such heritage, Korean nationalists hoped to create a new identity and culture in order to recover from Korea’s malaise. They thought the new culture should not be entirely comprised of Western ideas and institutions. Instead, it should incorporate native components that could be used as symbols of national identity and pride. The new culture had to be a distinctly national culture. The Munhwa hyo˘ksin undong (Campaign for Cultural Revitalization) that Tonga ilbo led in the 1930s regarded minjok (the ethnic nation) as the basis of Korea’s new identity and culture, calling for the recovery of minjok cho˘ngsin (the national spirit). Promoting

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and preserving national uniqueness, culture, and spirit became all the more important in the 1930s as Japanese attempts at assimilation intensified under naisen ittai.10 Yi Kwangsu’s changed view of nation best exemplifies the general shift in the Korean nationalist movement from the early 1920s to the 1930s. In his earlier works such as “Minjok kaejoron” (1922 / 1962) and “Minjokcho˘k kyo˘ngnyun” (1924/1962), Yi held Korea’s past responsible for the current national misfortune of colonization and sought to create a new Korea through the construction of a new nationality (minjokso˘ng). However, a decade later in “Choso˘n minjongnon” (A Theory of the Korean Nation), as well as other essays on nation, he presented a radically different view of the Korean nation. Here, he not only stressed pride in Korean heritage but also presented a highly racialized view of nation. He championed collectivism over individualism. In “Three Basic Tasks for Korean National Movements,” published in 1932, Yi defined nation as “eternal being” (yo˘ngwo˘n u˘i silchae), something immutable and unchangeable. He argued that religion and ideology were only parts of the nation, and while religion and ideology come and go, nation endures. In “Basic Morality of Old Koreans,” published four months later, he lashed out at individualism and liberalism calling for we-ism (uri chuu˘i), groupism (tanch’e chuu˘i), and totalitarianism (cho˘nch’e chuu˘i). Clearly departing from his earlier view that championed Western individualism and free will, he now charged these with destroying Korea’s valuable tradition of we-ism and groupism and called for their revival.11 Yi’s new view of nation was most clearly expressed in his “Theory of the Korean Nation,” published in 1933. First, he compared the idea of nation to the notion of “fate,” claiming that “Koreans cannot but be Koreans . . . even when they use the language of a foreign nation, wear its clothes and follow its customs in order to become non-Korean” (Yi Kwangsu 1933 / 1962, 326). In his view, the nature of the nation cannot change because hyo˘lt’ong (bloodline), so˘nggyo˘k (personality), and munhwa (culture) constitute a nation. Here, he defined nation in ethnic and racial terms, departing from his earlier view. He also sought to present Korean history in a way to grant national legitimacy to Koguryo˘ and Koryo˘ dynasties and not the Silla dynasty. He blamed Silla for breaking Korea’s national unity by inviting foreign forces into the boundaries of the nation and praised Koryo˘ for recovering those boundaries. He similarly criticized the Yangban class of the Choso˘n dynasty as worshipping China and for creating a sense of “a small China”

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(so chunghwa) among Koreans. Yi concluded, “Koreans have been without a doubt a unitary ethnic nation [tanil han minjok] in blood and culture for thousands of years” (1933/1962, 326 –30). Ethnic nationalism of the 1930s was obviously different from cultural nationalism of the 1920s. Both forms focused on nonpolitical issues and shared the same advocates, such as Yi, but they need to be treated differently as systems of thought or ideology. Their conception of nation, appreciation of Korea’s past, and philosophical outlooks varied. Ethnic nationalists who understood the nation in racial and ethnic terms had a much better appreciation of Korea’s cultural and historical heritage and were much less cosmopolitan in their outlook. Korean nationalism evolved from cultural to ethnic, and this shift had to do, in large part, with the rise of colonial racism and international Socialism.12 Yi’s theory of nation not only influenced the Korean nationalism of the time but also shaped the post–1945 notion of nation in both parts of the peninsula, despite his political denouncement as a Japanese collaborator. Like the cultural nationalist movements of the earlier period, ethnic nationalists were engaged in various efforts to promote national consciousness. The controversy over Japanese policy regarding ancient remains (kojo˘k or koseki) offers an illustration. With the 1916 “Regulations on the Preservation of Ancient Sites and Relics of Cho¯sen,” Japanese authorities set aside sites of Korea’s “ancient remains.” The move was put forth as a show of Japanese respect for “Korea’s indigenous culture and customs,” but it was actually undertaken to gain control over Korean culture and heritage. As the Japanese intensified assimilation in the 1930s, they sought ethnological, prehistoric, and archeological evidence from Korea, Manchuria, and Inner Asia to prove the common ancestral origins of the region’s people (Pai 2000, ch. 2). Korean nationalists denounced colonial approaches to ancient remains, complaining that the Japanese focused only on their “technical” (kijilcho˘k) aspects and overlooked their “spiritual” (cho˘ngsinjo˘k) dimension. They charged colonialists with intentionally excluding “holy places” from their designation since such sites—including Tan’gun’s birthplace—preserved Korea’s national spirit and tradition. Nationalists urged colonialists to adopt a policy toward ancient remains that fully recognized and respected Korean national heritage (C. Yi 1993). Campaigns to preserve sites of “national heroes” (minjokcho˘k wiin), such ˘ lchimundo˘k, were another effort as Yi Sunsin, Kwo˘nyul, Tan’gun, and U to demonstrate the uniqueness and greatness of the Korean nation and to

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preserve the national spirit. When national hero General Yi Sunsin’s tomb was on the auction block to pay off debts in 1931, in May of that year Yi Kwangsu published fourteen articles focused on his heroism in the newspaper Tonga ilbo. The next month, he began publishing a serialized novel called Yi Sunsin in the same newspaper. He called on fellow Koreans to save this “historic” place. Within a year, forty-six organizations and 21,543 individuals were reported to donate a total of 16,021 wo˘n. The newspaper followed up with similar campaigns to renovate the alleged tombs of Tan’gun and General Kwo˘nyul, another hero during the Japanese invasion of the late sixteenth century. Such attention to exemplary figures from Korea’s past was designed to preserve national consciousness and identity in the face of colonial assimilation policy. Efforts to preserve ancient remains and historical monuments grew into a broader movement to invigorate studies on Korea. Led by An Chaehong, Cho˘ng Inbo, and Ch’oe Hyo˘nbae, the Movement for Korean Studies (Choso˘nhak undong) sought to publish Korean classics, revitalize Silhak (Practical Learning), and promote the Korean language.13 An Chaehong defined Korean studies as “a discipline to investigate the cultural tendency [that] a particular . . . society . . . has maintained under a uniform cultural system.” The campaign for Korean studies, he claimed, presupposed a “nation that recognizes its spiritual being with a uniform history and culture.” He suggested two main approaches to Korean studies: (1) the examination of social dynamics with statistics; and (2) the investigation of the particular tendencies of a historical and traditional culture (C. Yi 1994). An believed that the latter would serve to refute colonialist interpretations of Korean history and to establish Korea’s distinct national culture as not beholden to the Japanese.14 He praised Cho˘ng Yakyong, a leading Silhak scholar, as the pioneer of modern thought, and hongik in’gan as an ideology of a new Korea.15 Cho˘ng Inbo similarly advocated for the need to promote Korean studies that could reveal Korea’s unique history and culture. He argued that Korea was subordinate to China and became a Japanese colony because its own national subjectivity (chajuso˘ng) fell into desuetude during the Choso˘n era. He sought to recover the academic standing of Korean studies by recalling the tradition of Silhak of the eighteenth century and by championing Cho˘ng Yakyong as its pioneer. In addition, in refuting colonialist historiography, he presented Korean history in terms of Korea’s ˘ol (spirit). For him, ˘ol was not only the essence of the human mind and a nation but also the

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prime mover of Korean history. From this historical perspective, Korea’s independence required the recovery of Korean ˘ol, a similar argument made by Sin Ch’aeho and Pak U˘nsik decades earlier. In 1934, Tonga ilbo published a series of articles on Korean studies. In the fourth in a series of articles on “Recent achievements and efforts regarding Korean studies: How to establish Korean studies,” Sin Namch’o˘l (1934) compared national studies in Japan and China. He argued that Japanese national studies was “restorative and ultra-nationalist,” while the Chinese was “progressive and reformist.” He urged that “Korean studies should be compatible and up to date with the social progress and changes, and should resemble that of China.” Such interest in Korean studies naturally led to booming research on nation’s ancient history. An Chaehong, Cho˘ng Inbo, Ch’o˘e Namso˘n, and many other nationalists of the time published works on Korean history, primarily contesting Japanese interpretations of Korea’s past. The Japanese had established the Committee for Compiling Korean History (Choso˘nsa p’yo˘nsuhoe) in 1922, which was assigned the task of producing thirty-seven volumes of Korean history (Choso˘nsa). Japanese colonialists wanted a new Korean history as part of a Japan-centered East Asian context to justify the assimilation of Koreans through naisen ittai. Korean nationalist scholars contested the official Japanese commission of Korean history and in response organized the Chindan Academic Society (Chindan hakhoe) in 1934. They shared a keen awareness that Korea would lose its distinct identity unless its people were taught their own history. Language, widely recognized as a critical element in the formation of national identity, became another focus of Korean nationalist efforts. As Japan gained control of Korea, and especially as it instituted its assimilation policy, it attempted to replace Korean with Japanese language. The use of Korean was prohibited in public places, including schools, and Koreans were forced to change their names to Japanese ones. Korean nationalists responded by claiming “our language” not only as “a heritage from ancestors” but also as “the essence of our nation,” and they called for the preservation of the language as necessary to keep national spirit and consciousness alive (C. Cho˘ng 1927, 11). Among their efforts, they initiated various programs and campaigns to preserve the Korean language, including the establishment of the Korean Language Society (Choso˘n o˘ hakhoe); they designated an official day to mark the promulgation of the Korean script; they started a project to publish a comprehensive dictionary of the Korean

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language; and they began to publish the journal Han’gu˘l. These efforts to preserve and promote han’gu˘l befit a broader nationalist movement whose main intention was to restore Korean national identity and culture. Korean nationalists also called for establishing an authentic body of “Korean literature” (Choso˘n munhak).16 In an article published in 1927 in Tongkwang, Yang Chudong proclaimed that the goal of a new literary movement would lie in establishing “Korean literature.” He lamented that in the past Koreans only accepted foreign literature as legitimate. Due to the paucity of Korean literature, he continued, establishing a real Korean literature program should be a “national task with historical significance.” Ironically, it was during this very colonial period, especially in the 1930s, that Korea underwent a renaissance in the study of its national history, literature, art, figures and heroes, and geography. Yet, Korean nationalists did not simply stress distinctiveness of the Korean nation. Some reversed the colonialist logic of a common East Asian heritage and presented a different, Korea-centered view. Rather than looking for unique and distinctive features of the Korean nation, this pan-Asian version sought to find elements common to Asian nations and to prove Korea’s centrality in the larger East Asian cultural sphere. Unlike earlier pan-Asianists, who sought to defend Korea and East Asia through a broad regional alliance, these Korean nationalists’ primary concern was to elevate Korea’s status to that of Japan, and if not to its present status, then at least its historical one. Ch’oe Namso˘n’s “Pulham Munhwaron” (A Theory of Pulham Culture) and other related essays represented that new, derivative, panAsian version of Korean nationalist thought under colonial rule. In a 1936 lecture on “Korea’s Unique Religion,” Ch’oe (1890 –1957) claimed that ancient Korea had a native religion called P’ungryu, Puru, or Pak. Pak divided the universe into three realms: heaven, earth, and the underworld. The religion worshipped heaven and its representation, the sun, which was seen as giving people life. It maintained that the state originated from a son of heaven who descended to earth on a lofty mountain, which was, therefore, worshipped as divine. The state’s Shaman-priest, Tan’gun, represented heaven and wielded both political power and religious authority. Ch’oe claimed that Pak had spread through a large part of Eurasia from the Black Sea through the Caspian Sea, Tienshan, and the Altai Mountains down to Korea, Japan, and Okinawa. In his view, Pak was a culture or religion common to the region, or what he called pulham munhwagwo˘n,

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and it was one of the three major civilizations of the world along with the Indo-European and Chinese ones. He pronounced Korea as the origin of the larger Northeast Asian cultural sphere, or tongbang munhwagwo˘n and Tan’gun as its leader (Ch’oe Namso˘n 1926/1974, 1939 / 1974). Like Japanese colonialists, Ch’oe noted the parallel between Korean Shamanism and Japanese Shintoism, but he did so in order to show Korean centrality in the larger East Asian cultural sphere. As Allen rightly points out, he sought to present “a Korean version of cultural, religious pan-Asianism to counter the Japanese pan-Asianism . . . [based on] political power and economic means,” one that depicted Korea as “a central nation in world history, placed higher than Japan or China” (1990, 803). Ch’oe Namso˘n made great efforts to assert Tan’gun’s status as the nation’s founder. He fiercely disputed Japanese scholars such as Shiratori Kurakichi and Imanishi Ryu¯ who questioned the legend’s authenticity, alleging that the Tan’gun story had been fabricated by Iryo˘n, author of samguk yusa (the work in which the story first appeared in Korean history writings in the thirteenth century). Using a folkloric and linguistic approach, Ch’oe claimed Tan’gun was not a myth but indeed a historical figure. In pronouncing Tan’gun founder of the Korean nation and the essence of the national spirit, Ch’oe did not greatly differ from earlier nationalists such as Sin Ch’aeho. But his efforts to elevate Tan’gun to the level of founder of the Japanese nation, placing Korea on par with Japan, was indeed distinct from other nationalists’ arguments. Ch’oe’s primary intention was clear—to elevate Pak to the level of Japanese Shintoism. In fact, he called Pak Korea’s old Shinto (Choso˘n kosindo) and pointed out parallels between Pak and Japanese Shinto, including their founding stories (Ch’oe Namso˘n 1936 / 1974). On the one hand, in stressing similarities between Korean Shamanism and Japanese Shintoism, Ch’oe’s view paralleled that of the colonialists. On the other hand, he made it clear that such a broad regional Shamanistic tradition originated from Korea, and not from Japan or elsewhere. Mun Ilp’yo˘ng (1888 –1936) also advanced a view to glorify the cultural role that Korea had played in the history of East Asia. In a “New Challenge for a Nation with Old Culture,” he sought to show the “cultural diffusion” originating from the Three Kingdoms to the East Asian region including Japan and Manchuria. According to Mun, Kokuryo˘, which included Manchuria, became the source of Manchurian culture, while Paekche, due to its close relations with Japan, became that of Japanese culture. Viewed from Korea,

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therefore, “Korean culture shone brilliantly throughout the entire region, embracing Manchuria with one arm and Japan with the other” (cited in P. Lee 1996, 487). Kwo˘n To˘kkyu wrote a controversial article on November 1926 in Tongkwang, arguing, “Chinese culture was born in Korea.” Calling China, china, a term that Japanese used to downgrade China’s status from the center of civilization to a mere country, he claimed that Chinese civilization was far behind Korea’s, and that China had to import civilization from Korea. As evidence, he pointed to the fact that China had no legendary ancestor to hail, whereas Korea had Tan’gun. Also according to Kwo˘n, Koreans regarded agriculture as the “basis of the world under heaven” from ancient times and were the first people in the world to create language. He asserted, “It is a historical fact that culture flowed from Korea to China in ancient times” (T. Kwo˘n 1926, 94). As with Ch’oe, Mun and Kwo˘n argued for the centrality of Korea in the larger East Asian cultural sphere by focusing on the cultural achievements of Korea’s past. Colonial racism and assimilation policy represented by nissen do¯soron and naisen ittai shaped the forms and nature of Korean nationalism. On the one hand, Korean nationalists racialized the notion of the Korean nation stressing the ideas of shared blood and ancestry. The uniqueness and purity of the Korean nation was asserted. On the other hand, other nationalists resisted colonial racism by advocating a Korea-centered view of East Asia. In so doing, they did not intend to abandon Korean identity. To the contrary, they worked hard to reconcile the argument for Korea’s unique history with advocacy of Korea’s centrality in a larger cultural sphere. In the end, colonial racism and the assimilation policy did not remove but rather crystallized differences between Koreans and Japanese. Also, the threat to Korean identity from colonial racism (along with international Socialism) worked to unify “compromising” and “noncompromising” nationalists under the banner of ethnic nationalism. “Noncompromising” nationalists, such as An Chaehong, joined Marxists in establishing a united front in 1927, but in the mid-1930s they worked closely with “compromising” nationalists such as Yi Kwangsu. It is a historical irony that colonial racism contributed to the unity of Korean nationalism.

Limits of Korean Nationalist Thought Although nationalism, both ethnic and pan-Asian, appeared to challenge colonialist discourse and policy, there were inherent limits in overcoming

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the current fate of subjugation or the colonialist logic of dominance. Its programs remained largely in cultural, historical, or rhetorical arenas, without any political power to lead Koreans to national independence. Thus, through glorification of their past, Koreans were perhaps able to enhance their psychological pride, but they fell far short of altering their unfortunate present. Also, while Koreans contested the contents and meanings of colonial racism, they could not escape from using the very logic and language of their colonizers. To use Chatterjee’s phrase, Korean nationalists “simultaneously reject[ed] and accept[ed] the dominance, both epistemic and moral, of an alien culture” (1986, 11). Still more disturbing, the ethnic version assumed an “elective affinity” with Japanese fascism, and the pan-Asian one was employed as an excuse for Korean collaboration in the later years of colonial rule.17 First, nationalists confronted inherent limits in subverting colonialist discourse. As Schmid (2002) shows, the Japanese influenced Korean nationalist thinking by producing knowledge of and about Korea as well as providing the conceptual vocabulary of modernity such as munmyo˘ng kaehwa, social Darwinism, minjok, and tongyang. Also, in denouncing colonial racism and the assimilation policy, Korean nationalists employed the logic and language that Japanese colonialists used. Robinson points out, “The search for and documentation of the unique and immutable core—the racial origins— of the Korean people appears similar to the Japanese obsession with the nation essence (kokutai) in the 1930s and earlier inquiries of the National Studies School (kokugaku) during the Tokugawa period” (1984, 135).18 However, this is not synonymous with a “colonization of the consciousness” of Korean nationalists, as some scholars have implied (C. Choi 1993). The ideology of nationalism and the notion of nation were Western in origin, and other than England and France, all other nations—including Japan—borrowed the language of nationalism. It is overly simplistic to view Korean nationalism either as a “colonization of consciousness,” or as a total rejection of colonial discourse. We must recognize the specificity of Korean nationalism within its own historical context as it borrowed the logic and language of colonialism for anticolonial purposes. In addition, Korean nationalists focused on an “organic” notion of society and nation rather than a civic one and emphasized the importance of collectivism. In an article published in Tongkwang, Kim Yunkyo˘ng introduced the Hegelian view of state, society, and individuals. Citing Hegel’s work, Kim stated that “the state is realization of moral will . . . the supreme duty of individuals is to become part of the state” (1927, 38). In this view,

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conflict within the nation had to be suppressed for the good of the will, personality, and growth of the organic whole, that is, the nation or the state. Yi Kwangsu, who defined the nation as an eternal being, similarly argued that “anyone who insults the nation must be denounced as a sinner against the nation” and urged Koreans to restore and promote Korea’s tradition of “collectivism” (Yi Kwangsu 1932b /1962, 318 –19). Yi and other nationalists of the time felt individual interests must defer to national interests, given Korea’s precarious situation. Yet, stress on nation over class and other social cleavages had an “elective affinity” with totalitarian Japanese fascism, which also counseled sacrifice of individual and human rights for the sake of the immortal nation. In fact, in calling for collectivism in his theory of Korean nation, Yi referred to a recent trend in Japan, “‘Japanization’ rather than ‘Westernization,’” an ideology that had been pursued since the Meiji era. Consistent with this recent trend, he had in mind the rise of Japanese ultranationalism and fascism when he promoted his theory of the Korean nation. “Japanization” was a form of nativism or particularism that appeared as a rejection of the West, especially as a critique of Western universalism, which was in fact Western European particularism imposed on the rest of the world. Similarly Korean ethnic nationalism was an effort to promote Korean particularism against the Japanese version. An Chaehong’s proclamation of “from the world to Choso˘n (Korea)” can be understood in this context. Japanese particularism, just as Western particularism toward the rest of the world, assumed a moral superiority vis-à-vis the rest of Asia and sought to absorb the “particularities” of others in Asia, including Korea. Ethnic nationalists resisted such Japanese efforts by promoting Korean nativism, but in doing so, they employed the same logic and language that the Japanese used in their critique of Western universalism. Furthermore, the pan-Asian version faced a more serious limit in overcoming colonial reality and logic. As Mun Ilp’yo˘ng himself acknowledged, Korea’s past glory was “only a historical daydream,” and in relationship to the past, the relative cultural positions of Korea and Japan were “totally reversed” in the present situation. It was one thing to glorify Korea’s past but an entirely different task to restore Korea’s cultural glory in a colonial situation. In addition, its pan-Asian rhetoric bought into the Japanese colonialist logic. For instance, Ch’oe Namso˘n’s studies of Korean history were similar in many ways to the Japanese nationalist studies (kokugaku) that he sought to repudiate. Ch’oe’s use of samguk yusa as the authoritative document

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concerning ancient Korea was, in fact, influenced by Japanese nationalist studies’ use of the kojiki as central for understanding ancient Japan. Kojiki, just as the samguk yusa, abounds in mythical and legendary stories. Ch’oe’s declaration of Shamanism as Korea’s indigenous religion and Tan’gun as Shaman ruler strongly echoed colonialist discourses. Accordingly, his arguments inadvertently supported colonialist discourse that designated Korea as part of a Japan-led East Asian culture, which regarded Tan’gun worship as Korean Shinto, a variety of Japanese Shintoism. Ironically, his view was used to justify Japanese assimilation on the grounds that Korean and Japanese people shared the same origin. Completely stripped of national sovereignty, Koreans had no political authority to form a transnational entity in East Asia that was different from Japan’s. There was no space for a Korean voice in the formation of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, which was a major scheme of Japanese imperialist ambitions.19 It was ultimately Japanese power and interests, both military and economic, that mattered. Any pan-Asian argument by Koreans was doomed to fail from the beginning. It served not only to abet Japanese plans for the Sphere but also ended up justifying Korean collaboration with colonialists. It is for this reason that Ch’oe, who had drafted the Declaration of Independence at the March First movement but later ended up collaborating with the Japanese, has been disgraced in postcolonial Korea.

three

International Socialism and Nationalism

Colonialism was not the only factor that shaped the formation of Korean nationalism: Marxism, especially the rise of international Socialism in the 1930s, also influenced the development of Korean nationalism. Ethnicization was largely a nationalist response to both colonial racism and international Socialism. Ethnicization of Korean nationalism was consistent with the worldwide development of national particularism that emerged as a reaction to Socialism in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In Germany, for instance, fascism arose as a response to international Socialism, or proletarianism, that posed perceived threats to the German nation, or the volk. Similarly Japanization, or Japanese fascism, was Japan’s reaction to European “universalism” expressed in both liberalism and Communism. Racism and nationalism, often combined, played key roles in shaping the particularisms that took the form of fascism in these countries. Korea was no exception to this larger trend even while it was under colonial rule. This chapter explains how ethnic nationalism containing elements of anti-Communism, racism, and fascism developed in colonial Korea in response to international Socialism. Michael Robinson’s work on cultural nationalism in colonial Korea (1988) has nicely shown how Marxism arose in the early 1920s as a response to cultural nationalism. It did not, however, address how this Marxist critique, in turn, provoked nationalist responses that worked to promote the ethnic notion of the Korean nation. It is my contention that in Korea, as in other countries, ethnic nationalism as a form of particularism was, in part, a response to international Socialism, which 58

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advocated universalism by privileging class over nation.1 As such, this chapter reveals the interactive nature of the changing relations between nationalism and Communism during Japanese rule. It also serves to explain, in part, the origins and nature of ethnic nationalism in colonial Korea.

Colonialism, Nationalism, and Communism In Marxist theory, Communism is not compatible with nationalism, which is predicated on the belief that the most fundamental divisions of humankind are the many vertical cleavages that divide people into ethnonational groups. In contrast, Communism rests on the conviction that the most fundamental human categorizations are horizontal class distinctions that cut across national and ethnic groupings. As such, Communism is inherently a transnational ideology that champions class over nation and calls for worldwide solidarity and the revolution of the proletariat. In The Communist Manifesto, Karl Marx called for the unity of the workers of the world. Lenin and Stalin followed suit by establishing the Communist International (Comintern) to support worldwide Communist revolutions. Marxists regarded nationalism as inherently a bourgeois ideology that arose with capitalism and was thus something that would pass away with the advent of a Communist social and political order. In practice, however, nationalism was not a simple issue for Communists because it appealed to people in many parts of the world as an ideology of national liberation, especially for those under colonial subjugation. That complexity produced the so-called national question for the Communist movement (Connor 1984). At the Second Comintern Congress held in the summer of 1920, Lenin and the Indian Communist leader M. N. Roy debated over the national question in colonies. Recognizing the popular appeal that nationalism had, Lenin conceded that Communist movements may collaborate with and even accept the temporary leadership of radical nationalist forces. Roy, however, rejected Lenin’s view as subordination of the Communist movement to the national bourgeoisie. Although no clear consensus emerged, the Theses on the National and Colonial Question that resulted from the Congress allowed space for temporary alliance between Communists and nationalist forces in colonial regions (Weiner 1996). Although the Theses remained ambiguous on the questions, Chinese Communists saw the value of a united front and formed an alliance with the nationalist Guomindang (GMD) in

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the mid-1920s. Stalin also changed his earlier internationalist view in favor of “socialism in one country,” acknowledging the presence of national interests in Communism. When Communism was first introduced to Korea in the 1920s, most Korean Communists did not draw a sharp line between nationalism and Communism. In fact, many of them were drawn to Communism because of its appeal as an ideology of national liberation and as a vehicle for their anticolonial struggles (Wales and Kim 1941/1972). The Russian revolution and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a champion of oppressed peoples generated excitement among Korean intellectuals and leaders who were increasingly disillusioned with Western liberalism, especially after the demise of the March First nationalist movement of 1919. For them, Marxist-Leninism offered an attractive alternative for Korean independence and nation building. The Korean Communist Party (KCP) was established in 1925 with the goal of leading the nation to independence and social revolution (see Kim and Kim 1967; Scalapino and Lee 1972; and Suh 1967, for detailed discussion of history of Korean Communist movements). The introduction of Marxism to Korea created a schism among Korean intellectual circles (Robinson 1988), yet many nationalists and communists saw similarities between the aims of the nationalist and Socialist movements and searched for ways to collaborate. A special issue of Tonga ilbo on January 3, 1925, featured opinions of six leading intellectuals (from both the Left and the Right) on the “Socialist Movement and Nationalist Movement: Differences and Commonalities.” The most important message among the six intellectuals featured was the need for collaboration between Socialist and nationalist movements. For instance, Han Yongun, a well-known nationalist monk, argued that both movements should converge; after all, he argued, they faced the same obstacle. According to him, Korea, which lacked national sovereignty, could not achieve complete social revolution without first establishing an independent nation-state. Han believed that the question of whether Korea should become a Socialist or capitalist country should be decided after it achieved political independence. By contrast, Socialist Cho Pongam advocated collaboration on the grounds that a “true” nationalist movement should encompass a Socialist movement in order to conquer capitalism and hence to achieve political independence. To be sure, their agendas differed, and each insisted that its own movement be given priority.

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Still they agreed that collaboration was necessary in order to achieve their primary objective, whether national independence or social revolution. The call for collaboration materialized with the establishment of the Sin’ganhoe (New Korea Society) in 1927. As in China, the united front included Communists and radical, or uncompromising, nationalists. Compromising nationalists were left out. Minjok hyo˘ptong cho˘nso˘nnon (Theory of the National United Front) began to appear in 1925, and the so-called Cho˘nguhoe Declaration of November 15, 1926, offered a theoretical base for Korean Socialist participation in the Sin’ganhoe. The declaration classified nationalists into two groups—reformist/compromising and radical / uncompromising—and urged Communists to form a “temporary” united front with the uncompromising nationalists (Kim and Kim 1986, vol. 3). Their forces became a major nationwide organization. Beyond prominent nationalist and Socialist leaders, the group also reached more than thirtynine thousand members by November 1930. The Sin’ganhoe did not last for long, however. Japanese suppression constrained its activities, and Communists were increasingly dissatisfied in the alliance with their nationalist counterparts. Furthermore, the collapse of the united front in China caused alarm among Korean Communists; the GMD’s suppression of Communists was interpreted as a realignment of the national bourgeoisie with feudal landowning elements. When the Comintern’s September Theses ordered the breakup of the Sin’ganhoe in 1930, Korean Communists did not hesitate to leave the organization. The Theses, which appeared in Korea in September 1930, was a product of the Fifth Congress of the Profintern, held August 15 –30, 1930. The Theses entitled, “The Tasks of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement in Korea,” was largely a directive to the Korean Trade Union, but it also condemned the united front organization. Given its importance in reorienting Korean Communist movements, the Theses require detailed discussion. The Theses first reviewed the current world economic crisis—the pauperization of peasants, wage reduction, intensification of the working process, increased unemployment, espionage systems at the factory, beatings of workers and organizers, and the relentless persecution of labor movement. It also discussed the economic crisis’ impact on the position of the Korean working class. From a Comintern perspective, the deepening economic crisis of the capitalist world seemed to augur well for the international revolutionary

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movement. At the Sixteenth Russian Communist Party Congress held on June 1930, Stalin predicted a rapid transformation of the current economic crisis into revolutionary mass movements. With this in mind, the Theses claimed, “the national emancipation struggle against Japanese imperialism, in general, and the class struggle of the proletariat, in particular, is growing and becoming sharper” (Suh 1970, 284). For evidence, the Theses referred to the growing number of labor and peasant struggles in the late 1920s and saw the Wo˘nsan strike of 1929 as a turning point in the development of the revolutionary labor movement in Korea.2 In an effort to stem “this new revolutionary wave,” the Theses further contended that “Japanese imperialism bribes the national-reformist bourgeoisie with promises of local self-management. . . . The national reformist bourgeoisie and its organs, Choson ilbo, Tonga ilbo, part of Chon’do-kyo, who fear the growth of the revolutionary wave in Korea, the revolution in China and in India, and the successes of socialist construction in the USSR, see in Chiang Kai-shek and in the Chinese counter-revolution an example worthy of imitation, and seek collaboration with Japanese imperialism, vilifying the USSR” (Suh 1970, 284). The Theses defined Sin’ganhoe as “a national-reformist organization, as has been proved by its policy of sabotage during the student and worker’s movements” and called for the leadership of the proletariat in Korea’s national liberation movements. It claimed that Korea was ready for “an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry under the leadership of the working class” (285), and it urged that “the left wing should systematically expose the opportunist and treacherous policy of the reformist leaders and win over the membership of the trade union organizations” (287). The Theses went on to argue for solidarity among workers in East Asia: The revolutionary workers of Japan and Korea must act in a united front in the struggle for the defense of the Chinese revolution and the Soviet Union, for the overthrow of Japanese imperialism. . . . The left wing must organize the Chinese workers, educate the Chinese and Korean workers in the spirit of international proletarian solidarity . . . and maintain the closest possible connections with . . . the entire international revolutionary trade union movement, in particular, with the revolutionary trade union movement of Japan and China. (Suh 1970, 290)

Once again, Korean Communists accepted the guideline of the Theses by leaving the Sin’ganhoe. Thereafter Korean communists became much more critical of nationalism in general and increasingly endorsed an internationalist

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approach for social revolution and political independence. They contended that nationalism stemmed from reactionary fascism and its purpose was to mislead the masses, concealing its class interests under the guise of promoting the “fatherland” (choguk) and the “nation.” Only through international solidarity among workers and peasants, they argued, could Korea escape from social fascism and colonialism once and for all.

The Rise of International Socialism In advocating internationalism, Korean Communists strove to reveal the fallacy of nationalism by engaging in a “war of position” (in a Gramscian sense) with nationalists. They highlighted the class nature of the nationalist movement, the historicity of nationalism, and its close connection to fascism. Leftist journals such as Pip’an and Sin’gyedan, which appeared since the late 1920s, well articulated their views. First, they accepted the Marxist view that considers nationalism a bourgeois ideology, not an ideology of and for all the people. In Marxist theory, the nation and nationalism are relegated to the superstructure as ideology. Nationalism is a device of the bourgeoisie for concealing their own class interests as the interests of the entire society. Largely accepting this view, Korean Marxists criticized the nationalist bourgeoisie as manipulating the nation’s collective sentiments in order to fulfill their own class interests. They claimed that the so-called native bourgeoisie emphasized the importance of “nationalist movements,” “anti-foreign movements,” or “people’s movements” in competition with their counterparts in the colonial metropole, but these discourses were aimed at benefiting their own interests, not those of the Korean people. Therefore, from an international Socialist perspective, it was a big mistake for Communists to form a united front with nationalists (Chin 1932). The only revolutionary class, they believed, was the proletariat. Other classes, such as peasants, could be revolutionary only under the guidance of the proletariat. An article published in Kyegu˘p t’ujaeng (Class Struggles) in December 1929 pointed to the class nature of nationalist movements: Even if nationalism pretends to represent the interests of the entire nation, it is after all to represent the interests of the landlords and petty bourgeois only. It can’t be revolutionary. . . . Their interests are contradictory to Japanese

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origins and development imperialists’ but more so vis-à-vis workers and peasants— class contradictions are greater than national ones. While landlords and bourgeois say they hope for Korea’s independence from colonial rule, what they genuinely want is power and government to guarantee their rights and interests. . . . They might have been revolutionary when there was little class differentiation but no longer these days. (cited in Y. Yim 1985, 474)

Having revealed the class nature of nationalist movement, Korean Communists criticized nationalists’ call for tongjok ae (or, “love of the same race”) or minjok ae (or, “love of the ethnic nation”) as a deceptive measure to mask the reality of class contradictions. As an article published in March 1933 in the leftist journal Sin’gyedan (New Step) argues, “That nationalists use a romanticized sermon about national class [minjok kyegu˘p] as its best weapon is an international phenomenon that we observe everywhere. Yet such a sermon is no more than a broken magic box [yosul sangja] to the conscious proletariat” (Y. Hwang 1933, 4). Thus, Communists were advised of the danger that a nationalist illusion could bring to the revolutionary movement. The “Platform of Action of the Communist Party of Korea” that was circulated in early 1934 warned of such a danger: The toiling masses of the country still have illusions about Ch’ondo-kyo and other so-called national organizations. They have not understood that these are the class organizations of the Korean national reformist bourgeoisie which oppose the basic interests of the toiling masses of Korea. The Communist Party of Korea declares that it will mercilessly expose all shades of national-reformism and especially the autonomist trends led by the leaders of Chondo-kyo. The exposure of and struggle against the national-reformists is one of the main tasks of the Korean Communists. (cited in Suh 1970, 338)

Internationalists were highly critical of reformist movements, such as the one led by Ch’o˘ndogyo, that focused on the enhancement of moral and spiritual power, while neglecting structural causes, as a way of resolving rural poverty. They also criticized the nationalist promotion of Tan’gun and Choso˘nhak (Korean studies), which stressed the uniqueness and oneness of the Korean people, calling them mere efforts to mask the reality of class divisions and methods of instilling false national consciousness among the masses. Second, Korean Communists viewed nation not as an “eternal being” but as a historical product related to capitalist development. An April 1932

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article published in Pip’an refuted the essentialist view of nation that Yi Kwangsu promoted in his theory of the Korean nation: Yi writes about the permanence of a nation. However, he should realize the fact that the rise and fall of a nation is correlated with the rise and fall of capitalism, and that a nation is not permanent. If he does not understand this, he should be noted as one who runs against the historical current. Yi’s illusion on the notion of nation can easily be refuted by historical evidence. Even a group of people with the same nationality is separated into classes with conflicting interests. This results in exploitation and oppression of others in the same nation. How will Yi explain the great contradiction in human society? (I. Pak 1932, 4)

A March 1933 article published in Sin’gyedan similarly argued that “a nation rises with the birth of capitalism, develops with capitalism, and will dissolve with capitalism” (Y. Hwang 1933, 7). For Korean Communists, nation was considered little more than a historical product of capitalism and, as such, something to pass away with the demise of the capitalist mode of production. Third, Korean Communists understood Korean nationalism as part of a worldwide trend in the growth of fascism, which they regarded as a reaction to the economic crisis that would occur in the last stage of capitalism. They saw nationalism as capitalism’s ideological organ. A March 1933 article in Pip’an offers an explanation of the origins of fascism: Fascism . . . is the last resort to resolving crises during the time of economic depression, which is also inevitable in the last stage of capitalism. Fascism arises when capitalism is developed to its financial extreme, where repression is inevitable because of internal contradictions within capitalism, and fascism is a reactionary response to repression by the proletariat. (C. Pak 1933, 24)

Writers also argued that intense class conflict in rural and urban areas and the economic depression that started in the late 1920s led to the rise of the fascist movement in Korea.3 An article published in Sin’gyedan on February 1933 illuminated this point: “Fascism has already become a global phenomenon and the bourgeois worldwide are excited about the arrival of the new ‘weapon.’ In Korea as well, various bourgeois publications are promoting the thoughts of Mussolini and Hitler. However, what these national bourgeois are pursuing are hollow concepts such as preservation and love of nation” (Nam 1933, 35). The article argued that the rise of ethnic nationalism in Korea was part of this larger trend of fascism and a reactionary response

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to the Korean proletariat movement. It charged that nationalists were “fake national reformists” and, ironically, “national traitors.” Thus, Korean Communists regarded nationalism as part of the worldwide fascist movement, which was considered a bourgeois reaction to economic crises and class conflict. An article published in Sin’gyedan in January 1933 argued: Recently, national reformists are stimulated by the global tide of fascism and call for leading Korea’s national bourgeois as well as peasants into the trend. They took off their old mask that helped them to disguise themselves as Korea’s most ardent patriots. They call fascism a powerful philosophy or blood-iron policy, and regard it as the only means to solve the current problems. Then, what does this infatuation with fascism mean? National reformists have realized the need to broaden their support base and they have decided to resort to fascism. Petit bourgeois and bourgeois upper class are the basis of their fascist construction and the general masses that lack social consciousness are gathered under the ˘. Han 1933, 4 –5) basis. (U

Having identified the class basis of the nationalist movement, the historicity of nationalism, and its close connection to fascism, Korean Communists called for internationalism in their movement. They also departed from the previous position that recognized the need for collaboration with nationalists. On the grounds that a new era had come, they championed class over nation: the age of capitalism was nearing its end, and a new era of Communism was being born. Therefore, they argued, nationalism as a product of capitalism was destined to pass away in a matter of time, and the transition from nation to class as the primary organizing principle of society was inevitable. As a March 1933 article in Sin’gyedan proclaimed, “The transition from nation to class as the basic unit of society is an unstoppable force that will break down the old national wall from its foundation so that anyone who goes against it will be considered an noxious insect.” Simply put, nation was viewed as an organizing principle of society of the past; class was the principle of the future. The article urged Korean Marxists to “crush without exception any and all nationalist illusion” (Y. Hwang 1933, 4). In promoting the internationalist approach, they called for collaboration with similar movements in other countries, rather than nationalist movements in Korea. They argued that the national liberation movement in colonies like Korea should be thought of as part of the world

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proletariat revolutionary movement and that true national liberation could be attained only through the broader proletariat movement. A 1929 Leninjuu˘i (Leninism) article argued: The Korean revolution is part of the worldwide anti-imperialist movement and part of the world proletariat movement. They were precipitated by the worldwide crisis of capitalism and presence of worldwide labor class, Comintern, and Soviets. The presence of the world propertyless class, the Chinese, and Japanese communist movements as well as the Soviet is the most powerful alliance to make the Korean revolution successful. (Y. Yim 1985, 474 –75)

Korean internationalists believed that they should seek support from such international agencies as the Comintern and collaborate with proletariat from other countries who would be allies in their struggles against both colonial power and the “feudal class” in Korea. An Kwangch’o˘n, who had earlier advocated cooperation with nationalists, argued for the importance of such an internationalist approach: We should not carry out this struggle from a narrow-minded nationalist perspective. The Korean revolution is not a self-righteous one but part of a proletariat revolution that is connected to a proletarian world revolution only through its anti-imperial struggles. The Korean revolution not only serves as a worldwide proletarian revolution but also cannot succeed without an alliance with the latter. . . . We must constantly educate the workers and the general revolutionary masses with internationalism [kukche chuu˘i]. (Pae 1987, 111)

Such advocacy for internationalism reflects the call for worldwide solidarity of the proletariat class expressed in Marx’s Communist Manifesto. Korean Communists refuted Korean nation-based particularism in favor of class-based universalism. In its extreme form, this kind of universalism denied Korea from celebrating any unique or indigenous feature of its past and dismissed as parochial the promotion of Korean studies and national heroes such as Tan’gun and Admiral Yi Sunsin. As a December 1935 article in Pip’an argued: The so-called Korean philosophy is neither authentic nor indigenous but rather imported from China. Moreover, what we call “modern thoughts” is not an offshoot of Korea’s ancient philosophy but still another imported good from the West. Therefore, throughout its history, it has been impossible to “Koreanize,” let alone properly digest, the philosophy. . . . Korea did not have its own original history of philosophy. (U˘. Han 1935, 50)

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The article claimed that since Korea had no indigenous roots in thought and philosophy, studying Korea’s past would be futile. Instead, it called for more attention to resolving the current problems that Korea faced, rather than the nationalist practice of glorifying Korea’s past or “deifying” historical figures. Korean Communists issued “The Dissolution Declaration of the Manchurian General Bureau of the Korean Communist Party” on March 20, 1930, as a concrete step toward enhancing international solidarity. The KCP’s Central Committee had established the Manchurian General Bureau of the KCP in the spring of 1926. However, the declaration argued that it was a mistake to extend the KCP into Manchuria and to maintain “a racially separate organization in public opposition to the Chinese Communist Party.” Korean and Chinese peasants and workers in Manchuria suffered from the same capitalistic and feudalistic oppression and exploitation, despite their different nationalities. It logically followed that cooperation between Korean and Chinese workers and peasants was essential to correct injustices and bring about social revolution. The declaration concluded, “Because this united struggle is the only course leading to emancipation and the only way for the workers and peasants in Manchuria to struggle, Korean Communists in Manchuria must be reorganized under the banner of the Chinese Communist Party, in accordance with the principle of ‘one party, one country’” (Suh 1970, 387). Simply put, class solidarity had to be given priority over national interests.

Ethnic Nationalist Response Nationalists turned this internationalist logic around by championing nation over class. They interpreted international Socialism as a form of universalism and promoted particularism, or nativism, in response to its mandates. As a form of particularism, Korean ethnic nationalism contained elements of anti-Communism, racism, and fascism, as well as anticolonialism. Notwithstanding colonial racism, the racialization of the Korean nation or the rise of ethnic-racial nationalism had to do with the rise of international socialism in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Contention between international Socialism and ethnic nationalism in Korea was consistent with the larger trend of the time that witnessed intense competition between international Communist movements and fascist

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movements in Europe and elsewhere. Korean nationalists were well aware of the trend, and they often wrote about it in newspapers and journals. An Chaehong of Choso˘n ilbo, for instance, discussed in detail the current rise of nationalism in Europe and elsewhere in various articles published in the early 1930s. He classified nationalism into two categories, kungmin chuu˘i of advanced nations (for example, Italy, Germany, and Japan) and minjok chuu˘i of backward nations (for example, China and India). He argued that nationalism, not “dogmatic internationalism” (kongsingnon cho˘k kukche chuu˘i) should be the direction Koreans should follow. An advocated nationalism as “a necessary step to produce energy needed for struggle for survival among people of backward countries by promoting collective consciousness and solidarity” (1932/1978, 462). Although he acknowledged that a nation would produce more than two classes, which could lead to social conflicts, he nevertheless claimed that this should not be taken as an excuse to deny the importance of nation and nationalism. Yi Kwangsu lamented that the import of Anglo-Saxonian individualism and liberalism weakened Korea’s traditional “spirit of sacrifice and service,” and he called for restoring collectivism based on the “communal spirit of villages of old Choso˘n” (1932b / 1962, 319). He also criticized Marxists, accusing them of being reluctant to use the term nation and of possessing “slave thought.” Both An and Yi, despite different political stances toward Japanese rule, agreed on the importance of promoting nationalism based on the essential features of Korea, especially blood and soul. The December 1934 article, “Re-appreciation of Korean Culture,” published in Kaebyo˘k by Pak Yo˘nghu˘i, captured the essence of the particularism that Korean nationalists sought to promote in response to Communist universalism. The article first lamented that, for a while, young Koreans refused to talk about “things Korean” (Chosonjo˘k) because they despised them as “backward,” “conservative,” or even “reactionary.” As a result, the author regretted, “nation, history, language, culture were all uncritically or categorically rejected as subjects of discussion, while class was considered the only element (chonjae)” (2). The article then welcomed the recent trend to “learn Korea (Choso˘n)” and study “Korean studies” (Choso˘nhak) under mottoes such as “Let’s learn about Korea,” or “As Koreans, we should know Korea.” It claimed that lacking a proper understanding of the past, Koreans would not be able to find a path for a new nation. This was because the “rich heritage of the past becomes a cornerstone of modern culture and without it modern culture becomes empty” (Pak Yo˘nghu˘i 1934, 3). The article classified methods

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of Korean studies in two ways: (1) understanding Korea from a class perspective, and (2) interpreting class from a Korean perspective. The article argued that the former was to “understand Korea as part of the world” while the latter was based on the premise that “Korea’s development would constitute the construction of the world” (4). In other words, the former would promote universalism; the latter would champion particularism. Yet, the principle of universalism would be unable to help one capture the complexities of a particular situation. The article concluded that Koreans should promote particularism using Korean studies as the method to reappreciate Korean culture and heritage. Korean nationalists did not simply engage in a “war of position” with international Socialists. Rather, they initiated various programs and campaigns to enlist popular support. The campaign for preserving ancient remains and historical monuments, the promotion of Korean studies with particular interest in the nation’s ancient history, and efforts to preserve the Korean language and promote Korean literature, all grew out of nationalists’ concerns with and interests in promoting Korean particularism. Also, after the dissolution of Sin’ganhoe on May 16, 1931, nationalists, led by Tonga and Choso˘n newspapers, sought to reorganize nationalist groups with the establishment of “national expressive associations” (minjok p’yohyo˘n tanch’e) and “national core groups” (minjok chungsim tanch’e). In so doing, noncompromising and reformist nationalists came to work together to oppose international Socialism as well as colonial racism, thus reversing the earlier split when the former had joined Sin’ganhoe, and the latter had not. They made joint efforts in raising national consciousness (for example, promotion of Korean studies) and gained popular support over the Communist movement. Ironically, the rise of international Socialism that sought to delegitimize nationalism had the unintended consequence of unifying the once-split nationalist movement under the banner of Korean ethnic national unity. One issue that illustrated the sharp differences between ethnic nationalists and international Socialists with regard to nation and class was the so-called Choso˘n-Manchurian problem. This issue referred to the exploitation and suppression of ethnic Koreans in Manchuria by the Chinese authority. Basically, nationalists framed the “Choso˘n-Manchurian problem” as a national issue that transcended any particular class interest, and they called for collective action. In contrast, Communists understood it as a class issue and advocated collaboration among peasants, workers, and Commu-

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nists of Korea, China, and Japan. Because nationalists and internationalists approached it in such contrasting ways, this problem merits detailed discussion. In the 1920s many Koreans left their country for Manchuria and Japan. While their motivations varied, most were poor and had been exploited in Korea. They were attracted by opportunities offered by the vast uncultivated areas in Manchuria. By 1930, more than six hundred thousand Koreans were said to live in Manchuria (some estimates put the figure much higher). Although some Korean migrants were engaged in political activities, the majority were poor peasants whose situation, both economic and political, remained precarious. They worked as landless tenants or semitenants subject to frequent social, economic, and political discrimination and oppression by Chinese landlords and authorities. The rise of anti-Japanese sentiment starting from the mid-1920s exacerbated the plight of ethnic Koreans living in Manchuria. They were often viewed by the authority as “agents of Japanese imperialism” or “Communists” and as such became targets and victims of political discrimination and unwarranted violence. In the late 1920s, the precarious situation of ethnic Koreans in Manchuria became a major social and political issue in Korea, and by December 1927, about forty organizations focused on addressing the problem emerged (Chi 1996). Communists approached the Korean-Manchurian problem as a class issue and did not regard what Koreans faced in Manchuria as anything unusual or unique. They understood it as a class problem that could occur in any capitalist society. Pak Il-Hyo˘ng’s article published in Pip’an on November 1931 is a good illustration of the Korean Communists’ approach. Pak began his analysis by saying that Chinese ill treatment of Koreans in Manchuria was understandable when viewed from a Chinese bourgeois’s perspective. This was, he argued, because Korean-Manchurians were considered to be “a conscious or subconscious vanguard of Japanese capitalism.” The Japanese military often intervened in cases of ill treatment of ethnic Koreans on the grounds that they needed to “protect its residents,” but this simply confirmed Chinese suspicions. As a result, Korean-Manchurians received even harsher treatment from Chinese authorities after Japanese interventions, thus creating a vicious cycle. Second, Pak noted that not all Koreans were subject to ill treatment. Instead, “merchants and usurers are treated relatively well but peasants, workers, and political elements who cannot leave Manchuria unless the very reasons (economic or political) they left Korea become obsolete.” Therefore,

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he continued, “when we discuss the Korean-Manchurian problem, rather than vaguely mentioning illusory nationalism, we have to put peasants and workers at the center of our main issue” (1931, 33 – 41). Pak concluded with a proclamation that “the issue of exploitation arises in any place under capitalism” and “it is not Manchu-specific”; therefore, it would be misleading to treat the Korean-Manchurian problem as a national issue. Instead, it should be treated as an issue of class. “The Dissolution Declaration” of 1930 also approached the KoreanManchurian issue from the perspective of class conflict. It maintained that Korean peasants and workers in Manchuria suffered not so much because they were Koreans but because they were peasants and workers. Besides, “the unhappiness that they suffer is not suffered alone, for the Chinese workers and peasants equally suffer such unhappiness.” Therefore, the declaration claimed that Korean workers in Manchuria must come to realize that “the mere ‘independence of Korea’ is not sufficient to emancipate them from the stubborn capitalistic and feudalistic oppression and exploitation.” The declaration called for cooperation between Korean and Chinese workers by saying that “the Korean workers and peasants in Manchuria must unite with the Chinese workers and peasants. They must struggle to establish a Soviet government and fight for a representative congress of the peasants, workers, and soldiers” (Suh 1970, 386 – 87). Such a call for class solidarity among workers and peasants across East Asia provoked a strong reaction from nationalists. In sharp contrast to communists, nationalists understood the Korea-Manchuria problem fundamentally as a national issue. A series of editorials in Choso˘n ilbo on January 10 –13, 1928, defined the Korean-Manchurian problem as “part of the survival of the Korean nation” and urged “all Koreans” to participate in efforts to bring about the best solution (C. An 1928 / 1978, 261). Another editorial on October 9, 1932 claimed that Koreans in Manchuria were suffering more because they were ethnic Koreans and urged Koreans in Korea to show “love of nation” (minjok ae) toward fellow Koreans in Manchuria (C. An 1931/1978, 445). The newspaper followed up such editorials with an aid campaign for fellow Koreans in Manchuria, and about 64,300 people reportedly donated a total of 12,615 wo˘n, 77 cho˘n, as well as 6,613 pieces of clothing. Some angry Koreans even attacked Chinese living in Korea when they heard about the suppression of ethnic Koreans in Manchurian, and about one hundred Chinese were reportedly killed in Pyo˘ngyang as a result (Chi 1996).

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Some nationalists believed that the Korean-Manchurian problem stemmed from Korea being a poor, weak nation within the context of geopolitical struggles. Chu Yohan, in an article published in Tongkwang in September 1931, contended that Manchuria became a battleground among powerful countries, such as Japan, China, and the United States, and that Koreans were victims of this international rivalry. He identified two new factors that would threaten the status of Koreans: (1) the increasing immigration of Chinese into Manchuria, and (2) growing antiforeign sentiments among Chinese already residing there. Chu argued that neither returning to Korea nor assimilating into China would solve the problem. Instead, he urged Koreans in Manchuria to preserve their “unique national culture” and to create “autonomous Korean villages” as a solution (Chu 1931, 5). In framing the Korean-Manchurian problem as a national one, Korean nationalists not only criticized Chinese authorities but also (or perhaps more so) blamed Korean Communists as responsible for the tragedy of Koreans in Manchuria. They considered the tragedy to be a direct result of the Communists’ reckless behavior, including having foolishly followed the Comintern’s order to attack the Chinese government in collaboration with Chinese Communists. Yi Kwangsu, in an article published in Tongkwang in January 1931, argued that Korean Communists attacked the Chinese military as members of the “Chinese Communist party (not Korean Communist party)” following order from the Comintern. Yet such actions, he accused, did great harm to fellow innocent Koreans because they provoked severe suppression of “tens of thousands of Koreans in Manchuria by the Chinese.” Sin Onjun, in a Tongkwang article in October 1931, similarly accused Korean Communists of making fellow Koreans victims of their “international strategy” and proclaimed that, as someone with a “Korean soul,” he could not forgive such leftist actions (O. Sin 1931, 9). Thus, Communists and nationalists debated over the root, nature, and solution of the Korean-Manchurian problem, which offered an excellent opportunity for both sides to express their views of nation and class in the colonial context. Communists regarded the issue as a class problem that was related to Japanese capitalism, and they called for international class solidarity as a solution. In sharp contrast, nationalists approached the problem as a national one, and they launched an aid campaign for fellow Koreans in Manchuria as their solution. Nationalists alleged that the problem resulted from those foolish Communists who followed the Comintern’s strategy, which helped victimize fellow Koreans.

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Triumph of Nation over Class Michael Weiner (1996) points out that between 1919 and 1939 the basic contour of Comintern policy in China was determined by three factors: (1) the assumption that world revolution was a unitary process; (2) the belief that the Bolshevik model of “successful” revolution was universally applicable; and (3) the fact that Comintern activities were increasingly subordinated to the shifting foreign policy requirements of the Soviet state. However, in applying the Bolshevik concept of revolution to the anticolonial struggle in China, Weiner contends that the Comintern failed to come to terms with the fundamental processes underlying revolutionary developments in China. In contrast to the framework provided by the Russian Revolution, the multiple forces of nationalism and anticolonial struggle, the agrarian question, and the peasant movement determined China’s revolutionary movement (Weiner 1996). Weiner’s points also apply to the Korean case. The Comintern’s September Theses similarly failed to appreciate the unique colonial situation in Korea. First, the theses overestimated the revolutionary potential of the underclass in colonial Korea. It interpreted the growth of class conflict in factories and villages as signs of social revolution in the colony. As such, the theses instructed Korean Communists to concentrate their efforts on organizing and mobilizing workers and peasants for political collective action. Contrary to their expectation, however, labor and rural class conflicts did not develop into revolutionary movements. By the mid-1930s most of them were either marginalized or institutionalized. Labor strikes and radical peasant activities (for example, red peasant union movements) received severe repression from the colonial government and almost disappeared by the mid-1930s. Moderate class conflict like tenancy disputes were institutionalized into the colonial legal system as the colonial government promulgated agrarian laws, such as the Tenancy Arbitration Ordinance of 1932 and the Agricultural Land Ordinance of 1934 (G. Shin 1996). Beginning in 1932 the colonial government also launched a comprehensive rural revitalization campaign to address rural poverty and social conflict in villages (Shin and Han 1999). Such corporatist policies as well as repression effectively quelled class conflicts in colonial Korea. Second, while overestimating the revolutionary potential of the proletariat and the rural poor, the September Theses underestimated the popular appeals of ethnic nationalism. Prior to the colonial period, Koreans had lived for centuries in a unified political community and only recently were

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stripped of sovereignty. Many Koreans still revered their lineage and clan (a 1930 colonial government survey shows that at the time there existed fifteen thousand such villages in Korea). Therefore, a blood-based notion of nation had a much stronger power of appeal to Korean people than the new “foreign” language of class, class conflict, and “comrades.” In addition, colonial racism and the assimilation policy that denied Korea’s past produced a bitter sense of resentment. In this situation, the Communist claim that ethnic nationalism was simply an ideology that masked the reality of colonialism and promoted bourgeois interests did not strike a popular chord. Even during the years of “total war,” Koreans resisted colonial rule by engaging in “everyday forms of resistance” with the consequence of further raising national consciousness (G. Shin 1996). It was no coincidence that the local Shinto shrine that symbolized assimilation policy during Japanese rule became the first target of retribution by Koreans after liberation.4 To be sure, not all Korean Communists advocated internationalism, following the September Theses. Others certainly appreciated the power of nationalism in the Communist movement, and it was indeed this kind of nationalist Communism, not an internationalist one, that eventually prevailed in North Korea after 1945. Although they criticized the nationalist movement, such as the campaign to aid Korean-Manchurians, as “exaggerating and distorting the problem in order to assert the importance of patriotism,” they admitted its effectiveness in gaining support from a broader population (I. Pak 1932). Some communists acknowledged that “the greatest mistake of the Comintern lies in basing the direction of the Communist revolution upon their own experiences in other countries of the world [that are] culturally and racially different” (Suh 1970, 214). Others went so far as to criticize international Socialism as the product of “leftist infantilism.” To them, international Socialism was a misguided strategy that opposed the organization of a national united front, mechanically adhered to the independence of the proletariat movement, and sought to establish a separate proletariat party. The Korean proletariat, they argued, could not separate its class duties and its national duties at this point in time. Recognizing the limit of internationalism and the power of nationalism, some Korean Communists returned to the united front strategy after the mid-1930s. Paek Namun was a key example of such nationalist, in contrast to international, Communists. He believed that the “Tan’gun nationalism” that Sin Ch’aeho, Yi Kwangsu, and other ethnic nationalists promoted could not produce any scientific understanding of class, nation, and state and, there-

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fore, could not be expected to offer any framework to overcome colonial reality. Still, he acknowledged the popular appeal that Tan’gun nationalism commanded among ordinary Korean people. This was because the Korean nation, according to Paek, had a long history of ethnic unity unprecedented in world history, and such features had historical meaning as “objective elements” in the formation of a modern nation. Also, rather than categorically rejecting particularism, he sought to offer a dialectical solution to tensions that existed between particularism and universalism. In an article published on October 20, 1934, in the Tonga ilbo under the title of “Choso˘n-specific Social System,” Paek posed a question by stating that “the main issue in the historical epistemology is how to resolve potential conflicts between the world-historical and national-specific views.” However, instead of championing universalism over particularism, he argued that “the issue of particularity can only be resolved by understanding generality; the issue of generality can only be resolved by understanding particularity” (October 20, 1934, Tonga ilbo). In the end, Paek agreed with Yi Kwangsu’s concept of the Korean nation as “a unitary nation with common blood, territory, language, culture, historical destiny for a thousand years, which is exceptional in world history” (cited in Pang 1992, 124). Such nationalist Communism emerged in North Korea after 1945. While the North stressed “a creative application of Marx-Leninism,” what eventually prevailed was not international Socialism or Marxism-Leninism, but militant nationalism in the form of juche (chuch’e) ideology that advocated “Socialism of our style.” Juche thought should be considered a version of nativism that appropriated the universalistic thought of Communism in the North Korean context. It was no coincidence that nationalist Communists like Paek went to work for the northern regime after 1945.

Nationalism, Communism, and Fascism in Korea Nationalism, colonialism, and Communism are often positioned against each other. To be sure, many Korean Communists opposed colonialism and nationalism on the grounds that the former was an imperialist ideology and the latter, a bourgeois ideology. Similarly nationalists contested both colonialists and Communists. It is conventional wisdom in Korea, both academic and public, that Korean nationalism arose as a response to Japanese colonialism. The disputes between international Socialists and eth-

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nic nationalists demonstrate that Korean nationalism was anti-Communist in its formative years. The relationships among nationalism, colonialism, and Communism, however, were much more complex than such binary conceptions suggest. First, the rise and development of Korean ethnic nationalism had to do with both colonialism and Communism. Ethnic nationalism was a response to colonial racism that led to assimilation policy as well as Communism that advocated the primacy of class over nation. By advocating the organic immortality of the Korean nation, its proponents could show that the Korean nation was distinct from the Japanese and that nation was a more important and longer lasting source of collective identity than class. In this sense, the ethnic-racial notion of nation based on common blood and culture was the expression of Korean particularism against the universalism expressed in the colonial racism on the right and the Marxism on the left. Second, Korean nationalists, while in contestation with Communists, shared with the latter in their opposition to colonialism. To be sure, ethnic nationalists focused on the cultural and spiritual aspects in resisting colonial racism, whereas Communists paid more attention to social and political issues arising from Japanese rule. Still they both opposed colonialism and even formed an ill-fated united front in 1927 to coordinate anticolonial efforts. In other words, their relations were not fixed, but changed over time, going back and forth between contention and collaboration. Third, ethnic nationalism and internationalism shared their emphasis on collectivism. In the early 1920s, many Korean nationalists embraced Western liberalism and individualism downgrading collectivistic traditions of the past as backward. By the late 1920s and early 1930s, however, Korean nationalists came to better appreciate Korea’s past, especially its collectivistic tradition, and sought to use it in raising national consciousness. Internationalist Socialists, while disputing such ethnic nationalists, nonetheless promoted collectivism in the form of class solidarity. In both ethnic nationalism and international Socialism, individuals had no independent epistemological position; they only had meaning as part of an abstract collectivity, whether nation or class. Fourth, ethnic nationalism shared colonialism’s anti-Communist stance. Both colonialists and ethnic nationalists preached the primacy of empire or nation over class and had affinities with racial fascism. In fact, this common stance against class and Communism offered some nationalists a basis, or

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an excuse, for collaborating with colonialists. This illustrates the danger of generalizing relationships among nationalism, colonialism, and Communism. It seems that their respective relationship was situational and issuespecific—nationalists accepted the colonialist logic in their opposition to class movements, while working with Communists in their resistance to colonialism. Fifth, the rise of international Socialism had the unintended consequence of unifying the nationalist movement. With the demise of the March First movement and initiation of so-called cultural rule, Korean nationalists were divided into two camps—reformist, or compromising, and radical, or uncompromising. When Sin’ganhoe was established in 1927, only the latter joined the organization with the Communists. However, with the rise of international Socialism and the subsequent breakup of Sin’ganhoe, uncompromising nationalists such as An Chaehong, joined reformists such as Yi Kwangsu in promoting particularism in the form of ethnic nationalism. Thus, it was ironic that the intent of Socialism to marginalize nationalism had the unintended consequence of strengthening it. Finally, after colonial rule, ethnic nationalism was combined with Communism and fascism to produce authoritarian politics in North and South Korea, respectively. Its fascist tendency was conflated with (or even masked by) its anticolonialism, and nationalism became a key ideological resource in both Koreas. It was no historical coincidence that the North saw the rise of a political regime that fused Marxist-Leninism with ethnic nationalism, while the South established a fascist-like authoritarian regime that mobilized ethnic nationalism extensively for its political agenda. In this sense, it is too simplistic, and even misleading, to argue that the nationalistCommunist split during the colonial period offered a historical condition for the post–1945 division (Cumings 1981; Robinson 1988). Nationalism became a highly effective organizing and mobilizing force in both parts of Korea. One must understand the complexities of nationalism’s relationship to colonialism and Communism in order to comprehend the interplay of national and transnational forces during Japanese rule.

four

North Korea and “Socialism of Our Style”

With the Japanese surrender to the allied powers, Korea was liberated from colonial rule on August 15, 1945. That summer was filled with the joys of liberation and hopes for creating a new, independent Korean nation. Contrary to such hopes, the national question remained unresolved and became ever more complicated. Although Koreans welcomed the prospect of independence, they differed in their visions of a postcolonial state and society. Four decades of colonial rule had significantly changed the landscape of Korean society and politics, and the issue of how to handle former collaborators with Japan presented a particularly thorny question for Korean leaders. Also, as before, not only Koreans were interested in Korean affairs: now the United States and the Soviet Union came to occupy the peninsula, competing against each other to shape a social and political order in liberated Korea. The interplay of these internal and external forces led to national division, social and political tensions, and eventually war. After three years of foreign occupations, two separate states emerged in Korea: the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the South, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the North. On the surface, they looked opposite in political ideology and system, capitalist and Communist, respectively, and indeed they fiercely competed against each other for legitimacy of the Korean community. However, careful examination reveals a great deal of similarity in terms of their view of the Korean nation, their use of nationalism in politics, and their appropriation of transnational forces for nationalist agendas. In the aftermath of liberation, instead of weakening, nationalism became reinforced. 79

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As before, the nationalism that appeared in both Koreas was ethnic and collectivist. Despite political denouncement of nationalist-turnedcollaborators such as Yi Kwangsu, nationalism of postcolonial Korea resembled that of the colonial period examined in the previous chapters.1 Postcolonial nationalism continued to function as an ideology of antiimperialism (anti-Americanism and anti-Japanism) for the North and antiCommunism for the South. In the North, nationalism, built on resentment against Japanese colonialism and American (neo)imperialism, evolved into a militant nationalism of juche.2 Today, few scholars would dispute that North Korea is a nationalist state. As historian Charles Armstrong points out, North Korea represents “‘Koreanization’ of Soviet communism, not the ‘Sovietization’ of North Korea” (2003, 241). However, North Korea did not start off as a nationalist state in its present form, nor did it become this way overnight. Although it was never simply a Soviet satellite, North Korea evolved from a nation under relative Soviet dominance to one with important links to China. Eventually it became a nationalist state. This chapter explicates the historical process of such evolution with particular attention to the ways by which Communism or Socialism has been appropriated for a nationalist goal in the North, eventually leading to the establishment of “Socialism of our style.”

Lenin, Stalin, and Mao In The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy, Walker Connor identifies “three strands of nationalism” in Marxism. The first one, “classical Marxism,” was predicated on the primacy of class over nation and was therefore irreconcilable with nationalism. In Korea, this was what internationalist Socialists claimed during colonial rule. The second strain, “strategic Marxism,” acknowledged the power of national sentiments and offered formal support for the right of national self-determination on the abstract level, though being selective and even reluctant in actual endorsement. This is close to what Korean Marxists thought when they joined the united front organization Sin’ganhoe in 1927. The third, “national Marxism,” recognized the role of nations as principal historical forces going against classical Marxism (1984, 19 –20). This is similar to what exists in today’s North Korea. Such strains in Marxism with regard to its view of nationalism reveal the complexities in their relationships. In particular, as they faced different

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situations in their own countries, leaders of Communist movements took various positions regarding Communism’s relation to nationalism. lenin and international socialism

Without a doubt, Lenin, like Marx, was an advocate of international Socialism. He believed that only when the proletariat of the world united, would a Communist revolution succeed. In contrast, he considered nationalism, a bourgeois ideology, to be harmful to Communist movements. In “Opportunism and the Collapse of the Second International” (1916), Lenin branded nationalism as “chauvinism”; in his view, it encouraged defending only one’s own fatherland, even at the cost of enslaving people in other countries. He warned that nationalism would split the international proletariat movement along the lines of nationality, since it emphasized unity within one’s own national bourgeoisie. The “Leninist national policy” was the “formula for performing the task of harnessing the powerful forces of nationalism to the revolution and then vanquishing them thereafter” (Connor 1984, xiii). Lenin’s position on nationalism and international Socialism was perhaps best expressed in the “Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and Colonial Questions,” which he wrote in 1920. Submitted for discussion to the Second Congress of the Comintern, the draft made twelve points, calling for all Socialists to unite against imperialists and bourgeois democracy. Lenin first pointed out how bourgeois democracy deceived the oppressed classes under the guise of the equality of all men. “On the plea that all men are absolutely equal,” he argued, “the bourgeoisie is transforming the idea of equality, which is itself a reflection of relations in commodity production, into a weapon in its struggle against the abolition of classes” (2). Based on this assessment, Lenin called for a clear distinction between the interests of oppressed classes and the general concept of national interests as a whole, which implied the interests of the ruling class. He urged that the Comintern’s policy should “rest primarily on a closer union of the proletarians and the working masses of all nations and countries for a joint revolutionary struggle to overthrow the landowners and the bourgeoisie.” Lenin defined this kind of “proletarian internationalism” as consisting of two elements: (1) “the interests of the proletarian struggle in any one country should be subordinated to the interests of that struggle on a worldwide scale”; and (2) “a nation which is achieving victory over the bourgeoisie should be able and willing to make the greatest national sacrifice for the overthrow of international capital.” He

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concluded, “Complete victory over capitalism cannot be won unless the proletariat and, following it, the mass of working people in all countries and nations throughout the world voluntarily strive for alliance and unity” (5). Still, Lenin recognized the tactical wisdom of alliances with national forces. In particular, he noted the importance of nationalist appeal to oppressed people in the colonies. In this context Lenin conceded the possibility of collaborating (if temporarily) with radical nationalist forces at the Second Comintern Congress held in the summer of 1920 in his debate with M. N. Roy on the national question in colonies. Connor characterizes this Leninism as a form of “strategic Marxism.” stalin and “socialism in one country”

Stalin, while initially a supporter of Lenin’s international Socialism, eventually replaced it with his theory of “Socialism in one country.” As late as 1924, Stalin supported international Socialism when he said that while the efforts of one country were sufficient to overthrow its own bourgeoisie, for complete victory of Socialism, joint efforts of several advanced countries were necessary. However, by November 1926, as he was consolidating his political power, he reversed his earlier internationalist position, saying, “The party always took as its starting point the idea that the victory of socialism . . . can be accomplished with the forces of a single country” (Cooper 2000, 2). Stalin’s theory of “Socialism in one country” encouraged Socialist movements to adapt to whatever was in the best interests of a particular country and opened up the possibility of forming “popular fronts” with so-called progressive elements of the bourgeois class. He recognized the strategic value of Socialist movements that considered country-specific situations. Even before officially advancing his theory of “Socialism in one country,” Stalin paid keen attention to the issues of nation and nationalism. He defined nation as “a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture” (1913 / 1954, 307). His definition was widely accepted among leaders of Communist movements elsewhere. He also recognized the potential power of nationalism when he admitted that the bourgeoisie could be useful in their appeal to “native folk” for the fatherland, as if their cause were the cause of the nation as a whole. Still, unlike many nationalists who considered nation to be an eternal being, Stalin viewed the nation as being subjected to the law of change, like every other historical

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phenomenon. He was not prepared to ride on the power of nationalism for his Communist revolutionary movement. Furthermore, he suppressed nationalist sentiments in fifteen republics within the Soviet Union, while promoting “Socialist patriotism” and loyalty to the Soviet Union. mao and the “united front”

It was Mao in China who saw the genuine value of nationalism in the Communist movement. Although he did not use the term nationalism, because it was considered a bourgeois ideology, he clearly sought national struggle against Japanese imperialism as an integral part of his Communist movement. Mao was willing to work with national bourgeois forces to fight foreign forces, and it was in this context that the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) formed a united front with GMD (Guomindang) in the mid-1920s. While the CCP broke the alliance a few years later and had to escape from the GMD suppression, the nationalist character of his movements became more clear and important after the 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria, which made China a “semicolony.” Also, unlike orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideals that advocated the dictatorship of the proletariat, Mao wanted to establish a “people’s republic.” Instead of calling for international solidarity for Socialist revolution, he focused on forming a “united front” against Japanese imperialists and “Chinese lackeys of imperialism.” Mao’s theory of national liberation was well expressed in a report written in 1935 entitled “On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism.” He pointed to “a great change” that had now taken place in China, that is, the Japanese invasion of his country. The CCP, he argued, must redefine its tasks in light of this precarious situation. In his view, the most urgent task was national struggle against Japanese imperialism, not an international Socialist movement aimed at emancipation of human beings as a whole. Toward this end, he called for forming a broad national united front with nationalist bourgeois and establishing a people’s republic of China. This broad representation would include every Chinese who was willing to take part in the national revolution. This inclusive representation, according to him, was necessitated by the Japanese invasion that “altered class relations in China,” making it possible for the national bourgeoisie to join the anti-Japanese struggle led by Communists. Mao’s 1938 report, presented to the sixth plenary session of the sixth central committee of the CCP, most directly expressed his view of the relationship between nationalism and international Socialism. Entitled “Patriotism

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and Internationalism,” the report unequivocally proclaimed that “a Communist, who is an internationalist, at the same time . . . can be and must be . . . a patriot.” Distinguishing patriotism of China from nationalism of Japan and Germany, the report explained how patriotism and internationalism could be and must be combined in Chinese Communist movement in the following way: Only by fighting in defense of the motherland can we defeat the aggressors and achieve national liberation. And only by achieving national liberation will it be possible for the proletariat and other working people to achieve their own emancipation. The victory of China and the defeat of the invading imperialists will help the people of other countries. Thus in wars of national liberation patriotism is applied internationalism. For this reason Communists must use their initiative to the full, march bravely and resolutely to the battle front of the war of national liberation and train their guns on the Japanese aggression. (Mao 1938/1975, 196 –97)

Apparently Mao did not discredit the internationalist approach, but he still championed nationalism over international Socialism in the Chinese Communist movement that he would lead. His was a “nationalist Marxism,” according to Connor’s classification. In Korea, Communism’s relationship to nationalism was complex and changed over time. Many Korean intellectuals during Japanese rule were initially drawn to Communism as an ideology of national liberation, and they formed the ill-fated Sin’ganhoe in 1927 with “noncompromising” nationalists. However, with the rise of international Socialism in the late 1920s, they split with the nationalists and turned to class movements focusing on the organization and mobilization of the peasants and workers. Korean internationalists also sought to establish a Soviet republic in Korea. Then, after the mid-1930s, seeing the value and power of nationalism in mobilizing the populace, they returned to the strategy of a national united front. Although Korean Communists were not all cut from the same cloth, it is important to examine Kim Il Sung’s activities during the colonial period, as they came to crucially shape the political ideology and system in North Korea after 1945.

Kim Il Sung and “Socialism in One Family” Political scientist Kenneth Jowitt (1987) characterized North Korea as “Socialism in one family,” referring to its Socialist system ruled by a single powerful leader and family. To be sure, the phrase was a cynical alteration of

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Stalin’s claim to be constructing “Socialism in one country” while putting world Socialist revolution aside. Still “Socialism in one family” captures the essence of the North Korean regime based on Socialism, nationalism, and familism. North Korea resembles the family-state of prewar Japan in that it regards Korean people as one family, or as a “sociopolitical organism” sharing the same bloodline with Kim Il Sung as a father figure. Indeed, Kim was not simply considered a political leader but was revered as ˘obo˘i suryo˘ng (the fatherly or parental leader) or minjok u˘i t’aeyang (sun of the nation) among North Koreans. He even called himself the present-day Tan’gun, the founder of the Korean nation. Controversy simmers regarding Kim’s background and activities during Japanese rule. The South Korean government branded the North Korean leader an imposter of General Kim Ilso˘ng, who had been highly regarded as a legendary fighter among Korean people during colonial rule. North Korean documents, in sharp contrast, exaggerated Kim’s activities during colonial rule, depicting him as the leader of a broad anti-Japanese movement. Most scholars now accept that the North Korean leader did indeed fight the Japanese during colonial rule, though he led only a handful (perhaps several hundreds at most) of guerilla soldiers in the Manchurian area (Suh 1988). Such guerilla experiences in Manchuria were much more limited than the North Korean official position claims, but they still played a crucial role in shaping the political system and ideology of the northern regime after 1945. These guerilla fighters came to constitute the core political elite of the North, and their experiences became “mythologized,” forming a backbone of the prevailing juche ideology (C. Armstrong 2003). Understanding the Manchurian experience is particularly important in understanding the formation of “Socialism in one family.” In his dissertation titled “Wounded Nationalism,” historian Han Hongkoo offers a persuasive, historical explanation of why North Korea became a nationalist, family state under Kim’s leadership. Han pays close attention to Kim Il Sung’s bitter experience with international Socialism in Manchuria in the 1930s. In February 1932, shortly after the Japanese takeover of Manchuria, a pro-Japanese Korean group residing in Manchuria organized the Minsaengdan (People’s Livelihood Corps), also known as the MSD. The CCP, however, wrongly suspected that its own Korean CCP members were affiliated with the MSD and led a purge of alleged MSD members. It must be kept in mind that many Korean Communists had joined the CCP abiding the Comintern principle of “one party in one country.” The CCP killed as many as two thousand Korean

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Communists and sympathizers in a two-and-a-half-year period. Kim himself was arrested by the CCP as an MSD suspect and was said to have been “only a hair’s breath away from execution” (H. Han 1999, 16 –17). The MSD purge left two important legacies for North Korea. Kim, for one, became obsessed with national independence and distrusted super powers and international Socialism. Korean Communists, including Kim, joined the CCP as part of a Communist strategy of internationalism, but the outcome of joining the ranks was, ultimately, the purge of Korean members by the foreign party, the CCP. Kim did not forget the harrowing persecution of Korean Communists by foreign Communist parties. This explains why Kim distanced himself from both sides and maintained an independent position during the turbulent Sino-Soviet dispute period. As Han points out, “Kim’s experiences enlightened him to the political behavior of the two self-acclaimed big brothers of the Communist camp that had sacrificed revolution of small countries for the sake of their own national interest” (1999, 356). Kim was said to begin formulating the basic notion of juche during the anti-Japanese armed struggle of the 1930s, though it was not until 1955 when the term was first used officially in the North.3 Many MSD suspects and children of MSD victims joined Kim in his fight against the Japanese. As Han points out, Kim gave the suspects “new political life” by burning investigation documents. He also became like a new parent to children who had been orphaned after their parents were executed in the MSD purge, and they lived and fought together with Kim as if they were his own children. After 1945, these guerrillas returned to Korea with Kim and became the backbone of the North Korean elite.4 The North Korean ideologues formulated a theory of the “grand revolutionary family” that encompassed all North Koreans. North Korean people were taught being “endowed with a more precious ‘political life’ from the ‘o˘bo˘i suryo˘ng’ [parental leader].” According to Han, the origin of this theory stretches as far back as the MSD incident. Seen this way, “Socialism in one family” was not mere political rhetoric or a mythological slogan, but rather had deep historical roots.

Between Socialism and Nationalism However important they might have been, Kim’s ideas on juche were not institutionalized in North Korea immediately after 1945. For the first five

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years after liberation (1945 –50), North Korea did not claim to be a Socialist or nationalist country. Rather, it proclaimed to be a people’s republic (inmin konghwaguk) and its party, the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), was not really a workers’ party as its name suggests. Instead the party was populist in character and was open to people from various sectors of society. When the DPRK was officially established in 1948, 62 percent of KWP members were from the peasant class and only 20 percent were workers (C. Armstrong 2003, 242). After the Korean War, Marxism-Leninism became more firmly established in the northern regime, and North Korea became an integral part of the Soviet empire. The North adopted many elements of the Soviet model, such as stress on heavy industrialization and the establishment of a highly repressive intelligence system. Even so, North Korea did not aspire to become merely a Leninist or Stalinist regime following the Soviet model. It still sought to appropriate both Socialism and nationalism in creating a distinctive system of its own. Throughout the 1950s and most of the 1960s, Kim stressed the necessity of creatively applying Marxism-Leninism to Korea’s situation. In a 1955 speech, for instance, Kim argued, “We are not engaged in any other country’s revolution, but solely in the Korean revolution. . . . When we study the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the history of the Chinese revolution, or the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, it is entirely for the purpose of correctly carrying out our own revolution” (1955 / 1977, 135 – 36). Similarly, in another speech made ten years later, he contended, “The Korean Communists are making a revolution in Korea. The Korean revolution is the basic duty of the Korean Communists. . . . Marxism-Leninism can be a powerful weapon of our revolution only when it is linked with the realities of our country. . . . When introducing the good experience of another country, we remodel and modify it to suit the actual conditions of our own” (1965/1972, 45 – 46). These speeches denounced both “dogmatism” and “revisionism,” rejecting efforts to mechanically apply Marxism-Leninism to North Korea and the kind of revision that was under way in the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin. Instead, Kim called for the “digestion” of, and not the “swallowing” of foreign experiences, namely, Marxism-Leninism. He sought to appropriate Marxism-Leninism to fit the North Korean context, creating a distinctive Korean system. Kim was aware of potential contradictions and dilemmas arising from the simultaneous pursuit of Socialism and nationalism, and as a result, he tried

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to reconcile any tensions that existed between the two. In the 1955 speech cited above, right after arguing for the importance of juche, Kim stated: Hearing us say that it is necessary to establish juche, some comrades might take it in a simple way and get the wrong idea that we need not learn from foreign countries. That would be quite wrong. We must learn from the positive experiences of socialist countries. . . . Internationalism and patriotism are inseparably linked with each other. You must realize that the love Korean Communists bear for their country does not conflict with the internationalism of the working class but fully conforms with it. (1955/1977, 143 – 44)

This view is reminiscent of Mao’s 1937 report of “Patriotism and Internationalism.” It was only after 1967 that juche became the primary ideological basis for the North Korean system, and its emergence was closely related to the Sino-Soviet dispute as well as enhanced confidence in Kim’s power.5 With the collapse of the Soviet empire two decades later, North Korea grew obsessed with promoting nationalism as a survival strategy in an increasingly precarious international environment. Most recently, in April 1992 when the North revised its constitution, it deleted Marxism-Leninism from the document. North Korea officially became a nationalist state. Also in the early years, North Korea intentionally avoided using the terms minjok (nation) and minjok chuu˘i (nationalism or ethnic nationalism) because they were seen as a bourgeois ideology. Instead, the term aeguk chuu˘i (patriotism) was used. Nevertheless, patriotism did not simply mean loyalty to the state, as opposed to loyalty to the ethnic nation. It also meant loyalty to the Korean nation, thus blurring any meaningful difference between patriotism and nationalism in the North Korean context. Here lies a crucial difference between North Korea and some other, especially multiethnic, Communist countries in which patriotism was intentionally promoted over nationalism. In the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, for instance, patriotism was considered an integrative ideology of state, while nationalism was criticized as a divisive one only to promote separatist interests of each ethnic group. This was, however, not the case for North Korea where there was a strong sense of ethnic unity. In Korea, one could not simply claim loyalty to the state against loyalty to the ethnic nation. If there was any difference between patriotism and nationalism in the North Korean usage, then it was in semantics only. There was no difference in substantive meaning. It was only a matter of time before North Korea would begin using terms like nation and nationalism explicitly and would become a nationalist state.

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Although North Korea initially accepted Stalin’s well-known definition of nation, in 1973 the country’s leadership added “bloodline” as one of the major criteria (along with language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup) of nation. By the mid-1980s, North Korea no longer hesitated to employ nationalist languages. In 1987 Kim Jong Il (who assumed power after his father Kim Il Sung died in 1994) officially used the slogan “Choso˘n minjok cheil chuu˘i” (A theory of Korean nation as number one). In the 1990s North Korea articulated the language of nationalism, not that of class or of Communism.

Nationalism over Socialism Entering the 1970s, North Korea elevated juche to the status of a supreme ideology. Kim Jong Il made a speech in 1974 that unequivocally claimed that juche is not a mere rendition of existing formal ideas like MarxismLeninism, but rather consists of original ideas of the Great Leader, the senior Kim. Although he and his father acknowledged that there was much to learn from Marxism-Leninism and that their thinking did indeed contribute to the birth of juche, here Kim insisted that Marxism had flaws as well. By identifying the shortcomings of Marxism-Leninism, the junior Kim opened up the rationale for creating a new, unique, and fortified political ideology by which to rule the nation. He argued that “although [Marxist classics] established the materialistic dialectical view on the human question, they did not give a full account of the essential features of man as dominator and transformer of nature and society” (1974/1985, 2). After distancing juche from Marxism-Leninism, the junior Kim coined the term “Kimilsungism” to refer to his father’s ideas. In a 1976 speech titled “On Correctly Understanding the Originality of Kimilsungism,” he contended that Kimilsungism was an original system of thought derived from juche, which is based on North Korean–specific ideals. According to the junior Kim, Kimilsungism comprises the “juche idea and a far-reaching revolutionary theory and leadership method evolved from this idea” (1976 / 1985, 11). Whereas in the past Kim Il Sung’s ideas were called “contemporary Marxism-Leninism,” Kim argued that it was now more fitting to label them Kimilsungism because they had evolved into a distinctive philosophy: Kimilsungism is consistent with the ideas of juche and forms a system based on the idea, theory and method in composition. Both in content and in composition, Kimilsungism is an original idea that cannot be explained within the

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origins and development framework of Marxism-Leninism. The ideas of juche which constitutes the quintessence of Kimilsungism is an idea newly discovered in the history of human thought. (1976/1985, 7)

This was one of the first explicit statements that emphasized the distinction between juche and Marxist-Leninism. He reiterated the importance of studying juche in its own right, rather than as a Marxist dialect. Also by naming his father’s thought “Kimilsungism,” the junior Kim elevated it to the level of a major ideology such as Stalinism and Maoism. The junior Kim contended: The revolutionary theory of Kimilsungism is a revolutionary theory which has provided solutions to problems arising in the revolutionary practice in a new age different from the era that gave rise to Marxism-Leninism. On the basis of the juche (idea), the leader gave a profound explanation of the theories, strategies and tactics on national liberation, class emancipation and human liberations in our era. Thus, it can be said that the revolutionary theory of Kimilsungism is a perfect revolutionary theory on Communism in the era of juche. . . . (1976/1985, 9)

Kim declared that the birth of a new era of juche made Marxism-Leninism obsolete and necessitated the rise of a new revolutionary theory, that is, Kimilsungism, to replace it. In short, the birth of Kimilsungism, he claimed, was a historical necessity. In essence, juche and Kimilsungism were expressions of the North Korean version of particularism over supposedly more universalistic MarxismLeninism. Such a particularistic orientation was well expressed in a speech made by the junior Kim in March 1982 to celebrate Kim Il Sung’s seventieth birthday and the development of the juche ideology. He began the speech by explaining that the party faced the unique task of modeling the entire North Korean society on juche. Kim claimed that this task was dire because the Korean revolution was unlike preceding historical examples. He lashed out against those in the past who failed to realize the uniqueness of their experience and did not pursue the independent spirit of juche, instead relying on “mechanical imitation” of other established ideologies. The junior Kim stated: Only when one knows his country well, will one be able to solve all problems arising in the revolution and construction in an independent manner and to suit one’s specific situation and carry out the revolution and construction in conformity with the aspirations and requirements of one’s people. Only then will one be able also to love one’s country and people ardently and demonstrate a high

North Korea and “Socialism of Our Style” 91 degree of patriotic devotion and revolutionary enthusiasm. . . . Koreans must know well Korean history, geography, economics, culture and the custom of the Korean nation, and in particular our Party’s policy, its revolutionary history and revolutionary traditions. Only then will they be able to establish juche and become true Korean patriots, the Korean Communists. (1982/1985, 43)

The tone is very different from when North Korea was trying to maintain a subtle balance between Socialism and nationalism. The speech champions nationalism over Socialism, or particularism over universalism. In fact, this was not much different from what the earlier nationalists promoted and also not much different from the position of South Korean leader Park Chung Hee. North Korean particularism expressed in juche and Kimilsungism culminated in “Choso˘n minjok cheil chuu˘i” (A theory of the Korean nation as number one) and “urisik sahoe chuu˘i” (Socialism of our style) that appeared in the 1990s. Both are logical extensions of juche and Kimilsungism and reflect the changed international environment, especially the demise of the Soviet empire that further isolated the country from outside. Just as the Sino-Soviet dispute contributed to the emergence of juche ideology, so too the collapse of the Soviet empire influenced the rise of such nationalist arguments. They were highly critical of the Chinese open-door policy and the Soviet policies of glasnost and perestroika as compromising to the capitalist world-system. On December 27, 1990, Kim Jong Il made a speech entitled “Socialism of Our Country is a Socialism of Our Style as Embodied by Juche Idea.” Appearing after the collapse of the Soviet empire, he reflected on why East European Communism failed and why North Korea would need “Socialism of our style” in an increasingly precarious international environment. Here Kim contrasted an Eastern Europe that was in “the turmoil of total destruction” with North Korea that is “a most advantageous socialist society” (1). First, he argued that Eastern Europe failed because it merely “imitated the Soviet experience in a mechanical manner.” However, the Soviet model was based on specific historical conditions and “if [their] experience is considered absolute and accepted dogmatically,” Kim claimed, “it is impossible to build Socialism properly, as the times change and the specific situation of each country is different from another” (1–2). In his view: Marxism-Leninism presented a series of opinions on the building of Socialism and Communism, but it confined itself to presupposition and hypothesis owing

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origins and development to the limitations of the conditions of their ages and practical experiences. . . . But many countries applied the principles of the Marxist-Leninist materialistic conception of history dogmatically, failing to advance revolution continually after the establishment of the socialist system. (5)

In contrast, North Korea was able to avoid such failure by establishing an original and creative form of Socialism, thanks to juche. According to Kim, North Korea, a “backward, colonial semifeudal society” when liberated from colonial rule, could not accept either a Marxist theory based on European capitalist experiences or a Leninist theory founded on Russian situations. Instead, it had to find a “solution to every problem arising in the revolution by racking our own brains and with our own efforts to suit our country’s sociohistorical conditions.” Kim added that the situation was more complicated due to territorial division and the presence of U.S. imperialists in the South. But the Great Leader, Kim Il Sung, the junior Kim claimed, “put forward original lines and policies suited to our people’s aspirations and the specific situation of our country” (2). He argued that the juche idea was original and led to the development of a creative form of Socialism: The juche idea is a revolutionary theory which occupies the highest stage of development of the revolutionary ideology of the working class. The originality and superiority of the juche idea, on which our Socialism is based, define the latter’s special features and advantages. The juche idea requires that one must undertake the revolution and construction for his own country on his full responsibility and with his own efforts to meet the actual condition of his country. Guided by the juche idea, our people have built Socialism to suit the specific situation of our country, following the road they have chosen and mobilizing their own strength. . . . Ours is a man-centered Socialism, an embodiment of the juche idea. Our Party and people have built Socialism in their own way on the basis of the juche idea. (2)

According to Kim, North Korean Socialism put human beings, not material forces as the Marxist-Leninists argued, at the center of historical progress. That would, among other things, make North Korean Socialism distinct from other forms, particularly the failed East European one, he claimed. In advancing “Socialism of our style,” the junior Kim presented a theory of a sociopolitical organism. He contended: The political and ideological might of the motive force of revolution is nothing but the power of single-hearted unity between the leader, the Party, and the masses. In our socialist society, the leader, the Party, and the masses throw

North Korea and “Socialism of Our Style” 93 in their lot with one another, forming a single socio-political organism. The consolidation of blood relations between the leader, the Party, and the masses is guaranteed by the single ideology and united leadership. (4; emphasis added)

In this writing, there is no reference to Marxism-Leninism, only the language of populism and organic nationalism. It is hardly surprising that North Korea aggressively promoted national tradition and heritage in the 1990s. The northern regime even claimed to have found the tomb of Tan’gun, the mythic founder of the Korean nation.6 North Korean leadership also reevaluated Confucianism, once condemned as a legacy of reactionary feudalism, as a political ethic to support juche ideology (Kim Cho˘nghun 1999). A 1998 speech by Kim Jong Il titled “Let Us Unify the Country Independently and Peacefully Through the Great Unity of the Entire Nation” illustrates how nationalistic North Korea has become: The Korean nation is a homogeneous nation that has inherited the same blood and lived in the same territory speaking the same language for thousands of years. All Koreans in the north, south, and abroad belong to the same nation with the blood and soul of the Korean nation and are linked inseparably with the same national interests and a common historical psychology and sentiment. No force can ever split into two forever the single Korean nation that has been formed and developed through a long history, nor can it obliterate our nation and our national traits. . . . The reunion of our nation that has been divided by foreign forces is an inevitable trend of our nation’s history and the law of national development. (5)

Once again there is no trace of the Marxist-Leninist or Stalinist notion of nation in the speech. Instead, Kim stresses the importance of the Korean blood, soul, and national traits, echoing earlier Korean nationalists such as Sin Ch’aeho, Yi Kwangsu, and Ch’oe Namso˘n. He no longer has any interest in applying Marxism-Leninism to the North Korean situation; indeed, it is no longer useful to the country. North Korea has evolved to establish its own style of Socialism, but it was, as Kim Cho˘nghun (1999) rightly points out, in fact no more than “Socialism without Socialism.” In other words, it is Socialism in name but not in content. Content is filled with nationalism. North Korea has developed an organic, defensive, chauvinistic form of nationalism, akin to what the earlier Korean nationalists had advocated in the face of the national peril. In fact, North Korea today faces a situation similar to what the old Choso˘n Korea faced a century ago: national survival in a hostile international environment.

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Conclusion In The North Korean Revolution, Armstrong writes, “North Korean Communism would not only be quite distinctive from its Soviet model, it would in some respects turn Marxism-Leninism upside-down” (2003, 243). He points to the North Korean emphasis on ideology over materialism, vocabulary of familial images and national unity over the language of class struggle, and social distinction and hierarchy over egalitarian ethos of Socialism. Seen this way, North Korea, he concludes, may have been “Stalinist in form” but was clearly “nationalist in content” (2003, 245). In Cumings’s words, North Korea “took from Marxism-Leninism what it wanted and rejected much of the rest” (1997, 398). For North Koreans, in other words, Communism was taken as an instrument to be appropriated for their own nationalist goal. However, the nationalist state that North Korea is today did not form overnight, nor did it exist from the beginning of the regime. Instead, it has evolved, adapting to a changing international environment. Although juche ideas might be found in Kim Il Sung’s pre–1945 speeches, they, as a coherent political ideology, did not obtain a hegemonic position until the late 1960s. Although North Korea was never a satellite state of the Soviet empire, it was still strongly influenced by the latter in the early years of nation building. After the Korean War, North Korea established an important relationship with China and skillfully maneuvered to maintain a balanced position during the Sino-Soviet disputes of the 1960s. Once Kim consolidated his political leadership after a series of purges of rival Communists, he pursued a more independent stance from both powers and juche became the ideological underpinning for this strategy.7 By the 1970s juche ideology became central to the northern regime and eventually was elevated to the status of a supreme ideology. With the open-door policy of China and glasnost of Soviet Union in the 1980s and especially with the collapse of the Soviet empire, North Korea came to stress the importance of nationalism expressed in “Socialism of our style” and “a theory of the Korean nation as number one.” Marxism-Leninism was dropped from its constitution, and North Korea became a nationalist state in the 1990s. Viewing North Korea as built on a nationalism based on blood ties with Kim Il Sung as the father figure helps one understand the country’s political system. Bruce Cumings argues that North Korea maintains a kind of “neosocialist corporatism” that substitutes nation for class as the unit of

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historical change. He regards North Korean corporatism as resonate with Asian corporatism, which sought to create a “family state” as it did in prewar Japan. Cumings cites from Chigaku Tanaka: “The emperor was the father of all the people, the people were united by blood ties, and the blood running through the veins of the race” (1997, 402). Noting similarities between prewar Japan and North Korea (that is, Kim Il Sung as the father of the Korean people who shared the same bloodline stemming from Tan’gun), Cumings refers to the neo-Confucian view of the human body and family as influencing the North Korean corporatist system. However, it was the organic notion of nation that Sin Ch’aeho and Yi Kwangsu had advocated before 1945 that strongly influenced the development of the North Korean political system. Ethnic nationalism offered a basis for the totalitarian system. Given that Yi Kwangsurian nationalism held some “elective affinity” with prewar Japanese fascism, it is hardly surprising to find Japanese fascist elements in the North Korean political system. Finally, that North Korea’s primary ideology is nationalism, not Socialism or Communism, explains its strength and resilience as well as its flaw. When the Soviet empire collapsed in 1989, many pundits and experts (including the then CIA director) predicted the demise of the North Korean regime imminent. However, North Korea has survived a series of crises in the 1990s: extreme isolation from the outside world, the death of its only leader Kim Il Sung, drought and famine, and economic hardship. Chirot (1991) points out that the fate of Communist regimes was closely related to its origins. Most East European Communist regimes had been established as Soviet satellites, and when the Soviets refused to save them, they collapsed. By contrast, Communist countries that formed on their own, Vietnam, China, North Korea, and Cuba, are still alive. North Korea has been largely independent from the Soviet empire since the 1960s, which explains why it is still alive even after the Soviet collapse. At the same time, militant nationalism of juche has become a liability in North Korea’s efforts to reform its economy. Instead of opening the country to the outside world as China did two decades ago, North Korea has resorted to a highly chauvinistic and defensive form of nationalism. It has chosen to remain a “hermit kingdom.” The North seems unlikely to change its course despite recent efforts of “economic reform”; it will continue to promote a defensive form of nationalism as a key strategy of national survival. Yet such strategy will be hindrance to any serious reform (economic or others) that the regime badly needs to survive.

five

Ilmin Chuu˘i and “Modernization of the Fatherland”

Like the North, South Korea resorted to the power of nationalism in the postcolonial building of a new republic. Although incorporated into a capitalist world-system under American hegemony, South Korea developed a highly nationalistic state as well. This chapter examines the development of nationalism during the first two administrations of the Republic of Korea (ROK): Syngman Rhee (1948 – 60), and Park Chung Hee (1961– 79). In particular, I examine Rhee’s Ilmin chuu˘i (One Peoplism, an ideology of one people) and Park’s Choguk ku˘ndaehwa (Modernization of the Fatherland). It might seem odd to put Rhee and Park in the same category since they had distinct backgrounds and careers. Rhee was born into a Confucian family and participated in the Independence Club. After spending more than five years in prison for his political activities to reform the ancient regime, he left Korea for education in the United States, earning his doctoral degree from Princeton. The political scientist Lee Chong-Sik describes Rhee as “a man whose life spanned the two contrasting worlds”: he was “a product of deep-rooted Confucian culture, but became a strong exponent of Western liberal principles” (2001, vx). He had spent much of his life in the United States, leading Korean independence movements before returning to Korea in 1945. Three years later he became the first president of the Republic of Korea. He left Korea again for exile in the United States when his government was overthrown by student uprisings in the spring of 1960. Park was born into a poor peasant family and worked as a teacher before entering the Japanese military academy during colonial rule. Considered one 96

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of the best Korean officers in the Japanese army, he graduated the academy with honor. By the time of Korea’s liberation from colonial rule, Park was a successful military officer in the Japanese army. After 1945, he was allegedly engaged in Communist activities before joining the ROK army. As a result, when Park led a coup in the spring of 1961, Americans were suspicious of his pro-Communist background. Once in power, he normalized relations with Japan in 1965 and vigorously pursued export-oriented industrialization with the United States and Japan as key trading partners. He ruled ROK with an iron fist for eighteen years until 1979 when the chief of the Korean CIA assassinated him in the midst of popular uprisings against his authoritarian rule. Thus Rhee and Park had very different backgrounds and careers before becoming leaders of Korea. Also Park denounced the Rhee regime as incompetent, corrupt, and authoritarian. Still both were politicians who knew how to mobilize the force of nationalism in politics and developed similar kinds of nationalism based on a popular perception of ethnic unity. Yet, it would be misleading to regard such nationalist politics as the mere product of these leaders. If so, they would have developed very different kinds of nationalism and nationalist politics given their different personalities and backgrounds. The specific context in which such nationalist politics became prevalent in postcolonial Korea is crucial. In this regard, it is essential to discuss the colonial legacy of ethnic nationalism in post–1945 South Korea.

Colonial Legacy of Ethnic Nationalism Despite political denouncement of Japanese rule after liberation, colonial legacy continued to shape postcolonial Korea, especially in the South. The legacy was broad and deep. No comprehensive “cleaning of elements of Japanese imperialism” (ilche chanjae ch’o˘ngsan) was made, and when the national assembly sought to punish Japanese collaborators with a special law, tensions arose and the Rhee government eventually vetoed the bill. Instead, much of the state apparatus built by the Japanese, especially bureaucracy and police, were reinstated, and many Koreans who had served them were reinstated in key positions in the new government: for instance, about 85 percent of the Koreans who had served in the Japanese police were employed in the Korean national police by late 1945. The bureaucracy and police were not the only areas where one could find the marks of colonialism left on liberated Korea. Equally important

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but overlooked is the legacy of ethnic nationalism that developed during Japanese rule in post–1945 politics. Ethnic nationalism that preached the purity, homogeneity, and eternity of the Korean nation became prevalent by the 1930s, and it continued to shape the thinking and politics of postcolonial Korea. Its anticolonial, anti-imperialist, anti-Japanese character and role were stressed by Korean leaders and scholars, but its fascist potential inherent in Korean ethnic nationalism, which was actualized after liberation, was ignored or overlooked. Nationalist historiography has presented primarily the positive side of nationalism, ignoring its negative aspects. Ironically, as Kwo˘n Hyo˘kpo˘m points out, the anti-imperialist nature of nationalism made Koreans blind to its dark side. Yet ethnic nationalism that had developed during colonial rule offered the basis of authoritarian state ideologies such as Kim Il Sung’s juche ideology and Rhee’s Ilmin chuu˘i. The fervor of nationalism, especially its power over transnational ideas and forces, in the immediate liberation period was best expressed by Koreans’ reaction to a proposed trusteeship by the United States, the USSR, China, and Britain. The idea of trusteeship of “liberated” Korea can be traced back to March 1943 when President Roosevelt mentioned the idea to the visiting British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. It became more concrete at the Cairo conference later in the year when the United States, Britain, and China published a declaration, announcing, “In due course Korea shall become free and independent” (cited in Cumings 1981, 106). The idea of multilateral trusteeship did not disappear when the Korean peninsula was divided and the U.S. and Soviet forces occupied the South and North following the Japanese surrender in the summer of 1945. Instead, in December 1945, the foreign ministers of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union met in Moscow to discuss a variety of postwar problems that remained unresolved in wartime negotiations. Korea became an important agenda item, and the three powers agreed on the establishment of multilateral trusteeship in the country. When the news of the trusteeship reached the peninsula, Koreans from both the Right and the Left, still smarting from Japanese protectorate moves at the turn of the century, became enraged. It was immediately compared to the Japanese protectorate treaty of 1905 and was denounced as another imperialist scheme. In “Declaration of Opposition to the Trusteeship,” An Chaehong (1946/1978), a leader of nationalist movements during Japanese rule, warned that endorsing trusteeship would be repeating the mistake that Korea had made in 1905. He characterized the anti-trusteeship movement

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as continuation of a national liberation movement from foreign powers that had begun during Japanese rule. When Communists later dropped their opposition to the trusteeship, they were roundly branded as antinationalist. An April 1946 Ko˘n’guk kongnon (Public Opinion of the State Building) article compared the proposed trusteeship to the 1905 treaty that made Korea Japan’s protectorate and denounced Communists for their “national betrayal” (H. Ch’oe 1946). Given the historical memory of colonial rule and the nationalist fervor, the proposal was doomed to failure from the start. The historical legacy continues today: Koreans remain suspicious of any proposal from Japan to establish a pan-Asian regional entity or organization. Despite some economic rationality for such an organization, it may not be easy to obtain political support among Koreans.1 From the ashes of the trusteeship plan two separate states emerged. In sharp contrast with Germany where a similarly strong ethnic and organic nationalism was discredited due to Nazi connections, nationalism became an effective resource on both ends of the peninsula. As Yim Chihyo˘n points out, “Both Koreas, despite their official ideologies of liberalism and socialism, appealed to the nationalist ethos” (1994, 117). More specifically, the southern regime was named Taehan min’guk, or the Republic of the Great Han Race, to distinguish from the North’s Choso˘n inmin konghwaguk and to claim the sole legitimacy of the Korean ethnic nation or race.2 The Tan’gun myth became an indispensable national symbol as illustrated by the adoption of Tan’gi or the Tan’gun calendar. Kaech’o˘njo˘l, or the anniversary of Tan’gun’s accession, was designated as a national holiday to celebrate the birth of the Korean nation. Also when the first general election was held in the spring of 1948, one hundred seats in the National Assembly were left open, to be filled by elections held when possible in the North. The southern government still appoints governors of the northern provinces. This is a clear expression of the ROK government’s claim to be the sole legitimate government for the entire Korean nation. Syngman Rhee, the first president of the Republic of Korea, proposed Ilmin chuu˘i as the “state policy [kuksi] of a new nation,” referring to Koreans as a unitary nation. Ilmin nationalism became a basis for his claim to represent the (ethnic) Korean nation and his “theory of unification through the northern advance” (pukchin t’ongilnon). Park Chung Hee, despite his denouncement of Rhee’s legacy, continued to appeal to the ethos of Korean nationalism. He proclaimed, “Ideology changes, but the nation stays and lasts” (1973c, 22), just as Rhee himself advocated and as Yi Kwangsu claimed

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in the 1930s. Despite his modernization program, Park did not eschew from emphasizing unity and eternality of the “great Han race.” Instead, he saw the power of such ethnic nationalism and sought to exploit it for authoritarian politics as well as his modernization project. Thus, despite the denouncement of key proponents of ethnic nationalism during colonial rule, their thought was preserved and even promoted. The Yi Kwangsurian version of ethnic nationalism that had developed during Japanese rule continued to shape Korean politics throughout postcolonial Korea, offering an ideological basis of their respective authoritarian politics. It is my contention that fascist potential, latent in ethnic nationalism during Japanese rule, became actualized in both Koreas after they gained national sovereignty and political authority. Although it was initially an ideology of anti-imperialism and anticolonialism, especially anticolonial racism, ethnic nationalism served authoritarian politics in both parts of the peninsula after liberation. The “overdeveloped state” and its repressive apparatus have been pointed out as the main colonial legacy that shaped post–1945 Korean authoritarian politics (Cumings 1984), but the legacy of nationalist sentiment was much deeper, penetrating into cultural and political consciousness of the Korean people. It was no historical coincidence that political leaders of both Koreas exploited organic, collectivist notions of nation to legitimize their respective authoritarian politics. Without a doubt the colonial legacy of ethnic nationalism has lived well into the postcolonial period.

Ilmin Chuu˘i Rhee was well-known for his long-standing hatred of Japan and Russia even before he became the president of ROK (C. Lee 2001). Once in power, he skillfully used anti-Japanism and anti-Communism in politics. He knew how to manipulate anti-Japanese sentiments as a way of mobilizing the populace for his own political interests and agenda. “Japan-bashing” was a common political strategy of most Korean politicians of the time, since Koreans’ experiences and memories of Japanese colonialism were still fresh.3 Rhee was also a fierce anti-Communist and advocated the unification of the divided land through “northern advance.” He regarded Communism as a disease that broke the unity of the homogenous Korean national community, and he pitted Communism against freedom. For him, “freedom and Communism are opposite; they cannot be combined. Compromise with

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Communism is impossible; it is like trying to mix oil and water. . . . The only choice is to surrender to Communist totalitarian control or oppose it. The only salvation for Korean nationalism was to reject Communism utterly, including rejection of trusteeship” (Oliver 1978, 391 and 31). In this context, Rhee opposed an international trusteeship that would include the Soviet Union, and he repeatedly requested military aid from the United States to achieve national unification. He also objected to a cease-fire at the end of the Korean War. His anti-Japanism and anti-Communism are well known and have received scholarly attention, but his views of nationalism, which infiuenced these anti-isms, have not been properly examined. Ilmin chuu˘i can capture the nationalist element of Rhee’s politics. One year after the establishment of ROK, Rhee formerly proposed ilmin nationalism in an article titled “What Is Ilmin chuu˘i?” (1949a). In the article, he proclaimed, “As a unitary nation [tanil minjok] that has a long history, we are always one and not two. As one nation, we have to be one always” (1949a, 2). He lamented that the Korean nation was divided by class cleavages, difference of wealth, and provincial (or regional) consciousness. Reflective of his activities at the Independence Club and independence movements in the United States, he claimed, “The two words, ilmin [one people], is the beginning and end of my movement of fifty years” (1949a, 3). He then called for Ilmin chuu˘i as the state policy (kuksi) of the new Korean state. He even argued that Korea had been able to recover some lost territories in the past with this kind of ilmin ideology. He urged Koreans to remove differences of class, wealth, and region. He concluded this article by proclaiming, “We will die if divided but will live if united” (1949a, 5). In another article entitled “Ilmin Chuu˘i and Nationalist Movements,” published in the following week, Rhee specifically presented Ilmin chuu˘i as the basis of anti-Communism. In his view the Communists were Korea’s main enemy, and Ilmin chuu˘i would offer an ideological weapon to fight them. As he claimed, “Like other nations, we are fighting the Communist party, and this warfare is still ideological until it evolves into a military one. Democracy is too plain to deal with theoretically complicated propaganda of Communism and we need Ilmin chuu˘i to remove Communism and establish an eternal base of democracy” (Rhee 1949b, 5). He reminded Koreans of the fate of Choso˘n dynasty, which, according to him, fell into colonial rule as a result of internal division and constant factional struggles. Rhee used ethnic nationalism as the rhetorical basis of his anti-Communist ideology.

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Rhee’s Ilmin chuu˘i was further articulated by An Hosang, his first minister of education. In the preface of “Fundamentals of Ilmin Chuu˘i,” published in 1950, An proclaimed, “We are one people. One people has the same bloodline, the same fate, and the same ideology. . . . Ilmin chuu˘i is the guiding principle of creating a new history of our nation and a peace of the world” (7). He claimed that in the past Korea was able to defeat China militarily when challenged but was conquered in thought and ideology. That was why, according to An, Choso˘n Korea had been subordinate to China. Therefore, he continued, Korea should not embrace foreign thought without reservation but rather critically digest so as to appropriate it for Korea’s own interests and goals. An was glad to prevent Korea from falling into trusteeship, a position he likened to being a slave of foreign powers. He argued also that Koreans had to fight against Communism, but that democracy was too weak and shallow to become a guiding principle of the Korean nation. In his view, even Communists claimed their system as democratic, and therefore, Koreans had to develop a unique ideology beyond a general appeal to democracy to become a free nation. For him only Ilmin chuu˘i could become such a principle by constructively combining elements of both tradition and modernity as it succeeds the principles of hongik in’gan of Tan’gun and hwarangdo (Way of “flower of youth”) of Silla. Ilmin chuu˘i was clearly an expression of ethnic nationalism similar to what had appeared during colonial rule. Nation was understood in organic and collectivistic terms, being considered a natural being or fate characterized by shared bloodline and ancestry. Koreans were also regarded as belonging to a unitary nation and expected to have the same thoughts and behaviors. Such stress on sameness and unity marginalized differences and diversity among individuals and social groups. Similarly the organic sense of nationhood privileged nation over other forms of collective identities and social cleavages. As An Hosang summarizes, “Nation is more important than any individual or class and the state is bigger than any organization or party. It is natural for one people to regard nation and state as such. . . . If we neglect the welfare of the whole nation and cling to one’s own foreign thought and ideology, our nation will not only be divided but also return to toadyism [sadae chuu˘i] of the past” (1950, 32 and 56). Nation was considered natural, indivisible, and immortal, and all individual interests and thoughts should be subordinate to those of the whole, the nation. This was precisely what early Korean nationalists such as Sin Ch’aeho and Yi Kwangsu had

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advocated. Although they used such nationalism as a way of overcoming imperialism and regaining national sovereignty, the Rhee regime employed the same logic in legitimizing anti-Communist authoritarianism.

“Modernization of the Fatherland” Park Chung Hee took power through a coup in May 1961 and established the draconian yusin system in 1972. He was no doubt an autocratic leader, ruling the country with an iron fist. At the same time, Park, like Rhee and like Kim in the North, was a politician who recognized the power of nationalism in governing the country. Throughout his tenure as president, Park relied heavily on nationalist rhetoric to justify his illegal power taking and extralegal exercise of authority. His coup was portrayed as an effort to achieve “modernization of the fatherland,” and his 1972 yusin reform was depicted as a “save-the-nation movement” necessitated by changing domestic and international conditions. From the time he seized power, he identified national “security” and “development” as the main tasks faced by the nation and justified his action as a patriotic mission. Park skillfully fused nationalism into anti-Communism and developmentalism in legitimizing his authoritarian politics. Like Yi Kwangsu and Syngman Rhee, Park accepted the basic premise of ethnic homogeneity and the eternity of the Korean nation stemming from Tan’gun. He also blamed Communists for breaking the unity of the Korean national community, and he repeatedly argued that the ROK solely represented the whole nation. What separated Park most from Rhee was the promotion of developmentalism. Unlike Rhee who was an independence movement leader and elected through popular election, Park suffered from a legitimacy problem because he came to power through a military coup. In response, he identified development as one of the main goals of his regime and linked economic performance to the legitimacy of his rule. Although Korea showed some development under colonial rule (Eckert 1991; Kohli 1994; G. Shin 1998), it is now largely accepted that South Korea’s (hereafter simply Korea) economy took off during the Park era. During the two decades when Park was the nation’s leader, Korea displayed remarkable economic growth (average annual growth rate of 8.6 percent in GDP from 1960 to 1982) and transformed its economy from agrarian to industrial (proportion of agriculture in GDP declined from 41.8 to 16 percent, while that of

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industry increased from 21.5 to 39 percent from the 1950s to early 1980s). In particular, Korea’s modernization was based on “export-oriented” industrialization: external factors, especially foreign capital, market, and export, played crucial roles in Korea’s modernization processes. Korea came to be known as one of “four little dragons,” along with Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong (Vogel 1991), and was lauded as “Asia’s next giant” after Japan (Amsden 1989). Most current studies of Korean modernization have stressed the interplay of the state and world-system. Statists emphasize the “developmental” role of the Korean government in contrast to the “predatory” role of most other non-Western nations. The former is said to possess both the “capacity” to lead the transformation with an efficient Weberian bureaucracy along with an “autonomy” largely insulated from society (Evans 1995; E. Kim 1997; Woo 1991). In addition, while largely rejecting dependency theory as inadequate in explaining Korean development, scholars have developed a more refined version of the world-system theory, citing Korea’s integration into the Japanese system first and then the American one as crucial to Korea’s take-off. I do not dispute that the state and the world-system have interacted to produce the Korean, and by extension the East Asian, industrial transformation in a relatively short period of time, especially compared to early developers of the West. Nonetheless, these studies fall short of appreciating more sociological aspects of Korean modernization processes. A better understanding of what I would call the “developmental psychology” of Korea’s transformation is required. If the Protestant ethic offered the epistemological basis for the rise of the West (Weber 1976), I argue that it was the nationalist ethic that provided a functional equivalent in Korea’s path to modernity. Such developmental psychology is best illustrated in the “modernization of the fatherland” project that Park led in the 1960s and 1970s. Park regarded modernization as more than improving the living standards of individual people or making profit for corporations. It was understood in collectivistic, nationalist terms, that is, as the primary means to achieve a unified, self-sufficient Korea. He claimed his modernization project to be a clear historic mission—“to accelerate our economic growth, to modernize our fatherland, and to achieve peaceful unification of our country on the basis of self-reliance, independence, and prosperity” (Park 1976, 31). Like reformers of Meiji Japan who sought to establish a “rich nation, strong military,” Korean modernization was taken as a matter of national survival in the sense

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that it was the only way to prevent ROK from falling into another colonial or Communist rule. Park called himself a “national conscience” ready to put himself on “an altar of sacrifice and devotion before the supreme mission and the gravest responsibilities” and urged other Koreans to follow (Park 1972c/1973, 135). Still, Park’s nationalism did not necessarily lead to xenophobia. He recognized the need to learn from the West and even from Japan to achieve the developmental goal. He firmly believed that Koreans “must accept, assimilate, and digest superior aspects of foreign civilization, while rejecting and repudiating any element that is injurious, decadent, or incompatible with our own cultural traditions” (1979b, 196). For Park, “foreign civilization” can be useful to enhance Korea’s national interests if properly used. This explains why, despite popular protest, he did not hesitate much when normalizing relations with Japan, and why he aggressively pursued a policy of exportoriented industrialization. While looking outward, however, his gaze was ultimately inward, focused on promoting Korea as a strong, self-reliant, sovereign nation. He wanted to use transnational forces to benefit Korea nationally. For Park, modernization was at best the “intermediate” objective; establishing a unified, self-sufficient Korean nation was the ultimate goal (Park 1976, 21–22). Such an instrumentalist view of modernization was nothing new to Korea. Koreans appropriated various forms of transnational forces as instruments to obtain nationalist goals. Also, as in the past, Park’s instrumentalist view of modernization largely stemmed from a social Darwinian understanding of the world, both past and present. Park proclaimed, “If we are weak, our country will be in jeopardy. It is the living lesson of human history of the rise and fall of nations. In order for a country not to fall, it must cultivate its own strength” (1976, 31). Park often invoked the historical memory of colonization and attributed that unfortunate national fate of the past to Korea’s failure to modernize in a world of national struggles. He also reminded people of Korea’s geographic location as it is positioned among powers and stressed the need to strengthen national power through modernization to shield the peninsula from external forces. Park urged Koreans to “take courage from our national pride and traditions, no matter how thorny the road to independence may be” (1976, 47– 48). Park held a Hegelian organic view of nation and state. Like early Korean nationalists such as Sin Ch’aeho and Yi Kwangsu or leaders of postcolonial

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Korea such as Syngman Rhee and Kim Il Sung, he viewed the nation as “a biological organism with infinite life” and the state as “the guardian of the nation.” As Park contended, “Without the State, there can be no such things as the prosperity and development of the nation. . . . We must . . . be persuaded that an individual can thrive only if the country itself is prosperous, grow wealthy and strong only when the country becomes so, and achieve only when that glory belongs to the country” (1979b, 192 –93). Such a view of nation and state would legitimize his government’s developmental role and promote a collectivistic approach to modernization. As Park pointed out in a speech made on February 7, 1972, “Everyone in this land has a historic mission to carry out. Each has to fulfill his duty, and when every individual performs his duty, a sound economic base will be created for the family. The community he belongs to will be developed through cooperative endeavor, and the country as a whole will move ahead” (1979b, 120). Once again, this collectivistic notion of nation and state was employed to legitimize Park’s project of state-led modernization of the fatherland. Although he appropriated “foreign civilization” for the nationalist agenda, Park also sought to preserve and revitalize national culture and identity. In Korea Reborn, he contended that while each nation was striving to modernize, only those with a clear “self-identity” would succeed. This was, he reasoned, because “a nation’s potential is never quite determined by its material resource or size of its territory, but rather by the spirit and wisdom of its collective life.” That is why, he continued, his government sought to “restore the spirit and wisdom that guided our forefathers in history” such as the repair and restoration of cultural relics. He criticized as “unfortunate and shameful” Korean intellectuals who “study the history and acquire the culture of other nations at the expense of our own . . . while neglecting to look at our own heritage.” Park suggested that the first step toward modernization or “national regeneration” lay in reestablishing Korea’s national culture and identity by rediscovering “our values inherited in our own culture and tradition” (1979a, 20 –21). He listed “spirit of jaju” (self-reliance), “harmony as a way of life,” and “power of creativity” as concrete examples of such values found in Korea’s cherished history.4 In 1971, Park launched the Saemaul (new village or community) movement to better mobilize the spiritual power of the Korean nation. Reflecting Korea’s tradition of agrarianism that regarded the rural as the essence of the Korean nation, he believed the rural population needed to be educated,

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organized, and mobilized for “national revitalization.” In his view, “Economic construction and spiritual development are not two separate concepts, but the two must go hand in hand together, for economic construction is not possible without spiritual development, and vice versa” (1979b, 71). Initially targeting the rural population, the Saemaul movement soon extended to factories and other areas of social and economic life. In this social movement Koreans were asked to preserve and develop virtues of their history, culture, and tradition. Park believed that while Korea was able to “miraculously” modernize itself by “wiping out premodern elements from our tradition,” “the nation must move speedily to bigger developments” by “reawakening the strength of our long traditions” (1979a, 142). The movement evolved into a comprehensive campaign that touched various aspects of life designed to enhance spiritual as well as material well-being.5 The promotion of indigenous culture and identity in the 1970s had much to do with a sense of crisis, both domestic and international. Domestically, Park narrowly defeated the opposition candidate, Kim Dae Jung, in the 1971 election (53.2 to 45.3 percent), and he felt an urgent need to secure popular, especially rural, support. The rural population had been a main supporter of the ruling party, but the 1971 election showed signs of erosion in such support. Internationally, the Nixon doctrine and the fall of Vietnam to Communism created a deep sense of anxiety and urgency for the Park regime.6 He sought to strengthen national power by inculcating a firm sense of national identity and consciousness. Yet, by stressing the primacy of nation and state over other social cleavages and collective identities, his regime became increasingly totalitarian. Park criticized political circles or political parties as “obsessed with factional strife and discord” and urged them to “transcend factionalism, regionalism and clannishness and join together in the grand cause of national unification” (Park 1972a / 1973, 22). He also warned that “disorder under the pretext of freedom, or inefficiency in the name of democracy,” would not be allowed to “prevail as in the past,” and he called for “loyalty to the nation” and “love and loyalty to the country” (Park 1973b, 185). In the name of the nation, national unity, and modernization of the fatherland, the Park regime suppressed all other collective identities and competing voices. With the establishment of the yusin system, any hint of criticism against him or his regime was severely penalized. Popular memories of colonial rule, Communist aggression, poverty, extensive mobilization of the mass educational system, and the precarious international

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environment (especially after the fall of South Vietnam to Communism) made his appeal to nationalist politics quite effective.7

Nationalism, Anti-Communism, and Fascism Antonio Gramsci (1971) acutely captured a key aspect of modern politics. He observed that modern forms of domination are not exclusively economic or political but cultural and ideological as well. Any political regime, even an autocratic one, does not solely rely on repressive measures but seeks to obtain spontaneous consent from the populace, though complete hegemony represents an ideal type seldom attained (Scott 1985). Although his argument was made to explain the hegemonic nature of advanced capitalism that successfully prevented a Communist revolution, it can readily be extended to explain other forms of modern political systems. In the Korean case, nationalism was extensively mobilized as a key resource for obtaining popular consent for authoritarian politics. Both Rhee and Park shared and promoted an organic sense of nation based on the single bloodline stemming from Tan’gun. Tan’gun was taken as a historical figure; hongik in’gan, supposedly the political ideology of old Korea that Tan’gun had ruled, became the principle of the southern state. Despite their different backgrounds and Park’s denouncement of Rhee as corrupt and incompetent, both shared the same belief in ethnic nationalism. Both leaders preached the primacy of nation over other social cleavages and used the nationalist rhetoric to legitimize their respective authoritarian politics. Despite some success, however, they ultimately failed to achieve hegemony. After all, their nationalist rhetoric proved to be little more than justification of their suppression of human rights and freedom in the name of the abstract, holistic nation. State-led nationalism was constantly challenged by activists and intellectuals who fought for democracy. In the end, the Rhee government was overthrown by student uprisings, and Park was assassinated by the chief of the KCIA in the midst of popular uprisings. Ethnic nationalism, which had developed as a reaction to international Socialism during colonial rule, was also deeply fused with antiCommunism. The conflation of nationalism and anti-Communism continued after liberation in the South. Rhee specifically proposed Ilmin chuu˘i as a counterideology of Communism, and Park framed his modernization project as a means to defend the nation from Communism. Both justified their

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anti-Communism on the grounds that Communists broke the long history of a unitary nation and committed tong jok sangchan (fratricide) through the Korean War. In South Korea, the public was presented with a false choice: Communism or authoritarianism. The latter was preferred to the former, or at least it seemed to many that authoritarianism was inevitable for the time being, until the South could achieve national unification by liberating “brothers and sisters” from the Communist regime in the North. One cannot, however, properly explain nationalist politics that appeared in the post–1945 period without considering the colonial legacy of ethnic nationalism. The organic conception of nation and the rhetoric of nationalist politics that Rhee and Park used had already developed during colonial rule. In particular, Yi Kwangsurian nationalism that preached an organic sense of nation, eternity of nation, and primacy of nation over other collective identities reappeared in postcolonial Korea. Also a strong antiCommunist, authoritarian tendency inherent in Yi’s nationalism came to shape nationalist politics of the postcolonial leaders. Despite the denouncement of Japanese rule and key proponents of ethnic nationalism of the time such as Yi Kwangsu, the colonial legacy of ethnic nationalism was deep and broad and came to crucially shape nationalist politics in postcolonial Korea. Yet this dark side of nationalism has been overlooked in nationalist historiography. Given that Korean nationalism was influenced by Japanese nationalist /fascist thought, it was no coincidence that both North and South Korea developed a system similar to a prewar Japanese state, nationalist, militaristic, and fascist, in the post–1945 period. Finally, with the fervor and power of nationalism, transnational forces were either discredited or appropriated for the nationalist agenda. The dismissal of transnational trusteeship as reviving colonial rule and thus going against Korean national interests was the expected outcome in the atmosphere of liberation. Also South Korea’s incorporation into a world capitalist system did not weaken the power of nationalism, although it can be said that it constrained the South from developing xenophobic nationalism as seen in the North. The presence of an external threat, real or perceived (for example, Japan, North Korea) provided the impetus for the deepening ethnic nationalism in South Korea.

six

Universalism and Particularism in Nation Building

In Korean historiography, there exists a strong tendency to regard ethnicization of the Korean nation as natural or logical without seriously investigating its origins. Given Korea’s long history of maintaining an agrarian bureaucracy within a stable territorial boundary that contained a more or less homogenous ethnie, it is assumed as natural or inevitable for Koreans to develop such an organic view of the nation. This view was first presented by early nationalists such as Sin Ch’aeho at the turn of the twentieth century then later articulated by the second generation of Korean nationalists (for example, Yi Kwangsu) during colonial rule. Even today, many assume a close link between the ethnie and nation. I do not dispute the historical fact that Korea maintained a geographically bounded community with a highly developed central bureaucratic state at least since the tenth century. I also do not challenge the theory that the old Korean community of the past was reframed or reconceptualized within the new modern language of nation and nationalism. However, I believe that the ethnicization of the Korean nation was not the logical or natural extension of preexisting notions of political community. Instead, I contend that it was crucially shaped by the structural and historical situations that Korea faced in the formative years of its modern nation-building process. Nation is a social and historical entity, and every nation contains civic and ethnic elements to varying degrees and forms. Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate, while at other times, the emphasis lies on ethnic and vernacular components. Korea was no exception to this general pattern. In its formative years, civic, political, and individualistic elements competed 115

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with ethnic, cultural, and collectivistic ideas in determining the ideological basis of the new modern Korean nation. Although the latter eventually prevailed, it would be a mistake to consider this historical destiny. Rather, the particular historical situation that Korea faced in its transition to the modern world, notably the circumstances of imperialism and colonialism, led to this predominance. This chapter demonstrates the historical processes by which ethnic and collectivistic elements came to dominate civic and individualistic values in defining the Korean nation.

Universalism and Particularism in Early Modern Years By the late nineteenth century, a general model of modern national society that originated in Western Europe became quite popular throughout the world.1 This Western model involves the notion of the individual as the basic unit of society and the nation as an aggregate of individuals, and it stresses such values as progress (national and individual) and justice (Meyer et al. 1997). Faced with a national crisis, Korean leaders sought to reform its system of governance by introducing “modern” values and institutions. King Kojong, for instance, sent diplomatic representatives to Japan (1880 – 81) and the United States (1883) to learn modern ideas and institutions. In 1895, the king issued the Decree of Nation Building Through Education (Kyoyuk ipkuk choso˘ ) that stated, “The worldwide trend teaches us that every affluent and independent country was formed due to well-educated citizens. Knowledge is secured through education. Therefore, education becomes the fundamental basis for national survival.” In this context Western, universal values and ideas were incorporated into school curriculum. The presentation of worldwide modern subjects in late Choso˘n was facilitated by experiences of Korean students and intellectuals abroad. Individuals such as Yu Kilchun introduced Western knowledge by writing what they saw during their travels to and studies in Western countries and Japan.2 They also translated Western texts into Korean. Others, including So˘ Chaep’il (Philip Jaisohn), formed organizations specifically aimed at promoting Western ideas and institutions as models for creating a new Korea. So˘ established the Independence Club, published Tongnip sinmun, or The Independent, and led a campaign to erect the Tongnip-mun, or the Independence Gate. He lectured widely in Korea, teaching about iconic events in Western liberal thought such as the American War for Independence

Universalism and Particularism in Nation Building 117

and the French Revolution. He also introduced the word “democracy” to young students—Rhee Syngman recalled later that he had learned from So˘ the idea of political liberty. In the late nineteenth century, Korea saw the growth of magazines, newspapers, and school textbooks that introduced and discussed foreign language, tradition, history, art, thought, geography, and social institutions. As a result, Koreans became familiar with modern Western ideas such as social Darwinism, civilization and enlightenment, liberalism, individualism, nationalism, imperialism, democracy, and racism. In this larger process of public discussion the new modern language of nation was introduced to Korea. In England and France, where the concept emerged and developed, nation referred to a new political community that integrated diverse ethnic groups under a centralized bureaucratic state. The formation of a nation was based on common civic and political elements that were thought to transcend particular ethnic group or consciousness. However, in Germany and Japan, the nation was based on the idea of race or volk, a group with common cultural and racial features, and ethnic or racial consciousness was promoted as a marker of the modern nation. Likewise, in Korea, nation, or minjok, came to be conflated with ethnicity and race. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to assume that the Korean notion of nation was ethnicized from the outset or that this process was inevitable. It would be equally misleading to say that such ethnicization occurred simply due to a diffusion or imitative process. Ample evidence suggests otherwise. Korean intellectuals at the turn of the century entertained political and civic ideas of nation. They emphasized the importance of the civic rights of individual Koreans as a way to strengthen Korea’s national power. Indeed, the discussion of individuals as “the sacred” and the nation as “the aggregate of the individuals” occupied a central position in the public discourse at the turn of the twentieth century. Kim Minhwan’s 1988 study shows that Korean leaders and intellectuals embraced diverse ideas other than ethnic nationalism in an effort to reform the ancient regime and create a new powerful Korea. Kim sampled 1,950 articles from five major newspapers published in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in order to identify major currents of social and political thought advocated by Koreans. Kim found that until the twentieth century, nationalism was not dominant as an ideology of national independence. He also found that Koreans were urged to accept Western culture and values. His findings show that many Korean intellectuals and leaders

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stressed the importance of improving the civic rights of individuals as a major means to strengthen Korea (M. Kim 1988). Kim Tongt’aek’s (2003) study clearly demonstrates that Korean intellectuals and leaders entertained the value of civic and individual rights in strengthening Korea. He coded key terms present in the editorials of The Independence Daily from 1896 to 1899. The Daily was published by the Independence Club, which sought to promote Western ideas and institutions to make Korea a strong and modern nation. According to his quantitative analysis, “self ” (1,021), “rights” (471), “civilization” (323), “progress” (264), and “equality” (101) were the most frequently mentioned terms. Furthermore, as relevant terms associated with nation, political and civic ones (paekso˘ng, inmin) dominated over racial or ethnic ones (tongp’o, hyo˘ngche). For instance, the term paekso˘ng was mentioned 2,466 times, and inmin appeared 1,522 times.3 In contrast, tongp’o and hyo˘ngche were found only 148 and 145 times, respectively. From this analysis, Kim concludes that Korean intellectuals were closer to being cosmopolitan than nationalist. Occasionally, they appeared to have stressed sacrifice of individual interests for the collectivity. However, the sacrifice was not directly related to nationalism or statism in the fashion that later nationalist historiography claimed. Instead, individual sacrifice was required for the achievement of a universal human value. He also found that in the early years of Korea’s transition to modernity, the intellectual class shifted position from premodern universalism (based on a Sinocentric view) to a modern Western universalism. Although one might question the validity of Kim’s study since it is based on a pro-Western newspaper, one cannot ignore that the civic and political notion of nation was widely discussed and accepted among Korean intellectual circles at the turn of the twentieth century. Undoubtedly, these studies demonstrate that there was much coverage and discussion of the “universal” concept of civic and individual rights in the formative years of nation building. The research challenges the conventional view that treats the current conflation of nation, ethnicity, and race as inevitable or natural. These studies show the presence of civic and universalistic approaches to nation building in their early years, but they fail to specify the historical processes by which ethnic, particularistic elements came to dominate civic, universalistic ones. It is my contention that the ethnicization of the Korean nation was heavily influenced by the specific historical situation of Japanese imperialist encroachment, particularly the 1905 Protectorate Treaty. With the onset of this “national peril,” even those who

Universalism and Particularism in Nation Building 119

had advocated individual civic and political rights came to recognize the importance of establishing the notion of a distinct Korean nation / race and of promoting a collective consciousness among Koreans to fight encroaching imperialism. In this context Koreans increasingly stressed particularistic (Korean, indigenous, traditional) over universalistic (Western, foreign, modern) elements in building a new nation. In order to show the historical process of ethnicization of the Korean nation at the turn of the twentieth century, I examine the following hypotheses: A-1) Both universalistic and particularistic elements appeared in the construction of modern nation during the period from the 1890s to the 1900s. A-2) In the early years of the 1890s, universalistic elements dominated particularistic ones as the basis of nation. A-3) Early dominance of universalism gradually gave way to particularism, especially after the 1905 Protectorate Treaty.

Data and Method To test these hypotheses, I examine textbooks used in primary and secondary schools in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As part of the 1894 Kabo reform, modern school curriculum (both public and private) was created to offer selected students opportunities to learn about “modern” ideas and institutions. As a result, many textbooks were published either by the public authority, namely, the Ministry of Education, or by private educational entities such as the Association of National Education (Kungmin kyoyukhoe) and private schools (for example, Poso˘ng). These textbooks reflected a wider trend of public discourse at the time and indicated a level of general acceptance of the ideas of universalism and particularism, which were key issues at hand. In addition, the examination of textbooks supplements the aforementioned research on newspaper articles. Four textbooks, Kungmin sodok (1895) and Simsang sohak (Basic Learning for Moral Education), vols. 1–3 (1896), are considered in analyzing the pre–1905 period, and nine textbooks, Yunyo˘n p’iltok (Basic Readings for Elementary Education), vols. 1– 4 (1907), Ch’odu˘ng sohak (Basic Readings for Primary Education), vols. 5 – 8 (1906), and Kodu˘ng sohak (Basic Readings for Secondary Education) (1906), are examined for the post–1905 period.4 I use content analysis to analyze topics discussed in these textbooks. This research methodology typically examines words and phrases used with a wide range of texts (Krippendorf 1980). Thus, I pay close attention to the

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words/terms, concepts, and illustrations presented in each chapter of the textbooks. For actual content analysis, I first created several subject categories in modification of cross-national studies of school curriculum (Meyer, Kamens, and Benavot 1992). The categories of Meyer and colleagues included language, mathematics, natural science, social sciences, aesthetic education, religious or moral education, physical education, and practical / vocational education. To better serve my goal, I modified the Meyer scheme to include history, figures (for example, prominent people), geography, moral education, knowledge/thought, art, civic education, and science and technology. These core categories appeared in most curricula of the time periods studied. The category of education was further divided into two subgroups, moral and civic, to assess the extent to which the civic notion of nation was discussed. For coding, I assigned the main subject of each chapter in the textbooks into each of these subject categories. If a chapter dealt with U.S. presidents, such as Roosevelt, for instance, it was coded as “figures.” After coding the main subject of each chapter, I sought to estimate the extent of particularistic and universalistic elements displayed in textbooks. For this estimate, I use a simple coding scheme with three subcategories: (1) Korean/traditional/indigenous; (2) Western / modern / foreign; and (3) mixed (see Appendix 1 for a detailed discussion of the coding scheme). For example, if a chapter covered a Confucian value, such as filial piety, or discussed traditional morality tales, it was classified as “traditional” moral education. If a chapter addressed values like the importance of time or introduced Aesop’s fables, it was classified as belonging to the category of “Western” moral education. I assume that the first category indicates particularism and the second reflects universalism. In the case of a chapter that could not be placed into either category, it was assigned into the third category of “mixed.” A total of 426 subjects (138 for the pre–1905 texts and 288 for the post–1905 texts) derived from the selected textbooks were coded and analyzed according to this coding scheme.

Findings Tables 6.1–3 and Figure 6.1 present key findings from the analysis. Table 6.1 shows that “moral education” (26.29 percent), “science and technology” (15.73 percent), “figures” (15.26 percent), and “civic education” (13.85 percent) were the top four subjects found in the textbooks.5 This clearly indicates

Universalism and Particularism in Nation Building 121 table 6.1 Contents of Textbooks Categories

Freq.

Percent

history figures geography moral education knowledge/thought art civic education science and technology others

50 65 38 112 23 3 59 67 9

11.74 15.26 8.92 26.29 5.40 0.70 13.85 15.73 2.58

Total

426

100.00

that at the turn of the twentieth century many subjects related to moral and civic education, such as citizenship, civic rights, patriotism, virtues, and filial piety, were widely taught in schools. Consistent with a worldwide trend in education at that time was the appearance of science and technology (biology, chemistry, physics, engineering, and public health) and civic education (state, government, rights and duties, patriotism, economy, occupations, and schools), as indicated by previous studies on mass curricula (Meyer, Kamens, and Benavot 1992). As Table 6.2 shows, the intellectual development of the early modern period can be largely divided into two broad categories, universalistic and particularistic. Two hundred and seven chapters (48.6 percent) addressed traditional/indigenous subjects, while one hundred eighty-six chapters (43.7 percent) dealt with Western/foreign subjects from 1895 to 1907. Only subjects of thirty-three chapters (7.75 percent) were classified into “mixed” because they did not clearly belong to either category. By and large, this trend is consistent with Michael Robinson’s observation (1988) that the intellectual development of this early modern period could be divided into two broad categories of inquiry: the discussion of Western political theory and social development, and the reexamination of the Korean tradition. Now, I examine whether there was any shift in focus in school curriculum as hypothesized above. My hypothesis is that universalistic elements dominated particularistic ones as the basis of nation in the early years, but that the trend was reversed after the 1905 Protectorate Treaty. Figure 6.1 presents a long-term trend in the composition of universalistic and particularistic

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contentious politics table 6.2 Textbooks: Particularistic vs. Universalistic Year of publication

Traditional

Western

Mixed

Total

1895

10 24.39 35 36.08 62 39.74 100 75.76

27 65.85 47 48.45 82 52.56 30 22.73

4 9.76 15 15.46 12 7.69 2 1.52

41 100.00 97 100.00 156 100.00 132 100.00

207 48.59

186 43.66

33 7.75

426 100.00

1896 1906 1907 Total

Pearson chi2(6)  66.13; P  0.000.

80 70

Percent

60 50

-------

40

--------------

30 20 10 0 1895

1896

1906

1907

Year Traditional

Western

figure 6.1 Change of Contents, Textbooks: Traditional vs. Western in 1890s and 1900s.

elements. It shows that in 1895 more than 65 percent of the chapters in textbooks dealt with universalistic issues, but their coverage of these issues gradually declined.6 These universalistic topics included civic education, science and technology, and Western moral education (for example, the value of time). By 1907, however, universalistic topics were present in less than 25 percent of the chapters. In contrast, particularistic topics increased dramatically, from less than 25 percent to more than 75 percent, clearly dominating coverage of universalistic ones. In particular, as Table 6.3 shows, national history, figures, and geography showed the largest increase in their coverage.

Universalism and Particularism in Nation Building 123 table 6.3 Textbooks: Contents by Period Content of articles

Pre–1905

Post–1905

Total

national language

1 0.72 4 2.90 3 2.17 0 0.00 3 2.17 3 2.17 1 0.72 3 2.17 5 3.62 1 0.72 29 21.01 15 10.87 7 5.07 4 2.90 4 2.90 3 2.17 0 0.00 1 0.72 10 7.25 34 24.64 7 5.07

0 0.00 37 12.85 2 0.69 1 0.35 55 19.10 3 1.04 0 0.00 27 9.38 2 0.69 0 0.00 31 10.76 21 7.29 9 3.13 10 3.47 1 0.35 1 0.35 2 0.69 0 0.00 49 17.01 33 11.46 4 1.39

1 0.23 41 9.62 5 1.17 1 0.23 58 13.62 6 1.41 1 0.23 30 7.04 7 1.64 1 0.23 60 14.08 36 8.45 16 3.76 14 3.29 5 1.17 4 0.94 2 0.47 1 0.23 59 13.85 67 15.73 11 2.58

138 100.00

288 100.00

426 100.00

national history foreign history mixed history national figure foreign figure mixed figure national geography foreign geography mixed geography traditional moral education Western moral education mixed moral education traditional knowledge Western knowledge mixed knowledge national art Western art civic education science and technology others Total

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Finally, to see whether this shift was substantial, I ran a statistical analysis. As Table 6.2 shows, there is a statistically significant association between period and content (chi-square is 66.13, p < .01). This statistic indicates that universalistic subjects declined over time, while particularistic ones increased, and this change was significant. In other words, the analysis demonstrates a crucial change in textbook subjects from more universalistic to more particularistic ones from the pre–1905 to the post–1905 period. Taken together, these findings reveal that in the early years of modern nation building, various “universalistic” subjects including civic rights and citizenship were addressed in Korean school textbooks. As such, my findings offer a challenge to the conventional wisdom that the Korean nation was ethnicized from the beginning. The results support my contention that civic and political notions of nation were widely discussed as the basis of the Korean nation in the pre–1905 period. Furthermore, the inclusion of “universalistic” subjects in school curriculum was consistent with the worldwide trend of modern education at the time. Therefore, it can be taken as evidence to suggest that Korea was not as isolated as some may have thought. Instead, Korea was keen to the wider “modern” trends of the time. The salience of universalism gradually declined, however, giving way to more “particularistic” coverage, like Korean national history and historical figures in the post–1905 period. The Protectorate Treaty appears to be the turning point that led to such a dramatic shift in curriculum emphasis. After 1905, largely as a defense strategy against imperialism, a particularism that stressed Korea’s indigenous roots and heritage became much more salient. In the imperialist context the notion of the Korean nation became ethnicized. Once again, ethnicization of the Korean nation was not historical destiny, but rather the product of a particular historical condition, namely, the realization of the external threat of Japanese imperialism.

Universalism and Particularism Under Colonial Rule With colonization, early Korean efforts to promote nationalism came to an end, at least temporarily. However, in the 1920s, largely encouraged by “cultural rule,” a new generation of Korean intellectuals and leaders began to resume public discussion about their nation. Expanded education, urban growth, and the development of communication technologies along with

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the new colonial policy had increased Koreans’ capacity to become effective consumer-participants in print capitalism. As in the precolonial period, this new generation of Korean intellectuals entertained both universalistic and particularistic ideas. They saw their major task as reconstructing Korean national identity and culture, and they sought to do so by embracing Western ideas and institutions. At the same time, they attempted to reevaluate Korean tradition and heritage in the process of reconstructing Korean nationality. To be sure, there existed some disagreement over the relative importance of Western and Korean ideas in the process of creating a new national culture and identity. Still, no strong effort to ethnicize the Korean nation emerged until the late 1920s. Universalism or cosmopolitanism based on Western liberalism dominated Korean intellectual discourse up through the mid-1920s.7 Articles published in various magazines in the early 1920s provide ample evidence of the prevalence of Western values and ideas at the time. For example, the inaugural editorial of Kaebyo˘k (Dawn), entitled “Know the World,” published on June 25, 1920, stressed cosmopolitanism by saying that the magazine’s effort was consistent with a “world trend of reconstruction.” The new culture had to be one that would promote peace and harmony, thus affirming the natural rights of all nations, great and small. As Robinson points out, the editorial “rang with the infectious post–World War I idealism, grounded in Wilsonian self-determination, that had swept East Asia after World War I” (1988, 58). Another article in the magazine stated, “My identity is formulated not by my father or brother or any other persons, but by myself ” (1920, 1 :282), declaring the individual the basic unit of society and all its collective entities. Yi Kwangsu’s theory of national reconstruction that championed Western individualism and free will illustrates the cosmopolitan universalism that appeared in the early 1920s. All these examples indicate that Korean intellectuals were not isolated; they were familiar with the current trends in the world. It was not until the late 1920s when the Korean nation was ethnicized. In response to colonial racism and international Socialism, Korean intellectuals increasingly stressed the importance of distinctive tradition and national culture. An article published in Tongkwang, for instance, argued that “each nation has distinctive traits [and] only distinct Choso˘n people can make their nation thrive to the world level. . . . Whatever forms it takes, every nation develops particularistic characteristics” (1927, 3 : 56). Many also

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promoted collectivism over individualism, attributing its origins to Korea’s native culture (Tongkwang 1927, 3:56). Korean intellectuals clearly sought to revive national history, tradition, knowledge, and language in the late 1920s and the 1930s. In order to assess such a shift in emphasis from universalism to particularism during the period of the 1920s to 1930s, I formulate the following hypotheses: B-1) Both universalistic and particularistic elements appeared in the construction of a Korean nation under colonial rule. B-2) In the early years of colonial rule, universalistic elements dominated particularistic ones as the basis of nation. B-3) Early dominance of universalism gradually gave way to particularism after the late 1920s with the rise of colonial racism and international Socialism.

Data and Method To test these hypotheses, I analyze articles taken from major magazines published in the 1920s and 1930s. It is generally understood that the public sphere created by magazines, journals, and newspapers was instrumental to the rise of modernity in Europe (Habermas 1991). This public sphere in colonial Korea grew significantly after “cultural rule” and reflected the sentiments and opinions of the public as well as the leaders. As such, a systematic study of the subject contents in these mass media can help explain the ways in which Koreans understood various concepts, from the idea of the individual to community, society, and the outside world. I analyze articles published in Kaebyo˘k and Tongkwang. To be sure, Kaebyo˘k and Tongkwang were not identical in character—the former was more general and the latter was specifically nationalist—but they existed as two major magazines representing nationalist thought in the 1920s and 1930s.8 Also because of different periods of publication (1920 –26, 1934, 1935 for Kaebyo˘k and Tongkwang 1926 –33), I had to combine both to be able to show a general trend in nationalist thought from 1920 to 1935. As with textbooks, I use a content analysis to classify main subjects of articles taken from these two magazines. I reconstructed the coding scheme used for textbook analysis by slightly modifying and expanding the original categories (see Appendix 2). Newly added categories include women’s issues

Universalism and Particularism in Nation Building 127

and sports. For coding, I assigned the main subject of each article in Kaebyo˘k and Tongkwang into each of these subject categories. In order to estimate the extent of particularistic and universalistic elements displayed in these magazines, I use the same coding scheme used for the analysis of textbooks with three categories: (1) Korean / traditional / indigenous; (2) Western/modern/foreign; and (3) mixed. For example, if an article dealt with feminism or women’s participation in the public sphere, it was classified as a “women’s issue” in subject, and “Western / modern / foreign” in nature. However, an article addressing traditional virtues of women, such as being a mediator of family, was assigned as belonging to “women’s issue” in subject, but “Korean/traditional / indigenous” in nature. A total of 2,626 articles (1,810 form Kaebyo˘k and 816 from Tongkwang) were coded and analyzed according to this scheme.9

Findings Table 6.4 shows major subjects that appeared in Kaebyo˘k and Tongkwang.10 The top four subjects in these magazines were “art” (31.57 percent), “civic education” (15.88 percent), “history” (14.93 percent), and “geography” (9.44 percent).11 Although it is not fair to directly compare subjects of textbooks with those of magazines, one can notice some difference in the coverage of subjects. Art and history got more coverage in the magazines; the coverage of moral education and science and technology substantially declined. Obviously magazines cover issues of more general interest, such as art, whereas textbooks contain topics, such as moral education, aimed at inculcating students. Table 6.5 shows frequency distribution of three subcategories designed to measure the extent of universalism and particularism over time. Consistent with hypothesis B-1, both universalistic and particularistic subjects appear to have been covered in the magazines from 1920 to 1935. Unlike precolonial textbooks, however, a large portion of the coded articles in the two magazines belong to a “mixed” category (39.09 percent). This seems largely due to a substantial portion of articles about art (22.49 percent of the Kaebyo˘k articles and 20.47 percent of the Tongkwang ones belonged to this mixed category). Many articles classified as “art” employed modern, Western methods or formats, while their contents were filled with things Korean or indigenous. These articles were classified as “mixed.”

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contentious politics table 6.4 Contents of Magazines Categories language history figure geography moral education knowledge/thought art civic education science and technology editorial women’s issues sports others Total

Freq.

Percent

66 392 198 248 166 48 829 417 92 100 24 20 46

2.51 14.93 7.54 9.44 6.32 1.83 31.57 15.88 3.50 3.81 0.91 0.76 1.83

2,626

100.00

Figure 6.2 shows a trend in coverage of particularistic and universalistic issues in the magazines.12 It reveals a general downward trend of universalistic subjects and an upward trend of particularistic ones over time (with the exception of 1925 when Kaebyo˘k published special issues that introduced unique or special features of various, local places in the peninsula). The percentage of articles categorized as “Western / modern / foreign” was more than 70 percent in 1920, but gradually declined to less than 30 percent in 1933 and 1934. In contrast, the percentage of articles dealing with “Korean / traditional/indigenous” issues was less than 30 percent in 1920, but gradually increased, reaching its peak in 1933 (more than 70 percent of all coverage). In particular, as shown in Table 6.6, discussion of the Korean language, traditional/national history, and national figures increased, while coverage of civic education declined.13 The descriptive findings in Table 6.5 and Figure 6.2 broadly support hypotheses B-2 and B-3, that is, universalistic elements dominated particularistic ones as the basis of nation during the early years of colonial rule, while the trend was reversed since the late 1920s. Finally, to see whether such trends were statistically meaningful, I ran a simple bivariate analysis. As presented at Table 6.5, a chi-square analysis shows a statistically significant association between period and content (chisquare is 120.41; p  .01).14 This result demonstrates a substantial shift of

Universalism and Particularism in Nation Building 129 table 6.5 Magazines: Particularistic vs. Universalistic Year of publication 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 Total

Traditional

Western

Mixed

Total

22 13.66 45 19.91 40 16.88 69 23.71 96 32.00 88 39.11 100 28.01 36 23.68 59 26.22 71 25.18 8 38.10 25 33.78 18 24.32

58 36.02 90 39.82 105 44.30 112 38.49 114 38.00 60 26.67 148 41.46 60 39.47 62 27.56 86 30.50 3 14.29 10 13.51 14 18.92

81 50.31 91 40.27 92 38.82 110 37.80 90 30.00 77 34.22 109 30.53 56 36.84 104 46.22 126 44.33 10 47.62 39 52.70 42 56.76

161 100.00 226 100.00 237 100.00 291 100.00 300 100.00 225 100.00 357 100.00 152 100.00 225 100.00 283 100.00 21 100.00 74 100.00 74 100.00

677 25.79

922 35.12

1,026 39.09

2,625 100.00

Pearson chi2(24)  120.41; P  0.00.

subject emphasis in the two magazines from more universalistic to more particularistic during the period from 1920 to 1935. Taken together, these findings show that in the early 1920s, universal concepts and ideas were widely discussed in the Korean public sphere. Yet the early dominance of universalism gradually gave way to particularism over time. This shift reflected the Korean nationalist response to colonial racism and international Socialism that emerged in Korea after the late 1920s. Both colonial racism and international Socialism took the form of universalism and either denied or downgraded the importance of nation in favor of a

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80 70

Percent

60 50

' ' ,___ ... , , ,

40 30

,

20 10 0 1920

1921

1922

1923

1924

1925

1926

1927

1931

1932

1933

1934

1935

Year Traditional

Western

figure 6.2 Change of Contents, Kaebyo˘k & Tongkwang: Traditional vs. Western in the 1920s and 1930s.

table 6.6 Magazines: Contents by Period Content of articles Korean language foreign language mixed language editorials national history foreign history mixed history national figure foreign figure mixed figures national geography foreign geography

1920 –23

1924 –26

1927–35

Total

1 0.11 4 0.44 2 0.22 23 2.51 37 4.04 23 2.51 11 1.20 33 3.61 29 3.17 0 0.00 34 3.72 24 2.62

7 0.79 0 0.00 2 0.23 28 3.17 76 8.62 47 5.33 17 1.93 34 3.85 11 1.25 0 0.00 113 12.81 19 2.15

39 4.70 8 0.97 3 0.36 49 5.91 54 6.51 68 8.20 37 4.46 55 6.63 29 3.50 7 0.84 13 1.57 6 0.72

47 1.79 12 0.46 7 0.27 100 3.81 167 6.36 138 5.26 65 2.48 122 4.65 69 2.63 7 0.27 160 6.09 49 1.87 (continued )

Universalism and Particularism in Nation Building 131 table 6.6 (continued) Magazines: Contents by Period Content of articles

1920 –23

1924 –26

1927–35

mixed geography

20 2.19 0 0.00 26 2.84 75 8.20 0 0.00 13 1.42 7 0.77 46 5.03 84 9.18 209 22.84 20 2.19 131 14.32 14 1.53 21 2.30 5 0.55 2 0.22 0 0.00 7 0.77 0 0.00 14 1.53

12 1.36 5 0.57 8 0.91 20 2.27 0 0.00 19 2.15 2 0.23 13 1.47 61 6.92 168 19.05 32 3.63 133 15.08 5 0.57 25 2.83 3 0.34 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 22 2.50

7 0.84 6 0.72 3 0.36 23 2.77 3 0.36 3 0.36 1 0.12 27 3.26 24 2.90 197 23.76 15 1.81 34 4.10 33 3.98 46 5.55 8 0.97 6 0.72 1 0.12 7 0.84 5 0.60 12 1.45

39 1.49 11 0.42 37 1.41 118 4.49 3 0.11 35 1.33 10 0.38 86 3.27 169 6.44 574 21.86 67 2.55 298 11.35 52 1.98 92 3.50 16 0.61 8 0.30 1 0.04 14 0.53 5 0.19 48 1.83

915 100.00

882 100.00

829 100.00

2,626 100.00

traditional moral education Western moral education mixed moral history traditional knowledge Western knowledge mixed knowledge national art Western art mixed art traditional civic education Western civic education mixed civic education science and technology Western women’s issues mixed women’s issues traditional sports Western sports mixed sports others Total

Total

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transcendent notion such as empire or class. In this context ethnicization of the Korean nation expressed in Yi Kwangsu’s theory of the Korean nation emerged and prevailed over more universalistic views, including his earlier one. Still, a large portion of articles published in Kaebyo˘k and Tongkwang were classified as “mixed” categories, suggesting that many Koreans were still experimenting with Western ideas, methods, or techniques, while dealing with Korean or indigenous topics.15

The Dominance of Ethnic Nationalism and the Poverty of Liberalism In the face of the historical reasons for the ethnicization of the Korean nation, this process exacted a price on Korean society and politics. In the name of an abstract, immortal collectivity (that is, ethnic nation), people were asked to sacrifice their individual, civic, and political rights. To be sure, such a nationalist demand performed the important function of defending the Korean nation against foreign aggression and preserving national culture and spirit during foreign rule. Still, the dominance of collectivistic ethnic nationalism constrained space for liberalism in the public sphere. Nation became a “trump” card, to use Calhoun’s (1994) term, overriding other forms of collective identity or political cleavage. One of the principal ideas of liberalism is that of the individual. That is, the individual is seen as a being “who, because he is human, is naturally entitled to ‘rights’ that can be enumerated, rights that are attributed to him independently of his function or place in society and that make him the equal of any other man” (Manent 1994, xvi). And as Calhoun (1997) points out, such liberal individualism was instrumental to the rise of the modern notion of nation as a categorical identity, namely, the notion that individuals are directly (not through intermediate associations) members of the nation. However, in modern Korea, individualism was equated with egoism or selfishness, and the discussion of individual freedom and civic rights was downplayed in favor of collectivism and national survival. During colonial rule ethnic nationalists such as Yi Kwangsu charged that Western individualism and liberalism were destroying Korea’s valuable tradition of we-ism and groupism, and they called for their revival. As Pak Noja points out, in the early years of the nation-building process liberalism was mistakenly positioned as the opposite of nationalism (2003, 98).

Universalism and Particularism in Nation Building 133

The trend continued after 1945 as the nation’s territory was divided and each side under the respective authoritarian regime continued to stress the importance of collectivism and survival mentality. It was often argued that individuals should be willing to sacrifice their rights for the nation until Korea achieved modernization or national unification. Authoritarian states in both Koreas promoted a nationalist ethic to demand and legitimize the sacrifice of individual rights. As in other societies (Chirot 1997; Greenfeld 1992), blood-based, communal nationalism has promoted the development of authoritarian collectivism in Korea.16 It was not until recent years that the repressive power of nationalism has begun to face a serious challenge within Korea (Cho and Yi 2000; H. Kwo˘n 2000; H. Sin 2003; C. Yim 1999).17 As Yim Chihyo˘n points out, nation has been “the framework of moral and historical judgment,” which made it extremely difficult to question the harmful effects of nationalism (1999, 6). Even today, with democratization and globalization, Koreans have not yet been able to move beyond notions of blood-based identity. Because of the dominance of collectivistic nationalism, liberalism had a difficult time taking root in Korea. The general poverty or shallowness of liberalism affected the development of both conservatism and radicalism in Korea. Instead of building on liberalism or engaging in a dialogue with liberalism, both conservatism and radicalism alike turned to nationalism for popular support. As Kim Tongch’un (1993) points out, Korean Marxism did not develop in constructive contention with liberalism but out of total rejection or denial of it. As a result, Korea failed to produce a theoretically and methodologically refined theory of Marxism— only pseudo-Marxist theories appeared. In his view, this explains the sudden demise of Marxism in Korea in the 1990s.18 The same can be said for the poverty of Korean conservative thought. Instead of resorting to liberalism in common defense against Socialism and communism, Korean conservatives resorted to antiCommunism, developmentalism, and nationalism under authoritarian politics.19 It is for this reason that Korean conservatism came to be associated with reactionism (sugu chuu˘i). The shallowness of modern thought (on the right and the left) in Korea had much to do with the poverty of liberalism and power of nationalism. Ironically, both the Left and the Right were able to exercise an ideological power only when combined with ethnic nationalism (this can be also said for the North). Yet, it was not simply because Korea had no soil to

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enrich liberalism or that Koreans have not attempted to promote it; in fact, features of liberalism, individualism, or universalism were widely discussed in the early years of nation building. Instead, it was due to the historical conditions of imperialism, colonialism, and national division that produced a sense of threat and urgency in collective survival. In such a historical situation, organic, ethnic, and collectivistic nationalism came to dominate civic, liberal, and individualistic nationalism, even at the risk of constraining individual freedoms and civic rights. The poverty of liberalism was the price individual Koreans paid for the dominance of ethnic nationalism in their society and politics. This is a painful legacy of Japanese colonialism and a consequence of prolonged national division. Even the democratic movements of the 1980s did not effectively uproot the ethnic, collectivistic, organic notion of the Korean nation.

seven

Tradition, Modernity, and Nation

After the peninsula was divided into North and South in 1945, each state appealed to its anticolonial record to legitimize itself, claiming an exclusive right to speak for the Korean nation. Neither side questioned the uniqueness and homogeneity of the Korean ethnic nation, yet each appropriated a particular line of historical nationalist movements, Marxist and bourgeois, respectively, to validate and give substance to its own nationalist narrative. As a result, the North cast bourgeois culturalists as little more than collaborators, and the South alleged that Marxists could not be nationalists because they were Communists with an internationalist allegiance. Such political use of history, however, not only oversimplified colonial rule but also gave the misleading impression that Korea’s division originated from a pre–1945 ideological split. Despite obvious differences in political and ideological orientation, these two nationalisms and the narratives based on them reveal striking similarities. Bourgeois and Marxist nationalists largely accepted a linear, progressoriented view of history. Although they differed in their vision for a new political community (an American or Western European-influenced capitalist, liberal society versus a Russian Communist-influenced one), their main ideology and view of history reflected a modernist orientation. Accordingly, both bourgeois and Marxist nationalists regarded Korean tradition, especially neo-Confucian thought, as backward and an “obstacle to progress.” Yi Kwangsu’s well-known theory of the reconstruction of the nation and Marxist attacks on neo-Confucianism exemplify how the two sides denounced Korea’s past as inhibiting progress toward modernity. 135

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Both groups either explicitly participated in colonial modernity or at least implicitly accepted it as inevitable in the process of historical progress. Bourgeois nationalists hailed colonial industrialization as an opportunity to create the “national capital” required for future political independence and economic development (Robinson 1988; Wells 1990). Marxists, to be sure, did not participate in colonial industrialization like their bourgeois counterparts did; yet, they saw modernity as inevitable in the historical course that would eventually lead to a Communist and independent Korea. Marxists clearly rejected colonialism but were more ambivalent regarding modernity. Bourgeois and Marxist nationalists furthermore advocated urbancentered movements. The former did not completely overlook the importance of the countryside, but they clearly saw the future of Korea in the cities. The rural populace, though garnering some sympathy from the bourgeois, was considered little more than a group to be educated, enlightened, and transformed by the urban intellectual. Similarly, Marxists focused their intention on the urban proletariat, whom they viewed as the main agent of social change. Even with the Comintern’s December Theses that urged Korean Marxists to attend to the importance of the countryside, the peasantry was still considered a supporting cast. They were never thought to be the leading class in social revolution. For both bourgeois and Marxist nationalists, the urban and the modern were favored over the rural and the traditional as the future of a new Korea. Post–1945 appropriation of these two nationalisms that stress historical progress toward modernity, whether communist or capitalist, has well served the state nationalism of both Koreas. However, this bifurcation not only eclipsed other important narratives, national and transnational, but also grossly oversimplified the complex relations between colonialism, nationalism, and modernity. Both narratives failed to recognize the multiple layers of colonialism. Colonial society was highly differentiated, and the implications and impact of imperial practices were not uniform. Colonialism may have dealt a final blow to some groups, such as the traditional elite, but it also created new opportunities for social mobility for other groups, including merchants and paekcho˘ng.1 Similarly, during the 1920s and 1930s modernity was primarily a phenomenon of the urban elite, whereas the rural became increasingly peripheral, a virtual “internal colony.”

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137

Because the effects of colonialism were uneven, the responses to it were likewise complex and diverse. Besides the bourgeois and Marxist discourses mentioned above, other narratives of political community, both national and transnational, emerged. However, nationalist narratives in both Koreas disregard such alternative historical voices because they go against the grain of the states’ current ideologies. We must specify the complex and overlapping relations weaving through the multiple layers of colonialism as well as pinpoint the competing versions of nationalism and narratives of political community. The pro-modern stance of the current narratives does not permit to adequately recognize the complex ways in which a particular form of discourse derives from both traditional /native sources and modern / foreign influences. Tradition is not replaced by modernity, but rather is often recycled or even reinvented in reaction (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Furthermore, nationalists have long engaged in contentious politics over what part of tradition and indigenous culture should be employed for their cause. Again, the complex ways in which tradition and modernity or indigenous resources and foreign political cultures interact with each other to produce a distinctive narrative must be specified. This chapter examines a narrative and movement that advocated an antimodern, agrarian notion of national identity. Its proponents understood the future of Korea from neither a capitalist nor a Communist perspective, but rather in terms of a self-sufficient communal society with explicit linkages to Korea’s agrarian traditions. They sought to revive agrarian thought and village institutions to rescue Korea from “modern diseases.” I call this view agrarianism (nongch’on chuu˘i), or agrarian nationalism, because its proponents sought to combine the agrarian traditions of premodern Korea with the modern language of nationalism. This movement represented an important antimodern conception of nation, and its examination will illustrate contentious politics of national identity between modernists and antimodernists in Korea.

Colonialism, Agrarian Transformation, and Crisis The genesis and growth of nationalism are closely associated with the arrival of modernity. As modernization infiltrates a “traditional” society, the perception of uneven development creates the potential for nationalism.

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Nationalism is born where the more and the less advanced populations can be easily distinguished in cultural terms within a “universal” scale. This thesis can be readily extended to explain the development of diverse representations of political community within a society. Modernization not only disrupts a society but more importantly does so unevenly, fostering competing visions of community among diverse social groups. Accordingly, modernization may not lead to the establishment of a universal national culture. On the contrary, it can strengthen the distinctive cultural and ethnic identities of particular social groups, especially those adversely affected by it. As Michael Hechter points out with regard to the Celtic fringe, “The English connection stimulated anglicization among the agrarian ruling class in the Celtic regions . . . [but] the bulk of the inhabitants of these regions adhered to Celtic cultural forms. . . . The existence of Celtic culture had become a weapon, in that it could be used as a basis for anti-English political mobilization in these traditionally disadvantaged regions” (1975, 343). Similarly, Korean agrarianism can be understood as a reaction to the uneven spread of colonial modernity, a reaction of the peripheral, rural regions to the increasing dominance of capitalist forces and culture centered in cities. To understand the historical and structural context for the rise of agrarianism, one must first consider capitalism’s effect on colonial economy and society. When Korea fell to Japanese colonization, it was predominantly agrarian with more than 80 percent of its population engaged in agriculture. Japan did not actively pursue industrialization in Korea until the 1930s, and it did not overlook the importance of agricultural production (especially rice) with their primary interests in feeding metropolitan Japan. As a result, there were advancements in agricultural production, exports to Japan, expanding markets, fluctuating crop prices, and increased agricultural commercialization. Korean and Japanese markets became closely linked: market conditions in Osaka and Tokyo directly affected peninsular rice prices. Although precolonial Korea featured forces of commercialization and market development, colonialism undoubtedly accelerated them, tightly integrating Korean agriculture into the larger Japanese market. Expanding markets and strong prices for commercial agriculture certainly brought some economic prosperity to rural Korea in the 1920s. The affect of agricultural capitalism, however, was not uniform across rural classes. The Korean rural class was differentiated into landlords, owner-cultivators, parttenant/part-owners, and landless tenants, and commercialization’s impact on these diverse rural strata varied accordingly. Big landlords reaped benefits

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from increased commercialization, but most landless tenants did not. This group was often forced to sell their crops, especially rice, on the market for no profit just to survive, and they supplemented any remainder with imported millet for consumption. A 1925 government survey, for instance, shows that those who owned more than twenty cho˘ngbo (1 cho˘ngbo  2.45 acres) of land had an average surplus of 5,582 wo˘n, whereas most landless tenants had negative income balances. Labor surplus and land scarcity promoted the intensified use of cheap labor for agricultural production, resulting in “growth without development” and increased rural inequality. Many landlords relocated to urban areas (by 1930, about 31 percent of landlords lived away from their land’s county). Meanwhile, most poor peasants remained peripheral to the emerging urban culture and thus to colonial modernity. Furthermore, rural Korea’s integration into the capitalist system increased dependency on market forces in a way that proved disastrous in human terms. James Scott (1976) has shown that the world market dramatically altered Southeast Asia’s agrarian system during the early twentieth century, reducing peasants’ subsistence margin and rendering them increasingly vulnerable. This vulnerability took two forms, subsistence crises in an absolute sense and income fluctuations. The combination of these two proved devastating. Korean peasants in the late 1920s and early 1930s confronted an analogous situation when the colony was hit hard by the Depression. In 1927, the price of brown rice was already 22 percent off that of 1925, and by 1931 it was only 39 percent of the 1925 price. Agricultural commercialization brought temporary prosperity to rural society in earlier years, but the collapse of the world market after 1929 dealt a severe blow to Korean agriculture and cast most of the rural population, with the exception of large landlords, into debt. Concentrating exports on one crop, rice, proved to be particularly disastrous because rice prices plunged far deeper than other crops. According to a 1932 survey, about two-thirds of the 26,160 farm households investigated carried debt, which averaged 107 yen, more than one-third of total annual income (see G. Shin 1996, ch. 6). Class polarization accelerated and starvation was common, leading a newspaper to describe the situation as “a starving hell” where “people live because they cannot die” (Tonga ilbo, March 24, 1932). Rural Korea was at the mercy of market forces with hardly any mechanism for defending itself. Besides integration into the capitalist market, Korean rural society also witnessed intensifying class struggles throughout the 1920s. With the

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onset of cultural rule, peasants, like other social groups, increasingly organized and mobilized themselves. Although not necessarily anticolonial or revolutionary, they initiated collective disputes against landlords over issues of rent, tenancy contracts, and land taxes, arguing that tenant welfare could not depend on the benevolent action of landlords but would only result from collective tenant action. From 1920 to 1932, a total of 4,804 disputes involving 74,581 tenants and landlords occurred nationwide. They were, in the words of the colonial government, a “constant phenomenon” of rural society (G. Shin 1996). Communists, viewing the eruption of tenant struggles as a chance to advance their cause in the countryside, actively supported them. In keeping with the Comintern’s view that the agrarian issue was “of greatest importance for Communist activity in Korea,” Korean Communists increased their involvement in rural conflicts and attempted to organize more radical “red peasant union movements.” These efforts were concentrated in the northeastern region, and the localized movements staged various protests against government offices over taxes and police interference in village affairs. Although these actions were not always revolutionary or anticolonial, rural Korea increasingly came under the influence of the Left. Now, in addition to the economic crisis at hand, social conflict among villagers—between the landed and the landless, and between leftists and conservatives—ripped through the countryside. The situation reached a point of such gravity that the colonial government adopted a corporatist social policy, leading to new land laws and a “rural revitalization campaign” (nongch’on chinhu˘ng undong) to appease discontent and restore social harmony (Shin and Han 1999). In short, 1920s and 1930s rural Korea was in crisis: it was at the center of the tensions, conflicts, and contradictions inherent to commercialism and capitalism, provoking diverse reactions from both the colonial state and society.

Agrarianism: A Critique of Colonial Modernity Notwithstanding the colonial government, various other sectors of society responded to the agrarian conflict and crisis. Communists blamed the rural crisis on capitalist contradictions and supported agrarian struggle in order to advance an agrarian revolution as a step toward their ultimate goal, proletarian revolution. In contrast, bourgeois culturalists, while concerned with the deteriorating rural situation, understood it in personal terms, attributing

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it to the peasants’ lack of “education and enlightenment.” A third response, one excluded from current nationalist narratives, came from agrarianists. Unlike the Marxists or bourgeoisie who considered the agrarian as merely transitional to a modern society, agrarianists advocated the establishment of an agrarian nation as the solution to the rural crisis. They blamed the Left’s mobilization of the rural poor for the “current stagnation of peasant movements” and criticized bourgeois programs (for example, the saenghwal kaesin undong [life regeneration movement] promoted by Tonga ilbo) as not intended for “peasant welfare” (I. Cho˘ng 1932; Ma 1932). Instead, agrarianists advocated construction of a self-sufficient agrarian community, namely one that could restore harmonious rural village life as it had once existed. Also, unlike the Marxists or bourgeoisie who regarded the peasant as a passive subject to be mobilized or educated, the agrarianists conceived of the peasant as the essence of the Korean nation. Agrarianism was not a phenomenon unique to Korea. Other countries witnessed similar movements, especially during the early stages of industrialization. For instance, early twentieth-century Russia saw the narodnik movement, which Lenin criticized as romanticist and even reactionary.2 A similar movement in Japan, best known as no¯honshugi, was active from the 1870s to 1940s. According to Tom Havens, agrarianism emerges when a society is in “transition from an economy based on farming to one dominated by commerce and industry.” Japanese agrarianism involved more than “Confucian reverence for peasant farming.” It entailed “farm-centered social and political ideas” that attempted to offer “a set of prescriptions for correcting imbalances in a rapidly changing society.” Its main beliefs included “faith in agricultural economics, an affirmation of rural communalism, and a conviction that farming was indispensable to those qualities that made the nation unique” (1974, 317–18). Likewise, Korean agrarianism appeared in the 1920s and early 1930s as market forces brought economic problems and social conflict to rural villages. As in Japan, Confucian tradition, which revered the peasant as “the basis of the world under heaven” (nongja ch’o˘nha chi taebon), provided the conceptual underpinnings for Korean agrarianism. However, to serve the purpose of creating a distinctively Korean community in the new era, Korean agrarian thought was reframed in the new language of nations and nationalism. An article published in Hyeso˘ng (Comet) in 1932 claimed that agriculture is the “last lifeline of Korea” and that, therefore, “the rural

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crisis is a national crisis” (Ma 1932, 2). Similarly, Yi So˘nghwan maintained in the inaugural issue of Choso˘n nongmin (Korean Peasants) that Korea is poor “because the peasants are poor . . . and, therefore, whether Korea will survive or not depends on whether the peasants survive” (1925, 4). Unlike the bourgeois or Marxists who despised the agrarian tradition and considered it an obstacle to development, agrarianists lamented that Korea had lost such a tradition in its transition to a modern (colonial) society and saw the value of agrarianism in creating a new Korean nation (S. Yi 1923). They believed that Korea’s future lay in its villages, and they envisioned “an utopian agrarian nation” (yut’op’iajo˘k nongmin kukka) as the political form of a new Korea.3 No simple description can do justice to the diverse views and movements of these agrarianists, who ranged from the well-organized Ch’o˘ndogyo (Religion of Heavenly Way) and its later development in the Tonghak-based Korean Peasant Society (Choso˘n nongminsa), to village-specific, Confucianoriented efforts to construct utopian villages (isanghyang, or isangch’on), to anarchist agrarianists, like Kim Chunggo˘n who attempted to establish an agrarian society in Manchuria.4 Except for the Korean Peasant Society, these groups did not cohere into a sustained movement, and even the Society itself was incorporated into government-initiated rural campaigns by the late 1930s.5 Nonetheless, these agrarianists expressed their views quite clearly in such magazines as Kaebyo˘k, Nongmin, Choso˘n nongmin, Hyeso˘ng, advancing antimodern, agrarianist views that were quite distinctive to both bourgeois and Marxist viewpoints. 1. Self-sufficiency over Capitalist Integration

Korean agrarianists took a strong anticapitalist, antiurban, and by extension, antimodern stance in reconstructing rural society as a step toward building a new Korea. They viewed urban areas as the “space and symbol of contradictions of current society” and argued that the rural should be “the center of the economy and culture of a society.” In order to achieve a society free from urbanism (tosi chuu˘i), commercialism (sangsi chuu˘i), or materialism (ku˘mbon chuu˘i), agrarianists advocated the establishment of a self-sufficient agrarian society.6 To be sure, “self-sufficiency” was a popular theme at the time, and bourgeois nationalists such as Cho Mansik indeed advocated a “self-sufficient economy” (Wells 1990). Yet they envisioned this within an industrial society, in sharp contrast to agrarianists whose new Korea was to be not only

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self-sufficient but also agrarian. Agrarianists regarded capitalist development as intensifying dependence on foreign forces and urbanism as destroying Korea’s rich traditions and culture. They insisted on finding the essence of the Korean nation in an agrarian tradition that preserved self-sufficient rural communities. More specifically, Korean agrarianists attributed rural problems, especially economic crises and social conflicts, to the penetration of capitalist forces into villages. As rural Korea was increasingly commercialized in the 1920s, they were deeply troubled by what they saw as capitalism’s destructive power. For instance, a 1932 article published in Nongmin, “Why Are Peasants Poor?” opined, “Unlike the past when peasant life was self-sufficient, today peasants cannot escape starvation no matter how diligent they are, because they are subordinate to the capitalist economy” (Tan 1932, 10). Similarly an article published in Hyeso˘ng in January 1932 pointed out that “(1) rural villages would inevitably collapse in the process of capitalist development; (2) the process of village collapse under colonial rule would be more rapid than that in the colonizer’s country; and (3) depression would further facilitate such a process of collapse” (Ma 1932, 4). Agrarianists felt that capitalism inevitably presaged rural economic crisis and decline, exacerbated in Korea by colonialism and agricultural depression. In a similar vein, a 1926 article published in Kaebyo˘k argued that “the main cause of current problems lies in the capitalism that rules over our society. Accordingly, rural problems cannot be discussed separately from capitalism. The pauperization of rural villages is due to capitalist forces, especially forces led by foreign capital” (Kim Kyo˘ngjae 1926, 29 –30). Recognizing the destructive power of capitalist forces and the consequent crisis in rural society, agrarianists argued that saving rural Korea from further damage required excising the influence of capitalism from villages. For this, Korean agrarianists noted the value of self-sufficiency that had existed in the past and that, free of market forces, had brought a “golden age” (hwanggu˘m sidae) to Korea. Accordingly, many articles published in Kaebyo˘k, Nongmin, and Choso˘n nongmin contrasted the self-sufficient peasant society of the past with the current capitalist calamity, illustrating that earlier rural society had been more stable and that capitalist forces had produced the rural poverty of the present. The message in these writings was explicit: the best way to save rural society from further pauperization was the removal of commercial and capitalist forces by establishing an agrarian economy based on “the spirit of self-reliance” or an “independent spirit” (S. Yi 1926, 36).

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A 1923 editorial in Kaebyo˘k, “The Fate of New Korea and the Status of the Peasant,” offered a more philosophical basis for the establishment of a new Korea based on a self-sufficient agrarian social order. It stated: Money is an idol. Agriculture is the place that preserves eternal sacred value since it maintains human life. . . . If the world were self-sufficient in the way that agricultural society is, there would be no need to rely on banks, it wouldn’t be affected by fluctuations of capital, and wouldn’t be subject to the abuses of modern civilization, such as class discrimination and economic pain. That is why the sacred value of agriculture becomes all the more crucial in modern society.

After arguing for the universal value of farming over commerce and industry, the editorial uses a culturally laden metaphor of chastity to explain why a new Korea should be based on agriculture: “Giving up farming in favor of commerce and industry is to leave one’s wise wife for a concubine [and] constructing a new Korea without basing it on agriculture is to marry someone other than the one you love.” The editorial continues: Even were Korea to develop commerce and industry, they would be subject to foreign forces of capitalism and therefore would not benefit Korean civilization. The only way to engage in economic war is therefore to preserve agriculture and establish our unique agricultural civilization in ways that prepare for a self-sufficient utopian agrarian nation, which would be the basis of our new society. . . . The joy and happiness of village life cannot be found in a modern civilization of commerce and industry. (4 – 6)

The movement championed agrarian life as the spiritual essence of Korea and thus conceived of it as the proper basis of a new Korea. Apparently the principle of self-sufficiency (chach’i ) or self-reliance (charip) guided numerous agrarianist movements in the 1920s and 1930s. The Korean Peasant Society encouraged collective farming and the purchase of consumer goods to achieve village self-sufficiency, establishing 180 mutual credit unions (kongsaeng chohap) by 1933 (T. Cho 1979). A special March 1929 issue on “Building Utopia” published in Sinmin similarly featured twentyseven exemplary villages that achieved self-reliance while fighting against commercial and urban forces. Kim Chunggo˘n, a Socialist anarchist, advocated the establishment of a “self-reliant agrarian league” (chach’i nongch’on yo˘nmaeng) made up of autonomous villages based on collective farming and communal ownership and distribution of goods. For Korean agrarianists, a

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new Korea had to be built on the agrarian heritage of a self-sufficient natural community, not on an unnatural modern industrial society. 2. Moral Reconstruction over Institutional Reform

Besides self-sufficiency, Korean agrarianists advocated the necessity of spiritual and moral reconstruction as a step toward rural regeneration. They criticized the Left’s mobilization of the peasantry for confrontation with the landed class and colonial government as “inviting severe repression and leading to the recent stagnation of the movement.” Their deeper concerns were with “spiritual and moral pauperization and decay” and increased materialism among villagers. Yi So˘nghwan, a major figure in the Korean Peasant Society, claimed capitalism alone could not be blamed for the current crisis: “We must repent for our lack of self-conscious effort to prevent it and acquire the conviction that ‘it is up to oneself whether Korea is destroyed or saved’” (1926, 36 –37; emphasis added). Similarly an article published in Hyeso˘ng lamented that a major reason for rural problems was the “poverty of agrarian thought” (So˘ Ch’un 1931, 7), and Kim Kijo˘n argued that the rural crisis mainly arose from the “lack of a common visionary policy [tongsi] for promoting village development” (1921, 14 –15). For Korean agrarianists, the rural crisis was spiritual and moral as much as economic and social; therefore, rural reconstruction required more than institutional reform in the areas of tenancy, finance, and irrigation. Rural Korea would have to recover first and foremost its spiritual and moral power (Ma 1932, 5 –11). Korean agrarianists, therefore, believed that rural regeneration meant restoring and developing the spiritual and moral power expressed in creeds, such as nongmindo (the way of the peasant), nongch’on sasang (agrarian thought), nongbon sasang (agrarian-centered thought), and nongmin simni (peasant psychology). An article in Choso˘n nongmin in 1926 urged, “Let’s go back to rural villages, which are our mother [o˘mo˘ni] and grand house [k’u˘njip], the place where we have lived for five thousand years and still live. . . . The main reason for the current poverty is our abandonment of rural villages. . . . We need to promote agrarian thought and peasant-centered thought” (Kim T’ae 1926, 7). In a similar way, Yi So˘nghwan advocated “correcting the current situation with the spirit of independence and self-management (tongnip chayo˘ng cho˘ngsin),” and Kim Kijo˘n spoke for a visionary policy, or tongsi, that could mobilize the spiritual and moral power of village members. A 1932 article published in Hyeso˘ng likewise pointed out the importance of

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developing a “new spirit,” or what the author described as the “philosophy of an energetic way of living” (kangnyo˘kcho˘k saenghwal chuu˘i), to reconstruct rural society. This new life included “developing both physical and spiritual power,” “maintaining a frugal way of life,” and above all, “heightening the sense of struggle in one’s life in order to overcome the current crisis” (saenghwal u˘i kinjanghwa) (Ma 1932, 5 –11). The stress on spiritual power was in line with the principle of self-reliance. Korean agrarianists launched moral crusades to “correct the moral corruption of Korean society.” Most villages that were introduced in the special issue of Sinmin on “Building Utopia” had organized a Society for Moral Correction (kyop’unghoe), which promoted the virtues of diligence, frugality, savings, social harmony, filial piety, and female chastity. This particular society punished those who “corrupted people’s moral sense” through their addictions to drinking, morphine, and gambling. Others intervened in tenancy disputes to mediate between landlords and their tenants.7 While the meaning given to the slogan “moral correction” was not always uniform, it was largely neo-Confucianist, and the colonial government would oftentimes support moral crusades that inculcated such conservative values (C. Lee 1996, 179 – 81). It should be noted that the emphasis on spiritual and moral reconstruction was quite popular at the time in nationalist circles, as exemplified by Yi Kwangsu’s “Minjok kaejoron.” Still, the agrarianists’ effort to find sources of power in Korea’s neo-Confucianism was distinctive; other nationalists turned to Western liberalism or Korea’s folk traditions like Shamanism. In addition, the agrarianist emphasis on spirituality and morality clearly departed from Marxist doctrine, which viewed rural problems in structural terms (for example, colonialism) and thus advocated direct political confrontation with the Korean elite as well as the colonial authority. Accordingly, the agrarianist focus on rural regeneration might be criticized as ignoring the structural context of rural problems and the importance of institutional reform. It might even be criticized as reactionary in that it attempted to restore a patriarchal moral system. Nonetheless, Korean agrarianists exalted the spiritual, the moral, and the agrarian as natural and indigenous, and therefore, as the rightful basis of rural regeneration and building a new Korean nation. 3. Collectivism over Individualism

Individualism as a major feature of the Enlightenment thought that developed in Western Europe, especially in England and France, wielded influ-

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ence on Korean intellectuals since the late nineteenth century. Many Korean leaders, especially those engaged in the early Patriotic Enlightenment movement, were fascinated with the concept of individualism that presupposed inherent rights, autonomy, and freedom of the individual in sharp contrast to the traditional conception of the individual seen only as a member of a collective. They identified the strong collective orientation of traditional Korean society as a source of stagnation and criticized the Confucian emphasis on filial piety, social harmony, the family system, and formalism for its role in repressing individual talent and initiative. In contrast to such Korean Enlightenment leaders (and later bourgeois nationalists), Korean agrarianists valued Confucian traditions and advocated a collectivist approach to solving rural problems. They regarded neoConfucianism not as a source of stagnation, but as a valuable resource in regenerating Korean society. They considered such neo-Confucian institutions as the extended family crucial for rural regeneration. A 1931 article published in Nongmin suggested the establishment of collective farming based on “the notion of the extended family” with three to seven households as a unit in order to promote a “spirit of cooperative and balanced life” (Kim Hwalsan 1931, 31). Korean agrarianists urged the revival of such premodern village institutions as the tonggye (village mutual aid society), tonghoe (village association), and hyangyak (village compact) as prototypes of self-sufficient village institutions. Much as German nationalists invoked collectivism as a defense of the German nation against Enlightenment individualism, Korean agrarianists turned to collectivist tradition as a principle to rescue rural society from the ills of commercial and capitalist forces. An editorial article in the November 1923 issue of Kaebyo˘k made it clear that rural regeneration could be achieved not by the individual efforts of peasants, but by cooperation among them: “In order to build a new society based on the ideal village, peasants must be united. To achieve such unity, it is necessary to create voluntary unions, consumer unions, agricultural associations, and mutual credit unions.” 8 Yet this call for village unity, unlike the Marxist argument, was not intended to promote confrontation with the landlord class or colonial authorities. Instead it aimed at promoting social harmony, village solidarity, and cooperation. Only then could villages effectively eliminate intermediary exploitation by merchants, improve peasants’ bargaining power vis-à-vis industrial manufacturers, and provide relief for peasants from the burden of usurious loans.

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Among their concrete suggestions, agrarianists offered to improve the peasants’ lot by establishing the lihoe (village association) as the basic unit of rural regeneration. An article published in Hyeso˘ng in 1932 envisioned the lihoe as an “organization based in each village like the tonghoe or tonggye of traditional villages that had functioned as self-governing institutions.” Describing “this wonderful heritage as a main means of regenerating rural life,” the author argued that such self-sufficient village institutions could effectively promote the type of autonomous, communal rural society and economy discussed above (Ma 1932, 6 – 8). Agrarianists also argued that traditional natural villages (chayo˘n purak or mau˘l) would be more effective in mobilizing people for rural regeneration than the “artificial” and “arbitrary” administrative villages (haeng jo˘ng purak) set up by the Japanese. In addition, they advocated forming units consisting of three to five households to collectively remove debt and usury and to practice collective farming (Nonggyo˘ng hagin 1931, 53; M. Paek 1933, 5). The Korean Peasant Society put this idea into practice by urging their branches in the countryside to form collective farming units. Most of the twenty-seven villages featured as ideal in the special issue of Sinmin also practiced collective farming and formed various mutual aid unions and associations. Interestingly, many agrarianists advocated restoring rural elite organizations, such as tonggye or hyangyak, rather than folk traditions such as ture (village communitarian mutual aid organization) or p’umasi (an ad hoc or temporary labor exchange group). As Yi Haejun points out, Choso˘n yangban elite practiced both tonggye and hyangyak to guard their interests against the central state and control local society. Hyangyak, for instance, stressed “mutual encouragement of morality, mutual supervision of wrong conduct, mutual decorum in social relationships, and mutual succor in time of disaster or hardship.” These objectives certainly expressed a collectivist orientation but one that secured elite dominance. In fact, a social hierarchy within the tonggye differentiated an upper division (sanggye) for yangban elite from a lower one (hagye) for commoners (H. Yi 1996). To be sure, agrarianists did not advocate such internal discrimination, but their preference for elite institutions reveals their pro-Confucian orientation and departs from other nationalists’ efforts to revive folk tradition. In contrast to bourgeois nationalists who turned to folk traditions such as shamanism as rich repositories of unique symbols and customs expressive of a Korean national identity

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( Janelli 1986), agrarianists championed neo-Confucian village institutions as self-sufficient communal organizations able to resist the forces of commercialism and capitalism. Colonial Korea witnessed an agrarianist conception of national community quite distinct from both bourgeois and Marxist narratives. Unlike the latter two, the agrarianist narrative did not subscribe to the modernist view of history as linear progress. Korean agrarianists positioned themselves as anticapitalist, antiurban, and, by extension, antimodern. They sought to revive Korea’s neo-Confucian tradition in both thought and institution so as to effectively confront urban dominance and colonial modernity. As Clark Sorensen (1999) points out, what was urban became “foreign, dangerous, seductive,” and what was rural became “the repository of Korean ethnicity” and therefore the foundation of Korean nationhood. Although they contested the modernist conception of nation, they accepted the naturalness and immortality of the Korean nation/race. As such, agrarianists crucially departed from the ch’o˘ksa wijo˘ng (reject heterodoxy and defend orthodoxy) ideologues of the late nineteenth century who used neo-Confucian moralism to rationalize “the status quo as the naturally ordained order” (Chung 1995). Korean agrarianists questioned modernity, but not the nation. Thus, despite their antimodern discourses, the form of their response was itself very modern.

Master Narratives and Politics of Marginalization In Rescuing History from the Nation, Prasenjit Duara (1995) challenges the repressive power of the nation-state in framing historical narratives in modern China and India. According to Duara, dominant narratives in both countries have been based on a linear, evolutionary, Enlightenment model of history that stresses national progress toward modernity, whether idealist evolutionism, anti-imperialism, or Marxism. As a result, such narratives have excluded other important discourses on political community that rejected modernist modes of thought, resulting in incomplete historical accounts. In order to provide a “multiplicity of historical representations of political community” (81), he examines a series of alternative narratives that promoted goals other than the nation-state, such as federalism, or those which expressed critiques of modernity in promotion of “Asian values.” With this, he seeks to “rescue” historical narratives from the dominant, repressive power of the

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nation-state that promotes “the false unity of a self-same, national subject evolving through time” (4). The problematic nature of modern narratives Duara indicates with regard to China and India is also present in Korean nationalist narratives (in both the North and South). As both states developed and “patronized” their own version of nationalism, they have not only oversimplified colonial history but also suppressed narratives that go against the grain of their respective political ideologies. Of particular importance is the antimodern, agrarian notion of national identity. As postcolonial Korea saw the establishment of a modern, industrial, nation-state in both sides of the peninsula, such an antimodern, agrarian notion was largely ignored. Yet, agrarianism examined here illustrates the diversity in representations of national community under colonial rule, diversity that was lost in the process of hegemonic narrative formation in both Koreas. It shows how an antimodern, agrarian notion of the Korean nation competed with modern, industrial ones, while its ethnic/racial base was largely taken for granted. While questioning modernity, agrarianists still embraced a nationalist paradigm by linking agrarian thought to nationalism. What was distinctive was not that they refused to recognize the claims of the “nation” on Korean collective identity or its ethnic/racial origins, but that they rejected Spencerian and Marxist notions of progress and historical development that modernists advocated. Agrarianism did not fare well in the postcolonial period, as it was not able to offer a coherent base for a political regime. Also, unlike ethnic nationalism that can transcend a specific form of political community and thus easily be combined with different political systems as in the two Koreas, agrarianism could not fit into a newly emerging political order in the peninsula. The modern and industrial was privileged over the traditional and agrarian in both the North and the South. Still, even at the height of industrialization, agrarian tradition and the view of the rural population as the essence of the Korean nation were not totally forgotten or overlooked. The Saemaul movement that the Park regime pursued in the 1970s was an effort to inculcate Korea’s agrarian tradition as a spiritual resource in the process of Korean modernization. Recent mobilization of farmers in antiglobalization movements can be understood in a similar way. Thus, despite political marginalization by modernist master narratives, agrarianism has continued to offer an important cultural basis for antimodern discourses in postcolonial Korea.

eight

Division and Politics of National Representation

In June 2000, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung visited Pyo˘ngyang, the capital city of North Korea, to meet his counterpart, Kim Jong Il. It was the first face-to-face meeting between the North and South leaders since the peninsula was divided in 1945. Although most South Koreans eventually embraced the historic summit with enthusiasm, their initial reaction was one of shock and confusion because their suspicion and fear of the Communist regime runs so deep.1 When I was growing up in South Korea, for instance, I believed that North Koreans were barely human. I was taught in schools that Kim Il Sung was an imposter leading his people into tyranny and starvation while pretending to be the legendary General Kim who had fought against the Japanese during the colonial era. Even when I was teaching at the University of California, Los Angeles, in the mid-1990s, I often received booklets from some dubious South Korean institutions, including one that depicted the current North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, as a demented playboy.2 In all these, the northern regime led by the Kim family dictatorship was depicted as a mere puppet of the Soviets, lacking any legitimacy to lead the Korean nation. Of course, North Korean depictions of the Southern leaders, society, and people have not differed much from this. Now that the two leaders have met and shaken hands, such claims have become obsolete. The two Koreas finally have come to recognize the legitimacy of each other’s existence and political leadership. In this sense, the summit was truly historic.3 Still, several questions come to mind: Why did both governments refuse to recognize the existence of the other when both held the same, shared 151

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sense of ethnic identity? Why did it take more than half a century for the leaders of the two Koreas to meet, despite a deep peninsula-wide desire for national unification? Why and how did a sense of ethnic homogeneity fail to prevent tensions and conflict in the peninsula? What was behind the contentious politics of national representation between the two Koreas? This chapter addresses these questions.

Territorial Division and Incongruity in National Identity The territorial division violated the “nationalist principle of congruence of state and nation,” to use Gellner’s famous phrase, creating a problem of national representation. Koreans still strongly identified with the Korean ethnic community, but territorial partition created an additional political identity incongruent with their primary source of identification. Each regime appropriated a particular (political) notion of nation and national identity to legitimize its raison d’être (that is, anti-Communism of the South and anticolonialism / anti-imperialism of the North), and contested the other’s view, claiming the right to sole representation of the entire Korean (ethnic) community. In addition, territorial partition, on top of a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity, produced irresistible pressure to recover lost national unity, which is a key factor in understanding the tension and conflict on the Korean peninsula, including the Korean War.4 To illustrate the contentious politics of national identity between the two Koreas, this chapter presents a comparative analysis of state-led nationalism focusing on Kim Il Sung and Syngman Rhee. Although their speeches and works contain propagandistic elements, I agree with Connor’s view that “nationalist speeches and proclamations are fruitful areas for research on nationalism,” since the focus here is “not the sincerity of the propagandist, but the nature of the mass instinct to which he or she appeals” (1994, 198). Close examination reveals the surprising similarities of the nature of nationalist rhetoric of Kim and Rhee, despite their different backgrounds and experiences. Both leaders agreed that the Korean people belonged to the same ethnic nation, or minjok, and shared a single bloodline. Rhee promoted Ilmin chuu˘i as the state policy of a new nation, claiming the timeless homogeneity of the Korean people, nation, or race as family, an organic body. South Korean leaflets distributed in the city of Haeju on October 25, 1949,

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targeting North Korean soldiers, displays such an organic thinking of the Korean nation by the Rhee regime: Your bloodline has the “blood” of the great Han nation. Your “blood” and the “blood” of our national army are the same “blood.” How come you are going to sacrifice your precious “blood” to become Soviet slaves? We know that you have no choice but to be subordinate to the Soviets and the Kim Il Sung clique. Gentlemen, however, your bleeding “blood” is not a sacrifice for the nation. Gentlemen, please come back as soon as possible to the national army that has a young “blood.” Our national army is ready to accept you. Our beloved brethren, who is the one who pushed you to fight against the same nation [han’gyo˘re]? Be awakened! And make up your mind! Wouldn’t you like to die for the fatherland, rather than die for nothing? Please stand up. Stand up for the freedom of the great Han! (cited in M. Pak 1996, 833)

The leaflet proclaimed that Koreans belonged to the same ethnic nation (han’gyo˘re) and appealed to one bloodness of the Korean race, the great Han race, in its attempt to persuade North Korean soldiers to rise up against the Soviets and Kim and his clique. Kim Il Sung too proclaimed the purity and unity of the ethnic nation: “Our people have lived as a homogeneous nation in the same land for thousands of years. They have spoken and written one language, and their history and cultural traditions are the same. Our country has no national minority” (1965/1972, 175). Besides, he continued, Koreans should be “proud of keeping the national spirit . . . [and] national purity despite Japanese attempts to destroy it with aggressive assimilation policy during colonial rule” (Kim Il Sung 1979, 305 –15). With such pride in the linguistic, cultural, and ethnic homogeneity of Korea’s past, Kim challenged fellow Koreans: “How can our nation which has a long history and time-honored culture put up with U.S. imperialist colonial rule and tolerate national humiliation and persecution?” (1965/1972, 222). From this perspective, even the civil war, with its devastating consequences, could be justified as a nationalist effort to liberate fellow South Koreans from American imperialism and its puppet regime. For Kim, since all Koreans belong to the same ethnic nation, despite a small fraction of “national traitors” who surrendered the nation to imperialist forces, the majority of “ordinary” Koreans could easily unite in their struggle for reunification. He noted that even countries consisting of people from diverse ethnic and national groups fight in concert for a common goal, so he asked, “Why can’t our people of one and the same descent and nation

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join hands in the bid for national reunification? . . . We do not antagonize our southern fellows nor do we seek to enforce our ideology and social system on them” (1982, 178). Although Koreans live under different political systems with different ideologies, Kim claims, there can be no contradictions between them so far as the reunification question is concerned. The nation, and not ideology—not even Communism— comes first. Neither Kim nor Rhee disputed the ethnic base of the Korean nation that had been homogeneous for thousands of years. And neither territorial partition nor political separation lessened the shared sense of ethnic unity that had been preserved throughout the colonial period. However, when it came to the political notion of the Korean nation, Rhee and Kim sharply differed from each other. Nation as a concept contains two elements, the ethnic / cultural and the civic/political. When Korea lost its sovereignty, the former was stressed in their understanding of the Korean nation. Now as both Koreas were seeking to establish their own sovereign state, they needed to apply a certain political criterion of membership in their respective regime (that is, who would constitute the kungmin of the ROK and the inmin of the DPRK). Although all Koreans belonged to the same ethnic nation, not all of them were qualified to be legitimate members of a new Korean community since some had betrayed Korea by selling out to foreign powers. Each regime had to identify a certain political base to build a new Korea free of such antinational elements. For this purpose, contrasting criteria were applied: anticolonialism or anti-imperialism for DPRK and anti-Communism for ROK. In other words, the DPRK had to be an anticolonial, anti-imperialist state; the ROK must be an anti-Communist state. Each side, then, claimed that they were the only legitimate central government, chungang cho˘ngbu, who represented the entire (ethnic) Korean nation (M. Pak 1996). In this view, the other side was simply the northern half or southern half and a lost territory to be recovered.5 Kim’s political notion of the nation reflects his ideological positioning and takes the form of opposition to Japanese and American imperialism. He resented national division and the presence of American military forces in the South. Kim’s speeches often start with glorifying the Korean nation as a way of justifying why Korea must promote its national spirit and fight against American imperialism and national traitors in the South in order to recover lost unity. For Kim, only the DPRK, which was founded on a

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tradition of national liberation struggles against foreign forces, could and should lead Korea to a unified independent nation-state. In his view, Korea was facing “a fierce struggle between the patriotic, democratic forces and the traitorous anti-democratic forces” who consisted of a “handful of proJapanese elements and traitors to the nation, who were hated and rejected by the entire Korean people” (Kim Il Sung 1984). For Kim, anticolonialism or anti-imperialism would be the basis for a new Korean community, and only the DPRK, which was fighting against colonial and imperialist forces, could and should claim national legitimacy. The South was taken as no more than a puppet regime beholden to American imperialists after 1945 and, prior to that, to the Japanese colonial regime. In Kim’s view, contemporary North Koreans are “fighting against imperialism” in continuation of their strong anti-imperialist tradition, yet the South is forced to remain “semicolonial under a new imperialism imposed by America” (1984, 418, 441). The current struggle for reunification is not simply between two Koreas but between patriots and traitors, or between the forces of national liberation and the imperialist forces of aggression, and at stake is Korea’s national integrity. Such views have eventually developed into an overarching ideology of juche that promotes self-sufficiency and self-reliance in politics, economy, culture, and ideology. In contrast, Rhee established anti-Communism as the basis of a new Korea. He called Communism a disease like “cholera” and proclaimed, “You can’t compromise with cholera.” He contrasted Communism to “freedom and democracy” and maintained that “the two can’t be combined” (Oliver 1978, 352, 391). For Rhee, Communists’ support of trusteeship attested to the fact that Communism was not compatible with nationalism. A 1946 article published in ko˘n’guk kongnon compared the proposed trusteeship to the 1905 treaty that made Korea Japan’s protectorate and accused Communists of having called “Soviets our fatherland” (soryo˘n choguk). The article asked how “we, descendants of Tan’gun with one bloodline for 5,000 years, can call a foreign country fatherland” and denounced it as an act of “national betrayal” (H. Ch’oe 1946, 12 –14). In the same context, Rhee bluntly demanded Communists leave Korea for their fatherland, the Soviet Union, as they were not qualified to be members of a new Korean national community (Yu 1997, 42). According to Rhee, the North, as just one of the many post–World War II satellite Communist states dependent on the Soviet Union, had neither

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political independence nor legitimacy in its claim to represent the Korean ethnic whole. He also described the civil war as the result of Communist aggression, as a traitorous attempt to destroy the nation’s rich tradition and identity. Just as Kim excluded the political system of the South from his definition of the (ethnic) nation, Rhee excluded the political system of the North, emphasizing that only the Republic of Korea has realized the true character of the Korean nation. The political notions of nation held by Rhee and Kim illustrate a principle of mutual exclusion, one contested across a shared sense of ethnic unity. By establishing their respective political bases for building a new Korea, leaders of both sides contended that they alone must represent the entire Korean nation. They branded each other as “national traitors” or “a puppet government.” Each claimed that the other was “selling our nation and fatherland” to foreign powers, thus disqualifying them as members of a new Korean community. Both considered territorial division to be temporary and unnatural, assuming the Korean nation as one organic body that could and should not remain divided.

Contentious Politics of National Representation How can we explain the contentious politics of national representation in Korea? Why couldn’t a strong sense of ethnic unity prevent the peninsula from tensions and conflict? Contrary to conventional wisdom, ethnic unity— or more precisely the perception of ethnic homogeneity—has not produced the peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas, but instead has provoked a half century of intense conflict and tension. I use the expression “Contrary to conventional wisdom” because most studies of ethnic nationalism argue that ethnic cleavages are fundamental and permanent. This argument implies that ethnic unity— or, the absence of ethnic division—would and should function as a unifying force in a divided nation like Korea. For instance, Connor asserts that when the loyalty to the ethnic group and the loyalty to the state are “perceived as being in irreconcilable conflict,” political loyalties generally succumb because they “cannot muster the [same] level of emotional commitment” as ethnic identities (1994, 208). Given the strength attributed to ethnic affiliations, it would seem logical to expect the force of a shared ethnie to work across the divide of different political systems, yielding unification: ethnic nationalism ought properly to function as an integrative force for nations

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like Korea that are territorially divided but have strong commitments to a shared ethnic identity (Breuilly 1994, esp. ch. 14). If so, it remains a puzzle why and how the Koreans’ strong faith in ethnic unity instead produced intense conflict. Current theories of ethnic nationalism drawn from multiethnic state settings are of little value in solving this puzzle. To seek a solution, I rely on insights drawn from social identity theory. This theoretical borrowing seems justified and even necessary in the current stage of theorization of ethnic nationalism and conflict. I, of course, recognize a gap between the two fields of social psychology and studies of nationalism, especially in terms of the level of analysis. Where studies of ethnicity and nationalism, often taking a sociohistorical perspective, assume the saliency of relatively large and complex social groups, experimental social psychology generally limits itself to local “naturally occurring groups,” or more often, to experimentally isolated groups with minimized internal differentiation and contestation. Nonetheless, the nation and ethnie, as forms of “imagined community,” fulfill the basic requirements of social identity theory for perceived group identity and provide sufficient group distinctiveness (Tajfel and Turner 1986) based on perceptions of shared culture, language, history, and geography. In fact, scholars of nationalism such as Connor (1994) and Horowitz (1985) recognize the potential value of experimental psychology for a better understanding of ethnonationalism, especially its emotional and psychological dimension. Conventionally, social psychologists have maintained that in-group members receive a favorable bias against out-group members so as to highlight their own positive distinctive traits. Recently, however, a number of scholars have begun to note more complex functions of in-group favoritism. For instance, Marques and colleagues argue that “judgments about both likable and unlikeable in-group members are more extreme than judgments about out-group members” (Marques, Yzerbyt, and Leyens 1988, 1). According to their study, in-group favoritism, a fairly commonsensical consequence of group identification and intergroup contest, extends not only to “an in-group bias for desirable members” but an “in-group derogation for undesirable members . . . [where] downgrading unlikeable in-groupers may be a cognitive strategy aimed at preserving the group’s sense of positivity as a whole” (Marques and Yzerbyt 1988, 288). In one experiment, Marques and colleagues interviewed a sample of Belgian university students for their comparative evaluation of Belgian students versus North African students living in

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Belgium for a number of positive and negative traits. In this study the ingroup was more extremely evaluated for both likeable and unlikeable traits (in-group favoritism and in-group derogation). The more negative judgments of in-group members, due to their relevance to the group identity, is termed the Black Sheep Effect (Marques, Yzerbyt, and Leyens 1988, 7). The black sheep effect is activated as “a manichean strategy of evaluations of the in-group” in which the pressure to maintain a coherent group identity in the face of intergroup or external challenges actually results in internal pressures to conformity that are themselves divisive. In other words, the in-group identity is constructed not only in contradistinction to the outgroup but involves active suppression of differences within the in-group in the promotion of an overall positive, unitary identity. Yet internal pressure to conformity can be divisive as it raises the fundamental question of who will define the group norm. If we view ethnicity and nationality as forms of social identification, theoretical insight into the process by which extremely negative in-group judgments produce the black sheep effect can be readily applied to understanding inter-Korean national conflict. When behaviors of undesirable in-group members are perceived to threaten the in-group identity, the black sheep effect can be activated to preserve or restore the perceived positivity of the ingroup as a whole. However, conflict could and would arise over who gets to define who the “black sheep” are, triggering intragroup conflict. Intragroup conflict is more intractable since the in-group is itself the place where identity must be preserved, allowing for the efficient functioning of the group in relation to other groups with which it is in competition. Accordingly, when there exists a deeply shared sense of ethnic unity, it is likely to produce strong pressure for in-group homogeneity and conformity to an essentialized identity like the abstract notion of Koreanness. This is because such an (imagined) unity increases expectations for all members to conform to certain shared norms or customs. However, the reality of territorial division, with its diverse array of powerful, international others, prevents fulfillment of the ethnic ideal. Resultant political / ideological cleavages could threaten the unity of that ethnic identity, triggering a process of selective ingroup derogation and policing of conformity. This can be done in the name of purifying the ethnic community by cleansing foreign ideas and thoughts that are seen to contaminate or betray the community. Here one observes the potential for operation of the black sheep effect in nationalist politics: each

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side—North and South—views the other as a profound threat to in-group (ethnic) homogeneity. Determining who would define and represent the ethnic nation becomes hotly contested, and the campaign for political and ethnic cleansing could lead to intense and bitter intraethnic conflict. The conflict is bitter and persistent because each side is wedded to a vision of ethnic unity in which the greatest threat to that level of identity is not outgroup members but internal “traitors” (unlikeable in-group members, that is, Kim and his Communist followers from the South Korean perspective, and Rhee, Park, and their supporters from the North Korean perspective). Thus, this highly compelling and problematic common commitment to the ethnic nation has not functioned as a unifying force, but has instead intensified inter-Korea conflict during the last half century.

Political Psychology of War-Making in Korea The most tragic outcome of the contentious politics of national representation between the two Koreas was no doubt the Korean War. The three-year war, which involved not only the two Koreas but also superpowers—the United States, China, and the Soviet Union—witnessed the deaths of at least three million Korean people and left much of Korea in ashes. Scholars have debated the origins and nature of the Korean War and a key debate occurred over the issue of whether the war was international or civil (Cumings 1981, 1990; Merrill 1989). Still, one simple question has not yet been explored: Why and how did a strong sense of one “bloodness” held among Koreans fail to prevent the war? Why did the perception of a common racial origin lead to a destructive, rather than a peaceful, resolution of territorial division? Why didn’t Koreans’ sense of ethnic homogeneity deter the killings of “sisters and brothers” on the other side of the border? What kind of war psychology was at work with the Korean leaders, both Kim and Rhee? Recently, political scientist Pak Myo˘ngnim (1996) sought to address some of these questions by pointing to the importance of nationalism in understanding the origins and nature of the Korean War. In particular, he disputes Bruce Cumings’s view of the Korean War as one between forces of revolution and antirevolution, or between forces of national liberation and reactionary forces, represented by North and South Korea, respectively. He instead claims that ideological and political cleavages were not bifurcated in such a way in post–1945 Korea; the northern regime prosecuted some

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nationalist leaders such as Cho Mansik, while the South contained some anticolonial forces. Accordingly, Pak argues that the Korean War was not a war of national liberation or merely a civil war. It was a war for achieving a unitary nation-state, whose establishment was broken by the post–1945 territorial division. Pak takes nationalism as a key variable in understanding the Korean War. In his view, both Koreas alike relied on nationalist politics to legitimize their respective regimes. The South linked anti-Communism to nationalism; the North fused anticolonialism/anti-imperialism to nationalism. He contends, “North and South were very similar to each other in their methods and degrees of ideological offense and defense” (1996, 840). This important observation needs to be taken seriously, but he does not explain microlevel workings of nationalism in war nor the political psychology of war making. Insights drawn from social identity theory to explain contentious politics of national representation are useful here, as well. Post–1945 territorial division provoked a chain reaction, threatening Koreans’ shared sense of ethnic unity and leading both Koreas to search for the reason for the national misfortune. The division also produced strong pressure to restore unity. In particular, in their search for comprehending the current situation, both Kim and Rhee blamed internal traitors as well as foreign powers, accusing the former of selling the soul of the nation to the latter. Derogating undesirable members or identifying “black sheep” who allegedly contaminate the homogeneous group can be an important first step toward restoring broken unity. That is, it can be used as a cognitive strategy aimed at preserving the group’s sense of positivity as a whole. It was, therefore, not an accident or coincidence that both Kim and Rhee framed the other as “national traitor,” “a puppet government selling fatherland and nation,” “a gang of traitorous stooges,” “second Yi Wanyong,” and so on. As national traitors, they had to be punished and excluded from the new Korean community. After identifying undesirable in-group members, both Kim and Rhee sought to restore the broken ethnic unity. Territorial division was considered unnatural and only temporary since any organic body cannot remain divided forever. As a result, both Kim and Rhee repeatedly made it clear that their goal was to establish a unified nation-state in the peninsula; in his inaugural speech on the occasion of the establishment of the Workers’ Party of North Korea on August 1946, Kim proclaimed, “The most serious task for

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our Korean people is to overcome the reactionary line of South Korea and carry out democratic reform as in the North so that we can establish a unified independent state” (Kim Il Sung 1946/1988, 15 –24). For Rhee, too, the establishment of the ROK was not an end in itself. Rather, it was only the first step toward achieving a unified Korean community, which required the excommunication of national traitors in the North. Also both Kim and Rhee separated regime from people in their cognitive reasoning: they regarded people on the other side of the border as innocent victims of a puppet regime by national traitors and set liberation from these traitors as their supreme goal for their respective regimes. Kim was said to believe that once he launched a war, a significant portion of the southern population would join him and his “people’s liberation army” (inmin haebanggun). Similarly Rhee claimed, “A large proportion of the Korean communist army is ready to mutiny and help us chase out of the country such Communists hirelings as Kim Il Sung and others. And the civilian population in the north will join with them in cleaning up and keeping under control all the terroristic Communist elements” (1949c, 22). It follows that both Kim and Rhee had to work diligently to liberate their brothers and sisters on the other side of the border from a puppet regime of foreign powers, whether Americans or Soviets. In a report at the inaugural Congress of the North Korean Workers’ Party on August 29, 1946, Kim urged party members to “defeat the traitorous reactionary forces and bring our democratic revolution to a victorious conclusion by . . . relying on the united strength of all the working people and of the people as a whole.” Rhee similarly characterized Kim as the second Yi Wanyong (whose signature formalized the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910) and called for the liberation of northern fellows from the puppet regime of Soviet imperialism: “We cannot rest until we save seven million brothers and sisters in the North from the vicious regime” (Kim Cho˘nghun 1999, 61). Such a call for liberating fellow Koreans from foreign power and its puppet regime developed into kukt’o wanjo˘ngnon (theory of consolidating national territory) of the North and pukchin t’ongillon (theory of unification through northern advance) of the South. Although the latter may have been a response to the former, both reflected the deep commitment to recover the lost ethnic unity of divided Korea. Including war as a viable means of national liberation and unification was significant to this new development. In a radio address to the “Entire Korean People” on the day of the outbreak of the Korean war,

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Kim proclaimed that “the traitorous Syngman Rhee gang has launched a fratricidal war against the people, whereas the entire patriotic people of our country are making every effort for the peaceful unification of the country.” He urged his listeners to “overthrow the traitorous puppet regime in South Korea and liberate it from the reactionary rule of the traitorous Syngman Rhee clique” (Kim Il Sung 1950 /1979). Rhee similarly contended, “If we have to resolve this situation [national division] through war, we will engage in all battles. We won’t ask our friends to fight for us. We will do all we can to remove Communism in this great ideological warfare” (Kim Cho˘nghun 1999, 60). In Robert Oliver’s view, Rhee was convinced that “the only safety for Korea lay in a reunification of the country by force” (1978, 220). In this sense, the Korean War was a logical outcome of the fierce contention between Kim and Rhee over national representation and their attempts to recover ethnic unity broken by the post–1945 territorial division. Seen in this way, the Korean War was a war of national liberation of fellow nationals from foreign powers and their collaborators for both Kim and Rhee, so that Korea could restore its lost ethnic unity caused by territorial division. I am not suggesting that nationalism alone made war inevitable in the Korean peninsula. Instead, I seek to understand the political psychology of war making in a land of ethnic homogeneity by focusing on nationalism. It would be fair to treat nationalism as a necessary but insufficient condition since foreign assistance was required to provoke a war. North Korea was able to launch a war only after it secured Soviet support, and it appears that Rhee might have also attacked if supplied with sufficient military power by the United States.6 In Rhee’s April 10, 1949, letter to Cho Pyo˘ngok, his special envoy to the United States at the time, Rhee wrote, “We are ready for the unification now in every respect but one; namely, we lack arms and ammunition. . . . We have to be prepared with a sufficient military force so that we can proceed into the north to join with our loyal army there, and to move the Iron Curtain from the 38th parallel up to the Yalu River” (Rhee 1949c, 22). Rhee then gave Cho specific guidelines for military request: “For this operation we need two naval vessels of eight thousand tons each, with 18 inch guns, for the defense of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. We need fast running patrol boats to guard against Communist underground movements along out coasts. We need two hundred thousand soldiers trained and organized for defense along the northern border. We need planes for defense and anti-aircraft guns. And we need

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them now” (22). He instructed Cho to “frankly discuss” this plan for the unification of the North and South “in fullest confidence with high officials of both the United Nations and the United States” (21). Given that this was a confidential letter to his special envoy, not a public statement or propaganda, Rhee seemed serious about taking the North with military means if supplied with arms. However, the United States never accommodated Rhee’s request for military aid. Disappointed, Rhee complained to his longtime friend Robert Oliver that despite receiving “piles and piles of requests” for arms, the United States gave “very little” because it was “fearful that might bring about an international war” (Oliver 1978, 223). After three years of tragedy, the war ended but the thorny question of national representation remained unresolved. Both North and South continued to vie for national legitimacy. In fact, after the war, anti-imperialism and anti-Communism were more firmly established as indisputable state ideologies in the North and South, respectively. As Hobsbawm (1990) points out, “When governments were plainly engaged in conscious and deliberate ideological engineering, . . . they were, indeed, most successful when they could build on already present unofficial nationalist sentiments” (92). For both North and South, the experiences of war certainly showed the antinational character of the other side. The Korean War was considered an act of slaughter of the Korean race (tongjok sangjan). These kinds of experiences and accusations made progress in inter-Korea relations extremely difficult. This is precisely why it took fifty years before both Koreas finally came to recognize each other at the June 2000 summit, which symbolized recognition of the other’s legitimacy.

Theoretical Implications Ernest Gellner has argued that while nationalist sentiment is deeply offended by “violation of the nationalist principle of congruence of state and nation,” it is “not equally offended by all the various kinds of violation of it.” It is “most acutely offended by ethnic divergence between rulers and ruled,” while a group that has “more than one state associated with its culture” has “less grievance” (1983, 134). Implications of his argument are clear: ethnic cleavages within a single state are more serious and difficult to deal with than the opposite situation, where a single ethnicity is divided into multiple states.

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By logical extension, ethnic unity or its perception would be expected to function as a unifying force across a divided system, a bias evident in current studies of nationalism. This chapter shows why this is not necessarily so. When a primary commitment to ethnic unity is violated due to territorial partition, there arises strong pressure for restoring that lost ethnic unity. The pressure, then, activates the dynamics of intragroup censure, which social identity theory terms the “black sheep effect.” The process works to sanction certain unlikeable in-group members as primary threats to national identity, that is, national traitors. As a result, conflict and tension inevitably arise over who would define the fundamental norm and identity associated with the category of the ethnic nation, and over who can represent the nation and claim legitimacy. This “politics of representation” would then lead to highly charged and intense conflict, as has been the case on the Korean peninsula during the last half century. This chapter also suggests a need to place greater attention on intragroup processes integral to the maintenance or disintegration of complex, real-world social identities like ethnicity and nationality. Although current studies tend to stress the presence of or conflict with an out-group strengthening solidarity and reinforcing identity of the in-group, social identity theorists have shown that things are not always so simple. On the contrary, the presence of an out-group can increase internal social identification pressures, which may have divisive consequences for the in-group. This is because pressures to consolidate a positive in-group identity can lead to derogation of undesirable in-group members rather than simply in-group favoritism. In this light, Chirot’s (1997) recent observation that anti-Semitism and anti-Sinicism were directed against the most “assimilated” Jews and Chinese is illuminating. These highly assimilated ethnic minority groups were viewed by the majority as more responsible than less assimilated ones for poisoning “the purity of the nation by introducing foreign ideas and practices” (Chirot 1997, 9). To understand this seemingly ironic feature of ethnic conflict requires more research attention to in-group processes and intragroup dynamics beyond the current focus on interethnic contexts. Finally, arguments made in this chapter can offer theoretical ground for rethinking the current unification approaches of both Koreas, which are based on the premise that ethnic unity ought to ultimately lead to reunification. The forgone analysis suggests this premise may not be justified: insofar as

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both regimes are complicit in the politics of national representation, little progress in a peaceful reunification can be expected. In addition, as Habermas has pointed out, the political commonplace which holds that “a democracy needs to be backed up by the bonding energy of a homogenous nation . . . [is] both empirically false and politically dangerous” (1996, 10). By extension, one might infer that unification efforts solely based on the precondition of ethnic homogeneity and nationalism may similarly be divisive and politically dangerous. If such is the case, Koreans need to promote a more democratic national identity rather than appeal to the sort of ethnic nationalism that preaches a false sense of uniformity only realizable through demands of conformity and a violent process of exclusion. Put differently, Koreans should envision a society in which they can live together not simply because they are ethnically one but because they are equal citizens of a democratic polity. Although a half-century of intraethnic politics may have made such a task very difficult, it can still be achieved with concerted effort. After all, national identity is a social and historical construction and as such is amenable to modification and transformation by political institutions and social movements. The promotion of a democratic national identity to overcome the harmful effect of a misplaced perception of ethnic unity and consequent intraethnic politics is urgently needed.

nine

Nation, History, and Politics Throughout this [March First] movement, our forefathers were able for the first time in our modern history to achieve a broad unity of the nation. . . . The fundamental purposes of the October Revitalizing Reforms include achievement of an impregnable unity of the entire people, regardless of faction or class, on the basis of a broad national will, . . . and . . . enhancement of our national glory throughout the world. From President Park’s 1973 speech delivered on the 54th anniversary of the March First Movement of 1919 (emphasis added)

Korean society is dominated by American imperialism and its puppet government. . . . Anti-American self-reliance is to push out American imperialism for national liberation . . . and the general ideology of our transformative movements is national liberation, minjung democracy, which is to establish the independence of the nation. From a 1986 leaflet by the radical student activist group, Chamint’u (emphasis added)

These two paragraphs well depict the highly contested nature of nation and national identity between state and society in South Korea. In his speech, President Park Chung Hee justifies the establishment of yusin (Revitalizing Reforms) as a means of achieving the “unity of the nation” based on the “national will” for the “glory of the nation.” In so doing, he compares his yusin system to the March First independence movement of 1919, characterizing both as “save-the-nation” movements. Park, an autocratic leader, did not simply rely on repressive measures like the National Security Law and Korean Central Intelligence Agency. He turned to the power of nationalism. 166

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The second quote reveals a similar reliance on nationalism by student activists during the 1980s pro-democracy movement. They characterize Korean society as dominated by American imperialism and therefore call for both national liberation and minjung democracy. In contrast to Park’s national “unity,” these activists stress the necessity of national “liberation” from foreign dominance. For them, nation (or minjok) and people (or minjung) are key elements of their movements, whose origins lie in earlier national liberation movements such as the Tonghak peasant wars of 1894. Evidently, student activists did not just mount political protests against authoritarian regimes; they also engaged in what Gramsci (1971) has called a “war of position” over the authoritarian state notion of nation and national identity. Contention over national identity was not confined to the inter-Korean state level. It also occurred between state and society. In particular, as authoritarian regimes mobilized nationalism into politics, their efforts created potential for challenges from civil society. As scholars of nationalism have pointed out, nation or national identity is often used for “political rationalization” of a modern state by offering a theory of political legitimacy. Yet when nation is closely linked to mass politics, as in Korea, the notion becomes “essentially contested” because “any definition will legitimize some claims and delegitimize others” (Calhoun 1993, 215). Korea was such a case. This chapter examines the rise and development of anti-American, minjung nationalism during pro-democracy movements of the 1980s as a major challenge to the authoritarian state notion of nation identity.

Minjok and Minjung The Park regime identified national “security” and “development” as the main tasks that the nation faced. His coup was portrayed as an effort to realize “national renaissance” and achieve “modernization of the fatherland,” and his 1972 yusin reform was depicted as a “save-the-nation movement” necessitated by changing domestic and international environments. He particularly stressed anti-Communism and developmentalism to mobilize the populace and legitimize his authoritarian politics. Although he accepted the ethnic base of the Korean nation, Park wanted to create a new national identity that could better meet challenges, both within Korea and outside.1 However, in the name of the nation, national unity, or modernization of the fatherland, the Park regime suppressed other collective identities and competing voices.

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Antigovernment forces or pro-democracy forces, which were often identical, were portrayed as pro-Communist and therefore antination, and they were severely repressed. Park’s emphasis on the historic mission to modernize the fatherland, for instance, pitted the interests of the working class against the abstract nation, thus suppressing the former in the name of the latter. The authoritarian state ideology based on anti-Communism and developmentalism faced a significant challenge in the 1980s. The slogan of “modernization of the fatherland” began to lose its political force, demands for human and political rights and a fair share of the expanded economic pie increased, and unification emerged as a primary issue. Dittmer and Kim suggest that insomuch as governments of less developed countries are apt to endorse development to legitimize their course, they are susceptible to a legitimacy crisis when the chosen path fails, succeeds, or is challenged by a convincing alternative (Dittmer and Kim 1993, 1–31). In Korea, economic success achieved during the Park regime precipitated such a crisis by obtaining its main goal. Furthermore, attention increasingly turned to the U.S. role in the division of the nation and U.S. complicity in the Kwangju massacre of May 1980. As a result, anti-American, minjung (mass or people), and unification movements gradually obtained popular support throughout most of the 1980s, offering counterhegemonic challenges to the state-sponsored view of nationalism. All these countermovements, of course, were interrelated, but I focus on anti-American minjungism as a new and contested form of nationalism that challenged anti-Communism and developmentalism. Korean minjung ideology first appeared in the 1970s primarily as anti-yusin populism, but was not until the 1980s linked to anti-Americanism to express nationalist rhetoric. The turning point in the development of anti-American minjung nationalism was the massacre that took place during the 1980 Kwangju uprisings. Until then, most Koreans did not subscribe to anti-Americanism and still favorably regarded the United States. As Gregory Henderson (1986), a wellknown Korean observer, points out, “We [Americans] were more than a friend to Seoul, we were the friend . . . ; until the late May 1980 Kwangju uprising . . . anti-Americanism was about as common in South Korea as fish in trees.” Shorrock explains this favorable attitude as “the legacy of antiCommunism and memories of the Korean War, [which produced] . . . a strong fear of the Soviet Union and North Korea and a feeling of genuine warmth towards the U.S. for supporting South Korea with the sacrifice of

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thousands of young men and millions of dollars in aid” (1986, 1198 –99). Even most Korean activists considered the United States a friendly power, an ally of their democratization movements. Prevailing sentiments, however, were shattered when the American commitment to human rights and democracy came to a test during the Kwangju uprisings. Begun as a student demonstration in the southwestern city of Kwangju, the uprising escalated into an armed struggle that mobilized hundreds of thousands of citizens against the seizure of power by General Chun Doo Hwan, who responded with brutal suppression. Many Koreans expected the United States would and should come to help stop the armed confrontation. Yet to their dismay, the U.S. military command was alleged to have released South Korean troops for redeployment in Kwangju, troops that then proceeded to kill hundreds of antigovernment protesters in the city (Shin and Hwang 2003). The United States denied such involvement, referring to an unpublished 1978 agreement that removed American operational control from South Korean forces “not directly concerned on a daily basis with the nation’s forward defense.” 2 But many Koreans were suspicious of the U.S. role in the Kwangju massacre. An invitation to President Chun to pay a state visit to President Reagan’s White House in early 1981 further confirmed Koreans’ suspicions. Whereas the United States complained that the Korean government-controlled media was painting a distorted picture of its role in the tragedy, many Koreans came to believe that the United States was using their country for its own strategic purposes and that all the talk about democracy and human rights was no more than rhetoric. Alleged U.S. involvement in the uprisings and support of the autocratic Chun regime shaped the subsequent development of opposition ideology. As movement leaders reflected on their previous struggles, especially on why they had failed to prevent such a tragedy in Kwangju, they came to realize that they had fought without a well-articulated strategy and ideology. They believed that if past mistakes were to be avoided, they would have to properly specify the nature of Korean society and to articulate a coherent ideology and strategy based on this analysis. In this context the early to mid-1980s saw a wide range of debates among activists and progressive intellectuals, such as “social formation debates,” “debates on Korean capitalism,” “debates on modern and contemporary Korea,” and “debates on the character of Korean society” (G. Shin 1995). In particular, Korean intellectuals and activists questioned their position vis-à-vis the United States and reevaluated previous

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strategies that sought American support for their democratic movements. They began to argue that Korean democratization could not be obtained without national liberation from American hegemony. As Shorrock points out, the Korean democratic movement began to transform from “a Westernoriented movement based largely on middle-class resentment of Park Chung Hee’s military dictatorship” to “a nationalist struggle for independence from foreign intervention and eventual unification” in the 1980s (1986, 1205; emphasis added). In the course of this change in movement character and strategy, Korean activists accepted the Gramscian strategy of “war of position” by engaging in ideological struggles against the authoritarian regime, especially against the U.S.-supported state nationalism of anti-Communism and developmentalism. Anti-American sentiments, however, did not remain at the level of suspicion and speculation. They provoked direct action from student activists against American facilities such as the American Information Center and the American Chamber of Commerce. Mun Pusik, leader of the 1982 arson incident in the Pusan American Information Center, explains in his letter to Cardinal Kim, “We chose the method of setting fire to a building in broad daylight because we felt there was no other way left to chastise the U.S. for acting as the mother-in-law for this [Chun] dictatorship” (B. Moon 1982). While the arson was initially considered “radical activism,” even by student activists, the mid-1980s witnessed a series of attacks on American facilities: from May 23 to 25, 1985, seventy-three students occupied the U.S. Information Center in Seoul demanding a formal U.S. apology for “its role in the Kwangju massacre”; on August 12, five students unsuccessfully sought to invade the U.S. Embassy for the same reason; and on November 4, fourteen students occupied the U.S. Chamber of Commerce office in Seoul, protesting reported U.S. pressure to increase agricultural imports to Korea. As Dong indicates, “Only a very small fraction of the 1980 student activists shared anti-American sentiments; but by 1985 it was apparent that most student activists subscribed to the view that the U.S. was primarily responsible for the very existence of the military-authoritarian regime” (1987, 246). Furthermore, anti-American sentiments gradually spread to the populace. A survey taken in June 1990 shows that more than one-third (37.2 percent) of the respondents supported anti-American movements and more than two-thirds (72.7 percent) agreed that “anti-American sentiments in Korea are serious.” The support for anti-American movements was most evident among those in their twenties

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(56.5 percent), college students (63.4 percent), the educated (45.3 percent), the new middle class (42.9 percent), workers (45.1 percent), and people in the Cho˘lla region (46.3 percent), where the Kwangju uprisings erupted. The other important ideological development in the 1980s was increased emphasis on nationalist sentiments in minjungism (minjung ideology) or minjungnon (theory of minjung), opening the way for its fusion with antiAmericanism. Minjung ideology first appeared on the Korean political landscape in the 1970s as a form of political populism against the yusin dictatorship, but it largely lacked nationalist appeals. However, by the early 1980s, minjungism had become increasingly nationalistic, as illustrated by the following discussion of minjung theology, an important variant of minjungism: This orientation of a significant part of the Korean Church, beyond doubt, has contributed much to making of Christianity the historical fulfillment of fourthousand years of Korean cultural tradition. Minjung Theology . . . expresses the historical experience of a church that identified itself with those who are oppressed politically, exploited economically, and alienated socially. It was the theology of a church that consciously opted to use the Hangul, the despised and neglected Korean vernacular script, over against the Chinese, the accepted medium of the educated and powerful. Differently from Latin American Liberation Theologies, which owe a debt to Marxist analysis, Minjung Theology arises out of the cultural soil of an original Korean tradition that spans over four millennia.3

This statement makes explicit Koreans’ effort to differentiate minjung theology from Latin American liberation theology as well as Western doctrine. Minjung doctrine was integrated into samminjuu˘i (three min ideology), which advocated minjok (nation), minju democracy), and minjung (people), by student activists who also led anti-American movements as a major oppositional ideology during the 1980s democracy movements. More concretely, dissident intellectuals identified the nation with the minjung as a democratic and independent entity. As Choi points out, minjung can be defined in terms of several overlapping arenas, that is, in political, economic, and national contexts. At the political level, minjung comprises those “who are made peripheral to, or alienated from, the political process”; in capitalist production relations, it consists of “workers, peasants, the lower middle class, and the urban poor”; and at the national level, it embraces those “sectors in society adversely affected by the division of the Korean peninsula and South Korea’s dependent and subordinated relationship to the United

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States” ( J. Choi 1993, 17). Although dissident intellectuals differed over who should be included in and who should be excluded from the minjung as a descriptive category, they agreed that the category as an analytical concept best represented the Korean nation and national identity as the subject of a Korean history of national struggle (Abelmann 1993, 139 – 65). As a nationalist ideology of dissident intellectuals, anti-American minjungism challenged anti-Communist or national security rhetoric and developmentalist or growth-first logic. A protest leaflet by a student activist group portrayed the Park regime as “sacrificing democracy in the name of ‘security,’” “putting the nation itself in jeopardy,” and “turn[ing] the people into slaves.” 4 Anti-Communism was also criticized as distorting “minimum identity indispensable to a national unity” and “selling national conscientiousness”; thus, dissident intellectuals questioned “if the anti-Communist dictatorial regime is part of our nation.” 5 Similarly developmentalist / growthfirst rhetoric was challenged as offering an “illusion” to the people that “it [the Park regime] would give them bread even if it did not give them freedom.” The rhetoric was also censured as ensuring “nothing but the profit of the comprador capitalists, ignoring the plea of the masses for subsistence, under a subordinate economic structure that is driving the national economy to catastrophic amid practically minus growth.” 6 Furthermore, student activists and dissident intellectuals considered both anti-Communism and capitalist development largely a product of American postwar strategy in East Asia that aimed to “contain” the spread of Communism and was extensively utilized to justify authoritarian regimes in Korea that were allegedly propped up by a complicit United States. It followed, then, that democratization of Korean society and politics was inseparable from national liberation from the United States. In sharp contrast to the state ideology, anti-American minjung discourse emphasized democracy and unification as the nation’s main tasks. The Korean National Council of Churches’ “State of the Nation Declaration” on March 14, 1986, illustrates the essence of this oppositional discourse: We, the Korean people and churches, despite the division of our nation, have kept alive our tasks for the realization of democracy and unification. . . . The argument made during the reign of the dictatorship that democracy must be delayed for the sake of economic growth and national security has been exposed as being completely invalid. The people can no longer be persuaded or fooled by those who say that economic development must come first and democracy

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and justice later. . . . Those who continue to obstruct democratization or waver at this critical juncture cannot hope to be spared the severe judgment of the nation’s people and history.7

The Korean Catholic Council for Peace and Justice agreed that “political democracy is the central element in the nation’s economic energy [and] a very vital condition for unification,” and the “unification movement must start from the viewpoint of the nationalist liberation movement against foreign powers” by “those who are now sacrificing their lives for democracy and independence,” that is, minjung.8 The contrast between the ruling rhetoric and oppositional discourse concerning nation and national identity is clear. In this new oppositional discourse, anti-Communism and modernization no longer defined the nation. Nation and national identity were instead defined in terms of national struggles for liberation from foreign dominance and unification of the Korean nation. To be sure, as in Park’s rhetoric, oppositional discourse did not deny that Koreans are a homogeneous people that belong to the same nation. It unequivocally proclaimed pride in “Korean people who have 5,000 years of history and tradition” and called those in the North “brothers and sisters . . . in spite of their differences in ideology and system.” 9 In other words, both discourses agreed on the ethnic base of nation. But they differed radically on the political notion of the nation. Oppositional discourse recognized the historical fact that the births of nation and of nationalism in Western Europe were closely linked to modern state making and capitalist development, and that these structural elements were crucial to the formation of the Korean nation. The Korean case was different from the Western experience, according to the opposition discourse, in that the Korean nation and national identity developed in the context of colonialism and neocolonialism—a form of capitalism or capitalism in its last stage, to use Lenin’s term. Thus the notion of the Korean nation and national identity could not be fully understood without considering such historical and structural developments as colonialism, division of the nation, neoimperialism, and the making of the authoritarian state under the auspices of the United States, a neoimperialist power (U. Paek 1989, 311–58). In constructing oppositional discourse, dissident intellectuals sought to reinterpret modern Korean history in ways to justify and legitimize their current nationalist movements. They rejected the dominant focus on institutional and intellectual history in favor of a social and popular history

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that stressed people’s efforts for national liberation from foreign dominance.10 Accordingly, they downplayed the history of the bourgeois nationalist movements such as the March First movement, central to Park’s nationalist rhetoric, in favor of the “new” history of national liberation movements such as the 1894 Tonghak peasant revolution. A radical reading group explained the necessity of approaching the issue of nation from a national liberation perspective: “In the West, the issue of nation was primarily concerned with bourgeois revolution and modern state-building. But with the imperialist nature of capitalism since the late nineteenth century, the issue of nation cannot be any longer confined to these two elements. It must also include issues of independence from colonialism and the establishment of the self-reliant nation-state.” 11 As Lee indicates, “What is their theoretical justification for appropriating historical phenomena for contemporary use is a secondary issue; what is at stake is the power to ‘name the name,’ and reinterpret historical events hidden from the knowledge of the people and long co-opted and distorted by the powers-that-be” (N. Lee 1994, 210). In other words, reinterpretation was an effort to “decolonize” people’s consciousness or reconstruct “popular memory” of resistance from the people’s perspective and trace legitimacy of current movements back to the pre–1945 period (C. Choi 1993). Dissident intellectuals went one step further by attempting to popularize this new reading of Korean history from the people’s standpoint. The two volumes of The Korean People’s History (Han’guk minjungsa)(1986) and History of People’s Movements in Modern Korea (Ku˘ndae han’guk minjung undongsa) (1989) are prime examples of works written for the larger, public audience. They explain all colonial period social and political movements of the workers and peasants as national liberation struggles, rather than as nationalist or Communist causes as conventional scholarship proposes. This alternative interpretation, as Robinson points out, “removes the leaders of the bourgeois independence movement—nationalist intellectuals, landed elites, and capitalists—from the subject position of modern Korean history and delegitimizes their role as political leaders in the post-liberation society” (1993, 183). Instead, it elevates people or minjung as the subject of history, putting them at the center of national struggles for liberation from foreign dominance including the current anti-American minjung movements. Schoolteachers supplemented their efforts to reinterpret modern Korean history with an organized nationwide teachers’ union intended to challenge state-imposed political education and promote “authentic education” (ch’am

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kyoyuk). The Park regime had actively promoted “political education” through the promulgation of the Charter of National Education (Kungmin kyoyuk ho˘njang) in 1968 and the creation of the National Conference for Unification (T’ongil chuch’e kungmin hoeu˘i) in 1972. In a statement to proclaim the formation of the teachers’ union (cho˘n’guk kyojigwo˘n nodong chohap) on May 28, 1989, the union charged the dictatorship for “using education as a means to justify and maintain its system” and declared that “authentic education must contribute to removing decades of military dictatorship and achieving the national task of democratization and national unification.” 12 The union criticized current school textbooks for “eliminating national soul,” “beautifying the dictatorship,” “deceiving the pains of the minjung,” and “perpetuating national division.” 13 Although the union failed to obtain legal recognition until much later and was suppressed, it succeeded in organizing 464 branches with a membership of 1,873 by June 25, 1989. The union movement was a clear example of challenges against the use of political education to justify the state ideology of anti-Communism and developmentalism. This makes evident that as a political community, the nation, as represented by minjung, radically differs from its explication in the ruling discourse of the authoritarian regime. That discourse extolled as the core of the nation those willing to sacrifice themselves for the defense of the nation from North Korean Communism and to devote themselves to the modernization of the fatherland. In contrast, the new oppositional discourse cast anyone who suppressed others in the guise of anti-Communism and modernization as antiminjung and therefore antination. It also characterized those repressed, alienated, and adversely affected in the political, economic, and national process as the true core of the minjung and, thus, of the nation. As oppositional politics of identity, anti-American minjung movements have garnered popular support since the mid-1980s, effectively challenging state-led nationalism.

Democratization and Politics of National Identity With democratization, anti-American minjung nationalism gradually declined in the 1990s, though there was some sporadic eruption, for example, during the 1997 economic crisis. A 1994 Gallup survey among South Koreans found that 64 percent of the respondents viewed the United States favorably. Also minjung as an organizing concept of democratic movements lost its dominance in the 1980s to be replaced by the concept of civil society

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(simin sahoe) (Sun-Hyuk Kim 2000). Although minjung was a concept developed to deal with an overarching issue, such as democratization, the concept of civil society represents the diversification of the social movement sector, which addresses a host of topics that remained neglected during the struggle for democracy. Civil society groups today incorporate diverse topics, such as environmentalism, migrant workers’ rights, and gay-lesbianbisexual rights. However, Koreans’ politics of national identity has not disappeared. With improved relations with North Korea, stronger economic power, and enhanced international status, South Koreans are once again seeking to redefine their identity vis-à-vis the North and the United States. In the Korean presidential election held on December 2002, antiAmerican slogans and protests filled the streets, and any candidate promoting a pro-American image was thus hindered. Polls revealed more critical attitudes toward America in South Korea than in any other Asian country, including Vietnam and Indonesia.14 Unlike the past when oppositional leaders led the politics of national identity, today the leading advocates are in government. A Gallup survey conducted in February 2002 shows that only one-third of the respondents view the United States favorably, and 60 percent view the United States unfavorably, which is a radical change from the 1994 survey. Unlike the 1980s when perception of U.S. economic and political dominance fueled anti-American sentiments, today’s resentment largely stems from Koreans’ belief that the United States is increasingly going against Korea’s national interests. They refer as evidence to recent incidents such as Bush’s characterization of North Korea as an “axis of evil,” U.S. pressure to buy F-15 Eagles that the Pentagon itself plans to stop using in the U.S. military, and the deaths of two Korean girls killed by an American military vehicle whose occupants were subsequently acquitted by a U.S. military tribunal. A recent survey shows that 62 percent of South Koreans consider Bush’s “axis of evil” statement as “an excessive statement to escalate tensions in the Korean peninsula,” and only 31 percent regard it “a proper statement to indicate the North Korean threat.” Anti-Americanism is now, as it was in the past, stronger among young, educated, white-collar Koreans (see Table 9.1). These findings are confirmed by a recent study by the Rand Corporation that not only shows a decline in favorable attitudes toward the United States but also points to historical and structural causes along with the more immediate/emotional response to the above events (Larson and Levin 2004).

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table 9.1 South Korean Attitudes Toward the United States (1)

(2)

Unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. Age 30s 50s Education middle school or less college or more Occupation farmers white collar Income less than 1 million won (monthly) more than 2 million won

74% 39% 33% 68% 37% 70% 38% 66%

Total

60%

T Bush’s “axis of evil” speech Age 30s 50s Education middle school or less college or more Occupation farmers white collar Political party support the ruling party support GNP (main opposition)

Escalating tensions 72% 46% 47% 69% 36% 68% 69% 56%

Total

62%

sources: Gallup Korea, (1) Feb. 26, 2002; (2) Feb. 7, 2002

Some social organizations even led campaigns to boycott American products, including Starbucks coffee, McDonald’s hamburgers, and Estee Lauder cosmetics. According to a survey conducted March 4 –12, 2002, by Salaryman .co.kr, an Internet site geared toward working people, 59.3 percent of the 481 members surveyed said that they were participating in the “Don’t Buy American Products” campaign; 34.4 percent said they “support the campaign but are not taking part in it”; a mere 2.5 percent said they opposed the anti-American product campaign (The Korean Herald, April 22, 2002). This kind of campaign is something new, which was not seen even during the heyday of anti-American movements of the 1980s. In addition, unlike in the 1980s, the recent surge is spreading through the Internet led by “netizens” of twenty- and thirty-something office workers. McDonald’s Korea homepage has been inundated with harsh comments by netizens like “Those who go to McDonald’s should croak” (ID “Lotteria”), “McDonald’s is history in Korea now” (ID “I don’t like McDonald’s”), and “Even if you sell your hamburger for 80 won [60 cents], I won’t go. If I do, I’m a dog” (ID “Kim Dong-sung”) (International Herald Tribune, April 17, 2002; The Korea

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Herald, April 22, 2002). When the Korean government announced that it would purchase F-15 military planes, the Ministry of Defense’s Web site was so overwhelmed by criticism and protest that the site was shut down. These incidents are, however, of secondary importance. Deeper roots have fueled recent anti-American movements. In particular, the recent eruption of anti-American movements has much to do with the rise of a new nationalism that reflects a shift in South Koreans’ view toward North Korea and the United States. One change involves inter-Korea relations, especially after the June 2000 summit meeting between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il. The summit’s tangible results may seem modest, and some of its outcomes may not even be entirely clear yet, but the prolonged pursuit of the “sunshine policy” has had a powerful and lasting psychological effect. Many South Koreans, particularly members of the younger generation, no longer regard the North as a looming threat to South Korea’s existence. Instead, North Korea has become an object of pity and compassion. Under these circumstances, fewer South Koreans worry about American abandonment. Instead, South Koreans fear “entrapment” in a U.S.-North Korean war, which could incinerate the South Korean capital. If North Korea no longer frightens South Koreans, American troops are less valued as a deterrent. At best, they are an unnecessary inconvenience. At worst, they infringe on South Korean sovereignty and interfere in its politics. Since the September 11 attacks on the United States, Washington has accorded a higher priority than Seoul to nuclear nonproliferation; it has worried more about Pyongyang’s missile/nuclear programs and the export of such items to rogue states or terrorist groups. Accordingly, Washington wants to increase pressure on Pyongyang and would welcome a change in North Korea’s regime. Seoul, by contrast, is concerned with stability on the peninsula and warns against abrupt changes in the status quo. In turn, they would prefer to avoid, or at least delay, the DPRK’s collapse for fear that this would bring about political and military instability as well as high economic costs. Such diverging threat perceptions have led to different policy responses toward North Korea. The United States wants to pressure the DPRK to adopt a diplomatic solution. Seoul fears that such insistence will back Pyongyang into a corner. The United States wants to redeploy its troops away from the DMZ to avert future incidents and manage flexibility without demonstrating its deterrent capabilities. The South is apprehensive on two counts, one that the North might misinterpret changes in U.S. troop deployments, and the other that U.S. maneuvers might indicate a readiness

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to consider coercive options against the North. Washington seeks tighter solidarity among the United States and the DPRK’s diplomatic neighbors, whereas Seoul yearns to exercise greater influence in the role of mediator. The rise of a new generation of political leaders, who have risen to positions of prominence, are unhappy with what they perceive to be the one-sided and unequal nature of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Growing up in a more prosperous economic environment than previous leaders, they possess greater pride and self-confidence and seek to redefine this relationship. Such a redefinition, in their view, would reflect South Korea’s status as a significant industrial power and stable, participatory democracy. Many Koreans believe that the United States behaves like a hegemonic power in their country, insensitive to South Korean sovereignty and determined to impose America’s national interests on the peninsula. The younger generation in South Korea is eager to free the peninsula from centuries of foreign domination. They find the politics of national identity appealing. Although South Korean “progressives” treat the North as part of Korea’s ethnic identity, many question the role of the United States and whether its policies are fully compatible with South Korea’s national interests. Those harboring the deepest misgivings about U.S. involvement are members of the current Roh government; this marks a shift from the past when the government largely supported U.S. involvement. Thus, despite democratization, Koreans’ politics of national identity has not disappeared. Communally based blood (that is, “racial”) nationalism still appeals to Koreans, and that has been the basis of recent anti-American politics of identity. As Koreans of the late nineteenth century sought to redefine their position in a changing regional and international order, South Koreans of today are struggling to redefine their identity by repositioning themselves vis-à-vis North Korea and the United States.

Limits of Identity Politics When nationalism is used in politics, the notion of nation is closely linked to political legitimacy and thus becomes contested political terrain. Even a highly repressive regime can define itself in national terms as a means for legitimizing and justifying its authoritarian politics, as the Park regime’s cultivation of nationalist rhetoric illustrates. However, because the notion of nation is not fixed but rather is hotly contested and linked to political legitimacy, it is likely to face a nationalist opposition claiming to speak for another nation or another conception of nation. The anti-American

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minjung discourse aimed to challenge the authoritarian state’s definitions of nation and national identity. Although the government and dissident intellectuals were engaged in the politics of national identity, they hardly disputed the ethnic base of the Korean nation. Regardless of political positions, almost everyone “naturalized” nationhood by claiming that the Korean nation existed since time immemorial with its traditions passed down intact. What they debated rather was the political notion of nation, that is, the ruling notion of nation based on anti-Communism and developmentalism versus the oppositional notion based on anti-Americanism and minjungism. That only the political aspect was contested offers a clue to why nationalist politics in contemporary Korea has been so emotional, bitter, short of compromise, and, thus, potentially undemocratic. By accepting the same ethnic notion of nation, each side expects the other to behave just like themselves as members of the same (ethnic) nation. Yet in subscribing to contrasting political notions of nation, each accuses the other of nonnation or even antination behavior, like a child going against the family norm. Just as Harumi Befu points out for the Japanese nihonjinron (discourse on Japanese uniqueness), so the notion of nation and national identity in contemporary Korea “does not merely ‘describe’ the constructed world view, but prescribes what is normatively right and, therefore, how one should conduct oneself ” (Befu 1993, 126; emphasis added). When taken prescriptively, then, contest over the definition of nation inevitably becomes highly charged and hard to resolve politically. Even democratization and globalization have not uprooted such politics of national identity, and ethnic or racial nationalism continues to appeal to Koreans. Kevin Doak’s observation of Japanese ethnic nationalism is illuminating in comprehending the Korean politics of national identity. According to Doak, contrary to standard accounts of Japanese nationalism that emphasize the rise of the modern state and the institution of the emperor, ethnic nationalism has functioned as a form of “populist attack on the [authoritarian] state” in place of “civil society.” Even the postwar “liberal” Japanese state “has not yet completely uprooted . . . ‘love of the fatherland’ and replaced it with . . . ‘love of society.’” “Civil society in postwar Japan,” thus, “still has to compete with ethnic nationalism as an alternative source of anti-state sentiment” (Doak 1997, 299). As in Japan, Korean minjung movements have not sought to replace “love of the nation” with “love of society.” They were effective in refuting national identity promoted by the authoritarian state

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but could not escape falling into the essentialist trap of repressing social and political diversity: minjung was a “trump” card as an overarching prescriptive category overriding other forms of identity from gender to region. Although the anti-American minjung formulation of national identity was largely a product of numerous open debates among dissident intellectuals, the radicalization of opposition movements since the late 1980s, especially manifest in the strong influence of North Korean juche ideology on student activism unfortunately closed rich public discourse (G. Shin 1995). In the end, a fundamental structure in the minjung discourse limited its ability to incorporate various elements of society. Criteria for who constituted the minjung— or were at least fighting on their behalf—necessarily excluded specific segments of society (for example, those with higher socioeconomic status, the political elite, and so on). This basic in-group– out-group distinction partly explains why the minjung identity failed to resonate with the whole of South Korean society, despite its claim to be inclusive. Mingjung nationalism came to lose popular support, almost disappearing from public discourse in South Korea by the 1990s. Koreans still have to develop a more civic and democratic national identity. The rise of civic social movements (simin sahoe undong) that replaced minjung movements in the 1990s has not yet fully embraced the task to cultivate democratic national identity beyond ethnic nationalism. As Habermas points out, when citizens’ loyalties are rooted in the consciousness of a common nature and destiny, shared by a more or less homogeneous nation, the government would have to “enforce a certain uniformity against the actual complexity and the growing diversity of modern life” (1996, 10; emphasis original). In fact, the current discrimination of foreign workers, especially those poor workers from China and Southeast Asia, can be understood in this context. Although intellectuals and civic activists began to address issues arising from prejudice and discrimination against foreign workers, their efforts are still far short of formulating any alternative notion of national identity. Koreans need to promote a civic national identity that would allow more diversity and flexibility among the populace, including foreign workers, rather than simply appealing to and enforcing conformity to an ethno-nationalism that tends to encourage false uniformity. Formulating a national identity corresponding to a democratic form of politics will be a major challenge for the Korean social movement sector.

ten

Ethnic Identity and National Unification

Korea remains divided, despite a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity. Yet, precisely because of this belief, Koreans regard the current division as temporary, and they expect future national unification. Korean leaders from the North and the South maintain a firm belief in ethnic unity and have proclaimed the necessity of national unification. In fact, though the two sides diverge over the form and strategy of unification, their proposals rest on the premise that Koreans will be reunified because they belong to the same ethnic nation / race. Given the redeployment of ethnic nationalism in the new Germany, a similar or even more intense use of nationalism in a unified Korea may emerge.1 How ethnic identity would actually affect national unification has not been empirically scrutinized. It is often assumed, rather than empirically verified, that Koreans’ belief in ethnic unity will inevitably bring national unification in the near future. To the contrary, some urge abandoning ethnic consciousness once and for all, citing that it can be a barrier to unification. Both of these positions are problematic because they are based on myopic conceptions of ethnic nationalism and require empirical investigation. This chapter evaluates how South Koreans’ belief in ethnic unity has shaped their attitudes toward unification-related issues.

The Ethnic Homogeneity-National Unification Thesis the thesis

Until now, ethnic homogeneity has been considered not only the raison d’être of unification proposals of both Koreas but also a crucial resource in the 185

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reunification process. As B. C. Koh aptly points out in comparing the proposals, “Both plans recognize not only the pressing necessity of reunification but also its ultimate inevitability” (1994, 157). In particular, the South Korean plan advocates a single unified nation-state after an interim stage of the Korean Commonwealth. Reflecting this orientation, the Research Institute for National Unification, a primary research unit affiliated with the South Korean Ministry of Unification, organized a conference in Seoul in April 1993 under the theme “ethnic nationalism as an ideology of unification.” “Unification of North and South,” they claimed, “would have to be based on nationalism of the han race . . . [because] nationalism is not only an ideology that prescribes lives of each individual of the han race but a guide in planning for unification and glory” (Pak and Pak 1993, 6). Kim Hakchun, political scientist and former key advisor to President Roh Tae Woo—whose “northern policy” sought normalized relations with China and the Soviet Union— similarly defines nationalism as a primary ideology for Koreans who yearn for unification. He asserts, “Only when the torch of nationalism is alive can Koreans achieve national unification” (1994, 40). These statements reflect what I call the “ethnic homogeneity-national unification thesis,” a position that declares that a divided Korea must and will be reunified because Koreans are ethnically homogeneous and have been so for thousands of years. In support of the ethnic homogeneity-national unification thesis, Paik Nak-Chung (1996) argues that ethnic forces in Korea can serve to overcome divisions and achieve national unification. According to him, ethnic consciousness has historically helped to unite Koreans in the face of foreign aggression and to counter antiunification arguments. He writes, “When a domestic regime or an influential foreign power is openly or virtually against reunification, ethnonationalism performs—as I think it did under Syngman Rhee and through most of the Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan years—a positive role by putting constraints on anti-unification discourse and policies” (personal letter to the author, September 24, 1998). He even claims that the experience with the United States as well as with Japanese imperialism instilled on both sides “a relatively progressive national consciousness” among Koreans and inflicted “shared suffering” that can potentially produce “a peninsula-wide solidarity movement in which national and democratic forces coincide” (Paik 1996, 18). Paik debated Jurgen Habermas, arguing that a “republican”—as opposed to ethnic— conception of nation goes little “beyond the vague principle already embodied in our slogan of

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‘peaceful and democratic reunification.’” Ethnic identity has “a powerful role to play in a . . . divided nation of exceptionally high ethnic homogeneity. . . . [O]ur particular historical experience . . . with at least ten centuries of political unity and, even now, an exceptionally high degree of ethnic and linguistic homogeneity should be the cornerstone of an envisioned unified Korea” (Paik 1996, 19 –20). Other scholars, such as Cho˘ng Yo˘nghun (1995), regard the recent promotion of “Tan’gun nationalism” by the North as indicative of the common ground between the two Koreas and therefore auspicious for unification. Facing political crisis, especially after the Soviet collapse, North Korea increasingly stressed the value of ethnic /racial nationalism in the “theory of the Korean nation as number one.” The theory articulates the ethnic homogeneity-national unification thesis presented by the North. In short, ethnic nationalism is seen as an invaluable, though insufficient, resource in the march toward unification in both Koreas. challenges to the thesis

Challenges to the thesis come from two directions. The first contends that a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity obscures real differences between the two Koreas and thus can lead Koreans to overlook practical problems associated with unification. The second critique argues that unification really means the hegemonic domination of the southern system over the North, making the unification process divisive and conflict-ridden. In Korea and Its Futures, anthropologist Roy Richard Grinker (1998) claims that the ethnic homogeneity-national unification thesis presents unification as a sacred, universally desired goal and as a recovery of a predivided homogeneity (tongjilso˘ng). Because this understanding of unification obscures NorthSouth differences developed since 1945, it prevents Koreans from taking the practical steps necessary to unify the nation. Belief in ethnic homogeneity can thus impede, rather than facilitate, unification, because it cannot “accommodate a changed and heterogeneous Korea” (Grinker 1998, 258). In addition, Grinker warns that unification “can be a euphemism for conquest, a gloss for winning the war . . . and [a belief ] that north Korea must be totally absorbed into the south, its state destroyed, and its people assimilated” (1998, 23, 49). Grinker suggests that the current belief in ethnic homogeneity should be redefined in a way that can incorporate differences and better appreciate “new identities and communities.”

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In his debate with Paik Nak-Chung, published in the New Left Review (1996), Habermas similarly warned South Koreans against taking an ethnic consciousness for granted in the process of unification. Referring to the German experience of “unification by absorption,” he reminds Koreans that West Germany’s hegemonic unification betrayed overconfidence in ethnic consciousness and unity. According to Habermas, German leaders “trusted too much in a common pre-political stock, hence in something like natural harmony among members of a nation, and paid too little attention to the need for political clarification on the part of citizens of different backgrounds” (1996, 11). Habermas urges Koreans to learn from German reunification and warns that an alleged shared sense of ethnic unity can portend dangerous fast-track unification by absorption. further clarfication

The belief in ethnic homogeneity might also overlook other complexities that arise from the real situation of political divide. The homogeneity-unification thesis does not afford a view on how Koreans understand the dynamics within the imagined Korean ethnic community. That is, an overwhelming belief in the solidarity of fellow ethnic Koreans, coupled with a realization of the real territorial divide, are logically inconsistent and might produce some level of cognitive dissonance. Pressure to reduce this dissonance and to restore the lost unity if the belief in a unified ethnic nation is to be sustained (HarmonJones and Mills 1999) can arise. This process of dissonance reduction allows Koreans to maintain the belief in Korean ethnic solidarity and to accept the reality of territorial and political division. More specifically, incongruity between an ethnic and political base for the imagined Korean nation can trigger a process of identifying undesired in-group members, or “black sheep,” and separating them from innocent people or victims. The possibility then arises that a strong belief in ethnic homogeneity can actually facilitate conflict within the ethnic group, which is clearly counterintuitive to those who advocate the homogeneity-unification thesis. In light of this possibility, it is helpful to rethink the relationship between ethnic homogeneity and unification attitudes. In particular, given that there are two possible diametrically opposing outcomes, scholars must explore the conditions in which the belief in ethnic unity will lead to conflict versus when it will lead to unification efforts. To address this issue, in this chapter I develop specific theoretical propositions and test them empirically with survey data.2

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Note that I do not, and cannot, verify the validity of the claims that Koreans actually do share the same blood or ancestry. I also realize that attitudes regarding unification are necessarily based on projections into the future. Nonetheless, I agree with Connor’s contention that ethnic consciousness can engender “a reality of [its] own, for it is seldom what is that is of political importance, but what people think is” (1994, 140; emphasis in original). In his view, scholars of nationalism have failed to appreciate the psychological and emotional power of ethnonational identity largely due to their lack of recognition of the impact perception has on people’s behaviors. As an “imagined community,” any nation has an element of myth, invention, or even fabrication, but it still exacts important consequences. In this context the homogeneity-unification thesis, while entailing the myth of ethnic origins and a romanticized view of unification, can have an important influence on the shaping of both attitudes and actions of South Koreans toward national division and unification.

Key Propositions Based on the above discussion, I test the following four propositions: 1. Ethnic Homogeneity-National Unification Thesis: I first test the ethnic homogeneity-national unification thesis by examining the relationship between belief in ethnic homogeneity and various attitudes on unification. In particular, I look at the impact of the belief in ethnic homogeneity on the insistence of a unitary ethnic nation, necessity of unification, and consideration of unification as a way of recovering the ethnic nation. 2. Behavioral Consequences of the Thesis: I then test whether the thesis has any behavioral consequences. Scholars of ethnicity and nationalism contend that perception often matters in the politics of ethnic identity since it can have behavioral consequences. We need to know whether the thesis remains at the level of consciousness or has any behavioral consequences. 3. Perceived Differences and Hegemonic Unification: I attempt to operationalize and verify two main critiques of the thesis: (a) a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity obscures real differences between the two Koreas, and (b) unification really means the hegemonic domination of South Korea’s system over the North. 4. Separation of People and Regime: I conclude by looking at intragroup processes that can explain Koreans’ acceptance of territorial division despite a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity. In particular, I examine whether South Koreans

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distinguish the North Korean people from the Communist regime to help explain the process of dissonance reduction, that is, mitigating the incongruity between reality and belief.

Data and Measures the national identity and unification survey data

Operationalization of various elements of the thesis, as well as its criticisms, is achieved through survey data. Data come from a nationwide (South Korea) survey of national identity and unification conducted from October 11 to November 6, 2000. Through multistage cluster sampling methods, quota by gender and age were assigned to each of the randomly selected sixty-six districts. After conducting a pilot study of one hundred Seoul residents, the multistage stratified quota sampling was used to overcome practical limitations including the difficulty of access to highly restricted residences and working persons (especially males). This process yielded a representative sample of one thousand and three respondents. independent and control variables

Table 10.1 presents independent and control variables with their mean values and standard deviations. As common blood and shared ancestry are defining features of Korean conception of nation, I measure independent variables by two statements: “Our nation has a single bloodline” (blood), and “Despite foreign citizenship, people belong to the same ethnic-nation insofar as they share the same Korean ancestry” (ancestry). Ten variables serve as controls. In addition to the usual sociodemographic variables (age, gender, education, class), six additional variables (NK kin, NK knowledge, meritorious society, summit, satisfied with summit, U.S. out) are controlled for because they might affect views on North Korea, national division, and unification. The variable NK kin identifies those respondents who have family members or distant relatives in North Korea. Also, the NK knowledge variable reveals the variation among respondents in how much published materials they have read on North Korea. The variable meritorious society distinguishes those respondents who do and do not believe that hard work is rewarded in South Korean society. This variable attempts to control for the belief in an efficacious South Korean capitalist system and conversely, a general level of jadedness. The variables summit

Ethnic Identity and National Unification 191 table 10.1 Independent and Control Variables Substantive definition

Measurement1

Mean (S.D.)

Our nation has a single blood line. Despite foreign citizenship, people belong to the same ethnic-nation insofar as they share the same ancestry.

3 point ordinal scale

2.383 (.613) 2.115 (.667)

Control Variables Age

Respondents’ age

continuous variable

Gender

Respondents’ gender

Education

Respondents’ education level

Class

Subjective class position

NK Kin

Have a family member or relative in North Korea? Have read publications about North Korea? Our society rewards those who work hard. Have you seen or heard about the North-South Summit? Were you content with the results from the Summit? The U.S. military should leave South Korea.

dichotomous variable: (0  male, 1  female) 7 point ordinal scale: (1  no formal education, 2  elementary, 3  junior high, 4  high school, 5  twoyear college, 6  college, 7  graduate school) 5 point ordinal scale: (1  lower low, 2  upper low, 3  middle, 4  lower high, 5  upper high) dichotomous variable: (0  no, 1  yes) dichotomous variable: (0  no, 1  yes) 5 point ordinal scale

Variables Independent Variables Blood Ancestry

NK Knowledge Meritorious Society Summit Satisfied w/ Summit U.S. Out

3 point ordinal scale

dichotomous variable: (0  no, 1  yes) 5 point ordinal scale 5 point ordinal scale

39.432 (12.916) .503 (.500) 4.078 (1.289)

2.688 (.771)

.070 (.255) .351 (.478) 3.258 (1.118) .963 (.189) 3.415 (.852) 3.040 (1.067)

1. Selected variables were recoded and categories were collapsed to ensure enough respondents for each category of that particular variable. Likelihood Ratio Tests comparing nested models were conducted to choose the optimal coding scheme for these variables. Unless otherwise noted, all scales are as follows: 5 point scale (1  strongly disagree, 2  disagree, 3  neutral, 4  agree, 5  strongly agree), 4 point scale (1  strongly disagree, disagree, 2  neutral, 3  agree, 4  strongly agree), 3 point scale (1  strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, 2  agree, 3  strongly agree).

and satisfied with summit indicate respondents’ awareness of the summit meeting between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il in 2000 and their satisfaction level with this meeting, respectively.3 Finally, the U.S. out variable measures attitudes regarding the U.S. military, specifically asking them if they want the U.S. military to leave Korea.

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dependent variables

Proposition 1

Similar to our independent variables, multiple indicators are used to measure attitudes about unification (see Table 10.2). First, the variable oppos measures whether respondents feel that there is indeed a connection between a belief in ethnic homogeneity and insistence on a unified political state. Second, the variable haveuni measures whether respondents feel that unification is necessary even at the expense of their present economic situation. Third, the variable unistate asks specifically whether respondents feel that North and South should be a unified nation-state. Finally, the variable recovery is used to flip the causal order around and asks whether unification will restore ethnic national homogeneity.

table 10.2 Dependent Variables Dependent variables

Substantive definition

Ethnic Homogeneity-Unification Thesis Oppos Opposing unification is to deny a unitary Korean ethnic-nation.

Measurement2

Mean (S.D.)

5 point ordinal scale

3.204 (1.048)

Haveuni

Have to unify even though the economy suffers.

5 point ordinal scale

3.089 (1.104)

Unistate

North and South must form a unified nation-state.

4 point ordinal scale

3.068 (.834)

Recovery

Unification means recovery of ethnic national homogeneity.

4 point ordinal scale

2.816 (.786)

Behavioral Consequences of the Thesis Partic Have you participated in relief efforts for North Korea?

Dichotomous variable: (0  no, 1  yes)

.276 (.447)

Tax

Are you willing to pay a special tax for unification?

5 point ordinal scale

3.034 (1.081)

Spchelp

After unification, we should give special help to the North Korean people.

5 point ordinal scale

3.209 (.924)

4 point ordinal scale

3.205 (.692)

Perceived Differences Between North and South Korea Barrier National division for the last half century has created a serious barrier between North and South Korea.

(continued )

Ethnic Identity and National Unification 193 table 10.2 (continued) Dependent Variables Dependent Variables

Substantive definition

Measurement2

Mean (S.D.)

Difflang

There are differences in language between similar cohorts in North and South Korea. There are differences in family life between similar cohorts in North and South Korea. There are differences in customs/tradition between similar cohorts in North and South Korea. There are differences in work life between similar cohorts in North and South Korea. There are differences in leisure life between similar cohorts in North and South Korea.

5 point ordinal scale

3.662 (1.047)

5 point ordinal scale

3.351 (.963)

5 point ordinal scale

3.706 (1.016)

5 point ordinal scale

3.719 (.847)

5 point ordinal scale

3.938 (.945)

dichotomous variable: (0  disagree, 1  agree) 4 point ordinal scale: (1  based on NK system, 2  equal NK /SK model, 3  based on SK system, 4  current SK model

.707 (.455) 2.834 (.702)

Difffam

Diffcust

Diffwork

Diffleis

South Korean Hegemony upon Unification Skrep South Korea should represent the Korean ethnic group. Skheg Upon unification, what is the ideal political system for Korea?

Separation of People of North Korea and Communist Regime Kim National division is due to 4 point ordinal scale: Kim Il-Sung and his clique. Victim North Koreans are victims 4 point ordinal scale of the Communist regime. Punish Those who supported 5 point ordinal scale Communism should be punished after unification.

2.600 (.985) 3.000 (.829) 2.733 (.960)

2. Unless otherwise noted, all 5, 4, and 3 point ordinal scales follow the coding from Table 10.1.

Proposition 2

Three measures are used to test if the belief in ethnic homogeneity has behavioral consequences. First, the variable partic asks whether the respondent has actually participated in relief efforts for North Korea. The variable tax asks respondents whether they would be willing to pay a special tax for expenses related to the unification process. The variable spchelp measures

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respondents’ willingness to offer special help to North Korean citizens if unification were to occur. Proposition 3

The variable barrier is used as the most straightforward test of differences. This variable asks whether the respondent feels that there are serious barriers between North and South Korea after a half century of division. I then ask more specific questions pertaining to perceived differences in personal, work, and leisure life between two Koreas. First, the variable difflang asks whether respondents feel there are differences in language between North and South Koreans of similar cohorts. Second, difffam asks whether respondents think that there exist differences in family life. Third, I use the variable diffcust to measure whether respondents feel that there are differences in traditions or customs. Fourth, the variable diffwork is used to measure respondents’ attitudes of likely difference in the workplace. Our fifth variable, diffleis, ascertains attitudes on differences in leisurely life or popular culture between North and South Korea. To test if respondents do in fact wish South Korean hegemony on the peninsula after unification, I use two indicators. First, the variable skrep asks respondents whether they think South Korea should represent the Korean ethnic group. And second, the variable skheg asks respondents what kind of system they would like to see after unification. Choices for this last variable range from a system based on the North Korean model, a mixture of North and South Korean systems, to one that is based solely on the current South Korean model. I interpret this last choice as an indicator that respondents desire South Korea’s political system to dominate a unified Korea. Proposition 4

Three indicators are used to test this proposition. First, I use the variable kim to see if the former leader of the Communist regime, Kim Il Sung, is blamed for national division. Second, the variable victim measures respondents’ attitudes about the victimization of the North Korean people. Finally, the variable punish is employed to see if respondents feel that those North Koreans who supported Communism should be punished even after unification. Because all our dependent variables use ordinal scales or are dichotomous variables, I construct ordinal logit and binary logit regression models to

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analyze the relationship between our independent and dependent variables (Winship and Mare 1984). Separate analyses are conducted for each of our independent variables and dependent variables. I report only the levels of significance for the main independent variables from the models (see Appendix 3 for all coefficients for both independent and control variables).

Main Findings proposition 1: ethnic homogeneity-national unification thesis

Table 10.3 presents findings from ordinal logit models analyzing the impact of ethnic homogeneity on unification attitudes. The ethnic homogeneityunification thesis is strongly supported by the survey data. Analyses indicate that there is a strong relationship between belief in ethnic homogeneity and different attitudes affirming the necessity of unification. With the exception of ancestry’s impact on having to unify, independent variables have positive and statistically significant impact on the dependent variables measuring attitudes about unification. That is, those who agree or strongly agree that the Korean ethnic nation shares the same blood and ancestry also agree or strongly agree that opposing unification is to deny the solidarity of the Korean ethnic nation. High scores on the indicators of ethnic homogeneity are also related to agreeing or strongly agreeing that Korea has to unify even if the economy suffers and that North and South must form a unified nation-state. In addition, high scores on the independent variables are related to affirming the belief that unification means the recovery of ethnic homogeneity. proposition 2: behavioral consequences of the thesis

In addition to testing the basic relationship between belief in ethnic homogeneity and unification, I also test the behavioral consequences of such a belief. table 10.3 Impact of Ethnic Identity on Unification Attitudes

Blood Ancestry

Opposing unification is to deny ethnic-nation

Have to unify

Unitary state

Recovery of ethnic nation

 

 n.s.

 

 

 positive and significant at p  .01.

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table 10.4 Impact of Ethnic Identity on Behaviors Associated with Unification

Blood Ancestry

Participation in NK relief efforts

Willing to pay special unification tax

Willing to give special help to NK citizens upon unification

n.s. n.s.

 n.s.

n.s. n.s.

 positive and significant at p  .01.

Findings reported in Table 10.4 indicate that neither of the independent variables is related to whether respondents have participated in relief efforts for North Korea. That is, those who agree or strongly agree that the Korean ethnic nation shares the same blood and ancestry do not differ from those who do not agree with these measures of ethnic homogeneity when it comes to participating in relief efforts. Also, neither of the independent variables is related to whether respondents believe that they should give special assistance to the North Korean people after reunification. Only the blood variable impacts respondents’ willingness to pay a special tax to help defray costs associated with unification. proposition 3: perceived differences and hegemonic unification

As indicated in Table 10.5, the relationship between the belief in ethnic homogeneity and perceived differences between various aspects of North and South Korean society is much more complicated. There does seem to be a general sense of perceived differences between North and South Korea as both independent variables are positively related to the belief that there are serious barriers between North and South Korea. Other indicators are not as straightforward. Neither indicator of ethnic homogeneity is significantly related to perceived linguistic differences between North and South Korea. Belief in shared ancestry does, however, lead to denying differences in family life and tradition/customs in North and South Korea. However, both indicators of ethnic homogeneity are positively and significantly related to the belief that North and South Koreans differ when it comes to the workplace. Finally, neither indicator of ethnic homogeneity is related to perceived differences with regard to leisurely activities. Table 10.6 reports findings related to the impact of the belief in ethnic homogeneity on the possibility of South Korean hegemony after unification.

Ethnic Identity and National Unification 197 table 10.5 Impact of Ethnic Identity on Perceived Differences Between North and South Korea

Blood Ancestry

Blood Ancestry

Serious barriers between north and south

Differences in language

Differences in family life

 

n.s. n.s.

n.s. 

Differences in customs and tradition

Differences in work life

Differences in leisure life

n.s. 

 

n.s. n.s.

 positive and significant at p  .05;  positive and significant at p  .01;  negative and significant at p  .05;  negative and significant at p  .01.

table 10.6 Impact of Ethnic Identity on the Possibility of South Korean Hegemony upon Unification

Blood Ancestry

South Korea should represent the Korean ethnic group

Ideal political situation for Korea upon unification

n.s. n.s.

n.s. n.s.

 negative and significant at p  .05.

Statistical tests do not reveal any significant relationship. Respondents who have a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity do not differ from those who do not when it comes to wishing that South Korea should represent the entire Korean ethnic nation. Also, neither indicator of ethnic homogeneity is related to the desire that a future unified Korea should be governed by a political system based on the current South Korean model. proposition 4: separation of people and regime

There seems to be some (if not strong) evidence that respondents do in fact mentally distinguish the people from the regime of North Korea (see Table 10.7). Those who have a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity, as indicated by the blood variable, are more likely to agree that Kim Il Sung is responsible for the territorial division of the ethnic nation. Furthermore, those are the ones who also believe that North Koreans are victims of the Communist regime. Yet neither of independent variables is, in any way, related to the desire to punish those who supported Communism if unification were to occur.

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table 10.7 Impact of Ethnic Identity on Distinction Between North Korean People and Communist Regime

Blood Ancestry

Kim Il-Sung is responsible for national division

North Korean people are victims

Communist supporters should be punished

 n.s.

 n.s.

n.s. n.s.

 positive and significant at p  .01.

Discussion and Implications The survey data attest to the strength of the connection between ethnic identity and national unification. Analyses reveal that South Koreans do indeed harbor a “racialized” image of the nation that centers on the belief in common blood and ancestry. More importantly, these markers of ethnic homogeneity are positively related to a strong desire for unification and other attitudes on national division. The commonly assumed ethnic homogeneity-unification thesis is empirically verified. The strong relationship between belief in ethnic homogeneity and positive attitudes toward unification might, as supporters of the thesis argue, be a possible resource to draw on if North and South Korea undertake the unification process. Encouraging belief in homogeneity might raise the level of understanding and acceptance when it comes to the real difficulty inherent in any unification plan. Still, assessments of the behavioral consequences of the belief in ethnic homogeneity should be cautious. I found no significant differences between those with a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity, and those without, with regard to actual participation in North Korean relief work.4 It is true, however, that most relief work centers around the famine issue in North Korea.5 This issue is not necessarily the same thing as unification. In any case, the behavioral consequences of a strong belief in ethnic homogeneity with regard to the unification process can only be approximated at this time. Furthermore, possible limitations of the ethnic homogeneity-unification thesis are revealed in the impact of some demographic variables on the measures of unification attitudes. It is significant that respondents’ age influences attitudes on unification (see Appendix 3.1).6 Older respondents are more likely to agree that opposing unification is to deny the unitary Korean ethnic-nation as well as to agree that unification is necessary even

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if the economy suffers. There are, of course, two possible interpretations to these findings. First, it might be simply the case that a strong desire for unification comes only after political awareness develops in the course of one’s lifetime. That is, younger respondents might only develop strong attitudes about unification as they get older. More devastating to the ethnic homogeneity-unification thesis is the second possibility, namely that there is a cohort effect. If the latter interpretation is correct, it might be the case that as the younger generation takes the place of older ones, South Koreans will not be as interested in unification or in the recovery of a single ethnic nation. Without longitudinal data, however, it is difficult to ascertain which of these two interpretations is correct. In any case, it is evident that at the present time, older generations have a stronger desire for unification. As for larger implications, one must ask whether such strong ethnic consciousness promotes or impedes the march toward unification. Views on this issue are various and include those who see “Korean blood” as a panacea as well as those who urge abandonment of it. Many South Koreans regard ethnic nationalism as a vital unification ideology, while Habermas (1996) and Grinker (1998) warn against overcrediting a common ethnic consciousness. Ethnic nationalism, they caution, may promote blind assimilation or hegemonic unification in which one side dominates the other. They also warn that it may encourage a dogmatic, even benighted view of unification that ignores real differences that have developed between the North and South in the course of half a century. The impact of ethnic homogeneity on perceived similarities or differences between North and South Korea is much more complicated than either the proponents or critics of the thesis understand. Most generally, I find that a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity does not obfuscate perceived differences between two Koreas that have risen in the past fifty years. South Koreans who have a strong belief in ethnic homogeneity understand the complexities of the unification process and realize that there are indeed real barriers between the two sides. They do not assume, as a straightforward interpretation of the ethnic homogeneity-unification thesis might imply, that unification is going to be an easy or natural process. Yet, there seems to be no overall effect of a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity on perceived linguistic differences. Furthermore, there is a negative effect of the ancestry measure on perceived difference in family life and traditional cultures / customs. As Grinker (1998) claims, a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity does in fact lead to assumed

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similarity between the North and South with regard to issues related to family and tradition. In addition, it is understandable that those who have kin in the North tend to deny differences in areas of family and language (see Appendix 3.3). Still, this assumed similarity constitutes a romanticized Korean past that is not necessarily applied to the current situation on the Korean peninsula. Indeed, analyses based on measures of perceived differences regarding current matters reveal an opposite trend. Regarding work life, respondents who have a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity (as indicated by two measures) are more likely to admit that there are indeed real differences between North and South Koreans. Overall, it seems that the belief in ethnic homogeneity is not related to realizing differences in language, family life, and traditional culture, but it does lead to realizing differences in work life. I interpret this seemingly conflicting finding as an indication that the belief in ethnic homogeneity tends to romanticize or idealize Korea’s past and heritage. Thus, respondents who score high on these measures also tend to repress differences associated with an imagined traditional image of the Korean ethnic nation (namely, when it comes to language, family life, and customs). This, however, does not mean that respondents neglect differences with regard to more modern or practical aspects of North and South Korea. Respondents do understand that there are serious barriers between North and South as well as real differences in work life. These findings suggest the need to revise Grinker’s claim that Koreans cannot discuss differences due to their obsession with homogeneity. Indeed, it is only in the romanticized notion of a traditional Korea that his critique can be applied. Respondents who have a strong ethnic identity appreciate those differences that are more relevant to the practicalities of the unification process. Recent efforts by the South Korean government to enhance cultural and political integration in a unified Korea reflect awareness of NorthSouth differences and the potential problems associated with unification (P. Hwang 1994; Pak Yo˘ngho 1994; Pak and Pak 1993). In addition, it is not clear that South Koreans assume unification will lead to the absorption of North Korea by the South and that this in turn ultimately signifies South Korea’s victory in the unfinished war. Only 16.7 percent support “hegemonic unification,” saying that the current South Korean system should be the basis of a unified Korea. In contrast, 31.8 percent support a unified Korea based on elements equally from North and South, suggesting willingness to accommodate. Instead, age is the most significant predictor for promoting

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hegemonic unification (see Appendix 3.4).7 Thus, although older people tend to support hegemonic unification, it would be incorrect to assume that a strong sense of homogeneity, along with its effect on unification attitudes, means the envelopment of North Korea into the South Korean mold. My theoretically driven hunch—that some kind of in-group categorizing is going on to preserve the sense of homogeneity in light of political realities—receives some empirical support. Those who believe in a shared bloodline between Koreans are more likely to blame Kim Il Sung for national division. To the contrary, as members of the same Korean ethnic nation, the people of North Korea are portrayed as innocent victims of the North Korean regime who betrayed the national community by collaborating with foreign powers and causing territorial division. Not surprisingly, the separation of people from regime or derogation of “black sheep” is more evident among the older generation (age has significant impact on two of the three dependent variables measuring the distinction between the NK people and the Communist regime, see Appendix 3.5). Finally, it is interesting that those with a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity are the ones who are more likely to blame the North Korean regime for the divide but are not any more likely to want to punish members of the Communist party after unification. This finding is relevant to those concerned that there will be a violent purge of the Communist Party members of the northern regime in a unified Korea (Habermas 1996). In other words, the data suggest that “black sheep” do not necessarily turn into “scapegoats” after unification, though once again there seems to be a generational gap (the older respondents tend to support punishment of Communist supporters when unified).

Conclusions Analyses of survey data confirm that common blood and ancestry are defining features of South Koreans’ national identity. These indicators of ethnic homogeneity help explain attitudes on North Korea, national division, and unification, including the promotion of such views as North Korean people are innocent victims of the Communist regime, national division is only temporary, and unification must be achieved at all costs to restore the lost ethnic unity. Analyses also show that belief in ethnic homogeneity does not necessarily obscure real differences developed between two Koreas during the last half century or promote hegemonic unification by the South.

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It is important to note the subtleties inherent in the ethnic homogeneityunification thesis. This study reveals that there are noticeable discrepancies between a romanticized Korea of the past and future versus the realities on the Korean peninsula today. This dissonance is manifest in the conflicting findings regarding behaviors associated with the thesis. While those who scored high on measures of ethnic homogeneity are willing to pay a special tax to help with costs associated with the unification process, these same people were not more likely to have participated in North Korean relief efforts. The discrepancy is also evident in perceptions of differences between North and South Korea. Perceptions of North-South Korea distinctions relating to traditional or historic elements of Korean society were downplayed or outright rejected by those with a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity (that is, differences in traditions and customs). However, elements of modern Korean society (that is, social development after 1945 such as work life) were perceived to differ in the North and South by those who have a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity. Finally, the “harmonious” ideal of a future Korea where nobody is punished for the current division is juxtaposed with the current situation in which Kim Il Sung and the Communist Party is implicated for the suffering and victimization of the North Korean people. These disparate findings point to the subtleties of the homogeneityunification thesis and the belief in ethnic homogeneity can lead to a romanticized or idealized Korea of the past and future. Age or generation is another crucial factor to consider in evaluating the efficacy of the homogeneity-unification thesis. Understandably, the older generation has a stronger desire for unification than younger generations, and this finding gives some reason for concern that young Koreans may not want or even care for unification, making it more difficult to achieve in the future. At the same time, the older generation tends to express a more negative view of the northern regime (for example, North Koreans are victims of the Communist regime) and promote South Korean hegemony after unification. They are also the ones who want Communist supporters to be punished after unification. If this is the case, Koreans might face a dilemma of which scenario to promote: unification with stronger popular support but with the prospect of a highly conflict-ridden divisive process; or unification with less popular support but with a chance of making the process more peaceful. This is something that Korean policymakers should take seriously in their formulation of unification-related policies.

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Having said that, and given the prevalence of ethnic consciousness at the popular level regardless of age, it is still likely to play a significant role in the unification process, if it does occur. It would not only legitimize the drive for unification but also could be common ground, especially in the early stage of the unification process, that is needed to facilitate a smooth integration of the two systems. As Kim Kwang-Ok points out, ethnic nationalism can accommodate diverse backgrounds and social traits so far as cultural homogeneity and heterogeneity are understood in terms of “function,” not in terms of “form.” Although uniformity of culture is not desirable, common ways of thinking and conducting social practices, as displayed by Confucian tradition and familialism, can facilitate the smooth integration of the two systems. In his view, a “hybrid model can be offered for forging a new integrated cultural system by abandoning what is negative and adopting only those positive aspects of the existing cultures of the two Koreas” (Kim Kwang-Ok 1999, 2). After all, despite the problems associated with ethnic nationalism that many scholars of nationalism stress, attitudes and belief in ethnic homogeneity have not been entirely negative and still offer Koreans a considerable amount of inspiration and solidarity. Thus, what Koreans need is not to unconditionally embrace a sense of ethnic unity as panacea, or conversely to categorically discredit it as mere myth or fantasy, but to recognize its presence and power as well as its limits and potential harm, and to search for constructive ways to use it. There is no doubt that ethnic consciousness alone cannot facilitate the process of unification. The behavioral impact of the belief in ethnic homogeneity is complicated: there is no guarantee that current attitudes will actually affect the unification process as projected. Formulating a civic national identity beyond ethnic consciousness and establishing democratic institutions will be essential to prevent “exclusionary” actions in the unification processes. Nonetheless, this self-ascriptive identity of homogeneity does not seem likely to disappear anytime soon and can at least serve as the basis for the initial impetus toward unification, if not as the stable collective identity for a unified Korea.

eleven

Between Nationalism and Globalization

A few years ago, a Stanford freshman came to ask me for help with his research project on Korea. At the time, I thought he was Korean American, given his excellent command of both English and Korean. To my surprise, I learned that he had been educated until high school in South Korea (hereafter, Korea) and had never visited the United States prior to attending Stanford. He surprised me further as he described his high school, the Korean Minjok Leadership Academy (KMLA, or minjok sagwan kodu˘ng hakkyo). Located in a remote area of Kangwo˘n Province, arguably the most underdeveloped region in South Korea, KMLA aspires to be the country’s version of Eton.1 The principal aim of the school is to produce Korea’s future leaders as individuals who possess a strong sense of national identity. Intrigued by our conversation, I made a visit to his high school in the fall of 2002. At KMLA, I was particularly interested in the fact that all of the school’s courses except Korean language and history, are taught in English. Even outside the classroom, students are required to use English with an exception granted on weekends. Fluency in English is understood as a necessary means to maintain Korea’s competitive position, so it is considered essential for the country’s future leaders to master this global language (Kwak 2001). Although instruction takes place in English, KMLA emphasizes a curriculum aimed at enhancing Korean national identity. The curriculum includes Confucian ethics and traditional rituals, music, and sports. For instance, every morning at 6 a.m., students gather in the courtyard of a traditional building to bow deeply to their teachers, a demonstration of filial piety that is performed by sons toward their parents. After the ritual, students are 204

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required to practice at least one of three traditional forms of music or sports. KMLA’s experimental methods seem to be working: every year the school sends its best students to top American colleges. KMLA exemplifies a larger trend in Korea today: the interplay of globalization and nationalism, two forces that are often understood as having contradictory trajectories. I argue that globalization in Korea is shaped by a powerful ethnic nationalism, thus maintaining a familiar relationship between previous state development projects and discourses of nationalism. The drive toward development and progress throughout Korea’s modern history has been characterized by the interplay of national and transnational forces. The ethnic nationalism that bolstered state-initiated drives toward modernization persists today. The interplay of globalization and nationalism, however, is not an illusion or a paradox, as some scholars (Alford 1999; Samuel Kim 2000) have argued. Rather, it is based on a familiar paradigm that has been in place during the course of modern Korean development. The approach to globalization in Korea, therefore, must be viewed within the specific historical trajectory and the structural conditions through which globalization has been apprehended.

Globalization and Social Change Although there exist different views as to when globalization began in Korea, it became a major state policy and ideology during the Kim Young Sam government (1993 –98). If modernization was the catchword for the autocratic Park regime, globalization served the same purpose for the Kim government, which was the first civilian government in three decades. In the Sydney Declaration of November 17, 1994, President Kim Young Sam, citing everincreasing competition in a rapidly globalizing world, formally announced his government’s drive for globalization.2 Under the term segyehwa, the Kim government attempted to reform the Korean political economy to meet the rapidly changing conditions of the world economy. Although some scholars (for example, Ohmae 1990) regard globalization as the formation of a borderless world with the weakening of nation-state political regimes, in Korea’s case, the state played a key role referred to as “managed globalization” by leading scholars (Alford 1999; C. Moon 1995). As a concrete step, the Kim government set up the Globalization Promotion Committee (segyehwa ch’ujin wiwo˘nhoe), or GPC, to oversee the globalization process. The GPC

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was headed by the prime minister and consisted of a set of committees on policy planning, administrative reform, educational reform, and science and technology (Gills and Gills 2000). Korea’s drive for globalization, like the modernization push of the earlier decades, was initiated by the state, and segyehwa was kept as a name to illustrate a Korean way of globalization. Reflecting state policy, segyehwa, kyo˘ngchaengnyo˘k (competitiveness), and other globalization-related terms became popular in the public discourse of the 1990s. The impact of globalization on Korean society and economy, particularly in the past decade, is undeniable. Despite the financial crisis of 1997, Korea has effectively implemented the prescribed structural changes to maintain its competitive status in the global economy. As of 2004, the Korean economy was the eleventh largest in the world in terms of GDP. Now, leading Korean companies, such as Samsung and LG Electronics, no longer rely on foreign exports exclusively, as they did during the 1960s and 1970s. They have grown into global companies that operate huge overseas businesses, sometimes with more employees abroad than within the country. Furthermore, Korea has become an attractive site for foreign investment as many multinational corporations have set up branches within its borders. To meet the demand for labor in particular sectors of the domestic economy, there has been a steady influx of foreign migrant labor, and in 2005, the foreign worker population rose to more than 305,000.3 Korea’s globalization can also be witnessed in social and cultural spheres. Nothing represents the radical changes brought about by globalization as powerfully as the role of the Internet in society. Korea is a world leader in the development, production, and consumption of digital telecommunications technologies, particularly broadband Internet technologies. By 2003, more than 60 percent of Korea’s fifteen million households had broadband Internet service, and more than two-thirds of all Koreans carried mobile cellular phones (Korean National Statistical Office). Koreans now travel widely, and it was reported that eight million Koreans went abroad in 2004 (Korean Tourism Organization). There has also been a major push for educational experiences abroad. In U.S. colleges, Koreans constitute the fourth-largest group among foreign students.4 For the Korean consumer, there has been a significant increase in “global” consumer products with the proliferation of foreign food and clothing chains and franchises. Korea is said to have the world’s largest Starbuck’s coffee shop. As the language of globalization,

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English is becoming increasingly important. A growing number of classes in colleges are being taught in English and many Korean companies use scores on standardized tests that assess English fluency (such as the TOEIC) to evaluate potential employees. In fact, interest is growing in making English the nation’s second official language. A survey I conducted in 2000 reveals that 54 percent of the respondents agreed that “English should be the second official language.” 5 Although these changes indicate that Korea is being globalized, that is, becoming more interconnected with the rest of the world, the Korean response to globalization has been shaped by the ideology of ethnic nationalism as well as its own specific history of national development. As such, the persistence of Korean nationalism throughout the processes of globalization has been the dominant topic of discussion by scholars of Korean globalization. In exploring the response to globalization by Koreans, C. Fred Alford argues that they view globalization as dangerous because it threatens to dismantle the foundation of Korean social relations and, thereby, the fundamental bases of Korean ethnic identity. Alford argues that, rather than embracing globalization, Koreans respond to globalization out of necessity, out of the need to survive in the global economy. He states, “Most of the ways in which Koreans appear to embrace globalization are in fact strategies to keep globalization at bay” (Alford 1999, 12). In his view, Koreans want to believe that they will be able to adapt to the mandates of globalization without changing the essential nature of the nation. They still assert the ideology of “Korean body, Western utensils,” which is just another version of the age-old adage “Eastern spirit, Western technology.” In this regard, Alford observes that at the core of Korean globalization is the belief that “the Korean body can ingest foreign ideas without altering the basic structure of the Korean body” (1999, 151). Yet, in his opinion, this confidence in the ability to integrate globalization without changing the Korean character is overestimated. He asserts that the notion that Koreans can maintain their unique character within this maelstrom of change is an “illusion,” a “collective fantasy.” His skepticism is grounded in the belief that radical structural changes incurred by globalization will eventually result in significant changes in the nature of human relations in Korean society. Therefore, Alford assumes that the deeper the processes of globalization take root, the more difficult it will be to maintain the existing state of social relations.

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As it did with the modernization drives of earlier decades, the Korean state has demonstrated a nationalist approach to globalization. In Samuel Kim’s view, however, state-initiated globalization policies have had paradoxical consequences in South Korea. Kim points out that while the state continued to extol globalization, it failed to make significant strides toward making projected changes through its segyehwa policies. Assessing Korea’s achievements in globalization throughout the 1990s, he laments, “Despite the rising globalization and globalism chorus, deep down Korea remains mired in the cocoon of exclusive cultural nationalism” (2000, 263). This cultural nationalism, he argues “acts as a powerful and persistent constraint on the segyehwa drive” (2000, 275). Kim asserts that while the state highly praised globalization through its discourses, it failed to make any significant changes. In terms of globalization, he concludes, “no fundamental learning—no paradigm shift—has occurred in the course of Korea’s segyehwa drive, only situation-specific tactical adaptation” (2000, 275). Kim is right: no paradigm shift has occurred. In contrast to his claim, however, nationalism might be viewed among Koreans not as a constraint, but rather as a primary mover in promoting a particular approach toward globalization. Most Koreans appear to see no inherent contradiction between nationalism and globalization. Rather, they seek to appropriate globalization for nationalist goals. This is particularly true of political leaders. In fact, from the outset, the Korean government has initiated and pursued globalization with a clear national agenda. Alford, too, is correct that “Korean body, Western utensils” explains the current globalization drive on the part of the state, but I disagree with his claim that such a slogan is mere illusion or a “collective fantasy” that Koreans can never achieve. The same slogan or attitude has produced rapid, successful modernization since the 1960s. It would be premature to conclude that this particular brand of Korean nationalism will not work for globalization. In this chapter, I discuss the interconnection of nationalism and globalization in Korea as a result of the interplay of global forces and Korean state policies. Thus far, scholars of globalization have failed to investigate how the historical relationship between nationalism and modernization in Korea continues to inform the nation’s approach to globalization. I explore various strategic approaches to globalization by the state. First, I investigate the appropriation of globalization for nationalist goals as a proactive strategy by the state. Second, as a reactive response, I look at the ways in which national

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identity has been promoted by the state through specific programs of national representation. Finally, I situate the contemporary emergence of regionalism and Asianism as essentially nationalist responses to globalization. Although I investigate the strategies of the state, I argue that state discourses rely on and perpetuate a naturalized notion of ethnic nationalism shared by the Korean public. These state strategies have had a significant effect in shaping the ways that Koreans understand globalization and how they live these changes through their everyday lives. It is my central contention that the intimate relationship between national and global forces is not a collective fantasy or paradox, but rather a familiar paradigm in Korea’s history of social change.

The Interplay of National and Global Forces Recent debates over nationalism and globalization have centered on whether globalization will weaken the functional power of the nation-state. There are also critical discussions about whether national culture and identity will be replaced by global culture and cosmopolitan identity (Guillen 2001).6 In The Borderless World, for instance, Kenichi Ohmae (1990) contends that the magnitude of cross-border activities in finance and industry has become so great that a state’s regulatory leverages have virtually disappeared. According to this view, while the boundaries between countries remain clear on a “political map,” those boundaries have largely disappeared on a “competitive map,” as one that shows the real flows of financial and industrial activities. Through competition, imitation, standardized rules, trade, and capital mobility, financial and industrial globalization is said to produce “convergence” across nations, both in the structures of production and in the relations among economy, society, and state. Such interplay creates a highly integrated and homogeneous world economy (see Berger [1996] for a critical review of “convergence theory”). Similarly, Tetsunori Koizumi (1993) argues that to the extent that globalism is a fact of social life, there is no place for a sense of national identity based on one land, one language, or one race. He asserts that the nation-state, guided by nationalism as ideology or as emotion, has outlived its usefulness in maintaining world order. Just as modernization theorists and Marxists predicted the demise of nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s (see Daniel Bell’s The End of Ideology), some proponents of globalization expect the transnational forces of late modernity to supersede nations and nationalism.

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Such globalist arguments have met with critical responses from scholars, activists, and policymakers alike. In Robert Wade’s (1996) view, the demise of the nation state is “greatly exaggerated”; in Linda Weiss’s (1998) opinion, it is no more than a “myth.” Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson (1996) claim that the current level of internationalized activities is not unprecedented and that the nation-state will not disappear, though it will have to change its functional role. Samuel Kim also points out that the impact of globalization is contingent on the type of state structure and its globalization strategies. “Far from making states functionally obsolete or irrelevant,” he states, “globalization has in effect redefined what it takes to be a competent and effective state in an increasingly interdependent and interactive world” (2000, 10). In short, these scholars assert that globalization does not necessarily entail a fundamental shift in the structural institutions and the functioning of a nation. Furthermore, the globalization of particular arenas in society does not always promote homogenization or entail a weakening of national identity and culture (Featherstone 1990). Instead, as Arjun Appadurai claims, while globalization involves the use of a variety of instruments of homogenization, these are “absorbed into local political and cultural economies, only to be repatriated as heterogeneous dialogues of national sovereignty, free enterprise, fundamentalism, etc. in which the state plays an increasingly delicate role” (1990, 307). Cross-national studies also show that globalization has not eroded feelings of pride and attachment to the nation (see Evans and Kelley 2002). As seen in the former Soviet empire and the “new” Germany, ethnic identity and nationalism are anything but dead. Instead, these elements have shaped the social, political, and cultural landscapes of these countries. In view of these realities, Anthony Smith claims, “In the era of globalization and transcendence, we find ourselves caught in a maelstrom of conflicts over political identities and ethnic fragmentation” (1995, 2). Therefore, the seemingly infinite variety of responses to globalization require a situation-specific investigation into the ways that local exigencies shape the ways in which globalization is apprehended. Globalization is a historical process that increases worldwide interconnectedness in human relations and transactions, and as in all modernization processes, capitalism has been an underlying force. Also, like modernization, globalization is a double-edged sword, a force that is both “civilizing” and “destructive,” a combination of “opportunities” and “threats” (Guillen 2001). As such, responses to globalization have varied, depending on the particular

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context in which a country is situated and the particular aspects of globalization it chooses to stress. One option is to categorically reject globalization and close off a country from the outside world. North Korea, Cuba, and some Muslim countries in the Middle East belong to this category. Another possibility is to wholeheartedly embrace globalization, believing that it is necessary and desirable, and that indigenous culture must be changed and replaced to meet “global standards.” Still another, and perhaps the most popular response, particularly in practice, is appropriating globalization as a means to enhance what are deemed as national interests. This response is based on the premise that while globalization is necessary and desirable, it can be achieved without substantially altering native culture and values. This approach seeks to maximize what globalization has to offer and protect their indigenous values and practices in the face of globalization’s homogenizing effects. In the contemporary world, in which globalization has become “a fact of life,” the third option is the most feasible. Korea generally falls into the third category, with some complexities.

Making Sense of Korea’s Globalization Korea’s approaches to globalization have been multilayered. I look at three major approaches by the Korean state: globalist, nationalist, and regionalist.7 The globalist approach is an instrumentalist one, appropriating globalization as a necessary means of enhancing national interests. The second is a nationalist one, seeking to preserve central values and practices of Korea’s indigenous culture in the midst of globalization. The third and most recent is a regionalist approach, intending to make Korea a hub of a new Northeast Asian regional alliance. It is my contention that all three approaches are not necessarily contradictory; they are interconnected. Furthermore, nationalism, as in the past, has been the major underlying principle in shaping these approaches to globalization in contemporary Korea. appropriation of globalization

The Korean state has sought to appropriate global forces for national interests, an approach based on the premise that globalization, like modernization, can be proactively appropriated as a means to enhance national interests out of necessity or desire. Modern East Asian history has shown that Japan, China, and Korea sought to appropriate the global forces of science,

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technology, and even the discourse of “civilization and enlightenment” for their own national use (Beasley 1990). “Western technology, Eastern spirit,” a highly popular slogan in early twentieth-century East Asia, reflected Asians’ desires to appropriate Western technology and science, even as they faced the encroaching forces of imperialism. This practice was known as “defensive modernization,” where modernization meant defending Asians’ own nations from Western aggression. This instrumentalist view of modernization prevailed during Korea’s drive toward “modernization of the fatherland.” Korea’s recent globalization efforts can be understood in a similar way. As with the earlier project of modernization, the current globalization initiative on the part of the state should be largely seen as an effort to increase national competitiveness in an expanding global market. Reminiscent of what President Park Chung Hee had said in launching his modernization project, President Kim Young Sam, laying out his segyehwa policy, defined the current age of globalization as “an era of turbulence and upheaval.” The contemporary era, in his words, was to be characterized by “a borderless global economy underpinned by continuing advances in information and communications technologies . . . [which were] . . . bound to fundamentally reshape the lives of all people throughout the world” (1996, 7). Reflecting on Korea’s modern history, he compared Korea’s current challenges in a globalizing world to “the challenge of similar revolutionary changes at the turn of this [twentieth] century” (1996, 9). Yet with only “a vague awareness of the need to pursue modernization,” he lamented, Korea had failed to reform and subsequently became a Japanese colony. He acknowledged that since the 1960s, Korea had been remarkably successful in its efforts to modernize and industrialize, but was currently underequipped to meet the new challenges of globalization. This was because the principles of national development in the globalization era must be fundamentally different from those of the past era of modernization and industrialization. His segyehwa policy was thus necessary “if Korea is to survive and thrive in this age of increasingly fierce borderless global competition” (1996, 15). Kim called for orienting “all aspects of national life” toward globalization. This would include radical changes in education, legal and economic systems, politics and news media, government (national and local), environment, and culture. Globalization became a major state ideology of the Kim government, and the Globalization Promotion Committee was established to oversee the globalization process. Kim’s globalization drive was described

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as a “political cover” or “slogan” (C. S. Kang 2000) and dismissed as a failure by some (Samuel Kim 2000), yet its main motivation seemed clear—to increase national competitiveness in a rapidly globalizing, unstable world. In the post– cold war era, globalization was viewed as a major external force that would affect the nation, and segyehwa reflected policymakers’ growing recognition of the need to enhance Korea’s national competitiveness in a global market.8 This reflects the social Darwinian thinking in Korea’s drive toward globalization that has utilized an instrumentalist treatment, which has aimed at maintaining a competitive edge for the nation in its approach toward globalization. Despite President Kim’s claim that a “national development strategy in the era of globalization should be fundamentally different from that of the past government-led modernization” (1996, 270), his instrumentalist approach to globalization was not dissimilar from the strategies of Park in his pursuit of modernization. The Kim Dae Jung government came to power right after the 1997 economic crisis (Shin and Chang 1999; Pempel 1999). Although it denounced the previous government for its failure to prevent the crisis, it accelerated the globalization processes already at work in the country. More specifically, the Kim Dae Jung government pursued reform in corporate governance, improved transparency in financial transactions, and increased flexibility in labor markets. These measures were aimed at better meeting “global standards.” Furthermore, the government recognized the strategic value of overseas Koreans, especially Korean Americans, and established the Overseas Korean Foundation under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, to “utilize overseas Koreans as a national resource for national development in a global era.” 9 In addition, a special law aimed at overseas ethnic Koreans was promulgated in December 1999. The Act Regarding the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans was promulgated to “guarantee immigration of Overseas Koreans into the Republic of Korea and their legal status in the Republic of Korea.” The law offered a comprehensive package of privileges from financial transactions to pensions (except legal citizenship) to overseas Koreans who wanted to return to Korea. The law’s larger goal was to create a global Korean community or networks on the following bases: (1) it was believed that overseas Koreans still maintain a strong Korean ethnic identity; (2) globalization, especially through the Internet, would improve communication among Koreans within and beyond the peninsula; and (3) the combination of the two could work to produce a

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new global Korean network. In practice, however, the main targets of this special law were Korean Americans because the globalizing Korean economy demanded more English-speaking professionals. Ethnic Koreans in China and Russia were excluded from the law, because the Korean government feared it might open the door to unskilled ethnic Koreans from these countries. In this regard, Samuel Kim criticizes the law as “hypernationalistic legislative sleight of hand [that] contradicts the spirit and letter of President Kim Dae Jung’s professed globalism” (2000, 262). Ethnic Koreans in Russia and China, along with civic social movement groups, protested the law, which was eventually ruled unconstitutional by the Korean Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the targeting of Korean Americans demonstrates a careful, strategic, and instrumentalist use of globalization by the government for what it deems to be collective national interests. strengthening national identity

Although the Korean government has been appropriating globalization, it has also been keen on preserving and even promoting Korea’s native culture and values. If the former was a proactive effort to take advantage of any benefits or opportunities that globalization could bring to the nation, the latter was a reactive measure to prevent those things that are harmful to the survival of the nation. As Smith (1995) points out, globalization, as with modernization, inevitably produces social and cultural disruption, and a nation-state often reacts to this upheaval by promoting ethnic and national solidarity. Chains of memory, myth, and symbol connect nations to their ethnic heritage, and national identity satisfies the people’s need for cultural fulfillment, rootedness, security, and fraternity in the face of tumult. From this perspective, national identity increases in importance as the processes of globalization continue; Korea is no exception here. Just as in the Park regime during the modernization drive of the 1960s and 1970s, the Korean governments of the 1990s were careful to preserve and even revitalize Korea’s native culture and identity in the midst of globalization. The Kim Young Sam government officially used the Korean term segyehwa when referring to globalization, deliberately employing the word to stress a Korean way of globalization. Furthermore, two of the “five major goals of globalization” specifically addressed issues of national identity and values. For instance, the third goal was to promote national unity in the process of globalization: “Only when the entire Korean people unite

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as one in the pursuit of globalization, rising above class, regional and generational differences, will we be able to triumph in global competition” (Kim Young Sam 1996, 273). The fourth goal was to ground globalization in “Koreanization.” President Kim unequivocally proclaimed, “Koreans cannot become global citizens without a good understanding of their own culture and tradition. . . . Koreans should march out into the world on the strength of their unique culture and traditional values. Only when the national identity is maintained and intrinsic national spirit upheld will Koreans be able to successfully globalize” (1996, 15). For him, Koreanization was not contradictory to globalization and should in fact be an underpinning for its processes. Here lies a parallel between Park’s rhetoric of modernization and Kim’s logic of globalization in the emphasis on Korea’s native culture and national identity as integral to their respective national development projects. The government promoted programs to revitalize Korean culture and heritage in its pursuit of Koreanized globalization. During the past decade, in various cities across the country, Korea has seen a proliferation of festivals and events designed to enhance images and identities that utilize the cultural heritage of each respective locality.10 The Andong Folk Festival, the Biennale of Kwangju, and the Asian Film Festivals in Pusan are good examples of the current active promotion of regional identities (Yea 2003). Andong is well known for its Confucian tradition and hosts a variety of folk festivals featuring “historical and cultural heritages,” from rituals and village compacts to games, music, and dances. In the fall of 2001, the city hosted an international Confucian cultural festival to commemorate the five-hundredth anniversary of the birth of T’oegye, one of the best-known Korean Confucianists. The festival organizers proclaimed that “Confucianism is an alternative to the spiritual and moral deterioration of the present day; a way to create a world in which respect and love are foremost.” The festival intended to “reexamine Confucian tradition that is at the center of our national culture and creatively apply the tradition to the present day with a view to achieve cultural diversity.” Activities included a variety of cultural and artistic events, a Confucian culture exhibition, and an international academic conference.11 Such activities illustrate Koreans’ efforts to defend and revitalize their indigenous identities and cultures from the encroaching forces of globalization. The Korean government has supported such folk festivals both directly and indirectly. The Ministry of Culture and Tourism issues a recommended list of folk festivals for tourists. The seventeen festivals that the ministry

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recommended for the second half of 2002, for instance, featured kimch’i, ginseng, ceramics, the mask dance, martial arts, and traditional music, all supposedly representing Korea’s cultural heritage and tradition.12 It was in this context that the government promoted developing the field of Korean Studies (han’guk hak), both in Korea and abroad.13 In short, the Korean state has not only appropriated globalization (segyehwa) for the nationalist agenda but also promoted various programs to preserve Korean heritage and culture. Reflecting such state policy, sint’o puli (body and soil as the same) discourse has become popular in the 1990s. As the term implies, sint’o puli claims that if a person has Korean blood, he or she is Korean, regardless of class background or place of residence. Therefore, it can be claimed that Koreans remain Korean because they share the same blood. Neither globalization nor any other social change can alter this fact. Moreover, the ideology of sint’o puli has not remained at the level of discourse. It has been transformed into the commercialization of the Korean culture and heritage. Food, drink, and other everyday commodities that incorporate traditional “Korean” elements have become popular products in the Korean market. For example, sikhye (sweet rice juice) reportedly outsold Coca-Cola, that ultimate symbol of global commodities. Also, the two volumes of Yu Hongjun’s Nau˘i munhwa yusan tapsagi (In Search of My Cultural Heritage, 1994), which describe his visit to Korea’s various cultural heritage sites, became a bestseller in the 1990s. Other similar works that address Korean history, culture, and heritage from a modern perspective have also become popular.14 As Kwo˘n Sugin points out, “National traditional culture is considered more than a product of the past or something to preserve and transmit. It has become an object to commodify to maximize its potential value” (1998, 186). asian regionalism

The promotion of Asian regionalism is the third response to globalization. Concomitant with the rising power of globalization, the world has seen the formation of various forms of regional entities. As Hedetoft (1999) points out, even the European Union (EU), a prototype of a transnational, regional entity, is not necessarily an attempt to remove the nation-state; rather, it is a proactive project to limit and contain global forces that evade the control of the sovereign nation-state. In his view, the EU’s primary goal is to defend “the Europeans” against the economic, political, and cultural forces of

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globalization. The rise of pan-Asianism at the turn of the twentieth century represents a similar East Asian response, in that case to the increasing power of white, Western imperialism in the region. The earlier pan-Asianist arguments were largely dismissed after 1945. Although the Park regime normalized relations with Japan in 1965 and promoted some Confucian (Asian) values in maintaining his autocratic regime, there was no serious discussion or promotion of Asian regionalism in Korea during much of the post–1945 period. The colonial legacy of Japanese rule and the Communist system of China made it difficult to promote any coherent East Asian solidarity or identity. Korea did join some regional entities, such as APEC, but these were far from coherent regional organizations and had diverse members, including the United States, China, and Australia. More recently, however, Asian regionalist arguments are gaining more currency in Korea. This new movement largely reflects the rise of China as well as Korea’s discomfort with U.S.-dominated globalization. China is now the biggest market for South Korean exports and the favored destination for its investment (replacing the United States). Korean students represent the largest proportion of the rapidly increasing group of foreign students in China. In addition, China has played a leadership role in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue, and some South Koreans regard reliance on China as an alternative to its security dependence on the United States. A survey of the newly elected members of the National Assembly taken right after the April 15, 2004, election attests to this belief: 50 percent of the ruling Uri Party members list China as Korea’s most important ally; only 42 percent refer to the United States in this regard. Koreans have been reluctant to accept Japanese leadership in a new East Asian regional order, largely due to the historical legacy of colonial rule, but they do seem more willing to embrace China as a new regional leader (despite the fact that South Korea fought the Chinese army during the Korean War). In this context the current Roh Moo Hyun government seeks to make Korea a hub of the Northeast Asian economy. He defined the current period as an era of Northeast Asia (tongbuk a sidae), and he unequivocally proclaimed that the Republic of Korea must actively participate in the new era by becoming a hub in the region. Whereas the previous Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung governments focused on globalization (segyehwa) and inter-Korean issues (sunshine policy), respectively, the Roh government has established regionalism as a key policy agenda. This new outlook, however,

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is not simply a matter of policy or strategy; it signifies Korea’s new politics of identity. As Gilbert Rozman points out in his recent book on Northeast Asian regionalism, “National identity is the foundation of state power and foreign policy. To accept regionalism means to redefine one’s country’s identity” (2004, 364). Koreans are actively seeking to (re)define their position vis-à-vis foreign powers like the United States and China, as well as in relation to their northern half. This new outlook is closely related to a changing regional order, especially the rise of China, and (South) Korea’s discontent with American unilateralism, especially its handling of the North Korean nuclear issue. To be sure, Asian regionalism and pan-Asian ideas are not new to Koreans. Yet, from historical and comparative perspectives, the current version of Korean Asianism reveals some distinctive features. Today’s Asianism reflects confidence in the economic power that the region (including Korea) has accumulated in the last several decades. In particular, it is spurred by China’s recent, rapid rise as a key player in the region. Besides its economic growth, China has taken the initiative in dealing with the current nuclear standoff with North Korea by hosting six-party talks in Beijing. Whereas late nineteenth-century pan-Asianism reflected a changing regional order with the decline of China and rise of Japan, today’s version stems from China’s crucial impact in the region and world. Likewise, whereas late nineteenthcentury pan-Asianism sought to resist the region’s incorporation into the Western world capitalist system, today’s version seeks to distance Korea from American hegemony and to grant it a more appropriate role as a hub in the region. In this sense, today’s Asianism is far more proactive and forward-looking. This recent version of pan-Asianism, unlike in the past, is being advocated by progressives. In the early 1990s, a group of Korean scholars and intellectuals, who were largely political or ideological conservatives, advocated promoting “Asian values” to establish “Confucian capitalism” or “Confucian democracy.” 15 As part of their capitalist strategies, they invoked common Asian culture.16 Yet, with the financial crisis of 1997, which allegedly showed the weakness of “Asian values” in a globalizing world, the argument lost popular appeal. Today’s Asianism comes from a group of progressive scholars and intellectuals who currently serve the Roh government. Unlike their counterparts on the right, they do not invoke old Asian ideologies, such as Confucianism, but focus on more universalistic values, such as human

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rights, civil society, and democratic ethics. Some are former activists who seek to promote Asian solidarity among transnational civic social movement groups and NGOs. Their main motivation appears quite nationalist in the sense that their ultimate goal is to contain or tame America-led globalization and unilateralism by building solidarity in what they understand as East Asian civil society. In short, they aspire to shift from a Korea focused on the United States to one focused on Asia, especially on China. They seek, to use Andre G. Frank’s phrase, to “reorient” Korea. Asianism is being promoted as a new strategy for the entire Korean peninsula. Its proponents argue that U.S.-led globalization unfairly excludes North Korea and that a new strategy of national survival must incorporate the North. A report by the Presidential Commission on Policy Planning defines this recent Asianism as “a new perspective of history and worldview” with the ultimate goal of forming an “Asian Union” that would include the North, which was left out in globalization processes (2003, 6). They treat the North as part of Korea’s ethnic identity, but question whether U.S. policies are compatible with South Korea’s national interests. They believe that establishing a system of peace and prosperity in the Northeast Asian region is essential to Korea’s survival, and regionalism offers one possible strategy in this era of globalization. In their view, such a regional entity would also play a crucial role in resolving inter-Korea problems, including unification. Finally, today’s Asian regionalism seems to be shaping up in a unique way, especially when compared to the forms that have appeared in Europe and North America. In Peter Katzenstein’s view, regionalism in Asia occurs in markets rather than through formal institutions, as happens in Europe: “Asia’s network-style integration shows a sharp contrast to the exclusive character of Europe’s emphasis on formal institutions” (1997, 3). He refers to two factors that have influenced the formation of network-like (instead of institutionalized) regionalism in Asia: (1) the international situation, especially the U.S. promotion of bilateralism in Asia after 1945 (in contrast to multilateralism in Europe); and (2) the network-like structure of East Asian states. I would add that East Asian nations, unlike their European counterparts, have not yet “come to terms with the past,” especially with the legacy of Japanese colonial rule in Korea and their history of atrocities in China. Thus, East Asian nations might be increasingly integrated economically and culturally, but much less so politically or institutionally. The recent controversies over the “history of Koguryo˘” between China and Korea and the

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territorial disputes over Tokto/Takeshima island between Korea and Japan attest to the difficulty of forming an East Asian identity (Shin, Park, and Yang 2005).

Civilization, Modernization, and Globalization National and global forces do not necessarily contradict each other; rather, they are readily compatible and interactive. This is because globalization can be appropriated for national interests and globalization can intensify, rather than weaken, national consciousness. Globalization presents both opportunities and threats (real or perceived), and a nation-state becomes proactive in maximizing what globalization has to offer, as well as reactive to what it perceives as its harmful effects. The Korean case shows that its approach to globalization has been multilayered. In the name of segyehwa the government has promoted globalization to enhance Korea’s national competitiveness in a rapidly globalizing world and has simultaneously sought to preserve and strengthen national heritage and culture. More recently, it has been promoting Asian regionalism as a reaction to U.S.-led globalization. Such interplay of national and global forces, however, is not new. Koreans have appropriated transnational forces to enhance their national interests, as illustrated by their instrumentalist acceptance of the notions of civilization at the turn of the twentieth century and economic development drives during the 1960s and 1970s. When Korea joined the modern world-system in the late nineteenth century, the Western notion of “civilization” became an international standard and provoked a radical rethinking of the nation and the region. Korean intellectuals and leaders widely embraced the notion of civilization and believed it to be necessary in making their country fully sovereign and modern among other nation-states. However, embracing the notion of civilization did not mean giving up Korea’s national heritage and culture. Far from discarding their East Asian or national heritage, they sought to utilize elements of Eastern or their own national tradition to create a new framework. In this context pan-Asianism and ethnic nationalism appeared. National and transnational forces coexisted, sometimes in contentious relation and at other times in supplementary ways. Several decades later, the notion of civilization reappeared in Korea, this time in the form of modernization. Similar to the early twentieth-century adoption of “civilization,” “development” was taken as a key principle for

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Korea’s “modernization of the fatherland” project. Although the notion of development itself was Western in origin and Korea’s strategy was indeed transnational (that is, export-oriented industrialization), its goals were clearly nationalist. While pursuing modernization, the developmental state sought to mobilize Korea’s “spiritual power” by promoting national culture and heritage. Some claimed that Koreans had to reject elements that could harm their cultural heritage, while accepting and digesting superior aspects of “foreign civilization.” It was likewise in this context that the Park regime stressed the simultaneity of “economic construction and spiritual development” in its pursuit of modernization project. As Korea entered the final decade of the twentieth century, globalization replaced modernization as a paradigm of socioeconomic change, just as modernization had replaced civilization decades earlier. To be sure, important changes have occurred with globalization, such as compression in time and space enabled through technological advances and the rise of flexible transnational capital. Still there exists little difference among civilization, modernization, and globalization in terms of their respective relationships with nationalism. All three involve an expansionary process, seeking to stretch the range of national influence to every corner of the globe. Capitalism has been the driving force behind this diffusion. In addition, all three are transnational forces with Western origins that have simultaneously been appropriated by Koreans for national goals. They have all provoked intense responses from both the elites and the wider populace.17 The intensification, not the weakening, of ethnic identity and national consciousness has resulted. In this sense, a strong nationalist character is not a collective fantasy or a paradox, as some scholars have claimed; rather, it is a major feature or “paradigm” of today’s processes of Korean globalization. There is no clear indication that either national or global forces will disappear in the near future. Instead, they will likely coexist in Korea, in relations that are both contentious and complementary. It would, therefore, be wrong to expect a “paradigm shift” in Korea’s national development strategy in the near future. Indeed, the intimate connection between global and national forces is not a new feature that only appears in current globalization processes; it has been the paradigm for Korea’s transition to modernity that began in the late nineteenth century and continues to shape the forms and nature of Korea’s development strategy.

Conclusion Genealogy, Legacy, and Future

This book has sought to account for the origins and politics of Korean ethnic nationalism in the twentieth century. Ethnic nationalism, here, has meant that which involves emphases on descent and race, that is, on biology. As such, it can also be called racial nationalism. I have attempted to identify the historical processes by which race, ethnicity, and nation came to be conflated in Korea to produce a strong sense of oneness based on shared bloodline and ancestry. I have treated nation or national identity not as a fixed entity or settled accomplishment, but rather as a field of politics and even a project. Nation, I argue, is a social and historical construction, not an eternal or natural one. As such, nation or national identity is in flux— constantly challenged, contested, reformulated, and transformed. I have looked at dual processes of contention in explaining the historical process of ethnicization of the Korean nation: one between national and transnational forces; the other over the very notion of nation. By way of concluding this study, I now offer a genealogy of Korean ethnic nationalism, assess its contribution and disservice to Korean society, and discuss its future.

Genealogy of Korean Ethnic Nationalism As scholars of nationalism have indicated, the origins and growth of nationalism are closely related to the arrival of modernity. As modernization infiltrates a “traditional” society, the perception of uneven development creates the potential for nationalism. In the Korean case, it was a newly emerging regional and world order in the late nineteenth century that stimulated 223

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a modern nation-building process. In particular, with the decline of China, rise of Japan, and increasing presence of the West in the East Asian region, Koreans were struggling with how to position their country vis-à-vis a rapidly changing regional and world configuration. They had to find an identity that could offer a vision and guide their efforts to create a new, modern, and viable nation. Koreans in the late nineteenth century had the daunting challenge of modernizing their country and (re-)creating its identity, which were closely intertwined tasks. In this context nation emerged as a major source of collective or categorical identity for Korean people. Although Korea had maintained a territorially bounded political community for centuries, the notion of “Korea” needed to be reframed in the new language of nation and nationalism. Furthermore, nation was not the only new source of collective identity: it now had to compete with other rival nonnational and transnational forms. In the early stage of the nation-building process, “region” and “East” emerged as a major rival form of collective identity to nation. Influenced by Darwinian racial thought, a group of Koreans viewed race as the basic unit of identity in the world and understood the present situation as an age of racial struggle, especially between the yellow (Asian) and white races. Such a binary view made them rethink their existing assumptions about the country and region, a process that led to the development of pan-Asianism, or Easternism, which advocated regional alliances and solidarity among Korea, Japan, and China against encroaching “white” imperialism. The rise of pan-Asianism, however, provoked a reaction in the form of nationalism that prioritized nation over region or race as a primary source of collective identity. Suspicious of the Japanese promotion of pan-Asian ideas, nationalists charged that Japan was concealing its imperialist ambitions. They tried to convince fellow Koreans of Japan’s real interests and attempted to promote national consciousness, rather than pan-Asian solidarity. While pan-Asianists stressed common cultural heritage among East Asians, nationalists sought to prove the purity and distinctiveness of the Korean nation. Nationalists, though influenced by social Darwinism, understood the present world as a struggle between imperialism and nationalism, not between races. For them, Japan was not a friendly ally in Korea’s struggle against white imperialism, but rather as the main menace to its national security. In short, nation and region were competing as a new source of collective identity for Korean people at the turn of the twentieth century.

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The early efforts to build a modern nation failed with Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910. Colonization forced Koreans to face a much more difficult task to build a new, modern, independent nation. Now Koreans not only needed an identity that would make their nation modern; they needed a method for becoming free from colonial rule and regaining political sovereignty. Encouraged by “cultural rule” in the post–March First independence movement era, a new generation of Korean nationalists who came of age in the 1920s sought to (re)construct the Korean nation. In developing a new notion of nation, Korean nationalists had to confront two major challenges: colonial racism and international Socialism. Colonial racism denied the distinctiveness of the Korean nation by advocating a theory of common racial origins of the Korean and Japanese people; international Socialism preached the primacy of class over nation. Both posed challenges because they either denied or marginalized the importance of nation as a source of Koreans’ collective identity. In response to colonial racism, Korean nationalists advocated the purity and distinctiveness of the Korean nation or race. They studied and reevaluated Korean history, culture, and heritage to provide a “scientific” basis for the distinctive origins of the Korean nation. In response to international Socialism, Korean nationalists stressed the natural and timeless essence of the Korean nation, while characterizing class as a fleeting product of history. By the end of colonial rule, it was nation, not empire or class that prevailed as a primary source of collective identity among Koreans. After colonial rule, the (ethnic) nation became a primary source of collective identity among Koreans on both sides of the peninsula. Other transnational forces, such as Communism in the North and modernization and globalization in the South, emerged as potentially rival sources of collective identity for Koreans. Yet these transnational forces did not remove or weaken the power of nation or nationalism. On the contrary, they were appropriated for nationalist agendas on both sides. In the North, Koreans were continuously asked to creatively apply Marxism-Leninism to the Korean situation. Such a call for the appropriation of Communism toward the Korean revolution gradually evolved into juche ideology, “Socialism of our style,” and “a theory of the Korean nation as number one.” Similarly, in the South, Koreans were asked to devote their energy for “modernization of the fatherland” and, later, for liberalization and globalization to increase national competitiveness in a rapidly globalizing world.

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Thus, in explaining the rise and dominance of nation over other rival forms of collective identity, one needs to understand the contentious politics between national and transnational forces (see Figure 12.1). In the end, nation has become dominant over the others. Its triumph, however, was not a matter of destiny; it is the product of historically specific factors and events. In particular, as in most other countries (perhaps with the exception of England and France), threat and resentment (as well as envy) were instrumental to the rise of ethnic nationalism in Korea. Nationalism did not necessarily preclude transnational elements, however. Transnational forces were also extensively appropriated for the nationalist agenda, as illustrated by nationalist politics in both North and South Korea. The historical processes of contention with and appropriation of transnational forces in explaining the rise, development, and triumph of nation and nationalism in modern Korea must be understood. Contention and appropriation explain the relationship between national and transnational forces in modern Korea. Contention was not confined to what was perceived as external to Korea. There was much debate over the very notion of nation as well. As scholars of nationalism point out, nation involves different elements to varying degrees in the construction process of a particular notion of nation. Sometimes civic elements dominate ethnic ones; at other times, the opposite occurs. Also as tradition is frequently (re)invented to produce a modern notion of nation, contention occurs over which element(s) of tradition should be selected and applied. Similarly, as the state mobilizes nationalism, the official notion of nation is contested by civil society. Thus, internal contention can take various forms: civic versus ethnic, modern versus antimodern, or official versus popular. Korea was no exception. One must understand the historical process of this internal contention in order to explain the rise and dominance of an ethnicized or racialized notion of nation or national identity. As with external contention, the triumph of a particular notion of the nation was not a matter of destiny. It was, rather, an outcome of historical contingency. In the early years of nation building, Korean nationalists entertained both civic and ethnic or universalistic and particularistic conceptions of nation. Contrary to conventional wisdom in Korea, ethnicization of the Korean nation was not the logical or natural extension of the preexisting notion of a political community. Early nationalists talked about the civic bases, such as civil rights, individual freedom, legal equality, and popular sovereignty, of a new, modern Korean nation. Ethnicization of the Korean nation was closely related to a certain sense of external threat—the 1905 Japanese Pro-

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Transnational (region, class, and so on) National—

Ethnic Political— Antimodern (agrarian) Modern—

Bourgeois—

State

Marxist

Society

figure 12.1 Genealogy of Korean Nationalism.

tectorate Treaty, colonial racism, and international Socialism were seen as constraining Korea’s national sovereignty, denying the distinctiveness of the Korean race, or arguing for the primacy of class over nation, respectively. By stressing the ethnic, collectivistic, organic nature of the nation, Koreans were able to enhance internal solidarity and collective consciousness of the Korean nation against external threat. Even after colonial rule, the sense of threat did not disappear in either North or South Korea. Communism and American imperialism were perceived to pose threats to the Korean nation from the perspectives of the South and North, respectively, reinforcing an organic sense of the Korean nation in both sides. Even today, many Koreans consider their nation or race to be immortal, indivisible, and eternal. Although its ethnic base was taken for granted, the political notion of the Korean nation was hotly debated. Even during colonial rule, there was no consensus over the proper form of political community of a new (future) Korea. Bourgeois nationalists, for instance, envisioned the new Korea as a capitalist society, while Marxist nationalists (different from international socialists who sought to establish a Soviet republic) advocated the establishment of a people’s republic. By contrast, agrarianists saw the future of Korea in terms of a self-sufficient communal society with explicit links to agrarian tradition. Despite envisioning different forms of political community, however, all used the modern language of nationalism and agreed on the ethnic base of the Korean national community. The internal contention over the political notion of the Korean national community continued after liberation. Both North and South Korea linked nation or national identity to their own legitimacy and appropriated a particular form of a political nation, Communist and capitalist, respectively. However, the antimodern, agrarian notion of national identity was marginalized on both sides because it did not fit into a newly emerging domestic

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and international order. Contention between the two Koreas over the political notion of nation that still shared the idea of a single ethnic origin produced a peculiar situation. The result was an intense and contentious politics of national representation because it presented the thorny question of which political conception of the Korean nation would and should represent the entire Korean ethnic nation. The political notion of nation has also been contested between state and society, since nationalism was extensively mobilized in politics (there was no space for such contention within the totalitarian regime of North Korea). In particular, authoritarian regimes relied on nationalist rhetoric to justify their autocratic system and to mobilize the populace for “national” goals they identified as security and development. However, in the name of the nation, national unity, and modernization of the fatherland, other collective identities and competing voices were suppressed. Korean civil society contested such an official notion of national identity by promoting anti-American, minjung nationalism. By characterizing the minjung (marginalized or oppressed people) as the core of the Korean nation, civil society offered an alternative to the official view of nation. Yet the internal contention centered only on the political notion of nation because both sides took for granted its ethnic base. This focus on the political aspect explains why nationalist politics in Korea has been so emotional and bitter. By accepting the same ethnic base of nation, each side expects the other to behave in the same way as members of the same (ethnic) nation. Yet in subscribing to contrasting political notions of nation, each accuses the other of nonnation or even antination behavior, like a child rebelling against family norms. Even democratization and globalization have not uprooted such politics of national identity. Communally based blood nationalism continues to appeal to Koreans. The rise and dominance of an ethnicized notion of the Korean nation in the twentieth century was the outcome of dual processes of contention. The first process involved contention between national and transnational forces as sources of collective identity. The second centered on contention over the very notion of nation or national identity. Seen this way, ethnicization of the Korean nation was not the natural or logical development of premodern forms of identity, but rather the outcome of such historical processes. Although the ethnic understanding of nation has come to dominate twentieth-century Korea, this does not mean that the contentious politics of nation or national identity will soon disappear. In addition to the ongoing territorial division

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that produces the contentious politics of national representation, Koreans continue to question their own identity in response to a changing international environment (for example, the end of cold war, the rise of China) and the arrival of a new transnational force (namely, globalization).

The Prize and Price of Ethnic Nationalism in Korea A tradition in the scholarship of nationalism views political nationalism as civic, integrative, and constructive, while regarding ethnic nationalism as dangerous, divisive, and destructive. Ethnic cleavages are considered more fundamental and permanent than other forms of cleavages, and conflict arising from them are said to be the most difficult to address. Yet these observations are largely based on European experiences, especially in multiethnic nations. The Korean case examined here shows many more complexities in the politics of ethnic nationalism than the current literature suggests. Belief in a unitary ethnic nation has produced an intensely felt collective sense of “oneness” and has performed a variety of roles and functions in modern Korea. Recognizing the complex nature of ethnic nationalism is necessary to assess its prize and price in modern Korean society and politics. Ethnic nationalism functioned as an anticolonial and anti-imperialist ideology. Unlike in Western Europe where nationalism developed as an ideology to integrate diverse ethnic groups into a unified political community and to justify imperialist expansions, in Korea nationalism arose primarily as a response to imperialism. For Korea, which had a long history of political, linguistic, and geographic continuity, the issue of political integration or geographic demarcation was less important than the threat of imperialism. Enhancement of collective consciousness and internal solidarity among Koreans against the external threat was even more urgent. As a result, an organic notion of nation (that is, nation as immortal and indivisible) developed. After Korea fell to Japanese rule, ethnic nationalism was effectively employed to counter the colonial racism that denied the distinctiveness of the Korean nation. Thus, ethnic nationalism did not play a divisive role but performed an integrative function in modern Korea. Ethnic nationalism also shaped developmental strategy in both Koreas. Scholars of development have pointed to the role nationalism plays in producing a literate, coherent population (Gellner 1983) or an “ideology of delayed industrialization” (Gerschenkron 1962). In South Korea nationalism

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was instrumental to the rise of a “developmental ethic,” which performed a function equivalent to what Max Weber called the “Protestant ethic” in the rise of Western capitalism. Ethnic nationalism is also the underlying principle of current globalization processes in the South. In the North, ethnic nationalism offered the grounds for the formation of a belief that Koreans are a chosen people, a position that became the epistemological basis for the development of juche ideology, “Socialism of our style,” and more recently, “a theory of the Korean nation as number one.” Ethnic nationalism could potentially play an integrative role as well in a unification process. A strong sense of ethnic unity could be common ground for Koreans, especially in the early stages of the unification process. Such feelings could help facilitate a smooth integration of the two systems. Despite the problems associated with ethnic nationalism that many scholars of nationalism stress, attitudes and belief in ethnic homogeneity still offer Koreans a considerable amount of inspiration and solidarity. To be sure, ethnic consciousness alone will not suffice in approaching unification issues. Formulating a more democratic and civic national identity will be essential to prevent breeding any “exclusionary” nationalism after unification. Nonetheless, this self-ascribed identity of homogeneity can serve as the basis for the initial impetus toward unification, if not as the stable foundation for a unified Korea. Having noted some positive, integrative roles, however, I must indicate the price that Koreans have had to pay for developing such strong ethnic identity and nationalism. The dominance of the ethnic, collectivistic, organic notion of nation has marginalized or repressed other important, competing forms of identities. The development of ethnic nationalism in the 1930s was influenced by fascist thought that preached the primacy of nation over other identities, including class. Such fascist potential was actualized after 1945 by autocratic states in both Koreas. Both Rhee’s Ilmin chuu˘i and Kim’s juche ideology had totalitarian elements that subsumed people under a holistic ideology. Individuals were considered part of an abstract whole, and citizens were asked to sacrifice individual freedom and civil rights for the collectivity. Korea was not too different from many Third World countries that saw the rise of populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism in the postcolonial period. In short, nation was used as a trump card to override other identities as well as to justify violations of human and civic rights in both Koreas.

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The dominance of collectivistic, ethnic, and organic nationalism constrained space for liberalism in the public sphere in general. During Korea’s transition to the modern world, issues of individual freedom and civic rights were downplayed in favor of collectivism and national survival. In its formative years of nation building, nationalism developed in opposition to liberalism, and these two ideologies were mistakenly positioned against each other. This historical legacy led to the poverty or shallowness of liberalism, which in turn affected the poor or distorted development of both conservatism and radicalism in Korea. Marxism, for instance, did not develop in constructive contention with liberalism, but out of total rejection or denial of it. Meanwhile, a lack of a liberal base made Korean conservatism highly vulnerable to manipulation by authoritarian leaders. One can thus claim that the shallowness of modern thought of both the Left and the Right in Korea had much to do with the poverty of liberalism and dominance of nationalism. The same can be said of North Korea. Both the Left and the Right were able to exercise ideological power only when combined with ethnic nationalism. The poverty of liberalism and consequent shallowness of conservative and progressive thought was the price that Koreans had to pay for the dominance of ethnic nationalism in society, culture, and politics. Ironically, it is this very belief in ethnic unity that has accounted for the tension and conflict between the two Koreas over the last half-century. A strong belief in the solidarity of fellow ethnic Koreans coupled with a realization of the artificial territorial partition has produced a kind of cognitive dissonance. Accordingly, there has been great pressure to reduce this dissonance and restore the lost unity; in turn, this has worked to heighten tensions within the group. Tensions and conflict have arisen since these efforts entailed contention over who truly represents the Korean nation versus who is at fault for undermining Korea’s ethnic unity. This battle for true representation of the Korean nation can help explain the highly charged inter-Korea conflict, including the destructive war between 1950 –53. Thus, ethnic unity has not necessarily performed an integrative role. On the contrary, it is responsible for inter-Korean conflict and could activate the “black sheep effect” in the unification process. In sum, ethnic nationalism has been a crucial source of pride and inspiration for people during the turbulent years of Korea’s transition to modernity that involved colonialism, territorial division, war, and authoritarian politics. It has also enhanced collective consciousness and internal solidarity against

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external threats and has served Korea’s modernization project as an effective resource. At the same time, ethnic nationalism became a totalitarian force in politics, culture, and society. It came to override other competing identities and led to the poverty of modern thought, including liberalism, conservatism, and radicalism. It was also responsible for inter-Korea conflict and tensions. As Korea enters the twenty-first century, it still needs to formulate and promote more cultural and social diversity beyond ethnic homogeneity.

The Future of Ethnic Nationalism in Korea South Korea today has at least three faces: nationalist, globalist, and regionalist. These are often competing but not necessarily mutually exclusive or contradictory. They closely interact with each other to shape the fabric of contemporary Korea. With respect to nationalism, Koreans maintain a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity based on shared blood and ancestry, and nationalism continues to function as a key resource in Korean politics and foreign relations. This is even more pronounced in North Korea, which has been stressing the importance of ethnic national identity in their struggle for regime survival. At the same time, South Korea has embraced globalization, and despite its 1997 financial crisis, it has become a major player in a global economy. Yet, globalization has been appropriated for nationalist agenda, and its presence has spurred efforts to preserve Korean national culture and heritage. A regionalist outlook is now gaining more currency among Korean leaders and intellectuals, and the current Roh government seeks to make South Korea a “hub” of the Northeast Asian region. Yet their main motivations seem to be nationalist, that is, as a way of resisting U.S.-led globalization and unilateralism, reminiscent of Pan-Asianism of the turn of the twentieth century that was promoted against Western imperialism. Thus, despite the presence and growing power of regional and global forces, ethnic national identity held among Koreans is not likely to disappear or grow weak in the foreseeable future. This raises a scholarly and policy question: What can and should be done with the ethnic nationalism that will remain an important organizing principle of Korean society? The answer is not to ignore ethnic national identity, treating it as a mere myth or fantasy, or to remain simply content with its current role. Instead, it should be first and foremost recognized that ethnic nationalism has become a considerable force in Korean society and politics and that it can be dangerous and oppressive

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when fused with racism and other essentialist ideologies. Koreans must thus strive to find ways to use ethnic nationalism constructively and mitigate its potential harmful effects. In particular, Koreans must seriously consider the establishment of a democratic institution that can contain repressive, essentialist elements of nationalism. As Michael Mann (2004) shows, the presence of democratic institutions was crucial to prevent a nation from falling into fascist nationalism in prewar Europe. After all, ethnic identity is not a settled accomplishment or an everlasting being but a historical product and even a project, and identity politics can and should be incorporated into institutional frameworks. In Containing Nationalism, Michael Hechter suggests three types of conditions that can mitigate nationalist conflict. The first condition increases the costs of collective action. The second lowers the salience of national identity. The third decreases the demand for national sovereignty. For the first condition, Hechter refers to the former Soviet Union that used repression to increase the cost of collective action. Yet repression is only a short-term solution, as ethnic conflicts in the post-Soviet republics have shown. Also repression in the contemporary world can be much less effective because it is more difficult for a repressive regime to control new communication technologies such as the Internet. Hechter does not view the second as a viable option either, since ethnic identity is unlikely to wane in the foreseeable future. He thus sees the third option as the best hope for containing the destructive elements of nationalism as it hinges on conditions that decrease the demand for sovereignty among national groups. He suggests “consociationalism,” electoral systems, and federation as concrete examples to produce such conditions. In particular, he sees federation as the best option, since with federation, “the central government incorporates regional units into its decision procedure on some constitutionally entrenched basis” (2000, 139). Containing Nationalism offers an interesting reference point to the Korean case. I do not think, however, the first two conditions that Hechter suggested would apply to the Korean case. Korea, now a democratic country, is neither likely nor viable to contain nationalism through repression. Also, Korea’s strong sense of ethnic identity is unlikely to wane in near future. A sense of ethnic homogeneity is still strong in the midst of globalization and it defines unification discourse and policy. The third option, especially federation, is more complicated for the Korean case. In principle both Koreas agree on federation (or “loosed form of federation” as two Korean leaders announced at

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the 2000 summit) as a system of a unified Korea. Yet it is not clear whether Koreans will be content with a federational form of governance, or whether they will eventually push for a single nation-state. Given such a strong ethnic identity, there will be great pressures toward the latter. Hechter’s argument is based on multiethnic states, but Korea is once again different from them. Thus it seems to me that federation in itself may not be an ultimate solution to containing harmful effects of nationalism. What is most crucial would be whether Korea can develop democratic institutions that can equally treat people living in Korea, not simply because they share the same blood but because they are democratic citizens. Largely due to historical situations, Koreans have not been able to adequately institutionalize identity politics. In the West, especially in the first cases of nation and nation-state such as England and France, identity politics were contained within legal, institutional frameworks as people became members of a nation as citizens. In contrast, in Germany, Japan, and Korea, people became members of a nation or a nation-state because they shared the same blood. As a result, as Brubaker has shown, citizenship in the former countries was inclusive, and in the latter citizenship was exclusive. This principle of “bloodline” or jus sanguinis still defines the notion of Korean nationhood and citizenship, which are often inseparable in the mind of Koreans. In other words, in its formative years and then during colonial rule, intellectuals, and not the state, were the main agents of nation building, and their main focus understandably lied on the development of the ethnic base of nation without a corresponding attention to the political notion of citizenship. After colonial rule, both states extensively mobilized nationalism and engaged in contentious politics of national representation, but they did not pay adequate attention or make any serious effort to develop a more inclusive notion of citizenship. Social and political institutions that can address issues of discrimination against ethnic non-Koreans (for example, ethnic Chinese known as hwagyo in Korea) have been largely overlooked. The Korean nationality law is still based on jus sanguinis and legitimizes, consciously or unconsciously, ethnic discrimination against foreign migrant workers. In this context, it is no surprise that my 2000 survey shows that Koreans have stronger attachment to “ethnic Koreans living in foreign countries” than to “ethnic non-Koreans living in Korea.” It is also much easier for a Korean American who supposedly has “Korean blood” to “recover” Korean nationality than for an Indonesian migrant worker living in Korea

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to obtain Korean citizenship. This is true even if the Indonesian worker might be more culturally and linguistically Korean than a Korean American. Korea needs to institutionalize a legal system that mitigates unfair practices and discrimination against those who do not supposedly share the Korean blood. Koreans need an institutional framework to promote a democratic national identity that would allow for more diversity and flexibility among the populace, rather than simply appeal to an ethnic consciousness that tends to encourage false uniformity and enforce conformity to it. They should envision a society in which they can live together, not simply as fellow ethnic Koreans but as equal citizens of a democratic polity. It should be an integral part of democratic consolidation processes that Korea is currently undergoing. Otherwise, it would be hard to expect Korea to become “Asia’s hub,” which will require the accommodation of cultural and ethnic diversity and tolerance. Discussion of unification is premature and can even be considered dangerous if unification occurs without such change. As the German unification experience shows, a shared ethnic identity alone will not be able to prevent North Koreans from becoming “second-class citizens” in a unified Korea. Even worse, because of higher expectations resulting from a shared sense of ethnic unity, a gap between identity (ethnic homogeneity) and practice (second-class citizens) will add more confusion and tension to the unification process. Thus, it will be a major challenge for Koreans to develop democratic institutions that can treat people living in Korea as equal citizens of a democratic polity. This task will be all the more important and urgent as Korea becomes more democratic, globalizes, and also prepares for national unification.

Reference Matter

appendix 1

Coding Standards on Textbooks

Traditional Western Mixed

Traditional/National History (Korea or China*) Foreign History (U.S., Russia) Mixed History ( Japan)

Traditional Western Mixed

Traditional/National Figure (Korea or China*) Foreign Figure (U.S., Europe, Russia) Mixed Figures ( Japan)

Traditional

Traditional/National Geography (Rivers and Mountains in Old Korea, Towns and Cities in Korea) Foreign Geography (Western Global Cities such as New York and London) Mixed Geography ( Japan)

Western Mixed Traditional Western Mixed Traditional Western Mixed

Traditional Moral Education (Traditional Values such as Family, Friendship, Filial Piety, Royalty, Traditional Tales) Western Moral Education (Western Values such as Time, Western Tales like Aesop’s Fables) Mixed Moral Education ( Japanese Characters in Tales) Traditional Knowledge/Thought (Knowledge Itself, Studying, Reading) Western Knowledge/Thought (Scientific Observation, Application, the Importance of Time) Mixed Knowledge/Thought

239

240

Appendix 1

Traditional Western Mixed

Traditional/National Art (Poem on Diligence) Western Art Mixed Art

Western

Civic Education (State, Government, Citizenship, Rights and Duties, Nationalism, Patriotism, Economics, Occupations, Schools) Science and Technology (Biology, Chemistry, Earth, Physics, Electronics, Engineering, Public Health) General Knowledge such as Train Stations, Farming

Western Others

* Chinese figures and history were coded as traditional category, as Koreans did not yet fully differentiate Korea from China in these areas.

appendix 2

Coding Standards on Magazines

Traditional Western Mixed

Korean Language Foreign Language (English, French, Esperanto) Mixed Languages (Korean and Foreign)

Traditional Western Mixed

Traditional /National History (Korea) Foreign History (U.S., Russia) Mixed History ( Japan and China*)

Traditional Western Mixed

Traditional /National Figures (Korea) Foreign Figures (U.S., Russia, Germany) Mixed Figures ( Japan, China*, Korea Mixed with Other Western Countries)

Traditional Western

Traditional /National Geography Foreign Geography (Traveling Around the World, Geography in U.S. and England) Mixed Geography ( Japan, China)

Mixed Traditional

Western Mixed Traditional

Traditional Moral Education (Traditional Values such as Family, Friendship, Royalty, Filial Piety, Diligence, Traditional Tales) Western Moral Education (Western Values such as Time, Western Tales like Aesop’s Fables) Mixed Moral Education Traditional Knowledge/ Thought (Knowledge Itself, Studying, Reading)

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Appendix 2

Western Mixed Traditional Western Mixed Traditional Western

Mixed

Western Knowledge/ Thought (Scientific Observation, Application, Western Philosophy, the Importance of Time) Mixed Knowledge/ Thought Traditional /National Art (Traditional Poem, Hansi, Traditional Music, Traditional Art History) Western Art (Modern Poem and Novels, Western Classical Music, Western Musicians, Opera, Symphony) Mixed Art Traditional Civic Education (Traditional Educational Institutions, Traditional Virtues) Western Civic Education (State, Government, Citizenship, Rights and Duties, Nationalism, Patriotism, Economics, Trade/Commercials, Modern Schooling, Occupations) Mixed Civic Education

Western

Science and Technology (Biology, Chemistry, Earth, Physics, Electronics, Engineering, Public Health)

Traditional Western Mixed

Traditional Women’s Issues (Traditional Virtues of Women) Western Women’s Issues (Feminism, Women’s Participation in the Public Sphere, Modern Women Leaders) Mixed Women’s Issues

Traditional Western Mixed

Traditional Sports Western Sports (Olympic Games) Mixed Sports (Korean Athletes)

Mixed

International History (History on Europe and America, Editorials on World War II)

Editorial Others

General Knowledge, Farming

* Japan and China were coded as a mixed category, belonging neither to national nor to Western.

appendix 3

Findings of Statistical Analyses

243

78.93 1003

.02** 0.20 0.04 0.01 0.20 0.05 0.08 0.17 .32** 0.09

.42**

67.16 1003

.02** 0.22 0.03 0.00 0.21 0.08 0.08 0.16 .34** 0.09

.24**

note: *.05, **.01; Model Chi2 significant at the .05 level unless noted otherwise.

Model Chi2 N

Control Variables Age Gender Education Class NK Kin NK Knowledge Meritorious Society Summit Satisfied w/ Summit U.S. Out

Independent Variables Blood Ancestry

Opposing Unification is to Deny Ethnic-Nation

111.62 1003

.01* 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.23 0.11 .19** 0.53 .41** .32**

.27** 0.13

106.15 1003

.01* 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.25 0.13 .19** 0.54 .42** .32**

Have to Unify

167.79 1003

0.01 .31* 0.11 0.06 0.33 0.05 .13* 0.44 .57** .22**

.76** .33**

125.84 1003

0.01 .36** 0.10 0.04 0.34 0.09 .13* 0.37 .61** .22**

Unitary State

appendix 3.1 Coefficients from Ordinal Logistic Models Analyzing Impact of Ethnic Identity on Unification Attitudes

142.39 1003

0.01 0.22 .22** 0.06 0.18 0.11 0.07 0.02 .57** 0.09

.67** .27**

109.03 1003

0.01 .25* .21** 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.01 .61** 0.10

Recovery of Ethnic Nation

134.77 1003

.02** 0.02 .33** 0.06 0.24 1.24** 0.05 0.76 .27** 0.13

0.02

135.02 1003

.02** 0.02 .33** 0.06 0.23 1.23** 0.05 0.77 .28** 0.13

0.06

note: *.05, **.01; Model Chi2 significant at the .05 level unless noted otherwise.

Model Chi2 N

Control Variables Age Gender Education Class NK Kin NK Knowledge Meritorious Society Summit Satisfied w/ Summit U.S. Out

Independent Variables Blood Ancestry

Participation in NK Relief Efforts

113.22 1003

0.01 .24* 0.10 0.03 .51* 0.16 .31** 0.49 .34** 0.09

.43** 0.06

93.68 1003

0.01 .26* 0.10 0.02 .51* 0.17 .32** 0.53 .37** 0.09

Willing to Pay Special Unification Tax

77.93 1003

0.00 0.18 .13* 0.13 0.28 0.17 .13* 0.22 .37** .18**

0.14

76.03 1003

0.00 0.19 .13* 0.13 0.28 0.17 .14** 0.25 .39** .18**

0.04

Willing to Give Special Help to NK Citizens Upon Unification

appendix 3.2 Coefficients from Binary and Ordinal Logistic Models Analyzing Impact of Ethnic Identity on Behaviors Associated with Unification

40.7 1002

24.73 1002

note: *.05, **.01; Model Chi2 significant at the .05 level unless noted otherwise.

Model Chi2 N

0.00 0.00 .17** 0.01 0.26 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.01 .12*

Control Variables Age Gender Education Class NK Kin NK Knowledge Meritorious Society Summit Satisfied w/Summit U.S. Out

0.00 0.03 .18** 0.00 0.24 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.11

.23*

.49**

Independent Variables Blood Ancestry

Serious Barriers Between North and South

28.07 1003

0.00 .28* 0.01 0.14 .72** 0.20 0.01 0.42 .20** 0.01

0.02

Differences in Language

31.2 1003

0.00 .28* 0.00 0.14 .73** 0.19 0.00 0.45 .21** 0.01

0.16

17.44 722

0.01 0.01 – – .66* 0.21 0.13 0.27 .25* 0.04

0.09

Differences in Family Life

0.01 0.02 – – .69* 0.18 0.12 0.27 .26** 0.03

.29*

22.44 722

appendix 3.3 Coefficients from Ordinal Logistic Models Analyzing Impact of Ethnic Identity on Perceived Differences Between North and South Korea

21.89 805

Model Chi2 N

29.05 805

0.00 0.16 .19* 0.02 0.00 .58** 0.08 .87* 0.17 0.06

.45**

note: *.05, **.01; Model Chi2 significant at the .05 level unless noted otherwise.

0.00 0.13 0.09 0.01 0.01 .53** 0.09 .83* 0.17 0.05

0.26

Control Variables Age Gender Education Class NK Kin NK Knowledge Meritorious Society Summit Satisfied w/Summit U.S. Out

Independent Variables Blood Ancestry

Difference in Customs and Tradition

23.13 1002

0.00 0.18 0.08 0.09 0.31 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.06 .16**

.23*

Difference in Work Life

22.81 1002

0.01 0.16 0.07 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.06 .16**

.20*

17.25 864

0.00 .64** – – 0.44 0.44 0.17 0.86 0.06 0.04

0.04

Differences in Leisure Life

17.48 864

0.00 .64** – – 0.44 0.43 0.16 0.89 0.05 0.04

0.09

appendix 3.3 Coefficients from Ordinal Logistic Models Analyzing Impact of Ethnic Identity on Perceived Differences Between North and South Korea

80.54 830

Model Chi2 N

80.36 830

.04** .38* 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.11 .19* 0.13 0.01 .25**

0.07

note: *.05, **.01; Model Chi2 significant at the .05 level unless noted otherwise.

.04** .37* 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.12 .19* 0.11 0.01 .25**

0.10

Control Variables Age Gender Education Class NK Kin NK Knowledge Meritorious Society Summit Satisfied w/Summit U.S. Out

Independent Variables Blood Ancestry

South Korea Should Represent the Korean Ethnic Group

52.46 982

.03** 0.19 0.06 0.11 0.4 0.00 0.05 0.44 0.01 0.08

0.15

50.34 982

.02** 0.20 0.05 0.11 0.41 0.00 0.04 0.42 0.01 0.08

0.02

Ideal Political System for Korea upon Unification

appendix 3.4 Coefficients from Binary and Ordinal Logistic Models Analyzing Impact of Ethnic Identity on the Possibility of South Korean Hegemony upon Unification

52.09 1002

39.09 1002

note: *.05, **.01; Model Chi2 significant at the .05 level unless noted otherwise.

Model Chi2 N

0.01 0.12 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.19 .20** 0.15 0.12 0.06

Control Variables Age Gender Education Class NK Kin NK Knowledge Meritorious Society Summit Satisfied w/ Summit US Out

0.01 0.14 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.16 .20** 0.17 0.09 0.05

0.17

.39**

Independent Variables Blood Ancestry

Kim Il-Sung Is Responsible for National Division

59.84 1003

.01* 0.14 0.04 0.00 0.33 0.19 0.08 0.35 0.13 0.11

.60** 0.10

28.24 1003

.01** 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.33 0.21 0.09 0.3 .17* .12*

North Korean People Are Victims

35.96 1003

.01* 0.15 .21** .22** 0.15 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.05

0.14

34.71 1003

.01* 0.16 .21** .22** 0.15 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06

0.08

Communist Supporters Should Be Punished

appendix 3.5 Coefficients from Ordinal Logistic Models Analyzing Impact of Ethnic Identity on Distinction Between North Korean People and Communist Regime

Notes

Introduction 1. Koreans overseas share these views. The survey asked the same questions to 929 ethnic Koreans living in the United States, Japan, China, and Russia. The figures were 61.6, 38.6, 48.8, and 81.4 percent, respectively (see KBS 1999). 2. I use findings from this survey in other chapters. See Chapter 10 for a detailed description of the survey. 3. Although we have no comparable data for North Korea, I see little difference between the two Koreas in terms of their sense of ethnic unity. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 8, North Korea has stressed the purity and uniqueness of the Korean ethnic nation, especially after the collapse of the Soviet empire, as expressed in the “theory of the Korean nation as number one.” 4. The extremely high figures in social surveys that reveal a strong belief in shared blood and ancestry as shown above may reflect social pressure to agree on these “politically correct” questions. I hear more disagreements on the notion of shared blood and ancestry when I talk to people in private conversations. 5. It is interesting to note that Korean scholars tend to take the ethnicist/ primordialist view, whereas non-Korean or ethnic Korean scholars overseas tend to accept the modernist/constructionist one. This division roughly corresponds to one between “participants” and “observers.” For the participant in national movements, national belonging appears as founded in ethnic, primordial roots; for the observer, the very same identities take on the appearance of constructs and (re)invention. What is “necessary” for the participant becomes “contingent” for the observer. Many Korean scholars, especially nationalist scholars, have been more than mere observers since they have sought to repudiate colonialist narratives of the Korean nation. It is therefore no surprise that recent challenges to 251

252

Notes to Introduction

Korean nationalism and nationalist narratives come from scholars working outside Korea or scholars of Western history (H. Sin 2003; C. Yim 1999), and not from those of Korean history. 6. The national script that Korea employs today was once the language of women and the lower class, and Chinese was that of the yangban elite. Also, Confucianism remained largely the culture of the yangban, not a national culture in the modern sense used today. 7. See the debate on the formation of the Korean nation published in the winter 1992 issue of Yo˘ksa pip’yo˘ng. 8. Anderson contends that the nation, as a community, is “always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each (1983, 16). 9. Seen this way, Western individualism was instrumental to the rise of the nationalist conception of identity, though individualism and nationalism are often posited against each other. See Calhoun (1997, ch. 2). 10. Here “race” does not refer to the Korean race but denotes a larger, transnational concept, such as the “yellow race.” See Chapter 1 for a discussion of contention between race and nation. 11. Statist theorists contrast the developmental state of East Asia to the “predatory state” of African nations or the “regulatory state” of the West. 12. For a critique of such a distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism as “both normatively and analytically problematic,” see Brubaker (1998, 274). 13. For a critique of Doak’s argument as conflating ethnic with popular nationalism, see Sato (1998). 14. “Organic solidarity” develops out of differences between individuals and is a product of the division of labor with increasing differentiation of functions in a society. 15. Durkheim later revised his earlier view and stressed that even those societies with highly developed organic solidarity would still need a common faith or a “common conscience collective,” if they were not to disintegrate into a group of mutually antagonistic and self-seeking individuals (see Coser 1971, 132). Anthony Smith explained the survival and revival of ethnic nationalism in a global era from this Durkheimian view, as I discuss in Chapter 11. 16. Recently Schmid (2002) examined the rise of Korean nationalism in interaction with pan-Asianism at the turn of the twentieth century. I not only consider a broader field of contention between national and transnational forces but also extend my study to the present day. 17. China/Taiwan may be similar to divided Korea. But unlike the two Koreas where people share a sense of ethnic homogeneity, many in Taiwan seek to formulate their own distinctive Taiwanese (not Chinese) identity.

Notes to Chapter 1

253

Chapter 1 1. This metaphor may well describe the Taewo˘n’gun era (1864 –73), which pursued a highly isolationist policy. 2. Scholars have recently begun to better appreciate the importance of nonnational, transnational ideologies. See Schmid (2002). 3. I am fully aware that these terms like “East” and “West” are not fixed terms but socially constructed, and that this binary classification can offer oversimplified and even biased views of history and society. I still see their utility as metaphorical terms. 4. In the mid-nineteenth century, Tonghak (Eastern Learning) thought already made a crucial distinction between Western and Eastern Learning. Fearful of foreign incursions and alarmed by the spread of Catholicism, Ch’oe Suun, its founder, sought to build Korean spiritual strength to resist the Western Way through the Eastern Way. Yet Tonghak did not develop into any coherent pan-Asianist movement, although it was an ideology for the 1894 peasant rebellion and subsequent anti-Japanese struggle. See Susan Shin (1978 –79). 5. Kato¯’s view influenced Chinese understanding of social Darwinism, too, mainly through the works of Liang Qichao (Chi-ch’ao 1873 –1928) who was exiled in Japan from 1899 to 1912 (during this period, he also spent two years in the United States). Like Kato¯, Liang came to regard the state and nation as an organism with its own will and claimed that “those that were united and fit would survive; those torn by internal strife were unfit and would be destroyed” (quoted in Huang 1972, 82). Liang’s works were used as textbooks in Korean schools such as the famous Taeso˘ng in P’yo˘ngyang. 6. Major proponents of Korean pan-Asianism, such as Yun Ch’iho, Son Pyo˘nghu˘i, Kim Kajin, Yun Hyojo˘ng, and O Sech’ang, were associated with the publications mentioned. 7. Japanese pan-Asianism took a variety of forms, from the cultural approach of Okakura Kazuzo to the activist approach of Miyazaki Toten. See Okakura (1970) and Eto and Jensen (1988). 8. The development of pan-Asianism was partly a reaction to the rise of Russia at the turn of the century. The Korean monarch, Kojong, moved to the Russian embassy on February 11, 1896, allegedly for protection from the Japanese threat. This caused humiliation and embarrassment among many Koreans. For them, Russia came to symbolize the menacing force of the white race to be confronted by the collaborative efforts of Asians. 9. Established in Tokyo on March 10, 1880, the semiofficial association was composed of bureaucrats, military officers, journalists, and others. With its primary goal of promoting “Asian interests,” it frequently invited other Asian neighbor leaders to its meetings.

254

Notes to Chapter 1

10. Japanese pan-Asian ideas also spread to Korean intellectual circles through various publications and translations. Tarui To¯kichi’s (1850 –1922) Daito¯ gappo¯ron (Thesis on the Great Eastern Federation), published in 1893, is a good case in point. The Thesis proposed that Japan and Korea unite as equals to form the country of Daito¯ (Great East), which would be joined later by China. Asians would then be able to defend themselves against foreign abuse. The book was translated into Chinese for both Korean and Chinese intellectuals and reportedly sold one hundred thousand copies in China and one thousand copies in Korea (Kang 1984). 11. Ilchinhoe is largely considered pro-Japanese, and its leaders are condemned as “national traitors” in Korean historiography. However, one may have to distinguish naïve idealists such as Yi Yonggu from explicit collaborators such as Song Pyo˘ngjun and Yi Wanyong, who personally benefited from annexation (Chandra 1974). For opposing views, see H. Cho (1984) and Kang (1984). 12. The Tan’gun legend had an ambiguous place in premodern Korean historiography. It was not mentioned in Korea’s oldest extant history, Samguk saki (Historical Record of the Three Kingdoms), compiled by Kim Pusik in 1145. It first appeared much later, in Samguk yusa (Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms) by the Buddhist monk Iryo˘n in the late thirteenth century (1285[?]). Samguk yusa was written after the Mongol invasion and dominance from 1259 to 1356, and the inclusion of the Tan’gun legend may have been a “narrative of resistance.” Not coincidently, Sin Ch’aeho’s use of the legend in his own works when Korea was witnessing the increasing Japanese influence and dominance was similarly a narrative of resistance. In addition, as Em points out, it was a case of “reinvention—and not simply a revival— of this old and recurrent narrative in premodern Korean historiography” for the present use (1999, 341). 13. Sin also identified Manchuria as the birthplace of the minjok and the central stage of Korean history. This view later developed into his irredentist narrative of Korean history. See Schmid (1997). 14. Other Koreans were engaged in armed struggles against Japanese after 1905 until Korea’s annexation into Japan in 1910. 15. Note that Sin Ch’aeho focused on heroic actions of these military leaders as possessing “authentic” national spirit. Through this, he was justifying his attack on Confucianism as responsible for Korea’s predicament and his promotion of new nationhood based on Korea’s military tradition. The project of heroic rediscovery, Sheila Jager points out, thus became “intimately connected to the project of forging a new history of the militarized nation rescued from the clutches of Korea’s slave literary culture. . . . It was in the name of the new military hero—strong, combative, loyal, courageous—that Sin sought to strengthen the weakened nation to ensure its survival in the battle for existence” (2003, 9).

Notes to Chapter 2

255

His military hero-centered view of national history was later replaced by his stress on the heroism of the fighting minjung (oppressed masses) as the agent of national struggle and liberation. Sin was also increasingly interested in anarchism later in his life. See Em (1999), for his anarchism and minjung-centered view of national history. 16. Some pan-Asianists did not entirely give up their dream; they allied with Japanese Asianists to create their own utopian, anti-Western polity called the Koryo˘ (Gaoli) nation in 1920. Located in the Jiandao region between Manchuria and Korea, it was previously the heartland of the ancient Koguryo˘ state (Duara 2003).

Chapter 2 1. The Japanese police reported “disturbances” in all but 7 of Korea’s 218 counties. See Baldwin (1969). 2. There existed an equally powerful drive to distinguish Japan from its “backward” Asian colonies, displaying tensions with colonial assimilationist arguments. See Tanaka (1993). 3. The simultaneous repression of nationalism and establishment of nationality were not unique to colonial Korea; these were seen elsewhere, including the Soviet Union. See Brubaker (1996). 4. In 1920 alone, the Japanese issued 409 permits for magazines and books, while in the 1910 –19 period, less than 40 magazine permits had been issued. Two vernacular dailies, Choso˘n and Tonga, began their publication in 1920, and by 1929, their combined circulation reached 103,027, a tenfold increase over circulation for the entire nationalist press in 1909. Also most magazines published after 1920 were “mass-circulation magazines” that provided a forum for discussion of current social and political issues (Eckert et al. 1990, 288). Kaebyo˘k and Tongkwang, two magazines that I use for analysis in Chapter 6, belonged to this new type of magazine. 5. As I detail in Chapter 3, radical nationalists, influenced by Marxism, advocated a more direct, political challenge to colonial rule for national independence. 6. He was critical of Kim Okkyun, the leader of the failed Kapsin Coup of 1884, the reform movement of the late nineteenth century. 7. Similarly Korean Marxists, whose political orientation sharply differed from Yi, sought to inculcate a new Socialist consciousness at the expense of Korea’s cultural and historical heritage. 8. As scholars of nationalism (for example, Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) point out, tradition often becomes a contested terrain because only some elements of tradition are selected, promoted, or reinvented. In colonial Korea, some intellectuals indeed sought to revive a Confucian agrarian tradition, rather than folk traditions, as the basis for a new Korea. See Chapter 7.

256

Notes to Chapter 2

9. In 1932 the Korean Folklore Society (Choso˘n minsok hakhoe) formed. 10. As detailed in Chapter 3, this movement was in part a response to Korean Marxists who advocated the primacy of class over nation. 11. While appreciating their own indigenous culture and heritage, ethnic nationalists did not deny the strength of Western science and technology. Like their counterparts in other parts of the world, especially in non-Western countries, they understood the world from a binary perspective. They understood the world in spiritual versus material terms, in order to account for the strength of imperial powers while demonstrating the continuing importance of their own culture and heritage. Precisely because of such a binary view of the world, Korean leaders, such as Park Chung Hee, were able to mobilize nationalism for modernization projects that utilized Western technologies (see Chapter 5). 12. Michael Robinson (1988) explains the rise of Marxism in the mid-1920s as Korean radicals’ response to nonpolitical cultural nationalism. Similarly, the rise of ethnic nationalism in the late 1920s and early 1930s was Korean nationalists’ response to international Socialism, as discussed in the next chapter. 13. Silhak refers to a broad intellectual movement of the eighteenth century that sought concrete answers to the practical problem that Choso˘n Korea faced in the wake of the Japanese and Manchurian invasion. Silhak scholars, writing in classical Chinese for their fellow literati, paid close attention to Korean history, geography, society, economics, and culture in their search for solutions. 14. An also refuted some Marxists who criticized such nationalist efforts as disguised collaborationism and promoted classism and internationalism. 15. Hongik in’gan, literally meaning “devotion to the welfare of mankind,” was supposedly a political ideology of old Korea that Tan’gun ruled. 16. This call for Korean literature was also a nationalist response to proletariat literature movements that Socialists led. See Chapter 3. 17. See Chapter 3, for Korean Marxist critique of ethnic nationalism as fascist, and see Chapters 4 and 5, for a discussion of the colonial legacy of ethnic nationalism in the formation of fascist-like authoritarian states in postcolonial Korea. 18. In an effort to subvert the Japanese colonialist thinking present in Korean nationalism, Sin Ch’aeho turned to anarchism later in his life. As Henry Em points out, he advocated “a political program that went beyond nationalism, and a historical view that undermined the continuous, unified narrative of the nation” (1999, 361). Still Sin was appropriated as a representative of Korean nationalism by both the North and the South after 1945. 19. The first official mention of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere came in a speech made by Foreign Minster Matsuoka on August 2, 1940. He defined the Sphere to include the Netherland Indies and French Indo-China as well as Japan’s colonies—Korea, Taiwan, China, and Manchukuo. Although the

Notes to Chapter 4

257

Sphere might have contained some pan-Asian idealism of the earlier period, it largely stemmed from programmatic and realistic considerations of Japan’s strategic, economic, and military interests. It was an attempt to establish Japan’s own subworld system to realize its imperialist ambitions (Lebra 1975).

Chapter 3 1. By definition, universalism is the belief that ideas and practices can be applied everywhere without modification, while particularism is the belief that circumstances dictate how ideas and practices should be applied. For instance, modernization theory that advocates the general applicability of Western ideas and institutions to non-Western societies in their development, or Communism that treats class as a general category of society (Western and non-Western) can be considered universalistic. In contrast, ethnic nationalism that stresses the importance of appreciating one’s own culture and history can be considered particularistic. The distinction, however, is not always clear-cut. Universalistic logic has been used as a basis of a particular system, such as the capitalist world economic system, and ethnic nationalists often use universal languages of nations and nationalism. See Wallerstein (1990). 2. Tenancy disputes were occurring nationwide by the late 1920s, and the radical peasant movement (known as “Red Peasant Union”) appeared in the late 1920s and 1930s in the northeastern part of Korea (G. Shin 1996). Likewise, labor strikes, which had been intensifying since the late 1920s, reached a peak in the early 1930s (Kim Kyo˘ngil 1992). 3. In 1931, for instance, brown rice could only be sold for 39 percent of the 1925 price. As a result, many Korean households were in debt and many left Korea for Manchuria and Japan (G. Shin 1996). 4. Carter Eckert makes the following observation: “It is clear from the great spontaneous outburst of nationalist feeling and activity at the time of Liberation that the terrible trial of war and naisen ittai, far from destroying popular nationalist sentiment, had in fact inflamed it. In the first flush of freedom in August 1945, when Koreans all over the country were ripping down Japanese war posters and flags and smashing the windows of Japanese shops and homes, one of the first objects singled out for retribution was the local Shinto shrine, the key symbol of the hated naisen ittai policy. Soon thereafter the focus of anger shifted to those Koreans who had served or collaborated with the colonial regime and its policies” (1991, 251).

Chapter 4 1. While Yi Kwangsu was disgraced as a collaborator, Sin Ch’aeho was promoted as a representative of Korean nationalists in both Koreas after 1945, despite

258

Notes to Chapter 4

the fact that both developed a similar kind of ethnic nationalism. Of course, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Sin turned to anarchism and irredentism in his later writings, but these were largely downplayed in favor of his earlier works on ethnic nationalism. This is a good example to show how postcolonial states selectively appropriated narratives of Korean national and political communities of the past for the present use. See Em (1999) and Schmid (1997). 2. Cumings vividly describes anti-Japanism seen in North Korea as follows: “Hardly a day goes by when the controlled press does not rant on about a fiftyyear-old Japanese atrocity, or warn about the imminent revanche of Japanese militarism. The resistance to Japanese imperialism is still so prominent that one would think the war had just ended; many signs exhort citizens to ‘live in the way of the anti-Japanese guerrillas,’ and young people go on camping trips that retrace their struggles” (1997, 397). 3. In a May 1936 speech titled “The Tasks of Korean Communists,” Kim was said to make the following statement: “The masters of the Korean revolution are the Korean people and the Korean communists. The Korean revolution must be carried out by the Korean people under the leadership of the Korean Communists. . . . The Korean Communists must carry on revolutionary struggle by their own faith and build up their own strong revolutionary forces and firmly rely on them in leading the Korean revolution to victory” (1936/1977, 68). Kim added, “No matter how great the assistance of the international revolutionary forces may be, the Korean Communists cannot lead the Korean revolution to victory if they fail to map out the line, strategy and tactics for the revolution to fit the realities of their country and, on this basis, solidly build up their own revolutionary forces” (1936/1977, 69). This speech is considered one of the earliest expressions of the importance of doing things “our own way,” but one must also be cautious with its authenticity, as North Koreans have often edited Kim’s earlier statements for contemporary purpose. 4. According to Han’s study, about twenty young guerrillas who had served as Kim’s orderlies or bodyguards returned to North Korea with him. See Han Hongkoo (1999, 360) for the list. 5. For an excellent discussion of complex meanings of the term juche, see Cumings (1997, 403 – 4). He concludes that juche is “the opaque core of North Korean national solipsism” (1997, 404). 6. In October 1993, the North Korean government announced that they found the tomb of Tan’gun in Kangdong-u˘p, Kangdong-myo˘n. The eighty-six bone fragments, including arm, leg, and pelvic segments, were pronounced to be identified as belonging to Tan’gun and his wife, and they were said subsequently to be dated BC 3,108 (with margin of error of 267 years) by electron paramagnetic resonance dating. The northern regime repaired the tomb and opened it to the public on

Notes to Chapter 5

259

October 3, 1994, the national holiday to celebrate the birth of the Korean nation. As Song Hojong (n.d.) points out, it was an effort to strengthen national identity among North Koreans at a time when the country was facing a difficult situation (both internally and externally) and to present a North Korea-centered history of the unitary Korean nation. It also affirmed the homogeneity and longevity of the Korean nation. Such promotion of Tan’gun nationalism was not new, having been mobilized in Korean history when the nation was in peril, such as when the Mongols invaded Korea during the Koryo˘ dynasty and when the Japanese colonized the peninsula. 7. There were various Communist groups contending for power in North Korea after 1945. They included Communists who remained in Korea during the colonial period (for example, Pak Ho˘nyo˘ng), those with ties to the Soviets (for example, Ho˘ Kai) or to China (for example, Mu Cho˘ng).

Chapter 5 1. For instance, Kim Chungsoo, in evaluating Korean perceptions on free trade with Japan, writes, “Due to the legacy of mutual antagonism during the period of Japanese colonialism, Japan can make no suggestion for grand integration without evoking memories of Japanese control in Korea. Many [Koreans] still remember all the ‘visions of Asian migration’ made by the Japanese as justification for its colonialism. The lingering suspicion about the motives behind Japan’s recent efforts to enhance its regional posture reflects the prevalent perception that the Japanese public is by nature narrow and egoistically minded. In spite of all the liberalization measures Japanese assert to have taken, many both in and out of the region still perceive that Japan has been, and remains, a closed and mercantilist economy” (2001, 10). 2. The name Great Han originated with Samhan or three Han (ca. second century BC) and was considered the only legitimate successor to the first Kochoso˘n state that Tan’gun had founded. “Korea” in DPRK and ROK refer to Choso˘n and Great Han respectively in Korean. 3. Sung-Hwa Cheong argues that Rhee was not necessarily anti-Japanese. As evidence he presents that Rhee visited Japan twice and advocated an antiCommunist Pacific alliance that would include the United States and Japan. This side of Rhee’s diplomacy, however, according to him, was concealed from the public and has been overlooked by historians. See Cheong (1991). 4. The term jaju (chaju) has the same meaning as juche (chuch’e) that North Korea uses. The common terminology also attests to similarities in nationalist ideologies of Park and Kim. 5. For its similarity to the rural revitalization campaign during colonial rule, see Shin and Han (1999).

260

Notes to Chapter 6

6. Guided by the doctrine, which was intended to remove direct commitment of U.S. ground forces in Asia, Presidents Nixon and Carter decided to reduce U.S. military and financial burdens in South Korea and to gain a flexible strategic posture in the Asia-Pacific region. The Nixon administration withdrew the Seventh Infantry Division from South Korea by March 1971, and Carter promised to withdraw all ground forces during his presidential election campaign. 7. Park promulgated in December 1968 the Charter of National Education (Kungmin kyoyuk ho˘njang), which, in his words, “[set] forth our spiritual posture to guide material expansion in the national modernization” (1972b/1973, 162). Inserted into every school textbook, the charter aimed to guide national education for all students. Beginning with a proclamation “We are born with the historic mission of national resurrection and prosperity,” it stressed that “the love of the state and nation based on anti-Communist and democratic spirit is the way of our life” and ended with an urge to “create new history.” Park also propagated “Our Oath to the National Flag” (Kukki e taehan maengse) that said: “I firmly swear that I will devote my body and mind for the development of the fatherland and nation in front of the proud t’aegu˘ggi [national flag].” School children were required to memorize and repeat the charter and the oath in front of the flag during morning and afternoon ceremonies. That I still remember the charter and the oath more than thirty years later illustrates the power to transmit nationalism through mass education.

Chapter 6 1. For definitions of universalism and particularism, see note 1 in Chapter 3. 2. Authors in primary school textbooks examined below provided detailed descriptions on what they saw and experienced in New York and London, which were viewed as the centers of civilizations at the time. For example, chapter 21 of a primary school textbook, Kungmin sodok (Basic Readings for People) (1895) introduced New York as a global city, detailing its geographical location, population size, famous streets, bridges, and so on. It was filled with surprise, curiosity, and admiration of Western civilization. 3. Paekso˘ng and inmin can be translated into people, while tongp’o and hyo˘ngche literally mean “the same cell” and “brothers” or “siblings,” respectively. 4. All textbooks except for kodu˘ng sohak (1906) were used in primary schools. Kodu˘ng sohak (1906) was published for secondary education. 5. If we follow John Meyer’s scheme, 55.4 percent deal with subjects in “social science,” 26.53 percent address “moral and religious education,” and 16.43 percent talk about “math and science.” 6. Figure 6.1 does not include the third category (mixed).

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7. Here I am seeking to identify genealogy of Korean ethnic nationalism. Others embraced Communism, another competing Western cosmopolitan ideology, as detailed in Chapter 3. 8. Kaebyo˘k began its publication in 1920 but ceased publication in 1926 because of Japanese suppression, only to resume its publication in 1934 and 1935. It was a general-interest magazine that covered a variety of issues such as public opinion, politics, history, science and technology, arts, and sports. Most contributors had been educated in either Western countries or in Japan; thus, they were well exposed to contemporary views of society, mass education, and nationalism. They included Socialists as well as nationalists. Unlike Kaebyo˘k, however, Tongkwang (1926 –33) was a magazine primarily for nationalists. Since the mid-1920s, many magazines were published to serve a target audience with a specific ideological/ political orientation, which reflected the differentiation of Korean intellectuals and leaders into nationalists and Socialists/Communists. If Sin’gyedan, pip’an whose articles I used in Chapter 3 served Marxists, Tongkwang represented nationalists. 9. I have coded all the available articles from the two magazines. 10. Although I report analyses of articles taken from both magazines, I have done separate analyses for articles of each magazine. Either way (combined or separate), I find the same results, so only the analyses of combined articles are reported here. 11. To use John Meyer’s scheme, 56.19 percent dealt with subjects in “social science,” 33.37 percent addressed “aesthetic education” (art, music, drawing) in Kaebyo˘k, while 45.52 percent in “social science,” 27.48 percent in “aesthetic education,” and 10.06 percent in “moral and religious education” in Tongkwang. 12. The figure does not include the third “mixed” category. 13. “National geography” got the most coverage in the mid-1920s, largely due to special issues in Kaebyo˘k in 1925, as mentioned above. 14. I have also run the same statistical analysis without the third “mixed” category, finding the same results. 15. The rise of pan-Asian nationalism discussed in Chapter 2 can be understood in a similar way. While the logic of pan-Asianism itself was colonialist in its origins, Korean nationalists filled the logic with Korean contents, that is, a Koreacentered view of East Asia. 16. In his study of Chinese and Jewish minorities in Southeast Asia and Central Europe respectively, Chirot points to the repressive power of blood or communal nationalism. In the communal view, he claims, there is a belief that “the community, the nation, is the relevant political actor and should speak with one voice, that of its elite. Consequently, individual rights and interests are trampled and dissent becomes a betrayal of the national community” (Chirot 1997, 23).

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17. Challenges to the repressive power of nationalism come from scholars of various fields, literature, anthropology, sociology, political science, and so on. Not surprisingly, one common thread among them is that they largely share postmodern, postcolonial studies perspectives. Also a new journal tangdae pip’yo˘ng has devoted much of its energy to revealing and criticizing “fascism in everyday life” that is seen as coming from uncritical internalization of ethnic nationalism. 18. This was also related to the demise of the Soviet empire in the 1990s. 19. Kang Jung In (2004) lists three factors as being responsible for the poverty of Korean conservatism. First is “conservative forces’ monopoly of politics and political power.” Ironically, according to him, the dominance of conservative forces in post–1945 Korean politics deprived them of opportunities to refine their philosophical foundation through constructive dialogue with radical or progressive ideologies. Second is “inherent contradiction between political and philosophical conservatism.” Although conservatism had originally developed in the West as a philosophy to advocate the defense of premodern social and political order and to resist modernization, in Korea conservatism emerged as an agent of modernization and change. Third is “heavy dependency of Korean political theories upon outside (Western) sources for their formation and revision.” As a result of these historical reasons, conservatism, Kang claims, has failed to take a root in the Korean context and is facing a crisis today.

Chapter 7 1. Paekcho˘ng was the class of hereditary outcasts equivalent to eta in premodern Japan who worked at butchering, tanning, and wickerwork during the Choso˘n dynasty (1392 –1910). See Kim Joong-Seop (1999). 2. Lenin belittled the movement as an “attempt to measure the new society with the old patriarchal yardstick.” See Lenin (1908, 241). 3. See the editorial, “Sin Choso˘n u˘i unmyo˘ng kwa nongmin u˘i chiwi” (The Fate of the New Korea and Status of the Peasant), Kaebyo˘k 41 ([November 1923]: 5). 4. See Cho Tonggo˘l (1979, 158 –233); a special issue on “isanghyang ko˘nso˘l ” (Building Utopia) in Sinmin (New People) (March 1929); and Sun’guk so˘nyo˘l sorae Kim Chunggo˘n so˘nsaeng kinyo˘m sao˘phoe (1994). 5. As of February 1928, the Korean Peasant Society had 158 branches nationwide with a total membership of 16,570. The society also published its own monthly journal, Choso˘n nongmin (1925 –30) and Nongmin (1930 –33). See Chi (1985). 6. See Sun’guk so˘nyo˘l sorae Kim Chunggo˘n so˘nsaeng kinyo˘m sao˘phoe (1994). 7. A special issue on building utopia in Sinmin ([March 1929]: 55). 8. “Fate of New Korea and Status of the Peasant,” 8.

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Chapter 8 1. My survey conducted in the fall of 2000 shows that 45 percent said they were satisfied or very satisfied with the summit, while only 11 percent said they were not satisfied. Also, 73 and 61 percent of the respondents said they changed their view of North Koreans and North Korean Communism, respectively, after the summit. 2. An example is The True Story of Kim Jong-Il (Seoul: The Institute for SouthNorth Korean Studies, 1993). 3. Before the summit, the South Korean government began to portray the North Korean leader in a much more positive way. Under the title of “S. Korea sees a New Side of North’s Kim,” Sonni Efron, the Los Angeles Times correspondent in Tokyo, wrote, “In a reassessment as dramatic as any image make-over by Madison Avenue, the man once reviled here as a reckless playboy is now being described by South Korean officials and foreign policy analysts as pragmatic, prudent and knowledgeable” (Los Angeles Times, April 21, 2000). 4. Dewey Short, American congressman from Missouri, after his visit to South Korea in late 1952, characterized the division as “a grave mistake” and claimed that no permanent peace in the region could be expected. He made the following remarks for inclusion in the U.S. Congregational Record of the April 12 statement of President Syngman Rhee in 1953: “It was a grave mistake, sir, ever to have drawn an arbitrary, artificial, imaginary line along the 38th parallel dividing the peninsula of Korea into halves. Korea is an old civilization, rich in tradition with a homogeneous people. The people in North and South Korea are of the same ethnic origin; they speak the same language, have the same interests, ideals, hopes, aspirations, love of freedom and must not be divided. One might as well divide the people of our own country east of the Mississippi and west of the Mississippi and hope for peace. It simply cannot be done and it must not happen. There can be no permanent peace or economic stability in the Far East or in the world with a divided Korea” (cited in Syngman Rhee Through Western Eyes 1954, 9 –10). 5. It is interesting to note that my 2000 survey shows 91.72 percent of the respondents call the northern part of the peninsula pukhan (the northern part of the Han race), while 74.48 percent call the southern part taehan min’guk (Republic of Korea). 6. In his September 30, 1949, letter to Robert Oliver, Rhee contrasted the Soviet to U.S. strategy in dealing with cold war on the Korean peninsula. In his view, “Soviet’s cold war is always a winning war . . . [since] they give the communist agitators money, weapons and propaganda literature to stir up the people to fight among themselves.” By contrast, he claimed, “what the Americans are doing now in the so-called cold war is a losing battle and if we continue in this losing

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battle by sitting still and warding off these gangsters no human flesh and nerve can hold on very long” (Rhee 1949d, 29).

Chapter 9 1. For instance, he proclaimed that “although we are now separated into south and north, we are one entity with a common destiny, bound by one language, and by one history and by the same racial origin. Ideology changes, but the nation stays and lasts. We must quickly recover our identity as the inseparable Han race, and boldly push ahead to bring about a historic turning point through which national identity can be revived in the northern land” (1972a/1973, 22; emphasis added). See also Shin et al. (1999). 2. William Gleysteen, U.S. ambassador to South Korea at the time, admits that the Twentieth Infantry Division under the U.S. command moved to Kwangju from Seoul with American consent. See Gleysteen (1986). For the Kwangju uprisings, see Clark (1988) and Shin and Hwang (2003). 3. Editorial, “With the Minjung (People) of Korea,” Response-Ability (summer 1984), 2, UCLA Archival Collection on Democracy and Unification in Korea. 4. Leaflet by the Student Body of Han’guk Theological Seminary, “Declaration in Blood” (dated October 8, 1980), UCLA Archival Collection on Democracy and Unification in Korea. 5. Korean Catholic Council for Justice and Peace, “Letter from the Korean Catholic Council for Justice and Peace” (dated March 3, 1986); and United Minjung Movement for Democracy and Unification, “Changgi chipkwo˘n u˘mmoru˘l tanhohi punsoe haja (Let Us Firmly Destroy the Conspiracy of LongTerm Rule)” (dated October 30, 1986), UCLA Archival Collection on Democracy and Unification in Korea. 6. “Second Joint Statement on National Situation” (dated May 10, 1980, and signed by twenty-two universities in Korea), UCLA Archival Collection on Democracy and Unification in Korea. 7. National Council of Churches in Korea, “State of the Nation Declaration” (dated March 14, 1986), UCLA Archival Collection on Democracy and Unification in Korea. 8. Korean Catholic Council for Justice and Peace, “Letter from the Korean Catholic Council for Justice and Peace”; and the Catholic Social Movement Council, “For the Reunification of Our Divided Nation” (dated June 18, 1986), UCLA Archival Collection on Democracy and Unification in Korea. 9. Kyunghee University Democratic Students Federation, “Let’s Punish the Murderer Chun Doo-Hwan in the Name of Our Nation” (dated September 9, 1980); and Ham So˘k Ho˘n et al., “Letter of South Korean Democratic Leaders to

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Presidents Rho Tae Woo and Kim Il Sung” (dated May 11, 1988), UCLA Archival Collection on Democracy and Unification in Korea. 10. See Mangwo˘n han’guksa yo˘n’gusil han’guk ku˘ndae minjung undongsa so˘sul punkwa, Han’guk ku˘ndae minjung undongsa (History of Minjung Movements in Modern Korea) (Seoul: Tolbege, 1989); and a special issue on “Yo˘ksaga 10 in ege tu˘nnu˘nda” (Listening to Ten Historians) in Yo˘ksa pip’o˘yng 11 (winter 1990): 15 –71. 11. Yo˘ksa munje yo˘n’guso minjok haebang undongsa yo˘n’guban, Minjok haebang undongsa: Chaengjo˘m kwa kwaje (History of National Liberation Movements: Main Issues and Tasks) (Seoul: Yo˘ksa pip’o˘yngsa, 1990), 15. 12. “Cho˘n’guk kyojigwo˘n nodong chohap kyo˘lso˘ng so˘no˘nmun” (Declaration of a Nation-Wide Teachers’ Union) (dated May 28, 1989), UCLA Archival Collection on Democracy and Unification in Korea. 13. “Onu˘l u˘i kyoyuk kwa cho˘n’guk kyojigwo˘n nojo” (Education of Today and the Teachers’ Union) (n.d.), UCLA Archival Collection on Democracy and Unification in Korea, 15 –16. 14. See page 55 in What the World Thinks in 2002 by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press.

Chapter 10 1. Unified Germany saw the reemergence of ethnic nationalism in the 1990s. The German elite has invoked ethnic nationalism to entice the population to tolerate a painful reunification process involving a delegitimized German Democratic Republic regime and the apolitical people of the German Federal Republic. This strategic use of ethnic solidarity is manifest in the shift of the prevailing political slogan from “We Are the People” to “We Are One People.” Ethnic nationalism, which previously had been discredited because of its prewar linkage with Nazism, became a highly useful political resource. At the same time, such tactical use of nationalism has aroused concern. Some German intellectuals view it not as “a nationalism of the sensitized collective soul” but “a coolly calculated ‘nationalism of the elite,’” contributing to a fast-track unification process by absorption (Offe 1990, 11; see also Fulbrook 1994; Habermas 1996). 2. Quite surprisingly, there has not been much empirical investigation of the thesis. More recently some scholars (for example, Grinker) have conducted a cultural analysis of these issues. 3. These variables are included here to control for any effects of the summit that took place five months before our survey. 4. The factor that has the strongest and most consistent overall impact on unification-related variables in Appendix 3.2 is the level of satisfaction with the

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summit, that is, those who are more satisfied with the summit are more likely to endorse unification and support special assistance to the North. This suggests that the South’s engagement policy toward the North has indeed raised Koreans’ desire for unification and willingness to absorb unification-related costs. 5. This point is supported by the significant impact of respondents’ knowledge of the North on their participation in relief programs as presented in Appendix 3.2. That is, those who were familiar with the North Korean famine tended to participate in relief programs for the North. 6. Gender is another demographic variable that appears significant in several models. In general, male respondents have stronger desire for unification and are more willing to sacrifice for unification. This is perhaps because males are generally more expressive when it comes to political discourse and unification related issues. At the same time, it may support a feminist argument that unification discourse is masculinized and, if so, merits further investigation. 7. Not surprisingly, the U.S. out variable has negative and significant impact on hegemonic unification; that is, those who want the United States to remove its troops from the South are more likely to object to hegemonic unification led by the South.

Chapter 11 1. Unlike Eton, however, the school is a privately funded, coed school. See website at http://www.minjok.hs.kr. 2. Note that President Kim first publicly discussed his vision of globalization in Sydney (not Seoul) at a press conference with Korean journalists who were traveling with him to cover his state visit to Australia. This seems to have been designed as a strategy to signify his determination to pursue globalization. 3. In 1991, the number of foreign workers (both legal and illegal) was less than fifty thousand. The number increased substantially in the 1990s with some temporary decrease right after the 1997 financial crisis. See So˘k, Cho˘ng, and Chang (1997). 4. Studying abroad itself is nothing new to Koreans. However, in the past most Koreans (including myself ) went abroad for graduate study. Now people are leaving Korea for high school and college as well. This new phenomenon is an important social and policy issue. Socially, this is creating a new problem. Many Korean families are separated because wives and children leave the country, while husbands stay in Korea to work to support their families abroad. It is also a crucial policy issue, since it is not clear whether those who leave Korea so early in their life will ever return. This could become a new form of “brain drain” and merits a long-term research.

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5. In 1998, novelist Pok Ko˘il published a book entitled National Language in an Era of Global Language, which called for making English Korea’s official language. His argument is based on the premise that since English has become a global language, it is necessary for Koreans to master it to compete better in a globalizing world. Although its publication provoked intense debate and his argument was criticized as going against national interests, his book is not free of nationalist motivation. For debate on his argument, see http://anu.andong.ac.kr/soongu/ word/bokkeuil.htm. 6. In a recent review of current literature on globalization, Mauro Guillen (2001) identifies five key debates: (1) Is globalization really happening?; (2) Does it produce convergence?; (3) Does it undermine the authority of nation states?; (4) Is globality different from modernity?; (5) Is a global culture in the making? 7. For a discussion about globalization processes at the popular level, see Shin Gi-Wook (2004). 8. Alford even claims that for most Koreans, globalization is an idea more terrifying than North Korea. This is because while North Koreans are related, globalization represents “the transformation of warm human ties, including ties whose warmth stems from hatred rather than love, into strictly instrumental encounters” (1999, 146). 9. See http:/ / www.okf.or.kr. The Overseas Koreans Foundation was formally established at the end of the Kim Young Sam government (October 31, 1997), but it actually began operating in the Kim Dae Jung government. 10. The proliferation of these local festivals and events also had to do with the establishment of “local self-rule” (chibang chach’i). Local officials such as the mayor, governor, and city council members are now elected, whereas in the past they were appointed by the central government. The decentralization of national government functions is also considered a characteristic of liberalization processes. 11. See http:/ / www.confucianfestival.org. 12. See http:/ /www.kowiz.com. 13. It is interesting to note that the Ministry of Education was in charge of promoting Korean studies within Korea, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade was responsible for it overseas. 14. Other example is a multivolume work on social and cultural lives of Koreans during Choso˘n dynasty. See Han’guk yo˘ksa yo˘n’guhoe (1996). 15. Of course, this is not unique to Korea. Longtime leaders of Southeast Asia, especially Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia and Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, have advocated an Asian identity based on common culture. Also, scholars in the West, such as Tu Wei-Ming, have noted East Asian modernity based on Confucian heritage. See Tu (1996).

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16. Interestingly enough, many leaders of this group were children of those who had served the government during the Park Chung Hee era. They also launched a new journal, Cho˘nt’ong kwa hyo˘ndai (Tradition and Modernity), to discuss and disseminate their ideas and arguments. It seems to me that their agenda was both academic and political. 17. Although transnational forces have been effectively appropriated for the national agenda, there exists a potential danger for authoritarianism in the process. As a major agent of modernization, for instance, the developmental state demanded sacrificing individual interests and civic rights for collective, national interests, that is, “modernization of the fatherland.” Also, in appropriating globalization, even the democratically elected Kim Dae Jung government pushed for promulgation of the special law regarding overseas Koreans, which prevented ethnic Koreans in China and Russia from benefiting. The exclusion was justified on the grounds that extending the benefits to them would open the gate to these poor ethnic Koreans and their consequent influx would create social and economic problems for Korea, thus hindering national interests. Korea also continues to discriminate against migrant labor from China and Southeast Asia.

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Index

Page numbers in italic type refer to tables. Act Regarding the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans (1999), 213 –14, 268n17 agrarianism, 135 –50; as anticapitalist, 142 – 45, 149; as antiurban, 149; on collectivism, 146 – 49; elite institutions preferred by, 148; modernity critiqued by, 112, 140 – 49, 150; on moral reconstruction, 145 – 46; on the nation, 149; neo-Confucianism of, 135, 146, 147, 148 – 49; in other countries, 141; in postcolonial period, 150; as reaction to uneven development of modernity, 138; Saemaul movement and, 106 –7, 150; on self-sufficiency, 112, 137, 141, 142 – 45, 227; tradition appealed to by, 112, 137, 142 Agricultural Land Ordinance (1934), 74 agriculture: collective farming, 144, 147, 148; in Japanese colonial period, 138 – 40; Kwo˘n To˘kkyu on, 54; peasant struggles, 62, 74; tenancy disputes, 74, 140, 146, 257n2; Tonghak peasant rebellion, 26, 167, 174, 253n4. See also agrarianism Alford, C. Fred, 205, 207, 208, 267n8 Allen, Chizuko, 53 American Chamber of Commerce, 170

American Information Center, 170 American products, boycott of, 177 An, Chaehong: ethnic nationalism promoted by, 69, 78; Korean history works of, 51; on Korean studies, 50; particularism of, 56, 78; on trusteeship proposal, 98 –99; in united front, 54 An, Chunggu˘n, 32, 35 An, Hosang, 4 –5, 102 An, Kwangch’o˘n, 67 An, Kyo˘ngsu, 31–32 ancient remains, Japanese policy on, 49 –50, 70 Anderson, Benedict, 7, 9, 46, 252n8 Andong Folk Festival, 215 anticolonialism: Bolshevik model applied to Chinese, 74; of Marxists, 136; nationalism as force of, 17, 19, 68, 77, 98, 100, 229; in North Korean nationalism, 80, 152, 154, 155, 160 anti-Communism: in ethnic nationalism, 58, 68, 77–78, 108 –9; of Korean conservatives, 133; minjung movement challenging, 168, 170, 171, 173, 175, 180; of Park, 108 –9, 167; of Rhee, 100 –101, 108 –9, 155 –56; in South Korean nationalism, 80, 152, 154, 160, 163, 227

289

290

Index

anti-imperialism: of ethnic nationalism, 98, 100, 229; in North Korean nationalism, 80, 152, 154, 155, 160, 163, 227 anti-Sinicism, 164 APEC, 217 Appadurai, Arjun, 210 Arendt, Hannah, 42 Armstrong, Charles, 80, 94 Asian Film Festivals, 215 Asianism: as pan-Asian variant in Korea, 31; as response to globalization, 209, 216 –20. See also pan-Asianism “Asian Union,” 219 “Asian values,” 149, 218 –19 assimilated ethnic minority groups, 164 assimilation policy, 19, 22, 42 – 45, 54, 55, 57, 75, 77 Association for a Prosperous Asia, 33, 253n9 authoritarianism: ethnic nationalism supporting, 78, 100, 103, 133, 228, 230; of Yi Kwangsu’s nationalism, 109 “axis of evil” speech, 176, 177 “Basic Morality of Old Koreans” (Yi), 48 Befu, Harumi, 180 Benavot, Aaron, 120, 121 Biennale of Kwangju, 215 black sheep effect, 158 –59, 160, 164, 188, 201, 231 blood: jus sanguinis, 234. See also ethnicity; race bourgeois nationalism: on agrarian crisis, 140 – 41; agrarianism contrasted with, 142, 148, 149; on fascism, 65 – 66; Mao Tse-Tung working with, 83; Marxism compared with, 135 –37; Marxist criticism of, 62, 63 – 66; minjung movement on, 174; on proper political community, 227; on selfsufficiency, 142; in united front, 82 Britain: identity politics in, 234; individualism of, 146; nationalism and modernity in, 13; the nation as conceived in, 117; trusteeship proposal of, 98

broadband Internet, 206 Brubaker, Rogers, 10, 234 Buddhism, 26 bunka seiji (cultural rule), 46, 78, 124, 126 bureaucracy, 42, 43, 44 Bureau of Academic Affairs, 44 Bush, George W., 176, 177 Calhoun, Craig, 7, 8 –9, 11, 132, 167 capitalism: agrarianism opposed to, 142 – 45, 149; Confucian, 218; in globalization, 210, 221; imperialist nature of, 174; Korean agriculture integrated into, 138 –39; minjung movement challenging, 171, 172; and nationalism in South Korea, 24, 109; as neocolonial, 173; print capitalism, 7, 9, 46, 125; in Western European national development, 173, 174 Carter, Jimmy, 260n6 categorical identities, 7, 10, 11, 21, 24, 224 cellular phones, 206 Chang, Chiyo˘n, 34 –35 Charter of National Education (1968), 175, 260n7 Chatterjee, Partha, 55 Cheong, Sung-Hwa, 259n3 Chiang, Kai-shek, 62 China: anti-Sinicism, 164; Choso˘n Korean elites traveling to, 26; Choso˘n-Manchurian problem, 70 –73; Comintern policy in, 73, 74; as divided, 252n17; as exceptional case, 18; in Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere, 256n19; “history of Koguryo˘” dispute with Korea, 219; independent stance regarding, 27, 28; in Korea-centered view of East Asia, 52 –54; Korea nationalists on, 22, 35, 38; in Korean War, 159; as “lips and teeth,” 31; Manchu conquest of, 27; national studies in, 51; and North Korean nuclear program, 217, 218; North Korea’s relations with, 80, 87, 91, 94, 95; open-door policy of, 91,

Index 94, 95; pan-Asianism on, 31, 32, 33; path to modernity in, 12; regional order centered on, 5, 25, 32, 35, 36; rise of, 217, 218, 229; Sino-Japanese War of 1894 –95, 25; Sino-Soviet dispute, 86, 88, 91, 94; “small China” (so chunghwa), 32, 48 – 49; South Korea shifting from U.S. to, 217, 218, 219; trusteeship proposal of, 98; Western science and technology appropriated by, 211–12. See also Chinese Communist Party (CCP); Manchuria Chindan Academic Society, 51 Chinese Communist Party (CCP): allying with Guomindang, 59 – 60, 61, 83; Korean Communists in Manchuria killed by, 85 – 86; and united fronts, 83 – 84 Chirot, Daniel, 95, 164, 261n16 Cho, Mansik, 142, 160 Cho, Min, 6 Cho, Pongam, 60 Cho, Pyo˘ngok, 162 – 63 Ch’odu˘ng sohak (textbook), 37, 119 Ch’oe, Haejong, 99 Ch’oe, Hyo˘nbae, 50 Ch’oe, Namso˘n, 51, 52 –53, 56 –57, 93 Ch’oe, Suun, 253n4 Ch’oe, Yo˘ng, 38 Choi, Jang Jip, 171–72 ch’o˘ksa wijo˘ng, 26, 149 Ch’o˘ndogyo˘ (Religion of the Heavenly Way), 142. See also Chon’do-kyo Chon’do-kyo, 62, 64 Cho˘ng, Inbo, 50 –51 Cho˘ng, Yakyong, 50 Cho˘ng, Yo˘nghun, 187 Cho˘nguhoe Declaration (1926), 61 Cho˘nt’ong kwa hyo˘ndai (journal), 268n16 Cho˘senjin, 44, 45 Choso¯n dynasty: Cho˘ng Inbo on decline of, 50; conditions at turn of twentieth century, 25 –27; Kabo reform, 26, 119; Kapsin coup, 26, 32, 255n6; nationalist ideology at end of, 5; as predominantly agrarian, 138; reform efforts in, 26, 117–18; Rhee on decline of,

291

101, 102; Tonghak peasant rebellion, 26, 167, 174, 253n4; Western studies introduced in, 116. See also Protectorate Treaty (1905) Choso˘nhak (Korean studies), 50 –51, 64, 67, 69 –70, 216, 267n13 Choso˘n ilbo (newspaper), 62, 69, 72, 255n4 Choso˘n-Manchurian problem, 70 –73 “Choso˘n minjok cheil chuu˘i” (“theory of the Korean nation as number one”), 89, 91, 94, 187, 225, 230 “Choso˘n minjongnon” (“Theory of the Korean Nation”) (Yi), 48 Choso˘n nongmin (journal), 142, 143, 145, 262n5 Chu, Sigyo˘ng, 36, 37 Chu, Yohan, 73 Chun, Doo Hwan: American support for, 169, 170; ethnic nationalism and anti-unification discourse under, 186; and Kwangju uprising, 169; uprising of 1987 against, 1 citizenship, 234 –35 civic education: in magazines, 131; in textbooks, 120, 121, 121, 122, 123 civilization: modernization and globalization compared with, 220 –21; Western notion of, 28 –29, 33, 212, 220 civil social movements, 181, 214, 219 civil society, 167, 175 –76, 180, 181, 219, 226, 228 class: in Choso˘n-Manchurian problem, 71–72; in classical Marxism, 80; conflict in Korea, 62, 74, 139 – 40; international Socialism on, 59, 80, 225; Korean Communists on nation and, 63 – 68, 77; lineage appealing to Koreans more than, 75; in nationalism, 16; nationalists championing nation over, 68; polarization in rural Korea, 139; Rhee on removing differences of, 101; socialists on nation and, 22 Coca-Cola, 216 cognitive dissonance, 188, 190, 231

292

Index

collective farming, 144, 147, 148 collectivism: agrarianism on, 146 – 49; in cultural nationalism, 47; dominance over liberalism, 132 –34; ethnic nationalism emphasizing, 8, 13, 77, 116, 227, 230, 231; in German ethnic nationalism, 13, 29; of Ilmin chuu˘i, 102; individualist nationalism contrasted with, 11; in Kato¯ Hiroyuki’s social Darwinism, 29 –30; Kim Yunkyo˘ng on, 55; in postcolonial nationalism, 80; shift to in 1920s, 126; Yi Kwangsu on, 48, 56, 69 colonialism: and Communism in rise of ethnic nationalism, 76 –78; multiple layers of, 136 –37; race and bureaucracy as key devices of, 42; in rise of nationalism, 41. See also anticolonialism; imperialism; Japanese colonial rule; national liberation Comintern (Communist International): on agrarian issue, 140; China policy of, 73; Korean Communists on, 67; Lenin’s “Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and Colonial Questions,” 81; on national question, 59; “one party in one country” principle of, 68, 85; September Theses, 61– 62, 74 –75; on united front, 61– 62 commercialization, agricultural, 138 –39, 143 Committee for Compiling Korean History, 51 communal nationalism, 133, 261n16 Communism: and colonialism in rise of ethnic nationalism, 76 –78; “Koreanization” of Soviet Communism in North Korea, 80; North Korea appropriating for its national goal, 94, 225; as not incompatible with nationalism, 59 – 63. See also antiCommunism; Chinese Communist Party (CCP); Korean Communist Party (KCP); Marxism Communist International, see Comintern Communist Manifesto, The (Marx), 59, 67

Confucianism: in Andong Folk Festival, 215; Confucian capitalism and democracy, 218; cultural nationalists criticizing, 46, 47; as culture of yangban, 252n6; developmental ethic and, 13 –14; in Japanese assimilation policy, 42; Kim Jong Il reevaluates, 93; at Korean Minjok Leadership Academy, 204; in Korean textbooks, 120; neo-Confucianism, 47, 95, 135, 146, 147, 148 – 49; Park promoting, 217; on peasants, 141; as revitalized in late nineteenth century, 25; Sin Ch’aeho attacks, 254n15; and unification, 203 Connor, Walker, 3, 80, 82, 84, 152, 156, 157, 189 conservatism, ethnic nationalism distorting development of, 133, 231, 232, 262n19 “consociationalism,” 233 constructionist (modernist) view of nation, 4, 5 – 6, 251n5 consumer products, global, 206 Containing Nationalism (Hechter), 233 content analysis, 119 –20, 126 contestation, 10 –11 contingency, historical, 9 –10, 24 cosmopolitanism, 28, 47, 118, 125 credit unions, 144 cultural nationalism, 46 – 49, 58, 208 cultural rule (bunka seiji), 46, 78, 124, 126, 225 Cumings, Bruce, 43, 94 –95, 100, 159, 258n2 Decree on Nation Building Through Education (1895), 116 democracy: Confucian, 218; for containing repressive elements of ethnic nationalism, 233; identity politics and democratization, 133, 175; Ilmin chuu˘i and establishment of, 101, 102; Lenin on bourgeois, 81; minjung movement and, 170, 171, 172 –73; and reunification, 165, 234, 235; So˘ Chaep’il introduces term to students, 117

Index Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, see North Korea Department of Religion, 44 Department of Research on National Treasures, 44 dependency theory, 104 depression, economic, 65, 139, 257n3 developmentalism: developmental ethic, 13 –14; developmental state, 12, 104, 221, 229 –30, 268n17; ethnic nationalism and, 13 –14, 229 –30; Korea embracing, 220 –21; of Korean conservatives, 133; minjung movement challenging, 112 –13, 168, 170, 171–72, 175, 180; of Park, 103 – 4, 167. See also industrialization Diamond, Larry, 14 discrimination against ethnic nonKoreans, 181, 234 –35 “Dissolution Declaration of the Manchurian Bureau of the Korean Communist Party, The” (1930), 68, 72 dissonance reduction, 188, 190, 231 Dittmer, Lowell, 168 Doak, Kevin, 14, 180 Dong, Wonmo, 170 Duara, Prasenjit, 11, 29, 33, 149 –50 Duncan, John, 6, 9, 27 Durkheim, Emile, 16 –17, 252n15 “East,” the, 28 East Asia: as exceptional cases, 18; financial crisis of 1997, 175, 206, 218, 232; Korea as hub of Northeast Asian alliance, 211, 217–18, 219, 232; Koreacentered view of, 52 –54; Korean participation in, 26 –27; nationalism and modernity in, 12; as not having come to terms with its past, 219 –20; social Darwinism as understood in, 29 –30; Western presence increasing in, 26, 32, 224; Western science and technology appropriated by, 211–12; “yellow race” in, 31. See also China; Japan; Korea Eastern European Communism, 91– 92, 95

293

Easternism (tongyang chuu˘), 31, 35 “Eastern spirit, Western technology,” 207, 212 Eckert, Carter, 3, 43, 257n4 economic depression, 65, 139, 257n3 Eden, Anthony, 98 education: Korean Minjok Leadership Academy, 204 –5; studying abroad, 206, 217, 266n4; teachers’ union, 174 –75; Western values incorporated into Korean, 116. See also textbooks Em, Henry, 5 – 6, 36, 45, 254n12, 256n18 embeddedness, 8 –9 Emigh, Rebecca, 18 England, see Britain English language, 204, 207, 214, 267n5 Enlightenment, 25, 146 – 47, 149, 212 ethnicity: as basis of nationhood, 7; and civic elements in nationhood, 10, 115 –16, 154, 226; cleavages seen as fundamental and permanent, 156, 229; cleavages within a state, 163 – 64; and constructed view of nationhood, 4; Koreans conflating race and, 4; minjok conflated with, 117; in nationalist response to Japanese imperialism, 22; political versus ethnic identity, 152; in primordialist view of nationhood, 4; as social identification, 157–59. See also ethnic nationalism; race ethnic nationalism: as anticolonial force, 19, 68, 77, 98, 100, 229; as antiCommunist, 58, 68, 77–78, 108 –9; authoritarianism supported by, 78, 100, 133, 228, 230; challenges to, 133, 262n17; on Choso˘n-Manchurian problem, 70, 72 –73; collectivism emphasized in, 8, 13, 77, 116, 227, 230, 231; colonialism and Communism in rise of, 76 –78; combining with other ideologies, 15 –16, 78, 232 –33; compromising, 54, 70, 78; cultural nationalism contrasted with, 48 – 49; current manifestations of, 183 –221; double-edged nature of, 14 –16, 17; dual processes of

294

Index

ethnic nationalism (continued ) contention in, 228; early nationalists, 35 – 40; essentialized view of, 19 –20; ethnic homogeneity-national unification thesis, 185 –203; external threat in, 8, 10, 109, 124, 134, 226 –27, 229; and fascism, 55, 56, 77–78, 95, 98, 230; as form of mechanical solidarity, 16 –17; future of, 232 –35; genealogy of, 223 –29; and globalization, 204 –21; Ilmin chuu˘ as expression of, 102; and individualism, 77, 132 –34; as integrative force, 156 –57, 164, 229 –30; as intensifying in response to transnational forces, 17, 125; Japanese colonization of Korea and, 41–57; legacy of colonial, 97–100, 109; in legitimation of regimes, 23, 103, 108, 179, 228; liberalism’s development distorted by, 132 –34, 231, 232; limits of thought of, 54 –57, 179 – 81; nation privileged over class by, 68; noncompromising, 54, 70, 78, 84; in North Korea, 78, 88 – 89, 93; as not natural or inevitable, 24, 115, 117–19; origins and development of, 21–109; pan-Asianism and, 21–22, 35, 39 – 40, 224, 252n16, 261n15; particularism promoted by, 56, 58, 68, 70, 77; positive aspects of, 229 –30; price of, 230 –31; psychological power of, 189; as racial, 223; reinforcement after liberation, 79 – 80; September Theses underestimating, 74 –75; and Socialism, 22 –23, 54, 58 –78; South Korean sense of, 2 –3; and territorial division, 18 –19, 112, 231; toward a sociology of, 16 –18; transnational forces appropriated by, 225 –26; as weak before late nineteenth century, 3; World Cup 2002 and, 1–2, 17 ethnic-nationalist historiography (minjok sahak), 6 European Union (EU), 216 –17 familism: in North Korea, 85, 95; and unification, 203

fascism: ethnic nationalism’s affinity with, 55, 56, 77–78, 95, 98, 230; Korean Communist analysis of, 65 – 66; Korean nationalists on rise of, 69; as response to Socialism in Germany, 58 federation, 233 –34 F-15 Eagles, 176, 178 financial crisis of 1997, 175, 206, 218, 232 folk festivals, 215 –16, 267n10 Frank, Andre G., 219 free will, 47, 48, 125 Fukuzawa, Yukichi, 28 Gellner, Ernest, 13, 19, 152, 163, 229 Germany: collectivism of nationalism in, 147; ethnic nationalism in, 13, 15, 19, 117, 185, 210, 265n1; fascism as response to Socialism in, 58; identity politics in, 234; Korea compared with, 18, 19; path to modernity in, 12; on social Darwinism, 29; unification by absorption in, 188, 235, 265n1 Gerschenkron, Alexander, 13, 229 globalization, 204 –21; Asian regionalism as response to, 209, 216 –20, 232; capitalism as underlying force in, 210, 221; as double-edged sword, 210, 220; ethnic nationalism intensifying in response to, 17, 214 –16, 232; five major goals of, 214 –15; interplay of national and global forces, 209 –11, 220; Korean nationalism informing experience of, 183 – 84, 208 –21, 225; making sense of Korea’s, 211–20; managed, 205; national identity maintained despite, 133, 214 –16; segyehwa policy, 205 – 6, 212 –13, 214 –15, 217, 220; social changes caused by, 205 –9, 214 Globalization Promotion Committee (GPC), 205 – 6, 212 global standards, 211, 213 Gramsci, Antonio, 108, 167, 170 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 57, 256n19

Index Great Korea Association (taehan hyo˘phoe), 31 Greenfeld, Liah, 13 Grinker, Roy Richard, 3, 6, 187, 199 –200 groupism (tanch’e chuu˘i), 48, 132 Guillen, Mauro, 209, 210, 267n6 Guomindang (GMD), 59 – 60, 83 Habermas, Jurgen, 165, 181, 186, 188, 199, 201 Han, Hongkoo, 85, 86 Han, u˘ngsu, 67 Han, Unya, 66 Han, Yongun, 60 Han’guk t’ongsa (The Bitter History of Korea) (Pak), 38 han’gu˘l (Korean script), 28, 37, 40, 51–52 Havens, Tom, 141 Hechter, Michael, 138, 233 –34 Hedetoft, Ulf, 216 –17 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 55, 105 Henderson, Gregory, 168 Hiddink, Guus, 1 Hirst, Paul, 210 historical monuments, 49 –50, 70 History of People’s Movements in Modern Korea, 174 Hobsbawm, Eric, 18, 163, 255n8 Hong, Ikhan, 37 Hong, Yo˘ngsik, 33 hongik in’gan, 108 Hong Kong, 104 Horowitz, Donald, 14, 157 human rights, 56, 108, 113, 169, 218 –19, 230 Huxley, T. H., 30 Hwang, Yo˘ng, 65, 66 Hwangso˘ng sinmun (newspaper), 31, 34, 38 hyangyak, 147, 148 Hyeso˘ng (periodical), 141– 42, 143, 145 – 46, 148 identity politics: democratization and, 175; Koreans not adequately institutionalizing, 234; limits of, 179 – 81. See also ethnic nationalism

295

Ilchinhoe, 33, 254n11 Ilmin chuu˘i (One Peoplism), 100 –103; anti-Communism of, 108; ethnic nationalism as basis for, 98, 102; on homogeneity of Korean people, 100, 102, 152; in legitimacy of Rhee government, 23, 99; totalitarian elements in, 230 Imanishi, Ry¯u, 53 imperialism: American neoimperialism, 80; of capitalism, 174; early nationalists on resisting, 35, 39; Japanese, 22, 31, 35, 57, 62, 83, 224; Kim Il Sung on American, 153, 154 –55; Koreans become familiar with Western concept of, 117; minjung movement on American, 166, 167; Western, 31, 35. See also anti-imperialism; colonialism Independence Club: founding of, 116; as reform effort, 26; Rhee in, 96, 101; Western ideas promoted by, 118; Yun Ch’iho in, 32 Independent, The (newspaper), 116, 118 individualism: agrarianism rejecting, 146 – 49; of Anglo-American social Darwinism, 29; versus collectivist view of nation, 11, 13; egoism and selfishness equated with, 132; ethnic nationalism and, 77, 132 –34, 230, 231; Koreans become familiar with Western concept of, 117; versus nationalism, 252n9; nationality as characteristic of individuals, 7; shift from in 1920s, 126; of Western modernity, 13, 116, 146; Yi Kwangsu on, 47, 48, 69, 125, 132 industrialization: agrarianist critique of, 112, 142 – 43, 144 – 45; bourgeois nationalists on, 136; during colonial period, 138; ethnic nationalism intensifying in response to, 17; North Korea stressing, 87; Park pursuing, 97, 104, 221; postcolonial privileging of, 150 in groups, 157–59, 160, 164, 181, 188, 201

296

Index

internationalism: on collectivism, 77; cosmopolitanism, 28, 47, 118, 125; Korean Communists supporting, 62 – 63, 66 – 67, 75; Mao Tse-Tung on, 83 – 84. See also international Socialism international Socialism: Kim Il Sung transforming, 23, 86, 258n3; Korean nationalism and, 22 –23, 54, 58 –78, 111, 125, 225, 227; of Lenin, 81– 82; North Korean juche and, 23, 76, 88; as privileging class over nation, 59, 80; rise of, 63 – 68, 78; Stalin turning from, 82; as universalist, 59, 68, 129 Iryo˘n, 53, 254n12 Ito¯, Hirobumi, 35 Jager, Sheila, 254n15 jaju (chaju), 106, 259n4 Japan: agrarianism in, 141; Choso˘n Korean elites traveling to, 26; and Choso˘n-Manchurian problem, 71, 73; contestation in national narratives of, 10 –11; ethnic homogeneity of, 18, 19; ethnic nationalism in, 14, 19, 117, 180; as exceptional case, 18; family state of prewar, 85, 95; identity politics in, 234; imperialism of, 22, 31, 35, 57, 62, 83, 224; “Japan bashing” by Korean politicians, 100; Japanization, 56, 58; in Korea-centered view of East Asia, 52, 53, 54; Korea following nation-building model of, 9; Korea liberated from, 79; Korean nationalists on, 22, 31, 35, 36, 38, 39; Korean pan-Asianism on, 31, 32 –34; Koreans and World Cup 2002, 2; Koreans migrating to, 71; Korean suspicion of pan-Asian proposals of, 98, 217, 259n1; Koryo˘ nation, 255n16; and legacy of colonial ethnic nationalism, 97–100; as “lips and teeth,” 31; Meiji reforms, 104; national studies in, 51, 55, 56; nihonjinron, 180; as obsessed with national essence, 55; panAsianism in, 32 –34, 224, 253n7, 254n10; Park normalizes relations with, 97, 105, 217; path to moder-

nity in, 12; Rhee’s hatred of, 100, 101, 259n3; Russo-Japanese War, 25, 32, 33, 34; Sino-Japanese War of 1894 –95, 25; territorial disputes with South Korea, 220; Western notion of civilization in, 28, 33; Western science and technology appropriated by, 211–12. See also Japanese colonial rule; Protectorate Treaty (1905) Japanese colonial rule, 41–57; agriculture under, 138 – 40; assimilation policy, 19, 22, 42 – 45, 54, 55, 57, 75, 77; and Comintern Chinese policy, 74 –75; cultural rule, 46, 78, 124, 126, 225; East Asia as not having come to terms with its past, 219; Japanese pan-Asianism leading to, 33; Kim Il Sung during, 85 – 86; Korean resistance to, 75; March First movement, 43 – 44, 57, 60, 78, 166, 174, 225; multiple layers of, 136 –37; pan-Asianism stripped of legitimacy by, 40; racism in, 41– 45, 55, 75, 77, 125, 129, 225, 227, 229; universalism and particularism under, 124 –32 Jowitt, Kenneth, 84 juche (chuch’e) ideology, 89 –93; antiJapanese struggle in origin of, 85, 86; ethnic nationalism as basis for, 98, 225, 230; international Socialism and, 23, 76, 88; jaju compared with, 259n4; Kim Il Sung on, 88, 91, 94; and Kimilsungism, 89 –90; as liability in reform efforts, 95; North Korean modernity defined by, 14; North Korean nationalism evolving into, 80; “Socialism of our style” and, 76; student activists influenced by, 181; totalitarian elements in, 230 jus sanguinis, 234 Kabo reform (1894 –96), 26, 119 Kaebyo˘k (magazine), 261n8; agrarianist views in, 142, 143, 144, 147; as mass-circulation magazine, 255n4; Pak Yo˘ngho˘i’s “Re-appreciation of Korean Culture,” 69; universalist

Index versus particularist content in, 125 –32 Kaech’o˘njo˘l, 99 Kamens, David, 120, 121 Kang, C. S. Eliot, 213 Kang, Jung In, 262n19 Kang, Wi, 33 Kapsin coup (1884), 26, 32, 255n6 Kato¯, Hiroyuki, 29, 253n5 Katzenstein, Peter, 219 Kim, Cho˘nghun, 93 Kim, Chunggo˘n, 142, 144 Kim, Chungsoo, 259n1 Kim, Dae Jung: in election of 1971, 107; globalization policy of, 213 –14, 268n17; meets with Kim Jong Il, 151, 178, 191; sunshine policy of, 178, 217; on World Cup semifinal appearance, 1–2 Kim, Hakchun, 186 Kim, Hongjip, 33 Kim, Ilso˘ng, 85, 151 Kim, Il Sung: blamed for territorial division, 194, 197, 201, 249; on creative application of Marxism-Leninism, 87; on ethnic homogeneity of Korea, 5, 153 –54; as father figure, 85, 95; international Socialism transformed by, 23, 86, 258n3; during Japanese occupation, 85 – 86; on juche, 88, 91, 94, 230; in Korean War, 159, 160 – 62; nationalism in socialist rhetoric of, 23; on patriotism and nationalism, 88; political notion of nation of, 154 –55; Rhee’s rhetoric compared with that of, 152 –56; during SinoSoviet dispute, 86, 88; “Socialism in one family,” 84 – 86; South Korean representations of, 151 Kim, Jong Il: “Choso˘n minjok cheil chuo˘i” slogan used by, 89, 91; on Eastern European Communism, 91–92; on juche, 89 –93; Kim Dae Jung meets with, 151, 178, 191; on Kimilsungism, 89 –90; on “Socialism of our style,” 91–93; South Korean representations of, 151, 263n3 Kim, Kijo˘n, 145

297

Kim, Kwang-Ok, 203 Kim, Minhwan, 27, 117–18 Kim, Okkyun, 32, 33, 255n6 Kim, Samuel, 168, 205, 208, 210, 213, 214 Kim, T’ae, 145 Kim, Tohyo˘ng, 16 Kim, Tongch’un, 133 Kim, Tongt’aek, 118 Kim, Young Sam, 205 – 6, 212 –13, 214 –15, 217 Kim, Yunkyo˘ng, 55 –56 Kimilsungism, 89 –90 Kodu˘ng sohak (textbook), 119 Koguryo˘, 37, 48, 53, 219 Koh, B. C., 186 Kohn, Hans, 14 Koizumi, Tetsunori, 209 Kojiki, 57 Kojong, King, 116 ko˘minka (assimilation policy), 19, 22, 42 – 45, 54, 55, 57, 75, 77 Koo, Hagen, 12 Korea: as case in study of nation and nationalism, 18 –20; Choso˘nManchurian problem, 70 –73; “civilization” embraced in, 28, 220; constructionist (modernist) view of nationhood of, 5 – 6, 251n5; ethnic homogeneity in, 5, 18; as exceptional case, 18; in Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere, 256n19; identity crisis of late-nineteenth-century, 25 –27; multiple forms of identity in premodern, 7, 9; nationalism as force of modernity in, 11–14; “overdeveloped state” in, 100; primordialist view of nationhood of, 4 –5, 251n5; Silla dynasty, 5, 48, 102; trusteeship proposal for, 98 –99, 101, 102, 109, 155; unique experience attributed to, 6 –7; United States and Soviet Union competing in, 79; Western science and technology appropriated by, 211–12. See also Choso˘n dynasty; Japanese colonial rule; Korean War; North Korea; overseas Koreans; South Korea; territorial division

298

Index

Korean Americans: in Kim Dae Jung’s globalization policy, 213, 214; recovering Korean citizenship by, 234 –35; and World Cup 2002, 1 “Korean body, Western utensils” ideology, 207, 208 Korean Catholic Council for Peace and Justice, 173 Korean Communist Party (KCP): and agrarian issue, 140; anticolonialism of, 77; on Choso˘n-Manchurian problem, 70 –72, 73; establishment of, 60; internationalism endorsed by, 62 – 63, 66 – 67, 75; Manchurian Bureau of the Korean Communist Party, 68, 72; nationalist Communism in, 75 –76; “Platform of Action of the Communist Party of Korea” of 1934, 64; “war of position” with nationalists, 63 – 68 Korean Folklore Society, 256n9 Koreanization, 215 Korean language: early nationalists in study of, 37, 70; during Japanese colonial rule, 45, 51–52; in Korean magazines, 128, 130; in Korean textbooks, 123 Korean Language Research Society, 46 Korean Language Society, 51 Korean literature, 37, 52, 70 Korean Minjok Leadership Academy (KMLA), 204 –5 Korean National Council of Churches, 172 –73 Korean Peasant Society (Choso˘n nongminsa), 142, 144, 145, 148, 262n5 Korean People’s History, The, 174 Korean script (han’gu˘l ), 28, 37, 40, 51–52 Korean studies (Choso˘nhak), 50 –51, 64, 67, 69 –70, 216, 267n13 Korean War: as effort to recover lost unity, 152, 231; favorable South Korean attitude toward U.S. after, 168 – 69; political psychology of, 159 – 63; South Korea blaming North Korea for, 109 Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), 87 Korea Reborn (Park), 106

“Korea’s Unique Religion” (Ch’oe), 52 –53 Koryo˘ dynasty, 26, 48 Kungmin sodok (textbook), 119 Kuzio, Taras, 10 Kwangju massacre (1980), 168, 169, 264n2 Kwo˘n, Hyo˘kpo˘m, 6, 98 Kwo˘n, Pyo˘nghyo˘n, 2 Kwo˘n, Sugin, 216 Kwo˘n, To˘kkyu, 54 Kwo˘nyul, 49, 50 Kyegu˘p t’ujaeng (journal), 63 – 64 labor strikes, 62, 74, 257n2 landlords, 138 –39 language: English in South Korea, 204, 207, 214, 267n5; Koreans said to have invented, 54. See also Korean language Lee, Chong-Sik, 96 Lee, Kuan Yew, 267n15 Lee, Namhee, 174 Lenin, 59, 81– 82, 92, 141, 173, 262n2 Leninjuu˘i (journal), 67 Leyens, Jacques-Philippe, 157–58 LG Electronics, 206 Liang, Qichao, 30, 253n5 liberalism: versus collectivism, 77; disillusionment with, 60; ethnic nationalism and poverty of, 132 –34, 231, 232; Japanization as reaction to, 58; in Korean intellectual discourse of 1920s, 125; Koreans become familiar with Western concept of, 25, 117; and nationalism in South Korea, 99; Yi Kwangsu on, 48, 69, 132 life regeneration movement (saenghwal kaesin undong), 141 lihoe (village association), 148 literature, Korean, 37, 52, 70 local self-rule (chibang chach’i), 267n10 Los Angeles, 1 Ma, Myo˘ng, 146, 148 magazines: agrarianist views in, 142; coding standards on, 241– 42; content analysis of, 125 –32; growth in late

Index nineteenth century, 26, 117; textbooks contrasted with, 127 Mahathir, Mohamed, 267n15 Manchukuo, 256n19 Manchuria: anti-Japanese struggle in, 85 – 86; Chos˘on-Manchurian problem, 70 –73; in Korea-centered view of East Asia, 53, 54; in Sin Ch’aeho’s history of Korea, 37 Manchurian Bureau of the Korean Communist Party, 68, 72 Manchurian Incident (1931), 43 Mann, Michael, 9, 233 Mao, Tse-Tung, 83 – 84 March First movement, 43 – 44, 57, 60, 78, 166, 174, 225 Marques, Jose, 157–58 Marx, Karl, 59, 67 Marxism: agrarianism contrasted with, 141, 142, 146, 147, 149; anticolonialism of, 136; ethnic nationalism distorting development of, 133, 231; introduction into Korea, 60; Kim Il Sung on creative application of, 87; Kim Jong Il on, 89, 90, 91–92; modernist orientation of, 135 –36; on nationalism, 59, 63, 66, 80 – 81; on neo-Confucianism, 135; North Korean constitution drops, 94; on proper political community, 227; as response to cultural nationalism, 58; in shaping Korean nationalism, 58; socialist consciousness as goal of, 255n7; in united front in 1927, 54, 61– 62; as urban-centered, 136. See also Communism McDonald’s, 177 mechanical solidarity, 16 –17 Meyer, John, 120, 121 Mingsaengdan (People’s Livelihood Corps; MSD), 85 – 86 minjok: as conflated with ethnicity, 117; in ethnic-nationalist historiography, 6; Japanese influence on Korean use of, 55; minjung movement on, 167, 171; multiple uses of term, 4; Munhwa hy˘oksin undong on, 47; North Korea using term, 88 – 89; in

299

primordialist view of Korean nation, 5; Sin on origins of, 36, 254n13 “Minjokch˘ok ky˘ongnyun” (Yi), 48 Minjok hy˘optong ch˘ons˘onnon (Theory of the National United Front), 61 “Minjok kaejoron” (Yi), 46 – 47, 48, 146 minjok sahak (ethnic-nationalist historiography), 6 minjung movement, 167–75; anti-Americanism of, 113, 166, 167, 168 –72, 180, 228; as contesting state’s definition of nation, 179 – 81; criteria for who constituted the minjung, 181; decline of, 175, 181; developmentalism opposed by, 112 –13, 168, 170, 171–72, 175, 180; on ethnic base of the nation, 173; as nationalist movement, 170 –72; origins of, 168, 171; theological variant of, 171; as “trump card,” 181 modernist (constructionist) view of nation, 4, 5 – 6, 251n5 modernity: agrarianist critique of, 112, 140 – 49, 150; bourgeois and Marxist nationalists as modernists, 135; historical narratives of, 149 –50; Ilmin chuu˘i and, 102; linear view of history of, 135, 149; nationalism as force of, 11–14, 17; in nationalism’s genesis, 137–38; nation building as modern project, 111, 112; publications in rise of, 126; tradition as not replaced by, 137; as urban phenomenon, 136; Western model of, 116 –19. See also modernization modernization: defensive, 212; globalization compared with, 205, 206, 208, 210, 211–12; Korea embracing, 220 – 21; minjung movement challenging, 173, 175; Park’s “modernization of the fatherland” rhetoric, 23 –24, 103 – 8, 167, 168, 212, 213, 214, 215, 221, 225; social changes caused by, 214; uneven development under, 137–38, 223 –24 monuments, historical, 49 –50, 70 Moon, Chung In, 205 Moore, Barrington, Jr., 12 moral education: in magazines, 128, 131; in textbooks, 120, 121, 121, 122, 123

300

Index

Movement for Korean Studies (Choso˘nhak undong), 50 multinational corporations, 206 Mun, Ilp’yo˘ng, 53 –54, 56 Mun, Pusik, 170 Munhwa hyo˘ksin undong (Campaign for Cultural Revitalization), 47 naisen ittai, 44, 48, 51, 54, 257n4 names, changing Korean for Japanese, 45 nation, see nationhood National Conference for Unification, 175 national core groups (minjok chungsim tanch’e), 70 national expressive associations (minjok p’yohyo˘n tanch’e), 70 nationalism: civic versus ethnic elements in, 10; class in, 16; colonialism in rise of, 41; Communism as not incompatible with, 59 – 63; contestation and, 10, 11; cultural nationalism, 46 – 49, 58, 208; embeddedness and, 8 –9; as force of modernity, 11–14, 17; globalization and, 209 –11, 220; as hegemonic in Korea, 9; in Kim Il Sung’s “Socialism in one family,” 85; Koreans become familiar with Western concept of, 25, 117; Lenin on, 81– 82; Mao Tse-Tung on, 83 – 84; Marxism and, 59, 63, 66, 80 – 81; as modern phenomenon, 27, 137–38; versus pan-Asianism, 27, 28; Stalin on, 82 – 83. See also bourgeois nationalism; ethnic nationalism national liberation: anti-trusteeship movement and, 99; Communism seen as ideology of, 60; Communist approach to, 66 – 67; Kim Il Sung on, 155; Kim Jong Il on, 90; Korean War and, 159 – 60, 161, 162; Mao on, 83 – 84; minjung movement on, 166, 167, 170, 172, 174; nationalism as ideology of, 59; Sin’ganhoe and, 62 national representation, politics of: contentiousness of, 5, 9, 156 –59, 228,

229, 234; national identity promoted by, 209; territorial division and, 112, 151– 65, 231 National Studies School (kokugaku), 55, 56 national unification, see unification National University, 46 nationhood: civic and ethnic elements in, 10, 115 –16, 154, 226; constructionist (modernist) view of, 4; contestation in formation of, 10 –11; contingency and formation of, 9 –10; embeddedness and formation of, 8 –9; ethnicity as basis of, 7; in mass politics, 167; nation as “trump card,” 132, 230; nation building as modern project, 111, 112; nations as “imagined communities,” 7, 157; naturalizing, 180; Park’s organic view of, 105 – 6; for political rationalization, 167; primordialist view of, 4 –5; as social and historical construction, 223, 226; Stalin’s definition of, 82, 89, 93; universalism and particularism in nation building, 111–12, 115 –34; Western model of modern, 116 –19. See also minjok; nationalism nativism, 56, 68 Nau˘i munhwa yusan tapsagi (Yu), 216 neocolonialism, 173 neo-Confucianism, 47, 95, 135, 146, 147, 148 – 49 nihonjinron, 180 nissen do¯soron, 44 – 45, 54 Nixon, Richard, 107, 260n6 Nongmin (journal), 143, 147, 262n5 Northeast Asia, South Korea as hub of alliance in, 211, 217–18, 219, 232 North Korea: anti-imperialism in nationalism of, 80, 152, 154, 155, 160, 163, 227; anti-Japanism in, 80, 258n2; becomes nationalist state, 88 – 89, 94; Bush’s “axis of evil” characterization of, 176, 177; and China, 80, 87, 91, 94, 95; claims sole representation of Korean nation, 24, 135, 152, 156; corporatism attributed to, 94 –95;

Index on ethnic homogeneity, 3, 5, 19, 152, 156, 232; and ethnic homogeneitynational unification thesis, 185 –203; ethnic nationalism and authoritarianism in, 78, 100, 133, 228; fascist elements in, 95; globalization rejected in, 211; as “hermit kingdom,” 95; juche ideology in, 14, 23, 76, 89 –93, 95, 181, 225, 230; “Koreanization” of Soviet Communism in, 80; in Korean War, 159 – 63; nationalism as hegemonic in, 9, 79, 226; nationalist Communism in, 23, 75, 76, 80; nuclear program of, 178, 217, 218; as people’s republic, 87; postcolonial nation-building of, 79 –95; sense of ethnic national identity in, 251n3; during Sino-Soviet dispute, 86, 88, 91, 94; as between Socialism and nationalism in early years, 86 – 89; “Socialism in one family” in, 84 – 86; “Socialism of our style,” 76, 80, 91–93, 94, 225, 230; South Korean attitudes toward, 176, 178; South Koreans feeling ethnic unity with, 2; South Korean system compared with, 78, 109; and Soviet Union, 80, 87, 91, 94, 95; after Soviet Union’s collapse, 88, 91, 94, 95; as surviving crises of 1990s, 95; “Tan’gun nationalism” of, 187; on Tan’gun’s tomb, 5, 93, 258n6; territorial division and politics of national representation, 112, 151– 65; “theory of the Korean nation as number one,” 89, 91, 94, 187, 225, 230; U.S.-led globalization excluding, 219; various groups contending for power in 1945, 259n7; xenophobic nationalism of, 24, 109. See also Kim, Il Sung; Kim, Jong Il nuclear nonproliferation, 178, 217, 218 O, Talche, 37 ˘ , Yunjung, 33 O Ohmae, Kenichi, 205, 209 o˘l, 50 –51 Oliver, Robert, 162, 163, 263n6

301

“On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism” (Mao), 83 “Our Oath to the National Flag,” 260n7 out-groups, 157, 164, 181 Outline of the Civilization, An (Fukuzawa), 28 Overseas Korean Foundation, 2, 213, 267n9 overseas Koreans: in Kim Dae Jung’s globalization policy, 213 –14, 268n17; pride in World Cup 2002, 2; recovering Korean citizenship by, 234 –35; sense of ethnic national identity among, 251n1; South Koreans feeling ethnic unity with, 2 Paek, Namun, 5, 75 –76 Paekche, 53 paekcho˘ng, 136, 262n1 Paik, Nak-Chung, 186 – 87, 188 Pak (religion), 52 –53 Pak, Ch’ansu˘ng, 16, 65 Pak, Cho˘ngyang, 33 Pak, Il-Hyo˘ng, 71–72 Pak, Myo˘ngnim, 159 – 60 Pak, Noja, 132 Pak, u˘nsik, 36, 38, 51 Pak, Yo˘nghu˘i, 69 –70 pan-Asianism: and collaboration with Japan, 55; forms of Korean, 31; and Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 256n19; in Japan, 32 –34, 224, 253n7, 254n10; Korea-centered version of, 52 –54; Korean nationalism and, 21–22, 35, 224, 252n16, 261n15; Korean suspicion of Japanese proposals for, 98, 217, 259n1; in Koryo˘ nation, 255n16; limits of thought of, 54 –57; major Korean proponents of, 253n6; as modern phenomenon, 27; versus nationalism, 27, 28, 39 – 40; regionalism as response to globalization, 209, 216 –20, 232; Russia opposed by, 32, 253n8; as transnational ideology, 11, 27 Pang, Kijung, 16

302

Index

Park, Chung Hee: anti-Communism of, 108 –9, 167; assassination of, 97, 108; background of, 96 –97; Charter of National Education of 1968 of, 175, 260n7; Communist activities of, 97; coup of, 97, 103, 167; on cultural revitalization, 106; developmentalism of, 14, 103 – 4, 167; in election of 1971, 107; on ethnic homogeneity of Korea, 5, 103; ethnic nationalism of, 99 –100, 108, 186; as increasingly totalitarian, 107; on jaju, 106, 259n4; Kim Jong Il compared with, 91; “modernization of the fatherland” rhetoric of, 23 –24, 103 – 8, 167, 168, 212, 213, 214, 215, 221, 225; as “national conscience”, 105; nationalism and legitimation of, 23, 103, 179; normalizes relations with Japan, 97, 105, 217; organic view of nation of, 105 – 6, 108; “Our Oath to the National Flag” of, 260n7; political education promoted by, 175; Saemaul movement launched by, 106 –7, 150; social Darwinism of, 105; Western technology used by, 256n10; yusin system established by, 103, 107, 166, 167, 168 particularism: An Chaehong promoting, 78; under colonial rule, 124 –32; ethnic nationalism promoting, 56, 58, 68, 70, 77; Japanization as, 56; juche and Kimilsungism as, 90, 91; in Korean textbooks, 120 –24; Paek Namun on, 76; Pak Yo˘nghu˘i on, 69; Protectorate Treaty of 1905 and rise of, 111, 121, 124; universalism contrasted with, 257n1; and universalism in nation building, 111–12, 115 –34; Western universalism as, 56 Patriotic Enlightenment movement, 147 “Patriotism and Internationalism” (Mao), 83 – 84, 88 peasant struggles, 62, 74 Peattie, Mark, 42 Pip’an (journal), 63, 65, 67– 68, 71 “Platform of Action of the Communist Party of Korea” (1934), 64

Plattner, Marc, 14 Pok, Ko˘il, 267n5 politics of national representation, see national representation, politics of popular fronts, 82 “Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and Colonial Questions” (Lenin), 81 primordialist view of nation, 4 –5, 251n5 print capitalism, 7, 9, 46, 125 progress, 135, 149, 150 Protectorate Treaty (1905): Chang Chiyo˘n denounces, 34 –35; ethnic nationalism as response to, 27, 38, 39, 118 –19, 226 –27; trusteeship proposal compared with, 98, 99, 155; universalism declines following, 111, 121, 124 publications: under bunka seiji policy, 46, 255n4; public sphere created by, 126. See also magazines public sphere, 126, 231 “Pulham Munhwaron” (Ch’oe), 52 p’umasi, 148 P’yo˘ngyang, 43, 72 race: ethnic nationalism as racial nationalism, 223; ethnic nationalism as response to colonial racism, 77, 100, 225, 227, 229; Japanese colonial racism, 41– 45, 55, 75, 77, 125, 129, 225, 227; as key to colonial rule, 42; Koreans conflating ethnicity and, 4; minjok conflated with, 117; in nationalism, 22, 36 –37, 40, 54; in pan-Asianism, 30 –33, 39, 40; particularism and racism, 58; social Darwinist racism, 29, 31, 40, 224. See also ethnicity radicalism, ethnic nationalism distorting development of, 133, 231, 232 Rand Corporation, 176 reactionism (sugu chuu˘i), 133 Reagan, Ronald, 169 “Red Peasant Union,” 140, 257n2 region: nation triumphing over, 40; in pan-Asianism, 32 –34; regionalism as response to globalization, 209, 216 –20, 232

Index “Regulations on the Preservation of Ancient Sites and Relics of Cho¯sen” (1916), 49 Republic of Korea, see South Korea Research Institute for National Unification, 186 reunification, see unification Rhee, Syngman: anti-Communism of, 100 –101, 108 –9, 155 –56; as anti-Japanese, 100, 101, 259n3; background of, 96; on ethnic homogeneity of Korea, 5, 152, 153; ethnic nationalism of, 108, 186; Ilmin chuu˘i rhetoric of, 23, 98, 100 –103, 108, 152, 230; Kim Il Sung’s rhetoric compared with that of, 152 –56; in Korean War, 159, 160, 161– 63; and legacy of colonial ethnic nationalism, 97; nationalism and legitimation of, 23, 108; organic view of nation of, 108, 153; overthrow of, 96, 108; political notion of nation of, 155 –56; So˘ Chaep’il influencing, 117; trusteeship opposed by, 101, 155; on U.S. strategy in cold war, 263n6 rights: civic and individual, 118 –19, 132, 133, 230, 231; human, 56, 108, 113, 169, 218 –19, 230 Robinson, Michael, 45, 46, 55, 58, 121, 125, 174, 256n11 Roh, Moo Hyun, 179, 217–18, 232 Roh, Tae Woo, 186 Roy, M. N., 59, 82 Rozman, Gilbert, 218 rural revitalization campaign, 140 Russia: agrarianism in, 141; pan-Asianists opposed to, 32, 253n8; RussoJapanese War, 25, 32, 33, 34. See also Soviet Union Russo-Japanese War (1904 – 05), 25, 32, 33, 34 Saemaul movement, 106 –7, 150 Salaryman.co.kr, 177 Samguk yusa (Iryo˘n), 53, 56 –57, 254n12 Samsung, 206 Sato, Shigeki, 11, 45 Savage-Landor, A. Henry, 25, 26 scapegoats, 201

303

Schmid, Andre, 6, 32, 37, 40, 55, 252n16 science: East Asia appropriating Western, 211–12; ethnic nationalists accepting, 256n10; Korean leaders adopting Western ideas of, 111; in Korean magazines, 128, 131; in Korean textbooks, 120, 121, 121, 122, 123 Scott, James, 139 segyehwa, 205 – 6, 212 –13, 214 –15, 217, 220. See also globalization Sejong, King, 37 self-determination, 43, 125 self-reliance ideology, see juche (chuch’e) ideology self-sufficiency, 112, 137, 141, 142 – 45, 227 Seoul, 1, 17, 43 September 11 attacks, 178 September Theses (Comintern), 61– 62, 74 –75 Shamanism, 44, 47, 52, 53, 57, 146, 148 Shin, Gi-Wook, 12, 17, 74, 75, 103, 139, 140, 169, 181 Shintoism, 44, 52, 53, 57, 75, 257n4 Shiratori, Kurakichi, 53 Shorrock, Tim, 168, 170 Short, Dewey, 263n4 sikhye, 216 Silhak, 50, 256n13 Silla dynasty, 5, 48, 102 Simsang sohak (textbook), 119 Sin, Ch’aeho: anarchism of later years, 256n18, 257n1; Confucianism attacked by, 254n15; on ethnic nationalism as natural or inevitable, 115; Ilmin chuu˘i compared with, 102; “Imperialism and Nationalism,” 35; Kim Jong Il compared with, 93; on nation and blood line, 38, 95; on o˘l, 51; Paek Namun on “Tan’gun nationalism” of, 75; pan-Asianism criticized by, 36; Park compared with, 105; postcolonial promotion of, 257n1; on Tan’gun as founder of Korean nation, 36 –37, 53, 254n12 Sin, Hyo˘nggi, 6, 252n5 Sin, Namch’o˘l, 51 Sin, Onjun, 73

304

Index

Sin’ganhoe (New Korea Society), 61, 62, 70, 78, 80, 84 Singapore, 104 Sin’gyedan (journal), 63, 64, 65, 66 Sinmin (periodical), 144, 146, 148 Sino-Japanese War (1894 –95), 25 Sino-Soviet dispute, 86, 88, 91, 94 sint’o puli discourse, 216 Smith, Anthony, 9, 10, 15, 210, 214, 252n15 So˘, Chaep’il (Philip Jaisohn), 116 –17 So˘, Ch’un, 145 So˘, Kwangbo˘m, 33 social Darwinism: Japan in introduction of, 25, 29, 55; Koreans become familiar with, 25, 117; pan-Asianism influenced by, 22, 28 –30, 31, 35, 40, 224; of Park, 105; in segyehwa policy, 213 social identity theory, 157–59, 164 Socialism: Kim Il Sung’s “Socialism in one family,” 84 – 86; Kim Jong Il’s “Socialism of our style,” 76, 80, 91–93, 94, 225, 230; Marxists attempt to inculcate socialist consciousness, 255n7; North Korean transformation of, 79 –95; Stalin’s “Socialism in one country,” 60, 82 – 83, 85. See also Communism; international Socialism; Marxism Society for Moral Correction, 146 Society for the Promotion of Native Production, 46 Son, Chint’ae, 5 Song, Hojong, 258n6 Sorenson, Clark, 149 so¯tokufu, 42, 43, 44, 45 South Korea: anti-Communism of, 80, 152, 154, 160, 163, 227; attitudes toward United States, 175 –79; bourgeois nationalism of, 135 –37; capitalism and nationalism in, 24, 109; Charter of National Education of 1968, 175, 260n7; claims sole representation of Korean nation, 24, 99, 135, 152, 156; developmental state in, 12, 104, 221, 229 –30, 268n17;

discrimination against ethnic nonKoreans in, 181, 234 –35; economic growth, 1960 – 82, 103 – 4; ethnic homogeneity in, 3, 5, 19, 152, 156, 198, 232; and ethnic homogeneity-national unification thesis, 183, 185 –203; ethnic nationalism and authoritarianism in, 78, 100, 103, 109, 133, 228; foreign labor in, 181, 206, 234 –35; among “four little dragons,” 104; globalization and nationalism in, 204 –5, 232; “history of Koguryo˘” dispute with China, 219; as hub of Northeast Asian alliance, 211, 217–18, 219, 232; Ilmin chuu˘i rhetoric in, 23, 98, 100 –103, 108, 152, 230; Kim Young Sam government, 205 – 6, 212 –13, 214 –15, 217; Korean Minjok Leadership Academy, 204 –5; in Korean War, 159 – 63; legacy of colonial ethnic nationalism in, 97–100, 109; minjung movement in, 112 –13, 167–75, 228; “modernization of the fatherland” rhetoric in, 23 –24, 103 – 8, 167, 168, 212, 213, 214, 215, 221, 225; national identity and unification survey in, 190; nationalism and legitimation of regimes in, 23 –24; nationalism as hegemonic in, 9, 79, 226; Nixon doctrine and, 107, 260n6; North Korean system compared with, 78, 109; postcolonial nation-building of, 96 –109; Roh Moo Hyun government, 179, 217–18, 232; Saemaul movement, 106 –7, 150; sense of ethnic national identity in, 2 –3; as Taehan min’guk, 1, 99, 263n5; Tan’gun myth in, 5, 99, 108; territorial disputes with Japan, 220; territorial division and politics of national representation, 112, 151– 65; three faces of, 232; yusin system, 103, 107, 166, 167, 168, 171. See also Kim, Dae Jung; Park, Chung Hee; Rhee, Syngman Soviet Union: Comintern policy directed by, 74; in Korean War, 159;

Index Lenin, 59, 81– 82, 92, 141, 173, 262n2; nationalist conflict mitigated in, 233; North Korea’s relations with, 80, 87, 94, 95; occupying Korea after liberation, 79; patriotism and nationalism in, 88; Rhee on cold war strategy of, 263n6; Rhee’s hatred of, 100, 161; seen as champion of oppressed peoples, 60; Sino-Soviet dispute, 86, 88, 91, 94; Stalin, 59, 60, 62, 82 – 83, 85, 89, 93; trusteeship proposal of, 98, 101 So˘yu kyo˘nmun (Yu), 28 Spencer, Herbert, 30, 150 sports, 127, 128, 131, 204 Stalin, 59, 60, 62, 82 – 83, 85, 89, 93 Starbucks, 177, 206 strikes, 62, 74, 257n2 studying abroad, 206, 217, 266n4 Sun, Yat-sen, 33 sunshine policy, 178, 217 Sydney Declaration (1994), 205 taehan hyo˘phoe (Great Korea Association), 31 Taehan maeil sinbo (periodical), 35, 36 Taiwan: among “four little dragons,” 104; in Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 256n19; as Japanese colony, 33; Taiwanese identity sought in, 252n17 Tajfel, Henri, 157 Tanaka, Chigaku, 95 tanch’e chuu˘i (groupism), 48, 132 Tangdae pip’yo˘ng (journal), 262n17 Tan’gun: China lacking counterpart of, 54; Ch’oe Namso˘n on, 52, 53, 57; Communist criticism of promotion of, 64, 67; external threat and myth of, 9; first appearance of myth of, 254n12; Ilmin chuu˘i and, 102, 103; Kim Dae Jung refers to, 2; Kim Il Sung compares himself with, 85; in Korean ethnic national identity, 4; North Korean “Tan’gun nationalism,” 187; Paek Namun on “Tan’gun nationalism,” 75 –76; proposal to

305

erect statues of, 5; Rhee on, 155; Sin Ch’aeho on, 36 –37; South Korean adoption of myth of, 5, 99, 108; tomb of, 5, 49, 50, 93, 258n6 Tarui, To¯kichi, 254n10 “Tasks of the Korean Communists, The” (Kim), 258n3 teachers’ union, 174 –75 technology: East Asia appropriating Western, 211–12; ethnic nationalists accepting, 256n10; Korean leaders adopting Western ideas of, 111; in Korean magazines, 128, 131; in Korean textbooks, 120, 121, 121, 122, 123 Tenancy Arbitration Ordinance (1932), 74 tenancy disputes, 74, 140, 146, 257n2 territorial division: versus ethnic homogeneity, 5; ethnic nationalism and, 18 –19, 112, 231; and incongruity in national identity, 152 –56; Koreans’ acceptance of, 189; and politics of national representation, 112, 151– 65, 231; Dewey Short on, 263n4. See also unification textbooks: coding standards on, 239 – 40; content analysis of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century, 119 –24; detailed descriptions of West in, 260n2; magazines contrasted with, 127 Theory of Eastern Peace (tongyang p’yo˘nghwaron), 31, 32, 35 “theory of the Korean nation as number one” (“Choso˘n minjok cheil chuu˘i”), 89, 91, 94, 187, 225, 230 Theses on the National and Colonial Question (Second Comintern Congress), 59 Thesis on Great Eastern Federation (Daito¯ gappo¯ron) (Tarui), 254n10 Thompson, Grahame, 210 “Three Basic Tasks for Korean National Movements” (Yi), 48 Three Kingdoms period, 5 T’oegye, 215

306

Index

Tonga ilbo (newspaper), 47, 50, 51, 60, 62, 70, 76, 141, 255n4 tonggye, 147, 148 Tonghak, 25, 142, 253n4 Tonghak peasant rebellion (1894), 26, 167, 174, 253n4 tonghoe, 147, 148 Tongkwang (magazine): on Choso˘nManchurian problem, 73; content analysis of, 125 –32; Kim Yunkyo˘ng on the state, 55; Kwo˘n To˘kkyu on Chinese culture, 54; as mass-circulation magazine, 255n4; as nationalist, 126, 261n8; Yang Chudong article on Korean literature, 52 tongyang chuu˘i (Easternism), 31, 35 tongyang p’yo˘nghwaron (Theory of Eastern Peace), 31, 32, 35 tradition: agrarianism appealing to, 112, 137, 142; bourgeois and Marxist nationalists rejecting, 135; as contested terrain, 137, 226, 255n8; cultural nationalists on, 47; in Korea magazines, 125 –32; at Korean Minjok Leadership Academy, 204 –5; in Korean textbooks, 120, 121, 122, 123; maintaining despite globalization, 214 –16; as not replaced by modernity, 137; in Rhee’s Ilmin chuu˘, 102; Western notion of civilization not replacing, 220; Yi Kwangsu rejecting, 47, 135 trusteeship proposal, 98 –99, 101, 102, 109, 155 Tu, Wei-Ming, 267n15 ture, 148 Turner, J. C., 157 U˘lchimundo˘k, 38, 49 unification: challenges to ethnic homogeneity-national unification thesis, 187– 88; consequences of ethnic homogeneity-national unification thesis, 189, 193 –94, 195 –96, 198, 202, 245; democracy and, 165, 234, 235; demographic factors and attitudes toward, 198 –99, 202, 266n6; ethnic

unity seen as leading to, 164 – 65, 183, 185 –203, 230; federation for, 233 –34; minjung movement emphasizing, 172; perceived differences between two Koreas and, 189, 194, 196, 199 –200, 202, 246 – 47; as premature, 235; separating North Koreans from regime and, 189 –90, 194 –95, 197–98, 201, 202, 249; as South Korean hegemony, 187, 189, 194, 196 –97, 200 –201, 202, 235, 248; testing ethnic homogeneity-national unification thesis, 189, 192 –93, 195, 198, 244 united front: Communist dissatisfaction with, 61– 62; international Socialist objection to, 63; Mao Tse-Tung on, 83 – 84; noncompromising nationalists in, 54, 61, 77, 84; return after mid-1930s, 75, 84 United States: Kim Il Sung on imperialism of, 153, 154 –55; in Korean War, 159; and Kwangju massacre, 168, 169, 264n2; minjung movement’s anti-Americanism, 113, 166, 167, 168 –72, 180, 228; neoimperialism of, 80; Nixon doctrine, 107, 260n6; and North Korean nuclear program, 178, 217, 218; occupying Korea after liberation, 79; redeployment of its troops, 178 –79; Rhee on cold war strategy of, 263n6; Rhee requesting aid from, 101, 162 – 63; South Korean attitudes toward, 175 –79; South Koreans who want it out, 190, 191, 266n7; South Korea shifting to China from, 217, 218, 219; trusteeship proposal of, 98 universalism: under colonial rule, 124 –32; of contemporary Asianism, 218 –19; ethnic nationalism as response to, 77; international Socialism as, 59, 68, 129; Japanization as response to Western, 56, 58; Korean studies as response to, 69; in Korean textbooks, 120 –24; of MarxismLeninism, 90; particularism contrasted with, 257n1; and particularism in nation building, 111–12, 115 –34;

Index premodern versus modern Western, 118; Protectorate Treaty of 1905 and decline of, 111, 121, 124 uri chuu˘i (we-ism), 48, 132 Uri Party, 217 Vietnam, 107 Wade, Robert, 210 Weber, Max, 12, 104, 230 Weiner, Michael, 74 we-ism (uri chuu˘i ), 48, 132 West, the: in early modern Korean curriculum, 116; “Eastern spirit, Western technology,” 207, 212; Enlightenment, 25, 146 – 47, 149, 212; imperialism of, 31, 35; increasing presence in East Asia, 26, 32, 224; “Korean body, Western utensils” ideology, 207, 208; Korean leaders adopting ideas and values of, 111; in Korean magazines, 125 –32; in Korean textbooks, 120 –24. See also United States; Western Europe Western Europe: capitalism and modern state-building in, 173, 174; contestation in national narratives of, 10; European Union, 216 –17; individualism of, 13, 116, 117, 146; modernity in, 12, 13; nationalism as integrative in, 18, 229; territorial notion of nation in, 18. See also Britain; Germany Wilson, Woodrow, 43, 125 women’s issues, 126 –27, 128, 131 Wo˘nsan strike (1939), 62 World Cup 2002, 1–2, 17 world-system theory, 104 xenophobia, 24, 105, 109 Yang, Chudong, 52 yangban: Chinese script used by, 252n6; identifying with other East Asian

307

literati, 26; in premodern Korea, 5; tonggye and hyangyak practiced by, 148; Yi Kwangsu criticizing, 48 – 49 Yi, Choyo˘n, 33 Yi, Haejun, 148 Yi, Kwangsu: authoritarian tendency inherent in, 109; Communist criticism of, 65; on Communists and Choso˘n-Manchurian problem, 73; as “compromising” nationalist, 54; denouncement of collaboration of, 80, 257n1; on ethnic nationalism as natural or inevitable, 115; ideas reappearing in South Korea, 109; Ilmin chuu˘i compared with, 102; on individualism, 47, 48, 69, 125, 132; on Japanization, 56; Kim Jong Il compared with, 93; on liberalism, 48, 69, 132; on new national character, 46 – 47, 48, 146; Paek Namun on “Tan’gun nationalism” of, 75; Park compared with, 99 –100, 103, 105; particularism promoted by, 78; racialized view of nation adopted by, 48 – 49, 76, 95, 132; on Yi Sunsin, 50 Yi, Sangjae, 33 Yi, So˘nghwan, 142, 145 Yi, Sunsin, 38, 49, 50, 67 Yi, Wanyong, 160, 161 Yi, Yonggu, 33, 254n11 Yidali jianguo sanjie zhuan (Liang), 30 Yim, Chihyo˘n, 6, 99, 133, 252n5 Yu, Hongjun, 216 Yu, Kilchun, 28, 29 –30, 33, 116 Yugoslavia, 88 Yun, Ch’iho, 32, 33, 253n6 Yun, Chip, 37 Yun, Hyo-jo˘ng, 30, 253n6 Yun, u˘ngyo˘l, 33 Yunyo˘n p’iltok (textbook), 34, 38, 119 yusin system, 103, 107, 166, 167, 168, 171 Yzerbyt, Vincent, 157–58