Essays on Tensing in English: Time, Text and Modality v. 2 (Linguistische Arbeiten) (German Edition) [Reprint 2010 ed.] 3484302283, 9783484302280

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Linguistische Arbeiten

228

Herausgegeben von Hans Altmann, Herbert E. Brekle, Hans Jürgen Heringer, Christian Rohrer, Heinz Vater und Otmar Werner

Essays on Tensing in English Vol. : Time, Text and Modality Edited by Alfred Schöpf

Max Niemeyer Verlag Tübingen 1989

CIP-Titelaufnahme der Deutschen Bibliothek Essays on Tensing in English / ed. by Alfred Schöpf. - Tübingen : Niemeyer. ME: Schöpf, Alfred [Hrsg.] Vol. 2. Time, Text and Modality. - 1989 (Linguistische Arbeiten ; 228) ISBN 3-484-30228-3

ISSN 0344-6727

© Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen 1989 Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen. Printed in Germany. Druck: Weihen-Druck GmbH, Darmstadt

CONTENTS

Foreword

νι

Introduction

l

ELIZABETH COUPER-KUHLEN Foregrounding and Temporal Relations in Narrative Discourse

7

CORNELIA HAMANN English Temporal Clauses in a Reference Frame Model

31

JANET HARKNESS Three Present Time Adverbials: Nowadays, These Days and Today

155

RICHARD MATTHEWS Reference Time and Modality

189

ALFRED SCH PF The Temporal Structure of Narrative Texts

247

Bibliography

285

FOREWORD

This is the second volume of Essays on Tensing in English, which, like its predecessor, owes its appearance in the first instance to the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and the Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft at the University of Freiburg, whose financial aid enabled the contributors to this volume to pursue their research on tense, aspect, modality, adverbials and narrative discourse in English and to meet and discuss the problems and questions that served as the basis for the papers included. All five members of the project wish to express their thanks to these two institutions for their generous assistance. The editor also wishes to thank the individual contributors for their patience and perseverance in working out, revising and often re-working their papers. Thanks are also due to those who undertook the laborious task of transforming the typescripts into readable manuscripts, above all to Frauke Liebschner, who typed or reformatted the papers in Microsoft Word, to Damian Padberg, who proofread various stages of the manuscripts and painstakingly checked formulae and diagrams, to Elke Szarf, who helped with proofreading and inserted the exotic symbols and drawings that the word processor could not handle, to Wolfgang Hochbruck and Gerd Hurm for their help with print-outs of various stages of the manuscript, and finally to Richard Matthews, who supervised and organized the production of the camera-ready manuscript on a laser printer.

INTRODUCTION

This is the second of two volumes resulting from the editor's Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft project on tensing in English. Again, as in the first volume, the five papers making up the volume do not yet mirror a unified theory of tensing in English and the reception (temporal reconstruction) of narrative discourse. It is hoped, however, that the views put forward in the five articles, although to some extent diverging, will stimulate the discussion of the questions raised. In 'Foregrounding and Temporal Relations in Narrative Discourse', the first of the papers, Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen deals with the distinction between foreground and background in narrative discourse. She first singles out five assumptions commonly held about temporal relations in the foreground of narrations, namely (1) that only foregrounded events move the reader/hearer forward in time, (2) that foregrounded events are all tensed in the Past as opposed to background events which may, for example, be tensed in the Past Perfect, (3) that foregrounded events are found only in main clauses, (4) that foregrounded events have perfective aspect only, progressive forms in English e.g. invariably belonging to the background, and (5) that foregrounded events are all of one event type, described variously as telic or punctual. Couper-Kuhlen questions all these assumptions and tentatively proposes a new view of foregrounding as it relates to reference time, tense, syntax, aspect, event type and the time adverbial and then. Her main proposals are the following: (1) Foregrounded events are those which are placed in temporal sequence via a succession of current reference times. (2) The foreground is not dependent on the Past but rather on the non-coincidence of reference time (RT) with speech time (ST) and on a succession of these RTs. (3) Foregrounded events are not necessarily always in main clauses; instead they are those which are located via the current RT. Backgrounded events are not always those in subordinate clauses but instead those which help to locate the foregrounded events by specifying a reference frame for them. (4) Foregrounded events are those whose RT does not provide a frame for subsequent events (or their RTs). If this is the case with progressivized propositions in context, then they are foregrounded. Backgrounded propositions are those whose RT serves as a frame for other (foregrounded) events. If this is the case with progressivized propositions in context, then they are backgrounded. (5) Couper-Kuhlen proposes several classes of foregroundable event types: (a) those which are fully bounded and, in her view, cause a new current RT to be introduced; (b) those which are totally unbounded and normally do not move the current RT; (c) those which are left-bounded only and

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cause RT to move minimally to a point just beyond their tj. She points out that propositions may belong to these categories either inherently or may fall into (a) or (c) because of context-determination. Finally, Couper-Kuhlen points out (6) that the time adverbial and then may cause a new current RT to be introduced eo ipso, unless preceding context has already provided one. In the former case it is fully functional and allows unbounded (progressivized) propositions to be foregrounded. Couper-Kuhlen sums up her findings in the statement that the temporal foreground in a narrative provides an answer to the questioning then what happened?, while the temporal background has generally adverbial function and answers the question And when did this happen? A further finding of hers may be of interest to the narratologist. She claims that the progression of reference time in narrative discourse is a reflex of the narrator's consciousness and can be exploited as such in the service of a protagonist's point of view. In general, it is such narratological aspects of her paper that may be appreciated by the reader. Cornelia Hamann's paper on 'English Temporal Clauses in a Reference Frame Model' takes a fresh approach to the model-theoretic analysis of temporal clauses in so far as they are treated on a par with temporal adverbs, i.e. as frames for the main clause RT. The denotation of a temporal clause is taken as an interval which serves as a frame (adverbial) whose specification is arrived at from the interaction of conjunction, tense and event notion. In comparison with previous work on temporal structures, this approach has the advantage of having to determine only the denotation of the temporal clause, while the meaning of the whole structure emerges via the rule for frame adverbs and the rules for the interplay of reference time and event time in the main clause. Her proposals thus supplant the cumbersome rule systems hitherto suggested in the literature. The conjunctions primarily investigated in her article are after, before and when. In trying to show how the denotation (i.e. the specific interval) of a temporal clause is built up from the information conveyed by the conjunction, the event notion occurring in the temporal clause and its tense, Hamann proposes the following rule of thumb: after and before with their unique measure phrase potential take a point as anchor, that is, after the lower and before the upper bound of an otherwise open interval (which can be bounded on the other side by pragmatic information). When, on the other hand, is treated as a simultaneity conjunction, which matches reference times directly. In making this provisional rule more

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precise Hamann records cases in which under the influence of event notion and tense after, contrary to the general rule, selects tj and before, tf of the respective events as anchoring points. In stressing the importance of event notions in determining the temporal relation between the subclause and the main clause event, Hamann suggests that the investigation of event notions has not yet reached a fully satisfactory stage. A short discussion of the conjunctions until, since and while reveals that while for after, before and when an appealingly simple rule system is possible, considerable alteration of the rules seems to be necessary to cover these other conjunctions. Apparently several classes of temporal clauses must be distinguished, each calling for its own treatment as temporal adverbs fall into different classes that call for specific treatment. What the reader will appreciate in Hamann's paper is her attempt to take account of the influence of event notion and tense on the processing of temporal clause and main clause and her sketching of a way towards a body of simple rules capable of combining the denotations of temporal clause and main clause. Janet Harkness's paper, 'Three Present Time Adverbials: Nowadays, These Days and Today', starts with an appraisal of what dictionaries, model theoretic analyses and the time adverbial analysis in Schöpf (1984) have to contribute to our understanding of the function of individual time adverbials. None, she concludes, go into sufficient detail in various areas to permit us to distinguish between such very similar time adverbials as nowadays, these days, today (denoting a time larger than one day) and at present. Working with a small corpus of examples of these time adverbials, she examines the typical contexts in which each time adverbial is found, considers their extensional limits and their collocational potential with different event types, aspectual forms and tenses. In the last section of her paper she is then able to pin-point differences between time adverbials in otherwise identical contexts. Her essay can be seen as a demonstration of the kind of information and level of detail required to be able to 'define' time adverbials in any real sense of the word. In 'Reference Time and Modality', Richard Matthews takes on two problems. First, whether there is any justification for the so-called 'branching futures' model (BF) that has been proposed recently in formal linguistics (Thomason 1970, Dowty 1977, Tedeschi 1981, etc.), or whether another model, the 'parallel worlds' model (PW), is equally, or even more, satisfactory. Second, how a Reichenbachian model of tense and time specification can be expanded to include specifications for the kind of phenomena normally included

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under mood and modality. His discussion of both problems involves: (1) expressions of modality, including 'dynamic', 'directive deontic' and 'deontic comment', as well as 'epistemic' modality, and Imperatives; (2) conditional sentences both 'indicative' and 'subjunctive', here called 'potentialis' and 'irrealis' respectively - parallel expressions with ay are also included as realis expressions. His conclusions are that the 'branching futures' model can only differentiate 'potentialis' and 'irrealis' when the temporal point-of-event is anterior to the point-of-speech; that BF presupposes a branching node on the time line, which in the case of modal expressions is indeterminate and for »/-clauses usually undetermined; that it is not time that branches but the course of an event or events; that the temporal metaphor for 'irrealis' ("looking at the present through the eyes of the past" - Tedeschi 1981) cannot be made to work in BF; that something like Lyons's 'intensional world' interacting with time is required to account for modality and kinds of modality. In a final section, he develops an iconic representation for events, times, worlds and speakers, incorporating point-of-speech (S), point-of-reference (R), point-of-event (E), and realis world (W + ) (= history line and its future projection), potentialis world (W°), and irrealis world (W~), conceived of as lines parallel to the time line. Some of the modal and conditional expressions discussed earlier are exemplified using this method of representation. In a postscript, he picks up a question raised in Alfred Schöpf s article about the status of the Future 'tenses' in English. Alfred Schöpf s paper, 'The Temporal Structure of Narrative Texts', is an attempt to apply the analytic procedures proposed in Schöpf (1984) and (1987) to the temporal structure of an extract from A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man by James Joyce. His step by step analysis of this passage reveals the following: (1) Any attempt to reduce the temporal organization of narrative discourse to a mechanical principle of reference time shift exclusively based on the aspectual character (event notion) of its propositions is, it seems, an inadequate approach. Schöpf also finds fault with David Dowty's "temporal discourse interpretation principle" (1986), which tenses each sentence of a narrative discourse via a separate and successive reference time. Interpretive progressives, for instance, clearly contradict such an assumption and the conclusion Schöpf reaches is that several different factors control the shift of current reference time. (2) Some of the more complex sentences of the extract analyzed suggest that in decoding narrative discourse we have recourse not only to reference times (as suggested by Schöpf in previous studies) but also to event times as temporal orientation marks with the aid of which we reconstruct the temporal sequence of

5

the events of a story. (3) His analysis further demonstrates that analysis of narrative discourse of this degree of complexity presupposes unusually large storage and retrievability capacities and interpretive faculties not (yet) available, as it seems, in computers and artificial intelligence, apparently calling in question the possibility of automatic discourse analysis. Narrative discourse of such complexity as manifested in Joyce's prose cannot be understood as a mere additive structure on a sentence by sentence basis, but requires the receiver to have access to information supplied far back in the discourse and in several places, in short, the memory and meaning searching faculties of human intelligence. (4) His article further suggests and enumerates a number of analytic steps that seem to be indispensable for any attempt to imitate the reception of narrative discourse by reader or hearer in a consistent and well-arranged flow diagram. One of these steps controls the positioning and type of reference time to be assumed for a proposition via the event type realized in it. (5) His article might also be of interest to literary scholars, suggesting a more detailed analysis of the narrative technique applied in Joyce's A Portrait of the Artist. In comparing the contributions to this volume, the attentive reader will undoubtedly notice that as far as the progression of the current reference time in a story is concerned two (more or less) conflicting ideas are adhered to. There is, on the one hand, the idea that reference time shift is triggered by the aspectual qualification of propositions (Hinrichs 1981, Partee 1984 and Couper-Kuhlen in this volume). According to this idea, any fully bounded event projects a new current RT onto the empty time line ahead of itself BEFORE the next sentence is received. Schöpf shows in his paper that at several points in the extract analyzed such a principle of automatic (or iconic) reference time shift is not operative and proposes a different approach saying that the positioning of an event reported by a fresh sentence can only take place AFTER the new sentence has been received and evaluated against the background of all the information supplied by the previous context, that is, that the integration of a new event into the temporal web of a narrative (via a reference time) is the result of a highly complex computational operation on the basis of multifarious information. Only in the default case, where neither semantic, pragmatic nor any other clues are available, might, according to Schöpf, some automatic reference time shift triggered by the aspectual character of the proposition be operative. It is hoped that the decision to leave the conflict between these two ideas unsettled will turn out to stimulate the reader into practical textual analysis and perhaps more extensive research on a broader basis of observational data. The general direction that suggests itself in such studies is towards a new type of text linguistics, a type of cognitive linguistics as part of cognitive science.

FOREGROUNDING DISCOURSE

AND

TEMPORAL

RELATIONS

IN

NARRATIVE

Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen The notion of foreground is a crucial one in most theories of narrative discourse.1 Longacre, for instance, calls foreground the 'backbone' of a story (1983:100); Hopper calls it 'the actual story line' (1979:213). In Labov's model foreground is presumably the 'complicating action' of a narrative, realized in a series of so-called narrative clauses (1972:363). And in more logically oriented models such as those based on discourse representation (Hinrichs 1981, Partee 1984, Kamp/Rohrer 1983) it corresponds, I shall assume, to 'reference time progression' (cf. also Reinhart 1984). In sum, most scholars seem to take it for granted that there is such a thing as foreground and that everyone agrees on what its features are. The purpose of this paper, however, is to criticize some of the widely held beliefs about foreground, in particular with respect to temporal relations, in the light of empirical data gathered from my own reading and/or gleaned from the growing literature on narrative temporal discourse. The thrust of this critique will be that we need to re-assess our view of what the foreground is and how temporal dimensions such as tense, aspect, event notion and time adverbial are related to it. 1. Common assumptions I shall begin by listing a few of the familiar and cherished ideas about time and temporal relations in the foreground: 1.1 The foreground consists of a sequence of events which 'push us forward in time' (cf. e.g. Hopper 1979, Dry 1983). The background2 contains events which are either concurrent with the main events or are temporally unordered. In any case they are not themselves sequentially ordered as foregrounded events are.3 11 am grateful to the Tensing System of English' project members for lengthy discussions of earlier versions of this paper, and in particular to Cornelia Hamann, Richard Matthews and Alfred Schöpf for detailed comments on the final version. 21 shall be using this term more broadly than e.g. Grimes, for whom it covers only 'secondary information that is used to clarify a narrative', distinct from temporal and spatial setting (1975:56). 3 The difference between the sentences in the foreground (the 'main line' events) and the ones in the background (the 'shunted' events) has to do with sequentiality. (...) Because the sequentially constraint is lift-

8

1.2 Events in the foreground are expressed via lexical verbs which are tensed in the Past (cf. e.g. Weinrich 1964). Other 'events'4, for instance those expressed by verbs tensed in the Past Perfect or Future Perfect, belong to the background (Hopper 1979), or if expressed by verbs tensed in the Simple Present or Present Perfect, to the evaluation section of a narrative (Labov/Waletzky 1967). 1.3 Events in the foreground are found onfy in main clauses (cf. e.g. Labov/Waletzky 1967). Any event contained in a subordinate or dependent clause is automatically part of the background.5 1.4 Events in the foreground are expressed via lexical verbs with perfective aspect (cf. e.g. Forsyth 1970, Weinrich 1964, Hopper 1979) or in English, in the simple form (Labov 1972). Imperfective aspect, or in English the progressive form, is reserved for events which are part of the background (Weinrich 1964), or which belong to some other section (e.g. orientation, evaluation) of the narrative.6 1.5 Events in the foreground are expressed via lexical verbs which denote onfy certain types of event. The background, so the claim goes, generally contains verbs which express states, whereas the foreground has telic verbs (Nerbonne 1984), or alternatively accomplishment and achievement verbs (Hinrichs 1981) or punctual verbs (Hopper 1979).7 In addition, it has been claimed that foregrounded events are found only in affirmative as opposed to negative sentences8 (cf. e.g. Labov 1972). However open to criticism this claim may be, I shall consider it here only to the extent that it touches upon questions of tempoed, backgrounded clauses may be located at any point along the time axis or indeed may not be located on the time axis at all" (Hopper 1979:214f.). "Because background tense markers signal happenings and states which are not 'in sequence' and which by their very temporal inconsistency cannot and do not move the discourse forward, they have access to a much wider spectrum of temporal deixis" (Hopper 1979:239). 41 am using this term generically until further notice. 5 "...subordinate clauses do not serve as narrative clauses. Once a clause is subordinated to another, it is not possible to disturb the original semantic interpretation by reversing it... It is only independent clauses which can function as narrative clauses" (Labov 1972:362). 6 "Progressives in be...ing (...) are usually used in narratives to indicate that one event is occurring simultaneously with another, but [they] also may indicate extended or continued action. Most of these occur in orientation sections.... But was...ing clauses also are found suspending the action in an evaluative section... (Labov 1972:387). 7 "Because foregrounded clauses denote the discrete, measured events of the narrative, it is usually the case that the verbs are punctual rather than durative or iterative... One finds, in other words, a tendency for punctual verbs to have perfective aspect (i.e. to occur in foregrounded sentences) and conversely for verbs of the durative/stative/iterative types to occur in imperfective, i.e. backgrounded, clauses" (Hopper 1979:215). 8 The use of negatives in accounts of past events is not at all obvious, since negation is not something that happens... Negative sentences (...) provide a way of evaluating events by placing them against the background of other events which might have happened, but which did not" (Labov 1972:380f.).

ral organization. 2. Some problems I turn now to a discussion of some of the problems which arise in conjunction with each of the above five assumptions. 2.1 Moving ahead in the background The implication in much of what has been written about moving the story forward in time is that only foregrounded events do this. However, consider the following examples9: (1)

I promised to drop in and returned to the dining room and my meal. When I had finished eating I went up to my room, fifth floor front. (RH 60f.)

(2)

/ drank a glass of water and went to sleep. The next morning Dick Trim was waiting for me when I walked into my office. He gave me a quick look over and proceeded as if nothing had happened.

In (1) it is undeniable that the foregrounded events , , < I go up to my room> move us ahead in time. However, notice that the event , which occurs in a subordinate temporal clause in the Past Perfect and would be assigned canonically to the background, also moves us forward in time, since it occurs after the narrator returns to the dining room and before he goes up to his room. Likewise in (2) the event < Dick Trim be waiting for me >, although it is ostensibly part of the background, is located in time after the preceding foregrounded event < (I) go to sleep > and consequently also pushes us ahead in time. In other words, in both cases we advance in time but it is backgrounded events which cause us to do so. Upon reflection, this state of affairs needn't surprise us. Events regardless of their grounding status are temporal affairs and as such have locations in time. The exact temporal location of a backgrounded event may of course be irrelevant in a narrative and consequently left unspecified (this is sometimes the case with events tensed in the Past Perfect). But on the other hand the temporal location of a backgrounded event may be quite rele9 Henceforth those tagged with initials and a number in parentheses are genuine examples from the following sources: KH-Red Harvest (Dashiell Hammett), BS=The Big Sleep (Raymond Chandler), DC=77ie Dain Curse (Dashiell Hammett), TM = 77ie Thin Man (Dashiell Hammett), MF=The Maltese Falcon (Dashiell Hammett), PS = 77ie Pear Stories (Chafe, 1980).

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vant in the story: it may be required to situate a foregrounded event [as in (1) above], or it may be needed to signal that the background of the narrative has itself changed [as in (2)].10 At any rate, if a backgrounded event has a specified or specifiable temporal location and if this location is posterior to the last foregrounded event it will inevitably cause us to move forward in time. The claim that only foregrounded events make the story advance in time is misleading for the simple reason that backgrounded events sometimes move us forward in narrative time as well. Now this problem disappears of course if the syntactic restrictions on what counts as foreground are relaxed and only the criterion of temporal sequence is used to decide whether an event belongs to the background or to the foreground. This is essentially what Dry (1983) does. Starting from the contrast between situations that 'move' narrative time and those that don't, she allows not only independent clauses but also modifying constructions such as subordinate clauses (temporal and non-temporal), reduced clauses and participials to fall in the former group. The notion of time movement alone then becomes criterial for the definition of grounding: "the foreground is composed of sentences which refer to sequenced points on a timeline. The background is composed of those sentences that either do not refer to a single point (e.g. imperfectives, habituals, iteratives), or refer to a point that is not presented in fabula sequence (e.g., sentences with Past Perfect tense)" (1983:48). But the relegation of all sequenced events to the foreground is a dangerous move to make because it clouds the distinction in clausal structure between, for instance, the narration in (1) above and the following: (!')

I promised to drop in and returned to the dining room and my meal / finished eating. I went up to my room, fifth floor front.

In both (1) and (I1) the sequence of events is the same but the way they are presented to the reader/hearer is different. In (I 1 ) in order to interpret I finished eating temporally, we presumably take the last reference time reached, i.e. that containing and use it to set up a new reference time posterior to it which helps us locate the event .n And we proceed similarly in locating the subsequent event < I go up to my room> in time. In discourse (1), however, the clausal 10 Cf. also Kamp/Rohrer, who point out that French imparfait sentences (and by extension, progressive ones in English) may contain their own adverb of temporal location (1983:258). 111 shall simply assume here that the events in narrative discourse are interpreted via some principle of reference-time progression or chaining; for more discussion see Partee (1984), Nerbonne (1986), CouperKuhlen (1987).

11

structure tells us to assume the event and use a (subsidiary) reference time posterior to it to help locate the reference time of the event < I go up to my room > (assuming a reference-frame interpretation of temporal tvAe/i-clauses; cf. Hamann, this volume). That is, to put it simply, in (1) we have only two 'main' events, whereas in (I 1 ) we have three. In sum, the view that all events which move forward in narrative time belong to the foreground is problematic because it ignores the role of syntactic structure. And if this happens, then differences in relative saliency of events which narrators may encode syntactically and which hearers/readers may use in interpreting discourse are not taken into account. Although ultimately the same line-up of events in time may result, the way these events are placed on the time line is quite different and should be reflected in a model of temporal relations in narrative discourse.

2.2 Narration in other tenses Those who claim that the Past tense is the narrative tense par excellence and consequently the preferred tense for the foreground (the second assumption) are of course not oblivious to the fact that an occasional historical Present may creep into the narrative at moments of heightened drama. But what is often overlooked is that a sequence of Present tense forms can take over the foregrounding function in a narrative, as in the (re-)telling of the plot of a film, a book or a play. For instance, in one of Chafe's Pear Stories, the narrator recounts: (3)

...and then he gets down out of the tree, and he dumps all his pears into the basket, and the basket's full, and one of the pears drops down to the floor, and he picks it up. and he takes his kerchief off, and he wipes it 12 0% places it in the basket which is very fulL (PS 301)

Despite the systematic use of Present tense here, most would agree that this example and others like it are all cases of narration provided we adopt Labov's definition of a narrative as "matching a verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events which (it is inferred) actually occurred" (1972:359f.). Likewise, a sequence of Future tenses can be used to relate a chain of events iconically: (4)

*(...) You'll be disappointed at first. Then, without being able to say how

12 I have preserved Chafe's transcription conventions for the representation of intonation: thus, [.] = sentence-final falling intonation, [?] = sentence-final level or rising intonation, [,] = clause-final but not sentence-final intonation. However, timed and untuned pauses have been omitted here.

12 or when it happened, vou'llfind you've forgotten your disappointment, and the first thing you know you'll be telling her vow life's history, and all your troubles and hopes..." (RH 25) In fact, at least one science fiction author has written a whole novel using the Future tense for foregrounded action (Michael Frayn,j4 Very Private Life, 1968).13 Finally, a sequence of events may be related iconically in the Past Perfect, as the following excerpt illustrates: (5)

It had broken a rib for him, and he had taken a back-door sneak... Noonan's men had picked him up in a doctor's office. (RH 102)

The second assumption concerning the foreground is thus erroneous to the extent that other tenses in sequence (including Past Perfect, Future and Present) can be used equally as well as the Past to represent a chain of events iconically. There is no preemptive relation either way between Past tense and foregrounded narration. 2.3 Foregrounded temporal clauses If the third assumption is understood to imply that independent clauses can be automatically linked with the foreground and dependent (subordinate, participial, etc.) clauses with the background, then it too is misleading. For one, non-Past tenses and progressive forms, which are canonically associated with the background, often appear in main clauses. But it is also misleading for a second, less obvious reason. Consider, for instance, another version of the narration in (1): (1")

I promised to drop in and returned to the dining room and my meal I had just finished eating when I heard myself being paged.

In this case the event is in a main clause which is in temporal sequence with surrounding events. However, there are good reasons for viewing not this event but the one in the subordinate clause as being foregrounded here. One reason is the fact that the event in the temporal clause furnishes a better answer to the question What happened then? than the event in the main clause.14 The latter in fact provides a better answer to the question When did this happen?. We conclude then that the grounding relations are exactly the reverse here of what a strict syntactic analysis would predict, and that consequently 13 Cf. the discussion in Bronzwaer (1970:70ff.). 14 As Labov has pointed out, this question is the one which temporally sequenced events in a narrative answer first and foremost.

13

syntactic structure cannot be relied on blindly in determining the foreground.

15

2.4 Backgrounded simple and foregrounded progressive forms There are two problems connected with the fourth assumption: (a) verbs in the simple form, although they occur in affirmative main clauses, may be used to relate backgrounded events, and (b) verbs in the progressive form sometimes relate foregrounded events. a. The first of these cases can be illustrated with examples such as (6)

"...she tried to sit in my lap" (I said). Nothing changed in his expression. His clasped hands rested peacefully on the edge of the rug... (BS 12)

(7)

...I let go the ice pick, drew in my arm, and got up. My eyes burned. (RH 151)

In (6) the predication describes a state of affairs which obtains at a moment or interval in time which overlaps (and may extend beyond) the interval of time at which < no thing change in his expression > obtains; in other words it does not make the story advance and is consequently part of the background, based on the criteria set forth above.16 Similarly, in (7) does not describe an action in the main story line: it is not part of the temporal sequence , , . Instead it refers to a state which, under one interpretation, coincides with the last of these events and is thus part of the background.17 Yet in both instances the backgrounded 'events' are related via verbs in the simple form. The explanation for this is of course obvious once we consider the nature of the predicates involved. (Hands) rest on the edge of the rug belongs to the category of States (more specifically to a subcategory whose members refer to position in space; (cf. Schöpf 1984:94f.), and eyes bum to the category of Simple processes (cf. Schöpf 1984:96f.). Characteristic for both types of predicate is the fact that the events concerned are conceptualized as lacking a beginning and an end, as having little or no internal 'structure' and as being relatively homogeneous or continuous situations. Consequently, when the simple form is used with 15 For more discussion of foregrounded temporal clauses see Couper-Kuhlen (1988a, 1988b). 16 Note that the predication < nothing change in his expression >, although it is one of Schopfs unquantified directed changes (cf. something gradualfy/slowfy changed in his expression), is arguably foregrounded (pace Labov), since it is a reaction to what the narrated-I has just said. We return to questions of this nature in 3.5. 17 Cf., however, 3.5 for an alternative interpretation.

14

them we do not have perfective meaning because these situations can hardly be looked at from outside, or as 'blobs' (Comrie 1976:18). Instead the very nature of these predicates implies imperfective meaning, or a view from within (cf. Comrie 1976:3f.) and the usual contrast between simple vs. progressive form is neutralized. Thus the fourth assumption concerning the foreground is faulty for the simple reason that it ignores the important interaction between event type and aspectual choice. b. But the fourth assumption is faulty for a second reason as well. Consider the following excerpt from the Pear Stories: (8)

...he comes down with a load of pears, and he puts them into the basket, and then he's going back up into the tree, it's like he's been doing this all day, and it's just a monotonous kind of thing for him. And a man comes along with a goat,... (PS 303)

or this one from a personally documented oral narrative recounting a game of miniature golf: (9)

and my friend and I were sort of playing ahead (...) and so I was just batting this thing up there and it fell in the hole and rolled out and lo and behold I get this hole in one

Although there is some evaluative comment in (8) and some background setting in (9), both narrators are basically relating sequences of events in the order of their occurrence. In (8) the events , , are clearly sequential and foregrounded. But a case can also be made for considering < he be going back up into the tree > as part of the foregrounded story line, although the verb is in the progressive form. One argument for this interpretation is the fact that the Simple Present/Past can be substituted for the progressive with no change in meaning: (8')

he comes down with a load of pears and he puts them into the basket and then he goes back up into the tree (...) and a man comes along with a goat

Although it could be objected that the narrator in (8) means rather: Svhile he's going back up, a man comes along', this cannot be so: we know from Chafe's description of the film plot and from other Pear stories that the pear-picker is already back up in the tree when the man with the goat comes along (Chafe 1980:xii). Therefore the conclusion appears to be that the simple and the progressive forms here express the same temporal relation. Consequently, it is not surprising that they both answer the question And what happened

15

then?. Similarly in (9) although sets a frame for the subsequent chain of events and is backgrounded, the event can hardly be interpreted as a setting for the event , since understood semelfactively its completion is a prerequisite for the ball to reach the hole. (An iterative interpretation is excluded by virtue of the fact that the narrator is talking about a miniature golf contest in which every stroke counts.) Here too the simple form can be substituted without changing the temporal relations involved: (9')

and so I batted this thing up there and it fell in the hole and rolled out and lo and behold Iget this hole in one

We conclude from examples like this that, just as simple forms do not automatically signal foregrounding, so progressive forms cannot be used as a diagnostic test for the background. There is thus ample motivation for questioning the validity of the fourth assumption. 2.5 Event types and narrative progression Although the fifth assumption at least recognizes the existence of different types of event, how they are related to the foreground depends on whose verb classification is being used (among those competing are Vendler's, Dowty's and Bach's). The resulting claims are for this reason often in conflict. Furthermore, as finer classifications (e.g. Schöpf s) reveal, those employed so far do not always capture the relevant features for grounding. In the following I shall outline three problems in this area. 2.5.1 Punctuality? Telicity? Boundedness? Based on my data, neither punctuality nor telicity in verbs and/or predicates is an adequate description of the type of event found in the foreground. It is true that punctual verbs are well suited for the foreground, as the following illustrates: (10)

There was a small ivory pushbutton beside the door marked '405'. I pushed it... (BS 64)

But the continuation of this narrative sequence demonstrates that the foreground is not restricted to punctual verbs:

16

(10')

... and waited what seemed a long time. Then the door opened noiselessly about a foot. (BS 64)

Now the foreground in this passage is clearly constituted by the sequence of events , < (I) wait...a long time> and . However, the latter two predications are not punctual if we understand by this "the quality of a situation that does not last in time (is not conceived of as lasting in time), one that takes place momentarily" (Cornrie 1976:42). They are, however, telic if we treat the verb and the durative adverb as a unit and interpret telic to mean "involv(ing) a process that leads up to a well-defined terminal point, beyond which the process cannot continue" (Comrie 1976:45). Yet this interpretation of telic necessarily excludes that of punctual. And since we find instances of both categories in the foreground, neither is appropriate as a single descriptive label for the type of event found in the foreground. One way of avoiding this problem is to postulate a more encompassing category, one which comprises both punctual verbs (including Bach's instantaneous events, or Vendler's achievements) and telic verbs (Bach's protracted events, or Vendler's accomplishments). This is the tack taken e.g. by Partee (1984), who distinguishes Events and States.18 Partee's Events are bounded intervals which, if they occur in main clauses, cause reference time to progress; her States are unbounded intervals which do not independently move reference time ahead.19 The criterial feature for the grounding distinction in this and similar approaches is thus boundedness. 2.5.2 Right unboundedness But even this revamped classification does not account for all types of event found in the foreground. Consider, for instance:

(11)

She nodded at last, turned slowly and walked back to her little desk in the comer. From behind the lamp she stared at me. I crossed my ankles and yawned. Her silver nails went out to the cradle phone on the desk, didn't touch it, dropped and began to tap on the desk. (BS 22)

Lined up in order of occurrence, the sequence of events here is presumably: , , , , . If this were the case, the stare would come to an end before the next event < I cross my ankles > begins. Instead it is more likely that the staring continues while the ankle crossing and subsequently the yawning take place; indeed it probably serves as a motivation for these activities. Yet if we construe the temporal relations this way - and there is nothing to prevent us from doing so - we have placed an event in the foreground which is neither an Event nor a State. In fact it can be argued that is bounded on the left but unbounded on the right, taking a leftto-right interpretation of time.21 That is, it has a definite beginning point (which is here immediately after the completion of ) but no definite ending point: it presumably continues until further notice or until something happens which prevents it from continuing. Here, then, is a second type of event which is foregroundable, in addition to fully bounded Events.22 The fifth assumption is thus only partially true, even once terminological conflicts have been resolved via the dichotomy Event (bounded interval) vs. State (unbounded interval). 2.5.3 States which progress and Events which do not There are two final respects in which the simplified assumption that States do not progress while foregrounded Events do, errs. First, in models which recognize a State-Event dichotomy based on unbounded vs. bounded intervals, progressive forms are typically reckoned to the former. Yet as shown in 2.4, progressives sometimes do occur in foregrounded narrative sequences. Provided such progressive forms are still called States, then they give cause to doubt the fifth assumption. Moreover, the fact should not be overlooked that States are sometimes moved forward by temporal adverbials and the likes. For instance, in: (12)

She looked at him, smiling. Then she was in his arms and he was kissing

20 I assume this event is foregrounded because it is temporally sequenced and answers the question And what happened then?. 21 One indication of its left-boundedness is the fact that in a sentence like When John looked in, she stared at me the predicate clearly signifies the beginning of the action (and possibly its resultant phase as well). 22 The event < her nails begin to tap on the desk > is arguably another example of the same type.

18

her with a fine certainty that surprised him. (Leisi 1974:245) the State does not coincide with but obtains at an interval in time which is fully posterior to this Event. In other words, the State has been pushed forward in time by the time adverbial (and) then. In addition, even certain lexically 'non-temporal' adverbials such as (and) suddenly or (and) all at once, which denote only unexpectedness, may have the same effect: (13)

John went over the day's perplexing events once more in his mind. Suddenly, he was fast asleep. (Dowty 1986:50)

Under certain conditions then States do progress, and this is a problem for narrative models with Event-based reference-time progression or chaining. A second problem lies in the fact that not all Events in a linear sequence of main clauses require a sequence interpretation.23 Consider, for instance: (14)

I finished my cigarette and lit another. The minutes dragged by. Horns tooted and grunted on the boulevard. A big red interurban car grumbled past. A traffic light gonged. (BS 22)

The Events here are , , < horns toot>, < (horns) grunt >, , but only the first two of these are likely to be sequential in the order given.24 The others could conceivably happen in any order, or they could be simultaneous within the right-unbounded interval established by .25 Consequently they do not push the story forward in any consistent fashion. This kind of linear sequence with underlying free temporal order constitutes an important restriction on the validity of Event-based assumptions about the foreground.

23 This was first recognized by Hinrichs (1981) and is also mentioned by Partee (1984), Comrie (1986), Thompson (1987), and most recently Kiefer (to appear). Indeed presumably because of this, Fabricius-Hansen (1986) treats simultaneity rather than sequence as the default case. 24 Even this sequentiality is pragmatic rather than semantic, since nothing prevents one from lighting a second cigarette before finishing the first (as chain-smokers will testify). However, given the fact that this excerpt is from a text written in the narrative mode and there are no signals to the contrary (such as, for instance, a preceding 'big' event or what Thompson calls an advance-summary predicate) a sequential interpretation for these two predicates in the order given appears more likely. 25 Although the predicate is State-like in terms of its inherent event-notion, I believe that the reference-time frame established for it by the narrator's consciousness puts a lefthand boundary on it. In other words, in this I-narration, is a state which is perceived by the narrator only after he has lit his second cigarette. Cf. 3.5.

19

3. Some partial solutions The time is thus ripe to re-assess the notion of foreground and the clausal, tense, aspect and event-type constraints which have been assumed to operate upon it. In the following I shall suggest some partial solutions to the problems sketched above and ultimately point to what I believe a modified view of temporal foregrounding must entail. 3.1 Foregrounding and progression in time As the discussion in 2.1 will have made clear, not all events which move ahead in time are foregrounded, nor should the term foreground be indiscriminately applied to any and all events which push us forward in time. Instead we need to distinguish between events which push us forward 'assertively' as part of the foreground and those which do so only coincidentally in conjunction with backgrounded events. The key to this lies in an understanding of the notion of current reference time. The term comes originally from Partee (1984), who suggests that we assume a reference time (hereafter RT) for the first main clause in narrative discourse and that each main clause containing an Event thereafter causes a new RT to be set up immediately posterior to the one obtaining. This RT which obtains at a given moment is the current reference time, and it is relevant for situating the next event introduced in discourse. Should the next event be one in a temporal clause, then it (or its 'subsidiary' RT, cf. Hamann, this volume) will ultimately be used to 'update' or specify the current reference time, but it will not cause the current RT to shift again even if it is left-bounded. The triggering of RT-progression or the introduction of a new current reference time is brought about only by main-clause Events. Thus regardless of the fact that temporal-clause and main-clause bounded events - and/or their RTs - may both be located posterior to a prior Event or its RT, they are different from one another in the effect they have on RT-progression. As it turns out, this distinction is a useful one for disentangling the notions of movement in narrative time and foreground. The foreground can be thought of as consisting of those events situated in temporal sequence via current reference times. 3.2 Foregrounding and tense Given this understanding of foreground, we are now in a position to see why narration in certain non-Past tenses is as feasible as in the Past. Adopting for the moment Reichenbach's (overly simplified) analysis of the English tenses, what seems to characterize those used for narration (based on the data in 2.3) is that, regardless where event time (E) is

20

located, reference time (R) is distinct from speech time (5): Past Historical Present26 Future Past Perfect

EJt ER E

R

S S S S

Indeed this state of affairs is reflected in the fact that the prototypic 'narrative' adverb is (and) then. *And what happens now? is ruled out as a foregrounding question. Note, however, that the then of narration need not necessarily precede speaking time: it is perfectly acceptable to ask And what will happen then?. In fact, according to the pattern established above, one should even expect narration in the Future Perfect: And what will have happened then? - a possibility which does not strike me as being wholly improbable. But although a tense with R separate from S may be a prerequisite for narration, it does not yet constitute narration. A minimal narrative requires at least two (foregrounded) events, as Labov and others have emphasized. (Note, by the way, that this is reflected in the and of the foregrounding question.) Furthermore, these two events must be located sequentially via current reference times, according to the view of foreground advocated here. It is these two conditions, then, which characterize narrative texts and presumably distinguish them from, say, descriptive or argumentative ones. In this sense it is meaningful to speak of a narrative mode of text construction/interpretation which is to a certain extent independent of considerations of tense.27 3.3 Foregrounding and syntax There is, however, an important drawback to an RT-progression or chaining model such as the one sketched in 3.1: it depends crucially on the syntactic distinction between main and subordinate (temporal) clause, which as shown in 2.2 is not always a reliable one for determining grounding relations. What such a model does provide, however, is a concretization of the idea that some (temporally sequenced) events may be used to help locate others, rather than simply getting located themselves. And this, I would suggest, is the crux of the matter: in determining which of two (temporally sequenced) events is backgrounded and which foregrounded, the question is which event serves to establish a reference-time frame for the other? (The answer to this question is of course likely to depend not only on 26 Note that I have chosen to analyze the Historical Present as similar to the Past rather than the Present (E,R,S) on the grounds that the prototypic reference time for a Historical Present is not the speaker's now but some other time, e.g. then. 27 I conclude that models like Hinrichs' or Nerbonne's, which make the temporal interpretation of narration depend upon the occurrence of Past tense, are insufficient for this reason.

21

syntax but also on considerations of saliency and informational value, non-temporal dimensions of discourse which I shall not pursue here.) The fact that it is a located-locator relationship which is behind the notion of grounding in complex sentences explains why the foregrounding question And what happened then? works: the adverbial and then refers to a new RT some time after the prior event or its RT in discourse, and the predication what happened elicits an Event to be located with respect to it. The question When did this happen?, which by extension can be treated as a 'backgrounding' question, works because it asks for a reference time which can serve as a frame28 for locating the event in question. Significantly, the backgrounding question permits answers ranging in form from at ten o'clock to when I looked out the window, after I finished eating, and before the clock struck one - all of which are ways of specifying RT either via a time named or via a time computed with the help of a temporal conjunction and an event. 3.4 Foregrounding and aspect The located-locator distinction is a useful one in disentangling grounding relations not only within complex sentences but also, in slightly modified form, on an intersentential level. Recall from 2.4 that presence of a progressive form, even with those verb or predicate subcategories where the simple-progressive distinction is fully functional, does not always serve as a reliable signal of backgrounding. Here too it is helpful to ask: is this event or its RT 'framing' another, or does it stand on its own? Granted, in contrast to the relation between located and locator-clause, where only one 'main' RT (the current RT) is involved, the relation between two independent clauses involves a 'main' RT for the interpretation of each. However, the relation between these RTs can itself be either sequential or overlapping, so that the notion of 'frame' becomes a meaningful one intersententially as well. If one 'main' RT serves as a frame for another - and this is the case in an RT-progression model with States, which do not trigger progression - then we can conclude that its event is backgrounded with respect to the other. The advantage of a 'frame' approach on the intersentential level is that it can help clarify grounding relations in a way which is less dependent on aspectual form.29 Recall the fore28 I adopt here Hamann's broad use of frame (cf. her article in this volume) to include not only partially filled intervals but points and filled intervals as well. 29 Interestingly enough, Jespersen was a strong advocate of a 'frame' analysis of the expanded form: "...the action or state denoted by the expanded tense is thought of as a temporal frame encompassing something else" (1954:180). However, in contrast to Jespersen the 'frame' approach advocated here is not irrevocably tied to the progressive form nor to a single clause or clause complex.

22 grounded events in (8) and (9) above: despite their progressive forms they do not serve as frames for other events in their respective discourses. In (8) the event is completed before the next event begins; similarly in (9) occurs in its entirety before . Consequently these progressivized events must push the current RT forward so that the following event is not interpreted as coinciding. Likewise in the following examples the progressivized events do not have RTs which 'frame' the subsequent event: (15)

Anyway, got the Cadillac. And I'm standing in line for like two and a half hours to get gas, and I get up there... (Wolfson 1982:38)

(16)

And then he comes down from the- from the tree, the little boys start /walk/ walking down, and u--h suddenly you see he begins to notice that..something's not right. And he's going {gestures counting} /and/ he's counting them, and he's really slow you know. Anyway, so then finally he figured out..something you know somebody's stolen the pears. (PS 303)

Although the predicate < stand in line> is a state, when accompanied by the expression for two and a half hours as in (15) it should probably be considered a quantified process. Note that for quantified processes the choice of simple vs. progressive form is normally functional;30 however, in this instance the event comes to an end before the next event (sc. to the pump)?1 That is, the current RT must be shifted forward to a new time for < I get up there >. In spite of the progressive form (which in an Event vs. State-based model would mean that the predicate belongs to the category of States and does not trigger RT-progression), must not be allowed to coincide with < I get up there >. That is, it is Event-like in its effect on RT-progression. The same can be said in (16) for . Here too it can be argued that this event and the following that the activity comes to an end, i.e. an inherent tf is lacking, note that in context it is rather unlikely that the holding of the umbrella over Geiger's 35 Presumably Schöpf s quantified processes would also belong to this group, although they tend to be forgotten when a Vendler-like classification is used. 36 In spite of the fact that predicates like look away, tilt one's head, etc. are strictly speaking punctual changes with implied resultant states, they behave in the context of narration similarly to initially determined processes or states. Therefore, I shall treat them here as belonging to the category of partially bounded intervals.

25 head continues after the onset of : it is simply not customary in the world as we know it to hold folded umbrellas over people's heads. What this means is that due to the pragmatic 'incompatibility' of the two events in question the first acquires a tf in context and consequently must cause a progression in RT in order to prevent an overlap in time. But this acquisition process is wholly dependent on context, as the next example shows: (18)

When I went out I found a man waiting by the door for me. He had bowed legs and a long sharp jaw, like a hog's. He nodded and walked down the street beside me. chewing a toothpick and squinting sideways into my face. At the comer he said: "I know for a fact that ain't so." (RH 65f.)

In this case there is no inherent end to the activity if we understand down the street as a directional adverbial: that is, the activity of walking is understood to continue until further notice. Since there is nothing to prevent it from coinciding with there is no need for it to acquire a tf and push RT ahead for the next event. Indeed the most likely interpretation is that the RT for provides a frame for . The upshot of such examples (and there are many more) is that acquired tfS come about when a prior event lacks one and a following event does not permit simultaneity on semantic or pragmatic grounds. Recall that this was precisely the mechanism determined to be responsible for the interpretation of progressives as foregrounded. Let us turn now to the acquisition of tj. This is a theoretical possibility for all event types lacking an inherent tj, i.e. for Schöpf s states and simple processes. Interestingly enough there is a well-known example of t-acquisition in the literature: (19)

James switched off the light. It was pitch dark around him, because the Venetian blinds were closed. (Hinrichs 1981:66)

This is the example usually cited to motivate the weak restriction on States, viz. that they may overlap a preceding event which has moved RT forward but need not do so. In this instance, cannot coincide with < switch off the light > because the state of darkness does not begin until the light has been extinguished. But in the approach being advocated here, the state would acquire a tj for semantic/pragmatic reasons in this context and push reference time ahead so as to ensure the non-coincidence of the state and the preceding event.

26

In example (19) the acquisition of tj comes about via the semantic impossibility or pragmatic unlikelihood of a following state overlapping a prior event. There is another situation, however, in which unbounded events acquire beginning points contextually. Consider, for instance: (20)

After a few minutes Guild called: "Hey, we haven't got all night. Shake it up." There was no answer. The bedroom was empty when we went into it... (TM 80)

Although from an objective point of view the state may obtain before the narrator goes in, nevertheless it is presented here as an act of perception by the narrator. If we adopt Fehr's convention of placing a colon before events which are 'substitutionary perception' (1944), then When we went into it: the bedroom was empty requires the same temporal interpretation as Svhen we went into it (we saw that) the bedroom was empty'. All perceived states of this kind I believe acquire a t;, that is they are Event-like in their behavior with respect to RT. And because with this acquired tj they cause current RT to progress, they should be considered part of the foreground.37 In sum, I have attempted to show that event types such as those worked out by Schöpf fall into a group of fully bounded ones, which move RT, a group of unbounded ones, which don't, and a mixed group (partially bounded) which move RT but only minimally in narrative discourse. However, in addition I have argued that lexically unbounded or only partially bounded events may acquire missing bounds in context and ultimately end up in the bounded class. There thus appears to be a clear bias towards temporal boundedness in narrative discourse.

3.6 Foregrounding and the time adverbial then One last question remains to be answered, however, about the temporal nature of the foreground: are fully or partially bounded events a sine qua non of the foreground or is left-unboundedness also tolerated? The line of reasoning usually adopted here is that in order to progress in time one needs the help of stakes, or 'guideposts' as Chafe calls them. Amorphous time spans which have no beginning or end - whether inherent or contextually acquired - clearly lack this feature and thus cannot 'push time forward* or in the model developed here, cause RT to progress. But this ignores the role of time adverbials, and in particular that of (and) then. Recall, for instance, example (12), repeated here for conve37 Accordingly, the preferred interpretation for examples (6) and (7) would be (And then I saw that) nothing changed in his expression and (And then I noticed that) my eyes burned, i.e. both states are foregrounded because they ate, perceived by the narrator at a definite moment in time.

27

nience: (12)

She looked at him, smiling. Then she was in his arms and he was kissing her... (Leisi 1974:245)

An example of this sort would hardly require comment if we were to analyze the event < she be in his arms > as acquiring a tj in context and thus pushing RT forward. But this interpretation is not obligatory: indeed it can be argued that the tj of is still missing, although the RT for this event is clearly a new one. The reason for this is of course that the time adverbial and then has served as a signal to assume a new current RT. And since RT has been moved, nothing stands in the way of allowing the fully unbounded state to include this RT, i.e. retain its State-like character. The effect of this adverbial is thus to create an abrupt 'jump' to a new RT which otherwise would not have occurred in the absence of inherent or contextually acquired bounds. But is the event or state placed in this new reference time automatically part of the foreground? Recall that we have placed two requirements on foregrounded events: that they be temporally sequenced and that they be located via current RTs. Now a state such as that in (12), although it is located via a new RT, does not have a tj, nor does the preceding event in this instance have a tf, being left-bounded only. It thus appears that they are not strictly sequenced, since there is nothing to prevent < she be in his arms > from overlapping < she look at him >. Consequently, one important criterion for foregrounding appears to be missing. However, this line of argumentation ignores the role of and then in narrative discourse. Although simultaneity between two events at a juncture with and then may not be semantically excluded, the pragmatic effect of this adverbial is surely to shift attention away from the first event and direct it to the second, i.e. it renders the events 'sequenced' for all practical purposes. Although it is physically possible for the two states in (12) to obtain at the same time, the pragmatic effect of and then is to 'sequence' them. Similarly in: (21)

and the little boy's going along, and urn, then you see this little girl Coming on a bicycle in the opposite direction, (PS 303)

In this instance it is an objective fact that the little boy is still going along when the little girl appears on the scene but rather than emphasize the simultaneity of these two progressivized events38 this narrative presents them 'in sequence' as seen through the cam38 For the sake of the argument I am treating you see this little gtri coming on a bicycle as the equivalent of 'this little girl is coming on a bicycle'.

28 era's eye.

If the effect of and then were not to 'sequence' or separate two events which would otherwise be simultaneous in time, the temporal interpretation should remain the same regardless of whether the adverbial is present or not. Yet this is not the case, where both sequential and simultaneous readings are possible. Consider, for instance: (22)

The question startled her. Then she pinched her lower lip between her teeth and answered reluctantly... (MF 36)

With the adverbial, the meaning here is arguably that she stopped being startled before pinching her lower lip and answering. That is, the resultant state of < the question startle her> and the event are temporally sequenced via current RTs and are consequently both foregrounded. But now consider the same sequence of clauses without the adverbial: (22')

The question startled her. She pinched her lower lip between her teeth and answered reluctantly.

Here there is no need for to temporally exclude < the question startle her >. In fact in context it becomes interpretable as a sign of the inner state of being startled. The RT of the resultant state of thus frames the event , i.e. the latter is backgrounded. I conclude then that the effect of and then on reference time in narrative discourse results in the pragmatic 'sequencing' of two events if they otherwise lack the necessary bounds.39 4. Conclusion The view of foreground which emerges from this discussion is one which relativizes the importance of temporal parameters such as Past tense, progressive form, or lexically inherent boundedness, traditionally thought to characterize grounding. Instead it emphasizes the importance of pragmatic and contextual considerations in determining temporal sequentiality/simultaneity and consequently the foreground/background relation. At the same time it accords a central role to the notion of current reference time, which depending on the medium can be thought of as the narrator's consciousness or the camera's eye. In the extreme case a reference-time introducing adverbial such as and then can vir39 Needless to say, if the linguistic context provides a preceding event with an inherent or acquired tp and then does not have this 'sequencing' effect, since a bound is already present.

29

tually create a foregrounded plane in which any kind of event - even a state - can be placed.

ENGLISH TEMPORAL CLAUSES IN A REFERENCE FRAME MODEL

Cornelia Hamann

Introduction The following discussion of temporal clauses was originally intended to form the main part of a small monograph on temporal relations and their theory. Unfortunately, funding was available for less time than originally hoped and hence the text had both to be shortened and cut into two smaller articles, one dealing with the proper representation of tenses, temporal adverbs and temporal connectives in English, and the present one giving a detailed description of the various temporal connectives. The first appeared as 'The Awesome Seeds of Reference Time' in the first volume of this collection of essays and the second, now severed from its theoretical foundation, has made Part 1 necessary, in which at least the most important conclusions, especially those touching upon temporal adverbs and connectives are set out. The dilemma is obvious; how to avoid being too repetitive while being repetitive enough for this article to stand alone. One of my decisions is not to discuss again the whole of Reichenbach's theory about tenses, but to rely on the reader's familiarity with it or his or her willingness to look it up. On the other hand, there may be passages that the reader familiar with my earlier article or some other article of this collection might well skip, and so I will first give a brief outline of the article. Part 1 deals first with general theoretical assumptions and then outlines some possible approaches and some problems specific to temporal clauses. The general foundations can be summed up as these: Temporal clauses and their particular temporal relation to the main clause have to be distinguished from other types of subclauses. Temporal clauses function as temporal adverbs, in particular as FRAME adverbs. This implies that temporal clauses a) semantically designate intervals, b) have to do with main clause reference time, not event time, apart from certain well-defined exceptions, and c) that they 'frame' main clause reference time. Temporal clauses differ from temporal adverbs in that they do not simply name the respective interval; the interval has to be computed. How this is done leads to specific problems in the theory of temporal clauses.

32

There are two basic problems. The first is the decision as to whether we have to do a) with relations of the two events involved, b) with relations of the two reference points so that events are placed only through tensing, whether we c) establish the main clause reference time in relation to the temporal-clause event time or whether we d) have to allow more than one of these possibilities, probably dependent on conjunction. The first possibility - which I call the 'direct' or EVENT-EVENT approach - is not reconcilable with the idea that a temporal clause sets a frame for the main clause reference time. Nevertheless, it has to be considered because it captures the intuitive working of conjunctions like after and before and it gets support from examples involving measure phrases like: He had telephoned his lawyer two minutes before he left. It is also the approach taken by Heinämäki (1978), in what is still the most detailed and influential work on temporal conjunctions. Nevertheless, this approach has to be rejected because it disregards tense and cannot explain meaning differences such as the following: When Thelma

passed had passed

the bakery, she breathed a sigh of relief.

which can be explained with the REFERENCE TIME-REFERENCE TIME approach advocated by Reichenbach (1947), Dinsmore (1982) and Hornstein (1977). This approach, however, has difficulty handling many before and after examples despite being in accordance with the reference frame idea. What remains to be tested is the EVENT-REFERENCE TIME approach, i.e. the possibility of using the temporal clause event as an anchor to establish the relevant interval and have the main clause reference time framed by this interval. As it turns out, this approach works well enough for after and before, provided one alters the frame rule for Past Perfect examples so as to allow the framing of the event - an alteration which is necessary for sentences without temporal connectives anyway. However, w/ien-examples show that when prefers a 'reference time-reference time' relation, so that the choice of anchor for the interval depends ultimately on the conjunction involved. I hope to show in the following that this is not purely coincidental. It involves one important

33 theoretical assumption, however, and that is that temporal clauses have reference times of their own.

It is obvious that counting 'from the event' in order to establish the interval cannot be the whole story; after usually counts from the final point of the event, before from the initial point. But there are exceptions to this rule-of-thumb and they lead directly to the second problem mentioned above: establishing the point from which to count. This crucially involves event notion and the tense of the temporal clause. Event notion also plays a role when determining whether a w/ien-clause has a coincidence reading, as in: He arrived when I was home. or a sequence reading, as in: He made supper when I came home. and consequently different classifications of event notion - among them Heinämäki's version of Vendler's classes and the more refined classification in Schöpf (1984) - are discussed briefly in the theoretical part and later put to the test when I come to work out the details of the analysis. Another important aspect of the theory not presented in the first part but only dealt with when it becomes relevant and when more examples are available concerns the main clause event notion. This is the fact that if, as suggested above, temporal clauses frame main clause reference time, then not only does the tense of the main clause become crucial for the placement of the main clause event, so too does the main clause event notion. This is so because states fill and overflow their reference times while true events are contained in their reference times. Once we recognize this we can explain why, for example, some main clause events, namely states, can have overlap with the temporal clause event even if the connective is before and why after and before structures with accomplishments in both clauses usually result in a non-overlap reading. In the course of the investigation of the interplay of suitable rules for the connectives, a rule for frame adverbs, the tense rules and the above facts about event notions and reference times, we have therefore not only found facts important for the description of the connectives but also facts that any theory of adverbs, tenses and event notions must deal

34 with, such as the observation that certain event notions are not content to contain their reference time but have to contain it as an initial part of the interval occupied by the event.

The second part of the article sets out to give meaning rules for the connectives and to fit these into the overall theory of tensing. These meaning rules probably do not capture every aspect involved, but they reflect an attempt to be as detailed as possible. In order to ensure a wide variety of actual usage, I began with an empirical study of two 'actionpacked' suspense novels - since these involve contexts most likely to have frequent temporal clauses. As a result, many of the examples used here are essentially non-highbrow and stylistically unsophisticated.1 However, I also ran tests with constructed examples, mostly in connection with the influence of event notion and tense on the interpretation. The people who were good enough to struggle through my question sheets or answer ad hoc questions about acceptability were a) three native speakers also involved in the Tensing of English Project and b) native speakers (American and British) from the scientific community of CERN in Geneva, of whose number I have lost count. I hope that with these widely different two groups a certain balance between linguistic hypersensitivity and everyday, educated use of language has been found. This procedure of collecting examples, running tests and formulating a rule system of at least descriptive adequacy, soon proved to be so time consuming that given the scope of this article I can only treat after, before and when in real detail and so give rather sketchy descriptions and meaning rules for such interesting conjunctions as while, since and until. For these conjunctions the meaning rules are meant only as suggestions; they have been given in order to show where the straightforward approach advocated here has to be augmented or abandoned. However they differ from the simple connectives, it nevertheless becomes clear that all temporal clauses are what Harkness (1987) calls Time Adverbials', i.e. they place the reference or event time on the time line. The bulk of Part 2 is, however, devoted to determining the relevant interval set up by a given connective and the particular subclause event. For after and before I start with a comparison of the conjunctions and their prepositional uses and put forward the hypothesis that after and before 'count' from points. These points have to be derived in the same way from the given event, even if this event happens to be a state. The quest for the point turns out to involve event notion, especially the quantified events in Schöpf (1984), the tense of the temporal clause and in some cases also pragmatic factors. This is unfortu1 Examples were taken from: Dashiell Hammett. Ttie Dain Curse; Jack Higgjns. Touch the Devil.

35

nate because it forces me to admit pragmatics into a semantic rule. On the other hand, the pragmatic facts I have to mention, namely the pragmatic interpretability of a state as having an initial point, might well be formulated as pragmatic presuppositions, and these can be regarded as an interface between a pragmatic and a semantic component, as Stechow (1978) and Hamann (1987b) point out. In any case, unlike Hornstein (1977), I do not regard it as questionable to bring in pragmatics; pragmatics has after all come of age in the last decade. For the conjunction when, the relevant interval is not established via a point anchor. When is regarded as establishing primarily the temporal relation of simultaneity, which makes my approach very different from that of Partee (1984), who gives 'just after' as the basic meaning of when. My rule is simple: when S designates the interval occupied by the reference time of S. How this leads to the correct relation of main clause and subclause event is then investigated in detail. On the whole, I think I have kept to the program outlined by Rohrer (1977), who required that temporal conjunctions be given meanings such that a temporal clause designates an interval, functions like a temporal adverb and is not described in tense dependent rule schemata, i.e. as when with a Simple Past/ Past Perfect etc. in the main clause. In addition to this, I bring in information from S in order to ascribe meaning to after S. The rest, i.e. the combination with the main clause, is, however, taken care of by the general rule system described above. In setting up the rule system, I only give semantic specifications, without either an underlying syntax or an explanation of the apparatus. I do not discuss the old controversy of whether tenses and adverbs are sentential or verb phrase operators, nor all the problems of scope involved with that choice (cf. Εης (1986), Fabricius-Hansen (1984), Nerbonne (1984)). The semantic rules are meant as sketches of what truth conditions must capture. I mostly use the idea of 'truth in a model' where such a model is defined in the usual way, i.e. with a basic set of individuals and an interpretation function for certain basic syntactic expressions, such that complex syntactic expressions can be interpreted recursively. The only difference from the usual model, e.g. as proposed by Montague (1974), qvist (1976), or Rohrer (1976), is that I, like Nerbonne (1984), use three context indices as temporal parameters, a position for which I argue in Hamann (1987). I hope that the rules, even without full definition of the apparatus, are readable and understandable and that the informal discussion and the neglect of syntax do not create insurmountable difficulties. A way has to be found to rectify the following discrepancy: syntactically after, before and when all combine with a sentence; semantically, however, they extract different things

36

from the denotation of the sentence, points in the case of after and before, and an interval in the case of when. The combination after/before/when S, however, always denotes an interval, so that the principles of compositional semantics are not completely lost. As to the literature used, it ranges from Reichenbach (1947), to whom the basic ideas have to be ascribed, to the generative treatment of Hornstein (1977) and the formal approaches of Rohrer (1977), Hinrichs (1981), Nerbonne (1984) and Partee (1984). The works I discuss in more detail are Heinämäki (1978), Ritchie (1979) and Hinrichs (1981) because they explicitly deal with temporal conjunctions and do so with respect to event notion. Heinämäki (1978), especially, can be considered a classic - most formal treatments of temporal connectives (cf. Äqvist (1976), Guenthner (1979)) are based on her observations - and though her approach is not in accordance with the theory outlined in Part 1, her examples and rules are still accurate enough to give a basic idea of where the problems are. Ritchie (1979) is a useful criticism of Heinämäki (1978) and it is closer to my own approach, in that he tries to establish crucial points as bounds of the intervals, depending on event notion. As I am particularly interested in the workings of event notion, Heinämäki (1978) and Ritchie (1979) provided good starting material to work through using the classification of events given in Schöpf (1984), which proved to be better suited to the problems at hand. Edgren (1972), a compilatory study on temporal conjunctions, was used occasionally to bolster up statistical observations, but the lack of a theoretical foundation made it unnecessary to discuss it in detail. Finally, I want to thank all those who commented on the material and the drafts of the paper. In particular, I am grateful to all the contributors to this volume, and especially Richard Matthews for unending comments on my misconceptions about the Present Perfect and modality. Some of my material goes back to discussions with Janet Harkness about temporal adverbs, some to a paper presented to our project group by Richard Matthews which he called On reference point and hypotaxis'. His conclusions are widely different from mine, but his ideas and the material proved to be invaluable and I apologise if I have made use of them without acknowledgment - they just grew into common property in the course of our project discussions. 1. Theoretical Preliminaries 1.1 A Model for Temporal Clauses When dealing with the problem of time reference and temporal relations in complex sentences it does not suffice to assume that main and subordinate clause 'share' the time re-

37

ferred to. Let us first observe that the time which is 'shared' is not simply the time of the events but often 'reference time' in the Reichenbachian sense: (1.1)

I met the man you had seen yesterday.

That it has to be reference time which is shared in this example is clear from the Reichenbachian tense analysis which gives: event time coincides with reference time for Simple Past and event time is earlier than reference time for a Past Perfect, in short ET = RT < ST for Simple Past and ET < RT < ST for Past Perfect.2 How SHARING and another principle called ORIENTATION work has been investigated by Smith (1978), (1980) and (1981).3 Let us add that the semantics and pragmatics of causation, reason, result, purpose etc. obviously play a role for the determination of possible time relations in complex clauses: 1.2a) 1.2b) 1.2c) 1.2d} 1.2e)

/ lent him the money because he needed it. I took no notice so he flew into a rage. / left early to catch the train. He was so happy that he passed his exam. He was so happy that he phoned immediately.

Treason) (result) ίpurpose) Treason) (result)

All these examples show, however, that the main clause reference time is primary in the sense of 'already given' and that it is the main clause event time that is handed down to the subordinate clause and helps to determine its reference time according to the semantics of the connective. This 'handing down' can be described in an elaboration of Smith's two principles (s.a.) and a formalization for thai-clauses can be found in Nerbonne (1984:30). It would be wrong, however, to assume that the main clause ET determines the subclause 2 Let it suffice to give a few examples of Reichenbach's tense analysis. He postulates three times: speech time, event time and reference time, which he abbreviates as S, E and R. He has He sees He saw He has seen He had seen S,E,R E,R—S E—R,S E—R—S among others. As to the abbreviations I use, it is S,E,R if I speak of Reichenbach's original concepts, ST,ET,RT when I want a shorthand for speech time, event time and reference time and s,e,r when I use my own formal system where these three times have the status of indices. Sometimes a subscript marks whether we are dealing with a main or temporal clause time, cf. R m or R( or in the sketches p. 24ff. ET , ET( and RT^, RT(. 3 Especially Smith (1978:57) for 'sharing' and Smith (1978:6l5'for Orientation', though caution has to be applied with some of Smith's examples because they often involve verbs of saying and thus suggest an embedded point of speech.

38 RT not only for complement clauses but for all complex structures. The notable exceptions are, of course, temporal clauses.

This may be obvious to some, but has tended to be obscured by Reichenbach's rather misleading remarks on the subject. With his principle of the PERMANENCE OF THE REFERENCE POINT and his analysis of the Past Perfect, a sentence like: (1.3)

After he had eaten everything, he said good-bye.

has been mistakenly interpreted (Nerbonne 1984:4) as: "The event time of the subordinate clause is the time at which he ate. The reference time of this same clause is provided by the event time of the main clause: it is the time of saying good-bye". In contrast to this view I hope to prove that it is the temporal clause that helps to determine the main clause RT, not the other way round. 'Determine' does not necessarily mean that the temporal clause 'introduces', 'provides' or 'sets' the main clause reference time, it can well be the case that the temporal clause only characterizes or specifies more closely a main clause RT that is already assumed as a definite, but unspecified time.4 1.2 Temporal Clauses as Temporal Adverbs Traditionally temporal clauses are classed among adverbial clauses and transformational grammar covers this case with a rule like: AP

> Prep - S

PP

> Prep

or even: NP S

(cf. Emonds 1976:175), where a temporal clause is treated as a prepositional phrase. To prove that expressions like yesterday and before you came are both adverbs, we can use the classic syntactic argument for 'same constituent': a) the question test and b) coordination and apposition.

4 For clarification of this point see Hamann (1987), also for a detailed discussion of what the reference point/time is, apart from being that time in the past from which we view an event still further in the past when using a Past Perfect.

39

a) A w/terc-question can be answered appropriately by (1.4a) or (1.4b): (1.4)

When did Hans meet his wife?

^ * / b) When he was a student.

b) The examples (1.5a,b) may serve to show that coordination and apposition are possible. (1.5c) is a bit odd, owing to the greater degree of temporal vagueness in subclauses, but it is possible if the event is narratively relevant not only for time determination, cf. (1.5c'). (1.5d) is much better than (1.5c) for reasons which are not quite clear.

(1.5d)

All that happened a long time ago, and before she met Hans. All that happened a long time ago, before she met Hans. All that happened in 1970, and before she met Hans. She had three lovers in as many months. But all that happened a long time ago and before she met Hans. All that happened in 1970, before she met Hans.

The conclusion we can draw from these observations is - roughly stated - that temporal clauses can be treated syntactically and thus semantically on a par with temporal adverbs, more specifically, with one group of temporal adverbs called time adverbials (TA) by Harkness: They help to "provide a temporal setting" for the main clause (see for example Harkness 1987:85-86). Rohrer (1977), though taking a totally different approach, comes to the same conclusion: temporal adverbs and temporal clauses belong to the same syntactic and semantic category. "They all denote intervals" (Rohrer 1977:6).

1.3 The Function of Temporal Adverbs and Temporal Clauses Leaving aside frequency and duration adverbials and considering only the true time locators, we adhere to the view first put forward by Reichenbach (1947) that these (in general) do not locate event time, but reference time. This can be seen in examples where reference time and event time do not coincide, overlap or include each other: (1.6)

He has come yesterday.

is an unacceptable sentence and its unacceptability can only be explained if yesterday does not characterize the event time of coming, which might well be included in the interval of yesterday, but has to do with reference time, which is speech time in the above sentence and cannot be included in the time interval designated by yesterday. There is another argument for reference time characterization with adverbs, which has to

40 do with the semantics of then. Then is a reference time dependent adverb, chains of reference times can be set up by and then in narrative discourse, and it is the one candidate which might be referring directly to or even naming reference time. Now assume an ET < RT < ST analysis for the Past Perfect:

(1.7)

At ten o'clock, John had already arrived. Then we all had a drink.

In (1.7), then clearly does not refer to the time of event of John's arrival but to at ten o'clock, and therefore the main clause reference time. As then can replace temporal adverbs and temporal clauses, we can deduce that these too are relevant for reference time, not event time: (1.8)

John came

at ten o'clock, when Bill left.

George came then, too.

When we try to transfer the first argument, the one involving Present Perfect in (1.6), things turn out to be more difficult, as there are readings for: (1.9)

He has met her

when { after before

he left the house.

These readings, however, treat met her when he left the house as one constituent and always involve the 'experiential perfect' in the sense of it has happened that he met her when he left the house. This seems to be an indication that temporal clauses in the environment of an 'experiential perfect' can modify event time. On the other hand there is no way in which: (1,9a)

He has met her.

can be modified by when, after, before he left the house and still keep the original interpretation of (1.9a). (1.9b)

He met her.

can be so modified without any reinterpretation. Thus the examples cut both ways: there is a reference time modification which makes (1.9) unacceptable, but there also is an event time interpretation which makes (1.9) acceptable via reinterpretation. We return to the possibility of event time modification later continuing for the time being to work with the rule-of-thumb that temporal clauses function as temporal adverbs. They designate inter-

41 5

vals on the time line which serve as frames for the reference times of the main clauses.

The term 'frame' was introduced by Bennett/Partee (1978) and justified and adopted by Nerbonne (1984) for the following reason: Temporal adverbs (and so temporal clauses) 'modify' or 'characterize' reference time, but do not provide it. What the adverb provides is a time frame which narrows down the possible locations of the reference time in the sense that reference time will be found inside or range over this frame. Some authors (Schöpf (1984), Harkness (1985)) have pointed out that there are special cases where the adverb does more than 'frame' reference time, as in the case of punctual adverbials like at ten o'clock or of adverbials which require that all of the interval is 'filled'. These authors therefore distinguish true 'frame' and so-called 'interval' adverbials. In Schöpf (1984) an interval adverbial can also be a durative like for three hours so that caution has to be used when applying these terms. I will use the term 'interval' in its mathematical sense and use 'frame' not in an everyday sense but so that I even call at ten o'clock a frame. Mathematical intervals, by definition, can consist of only one point or be unbounded on one or both sides. I come back to the distinction of true and filled frames later, however. If temporal adverbs and temporal clauses set up frames for reference times, temporal clauses do so more indirectly than temporal adverbs: We first have to locate or posit the event of the subordinate clause on the time axis. From its location, together with the semantics of the connective and other information given by the temporal clause we compute the frame that helps to locate reference time for the main clause and so - via event notion and tense - the main clause event. As the problems in example (1.9) have already shown, there are some things to keep in mind. First, the reference frame analysis for temporal adverbs holds only provided they occur in main clauses: (1.10)

I when we were at the party. I met the man you had spoken to { I yesterday.

Yesterday or when we were at the party, seen as belonging to the subordinate clause, modify the event time of speaking, not its reference time, which is the time of meeting (given that

S The view that temporal adverbs and temporal clauses modify main clause reference time is also held by Ritchie (1979) and Partee (1984). Nerbonne (1984) uses it for adverbs, but fails to transfer it to clauses, and Edgren (1972) and Heinämäki (1978) do not use the concept of reference time in the Reichenbachian sense at all, though they, too, agree that temporal clauses give "a time reference for the main clause" (Heinämäki 1978:23).

42

ET roughly corresponds to RT in a Simple Past sentence).6 This can be explained on the basis of arguments from Smith (1978): As soon as reference time is given, which is the case here, the principle of sharing for complement clauses means that the adverb is 'free' to determine event time. This also explains the ambiguity of most Past Perfect sentences: (1.11)

He had come back Tuesday.

which can be read either with the event occurring before Tuesday (RT-reading) or on Tuesday (ET-reading). Past Perfect normally has a contextually determined RT - either set up in the previous text, given in the sentence itself or created as in the beginning of texts - so that the adverb is free to refer to event time. Note also that position plays a role in the interpretation of such sentences: (1.1 la)

Tuesday, he had come back.

shows a preference for RT-modification, while (1.11) has a tendency towards ET-modification, but remains ambiguous. These examples show that adverb-preposing, as Transformational Grammar called it, is not always possible without a change in meaning or at least in implicature. This, however, is a well-known effect of topicalization, and I suspect that it is in fact topicalization of the RT which accounts for the difference here. There is a parallel for temporal clauses first noted by Heinämäki (1978:103): (1.12a} (1.12b)

Jan lived in London after the war was over. After the war was over, Jan lived in London.

In (1.12b) the temporal clause specifies the time period we are considering and the main clause tells us where Jan lived during that time. Other times are not relevant for this sentence and therefore Jan may have lived in London at other times also without making (1.12b) awkward or misleading. (1.12b) is an appropriate answer to (1.13b), not to (1.13a): (1.13a)

When did Jan live in London?

6 An ET=RT analysis for Simple Past cannot be upheld for various reasons. It has to be refined, at least, to a) ET £ RT and b) RT £ ET according to event notion, a) for quantified events and b) for states and simple processes. Therefore, I will use the sign = to indicate this situation, in those cases where it is immaterial which time is included and which includes.

43

(l. 13b)

Where did Jan live after the war?

(1.12a) is the appropriate answer to (1.13b) if there are no times other than the one specified at which Jan lived in London. This shows that there are differences in implicature, which have to do with reference time and event time: in one case reference time is not only specified by the temporal clause but topicalized. It thus has informational priority. In the other case our primary concern is with the event and the temporal clause specifies its reference time in the usual way. Apart from these exceptions to the general function of t-adverbs and t-clauses7, there is one main difference which arises from the fact that in a temporal clause the temporal information is given indirectly via an event. This fact leads Edgren (1972:146) to the observation that "the main function of the average t-clause is to confront two actions and to inform of the temporal-aspectual relationship between these two actions...". Though one might dispute that this is the main function, it is certainly true that the t-clause event not only informs about time location but has a narrative relevance in its own right. This is quite evident, considering there are thousands of events available which could place John's coming home on the time axis by a simultaneity relation, but only some of them make sense in context, cf. (1.14a). Observe that total unconnectedness, as in (1.14b), leads to a purely temporal reading, or to some profound statement about the way of the world brought about by the interpreter's willingness to see a narrative connection: (1.14a}

John came home when Mary was leaving.

(1.14b)

John came home when Jupiter completed its orbit.

As the use of the subclause and thus another event necessarily introduces more than temporal information, it also presupposes that speaker and hearer share the knowledge of when this event occurred or will occur, or, at least assume its occurrence at a given time.8 The difference with respect to textual cohesion and narrative effect and the choice between the placing of events without temporal indication, with a simple temporal adverb or with a temporal clause can be highlighted easily with a few examples: 1.15a) 1.15b) 1.15c) 1.15d)

I picked I picked I picked I picked

up the letter. I looked inquiringly at John, up the letter. Two minutes later I looked inquiringly at John. up the letter. I read it. Then I looked inquiringly at John. up the letter. When I had read it, Hooked inquiringly at John.

7 The abbreviations t-clause and t-adverb will be used for temporal clause and temporal adverb. I also sometimes use m-clause for main clause. 8 The notable exception are so-called narrative clauses, especially Η-Λ en-clauses.

44

1.4 A Semantic Rule for 'Frame'-Adverbs and Definite or Indefinite RT Before we proceed to a semantic computation of the time 'frame' for the main clause RT, it is necessary to keep two things in mind: a) the temporal adverb/clause does not provide reference time but characterizes or frames it because in (1.16) Hans certainly did not come home all the time of yesterday in: (1.16)

I yesterday. Hans came home { I before Susie left.

b) the functions of adverb and reference time have therefore to be kept apart.9 This leads directly to the problem of definite or indefinite reference times. The assumption that the adverb only modifies reference time works best if we are dealing with given and definite though unspecified reference times. Such reference times were advocated by Partee (1973) and are assumed by the indexical model Nerbonne (1984) develops. In such a model the rule for frame adverbs simply is: Given the context e,r,s (i.e. an event time, a reference time and a speech time) then M is a model for A(p) (i.e. a proposition with a temporal adverb) at the context e,r,s iff M is a model for p at the context e,r,s (i.e. the given context is indeed the event time, reference time and speech time for the proposition) and a) r c A' where A' is the meaning of A in the context e,r,s; b) r = A' if A is a punctual adverbial. This we can write formally : I.I For 'frame' adverbs A we have: Af.e,r,5 iff M„c,r,» r c t= A(p) r c 1= p and a) r c A', b) r = A' for punctual A, * Clearly, the main clause reference time is set already, either by conventions of discourse or other linguistic and extralinguistic context.

9 This is due to a certain mixture of approaches. Like Bäuerle (1979), I believe that adverbs set Betrachtzeit or, in my terminology, frames. UnlUke Bäuerle, I do not use my frames (Betrachtzeit) as context indices. Instead, I keep the concept of reference time and hold it to be a vital concept for any analysis of temporal reference in discourse. Bauerle's arguments for a differentiation of Betrachtzeit and reference time carry over to my concepts of frame and reference time, however. Cf. Hamann (1987).

45 There are cases, however, in which reference time - and therefore a Simple Past event ranges existentially over an interval given by an adverb. These readings (involving an existential quantifier) I call indefinite, but non-particular might be a better term. (1.17)

He met Hans yesterday.

might well be true if there exists a time, any time, inside the frame of yesterday at which the proposition is true. To provide for this case, we must allow an existential quantifier to slip in somewhere. We can either formulate: 1.11.1 For a given context e,r,s M

e,r,s

N A

(P)

iff

3r M

'( e,r-,s

N

P and

r< c A

')'

which makes the role of r somewhat dubious and superfluous for the sentence meaning, or we assume that the set of indices can be handed down by context either with a definite r or in such a way as to keep the r-index indefinite: 1.11.2 There is an r such that in the context e,r,s: >= A (P)

iff

M

e& r P*

and

C A'.

1.II.2 puts the burden on the rules of context change and discourse conventions. These problems are discussed in Harkness (1987) and in Hamann (1987) and are repeated here only to demonstrate that one part of the formula remains constant: whatever the reference time is, definite or indefinite, the adverb does not introduce or replace it, it only frames it. One problem for this view is the 'ambiguity' of the English Present tense: only with an adverb is it possible to determine whether we have a future, habitual or past reading. In this case a tacit context does not suffice to fix a reference time, the context has to make it explicit. But this is a problem of tense analysis and might be resolved by two possible scope relations of tense and adverb A(T) and T(A) as Fabricius-Hansen (1984) suggests, by the assumption of an abstract reference time, by an analysis as given by Hornstein (1977) or by one along the lines of Cooper (1986). There is also a competing analysis advocated by Bäuerle (1979), Fabricius-Hansen (1984) and Schöpf (1987), who claim that in the indefinite case the adverb indeed 'gives' Betrachtzeit/the truth-interval/reference time and it is the event time variable which ranges, existentially bound, over this interval. This analysis has the advantage that it keeps the reference time definite. The adverb, on the other hand, is suddenly no longer just a frame, but a truth interval. I prefer the other possibility, i.e.

46 having the context pick definite or indefinite reference time, not frame or truth-interval, and keep the adverb contribution to the sentence meaning constant. One reason for this decision is, that it is more natural to let context determine a context index than it would be to let it work on a part of the sentence meaning. Our rules will therefore be modelled on the basis of I.I and 1.II.2 with the provison that there might be temporal clauses that are not reference frames, just as there are adverbs which are not. 1.5 Getting at the Main clause RT Given a rule like I.I we are left with the problem of supplying the meaning of A, the meaning of the adverb in context. For the deictic yesterday this involves speech time and the interval we want to count as the day before the day which includes speech time. For temporal clauses more complicated computations are necessary - because the relevant interval is not named but only described. 1.5.1 The direct analysis A direct approach is to consider exclusively the events and their temporal relations. Although this event-event approach does not fit the theoretical frame we have so far adopted, the most influential work on temporal conjunctions, that of Heinämäki (1978), uses it, and it thus merits consideration. The event-event or direct approach describes the semantics of temporal conjunctions roughly as follows: S' when S states a simultaneity relation between the main clause and the subclause events, S' after S states that the main clause event occurred later than the subclause event, and S' before S states that the main clause event occurred earlier than the subclause event. This is, of course, intuitively correct, but only roughly so. Heinämäki's contribution to our understanding of conjunctions is that she provides detailed modifications of these statements on the basis of a classification of event notion into duratives, non-duratives and accomplishments. That some such differentiation is needed is evident. Compare the different sorts of 'simultaneity', i.e. inclusion, overlap, coincidence, plus even clear non-simultaneity (sequence of events) involved with when:

47 (1.18a) (1.18b) (1.19a) (1.19b) (1,20a) (1.20b)

Prices were high when we lived in Geneva. (coincidence or overlap) She broke her ankle when she lived in Geneva. (inclusion) Prices were high when she discovered quality clothing. (inclusion or overlap) / went to the States when I discovered American non-fashion. (sequence) He looked away when she was smiling. (inclusion) He looked away when she smiled. (sequence)

We will have to say more about this problem of event notion later. The event-event approach gets support from examples with measure-phrases, which are possible with after and before. Intuitively, in (1.21a) the time between events is measured and nothing else: (1.21 a)

before after

Hans came two minutes

John left.

(1.12a) is, however, not at all decisive, given an RT « ET analysis for Simple Past. (1.21b) is better: (1.21b)

before after

Hans came two minutes

John had left.

It shows clearly that we begin measuring from the t-clause event, not the RT. But we could compute the main clause RT or ET from there, both are possible for (1.21b), the result is the same, as the diagram below for the o/fer-variety of (1.21b) reflects:

ETt

ETm = RTm

The same applies to (1.21c): (1.21c)

The bomb exploded a split second before they had reached the door. ETm -H

split sec.

ET(

RT(

1

1

RT

m

explode

reach door

48 But (1.21d,e) argue for measuring the distance to the main clause event, i.e. together with (1.21b), for a pure event-event computation: ( 1 .2 1 d) (1.21e)

He had telephoned his lawyer two minutes before he left. He had telephoned his lawyer two minutes before he had left. 2 min ET{

or

ETm

2 min

{

RT {

RT. RT

m

2 min

What has to be criticized in the event-event approach, especially in Heinämäki (1978), is the treatment of tense. Though Heinämäki incorporates the point of speech into her considerations, there is no way to predict the obvious difference in the examples of Dinsmore (1982) given in my enumeration: (1.22a) (1.22b)

When Thelma passed the bakery, she breathed a sigh of relief. When Thelma had passed the bakery, she breathed a sigh of relief.

or the ambiguity in (1.23a) and (1.23b): (1.23a) (1.23b)

When John arrived, Mary had left. When John had arrived, Mary had left.

In (1.22a) the sigh is included in the event of passing, which can count as simultaneity, in (1.22b) the events are strictly sequential. This cannot be attributed to event notion, as the event notions are the same in (1.22a) and (1.22b). We could capture this difference by postulating a whenj signifying simultaneity and a when2 signifying sequence, where the latter is triggered by a Past Perfect in the t-clause. This is unconvincing, because in view of (1.23a) and (1.23b) it is not enough. We would have a when with ETm n ETt ^ 0 for overlap and other simultaneity situations if one of the clauses contains a durative event, a when with ETt < ETffl for sequence situations triggered by accomplishments or a Past Perfect in the t-clause and another sequence when with ETm < ETt for main clause Past Perfects as in (1.23a) and (1.23b), where (1.23b) would allow a reading for both sequencewhens, i.e. with ETm < ETt and ETt < ETm. This would be somewhat erratic behaviour for one simple (?) conjunction - even if we were to grant the existence of a simultaneityand a sequence-w/ien.

49

1.5.2 The indirect approach: reference time - reference time Leaving aside the measure phrase problems, the above when examples lead directly to Reichenbach's suggestion that temporal clauses establish the temporal relations of overlap, anteriority and posteriority between reference times, not event times. I call this the indirect approach because event times are arrived at only by the addition of tense and the specification of the relation of event time and reference time contributed by tense. This aproach has one theoretical advantage over the direct approach from the outset: it is in accordance with our conclusions about the function of temporal adverbs in so far as it says something about the main clause reference time. Reichenbach does not actually state that the main clause reference time is determined by its relation to the t-clause reference time, but one can reinterpret and extend his approach to mean exactly this. Let us look at Reichenbach and this possible reinterpretation in more detail. His admittedly sketchy treatment of complex clauses is based on his two principles for the reference point: A) the permanence of the reference point B) the positional use of the reference point. Reichenbach applies the permanence principle to complement clauses and w/ien-clauses. The principle of positional use is meant to account for before- and α/ter-clauses and says in essence that temporal conjunctions do not order the events but the reference times of the constituent clauses on the time line (applied to simple adverbs it simply says that adverbs locate reference time and that reference time is the carrier of the time position): "In he telephoned before he came R X is said to be before R^' (Reichenbach 1947:295). The same view is held by Dinsmore (1982): "The interpretation of complex sentences with various temporal conjunctions is likewise systematically related to the reference times of the constituent simple clauses" (Dinsmore 1982:221). Dinsmore gives two semantic rules to illustrate his approach: l.III When Slf S2 is true only if S1 and S2 are each true and have the same reference time. l.IV Before Sj, S2 is true only if Sj and S2 are each true and the reference time for S2 precedes that for Sr (Dinsmore 1982:222) These, together with the Reichenbachian Simple Past and Past Perfect tense analyses, give exactly the right results for the sentences (1.22a,b): RTm and RTt are simultaneous by the

50 semantics of when, and RTt is simultaneous to ET( and RTm is simultaneous to ETm by Reichenbach's analysis of Simple Past. Therefore ETm is simultaneous to ETt:

(1.22a') RTt = ETt RT

m = ETm

For (1.22b) RTm and RTt are simultaneous by the semantics of when, RTm = ETm because of the Simple Past in the main clause and ETt < RTt because of the Past Perfect in the subclause. Therefore ETt < ETm as predicted.10 (1.22b') ET,

RT, =

ET

m

They also give the right predictions for: (1.24a) (1.24b)

He telephoned before he came. He came after he telephoned.

One problem is that Reichenbach does not specify whether it is the conjunction or the tense, the combination of both, or some pragmatic or contextual factor that triggers the choice of principle. In (1.25a,b) both principles result in the required ETm < ETt order: (1.25a) (1.25b)

He had telephoned before he came. He came after he had telephoned.

(1.25a',b') with positional use: ETm

RTm

RTt = ET( -tcome

telephone

(1.25a' ',b") with permanence principle: = RTt telephone

RT£ = ETt (come)

10 There are some problems with this chain of reasoning: a) the times in question are conceptualized as points in Reichenbach. We have, however, often intervals as event times and also reference times. Therefore b) the analysis of Simple Past suffers from the ET=RT defect and c) we seldom have full simultaneity, i.e. the beginnings and ends of the intervals do not usually coincide precisely. This means that the iconic representations given so far can be regarded as approximations only.

51 Dinsmore's rule I.IV would give only (1.25a'). Observe also that the difference in tense choice in (1.24) and (1.25) does not change anything in the final order of events. (1.25a'') shows the situation where the subclause event serves as vantage point, a good choice, because it is presupposed and therefore contextually established. For (1.24a) we have to assume that we have some contextual hint that RTm is supplied elsewhere and is only modified by the subclause. The use of the Past Perfect in (1.25a,b) seems, on the other hand, to be the 'natural' or 'logical' choice - considering that we define some vantage point in one of the clauses and then specify the other event as occurring earlier: the textbook situation for the use of Past Perfect. A closer look, however, shows that the situation is not quite as straightforward as the above consideration suggests:

1. Observe that the Past Perfect has to occur in the main clause for oe/ore-structures, if one of the events is the vantage point for the other, but in the subclause for an after-structure. So the vantage point jumps from main clause to subclause, depending on conjunction. This is disturbing because a) it is the temporal clause event which is presupposed in both cases and b) we had decided that it is the temporal clause that frames main clause reference time, not the other way round. 2. In both cases (after and before) the use of the Simple Past in both clauses is just as 'normal'. 3. There are, and this is even more worrying, quite acceptable sentences with the 'illogical' tense choice: (1.26a.) (1.26b)

He dropped the letter before he had read it, He had read the letter after he dropped it.

4.The examples (1.21b-e) are a serious problem for the indirect approach: we clearly do not compute the main clause reference time by adding or subtracting the time quantum specified to or from the subclause reference time. Notwithstanding these problems, there are indirect approaches even more radical than Reichenbach's or Dinsmore's. Hornstein (1977) is one of them. Hornstein assumes the permanence principle for all temporal conjunctions. For the structure P-TC-Pj (sentencetemporal connective-sentence) he has: "Line up the S points of Pj and P; that is, write the tense analysis of Pj and P, lining up the Rs. Move Rj to under R, placing Ej accordingly... Thus, if P = S R,E and P; = S,R,E then the tense analysis of P-TC-P; is

52 S S

R,E R· E· "

'' '

(Hornstein 1977:539)

We can see that this rule keeps R and Rj coincident, but alters the tense analysis of Pj. This, however, is allowed in Hornstein's system, provided the linearity of the string is preserved and points are not suddenly associated (i.e. separated only by a comma) which were not associated before. In fact, adverbs freely operate on the string of the basic tense analysis - restricted only by the above conditions. John left would get the basic tense analysis Reichenbach suggests:

E,R

s

but John left a week ago yesterday would have:

a week ago

yesterday

which is an admissible string because the linear order is preserved and no points are associated which were not associated before. But it is obvious that through the operation of the adverbs a Simple Past sentence now has the configuration of a Reichenbachian Past Perfect sentence. In Hornstein's system, however, this is irrelevant because S, E and R are not seen as semantic entities but as syntactic elements that can be combined to certain strings which can be shifted around by the adverbs in certain, admissible operations. We have a syntactic derivation, not a combination of the semantic analyses of tenses and adverbs. In the syntactic derivation the basic string - here the Simple Past configuration would not be lost since it is the underlying string. To make sense of the above permanence rule for all connectives, Hornstein defines the meanings of the connectives as the way they interpret the string generated by the rule. With these interpretation rules "S-R^Efbefore-S,^*^ may we^ ^e interpreted differently from S-R1,E1-w/ien-S,R2,E2." (Hornstein 1977:545). Both configurations will first combine into:

S-R1,E1 S

and then before will interpret El and E2 as being in sequence, while when will allow simultaneity (or sequence).

53

Though the system may work and offers some surprisingly easy explanations (e.g. for the future interpretation of Present Tense sentences), I do not think it advisable to use S, E and R , which are essentially semantic or even pragmatic in concept, as syntactic symbols that can be. shifted around and so lose all their semantic content. What Hornstein is offering is, in fact, a definition of an intermediate formal language for tense, and it is a bit confusing how this intermediate level could be integrated into a generative system: The conjunctions receive meaning only through interpretative rules. Do these rules work upwards, so that the last configuration we get gives the final valid constellation which serves as input into the semantic component? And how would this fit together with the fact that the basic tense analysis has been destroyed much earlier? Or do these rules work downwards, i.e. towards deep structure and the semantic component? On the whole I think it is preferable to give semantic descriptions of the function of temporal connectives, of the individual semantic content of a conjunction and of the tenses which can be combined into complex semantic structures which contain all the necessary information on one level without having to look back or forward - especially as many of Horastein's intermediate strings would violate Partee's well-formedness constraint (Partee 1971). For these reasons, Hornstein (1977) will be mentioned occasionally for details, but I do not adopt his approach. 1.5.3 The 'mixed' approach If we do not want to abandon our basic assumption, i.e. the view that temporal adverbs characterize reference times, we have one possibility left: we compute the frame for main clause reference time starting from the subclause event time, thereby assuming that temporal conjunctions establish a relationship between these two times. This 'mixed' approach is not totally new, it recalls Smith (1978) and her analysis for complement clauses, though there it is the other way round. It is also what Ritchie (1979), quoting Isard (1974), seems to have in mind when he states: "executing the semantic part of when does the following in the program: a) locates event time of the subordinate clause b) sets this event time into the appropriate slot (present or remote). The interpretation of the main clause then uses for its reference time whatever has been loaded into the slot that its own tense refers to." (Ritchie 1979:91). Elsewhere, however, we find "that it is the task of the time-binder when to get the reference time from the subordinate clause and put it into the appropriate slot." (Ritchie 1979:90)

54

It is not quite clear whether 'get' here actually means 'get' and establishes the main clause reference time or whether it is the subclause reference time which is 'got' and put into the slot. In view of the inconsistent handling of this problem in most of the literature. I will examine it more closely. One argument for the mixed approach is the fact that the occurrence of the subclause event is normally presupposed - using the classical semantic definition of 'presupposition'. (1.27a)

Mary

didn't come back came back

when John left.

(1.27b)

Mary

didn't come back came back

after John left.

(1.27c)

Mary

didn't come back came back

before John left.

In all three cases the t-clause event is presupposed to have occurred (cf. Heinämäki 1978:21 and 99ff.).11 There are, of course, the well-known exceptions with fre/ore-clauses such as he died before he saw the ambassador, which have been variously explained by postulating a before2 called 'counterfactual before' (Lakoff 1972), or by contextual factors (Heinämäki 1972 and Heinämäki 1978:5 Iff.). There are also differences in the exact presuppositions of after and before (cf. Miller/Johnson-Laird 1976:426) but for the present argument it is important that when uttering any of (1.27a,b,c) we presuppose that John left. Therefore this event and its time of occurrence seem to be the only times which count, not the process of placing it on the time line, which would involve the subclause reference time. As the prominent time, the event time thus becomes the natural candidate for starting computation. Let us at this stage return to look at our problem examples, to see how they are analysed in the mixed approach. The measure phrase examples (1.21a-c) are unproblematic, (1.21a) because it works both in the event-event approach and a reference-reference approach and so it must work in the mixed computation. For (1.21b) we now do not use the t-clause Past Perfect reference time for computation and therefore arrive at the correct result, and the same applies to 11 But see Hornstein (1977:552) for a different view.

55

(1.21c). (Remember that the indirect approach could not analyse (1.21b,c) correctly.) However, the mixed approach encounters difficulties as soon as ET and RT in the main clause do not coincide. Given that we compute main clause reference time from the tclause event, we arrive at (1.21d') for ( 1 .2 Id)

He had telephoned his lawyer two minutes before he left.

ETm RTm -1 -1 telephone

2 min

ET t (=RT t ) ι -> leave

and something like (1.21e') for (1.21e)

He had telephoned his lawyer two minutes before he had left.

ETm RTm - 1 -1 telephone

2 min ΕΤ( --leave

(RTt) 1-)->·

One possibility of solving this problem is to remember that adverbs in Past Perfect sentences can always characterize event time because reference time is already contextually given. This would mean that in (1.21d,e) we compute the main clause event time not reference time - and all is well for the mixed approach. Note that the indirect approach by starting computation from the t-clause reference time would still arrive at the wrong analysis. But so far we have achieved nothing the direct approach could not also do - apart from assuming a unified approach for adverbs and t-clauses. It might be a point in favour of the mixed approach if we could come up with examples like (1.21d,e), where we have a second, a reference time, reading, just as we had two readings for (1.11). Let us front the t-clause and add some context: (1.28)

It was a bad night. He had come home and had found the note. So he had left again. And only two minutes after he went out into the rain he had (already) found a taxi.12

I think that (1.28') is a possible reading for (1.28): 12 The addition of already in this example has been criticised as a German use of already. On the other hand, many examples in Chomsky's works and also in Ladusaw (1979) seem to involve exactly this use of already. Note also that the addition of the measure phrase only two minutes seems to influence the interpretation of (1.28): after he went out into the rain, he had found a taxi and gone home gets a quite different interpretation or has been rejected as unacceptable.

56 (1.281) 2min go into rain

~

~

find taxi

^

i

E

T

*

R

T

m

'

We have changed the conjunction (after instead of before) but that does not effect the argument because the important thing is the Past Perfect in the main clause. We have also added already which brings in certain presuppositions about reference time (Harkness 1985) and therefore makes an interpretation involving reference times more likely. Nevertheless, there might be another factor involved which still makes the event-event reading preferable in most cases: The reference point for a Past Perfect has been analysed as indefinite by some authors. Therefore a measure phrase modified after/before -clause has much the same effect as the addition of a punctual adverbial in these cases: (1.29) (1.30)

He had come home at ten ο 'clock. He had come home two seconds before the phone rang.

In both cases the tendency seems to be not to pin down the reference point, but to keep it vague (i.e. indefinite) and so interpret the adverb as giving the exact location of event time. Without further going into these problems, we can say so far that the mixed approach is superior to the indirect approach and seems to be able to handle the measure phrase examples as well or in view of (1.28) slightly better than the direct approach. Let us, therefore, look at the examples which the direct approach could not handle, namely (1.22a,b) and (1.23a,b), and let us assume, for this purpose, a mixed analysis of when along the following lines: For S' when S to be true, the reference time of S1 must be roughly simultaneous with (or sequential depending on event notion) to the event time of S.13 We get a correct analysis for (1.23a) assuming a simultaneity when: (1.23a)

When John arrived, Mary had left.

13 A correct semantics will be given in 25.

57 (1.23a') Et

RT

m · ETt * RTt 1 J. arrive

m 1 M. leave

>

Note that with (1.23a) an event reading is possible in accordance with our observation about Past Perfect in m-clauses. For (1.23b) we get an analysis that shows no difference to (1.23a') as we had discounted the t-clause RT altogether. Therefore we do not get an analysis where the reference times coincide or where ETt < ETm, not even with the possibility of event modification. (1.23b)

When John had arrived, Mary had left.

(1.23b')

ETt (RTt) J. arrive 1

ETm 1 M. leave

>

RTm

and for (1.23c), which we add here, we need a sequence when triggered by the achievement arrive to account for the most usual reading.14 (1.23c)

When John arrived, Mary left.

(1.23c') (RT t =)ET t J. arrive

m

M. leave

The advantage the mixed approach has given so far, is that we do not need a sequence when triggered by a Past Perfect. On the other hand, we do not get all the readings of (1.23b). If we read pass the bakery as a simple process, not an accomplishment and leave aside the refinements about the inclusion of one interval in the other15, we can interpret (1.22a) with a simultaneity when and achieve correct results: (1.22a)

When Thelma passed the bakery she breathed a sigh of relief.

14 Whether we can have overlap readings for arrive and leave as some speakers suggested to me, will be discussed later when we know more about event notion and the interplay of rules. 15 See 2.5. for the dependence on event notion of the inclusion, overlap and sequence readings.

58

(1.22a') ET t (=RT t ) RT

m=

For (1.22b) we run into the same difficulties as for (1.23b), though we do not have the event-modification possibility. Both problem examples involve a Past Perfect in the subclause and as we do not take note of the subclause reference time but only of the event time, and do not want to require a sequence when as soon as we have a Past Perfect in the subclause, the mixed approach cannot handle these examples, just as the direct approach couldn't. Taking stock, we note that the mixed approach gives correct analyses for those cases the indirect approach couldn't explain, i.e. the measure phrase examples (1.21a-e), provided we allow an adverb to become an event time modifier in cases where the reference time is already sufficiently specified, as is the case in many Past Perfect contexts, or where RT is supposed to remain indefinite. The direct approach could also handle these examples, but has the disadvantage of allowing no ambiguity at all for (1.21d,e), which might be undesirable in view of (1.28). The mixed approach could also take care of some of the problem cases for the direct approach (1.23a,c), but cannot account for the difference in (1.22a) and (1.22b) or the ambiguity of (1.23b). This, however, does not prove that the hypothesis about the general function of adverbs is wrong (it is due to the fact that we try to compute main clause reference time), but only shows that it is obviously not sufficient to anchor the computation process to the t-clause event and only the event. If we take the broader view that we can anchor to event or reference time, which we will call the MIXEDMIXED approach. We are, however, back to the problem we faced when discussing Reichenbach's two principles: We will have to look for clues in order to determine where we start to 'count' in each separate case. One obvious clue is the fact that the (1.21a-e) examples contain after and before, while (1.22a,b) and (1.23a,b,c) contain when. This looks a bit like the rule-of-thumb we deduced from Reichenbach: permanence principle for when, positional use for after and before. But this might turn out to be more deeply rooted in language, if we put it like this: wften-clauses determine main clause reference time with the help of when-c\ause reference time, while after and before prefer an event time anchor. As support for this function of when, observe the archaic correlation of when—then, or: (1.31a)

...and then, when she had advanced onty five paces, she realized the cat was dead.

59

where the w/ien-clause specifies a reference time already given by and then not via a coincidence of its event time with this time but via simultaneity of reference points; or compare: (1.3 Ib)

When had she left the house?

which has a reading where we ask for the reference time of the Past Perfect, not the event time. When as a w/i-word, especially relative-vf/ιβη, seems to have the basic meaning of simultaneity of reference times. After and before, on the other hand, are also prepositions and unless action nouns have a reference time, it is sensible to count from event time in (1.32a).16 (1.32b) is related closely enough to (1.32a) to have essentially the same analysis: (1.32a) (1.32b)

He went out after/before the explosion. He went out after/before the bomb exploded,

Problems like these and exceptions will be discussed in more detail when we deal with the individual conjunctions. Before formulating another rule-of-thumb for after-, before- and wAe/i-clauses, let me point out that we have distinguished anchors and reference times: Just as ten o'clock in (1.33a) is not the reference time but an anchor, so is he left in before he left of (1.33b) the event which serves as anchor to establish a time frame, the set of all times anterior to this anchor, and the main clause reference time is located inside the thus defined stretch of time: (1.33a) (1.33b)

He telephoned before ten ο 'clock. He telephoned before he left.

Using the same procedure for: (1.33c)

He had telephoned before he left.

we get the correct order of events, but the event of leaving does not serve as reference 16 This question may well be regarded as unanswered yet. Εης (1986) argues that only verb phrases are affected by tense and that the classical scope relations of NP in the scope of tense or tense in the scope of NP do not provide the readings we want. Cooper (1986), however, puts exactly the same question in terms of his situation semantics: "Are space-time locations only connected to tensed verbs and not to non-tensed verbs or any other category" (Cooper 1986:24). As Cooper's ideas of space-time locations, discourse locations and connections have much in common with our system of indices and the use of a reference point (which could be interpreted as roughly corresponding to a discourse location), we regard the issue as open.

60

time, it is only the anchor! We get the following configuration: (1.33C1) telephone

RT

leave

The configuration where the event serves as reference time is only possible if we use the option of event characterization which a main clause Past Perfect gives: If the stretch of time previous to the anchor of leaving frames the event of telephoning (not the reference time), the reference time can well be identical to the anchor - which seems to be the natural interpretation of an out-of-context (1.33c). With context, RTffl would quite likely be different from and most likely be later than ETt. With this in mind, we now formulate the rule for the mixed-mixed approach: when-, after- and fee/ore-clauses characterize main clause reference time. Temporal clause event or reference time may serve as anchor for the main clause reference frame which is established through the conjunction inherent time relation.1' 1.5.4 Reference times for subclause events? The decision which approach to take, especially the choice between the indirect, mixed or mixed-mixed approaches tacitly involves an important theoretical decision. We have assigned reference time for the t-clause tense, which we might need as anchor, cf. the case of when. However, in view of the fact that the t-clause event is presupposed, i.e. the event is already located in time, we have argued that we do not need the reference time, in fact have forgotten all about it at this stage of the game. Put differently, the problem is whether or not to assign a full set of indices (i.e. speech time, event time, reference time) to all tensed forms, including those occurring in subclauses, especially in temporal clauses. Though we will have to keep in mind the problem examples (1.22a,b) about Thelma's sigh of relief, there are some more arguments against a reference time for a t-clause tense. Quirk et al. (1972:92,783) note that Past and Past Perfect are interchangeable in some contexts, notably the context of an q/ter-clause or a clause with a sequence-wAen. Their examples are: 17 We would like to draw attention to the extreme caution we use in restricting the rule to these three conjunctions. They are the conjunctions we have used as examples so far, so we can be reasonably sure about their behaviour. Other conjunctions will be tested in a cursory fashion later. As it turns out, most of them, with the possible exception of since could be included in the above rule provided one adds certain specifications.

61 (1.34)

/ ate my lunch after my wife

(1.35)

After When

he

ι came ι ' ( ) had come

home...

returned \ ι from work his wife cooked supper. ) had returned \

They claim that sequence-w/ierc with Simple Past gets the interpretation of immediate sequence, elsewhere called contiguity, which the other possibilities do not share. The basic similarity of interpretation in the (1.34) choice seems to be the reason for the total disappearance of the Past Perfect in o/fer-clauses in American English. But if we agree that there is no meaning difference in the above case, we would do well not to assign a reference time to a temporal clause Past Perfect: the difference in the relation of event time and reference time for a Simple Past and a Past Perfect would predict a meaning difference that is not there. One might therefore, on purely theoretical grounds, i.e. for reasons of metasemantics, decide against a reference time for tensed expressions in temporal clauses.18 Leaving aside the fact that other tenses beside Simple Past and Past Perfect would have to be checked, there is one argument against this decision, also purely theoretical: as in the case of possible scope relations and multiple ambiguous readings resulting from these logically possible relations, it might be wise to accept the different readings on the semantic level and eliminate ambiguities on the pragmatic or text level. In our case, it might be good to keep reference time in order to be able to explain the differences in meaning which do occur, cf. Thelma's sigh of relief, without creating some ad hoc explanation and reference time every time such a meaning difference turns up. That implies, of course, that we should explain why the differences are not relevant in some contexts. One of these differences is what Quirk (1972:783) called the immediacy of when in a Simple Past combination. Compare: (1.36a) (1.36b)

When he got home, he called his lawyer. —hen he had gotten home, he called his lawyer. W

Another difference is the completion component of the Past Perfect in comparison with a Simple Past:

18 This is in fact what Rohrer (1977) does. He only takes into account the t-clause event, before S is interpreted in such a way that S is regarded as giving the name of an event or state. Cf. Rohrer (1977:11, fn.7).

62 (1.37a) (1.37b)

After he telephoned for a taxi, he called his lawyer. After he had telephoned for a taxi, he called his lawyer.19

This completion component is most remarkable in fte/bre-sentences, where before with Past Perfect gets the interpretation 'before completion of activity and therefore during the event': (1.38a) (1.38b)

He dropped the letter before he read it. He dropped the letter before he had read it.

Even with Quirk's caveat that when does not express sequence but simultaneity in cases of stative or progressive predicates, we get a most disturbing meaning difference in (1.39a,b), though he telephoned is neither stative nor progressive: (1.39a) (1.39b)

When he telephoned for a taxi, he called his lawyer, (i.e. by mistake) When he had telephoned for a taxi, he called his lawyer, (i.e. too)

If, in view of all these problems, we decide to keep on the safe side and retain the reference time for every tensed expression, we have to do two things: a) find the context factors that allow neutralization, and b) explain what 'immediacy' or 'completion' have to do with the reference point. Problem a) clearly has to do with event notion. For α/ter-clauses, at least accomplishments and achievements turn out to be a neutralizing context: (1.40a) (1.40b)

After he got home, he called his lawyer. After he had got (ten) home, he called his lawyer.

Problem b) leads to speculations about the proper analysis of the Past Perfect, especially the question of whether the reference time for an event in the Past Perfect is the final point of that same event or whether we are dealing with different sorts of Past Perfect, an independent one, needing a reference time of its own, and a dependent (or even bound) one, involving not another reference time but an entailment or implicature of completion. Some of these problems will be taken up later when we discuss the different conjunctions. If we accept the full set of indices for every tensed expression as a working hypothesis, we need not accept the view that the t-clause reference time, even where we need it, is as 'important' as the main clause reference time. Its comparative unimportance is the reason for calling it a 'subsidiary' reference time. 19 These examples as also (1.39a,b) and (1.40a,b) are due to Richard Matthews (1984).

63 Approaching this from another angle, Partee (1984) introduced the notion of "current" reference time. Applying this notion to the fact that t-clauses are in the classical view presupposed, it is quite clear that the t-clause reference time in a complex sentence can never be the 'current' reference time. An argument which was used in Schöpf (1984) in order to prove that t-clauses do not have reference times of their own, namely the fact that so called relational adverbials like later never tie to t-clause reference times, can then be interpreted as showing that t-clause reference times are just never 'current' - only current (or once current) reference times have narrative relevance. If we accept this, we can have the t-clause RT and not have it in the following sense: we do not think of a semantic representation ä la Reichenbach, we think of a processor model along the lines of Isard, Ritchie, Heim's file cards or the discourse representations of Kamp. We have a slot for reference time where the current RT is stored, but we also have an 'RT-memory' where previously established RTs can be stored and inspected if necessary. We need such a memory in any case to take care of the narrative progression of RTs, so we could easily store presupposed RTs in that memory, too. This model would explain the equivalence, as far as order of events is concerned, but otherwise subtle difference in: (1.4 la)

Mary turned the comer. When John saw her, she crossed the street.

(1.41b)

1 2 3 Mary turned the corner. John saw her. She crossed the street. 1 2 3

In (1.41b) we would assign a reference time for (1.41b,2) John saw her, which would also be the current reference time for this sentence. (1.41b,3) would, however, have a new current RT, i.e. the current slot would be cleared, the RT of (1.41b,2) would be stored in RTmemory and a new RT would be loaded into the current slot. For (1.41a,3) we would have exactly the same internal state of our discourse machine when we reach the end of the string of sentences: i.e. the RT of (1.41a,3) in the current slot and the RT of (1.41a,2) in memory. However, the procedure would be different: reading the complex (1.41a,2,3), the machine would not load the RT of (1.41a,2) into the current slot, it would immediately put it into the memory and then it would start to compute the current RT either by using only the t-clause event or by looking up the RT in memory. When the calculation is completed, it would write the computed RT into the current slot. The difference, therefore, is that the t-clause RT never was a current RT, something which can no longer be seen by looking at the internal state of the machine after it has finished processing the string of sentences. The sketches we have so far presented only capture this final state. But we can continue to concentrate on the final state and to assign reference times to r-clauses if we only keep the above model in mind and do not lose sight of the fact that there is a functional difference

64 between t-clause RTs and main clause RTs. 1.6 Event Notion We have already had occasion to mention the fact that event notion influences the interpretation of temporal clauses or conjunctions, the most notable case being the choice of simultaneity-w/ien or sequence-tv/ten. Starting from the four classes established by Vendler (1967), i.e. states (know, believe, be tired), activities (run), accomplishments (run a mile), and achievements (reach the station), scholars have found reason to group these classes in different ways. Hinrichs (1981) groups together states, activities and progressives20 and, on the other hand, accomplishments and achievements, because the former contain their reference time, while the latter are contained in it, and because the latter trigger what he calls RTprogression, while the former don't. Heinämäki (1978) calls Vendler's states and activities 'duratives', while achievements and her 'fast' accomplishments, i.e. punctual events like switch on the light, are 'non-duratives', and accomplishments form a class of their own. The aim of this classification is to capture the 'point' or 'interval' reading of clauses : (1.42a) (1.42b)

when he switched on the light (fast accomplishment, therefore point-reading) when he lived in London (durative, therefore interval-reading).

Ritchie (1979), while maintaining the point/interval distinction, claims that a more appropriate classification is achieved in terms of 'completed' and 'continuing' events. His argument is that activities, though durative, often do not behave as predicted. For beforeclauses Heinämäki claims that in the case of a durative in the main clause, the time relation expressed is one in which the main clause process begins prior to the time point expressed in the oe/ore-clause. But Ritchie (ibid.) feels that (1.43)

He slept before his guests arrived.

has the completion component (Ritchie ibid.: 104,105). He concludes that the completed/continuing distinction runs in some 'untidy' fashion through the class of activities (Rit20 I give Hinrichs' (1981) classification here, though a progressive is, of course, not an event notion.

65

chie ibid.:105). He arrives at the following table (Ritchie ibid.rllO): Completed: Continuing: all achievements progressive verb forms all accomplishments be with complement clause actions without a statives repeated interpretation activities type(b) sleep semi-statives live activities type (c) sleep for habitual/repeated readings an hour, i.e. with time duration specified activities type (a) run Accomplishments are no longer in a class of their own, and we have the somewhat surprising distinction between run and sleep. On the other hand, a more detailed analysis of activities seems called for, especially as we might want to know which activities though occupying an interval of time have initial and final points. This is important even if the completion reading in some before-cases might be an implicature.211 adopt therefore the classification suggested by Schöpf (1969), (1976), and (1984), in which the quantified process plays an important role. We may observe that laugh and run are both activities, but one is a quantified process, the other in its basic meaning a simple process in the sense that one can give 'a laugh', but not do 'a run'. In the sense of a sports event or a daily jogging program the latter is possible so that we are probably dealing with a nml as simple process and a run2 as quantified process. Another advantage of Schöpf s classification is the fact that it considers not only punctual events like switch on the light or knock once but distinguishes these because of the implied resultant state in the former case. It might also be useful to take account of the fact that the event notion of accomplishments contains both the process phase and the final point, while achievements presuppose a process phase, but do not assert it. The importance of resultant states can be seen in: (1.44)

"..." he said when we had crossed the stream and were climbing the slope... (Ham 123)

If we want a simultaneity-tv/ie/i for both verb phrases (not a sequence-w/ie« for the Past Perfect and a simultaneity-w/ien for the progressive event), we can achieve this by requiring simultaneity of reference times. But the Past Perfect reference point must not only be 21 For sleep we have the choice of a true durative be asleep and a quantified process sleep in the sense of 'have a sleep', so that the completion reading in (1.43) might be due to this choice. There are, however, examples in which sleep does not necessarily have to have a completion reading^ so that Heinämäki's rule seems better than Ritchie's, cf. He was very tired and slept (even) before the guests arrived. So he could greet Anna only in the morning, and further discussion in 2.4.

66 posterior to the event of crossing, it obviously has to be included in the resultant state of being across the stream. If it were later, i.e. should the resultant state of being across the stream no longer hold, then the sentence becomes odd. Schöpf (1984) distinguishes the following event notions and gives the following iconic representations: 1. STATES: lie on the floor, be blue in the face, love, be happy; RT

2. SIMPLE PROCESSES: run, walk, sing, but also pass and rain in contexts like time passes, it is raining. Simple processes can be distinguished from states by their ability to be collocated with adverbs that modify the dynamics or intensity of the process. Simple processes, unlike states, take on the meaning of quantified processes in certain contexts, especially the so-called 'Inzidenzschema': when they saw the policeman, they ran. Here we get an event which is initially quantified. Compare also the second sense of run, mentioned above. The inherent temporal structure of a simple process is, however, the same as that of a state, so the representations are the same. See Schöpf (1984:95ff.) for discussion. RT

There is a slight problem about the reference point here. Schöpf (1984) claims that though the progressive might be preferred if the reference point given by a punctual adverbial is included in the activity, the same situation might be expressed in the simple tense: a minute later we were shaking with cold / a minute later we shook with cold. On the other hand, there really seems to be a tendency, probably arising from the choice between progressive and simple tense, to interpret at ten, he ran as initially determined. This choice does not exist for states, of course. 3. QUANTIFIED PROCESSES:

a) initially and finally determined: smile, grin, laugh;

67

b) initially determined:

This representation is given for run in the collocation when he saw the policeman, he ran. The problem here is that we cannot tie the event notion of the initially determined process to the infinitive run, but have to look at the whole structure. This is a problem which we will have to discuss again later when it becomes relevant for our rules. There is another problem here, which has to do with the assumption mentioned above that at ten, he ran can be paraphrased not only as at ten, he started to run but also as at ten, he was running. The problem is that at ten and when he saw the policeman are both punctual adverbials. Why, then, should we necessarily have to interpret one as initially determined while with the other we have a choice? One explanation leads directly to pragmatics: seeing the policeman caused him to run - which accounts for the paraphrase as started to run. This, however, would mean that it is not a linguistic potential of the simple process to be initially determined, but a pragmatic fact of life - and with the same pragmatic reasoning we would get initially determined states: when he saw the policeman, he was (suddenly) very nervous. The difference that remains, however, is that states have no progressives, so that the above mentioned choice of progressive or simple tense is impossible. If we assume that the possibility of that choice leads to a conventional implicature towards initial determination when a simple process in the simple tense is collocated with a punctual adverbial, we are not only using concomitants of the world as an explanation, but also have recourse to linguistic facts. This might suffice to explain the existence of the 'initially determined process' but not the 'initially determined state' in the linguistic category of event notion. On the other hand, we have examples like suddenly he was very nervous, which clearly show that some states can have a beginning. These examples - and we will encounter more of them in the course of the investigation - seem to demand that some states have a semantic description that does not clash with the semantics of suddenly or at once. Because of this, we will later speak of states that are 'interpreted as being initially determined' and leave open whether this interpretation is due only to pragmatics or to a certain semantic potential of states. The third type of quantified process is the

68 c) punctual process or event: knock, tap, nod, sneeze, blink, dick;

which does not present any problems. 4. PUNCTUAL CHANGES with presupposed prephase and implied specific resultant state: switch off the light, look away; 1

·»

im resultant state

initial state t

= point of change

There are some distinctions to be made inside this category, but for our purposes these do not seem to be relevant. Compare Schöpf (1984:103ff.). 5. EVENT NOTIONS WITH PHASES OF CHANGE:

a) unquantified directed change: grow older,

b) directed change with initial point tj: improve, increase, deteriorate;

initial state

c) directed change with tj and tf (initial and final point): dry, run a mile, wash the car; resultant state initial state

This event notion includes accomplishments; 6. ACHIEVEMENTS are treated as special punctual changes because they presuppose a process phase, lexicalize its tf, and imply a resultant state:

69 resultant state

One of the aims of this article is the investigation of the relevance of such fine distinctions for the interpretation of temporal clauses - i.e. the interplay of the conjunctions and the event notion of the temporal clause. As it turns out, the quantified vs. unquantified distinction is the most important for our ends.

1.7 Points and Intervals It will have become obvious in this preliminary discussion that our loose use of the term reference time and event time was intentional. Clearly, a strict Reichenbachian analysis where events and reference times are conceptualized as points cannot do justice to the complex relationships of strict sequence, overlap, inclusion and others which are all expressible with temporal clauses. We will, on the other hand, not waste time discussing what is primary, the point or the interval, but use both concepts in our ontology.22 We will also have something like the line of positive real numbers in mind with their canonical topology of open intervals and the canonical order. We are aware that time is at most isomorphic to the positive real numbers, and probably not quite so in language. We will, however, use the abstraction as long as possible, and try to describe what temporal clauses do and how they place events and reference times on this line.

2. Temporal Conjunctions 2.1 The Conjunctions After, Before and When From the list of conjunctions commonly considered to be temporal, i.e. after, as, before, once, since, till, until, when, whenever, while, whilst, now (that), as long as, as soon as, immediately (that), directly (that), cf. Quirk et al. (1972:744) we will consider only after, before and when in detail. The reason for this choice is that 22 For arguments for the necessity of intervals see Cresswell (1980). The view that intervals have priority and point events can be constructed is put forward in Kamp(1979) and Hinrichs (1981) and (1986). Tichy (1985) argues that intervals are unnecessary.

70

these three specify the three basic temporal relations: posteriority, anteriority and simultaneity - and do so in a way that almost makes them equal to the basic tenses. These three types of temporal clauses are also quite clearly frame adverbs, so they constitute a natural point of departure for our investigation. In a short third part, where we treat some other conjunctions, we will then also deal with questions like: Do temporal clauses mirror the classification of temporal adverbs, i.e. do we have frequency clauses corresponding to adverbs like often, or durative clauses corresponding to adverbs like for three hours, or do we always have frames and can only expect the difference between 'true' and 'filled' frames, not the difference of frame and duration of event. Let us consider some general questions, some syntactic facts and some old problems first, and then enter into a detailed discussion of the separate conjunctions. 2.1.1 Purely temporal conjunctions and relations? When I said that after, before and when correspond to the three basic temporal relations, I did not mention the fact that relationships other than the purely temporal are often involved. The sequence reading of when in (2.1a) is helped along by a strong causal relationship. Causality also helps the interpretation of (2.1b) such that the beginning of being happy is later than the meeting, and in (2.1c) causality suggests that the state of being happy comes to an end with the meeting, so that we get a completion reading in (2.1c). (2. la) (2. Ib) (2. Ic)

Wfien she saw the body, she screamed. He was happy after he met her. He was happy before he met her.

Sequence of events seems to imply a cause-effect relationship and vice versa. The causal implicature can be traced to the use of a temporal clause instead of an adverb and therefore to the information value of the event. Compare (2.1b) and (2.2) for this: (2.2)

He was happy after Christmas 1971.

The fact that the event is mentioned instead of only its date of occurrence is most informative (Grice) if the event has something to supply: a cause-effect relation. To put it in E.M. Forsters's terms: We presume a plot in a temporal structure, not only a story. This we will have to keep in mind when we concentrate on the temporal relations.

71 Note also that when can function not only as a temporal or causal conjunction, but also as a conditional (in the sense of whenever) or as a contrastive conjunction. Just as sequence is coupled to causality, so simultaneity is to contrast: (2.3a) (2.3b)

During the day he played the horses. When his wife was at work, he played the horses.

The reason is the same, the event acquires more information value by virtue of its additional connection with the main clause. From this it follows that what Edgren (1972) calls the test for simultaneity-when, i.e. the possible switch of main- and subclause, must discount all other but temporal information to be acceptable at all: (2.4a) (2 Ab)

Wfien she was at work, he played the horses. When he played the horses, she was at work.

Causality and contrast will be returned to later, but for the time being, I would like to consider only the contribution to the temporal structure which after, before and when have to make. 2.1.2 After, before and when: overlap and differences Collecting temporal clauses from two novels quickly substantiated the claim that when is by far the most frequent temporal conjunction. This is certainly due to the fact that when has such a variety of functions, even in the temporal range. What is at first glance surprising, however, is the fact that after and before are not symmetric in quantitative distribution; after is a rather rare temporal conjunction, as Edgren (1972) and her data corroborate. This can be explained partly by the fact that many possible α/ter-occurrences can be covered by sequence-w/ien and partly by the observation that after often occurs with a non-finite construction, so that the overall distribution of after and factual before is, after all, approximately even. Apart from its simultaneity meaning, when overlaps not only with the meaning of after, but also with that of before:

i

2.5a) 2.5b) 2.5c)

When they built the bridge, they made several geological surveys. When they built the bridge, they used only the best materials. When they built the bridge, they had a big gala opening.

This observation leads Ritchie (1979) to postulate a broad, vague meaning for when which

72 he gives as 'approximate coincidence' (Ritchie 1979:109). There is another more systematic overlap of when and before, at least as far as order of events is concerned, in the so called narrative when:23 (2.6)

He had just come in when the phone rang.

Without consideration of reference times or anchors we can summarize these first observations by saying that while Ά after B* signals posteriority of A and Ά before B' signals anteriority of Α, Ά when B' can mean simultaneity, posteriority or anteriority of A and B. This, and especially the Vagueness* of when, will be investigated later. 2.1.2.1 Syntactic observations concerning future and negatives and an attempt at semantic explanation As has often been observed (cf. Quirk et al. 1972), after, before and when do not co-occur with a so-called Simple Future in the temporal clause, they occur with the Present or Present Perfect tense: 2.7a} 2.7b) 2.7c 2.8a 2.8b 2.9a 2.9b

* After he ΊΙ arrive, we ΊΙ leave. After he arrives, we ΊΙ leave. After he's arrived, we'll leave. * When he'll arrive, we'll leave. When he arrives, we'll leave. * Before he'll arrive, we'll leave. Before he arrives, we'll leave.

This does not hold for non-factual before: (2. lOa)

/'// die before I'll do that.

or cases where there is some doubt as to the future occurrence of the 6e/ore-event: (2.10b)

We'll have to work on his wife before he'll agree.

while it holds in command situations: (2.1 Oc) (2.1 Od)

* Put the knife down before you ΊΙ cut yourself. Put the knife down before you cut yourself.

23 Cf. Edgren (1972), Quirk et al. (1972) and especially Couper-Kuhlen (1986).

73 24

It has also been observed that after-, before- and ννΛβη-clauses tend to be non-negative: (2.1 la) (2.1 Ib)

* After John didn t come, Eva left. * Eva left before John didn't come.

A negated w/ie/i-clause automatically gets a causal reading and is odd when interpreted as purely temporal: (2.lie)

? When John didn't come, Eva left.

This fact about negatives is explained by the "missing presumption of fact" (Edgren (1972) and Harkness (1985)) which is another way of saying that the events denoted by these temporal clauses have to be presupposed.2^ But let us take a look at what 'negative' means or doesn't mean here, and what exactly is presupposed. Predicates that are semantically negative can describe 'facts' as Harkness (1985) found and (2.12a-c) show: 2.12a) 2.12b) 2.12c)

i

After John failed/forgot to come, Eva left. When John failed/forgot to come, Eva left. Before John failed/forgot to come, Eva left.

Only (2.12c) in a factual interpretation sounds odd, but on the other hand not even the presence of negative morphemes is enough to make temporal clauses unacceptable: (2.13)

Only after there was no reply to their repeated calls did they burgle the house.

Though there is a causal component in (2.13), it can be interpreted without difficulty in a temporal sense, i.e. a statement about the sequence of events. Therefore, the data here do not follow the pattern of the known negation phenomena and we cannot quite agree with Edgren (1972), who concludes that t-clause events are about concrete situations not nonfacts (or probably better non-events). The problem is not that we are dealing with something that does not happen, nor is it the openly negative syntactic environment, nor, again, is it (as Harkness (1985) tentatively suggests) the event notion. We can easily create perfectly acceptable sentences: (2.14a)

After John didn't arrive on the ten ο 'clock train either, Eva finally left the

24 Harkness (1985:337f.) 25 Compare these examples with other cases of presupposition failure.

74

(2.14b) (2.14c)

station. After John didn 't come to the party, Eva got realty angry, After John didn't come at ten, Eva phoned him.

In all these sentences we are dealing with events that don't take place, but - and this is the important point - they are interpretable because they involve a schedule and so a definite and even contextually specified reference time for the event. We must conclude that it is the reference time of the temporal clause, not the event itself, which has to be presupposed as a definite time during which something occurred or didn't occur. We can also conclude that in the case of odd negatives, it is not only the event that is missing, but also a definite reference time - i.e. those cases where we do not have any clear reference time at all, or those where an indefinite reference time is given: (2.15)

? After he didn't meet Hans, he died.

This is so because we then have no possible anchor for the conjunction to work on (neither the event nor the reference time) and therefore no possibility for the placing of the main clause reference time.26 The examples were more or less all after examples because it is difficult not to accept when -clauses, which at once take on the causal meaning in such combinations. Before-dauses are a bit more difficult, and in most cases until is preferable. But they become interpretable (at least for some speakers) if not good English, with a clear reference time:27 (2.16)

Eva was quite happy - before John didn't phone on her birthday.

Let us now take our conclusion about the presupposed reference times to the first observation about the choice of Present instead of Future tense in t-clauses. Though there is nothing to disallow the presupposition of a future event, it is normally Past or Present which go together with a presupposition. So the use of the Present tense seems to signal the presupposition here, it is - so to speak - better suited to indicate that a future event is 'presupposed', i.e. is to be considered a fact. Let us content ourselves with pointing out that this use of the Present tense could be given the label: future presuppositional. It would be interesting to know whether there are other cases where such a future meaning 26 Example (2.15) can have a reading if context supplies reference time. But I think that it is odd enough to illustrate the point. Another thing is that the problems about events that do not happen show once again that it might be wise to have the (third) parameter of reference time even for temporal clauses. It would be very illogical, to say the least, to postulate event times for events that do not occur. 27 Harkness (personal communication) suggests that it might be the complication of non-factual before that make the before examples especially bad.

75

of the Present tense involves a presupposition of fact.

2.1.2.2 Differences between after, before and when So far we have dealt with general similarities of these conjunctions and also with a certain overlap in their meanings. Let us now pass on to some differences: when is also a wft-word, before and after are also prepositions. Before and after act in many respects as time comparatives; when occurs as relative when in its basic simultaneity function: Hans is two inches taller than John. The house crashed down two minutes after the last person had left. Two minutes before the house crashed down, the last person had left. At the time when the house crashed down everybody had already left. Even in the area of semantic overlap, there are differences. As has been said already, a sequence-w/ien with a Simple Past seems to imply a more immediate sequence than an after-clause in the same environment. But there is more. Even if the time specified is a nanosecond, i.e. we are dealing with very immediate sequence, a measure phrase specification cannot be given for when - or the phrase is read as giving duration of the event: (2.18a) (2.18b) (2.18c)

The screen began to flicker a nanosecond after the beam was switched on. The beam was switched on a nanosecond before the screen began to flicker. * The screen began to flicker a nanosecond when the beam was switched on.

where (2.18c) is acceptable, if read as for a nanosecond. It is also interesting that the addition of just tends to produce a simultaneity not a sequence reading with when: i2.19a} (2.19b)

Just when the beam was switched on, the screen flickered (briefly). Just after the beam was switched on, the screen flickered briefly.

The semantics of when and after must therefore be sufficiently different to take care of these problems. It will certainly not do to follow Partee (1984), who treats when only in its 'just after' sense as a kind of signal for RT-progression. The facts just cited point in a different direction: when basically signals simultaneity (or near simultaneity) and other meanings are derived, while after and before with their unique measure phrase potential involve distances of times.

76 2.2 After and Before: Similarities and Differences

2.2.1 From preposition to conjunction: the first hypothesis With the mathematical models of time in mind and also the most basic relations we have in these models, i.e. something isomorphic to '' in real numbers, working hypothesis 1 follows directly from this model: Hyp. 2.1

After and before use points as arguments.

This is obvious in examples like after ten, before ten. But it also works in the case where the surface argument is an interval: after lunch means after the lunch is over, i.e. after the endpoint of the interval of lunch, and before lunch means before the initial point of the lunch interval. After thus extracts a point from the given interval and uses this as argument, so that after NP can be defined as:28 after t : = { χ: χ > t } after t

after [1^^]:= { χ: χ > l£ lunch

after lunch

[

Χ// t t , / n M M l l l l l l l

Ί

h

For before we take the inverse relation: before t : = {χ: χ < t} before t / / /1

.

before [t1? 12]: = {χ: χ < tj} before lunch

lunch

1—M ) l l l l i l l l i / / I I l

Ί 28 An open interval I does not include its endpoints: I: = (t^): = {x:tj < χ < Lj. A closed interval J includes its endpoints:

]

h

77

The problems are quite clearly never with cases where a point is directly given. They lie hidden in the various ways language can name intervals. If we say lunch, the time it occupies is only implied and we cannot even be sure whether we can treat this time as an interval. We might, in some cases, have to treat lunch as a blob-like entity which is conceptualized as a point. One argument for our Hyp. 2.1. is the possibility of quantifying measure phrases: (2.20)

He came ten minutes after lunch.

The measure phrase clearly gives the distance between two points in accordance with the fact that distances are always measured between points. A counterexample to this line of argument appears to be: (2.21)

Two hours after dark he was still not home.

Apart from the fact that we do not count from a final 'point' here (darkness is not over), but at best from an initial point, (2.21) does not give clear points between which we can put the time distance of two hours. But this is a question of vagueness and not an argument against the point hypothesis, because dark cannot be defined as an interval with a definite initial point but involves grades of darkness. That we have a vague margin can be seen from more examples: Two seconds after dark does not make sense at all, two minutes after dark is almost as bad, and only ten minutes after dark begins to sound better. The moment it was dark, we set out, however, shows that dark can be interpreted subjectively as having an initial point. So far we have followed up our hypothesis in the prepositional use of after and before. It is clear from these observations that we will be able to transfer them to the conjunctions, with the difference that there we will be dealing with verbalized events, which will therefore have to be classified as punctual events, events with initial and/or final points, and events which do not possess either, i.e. states and events expressed in the progressive. 2.2.2 Testing the hypothesis and first meaning rules We can make certain predictions from our hypothesis and such a classification of events: 1. The conjunctions after and before will combine best with punctual events, punctual changes, and achievements, i.e. events involving only one point.

78 2. In the case of quantified events after will pick the final point (tf) and before will pick the initial point (tj). 3. States and progressives will be problematic. 4. Only in the case of punctual events, punctual changes and achievements can we expect symmetry between after and before, i.e. will after t give exactly the complement of before t. A superficial test bears out predictions (1-3): Onl

(2.22a)

After Before

he knocked once, he hung up his coat.

(2.22b)

After Before

he switched on the light, he saw Mary.

(2.22c)

After Before

he reached the station, he called his wife.

(2.23a)

After Before

he read for three hours, he checked his position.

(2.23b)

After Before

he wrote the letter, he had a drink.

(2.24a)

?After ?Before

he was running, he had a meal

(2.24b)

*After ^Before

On 2

On 3

'

he was intelligent, he understood the problem.

Obviously, there are some problems, and it is not only the event notion which provides the point we need: A. To make sense out of after- and fcefore-sentences with states, sometimes a point is assumed, often a point which is interpreted as the point of entering into that state.

79

i2.25a) (2.25b)

After he was wise, he left her. Before he was wise, he brought her flowers daily.

which sound much better when changed to 'get wise' instead of *be wise'. B. A Past Perfect can provide a (final) point for states: (2.26a) (2.26b)

After he had been blue in the face, he called a doctor. Before he had been blue in the face, he never thought of his health.

The case of quite acceptable progressives in α/ter-clauses will need some more consideration: (2.27a) (2.27b)

After the horses were running, he tried to place a bet. After they were sitting comfortably, he broached the subject.

With before and progressives we simply assume the point of entering into the activity: (2.28)

Before I was working, I was unhappy.

The prediction that after picks tf and before picks tj of given events is also to be used with some caution: (2.29)

He dropped the letter before he had read it.

For some speakers, this has the meaning that the letter was dropped during the process. We have also already noted α/ter-examples, where after picks the pragmatic point of entry into a state, i.e. the initial point. For this reason Rohrer (1977) simply postulates after12 and before j 2, which count from the initial and the final point of the event respectively. As there is no indication given in Rohrer (1977) as to which factors determine the choice between afterj and after2, the classification itself is certainly insufficient. The problems we have discussed show that more detailed investigation of exactly these factors is necessary. Before we embark upon this investigation, we can, however, summarize our findings in a preliminary meaning rule: 2.1

After S denotes the interval (t, «) such that t is a point i. identical to the point of change in case S contains a punctual event, punctual change or achievement,

80

ii. identical to tf of a fully quantified event, or iii. t is given by the interplay of event notion, tense, aspect and also pragmatic considerations. After S is undefined, if no such point exists. Let us pause briefly to discuss the unboundedness of our o/fe/--interval on the right side. By putting the sign for infinity we have tacitly assumed that the interval is unbounded. In actual discourse, however, context will often provide an upper bound (which in Simple Past sentences is often the time of speech), so that we might do better to put a variable V as the unspecified upper bound which can be specified by context - e.g. by a measure phrase: after S denotes the interval (t,x).... For before S the rule will look similar, only that here the lower bound will either be provided by immediate context (speech time) or ultimately by the beginning of all time which is, however, not a bound traceable in language. We opt for the same representation as for after S: 2.II

Before S denotes the interval (x,t) such that....

and we alter ii. to: tj of a quantified event. The rule which combines after S with the main clause S' will follow the general rule we have formulated for frame adverbs. The interval given by after S and before S can either be filled by the main clause event (and in the case of states and progressive events it might even Overflow') or, for quantified and punctual events in the main clause, it can be a true frame: (2.30a) (2.30b) (2.30c)

He was here after/before lunch. He was reading after/before lunch. He left after/before lunch.

We would therefore be playing safe if we require r c I in the frame rule, where I is the interval denoted by the t-clause and r the main clause reference time index. We will want to tighten up the rule to r c I later, however, and we can do so, because the 'fillability' results quite naturally if we analyse the ET of states and progressives as containing their reference times. Then the reference time might be a true subinterval of the interval given by the t-clause and the event might still fill the whole interval - or not, an interpretation which is admissible for (2.30a,b).

81

We therefore formulate: 2.III

M., a ,c ,i N S' after S iff there are e,r,s with s = s' andA/s,c,r, t= S

andA/, e , r , N S and r' c (t,x) O

|&

yl

where (t,x) is the denotation of after S in M& er and t is chosen according to 2.1.i-iii. From this rule we see that we will have to make 2.1 more precise, which we shall now do: 2.1 '

after S denotes (t,x) in the model M& & T iff M& er 1= S and i. t = e for a punctual event, punctual change or achievement; ii. t = tf of e for a quantified event e; iii. t is otherwise determined by the interplay of e and r.

I believe that for after and before there is only the condition of s = s' to be put on the indices. Later we will discuss conjunctions where there are more conditions and dependencies of these two sets of indices. With these rules we can now also go back to prediction 4, check it and explain the facts in more detail. Let us determine t as a punctual change like switch on the light. Then after and before are complementary in the sense that after he switched on the light covers that part of the time line that is not covered by before he switched on the light - leaving aside the point of switching on the light which is not covered by either clause. In the ideal case we get: before he switched on the light

after he switched on the light

In the case of events that have intervals for event times we expect one area of the time line to be unaccounted for, the interval of the event itself as in after/before they had dinner: before they had dinner

have dinner

after they had dinner

-1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ι ι 1 1)[-](i ι 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 η 1 1 ι ι ι ι >

If we leave aside pragmatic influences, we can conclude that the only case where we can truly expect that the symmetry of a < b and b > a carries over to S' after S and S before S' is the case where both, main clause and t-clause event are punctual: (2.3 la) (2.3 Ib)

He knocked once before he switched on the light. He switched on the light after he knocked once.

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In the literature there has been much discussion of the question of whether after and before are converses of each other. Most authors have concluded that they are not. But their premisses were slightly different from ours. They neglected the reference time problem altogether and also the frame-function of t-clauses and simply took after and before to relate events. From this (direct) approach it is only logical to conclude that after and before are basically different because they relate different points of the events. From the examples (my enumeration) f 2.32a) (2.32b)

It was raining after he was working. He was working before it was raining.

Miller/Johnson-Laird (1976:425) have concluded that before relates the beginnings of the two events while after relates the final point of the t-clause event to the beginning of the main clause event. Though part of this is incorporated in our rule 2.1. and 2.Π., i.e. in the clause that before prefers tj of the t-clause event and after prefers tf, this is not evident from the above examples. On the contrary, I think that in (2.32a) the only possible interpretation is that it rained sometime after he started to work, not after he finished. Remember: (2.27)

After the horses were running, he tried to place a bet.

where after tf of running is not intended as the meaning. In view of (2.29)

He dropped the letter before he had read it.

this rule and explanation of asymmetry clearly has to be revised. That there is a difference is undeniable, and it is captured in our rule in clauses ii. and iii. The latter has to be mentioned especially, because the examples of asymmetry mostly involve states in the main clause. But if we make the conjunction switch clauses in such a case, we get what I would like to call the 'panic'-case: the state is now in the t-clause and no naturally prominent point is provided, it has to be created in a more or less ad-hoc fashion, at the cost of reinterpretation of the event notion. Any such reinterpretation will necessarily lead to an asymmetry in meaning - apart from the fact that such sentences never sound quite right: He was tired (even) before she came home - so they went to bed and she came home after he was tired - so they went to a dance. The question now is: How does our approach handle the fact that in fre/ore-structures with states in the main clause we often get an overlap reading so that it is only the 'beginning'

83 of the main clause state that is actually anterior to the t-clause point of anchor. This fact is easily explained, however, by our frame rule, and by the interplay of event notion and reference time. For states and progressives the reference time is contained in the event time; and for the .other event notions, the reference time contains the event time. We select a state for an example: (2.33)

/ could drive before you were born.

That the state of being able to drive can (and in this case is supposed to) stretch into the period after the addressee's birth (in fact up to and beyond now) follows easily: Only the reference time of the main clause is required to be anterior to the t-clause event and as the main clause event is a state, it contains its reference time. Therefore, the state itself can stretch beyond the event of the birth, and its beginning is certainly anterior to the time of birth. I can drive

1)} before you be born

birth

If we go back to the original context of this example, i.e. "Don't tell me how to drive!" (cf. Harkness 1985:323), it is obvious that in this case a conversion to an o/ter-structure with the same reading is out of the question: (2.34)

Don 't tell me how to drive! After I could drive, you were bom,

Does this follow from our semantic rule? Unfortunately, it does not. In fact, we get the same kind of picture for the events with the only difference that in the after-case we have to assume an initial point for the state (presumably the time of getting the driving license) in order to have an anchor:

r

Γ

'V

t

after I can drive birth

We get the same possibility of overlap, however! Have we gone wrong, then? I think not. I think that the temporal relations of the events expressed in both sentences are indeed the same. That the α/fer-structure cannot take the place of the fte/bre-structure is due to some other fact: t-clauses are presupposed! Therefore (3.34) is a statement about the addres-

84 see's birth, not the speaker's driving ability and as such it is pragmatically inappropriate (a factor Miller & Johnson-Laird (1976:426) are aware of). So here it is pragmatics that is responsible for the asymmetry. There are cases, however, (cf. Miller & Johnson-Laird ibid.) where the pragmatic incompatibility of events forces a non-overlap reading and therefore makes the events symmetric for all practical purposes with regard to after and before.

In this light it appears to be a matter of taste whether one wants to stress the differences of before and after, or maintain that they are basically alike and complements of each other. What we should remember, however, is that our approach is entirely different from that of other authors in that it does not relate events, and therefore some arguments have to be scrutinized closely before we accept or reject them. We have gone into this discussion in some detail because a) it is well covered in the literature and the reader might have wondered how our approach can deal with the problems, b) it shows where the 'frame'-approach is of advantage, c) it shows where detail-work is needed: 2.1 '.ii. and iii. will have to be further specified, and the interplay of frame, reference time and event notion will need investigation. Little is known about the latter. 2.2.3 After and before as comparatives Before we investigate this further we should, however, turn to another subject, closely connected with the converse problem and equally well covered in the literature: the question of whether before and after are comparatives and should be derived (transformationally) from the same source as earlier and later. First there are some diachronic and comparative facts that point into this direction: after goes back to an Indo-Germanic comparative, and other languages have a comparative morpheme in their fte/ore-word, (cf. Heinämäki 1978:39). The best known argument is, however, the existence of paraphrases with earlier and later. (2.35a} (2.35b)

John arrived after Bill arrived. John arrived later than Bill.

Like most paraphrase arguments, this suffers from the observations that a) the surfacestructures show too many syntactic differences, and b) the paraphrases do not work in all

85

cases. Heinämäki shows convincingly that earlier/later cover just a subpart of the domain covered by before and after. Another, more semantically oriented, argument is the fact that adjectival comparatives and before and after can be modified by measure phrases, so the same kind of scale idea and relation must be involved: 2.36a 2.36b 2.37a 2.37b

Hans is tatter than Bill Hans is two inches taller than Bill Hans came after Bill left. Hans came two minutes after Bill left?*

One of the problems is, of course, that these examples are 'good' only with event notions that are punctual in nature, so that we can have definite points between which we can measure. A vague location of the points brings back all the problems of after dark. Such vagueness we can best expect with examples involving progressives, but surprisingly no vagueness results, only the choice of the initial point as argument: f2.27a) (2.27b)

After the horses were running, he tried to place a bet. A minute after the horses were running, he tried to place a bet.

We see that though there are some similarities to adjectival scales and though the basic relations involved are the same, i.e. simple order relations, before and after are unique in the way we have to choose or create the argument point in order to make sense out of some utterances. There are other differences, the most notable of which is that adjectival comparatives can be modified by much, while before and after take long, just as a long time elapsed is better than much time elapsed. (2.38a)

(2.38b)

. Hans is

Hans came

\ much I „ , taller than John, \ * long \ long | after John left. * much \

Other problems arise because we do not have one single adjectival scale. We have different scales with different structures for different classes of adjectives. Therefore it is only to be expected that the parallels are only few. 29 The exact argument, cf. Ross (1964) and Geis (1970), involves a demonstration that before and after, not some deleted adjective, are themselves responsible for the measure phrase slot.

86

So again, it appears to be a matter of taste whether one wants to stress the very basic similarity (scale and order relations) or to warn against the oversimplification involved in a parallel treatment. 2.3 After 2.3.1 Event notion and time relations in o/ifer-structures From the previous discussion we are already aware of most of the problems. Let us look briefly at some treatments, therefore, notably those which will hopefully help us to make 2.1' more precise. 2.3.1.1 Heinämäki From the set of examples reproduced as (2.40a-f) here, Heinämäki (1978:68) concludes that all verb-types can show up in either clause: 2.40a 2.40b 2.40c 2.40d 2.40e

The armadillo noticed John after he noticed it. John became famous after he made the statue. John wrote a novel after he got inspiration. Bill was running long after the bull stopf There was a huge crowd in the street after the car was moving.

2.40f)

Harry was a student after Bill was.

By Verb-type' she means her duratives, non-duratives and accomplishments which we have discussed in 1.6. The examples, indeed, show that non-duratives, accomplishments and duratives can occur in both, the main clause and the t-clause. They give, however, only a selection of combinations; write a novel is mistakenly called an achievement (which is probably only a misprint); and the examples do not show that there are states (and probably also activities) that are not admissible in after-clauses. These are co-extensive or aboriginal states that cannot be initiated, either not at all or not in the period of time which is contextually under consideration, cf. the oddity of lafter he was intelligent. Let us, therefore, note first that duratives in the t-clause can only occur if they can be initiated, or can otherwise provide a point, via a Past Perfect, for instance. Heinämäki further concludes that momentary events are unproblematic, that the argument (she calls it the reference point) of after is the final moment of the event in the case

87

of accomplishments in the t-clause (Heinämäki 1978:69), that it can, however, also be the initial moment and that this is so in the case of duratives (Heinämäki 1978:72). She further states that for durative main clauses only a part of the whole interval has to be posterior to her tr (our anchor or argument) and that this can be so, even in the case of accomplishments, i.e. John can have gotten inspiration while he was writing (Heinämäki 1978:69f.). To take all these relations into account, Heinämäki sets out the following rule (Heinämäki 1978:72), which I have taken the liberty to amend a little by introducing K as the truth interval (i.e. the event time) of B: A after B is true at the present moment t iff: i. A is true at some interval J ii. B is true at some interval K iii. there is J' such that J' £ J and J' > t^K) and for some speakers J 1 = J in the case of accomplishments in A, where tr(K) is defined as above, i.e. tf of K in the case of accomplishments in B, and tj of K in the case of duratives. I have copied out the rule in order to point out one thing: in trying to determine the temporal relation between two events conjoined by after, Heinämäki has to discuss the effect of combination of clauses in her rule. Therefore she has to introduce the subinterval J1 to account for overlap situations. As we have seen, the situation of overlap (or non-overlap) can be deduced from independent factors, it does not have to be incorporated into the o/ier-rule. In fact, in our rule 2.1' there is no place for it at all. All we are interested in is finding out which point after has as an argument and this is given by the definition of tr(K) in Heinämäki. Taking this information and our criticism, we arrive at the first improvement of 2.1':

2.1" ii. tf in case of accomplishments, iii. tj in case of duratives that can be initiated, undefined otherwise. 2.3.1.2 Ritchie In an approach we already have had occasion to mention, that of Ritchie (1979), we find more parallels to our own. Like us, Ritchie is mainly concerned with determining the point

88 used as anchor. He has only two categories of bound-clause that influence this choice: completed and continuing which divide the activities in two classes (cf. 1.6. here), while in Heinämäki activities are all durative. Ritchie argues, however, that it is not enough to know which point is involved as the anchor. He makes a distinction between 'limits' and 'endpoints'. (2.41) (2.42)

They left before the earthquake occurred. They were happy until the guests arrived.

"...the bound clause in (2.41)30 indicates a limit before which the event or state occurred. It does not precisely mark a beginning or end of the main clauseprocess, but sets a bound on it. Also, it uses a single point to mark the bound...The time clause in (2.42) is similar to that in (2.41) in that it uses only a single point to indicate a time...but it differs from (2.41) in that this point precisely marks the end of the main clause process, rather than merely stating a bound on it" (Ritchie 1979:102f). This is certainly an important distinction, but it is unfortunately not quite clear what it involves. The intention may be to capture the distinction between true frames and obligatorily filled intervals, or it might - as the term 'bound' itself suggests - be the common mathematical distinction between compact (closed) and open intervals: the first contain their boundaries, the latter don't. This mixture of ideas is unfortunate, because both are important for o/ter-clauses. The first distinction has been taken care of in our rule 2.III, where we classified o/ter-clauses as frame-adverbials, the latter distinction is mirrored in the type of interval we have specified as the denotation of q/ter-clauses, an interval open, but bounded on the left-hand side (p. 75).This left-hand bound is what Ritchie calls a 'start limit' (Ritchie 1979:105). I would prefer not to invest the time point in question with the properties of the ensuing interval, especially its frame function, because this tends to obscure the fact that q/ter-clauses denote intervals, not points. The information that after selects a 'start limit' can be more properly given by saying that the interval serves as frame. Be that as it may, the distinctions we were looking for, i.e. information as to which point is selected as lower bound of the interval is tabled by Ritchie as: type of bound clause

descriptor category

point used

after

completed

start limit

end of process

after

continuing

start limit

start of process

Ritchies's examples with o/ter-clauses argue for the completed/continuing distinction in30 The numeration is mine.

89 stead of non-durative/accomplishment/durative, because those activities which do not behave as duratives should, i.e. sleep and eat, are classified as completed. Thus: The guests arrived after he slept.

(2.43)

therefore only gets the 'posterior to tf of sleeping'-reading, which is, at the very least, doubtful in view of the uncertainty of interpretation in The guests arrived five minutes after he slept.

(2.44)

which - if interpretable at all - tends towards a t-reading, i.e. the guests arrived five minutes after he fell asleep. Before suggesting other decisive criteria, we have to deal with the problem of how Ritchie treats the. interplay of main clause event and t-clause interval. Here he has only two decisive categories: points and intervals (which correspond to completed and continuing). after

bound-clause category

main clause category

relation

start limit p

point

start follows p

start limit p

interval

end follows p

What is interesting is that though the frame idea is tacitly present in the definition of limit', we still need a separate table to define the relations which in our approach are entailments. Another question is what the point/interval distinction for main clauses is meant to capture and whether it is the pertinent one. 2.3.1.3 Event notion inherent points In our quest for the point, the lower bound of the interval designated by after S, it seems natural to look for answers in a classification of event notions that tries to take account of inherent phases and points, notably that given in Sch pf (1984), cf. 1.6. The tentative hypothesis we can put forward is this: Hyp 2.2

a) If the event notion e pertinent in S has an inherent tp then after S = {χ : χ > tf of e} b) if there is no inherent tf in e of S, then bi) after S = {χ: χ > t; of e} for those e which have inherent tj

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bii) after S = { : > tj of e} where t; is assumed in cases where S involves an event notion that can be initiated (pragmatically) c) undefined for all S with an e which has neither tf nor tj and which cannot be interpreted as initiated. There are two problems with this hypothesis: a) Why is the event notion with no inherent point reinterpreted - possibly only via pragmatic considerations - as being initially determined, not finally determined as one might want to postulate because of the preferences of after"? b) In formulating after S = { : > tj of e} where e is the event and the event notion involved in S, we assume that event notions can be fixed at proposition level. That they cannot be tied to verbs has been variously shown, cf. run and run a mile or run at ten o'clock where a simple process changes into an accomplishment or an initially determined process. That they cannot be tied to VP has been shown with the difference that can arise through subject change: he smiled and the weather smiled on us, the first a quantified process the latter a simple process or a state. Most authors have concluded that proposition or sentence level is the pertinent level at which to ascribe event notion, and this is exactly as we might wish: we can give rules combining the conjunction with S and so a given event notion. However, in the case of embedded propositions we necessarily add context and this might change event notion: for after he ran we cannot formulate something like 'after S = { : > tj of e} if e of S is an initially determined process', because he ran is not - a priori - an initially determined process. It is interpreted as one because of its combination with a 'point'-conjunction. It could just as readily denote an interval event: while he ran. The best we can do is the strange formulation, strange as least for the basic assumptions of compositional semantics, in Hyp.2.2.b.ii and c. where we say that we get such and such an interpretation in case the event notion CAN BE READ in such and such a way. Note that neither Heinämäki nor Ritchie clearly say on what level they ascribe event notion. That their rules are deficient because they seem to assume fixed and given event notions is also clear. Here, however, Heinämäki has a slight advantage in not aiming at a compositional approach at all, but only trying to determine the relations of events in the whole construction. What remains unclear, however, is whether for Heinämäki the initially determined event notion is after he ran (which is not really an event notion but an interval) or he ran; she speaks merely of the "beginning of duratives". So her rule is not better, after all. We are at least aware of the problem and have tried to deal with it, however awkwardly, in

91

our rule. We will classify the event notion involved in he is happy as a state that can be pragmatically interpreted as initiated and ended31, and the event notion involved in he is intelligent as a state that cannot be initiated and therefore does not combine with after, indeed does not combine with frame adverbs at all, as we will see. A first marking of at least the potentialities will have to take place at W or even verb level, because otherwise we are in danger of not investigating event notions but individual events, which come about only through a combination of event notion, adverbs, aspect and tense. If we do not assign a basic event notion to run, we will not be able to draw any conclusions about the contribution of Past or Past Perfect, for instance in he runs, he ran, he had run or Progressive he is running, and thus be obliged to give up any hope of useful generalizations. Besides, there is little doubt that 'running'· is a process and 'be intelligent' a state. Therefore we will sometimes simply call 'run' a simple process and 'be intelligent' a state. We are aware that these considerations lead to the sensitive area of independence or dependence of the components of a grammar, in fact, seem to supply arguments for the view that there cannot be complete independence. We will, however, steer a course of trying to assume as much independence as possible by tentatively suggesting the following rule: For a sentence S attach event notion to S' where S' is the basic proposition of S, i.e. the untensed and untemporalized proposition. Thus cautioned, we will return to problem (a). Why does after not force a finalized reading for simple processes or states? There is no pragmatic reason why run or be happy should not be finally determined. The possibility of saying he began to run/he began to be happy is matched by the possibility of he stopped/ceased/finished running/being happy. To my knowledge the question is not answerable in a definite way, but at least some tentative explanations are possible. Observe first that Schöpf (1984) lists initially determined processes, but no finally de31 Note that unlike Schöpf (1984), many authors represent states like be happy, or be there as bounded in their sketches. Cf. Bäuerle (1979), Nerbonne (1984) and Nerbonne (1986:90), who gives 7-8 pm

2

\^ tj of e} for after S with a progressive in S. We are not so sure whether it has to be tj, as there is one other possibility. Let us reconsider: (2.27)

After the horses were running he tried to place a bet.

We want to have an interpretation where the bet was placed during the course of the race, i.e. after the start. We get this naturally, because we required that after t is always an open interval. For open intervals the bound, here tj of running, can never be reached, i.e. the bet can have been placed as close to the start as we might wish to get, but never at the start and of course not before, so it has been placed during the race. But we get the same interpretation if we require that we take reference time, which is located inside the event time of a progressive and never at the start, and analyse (2.27) as {χ: χ > r of e}.

32 This can be turned into an argument for treating Past Perfect not as a tense, but as a sort of completed aspect - cf. Saurer (1984).

93

The reason for the speculation about after t with t = r in the case of progressives is that some native speakers felt that (2.27) does not mean 'after the beginning of the race', but 'after some point at which the horses were already well under way'.33 Exciting as this possibility of the reference point as a lower bound may seem, there are some arguments against it: (2.45)

He tried to place a bet a full minute after the horses were running.

counts from the beginning of the race. And somehow we cannot easily get hold of the reference point; we can mark it in a simple progressive: (2.46a)

The horses were running at ten.

(2.46b) (2.46c)

?? After the horses were running at ten... ?? After at ten the horses were running...

but:

are both odd or even unacceptable - or if acceptable, run at ten seems to be one constituent so that RT is not involved. On the other hand: (2.47)

After the horses were running, at ten, he left the course disappointed.

is possible, and in this case his leaving takes place at or just after ten o'clock, and ten o'clock is the reference time for the progressive! The conclusion to draw from this is that in most dialects progressives are covered by (bii) of Hyp. 2.2. (i.e. one counts from an initial point), but that there are some speakers who have a strategy like: 'In case of absence of event notion inherent points, remember the reference point!' As we are working from the bottom up, let us now test (bi), i.e. the interplay of after and event notions without tf but with tj. Such event notions are a) initially determined processes, and b) initially determined changes like improve, deteriorate, etc. (cf. 1.6. for sketches and more examples). With the (a) predicates we had the problem that they only seem to exist in context: when 33 This reading might be a conventional implicature originating in the desire to distinguish after the hones were running from after the horses ran. Then it would exist mainly (only?) for event notions that can be initiated.

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he saw her, he ran. We therefore decide not to treat them as having an INHERENT tj, but an INDUCED tj. Predicates like begin to run are better treated as punctual changes, but if one wants to see them as initially determined processes, this case is covered by (bi) of Hyp.2.2. and also in rule 2.1 '.i: (2.48a} (2.48b)

We left after they began to run. We were there after they began to run.

Both sentences have the interpretation that the main clause event occurs later than the tj, i.e. the beginning of the process phase in the t-clause. The b) predicates are a bit difficult. In comparison to grow older, they seem to have an inherent tj, as there is always a given state that is the level or degree from which the improvement, increase or decrease operates, though one might debate the relevance of this level for temporal considerations. There is one other problem, however: the results improved is basically ambiguous (cf. Schöpf 1984:107f.) and could be read as either: the results began to improve and are still improving, or, as the results improved from level to level y. Therefore, improve can be an initially determined change or a quantified change, and we have to consider the question of why after should not force a quantified change reading and then pick tf. Tests are called for. 2.49a} 2.49b) 2.49c) 2.49d)

After After After After

the weather improved, they went for a walk. his eyesight improved, he did not need glasses any longer. the results improved, they had a party. the vacuum improved, they got better data.

These examples show the problem of improve in its pragmatic light. There always exists a point where improvement has to stop, the point of perfection, and the respective interpretations have to do with our expectations about the attainability or unattainability of that point - and other expectations coupled to the situation. Nobody would expect a vacuum to improve for ever - a so-called vacuum is never a vacuum in any case - as the mechanics of vacuum chambers are such as to make deterioration the natural tendency, improvement always being coupled to an effort. We would therefore interpret (2.49d) as 'got sufficiently better', so that it becomes a kind of accomplishment. In the same manner we would not expect eyes to improve forever, though there is nothing in (2.49b) to block an interpretation where the eyes in question got better still after the point at which it is judged that 'he didn't need glasses anymore'. With scientific results it is slightly different. We would be rather disappointed and probably not have the party if the results had already stopped improving, we probably have an open scale in this case. We can, of course, easily quantify the improvement:

95 (2.50a) (2.50b)

After the results improved a bit... After the results improved vastly...

For (2.49a), one might also tend to interpret it as 'after the weather improved enough'. This seems to have tf, though the weather can clear up even more during the walk.34 Let us now add measure phrases to see from which point they count: 2.5 la) 2.5 lb) 2.5 lc) 2.5 Id)

Ten minutes after the weather improved, they went for a walk. A week after his eyes improved, he didn't need glasses any longer. Four hours after the results improved, they had a party. Five minutes after the vacuum improved, the data suddenly made sense.

We clearly interpret (2.5 Id) as 'five minutes after tf', but cannot be so sure about the other examples. (2.5 la) seems to have an after t-interpretation, (2.5 lb) and (2.5 lc) are ambiguous. One more observation, before we attempt to extract a moral from this: there is also a problem of agency and control, a vacuum does not improve by itself, but only through human intervention (a pump is repaired and a valve closed). The weather improves without human control, and eyes can be operated on, but can also heal and change by themselves. All this reasoning involves pragmatics, and therefore we formulate: after S : = {χ : χ > tj of e if e is a directed change which is pragmatically interpreted as initially determined} or:

after S : = {χ : χ > tf of e if e is a directed change which is pragmatically interpreted as a fully quantified change} The problem with this rule is that there can also be pragmatic reasons to suppose that he ran in after he ran he walked is finally determined (via its incompatibility with the main clause event) - apart from the fact that he ran can be a quantified process or event. The difference we can mention and which might justify a different treatment, is that it is semantic and pragmatic knowledge of the subject involved in the subclause in the case of directed changes, and not incompatibility with another event; with directed changes it is an event-internal business. Taking the other way out, i.e. postulating after S only as after tj of e 34 Richard Matthews (personal communication) suggests that in (2.49a-c) after tends to take some implied tf which does not exclude continuation, i.e. this tf would be implicature. See also the discussion of improve in Matthews (1987).

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and getting the threading as implicature which can be blocked, is not quite convincing either: after the vacuum improved cannot reasonably have any reading other than the tj-reading. There is no possible situation where the process is still going on. The only conclusion we can draw is that directed changes need to be investigated and that it is not wrong to give an 'either-or' rule - though that does not help very much to predict the reading. For a prediction we need to know more about which pragmatic factors influence which reading. We will, however, keep the above rule as the best we can do for now. Let us pass on to event notions with inherent tf. Here Sch pf (1984) has distinguished a) quantified processes like smile in he smiled and b) directed processes with a preliminary state, a process phase and a resultant state. The latter are a special case of quantified changes and have elsewhere been called accomplishments. As such they are well investigated and there is no point in going through the examples again. The rule is: after S : = {χ : χ > tf of e in case the e of S is an accomplishment} Ritchie has pointed out, however, that there are other events, apart from accomplishments, that arrive at the same threading. He used the 'completed' label. Our problem now is to test whether the concept of quantified process achieves an explanation of the problem cases without recourse to the more aspectual terms 'completed' and 'continuing'. Let us therefore place a quantified process into the t-clause and have a pragmatically compatible event in the main clause (otherwise tf-readings might be pragmatically induced via incompatibility): (2.52a) (2.52b)

After he smiled, he walked out. After he smiled, she was happy.

We do, indeed, get the interpretation that 'he walked out' or 'she was happy' when the smile is over, i.e. posterior to tf. The test with measure phrases corroborates this: (2.53a) (2.53b)

Two seconds after he smiled, he walked out. Two seconds after he smiled, she was happy (already).

This means in particular that accomplishments and quantified events are the candidates for neutralization of Simple Past and Past Perfect. We do, in fact, not detect much difference to (2.52a,b) in

97 (2.54a) (2.54b)

After he had smiled, he walked out. After he had smiled, she was happy.

It has been argued that predicates like smile, roar, laugh, groan are assumed to be completed/quantified because of their pragmatic briefness. But it is not briefness that characterizes the quantified process and influences the reading. He walked for an hour also involves a quantified process, and in (2.55)

After he walked for an hour, he had tea.

after S has the 'posterior to tf of e' reading, which is easily proved with the measure phrase: (2.56)

(Some) ten minutes after he walked for an hour, he had tea.

though a Past Perfect in that sentence would be better. But we have established that event notions that can be represented as:

t of e where e is the S-event and e features only one point} - this covers: punctual events, punctual changes, achievements, but also events that provide only tj, as some directed changes do; b) after S: = {χ : χ > tf of e where e is the S-event and e is fully quantified} - this covers: quantified processes, quantified changes, which can be pragmatically determined, and accomplishments (and once again punctual events like sneeze); c) after S: = {χ : χ > tj of e where e is the S-event and e has no inherent point, but can be reinterpreted as initiated} - this covers: simple processes and some states; d) after S is undefined in cases where the event notion e of S has no inherent points, and cannot be reinterpreted as having such

99 points. This is sufficient refinement and can stand in this form. Notice that we have also tidied up 2.1', iii. and made i. and ii. a little more precise with regard to the influence of event notion. The distinctions we have made, as reflected in the above rule, are based on the quantified vs. unquantified distinction and remind one of Ritchie's completed vs. continuing distinction. We can group event notions in the following way: a) fully quantified events i. those involving only one point ii. those with tj = tf; b) initially quantified events; c) unquantified events i. initially quantifiable, inherently or pragmatically ii. unquantifiable. Now we have to ask whether in comparison with Ritchie we get better, worse or the same results. There is no debate about punctual events, i.e. one point events. Neither is there any question about accomplishments or states. With states though, Ritchie (like Heinämäki) does not see the co-extensive cases where the combination does not work. The crucial cases for Ritchie were activities, which could be either completed or continuing and accordingly behave differently in combination with after. We have divided the activities into simple and quantified processes and intially determined changes and quantified changes. The latter event notion has not been treated in combination with temporal conjunctions so far, so that we cannot know how Ritchie would classify them and what results he would obtain. Let us therefore only look at the distinction between simple/quantified processes and continuing/completed activities. The problem is that we do not have test criteria for the completed vs.continuing distinction; we only have a list of examples and some very confusing statements elsewhere. In (2.61a) (2.6 Ib) (2.6 Ic)

He walked while the wind was favourable. He slept while you were out. He walked for several minutes while the rain poured.

the main clause events are analysed as:

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activity type (a.} producing an interval, activity type (b) producing a point, activity type (c) producing a point, which is a rather questionable classification (Ritchie 1979:106). Activities of type (b) and (c) are later called 'completed', activities of type (a) 'continuing'. We would call activities "with time duration specified" (Ritchie's type (c)) 'quantified events'. We would not conceptualize them as points and are doubtful about the application of the aspectual term 'completed'. Activities of type (a) like run would be a simple process (no tt, no tf) and so would live be, a semi-stative in Ritchie (1979). The last two are continuing in Ritchie so that either classification so far arrives at the same results - even though the classes may be somewhat dubious in Ritchie. There remain activities of type (b), which seem to correspond to quantified processes, but probably also encompass predicates like sneeze, cough, i.e. truly point-like events. Again, Ritchie (1979) suffers from lack of criteria. We only have the examples sleep and eat. Sleep and eat, unfortunately, are not quantified processes as one cannot 'have an eat' or 'produce a sleep'. For dialects which accept 'have a sleep', sleep is ambiguous as to its interpretation as a quantified or simple process, but still, the predicate does not seem to be quantified a priori. Ritchie's example, which motivated the completed vs. continuing distinction, involved the predicate sleep and has been shown to be at least open to either a tj or a threading and to prefer a threading when combined with a measure phrase (cf. examples (2.43) and (2.44) here). We therefore conclude that Ritchie's classification suffers from lack of criteria, and does not cover the facts. Note that even if we agree that we have a threading with sleep in combination with after, we still have two choices: we can classify sleep as a simple process which can be initiated and get the 'posterior to tj'-reading in combination with after by Hyp. 2.2', thus allowing the 'posterior to threading only as implicature, or we can classify sleep as ambiguous. The fact that the measure phrase attaches itself to tj is an argument in favour of the first choice (cf. example (2.44)). There is one other problem involved: Ritchie attaches the properties of being completed or continuing to verb concepts.35 But the very terms suggest aspectual notions, which quite naturally lead to the classification of progressives as continuing (which they certainly are). Schöpf (1984), however, does not treat progressive as an event notion, correctly in my 35 See our discussion in 2.3.1.3 concerning the problem of where to assign basic event notion.

101 view. In short, the progressive aspect can be seen as some sort of function that turns one event notion into another (he looked away - he was looking away). In Ritchie's terms tense would also have the effect of changing event notion, i.e. a change from continuing to completed in case of Past Perfect: (2.62ai) (2.62b)

After he was blue in the face... After he had been blue in the face...

Therefore we would prefer not to use the completed vs. continuing distinction in connection with event notion. Whether it could be useful on another level is another question. Event notions, however, give other kinds of information, information about process phases and (missing) endpoints. When we look at the contribution of event notion to the reading of o/ter-clauses, it is therefore more useful to distinguish quantified and unquantified events. This leaves us with the problem of having to specify the contribution of tense.

2.3.2 After and tense 2.3.2.1 Past Perfect in the after-clause As the Past Perfect, even in its most simple analysis, requires that the event in question is totally anterior to reference time (i.e. with no overlap), it follows that Past Perfect events are necessarily 'completed'. A Past Perfect therefore provides, or at least accentuates, tf and can be expected to combine well with after. We have seen that it does. It makes odd sentences involving progressives, states and simple processes acceptable, cf. (2.26a,b). On the other hand, some of these Past Perfects seem redundant in the sense that they add no new information about tf. This is the case with punctual events, quantified processes, quantified changes including accomplishments and also achievements. It does not hold for event notions which provide only tj or no point at all. Therefore we get a difference of interpretation (marked as #) with respect to a tj or tf reading in: 2.63a) 2.63b) 2.64a) 2.64b)

After the baby slept, she breathed more freely. # After the baby had slept, she breathed more freely. After the results improved, he danced a jig. # After the results had improved,he danced a jig.

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i2.65a) (2.65b)

After he was happy again, he liked to go to dances. # After he had been happy (for so long), he (still) liked to go to dances (even though he felt miserable).

The difference is sometimes only that the Past Perfect introduces the possibility of a tf reading, thus making two readings possible while the (a)-sentences have only one. In (2.66-71) we detect no important tj/tf difference (marked as =), though there may be other differences which we will discuss later: 2.66a) 2.66b) 2.67a) 2.67b 2.68a 2.68b 2.69a 2.69b 2.70a 2.70b 2.71a 2.7 lb)

After he sneezed, he blew his nose. = After he had sneezed, he blew his nose. After he walked for an hour, he returned home. = After he had walked for an hour, he returned home. After he laughed,he blew his nose. = After he had laughed, he blew his nose. After the vacuum improved, they took the data. = After the vacuum had improved, they took the data. After he ran a mile, he was exhausted. = After he had run a mile, he was exhausted. After he found a room, he called his wife. = After he had found a room, he called his wife.

Punctual changes are a neutralizing environment as well: (2.72a} (2.72a)

After he switched on the light, he walked to the bar. = After he had switched on the light, he walked to the bar.

But there is some doubt about those with the peculiar behaviour of the resultant state: (2.73a) (2.73b)

After he looked away, she smiled. ? = After he had looked away, she smiled.

While the (a)-sentence seems to say that she smiled after the time of his averting his glance, the (b)-sentence seems to be ambiguous between the (a)-reading and the reading where the resultant state of the averted glance is also over at the time at which she smiles. These results, though not wholly conclusive, at least do not contradict our approach and analysis of after. We should recall that we have postulated a presupposed RT for afterclauses and that we are now using it to explain the differences in meaning and that we have also found an explanation for those cases where no meaning difference arises. The Past Perfect reference time does not feature in the interpretation of the ß/ter-clause, after still only combines with a point provided by the event, but the presupposed reference time has helped to place that event and can, by inference, provide the information that the

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event has tf. In those cases where this information is redundant, we have no meaning difference. There is one phenomenon that is not captured by this analysis and that is the intuition that there is greater distance between the events in case of Past Perfects: (2.74a)

After they left, Mary slunk down the stairs.

was felt to be contiguously sequential, while (2.74b)

After they had left, Mary slunk down the stairs.

was seen as involving a greater distance as well as the factor of completion. This intuition gets substantial support from the fact that (2.75b) sounds much better than (2.75a): i2.75a) (2.75b)

?? Long after they left, Mary slunk down the stairs. Long after they had left, Mary slunk down the stairs.

If we substitute a quantified event without a resultant state, this opposition disappears, however. (2.76) is fully acceptable: (2.76)

Long after they telephoned, Mary slunk down the stairs.

On the other hand, we can have modifications expressing immediate sequence in all the cases, notably with leave and Past Perfect: (2.77)

A split second after he had left, the bomb exploded.

Therefore we should not look for a 'considerable distance' reading in after + Past Perfect, but try to find a way to explain the contiguously sequential inference in the case of after + Simple Past for quantified changes with resultant states. A promising path is the assumption that we have an implicature because we have ET « RT in the case of Simple Past and thus concentrate on the event itself, while the Past Perfect requires a reference point posterior to the event but probably interior to the resultant state, thus putting a certain distance, filled by the resultant state, between the two times. Before we have another look at the whole o/ter-structure, i.e. take the main clause event and tense into consideration as well, let us say something about other tenses.

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2.3.2.2 After and Present Perfect A Present Perfect in the after-clause must be expected to be somewhat problematic because it often involves the resultant state of the event and therefore cannot be expected to provide clearly defined points for after to choose as arguments. Now observe the following: (2.78a) (2.78b) (2.78c)

After he's been to Paris, he'll go to London. ? After he's been to Paris, he only drinks French wines. * After he 's been to Paris, he onfy drank French wines.

These examples open up an interesting point: after + Present Perfect can obviously not specify a past reference frame, cf. (2.78c), and (2.78b) can only have a non-specific reading in the sense of whenever. The inability to establish a past frame could mean that after here completely discounts the event as the possible source of argument points. In (2.78c) the after-event could be in the past - all other assumptions lead directly to unacceptability and if in the past, it should be unproblematic as the source of an anchor. But it isn't, which is perhaps to be seen more clearly in (2.79a-c): (2.79a) (2.79b) (2.79c)

After he 's committed his first offence, he ΊΙ be taken into the gang. After he's committed his first offence, a man is marked. * After Bob 's committed his first offence, he panicked.

We can explain these examples by saying that after + Present Perfect defines an interval beginning at speech time. In (2.79b) we have a reading where an assessment at speech time is made of the general validity of committing an offence being the cause of some other state-of-affairs. And (2.79c), which does not involve an 'experiential perfect' as (2.78c) might, again shows that we cannot count from the event. If speech time is involved, however, we could also say that after counts from reference time in this case: after S : = {χ : χ > r of e, where e is the event involved in S and S is a Present Perfect sentence} This then is another reason to provide the subclause RT in the first place. Note that because of (2.79c) we cannot count from the event and let the main clause tense do the rest. 2.3.2.3 Future tense and Present tense We have already mentioned that after cannot combine with so-called Simple Future and explained this by means of the presupposition of fact which seems to be better expressed

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with a Simple Present (albeit with future meaning). That a Simple Present o/fer-clause necessarily requires a future time main clause, can be explained by the fact that either the subclause event is already in the future, so after S opens a posterior interval, even farther in the future, or, in case of an event overlap with ST we still have the strict > ST inference through the use of after and a requirement which proves necessary for other reasons as well: tj is included in r for event notions that are only initially determined. Then any overlap of ST and the main clause reference time is impossible, and Present Tense is blocked. 2.3.3 Main clauses and o/fcr-clauses 2.3.3.1 Event-overlap or sequence Our suggested treatment was to require only that the reference time of the main clause is framed by the interval specified in the after-clause. This treatment is, of course, only viable if we have more than the Reichenbachian suggestion that event time and reference time coincide for Simple Past, though the case of tenses where event time and reference time follow each other can be left as it is. For 'coincidence'-tenses we need to have rules that specify the exact relation of event time and reference time, depending not only on tense but also on event notion. So far we have been content to assume the rather broad regularity that there is a reference time r anterior to speech time and that for Simple Past this reference time 'coincides' with the event time e in the following manner: e c r for achievements and accomplishments, r c e for states, activities and progressives. This is essentially the rule Hinrichs (1981) suggests for Simple Past - assuming his predicate classes. With the considerations we have already put forward concerning the event notions discussed in Schöpf (1984), we can easily give the following specification: A. e c r for punctual events, punctual changes, fully quantified processes, quantified changes including accomplishments, achievements; B. r £ e for states and simple processes (and progressives, if progressives are treated as states with respect to their event notion);

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B.i. r £ e with r covering an initial interval of e for states, processes and changes which (through pragmatic considerations) are initially determined. We see that we have cut through the class of activities in distinguishing simple and quantified activities. We also need the addition of Bi. for the reasons given above and because of: (2.80a) (2.80b) (2.80c)

The results improved at ten. The results improved yesterday. The results improved yesterday and are still doing so.

The two readings we get for (2.80b) are due to the ambiguity of event notion, though there seems to be an implicature which sees yesterday as a frame and thus prefers the fully quantified reading for results improve. That this is implicature is proved by (2.80c). But more investigation would be welcome. Let us now go back to Ritchie's table and the only basic distinction he requires for main clauses, that of point and interval. This seems to reflect roughly the e c r and r c e distinction because the e c r requirement seems to contract and lead to a pointlike conceptualization of the event. We will, therefore, have to inquire whether we are not overdetermining the factors by adding information about r, even the location of r in the case of initially determined states, processes and changes (see the previous discussion). The difficulty now is that the 'point' and 'interval' labels are only another way of making the completed/continuing distinction (Ritchie 1979: lOOf., 103) and have nothing whatever to do with predicate phases: accomplishments are points! Point and interval are therefore, to say the least, unfortunate terms. Our distinction, on the other hand, provides the link with the other components of the system, the general frame function of adverbs and the analysis of tenses. We will, therefore, now test the workings of our rules by running through some examples, testing especially the possible overlap of events in the case of r S e events in the main clause. The (a)-examples all admit a tj-reading of the α/fer-clause though they tend to be corrected into once-clauses or take on an interpretation involving a fully quantified, not a simple, process. The (b)-examples have uncontroversial tj-readings.

107 2.81a 2.81b 2.82a 2.82b 2.83a 2.83a 2.84a 2.84b 2.85a 2.85b

After After After After After After After After After After

he ran, he clapped his hands. he reached the goal, he clapped his hands. he ran, he laughed. he reached the goal, he laughed. the valve worked, the vacuum improved. they closed the valve, the vacuum improved. the computer worked, they solved the problem. they made the diagram, they solved the problem. the text-system worked, they wrote the letter. they made the drawing, they wrote the letter.

This list of examples shows that our distinction works - so far! Though quantified events and accomplishments involve periods of time, we arrive at the correct readings via the 'frame for main clause r'-rule and the e c r specification for these events in the Simple Past. In all the (a)-sentences the reading that the main clause event follows the tj of the after-event is possible by these rules, and we can let the pragmatics make the choice as to whether we have a true t-reading, i.e. one with event-overlap, or tend to a have a t^reading and event-sequence after all. The (b)-sentences only have readings with no eventoverlap, and this is exactly what our rules predict. Let us therefore run through examples of the other group. Here we postpose the t-clause because the examples somehow 'sound' better that way. One of the problems seems to be that with a preposed t-clause a causal connection and thus a reading with the state beginning after the t-clause event is over is more normal. However, I think that most of the examples also work with preposed t-clauses as the argument about the addition of still shows. On the whole, I have neglected the problem of the effect of post- or preposing t-clauses because this effect does not seem to be a purely semantic one, the reader may judge whether it plays a role in the overlap/no-overlap decisions - provided one disregards a possible cause-effect relation: 2.86a} 2.86b) 2.86a ) 2.86b') 2.87a) 2.87b) 2.87a ) 2.87b') 2.88a) 2.88b^ 2.88a ) 2.88b') 2.89a) 2.89b) 2.89a ) 2.89b')

The grass was wet after he ran. The grass was wet after he ran a mile. After he ran the grass was wet. After he ran a mile the grass was wet. * He was intelligent after he worked harder. * He was intelligent after he solved the problem. * After he worked harder he was intelligent. * After he solved the problem he was intelligent. It was raining after he walked. It was raining after he reached the station. After he walked it was raining. After he reached the station it was raining. He ran after she ran. He ran after she ran a mile. After she ran he ran. After she ran a mile he ran.

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2.90a) 2.90b) 2.90a ) 2.90b j

The results improved after they worked harder. The results improved after they made the flow-chart. After they worked harder the results improved. After they made the flow chart the results improved.

It has been claimed (Harkness 1985:336) that "the event in the main clause must permit location on the time axis posterior to another time and must therefore be able to be assigned a t;" [presumably posterior to that other time]. This is not the whole story, however. By the addition of still in the main clause, we can easily see that such a tj can, but does not have to be assigned and quite often is not: a state can be in effect anterior to tj or tf of the o/ter-clause event. We thus can have (2.86c) and (2.86c'): f2.86c) (2.86c )

The grass was still wet after he ran. After she ran the grass was still wet.

without a contradiction. (2.86b) shows that a state can be in effect earlier than the afterevent tf, notably during the period of the after-event. The same holds for progressives, which are, however, ruled as bad or unacceptable by some speakers. This shows that so far, our rules 2.2 and 2.2' with r c {χ : χ > t; of after-event e} for the (a)-examples and r c {x : χ > tf of after-event e} for the (b)-examples and the r c e analysis for states does not produce wrong results. Note that we do not get any necessary order of the beginnings of the events. This seems strange and at first makes one want to clamour for some restriction. Compare however: The grass was wet before he ran. After he had run a mile, it was still wet. In this case the grass is wet before the start, during the running and after a mile is completed. A problem for states are those that are co-extensive. Our analysis would not block (2.87a,b). But now observe that this particular event notion does not combine well with any kind of true frame adverb and not with pointadverbs either: (2.9 la)

(2.9 lb)

* He was intelligent yesterday.

* He was intelligent at ten ο 'clock. *

On the other hand, addition of still makes the sentence acceptable:

36 The examples (2.87a,b) and (2.91a,b) become acceptable if one assumes the construction of an intelligent robot or the use of an intelligence drug, because then we would not have a necessarily large RT. Harkness (1985) suggests another explanation, namely the fact that t; is not assignable for co-extensive states, but is assignable in examples which have been altered in the above sense. I believe, that the unassignability of tj for co-extensive states is the result of the condition such states put on their RT.

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(2.9 Ic)

He was still intelligent after they brain-washed him.

Obviously, the r c e analysis is in need of revision for this event notion. We probably have to assume e = r with r all time, a lifespan or a large part of one. Thus the event would resist being squeezed into any kind of smaller frame and require being stretched out of it. This general revision makes it possible to drop the clause about co-extensive states from Hyp. 2.2'. With simple processes we also run into problems because of the simple form/progressive choice: (2.89c) (2.89d)

* He still ran after she ran. He was still running after she ran.

Therefore we might generally have to interpret simple processes combined with frame adverbs as initially determined: (2.92a) (2.92b)

* He still ran yesterday. He was still running yesterday.

(provided we speak of one uninterrupted activity, not the ability and not the habit). Then we will also have to postulate that their r is an initial subinterval of the whole event, cf. above. The same seems to be necessary for initially determined changes, as the examples (2.90a,b) enriched with still are decidedly worse than their progressive correlates (even with help from pragmatics): (2.92c) (2.92d)

? The results still improved after they worked less. The results were still improving after they worked less.

With the requirement that r be the initial subinterval of an initially determined change or process when combined with a frame adverb, we now get the correct results in a systematic fashion through the interplay of an analysis of event notion, tense rules, frame adverbs, and the conjunction specific frame.37 We have also shown that though most of the 'tj of main clause event posterior to tf (or tj) of after-clause event'-readings are cases of implicature (cf. Heinämäki 1978:110), not all of them are, or at least not of conversational implicature. Differences in interpretation arising through the choice of the simple and the progressive form are either semantic entail37 Note that Heinämäki's rule cannot explain in a systematic way the difference arising from the combination of an after-clause, with a state like be wet and an initially determined change like improve.

110 ment or conventional implicature. Here, too, investigation would be welcome.

2.3.3.2 Past Perfect in the main clause As has variously been pointed out, frame adverbs frame reference time unambiguously in the case of Simple Past and Simple Present, but are ambiguous in interpretation as to event-frame or reference-frame with Past Perfects: (2.93)

He had come home yesterday.

(2.94)

He had come home after Anna left.38

For

we seem to prefer the event-frame reading because in (2.94a)

Two minutes after Anna left, he had come home.

the measure phrase does not count towards the Past Perfect reference time, but towards the event. But even here we find exceptions, though the examples might be considered contrived: (2.95)

- So he was still on the road when it happened? - Yes...No, wait. You say it must have happened exactly ten minutes after she left. Well, he was here then. Ten minutes after she left he had already come home.

In this case ten minutes after she left clearly defines the reference time, the event of coming home is to be located earlier - otherwise the alibi is not much good. In cases where both clauses carry the Past Perfect, we can assume that the reference time has been determined by context and the subclause is therefore 'free' to frame the event. All this leads to a slight revision of the frame-part of rule I.I: with a) r c A', b) r = A' for punctual A and in case of Past Perfect in p: 38 Note that these cases are contradictory if analysed with 'the same reference time' view - unless one lets tense be determined by a basic configuration of ET, RT and ST and then allows systematically restricted transformations on these configurations so that the final configuration no longer indicates the tense relations, as Hornstein (1977) does. We have discussed the disadvantages of this system, where ST, ET and RT are emptied of their intuitive semantic content in 1.5.2.

Ill

a) r c A', b) r = A' for punctual A or

c) e c A', d) e = A' for punctual A. 2.3.4 Measure phrases We have used the possibility of measure phrase modification to illustrate various points so often that it is time to specify what the measure phrase does. Intuitively this is clear: if after S specifies the interval {χ: χ > t, t = tj or tf of the S-event}, then x-time after S specifies that point of this interval that is x-time posterior to t. Thus the measure phrase makes a point-adverb out of a frame adverb. This point still specifies the reference time: (2.96)

Two minutes after he left, she was in a terrible state.

As before, r is located in the event interval for states, states expressed in the progressive aspect, and initially determined changes. For simple processes and quantified event notions, we get the usual results for combinations with point-adverbials: 2.97a} 2.97b) 2.97c) 2.97d)

Two minutes after Two minutes after Two minutes after Two minutes after

he left, he left, he left, he left,

she laughed. she ran (began to run). she wrote the letter (began to write). she reached the station.

We have no problems in case of punctual events (including achievements) and get a re-interpretation into an initially determined process in the other cases. What we would like to achieve, therefore, is not only a semantic rule that specifies two minutes after six (or two minutes after S) as that point t with t in {χ: χ > 6} and t - 6 = 2 minutes, but something that shows that with the interval we are running through all the possible distances counting from six, which can be specified by filling in information about the specific distance involved. We will therefore write the interval in a different fashion: Let 'a' be a constant denoting a time, *x' and y be variables. Then after a = {x:a + y = x and y any length of time}. In this fashion we cover the whole stretch of time posterior to 'a',39 and with a constant 'b' 39 Imagine the variable y starting to run at the point 'a' towards right hand infinity and thus reaching or passing all points 'χ* posterior to 'a'.

112 in place of y, i.e. with a specified distance, we get: b-time after a = {x : a + b = x}. This, of course, gives a fixed value, and we have arrived at the value simply by filling the variable y with a specific value 'b', the distance specified by the measure phrase. As this seems to be a neat solution, we will alter our rules accordingly, now incorporating all the revisions and details we have collected. We arrive at a set of rules that show how the system as a whole works. A TENSE RULE.

First we put down the rule for the relation of e and r in the Simple Past (PAST) depending on event notion: M«b,C,I P r ·= (PAST) p iff M.!>>C,r t= p with e < s and r < s and e » r in the fol_ lowing manner: a) e c r for punctual events, punctual changes, fully quantified processes, fully quantified changes (accomplishments) and achievements b) r c e for states and simple processes b.i) r c e with r an initial interval of e for initially determined processes, changes and pragmatically so determined states b.ii) r = e and r 'large', maximally the lifetime of the subject for co-extensive states. A FRAME RULE.

Second, we amend the simple frame rule I of Part 1: For frame adverbs A and A' the denotation of A in the model AT M

s,e,r "· A(P) iff Ms,e,r * P and

in the case of Past Perfect in p i. a) r c A', b) r = A' for punctual A

or c) e c A(', d) e = A' for punctual A ii. a) r c A', b) r = A1 for punctual A in other cases.

113

Now the rules are already capable of explaining a) the cases with Past Perfect in the main clause and b) the general resistance of co-extensive states to frame rules - the specification is built in and therefore superfluous in further rules: frames that are too narrow are impossible. AFTER-RULES.

Hyp. 2.2' now reads as: Hyp.2.2" a) after S = {x : t + y = x with y > 0, where the S-event e features only the point t, i.e. e is a punctual event, punctual change or achievement or an event notion which has only tj as inherent point } b) after 5 = {x : tf of e + y = χ with y > 0, where e is the S-event and e is fully quantified, i.e. a quantified process or change } c) after S = {χ : tj of e + y = χ with y > 0, where e is the S-event and e has no inherent point, but can be reinterpreted as initially determined} d) after S is undefined in cases where the event e of S has no inherent point and cannot be reinterpreted as having such a point. With Hyp. 2.2'' and the information about the effect of Present and Past Perfect, we now reformulate rules 2.1' and 2.III.

2.1" after S denotes the interval {x : t + y = x with y > 0} where t is: i. the only point marked in the event notion and the tense of S, ii. tf of the event in the case of a) quantified events and changes b) a Past Perfect in the after-clause iii. another point, i.e. a) tj of the event if the event notion has no inherent point but can be reinterpreted as having one and is not marked with a Past Perfect b) r of S in case of Present Perfect in S (and possibly also for some S-progressives). Combining the frame rule and 2.1", we arrive at:

114

2.III' , 9 „, J _, 1= S' after S iff there are e,r,s with s = s' and M s e r |= SandA/ s , e, r, N S' and r1 c = { : t + y'='x with y > 0 } and I is the denotation of after S in MS e r where t is chosen according to rule 2.1" - or in the case of e 1 < r1 < s':r'c l o r e ' c I. 2.4 Before We have treated after in some detail so as to show the problems of the specific conjunction and the problems of the background theory, i.e. the assumptions about the workings of frames, tenses and event notions. We will deal much more summarily with before, giving real attention only to the problem cases. We will also treat first and foremost the so-called factual before. Something will be said later about the non-factual case. 2.4.1 In quest of the 'point-from-which': before and event notion First we will look briefly at other authors' treatment. 2.4.1.1 Heinämäki As the rule for before Heinämäki gives: A before B is true...iff (i) A is true at some interval I (ii) B is true at some interval K, and (iii) tr(I) < t;(K), where tr is again her "reference point of an interval", i.e. tf for accomplishments and 11 t; in all other cases.an Just as for after, Heinämäki claims that all three event-types (non-duratives, accomplishments, duratives) are possible in both main and subclause. What is interesting is that unlike other authors (Miller/Johnson-Laird (1976), Ritchie (1979)), she does not claim that before orders the beginnings of the two events and the rest is implicature. In the rule she gives, the beginnings are the crucial points only when the events in both clauses are duratives: (2.98a) (2.98b)

Our dog was barking before the neighbour's was. The lawn was wet before the terrace was.

40 Notational emendations, especially the replacement of the respective intervals I and K for the sentences or events A and B in (iii) were necessary. Compare Heinämäki (1978:49).

115

Main clause accomplishments end anterior to t} of the subclause event by the tr(I) < tj(K) specification: (2.99)

Mark built a sailboat before he knew how to sail.41

For the following two sentences Heinämäki (1978:50) observes that there are speakers who get an 'anterior to tf of subclause' reading and suggests a tr(I) < tr(K) rule for this dialect: (2. lOOa) (2.100b)

Mark built a sailboat before he wrote a novel Mark was in Egypt before he wrote a novel

2.4.1.2 Ritchie Ritchie (1979) works with the term "end-limit" in the case of before, meaning that before S specifies an interval that is bounded on the right-hand side and can serve as a true frame. He gives the following tables: binder before

type of bound clause any i.e. completed or continuing

bound-clause category end-limit i.e. only before

descriptor category

main clause category any i.e. point or interval

end-limit

end point used start of process

relation start precedes p, where p is the boundclause interval

This shows that Ritchie strictly adheres to the 'main clause tj precedes subclause tj'-theory. By analysing completed main clauses as points and classifying his predicates as completed and continuing, he quite naturally gets the reading 'tf anterior to t;' in (2.99) and (2.100a). His is a simpler approach than Heinämäki's therefore, and is also closer to ours. We do not distinguish between completed/continuing and point/interval, but we do distinguish between quantified and unquantified events and have the ensuing e c r and r c e specification.

41 There are some doubts as to the interpretation of this sentence. Know as a state does not have tj. The interpretation Heinämäki envisages seems to be something in which the end of the learning process implies the beginning of knowing. In this sense her interpretation is probably correct.

116

What remains to be done, therefore, is to test whether we can agree with the claim that before takes t; of the subclause event as its anchor/'point-from-which' in all cases, and then see what happens in combination with the e Q r and r c e distinction.

2.4.1.3 Evaluation In our discussion of after, we checked through the event notions and found that, although after would 'like' tf, it often has to 'content' itself with tj because event notions like simple processes can be reinterpreted as initially determined but hardly ever as finally determined. The same holds for states when seen in their pragmatic context: we found that a Past Perfect and other factors can provide the final point, but we also found that there are no cases where we have tf as the prominent point in the absence of a) its inherence in the event notion, b) a Past Perfect, c) a lexicalization through stop, finish, cease. If we transfer this to before, we see that here matters are simpler. Before certainly prefers tj (cf. before lunch) and t; is always provided, either inherently or through reinterpretation of the event notion. In other words, there are no event notions with tf but no t;. In:

(2.101)

He knew how to sail before he finished building the boat.

we get an interpretation where the tf of building the boat is the point in question, but we are not dealing with the accomplishment 'build the boat', we are dealing with the lexicalization of one particular point (which happens to be tf of the complement), and therefore we have the unproblematic One-point' case. The same applies to cases with achievements: (2.102)

He knew how to sail before they reached Port Said.

Though the prominent point in achievements is the end-point of the presupposed process phase, we decided to treat them as punctual events and as such they are unproblematic. These examples, however, have shown that it might be misleading not to distinguish punctual events and other events in the fte/ore-rule. To call the point involved in before he finished building the boat the "start of the process" as Ritchie does is at least confusing.

117 To complete our check, we have to take a quick look at quantified processes and changes: (2.103a)

He ate his meal before he read for two hours.

Though some people read during their meals, the only possible interpretation here is that the person referred to finished eating before starting to read. Measure phrases which might prove the point conclusively sound curiously awkward, if not completely wrong with quantified events like read for two hours: (2.103b)

? He ate his meal

some time ten minutes

before he read for two hours.

The awkwardness is due to the fact that for two hours is not a TA: it does not locate the event on the time axis, but only gives its duration. Therefore the end-points could be anywhere - provided they are two hours apart - and cannot serve as 'points-from-which' for the measure-phrase. With more context, perhaps an established schedule or a habit, a reference point could be provided and the event could be placed and then the measure phrase clearly counts from the beginning, not the end. Other quantified events are not so problematic: (2.103c)

He stared at her, a second before he smiled.

And quantified changes are unproblematic: (2.104a} (2.104b)

He checked the pump before the vacuum improved. He checked the pump, a quarter of an hour before the vacuum improved.

The measure phrase counts backwards from tj of the feefore-clause in (2.103c) and (2.104a,b). The only events where we might be in doubt are accomplishments. Here, the event notion, though having tj and tf, stresses tf because it needs the completion of the process phase to make the whole event true. These are exactly the cases where Heinämäki allows the 'anterior to threading: (2.105a) (2.105b)

John wrote a novel before he built the sailboat. John wrote a novel two months before he built the sailboat.

118 Still, the 'anterior to tj'-reading seems to be preferable, at least for those speakers who have the opposition 'anterior to tj/anterior to tf' in (2.106a,b): (2.106a) (2.106b)

John finished his cigarette before he wrote the letter. John finished his cigarette before he had written the letter.

We will say more about this opposition later and will content ourselves for the present with a be/bre-rule like:

2.II' before S denotes the interval {x: t - y = with y > 0} where t is ) the only point marked in the event notion and the tense of S, (ii) the initial point of the event in the case of quantified processes and quantified changes or the initial point created through a re-interpretation of a state or simple process as initially determined events. This rule will be augmented later.42 2.4.2 Main clauses Let us first check what our e c r and r c e distinction gives. For accomplishments, punctual events and changes and achievements, we get the same results as Ritchie and Heinämäki, and probably slightly better ones than they do for quantified processes and other kinds of processes. (The reader is invited to check.) Like Heinämäki we get results for these event notions whereby not only the start precedes the tj of the before-evenl, but even the whole main clause event precedes it, including tf. Ritchie' s system gives the same result because in his analysis completed predicates (e.g. accomplishments) are to be seen as points and then, of course, tj = tf. As some of the completed predicates, accomplishments in particular, have ti? a process phase, and tf = tj, his simplification and formulation is misleading, to say the least. The critical reader will already have noticed that with r c e for states and simple processes in the main clause and the analysis of before S as a frame adverb, we get only the main clause r preceding tj of the fte/ore-event and know nothing whatsoever about the start or end of the state (or simple process) itself. Ritchie and Heinämäki are in agreement that 42 Note that the time of birth in co-extensive states cannot serve as the 'point-from-which' in before-c\auses: ?? His mother was very unhappy before he was bom and intelligent.

119

states and simple processes do not necessarily end anterior to tj of the fte/ore-event. But they formulate their rules as if we necessarily have an initial point that precedes the tj of the before-eveni (tr(I) is tj in the case of duratives). I am not sure whether we necessarily have to reinterpret states and simple processes into initially determined ones. If (2.107) is acceptable: (2.107)

He was very musical before he lost his hearing.

and we do not want to fix tj of being musical as a person's time of birth, the only thing that can be deduced is that there was a time at which he was musical and that this time is anterior to the one described in the fte/bre-clause. An interpretation that arrives at "he started to be musical anterior to losing his hearing" seems rather absurd.43 From the two conditions r c e and r precedes tj of the oe/bre-event, however, we can deduce that the point of entering into a state or simple process - if such a point can be taken to exist pragmatically - necessarily precedes the tj of the fte/ore-event. The point of entry is created in the case of measure-phrase modification with a simple process in the main clause: (2.108)

He ran five minutes before the alarm went off.

As discussed with after, this is due to the fact that two hours before/after S does not describe an interval, but a point, and simple processes are mostly reinterpreted as initially determined when combined with a punctual adverbial. This is not so for states, of course: (2.109a} (2.109b;

The grass was already wet two hours before dark. The grass was already wet at ten ο 'clock.

To sum up, we do not always have a 'tj anterior to tj'-reading and those readings for simple processes and states that can be quantified are due to deduction and implicature. If beforeclauses are seen as elliptical for 'measure phrase' + before then some 't; precedes tj'-interpretations can be explained by the general combinatorial potential of event notions with point adverbials. We will, therefore, not require a 't; anterior to t;'-reading for durative main clauses in our oe/ore-rule, but will rely on the interplay of rules and pragmatics. Our approach is also able to handle Past Perfect main clauses by a) allowing the eventframe reading alongside the reference-frame reading and b) taking account of the fact that a Past Perfect stresses the completion of the event in question by virtue of its location an43 The frame given by before-dsa&es, however, agrees with co-extensive states.

120 terior to a reference time. For Past Perfect main clauses we have rather clear t^anterior-to-tj interpretations: 2.1 lOal

Ϊ2.110b)

He had built the boat before he wrote the novel He had been sick before he sent for his son.

In the case of reference time modification we get these readings quite easily, because em < rm and rm c A' where A' is an interval bounded on the right by t; of the beforeevent. In the case of event modification, however, we cannot use the main clause RT for the argument, we do not know where this is. But the em c A' variety of the frame rule, by virtue of the strict inclusion in the frame, also guarantees that the main clause event ends anterior to the t-clause tj. The tf-anterior-to-tj reading gets further support from the fact that a Past Perfect stresses tf so that it would be rather pointless to introduce this point and then not use it. If, on the other hand, there are doubts about the t^anterior-to-tj reading of (2.11 Ob), then we might have to revise the frame rule so that em c A' and a situation like: e

m

before- frame

e

t 1

ι

-t

becomes possible. We would then have to rely on implicature for the given tf-readings, wherefore I prefer the first alternative. But more arguments, examples and interpretations would be welcome. 2.4.2.1 Other tenses in the main clause fie/ore-clauses like other t-clauses show a certain reluctance to combine two 'different' tenses.44 This can be explained by the general reluctance of, for example, the Present Perfect to combine with (past) frame adverbs, though some rare cases of event modification might exist: (2.111)

/ have been in London · ???long before you were there.45

44 Cf. Edgren (1972:113), For Edgren, however, Past Perfect and Simple Past are not 'different' tenses, nor are Present Perfect and Simple Present. Past and Present, Past and Future, etc. are considered 'different'. 45 It is clear that this example does not show a complex clause, so that the strange combination of Present Perfect and Simple Past and also the change in view point can be explained by ellipsis: / have been in London. And that was long before you were there.

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The problem here is not only the past frame for a Present Perfect, but the strange change in View point' - another reason to postulate a subclause reference time. Heinämäki claims, correctly, that tense clash is due to the fact that oe/ore-structures disallow a speech point in between the two times ordered by the conjunction: (2.112a) (2.112b)

* / left before Lucy comes. /'// leave before Lucy comes.

Unlike the case of after, we cannot argue that we are dealing with a present frame. The frame, bounded by Lucy's coming on the right, might stretch (indefinitely) into the past, so that a Past tense main clause is not a priori blocked. Note that (2.112c), said at ten o'clock in the morning of the same day on which I left at nine o'clock, is also very strange: (2.112c)

/ left before noon.

The explanation (though different from Heinämäki's) has to do with the speech point. The speech point is so prominent a parameter in every utterance that it does not make sense to look farther than this point for a right-hand bound for an event that is in the past. Applied to a Present tense öe/bre-clause, the prominence of the speech point provides a lower (a left-hand) bound for the frame. Before S then defines a full frame with the point of speech as lower and the tj of the before-event as upper bound. The same, properly modified, applies to after. (2.113)

•She'll come after I left.

So we have to add something about the bound provided by the speech point either in the rules themselves or, in a fully-fledged theory, in a pragmatic component which lists the implicatures. For now, we will content ourselves with mentioning the possible implicature and will not incorporate the speech point boundaries into the rule. On the whole we see that the frame approach and the special properties of the beforeframe explain the interpretation of the whole structure, provided one works with a detailed analysis of tense and event notion. 2.4.3 Tenses in the £>e/bre-clause We have left consideration of the influence of parameters other than event notion on the

122 interpretation of the particular frame given by the before-daase to the last, because this seems to involve factors that are not yet fully understood. So far we have only treated the case of the Present tense in the oe/bre-clause and the change it works on the kind of frame - i.e. the introduction (by implicature) of a lower bound. 2.4.3.1 Present Perfect In the case of Present Perfect, we get the same behaviour as with after: (2.114a) (2.114b) (2.114c)

Before he's committed his first act of violence, an inmate is treated with good will Before he's committed his first act of violence, he 11 be left alone. * Before Bob's committed his first act of violence, he asked to see the warden,

As with after, before cannot take the subclause event as the source of the argument point, because then (2.114c) would not be blocked. It cannot take the reference point (speech point) as after did, because then (2.114c) would probably be blocked, and (2.114a,b) certainly would. (2.114a) and (2.114b), however, seem to establish a frame, bounded by the point of speech on the left-hand (!) side and the subclause event on the right-hand (!) side, thus placing this event in the future. Note that before he commits does the same, i.e. with before and a Present or Present Perfect subclause we get a true future subclause event and a full frame : [s, t; of e]. The whole seems to be a kind of reflection, with s (speech point) as the axis: before he's committed commit the offence

s

This 'reflection' might be the effect of the need for reinterpretation in case of Present Perfect events. We can deduce that a past event can serve as anchor for before only if not given in the Present Perfect mode, i.e. without the s (ST) view point. If we have this ST reference and view-point, it serves as axis of reflection and we take the event as located in the future. This does not explain why the 'logically' better (2.114d) sounds decidedly worse than

123

(2.114d)

* Before he will have committed his first offence, he ΊΙ be left alone.

2.4.3.2 Past Perfect in the fte/ore-clause We have already seen that the choice of a Simple Past or a Past Perfect in the subclause influences the choice of argument for the conjunction. In the case of α/ter-clauses a Past Perfect led to the completion reading and we found environments of neutralization, i.e. environments where the Past Perfect operated on an already quantified event notion with tf and thus could not add more information about this point. These same environments of neutralization for after lead to meaning differences with before (before I read the letter/before I had read the letter) so that tests with different event notions were made. These tests showed first and foremost that many speakers, notably from America and Australia, do not have any difference at all, and that those who have differences do not agree as to interpretation and occurrence. Let us recall the 'theory': with a Past Perfect in the subclause (the "unnormal" case with before, cf. 1.5.2.) we have to assume a subclause reference point that explains the tense choice. This reference point is either tf of the event, or, as has been claimed elsewhere, is minimally posterior to it, or it provides tf by entailment, because the event has to precede the reference time for a Past Perfect completely. Unlike in the case of after, however, the conjunction itself does not look for t^ i.e. there is no additional pressure towards a tf-interpretation from the combination with the conjunction. This is a step towards an explanation of why states and simple processes in the Past Perfect could combine well with after but are unacceptable or at least odd with before: (2.115)

? He became famous before he had been happy.

We can pin down the problem like this: if the event notion is unable to provide an inherent tf, there is a conflict. Before tends to force a reinterpretation into an initially determined event and would like the ensuing tj as an argument, but the Past Perfect stresses tf. Without the support of the event notion for one of the readings this conflict seems to be insurmountable and leads to unacceptability. An accomplishment on the other hand, that is, an event notion for which tf is the important point, together with the Past Perfect gives enough weight to tf so that before can (but does not have to) pick this tf as its anchor:

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(2.116a) (2.116b)

He dropped the letter before he had read it. He dropped the letter before he read it.

Speakers who have a difference in interpretation here agree that in (2.116a) the letter can have been dropped during the process of reading, i.e. anterior to its completion. With other quantified events responses were widely diverse, even among British speakers who consistently distinguish Simple Past and Past Perfect. Some did not detect any difference at all, others found the same difference as in (2.116a) and (2.116b) and still others found sentences like (2.117a) rather odd. (2.117a} (2.117b)

(?) He rested before he had run for an hour. He rested before he ran for an hour.

For the dialect which detects oddity, we can argue in the same way as for states: a quantified process like run for an hour provides t{ as well as tf with no preference, so that before and Past Perfect create the same conflict. Those who have the 'before completion' reading obviously feel that tf gets enough weight through the Past Perfect to be the anchor for before. In the case of punctual events we would not expect any possible meaning difference, because tj = tf in any case. The surprising fact is that no meaning difference was detected with states in the main clause, but with quantified events in the main clause the Past Perfect sentence was often given an interpretation of 'incomplete' or 'unexpectedly early', thus differentiating it from the Simple Past sentence: 2.1 ISa) 2.118b) 2.118c) 2.118d)

She was unhappy before he had knocked. She was unhappy before he knocked. She laughed before he had knocked. She laughed before he knocked.

The component of 'unexpectedly early' is notable also with achievements: (2.119a} (2.119b)

The shot rang out before he had reached the door. The shot rang out before he reached the door.

There was agreement among informants that in the cases where a meaning difference arises, the Simple Past makes the event more blob-like, while a Past Perfect (by stressing tf) keeps the awareness of the event phases. It seems rather early to try to explain these observations by capturing them in a formal

125 46

analysis of Past Perfect and Simple Past. What we can deduce, however, is that event notion is something very basic on which other parameters operate. We can also deduce that basic temporal operators like after and before, which divide the time line in a similar fashion to the basic tenses (the only difference being that they are not deictic), are as influential as the tenses with regard to their operation on event notion. The best model would therefore be to let tense and the basic conjunctions work simultaneously on the input of event notion. A processing model can do that, in our rule system we have to content ourselves with having before reject some contexts, notably those that provide either no point at all or offer a tf which is tense induced only.47 Here too, we have made use of the subclause reference time, otherwise we would not be able to explain where tf comes from, and we have attempted to find neutralizing factors the conjunction together with event notion and tense explained some of the different/not different cases. But we also found that the main clause event notion can influence whether the interpretation is different or not different. We have to admit, therefore, that the factors involved are not totally understood. Nevertheless, we will now formulate the rule for before:

2.II' Before S denotes the interval {x : t - y = χ with y > 0} where t is: (i) the only point marked in the event notion and the tense in S, (ii) the initial point of the event in case of quantified processes and quantified changes or the induced initial point created through a reinterpretation of a state or simple process as initially determined, (iii) the final point of the S-event in case tense and event notion mark

V Before S is undefined if either there is no such point provided, or tj and tf are provided by event notion and tf is marked by tense. 2.4.4 Non-factual before One notable difference between the conjunctions after and before is the use of before in so46 In other cases we found that Past Perfect leads to a point or blob interpretation so that a full rule will certainly not be trivial. 47 Saying that before rejects certain contexts or requires appropriate contexts amounts to saying that we would have to add contextual presuppositions to the model we have (roughly) used so far. Cf. Introduction.

126

called non-factual and counterfactual sentences: (2.120a.} (2.120b)

Put it down before you hurt yourself. Max died before he saw his grandchildren.

Anscombe (1964) and Lakoff (1972) have postulated two lexemes beforej and before2 which behave differently with respect to the presupposition of the subclause.48 Heinämäki (1972, 1978) argues convincingly that we do not need two lexemes, but can infer the factual and non-factual readings from the information we get in main and subclause. In (2.120b) we would get a blatant contradiction about the facts of the world if we presuppose the subclause proposition to be true. So we deduce that Max did not see his grandchildren in the actual world. The contradiction seems a sufficient condition for nonfactual readings. A necessary condition is that there is a causal or other connection between the events, i.e. that the main clause event can influence the world in such a way as to make the subclause event improbable (cf. Heinämäki 1978:52). So on the one hand, there are sentences like (2.121a), where we tend towards a factual interpretation because the events are normally not causally connected, while (2.121b) on the other hand, though ambiguous, tends towards a counterfactual reading because there is a causal connection and there are sentences like (2.121c) which remain neutral, i.e. ambiguous, because the context is not specific enough to resolve the ambiguity (Sue might have met Sam on her way home, for instance). (2.12 la) (2.121b) (2.121 c)

Harry blew his nose before the policeman gave him a ticket. Harry put money in the parking meter before the policeman gave him a ticket. Sue left the party before she punched Sam.

Heinämäki's approach therefore seems to be on the right track because the temporal placement of events seems to be the same in factual and counterfactual sentences, the difference being in the Svorlds' in which these events take place.49 48 There are languages which have two such lexemes or use a different mode in the subclause to mark the counterfactual case (cf. Tedeschi (1981:264)). 49 Hornstein (1977) rejects pragmatic explanations for the disambiguation of before. He observes that a Past Perfect main clause forces a factual reading: a) John telephoned Sol before the latter came over, (ambiguous) b) John had telephoned Sol before the latter came over, (factual) while: c) Bill will go before he has sold the car. is necessarily counterfactual. Hornstein's before-nle (Hornstein 1977:554) therefore arrives at: ET( > ETm factual ETm > ET, counterfactual ETm = ET, ambiguous (or neutral).

127

How can we capture this in a model that needs the location of the event on the time line before the conjunction can work? Quite easily, we suggest, if we allow not only the time line of the actual world, but use a branching time model. Then the relations which before establishes on other time lines are the same as on the actual time line (i.e. something akin to 'o ji there are s,e,r with M s,e,r _ _ N S and r £ I = e. Note first that with r' £ I we do not treat while S as a true frame. True frames can only be filled by main clause states, while S can be filled by other event notions as well, as will become apparent later. What we get from this, as opposed to from Ritchie's rule, is that states (progressives) and other main clause event notions with r 1 Q e' can extend beyond the subclause event, but, with pragmatic help about the boundaries of a state, they can also be included. Let J be the main clause interval, I be the subclause interval; (3.3a,b,c) would then be interpreted in the following way: The sun was shining while you were out. (J 2 I or J £ I) He was unhappy while she was angry. (J = I) The kid was naughty while you were out. Well, not all the time, but at least the last hour. (J Q I) Ritchie and Heinämäki disagree once more about which event notions form 'points' - and also differ in judgements. Heinämäki allows simple intersection of events, Ritchie rejects it. This is probably a difference in dialects - and a disregard of pragmatic factors. Our treatment gives the usual quantified vs. unquantified distinction and leaves room for pragmatic decisions, cf. (3.3a,b,c). For the event notions with e' Q r 1 we would get clear inclusion if we had formulated the rule as r' c I = while S. In (3.4a,b) however, we see that this is not what we want for these

147 event notions; instead we want to allow the possibility of the events covering the same length of time, and that was why we relaxed the condition to r' £ I: / read a book while you were out. I wrote a letter while you were out. Hans arrived while you were out. It ought to be difficult to combine an accomplishment (an event notion with a certain duration of the phase of change, which therefore occupies a real interval) with a point-like event in the while-clause: an interval cannot be included in a point. Note that with Ritchie's rule this combination should be no problem at all because an accomplishment is completed and therefore a point. As such it can be located inside the M>/iz7e-interval without difficulty (remember that with Ritchie's rule even point-like subclause events lead to wMe-intervals). But (3.5) is odd, unless re-interpreted as some sort of extended activity of searching for the light switch: (3.5)

? / wrote α letter while you switched on the light.

Because of this example and the behaviour of main clause accomplishments, I prefer rule 3.1, especially since a rule capturing Ritchie's dialect would have to employ some ill-defined interval of activities that have only remotely to do with the t-clause event. We would have to build in the possible and pragmatically influenced re-interpretation in a rule like: while S = I, where I is the event time of the S-event or some interval occupied by some activity connected with and containing the S-event. The reader will have to decide, whether this is satisfactory. 3.2 Whenever ? Hans has come whenever she was out I*had been out. Hans has come often. Hans has come everytime Dorothy was out/*had been out. Though whenever seems to be paraphrasable as 'at all those times when' and therefore involves more than one occasion, it does not behave as a true frequency adverb.59 It still seems to have to do with frame setting, i.e. all the possible frames described by all the possible events, not one individual event and reference time, and hence one frame only. The parallels with //-clauses have been demonstrated by Partee (1984). We will, therefore, content ourselves with the observation that we have a 'multi-frame' adverb. How this is best 59 There is another use of whenever, which could be described as 'first occasion'-whenever. Whenever you can, tell John. This is tied to a future occasion though and might require a completely different treatment.

148 captured in a discourse model can be found in Partee (1984). The adaptation is then no problem. 3.3 The other conjunction pair: until and since 3.3.1 Until Like before, until uses as argument a single point, the beginning of the t-clause event: (3.7a) (3.7b)

Untilyou leave town... Until there are ducks in the English Channel..

Thus states and simple processes have to be reinterpreted as initially determined or - as with events which will never take place - they give the whole structure a sardonic reading of 'eternally' or 'always': (3.7c) (3.7d)

* You'll practise till you are intelligent. You ΊΙ be behind bars till hell freezes over.

The difference from before is that this point, the tj of the t-clause event is not only a bound, but is included in the interval: the main clause process continues right up to this point, which makes Ritchie call until an 'end-point' conjunction and Rohrer (1977) analyse it with a universal quantifier. The other difference is that main clause durative/continuing event notions combine best with unfiV-clauses: 3.8a} 3.8b) 3.8c) 3.8d)

He ran until he was past the bridge. * He switched on the light until he could see enough. ? He wrote a letter until she came home. He was writing a letter until she came home.

If (3.8c) is acceptable, this has to be explained by the process phase involved in an accomplishment, it cannot be explained by Ritchie's classification. In cases where punctual changes in the main clause are acceptable, we are considering not the point of change, but the resultant state of the change (cf. Harkness 1985:315): (3.8e)

She switched off the heating until the snow came.

This behaviour could be explained, of course, if «nftY-clauses did not set reference frames, but gave pure event duration. The test for frame adverbiale, applied with the necessary

149 caution, suggests however that until is a frame adverb: (3.9a)

? He has run until he passed the bridge/*had passed the bridge.

Indeed, u/tf /'/-clauses are different from pure event-duration specifiers: (3.9b)

He has run for hours.

Together with the same conclusion for wA//e-clauses, this calls for some general comment. For hours is not located and (without special context) not locatable on the time axis. Until he was past the bridge, however, gives a definite, located interval through the location of the t-clause event - a past interval in the case of (3.9a) and hence the clash with the Present Perfect. We can draw one conclusion from this consideration: all temporal clauses specify times that are themselves locatable because they all employ an event which has a definite position on the time line. All are true TAs, none is a pure event-duration specifier. Until S, therefore, is a reference frame, although not a true frame, but what Sch pf (1984) has called an 'interval'. We prefer the awkward but clear term 'filled' frame. Because of the importance of this, we start with the rule for the combination: S.II.b. M.,s ,c,, ,r_, 1= S' until (S iff M., p l ,r., t= S' and there exist s,e,r with a ,c M, , , t= S and s = s and i) r' c I, where I = {x : χ < tj of e or χ < t where t is the point of change for a punctual change e with resultant state} ii) e' 5 1, where I is as in i). Condition i) guarantees that until S is a frame, condition ii) guarantees that the frame is always filled. We have given this rule for until S only, but there are other adverbs A which describe intervals which are always filled frames and function according to 3.11.1) and ii) without the specification about how I is defined in this case. We need a rule for 'filled' frames: 3.ΙΓ Let A be a "filled"-frame adverb and I be its denotation: A/ s , e , r , t = A ( S ' ) i f f M s , e l r , 1=5' and 'r' e l a n d e' 3 I.' We now add the specification for until S:

150 3.II.a. If M. . _ is a model with M. „ , >= S, then in this model ajt.,1

«yC,!

until S : = {χ : χ < t; of e, where tj is either event inherent or induced (states and simple processes) or χ < t, where t is the point of change in a punctual event e with a resultant state}. Let us return to example (3.8c). Those who can accept it have ' £ ' in 3.ΙΙ.Ϊ). Otherwise, because of e' c r' in this case, we could fulfill i) but not 3.II. ). People who do not accept (3.8c) will sharpen 3.ΙΙ.Ϊ) to r' c I. For this dialect it is impossible to drop condition (i), a strategy the other dialect might suggest. We formulated e' 2 I, thus not demanding that the main clause process end at the starting point of the t-clause event. Hein m ki has argued convincingly that the end-of-process variety is implicature, therefore we keep (ii) as it is. Nevertheless, as Ritchie (1979:107) points out, the u/tfi'/-structure itself only says something about the filling of the specified interval and nothing about other intervals. This, by virtue of the 'be informative' maxim, might well be the cause of the implicature and is applicable to other temporal structures as well. More material about until and certain event notions can be found in Harkness (1985:313ff.). 3.3.2 Since Since is a notoriously difficult conjunction, and it is well known that a imce-structure involves the speech-point as anchor, or - as some scholars have claimed - the reference point. The interval the smce-clause describes stretches from the since-event up to the time of speech - or the main clause reference time. Since-clauses therefore cannot define intervals that begin posterior to s (ST) (since he comes involves a different since), they combine with Present Perfect main clauses but not with Simple Past: (3. 10a) (3. 10b)

He has lived in London since Mary left him. * He lived in London since Mary left him.

They also combine with Past Perfect in the main clause: ,„

^

(3.Λ11Λ a)

TT

, ,

,

,

.

He had seen her three times

I since Christmas. { I

since he left London.

151

and they combine with Present tense main clauses: (3.lib)

I feel better since the plaster came off.

as the examples taken from Harkness (1985:308) show. Since-clauses take as anchor the tj of the 5i/ice-event and reinterpret states and other r c e events into initially determined ones: (3.12a} (3.12b)

Since I lived in London... Since he was so happy...

They have been found to function as true frames in (3.13a) and as intervals, i.e. 'filled' frames, in (3.13b) as Harkness (1985:301) observes: (3.13a) (3.13b)

He has/had seen her once since he left London. He has lived there since she left.

But this obviously depends on the event notion in the main clause and we allowed the term 'filled' frame only for those frames which can also be filled by event notions other than states or simple processes. We have so far been able to capture the above case by means of the r' c A1 rule for true frames and the e c r and r Q e distinction for event notions, so that the adverb itself has only one function, that of a true frame. We could give the same explanation for the readings of (3.13a,b) - provided a jmce-clause gives a reference time frame! But this it obviously doesn't do in the straightforward way we have encountered so far. The preference for Present Perfect is ample proof that our simple rule for true frame adverbs will not do for ί/nce-clauses. What is framed, and this is what Harkness (1985) speaks of, is the event. In view of the fact that a j/nce-clause is a TA by virtue of its locatable event, and therefore can help to locate the main clause event, it is still tempting to deduce something about the main clause reference time from the Ji'nce-clause (remember that it is the reference time which locates the event by the help of tense). So the first specification which comes to mind is to require that in the case of since, the main clause reference time not only has to be located inside the interval given by the .»/ice-clause, but also has to occupy or include the final point of the interval. At first glance this appears to be ideal: In combination with a Present Perfect the final point is ST because for a Present Perfect RT=ST, and in combination with a Past Perfect the final point is RT and the interval ends anterior to ST. This agrees with the readings we have for (3.10a) and (3.1 la). This, i.e. to assume that the

152

since-interval is reference time bounded, is what Harkness (1985) and Rohrer (1977) suggest. Kamp (1968), however, claims that since is always deictic. This view can only be upheld if we find a way to explain the reading with a Past Perfect main clause, where the since-interval ends anterior to ST, without taking recourse to a 'reported speech' situation. The problem about the 'reference time' view as opposed to the deictic view is the fact that for an interpretation of since S we have the speech point of S, which is the same as the one for S' in the combination S' since S, but at that stage of the composition of meaning we do not have the reference point of S1. How, then, can we write a semantics for since 1987 or since he left London! Let us, therefore, first try the other approach, i.e. assume that the smce-interval is bounded by the ST of S. 3.III If M.. _ is a model with M f if >r N S, then in this model »> > since S = {x: tj < χ < s, where tj is the initial point of e, or the induced initial point in the case of states and simple processes}. c

r

s c

r

In this case, we will not begin a quest for the 'point-from which' but content ourselves with a rule that only envisages tj of e as the lower bound for the interval, though there are cases where we have t^ readings: (3.14a} (3.14b)

Since she knitted the sweater, she 's had nothing to do. Since she knitted the sweater, she's knitted two leg-warmers.

Instead, we will check what this since-rule achieves. If we keep our rule for frame adverbials as it is, i.e. such that the main clause RT is strictly included in the frame interval, Present Perfect in the main clause would be blocked, because RT could not be at ST. Therefore, as in the case for while, we have to relax the frame rule to RT £ I, so that the bounds of the interval are attainable by RT. This can explain the Present Perfect combinations: RT is situated inside the since-frame and because RT = ST it happens to be the upper bound. But this rule together with the above j/nce-rule cannot block the Simple Past combinations. There is nothing to forbid that RT = ET is located inside the «nee-frame. For this reason we will introduce a special frame rule for since: 3.IVA/.. „, ,r„ N S' since S iff Mcls ,c,. ,r„ t= S' and there exist e,s,r with s = s' and s ,c Af N Sand

153

i) r' is a final subinterval of I, i.e. s c r' ii) the lower bound of I precedes tj of e', i.e. tj of e < tj of e', where I is as in 3.III. With this rule, the Present tense or Present Perfect combinations become the most suitable, and Simple Past in the main clause is blocked. The remaining problem is the Past Perfect in the main clause. If we assume that a 5i/ice-frame and a Past Perfect main clause only allow event modification and the strict modification at that: RT c I, then we get the reading that the sz/ice-interval is bound by the main clause reference time with an implicature: We know that tj of e < tj of e' < s. For Past Perfect we also know that e' < r' < s' and s = s'. As the Past Perfect structure is acceptable, we must have a chain: t;of e < tjOf e' < tf of e' < r 1 < s1 = s. As a result, the main clause event necessarily occurs between the tj of the s/nce-event and the main clause reference time. As a Past Perfect has been used instead of a Present Perfect this might be read such that the «nee-interval is bound by the main clause reference time: the stretch of time between r' and s is necessarily empty of events and therefore useless as a frame. We assume the frame is smaller, really, i.e. reference time bounded in this case. By means of this rather devious argument we have explained how the main clause reference time can introduce a bound for the .«Vice-interval: the since-interval by definition remains deictic, but the Past Perfect main clause cuts off (at least by implicature) a bit from the right hand side of the interval. Note that we have not had recourse to a past, a shifted ST which would make the whole into Reported Speech. However, the problem is that we have used different kinds of frame-rules depending on conjunction and tense and this might not be very convincing. Therefore we try the reference time approach. For this we assume that the «nee-interval is bounded by a context dependent variable tc, which is specified by the main clause reference time - or by speech time. 3.ΙΙΓ since S = {x : t; of e < χ < tj with the model as in 3.ΙΠ. 3.IV Af » , ,c„, ,ir, t= S' since S iff there exist s,e,r with M.»»t,r e r N S and r · = t c ( o r s = tc). This now quite naturally gives us, in combination with a Present Perfect, the jince-interval

154

stretching up to and including ST, while in combination with a Past Perfect the s/nce-interval is bound by the main clause reference time. But we get the same kind of reading for a Simple Past main clause (bounded by reference time), and such a combination ought to be blocked. If we build in some requirement that the reference time of the main clause has to include speech time, we can block Simple Past, but would also block Past Perfect main clauses. The third possibility is to require that since S is ST-bound but establishes an event frame, not a reference frame, which would single out since from the rest of the conjunctions. In that case we would get a perfect deictic reading for a Present Perfect main clause combination, we could argue as in the first possibility discussed for a Past Perfect introduced reference time bound, but once again, we could not block a Simple Past main clause. The problem about the unacceptable Simple Past main clauses indicates strongly that we need some specification about main clause reference time and ST as given in 3.IV. But this sort of specification necessarily leads to a s/rcce-analysis as suggested in 3.III. and brings back all the complications. In closing this article with this problem (the behaviour of since) unsolved, I wish to indicate that, if it is not treated as suggested in the first possibility, it poses a serious problem for the frame approach. On the other hand, I am convinced that a iince-clause not only places the main clause event, but has something to say about its reference time, too, otherwise we would not have the Simple Past problem. But the approach which worked without problem for after, before and when now obviously has to be altered, and when altered as required for since, it loses its simplicity and thus much of its appeal. Perhaps we need additional criteria to classify adverbial clauses, which might establish the classes of simple frame adverbials (after S, before S, when S) and marginal frame adverbials (while S, until S, since S).

THREE PRESENT TIME ADVERBIALS: NOWADAYS, THESE DAYS AND TODAY

Janet Harkness

0. Introduction In Volume One we outlined the time characterizing function of time adverbials (TA) in connexion with speech time (ST), reference time (RT) and event time (ET). We distinguished between the time provided by or characterized by TA, namely TA time, and ST, RT and ET, suggesting that the chief function of TA is to characterize or help to characterize RT by providing either a temporal setting or a location for RT. Thus the TA time of yesterday, depending on context, can characterize a time referred to and extending over that day, as in one reading of: (1)

Harry was in Paris yesterday.

or provide a setting within which the time referred to is to be posited, as in: (2)

Harry broke his leg yesterday.

In the following we wish to consider the semantic composition of a small group of rather similar TA which refer to present time, that is, to time understood as including and surrounding a current ST, as described below. The aim is to provide a detailed enough analysis of the TA times involved to permit a proper appreciation of the role of each TA in the tensing system of English. 1. 'Present Time' Adverbials The TA considered are nowadays, these days, and today2 (the 'today' not restricted to the 24 hours of the day of ST). Each of these dependent TA is deictic and each refers to some non-minimal interval present time which can be thought of as surrounding the current ST. As will be evident, they are not the only TA which refer to whatever time qualifies as the present in a given context. Other TA in this category are, for example, at the moment, for the time being, at present, right now (not in the sense of immediately), presentlyj (not used by all speakers) and various senses of now.

156

And although present time TA are the only TA whose TA times 'surround' ST, by virtue of the relation of simultaneity, they are not the only TA to include ST in some sense. Anteriority TA (TA time is considered as past) such as until now and up to now involve time up to and potentially including ST. Posteriority TA such as from now on and as of now have ST as the starting point of a span of time. And, depending on context (if RT includes ST), TA such as currently, so far and as (of) yet can refer to time which includes ST. In the following we set out to establish criteria on the basis of which distinctions can be drawn between nowadays, these days and today2. Our interest in these three in particular has been sharpened by difficulties encountered by native speakers of German in selecting one of these TA in given contexts and in particular by the difficulty they have in using these days and nowadays appropriately.1 2. Three approaches to TA In arriving at the analysis presented here, three approaches to defining the semantics of TA were of chief importance: dictionary definitions of these expressions, model theoretic, formal analyses of TA and the analysis of English TA in Schöpf (1984). 2.1 Dictionaries We turn to dictionaries in the expectation that they will provide information about the denotation of lexemes, and thus presumably reflect a sizeable chunk of their 'meanings'. The sample definitions in the table (p. 158-159) reflect that dictionaries are able to describe the nature of some TA better than that of others. Thus entries for special deictic terms such as todayj, and tomorrow provide more unambiguous information about the TA involved and exhibit greater consensus of definition across dictionaries than do those of the TA considered here. Furthermore, in contrast to the uneven treatment afforded these days in particular in the dictionaries consulted, every dictionary referred to has an entry for today j and tomorrow, and all reflect the connexion to ST and the temporal relation (simultaneity, posteriority) involved. The entries at DAY (not given here) then usually provide

1 The difficulties German learners of English have with these days are complicated by the TA time involved in the German TA in diesen Tagen (literally in + these + days). This TA can refer to time either prorimally anterior to ST (a span which can exclude or include ST) or to an extended present including ST. In each case the span of time involved seems to be limited to a not too large number of days. A second complication is provided by English constructions such as in these days of (..sorrow..),cte., which have quite different temporal characteristics from these days and in diesen Tagen. Lastly, learners may come across in these days (cf. various entries in Table of Dictionaries). This may simply be an alternative form of these days on analogy to in those days.

157

the exact extension of time involved (cf. Table of Dictionaries, overleaf). A particular drawback of dictionary definitions for TA which are very similar in meaning is that dictionaries generally define by paraphrase and the provision of synonyms. Consequently one TA is often used as a gloss for another, or two TA are given the same gloss. Webster's, for example, is among those which gloss nowadays and today2 with at the present time, thus using not only the same gloss for two TA not considered synonymous here, but also equating them with at the present time, a TA primarily used in contexts in which the state-of-affairs obtaining over the extended present is expected to terminate (although not by implicature). At the present time, therefore, can be usefully contrasted not only with nowadays and today2 but with (not) yet, for the time being and so far. The DCE also equates both TA with at the present time, for some reason adding the alternative during or at (the present time) for today2 - see, too, the Heritage definition of today2· 'during or at the present time'. During ^-expressions, when contrasted with at ^-expressions, as in during lunch and at lunch, tend to be used in contexts where the time characterized (usually RT or ET) is located within but not over TA time. This is a frame/setting structure not possible with the TA today2· Furthermore, in the DCE 1984 edition, in which these days is given as an example of THESE, it, too, is glossed with at the present time. The other most common gloss given for today2 is nowadays (cf. Chambers, Shorter Oxford, Longman, CDEL). None of the dictionaries consulted had a separate entry for these days. The 1984 DCE, as mentioned, includes these days as an example of THESE and also glosses it, albeit with the same gloss used for the other two TA considered here. Webster's also uses these days in an example, this time under THIS and without a gloss. Cobuild also has an example under THIS, not glossed; it glosses nowadays, however, with these days. The other dictionaries listed make no reference to these days under THIS, THESE, DAY or DAYS. Dictionary definitions, therefore, can indicate in general terms the nature of the TA time of a TA but cannot help us to appreciate what is involved precisely enough to be able to differentiate between very similar TA. The choice of the appropriate TA for a given context is determined by event notion, tense, aspect, the larger context, but also by the structure of the TA itself. And, since TA are used to clarify the tensing situation in certain contexts (for example TA combined with Present tense forms can indicate whether present or future time is intended2) or, alternatively, to indicate important modifications to the tem2 Equally tense forms can indicate whether a TA is being used to refer to time anterior or posterior to ST, as in / saw her today/1 will see her today.

158 Table of Dictionaries

N Ο W A D A Υ S

T H E S E

Webster's

Longman

DCE

CDEL

in these days; at the present

at the present time in history

not formal:(esp. in comparisons with the past) at the present time; in these times;now SEU:S; < he said nobody ~ reads Lawrence > SEU:W

in these times

under THIS: < entertaining a great deal ~ > no gloss

under THESE: < doing a hard day's work ~ > SEU:S. Gloss:at the present time. In 1987 edition, entry deleted

D A Υ S

at the present time

in the present time; nowadays

during or at the present time: < we sell more cars abroad ~ than we've ever done before >

nowadays

T 0 D A Yl

on or for this day

in or during this present day

during or on the present day

during or on this day

T 0 M O R R O W

on or for the day after today

on or for the day following today

during or on the day following today

on the day after today

T

o

D A Y2

Webster's = Webster's Third International Dictionary. Longman = Longman Modern English Dictionary. DCE = Dictionary of Contemporary English. CDEL = Collins Dictionary of the English Language.

159

Table of Dictionaries (cont.) Shorter Oxford at the present day, in these times

Cobuild

Heritage

Chamber's

means at the present time in general, in contrast with the past.MargLn entry: = these days

in these days, during the present time

in these times

the present period of time in the history of the world

during or at the present time

nowadays

at the present time; in the present age; in these times; nowadays

the day that is happening at time when you are speaking or writing

during or on the present day

on the present day

on this very day

the day after today

the day following today

on the day after today

for or on the day after today

under THIS: when you refer to the present time..e.g. No gloss, given as gloss at NOWADAYS

Cobuild = Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary. Heritage = The Heritage Ilustrated Dictionary of the English Language. Chamber's = Chamber s Twentieth Century Dictionary. Shorter Oxford = The Shorter Oxford Dictionary.

160 poral structure in situations where the core tensing situation is already established, it is clearly useful to be able to pinpoint differences between them. Consider, for example, the following: (3) (3') (3 ") (3 "')

"I feel it is time I had a raise." "I'm afraid salary increases are not possible nowadays." "I feel it is time I had a raise." "I'm afraid salary increases are not possible these days." "I feel it is time I had a raise." "I'm afraid salary increases are not possible today." "I feel it is time I had a raise." I'm afraid salary increases are not possible at present."

The response in example (3), rather like that in: (3 " ")

"I feel it is time I had a raise." "I'm afraid salary increases are not possible."

would presumably prompt the first speaker to re-assess his or her prospects with the firm, whereas the other responses can be taken as less than outright refusals to countenance a salary increase. 2.2 Logically based approaches Model theoretic treatments of TA (for example, Äqvist (1979), Äqvist et al. (1978), Richards (1982), Fabricius-Hansen (1984), Hamann (this volume)) have proposed logical, formal analyses for a number of TA, in particular for TA in which the extent of TA time can be expressed in concretely quantified terms and/or the relation of TA time to the current ST is fixed (examples are: today, tomorrow, three weeks ago, but note Tichy (1985:266) on difficulties here too). Independent TA (indexicals), such as on the 24th March, 1928 or in 1919 have a fixed unambiguous value, and are also readily expressed in numerically based formulae, an RT or ET characterized by such divisible interval TA is, of course, not of fixed value. Dependent TA incorporating the names of times established on cyclically organized systems of orientation (clocks, calendars, etc., based on what Bull (1960:4) calls "the observation of the metric periodicity of natural phenomena") are also amenable to logical analysis, provided it is clear what the temporal relation of TA time is to the current RT or ST (last March, over Christmas, in June), that is, which member of the set of instances of 'March', 'June', etc., is intended. Thus, for example, Äqvist (1979:227ff.) has analysed measures of time lengths (minutes, months, days, etc.), indexicals such as March llth, 1975, clock references such as 5 minutes

161

past'/to 3 o'clock (anchored to a time on the time line and not understood simply as a reference to points on the clock), and TA such as yesterday, tomorrow, this month, last month, and today (todayj). Among the expressions Fabricius-Hansen (1984) considers are TA such as zur Zeit (which can be taken as equivalent to at present as well as to at that time and at the time of (his arrival,etc,)), heutzutage (nowadays) and/ete/ (now). She makes several useful observations about the general nature of these TA, such as, for example, that with indivisible TA like zur Zeit, the time looked at is "that surrounding a definite time and whose boundaries to the left and right are not unambiguously bounded" (1984:438f. - my translation). Precisely the nature of such boundaries will be considered below. Hamann (this volume) treats expressions such as before X, after X and when X. To the best of our knowledge, however, formal analyses of this kind tend to concentrate on indexicals, certain deictic TA, and relational TA such as mentioned above. Those which do consider TA similar to nowadays, do not take the analysis far enough for our purposes, which are to establish what Value' a given TA time might involve. Hence it is not possible, in the manner of some formal analyses, to assign an 'appropriate' value to represent TA time. In any case, as it turns out, if Value' is understood essentially as length of extension, this will not be sufficient to capture the essence of the TA times involved. 2.3 The Schopfian analysis In Schöpf (1984), the author sets out a number of features he considers central to the semantic composition of 'temporal expressions', under which he includes TA and duration and frequency expressions.3 The features Schöpf identifies are, for the most part, presented in terms of a binary classification, although, as Schöpf (1984:120) states, it is not his intention to present a rigorous binary taxonomy. Nevertheless, a dichotomous approach of this kind may well result in areas or features being overlooked and in complex distinctions being less adequately dealt with than might be the case with a more flexible model. Schöpf indicates he saw his analysis as tentative, as a stimulus for further analysis and the results obtained by applying his system of distinctions to a large number of TA in Harkness (1985) indicate, we suggest, how useful his categories are. The distinctions proposed in Schöpf (1984) pre-date the many months of Tensing Project discussions which led to the present volumes. In the course of these, modifications to his 3 As in Vol. 1, we distinguish here between temporal expressions and time adverbials; the latter locate or help locate times on the time line and the former only do so in conjunction with times (see Harkness 1987). For the most part here, we restrict our remarks to TA. In passing, however, we note that a number of other kinds of expression can be considered temporal, beyond those of frequency and duration. Indications of speed or the nature of scatter of repeated enactments, for example, can provide temporally relevant information. In Harkness 1987, we suggest they contribute to the 'temporal profile* rather than to tensing in any central sense.

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scheme were made which have yet to be set to paper. Since the present concern is to see how far his features take us in distinguishing between a small set of TA, we present his outline below as it stands, with minimal commentary and only a little re-numbering of items. 2.3.1 Schöpf s distinctions 1) The first distinction Schöpf makes is between orienting expressions and quantifying expressions. Orienting expressions indicate a temporal location. Quantifying expressions indicate the duration of an event or a time span or the frequency of occurrence of events

2) Schöpf divides TA which involve quantification into intervals and frames (ibid.: 121122). As he describes frame adverbials, they place an event in a time setting larger than that of the ET. Interval adverbials place events over the TA time. Consequently certain event notions are compatible with frame structures rather than interval structures and vice versa.4 3) TA involve one of three temporal relations: anteriority, posteriority and simultaneity (ibid.: 122). 4) These relations can be unquantified, as in later, or quantified, as in soon (ibid.: 124). Following Bull (1968:14f.), Schöpf calls TA with unquantified relations vectors, those with quantified relations, tensors. 5) Later (ibid.: 125), Schöpf notes that quantification can either be Objective', that is, stated in concrete, numerically expressed terms (three weeks ago) or in more 'subjective' terms (ages ago). 6) Schöpf says of TA such as already and still that they relate the given RT and state of affairs obtaining at RT to an 'Expectation Time' by virtue of the presuppositions (probably implicatures and entailments) they involve (ibid.:125ff.). Some expressions relate to an 4 In Harkness 1987 we distinguish between divisible non-minimal intervals (yesterday) and indivisible nonminimal intervals (nowadays). Indivisible non-minimal intervals can only characterize times or events of as great dimensions as TA time, divisible non-minimal interval TA can characterize times or locations of events of less extension than TA time. In other words, rather than distinguishing between frame adverbials (in Schöpf s sense) and interval adverbials, we distinguish between non-minimal interval TA which are divisible and those which are not. And rather than suggesting TA 'place events in settings', we describe their function as characterizing times.

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Expectation Time earlier than RT (not yet), others to one later than RT (already). 7) For dependent TA (non-indexicals) Schöpf distinguishes three categories in terms of the 'anchoring potential' of a TA,5 that is, the kind of time (in terms of RT, ST and ET) dependent TA can be tied to. He distinguishes between TA which only anchor to a current ST, those which only anchor to a time which is not the current ST and those which anchor to either ST or a time which is not a current ST. The first of these he calls ST-anchored TA, the second RT-anchored TA and the third either ST- or RT-anchored TA (ibid.: 123125). Central to these distinctions is the basic distinction between independent TA and dependent TA. Independent TA refer to times of fixed value; thus the TA in 1919 can only refer to the TA time uniquely identified by the year named. Dependent TA do not have fixed values; in a given context the value of soon or a week later is determined by the context (the scale of time involved) and by the time to which these TA are tied, their 'anchor'. Schöpf s distinction takes note of the fact that dependent TA are sometimes free to anchor to any temporal location (500«) whereas others anchor to a current ST (three weeks ago) or to a time other than the current ST (three weeks before). (See, however, the more complex situations considered in Smith 1980, 1981, and Schöpf, this volume.) For ST/RT-anchored TA, Schöpf further distinguishes between those which can or must anchor to a past time, those which can or must6 anchor to a future time and those which can do either. 8) The last distinction to be mentioned concerns expressions such as originally, finally and in between, for which Schöpf identifies a sequencing function; initial, medial or final (ibid.: 126). 2.3.2 Applying Schöpf s distinctions Schöpf demonstrates the application of these distinctions in a preliminary analysis of the TA three days ago and three days before (ibid.: 127): both are orienting in function, both are dependent, anchored TA which, however, we take to provide a TA time more to be understood as a time location than as a frame or interval as Schöpf uses the terms. Both TA involve the relation of anteriority, quantified in objective (numerical) terms. The di5 Schöpf uses the term 'gebunden'. The term 'anchor' was we believe first used by Carlota Smith (1978). Bäuerle (1979) and Fabricius-Hansen (1984) have used 'evaluation time' ('Evaluationszeit') for 'anchor' times. In Harkness 1987, we distinguish between the two. 6 As Schöpf notes (1984:125), TA which necessarily anchor to a future time do not seem to exist in English.

164 stinguishing feature between the two revealed by Schöpf s analysis is the nature of the anchor. Three days ago is ST-anchored whereas three days before is RT-anchored in Schöpf s terms.

2.3.2.1 Schöpf s analysis and nowadays, these days, and today2 Of interest now is what Schöpf s features can tell us about nowadays, these days, and today2· Applying his distinctions, we can establish the following: each involves the relation of simultaneity and each is ST-anchored. Hence it follows that these are TA which have a TA time understood as 'present' time. All three are intervals in Schöpf s terminology, that is, the TA time is an indivisible non-minimal interval; consequently any RT characterized with these TA obtains over TA time, as must any state-of-affairs located at (over) RT. They stand in contrast therefore to TA such as todayj or this week. These can be used to characterize a span of time equal to RT but also to provide times which function as settings ('frames') for a characterized time of less extension. It will become clear, however, that Schöpf s distinctions do not provide a means of distinguishing between these TA. To do so, we need to be able to differentiate between the different notions of 'present' time each involves. It might be possible to move some way towards this by refining distinctions made under Schöpf s feature of quantification. Nonetheless, any attempt to differentiate between them solely in terms of extension will be unsatisfactory, since we also need to investigate the ways in which the TA times of such TA might be bounded, the implications (pragmatic or otherwise) they may carry about other times or their own times, and their preferences for particular event types, aspectual forms, and tenses. 3. An analysis of nowadays, these days and today2 In contrast to our discussion of these TA in Harkness (1985), in which we considered the TA in minimally distinct (constructed) contexts, in the present paper we consider the TA in genuine contexts, usually larger than a single sentence. Gratifyingly perhaps, the conclusions we come to do not agree on all points with our earlier analysis. The examples are taken from written sources; the large majority are taken from 1986,1987 and 1988 issues of THE SUNDAY TIMES. Examples taken from other sources are identified each time as, from now on, are examples constructed for purposes of demonstration (with * at the example number).

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3.1 Nowadays The examples collected indicate (as some of the dictionary entries reflect) that in contexts in which nowadays is used the TA time usually stands in contrast with some past time. By this is meant a time anterior to the time of nowadays and not simply anterior to ST. Without exception, this past time is to be understood as belonging to or constituting another age or era. In other words, time represented as anterior to the time of nowadays is understood to belong to time prior to the present age. Conversely, the TA time of nowadays is that extended present considered to constitute the present age in a given context. Although a TA used to characterize time understood as an 'age' must be of sufficient extension to warrant this status, the span of time involved in nowadays can neither be expressed in concrete quantificational terms nor is it indeed of fixed extension. The relevant context determines in each case the scale of dimensions involved - thus nowadays can be used to refer to a present conceived of as the age of computers, the age of AIDS, the age of someone's adulthood, and so forth. The examples below illustrate this point: (4)

(5)

(6) (7)

(8) (9)

At the time [of Pindar - JAM] people must have been so dazzled by music and spectacle that meaning hardfy mattered. But nowadays, when words are all we have, we need help. For Pindar is every bit as magnificent as scholars claim. Fifty years ago few people grew up without helping to look after a succession of younger brothers, sisters, cousins, nephews, and nieces. In this way they learned the reality of caring for children, whereas nowadays we often grow up with access only to our own age group. There was a time when economists wrote serious books that could be read by other people but were still regarded as respectable by colleagues. Nowadays they write textbooks in the hope of striking it rich. "As a choirboy my treble voice had been very good. When it broke I wanted to play something else...So I played it [the B-flat trombone JAH] for six years and enjoyed it greatly. Nowadays I'm an opera fanatic." "When did that start?" "I can tell you specifically. Date: 1944." Christ, whose birthday we are supposed to be celebrating, was persecuted for his compassion - nowadays Christmas is a time when others are persecuted for their isolation. Once our men blazed trails across continents... Nowadays when visiting the tropics we are more likely to huddle together in big bland hotels.

The larger context in (4) is that a critic is hailing the appearance of a new edition of Pindar's works in English. The time of Pindar, the time when 'more' was available than the mere text, is contrasted with a present age which can be understood as something approximating the 20th century, but equally probably as a longer 'modern' period, the period over which we have and have had only Pindar's texts available to appreciate his art.

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In (5) the time considered as a past age or belonging to a past age is concretely located in relation to the current ST with fifty years ago, that is, for the ST of the writer of the text, shortly before the Second World War. The state-of-affairs obtaining then is contrasted with that in the present, but beyond the fact that the TA time is to be thought of as an age, even approximate dimensions of nowadays are, as usual, left uncharacterized. Our extralinguistic knowledge of present-day society allows us to assume reference is to some appropriate span, such as the post-war period, over which the nuclear family has become the norm in urban life. In (6) the reader versed in books on economics might be in a position to assess accurately which, if any, specific past time the speaker has in mind when 'economists wrote serious books that could be read by other people..' is located. For those less well-informed about the subject, all the linguistic context affords is that the unidentified time is contrasted with a present time of equally unspecified dimensions - beyond that the TA indicates it has the status and hence appropriate dimensions of an age. In (7), in contrast, the speaker refers first to the time of his boyhood, then that of his adolescence and then contrasts the states-of-affairs obtaining over these times with that obtaining at a time described as nowadays, a time which does not necessarily follow directly upon the last of the times mentioned, i.e., his adolescence. An unusual feature of the larger context here is that the speaker, when prompted, sets bounds to the beginning of the state-of-affairs he locates over nowadays. Although this indication of when the state-of-affairs began is unusual, linguistically there is no conflict between the two times. Nowadays can have some suitable age/era extension and nevertheless be bounded at a time over 40 years prior to ST at which the initiation time of the state-of-affairs , that is, , and a past time with a different state-of-affairs, more explicit. In contrast to the foregoing examples, the state-of-affairs over nowadays in: (16)

Nowadays, as always, the Princess says she likes London clothes better than country ones.

illustrates that the state-of-affairs has obtained since some earlier period; the beginning of the state-of-affairs obtaining over nowadays can, therefore, lie anterior to TA time.8 The points just made in connexion with (11) to (15') above can help us explore the awkwardness of < Harry be too young > and nowadays in: (17*)

Nowadays Harry is too young.

In the world as we know it, the process of ageing is cumulative, irreversible, and such that the state-of-affairs over nowadays, < Harry be too young >, cannot stand in contrast with some earlier age/era over which Harry was either also too young or not too young. Thus 8 Personally I cannot combine nowadays with always.

170 pragmatic considerations, our understanding of the aging process, conflict with a straightforward reading of this sentence. We can, however, construe a reading in which it is asserted that over nowadays people of Harry's age (and hence Harry) are considered too young (for some particular purpose) and that at some earlier period in history people of Harry's age (and hence Harry) might not have been considered too young.

3.1.3 Tense, aspectual choice and nowadays The three TA discussed here are ST-anchored. Nevertheless, each of them can also anchor to a secondary ST, that is an ST other than the immediately current ST, which roughly and generally speaking is the ST of the producer of a text (oral or written) at the time of production. The ST within a text or piece of discourse may overlap with this ST or may relate instead to times under consideration in the text anterior or posterior to the current ST. TA which are anchored to speech times other than the primary ST may be transposed in relation to the primary ST: thus many months ago may become many months before. Alternatively, the TA can remain untransposed despite the fact that, for example, many months ago is not anchored to the primary ST. However when nowadays is anchored to the current ST, Present tense forms are the rule. Simple Past tense forms and Past Perfect forms appear with nowadays in transposed contexts in which, for example, someone's comments about his or her present are reported in a narrative in which the narrator's standpoint is blended with that of the narrated figure's. Thus, for example, in a modification of (15): (18)

She rarefy went south of the Thames nowadays.

not only could the nowadays stem from the speaker reporting what 'she' said, but also from what 'she' actually said, , untransposed despite the tense shift, because the TA time holds for both 'she' and the second speaker. Alternatively, if the two speakers do not share the RT, all that would be required to produce an untransposed nowadays is a particular interest in whether the first speaker actually used 'nowadays' or, for example, 'at present' or indeed perhaps did not use a TA. Tense forms taken to refer to future time are incompatible with nowadays, these days, and today2, as indeed they are for any present time TA involving indivisible intervals.9 Present Perfect forms are only compatible with these TA if the Perfect form expresses the resul-

9 Thus at present stands in contrast with the TA/or the present in this respect.

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tant state of some event which obtains over the extended present. As it turns out, such situations are more likely to co-occur with the temporal structure provided by today2 than with the TA time of nowadays or these days. The compatibility of Present Progressive with nowadays is determined in part by the event notion involved. Present Progressive forms (as aspectual forms) often signal the individualized, actualized, sometimes temporary enactment of an event (cf. Schöpf (1984:247f.) and, with a different view, Smith (1986)), as the following pairs reflect: 19) 19 ) 20) 20 ) 21) 21 )

Harry is smoking. Harry smokes. Harry is living with his brother. Harry lives with his brother. Harry is being very kind. Harry is very kind.

Remembering that events over an RT characterized as nowadays are necessarily states-ofaffairs of some kind, since the indivisible non-minimal interval of TA time allows no other possibility, various combinatory possibilities nevertheless remain. Where a reading for the event notion with Present Progressive is compatible with the nature of the TA time of nowadays, the TA can appear with these forms, as in: (22*)

Nowadays the firm is taking $20m a year.

Where the event does not lend itself to the Progressive (see, for example, the event types discussed in Schöpf 1984:247 ff.): (23 *)

* Nowadays Harry is having a lot to do with market development.

as opposed to: (23*')

Nowadays Harry has a lot to do with market development.

or where the event with Progressive does not lend itself to a global, non-specific or non-actualized reading: (24 * )

* Nowadays Harry is driving a Jaguar.

10 In contrast, the set of TA which can be used to refer to time up to and including ST, such as until now, so far, as yet, (see Harkness (1985, 1987) and Matthews (1987)) regularly combine with both Present Perfect and Simple Past tense forms.

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as opposed to: (24 * ' )

Nowadays Harry drives a Jaguar.

incompatibility results. In sum, while the niceties of aspectual choice with different event types is complex, if the event type allows a state reading over the extended present and the state does not conflict with the nature of the extension proposed here for nowadays, Progressive aspect can be found, although Simple Present tense is by far the more common. 3.2 These days

We leave nowadays for the present and turn to the TA which most closely resembles it, these days. One of the interesting things about these days is that it is found in contexts ideally suited for nowadays as analysed above but is also found in contexts unsuitable for nowadays. 3.2.1 Age/era contexts for these days To take contexts ideal for nowadays first, among the examples we collected are: (25) (26) (27)

Materials for the evening she likes to be "all the richest: velvets, satins, silks - but not too much decolletage these days. I think when you're older exposing too much skin is hideous. " 'You can 't win, you can't win... These days you don't know who to trust, " he said. "Ain't that the truth?" "People are certainly not nice like they used to be, "said the grandmother.11 They say that it is more difficult to induce children to sleep on light evenings, but they seem to go to bed later these days and I do not think this should foil the other advantages [of returning to double daylight saving time -

In (25) our knowledge of the world combined with temporal information provided by the speaker produces an implicit contrast between necklines she is prepared to wear over an extended present characterized with these days and lower necklines she wore when the present state-of-affairs (and, it is understood, ) was not the case. Extralinguistically we know that presupposes < become older > from a state of and that is an irreversible state. Thus the current preference for higher necklines is unlikely to change since it is founded on a state-of-affairs 11 Taken from Ά Good Man is Hard to Find' by Flannery O'Connor 1953:15.

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which is irreversible. Consequently, the time referred to here seems to be the global extended present and not any sub-division of this; a context ideal for nowadays. These days is thus either being used as equivalent to nowadays here or at least as some sort of acceptable alternative if, as is conceivable, the speaker wishes to avoid evoking the connotations of 'this era' in contrast with 'past eras' involved in nowadays, since this could draw unwanted attention to her age. In (26) two speakers are involved, the first of whom refers to these days as the time over which the state-of-affairs obtains. The only clue we have as to the extension of these days is the contrast between this current state-of-affairs and that of a past characterized by the second speaker with used to. Used to, as we understand it, is typically used to refer to states-of-affairs at or over time seen as distal from the current ST. We can, for example, expect used to in contexts such as: (28*)

When we were children we used to swim here, you know.

but not normally in: (28*')

* Last week /recently we used to swim here, you know.

The second speaker in (26), therefore, seems to have understood the first speaker as referring to the state-of-affairs of some present age, since she contrasts this with a state-ofaffairs from an earlier non-proximal time - again a context ideal for nowadays is involved. In (27) the larger context indicates that the speaker is referring in general to the sleeping habits of children over the RT. Changes in social patterns of behaviour are something we view in terms of changes from one era/age to another - in fact such changes are often what we take as signals that we have passed from one time/age to another. Once again, this seems a context where an extended present of age/era status could well be involved. In these examples, therefore, we conclude that these days must either have a TA time able to be taken as equivalent to nowadays or one at least compatible with contexts suitable for nowadays. In the following examples, in which points of view held in the early days of twentieth century linguistics and terminology used at that time are contrasted with standpoints and terminology used now, one and the same speaker uses nowadays and these days in virtually identical situations'12

12 All from Lyons (1977:99f.).

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(29) )) u I)

Most linguists do nowadays draw some kind of distinction between language-behaviour and the system of units and relations underlying that behaviour. Few linguists would put the question in such general terms these days. Most authors nowadays, however, use semiotics as the noun... It is nowadays customary to distinguish three areas within the field of semiotics.

There is nothing to suggest that these days here is not being used as an equivalent to nowadays - and examples of this kind are by no means uncommon. 3.2.2 Contexts not suitable for nowadays On the other hand, in a number of contexts typical for these days, nowadays would be less appropriate. We distinguish several different types of context, as set out below: 1) Contexts in which the TA time must be a short span, too short to be considered as an 'age' of any kind (see (33) and (34)). 2) Contexts in which topical and temporal references indicate an ST core time (discussed below) is intended - that is, again a time shorter than any 'age' (see (35) and (36) and, marginally, (37)). 3) Contexts in which tense and aspect forms (possibly with further adverbial modification) indicate or suggest an ST core time is intended (see (35), (36) and (37)). 4) Contexts in which context considerations indicate the present time referred to is likely to be an ST core time (see (38)). 5) Contexts where a frequent change in the state-of-affairs is implied - often indicated by aspect or by pragmatic considerations (see (39*) and (40*)). In addition to these, we collected a number of 'mixed' examples which feature these days and in which topical references are present but in which a contrast is also made between the present state-of-affairs and that of a previous era/age (see (41) to (43)). Example sentences: (33) (34) (35)

Scarcely a Labour frontbencher offers an election postmortem these days without sniping at Hattersley's vote-losing management of the party's economic and taxation policy in the election. Joan Burstein of Brown's was among the first to spot Romeo Gigli, this season's big success, four seasons ago... These days she finds she buys as much from Italy as she does from France. Atticus increasingly hears people bemoaning the lack of authority or in-

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(36)

(37)

(38) (39*) (40*) (41)

(42)

(43)

sight these days in the political coverage of THE ECONOMIST and has been puzzled by the decline. Last Friday's WHAT THE PAPERS SAY on Channel 4 contained a clue. It was presented by THE ECONOMIST'S political correspondent... a rather smug young lady who thinks she knows it all but clearfy has a lot to learn. But look what's happening to Manhattan. That was the ultra-metropolis, the urban island that was so exciting, so creative, so alive. New York was so good they named it twice. I loved it too. But it's under threat. Property prices and rents in Manhattan these days are higher than the buildings. It began about five years ago when a universe of chattering appliances descended on American consumers... These days, speech synthesis - the science of teaching computer chips to talk - and speech recognition - the science of teaching them to listen - are going beyond gimmickry. // takes quite a lot these days to make me shake with mirth. I snigger occasionally at the weather, but the confines of mirth are narrow. 'Who's Harry dating these days?" "I'm not sure - it's so hard to keep score." "How's your grandmother these days?" "Quite well, thanks. This warm weather helps her arthritis." Our systems of secret censorship are still the envy of our intelligence allies. Ask an American spook, ask a West German. If there are occasional lapses these days - these are onfy the consequence of decades of unnatural restraint. And Heaven help me if I were to take a literary tone with him and suggest that the bastion of the nation's secrets is not an unreasonable target if you are a novelist speculating about the nation's secret self... and when the sheer size of the bastion these days, if rumour is anything to go by... exceeds anything that he or I had dreamed of 25 years ago. If you really want to know how good we are at spying, don't look at the muddled passport photo of our latest gallant chief, look at your very own foreign secretary and home secretary - though these days you may have to look pretty fast before the next scandal sweeps them off.

3.2.2.1 An ST core reading for these days To complicate the situation further, certain speakers distinguish regularly between the TA time of nowadays and that of these days. For them, the extended present of the latter lacks the status of an age or era and is, instead, a time more closely centred around the ST. We have called this above an 'ST core' present. While the span of time involved is of less extension than that required for any 'age', these days, like nowadays, does not have a fixed extension which can be expressed in concrete quantificational terms. Depending on the context, it can extend over a vague number of weeks, months (years?) or simply be considered as some blob of time centred around ST. There are, nonetheless, limits to the minimal extension of the TA time, as reflected by the fact that times referred to with TA such as yesterday fall within the TA time of these days, whereas time referred to by a TA such as a while ago or last year could lie outside the time of these days. Consequently a state-of-affairs obtaining over an RT of (all or part of) last

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year or over a while back can be contrasted with one obtaining over these days, as in: (44*)

A while back/last year everyone was raving about eating out in the right places; these days eating in with the right people is the thing.

The suggestion being made then is that although both TA involve indivisible intervals of indeterminate extension, nowadays involves a global extended present, whereas these days can, and for some speakers must, focus on an ST core present. Thus, depending on whether only one of these TA time types is possible in a given context, speakers who distinguish between the two TA will have clear preferences for one or the other TA. The examples: (45)

(from a satirical account of the re-use of garni from restaurant plate to restaurant plate ) "I said that table four has just eaten all their garni! Look - there's onfy orange peel left!" "How dare they?" exclaimed the affronted chef. "Do people have absolutely no manners these days? Eating the garni? Whatever next!"

(46)

Life has been made much easier for an incoming prime minister these days. Much of the stiff formality of the past has gone. When you are summoned to the Palace after an election you have to answer one simple question: "Can you form a government?"

and:

for instance, involve contexts in which an ST core reading for the TA time of these days is unlikely. The reference in both sentences seems to be to a general state-of-affairs over the global present rather than to a state-of-affairs over a shorter period around ST. In (45), it makes little sense to limit the generality of the state-of-affairs being questioned (actually criticized) to a time around ST of no great extension. Similarly in (46), since the occasions being talked about only happen every four years and the reference is not to a single summons, the 1987 summons to the Palace, only a global present reading seems probable. Here, however, the Present Perfect may have triggered a focus on the ST, thus facilitating the presence of these days. Both contexts are, nevertheless, somewhat at odds with an ST core reading of these days; consequently some speakers would prefer or require nowadays here. Similarly, in a number of the examples collected which feature nowadays, speakers who differentiate between the two TA would not use these days. Examples are: (16)

Nowadays, as always, the Princess says she likes London clothes better than country ones.

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(47) (8)

The original use of 'community' was a sign of togetherness, belonging, inclusivity. Nowadays it preserves that usage onfy in a weak sense. Christ, whose birthday we are supposed to be celebrating, was persecuted for his compassion · nowadays Christmas is a time when others are persecuted for their isolation.

In (16) and (47) a degree of continuance between the state-of-affairs of a past time/age and that of the present is involved. For anyone with only an ST core reading for these days, a certain conflict would arise in simultaneously asserting 'still-as-in-the-past' and 'right around ST. In (8) there would be an intrinsic conflict between asserting the state-ofaffairs < Christmas be a time when others are persecuted... > over a time which itself need be no greater than Christmas and focusses on ST; the state event calls for a general extended present which an ST core reading of these days would deny. In other examples collected, such as: (48)

//'s not that Americans think B&B's are wonderful, it's just that they are too polite, embarrassed or cautious to say what they realfy think. It is a risky business for an American to criticize a foreigner in a foreign country these days. They are so non-plussed by the haphazard conditions that after a breakfast including cold toast... they just scribble "realfy great" in the visitor's book and get the hell out of it.

where there is no imperative to read these days as equivalent to nowadays, such speakers simply distinguish between the temporal structuring afforded by each TA. Of interest for a generally valid account of both TA is that the contexts which such speakers consider typical for these days are those in which they consider nowadays less appropriate; these are, we suggest, the contexts 1 to 5 listed above. In direct contrast to contexts such as in (48), in which these days can be read either way, the statement about postmortems of the election in:

(33)

was made in late June 1987 about the elections held earlier the same month; thus the postmortems offered 'these days' can only obtain over a span extending back one or two weeks from ST. This time is undoubtedly an ST core present, unsuitable for nowadays. In:

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(34)

Joan Burstein of Brown's was among the first to spot Romeo Gigli, this season's big success, four seasons ago... These days she finds she buys as much from Itafy as she does from France.

the fashion buyer Burstein first bought clothes from a particular Italian designer four fashion seasons prior to the time of writing (depending on whether we count two or more seasons a year, at most two years before then). The state-of-affairs reached in the interim and now obtaining over a present characterized with these days is that, in contrast to past practice, she buys as much Italian fashion as French. While some speakers may read these days as equivalent to nowadays here, it can also be taken as referring to an ST core present. Again, in: (35)

Atticus increasingly hears people bemoaning the lack of authority or insight these days in the political coverage of THE ECONOMIST and has been puzzled by the decline. Last Friday's WHAT THE PAPERS SAY on Channel 4 contained a clue. It was presented by THE ECONOMIST'S political correspondent... a rather smug young lady who thinks she knows it all but clearly has a lot to learn.

pragmatic (background) considerations play a role, such as a recent change of political correspondent on THE ECONOMIST. Even without knowing this, however, and although the verb hear is in the Simple Present form,13 the elliptical bemoaning (= people are bemoaning), the signal of an accumulative process through the adverb increasingly plus the Present Perfect of has been puzzled combine to focus on a time immediately around ST, a time readily thought of as an ST core time.14 Note, too, that the partial resolution of the puzzlement obtaining before ST is located proximal to ST with last Friday, which further supports this interpretation. The reference to the weather in: (38)

It takes quite a lot these days to make me shake with mirth. I snigger occasionally at the weather, but the confines of mirth are narrow.

is the only clue as to whether these days is to be read as equivalent to nowadays or is to be understood as referring to an ST core time. Extralinguistic knowledge is needed in this case; the sentence was written in late June 1987, during an extremely rainy summer in Britain when everyone was complaining about the miserable weather; in this light an ST core reading is appealing.

13 As we might expect (cf. Comrie (1976:35), Leech (1971:20), Schöpf (1984:284f.) and Smith (1986). 14 For discussion of RT and the Present Perfect see Schöpf (1984:passim), Matthews (1987).

179

As mentioned in connexion with (35) above, the Present Perfect can signal that the time referred to extends up to ST, possibly including ST and can, therefore, focus attention on ST. In: (49)

The apolitical majority of voters have never understood the effects of having a potential party of government committed to socialism. That is hardly surprising, for the Labour leadership's explanations of what it means by socialism have become increasingly incoherent. These days the doctrine can mean almost anything from the expropriation of all private assets to shoving another couple of beds into the local hospitals.

it is asserted for some current ST that Labour's explanations have become increasingly incoherent. The Present Perfect of have become suggests a focus on ST and, as in (35), increasingly again suggests a cumulative process of < become incoherent >. This is then followed by an example of the incoherence about what socialism means < the doctrine can mean almost anything from the expropriation of all private assets to shoving another couple of beds into the local hospitals >, located over a present characterized by these days. It is important to note that the two things mentioned as extremes (expropriation and the addition of beds) constitute topical events at ST - in the second half of 1987 the British press was full of reports dealing with the state of Britain's National Health Service; a frequent point at issue was the shortage of beds in hospitals. And, in the course of the 1987 British general elections, the radical anti-property views of left-wing factions in the Labour Party were also a frequent topic of discussion in the press. In other words, although an age/era TA time reading is possible here, if the text is read as referring to current events, an ST core TA time makes sense. In:

(50)

Oxford in the 1930's was, according to the account given by Garth Lean in his instructive life ofBuchman, dominated by communism. Buchman ... encouraged undergraduate meetings where the top chaps might confess their failings, read the Bible and be "changed". They asked each other such searching questions as, 'What time do you get up these days?" "How about your times of prayer and listening?"

the temporal context is that of particular undergraduate meeetings in the 1930s. At these meetings, graduates were encouraged to be 'changed' and to alter their way of life. Thus the questions ironically quoted here which undergraduates asked one another are pertinent to their ST core present - in terms of whether they are managing to change their times of rising, saying prayers regularly, etc. These are questions about new states-of-affairs, not stable states-of-affairs and these days consequently can be taken to refer to an ST

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core present. The last context in which we wish to consider these days is illustrated by examples such as: (39*)

"Who's Harry dating these days?" I'm not sure - it's so hard to keep score."

(40*)

"How's your grandmother these days?" "Quite well, thanks. This warm weather helps her arthritis."

and:

In each case, we suggest, the TA time characterizing the RT is more appropriately read as an ST core time than as a global present. The second speaker in (39*) implies that Harry changes dating partners frequently by asserting that it is difficult to keep count of his partners. This lack of permanence can be extended to the present state-of-affairs - there would be little problem in introducing the suggestion of a boundary to the right of ST. Certainly we assume conversationally that the present state-of-affairs has not been the case for very long. Even the first speaker, however, contributes to this reading of the situation, first in that he or she asks who Harry is dating rather than, for example, simply asking who his girlfriend is and, second, by characterizing the time over which the state-of-affairs asked about obtains with these days rather than simply leaving it open. These considerations explain, we suggest, why we get a reading for: (51*)

Who's Harry married to these days?

in which Harry is understood to be someone who changes marriage partners with unusual rapidity. In (40*), working on the assumption that the second speaker is offering relevant information in response to the question asked, he or she implies that the state-of-affairs < grandmother be keeping quite well> is conditioned by the current warm weather, and we understand or assume that this state-of-affairs is limited (vaguely) to the left of ST by the time at which recent warm weather began.

3.2.3 The time of these days and other times We saw earlier that time characterized by TA such as yesterdayj falls within the minimal limits of these days. In a similar fashion, a contrast between the state-of-affairs obtaining

181

over these days cannot be contrasted with that holding over tomorrow or next week, but it can be contrasted with the state-of-affairs envisaged for a less proximal posterior time, as the examples: (52*)

He seems to be rather down these days - we're hoping his new responsibilities will help him snap out of it.

(53*)

Last year it was a racing bike he couldn't do without, these days it's a motor-bike, no doubt it'ttbe my car next.

and:

reflect. Indeed, we can contrast: (54*)

He seems to have lost all interest nowadays.

(54*')

He seems to have lost all interest these days.

and:

in that the latter can be continued as (52*) above: (54")

He seems to have lost all interest these days but we're hoping his new responsibilities will help him snap out of it.

whereas (54*) with nowadays cannot be potentially bounded in this way. 3.2.4 Conclusions In sum, we suggest that nowadays involves a TA time of global nature and that these days, although used by many speakers as an alternative for nowadays, can also be used to refer to an ST core time of less global nature. It is this TA time which is associated with the TA by speakers who always distinguish between these days and nowadays. 3.3 Today 2 Today2 is, we suggest, a metaphorical extension of todayj, which is a dependent deictic TA referring to the 24-hour day span including the current ST. Today j involves a divisible non-

182

minimal interval and can be used to refer to time anterior to ST: (55 *)

/ saw him today.

time posterior to ST: (56 * )

/ will see him today.

or time including ST: (57 *) Today2>

m

We realty are having good weather today.

contrast, is an indivisible non-minimal interval, hence any RT characterized by

today2 is equal to the TA time of the adverb. As we might expect, today2 is deictic, but unlike todayj, it does not refer to a span of time which can be measured in concrete terms. Instead the time involved is best thought of as largely unstructured and in that sense 'bloblike' (cf. Comrie 1976:18) but, by virtue of the strong deictic force of today, as nevertheless focussing on the current, immediate present.

3.3.1 TheTAtimeoffoday 2 We distinguished earlier between a global extended present for nowadays and an ST core present for these days. Today j, on the other hand, involves a time which is current or immediate in that it centres on the specific hours and single day span around ST. Today2, in contrast to this, refers to the immediate present in a global fashion; it does not refer to a specific day, thus sharing similarities with nowadays in its generality, but, on the other hand, focusses on only a small slot of present time which excludes consideration of any past time and any future time as part of the extended present. In this respect, then, it also differs from both nowadays and these days.

3.3.2 Characteristic contexts for today2 A look at contexts in which today2 is found but which are less suitable for the other two TA will help clarify these points. (58) (59)

What we are facing today are the hind of basic decisions that led to the replacement of the horse by the tank. At Cornell his class of students learning Russian sank to only three, and the professor who succeeded him reported that they had received no elementary instruction whatsoever. But Nabokov's methods sound bracing and radical and would presumably be all the fashion today, for

(60) (61) (62) (63)

183 ignoring grammar, he made his students start by reciting and reading passages of Russian poetry and prose. There is no broadcaster in Britain today who can match him for his journalistic track record... Paranoia over aliens is in keeping with the late Hoxha and those who survive him in authority today. ...and the young photographer Thomas Joshua Cooper, the most original and visionary photographer working today. A little book, first published in 1932 and now reissued in facsimile, reads today like an epitaph for the elusion of progress.

The time referred to in each of the above is the immediately relevant but globally conceptualized present. Time thought of as relevant or current in this way is also often thought of as 'modern', it is the current 'now' lent added deictic force by virtue of the association with the special name for the day of ST. If we introduce nowadays or these days in these contexts, as in: , (61 )

ι nowadays. ... those who survive him in authority < \ these days.

, (62 )

(these days. ... the most original and visionary photographer working { \ nowadays.

v(59')

... it would presumably be all the fashion { , r y j \thesedays.

'

we can see how inappropriate a TA time is which calls for an extended present involving time anterior and posterior to ST.15 The focus we require is one on a general, extended 'now' but without any structuring of the extension to the left and to the right of ST. Today2, we suggest, provides precisely this. 3.3.3 The time of today2 and other times Since it focusses on what might be thought of as a 'punctually conceptualized' extended present, today2 carries with it none of the implications about continuation or likelihood of change as regards the current state-of-affairs discussed above in connexion with nowadays and these days. As our examples demonstrate, however, the contrast between current states-of-affairs over today2 and those over earlier time is frequently overt: 15 Note that It is all the fashion these days and even It is ail the fashion nowadays involve assertions that a state of affairs holds over an extended present. In example (59), however, the focus is on a state-of-affairs which could hold over a blob-like present and in the context we are unconcerned with how much time anterior or posterior to ST this present involves.

184 (64) (65)

(66)

Once in the nineteenth century ... Today the Balogne is more beautiful than ever. For it remains as true today as it did in the far-off days when I foolishly put my feet on the desk while working (very hard) to be informed that I "clearly wasn't doing anything", that informality is not equated with professionalism. They grew in grey but Elizabeth thought this made him even more attractive and swore that half the women in Rome were mad about him. They would be today too - look at the modem, never mind Victorian, passion for hair in our pop stars from the Rolling Stones onwards.

In other examples the contrast with states-of-affairs over earlier times and those over today2 or the continuation of states-of-affairs from the past into the present is only implied: (67) (68)

Two generations have grown up without proper discipline to teach them manners. Today graduates who are coming out of business schools don't know how to behave. The old-fashioned authoritarian teacher is thankfully dead and buried. To attempt such a style in the schools today would be undesireable to say the least.

3.3.3.1 States-of-affairs from past time into present Example (69) asserts the continuation of the state-of-affairs of from the past into the present (see, too, (65) and (66)): (69)

And although such striking examples are harder to come across today, philoxenia is still pretty much alive and well in many areas of Greece.

When, as here, the state-of-affairs in time prior to that of today2 continues into TA time, the adverb still is often used. Without still the combination of a past state-of-affairs and one over today2 need not necessarily express continuation. Thus: (70*)

He opened his business in Fleet Street in 1789 and that's where the shop is today.

can be read as suggesting the shop is still in Fleet Street, i.e. to this day, or that the business is once more located in Fleet Street. A case in point is: (71)

No wonder that today she still sings more Ellington than anyone else.

Without still we would tend to read (71) as implicitly contrasting the present state-of-affairs with an earlier state-of-affairs. Alternatively, as in:

185

(65)

It remains as true today as it did in the far-off days when I foolishly put my feet on the desk while working (very hard)...

the event notion can be used to assert the continuation of the past state-of-affairs into the present. Once again the age/era TA time of nowadays would be awkward in such contexts, since too great a structured spread of present time would be involved. An ST core reading of these days in such contexts is equally awkward, if for different reasons; the limitation of the present to an ST core time stands in conflict with the assertion of 'then-and-still-now'16 involved in remains or still. Contrasts between the current state-of-affairs and states in the future are also readily made, as the following indicates: (72*)

We have to concentrate on the situation as it is today and not how it might be in six month's time.

3.3.4 Tense and aspect with today2 As with the other two TA discussed, the nature and indivisibility of the TA interval is of consequence for the event notions and tense forms compatible with today2. Future tense forms and Simple Past tense forms are incompatible with today2. Where these occur with today, they can be taken as a sure indication that today 1 is involved. Present Perfect forms and Present Progressive forms, however, do co-occur with today2- The Perfect is found in those contexts where the event notion provides a resultant state which obtains over the extended present, as in a today2 reading of: (73*)

Today I have reached the stage where I at least know what I want.

As mentioned earlier, nowadays and these days can co-occur with Present Perfect forms, although none of the examples collected illustrate this. Nevertheless, they are at least unusual in the context above since the extended present they involve does not focus squarely enough on the immediate, current-yet-general present: (73*')

? Nowadays/these days I have reached the stage where I at least know what I want.

A further point to notice about today2 is that since the TA time is punctually conceptualized, it co-occurs readily with predicates of initiation: 16 Cf. lessen (1974:160f.), Schöpf (1984:154f.) on still.

186

(74 *)

Today we are just beginning to make progress in combatting the disease.

thus again providing a contrast to these days and nowadays. 3.3.5 The other TA in today2 contexts A number of the examples collected would be able to accommodate nowadays or these days, even taking an ST core reading for the latter. Examples are: (64') (64") (75)

75') 751 ) 69') (69'')

Once in the nineteenth century... Nowadays the Balogne is as beautiful as ever. Once in the nineteenth century ... These days the Balogne is as beautiful as ever. It is well written and fair-minded for, like everyone else who spends time in Poland today, its author has been overwhelmed by the Polish past and present and knows when he considers Poland he is really writing about issues that matter in Europe at large. ...for, like everyone else who spends time in Poland these days ... ...for, like everyone else who spends time in Poland nowadays... ... And although such striking examples are harder to come across these days, philoxenia is still pretty much alive ... ... And, although such sinking examples are harder to come across nowadays, philoxenia is still pretty much alive...

In each case, however, the temporal structure differs along lines outlined in the foregoing sections, providing us with distinctions in temporal structuring such as suggested below. 4. Concluding remarks We see then that nowadays, these days, and today2 have a great deal in common. However, despite the considerable similarities and although the extension of TA time is in each case partly determined by the TA itself and partly by the context, and in each case a concrete indication of the extension involved is not possible, we can nevertheless characterize each sufficiently to indicate the kind of temporal contrasts possible between the three. Consider the three sets of sentences below, in which we substitute the other two TA for a different original in each set. (75)

(75') (75 ")

It is well written and fair-minded for, like everyone else who spends time in Poland today, its author has been overwhelmed by the Polish past and present and knows when he considers Poland he is realty writing about issues that matter in Europe at large. ... for, like everyone else who spends time in Poland these days, its author has been overwhelmed by the Polish past and present... ... for, tike everyone who spends time in Poland nowadays, its author has been overwhelmed by the Polish past and present...

187 (76) (76')

Is it possible for anyone in Germany nowadays to raise his right hand, for whatever reason, and not be flooded by the memory of a dream to end all dreams? Is it possible for anyone in Germany today to raise his right hand, for whatever reason, and not be flooded by the memory of a dream to end all dreams?

(76")

Is it possible for anyone in Germany these days to raise his right hand,

(48) (48 j} (48' )

for whatever reason, and not be flooded by the memory of a dream to end all dreams? ... It's a risky business for an American to criticize a foreigner these days... ... It's a risky business for an American to criticize a foreigner today... ... It's a risky business for an American to criticize a foreigner nowadays...

In each case the examples with today2 focus on a punctually conceptualized extended present without further structuring. The situation over today2 could in each case change quite rapidly. Thus in (75) the state-of-affairs in Poland over today'2 could be a newly re-introduced state of martial law, and the focus in (76') is on the current state-of-affairs in contrast to some state-of-affairs in the past, without indication of how long this state-of-affairs has already been the case. In (48'), too, the focus could be on a state-of-affairs arrived at after and as a consequence of a recent bombing. In each case the state-of-affairs as it is now could both continue to obtain or change at short notice. In each of the sentences with nowadays, (75"), (76) and (48"), the time over which the current state-of-affairs obtains is the present age/era. These are states-of-affairs as they have developed historically and now are. Any expectation of change or suggestion of temporariness is excluded. Thus for (76) this is the way people must react in Germany given its history of the Third Reich, for (48") this is the established state-of-affairs arrived at for Americans abroad after Gadafi, the long series of bombings, and the hijacking incidents of recent decades, and for (75"), this is the situation in post-war and perhaps post-Solidarity Poland. In contrast to each of these, the sentences with these days can focus on a slot of present time which obtains to the right and to the left of ST, but which can be readily bounded at short notice in either (time) direction. Thus in (75') people spending time in Poland over these days might experience a view of Poland not possible a few months ago and soon to disappear. In (76") the time focussed on for the state-of-affairs in Germany these days can be that of a particularly tense official state visit, when old memories come more sharply to mind than at other times, a state-of-affairs which could pass with the end of the visit. Similarly in (48) the hesitancy Americans feel over the present of these days can be one 17 Taken from How German Is It by Walter Abish (1982:252) - the last sentence of the novel.

188

sparked off by very recent events and expected to pass as the events become more distant in time. Even these very brief suggestions indicate that a proper appreciation of the structuring of present time achieved by each TA, while perhaps of minor importance for the core tensing situation (since they all indicate extended present time), is nevertheless of considerable importance in determining the finer temporal details of this present.

REFERENCE ΉΜΕ

AND MODALITY

Richard Matthews

0. Introduction The Reichenbachian approach to the analysis of tense is one that has been seminal not only for logicians but also for linguists. In being adapted and extended it has, however, undergone a fair amount of re-interpretation and even distortion (for a discussion, cf. Hamann, 1987). My purpose in this paper1 is, adopting Sch pf s basic axiom of the interaction of tense, aspect, modality and event notion, to examine how a Reichenbachian analysis of tense (or the kind of development thereof made by Sch pf and others involved in his Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft project) can be made compatible with an account of modality. It should be pointed out here that I am approaching this question as a descriptive linguist. My discussion of proposals made by logicians on the analysis of modality and tense is designed to elucidate the consequences of such proposals for a general linguistic theory, in other words, the view of language that they commit us to. I shall not, therefore, enter upon a discussion of the formal apparatus and expressions of such approaches, but will tacitly assume that they work, given the limited premisses upon which they are based. I shall begin with a brief look at the conceptualization of time in language and its consequences for modality. 1. Times and Worlds 1.1.1 While many approaches to tense (Jespersen (1924) and Reichenbach (1947) among them) have treated time as being purely linear (as objectively and ontologically it may be), more recent logico-linguistic approaches have developed a 'branching futures' model of time, which is phenomenologically more appealing (cf. Thomason 1970, Dowty 1977, Tedeschi 1981, etc.2). In essence this goes back to the ancient Aristotelian observation that 1 I wish to thank in particular Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen and Cornelia Hamann for their detailed comments on earlier drafts of this paper, the former for her comments on presentation and clarity, the latter for defending the model-theoretic, and in particular, the branching-futures position against my own position. I alone am responsible wherever I have refused to be convinced. 2 Thomason's paper is concerned, inter alia, with the logical problem of assigning a truth value to future contingent statements. Dowty's paper is an attempt to argue for a branching futures analysis of English Present Progressives (both current and futurate) in a truth-conditional semantics, while Tedeschi takes up the same topic specifically with respect to accomplishments, and presents suggestions for further extensions to

190

the past and the present are known, or at least knowable, while the future is unknown and can only be verified ex post facto, when it is no longer a future. Thus, ignoring questions of actuality, etc., the factuality of present and past allows us to distinguish a linear history of fact (the world as it is and was) from a multiplicity of non-fact or counter-fact (the world as it is not and was not). With the future we cannot distinguish the factual from the nonfactual or counter-factual, but only an indefinite number of more, or less, likely courses the world may take ("alternative possible futures" - Dowty 1977:63). Even if we are absolutely certain in a particular instance that something is going to happen, as, for example, when we utter Mary's going to faint, the proposition contained in such an utterance cannot be accorded the status of fact. A 'branching futures' model of time says simply that, in the default case, from the present (or more precisely, the moment of utterance (or 'point-ofspeech' as Reichenbach terms it), which is the ultimate time of assessment of what is factual and non-factual) onwards, time may be conceived of as branching into a number of alternative worlds3, and we may at most only speculate as to their candidacy for becoming fact, i.e. make a modal judgment about them, inferred from our empirical knowledge of the physical, social and rational planes of reality. This can be represented schematically as: past

This has been taken from Dowty (1977:63) leaving out some detail relating to the truth value of Progressives (the "imperfective paradox"4). The number of alternative paths at any one point in this model is per definitionem minimally two. S has been added to the representation for 'point-of-speech' or 'speech time'. This may be compared with the purely linear representation: past

S

future

1.1.2 An intermediate position seems to be adopted by Bull (1963), who, while keeping conditionals (both open and counter-factual) and to fcefore-clauses. Whatever the justification or plausibility of these analyses, it is the more general question of the appropriacy of the conceptualization of time that is of concern to us here. 3 Tedeschi, in fact, restricts himself to 'histories' and their branching futures, and avoids the whole issue of times and worlds. 4 "...the problem is to give an account of how [John was drawing a circle] entails that John was engaged in bringing-a-circle-into-existence activity but does not entail that he brought a circle into existence" (Dowty 1977:46).

191

time linear, analyzes tense in terms of four "axes of orientation" and three "Vectors". The axes are Point Present (PP), Retrospective Point (RP), Anticipated Point (AP) and Retrospective-Anticipated Point (RAP), and it seems, to judge by Bull's data, that empirically no language distinguishes more than these four. The three vectors (symbolized V) are: simultaneous (0), anterior (-) and posterior (+). This produces a maximal model for tense (excluding what Bull terms 'tensors', which may be relevant in the tense-systems of some languages (cf. Comrie 1985: Chap. 4 on languages with degrees of remoteness)) - E being 'event': 00

E(PP-V)

E(PPOV) /^\

E(PP+V)

h—E(AP^V)

oo

E(RP-V)

E(APOV)

E(RPOV)

E(AP + ^

E(RP + V)

oo

•"-^

|

E(RAP-V)

E(RA?bv)

E(RAP+ V)

oo

(Bull 1963:25) For English, Bull assigns: oo

t(FF-V) has sung

mrr+v) will sing

t(hrUV)^ sings /

-w

1 / E(AT-V) will have sung oo

•E(RP-A') had sung

"

··

|

E(RrUV) sang ·\

E(RAP-V) would have sung

Ιί(Κ.Ι+ν)

—

would sing E(RA&)V)

E(RAP + V)

oo

At first sight, it may seem that Bull is wrong in assigning will sing and would sing to the PP and RP axes respectively, while assigning will have sung and would have sung to AP and RAP respectively. But the clue to this apparent discrepancy is to be found in connexion with Bull's comments on Spanish, where he notes: "In terms of the theoretical tense system [

], Spanish has no systemic forms which

192

correspond to E(APOV), E(AP+V), E(RAPOV), and E(RAP+V). This lack, in one sense, is more apparent than real. The difference between E(PP+V) and E(APOV) or between E(RP+V) and E(RAPOV) is basically the difference between two formulations of the same facts, that isf from the point of view of either PP or RP. the axes AP and RAP are variant conceptualizations of the plus vector. [My emphasis RM] Any event taking place at AP, for example, must be posterior to PP and Cantara a la una hoy may therefore be described either in terms of the orientation of cantara to PP - the formula is E(PP+V) - or in terms of its orientation to the lexically defined axis a la una hoy - the formula is E(APOV). This difference in conceptualization is not significant whenever a single event is anticipated at either PP or RP, and special forms for either E(APOV) or E(RAPOV) would result only in needless redundancy." (Bull 1963:67) It seems that Bull is coming close to the view that what is future with respect to a point (PPOV) or (RPOV) can be seen as being on the continuation of that axis or as being on an axis that is not a continuation, but whose temporal origin is not anterior to that point. The links represented by the dotted lines from E(PPOV) to E(APOV) and from E(RPOV) to E(RAPOV) even suggest a branching future. It could also be argued, however, that had Bull not restricted the set of forms he includes under tense quite so radically, be going to would be a better candidate for E(PP+V) than will, which would assume the position for E(APOV), thus preserving the notional connexion between will sing and will have sung. Be going to (or for that matter be about to) are better analogues for the Perfect in English. An alternative solution for the Spanish Future would be to treat it as indeterminate between E(PP+V)andE(APOV). 1.1.3 The Reichenbachian analysis of time provides for 3 temporal points: point-of-speech (S), point-of-reference (R), and point-of-event (E). Reichenbach's analyses of tense forms in comparison to Bull's can be displayed as:5 S R E / have seen John Anterior Present

E I see John Simple Present

E / shall see John Posterior Present

R

/ had seen John Anterior Past

I saw John Simple Past

He would see John Posterior Past

5 The configurations are taken from Reichenbach (1947:290 and 297); the names from Reichenbach (1947:297).

193 E E E / shall have seen John Anterior Future

E I shall go (tomorrow) Simple Future

E / shall be going to see John Posterior Future

In addition to the implausibility of having three specifications each for forms that languages do not avail themselves of very often, and above all, which do not intuitively have three interpretations, viz. Posterior Past a s R - E - S o r R - S,E or R - S - E; and Anterior Future as E - S - R or E, S - R or S - E - R, it can be objected that Reichenbach failed to complete the picture in not specifying so-called Conditional Perfect, e.g. He would have gone and, like Bull, in not taking into account forms like be going to. 1.1.4 It was not, however, Reichenbach's intention to account for more than the purely temporal parameter in natural language tenses, and in this and its companion volume (cf. Schöpf, Hamann, etc.) the terms 'speech time' (ST), 'reference time' (RT), and 'event time' (ET) have been taken as the correlates of Reichenbach's terms, thus making explicit the restriction to the temporal parameter. The literature on the grammatical category of tense, however, with few exceptions, accepts that other parameters are involved in the semantic specification of tenses, more in some languages than others. In English, at least in recent accounts (cf. especially Quirk et al. 1972), a syntactic function Operator' has been recognized which has among its form classes morphological tense (present vs. past), temporal-aspectual auxiliaries (used to), temporal-modal auxiliaries (will, would), modal auxiliaries (may, should), etc. The latter have increasingly taken over the role that mood once played in older forms of English, and indeed some scholars, recent (e.g. Strang 1968:165) and not so recent (e.g. White 1761:1-16), have handled them as moods. The interaction of the temporal with the modal in the mood systems of Germanic and a great many other branches of Indo-European is obvious: the existence of the distinction between Present and Past Subjunctives, which in Spanish is still quite vital, may be cited as an example. The case, then, for attempting to unify an account of time with an account of mood and modality is supported not only by synchronic and diachronic factors in English, but also by contrastive linguistic considerations6. Indeed, attempts have already been made in this direction. We may single out, in particular, Lyons (1977), which also adopts a temporal triple very similar to a Reichenbachian triple (Lyons uses t0, ?,·, /·, where Reichenbach has S, R, E respectively). To this Lyons adds a specification for worlds: WQ, w^ w-, thus setting up time-world (or temporal-modal) pairs, 6 Cf. the interesting survey by Chung and Timberlake in Shopen (1985:202-258).

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e.g. "in WQ at tQ" (cf. also Dowty 1977: 62). The essence of Lyons' approach may be illustrated by his analysis of Don't tell lies!, viz. "I say in WQ - let it not be so in w,· - that p holds of w·' (Lyons 1977:828). In this, WQ is the world in which the utterance is made, w>(· is an "intensional world" and wan "extensional world" (cf. Lyons 1977:170). "If true a proposition will be true in some intensional world and it will be true of some (actual or possible) extensional world. To say that a proposition is true in some intensional world implies that it exists in that world; to say that it is true of some extensional world implies that the state-of-affairs (process, activity, etc.) which it describes exists in that world." (Lyons, loc. cit.) The differentiation between what Lyons means by 'intensional' and 'extensional' worlds is one that will be in principle accepted, but rather than adopt the terms 'intensional world'7 and 'extensional world', I shall, in what follows, extend the denotations of 'point-of-reference' (R) and 'point-of-event' (E) to include worlds as well as times. Since the point-ofspeech (S) may be similarly extended to cover a time of speech and a world in which that speech takes place, the Reichenbachian symbols S, R and E will be taken henceforth to stand for time-world pairs. 1.2.0 So far, I have tacitly assumed that it is a temporal analysis which requires complementing by a modal component. This is tantamount to acknowledging the primacy of temporal relations, yet this position is open to question. Not only is it demonstrable that a good proportion of the world's languages have a fundamental aspectual system, i.e. there 7 I have certain qualms about the term 'intensional world' for two reasons. Lyons uses 'intensional' as the opposite of 'extensional', when the latter is taken as a synonym for 'truth-functional'. Since expressions such as / think that ρ, I know that p, etc. and modality in general are viewed by most philosophers as being non-truth-functional, they can be said to be non-extensional and hence 'intensional'. Equating extensionality with truth-functionality is not a position that is universally accepted, however, and this use of 'intensional' should not be associated with the use of 'intension' in the intension vs. extension distinction, at least as it is usually drawn, extension being the entity or class of entities referred to (cf. 'reference' and 'denotation' as used by Lyons) and intension the properties of that entity or class. If we apply the intension vs. extension differentiation rigorously to an epistemically interpreted expression like: The king may be dying. then the extension of is a specific object world situation referred to by the expression comprising an identified individual conventionally known as 'king' undergoing a process known as 'dying* at a contextually or co-textually determined time. The intension(s) of the expression are the sets of properties defining or characterizing the terms of the expression. With may, we can equally, if we are being rigorous, differentiate intension and extension. The extension is, however, not the object world situation, but a degree of probability of the truth of the proposition [the king be dying]. The intension is the set of properties that go to make up the kind of possibility the speaker ascribes to the proposition. 'Intensional world' would, therefore, be better termed 'conceptual world" or 'evaluative world' or 'modal world'. Where I have used the term, I have accordingly placed it in single quotation marks.

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is at least an equal case for the primacy of aspect, there are also languages, Hopi is reportedly one of them (cf. Whorf 1938), that are devoid of tense and aspect, but have fundamental distinctions for kinds of reality and numerous modal distinctions. We could, then, reverse the question posed by this paper and ask how an analysis of tense can be incorporated into an analysis of modality. 1.2.1 Let us consider briefly what a modally-based analysis of tense would involve (cf. also Lyons 1977:809-823). We may take as our point of departure the world of the speaker and the world to which he refers, henceforth the Object world' (extra-linguistic world), which may in fact be purely a construct of the speaker's (or a society's) imagination, a world of fantasy, or a representation of a world. The object world (wy) may involve an event (or aspect thereof) or a process or a state or a secondary state (habitual action, potential action, non-occurrence, abstract relation, etc.). These, in turn, may be conceptualized by the speaker in a variety of ways - this is the 'intensional' world (w,·) - and presented as real or non-real, and if non-real then either as possible alternative worlds, from the point of view of the speaker in WQ (at t0), or impossible ones. This conceptualization as real or non-real has nothing to do with the objective reality or non-reality (the mode of existence) of the object world. 1.2.2 It is possible to extend such an analysis to cover a number of tense phenomena. For example, the use in English of Past in narrative can be analyzed as the presentation of events as factual8 in a world that is remote from the speaker's current reality or world, his 'hie et mine' (cf. Bull's "Retrospective point"). Similarly, the use of Past in conjunction with states of volition, etc. which are not temporally remote, e.g. Did you want to see me? can be explained in terms of the speaker dissociating himself or removing himself from an actual, current commitment, whatever the pragmatic reasons and conventions for this might be (politeness, doubt, etc.), his hiding, in other words, behind an expression of remoteness. The analysis Lyons suggests for John was coining tomorrow, viz. "I assert (in w ) that it was a fact in iv- ( < w ) that 'John be coming' is true of w· ; ( > w0)" (Lyons 1977:814) appears to be of a similar nature, i.e. tense interpreted in terms of worlds, but expressions such as wi < w0 and w- > WQ are really shorthand for ti < tQ and t· > t0, since worlds cannot be quantitatively distinct from one another, i.e. greater or less, they can only be quali8 Objectively, they may not be facts or, at least, not be verified. The point is that they are presented by the speaker as facts.

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tatively distinct, - whether this qualitative distinction operates in terms of identity, similarity, consistency or proximity is a question we may leave open for the moment9. 1.2.3 What we have said above does not necessarily mean that the analysis of tense has to be conducted in terms of two discrete and independently variable parameters: time and worlds. Nor does it mean that we have to opt for one or the other, positions which would imply a universal status for the parameter chosen. Rather, we should view the Reichenbachian 'points' S, R and E as being amalgams of the temporal and the modal/existential. We may cite in support of this the fact that t and w specifications cannot vary arbitrarily, indeed they cannot vary at all as far as S is concerned (hie et nunc). If we have a report of an utterance, its S (or actually S'), even though it is the hie et nunc of that utterance, is of necessity distinct from that of the speaker reporting it, and constitutes the E of the speaker's S (cf. Schöpf 1984:366f. and passim). With E, some variation is possible: an event may actually occur, or a state (or state-of-affairs) hold, at E, but a secondary state such as a habit or potential action/activity or an abstract relation, e.g. John smokes or Mrs Thatcher rules England with a rod of iron, does not have to have any realization at the time in question of what is denoted by the predicates < SMOKE > and 10. Greater variation is possible with R, yet even here only within fixed limits: times that are anterior, posterior or simultaneous linked with worlds that are real, potential or unreal (cf. Leech (1971:112) 'factual' vs. 'theoretical' vs. 'hypothetical'). In what follows I shall adopt the terms: 'realis', 'potentialis' and 'irrealis'11. For our purposes, this three-way distinction12 is interpretable in terms of the way R relates S to E. In the 'realis' case, whatever is said to hold or occur in the object world by means of the wording of the predication is presented by the speaker as true. We could say that there is conformity or a match between the object world and the world in which the speaker finds himself13. In mediating between S and E, R has a primarily temporal func9 Lewis (1973) suggests similarity of possible worlds and Dowty (1977), following Thornason (1970), a likeness relation. Clearly, if one adopts the distinction between intensional and extensional worlds, then identity is ruled out as intensions cannot be equivalent to extensions. 10 English rarely uses grammatical means to differentiate Object world reality" and Object world non-reality1 - the world of a story, legend, myth, painting, poem, play, etc., though once upon a time (+ Past) is usually reserved for fairy stories. 11 These have sometimes been employed in Latin grammars to denote types of conditional sentence pattern. 12 Some writers, e.g. Chung and Timberlake (1985) make a distinction between 'realis' and 'irrealis', 'irrealis' including both 'potentialis' and 'irrealis' (cf. their comments on Attic Greek Subjunctive and Optative, p.241). In Matthews (1979), I came to the conclusion that a set of time-world modalities: 'present', 'past', and 'future' (which would include 'potentialis') was inadequate, and I was forced to adopt 'irrealis' for counterfactual and counter-expectational utterances (cf. Matthews 1979: 547ff.). 13 The expression 'finds himself is relative to the honesty of the speaker. In lying, for instance, the speaker 'finds himself in a world which he knows is not his, but which he knowingly and falsely presents as

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tion. In the 'potentialis' case, the predication is presented as neither true nor false. There is no match but also no conflict between the object world and the world in which the speaker finds himself: the object world is no more than reconcilable with the speaker's world and this should be reflected by the specification of R. In the 'irrealis' case, the predication is presented as being false, i.e. object world conflicts with the world in which the speaker finds himself. The 'match' or 'conflict' is assessed not only in terms of 'facts', but also in terms of expectations and beliefs in the respective worlds. 'Irrealis' should be differentiated from 'counter-factual conditionals', which are only a subset of expressions that fit into the 'irrealis' paradigm, viz. expressions of the form: If X had Ved, then Υ would have Ved that have particularly attracted the attention of logicians. It is true that this subset can be assigned clear truth values, but the absence of a truth value does not mean that expressions of the form: If X were to V, then Υ would V are of a linguistically different order. As Lyons (1977:819) notes in connexion with: We could be in Africa. used "say, on a fine night in Scotland (Boyd & Thome 1969:73)": "The possible world, H··, of which the proposition expressed by [this example] is true and the intensional world, wt, in which this proposition is true are envisaged as being contemporaneous with, but modally remote from, w0... Contrafactivity is simply a special case of subjectively remote possibility." Lyons himself does not, however, formally pursue the question of how "modally remote" worlds might be represented or specified. 1.2.4 One treatment of this subset of irrealis conditional sentences, cf. in particular Tedeschi (1981), is to view the branching future as being transposed back in time to the point of divergence of the real world ('history') from the non-real world. 'Counter-factual conditions', then, are, for him, assertions based on a future path (condition) that failed in the past to be followed by the course of events (the linear history). I will have occasion to return to this later. An alternative to the branching-futures model might be termed the 'parallel worlds model'14. This says that at S, and for any S, the speaker may entertain a number of temporally parallel 'intensional' worlds, one of which he knows (or claims to know) matches the obmatching the object world. 14 This is an intuitively constructed model that I used for work connected with the Tensing System of English project.

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ject world ('realis'), others which he does not know (or does not claim to know) not to match the object world ('potentialis'), and yet others that he knows (or claims to know) to be contrary to his world (Irrealis'). For these worlds, temporal specifications for E are variable, thus for 'irrealis' (not to be equated with 'counter-factuality'), we may have, e.g. Jane would come {tomorrow) vs. Jane would be coming (right now) vs. Jane would have come (yesterday). The essential difference between the two models lies in the fact that the 'branching futures' model (henceforth BF) entails a definite, if unspecified, point of divergence between reality and non-reality ('fact and fiction') on the time line (or, in the case of Tedeschi, on the history line), while the 'parallel worlds' model (henceforth PW), allows events, whether (factual or fictional) to be placed on or against the time line while viewing them, from the point-of-view of the speaker, as real, potential or unreal. With PW, the 'fact or fiction' assignment is at one remove from the time line; with BF it is within the time line. 1.3 Having outlined two ways of approaching the integration of times and worlds, we can now examine in detail how certain types of modality can (or cannot) be accommodated by them. I shall look, in particular, at 'dynamic' modality, 'deontic' modality, 'epistemic' modality, tentative assertions, conditional sentences, and past modality. 2. PW and BF meet the Modals 2.0 The essential components of an iconic15 representation of the temporal relations in tense are: S (the point of speech), R (the point of reference), E (the point of event) and their positions relative to each other and a left-to-right time line. The iconic representation of an historical event like The Normans conquered England would (cf. Schöpf 1984) be:

Following Schöpf (1976) and (1984), E can be further represented in terms of the temporal structure of its event notion. The location of E in time, moreover, can be specified by certain temporal adverbials (on 14 October, 1066) (cf. Hamann, Harkness and Schöpf, all 15 I use 'iconic' to mean 'resembling in some way what is represented' as opposed to 'symbolic', which involves an arbitrary relationship between a sign and the thing it stands for (cf. the use in phonetic transcription in Abercrombie 1961).

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in volume I, for discussion of the relationship between R and adverbial specification). Adopting this framework, though without representing the temporally relevant features of event notions, and allowing for the modification argued for earlier, that tense has modal concomitants, we can say that the relation of R to S may be interpreted temporally and modally. The temporal is reflected in the iconic representation by means of the time line, the modal, if it is not to be seen as merely an inference from time, will have to be reflected as some kind of mediation between the world of the speaker which is associated with S and the object world associated with E by means of either a parallel world or a branching future. This mediation is, as already proposed, performed by R. It should be noted that this kind of iconic representation can only incidentally reflect the ontological distinction between 'intensional' and 'extensionaT worlds that is fundamental to Lyons' approach, that is, by means of the obligatory assignment of R and E for every tensed expression.16 An alternative to an iconic representation is a notation involving S, R and E and the relations: ' = ' for simultaneity (not identity); '>' and ', and it is clear that this event (if and when realized) cannot lie prior to S. We cannot attest felicitous utterances such as: * Have written your essay! * Have been writing your essay! even for future completion, though we can attest: Have your essay written (by then)! where the event, having an essay in a completed state, again cannot lie prior to S. We can also attest a Progressive Imperative, but only if the point at which the process obtains is made explicit: * Be writing your essays! Be writing your essay (when Iget back)! Here the adverbial gives us the temporal location of the world in which the process is to proceed. And this itself is necessarily posterior to S, as can be demonstrated by the oddity of: * Be writing your essays as up to now! If a speaker wishes an existing process to continue, he cannot express this by means of a Progressive Imperative but has to make his instruction explicitly one to continue: Continue writing your essays! Continue writing your essays until I return! If it is clear that E cannot be anterior to S in the above, but it can be at any time posterior toS:

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Write your essays immediately! Write your essays tomorrow! Write your essays next month! then it seems that temporal configurations conforming to: (S < R) & (R 3 E) (for events) and (S < R) & (R c E) (for states and processes) is required for Imperatives, though with the refinement that R need only be minimally posterior to S (cf. Lyons (1977:830), in which the symbol < is employed, contrary to its strict use, to specify this). But even in cases such as Continue writing your essays!, we are not referring to the object world as it is or will become without our intervention, but precisely to a state of the object world that is deemed to be possible and can be brought about only by our intervention, i.e. by telling someone to bring it about. If we translate this into the terms of PW and BF, then an Imperative like Write your essay! can be characterized, respectively: a) an instruction to enact < YOU WRITE YOUR ESSAY > at some time in the object world that is posterior to the time of S: enactment is viewed as possible as from the time of S on, irrespective of whether it was previously possible or not. b) an instruction to enact < YOU WRITE YOUR ESSAY > at some time on the time branch that proceeds from the time of S: this branch is viewed as a possible future with respect to S. The contrasting cases are uses of declaratives such as You're going to write your essay!, which can have the force of a directive by virtue of the fact that its assertion contradicts the expected future state of the object world as assessed at the time of S; and desideratives such as If onfy you'd write your essay!, which cannot be taken as a directive, since the speaker has committed himself to the impossibility/unreality of the enactment of < YOU WRITE YOUR ESSAY >. Here the potential event time seems to surround the time of S, not proceed from it. The utterance is taken as a comment on the discrepancy between the object world and the world the speaker desires. 2.2.2 Before we attempt to incorporate the specifications suggested for imperatives into iconic representations, we should consider how R, which is now being taken as a timeworld pair, should be shown in such representations. If we take » * to represent a w possible parallel world, this covers R adequately and allows us to pick out an R1 within that world - for the sake of simplicity, the superscriptl will be omitted - then PW can be represented as:

204

In the case of BF, the Rw is the branch that is picked out and R1, also for the sake of simplicity shown as R, pinpoints a time on that branch. Since the BF model represents events on the time line (history line) or branch, E will have to appear on the branch itself, so R will be shown as being just off the line, as in:

(For the sake of typographic simplicity, I represent the future branches containing E as side axes from a monopodial time line rather than as the co-axials of Dowty's and Tedeschi's sympodial representation.) For PW, then, we can represent Write your essay! as: S * -

- R E

*

00

00

Write your essay! (PW)

This represents (Sl < R1) & (R1 => E1)19· Strictly speaking, time encompasses the whole set of relations, and we would be justified in representing:

R -

- *

E oo

with the time line spread. But we will not take account of this in our representations. The representation in BF would be: R ^ E —'

Write your essays! (BF)

19 The relation R n E could be represented more precisely as: /R\ or R or |—R—| / E \ IT E Just as we have excluded details of the structuring of E, and hence cannot represent R C E precisely, we will foresake precision here for a minimally cluttered iconic representation.

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The same configurations as the above can be taken for a 'directive deontic', such as You may leave, which is interpreted, for PW, as the speaker's creating a possible world ('granting permission') to match an object world occurrence of at some time posterior to S, and for BF, as creating a branch on which < YOU LEAVE> is enacted. 2.2.3 Not all deontic uses of modal expressions are directive. We find expressions that, illocutionarily, are weaker, as well as expressions that could be termed 'deontic comment': (la)

(lb)

You ought to go, You ought to have gone.

In cases like la, a 'deontic attitude* is adopted by the speaker towards the potential enactment of ; in cases like lb, the attitude adopted is towards the failure to enact . The temporal location of the event is largely determinative in this. Generally, a Simple Infinitive20 will be involved in the first case; a Perfect and-or Progressive Infinitive in the second. The Simple Infinitive, however, is, like the Present Simple, ambiguous. If < YOU GO > is a proposal for the world that is temporally minimally posterior to S, the utterance as a whole is interpreted as a recommendation, which may not yet be followed. But if < YOU GO > is taken as habitual action (a secondary state) proposed for a current world, i.e. one that is simultaneous to S, then the utterance is a 'deontic comment' on the state of the current (actual) world - even if the addressee were to start enacting he can only be said to be making good an omission, and this can always be judged to be too late. Similarly, if < YOU GO > was a proposal for the past world, then uttering lb is a comment on the discrepancy between what was enacted as opposed to what could and should have been enacted. In all three cases, however, we have to do with a current assessment of social and-or moral desirability (i.e. at S). A contrasting case of non-current desirability can be expressed by They were supposed to go, which, unlike They ought to have gone, does not entail failure to enact . While the world of social/moral responsibility is assessed at S (i.e. is temporally undifferentiated), the time of the event or state-of-affairs varies, and in order to preserve temporal specifications we have to allow for three cases: (S < R) & (R ^ E) (la - event reading), (S = R) & (R c E) (la - secondary-state reading), (S = R) & (R > E) (lb). There is, therefore, an apparent conflict between the 'oMg/zf-world', Rw, which must hold at S1, and the time R1 that has to be picked out in it for the event reading of la, i.e. S1 < R1. This can be resolved for PW by placing a temporal point-of-reference posterior to S within the parallel world of social/moral desirability. 20 Other tense forms are, of course, possible with appropriate adverbial support, e.g. You ought to have gone by the 23rd of next month.

206 S *

R E

- *

«

oo

You outfit to go (PW)

For BF, we have the intuitively acceptable representation of the branch on which E < YOU GO> occurs as an 'as-of-S' branch. Preserving the temporal configuration (S < R) & (R = E), we get: R ___ — E" ~" E

You ought to go (BF)

For a deontic comment on failure to fulfil a proposal in anterior time, You ought to have gone, the BF configuration can reflect the counter-factuality by indicating the fulfilment of the ~E branch by means of a solid line. It will also require the placing of the branching node before S, in order to get the necessary (S = R) & (R > E) configuration: S R —

E

You ought to have gone (BF)

For PW, we can preserve the parallel world representation but align R with S:

s E * You ought to have gone (PW)

BF, here, appears to score over PW in indicating the counter-factuality of at R < S. 2.2.4 To an expression like You were supposed to go, we can append both and did and but didn't, which is an indication that it may have an Open' modality like You ought to go, but that this is shifted to a time prior to S. Its configuration would thus be similar to that for a past tense, except that with PW, R is in a parallel world in the past, and with BF on a branch that may or may not have been pursued. A question raised by such forms is whether R^E, as for Past, or R < E, as with 'future in the past' expressions. If the latter, BF could place R at the branching node, viz.:

207 R

___ E"~ - — -- E — You were supposed to go (BF if R < E)

If the former, i.e. "your going was required' - a past deontic comment - the PW and BF configurations would be:

R - - - * E « You were supposed to go (PW if R => E)

R . E"""

— ~E — You were supposed to go (BF if R 3 E)

Of the two, the latter squares better with the patterning of be supposed to in narrative, e.g. He was supposed to go yesterday, the former might match its patterning in indirect speech and thought, e.g. He knew he was supposed to go (the next morning). There is also the case of He was supposed to go tomorrow, which, as I shall argue later, has to be handled in terms of anteriority of R for the modal expression, though another R (or something similar) is needed for the time specification 'tomorrow* of (cf. 4.2.7). In this set of examples, BF shows a certain advantage over PW in being able to distinguish contrafactual from non-factual cases, but also has the disadvantage that the branching node has to be specified but cannot always be linked to S by means of R, while at the same time preserving established temporal configurations. This suggests that, for BF, a further temporal component, the point-of-branching, might be required, and yet, such a component would be motivated only by the model, not by the linguistic facts we are trying to capture in the model. 2.3.1 In temporal terms, there is a strong similarity between the non-directive deontic utterances that have just been discussed ('deontic comments') and epistemic utterances. While with deontic interpretations of: John ought to go. John ought to be at home.

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attitudes to and are adopted that implicate the discrepancy between how the world is (or is expected to be) and how the speaker and-or society deems (or has deemed) that it should be, with epistemic interpretations of: (3a) (3b)

John may go. John may be at home.

attitudes to and are adopted that involve lack of knowledge as to how the world is (or will turn out to be). Though clearly there is a difference in the nature of the kind of alternative worlds involved, that is, in its conceptual terms and its conditioning factors (cf. Perkins's 'system of organized belief and 'set of circumstances under which the system is relevant' (Perkins 1983:28-29)), the temporal potential for E is analogous, and this should be reflected in a modified Reichenbachian representation, viz.

S *

- R - - - * E

oo

oo

John may be at home (PW)

S E

John may go (PW)

For BF, representation is not quite so straightforward. In order to represent the discrepancy between what is known and what is subject to speculation, it is necessary to shift the point of branching to some unspecified point prior to S, as we did in the case of You ought to have gone above. That is, we no longer have a branching future with respect to S, but with respect to some other (unspecified) point. A possible representation for John may be at home is one which says that E is on one 'future branch' and that R is included in this, thus we preserve the intuitive simultaneity of S and E, mediated through the unknown world of R, viz. S R John may be at home (BF)

In the case of John may go, assuming a non-iterative (non-habitual) interpretation, E will be placed posterior to S and the branching point is not necessarily distinct from S. If R ^ E is to be preserved, the following configuration might apply:

209 R ^- "" --E """ -- E — — —

John may go (BF)

The difference between John may be at home and John may go, i.e MAY and MAY < event >, is thus not only reflected in the temporal configurations (S = R) & (R c E) and (S < R) & (R ^ E), but also in the point at which the branching node falls. On the other hand, one might argue that R, i.e. R1, should be the branch as a whole, that at S the speaker cannot say whether the branch including E or the branch including ~E holds. But this position would not only blur the world vs. time distinction, it would also make it impossible to preserve the R , with no adverbial determination of time. The king may die. The king will die. ?* The king must die. 4c would only be interpretable epistemically if the context established the logical priority 21 It should be pointed out that may with state-of-affairs predicates , can with suitable context be interpreted as referring to a future state-of-affairs. This is analogous to the ambivalent reference of Present Progressives and Simple Present states, though the latter are sometimes harder to construe with future reference.

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of the basis for an inference, such as the reconstruction of the partially known plot of a play, cf. (I think) the king must die (in the end), because the last scene shows the coronation of his son. This, of course, is arguably a world within a world. 4c could also become interpretable, with contextually or co-textually established future temporalization, if the event is seen as part of a schedule: The king must die tomorrow then (but I realty thought it was planned for today). This kind of 'death by appointment' is not the most usual meaning of , however. When is presented as a process, i.e. progressivized, and interpreted as referring to a current (not future) process, will appears to be the awkward item: (5a) (5b) (5c)

The king may be dying. ? The king will be dying. The king must be dying.

While 5a represents a speculation about the probable nature of the current process and 5c a necessary inference (from certain unspecified pointers) as to the nature of the process, 5b represents a relatively confident prediction about a present process that is not (or is not presented as being) accessible to verification. The strangeness of 5b arises from the fact that a process of dying, which would normally invite concern, is 'detached' from the speaker by setting it in another world. But if we contextualize - assuming A and B to be courtiers, with A presuming B to be better informed: A:

Wliat's wrong with the king?

B:

He's dying (I'd say). He may be dying. He'll be dying (Ishould think). * He must be dying.

He'll be dying comes across as a speculation based on indifference to the situation or distance therefrom.22 A response with must, which is an inference based on evidence and prior expectations is inappropriate as an expression of opinion or speculation. The arguments above have tended to support the view that will, may and must can each be 22 The pragmatic conditions for this 'prophetic' use of will are not only complex, they may also be regionally determined, occurring more readily in Scottish and Irish varieties of English. But this does not affect its epistemic status.

211

ascribed a distinct temporal orientation: will is future oriented, may is present oriented, and must is past oriented23. 2.3.3 Let us examine how the two models might represent 4a-b and 5a-c, and some of their non-modal correlates. 2.3.3.1 The king may die requires that E should be posterior to S. With PW the possible world of may is distinct from the world of is going to, which most nearly denotes the continuation of the actual world into posterior time, or in other words, is the least modal future expression. In terms of the temporal relations of S and E, there is no difference, and so we can justify the same configuration as for John may go in 2.3.1, viz.

The king may die (PW)

With is going to, we need to consider a) whether a parallel possible world is necessary and b) how R relates S to E. The function of be going to is to indicate that the time of enactment of an event is posterior to S and that this enactment will take place as a matter of course in the world which extends from S. It is only 'modal' insofar as it has to do with events in the future, but this should not be taken to mean that it involves a distinct 'intensional' world. Thus in an example like The king is going to die the future event is already part of the speaker's present reality, his 'realis' world. There is therefore a strong case for taking its temporal configuration to be (S = R) & (R < E), and not representing it in terms of a parallel possible world but in terms of the actual world, viz. S R The king's going to die (PW)

BF, however, commits us to branching futures 'as of S', so the expressions would have to 23 'Past oriented' does not mean having a past tense specification, though a specification similar to that of a perfect tense could, cross-linguistically, be supported in view of the well attested double function of the Georgian Perfect (cf. Comrie (1976:109) inter al.) whose translation potential encompasses English Perfect forms and epistemic modal use such as 'inferential must'. There is also a morphological link between Perfect and Inferential in Bulgarian (Comrie 1976: ibid.). The fact that English must is diachronically a past form tends to corroborate this, but German muß, a paronym of the German etymon of must, would, being non-past, refute this.

212

be differentiated according to the probability value attached to a future branch, i.e. S

^, —' ^-E" -C^.- - Ε - - ~

may-branch 'possible' is going ίο-branch 'certain'

and of course in terms of the location of R. But the location of R and even its function has already been seen to be a weak point with BF. If The king may die and The king's going to die are represented in BF in terms of the temporal specifications assumed for PW, we would have something like:

S R ^· ^- Ε"" ~ Ε S R

The tongmay die (BF)

--^ E"" ^" E

The king's going to die (BF)

In one case, R is linked to the branching node, in the other it is not. As before, a strange state-of-affairs. 2.3.3.2 The king may be dying requires that E should extend back and forwards in time from S. The contrast with be going to drawn above is less appropriate, since be going to is rarely used when the event or process is current. Instead, we can take is dying. For PW we could justify24: S * - - - R E

*

The lang may be dying (PW)

vs.

24 I have not employed the full details here of Sch pf s representation of the event notion of q.v. Sch pf (1984:237).

213 S R E - - - -

The king's dying (PW)

For BF, we would, as already pointed out, have to place the node of the branches at a point anterior to S; the process of dying being, in the case of may, on a non-factual but possible branch at S:

S R -=="

__ --

~E — The king may be dying (BF)

For the non-modal progressive (is dying) the configuration we would expect is one in which at S ( = R), the process is in progress but not complete:

Έ.—

The king's dying (BF)

Under normal circumstances, an assertion of this kind will be interpreted as implicating the completion of the process. But such an implicature is, of its nature, defeasible, and so it is possible for another branch to fork off at R (= S) - or later - on which this completion of the process does not occur. It is this kind of assertion that has so greatly exercised scholars like Dowty, etc. in the formalization of their truth conditions. For our purposes, the branches in the BF representation would have to include one on which the tf of , i.e. death, lies and another on which this tf is absent. Such branches could also be argued for the may be dying configuration, viz. S R

Λ£.^ The king may be dying (BF)

2.3.3.3 We should perhaps consider a little more closely at this point what it is we are reflecting and what we should be reflecting in such BF configurations. If we say that it is the positioning of the branching node with respect to R ( = S) that distinguishes The king may die from The king may be dying, we have to recognize that the actual location of this node is, at least in the case of The king may be dying, indeterminate. This much may be accep-

214

ted. But in fact there is no reason to represent time itself as branching. What is involved in the so-called 'imperfective paradox' is not the branching of time (or history, pace Tedeschi 1981) but the branching of the course or development of an event or process within time (or history). This could be represented as: S R

E—

^, -^

*^

tE

--

~tE

--

—

But we run up against the problem that this representation forces us to specify a node at S or some time subsequent to S, when no such temporal specification can be inferred from the syntagm may be dying, and when none of the three terms (S,R, and E) of the Reichenbachian triple can be made to specify such as node. If we accept the ontological distinction between 'intensional' and 'extensional' worlds drawn by Lyons (1977) (or something like it), we have reason to say that our representation of The king may be dying requires not a posited branching node on the time line at some indefinite point prior to S, but a cessation of known history with respect to at some indefinite point prior to S. This could be represented by: S R - - - - - - - known history

'be dying'

The king may be dying

where tfE is on the continuation past R of the line of the event toward which the speaker's subjective judgment is made that it is possible to determine this as 'dying'. By convention, it could be said that at any point after R, the course of the event could change, but that this need not be represented. Such argumentation appears to strengthen the case for PW, even if not in exactly the formulation we have taken so far, but we will leave this aside for the moment and consider the remaining examples in 4. and 5. 2.3.3.4 As with The king may die, E for The king will die must be located posterior to S. With PW, the future world of will is distinct from the world of is going to in that it denotes a world that is not a direct continuation of the actual world into posterior time. In terms of temporal configuration, we appear to need to indicate that the wz7/-world itself is posterior to S, a predicted or prophesied world with respect to S, hence:

215

s » - - - R - - - * E «

The king will die (PW)

Ignoring the pragmatic restrictions made earlier, The king will be dying would typically refer to a process within a future world, differing only aspectually from the expression above, 4b. Taking these restrictions into account, however, that is taking it as if it were used epistemically, the process E will extend over S, but be accessed via a future world: 'the present through the eyes of the future'. The problem involved in representing this is to avoid confusion with the configuration for a so-called Future Perfect: The king will have died, viz. (S < R) & (R > E), in Reichenbachian formulation. The following potential solutions present themselves: i) handling epistemic uses of will as being co-textually or contextually determined and thus saying that temporal specification is dependent on a time set by adverbials, or other means; 11) handling epistemic uses of will as a kind of forwardshift of the current world into a future world (cf. the backshift of English in 1) reported speech and thought, 2) superseded intentions. Backshift 1 can be a means of distancing the speaker from the validity of what is said, and backshift 2 a means of rejecting the actuality of intentions). Forwardshift is a means of projecting into a future world the uncertain state of the current/actual world. Solution rests upon the modified claim that there are four determinants of temporal relations: Speech time, Reference time, Adverbial time (here T) and Event time, cf. Harkness, Hamann and Schöpf (Vol. I). It could be expressed semi-formulaically: (S < R) & (R > T) & (T c E)

Solution II, analogously, would be: (SR')&(R'cE) Solution I could be represented in PW as:

S R -

*

*

T E

- - -

while solution II could be represented:

The lang will be dying (PWl)

216

R' E — - -

The l ng will be dying (PWll)

These are configurationally equivalent, and fail equally to solve the problem of how T (unless it is deictically anchored to S, cf. Harkness (vol.1)) or R' may be said to be simultaneous to S, unless we introduce into the iconic representation what is expressed in: (S < R) & (R > R') & (T/R1 = S) & (R1 c E)

If it were to turn out that all potential adverbial specifications are deictically anchored to S, then at least I is vindicated. In BF, The king will die will receive the same kind of representation as The king may die and The king is going to die. Arguably, the world in which the event takes place does not proceed directly (necessarily) but only indirectly (contingently) from the actual world, but this cannot be captured by BF representations as formulated. For an epistemic reading of The king will be dying, BF would require a configuration in which the branching node is again anterior to S, the witf-branch being one of greater probability than others. I exclude here the details of extra branching needed for the 'imperfectivity' of be dying, cf. above. S R — -- Ε

--' --

witf-branch The king will be dying (BF)

This reflects the similarity in non-reality between will and may (cf. above), but fails to reflect the inherent futurity of will as opposed to may. 2.3.3.5 With The king must be dying, the Ε of the process must be located around S, as will that of The king will be dying above. The world of necessary particular inference25, in contrast, is one that can only be backward looking, so it is arguable that PW would have to represent it as extending up to, but no further than, S, and with R as being no later in time thanS: 25 I say 'particular inference' to differentiate this world from universal inferences such as one finds, arguably, in 2 and 2 are (necessarily) 4.

217 S R* E — - - -

The king must be dying (PW) oo

In BF, the configuration will be much as for will be dying, but will select a slightly different kind of branch, one that is not yet known to be factual, but the only one filling the gap between what was last known and S. As before, this cannot be reflected, except by labelling the branch. S R --

E — —

The king must be dying (BF)

If ?* The king must die were suitably determined by a future-referring adverbial, e.g. tomorrow, its PW and BF configurations keeping S = R or S > R and incorporating an additional temporal specification for the adverbial, would be:

i-T-i E

The king must die (tomorrow) (PW)

S R

.

— — ~E — The king must die (tomorrow) (BF)

2.3.4 What the above has demonstrated is that PW allows us, albeit with major difficulties, to preserve the integrity of the representation of the world involved in the modal expression, while BF requires different branching nodes for different E specifications, even though the modality is constant, i.e. there is no 'integrity' of representation of the modal expression. A problem with PW is whether the temporal orientation of the various kinds of world should be incorporated in the iconic representation, or whether they should all receive the configuration:

co-

with R and E assigned at appropriate points. If the latter is taken, we get into difficulties

218

with the future use of will as in The king will die. If the former is taken, we get into difficulties with must and the 'epistemic' use of will. The principle of forwardshift does not seem to overcome this second difficulty. As far as BF is concerned, we have a set of configurations that fail to preserve the integrity of the kind of world involved in the three modal expressions, but give a satisfactory enough division between future-reference (events) in The king may die and The king will die, and present-reference (processes, states, etc.) in The king may/will/must be dying, in terms of the location of the branching node. But this is probably over-specification. The whole question of branches as worlds is itself suspect. More fundamentally, BF is a timebased account of modality, and this is, ultimately, the source of our difficulties in adapting it to represent modality. 2.4 We should, before concluding this section, have a brief look at 'tentative' expressions of modality such as: They They They They

could be there. might be there. should be there. ought to be there.

when not interpreted dynamically (in the case of could) or deontically (in the case of should and ought to). We should note that, as with epistemic uses of may and will, the temporal location of E, can be posterior or simultaneous to S; without adverbial determination (e.g. by then, tomorrow, etc.) E will be simultaneous, rather than posterior, to S. E is anterior to S when a Perfect Infinitive is selected: They could have been there. They might have been there. should and ought to + Perfect Infinitive are normally limited to a 'deontic comment' interpretation, except in cases of present reconstruction of past events, usually with adverbial determination such as: at that moment, by then, etc. in the context of a detective story, criminal proceedings, etc. Would is also occasionally found as a kind of 'tentative' that may be contrasted with might: She might be there. She'd be there.

219

In the case of might, the speaker fails to commit himself even to a probability value: he concedes the possibility but does not adopt it as part of his world. The use of would in utterances like the second has often been explained in terms of ellipsis of an »/-clause, but this seems to be a rather superficial explanation. Not only are there (conventionalized) uses where ellipsis of an i/-clause is not intuitable and certainly not determinable, viz. There would appear to be some mistake, officer. there are also cases where it is the presupposition of an imaginary and, for the hearer or reader, improbable world that is sufficient to prompt the choice of would. In principle, such 'tentative' expressions are a variety of 'epistemic' use, and not cases that can be explained as past temporalization or backshift, i.e. They could be here cannot be explained as viewed via the past (cf. my arguments in 3.2.1). There is, therefore, no need to exemplify their configurations, given the formulation of the models adopted so far. BF would, as before, reflect only the temporal configuration; PW, as formulated, would fail to reflect the difference in the kind of world adopted not just in terms of its probability, but also in terms of its remoteness. Before looking at how this may be improved upon, we should look at the complex issue of conditional sentences. 3. PW and BF take on Conditionals26 3.0 There have been numerous attempts to classify conditional sentences, both from the point of view of logic or formal semantics (into which category Tedeschi would fall) and from the point of view of linguistic or syntactico-semantic description (e.g. Palmer 1974, Davies 1979, Matthews 1979, inter al.). Logicians and model-theoreticians have been largely concerned with truth values, the adequacy of material implication for the relationship between protasis and apodosis, and, more recently, with time; while descriptive linguists have been more concerned with tense-mood sequencing and patterning. To an extent, these concerns have dictated the kind of classification made. It is not appropriate here to enter into a discussion of such classifications, other than to remind ourselves that logicians have often overlooked the fact that what they term 'counter-factual conditionals'27 are only part of a more general paradigm of 'irrealis' conditionals. And this is prob26 This section owes something to Chap. 13 in Matthews (1979), but has also been influenced by Davies (1979). It was written in winter 1986-7, before the Traugott et al. volume (1986) came to my attention. Several papers in this, especially Comrie's, are relevant to the general thrust of my arguments. 27 Lewis (1973), for example, differentiates his subject matter 'counter-factuals' from other 'subjunctive conditionals' such as If our ground troops entered Laos next year, there would be trouble (Lewis 1973:4), on the grounds that these have the truth conditions of 'indicative conditionals'.

220 ably largely responsible for attempts such as Tedeschi's to analyze such expressions in terms of time28. His claim (Tedeschi 1981:256) is typical: "we evaluate counterfactual conditional sentences as if we returned to the past and looked at possible futures with respect to that past."29 It is true, of course, that in time-based languages, like English and most contemporary European languages, the expression of counter-factuality involves the morphological material of the tense-system. But this is not necessarily the case (cf. again Whorf s comments on Hopi, Whorf 1938), and the status of time in such expressions is not literal but metaphorical: temporal remoteness (past) as a metaphor for modal remoteness (counter-factuality, improbability). This is sometimes referred to in grammars as a 'secondary function'. I will attempt to show in what follows that a purely temporal approach is incapable of differentiating certain types of conditional. Many types of conditional, however, from the 'contrastive conditional' (which is arguably not strictly conditional30), e.g. If Elizabeth was resolute for peace, England was resolute for war (Onions 1971:70), to those 'knowledge conditionals' that according to Davies exploit 'modus ponens', e.g. She's fifty if she's a day (Davies 1979:167), and 'modus tollens', e.g. If that's really gold, I'm a Dutchman (Davies 1979:ibid.), to 'analytic conditionals', e.g. If John's a bachelor, he's unmarried, to what Davies terms 'telling conditionals', e.g. There are some biscuits on the sideboard if you want them (Davies 1979:146), and 'decision conditionals', e.g. If you'll just take this bag, I'll pay the taxi (Davies 1979:148), need not concern us here. Others, primarily 'performance conditionals' and 'knowledge conditionals' - excluding those listed above - (Davies 1979:152ff. and 162ff.) are central to our concern. 3.1.1 We may begin with conditional structures relating to simultaneous states, which includes secondary states like habits: If it's wet, he wears a hat. If it was wet, he

wore would rvuum wear rvcui used to wear

I /

a hat.

(

These can alternatively be presented as generic temporal clauses:

28 Even in logic, however, it is usual to treat conditionals in terms of worlds as well as times. 29 Tedeschi's general statement follows an example which involves a past Vorld': If Hubert had disagreed with LBJ, he would have become president and is thus, implicitly, an induction therefrom. It makes sense for this particular example only because of the co-incidence of irreality and past time. As a generalization, it is nonsense. 30 Or rather, it may be said to be 'conditional', but without the causal relation that is usually a part of what is classified as conditional, i.e. the {/-clause is not a condition for the rten-clause. 31 This does not mean that wore, would wear and used to wear are completely synonymous.

221 When(ever) it's wet, he wears a hat. \ wore When(ever) it was wet, he ( would wear used to wear

a hat.

Whether the protasis contains a predication denoting a temporary state or a process or event, e.g. , , the simultaneity of the secondary states remains unaffected. A non-habitual interpretation of: If he left, he wore a hat. which can be glossed 'if it is true/ the case that he left at ix, then it is also/ equally true/ the case that he wore a hat at t^', i.e. simultaneity of events, is markedly different from non-habitual: When he left, he wore a hat. In both, of course, wore could be replaced by was wearing and still refer to the same object world situation in either case. Both share the same temporal configuration, but differ in modality, even though the verb form of the protasis does not indicate it. The habitual type When(ever)/If it's wet, he wears a hat does not present any particular problem either for PW or for BF. The 'non-habitual' case requires differentiation of the factual world (when) from the non-factual, possible world (if). PW might do this as follows:

R

S

---

EI Deleft) E" (he wore a hat) -oo

When he left, he wore a hat (PW)

R E' E"

---

00

If he left, he wore a hat (PW)

BF would presumably have:

R

R

E' E" When he left, he wore a hat (BF)

If he left, he wore a hat (BF)

222

Although the diagrams cannot show this, both E' and E" are on the history line, or, in the case of If he left, he wore a hat, on a branch whose node lies anterior to S. An alternative to this is one based on Lewis' suggestion that worlds are exactly alike up to a particular point. Dowty (1977) considers this, but rejects it in favour of branching time. The principle could, however, be extended to a BF model:

ER

S

— — _ !~~ ' _ -E;;— "~ =~ — E — — —

w'

.-r-_r~:

w

if he left

E

he wore a hat

This says that at R (which is anterior to S) E' is on a branch developing out of w', and E" is on a branch developing out of w" and that w1 and w" are exactly alike in all other respects. We will not adopt this kind of representation because its primary purpose is to explain the inferentiality of conditionals, not the modality. 3.1.2 Let us turn our attention now to the following paradigm based on an example in Davies (1979:152): 6a) 6b) :) 1)

If If if If

the the the the

weather's wet, the roads're treacherous. weather's wet, the roads ΊΙ be treacherous. weather were wet, the roads'd be treacherous. weather were to be wet, the roads'd be treacherous.

In all four cases (excluding an habitual reading of 6a) the apodosis can be related to either the assertion: The roads are treacherous. or to the prediction: The roads will be treacherous. which have (S = R) & (R R) & (R c Ε',Ε"). (The comma is used in this expression to list E' and E" as both including R.) 9bi, If the weather was wet, the roads would be treacherous, is interpretable habitually ('past habitual' use of would) or non-habitually, in which case would is 'epistemic' would?1. However, with 9bii, // the weather was wet, the roads would have been treacherous, we have a prediction about the past qualified presumably by the uncertainty of whether held in the past. It differs from 9bi in that the speaker is not projecting himself into the situation described. It should also be contrasted with the true counter-factual case 9cii, If the weather had been wet, the roads would have been treacherous, in which speculation is made about the past that runs counter to the known facts, i.e. the weather was not wet. The predictive nature of the apodosis is the same, it is the nature of presuppositions involved in the premisses indicated by the protasis that differs. What is more, there is no justification for linking the point of the prediction to the past, as we would probably be forced to do if we accepted the Tedeschi claim. It is a current prediction that is presented as unreal, i.e. irrealis. We can, furthermore, construct examples with suitable adverbial specification where it is not the past that is the subject of speculation, but the present, e.g. If the weather was wet yesterday, the roads would be treacherous today. [sc. I don't know whether it was, and I'm not in a position to find out if they are] (cf. will be treacherous today, cf. 9bi) If the weather had been wet yesterday [sc. it wasn't]tfte roads would be treacherous today, [sc. they can't be] (cf. 9ci) 9ci, If the weather had been wet, the roads would be treacherous, without adverbial specification, could also be interpreted as an inference about the past with E' prior to E" - arguably a backshift of If the weather was/has been wet, the roads'll be treacherous. 9e, If the weather had been wet, the roads were treacherous, also has sequential ordering of E' and E", but the apodosis is an assertion, not a prediction. Finally, the inadmissibility of 9d, * If the weather had been wet, the roads had been treacherous, appears to indicate that simultaneous E' and E" cannot be temporally located anterior to a past R, but with another kind of conditional structure, this is not the case:

321 exclude here for the sake of simplicity the interpretation of 9bi, when taken as a variant of 7e.

229

If Elizabeth had been resolute for peace, England had been resolute for war. To sum up this discussion, we can produce a set of expressions comparable to those in 7, which have the common denominator: (S > R) & (R R " ) & ( R ' = R " ) & ( R ' c E ' ) & ( R " c E") even though the past 'epistemic' would, like 'epistemic' will is a future-oriented world. There is, therefore, in 9bi an additional marking for modality in the apodosis that is not present in its near equivalent: // the weather was wet, the roads were treacherous. Attempting to capture this future-orientation would involve us in the contradiction of R" being

231

posterior to R' but linked to E" which is simultaneous to E', i.e. R

R

E' E" oo

or in formulaic notation, leaving out specification of relations to S: *(R' c E ' ) & ( R ' < R " ) & ( R " c E")&(E' = E") We hit upon an analogous problem with respect to representing 'epistemic' will, in fact, and indicated at that point that some kind of forward shift might be conceivable. Yet how could this be incorporated in this case? Presumably, only by introducing a device similar to the one used to handle indirect speech and thought. One possibility might be to take the R of the roads would be dangerous as being posterior with respect to an anterior prediction, viz.

S"

R' E' R" E"

S

00

00

This would preserve the time configuration, but runs counter to our intuitions about the nature and status of the apodosis; we do not conceive of it as a prediction anterior to the time of the //-world. Another possibility might be to introduce a further world, viz. if

would

-R1* £'_ * - - - R " - - - * E"

S

*

but this is equally counter-intuitive: as already pointed out, the »/-clause defines for us the world of the apodosis, so we do not want to introduce additional worlds. (One might vary William of Ockham's saying: mundi non sunt multiplicand! praeter necessitatem!) It seems better to adopt the position implicit in the configuration and notation I suggested to begin with that If the weather was wet, the roads would be treacherous and If the weather was wet, the roads were treacherous share a temporal configuration, a non-factual past world being established in both cases by the protasis, and a non-factual past world being marked in the case of would be treacherous, and unmarked in the case of were treacherous.

232

Non-factuality is, after all, adequately indicated by the morpho-syntax of the sentence34. We may now consider how BF would handle 9bi, If the weather was wet, the roads would be treacherous, assuming the above arguments can be accepted. In addition to being simultaneous, E' and E'' will have to be on the same branch: R E'

If the weather was wet, the roads would be treacherous (BF)

3.2.4 Let us turn to 9bii, // the weather was wet, the roads would have been treacherous. Here, in order to motivate the temporal analysis, we require a configuration: R" > E" for would + Perfect Infinitive. The question then is, how is this R'' linked to the other temporal points. If it is accepted that would + Perfect Infinitive is an irrealis prediction about the past, then we might be able to justify:

Φ

_ _ R·

R" - - *

Ε' E" If the weather was wet, the roads would've been treacherous (PW)

that is, extending the parallel world beyond S and locating R 1 and R" at appropriate points within it. The correlate of this in BF would be:

R1

S R _-

If, however, we were to accept the kind of analysis suggested in Tedeschi's statement, we would have to have a configuration like: (S" < R") & (R" > E"), i.e. a future perfect specification, backshifted to the past, e.g. (S1 > R ' ) & ( R ' c E > ) & ( E ' =S")&(S" < R")&(R" > E") 34 The recessiveness of the use of Present Subjunctive in i/-clauses (cf. Shakespeare's "If this be error and vpon me proued/1 neuer writ, nor no man euer loued" (Sonnet 116) is explicable as a loss of the double marking of the protasis for non-factuality: //and PresSubj.

233 This not only makes it difficult to establish the simultaneity of E' and E", it also runs into the difficulty that would + Perfect Infinitive is aligned with indirect speech and thought, and for this there is no justification. Even more perturbing is the position it forces us into when E" is posterior to S, as in if Jane were to come, he'd leave at once. For the protasis tense form, the Tedeschi position would require: (S' > R') & (R1 < E1), and for the apodosis: (S" < R") & (R" =>E") which is backshifted. There is no way, other than specifying (E1 > S'), to get the correct temporal location of E'. In the following the dotted line is meant to indicate that the E or R in question has to be located somewhere within the given limits: R S"

R" E"

R E'

Even if we remove the second S (S"), which is counter-intuitive anyway, we still have to link R" in some way. If it is linked to R', the R" ^ E" specification means that 'his leaving' is prior to 'Jane's coming', and if it is linked to E', then 'Jane's coming' and 'his leaving' are simultaneous, not sequential. Moreover, the Tedeschi statement would presumably also lead to the incorrect temporal configuration: (S > R) & (R > E) for If the weather had been wet of counter-factuals like 9cii, just as here it leads to a past specification for the temporally current protasis: If Jane were to come... Temporally, we need to keep the following fixed in the configuration: a point-of-event E' for that is posterior to S (on a non-habitual reading), and another E" for that is, from the nature of things, minimally posterior to E1. Modally, we need to keep fixed in the configuration: a world that runs counter to the speaker's expectations as to how the world characterized by the enactment of in which is the consequence of will proceed. This is patently not accomplished by any attempt to treat irrealis forms as viewing the present or future through the eyes of the past. The only viable incorporation of R in such cases is in terms of a world that is currently an alternative to the actual world and which has the further property that it only has remote likelihood of representing the facts. Despite the fact that English employs temporal notions to express degrees of reality (the 'temporal metaphor' referred to earlier) the metaphor cannot be incorporated in terms of a time specification into a Reichenbachian framework.

234

4. Towards a solution 4.0 In the preceding discussions of how PW and BF can be integrated into a modified Reichenbachian model of tense, we have encountered difficulties as to: 1. whether time branches (inherent to BF) are essential for the representation of modality. We concluded that with //-clauses their indication might be justified (even though there are difficulties with the temporal location of the branching node: it is represented as being specific) but that they are unnecessary for modality as such as they involve specification of a world of unstated conditions. 2. whether PW and BF can differentiate 'potentialis' and 'irrealis'. We found that BF can only do so when the node is anterior to the point-of-speech, and one of the branches can be marked as 'factual' (history). For the distinction between She may come and She might come, the notion of branching alone is of no help. 3. whether it is time (or history) that branches in the case of the 'imperfective paradox' or whether it is merely the course of individual events and processes. We concluded that it is the latter. 4. whether the temporal metaphor for 'irrealis', i.e. "looking at the present through the eyes of the past", could be made to work in BF. We concluded that it could not. 5. whether PW and BF can reflect the respective temporal orientation of must, may and will. We discovered that marking off such modalities in terms of time conflicted with the temporal configuration required to explain temporal reference, or else led to non-unitary representations of the modality depending on the temporal-aspectual nature of the modalized predication. The temporal limits of 'intensional' worlds appear to be indefinite. 4.1.1 Let us now reconsider what requirements we should make of an iconic representation of times and worlds. As before, S, R, E, their interrelations, and the time line will be taken to be essential components of the model. Let us introduce, however, a distinction between time, which is linear, and history. Time is 'extensional', while history is 'intensional'. History is, in the first instance, the speaker's assignment of events, etc. as facts in time, but this may be a part of the cultural consensus. History stops at the point-ofspeech (S), the ultimate point of assessment; what follows is prediction. What is not history, regardless of time, may be the subject of speculation, but this can be conceived of in terms of the two parameters mentioned: 'potentialis' and 'irrealis'.

235

4.1.2 We may now consider how these parameters can be given a notation. 'Potentialis' and 'irrealis' were glossed earlier as the case where the 'intensional world' neither matched nor conflicted with the speaker's world and the case where the 'intensional world' conflicted with the speaker's world, respectively. This kind of conceptualization lends itself to three rather differing accounts. What they share is that they give us a non-linear system of two absolute terms ( + and -) and an included middle (o). If we take the abstract notion of consistency, our system can be analyzed as: + consistent

ο consistent

- consistent

or metalinguistically: 'consistent', 'non-consistent' and 'inconsistent'. Lewis' notion of similarity (Lewis 1973) would be less easy to fit into such a scheme, unless quantification were introduced, viz. most similar

less similar

least similar

The logical notion of identity is ontologically problematic, since it is taken as One and the same'. A system: 'same', 'similar' and 'different', however, might be workable35. An alternative is to take a local or deictic metaphor, and analyze 'realis', 'potentialis* and Irrealis' in terms of proximity to the speaker's world: + proximate

ο proximate

- proximate

which could be seen as analogous to: 'here' vs. 'there' vs. Bonder' deixis. Finally, we might stick to the notion of 'reality' that lies behind 'realis', 'potentialis' and 'irrealis', and take the system to be: + real

ο real

- real

i.e. 'real', 'non-real' and 'unreal'. Each of these no doubt has its advantages, but we need not commit ourselves here. It will suffice to incorporate into our representational model 35 Another possibility I explored, but had to reject, was one using inclusion relations: S=>R =>E 'realis', S / R =3 E 'potentialis', S φ R ^ Ε 'irrealis', where 'R' is taken as Rw. The problem with this is fundamental, as it means including an 'extensional' world in an 'intensional' one, and restricting the speaker's world to being intensional, whereas , if we adopt the Lyonsian position, his world is indivisibly intensional and extensional in that it is simultaneously part of his conceptual world and part of the object world (mind and matter).

236

some analogue of the + ο - system.36 4.1.3 Leech (1981) develops a notation for the factivity of dependent predications in terms of superscript + , o, -, which we may usefully adopt, thus 'realis' can be symbolized R + , 'potentialis' R° and 'irrealis' R". This avoids having to specify a relation between S and R in terms of both times and worlds simultaneously, thus allowing that '=' does not mean temporal identity but temporal non-differentiation, i.e. neither anterior nor posterior, S = R + , S = R°, S = R" may be taken as time-world specifications for The king's dying, The king may be dying and The king might be dying respectively. R, here, is shorthand for: at R' in Rw, and the superscript specifies the kind of world (w). Further specification will in fact be needed for differentiation of possibility (may) and necessity (must), but this need not be entered upon here. 4.1.4 We may translate this kind of notation into an iconic representation by adding an axis at right angles to the time axis, i.e. Γ

e a j i t y

> time

picking out time lines parallel to the time axis for 'realis' (=history), 'potentialis' and 'irrealis': line for R* (i.e. history), i.e. W* line for R°, i.e. W° line for R", i.e. W" 00

00

It will be seen that the history line has been continued beyond S as a dotted line. This is to 36 Alternatively, we could reduce this to a system with two binary features (with some redundant marking), viz. 'realis' + real (+ possible) 'potentialis' - real + possible 'irrealis' (- real) - possible The redundancy is that if something is real (or true) it entails its being possible, and if something is impossible it cannot be real (or true). Hence the two features only need to be specified for 'potentialis'.

237 represent the extension (in the non-technical sense) of the speaker's current 'intensional world' into the future, the sort of case that is typically expressed by be going to. The W° line will typically be the representation for may, will, must and non-factual (f-clauses37 (and arguably non-factual fee/ore-clauses), while W" will be that for might, would, should and ought to, and counter-factual and counter-expectational i/-clauses.

4.2.0 We may put this kind of configuration to the test by using it to elucidate some of the more intractable examples discussed earlier. 4.2.1 For expressions like The king'll be dying and The king may be dying, we need to indicate that the temporal relationship is (S = R) & (R c E), and that R is within a non-factual/potentialis world. In the case of may, this is not temporally differentiated from S; arguably, in the case of will it is 'future-oriented' or 'forwards-looking' and should be handled as (S < R). Accordingly, representations of these utterances, when used epistemically, would look like this: W* W° w" 00

00

w* w° W" oo-

For the predictive interpretation of The king'll be dying, R can be placed posterior to S, thus:

37 There is good reason for such a classification. Unlike deontic uses, epistemic uses of may, must and will do not normally collocate with if unless they are 'quoted'. For example, in If she may be coming she may also want revenge can be interpreted as involving epistemic uses of may if one presupposes a context that has already established 'she may be coming1, i.e. the {/-clause is to be understood as 'if it is the case/true that she may be coming,...'. This makes the proposition contained in the alternative world created by the (f-clause, not < SHE BE COMING >.

238

l-will R

W 00

00

4.2.2 Directive deontics can be represented in rather similar fashion as potentialis-future worlds that are realizable or to be realized, thus for promissive You shall have a comet, though I did not discuss shall in detail earlier, the representation could be:

-shall

1

- R

W°

00

00

4.2.3 Turning now to deontic comments such as You ought to have gone, we need to represent an event anterior to S viewed as having not taken place, hence R". The judgment, as noted earlier, is a present one: it is possible to utter such a sentence when there was no hint at the event time in question of any obligation. It is, in other words, a typical expression of 'being wise after the event'. Apart from the more detailed semantic specification of ought to, which we cannot enter upon here, the configuration we want for such an expression is:

-ought • R

00

1 W

00

4.2.4 Somewhat less straightforward is the case of That'd be the gamekeeper, uttered, as noted before, as a comment within the recounting or recapitulation of a sequence of events in the past. There are two reasons for saying that its notation involves R°, i.e. (S > R°) & (R° c E), and that its configuration is:

239 W* W° W" oo

00

One reason is that it is pragmatically related to predictive-epistemic will, not irrealis would, viz. [Three shots] A: Ah, that'll be the gamekeeper. cf.

B: Then I heard three shots... A: Ah, that'd be the gamekeeper. The other reason is that to treat it as R" would make the configuration indistinguishable from that of would + Perfect Infinitive in past irrealis, which I will come to in due course. 4.2.5 An expression such as / might have helped you ^, when decontextualized, would most likely be interpreted as a current expression of epistemic modality in connection with an event that is prior to S. It would translate into German, for example, as 'ich habe dir möglicherweise geholfen', in other words presenting the validity of as being remote (for whatever reasons one might wish to do so). Contextualized as follows, however, its interpretation differs: Why didn 't you tell me? I might have helped you. This would translate into German as 'ich hätte dir vielleicht geholfen'. (Comparison with German is instructive in that it brings out differences in the way the two languages give expression to various modal notions.) It is important to note that this case cannot be explained as a transposition into the past (or to an anterior point-of-reference) of / may have helped you or / may help you. Its configuration would presumably have to be:

38 This example was suggested in project meetings in connection with the temporal analysis of might, would, could, and should, i.e. as past tensing of may, will, can and shall, which I argued against then, and in Matthews (1979), and have argued against in the present paper.

240 S

---------l-might-1 -- -- - R - - ----E •

--------

W*

-- -- -- -- W

00 - 00

In other words, 'helping' is viewed as a possibility in a past irrealis, i.e. counter-factual, world. If this is upholdable, then a syntagm like might have Ved has two specifications:

(S = R') & (R" > E) and (S > R') & (R' c E) [or: (S > R') & (R" u E)] This does not mean, however, that might itself is ambiguous; a part of its sense can be glossed as 'possibility in irrealis world', irrespective of its tensing. 4.2.6 This is a convenient point to pass on to conditional sentences. For this we may take two examples similar to those discussed earlier: If the roads were wet, the traffic was bad. If the roads'd been wet, the traffic would've been bad. The strongest case for BF, we established, is the possibility it gives us of specifying the world set up by i/-clauses as being distinct from the world of known and established fact. For the first example, we need to have a configuration that reflects E' (wet roads) = E" (traffic bad), a world that is neither fact nor counter-fact, i.e. R°, and a time that is anterior to S, i.e. (S > R). We can, if we wish, indicate a branch off the history line for the ifworld, viz.

W°

241 1

[R ' for has been omitted as it is not distinct from R'.] For the second example, the configuration will be similar, assuming the simultaneity reading, except that the //-world is contrary to fact, i.e. R".

w* w° R E'

oo

4.2.7 We may conclude with configurations for cases with an apparent conflict between tense form and event time. First the conditional sentence: If the roads'd been wet yesterday, the traffic would've been bad today. Here we need to reflect the temporal differentiation of R' and R", and also add the temporal specification given by the adverbials.

w° R1

R ··

E 1

yesterday

w-

E" '

'

today

oo

oo

This gives us adequate specification for if...had been wet (I assume it is correct to see the verbal group as being subordinate to the mood marker if), i.e. (S > R") & (R'cE) and equally for would have been bad, i.e. (S = R") & (R" > E). For a 'cancelled expectation' such as: He was supposed to go tomorrow. we require a realis past specification S > R* to capture the minimal anteriority of the ob-

242

ligation, 'minimal' because the assertion of such an obligation (at S) need only follow seconds after its loss of validity, cf. - Tom 's off to London today! - (But) he was supposed to go tomorrow (damn it!) The event < HE GO >, whether realized (He was supposed to go, and go he did) or not (He was supposed to go, but didn't), without adverbial support from tomorrow, may be simultaneous or minimally posterior to R (cf. 2.2.4). With collocation with tomorrow, however, the obligation of be supposed to encompasses an event that is temporally posterior to S. This can be captured by the following, in which be supposed to is represented not as a subjective or speaker-based modality but as an object-world state of obligation, the speaker-based modality being in fact the choice of Past over Present: S R

-W*

W° W" 1

—tomorrow—'

be supposed to 00

00

This might be glossed: '(For the speaker) it was the case that a state of obligation existed for the enactment at some unspecified time during the interval denoted by tomorrow of < HE GO >'. In symbolic notation, this works out as:

(S < R+) & (R* c Em) & (Em a I) & (I 3E1) where Em : temporal extent of 'be supposed to' I : interval deictically anchored to S: 'tomorrow' E' : event time of < HE GO > The fact that < HE GO > may or may not be realized in the case of He was supposed to go (yesterday), while it is expected not to be realized in the case of He was supposed to go tomorrow, cf. He is supposed to go tomorrow, follows from the temporal location of an event in relation to S when that event is within the scope of a tensed object-world modality expression. Thus: * He's supposed to go yesterday. He was supposed to go yesterday (and may or may not have).

243 He's supposed to go tomorrow (and may well do so). He was supposed to go tomorrow (but now presumably won't). This is a different state of affairs from that of the counter-factual and counter-expectational conditionals discussed earlier. 4.3.1 The above, which is strictly speaking a revision of PW, rather than BF, provides us with a viable means of representing both time and reality. It can also be translated into a symbolic notation. It allows us to pick out times within worlds for temporal point-of-reference, but also allows worlds to extend (indefinitely) in time. It does not commit us to a definite temporal node at which non-factual or counter-factual or counter-expectational worlds branch off from history, nor does it commit us to the dubious notion of 'branching time'. It does, however, commit us to the view that 'intensional worlds' (including possible worlds) can be reduced to three kinds, represented as parameters for R + , R° and R". The plausibility of this can be demonstrated by the following set of forms: That's the gamekeeper

That'll be the gamekeeper

That'd be the gamekeeper

That was the gamekeeper

That'd be the gamekeeper

That'd've been the gamekeeper

(S = R+) & (R+C E)

(S = R°)&(R°CE)

(S = R") & (R" C E)

(S > R*)&(R*CE)

(S > R°) &7R°C E)

(S > R") & (R" C E)

i.e.

the M'//-form here being taken as 'epistemic' and the would-forms being both 'past epistemic' and 'irrealis present'. Arguably, if we require a unitary specification for will + V (in both 'epistemic' and 'future' use) this should be: (S < R°) & (R0:/4E). A unitary specification for would + V does not seem warranted: for 'irrealis' uses of would the specification (S < R") & (R"=?^E) seems plausible, while for the 'past epistemic' use we have, as above, (S > R°) & (R°^E). 4.3.2 One last question can be raised here. I have assumed generally a specification for Modals + Perfect Infinitives that accords with the notation: (R > E). In my article on the Present Perfect (Vol. I, cf. p. 143f.) I argued that its basic configuration should be:

244

s R

L.J

l

which can be given the notation:

This difference can be upheld on the basis of the differing collocatability of these syntagma with temporal adverbials. The simpler notation is compatible with both definite and indefinite E, all that is required is that E should be anterior to R. The more complex notation is compatible only with indefinite E. This matches observable behaviour: Modal + Perfect Infinitive (with the possible exception of shall) being collocatable with time point as well as time-period (and other) adverbials, Present Perfect being normally not collocatable with time-point adverbials, e.g. He may have seen her in the last few days. He may have seen her yesterday. He's seen her in the last few days. * He's seen her yesterday. 5. A Postscript on Futurity 5.0 In his paper on the English Past (Vol. I), Schöpf notes towards the end the apparent asymmetry of the English Tense System, asking whether there are correlates of Past and (Present) Perfect (i.e. configurational mirror images) in the future/posterior time, and suggesting that will-forms represent the most neutral future tense (Schöpf 1987:218f.). I would like, by way of conclusion, to consider the questions raised by this. 5.1 Is there a neutral future? If we take 'neutral' to mean unmarked, then the answer is probably Ves', given the nature of future worlds. And the expression of this typically involves will. But unlike some languages, there is no one form in English that is always appropriate for the expression of future events or future states-of-affairs. Even though it is sometimes maintained, even by reputable grammars, that the expression of such events or states-of-affairs by means of be going to is 'colloquial' or 'spoken style', thus implying that in another style, will is a suitable substitute, the facts are rather different. In texts, we find, just restricting ourselves to will and be going to, three cases:

245

be going to is used; will would be inappropriate be going to and will are equally appropriate be going to is inappropriate; will is used When both forms are appropriate, be going to and will still differ semantically, not stylistically. If be going to is found more often in spoken mode, this is attributable to a greater willingness in speaking to others in informal social contexts to see the future as progressing out of the present, while the greater frequency of will in written mode might be attributable to a desire to be less committal when formal pronouncements are made. Be going to makes an assertion about the future, will makes a prediction about it. 5.2 Is there a mirror image of the Perfect? The answer to this question depends on the analysis of the Perfect. In the foregoing paper, I suggested that the analysis of Modal + Perfect Infinitive differs from that of PresPerf, a simple (R > E) configuration being adequate for the former, and a more complex (R = tf(I)) & (I ^ E) for the latter. If this is accepted, then the mirror image we are looking for would be: (R = tj(I)) & (I ^ E), i.e. the opening up of an interval at R within which an event occurs or a state-of-affairs holds. Neither will nor be going to paradigms fit this bill, but be about to 39,1 suggest, does. To run briefly through some points of similarity: a. Both PresPerf and be about to resist collocation with time adverbiale that denote definite points in time. ?* He's left at 6.15. ?* He's about to leave at 6.15. N.B. at 6.15 is outside the predicate (cf. Matthews in Vol. I, p. 159) b. With both, collocation with/utf denotes greater proximity of the event: He's just left. He's just about to go. cf. He'll just leave, where just is a speaker-based evaluation like simpfy. He's just going to leave, however, permits both interpretations. c. be about to is limited to immediate posteriority, but PresPerf, although more typically applied in cases of immediate anteriority, is also appropriate for remote anteriority ('perfect of experience'). The three expressions: 39 or its near synonym be on the verge ofV-ing.

246

This planet is going to bum itself out. This planet will bum itself out. This planet's about to bum itself out. can refer without contextual or co-textual support (unlike PresProg) to events that are posterior to S, but each in its own distinct way, that is, notationally: (S = R+) & (R+ < E) (S < R°) & (R° ^ E) (S = R+) & (R+ = tj(I)) & (I => E)

THE TEMPORAL STRUCTURE OF NARRATIVE TEXTS

Alfred Schöpf

1. It is the purpose of this paper to apply the notational devices proposed in volume 1 (cf. pp. 209ff.) to a piece of literary prose. The text chosen is a passage from James Joyce's A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man.1 The passage runs as follows: (1) Weary! Weary! - (2) He too was weary of ardent ways. - (3) A gradual warmth, a languorous weariness passed over him, descending along his spine from his closely cowled head. · (4) He felt it descend and, seeing himself as he lay, smiled. - (5) Soon he would sleep. - (6) He had written verses for her again after ten years. - (7) Ten years before she had worn her shawl cowlwise about ner head, sending sprays of her warm breath into the night air, tapping her foot upon the glassy road. - (8) It was the last tram; the lank brown horses knew it and shook their bells to the clear night in admonition. - (9) The conductor talked with the driver, both nodding often in the green light of the lamp. - (10) They stood on the steps of the tram, he on the upper, she on the lower. - (11) She came up to his step many times between their phrases and went down again and once or twice remained beside him forgetting to go down and then went down: (12) Let be! Let be! (13) Ten years from that wisdom of children to his folly. - (14) If he sent her verses? - (15) They would be read out at breakfast amid the tapping of eggshells. (16) Folly indeed! - (17) The brothers would laugh and try to wrest the page from each other with their strong hard fingers. - (18) The suave priest, her uncle, seated in his armchair, would hold the page at arm's length, read it smiling and approve of the literary form. - (19) No, no: that was folly. - (20) Even if he sent her the verses she would not show them to others. - (21) No, no: she could not. (22) He began to feel that he had wronged her. A little background information helps to understand the passage better: Stephen, 'the artist as a young man', after waking from sleep, has just finished a villanelle addressed to Emma deary, the girl he loves. It is early in the morning, dawn is just breaking. Stephen copies his verses onto a piece of paper, lies back on his pillow and drifts off into memories and, finally, into sleep again. This last step, however, is not reflected in our passage.

2. The passage starts with two exclamations which contain no indication as to their narrative

1 References here are to the Triad Panther 1980 reprint of their 1977 edition, in this case pp. 200f.

248

technique. Are they then to be looked upon as direct or indirect interior monologue, or should they be interpreted as belonging to the sentence which follows, a sentence which is unmistakably free indirect thought? We are familiar with the untransformed occurrence of interjections and exclamations in contexts which are clearly to be taken as free indirect thought: Thank Goodness, he had passed his exam! - Good heavens, the bridge was falling! etc. The two exclamations are therefore taken as belonging to the following sentence Σ22 and hence as involving free indirect thought: Zj: (Rj < S)1 {(Rj =) E(he think p2))}2 (Rj = S')3 p2:[(S' = R 1 ,) 4 (R 1 ,c E'( wearylweary!))5] Note that the exclamation 'Weary!' is interpreted in our formula as a sentence with an ellipted subject and copulative verb, indicated in the formula by the inclusion in angled brackets of Ί be'. Note further that 'p2' in parenthesis 2 represents the contents of the thought act tensed in the first two parentheses, i.e. points forward to the proposition ' < I be> weary!', tensed in parentheses 4 and 5. Finally, the reader should be aware that our formulae are not intended as a truth-functional representation of the sentences in symbolic logic. They merely attempt to capture the tensing acts operative in the individual sentences and present them in a clearly arranged way. They therefore dispense with the truthfunctional sentence connectives between the individual parentheses. Turning to the next sentence, Σ2, we are faced with the question whether the proposition underlying it should be related to a new reference time, i.e. a reference time later than the one the exclamations are related to. This involves the question of how the progression of the reference time in narrative discourse is signalled. As pointed out in volume 1 of Essays on Tensing in English?, the most widely discussed theory postulates that it is the aspectual characterization of the propositions, in our terminology the event type or event notion underlying the respective proposition that controls the progression of the reference time. In the case at hand, this theory would say that as Σ2 contains a state proposition and as state propositions do normally not move the reference time forward4, Σ2 is to be related to the already current reference time, i.e. to the reference time presupposed by Σ1. We agree that Σ1 and Σ2 share the same reference time, but propose a different explanation. In our interpretation, the fact that the reference time does not move forward is a consequence of the fact that Σχ and Σ2 refer to the same 'event': the weariness of the speaker. This bodily and psychological state is the basis of a predominantly expressive utterance in Σ1 - (note 2 In the following we refer to each sentence by the number assigned to it above, e.g. &, £~> etc· 3 Cf. the contributions of Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen, Cornelia Hamann and Alfred Sch pf. 4 This regularity does not hold without exceptions. Cf. the examples discussed by Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen and Janet Harkness in Sch pf (ed.) (1987).

249

the exclamation mark in the text!) -, while it is the basis of a 'representative' utterance5 in Σ2. It is this 'referential identity' of the two sentences which we hold primarily responsible for the fact that they are related to the same reference time. And the referential identity of the two sentences is signalled by their lexical content. We propose the following formula for the representation of Σ2:

(RI = R2)

Σ2: (R2 < S)1 {(R2 3 E(he think p2))}2 (R2 = S')3 P2:[(S' = R2,)4 (R2, c E'(I too be weary of ardent ways))5] With Σ3 the narrative perspective changes. The events reported are located in the narrator's deictic field, i.e. are tensed in relation to the narrator's speech time (S). The sentence reports two processes. The first process is lexicalized as the proposition 'a gradual warmth, a languorous weariness pass over him' and clearly implies a beginning and an end. The second proposition, ' descend along his spine from his closely cowled head', can be interpreted in two ways. It can be interpreted against the background of the information supplied by the first proposition. In this case it turns out to be a fully determined process with an initiation and a termination phase, i.e. as meaning that warmth and weariness covered Stephen's whole body. This interpretation takes account of the fact that the hearer or reader complements the verbal information of the individual propositions by information he can retrieve from the context. After the first proposition of Σ3 has been processed the reader knows that warmth and weariness fully cover Stephen's body. In this interpretation the reference times of the two propositions coincide: (R3 = R3,)· As to the relation between R3 and the reference time of the preceding sentence, R2, the latter is included in the former: (R2 E(a gradual warmth,...pass over him)) (R3, = R3(ti)) (R3, < S)(R3< ^ E'tj(it descend along his spine from...)) Notice that the participial rendering of the second proposition is interpreted as the abbreviation of a simple Past tense ( descended along his spine...) and not as the abbreviation of a progressive past. Again, how do we arrive at our conclusions about the reference times in sentences Σ2 and Σ3? The (provisional) explanation proposed here is that the progression of reference times in narrative discourse is simply the result of collocating the information of one or more preceding sentences with the information supplied by the 'new' sentence, the sentence under discussion. In the case at hand, the preceding sentence, Σ2, reports the narrated figure's consciousness of feeling tired, while the following sentence, the sentence to be processed, Σ3, describes from the narrator's point of view how this physical and psychological state develops and spreads in the narrated person's body. Σ3 is in a way an explanation and specification of Σ2. It is again primarily the lexical information supplied by the two sentences together with our experience and knowledge of extra-linguistic reality that tells us that the same instance of weariness is spoken about in the two sentences. We therefore conclude that the reference time of Σ2, which is conceived of as point-like because the event notion underlying its proposition is a state,6 must be included in the reference time of proposition 1 of Σ3 which is a non-minimal interval7 because the event notion underlying it is an accomplishment and predicated in the simple form. Thus, (R2 r 4l ,r 4ll ) = R 4l ) The expression 'minimal interval' requires some comment. It means that the two reference times contained in the interval suggested by the when-dause may either fully coincide, overlap, be strictly sequential or, in some rare cases, be simply sequential with an undefined time gap. The precise interpretation of the temporal relation between w/ien-clause and main clause is clearly controlled by the aspectual characterization of the two clauses and in addition to this by semantic or pragmatic relations between them. In the case at hand, the interval T suggested by the w/ien-clause is in its initial point defined as the initiation phase of 'he see himself as...', i.e. as the latter's reference time r4,, which can approximately be rendered by the formula: (R4.(i) = r4.) The w/zen-clause can then be tensed by the formula: (r4, < S)(r4, = E(t;p2: he see himself as p3)) The event of the object clause as he lay can also be related to the reference time r4,. It overlaps or includes it: (r 4 ,cE(p 3 :helie)) Finally, the relation between r4, and r 4 ,, is defined by the causal relation between the events 'he see himself and 'he smile': (r4, < r 4 „ ) The main clause he smiled is interpreted as a quantified activity which is included in its reference time: (r4,, < S)(r 4ll 3 E(p4:he smile)) If we read 'min.I 3r4,, r 4 E(he think))}2 (R5 = S')3

l(^> min S') 4 (TA t = R5,)5 (S1 < R5,)6 (R5,c E'(I sleep))7] The meaning of the individual parantheses (numbered 1-7 above) is as follows: parenthesis 1 is a search instruction to look for or adopt a reference time earlier than the speech of the narrator; parenthesis 2 reports the narrated character's act of thinking as contained in or simultaneous with this reference time; since this act of thinking is not directly reported in the text, this second parenthesis is included in a pair of braces. The third parenthesis equates the narrator's past reference time with the speech time of the narrated character (S1), i.e. embeds the narrated character's deictic field into that of the narrator. The square brackets contain the tensing operation in the deictic field (or temporal universe) of the narrated character: the fourth parenthesis describes the adverbially defined time as 'minimally later' (>min.) than the narrated person's speech time. This time is, in the fifth 9 As to this terminology cf. Jespersen (1948-49, vol. IV: 310f.). 10 Stephen's smile is interpreted as a bodily reflection of his thought expressing his expectation of sleep. Therefore r 4 ,, coincides with Ry

254

parenthesis, identified as the reference time for events referred to in the narrated person's act of thought. Parenthesis 6 says that this reference time is later than the narrated character's speech time, i.e. suggests the choice of future tense for the reported event, and parenthesis 7, finally, describes the reference time as included in the event time, thereby supplying a hint as to the choice of aspect. The inclusion of the reference point in the event time suggests Progressive aspect, but with states, unbounded activities and processes the simple form is also possible, as reflected in the case under consideration. With the next sentence, Σ6, there is again the question of whether to take it as a narrative report or as indirect free thought. Taken as an isolated sentence, Σ6 does not supply any unmistakable signals to determine our choice. But when we try to fit it into the context, a reasonably founded decision is possible: It is, of course, the Past Perfect that requires explanation. And it finds some sort of explanation if we regard Σ5, the immediately preceding sentence, as a narrative report, i.e. soon he would sleep as Future-in-the-Past. In this case, the event 'he sleep' would be directly related to R5 in the narrator's deictic field, and R5 would also serve as an anchor for the Past Perfect that reports 'he write verses for her again after ten years'. While the Past Perfect would be adequately explained by this reading, we discarded it on the grounds of Jespersen's remarks about vvouW-sentences (cf. footnote 9). The following diagram is an attempt to represent this discarded reading graphically: DIAGRAM I:

E (smile) I :Rc

Future in the Past E(he sleep)

after ten years (he write verses) ten years before (she wear her shawl)

If we assume that Σ6 switches back from the indirect free thought of Σ5 to narrative report, we need a reference time in the past of the narrator's deictic field to which the Past Perfect could be anchored. There are only two reference times that could be envisaged as such anchors. In the immediately preceding Σ5 the only reference point in the narrator's time sphere is R5, i.e. the time tensing the act of thinking of the narrated character. This reference time is not expressed directly in Σ5 if taken as free indirect thought, and it is very unlikely that the narrator should use it as an anchor for an overt tensing act (cf. diagram Π

255 below), i.e. as an anchor for the Past Perfect he had written verses... DIAGRAM II:

Ε (he smile)

g,

after ten years

R '(soon) E (I sleep)

(he «rite verses)

The other reference time that might offer itself is r4, „ the reference time for the proposition 'he smile'. But this, too, does not seem a very attractive solution: why should the author, in tensing 'he write verses for her again after ten years', want to skip an intervening reference time (R5) without any semantic or pragmatic motivation whatever and anchor the event in the Past tense to r 4 ,,. This tensing alternative is represented graphically by the following diagram: DIAGRAM III:

-Σ, : r E (he smile)

E (he think) R1 after ten years

(soon)

Ε (I sleep) (he write verses)

An attractive alternative would be to look on the Past Perfect of Σ6 as a transposed Present Perfect. In this case, the event Svrite verses for her' would be located in the narrated character's deictic field and could be interpreted as belonging to his present (S'). This situation is presented graphically in diagram IV:

256 DIAGRAM IV:

Ε (smile) Σ

5 :Κ 5 E(he think)

S1

:5'

E ( I sleep)

E(he think)

S 1 (now)

after ten years >

Ε (I unite verses)

E(he think) ten years before < ( I meet her)> (she wear her s h a w l . . . )

"β E(he

think)

E ( i t be the last tram)

Following this interpretation of the ternporal structure, the reader would remain in the narrated character's consciousness, whose thought could be rendered as: 7 have written verses for her again after ten years''. This is, moreover, how the reader intuitively interprets this sentence. But we have not yet asked to which reference point the thought act reported by Σ6 should be related. As thoughts follow one another in time and cannot be simultaneous, the reference points tensing these thoughts must necessarily be successive. The question, however, is whether the thoughts are inherently ordered, i.e. whether the states of affairs referred to in these thoughts suggest a definite sequence. In the case under consideration, we must say that R6 follows upon R5. We were able to look upon the reference points of Σ4 and Σ5 as falling together because we assumed the thought tensed by R5 to be the source of, or to be accompanied by, the 'smile' tensed by r 4 ,,. But we cannot apparently let R6 coincide with R5, ultimately with r 4 ,,, because no such identity relation as we found to hold between r 4 ,, and R5 can be said to exist between the thought expressed by Σ6 and the event reported by he smiled in the last clause of Σ4.

257

How can we justify this interpretation? Elsewhere we proposed that the Past tense serves as a search instruction - a cue to look for a reference time and, in a first attempt, to identify the reference time of a sentence added to a narrative discourse with the current reference time.11 We now propose to modify this instruction to the effect that both the progression of reference time as well as its identification with the one already established by the last processed sentence should be looked upon as depending to a considerable extent on semantic and pragmatic relations between the new sentence and the preceding including all the preceding context. Only in cases where no conclusive evidence is supplied by the text should the iconicity or automatic progression principle be assumed to be in force, which seems to be the case in Σ6. The formula for Σ6 would therefore run as follows: 0*5 < R6>

Σ6: (R6 < S)1 {(R6 => E(he think p2))}2 (R6 = S')3 = E^lOyears^OA = S1 = Itf)5 (R6, = I tf ) 6 (R 6 , => E'(I write verses...))7] Note here that the time adverbial after ten years is represented as simply identifying a time which is ten years later than some act or event not identified by the immediate context but clearly referred to 135 pages ago.12 The information conveyed by the Present Perfect is distributed over the parentheses 5 to 7. Parenthesis 5 identifies the adverbially specified time with the narrated person's speech time, that is, his present, an identification which is signalled by the Present Perfect.13 Parenthesis 6 identifies the interval referred to by 'Itf' as the reference interval presupposed by the Present Perfect tense (in the present case an immediate recent past terminating in S') and parenthesis 7 locates the event Ί write verses for her again' within this interval. With Σ7 we reach the most critical point in the temporal structure of the passage. Two things in particular require explanation: (1) the time adverbial ten years before and (2) yet again, the Past Perfect tense. As to the time adverbial, it clearly suggests a reference time in the past to which it is anchored. The question, however, is whether this reference time is to be looked for in the deictic field of the narrator or in that of the narrated person. The reading represented by diagram I above anchors the Past Perfect of the proposition 'he write verses for her again after ten years' to a past reference time in the temporal uni11 Cf. Sch pf (ed.) (1987:217). 12 Cf. Joyce (repr. 1980: 65). 13 An extensive study of the Present Perfect by Richard Matthews is contained in Sch pf (ed.) (1987: lllff.).

258

verse of the narrator, namely R5 in Σ5. The event tensed via this reference time by means of a Past Perfect, i.e. 'he write verses for her...', could for its part serve as an anchor or reference time (namely as R' in diagram I) for the Past Perfect of the proposition 'she wear her shawl cowlwise' in Σ7, i.e. an event introduced by a Past Perfect would (in this interpretation) serve as an anchor for another Past Perfect, the English language lacking the 'Vor-Vorvergangenheit' we occasionally find in some varieties of German. This interpretation supplies some sort of an explanation for the Past Perfect in Σ?. But note that we interpreted Σ5 not as an instance of narrative report (as in diagram I and the preceding interpretation), but as an instance of indirect free thought, which, of course, torpedoes the explanation for the Past Perfect in Σ7 proposed above which presupposes a past reference time in the deictic field of the narrator. Let us try then to look for a reference time for our Past Perfect of Σ? in the temporal universe of the narrated character. If we assume Σ5 and Σ6 to be indirect free thought, the Past Perfect in Σ6 will have to be looked upon as a transposed Present Perfect, i.e. as anchored to the narrated character's 'now' (S'(now) in diagram IV). This means that the temporal universe of the narrated person lacks a time point that could serve as an anchor for the Past Perfect of the following sentence Σ7 (interpreted as indirect free thought) and the time adverbial ten years before, which could not be anchored to the 'now5 of the narrated person. We seem to have arrived at a point where the temporal coherence of the text appears to be at stake. The only way out seems to be to assume that the Past Perfect of Σ7 ('she wear her shawl cowlwise') comes directly from the narrated person's consciousness, i.e. that it is understood as indirect interior monologue. In this case the Past Perfect would remain untransposed. The narrated person's thought would have to be worded as: Ten years before she had worn her shawl cowlwise about her head*. Needed for this interpretation is, however, a reference time in the NARRATED person's past for the time adverbial ten years before and, unfortunately, the immediately preceding sentences fail to supply one. There is no event referred to in the immediately preceding text that could assume this function. But the remoter context might, upon scrutiny, suggest such an event. Let us look at Σ6 again. We interpreted this sentence as representing the narrated person's thought Ί have written verses for her again'. We might, I suggest, assume this thought to have evoked in the narrated person's mind the source and occasion for his poetic activity, namely his meeting Emma deary on the steps to the national library the day previous to this scene while sheltering from the rain.

259

The image of Emma on the steps of the national library evokes the way she looked when ten years before Stephen waited with her for the last tram to depart. The relative adverb ten years before is thus anchored to this event of the previous day, i.e. their being together for a while at the library during the rain. This is indirectly suggested by sentences Σ6 and Σ?: The again clearly indicates that there was another occasion that led to Stephen's writing verses for her and the image of Emma as expressed in Σ7 presupposes another image to which it is compared, the image of Emma on the steps. And it is this event that serves in the mind of Stephen as an anchor for the relative time adverbial ten years before and also for the Past Perfect, if we assume that this meeting suggests itself to his mind as a Past tense, thought of as something like 'she looked beautiful yesterday on the steps to the national library'. The text reporting this meeting, however, is separated from Σ7 by about five pages. It runs as follows (p. 195): The rain fell faster. When they passed through the passage beside the royal Irish academy they found many students sheltering under the arcade of the library. Cranly, leaning against a pillar, was picking his teeth with a sharpened match, listening to some companions. Some girls stood near the entrance door. Lynch whispered to Stephen: - Your beloved is here. Stephen took his place silently on the step below the group of students, heedless of the rain which fell fast, turning his eyes towards her from time to time. She stood silently among her companions. She has no priest to flirt with, he thought with conscious bitterness, remembering how he had seen her last. Lynch was right. His mind, emptied of theory and courage, lapsed back into a listless peace. Their voices reached his ears as if from a distance in interrupted pulsation. She waspreparing to go away with her companions. The quick light shower had drawn off, tarrying in clusters of diamonds among the shrubs of the quadrangle where an exhalation was breathed forth by the blackened earth. The trim boots prattled as they stood on the steps of the collonade, talking quietly and gaily, glancing at the clouds, holding their umbrellas at cunning angles against the few last raindrops, closing them again, holding their skirts demurely. And if he had judged her harshly? If her life was a simple rosary of hours, her life simple and strange as a bird's life, gay in the morning, restless all day, tired at sundown? Her heart simple and wilful as a bird's heart? In this novel many events reported by the narrator reappear later as recollections of Stephen's. This is also the case in the text just quoted: As Stephen sits looking at Emma on the steps, his mind is carried to a scene where he saw her flirt with Father Moran reported and again alluded to in the remoter preceding context. What the writer apparently wants to convey is how Stephen's consciousness is pestered by thoughts and images of Emma, almost to the last page, where he frees himself of these thoughts (Oh give it up, old chap! Sleep it off!' (p. 277)) and decides to go away. And what the author expects the reader to do is to identify himself with Stephen's consciousness and thoughts, the sequence of which is psychologically well motivated. Emma enters his consciousness again when his thoughts

260

return to the poem he has just composed for her, which thought has, as demonstrated by the adverbial again in Σ6, associated with it his remembrance of the other occasion that led him to write poetry for her and of her image (Σ7). The sequence of Stephen's thought acts as portrayed in the text is, of course, signalled by the sequence of the sentences (Σ6 and Σ7) in the text. But this sequence is also motivated psychologically, by the subject matter of these thoughts. Thus, (R6 < R7) is not only iconically signalled but receives some degree of likelihood by the contents of these thoughts. If V is taken as reference time for Stephen's meeting Emma on the steps of the library, the following formula for Σ7 suggests itself: Σ7: (R7 < S) {(R7 = E(he think))} {(R? = S')} [(TAj = r-10 years) (r < S') (t c E'(she wear her shawl cowlwise...)) (t c E"( send sprays of her warm breath...)) (t c E'"( tap her foot...))] As indicated by the formula above, the time adverbial anchored to r is taken as suggesting a definite time (t) which is surrounded by states and unquantified or unbounded activities (t < R10) because the two thoughts cannot occur at the same time. In addition to this the remembered situation moves on. Stephen's memory focusses next on the situation at a later time, a time when the two children stood on the steps of the tram. This is an interesting fact. Current theory will have it19 that statives and unbounded processes and activities do not move the reference time forward. Our sentence, however, contradicts this hypothesis. Although sentence Σ10 is clearly an unbounded activity, narrative time (in our case: remembered time) moves forward, a clear indication that the progression of the reference time cannot primarily depend on the aspectual character of the propositions predicated. ΣΙΟ is not a complicated sentence and can be represented straightforwardly by the following formula: Σ10: (R10 < S) {(R10 => E(he think p2))} {(R10 = S')} P2:[(R10, < S') (R10, r x ) (rx r> E(px,))]. The next reference times directly related to TI are the ones of pxl, and p^,. The reference time of pxl, is contained in r^ [(TI 33 r1,) (r x , => E(she come up to my step))]. The reference time of p^, is defined by two relations. It is, on the one hand, contained in r^ and is, on the other, sequential to FJ,: [(rj => r 2 ,) (r1§ < r2.) (r2, => E(she go down again))]. We must now return to py. Apart from its quantifier it contains three sub-events: 'she remain beside him', 'she forget to go down', and 'she go down'. The whole clause ρ particularizes px. Its reference time must therefore be contained in the reference time of ρχ: [(R1M => R 2 ,,)(R 2 l l => E(p ))]. The clause ρ stripped of its quantifier once or twice can be looked upon as denoting a single instance of the proposition pz, its reference time must therefore be looked upon as being contained in R2, ,:

The reference times of the two subclauses pz, and pz, , are contained in r2: ΚΓ2 => Γ3·) (is- => E(Pz·))] and [(r2 => r4.) (r3, < r4.) (r4, => E( go down))] Note that the reference time of pz, , ('she go down') in addition to being contained in r2 is defined as following pz, or r3,. Proposition ρ , consists of two sub-propositions. The events they denote coincide. We de-

267 fine the reference time of the first subclause, gj, as contained in r3, and the reference time of the second subclause, g 2, in addition to being contained in r3, as following 9r We propose for pzl, the formula [(Γ3· => § ι) ( ?ι ^ E( remain beside him))] and for ρώ ι the formula [(r3, 3 ?2) (§j = ?2) (? 2 => E( forget to go down))]. Our analysis of Ση can be summarized by the following formula:

(Rio < R n) Ση: (Rn < S) (Rn ο E(he think p q )) (R u = S') (R n , c Ε'(Σ10)) [(Rn, < S') (Rn, => E(p : many times between our phrases ρχ and...p ))] [(R1M ^ r j M r [(r1 => Γ χ ι ) (rj, r> E(she come up to my step))] [(^ => r 2 ,)(r 1 , < r 2 ,)(r 2 , o E(she go down again))]

[(Γ 2 3Γ 3 ,)(Γ 3 , =Ε(ρ ζ ,))] [(r2 z> r 4l ) (r3, < r4.) (r4, => E( go down))] [(r3, zj ?!)(§! =3 E( remain beside me )] [(r3, 3 g2) ( ?j = §2) ( ?2 = E( forget to go down))] Note that various symbols have been used for the reference times in our analysis: capital and small letters and the Greek letter ξ . This was done for the sake of clarity. It is hoped that these different symbols will permit an easier comparison between the explanatory text and the tree diagram representing the syntactic structure of Σ^. The formula above has been arranged in such a way as to show that new reference times 'emerge' in relation to established ones or, in one case, in relation to an event time. Thus, R U , is the anchor for R l t ,, which in its turn leads to FJ, and r^ to Γ Ι ( , and so on. Our analysis of Ση points to the following problems. There was first of all the impression that the temporal structure of narrative discourse can apparently not be reconstructed by

268

relying on reference times alone. In locating the reference time R n , we had recourse to an event time of Σ10, the preceding sentence. Such a procedure seems to suggest itself whenever an extended quantified event tensed via a reference interval follows upon an unquantified event tensed via a reference point. A preceding reference point included in an unquantified event can of course without difficulty be described as included in a following reference interval including its event, but to do so may mean to lose the information that the latter event, as in our case above, is included in the former. This also raises the question of the psychology of the temporal orientation processes at work in narrative discourse and how far linguistic analysis can do justice to these undoubtedly most intricate processes. Can one expect a cognitive text linguistics to be able to cope with these problems? Our analysis of Ση further raises the question of how indefinite quantifiers such as many times, often, for a while, etc., change or affect the event notion or aspectual characterization of propositions. Was it correct to consider she came up to his step many times as a bounded event included in its reference time? We also have to ask how the syntactic analysis of such complex sentences as Ση could be integrated in their temporal analysis. There is some parallelism between syntactic and temporal relations in sentences but also considerable lack of correspondence. Finally, ΣΠ can show us how intricate and complicated the time relations that can be signalled by a single sentence may be. Our analysis is hence only a tentative first step into this fascinating field. It is also remarkable that there is no progression of reference times in our sentence, although almost all of the subclause predicates are bounded or quantified events. Apparently, a reduction of the temporal organization of narrative discourse to a mechanical principle of reference time shift exclusively based on the aspectual character of its propositions is, it seems, an inadequate approach. The temporal relations between the individual propositions are determined to a considerable extent by pragmatic and semantic relations. This said, let us continue the analysis. Sentence Σ12, Let be! Let be! is an instruction or command of the narrated person directed at himself. The underlying proposition could be worded as 'you let it be'. The question is what is to be tensed, the illocutionary force or the underlying proposition. The illocutionary force (the speaker's obligation placed on his addressee) comes into existence with the completion of the utterances and a command or di-

269

rective might therefore be called a point-present. The temporal realization of the proposition, on the other hand, is an indefinite future in the deictic field of the narrated person. We indicate the illocutionary force of this utterance with Searle's symbol for the direction of fit, {, "world-to-word".20 We consider the narrative technique of the utterance as DIRECT interior monologue,21 and propose the following analysis: First of all there is the fact that Σ12 is a new thought which is temporally incompatible with the preceding thought. (R n < R12) is in addition semantically motivated because, contrary to generalized commands or directives, this particular command refers to and presupposes the mental activity that produced the preceding thought.22 The fact that the reference time of the proposition is in the future follows from its illocutionary force. The command itself can be interpreted as a lexical negation and be paraphrased as 'Stop thinking about it!' and what it brings about must be looked upon as a state which, if the command is obeyed, begins with the completion of the utterance and extends indefinitely into the future. We may say therefore that the reference time of the proposition follows immediately upon the speaker's speech time and is identical with the initiation phase of the interval over which the command is expected to be complied with. These considerations suggest the following formula: (Rn < R12)

Σ12: (R12 < S) {(R12 ^ E(he thinkp 2 ))} { t.): (S1 < R14.) (R14, s E'(I send her verses))] p 2 (pot.):[

Σ17: (R17 < S) (R17 ID E(he think pc)) {(Rn = S')} Pc:

ί,Σ^): [(S1 < R17,)(R17, ι? Ε '(the brothers laugh...))] (R17 < R18)

Σ18: (R18 < S) {(R18 3 E(he think pc))} {(R18 = S1)} Pc: [ — > Ρι(ροΐ.Σ18)] (Rl4. => Rig,)

(R17, < R lgl ) Pjipot-Zjg): [(S' < R18,)(R18, 3) Ε '(the suave priest... < be > seated...))] (R18, => Ri8")

[(R18,, => E"( hold the page...))] (Rlgl , => R18, , ,), alternatively [Rlgl , = R18, , ,] [(S1 < R 1 8 ,,,)(R 1 8 l l l 3 E'"( read it)) ] (R18"'

= R

18"")

1

[(S < R 1 8 , , , , ) ( R 1 8 l l , , c E" "(< he > smile)) and]

(RIS···· < R^8 ..... ) [(S' approve of the literary form))] Note that this formula interprets the participial construction read it smiling as 'read it while

273 smiling', i.e. the reading is included in and surrounded by smiling: R^g,,, = Rig···, and R 18 , M1 c. E""( smile).

This relation is expressed by equating the reference times R^g,., and Rjg,,,, and by including R l g ,,,, in its event time: R l g l ,,, c E""( smile). The next sentence, Σ19, is a final evaluation of his idea of sending the poem to Emma. It is understandable that this thought should grow out of his picturing to himself what would happen at the breakfast table. Again, the sequence of the thoughts and the progression of the reference time is pragmatically motivated:

(Rig < R^) Σ19: (R19 < S) {(R19 => E(he think p2))} (R19 = S1) p2: [(S' = R19.) (R19, c E'(no, no: this be folly))] The last line of our formula equates the reference time for the proposition 'this be folly' with the speech time. By saying that this reference time is included in the event time of 'this be folly' we want to express that 'be folly' is a co-extensive predicate. Sentence Σ19 shows tense transposition and is consequently taken to be indirect free thought. The following two sentences, however, are ambiguous. Formally, their tenses could either be taken to be transposed Present tenses, in which case the two sentences could only be read as indirect free thought, or they could be taken to be untransposed conditionals. In this case they could either be read as indirect interior monologue (note the transposition of the pronouns) or as indirect free thought. The latter is also possible because conditionals allow no further transposition or backshift and the context decides their interpretation. Again, as Σ19 is unmistakably indirect free thought, we take Σ^ and Σ21 to be in the same narrative mode. The thought as worded in Σ^ is temporally incompatible with the previous thought but it does not contain any indicators that it must follow it, (R19 < R^) has no interior motivation.

(R19 < R^) Σ^: (R^ < S) {(Rjo 3 E(he think pc))} (R^ = S') pc: [even if p^pot.) 1

> p2(pot.)] R

.): [(S < R2o.)( 20' ^ Ε'(I send her the verses))]

274

(R20'